

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SOCIAL DISTANCE IN ANKARA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY
LÜTFİ ALTUNSU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2007

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SOCIAL DISTANCE IN ANKARA

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September 2007, 179 pages

The purpose of this study is to investigate perceived group identity and the differences between select ethnic groups as well as the perceived distance and discrimination experienced by these groups from the other ethnic groups. Using the conceptual framework provided by Constructionist Theory of ethnicity and subjectivist approaches to ethnicity, as well as the theoretical insights of Symbolic Interactionism, this study explores the individual and ethnic identity, images and perceptions of the other groups, discrimination or feeling discriminated by the others, social distance between the groups, commonly shared traits among the groups, ethnic relations and interactions among the groups, and finally the future of the intergroup relations. These problem areas of the thesis are explored conducting a survey questionnaire applied to 252 people, chosen on the basis of purposive sampling, and 20 in-depth interviews in Ankara. It is found out that the ethnic identities are not salient characteristics of the members of the ethnic categories and determining factor in intergroup relations in Ankara.

Keywords: Ethnic Identity, Ethnic Relations, Social Distance, Discrimination

ÖZ

ANKARA'DA ETNİK KİMLİK VE SOSYAL MESAFE

Altunsu, Lütfi

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

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Eylül 2007, 179 sayfa

Bu araştırmanın amacı, algılanan etnik grup kimliği, seçilen gruplar arası farklılıklar ile grupların birbirleriyle arasındaki sosyal mesafeler ile bu gruplarca tecrübe edilen ayrımcılık konusunu araştırmaktır. Çalışma, bireysel ve etnik kimlik, diğer gruplar hakkındaki imajlar ve algılamalar, ayrımcılık ve diğer gruplarca uygulanan ayrımcılığa maruz kalma duygusu, gruplar arası sosyal mesafe, gruplar arası paylaşılan özellikler, etnik ilişkiler ve gruplar arasındaki etkileşim ve nihayet algılanan gruplar arası ilişkilerin geleceğini Sembolik Etkileşimciliğin iç görüşleri ve Constructionist Kuram ve etnisiteye öznelci yaklaşımlarla sağlanan kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçeveyi kullanarak araştırmaktadır. Çalışmanın bu problem alanları Ankara'da amaçsal örnekleme ile seçilmiş 252 kişiye uygulanan bir anket çalışması ve 20 kişiye uygulanan derinlemesine mülakat ile araştırılmaktadır. Araştırmada Ankara'da etnik kimliklerin, etnik kategorilere konulan bireylerin baskın bir karakteri olmadığı ve toplumsal ilişkileri belirlemede belirleyici bir etken olmadığı bulunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik Kimlik, Etnik İlişkiler, Sosyal Mesafe, Ayrımcılık

To My Family and Friends
And
To Those Who Suffer from Being Different

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been completed without the kind help, support and inspiration of those whom I feel deeply indebted. The first and above all, I am deeply grateful to Professor Kayhan Mutlu for not only his intellectual insights and academic guidance but also his caring encouragement and support. I am very thankful to Professor Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Associate Professor Ertan Beşe, Assistant Professor Asiye Aka, and Doctor Erdoğan Yıldırım for their invaluable contributions. I also feel gratified to Associate Professor Sibel Kalaycıođlu and Associate Professor Aslıhan Öđün for their intellectual input.

I must express my special appreciation to Murat Cem Demir and Harun Özer without whose caring support and heartfelt friendship this thesis could not have been completed. They were with me all the time in every stage of this dissertation from the beginning to the end with their intellectual and technical contributions as well as loving solidarity. They have always and still sacrificed their time and capacity without hesitation.

I am also deeply thankful to Halil Apaydın, who has contributed to this study with his intellectual vibrancy and offered his life time friendship freely. Hakan Karaca and İzzet Karatay deserve my deep appreciation not only for their sincere friendship but also technical cooperation during all stages of my degree.

I offer great thanks to Ahu Ünal for her friendly and kind help that needs to be appreciated fully. Very special thanks must go to my life time friends İlhami Karabulut and Cevdet Yılmaz, who were there with me when I needed their friendship. I cannot ignore Ünal Birtane, Ahmet Tak and Salih Özcan when it comes to offer a sincere and caring friendship. I thank them all.

I must express my feelings of deepest gratitude to my mother Fatma Altunsu for her never-ending love, care and generosity. I know my sisters and their families are as happy as I am to see that I have finally completed the degree. They felt my stress in every stage of the thesis. I also know their hearts were with me all the time. I am very grateful to be their brother and uncle.

Finally, I cannot possibly express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my wife, Michelle, my children Bengisu, Bengican, Bilgehan and Keremcan whom I had to ignore most of the time during the completion of this degree. I know there is no way to pay them back but hope that they would understand that they are and will be appreciated for the rest of my life.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.” *Gertrude Stein*

Like all researches in social sciences, this research involves many issues interrelated each other to deal with, too. First of all, it intends to study to some social groups in terms of how they perceive themselves and the others and what type of interaction and image they have with the others. Such a complex issue has many dimensions to consider. This chapter will provide introductory information about the scope, the problem, the purpose and the significance of the thesis as well as the plan of the thesis.

1.1. The Scope of the Study

This study is about the Turks, Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis who live in Ankara. These four ethnic categories do not only constitute the main ethnic groups regarding the size, but also occupy the two centers of the ethnic problems of Turkey. However, the scope of this study is not about the actual size, the real ingredients of the ethnic identities of these groups. It is not about the origins of the conflicts or clashes that cause the death and terror of thousands, either. Leaving these matters to historical, documentary, and macro level analyses, this study is concerned mainly how the individuals who are defined in terms of ethnic identities perceive themselves, what kind of images they have about the others, what kind of interaction they have with one another and how they feel about the future of their relations with the others. This scope of the thesis has to do with mainly the theories of identity and ethnicity.

Along with the increase in ethnic sensitivity in the world, the social scientists' orientations towards the ethnic issues have been increasing too. This is probably what social scientists are supposed to do more than anything else: reflect and make

sense of what is going on in the social world around them. The scope of this study is, too, meant to be about the issues that are experienced by the people in our social world. One way of studying the human group relations is located in ethnic studies. From the perspective of ethnic studies, we can see that there are some ethnic issues to analyze and make sense of it. Considering the theoretical approaches that deal with making sense of the ethnic relations, there are two main camps: primordialism and circumstantialism. The former sees the ethnic identities and ties in terms of primordial attachments, given by birth and; thus, it is always out there, waiting to be salient. The latter formularize the ethnic identities and ties in respect to the interest of some kind, whether this interest is economical, political, or cultural.

It is true that the words ethnic and ethnicity do not have a long history¹. Originally, it meant to define the others such as subgroups and minorities. However, today it refers to 'us' too. Today, ethnicity defines "all the groups of a society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent" (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:4). But this is the story of the etymological change. How about the groups, defined as ethnic groups? The founding fathers of the sociology might have not paid enough attention except for Weber, whose definition of the word ethnicity is still probably the most common quoted definition.² Most probably due to the expectation that the collectivity type based on shared kinship and culture ties would disappear, neither Marx nor Durkheim showed interest in ethnicity. The project of modernity assume that kinship ties are the ties of old times and would not survive long with the emergence of modern nation-states. National identities would sweep the primordial attachments. Assimilationist approaches too, expected minorities and subgroups to melt into cement of majority cultures. They are seen as the remains of old ties or the transitory ties come with migratory movements. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) are two of those scholars who have observed the persistency of the ethnic groups:

Formerly seen as *survivals* from an earlier age, to be treated variously with annoyance, toleration, or mild celebration, we now have a growing sense that they may be *forms* of social life that are capable of renewing and transforming themselves. As such, perhaps, the hope of doing without ethnicity in a society

¹ See section 2.2.1 for a detailed historical usage of the terms.

² See section 2.2.1. for Weber's definition of ethnicity.

its subgroups assimilate to the majority group may be as utopian and as questionable and enterprise as the hope of doing without social classes in a society (p.4-5).

Unlike the expectations, the ethnic identities have become more salient than ever. There have been horrifying events increasingly occurring especially after the end of the cold war era as a result of the collapse of Soviet Union on the basis of ethnic conflicts and clashes, which resulted in deaths, permanent injuries or displacements of millions of people. For instance, approximately one million Iraqi Kurds were dislocated from the homes and towns as the result of Saddam Hussein's campaign against Northern Iraqi Kurds between the years 1986 – 1989. More than 528,000 Azerbaijanis had to migrate to Azerbaijan from their homes in Karabakh during the years 1989 - 1993. About 110,000 people died and 1,8 million people were displaced from their homes during the Bosnian War (1992 - 1995). In the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, about one million Tutsis were killed by Hutus. Thousands died and about 500,000 Chechen and ethnic civilians in Russia were forced to leave their homelands during the First Chechen War in 1994 – 1996. According to some estimates, since the War in Iraq started (2003), more than 650,000 Iraqi people died, about 1,8 million Iraqis were displaced within the country, and approximately 1,6 million people fled to the neighboring countries. Even though these figures are the total casualties of the war, some of these casualties were caused by ethnic conflicts within the country among the members of different ethnic groups and sects after the war broke out.³ And, again more than 30,000 people died in Turkey as a result of the conflict with the separatist Kurdish movement and the Turkish Government. The examples of terrible consequences of ethnically based conflicts could be extended. The numbers might not be accurate; however, the point is the ethnic identities and ethnically based conflicts have increased so much that the abundant class conflict analyses have been replaced by ethnic studies even though some scholars have hesitated using the term ethnic and doing social analyses in terms of ethnic relations because of the fact that paying attention and highlighting the differences where unity is needed seems threatening.

³ See Wikipedia (a,b,c).

Another aspect of the ethnicity involves the issues regarding the concept and theories of 'identity'. Scholars of symbolic interactionist tradition have dealt with the problem of the social construction of the self and identity for more than a half of a century. However, one can observe that the concept of identity has gained much more attention recently from politics to psychology. Especially after the decrease of universalistic and essentialist identity formations, and with the increase in postmodern sensitivity, identity studies have paid more attention to divided, multiple, fluid characteristics of the self and identity.

Both Symbolic Interactionist tradition in the American continent and the Social Identity Theory in Europe have contributed to the group relations in general and ethnic relations in particular with refined theoretical, conceptual and methodological analyses in order to understand the ethnic issues. For instance, Salazar (1998) says that Tajfel's Categorization-Identity- Comparison (CIC) is very relevant to understanding of national or ethnic identities especially with the developments regarding the basis of the elements of social identity theory. And the field factors, situational factors such as economic or political factors affect the salience of a particular category. He says: "In defining the in-group, there exists an implicit definition of out-group. Yet these definitions are not static." According to this, one's Kurdish identity may come to the fore if he is defining himself in relation to the Turks, but he may feel himself as an Alevi in his relation to the Sunnis.

According to Tajfel and Turner, group categorization leads attribution of favorable characteristics about one's own group while creating attribution of unfavorable characteristics about the other groups. But this claim needs some clarification. From a non-essentialist account of identity, we are not able to say that categorization and group belongingness necessarily creates favorable and unfavorable attributions. And this point is clarified by Páez et.al. (1998) who show that Turner's Social Identity Theory can integrate the role of the other variables such as the status, values and perception. They say:

"Hinkle, Brown and Ely's (1992) revision of the literature has shown that there is not always an association between group identification and in-group

favoritism, and that there is no consistent association between discrimination in favor of one's group and increasing one's self-esteem. Hinkle et. al. confirm that subjects who share collectivistic values are those who show more association between identification and in-group favoritism. Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) have found that the variable linked to intergroup discrimination is collective and not personal self-esteem..." (Páez et. al. 1998: 211-212).

However, these analyses are not very popular in analyzing the ethnic relations in Turkey. My main concern is indeed analyzing the ethnic relations from this micro perspective. Seeing what is really happening in the daily lives of the individuals who are called Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis.

1.2. The Problem of the Study

The problem areas of the thesis can be categorized into ethnic identity and ethnic relations, which are interrelated to each other. Each of these problems can constitute a different study. However, I wanted to see the whole picture by studying the interrelation between the perception of the identity and its effect on the individual's image of the others, their attitude towards others, their interaction with others, and their willingness to improve intergroup relations with the other groups. Thus, the problem areas of the thesis can be expressed as:

- 1- How do the members of the ethnic categories called Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis who live in Ankara define themselves?
- 2- Do their perceptions of who they are affect their images, attitudes, interactions and willingness to improve intergroup relation with the other groups?

In order to tackle with the first problem area, the perception of identity, I will utilize the conceptual and theoretical approaches to self and identity benefiting from the symbolic interactionist tradition, Tajfel and Turner's 'theory of identity' as well as the theoretical approaches developed in ethnic studies. Based on the subjective definition of ethnic identities developed by Weber (1997 [1978], Schermerhorn (1996 [1970], and Cornell and Hartmann (1998), and benefiting from the Meadian -

Blumerian concept of identity which is also the source of many postmodernist symbolic interactionist approach to self analyses, and the notions from Tajfel and Turner's Theory of Identity, ethnic identity is defined here on the distinction between the sameness and difference. My main concern regarding this problem area stems from the fact that there is a distinction between ethnic categories and ethnic groups, and like other types of identities, such as gender or national, ethnic identities are not fixed or essentialist. Ethnic categories do not necessarily result in the formation of ethnic identities. Ethnic identities might be salient in some circumstances and might not be in others. It might be affected by many factors such as class, religious attitude, political and ideological world-view and so forth. I wanted to see if the people who live in an urban setting define themselves in terms of ethnicity. What are the demographic characteristics of the people who define themselves in terms of ethnic identities? Is there a relationship between some social characteristics such as income level, property ownership, educational level, gender and their defining themselves on the basis of group belonging? My second concern regarding the first problem area is to see if the individuals who see themselves see their difference in terms of some ethnic markers such as shared descent, shared history, shared fate, shared customs, religious beliefs and so forth so that we are able to speak of the ethnic markers between these groups based on the individuals' point of view.

The second problem area is about the ethnic groups' images about the other groups, their attitudes towards the others, their interactions and the social distance with each other and their willingness to improve the interethnic relations with the other groups. My concern about this problem area stems from a theoretical interest in whether or not the individuals' salient identities affect the social distance among them, images, about each other, attitudes towards the members of other groups, their interactions with each other. According to many scholars of ethnicity, the four ethnic categories, which are the main ethnic categories in Turkey, have been in conflict and competition. And the members of the conflicting groups are supposed to be in competition and conflict, too. From the point of view of the circumstantialist approach, we should expect conflicting and competitive relations from the individual members of these groups. However this approach might be true in some cases, it

needs further elaboration through conducting research in different social contexts. I intend to see whether people who define themselves in terms of different ethnic identities actually have unfavorable images and attitudes, weak social interactions and lack of optimism about the future of their relationship. This problem area could have been refined by studying the types of the individuals' definitions of their identities in terms of psychological types, e.g. individualistic or collectivistic definitions (See Morales et. al., 1998). However, the purpose of the thesis regarding this problem area is finding out whether individuals' definition of their identity based on ethnicity affect their relations with others. Thus, at this point, there would not be a need for more refined identity categories.

In order to tackle with this problem area, I have utilized a set of measurements developed by Stephan (1999), who is a well known social psychologist specialized in resolving ethnic groups conflicts. Indeed, he used these measurements to apply in workshops between different ethnic groups in the U.S.A. in order to measure the intergroup belief similarity, anxiety, attitude, interaction, understanding, trait and optimism. However, these scales were too refined and detailed for the purpose of this study to apply one by one. Therefore, I have benefited from them and prepared my questionnaire and interview questions combining Stephan's scales with the issues related to ethnicity but were not used in Stephan's scales.

Even though this thesis deals with many theoretical issues, it actually does not intend to prove or disprove a theoretical approach. It does not aim to construct a model to explain the ethnic identities and relations either. It is a descriptive study after all. Its main purpose is to picture what is going on in an urban center of Turkey in terms of ethnic relations. In order to do this, a research was conducted in Ankara city center based on the assumptions that social identities including ethnic identities are socially constructed; ethnic categories do not necessarily create certain attitudes of individuals who belong to them, and the type of the ethnic relations change according to different contexts. Based on these assumptions and maintaining the opinion that the ideas we have about other groups create feelings and attitudes that eventually affect the social distance between us and them, we developed twelve sets of hypotheses which are stated in the methodology chapter.

A field work was conducted among the members of four ethnic categories; Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis who live in Ankara on the basis of purposive sampling. Due to the sensitivity of the problem area and my questions, the issue of anonymity was important. Because according to observation, individuals hesitate to talk about ethnic issues openly. For this reason, instead of in-depth interviews, I decided to conduct a questionnaire. In order to get sufficient number of responses from the sub-sets of the population in question, I conducted a questionnaire among the participants of some unions, associations, foundations, cemevis, halkevis, mosques and mosque construction and maintenance unions and hemşehri organizations in Dikmen, Tuzluçayır, Hüseyingazi, Batıkent, Natoyolu, Boğaziçi, Ayrancı, Çankaya, Cebeci, Yenimahalle, Mamak and the city center of Ankara. I assumed that active participants of these organizations would fall in ethnic categories more than the non-participants of such organizations. The four hundred and fifty questionnaires were distributed to these organizations initially. But the returned questionnaires were only a hundred and twenty five. Then, about four hundred copies of them were distributed again. This time, we reached around two hundred and fifty returned questionnaires. Because of the low return rate of the questionnaire, especially from the Alevis and the Kurds, and the fact that in-depth interviews could help us to fill in the gaps in understanding the ethnic phenomena, I also conducted some in-depth interviews with the participants of such organizations. We tried to include as many heterogeneous groups as possible among the sub-sets of this population in terms of income, education level, gender, political and ideological approaches. After the data were collected, they were entered into SPSS 11 and analyzed by taking the frequency tables and Chi-Squares. In order to understand the effect of some variables such as the place of birth, political and ideological approaches, gender, education on defining identity, we used frequency tables, and in order to understand how the definition of identities affect the individuals' images, attitudes, interactions, and the perceptions of the future of ethnic relations, we used Chi-Square method. Thus, identity was both a dependent and an independent variable. Interviews were recorded in the word processor and interpreted along with the other data obtained from the questionnaires.

1.3 The Purpose and the Significance of the Thesis

The purpose of this study is to investigate perceived group identity and differences between some ethnic groups as well as social distance among these groups from their own perspective. The researches of ethnic relations and conflicts can be carried on mainly at two levels. Macro-level investigations that tackle with ethnicity focus on social, cultural, economical, political structures as well as large-scale historical global conjunctures. On the other hand, micro-level researches are concerned with identity formation and group affiliations, attitudes toward other ethnic, racial or religious groups including dialogue, interaction, cooperation, integration, discrimination, stereotyping and prejudice between such groups.

Even though macro-level researches and especially those that deal with the construction of "Turkish" national identity and the conflicts between certain groups in Turkish society have been attracting much attention, micro-level researches on ethnic relations in Turkish society have not drawn enough interest from the social scientists. As a result of this disproportionate interest, there is abundance of literature on political and ideological aspects of ethnicity, especially the emergence of "Turkish" national identity and the problems with the "Kurdish problem". Micro level studies that focus on intergroup relations usually tackle with ethnic relations between Turkish immigrants and the native people of the countries they immigrated to. However, there is not much research on the micro aspects of the ethnic groups and their relations in Turkish society. This disproportionate distribution of scientific knowledge provides strong support that there is a need for micro-level sociological research and therefore my research gains its significance mainly from this fact.

Although history of ethnically based group conflicts can be traced back to earlier periods, it draws much attention from the scholars of various disciplines of social sciences within the last quarter of the 20th century. This is probably due to the collapse of class based ideological conflicts within last two decades. Some severe ethnic conflicts have burst suddenly and violently causing the deaths of thousands of people in former Yugoslavia, India, and Africa etc. Furthermore, democracies practiced in such countries as the U.S., England, Germany could not have eliminated

racial and ethnic discrimination so far. Some events and researches have shown that racial and ethnic discrimination survives in its various forms whether they are institutional or not, visible or hidden kind. In addition to that, migratory movements all over the world have gained new dimensions recently especially after the globalization of the world economy. Globalization of the world economy, developments of telecommunication and computer technologies and the demise of ideologies created what we can call postmodern sensitivity which advocates understanding and appreciation of "the others" whether or not the "otherness" come from ethnic, religious, cultural, gender or sexual orientations of people. Probably due to these kinds of reasons, there is an increasing interest in ethnic studies, and this fact also gives significance to a study in the field of ethnic relations in a country like Turkey where more than 30 thousand people died in the last two decades due to ethnically based conflict.

The study also gathers its significance from a recent international conjectural development, namely when Turkey's long-term enthusiasm and hope to join the EU finally seems attainable at some time. Ethnic sensitivity is one of the main many other conditions that the EU has imposed upon Turkey. The EU seems to have a great sensitivity about ethnic intolerance and discrimination and put great effort to eliminate them from educational institutions, health sector, police departments and so forth. All these efforts can be done only a deeper understanding of ethnic identities and their attitudes toward the others. Such a study can be a starting point to investigate ethnic relations, discriminations, prejudices, and stereotyping in these institutions if there are any. This point also attaches recent significance to the present research.

After all, this is a study about human being. It is motivated by mainly a desire to contribute to understand, as Berger would say what is going on at the other side of that river. In other words, to provide some scientific knowledge on what is the world of the others like. What do they think of themselves and the others? How do they perceive the differences between themselves and the others? What kinds of prejudgments they make about each other? Do they have some fixed identities or do

their perceptions of their own identities change over time and are they contingent and fluid?

1.4. The Plan of the Study

The thesis concerns with ethnic identity and ethnic relations. For this reason, a review of conceptual and theoretical approach to ethnicity and identity was needed. Chapter II contains theoretical and conceptual approaches to self, identity and ethnicity as well as the studies on ethnic relations in Turkey. Because of the fact that theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis is shaped by the symbolist interactionist tradition and social psychological approaches of social identity theory, we reviewed the conceptual and theoretical approaches to self, social self, identity, personal and social identity and group identity from these theoretical approaches. We argued that according to these theoretical approaches, identity and group identity are socially constructed. They are a process rather than a universal entity. In other words, they are an outcome of the interplay between the sameness and difference. Identities are formed in terms of the group categorization which results in creating favorable and unfavorable characteristics of the group.

We tried to link the theoretical approaches of symbolic interactionism and social identity theory to the theoretical approaches to the ethnic identity and ethnicity by reviewing and arguing subjective and objective definitions of ethnicity, primordialist, circumstantialist and constructionist theories of ethnicity. Following constructionist approach to ethnicity developed by Barth, we argued that ethnic identities and attachments are formed on the basis of social contexts which are for some material or spiritual or economical or cultural purposes. But we admitted that once they are formed, they are conceived as primordial by the members of the ethnic groups. We wanted to avoid the dilemma of primordialism or circumstantialism by viewing ethnic identities as socially constructed subjective definitions of individuals whose salient features change according to different contexts. Chapter II also reviews the studies on the ethnic relations in Turkey in terms of both micro and macro level of analysis and the theoretical approaches to ethnic identities.

Chapter III explains the methodological approach of the thesis which is highly influenced by symbolist interactionist tradition in explaining individuals' subjective definition of the situation. It explains why this theoretical approach is preferred instead of more macro level approaches. In this chapter, we identified the type of the study as an explanatory and descriptive study, which describes the situations and events as observed by the researches instead of explaining the result of the important as a causal relationship. The assumptions and the hypotheses of this research are given. The sampling method; purposive sampling and the data collection; consisting of a questionnaire and in-depth interview were explained. Information about how and where the data were collected and the problems faced were explained, too here in this chapter. This chapter also gives the definition of the key concepts such as identity, group identity / ethnic identity, ethnicity, ethnic category, ethnic group, stereotyping / prejudice / discrimination and stigma as they were used in the thesis.

In Chapter IV, we discussed the definitions of the individuals who perceived themselves as members of the ethnic categories of Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis. We analyzed the factors affecting the definitions of the identity as well as their subjective account of the shared traits that are usually suggested as the elements or markers of ethnic groups. These elements are blood tie, religious beliefs, shared descents, history, customs, life style, political interest, fate, and hopes and desires. We also looked at their perception of the common values; family values and values related to business and work. Their perception on whether they feel that the groups they belong to also share similar educational and economical level were included in our analysis. By using Chi-Square and analyzing whether the opinions of the individuals about ethnic markers change in terms of ethnic identities, we wanted to see if these individuals who define themselves on the basis of ethnicity see the other groups different than their own group. We tested three main hypotheses regarding the ethnic identity. The first hypothesis was tested by using identity as a dependent variable and using some sociological factors such as income, property, education level, parents' education level, place of birth, etc. as independent variables. The second and the third hypotheses, which consist of fourteen sub-hypotheses, were tested by using Chi-Square and using identity as an independent variable. The

hypotheses we discussed in this chapter are as follows: (a) Ethnic identity does not have a fixed nature and is not independent from socio-economic-political and cultural variables; (b) Ethnic groups in Ankara perceive that their own groups share some traits that the other groups do not, and (c) Ethnic groups in Ankara perceive that their values are different from those of the other groups.

Chapter V attempts to describe what kinds of images the members of the ethnic groups have about each other; whether they can build emphatic relationship with the members of other groups; what kind of feelings they have when they interact with one another; what they think about others' attitudes and treatment towards the members' own group, and whether they feel threatened by the other ethnic groups in the society. Likewise the above, by getting use of Chi-Square analysis, we wanted to see the images, feelings, and the attitudes of the members of the ethnic groups about the each other. The reason that we wanted to understand and describe these feelings and attitudes is the fact that they bring about discrimination and affect the social distance between the groups according to social identity theory.

After analyzing the images and opinions and the feelings and attitudes and the feelings about the other groups, we finally wanted to see and describe the desired social distance between the groups as well as their willingness to overcome ethnic problems, improve the ethnic relations and their feelings of optimism about the future of inter-group relations. Again, we used Chi-Square method to analyze the individuals' point of view regarding these issues.

The final chapter constitutes the conclusion drawn from the interpretation of the data in terms of the theoretical framework. It also consists of the implications of the research and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

This chapter deals explains the theoretical approach used in this thesis. Because of the fact that we are studying some groups, which have been categorized as ethnic groups in many social science disciplines at least for a long time. Categorizing individuals in terms of ethnicity necessarily calls the problem of identity in question. Thus, this chapter will review the theoretical and conceptual approaches and issues around the concepts of identity and ethnicity such as self, self-concept, personal and social identity, group belongingness, ethnic identity, ethnic categories and groups, ethno-nationalism, nationalism etc. After reviewing the conceptual and theoretical approaches, the theoretical framework of the thesis will be drawn in terms of the reviewed approaches. After this, the literature on Alevis, Sunnis, Turks and the Kurds and their relations in Turkish society will be reviewed.

2.1. The Concept and Theoretical Approaches to Identity

In order to tackle with the conceptual and theoretical approaches to ethnic identity and ethnic relations, we should begin with the issues related to the concept of identity. The following part of the thesis deals with the use of the concept of identity in social science in general and in sociology in particular.

2.1.1. The Concept of Identity

Due to the fact that the issues regarding the concept of identity are closely related to the concept of self, and indeed because of the very fact that the earlier studies on identity have been carried on mainly around the concept of self, we need to distinguish the terms of identity and self. In their review of the concepts of self and

identity, Gecas and Burke (1995: 41-42) attempt to make distinctions between self, self-concept, identity and personality⁴. Referring Mead, the authors define the self as “the process of reflexivity that emanates from the interplay between the “I” and “Me.” This means that self emerges from the process of being both the subjects and the objects to ourselves, which Mead put very comprehensive effort to analyze. Gecas and Burke also distinguish the self from the concept of ‘self-concept’ while the former refers to the process of reflexivity; the latter “involves all of the products or consequences of this reflective activity.”⁵ Then the concept of identity is very much connected to the concept of ‘self-concept’. Gecas and Burke make this connection clear:

Much of the content of self-concepts can be discussed in terms of identities. Identity refers to who or what one is, to the various meanings attached to oneself by self and others. In sociology, the concept of identity refers both to self-characterizations individuals make in terms of the structural features of group memberships, such as various social roles, memberships, and categories (Stryker 1980), and to the various character traits an individual displays and others attribute to an actor on the basis of his/her conduct (Alexander and Wiley 1981; Goffman 1959, 1963). In a sense, identity is the most public aspect of self. As Stone (1962) observed, identity locates a person in social space by virtue of the relationships and memberships that it implies (Gecas and Burke Ibid. 42).

However, it is no accident that many studies of ethnic identity or conflict start with the usual remark that the concepts of ‘ethnic’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ are ambiguous and vague concepts (Eriksen 2002: 1, Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4). This ambiguity seems to result from the fact that identity is quite a “polysemic”

⁴ Gecas and Burke (1995: 42) also make a distinction between self and personality as follows: “Last, we need to distinguish between self and personality. If personality generally refers to the various psychological traits, motivations, dispositions, and styles or patterns of thinking and feeling (Singer and Kolligian 1987), then self is that part of personality that is aware of itself and defines itself in terms of these qualities. Even though self can be viewed as a subset of personality, the different intellectual histories and traditions associated with the two concepts (sociology versus clinical psychology) have resulted in quite different emphases and orientations: “personality theory” is still largely equated with “trait theory,” emphasizing early formation and relative permanence of traits (Pervin 1985); “self theory” is more likely to emphasize the social, interactional, and changeable qualities of the self. However, there is a blurring of these historical differences as personality psychologists have increasingly turned to the study of self-processes (see Singer and Kolligian 1987) and as the “social structure and personality” area has become more prominent within sociological social psychology.”

⁵ Gecas and Burke (Ibid.) gives further details about the concept of self-concept and says it “can be thought of as the sum total of the individual's thoughts and feelings about him/herself as an object...It is composed of various identities, attitudes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences, along with their evaluative and affective components (e.g., self-efficacy, self-esteem) in terms of which individuals define themselves.”

concept with uses in everyday and scholarly discourses. Deschamps and Devos inform us that:

Few concepts are as polysemic as identity. The idea of identity appears in the first texts of Antiquity (the famous 'Know Thyself of Delphi) and is used in both everyday language and scholarly discourses; it is also the concern of many scientific disciplines. There are many synonyms or near synonyms for identity (one can mention at random: oneself, I, the self, we, self-perception, self-image, self-representation or self-awareness, the ego, and so on). The self can refer to a familiar subject, but also to a social agent's action. It can also refer to active processes and mechanisms that rule behavior. (Deschamps and Devos 1998: 1).

The issue of identity is one of the oldest questions of human history though it could be presented or formulated in some other terms such as 'Know Thyself' (Worchel et. al. 1998: xvii). However, in two widely used dictionaries of sociology, there is no 'sociological' definition of identity as such. While *Dictionary of Sociology* (Abeercombie et. al: 1984) has no entry for 'identity' at all, the *Dictionary of Sociology* by Jarry and Jarry (1991) contains one which is rather social psychological than sociological. Jarry and Jarry (1991) refer to Erik Erikson's notion of identity that is "the sense of self that develops as the child differentiates from parents and family and takes a place in a society" (Jarry and Jarry 1991: 294-295). Considering that there exists an abundance of literature on identity and issues regarding it, the ambiguity of the concept is pertinent. In his article, Philip Gleason emphasizes that "if pinned down, most of us would find it difficult to explain just what we do mean by identity" despite its frequent employment in immigration, ethnicity, race, gender, etc, studies (Gleason 1996 [1983]: 460). By looking at *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science* published in 1968 and the original *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* published in 1930s, he finds no entry for identity. Gleason concludes that "identity is a new term, as well as being an elusive and ubiquitous one" (Gleason Ibid.). Although Gleason's frame of reference is American history, we can still claim that his arguments still hold their validity. Therefore, I will try to summarize his exposition of the semantic history of identity in detail here.

Gleason first tries to substantiate his claim that identity is a “new” term by looking at the “emergence and diffusion” of it (Gleason Ibid.). As is customary in semantics and in a sense etymological-historical analysis of the concepts, he starts his explanation with analyzing dictionary entries for the term identity. He claims that the term identity, which derives from the Latin root *idem* (=the same) and has been in use in English since the sixteenth century, has a technical/philosophical meaning as it is employed in logic and algebra. This technical/philosophical meaning is closely related to “the perennial mind-body problem in philosophy since the time of John Locke” and it is similar to the meaning of the term in ordinary usage. The entry of the term identity in *Oxford English Dictionary* which contains two usage citations from Locke and David Hume runs as follows:

The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or a thing is itself and not something else; personality, individuality.

Personal identity (in *Psychology*), the condition or fact of retaining the same person throughout the various phases of existence; continuity of the personality. (cited in Gleason 1996: 461).

For Gleason, it seems that it is no accident that the definition includes illustrative sentences from Locke and Hume since following Robert Langbaum, According to Langbaum “Locke and Hume use the word *identity* to cast doubt on the unity of the self” (Gleason 1996: 461). Thus, Gleason believes that the process by which identity takes on “psychological connotations” starts with the questioning of traditional Christian belief of the unity of self by the empiricist philosophy. What is important here is that this usage of identity in a psychological sense charges the term “with great intellectual significance and moral seriousness” (Gleason 1996: 461). Whereas this technical/philosophical usage of the term identity is morally charged, “vernacular usage” of the term refers simply to “personality or individuality” in a “looser, more informal manner” (Gleason 1996: 461).

After this short etymological-historical explanation of the term, Gleason then tries to identify when the term obtained the status of an “important analytical concept” (1996: 462). By looking at studies of immigration in American history, he identifies

1950s as the turning point in the semantic history of term. Here, I will not refer to the particular studies he has analyzed in detail. Suffice it to say that the term identity started its journey in the vernacular in 1950s and become “the purest of clichés” (Coles 1972 cited in Gleason 1996: 463) together with the concept of *identity crisis*. In other words, identity had acquired such a “level of generality and diffuseness” that “it had come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” and many contemporary studies, which are to be briefly analyzed in the following section, still complain about its ambiguity and polysemic (Gleason 1996: 463-464)⁶.

Gleason contends that it is no use to ask the question of what identity really means after such a saturation of the concept. Instead, he offers us an analysis of how the term come to be employed in such a pervasive way and what makes it popular to the intellectuals (1996: 464). In answering the question of how the term become so pervasive, Gleason surely starts with, as most sociological expositions does, with the work of Eriksen and Freud.⁷ Accordingly, “Eriksen was the key figure in putting the word into circulation” and “did more than anyone else to popularize identity” (Gleason 1996: 464). This argument is also acknowledged by some sociologists such as Weigert (see Côté et. al 2002:32). However, the popularization of the term identity was aided by sociologists as well besides Eriksen and Freud.

Although Gleason mentions figures like Ralph Linton, Nelson N. Foote, Robert K. Merton, it is with the symbolic interactionism (SI) in the vocabulary of which “identity gained an even more prominent place” (Gleason 1996: 467). Although

⁶ Discussing the use of the term identity, Gleason argues: “Historians need to be very careful in talking about identity and highly critical in assessing the way others talk about it. The term can legitimately be employed in a number of ways. It may, for example, mean no more than that a person or group is known by a certain name, but it may also be used in reference to the distinguishing characteristic marking whatever is known by that name or to the ensemble of cultural features that collectively constitutes the larger reality with which a person or a group is identified through a certain name....For these reasons, responsible use of the term demands a lively sensitivity to the intrinsic complexities of the subject matter with which it deals, and careful attention to the need for precision and consistency in its application. But of course its enormous popularization has had just the opposite effect: as identity became more and more a cliché, its meaning grew progressively more diffuse, thereby encouraging increasingly loose and irresponsible usage. The depressing result is that a good deal of what passes for discussion of identity is little more than portentous incoherence” (Gleason 1996: 480).

⁷ It is notable that many introductory sociology texts discuss identity and self under the heading of socialization mentioning Freud, Mead, Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan and excluding Eriksen despite Eriksen’s contribution to popularize the concept of identity. For instance Giddens, A. (1989) *Sociology*, 3rd ed., Cambridge Polity Press and Macionis, J. J and Plummer, K. (1997) *Sociology: A Global Introduction*, London: Prentice Hall Europe.

founding fathers of Symbolic Interactionism like Cooley and Mead did not explicitly use the word identity (they used, instead, the self), by the 1960s identity had become a “technical term” in the school (Gleason 1996: 467). For Gleason, it was Goffman and Peter L. Berger who popularized identity in its sociological version.⁸ In his 1963 work on Stigma, Goffman “shifted from the terminology of ‘the self’ to that of ‘identity’” (Gleason 1996:467). In other words, after 1960s “the word *identity* was used so widely and so loosely that to determine its provenance in every context would be impossible” (Gleason 1996: 448). Papastergiadis (1998) also acknowledges the ambiguity of the term identity and says that neither what identity means nor what sort of politics it entails is clear.

Therefore instead of continuing Gleason semantic history of the word identity, I will now dwell on the various schools of sociology and their approach to identity.

2.1.2. Theoretical Approaches to Identity

Even though the concept of identity does not have a clear and analytic meaning, as many scholars have noted the concept of identity has taken much attention from the disciplines of social psychology, sociology, clinical psychology, cultural anthropology, and political science, language studies, comparative religious studies as well as cultural studies (see Rex 2001: 232, Deschamps and Devos 1998: 1, Bolaffi et al. 2003: 141). Although the use of the concept of identity and the theoretical and the empirical studies about identity can certainly be considered complementary from a multidimensional perspective on identity and self, as Rex (2001) notices it is not the case most of the time.

Practitioners in these disciplines have usually used the term without reference to each other, and one might be inclined to ask whether there is anything more than a nominal or verbal relationship between their ideas. Prima facie it would seem to be possible that they were simply talking about different problems and that, while political scientists, for instance, were really discussing the rights and

⁸ It should be added that Gleason recognizes the importance of Anselm Strauss’s *Mirrors and Masks* “in putting the word identity into the working vocabulary of symbolic interactionists” in a footnote.

duties attendant upon citizenship, social psychologists were discussing the question of what was meant by 'belonging' and the effect which this has on mental health, there being little relationship between these problems, other than their accidental use of a common term.

One should ask about the reasons of this tremendous interest in the concept and the issues of identity in social sciences and the other disciplines we have just mentioned above. Bolaffi (Ibid. 141) identifies a number of reasons for this preoccupation. These reasons can be summarized as follows:

1. The crisis of identities in the last part of the 20th century which will also be expected in the new millennium. This crisis is due to a number of changes and transformations leading to a new period of 'late modernity' and 'postmodernity' or 'a new Global Age'.
2. Formation of national identities after struggles against colonial rule.
3. The change in the gender identities that started with women's participation in the work-force and with the development of feminism.
4. Emergence of other new social movements such as the Greens and gay liberation.
5. Emergence of 'hybrid' or syncretic identities especially among young people mostly caused by the formation of diasporic communities.

Compare to the other sociological theoretical approaches, Symbolic Interactionist tradition and its various forms such as interactionist interpretivism, ethnomethodology, dramaturgy and so forth, have developed much more ample theoretical, methodological and empirical work on identity and inter group relations (Côté et. al. 2002: 37). From a structuralist approach, which is influenced by Saussures' ideas on the relationship between the structure of language and meaning, identity is seen as the meaning created in languages in which individuals are born. Thus, our identities and the categories our understanding of who we are and how different we are from others are determined by the structures we are born into. Post-structuralist account of identity (i.e. Foucaultian approach to identity) is determined by the discourses in which we go through. For instance, the identity of an ill and the doctor is shaped by the discourse about the health system. From a structuralist

functionalist point of group identity can be seen as a part of functioning system that hold individuals together in a system of meanings. Meanwhile, from a conflict theory's perspective group identities are formed in respect to conflicts over the scarce sources and there are inequalities in sharing power and reward among the groups. Thus, it can be said that the issues regarding the identity in general and ethnic identity in particular can be studied from a variety of perspectives. However, because of the fact that social psychological approaches in general and Symbolic Interactionism in particular have studied identity as a core focus and have produced ample empirical work, and my contention that ethnic identities and relations can best be studied from a combination of symbolic interactionist perspective with the incorporation of constructionist approach in ethnic theories have let me to use such an association in this thesis. In the following section I will review the social psychological and Symbolic Interactionist approaches to identity and inter group relations.

2.1.2.1. Social Psychological and Symbolic Interactionist Account of Identity

Due to the fact that the early studies on identity stemmed from the studies on 'self' we need to elaborate the theoretical approaches around the concepts of and issues about 'self,' 'self-concept' 'identity' 'personal identity' 'social identity' and 'group identity' followed by the theoretical approaches to ethnic identity and ethnic relations.

We can say that social psychology is the source of scholarly definitions of the concept of identity in sociology. Social psychologists have preceded the study of identity by their contributions on the study of self. In this respect, reviewing the theoretical approaches to self also means reviewing approaches to identity. There are two main branches in social psychology both of which are very much interested in studies of self: sociological social psychology and the psychological social psychology. Making a distinction between the social psychology that emphasizes the sociological aspect and the one emphasizes psychological aspect of social psychology in their focuses on self, Gecas and Burke (1995) states that:

The increased interest in self phenomena in psychological social psychology and the continuing focus on the self in sociological social psychology has led to some convergences between these two traditionally separate branches of social psychology. This is particularly evident in discussions of labeling and attribution processes, impression management and identity negotiations, and self and emotions. In general, however, sociological social psychology and psychological social psychology remain largely separate and distinct in their orientations toward the study of the self. Sociologists are still much more likely to be interested in the social contexts within which selves develop and the processes by which the self is affected. Psychologists are much more likely to focus on intra-psychic processes and on the consequences of self-phenomena for behavior (Gecas and Burke 1995: 41).

It could be said that the sociological studies on identity can be traced back to the founding fathers of symbolic interactionism in spite of the fact that the concept of 'self' was the key concept to led these leading sociologists to begin their analysis of the issues regarding the concept of now known as the issues of identity.

Self and identity have been central concepts of a sociological social psychology at least since the writings of G. H. Mead (1934), C. H. Cooley (1902), and the early interactionists in the 1920s and 1930s. In these writings the self is essentially social in nature, anchored in language, communication, and social interaction. Increasingly, this focus on the social context of the self has expanded to include social structural and historical influences, particularly where "identity" is the aspect of self under consideration (Gecas and Burke 1995: 41).

G. H. Mead stands as the prominent founding figure whose writings about self and self-identity can still easily be claimed to be paradigmatic. Mead contributed to social psychology "enormously" (Reynolds 1993: 57). As Joas argues, "Mead developed the conditions of the possibility of self-reflexivity out of a theory of the origins of specifically human communication and sociality" (Joas 1987: 91). According to Mead it is the self that highlights our reflective and reflexive abilities to conceive ourselves as both subjects and objects of our own thoughts and thus it makes the distinctively human society possible.

Mead's theory of self had various influences, the most important of which were German idealism; psychological behaviorism, and American pragmatism (Reynolds 1993: 57). According to Don Martindale (cited in Reynolds 1993: 57) Mead's

critique of the previous theories of the self is as follows: “(1) either they presupposed the mind as antecedently existing to account for mental phenomena (Wundt); (2) or they failed to account for specifically mental phenomena (Watson); and (3) they failed to isolate the mechanism by which mind and self appeared (James and Dewey)”.

Mead in trying to rectify these deficiencies makes an important claim about human society: it is made up of persons with selves, a composition of individuals whose selves are socially constructed through interactions because of the fact that group life necessitates interactions with another (Blumer 1969, p.7, Reynolds 1993: 58). What makes a person a self is his or her ability of reflexivity, which is in turn made possible by language. In other words for Mead, the assertion that a human being has a self means, that “the human being is an object to himself” (Blumer 1969: 62). It is important to emphasize that for Mead as well as for Blumer, the self is a “process” not a “structure”. We interact with ourselves as well as others through utilizing “I” and “me” aspects of the self, responding to ourselves and constructing meanings through planned built up actions (Blumer 1969: 62, Reynolds, 1993 pp. 42-72). In other words, in order to understand individuals, we must study him or her in their group or joined interaction. “The self is best conceptualized as a social process within the person” (Reynolds 1993: 60).

Following the path opened by Mead, various versions of symbolic interactionism has been developed such as the Chicago School by Herbert Blumer, the Iowa School by Manfred Kuhn, Ethnomethodology by Harold Garfinkel, and Dramaturgical Approach by Erving Goffman. The transition from the concept of the self to that of identity is performed mostly by Goffman. Together with Anselm Strauss, whose work still stands as “foundational for those interested in the self and identification,” Goffman is one of the most prominent figures of symbolic interactionism with respect to the development of the concept of identity (Côté et. al. 2002: 33). Goffman's identity management in the *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* which can be described as complex ways in which we present ourselves to other people brought up the problem of the authenticity of identity. Although Goffman's work

parallels Mead's "mind, self and society" (personality, interaction, social structure) he develops the concept of identity "much further" by discussing "ego identity, personal identity, and social identity" in *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identities* (Côté et. al. 2002: 33).

Gecas and Burke (1995) have identified four orientations in the studies of self and identity three of which are primarily sociological and they have been affected by the writings of early interactionists such as Mead, James and Cooley especially by their emphasis on maintenance of meaning in communication and interaction, its relevance to the self and identity, the subjectivism of the interactionist tradition that requires taking the actors' definition of the situation into account.

These four orientations are: situational, social structural, biographical-historical, and intra-personal. The first group whose main representatives according to Gecas and Burke includes Blumer, Becker, Strauss, and Goffman who are also known as the Chicago school interactionists, emphasizes the "emergence and maintenance of the self in situated (typically face-to-face) interaction." The main focus of this orientation have been the problems of actor's definition of the situations, problems regarding the construction of identities, negotiating, bargaining, role taking, presentation of the self, and labeling.

The second group includes Manfred Kuhn and his students known as the Iowa School Interactionists. Their focus is mainly the structural features of social groups such the antecedent variables, historical, economical and social conditions that determine the definitions of the self. They also focus on the consequences of role taking. Compared to the Chicago School Symbolic Interactionists, they have developed their research using measurements, surveys, questionnaires. Some of the sociologists who are known today as the Indiana School symbolic Interactionists such as Stryker and Burke have diverged from this school slightly and focused more on the relationship between the self and the society but still using the Twenty Statements Test, the technique developed by Kuhn and his students and will be addressed later in this chapter.

A comparison between the Chicago school symbolic interactionism and the Iowa school interactionism can be made in terms of their differences on understanding of self and society as it has been done by many scholars such as Lemert (1979), Reynolds (1993). However, even though Kuhn shares the same philosophical tradition with Blumer's interactionism, the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of Kuhn's interactionism are just the opposites of those of the Chicago School. Kuhn's interactionism is in favor of quantitative methodologies and realist assumptions about the self. It can be argued that the difference between Blumerian and Kuhnian approaches to self stem from their emphasis on the "I" and "me" aspects of the self in Mead's analysis (Reynolds, 1993: 86-87). According to Lemert (1979, p.112), one of the basic differences between the Chicago school interactionists led by Blumer and the Iowa school interactionism led by Kuhn are that Blumer views the self as more active, creative, dynamic, spontaneous, fluid, indeterministic, and unpredictable in contrast to Kuhn's conception of self which is more fixed, stable, structured and defined, deterministic, predictable, as well as more convenient for traditional "sociological" analysis. Blumer's concept of self is "indicator, interpreter, actor, role-taker, definer, and creator of the social world which is at the end meaning" (Lemert 1979, p. 134).

Blumer's conception of self, his understanding of reality of the social world and the belief that the social world talks back to us needs an empirical methodology that avoids formalization. The reality of the social world is actually calls for an empirical science as he said once: "It is this obdurate character of the empirical world, its ability to resist and talk-back that both calls and justifies empirical science" (quoted in Lemert 1979: 116). If the social world is the total of the mystery of interpreted meanings waiting to be explored, then there is need for an empirical scientific approach to it, and because the social world exists within interaction and communication through which both the society and the self are continuously produced and reproduced through symbols and language, we need to be able to explore the meanings of things for the individuals. According to Blumer, even if all social objects are not symbols or they do not carry symbolic meanings, the self is able to communicate, not only with others but also with itself, by utilizing the

symbolic meanings we attend to. The meanings and representations of the symbols are socially constructed and arbitrarily associated with what they represent. (Charon 1992, p.42-46).

The Blumerian version of symbolic interactionism has produced many ethnographic studies about identity as well as other small group sociological studies. Because of Blumer's understanding of the social reality as the world of interpreted meanings and the self as spontaneous, fluid, indeterministic, and unpredictable, there have been many scholars (i.e. Clough 1992a, 1995, Fine 1990, Musolf 1993, Prus 1996, Richardson 1991, 1992a, and 1992b) who have been studying the divided, fragmented, fluid, hybrid or syncretic characteristic of newly developed identities from a Blumerian perspective applying mostly ethnographic studies especially in the last two decades.

As Côté et. al. (2002: 33) tell, the Twenty Statements Test is one of the most popular quantitative instruments for the sociologists studying issues of identity. The test is very simple to use and analyze. The respondents are invited to list twenty personal traits in response to the question of "Who am I?" The test has been used in studies of self extensively among the students of Iowa school interactionists. Even though it has helped to produce significant amount of analysis of self image and the social determinants of the self and salient features of social and personal identity, it has also been criticized for being biased and lack of coherence. For instance, the responses might vary if asked the same subjects in different contexts. However, finding out that some respondents might define themselves using social identities at some period of time and they use personal or reflective identities to respond the question of who they are at another time shows at least some changes about the social determinants of some periods. Even though Kuhn's perspective seems to share much in common with self-psychology in terms of its micro, quantitative approach, still, the perspective brought to the study of self and identity in the sociological literature by Kuhn contrasts sharply with that in the psychology literature.

Côté et. al. (2002: 33) argues that this feature of the test suggests that the test is "a

useful instrument for monitoring late modern or so-called "postmodern" trends in identity formation" in spite of Kuhn's more realistic and empiricist position. The authors give examples of Zurcher's and Turner's studies to support the idea that Kuhnian self studies can be applied to postmodern or late modern identity analyses. For them, Zurcher's study has shown that individuals develop abilities to switch from single identity modes to mutable identity modes as the situation demands. And Turner's work in 1976 has shown that there is a movement from "institutional self", which is attained, created or achieved but not discovered, to the "impulsive self", which is discovered partly through a rejection of institutional constraints. As Côté et al. (Ibid: 33) argues these types of selves can be reducible to the more conventionally accepted concepts of 'social identity' and 'personal identity,' which will be discussed here later.

The third orientation developed by the symbolic Interactionists mainly deal with the self as a cultural and historical construction. Even though the studies in this group has been influenced by the Chicago and even by the Iowa school Interactionists, the sociologists in this group mainly deals with the larger cultural and historical context and how the self is constructed in a given cultural context through narrative analysis, life stories, or biographies. According to Gecas and Burke, they have combined interactionist tradition with Weber and Mills and share much with postmodernist textual discourse analysis and thus the perspective is used mainly in cultural studies, and feminist literature. The convergence between symbolic interactionism and postmodernism has been offered by some scholars such as Norman Denzin (1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1993), Altheide and Johnson (1992), and Charon (1992) and has caused an ongoing debate about whether such an association between symbolic interactionist tradition and postmodern theoretical approaches are possible and useful.⁹

⁹ For the discussion about the possibility of associating postmodernism with symbolic interactionism at ontological, epistemological and practical level, see Altunsu 1997, for the debates around this association see also Altheide 1995, Clough 1992b, Farberman 1991, Fee 1992, Fontana 1992, Kotarba 1991, Maines 1996a and 1996b Manning 1991, Plummer 1990, Shalin 1991 and 1993.

The fourth orientation included mainly the psychological social psychologists that focus on the intrapersonal processes, motives, motivations, cognitive processes within self and personality that affect the behavior using mostly laboratory settings.

Although both disciplines sometimes share an interest in the domain of the interpersonal self, the sociological perspective emphasizes the claim that identities and selves emerge in social processes, reflect social processes, social values, and social structures, and function to contribute to the maintenance, and sometimes change, in social structure. In contrast, if ethnic or national identity, for example, is studied from a psychological perspective, interest in it is likely to be linked to questions of cognitive function, self-esteem, cognitive consistency or inconsistency with other self-schemas, stereotyping, and so forth. And although the sociological perspective might acknowledge the role of self-esteem and stereotyping in the study of such identities, its major concern is to understand the relevance of national and ethnic identity in reference to issues concerning group solidarity and intergroup difference (Côté et. al. 2000: 36).

The similar evaluation has been made by John Rex (2001) who is known to be as the founder of situationalist approach to ethnicity. In his article *The Theory of Identity*, Rex argues that the concept of identity is closely related to the Freudian concept of ego even though they are not the same thing. The inner core of a psychic structure has a sense of continuous sameness. Thus we can say that this perceived continuity constitutes the individual identity. Rex quotes Weinreich (1980):

One's identity is denned as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to the future (Weinreich 1980 quoted in Rex 2001: 233).

However, for Rex even though this kind of cognitive description of identity which can be developed through the developmental stages of childhood, also gives us the notions of self-knowledge and the uniqueness along with a positive emotional attitude towards one's self knowledge, this conception of identity is not adequate due to the fact that it attempts to explain identity merely in terms of individual psyche

and lacks the connection with the world of social objects. In other words, in order to have an identity one needs to distinguish himself/herself from other objects including from other people. Thus, identity has at least three properties: the sense of self-knowledge, the evaluative attitudes towards the other objects and humans and the sense of continuity. Rex finds a relationship with the individual and the social object world in the Freudian psychology because of the fact that the superego and ego need to know and deal with the demands of others, he views that Symbolic Interactionism makes this connection more clear. The self in both traditions is expressed as a socially constructed product. Rex (2001: 234) states:

Cooley (1902) speaks of the 'looking-glass self or the self as it is perceived by others, while Mead (1934) argues that the concept of the self emerges as a result of the internalization, first, of the specific demands of specific others, and then of 'the generalized other'. The demands of others then become part of the internalized 'Me' which the 'I' has to confront.

Reviewing Erikson who is known as one of the founders of the identity theory in psychology and Kelly who developed identity structure analysis from a cognitive perspective incorporating Erikson, Rex comments that the identity is formed in terms of the cultural and structural meanings and qualities along with the notions of self-concept, continuity and being connected to the world of social object and humans (Rex 2001: 234-235). Rex continues to develop his theoretical approach, which will be discussed in this chapter later, based on these psychological and social psychological approaches.

Deschamps and Devos (1998) also argue that identity has been the central theme in social psychology due to the fact that it is the main concern of the discipline. As they aptly explain, it is a central theme because identity involves “the opposition between the individual and the social” which can be reduced to the distinction between personal identity and social identity. The conflicts between the search for an individual identity versus the search for a collective identity, the construction of individual differences and collective similarities or simply individual versus group have been the major concerns of the social psychology as well as sociology and some of the other disciplines of humanities.

The distinction between the personal self and social self, according to Deschamps and Devos, was made by William James, commonly known as the founder of social psychology and also known as the one of the earliest antecedents of Symbolic Interactionism, when he wrote about the idea of duality in self-representation. Developing his ideas on the relationship between the dual character of the self, Mead views that “the self consists simultaneously of a sociological component (the me) - which would only be an internalization of the social function - and a more personal component (the I); the developments of that definition of the self have gradually led to the distinction between social identity and personal identity.” (Ibid.2). Even though identity is both personal and social because it is situated within a person and the formation of personal identity is a social process Mead has overcome the duality between the individual and the society through his ideas about the interplay between the “I” and the “Me” a process through which both individuals and society continuously create each other.

However, as opposed to Mead, “personal identity” which is the reflection of “I” and social identity which is the reflection of “ME” can be considered as two opposing poles as Deschamps and Devos does (Ibid. 2). Personal identity is characterized by more specific and idiosyncratic features while social identity is characterized by more social features such as being a member of a group or a social category. Thus an individual has both of these features. It means that while an individual perceives himself in terms of his self identity, he or she sees himself or herself as a member of this or that group. While personal identity emerges from the difference social identity emerges from sameness. Thus, personal identity leads us the feeling that one is “different” from others while he/she is “similar” to himself/herself. Social identity also leads us the conception that we are “different” from other groups or social categories while at the same time we are “similar” to ourselves. This is because of the fact that the conception of being a member of a group and categorization through the perception of sameness or similarity, which has been addressed as creates the feeling of difference. If individuals feel that they belong to a group or a category and

identify themselves with that group or category, it means they feel that they do not belong to other groups or categories. In other words, individuals see themselves similar to the other members of the group they feel that they belong to while they see themselves different from those who are not the members of the same group or category. The feelings of “us” and “them” emerge from this identification or the feeling of belongingness. Deschamps and Devos state that there is a correlation between the strength of identification with a group and differentiation of that group from other groups.

Referring to Goffman’s descriptions of the individual who plays different roles for different audiences and Gergen’s idea of fluidity of the self Deschamps and Devos say that the durability and stability of self-permanence is debatable and speaking of multiple identities is necessary. However, maintaining the idea that feeling of identity is socially constructed and reconstructed differently in different contexts doesn’t mean that identity is unreal or inefficient. It still provides guidance for our behaviors and is essential for the functioning of the society. How individuals can feel both “the same” and “different” at the same time? In other words, how can we feel ourselves both as a member of this or that group or category but at the same time as an individual?

This brings us to the issue of group belongingness, which we will discuss it here more. Having reviewed the theoretical approaches in social psychology and sociology about the self, social self, and identity and showing that both sociological social psychologists and symbolic interactionist tradition in their various forms consider the self, social self and identity something constructed socially within the process of interplay between individuals and the society, we now need to talk about group identity in terms of the Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theories of intergroup relations because of the fact that these social psychologists have had a great influence on intergroup relations especially on studies about the categorization, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination which are also the content of this study (see: Worchel 1998, Bar-Tal 1998, Deschamps and Devos 1998). Considering their connection to Symbolic

Interactionism Cote et. al. acknowledges their influence on intergroup relations as “finally, an independent but epistemologically similar tradition emerged in Europe inspired by Tajfel's (1981) "social identity theory of intergroup relations” (Côté et. al. 2002: 33).

Tajfel and Turner developed Social Identity Theory in order to understand the intragroup and intergroup processes. According to the theory, “individuals do not only adopt a personal identity as unique persons, but also form a social identity which reflects their membership in various groups to which they belong to” (Bar-Tal 1998: 93). Social identity emerges from self-concept, which reflects individuals’ knowledge about which group he/she belongs to and the value and emotional significance those groups have for individuals. Bar-Tal (Ibid. 93) says:

Social identities, in the form of such social categories as nationality, religion, gender, profession, ethnicity or political orientation, are internalized and constitute a potentially important part of the individual's self-concept. They provide meaningful and significant self-references through which individuals perceive themselves and the world around.

At this point we need to refer to Tajfel’s distinction between ‘social category’ and ‘social group’. Social category refers to a group of people whose “defining feature is socially neutral and does not allow us to draw conclusions (rightly or wrongly) about them.” But if the feature of the group is “considered a meaningful distinguishing feature, such that the feature of the group were “singled out and treated differently”, then it is a social group (Jones 2002: 14).

The theory is pushed further by Turner in Self Categorization Theory in which Turner claims that in order to comprehend the objects around us, we categorize things. This is an essential part of our understanding. We categorize ourselves using social categories such as whites, blacks, Turks, Muslims, Christians, proletariat, men, women and so forth in order to understand the social world and constitute self-references. Tajfel and Turner hold the view that the individuals need to maintain positive social identity and that is why they appropriate positive behaviors and norms to the group(s) they belong to. This can be done through comparisons between their

group and the other groups. We need to mention that individuals are creative in a sense that they need to feel positive feeling towards their social identity and their group and that is why they highlight or maximize the positive characteristics of their group and minimize their negative characteristics in their comparisons.

However, as we have mentioned above, individuals' feeling of belongingness may vary from a context to another just like their identifying themselves with their self and self-concept, meaning that individuals sometimes have a tendency to see themselves as unique individuals and sometimes as a member of some groups. Because they feel they belong to various groups they develop multiple representation of identity too (Bar-Tal 1998, Deschamps and Devos 1998). This dimension of the theory is referred as the salience of identity (Worchel 1998: 55). According to the theory, one individual may see herself such as a woman and may see herself as a Turkish person or a Muslim person allowing her either gender, or national or religious identities salient in different contexts.

The theoretical approaches to identity we have reviewed so far basically underlines the fact that self and identity are socially constructed. We have seen that social psychologists in general and Symbolic Interactionists as well as European counterparts in identity studies share the idea that individual identity is shaped by individuals' social (symbolic) interaction with the social world, with other individuals and with other groups. We have seen that the feeling of belongingness to a group or groups define individuals' social identity. We develop the feeling of group belongingness through socialization learning that we belong to a group starting with simple groups such as family and a kinship. However, as Rex (2001) explains that these interactions involve complex, specific and defined relations with others. This relationship with the family and kinship systems has taken much attention from social psychology, sociology, anthropology. Rex tells us that:

Such relationships were explored, for instance, by Spencer and Gillen in Central Australia (Spencer and Gillen 1968), and their work became the basis for the sociology of Emile Durkheim (1933) and for the social anthropology of Radcliffe Brown (1930). Further, although kinship and its extensions through the clan system are of primary importance, other rather

more loosely defined relationships also exist even in quite primitive societies. There are relationships of exchange, as studied, for instance, by Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands, there are relationships with non-kin who live in the same village, and there are relationships of a political kind with chiefs and headmen (Rex 2001: 235-236).

Thus, even in the simple societies, individuals develop feeling of belongingness to extensive groups where they develop group identities such as the feelings of 'we' and 'they'. The development of group identity in simple societies was also the concern of early sociologists too. Rex (2001) aptly refers to Durkheimian condition of mechanical solidarity and Tonnies' 'Gemeinschaft,' in explaining the development of group identity in these societies. However, in complex societies, individuals develop warm and positive relations with their small kin groups and friends to incorporate their group identity, but they also seek ways and other groups to extend their world of belongingness through organic solidarity such as being a member of a guild as Durkheim offered (Rex 2001: 236). However, the feeling of belongingness extends from individuals direct relations with the others to the ideas and symbols of culture and this brings us to the issue of ethnicity and ethnic identity (Rex: Ibid.). In a similar transition from group identity to ethnic identity Eriksen expresses that:

Notably, the use of the term 'ethnic group' suggests contact and interrelationship. To speak of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd as to speak of the sound from one hand clapping (cf. Bateson, 1979: 78). By definition, ethnic groups remain more or less discrete, but they are aware of- and in contact with - members of other ethnic groups. Moreover, these groups or categories are in a sense *created* through that very contact. Group identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are not - in other words, in relation to non-members of the group (Eriksen 2002: 11).

2.2. The Concept and Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity

In the following section, the main conceptual and theoretical approaches regarding ethnicity will be reviewed in terms of the subjective and objective analyses of the concept of ethnicity and the debate around the main theoretical approaches, primordialism and circumstantialism chronologically. Other alternatives to these

approaches especially constructionism is also reviewed in terms of the theoretical and conceptual developments.

2.2.1. The Concept of Ethnic Identity: Objective vs. Subjective Definitions of Ethnicity

Like identity the word ethnicity and ethnic identity is elusive too. It does not make much sense to list all the definitions because they are already too many and the number of definitions is growing. Referring to B. Williams, Banks and A.P. Cohen, Eriksen tells that listing the definitions and showing the nuances of these definitions are not useful. And indeed most of the studies on ethnicity leave the concept undefined (Eriksen 2002: 11-13). Likewise, Cornell and Hartmann views that we have been using the words such as *ethnic group*, *ethnic identity*, and *ethnicity* increasingly not only in academic analyses but also in media, yet these concepts are slippery and hard to define because of the confusion not only in media but also in academic studies too (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 15-16). Thus, as Cornell and Hartman say ambiguities “seem an inevitable part of the study of ethnicity” (Ibid. 18-19).

As many scholars of ethnicity mentions, the word ‘ethnicity’ is relatively a new concept. Its first usage in Oxford Dictionary was in 1972. However the history of the word ethnic is much older and it is derived from the Greek word *ethnos* which meant nation, the unity of people by blood or kinship ties but not with political ties. The word *ethnos* was also derived from the Latin word *ethnikos* which meant gentile, or heathen. Around the mid-fourteenth century it was used in English in this sense referring to the people of non-Christian or Jewish origin (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 16, Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4, Eriksen 2002: 4, Oxford English Dictionary 1961: 313-314). But how the word ethnicity entered sociology? According to Cornell and Hartman (Ibid.) the matter of belief is not more important than drawing of a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The specific reference to religion might have gone, but the idea that only “the others” but “not us” are ethnics still remained for a while and finally and “increasingly ethnicity referred to a particular way of defining not only others but also ourselves, and this is how it entered sociology” (Ibid.).

Having said that ethnicity is an elusive, slippery, hard to define concept, we still need to state that the definitions of ethnicity fall in two general categories: subjective and objective definitions. With subjective definitions we mean to express the definitions that hold the group's ascription of the idea of the distinctiveness as the basis of ethnicity rather than some objective criteria. This position is also called emic definitions in anthropological works where the researcher applies native's definitions in contrast to those that apply analysts' definitions or concepts which is called etic definitions (see Eriksen: 2002: 11). The objective definition of ethnicity attempts to find some ethnic markers and if a group has those markers, then they decide that the group is an ethnic group.

Subjective definition of ethnicity was given by Weber who is the only founders of the sociologists who gave an explicit definition of ethnicity (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 16). Weber viewed that ethnicity was a different category than class, status and party in terms of subjectivity. Defining ethnicity in terms of subjectivity, Weber (1968) said:

We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and "migration"... whether or not an objective blood relationship exists (quoted in Cornell and Hartmann Ibid. 16).¹⁰

Cornell and Hartmann evaluate Weber's definition and comment as:

At the foundation of ethnic attachments lies real or assumed common descent. Ethnic ties are blood ties. The fact of common descent is less important than belief in common descent. What matters is not whether a blood relationship actually exists, but whether it is believed to exist, "not *what is* but *what people perceive*" (Connor 1993:377). Ethnicity is a subjective matter; the crucial issue is how we see ourselves. The potential bases of this belief in common descent are multiple, varying from physical resemblance to shared cultural practices to a shared historical experience of intergroup interaction. Any of these, or some combination, might be the basis or justification of our assumption of common

¹⁰ For a detailed evaluation of Weber's definition and its implications, see Guibernau and Rex 1997: pp. 2-3). For Weber's own writing on ethnicity, 'race', and nation, see the Passages from Max Weber (1997).

descent. An ethnic group exists wherever this distinctive connection—this belief in common descent—is part of the foundation of community, wherever it binds us to one another to some degree (Ibid 16-17).

Thus subjective belief in common descents and group ascription is the essence of ethnic identities in the Weberian definition of ethnicity. This tradition is followed by many including Donald Horowitz and Schermerhorn (see Cornell and Hartman: 17; Horowitz pp. 52-53). Like Weber, Schermerhorn (1996:17) defines ethnicity from a subjectivist perspective too. According to his definition ethnic group is:

a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these.

Schermerhorn clarifies that there are three necessary accompaniments to above definition of ‘ethnic group’. The first one is that some consciousness of kind among members of the group is necessary to form an ethnic group. The second one is that there is one dominant group in each society and the other groups are all subordinate groups. And the third one is that ethnic groups and the terms majority and minority need to be thought according to the size and the power structure of the society. The following figure, which he calls it paradigm, gives his classification of ethnic groups clearly:

Figure 1: Schermerhorn’s Paradigm for Ethnic Groups in Terms of Size and Power Source; Schermerhorn (1996:17)

<i>Dominant Groups</i>		
Size	Power	
Group A +	+ Majority Group	
Group B -	+ Elite	
<i>Subordinate Groups</i>		
Group C +	— Mass subjects	
Group D —	— Minority Group	

AD and BC = typical intergroup configurations

Even though Group C can be seen as a majority group, Schermerhorn calls it Mass subjects in spite of its awkwardness. He also admits that Group B can also be called as a minority group but he prefers to call them as Elite in order to show the power they hold. What is worth noticing in his definition is that ethnic groups are part of a larger society which calls it nation-state in the modern world (see Ibid. 18). One can see the similarities between Weber's definition and Schermerhorn's definition easily.

Using Schermerhorn's definition Cornell and Hartmann says that saying that ethnicity is subjective does not mean that others do not affect the ethnic identities. According to them, ethnic categories are shaped by others whereas ethnic groups are shaped by the insiders. Ethnic identities are usually influenced by what others assign to it. This is the way ethnic categories are created. And when we claim that identity, we form the ethnic group. Even though Schermerhorn sees that the ethnic groups in modern societies should be understood in a nation-state, Cornell and Hartmann views that one ethnic group can be a majority in one society and be a minority group in another society in terms of size and power. But ethnic groups can exist only in relation to the other groups; they can never exist in isolation. So there is always the duality of 'us and them'.

Weber's and Schermerhorn's definitions of ethnicity have inspired many scholars of ethnicity and some have changed these definitions slightly. But what has remained is the groups own ascription or idea of being a member of an ethnic group and developing their own perception of an ethnic identity. However, the idea of being a member of an ethnic group or the meaning of the ethnic identity is not fixed but rather contextual in nature. Showing examples from each of the various types of ethnic groups, such as ethnic minorities, indigenous people, proto-nations, and ethnic groups in plural societies and the meaning of ethnicity in these societies, Eriksen defines ethnicity as:

Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a

social identity (based on a contrast vis-à-vis others) characterized by metaphoric or fictive kinship...When cultural differences regularly make a difference in interaction between members of a group, the social relationship has an ethnic element. Ethnicity refers both to aspects of gain and loss in interaction, and to aspects of meaning in the creation of identity. In this way it has a political, organizational aspect as well as a symbolic one. Ethnic groups tend to have myths of common origin and they nearly always have ideologies encouraging endogamy, which may nevertheless be of highly varying practical importance (Eriksen 2002: p. 12).

The question that arises from these subjectivist accounts of ethnicity is whether or not we can call some groups ethnic groups if they have let us say shared culture or language regardless of what individuals feel about it. Objectivist definitions of ethnicity respond affirmatively. Most of the objectivist definitions of ethnicity defines the term in an sense that ethnicity contains one or more of the following characteristics: common culture typically including language, religion, customs, the patterns of behavior and belief, or some physical characteristics such as skin pigmentation, hair texture, or national origin (Guibernau and Rex 1997: p. 2; Hutchinson and Smith 1996: p. 8 and 15).

Agreeing mostly with Schermerhorn's definition of ethnicity, Manning Nash (1996: 24-28) suggests some core elements, which he calls index features, and some secondary elements, which he calls secondary cultural markers, as the characteristics of ethnic groups. According to Nash, *Kinship* (only the members have the blood ties), *commensality* (eating together indicating very close relationship), and *a common cult* (a continuing value system and the sacred symbols) constitute the core ethnic markers, whereas secondary ethnic markers including dressing, language, and (culturally denoted) physical features make the ethnic border markers visible. He says:

All of them take their force of separating groups and persons only if they are linked to the core features of differences. Differences in dress, from whole costumes to single items of apparel, serve as surface markers of group differences. These items of apparel best serve when visible and public, but items of dress may reinforce group boundaries even if not visible, like the underwear of Sikhs, or the undergarment of pious Jews. The meaning of dress codes in ethnic boundary identification is a branch of semiotics until it is tied to the core elements of social differentiation (Nash 1996: p. 25).

Having reviewed the subjective and objective definitions of ethnicity, we may conclude that despite the terms ethnicity, ethnic group, and ethnic identity are not clear, we speak of ethnicity when we talk about people who consider themselves distinctive from others in terms of culture, real or presumed ancestry and especially when these differences make differences in their relations with others. However, instead of understanding ethnicity from definitions whether they are conceptual or analytical, we should focus on the theoretical approaches. In the following section, we will review the theoretical approaches to ethnicity.

2.2.2. Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity

2.2.2.1. Early Studies of Ethnicity

As we have mentioned above Weber considered ethnic groups different than other categories such as class and status in respect to the subjectivity and objectivity criteria. Marx neglected the ethnic identity and groups most probably because it is a form of false consciousness. Generally speaking Marxism is still not interested in studying ethnic identities and cultural differences and other issues related to ethnicity because of the view that with the advancement of classes, ethnic boundaries will disappear. Durkheim and Tonnies were interested in group belongingness in terms of the differences between mechanical and organic forms of solidarity or simple and complex societies. Including Weber, none of the founding fathers of the sociology were interested in analyzing the ethnic identity or ethnic groups (Guibernau and Rex 1997: 2). After analyzing Marx' Weber's Durkheim's and Tonnies' approaches to the future of the modern societies, Rex (2001) argues that the in the modernized world, which is characterized by secularism, by science based technology, by rational economic calculation and bureaucratic administration, only nations and the state occurs. According to Weber (and Gellner, a leading contemporary sociologist who is known with his work on modernization and nationalism) the state requires absolute power and in order to exercise this power, it requires a shared culture. Thus independent ethnic groups should disappear in the process of modernization.

Commenting on Weber's prediction about the future of the ethnic relations, Eriksen also thinks that these concepts are observable and evident in most of the societies around the world is one of the underlying factors, to a greater extent, of the present academic concern for ethnicity and nationalism, drawing the attention to them. A dominating social theorist such as Max Weber, in the beginning of the last century, left aside 'ethnic community action (*Gemeinschaftshandeln*)' as an inquisitive notion which indicates various phenomena (Weber 1980 [1921]). Furthermore, Weber thought that 'primordial phenomena' such as ethnicity and nationalism would lose its place and signification, and disappear with the effect of Modernization, industrialization and individualism. However, this anticipation of Weber did not come true, and the last century and the period especially after the Second World War experienced greater influence and effect of ethnicity, nationalism and identity-related politics in the world (Eriksen, 2002, p:2).

However, there were others who were interested in studying the cultural differences of the groups. Following Cornell and Hartmann's (1998) genealogical summary of theoretical orientations to ethnicity we can say that the early sociological thinking considered the ethnic issues in terms of social Darwinism, explaining the differences in biological terms just like the differences between sex and even between classes were explained by the genetic or biological differences. Thus, cultural and racial groups were seen inferior or superior to each other. However, at the beginning of the 20th century Boas showed that the cultural, as well as social and economical differences between the races could not be explained in biological terms but in cultural terms

2.2.2.2. The Assimilationist Model of Ethnicity

Boas' approach had a great impact on not only anthropological studies but also sociological studies especially on Chicago School of sociologists such as Robert Park and W. I. Thomas. Thus the assimilationist model of ethnicity was developed with Park's orientation to the identity and adjustment problems of the immigrant groups. According to park, the immigrant groups go through five stages to take their place in

the melting pot. These stages were: contact, competition and conflict, accommodation, and ultimately assimilation. After going through these stages, immigrant groups are incorporated in common cultural life without encountering prejudice (see Cornell and Hartmann 1998).

Cornell and Hartman make the following comment about the model which was drawn by Park:

There are several key points to be made about these developments. First, they resulted in a view of ethnicity as most fundamentally a cultural phenomenon. Second, against the notion of a biologically rooted ethnic stasis, they posed a socially and culturally rooted ethnic dynamic. Ethnicity, in the new account, was variable and contingent; it could change. Third, they projected a general process of assimilation, a process in which minority identities eventually would disappear. Ethnic and, in the more ambitious versions, even racial groups would be integrated into the majority society's institutions and culture. The world itself would move away from ethnic and racial particularism and toward a universalistic model in which the fortunes of individuals were tied to their merits and to markets (in the liberal democratic vision) or to their place in the system of production (in the socialist one) Cornell and Hartman 1998: 43-44).

However, for Cornell and Hartmann the assimilationist model has been criticized and outdated by many for mainly two reasons. One of the reasons is that the emergence of the new nation states after the Second World War considering the fact that the new borders were not drawn in terms of ethnic boundaries and even the new states were formed on the basis of nation-states, the people of the new nation-states contained different ethnic groups which could not be incorporated in the same national identity. And another reason for the reaction to the assimilationist model is that there has never been a melting pot. In the industrialized countries ethnic identities and ethnic groups has shown a persistent character. It could be even said that they got strengthened especially after the 1960s. This era was the era of the boom in ethnic studies which contained various perspectives and orientations. These studies according to Cornell and Hartmann's review had some underlying assumptions and assumptions about the nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations too. Some of these studies, according to the authors, viewed ethnicity as a new, malleable, negotiable, resilient and unchanging, phenomenon; or a refuge term

“for persons alienated by modern society or struggling with the costs of social inequality, a resource to be used as a basis of proactive mobilization, linking people together and firing their passions on behalf of a common interest or cause;” a social form with a logic of its own; “a social category or set of categories that individuals can use, manipulate, transfigure, or work with according to their own logics and by their own lights; self-consciously chosen by those who carry them; or so deeply embedded as to be beyond choice or even consciousness.

Cornell and Hartmann continue to their comment about the underlying assumptions of those studies:

From one perspective, material interests drive ethnicity. Ethnic identities are utilitarian: They come to the forefront of social life when there are payoffs attached to them, when people think that they can gain something politically or economically by organizing and acting on ethnic terms. From another perspective, shared cultural practices drive ethnicity. Ethnic identities are not tools for the pursuit of gains but products of the distinctive ways that people live, act, speak, eat, worship, and celebrate. It is our cultural practice, not our agenda that makes us ethnic. From yet another perspective, what drives ethnicity is the cognitive schemes by which people think about, understand, and negotiate the world around them. Ethnic identities are embedded in the conceptual models of the world and of the self that people learn—from parents, from peers, from experience—and then use to organize their actions and account for what happens to them and to the world at large. However ethnicity may be described or explained, there are those who celebrate it as a haven in a heartless world or as the fountainhead of a human diversity that should be cherished and preserved. To them, it is the key to a better future. There are others who see ethnicity as a threatening and ultimately destructive force whose emphasis on human differences and group entitlements already bears responsibility for a remarkable share of avoidable human tragedy.

During the 1960’s and 1970’s two theoretical approaches have come to dominate the theoretical frameworks of many studies. These were primordialism and instrumentalism also known as circumstantialism. These two theoretical approaches to ethnic identity and ethnic relations have divided the studies of ethnicity into two main camps for a long while and still continue to do that¹¹. During the 1970’s Van

¹¹ For the scholars of ethnicity who also divides the theories of ethnicity into two main camps, see Hutchinson and Smith 1996, Cornell and Hartmann 1998, Eriksen 2002, Eller and Coughlan 1996, Grosby 1996, Rex 2001. This list can be extended for sure as almost any review of theories of ethnicity mentions these camps.

Den Berghe's sociobiological account of ethnicity and around 1980's Fredric Barth's and Cohen's constructionism also shaped many of the ethnic studies.

2.2.2.3. Primordial Theory of Ethnicity

Building up on Edward Shills' classification of social bonds, Clifford Geertz has seen the power of primordiality in ethnicity. According to Geertz, primordial attachments stem from the assumed givens of social existence. Accordingly, ethnicity is fixed, fundamental, and rooted in the unchangeable circumstances of birth which is seen as exterior, coercive and given (Cornell and Hartman 1998: 48, Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8). With Geertz's own words:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' of existence, or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer ipso facto, as the result not merely of personal attraction, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz 1963, quoted in Rex 2001: 237).

Geertz claim that ethnic ties, whose power is hard to comprehend, difficult to explain has overpowering effect on the members of the ethnic groups. What is more important here is the claim that these ties are so important that it comes before any other ties and cannot be reducible to them such as political or economical ties (Rex 2001). It can be even said that even if identity claims harm the members of a group economically, politically or even physically, the members still would define themselves with their ethnic identities.

Van Den Berghe (1996) attempts to explain the reason why people are bounded with ethnic ties asserting that human beings are connected to each other with nepotism

and inclusive fitness as a result of their genetic reproductive capacity. Berghe (1996) argues:

My theory, first stated a decade-and-a-half-ago, is very simple. All social organisms are biologically programmed to be nepotistic, i.e. to behave favorable (or 'altruistically') to others in proportion to their real or perceived degree of common ancestry. Social organisms evolved to be nepotistic because altruistic investment in unrelated organisms is biologically wasted and therefore *could* not evolve, as Darwin clearly saw well over a century ago. The evidence, both human and non-human, for rampant nepotism is overwhelming. The bibliography on humans alone now runs into several hundred titles. Favoring kin among humans is sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious, and biologically, it does not matter which. But, consciously or unconsciously, we must be able to discriminate according to degree of biological relationship to ourselves, if our beneficence to others is to increase our inclusive fitness (Berghe 1996: 57).

Although Berghe's approach is criticized due to its biological reductionism, it is also strong in explaining the primordial ties in terms of nepotism. Especially considering the fact that nepotism plays a very significant role among the immigrant groups or even among the members of ethnic groups in terms of solidarity, we may agree that Berghe makes a strong point. However, nepotism is also criticized due to its weaknesses in explaining larger ethnic formations such as ethnonationalist movements (see Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8).

Although the primordial attachments or the ties can explain much of the strength of the ethnic identities and ethnic relations as well as many ethnic conflicts around the world, it is also criticized by many in terms of its readily weaknesses as Cornell and Hartmann (1998), Eller and Coughlan (1996) or Rex (2001) do. It is true that in some occasions it might be more reasonable for individuals to form their group identity in terms of their political and economical interests, but they do not always do that and in spite of the all the disadvantages, they form and develop their ties on the basis of ethnicity (Rex 2001). However, this is not always the case. Cornell and Hartmann show the examples of those cases in which some individuals and even the whole group have changed their ethnic affiliation after they moved into somewhere else. They also give examples from those cases where the individuals express their hybrid or fragmented identities and they conclude their criticism as:

For the moment, however, the point is that primordialism has difficulty accounting for those persons who attach little importance to their ethnicity. More important, it is difficult to cope with change and variation from a primordialist point of view. By definition, primordial "givens" are not supposed to change or to vary much within the group. In the primordialist vision, "man is seen as a leopard who cannot change his ethnic spots...Both ethnic categories and the intensity of an individual's attachment to them, however, clearly vary across situations and over time. Furthermore, many individuals experience identity shifts, sometimes intentionally, over the course of their lives (Cornell and Hartmann 1998:50).

It can be argued that primordial attachment may not be as strong as Geertz and Shills think in many cases, they are rather contextual as many Circumstantialists would say. They are not static, fixed, or essential, but rather they are dynamic, changing, malleable, and sometimes multiple as a result of migration, exogamy, or change in status or in class position of individuals. Similar criticisms are made by the circumstantialists who see the ethnic identities as contextual and related to some common group interests.

2.2.2.4. Circumstantialist Perspective (Situationalism/Instrumentalism)

Putting it into simple words, from circumstantialist perspective, (also called situationalism or instrumentalism¹²) ethnic identities and bonds are products of manipulations of political elite to gaining or maintain some political or economical interest such as power, wealth or status. Cornell and Hartmann (1998) suggest that circumstantialism was also a reaction to assimilationist model and advocated by many including Glazer and Moynihan, Cohen, Roosens, and Patterson in order to show that the ethnic identities and groups are recreated for maintaining interests in New York (Glazer and Moynihan); that they are fundamentally political phenomena and they are a result of intensive struggle for positions of power, employment, taxation, funds, education and political positions in Nigeria (Cohen); they are organized by a utilitarian logic and can cause political mobilization as they did in the example of the affirmative action activism (Roosens); they are

¹² The theoretical approaches that explain ethnic identities and ethnic relations in terms of the contexts or situations that creates them are named as circumstantialism, situationalism and instrumentalism interchangeably.

contextual, meaning they can be formed if they provide solidarity for the economical and social struggle and they do may not be formed if they are not needed as we can see in the examples of Chinese immigrants to Jamaica and Guyana (Patterson). Thus, ethnic identities are formed if they provide some sorts of advantages and interest and they are not if they don't. It is basically depended on the contexts and circumstances. Putting ethnic identities this way means that ethnic identities come in many forms, they are fluid and contingent, changing from situation to situation depending on the interests of the groups (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). It also means to see ethnicity as a dependent variable instead of an independent variable. In this respect circumstantialism and primordialism are just the opposing theoretical approaches not only in their treatment of ethnicity but also in their methodological approaches too.

However, is it true to reduce ethnic identities and bonds into merely interests and see it as an instrument? Cornell and Hartmann make the distinction between instrumentalism and circumstantialism and say that ethnic identities and the formation of ethnic groups should not be seen merely as a matter of material interest. Indeed, the focus of the research should not be the interest but the circumstances due to the fact that circumstances may cause to form ethnic identities which in turn influence the group members' perceptions of their interests and the fact that some ethnic identities are formed "without the intervening mediation of interests" (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). Giving examples from some theoretical studies such as internal colonialism, split labor market theory, and middleman/enclave theory, Cornell and Hartmann argues that circumstantialism is strong in explaining some racial and ethnic antagonisms and how certain circumstances lead the formation of ethnic groups, but it is weak to explain those ethnic relations which are formed not on the basis of economical or political advantages.

Figure 2: Comparison of Primordialist and Circumstantialist Models of Ethnicity

Source; Cornell and Hartman 1998: 68

	<i>Circumstantial</i>	<i>Primordial</i>
Rationale for group formation	Either utility (access to political power, economic resources, status) or organizational experience (conditions sustain interactions)	Blood, kin, family; cultural connections rooted in circumstances of birth
Orientation of ethnic identities	Toward political, economic, and status interests	Toward local community interests, often not material but ideal
Key explanatory variables or terms	Circumstances, history, structured inequality	Nature, biology, culture, socialization
Nature of the ethnic tie	Instrumental, expedient, convenient—a matter of circumstance and choice	"Given," deeply rooted, not a matter of choice but of circumstantial inheritance
Relationship to history	Product of history, changing, variable	Rooted in history and tradition, stable, permanent
Relationship to circumstance	Product of circumstance	Unaffected by circumstance
Relationship between ethnicity and class	Often serves class interest	Prior to and preemptive of class interests
Role as social scientific variable	Dependent	Independent

As it can be seen in the figure above, primordialism and circumstantialism are two opposing theoretical approaches. They both have some strengths to explain some ethnic formations whereas have some weaknesses to explain other cases. However, this means that both of these approaches have some merits in understanding and explanation of the ethnic issues. Then, is it possible to combine these approaches? Is what Cornell and Hartmann (1998) calls ‘primordial circumstantialism possible? We can understand primordial ties in terms of Weberian subjectivism that is the view that ethnic identities and bonds exist because the individuals ascribe to them. It really does not matter if they really exist or not. The real reasons behind the ethnic formations might be many varieties of circumstances. However, when it is established once and seen as primordial by the members of the ethnic groups, then

they are primordial for the social scientists that are going to study the ethnic phenomena.

2.2.2.5. Constructionist Theory of Ethnicity

Other than these two dominant theoretical approaches to ethnicity, there are some alternative approaches. These are Horowitz's social psychological approach, Smith's ethno-symbolic approach and Barth's transactionalism which is also called constructionism. According to Hutchinson and Smith, Horowitz 'focuses on differential estimations of group worth, and on their collective stereotypes' using mainly Henri Tajfel's group psychology which we have discussed previously. Horowitz views that ethnic affiliations are based on kinship myths and the notion of group honor in respect to other groups and thus their strategies, including 'secession and irredentism,' can be studied in terms of the cultural and economical resources (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 9-10). However, for Horowitz, ethnicity is basically 'a family resemblance' and whether the blood ties are real or assumed, ethnic ties are formed based on the given kinship ties and despite the mutability of the ethnic boundaries and strategies, they are not simply reducible to economic interests (Horowitz 1998, Cornell and Hartmann 1998). While he holds the view that minimal primordialism can be defensible, he argues that combining the theoretical approaches of circumstantialism and primordialism is a fruitful endeavor (1998). Horowitz' main assumption is that ethnic phenomena including the ethnic conflicts can be studied in terms of group psychology, from categorization to stereotyping and creating cultural differences. Even though cultural differences may create differences in groups, groups also create cultural differences (Horowitz 1996, 1998).

The role of the myths and symbols of the past especially the myths about the origins of the ethnies and how they have been affective to shape the cultures of the current cultures of the ethnies are the main concerns of the theoretical approach called 'ethno-symbolists'. Hutchinson and Smith (1996:3-14) argues that the concept of ethnie for Smith's is almost the same as Schermerhorn's definition of ethnicity. The only difference is Rex does not think that ethnie must exist within a larger group or a

system. According to Smith and Armstrong the myths of the past have given strong push for the emergence of new ethnic identifications in the modern world. Even though this orientation may present much research richness, it is also criticized for being unable to comprehend the role of the material bases of the ethnic formations.

Anthropologist Fredrick Barth, who is known to be the founder of constructionist theory of ethnicity, opposes reducing ethnicity into culture as it is the case in many ethnicity studies (Barth 1996). He claims that ethnic groups must be thought as units of ascription which is attributed to them by others and by themselves in return and thus ethnic identities need to be seen eventually as forms of social organization. Ethnic groups are formed in their interactions with other groups and they define boundaries between them which create culture in the end and when the boundaries change, the culture of the group changes too. Even though there are culture guards, or signifiers such as language, dressing type, or food that provide the continuity of the boundaries, these can change from groups to groups and from contexts to contexts. However, the transactions across the boundaries help maintaining the boundary more durable (Barth 1996, Hutchinson and Smith 1996, Cornell and Hartmann 1998). According to constructionism interaction, which is a continuing process between the ethnic groups, is the key to explain the maintenance of the boundaries and the borders. Based on the interaction, the ethnic identities, ethnic groups and their ascriptions as well as the other's ascription about them change. Cornell and Hartmann, who also favor this approach, say:

That approach focuses on the ways ethnic and racial identities are built, rebuilt, and sometimes dismantled over time. It places interactions between circumstances and groups at the heart of these processes. It accepts the fundamental validity of circumstantialism while attempting to retain the key insights of primordialism, but it adds to them a large dose of activism: the contribution groups make to creating and shaping their own identities (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 72).

Adding Barth's constructionism, Cornell and Hartman (1998:81) suggest that three important concepts to explain the identity constructions are *boundary, the perceived positions, and the meaning*. Boundaries separate group members from the members and they involve a set of criteria such as "skin color, ancestry, place of origin, a

cultural practice, or something else—or a lot of things at once.” Which of these criteria are used is not important. It can be any criteria that signify the separate identities between the group members and nonmembers. Perceived position expresses the perceptions of the group members in relation to their positions relative to other groups in terms of status. What makes the difference between their group and the other groups according to them is a part of identity construction. Meaning here refers to the meanings attached to the identity either in simple forms such as ‘we’ and ‘they’ or complex ones that produce superior or inferior characteristics about themselves or the others. If there is any changes in any of these elements, the groups’ identity changes and is reconstructed.

Cornell and Hartmann’s categories of assigned and ascribed and thick and thin identities are also helpful to differentiate the different type and strength of the identities. Assigned identity means what other groups say about the group and the ascribed identity means what group claims about their characteristics. Thick and thin identity types are about how much identities have strength in organizing the groups’ daily behaviors and their interactions with the members of the group and the nonmembers (Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 82-85). However, the consciousness of the identity is not enough to form ethnic groups by itself. Perceived shared interests, shared institutions and shared culture are needed to establish and maintain solidarity among the members of the ethnic groups.

Constructionism combines primordial attachments to circumstantial contexts and acknowledges the dynamic, changing, fluid, and complex characteristics of ethnic identities and ethnic relations. It sees the significance of circumstances in the formation of ethnicities without neglecting the power of primordial attachments after they are formed. For this reason, we will attempt to utilize this theoretical approach to understand the ethnic identities we will study. This approach is also compatible with the theoretical and conceptual approaches about identity and group identity we have reviewed previously, namely symbolic interactionist tradition and Tajfel’s group identity. In the following section, the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis will be presented.

2.3. Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

Theoretical and conceptual framework of this study is formed by the symbolic interactionist approach to self and identity, advocated by Mead, Blumer and Kuhn and developed lately by the postmodernist symbolic interactionists like Norman Denzin, the social psychological approaches to identity and group identity, formulated by Tajfel and Turner, and those theoretical approaches which combine primordialism with circumstantialism such as the social psychological approach of Horowitz and constructionist approach formulated by Barth and advocated by Cornell and Hartman.

Thus, this study, following Symbolic Interactionists such as Mead, Blumer, Goffman, sees self and identity as an essentially social process developed through communication, face-to-face interaction and language and affected by the social structural and historical influences. It has the capacity to reflect us and be reflexive about ourselves. As we discussed above, there are internal differences between the theoretical approaches between Blumer's conception of self and Kuhn's perception of self. In this study, the self is thought in terms of Blumer's definition. I tend to view that even though the perceptions of self is influenced by the structural, economical and historical influences, we still need to pay particular attention to actor's definition of the situation if we are to comprehend the active, creative, dynamic, spontaneous, and fluid characteristics of the self . In this regard, we need to keep Goffman's identity management and the presentation of self in mind.

Due to the belief that the social world, I wanted to study, namely the identities and interactions of Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis in Ankara, has the ability to talk back, I wanted to go to the field and explore who are they according to not the researcher but themselves. I wanted to see their definitions of the situation and accept and conceptualize them. I also benefited from the postmodern symbolic interactionist conceptions of the self, utilizing their views about mutable, split, divided, and fragmented and multiple self regardless of the institutional and historical self definitions. It is true though this study could be extended through textual discourse

analysis, and comparative narrative analysis of cultural products to benefit from postmodernist or poststructuralist approaches.

Benefiting from both symbolic interactionist tradition and social psychology of Tajfel and Turner, I tend to see the identity, not in terms of merely individual psyche or cognitive property, but with its connection to the social world. Seeing identity as a social construct is common in both Freudian and Symbolic interactionist tradition. The same theme can be found in Cooleys' 'the self as it is perceived by others', and in Tajfel and Turner's, 'a social identity which reflects their membership in various groups to which they belong to'.

Even though Mead's attempt to overcome the duality of the personal identity or the self is acknowledged, the difference between the social and personal identity needs to be recognized as personal identity is expressed by more idiosyncratic expressions. Thus making such a distinction between individual identity and social identity, I wanted to see if the groups I study define themselves in terms of individual or social identities and if the groups attend particular values and emotional significance their group identities. I wanted to see if their self-concept and social identities as well as their categories shaped by religion, ethnicity, nationality, gender, profession etc. At the same time this theoretical approach allows us to see the multiple identities or a cut and fix type of self conceptions and group identities.

Using Tajfel and Turner's categorization, we can explain the formation of group belongingness which has also taken the attentions of sociologists and anthropologists, like Durkheim and Malinowski. From there, we have seen that group belongingness creates categories as it is suggested by Turner. Through categorizations, we both are able to understand things and also create positive feelings about ourselves by making comparisons.

Explaining that feeling of belongingness and the formation of group identities have been studied by many sociologists including the early sociologists such as

Durkheim, Malinowski, and Tonnies, we wanted to show that the formation of ethnic identities can be studied in terms of social psychological terms in general and symbolic interactionist terms in particular. As Thomas Eriksen expressed clearly, we cannot speak of ethnic identities in isolation, it is always in reference to others and as Cornell and Hartmann says it draws boundary between 'us and them'.

Subjective definition of the ethnicity defined by Weber and Schermerhorn is more compatible to symbolic interactionist perspective of the ethnic identities. Thus, even though there are some commonalities can be found in ethnic groups such as those offered by Nash, I prefer to view them in terms of how individuals ascribe to those meanings more than the so called objective qualities of the ethnic groups. Thus, emic definitions are more important than the analyst's definitions. For instance, studying the groups, I did not pay attention to real blood relations of the individuals with each other. Instead I wanted to see if they perceive any blood relationship with their own group. However, I wanted to see, if they have collectivity, real or putative common ancestry, shared history, shared culture, religious affinity, shared customs.

Even though ethnic relations have been studied within the theoretical approaches of Social Darwinism, Assimilationism, Primordialism, Circumstantialism, I have chosen to apply constructionism that is advocated by Barth, Horowitz, and Cornell and Hartman that utilizes both primordial elements with circumstantialism. This means that although primordial attachments might be very powerful and might explain much of the ethnic phenomena, we also need to see the weakness of primordialism as in the cases of many examples of ethnic identity switches, different levels of ethnic affiliations, and the circumstantial factors that affect these differences. Similarly, circumstantialism may explain the role of economic, social, political interests or the manipulations of the elite, but what about the cases when there are ethnic groups that are formed not on the basis of some utilitarian logic but because of the fact they feel they belong to ascribe to certain shared properties. Thus, considering the ethnic groups in Turkey in general and those in Ankara in particular, I hold the view that constructionism suggested by Barth and

followed by Cornell and Hartmann can fit the realities of these groups. Horowitz' social psychological approach to ethnicity is also incorporated to explain some of the ethnic relations in this study. Although ethnic identity is an independent variable in primordialism and a dependent variable for circumstantialism, it is used as both dependent and independent variable in this study.

In the following section, the literature on the Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi identities and relations will be reviewed.

2.4. Literature Review

Studying ethnic identities and intergroup relations from a micro level point of view in Turkey faces with some problems. One of the problems is about the scarcity of the scientific literature on the issue. Reviewing the studies on the ethnic groups in Turkey, one could come to realize that there is indeed scarcity of scientific studies of ethnicity and ethnic groups in Turkey. The scarcity of the studies can be categorized in three areas. Firstly, there is a scarcity of the micro level empirical research in contrast to macro level analysis. Studies about the ethnic groups are indeed mostly about the ethnic categories in Turkey. Most of the studies deal with the long term macro level social transformations, the impact of socio-political and economical and ideological structures in different eras of Turkish society. Although these studies provide us with useful information, they neglect the individual's accounts of who they are and who the others are for them. Secondly, compared to the ideological, political, and normative works that deal with the meaning, history, belief systems and the customs of the ethnic groups, there is a scarcity of empirical scientific analysis of the ethnic groups in Turkey both at micro level or macro level analyses¹³. Thirdly, the scientific analyses of the ethnic groups in Turkey usually deal with the intra-group relations such as family structure, customs, economic organization of life and

¹³ Vorhoff 2003 [1997] reviews the publications on Alevism and Bektashism in Turkey and says that there was a scarcity of publications until 1980's and After 1980's the publications has increased dramatically. Bozarlan (2003) also complains about the scarcity of empirical studies compared to normative books. Huseyin Bal also notices that there were only five sociological fieldwork on Alevism and Bektashism, four of which were MA thesis and one of which was a Ph.D. thesis until 1996.

so forth mostly in some rural areas of Turkey compared to those deal with the interethnic group relations whether in an urban or a rural setting.

Another important problem is the fact that there is a problem with conceptualizing and defining the categories due to the nature of the problem. Studies about the Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi identities and relations usually fall into the problem of definitions and categories. The concepts such as nationalism, religion, culture, language, minority, majority, citizenship and so forth all becomes the crucial concepts in defining these groups. One of the main problems we faced with categorization and conceptualization in relation to literature review is the fact that there is no scientific study about the Sunni groups who live in Turkey other than normative studies. Thus, one needs to go through the studies about the Muslims as a reference point which is also a problematic issue because of the fact that many Alevi groups define themselves as Muslims whereas many others see themselves as unique cultural groups.

The studies on the ethnic categories and groups could be categorized into the underlying theoretical approaches they hold such as Integrationist, Primordialist, Circumstantialist and Constructionist approaches. However, this causes a problem with the reading of the texts as they sometimes contain ‘cut and mix’ theoretical approaches to ethnicity. For instance, while some argue that the Kurds form a distinct ethnic group, they also explain how the Kurdish identity has changed and transformed throughout the history. Therefore, because most studies lack clarity in their underlying theoretical approach, I prefer classifying them in terms of their orientations. As it is mentioned above, most of the scientific studies on the ethnic groups in Turkey are not empirical studies. Most of them are historical documentary studies on the emergence, maintenance and transformations of Turkish, Kurdish, Alevi and Islamic (Sunni) identities. Only a few of the studies are based on field work on the members of these groups.

2.4.1. Macro Level Analysis of Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups in Turkey

The macro level analyses of Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevi can be divided into two categories. While studying these groups, I have come across to many macro level analyses of these groups. They are mostly conceptual, normative, and ideological works. Even the most scientific analyses seem to contain an underlying ideological approximation: we are all the same or we are different. Thus, even though it was not my intend to go such categories but considering the studies I have come across in my review, this categorization was too visible to ignore.

2.4.1.1. Macro Level Studies: We Are Different

The macro level analysis of the Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi identities in Turkey mainly fall into two categories. One of them views these groups as separate groups whose ethnicity have developed throughout the years as a result of modernization, and social, political and economical transformations in Turkey such as the development of nationalism, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the nation state, migration from rural areas to urban areas, the development of transportation and communication, or as a result of the elite manipulation. The other category holds the view that these groups are the different elements living together in harmony and constituting the Turkish national identity. According to this group, the ethnic conflicts are sourced from the separatist internal or external forces that are willing to divide the country or the people of the country into different groups.

Martin Van Bruinessen (1999) is one of the most known scholars of ethnic groups in Turkey and in the Middle East. In his book, *Kurdishness, Turkishness and Alevism*, he explains the formation of the Kurdish identity and the Alevi identity and the historical developments and changes in these identities in terms of Barth's and Smith's theoretical approaches. As we mentioned, Barth approached ethnicity as a matter of the maintenance of borders and Smith emphasized the role of the ancient myths in creating ethnies.

In his visit to northeastern Iran, he observes that the identities of these groups are not very clear to the members of these groups. In one of his researches, he tells a personal experience while talking to a young man in North-East Iran. He asks the boy if he was a Kurdish or an Azeri person. Bruinessen was shocked with the answer: "I am Kurdish, Azeri and Iranian." Trying to figure out what his ethnicity was Bruinessen asks him about the language he speaks at home. His mother spoke Kurdish only, but his father spoke both Kurdish and Turkish, and sometimes Persian. Then Bruinessen thought that his mother was Kurdish and his father was Azeri. However, the boy corrected him saying that his father was, too, Kurdish, Azeri and Iranian. Bruinessen did not ask if he was Sunni or Shia; however, he is content that the answer would not be clearer than the first one as the young generations in that region were not religious at all. This experience of Bruinessen shows that the ethnic categorization of the experts may not fit into the realities of the field. Like most of the other studies of ethnic groups and ethnic identities, Bruinessen emphasizes the richness of the ethnic categories in Turkey. This is because of the fact that the language, religious beliefs, decent ties as well as the cultural features present many varieties. Bruinessen tells that there are many dialects in the region and those who speak one of these dialects may not understand the other. One of these dialects is Kurmanj; the others are Zaza and Gorani in Turkey. The other dialect, Sorani is commonly spoken in Iraq and Iran. At the same time, there are some Kurd groups who speak Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Considering the effect of the national education programs on these people, they have different political cultures. For example, the Kurds from Iraq are Iraqis as much as they are Kurdish (pp. 9 - 10).

Religious beliefs, too present many varieties; thus it cannot be a unifying factor. Even though most of the Kurds are Shafis, a Sunni sect; there are other beliefs and sects which are also common in the region. Furthermore, the level of religiosity and the religious rituals are various, too. About 80 per cent of the Kurds are Sunnis according to Bruinessen, and the most of the rest are Alevis. But there are still many heterodox religious beliefs and sects such as Ehl-i Hak, Kakaism, Yezidism, as well as some Christians, Suryanis and Asuris in the region. Despite the fact that majority of the Kurdish Alevis speak Zaza, there are other Alevi groups who speak Kurmanj

or Turkish. And still, there are some Muslims who are not Kurdish in the region such as Arabs and Turkomen.

Bruinessen also talks about the varieties of Ashirets (called Eshiret in Kurdish), and those who do not belong to any of the Ashirets, which have an important effect on the definition of identity among the people of the region because of the fact that many individuals define themselves in terms of Ashirets. This fact is also pointed out in by Heckmann (2002 [1991]).¹⁴ Heckmann says Ashiret identity and ideology is as much important as the ethnic and national identities at least among the Sisin village of Hakkari (pp. 134 - 157).

Arguing the varieties of the elements which are considered as the main components of ethnicity, Bruinessen is attempting to show that none of these elements are indeed the constituting factors of the Kurdish identity for him. Unlike Gellner and Anderson, who emphasize the role of the technological and economical development in the formation of national identities, the Kurdish nationalism is not a result of social and economical transitions from rural to urban areas despite their roles in popularizing it. Modern means of communication, print, radio and tapes might have played an important role in the formation of the imagined community of the Kurds, but the Kurdish ethnicity had been formed much earlier than Kurdish nationalism.

Bruinessen explains the role of the famous Şerefname, written in 1597 by Şeref Han, the Emir of Bitlis saying that Şeref Han considered Kurmanj, Zazas and Goranis as well as Sunnis, Alevis and Yezidis as Kurdish even if he excludes the reaya, who do not belong to urban aristocracy or ashirets. Evliya Çelebi too talked about the Kurds as a separate nation including the Zazas, Alevis and Yezidis as well as the different dialects. Furthermore, Bruinessen talks about the significance of the Kurdish epic poem, Mem u Zin by Ahmed Hani (1650 – 1706) in creating Kurdish ethnicity.

Bruinessen argues that the ethnic identities of the Kurds were formed during the 1600s by these cultural products through creating some feelings of unity, territory,

¹⁴ According to Heckmann, the Ashiret system consists of Ocaks and tribes (kins and klans), which consist of Mals (households and sulales).

common Ashiret culture and ethos, common historical experience, the integrating role of the Emirates, and constituting the differences between themselves and the neighboring Arabic and Turkish Ashirets into the differences that make the differences. Even though this feeling of unity did not provide the political integration of the ethnies, the idea of Kurdish ethnicity was formed in the 16th century. However, until the 19th century, the idea of Kurdish ethnicity included only aristocratic elements and excluded the reaya. The ethnic identity of the Kurds has gained its political feature throughout the rebellions and revolts mostly led by sheiks (the religious leaders) in the 19th century. During this period, the Kurdish ethnicity was gradually Sunnized, and the Shia, Alevi and Yezidi Kurds were marginalized. In the 20th century, the first Kurdish cultural and political organizations were established, and the idea of autonomy and even the idea of secession from the Ottoman Empire gained support from the urban nationalists, and the Kurdish nation was formed as an imagined collectivity. This was the time when the lower strata of the Kurds were incorporated to Kurdish ethnicity. Then Bruinessen continues arguing the role of the secularization of the Kurdish ethnicity as a result of the secularization in Turkey, and the word ‘Kurmanj’, which used to define the villagers of the south eastern part of Turkey, has been equated the word ‘Kurd.’ During the 70s, with the development in media, mechanization in agriculture, immigration from rural areas to urban areas, the spread of education; the traditional social structure of the region where the Kurds live mostly changed. The Kurdish population in big cities increased dramatically. The ethno-nationalist organizations have increased the ethnic identity of the Kurds especially the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, and the migration as a result of this conflict pushed up the ethnic identity of the Kurds.

However, Bruinessen states that not all the Kurds today define themselves as part of the Kurdish nation. There are Kurds who are Turkisized, and affiliate themselves with Turkey in spite of the fact that some have accepted the Kurdish identity as a result of Kurdish nationalism. In the last twenty years, some people have shifted from Kurdish identity to Turkish identity and vice versa. With the increase of Islamism, some define themselves with Muslim identity.

In respect to Alevi, Bruinessen categorizes them into four language groups: The first one is the Azeri speaking Alevi of Kars who are close to Iranian Shiism. The second one is the Arabic speaking Alevi who live mostly in Hatay and Adana and close to the Syrian Alevi. The third and the fourth groups are Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza speaking Alevi who are descendents of Safevi. The Turkish speaking Alevi live mostly in central Anatolia, the Mediterranean and Aegean coastal areas, and the European part of Turkey. The Kurdish speaking Alevi live mostly in Tunceli. According to Bruinessen, Kurdish and Turkish Alevi reflect the Ottoman oppression, and for this reason, they lived mostly in mountainous and isolated parts of Turkey, and only after the 1950s, they started to migrate to towns and cities across Turkey. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, they supported the secular and populist ideas of Kemalism, and they voluntarily integrated to Turkish society. Even the Kurdish Alevi started to express themselves as Turkish instead of Kurdish. However, according to Bruinessen secularization of the country could not manage to end the Sunni prejudices and indeed, with the migration and integration of Alevi into cities and towns brought them face to face with the Sunni majority, and this brought some competition that caused some tension between these groups. As a result of this, some Sunni and Alevi neighborhoods occurred in some cities and towns. The polarization during the 70s made things worse between these groups and some of the Alevi were allied with the extreme left groups. As a result of the migration to the cities, with the increase in education and the media, and as a reaction to the Sunni Islamism, Alevi cultural identity has been formed after the 70s and onwards. This is what Bruinessen as well as many others who study the current Alevi identity call as Alevi revolt.

The themes in Bruinessen have actually occupied most of the macro level analysis of the Kurdish and Alevi identity in Turkey. However, we need to mention those who emphasize the role of the emergence and development of the Turkish nationalism particularly because of the fact that ethnic groups are formed as part of its opposition. Many studies consider the emergence of the Kurdish national identity as a reaction to Turkish national identity and Alevi identity as a reaction to Sunni Islamism. First, we will mention the studies that deal with the Kurdish identity and ethnicity. For

instance, Ahmet Yıldız (2001) focuses on the two faces of the Turkish nationalism, and claims that the shift from the early Turkish nationalism that was inclusive of all the Turkish citizens especially the Muslim elements and defining the non-Muslim elements as minorities to the later interpretation of nationalism which tend to define Turkish national identity in terms of ethnic definition of Turkishness. With the rising of the latter, Turkish official ideology systematically tried to Turkisize all the ethnic identities through assimilationist policies to the degree that banned to define oneself as Kurdish and speak Kurdish in public. Yıldız maintains that the Kurdish ethnic identity has been formed as a reaction to hard Turkish nationalism and its assimilation policies. Many other studies can be added to this type of analysis such as Atabaki (2005), Bozarslan (2005), Kutlay (1997), Özoğlu (1996) and McDowal (1992).

Yeğen's (1996) work differs from most of the studies mentioned above in respect to his methodology. He applies mostly textual analysis of official and unofficial texts to uncover the official discourse about the Kurds. According to him, the official discourse is not manipulating the history and the culture of the Kurds on purpose, but the problem is sourced from the problems of modernity. It is about the nation building after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Apart from this type of analysis, there are many studies which give encyclopedic information about the history, culture, language, religion, literature, art etc. about the Kurdish people such as Andrews (1992[1989]), Izady (1992), Kutlay (2001), Blau (1996) O'shea (1996) and Eagleton (1996). However, these works should be considered in terms of constructing history with a political intent for ethnic or national identities, too. And there are also some studies on the different sub-categories of the Kurds such as heterodox Kurds or Jewish Kurds such as Eriş (2006) and Ünlü (2006).

Studies about the Alevi identity and ethnicity is not very unrelated to the studies on Kurdish identity and ethnicity because of the fact that some Alevis are Kurds and speak Kurdish as we have mentioned before. However, there is a distinction which is

usually made in most studies that while Kurd is an ethnic or language category, Alevi is a religious category. The macro Level studies about the Alevi that deal with Alevism as a separate ethnic group or identity focuses on how the religious identity of Alevi turn into a cultural or ethnic identity in spite of their internal differences such as Turkish Alevism, Kurdish Alevism, Alevi-Bektashism etc.

As Vorhoff (2003) says the early literature on Alevism were created usually by Sunni scholars and the underlying theme were Alevi and Bektashi are part of Islam and with the emergence of conflict in the East part of Turkey, the main concern included the claims about Turkishness of Alevism and Bektashism. Vorhoff says that we can talk about four phases of Alevi literature. About 1980s, there was a boost in Alevi literature written by Alevi scholars. As it is mentioned above, most of this literature focuses on what Alevism is and gives comprehensive information about Alevism including the historical developments as well as definitions and descriptions of some key concepts and beliefs¹⁵. This was the first phase of the Alevi literature according to Vorhoff. The second phase dealt with the issues regarding practical methods such as the restoration of the Alevi and Bektashi tombs and cemevis, and the guidebooks about the rituals, prayers and other Alevi practices. The third phase of the Alevi literature concerned mainly with reorganizing Alevism resisting against the other (Sunni and the state), and unifying the ethnic Alevi sub-groups. The last phase consists of the journals and magazines that provide the needs for the communication among Alevi. The academic studies on Alevi as an ethnic group usually focus on four key periods. The first period is about the earliest period of Alevi beliefs and Turkey. The second period is the period when the republic was established. The third period is the 1960s – 70s when Alevism and the left established a coalition. The last period is 1980s and 1990s which is usually called Alevi revivalism.

According to Bozarslan (2003), the common postulates in the academic studies are:

The Alevi were repressed by the despotic Sunni Ottoman state for centuries and were opposed to it; later on, they contracted an alliance with the ‘secular’ Kemalist against Sunni domination and theocracy; in the post-Kemalist period,

¹⁵ See Engin and Engin (2004)

they become once again, opponents of the ‘anti-secularist’ and ‘reactionary’ state. This changing attitude is to be explained by the democratic and secularist nature of Alevism, which ‘naturally’ contracted an alliance with the ‘left-wing’ opposition in Turkey (p. 3).

Bozarslan criticizes these postulates and says that their conceptual ground consists of very normative concepts and for this reason; it cannot be of much use in explaining the Ottoman and Turkish history. His second criticism concerns some methodological issues. The methodological standpoints of these postulates consist of long term historical analyses which are not based on empirical evidences; discontinuity in the nature of the state under the Kemalist regime; and a new radical change of the nature of the state’s returning to its old essence, Sunnism and despotism. Bozarslan complains about lacking of empirical studies and says that “thanks to this research technique, the three postulates eluded any empirical questioning and were reproduced in one book after another (p. 4).”

Apart from the issues Bozarslan mentions, two of the main concerns of the academic studies on Alevism are the diversity of Alevism in Turkey and the switching of Alevi identity from religious to political or cultural one¹⁶. As it is mentioned above, Bruinessen (1997)¹⁷ talks about the diversity of the Alevis in Turkey. This diversity can be seen in the languages spoken among the Alevis; namely Azeri, Turkish, Kurmanj, Zaza and Arabic, in their descents that are Kurdish, Zaza, Turkish, Azeri and Arabic, and in the religious beliefs which are Kızılbaş¹⁸ (Alevi), Bektashi, Caferi, Nusayri and Tahtaci. There is also a distinction between those who aim to see Alevism as the true interpretation of Islam, and those who see Alevism as a separate religious belief. Most of the other articles I have come across during my study debate

¹⁶ I owe the concept of switching to Georg Elwert (1997b). “Switching refers to a. Alternations between reference frames and b. Moves between different, more or less, inclusive conceptions of the group’s boundary.”

¹⁷ This article is actually published in his book (1999).

¹⁸ The word ‘Kızılbaş’ is considered as a pejorative name for Alevis for some while it should be preferable name for others. While some consider Kızılbaş as a general name for both Alevis and Bektashis (Bozarslan, 2003, p. 5), some consider it a name for Zaza Alevis and separate it from Bektashis, or Kurdish Alevis (White, 2003). According to Mélikoff (2003 [1999], p. 9), Kızılbaş means someone with a red hat. It dates back to the time of Sheik Haydar (1460 - 1488), the father of Shah Ismail of Safavits. They are called Kızılbaş because of the red hat they wore. They used to wear a red serpush with twelve sides. It used to be called Tac-i Haydari (Haydar’s Crown). Because Kızılbaş gained a pejorative meaning during the Ottoman time, the word ‘Alevi’ was started to be used.

either the diversity or the change in the Alevi identity in time parallel to the social and political changes in Turkey (White and Jongerden 2003, Olson et. al. 2003 [1999]).¹⁹

For instance, according to Şener (1995), Anatolian Alevism is shaped by three factors: the first one is the political problems between the Sunnis and the Alevi regarding the choice of the Khaliph after Muhammad's death; the second one is the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Turks before they migrated to Anatolia, and the third one is the belief systems of the local people of Anatolia before the Turks immigrated to Anatolia. Şener asserts that the Sunnis suppressed the Alevi and the Bektashis under the reign of the Ottoman rulers. Starting with Mustafa Kemal's secular policies and principles with the foundation of modern Turkish Republic, Alevi affiliated themselves with secular groups, and this has increased the differentiation between the Alevi and the religious Sunni groups. For Şener, Alevism should be thought as a historically resistant group.²⁰ Şener, however, believes that Alevism and Bektashism are the representatives of the cultural richness of the Turkish society, and the integration between these rich groups can be maintained by acknowledging the differences. For Şener, although there are Kurdish Alevi as well, the language of Alevism is mainly Turkish, and Alevism indeed is part of "true Islam."

2.4.1.2. Macro Level Studies: We Are the Same

The following studies are macro level studies that emphasize the togetherness of the groups as members of the Turkish society. The underlying theoretical approach is that these groups have lived together for centuries without ethnic clashes. The differences are seen as the richness of the country and the culture. How about the clashes? The macro level approaches that emphasize the unity of the groups see the problems as a result of either some external forces or the separatist political elite or

¹⁹ See also Çamuroğlu, 2005 [1992] for the transition of traditional religious Alevi identity to politically oriented Alevi identity. See also Kirkbudak, Journal of Anatolian Folk Beliefs for the number of articles that discuss the transition of Alevi identity.

²⁰ See also Çamuroğlu (1997 and 2005[1992]), Tuğsuz (2002) and Schüler (2002 [1999]) for the discussion about the relationship between left-wing politics and Alevism around 1970s and the rising Alevi identity in and after 1990s. See also Çakır (2003 [1999]) for discussion about the similarities and differences between political Alevism and political Sunnism.

the economical or social development such as the lack of economical evenness or underdevelopment etc.

Servet Mutlu (2002), for instance, emphasizes the role of the uneven economical development in the Eastern and Western part of Turkey on the ethnic conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish national state. According to him, the movements with the political orientation in the East cause economic underdevelopment of the region, and this in turn turns the problems into a political one legitimatizing the demands of the ethnic movements. Similarly, Kirişçi and Winrow (1997) examine the ethnic problem in terms of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the Turkish nation state, the assimilationist policies and the emergence of the terrorism, and the international dimensions of the problem, and say that this problem could be resolved by the betterment of the human rights, more democratization and the increase of the multi-culturalism.

İçduygu et. al examine the ethnic problem in terms of material and non-material security. Based on 1993 Turkish demographic and health survey, they claim that “Kurdish population in Turkey is relatively much worse off than the Turkish population in the country.” This is the most important factor in the Kurdish revival.

In his study of ethnic discrimination in England, France, Spain and Turkey, Aytekin Yılmaz (1994) sees the ethnic problems of Turkey have increased because of the armed struggle of a terrorist organization. However, he refers to Piar – Gallup research in 1992, which finds out that 33 per cent of the elites, 55 per cent of the Turks think that the problem is a result of terrorist organization while one per cent of the Kurds think that the problem is sourced from the terrorist organization. He maintains that there are other reasons of the ethnic conflict: 1. The problems sourced from the political structures; 2. The problems sourced from the economic structure; 3. The style of Turkish state’s discourse; 4. The political ideas and role of the symbols; 5. The different attitudes of the different generations and; 6. The perspectives of the perceptions and the equation of negotiation. Thus, the ethnic problem between the Turks and the Kurds are not solely about terror. Therefore, the

solution to the problem should be more than dealing with terrorism, and the most of important of this is to create the integration through interaction.

2.4.2. Micro Level Analysis of Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups in Turkey

The micro level analysis of the ethnic identities and the groups who live in Turkey did not take much attention from the social scientists. Surprisingly, most of the micro-level studies on ethnic categories or identities have the underlying approach that Turkish society lives in harmony in terms of ethnicity with all differences. The studies of Orhan Türkdoğan (2006a and 2006b) are good examples to review. Applying both emic and etic definitions, and relying on his findings based on his participant observation, deep interviews, and surveys about 24 different groups in Turkey, Türkdoğan's book (2006a) is still one of the most comprehensive books about the ethnic groups in Turkey.

Criticizing Peter Andrews, whose book (1992 [1989]), which is also one of the most comprehensive studies about the ethnic groups in Turkey, he says if there are 47 ethnic groups in Turkey, this means that they kept their identities and existence without melting them in the melting pot (!) unlike those ones in the western countries (2006a: 15). Türkdoğan views ethnicity in its objective definition and thinks that at least one of the characteristics of having common descents, language or religious beliefs should be different from that of the majority group. Based on Milliyet Newspaper's survey, whose findings indicate that only 3.7 % people define themselves with any other identity than being Turkish, Türkdoğan disagrees that Turkey is a pool of ethnic groups. Both of his study attempts to show that Alevi and Bektashis, the Kurds and Zazas are not very different from the majority. For him, the Kurdish which consists of Kırmanj, Zaza and Kirdash (2006a:112) is not a different language than Turkish. Following Ziya Gökalp, Türkdoğan views that Kurdish is a dialect, not a language (p. 120). Similarly, the Kurds and Turks have the same descents. And their beliefs are not different from that of the Turks. For these, reasons the Kurds cannot be thought as an ethnic group. Neither can they be thought as a minority group. Türkdoğan sees the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish

national State as a conflict between the separatist movement and the state as a result of internal and external forces not a conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. His research in Sünnetçiler Köyü presents an interesting finding about changing, transiting character of ethnic groups. According to him, this village has been sunnized in years.

Similarly, relying on his research conducted in five Southeast provinces and 49 villages in 1993, Kayhan Mutlu (2006 [1997]) contributes to the debate about the identity in Turkey. He indicates that the local Kurds do not see their problem as an identity problem but a problem with the government policies or other economical problems such as poverty, unemployment etc. Mutlu also criticizes those studies that apply double standards: applying refined and detailed scientific analysis when studying western societies and implying only overgeneralized approaches to Turkish society without seeing the differences between Turkish and Western societies such as American society in terms of ethnic differentiations (Mutlu 2006: 78-91).

In his study on the Alevi and Bektashi identity Türkdoğan (2006b) argues that the Alevi and Bektashis in Turkey do not differ from the majority Sunnis in terms of the main belief system²¹. Based on his research in 47 provinces and 45 villages in Turkey, Türkdoğan attempts to show that Sunni and Alevi-Bektashi belief systems stem from the same origin in spite of their internal richness.

Hüseyin Bal (1997a) conducted a research in the villages of Isparta and Burdur on Alevi – Bektashi social institutions. In this study, he deals with social institutions such as marriage, household, structure, religion, and culture. He asserts that even though there was a differentiation between Alevi and Sunni identities and this was because of the fact that there were strong assimilation policies in the past, this is changing due to democratization and dialogs (p. 172-184). In his other study (1997b), Bal conducted a study in two villages of Isparta, where both Alevi and Sunnis live together. Due to the sameness of the belief system in spite of the

²¹ In his article “Alevism are not minorities,” Hüseyin Tuğcu (2005) defends the position that Alevism and Sunnism are not very different from each other. Indeed, Alevi – Bektashism is part of Turkish Sufi culture, and those who perceive conflicts between these two groups are either the foreign or internal so called intellectuals.

differences in sub-cultural level, language unity and living together for a long period and the necessity of interacting with each other because of the limited social environment rendered these communities closer to each other. Based on Türkdoğan's opinions, Bal thinks that Alevi – Sunni phenomenon needs to be considered in terms of integration because neither Alevism nor Sunnism can be considered outside the trinity of Allah, Muhammad and Koran. In respect to differentiation, Bal, based on Amiran Kurtkan Bilgiseven's analysis of the reasons of the differentiation between Alevism and Sunnism states that the factors affecting the differentiation between these two groups can be classified into three reasons: One of these factors is the Ottoman policy of the opportunities given to non-Turkic elements of the society compared to the Turkic origins. The second reason is Iran's provocations during the reign of Shah Ismail, and the third reason is the wrong social cultural policy of the late Ottoman rulers under the influence of the Ulema, who could not comprehend the true nature of Alevi formulation of the difference + cem.

In spite of the fact that the respondents differentiate each other in terms of different interpretations of Islam such as Alevi – Bektashi perception of Sunnism as strict Sheria rules, and thus deviation from the essence of Islam and Sunni perception of Alevi – Bektashism as deviation from Islam and the synthesis of Islam with the pre-Islamic beliefs of Turkish culture, the integration between the groups could have been maintained by the virtue of shared and common culture especially the spiritual elements of culture. According to Bal, the differences which are presented as problems are regarded as natural or spontaneous differences among the respondents.

Yahya Mustafa Keskin (2004) defends the same position in his research, conducted in Sünköy, Elazığ. He holds the view that Sunnis and Alevis of Turkey can be integrated even though Sunni and Alevi differences are advocated by some separatist projects. He supports his idea with his findings that show correlation between the age and the perception of Alevism. According to the findings, older respondents perceive Alevism as a belief system which is located in Islam whereas the younger respondents see Alevism as an identity of revolt or resistance. Similar correlation can be found between the educational level and expressing the identity. When the level

of education increases, respondents have a tendency to express themselves as a part of ideological groups such as Marxist, whereas the respondents with lower education express themselves as members of religious groups such as Alevi or Bektashi. Keskin, too, expects that the differences can be resolved through interaction between the groups which is inevitable as the result of social and economical changes of Turkey.

Similarly, Cengiz (2002) studied the social cultural structure and political tendencies of an Alevi-Bektashi group, as well as their conceptions of Alevi-Bektashism and Sunnism in of Çamiçi District of Tokat. He finds out that about a quarter (%23) of the respondents define Sunnis as out-group (yezid) and about 23 percent of them believe that being married to a Sunni person makes someone mundane in his Alevi religiosity. However, more than half of them would marry a Sunni person. Cengiz also indicates that 44 percent of the respondents support the politicization of Alevi identity, while 45 percent feel that it would harm Alevism. Cengiz argues that Alevism is indeed a Turkish element.

Based on her research on Almancıs who returned back to their town permanently in Turkey, Rittersberger-Tılıç (2003 [1999]) interviewed 184 people, 70 per cent of whom were Alevis. She visited the town in 1988 and 1996. Her concern was to see how Almancı identity turned into Alevi identity. She found out that with their financial support and also the leadership, they have established a vakıf where the local Alevis get together and participate in some activities. Tılıç tells that when the Almancıs returned to their town, they got reaction from the non-Alevi people of the town, and they were considered as *kirli* (dirty) by the non-Alevi people. In return, they developed their Alevi identity and as a result of this, they helped the community to express their identity, and pursue more rights.

Doğruel (2005) studied the Nusayri Alevis, Arab Christians and Armenians who live in Hatay in terms of inter and intra-group occupational relations, marital relations, everyday relations, religious and political matters. As opposed to the many other studies, she finds out that living in multi-cultural city, town and villages develops

some kinds of interactions that lead to close relationship among the different ethnic groups. The nature of this relationship is based on Durkheim – type of organic relationship in occupational relations. Even though the marriage relations used to be more endogamic than now, it is changing in time through education and migration to other cities and towns. Interestingly enough, the ethnic group is much tolerant to one another's religious beliefs and rituals in such a way that they participate in each other ceremonies and this increases the positive interaction among the groups. In respect to political approaches, these three ethnic groups have similar tendencies that have been traditionally left wing politics and parties. This tendency is usually expressed as progressive secular modern or left politics. Doğruel's study among the members of the three different ethnic groups can be evaluated in terms of constructivist approach due to the fact that these groups keep their primordial attachments to their own ethnicity, but at the same time develop their relations with other groups which is different than what it used to be as a result of more interaction with one another and social changes throughout the country.

Yapıcı (2004) analyzes in group and out group perceptions of Sunni and Alevi groups and the social distance between them. His aim is to discuss the factors that determine the relations between these groups from a socio-psychological approach. He finds out that the religious and social identities of the groups are the main determiners of the social distance. His findings show that the groups define their own groups with favorable adjectives in contrast to the negative adjectives for the others.

2. 5. Overcoming the Dualities

Reviewing the studies on ethnic categories in Turkey, we have noticed that most studies are conducted with a political intent. In such a way that political positions of the studies can be judged with the categorization they make. The terms such as identity, ethnic identity, ethnic groups, religious and cultural identities, and national identity are so politicized that one is not able to speak about them without referring to the political consequences of even the categorization. This is of course partly related to the nature of the categorization itself. Once one categorizes oneself in

terms of groups and if these groups are may turn into a politically oriented group in some contexts, it may be too difficult for one to escape doing research, which is without political implications. However, ethnicity or ethnic identities do not necessarily bear political orientations de facto. And even if so, the role of the researcher is not political at all. The nature of the academic concerns is much more comprehensive than intellectual activities with political concerns. There are a lot to explore in people's lives and relations and social science is a way to find out about them. Ethnic studies is too one-way to approach the social realities of the people. It categorizes the people in terms of ethnicity but only if the individuals already categorize themselves, identify or affiliate themselves with others in terms of ethnic ties.

It is true that some of the studies about the ethnic categories in Turkey stemmed from the idea that corresponds to early American ethnic studies. People of difference should get together in a melting pot and create the American society despite their differences. However, this approach is criticized by many scholars. For instance, Glazer and Moynihan (1996 [1963] p. 135-138) say that there has never been a melting pot in America. Even though there is an important difference between American melting pot and Turkish national identity, the point they share in common is that both the American assimilationist theorists and the Turkish integrationist approaches expect the different ethnic groups to be incorporated into the majority society's culture and institutions. However, the difference between assimilation and integration is important to be clarified. Apart from the fact that integration does not have negative connotations as assimilations do, the former refers to articulation, or incorporation of the elements into the whole. In this case, it refers to the articulation or incorporation of Alevi or the Kurds into the 'whole' (Turkish society). However, assimilation refers to turning the foreign elements into 'us'. In our case this means to Turkisize the Kurds or to sunnize the Alevis. However, both the former and the latter bear some weaknesses because of their connotations to incorporating immigrant groups into the whole of the host society. Lale Yalçın Heckman (1995) argues that assimilation, integration, acculturation all stemmed from the problems integrating immigrant groups into the western societies. However, considering the groups in

terms of pluralist or multiculturalist perspective, all of these categories will not fit into the reality of multi-ethnic nations whose ethnic categories are local people but not immigrants. And for this reason, like assimilation, the concepts of integration or acculturation are not useful to apply to Turkish society.

It is also true that some other studies we have reviewed consider ethnic groups as separate groups and emphasize the differences between groups. It is also true that these kinds of differences might make differences in the relations of the groups with one another. And it is also true that assimilationist approach fail to acknowledge and appreciate the differences. However, do these differences necessarily mean that these groups are in primordial conflicts that cannot be resolved? Do those individuals who perceive themselves as the Kurds or Alevi feel that they have to keep social distance between themselves and with those who define themselves as Turks or Sunnis in terms of political conflict? And if so, the academic achievement would be to find out under which conditions do they feel this way. However, we also know that these groups have been able to find some grounds to communicate, interact, establish and maintain firm relations with one another whether they define themselves in ethnic, religious, political, or ideological terms. What is important here is to acknowledge and appreciate the differences while finding the common ground for the dialogue. The empirical studies that are based on fieldwork actually guide us showing that those who are in interaction with one another have better understanding and positive feelings towards each other.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with the definitions of the key concepts, methodological approach of the study, the type of the study and the issues regarding the data collection and analysis of the data.

As we have discussed in previous chapter, both the lay people and the social scientists categorize things and people to make sense of things. One way to categorize people is based on ethnicity, which affects the relationship between people in various ways. The scope of this study is to focus on the ethnic relations in Turkey. This is a study about how the people who live in Turkey identify themselves and how their senses of identity affect their perceptions of the major ethnic categories in Turkey. According to some studies, main ethnic categories in Turkey are Turkish and Kurdish groups in terms of language and Sunnis and Alevis in terms of religious beliefs (see Andrews 1992 [1989]). Many researches argue that the ethnic groups in Turkey have some essential problems and conflict, which cannot be resolved, while others have a tendency to neglect the problems. This study is meant to explore how the subjects see the others in respect to their ethnic groups. In sum, the problem of this research is to explore and describe the individuals' perception of themselves and their relations with others in terms of ethnicity.

3.1. Methodological Approach of the Study

This is a study about the perceived group identity and social distance between some ethnic groups who live in Ankara. The purpose of the thesis is not developing a general scientific model or a general theory about formation of ethnic identities or explanation of the dynamics of ethnic relations in general. On the contrary, the study

aims to understand and describe the ‘local’ peoples’ perception, behavior and attitudes towards each other from the respondents’ point of view. This approach to ‘studying a social phenomenon’ fall into symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology for a few reasons:

- 1- It aims to understand the phenomena from the individuals’ point of view. Instead of analyzing the ethnic groups and identity in Turkey through macro-level analyses such as seeing it as a result of modernization, collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Emergence of nationalism, establishment of the nation-state etc., it attempts to understand and analyze the individuals’ definition of the situation.
- 2- It aims to show that ethnic identities are not fixed in nature; on the contrary, it is fluid and changes according to some sociological variables.
- 3- It emphasizes the significance of interaction in the development of ethnic identities.
- 4- It also utilizes the data collection techniques that are rather used in micro-level analyses such as questionnaire and deep interview.

These issues mentioned above need to be clarified in terms of studying the social phenomena by applying scientific procedures. Positivist approaches such as structuralism and functionalism hold the view that sociology can use the same procedures that natural sciences apply because of the belief that natural sciences are neutral and value-free and thus, sociology can be, too. From this perspective, science is a set of procedures that look for regularities and order about social objects. Natural sciences have the features of being logical, general, specific, causal, valid, reliable, testable and value-free. These features make natural sciences scientific. From a positivist perspective, sociology could be as scientific as natural sciences because sociology can have these characteristics, too. Sociological studies can find out the regularities between events and cause and effect relationship just as natural scientists do. Sociology can use inductive and deductive logic, and create valid relationship between the majoring tools and variables, and reliable measurements by getting the same results if applied by others. Sociology also can generalize their findings just

like the way natural scientists do. Using valid and reliable procedures to verify or refute, sociological claims differ from other sorts of claims such as ideological, sociological and philosophical ones. This kind of approach to sociology considers the social facts as something out there and ready to be discovered, and explained.

On the other hand, interpretivism such as symbolic interactionism emphasizes that there are no realities outside our interpretations. Realities are social realities just objects are social objects. We give meaning and create them constantly on everyday basis. The realities are hidden in the world of symbols and meanings, and one needs to dig them using appropriate methodologies such as participant observation, ethnographies, deep interviews, etc. to explore those meanings. This methodological approach acknowledges the subjective account of the scientific endeavors as Weber views that our interest in things and events are painted by our culture. I also maintain that our underlying assumptions about the social realities cannot be free from our positions within class structures, cultural backgrounds, gender types, and group belongingness and such.

3.1.1. Definitions

Even though we have argued most of the key concepts in the previous chapter used in this thesis, it would be useful to give brief definitions of the key concepts as well as some concepts, which we have not defined before.

- a. Identity: In this study identity is referred as the sum total of the individual's thoughts and feelings about whom and what they are. Following the interactionist tradition, identity is considered as a continuing process of structuring oneself within the interplay between how one sees oneself and how he/she is seen by others in interaction with others.
- b. Group identity/Ethnic Identity: Group identity is individuals' sense of who and what he/she is in terms of his/her similarity with others. It emerges from individuals' realization that he/she is similar to the other members of the

group he/she belongs to. This realization also makes individuals perceive himself/herself different from the others. If these similarities and differences are drawn in terms of ethnic elements than we called it ethnic identity.

- c. Ethnicity: Ethnicity is considered here in terms of the definition made by Weber, Schermerhorn and Cornell and Hartman, whose definitions were discussed in the previous chapter. According to this, ethnicity is considered a collectivity that has the following characteristics: (a) real or putative common ancestry, (b) memories of a shared past, (c) common cultural markers or symbolic elements such as kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these.
- d. Ethnic category refers to the categories shaped by others about the group of people in terms of their difference from the group based on the elements of ethnicity. This definition is based on Tajfel's definition of the social category, which "refers to a group of people whose "defining feature is socially neutral and does not allow us to draw conclusions (rightly or wrongly) about them" (Jones 2002: 14).
- e. Unlike ethnic category, ethnic group is shaped by the members of the group through internalization of the features, which are assigned to them by others. Again Tajfel's definition of a social group is useful here: If the feature of the group is "considered a meaningful distinguishing feature, such that the feature of the group were "singled out and treated differently", then it is a social group (Jones 2002: 14). Thus, we can say that if the feature of the group that is singled out is an ethnic element such as language, religious belief etc., then it will be used here as an ethnic group.
- f. Stereotyping / Prejudice / Discrimination: It might be useful to define these three concepts together in order to show the relations among them. Preju-

dice and discrimination are two different concepts though mostly used instead of the other (Jones, 2002, p: 3).

There are different definitions of prejudice among the social psychologists. Allport (1954) defines it as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization.” According to Simpson and Yinger (1965), it is “an emotional, rigid attitude . . . toward a group of people.” Another definition of prejudice by Fishbein (1996) is “an unreasonable negative attitude towards others because of their membership in a particular group.” And Jackson (1992) defines it as “differential evaluations that are based solely on category membership” (quoted in Jones, 2002, p: 3).”

Prejudice, thought as an *attitude* toward members of other groups, has positive aspects as well as negative ones. Both favoring members of one’s own group and disapproving the out-group members, namely positive and negative attitudes are regarded as prejudice. If you do not like someone just because of his or her own behaviors or beliefs or manners, it is not prejudice. However, if your ideas and thoughts of that person are rooted in the specific group he or she belongs to, and then it would be prejudice. Victoria Esses and her colleagues (1993) claim that prejudice studies should be similar to studies on attitude since prejudice is a kind of attitude. Attitudes toward social groups can be classified as follows in terms of information sources: affective information, cognitive information and behavioral tendencies.

As an attitude, prejudice enables to unify stereotyping, discrimination and such concepts. While prejudice corresponds to affective response to social groups, stereotypes are cognitive disclosure of prejudice, and discrimination is the behavioral display of prejudice. Therefore, negative stereotype may result in prejudiced attitude, and prejudiced attitude may turn into discrimination.

The following can be the exemplification of the forms they are put into:

“Members of Group X are lazy and unreliable (Negative Stereotype). I do not like Group X (Prejudiced Attitude), and I prefer not to get in touch with them in work, or neighborhood (Discrimination). So prejudice is ‘not liking’

members of a certain group (X); stereotyping is 'believing them' to be of certain characteristics such as lazy, unreliable; and discrimination is having a kind of exclusory behavior and manners towards those members. It should be noticed that stereotypes can cause prejudice, and prejudice may bring about discrimination. On the other hand, it is important to note that these concepts do not always lead to one another (Jones, 2002, p. 4 - 5).

- g. Stigma is used here as defined by Erving Goffman, who traced the meaning of the word to its Greek origin and said that stigma is "bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier" (quoted in Jones, 2002, p. 15). Stigmas are meant to signify the people as either criminal or slave or someone to keep distance from. For Goffman, there are three types of stigmas: "(a) *tribal stigmas*, such as membership in devalued racial, ethnic, or religious groups, (b) *abominations of the body*, including physical deformities and disabilities, and (c) *blemishes of individual character*, such as addiction, homosexuality, and imprisonment" (quoted in Jones 2002:16).
- h. Social distance refers to the distance between different groups of society on the basis of racial, ethnic, sexual, and class differences and so forth. This concept emphasizes the fact that different groups are not closed to one another because of their social differences, and the distance is usually assessed by measurements developed by social psychologists.

3.2. The Type of the Study

In respect to the purpose of the research, it needs to be delivered that this research is a mix of an exploratory and a descriptive study. Exploratory "research is conducted to explore a topic and provide a beginning familiarity with that topic." On the other hand, a descriptive study intends to "describe the situations and events" that is being observed by the researcher (Babbie, 1995, p. 84 - 85). Due to the willingness for a better understanding of the topic and describing the situation rather than explaining the reasons of the situation in a causal relationship, I have chosen this type of a research. By definition, exploratory and descriptive studies do not intend to verify or

refute any theories. But this does not mean that descriptive and explanatory do not have a theoretical framework to study the phenomena. Indeed, our purpose is to explore and describe how some groups who are defined as ethnic groups perceive their identities, and what they think about one another using a symbolic interactionist tradition combined with constructionist theory of ethnicity and utilizing some concepts and techniques of social psychology of inter-group relations.

3.3. The Assumptions of the Thesis

All theoretical approaches and scientific investigations necessarily have some assumptions. Assumptions are the underlying ontological and epistemological approaches and beliefs about the reality that are not tested in contrast to the hypotheses. Assumptions set the background of the researcher's perspective on the social reality he/she is studying. It is the honesty of the researcher to acknowledge and express his/her assumptions clearly in his/her studies. My assumptions about the reality I am attempting to explore and understand as follows:

- 1- Social realities including self, identity, ethnic identity, ethnic categories and groups are socially constructed.
- 2- Categorization is an inevitable process we use in order to understand and make sense of the realities. However, categorization necessarily involves interpretations, too. Thus, they are not essentially and universally valid.

It is also assumed that the respondents filled in the questionnaires and the interviewees responded my questions sincerely. Their responses represent their individual perceptions to the questions asked by the researcher.

3.4. Hypotheses of the Research

The following sets of hypotheses are established to test and see (1) how the individuals define themselves and if their definitions are effected by some independent variables such as age, gender, education level, income, property, etc.

Ethnic identity is used as the independent variable in the first set of hypotheses. (2) How they perceive their own groups and other groups, how much they are willing to interact with other groups and how they feel about the future of the inter-group relationship. In these sets of hypotheses, identity is considered as independent variable.

A- Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity:

- 1- Ethnic identity does not have a fixed nature and is not independent from socio-economic-political and cultural variables.
- 2- Ethnic groups in Ankara perceive that their own groups share some traits that the other groups do not.
- 3- Ethnic groups in Ankara perceive that their values are different from those of the other groups.

B- Perception of Own Group and the Other Groups:

- 4- Ethnic groups in Ankara have negative images of the other ethnic groups compared to their own.
- 5- Ethnic groups in Ankara do not have empathic relations with the other groups.
- 6- Ethnic groups in Ankara feel that the other groups do not have positive attitude towards them.
- 7- Ethnic Groups in Ankara feel anxious in their relations with the other ethnic groups.
- 8- Ethnic groups in Ankara have negative attitudes towards the other ethnic groups.
- 9- Ethnic groups in Ankara feel that the other groups are damaging their own group interests as well as their values.

C- The Future of the Interaction and Inter-Group Relations:

10-Ethnic groups in Ankara are not willing to have more interaction with the other groups.

11-Ethnic groups in Ankara do not try to overcome the ethnic discrimination and they are not willing cooperate with the other groups to improve the inter-group relations with them.

12-Ethnic Groups in Ankara feel pessimistic about the future of their relations with the other groups.

3.5. Data Collection

This section deals with the issues about how and where the data was collected including the sampling method and the content of the data collection method.

3.5.1. How Was the Data Collected?

Even though deep interviews, participant observations, or an ethnographic study would give us better understanding of the topic we are studying, because of the sensitivity around the issues and the group categories we are studying, some sort of anonymity was needed. For this reason, a survey research was chosen as a more convenient method. Nevertheless, because of the problems faced with getting enough feedback from the respondents, we decided to conduct a few in-depth interviews, too.

3.5.2. Sampling

Since my aim was to study and reach the identities, which I believe theoretically exist such as Alevi, Sunni, Kurd, Turk, I distributed the surveys in equal numbers to the associations, foundations and publishing houses that represent the ethnic groups under my study.

In order to get a valid sampling, initially, I wanted to apply stratified proportionate sampling. However, due to the problems occurred during the pilot study, we have decided to apply purposive sampling. As it is identified in methodology textbooks, findings acquired by using purposive sampling “would not represent any meaningful population” (Babbie, 1995 p. 225). However, it might be the only possible form of sampling when you need to study a larger population, which cannot be identified easily and reliably. In such cases, we “may wish to study a small subset of a larger population in which many members of the subset are easily identified, but the enumeration of all of them would be nearly impossible.” (Babbie, Ibid.). When you are using purposive sampling, conducting a pilot survey becomes almost necessary in order to develop the research instruments that could be adequately testable (Arber 2001, pp. 71-72). The researcher has to sacrifice the generalizability of the research findings to overall population of the subject matter but he/she uses this sampling type in order to explore an area, which is both justifiable and convenient in terms of the purpose of the study. In order to avoid from the shortcomings of the purposive sampling we have used a pilot study among the university students at Middle East Technical University. Seeing the ambiguity of some of the questions asked in the questionnaire, we have modified some of the questions and decided that we cannot do the survey in randomly selected settings.

In order to get sufficient number of responses from the subsets of the population in question, Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis who live in Ankara, we have decided to conduct the survey among the members or participants of some unions, associations, or foundations which are known for either their identity claims such as Sunni, Alevi, Turkish, and Kurdish. We have tried to include as many heterogeneous groups as possible among the subsets of these populations in terms of income, gender, educational level, political and ideological approaches and so on. However, we have faced many difficulties to get sufficient number of responses from especially the Alevi and Kurdish groups. This was actually one of the main reasons of conducting interviews. The other reason was to fill the ontological and epistemological gap would arise conducting only questionnaire.

3.5.3. How Was The Survey Conducted?

Because the sensitivity of the issue required some anonymity, the questionnaire were given to the individuals for them to fill in their offices, work places or homes according to their choices in order to get good and valid in sufficient level answers. The individual respondents were requested to return the questionnaires after filling in them in the boxes located in the foundations, associations, magazine or journal offices and administrative bureaus specified. For the beginning, about 450 questionnaires were distributed to the individuals, however only 125 of them were returned. Therefore, about 400 copies of them were made and given to the individuals for the second time. Working this way, we received about 250 questionnaires total in hand and these surveys were evaluated and analyzed. In some of the questionnaires returned, there were one or a few pages on which the questions were not answered. So these questionnaires were not included in the evaluation. This problem I encountered while collecting data is a common and known problem in the related literature. The return rate of the surveys reached to only 40 – 50 per cent. But, unfortunately, due to the lowness of the return rates of the surveys, I could not get adequate answers on the choice of “ethnic identity.” Namely, while I received 80 – 90 answers from ethnic group A, I only got 5- 10 answers from group B. This less amount is not enough to make a valid analysis. Therefore, I developed my arguments in the framework of the data I collected. However, Because of the difficulty of interpreting the data collected with the questionnaire method, in-depth-interview was a good choice even though we had previously decided not to apply because of the problem with anonymity. However, this time, the in-depth interviews are thought as complimentary to the questionnaire. This has given us a better understanding of the respondents’ point of view, too.

3.5.4. How Were the In-Depth-Interviews Conducted?

I tried to make the interviews with a few people whom I trusted and who were neutral in order to get sociological information and data to the possible extent. It was

very important that this person be consistent with his words and was sincere in his/her answers.

As an example of a question: You, as a fellow-citizen from Malatya have been living in this country for about forty years. Have you ever encountered with problems in your life so far while you were looking for a job, trying to rent an apartment, meeting and becoming friends with people, trying to develop your business just because of you are from Malatya? Have you ever been discriminated because of your hometown? If the person states that he was not hired or employed just because of he/she was a fellow citizen of Malatya, material proofs of this case were asked for²².

3.5.5. Where Was It Conducted?

The survey was conducted merely in Ankara. Even though the subject of the thesis could be extended to whole Turkey, it needed to be limited based on time pressure usually faced with Ph.D. or Master's degree dissertations and financial limitations. The researcher felt that in spite of the need for a nationwide research on ethnic distance in Turkey, this study could be an initial work for the future and could be limited to Ankara population. However, because of the problems faced with the random sampling, the researcher also decided to apply purposive sampling. Therefore, some organizations were selected to represent the universe of the study.

The data were collected mainly at the organizations such as unions, associations, foundations, cemevis, halkevis, mosques and mosque construction and maintenance unions in Dikmen, Tuzluçayır, Hüseyin Gazi, Batıkent, Nato Yolu, Boğaziçi, Ayrancı Çankaya, Cebeci, Yenimahalle, Mamak and city center of Ankara also known as Kizilay area. Our study is based on four main groups. The first of these groups are Sunni citizens. Generally, Sunni people live in the central areas of the city. The Sunni people living in Dikmen, Çankaya, Cebeci, Yenimahalle and Mamak constitute the sampling. The mosques, mosque construction and maintenance unions, charities and conservative political parties and their junior and woman branches,

²² See appendix 2 for the interview questions.

some conservative human rights associations, and woman Koran teaching courses are the underlying ground for us to prefer these places. Likewise, information about Turks who consider themselves as of Turkish ethnicity was obtained for the study. However, “Alperen Ocakları”, “Ülkü Ocakları” and some citizen of Turkic Countries and their foundations and institutions in places such as Keçiören, Türközü and Kurtuluş were also studied considering the vote rate of the National Movement Party and other national-oriented parties in the elections. The Kurdish citizens of Turkish Republic mainly live in the areas such as Demetevler, Batıkent, Dikmen, Eryaman, Altındağ and Mamak, Natoyolu and Tuzluçayır. The youth associations and related institutions in these places and the college students who live in these places were included in the study. Mostly Dikmen and Sokullu, Mamak, Natoyolu and Boğaziçi, Keçiören – Piyangotepe and Ovacık and Altındağ - Hüseyingazi Neighborhoods were preferred to study Alevi citizens. The Hacı Bektashi associations and Cemevis, Pir Sultan Abdal associations and youth and labor associations were also covered under the study. Cemevis enabled us to get a better idea of their beliefs and life styles, and to conduct the research in a better way in details. Alevi foundations and associations were important in our study because these places are gathering and socializing units for the Alevi citizens. In our study on Alevi citizens, Ahad (Association of Anatolian Folk Beliefs) and Kırkbudak quarterly journal helped us both in terms of related publications and getting in touch with other Alevi-oriented institutions. Especially, a few articles published in Kırkbudak provided us with valuable information on this study, which was not so familiar to us. Two of them were especially helpful. The first of these articles is about Urban Alevis written by Kamil Fırat (2005). And the second article in Kırkbudak is about Kurdish Alevis by Erdal Gezik (2005).

Following all these sampling studies, the survey was ready to be conducted using 450 questionnaires. In this way, the descriptive information was gathered about the ethnic geography in Ankara. However, due to the fact that partial and epistemological gaps and lacking of the information provided by the questionnaires, we conducted 20 interviews with subjects most of who were Alevis as a secondary option. The main reason that we chose the Alevis was the less number of the Alevis.

In fact, only 252 surveys out of 450 provided us with reliable and valid results. Most of the not applicable ones were those that were submitted to the Alevi citizens although these surveys were re-sent to them for a few times.

We have also conducted deep interviews with 20 people most of whom were Kurdish Alevis because of the lack of sufficient questionnaire feed backs from the Alevis. But this also gave us an opportunity to use deep interviews, which go along better with the symbolic interactionist approach than using questionnaire alone, which is the theoretical framework of our thesis. With the help of the in-depth interviews, the subject is understood clearly and from various aspects that he explains himself and the relations with others in detail.

3.5.6. What Does the Survey Contain?

The questionnaire consists of 69 questions, which can be classified into 4 main categories tackled in this thesis. The first category is related to ethnic identity and its relations to some variables such as class, gender, age, educational level, occupation, region, family background, and political and ideological approaches. The other categories are related to perception of our group and the other groups, the interaction between the groups, the future of the intergroup relations and indeed adapted from 7 different scales designed by Walter G. Stephan (Stephan 1999). These scales were:

1. Belief Similarity Scale
2. Intergroup Anxiety Scale
3. Intergroup Relations Optimism Scale
4. Intergroup Attitude Scale
5. Intergroup Interaction Scale
6. Intergroup Understanding Scale
7. Trait Scale

The scales designed by Stephan were developed to examine the outcomes of dialogue groups in the U.S.A. “The intention was to measure attitudes toward racial,

ethnic and cultural groups, optimism regarding the future of race relations in this country, willingness to interact with members of other racial and ethnic groups, perceived understanding of other racial and ethnic groups, and racial and ethnic stereotypes” (Stephan Ibid. p. 1).

The scales were too long to apply in a limited study and designed from a social psychological perspective rather than from a sociological perspective, i.e. they could be conducted in small-scale groups such as a classroom easily. However, it was not very convenient to apply to a larger group of people such as the sample of this study. Therefore, we have adjusted these scales and turned them into a survey questionnaire consisting of 69 questions in 8 pages²³. The questionnaire takes about 25 minutes to fill out. Because the questions between 19 through 69 are asked for the Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi people, it is inevitably a long questionnaire.

3.5.7. Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

In order to acknowledge the universe of the research, we need to provide the demographic characteristics of the respondents so that we can generalize the results of the research to similar groups of people.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

GENDER	
Female	77
Male	173
AGE	
20-30	19
31-40	76
41-50	84
50<	25

²³ See appendix 1, the questionnaire.

Table 1 (continued)

INCOME	
500<	28
500-1000	67
1001-1500	43
1501-2000	44
2001-2500	20
2500-3000	27
3000<	23
WEALTH	
<25000	108
25000-50000	28
50000-75000	8
75000-100000	42
>100000	66
BIRTH PLACE	
Metropolitan	103
City	28
District	8
Town	42
Village	66
MOSTLY LIVED PLACE	
Metropolitan	182
City	36
District	21
Town	1
Village	9
EDUCATION	
Illiterate	2
Primary School	11
Secondary School	11
High School	47
Faculty/Higher	147
Master	21
Doctorate	12

Table 1 (continued)

MOTHER'S EDUCATION			
Illiterate	77		
Primary School	120		
Secondary School	17		
High School	21		
Faculty/Higher	15		
Master	1		
FATHER'S EDUCATION			
Illiterate	20		
Primary School	98		
Secondary School	18		
High School	36		
Faculty/Higher	95		
Master	2		
Doctorate	2		
WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE			
CHP	13		
AKP	66		
MHP	19		
DYP	12		
ANAP	7		
Saadet	13		
ETHNICITY			
	Male	Female	Total
Turkish	73	27	100
Kurdish	5	0	5
Sunni	58	34	92
Alevi	12	4	16
Total	148	65	213

According to the table above; about 69 per cent of the subjects participating in our research were male and about 31 per cent of the subjects were female. When looked at both percentages in terms of gender, it is seen that they do not reflect the normal

distribution in Turkey. This is due to the fact that most of the members of the organizations we conducted the survey in are male.

In respect to the ages of the respondents, the majority of the subjects participating in our survey were at the stages of young adulthood (20 - 30) and adulthood. This rate is about 64 per cent. The rate of the subjects below the age of 20 is approximately 8 per cent. The rate of the subjects above the age of 40 is about 29 per cent. Namely, most of the subjects participating in our study reflect the average of Turkey in terms of age.

Analyzing the subjects participating in our research in terms of their income, the lowest income level is found as about 11 per cent out of the total numbers of the respondents. The income of the majority of the population is in the range of 1.000 – 2.000 YTL. This rate of income is equal to about 35 per cent. The section with the highest level of income (3.000 YTL and above) is in the rate of about 9 per cent. When our sampling is analyzed, it is seen that there exists a piling in terms of income between the low group and middle group, and this piling decreases towards the upper levels.

When we have a look at the total wealth of family, which is parallel to the variable above, the same piling is also seen at this point. About 43 per cent of the total wealth is below 25.000 YTL. The richest group, in other words, the group which has the highest wealth (100.000 YTL and above) is about 26 per cent.

When looked at the places of birth, the majority of our subjects were born in big or metropolitan cities. This rate is about 41 per cent. It is noticeable that during the recent decades, it is a general tendency that the metropolitan or bigger cities are attraction centers across Turkey; and in the same way, the places such as villages and towns are losing their attractiveness day by day. Within this context, the rates which are seen in our survey related to the villages and cities overlap with the Turkish reality.

Being parallel with the variable above and almost verifying each other in terms of results, we see that the majority of the subjects of our study have been spending most of their lives in metropolitan cities (73 %). The rate of the subjects living in villages, towns or district centers corresponds to a very small one. This value is important for us because of the fact that one of the basic factors determining one's own ethnic belongingness is the place where he / she lives or lived. Most of the values related to ethnic identity are realized by the communication network in the small living centers. Urbanization (modernization) creates a social environment in which the individuals experience and meet the differences and get in touch with the others. In this context, the majority of our subjects are the ones who have already gained the experience of urbanization and modernization. According to the simple theoretical deduction stated by general modernization theories; as the modernization increases, the disintegration and dissolution in the conventional structures increase as well. We will see this in the most summarizing style in our study.

When we look at the family background of the subjects, we need to draw attention to a few variables. One of these variables is the education of mother and father because of the dual importance of the education. One way of the importance of education comes from the fact that education itself is one leg of the modernization process. As this leg of education functions, it contributes to the daily activities of the individuals in terms of interpretation. The second effect of education is its multiplier effect. This effect is seen in transferring the education opportunity that the groups have to the next generations and forming an example. Looking from this approach, it is seen that the majority of the subjects are graduates of faculty and higher school (53 %). This figure being high above the Turkey average plays a role that softens ethnic perceptions. Most of the parents of the subjects are graduates of primary school.

Considering the political preferences of the subjects, it is seen that they voted for the Ak Parti (Justice and Development Party) which gets votes from all over the country. There is a pro-Islamic discourse in the main and basic philosophy of this party. However, this discourse does not push away the ethnic structure; on the contrary it is based on joining and bringing together the ethnic groups. From this perspective, this

party gets votes both from the urban areas as well as rural areas and from different sections of the population different from the traditional conservative parties. It is seen that those two parties which are considered to get votes based on the ethnic roots of the people have less vote rates. MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) is found as 9,2 per cent and DTP (Democratic Society Party) is found as 1,9 per cent²⁴.

3.6. Data Analysis

The data obtained through interviews and surveys were entered by an expert team. The surveys were entered into SPSS 11 (Statistical Package of Social Sciences) system and analyzed. The interviews were recorded in word processors and interpreted and evaluated on a theoretical basis and background.

The surveys, in the first stage, were interpreted in a descriptive way by taking the frequency tables in SPSS. In this way, we obtained the demographic characteristics of the sampling by using the sections of age, gender, education, ethnic identity, and social and economical features. This provided us with valuable and basic information for understanding the ethnic identities of the sampling, which is an important part of the study. In this part of the study, identity is used as a dependent variable.

The second and important theoretical part of our study is the interactions and relations among the ethnic groups. This relation was understood by cross – tab and Chi Square method. Chi Square technique analyses the relation among two or more categorical variables. Because most of the variables in our study are categorical ones, we applied the Chi Square method. In our study, the independent variable was ethnic identity, and the dependent variable was the attitudes of ethnic groups toward one another. The more complicated statistical analysis such as co-variations and annova and regression analysis etc. are not used due to the fact the categorical variables do not function in this study since both questions of our thesis and questionnaires include categorical variables (both independent and dependent variables).

²⁴ The survey was conducted in 2006. It was before the July 22, 2007 general elections. According to the results of the general elections in July 2007, Ak Parti got 46,58 %, Republican People's Party (CHP) got 20,88 %, MHP got 14,27 and the independent candidates, most of whom were from the DTP got 5,24 % (see <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2007secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>).

3.7. What Kinds Of Problems Were Faced?

It has been always very speculative how many Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi people live in Turkey. The estimates about the accurate number of these groups usually fail to be biased most probably due to the political projections²⁵. It is not possible to get accurate information about the size of the population of the Turks, the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis who live in Ankara. Even though there are some observations about which of these groups live where in Ankara, these observations were not sufficient enough to draw probability sampling. Therefore, in spite of all of the disadvantages and shortcomings of non-probability sampling, purposive or judgmental sampling type is used in this research in order to utilize an available and convenient research instrument.

One of the requirements of conducting purposive sampling is to have sufficient information about the population in question. We have to be able to reach the subsets of the population and be able to conduct the survey among them. After deciding many organizations as our potential subsets, we still had some difficulties to get sufficient number of responses. This was mostly due to the nature of the subject matter we studied. People tend to hesitate to fill out a questionnaire in which they are asked about their income, property, political, ideological views and their identity and so forth. In order to overcome these difficulties, we have found some key persons who are either in the management of these organizations such as the leaders of the organizations or have a trust relationship with the organizations and asked their help with the filling out of the survey questionnaire. With their help we were able to get more questionnaires that were filled out properly. In addition, we have conducted some deep interview so that we could have sufficient responses from the subsets of the population in question.

²⁵ For a discussion about the population size of the Kurds who live in Turkey, see Güzel, Hasan Celal: 2006. Guzel, a former Ministry of National Education Youth and Sports of Conservative ANAP Party, argues that the population of the Kurds in Turkey should be around 5 million to maximum 8 million even though some would claim that it is around 25 million and will reach around 49 million in the year 2050.

For discussions about the population size of the Alevis, see Kazım Genç: 2005, In his interview with Neşe Düzel Genç, The president of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associations and a Board Member of Alevi and Bektaşî Federation, predicts that the number of the Alevis in Turkey is around 20 to 25 million.

CHAPTER IV

ETHNIC IDENTITY IN ANKARA

4.1. Self Definition of Individual Identity

In order to analyse the definitions of the individuals from their perspectives, we have established a hypothesis, which is “Ethnic identity does not have a fixed nature and is not independent from socio-economic-political and cultural variables.” In order to see the emic definition of the individual identity of the respondents, we have utilized Manfred Kuhn’s Twenty Statements Test, and asked the respondents to define themselves if they were asked who they are. The responses to this question are so various that it is almost impossible to say that ethnic identities are salient characteristics of the individuals in Ankara²⁶. The responses of the individuals are grouped as follows²⁷:

Table 2: Self identity definitions

Defining Identity	Frequency
Turkish	20
Other Ethnic Groups (Kurdish, Alevi Etc.)	7
Nationalist (Kemalist, Turkish Nationalist, Patriotic)	52
Other Ideological and Political Choice (Democratic, Leftist, Conservative, Anti- Oppression etc.)	40
Religious Identity (Religious, Muslim etc.)	68
Other Existential Statements (Human Being, God’s Servant, Plain Citizen etc.)	61
Social Roles (Mother, Spouse)	9
Occupational	17

²⁶ See Appendix 3 for the frequency of ethnic definitions of the individuals.

²⁷ See Ronnie M. Alm et al. (1972) for Kent Schwirian’s categorization of Manfred Kuhn’s Twenty Statements Test, from which we benefited to develop this classification. Schwirian suggests five categories to utilize the TST: Consensual responses, Ideological beliefs, Aspirations, Preferences, and Self-evaluation.

Table 2 (continued)

Defining Identity	Frequency
Personal Traits (Interests, Physical and Mental traits, (Smart, Honest, Nature Lover etc.)	41
By Name	6
Geography (Anatolian Man, Someone from Adana etc.)	4
Gender (Women etc.)	6
Omissions	1
Total ²⁸	325

This finding clearly shows that the etic categorizations may not apply to all settings. While the researchers expect to see individuals' identities in terms of the classifications in their theoretical and scientific approaches, the individuals may define themselves totally different from the researchers' categorizations.

4.2. Factors Affecting the Definition of Ethnic Identities

In this section of the thesis, we will analyse the factors affecting the ethnic identities. According to the theoretical approaches to ethnic identities reviewed in chapter II, we have seen that while some approaches see ethnic identities as independent variables, other see them as dependent variables that are not fixed, and that they are constructed based on some circumstances. In order to understand whether ethnic identities of the individuals are fixed or not, we should see if they are affected by some factors such as gender, educational background, income level, place of living, etc. The following table shows the relationship between such factors and the individuals' definitions of ethnic identities.

²⁸ Due to the fact that most respondents gave more than one answer, the total number came out more than the number of the total respondents.

Table 3: The Relationship between the Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents and their Ethnic Identity

	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
Gender				
Male	73	5	58	12
Female	27	0	34	4
Mostly lived				
Metropolitan / city	69+17	1+4	73+7	12+3
Town/village	11+3	0	5+4	1+0
Mother's education				
Literacy	20	2	30	11
Primary	50	2	50	4
Secondary	7	0	5	0
High school	12	1	4	0
Higher education / MA, PhD	4+1	0	3	1
Father's education				
Literacy	4	1	8	1
Primary	38	1	35	9
Secondary	4	1	9	0
High school	19	1	10	3
Higher education	29	0	21	2
Respondent's own education				
Literacy	1	0	0	1
Primary	0	0	9	0
Secondary	4	0	4	2
High school	17	1	16	4
Higher education / MA, PhD	66+11	-	51+12	5+4
Age	5	1	5	3
<20	36	3	23	2
20-30	31	-	37	6
31-40	18	1	17	2
41-50	10	-	10	3
>50				
Income (ytl)				
<500	10	-	9	4
500-1000	24	1	27	5
1000-1500	16	2	15	4

Table 3 (continued)

	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
1500-2000	21	1	11	2
2000-2500	8	-	7	1
2500-3000	12	1	12	-
3000<	9	-	11	-
Property (YTL)	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
<100,000	68	9	66	16
100,000 – 200,000	35	3	19	
200,000 – 300,000		1	3	

Table 4: The relationship between religiosity and ethnic groups

Religious Attitude	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
Not Religious at all	7	1	2	9
Somewhat Religious	28		8	3
Religious	55	3	61	3
Highly Religious	7		16	
Very Religious	2		4	1

Table 5: The relationship between political choice and ethnic groups

Party	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
AKP	8		13	1
CHP	12		4	5
MHP	23		12	
DTP				
Other Rightist Parties	17	2	33	2
Other Leftist Parties	2	1	2	4
No Party	3	1	13	1

Table 6: The relationship between ideological approaches and ethnic groups

Ideological Views	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi
Rightist	44		59	12
Leftist	10		5	12
Turkish Nationalist	35		28	2
Plain Citizen	52	1	40	5
Islamist	15	4	44	1
Kemalist	12		5	4
Democratic	28	2	18	10
Other Nationalist Groups	1		1	
Globalist			1	

In our analyses, we have utilized the Chi-Square in order to see whether or not there is a meaningful relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The results of the Chi—Square analyses are given in parentheses in each related section.

When we look at the relationship between the demographic variables and ethnic identity, it is seen that the ethnic identity of an individual is not determined by the gender ($P = 0.186 > 0,05$). Most of the subjects in our study are Turkish origin and male citizens of Turkey. There is not meaningful relationship between the age and ethnic identity. The majority of the individuals, regardless of the ethnic origin, are in the age range of 20 and 40. It is also seen that there is a meaningful relationship between ethnic identity and the place where an individual spends most of his time. While most of the Turkish, Sunni and Alevi citizens live in cities, the majority of the Kurdish people live in small and medium sized cities. This finding clearly indicates that Kurdish identity is still in the process of the urbanization. It is generally seen that Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi identities relatively dominant in rural areas compared to the Turkish national identity. However, having taking the migration phenomena into account, the ethnic and religious identities are also gradually becoming apparent in urban areas of Turkey.

One of the interesting results of this research is that there is not a significant finding when we look at the relationship between the education level of parents and ethnic

identity. The values obtained through Chi-Square show that the education of parents does not determine the ethnic definition of the individuals. Likewise, there is not a relationship between the education level of the individual and ethnic identity. This is quite surprising because it is commonly expected to find a correlation between educational level and the high national identities instead of ethnic identities. However, in our research, we could not see a significant relation between the level of education and the definition of ethnic identities mostly due to relatively homogenic structure of our respondents.

Another finding of this research is about the political choices of the individuals and their ethnic identities. It is found out that there is a meaningful relationship between the political choices of the individuals and their ethnic identities. Most of the Turkish and Sunni citizens vote for conservative and nationalist parties. The Kurdish citizens generally vote for the pro-Islamic, namely conservative parties. On the other hand, the Alevi citizens prefer a party like DTP, mainly marginal but addressing and sensitive to ethnic roots. In our opinion, the majority of these Alevis are the Alevi citizens with Kurdish origin.

One other interesting finding of this research is that there is not a meaningful relationship between the income of the individuals that participated in our study and their ethnic positions. The income level of the individuals; whether they are Turkish, Sunni, Alevi or Kurdish, is close to each other. The income level of the groups is mainly in the range of 500 – 2.000 YTL. This rate is close to the Turkish life scale. Considering the relationship between class and ethnic groups, it is usually expected to see a class differentiation between the majority and minority ethnic groups. In addition, most of the studies show the economical disparity across Turkey, a country where most of the Turkish and Kurdish people live in different parts of it. Considering our finding and the different economical levels of the people living in different parts of Turkey, we can say that the economical disparities seen in different parts of Turkey do not necessarily reflected in the big cities like Ankara.

Analyzing the relationship between the demographic factors, we have seen that there is no relationship between age, gender, educational levels of the respondents and their parents and their income level. However, there is a significant relationship between the places where individuals spent most of their lives where and their ethnic identities. And also, the political choices of the individuals come in front of us as an important indicator of ethnic identity.

When we look at the religious attitudes of the respondents, we see that most of the respondents associate themselves with the religion to a greater extent except for the Alevis most of whom see themselves not religious at all.

The table related to the political views of the respondents show that most of the Turkish, Kurdish and Sunnis people are in favor of right wing parties while the majority of Alevis prefer left wing parties.

The table regarding the ideological points of views of the respondents in our survey indicates that the majority of the Turkish respondents affiliate themselves with no ideological view while many others think that they feel close to rightism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. A few Turks express that they are close to the Democratic and Kemalist views. Most of the Kurdish respondents feel close to Islamism while some of them affiliate themselves with democratic point of view. As for the Sunnis, most of them fall in rightist and Islamist ideologies, and a quite high number of them affiliate themselves with no ideological views. On the other hand, the Alevis express themselves with leftist and rightist views in equal numbers. A quite number of them also express that they are democratic.

Regarding the total wealth of the households of the respondents, we can say that most of them fall in the category of less than YTL 100,000. Regardless of their ethnic group, those who own total value in the range between YTL 100,000 and 200,000 come next for all the groups. Only very few of the respondents own more than YTL 200,000.

4.3. Ethnic Groups and Perceived Shared Traits

As we have argued in Chapter II, objective definition of ethnicity suggests that there are some traits that define individuals' group belongingness. These traits are thought to be shared among the members of the same ethnic groups, and differentiate the individuals from the other groups. We wanted to see which traits the individuals who live in Ankara, and see themselves as members of the ethnic groups feel that they share with their own groups and do not share with the others. In other words, what are the commonly shared traits of the groups according to the individuals? We wanted to see whether *ethnic groups in Ankara perceive that their own groups share some traits that the other groups do not*. Some of their significant responses are shown in the following table.

Table 7: Ethnic groups and perceived shared traits

Ethnicity	Variables	Ethnicity					
		Alevi		Sunni		Kurds	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Turks	Shared Blood Ties	9	5	23+57	12	5	-
	Shared Customs	10	3	33+44	7	2	1
	Shared History	9	5	81	2	5	-
	Shared Religious Beliefs	11	2	37+48	4	4	-
	Shared Ancestors	6	7	37+25	9	2	3
	Shared Destiny	10	3	29+35	12	3	1
Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Sunni		Alevi	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Kurds	Shared Blood Ties	13+16	19+12	9+21	31	9	5
	Shared Customs	30+15	16+7	13+39	13+8	11	2
	Shared History	23+29	14+7	24+39	16	10	4
	Shared Religious Beliefs	22+34	10	17+45	10	8	3
	Shared Ancestors	32	33	13+21	34	7	6
	Shared Destiny	16+17	17+16	17+29	16+8	13	1

Table 7 (continued)

Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Alevi		Kurds	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Sunni	Shared Blood Ties	30+23	9	6	6	4	-
	Shared Customs	40+24	8	8	5	2	-
	Shared History	32+33	8	9	4	4	-
	Shared Religious Beliefs	41+29	1	8	5	4	-
	Shared Ancestors	32+25	9	6	7	1	3
	Shared Destiny	33+24	14	9	4	2	1
Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Kurds		Sunni	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Alevi	Shared Blood Ties	13+21	15+11	1	3	30	19+9
	Shared Customs	13+28	19+8	2	-	8+26	28+13
	Shared History	27+26	14+5	4	-	25+4 2	7
	Shared Religious Beliefs	11+23	15+12	3	1	3+29	23+14
	Shared Ancestors	26+29	16+7	4	-	17+2 4	11+7
	Shared Destiny	19+20	16+13	4	-	15+2 4	18

Shared blood tie is considered as one of the significant indicators of the ethnic group membership. Therefore, we wanted to find out how the members of the ethnic groups perceive their relationship among themselves and others in terms of shared blood ties. The research provided us with the following figures and percentages. 100 per cent of the Kurds feels that they are close to the Turks in terms of blood ties. 100 per cent of the Kurds feel that they are close to the Sunnis. 25 per cent of the Kurds feel that they are close to the Alevis. While the approach of the Kurds towards the Turks and Sunnis is similar, which is seen as feeling close to them, on the other hand, they do not feel close to the Alevis regarding shared blood ties. This finding is surprising because of the fact that there is group of people who are called Kurdish Alevis or

Alevi Kurds, who live mostly in Tunceli and some parts of the Eastern Turkey. The fact that the respondents in this research did not feel that they are close to the Alevis simply is due to the fact that these Kurdish respondents were Sunnis. However, the results of the in-depth interviews with the Alevi Kurds suggest otherwise. About 73 per cent of the Sunnis feel that they are close to the Turks in terms of blood ties. About 41 per cent of the Sunnis feel that they are not close to the Kurds. About 41 per cent of Sunnis feel that they are close to the Alevis in terms of blood ties. These findings suggest that people who define themselves in terms of religious identities feel that share the same blood ties with the Kurds and Turks, the majority of whom are thought to be Sunnis. However, majority of the Sunnis do not consider that they share the same blood ties with the Alevis, which suggests that religious identities plays significant role in perceiving the shared blood ties in ethnic definition of the individuals. As for the Alevis, about 73 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Turks in terms of blood ties. About 36 per cent of them feel that they are not close to the Kurds in terms of blood ties. About 50 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Sunnis in terms of blood ties. This finding suggests the same interpretation we made for the Sunnis. For the Turks, about 40 per cent of them feel that they are not close to the Kurds. About 66 per cent of the Turks feel that they are close to the Sunnis. About 43 per cent of the Turks feel that they are close to the Alevis. The findings about the feelings of the individuals who define themselves as Turks indicate that majority of the Turks feel that they share the same blood ties with the other ethnic groups except for the Alevis. Here again religious attitudes play a significant role in defining of one's perception of blood ties even though the respondents who define as Turks, the majority of them are Sunni Turks.

This brings up the question about which groups the respondents feel closer in terms of shared religious beliefs. As commonly accepted, religion has an important role and place in definition of identity. With this fact in mind, we wanted to see how the individuals perceive the relationship between religious ties in reference to other groups. In our research, we found out that while about 68 per cent of the Turks feel that they are close to the Kurds, approximately 84 per cent of them expressed that they feel close to the Sunnis, and about 44 per cent of them feel that they are close to

the Alevis. For the Kurds, 100 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Turks and Sunnis while half of them think that they are close to the Alevis. About 91, 80 and 44 per cent of the Sunnis feel that they are close to the Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively in terms of religious ties. These percentages go for the Alevis as follows in terms of feeling close to the others regarding the religious ties; 79, 67 and 62 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively. Considering the above figures, we can say that religious beliefs have an important role in the perception of the other groups.

The percentages of feeling close in terms of shared ancestors are relatively low in the relationship among the members of the ethnic groups. When they are asked which groups they feel closer in respect to the shared ancestors, we received the following responses: while about 57 per cent of the Turks feel that they have the same ancestors with Sunni people and 45 per cent of them feel that they have the same ancestors with Alevi people, only about 32 per cent of the Turks feel that they have the same ancestors with the Kurds. Unlike their perception to religious ties, most of the Turkish respondents perceive that they do not share the same ancestors with the Kurdish people. While 40 per cent of the Kurds feels that they have the same ancestors with the Turks, 20 per cent of them think that they have the same ancestors with the Sunnis and Alevis. From the perspective of the Sunnis, 78, 37 and 45 per cent of them feel that they have the same ancestors with the Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, while about 38 per cent of them feel that they have the same ancestors with the Turks and Sunnis, this percentage goes a little bit higher for the Kurds, which is about 44 per cent. Contrary to many other traits, the perceived ancestors appear as a distinguishing factor that differentiates one group from the others. This fact is more apparent for the Turks and Kurds. Even though most of the Alevi respondents in the survey did not feel close to the Kurds in terms of the shared ancestors, this was not the case for the Kurdish Alevis with whom we made in-depth interviews.

Regarding the shared history, a little more than half of the Turks feel that they share the same history with the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis. While 100 per cent of the Kurds

feel that they share the same history with the Turks, with a high percentage, 80 per cent of the Kurdish people feel that they share the same history with the Sunnis and Alevis. The percentages of the feeling close in terms of the perceived history from the Sunni point of view are about 88, 63 and 77 for the Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, they have the lowest percentages of feeling close in respect to the shared history compared to the other three groups. The figures are as follows; about 56, 63 and 56 per cent towards the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively. Regardless of how much different they feel from the other groups with the respect to religious beliefs and shared ancestors, most of the groups feel that they share the same history with the other groups. This is due to the fact that all these groups have been living in the same geography for centuries.

Shared customs and traditions are considered as one of the traits that separate one group from the other and create the feeling of sameness with one's own group. For this reason, we wanted to see how much the groups we study feel close to the other groups regarding this trait. We found out that while 50 per cent of the Kurds feel that they are close to the Turks in terms of customs and traditions, about 67 per cent of the Kurdish people feel that they are close to the Sunnis and Alevis in terms of customs and traditions. As for the Sunnis, about 91 per cent of them feel close to the Turks, about 66 per cent to the Kurds, and 44 per cent to the Alevis in terms of customs and traditions. On the other hand, the percentages are close to each other from the Alevi point of view regarding the customs and traditions: about 71, 79 and 62 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively. Likewise, the majority of the Turks feel that they share the same customs and traditions with the other groups with the figures as follows: 57, 76 and 51 per cent for the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively. Considering the figures above, we can say that religious beliefs are highly effective in the feelings of closeness to the other groups.

Regarding the perceptions of the groups in terms of shared life styles, we found some interesting results. Half of the Kurdish respondents think that they share the same life styles with the other group members of ethnic roots. Whereas about 60 per cent of the Sunni people feel that their lifestyles are close to the Alevis', about 52 per cent of

them feel close to the Kurds, and interestingly enough only about 37 per cent of the Sunni people feel that they are close to the Turks in terms of life styles. This very percentage overlaps with the Turkish attitude towards the Sunnis in respect to shared life styles. For the other two ethnic groups, the Turks think that they share the same life styles with the Kurds and Alevis at 56 and 53 per cent respectively. As for the Alevis, about 73 per cent of them feel close to the Turkish people, 69 per cent to the Kurds, and 71 per cent to the Alevis in terms of life styles, which are relatively high figures in comparison to the other groups' attitudes. These findings suggest that the individuals from all ethnic groups do not feel different from one another in terms of shared life styles. In other words, they all feel that all the groups living in Ankara share the similar life styles.

Political interests form one of the most significant breaking point among the members of all groups except for the Kurds. The results of the survey research regarding this matter came out as follows. While only about 22 and 25 per cent of the Turks feel close to the Kurds and Alevis respectively in terms of political interests, this rate goes up to about 60 per cent towards the Sunnis. All of the Kurdish respondents feel that they are close to the Turks and Sunnis in terms of political interests; on the other hand, only half of them feel close to the Alevi people in this respect. While about half of the Sunni people feel that their political interests are close to those of the Turks and the Alevis, about 25 per cent of the Sunnis feel close to the Kurds in terms of political interests. Generally, less than half of all Alevis think that they have the same political interests with the other three groups. As the figures above suggest, there are remarkable differences among the members of the different groups. This data was mostly parallel to the results of the interviews we made. However, some of the Kurdish people we talked did not feel the same as the Kurdish respondents in our survey. This can be explained by the fact that ethnic politics may play an important role to some extent of the others while some other individuals from the same ethnic group may find other political tendencies closer to their group's interests. Indeed, this data was confirmed with the results of the July 22, 2007 general elections in Turkey when the ruling Ak Party won the votes in the

areas where mostly Kurdish people live, and the independent candidates who formed the DTP, pro-Kurdish political party got relatively less votes compared to Ak Party.

The members of all four ethnic groups do not have remarkable or sharp differentiative ideas and approaches related to the perceived differences in economic level where generally almost half of the respondents who participated in our survey and the interviews think that the members of other groups are close to their own economic level. The figures go as follows: About half of the Turks feel that their economic level is close to the levels of the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis. Likewise, 50 per cent of the Kurds think that they are close to the Turks and Alevis in terms of economic level while about 33 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Sunni people. About one third of the Sunnis feel that they share the same economic levels with the other groups. As for the Alevis, about half of them feel that their economic levels are closer to the members of other ethnic groups. Even though ethnic differences are not shaped by class differences in Turkey, approximately half of the respondents feel that there are economic differences between their own group and the other groups.

When the respondents were asked if they share the same education level with the other groups, we obtained the following data. While about 31 per cent of the Turks feel that they are close to the Kurds in terms of education level, slightly more than half of the Turks feel that their education level is close to the ones of the Sunnis and Alevis. Approximately three quarters of the Kurdish respondents think that their education level is close to the education level of the other three groups. While the majority of the Sunni people think that their education level is close to the education level of the Turks and Alevis, only 44 per cent of them feel that their education level is close to the Kurds. As for the Alevis, the majority of the Alevis think feel that their education level is close to the education level of the other three groups. The results indicate that the groups who are in majority feel that they do not share the same educational level with the other groups while the ones in minority feel that they do so.

While about one quarter of the Turkish respondents feel that they share the same destiny with the Kurds and Alevis, more than half of them think that they share the same destiny with the Sunnis. On the other hand, whereas 60 and 80 per cent of the Kurds think that they share the same destiny with the Turks and Alevis respectively, less than half of them feel that they share the same destiny with the Sunnis. The percentages were found as follows from the Sunni point of view: about 70 per cent of the Sunni people feel that they share the same destiny with the Turkish people and about half of them feel the same for the Kurds and Alevis. As for the Alevis, more than half of them think that they share the same destiny with the Turks and Sunnis, and about 81 per cent of the Alevis feel that they share the same destiny with the Kurds. Considering the fact that the notion of the “same destiny” is directly related to the political projections, the minority groups feel close to each other, and the groups in minority feel that they share the same destiny more than they do with the other groups. This data is also confirmed with the data obtained by in-depth interviews.

About one third of the Turkish respondents in the survey feel that they are close to the Kurdish people in terms of hopes and desires. While 39 per cent of the Turks feel that they are close to the Alevis in respect to the hopes and desires, about 73 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Sunnis. The Kurds feel most close to the Alevis in terms of hopes and desires with about 68 per cent, and 50 and about 33 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Turks and Sunnis in this regard. While 90 per cent of the Sunnis feel close to the Turks, only about 42 and 27 per cent of them feel close to the Kurds and Alevis in terms of hopes and desires. As for the Alevis, 57, 71 and 42 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively related to shared hopes and desires. Taking the fact that perceived hopes and desires are also directly related to the political projections into account, the minority groups feel close to the each other, and the groups in minority feel that they share the same hopes and desires more than they do with the other groups.

4.4 Ethnic Groups and Perceived Shared Values

While the majority of the Turks feel that they share the same family with the Sunnis, only about one third of them think that they share the same family values with the Kurds and Alevi. All of the Kurdish respondents think that they share the same family values with the Turks and Sunnis, and half of the Kurds feel that they share them with the Alevi. There are remarkable differences in regards to the shared family values from the Sunni point of view with the percentages as follows; 85, 39 and 19 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Alevi respectively. About three quarters of the Alevi feel that they share the same family values with the Turks and Kurds while only one third of them think that they share the same family values with the Sunnis. While three of the groups feel that they do not share the same family values with the Alevi, the Alevi do not feel that they share the same family with the Sunnis. This also underlies the significance of the religious differentiation in the perceptions of the ethnic groups. In addition, the perceptions of the Turkish respondents towards the Kurds also reflect that the group in majority differentiate themselves from the group in minority based on family values.

While most of the Turkish respondents feel that they share the same business values with the Sunnis, 55 per cent of them feel that they share the same business values with the Alevi and only 47 per cent of the Turks think that they share the same business values with the Kurds. Considering the Kurdish respondents, about three quarters of them feel that they share the business values with the other groups. On the other hand, while about 40 per cent of the Sunnis think that they share the same business values with the Kurds and Alevi, 75 per cent of them feel that they share the same business values with the Turks. The percentages from the Alevi perception of the shared business values are as follows according to our survey: about 71, 36 and 31 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively. The findings above indicate that perceived values regarding work and business play a significant role in group differentiation.

While about 40 per cent of the Turks think that they share the basic moral values with the Kurds and Alevis, about 74 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Sunnis in terms of basic moral values. As for the Kurds, 75, 67 and 33 per cent of them feel that they are close to the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis respectively in terms of basic moral values. There are huge differences from the Sunni perspective related to basic moral values with the following percentages: whereas 87 per cent of the Sunni respondents feel that they share the same basic moral values with the Turks, about 58 and 18 per cent of them feel that they share the basic moral values with the Kurds and Alevis. Likewise the above, only about 46 per cent of the Alevis think that they share the basic moral values with the Sunnis while 73 and 57 per cent of them think that they share the same basic moral values with the Turks and Kurds respectively. Similar to the family and business values, Turkish people feel that they are close to the Sunnis in this respect, the Kurds feel that they are close to the Turks and Sunnis, and the Alevis feel that they are close to the Turks and Kurds in their perception of basic moral values.

To summarize the findings in the section above, we can map one group's perception towards the other groups as follows. To begin with the Turkish perception of the other groups, the following considerations can be made. Most of the respondents who define themselves as Turks perceive that they share religious ties, history, customs, life styles, economic level with the Kurds level while they feel that they do not have the same blood ties, political interest, education level, destiny, family values, work values, basic moral values and hopes and desires with the Kurds in common. They perceive that they share blood ties, religious ties, the same ancestors, history, customs, political interests, educational level, same destiny, family values, work values, basic moral values, hopes and desires with the Sunni people. But they do not share life styles and same economic level with the Sunnis. Most Turkish people think that they share the same history, same customs, same life styles, and same work values with the Alevis whereas they feel that they do not share the same blood ties, religious ties, the same descents, political interest, the same education and economic level, same destiny, family values, basic moral values and hopes and desires with the Alevi people.

In order to summarize how the Kurdish people feel about these issues we discussed in the section above, one can say that most of the respondents who define themselves as the Kurds feel that they share same blood ties, religious beliefs, history, political interest, education level, destiny, family values and moral values with the Turks. Half of the Kurdish people feel that they have the same customs, life styles and economic level, hopes and desires with the Turks in addition to the shared traits mentioned above. However most of the Kurdish people feel that they do not share the same ancestors with the Turkish people. Most of the Kurdish people feel that they share some traits with the Sunnis such as blood ties, religious ties, history, customs, life styles, political interest, family values, moral values, work values; but they feel they do not share the same ancestors, economic level, the same destiny, and hopes and desires. Approximately half of the Kurds feel that they share common religious ties, life styles, political interest, economic level, family values with the Alevis while most of the them feel that they share the same history, customs, education level, the destiny, work values, hopes and desires with the Alevis. However, they do not feel that share the same descents with the Alevis.

When looked from the Sunni perspective, it is seen that most of the Sunni people perceive that they share blood ties, religious ties, descents, history, customs, education level, destiny, family values, work values, basic moral values and hopes and desires with the Turkish people. But most of the Sunnis feel that they do not share the same political interest, life styles and economic level with the Turks. Most of the Sunnis feel that they share religious ties, history, customs, life styles, destiny, and basic moral values with the Kurdish people; but they do not feel that they share the same blood ties, descents, political interest, economic level, education level, family values, work values, and hopes and desires with the Kurds. While most Sunnis perceive that they share the same history, life styles, education level, the same destiny; only half of them feel that they share the same political interest with the Alevi people. The majority of them do not feel that they share religious ties, blood ties, common descents, customs, economic level, work values, family values and desires and hopes with the Alevi people.

Most of the respondents who define themselves as Alevis think that they share religious ties, blood ties, history, customs, life styles, economic and education levels, destiny, family and work and basic moral values and hopes and desires with the Turkish people while they do not feel that they share the political interest and the same descents. Most of the Alevis feel that they share religious ties, history, customs, life styles, economic level, educational level, destiny, family values, basic moral values, hopes and desires with the Kurdish people; whereas they do not feel that they share the same blood ties, descents, political interest, and work values with the Kurds. Most of the Alevi people feel that they share the following traits with the Sunnis: religious ties, history, customs, shared life styles, education level, destiny while half of them feel that they share blood ties and same economic level with the Sunnis in addition to the traits mentioned above. However, most of the Alevis do not feel that they share the same descents, political interests, family values, moral values, work values and hopes and desires.

One can infer from the findings above that the Turkish respondents share many things with the other groups but they do not feel that they share the same blood ties, political interests and same values with the Kurdish and Alevis. The important thing in the perception of the Kurdish is the fact that they do not share the same descents with the other groups even if they feel that they have blood ties with them. Sunnis, on the other hand, do not perceive that their political interests, ancestors, family values, hopes and desires are in common with the Kurds and the Alevis. They also think that their religious beliefs are different from those of the Alevis. Finally, the Alevis do not see that their political interests and ancestors are the same as those of the other groups. It can be said that the members of the ethnic groups mostly differentiate themselves from the others on the basis of perceived ancestors, political interests and the values.

CHAPTER V

IMAGES AND RELATIONS WITH THE OTHERS IN ANKARA

This chapter mainly deals with what kind of images the members of the ethnic groups have about the others, how they feel about understanding the others, what kind of attitudes they have for each other and how much they want to have interaction with the members of other ethnic groups. In order to investigate and describe these problem areas, we utilized some scales based on Stephen's inter-group scale. The findings regarding these issues are documented in the tables below and in the following paragraphs.

Table 8: Ethnic groups and the images of the other

Ethnicity	Variables	Ethnicity					
		Kurds		Sunni		Alevi	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Turks	Hardworking	2	0	13+29	22+5	13	2
	Intelligent	3	1	15+36	14	10	5
	Friendly	5	-	18+42	9	10	4
	Honest	5	-	14+35	17	10	5
	Understanding	4	-	29+42	6	13	1
	Disrespectful	1	2	10	60	6	7
	I Respect them	4	-	40+39	4	11	1

Table 8 (continued)

Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Sunni		Alevi	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Kurds	Hardworking	15+22	24+8	4+25	26+6	10	4
	Intelligent	13+25	25	35	22	10	4
	Friendly	37	19+11	47	19	9	4
	Honest	9+18	21+13	33	26	10	4
	Understanding	43	22	14+35	18	13	1
	Disrespectful	52	27	28	43	5	8
	I Respect them	35+23	21	24+33	7+9	12	-
Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Kurds		Alevi	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Sunni	Hardworking	25+27	12+2	1	-	13	2
	Intelligent	25+32	9	2	1	10	4
	Friendly	62	11	4	-	9	4
	Honest	58	13	3	-	9	5
	Understanding	62	7	1	-	11	3
	Disrespectful	16	25+27	3	2	12	4
	I Respect them	54+26	4	3	-	14	2
Ethnicity	Variables	Turks		Kurds		Sunni	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Alevi	Hardworking	19+24	18+4	1	1	33	25
	Intelligent	19+24	17	2	-	37	18
	Friendly	18+31	22	4	-	39	22
	Honest	16+17	28	4	-	29	27
	Understanding	16+25	22	4	2	37	29
	Disrespectful	11+21	16	1	-	12+19	28+8
	I Respect them	39+24	15	3	-	25+36	13

5.1. The Images of the Others

This section describes the images of the other groups from the eyes of each group. While about 45 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurds are hard-working, about 65 and 53 per cent of them feel that the Sunnis and Alevis are hard-working respectively. The percentages from the Kurdish perspective are below 50 per cent; whereas 40 per cent of the Kurds feel that the Turks are hard-working, 25 per cent of the Kurdish people feel that the Sunnis and Alevis are hard-working. As for the Sunnis, a little more than half of them feel that the Turks are hard-working, and about 38 and 42 per cent of the Sunni people feel that the Kurds and Alevis are hard-working respectively. The percentages in this respect are quite high from the Alevis point of view; the figures go as follows respectively for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis: 87, 71 and 86 per cent.

In our survey, we got relatively not very low figures related to thinking others as intelligent. While about 46 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurdish people are intelligent, this rate goes a little above the half, which is 53 per cent for the Alevis. On the other hand, about 69 per cent of the Turks feel that the Sunni people are intelligent. Half of the Kurdish people think that the Sunnis and Alevis are intelligent while 60 per cent of them feel that the Turks are intelligent. While about 63 per cent of the Sunni people feel that the Turks are intelligent, some less than half of the Sunnis think that the Kurds and Alevis are intelligent. These percentages are high above the majority in terms of thinking that the other groups are intelligent from the Alevi perspective, which go as follows respectively for the groups; 67, 71 and 72 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis.

While a little below fifty per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurds are friends, some above fifty per cent of them think that the Alevis are friends. On the other hand, about three quarters of the Turks feel that the Sunnis are friends. For the Kurds, the percentages are relatively high, which come as follows: about 58 per cent of the Turks feel that the Alevis are friends and all of the Turkish respondents think that the Kurds and Sunnis are friends. All the percentages received from Sunnis in our survey above the half. While only about 51 per cent of the Sunnis think that the Alevis are

friends, a little more than half of the Sunnis and about three quarters of them feel that the Kurds and the Turks are friends respectively. Generally speaking, about two thirds of the Alevi respondents think that the members of all other three groups are friends.

While about one third of the Turks feel that the Kurds are honest, about two thirds of the Turks feel that the Sunnis are honest and about 41 per cent of them feel that the Alevis are honest. As for the Kurds in this regard, all of them feel that the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis are honest. The figures of feeling that the others are honest are as follows from the Sunni point of view: about 60, 43 and 38 per cent for Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively. About two thirds of the Alevis think that the members of all other three groups are honest.

While about 30 and 62 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurds and Sunnis are open minded, about 43 per cent of them feel that the Alevis are open-minded. These percentages go as 60, 75 and 100 per cent from the Kurdish perspective respectively for the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis. As for the Sunnis, a little above the half them feel that the Kurds are open minded, and the figures being below fifty per cent for the other two groups, Kurds and Alevis are about 28 and 34 per cent respectively. From the Alevi point of view, while about 60 per cent of them feel that the Kurds and Sunnis are open minded, about 54 per cent of them feel that the Alevis are open minded.

While about 91 per cent of the Turks respect the Sunnis, the percentages remain as about 70 and 74 for the Kurds and Alevis from the Turkish perspective, which are quite high figures as we see in the following. On the other hand, while 80 per cent of the Kurds respect the Turks, three quarters of them feel respect for the Sunni and Alevi people. Almost all the Sunnis respect the Kurds, and about 75 per cent of them respect the Alevis. As for the Alevis, about 80 per cent of them feel respect for the Turkish, Kurdish and Alevi people.

While some more than half of the Turkish people feel affection for the Kurds and Alevis, the percentage in this regard go as high as 84 per cent for the Sunnis. On the

other hand, three quarters of the Kurds feel affection the Turks and Sunnis, only half of them feel affection for the Alevis. About 87 per cent of the Sunni people feel affection for the Turks whereas about half of them feel affection for the Kurds and Alevis. From the Alevi perspective, again the percentages are relatively for feeling affection towards the others. While about 75 per cent of them feel affection for the Turks and Sunnis, all of the Alevis feel so towards the Kurdish people.

The findings of our survey showed that the majority of all the groups appreciate the existence of the others within the same society. The figures are as follows from the Turkish perspective: about 58, 74 and 63 per cent for the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively in this regard. About three quarters of the Kurdish respondents in our survey think that they appreciate the existence of the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis within the same society. While about 88 per cent of the Sunni people appreciate the existence of the Turks within the same society, about two thirds of them do so for the Kurds and Alevis. As for the Alevis, about 85 per cent of them appreciate the existence of the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis within the same society.

About 50 per cent of the Turks feel warmth for the Kurds and Alevis while about 81 per cent of the Turks feel warmth for the Sunni people. All the Kurds feel warmth for the other groups. The figures are as follows from the Sunni point of view: about 88, 63 and 52 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, while about two thirds of them feel warmth for the Turks and Sunni people, about 79 per cent of them feel warmth for the Kurds.

5.2. Understanding the Others

The following part generally concerns with how the members of the ethnic groups feel about understanding the members of the other groups. A little less than half of the Turks feel they can understand the Kurdish points of view while about three quarters of them feel that they can understand Sunni point of view and about half of them feel that they can understand Alevi point of view. For the Kurdish respondents, the percentages are relatively high and positive. This fact is reflected as 75 per cent

for the Turks and Sunnis while about two thirds of the Kurds feel that they can understand Alevi point of view. From the Sunni perspective, the figures are as follows: while the majority (about 86 per cent) of the Sunni people feels that they can understand the Turkish point of view, about 65 per cent of them feel that they can understand the Kurdish points of view and about half of them feel that they can understand Alevi point of view. As for the Alevis, again we found quite positive images as in the percentages like about 87, 86 and 79 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively.

While about half of the Turks feel that they can easily establish emphatic relations to understand Kurdish and Alevi point of view, about three quarters of the Turks think that they can easily establish emphatic relations to understand Sunni point of view. 75 per cent of the Kurds feel that they can easily establish emphatic relations to understand Turkish point of view whereas all of the Kurds feel that they can easily establish emphatic relations to understand Sunni and Alevi point of view. About 87, 61 and 46 per cent of the Sunni people feel that they can easily establish emphatic relations to understand Turkish, Sunni and Alevi point of view respectively. As for the Alevis, the percentages are respectively as follows with the Kurdish as the highest; about 87, 93 and 79 per cent respectively for Turks, Kurds and Sunnis in terms of easily establishing emphatic relations to understand their points of view.

5.3. Perceived Attitudes of the Others

After describing what kind of images the groups have about each other and what they think about how much they understand each other, we would like to see what they feel about the treatment of the other groups towards their own. While half of the Turks feel that the Kurdish people do not treat well to the Turks, only about 15 per cent of them feel that the Sunni people do not treat well to the Turks, and about 39 per cent feel that the Alevi people do not treat well to the Turks. Only one quarter of the Kurds feel that the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis do not treat well to the Kurds. There came also relatively low percentages from the Sunni point of view, which are about 16, 38 and 41 for Turks, Kurds, and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, whereas

about two thirds of them feel that the Turkish and Sunni people do not treat well to the Alevis, a little less than half of the Alevis feel that the Kurdish people do not treat well to the Alevis.

About 58, 21 and 39 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi people respectively do not respect the Turkish people. Only one quarter of the Kurds feel, in this respect that the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis do not respect the Kurdish people. There also quite low figures from the Sunni perspective. While about only 13 per cent of the Sunni people feel that the Turkish people do not respect the Sunnis, about 33 and 38 per cent of them feel that the Kurdish and Alevi people do not respect the Sunnis. As for the Alevis, about half of them feel that the Turkish people do not respect the Alevis; about 39 per cent of them feel that the Kurdish people do not respect them, and about two thirds of them feel that the Sunni people do not respect the Alevis.

About 37 and 44 per cent of the Turks think that the Kurds and Alevis respectively approach the Turkish people with affection and love while about three quarters of them feel that the Sunnis approach the Turkish people with affection and love. While 60 per cent of the Kurds feel that the Turks approach the Kurdish people with affection and love, half of them feel that the Sunni and Alevi people approach their groups with affection and love. The majority of the Sunni people feel that the Turkish people approach their groups with affection and love whereas about half of them feel that the Kurdish people approach their groups with affection and love, and about one third of them feel that the Alevi people approach their groups with affection and love. As for the Alevis, the figures are as follows in this regard: about 69, 54 and 50 per cent of them feel that the Turkish, Kurdish and Alevi people respectively approach their groups with affection and love.

While about 40 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurds and Alevis approach the Turkish people with understanding, about 71 per cent of them feel that the Sunnis approach the Turkish people with understanding. 60 per cent of the Kurds feel that the Turks approach the Kurdish people with understanding while three quarters of

them think that the Sunni and Alevi people approach their groups with understanding. From the Sunni perspective, while about three quarters of them think that the Turkish people approach their groups with understanding, about a little less half of them feel that the Kurdish people approach their groups with understanding, and about 39 per cent of them feel that the Alevi people approach their groups with understanding. As for the Alevis, while half of them feel that the Sunnis approach their groups with understanding, about two thirds of the Alevis feel that the Turkish and Kurdish people approach their groups with understanding.

While about 61 per cent of the Turks feel that the Kurds perceive the Turkish people as having negative features, about 27 and 48 per cent of the Turks feel that the Sunnis and Alevis respectively perceive the Turkish people as having negative features. On the other hand, 40 per cent of the Kurds feel that the Turks perceive the Kurdish people as having negative features, and about two thirds of them do not feel that the Sunni and Alevi people perceive the Kurds as having negative features. The percentages are as follows for the fact that Sunni people feel the Turks, Kurds and Alevis perceive the Sunnis as having negative features: 24, 43 and 54 per cent respectively. From the Alevi point of view, while about one third of them think that the Turkish people and Kurds perceive the Alevis as having negative features, about two thirds of them feel so.

Only about one fifth of the Turkish people feel threat from the other groups regarding the job, health, education and other services. While about one quarter of the Kurds feel threat from the Turks and Sunnis regarding the job, health, education and other services, all of the Kurdish people do not feel any threat from the Sunnis regarding the job, health, education and other services. From the Sunni perspective, while about 25 per cent of them feel any threat from Kurds and Alevis in this regard, only 10 per cent of the Sunni people feel threat from the Turks regarding the job, health, education and other services. As for the Alevis, while about one quarter of them feel threat from the Turks and Sunnis regarding the job, health, education and other services, 60 per cent of them feel threat from the Kurds regarding the job, health, education and other services.

About half the Turks feel threat from the Kurds and Alevi regarding the spiritual values while only about 16 per cent of them feel threat from the Sunnis regarding the spiritual values. About a quarter of the Kurdish people feel threat from the groups regarding the spiritual values. The figures are as follows from the Sunni perspective respectively: about 19, 38 and 52 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Alevi in this respect. As for the Alevi, about 40 per cent of them feel threat from the Turks and Kurds regarding the spiritual values while about 69 per cent of them feel threat from the Sunnis regarding the spiritual values.

5.4. Relations with the Others

This section describes the emotional states of the respondents during the interactions with the others. About 40 per cent of the Turks feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Kurds and Alevi while about one fifth of them feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Sunnis. From the Kurdish point of view, one fifth of them feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Turks, and all of the Kurdish respondents do not feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Sunni and Alevi people. As for the Sunnis, whereas about 15 per cent of them feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Turks, about one third of the Sunni people feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with the Kurds and Alevi. On the other hand, about 36, 40 and 60 per cent of the Alevi feel uncomfortable in the event of interaction with Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively.

While about three quarters of the Turkish people feel confident in the event of interaction with the Sunnis, a little more than half of them feel confident in the event of interaction with the Kurds and Alevi. The figures are as follows from the Kurdish point of view: 60, 75 and 75 per cent for the Turks, Sunnis and Alevi respectively. The percentages are above the half from the Sunni perspective. While about three quarters of the Sunni people feel confident in the event of interaction with the Turks, slightly more than half of the Sunnis feel confident in the event of interaction with the Kurds and Alevi. As for the Alevi, about 67 per cent of them feel confident in

the event of interaction with Turks whereas about 57 per cent of them feel confident in the event of interaction with the Kurds and Sunnis.

In terms of feeling anxious during interaction with the others, we found quite low percentages for all the groups. About 38, 10 and 30 per cent of the Turks feel anxious in the event of interaction with the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively. From the Kurdish point of view, while 40 per cent of them feel anxious in the event of interaction with the Turks, only one quarter of them feel so in the event of interaction with the Sunnis and Alevis. The figures go as follows from the Sunni perspective: about 10, 26 and 29 per cent of them feel anxious in the event of interaction with the Turks, Kurds and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, about 7 and 13 per cent of them feel anxious in the event of interaction with the Turks and Kurds respectively, about 29 per cent of them feel anxious in the event of interaction with the Sunnis.

While about some more than one third of the Turks feel peaceful in the event of interaction with the Kurdish and Alevi non-acquaintances, a little more than half of the Turks feel peaceful in the event of interaction with the Sunnis non-acquaintances. The percentages are like the following from the Kurdish perspective: 60, 50 and 75 per cent of the Kurds feel peaceful in the event of interaction with the Turkish, Sunni and Alevi non-acquaintances respectively. While about three quarters of the Sunni people feel peaceful in the event of interaction with the Turkish non-acquaintances, a little more and a little less than half of the Sunnis feel peaceful in the event of interaction with the Kurdish and Alevi non-acquaintances respectively. As for the Alevis, while about half of them feel peaceful in the event of interaction with Turkish and Kurdish non-acquaintances, about 39 per cent of them feel so in the event of interaction with the Sunni non-acquaintances.

One can draw the following by taking into account the findings above. Most Turkish people have negative images of the Kurdish people, for instance they feel that Kurdish people are not hard working, intelligent, friendly, honest, or open minded. Most Turkish people have completely positive images of the Sunni people; for instance they think that Sunni people are hard working, intelligent, friendly, honest,

and open minded. While most Turkish people feel that Alevi are hard working, intelligent, friendly; but they do not feel that they are honest and open-minded. Apart from the fact that they feel that the Turkish people are not hard working, mostly they have positive images of the Turkish people. For instance, they feel that the Turkish people are honest, friendly, open-minded and intelligent. Most of them feel that the Sunnis are friendly, honest, open minded while half of them think that Sunnis are intelligent. And only a quarter of them feel that the Sunnis are hard working. Most of them feel that the Alevi are friendly, honest, open minded while half of them think that Alevi are intelligent. And only a quarter of them feel that the Alevi are hard working.

Most Sunni people have positive images of the Turkish people in every term. Even though most of the Sunnis people feel that the Kurds is friendly, they also feel that the Kurds are not hard working, intelligent, honest, and open minded. While 51 per cent of the Sunnis think that Alevi are friendly, most of them have negative images about Alevi people in general terms. Most Alevi people have positive images of the Turkish people. Most of the Alevi have positive images of the Kurds. Most of them have positive images of the Sunnis.

While most of the respondents who express themselves as Turks feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Kurdish people in order to understand them, but they are not able to understand the Kurdish people. Most of the respondents who identify themselves as Turks feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Sunni people and they can understand them. Half of the Turks feel that they can understand the Alevi but a little more than the half of the Turkish people feel that they can put themselves in the shoes of Alevi in order to understand them.

Most of the Kurdish people feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Turkish people and they can understand them. Most of the Kurdish people feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Sunni people and they can understand them. Most of the Kurdish people feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Alevi people and they can understand them.

The majority of the Sunni people feel that they can put themselves in the places of the Turks and understand them. The majority of the Sunnis can establish emphatic relations with the Kurdish people in order to understand them. While 52 per cent of the Sunni people feel that they can understand Alevis, less than half of them feel that they cannot put themselves in the places of the Alevis in order to understand them.

Most of the Alevi people think that they have emphatic understanding for the Turkish people. The majority of the Alevis feel that they can understand and put themselves in the place of the Kurds. Most of the Alevi people feel they can understand the Sunnis and put them in their shoes to understand them better.

The majority of the Turkish people feel that they are discriminated by the Kurdish people. For instance, they feel that the Kurds do not treat the Turks well, they do not respect them, they do not think about the Turks in a positive way. Neither do they understand or like the Turks. The majority of the Turkish people feel that they are not discriminated by the Sunni people in any way. Most of the Turkish people feel that they are discriminated by the Alevi people. For example, they feel that the Alevis do not treat the Turks well, they do not respect them, and they do not think about the Turks in a positive way, they do not understand or like the Turks.

The majority of the Kurdish people feel that they are not discriminated by the Turks. For instance, they feel that the Turkish people treat the Kurds well, they respect them, they think about the Kurds in a positive way. Furthermore, according to them, the Turks like them, understand them, and stuff like that. The majority of the Kurdish people do not feel that they are discriminated by the Sunni people. The majority of the Kurdish people do not feel that they are discriminated by the Alevis.

The majority of the Sunnis do not feel that they are discriminated by the Turkish people in any way. Even though the majority of the Sunni people do not feel that the Kurds like Sunnis nor understand them, they still feel that they are not discriminated by the Kurdish people. The majority of the Sunni people feel that they are discriminated by the Alevi people. They think that the Alevis do not treat Sunnis

well, they do not respect them, they do not think about the Sunni people in positive ways, and they do not understand or like the Sunnis.

Apart from the fact that the majority of the Alevi people feel that the Turks do not treat them well, they, in general aspects, feel that they are not discriminated by the Turkish people. They do not feel discriminated in any way and approach. Half of the Alevi respondents feel that Sunni people like and understand them while most of them feel that they are not treated well and respected. Most of them also feel that Sunnis think negatively about the Alevis.

While most Turkish people feel confident and comfortable in the event of interaction with the Kurdish people, they feel anxious and not in peace. Most Turks feel that they respect and like the Kurdish people. While they do not feel warmth towards them, they accept and appreciate their existence in Turkish society. Most Turkish people feel threatened by the Kurdish people in terms of their moral values, but they do not see a threat for the material interests. The majority of the Turkish people feel confident, comfortable and in peace in the event of interaction with the Sunni people and they do not feel anxious either. Most Turks feel that they respect and like the Sunni people. They have positive attitudes towards the Sunnis; they feel warmth towards them, and they accept and appreciate their existence in Turkish society. The Turkish people do not feel threatened by the Sunni people in terms of material interests and moral values. While most Turkish people feel confident and comfortable in the event of interaction with the Alevi people, they express that they do not feel comfortable and in peace. Yet they feel anxious when they interact with them. Most Turks feel that they have positive attitudes towards the Alevis. They feel warmth towards them, and they accept and appreciate their existence in Turkish society. Most Turkish people feel threatened by the Alevi people both in terms of material interests and moral values.

Most Kurdish people feel confident and in peace in the event of interaction with the Turkish people, and they do not feel anxious and comfortable. They have positive attitudes towards the Turks in all terms. The Kurdish people do not feel threatened by

the Turkish people in terms of their moral values and material interests. The majority of the Kurdish people feel confident and in peace, and they are not anxious either in the event of interaction with the Sunnis. The Kurds all has positive attitudes towards the Sunni people in every respect. They do not feel threatened by the Sunnis. The majority of the Kurdish people feel confident and in peace, and they are not anxious in the event of interaction with the Alevis. Only a quarter of them feel anxious when they interact with the Alevis though. The majority of the Kurds has positive attitudes towards the Alevi people in every respect and manner. Most of the Kurdish people do not feel threatened by the Alevis in terms of material and moral interests and values.

Most of the Sunni people feel confident and comfortable in the event of interaction with the Turks, and they do not feel anxious either. They feel in peace when they are in relation with the Turkish people. Most Sunnis feel that they respect and like the Turkish people. They feel warmth towards them, and they accept and appreciate their existence within the society. The majority of the Sunni people do not feel threatened by the Turkish people in terms of their moral values and material interests. Most of the Sunni people feel confident and in peace in the event of interaction with the Kurdish people and do not feel anxious, but the majority of them expresses that they feel uncomfortable during interaction with the Kurds. Most Sunnis feel that they respect and like the Kurdish people, feel warmth towards them, and accept and appreciate their existence within the same society. Most Sunni people feel that they are not threatened in terms of their moral values and material interests by the Kurdish people. Most of the Sunni people feel comfortable in the event of interaction with the Alevi people. Again the Sunnis do not feel anxious but they do not feel in peace either with the Alevis, and only 51 per cent of the Sunnis feel confident when they interact with Alevi people. The Sunnis feel that they respect and like the Alevis and have positive attitudes. While most of the Sunnis people feel that the Alevis do not constitute a threat for the material interests, about half of them think that the Alevis are threatening their moral values.

The Alevi people have positive feelings when they are interacting with the Turkish people. They feel confident and comfortable in the event of interaction with the Turks, they also feel in peace but not anxious. The attitudes of the Alevi people towards the Turks are positive in general. The Alevi people do not feel any threat from the Turkish people in all respects. Most of the Alevi people have positive feelings when they are interacting with the Kurds. Most of them have positive attitudes towards the Kurds. Most of the Alevi people do not feel any threat to their moral values from the Kurds but they feel that the Kurds threaten their material interests. The majority of the Alevi people feel confident, at the same time most of them feel uncomfortable and anxious; furthermore they do not feel in peace in the event of interaction with the Sunnis. Most of them express that they have positive attitudes towards the Sunni people in every respect. Most of the Alevi people feel that they are not threatened by the Sunnis in terms of material interests. However, most of them feel threat from the Sunnis in terms of their moral values.

CHAPTER VI

INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

This chapter will describe how much the members of the ethnic groups in concern who live in Ankara are willing to have interaction with the others, how much they are willing to cooperate with the members of the other groups in order to improve the inter-ethnic relations, and how optimistic they are about the future of the inter-group relations.

6.1. Willing to Have More Interactions with the Others

According to our findings in this regard, about two thirds of the Turks think that they are open to a relationship with the Kurds and Alevis, and about 84 per cent of them think that they are open to a relationship with the Sunnis. All of the Kurds think that they are open to a relationship with the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis. While about 89 per cent of the Sunnis think that they are open to a relationship with the Turks, about 70 per cent of them think that they are open to a relationship with the Kurds and Alevis. As for the Alevis, the figures are as follows: about 87, 100 and 79 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively.

While about three fifths of the Turks desire inviting the members of Kurdish and Alevi ethnic groups as a dinner guest, about four fifths of them desire inviting the members of Sunni ethnic group as a dinner guest. All of the Kurdish people desire inviting the members of Turkish, Sunni and Alevi ethnic group as a dinner guest. Almost all of the Sunnis desire inviting the members of Turkish ethnic group as a dinner guest whereas about 78 and 68 per cent of them desire inviting the members of Kurdish and Alevi ethnic groups respectively as a dinner guest. As for the Alevis, the majority of the Alevis desire inviting the members of all the ethnic groups as a dinner guest.

While about two thirds of the Turks are willing to work in the same work with the Kurds and Alevis, about 80 per cent of them are willing to work in the same work with the Sunnis. All the members of the Kurdish ethnic group are willing to work in the same work with the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis. While almost all of the Sunnis are willing to work in the same work with the Kurds and Alevis respectively, about 76 and 60 per cent of the Sunnis are willing to work in the same work with the Kurds and Alevis respectively. As for the Alevis, about 80 per cent of them are willing to work in the same work with the members all other three groups.

About 69, 75 and 89 per cent of the Turks are willing to belong to the same club with the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively. All of the Kurdish people are willing to belong to the same club with the members of other ethnic groups. While almost all of the Sunnis are willing to belong to the same club with the Kurds and Alevis, about 74 per cent of them are willing to belong to the same club with the Kurds. As for the Alevis, about 87 per cent of them are willing to belong to the same club with the Kurds and Sunnis, all of them are willing to belong to the same club with the Sunni people.

About two thirds of the Turks are willing to eat a meal in the same restaurant with the Kurds and Alevis while about 86 per cent of the Turks are willing to eat a meal in the same restaurant with the Sunni people. All the members of Kurdish ethnic group are willing to eat a meal in the same restaurant with the members of the other ethnic groups. Whereas about 84 per cent of the Sunnis are willing to eat a meal in the same restaurant with the Kurds, about two thirds of them are willing to eat a meal in the same restaurant with the Kurdish and Alevi people. As for the Alevis, the figures are relatively close to each other as the following: about 83, 86 and 71 per cent for the Turks, Kurds and Sunnis respectively in this respect.

Table 9: Ethnic groups and inter-marriages

Ethnicity	Kurd		Sunni		Alevi	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Turk	5	-	76	3	13	2
	Turk		Sunni		Alevi	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Kurd	35+23	14	19+44	8	12	-
	Turk		Kurd		Alevi	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Sunni	66	9	1	-	14	-
	Turk		Kurd		Sunni	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Alevi	48+29	-	4	-	22+44	-

About 72, 69 and 88 per cent of the Turks are willing to marry a Kurd, a Sunni and an Alevi respectively. On the other hand, all of the Kurds are willing to marry a member of all other three groups while the majority of the Sunnis are willing to marry a member of other ethnic groups. From the Alevi perspective, while about 87 per cent of them are willing to marry a Turk and a Kurd, all of them are willing to marry a Sunni.

6.2. Willing to Improve the Inter-Group Relations with the Others

About 73, 87 and 78 per cent of the Turks reproach their group members for making an offensive joke about the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively. All the members of the Kurdish ethnic group reproach their group members for making an offensive joke about the members of other ethnic groups. On the other hand, the majority of the Sunnis reproach their group members for making an offensive joke about the members of the other groups. As for the Alevis, a little less than the total of them reproach their group members for making an offensive joke about the Turks and Sunnis while all of them are reproach their group members for making an offensive joke about the Kurds.

About two thirds of all the Turkish respondents are willing to improve inter-group relations with the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis. From the Kurdish point of view in this respect, while about three quarters of them are willing to improve inter-group relations with the Turks and Sunnis, about two thirds of them are willing to improve

inter-group relations with the Alevis. As for the Sunnis, about 90 per cent of them are willing to improve inter-group relations with the members of other ethnic groups. As regard to this point, almost all of the Alevis are willing to improve inter-group relations with the members of all the other groups.

About 62, 79 and 86 per cent of the Turks are willing to work together actively with the Kurds, Sunnis and Alevis respectively to improve inter-group relations. All of the Kurdish respondents are willing to work together actively with the members of all three ethnic groups to improve inter-group relations. About 85 per cent of the Sunnis are willing to work together actively with the Turks to improve inter-group relations while about 70 per cent of them are willing to work together actively with the Kurds and Alevis to improve inter-group relations. As for the Alevis, almost all of them are willing to work together actively with the members of other ethnic groups to improve inter-group relations.

6.3. Optimism about the Future of the Inter-Group Relations

About half of the Turks think that the problems between their group and the Kurds and Alevis will continue in future while about 27 per cent of the Turks think that the problems between their group and the Sunnis will continue in future. While two fifth of the Kurds think that problems between their group and the Turks will continue in future, a quarter of them think that problems between their group and the Sunni and Alevi people will continue in future. About 19 per cent of the Sunnis think that problems between their group and the Turks will continue in future whereas about half of them think that problems between their group and the Kurds and Alevis will continue in future. From the Alevi perspective, while about 30 per cent of the Alevis think that problems between their group and the Turks and Kurds will continue in future, about half of them think that problems between their group and the Sunnis will continue in future.

Regarding the respondents' feelings towards the future of the relationship among the groups, we found out that the most of the Turks feel very optimistic about their

relations with the Sunnis with a percentage of 71. However, they are not very optimistic about their relations with the Kurds with a percentage of 47. Meanwhile about 57 per cent of the Turks think that Turks and the Alevi will one day be able to truly get along. The Kurdish respondents in the survey all optimistic about the future of their relationship with all of the other groups as 100 percent of them expressed they will one day be able to truly get along with all of the groups. The Sunnis are mostly optimistic about their relationship with the Turks (71 percent), and with the Kurds (55 percent). However, they are not that optimistic about the future of their relations with the Alevi. Most of the Alevi are optimistic about their relations with all of the groups. 57 percent expressed their hope for their relations with the Turks, while 64 percent did that for the Kurds and 60 percent are optimistic for their relations with the Sunnis.

Most of the Turkish, Kurdish and Sunni respondents do not feel that the disparity in income between their own groups and the other groups will go away except for the 50 percent of the Kurds believe that the income disparity between the Kurds and the Turks will disappear. Approximately half of the Alevi feel that the income disparity between themselves and the other groups will disappear.

Most of the Turks believe that the ethnic hierarchy between the Turks and the Sunnis will totally be in the past whereas they do not feel the same thing for disappearance of the ethnic hierarchy between their groups and the Kurds and the Alevi. The Kurds are very optimistic about this matter, while the Sunnis hold the view that the hierarchy among the Sunnis and the other groups will remain the same. The Alevi keep their position about the future of the ethnic relations. Like their opinion about the optimism for the future of the ethnic relations in respect to disappearance of the income disparity among the groups, half of them feel that the ethnic hierarchy will disappear among the groups.

Regardless of their ethnic groups, all of the groups expressed that understanding among their own groups and the other groups is an achievable goal

If we want to summarize the findings regarding the group relations and the social distance between the groups as well as the feelings towards the future of the relations, we can say that the majority of the Turks are willing to interact with the Kurdish people. They feel that they are open to relations with the Kurdish people; they would like to invite them for dinner; they are open to work together, be members of the same clubs, associations, etc., they are willing to go to the same restaurants or cafes, they are even open to get married with the Kurdish people. Most Turkish people express that they are willing to improve the relations with the Kurdish people. For example, they would cooperate with Kurdish people to improve inter-ethnic relations; they would even reproach an in-group person who is telling offensive jokes about the Kurds. The majority of the Turks are willing to interact and improve relations with the Sunni people in any terms. The majority of the Turks are willing to interact with the Alevi people in every sense. They feel that they want to improve the relations with the Alevi people; they would like to invite them for dinner; they are open to work together, be members of the same clubs, associations, etc., they are willing to go to the same restaurants or cafes, they are even open to get married with the Alevi people. Most Turkish people express that they are willing to improve the relations with the Alevi people. For example, they would cooperate with Alevi people to improve inter-ethnic relations; they would even reproach an in-group person who is telling offensive jokes about the Alevi people.

The respondents that express themselves as the Kurds are willing to interact with the Turkish people. They feel that they are open to relations with the Turkish people; they would like to invite them for dinner; they are open to work together, be members of the same clubs, associations, etc., they are willing to eat in the same restaurants or cafes, they are even open to get married with the Turkish people. Most of the Kurdish people are willing to improve the relations with the Turkish people. They are willing to cooperate with Turkish people to improve inter-ethnic relations; they would even reproach an in-group person who is telling offensive jokes about the Turks. The majority of the Kurds is open to interact with the Sunni people. They are willing to improve the group relations with the Sunnis. The majority of the Kurds is

open to interact with the Alevi people. They are willing to improve the group relations with the Alevis.

The majority of the Sunnis are willing to interact with the Turkish people. They feel that they are open to relations with the Turkish people; they would like to invite them for dinner; they are open to work together, be members of the same clubs, associations, etc., they are willing to go to the same restaurants or cafes, they are even open to get married with the Turkish people. Most Sunnis think that they are willing to improve the relations with the Turkish people. They are ready to cooperate with Turkish people to improve inter-ethnic relations. The majority of the Sunnis are willing to interact with the Kurdish people in every respect and term. Most of the Sunni people think that they are willing to improve the relations with the Kurdish people, are ready to cooperate with Kurdish people to improve inter-ethnic relations. The majority of the Sunnis are willing to interact with the Alevi people. They feel that they are open to all kinds of relations with the Alevi people. Most of the Sunni people express that they are willing to improve the relations with the Alevi people.

The majority of the Alevi are willing to interact and improve relations with the Turkish people. Most of the Alevis are positive regarding interactions and relations with the Kurdish society. The majority of the Alevi is open to interact with the Sunni people. They are willing to improve the group relations with the Sunnis.

Most Turks are not optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Kurdish people. They feel that the problems will continue with the Kurdish people and the income disparities and hierarchical disparities will continue, and they do not think mutual understanding is an achievable goal. Turks are very optimistic about the future of the relations with the Sunnis. Even though most Turks expect that the problems will continue with the Alevis in future, the income disparity and hierarchy between the groups will continue, they are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Alevi people and they think mutual understanding is an achievable goal.

Even though most of the Kurdish people are expecting the problems with the Turkish people will continue in future, they are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Turkish people. About half of the Kurdish people feel that the income disparities will disappear; they are hopeful that the hierarchy between the groups will disappear. Almost all of the Kurds think mutual understanding is an achievable goal. They have optimistic feelings towards the future of the inter-group relations. On the other hand, only one third of the Kurds feels that income disparity between the Kurds and Sunnis will disappear in the future. They have optimistic feelings towards the future of the inter-group relations with the Alevis. On the other hand, only one third of the Kurds feels that the income disparity between the Kurds and Alevis will disappear in the future.

The majority of the Sunnis are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Turkish people. But only a few of them expect problems, and believe that income disparity will disappear in future. Most of the Sunnis are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Kurdish people. They think that mutual understanding is an achievable goal. They do not expect the problems will continue with the Kurdish people in future, but they feel that the income disparities and hierarchical disparities will continue in future. While the majority of the Sunnis think that they are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Alevi people and understanding each other is an achievable goal; income disparity and hierarchy between the Sunnis and Alevis will not disappear. Furthermore, they do not expect that the problems will continue with the Alevi people in future.

Most of the Alevis have optimistic feelings about the future of intergroup relations between Alevis and Turks while half of them feel that the income disparities between the groups will disappear and understanding among the members of these two groups is an achievable goal. Most of the Alevis are optimistic about the future of intergroup relations with the Kurdish people. But 50 per cent of them feel that the hierarchy between the groups will disappear and 47 per cent of them feel the income disparity will disappear. While half of them express that they are expecting that the problems between Alevis and Sunnis will continue, and about half of them feel that income

disparity between these two groups will disappear in future, most of the Alevi feel that they are optimistic about the future of the relations and they think that mutual understanding of the groups is an achievable goal in spite of the fact that most of them think that the hierarchy will not disappear in future.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This research is mainly concerned with the ethnic identities of four ethnic groups as well as their images, feelings, attitudes, perceptions on interacting with each other, and their prospects for the future of the intergroup relations. These groups are the Turkish, Kurdish, the Sunni and the Alevi groups who live in Ankara, the Capital of Turkey. These groups are chosen not only due to the fact that these groups experience some political problems between them but also they constitute the largest ethnic groups in terms of their sizes in Turkey.

There are many researches that focus on the macro aspects of the relationship between Turks and the Kurds or the Sunni and the Alevi groups in Turkey. They usually deal with the historical developments of the relations between these groups in terms of nationalism or ethno-nationalism. They try to answer either why the 'Kurdish ethno-nationalism' or why the 'Alevi revivalism' emerged again during the 1980s and what are the possible reasons. Some address the question in terms of social and economical factors, while others try to answer the roots in modernization and the establishment of the nation states in the region. However, the individuals' accounts of the problems, perceptions of each other, as well as their interactions with each other are mostly neglected. The scope of this thesis stemmed from a curiosity; how the members of these groups define themselves in terms of identity and how do they perceive their relations with the other groups keeping aside what the experts say about the ethnic conflicts in Turkey. This is a significant issue in terms of the orientation of studying group relations in Turkey. There is a need for researches that focus on the living experiences of the individuals if we are to understand the living group relations instead of producing 'arm chair' sociology.

Studying ethnic identities and ethnic relations has three main traditions. One of them is rooted in Symbolic Interactionism, another one comes from the social psychological approaches of Tajfel and Turner and the other one is in ethnic studies, which is mainly influenced by the Anthropologists. In this thesis I have tried to benefit from all these traditions, which are not mutually exclusive. And indeed, they can be combined with each other. Reviewing the basic conceptual and theoretical approaches to ethnic identity and ethnicity, I have established the theoretical framework of the thesis based on subjectivist account of ethnicity and constructionist theoretical approach to ethnicity. However, Symbolic Interactionist notion of socially constructed self, which can be multiple, fluid, and dynamic whose salient character may change from situation to situation set the basics of my understanding of the identity. Furthermore, Tajfel and Turner, who are also considered as the European counterparts of Symbolic Interactionism and defined the identity formation in terms of the sameness and difference which are constituted when an individual categorize himself/herself as a necessary process in order to make sense of things around himself/herself have also shaped the theoretical framework of this thesis.

According to the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis, the idea of “who we are” is shaped in relation to how we draw the lines between ‘us and the others’. This point can be referred to Mead’s interplay between “I” and Me” process, Tajfel and Turner’s categorization and creating favorable characteristics for the in-group members and unfavorable characteristics for the out-group members, and Barth’s process of “maintaining the boundary” between the groups which is always in reference to the others. Following this line of thinking, the concept of identity in this research is thought as a dynamic, fluid, and active as it is defined by Blumer but also affected by the structural factors as it is defined by Kuhnian version of Symbolic Interactionism.

Tajfel’s Categorization-Identity- Comparison (CIC) and Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) are also very strong in explaining how identities might lead images, feelings and attitudes such as stereotyping and prejudice and eventually determine the social distance by creating behaviors such as discrimination. Even though social

psychological studies examine the relationship between these concepts in various researches, there are not many studies that focus on the relationship between the ethnic groups in this respect. This study aims to study if there is a relationship between the ethnic identities of the respondents who define themselves in terms of ethnicity and their images of the other groups, feelings when they interact with them, their attitudes towards them, their feelings of being discriminated by them, their willingness to interact with the other groups and their perception of the future of the intergroup relations.

In order to research these problem areas, I have conducted a survey and in-depth interviews among the members of the ethnic groups in question. The questionnaire was applied to 252 respondents and the in-depth interviews were applied to 20 respondents. In order to prepare the questions, I have benefited seven scales of Walter G. Stephan (1999), which are prepared to measure the prejudice, social distance and developing dialogues between different ethnic groups. Then I conducted the questionnaire and the interviews in various organizations whose orientations are mainly the ethnic or religious ties such as unions, associations, foundations, cemevis, halkevis, mosques and mosque construction and maintenance unions and hemşehri organizations in Dikmen, Tuzluçayır, Hüseyingazi, Batıkent, Natoyolu, Boğaziçi, Ayrancı, Çankaya, Cebeci, Yenimahalle, Mamak and the city center of Ankara assuming that active participants of these organizations would fall in ethnic categories more than the non-participants of such organizations. Data was analyzed using SPSS 11 by applying frequency tables and Chi-squares. In our analyses identity is used both as a dependent and an independent variable.

Analyzing the data obtained from the questionnaire and the interviews, we found that ethnicity is not the salient character of the individuals who live in Ankara. Most people do not define themselves in terms of ethnicity unless we ask them to do so. Among the individuals who define themselves in ethnic terms, the variables such as age, gender, educational level of the respondents and their parents, and income level were not important factors in determining the ethnic identities of the respondents, whereas the place of the birth, political and ideological views, religiosity, property

and mother tongue were effective in people's defining themselves in terms of ethnicity.

We also wanted to know which ethnic elements the respondents thought as the markers that draw the line between themselves and the others and which ones they feel that they share with the other ethnic groups. We also examined their perceptions of the common values; family values and values related to business and work to see if they feel that they share these values with the others. Their perception on whether they feel that the group they belong to share similar educational and economical level were included in our analysis as well.

One of the most important findings of the research is the fact that ethnic borders are not drawn by the same traits among the ethnic groups in question. One trait such as religious ties might be seen as an ethnic marker that defines one group from the other. However, the same trait might not be a defining factor from the point of view of the members of the other groups. Although there is a tendency to explain the ethnic differences between the Turks and the Kurds in terms of language and the shared ancestors and to explain the ethnic differences between Alevis and Sunnis in terms of religious beliefs, the findings suggest that respondents' perceptions on the ethnic differentiation are richer than these two explanations. For instance, some respondents who define themselves as Turks believe that they do not share the same blood ties, the same descents as well as political interests, destiny, values, desires and hopes; but they feel that they share the same religious beliefs, history, customs, and life styles. On the contrary, the respondents who defined themselves as Kurdish feel that only their language and their ancestors are different than Turks, but they feel that they have strong blood ties with the Turks even though their very origin might be different. Similarly, while Sunnis feel that they do not share the same blood ties, religious beliefs, customs and values with the Alevis, most Alevis feel that they share the same religious beliefs, blood ties, and customs. But they feel that they do not share same descents, political interests and the values.

Based on these findings, we can say that what is really different is not important as far as the individuals do not perceive it as difference. In other words, objective criteria of the ethnicity might be found in many ethnic relations, but what are more important are the subjective beliefs of the members of the ethnic groups. Although different groups found various differences between themselves and the other groups, especially history, customs and life styles were found in common among all of the groups.

On the contrary, while most Turkish and Sunni members of the groups feel that they don't share the same economic level with the Alevi and the Kurds, around half of the members of the Alevi and Kurdish groups express that they share the same economic level with the Turkish and the Sunni groups. While most studies of ethnicity finds parallelism with class positions and ethnicity because of the fact that minorities in most societies are in disadvantaged positions even though they are seldom more advantaged than the majority people as in the case of South Africa. Our finding suggests that about half of the respondents do not agree with the ethnic cleavage based on class structure.

Similarly, most of the Turkish and Sunni and Alevi groups feel that they do not share common political interests with the Kurds and the Alevis, unlike the expectations most of the respondents who defined themselves as Kurdish expressed that they share the same political interests with the Turks, Sunnis and Alevis. Considering the political problems with the Kurds after 1980's in Turkey, this finding seems very surprising. However, this is an important finding to argue that while there are some political problems between some groups, the individuals who are in the same ethnic category may have different realities than those who are in the ethnic conflict. Being in the same ethnic category does not mean that all the members of the same ethnic category share the same political ideas too. The Kurds who live in Ankara is a good example of this. However, considering the fact that most of the Turkish, Sunni and Alevi people do not feel that they share the same political interests, we can say that political interests are important to draw lines between people who define themselves on the basis of ethnicity.

In terms of the images of the groups from the perspectives of the other groups, we found that while the Turks and Sunnis have negative images and prejudices about the Kurds and Alevis, most of the Kurds and Alevis have more positive images of the other groups. However, the ethnic prejudice is seen among the members of all of the groups at some degree.

Almost all of the groups expressed that they have strong empathetic relations with the others. That is, understanding each other and putting themselves into each other's places to understand them. The only exception to the fact that the groups have strong empathetic relations with each other is that about 45 per cent of the respondents who defined themselves as Turks feel that they do not understand the Kurds.

Almost all groups expressed that they have positive feelings and attitudes towards the other groups when they are interacting with them. Although most groups express that they have positive feelings and attitudes towards the others, most of them express that they feel discriminated against their ethnicity by the members of the other groups. However, most of the members of the Alevi groups feel that they are not experienced discrimination based on their ethnicity. This is an interesting finding in regards to the theoretical debates about the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Most research suggested that negative prejudice cause discrimination. According to this, we expected them to feel discriminated because of the finding that the Sunnis have negative prejudices towards them, but the result was not as we expected to see. This supports those views that discrimination is not direct result of negative prejudices. It can be even discussed that prejudices could be the result of being discriminated (see Jones 2002: 1-22).

From the point of circumstantialists, ethnic groups are formed based on economic, political or cultural interests. For this reason, we wanted to see whether ethnic groups see each other as competitive regarding the material interests and a threat to their moral values. We found that only Alevis see the Kurds as competitor to their material interests while Turks see the Kurds, Sunnis see Alevis, and the Alevis see Sunnis as a threat to their moral values. Again this finding can be argued whether the primordial

attachments cause differentiation between the groups, or some kind of interest foster ethnic differences.

All of the groups expressed that they are willing to have interactions with the other groups. For example, they are open to have more relations with them, including having dinner together, working at the same work places, being a member of the same clubs or associations, etc. They are also willing to get married to the members of the ethnic groups. As far as we know from the ethnic studies, endogamy is one of key marker of ethnic relations with others, and having also dinner together is an important sign of having close inter-group relations. All of the groups express that they are willing to improve inter-group relations. Most of them think that they would not allow offensive behaviors towards the members of the other ethnic groups. They are willing to cooperate with the members of the other groups to develop the relations with each other.

Most of the members of all groups believe that mutual understanding among the groups is an achievable goal, and most feel optimistic about the future of the inter-group relations. Some feel that income disparity and hierarchy between the groups will not disappear in future.

Nash's (1996) claim that kinship, commensality and common cult are core ethnic markers, is known as the minimum objective criteria of the ethnic markers. I hold the view that Nash is right to some extent in his assertion in many cases; however those cases are where the ethnic identities are strong and salient. But his criteria do not apply to our case where many individuals of the groups think that they might have kinship ties with the members of the other groups because of living in the same society for quite a long period where inter-group marriage was seen a reality especially in urban settlements. Considering the fact that almost all of the respondents feel that they are open to inter-marriages as well as having close relations such as visiting them, inviting them to dinner, it is possible to say that ethnic identities are not salient in Ankara. According to Nash, the ethnic groups have some secondary markers, too. These secondary (surface) markers could be the skin color, dressing, language, and (culturally denoted) physical features, which make the

ethnic differences visible. Again Nash might be right in many cases in that these surface markers can be visible in different parts of Turkey. But none of these surface markers are seen among the members of ethnic groups in Ankara.

In spite of the fact that ethnic identities can be seen as salient in some parts of Turkey and ethnic group belongingness did not disappear with modernization as the founders of Sociology such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber assumed, it might not be the case in some settings such as Ankara. The formula that negative prejudice cause discrimination needs further research. Discrimination may cause negative prejudices too. Even though the individuals who define themselves based on ethnic identities feel discrimination by the members of the other groups, they are willing to overcome the problems with the other groups and improve the intergroup relations.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Dear Respondent,

This research is being conducted in order to determine your own peculiar ideas and thoughts about some issues. The questions do not have a specific right or wrong answer. It is enough for you just to give the most appropriate answer. Your sincere responses are highly important for the validity and correctness. Please do not write your name on anywhere on questionnaire form. Your responses and answers to this questionnaire shall be evaluated for a PhD thesis. We appreciate your time and valuable contributions in advance.

1. Sex: a- Male: b- Female:
Age:
2. Please specify the total monthly income of your family:
3. What is the approximate value of the total assets (real estate and other possessions) that your family owns? :
4. The Province where you were born:
5. To which of the following does the place you were born apply?
 - a. Metropolitan city
 - b. Small or medium size city
 - c. District center
 - d. Town
 - e. Village

6. In which of the following places did you spend most of your life?
- | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Metropolitan city | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. Small or medium size city | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. District center | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. Town | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Village | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
7. Which of the following applies to your educational background?
- | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Illiterate | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. Primary school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Secondary school | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. High school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Undergraduate or higher school | <input type="checkbox"/> | f. Master degree | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| g. Doctorate degree | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
8. What is the educational background of your parents?
- | <u>Mother</u> | | <u>Father</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Illiterate | <input type="checkbox"/> | a. Illiterate | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Primary school | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. Primary school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Secondary school | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. Secondary school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. High school | <input type="checkbox"/> | d. High school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Undergraduate or higher school | <input type="checkbox"/> | e. Undergraduate or higher school | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f. Master degree | <input type="checkbox"/> | f. Master degree | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| g. Doctorate degree | <input type="checkbox"/> | g. Doctorate degree | <input type="checkbox"/> |
9. Your occupation :
- Your position in the job :
10. What are the occupations of your parents?
- Mother :
- Father :
11. If there were an election now, for which party would you vote?
12. Considering your entire life, which party did you support most / feel closest?
13. To which of the following groups do you feel close? Please mark each of the groups that apply to you.
- | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Rightists | <input type="checkbox"/> | b. Leftists | <input type="checkbox"/> | c. Turkish nationalists | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. Someone who loves his country | <input type="checkbox"/> | e. Islamists | <input type="checkbox"/> | f. Kemalists | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| g. Democratic | <input type="checkbox"/> | h. Conservatives | <input type="checkbox"/> | i. Liberals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| j. Other nationalist groups apart from Turkish nationalists (please specify) | | | | | |
| k. Other (please specify) | | | | | |

14. Which of the following attitudes regarding religion applies to you?

- a. I am not religious at all b. I am religious though a little
 c. I am religious d. I am fairly religious
 e. I am quite religious

15. If someone asks you who you are, how would you introduce yourself? (If your answer includes more than one item, please specify and put in order according to its importance degree)

.....

16. If your parents are asked the same question above, how do you think would they introduce themselves??

- a- My father :
- b- My mother :

17. To which group/groups do you feel yourself as a member before all? (For example: Turkish, Sunni Turkish, Alevi Turkish, Yörükler, Turkmens, Azeris, Uzbeks, Circassians, Kurdish, Sunni Kurdish, Alevi Kurdish, Yezidi Kurdish, Zazas, Lazs, Georgians, Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Nusayri (Alevi) Arabs, Other Alevi Arabs, Christian Arabs, Süryanis (Syrian Orthodox Christians), Bulgarian Migrants, Albanians, Christian Turkish Greeks (Rumlar), Other Christians, Jewish, Gipsies, etc.) If you are of mixed blood or do not feel a member of any group, please specify.

.....

18. How do you think your parents feel regarding the above question as feeling a member of a group/groups?

- a- My father :
- b- My mother :

While providing responses for the following questions, please mark the best opinion that applies to you.

19. Family values of the group I belong to are similar to those of the most of the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

20. Business and work values of the group I belong to are similar to those of the most of the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

21. Basic moral values of the group I belong to are similar to those of the most of the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

22. Hopes and desires of the group I belong to are similar to those of the most of the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

23. I do not feel comfortable when I interact with a member of the following groups whom I do not know.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

24. I feel totally confident when I interact with a member of the following groups whom I do not know.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

25. I feel highly anxious when I interact with a member of the following groups whom I do not know.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

26. I feel quite peaceful when I interact with a member of the following groups whom I do not know.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

27. The problems between the group I belong to and the following groups will continue in the future.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

28. The group I belong to and the following groups will one day get along well.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

29. I believe that the income disparity between the group I belong to and the following groups will disappear in the future.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

30. The ethnic hierarchy between the group I belong to and the following groups will one day totally disappear.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

31. The mutual between the group I belong and the following groups is an achievable goal.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

32. I feel respect for the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

33. I feel affection for the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

34. I appreciate the existence of the following groups in our society.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

35. I feel warmth for the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

36. I am open to relations with the members of the following groups

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

37. I would like to invite the members of the following groups to my house for dinner.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevi					

38. I would like to visit the houses of the members of the following groups for dinner.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

39. I would like to work in the same work place with the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

40. I would like to attend the same clubs, associations, cafés or foundations with the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

41. I would like to have meal in the same restaurant with the members of the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

42. I would like to marry a member of the following groups (If I am/were single).

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

43. I would defend the members of the following groups if they were treated unfairly in the same working environment.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

44. I would reproach a member of my own group when he/she tells an offensive joke about the following groups.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

45. I am willing to work actively with members of the following groups in order to improve inter-group relations between my own group and theirs.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

46. I can understand the world views and the point of views of the members of the following groups regarding various issues.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

47. I can put myself in the shoes of the members of the following groups when I want to understand them.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

48. The group I belong to do not benefit from the social services such as health, education, work adeaunately because of the existence of the following groups in our society.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

49. Most of the members of the following groups are trying to undermine the spiritual values of own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

50. Most of the members of the following group do not treat well to the members of my own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

51. Most of the members of the following group do not respect the members of my own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

52. Most of the members of the following group approach with love to the members of my own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

53. Most of the members of the following group approach with understanding to the members of my own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

54. Most of the members of the following group approach with negative prejudices to the members of my own group.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

55. I believe that most of the members of the following groups are hard-working.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

56. I believe that most of the members of the following groups are intelligent.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

57. I believe that most of the members of the following groups are friendly.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

58. I believe that most of the members of the following groups are sincere and honest.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

59. I believe that most of the members of the following groups are open minded.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

60. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same blood tie.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

61. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same or similar religious beliefs.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

62. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same ancestors.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

63. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same history.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

64. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same or similar customs and traditions.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

65. The group I belong to and the following groups have different life styles.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

66. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same or similar political attitudes and interests.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

67. The group I belong to and the following groups are in different economic levels.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

68. The group I belong to and the following groups have the same or similar educational level.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

69. The group I belong to and the following groups share the same destiny.

Groups	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Idea
Turks					
Kurds					
Sunnis					
Alevis					

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Could you please tell us about your educational level, your parents' educational level, your occupation, your position at work, income, wealth of your family, your place of birth and the place you mostly lived in your life?
2. Please tell us about your ideological, political and religious opinions?
3. Regarding the social identity, how would you describe yourself and your parents? Do you consider yourself Kurdish/Alevi/Sunni/Turkish?
4. How do you feel about the closeness of the other groups (Turkish/Kurdish/Sunnis/ Alevis) regarding family values, work and business values, basic moral values and hopes and desires?
5. How do you feel when you interact with the members of the other groups whom you do not personally know (comfortable, confident, anxious, peaceful)?
6. What do you think about the future of the inter-group relations with your own group and the other groups regarding understanding each other, ethnic hierarchy, equality, etc.?
7. What do you feel about the members of the other groups (respect, affection, warmth, etc.)?
8. How would you describe the current interaction between you and the members of other groups (hanging out, eating, working and living together, inter-marriage, etc.)?
9. Would you try to improve inter-group relations with the other groups and how much effort would you put in?
10. Do you feel that you understand being a member of another group in this society?
11. Do you feel any threat/harm from the members of the other groups towards your own group?
12. How do you think the other group approach to your own group? Do you feel discriminated by the other groups against your ethnic background? Can you provide some examples?
13. Can you tell us about the general characteristics of the members of the other groups?
14. What are the common traits your own group and the other groups share (the same blood tie, religious beliefs, ancestors, history, customs and traditions, life styles, political orientation and interests, economic and educational level and the same destiny)?

APPENDIX C

Table 10: Frequency of self definition of identity: the responses to the open ended question “How would you define yourself if you were asked ‘Who are you?’”

Responses for defining oneself	Frequency
By name	3
Someone who gets very upset about the injustice and discrimination	1
Man just like a man	1
By name and the last name	1
By name and occupation	1
By name and the things I have done	1
Person who is devoted to his family, religious and honest	1
Someone who loves his family and his country, idealist and altruistic	1
Intelligent, a good speaker, understanding and mature.	1
Man of action	1
God’s servant and a Muslim	2
Nature protector who devotes his life to God	1
God’s servant	1
God’s servant and a member of the Ummah of the Prophet	1
Muslim Turkish woman whom God created	1
Anatolian human	1
Mother, Spouse, Engineer	1
Mother, businesswoman, housewife	1
Kemalist	1
Kemalist and a modern person who values his religion	1
Person who follows God’s way	1
Turkish Nationalist who loves his country and nation	1
Human being	1
Spouse, a child, a friend, and a worker	1
Somewhat religious	1
Individual	1
Hard working, responsible, ambitious, open minded	1
Person who wants to trust his social environment	1
Mother of her children, a doctor	1
Democratic – Avşar girl	1
Democratic	2
Democratic Kemalist	1
Democratic Intellectual Alevi Kurd	1
Democratic Muslim Educated Modern Turkish Woman	1
Democratic and Nationalist	1
Religious Turkish	1
Religious Patriot A person who has strong family ties	1
Religious, nationalist, conservative	1
Religious, patriotic and nationalist	1
Pious Religious	1

Table 10 (continued)

Friend not discriminating, patriotic	1
Honest, smiling face	1
Thoughtful and Sensible	1
Educator	1
Educator Engineer	1
Retired, An ordinary citizen on his own	1
Humanist who attaches values to differences	1
Unique person who cannot be identified with others	1
Ordinary citizen	1
Humanist Hard-working	1
Humanist, without form and sex	1
Idealist Perfectionist, attaching importance to his religion	1
Person who has two degrees	1
Communication person	1
Person with principles, and does not like lies	1
Human being	9
Human being Muslim Turkish Liberalist and Responsible	1
Human being Muslim Turkish and A Turkish Idealist (Ülkücü)	1
Human being, Woman	1
Humanist Patriotic Liberalist	1
Businessman	1
Human being who suffers from torture and whose human rights were violated	1
Good Muslim and Patriotic	1
Good Muslim, Patriotic, hard-working	1
Good Muslim	2
Good Turkish Nationalist	2
Good person	1
Good intentioned, hard-working, truthful	1
Good and honest Human being	1
Myself	11
Kurdish Alevi	1
Kurdish, Pro-European Union	1
Liberal Democratic	1
A person who identifies himself / herself with his/her country and profession	1
Civil servant	1
Turkish Nationalist, religious, honest, plain citizen.	1
Nationalist	3
Nationalist Conservative	3
Nationalist Conservative A Patriotic	1
Nationalist Conservative Liberal Turkish	1
Conservative Citizen	1
Conservative, Patriotic, Laborer, Egalitarian	1
Muslim	13
Muslim Alevi and fellow citizen of Sivas	1
Muslim Islamist	1
Muslim Nationalist Liberal Social Democratic	1
Muslim Conservative Sensitive Intellectual	1

Table 10 (continued)

Muslim Liberal and Free Woman	1
Muslim Plain Citizen	1
Muslim Turkish	11
Muslim Citizen	2
Muslim, Democratic, Religious, Liberal	1
Muslim, Religious	1
Humble Short Tempered	1
Namık Kemal	1
Honest, Chaste, Shop keeper	1
Normal	1
Normal Citizen	2
Teacher	1
Educated, Helpful, a person who tries to help others, hard-working, a woman with a golden hearted	1
Modest person	1
Ordinary citizen	8
By name only	1
By myself only	1
Selective, with principles	1
Sufi	1
Leftist Worker	1
Responsible, A good father, Patriotic.	1
Social Democratic, Kemalist	1
Socialist Democratic Alevi Kurd	1
Shamanist Turkish European	1
Technician, A mother	1
Medical Representative	1
Turkish	5
Turkish Sunni Religious Conservative Democratic and Tolerant	1
Turkish Citizen	2
Turkish, A Fenerbahçe Fan, Turkish Nationalist, Muslim, Radical	1
Turkish, Muslim, Alevi	1
Kemalist from Turkey	1
Person who loves his values and country, Hard-working	1
Patriotic	3
Turkish Nationalist, Servant of Allah	1
College graduate Retired Accountant	1
Ordinary Human being	1
Patriotic, person who loves his country and religion	1
Turkish Youth who loves and lives for his country	1
Good citizen who loves his country	1
Patriotic Religious Ordinary Citizen	1

Table 10 (continued)

Patriotic Believer	2
Patriotic Muslim	1
Patriotic Ordinary Citizen	1
Patriotic Turkish Citizen	1
Patriotic, Religious A Human being	2
Patriotic, Traditionalist, Well Educated, Responsible	1
Patriotic, Nationalist	1
A person who loves the servants of Allah because of Him	1
Total	252

APPENDIX D

Table 11: Summary Table

	TK ²⁹ %	TS %	TA %	KT %	KS %	KA %	ST %	SK %	SA %	AT %	AK %	A S %
Shared Traits												
Shared Blood Ties	40	66 ₃₀	<i>43</i> ₃₁	80	100	25	73	41	<i>41</i>	73	36	50
Shared Religious Ties	68	84	<i>44</i>	100	100	50	91	80	<i>44</i>	79	67	62
Shared Descent	32	57	45	<i>40</i>	20	20	78	37	45	38	44	38
Shared History	52	55	53	100	80	80	88	63	73	56	63	56
Shared Customs	57	76	<i>51</i>	50	67	67	91	66	44	71	79	62
Shared Life Styles	56	42	73	50	50	50	37	52	60	73	69	71
Shared Political Interests	22	60	25	100	100	50	49	25	50	49	29	39
Same Economic Level	50	46	46	50	33	50	30	37	29	60	50	50
Same Educational Level	31	56	48	80	75	75	66	44	59	73	54	64
Shared Destiny	33	57	39	60	40	80	70	50	53	63	81	56
Shared Family Values	<i>40</i>	78	<i>31</i>	100	100	50	85	39	<i>19</i>	71	73	<i>33</i>
Shared Work Values	47	77	55	75	67	67	75	40	39	71	39	31
Shared Basic Moral Values	43	74	37	75	67	33	87	58	18	73	57	46
Shared Hopes & Desires	29	73	<i>39</i>	50	33	68	90	42	27	57	71	42
Images												
Hardworking	45	65	53	40	25	25	52	38	42	87	71	86
Intelligent	46	67	53	60	50	50	63	46	48	67	71	72
Friendly	46	75	58	100	100	100	74	60	51	67	64	64
Honest	34	69	<i>41</i>	100	100	100	60	43	38	67	71	64
Open Minded	30	62	<i>43</i>	60	75	100	53	28	<i>34</i>	60	54	62
Empathy												
Can Understand Them	45	74	50	75	75	67	86	65	52	87	86	79
Put Myself in Their pl	54	77	52	75	100	100	87	61	46	87	93	79
Feeling Discriminated												
Don't Treat Us Well	50	<i>15</i>	39	25	25	25	<i>16</i>	38	41	62	46	62
Don't Respect Us	58	<i>21</i>	39	25	25	25	13	33	38	47	39	69
Like Us	37	73	<i>44</i>	60	50	50	80	47	<i>34</i>	69	54	50
Understand Us	36	71	<i>40</i>	60	75	75	79	46	39	64	67	50
Think Negative About Us	61	27	48	40	67	67	24	43	54	39	36	69
Feelings When Interaction												
Uncomfortable	44	<i>18</i>	36	20	0	0	15	64	35	36	40	57
Confident	53	73	54	60	75	100	72	56	51	67	57	57
Anxious	38	10	30	40	25	25	10	26	29	7	13	29

²⁹ T: Turks, K: Kurds, S: Sunnis, A: Alevis. TK means the opinions and perceptions of the Turkish respondents about the Kurds. Similarly, SA means opinions and perceptions of the Sunni respondents about the Alevis.

³⁰ All the **bold** figures are statistically meaningful according to Chi-Square analysis.

³¹ All the figures in *Italic* represent more than half of the respondents.

Table 11 (continued)

Peaceful	38	59	36	60	50	75	75	55	43	53	54	39
Attitudes												
Respect Them	70	91	74	80	75	75	93	73	77	79	86	80
Like Them	58	84	62	80	75	50	87	57	53	73	100	71
Accept	58	74	63	80	75	75	88	69	67	87	86	79
Feel Warmth	49	81	57	100	100	100	88	63	52	67	79	64
Feeling Threatened												
	TK	TS	TA	KT	KS	KA	ST	SK	SA	AT	AK	A S
Threat To Us Material	22	18	17	25	0	25	10	25	22	27	60	27
Threat To Us Moral	52	16	48	25	25	25	19	38	52	41	39	69
Willingness To Interac												
Open To Relations	64	84	71	100	100	100	89	70	73	87	100	79
Invite Them To Dinner	61	83	64	100	100	100	94	78	68	87	93	79
Work Together	60	80	60	100	100	100	91	76	60	80	86	79
Café & Club	69	75	89	100	100	100	92	74	89	87	86	100
Restaurant	65	86	68	100	100	100	84	63	57	83	86	71
Marriage	72	69	88	100	100	100	87	78	91	87	86	100
Willingness To Impro												
Reproach The Joker	73	87	78	100	100	100	95	89	88	93	100	93
Improve The relations	70	75	68	80	75	67	84	88	90	100	93	100
Cooperate To Improve	62	79	86	100	100	100	85	71	68	93	93	94
Future												
Expect Problems	55	27	42	40	25	25	19	48	47	23	33	50
Optimism	47	71	57	100	100	100	71	55	46	57	64	60
Inc. Disparity Wil Disa	30	40	37	50	33	25	35	28	29	50	47	50
Hierar Will Disappear	37	63	45	100	100	100	46	40	39	57	50	47
Understan Achievable	57	77	64	100	100	100	79	70	64	50	62	57

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2001-Present	METU Department of Sociology	Research Assistant
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