

**A SOCIO-SPATIAL APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF
CLASS AND CONSCIOUSNESS FORMATION IN A LOCAL SETTING:
THE CASE OF BURSA INDUSTRIAL WORKERS**

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ABSTRACT

A SOCIO-SPATIAL APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF CLASS AND CONSCIOUSNESS FORMATION IN A LOCAL SETTING: THE CASE OF BURSA INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

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The aim of this thesis is to explore the class and consciousness formation in a local setting by also developing and applying a theoretical framework which allow us to study the interaction of locus of class consciousness with the other loci of consciousness formation such as the community and the state. Such an approach is also grounded in the belief that a relational understanding of these processes requires us to take spatial dynamics such as local dependency, spatial fix and fixity and mobility into account. By critically drawing upon historico-geographical materialist approach(es), the thesis attempts at resolving the tensions between ‘locality-wider society’ and ‘structure-consciousness’. By integrating them into a holistic and operational conceptual framework, it investigates the highly complex patterning of relations within urban structured coherences, and their effects upon the class and consciousness formation processes. It is shown that interpenetration of these fields of tension through urban processes is crucial in shaping a backbone for the concrete struggles fought by working class against capital in and of the urban regions.

These issues are discussed with reference to two working class neighborhoods in Bursa. The first community, Emek, is an unplanned, illegally built settlement, hosting mostly migrant, and lower-wage earning industrial workers, and the second one, Akpınar, is a planned settlement, composed of low-cost housing cooperatives, symbolizing a higher living standard environment for well-paid, socially secure workers, mostly local in origin. The field research focuses on the relations between ‘the labor market, housing market and local

dependency' and 'the strategies between mobility-fixity adopted both on part of capital and labor'. The specific character of these strategies also tell us how the patterning of the relations between class, community and state loci of consciousness formation and the formation of local coherences mutually shape one another.

It is often assumed in this context that formation of class-based consciousness is hindered by other loci of consciousness such as the community-based one. This study shows that community-based consciousness is itself largely absent in the communities in hand and when community-base is deployed by the local workers it is often strategically employed to get personal benefits. In this sense, the study concludes that the lack of community-based consciousness does not device more effective strategies of formation of class-based consciousness but perhaps another adverse factor in developing class-based consciousness in an environment heavily dominated by individualized form of consciousness.

Key words: Consciousness formation, Class formation, Working-Class Community, Class Consciousness, Locality

ÖZ

YEREL BİR MAHALDE SINIF VE BİLİNÇ OLUŞUMU SORUNUNA SOSYO-MEKANSAL BİR YAKLAŞIM: BURSA SANAYİ İŞÇİLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tezin amacı yerel bir mahalde sınıf ve bilinç oluşumunu araştırırken aynı zamanda sınıf-bilinci odağının yerel-topluluk ve devlet gibi farklı bilinç oluşumu odakları ile etkileşimini incelemeye olanak sağlayacak bir teorik çerçeve geliştirmek ve uygulamaktır. Söz konusu süreçlerin ilişkisel olarak kavranabilmesi için bu tür bir yaklaşım yerele bağlılık-bağımlılık, mekansal sabit, sabitlik ve hareketlilik gibi mekansal dinamiklerin de hesaba katılmasını gerektirmektedir. Tez, tarihsel coğrafyacı materyalist yaklaşım(lar)dan eleştirel bir biçimde faydalanarak, ‘yerellik-genel toplum’ ve ‘yapı-bilinç’ arasındaki gerilimleri çözümlenmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu gerilimler bütünsel ve işlevsel bir kavramsal çerçeve içinde birleştirilerek, kentsel ‘yapılandırılmış uyumluluklar’ içindeki karmaşık ilişki örüntüleri ve bunların sınıf ve bilinç oluşumu süreçleri üzerindeki etkileri incelenmektedir. Bu gerilim alanlarının kentsel süreçler boyunca nasıl içiçe geçtiğini anlamak kent mekanında sermayeye karşı işçi sınıfı tarafından verilen somut mücadelelere belkemiği oluşturmak açısından önemlidir.

Bu konular Bursa’da yer alan iki işçi-sınıfı mahallesine referansla tartışılmaktadır. İncelenen mahallelerden Emek plansız gelişmiş, kaçak yapılaşmış bir yerleşim olarak daha çok düşük-ücretli ve göçle gelen sanayi işçilerini barındırmaktadır. Düşük-maliyetli konut kooperatiflerinden oluşan diğer mahalle Akpınar ise sosyal güvenceli ve görece yüksek-ücretli yerel işçiler için daha iyi bir yaşam kalitesi sunan planlı bir yerleşimdir. Alan

çalışması, emek pazarı, konut pazarı ve yerele bağılılık-bağımlılık ile sermaye ve emek tarafından sabitlilik-hareketlilik üzerine geliştirilen stratejiler arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanmaktadır. Bu stratejilerin niteliği sınıf, yerel-topluluk ve devlet bilinç oluşumu odakları arasındaki ilişki örüntülerinin ve yerel uyumluluk oluşumu süreçlerinin karşılıklı olarak birbirini nasıl şekillendirdiğine dair bir hikayeyi de anlatmaktadır aynı zamanda.

Bu bağlamda genel bir varsayım sınıf-temelli bilinç oluşumunun topluluk-temelli bilinç oluşumu benzeri farklı bilinç odakları tarafından engellendiği şeklindedir. Ancak bu çalışma göstermektedir ki topluluk-temelli bilincin ta kendisi ele alınan topluluklarda büyük ölçüde eksiktir ve topluluk-temelli ilişkilerin yerelde işçiler tarafından kullanımı genellikle kişisel fayda sağlamaya yönelik stratejilere işaret etmektedir. Bu anlamda, topluluk-temelli bilincin eksikliği sınıf-temelli bilinç oluşumu için daha etkili stratejiler geliştirilmesine yol açmamakta, hatta belki de bireyselleşmiş-bilinç biçiminin ağırlıkla hakim olduğu koşullarda sınıf-temelli bilinç gelişimini engelleyen olumsuz bir başka etki olarak kaydedilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bilinç Oluşumu, Sınıf Oluşumu, İşçi Sınıfı Topluluğu, Sınıf Bilinci, Yerellik

To us, the laborers

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Justice and Development Party
ANAP	: Motherland Party
Bağ-Kur	: Social Security Organization for Artisans and the Self-Employed
BBP	: Grand Union Party
Birleşik Metal-İş	: United Metalworkers' Union (affiliated to Disk)
BOIE	: Bursa Organized Industrial Estate
BMM	: Bursa Metropolitan Municipality
BTSO	: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bursa
CHP	: People's Republican Party
Çelik-İş	: Steel Industry Workers' Union (affiliated to Hak-İş)
DEHAP	: Democratic People's Party
DİSK	: Revolutionary Labor Union Confederation of Turkey
DOIE	: Demirtaş Organized Industrial Estate
DSP	: Democratic Left Party
DYP	: True Path Party
DP	: Democrat Party
FP/RP	: Virtues Party / Welfare Party
FSM	: Fatih Sultan Mehmet
GP	: Young Party
Hak-İş	: Rights Labor Union Confederation of Turkey
ILO	: International Labor Organization
İP	: Workers' Party
Lastik-İş	: Petroleum, Chemicals and Rubber Industry Workers' Union
LDP	: Liberal Democratic Party
Met-İş	: Metal Workers Housing Cooperative
MHP	: Nationalist Movement Party
NOIE	: Nilüfer Organized Industrial Estate
Metal-İş	: Metal Workers' Union (affiliated to Disk)
OIE	: Organized Industrial Estate
Otomobil-İş	: Automobile Workers' Union (independent)
OSBÜK	: Upper Organization of Organized Industrial Estates
OYAK	: Army Solidarity Organization
SSIE	: Specialized Small-scale Industrial Estate
SSK	: Social Security Organization (of the state)
Teksif	: Textile Weaving and Confection Industry Workers' Union (affiliated to Türk-İş)
Tekstil	: Textile Workers' Union (affiliated to Disk)
TİP	: Labor Party of Turkey
TKP	: Communist Party of Turkey
TOFAŞ	: Turkish Automobile Factory Joint-Stock Company
TOKİ	: Housing Development Administration of Turkey
TÜİK	: Statistics Institute of Turkey
TSSA	: Turkish Social Sciences Association
Türk-Metal	: Turkish Metal Union (affiliated to Türk-İş)
Türk-İş	: Labor Union Confederation of Turkey
WB	: World Bank
YTL	: New Turkish Liras
YTP	: New Party of Turkey

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Any political movement that does not embed itself in the heart of the urban process is doomed to fail in the advanced capitalist society” (Harvey, 1985, 276).

The aim of this thesis is to explore the class and consciousness formation in a local setting by also developing and applying a theoretical framework which allow us to study the interaction of locus of class consciousness with the other loci of consciousness formation such as the community and the state. These issues will be discussed with reference to two working class neighbourhoods in Bursa. We in this respect will inquire how and to what extent the theoretical approach(es) of **historico-geographical materialism** can provide a coherent conceptual framework. Shortcomings and strengths of its explanatory power will be questioned against various other approaches in socio-spatial analysis grounded upon historical-analytical Marxist and Weberian social theories.

For the purpose stated above, we will start by discussing what is meant by ‘**of the local**’, problematizing the relation between **local dependency** and **wider social structures**. Identification of the ‘**local labor-housing market**’ as the urban specific unit of analysis, and the social and physical structuring of it between ‘**fixity and mobility**’ will throughout the discussion be the founding axis to be utilized in linking local dependencies to consciousness formation processes. The continuous interplay between ‘dependency and flows’, ‘social and physical stabilities and disturbing effects’ will be treated as the prime movers, the *modus operandi* of uneven geographical development to produce ‘**structured coherences**’, which can be defined as temporary states of equilibrium realized between production and consumption for the perpetuation of capitalism in the urban geographies. **Separation of workplace from the living place** and the kind of relation established between local labor and housing markets under capitalism will be the connected issues to be investigated. Labor and housing market segmentations uniting and dividing the society simultaneously through production and reproduction of shared identities, social and technical divisions of labor and definition of interests on basis of these differences will be analyzed in their relation to the destabilizing structural forces (mobilities) of capitalist accumulation like **competition, shifting space relations** and **class-struggle** over social relations of production and reproduction.

Residential differentiation process will also be discussed as one of the manifestations of the socio-spatial fragmentation and homogenization movement generated by the contradictory forces of capitalism acting on the structured coherence in the local labor markets. The strength of its disturbing effect on the coherence will be dependent upon the strength of the counter forces exerted by the immobilizing local dependencies. The consequent issue to be questioned will be the mechanisms through which the produced social differentiations transform into local dependencies which in time rigidify the local labor and housing market relations and become targets for destruction. Residential community will be regarded as an influential social milieu whereby **diverse life experiences and forms of local dependency coalesce** to intermediate the complex patterning of interrelations between the local social structures and different states of consciousness.

At that point, we will need new theoretical devices to handle the ‘**consciousness formation**’ problem, which is to be treated as a dialectical continuous process of becoming. The bodies of literature on ‘**class formation**’, ‘urbanization of consciousness’ and Weberian conceptions of community formation diverge considerably in the ways in which they conceptualize the relation between social structure and social consciousness and how they integrate space and **specificity of the urban** into their analysis. After a brief discussion on these differences, and together with the elements explored in previous sections on the nature of local specificity, the **five loci of consciousness formation** ‘class, individualism, family, state, and community’ will be more fully incorporated into the scheme as patterns of relations (forms of solidarity-solidity), linking the different forms of dependency in the locality (forms and technologies of production, labor and housing markets, social and physical infrastructures) to wider society vertically and to one another horizontally. They will act either in the form of local dependency or loci of fixity or mobility in the local labor-housing markets, in other words, disturb or preserve the structured coherence in relation to its present state. This will in turn shape different patterning of interrelations among different modes of consciousness, producing different forms of local dependencies.

We will see that whether they are interpreted as local dependency or loci of mobility in space is a relative and conjunctural matter. While local dependency which prevents growth might be regarded by capital as spatial barriers, the very same structures might be interpreted as pivots for class-struggle by laborers who might use them to command

geographical mobility rather than to remain locked in place. The present state of the territorial coherence, its current position with respect to the equilibrium state, will also effect how these influences are perceived by different fractions of society. Local dependencies are constantly being restructured as new barriers-fixes through the motion of the flows. This relativity phenomenon is best summarized in the words of Harvey saying; “Urban space is fixed, to the degree that the key processes are confined within fixed spaces, and perpetually in flux to the degree that those processes are in motion” (Harvey, 1985b).

The local coherences and the class and consciousness formation processes of the two **sample working-class communities** will be investigated under the guidance of a holistic and operational conceptual framework integrating the tensions between ‘locality-wider society’ and ‘structure-consciousness’. Both communities are located next to Bursa Organized Industrial Estate, the oldest OIE of Turkey. The first community, **Emek**, is an unplanned, illegally built settlement, hosting mostly migrant, and lower-wage earning industrial workers, and the second one, **Akpınar**, is a planned settlement, composed of low-cost housing cooperatives, symbolizing a higher living standard environment for well-paid, socially secure workers, mostly local in origin. The field research will focus on the relations between ‘the labor market, housing market and local dependency’ and ‘the strategies adopted both on part of capital and labor’. The specific character of these strategies will tell us how the patterning of the relations between class, community and state loci of consciousness formation and the formation of local coherences mutually shape one another.

Our field research will be formulated within three interrelated chapters:

- Production of Locality: Labor and Housing Markets and Local Dependency
- Between Fixity and Mobility: Accessibility and Distanciation
- Loci of Consciousness Formation: Forms of Solidarity

In the **first** chapter, the four constitutive components of the ‘structured coherence’, namely, forms and technologies of production, labor market, housing-consumption market, and social and physical infrastructures, will be examined within the context of Bursa case. It is important to pin down the **specific kind of structured coherence** achieved within an urban region, whether it is stable or not and by what means, before going on to analyzing the destabilizing capacities of the forces influencing the territorial coherence. While scrolling through the specific form and content of each domain, we will try to find out the kind of local dependency that they may produce for the use of industrial workers living in our communities. Those structures which are capable of locking people or firms into particular

spatially defined labor markets will function as spatial barriers before mobility when they are disturbed by the destabilizing forces acting on the coherence. This means that the degree to which they are immobilizing structures and for whom, can only be determined as an outcome of the inquiries made throughout the three chapters of the field research. Here, therefore, just the fields to produce a ‘potential’ local dependency will be identified.

In the **second** chapter, both the character and the effect of the disturbing forces and processes which aim to restructure, destruct or enhance the local dependency of labor through the mediation of urban processes will be specified. These forces are wide ranging including competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization; push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation; shifting space relations; and class struggle over distribution, social relations of production and reproduction. But in our study, we will concentrate upon class struggles and shifting space relations of labor rather than those forces arising out of the accumulation oriented competition among the capitalists. Only the changing patterns of social organization in production will be examined due to their direct impacts upon shaping laborers’ living conditions. Socio-spatial mobility through migration and residential differentiation as different forms of ‘**shifting space relations**’, and **class struggles** over distribution, on the other hand, deserve detailed examination as they form the primary force-movement field within which the laborers and capitalists, with unequal powers under capitalist conditions, employ specific mix of strategies to shape class and consciousness formation processes as they fit to their own interests. In sum, we analyze in this part the extent to which local dependency might enhance laborers’ command over geographical or social mobility, or conversely, lock them in place.

And finally in the **third** chapter, we intend to match the particular local dependencies specified in the first section with the related locus of consciousness formation; namely, class, state, family, and the community. In the cases of ‘state’ and ‘class’, the particular dispositions, opinions, values and actions which emanate from these loci of consciousness formation will be examined in relation to degree to which they change by residential community as a local dependency. In ‘**Class**’ locus, we will try to analyze class-based consciousness and forms of solidarity mainly in relation to Mann’s formulations of ‘class identity’, ‘class opposition’, and ‘class totality’, and Lockwood’s three different working-class typologies of the ‘traditional proletarian’, ‘traditional deferential’ and ‘privatized’ respectively. Secondly, we will spend some time on how class organizations which mediate

between consciousness and collective action are perceived by the laborers. In ‘**State**’ locus a similar investigation will be made with respect to electoral behavior and general political attitudes and ideological self-identification of the workers. In the ‘**Community**’ locus, however, we prefer to go the other way round. Since it is harder to pin down the specific dispositions or value systems arising out of this locus, we will first try to identify certain dependencies to represent them. This will include detection of the nature of the local status systems, senses of group membership and degree of integration with the local community; in other words, the kind of ties and values that might be considered as part of the shared identities or cultures in these communities. This general view of the culture of everyday life in our working-class communities will illuminate the extent to which class struggle is influenced and controlled by these direct face-to-face encounters, and whether they divide working-class members around individualism and parochial community interests, or unite around integrative class interests.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

II.I. LOCAL DEPENDENCY

In this thesis, we will conceptualize '*of the locality*' as an interrelation of the local dependencies, the geographical dynamics of accumulation between mobility and fixity, and the loci of consciousness formation which, though not always located in the urban region, becomes *of the locality* by circulating these flows and fixes in and through the local labor-housing markets and their own material bases. We will try to build up each concept one by one and explore the material and social mechanisms through which they are interrelated. It is Marxist urban geography that gives more insights on setting up the interrelations between these diverse social elements, which otherwise, even when historicized as in Katznelson's case, still stand socially disconnected and autonomous.

Since we are dealing with the urban phenomena, it is necessary first to pin down the **specificity of the urban**; the difference that it makes and the kind of conceptual tools that can account for deeper analysis of class formation on the locality level. To do that, it would be illuminating to delve into arguments of Harvey, Cox and Pickvance on determining the degree to which locality can have effects that are **not reducible** to generic formations of larger social forces, without underestimating on the other hand, the political forces and historically shaped patterns of social relations that link local structures to the wider society vertically and to one another horizontally.

The concept '**local dependency**' is formulated by Cox. In his paper on 'Locality and Community', he sets forth for conceptualizing the 'local social structure'. What he ends up with, however, is rather identification of the 'local dependency', and that not even fully. The seemingly two separate concepts collapse into one another during his argumentation, and lose most of their analytical and explanatory capacities that could have stemmed from their standing apart. The failure is in that he derives local social structures from relations of local dependence and this creates an over-restrictive idea of what processes and structures are *of the locality* (Pickvance, 1997, 44).

Cox bases his arguments on Harvey's definition of the 'urban' as a "geographical labor market within which daily substitutions of labor power against job opportunities are possible" (Harvey, 1985b, 126). Geography of housing markets are also determined by the geography of labor markets, commuting fields and shopping trips overlap and urban areas become **unities of job and consumption opportunities**. We will also follow this geographical understanding of the relation between housing and labor markets in the way to specifying our focus of interest in later sections. But before that, we should try to unravel Cox's conception of 'local dependency' which plays a constitutive role in understanding how local labor and housing markets function. For Cox, Harvey considers the urban labor market as the context within which the immobilizing aspects of capital as a social relation occur and this results in the formation of specifically local classes (Cox, 1998, 18). He borrows from Harvey the categorization of these immobilizing aspects into the physical and the social infrastructures, which we will discuss below, but then fails to incorporate them fully. For him, what people and firms may have in common in a locality is a dependence on a particular local or urban product, service, labor-housing market or a local government jurisdiction (Cox, 1998, 20). He argues that particular agents have interests in the future of particular places because they have material interests in the particular local economy by virtue of their necessary dependence on it. The reasons capable of locking people or firms into particular spatially defined labor markets or neighborhoods are considered by **Cox** within directly economic terms. He gives various examples in this means, such as fixed rate mortgages, employment of spouse, residency rules of public housing, statutory restrictions, internal labor market of firms, built up local knowledge, reputation, and relations of trust, common interest in the labor costs or the residential taxes, competition capability of class, ethnicity, religion or place-based communities, etc. These are some of the social and material relations which have been converted in non-portable stakes in profits/wages/rents in particular place-specific labor and housing markets.

Pickvance rightly argues that this overemphasis on local dependency may conceal an economic determinism and deny may other factors and mediations, such as political forces and patterns of social relations that affect whether and how people act (Pickvance, 1998). Pickvance is right to the extent that Cox tries to derive the whole local social structure from local dependency. But once this unsuccessful attempt of Cox is ignored and local dependency is not regarded as belonging to a distinct domain of reality, we find it an **analytically useful category** which can account for the total effect of economic and social assets that tie people to certain places. These ties, or entrapment in a particular labor market,

will play an important role in people's acquisition of (local) class interests and formation of social consciousness. While this is not to say that they are the only sources from which people derive their consciousness, it is, however, to appreciate that material, social or political dependency that tie them to urban regions will create new and shared interests in the outcomes of market and political processes. Furthermore, we again agree with Pickvance that the extent to which dependency relations are of the locality is a matter of degree, considered that their production and reproduction involves processes that belong to a broader social domain, but their lived effects are reflected largely on the local (Pickvance, 1998).

Before passing to a discussion for a wider definition of 'local social structures and processes', that are in dialectical relation with class formation processes, we should further enrich the content of the term 'local dependency' by **Harvey's** conception of '**social and physical infrastructures**'. According to Harvey, **physical infrastructures** denote immobilization of value in fixed facilities of long life. Embedded in the land as a built environment of roads, bridges, houses, schools, factories, shopping centers and so on, they are spatially-specific assets to support both production and consumption, or in other words, circulation of capital and reproduction of labor power. Hence, urban region acquires another meaning as a particular spatial configuration of a built environment for production, consumption and exchange. Ownership of a fixed capital or having material benefits in using it creates a directly spatial dependency. **Social infrastructures**, on the other hand, are harder to pin down in space. They are confined spatially to the extent that they use the built environment. These social institutions and relations that support life, work and the circulation of capital help consolidate the tendency towards structured coherence within the urban region. Whether national, regional or local in scope; or whether public, services for capitalists-laborers like education, etc., or outside the framework of state, like religion, culture, racial heritage, social attitudes, and class consciousness, they are not created overnight and require a certain degree of stability in order to be effective. These relatively stable social and physical infrastructures can reproduce the initial diversities in the urban society to form the basis of **labor market segmentations**. And these segmentations also help produce dependency patterns. They are experienced by people or firms as relations of dependency to the extent that the position in labor-housing market is gained or perpetuated by the agency of the facilities brought by segmentation.

When looked **from the point of view of capital accumulation**, Harvey emphasizes segmentations based on the skill distributions and availability of the labor surplus. Firms are dependent upon structured rigidity or a controlled flexibility of the labor supply in terms of its qualities and quantities, low wage rates and social costs, etc. **From the standpoint of the laborers**, on the other hand, the necessity for daily and long term reproduction of labor power produces much more complex segmentation patterns. These segmentations “arise as much out of the laborer’s desire to control the supply of labor power as they do employers’ search to divide and rule” (Harvey, 1985b, 132). Labor markets are divided so that certain kinds of jobs are reserved for certain kinds of workers. In the end, certain social groups like women, racial minorities, recent migrants, ethnic groups, etc. might be trapped in geographically distinct submarkets, or might have differential access to different resources like education, transportation, etc. As a response to these material conditions, people try to establish networks to transform their disadvantaged positions into relatively more advantaged ones, and thus experience these place-bound relations as dependency relations. For example, family and kinship relations, personal networks, community or class solidarity and membership to societies or institutions based upon these interests might result in acquisition of certain skills, job, housing, low rent, high wage or job security opportunities, etc. which would provide material bases to preserve and struggle for, and therefore reduce the social and spatial mobility chances of the laborers. In these cases, either the materialized gain in the form of a house or a bonus payment, or the social relations behind it in the form of ties of affect might interchangeably be regarded as local dependency by the laborers.

But we should note that under capitalist conditions of unequal power relations between capital and labor, **immobilizing aspects operate against the collective interests of the laborers**, more than they do against the capitalists’. This is largely due to the fact that fixed spatial configurations are not the outcomes of the active involvement of laborers in production of local social structures; rather they adopt reactionary survival strategies against the active restructuring-organizing power of the capital in the labor markets. Capital can exploit the potentials brought by the limited mobility of labor in space, much more than it is possible the other way round. Ownership over the means, mechanisms and forms of production gives them this advantage. It is only through collective class-based organizations around use-values of immobile local social structures that labor can gain a disturbing power against the forces of capital.

Another Marxist writer, **Hudson**, also puts particular emphasis upon labor markets that are deeply and multiply segmented around dimensions of industry, occupation, ethnicity and gender, which are in each case associated with spatial differentiation and discontinuities that at once unite and divide the laborers (Hudson, 2001, 218). They are either actively produced by the workers themselves in seeking to unite around a common identity, or by the capitalist wishes to divide labor. And sometimes they are pre-formed characteristics and identities which people retain, when they come to share the same class structural position as wage labor in relation to capital. He categorizes the **divisions in the labor market** in two groups:

- a. Shared identities, defined in terms such as place (community, urban, national, international level), ethnicity, age or gender, which can be named as ‘**putative exteriors**’. These external cleavage planes are gathered together in the domain of concrete labor, and infused into the capitalist system through abstractions of social labor. (Hudson, 2001, 225)
- b. Those generated through social, technical and spatial divisions of labor which are differences ‘**internal**’ to capitalist production, like institutions of organized labor, industry, occupation (white-blue collar, etc.), security and precariousness of employment (core-periphery, etc.), different forms of production and work (legal-illegal, formal-informal, etc.)

He argues that these divisions must be seen as “distinct if wholly intertwined structures of social oppression, exploitation and difference” (Sayer and Walker, 1992, quote by Hudson, 217). What makes his assertion more valuable is his acknowledgement that these divisions are also dimensions of socially constructed identities and organization. Hence, there is a continuous dialectic of unity and division in their operation; they “may act to solidify class formation, but do so via creating differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’”. Trade unions, for example, as the primary institutional form of workers’ organization, while uniting them on one dimension, inevitably define ‘other’ groups of workers with whom they lack shared interests, or whom they are actively in competition. Or say ethnic divisions; in many instances ethnic groups are found concentrated in particular jobs and labor market niches. These ethnic divisions are often perpetuated by both kinship and managerial strategies and sometimes even by trade union practices that encourage development of such cleavages. In short, Hudson’s contribution to definition of local dependency might be summarized particularly around two points:

- a. Recognition of the importance of the complicated interplay between **class** relations of capitalism and a variety of **non-class** relations

- b. **Simultaneous unity and division** producing character of social structures under capitalism

We can conclude that Hudson may complement Harvey's and Cox's conceptions by introducing the equally important contribution of non-class relations, like ethnicity, gender, territory, around which people can define and defend their interests and form shared dispositions immobilizing people in space. While the shortcoming of Hudson's approach is that he considers fragmentations only in relation to labor markets, and says not much about the divisions lived in residential areas and the interrelation between the two. He recognizes laborers' ambitions to create spatial fixes on terms favorable to them, but only in terms of the landscapes of work and wage labor; around the labor market issues, such as employment rather than unemployment, trade union power rather than impotence. We argue that this may partly be due to two reasons:


- a. **First**, he prefers to concentrate on social structures and their effects on social processes rather than the bidirectional relationship in between. When dynamics of capitalist accumulation and the internal contradictions of capitalism are not placed into analysis, however, it becomes impossible to understand generation of labor market divisions in its dynamism, which are continuously being destabilized and reshaped under capitalism.
- b. And **second**, production and reproduction of space is not employed by Hudson as an essential mediating arena in and through which these divisions coalesce to produce more intertwined and complicated patterns of divisions. He cannot account for the problem of residential community as a locus of simultaneous unity and division.

In sum, having briefly discussed different forms of local dependency in this section, we might classify them under four sub-domains:

1. Forms and technologies of production
2. Labor market (daily exchange of labor power)
3. Housing-Consumption market (daily reproduction of labor power)
4. Social and physical infrastructures

Figure 1. Local Dependency

Local Dependencies



II.II. INTERRELATION PROBLEMATIC OF THE LOCAL LABOR AND HOUSING MARKETS, or of the Work and the Community

II.II.I. 'Separation of Workplace from the Living Place' as an External Relation

So far we have tried to give a brief account of the relatively stable spatial fixes which might lock labor and capital in particular places. This was only a first step into defining the attributes of the 'urban region', which is conceived in this thesis by all means as more than a set of discrete dependencies. Urban is necessarily endowed with a set of intersecting **labor processes and productive forces** as well. These dynamic processes and forces emanating from the contradictions internalized by capitalism tend simultaneously to undermine and disrupt the tendency for creating spatial fixes on one hand, and encourage creation of them on the other, as traces carved in space by those social and economic forces. In order to examine the specific natures of these processes, how they operate in capitalism general and how they are reflected in urban labor and housing markets (or in Harvey's words, between cities as points in a larger economic network and cities as forms with distinctive internal spatial configurations), we should first spend some time on constructing the conceptual **relation between the urban labor and housing markets**, or the production and consumption spheres. Because it is the unity of these spheres that defines the local socio-spatial boundaries within which fixes and flows interact.

This relation is formulated differently in the two schools of thought discussed throughout this thesis, namely, the historico-geographical materialism of **Harvey** and the social theories

proposed by **Katznelson and Lockwood** (Weberian convergences to Marxism), former establishing an ‘internal’ and the latter ‘external’ linkage in between. We will examine each in turn starting with the latter first.

Katznelson puts the separation of work and community (living place) at the core of his analysis since he believes that this split lies at the core of the capitalist industrialization and modernization process. His claims about this spatial reorganization also provide the premises of his comparative and contingent analysis of working-class formation. He summarizes these claims as follows:

“...countries did in fact experience a powerful spatial reorganization that divided the spaces where people worked for wages from the residential communities where they lived; that split segregated the social classes from each other; and that it produced fine-grained differentiations between members of social classes based on income and styles of life, including the consumption of housing” (Katznelson, 1992, 214)

We argue that this formulation has crucial failures. Here, **first of all**, we find a highly importance attributed concept by himself reduced to an analytically useless state. When ‘separation of the living and the workplace’ is understood as happened once-and-for-all in the past, that is, as a thing in itself but not a process, it loses any explanatory and operational capacity in understanding the socio-spatial and economic transformations going on in contemporary cities. Furthermore, and in line with this static conception, when the separation is regarded as a generic movement, as a similar objective restructuring of space in different countries, it becomes devoid of accounting for the dissimilarities of classness and the characters of class dispositions in different countries. Katznelson argues that topography and the economic substructure of the urban community take precedence in determining how the land is utilized, and this creates similarities rather than variations. Here topography is treated as a mere outcome of economic relations, and uneven geographical development of the socio-economic relations is not integrated into the analysis. In this respect, Katznelson adheres to the conception of ‘absolute’ space. He constitutes no dialectical spatial relation between structure and agency, and consequently, cannot formulate the consciousness formation process in and through the urban space, which could have accounted for the variations in economy-society relations, forms of capitalist accumulation strategies and regimes in different times and geographies. By this way of thinking, Katznelson cannot inquire how different spaces and consciousnesses are produced within for example the Keynesian or the New-Right eras. At this point, Katznelson introduces ‘state’ as integral in bringing about these variations, and doing this, totally diverts from his promising assertion to establish the contingent connections between the

social and spatial changes in capitalist cities and the patterns of working-class formation. He leaves spatial and economic processes on a level of 'generics', and cannot link these flows and processes with the causal forces behind the variations in spatially-patterned configurations of work and the residence communities. Further implications of his understanding of state, as an autonomous institution in external relation with state and economy, will be discussed later in section II.VI.II.I.

A connected second shortcoming in his thought is the 'segregation by class' derived at one stroke from the 'geographical separation of workplace from the living place'. In this approach, functional division of labor in the city, or in other words, the division of uses in the city produces the division of classes. It is treated as if the broken link between work and home can account for the segregation by class. Here, a causal relation is established between the two actually separate socio-spatial processes, one having industrialization and the other capitalism behind. The complex interrelation between industrialization, urbanization and capitalism is not problematized as empirically separate, but totally interpenetrated processes under capitalist accumulation conditions. It is asserted that "few events in economic history have had more fundamental effect of the shape of the city than the physical parting of the residence from the workplace" (Katznelson, 1992, 228). Reduced to a matter of proximity, breaking up of the proximity of home and workplace is regarded as the causal force behind the new emerging patterns of segregation in the cities. He points out that residential location which was once determined by location of employment is now determined by social differences. But why and how these social differences are produced is never asked. A spatial structure, a geographical outcome is attributed causal power for a social process which must be explained rather than taken as given.

Development of separate housing and labor markets are again at one stroke derived from the breaking of the ties between work and home. Workplaces cluster separately from home places, and automatically new sets of social actors, landlords, tenants, solicitors, etc. emerge, distinctive flows of capital circulate in the industrial and real-estate sectors, and distinctions among men, such as purchasing power, come to be reflected in the housing provisions. If political leaders formulate interests and direct demands to employers and the state on class terms, then both realms are perceived to be united, if not, split consciousness is produced. The only mediating relation between the separate labor and housing markets is formulated as the one way effect of the political context created by state authorities. Ironically, here we find inherent limitations in Katznelson's social theory; a failure to treat the relationship of work and community. Ironic because his theoretical ambition in the first

place was to overcome this failure which was attributed to Weberian sociology, viewing the society atomistically as the sum of differentiated parts (Katznelson, 1981, 199). Unfortunately, neither can Katznelson unravel the mechanisms through which they are actually interrelated, and subsequently, through which this separation has a fundamental mediating influence on production of consciousness and social awareness in capitalist societies. The separation is not done once and for all, as he assumes; there is a continuous struggle over drawing the boundaries in between, in political, legal, cultural and economic terms. Therefore we should not see, as Pratt puts it,

“... the spatial patterns reinforcing class differences or new forms of work and living place relations as agencies of social control, as tools of manipulation generally forged by finance capital, the state, or capital in general. This relatively static conceptualization misses the point that spatial structures emerge out of a continuous process of class-struggle: the working-class also shapes urban space and reproduces class relations, and the social relation between capital and labor is under a constant process of renewal and renegotiation. Further, all spatial outcomes should not be seen as directly functional to capital” (Pratt, ?, 101)

Similar Weberian failures are inherent in **Lockwood’s** work, too. For Lockwood, as it was for Weber, separate dimensions of segregation (class, status, power) patterns the connections between dynamics of capitalist accumulation and what people think and do. Yet, Weberian approach takes differentiation of residence community from the workplace as a relatively unproblematic given. Conceptualizes both the workplace and the residence community as objects to be studied in themselves, treating them as if they were independent and autonomous spheres. In relational Marxist approach, however, focus is placed upon the parallel evolution of the two spheres by means of the interlinking processes of “reproduction of labor power, circulation of revenues and capital accumulation” (Harvey, 1985a, 252). Labor and housing markets are introduced as social and physical structures in and through which these processes affect certain geographical units, be that residential communities or the urban regions at large.


II.II.II. ‘Structured Coherence’ as a Conceptual Tool to Relate Housing and Labor Markets Internally

Harvey, recognizing the theoretical and practical necessity of establishing such internal relation between both markets, introduces a new concept ‘**structured coherence**’, denoting a particular technological mix of structures, organizational forms and social relations interrelated through a certain spatial coherence:

“Together these define models of consumption as well as the labor process. The coherence embraces the standard of living, the qualities and style of life, work satisfactions (or lack thereof), social hierarchies (authority structures in the workplace, status systems of consumption), and a whole set of sociological and psychological attitudes toward working, living, enjoying, entertaining, and the like” (Harvey, 1985b, 140).

The kind of structured coherence to be achieved is related to the particular kind of equilibrium sought among local dependency and flows between mobility and fixity in and through the four interrelated sub-domains of local dependency as schematized below:

Figure 2. Urban Region



Harvey argues that locational decisions grounded upon the need to minimize the cost and time of movement under conditions of inter-industry linkage, the social division of labor, and the need for access to both labor supplies and final consumer markets, shape distinctive spatial configurations for production. These form a constitutive set of productive forces and social relations within the specific kind of structured coherence created. ‘Coherence’ serves as a norm around which **capitalist organization in space pivots**, in terms of patterns of resource use, inter-industry linkages, forms of organization, and size of firms, etc.

It is not only the forms, technologies, quantities and qualities of production, but also of consumption that are implied by the structured coherence. Within a socially given commuting range and a pattern of labor demand and supply, workers substitute their labor power with job opportunities depending on the present hierarchies of labor skills and forms of segmentation in the labor market. Wage rates and working conditions within sectors are generally adjusted with reference to the degree of competition within the urban region. For the reproduction of labor power, on the other hand, laborers and bourgeoisie convert their

wages/profits into a certain style or pattern of consumption within a system of market areas for goods (consumer markets) and geographically defined labor markets. These two markets, coterminous most of the time, function against a standard set by the underlying unity of job and consumption opportunities. Regulatory practices over quantity and quality of those job and consumption opportunities are constrained by the circulation and accumulation dynamics of capital and the infrastructures, spatial fixes produced by it. (Harvey, 1985b)

Put another way, this unity is largely determined by the necessary dependency relation between employers and laborers under capitalist conditions of production. Employers have to profit, they need labor power both as value creating forces of production and consumers. Quantitative expansion in the work-force or qualitative changes in response to organizational and technological revolutions in the methods of production, should be produced and maintained. What is produced has to be consumed, and the cost and time of the circulation movement must not exceed the socially-necessary turnover time. Laborers should spend what is earned on housing, food, entertainment, etc. to reproduce themselves so that wage revenues out of production can enter back into production. And finally, primarily state-supported physical and social infrastructures (telecommunication, transportation systems, factories, housing, education, religion, health care, social services, etc.) should improve the spatial mobility of capital and labor power by absorbing the surplus capital and labor power and facilitating the reproduction of social relations necessary for accumulation of capital. (Harvey, 1985b)

In sum, structured coherence is a tendency for achieving a momentary state of stability and security around the need for the perpetuation of this dependency relation under the overall domination of capital.

II.III. BETWEEN MOBILITY AND FIXITY: Contradictions Expressed through Geographical Transformations

So far local dependency was discussed both in an analytically separate form in section II.I. and in its interrelation among each other in section II.II. We have started to construct some dimensions of the internal relation between labor and housing markets secured by the mediation of local dependency and forms and technologies of production, but the full establishment of the underlying unity still remains to be accomplished. In order to fulfill this


task, we should change our focus from the world of stabilities, fixes, and equilibriums towards that of the mobilities, flows and disruptions.

At the heart of Harvey's theorizing, named by him as historico-geographical materialism, lie the internal contradictions of capitalism deriving out of the core features of the circulation of capital. Two of these, he asserts, as being those between 'growth and technological progress' and between 'the growth of productive forces and the dominant social relations of production' (Harvey, 1990a). The forces that emanate from these contradictions make for imbalances which continuously undermine and disrupt the 'structured coherences' and render them crisis-prone. These forces can be mainly classified under four headings (Harvey, 1985b, 143):

1. Competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization
2. Push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation
3. Shifting space relations
4. Class-struggles over distribution and social relations of production and reproduction

Figure 3. Between Mobility and Fixity

Between Mobility and Fixity



For the purposes of this thesis, **class-struggle** and **residential differentiation** as a form of 'shifting space relation' deserve special attention as they have direct influences over the daily life of the laborers and on the local class and consciousness formation processes. So, after giving a very brief account of the first two of the four forces above, we will then have a deeper look into the last two of them below. By the end of that discussion, we hope to have arrived at a broader definition of the 'urban region' proposed by Harvey, arranging in the reverse way what we have examined so far as a totality of local productive forces and social relations:

"Urban region is more than a set of overlapping and interpenetrating commodity and labor markets; more than a set of intersecting labor processes and productive forces; more, even than a simple structured coherence of production and consumption. It is also a living community endowed with certain physical and social assets, themselves the product of a long process of historical development and class-struggle" (Harvey, 1985b, 147)

Let us first have a short look at the first two forces then. Coercive laws of competition push acceleration of accumulation through search out for superior technologies and locations. This set of disturbing forces on the structured coherence belongs largely to the sphere of competition among the capitalists themselves, though intermediated by the specific flexibilities and rigidities in the labor and housing markets of the urban regions. Coercive expansion generally ends up in overaccumulation crisis under capitalism. Overaccumulation of capital (in the form of money, commodities, and productive capacity) and labor power, and the consequent efforts of capital to absorb them through monopolization or temporal-spatial displacement (overaccumulated capital stored in physical and social infrastructures) are considered, by Harvey, as the pivots of capitalist development (Harvey, 1990a, 133). Both strategies of capital, however, reinforce production of more fixed and immobile spatial configurations which in the end put spatial barriers before the capital increasingly less easy to overcome (Harvey, 1985b, 144). Here we come to the crucial point where we encounter **the contradictions expressed through geographical transformations**: spatial organization is necessary to overcome space. "A portion of the total capital and labor power has to be immobilized in space in order to facilitate greater liberty for movement for the remainder". And if the remainder cannot circulate through the spatial paths in time, both are devalued. Capitalist accumulation process is pregnant to such restless formation and reformation of landscapes. This primary intermediating role of space in human affairs is expressed also as '**distanciation**' in another work of Harvey. There he claims that,

"Distance is both a barrier to and a defense against human interaction. It imposes transaction costs upon any system of production and reproduction (any elaborate social division of labor, trade, and social differentiation of reproductive functions). Distanciation is simply a

measure of the degree to which the friction of space has been overcome to accommodate social interaction” (Harvey, 1990b, 250).

We can apply this fundamental geographical contradiction to the forces of technological change as well. Competition generates pressures to accelerate turnover times through technological and organizational change. But if technology as a vital means of control over the production of labor surplus within the labor market supplants too much living labor, then growth cannot occur. Here production of fixed capital (dead labor) fostered by technological innovation becomes a barrier before reproduction of the value creating living labor. Similarly, technology renders boundaries of a region unstable as it improves the capacity to overcome spatial barriers. It facilitates interregional linkages and territorial specialization. Revolutions in capitalist forms of organization create greater capacity to command larger spaces through multinational corporations and rise of finance capital, etc. and disturb the structured coherence within the urban regions. (Harvey, 1990a)

II.III.I. Residential Differentiation as both a Local Dependency and a Destabilizing Force

“Residential differentiation is produced, in its broader lineaments at least, by forces emanating from the capitalist production process, and it is not to be construed as the product of the autonomously and spontaneously rising preferences of the people” (Harvey, 1985b, 123).

Before examining class-struggle in greater detail as contradictions expressed through geographical transformations, we should first examine how the settings in which these struggles take place are organized spatially. We have so far explored the nature of local dependency and social processes in and of the local social structures in an analytically separate form for the purposes of analysis. In order to relate now these parts to the local social whole, we will employ the theory of residential differentiation founded in the philosophy of internal relations. We will try, in this respect, to reveal how Harvey connects the internal relation between production and consumption, or the labor and housing markets to the study of community by reintroducing the concept of ‘residential differentiation’ as both a **destabilizing force and a local dependency** (inherently spatial) into the analysis.

For Harvey, urban labor and housing markets not only host certain immobile structures, social processes and forces that organize space, but also themselves are specific geographical landscapes which are dominated and shaped by the complex dynamics and evolutionary character of capitalist societies. Residential differentiation is both the outcome

of the processes of social transformation that produce new social groupings and also an integral mediating force in the processes that produce and sustain those groupings. It is true that some of those social divisions have historical roots in the preceding social configurations, and that examination of their successive transformation under capitalism might be explanatory in understanding how certain shared dispositions or solidarities are construed around such fragmentations (ethnicity, occupational categories, etc). But more important than that, it must be acknowledged that some of those divisions are the products of the capitalist mode of production, and more important still, all are continuously reproduced, reshaped within the socio-spatial milieu created by capitalist forces. This constantly reshaping dynamic character of urban geography for perpetuation of capitalist order is what is missing in Katznelson's static conception of segregation by class (reduced to workplace-living place segregation, see section II.II.I.). There, 'an autonomously and spontaneously arising consumer sovereignty' or 'a preference system based in social relationships' is assumed implicitly as an explanation for residential differentiation, not recognizing that residential differentiation is a **capitalist force itself** mediating the production of those preference systems.

The forces that we have identified in this section (accumulation rates, competition over technological change, shifting space relations, and class-struggle) are also at perpetual interaction amongst themselves. Some of them create class configurations antagonistic to perpetuation of the capitalist order, whereas some create social differentiations favorable to it. As a result of these struggles, activities of the speculator-developers, speculator-landlords, and real-estate brokers backed by the power of financial and governmental institutions produce residential differentiation to which individuals have to adapt their preferences. These **social differentiations** within capitalist societies progressively concentrate in these produced spaces, transform their geographical landscapes, and create social and physical infrastructures of their own. Residential differentiation is the outcome of forces of capitalist accumulation acting on socio-spatial structures. These patterns of residential differentiation function as a **coalescence of the sub-domains of local dependency** which immobilize people in space providing them with bonds and privileges for individualistic or collective ambitions. Harvey identifies three kinds of forces making for such social differentiation. But before that, we should underline that these forces are formulated with reference to how their production and reproduction is sustained, controlled and restricted by the forces acting on the specific forms of structured coherence achieved within urban regions, and secondly, that they are conceived as pertaining both to housing

and labor markets. In other words, we see the notion of underlying unity of consumption and production reflected in definition of these divisions, too. Here are the forces behind social differentiation:

1. “A **primary force** arising out of the power relation between capital and labor
2. **Secondary forces** arising out of the contradictory and evolutionary character of capitalism which encourage social differentiation along lines defined by;
 - a. The division of labor and specialization of function
 - b. Consumption patterns and life-style
 - c. Authority relations
 - d. Manipulated projections of ideological and political consciousness
 - e. Barriers to mobility chances
3. **Residual forces** reflecting the social relations established in a preceding or geographically separate but subordinate mode of production.” (Harvey, 1885a, 117)

When connecting residential differentiation with the social structure, social differentiations should be understood as emanating from the interrelation, rather than the distinct effects of these three forces of capitalism identified above.

Geographical and social polarization among the dominant and the working-class is the prevailing urban process taking place, most dramatically in the cities of the third world. This is mainly a class-based geographical polarization based upon the **primary force**, that is, the uneven power relation between capital and labor. While creation of distinctive housing submarkets helps regulate the dynamic of urbanization process in the interest of accumulation, individuals adapt their preferences within this defined range of choices, poorest having no choice. When the section of society at issue is the working-class under capitalist order, both mobility chances and diversification of consumption patterns have certain structural limits to it. Patterns of consumption in relation to both consumption funds and durables are not as variegated as those of the upper classes, since the relation between reproduction of the working-class and creation of effective demand has to be kept on a certain balance defined by the capitalist interests. That is, the wages and the costs related to the reproduction of labor power have to be kept down to improve profitability in production, but only to the extent that the laborers do not lack the optimum consuming power necessary for the survival of capitalism.

This underlying dependency relation between the laborers and the employers does not permit formation of working-class residential communities highly differentiate among themselves. In working-class communities, the tie between reproduction of social relations as conducive to being in the working-class and the maintenance of effective demand sufficient to sustain a growing internal market is much tighter than that of the upper classes.

Formation of highly diversified consumption classes is more feasible and possible, from the standpoint of the capital, among the different segments of bourgeoisie, rather than among the working-class. Therefore, particularly in the inner city regions, the duality between squatter and apartment-dwellers disappears. Working-class and traditional middle class get increasingly mixed in those neighborhoods due to both the “impoverishment and the proletarianization of the traditional middle-class” (Şengül, 2005, 128) and relative affluence of certain segments of the working-class.

Further fragmentations encouraged by **secondary forces**, on the other hand, take place largely as intra-class differentiations. Those sections of the society whose positions within the labor and housing markets converge, with similar job and consumption opportunities, generally appear to be fragmented along shared identities (ethnic, religious, political, territorial) or social and technical division of labor (sectoral, workplace differences, security and precariousness of employment, different factory regimes, terms and conditions of work, authority relations). These labor and housing market divisions whose production is under the control of the forces achieving structured coherence, coalesce in certain residential areas and homogenize the life experiences which reinforce formation of relatively permanent social groups within relatively permanent structures of residential differentiation. The social and physical infrastructures become stabilized as local dependency and their effects on determining the mobility chances crystallize in space. The chances of access to the scarce resources required to acquire ‘market capacity’ (“bundle of skills and attributes to market one’s labor power within certain occupation categories”), consumption capacity, particularly with regards to education, and the expectations, aspirations and value systems, all become **relatively fixed features** transferred from generation to generation within a social landscape, most movement merely taking place between strata within the division of labor (from, say, the manual to the white collar category) (Harvey, 1985b, 116).

So far, we have tried to depict how whole residential areas or particular institutions-relations embedded in them become local dependency both for the laborers and capitalists under the coherence producing dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Nevertheless, the processes creating and sustaining patterns of residential differentiation also render it a locus of instability and contradiction. Then we see ‘residential differentiation’ acting as a **destabilizing force** on the territorial coherence. Local dependency within residential areas might come out to function either favorable or antagonist to capitalist accumulation

processes depending upon the state of class-struggle between the capital and labor, to which now we turn.

II.III.II. Class-Struggle as a Destabilizing Force

Asserting that it is mainly the dependency relation between capital and labor that structures the specific form of coherence within an urban region, Harvey proposes ‘class-struggle’ as a crucial force with the **capacity for producing instability** in favor of improving the conditions of workers confined within particular labor and housing markets. Capital tries to render labor powerless within the structured equilibrium it achieves, through its hegemonic coordinating power over production and maintenance of the divisions in both housing and labor markets which set up barriers to the equalization and improvement of the living standards of labor. But Harvey asserts that there is enough room for labor’s effect, too, on the kind of structured coherence created. It is not a one way relation that capital exerts its limitless power on labor. While the uneven nature of the relation must be accepted, laborers might not be regarded as passive agents; they also actively adapt or transform their structural conditions. In Harvey’s words:

“Workers can also improve their lot if they stay in place, collectively organize, and fight for a better life. To this end they may build their own physical and social infrastructures (or co-opt those promoted by the bourgeoisie), struggle to control the state apparatus and thereby enhance their power to improve their lives” (Harvey, 1990a, 149).


Class-struggle has a **built-in spatial dimension** to it. Both capital and labor restructure their own conditions to overcome the spatial barriers established at perpetually changing strength and intensity by the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. A social or physical infrastructure which is erected for the perpetuation of capitalist order, for facilitating the flow of capital, transforms into a treat for capitalist accumulation as soon as it begins to act as a spatial barrier, a form of stability and resistance before growth. And both labor and housing markets are full of such local dependencies which might evolve into loci of collective resistance built around use-values defined by the laborers as against the exchange-values defined by the capitalists. Absolute spaces produced through reproduction of labor power are at continuous interplay with the production of relative spaces dominated by the guiding rules of extraction of surplus value where exchange value reigns. As a result of this struggle, in certain circumstances, a specific patterning of interrelations around a local dependency immobilizes in space either in service of the alienated individualism and capitalist urbanization, or self-realization and use-value oriented urbanization. Collective struggles

affect the exact form of structured coherence achieved through this geographical reformation process. Under the overall domination of capital, however, **cooperation, cooptation and consent** are also part of the class-struggle. Continued prosperity of the urban region gives a stability and security to both work and the standard of living; both the laborer and the capitalist have vested interests in preservation of production and consumption at a certain level and of a certain type for a relatively long period. New forms of structured coherence between production and consumption might be secured by formation of class alliances which promise the labor certain material advantages in the short or long run in exchange for its docile engagement in production. Here it is significant to highlight Harvey's comment on such alliances that, even when they foster solidarities other than class, the interest for social progress and defense of local interests make them still manifestations of the way class relations and accumulation unfold in space, and not of an aberration of class-struggle.

Anyway, the tension between free geographical mobility and production-reproduction processes within a confined territory is an internal contradiction of capitalism, and how that tension is resolved depends on the state of the class-struggle, including the class alliances between different factions of labor and capital. The victory of one might either result in flight or escape of the other from the region or the in-migration of extra labor power or capital from outside. Since the capacity for geographical mobility changes depending upon the assets and intangible restraints that are owned, we find local dependency as playing a crucial role in shaping of the class-struggle.

At this point of our discussion then, before exploring some situations for class-struggle that might be fought within the urban regions, we should have a deeper look into the analytical significance of 'class-struggle' as an intermediating term between '**social structure**' and '**social consciousness**'. Construing the meaning and the specific role of class-struggle as a building block within the class formation processes of capitalist societies will be crucial, indeed, before going on in integrating class formation analysis with urban geography.

Figure 4. ‘Class-Struggle’ as an Intermediating term between ‘Structure’ and ‘Agency’



As can be seen in the schema above, class-struggle as a relational process is conceived as the intermediating component of the class formation process. It is through this struggle that classes interpret the given structural conditions, experience the contradictions and decide to act. In a dialectical fashion, it is through this struggle that they become aware of their identities, their specific positions in the society and construct themselves as social subjects. The dialectical relation between socio-spatial structures and social consciousness which mutually determine and shape each other is only possible through the agency of a struggle process. It is also this understanding that Thompson follows while asserting class-struggle as prior to formation of classes:

“...classes do not exist as separate entities and struggle in order to discover some enemy classes around. To the contrary, people find themselves in a society structured by the relations of production; they experience exploitation, define themselves within these antagonistic relations, and start struggling around these issues. It is throughout this struggle process that they discover themselves as classes, and class consciousness means possessing the knowledge of this discovery. Class and class consciousness are always placed at the end of the real historical process, never at the beginning” (Thompson, 1995, 136, quote by Berber, 2003).

Social relations of production place people to class positions based upon the exploitation relation and conflict of interest between capital and labor. This forms the primary material basis for class-struggle. This primary base, together with a variety of secondary forces arising out of the contradictory and evolutionary character of production and reproduction relations under capitalism constitute the socio-spatial ‘**structure moment**’ of the ‘**struggle pendulum**’. Consciousness is formed through an oscillation movement in which people experience and live the antagonisms inherent in these class positions, where these antagonisms are not limited only to the class-based ones, but also include other non-class

bases of social differentiation in society. And dialectically, social agents, passing through the '**consciousness moment**' of the pendulum turn back to reshape the socio-spatial configurations of the class-structured society. This is a dialectical and never-ending oscillation movement between the structure and consciousness moments. Both moments press themselves on the other by means of struggle. And this whole mechanism comprising of both the moments and the struggle in between is called, by historical Marxists such as Thompson and Wood, as the '**class formation process**'. Classes are constantly organized, disorganized and reorganized within this formation process; structural characteristics of the classes are never left static or given, but are subject to this dynamic restructuring movement. Class formation, in other words;

“... is simultaneously an objective and subjective phenomenon, both something independent of member's consciousness and something expressed in conscious thought and practice. From this it follows that “class formation” must be conceived as a **double process**” (Therborn, 1983, 39, quote by Yıldırım, 31)

“... is a process concerned with experience in a double sense: experience of the world and learning to act within and on it” (Katznelson, 1992, 204)

At this point, in order to remind against a common misinterpretation of the notion class-struggle, we must underline significance of Harvey's formulation presenting three different strategies for labor to define its own living standards: those around **competitive individualism**, **community-consciousness** and **class-consciousness**. In the **first** situation, each worker seeks independently to command his or her own private use of the best bundle of resources in the best location. Workers use their social power as individuals to seek individual solutions, and compete with each other for survival chances. The **second** reflects collective action in space. People come together along parochial, community-based interests which give rise to internecine conflicts within the working-class, leading one faction of laborers benefit at the expense of another. From the standpoint of capital, individual and community competition is advantageous because it then seems as if class-struggle results from laborers' own actions, rather than from actions of the capitalists themselves. In the **third** situation, however, laborers fight collectively along class-based interests to improve the lot of all workers everywhere and against all forms of exploitation, whether in the workplace or in the living. It makes clear that it is not labor's competitive bidding or own action that determines conditions of their living, but class power of capital that confines labor to those conditions (Harvey, 1985a, 60-61).

In short, class-struggle includes all three kinds of survival strategies and power struggles employed by labor in a capitalist society. What makes a struggle a ‘class-struggle’ are not the class-conscious actions of the actors, but the class structure of the society within which they act. It can be argued that Thompson introduces the concept of “**experience**” as an equivalent to this understanding of class-struggle. Thus he tries to overcome the restrictions of his teleological understanding that “Classes are formed when people, who share a common experience with regards to the determination of the relations of production, come to realize their common interests, and start to perceive life in class terms” (Wood, 2001, 104). In this kind of conception, struggle pertains only to those class-conscious dispositions and actions which give rise to formation of class-consciousness in the end. ‘Experience’, on the other hand, recognizes the significance of other bases of consciousness formation as well. The term refers to the totality of relations, conceptions and interpretations that intermediate the practices implied both by the objective positions and by the perpetuation and reproduction of those positions. Experience gives its color to culture, values and meaning systems, at the same time as it is shaped by the dynamic relation between production and reproduction. (Berber, 2003)

II.IV. BASES FOR CLASS-STRUGGLE OVER ‘MOBILITY-FIXITY’ WITHIN URBAN REGIONS

Struggle over mobility-fixity might span over a spectrum of many issues including those over deployment of new technologies, sustenance or enhancement of labor quantities and qualities, competition and complementarity between urban regions, local wage rates and working conditions, type, price and quality of consumption goods and public services, distribution and forms of consumption, costs of living, environment quality, socialization of labor and relation to nature, etc. In short, any local dependency within a specific territorial coherence might become the object of class-struggle over mobility-fixity. In this section, first we will explore the different bases for struggle in relation to the interventions of capital in the urban regions, and then in relation to the changing material basis of urban society.

This will be an attempt to draw the general outline of loci of struggle that might be encountered within the contradictory urban geographies of capitalism. But each urban region has a form of structured coherence specific to its own. It faces a specific patterning of interpenetration of local dependencies with urban and national level forces. Therefore, these can only be guiding abstractions to identify the particular tensions and contradictions

that might show up within the landscapes of localities. Concrete situations, however, entail concrete empirical investigations.

II.IV.I. In Relation to the Interventions of Capital in the Urban Region

Harvey, when discussing the relation between consciousness and urban experience (Harvey, 1985a, 36-62) restricts himself to struggles around the built environment and does not incorporate the contradictions stemming from the spatially organized labor markets, or elaborate on how they are reflected in residential areas. In our present attempt to classify the issues over which class-struggle might be fought to disturb the structured coherence in urban regions, we will try to overcome this deficiency. Some struggles will be related to the housing market and some others to the labor market. In each case, however, we will try to pin down the particular effect of the 'residential area' in the struggle either as a **disturbing force** or a **local dependency**. But in certain issues, the focus will be on the structures-processes linking the residential area to the wider urban or national society, and then we will discuss the nature of their poor connection with the residential areas.

Five kinds of **interventions of capital** can be identified drawing the broad contours of the struggle between capital and labor within the confines of the urban region (Harvey, 1985a, 42; 1985b, 141):

1. Private property and homeownership for labor
2. The cost of living
3. The socialization of labor and relation to nature
4. Quality and quantity of labor power
5. Wage rates, working conditions, job structures and hierarchies

1. Homeownership promotes the allegiance of working-class to the principle of private property, promotes the ethic of possessive individualism (Harvey, 1985a, 42). People get concerned to preserve or enhance the value of their savings in the physical form of a property. It can also lead to petit landlordism which can be a means to engage in the appropriation of values at the expense of other workers. However, here the point is that homeownership as a local dependency puts the workers in a struggle over appropriation of values because of the shifting patterns of external costs and benefits within the built environment. While this fragments the workers, it is also a fact that it renders homeowners with more stakes in the developments that enhance the value of their properties, and consequently more resistant against those that tend to devalue or destroy it. This is why

when a highway construction is to devalue living in the neighborhood right next to it, homeowners might come out to be more willing to organize against it. They can stand against disruptive speculative activity of capital which is forced to disrupt the spatial barriers in the form of a neighborhood to maintain its own dynamic. It is seen here that the residential area acts as a barrier before accumulation in two interrelated terms: as a social infrastructure of solidarity for labor in the class-struggle and as a physical infrastructure preserved by residents against the temporal displacement requirements of capital which has to destruct and build anew in order to absorb surpluses of capital.

2. Because of the relation between the wage rate and the **costs of reproduction** of labor power, capital generally sides with labor against excessive appropriation of rent and rising costs of new development. Cheap subsidized housing under public ownership, or industrialization and rationalization of building production through comprehensive land use planning policies, may be favored by the capital as long as they reduce the costs related to the reproduction of labor power. Even capital itself might prefer to invest in housing for the working-class, to exert a downward pressure on the wages (Harvey, 1985a, 44). So a class alliance between certain fractions of capital and the working-class can be formed in the struggle for cheap housing provision, lower rents or improvement of the conditions of built environment with poor physical and social infrastructures. This necessitates the organized collective power of the working-class around organizations either specific to residential communities, like friendly societies, working men's clubs, or wage work, such as trade unions or labor parties that consider issues around the built environment important. The division of work and living place with distinctive patterns of organization, however, reduces the capacity to press such demands against both state institutions and capital.

In fact, these considerations apply to all elements in the labor and housing markets that are relevant to the reproduction of labor power, such as demands for health care, housing, education and various other social services, streets and sidewalks, drains and sewer systems, parks and playgrounds, etc. These social and physical infrastructures that link the residential areas to wider urban region return to dominate daily life due to their fixity and longevity in space. That is, once they are created they have to be used if the value that it represents is not to be lost. For this reason, capital asserts for creation of built environments that conform to the needs of accumulation and commodity flow, and ensure it mostly by collectivization of consumption through the agency of the state. And this very fact that the built environment requires collective management and control makes it a primary field of struggle between

capital and labor over what is good for accumulation and what is good for people. Against the coercive power of capital which dictates certain uses by defining the standard of living and the quality of life, labor can struggle for the definition of those use-values, and resist and transform those configurations to suit them to labor's needs and interests. (Harvey, 1985a)

In a similar fashion, capital tries to manage and rationalize the household economy. Rational consumption of consumer durables and an expanding internal market provided by wage-labor has great significance for capital. Therefore it engages in production of both consumption and the mode of consumption by employing the persuasions of press, schools, ad-men, etc. In this means, it perpetually tries to disturb the customary relations within the family, and this makes the balance between market purchase and household work a locus of struggle between capital and labor.

3. Interventions of capital are not limited to production of social and physical infrastructures, but also aim at production of **states of social awareness** that would socialize labor to work process through control in the living-place. History shows that direct forms of control of the living-place (company towns) by industrial capital exacerbate the class tensions due to that labor can easily identify its class enemies. Therefore capital in general prefers indirect forms of involvement in the provision and the management of built environment. Through religious, educational, paternalist channels, by means of ideological and political mechanisms, it habituates workers to the needs of production and inculcates the work ethics, bourgeois values of honesty, reliability, respect for authority, obedience to laws and rules, respect for property and contractual agreements, etc. Creation of a relatively well satisfied workforce through improvements in the living place contributes to the establishment of social stability and enhancement of the docility and efficiency of labor. (Harvey, 1985a, 48-56)

4. **Urban labor markets**, providing the geographical range of possibilities for the working day, mediate various kinds of struggles over definition of the quality and quantity of labor power and standards of working-class life. Large urban labor markets while, on one hand, provide for both capitalists and laborers large opportunities for substitution, on the other hand, size of the reserve army directly affects the wage levels and conditions of employment. Thus employers have to produce and maintain a labor surplus (an industrial reserve army) in an urban labor market at an optimum level also considering the social costs

involved in feeding, housing and caring for the laborers. Technologically induced unemployment, tightening or relaxation of discriminatory barriers between the races and sexes, internal adjustments in patterns of segmentation, mobilization of latent labor reserves (women, unemployed) are some of the strategies that might be employed by the employers for this purpose. When there is not enough labor surplus, capitalists may tend to make labor saving innovations, raise exploitation rates and overworking. Or in order to prevent any break down in established systems of reproducing labor power in place, it may “often with the cooperation of the state, seek to find ways of turning ‘place boundedness’ to its advantage, playing on the aspirations of individuals and communities to improve their lot” (Hudson, 2001, 248). Extending their search for labor power to other places where there is surplus labor encourages this process. And lastly, capital can choose to flee, move somewhere else, if it can dare the devaluation of its assets.

This desire to control the supply of labor power, however, pertains not only to the employers, but also to the laborers themselves. Individuals migrate for economic advancement with the psychological motivations of moving to large urban labor markets where choice and possibilities for substitution are greater. Self-interests of laborers and their instincts for survival contribute to formation of a large labor surplus which makes a downward pressure on wage levels, job opportunities, conditions of work and living, etc. Labor organizations then may try to limit in-migration by monopolizing certain jobs or giving an unfriendly reception to newcomers. Divisions in the labor force (religion, gender, ethnicity, etc.) may be utilized for this selective integration into the urban labor markets. Against the in-migration of labor power of lower cost and different qualities, those who stay in place might fight collectively on community, class or individual basis for improvements in their regions; for work, living, consumption and social progress. (Harvey, 1985b, 125-135)

5. Another important dimension determining the flexibility of the labor markets is the adaptability of the qualities of labor to technological and accumulation requirements. Long-term investment of capital in a place relies on the particular composition of the workforce in terms not only of skills and capacity, but also discipline and work attitudes, and the whole psychology and sociology of work which affects the productivity of labor. This may also result in struggles against the capitalist domination, however. Transformation and improvement of labor skills, like the quantity of labor surplus, do not always stay under the control of the capitalists and functional to their interests. They generally adapt to individual

motivations and ambitions, to monopolizing of certain skills by certain sections of the working-class, or to collective endeavors of active political militancy. These different strategies end up in differentiated urban labor markets with long-term structured rigidities of unique mixes of qualities. Coercive laws of competition force individual capitalist to employ strategies against their collective interests. De-skilling, overworking, bad labor relations, unemployment, together with these labor market segmentations may turn into attitudes of confrontation and fierce struggles in the workplace. Value of labor power, physical standards of living of labor, and the length of the working-day are not only outcomes of class-bound processes, but also of the class-struggles. So we might conclude that coherence in the labor market depends upon the strategies of capital and labor agreeing to some kind of regulation of the labor market over the in-migration rates of labor and capital and the internal conditions of the labor demand and supply. (Harvey, 1985b, 125-135)

II.IV.II. In Relation to the Changing Material Basis of Urban Society

Now we will refer to the work of Lockwood; a theorist who, while practicing within the confines of Weberian sociology, incorporates some Marxist insights into his analysis as well. What makes his work of particular interest in relation to our discussion here is that **firstly**, he considers the issues related with the world of work and living together, though not basing his arguments upon the underlying unity of production and consumption. And **secondly**, he provides us with some exemplary cases resulting from the forces creating imbalance on the tendency for territorial coherence and tries to reveal the kind of class-struggle they may lead to under capitalist conditions, though not interpreting them as in a relational-strategic approach. In other words, he tries to unravel how these new cases are being experienced and given meaning by the individuals and groups who are affected both at work and in the living place. In this way, he aims to attack the anti-Marxist ‘**embourgeoisement of the working-class**’ thesis arguing for progressive integration of the working-class into the institutional structure of capitalism through changes in the consumption patterns (**economic**), advanced production systems (**technological** and **managerial**), and patterns of residence and community life (**ecological**). This theory in the context of advanced industrialism is a liberal conception which completely disregards the inherent contradictions of capitalism which, for the sake of its perpetuation, create and destruct socio-spatial structures in a constant manner, and reproduce the unequal social

relations of production, compelling certain sections of society to the laborers' and some others to the employers' position.

Lockwood argues for a much less dramatic process of '**convergence**' taking place, rather than the assimilation of manual workers into the social world of the middle-class (Lockwood, 1971, 26). He identifies such convergence mainly around two points; acceptance of trade union as a means of economic protection (instrumental collectivism), and acceptance of family and its fortunes as a central life interest (family-centeredness). These kinds of changes in working-class life-style may well be interpreted as adaptation of traditional patterns to the problems posed by new conditions and opportunities. He asserts that the modifications in manual/non-manual differences stemming from the changes in the material basis of modern society, like income, standards of living, conditions of work and patterns of residence, occur at the level of values and aspirations only, rather than in any radical reshaping of the status hierarchies or relationships in either work or community life. Changes observed in economic terms do not necessarily bring similar changes in normative (adoption of a new social outlook and social norms that are of a distinctively middle class kind) and relational terms (general acceptance by white-collar persons on a basis of equality and aspiration for identifying with the norms of middle class groups and rejecting working-class social norms). This is because, social differentiations result as an outcome of the approved social values, social relationships and social consciousness which can not be radically reshaped under capitalist order. For example, even when a factory worker improves his/her life standards two times compared to the past, he still continues to be in a social position defined by the selling of labor power in exchange for a wage. Class position cannot be reduced to a mere matter of consumer power.

Lockwood classifies the types of changes taking place in the material basis of society in three groups: **economic**, **technological**, and **ecological**, and considers their implications on shaping the class-struggle in turn:

1. The most important change in the **economic** arena is the increase in mass consumption. There has been observed a homogenization of incomes and living standards among the self-employed, the white-collar and the manual workers, and subsequently a considerable expansion in the number of middle-income families. Rise in incomes results in the rise of living-standards and possession of various kinds of consumer durables. In this manner, it can be argued that the inferior position of the working-class with regards to

economic resources and consumer power obliterates for some sections of the working-class. And adaptation of the traditional patterns takes place in the cultural level, in terms of the modes of speech and dress, eating habits, styles of décor, entertainment, leisure activities, child-rearing practices, and parental aspirations, etc.

Against those who press these changes as evidence for the ‘embourgeoisement’ thesis, Lockwood argues that working-class prosperity itself could eventually give rise to a significant increase in discontent and social protest. “As affluence makes possible the satisfaction of the more obvious personal and domestic wants, urgent new wants may be expected to develop of a kind less readily met by private incomes -for improved environmental conditions, for more public amenities for leisure and cultural activities, for better and more equal educational and work opportunities” (Lockwood, 1971, 20). Since capitalism has inherent barriers for achieving them, awareness of the oppressive nature of this form of society can rise more easily. On the other hand, “consumption of consumer durables and consumption fund items might be used by labor to raise itself to a new condition of material and mental well-being, which in turn provides a new and more solid basis for class-struggle” as well (Marx 1973, quote by Harvey, 1985a, 47). But it also might be exploited by capital in substituting work in the household for work in the factory, or in definition of use-values advantageous to accumulation rather than reflecting real human needs. Whether exploited by labor as a civilizing influence or by capital as a means for accumulation is a matter of class-struggle.

“Although the immediate survival needs of the worker may thus have been largely provided for, his fundamental needs as a human being –those essential to free development of his human potentialities- remain unfulfilled and indeed deliberately frustrated, and at the same time the worker’s awareness of this fact is systematically inhibited” (Lockwood, 1971, 16)

2. Technological progress in industry causes a sharp increase in incomes of those employed in the most advanced sectors and plants. In these progressive branches of industry with largely automatic, continuous flow production systems, workers exercise their knowledge and experience, rather than pure effort, hence diminishing the division between manual and non-manual grades to a certain extent. Advanced production systems and progressive management policies seek for integration of workers into their employing organization through reward systems, providing greater autonomy in organizing their work, etc. These harmonious and cooperative management techniques favor harmony rather than conflict; through more cohesive and integrated industrial climates workers are helped to

identify with their enterprise instead of viewing the employment relationship in the old oppositional terms of us and them. (Lockwood, 1971, 11)

Lockwood here underlines the persistence and even intensification of alienation by means of these changes and continuation of the laborers' subordinate position, their being a mere instrument without control over what is produced. In this means, he rather points out the enhanced potential power of rank and file, in that, they can seriously disrupt production and keep expensive plants idle by strike action. These technological changes give a higher bargaining power to them for pressing for rights in the decision-making process within the enterprise. Moreover, the solidarity between workers, technicians and operating managers encouraged by the advanced technology can become the basis for recognition of common interests and for unified action on part of all employees, manual and non-manual, against the directors and the executives. (Lockwood, 1971, 18)

3. Lockwood identifies two **ecological** changes reducing the cohesiveness of the working-class; rural in-migration from without, and urban growth and renewal from within. It is argued that rural migrants see industrial labor as a transitional phase in a movement of social ascent towards petit-bourgeois status. Therefore, they are reluctant to define their social position with reference to their present work situation, and perpetuate their more individualistic, conservative values of original culture. On the other hand, in the new estates and suburbs of urban growth and renewal, workers get physically separated from their extra-familial kin and live in far less intimacy with their neighbors and they are more imposed to pressure of wider society, mass media, and contact with other social groups. This decomposes the network of kinship, the pattern of neighboring and the collective identities and rituals of communal solidarity that working-class culture is transmitted and preserved. (Lockwood, 1971, 13)

Against these processes that are presented as causes for decline in class-consciousness, Lockwood asserts that class-consciousness is not the particular product of deeply felt ties of neighborhood and kinship. "Solidarity of class is not rooted in the kind of parochial solidarity which is its very antithesis". Therefore, the ending of working-class particularism, the forcing of workers and their families out into the mass society might be considered as a prerequisite for the development of class-consciousness as well. This might well transcend the parochial or sectional loyalties in the communities and foster class

consciousness based upon a rational appreciation of class interests and class enemies. (Lockwood, 1971, 19)

II.V. HOW TO LINK ‘CLASS-STRUGGLE’, ‘CLASS FORMATION’, ‘CONSCIOUSNESS FORMATION’ AND ‘SPECIFICITY OF THE LOCAL’

In this section, we aim to analyze how Katznelson and Harvey in their respective approaches try to relate ‘class formation’ with ‘consciousness formation’, and ‘class and consciousness formation’ with ‘urban-spatial development’. How they construe the meaning and the specific role of class-struggle as a building block or an intermediating term within these formation processes will be the integral focus of our discussion. This will be an effort to unravel relative strengths and shortcomings of each approach with respect to one another. And this we deem important since these theoreticians represent the two major rival schools of thought within the historical Marxist channel with a claim to bring geographical insight into class analysis.

II.V.I. Criticism of Katznelson’s Model: Four Layers of Class

Katznelson starts by an analytical endeavor to distinguish between four connected levels/dimensions of class, hoping that this clear analytical distinction can overcome the too direct passage from ‘class in itself’ to ‘class for itself’ and refute the understanding that class-consciousness formation is the logical outcome of the class-structure. He identifies two objective and two subjective dimensions in this respect; ‘**structure**’, ‘**ways of life**’, ‘**dispositions**’ and ‘**collective action**’ respectively. With the tools developed in each layer of theory and history, cases of class formation in different geographies are to be constructed systematically. This approach, he claims, would make sense of the similarities and variations in the dynamics and character of the class relations in different societies. In his empirical work, we find similarities generally relegated to the objective structuring of the first and second levels and variations to the third and fourth levels of class. (Katznelson, 1992, 224; 1986, 23) Another point that he insistently underlines is related to the relationship-connection problem between the layers. Questions regarding the content of each level and the connections between these levels constitute the very heart of his class-formation analysis. He asserts that the precise charting of class-formation or developing of hypotheses about the variations in a comparative analysis, should base themselves on the connections between these four layers. Connections are contingent, but not undetermined;

problematic and conditional, but not random. These points of contact define the possibility of alternative kinds of relationships to be established between the layers. In short, class formation is the conditional process of connection between the layers of class (Katznelson, 1986, 21-22). He explicates the content and concern of each layer as follows:

First is 'class' within the structure in capitalist development, the level of class Marx analyzed in *Capital*. This is a model of empty places within the mode of production. 'Class' at the **second** level, by contrast, concerns how actual people live within determinate patterns of life and social relations. Class here refers to the features of the organization of social existence at work and off work. At the **third** level, that of cognitive and linguistic dispositions, 'class' refers to the ways people come to represent their lived experiences and how they constitute a normative guide to action. Class agents are constituted within given cultural orders and distinctive sets of preferences, cognitions, and possibilities. Class dispositions, however, are not simply mirrors or reflections of class realities; they are plausible and meaningful responses given to circumstances. Grounded in language and symbols, they constitute significant cultural resources which structure the repertoire of the working-class at the **fourth** level, that of the collective action. People who share dispositions may or may not act together in pursuit of common objectives. A class may be said to exist at this fourth level when its members act self-consciously through movements and organizations to affect society and the position of the class within it. (Katznelson, 1992, 208)

Having presented a brief outline of Katznelson's approach, we now will assert that several crucial misconceptions in his thinking render his model dysfunctional for use in an empirical research. Katznelson aims to transcend the choices offered by Marxist urban geography and Weberian sociology, but his methodological inconsistencies ironically prevent him from doing so. We claim to gather those inconsistencies around three points: **First of all**, reducing everything to a dimension of class, we are left deprived of any analytical tools to investigate the interplay between **class and non-class** relations of social life; or the class (social relations of production) and non-class (material relations of production) aspects of the capitalist accumulation processes. **Secondly**, **space** is conceived in 'absolute' rather than in 'relational' terms, and 'separation of workplace from the living place' is conflated with a whole urban-spatial development process. And **thirdly**, an ordered causal account of the class formation process and the dynamic **link between 'class' and 'class formation process'** is not presented. This is largely because, capability of establishing internal relations between '**structure**' and '**consciousness**' is curbed once the four levels are formulated as independent but complementing layers connected through some contingent relations. The allegedly analytical separations between the layers come out, unfortunately, as 'real' separations in the end. We will be able to observe how this happens more clearly in the coming sections when we focus upon the empirical material he provides for us (sections II.VI.I., II., III.). Below we will consider each point in turn:

1. Katznelson argues that at the **third** level “classes are formed groups sharing dispositions”. He agrees with Thompson that,

“When we speak of a class we are thinking of a very loosely defined body of people who share the same congeries of interests, social experiences, traditions, and value systems; who have a disposition to behave as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways” (Thompson, quote by Katznelson, 1986, 18).

We know that not all members of the same class have to share similar dispositions; it depends on the kind of class formation process they experience. More still, when they come to share such dispositions, they do not have to be class-based ones. If they share a community identity, a value system based on ethnic solidarity for example, then we observe a working-class with community consciousness. This is why the empirical research should not be restricted to searching for class-based consciousness, but should explore the specific patterning of interrelations between different loci of consciousness formation realized in particular cases. It is only when people share class-based dispositions that we can talk about a class-conscious group of some kind. In Katznelson’s conception, however, it becomes impossible to distinguish a religious cross-class community from a religious working-class community; or a class-conscious working-class from a community-conscious working-class.

In the **fourth** level again, Katznelson falls into the same trap of essentialism and teleological understanding, and this is really surprising because elsewhere in the same essay he spends so much space directing powerful criticisms against it. This time, collective action is reduced to those which are “organized and that act through movements and organizations to affect society and the position of the class within it”. And he continues, “this kind of behavior is self-conscious and refers to activity that is more than just the common but unselfconscious shared behavior of members of a class” (Katznelson, 1986, 20). This approach totally disregards the existence of non-class based individual or collective actions. And this prevents the model from embracing the actions emanating from **non-class based dispositions** of the third level. This is the kind of theoretical error that we particularly tried to remind against in section II.III.II.; that of reducing class-struggle to class-conscious actions of the working-class. The same error can be identified in the **second** level as well. Here Katznelson asks why social relations of work are given a special or privileged status with respect to other sets of social relations that are also structured in class ways, including the social relations of community. Our point is that they are not structured in class-ways, but are structured by the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Ethnic relations for example are non-class relations which can be exploited by capital but this does

not mean that they are class relations. The capitalist system integrates non-class relations into the accumulation process but does not structure them in class-ways. It puts them into a certain patterning of interrelations with the class-based relations. Only in the **third** level are we introduced to some non-class bases of social life, of bases of solidarity influencing consciousness formation. And even there, they are put into service of formation of class-consciousness. In the remaining three levels, class is proposed as the only material base to live in and to struggle around. All non-class patterns are regarded as “other bases of class relations” by Katznelson.

The workplace-living place separation and state formation (see also section II.VI.II) are always investigated in and through class-based structures; it is as if all structures and relations (including those other forces stemming from capitalist dynamics) in a capitalist society directly overlap with the class-based ones. The accumulation dynamics, and all tendencies within capitalist mode of production (falling rates of profit, uneven geographical development, overaccumulation - underconsumption crisis, contradiction between growth and technology, etc.) are conflated with that “buying and selling of labor power and social relations embodied in the socio-technical conditions of production under conditions of surplus value extraction” (Harvey, 1985a, 252) under the overall term ‘class’. The former, however, implies the totality of a mode of production as a higher level category which produces the latter. It should not be reduced to a dimension of class, as Katznelson does.

2. Socio-spatial analysis, in Katznelson’s approach, is reduced to a once-and-for-all workplace-living place separation (see also section II.II.I), or in other words, to space separated from the social. He tries to integrate ‘urban-spatial development’ into ‘class formation process’ by introducing ‘living place’ into the analysis, but conflates living place with the whole dynamics of urban-spatial development. He cannot present the ordered causal account of the processes which tie formation of residence communities to dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Space is treated (either of residential community or the urban) as a neutral scene, as a container for the social relations it hosts. Not as a relational force endowed with a structuring power once it is created, and continuously being reshaped by the socio-spatial relations it embodies.

Katznelson specifies three steps of research in purpose of inculcating urban-geographical imagination into the analysis of working-class formation. **First one** covers the specification of structural determinants of city growth and development. **Second** is concerned about

presentation of spatial configurations characteristic of these new spaces. And the **third** deals with a systematic, contingent and comparative account of how new working-classes made sense of these spaces in different countries (Katznelson, 1992, 207). In the second step, he identifies workplace-living place separation and division by class as the new divisions in the nineteenth century urban space posing fundamental challenges to class-based dispositions. And then goes on to the third step to analyze the variations in dispositions as against this spatial characteristic interpreted as the ‘similarity’ across different societies. If spatial restructuring is reduced to a mere observation of workplace and living place separation and segregation by class, and the mechanisms through which the shifting space relations pose barriers before mobility are not analyzed, space comes to be misconceived as a ‘similarity in appearance’ or contextual rather than a causal variable, and the social relations and attitudes as ‘variations’. This is a very telling example to the conception of ‘absolute’ space as against the ‘relational’ space within which variations in dispositions are necessarily reflected in socio-spatial configurations. It is not that people give different responses to similar conditions; it is that there are both similarities and variations in structural configurations which produce again both similarities and variations in consciousness configurations. Variations and similarities cannot be ascribed to different layers separately, variations being in one layer and similarities in the other. Both arise out of the total functioning of the class formation process.

3. We argue that ‘class’ refers to a non-observable social relation; it becomes observable either in its structural form or consciousness form. It is one of the loci around which struggles can be fought in a capitalist social structure, and not the only one. It is not a process, but a static form, a social base-locus, the outcome of the whole class formation process. ‘Class formation’, on the other hand, is a process and is a much more complicated mechanism through which class base, along with the other bases of society (family, state, community, etc.), interrelates with the whole society and changes thereby. Katznelson identifies each level as a static form of class, and then cannot account for the multi-directional interrelation between the layers or how the dynamic process of class formation operates. We are not given the conceptual tools unraveling the *modus operandi* of the class formation process which constantly organize, disorganize and reorganize the classes through the interaction of social structure and consciousness.

It cannot account for the interrelation between the layers, whether contingent or else, due to the limitations inherent in the theory. Levels are proposed as separate but linked objective

and subjective dimensions of class. That is, he tries to separate what cannot be separable; structure from the consciousness and vice-versa. Class formation is a **double process** which **cannot be fragmented as of structure and consciousness**; it is a continuous dialectical process. An analytical distinction can be made, yet it is impossible to observe them separately in concrete analysis. When studying consciousness formation, you have to understand the social structure in relation to which it is formed. When studying class formation, on the other hand, you have to understand how people interpret the capitalist social structure and act so that is formed that way. For example, the desire for spatial or occupational mobility of a worker cannot be understood regardless of the specific structured coherence achieved within the urban region s/he lives. The dynamics of the labor and housing markets, the specific patterning of social and physical infrastructures, and local dependencies, all shape worker's chances for mobility. They cannot be analyzed at separate levels. Social structure is the crystallization of the 'actions' which have changed it in the past (worker not willing to move, but already have moved for example). In other words, it is an actualized-realized form of consciousness. So, we can start the analysis from within either moment of class and end up with similar conclusions. In internal relations philosophy, one can define either 'structure' or 'consciousness' as an entry point into investigating the class formation process, just the emphasis changes. But in the four layered model, we cannot move through or within the layers.

Nonetheless, the above criticisms we made against this methodological approach of external relations do not render Katznelson's contributions totally discardable. The empirical material that he provides us on state, community, and class is going to be taken into consideration in the next sections. Historico-geographical materialism of 'internal-relations philosophy' needs to be enriched and made more sensitive particularly with respect to micro-level analyses through the refining contributions of other theoretical approaches. Before going on to Harvey's proposal for class formation analysis, then, we should underline several of those **useful contributions of Katznelson** saying:

- a. "Groups of people sharing life situations and dispositions may or may not act collectively to transform their dispositions into behavior". It does not assume a causal lineage between **structure and action** and struggle to account for the non-appearance of certain expected class practices (Yıldırım, 1994, 375)
- b. "**Class** relations are lived and experienced not only at work but also off work in residence communities. If we are interested in the social organization of society, then there is no warrant for giving a privileged place to the workplace in the analysis of group and class formation. If we are interested in how social classes in cities are formed

as groups sharing dispositions, then we must attend to how they construct maps of their social terrain in both domains, and how they do, or do not link them”

- c. **State** must not be reduced to its role in the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. State-society relations in terms of organization, repression, political incorporation (franchise) and public policy (services, planning, etc.), and the state autonomy in terms of the specific interests and actions of local officials, government bureaucrats, etc. should also be taken into account. The history of state formation should be integrated into the analysis of working-class formation. (Katznelson, 1992, 129-134)
- d. “Capitalist **community** is the spatial and material basis both for the elaboration of the market in which people secure their social needs, and for the reproduction of the intimate, the personal, and the affective.” (Katznelson, 231, 1979)


II.V.II. Criticism of Harvey’s Model: Five Loci of Consciousness Formation

Harvey proposes certain conceptual tools to relate social structure with social consciousness; or rather ‘urbanization of capital’ to ‘urbanization of consciousness’. Until now, we have tried to examine the urbanization process from a structural point of view (urbanization of capital) and named it the ‘class formation process’, but here we, following Harvey, will try to look to the same totality of processes of production and organization of society from within the consciousness moment of the class struggle, and name it the ‘consciousness formation process’. Harvey conceives of **five primary loci** as roots of consciousness formation in the material realities of life. These five loci cannot be understood independently of their relation to one another. “It is the total patterning of interrelations that counts” (Harvey, 1985a, 251). He briefly defines them as follows:

“**Individualism** attaches to money uses of freely functioning markets. **Class** under capitalism reflects the buying and selling of labor power and the social relations embodied in the socio-technical relations of production under conditions of surplus value extraction. **Community** plays a fundamental role in terms of the reproduction of labor power, circulation of revenues, and the geography of capital accumulation. **State** impinges on consciousness as a center of authority and as an apparatus through which political-economic power is exercised in a territory with some degree of popular legitimacy. The **family**, finally, has a profound effect upon ways of thought and action simply by virtue of its function as the primary site of social reproduction through child rearing” (Harvey, 1985a, 252)

Consciousness formation process denotes a continuous pendulum movement between structure and consciousness; therefore, while trying to visualize it below, we placed a mold for each locus in each one of the moments. The material patternings among five loci are to have reflections in thought, and vice versa, all modes of consciousness are to have real material bases in social life.

Figure 5. Material and Cognitive Bases of Different Loci of Consciousness Formation



We will argue that Harvey’s approach to consciousness formation analysis is a more operational conceptualization in three aspects, the third of which we will discuss in the next section on ‘Class Locus’:

1. It recognizes the distinct but interrelated effects of both **class and non-class** bases of solidarity in the consciousness formation process
2. It incorporates **spatial relations** -contradictions expressed through spatial transformations- right into the heart of ‘consciousness formation’ analysis, having unraveled the two-fold nature of the socio-spatial as both a ‘structure’ and a dialectical ‘process’
3. It makes an analytical distinction between capitalist principles of **accumulation in general** and the **class-relations in particular**

1. Here we see that Harvey does not reduce everything to an analysis of class relations. He argues that to do so is to lose any capacity to understand the role of urbanization under capitalism (Harvey, 1985a, 264). To conceive class-base as if it was the only material base within which the totality of the processes, relations, and structures in a society were produced and reproduced, or in other words, to reduce other loci of consciousness formation to mere instruments of the class locus, amounts to undermining of what we most desire to defend. Because this kind of thinking underestimates or depreciates the crucial role that **other constitutive bases of society** as forms of solidarity may play in struggles for humanly living, against the power of money and capital, which may or may not yield to transcendence of a class-structured society. It is through the existence of non-class bases to be dominated that class relations can be perpetuated. And consequently, abolition of class structure is possible only through a coordinated attack against the power of capital mounted out of all loci of consciousness formation in alliance with the class resentments that derive

from the conditions of labor and the buying and selling of labor power (Harvey, 1985a, 274). This was what happened in the Paris Commune: "... different identities and states of consciousness fused in a given historical moment into a political movement to defend a particular space against those who represented the power of money and the power of capital unalloyed" (Harvey, 1985a, 263). The alliance of forces was against the power of capital, but not capitalism per se.

Since class resentments deriving from social relations of production are not lived only at the workplace, but also in the living place, the communities, the families, and against the state, class-conscious struggles should find ways to press their own terms within each realm, in order to join rather than divide these different but interrelated bases of social life around the collective interests of labor. They should resist against the instrumentalization of these roots of consciousness for purposes of creating relative spaces of exchange-values, to the contrary, they should press for use-values of absolute spaces and real needs of concrete labor. This is exactly what bourgeois-consciousness does; it invades and dominates all other loci in order to reinforce a social consciousness which produces actions and behaviors in congruence with perpetuation of the capitalist order and profit-making capabilities.

We should emphasize the relatively autonomous constitutive presence of non-class bases here once more. They provide the material basis we need, to be able to theorize, conceive or dream of a classless society. They represent different forms of solidarities constituted around some shared identities, values, meaning systems, moral codes, and expectations other than those arising out of class relations. Ethnic, familial, place, religious, national attachments, ties of affect, altruistic behavior, etc. do not have their historical roots in a capitalist society, but are certainly transformed and articulated by the capitalist accumulation processes, the social and technical relations of capitalist production and the individualism that money power brings. It is the task of historical-geography to investigate the mechanisms through which this articulation takes place, to unravel the degree to which they become instruments of capital for class domination, or of labor for resistance against class domination.

2. It is important to see that in Harvey's conceptualization, neither the real material bases of consciousness formation, nor their replication in thought are located and interrelated within an empty void. Individuals draw their sense of identity and shape their consciousness in a context within which "these material bases intersect within a produced

urban milieu that institutionalizes and reifies the social and physical patterning of all such human relations in space and time” (Harvey, 1985a, 262). **Urban milieu mediates** production of consciousness in important ways. Loci of consciousness formation are interrelated through the urban specific geographies of capitalist mode of production and organization, within territorial coherences of particular forms and technologies of production, labor and housing markets and social and physical infrastructures. Local labor and housing markets structure the interrelation of the forces that arise out of each locus in a certain way and contribute to production of unique absolute spaces. Experience of these reified social and physical relations shape individuals’ consciousness and give stimulus for action. Therefore, tendency to produce structured coherence in urban politics and economy is always paralleled by a tendency to produce unique configurations of consciousness in each urban context. And much of that consciousness finds expression in lived cultures which are also qualities of created absolute space. (Harvey, 1985a, 262-6)

For Harvey, class-struggle against capital is simultaneously a **spatial struggle** fought for organization, control and command over landscapes of production and consumption. Laborers involve in struggles with reference to the immobilizing effect of their local dependency spatially fixed around different material bases of daily urban life. The loci of consciousness formation can be conceived as focuses around which certain sub-domains of **local dependency coalesce**. While people organize around those structures for some kind of collective interest, or even when they act individually, they are exposed to intersection of forces emanating from different loci mediated by the urban milieu. The character of the struggles are largely determined by the kind of local dependency which constrains or reinforces them, the institutions or organizations around which these demands are structured and where these demands are directed. To give an example, if it is a struggle carried by a residential community association for betterment of a local education facility, then the analysis of the immobilizing aspects of the education facility and the specific divisions, shared dispositions and identities within the association will be determining to understand the nature of the collective action. And if it is a demand formulated against the local state, interaction with the state will depend upon both the residents’ perception of the state and the representative and interventionist mechanisms developed by the local government organization in question.

Like the urban milieu itself, the loci of consciousness formation also have a dialectical nature; they might either become barriers before capitalist forces, or supportive in their

reproduction. They can be organized as coping mechanisms that ward off the worst aspects of class domination and alienated individualism, or may make domination of money and capital more acceptable. In each time, resolution of the tension should be worked out under specific conditions of urbanization of capital. And those specific conditions are outcomes of the power struggle between capital and labor over **control and command of organization of space**. The dominant classes, with their enhanced command over the production processes, will have considerable advantages in organization of space and tailoring social life to their needs. But this does not mean that other classes will completely be dominated or passivized, they also might find ways to resist by organizing their lots in relation to their own interests. This struggle for hegemony over space determines the extent to which a material base of social relations comes to function either as a **locus of resistance or submission** to capital.

II.VI. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK LINKING UNITS IN THE LOCALITY TO WIDER SOCIETY VERTICALLY AND TO ONE ANOTHER HORIZONTALLY

Figure 6. Loci of Consciousness Formation Linked through Local Structured Coherences





Figure 7. Geographical Relations among the Loci of Consciousness Formation and the Local Structured Coherence



Above are the **schemas we propose** for the mechanism through which ‘loci of consciousness formation’ can be integrated with formation of the local structured coherences or the local specificities. These loci of consciousness formation comprising duplicated patterns of relations (forms of solidarity-solidity) in the material and cognitive bases of society, link the units in the locality (forms and technologies of production, labor and housing markets, social and physical infrastructures) to wider society vertically and to one another within the urban region horizontally. Five primary material bases given by “the individualism of money, the class relations of capital, the limited coherence of community, the contested legitimacy of the state, and the protected but vulnerable domain of family life” (Harvey, 1985a, 262) are tuned into crystallized socio-spatial relations by the unique geographical configurations of physical and social relations of the urban. The forces (capitalist competition, accumulation rates, shifting space relations, and class-struggle) which link and restructure them are also being shaped by these definite places into a definite patterning of socio-economic and political processes. And this definite patterning of processes, simultaneously, produces the social consciousness that in turn feed back the paths and qualities of capitalist urbanization. This is a process of continuous restructuring between structure and consciousness and the urban.

In this section, we will **first** try to clarify what we mean by class, state, and community. This entails detecting their distinctive characteristics, what kind of social relations they are, and what type of actions, dispositions, values they give rise to. **And then**, identify the mechanisms through which consciousness of one invades consciousness of the other

through the ideological and organizational links made between different loci of consciousness formation; how the loci intersect on both material and consciousness levels. And **third**, explore the extent to which these new patternings are consistent with the capitalist accumulation process or antagonist to it. Since in our case study the vantage point from which we try to capture the social whole is the working-class residential community, in the end we will intend to sum up the effects of their interrelation under the specific conditions of the geographical and social space of the communities, which express themselves as one of the two dimensions of community formation, in other words, entirely consistent with capital accumulation or antagonist to it.

II.VI.I. Class Locus

II.VI.I.I. Class-Based Consciousness Formation in relation to the Capitalist Social Structure

According to Harvey as long as capitalism pervades as the dominant mode of production, and the circulation of capital is fundamental to the ways we gain our individual and social power, it is class relations that we should put at the center of our analysis. Under capitalist order, class relations invade and dominate all other bases of consciousness formation (Harvey, 1885a, 264).

Here Harvey pays careful attention not to conflate **class-base** with the **circulation processes of capital**. Class relations are crucial, but only as one dimension within the totality of the circulation processes of capital which also encompasses other principles only indirectly related with the buying and selling of labor power. These accumulation dynamics of capitalism include competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization, push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation, and shifting space relations. Capital has to expand and engage in continuous revolutions in productive forces and social relations of production. These immaterial processes are in continuous flux, which, when rooted or immobilized in the geographical configuration of interactions within specific labor and housing markets, are observed as social or material relations/infrastructures rather than processes. (Harvey, 1885b)

Class-base invades and **dominates** all other material bases due to their organic links with the mode of production, but **class-based consciousness cannot**. Class-consciousness, for

Harvey, derives out of the experience of earning money (Harvey, 1985a, 254). And particularly from the experience of the local labor market conditions which are not confined to the spatial limits of the workplace, but extends over the whole urban landscape. In Katznelson's work, however, social relations of work and community are considered as differentiated arenas of social life to be linked. There, relations of work are spatially represented by the workplace. But in Harvey's approach, buying and selling of labor power or social relations of production are inherently spatial and denote the wider space of the whole urban region, including both the work and residential communities mediated by a spatially structured labor market. "The qualities, quantities, and value of labor power depend crucially on the nature of family economies and community structures" (Harvey, 1985a, 265).

Therefore, struggles in the individual or collective consumption sphere, the housing market, the living place or the built environment, may as well be **class-conscious struggles**. They are class-conscious to the extent that they seek **collective interests** of the working-class as defined within social relations of production under conditions of surplus value extraction. Class-consciousness can relate with different material bases of consciousness only through the mediation of social consciousness expressed in different forms of class-struggle. When terms of class-consciousness invades the total patterning of interrelations within the social consciousness, then it is likely that class-struggle becomes a class-conscious struggle, rather than individual or community conscious one. And this in turn restructures the interrelations between different material bases due to the class-coloration that the forms of solidarity pertaining to different loci get. For example, community-base comes to be invaded-directed by class consciousness. The reverse is also possible of course; class-base may come to be invaded by community-consciousness. Capitalism, in short, survives through a particular configuration of intersections of these different loci of consciousness formation. It is a process of continuous restructuring:

"...individuals internalize diverse conceptions and act upon them in a milieu that demands mixed conceptions rather than giving them a clear-cut identity. And this explains the peculiar mix of satisfactions and disappointments; of fragmented ideologies and states of consciousness; the kaleidoscope of diverse urban social and political movements; the curious cross-cutting of labor struggles, community struggles, struggles around state or family and the seeming withdrawal of individuals and families from matters of broader social concern" (Harvey, 1985a, 262).

At this particular point, Harvey reintroduces a core Marxist concept, that of '**fetishism**'. The complexities and perplexities deriving from the intricate patternings of surface experience

defined above sometimes produce a confusion that obscures the inner meanings, hiding the deeper social forces behind. And under capitalist order those hidden forces are generally those of the class-bound logic of capital accumulation, and the unequal power relation between capital and labor. For example, suburbs may be regarded as outcomes of the rise in automobile ownership. Here forces emanating from shifting space relations of capitalism are misinterpreted-misrepresented as forces arising out of an individual preference system. This is not false consciousness, however, nor can be stigmatized as bourgeois or capitalistic, but is a fetishistic reading of daily urban life.

Class relations exist as “a system of places generated by the prevailing social relations of production through the medium of institutions which set limits on people’s capacity for action” (Yildirim, 1994), whether class members are aware of this class conflict or not. Class relations cross-cut different concrete communities in definite places, it is integral to the capitalist system as a whole, is extensive and all inclusive. The fusion between class and community occurs during the consciousness formation process. It involves action and spatial practice as a dialectical relation between social structure and agency. ‘Family’ and ‘community’ are concrete, observable social constructs, but ‘class’ and ‘state’ are abstract social relations. While ‘state’ takes on a ‘self-conscious’ character through transforming itself into a concrete territorial institution, ‘class’ should also crystallize itself on communities to become self-conscious. Class-consciousness formation process necessitates building up of real class communities, within which class members gain organizational capacity through establishment of solidarity lines to reproduce both their material conditions and consciousness. Furthermore, if class agents form new organizational channels and reorganize the existing ones in service of defending collective class interests, such organizational practices enhance the observable character of class.

In sum, class as an analytic construct, or say as an **abstract community**, should crystallize itself on actual socio-spatial configurations and must take on empirical validity to become observable. Class, as Marx puts it, “will become an **observable aggregate** of individuals only when that aggregate buries all the differences within it and becomes conscious of its class identity in the struggle between capital and labor” (Marx, quote by Harvey, 1985b, 115). This however, we argue, is assertion of a non-spatialized ideal type. Differences within the society have never been that buried, and may be not. For transcendence of capitalist order, the hegemony of ‘class identity’ over a territory would do.

Class relationships give rise to formation of two different kinds of consciousness; that of the bourgeois and the working-class. 'Class-base' invades all other bases on the material level, puts people to class places, but on the consciousness level, it is bourgeois consciousness rather than the working-class that can organize other modes of consciousness in pursuit of its own interests. **Gramsci** identifies three different tones in class-consciousness: **first**, sectionalist consciousness; laborers define their reaction to the system within the boundaries of their occupational interests. **Second**, united class-consciousness; they perceive working-class as a whole and define interests for the class totality. And **third**, revolutionary or hegemonic consciousness; they define class interests as the interests of the whole society (Özuğurlu, 2005, 82). In this study, class-consciousness will be understood as different combinations of the following elements, as classified in sociological terms by **Mann**;

- a. **Class Identity**: identifying oneself as part of working-class and recognizing the class division in society
- b. **Class Opposition**: the recognition of the capitalist and his/her agents as class opponents, as against the collective interests of the workers
- c. **Class Totality**: awareness of exploitative class relations as the defining characteristic and upshot of the wider institutional structure of society
- d. **Conception of an Alternative Society** (Mann, 1973, 13)

Mann argues that progress from the first element towards the fourth is not a cumulative and linear one. Revolutionary consciousness is composed of the combination of all four elements, but we cannot assert that workers who place themselves in the working-class and who experience class conflict or opposition in the production process will have conception of an alternative society in the end. Neither that recognition of class divisions will consequently bring awareness of the conflict of interest among the laborers and the capitalists. Class-based consciousness formation is a dialectical **process of becoming**, redefined each time as the outcome of a specific struggle. Under the hegemony of ruling class strategies invading all bases of consciousness formation, development of class-based consciousness entails active employment of political and organizational projects and strategies on part of the working-class. Harvey illustrates class-based struggle over the domination of space with a particular emphasis on its unitary/integrative character. In this kind of struggle, laborers fight collectively to improve the lot of all workers everywhere and against all forms of exploitation whether in the workplace or in the living (Harvey, 1985a, 60-61).

II.VI.I.II. Class as a Locus for Class-Struggle: Role of Labor Organizations within the Work-Residential Community Connection

We need an approach that pays sufficient attention to consciousness formation in terms of both individual workers' beliefs, behaviors and actions, and those manifested through the activities of collectivities. We so far argued that, and will continue to do so in the following sections, analysis of interrelation of different loci of consciousness formation and the class locus tells a lot about individual workers' consciousness formation. But here, we will now spend some time on the function of class organizations in this respect, which are to mediate between consciousness and collective action, or consciousness and urban space.

With the growth of large-scale industrial capitalism, the primary institutional form of workers' organization gradually became the trade union. But, "people seek to unify around shared attributes as wage workers always in circumstances in which they become wage workers differentiated from one another in other ways" (Hudson, 2001, 219). And not only divisive strategies of capital, but also organizational practices of unions contribute to production of divisions by reducing the possibilities for cooperation between unions, and between unions and other social forces, in so much so that, they come to be institutional forms of such divisions in the long run" (Hudson, 2001, 221). Trade unions, while unifying some workers, divide them from others industrially, occupationally, spatially, by gender or ethnicity. And, this results in class militancy resting on severe isolation from other groups in society which in turn dampens the effects of working-class movement on the social whole through curbing the possibilities of expanding into wider societal relations.

The lost interrelationship between **trade union organizations** and the **traditional geographic kind of communities** is a common feature observed in different capitalist societies. Trade unions become purely contractual communities and lack any organizational links with 'traditional communities' (geographically-bounded groups of face-to-face interpersonal interactions where people develop personal ties to each other). As partly a result of this, larger scale integration of classes becomes greater than the local level ones (in class terms). Growth in population size and development of institutions to deal with these issues results in those institutions less likely to be based on local social bonds and personal interrelationships and more likely to be based on bureaucratic procedures (Thrift, 1987, 19).

Disintegration of these two forms of communities has serious adverse impacts on the class-consciousness formation processes. Class formation takes place not only at the production sphere, but also in the living place communities. When living place dimension is lost, this means that the roots in urban life to secure reproduction of class-consciousness is pulled out, and thus, labor organizations gain ossified, pro-status-quo characters in time. There is a tendency towards localization of class-based politics in the workplace and this has the inevitable effect of dividing and weakening the working-class consciousness. Locking the trade unions, which play a primary role in reproduction of class-based politics, within the walls of the workplace is also a crucial part of the liberal strategy of separation of economy from politics. Labor unions are better kept disconnected from other institutions and locations of working-class life and political activity. When unions consider only the workplace related issues, they fail to address the problems workers face with outside the workplace, and lose any chance of contact with the reproduction sphere. As a result, workers lose the living place as a reinforcing arena for their class-based struggles.

Katznelson, however, shows us that this tendency for split between work and off-work forms of collective action was not lived in a similar fashion in different societies. He makes a historical **comparison between US and England** in this respect. In US, he underlines the stark split between the ways workers think, talk and act at work and away from work in their residential communities, whereas in England, class comes to define the terms of speech and action in both spheres (Katznelson, 1992, 233). In this regard, we observe the differences between the particular roles labor organizations played in mediating between consciousness and urban space in each country. While work and community conflicts had their own separate vocabulary and set of institutions in US, they intersected in England.

American unions were disconnected from partisan electoral activity, their domain restricted to the workplace and to political demands that directly affected work. State officials tolerated only workplace based concerns. The conflict with the employer in the workplace was not transferred to the political arena where one felt capable of influencing the state as a citizen (Katznelson, 1985, 26). And in the political arena, political machines mobilized supporters where they lived on the basis of territorial, religious and ethnic identities. In this politics, workers appeared not as workers, but as residents of a specific place or members of a specific non-class group. Voting was for most urban workers focused on distributive public policies (fiscal capacity, taxation, delivery of services, etc.) of the local government where partisan identification based on territory and ethnicity made good sense. Fraternal

community organizations also diverted from construction of class-based social and cultural relations. Trade unions' meeting places were either at the workplace or close to workplace and away from living places of. Living place increasingly came to be perceived disconnected from the class formation processes. 'Work' had class and trade unions; and 'community' had ethnicity, local parties, churches and voluntary associations on its part. (Katznelson, 1992, 203-256)

But in **England**, trade unions and political agitation were pressed into the institutions of residential communities. Therefore, there was a unity between the rhetoric, organizations and demands at work and away from work. Working-class community based organizations were integral parts of a network of values and organizations that promoted the view that class pervaded all social relationships, not just those at the workplace. This holistic understanding of class transcended the divisions of work and home. Trade unions' meeting places in England were generally the pubs in the neighborhoods (public houses). They were trade unions by other names that sought to protect their members from legal recrimination. Self-help community organizations and friendly societies also gathered in those pubs. Leisure and political mobilization went hand in hand. The organizations in the neighborhoods were not necessarily directly linked to local trade unions, more flexible forms of organization and interaction with daily life activities could develop. These neighborhoods surrounding the work areas provided the working-class with the social and political space in which to resist economic change and to develop political responses to shifts in its condition. Working-class political leaders directed demands at workplace at the employers and away from work at the state in the same broad class terms, since the same labor organizations (unions, clubs, associations) organized demands in both the living place and the workplace and carried them to the relevant political arenas. (Katznelson, 1992, 203-256). Öngen is so right to assert that "when non-class conflicts overlap with class relations or when they succeed to mobilize class-based conflicts, they might contribute to expansion of class capacity and rising of social opposition" (Öngen, 1994, 237).

In short, we see that spatial division of work and home or the state formation process alone cannot be an explanation for patterns of divided working-class dispositions and collective action. It is rather the class-struggle strategies employed against the particular political, economic, spatial and social conditions in definite places that accounts for the difference. If labor organizations retreat into workplace related issues, it is the result of the current state of class-struggle between capital and labor over social relations of production and

reproduction, and the success of the liberal ideology on organizing consciousness formation processes which try to render this separation of work and living unproblematic and natural for the working-class perception. Therefore, in order to overcome these divisive effects of functional, ethnic and place-based differentiations which hinder perception of the capitalist system as a totality, and to foster consciousness formation and collective action against it, labor organizations should play more active and strategic roles.

II.VI.II. State Locus

Jessop makes a definition with reference to three fundamental dimensions of the state: institutional structure and internal organization; forms of representation in and around the state; and forms of intervention of the state in other relations (Jessop, 1990, quote by Şengül, 2003, 184). Each component in this definition produces specific effects on the consciousness formation processes in a capitalist society. In order to account for these impacts on the local level, we should first discuss what kind of material gains, local dependency they produce, and then try to pin down the status of the state loci as an arena for class-struggle in urban regions. In this respect, we will try to draw insights from two different schools of thought, **statist-institutionalist** and **strategic-relational** approaches to state. We will discuss these different formulations with respect to two interrelated dimensions:

1. Whether it can account for the continuous and destabilizing forces of class-struggle or the changing dynamics of state formation under capitalism, in other words, the kind of relation the **state** is put **with respect to society and economy**
2. The degree to which **internal relations** are established between the **three dimensions of state** and its effects on state-based consciousness formation

II.VI.II.I. State as a Locus for Class-Struggle: Interrelation Problematic of the State with Society and Economy

As for the first dimension, **Harvey**, resting on the internal relations philosophy, develops a relational approach to state formation. Contrary to Katznelson's claims, this approach does not conflate state and capitalism into a single jumbo macrostructure (Katznelson, 1992, 133). It is true that it does not grant an ontological independence to state, state-building or to politics, but this neither means that state is reduced to an instrument for the functional reproduction of capital, nor that role of the interests and actions of local officials and government bureaucrats in state-building are totally denied. To the contrary, Harvey, like

Poulantzas and Jessop, recognizes that state is more than a mere state apparatus. It is a wider social relation which includes an institutionalization process as well (Şengül, 2003, 184). In other words, as an arena of struggle, it reflects the specific form of the balance between different political forces acting on it. Harvey points out that whether or not the state can continue to impose its will depends on the strength of the class alliance behind it and the relative power of the opposing forces. Struggles over the control of the state apparatus are over the kind of actions and consciousness the state is to represent and to reproduce (Harvey, 1985a, 261). This relational understanding provides a much more dynamic and open framework for understanding the internal relation of state to society and to economy. Changing state strategies with respect to forms and functions of the state are to be interpreted as adaptations, or responses given to the changing dynamics of power relations, struggles and accumulation processes. State, like all other loci of consciousness formation, is instable and vulnerable to the actions and revolts in civil society. Changes taking place in the economic interventions, representative forms and spatial and institutional organization of the state are both products and means of the class-struggle in a capitalist society.

Katznelson, on the other hand, converges to conceptions of the institutionalist approach, in that, he implicitly seems to treat the state as a ‘thing’, with an autonomous logic of its own. Katznelson emphasizes the independent interests of state and state located actors, and its ontologically independent macrostructure with unconfined or self-motivated standing (Katznelson, 1992, 133). In this way of thinking, state is not considered as an outcome of the uneven development of the geography of capitalism, nature or civil society, but as a separate institution from society. The defects of the conception can be followed in Katznelson’s main arguments on the relation between ‘city space’, ‘capitalism’ and ‘state formation’. He summarizes it as follows:

- a. “Both English and American working-classes experienced capitalism through broadly similar transformations in city space.
- b. These new divisions in 19th century urban space posed fundamental challenges to the formation of class based dispositions.
- c. Character of each country’s state was integral in bringing about variations in classness in each case” (Katznelson, 1992, 212).

He further argues that;

“The spatial segregation by function and class imposed on the cities by the imperatives of capitalist accumulation as well as markets for land and housing, proved to have been a contextual rather than a causal variable, with the main differences accounted for by state-connected factors of organization, repression, political incorporation and public policy” (Katznelson, 1992, 254).

This terminology ascribing contextual status to spatial imperatives of capitalist accumulation and causal to state-connected factors is devoid of understanding their internally related co-development process mediated by struggles given in definite places. What is causal is the specific interaction of the contextual and causal processes within a locality; no one social force in this particular interaction can be said to have a distinct-separate causal force of its own. Reducing the influence of capitalist development on space to a generic and once-and-for-all workplace-living place separation eliminates at one stroke the uneven geographical development of capitalism and its effects on the state formation processes. Different urban regions both have similar social and spatial configurations stemming from the similarities in the accumulation dynamics and class relations of capitalism, and local specificities in terms of the specific patterning of labor and housing markets, social and physical infrastructures, the relations to wider social structures or other urban regions, etc. State plays a role in production of both the similarities and variations; it is both a contextual and a causal force in this respect.

Here neither the internal relation between capitalist accumulation dynamics and the capitalist state formation, nor how these accumulation and state strategies are mediated by production of urban space, is problematized. It is as if the three processes function on separate tracks. This is both a non-historical and non-geographical approach to social formation. If variations in classness are deriving from functions of the state, and we cannot relate state to other forces in the society (mode of production, other loci of consciousness formation, particular socio-spatial configurations) then we lose all grounds to attack the particular forms and functions of state, and confine labor struggle within the limits of bourgeois democracies. Similarly, we cannot understand why state strategies change in time, for example, why it weighs to the side of labor or the capital in different accumulation regimes. This approach contradicts with the understanding of class formation as a dynamic process, as well. It is because dynamism of class formation largely bases upon class-struggle which is not only shaped by forms and functions of state, but also those of other loci of consciousness formation mediated by the specific conditions of different urban geographies. The differences in the spatial patternings of class formation must also have corresponding effects on state formation. In other words, this diversity must affect formation of state strategies with regards to organizing, creating, maintaining and dismantling of the spatial fixes. Focus on state as a major source of variation in patterns of class formation cannot be regarded as a one-way process.

II.VI.II.II. State-Based Consciousness Formation in relation to Three Dimensions of the Capitalist State

Now let us turn to the second dimension. We might start by saying that **Katznelson** seems again to adhere to the first school of thought regarding his analysis on the relations between the three dimensions of state. Here we will see that Katznelson emphasizes particularly state's representative role as explaining the variations between class-consciousness formation processes in different countries, at the expense of other dimensions of the state, and partly as a result of this, puts them in external relation to each other. Katznelson's thoughts might be summarized as follows. For him, the way linkages between capital, labor and state were established, as hallmarks of modern liberal democratic life, provides the initial basis for subsequent patterns of class expression. In this respect, he identifies, as state response to the pursuit of social control, three elements which displace the dynamics of conflict between capital and labor into the relations of state and citizen. These are;

- a. "Regulation and proscription of workers at the point of production,
- b. Use of franchise to incorporate workers and their leaders into the polity in ways least threatened social cohesion,
- c. Development of new nexus of political relationships linking residence communities to government" (Katznelson, 1979, 237).

He asserts that formation and organization of the state (federal-unitary), citizenship and franchise, constitutional and public policies, party politics, political incorporation or repression, administrative expansion and reforms, all play important roles in definition of the terms and content of working-class lives. He stresses the importance of different histories lived with respect to formation of distinctive patterns of organization and interaction in the work and living places. The character of intermediary institutions (party, union, associations, and church) shapes the distinctive dynamics of competing class capacities. Whether political parties intersect with labor organizations or follow separate tracks affect how state penetrate into the life at work and in residential communities. Consequently, workers experience either a split consciousness or an integrative one with respect to different spheres of life. In most countries, voting citizens organize into politics on the basis of many identities but rarely those of class as such (Katznelson, 1992, 244). Cross-class political parties appeal to voters by mobilizing the non-class solidarities of religion, ethnicity and place and create political rights which have certain effects on structuring of working-class organizations. State controls reach to the relatively few institutions where laborers can constitute a partially autonomous culture and sometimes exercise a fierce repression on labor organizations. The communities become vehicles for

political integration into the regime. State penetrates in residence communities through clientalist or pluralist channels providing public services (police, schools, licensing, taxing, welfare provisions) in exchange for votes. Communities of citizens become units of representation and all kinds of associations (pubs, workingmen's clubs, parties, interest groups) compete for the ideological and electoral allegiance of the citizens (Katznelson, 1979, 233).

He claims that confinement of class-based politics and organization to the workplace related issues, and other issues of daily life to non-class based mass political parties in the living place, results in separation of economy from the polity and hegemonic representation of non-class identities in the political sphere. Workers come to be recognized as residents of specific places in their relation to state, and not as workers. As Katznelson puts it, "State appears in working people's lives where they labor as the regulator of hours and conditions of employment, and where they live as the regulator of public space, provider of services and the definer of the rights of citizenship" (Katznelson, 1992, 232). The institutional structure of the state, whether unitary or federal, centralized or decentralized, has also rather diminishing influences on the class capacity. In some countries, decentralization of politics serves to a voting process focused on distributional policies, delivery of services, governance and taxation on the local level and diverts attention from many class-related economic issues on the national level. These factors also define the spatial organizational level of the working-class organizations. Trade unions and political parties are organized either at local or national levels while possibilities for linking the two are seriously impeded. Contested construction of scales of representation and organization is a further potential cleavage plane dividing workers.

As summarized above, Katznelson does not consider effects of other dimensions of state on formation of class-based dispositions as important and detailed as the representation dimension of the state. This partly results from the ontological status ascribed to state. Identifying forms of representation as the only variation producing dimension, he disregards the internal linkages between all three dimensions of the state. And even those particular forms of representation are treated with particular reference to their seemingly static and stable natures. We see that not only Katznelson, but also other writers closer to the institutionalist approach rather focus upon analysis of the effects of franchise, citizenship, civil and political rights. In this respect, **Lockwood** suggests that structure of citizenship is central to social cohesion. He asserts that institutionalization and practice of citizenship

exerts a force-field of its own and therefore should be taken into account as an additional factor besides class analysis in explaining class formation processes. He formulates the question as how in practice inequalities of class and status modify institutionalization and integrative function of citizenship (Lockwood, 2001, 547).

We agree with both writers that social integration mechanisms of the state play crucial role in shaping of the consciousness formation processes through the material gains, **local dependencies** they provide, like the state pensions, unemployment benefits, single parents-retired-youth benefits, right to enter into free and equal contract, occupational or private pension schemes, mortgages, personal equity plans, investment and unit trusts and capital gains. But we also argue that the **relation between class formation and social integration** cannot be understood in terms of complementary or competition; or social integration as ‘additional’ to class analysis as Lockwood explicitly and Katznelson implicitly argues. On the contrary, they are interpenetrated aspects of the struggle between capital and labor over the degree to which state consciousness is projected either in favor of capital’s or labor’s interests in the name of the public interest. Or in **Harvey’s** words, it should be understood in terms of the “struggle between political consciousness directed toward the transcendence of the capital-labor relation, or states of social awareness which allow of social differentiations consistent with the accumulation of capital and the perpetuation of the capital-labor relation” (Harvey, 1985b, 116). Harvey reminds us that under capitalist order, the state, being a capitalist state under the hegemony of the bourgeois ideology and politics, will seek out ways to draw social distinctions along lines other than that between capital and labor. Separation between economy and polity is a fundamental strategy employed by the capitalist states in this respect. By this means, equality in the political sphere as citizens diverts attention from the inequality between labor and capital in the marketplace. And this feeds trade union consciousness on the part of labor, and middle-class awareness on part of the intermediate groups focusing on civil and political liberties (Harvey, 1985b, 117).

Creation of a social awareness to the **exclusion of questions of economic control**, masking of the class-base in society, and the state strategies and organization which best fit these capitalist interests are the issues that historical-geographical materialist investigation should reveal. In community studies, they are harder to detect because of the separation between economy and polity, and their organizational structures reaching out to residential communities in distinct patterns-tracks. We generally observe social cohesion producing effects of the state on the local level, and the economic conflicts lived around non-class

bases. We should analyze the specific effects of these state-mediated material conditions on the kind of social consciousness produced, and why and how it curbs the class-consciousness formation processes. So the literature on citizenship, rights, voting behavior and organization of representation channels provide a rich material to be examined and incorporated from a Marxist point of view. **The difference of the relational approach**, however, would be that the three dimensions of state not discussed in isolation, but in their interrelation to each other. Otherwise, this would yield treating of the present forms of representation, intervention and structural organization of the liberal democratic state as given, and contribute to reproduction of state-mediated social distinctions producing consciousness other than that of class. Evidence to that state is not a neutral institution lies in the struggle between capital and labor over particular interventions, non-interventions, forms and reforms of the state. Resistance of state institutions against the demands of labor reveals the class-base of capitalist accumulation processes.

So we should now turn to other dimensions of the state, namely, forms of intervention and internal organization respectively. According to **Cockburn**, state performs three basic functions on the urban level through its interventions on the central and local levels:

- a. “Perpetuation of production and capital accumulation (provision of fixed capital, producer durables, technology and science, urban planning, regulation of the demand, skills, etc.)
- b. Reproduction of labor power through collective consumption (provision of consumption funds, housing, education, health, cultural services, etc.)
- c. Social cohesion and control (Repression, incorporation services: Police, unemployment funds, civil rights, etc.)” (Cockburn, 1977, quote by Şengül, 2003, 188)

These functions also provide **material benefits** for the workers. In addition to the services listed above, sewage disposal, regulation of traffic flow, countering market failure, articulating collective class interests, protecting against abuses, arbitrating between warring factions, all provide a material basis for legitimate pride in and loyalty to the local or national state (Harvey, 1985a, 260). **Harvey** argues that the legitimacy of the state rests on its ability to define a public interest over and above privatism (individualistic or familial), class-struggle, and conflictual community interests (Harvey, 1985a, 259). State appears to be neutral. It is against this legitimacy that it can exercise political economic power in a territory, provide gains from its interventions and create a force field of its own projecting its consciousness onto the whole civil society. Therefore, in order to undermine this mask of neutrality, lack or low quality of the services within urban regions, or the particularistic interests to which they serve, should be brought to the political agenda of labor

organizations and directed to the state, pressing for cheaper, higher-quality, non-discriminative, expanded forms of collective consumption.

According to Harvey, state structure is also vulnerable to different accumulation strategies and revolts centered in different loci of consciousness formation. It adapts its internal organization in relation to the shifting relations with other loci and changing dynamics of the capitalist development. Local government reform movements, efforts to decentralize decision making processes, etc. illustrate this adaptation or redesign of political and administrative structures to remake labor relations. Changing urban class alliances, governance structures, public-private partnerships, rise of managerialism, technocratic modes of thought, all reflect the changing contexts in which employers, governments, and workers make decisions. To achieve structured coherence within an urban region, class alliances are to preserve or enhance “the models of production and consumption, dominant technological mixes and social relations, profit and wage levels, qualities of labor power and entrepreneurial skills, social and physical infrastructures and the cultural qualities of living and working” (Harvey, 1985b, 148). And these alliances are inherently unstable. Everyone has some interest in finding political means to affect the form that structured coherence takes, but some have greater interests than others. And some are more solid partners in alliance because they have fewer options to move elsewhere. Internal divisions (pull of different interests in different directions) and external pressures (capacity for geographical mobility, in-migration, inflows of money capital, redistribution of revenues, etc.) produce constant imbalances around local class alliances, within which different interests try to redefine ‘public interest’ to their own particularistic advantage. (Harvey, 1985b, 148-155)

Other relational Marxist theoreticians like **Duncan and Goodwin** formulate development of local state institutions as a response to the uneven geographical development of capitalism. The uneven development of class conflict and capitalist accumulation necessitate the emergence of local government structures, which play both interpretive (of the central state) and representative (of the local social base) roles (Duncan and Goodwin, 1989). Katznelson puts emphasis on the ‘interpretive role’ at the expense of the ‘representative role’ as the main arena of class-struggle, thus, cannot incorporate the tension between the local and national level states into his theoretical approach. Accordingly, he fails to come to terms with the changing role of local state in articulating formation of local class coalitions as a result of the socio-economic changes taking place in urban regions. And with the local class

relations that, forged in particular workplace and community experiences, give expression to the content of local state action. For example, the influence of the urban poor on local government might cause a tension and conflict between the local and central governments.

II.VI.III. Community Locus

II.VI.III.I. Community-Based Consciousness Formation in relation to the Capitalist Social Structure

History of urban communities “appears as a vantage point from which to capture some salient features in the social processes operating in society as a whole; it becomes, as it were, a mirror in which other aspects of society can be reflected” (Katznelson, 1979, 203). ‘Working-class community’ reflects a partial image of the urban-wide structured coherence as intersection of different material bases, and is one of the primary sites of interrelation between different forms of consciousness. It reflects a particular balance of social forces, mix of forms of consciousness, and produces fragmented states of consciousness in the end. Therefore, it is not easy to make an abstraction and ascribe a constitutive essence to community-consciousness to distinguish it from other modes of consciousness; nonetheless, here we will attempt to do so.

Community-consciousness might be identified as essentially sectionalist, divisive, particularistic, and parochial, in the sense that communal solidarity embraces community members only. Collective interests of the community members sharing an identity, place or dispositions are narrow-based to the extent that they exclude interests of those who do not share that constitutive commonality. This is true both for *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* type of communities. Whether people are essentially united through face-to-face interpersonal interactions and relationships where people develop personal ties to each other, or essentially separated through impersonal relations that superficially unite them in a collectivity, communities are ontologically devoid of the capacity of being all-inclusive and creating universalistic values. In this means, ‘family’ and ‘state’ must also be regarded as ontologically partial social structures. Communities, while exclusionary for outsiders, might gain, through imposition of moral codes, etc., intolerant and repressive character towards insiders as well. Not only ethnic, religious or occupational communities, again ‘family’ and ‘state’ can also reproduce such conservatism and oppression, to such an extent that the “dissolving effects of money and the anonymity of urban life may appear as welcome relief;

and the incoherencies of entrepreneurial capitalism, positively stimulating” (Harvey, 1985a, 257). The degree to which a locus of consciousness formation might gain an oppressive or emancipating character is a highly contingent phenomenon depending upon the particular patterning of relations it gets in with other loci, and the particular positions/stances the individuals or the groups have in relation to them.

Community-consciousness formation process entails either reorganization of the existing channels or formation of new ones in pursuit of some particularistic interests, such as kinship relations, mutual-help associations, clubs, friendly societies, etc. Most of the time, these particularistic interests serve for reproductive purposes of the labor power. Communities may create protective milieus against the harsh effects of class domination and alienated individualism through mutual aids like recruiting one’s own townsmen, etc. But this does not stop exploitation by the markets; to the contrary, they absorb the social energy necessary for organizing collective struggles directed at class opponents and the state. For example, when a worker finds work by agency of his/her relatives, we enter into the field of the **interaction between community and class bases of consciousness formation**. And, in this example, while the material base of class seems to invade and dominate the community base, at the consciousness level, watching for a community member may contribute to development of a particularistic community-consciousness, at the expense of fragmentation of an integrative class-consciousness. Harvey illustrates this divisive character of community-consciousness on the strategies adopted for domination and appropriation of land. In his example, communities create small legal islands within which monopoly rents are appropriatable, often by one faction of labor at the expense of another. This collective community action produces a consciousness of place which spawns competition between communities for scarce public investment funds. And this gives rise to internecine conflicts within the working-class along parochial, community based lines (Harvey, 1985a, 60).

Harvey highlights the crucial relationship between the **life experiences** of people and the values, **consciousness** and ideologies they develop. Through the social interaction process within a community, people derive distinctive value systems, aspirations, consumption habits, market capacities and states of consciousness, which in turn shape their life expectancies in both material and social terms (Harvey, 1985b, 118). Cognitive, linguistic and moral codes of the community provide the conceptual equipments which facilitate reproduction of such value systems and the material conditions conducive to being in the

community. Laborers perceptions of the wider society and the social inequalities mostly base on the experiences they live in their small communities of work and living. **Lockwood**, in this respect, builds up three different working-class typologies with reference to the characteristics of specific work and living place communities and forms of interaction in between. He names the worker groups as the ‘traditional proletarian’, ‘traditional deferential’ and ‘privatized’ respectively.

The ‘**proletarian**’ and the ‘**deferential**’ are traditional in the sense that their work and community relations generally overlap; in other words, occupational solidarity and communal sociability are highly intertwined. The main difference between them is that, while proletarian workers’ model of society is basically dichotomous, deferentials’ is a hierarchical one. Dichotomous model of society is centered on an awareness of ‘us’, the workers, in contradistinction to ‘them’, the employers, managers, public authorities, etc. Hierarchical model, on the other hand, thinks of social divisions in terms of status or prestige differentials. Those deferential workers, who believe in the intrinsic qualities of an elite, paternalistic leadership, defer to their superiors both socially and politically. Other than this difference, however, both types of workers are similar with respect to their strong group memberships and integration into their respective local societies. Their attitudes and behavior are rather influenced and controlled by means of direct face to face encounters. And this encourages treating strata or classes as active social formations and not merely as amorphous aggregate of individuals. (Lockwood, 1975, 16-31)

The ‘**privatized**’ workers, on the other hand, do not convey such awareness of group affiliations. They have low job involvement; they lack cohesive work groups and occupational communities. Under these social conditions, the model of society developed is a pecuniary and calculative one. Class divisions or status are seen mainly in terms of differences in income and material possessions. The instrumentalist approach to work-attachments and privatized community relations bring out individuals wage-oriented in the workplace and consumption-oriented in the living place. And this leads to growth of neither class, nor status consciousness, but of commodity consciousness. They are, in short, politically indifferent, socially isolated, home-centered workers. (Lockwood, 1975, 16-31)

He summarizes the distinguishing characteristics of each group as follows:

Table 1. Distinguishing characteristics of the working-class typologies

	Work Situation			Community Structure		
	Involvement in job	Identification with workmates	Identification with employers	Interactional status system	Occupational community	Occupational differentiation
Deferential	+	-	+	+	-	+
Proletarian	+	+	-	+	+	-
Privatized	-	-	-	-	-	-

Lockwood's conception of these ideal types is useful to the extent that it recognizes the relation between community structures and class-consciousness formation processes and provides some conceptual tools to analyze the ways they interact. Extension of the community concept as including both spheres of life, living and workplace, should also be appreciated. But this still gives a rather static picture abstracted from the internal dynamics of capitalist development. We cannot understand from his formulation how and why different types of communities are produced and reproduced that way. We best can formulate a dynamic conception by recognizing the tension between the two dimensions of community formation, to be discussed below, which can only be worked out as the outcome of class-struggle.

II.VI.III.II. Residential Community as a Locus for Class-Struggle: Two Dimensions of Community Formation

First, we should say a few words on the different methodological approaches to community. Community is a very ambiguous notion swelled with many meanings. In this study we, as we did in general, will try to stick to the historico-geographical understanding of it following that of **Harvey**. He identifies the three fundamental roles of community as follows;

- a. Circulation of revenues
- b. Reproduction of labor power
- c. Geography of capital accumulation

Here we find community not defined as some autonomous entity, but as a set of **processes** and **interacting dependencies** which produce a geographical product (Harvey, 1985b, 148). As we have already discussed in section II.III.I. on residential differentiation, residential community is treated as both a socio-spatial product and a social force itself; shaping and being shaped simultaneously. The geographical area it indicates may vary from a neighborhood, district, or urban region, to national or global territory at large. Whatever it indicates, however, the main process behind spatial differentiation is understood as the

uneven development of social production and reproduction. Residential communities contribute to reproduction of the social relations within capitalist societies. It is in these communities that daily processes of living occur against the seemingly permanent background of social and physical infrastructures, strongly implanted in the landscapes of capitalism (Harvey, 1985b, 148). In this means, Harvey connects the study of community to an elaboration of the internal relations between the production and consumption (Katznelson, 1979, 232). **Katznelson**, on the other hand, treats community rather as a static absolute space, as a container hosting certain social relations. He argues that communities, the class differentiated residence spaces segmented from workplaces, confine three sets of relations:

- a. Individual and collective consumption
- b. Ties of affect
- c. Political linkages

Leaving the shortcomings of this methodological approach aside, however, we admit that Katznelson points out an important phenomenon in defining capitalist community as the spatial and material basis both for the elaboration of the market in which people secure their social needs, and for the reproduction of the intimate, the personal, and the affective (Katznelson, 231, 1979). Both Harvey and Katznelson recognize these **double reproductive functions** or the two dimensions of the community formation process, but in different terms. Katznelson rather stresses the distinct effects of different forms of community relations on how people think and act and collectively express themselves, while Harvey is concerned with relating the changing interactions between different bases of solidarity and consciousness in the community to the whole, to the social structure. Katznelson provides a more detailed elaboration regarding the role of shared institutions, cultural identities and the representative functions of the state (use of franchise to incorporate workers into the polity, political relationships linking residence communities to government). Harvey's conception, in this respect, can be improved with that of Katznelson's, in other words, "reproduction of labor power" should be expanded and enriched with the terms of the relations of "ties of affect" and the "political linkages".

Interaction of different bases of consciousness formation with the class-base has always been a problematic arena of struggle. Capitalists strive to reorganize and dominate the arena of consciousness formation in favor of the requirements of the capitalist accumulation process, they instrumentalize human relations by means of strategies that put community, family and state relations in service of the market relations. While struggle is that straight

forward for reproduction of capital, it is a more **contradictory process** for reproduction of labor power. Working-class articulates these material bases both for its integration into the markets, and for construction of social spaces beyond the reach of the alienated individualism of these markets. Reproduction of someone as a worker necessitates integration to the system, to housing and labor markets to a certain extent and all kinds of social relations might be utilized for this purpose. But reproduction of someone as a human being necessitates production of non-market affective relations and social structures as well. What is striking about communities is that they accommodate a fusion of these relations of exchange and affect (Katznelson, 1979, 230). We make the separations for analytical purposes, but since capitalist communities provide the basis of social relations of feeling, as well as the indifferent relations of exchange, they remain empirically inseparable. This is true both for the **work and living place communities**, alienation to one's self is lived in both spheres of social life, and non-alienated relations of affect, when not instrumentalized by alienated relations of exchange, might provide a base against the domination of capital.

Capitalist urbanization tries to shape the matrix of interrelations between different loci of consciousness formation in different constellations in different accumulation regimes. In the neo-liberal turn after the 80's, family consumer sovereignty and money-based individualism are fostered together with the policies for minimization of state and deregulation of the markets. As Harvey puts it, "New-right helped divert attention from the restructuring of production and class relations. It divided and ruled in the social sphere those who should have common interest in the economic sphere" (Harvey, 1985a, 268). People confronting changes in the material conditions of life map and interpret these changes through the intermediation of their local communities of work and off-work. Traditional communities based whether on ethnic, kinship, occupational lines or loyalty to place, are accordingly, extremely vulnerable against the power of capital, the inhuman dynamics of capitalism. Even if they are deliberately organized as solidarity niches saving from direct exposition to market powers, still they are short living structures vanishing due to time and money discipline of capitalist urban dynamics. Individualism is the order of the day, fostered by domination of the cash nexus over other kinds of human interactions, invading community and class bases of consciousness formation, through the agency of the state and the family.

But even within the strategic constellation of negative conditions against the development of class based consciousness, the internal contradiction of 'reproduction of labor power' as both a '**human being**' and as a '**laborer**' always creates a ground to be invaded by counter-

strategies of the working-class based on use-values and the real needs. Ties of affect like shared institutions of family, worship, politics, conversation, shopping, and recreation both facilitate the reproduction of class with values and material conditions conducive to being in the working-class, and simultaneously, with values conducive to resist being in the working-class. When working-class is crystallized in space, it provides a potential for discontent and struggle as well (Harvey, 1985b, 119). Therefore, working-class culture developed and lived in spaces is **inherently contradictory**; segmentation may produce insular accommodative reactions, or the sharing of life experiences may produce powerful practices of revolt (Katznelson, 228, 1979). Conflict and cohesion with the system is nurtured at the same time in the working-class communities through the same social channels.

This makes it very important to understand the specific nature of concentrations of the working-class on urban space and the resulting configurations of consciousness, for working-class communities have a capacity for facilitating and catalyzing a consciousness formation process emanating from the exploitation relation with capital (Şengül, 2001, 146). Spatial concentration, however, would not be able to give rise to class-consciousness as a causal force per se; it requires active political intervention. In order homogenization of life experiences not to transform into social consciousness in congruence with the capitalist system, political mobilizations on class basis must organize people along the class interests. As long as the objective conditions for alienation continue, there is always a political potential for the working-class. Concentration of a class within a residential area may encourage contact, promote class-consciousness and facilitate political organization (Pratt, 19.., 99). Or in Katznelson's words;

“Segregation of residential areas by class may sustain political insularity by reducing contact between the classes, thus making the class structure opaque from the vantage point of the residential community. But it is just as convincing to propose that residential differentiation may heighten the possibilities of developing dispositions based on class understandings, as well as the probabilities of political mobilization on a class basis, by increasing opportunities for contact between members of the same class” (Katznelson, 1992, 223).

Harvey emphasizes the same fundamental tension in construction of community as follows;

“Movements against the power of concrete abstractions like money, capital, space and time may spiral into fierce struggles to create an alternative kind of community. But there are also processes of community construction and community empowerment that integrate well into dynamics of capital accumulation through the production of space” (Harvey, 1985, 257).

This **inherent dialectical tension** within the community will never be resolved in favor of one rather than the other, but the class aware strategic political actions of the class agents

must strive for establishment of the hegemony of class-based consciousness and class-based ways of living. A community converges more to a **class-conscious community of resistance** only if forces emanating from class relations and structure can inform community relations in favor of construction of class identities. But it should not be forgotten that other bases of social structures and forces will also continue to inform that community. The existing solidarity lines in a community might provide effective channels for dissemination of class values and interests. The collective identities and rituals of communal solidarity in the working-class communities will transmit and preserve this particular form of working-class culture which in turn might facilitate a social base for making sense of the oppressive logic behind capitalist development, and the limits it sets on free humanly activity of labor. The same community, though, might as well preserve and transmit sectional, parochial loyalties which might inhibit class-based consciousness formation. The parochial interests of solidarity groups might divide working-class communities from each other. They may foster intra-class distinctions along the lines of ethnicity, gender, division of labor, age, etc.

This is a continuous process of class-struggle over construction-invading of a spatially structured community, since social relation between capital and labor is a constant process of renewal and renegotiation. The influence of the struggle on the interplay between different loci of consciousness formation will determine the extent to which a community becomes consistent with capitalism or transforms into an alternative kind of community. When individualism of money and profit-seeking class-bound logic of capital circulation reigns, this will lead to community-boosterism and social competition with respect to life-style and command over space. But when movements antagonistic to these concrete abstractions prevail, then this kind of '**active community building**' may lead to formation of community solidarities resisting the dominations of money power, capital and the repressive state.

CHAPTER III

THE FIELD RESEARCH

III.I. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOOSING THE RESEARCH SETTINGS

In a research on class and consciousness formation, any urban region or residential community could have become the object of analysis. Nonetheless, since capital accumulation as a geographical process produces distinctive urban regions, we would have to handle with different kinds of ‘structured coherences’ each time; a particular patterning of interrelations between local social structures, relations and processes. We argue in this thesis that **all cities deserve such analysis**, regardless of their current state and kind of territorial stability. If we are to find clues for developing viable strategies for changing the lives of real people living in real places, justification to choose a particular setting should lie in the specificities of that locality, which can only be identified as an outcome of an analysis process. Yet, some preliminary observations or information could play determining role in directing our attention to particular places, this however, in the last instance, is still a matter of preference basing on our subjective decisions. Since one cannot give account of all urban processes in all regions, we try to choose the ones that we think have representative capacity for what we find important with respect to the socio-spatial changes taking place in capitalist geographies. Moreover, easy reach into the research field might also reinforce the tendency for making a particular choice, which was also a case here, in that; author’s family lived in Bursa.

We can list several reasons which make Bursa and our residential communities interesting from our point of view in terms of investigating the interplay between their structural conditions and consciousness formation processes:

1. Bursa, the 4th biggest city of the country, is one of the **oldest and most important industrial areas** in Turkey, its industrial tradition dating back to 1800’s. Forces emanating from industrial development play an important determining role in shaping of the kind of structured coherence achieved within the urban region. Bursa has always been known as an affluent city with considerable industrial welfare, holding its

competitive position with respect to other urban centers in the country under all accumulation regimes. With its strategic geographical location on transportation crossroads in easy reach both to international and domestic markets, the urban economy expands at a relatively accelerated rate in 2004, as relevant figures are presented in the next section. At the time of the field research, there prevailed an economic climate more or less at equilibrium, with high production levels, far away from an urban stagnation or crisis. The structured coherence seemed to provide a win-win situation both for capital and labor, in other words, a moral space economy achieving a sense of collective self-worth.

2. Economic prosperity draws **migrants from all regions**, particularly from Blacksea, Eastern, and South-Eastern regions and from abroad. With its high migration rates, Bursa has been one of the fastest growing cities in the whole country since the 50's. Majority of its population being industrial wage earners, this large labor pool provides for capitalists abundant reserves for start-up and expansion. Substitution chances are considered high both for capital and labor; providing labor surplus for capitalists, and quiet high employment opportunities for the laborers. Due to the large size of the market, all ethnic groups can find a place and create segmentation in the labor market, generally resulting in the form of sectoral differentiation.
3. Bursa industry provides a rich material in terms of **long-established social and physical infrastructures** both from the standpoint of capital and labor. The city has a relatively long tradition of clustering both small and big scale industry in organized industrial estates, reaching up to 10 established, 3 under construction, and 4 on proposal OIE within its provincial borders in 2007. BOIE, being the oldest OIE of Turkey and the most developed one in terms of its physical and technical infrastructures, forms a huge local dependency for capital. It was mostly the Bursa example and experience that stimulated development of other OIEs in different regions. Therefore BOIE is an interesting industrial focal point for analysis; as a long-term industrial investment fixed in space with large production units and lumpiness, it shapes local labor and housing markets and effects forms and technologies of production.
4. **Centralization movement of industrial capital** has crucial powers on organization and restructuring of the urban landscape in Bursa. It not only affects the urban macroform through location of big industrial estates, but also accelerates the strict workplace-living

place separation process, and restructures the residential differentiation patterns. Industrial activities had always been determinative over socio-spatial formation of the residential areas in the urban history.

5. Parallel to its industrial development, **unionization rates** were always high in Bursa with respect to other industrial towns. The first labor confederation of Turkey, Türk-İş, was founded in early 1960's by the cadres from Merinos Woolen Factory, a state economic enterprise established in 1938. Organized industrial labor force in Bursa, unionized largely in bigger firms, has a militant past and considerable collective action experience.

As for the **residential communities** and our **sample group**:

1. **Industrial workers** throughout the development of industrial capitalism formed one of the most militant and class-conscious segments of the working-class due to harshness of their alienating working and living conditions. They pioneered or played a crucial role almost in all countries in the organization of collective actions against capital. Although Turkey's late industrialization process amounted to formation of a relatively new and weak industrial working-class compared to European examples, they still constitute the most organized and politically mobile segment of the working-class with an institutional capacity for collective action.
2. Industrial workers form a **majority group of the labor force** in Bursa since 1800's. Their dispositions, behavior and actions are determinative in accomplishing coherence within the urban economy. It is important for capital to keep a docile and cheap labor force at the right quantity and skills.
3. **Proximity of the neighborhoods to the BOIE** results in agglomeration of industrial workers in space which in turn renders observation of working-class social infrastructures more viable. The degree to which proximity transforms into a local dependency either for capital or labor is also an important issue to be examined. And another issue might be to inquire the effect of BOIE on establishing outsourcing relations with the residential communities.

4. Proximity also facilitates concentration of workers most of them **working in the same industrial zone**, which is BOIE in our case. Making surveys with laborers working in the plants of various size and sectors, we can obtain a general picture of the BOIE regarding its technical and social organization, forms and technologies of production, and how it shapes the urban housing and labor markets.
5. The **distinctions between the two residential communities** in terms of forms of production of the locality, quality of the built environments, ethnic compositions, job hierarchies, etc. might give an account of the degree to which intra-class residential differentiation patterns influence class and consciousness formation processes.

III.II. SAMPLING STRATEGIES AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

At the beginning, the field study was to be carried out in Emek only, an unorganized, illegally built settlement, like most others in Bursa valley, hosting mostly migrant lower wage earning industrial workers. During the research, however, it was recognized that the neighboring settlement Akpınar, rather as a minority case, was composed of planned, low-cost housing estates and cooperatives, symbolizing a higher living standard environment for well-paid, socially secure workers mostly local in origin. It was decided, then, to include Akpınar into the research as well, in order to provide a comparative basis for investigation regarding the relation between residential differentiation and local class formation processes.

The field work was carried out within the three months period between June - September, 2004. Out of the 140, 128 surveys, 98 in Emek and 30 in Akpınar, matched with the goals of our study, and were evaluated by SPSS program. All surveys were conducted by the author of the research in order to maximize chances for extracting deeper experience by further observation. "Snowball" strategy was applied for the purpose of mixed sampling; in addition to three names asked from each respondent, local institutions, organizations and residents; such as municipality, mukhtars, townsmen associations, coffee houses and local tradesman were utilized as access points into the sample group. The questionnaires were most of the time filled in the homes and seldomly in the coffeehouses or townsmen associations. Two selective criteria were applied to the respondents: first, they were to live in Akpınar or Emek and work in a closer industrial area, in BOIE by preference, and

second, they were to be recruited in a factory with more than 29 employees. Other factors, such as age, gender, migration date, tenure type, ethnic identity, recruitment status, sector, etc. were retained as variables. This was done on purpose in order to be able to map the specific configuration of the local labor and housing market in its diversity.

In the research, three methods of data collection were conducted at different levels of the analysis: historical, qualitative and survey methods. The historical investigation discloses macro-level structural processes, which in turn are complemented by qualitative research at the micro-level. The empirical findings illuminate the local specific nature of the dialectical relation between these longer-term wider-society historical processes and local socio-spatial configurations. While the focus of investigation was on the community level, it remained in dialectical relationship with the data gathered in the national, urban, family and individual levels.

III.III. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH SETTINGS AND THE SAMPLE GROUP

III.III.I. Urban Industrial Setting: Bursa

“Happy the urban region that is attractive to control functions because it is an interesting place to live and that can thereby so expand the circulation of revenues and attract redistributions that local industry becomes both locally viable and internationally competitive, thus attracting a strong inflow of low wage labor” (Harvey, 1985a, 270).

Figure 8. Satellite View of Bursa Metropolitan Region



Google-View (2007)

Bursa, listed among the ‘traditional industrial cities’ of Turkey along with İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara, Adana, Eskişehir, Kayseri, and Kocaeli (Köse; Öncü, 2000, 80), can, for the present, be regarded as a ‘**winning**’ city within post 80’s integration process of the Turkish economy into the world markets, as against those ‘losing’ cities on other side of the ‘uneven development’ coin. The city, with its long-standing industrial infrastructure and well-established relations with the international capital already in pre-80’s, has improved its position in terms of an increased share of foreign trade revenues within the distribution of the gross capital aggregate (Eraydın, 1992, 112). This made Bursa the **4th biggest city** in the country with reference to both its economic and demographic indicators. With its substantial manufacturing base, with a large number of national and multinational manufacturing companies, in 2005, Bursa generated 4 percent (approx. 14,5 million dollars) of the country’s gross national product (TUIK, 2005).

A grand majority of the population in Bursa is engaged in **wage-earning activities**. According to the ‘2002 Household Labor Force Statistics’, 67 percent of the employed labor force of the province center are workers, 11 percent casual workers, 4 percent unpaid family workers, 11 percent self-employed, and lastly 6 percent employers. To show the accentuated rate of proletarianization (expansion of wage labor), it should also be noted that in the course of 1980-2000, the proportion of regular wage workers and employers increased continuously, as against the decrease in the proportion of unpaid family workers and self-employed (TUIK, 2000). As for the sectoral distribution of the labor force, it is important to highlight that Bursa is the only city in the country with its highest share of employment in manufacture (www.btso.org.tr, 2007). In 2002, 44 percent of the employed labor force engaged in manufacturing sector activities, of them 88 percent being wage earners (TUIK, Household Labor Force Statistics). The share of persons employed in agriculture decreased between the years 1980-2000, whereas within the same period share of services and manufacture increased continuously. We can also follow from the table below the increase observed in share of employment in manufacture from 44 percent to 45 percent within a years’ time, surpassing that of services in 2003:

Table 2. Sectoral Distribution of the Work force in Bursa

	2002			2003		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Total Workforce	124.608	314.856	439.464	139.277	330.261	469.538
Employed Workforce	104.240	274.832	379.072	112.661	288.915	401.576
Agriculture	7.471	9.161	16.632	7.721	12.597	20.318
Manufacture	55.055 %52,8	113.401 %41,2	168.457 %44,4	60.648 %53,8	121.702 %42,1	182.350 %45,4
Construction	356	16.899	17.255	508	16.965	17.473
Services	41.358	135.370	176.728 %46.6	43.784	137.651	181.435 %45.1
Unemployed	20.368	13.786	60.392	26.616	18.286	67.962

Source: www.btso.org.tr, 2007

Regarding the picture given above, Bursa rather falls into the category of what Harvey calls as ‘**Cities as Workshops for Production**’. Its competitive position in relation to the international division of labor is enhanced through improvements in physical and social infrastructure that support technological restructuring, tax subsidies, business reorganization, and control of the local labor force. Harvey summarizes this kind of differentiation of the city under interurban competition conditions as the “public subsidy of conspicuous consumption for the rich at the expense of the social wage of the poor”. It might be asserted that what is undertaking in Bursa is also a “corporate and affluent welfarism at the expense of social welfare for the underprivileged” (Harvey, 1985a, 269). This reality puts much burden upon the families and the communities of the working-class.

III.III.II. Work Setting: Bursa Organized Industrial Estate

BOIE is the **first OIE of Turkey** and the most developed one in terms of its physical and technical infrastructure. Hosting major enterprises of advanced technology, most of them employing progressive management policies, and with its more than 45 years of experience, it was taken as a model by most other OIEs in the county.

The first industrial estate of Turkey, established on the 14th kilometer on Mudanya Road, grew rapidly through several expansions since its foundation in 1961. Parallel to the increasing demand for industrial parcels, the estate grew from 1.8 million to 6.8 million square meters in time, 2.45 million of which are reserved for infrastructural facilities and 3.85 as industrial parcels. And in 2001, NOIE, the first privately owned industrial estate of Turkey, was established right next to it (www.btso.org.tr). Beginning with 4 firms (OYAK-Renault, Karsan, Sifaş, Sönmez Filament) at the outset, it now hosts 220 firms with a sectoral distribution as follows: 38 percent textile, 20 percent iron-steel and metal, 20 percent automotive and components, and 12 percent chemical and plastics industry.

Exportation volume of the firms increased by 74 percent between the years 2004-2005 and was realized as 2.217 million dollars.

Figure 9. Aerial View of BOIE / Layout Plan of BOIE



Source: www.boie.gov.tr Note: not an up to date photo

35.322 people were employed within the estate by the end of 2004. In a closer look, we find Oyak-Renault (1971), Karsan (1967), Bosch, Maysan, Coşkunöz, and Mako in the metal sector, and Nergis Holding Company (Sifaş, Polylen, Nergis), Coats, and Korteks in the textile sector, each recruiting more than 1000 employees, as the backbone factories within BOIE with crucial shaping powers on urban economy. Other factories recruit less than 1000 workers and are generally components producers. Distribution of the laborers in the 54 firms of our sample by location and firm size is as follows:

Table 3. Workplace Location * Firm Size

	Workplace Location							Total
	BOIE	NOIE	Geçit	DOIE	Merinos	Küçük Balıklı	Görükle	
30-100	7	3	3	-	-	1	1	15
101-300	23	3	2	1	-	-	-	29
301-500	6	-	1	-	-	-	-	7
501-1000	4	-	3	1	-	-	1	9
1001-1500	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
2501-3000	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
3001-4000	27	-	-	-	2	-	-	29
6001-7000	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	105	6	9	3	2	1	2	128

III.III.III. Residential Settings: Emek and Akpınar

Both neighborhoods are located 13-15km away from the city center on Mudanya Road; the road which separates them from the neighboring BOIE and NOIE.

Figure 10. Neighborhood Borders Map of Bursa Metropolitan Region



Source: Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

Growth of **Emek**, a relatively old settlement dating back to 1965s, displayed a parallel development with that of BOIE and pioneered residential development to the North of Mudanya axis. Its spatial proximity (walking distance) to BOIE, NOIE and the Small-Scale Industrial Estate in Geçit-Hamitler contributed to formation of an industrial working-class concentration in space most of whom shared the same work and living environments. Construction workers formed the second largest group in Emek's labor force.

The neighborhood was a physically detached settlement until the 90's, its only neighbor being BOIE on its West. The territory had served as fields and feeding grounds of the surrounding villages until it received village status in 1976, and later on in 1987 became a sub-district of Osmangazi District Municipality. The land-owners of the surrounding villages divided and sold the lands illegally and people built their houses on these purchased lands. The mayor emphasizes, however, that there is no disputed land ownership or shared-title deed left since 1999 due to completion of the development plans. Built environment in Emek largely consists of 2-3 and sometimes 4-5 floored, mostly self-constructed apartment blocks. The fast migration process amounted to a population increase at a higher rate than that of Bursa between the years 1990-2000. 2000 census shows that Emek has 26.900 registered inhabitants. According to the mayor, however, now in 2004 population is over 40.000 due to the continuing inflow of migrants, also noting that the census does not cover the unregistered children of the "eastern" families. As the population increased, Emek expanded into the public lands to the North and the East resulting in a growth by 500-600 percent in the last 15 years. With emergence of new neighborhoods, Hamitler on the East, Geçit on the North and Akpınar on the South-East, in 90's Emek was not a physically

isolated settlement any more. Emek is still a very dynamically growing neighborhood, with accelerated construction activities since the 90's.


Contrary to Emek, **Akpınar**, attached to the Osmangazi district, was a planned settlement from the beginning, with green areas, auto parks, and better educational, medical, and socio-cultural facilities. No self-constructed building was observed in the sample, homeownership generally achieved through housing cooperatives. The territory was declared as a 'Squatter Prevention Zone' in 1979. In 1985, Ministry of Public Works and Settlement prepared a development plan aiming at low-density housing to meet the housing requirements of people drawn by BOIE to the area. In 2000, 9.300 people were living in the once empty lands of Akpınar of the 80's (TUIK, 2000), and now in 2004 mukhtar mentions of a population around 15.000. Akpınar is a relatively new but rapidly growing neighborhood not fully established yet. Mukhtar resents that, even it has been 15 years now since the establishment of the first housing estate, there are lots of problems regarding the deterioration of the buildings, the green, and the infrastructure problems (sewage system, asphalts, etc.) in the neighborhood.

The neighborhood hosts 30-40 private housing cooperatives at varying scales (20-40 households), a few trade-union initiated cooperatives, several public workers' cooperatives (PTT, Municipality workers, etc.) and one of the three largest (besides Merinos and Kaplıkaya) social housing estates of Bursa, 1050 Konutlar. In addition to these, in Northern parts of the neighborhood there also exists some estates for villa-type, detached houses. Composition of the inhabitants by occupation and income level varies among different estates. While there are relatively better conditioned small apartment or villa estates for middle and upper-middle classes (for small-scale employers, middle rank administrative staff in the industrial sector, etc), residents of the two biggest housing estates, namely 1050 Konutlar and Harikalar (1700 households in total), are either lower-rank civil servants (teachers, police, etc.) or well-paid, skilled, usually unionized industrial workers with considerably high job security.

Our surveys were largely conducted in 1050 Konutlar (app. 4000 people) which was a housing cooperative established in 1975 by Teksif workers (a right wing trade union in textile sector). And some others were conducted in an 80-household, newly constructed housing-cooperative initiated by Metal-İş workers (a right wing trade union in automotive sector). 1050 Konutlar was a housing provision for SSK members only. Its construction

took about ten years from 1978 to 1989. Most of the cooperative members were textile workers of Merinos then, but nowadays, the mukhtar says, workers from different sectors lower grade civil servants, professionals, and retired people live together in 1050. The area is known to be heaven for the retired.

Figure 11. 1/1000 Plan / Satellite View of the Sample Zone



Source: Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

Having presented short constitution stories of the two residential communities, we should now turn to **general demographic features** of the respondents. Our sample group consists largely of blue-collar shop-floor workers recruited in 54 big-scale industry firms of the automotive and textile sectors. Their factories, all employing more than 29 workers, are almost entirely located in BOIE-NOIE or in closer other areas. Comparing the two neighborhoods, we observe the relative affluence of Akpınar laborers, and a similar differentiation in their unionization rates. Among the sample, only 14 percent are women, most of them being single. It was harder to convince married women workers for the survey which lasted more than an hour; they generally had a strong excuse, that is, lack of time due to their double work-load both at home and in the factory. We have respondents from all age groups in relatively evenly distributed proportions. Yet the variations by neighborhood, younger respondents being mostly in Emek and older ones in Akpınar, accord with the neighborhood-wide patterns, 60 percent below 25 in Emek compared to the 40 percent in Akpınar. And lastly for the ethnic composition, we can say that Emek reflects the longer-

distance migration pattern in Bursa with inhabitants mainly from Blacksea, Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolian regions, whereas Akpınar reflects both the shorter distance and international migration patterns, with inhabitants mostly from rural parts of Bursa and the Balkans. These general characteristics of the sample group might be briefly summarized as follows:

Table 4. General demographic features of the sample group

	Neighborhood		Total		Neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
Sex				Age			
Male	30	80	110	1980-1984	4	12	16
Female	-	18	18	1975-1979	-	30	30
				1970-1974	4	26	30
Trade union membership				1965-1969	6	23	29
Yes	23	50	73	1960-1964	10	6	16
No	7	48	55	1950-1959	6	1	7
Sector				Status			
Textile	7	47	54	Unskilled worker	7	42	49
Automotive	23	43	66	Skilled worker	15	36	51
Other	-	8	8	Master, foreman	5	12	17
				Technician, officer	3	8	11
Ethnic Identity				Wage Level			
Kurdish	1	20	21	320-600	7	67	74
Local	19	5	24	601-900	2	20	22
Blacksea	-	64	64	901-1.200	15	8	23
Other	10	9	19	1.201-1.500	6	3	9
Total	30	98	128	Total	30	98	128

Figure 12. Views from Emek




Figure 13. Views from Akpınar



CHAPTER IV

PRODUCTION OF LOCALITY: LABOR AND HOUSING MARKETS AND LOCAL DEPENDENCY

In this chapter, firstly, we will try to examine the four constitutive components to form a ‘structured coherence’ within the context of Bursa case. It is important to pin down the specific kind of structured coherence achieved within an urban region, whether it is stable or not and by what means, before going on to analyzing the destabilizing capacities of the forces influencing the territorial coherence. As we have discussed in the theoretical framework (section II.II), the kind of structured coherence to be achieved is related to the particular kind of equilibrium sought among four major interrelated sub-domains of local dependency (Harvey, 1990, 146):

1. Forms and Technologies of Production
2. Labor Market (Daily Exchange of Labor Power)
3. Housing-Consumption Market (Daily Reproduction of Labor Power)
4. Social and Physical Infrastructures

Secondly, while scrolling through the specific form and content of each domain, we will try to find out the kind of local dependency that they may produce for the industrial workers living in our communities. Those structures which are capable of locking people or firms into particular spatially defined labor markets will function as spatial barriers before mobility when they are disturbed by the destabilizing forces acting on the coherence. This means that the degree to which they are immobilizing structures and for whom, can only be determined as an outcome of the inquiries made throughout the three chapters of the field research. For the present, therefore, just the fields to produce a ‘potential’ local dependency might be identified.

IV.I. FORMS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF PRODUCTION

Tekeli identifies **three major stages** of transformation within the urbanization history of Bursa. **First** period covers the time from Bursa was conquered by the Ottoman Empire up into the 1850’s. The **second** period, stimulated by the modernity project, expands from 1850

to 1950's. And the **third** transformation takes place within the context of post-war urbanization of Turkey, resulting in a metropolitan scale restructuring of the urban macroform particularly during the post 70's. It is within this period that the rapid and unprecedented population increase in the city occurs due to the appeal of this important industrial center with substantial share of industry decentralizing from Istanbul (Tekeli, 1999).

In this third period, industrialization process in Bursa achieves a qualitative turn with respect to the effects of two major events: **one**, the industrial credits arranged for the Anatolian cities within the extent of the import substitution strategy of the early 70's, and **two**, establishment of the first Industrial Estate in Turkey in 1961 (**Bursa Pilot OIE**) as part of the strategy for the decentralization of Istanbul industry to Bursa (Tekeli, 1999). As the result of the research carried out by a consultant team working for State Planning Organization, among other candidate cities like İstanbul, Adapazarı, Mersin, Adana and Zonguldak, Bursa was chosen as the pilot region for establishment of the first OIE. By declaration of this result under the 'First Five Year Development Plan', it was shown that the city of Bursa was designated as the main concentration zone for development of the manufacturing sector following that of the Istanbul-Kocaeli axis (Akkılıç, 2002, 74). And from then on, the number of OIEs in Turkey has reached up to 251 in 2007, according to the data of the OIE Upper Organization (OSBÜK).

By the establishment of BOIE, for the first time in the urban history **spatial differentiation of the big and small-scale industry** was realized, which also corresponded to the functional differentiation of the residential areas from the industrial areas. Thereafter, the two completely different industrial production models, in terms of production techniques, labor processes and recruitment strategies (job security, unionization rates, etc.), formed a bifocal structure in the manufacture sector, closely interrelated, though, through **outsourcing mechanisms** (Aktar, 1997, 141). In Bursa, the connection between big and small-scale industry is settled as the relation between the components (supplier) and the primary industries. The linkage is generally observed in one of the following forms: in the **first** instance, the primary factory (like TOFAŞ-Fiat, OYAK-Renault, KARSAN-Peugeot) gets in relation with another large-scale factory (like Mako, Bosch, Coşkunöz, Yaysan, Maysan, Çemtaş, etc.), in the **second** form it gets in relation with the small-scale industry which generally provides the supplies in a semi-manufactured form at lower prices, and in

the **last** instance, which is not that common in Bursa, the supplier firm which holds the task also out-sources it to another firm (Yurt Ansiklopedisi, 1707).

In textile sector, for example, biggest factories dominate the field of filament production in Bursa. Fabric production, on the other hand, can be realized by various sizes of firms, and printing and dyeing of the fabric are generally done by the small-sized firms. Confection, as a labor intensive type of production, almost totally rests upon small-scale firms. There also exists, however, some integrated industrial organizations that have capacity and expertise in all of these fields of production (Eraydın, 1991). It is the same for the automotive sector. Small and medium scale factories or workshops provide supplies (shock absorbers, seats, bonnets, etc.) for big production factories like OYAK-Renault and TOFAŞ.

Subcontracting relations are not only restricted to intra-urban relations, but also have inter-urban and international dimensions. While Bursa industry is engaged in outsourcing relations with other closer cities like İzmit, Gebze, and İstanbul, it is also in intense subcontracting relations with the multinational capital, thanks to its strategic geographical location providing easy access to national and international markets through Marmara seaports. In this context, Bursa is a good example to those new “localities where flexible production is organized in a form that increases the profitability of the multinational capital” (Ersoy, Şengül, 1998, 138).

In short, we can say that the city perpetuates its traditional small-scale industrial activities in a parallel development to its specialization in certain sectors of advanced technology. Specialization is fostered by the external economies generated in the sectors, full integration with the supplier firms, and wide range of opportunities for outsourcing relations (Güvener, 2004). And in those **advanced technology sectors**, as Nichols asserts in his research carried out in three of the biggest firms (two in textile and one in automotive) of Bursa, physical working conditions are observed even better compared to international standards, which falsifies the readily assumed hypothesis in the western literature regarding the inhuman conditions in the 3rd World industries (Nichols, Suğur, 237). In Bursa’s progressive branches of industry, we find largely automatic, continuous flow production systems; workers exercising to a certain extent their knowledge and experience as well, rather than their pure effort. Some firms employ progressive management policies seeking for integration of workers into their organization through reward systems, creating more cohesive and integrated industrial climates, and providing greater autonomy in organizing

their works. Technological progress in industry also causes a relatively important increase in incomes of those employed in the most advanced sectors and plants.

Bursa was one of the least state invested cities of the statism years; Sümerbank Merinos (1938), Gemlik Artificial Silk (1938), and Tekel Tobacco Processing (1955) plants were the only three State Economic Enterprises (SEE) in the city until the 55's. And in 1960's when 45 percent of the industrial workforce was recruited in **public** sector as against the 55 percent in **private**, there were only 4 SEEs. Firm sizes in the private sector did not exceed 30 employees but SEEs were big factories recruiting 1.300 workers in total. Yet, Bursa has always appeared to have been neglected by the public sector, or maybe has been deliberately left to the hands of the private sector. The dramatic change, in this respect, occurred after the 80's; the ratio of 80 percent in the private sector in 80's reached up to 98 percent within the privatization wave in the early 90's. (Akkaya, 1998)

From 70's on, according to Tekeli, mainly two major leaps shaped the new industrial structure of Bursa, rendering the city as a diversified industrial center. One is the establishment of 'Automotive' industry, and the other is the development of large-scale 'Synthetic-Filament and Integrated Weaving' industry. Those two '**core industrial sectors**', **automotive and textile**, form the basis of industry and exports in Bursa in terms of both production and employment capacity. The two sectors together account for the 70 percent (almost evenly distributed) of the urban wide added-value generation in the manufacture sector (Güvener, 2004). Within the national export items, Bursa produces 60 percent of the ready-made clothing and 80 percent of the automotive (www.btso.org.tr, 2007).

Bursa has been an important center for **silk weaving** since the Byzantium era and was one of the first urban regions to witness emergence of wage labor in the Ottoman era. Export-oriented silk industry perpetuated its dominance in the urban economy into the first years of the Republican era. At that time, firms of the Greek and Armenian minorities passed into the hands of Muslim employers and consequently nationality of the workers also changed, most being Muslim Balkan migrants from then on. Accordingly, rate of women workers in the sector has also fallen dramatically from 90 percent down to 4 percent. Textile was the lowest waged branch with toughest working-conditions as the first sector to witness waged labor in Bursa. Being the dominant sector both in terms of the industrialization level and the extent of wage labor, 80 percent of the industrial workforce remained in textile sector until the mid-60's. In 60's and 70's, however, as the manufacture sector developed in consumer-

lasting, intermediate and capital good categories, dominance of textile gradually diminished. Foreign investments and partnerships with international capital also prospered in those years (Karsan, Renault, Tofaş). In 1978, only 46 percent of the industrial workforce was employed in textile. (Akkaya, 1998, 198-202)

In the late 60's, there was a fairly well developed pool of skilled labor employed in traditional small-manufacture and repair-workshops (Erder, 1976, quote by Parlak). This was an attractive asset for the **automotive industry** to choose Bursa for its long-term investments (Parlak, 1996, 131). Parlak particularly highlights the substantial contribution of establishment of TOFAŞ and OYAK-Renault automotive plants in the early 70's on the industrialization and urban transformation of the city of Bursa. Automotive industry has dominated the industrial landscape since the 70's. Therefore, it can be asserted that besides being a major center for textile production, Bursa is the largest center in Turkey for car production (Parlak, 1996, 127). In 2006, 57 percent of the passenger-car production in national-level took place in Bursa. Yet, on the other hand, with its synthetic-filament production capacity corresponding to 75 percent of the national level, Bursa is the only urban region in the world agglomerating so many filament plants together (www.btso.org.tr, 2007). In addition to automotive and textile industries, food, metal, plastic and various auxiliary activities (packaging, maintenance, etc.) are also relatively strong industrial sectors in Bursa.

IV.II. LOCAL INDUSTRIAL LABOR MARKET

What is authentic about the local level is that it defines a local labor market, in that; the local derives its identity from the pattern of social relations around this labor market (Cooke, 1990, quote by Şengül, 2001, 152). The identity and size of the industrial workforce is a significant factor which of itself exerts considerable influence on consciousness formation processes, since the value of labor power, physical standards of living of labor, or length of the working day are not the outcomes of class-bound processes only, but also of the class-struggles. The coherence within the labor markets is based upon **three important** phenomena: strategies of capital agreeing to some kind of regulation of the labor market, internal conditions of the labor demand and supply, and in-migration rates of labor and capital (Harvey, 1985b, 125-135). Accordingly, in order to get a general idea about the kind of labor market we are faced with in the two working-class communities studied in this thesis, in this section **firstly**, we intend to examine those strategies of capital

in relation to regulation of the quality and quantity of the workforce in the local labor market, and **secondly**, some of those internal conditions of labor demand and supply with respect to indicators such as sectoral differentiation, employment regimes, wages, unemployment-supplementary work regimes and occupational volatility. Migration movement of labor, on the other hand, will be left to the next chapter to be examined as a force of mobility.

IV.II.I. How BOIE shapes the Local Labor Market

Despite the proximity of BOIE, it is significant that we find only 13 percent walk to work, and those are generally to factories like OYAK-Renault, located closer to the neighborhoods along the Mudanya road border of BOIE. Mayor of Emek points out that they have been pressing for construction of a pedestrian bridge between the neighborhood and BOIE for long, but the employers ignored this demand. They do not prefer expanding direct pedestrian access into the zone, he says, and each year people die in the accidents while trying to pass the transit road. 77 percent use factory service vehicles and 8 percent prefer their own cars; this latter rate found not that low due to the high car ownership ratio of particularly the automotive workers. Public transportation to BOIE is mentioned only by two workers.

Cheap public **transportation** brings mobility for labor on space, in that, it directly affects accessibility to labor and housing markets and the daily urban life. Therefore, it is an important physical asset for capital to control, and by means of that, exercise domination on labor. The light railway system reaches the BOIE since 2001, but neither the workers nor the employers seem to prefer it for service transportation. On part of the workers, this might be because of two main reasons. **One**, the rail system does not reach the working-class residential areas of the inner zones; it is a feeble, scissors-like one-line system and not integrated with other modes of transportation effectively. And **two**, the system does not reach into the industrial estate. In fact, no public transport enters deep into the estate which is approximately 3km long and 3km wide. Therefore, in the absence of public transportation systems which should effectively link working-class residential areas to workplaces, the freedom for marketing one's labor power, or, the substitution opportunities for labor is reduced, and consequently its dependency increased. And on the other side of the coin lies the increased capacity of the landlords in advantageous locations to gain monopoly rents.

Labor can escape such geographical entrapment by pressing for new and cheap forms of transportation (Harvey, 1985, 40).

Nearly all factories in the BOIE have transportation services reaching out all over the city. Service transportation seems to be an advantageous gain for the workers at the first sight, but more than that it serves the interests of employers in exercising discipline and control over the circulation regime of the workforce, both in the city and in the OIE. **Four dimensions of control** might be cited in this respect. **First** of all, they guarantee workers' timely arrival, which is necessary for a timely regulated non-stop production process. **Secondly**, it prevents daily social encounters among the workers of different factories, hence interaction and communication among the workforce is restricted. **Thirdly**, it limits the chances to meet other workers in the same workplace, divides the laborers into the same small amount of 15-20 people. **Fourthly**, the factories utilize it as an instrument to relate with the local labor market as it suits to their own needs and interests. It is not a coincidence that one most common form of resistance observed in the OIE is 'service boycott' as mentioned by most of the workers. In a similar fashion, most militant workers in terms of activity in the labor movement history of Bursa have generally been those working for the Municipality Bus Company.

Şenyapılı identifies two spatial strategies that might be employed by firms regarding their relation with the urban space: **first**, they may try to enhance the efficiency and pervasiveness of the benefits acquired from the existing urban space, i.e. through **generalization of the labor market**, and **second**, they may choose to create a **local dependent labor market** by drawing workers to their locality and changing the qualities of the local labor force as it fits to their particular requirements (Şenyapılı, Acar, 1980, 11-12). Generally firms employ both strategies together in order to preserve their dominance over the labor force, playing one strategy for the other as it fits to their interests.

In our case, the respondents underline that BOIE workers come from every part of the city, from Görükle to Kestel (far East and West ends of the city). When asked whether employers prefer workers living closer, they tell that it is not a matter of concern for big factories since they have services reaching up to every part of the city, but for smaller factories (30 to 300 workers), transportation costs constitute a considerable expense to be reduced. Emek increasingly serves as a local labor market particularly for those factories. Here, however, we do not identify a particular concern on part of BOIE employers to create an effective and

more dependent local labor market. The factories' service policies do not promote differentiation of the working-class neighborhoods according to skilled or unskilled nature of the labor force; they rather seem disinterested against where the **skilled or the unskilled** laborers live. And this fosters a spatial homogenization in terms of skills, rather than the unskilled in closer neighborhoods and the skilled in inner-city, or vice-versa. We know that Emek and Akpınar accommodate both skilled and unskilled laborers, but existence of a relatively more skilled labor force in Akpınar might be related with the spatial strategies of BOIE employed by the agency of the local state. The territory was declared as a 'Squatter Prevention Zone' first and in 1985, Ministry of Public Works and Settlement prepared a development plan aiming at low-density housing to meet the housing requirements of people drawn by BOIE to the area. Just as Şenyapılı also recognized, as the service system developed, it was seen that unskilled labor force was rather to be provided from the inner-city neighborhoods, and skilled labor force scattered over the urban-landscape, including those in the closer neighborhoods (Şenyapılı, 1980, 12).

Either as a result of the big-scale of production or because of the existence of the pool of labor force at the required quality in the small-scale workshops of the inner city regions, there had never been dependency upon a locally defined labor market on part of the BOIE. Complaints of the small-workshop owners also support this argument; they resent that the 'usta's (master worker) that they train with so much effort leave their jobs for factory work, even it was for sweeping the factory floor (Parlak, 1996). In Bursa, big-scale industry exploits the presence of precariously employed workshop and small-scale manufacture workers. And **workshop and factory workers** do not seem to be residentially differentiated in most cases. One reason for this might be that this strategy of the big industry creates a dynamic occupational mobility pattern between workshop and factory work which drives workers into the same residential communities. And a second reason might be the spatial distribution of the small-scale industrial estates and the unorganized industrial zones in the city. They are generally located closer to the inner city working-class neighborhoods where factory workers live.

In sum, in a closer look to the distribution of labor force on urban space we might conclude that, the relation of BOIE with the urban space is rather guided by the first dynamic that Şenyapılı identifies, namely, generalization of the labor market (Şenyapılı, Acar, 1980, 11).

IV.II.II. Labor Market Dynamics viewed from Emek and Akpınar

As for the **sectoral distribution**, Mayor of Emek claims that Emek is the fastest growing district in the city of Bursa, with the highest share of workers among its population. As the name of the district suggests, 62 percent of the employed male labor force are regular wage workers; approximately 30 percent of the employed male labor force employed in manufacture, 20 percent in construction and 10 in service sector. In Akpınar, on the other hand, male wage workers' ratio reaches up to 83 percent, this time 40 percent placed in manufacture, 20 percent in trades and 30 percent in services. The **first significant difference** regarding the composition of the labor force among the two neighborhoods is the higher frequency of wage-work in Akpınar which is compensated by the self-employed category in Emek. Self-employed population in Emek is generally engaged in construction or agricultural activities, both of which are found rarely to any in Akpınar. The **second** important difference is related to the women work force. Woman working in manufacture is relatively low in Emek (E: 10 percent; A: 35 percent). While Emek women are generally employed in agricultural works (83 percent), it is rather in service sector (46 percent) in Akpınar, and mostly in those lower-grade civil services, as teachers, nurses, bank clerks, and saleswomen, etc.

Distribution by industry within the sample group resembles the urban-wide patterns where the industrial labor force is mainly recruited in textile and automotive sectors. Respondents are evenly split between the two sectors, except for a small percentage of 6 percent employed in food and chemical-petroleum-plastic industry. When workers are asked to make a comparison between these core sectors, to get a general image of the perceptions regarding the sectoral division in the industrial landscape, we see that automotive is the overwhelmingly preferred sector by 3/4 of the workers. The reasons vary: higher wages, social benefits, unionization rates; higher respectability in society; presence of skilled, mentally involved and 'conscious' workers; less crisis-prone; less noise and chemicals, healthier working-conditions. Textile, on the other hand, is regarded as easy, unskilled, monotonous and boring, clean and comfortable (if you are not working with chemicals), and less risky (in terms of accidents). Along with various other illnesses, the most typical physical defect observed among the textile workers is deafness due to high noise, whereas it is getting the fingers caught for the automotive workers. Some automotive workers resent that the sectors will get in the close future similar in terms of economic benefits, due to the rapid development of supplier industries and outsourcing mechanisms. As for the **size of the**

firms, they vary from 30 to 7000 employees and the sample is more or less evenly distributed among them, differentiated by neighborhood only in the 30-300 category; observed with 37 percent in Emek against the 23 percent in Akpınar. A brief discussion on the benefits of agglomeration of different sizes of firms for capital can be found in section IV.IV.I.

Contractual statuses of most of the workers are permanent. Even though permanent status is very high in both communities, those few (9 percent) working on temporary basis (seasonal or subcontracting worker) are mostly Kurdish workers living in Emek (1/4 between the ages 20-24 at the time of the study). In our sample, various shift systems and overtime work regimes are employed depending upon the rhythm and the level of production. New Labor Code brings new articles changing considerably the social organization of labor power in production in favor of capital as a result of the capitalist competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization. Therefore, its effects on promotion of less secure, individualized contracts, on more exploitative working conditions and diminishing of the capacity for unionization will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (section IV.I.) as one of the disturbing forces acting on the form of structured coherence achieved in Bursa.

Table 5. Firm size * labor union membership / Amount of net wage * labor union membership

size	union membership		Total	wage	union membership		Total
	yes	no			yes	no	
30-100	-	15	15	320-600	26	48	74
		100,0%	100,0%		35,1%	64,9%	100,0%
101-300	10	19	29	601-900	20	2	22
	34,5%	65,5%	100,0%		90,9%	9,1%	100,0%
301-500	3	4	7	901-1.200	18	5	23
	42,9%	57,1%	100,0%		78,3%	21,7%	100,0%
501-1000	-	9	9	1.201-1.500	8	-	8
		100,0%	100,0%		100,0%		100,0%
1001-1500	21	3	24	Total	72	55	127
	87,5%	12,5%	100,0%		56,7%	43,3%	100,0%
2501-3000	12	2	14	sector textile	24	30	54
	85,7%	14,3%	100,0%		44,4%	55,6%	100,0%
3001-4000	26	3	29	automotive	49	17	66
	89,7%	10,3%	100,0%		74,2%	25,7%	100,0%
6001-7000	1	-	1	other	-	8	8
	100,0%		100,0%			100,0	100,0%
Total	73	55	128	Total	73	55	128
	57,0%	43,0%	100,0%		57,0%	42,9%	100,0%

All workers interviewed are adhered to the state insurance scheme (SSK), and 65 percent are unionized (A: 76, E: 51 percent). Considered that trade unions are important social and physical infrastructures for laborers in the local labor and housing markets, or, within the

work and the living place connection, they deserve a deeper examination in section IV.IV.II. along with other institutional and organizational structures that support working-class life. Not to repeat what it is to be said there, we will here concentrate rather on the relation of union membership with firm size, wages and sectors. Unionization rate is considerably lower in textiles than in automotive sector even though the firm sizes are more or less evenly distributed among the sectors. **Unionization level** increases as the firm size and wage level increases; this reflects the general pattern in Bursa. Wage level of course has various other indicators as well, like age, length of employment, sector, firm size, etc. but still its correlation with unionization is significant. In smaller factories recruiting lower than 500 employees, on the other hand, unionization is an ongoing struggle achieved to the extent that workers in the factory fight for it, contrary to the procedural type of unionization observed in bigger factories.

Table 6. Status at work * neighborhood * sector

	neighborhood		Total	sector			Total
	Akpınar	Emek		textile	automotive	other	
unskilled worker	7	42	49	22	24	3	49
	23,3%	42,9%	38,3%	40,7%	36,4%	37,5%	38,3%
skilled worker	15	36	51	18	30	3	51
	50,0%	36,7%	39,8%	33,3%	45,5%	37,5%	39,8%
master - foreman	5	12	17	6	9	2	17
	16,7%	12,2%	13,3%	11,1%	13,6%	25,0%	13,3%
technician - officer	3	8	11	8	3	-	11
	10,0%	8,1%	9,0%	14,9%	4,5%		8,6%
Total	30	98	128	54	66	8	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 7. Firm size * location

Firm size	Location							Total
	BOIE	NOIE	K. Ba hkh	DOIE	Ge çit	Me ri nos	Gör rük le	
30-100	7	3	1	-	3	-	1	15
	6,7	50,0	100,		33,3		50,0	11,7
101-300	23	3	-	1	2	-	-	29
	21,9	50,0		33,3	22,1			22,7
301-1000	10	-	-	1	4	-	1	16
	9,5			33,3	44,5		50,0	12,5
1001-1500	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
	22,9							18,8
2501-3000	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
	13,3							10,9
3001-4000	27	-	-	-	-	2	-	29
	25,7					100,		22,7
6001-7000	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
				33,3				0,8
Total	105	6	1	3	9	2	2	128
	100,	100,	100,	100,	100,	100,	100,	100,

There are very few white-collar workers (technician-bureau worker) among our sample group (9 percent). And among the blue-collar workers, we find few foremen or master

workmen (usta) (13 percent). Those in charge of other workers are 22 percent in total; the rest are evenly distributed among the **skilled and unskilled jobs**, unskilled jobs mostly found in Emek (E: 43, A: 23 percent). Most workers hesitate to call themselves whether skilled or not, rather the old recruits name themselves skilled with reference to their longer terms of experience. The general opinion that textile accommodates an unskilled labor pool is not proven here, since distribution of the unskilled laborers among the sectors do not vary a lot. Introduction of advanced technology seems not to have brought a parallel increase in demand for advanced skills, either. This finding is also supported by Eraydın’s research on ‘Relations of Production and Division of Labor in the Textile Sector in Bursa’, which specifies that technological changes are not reflected upon the skills required in the sector (Eraydın, 1991, 163). On the contrary, the fordist-taylorist labor process, which still perpetuates in Bursa, chiefly requires unskilled and semi-skilled workers for direct production tasks and a small number of skilled workers for indirect tasks, such as building and repairing of the machinery (Parlak, 1996, 131). Due to the extreme fragmentation of work, an unskilled worker would be able to perform most of the tasks. One can become a fully-fledged operator within a couple of hours of training. Nearly all workers in our sample are directly involved in different stages of production, except for the 16 percent who work in supplementary factory-shops (shipment, packaging, quality control, security, bureau, construction repair). Diversity of the tasks done can be observed in the table below:

Table 8. Detail of the work

	Frequ- ency	Percent
upholstery / sewing operator	4	3,1
sewing-machine operator	4	3,1
Weaver / “bükümcü-çözücü- devere-tekstüre”	18	14,1
production / production line	27	21,1
montage line	10	7,8
machine maintenance-setting	13	10,2
boiler operator	3	2,3
press-CNC operator	12	9,4
forklift operator	6	4,7
paint shop	6	4,7
welder	5	3,9
quality controller	5	3,9
shipment / stacking/ packaging	8	6,3
security / social service / bureau	3	2,3
machine-bureau cleaning	2	1,6
construction maintenance	2	1,6
Total	128	100,0

Erder points out that during the course of the 70’s, the average daily wage paid in Bursa was 16 percent less than the average in Turkey due to the existence of abundant labor supply (Erder, 1976). In 1978, while the share of **wages** in the added-value generated in

manufacture industry was 38 percent in Turkey, it remained at 33 percent in Bursa, which means that the profitability rate of Bursa firms in the manufacture sector was higher than that of Turkey in general (Yurt Ansiklopedisi, 1982). Despite the higher wage levels in production for domestic markets, Bursa had always been one of the cities paying the lowest wages compared to other urban regions, and export-oriented policies of the 80's exacerbated this situation (Akkaya, 1998).

At the time of the study, the statutory minimum wage was approximately 320 YTL (271 \$). $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers in the sample earn 2 to 3 times of that minimum wage, $\frac{1}{4}$ receiving 4 times of it. The difference between the two communities with respect to the amount of wages is striking indeed. While 70 percent of Emek workers get 320-600 YTL (271-508 \$), the situation is just the reverse in Akpınar where 70 percent get 900-1500 YTL (763-1.271 \$). It appears that neither education, nor skill affects the amount of wage, but a strong correlation exists between ages, sector and size of the factory. Automotive workers, as recognized by all respondents, receive significantly higher wages compared to those in textile. This can also be observed in the lowest income category divided among the sectors as follows: 73 percent in textile, 40 percent in automotive. Again in smaller factories (up to 1000 employee) 9/10 belong to the lowest income group. However, some automotive workers point out that the seemingly higher level of wages in the sector is deceiving since if they did not have permanent Sunday overtimes, their wages would equalize with that of the textile workers. In almost all factories in BOIE, including the biggest ones in automotive, workers start with the minimum statutory wage, which increases partly with the bonuses and fringe benefits. Workers in big automotive factories complain that wages and working conditions in the sector are deteriorating day by day, expected to worsen particularly in the near future due to the enactment of the new Labor Code. This situation is observed in most factories in the BOIE. A common method employed by the patrons to keep wage bills at a certain level is to renew contracts each year. The figures seen in the table below are bonus-added values. More than half of the workers receive their **bonuses** distributed in their wage bills, rather than once in a three or four months period; this is done on purpose by the employers to let them diminish gradually against the inflation, or render them vulnerable against the instable social-benefits regime.

Table 9. Amount of net wage (bonus added) * neighborhood * sector

	neighborhood		Total	sector			Total
	Akpınar	Emek		textile	automotive	other	
320-600	7	67	74	39	27	8	74
	24,1%	68,4%	58,3%	73,6%	40,9%	100,0%	58,3%
601-900	2	20	22	10	12	-	22
	6,9%	20,4%	17,3%	18,9%	18,2%	-	17,3%
901-1.200	15	8	23	4	19	-	23
	51,7%	8,2%	18,1%	7,5%	28,8%	-	18,1%
1.201-1.500	5	3	8	-	8	-	8
	17,2%	3,1%	6,3%	-	12,1%	-	6,3%
	29	98	127	53	66	8	127
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 10. Amount of net wage (bonus added) * firm size

	firm size								Total
	30-100	101-300	301-500	501-1000	1001-1500	2501-3000	3001-4000	6001-7000	
320-600	15	25	6	7	12	5	4	-	74
	100,%	86,2%	85,7%	77,8%	50,0%	35,7%	14,3%	-	58,3%
601-900	-	2	-	2	7	5	6	-	22
	-	6,9%	-	22,2%	29,2%	35,7%	21,4%	-	17,3%
901-1.200	-	2	1	-	2	3	14	1	23
	-	6,9%	14,3%	-	8,3%	21,4%	50,0%	100,%	18,1%
1.201-1.500	-	-	-	-	3	1	4	-	8
	-	-	-	-	12,5%	7,1%	14,3%	-	6,3%
	15	29	7	9	24	14	28	1	127
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Developing practices in control and regulation of the surplus labor force is vital for capital, and dismissals serve as useful tools in this respect. It is seen that 40 percent of Emek compared to the 17 percent in Akpınar have an experience of being unemployed, while Kurdish workers being more vulnerable against it (60 percent). Reasons like dismissal, economic crisis, and factory closure are observed relatively low in number; only 15 workers out of 128 have such experiences. In general, however, **unemployment** is observed just after or before the military service. Nearly half of the unemployment situations are observed between the years 2000-2004 and last for 6-12 months. Here we see the effects of 2001 economic crisis on the local labor market. 42 percent of the workers report that they have witnessed collective dismissals due to crisis conditions in 94, 98-99, 2001-02, and 2003-4 respectively. The most dramatic crisis in terms of its impact upon the labor market is considered as the one in 94; almost 1000 people were dismissed from OYAK-Renault. In addition to 94, 98-99 and 2000-01 are also remembered as crisis years of large number of dismissals. Automotive workers are a bit more aware against these issues. Laborers generally depend on family help during the unemployment periods, and a few do temporary works. Severance payment or unemployment compensation is mentioned only by 4 workers.

For most workers **military service** was considered as an obligatory break, a natural end for the first factory work. When looked from the capitalist's point of view, however, we face with a different picture. The hidden role of military service contributes to the regulation of the labor market in favor of the capitalist interests. Together with the temporary employment contract, initially imposed by the military government, this also enables management of the size of the workforce, reduction on the wage bills, and also serves as an extended selection and probation mechanism for disciplining and controlling the workers (Atkinson, 1985, quote by Parlak, 1996). Those young workers are easily dismissed since they are generally single chaps with no family responsibilities. This is also appreciated by the senior workers, who are shielded from dismissal by those non-conscripted juniors in times of stagnation (Parlak, 1996). And, moreover, they are forced to do whatever they are asked, such as intensified work, by the foreman due to their contractual weaknesses.

Supplementary work besides factory work is seldomly observed among the sample group. Only 15 percent do irregular works from time to time (painting and parquetry in general) except for a few respondents working on everyday basis. It is not that they feel economically well-off, but probably because of the two other regulation strategies of capital, namely, the shift and overtime work systems (section IV.I.) that exhaust both the time and physical energy of the workers for any extra job.

More than half of the workers started working below the age 15, for Kurdish workers this age even drops down to 5-10. Only 19 percent of the workers started his/her work-life in a factory (29> employees). In Emek, direct factory work is a little higher than in Akpınar (A: 16, E: 19 percent). **Entrance into the local labor market** directly through factory work is essentially associated not with age but with education. High school graduates have more chances in this respect. Under existence of a massive reserve army seeking for employment in regular industrial work, education, particularly the vocational one as a scarce resource for laborers, is increasingly utilized by employers as a selecting tool against a relatively more plenty resource, the 'work experience'. Workers generally involve in several different temporal works, mostly informal in character, before they get their first factory work. Agricultural activities, construction works or low-waged service sector jobs like waiter, salesmen and apprenticeship in crafts are the most commonly observed pre-factory works. Construction works rather prevail among the long-distance migrant workers. While no one Local worker (workers from towns of Bursa also included) has reported to have worked in construction sector, it is rather small-manufacturing workshops that Akpınar workers

mention in their work stories (A: 40, E:23 percent). Military service and finding a better job, usually a regular factory work with state insurance, constitute the main reasons for quitting the first work. The labor market in Bursa seems to provide workers simultaneously with better work opportunities and dismissal risks, considered that 29 workers show a reason like finding better work; 10 workers the military service; and 33 workers dismissal-economic crisis-factory/unit closure or end of contract, to quitting their last jobs.

If one **general characteristic of the local labor market** is becoming familiar with industrial work through apprenticeship, workshop and casual work, the other is that, once entered into the industrial labor market, the boundary of **mobility chances** are drawn by industrial works to a large extent. A person might enter into the market at most at the age of 25 and most of the time tries to stay in the market since s/he cannot take the risk of a long absence from the market. Finding job becomes harder at higher ages, especially when one lacks the required experience which is associated by the length of industrial work. The average number of work changed before the first factory work is 1,6 in Emek and 1,9 in Akpınar.

But this number after the first factory work rises to 2.5 in Emek, and drops down to 1.9 in Akpınar and to 1.5 among the Local workers. A correlation exists among age and number of jobs after the first factory work. Occupational mobility is seen until the age 35, after 35 we observe rather stability. Mobility is also affected by education. Vocational high school graduates are more mobile compared to primary school graduates, since they are more preferred by the employers.

It is the same for length of stay in the same factory job. The difference between the **total lengths of industrial experience** is dramatically high between the two communities. For 53 percent of Emek workers, it has been 1-to-9 years in a factory, whereas it is more than 9 years for 87 percent of the Akpınar workers. After the Local comes, Other and Blacksea groups respectively, Kurdish workers having the shortest factory work histories. Only 15 percent of Emek have been working in the same factory for the last 15-19 years as against the 50 percent in Akpınar. This might be associated with the higher average of age in Akpınar; however, we will rather use this finding as evidence for the concentration of higher job security workers in Akpınar, compared with the younger work force in Emek which is more stratified in itself in this respect. But still we must emphasize that both communities display relatively long duration of stays, which demonstrates a consolidation

pattern of blue-collar wage labor. A relatively large number of workers in both neighborhoods are still perpetuating their first factory works (E: 35, A: 40 percent), and contrary to the changing tendency, job stability is still essentially associated not with education but with experience.

IV.III. LOCAL HOUSING MARKET

IV.III.I. A Brief Outline of the Urbanization Process in Turkey

During the 1950-80 period, within the framework of the import substitution regime, state policies to minimize intervention on built environment was exacerbated. This limited intervention resulted in handing over of the initiative behind the urbanization process to the local communities (Şengül, 2001, 77). Şengül depicts this change as transition from state and middle-class centered urbanization phase to a local-community centered one. Communities solved their housing problems through squatter building on government land, and unemployment problems within the vicissitudes of the informal economy. Hence, extension of individual homeownership which put labor on the side of the principle for private property was simultaneously achieved, without any active intervention of the state. And after the 80's, as the logic of capital came to be more determinant on the urban space, even the strategies supporting urban services for urban poor were abandoned. "No provision of service under the cost-price" became a common local government policy. While infrastructural improvement of the cities became one of the major tasks of the local governments, this pricing policy transferred investment costs to the users of the urban services, turning, in a way, laborers into financiers of those infrastructural investments (Şengül, 2003, 201). Under the export-oriented accumulation strategy in Turkey, particularly after the 90's, already scant resources necessary for the reproduction of labor, services like health, education, and housing are almost totally curbed. Provision of all kinds of social services is given up (Güler 1992, quote by Şengül, 2001, 88). In these years, transformation of squatter dwellers into entrepreneurs and their orientation towards taking share from the urban rent was not only promoted, but also directed by the state (Özdemir, 1999, quote by Şengül, 2001, 90). And as a consequence, particularly the squatters in neighborhoods closer to city center turned into apartment blocks in very short periods. Another mechanism for encouraging homeownership was through membership to housing-cooperatives. Yet, the qualitative and quantitative development in the housing-cooperative sector of the 80's was not a reflection of the belief of the official quarters in the social

utilities and superiority of this method of housing production, but rather of seeing the low and middle-income groups as fertile investment fields for economic development (Alkan, 1998, 212).

By means of increased **homeownership**, not only possessive individualism was promoted, but also costs of living were reduced which was to make downward pressure on wages. As for enforcing 'rational and managed consumption', in order to expand the domestic good markets, wages were kept higher from time to time as a government policy in both accumulation regimes before and after the 80's. This aimed at a certain balance between market purchases and household work since consumer durables were important growth sectors in the economy. Washing machine, refrigerator, television, etc. came to be seen almost in every working-class household. It can be summarized in Harvey's words that while "labor strives to raise its living standards by reducing the cost of living and increasing the use-values it can command, capital for reduction in the value of labor power and rational mode of consumption understood from the standpoint of accumulation" (Harvey, 1985a, 57).

Under these circumstances, when we analyze patterns of **residential differentiation** in Turkey, we observe the polarization on class basis getting deeper among the working-class and the upper and middle classes who isolate themselves through creating niches tailored to their life styles in inner or outer city neighborhoods. Şengül argues that as they prefer to live particularly in the outer city ghettos for the rich, a **convergence** in terms of economic conditions occurs among those left in the inner cities, namely, among the working-class of the squatters and the traditional middle-class of the inner city apartments. The duality between squatters and apartment dwellers is disappearing, since the working-class and the traditional middle-class are increasingly mixed in such neighborhoods due to impoverishment and proletarianization of the latter (Şengül, 2005, 128). Here, Şengül rather emphasizes the downward movement of the middle classes, but upward movement of certain segments of the working-class should also be taken into account to understand this convergence, considering the fact that squatters have long now turned into 2-3 floor low-quality apartments even in those outer skirt neighborhoods. Another dimension of this convergence is related to the changes taking place with respect to the actors who are shareholders in the urban rent. The growing concern of the big construction capital with the urban rent, compared to the wider base of the pre-90's, has narrowed down the social base sharing this rent at the expense of the small-bourgeoisie (Tekeli, 1988, 130, quote by

Doğan). And even in those circumstances when planned urban development provided certain opportunities to get a share in the urban rent, contractors and mediators came out to be the real winners more than the squatters (Özdemir, 99, quote by Şengül, 2001, 91). And lastly, despite the existence of development plans, urban transformation did not take place in those geographically disadvantaged urban locations. Bursa is a good example to those cities where working-class neighborhoods have mostly developed according to use-value oriented ambitions, due to non-presence of rentier or construction capital pressure felt in those geographical locations with respect to the city center. We might conclude that despite the dynamic flows of **change** in the capitalist cities, production of **stability** is also remarkable due to the restricted mobility chances.

The tension between fixity and mobility seems to get tighter. Simultaneously, there goes on a **fragmentation** process as well. Those sections whose material conditions of reproduction, such as income level, market capacities, consumption habits and living environments converge, might be fragmented in the states of consciousness, in political and ideological terms (secular, religious, ethnic, class consciousness, etc.) or division of labor and specialization of function (blue-white collar, sector, security and precariousness of employment, terms and conditions of work, etc.) and authority relations. Şengül asserts that after the 80's heterogenization among the losing class was exacerbated on both economic and cultural levels. Introvert local communities in little to no communication with other communities, even with those closer ones, became a basic characteristic of the urban tissue (Erder, 1996, quote by Şengül, 2001, 93). This fragmentation, however, is rather reproduced on the political level through diversification and dispersal of political projects founded not on redistribution-based policies, but on identity-based ones (Şengül, 2001, 93). Absence of projects to bring these different groups together around a common project enhances the divisive potentials of these fragmentations. The integrative potential, on the other hand, lies in recognition of the fact that political attitudes are not only determined by ethnic and religious preferences but, more than that, by the growing concern about the economy policies related to the distribution of income in society.

The changes in objective material conditions points to class polarization and **heightened class conflict** in all over the world. In Turkey, we also witness rising unemployment, falling real wages, industrial restructuring, escalating competition, erosion of workers' rights, privatization and deregulation. Increasing poverty and inequality is felt particularly during the recession years such as 1994, 2001. All such indicators of chronic economic crisis

provide a convenient background of discontent that might evolve into political crisis through organization-mediation of a powerful class-based leadership movement (Şengül, 2001, 93). In addition to these economic developments, we should again underline that after the 80's, state in Turkey has totally sacrificed its role in the social reproduction of society, for the sake of preserving the economic interests of capital (Öngen, 2003, 185). This preference in favor of capital is felt both at work relations (production) and living-place relations (reproduction). For the former, the harmonious total effect of the new accumulation and state strategies brings reduction on wages and job security, increase in working hours, intensification of work, disintegration of organized labor force (flexible working) etc. And in the reproduction sphere through the reduction on public services local communities are increasingly left to their own fates with regards to solving their daily problems. Residential communities of the working-class are destroyed and transformed into spaces of capital, entertainment, shopping, luxury housing zones, etc., and some are left to deterioration.

While leaving production of locality completely to the local communities helps diffuse the target of discontent in the residential areas, at the same time, however, integration of the working-class and new urban poor into the system becomes ever harder than before due to the reduced capacity of the state to develop buffering mechanisms. Therefore, the illusion of freedom of choice in the living place can easily be shattered through securing direct confrontation with capital, as it is in the workplace. Such demands from the capital through the agency of the state, especially in the neo-liberal era when state shrinks through privatization, reduction on social rights, etc, would make the conflict between capital and labor more transparent, and show that capital is incapable of fulfilling such promises.

IV.III.II. Residential Differentiation by Function and Class in Bursa

Particularly after the 90's different fractions of capital play two important roles in the cities. One, in a relatively passive position as the receiver of urban services, such as those state investments in service of the industrial capital, and second, as active producers of the built environment, again promoted most of the time by the state incentives in service of the rentier-financial capital. Though this new accumulation strategy has resulted in a general abandonment of industrial investments in Turkey, Bursa, as a traditional industrial city, witnesses urban development in both dimensions. Reproduction of capital takes place in the **first circuit** related with production through provision of infrastructure, communication, transport, planning facilities, etc., and in the **second circuit** related with consumption,

through direct investment in urban space, like housing, shopping malls, business centers, hotels, etc. (Harvey, 1985b, 3-6).

In Bursa, economic and spatial development of the industrial sector always had a strong relation with and impact upon the **mapping/spatial patterning of the residential areas**, and particularly those of the working-class. In this respect, working-class residential development in Bursa resembles that of Istanbul until the 70's. In this first and the biggest industrial city of Turkey, industry came to be the leading force behind the patterning of the working-class settlements on the urban landscape (Şenyapılı and Acar, 1980, 7). By the establishment of the BOIE, for the first time in Bursa history, spatial differentiation of the big-scale manufacture from the small-scale was realized, which also corresponded to gradual **differentiation of the residential areas from the industrial areas** (Aktar, 1997, 141). After the 80's, by the rapid industrialization and population growth due to migration from the rural, squatter neighborhoods gradually grow deeper into the valley towards where the OIEs are located. But still the compact inner zones northern to İzmir-Ankara road accommodate most of the second-generation workers. Besides these neighborhoods, in the large informal industrial zones of the inner city, small and middle scale firms (car repair, iron and metal works, and textile) still remain tightly knit into the residential areas, most of them placed in first floors of the 2-3 floored squatter dwellings (Nichols, Suğur, 2005, 35). Some of the districts where this kind of strong workplace-living place relation still perpetuates are: Tütüncüoğlu Farm, lower parts of Cezaevi, Selamet, Başaran, Zafer, Garaj and its surrounding districts (Aktar, 1997). Eraydın asserts that this intertwining of the work and the living place supports home-based production to a large extent, particularly in the textile sector where women workers who work at home due to traditional reasons provide a massive cheap labor force (Eraydın, 1991, 163). In this respect it should be noted that in our sample neighborhoods, where the living place is completely separated from the industrial workplaces, we did not come across, except for a few cases, with home-based production during the research.

In Bursa, there is an accelerated urban transformation process going on. Big shopping malls built since the late 90's, lined along the main Roads (Carrefour and Metro on İzmir Road; AS Merkez and Özdilek on İstanbul Road; Zafer Plaza in the city center; Korukent on Mudanya Road) are increasing rapidly in number. Internationalization of industrial capital brings clustering of the modernized industry in outer industrial zones. The small workshops in the city center which are closer to upper-class neighborhoods are to be 'cleansed' and the

surrounding lower and middle class residential areas are to be rehabilitated. **Urban renewal projects** of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality (BMM) targeting the inner zones around İzmir-Ankara road, including Merinos, Santral Garaj, Kültürpark and Kükürtlü (lower parts of Çekirge) are good examples to this transformation. The tanneries and woodwork ateliers in western Kükürtlü residing in the urban renewal project area shall be moved to an outer-city zone, and thus, Kükürtlü is planned to be integrated into the region to the north-west of Kültürpark which is announced as a ‘tourism center’. ‘Profitability analyses’ envisage that local trade and housing units be established there. Santral Garaj, hosting the places of work and living of the working-class, also goes under such transformation. In addition to these, Merinos Factory located to the north-east of Kültürpark, one of the oldest republican industrial buildings of the 50’s, and which was allocated to BMM in 2003 through privatization, is being transformed into a city museum (BMM, 2005). Its surrounding area is known to be one of the oldest working-class districts in Bursa, and disruptive effects of these projects on the social and physical infrastructures of the localities remain to be seen.

Gentrification project of ‘Kültürpark’, the park which up until now rather served to lower and lower-middle segments of society, and the parallel development of ‘Botanik Park’ established to the north of the working-class neighborhoods in the valley might also be interpreted as other inclinations toward the geographical segregation of different social groups on urban space. The development history of Botanik Park, founded by BMM during the ANAP term two before the last, considered unnecessary during the DSP term one before the last, and revitalized recently during the AKP term, is also an interesting issue to be further investigated within the context of local state strategies and their relation to local social base.

Having briefly discussed the **functional separation** pattern in the city, now we will try to draw the outline regarding the general **class-based geographical segregation** pattern in Bursa. With reference to what we have discussed in section II.III.I, we will mainly focus upon the effects of the “primary force arising out of the power relation between capital and labor” which mainly denotes the inter-class residential differentiation on space, while we think that secondary forces are rather related with intra-class differentiation patterns. Inter-class residential differentiation, driven by the production of space by the exchange-value oriented capitalist communities, seems to polarize the urban landscape in Bursa into mutually excluding upper and lower class residential areas. Intra-class differentiation, on the other hand, due to the more use-value oriented production of space by laborers and having

to adapt their preferences within the capitalistically defined range of choices, is not that significant. To the contrary, what is observed is rather a kind of homogenization, **convergence** among different segments of the working-class. In other words, the capacity to purchase residential environments has not become totally independent of the functioning of the labor markets in Bursa, so there cannot be observed a high stratification in hierarchy of neighborhoods providing different styles of life. As a result, the sharp divide is rather felt between the upper and lower class neighborhoods, not within them. Waged workers, whether peripheral or center; casual, precarious or relatively more secure, permanent; industrial, service or construction workers; lower-rank civil servants, white-collar, craftsmen-artisan, unemployed, small-scale retailers; those directly exploited or indirectly through the fluctuations in the capitalist markets, all differentiate within similar residential areas where they find opportunities to reproduce themselves at lower costs.

According to the brief outline of Tekeli regarding the socio-spatial patterning of **residential development in Bursa**, both organized and unorganized workers have generally settled in the northern parts of Mudanya-Ankara road after the 60's. **Organized sections** of the working-class solved their housing problems rather through the parcel-based housing-cooperatives concentrated in districts to the north of Merinos Factory, known as 'Merinos Labor Blocks' (Tekeli, 1999, 27). Besides these blocks, only several other low-cost housing estates exist in Bursa; one in the Kaplıkaya region expropriated by municipality in 1975 as a squatter prevention zone and announced as social-housing area for the low-incomed in 1981. Kaplıkaya (Mesken) cooperatives are 5-10 floored buildings (BMM, 1999). A second one is Göçmen Konutları in Görükle district built by TOKİ for the 1989 Balkan immigrants. A third one is that in Akpınar; being one of our sample neighborhoods it will be explored in detail in the next sections. The **unorganized** generally rural **migrants**, however, constituting a higher proportion of the working-class, settled in the squatter areas expanding over the lands of Bursa valley, most of them with shared-title deeds. Establishment of TOFAŞ in 1971 on the İstanbul road and the consequent development of Demirtaş OIE in 1975 accelerated the residential growth deeper into the valley. While in the eastern parts of the city, those squatter neighborhoods expanded on both sides of the Ankara Road, in the western parts, they remained to the north. And on the hillsides to the south, they formed a belt over the apartment zones of the lower parts (Tekeli, 1999, 27). As BOIE on Mudanya road grew bigger utilizing higher proportion of its capacity, working-class neighborhoods also have extended in time towards the closer zones to OIE. The first neighborhood established on Mudanya Road was Hürriyet in 50's for the immigrants from Bulgaria who


were mostly recruited in the industrial sector in Bursa. Hürriyet was followed by the development of İstiklal, Adalet and Milliyet neighborhoods towards the North West.

As for the story of the **upper and upper-middle class** neighborhoods, those more ‘prestigious’ residential areas of the city began to develop on the west around Altıparmak and Çekirge after the 30’s, gradually transforming into high density neighborhoods of luxurious apartment blocks after the 60’s. In the meantime in the east, hillsides to the south of the central business district (around Maksem) were transforming, through the ‘yap-sat’ system, into apartment blocks for lower-middle and middle classes. After the establishment of Uludağ University on the 18th km of İzmir road in the early 80’s, middle and upper-middle classes began to spread out along this axis; the location of the private housing cooperatives in Fethiye and İhsaniye by the 1984 Plan also contributed to acceleration of this process. And consequently, after 85, the villa-type luxurious gated communities developed in Bademli on Mudanya Road, for the upper-classes.


IV.III.II.I. Mapping the Residential Communities around BOIE

To examine the socio-spatial structure in the **14 km circle around BOIE-NOIE** including the ‘Hamitler-Geçit Specialized Small-Scale Industrial Estate’ in the north, and Mudanya-İzmir turn in the south, would serve to better understand how OIE as a crucial social and physical infrastructure in the urban landscape maps its surrounding in socio-economic terms and shapes the urban macroform since the 70’s. Both BOIE-NOIE and Hamitler-Geçit SSIE (generally in sub-contracting relation with the firms in BOIE) attract highly divergent socio-economic groups to their vicinity. Industrial estates generally function as attracting loci for the urban population in the development process of the urban regions, but this was just the reverse for the BOIE case. The city developed and concentrated rather to the east and to the urban center towards the small production areas around the city center. Bursa kept to a large extent its one-centered, non-fragmented, compact urban macroform; the linear development along İzmir and Mudanya roads took place mostly after the 90’s. High level of rents around the industrial estate, its being outside the city though linked with effective service transportation of the firms, and its slow and gradual development in time, prevented both the SSIEs’ and the working-class communities’ location in its vicinity. It was not until late 90’s that struggle between different classes over the appropriation of land around BOIE has started.

Figure 14. Residential Development Diagrams



BURSA KENT GELİŞİMİ 1960-1994



As can be followed from the residential development diagrams above, before the 60's there were only several old valley-villages in the area (BMM, 1999). The chronological appearance of neighborhoods in the region is as follows: Hürriyet, İstiklal, Adalet (1960-76); Karaman, İhsaniye (few settlements first), Fethiye, Yeni Karaman, Bağlarbaşı, Hamitler, Emek (1976-82); 1050 Konutlar (core of Akpınar), Yunuseli, Beşevler (few settlements first) (1982-90); Akpınar, Hamitler, İhsaniye, Beşevler, Ataevler (1990-94); Geçit, Balat, Minareliçavus, Bademli (1994-2004). Among those neighborhoods listed above, those to the north of Mudanya Road, Hürriyet, İstiklal, Adalet, Yeni Karaman, Bağlarbaşı, Hamitler, Emek and Geçit (arranged by distance from the center) are **working-class neighborhoods**. These are the frequently cited settlements as a response to the survey question where workers of BOIE come from. The neighborhoods closer to the city center


host mostly the more skilled second generation Balkan immigrant workers. Others are inhabited by a mixture of skilled and unskilled, more first than second generation laborers, composed of migrants from other cities or rural areas of Bursa, or the old residents of those prior villages of the valley.

Those neighborhoods located to the south of Mudanya Road (Karaman, İhsaniye, Fethiye, Ataevler, Cumhuriyet, Minareliçavuş, Balat) and Akpınar located to the north, however, are quiet **mixed** in terms of inter-class differentiation. In Akpınar, while there are relatively better conditioned small apartment or villa estates for middle and upper-middle classes, residents of the two biggest low-cost housing estates, namely 1050 Konutlar and Harikalar (1700 units) are inhabited by the working class of the lower-middle income group. Housing-estate type residential development envisaged by the 1984 Plan in Fethiye, İhsaniye and Beşevler, resulted in development of illegal-squatter settlements as well, mostly towards the outer skirts of those neighborhoods. Those parts of Karaman and Fethiye closer to the Mudanya road, and Minareliçavuş and Balat to the west of BOIE are mostly the working-class residential areas. While Ataevler and Cumhuriyet neighborhood cooperatives, initiated either by the municipality or some occupational chambers, address the middle-classes, Fethiye-İhsaniye private cooperatives are inhabited by more than not the middle and upper-middle classes. These observations are further reinforced by most respondents stating that Ataevler and Beşevler (south of İzmir Road) were rather preferred by the technical staff in their factories (engineers, etc.), while the administrative staff like the managers and the small-to-medium-scale employers lived in İhsaniye especially around the FSM Boulevard. And one worker reported that his workmates, who applied for the cooperative initiated by Teksif (trade union in Textile) in Ataevler, resigned from membership since they could not afford the increasing dues. Besides this one, a several other 100-200 unit housing-cooperatives carrying the name of a labor union or a factory can be found in the area, one being the Met-İş Cooperative (of the metal workers mostly working in Renault) in Akpınar (see section III.III.III).

There goes on a very **dynamic socio-economic and spatial restructuring** and struggle over acquisition, control and command over space around the organized industry in the region. The new upper-classes try to invade in and dislocate workers from their places. The highly luxurious gated communities, villa-type high security residential estates of Bademli where the big employers live, try to creep in closer to BOIE from the north-west through Balat district. These planned and highest-luxury villa neighborhoods are growing rapidly

and have approached almost 3 Km to BOIE from the west. Simultaneously, on the other hand, big construction capital for the first time jumps to the north of Mudanya Road and initiates a 200 Million \$ gated community project with 1.300 housing units and Bursa's biggest (30.000m2) shopping-mall and entertainment center on the land previously owned by BOTAŞ along the border between Emek and Akpınar. The brief story of this fierce attack of capital is left to the conclusion of our research.

Figure 15. Satellite view of the Izmir-Mudanya triangle (BOIE triangle)



Source: Google-View (2007)

IV.III.III. Local Housing Market Dynamics viewed from Emek and Akpınar

In the pursuit of improving its housing policies, TOKI organized a research in 1998 carried out by Turkish Social Sciences Association, in order to assess the impacts of the 'Rehabilitation Plans' on the residential areas within the five selected urban regions where those plans have been implemented (TSSA, 1998). Before going on to our sample neighborhoods, a brief summary of the results of this research might give us a general image about the characteristics of the working-class housing market in Bursa with respect to

physical appearance, land and home acquisition practices. The research also shows the ineffectiveness of this kind of planning in working-class neighborhoods with high migration rates, which are located particularly to the north of the Mudanya-Ankara road in Bursa.

In **TOKI research's** sample, 65 percent were two-floored buildings as against the one-floored 27 percent. Nearly all had toilets, electric and water-meters indoors and were connected to the sewage system. The average building age was 21; of those, 84 percent were self-constructed, 8 percent purchased and 7 percent built by 'usta's (workmen). 'Earnings in the city' were generally utilized as the basic financial resource for construction. Nearly all house owners had documents as evidence of ownership, 90 percent of which were separate title deeds. Of the lots, 130 m² in average, ¼ were purchased after the 80's and ½ within the 1970-79 period. Nobody reported occupation of land. At the time of purchase, ½ of the lands were empty, 1/3 planted and 12 percent constructed. Empty lots had separate title-deeds with 60 percent and shared-deeds with 30 percent, planted lots are also assumed to have shared-deeds.

The research accentuates two main findings as common characteristics of these neighborhoods. **Firstly**, despite the fact that these neighborhoods were left in inner city areas by time, and where land-rent has increased accordingly, they were not preferred by the contractors (müteahhit). In other words, they did not occupy advantageous positions in the urban landscape from the viewpoint of the construction capital. Authors specifically underline that the ratio of lack of confidence in contractors was observed the highest in Bursa with 38 percent among the five sample cities including İstanbul, Urfa, Samsun, and Ankara (TSSA, 1998). Impediments before the renewal of these neighborhoods were classified under three headings in the research; financial insufficiency, contractors' disinterest or the 'non-appealing' proposals made to the residents, and the disagreement with shareholders and neighbors. **Secondly**, it was seen that under very restricted financial conditions, cheapness of land and lowness of rent were the appealing factors behind residence in these neighborhoods. Enforced also by the presence of townsmen, concern for obtaining a shelter in the city was the predominant force behind settling in these lower and lower-middle-class residential areas, rather than the rent-seeking ambition which was observed only by 8 percent. By the rehabilitation plans, on the other hand, they are driven into anxious waiting processes again, due to the ambiguous information disseminated by the formal channels and non-convincing information received from the community members with similar restricted knowledge and urban experience.

Table 11. Number of floors

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
1	-	5	5
		5,1%	3,9%
2	-	16	16
		16,3%	12,5%
3	-	37	37
		37,8%	28,9%
4	28	28	56
	93,3%	28,6%	43,8%
5	2	10	12
	6,7%	10,2%	9,4%
6	-	2	2
		2,0%	1,6%
Total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0

Having given this brief account, we find that **Emek and Akpınar** have both similarities and variations with respect to this wider picture. Nearly all workers interviewed in Akpınar are living in 4-floored apartments; in Emek, the ratio in 4-and-more floored apartments falls down to 40 percent (see table above). We see that our sample neighborhoods are higher in elevation compared to those similar neighborhoods in the valley. This might be interpreted as the effect of BOIE on urban-rent, since we mostly observe higher density apartments in closer streets to the industrial zone, and especially in the district center where the municipality is seated against the OYAK-Renault factory. Only five workers live in 1-floored houses, which are not called ‘squatters’ by the workers any more, but detached-houses. Those are located rather in deeper parts of the district towards the valley. Majority in Emek live in 2+1 roomed flats compared to the 3+1 ones in Akpınar. And 38 percent in Emek have gardens; most of them planted either with vegetables or fruit trees.

Within the boundaries of BMM, 59 percent are found to be **homeowners**, 30 percent **tenants**, and 9 percent fall into the ‘not owner but not paying rent’ category (BMM, 1999). Now let us see the situation in our sample. In the 2000 census results, homeowners account for the 75 percent and tenants for the 20 percent in Akpınar. Yet, as a consequence of the homeownership aspirations of the higher-income working-class members in Akpınar, homeownership rates are observed much higher with 90 percent in our sample. Regarding the higher average of age in Akpınar sample, it might be concluded that first generation homeowners generally can go under financial commitment such as a housing-cooperative’s, only in the later stages of their life cycles. The ownership situation is a bit more complicated in Emek. First of all tenancy rate is much higher. This can also be followed in the 2000 census results with 57 percent homeowners against the 36 percent tenants. Similarly in our

sample group, 32 percent are tenants. As for homeowners, however, we are certain only about the 29 percent's ownership status. Since the remaining 40 percent inhabit houses owned generally by their fathers (only 2 owned by relatives), their future ownership situation remains ambiguous. We should note that most of these respondents are relatively older, married workers with nuclear families, but due to the tradition the property belongs to the father until he dies. Our results also overlap with those of Yıldırım's research on Gebze industrial workers, where nearly 2/3 of the workers were living in their own houses, and just over 1/3 living in rented houses or flats (Yıldırım, 1994). And we should add that, 43 percent in Akpınar and 36 percent in Emek also own landed-property such as land, shop or flat other than his/her home (tenants included). We find that homeowners are the ones with higher opportunities to own a second or third landed-property. Tenants, on the other hand, by 34 percent also have other flats or rather lands to construct on.

In Akpınar, only 1/10 of the workers have arrived at Bursa after the 90's compared to the 4/10 in Emek. The data verifies the fact that Emek as a first step into Bursa is still a rapidly growing settlement receiving an incessant influx of migrants from other cities; whereas Akpınar rather hosts workers with longer urban experience who have previously lived in other neighborhoods of Bursa. There exists a correlation between the years of migration and homeownership status; tenancy rate gets higher as we come closer to 2000's. While most homeowners are those who migrated during the years 1985-1989, the sample period with the highest migration rate, most tenants have migrated during 1995-1999. But still, the fact that it has been more than 10 years in Bursa for more than half of the tenants, and more than 15 years for those father-owners may mark a trend for increasing tenancy ratio in Emek. (see section V.III.II.I for ownership status mobility pattern)

Rents ranging between 250-350 YTL (212-296 \$) in Akpınar against the 50-150 YTL (42-127 \$) in Emek (summer, 2004) can be regarded as an indicator of the socio-economic difference between the two neighborhoods. This difference is further reflected in the sales-value of the housing units which drops from 60-80.000 YTL in Akpınar to 20-30.000 YTL in Emek. Workers largely depend on their earnings as the main financial resource to construct or buy their housing units. While some Blacksea and Kurdish workers mention selling property in their villages, local workers rather sell property in the city. Support of the father and kinship relations play an important role for the Blacksea workers; Kurdish workers rather prefer money borrowing from friends. Only a quiet low rate of workers (6 percent) seems to be familiar with bank loans in this respect.

Table 12. Current ownership situation / How the residence is acquired (among homeowners)

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
tenant	3	26	29	inheritance	2	3	5
	11%	32%	26,3%		7,7%	4,3%	5,2%
home owner; his/her own	24	24	48	purchase	4	6	10
	89%	28%	43,6%		15,4%	8,6%	10,4%
home owner; father owns	-	31	31	self-construction	-	60	60
		38%	28,1%			85,7%	62,5%
relative's house	-	2	2	cooperative membership	20	1	21
		2%	1,8%		76,9%	1,4%	21,9%
Total	27	83	110	Total	26	70	96
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Note: single workers living with their parents excluded

Now against this physical infrastructure of the local housing market, we should add some dimensions regarding the social infrastructure in terms of the general **conceptions** of the workers regarding their neighborhoods and the degree to which **status differentiation** (occupational, ethnic, etc.) occurs in these communities. Conceptions of the community tell us the kind of life standards achieved or demanded, and draws the consumption pattern of local public services and housing.

When workers are asked to identify the **positive distinguishing features** of their neighborhoods, in **Emek**, proximity to the industrial zone is referred in the first place by 37 percent, existence of relatives and townsmen falls behind many other features cited (4 percent), though we should recall that it was cited in the first place by half of the workers in Emek as the reason for coming to the neighborhood. Excluding the 15 percent who believe that no positive feature exists; the green, clean air, cheapness, self-contained locality structure, transportation facilities, progressive development and good communal relations are expressed in relatively smaller and more or less equal percentages. The fact that socio-cultural aspects such as homogeneity of life standards, good relations among residents, etc. are not stated as frequently (14 percent) should be underlined.

While both neighborhoods seem to emphasize physical advantages more than the social ones, there still exists a significant difference between them, in that, workers living in **Akpınar** cite proximity to the industrial zone (only one person) and good relations with the neighbors hardly at all. This might be because, as we have seen above, the relationship between the housing and the labor market in Akpınar has been constructed on a different basis than that of Emek. It is one of the few examples in Bursa as a planned housing-estate, designed specifically for working-class use. Workers generally aim at social and physical improvement in their lives through movement to this neighborhood. Residence in a housing-

cooperative symbolizes the desire to enhance the value of personal property and access to life chances. **Proximity of the OIE**, in this respect, is not a binding factor for them. Most Akpınar workers are Locals who migrated from rural areas of Bursa. They are mostly retired, unionized workers, with higher social and job securities, education levels and higher quality education chances for their children. They were once the inhabitants of older central districts spilled out to rapidly expanding fringe areas of the city. Many long-established community ties were disrupted and new ones created, with distinctive new opportunities and problems. For example, spatially concentrated bonds with the relatives and old neighbors were dissolved through this change. And it seems that newly established relations are not considered as strong as the older ones yet. We also know that, in Akpınar, community relations do not necessarily play active role in establishing job relations with the industrial labor market. As a consequence, we find Akpınar people emphasizing rather the physical attributes of their neighborhood, like clean air, parks, silence, green planned environment, higher quality of transportation and public services (57 percent). The highest rate (27 percent) belongs to ‘being outside and far from the crowd and hub of the city, peacefulness’, which might be interpreted as a longing for nature against the alienation lived within the artificial and unhealthy factory environments, rather than as middle-class conceptions of ‘suburb life’ where who you are depends more on how you spend, and not on how you earn.

53 percent of the workers in Akpınar and 32 percent in Emek can think of no **negative features** in relation to their neighborhoods. Akpınar workers seem more satisfied with the qualities of their living place. 33 percent complain about poor physical qualities like the building quality, landscape planning, closeness of the city garbage and factory wastes, whereas dissatisfaction with social facilities remain at 13 percent. In Emek, however, rather social dissatisfaction seems to be the main problem. There is a general discontent in Emek about the low socio-cultural level in the neighborhood and especially a concern of women workers on the negative influence of this situation on their children (20 percent). 6 percent ($\frac{3}{4}$ women) also complain about the social pressure on women. Social conflicts, ethnic diversification and security problems are sources of discontent for 12 percent. As for the social infrastructure, poor social life due to lack of social facilities, such as cafes, sports-wedding halls, entertainment facilities, schools, libraries, hospitals, etc. is a concern for 20 percent. At the time of the research, Emek had only one cafe on a second floor on the main commercial street, and was rather used for guests coming from the city, and by young couples meeting secretly. It was felt that everybody knew who went there so was not a place

where you could feel free. We find Emek, in the end, only with 9 percent complaining about the physical attributes.

Table 13. First division among the people living in the neighborhood

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
townsmanship	4	38	42
	14,8%	49,4%	40,4%
no division	17	8	25
	63,0%	10,4%	24,0%
political division	4	12	16
	14,8%	15,6%	15,4%
economic division (income groups)	2	12	14
	7,4%	15,6%	13,5%
sect division	-	6	6
		7,8%	5,8%
all of them	-	1	1
		1,3%	1,0%
Total	27	77	104
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

In order to detect the secondary forces of residential differentiation arising out of the contradictory and evolutionary character of capitalism influential in our communities, we asked the perceptions regarding the **social differentiations** in respective communities. Half of Emek workers detect townsmanship (hemşehricilik) as a major line of division, whereas no division is recognized by 63 percent in Akpınar. So even if townsmen associations do not function as influential power structures in the migrant community of Emek, loyalty to fellow townsmen and place of origin is recognized as a division in society. Political view counts as a cleavage plane only by 15 percent in each community, the ideological convergence of all parties on the national level since the 80's diminishes distinctions in the political views. And lastly, sect division is only cited in Emek with a rather lower ratio of 8 percent. Economic differentials are rarely identified and even less in Akpınar (A: 7, E: 16 percent). Akpınar, populated largely by white and blue-collar workers in manufacture and public service sectors, belonging more or less to the same income groups, does not experience much economic hierarchy. In Emek, on the other hand, unemployed, casual workers, tradesmen and small-entrepreneurs in construction and transportation sectors make economic differences more visible. Nonetheless, economic hierarchy in neither community is deemed in the forefront, they are rather differences perceived within the same status level.

We can also follow the **occupational composition** and status homogeneity from the list below showing the closest occupational groups in society. Workers generally identify a wider category denoting 'other wage-earners' as closest to themselves. While small-scale retailers and civil-servants rank higher in Akpınar, it is replaced by construction and casual

workers in Emek. The low ratio of craftsmen, farmers, unemployed or professionals is significant. While these self-employed category people are deemed distant, employers are not mentioned at all.

Table 14. Social groups that s/he feels close to

	First social group			Second social group			Third social group		
	A.pınar	Emek	Total	A.pınar	Emek	Total	A.pınar	Emek	Total
other wage earners	14	32	46	2	11	13	4	10	14
	53,8%	36,8%	40,7%	7,7%	13,6%	12,1%	16,0%	14,9%	15,2%
small scale retailers	6	15	21	6	9	15	5	17	22
	23,1%	17,2%	18,6%	23,1%	11,1%	14,0%	20,0%	25,4%	23,9%
construction workers	1	15	16	-	15	15	1	6	7
	3,8%	17,2%	14,2%		18,5%	14,0%	4,0%	9,0%	7,6%
civil servants	-	8	8	7	11	18	3	8	11
		9,2%	7,1%	26,9%	13,6%	16,8%	12,0%	11,9%	12,0%
professional	1	6	7	1	7	8	1	3	4
	3,8%	6,9%	6,2%	3,8%	8,6%	7,5%	4,0%	4,5%	4,3%
casual workers	-	3	3	-	4	4	-	7	7
		3,4%	2,7%		4,9%	3,7%		10,4%	7,6%
unemployed	-	3	3	3	9	12	1	6	7
		3,4%	2,7%	11,5%	11,1%	11,2%	4,0%	9,0%	7,6%
farmers	2	2	4	2	7	9	4	4	8
	7,7%	2,3%	3,5%	7,7%	8,6%	8,4%	16,0%	6,0%	8,7%
craftsmen	2	1	3	5	8	13	6	6	12
	7,7%	1,1%	2,7%	19,2%	9,9%	12,1%	24,0%	9,0%	13,0%
all of them	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
		2,3%	1,8%						
employers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	26	87	113	26	81	107	25	67	92
	100,0	100,0%	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

IV.IV. SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

Before we start, we should make a **clarification on the terminology** first, underlining the difference between our use of the concept ‘**infrastructure**’ and that within some interpretations of Marxist theory as referring to the economic foundation of society. We borrow the term from Harvey, and argue that his conception by no means infer separation of the political from the economic, on the contrary, it refers to a socio-spatial configuration of assets which themselves are the product of a long process of historical development and class-struggle. He simply extends the meaning implied in the daily use of the term as ‘underlying features of an operation’, as a metaphor to the field of institutional and non-institutional relations of the social and the physical. We find it useful to preserve, in that, it grabs the slight difference emanating from a **time-related hierarchy** between the two different types of structures. While the patterning of labor and housing market structures are less solidified as shorter term relational processes, more reflexive and responsive to the changes in capitalist accumulation processes or to the local or wider social, political and

economic conditions, social and physical infrastructures, on the other hand, reflect relatively more immobile long-standing assets of society. They are, as we have discussed in the theoretical framework, wide-ranging from culture, religion, social attitudes to education, governmental, legal and technical services, including the material bases of various consciousness/class formation processes, within which labor and housing market relations and forms and technologies of production are seated. We make a rather restricted selection of them in terms of our focus of interest here, namely, the institutions and relations in and around the OIE, the local government, the trade union, and the ethnic communities.

IV.IV.I. Organized Industrial Estates

Nearly all of the workers in our sample group work in Bursa Organized Industrial Estate. Therefore, in this section we will try to examine the brief **history, form and function of the OIE** concept in general, and then in Bursa and of BOIE in particular. As gigantic social and physical infrastructures produced by circulation and accumulation dynamics of capital, in Bursa, these spatial fixes shape to a large extent the tendency for achieving a momentary state of stability and security around the need for perpetuating the dependency relation between capital and labor.

First OIEs were established in 19th century in USA and consequently in England. OIEs served the aims of the private sector to maximize their profits and came to be supported by the state subventions in most countries particularly after the World War II (Ceviz; Araz, 2005). Main ideas behind the OIE form can be listed as follows:

1. Agglomeration of the similar branches of production on space
2. Allocation of appropriate land for industrial use in an urban region
3. Easy access to raw material opportunities
4. Creation of labor power at the right quantity and quality
5. Advancement of modern technology enterprises
6. Increasing the rates of profit and productivity

The history of the OIE concept in Turkey might be considered relatively short. State policy for clustering small and medium sized enterprises in industrial zones with appropriate physical infrastructure is a product of the planned industrialization era. Supported by both ILO and WB, it was associated with the policies for solution to the employment problems in the 3rd world countries. But the real prospering of the OIEs took place in the export-oriented era after the 80's. Meanwhile, of course, the discourse related to the 'creation of employment opportunities in the 3rd world' also changed towards emphasizing of the

advanced technology in production, entrenchment of big industry through outsourcing relations, and supporting competitiveness of the country in international markets (Özüğurlu, 2005, 120). This new logic behind the OIE is well summarized by Ministry of Industry as follows:


“Advanced technology, mass production, competitiveness in domestic and foreign markets, quality, structural adjustments for the tariff union, social peace and balanced development, meeting of the national and international capital, are all built in aspects of the OIE logic. It also aims at development of university-industry cooperation on issues such as technology transfers, production, design, marketing, efficiency and engineering” (Ministry of Industry, 1966, quote by Özüğurlu, 2005, 120).

State intervention in the economy in favor of capital at the expense of labor is the hallmark of the 80's. Economy has been restructured so as to foster export-orientation, flexible, precarious working relations, marginalization of labor markets, privatization, and repression of the working-class movement, etc. In addition to these, state involves in establishment of the physical infrastructure necessary for industrial production. OIEs provide a powerful spatial and organizational tool in this respect. Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for the establishment, inspection, and the crediting facilities and for coordination of the OIEs with the related organizations. Through investment in industrial infrastructure, state can also secure the regulation of incentives. Provision of cheap and developed land for the investors, firm-based investment discounts, and increased share of market rent (external economies) for each firm brought by clustering in space are some of the mechanisms of continuous resource transfer to industrial capital (Aktar, 1997, 142). The external economies not only comprise of the benefits of producing for a common market, but also include the outsourcing relations, in which firms of various sizes get into relation preferably in short distances, in that, various sized firms realizing various stages of production are clustered in the same zone.

When looked at the **geographical landscape of the large-scale industry** in Bursa, it is seen that particularly after the 90's industrial activities are mainly clustered in these organized estates, four of the major being BOIE and NOIE on the West, DOIE on the North, and Batı OIE on the West, recruiting approximately 80.000 people in about 700 firms in total (Güvener, 2004). Bursa appears as a heaven of OIEs, in overall, there are 13 OIEs within the provincial borders of Bursa, 10 of them already established and 3 still under construction. In addition to these, 4 others are on proposal stage waiting for approval. The total area of the 13 OIEs add up to 3.156 hectares, accommodating 959 firms and 102.500 workers (BTSO, 2007). The small-scale industrial estates, on the other hand, are scattered

around the city, particularly along Ankara and Yalova roads and in the traditional city center, just to mention Hamitler–Geçit (on Mudanya road) and Beşevler (on İzmir Road) Specialized Small-Scale Industrial Estates which are the geographically closer ones to BOIE. Moreover, other than these formal estates, Bursa also accommodates large ‘informal industrial zones’ where small and middle scale firms (car repair, iron and metal works, and textile, etc.) are tightly knit into the mostly inner city residential areas to the north of the İzmir-Ankara road, placed on the first floors of the 2-3 floored squatter dwellings (Nichols, Suğur, 2005, 35).

Figure16. Bursa Central Planning Zone; Planned Industrial Zones



Red: Big-scale industry; **Green:** Small-scale industry

Source: Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, Research-Project-Coordination Department, 1997

Table 15. General features of the four major OIEs in Bursa

	Date of Foundation	Number of firms	Number of employees	Sectoral distribution of the firms	Area	Location
BURSA (BOIE)	1961	220	34.322 (2004)	%38 weaving-confection %20 iron-steel and metal %20 automotive and components	670ha	Mudanya Road (West)
NİLÜFER (NOIE)	2001	116	5.700 (2004)	%32 automotive and components %52 textile-confection	221ha	Mudanya Road (West)
DEMİRTAŞ (DOIE)	1990	354	28.000 (2007)	%60 weaving-confection %15 automotive and components	475ha	Istanbul Road (North)
BATI OIE	2003	32	2.500 (2004)	-	122ha	İzmir Road (West)

Sources: B.M.M., Research-Project-Coordination Department, 2004
(www.btso.org.tr), 2007

Above we find some general figures related to some basic features of the four big OIEs. We should note that the number of working people stated in the table does not cover the number of subcontracting or the unregistered workers. Our field research shows that the real figures, particularly in BOIE, are much higher and increasing still due to the permeation of

subcontracting relations at accelerating rates. In section III.III.II., we saw the firm size by location distribution of the sample and detected the clustering of different sizes of firms in the BOIE. When different sized firms are located close together, the operational costs of outsourcing relations are minimized in terms of both the product and labor force transfers among the factories. Particularly after the New Labor Code which recognized ‘lending of workers to other firms’ as an employer right, it must be expected that such labor force transfers will increase.

Let us have a more **detailed look at BOIE** now. The general directorate of BOIE in Bursa declares in its web page that their estate meets the following requirements in the city (www.boie.gov.tr):

1. Requirements of modern urban planning met, in that, historical and cultural specificities of the city preserved, and separation of the industrial and residential zones achieved.
2. Investments in manufacture encouraged
3. Costs for infrastructural construction per factory reduced
4. Small and medium scale entrepreneurs encouraged for institutional modernization

BOIE was financed by the credit raised by Ministry of Finance from International Development Organization, and by the 10 percent financial contribution of Bursa Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The land allocated for the OIE was purchased by the Chamber and divided into parcels. The chamber completed construction of most of the infrastructural facilities, like road, sewage, drainage, natural gas (1992), electricity and telephone systems and put the estate into service in 1966. In order to meet the housing requirements of the industry, urban lands around the BOIE were planned as residential areas. In BOIE, all kinds of infrastructural and maintenance services are provided. Garbage collection, fire extinguishing and ambulance services are given free of charge. The collective water treatment facility integrated to the collective sewage system was completed in 1998 and has been working in full capacity since then.

We see various local institutions of capital and the private firms well-organized in urban space through the mediation of state to create their own social and physical infrastructures necessary for the absorption of surplus capital through long term investments. Capitalists are aware that in order to survive through the fierce dynamics of competition and to secure proper investment conditions in a locality, they should establish some kind of cooperation and coordination among themselves, form some collective networks for struggle. BOIE, in this respect, **resembles the ‘gated-communities’** of the upper classes, safely closed against any unpleasant attack to devalue their fixed capital. The space of production is under

enhanced control of the capitalists; workers are part of this community as much as the cleaning women are in Bademli (a gated-community of the rich in Bursa). BOIE has a newly built, monumental directorate building which demonstrates the power and prestige of capital to the newcomers. Head-offices or branches of institutions like Exporters Union, Revenue Offices, Turkish Standards Institution, and Banks are also located in the estate. They contribute to regulation of capital accumulation processes through achieving cooperation and coordination among the capitalist organizations. They form part of the social and physical infrastructure which collectivize costs of production and secure higher profits for the producers.

While the OIEs provide big incentives and opportunities for the patrons, they contribute to creation of negative working conditions for the laborers. OIEs generally established far away from the city center, separate the workers from the daily urban life. Though service and lunch rights are gained rights on part of the laborers, they are also used by capital as tools to reinforce the disciplining effects of this social and psychological separation. Workers forced to have their lunches in the factories and use the factory services are exposed to the time discipline of capitalist control to larger extents. No options for going home or elsewhere are presented within the restricted OIE times. This provides the employers wider possibilities for control and repression on the labor movement. The term ‘organized’ not only denotes organized production, but also the **organized power of capital** against the working-class (Ceviz; Araz, 2005). Managerial head-offices in the estates function at the same time as the centers where collective actions of labor are monitored, discussed and repressive intervention mechanisms developed. Ever-presence of the coercive force is felt by the presence of a police-station at the entrance of the estate; gated community is guarded against any disturbing effects of individual or collective action. Besides a mosque, hospital, post office, police and fire station, BOIE also hosts an industrial vocational high school. Students educated here first become apprentices (stajyer) and then workers in the factories of the estate. The school brings up new workers who are inculcated to be ‘good workers’ from small. Capitalists launch or support programs for the modification of labor qualities in ways that appear amenable to them (Harvey, 1985b, 131). Qualities such as discipline, work attitudes, respect for authority, loyalty, and cooperation might be ensured through education, as it plays crucial role in consciousness formation processes (see section V.II.I.III). Thus, a plot for construction of another school is already spared in the zone. But we should note that still the majority of workers employed in the

zone are migrants from Blacksea, Middle or Eastern Anatolia regions mostly educated in their hometowns.

While factory administration buildings are generally well designed and decorated, appealing for the customers, production hangars are closed (with no windows), rugged, time-worn buildings, isolated from nature and day light. One can see no trade union office, local or cafeteria in the zone, where the workers can come together. This observation is further supported by the statements of workers in our sample who assert that there are no locals for workers neither in their factories nor in the OIE. The only two exceptional cases are reported to be in TOFAŞ Car Plant in DOIE and in Merinos, a now closed state economic enterprise in the city center. Yet, even that local in Tofaş was not largely preferred by the blue collar workers, but rather by the technicians and the office workers. The closest union office is that of Teksif and it seems resorted on the other side of the highway outside BOIE, where pedestrian access is highly difficult. And the other union offices are in the city center, 15 km away from the factories, and away from the residential areas of the workers. Contrary to the so-called progressive management policies employed in advanced production factories that seek harmony between management and the workers, 70 percent never see their chefs or managers other than in the shop-floor. Even the lunch halls are differentiated. Only some small factories organize football tournaments and some bigger factories, symbolic dinners, picnics, or sports activities (21 percent). Home visits, going out together or meeting on special occasions, like weddings, etc. are rarely found.

IV.IV.II. Local Governments

In the 2004 local elections, distribution of approximately 12.000 valid votes in Emek was around 8.000 for AKP and 4.300 for DYP, which resulted in 12 AKP and 3 DYP municipal council members. The voting behavior in both neighborhoods is observed to reflect the national patterns, though Akpınar mukhtar saying that CHP is generally represented slightly more than the average in his neighborhood.

Table 16. Parties on charge in B.M.M., Osmangazi and Emek District Municipalities

	Bursa Metrop. Municipality	Osmangazi Municipality	Emek Municipality
2004	AKP	AKP	AKP
1999	DSP	DSP	ANAP
1994	ANAP	ANAP	ANAP
1989	<i>DYP</i>	<i>DYP</i>	DYP

Source: www.yerelnet.org.tr

The territory of **Emek** had served as fields and feeding-grounds of the surrounding villages until it received village status in 1976, and later on in 1987 became a sub-district of Osmangazi District Municipality. Emek, comprised of three neighborhoods, has a unique characteristic of being the only island-like municipal sub-district surrounded by the central districts of Bursa. It remains within the boundaries of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality since the year 2004. From then on, its land-use plans, budget plans, etc. will have to be approved by the Metropolitan Municipality. This, the mayor says, might foster Emek's integration to Bursa, but will also damage the 'participatory' local democracy he has achieved in the district. Centralization of the authority will deprive the mayor of most of his local policy initiatives. The mayor utilizes the opportunities of administrative autonomy and a 'local democracy' based on clientelist relations so eloquently that this is his third term in office. He emphasizes that there is no disputed land-ownership or shared-title-deed left since 1999 due to completion of the development plans. There had been no squatter demolition/slum clearance in Emek and this was highly confidential for the newcomers. There is no occupation of government land either; nearly all of the homeowners construct their houses themselves (no contractor involved) on their purchased lands. They get their licenses at tariffs determined by the subjective criteria of the mayor (generally depending on the townsmen bonds). The fact that each townsmen group is charged at different tariffs is a common knowledge among the residents. Blacksea people, being the townsmen of mayor, are charged less, but since all licenses are below the legal tariff line, this preferential treatment is never publicly opposed by people of other ethnic communities in the neighborhood. This is a routine, all encompassing practice. And yet, most of the buildings are unlicensed.

Mayor of Emek is a politically ambitious figure with expectations to become a member of the parliament in the future. An eagerness for expanding his administrative capacity is also reflected in his restless lobbying activities to make Emek the 4th central district of Bursa, uniting with the western parts of Osmangazi District, and particularly with Akpınar. He had worked for 14 years in Bursa Court House as the director of financial and administrative affairs, and was the founder and five-year headman of Giresun Townsmen Association in the district, just to note by passing, people from Giresun form majority of the population in Emek. Yet, at the same time he believes that ethnic or place-based associations reinforce discriminative behavior and further the divisions in society; they produce conflict and competition around ethnic-based divisions.

70 percent in Emek find mayorship as the first place to recourse in order to resolve their daily problems. The influence of the mayor on regulation of the daily life in Emek and his close presence over the district is felt by most of the workers irrespective of their ethnic identities. A common impression is that he can be elected as long as he wishes. The mayor powerfully adopts the **paternalistic rhetoric** typical of ANAP and AKP type of populism, as embracing the whole community like a father. The new headman of Giresun Association states that genial welcome is very precious for the poor people of Emek who are used to bad treatment in government offices, and the mayor fulfils this need. In our interview, the mayor repeatedly underlined that he always tried to inculcate the importance of hardwork, loyalty, respect, and benevolence to the people; that these were in equal status with religious service. Most workers do not question his authority and the third term in office, except for some CHP voters. Generally the party affiliations, rather than ethnicity, determine the attitudes against the mayor. Local party organizations act as conveyors of local interests to the local governments. They secure up-to bottom and bottom-up relations and provide integrity of those patterns of clientalist relations.

Most respondents in Emek believe that their district is improving each day. An optimistic vision regarding a progressive development prevails due to the decrease in unemployment rates, the increases in the number of working-women, car and house-ownership, higher-quality buildings, integration into urban life, expanding of industrial economy, and enhanced public security conditions. Economic integration of the neighborhood to Bursa is fast, thanks to proximity of BOIE and the locality spirit fostered by the mayor. Emek had a reputation of being an insecure ghetto-town closed to outsiders until 95's. It witnessed continuous street-fights among different political and ethnic groups, particularly among the Kurdish and the Blacksea people. The police officers in Emek state that there are no such conflicts observed any more. They identify no difference with respect to other parts of Bursa in terms of security issues any more. Current mayor is shown as the man who resolved the apparent social and cultural conflicts among different townsmen groups, both by bringing logistic support to the police-station, and his conciliatory gestures and speeches, participating in nearly every special occasion, wedding, and ceremony of each ethnic community in the neighborhood. We should also note that at the time national level politics also contributed to creation of a relatively moderate approach against the Kurdish problem. Yet, even most of the Kurdish residents of Fatih Sultan Mehmet acknowledge the mayor's role in creating a friendly community spirit, besides recognizing the unequal treatment in service provision among the neighborhoods in Emek. 60 percent, irrespective of ethnic

identity, are aware that a lot of **favoritism** is going on in the municipality, particularly on issues like reduction on construction license fees, discount on bills (water, garbage), maintenance of parks, green areas, provision of cleaning services, food aids, and putting on to jobs, etc. General Secretary of the municipality states that until the 90's the employers left their cards to the municipality to reach for the workers, but since 94 it was just the reverse, whenever they called them they pretended to be busy not to reply.

Table 17. Who resolves the problems in the neighborhood / Groups influential on municipal decisions

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
mayor	2	62	64	party groups	12	19	31
	6,7%	68,9%	53,3%		40,0%	19,4%	24,2%
mukhtar	16	-	16	townsmen associations	5	23	28
	53,3%		13,3%		16,7%	23,5%	21,9%
ourselves	11	1	12	Small-scale retailers	-	18	18
	36,7%	1,1%	10,0%			18,4%	14,1%
associations	-	12	12	I do not know	8	8	16
		13,3%	10,0%		26,7%	8,2%	12,5%
nobody	1	10	11	businessmen-industrialists	5	10	15
	3,3%	11,1%	9,2%		16,7%	10,2%	11,7%
party groups	-	5	5	only the mayor	-	14	14
		5,6%	4,2%			14,3%	10,9%
-	-	-	-	the public	-	6	6
						6,1%	4,7%
Total	30	90	120	Total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

In the instance of Emek with a relatively smaller population and size, and 'thanks to' the populist practices of the mayor, people are aware of what is going on in the municipality. 14 percent recognize mayor as the only power holder in local government. Townsmen associations (23 percent) are seen more active as influential on municipal decisions compared to the party groups (19 percent) and small-scale retailers (18 percent). It is observed that the respondents in **Akpınar** have rather restricted interaction with the municipality, 1/4 having no idea about the local power structure. 40 percent mention party groups as influential upon the local decision mechanisms. 'Small-scale retailers' or 'the public' is not cited at all, whereas the influence of the upper segments of bourgeoisie, like the businessmen and industrialists, are recognized with 17 percent, more than that in Emek with 10 percent. Townsmen associations appear to have a less significant effect (16 percent).

Akpınar is a planned low-cost estate, with relatively more green, auto parks, and better educational, medical, and socio-cultural facilities. No self-constructed building is observed in the sample, homeownership is generally achieved through the housing-cooperatives. The

territory was declared as a ‘Squatter Prevention Zone’ in 1979. In 1985, Ministry of Public Works and Settlement prepared a development plan aiming at low-density housing to meet the housing requirements of the people drawn by BOIE to the area. Akpınar is a relatively new but rapidly growing neighborhood, not fully established yet. Akpınar workers, inhabiting a smaller neighborhood attached to Osmangazi, one of the three biggest central districts of Bursa, rather see the **mukhtar** as the problem solving agency. Municipality, in this regard, is cited only by 2 workers. Another noteworthy finding to be underlined is the higher ratio of Akpınar workers referring to themselves as the problem solvers. Basing upon our observations, we might interpret this not as a participatory or a self-contained and politically indifferent attitude, but rather as an expression of critical resentment against the local authorities in charge. This indicates that expectations for better life standards and chances are on the agenda of the working-class in Akpınar. Mukhtar resents that, even it has been 15 years now since the establishment of the first housing estate, there are lots of problems regarding the deterioration of the buildings, the green, and the infrastructure problems (sewage system, asphalts, etc.) in the neighborhood.

Public services are generally deemed satisfactory in **Akpınar**; they have a newly-built cultural center, high schools, etc. But for particularly the Kurdish and Other workers in **Emek**, lack of social and cultural facilities, a public library, high school, hospital, green areas and parks, etc. and presence of infrastructural problems compose the matters of resentment. Particularly lack of a high-school is considered a great defect by the workers, but one of them adds that in the survey of the municipality asking whether they wanted a high-school or a wedding-hall, the latter was chosen.

IV.IV.III. Ethnic Divisions and Organizations in the Labor and Housing Markets

Emek to a certain extent reflects the long-distance emigration pattern in Bursa drawing population largely from Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia and Blacksea regions. Akpınar, on the other hand, reflects both the immigration and short-distance emigration patterns, namely, from the Balkans and the rural parts of Bursa. Emek is further divided into three neighborhoods according to long-established townsmanship allegiances: Fatih Sultan Mehmet composed of Eastern and South-Eastern townsmen groups; Adnan Menderes, Eastern-Blacksea groups and especially the groups from the mayor’s hometown Giresun; and finally Zekai Gümüşdiş, a relatively mixed neighborhood most of its inhabitants being

from Eastern-Blacksea, Central, Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia. **Ethnic distribution** by neighborhoods can be summarized as follows:

Table 18. Ethnic identity

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
Kurdish	1	20	21
	3,3%	20,4%	16,4%
Local	19	5	24
	63,3%	5,1%	18,8%
Blacksea	-	64	64
		65,3%	50,0%
Other	10	9	19
	33,3%	9,2%	14,8%
Total	30	98	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Note: 'Other' signifies those largely from Central-Anatolia and Marmara regions

¾ of the workers in the sample group have no relation with any **organization**, like an association, foundation, club or cooperative. But there are important differences among the neighborhoods with respect to both the rates of membership and characteristics of the organizations. Nearly half of the workers in Akpınar are affiliated to an organization; most being sports club, school and mosque maintenance association, consumption cooperative, housing cooperative, etc. These are mostly workplace based (consumption coops.). Membership level is much lower in Emek, only 15 percent of the workers have affiliations and those are entirely with village/province culture and solidarity associations. **Associations** do not appear to be very powerful in the organization of community life, since only 13 percent claim to resort to an association in case of problems or disputes, none being in Akpınar. Party groups are seen even less effective. 1/5 of Akpınar workers are either an executive committee member or chairmen of an organization, which is a considerably higher rate. The general picture in Emek, however, is that workers are not interested or actively involved in organizational structures or the services of such associations (only one worker) except for using their places as coffeehouses.

Table 19. Type of the organization

	neighborhood		Total	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek		Akpınar	Emek	
consumption cooperative	5	-	5	1	-	1
foundation	1	-	1	1	-	1
housing cooperative	-	-	-	2	-	2
sports club	6	-	6	-	-	-
mosque maintenance assoc.	1	-	1	1	-	1
school maintenance assoc.	2	-	2	-	-	-
teacher's local	1	-	1	-	-	-
culture and solidarity	-	13	13	-	-	-
'ülkü ocağı'	-	1	1	-	-	-
religion and culture assoc.	-	2	2	-	1	1
Total	16	16	32	5	1	6
	53%	16%	25%	16%	1%	0.4%

Ülkü ocağı: Local organization of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)

There are six townsmen associations in Emek, namely, Samsun (500 members), Giresun (230), Erzurum (200), Bitlis (70), Amasya (40), and Yağlıdere (district of Giresun). When occupational composition of members is investigated, it is seen that most are waged workers, particularly those of the industrial sector and the construction. The **culture and solidarity associations** in Emek generally make food or money aid to poorer, unemployed people; organize weddings, funerals, circumcision entertainments, festivals or picnics once or twice a year; and most importantly arrange trips to the city center or the hometowns. Particularly this last task seems to be a fundamental issue, in that, they function as travel agencies to hometown for the women, children and the old who generally have no freedom of mobility and ‘need to be protected and controlled’ when outside the home.

The society headmen generally resent that they have few **financial resources**. They lack chances to give grants particularly to the students, and find jobs for the fellow-townsmen. All except for Amasya have ambitions to grow, build association buildings, establish links with the townsmen in other neighborhoods, reach to the rich townsmen and find new financial resources. Amasya believes that they are all divisive; they were forced to establish that association as a reaction against the discriminative attitudes of the others. The associations like Erzurum and Samsun, who feel discriminated and underprivileged in Emek, have ambitions for political mobilization as well. While Giresun (town of the mayor) and Bitlis (with Kurdish members) seem to refrain from politics (in the rhetorical level at least), Erzurum and Samsun explicitly underline their roles in mobilizing votes to support the party to their interests. Mayor of Emek, on the other hand, asserts that they do not contribute to increase in solidarity of any kind; neither provide material benefits for their members. Membership fees are generally not paid and the well-off do not even pay visits to the associations. They only function to mobilize votes and press for unlicensed construction permissions, etc. We may recall that he himself headed Giresun association for five years (see section VI.III.II for the perception of the workers).

In the industrial city of Bursa attracting migrants from all over the country since the 50’s, there exists a continuous struggle among different ethnic groups over expropriating different **segments in the labor market**. Existence of migrants with higher bargaining powers is generally considered as a divisive factor. This is deemed one of the most important cleavage planes in urban labor markets of Turkey in the 90’s, which can be characterized by high unemployment rates, competition-based fragmented working-class, and a growing informal sector (İçduygu, quote by Özügür, 2005, 73). Therefore, it is important to give here a very

general outline of the ethnic mapping of the industrial labor market, and then in section VI.III.II, explore how this fragmentation is reflected on views and attitudes of the laborers, the extent to which it reproduces a divisive effect in their social consciousness.

We will largely base on the observations made in the field and statements of the respondents, hence it will be a general approximation regarding the distribution of ethnic groups among different **economic sectors** in and around the BOIE. When we sum up the findings, it appears that while Local workers (most of them being from Bursa's towns) are largely recruited in the automotive sector, 'muhacir' workers (Balkan immigrants) concentrate in textiles. Blacksea and Central Anatolian workers are not as massively employed in big-scale manufacture as those two groups above, but still it might be said that Blacksea workers are mostly seen in textiles, and Central Anatolian workers in automotive. And lastly, Kurdish workers are rarely seen in big-scale industry, they rather find jobs either in small-scale industry, or construction, transportation, and retail-trade sectors in Bursa. Our findings are also in congruence with those of Parlak's and Nichols's researches. Parlak observed in 1996 in TOFAŞ (car plant) that most recruits were from Bursa's towns and the Aegean and Marmara regions, followed by Central Anatolian and Blacksea migrants (Parlak, 1996). And Nichols-Sugur's research in 2005 puts a special emphasis on muhacir workers' place in the local labor market recognizing their large concentrations in the textile sector (Nichols-Suğur, 2005, 84). Establishment of paternalistic relations with the workforce as a recruitment strategy is highly utilized by the Balkan migrant employers of the big textile factories in Bursa. But more important than that, they are preferred in all sectors of industry due to a general opinion that they work for lower wages, have higher skills and education levels.

The industrial labor market situations of the two major ethnic groups in Bursa deserve particular attention; that of the **muhacirs'** and the **Kurdish** people. There are only 2 Balkan migrants in our sample group and 21 Kurdish migrants, but the reasons that they are in smaller numbers compared to the Local and Blacksea workers completely differ. We simply do not come across with muhacirs due to the fact that they generally live in more or less ethnically and spatially segregated neighborhoods, yet we know that they constitute a considerable portion of the industrial labor force in Bursa. As for the Kurdish workers, by contrast, it is significant that we cannot find so many factory workers in a neighborhood where they are largely populated. They are invisible in formal sector jobs, and this signifies existence of a process which gives an ethnic character to poverty (Nichols-Suğur, 2005, 84).

While Blacksea people prefer factory jobs even if low paid but with social-security, Kurdish people try to engage in self-employed jobs, small-scale retail, etc., since it is harder for them to get into factories. The head of Bitlis Solidarity Association states that he knows only one Kurdish employer in the BOIE and a few in DOIE, whereas eastern employers in construction firms are quiet many.

We might also note a few things regarding the mapping of some ethnic groups on the Bursa **residential landscape**. We know that Balkan immigrants (muhacır) mostly live in Hürriyet (means ‘freedom’ referring to the assimilation of muhacırs in Bulgaria) and in poorer neighborhoods like Yeni Bağlar (next to Emek), Ovaakça, Kazım Karabekir, and Kestel (Nichols, 2005, 84). And Kurdish people generally prefer Eastern parts of the city, that is, Yıldırım district particularly and there, Yavuz Selim and its surrounding neighborhoods. The local born are either in the city center towards the upper parts on the hillsides, or in the valley’s once village, now neighborhood residential areas.

IV.IV.IV. Trade Unions

IV.IV.IV.I. General Characteristics of Unionization

Hudson argues that with the growth of large-scale industrial capitalism, the primary institutional form of workers’ organization gradually became the trade union. People seek to unify in these unions around shared attributes as wage workers always in circumstances in which they become wage workers differentiated from one another in other ways (Hudson, 2001, 219). In order to analyze the specific conditions for the workers in our sample, we should start with the situation in the local level and then throw a short look at the national scale where the locus of decision-making capacity within the unions is located and such capabilities are fundamentally exercised. This will provide a general outlook of the social and physical infrastructures that restrict labor disputes to certain scales and issues. And will help us understand what kind of a local dependency they produce for capital and labor, and to what extent they can be utilized in transformation of the labor discontent into collective action.

In BOIE hosting 220 factories, workforce is generally organized by Türk-İş affiliated trade unions (a right-wing federation); namely, Türk-Metal in metal sector, and Teksif in textiles. Only one textile factory is known to have a union affiliated to DİSK (left-wing federation). Since, at the time of study, Tekstil affiliated to DİSK dropped below the 10 percent barrage

in that branch of industry, it has lost its collective-bargaining rights and the arena was left to Teksif affiliated to Türk-İş. In our sample, 57 percent of the workers are unionized. **Unionization rate** is considerably lower in textiles than in automotive sector, even though firm sizes are more or less evenly distributed among the sectors. A similar kind of difference also exists between the two settlements. While $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers in Akpınar are registered with a union, this ratio lags behind at $\frac{1}{2}$ in Emek, with the lowest ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$ among the Kurdish and Blacksea workers against the 80 percent among the Local.

In 1992, 15 percent of the unionized workers were employed in 50-100 sized workplaces, 44 percent in 100-250 and 100 percent in 250 and over in Bursa (Akkaya, 1998, 203). Sample findings also draw a similar picture: 76 percent working in firms recruiting below 1000 are non-unionized, as against the 11 percent in firms 1000 and over. Since smaller size firms are less convenient for unionization, capitalists increasingly foster outsourcing and subcontracting relations with the smaller workplaces. Just as, nearly all respondents have a tacit belief about the presence of a stronger solidarity in bigger factories, and particularly in the automotive sector, except for the 19 percent who think that no workplace-based solidarity exists anywhere. Solidarity, however, is generally understood as the mere existence of a union in the factory or in purely community-based terms (against the class-based), such as the presence of mutual-help or a friendship atmosphere.

Table 20. Labor union membership * neighborhood * firm size

	neighborhood		firm size								Total
	A.pınar	Emek	30-100	101-300	301-500	501-1000	1001-1500	2501-3000	3001-4000	6001-7000	
yes	23	50	-	10	3	-	21	12	26	1	73
	76,7%	51,0%	-	34,5%	42,9%		87,5%	85,7%	89,7%	100	57,0%
no	7	48	15	19	4	9	3	2	3	-	55
	23,3%	49,0%	100	65,5%	57,1%	100,	12,5%	14,3%	10,3%		43,0%
Total	30	98	15	29	7	9	24	14	29	1	128
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Registration with the unions is obligatory for all new beginning workers. New recruits are sent to the local union office as part of the standard admission procedures. It is a much routine issue like registration to the social security office, and is obligatory indeed since non-members are not given the job (Nichols, 2001, 221). This denotes the collaboration of the unions and the employers around some common interests. The union guarantees a docile workforce as a tool for social containment. It prevents all kinds of problems which might occur on the shop-floor before they reflect to the management level. Besides, the management can foresee the labor costs during the two years time of the contract (Akkaya, 2002). But this is not to say that no risks are involved on part of the employers within this

process. The growing distrust in the unions, which will be analyzed in later sections, might render them dysfunctional in the long run (Nichols, 2001). When access to the unions is based on such **coercively** imposed terms and not emerged as **voluntary** will of the workers, this either diminishes the potential of the workers to identify with their unions, construct class-based identities, and involve in class-based actions, or nurtures the discontent and evolve into a collective action against the organized union. In our case, we will see that both tendencies are observed simultaneously.

The particular **socio-spatial strategies** employed by the unions also prevent identification of the workers with their unions and successfully hinder the view that class pervades all social relationships, not just those at the workplace. The closest local union office is that of Teksif, and it seems resorted on other side of the highway outside BOIE, where pedestrian access is highly difficult. And other union offices are in the city center, 15 km away from the factories. Accessibility chances of the workers to the unions are very poor. Labor unions are disconnected from other institutions and locations of working-class life as well. No branch offices are seen in the neighborhoods or union meetings reported to be held in the sample communities. Trade unions' meeting places in America were at the workplace or close to workplace, whereas in England, they were generally the pubs in the neighborhoods (public houses). There the organization of industrial disputes was often based in these pubs, and their landlords frequently acted as strike coordinators or union treasurers (Katznelson, 1992). In Bursa, union places are far away from both. Only in Siemens factory in Mudanya, Birleşik-Metal (left-wing union) was reported to have a local branch in the surrounding neighborhood. Besides, none of the workers recall a specific place in the city, a society, club, local or coffeehouse where factory workers come together deliberately to discuss social, political, economic or organizational matters.

When analyzed the responses given to the **reason of membership**, as a consequence of the situation summarized above, we find most workers ($\frac{3}{4}$) stressing the passivizing reality that membership has no relation with their free will; it stands as a mere obligation. While "solidarity with other workers" is not mentioned as a reason at all, even a more likely motivation like "defending and ensuring labor rights" is uttered only by a considerably smaller number of workers ($\frac{1}{4}$). Accordingly, 70 percent of the union members are plain members; only 7 percent being actively involved in union activities or administrative tasks, and 23 percent get involved only from time to time. 30 percent of the union members, nearly all being in automotive, have attended at least one seminar organized by their unions,

and 2 workers mention the union picnics. Activities such as picnics, excursions, seminars, and courses are organized very rarely and in small quotas where workers are appointed to on an arbitrary basis. Most workers reproach this system either in a touchy, sarcastic or protesting tone.

When asked the content of the **seminars**, we see that rather than class-based consciousness raising activities, they serve to inculcate laborers to work ethics, and new production techniques. Importance of the new consensus-based employer-worker relations, the good family relations, women rights, high quality in production, operation principles of the liberal economy, etc. are some of the issues the employer-sided unions work on in their seminars. Those who find these seminars useful generally emphasize their benefits with regards to the improvement in their family relations, and to the development of solidarity among the workers and the employers. Besides the technical (quality, safety, etc.), legal and work-discipline-related issues, how to follow a proper family-life and family-planning issues are also given particular importance by the union experts. Here is seen that reproductive and caring capacities of the family institution are cleverly adapted to the needs of capital, for creation of a happy, peaceful, docile, on time, well fed-slept, healthy and more productive workforce. Family and home economy planning rationalizes the consumption behavior, implying that, if logically spent, theirs is a ‘sufficient’ wage level. Through these educational channels workers are habituated to bourgeois values of honesty, reliability, respect for authority, obedience to laws and rules, respect for property and contractual agreements, etc. Anyway, half of those who attend such seminars are aware of these purposes and believe that they are just brainwash, to deceive the workers through false information. This is summarized in the impressing words of one worker as “They just train us; not educate! So that we become submissive monkeys...” Only 2 workers claim that they were educated about how to defend their social rights or the issues about the new labor law.

IV.IV.IV.II. Ideological Approaches and Institutional Structures of the Unions in the Sample

Here we should give a very brief account of the ideological approaches and institutional structures of the union federations and particularly that of the biggest right-wing union in the sample. This would help understand the relative weakness of the workers in the struggle for changing the union from within (Nichols, 2001, 221). It is important to acknowledge that consciousness formation process of the workers in the sample group, most of whom were children or not born yet in the 70’s, took place under the influence of the socio-

economic and political atmosphere of the 80's and onwards; or in Nichols's words, under the "impoverished, American type unionization, and restricting legal framework provided by the government" (Nichols, 2001, 196).

By lifting of the ban on formation of communities on class-basis in 1946, 6 unions were established by 1949 in Bursa. They formed 'Bursa Labor Union Federation' which soon became the constitutive force behind the establishment of Türk-İş Labor Federation. In those years, unionization was taking place both at workplace level and on occupational basis. During the 1960-80 term, the workplace-based unionization and the branch (işkolu) based centralization process went hand in hand. Besides Türk-İş and DİSK, there were 26 other Bursa-centered trade unions. Mostly being in metal sector, each branch consisted of at least a several number of unions. By the 1980 military intervention, however, all union activities were suspended. And when the unionization law issued in 1983 banned the workplace and occupation based unionization, all small unions functioning up to that time were abolished. Undemocratic legislations strictly banned pursuing of political goals, movement or collaboration with or getting financial support from political parties, associations or occupational chambers. The ban was not lift until 1995, and DİSK was kept closed until 1991. Hence, workers were pushed to get unionized under the only available union federation Türk-İş. After the 90's, Hak-İş also began to gain base in Bursa. (Akkaya, 1998, 200)

There are three union federations in Turkey: DİSK, less radical compared to the 70's militant socialist union movement, but still left-wing; HAK-İş, appealing to Islamic tendencies and to the employers in MUSİAD; Türk-İş, closer to CHP line in the 70's, having a pragmatist attitude changing by political trends, and largely consisting of right-wing unions after the 80's. As can be followed from the table below, ratio of DİSK members against Türk-İş in Bursa is lower than that of the national one. And in our case, except for the 6 workers adhered to DİSK, all union members are adhered to Türk-İş.

Table 21. Number of members / workplaces organized

	Turkey	Bursa	
	Number of members	Number of members	Number of workplaces
TÜRK-İŞ	1.950.000	70.000	20
DİSK	393.000	4.460	19
HAK-İŞ	362.000	?	?

Source: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/kitaplar/turkey2005/index.htm>
: Bursa Regional Offices of the Union Federations

Türk-İş, in opposition to class-based politics, was established in 1952 by a strong American support, to repress the opportunities for leftist unionization movements (Güngör, 1996, quote by Nichols, 2005). Türk-İş, as a state-controlled and guided structure, has always employed the rhetoric of ‘**non-partizanship politics**’, which implied independence from and equal distance to all political parties. In exchange for this close corporatist relation with the governments, it gained privileged representation rights in public institutions, organizations and enterprises; could easily organize and gain power in the public sector. As a reaction to this type of unionism, in 1967, the left-wing federation DİSK was established by the departures from Türk-İş. DİSK, closer to TİP at the beginning, made class-based unionism and was organized rather in the private sector. But in the late 70’s, the most militant DİSK, instead of the socialist parties, collaborated with CHP, the party representing the state ideology with a mostly middle-class social base, and with a historical legacy as the party of the ruling classes (Akkaya, 2002b; Yıldırım, 1994).

Türk-İş affiliated **Türk-Metal** deserves more special attention here, as for it dominates the metal (automotive) sector in Bursa. Known as ‘government and employer friendly’, it perpetuates a monopolizing position with approximately 500.000 members all over Turkey as the biggest union in metal and manufacture industry; the industry which plays a vital role in the Turkish economy (Büyüksulu, 1994, quote by Nichols, 2005). Struggle for unionization among Türk-Metal and Maden-İş (DİSK) was identified with the left-right fight in the social and political atmosphere of 1976-77. When Bursa office of Türk-Metal was opened in 1976, it had to confront with Maden-İş during its organization process. The rivalry turned into fierce and even bloody fights eventuating in the well-known ‘TOFAŞ Events’ of 1976. Employers of the time preferred Türk-Metal and recruited rightist workers. The police who intervened into the daily events also supported Türk-Metal, and finally, the union came to control the workplace. By the closing of Metal-İş by the military regime in 80, there was no alternative left against Türk-Metal for the workers during the 80-90 period. Known with his closeness to the MHP line (nationalist conservative right), union leader’s declaration in the general assembly in 1983 summarizes the political vision of the union well:

“Those who talked about the conflict between capital and labor are striped of their disguises now. We, in this new era of national solidarity and cooperation brought by the 12 September movement, do not want to deal with the labor-capital conflict any more. This is because we acknowledge the concerns of both labor and capital, and approach them from the standpoint of our national interests” (Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi, 361).

Compulsory membership to the union, however, does not mean that there are no resentments or actions against the union (see section V.II.III.). Yet, it is hard to struggle within such an **autocratic**, undemocratic organizational structure whose officers are tied to their leaders with a nationalist ideology and strong personal loyalty, referring to Mustafa Özbek (the union leader) as “Our Great Leader”. Union representatives are assigned by head of the local branches without any election system being employed, and the delegates, in a similar fashion, are proposed as a list by the local union office managers. In addition to these procedures, some material benefits are provided through clientalist relations for the branch heads and the fellow-townsmen; such as trips abroad, holidays in luxury hotels, trainings in Ankara, etc. These favoritism channels, along with an authoritarian domination, help reproduce the autocratic structure in the union.

CHAPTER V

BETWEEN FIXITY AND MOBILITY: ACCESSIBILITY AND DISTANCIATION

We now in this chapter will change our focus from the world of stabilities, fixes, and equilibriums of the previous chapter, towards that of the mobilities, flows and disturbances, to the loci of instability and contradictions. Both the character and the effect of the disturbing forces and processes which aim to restructure, destruct or enhance local dependency of labor through the mediation of urban processes will be tried to be specified. The forces that emanate from the internal contradictions of capitalism make for imbalances which continuously undermine and disrupt the structured coherence within the urban regions. In our theoretical framework, these forces were classified under four headings:

1. Competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization
2. Push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation
3. Class struggles over distribution, or social relations of production and reproduction
4. Shifting space relations

The **first two** disturbing forces on the structured coherence belong largely to the sphere of competition among the capitalists themselves, the detailed dynamics of which are out of the scope of our work. Yet, the changes on the social organization of production emanating from ‘the push to accelerate accumulation’ inscribe crucial impacts upon the specific flexibilities and rigidities in the labor and housing markets. Our analysis here will be restricted to those impacts which are particularly observed to have strong and direct affects on the work and off-work life of the laborers. On the other hand, **socio-spatial mobility** through migration and residential differentiation as different forms of ‘shifting space relations’, and **class struggles** over distribution, deserve detailed examination as they form the primary force-movement field within which the laborers and capitalists, with unequal powers under capitalist conditions, employ specific mix of strategies to shape class and consciousness formation processes as they fit to their own interests.

V.I.PUSH TO ACCELERATE TURNOVER TIMES AND ACCUMULATION

It was seen in the logic behind OIEs in the previous chapter that appropriation of spaces of production occurs through the agency of the state. State provides the necessary

infrastructure and credit facilities in configurations that best fit the needs of the industrial capital's accumulation process. Here, we will deal with how capital, again through the agency of the state, permeates into sphere of reproduction, with intended or unintended consequences on the restructuring of life and use of space at the living place, through mechanisms that serve accelerated accumulation and higher profitability at the cost of reducing the reproductive and organizational capacities of labor.

Under economic circumstances increasingly fragile, adaptability of labor force to the changes taking place plays a strategic role for the survival of capitalists, and more so within the economies which strive to, and in a way have to, integrate with the capitalist world economy (Ercan, 2003). By the new labor law issued in 2003, Turkey has legalized its process of passing to a “new employment regime based upon less secure and individualized contracts, geographical dispersal, and organizational fragmentation of the workplace, and greater flexibility both in hours worked and length of employment” (Hudson, 2001, 239). During the 80's, both in the world and the country, labor market and workforce **flexibility** was increasingly emphasized as a means to achieving corporate competitive success across the entire spectrum of formal capitalist economy. While, as Hudson argues,

“for the core labor force, the dominant form of flexibility was functional, linked with ideas of multi-skilling or multitasking, for the periphery group, flexibility was predominantly experienced as numerical, as individuals moved in and out of work depending upon the fluctuating level of demand for labor” (Hudson, 2001, 237).

Under crisis-prone accumulation conditions of Turkey, however, flexibilization process seems not to be limited to the peripheral workforce. The capitalists do not want the line between the core and the peripheral drawn so sharp in a fragile economy. Blurred and manipulative lines are much more effective in adaptation of the workforce to fluctuating markets, at the expense of job security for the ‘higher’ purposes of profitability. Core workers in the BOIE are worried that, after the law, implementations for expanding flexibility will gain speed, and their standard contracts covered by collective-bargaining will begin to shatter. In this respect, we can once more underline that while “flexibility is the language of the employer; **risk** is the language of the employee” (Hudson, 2001, 237).

Flexibility takes various forms:

- a. Organization of the work (hours worked)
- b. Individualization of contracts and working conditions (length of employment)
- c. Subcontracting, outsourcing, home-working
- d. Multi-skilling or multi-tasking

We will here restrict ourselves to the first and second types of flexibility in this section, to those which not only control the time of labor in workplace, but also have very important implications on control of the time in living place. This is of particular importance because capital extends its control over the labor power increasingly through controlling its time. It employs the strategy of **annihilating workers' space by time**, both in production and reproduction spheres. Increased control over labor time, in this respect, can be considered as a practice of exercising control and command over space by the capitalists. And it is so in form of two different aspects. **First**, extending command over organization and production of space overcomes the frictions in the labor and commodity markets through flexible provision of labor force tailored to the needs of the specific production level, achieving non-stop or underwork depending on the circumstances. And **second**, it divides the workers by length and conditions of employment, dissolving their organizational and collective action capacities in both spheres of production and reproduction. When looked from the standpoint of reproduction, demands of capitalist production increasingly penetrate the off-work world through defining work-time in ways that do not harmonize with the humanly social time of the living place, which consequently, have destructing implications on the use of living space. Control of labor time in production has direct consequences on the occupation of labor time in reproduction, when life is conceptualized in its integrity.

We have already said that we will discuss the first and second types of flexibility in relation to the new tools brought by the new labor law, and their consequences on the laborers' life as observed in the research field. In passing, however, we can make a short comment on the **third type**, namely, the **subcontracting** relations as well. As we have seen in section IV.II.II., nearly all our workers are employed on permanent basis. But when asked to comment on the subcontracting relations in their firms, they state that, particularly since the 2000's, subcontracting relations in secondary tasks to production, such as the auxiliary tasks of cleaning, kitchen, building-repair, etc. and the pre-or-post production tasks of machine-setting, shipment, stacking, paint-shop, junk-piling, forklift-operating, are becoming widespread in the big factories. Only 26 percent report non-existence of subcontracting relations in their workplace, most of them being in smaller firms. In addition to above, we find 20 percent of the workers reporting existence of subcontracting in primary tasks directly related with production as well, like in montage-line works, etc. These subcontracting workers are distinguished by the permanently employed in terms of their lower education and wage levels, lack of social benefits and union, unclean-filthy working conditions, and being "treated as second-class people doing the hardest tasks". A few assert

that they are a threat to their jobs, while most rather state that there is no dialog between the permanent and subcontracting workers due to both social and physical impediments. It seems that though in BOIE subcontracting in production is not that common yet by 2004, it is expected by workers to expand in the coming years due to the encouragement by the new labor law. Yet, its divisive effects are already observed among the workers in the same workplace.

V.I.I. Overtime Work, Shift System and Individualization of Contracts

The **first** type of tool for flexibility is related to the organization of the work in the workplace. The target is longer and arbitrarily arrangible working-hours. Hence, daily working-time is increased from 8 to 11 hours. **Balancing** of working-hours (denkleştirme), **compensation** work (telafi çalışması), **overtime-work** and the **shift system** are the main strategies employed for this purpose. The former two, brought by the new law, make distribution of daily hours-worked subject to arbitrary treatment of the employers.

In the ‘**balancing** of working-hours’, weekly hours-worked can be distributed to each working day in different proportions; 11 hours’ work being the daily limit. The average weekly hours-worked should not exceed the legal weekly working-time (45 hours) within any four-month period. While in the older law 8 hours was the daily working-time limit, and the exceeding hours were subject to overtime bonus, in this new regulation in some weeks hours-worked exceed 8 hours and not treated as overtime work. But for our specific interest here, we rather put emphasis on the effect of this arbitrariness on losing of control of the worker on his/her own time and space. In this way, the time off-work is made subservient to time at work. Similarly, in ‘**compensation** work’, the employer can stop work or reduce the working-hours under some ‘compulsory’ conditions which are open to interpretation of the employer. Within a two-month time, however, the non-worked hours might be asked by the employer to be compensated and this cannot be regarded as overtime work. In both deregulation mechanisms playing on ‘time’, we see ‘creative’ inventions of capital to impose overtime work, though not naming it so, and not paying it so.

Since, as we see in the case study that regular **overtime** work is a very common experience for the workers, it is understandable that capitalists look for ways of not paying it. Overtime work is allowed in the law in cases when the national interest, the quality of work or the high production level necessitates, while the underlying fact behind this rhetorical assertion is that it is more profitable to do as much work as possible with less people. Overtime is

particularly highly observed in automotive sector, with 81 percent against the 43 percent in textile, ranging between one-to-four overtime weeks a month. For 20 percent, an average working week reaches up to 60-90 hours, against the 45 hours envisaged by the law. 70 percent of the workers have only one-day weekend holiday, and 15 percent, mostly being in the automotive sector, tell that all Sundays are occupied by overtime work. As for the payments, for most workers in the sample overtime bonuses are paid with no problem, yet they add that most factories pay 25 percent more of the normal wage per-hour instead of the legal 50 percent. Moreover, despite the legal statement that consent of the worker should be asked, workers state that the employers threaten those who reject overtimes with dismissal. One automotive worker says “Even when there is not a direct threat, we all know that refusing overtime would stigmatize one to be used against him/her in a case of dispute”.

More than not, however, workers welcome the overtimes as extra income. They find themselves in a devil’s bargain. As Harvey puts it, they “connive or accede to their own exploitation in production in return for increased money power that gives them greater market freedoms and greater ability to control a portion of their own space and their own time” (Harvey, 1985, 254). They submit themselves to suffering from extreme physical and mental tiredness, in exchange for the liberty that money power gives. But when the overtime differential in wage is cut through ‘balancing’ and ‘compensation’, the exploitation and oppression will get deeper. At the time of the survey, these two regulations were not very well known by the workers, only a few stated that there had been attempts for ‘balancing’ in their workplaces, but faced with resistance of the workers and could not be carried out. Again few workers are aware that the employers have been considering it for a while and the new law would give them great support.

In addition to overtime work which denotes longer working hours, there is also another ‘efficiency’ tool, the **shift system** which rather denotes intensification of work through more effective use of the working-day. Shift system is a matter of great complaint among the workers due to its more dramatic effects on destroying one’s control on his/her own space and time in the living place. Rotation of working hours makes adaptation to both work and family/social life very difficult, especially the night work destroys their social life. Time-discipline of modern capitalism tries to reshape life in all scales of the community, family and body. Shift work causes many industrial diseases as well; tougher working conditions increase the herniated disk, crick, and nervous derangement cases and the accidents due to dizziness. “Very inhuman” they say “and unhealthy, you cannot get enough

sleep, meet friends, relatives or even your own wife and children". Workers are often absent when important family activities are to be performed. As one worker in Yıldırım's work summarizes;

"Workingman's family life is submitted to different rules and hours. In a short time, every neighbor, relative, friend and family member has to learn this. The visits are arranged according to the day-shifts. When it is the night-shift, I cannot endure any neighbor at home talking when I am trying to sleep. Yet, the worst is that I cannot spend time with my children" (Yıldırım, 1996).

Similar claims are made by nearly all BOIE workers. When they are at night shift, they cannot see their children for weeks. For working women with children, the shift system turns into a total nightmare. They resent that they fall apart with their children, both physically and psychologically, the children are becoming alienated to their mothers. They have to call down a relative or a babysitter to look after them, and it is not easy to arrange all these, and do housework at the same time. In families with more than one wage-earner (both spouse working) challenges of coordination among the family members become sharper still. When workers are asked to comment on women working outside, most emphasize these issues and say that "I work overtime and in shifts, and get so tired that I long for a plate of food in front of me when I get home. It is the only pleasure of my life. If I were to lose it, I would not be able to live". Some others say "my wife deals with the children also on my part, since I cannot find the time". The role of women as caring mother of the family is reinforced under such conditions, and the gender roles sharpened.

Another important effect of the time-regime brought by shifts is observed on deregulation of the **weekend holidays**, which are not placed at the end of the week any more. Week or month concept of the worker is restructured when the day for the week holiday is determined by the employer. This makes adaptation to the time of the wider social life much harder. In the new shift systems, particularly in the 'septet' (yedili) and the 'sliding' (itelemeli) ones, the day for holiday continuously changes. In the sliding system, holiday is made in the 8th day after each seven days work, thus a worker is made to work for an extra seven days in each year. In the septet system, on the other hand, the weekend holiday matches with Sunday only once in six weeks (www.evrensel.net).

In the sample, mainly three different shift systems are observed; **double**, **ternary**, and the **septet**. Septet system is prevalent among the biggest textile factories (Korteks, Polylen). Some automotive workers (OYAK-Renault) are also distressed by the rumor that their firms would also change into that system. In this system, workers are divided into seven groups,

and each group goes on holiday in consequent days of the week. Hence, the production never stops and the employer gets rid of Sunday overtime bonuses. It is one of the worst techniques in terms of maximizing exploitation by means of increasing the hours-worked per worker a month. As production level increases, size of the work force decreases in the factory, which results in collective dismissals while shifting to this system. Double shift system, more common in the automotive sector, brings two-day weekend holidays, the first of which nearly always is spent as the overtime day. It is regarded by the workers as a very tiring, but gainful system in economic terms, since one works 9 hours a day, in addition to Saturdays. And lastly, the ternary shift, the most commonly observed shift in the field with 40 percent, has regular one-day Sunday holidays, with Sunday overtimes once or twice a month.

Table 22. Shift system by sector

	sectors			Total
	textile	automotive	other (food, packaging..)	
permanent day-time	18 33,3%	9 13,8%	4 50,0%	31 24,4%
double shift	3 5,6%	20 30,8%	2 25,0%	25 19,7%
ternary shift	14 25,9%	34 52,3%	2 25,0%	50 39,4%
septet system	17 31,5%	-	-	17 13,4%
irregular shift	1 1,9%	2 3,1%	-	3 2,4%
quad shift	1 1,9%	-	-	1 ,8%
Total	54 100,0%	65 100,0%	8 100,0%	127 100,0%

Above, the distribution of shifts by sectors might be followed. We see that 75 percent of the workers are subject to a shift-system. In other words, three in every four worker is vulnerable to these unpredictable time-regime changes and have to adapt their daily lives accordingly. This fragmenting of the workers into little groups not only diminishes organizational capacity in the workplace, but also in the living place, all time and space opportunities as breeding grounds for the solidarity lines are increasingly destroyed through **differentiating the time-world** of the laborers. And as a further divisive practice, we should also note that union representatives and administrative personnel are generally not made subject to these shift systems.

Individualization of contracts and working conditions is another important tool of the Labor Law to fragment the working-class. In our sample, except for a few young workers with 'trial-time' and 'seasonal' contracts, the rest works on full-time, non-specific time

contracts. And most workers are not aware that the law would bring new type of contracts, individualized as specific and non-specific time, trial-time, full-time, part-time, and work-on-call (çağrı üzerine çalışma). Specific, non-specific and trial-time contracts organize the length of employment. Under decreased job security conditions, workers spend most of their time searching a job, and when found it is not easy to predict what will happen after the term of the contract ends. Full-time, part-time, and work-on-call contracts, on the other hand, control labor time on daily basis. Particularly the work-on-call form of part-time work is a serious attack at the worker's capability of organizing his/her living space. In that, workers will be called to work when there is high workload, and worker will have to be at service of the employer at the time s/he needs. By these kinds of regulations, workers are tried to be deprived of any decision power over their own material conditions. 'Turnover of the workplace' or 'lending of workers to another firm' by establishing temporary work relations, which was reported by 16 percent in the sample, likewise, extend the commodification of labor power. By all these regulations, established social relations both at work and off-work are dispersed, organizational capacity against capital is weakened, and control on organization of time and space is lost on part of the laborers.

V.II. CLASS STRUGGLES OVER DISTRIBUTION, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION

The tension between free geographical mobility and organized reproduction processes within a confined territory is an internal contradiction of capitalism and how that tension is resolved depends on the state of the class struggle between different fractions of labor and capital. Class struggle is a vital force with capacity for producing instability in favor of improving the conditions of workers confined within particular labor and housing markets. It includes all kinds of survival strategies and power struggles employed by labor in a capitalist society to define its own living standards; all those around **competitive individualism**, **community consciousness** or **class consciousness**. Therefore, prior to the shifting space relations of the next section, in this section, we will examine struggles given around local dependency which play crucial role in shaping of the class struggle, due to that, capacity for geographical mobility is defined to large extent by these assets and intangible restraints that are owned. We will explore the socio-spatial strategies employed by labor, how it reproduces or manipulates the accessibility conditions provided for itself; in other words, how it employs family, community or class relations in struggles over accessibility to labor market, occupational mobility, quality of labor power, household economy, and

collective action. This will give an idea about the structural capacity of our working-class communities for building different bases of solidarities, and their implications on connectedness on class-basis.

V.II.I. Struggles over Mobility in the Labor Market

V.II.I.I. Accessibility to the Labor Market

From the standpoint of the workers, social networks are very effectively utilized in getting the factory work. For almost 80 percent of the workers, either a friend or a relative has been involved as a **mediator** in getting the job. It reaches up to 87 percent in Akpınar and drops down to 66 percent among the Kurdish workers in Emek. In both neighborhoods, however, only around 27 percent mention kinship bonds, this being particularly less than what is expected in Emek where those kinds of bonds are known to be stronger. New acquaintances (50 percent) play larger role in this sense, compared to family members or relatives. And among them, role of the friends from the neighborhood (30 percent) should be highlighted; most of them being an employee in the applied factory. It can be said that worker friends (40 percent) are more helpful as intermediators than the acquainted managers, chiefs, or factory officers. While connection with higher status staff in the factory is mostly observed among Akpınar workers (37 percent), Emek rather cites mediators from outside the factory (21 percent). And one important remark, vocational high-school graduates seem to have fewer tendencies for utilizing mediators.

Table 23. Where do you know the mediator from / Work situation of the mediator

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
friend from the neighborhood	8	32	40	worker in the factory	14	38	52
	26,6%	32,6%	30,4%		46,6%	38,7%	40,6%
family member-relative	8	27	35	manager in the factory	5	6	11
	26,6%	27,5%	27,3%		16,6%	6,2%	8,5%
old employer/chief	1	5	6	chief in the factory	1	4	5
	3,3%	5,1%	4,6%		3,3%	4,1%	3,9%
friend of a relative	7	7	14	middle-lower rank officer in the factory	5	7	12
	23,3%	7,2%	10,9%		16,6%	7,2%	9,3%
old workmate	1	2	3	influential person from outside factory	1	11	12
	3,3%	2,0%	2,3%		3,3%	11,3%	9,3%
friend/schoolmate	1	1	2	other	-	8	8
	3,3%	1,0%	1,5%			8,2%	6,2%
none	4	24	28	none	4	24	28
	13,3%	24,5	21,8%		13,3%	24,5	21,8%
Total	30	98	128	Total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

Among the sample, 40 percent have at least one relative in his/her workplace, the ratio of Local workers having relatives is observed higher than that of other ethnic groups. When asked the number of townsmen (hemşehri) in the factory, the ratio having at least one townsman reaches up to 65 percent, most of them having more than 20-30 fellow-townsmen as workmates. Among all, by 80 percent Blacksea workers seem to be choosing rather the factories where their townsmen are largely recruited, followed by Local workers (63 percent), against the Kurdish and Other workers with 45 percent.

Besides these social relations, we also question the effect of physical **proximity to industrial zone** in terms of providing an accessibility strategy for the workers. Akpınar workers do not think (88 percent) that living in that neighborhood increases the possibility of finding industrial jobs, though, some agree that employers prefer those living closer. 72 percent of Emek, however, acknowledge the advantages of proximity in job finding. Since most Akpınar workers were already related with the industrial labor market before moving to Akpınar, and have relatively high job securities, they do not seem to be interested in the physical proximity as an advantage. It is the same for younger workers, who rather rely on their vocational-education. Organic ties between Akpınar residential community and BOIE have not been that established yet. Whatever the case, workers prefer living closer still for mainly three reasons. **First of all**, after a hard working-day every minute spent on the way is directly stolen from the time to socially reproduce, refresh themselves. **Secondly**, this is for Emek, living close increases the possibility of finding job in the factories. They can look for work at any free time wandering around on foot, at no cost, and be informed immediately about the vacancies announced on the factory notice boards. One can easily be informed about them from the neighbors and relatives who work there as well (in coffee-shops, local townsmen associations, etc.). Besides, small-sized factories might also prefer workers living close, for it reduces their transportation costs. **Thirdly**, existing friends or townsmen in the factories act as referees for the new employees who are asked to provide three during the formal application process. It is easier to get reference from a neighbor or relative working in that factory.

Now let us look at what these all might mean from the standpoint of the employers. Şenyapılı emphasizes that kinship and ethnic relations are used by employers as a **recruitment strategy** to establish social control mechanisms producing docility on part of the workers. The transfer of social relations of the living-place to the workplace is done on purpose in order to create a distinct non-militant workplace culture (Parlak, 1996). “This

serves both to exclusion of the militants, and binding of the new recruits to behave responsibly by virtue of their indebtedness to or fear from their fellow worker referees” (Parlak, 1996, 132). As one respondent puts it “My uncle would kill me at home, if he heard that I did not work hard or disobeyed my superiors in the factory”. Some workers sarcastically state that the factories function as marriage offices, most workers being either spouse or relative of the other. Even people from the union like the shop-stewards are told to be used for creating such indebtedness. The statement that “We would not bite the hand that feeds us” shows how well this system works (Yıldırım, 1994, 302). Further still, as Şenyapılı argues unity and harmony potentials of the relatives and kins might be exploited particularly in tough physical works, adding however that, this solidarity might also have counter effects like reinforcing the resistance against the foreman in the shop-floor (Şenyapılı, 1980, 13).

There are other strategies adopted by the employers as well. Workers generally agree that education, particularly the vocational one, plays an increasingly eliminative role in the expanding labor market. Most workers believe that, despite the multiple-choice test, the interview and on-the-job demonstration demanded in application to big factories, this pseudo procedure is rather utilized as a legitimization mechanism by recruiters to hinder the ‘torpil’s (‘torpedo’ denoting the support of an influential person) or the inclination for educated workers. Primary-school graduates (50 percent) and the unskilled (20 percent) find it harder to get jobs in factories (local workers’ emphasis). Lack of ‘torpil’ (10 percent), being from the ‘East’ or over the age of 25, are also regarded as disadvantageous attributes. Our study shares the observation in Nichols’ research that easterners and particularly the Kurdish people are to a large extent discriminated in Bursa industrial labor market (Nichols, 2005). Since it is very hard to find Kurdish factory workers, they are limited to 16 percent in our sample.

In sum, it might be concluded that in the BOIE “modern institutionalized recruitment strategies and traditional strategies based on ethnic-kinship relations go hand in hand”, as a double strategy employed by the firms which diversify their resources for enhanced manipulation capacity over the labor market (Şenyapılı, 1980, 13).

V.II.I.II. Occupational Mobility

Inter-Generational Mobility

Another dimension, besides spatial mobility, related to transfer of market and class capacity is concerned with occupational mobility patterns. We should start with exploring the inter-generational mobility of workers by comparing their class positions with that of their fathers' first.

Occupational distribution and **work situation of the fathers'** are strikingly similar in both communities. We find approximately 45 percent of the fathers self-employed, only two fathers being employers. Fathers' engagement in agricultural activities (30 percent) is also not that high as would be expected in a largely migrant community. And only 1/3 of those farmers are seen not to have migrated and stayed in the hometown. Only 5 percent are artisans or craftsmen. Slightly more than half of the fathers are engaged in waged works, mostly (44 percent) as manual workers, and 8 percent as white-collar workers (civil servants). Industrial work is significantly high in both settlements, with 46 percent in Akpınar and 30 percent in Emek. Difference between the ratios of industrial work is compensated by construction work in Emek. We can also follow the pattern from the social-security adherences of the fathers, half being attached to SSK (social security for workers) and 37 percent with no attachment in each neighborhood. As for the rest it is rather 'Emekli Sandığı' (social security for public servants) with 10 percent in Akpınar against 'Bağkur' (social security for self-employed) with 13 percent in Emek. When we examine the youngest group among the sample (80-84 born), we find workers in Akpınar all as children of waged-workers, while in Emek, 33 percent have self-employed fathers as well. A more marked trend towards blue-collar waged work is observed in Akpınar. This situation indicates that in Akpınar chances for upward class mobility are weaker and class positions relatively more stabilized.

In sum, we find that 55 percent of the workers come from working-class households, and for them the pattern of wage labor is rather consolidated. 14 percent have experienced downward class mobility largely from self-employment status. And the remaining 30 percent have experienced a first generation rural to urban proletarianization process.

Table 24. Father's work situation / Desired job for the children

		neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
		A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
Waged	factory worker	12	15	27	engineer, doctor, lawyer, manager	8	39	47
		40,0%	15,5%	21,3%		24,2%	33,3%	31,2
	construction worker	-	15	15	whatever they want	16	21	37
			15,5%	11,8%		48,4%	17,9%	24,6
	workshop worker	2	12	14	teacher, nurse, police, soldier	6	26	32
		6,7%	12,4%	11,0%		18,1%	22,2%	21,3
	lower rank civil servant	3	3	6	civil servant, white-collar work	-	14	14
		10,0%	3,1%	4,7%			11,9%	9,3
	middle-higher rank factory officer	-	2	2	whatever except under command	2	8	10
			2,1%	1,6%		6,0%	6,8%	6,6
middle rank civil servant	-	2	2	tradesman	1	3	4	
		2,1%	1,6%		3,0%	2,5%	2,6	
distributor, cashier, cook	-	2	2	football player	-	2	2	
		2,1%	1,6%			1,7%	1,3	
unemployed	-	2	2	factory worker	-	2	2	
		2,1%	1,6%			1,7%	1,3	
Self-employed	farmer	9	30	39	craftsman	-	1	1
		30,0%	30,9%	30,7%			0,8%	0,6
	shopkeeper, driver, transporter, vendor	2	7	9	small-scale manufacturer	-	1	1
		6,7%	7,2%	7,0%			0,8%	0,6
tailor-shoemaker-welder-miller	2	5	7	-				
	6,7%	5,2%	5,5%					
Employer	transportation firm owner, hotel owner	-	2	2	-			
			2,1%	1,6%				
Total		30	97	127	*Total	33	117	150
		100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

*Note: Some workers suggest more than one job

When asked to choose an **occupation for their children**, Akpınar workers display a more tolerant attitude, half of them leaving the choice completely to their children against the 18 percent in Emek. 31 percent, more being in Emek envisage professions which require higher education, such as medicine, engineering, law, etc. 21 percent mention lower-grade public works, like teaching, nursing, public security, etc. The job spectrum in Emek appears wider than Akpınar. Jobs like civil service, crafts, manufacture, and factory work are not seen in Akpınar. However, in an overall evaluation, we see that only 10 percent in total explicitly state non-waged jobs. Ambition for self-employment or public-works with job security is clearly recognizable. Neither employer status (except for one) nor factory work (except for two) is envisaged for the children. But in reality, we find 5 of the 9 working children as factory workers, 2 of them lower-rank waged in service sector, and another 2 unemployed.

When directly asked whether ‘becoming a professional’, ‘setting up own work’ or ‘becoming a worker’ is more likely for their children, Akpınar and Emek affirm each category in the following ratios respectively: 63, 83; 73, 29; 43, 24. Akpınar workers not only have stronger entrepreneurial ambitions for their children but also are more

comfortable with their becoming a worker, and interestingly, less optimistic for professional jobs. Emek, on the other hand, highly aspires for professional jobs, and does neither prefer entrepreneurial jobs, nor factory work. This situation might indicate that Akpınar is more aware of the limits to educational opportunities for a working-class family, and recognizes the higher possibility of factory work for their children. Yet, displeasure with working under command is so much that, they still wish jobs with more control over the work process. But Emek, with a lower economic level, might be seeing education as the only chance for upward social mobility for their children. Most Emek workers say that they would force their children for education even if they did not want to, while this concern is not that high in Akpınar. ‘Job security’, on the other hand, is valued a remarkably higher asset in both neighborhoods against ‘high income’ or ‘status’. It ranks first with 60 percent. ‘Status’ follows (27 percent), and lastly comes the ‘high income’ (10 percent). In parallel with the findings above, we see ‘job security’ relatively more valued in Akpınar compared to the ‘status’ in Emek.

Lifetime Mobility

Since we have already examined the general structure of the labor market in terms of job stability, frequency of work changes and reasons in section IV.II.II., we will restrict the analysis here with the pattern of past work experience in relation to class mobility.

If one general characteristic of the local labor market is becoming familiar with industrial work through apprenticeship and casual work, the other is that, once entered into the industrial labor market, the boundary of mobility chances are drawn by industrial works to a large extent. A person might enter into the market at most at the age of 25, and most of the time tries to stay there since s/he cannot take the risk of long absences from the market. Finding job becomes harder at higher ages, especially when one lacks the required experience which is associated by the length of industrial work. In the table below, we observe that 124 of the 151 (82 percent) works after the first factory work again are factory works, and most of the rest are generally works which might be considered as temporary that are preferred during the intervening unemployment periods. Only 17 cases might be regarded as attempts for class mobility, towards self-employed and employer (only 1 person) status. As for ‘before the first factory work’, 76 cases out of 171 are seen in self-employed and employer (only 2 persons) status. These mostly casual, instable and insecure works, however, are left as soon as entrance into the long term consolidation pattern of blue-collar wage labor occurs.

Table 25 . Occupational mobility pattern

	Jobs before the first factory work						Jobs after the first factory work					
	Work before the first factory work		Second before the first factory work		Third before the first factory work		One before the current work		Two before the current work		Three before the current work	
	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
factory worker	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	50	6	33	2	17
workshop worker (9-29 employees) worker	8	16	3	5	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	1
busboy, waiter, salesclerk, shoeshine, bakery, security	7	25	1	5	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	-
office boy, accountant, secretary, bank officer	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
lower-rank civil servant	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
higher-rank waged	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
driver, drummer, street-bazaar vendor	1	3	2	3	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-
shoemaker, car repair, carpenter, electrician, barber	2	6	6	3	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-
construction worker, installer, house painter	1	13	1	9	-	6	-	5	-	-	-	2
small-scale producer	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
small-scale retailer	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	1
farmer, agricultural worker, shepherd	5	11	1	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	25	79	16	34	4	13	19	63	7	38	2	22

Table 26. Class mobility pattern

	One before the current work		Two before the current work		Three before the current work		Works before the first factory work	
	A	E	A	E	A	E	A	E
waged	17	55	6	35	2	18	23	62
self-employed	1	8	1	2	-	3	16	58
employer	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
family employed	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	6
Total	19	63	7	38	2	21	45	126

Fear of losing the job is observed only among 1/3 of the workers (A: 21, E: 35 percent), mainly due to lack of job security in private sector, unstable economic conditions, and the high unemployment rates. Fear rises gradually in correlation with age and particularly among the Kurdish workers. Here, however, it seems more interesting to be able to understand why 2/3 of the workers feel more confident in terms of their employment situation. Most of them believe that they can do any work or they can easily find work. Those are usually the skilled workers who own a craft (Renault workers particularly) and

constitute 40 percent of the confident group. Most of the rest explain this situation in relation to workplace based merits, such as high job security or production level (generally in Bosch, Nergis). Some workers simply believe that they like him/her in the workplace. 5 workers think that they can set up own business in case of unemployment. Only 2 workers refer to new Labor Code as a guarantee against dismissals. When answers are categorized by sectors to investigate the general opinion that automotive sector is more secure than textile, we find no meaningful correlation. There also seems to be no significant difference between the skilled and unskilled categories. It is rather being foremen, or bureau worker that makes a difference in favor of feeling higher job security. Firm size also plays a role in this respect. Big (>3000) and smaller factories (30-100) both give more confidence in the sense that former provides good reference for other jobs, and latter sets up paternalist relations with the workers. Once transferred to permanent workforce, s/he is unlikely to be made redundant unless troubled with his/her superiors. We should also note that fear of dismissal is considerably higher among regular high school graduates with 53 percent, against the 30 percent among the vocational high and primary-secondary school graduates. These findings might be interpreted as that present jobs of the workers do not necessarily provide strong local dependency for the industrial workers in our sample.

Table 27. Reason of job security feeling / Intended work in case of quit or dismissal

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
high job security in my workplace	6	7	13	factory worker	17	58	75
	27,3%	11,5%	15,7%		56,7%	59,2%	58,6%
I can do any work / I've other crafts as well	2	9	11	shopkeeper, tradesman	7	17	24
	9,1%	14,8%	13,3%		23,3%	17,3%	18,8%
They like me at the workplace	1	11	12	driver, transporter	-	8	8
	4,5%	18,0%	14,5%			8,2%	6,3%
I am experienced / have good references	1	9	10	construction worker, installer, hous painter	-	4	4
	4,5%	14,8%	12,0%			4,1%	3,1%
I have a craft at hand	4	5	9	secretary, accountant, lower rank officer,	1	3	4
	18,2%	8,2%	10,8%		3,3%	3,1%	3,1%
high production level in my workplace	3	5	8	would not work / retired	4	3	7
	13,6%	8,2%	9,6%		13,3%	3,1%	5,4%
I'm honest-loyal	1	5	6	casual work	-	2	2
	4,5%	8,2%	7,2%			2,0%	1,6%
I can set up my own business	1	4	5	workshop worker	-	2	2
	4,5%	6,6%	6,0%			2,0%	1,6%
I am old, waiting for retirement	3	1	4	home-based production	-	1	1
	13,6%	1,6%	4,8%			1,0%	,8%
High work opportunities in Turkey	-	3	3	never thought about it	1	-	1
		4,9%	3,6%		3,3%		,8%
New labor law prevents dismissals	-	2	2	-	-	-	-
		3,3%	2,4%				
Total	22	61	83	Total	30	98	128
	100,	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

Only 22 percent have **intention to quit work** within 5 years (excluding the 10 percent who will retire), mostly for reasons related to dissatisfaction of wage or working conditions, etc. This again is evenly distributed among the sectors, but not among the ethnic groups, in that, no one Local worker seems to be dissatisfied. One worker says that “those who complete the first three years in the same workplace generally prefer to stay there until they retire. But before that, hope for getting a better paid work is at the forefront.” In our case also 56 percent of those between the ages of 20-25 compose the dissatisfied-group searching for better work. **Intended work situation** in case of quit or dismissal is factory work again for 60 percent. 25 percent think of small-scale retail, trades, or transportation, etc., only 3 percent expect a lower-rank office job, and the rest, temporary works like construction, etc. Tendency for factory work does not change according to ethnic identity, but it is observed that self-employment is rather preferred by Kurdish workers. Lowness of entrepreneurial aspirations shows that there is a relatively strong perception of the decreased chances for social mobility, and this does not change by age. 70 percent of the workers think that they will as of now be in the same position in the factory, while 30 percent, expect a higher status responsible for more workers in production. Particularly ‘usta’s (master workman) have such ambitions for progress to become a foreman, and those between the ages of 25-30. It, then, gradually decreases by age. As emphasized above, those between the ages 20-25 seem to be less optimistic about their future in the current workplace.

V.II.I.III. Quality of the Labor Power: Educational Mobility

Table 28. Education level of the father / Education level of his/her own

	Father's			His/her own			Neighborhood	
	neighborhood		Total	neighborhood		Total	General	
	A.pınar	Emek		A.pınar	Emek		Akpınar	Emek
primary school	20	56	76	7	41	48	2747	9816
	66,7%	57,7%	59,8%	23,3%	41,8%	37,5%	32%	43%
secondary school	-	9	9	5	18	23	1046	1995
		9,3%	7,1%	16,7%	18,4%	18,0%	12%	8%
regular high school	1	-	1	2	13	15	1384	1549
	3,3%		,8%	6,7%	13,3%	11,7%	16%	7%
vocational high school	1	2	3	15	24	39	847	492
	3,3%	2,1%	2,4%	50,0%	24,5%	30,5%	10%	2%
arts and crafts school	3	1	4	-	-	-	57	34
	10,0%	1,0%	3,1%				1%	0%
upper school	1	-	1	1	1	2	979	480
	3,3%		,8%	3,3%	1,0%	1,6%		
university	-	1	1	-	1	1	11%	2%
		1,0%	,8%		1,0%	,8%		
Literate	3	16	19	-	-	-	1361	5910
	10,0%	16,5%	15,0%				16%	26%
illiterate	1	12	13	-	-	-	287	2571
	3,3%	12,4%	10,2%				3%	11%
Total	30	97	127	30	98	128	8709	22847
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0	100,0

Workers in the sample are more educated than their fathers as would be expected. And most Emek workers say that they would force their children for education even if they did not want to, while this concern is not that high in Akpınar (see section V.II.I.II for the desired jobs for the children). Education of female children is supported by all the workers. Due to economic difficulty, however, 4 out of 101 respondents reported to have terminated their daughters' training.

With 42 percent, high school degree has a relatively higher share among the education levels of the respondents. And when considered that **vocational high-school** graduates constitute the 30 percent (A: 50, E: 25 percent), we identify an increasing trend of correlation between industrial work and vocational education. Particularly educational situation of the younger workers (1980-84) in the sample and that of the respondents' children signify this fact. Among the 42 children over 15 years of age, 8 go to upper-school (yüksek okul) and university, 20 to vocational high-school, 10 to regular high school, and only 4 have graduated from primary school. Regarding the decreased chances for higher education provided for vocational school graduates, it might be assumed that they will have more tendencies for industrial work. A similar higher rate of vocational education is observed among 1955-64 born workers, the rate sharply decreases among 1965-69 born and gradually rises again during the following generations, highest being among the 1980-84 born. Yet, we should note that majority of the workers employed in BOIE are still the migrants from Blacksea, Middle or Eastern Anatolia regions mostly educated in the primary or secondary schools of their hometowns.

Vocational high-school graduates in our sample display more occupational mobility in the labor market compared to primary school graduates. Since they are preferred by the employers, they have more opportunities for seeking better jobs. Accordingly, it is observed that vocational high-school graduates seem to have fewer tendencies for utilizing mediators to get a job. As for 'fear of unemployment', on the other hand, with 30 percent they show no significant difference from other educational groups except for the regular high-school graduates with 53 percent. Workers generally agree that education, particularly the vocational one, plays an increasingly eliminative role in the expanding labor market. Primary-school graduates and the unskilled find it harder to get jobs in factories (local workers' emphasis). There are rumors going in automotive sector that in the New Year, they will make all those older workers retired and dismiss those other than from the vocational high-schools. Under existence of a massive reserve army seeking for employment in regular

industrial work, education, particularly the vocational one as a scarce resource for laborers, is increasingly utilized by employers as a selective tool against a relatively more plenty resource, the ‘work experience’.

Capitalist system tries increasingly to synchronize their employment policies with the education policies. Employers prefer such control over the quality of workforce in three respects. **First**, they demand skilled workforce to reduce their production costs emanating from unskilled labor. Advanced technology does not necessitate more knowledge (maybe for a smaller section of the workforce), but more skill in terms of flexibility, productivity and adaptability. Laborers should be able to adapt swiftly to newer tasks and to newer machines with a perspective of life-long training (Ercan, 2006). **Second**, school brings up new workers who are inculcated to be ‘good workers’ from small. Capitalists launch or support programs for the modification of labor qualities in ways that appear amenable to them (Harvey, 1985b, 131). Qualities such as discipline, work attitudes, respect for authority, loyalty, and cooperation might be ensured through education, as it plays crucial role in consciousness formation processes. Students are given study grants and made indebted through these mechanisms (Liselilerin Sesi, 2006). It is interesting to note that, also in our sample it is particularly the vocational high-school graduates who emphasize the ‘common interest of the workers with the employers’. Rather than conflict of interest, they employ the rhetoric of mutual dependency relation, father-son relationship, being part of the same whole, etc. Compared to other educational groups, they are the ones who rather approve the privatization policies and take a less critical stance towards the new labor law. **Third**, they provide young cheap labor; exploitation starts from the school-age. For example, Atatürk Industrial Vocational High School located in BOIE has more than 4000 students, who are to become apprentices (stajyer) and then workers in the factories of the estate. One student states that, though they do the same tasks as other workers, and sometimes even tougher ones, they get 125 YTL (nearly 1/3 of the minimum wage in 2005), and their insurance premiums are paid by the school, not the employers (www.evrensel.net).

V.II.II. Struggles over Household Economy

As Harvey puts it, “the family, with some internal adjustment, managed to preserve itself as an institution at the same time as it played a vital role in the adaptation of individuals to conditions of wage labor and the money calculus of urban life” (Harvey, 1985a, 258). Here we will focus upon how that adaptation takes place in our communities and the structural

limits to formation of diversified consumption classes in terms of both the values of labor power and the consumption habits.

In our sample, household incomes range between 320-3.000 YTL (271-2.542 \$), $\frac{3}{4}$ being below 1.200 YTL (1.017 \$). While half of the household incomes in Emek do not exceed 900 YTL (763 \$), it is only 13 percent below that line in Akpınar. When the **household incomes** and the **wages** of the respondents are compared, the 24 percent over 900 YTL in wages, increases to 58 percent in household incomes. In the income groups over 900 YTL, this corresponds to a rise of 38 percent in Emek against the 18 percent in Akpınar. It is seen that the inequality in wages between the two communities is compensated through the merging of various types of incomes by Emek workers.

Table 29. Amount of net wage (bonus added) / Household income

Net wage (YTL)	neighborhood		Total	Household income (YTL)	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
320-600	7	67	74	320-600	2	22	24
	24,1%	68,4%	58,3%		6,7%	22,4%	18,8%
601-900	2	20	22	601-900	2	28	30
	6,9%	20,4%	17,3%		6,7%	28,6%	23,4%
901-1.200	15	8	23	901-1.200	13	30	43
	51,7%	8,2%	18,1%		43,3%	30,6%	33,6%
1.201-1.500	5	3	8	1.201-1.500	7	8	15
	17,2%	3,1%	6,3%		23,3%	8,2%	11,7%
-	-	-	-	1.501-3000	6	10	16
					20,0%	10,2%	12,5%
Total	29	98	127	Total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

Table 30. Number of wage earners / Household size

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
1	28	53	81	1-2	-	5	5
	93,3%	54,1%	63,3%			5%	3,9%
2	1	35	36	3-4	21	49	70
	3,3%	35,7%	28,1%		70,0%	49,4%	54,6%
3	1	7	8	5-6	9	34	43
	3,3%	7,1%	6,3%		30,0%	34,6%	33,5%
4	-	1	1	7-8	-	4	4
		1,0%	0,8%			4,0%	3,1%
5	-	2	2	9 and more	-	6	6
		2,0%	1,6%			6,1%	4,6%
Total	30	98	128	Total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

Now let us try to sum up the main **income generation strategies** in the two communities. **First of all**, we find that there are generally one-bread-winner households in Akpınar, noting that there are no women respondents against the 18 percent in Emek. Half of the families in Emek, on the other hand, have more than one-bread-winner. Emek households'

main strategy to increase the reproductive powers of the family seems to be the engaging of more family members into the labor market. But it is not the woman or child employment in question; rather we see parents or brother-sisters of the extended families in the work force. Accordingly, the average household size is found higher in Emek (E: 4,9; A: 4,2). But still the nuclear family structure is prevalent with 80 percent in Emek and 90 percent in Akpınar. Role of the women as ‘housewife’ continues for 84 percent of the married male workers. Only 11 percent have wives as factory workers, in the same proportions in both settlements. But together with the female workers nearly all of them married to industrial workers, the ratio of factory worker couples reaches up to 19 percent in total. Kurdish and Local families seem to be more resistant against the outside work of women. Women are generally allowed to work until marriage or pregnancy. Under these circumstances, 45 percent of the wives are told to have worked in the past mostly in the factories or workshops. Besides, 63 percent of the single women workers are also planning to quit work by marriage. So it seems that pre-marriage savings of women laborers rather serve as the capital invested into the foundation of the family institution.

Table 31. Ownership of other real-property * current ownership situation

	current ownership situation					Total
	tenant	family home	homeowner	father owns	relative owns	
none	21	13	24	24	-	80
	65,5%	72,2%	50,0%	77,4%		62,5%
1	8	3	13	6	2	34
	34,5%	16,7%	27,1%	19,4%	100,0%	26,6%
2-4	-	2	11	1	-	14
		11,1%	22,9%	3,2%		10,9%
Total	29	18	48	31	2	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

A **second type** of income generating strategy utilized by 15 percent in Emek is ‘renting out’, compared to the 10 percent in Akpınar, though it corresponds to a 75-150 YTL monthly additional income at average. 43 percent in Akpınar and 36 percent in Emek own a landed-property such as land, shop or flat other than his/her home. While house or land ownership is more common among Local and Others, it is land, flat or shops that Kurdish and Blacksea workers own. Emek generally prefers to rent out those new flats added on their apartments, while Akpınar spares the second property for children or for vacation purposes. We find that homeowners are the ones with higher opportunities to own a second or third landed-property. Tenants on the other hand by 34 percent also have lands to construct on. A **third type** of income is derived from the pensions belonging to parents in general; here the ratio in Akpınar is higher (A: 30; E: 20). Incomes obtained from agricultural activities or supplementary work are quiet ignorable in quantity. But still we might note the supplementary work at the level of 7 percent in each neighborhood, and

those 5 households with agricultural income in Emek. Home-based production is not observed.

Even after deploying various strategies to enhance the reproductive power of the household, for $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers, the total income still remains below 4 times of the minimum-wage (approx. 320 YTL (271 \$) in 2004), below three times of the poverty line defined by TÜİK (429 YTL (363 \$) in 2004), and below the necessary minimum income (1.173 YTL (994 \$), fixed by 2004 consumer prices) calculated by Birleşik Metal-İş (United Metalworkers' Union) for a four member family. The sample family in this minimum wage research has two children of 2 and 7 years of age, and one bread-winner father. In their report the union experts assert that the sample family, in order to be able to make a living with this income, has to make no extra expenses, such as buying new goods, paying installments, making repairs, going on vacations, buying toys to children, or receiving guests. It has to face with no accidents, health problems or any other kind of breakdown, and has to keep a perfect control over their budget. The only cultural activities envisaged for the parents are a daily newspaper and a once-a-month public-day cinema. Under these conditions, the breakdown of the budget is as follows:

Table 32. Monthly Total Expenditure

	YTL	%		YTL	%
Kitchen	485	41,3	Heating	61	9,5
House rent	342	29,2	Cleaning	42	
Garments	130	11,1	School	7	
Other	103	8,9	Total	1.173	100

Source: Birleşik Metal İşçileri Sendikası (2004)

We see that **kitchen expenses** with 41 percent constitute the major item, followed by the house rent with 29 percent. And these form the two items that working-class families try to minimize most as a survival strategy. When we examine the average monthly kitchen expenses per household in Akpınar and Emek, the quantities we get are considerably below that proposed by the union; namely, 328 and 264 YTL respectively (78 and 54 YTL per person). It is remarkable that working-class families cannot get the proper nourishment necessary for their mental and physical development, particularly in Emek. As for the **house rents**, at the time of the survey (summer, 2004), they ranged between 250-350 YTL (212-296 \$) in Akpınar, and 50-150 YTL (42-127 \$) in Emek. While Akpınar matches the average in the research, Emek seems to provide a very cheap housing market for the low-income families. And it is understandable why workers aspire for house-ownership as part of their survival strategies, when seen what a great relief it makes in the budget.

While half of the workers complain about the **cutbacks** in their expenditures due to economic difficulties, Akpınar workers together with the Kurdish workers in Emek (66 percent each) seem to be more sensitive against it. Blacksea workers with 37 percent are more comfortable with their economic conditions since they can compensate the cutbacks by rental incomes or extended family involvement in the labor market. Economic difficulty reveals itself more than in selling of goods or reduction on food-consumption (which is already at the minimum), in reduction on garment consumption, bills, frequency of social activities, and amount of savings, respectively. Workers strive for keeping basic material needs of survival at the expense of other basic social needs of humanly reproduction. Most workers bluntly state that they cannot cut down social activities since there are not any.

Under these circumstances, there seems to be very restricted chances for **savings** for anything other than the most basic needs, just as $\frac{1}{2}$ of the workers express that they can make no savings at all. Akpınar surpasses Emek in this respect (A: 66, E: 46 percent). In line with their highly lowered consumption habits, they rather try to invest the money in stocks and bonds, gold, foreign money, and less in landed-property (21 percent). Investment in landed-property drops down to 6 percent in Akpınar. Homeowners have greater tendency for another investment in property compared to the tenants.

Going into **debt** is a prevailing consumption market behavior (E: 86, A: 76 percent). While only $\frac{1}{4}$ assert that it is to make a living, mostly it is for landed-property or automobile purchase, or for another extraordinary reason (wedding, circumcision, health problems, durable purchase, etc.). Kinship relations (26 percent in each settlement) are not as widely preferred for borrowing money as would be expected (least among the Kurdish). Similarly, friends are not mentioned in Akpınar, against the 10 percent in Emek. This shows that **ethnic-kinship relations** among those in the same economic level **do not function much** as an economic support system. Bank borrowing is the most preferred form of going into debt. While bank-loan, as a longer term commitment and dependence on the capitalist financial system, is more common in Akpınar (A: 47; E: 35), credit-card usage is observed at the same high rates with 75 percent in each neighborhood. Institutional borrowing mechanisms increasingly penetrate working-class life both as powerful tools of integration with the system and of canalizing the earnings of working-class families into the financial market. Similarly, shopping in installments is also quiet widespread; $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers, most being Local, have installment debts mostly ranging between 50-400 YTL. Higher amounts (up to 1.000 YTL at most) are more common in Akpınar.

According to the findings of our survey, **durables**, such as refrigerator, television, telephone, are found in all working-class households. Difference is rather observed in the ownership of technologically newer, more expensive, ‘luxury’ goods, such as VCD-DVD, computer, mobile telephone, dishwasher and automobile. As can be followed from the table below, Akpınar families’ consumption pattern, in parallel with the physical advantages of their built environment, diverges from Emek in almost all ownership categories. Dishwasher ownership as a labor-saving device specifically shows the changing role of women in the family. Relatively higher rate of **automobile ownership** particularly in Akpınar (A:63, E:36 percent), and almost evenly distributed among automotive and textile sectors, demonstrates not only the encouragement and support given by the automotive factories to the workers, but also the increasing importance given to the autonomy-mobility of the family by the workers. This is also reflected in the preference of the big shopping-malls not within reach on foot. But it is not easy to interpret all these as a tendency towards consumption of non-real-human-need use-values; it seems rather an ambition to raise oneself to a condition of material and mental well-being. Durables like air-conditioner, digital camera, LCD television, are not found in these houses. Besides, depending on the observations made during the surveys conducted mostly in the houses, it can be concluded that even the most affluent working-class households are considerably modest in terms of the quality and brand of household goods and the standards of decoration.

Table 33. Ownership of consumption durables

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
Refrigerator	30 100,0%	98 100,0%	128 100,0%	Telephone	30 100,0%	96 98,0%	126 98,4%
Vacuum-cleaner	30 100,0%	92 93,9%	122 95,3%	Mobile Telephone	30 100,0%	86 87,8%	116 90,6%
Dishwasher	10 33,3%	7 7,1%	17 13,3%	Automobile	19 63,3%	35 35,7%	54 42,2%
VCD	24 80,0%	59 60,2%	83 64,8%	Big Shopping-Malls	16 69,6%	24 34,8%	40 43,5%
DVD	16 53,3%	12 12,2%	28 21,9%	Credit-Card	22 73,3%	72 75,0%	94 74,6%
Computer	7 23,3%	13 13,3%	20 15,6%	Bank Loan	14 46,7%	33 35,1%	47 37,9%

V.II.III. Labor Movement

In times of collective action, distancing and accessibility strategies for the purpose of extending control and command capacity in organization of space becomes more apparent. Collective actions are deliberately spatial struggles; they last as long as particular spaces can be defended against the invasion of enemy forces. Actions are the high times when the

restructuring of distance among laborers themselves and against the capital occurs and new accessibility points into the space of capital are created. While capital tries to restrict the maneuver space for labor organizing against itself, labor tries to expand the boundaries of struggle in either passive or active forms of action in terms of its effects on the production process. The sustainability of the newly placed patterning of distances, however, is another process which can be examined rather under the topic of control and command strategies over space.

V.II.III.I. Brief Story of the Collective Action Experience in Bursa

Here, we will try to examine main lines of the trade union movement in Bursa in terms of the actions undertaken, which is closely connected to the history of the nation-wide trade union movement and socio-economic developments. Among these, after the 80's, the most widespread and mass-participated collective movements in Turkey, the '89 Spring Actions', and '91 Zonguldak Strike' should be cited. Bursa labor movement also experienced a lively period in parallel with this nation-wide movement. Due to lack of strong leadership, however, the movement which began in mid 87's could only last until the end of 91, and the strong opposition of the unions, particularly against privatization, lost their effectiveness after the 95's. Social movements and their interaction with labor organizations in Bursa, on the other hand, are interesting issues waiting to be further investigated, which is beyond the scope of our study.

Actions within the **89 movement** and some of them afterwards can be summarized with respect to more or less common four main characteristics. **First**, most of the actions did not seek consent of the union administrations. Due to discontent of the working-class with the union bureaucracies, most actions were spontaneous movements going beyond the existing union structures. Actions took their impetus from the power of working-class itself and tried to include the unorganized sections of the working-class as well. Yet, they remained within the limits of spontaneity and could not evolve into an organized form alternative to the existing ones. **Second**, from time to time the actions had political reasons as well, but these did not remain steady. Resistances were rather formulated around economic demands, such as collective-bargaining disputes, wage increase/additional charge demands, workers' receivables, etc. As a sign of class solidarity, workers also went on actions for re-employment of their dismissed friends, or to prevent coming dismissals. Political demands extended from pressing government to resignation, support for the death-fasts in the prisons, women workers' rights, job security and conditions of work, to those against the bans and

restrictions on organizational rights and freedoms, privatization, tax policies, and minimum-wages. And yet, privatization of public enterprises, dismissals, closures, de-unionization and spreading of subcontracting relations could not be prevented. This was largely because economic demands of the workers were put to forefront, at the cost of these interrelated problems of the political, as part of the bourgeois strategy for separation of the economy from the polity. **Third**, except for a few examples, actions lacked the power to organize support from the sphere of reproduction, from the working-class communities of the urban landscape at large. We will shortly try to explain what this meant for the actions in Bursa in section V.II.III.III. **Fourth** is that besides the actions interrupting the production process, different forms of actions were also undertaken. Under the laws which cropped the labor rights, these were creative new ways to circumvent the barriers before the trade union movement. (<http://ezilenlerinkurtulusu.org>)

Invention of new forms of action and actions against union bureaucracies show the rising dissatisfaction with the existing union structures. These might be considered as part of the struggles to find new paths for working-class movement for prospering and penetrating into wider spheres of life. In other words, they are attempts for appropriation of space by new activities, against the ineffectiveness or insufficiency of the older ones. But if long term institutionalization and systematization of these does not occur, production of new and extended forms of solidarities cannot take place. These new forms, on the other hand, must not be prioritized at the cost of losing the already won grounds, like strikes, go-slows which directly intervene in the production process, but must be utilized for generating a wider solidarity base in the society both on urban and national levels, to enhance legitimacy of those won grounds. Boycotts or resistances may serve in this respect as more daily forms spanning over time, and contribute to creation of a lively working-class culture of resistance.

Now let us try to depict the track of the labor movement in Bursa, basing mainly upon Akkaya's work comprising the period until 1994. This brief account will successively be supported by the observations and findings of the field work.

1960-1980 Period

The **unionization speed and tendency** in Bursa was always high compared to that of the national average. In 1954, unionization rate was 80 percent against the national average with 37 percent. And in 1992, according to the Ministry of Labor statistics, 66 percent of the

unionizable work force was unionized, which indicated a higher unionization rate compared to other cities of the time (Akkaya, 1998, 203).

We see no collective action in the city before the 60's. It was 1960-70 time period that witnessed the familiarization process of both the employers and workers with the collective-bargaining procedures and strike actions. While employers were trying to resist making collective wage negotiations, workers were striving for exercising of these labor rights by means of their unions. With the longest-ending strikes in 66, those 6 years from 60-to-66 have been very active in terms of both quantity of the strikes and their dispersion to new work-branches and to the private sector. In 67, working-class movement began to get tougher. Each year with 2-3 strikes, culmination in actions took place in 69-70. During the decade, 20 strikes and 6 non-strike actions were performed in total. 1973 made another peak in terms of actions; with 9 strikes, 1 boycott, 1 meeting and 1 occupation. The following 1974-76 term period passed with 9 strikes, 1 boycott, 1 occupation, and 1 march. Until 1976, non-strike actions were rather very limited. 76 was the intensification year of the rivalry between Türk-İş and DİSK over unionization. As labor movement was going through a radicalization period, syndicalist competition culminated in the conflicts well-known as the 'TOFAŞ Events' (car plant) where one Metal-İş worker was killed. The crime was protested in a mass-meeting with the participation of ten-thousands, and a one-day stop-work action was performed by the left-wing union Lastik-İş. After 1977, however, non-strike actions surpassed the strikes. During 1977-78, besides 7 strikes, 12 resistances and 2 service boycotts were carried out. Resistances were generally against the violation of collective-bargaining clauses, dismissals and prevention of unionization movements. 1979-80 witnessed again a strike boom with 15 strikes against 2 non-strike actions. (Akkaya, 1998)

In sum, the 1960-80 period greeted 95 actions; strikes covering the 70 percent and non-strike actions the 30 percent. 61 percent were performed in manufacture, and the rest in service sector. Contrary to their higher unionization levels and lower wages workers in the export-oriented **textile** sector, recruiting majority of the labor force, displayed very little action during the time. **Automotive**-and- components workers, on the other hand, despite their relatively shorter history, proved to be much more active. But municipality workers, in line with the general trend in Turkey, were still the most active section of the working-class.

After 1980's

1980-86 was a rather inactive period for the working-class movement in general due to the suppression by the military regime. During 1989-91, however, as on the national level, number of collective actions, rather in the form of passive resistance, highly increased and dispersed to many workplaces. This activity in Bursa was partly the reflection of the mass participated 'Spring Actions' in Turkey which began in mid 87's and lasted until the end of 91. After the 80's, these were the first that pervasive and widespread actions. In Bursa, too, the actions spread to different sized firms and to different locations, even into the district towns.

The non-strike actions of 1989 eventuated either as passive actions, like service or lunch boycotts, collective visits, and resistances, or as active actions affecting the production process, like go-slows and stop-works. In 1990, 6 strike and 10 non-strike actions occurred. Non-strike actions were either to support the collective-bargaining processes, against dismissals, or against the syndicalist oppression. The characteristic feature of 1990 was that the strikes were performed in big-scale workplaces. In 91, on the other hand, 7 strikes and 5 non-strike actions were rather performed in small and medium-scale workplaces. The movement lost its pace during 1992-94 period. But still, non-strike actions, like sit-ins and marches perpetuated besides fewer strikes. In total, during the 80-94 period, 26 strikes and 37 non-strike actions were performed. Compared to earlier periods, non-strike actions were seen to be more preferred, with 31 percent during 60-80 against the 50 percent during 80-94. And the rate of strikes in the service sector had fallen from 30 percent to 15 percent during the same time. Industrial workers, particularly those working in bigger firms, became a distinguished section of the working-class in the movements of the time. On every account and at all costs, however, most workplaces in Bursa came to be acquainted with collective actions of some kind. (Akkaya, 1998)

V.II.III.II. Collective Action Experience of the Workers in the Sample

Strikes and Non-strike Actions

In 2004, however, when we investigate the collective action experiences of the workers in the sample, most of them working over 54 firms in and around the BOIE, and affiliated to Türk-İş except for the 5 workers affiliated to DİSK, we observe neither such lively memories, nor present activity regarding the working-class resistance. This of course is also

related with the nationwide dramatic decrease in actions since 1994. At the time of the survey, there were no actions going on at the factories in BOIE. Only in the big Korteks and Nergis textile factories were there reactions and counter-unionization movements against the existing union Teksif.

Except for 1 or 2 workers old enough to remember that more lively times of massive and influential strikes before the 80's, only 25 percent of the workers do recall a strike in their past experiences. And among these, except for a few others, they are mostly the OYAK-Renault, Mako, and Bosch automotive and components workers. That only and the **most impressive memory of a strike** in automotive sector dates back to 1990. In 26th December 1990, 85.000 members affiliated to Türk-Metal (Türk-İş) and 42.500 members of independent Otomobil-İş (left wing) and Çelik-İş (Hak-İş) went on a strike due to the disagreement in the collective-bargaining process. It lasted for 29 days. When asked to evaluate the success of the strike, workers assert that though an increase was get, it was not as much as it could be if the strike lasted longer. They blame the union for not only not having paid the workers during that 29 days period, but also not daring to pay for a longer strike period. While most believe that the action strengthened solidarity among the workers, it was just the reverse for the trust in the union. Since this strike took place during the peak times of the spring actions, when discontent of the working-class against the union bureaucracies was high and most actions were spontaneous actions of the laborers surpassing the unions, this strike was considered as an eyewash and a tool of containment, and the union as compelled to do it before a working-class imposing itself. Therefore, the gains were not deemed satisfactory by this working-class of higher expectations. The only other strike action mentioned by the respondents took place in 1998 in a single factory location outside the OIEs of Bursa; in the textile factory ASF on İstanbul road. Disk affiliated union perpetuated the strike for 8 months to get the demanded wage increase.

While we find BOIE with a very poor history of strikes since the 90's, non-strike actions also seem to be not that pervasive. Only 18 percent remember non-strike actions in various forms, such as lunch, overtime, service, picnic boycotts, beard growing, go-slows, sit-ins, marches, etc. These non-strike actions are more diversified in terms of dates of action, reasons of action, firm sizes, and sectors. Most active periods appear to be the years before the economic crisis. During the recession times, rather silence prevails on part of the workers when employers can exploit the suppressive potentials of the threat of unemployment more easily. In the sample, we observe actions in 88-90, 98-2000, and

2003-04 term periods. No worker mentions activity during the 1994 and 2001 crisis and the subsequent years, except for Renault workers stating that in the 94 crisis, hundreds of workers (500-1000) were dismissed and the silence of the union against this situation had triggered great resentment among the workers. While reasons for strike are almost in all cases related with the conflicts in collective wage negotiations, non-strike actions, however, have generally been performed against dismissals, performance of the organized union in the workplace, poor food quality, excessive overtimes, and payment delays, etc., while slightly less than half against the disagreement on wages. The most significant finding is that 83 percent of these **non-strike activities** were reported by the **textile workers**. There is relatively an even distribution among different sized firms, and similarly, among those living in both neighborhoods.

In sum, it appears that while the strikes were generally accompanied by non-strike actions, they continued in the absence of strike actions as well. Since the strike right was castrated (rights and solidarity strikes banned, etc.) and the arena for struggle restricted by the 12 September regime, these creative and original forms of action and transgression provided new opportunities, channels for the working-class movement which was clogged for a long time.

Unionization or Movement against the Existing Union

When we investigate the unionization movements or actions against the unions organized in the workplace, we find more workers (53 percent) involved in such actions, compared to those involved in actions organized by the unions. And understandably, these actions are more evenly distributed among years, sectors and firm sizes compared to those under the control of the unions.

Table 34. Union in charge in the workplace * Unionization movement against the existing union

	union in charge within the firm					Total
	none	Türk-Metal	Teksif	Tekstil	Çelik-İş	
yes	14	38	13	1	1	67
	32,6%	71,7%	61,9%	16,7%	100,0%	54,0%
no	29	15	8	5	-	57
	67,4%	28,3%	38,1%	83,3%		46,0%
Total	43	53	21	6	1	124
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

32 percent of the non-unionized, working mostly in 101-300 sized smaller factories, have experienced an attempt for unionization, all failed and resulted in dismissal of the workers who led the actions. As a protest against the existing union, on the other hand, non-strike

actions like stop-works, service boycotts, meetings and marches were largely employed. All these actions were to dismiss Türk-İş and organize DİSK in the workplace. Mainly two major attempts were reported by the workers in BOIE in this respect. Both actions took place in the pioneering factories of their sectors; OYAK-Renault in automotive, and Korteks and Nergis in textiles.

Action in OYAK-Renault (4000 employees) in 1998 was against the right-wing Türk-Metal union which did not get the promised wage increase. Workers of the big automotive factories in the BOIE collectively resigned from the union as a protest, in order to join Birleşik-Metal, a left-wing union affiliated to DİSK. They stopped work for one-day and marched 5 kms down the Mudanya road to the notary office in the city center for the resignation procedures. But in the end, leaders of the action were dismissed and workers were forced to re-membership by the employers. When asked the consequent effects of this movement on the workers, some workers say that “employers increased their control and domination due to increased distrust in the workers, and this dissolves the solidarity among the workers.” But others believe that the resistance culture in Renault would not let such atomization among the workers and recover sooner. Renault is a factory in a key position in the automotive sector in Turkey. Therefore it has always been an important ground for struggles for unionization. Old Maden-İş affiliated workers preferred Otomobil-İş after the 80’s, but were forced to join Türk-Metal. In 90, Birleşik-Metal had a failed attempt for unionization in Renault. One worker says that “if it succeeded it could have been a turning point for the trade-union movement in Turkey, accelerating the disintegration process of Türk-Metal”.

A similar action against the union in charge took place in 2003, this time in one of the leading textile factories of BOIE, Korteks (2500 employees), and the result was the same. Against the unjust dismissal of workers, non-payment of severance payments, insults of the employer, low wages and the oppressive working conditions brought by the septet shift system, the workers wanted to resign from Teksif of Türk-İş, but were suppressed by dismissal of their leaders. Korteks is very well-known among the workers with its tough working-conditions and high exploitation rates. Korteks was the first factory in BOIE to put the ‘septet shift system’ in practice.

At the time of the survey, there was a very clearly observable discontent among the workers of the big textile factories. Workers of another pioneering textile firm, Nergis (2000

employee), were complaining about the new shift system, for the delays in the wage payments, reduction in overtime and bonus payments, unhealthy working conditions, etc. Since the union Teksif ignored their demands and took side with the employers, they took autonomous actions (stop-work) in 2005. These actions were partly successful to the extent that they could get some of the delayed payments.

V.II.III.III. Socio-Spatial Strategies and Labor Organizations

Each spatial condition in the industrial arena, whether organized or unorganized, has its own strategic advantages or disadvantages for organization of social relations on part of both labor and capital within and against each other. For example, the closer social and economic ties of one-plant spatial configurations with the surrounding neighborhoods or villages can be adopted by leftist labor organizations as a powerful support force behind the labor actions which might put effective social pressure upon the employers. But the reverse is also possible, solitary factories can become vulnerable against lack of support from wider urban society or likewise from the labor force of other plants. In each case, it is the mode and degree of class organization that determines the class's ability in linking individuals into a social force. Certain types of organizations will be more or less effective, enabling a class to exert more or less of its powers in the service of particular causes (Wright, 1979, quote by Thrift, 1987, 9). And effectiveness of a class organization depends not only on generation of appropriate institutional orders, but of socio-spatial strategies as well. Like capitalists which perpetually invent new ways of appropriation and domination of spaces, laborers should also employ more strategically organized socio-spatial practices, exploiting the potentials of living place as a maneuver arena away from direct control by capital, and creating urban-alliances around economic and political struggles. Some concrete cases from Bursa might illustrate what we have discussed so far.

In the field, it was recognized that **OIEs proved to be highly resistant** against invasion of relatively more radical trade unions affiliated to DİSK. Repressive power of capital gets sharper in these estates through strategic cooperation with employer-friendly unions and establishing their dominance on a wider terrain by means of various institutional infrastructures summarized in section IV.IV.I. We have encountered several major failed attempts for organization of DİSK in the biggest plants of BOIE, one in 1989 in OYAK-Renault automotive plant and others in 2005 in Nergis and Korteks textile plants. And among the 54 firms in our sample, only one medium-sized textile factory, Coats, was organized by Tekstil of DİSK in BOIE. We observe that while Türk-İş is largely organized

in **the OIEs**, DİSK has rather **one-plant industrial areas** or **company towns** like Mudanya, Gemlik, and Orhangazi, etc.

At the time of the survey, one very long and disputed unionization struggle of DİSK against Türk-İş was still going on in Grammer Car-seats Factory in **Demirtaş OIE** on İstanbul road. Though workplace majority was obtained by Birleşik-Metal, the employers made retroactive employment of Türk-İş siding new workers, and the resulting controversy was carried to the court. The case attracted attention of the public and the international labor organizations as well. The conflict is still not resolved in 2007 yet, at the cost of workers' unionization and collective bargaining rights. We can comment that such a strong employer resistance before the case also signifies the wider strategic importance of its being the first DİSK organization in DOIE. Invasion of big factories by more militant trade unions is frightening for employers since it can accelerate the disintegration process of the employer-sided unions in other factories as well.

Another case is that of Siemens Cable Factory located in Mudanya, one of the **seaside towns** of Bursa. The plant is organized by Birleşik-Metal (DİSK) and is under the threat of closure since 1991. One worker says that if they did not resist it was to happen in 1993, "... but by our actions, 1-to-3 day passive resistances, we could delay the closure of our unit until 2004. Each extended year was to our benefit. The 'esnaf' (small-scale retailers) also supported our actions; they knew that if we earned, this was to their benefit as well. Our wives and children also participated in the actions. The town folk and our families were all fully engaged in the actions." One of the executive staff of Birleşik-Metal also states that they try to involve and cooperate with Mudanya people in the resistances. It is for this purpose that local union office is established in a working-class neighborhood, and they make meetings in the neighborhoods to sustain high interaction with the local folk. "It is the only factory here, these workers are their people" he says. This kind of support from other sections of society is not seen in the OIEs. Due to the longer distance from the residential areas of the working-class, it is not easy for families or other local groups to get involved in actions.

But there is also another case showing that a strategic **inner city physical location** per se cannot be a causal force behind success either. It should be actively adopted by class organizations to link individuals of a wider social-base into a social-force. The case in question is the privatization process of Merinos Woolen Factory located in Bursa city

center. Affiliated to Sümer Holding Company, it was established in 1938 as the first state economic enterprise in Bursa. It occupied a crucial place in the urban collective memory as a symbol of the industrialization process and the growing working-class culture in Bursa. First working-class housing units of the city for the organized workers were established in the neighborhoods to the north of the factory. It even had national level consequences; Türk-İş was first founded by the cadres from Merinos. The privatization process was at the agenda of the company since early the 80's; the factory did not recruit new workers since 83, and deliberately shrunk from 3500 to 950 workers in these years. Resistances of the workers began in 2000's and intensified during the one-and-a-half year term before the closure and transfer of the factory to Bursa Metropolitan Municipality in 2003. One worker resents that urban folk in Bursa did not give support to their actions and this was a major lack in motivation of the struggle.

Each labor action has its unique stories of success or failure depending upon the specificities of their particular settings; institutional structures, actors and strategies employed, and the degree of organizational capacity of the opposing sides, etc. Though it is beyond the scope of our study, it should be underlined that recording and in-depth analysis of these lived experiences remains a major task for the studies on class formation.

V.III. SHIFTING SPACE RELATIONS

Shifting space relations are also part of the 'class struggles over distribution' of the previous section. Yet, as both a capitalist force and a local dependency, they form rather a different category. Socio-spatial mobility is, in a way, the geographical summary of all other labor struggles discussed above. In other words, "residential differentiation becomes an outcome of the reproduction of social relations within a capitalist society", to which labor comes to adapt its preferences (Harvey, 1985b).

In this section, we explore the tension between **staying in place** and striving for local improvement, or **moving elsewhere** to where wage rates, working conditions, life-styles, and hopes for the future appear better. In this respect, two shifting space relations can be identified from the standpoint of labor; the **macro inter-urban movement** of labor and the **micro movement within the cityscape**, both submitted to rules of capitalist geographical differentiation, and both having highly significant effects on the life-chances of the laborers. The migration story provides an important dimension of the framework for strategies

involved in accessibility into the labor and housing markets, with respect to changing nature of relations with the hometown, the fellow-townsmen, and social and physical infrastructures reproduced both in work and the living place. Socio-spatial mobility patterns and qualities of the present neighborhood, similarly, reflect the boundaries of the struggle for building up new configurations with respect to access to resources providing higher life standards, such as chances to acquire 'market capacity', consumption capacity, education, or new value systems. Our focus will be on the degree to which they become relatively fixed features transferred from generation to generation within a social landscape, or in other words, whether they **immobilize** the laborers in space or may be used to **command geographical mobility**.

V.III.I. Bursa as a Migration Field

Migration forms a crucial part of the proletarianization process which tells the story of the laborers torn apart from a place and thrown to another place. Migration "is a social phenomenon which provides redistribution of the labor force on space and contributes to the organization of new divisions of labor" (İçduygu, 1998, quote by Özügürü, 2005, 73). Since buying and selling of labor power freely as a commodity is a precondition for capitalism, production of free labor through rural-urban migration plays a vital role in both expansion and consolidation phases of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. In order for the capitalist relations of production to take place, labor power should be at the required time, at the required quantity and at the required place (Ersoy, 1985, 15-16). Labor reconstructs its relations with the production sphere through distancing itself from the low work opportunity areas where s/he is deprived of the means of production, getting closer to the required places dictated by capitalism, where s/he can sell his/her labor power more easily.

Bursa seems to have **always attracted migrants**; driven first by the mechanization in agriculture and changes in land-ownership patterns in the rural in 60's and 70's, and then by rapidly expanding industrial sector through the import substitution strategy in the 70's, and finally through the export-oriented policies of the post 80's. In 60's, emigration was rather from the immediate urban hinterland, but in the following decades its scope far extended to Eastern Anatolia and Blacksea regions from where nearly half of the migrants came from. In Bursa, population increases not only in the urban center, but also in those closer villages which function as part of the urban labor market providing temporary and seasonal workers.

Yet, the share of urban population against the rural grows faster than the national average in Bursa, having surpassed its rural population since 1975 (TÜİK, 2000).

In Marmara region industrial activities are largely clustered in the ‘İstanbul-İzmit-Bursa’ triangle. As a result of this agglomeration, the triangle accommodates 20 percent of the total population in Turkey (Nichols and Suğur, 2005). In addition to the long and short-distance migration patterns given above, Bursa, as part of this larger industrial zone, experiences also a continuous intra-triangle population circulation in both directions. Just as 22 percent of the longer distance migrants in our sample have reported to have stayed 1-to-4 year in İstanbul, Kütahya, Eskişehir, and İzmit before coming to Bursa. Among these, particularly İstanbul serves as an entrance point into the urban labor market. Population increase in Bursa Province general since 1960 can be followed from the table below:

Table 35. Population increase in Bursa Province

1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
693.894	755.504	847.884	961.639	1.148.492	1.324.015	1.603.137	1.825.600	2.125.140

Source: TÜİK, 2000

The population in the province center reached up to 1.237.000 inhabitants between the years 1970-2000, with an accelerated urban growth and expansion in population by 400 percent (TÜİK, 2002). It is seen during this period that the average population growth of Bursa has generally been above that of the national level. The population boom, however, occurred with the **highest annual growth rates** of 35 and 38 percent during the years 1975-80 and 1985-90 respectively, and eventuated in 28 percent during 1990-2000. While the 1975-80 boom might be explained by higher rates of industrialization, 1985-90 boom emanates from other socio-political events as well. Bursa was one of the main destinations for **Balkan immigrants** (muhacır) in each of the three major immigration flows, in 1921-28, 1950-51 and in 1989 from Bulgaria. In 1989, running away from the forced assimilation policies of Jivkov, most of those 350.000 immigrants settled in Bursa. During the same years, **Kurdish people** were also suffering from repressive displacement policies due to socio-political unrest, armed conflicts and ensuing security problems in the South-Eastern region of Turkey. According to the ‘Prime Ministry Family Research Institute’ research made in 1997, migration owing to security problems began in 1983 and made a peak during 1990-93 (UPL, 1999). During those years, among other industrial towns like İzmir and İstanbul, Bursa also served as a major destination point for the displaced Kurdish population, which also was the case for ¼ of the Kurdish workers in our sample.

Table 36. Reason of migration / Date of migration

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
find work, economic reasons	18	59	77	1945-1969	7	2	9
	90,0%	60,8%	65,9%		26,9%	2,0%	7,3%
improve living conditions, work with insurance	-	17	17	1970-1974	3	5	8
		17,5%	14,5%		11,5%	5,1%	6,5%
father's assignment, marriage	-	7	7	1975-1979	6	13	19
		7,2%	6,0%		23,0%	13,3%	15,4%
family problems	-	6	6	1980-1984	1	7	8
		6,2%	5,1%		3,8%	7,1%	6,3%
political reasons (forced migration, dam construct)	1	7	8	1985-1989	6	31	37
	5,0%	7,3%	6,8%		23,0%	31,6%	30,0%
education	1	1	2	1990-1994	3	18	21
	5,0%	1,0%	1,7%		11,5%	18,4%	17,1%
-	-	-	-	1995-1999	-	18	18
						18,4%	14,1%
-	-	-	-	2000-2004	-	3	3
						3,1%	2,4%
Total	20	97	117	Total	26	97	123
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

These urban region-wide effective forces are also reflected in the **reasons for migration** put forward by our respondents. ‘Being closer to a labor market with higher job opportunities’ appears to be the main enforcing reason for migration. 65 percent assert ‘finding job’ and 18 percent ‘improving the economic conditions’ in this respect. While those long-distance migrants mention better life standards and regular job opportunities, it is merely finding job in the first place for Local workers. Besides these economic reasons, 24 percent of the Kurdish workers mention forced migration due to socio-political and security problems (6,8 percent in total). When reproduction of the material conditions for survival becomes impossible, those people migrate from their villages to the city centers. Assignment, marriage, family problems and education, though at lower ratios, might also become reasons for restructuring one’s distance against new social and material relations. As for the migration dates, among all migrants (Bursa born included), we find 70 percent come to Bursa city center after the 80’s. The highest ratio of migration among the respondents is observed during the years 1985-1989, and this is followed by the years 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 respectively. As for pre-80’s, highest ratio is witnessed during 1975-1979. Almost 70 percent of the interviewed workers’ length of urban residence dates back at least to 15 years. These findings are in complete conformity with the general population movements in Bursa as outlined above.

Table 37. Emek and Akpınar population by birthplace (2000 Census)

	Population	%		Population	%
EMEK	26.901	100,0	Tokat	672	2,5
Bursa	7.220	26,8	Yozgat	620	2,3
Giresun	4.000	14,9	Van	580	2,2
Samsun	2.251	8,4	Zonguldak	558	2,1
Muş	1.793	6,7	AKPINAR	9.334	100,0
Erzurum	1.535	5,7	Bursa	4.677	50,1
Bitlis	1.078	4,0	Abroad	753	8,0
Gümüşhane	861	3,2	Artvin	250	2,6

Source: 2000 Census, TÜİK (in Emek below 500, in Akpınar below 250 excluded)

Table 38. Bursa provincial population by birthplace (1990)

	Population	%		Population	%
Bursa	1.008.000	62,9	Muş	13.823	0,9
Bulgaria	114.784	7,2	Ankara	11.938	0,7
Erzurum	40.185	2,5	Giresun	11.870	0,7
Artvin	28.417	1,8	Bilecik	11.685	0,7
Kars	20.987	1,3	Sivas	8.466	0,5
Trabzon	20.761	1,3	Eskişehir	7.373	0,5
Samsun	19.932	1,2	Konya	7.610	0,5
Yugoslavia	19.919	1,2	Diyarbakır	7.319	0,5
İstanbul	19.613	1,2	Tunceli	7.122	0,4
Balıkesir	18.826	1,2
Greece	15.840	1,0	TOTAL	1.603.137	100,0

Source: Migration statistics, TÜİK, 1990 (below 7000 excluded)

According to the 2000 census data, 42 percent of the city population registered their birthplace as outside Bursa (TÜİK, 2000). This ratio should be expected to be much higher in the city center, when the 23 percent largely local-born rural population is excluded; and again higher among the working-class, just as Dülgeroğlu points out those who registered their birthplace as outside Bursa made up 73 percent of the workforce in 1990 (Dülgeroğlu, 1992, quote by Parlak, 1996, 128). As can be observed in the tables above, **Emek** to a certain extent reflects the **long-distance migration pattern** of Bursa, drawing population mainly from Eastern-Anatolia and Blacksea regions. **Akpınar**, on the other hand, reflects both the **short-distance and international migration patterns**, namely, from the rural parts of Bursa and the Balkans. Among the Akpınar respondents, 77 percent are born in Bursa and its towns (like Karacabey, M. Kemal Paşa, Mudanya), the rest are either from Central-Anatolia or Mediterranean regions. And except for one South-East Anatolian worker, there exists no one from the more underdeveloped regions such as Blacksea, Eastern and South-East Anatolia. The situation, however, is quite the opposite in Emek, more than half of the workers are from Blacksea (57 percent), 1/5 from Eastern and South-Eastern regions and 1/5 from Marmara. Emek is further divided into three neighborhoods according to long established townsmanship allegiances: F. Sultan Mehmet, composed of Eastern townsmen groups; Adnan Menderes, Eastern-Blacksea groups, and especially groups from the mayor's hometown Giresun; and finally Zekai Gümüşdiş, a relatively

mixed neighborhood most of its inhabitants being from Eastern-Blacksea, Central and Eastern-Anatolia.

Table 39. Ethnic identity * neighborhood

	ethnic identity				Total
	Kurdish	Local	Blacksea	Other	
Zekai	6	3	29	4	42
Gümüşdiş	14,3%	7,1%	69,0%	9,5%	100,0%
	28,6%	12,5%	45,3%	21,1%	32,8%
Adnan	2	1	22	4	29
Menderes	6,9%	3,4%	75,9%	13,8%	100,0%
	9,5%	4,2%	34,4%	21,1%	22,7%
Fatih	12	1	13	1	27
Sultan	44,4%	3,7%	48,1%	3,7%	100,0%
Mehmet	57,1%	4,2%	20,3%	5,3%	21,1%
Akpınar	1	19	-	10	30
	3,3%	63,3%		33,3%	100,0%
	4,8%	79,2%		52,6%	23,4%
Total	21	24	64	19	128
	16,4%	18,8%	50,0%	14,8%	100,0%
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

In our survey, we are faced with largely first-generation migrant worker communities. Except for the 19 percent (25 workers) born in Bursa city center (Emek-born included), 11 percent are migrants from other city centers and the rest are from rural parts of either Bursa or other cities. And among the Bursa born workers, only 1/5 is Bursa city center originated, in that their fathers are also born there. Emigration among urban centers might be considered as emigration of a relatively skilled labor force, which is observed more frequently in the recent researches on migration compared to the rural-urban emigration model (Özüğurlu, 2005, 73). Half of the workers in the sample have rural origins in a **village**, 20 percent in a **district** and 30 in **city center**. When the two settlements are compared, Akpınar reveals itself more as the host of workers of an urban background with 47 percent. And this demographic difference between the two working-class groups becomes deeper when considered that Emek as an older settlement hosts also second-generation migrant workers born in Emek. In Emek those born in the city center are generally gathered in the oldest core neighborhood of Emek, in Zekai Gümüşdiş with 38 percent. While Zekai Gümüşdiş, surrounded by the newer neighborhoods, cannot grow horizontally, Adnan Menderes neighborhood, expanding into the valley, hosts migrants mostly from the villages and the districts.

Table 40. Place of birth by provinces * place of birth by city center/district/village * neighborhood

	place of birth by c. center/district/village			Total		place of birth by c. center/district/village			Total
	c.center	district	village			c.center	district	village	
Bursa	25	8	7	40	Zekai	16	6	20	42
Giresun	1	4	15	20	Gümüşdiş	38,1%	14,3%	47,6%	100,0%
Samsun	3	3	7	13		41,0%	22,2%	32,3%	32,8%
Tokat	-	-	9	9	Adnan	2	8	19	29
Gümüşhane	-	-	8	8	Menderes	6,9%	27,6%	65,5%	100,0%
Bitlis	3	-	4	7		5,1%	29,6%	30,6%	22,7%
Muş	-	2	1	3	Fatih	7	7	13	27
Amasya	-	1	2	3	Sultan	25,9%	25,9%	48,1%	100,0%
Yozgat	-	-	3	3	Mehmet	17,9%	25,9%	21,0%	21,1%
Filibe	2	-	-	2	Akpınar	14	6	10	30
Ankara	1	1	-	2		46,7%	20,0%	33,3%	100,0%
Erzurum	-	2	-	2		35,9%	22,2%	16,1%	23,4%
Diyarbakır	-	2	-	2	Total	39	27	62	128
Bingöl	-	1	1	2		30,5%	21,1%	48,4%	100,0%
Batman	1	-	-	1		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0%
Mardin	-	-	1	1					
Tunceli	-	1	-	1					
Sinop	1	-	-	1					
Artvin	-	1	-	1					
Kırıkkale	1	-	-	1					
Kırklareli	1	-	-	1					
Çorum	-	-	1	1					
Isparta	-	-	1	1					
Eskişehir	-	1	-	1					
Akşehir	-	-	1	1					
İstanbul	-	-	1	1					
TOTAL	39	27	62	128					

Half of the workers have arrived at the urban arena below they were 11. While the age of migration appears to be higher among the short-distance migrants, being 22-to-25, it decreases among the longer-distance migrants. This shows first of all that families from distant regions generally prefer moving right after marriage or when their children are still small, when motivations and energy for search of a completely new and better life are at the highest. And second that Emek is at its transition stage from a first to second-generation workers' community. For rural born Local workers, on the other hand, as we will see further on, relation with the hometown or the rural is rather a continuous, less easily broken one. Growing up to the working age, one can swiftly move to the city center.

Relation with the hometown takes different forms after migration. The extent to which workers distanciate themselves from the rural incomes and ways of living shows their level of integration into the urban life, dependency level on wage and degree of proletarianization. In the first years of migration, rural support increases the accessibility chances of migrant families into the urban life; sale of property in the village is utilized for acquisition of urban property, or food aid for cheaper reproduction of the household

members. In later years, economic relations are gradually curbed and only social relations are sustained. In our case, $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers perpetuate a relation in either social or economic form. What is significant is that all of the Local workers seem to perpetuate their relations in either social or economic form, showing the facilitating role of physical proximity to the hometown. The frequency of visits paid to hometown might reach up to 10 times a month. They have the highest ratios in both making and getting monetary aid to/from their hometowns with 42 percent, while it remains at a lower level of 20 percent for the Kurdish and Blacksea workers.

Nonetheless, we see that more than half of the workers have no economic relations left. Although workers are diversified in terms of their relations with the hometown, the argument that not the economic but the symbolic (social) character of the aids is more important might be supported by the following observations; generally who makes aid also gets aid, it is a mutual relation; it is observed at similar proportions among different income groups; they are mostly not in cash but in kind (food), and not on regular but on time to time basis depending upon the frequency of the visits. This proposition is supported by the land ownership situation as well. 65 percent of the Blacksea workers and 55 percent of the Local own cultivated land in the village. The land, however, either belongs to parents or is shared with other relatives; self-ownership is significantly low (8 percent). Besides, ownership of land does not result in noteworthy money transfer from the rural to the urban, even for the Blacksea workers. Only 8 percent, in total, report that they have regular income deriving from agricultural activities. As for the Kurdish workers, only $\frac{1}{4}$ have land. Most Kurdish workers also express that they cannot even pay visit to their hometowns due to political and economic difficulties, in contrast to Local and Blacksea workers who keep their social contacts with their villages. Proletarianization and dispossession process in Turkey should be regarded not as a fast, but a slow break from the landed-property particularly after the 80's (Demir, 1995, 77). Even in a big industrial city as Bursa, we find that property ownership ties with the rural are not totally broken but on its way to it.

Table 41. Ownership of cultivated land * ethnic identity

	ethnic identity				Total
	Kurd	Local	Blacksea	Other	
yes	5	10	42	5	62
	8,1%	16,1%	67,7%	8,1%	100,0%
	25,0%	55,6%	65,6%	33,3%	53,0%
no	15	8	22	10	55
	27,3%	14,5%	40,0%	18,2%	100,0%
	75,0%	44,4%	34,4%	66,7%	47,0%
Total	20	18	64	15	117
	17,1%	15,4%	54,7%	12,8%	100,0%
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

When asked whether they would prefer farming or factory work, 60 percent in Akpınar against the 70 percent in Emek prefer factory work. Reasons for preferring industrial wage work vary. The mostly stated ones (65 percent) are that agriculture is risky, one has all the responsibility. Besides it is hard work, under the sun, with irregular working hours and with no insurance. It does not make much money either due to the poor agricultural policies in Turkey. A 30 percent section assert that they have no big lands or tractor, etc, have no idea about farming, or that village life is not civilized, lacks socio-cultural facilities. While this is so, 28 percent of the migrant workers are **planning to turn back** to their hometowns after retirement or after having their children grown up. This is not a very low number; 1/3 of the workers seem emotionally split between living in the city and memories of the hometown. But the rest, with the image that hometown lacks the necessary socio-economic facilities to make a living, are assured to settle their order in the city. This ratio is higher among Akpınar workers. Since, being from the towns of Bursa, they can more easily manage a life in the city, while at the same time not losing touch with their relatives and friends in the village.

V.III.II. Struggles over Residential Differentiation

V.III.II.I. Past and the Present

Table 42. First reason of settling down in the current neighborhood

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
existence of relatives or fellow-townsmen	3 10,0%	48 49,0%	51 39,8%
cheapness of land/ lowness of rentals	-	22 22,4%	22 17,2%
proximity to the industrial zone	3 10,0%	18 18,4%	21 16,4%
choice of the cooperative	14 46,7%	1 1,0%	15 11,7%
home-ownership through parents	9 30,0%	-	9 7,0%
coincidence	-	7 7,1%	7 5,5%
existence of acquaintances	-	2 2,0%	2 1,6%
socio-culturally more developed than Emek	1 3,3%	-	1 ,8%
Total	30 100,0%	98 100,0%	128 100,0%

In Emek, half of the workers show existence of relatives and townsmen as the **reason of settling down** in this neighborhood, another 22 percent settled because the land was cheap

and rents were low, while only 18 percent mention the proximity to BOIE. This result is quiet interesting because, viewed from outside, proximity to the industrial zone seems such a significant asset that it could easily be assumed as an obvious first reason to have attracted the workers. And more interesting still the answer does not change by migration date or age of the respondents. This might be interpreted as that, locational advantages of the neighborhood, even though it is a great opportunity in enhancing one's labor market opportunities, cannot be prioritized in the social consciousness of the pre-migration years. Even though Bursa is well-known for its industrial job opportunities, and finding job is the main driving force behind migration, it cannot be set forward as criteria for choosing the location in the city. Considering that most migrants do not have an experience of urban industrial life before, it is understandable that ethnic relations come to be more determining as points of access to urban life. The physical advantages, however, are recognized as soon as the urban challenge begins, just as they were counted, in the previous chapter, among the positive features of the neighborhood. They are not the 'villagers in the city' any more. This rapid change in perception is related with wider historical developments as well, rather than the migration histories of the individuals. One worker expresses this change in the general state of mind as follows, "Before the 80's, employers would visit our coffeehouses and beg us work in their factories. But we, the peasant-minded, did not know even the meaning; leave the vitality, of social-security so we rejected them. Now we are the ones who beg for job at their doors". First settlers came during the 60's and most of them worked in construction of the plants. It was only after 80's that industrial activities began to attract residents of the neighborhood to a larger extent.

In Akpınar, again, proximity to BOIE is mentioned only by a few workers (10 percent). For 47 percent, it is rather the housing-cooperative's choice to live in this neighborhood, not theirs; while for another 30 percent, it is the parents' home-ownership. In the case of Akpınar, it seems that the material dynamics/relations of the capitalist housing market replace those social relations and ties of affect in Emek to play a constitutive role in the formation of the community.

Table 43. Type of dwelling

	First type of dwelling		Current type of dwelling		1 before the last type of dwelling		2 before the last type of dwelling		3 before the last type of dwelling	
	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek
squatter house	5	19	-	1	2	4	1	-	2	1
	16,7%	19,4%		1,0%	9,5%	13,3%	11,1%		66,7%	50,0%
detached house	12	34	-	20	4	13	4	5	-	1
	40,0%	34,7%		20,4%	19,0%	43,3%	44,4%	41,7%		50,0%
apartment flat	11	45	30	77	15	13	4	7	1	-
	36,7%	45,9%	100,0	78,6%	71,4%	43,3%	44,4%	58,3%	33,3%	
bachelor house	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	6,7%									
Total	30	98	30	98	21	30	9	12	3	2
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Table 44. Ownership situation

	First ownership situation		current ownership situation		1 before the last ownership situation		2 before the last ownership situation		3 before the last ownership situation	
	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek
tenant	19	49	3	26	15	23	9	11	3	2
	63,3%	50,0%	10,0%	26,5%	71,4%	82,1%	100,0	91,7%	100,0	100,0
home owner	2	7	24	24	1	1	-	-	-	-
	6,7%	7,1%	80,0%	24,5%	4,8%	3,6%				
father owns	-	-	-	31	-	1	-	-	-	-
				31,6%		3,6%				
family home	9	18	3	15	5	2	-	1	-	-
	30,0%	18,4%	10,0%	15,3%	23,8%	7,1%		8,3%		
relative owns	-	8	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
		8,2%		2,0%		3,6%				
Total	30	98	30	98	21	28	9	12	3	2
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Before passing to future plans of the respondents for geographical mobility and whether this corresponds to mobility in class terms as well, we should examine **past mobility patterns** and its **impacts on the community ties**. As can be observed in the first table above, there is a similarity in both neighborhoods in the first type of dwellings, and a growing trend towards living in apartment flats. While no squatter+detached house is left in Akpınar, there is only 20 percent left in Emek against the 57 and 54 percent (squatter+detached) as first dwellings respectively. The significant trend towards apartment flats is observed even in Emek with an increase from 46 to 79 percent (3 and more floors, see section IV.III.III). The terms detached-house and squatter are used by the respondents in place of each other frequently. We see that unless it is illegal invasion of land, people do not name their houses as squatters; and in Bursa it is generally on purchased land that illegal houses are built. In the second table, we observe the fall of tenancy rate dramatically in Akpınar, from 63 to 10 percent and in Emek from 50 to 26 percent. 83 percent of those tenants live in apartment flats (See section IV.III.III. for the relation between the years of migration and ownership status)

Table 45. Pattern of spatial mobility

First neighborhood	A	E	One before the last	A	E	Two before the last	A	E	Three before the last	A	E
Hamzabey	1	1	Küplüpınar	2	-	Mudanya	1	-	Hürriyet	1	-
Küplüpınar	1	-	Soğukkuyu	1	-	Soğukkuyu	1	-	Yeşilyayla	1	-
Kemerçeşme	2	1	Sinandede	-	1	Çarşambapaz.	-	1	Esentepe	1	-
Adalet	1	-	Akpınar	4	-	Karaman	2	-	F.S.M.Emek	-	1
Sinandede	2	-	Mollaarap	1	-	Çekirge	-	1	A.M.Emek	-	1
Çirışhane	1	-	Çarşambapaz.	-	1	Yeşilova	-	1			
İpekçilik	1	-	Emekköy	1	-	Hürriyet	-	1			
Çarşambapazar	2	-	Hürriyet	1	-	Beşevler	1	-			
Çekirge	1	1	Hamitler	1	1	Kanalboyu	1	-			
Kuştepe	1	-	Çiftelhavuzlar	2	1	Sırameşeler	-	1			
Elmasbahçeler	1	-	Teleferik	1	-	Şükranıye	1	-			
Görükle	1	-	Bahar mah	1	-	Gaziakdemir	1	-			
Hürriyet	1	2	Kanalboyu	1	-	Başaran	1	-			
Çiftelhavuzlar	2	-	Sırameşeler	1	-	F.S.M.-Emek	-	2			
Altıparmak	2	-	Reyhan	1	-	Z.G.-Emek	-	1			
Mesken	1	-	İhsaniye	-	2	A.M.-Emek	-	1			
Teleferik	-	1	Selamet mah	1	-	Yıldırım	-	1			
Soğanlı	2	-	Gazcılar	1	-	Geçit	-	1			
Bahar mah	1	-	Tahtakale	1	-	Merinos	-	1			
Kanalboyu	1	-	F.S.M.-Emek	-	5						
Hocahasan	1	-	Z.G.-Emek	-	7						
Sırameşeler	-	3	A.M.-Emek	-	7						
İvazpaşa	1	-	Akpınar	-	1						
Gaziakdemir	-	1	bağlarbaşı	-	1						
Etibank	1	-	Emir Sultan	-	1						
İhsaniye	-	1	Minareliçavuş	-	1						
Davutkadı	1	1	Yunuseli	-	1						
Selamet mah	1	-									
F.S.M.-Emek	-	17									
Z.G.-Emek	-	39									
A.M.-Emek	-	19									
Bağlarbaşı	-	4									
Emir Sultan	-	1									
Pınarbaşı	-	1									
Geçit	-	1									
K.Balıklı	-	1									
Koğukçınar	-	2									
Minareliçavuş	-	1									
	30 %	100		21 %	70		9 %	30		3 %	10
		98 %			30 %			12 %			2 %

We know that Akpınar is a relatively new neighborhood where the dominant form of house-ownership is cooperative-membership, and Emek, an older settlement mostly with self-constructed buildings. In accordance with this fact, we see spatial mobility of Akpınar workers, in terms of the average number of residential areas shifted, significantly higher than Emek (A: 3,09; E: 1,61). A pattern can be traced in the spatial mobility of Akpınar workers. Most had resided northern to the Gökdere Boulevard, all along from the hilly upper-parts down to Ankara-İzmir road, not jumping across the road. And nearly half are seen to concentrate in the inner-zones around Merinos and Garaj extending towards the

valley, mostly to the west, but also to the east of Istanbul road. It should be noted that these **two concentration zones** largely overlap with the locations generally indicated as the living places of the organized workforce in Bursa. Emek, on the other hand, displays mobility mostly within the three neighborhoods remaining in its borders, generally towards the newly-growing neighborhood Adnan Menderes from the inner and smaller neighborhood Zekai Gümüşdiş (40 percent). Only 23 percent reports to have resided in neighborhoods outside Emek beforehand. Among them, a specific concentration on space cannot be observed, but we find closer neighborhoods on Mudanya road also added to the list attained from the Akpınar workers.

By each neighborhood change, the relative distance to relatives, neighbors and friends also change and the intensity of these **long-established social relations are restructured**. When we examine location of the three closest friends of the respondents, we find that most of them (70 percent) are factory workers living in either the older neighborhoods or the current one. More than half of the friends presently live in the same neighborhood as themselves. And almost 30 percent are the workmates met in workplace who might also be living in the same neighborhood. In short, more than not, we see that best friends are the workers who live in the same or closer neighborhoods; spatial proximity strengthens their ties of affect. It is the same for the relatives. Most of the relatives of Akpınar workers live in their prior neighborhoods. Moving here, half of them left all their relatives behind, and the rest have only 2-to-3 households at most, mostly being parents or siblings. By contrast in Emek, it is only 15 percent who have no relatives in the neighborhood, while half of them have 6-to-50 households. Accordingly, relation with other parts of Bursa is stronger in Akpınar, with 63 percent going out of the neighborhood at least 5-to-15 times a month, whereas in Emek this ratio drops down to 31 percent, and significantly lower still among the women workers.

Table 46. Location of Close Friends/Relatives

Close friends				Relatives			
Akpınar		Emek		Akpınar		Emek	
Akpınar	25 %40	Emek	158 (%63)	Mollaarap	1	Hürriyet	4
Başaran	2	İnegöl	1	Çarşamba	1	İhsaniye	2
Mollaarap	1	another city	13	Beşevler	3	Bağlarbaşı	3
FSM Bulvarı	1	Demirtaş	2	İhsaniye	1	Doğanköy	3
Çarşambapazarı	1	Beşevler	2	Yeşilyayla	1	Yavuz Selim	3
Güllük	1	Dikkaldırım	3	Güzelyalı	1	Geçit	3
Muradiye	1	Etibank	1	Beşyol	1	Etibank	1
Dikkaldırım	1	Yenibağlar	3	Çiftelhavuzlar	1	Arabayatağı	2
Emek	4	Fethiye	3	Kuştepe	2	Yıldırım	2
Yeşilyayla	1	Yeşilyayla	1	Eğitim	2	Mesken	2
Fethiye	1	Ataevler	2	Beşyol	2	Eski Fakülte	1
Adalet	1	Bağlarbaşı	5	Elmasbahçeler	2	Gürsu	1
Ataevler	2	Akpınar	1	Ataevler	1	Erikli	1
Karaman	2	İhsaniye	2	Gazcılar	1	Ataevler	1
Hamitler	1	Hamitler	4	Erikli	2	Doğaçınar	1
K. Balıklı	1	Mesken	3	Hürriyet	4	Dikkaldırım	1
Gülbahçe	1	Kestel	1	Çirişhane	3	Setbaşı	1
Hürriyet	3	Etbalık	1	Sinandede	3	Yunuseli	1
Mesken	2	Teleferik	5	Gülbahçe	1	Görükle	1
Çirişhane	1	Hürriyet	3	Setbaşı	1	Beşyol	1
Bahar mah	1	Soğanlıköy	5	Bahar mah	1	Soğanlıköy	1
Kanalboyu	1	Fakülte	1	Küplüpınar	1		
Arabayatağı	1	Gülbahçe	2	Muradiye	1		
Altıparmak	1	Çiftelhavuzlar	2	Mesken	2		
Hacıhasan	1	Mudanya	3	Selamet	1		
Beşevler	1	Çarşamba	1	Alemdar	1		
152 evler	1	Karapınar	1	Soğanlı	2		
Esentepe	1	Beşyol	2	Polis okulu	1		
Davutkadı	1	Çirişhane	2	152 evler	1		
		Sinandede	1	Gaziakdemir	1		
		Yıldırım	2	Srameşeler	1		
		152 evler	1	Yenibağlar	1		
		Pınarbaşı	1	Esentepe	1		
		Ülkü Köyü	1	Fethiye	1		
		Doğanköy	1	Davutkadı	1		
		Mutlular	1				
		Yeşilova	1				
		Nilüfer	1				
		K. Balıklı	1				
		Esentepe	1				
		Mollaarap	1				
		Yunuseli	1				
		Merinos	1				
		Minareliçavuş	1				
	62		249		50		36

V.III.II.II. Future Plans

43 percent in Akpınar and 36 percent in Emek already own a landed-property such as land, shop or flat other than his/her home (tenants included). We find that homeowners are the ones with higher opportunities to own a second or third landed-property. Tenants on the other hand by 34 percent have also lands to construct on. Furthermore, 40 percent of the

respondents have plans for acquiring landed-property within the forthcoming 5 years. Another 15 percent consider it in a longer future. The lowest intention is observed among the Kurdish workers (27 percent), other ethnic groups being at about 38 percent. It appears that current homeowners are more encouraged for future ownership opportunities, when compared the 42 percent among the owners against the 27 among the tenants. This might be signifying the diminishing ownership opportunities on part of the tenants. More than that, however, income level plays a determining role on ownership plans. The 12 percent within the lowest 320-600 YTL (271-508 \$) income group with ownership ambitions rises up to 50 percent within the 1500-2000 YTL income group. Self-construction still prevails as a **way of acquisition** with 67 percent among those who have plans, and it is rather construction anew than adding storey to the existing building. This shows perpetuation of the disinterest of the rentier and construction capital (contractors, etc.) in these working-class neighborhoods. While 19 percent consider purchase as a form of acquisition, organized forms, like through a private or social housing-cooperative are mentioned only by the 14 percent of those with plans. But still we can note that social-housing is rather demanded by the Kurdish workers (27 percent) whereas private housing-cooperatives by the Local (17 percent).

Intentions for new property ownership do not imply a pattern of geographical or **social mobility**. More than half with such intentions express that the new location will still be in the same neighborhood. No worker mentions middle-class neighborhoods. The rest prefer neighboring settlements more or less in the same socio-economic level with that of Emek, like Hamitler, Nilüferköy, Yenibağlar and Yunuseli (3,9 percent), or with that of Akpınar, like Mesken and Akpınar (for Emek workers) (3,9 percent). Most of the new housing units are intended either for the children or other family members, which in this case denotes the inter-generational transfer of similar market capacities. For 7 percent, on the other hand, it contributes to generation of income through renting out. And for the 6,2 percent who plan moving to a village or seaside, all being homeowners, mobility rather means access to nature.

Table 47. Plans for acquisition of new landed-property, and where

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
No plan	23	64	87
	76,6%	65,3%	67,9%
In the same neighborhood	3	20	23
	10,0%	20,4%	17,9%
Hamitler, Yunuseli Nilüferköy, Yenibağlar	1	4	5
	3,3%	4,0%	3,9%
Akpınar, Mesken,	1	4	5
	3,3%	4,0%	3,9%
Seaside	1	3	4
	3,3%	3,0%	3,1%
In the village	1	3	4
	3,3%	3,0%	3,1%
Total	30	98	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

When asked whether they have intentions for moving somewhere else, we see that even a higher ratio (72 percent), irrespective of the neighborhood, have no such plans. Almost 60 percent of Akpınar workers express the reason of their stay as “I like living here”, compared to 30 percent in Emek (including the 8 percent who mention existence of friends and relatives). The rest propose either economic difficulties or established economic ties (home-ownership) for not moving. This means that, actually for 70 percent in Emek and 40 percent in Akpınar living there is regarded as an obligation because alternative places cannot be afforded or material investments in the place cannot be abandoned. This shows that despite the growing concern and dissatisfaction about the quality of life, particularly in Emek, regarding the urban services like sewage, drinking water, health care, public education, etc., there is also an increasing awareness regarding the **limits and reduced opportunities for movement**.

Among different ethnic origins, Blacksea workers are more content with living in the neighborhood. Since they have fewer problems in getting jobs in the factories and their community is an expanding one with the largest population in Emek, they feel more comfortable in both economic and social terms. By a similar logic, Kurdish workers, being discriminated by the industrial sector and being members of a more narrow community in the quarter, are more willing to move. It is interesting to note that those who do not belong to these ethnic groups, who are minority in both neighborhoods, have plans for moving the most. This shows an inclination towards formation of **ethnically more homogenous neighborhoods**. To achieve any level of social mobility, however, first economic and educational disadvantages must be overcome. Hence, the **decision to move** is not only related to ethnic community relations, but also to **income level of the respondents**, just as it is observed that this decision is at higher rates among the workers belonging to higher

income groups (1.200 YTL and over) and the high-school graduates. In Emek, the ratio of those who would move with 19 percent among the 320-600 YTL income group, rises up to 37 percent among the 901-1200 YTL group.

The neighborhoods cited for moving, on the other hand, are generally the well-known working-class neighborhoods, most of them being the considerably long-established ones. 8 percent long for a socio-culturally more developed environment, an upper working-class neighborhood (Mesken, Beşevler, Akpınar), while 11 percent prefer closer similar settlements on Mudanya road (Hürriyet, Bağlarbaşı, Hamitler, Yenibağlar, Emek), 2 percent prefer inner-city neighborhoods (Sinandede, Yeşilyayla) and 5 percent a more green and quiet place, gardened house, etc. This **map of residential mobility** draws the boundaries within which working-class reproduces itself with values and skills conducive to being in the working-class, probably transferring this capacity to the next generations.

Table 48. Plans for moving, and where

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
No plan for moving	20	73	93
	66,6%	74,4%	72,6%
Hürriyet, Bağlarbaşı, Emek Hamitler, Yenibağlar,	1	13	14
	3,3%	13,2%	10,9%
Mesken, Beşevler, Akpınar	3	7	10
	10,0%	7,1%	7,8%
Seaside, Mudanya	3	2	5
	10,0%	2,0%	3,9%
Mollaarap, Yeşilyayla	1	2	3
	3,3%	2,0%	2,3%
My village	1	1	2
	3,3%	1,0%	1,5%
Another city	1	1	2
	3,3%	1,0%	1,5%
Total	30	98	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Difference between the two communities in terms of **dissatisfaction with their living places** becomes even sharper when asked whether they would still live there or not if it was possible to move somewhere else. Compared to 80 percent in Akpınar, it is only 27 percent in Emek who would want to stay. The significantly lower rate in Emek demonstrates that there is a clear dissatisfaction among the workers regarding their life standards.

As for where they would want to live if it was possible to move, 13 percent prefer their hometowns and 15 percent long for a quieter, green place either by the seaside or in a small town. 16 percent want to live in a more traditional, well-established, older working-class (now lower-middle class) neighborhood, such as Hürriyet, Akpınar, Teleferik, Mollaarap, or

Yeşilyayla, and some in relatively new ones, like Göçmen Konutları, Yenibağlar. 18 percent prefer living in socio-economically more developed, commonly known as middle and upper-middle class neighborhoods, such as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Beşevler, İhsaniye, Ataevler, Heykel, and Çekirge. This relatively low ratio shows that they are well aware, even in imagery, of the limits of entrance into these residential areas of the uppers-echelons of society. We see that when unconstrained by their objective material conditions, like in this imaginary situation, 60 percent dream of better places either in terms of its similarity to village life (24 percent), but still more, of a socio-economically and culturally more developed urban life.

Table 49. If it was possible to move, where to live

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
In the same neighborhood	24	27	51
	80,0%	27,5%	39,8%
FSM, Beşevler, İhsaniye, Ataevler, Heykel, Çekirge, Nilüfer	3	18	21
	10,0%	18,4%	16,4%
A more quiet, green place, seaside, a small town	3	15	18
	10,0%	15,3%	14,0%
Göçmen Konutları, Hürriyet, Yenibağlar, Teleferik, Mollaarap, Yeşilyayla, Akpınar	-	16	16
		16,5%	12,5%
In the hometown	-	13	13
		13,2%	10,1%
A socio-culturally more developed place	-	6	6
		6,2%	4,6%
Another city	-	3	3
		3,0%	2,3%
Total	30	98	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0

These findings might have **two important meanings**. **First**, it is surprising that those who are expected to benefit from ethnic solidarity lines the most, namely Emek residents, are the ones again who want to move the most. This might signify that the support, both in economic and social terms, received from the kinship and ethnic bonds is not strong enough to hold them in the neighborhood. One worker says that “Workers all have poor, self-contained families; no one can make financial help to one another. It is better in mixed neighborhoods where you can benefit from a rich townsman or relative”. The material advantages of townsmen-bonds lessen in time, and are replaced by the psychological effect of being in a known territory, that feeling of social confidence. However, when not accompanied by economic advantages, even this psychological effect becomes dispensable before the material interests of a working-class family. **Second**, it seems that for most of these first generation migrant workers relative improvement of life standards compared to village life does not create an optimism-tolerance towards a deprived position in urban life

any more. This kind of critical approach towards life-standards in Akpınar is rather found among the higher income groups (1.500 YTL and highest). Generally the local workers in Akpınar are much more content with their neighborhoods due to the better quality of the physical environment and social facilities compared to their previous living places. Most feel that they are where they can do best. This shows that when the socially defined limits of life standards tailored for a worker like him/her is reached, inclination is rather towards growing a compliance with the social status as it is. Ambition for upward social mobility fades away. And this might accelerate the **crystallization process of the social and residential differentiation patterns**.

In sum, we neither observe **community-based** nor **class-based** identity or behavior acting as local dependency of immobility in the decisions on spatial mobility. It seems that both material well-being and material deprivation might foster development of discontent against conditions of life dictated by the requirements of capitalist accumulation rather than by the real human needs.

CHAPTER VI

LOCI OF CONSCIOUSNESS FORMATION: FORMS OF SOLIDARITY

VI.I. CLASS LOCUS

In line with our discussion in section II.VI.I.I, in this section, **firstly**, we will try to analyze class-based consciousness and forms of solidarity mainly in relation to **Mann's formulations** of 'class identity', 'class opposition', and 'class totality', and **Lockwood's** three different working-class **typologies** (see section II.VI.III.I) of the 'traditional proletarian', 'traditional deferential' and 'privatized' respectively. While trying to understand class conceptions of the workers and whether they identify themselves as part of the working-class, we will utilize Lockwood's measures of job involvement, identification with workmates, etc. Similarly, when analyzing recognition of their employers as class opponents, we will consider the nature of the identification with the employers. As for recognition of the class division in society, or of the class-totality, lastly, we will try to reveal their models of society, whether they are based on **dichotomous** descriptions of proletarian traditional, **hierarchical** ones of deferential proletarians, or merely on differences of income and material possessions (**pecuniary** model) of privatized workers.

Secondly, thoughts of workers regarding their **labor organizations**, which are limited in our case to trade unions, will be explored. Following Katznelson, we will spend some time on how class organizations which mediate between consciousness and collective action, or consciousness and urban space, are perceived by the laborers. This will reveal, under the hegemony of ruling class strategies invading all bases of consciousness formation, capacity of the labor unions for development of class-based consciousness, and active employment of political and organizational projects/strategies.

VI.I.I. Perceptions of Class Identity, Class Opposition and Class Totality

VI.I.I.I. Perception of Class Identity

We know from Lockwood's formulation that involvement in job is one important indicator showing the difference between traditional and privatized workers. We ask several complementary questions to understand the degree of workers' association with factory

work and how they map the terrain of their lived experience of being a factory worker. In order to map a wider terrain of lived experience encompassing life both at work and off-work, an open-ended question is asked, aiming at a fuller understanding with regards to both the advantages and disadvantages of being an industrial worker, without making the respondent prefer one for the other.

Table 50. Advantages / Disadvantages of being a factory worker

Advantages	neighborhood		Total	Disadvantages	neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
fixed wage / regular life-working hours-holidays	9	28	37	no command on labor process-working hours/ being ruled	6	38	44
	31,0%	28,6%	29,1%		20,7%	40,4%	35,8%
social security, social benefits	6	30	36	none	8	26	34
	20,7%	30,6%	28,3%		27,6%	27,7%	27,6%
none	4	15	19	no improvement/ monotonous, non-social/ non-prestigious life	4	15	19
	13,8%	15,3%	15,0%		13,8%	16,0%	15,4%
defined task, do not have to think more than the given task	5	3	8	low wages / cannot get what you deserve	5	10	15
	17,2%	3,1%	6,3%		17,2%	10,6%	12,2%
friendship atmosphere, human relations, collective work spirit	-	8	8	work overload/ noise/ accident risks/ stress/ health problems	5	3	8
		8,2%	6,3%		17,2%	3,2%	6,5%
reward system/ occupational trainings/ prestige of the factory to produce something	1	6	7	non-existence of a union/ ineffectiveness of the union	-	2	2
	3,4%	6,1%	5,5%			2,1%	1,6%
saves you from the crises /no risk	2	3	5	social rights/ working conditions/ friendship/ wages	1	-	1
	6,9%	3,1%	3,9%		3,4%		,8%
satisfactory wage level	1	3	4	-			
	3,4%	3,1%	3,1%				
Total	1	2	3	-			
	3,4%	2,0%	2,4%				
Total	29	98	127	Total	29	94	123
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

15 percent can identify no positive aspects at all. 1/3, however, attribute positive value to some fixes like steady wage, regular life, regular working hours and holidays, etc. It is not meaningless that workers do not use the term ‘job security’, which they doubt that exists, but rather prefer terms like ‘continuity’ and ‘regularity’ instead. It is significant to note that Akpınar workers with 17 percent, appreciate the defined, predictable nature of the work and that one does not have to think anything more than the given task, much more than the Emek workers (3 percent). For some, rather than being a small-scale retailer under the crisis-prone economic conditions, factory work stands far less risky. Under the merciless, harsh and insecure market conditions of capitalist economies, predictability in both social and economic terms is counted as a positive asset in its own right. Such **regularity and continuity**, at the expense of the monotony it brings and despite the high rates of

exploitation involved, gives sense of a protective shield against the chaos of the labor market. For another 1/3, adherence to **social security** scheme of the state (SSK) and existence of **social benefits** are indicated as positive assets. These are rather material interests satisfying longer term security in life, in times of health failure, retirement, etc. In the industrial city of Bursa, small-scale manufacture occupies large place both in the urban economy and in the past work experience of the industrial workers. Therefore, particularly Emek workers at the back of their minds always compare their conditions with those of the smaller workshop workers who generally have no adherence to security schemes. Existence of an unemployed reserve army, low waged, low security service works or casual works like construction also makes this relative advantage in factory work more appealing and diminishes the strength of discontent. We see, on the other hand, positive assets related to satisfaction brought by social relations in the workplace, the reward system, occupational trainings, prestige, or nature of the work, such as fulfillment of producing something, as expressed only by about 15 percent in total.

About 1/3 can think of nothing **negative** about the factory work. But for the 40 percent in Emek, being under command, strict hierarchy, not being able to affect the labor process and working-hours are deemed unendurable, whereas in Akpınar, 38 percent complain about low wages, not getting what they deserve and the bad working conditions. It is interesting to find out that Akpınar workers rather mention disadvantages related to **working conditions** whereas Emek workers stress **alienation at work**. Disadvantages of being a factory worker in terms of its influences on the life off-work, such as non-existence of social life, monotonous life, no chance of improvement, is recognized only by 15 percent. The influence of factory work on the **life totality** still waits as a dimension to be politicized by working-class organizations which must place the issue into the agenda of class struggle. In this question, we see that when the focus of attention is put on a wider terrain than that limited to the workplace, alienating effects of factory work become much more visible. Affirmation of factory work is always a relative consideration against worse conditions in the market and based upon very modest expectations indeed, such as social security and job security. Though, it should be added that, they do not seem that modest under the increasing attacks at the labor rights through promotion of flexible work, etc.

Table 51. Whether happy at work and why

		neighborhood		Total	
		A.pınar	Emek		
Happy	Involvement in job	I do my craft, what I have been trained for	4	3	7
		I like automobiles / I like producing such aesthetic things	1	-	1
		I produce something	1	2	3
		I am good at my work, fast-make no mistakes	2	1	3
		It's a semi-autonomous task, with more responsibility	3	2	5
		It is a mobile / changing task / risky / stressful	2	5	7
			44%	13%	20%
	Working conditions	The friendship atmosphere is superb	3	13	16
		My firm makes me feel that I contribute to its success / rewards	1	3	4
		It is a comfortable, easy work / not tiring /defined / monotonous	2	11	13
		I am free from interference as long as I do the task on time	1	4	5
		I like my workplace, less injustice than private sector	1	-	1
		I can earn what I deserve	1	4	5
			29%	36%	34%
	Relative happiness	I thank god that I can work, we're neither hungry nor homeless	2	1	3
		I like working itself / duty consciousness / honest bread-winning	-	7	7
		I am used to this work after all those years	1	1	2
		Best work for this education level	-	3	3
		You're obliged to work, better be happy than not	2	10	12
Indifferent		1	1	2	
		20%	23%	23%	
Not happy		Boring, monotonous / stressful, hard, tiring work	-	6	6
		Low wages / bad working conditions / deteriorating rights	1	9	10
		No command over the labor process / under command	-	7	7
		Obliged to work, better than being needy	-	2	2
		Cannot improve yourself technically etc. / unjust promotions	1	3	4
		7%	28%	23%	
Total		30	98	128	
		100%	100%	100%	

The second question is to further investigate identification with work is whether they are **happy** at work and why. 3/4 of the respondents claim to be happy at work, this ratio reaches up to 93 percent in Akpınar, falls down to 72 in Emek and 62 among the Kurdish workers. When the motives behind their happiness are investigated, it displays a rather complicated picture. Statements which imply job involvement is considerably high in Akpınar with 44 percent against the 13 percent in Emek. This first category includes attachment to what is produced and to the craft. Yet, there are other motives for attachment to job as well, like relations with the workmates or the good working conditions. Money calculative approach is displayed only by 5 workers. ¼ of the respondents, on the other hand, feel a relative happiness based on comparison with worse situations found in larger society or own past experience. We see various motives and degrees of alienation in the table above; neither of them however, even if some display low job involvement, might easily and directly be regarded as pure calculative exchange of labor power for maximum pay. This is still true despite that in Akpınar we find such a tendency with 17 percent compared to the 3 in Emek who define advantages of factory work as its being a ‘defined task in which one does not have to think more than what he does’. Under high unemployment and fierce market

conditions, except for a handful of workers, we **cannot find** any **privatized worker** who sees work as a mere means to an end, a mere way of acquiring income. Work remains a central life interest and struggle for the workers.

Table 52. Depiction of a 'good worker' from the workers' point of view

		neighborhood		Total
		A.pınar	Emek	
Loyalty to work	Good at work / loyal to work / imbibes her work	9	16	25
		23%	28%	26%
Loyalty to work ethics	Productive	1	-	1
	Improves herself / adapts to changing technology	2	2	4
	Always on time / no absentee	3	4	7
	Works honestly / respectful	10	11	21
	Works for her country	2	-	2
	Hardworking	1	8	9
		47%	44%	45%
Loyalty to individual-collective class interests	Conscious / defends-gets her rights / gives political struggle	5	2	7
	Gets what she deserves / high waged / has social activities	2	7	9
	Does not work more than the others	-	1	1
	Liked by her friends, helps them when needed	2	2	4
		22%	21%	22%
Other	Educated	1	1	2
	Healthy	1	-	1
	Works	1	1	2
	There is no good worker	-	2	2
		7%	7%	7%
Total		40	57	97

Note: Question is asked to 30 Akpınar, 45 Emek respondents, some have more than one answer

Table 53. Depiction of a 'good worker' from the employers' point of view

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
works like a dog-works too much / on time	2	6	8
obedient to employer / never raises objection	4	3	7
unreliable, toady (yalaka)	1	-	1
demands the lowest money	1	-	1
Total	8	9	17

We see a similar situation in the descriptions of the workers of a 'good worker'. Among the 75 respondents, 26 percent emphasize loyalty to labor itself, around 45 percent loyalty to work ethics, and around 22 to individual or collective interests of workers. Hearing the question, some workers ask whether we want the employers' point of view or theirs, and prefer replying both. This is a very important question, in that; it reveals the **internal contradiction of the alienation** process. A worker might show interest in job at the same time as s/he grows awareness towards class-opposition. We can support the same argument also with the finding that half of those with job involvement realize that they have conflicting interests with their employers. Similarly, loyalty to work ethics might not be dismissed altogether as a bourgeois value. Half of those who stress virtues of hardworking, respect, honesty, etc. also recognize employers as class opponents. We know that inculcation of work discipline is in part accomplished by training, threats, incentives, and

cajolery in the workplace which impose work ethic, bourgeois values of honesty, reliability, respect for authority, obedience to laws and rules, respect for property and contractual agreements (Harvey, 1985, 49). But it also reflects desire for some non-alienated, non-capitalist universal values, which are to be rescued from the domination of ruling class interests in a capitalist society.

Characteristic features that workers look for in a workmate, like reliability, non-egoism, selflessness and tolerance indicate how certain forms of solidarity are highly esteemed at the workplace. Not being ‘yalaka’ (toady) and ‘ispiyoncu’ (squealer), the two qualities most frequently cited, show the importance of feeling on the same side against the managerial staff. Attributes like being loyal to work, hardwork, attentiveness, alertness, cautiousness, on the other hand, are expressed only by a few workers. Despite the importance of such attributes in the production process, alienation fosters repression of that latter group of attributes and brings the former to the foreground. More class-conscious expressions, like defending labor rights are rarely stated.

Table 54. What 'working-class' means / Whether interests of the worker and employer are common

		neighborhood		whether common			Total
		A.pınar	Emek	No	Yes	I don't know	
Working-class identification	‘Emekçi’ / ‘Alın teri’ / Productive / Honorable	6	19	14	11	-	25
		20,0%	20,2%	24,1%	17,5%		20,2%
	Oppressed / Exploited / Cannot get what s/he deserves	3	9	3	9	-	12
		10,0%	9,6%	5,2%	14,3%		9,7%
	Works under order / Waged / Obligated to work / Ruled	2	5	6	1	-	7
	6,7%	5,3%	10,3%	1,6%		5,6%	
	Smashed class or class solidarity	3	1	2	2	-	4
		10,0%	1,1%	3,4%	3,2%		3,2%
Income or status groups	Lower people / ignored / despised worthless / ‘amele’ / ‘köle’ / ‘hamal’	5	46	19	30	2	51
		16,7%	48,9%	32,8%	47,6%	66,7%	41,1%
	Working people / Working section of society	7	5	5	6	1	12
		23,3%	5,3%	8,6%	9,5%	33,3%	9,7%
	Lower income group / ‘dar gelirli’ / Working poor	1	5	4	2	-	6
		3,3%	5,3%	6,9%	3,2%		4,8%
	Self-contained / Middle income group	2	2	4	-	-	4
	6,7%	2,1%	6,9%			3,2%	
	Construction / subcontracting / factory / municipal / un-skilled	-	2	-	2	-	2
			2,1%		3,2%		1,6%
	Lucky, comfortable man / defined task	1	-	1	-	-	1
		3,3%		1,7%			,8%
	Total	30	94	58	63	3	124
		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

When workers are asked what ‘working-class’ means, compared to the next question regarding the ‘divisions in society’, we find more workers with conceptions which express awareness of own class position. 46 percent in Akpınar and 36 in Emek use terms like

‘laborer’ (emekçi), ‘to earn by hardwork’ (alın teri), ‘productive’, ‘oppressed’, ‘exploited’, ‘ruled’, ‘class solidarity’. So it seems that perception of class identity is stronger than that of class totality, or in other words, workers do not perceive class relations as a defining characteristic of the society, as much as they identify themselves as part of the working-class. Yet, in accordance with their models of society to be discussed in the next pages, in both communities, we rather find (60 percent) income or **status-based descriptions**, such as ‘working segment of the society’, ‘middle/lower income group’, ‘self-contained people’ etc. However, one very significant difference between the two communities should be emphasized, which is, while Akpınar workers adhere to group affiliations of status and income, Emek, by almost 50 percent formulate individualistic conceptions, like ‘hamal’ (porter), ‘amele’ (casual workmen), ‘köle’ (slave), etc. These terms should be underlined due to the strong ethical discontent and deprivation they imply. They are more than mere indicators of status in this respect.

VI.I.I.II. Perception of Class Opposition

Table 55. Whether interests of the worker and employer are common

	Neighborhood		sector			Total
	Akpınar	Emek	textile	automotive	other	
yes	22	37	17	39	3	59
	73,3%	37,8%	31,5%	59,1%	37,5%	46,1%
no	8	58	36	26	4	66
	26,7%	59,2%	66,7%	39,4%	50,0%	51,6%
I do not know	-	3	1	1	1	3
		3,1%	1,9%	1,5%	12,5%	2,3%
Total	30	98	54	66	8	128
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Other: chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic/ food, packaging, construction care

Table 56. Statements showing identification with the employer / opposition with the employer

	identification with the employer	Neighborhood		Total	opposition with the employer	Neighborhood		Total
		A.pina	Emek			A.pinar	Emek	
Pecuniary	Both of us want to earn money	6 22%	9 10%	15 13 %	We work just for a living, but they earn/advance more	5 18%	16 28,1%	21 32,3 %
	They can earn/pay wages/produce, only if we work.	5 18%	9 10%	14 12%	They always think their own interests	1 4%	13 22,8%	14 21,5 %
	If they earn, we can earn / can have jobs / move upwards	-	5 6%	5 4%	They want more work/profit, for lower wages	-	10 17,5%	10 15,4 %
Related to Production	Both of us want to make higher quality / worldwide production	3 11%	-	3 3%	They exploit us / We never get what we deserve	2 7%	11 19,3%	13 20,0 %
	We produce together	2 7%	1 1%	3 3%	They treat us as robots, not human beings	-	3 5,3%	3 4,6%
	Both of us work for the development of the country.	2 7%	-	2 3%	They give the orders, we obey them	-	4 7,0%	4 6,2%
Family metapho	We are part of the same whole / need each other / like father and son	2 7%	10 11%	12 10%	-	-	-	-
	Shows Opposition	8 29%	57 63%	65 55%	Shows Identification	20 71%	34 37%	54 45%
	Total	28	91	119	Total	28	91	119

The picture becomes a bit more complicated when we compare the models of society with recognition of class enemies. Slightly more than half believe that they have conflicting interests with their employers. But the striking finding is that, in Akpınar, workers are **much more deferential** to their employers in the sense that they see their interests as common (A: 73; E: 38 percent). This dramatic difference between the two communities becomes even bigger when compared with the Kurdish workers (33 percent) or with lower-income groups in Emek. Akpınar workers are generally higher waged automotive workers. We observe, like Lockwood, that greater job involvement does not produce conflict with the deferential kind of attitude. By the same token, textile workers have less involvement and more antagonistic attitudes. When we look at the reasons for identification with the employer, we see 40 percent of Akpınar basing their thought on pecuniary reasons, and ¼ on reasons related with involvement in production. This shows a **tendency towards** formation of a **privatized working-class** in Akpınar. While class opposition feelings are much stronger in Emek, the small amount of workers who defer, mostly show pecuniary reasons and mutual dependency with the employers. Some workers (22 percent), particularly in Emek, seem to adopt the paternalistic rhetoric exploited by the managers that they were members of the same family. Here we find another form of replication of the family authority structure within the organization of labor process, thus making family relations a vehicle for class

domination. Just to recall, this kind of rhetoric is very effectively utilized by progressive management techniques like ‘Total Quality Management’, etc. We must also note that party affiliations seem not to affect the attitude against the employers, among those voting for different parties, similar ratios of workers display deferential attitudes.

VI.I.I.III. Perception of Class Totality

Table 57. Social divisions in Turkey / Conflict of interest between workers and employers

Social divisions in Turkey	neighborhood		Conflict of interest between workers and employers				Total
	Apinar	Emek	Akpınar		Emek		
			No	Yes	No	Yes	
The rulers - The ruled - The robbers	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
The rulers - The ruled	-	2	-	-	1	1	2
The rich – The workers	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
The exploiters - The exploited	2	-	2	-	-	-	2
Bourgeois - Noble – Peasant / Bourgeois - Bureaucrat – Rentier - Working segments	1	1	1	-	1	-	2
Employers – Workers - Peasants	-	3	-	-	1	2	3
Working-class – Middle - Rich	1	2	1	-	1	1	3
The unemployed – The working – Inheritor – Factory owner	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
The rich - The poor	2	21	2	-	8	13	23
Sense of us and them	9 30%	29 30%	7	2	12	17	38 30%
East - West	4	8	1	3	1	7	12
Easterners - Blacksea people - Balkan migrants	-	4	-	-	2	2	4
PKK - Mafia	1	1	-	-	-	1	2
Kurds - Balkan migrants	3	10	2	1	3	6	12
Kurd, Laz, Manav, Circassian, Armenian, Gypsy, Arabic, Bosnian, Albanian, Azerbaijani	1	9	1	-	6	3	10
The settled - The migrants / Peasant - Citizen	-	3	-	-	1	1	2
Educated - Uneducated	-	5	-	-	5	-	5
The excluded (leftist, easterner, gypsy, alevi)	-	1	-	-	-	1	1
Alevi – Muslim – Jewish - Christian	-	2	-	-	-	2	2
Religious - Non religious	-	2	-	-	-	2	2
Occupational groups	-	3	-	-	-	3	3
Partizanship	-	3	-	-	1	2	3
None	1	6	-	-	3	3	6
Hierarchical status or prestige differentials	10 33%	57 58%	4	4	22	33	64 52%
Very low income groups – Normal – High income groups	5	4	4	1	1	3	9
The poor - Lower middle – Middle - Very rich	-	2	-	-	1	1	2
The poor - Lower middle - Middle rich – The rich	1	1	1	-	-	1	2
Poor - Lower middle - Middle - Higher middle – The highest	2	1	2	-	-	1	3
Luxurious neighborhoods - Social housing – Squatters - Villages	-	2	-	-	1	1	2
Public - Private sector / Good - Bad firm / Low – High waged workers	1	1	1	-	-	1	2
‘Sosyetik’ high class – The rest / Who live in luxury - Who want to live in luxury	2	1	1	1	1	-	3
Income and material possessions	11 36%	12 12%	9	2	4	8	23 18%
	30	98	20	8	38	58	125

When we ask whether there are different social classes in Turkey, nearly all workers give a positive answer to this question, except for only 5 percent. While 30 percent have **dichotomous** conceptions with a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, 18 percent recognize **income groups** mostly based on three or more class descriptions, and the remaining 52 percent make **hierarchical** status definitions based on differentials such as ethnicity, religion, etc. It is not more than 12 percent whose formulations regarding the division in society include explicit leftist and Marxist connotations, such as ‘bourgeoisie, working-class, ruling class, exploitation, employer and worker’. Such **class-based terms** and modes of thinking are quiet **absent from the daily rhetoric** of the workers. The dichotomous conception is largely expressed as ‘rich and poor’ and generally Emek workers adhere to this description; ethnic or other status categories are also more common in Emek. Detailed income categories, on the other hand, are rather formulated by Akpınar workers. Among the three different models, those who believe that they have conflicting interests with their employers are more or less evenly distributed. So we **cannot find a significant correlation** between the perception of class totality and perception of class opponents.

Table 58. First / Second division among the people living in Turkey

	First division		Total	Second division		Total
	Akpınar	Emek		Akpınar	Emek	
Rich-poor	10	33	43	8	18	26
	33,3%	34,4%	34,1%	29,6%	20,2%	22,4%
Employer-worker	7	14	21	3	12	15
	23,3%	14,6%	16,7%	11,1%	13,5%	12,9%
Secular-religious	2	14	16	5	15	20
	6,7%	14,6%	12,7%	18,5%	16,9%	17,2%
Educated-uneducated	1	13	14	-	10	10
	3,3%	13,5%	11,1%		11,2%	8,6%
Turk-Kurd	5	8	13	2	16	18
	16,7%	8,3%	10,3%	7,4%	18,0%	15,5%
Leftist-rightist	2	4	6	4	8	12
	6,7%	4,2%	4,8%	14,8%	9,0%	10,3%
Sunni-Alaouite	1	3	4	3	3	6
	3,3%	3,1%	3,2%	11,1%	3,4%	5,2%
All exist in equal importance	1	3	4	-	-	-
	3,3%	3,1%	3,2%			
Muhacir-native	-	3	3	1	2	3
		3,1%	2,4%	3,7%	2,2%	2,6%
Peasant-urban dweller	-	1	1	1	5	6
		1,0%	,8%	3,7%	5,6%	5,2%
None	1	-	1	-	-	-
	3,3%		,8%			
Total	30	96	126	27	89	116
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

How the workers define the axis of the social division in society indicates the perceived character of the social conflict which plays an important role in shaping the social and economic struggle of the working class. When the question becomes one of **sequencing**

among a given list of divisions in the survey sheet, we see that the ‘**rich–poor**’ category runs in the forefront by 34 percent, and is followed by the ‘**employer-worker**’ category by 16 percent. Employer-worker category members have a stronger sense of class opposition compared to the workers in the ‘rich-poor’ group, but still cannot be regarded that high. 61 percent of the former recognise the conflict of interest in between, against the 44 percent of the latter. It is seen that for half of the workers the first division in society refers to the economic sphere. The latter, which overlaps with the fundamental social conflict conceptualization of Marxist sociology, can be interpreted as belonging to a higher level of class-based consciousness. However, the highness of the former compared to this workplace-based formulation shows that there is need for a wider conceptualization which can include living place based social categories as well. Religion, ethnic and education based divisions occupy the third place with similar ratios of approximately 10 percent each. Employer-worker category is mentioned more by the Akpınar workers. Although leftist-rightist division is uttered only by 5 percent, it is still Akpınar workers who assert this political division in society. Turk-Kurd division is also seen higher in Akpınar. Workers of ethnically more heterogenous Emek interestingly are more reluctant to put it in the first place. They rather see religion as sharing the second place with the ‘employer-worker’ division. When we look at the second ranking divisions, it is still ‘rich-poor’ in the first place, but this time closely followed by religion and ethnic divisions respectively.

When asked to locate themselves into one of the four ‘upper middle–middle-lower middle–poor’ income categories, 87 percent of the workers living in Akpınar associate themselves with the middle-income category, and most in Emek, though with a lower percentage of 60 percent, also share the same belief. It is only 10 percent in total that classify him/her as poor, and 15 percent as lower-middle. Even 42 percent of the lowest income group members (320-600 YTL, (271-508 \$)) perceive themselves middle-income compared to others in the society. It is seen that not only the average household income, but **home-ownership status also affects** this perception; tenants rather believe to be lower-middle or poor whereas home owners have a higher ratio within the middle income group.

Lack of an understanding of class totality might also be observed through the answers given to the following questions that **further investigate the issue of class inequality**:

- a. Do you believe that an honest and hardworking person can always move upwards in life?
- b. Who/what is responsible for your not being in a better economic status in society?

- c. What do you think about the difference between the living conditions of a factory owner and a worker?
- d. What do you think about the difference between the living conditions of the children of a factory owner and a worker?

Half of the workers do believe that a hardworking, honest person can move upwards in life. It does not change according to age, income or neighborhood. Only vocational high-school graduates have fewer tendencies towards this belief. But it should also be noted that it is usually a very modest interpretation of upwards mobility conceived by the workers, like being transferred to a better unit in the factory, or owning a house, etc. As for identification of the sources of economic inequality, most workers hold either their families or themselves alone responsible for their economic status in society; only 1/3 recognize the delimiting power of objective structural conditions over their preferences, identifying them either as the capitalist system, the politicians or the economic difficulties. A dominant bourgeois ideology that economic advancement is solely a matter of individual ability and personal ambition pervades among the workers. Accordingly, we find 25 percent considering the difference between living standards of a factory owner and worker completely fair, 57 percent that it must be less, and only 17 percent that there must be no such difference. Largeness of the medium category indicates a typical deferential attitude which considers the socio-economic difference between the working-class and the elites “who deserve leadership” as natural. The more interesting finding is that in Akpınar, we see the continuation of such deferential attitude in regard to the difference between conditions of their children as well. **Emek** gets closer to a **more antagonistic conception** of class inequality in this respect.

Table 59. Difference between themselves / Difference between the children

	themselves		Total	children		Total
	A.pınar	Emek		A.pınar	Emek	
it is completely fair	8	25	33	6	14	20
	26,7%	25,5%	25,8%	20,0%	15,6%	16,4%
it must not be this wide	19	54	73	17	15	36
	63,3%	55,1%	57,0%	56,0%	17,8%	27,3%
there must not be any	3	19	22	7	59	62
	10,0%	19,4%	17,2%	23,0%	66,7%	56,4%
Total	30	98	128	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

VI.I.II. Perception of Trade Unions

In Turkey, particularly after the 80's, parallel to the world-wide neo-liberal turn, trade union movement is increasingly tried to be kept within the limits of the sectionalist, workplace based unionism, where laborers define their reaction to the system within the boundaries of

their occupational interests. This kind of consciousness is produced by the intense efforts of capital, mostly through corporatist strategies employed by the agency of state and employer-sided trade unions. The 1980 militarist intervention restrained all movements heading for a united class-based consciousness supported by class-based social movements engaged in issues of reproduction as well. In section IV.IV.III., we gave a very brief account of the ideological approaches and institutional structures of the union federations and particularly that of the biggest right-wing union in the sample. This was to help understand the relative weakness of the workers in the struggle for changing the union from within. Here we will see, however, that impoverished, authoritarian unionization and the restricting legal framework provided by the government do not produce workers displaying totally submissive attitudes against these conditions. To the contrary, we find **great discontent** and sharp tone of criticism in perceptions of the laborers regarding their unions.

Dissatisfaction about the unions is strongly felt by 80 percent of the 73 (A: 23, E: 50) unionized workers. In Akpınar, no one worker believes that the union can defend labor rights. This ratio is slightly lower in Emek, 12 percent also saying that they do as much as they can; to the extent that legal regulations permit which limit the struggle to defending the already acquired rights. 10 percent exhibit a **third view** saying that they are partly useful. However, the most pronounced, **strongest thought** possessed by half of the unionized workers is the unions' being under control of the employers. Another criticism, significantly asserted by Akpınar workers (43 percent), is concerned about the restricting legal framework. This shows that these workers have an implicit tendency for politicizing their resentment. Discontent with the undemocratic union administrative structures is low in both communities with about 10 percent. Migrant workers rather focus upon the weakness and ineffectiveness of the unions in improving the labor rights, working-conditions and the wages. When we investigate thoughts of the **non-unionized** 55 workers, we find 40 percent do not wish to become unionized (most are Blacksea workers). Except for a few workers who fear dismissal, most workers, generally in textile and the factories recruiting less than 300, claim that employers care enough for them, or complain about the highness of the union-dues they would pay. Enhanced job security and social-benefits are the appealing reasons why non-unionized workers generally wish to become unionized. Higher wages, defending labor rights are also stated, but by fewer people, class solidarity being only mentioned by one worker.

Table 60. Why the unions cannot defend the interests of the laborers

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
they are under influence-control of the employers	10	24	34
	43,5%	57,1%	52,3%
laws are inadequately designed for this purpose	10	2	12
	43,5%	4,8%	18,5%
undemocratic union elections / no word right for workers	2	5	7
	8,7%	11,9%	10,8%
we lose our rights / do not prevent dismissals/no increase in wages	-	6	6
		14,3%	9,2%
they are not active-influential-strong enough	-	5	5
		11,9%	7,7%
I do not know	1	-	1
	4,3%		1,5%
Total	23	42	65
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0

Workers' general opinions about the unions also display their great discontent and **lack of trust**. 9 of every 10 worker accuse the unions of thievery, mafiatric relations, and close cooperation with the employers; the softest judgment being their ineffectiveness. It should be noted by passing that half of the women workers have no general idea about their unions. When **expectations from the union** are asked, some workers (13 percent) assert none with a totally lost feeling of trust. Expectations of the workers from the unions might largely be **classified under three categories**: increase in wages, defense of workplace related labor rights (social rights, job security, etc.) and more progressive demands. Some of these more radical-progressive demands are social and others political. Social ones, expected by 41 percent, include organization of social activities and services both for the workers and their families like seminars, picnics, discount in hotels and wedding-halls, and establishment of free hospitals, schools, economy markets. Political ones necessitate legal or organizational rearrangements made in government or union regulations, such as providing unions with the authority to organize more movements, strikes; ensure transparency in the union budget; abolish anti-democratic laws; make it a state-sponsored free service; prevent subcontracting relations and wage differentials among the sectors. These latter are, however, proposed only by 19 percent of the unionized workers. Here we find that, even though the current state of class struggle between capital and labor over the social relations of production and reproduction makes labor organizations retreat into workplace related issues, there is sufficient ground for problematizing this separation of work and living, and help politicization of living place by means of labor union movement as well.

Table 61. General opinions about the labor unions in Turkey / Expectations from the union

	neighborhood		Total		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			
unionism is finished / all in favor of the employers.	7	17	24	defend my rights	32
	26,9%	17,9%	19,8%	wage increase - standardization	22
fill their pockets / exploits workers / mafia	3	16	19	social activities for families, seminars, hotels, wedding halls, picnics, locals	22
	11,5%	16,8%	15,7%		
I have no idea	4	15	19	none	11
	15,4%	15,8%	15,7%	establish hospitals, schools, cheap markets	8
they are ineffective	5	12	17	job guarantee	6
	19,2%	12,6%	14,0%		
they are getting worse / cannot defend us	2	10	12	organize movements, strikes etc	5
	7,7%	10,5%	9,9%	transparent budget	4
employers are more caring than the unions	3	6	9	provide transparent, in workers favor dialog between workers & employers	4
	11,5%	6,3%	7,4%		
defends the rights of workers /deals with their problems	-	9	9	abolition of anti-democratic laws	2
		9,5%	7,4%	cancel the septet shift system	2
no worker trusts in the union undemocratic, procedural	2	5	7	preserve bonuses-overtime payments	2
	7,7%	5,3%	5,8%	be a state sponsored-free service	1
narrow wage unionism / only guarantees the severance pay	-	3	3	abolish wage differences among different sectors	1
		3,2%	2,5%		
they know how to establish dialog with the employers	-	2	2	prevent subcontracting relations	1
		2,1%	1,7%		
Total	26	95	121		73
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0

Note: some workers have more than one expectation

In sum, throughout our investigation of the class-based consciousness formation process, we observe “complexity, **ambivalence and occasional contradictions**” (Yıldırım, 1991, 315). This logically inconsistent interpretation of class, however, is a common finding of most of the researches on class consciousness. And it is understandable because capitalist system as a whole, through the agency of other loci of consciousness formation like state, community, family and individualism, imposes values that foster such fetishistic readings of daily experience. And in the absence of labor organizations to overcome the divisive effects of the social differentiations which hinder perception of capitalist system as a totality, and to foster consciousness formation and collective action against it, the ambivalence in interpretation of daily life deepens. While class-identification and class-opposition are recognized to a certain extent, logically inconsistent interpretations of the interrelation between these two elements largely stem from the lack of **the third binding element** class totality, that is, “acceptance of exploitative class relations as the defining characteristic of the capitalist society as a whole” (Mann, 1973). This in turn reduces class-identification and class-opposition to a narrower standing of workplace related issues. We also identify that **Akpınar** workers display rather a mixture of deferential and privatized attitudes compared

to the more antagonistic attitudes of the proletarian kind in **Emek**, in terms of recognition of the class inequality, class opposition and class totality.

VI.II. STATE LOCUS

In Turkey, relationship of the laborers to the state oscillates with the complicated history of the military takeovers, constitutional changes, shifts in franchise regulations, union and labor laws and other organizational rights, social movements, populist, paternalist party politics and changes in accumulation and hegemony strategies. Therefore, the repressive, central and authoritarian state cannot easily be identified as ‘them’ on part of the workers; these oscillations make the **state an ambivalent phenomenon**.

Political leaders do not direct demands in the same broad class-terms to employers at the workplace and to the state away from work. Rather cross-class mass-parties flourish. Class politics is largely left restricted to worker-employer conflicts at the workplace. The so-called mass working-class parties, like DSP, using rather nationalist terms in politics off-work, never went in strong collaboration with the unions, and finally in the 90’s, slid to center to become the party of the Kemalist nationalist sections of the society (Öngen, 2003). The most militant DİSK closer to TIP in the 60’s, instead of socialist parties, collaborated with CHP in the late 70’s, the party representing the state ideology with a mostly middle-class social base and with a historical legacy as the party of the ruling classes (Akkaya, 2002b; Yıldırım, 1994). In the 50’s and 80’s, migrants who felt themselves better-off were susceptible to right-wing populism of DP or ANAP. But migrant workers of the 70’s, still with high expectations, were attracted by radical class organizations propagating socialism as well. 70’s class-based movements and institutions (local governments with socialist policies, illegal radical political groups, unions and various occupational organizations) were integral parts of a network of values and organizations that promoted the view that class pervaded all social relationships, not just those at the workplace. But the military takeover in 1980 smashed all those structures and relations, and placed nationalist, religious and liberal ones instead. In the name of public interest, the regime fostered community and individualism based consciousnesses. Özal type of right-wing populism pumping money-based individualism, family self-sufficiency, and entrepreneurial drives under the motto ‘köşe dönmeçilik’ appealed particularly to the urban poor and new migrants to make them allies for the free-market economy and ideology (Öngen, 2003, 177).

Lacking class-based mass political parties and radical leadership, labor movement is divided along different party lines, and socialism has always been a minor rhetorical voice. Weakness of the socialist movement in Turkey is a handicap for the working-class that needs a political project to organize around, and to mediate transformation of potential class capacities into actual class practices. This shows the importance of **leadership and existence of alternative political projects** in society to reassert state-base as an arena of class struggle, invade state-consciousness formation processes with that of class, and gain the power to redefine ‘**public interest**’ as the **laborers’ interest** rather than that of the capitalists.

VI.II.I. Electoral Behavior

What is significant is that against ¼ of the respondents interviewed in Emek who are registered with a political party, Akpınar seems **politically more detached**, only one worker with political engagement as an executive committee member in AKP. Organized political behavior of the workers seems to be weakened in time in Akpınar, whereas increased in Emek. When we look into the past, we see that more Akpınar workers (16 percent) used to be registered with parties, and all to those of the left-wing (DSP, SHP).

Table 62. Political affiliations of close relatives / duty in the party structure

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
none	23	65	88	none	29	70	99
	79,3%	66,3%	69,3%		96,6%	71,4%	77,3%
mayor	1	6	7	member of district exe. committee	1	3	4
	3,4%	6,1%	5,5%		3,3%	3,0%	3,1%
municipal council member	4	22	26	municipal council member	-	1	1
	13,8%	22,4%	20,5%		-	1,0%	0,7%
chairman of party prov. or district org.	1	2	3	member	-	24	24
	3,4%	2,0%	2,4%		-	24,4%	18,7%
mukhtar	-	3	3	-	-	-	-
	-	3,1%	2,4%		-	-	-
total	29	98	127	total	30	98	128
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0%	100,0	100,0

Nearly half of the current affiliations are to AKP (conservative democrat), the party in power both in national and locality levels. CHP (social democrat-Kemalist), as the strongest party in opposition has 30 percent of the registered workers, most being ‘Alevi’. In Emek, most are passive members in local party administrations, not actively participating in these administrative bodies. Active membership is observed to be very rare; only 4 people have responsibilities, 3 as members of the party district executive committee, and 1 as a municipal council member. Nearly half of those affiliated to a party in Emek explicitly state

that it was **just not to offend** the friends-townsmen from the party. When asked the political expectations, we find in Emek 2 workers planning to become mukhtar and 1 a municipal council member in the next local elections. **Clientalist relations** established through townsmen groups prevail in voting behavior of the neighborhood, while these relations seem to have been broken in Akpınar. 34 percent in Emek (Kurdish and Blacksea in equal proportions) have close relatives or townsmen in power holding positions in either local branches of AKP or in the municipality (council member), 6 Blacksea workers being in close kinship relation with the mayor. Workers classified as 'Other' are seen to have the least involvement in local politics. Yet, the ratio of acquaintances with political affiliations is not that low in Akpınar either; 21 percent, regarding the fact that Osmangazi is the largest district municipality in population, can still be counted as quiet high.

Distribution **pattern of votes** in the sample in the 2002 elections resembles almost that of the national level. As can be followed from the table above, majority (3/5) voted for AKP, 1/5 for CHP, 1/20 for MHP, and most of the remaining preferred not to vote either as a result of disinterest or disbelief in the political system. In both neighborhoods, a dramatic fall is observed in votes of the left-wing parties (CHP, DSP) since the 1999 elections. It drops from 32 to 15 percent in Emek, and 61 to 24 in Akpınar. Similar drops are observed in right wing-parties like ANAP, DYP, and MHP as well. And in Emek, AKP, as a political party parting from RP, multiplies the 19 percent of RP and collects almost 70 percent of the votes in the 2002 elections. Akpınar's voting behavior is quiet different from Emek's. The **first important difference** is seen in the significantly high ratio of votes in the 1999 elections for DSP (Democratic Left Party), recognized as the party of the laborers. In 2002, as a result of the general political climate change towards conservative right and neo-liberal politics in the country, and the restructuring and leadership change in DSP, we find 1/3 of the votes slid to CHP, while almost 2/3 to AKP. The **second** difference is related to the non-voting behavior. 35 percent, pretty high compared to the 7 percent in Emek, find the existing parties unworthy for voting for.

Table 63. Voting pattern

	Emek					Akpınar				
	Fat-her	Next elec-tions	2002	1999	1995	Fat-her	Next elec-tions	2002	1999	1995
AKP	-	31	66	-	-	-	7	10	-	-
		32,6%	67,3%				24,1%	34,5%		
CHP	16	11	15	14	8	5	3	6	1	2
	16,5%	11,6%	15,3%	18,7%	21,6%	16,6%	10,3%	20,7%	3,8%	10,5%
DSP	11	-	-	10	7	4	1	1	15	8
	11,4%			13,3%	18,9%	13,3%	3,4%	3,4%	57,6%	42,1%
FP/RP	17	-	1	14	8	-	-	-	2	-
	17,7%		1,0%	18,6%	21,6%				7,7%	
DYP	16	-	1	5	1	12	-	-	2	2
	16,7%		1,0%	6,7%	2,7%	40,0%			7,7%	10,5%
ANAP	12	-	-	13	8	1	-	-	1	6
	12,5%			17,3%	21,6%	3,3%			3,8%	31,6%
MHP	3	4	5	14	5	1	1	1	2	1
	3,1%	4,2%	5,1%	18,7%	13,5%	3,3%	3,4%	3,4%	7,7%	5,3%
GP	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
			1,0%				3,4%	3,4%		
BBP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
									3,8%	
LDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
									3,8%	
TKP	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		2,1%								
İP	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			1,0%							
YTP	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		1,1%								
DEHAP	1	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
	1,0%		1,0%	2,7%		6,7%				
Did not vote	-	-	7	3	-	1	-	10	1	-
			7,2%	4,0%		3,3%		34,5%	3,8%	
No party worth voting	-	19	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
		20,0%					17,2%			
Too early to say anything	-	27	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-
		28,4%					37,9%			
Parties on the right	7	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	7,3%					3,3%				
Left-right mixed	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	4,2%					3,3%				
Total	87	95	98	75	37	28	29	29	29	26
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

It is interesting to note, however, that the **reasons** stated for **voting** is quiet similar among the two neighborhoods. The difference is observed in non-voting group showing dissatisfaction with or disbelief in all, more in Akpınar, and those who state that they relied on their friends', relatives' or the mayor's choice, all in Emek. This last group of workers mostly vote for AKP and is composed of 30 percent of the women workers as against 12 percent of the men. While party ideology, approach to the ethnic-religious culture (alevi

culture particularly) or to the condition of the workers and the poor, generally stated by CHP followers, AKP voters rather emphasize good services, particularly the former success of AKP party leader as a mayor in İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality. And still more than that, in line with AKP's vulgar populism, its voters emphasize with 41 percent the personal characteristics of the party leader, referring to his being a new face, young, dynamic, convincing and honest. The party approach to religion or conservative life-style is mentioned only by a very small proportion (7 percent of AKP voters). Preference made on class basis, on the other hand, is also observed significantly low, being 8 percent in total.

Table 64. Reason for voting

	neighborhood		CHP	AKP	MHP	No vote	Other	Total
	A.pınar	Emek						
He is a new face / young, dynamic, convincing	6	18	-	24	-	-	-	24
	25,0%	19,6%		32,0%				20,7%
I believe in its ideology /its approach to my culture	5	18	12	7	2	-	2	23
	20,9%	19,5%	57,1%	7,3%	33,3%		40,0%	19,8%
No reason / friends'-relatives'-mayor's choice	-	17	1	12	2	-	2	17
		18,5%	4,8%	16,0%	33,3%		40,0%	14,7%
Was a successful mayor in İstanbul /gave good service	3	12	-	15	-	-	-	15
	12,5%	13,0%		20,0%				12,9%
He is honest / not a populist / makes no bare promises	1	9	-	7	2	-	1	10
	4,2%	9,8%		9,3%	33,3%		20,0%	8,6%
It sided with the workers / the poor / the retired	2	8	5	5	-	-	-	10
	8,3%	8,7%	23,8%	6,7%				8,6%
I do not trust in any of them	6	3	-	-	-	9	-	9
	25,0%	3,3%				100,0		7,8%
No alternative exists	1	7	3	5	-	-	-	8
	4,2%	7,6%	14,3%	6,7%				6,9%
Total	24	92	21	75	6	9	5	116
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

In our sample group, too, we observe the effects of **Özal type of populism** based on encouragement of money-oriented individualism and family consumer sovereignty. Özal is proposed by 42 percent of the workers as the **most successful leader of the past**. He is perceived to have fostered broad improvements in the country, particularly in terms of the infrastructural investments, such as road-dam constructions, installation of electricity-telephone networks, implementation of development (GAP) and urbanization projects. In economic terms, they rather emphasize the enhanced consumption capacity and annihilation of the black-markets. The reservations are put on his approach against the Kurdish problem, in that, he welcomed the 'Peshmerga' and recognized the Kurdish language. In Emek, except for the 44 percent for Özal, other names such as Ecevit (14 percent), Erbakan (9 percent), Türkeş, Demirel, and Atatürk are stated as well as past successful leaders. 30 percent in Akpınar, with a more critical attitude, assert that none of them were successful, whereas another 37 percent propose Özal and 27 percent Ecevit. While Özal seems to attract similar high proportions of workers in both communities, variation is observed in the **ratio**

of Ecevit followers. Rather among Akpınar, he is mostly known to have been a leader on the side of the 'halk' (folk), father of the laborers, sensitive to unequal income distribution problem, etc. His nationalist stance, emphasis on national independency (Cyprus operation), consistency in ideological terms (nationalist and social democrat), and convincing, trustable, honest, non-populist character is also appreciated.

In Akpınar, only 33 percent of the sons of fathers voting for CHP-DSP still vote for CHP-DSP. Continuity of leftist voting behavior between the two generations in this respect is higher in Emek with 48 percent. A similar intergenerational continuity is observed in AKP votes, too. In Akpınar, fathers of most AKP voters vote for ANAP or DYP, but in Emek AKP voters have fathers voting for RP as well. In total, however, between the two generations, **drop in leftist votes** in Emek from 28 to 15 percent is higher than that in Akpınar from 30 to 24 percent.

When the voting tendency for the **next elections** is investigated, it must be emphasized that 30 percent of the workers assert that it is too early to say anything. They rather want to wait and see. This shows a high **disintegration** in long-established social bases of the political parties; non-existence of distinguishing party policies, convergence particularly in economic policies, and the pseudo divergence in discourse over identity politics, yield large masses developing short term, shallow and media-distorted opinions about the general political conjuncture, resulting in instable voting behavior. Short term economic improvements and populist appeals to religious or ethnic identities shape the workers' political attitudes. This **instability** is specifically seen in the AKP votes in Emek; only half of the current AKP voters insist on this party in the next elections. While insistence on AKP votes is higher with 70 percent in Akpınar, rather the drop from 24 to 14 percent in left wing votes attracts attention in this neighborhood, compared to the relative stability in left wing votes in Emek (drop from 15 to 12 percent). In addition to these, we find 19 percent in total showing critical attitude towards the whole electoral/political system, and expressing their dissatisfaction with rejection to vote in the next elections.

VI.II.II. General Political Attitudes and Ideological Self-Identification

In order to analyze the interplay of state and class consciousness formation processes, we ask a series of questions regarding the respondents' perception of the power structure in society and in the factory, thoughts about the government policies, particularly the new

labor code, and their ideological identification with a series of social divisions-differentiations in society. This is to understand the terms of the struggle between political consciousness directed toward transcendence of the capital-labor relation, or states of social awareness which allow of social differentiations consistent with the perpetuation of that relation. To start with, we can say that the **sharp tone of criticism** as was against the unions is observed **neither in relation to the political party programs nor the government policies**. And we find class-based consciousness rendered inconsistent by the strong influence of the consciousness projected by the state and other apparatuses of the bourgeois ideology, particularly on Akpınar workers.

Regarding the **power structure in society**, workers are asked to identify one of the four options, the ‘electorate, government-politicians, soldiers, or the big businessmen’, as with the capacity to hold the decision power in society. It is found out that workers do not regard ‘electorate’ as holding a decision power in society in Turkey, only 4 percent think so. 53 percent believe that decisions which affect the society at large are taken by the businessmen (Blacksea the most), second to that, 36 percent posit ‘government and the politicians’ (Kurdish the most), whereas soldiers are cited by 7 percent. When asked what it ought to be, on the other hand, 58 percent propose ‘government and politicians’, and 38 percent the electorate. With reference to these results, it can be said that although the decision power of businessmen is treated illegitimate, interrelation of capital with state policies cannot be critically evaluated by the workers. Kurdish and local workers have more trust in government in this respect compared to other ethnic groups. In a similar fashion, private **ownership and management of the factory** is not problematized by nearly half of the workers. Local workers appear to be more supportive for private firms. Neither state (12 percent), nor union ownership/management (6 percent) seems to constitute a strong alternative to private ownership. Political party affiliations make no difference in this respect. But it is interesting to note that 32 percent, which is a quiet higher ratio, and largely being Kurdish and Other, propose ‘self-government of workers’ as an alternative management strategy. When it comes to workplace, the state and the union lose their legitimate power holding positions. This also shows that neither is regarded as a means/ground for class struggle in the political consciousness of the workers.

To investigate the role of the projected state consciousness and strategies in shaping workers’ political world views, it is asked whether the policies of the government with regards to **privatization, economy, EU relations, new Labor Code, and amnesties** issued

for illegal housing are approved by the respondents or not. First of all, we should underline that the approaches in the two neighborhoods show no significant divergence, and Kurdish workers seem to be the least critical group in the sample against the government policies.

While 56 percent appear to support **privatization** policies (13 percent with reservations), another 20 percent have no idea at all. Opinions related to privatization, more than anything, are in line with the views of the political party affiliated, generally disapproved by CHP voters and approved by AKP voters. Yet, it is significant that while what is disapproved by most CHP voters is the sale at lower prices for the sake of political interests (*peşkeş*), AKP voters rather emphasize the adverse effects on job security, the wages and on the public sphere shrinking due to annihilation of public goods. Interestingly, vocational high school graduates display the highest pro-privatization tendencies, against the regular high school graduates who oppose it the most. They mostly assert that public enterprises provide unjust privileges for their recruits in terms of wages and working conditions and foster establishment of patronage relations. As for the **economy policies** in general, including the 9 percent having no idea, 72 percent (17 with reservations) appear to be content with them, most being AKP voters again. 60 percent support the **EU policies** of the government in congruence with their party views on the subject, 27 percent of the CHP voters versus 75 percent of the AKP. We should also note a gender specific dimension at this point that most of those who stated to have no idea about the content of the questions asked are the women workers.

To further investigate the nature of the relation between wider political structure of society and workers' class-based perceptions, they are asked to agree with one among the two, one positively and other negatively formulated versions of several statements (see appendix B, question 118). This time results vary by the neighborhoods. Those living in Akpınar rather agree that 'Free market economy reduces majority to poverty' (A: 72, E: 49 percent) and 'Religion classes should not be compulsory' (A: 36, E: 23 percent). Mostly, CHP voters are seen to oppose to both compulsory religious education and the free market economy. Emek, on the other hand, is more insistent on that 'Public economic enterprises are public goods and should be improved' (A: 37, E: 50 percent) and on that 'Labor unions should involve in politics in order to defend labor rights' (A: 30; E: 43 percent). In these two issues, we find AKP voters more supporting.

When workers' stance against the **new Labor Code** issued in 2003 by the AKP government is investigated, however, contrary to the generally observed positive attitude towards the government policies, this time workers display their dissatisfaction with the changes brought by the law. Concrete material interests based on class experience at the workplace seem to produce consciousness suppressing that emanating from the state as a locus of consciousness formation. Yet, despite the would be direct influence of this legal change on the daily lives of the laborers, still a relatively higher ratio of 40 percent, most being AKP voters, report to have no idea about the law. Workers affiliated to CHP display more awareness towards its regressive nature. Here we observe a significant difference among the two neighborhoods, Akpınar having no idea with 53 percent, compared to the 33 percent in Emek. Akpınar community with more job security and higher wages seem to be more disinterested in the issue. Again vocational high school graduates together with the primary school graduates, irrespective of their political party affiliations, are less aware regarding the content of the law compared to the regular high school graduates. In total, 54 percent of the workers say that they disapprove either one or two of the following consequences of the law: introduction of flexible working (the most cited aspect), subcontracting relations, lend of workers to other firms, compensation (telafi) work, reduced job security, abandonment of overtime bonuses and separation payments, transfer of the seniority related bonus/unemployment benefits to the fund, increase in the premiums paid by the employees, increase in the age of retirement, and increase in the trial recruitment period. Adverse implications of these changes on unionization are cited only by two workers. Positive opinions by 8 percent include benefits brought for the women workers (birth-leaves, etc.) and enhanced job security.

Another issue directly related to the daily life of the laborers is concerned about the government **amnesties** issued **for illegal housing**. The type of housing community the workers live in seems to have a direct influence on the stances they take. 56 percent of the respondents in Emek, mostly dwelling in unlicensed housing units built on privately owned land, find amnesties necessary, whereas Akpınar people of low-cost apartment blocks disapprove them with 70 percent. They say that amnesties pave the way for 'çarpık yapılaşma' (unplanned development lacking the necessary social and technical infrastructure), encourage illegal building and do injustice against those who pay for their houses. Homeowners are stricter in this sense with 65 percent, against those at rent with 50 percent. But still, the quiet high ratio of opposition with 50 percent in total indicates that both worker groups tend to lose sense of the capitalist forces rendering squatter building

unavoidable in the absence of proper housing policies. Just as, as seen in the table below, they do not feel as squatter-dwellers any more in neither neighborhood, but remarkably more like urban-dwellers in Akpınar than in Emek (A:67, Emek: 25 percent). But half in each neighborhood still feel ‘very close’ to being a peasant, and by 40 percent share a less strong perception of being ‘close’. These migrant communities, and particularly Emek, appear to living a transition period with a mixture of feelings of belonging both to the village and the urban simultaneously.

Table 65. Self-Identification

	Akpınar				Emek			
	Very Close	Close	Partly Close	Far away	Very close	Close	Partly Close	Far away
Türk	26 86,7%	3 10,0%	1 3,3%	-	84 85,7%	10 10,2%	1 1,0%	3 3,1%
Patriotic	27 90,0%	3 10,0%	-	-	83 85,6%	14 14,4%	-	-
Nationalist	17 58,6%	7 24,1%	4 13,8%	1 3,4%	52 53,6%	22 22,7%	9 9,3%	10 10,3%
‘Ülkücü’	3 10,0%	1 3,3%	6 20,0%	20 66,7%	12 12,4%	9 9,3%	13 13,4%	62 63,9%
‘Atatürkçü’	17 58,6%	9 31,0%	3 10,3%	-	39 39,8%	29 29,6%	15 15,3%	14 14,2%
Secular	16 53,3%	11 36,7%	1 3,3%	2 6,7%	36 37,1%	31 32,0%	12 12,4%	15 15,5%
Muslim	26 86,7%	3 10,0%	1 3,3%	-	84 86,6%	7 7,2%	4 4,1%	2 2,1%
‘Şeriatçı’	1 3,4%	2 6,9%	1 3,4%	24 82,8%	4 4,1%	1 1,0%	5 5,2%	86 88,7%
Conservative	3 10,0%	4 13,3%	6 20,0%	15 50,0%	10 10,3%	21 21,6%	12 12,4%	37 38,1%
Social Democrat	8 26,7%	5 16,7%	4 13,3%	12 40,0%	13 13,3%	20 20,4%	12 12,2%	49 50,0%
Socialist	1 4,1%	2 8,3%	4 16,6%	17 70,8%	5 7,5%	7 10,6%	2 3,0%	52 78,8%
Leftist	3 10,0%	4 13,3%	4 13,3%	19 63,3%	14 15,2%	3 3,2%	11 11,9%	64 69,5%
Peasant	13 43,3%	12 40,0%	3 10,0%	2 6,7%	47 48,5%	38 39,2%	5 5,2%	7 7,2%
Squatter-dweller	4 13,3%	9 30,0%	2 6,7%	15 50,0%	18 18,6%	30 30,9%	7 7,2%	42 43,3%
Urban-dweller	20 66,7%	5 16,7%	3 10,0%	2 6,7%	24 25,0%	36 37,5%	14 14,6%	22 22,9%

Şeriatçı: Favors Islamic law, Ülkücü: Extreme nationalist right, Atatürkçü: Kemalist

This table above is very telling indeed since it shows both the **variations and similarities among the two communities** with respect to their ideological self-identifications. What we find similar is that class-based identifications are observed at considerably small rates. 76 percent regard socialism in a ‘far away’ category, though Akpınar with a slightly more affinity towards it. And leftism with 68 percent is again placed in the ‘far away’ category. Most workers deny this division as a demonstration of humanist, integrative attitude since they believe that left-right distinction divides people, and specifically the working-class. We

also know that a similar concern is observed in the refrain from talking about politics with friends from the community or the workplace. ‘Şeriatçı’ is considered as ‘far away’ with 89 percent in total. Another similarity at the reverse end of the spectrum is observed in the Turk, Muslim, and patriotic categories, with 86 percent in each neighborhood feeling very close to them. In ‘nationalist’ and ‘ölkücü’, on the other hand, again a similarity exists, but at lower percentages, 56 and 10 percents respectively. Extreme nationalism is not found that high, but a ‘moderate’ nationalism prevails among the workers. As for the variations, Akpınar workers feel considerably more ‘Atatürkçü’ (representing the state ideology), ‘secular’, ‘social democrat’ and slightly less ‘conservative’. The first two identities are perceived as adjunct to one another in both communities.

In sum, with respect to the state-based consciousness, Akpınar is seen with more former DSP affiliated workers, and experiencing higher drops in leftist votes since the 1999 elections, from 61 to 24 in Akpınar against the 32 to 15 percent in Emek. While similarity in both neighborhoods in terms of the general opinions of approval about the government policies is recognized, Akpınar has more tendency towards disinterest in class related political issues, in that, with higher ratio of no idea about the labor law, disapproval of the amnesties, and approval of the privatization policies.

VI.III. COMMUNITY LOCUS

Community life plays an important part in fixing and sharpening the sense of hierarchy that someone acquires in his/her role as a worker (Lockwood, 1975, 21). Following Lockwood, we agree that definition of position in the wider social context is not only guided by hierarchical workplace relations, but also by the local status structures through which people recognize who is above and below them. In this section, we will have a general look at how our working-class communities create their own culture of everyday life within the spaces created by the logic of capital, and try to understand the extent to which their attitudes and behaviors are influenced and controlled by direct face-to-face encounters. Any attempt to understand whether ties of affect divide working-class members around parochial community interests or unite around integrative class interests entails examination of the material base of the communities with respect to the nature of the local status systems, senses of group membership and degree of integration with the local community. This includes detection of the kind of ties and values that might be considered as part of the shared identities or cultures in these communities, whether they are class-based,

occupational, religious, kinship, ethnic or place-based bonds, and how the pattern of their interrelation changes in time and place.

VI.III.I. Social Networks and Daily Life in a Working-Class Community

It can be said from the beginning that none of the communities, either that of the low-cost housing estates in Akpınar or the unplanned settlement of Emek, resembles a one-to-one sample to the ‘privatized community’ of Lockwood, comprising of purely money-oriented, calculative workers, with no group affiliations. Workers have more or less interactional relations, though not as closely knit as that of the ‘traditional proletarians’. These social relations based on kinship or place-based identities have no positive or negative roles in the class formation process per se. As Yıldırım puts it, whether they play “a constructive or a debilitating role hinges on the historical experience and the material situation of the class” (Yıldırım, 1994, 385). For our case, we can say that the prevalence of non-class affiliations amongst the workers might operate against class-consciousness formation because they are dominated by individualism-based consciousness, rather than community-based one.

Table 66. Jobs of the closest Friends / Neighbors

	3 closest Friends		3 closest Neighbors	
	A.pınar	Emek	A.pınar	Emek
factory worker-officer	69	183	52	117
%	77%	67%	70%	48%
craftsman-artisan	-	4	2	3
small scale retailer-tradesman	4	11	2	21
lower rank civil servant	4	9	16	16
professional	4	5	-	-
lower-rank waged in service sector	2	14	2	15
middle-rank waged in service sector	3	2	-	-
farmer	1	3	-	-
self-employed in service sector	2	7	-	9
construction worker-employer	-	9	-	45
unemployed	-	6	-	-
student	-	2	-	-
housewife	-	13	-	7
small scale producer	-	-	-	1
no close friends/ neighbors	-	3	-	9
	89	271	74	243

In section IV.IV.II, we examined the occupational composition, status structure and social cleavage planes as part of the social infrastructure in both communities. Here we will rather focus on character of the **daily social relations** and face-to-face encounters. A very similar composition to that of occupational composition in the neighborhoods can as well be observed in the occupational distribution of the three closest neighbors and friends. It is seen that neighbor relations generally (60 percent) take place **among the industrial**

workers. Three of four in Akpınar, compared to one of two in Emek are in relation with factory worker neighbors. Slightly more than half of the landlords are reported to be factory workers as well. Lower-grade civil-servant neighbors (teacher, police, etc.) take the second place in Akpınar, and are replaced by construction workers in Emek. As for the closest friends, a considerably larger percentage of 70 are factory workers. Small-scale retailer/tradesman, lower-rank civil servants, lower-rank waged in service sector are observed in smaller proportions. And again professionals, employers and unemployed are considerably in rare numbers. We see that manual workers are not deemed by white-collar persons as social equals and incorporated into distinctively middle-class status groups. ¼ of the 3 closest friends are first met in the workplace; workplace based relations constitute a higher ratio in Akpınar. Yet, immediate **residential community**, with 53 percent, plays a **more vital** role as the socio-spatial base for establishing friendship ties. Encounters in social activities other than work and living place related ones are significantly low; the boundaries of sociability do not include settings like hometown, school or voluntary organizations of any kind. This is in accordance with the finding that there is a relatively low level of participation in clubs, friendly societies, etc. among the respondents.

One significant dimension of community life in working-class neighborhoods composed largely of migrant families is the **strong intertwining of townsmen and kinship based social relations with the occupational, place and class-based ones.** But it appears that even in Emek, populated by longer distance migrant families, townsmen bondage is not regarded in isolation from work-based or local-community-based relations, or deliberately prioritized in the rhetoric-daily discourse of the workers, other than in a few cases. 70 percent of Emek workers have more than 3 households of kins in their neighborhoods, which is only 13 percent in Akpınar. While majority (93 percent) do not have kinship relations with inhabitants of the other flats in their apartments in Akpınar, in Emek, 42 percent still share their apartments only with extended family members and relatives, and 17 percent with a mixture of relatives and non-relatives. By 40 percent, Emek workers have all their closer neighbors from the same hometown as theirs, compared to the 18 percent in Akpınar.

Contrary to such pervasiveness of townsmen-kinship relations, we still see that more than half even in Emek have relations with neighbors from various other places. And only 19 percent in Emek claim that they would give priority to townsmen against a workmate in case of an urgent economic difficulty. Similarly, in cases of moral difficulty new

acquaintances like workmates, friends or neighbors are trusted more than the relatives or family members. We have also seen earlier that relatives played a limited role as intermediates to find work with 27 percent in total at similar rates in each neighborhood. Rather non-kin friends from the residential community were helpful as mediators. In addition to these findings above, a general resentment among the workers that relations with relatives and townsmen are weakening in time (E: 75, A: 83 percent) also support the observation that they are getting divorced of from being the hegemonic type of social relation in these communities. They ground the reasons behind this weakening on the economic difficulties with 31 percent, and oppressive nature of the small communities, family problems, gossip, etc. with 20 percent. 19 percent say that urban life and tough economic struggle leaves no spare time for social relations, another 18 percent complain about the money-oriented individualism that economic welfare promotes. While it is so, relations with the neighbors look still higher than would be expected in both Emek and the low-cost housing estates of Akpınar. And in Akpınar where kinship relations are considerably lower, neighbor relations are even stronger than in Emek, with 80 percent regularly visiting more than five families, this for some reaching up to 30 and even 50 families. It should be underlined that in both neighborhoods non-working wives play a huge role in establishing social ties with other working-class families.

Table 67. Number of relatives living in the current neighborhood / First one to turn to in case of moral difficulty

	neighborhood		Total		neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek			Akpınar	Emek	
none	16	15	31	relatives	6	28	34
	53,3%	15,3%	24,2%		20,0%	29,2%	27,0%
1-2	10	15	25	townsmen	1	1	2
	33,3%	15,3%	19,5%		3,3%	1,0%	1,6%
3-5	4	18	22	neighbor	5	8	13
	13,3%	18,4%	17,2%		16,7%	8,3%	10,3%
6-10	-	16	16	workmate	9	12	21
		16,3%	12,5%		30,0%	12,5%	16,7%
11-20	-	15	15	friend	4	33	37
		15,3%	11,7%		13,3%	34,4%	29,4%
21-50	-	14	14	family members	2	10	12
		14,3%	10,9%		6,7%	10,4%	9,5%
51 and more	-	5	5	all of them	3	4	7
		5,1%	3,9%		10,0%	4,2%	5,6%
Total	30	98	128	Total	30	96	126
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

We gave a general outline of the **ethnic mapping of the industrial labor market** in section IV.IV.III. as important labor market segmentations creating a social infrastructure of solidarity for the laborers. And now we will look at how this fragmentation is reflected in

views and attitudes of the sample group, the extent to which it reproduces a divisive effect in the social consciousness of the workers.

In order to get a general idea about the relationship between market competition and ethnic division, workers are asked whether older settlers and the migrants/newcomers are rivals to each other in **economic terms**. 65 percent of the workers in each neighborhood do not think that they are rivals. The general view is that Bursa 'is long accustomed to newcomers', it is not easy to identify who is local or not due to the well-rooted and still continuing migration flows. The expanding markets and high production levels in the city in 2004 also fostered these non-competitive views that everybody could find a place in the labor market. But it was not always like that in the past, particularly in times of economic recession the hostility among different ethnic groups increases. In mid 80's, as for an extreme example, there had been a serial murder targeting the Balkan migrants (muhacir) in Emek. It was found out in the end that the murderer was a worker dismissed as a result of the collective recruitment of the Balkan migrants in a factory. Negative attitudes against the 'muhacir' workers are also seen in the statements of those who recognize economic rivalry. When the respondents are asked to comment upon the workplace relations with the 'muhacirs', local workers display a completely indifferent attitude, 38 percent of the Kurdish and Blacksea workers, on the other hand, have considerably negatively loaded perceptions. They complain about their individualistic money-oriented, calculative behaviors, not participating in collective actions, closeness to managerial staff, hardworking, isolation in their own groups and supporting of each other. Most believe that they work for lower wages and contribute to increased unemployment in Bursa. It appears that economic **competition** is rather experienced **in and among the migrant groups** who feel less secure in the urban labor markets, rather than between the migrant and local (including the towns of Bursa) groups.

Regarding that there are few Kurdish people in the factories, 82 percent in the sample do not or cannot comment upon the workplace relations with Kurdish workers. But still discriminative statements are uttered by 12 percent in each ethnic category. Some find them disobedient, ignorant and quarrelsome. They are generally stigmatized as terrorists or nationalists. 43 percent of the Kurdish workers explicitly state that there is discrimination against the easterners in the factories. What they generally emphasize is that they are not accepted to factory work. Blacksea workers with 51 percent seem to be significantly more **discriminative against Kurdish** workers in the living place compared to the 21 percent among the Kurdish with negative thoughts against Blacksea workers. While 90 percent of

Kurdish respondents have close friends from Blacksea, 64 percent of Blacksea people report to have Kurdish close friends. It is also significant that Kurdish workers have negative attitudes against their own ethnic groups, too; it is the same with the Blacksea people though at a lower percentage. Analysis of this very complex integration process which displays multidirectional interrelations between social, economic and political dimensions is beyond the scope of this work. But it shows us that the dynamic process of interpretation of the lived experience is always open to reformulation and change and this provides a possibility for dominance of class-based political strategies of working-class organizations as well.

At this particular point, it will be helpful to look at **perceptions** of the workers regarding the role of **ethnic/place-based voluntary associations** in the community to have an idea about the extent to which their divisive or unitary character is recognized and might be perpetuated in daily life. In Turkey, and in our sample, the fraternal community organizations rather divert from class-based social and cultural relations-institutions. But these community based organizations might have promoted them as well. For example, English working-class voluntary associations rather than reinforcing local particularities based on intra-class differences of territory, income, and crafts, linked the activities and sensibilities of workers to each other across these lines. They joined the concerns of the residential community, the class issues of political participation, trade unionism and public policy (Katznelson, 1992).

We have seen in section IV.IV.III. that membership to such associations is considerably low, observed only in Emek with 15 percent affiliated to a village/province culture and solidarity association. These kinds of associations do not appear to be very powerful in the organization of community life; few resort to them in case of problems or disputes or pay visit to the locals of these associations.

It is interesting that Emek as more involved in these associations and with townsmen relations stronger due to long distance migration patterns has also a **more critical stance** against them. Townsmen associations are regarded as playing positive roles in society only by 34 percent of Emek, as against 57 percent in Akpınar, least among the regular high school graduates and highest in the lowest income group. Those positive aspects are listed that they foster collectivism and solidarity in civil society in economic and cultural terms, provide channels to help the poor townsmen, chance to know each other, join social

activities, etc. Except for the 16 percent in Emek who consider the associations as purely negative, 32 percent, of whom Blacksea people lead the most, take a twofold stance against them as both positive and negative. They complain that they do not operate well in the district, and are dysfunctional in terms of establishing solidarity and economic support lines. They rather serve for gambling as tax-free coffeehouses. Moreover, most stress that they discriminate and divide people by ethnic identities, serve for clientalist or individualistic interests. It is remarkable that Kurdish workers form the majority in both groups who have the positive and the negative attitudes, and particularly among those criticizing them as being discriminative. **Minority group members** in the neighborhood seem to be more **supporting** for these associations, probably in that, as we have discussed in section IV.IV.III, they serve as patronage channels which seek partial interests of the ethnic groups, as the primary mode of representation of the workers for articulation to the urban political system. The **majority groups**, on the other hand, seem **more critical**. It is even so in the rhetoric of the local urban managers. While the mayor and a municipality council member stress their divisive roles and oppose to such organizations, we find both as the founders of the two major associations in the neighborhood (Giresun and Samsun). They further claim that these associations even cannot mobilize votes any more, showing as evidence all Kurdish people voting for the Blacksea man of AKP in the last elections. This is to assert the national level political conjuncture as determinative in this respect.

Table 68. Opinions about the ethnic/place-based associations

	neighborhood		Total
	Akpınar	Emek	
positive	17	33	50
	56,7%	34,4%	39,7%
negative	6	15	21
	20,0%	15,6%	16,7%
twofold	4	31	35
	13,3%	32,3%	27,8%
I have no idea	3	17	20
	10,0%	17,7%	15,9%
Total	30	96	126
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

One of the most important information sources of the workers is those social networks in the neighborhoods. The number of acquainted industrial workers in the neighborhood is remarkably high in both communities, the average being 30 in Akpınar and 75 in Emek. They frequently see each other out of the workplace as well. The most frequent topic of the **conversations** when met is stated with 27 percent as workplace related problems, comparing of wages, working conditions, etc. It is followed by sports with 23 percent. While general wage and collective bargaining issues, economic difficulties rank the third,

daily issues, education of children, etc. rank fourth with 18 percent. And lastly, with 10 percent comes the national economic, political and social problems. Some say that they **refrain from talking political issues**, because it divides the community and puts distance between the friends. There are also those particularly in Akpınar who once being involved in politics now are disappointed and lost faith in it. On national issues information is gathered mainly from **television**. However, **newspaper** readership ratio comes surprisingly high as well; many reading at least two newspapers, 52 percent on daily basis and 82 percent at least once a week (half of the non-readers are women). Newspapers are not necessarily bought by the workers, coffee or tea-houses, locals and clubs also serve as places providing free papers. Furthermore, as can be seen from the table below, they are not only that colored, ‘light’ ones, but also local newspapers or mass distributed popular liberal, religious, nationalist papers, the latter group rather observed in Akpınar. As for the TV channels, we find the popular-liberal channels like ATV, Kanal D, Show TV, Star, Kanal 6 as the most watched in both neighborhoods. While Islamic-conservative channels, like STV, TGRT, Kanal 7, TV 5 are rather watched in Emek, the elitist-liberal channels like NTV, CNN Türk, TV 8, Haber Türk and public channels, like TRT 1, 2, 3, watched in Akpınar.

Table 69. Frequently watched TV channels / frequently read newspapers

TV channels	neighborhood		Total	newspapers	neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
ATV, KanalD, Show TV, Star, Kanal6	15	56	71	Local newspapers; Hakimiyet, Olay	19	39	58
	51,7%	62,9%	60,2%		68%	52%	56%
STV, TGRT, Kanal 7, TV5	-	17	17	Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Akşam, Vatan	16	29	45
		19,1%	14,4%		57%	39%	44%
NTV, CNN Türk, TV8, Haber Türk	6	8	14	Zaman, Tercüman, Vakit, Türkiye, Y.Şafak	6	27	33
	20,7%	9,0%	11,9%		21%	36%	32%
TRT 1, 2, 3	4	5	9	Posta, Güneş, Takvim, Gözcü	7	24	31
	13,8%	5,6%	7,6%		25%	32%	30%
Local channels	4	2	6	Sports newspapers	5	25	30
	13,8%	2,2%	5,1%		18%	33%	29%
Kral	-	1	1	Cumhuriyet	3	10	13
		1,1%	,8%		10%	13%	12%
Total	29	89	118	Total	28	75	103
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%

We observe a difference with respect to the meeting places with friends between the two neighborhoods particularly in relation to coffee-house and home visits. In Emek, **coffee-house** culture among men still continues by 42 percent, which drops down to 27 percent in Akpınar. There is a general understanding in the latter community that coffee shop culture belongs to a lower status way of socializing. Coffee-houses are regarded as places of low-educated, lazy people, full of smoke and card-players. There is also a similar consideration among some Emek workers. They prefer and esteem ‘çay ocağı’ against the coffee-shops in

the sense that they are generally open-air places where no one plays cards; one just reads newspaper, drinks tea and chats with friends. Open air is highly valuable for workers who work away from sunlight in the factories. In Akpınar, on the other hand, they rather prefer meeting in the teachers' house or sports club of the neighborhood. Although these places more or less look like the coffee-houses in appearance, they are deemed more respectable with respect to the status of people who attend. Workers generally get together with teachers, other lower-grade but more educated civil servants, the retired, the 'esnaf' and small entrepreneurs there. The increasing frequency of social encounters with these salaried employees might indicate their **convergence** in some important respects to the industrial working-class and joining the latter in its political struggle.

Home visits in couples are observed more in Akpınar with 50 percent against the 25 in Emek. Akpınar workers have slightly more **tendency for a family-centered** life, in that, in the week days they mostly prefer staying home, taking a rest, watching TV and dealing with the children. Most think that a factory worker can just try to rest his/her body when out of work; he would have neither time, nor energy for some other useful task. Particularly **shift-work** (see section IV.I.) dramatically decreases the possibilities for any social relationship. But women workers who are also responsible for the housework are expected to create that energy. It was harder to convince them for the survey which lasted more than an hour; they generally had the strong excuse of lack of time due to their double work-load. For both communities the general pattern of daily life in the **weekdays** seems to comprise of either visiting the coffee-shop, tea house, local or the sports-club, or staying home. For almost 70 percent of the workers, weekend holidays last only one day. At the **weekends**, coffeehouse visits shift place with activities done with the family at home or outdoors. Visiting relatives and friends is the second major activity. Being 20 km away from the seaside, they either prefer picnic at the seaside, in the city parks, or shopping in the Grand Closed Bazaar of Bursa. More middle-class type of activities like going to cinema or shopping malls, having dinner outside, sports and work in voluntary associations are cited by a very small percentage. Workers report that seasonal changes largely affect the daily life in a working-class neighborhood. While winters are home-centered periods, summers are fed by outdoor activities like picnics, wedding and circumcision ceremonies, which appear to be the most important and interesting chances for interaction, particularly for women, in the very passive and unvaried social setting of a working-class community.

Table 70. Daily activities / Weekend activities

Daily	neighborhood		Total	Weekend	neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
stay-rest at home/ watch TV/ deal with children	20	43	63	with family; stay at home, picnics, seaside, city parks	13	39	52
	66%	43%	49%		43%	39%	40%
visit coffee-tea house, teachers' local, sports club	16	46	62	Visit relatives, friends; walk around with friends, picnics, fishing, seaside	13	31	44
	53%	46%	48%		43%	31%	34%
walk around with friends	1	11	12	visit coffee/tea house, local, sports club	2	19	21
	3%	11%	9%		6%	19%	16%
housework	-	12	12	always overtime	3	15	18
		12%	9%		10%	15%	14%
visit relatives, friends	-	7	7	visit closed bazaar, walk around in Bursa	4	10	14
		7%	5%		13%	10%	11%
work in the garden/ house repairs	1	6	7	football, billiard, cycling taekwondo, walking	5	8	13
	3%	6%	5%		16%	8%	10%
have a walk in open air	3	4	7	housework	-	11	11
	10%	4%	5%			11%	8%
read a book- newspaper	1	4	5	supplementary work	2	6	8
	3%	4%	4%			6%	6%
supplementary work	1	2	3	cinema, dinner, shopping malls	2	4	6
	3%	2%	2%			4%	5%
go to cafe-internet cafe	1	2	3	visit the village	1	1	2
	3%	2%	2%		3%	1%	1%
work in school association/ voluntary trainer	1	2	3	-	-	-	-
	3%	2%	2%				
Total	30	98	128	Total	30	98	128
	100%	100%	100		100%	100%	100

Note: Some workers have more than one answer

To investigate further the sense of belonging to a working-class community, how occupational sociability is lived and interpreted by the workers, we asked whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous of living in a neighborhood where workers are densely populated. While 63 percent find it advantageous, Akpınar workers seem to be more sensitive towards the **benefits brought by the homogeneity of life standards**. They put it as being able to share problems, understand each other, establish better social relations, and chances for solidarity. And it is a relief in the sense that no one looks down on one another, thus being saved from the despising of the rich or the professionals. In addition to these, Emek workers also mention its facilitative role in finding jobs, which displays a rather instrumental approach to occupational social relations. Some workers hesitated to prefer among the advantages or the disadvantages, in that, they lived both at once. Then we understand that this question should better be asked in two steps; to receive answers with regards to both aspects first and then to get a comment upon which one is given priority. Disadvantages, on the other hand, also differ among the communities. Akpınar rather emphasizes poor public services and jealousy, and Emek the low wages, economic

difficulties, no benefit to one another, and decrease in social relations in the working-class families (due to shifts or hard work).

Table 71. Advantages / Disadvantages of living in a working-class neighborhood

Advantages	neighborhood		Total	Disadvantages	neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
None	8	38	46	None	20	59	79
	28,6%	39,2%	36,8%		71%	61%	63%
Easier to understand each other / share problems	11	28	39	Comparison of the rewards, bonuses / jealousy	2	6	8
	39,3%	28,9%	31,2%		7%	6%	6%
No one looks down on you similar life standards	8	12	20	These neighborhoods benefit less from public services	5	-	5
	28,6%	12,4%	16,0%		18%		4%
Becomes easier to find work	-	16	16	Different shift-hours	1	4	5
	-	16,7%	12,9%		3%	4%	4%
We can talk about workplace problems	1	3	4	Not good for children's education	-	9	9
	3,6%	3,1%	3,2%			9%	7%
-	-	-	-	Low wages / no benefit to one another / economic difficulties	-	11	11
						11%	9%
-	-	-	-	Social relations decrease in working-class families	-	8	8
						8%	6%
Total	28	97	125	Total	28	97	125
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

Accordingly, desire for living in a working-class neighborhood is observed less in Emek with 39 percent compared to 57 percent in Akpınar, and 10 percent in total saying that it does not matter. While being together with working-class families of the same standards is generally preferred for the sense of social equality it gives, most of those who prefer mixed neighborhoods mention that diversity fosters mental development; one learns about different social activities, hobbies, world views, etc. They find it monotonous to talk always about the same work-related problems; it makes a man robot-like. They also express that it is advantageous to know people from other jobs, especially from the government-related ones, to get your work done. Alienation is furthered in the daily life of a working-class neighborhood due to the decrease in neighborhood relations through the shift system, exhausting work conditions, and non-existence of social activities; the low quality in life standards, poor education facilities for children, and poor public services. Furthermore, some do not appreciate discrimination against different social groups, be that the poor or the rich, and favor mixed socio-spatial formations. **In sum**, we see that living in a working-class neighborhood is **considered as intensification of alienation** in the living place by most of the workers.. So community-consciousness in a sense of occupational-solidarity is also absent in our working class communities, in addition to the weak ethnic and place-based community consciousness we observed in the previous sections.

Table 72. Desire for living in a working-class neighborhood

why not	neighborhood		Total	why	neighborhood		Totl
	A.pina	Emek			A.pina	Emek	
difference fosters mental development, hobbies, more information, reduces stress	4	12	16	no class-human distinction/ no despising of the rich-professionals	11	15	26
	36,4%	25,5%	27,6 %		68,7%	44,1 %	52,0 %
boring, monotonous, robot-like, always talk about work problems	1	12	13	they have family-order, good manners	2	1	3
	9,1%	25,5%	22,4 %		12,5%	2,9%	6,0 %
advantageous to know people from other jobs, to get your work done	2	6	8	if from the same union-factory/ cooperative etc.	-	5	5
	18,2%	12,8%	13,8 %		-	14,7 %	10,0 %
low education level, no culture of living-social activity-time, bad for children's education	1	6	7	better social relations/sharing, solidarity	3	13	16
	9,1%	12,8%	12,0 %		18,7%	38,2 %	32,0 %
discrimination against other social groups	3	4	7	Total	16	34	50
	27,3%	8,5%	12,1		100,0	100,0	100,
I prefer being with my relatives / townsmen	-	4	4	-			
		8,5%	6,9%				
comparison of the rewards, bonuses/ jealousy / competition	-	2	2	-			
		4,3%	3,4%				
working-class neighborhoods benefit less from public services	-	1	1	-			
		2,1%	1,7%				
Total	11	47	58	-			
	100,0	100,0	100,0				

The correspondence between **work situation and community structure** that Lockwood defines is not clearly observable in our communities. Those who display deferential attitude in work might come out to have occupational communities as that of the proletarian workers, or those who recognize class opposition in the workplace might have weaker occupational communities in their living places.

We might conclude that perception of class totality is affected by the consciousness of social placement in the community in adverse ways. Being in close relation to similar class and status people in the residential communities do foster identification of oneself as part of the working-class, **but not of perception of class-opposition and class-totality**. They are outcomes of the forces emanating from an interrelation of all loci of consciousness formation. This is a finding which looks highly relevant to the discussion on the relationship between class and community. What we find in our research is that there is a strategic attachment to local community. In this respect, people use their local community as a resource upon which they draw whenever needed. This creates a kind of attachment to living place. But it would not be wrong to argue that individual and family based consciousness and identity over increasingly dominates the community level as well. This in turn, creates a tendency towards a loosely knit community and such a community does act as against the formation of class based consciousness due to, as oppose to various

approaches, its weakness rather than its strength. **Individualism acts** in this instance not only against the class based but also community based consciousness and identity. The lack of strong solidarity in the community especially in the face of problems resulting from capitalist market relations including the labor market is a sign not only the weaknesses of class but also community based consciousness.

VI.III.II. Family and the Gender Issue

The founding principles and values of the family and the perception of women's role within it tell a lot about how the family unit is reformulated under capitalist patriarchal conditions. In the sample, 100 out of 128 workers are married. 33 percent of these marriages in each neighborhood were arranged '**görücü usulu**', that is, the partners did not know each other before the marriage. Another 14 percent were a rather more modernized version, a mixture of '**görücü usulu**' and mutual agreement. This traditional form of marriage appears to continue even among the younger couples, generally in a form within which parents find the person to be married, and then the young couple decides whether to marry or not. And they do marry rather than not. While nearly half of the spouses first met in the hometown, some 27 percent met in the neighborhood. "Görücü usulu" occurs mostly in these categories, whereas mutual agreement pervades among those who meet at the workplace (8 percent) or in other places. Some workers state that the factories operate as marriage offices, most workers being either a spouse or relative of one another. In addition to their own forms of marriage, attitude towards the **marriage of children** with people from other **sects** (especially Alevi, a heterodox Muslim sect), **religions** or **ethnic groups** indicate the extent to which such social divisions are to be reproduced within these families. Ratios of positive attitude are 48; 37; 78 percent respectively. Kurdish workers display a strikingly less discriminative attitude in all those categories; might be because, being Kurdish, they rather are the victims of discrimination. And Local workers are significantly more reluctant against different religions. While CHP affiliated people seem more tolerant in religious terms (due to CHP's embracing approach to Alevi people), AKP followers are found to be more tolerant in ethnic terms.

¼ of the married male workers state that they do not share management of the family budget with their wives, another 4 percent leaving it to their parents. All of the married women workers, however, contribute to the management of the family economy. Slightly more than half of the male workers help their spouses in housework and child rearing. It is interesting to note that ratio of Kurdish men helping their wives is higher in comparison to other

groups, since they are regarded as belonging to a patriarchal culture. Another interesting issue is that help increases by age, men of older couples around the age 40-45 seem to be more helpful in housework.

Role of the women as a **housewife** continues for 84 percent of the married male workers. Only 11 percent have wives as factory workers as well. In our sample, we have 18 women workers, 10 of them married, and all to factory worker men. Together with them, the ratio of factory worker couples reaches up to 19 percent in total. 80 percent of our **women workers** work in textile sector, as sewing-machine operator, weaver, ‘bükümcü’, ‘çözücü’, etc, while 6 percent in automotive, and the rest in food and chemical industry, either in montage-line, quality control, dying or cleaning departments. These are all smaller factories recruiting less than 300 employees. Women workers are generally recruited in textile sector in Bursa, the automotive sector, known as ‘heavy industry’ recruits women only in shop-floors which are physically suitable for them. Factory worker wives and women workers are either Blacksea originated or Other, **Kurdish and local** families seem to be **more resistant** to outside work. Since 45 percent of the wives are reported to have worked in the past mostly in factories and small workshops, it is observed that marriage or having a baby is considered as a deadline for work for most of the women. When asked to name a **general condition to quit work**, it is again these two reasons proposed by 33 percent of the women workers. So it seems that pre-marriage savings of women laborers rather serve as the capital invested into establishment of the family institution. What is significant is that half of them point out ‘improvement in family’s economic situation’ as a reason not to work. Decrease in social relations with neighbors, relatives, destruction of family life, less time for children, not being able to find someone to look after the children, stress and weariness of double-workload both at house and outside, are some of the problems they face as women workers. They do not mention much about the workplace related social problems. Only 20 percent support working outside for the economic and social freedom it brings.

Attitude towards **women working outside** is an important indicator showing the degree to which the traditional role of women in the family is transformed, or the changing role of women in the production-reproduction connection. 29 percent in the sample oppose to it stressing the traditional role of women as house-keeping and child-rearing. 71 percent, on the other hand, irrespective of the ethnic identity, take a positive stance; male workers of Akpınar slightly more supporting with 76 percent in this respect. When asked why, however, it is seen that only 26 percent assert the **economic and social freedom of women** (Other, Blacksea most), the rest proposing either its benefits for the family economy, or that

it becomes a must within deteriorating economic conditions, etc. 11 percent pose a conditional stance; they approve it only if it is not a factory work, a shift work, a lower rank work, or a men-majority work. Emancipation of women is considered more important by the female workers (55 percent of the women, against the 21 percent of the men), while, yet, 11 percent of women also believe that women should not work.

Table 73. Attitude towards the outside work of women

Positive, Why	neighborhood		Total	Negative, Why not	neighborhood		Total
	A.pınar	Emek			A.pınar	Emek	
economic-social freedom of her / has own insurance	8	25	33	against the customs / men look after-protect women	2	20	22
	27%	25%	26%		7%	20%	17%
contributes to family budget/ necessary under these economic conditions	7	22	29	child-rearing & housework is the priority of women	4	9	13
	24%	22%	23%		14%	9%	10%
not in factory / shift / lower rank / men majority jobs	3	11	14	It's not appropriate where men are unemployed	1	1	2
	10%	11%	11%		3%	1%	2%
if economic situation is bad, otherwise not	3	7	10	None	22	68	90
	10%	7%	8%		76%	69%	71%
if there are no children	1	3	4	-	-	-	-
	3%	3%	3%				
None	7	30	37				
	24%	30%	29%				
Total	29	98	127	Total	29	98	127
	100,0	100,0	100,0		100,0	100,0	100,0

The question ‘what you are proud of about yourself’ is a summarizing question as it stands at the intersection of the influence of different loci of consciousness formation. It is significant that here we observe work-related issues at a remarkably low level; also non-work related success stories seem to be very poor, and even group-belonging in terms of ethnic or other identity feelings is considerably low. What are deemed as a source of pride and self-esteem by our workers are rather family-related issues with 42 percent, of holding responsibility of the family, success of the children, owning a house, self-sufficiency in economic terms, etc. and secondly, personal features, such as sharing, honesty, self-confidence, respectfulness, justness, helpfulness, with 31 percent. We might interpret these findings as supporting evidence to that family as a locus of consciousness formation, and the specific virtues and values reproduced within it deserve a more detailed, spacious analysis, which is beyond our scope here. The task should be to reveal whether “family protects individuals against the alienations of money and breeds social relations antagonistic to money and capital, or rather play a vital role in the adaptation of individuals to conditions of wage labor and the money calculus of urban life” (Harvey, 1985a, 258). Or in other words,

“Retreat to its inward looking affective relations against the dangers of urban life might encourage a family-centered life excluding any community or class action. But if the moral basis of such affective relations spill out to wider society then they may become dangerous for capitalism” (Harvey, 1985a, 258-59).

Yet, it is not possible to interpret the shifting family actions and strategies as adaptive or resisting to the dominant mode of production ‘in itself’. They can only be understood in their relation to other consciousness formation processes that we have tried to investigate throughout our field research.

Table 74. What s/he is proud of about him/herself

		neighborhood		Total
		A.pınar	Emek	
family related	my family/ holding responsibility of my family	6	21	27
	my children / their good manners / success / education	3	6	9
	success of one of my kins-relatives	2	-	2
	being able to buy-build this flat-house	2	4	6
	being self-sufficient in economic terms	-	7	7
	Sub total	13	38	51
	43,3%	41,7%	42,1%	
personal features	not being submissive, being able to oppose to wrongs	2	3	5
	my humanism / sharing nature / making no discrimination	2	8	10
	honest, respectful, keeping promises, honest earnings	4	10	14
	being self confident / at peace with myself	1	4	5
	being able to help my workmates-other people	1	3	4
	Sub total	10	28	38
	33,3%	30,7%	31,4%	
work related	working	1	2	3
	being good at my work / success in the workplace	1	4	5
	the firm I work for	-	2	2
	Sub total	2	8	10
	6,6%	8,7%	8,2%	
group belonging	Being a Turk / Muhacir / Kurd	1	3	4
	Being a muslim	1	4	5
	Sub total	2	7	9
	6,7%	7,7%	7,4%	
other	having passed university exams	-	3	3
	the medal I received during my military service	-	1	1
	my political view	-	1	1
	once having set up my own work	1	-	1
	having conducted a theatre play	-	1	1
	playing ‘saz’ and singing	-	1	1
	being praised by others	-	1	1
	Sub total	1	8	9
	3,3%	8,7%	7,4%	
none	none	2	2	4
	Sub total	2	2	4
		6,7%	2,1%	3,3%
	Total	30	91	121

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

VII.I. Summary of the Key Discussions

The aim of this thesis is to explore the class and consciousness formation in a local setting by also developing and applying a theoretical framework which allow us to study the interaction of locus of class consciousness with the other loci of consciousness formation such as the community and the state. Such an approach is also grounded in the belief that a relational understanding of these processes requires us to take spatial dynamics such as local dependency, spatial fix and fixity and mobility into account. By critically drawing upon historico-geographical materialist approach(es), the thesis attempts at resolving the tensions between ‘locality-wider society’ and ‘structure-consciousness’. By integrating them into a holistic and operational conceptual framework, it investigates the highly complex patterning of relations within urban structured coherences, and their effects upon the class and consciousness formation processes. It is shown that interpenetration of these fields of tension through urban processes is crucial in shaping a backbone for the concrete struggles fought by working class against capital in and of the urban regions.

Given this objective, the main point of departure for the thesis is the assumption that there exists a dialectical relation between theory and empirical study as they contribute to the development of each other in a manner of cross-check. In this sense it would not be wrong to argue that theory helps us to judge on the findings of the case study and likewise, latter would lead us to re-evaluate the theoretical premises of the study, if not directly allow us to test them. The three sections of the case study, namely production of locality, between mobility and fixity, and loci of consciousness formation, were formulated around the endeavor to answer two main questions, namely, why and how the class struggles over mobility and fixity were fought in a local community.

Having described general aims of this study, in what follows, we will present the specific aims and key concepts and arguments of the thesis belonging to each field of investigation in theory and field work that might contribute to the formulation of a socio-spatial approach to the question of class and consciousness formation.

As far as theoretical framework of this thesis is concerned, **local dependency** was asserted as an analytically useful category to account for the total effect of economic and social assets that tied people to certain places. These ties or entrapments in particular labor markets play important roles in people's acquisition of (local) class interests and formation of their social consciousness. Having briefly discussed different forms of local dependency, we classified those under four headings: forms and technologies of production; labor market; housing-consumption market; and social and physical infrastructures. We recognized the complicated interplay between class relations and a variety of non-class relations, and the simultaneous unity and division producing character of social structures under capitalism. We also underlined that under capitalist conditions of unequal power relations, the immobilizing aspects of capital operated against the collective interests of the laborers, more than it did against the capitalists'.

The forces **between mobility and fixity** were also classified under four headings; competition over technological change, product innovation and social organization; push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation; shifting space relations; and class-struggles over distribution and social relations of production and reproduction.

We focused on **residential differentiation** as a form of shifting space relations, and conceptualized it as both a local dependency and a destabilizing force. Residential differentiation is both the outcome of the processes of social transformation that produce new social groupings and also an integral mediating force in the processes that produce and sustain those groupings. We tried to depict how residential areas became local dependency both for laborers and capitalists under the coherence producing dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Nevertheless, the processes creating and sustaining patterns of residential differentiation also rendered it a locus of instability and contradiction. Then we saw 'residential differentiation' acting as a destabilizing force on the territorial coherence which might come out to function either favorable or antagonist to capitalist accumulation processes depending upon the state of class-struggle between capital and labor.

Class-struggle is conceived with a built-in spatial dimension to it. Both capital and labor restructure their own conditions to overcome the spatial barriers established at perpetually changing strength and intensity by the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. The tension between free geographical mobility and production-reproduction processes within a confined territory is an internal contradiction of capitalism, and how that tension is resolved

depends on the state of the class-struggle. We defined a pendulum movement of struggle between structure and consciousness. Social relations of production place people to class positions based upon the exploitation relation between capital and labor. This forms the primary material basis for class-struggle, which, together with a variety of secondary forces, constitute the ‘structure moment’ of the ‘struggle pendulum’. Consciousness is formed through an oscillation movement in which people experience and live the antagonisms inherent in these class positions, where the antagonisms are not limited only to the class-based ones, but also include other non-class bases of social differentiation in society. And dialectically, social agents, passing through the ‘consciousness moment’ turn back to reshape the socio-spatial configurations of the class-structured society. We also emphasized that class-struggle included all kinds of survival strategies and power struggles employed in a capitalist society; those around competitive individualism, community-based consciousness and class-based consciousness.

Bases for class-struggle over ‘mobility-fixity’ to disturb the structured coherence within urban regions were explored both in relation to the interventions of capital and the changing material basis of urban society. To overcome the shortcomings accruing from conceptualization of struggle limited to that fought around the built environment, we tried to incorporate the contradictions stemming from the spatially organized labor markets and how they were reflected in residential areas, as well. In each case, we tried to pin down the particular effect of the ‘residential area’ in the struggle either as a disturbing force or a local dependency. Some Weberian findings, considering the issues related with the world of work and living together, also provided some exemplary cases for us to reveal the kind of class-struggle they may lead to under capitalist conditions.

We insisted on internal relations be established consistently within and among all social structures and forces. These relations are formulated differently in the two schools of thought discussed throughout this thesis, namely, the historico-geographical materialism of Harvey and the social theories proposed by Katznelson and Lockwood, former establishing ‘internal’ and the latter ‘external’ linkages in between. The key entities we considered can be listed as follows:

1. Among the forms of local dependency: local labor and housing markets.
2. Among the mobilities: residential differentiation and class struggle; space and society; residential differentiation and whole social structure/community and wider society
3. Among the loci of consciousness formation: class-base and non-class bases of society; class-base and capitalist social structure; five loci and economy and society

4. Among the dependencies, mobilities and the five loci: structure and struggle and consciousness

We started with the conceptual relation between the urban **labor and housing markets**, since it is the unity of these spheres that defines the local socio-spatial boundaries within which fixes and flows interact. After a criticism of the static conception of ‘separation of workplace from the living place’, we argued that ‘**structured coherence**’, denoting a particular technological mix of structures, organizational forms and social relations interrelated through a certain spatial coherence, was an appropriate conceptual tool to relate housing and labor markets internally. ‘Coherence’ serves as a norm around which capitalist organization in space pivots. It is not only the forms, technologies, quantities and qualities of production, but also of consumption, standard of living, the qualities and style of life, social hierarchies, etc. that are implied by the structured coherence. It is a tendency for achieving a momentary state of stability and security around the need for the perpetuation of the dependency relation between employers and laborers under the overall domination of capital.

In order to link ‘class-struggle’, ‘class formation’, ‘consciousness formation’ and ‘specificity of the local’, we first tried to specify the failures and strengths within Katznelson’s model ‘Four layers of class’. We argued that Harvey’s model, which conceived state, class, community, family, and individualism as different roots of consciousness formation, was a more operational conceptualization.

One important assertion in this thesis was to reject conceptualization of the class-base as the only material base within society, or in other words, reduction of other loci of consciousness formation to mere instruments of the class locus. This kind of thinking underestimates the crucial role that other constitutive bases of society as forms of solidarity may play in struggles for humanly living, against the power of money and capital. Accordingly, in this study, class-based consciousness is not understood within a dichotomous conception, in an all-or-nothing manner. We do not discuss whether class consciousness exists or not. Our point is to find out why it does not dominate social consciousness and guide the struggles within capitalism. We attempt to find out specific influences emanating from different cognitive bases, and the possibilities and barriers provided by each in terms of developing class-based struggles.

Another important assertion is that neither the real material bases of consciousness formation, nor their replication in thought are located and interrelated within an empty void. Urban milieu mediates production of consciousness in important ways. Loci of consciousness formation are interrelated through the urban specific geographies of capitalist mode of production and organization, within territorial coherences of particular forms and technologies of production, labor and housing markets and social and physical infrastructures. They structure the interrelation of the forces that arise out of each locus in a certain way and contribute to production of unique absolute spaces. Experience of these reified social and physical relations shape individuals' consciousness, sense of identity and give stimulus for action.

For an **integrated framework** linking these two important assertions, we proposed a schema for the mechanism through which 'loci of consciousness formation' comprising duplicated patterns of relations in the material and cognitive bases of society, could be integrated with formation of the local structured coherences. Five primary material bases are tuned into crystallized socio-spatial relations by the unique geographical configurations of physical and social relations of the urban. And this definite patterning of relations, simultaneously, produces the social consciousness that in turn feed back the paths and qualities of capitalist urbanization. This is a process of continuous restructuring between structure and consciousness and the urban.

Careful attention was paid not to conflate **class-base** with the circulation processes of capital. Class relations are crucial, but only as one dimension within the totality of the circulation processes of capital, which also encompasses other principles only indirectly related with the buying and selling of labor power. Class-base invades and dominates all other material bases due to their organic links with the mode of production, but class-based consciousness cannot. Class-consciousness is derived out of the experience of earning money, and particularly from the experience of the local labor market conditions which are not confined to the spatial limits of the workplace. Under the hegemony of ruling class strategies invading all bases of consciousness formation, development of class-based consciousness entails active employment of political and organizational projects and strategies on part of working-class. Trade unions, on the other hand, increasingly become purely contractual communities and lack any organizational links with the traditional geographic kind of communities. Disintegration of these two forms of communities has


serious adverse impacts on the class-consciousness formation processes and development of the class-based struggles.

We adhered to the relational conception of **state-base** within which whether or not it could continue to impose its will depended on the strength of the class alliance and the relative power of the opposing forces behind it. State, like all other loci of consciousness formation, is instable and vulnerable to the actions and revolts in civil society. Changes taking place in the three dimensions of state, namely its forms of intervention, of representation, and spatial and institutional organization, are both products and means of the class-struggle in a capitalist society. We insist that the three dimensions of state not discussed in isolation, but in their interrelation to each other. Otherwise, this would yield treating of the present form of the liberal democratic state as given, and contribute to the reproduction of state-mediated social distinctions producing consciousness other than that of class. Evidence to that state is not a neutral institution lies in the struggles between capital and labor over particular interventions, non-interventions, forms and reforms of the state, and in our case in this study, over the local dependencies they provide.

We highlighted the crucial relationship between the life experiences of people, the social interaction process within **community-base** and the values, consciousness and ideologies they develop. Community-consciousness is identified as essentially sectional, divisive, particularistic, and parochial, in the sense that communal solidarity embraces community members only. However, communities can create protective milieus against the harsh effects of class domination and alienated individualism as well. Comparing different methodological approaches to community formation, we defined capitalist community as the spatial and material basis both for the elaboration of the market in which people secure their social needs, and for the reproduction of the intimate, the personal, and the affective. Conception of residential community as a locus for class-struggle recognizes these two dimensions of the community formation process as an inherent dialectical tension. A community converges more to a class-conscious community of resistance only if forces emanating from class relations can inform community relations in favor of construction of class identities.

In sum, below are presented, in the order of their logical appearance, the seven schemes developed throughout these theoretical discussions:

Figure 16. Seven Schemes of the Theoretical Discussions



As the thesis relies upon a historico-geographical materialist understanding, it goes without saying that there exists a dialectical relation between theory and empirical study as they contribute to the development of each other in a manner of cross-check. Thus in what follows, we would like to turn to the findings of the field research in relation to the discussion carried out above.

The field work is constructed around two main questions to be answered with regards to class-struggle over mobility and fixity within urban regions: why they are fought, and how they are fought.

1. The question ‘**why**’ is tried to be answered through identification of the interests, stakes, aims or ideas around which these struggles might arise. The bases for struggle are local specific as long as these interests are defined around the local labor and housing markets, social and physical infrastructures, and forms and technologies of production. People derive their local dependency out of the specific patterning of interrelations between these socio-spatial configurations. The uneven geographical development of capitalism prevents dependencies to be allocated evenly to different individuals. Only through an analysis of the disturbing effects of class struggles can we weigh the particular immobilizing effects of local dependency within specific territorial coherences. And accordingly, only then can we draw the boundaries of the universe for mobility chances, the extent to which command over certain use values can be used in struggles for mobility chances. The linkage with wider society should also be pinned down if we are to unravel the inter-scalar mechanisms through which local dependencies are produced. This leads to identification of both the similarities and variations among different urban economic and social processes which are captured by the same capitalist logic of accumulation, faced with own specific social-spatial configurations, and experienced ultimately as similar or varying contradictions.

2. As for the question ‘**how**’, we intended to identify the character and the effect of the strategies adopted by laborers around the specified bases of struggle. The patterning of the interrelations between different material bases within the social structure, and between different cognitive bases within the social consciousness, determine the character of the class struggles through which they are interlinked; whether they will be individual or collective ones, and when collective, community or class-conscious ones. Another important point to be underlined here is that, not all dispositions give rise to actions or

behaviors. So we should also consider why some remain at the disposition level and do not or cannot be converted into practices. These necessitate examination of the kind of channels chosen for interest representation and the institutions-persons chosen to direct the demands. In this thesis, these choices are not treated as mere products of people's preference systems; we assert that they are rather adapted to the range of choices curtailed by the capitalist social structure.

These issues are discussed with reference to two working class neighborhoods located next to Bursa Organized Industrial Estate in Bursa. The first community, Emek, is an unplanned, illegally built settlement, hosting mostly migrant, and lower-wage earning industrial workers, and the second one, Akpınar, is a planned settlement, composed of low-cost housing cooperatives, symbolizing a higher living standard environment for well-paid, socially secure workers, mostly local in origin. The field research focuses on the relations between 'the labor market, housing market and local dependency' and 'the strategies between mobility-fixity adopted both on part of capital and labor'. The specific character of these strategies also tell us how the patterning of the relations between class, community and state loci of consciousness formation and the formation of local coherences mutually shape one another.

Forms and technologies of production, particularly in an industrial city like Bursa, serve as a major local dependency both for capital and labor. The establishment of 'Automotive' industry and the development of large-scale 'Synthetic-Filament and Integrated Weaving' industry rendered Bursa a diversified industrial center. It was seen that by the establishment of BOIE, for the first time in the urban history, spatial differentiation of the big and small-scale industry was realized. They remained closely related, though, through the outsourcing mechanisms; city perpetuated its traditional small-scale industrial activities parallel to its specialization in advanced technology.

Workshop and factory workers, and the skilled and the unskilled were **not residentially differentiated** in Bursa in most cases. First, factories' service policies did not promote such differentiation of the working-class neighborhoods. Second, in Bursa, big-scale industry exploited the presence of precariously employed workshop and small-scale manufacture workers. This strategy of big industry created a dynamic occupational mobility pattern between workshop and factory work which drove workers into the same residential communities. And third, small-scale industrial estates and some unorganized industrial

zones were generally located closer to inner city working-class neighborhoods where factory workers lived. OIEs fostered generalization of the labor market rather than creating local dependent labor markets of their own, differentiated by skills. And private service transportation rather served the interests of employers in exercising discipline and control over the circulation regime of the workforce.

If one general characteristic of the **local labor market** was becoming familiar with industrial work through apprenticeship, workshop and casual work, the other was that, once entered into the industrial labor market, the boundary of mobility chances were drawn by industrial works to a large extent. The difference between the total lengths of industrial experience was dramatically high between the two communities. In general, unemployment was observed just after or before the military service. Reasons like dismissal, economic crisis, and factory closure were observed relatively low in number. Distribution by industry within the sample group resembled the urban-wide patterns where the industrial labor force was mainly recruited in textile and automotive sectors. Contractual statuses of most of the workers were permanent, and all were adhered to the state insurance scheme. There were very few white-collar workers (technician-bureau worker) among our sample group, and more skilled workers in Akpınar compared to the unskilled in Emek. However, we saw that due to the extreme fragmentation of work, an unskilled worker would be able to perform most of the tasks even in such advanced technology industries. Akpınar workers belonged to a higher income category than that of Emek. It appeared that neither education, nor skill affected the amount of wage, but a strong correlation existed between length of work, sector and size of the factory. Automotive workers received significantly higher wages and had higher unionization rates compared to those in textile.

In Bursa, economic and spatial development of the industrial sector was seen to have a strong relation with and impact upon the mapping/spatial patterning of the **local housing market**. By the establishment of the BOIE, for the first time in Bursa history, functional differentiation of the residential areas from the industrial areas has started. Except for some of the inner districts where strong workplace-living place relation still perpetuates, in most relatively new neighborhoods such as ours, living place is completely separated from the industrial workplaces. As for the class-based geographical segregation pattern in Bursa, what is observed is rather a kind of homogenization, convergence among different segments of the working-class. The capacity to purchase residential environments has not become totally independent of the functioning of the labor markets, so there cannot be observed a

high stratification in hierarchy of neighborhoods providing different styles of life. Both organized and unorganized workers have generally settled in the northern parts of Mudanya-Ankara road after the 60's. We observed a significantly dynamic socio-economic and spatial restructuring and struggle over the space around BOIE; the new upper-classes had projects to invade in and dislocate the workers from their places.

Economic hierarchy in neither community was deemed in the forefront, the differences were rather perceived within the same status level. Workers generally identify a wider category denoting 'other wage-earners' as closest to themselves. While small-scale retailers and civil-servants rank higher in Akpınar, it is replaced by construction and casual workers in Emek. As a consequence of the homeownership aspirations of the higher-income working-class members in Akpınar, homeownership rates are observed much higher. Ownership situation is more complicated in Emek with a higher tenancy rate and father-owner category as well, and we observe a trend towards increasing tenancy ratio in Emek. While both neighborhoods seem to emphasize physical advantages more than the social ones, there still exists a significant difference between them, in that, workers in Akpınar cite proximity to the industrial zone and good relations with the neighbors hardly at all. Akpınar workers seem more satisfied with the social and physical qualities of their living place and rather show dissatisfaction with the physical facilities. In Emek, however, both are observed at higher rates, but rather social dissatisfaction seems to be the main problem. There is a general discontent in Emek about the low socio-cultural level and especially a concern of women workers on the negative influence of this situation on their children.

While the patterning of **labor and housing market** structures are less solidified as shorter term relational processes, more reflexive and responsive to the changes in capitalist accumulation processes and to the local or wider social, political and economic conditions, **social and physical infrastructures**, reflect relatively more immobile long-standing assets of society. We identified four major forms of local dependency under this heading.

The first one, **BOIE**, resembled the 'gated-communities' of the upper classes, safely closed against any unpleasant attacks to devalue their fixed capital. We saw that the term 'organized' not only denoted organized production, but also the organized power of capital against the working-class. The second infrastructure was the **local government**. The mayor in Emek powerfully adopted a paternalistic rhetoric as embracing the whole community like a father. With a relatively smaller population and size, and 'thanks to' his populist practices,

in Emek, people are aware of what is going on in the municipality through the clientalist relations well-strengthened by the mayor. Townsmen associations are seen more influential on municipal decisions compared to other organized or unorganized groups in society. It is observed that the respondents in Akpınar inhabiting a smaller neighborhood attached to Osmangazi, one of the three biggest central districts of Bursa, rather see the mukhtar as the problem solving agency, and have rather restricted interaction with the municipality. The third infrastructure was related to the **ethnic divisions and organizations** in the labor and housing markets. Affiliation to village/province culture and solidarity associations was none in Akpınar and only 15 percent in Emek. Community organizations did not serve as an effective local dependency for the workers other than their roles in mobilization of votes, while on the other hand, ethnic segmentations in the labor market were more clearly observable as creating dependency. Perception of the **trade unions** as a local dependency was considerably weak, despite the material gains it provided and the relatively higher unionization rates in BOIE. Compulsory membership to the unions diminished the potential of the workers to identify with their unions, construct class-based identities, and involve in class-based actions, simultaneously however, fed great discontent among the laborers, and created potentials to evolve into collective actions against the organized unions. The particular socio-spatial strategies, ideological approaches and institutional structures of the unions also prevented identification of the workers with their unions.

With regard to the question of **'how'**, **first** mobility was related with the **'push to accelerate turnover times and accumulation'**. We identified flexibilization of work through shift-work and overtimes of particular importance because capital extended its control over labor power increasingly through controlling its time. By these kinds of regulations, workers are tried to be deprived of any decision power over their own material conditions. Hence, control on organization of time and space is lost on part of the laborers, established social relations both at work and off-work are dispersed, organizational capacity against capital is weakened, and commodification of labor power is extended.

Second domain of mobility **'class struggles over distribution, and social relations of production and reproduction'** was examined in relation to struggle over mobility in the labor market, household economy, and the labor movement. We found out that social networks were very effectively utilized by the workers in getting their factory work. In both neighborhoods, however, less than 1/3 mention kinship bonds, this particularly being less than what is expected in Emek where those kinds of bonds are known to be stronger. Role

of the friends from the neighborhood should be highlighted in this respect, most being an employee in the applied factory. And one important remark, vocational high-school graduates seem to have fewer tendencies for utilizing mediators. Workers prefer living closer to BOIE. It reduces the time to get to work, which is added up to the time for refreshing. Particularly for Emek, living close increases the possibility of finding job in the factories. Friends or townsmen in the factories either inform or act as referees for the new employees who are asked to provide three during the formal application process. Also on part of BOIE, modern institutionalized recruitment strategies and traditional strategies based on ethnic-kinship relations go hand in hand, as a double strategy which diversifies resources for enhanced manipulation capacity over the labor market.

We found that half of the workers came from working-class households, and for them the pattern of wage labor was rather consolidated. Most of the remaining has experienced a first generation rural to urban proletarianization process. When asked to choose an occupation for their children, Akpınar workers displayed a more tolerant attitude, half of them leaving the choice completely to their children. Significantly more in Emek, workers envisaged professions which require higher education, such as medicine, engineering, law, etc. Most mention lower-grade public works, like teaching, nursing, public security, etc. Ambition for self-employment or public-works with job security was clearly recognizable. Neither employer status, nor factory work was envisaged for the children. But in reality, we found most of the working children as factory workers. Education is still regarded a means for class mobility particularly in Emek type of communities. But we also identify an increasing trend of correlation between industrial work and vocational education. Particularly educational situation of the younger workers in the sample and that of the respondents' children signify this fact. Capitalist system tries increasingly to synchronize its employment policies with education policies. Fear of losing the job is observed only among 1/3 of the workers. Fear rises gradually in correlation with age and particularly among the Kurdish workers. It seems more interesting that workers feel more confident in terms of their employment situation, believing that they can do any work or can easily find work. Intended work situation in case of quit or dismissal is factory work again for the most. Present jobs do not necessarily provide strong local dependency for the industrial workers in the sample.

As for the income generation strategies in the two communities, we find that against the one-bread-winner households in Akpınar, half of the families in Emek, have two or more. Another income generating strategy utilized more in Emek by 15 percent is 'renting out'. A

third one is the pensions belonging to parents rather in Akpınar. Rarely observed money borrowing relationships among relatives reinforces our observation that ethnic-kinship relations among those in the same economic level do not function much as a support system. Even after deploying such strategies for $\frac{3}{4}$ of the workers, the total household income still remains below three times of the poverty line defined by TÜİK, and below the necessary minimum income calculated by United-Metalworkers' Union for a four member family. Workers strive for keeping basic material needs of survival at the expense of other basic social needs of humanly reproduction.

We observed neither lively memories of collective action experiences, nor present activity regarding the working-class resistance in our sample. This is partly related with the dramatic nationwide decrease in actions since 1994. Only in two big textile factories were there clearly observable discontent, reactions and counter-unionization movements against the existing union. While we found BOİE with a very poor history of strikes since the 90's, non-strike actions also seemed to be not that pervasive. More workers seem to be involved in unionization movements or actions against the unions in the workplace, compared to those organized by the unions. It was recognized that OİEs proved to be highly resistant against invasion of relatively more radical trade unions. Repressive power of capital gets sharper in these estates through strategic cooperation with employer-friendly unions and establishing their dominance on a wider terrain by means of various institutional infrastructures. While labor actions did not foster mobility, we underlined that recording and in-depth analysis of these lived experiences still remained a major task for the studies on class formation.

Within the **third** domain of mobility, **shifting space relations**, we explored the tension between staying in place and striving for local improvement, or moving elsewhere to where wage rates, working conditions, life-styles, and hopes for the future appear better. Emek to a certain extent reflects the long-distance migration pattern of Bursa, Akpınar, on the other hand, reflects both the short-distance and international migration patterns. Half of the workers in the sample have rural origins in a village, 20 percent in a district and 30 in city center. All local workers seem to perpetuate their relations with the hometown in either social or economic form, showing the facilitating role of physical proximity. They have the highest ratios in both visiting and making and getting monetary aid to/from their hometowns. It is seen, however, that not the economic but the symbolic (social) character of

the aids is more important, ownership of land does not result in noteworthy money transfer from the rural to the urban.

Akpınar is a relatively new neighborhood where the dominant form of house-ownership is cooperative-membership, and Emek, an older settlement mostly with self-constructed buildings. In accordance with this fact, we see spatial mobility of Akpınar workers significantly higher than Emek. In Emek, half of the workers show existence of relatives and townsmen as the reason of settling down in this neighborhood, in Akpınar, for half it is rather the housing-cooperative's choice.

Intentions for new property ownership do not imply a pattern of geographical or social mobility. More than half with such intentions express that the new location will still be in the same neighborhood. The rest prefer neighboring settlements more or less in the same socio-economic level with theirs. We see that even a higher ratio, irrespective of the neighborhood, have no plans for moving somewhere else. This shows that despite the growing concern and dissatisfaction about the quality of life, particularly in Emek, there is also an increasing awareness regarding the limits and reduced opportunities for movement. Ethnic minorities in both neighborhoods have plans for moving the most. This shows an inclination towards formation of ethnically more homogenous neighborhoods. To achieve any level of social mobility, however, first economic and educational disadvantages must be overcome. Hence, we see the decision to move not only related with ethnic community relations, but rather with income and education level of the respondents. In a question investigating the desire to move if it was possible and where, middle and upper-middle class neighborhoods are again mentioned in very low ratios. There is, even in imagery, an awareness of the limits of entrance into these communities of the uppers-echelons of society. But what is more significant is that a very high ratio in Emek wants to move, and generally to well-known, old-established working-class neighborhoods.

These findings might have two important meanings. First, those who are expected to benefit from ethnic solidarity lines the most, namely Emek residents, are the ones again who want to move the most. This might signify that the support, both in economic and social terms, received from the kinship and ethnic bonds is not strong enough to hold them in the neighborhood. Second, it seems that for most of these first generation migrant workers relative improvement of life standards compared to village life does not create tolerance towards a deprived position in urban life any more. This kind of critical approach towards

life-standards in Akpınar is rather found among the higher income groups. Local workers in Akpınar are generally much more content with their neighborhoods due to the better quality of the physical environment and social facilities compared to their previous living places. This shows that when the socially defined limits of life standards tailored for a worker like him/her is reached, inclination is rather towards growing a compliance with the social status as it is. And this might accelerate the crystallization process of social and residential differentiation patterns.

On the other hand, it would be argued that within the ‘**Class Locus**’, except for a handful of workers, we cannot find any privatized workers who see work as a mere means to an end, a mere way of acquiring income. Work remains a central life interest and struggle for the workers. We find out that workers might show interest in job at the same time as they grow awareness towards class-opposition. Similarly, loyalty to work ethics should not to be dismissed altogether as a bourgeois value. It reflects also a desire for some non-alienated, non-capitalist universal values, which are to be rescued from the domination of ruling class interests. These reveal some internal contradictions of the alienation process.

‘Working class’ is conceived rather in income or status-based terms in both communities. One very significant difference between them is that while Akpınar workers adhere to group affiliations of status and income, Emek, rather formulates individualistic conceptions which involve strong ethical discontent and feelings of deprivation. In addition to that, in Akpınar, workers are much more deferential to their employers in the sense that they see their interests as common. This shows a tendency towards formation of a privatized working-class in Akpınar. There, we see the continuation of such deferential attitude in regard to the condition of their children as well. Class-based terms and modes of thinking are quiet absent from the daily rhetoric of the workers in both communities. The dichotomous conception of society is largely expressed as ‘rich and poor’ and generally in Emek; ethnic or other status categories are also seen more common in Emek. Detailed income categories, on the other hand, are rather formulated by Akpınar workers. We cannot find any significant correlation between perception of class totality and perception of class opponents. We might conclude that Akpınar workers display rather a mixture of ‘deferential’ and ‘privatized’ attitudes compared to the more antagonistic attitudes of the ‘proletarian’ kind in Emek.

The impoverished, authoritarian unionization and the restricting legal framework provided by the government do not seem to produce workers displaying totally submissive attitudes

against these conditions. To the contrary, we find great discontent and sharp tone of criticism in perceptions of the laborers regarding their unions. In Akpınar, none of the worker believes that the union can defend labor rights, this ratio being slightly lower in Emek. Expectations of the workers from the unions might largely be classified under three categories: increase in wages, defense of workplace related labor rights, and more radical-progressive demands in both social and political terms. Social terms include organization of social activities and services both for the workers and their families. Political ones necessitate legal or organizational rearrangements made in government or union regulations, which are proposed only by a small percentage of unionized workers. Here we find that, even though the current state of class struggle between capital and labor makes labor organizations retreat into workplace related issues, there is sufficient ground for politicizing the living place by means of labor union movement as well.

Within the ‘**State Locus**’, we find Akpınar’s behavior quite different from Emek’s. Against ¼ in Emek who are registered with a political party, Akpınar seems politically more detached, with only one registered worker. Non-voting respondents in Akpınar, pretty high compared to Emek, find the existing parties unworthy for voting for. But we see that more Akpınar workers used to be registered in the past, and all those to parties recognized as the party of the laborers (DSP, SHP). Akpınar experienced higher drops in leftist votes since the 1999 elections towards AKP. Between the two generations, however, drop in leftist votes in Emek is higher than that in Akpınar. Clientalist relations established through townsmen groups prevail in the voting behavior in Emek, while these relations seem to have been broken in Akpınar. Party preference made on class basis, on the other hand, is observed significantly low in both neighborhoods. We observe high disintegration in long-established social bases of the political parties. This instability is specifically seen in the AKP votes in Emek. While a similarity is recognized among the neighborhoods in terms of the general opinions of approval about the government policies, Akpınar has more tendency towards disinterest in class related political issues, in that, with higher ratio of no idea about the labor law, disapproval of the amnesties, and approval of the privatization policies.

In sum, the repressive, authoritarian capitalist state cannot easily be identified as ‘them’ on part of the workers. Although the decision power of businessmen in political issues is treated illegitimate, the trust in government and the politicians shows that the interrelation of capital with the state policies cannot be critically evaluated by the workers. The sharp tone of criticism as was against the unions is observed neither in relation to the political

party programs, nor the government policies. And we find class-based consciousness rendered inconsistent by the strong influence of the consciousness projected by the state and other apparatuses of the bourgeois ideology, particularly on Akpınar workers. Lacking class-based mass political parties and radical leadership, labor movement is divided along different party lines.

One of the most important information sources of the workers are those social networks within the ‘**Community Locus**’. The number of acquainted industrial workers is remarkably high in both communities. They frequently see each other out of the workplace as well, and they generally are in relation with factory worker neighbors. Immediate residential community plays a vital role as the socio-spatial base for establishing friendship ties. One significant dimension of community life in working-class neighborhoods composed largely of migrant families is the strong intertwining of townsmen and kinship based social relations with the occupational, place and class-based ones. But it appears that even in Emek, populated by longer distance migrant families, townsmen bondage is not regarded in isolation from work-based or local-community-based relations, or deliberately prioritized in the rhetoric-daily discourse of the workers, other than in a few cases.

While the intra-integrative role of community relations in ethnic communities are not that significant, their inter-divisive roles are. It appears that competition is rather experienced in economic terms, and in and among the migrant groups who feel less secure in the urban labor markets, rather than between the migrant and local (including the towns of Bursa) groups. It was interesting that Emek as more strongly involved with townsmen relations due to long distance migration patterns also had more critical stance against them. In Akpınar, with no one respondent with affiliations to such associations, townsmen associations were regarded as playing more positive roles in society. And in Emek, rather the minority group members seemed to be more supporting for these associations. The majority groups, on the other hand, stressed their divisive roles; that they discriminated and divided people by ethnic identities, or served for clientalist or individualistic interests.

Desire for living in a working-class neighborhood is observed less in Emek compared to in Akpınar. While being together with working-class families of the same standards is generally preferred for the sense of social equality it gives, most of those who prefer mixed neighborhoods mention that diversity fosters mental development; one learns about different social activities, hobbies, world views, etc. They find it monotonous to talk always

about the same work-related problems; it makes a man robot-like. They also express that it is advantageous to know people from other jobs, especially from the government-related ones, to get one's work done. Alienation is furthered in the daily life of a working-class neighborhood due to decrease in neighborhood relations through the shift system, exhausting work conditions, and non-existence of social activities; the low quality in life standards, poor education facilities for children, and poor public services. Furthermore, some do not appreciate discrimination made against different social groups, be that the poor or the rich, and favor mixed socio-spatial formations. We see that living in a working-class neighborhood is considered as intensification of alienation in the living place by most of the workers. So community-consciousness in a sense of occupational-solidarity is also absent in our working class communities, in addition to the weak ethnic and place-based community consciousness we observed in the previous pages.

VII.II. Key Finding/Argument of the Thesis

None of the communities, either that of the low-cost housing estates in Akpınar or the unplanned settlement of Emek, resemble a one-to-one sample to the 'privatized community' comprising of purely money-oriented, calculative workers, with no group affiliations as Lockwood defined. The workers have more or less interactional relations, though not as closely knit as that of the 'traditional proletarians'. These social relations based on kinship or place-based identities have no positive or negative roles in the class formation process per se. Whether they play a constructive or a debilitating role hinges on the historical experience and the material situation of the class. For our case, we can say that the prevalence of non-class affiliations amongst the workers might operate against class-consciousness formation because they are dominated by individualism-based consciousness, rather than community-based one.

It is necessary to translate the finding on mobility-fixity dynamics in both communities to the consciousness formation processes. What we observed in relation to residential mobility is that those who have more resources are more mobile and those who remain more fixed in a local community are so largely due to the lack of necessary resources to move. When asked, they also declared their desire to move to better-off residential areas. **In sum**, we neither observe community-based nor class-based identity as strong determinants of the attachment of people to a particular local setting. It seems that both material well-being and material deprivation might foster development of discontent against conditions of life

dictated by the requirements of capitalist accumulation. And the most important finding is that the community base seems to be under the domination of neither class nor community-based consciousness; it is rather **individualism-based consciousness** that informs the class-struggles in our working-class communities.

Throughout our investigation of the class-based consciousness formation process, we observed complexity, ambivalence and occasional contradictions. This logically inconsistent interpretation of class among class identity, opposition and totality is understandable because capitalist system as a whole, through the agency of other loci of consciousness formation like state, community, family and individualism, imposes values that foster such fetishistic readings of daily experience. We identify the absence of community-consciousness both in place-based, ethnic or occupational terms to inform class-consciousness as a form of solidarity, and the absence of labor organizations to inform community-base with class-based solidarity. On the other hand, presence of state-based consciousness based on a 'neutral, integrative' state ideology is strongly felt among the laborers. While class-identification and class-opposition are recognized to a certain extent, logically inconsistent interpretations of the interrelation between these two elements largely stem from the lack of the third binding element class totality, that is, acceptance of exploitative class relations as the defining characteristic of the capitalist society as a whole. And perception of class totality necessitates other loci of consciousness formation and particularly that of the residential community integrated into the class-based struggle. Otherwise, this reduces class-identification and class-opposition to a narrower standing of workplace related issues. And even weakens it still due to the lack of the sense of workplace-based community among the workmates.

We might conclude that perception of class totality is affected by the consciousness of social placement in the community in adverse ways. Being in close relation to similar class and status people in the residential communities do foster identification of oneself as part of the working-class, but not of perception of class-opposition and class-totality. This is a finding which looks highly relevant to the discussion on the relationship between class and community. What we find in our research is that there is a strategic attachment to local community. In this respect, people use their local community as a resource upon which they draw whenever needed. This creates a kind of attachment to living place. But it would not be wrong to argue that individual and family based consciousness and identity over increasingly dominates the community level as well. This in turn, creates a tendency

towards a loosely knit community and such a community does act as against the formation of class based consciousness due to, as oppose to various approaches, its weakness rather than its strength. Individualism acts in this instance not only against the class based but also community based consciousness and identity. The lack of strong solidarity in the community especially in the face of problems resulting from capitalist market relations including the labor market is a sign not only the weaknesses of class but also community based consciousness.

It is often assumed that formation of class-based consciousness is hindered by other loci of consciousness such as the community-based one. This study shows that community-based consciousness is itself largely absent in the communities in hand and when community-base is deployed by the local workers it is often strategically employed to get personal benefits. In this sense, the study concludes that the lack of community-based consciousness does not device more effective strategies of formation of class-based consciousness but perhaps another adverse factor in developing class-based consciousness in an environment heavily dominated by individualized form of consciousness.

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APPENDIX

A. Conclusion Re-Written by Capital

Our conclusions are rendered invalid once again; we are not allowed to say the last word. Like in real world, capital crushes rudely in to capture it.

Big construction capital for the first time jumps to the north of Mudanya Road to initiate a 200 Million Dollar gated-community project with 1.300 housing units and Bursa's first and Turkey's third biggest shopping-mall and entertainment center (30.000 m²), on the land previously owned by BOTAŞ along the border between Emek and Akpınar. Owner of the construction company points out the high rates of profit involved in the sector. They base their market strategy mainly upon the locational advantages of the project; being next to the autobahn and the metro-station, easy access to both city-center and to Mudanya-Yenikapı ferry (16 km). Project aims to draw people both from İstanbul and Bursa to the area. 'Big boss' is assured that this is the right investment in the right place.

Figure 17. Aerial View I of Korupark Project, among Emek and Akpınar



Source: <http://www.korupark.com.tr/evlerindex.html>

Akpınar and Emek are under the attack of a huge capitalist project. Nothing is the same since September 2007 for the local residents. Our story belongs to 2004 and has to be re-written now. Profit-oriented capital, with the accomplice of the local governments, invaded this geographically strategic position in the city. 'Chamber of Architects' and several other NGO's in Bursa took the case to the court against Bursa Metropolitan and Emek Municipalities who have changed the plan decision denoting the parcel as a 'public-institution area' to a high-density 'residential-commercial area'. This totally disregarding

the provisions of the upper-scale plans, urban and local-scale social and physical developments and the principle of ‘public interest’ (see appendix A for the expert report). The court called for stay of execution both during and after the construction process, and here we are face-to-face with the completed and full-functioning project.

The winners are obvious; a private company makes huge profits. And the losers are obvious: laborers will be displaced and deprived of their long-established physical and social use-values. Local labor and housing markets and local dependencies will be restructured; the whole geographical landscape will be transformed to their collective disadvantage. They will be pushed to more disadvantaged parts of the city and will have to adapt their preferences to this residential differentiation fostered by capital. And will have to travel back to their factory and ‘shopping-mall’ floors to be exploited at higher rates. The more dramatic impacts of the spatial struggle on the local class and consciousness formation process will become more visible in the coming years.

Below, however, we find some early comments published in a local news web-page. It seems that the project will also have implications nurturing the individualism-based consciousness of some residents, creating improved local dependency for some segments of the working-class, pushing for further divisions in society:

- “Bu projeyi cesur ve emin adımlarla devam ettirdiğiniz için tebrikler..Yapımda çalışan personelinizin gayretlerinden dolayı onları ve bu motivasyonu onlara verdiğiniz için sizi kutluyorum. Korupark’a komşu olmak beni şimdiden heyecanlandırıyor. Akpınar mah.”
- “bursaya böyle bir yerin açılması biz burasalılar olarak sevindirici peki bu alan kuruldunda esnaf için mekanlar kurulacak mı mekanlar olduğu taktirde kimne irtibata geçip bilgi alabiliriz bölge halkı olarak bizi bilgilendiriseniz sevinirim”
- “samsun asarcıklı birisi olarak koruparkta hemşehrilerimin ve özellikle beşer artış kalfanın yaptığı işlerden gurur duyuyorum. beşer kalfa sen çok yaşa”
- “Korupark çok kısa sürede ve hızlı yapılıyor eyvallah, o mahalleler değerleniyor, fakat bunu yapan şirketine çalıştırdığı elemanlara dikkat etmesi gerekiyor. Nitekim bu mahalle karakoluna gidip sorulursa; sarkıntılık, taciz vb. olayların orada çalıştırılan işçiler sayesinde meydana geldiği ve sayılarının da arttığı çok kolaylıkla öğrenilebilir. Ya bu şirket önlemini alsın ya da işçileri ismini kirletmeye devam etsinler”.¹
(www.kenthaber.com) (Note: spelling mistakes left as original)

¹ “I congratulate you for your brave and confident progress in the project; for the motivation you give to your construction personnel, and for their great efforts. I am already very excited to become a neighbor to Korupark”
“It is very pleasant that Bursa will gain such a place. So, when finished will there be places spared for the small-scale retailers as well? Whom can we contact with to get information? We will be very glad to be informed as local residents”

“Being from Samsun Asarcık, I am proud of the work done in Korupark by my townsmen and particularly that of journeyman Beşer Artış. Long live Master Beşer.”

“It is okay that construction proceeds very fast and those neighborhoods will gain value, but still the construction firm should control and watch their personnel. Paying a visit to the community police station, they will learn that there is an increase in indecent assaults and harassments and they are done by their workers. The firm must take precautions or the workers will stigmatize the company’s name.”

In the absence of organizational channels (class or community-based) to mobilize use-value and public interest oriented local counter-forces relying on the local discontent of the laborers, individualism of money and the profit-seeking, class-bound logic of capital circulation will reign. This will lead to community-boosterism and social competition with respect to life-styles and command over space. Only those ‘active community building’ movements antagonistic to these concrete abstractions may lead to formation of community solidarities resisting the dominations of money power, capital and the repressive state.

Figure 18. Aerial View II of Korupark Project, among Emek and Akpınar



Source: <http://www.korupark.com.tr/evlerindex.html>

B. THE SECOND EXPERT REPORT ON KORUPARK TRIAL

"...Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nin 19.01.2006 gün ve 431 sayılı kararı ile onaylanan 1/5000 ölçekli nazım imar planı değişiklik kararı ile Emek Belediyesi'nin 01.10.2005 gün ve 41 sayılı kararı ile onaylanan 1/1000 uygulama planının ve bu planlara dayanılarak verilen 519 ada, 8 parseldeki tüm ilgili inşaat ruhsatlarının iptali istemiyle açılan davada Bilirkişi Kurulumuz aşağıdaki sonuç görüşlerine ulaşmıştır. Kurulumuz,

1. Kentsel merkezler ve alt merkezler ilişkisi ve kademelenmesi, kentsel yoğunlukların dağılımı, alışveriş merkezleri olgusunun Bursa metropoliten alan gelişimi içinde merkezler-alt merkezler, konut alanları ve mahalleler ile nasıl eklemeneceği, kentsel ulaşım sistemiyle nasıl bütünleşeceği konularının dava konusu değişikliklerde irdelenmediği ve bu yönlerle eksiklikler taşıdığı,
2. Dava konusu taşınmaz üzerinde özelleştirme sonrasında satış gerçekleştirildikten sonra imar koşullarının belirlendiğini, bunun yoğunluk ve yapılaşma koşullarının, kentsel yoğunluk dengeleri, kentsel trafik vb. konularda yol açabileceği kamusal kayıplar bir yana, imar ve planlama kararlarının yarattığı değer artışlarının kamu maliyesine kamusal bir yarar olarak dönmesi yerine taşınmaz sahibine aktarılmasına yol açacağı,
3. İşlevini yitirmiş bir alanın metropoliten gelişme içinde ne şekilde değerlendirileceği konusunun, nazım imar planlama düzeyinde ele alınması ve düşünülen kullanımın kentsel gelişme dengeleri, kentsel ulaşım ile ilgili konular ve sorunlar, kentsel gereksinimler, kentsel merkezler ve alt merkezler ilişkisi ve düzeni çerçevesinde, yakın bölgede olası sonuçlarının irdelenmesi gerekirken dava konusu değişikliklerde bunun yerine getirilmediği,
4. Nazım İmar Planlama sürecinin, 1/1000 ölçekli uygulama imar planı ölçeğinde yapılmış değişikliğin 1/5000 ölçekli pafta üzerine işaretlenmesinden öteye geçemediği, bu ölçekte yapılan değişiklik planlarının hiç birisinin, nazım imar planlamasının kapsamına uygun plan değişiklikleri olarak değerlendirme olanağı bulunmadığı,
5. Emek Belediyesi'nin kentsel alanının planlanmış gelişmesi ile yeni kullanım ve gelişmenin nasıl bütünleşeceği vb konularda irdelene yapılması gerekirken rastlantısal ve keyfiliğe açık bir uygulama yapıldığı,
6. Yer seçimleri günümüz kentlerinin önemli problem konularından birine dönüşen "alışveriş merkezleri" konusunda davalı Büyükşehir Belediyesinin herhangi bir strateji geliştirmemiş olmasının önemli bir eksiklik olduğu, planla sürecinin bu nedenle belirsizliğe ve keyfiliğe terk edilmiş olduğu,
7. 1/25,000 ölçekli Nazım İmar Planı'nda yüksek yoğunluktaki meskun yerleşme alanını kuzeyden çevreleyen kentsel büyük yeşil alan kuşağı, 1/5000 ve 1/1000 ölçekli planlarda ortadan kaldırıldığı,
8. 1/25,000 ölçekli Nazım İmar Planı'nda kamusal kullanıma açılması öngörülen kentsel büyük yeşil alanın büyük bir kısmının proje alanı içerisine katıldığı, kendi içine kapalı bir konut alanı içinde kalacak açık alanın kamusal kullanımının sınırlı olacağı
9. Parçacı bir kararla kentsel gelişmeye açılan alan üzerinde öngörülen gelişmenin ölçeği ve büyüklüğü dikkate alındığında, söz konusu yer seçim kararının çok daha geniş bir bölgede gelişme dengelerini tümüyle değiştirecek bir sonuç yaratacağı,
10. Dava konusu plan değişikliklerinin, Emek beldesi ile bütünleşmeyi dikkate almayan bir planlama ve tasarımı içerdiği,
11. Ortaya çıkan yoğunlukların 1/25 000 ölçekli Çevre Düzeni Nazım İmar Planının bu bölge için öngördüğü nüfus yoğunluklarının oldukça üzerinde olduğu, bu değerlerin bölgedeki gelişme dengelerini planlama öngörülerinin dışında değiştirecek ölçülerde olduğu,
12. Dava konusu yerde uygulama imar planı değişikliğinin öngördüğü yapılaşma koşullarının dahi oldukça üzerine çıkmış olduğu sonuç görüşlerine ulaşmıştır."

(<http://forum.arkitera.com/diger-kentler/10308-bursa-korupark-organize-sanayi-manzarali-lux-konut.html>)

C. QUESTIONNAIRE OF OUR STUDY

1. Doğum yılı	2. Cinsiyeti	3. Medeni Hali	4. Doğum yeri	5. Eğitim Durumu -Okulun türü (İmam-hatip,meslek)	6. İş-görevi-mesleği -Ücretli; Kendi hes; İşveren kaç kişi?	7. Nerede çalışıyor? -mekan-kurum, ev-içi v.s. -Sektör	8. -Aylık net ücret	9. Sosyal güvenlik kurumu
B a b a	Nerede yaşıyor:		() okur yazar () okur yazar () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:	Miktar:..... () Emekli () Çalışıyor () Kıra	() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri
A n n e	Nerede yaşıyor:		() okur yazar () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:	Miktar:..... () Emekli () çalışıyor () kira.	() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri
K e n d i		() Evli () Dul () Bek	Kent merkezi: İlçe: Köy:		() Duz işi () Kalifiye işçi () Usta () Teknisyen () Memur-Büro işçisi () Sürekli işçi () Tasarım işçisi () deneme-geçici işçi	Fabrika ismi:..... Yer: Kaç kişi çalışıyor..... Çalışma Süresi:.....	Net ücret: (İkramiye-mesai dahil)	() Hayır () Evet Kaç yıllık?
E ş i	Evlilik yılı:	() Evli () Dul () Bek		 () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:		() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri
Ç o c u		() Evli () Dul () Bek		Semt adı:..... () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:		() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri
		() Evli () Dul () Bek		 () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:		() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri
		() Evli () Dul () Bek		 () Ücretli..... () Kendi Hesabına () İşveren	Nerede: Sektör:		() Emekli S. () BağKur () SSK () Hiçbiri

1. a) Toplam Hanehalkı Sayısı:.....Kimler: ()kendi ()eş ()anne ()baba ()kardeş
b)Aile ve Yakın Akrabalarda Bulunan Sanayi İşçisi sayısı:.....
Kimler:.....
2. a) Evde kimlerin geliri hane bütçesine katılıyor?.....
b) Evli çocuklar/kardeşler nerede yaşıyor? Ne işle uğraşıyor?.....

GÖÇ HİKAYESİ

3. a) Siz ya da aileniz Bursa'ya hangi yıl geldiniz?.....
b) Bursa'ya niçin geldiniz? Siz yada aileniz.....
4. Memleketinizle bağlantınız nasıl devam etmektedir? (tek tek sorunuz)
1 () Memlekete para yardımı yapma
2 () Maddi yardım alma () un, bulgur, ekin () para.....
3 () Düğün, bayram, yıllık izinde akraba ziyareti Yılda sıklık:.....
4 () İşlenmeyen toprağının olması Kime ait.....
5 () İşlenen toprağının veya hayvanlarının olması Kime ait.....
Arazi miktarı: Toplam Gelir:.....
6 () Memleketle ilişkim kalmadı ->Neden?.....
5. a) Bu mahalleye taşınma nedenleriniz nelerdi? (önem sırasıyla belirtiniz)
1()Sanayie yakın olması 4()Tanıdıkların burada olması
2()Arsaların ucuz olması 5()İşe yakın olması
3()Akraba-hemşehrilerin burada olması 6()Tesadüf 7()Diğer.....
6. Akpınar'ı diğer mahallelerden ayıran özellikler nelerdir?
Olumlu:.....
Olumsuz:.....
7. a) Bu mahalleden taşınmayı düşünüyor musunuz?
1()Evet 2()Hayır -> Nereye? Neden?
- b) İmkânınız olsa, yine burada mı yaşamayı tercih ederdiniz? 1()Evet 2()Hayır->
Nerede? Neden?.....
Sizce bu imkânınız hiç olacak mı? 1()Evet 2()Hayır
- c) Memlekete geri dönmeyi düşünüyor musunuz? 1()Hayır 2()Evet->
Neden?.....

KONUT PAZARINDAKİ KONUM

8. a) Bursa'ya gelmeden önce oturduğunuz yerler:
Yıllar Şehir
1..... ()Köy ()İlçe ()Şehir merkezi
2..... ()Köy ()İlçe ()Şehir merkezi
3..... ()Köy ()İlçe ()Şehir merkezi
- b) Bursa'da şimdiye kadar hangi mahallelerde oturdunuz?
Yıllar Semt-Mahalle Adı
1..... ()g.kon ()apt. ()müst. ()Kira ()ev sahibi ().....
2..... ()g.kon ()apt. ()müst. ()Kira ()ev sahibi ().....
3..... ()g.kon ()apt. ()müst. ()Kira ()ev sahibi ().....
4..... ()g.kon ()apt. ()müst. ()Kira ()ev sahibi ().....
- c) Şu an oturduğunuz blok kaç katlıdır?.....Kaç daireliktir.....

9. Konutunuzun mülkiyet durumu nedir?

- a) () Kira -> Hangi yıldan beri?.....
-> Kira bedeli nedir?
-> Ev sahibiniz ne iş yapıyor? Hangi semtte oturuyor?
-> Bu evi kimler aracılığıyla buldunuz? 1() akraba-tanıdık 2() emlakçı.....
-> Diğer katlarda kimler oturuyor?.....
- b) () Diğer (baba evi vs)
- c) () Kendime ait -> Konutunuzu nasıl edindiniz?
1() miras 2() satın alma 4() kendi yapma-yaptırma 5() kooperatife girme
2a) Bu evi kimler aracılığıyla buldunuz? 1() akraba-tanıdık 2() emlakçı.....

10. Ev edinmek için gerekli birikimi nasıl sağladınız?

- 1 () işten biriktirdim 4 () Miras 7 () kentte mal sattım
2 () kredi 5 () borç 8 () emekli ikramiyesi-tazminat
3 () baba yardımı 6 () köyde mal sattım 9 () altın-ziynet sattım

11. a) Eviniz, salon dışında, kaç odadan oluşuyor?..... b) Kaç m2?.....

12. Kendinize (eşinize-babanıza) ait başka bir ev-dükkan-arsanız var mı? 1() Hayır 2() Evet->

- 1.a () ev () arsa () işyeri-dükkan 2.a () ev () arsa () işyeri-dükkan
b. () gecekon. () apt. () müstakil b. () gecekon. () apt. () müstakil
c. Mahalle-ilçe:..... c. Mahalle-ilçe:.....
d. Alınış tarihi:..... d. Alınış tarihi:.....
e. () kirada () oturuyor e. () kirada () oturuyor
f. Kira geliri..... f. Kira geliri.....

13. a) (yeni bir) Konut edinme planınız var mı?

- 1() Hayır->niçin?.....
2() Evet->Ne tür bir konut edinme girişiminiz var?
1() Arsa satın alıp ev yapma-nerede..... kaç katlı..... 4() Kooperatif aracılığıyla
2() Mevcut arsama ev yapma kaç katlı..... 5() Toplu konut aracılığıyla
3() Kat çıkma 6() Daire satın alma
b) Bu arsayı- daire(yi)leri hangi amaçla kullanmayı düşünüyorsunuz?.....

TOPLUMSAL YAŞAM PRATİKLERİ

14. a) Bloкта ve Mahallede sık görüştüğünüz kaç hane vardır? B..... M.....

- b) En sık görüştüğünüz üç haneyi düşünün: ne işlerle uğraşırlar, nerelidirler ve hangi sokaktadırlar?

İşleri	Nereli olduğu	Sokak adı	Akraba mı?
1.....			()
2.....			()
3.....			()

15. a) Akrabalarınız Bursa'da çoğunlukla hangi semtlerde yaşar?

b) Yaklaşık kaç hane akraba-hemşeriniz Akpınar'da yaşıyor?

A:.....yer..... H:.....yer.....

16. a) Sanayiden tanıdığınız yaklaşık kaç işçi arkadaşınız Akpınar'da yaşıyor? F().....S().....

b) Onlarla ayda ortalama kaç defa görüşürsünüz? Nerelerde?

c) İşçi arkadaşlarla biraraya geldiğinizde en çok bahsettiğiniz üç konu hangisidir?

- 1() Ekonomik sorunlar-geçim sıkıntısı 2() işyerindeki sorunlar 3() İşçilerin sorunları
4() Siyaset 5() Spor 6() Diğer.....

17. İşyerindeki diğer arkadaşlarla işyeri dışında görüşebiliyor musunuz?
()Hayır ()Evet->
Ayda.....Semt.....

18. Son 5 yıl içinde işçi arkadaşlarınızla görüşme sıklığında bir değişim oldu mu?
1()Arttı 2()Azaldı 3()Aynı
Neden?.....

19. Kendinize en yakın hissettiğiniz üç arkadaşınız kimlerdir?
İşleri: **Nerede tanıştınız? (mekan adı)** **Nerede otururlar?**
1..... 1..... 1.....
2..... 2..... 2.....
3..... 3..... 3.....

20. Emek dışına, işe gitmek dışında, ayda kaç defa çıkarsınız?.....
Nerelere

21. a) Fabrikaya işçiler çoğunlukla hangi semtlerden gelir? 1()
b) Müdürler-patronlar hangi semtlerde yaşar? M()P()

22. a) İş dışında şef yada müdürlerinize bir araya gelebildiğiniz mekanlar var mıdır?
1()Hayır 2()Evet-> Hangi mekanlar?.....
b) Fabrika işçilerinin bir araya gelebildiği lokal-dernek benzeri yerler var mı? 2()Hayır
1()Evet ->neresi.....
c) Olmasını ister miydiniz?
1()Hayır 2()Evet.->Neden?.....

GÜNDELİK YAŞAM PRATİKLERİ

23. a) Gazete okur musunuz? 1() Evet, her gün 2() Hafta birkaç kez 3() Sadece hafta sonları
4() Hayır okumam-> Niçin?.....
Hangi gazeteleri okursunuz? Neden?

24. a) Radyo dinler misiniz? 1()Hayır 2()Evet->Hangi radyolar?.....
b) Televizyon izler misiniz? Sıklığı:.....
En çok takip ettiğiniz tv kanalları?.....
Ne tür programları tercih ediyorsunuz?
1() Haber-tartışma 2() Film-dizi 3() Yarışma 4() Magazin/eğlence
5()Belgesel vb kültürel 6()Müzik
Program adı, neden?.....

25. Günlük yaşamınızda, işten çıktıktan sonra genel olarak ne yaparsınız?
1()Doğrudan eve giderim 2()Kahveye giderim (sıklık).....

26. Hafta sonu tatilinizde genellikle gününüzü nasıl geçirirsiniz? ()Tatil yok ().....

27. Yıllık tatilinizi nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?
1() Dinlenerek a()Tatil yerinde b()Memlekette c()Bursa'da d().....
2() Çalışarak a()Memlekette b()Bursa'da c().....
3() Yıllık izin yok

İŞGÜCÜ PAZARINDAKİ KONUM

28. Şu an ek gelir sağlamak için, başka bir iş (ev-içi dahil) yapıyor musunuz?

1 () Hayır 2 () Evet->

Nedir?

Sıklığı:.....Geliri:.....Ne zamandan beri:.....

29. Çalışma yaşamınız boyunca iş arayıp da işsiz kaldığınız oldu mu?

1 () Hayır 2 () Evet ->Kaç kez?.....

->En son işsizlik durumunun Süresi..... Yılları.....

30. Bu zamanlarda geçiminizi nasıl sağladınız?.....

1 () Kendi hesabına düzensiz işler yaparak 5 () Eski birikimlerini harcayarak

2 () Başkasının yanında geçici işler yaparak 6 () Borçlanarak

3 () Kira geliri ile 7 () Gayrimenkul satarak

4 () Baba-kardeş maaşı ile 8 () Diğer.....

31. (Tekrar) işsiz kalma korkunuz var mı? 1 () Hayır ->neden?.....

2 () Evet->neden?.....

32. a) Kaç yaşında çalışmaya başladınız?.....

b) İlk işinizden başlayarak, şimdiye kadar (şimdiki dışında) çalıştığınız işleri sıralar mısınız?

Yıllar	Görev	-Yerin adı	- Kaç kişilik	-Semt	Bırakma nedeni
1.	() İşçi () Kendi hes. () İşveren.....				
2.	() İşçi () Kendi hes. () İşveren.....				
3.	() İşçi () Kendi hes. () İşveren.....				

33. Fabrikadaki işinizi bulmanıza yardım eden birileri oldu mu? 2 () Hayır, resmi başvuru

1 () Evet->Size yakınlığı.....O sırada çalıştığı yer-görev.....

Nereden tanıyorsunuz(mekan adı).....

34. a) Bu fabrikada çalışan hemşehri veya akrabalarınız var mı?

Kaç kişi? A..... H.....

b) Hemşehri ve akrabalarınızdan şu görevlerde olanlar var mı?

1 () işçi-sendika temsilcisi 2 () Postabaşı-Ustabaşı 3 () şef-müdür 4 () İşveren

c) Sanayide çok ...li var mı biliyor musunuz?.....

35. Haftada ortalama kaç saat çalışıyorsunuz?

Saat:..... Mesailer ile:

Mesai sıklığı:..... Mesai ücreti:..... Vardiya sistemi:.....

36. Fabrika krizlerden nasıl etkilendi?.....

Ücretli-ücretsiz izin/eksik çalışma.....

37. İşçilik hayatınız boyunca fabrikanın çalışma koşullarında ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz?
- a) Vardiya sistemi – Mesailer. Yıllar?.....
- b) Denkleştirme - Belirli süreli işçi alımı - Ödünç işçi verme - Çağrı üzerine çalışma - Taşeron Yıllar?.....
()temizlik-yemekhane ()bakım-kaynak ()üretim ().....
- c) İş sürekliliği ()emekli mi olunur ()işçi giriş-çıkışı yüksek midir?.....
- d) Toplu – azar azar işten çıkarmalar. Yıllar, Neden?.....
- e) Tazminatlar (kıdem).....
38. a) Fabrikanın hangi biriminde çalışıyorsunuz? Görevinizi tam olarak tarif eder misiniz?
.....
- b) Fabrika işçiliğine başladıktan bu yana işinizde ilerlediniz mi?
1()sadece ücretim arttı 2()vasıflı oldum 3()kendi denetimimde çalışanlar var.....
39. a) Önümüzdeki dört-beş yıl içinde çalıştığınız bu işyerinden ayrılmak gibi bir niyetiniz var mı?
1() Hayır->Bu fabrikanın olumlu tarafları nelerdir? (ödüller, erzak, ikramiye, piknik, turnuva, eğitim, kreş)
- 2() Evet- >Neden?.....
- b) Çalıştığınız işyerinde 5 yıl sonra hangi konumda olmayı bekliyorsunuz? (birim değiştirmek vs.) 1() aynı 2().....
40. (Niyetiniz olmadığı halde ayrılırsanız) Ayrıldıktan sonra geçiminizi nasıl sağlarsınız?
1() İş kurarak ()k.hesa. ()işveren
2() Ücretli a() Yine fabrikada b()
41. İşe nasıl gidiyorsunuz? 1()servisle 2()Kendi arabamla 3()Yürüyerek

HANE EKONOMİSİ

42. a) Ailenizin geçimi için gerekli tüm giderleri düşündüğünüzde aylık ortalama harcamanız kaç liradır? mutfak..... faturalar..... kira..... toplam.....
- b) Hanenize giren aylık gelir ne kadardır?.....
- c) Sizin gibi bir ailenin, rahat yaşayabilmesi için ayda ortalama ne kadar para gerekir?
.....
43. Şu eşyalardan hangilerine sahipsiniz?
- | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 () buzdolabı | 5 () müzik seti | 9 () elektrikli süpürge |
| 2 () otomatik çamaşır makinası | 6 () vcd | 10 () telefon |
| 3 () televizyon | 7 () dvd | 11 () cep telefonu |
| 4 () bulaşık makinası | 8 () bilgisayar | 12 () otomobil |
44. Aylık-haftalık ihtiyaçlarınızı daha çok nereden karşılıyorsunuz?
Yiyecek.....Giyecek.....
45. Tasarruf yapmak amacıyla hangilerini aldınız ya da hangilerine yatırım yaptınız?
1() (arsa, ev, dükkan) vb. gayri menkule yatırım 3() Tasarruf yapamıyorum
2() (banka hesabı, döviz, altın) vb. menkule yatırım

46. a) Aylık taksit ödemeniz var mı? 1()Evet->Ne kadar? 2()Hayır
b) Ne sebeple borçlanırsınız? 1()Ev, arsa, araba alma 3()Düğün, sünnet nedeniyle
2()Geçim sıkıntısı nedeniyle 4()Sağlık sorunları nedeniyle
3()Dayanıklı tüketim malı alımı 5()Diğer.....
c) Kime borçlanırsınız?
1() Akrafa, ()Faizli ()Faizsiz 3() İşyerine, patrona 5() Arkadaş-tanıdıklara
2() Bankaya ()kredi kartı ()kredi 4() Bakkala-Esnafa
d) Son 5 yıl içinde borçlanmanızda bir artış oldu mu? 2()Hayır 1()Evet
47. a) Evlendiğinizden bu yana, geçim sıkıntısı nedeniyle herhangi bir şey sattığınız oldu mu? 1()Hayır 2()Evet>.....
b) Daha önce düzenli olarak aldığınız-yaptığınız ancak maddi zorluklar yüzünden artık alamadığınız-yapamadığınız şeyler var mı? 1()Hayır 2()Evet->
1()Yiyecek-giyecek..... 2()Sosyal faaliyeti azaltma
3()Tasarruf yapamama 4()Faturalardan kısma
48. a) Ailenizin ekonomik durumunu nasıl görüyorsunuz?
1()ortanın-üstü 2()orta halli 3()ortanın-altı 4()fakir
b) Gelecekte ne yönde değişeceğini düşünüyorsunuz?
1()Daha iyi 2()Aynı 3()Daha kötü 4()Bilmiyorum

ÖRGÜTLÜLÜK VE YARDIMLAŞMA

Parti ile ilişkiler

49. a) Herhangi bir parti ile üyelik, delegelik yada il-ilçe teşkilatında görev alma ilişkiniz oldu mu?
1 () Hayır **Parti** **Görev** **Yıllar**
2 () Evet -> Nedir?.....
b) Geleceğe yönelik politik bir beklentiniz var mı? Nedir?.....
50. Yakın akraba ya da hemşehrilerden aşağıdaki görevlerde bulunanlar oldu mu?
Kim **Parti** **Yıllar**
1 () Belediye başkanlığı.....
2 () Belediye meclis üyeliği.....
3 () Parti il-ilçe başkanlığı.....
4 () Muhtar.....
51. a) Son üç genel seçimde hangi partilere oy verdiniz?
1()1995: 2()1999: 3()2002:
->Neden?
b) Yerel seçimde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? Neden?.....
c) Önümüzdeki seçimlerde hangi partiye oy vermeyi düşünüyorsunuz?.....

52. a) Oy tercihinizde kimlere danışırsınız? b) Çevrenizdekiler kimlerin etkisi altında kalır?
()sendika ()dernek ()iş arkadaşları ()akraba ()kendi ()sendika ()dernek ()iş arkadaşları ()akraba ()kendi

53. a) Eskiler arasında en başarılı bulduğunuz lider kimdir?

Neden?

- b) Babanız hangi partiyi destekler-di?.....

Dernek-vakıf-klüp ilişkileri

54. a) Akpınar'da yaşayanların sorunlarını çözmede kimler etkilidir?
1()Dernekler 2()Belediye 3()Muhtar 4()Kendimiz 5()Hiç kimse
- b) Hemşehri dernekleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?.....
.....
- c) Derneklerin semt yaşamı üzerindeki etkisi son 5 yıl içinde nasıl değişti?
1()arttı 2()azaldı 3()değişmedi Neden?.....

55. a) Herhangi bir vakıf/dernek/klüp/kooperatife üye misiniz? 1()Hayır>neden?.....

2 () Evet **İsim** **Mahalle** **Yıllar**

1.....

2.....

- b) Dernek/vakıf üyeliğiniz aşağıda sayacaklarımdan hangisine uygundur?

1. Dernek: 1() Sadece üyeyim 2() Ara sıra toplantılarına katılıyorum
3() Aktif üyeyim 4() Yönetimde görev alıyorum

2. Dernek: 1() 2() 3() 4()

(üyelere sorulacak)

56. Üyeler çoğunlukla kimlerdir? Ne iş yaparlar?

57. Niçin bu derneklere üyesiniz? Size ya da başkalarına ne faydaları var? Ne tür etkinlikler yapıyor?
.....

(herkese sorulacak)

58. a) Sizin katılmadığınız, fakat semtte etkili olduğunuzu gözlediğiniz bir dernek var mı?

1()Hayır 2()Evet-> Nedir?.....

Faaliyetleri?.....

59. Bir hemşehriniz ve işçi arkadaşınız sizden aynı anda yardım istese hangisine öncelik verirsiniz? 1 () hemşehrime 2 () işçi arkadaşıma 3 () fark etmez

Mahallede dayanışma ilişkileri

60. a) Zor durumda kaldığınızda ilk kim(ler)den yardım istersiniz? Maddi değil.. (sıralama)

1 () Akraba 3 () Komşu 5 () arkadaş
2 () Hemşehri 4 () İş arkadaşı 6 () Diğer.....

- b) Herhangi bir maddi yardım alıyor musunuz? (muhtar-belediye vs.)

1() Evet->nedir?..... 2 () Hayır

61. a) Sizce yakın hemşehri ve akrabalarla ilişkilerinizde bir artma mı var yoksa azalma mı?

1()artma 2()azalma-> neden?

- b) Komşularla ilişkilerde? 1()artma 2()azalma-> neden?.....

Sendika ile ilişkiler

62. a) İşyerinizde faaliyet gösteren sendika var mı? 1() Evet ->İsmi?..... 2()Hayır

- b) Siz bu sendikaya üye misiniz? 1() Evet 2 () Hayır

- c) Şimdiye kadar üye olduğunuz sendikalar?.....

(Sendikaya üye olanlara sorulacak)

63. Sendikaya üye olmanızdaki en temel nedeni açıkla mısınız? (sıralama)

- 1 () Herkesin üye olması -Zorunlu olması 3 () Haklarımı koruyabilmek ve güvence altına almak
2 () Toplu sözleşmeden yararlanabilmek 4 () İşçilerle dayanışma içinde olmak

64. a) Sendikaya üyeliğiniz aşağıda sayacaklarımdan hangisine uygundur?

- 1 () Sadece üyeyim 3 () Aktif olarak sendika faaliyetlerine katılıyorum
2 () Ara sıra sendika toplantılarına katılıyorum 4 () Yönetimde görev alıyorum

b) Sendikanın işçiler için düzenlediği herhangi bir faaliyete katıldınız mı?

(eğitim, gezi, piknik vs.)

- 1 () Hayır ->neden?.....
2 () Evet->Nedir? Faydaları ne oldu?.....

65. Sizce sendikanız işçilerin çıkarlarını yeterince koruyabiliyor mu?

- 1 () Hayır →Neden?.....
2 () Evet 3 () Kısmen

(Sendikaya üye olmayanlara sorulacak)

66. Bir sendikaya üye değilseniz bunun nedenleri nedir?

- 1 () Patronum izin vermiyor 3 () Çevremde kimse sendikalı değil
2 () Sendikaya güvenmiyorum 4 () Diğer

67. Sendikalı bir işçi olmak ister miydiniz?

- 1 () Evet 2 () Hayır ->Neden?.....

(Herkesine sorulacak)

68. a) Genel olarak sendikalar hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

.....

b) Sizin sendikadan beklentileriniz nelerdir?.....

69. Çalıştığımız yerlerde hiç sendikalaşma hareketi, ya da mevcut sendikaya karşı bir hareket oldu mu? (Başka sendikaya geçme niyeti-istifa vb.) Anlatır mısınız?

- 1 () Hayır 2 () Evet->

.....

70. İşyeri arkadaşlarınızla sendikanın faaliyetleri konusunda konuşur musunuz?

- 1 () Çok sık 2 () Genellikle 3 () Arada bir 4 () Nadiren 5 () Hiç

71. Son birkaç yıl içinde işinizle ilgili kişisel yada toplu herhangi bir şikayetiniz oldu mu?

- 1 () Hayır 2 () Evet->Bunu kime, nasıl iletiniz?

Eylem deneyimi

72. Bursa'daki işçilik yaşamınız boyunca çalıştığımız işyerlerinde toplu işçi eylemlerinden hangileri gerçekleşti? 1 () grev 2 () İş bırakma 3 () İş yavaşlatma 4 () Yemek boykotu 5 () Basın açıklaması, yürüyüş

Türü	Yıl-Süre	İşyeri	Başarılı Oldu	Olmadı
.....
.....

73. Eylemlerin temel nedeni neydi? () Toplu sözleşmedeki ücret anlaşmazlığı

.....
.....

(sadece greve katılmış işçilere sorulacak)

74. Grev döneminde işçilerle sürekli olarak toplandığınız mekanlar var mıydı? (sıralama)
1() Hayır 2() Evet ->1() Sendikada 2() Kahvelerde(mahalle?)..... 3() Fabrika önünde

75. Grev döneminde geçiminizi nasıl sağladınız? (sıralama)

1 () Sendikanın verdiği parayla 3 () Borçla (akraba?-hems?) 5 () Köyden gelen ek gelir ile 7 () köye döndüm
2 () Tasarruflarımızla 4 () Borçla -Esnaf-bakkal 6 () geçici işlerde çalışarak 8 () Diğer.....

76. a) Grev sizce işçiler arasındaki dayanışmayı güçlendirdi mi? 1() Evet 2() Hayır
b) Grev sendikaya olan güveninizi artırdı mı? 1()Evet 2() Hayır
Niçin?.....

KADIN KONUSUNA YAKLAŞIM

77. Eşinizle/nişanlınızla (kız-erkek arkadaş) nerede-nasıl tanıştınız? ()görücü ()anlaşarak
1()Çalıştığım yerde 2()Mahallede 3()Memlekette 4()diğer.....

78. Evde kazancınızı nasıl harcayacağınız ile ilgili kararları kim verir?
1()Kendim veririm 2()Eşim verir 3()Birlikte veririz 4()Diğer.....

79. a) (erkeklerle) Ev işleri ya da çocuk bakımında eşinize yardımcı olur musunuz?
1()Evet 2()Hayır

b) (kadınlara) Çalıştığınız için ev işlerine yardım eden oluyor mu?
1()Hayır 2()Evet- Kimler?
Çocuklara kim bakıyor(du)?

80. Kadının dışarıda çalışması konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz?
1()Çalışabilir 2()Çalışmamalı Neden?

81. a) Temizlik-yemekhane-büro dışında kadın işçi var mı?. Kaç kişi:.....
b) İşyerinde kadın/erkek işçiler arasındaki ilişkiler nasıldır? (dertleşme-muhabbet-yemekhanede-serviste).....

82. Eşiniz ev içinde veya dışında şimdiye kadar (şimdiki hariç) ne tür işlerde çalıştı?
1..... yıllar.....

(Çalışan kadınlara sorulacak)

83. a) Çalışmanız için talep kimden geldi?.....
b) Çalışmanıza karşı çıkan oldu mu? 1()Hayır 2()Evet -Kimler?
c) Hangi durumlarda işi bırakmayı düşünürsünüz? (birden fazla işaretlenebilir)
1()Evin gelirinin yeterli olması 2()Evlilik 3()Çocuk sahibi olma 4()Hiçbiri 5()Diğer.....

84. a) Evde ya da sosyal yaşamda çalışıyor olmaktan kaynaklanan sorunlar yaşıyor musunuz?
1()Hayır 2()Evet>nelerdir?.....
b) İşyerinde kadın olmanın getirdiği sorunlar ya da faydalar nelerdir?
.....

SINIF KÜLTÜRÜ VE BİLİNCİ
İşçilik deneyimi

85. a) Fabrika işçisi olmanın olumlu-olumsuz tarafları nelerdir?
olumlu.....
olumsuz.....
b) Yaptığınız işte mutlu musunuz? (Manevi tatmin.)
1()Evet + 2()Hayır → Neden?

86. Fırsat olsaydı, hayatta ne iş yapmak isterdiniz?
Neden?.....

87. a) Memurluk ile fabrika işçiliği arasında ne gibi **farklar** vardır?

b) Çiftçilik ile fabrika işçiliği arasında ne gibi **farklar** vardır? Hangisini tercih?

c) Tekstil işçileri ile otomotiv işçileri arasında ne gibi **farklar** vardır? Hangisini tercih?

Sınıf-İçi Farklılaşma

88. a) Sizi nasıl bilirler? Çok arkadaşınız var mıdır?
İşçiler/Şefler.....

b) (...)’li olmak, işveren ya da diğer işçiler gözünde nedir? (ayrımçılık).....

c) Fabrikanızda nereliler çoğunluktadır?.....

d) İşçi arkadaşlarınız nasıl insanlardır?.....

89. Sizce fabrikadaki işçiler arasında en belirgin olan ayrımlar hangileridir?

(önem sırasına göre)

1 () Kadrolu-taşeron

3 () Siyasi görüş

5 () Doğulu-Batılı

2 () Eski-yeni

4 () Muhacir-Yerli

90. a) Taşeron işçiler ile kadrolu işçiler arasında ilişkiler?

b) Fabrika memuru-üretim işçileri arasında ilişkiler?.....

c) Yerli ve Muhacirler arasında ilişkiler nasıldır? Birbirlerine rakip midirler?

d) Doğulu ve Batılılar arasında ilişkiler?.....

e) Farklı siyasi görüşler neler?.....

f) Eski-yeni işçiler arasında ilişkiler?

91. Sanayide, işçiler arasında dayanışma eğilimi hangi fabrikalarda daha fazladır?

()bilmiyorum

Neden:.....

Sınıflar-arası Farklılaşma

92. Sizce Türkiye’de farklı toplumsal sınıflar var mı? 1 () Hayır 2 () Evet->

Nelerdir?.....

93. İşçi sınıfı denince siz bundan ne anlıyorsunuz?.....

94. Sizin toplumda daha iyi bir yerde olmamanızdan kim sorumlu?.....

95. a) İyi işçi nasıl olur?.....

b) İyi şef nasıl olur?.....

96. Sizce işverenin ve işçinin çıkarları ortak mıdır?

1 () Evet 2 () Hayır ->Niçin?

97. a) İşinde dürüst olan ve çok çalışan birinin hayatta daima yukarı doğru çıkabileceğine inanıyor musunuz? (maddi anlamda) 1()Evet 2()Hayır
 b) Bir fabrika sahibi ve işçinin yaşadığı koşulların farklı olması konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz?
 1()Tamamen adildir 2()Bu kadar büyük olmamalı 3()Çok az olmalı 4()Hiç olmamalı
 c) Çocuklarınızın yaşadığı koşulların farklı olması konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz?
 1()Tamamen adildir 2()Bu kadar büyük olmamalı 3()Çok az olmalı 4()Hiç olmamalı
 d) Sizce çalıştığınız fabrika en iyi kim tarafından yönetilebilir?
 1()Devlet 2()Özel şirket 3()Sendika 4()Tüm çalışanlar

Semtin genel güç yapısı

98. Belediyede kimlerin sözü geçer?
 1() Hemşehri derneklerinin 3()İşçilerin 5()İşadamı-Sanayicinin
 2() Parti örgütlerinin 4()Esnaf-tüccarın

99. a) Belediyede iş bulma, ruhsat verme gibi hizmetlerde kayırmacılık olur mu?

- b) Belediyeye hiç işiniz düştü mü?.....
 c) Belediyenin hizmetlerinden memnun musunuz? 1()evet ()hayır>neden?.....

100. Belediyenin sanayi ile ilişkileri nasıldır? 1()çok iyi 2()iyi 3()hiç yok 4()bilmiyorum

Sosyo-mekansal boyut

101. Bu mahalle-blok-sitede kimler yaşar? (yüzdeleriyle)sizin durumunuz kimlerden daha iyi, daha kötü?
 Nereli /ne işler /.....

102. Son yıllarda mahalede nasıl bir değişim görüyorsunuz? Bunu neye bağlıyorsunuz?

103. a) Burada oturmak sanayide iş bulma olasılığını artırıyor mu?

1()Hayır 2()Evet-neden?.....

- b) İşveren sanayie yakın yerlerden işçi almayı tercih ediyor mu?

1()Hayır 2()Evet.....

- c) Kimler sanayide iş bulmakta zorlanır?

104. a) Sizce işçi ailelerinin yoğun olduğu bir semtte yaşamının olumlu-olumsuz tarafları neler? (komşuluk ilişkileri, paylaşma, rekabet)

Olumlu ().....

Olumsuz ()

- b) İşçi ailelerinin daha yoğun olduğu bir yerde yaşamak ister miydiniz?

1()Evet 2()Hayır ->neden?.....

105. Şu toplumsal gruplardan hangilerine kendinizi en yakın hissediyorsunuz?

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 1 () İnşaat işçileri | 6 () Esnaf |
| 2 () Diğer ücretliler (hizmet sektörü-market) | 7 () Zanaatkar |
| 3 () Geçici işlerle uğraşanlar | 8 () Memur |
| 4 () İşsizler | 9 () Meslek sahipleri (doktor, mühendis vs) |
| 5 () Çiftçiler | 10 () Patronlar |

106. Şu özelliklere olan yakınlık dereceniz nedir...

	Çok yakın	Yakın	Kısmen yakın	Uzak	Bilmiyorum		Çok yakın	Yakın	Kısmen yakın	Uzak	Bilmiyorum
1. Türk						12. Şeriatçı					
2. Atatürkçü						13. Doğulu					
3. Ülkücü						14. Muhacir					
4. Sosyal demokrat						15. Karadenizli					
5. Muhafazakar						16. Bursa'lı					
6. Vatansever						17. Alevi					
7. Laik						18. Müslüman					
8. Köylü						19. Milliyetçi					
9. Gecekondu						20 Şehirli.					
10. Sünni						21. Solcu					
11. Sosyalist											

107. Sizce bölgedeki insanlar arasında hangi ayrımlar vardır? (**sıralama**)

- 1 () Ekonomik farklılık (gelir durumuna göre) 3 () Siyasi görüş farklılığı 5 () Eğitim
2 () Mezhep farklılığı 4 () Hemşehricilik 6 () fark yok

108. a) Şu insanları nasıl bilirsiniz? Nasıl insanlardır?

Bursa'nın yerlileri.....

Dışarıdan gelenler.....

b) Sizce birbirlerine rakip midirler? 1 ()Evet 2 ()hayır ->

Neden?.....

c) İş dışında, gündelik hayatınızda aşağıda sayacağım insanlarla bir araya gelir misiniz?

Yakın Arkadaş Ev ziyareti Yakın Arkadaş Ev ziyareti Yakın Arkadaş Ev ziyareti
karadenizli..... doğulu..... muhacir.....

Cocuklara ilişkin tutum

109. Oğlunuz veya kızınızın farklı mezhep, din ya da bölgeden insanlarla evlenmesine razı olur musunuz? () () ()

110. a) Hanenizde çocuk okuturken kız/erkek ayrımı yapıldı mı –yapılacak mı?

1 ()Evet-> neden?.....2 ()Hayır

b) Ekonomik nedenlerle okuyamayan kardeş-çocuk oldu mu?

1 ()Evet->Kaç çocuk?..... 2 ()Hayır

c) Çocuklarınızı ne kadar okutabileceksiniz?

d) Okumazsa baskı yapar mısınız?.....

111. a) Çocuklarınızın hangi mesleğe sahip olmasını istersiniz?

K.....E.....

b) Peki hangisi mümkün?

1 () Mimar-müh gibi meslek sahibi olabilir 3 () Benim gibi o da ancak işçi olabilir

2 () Kendi işini kurup para kazanabilir 4 () Polis-öğretmen vb. memur olabilir

c) Çocuğunuzun sizin gibi işçi olmasını tercih eder misiniz? 1 ()Evet -> ()kamu ()özel

2 ()Hayır>Neden?.....

d) Çocuklarınızın mesleği açısından hangisi daha önemlidir?

1 ()Yüksek gelir 2 ()Statü/mevki 3 ()Süreklilik

Siyasal davranış

112. Hayatta en gurur duyduğunuz şey nedir? (kendinizle ilgili, yaptığınız vs..)

113. Sizce bugün Türkiye’de şu ayrımlardan hangileri var? (**önem sırasına göre**)

- | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 () İşçi-İşveren | 4 () Laik-Dindar | 7 () Köylü-Şehirli |
| 2 () Zengin-Yoksul | 5 () Türk-Kürt | 8 () Eğitimli-Eğitimsiz |
| 3 () Solcu-Sağcı | 6 () Sünni-Alevi | 9 () Muhacir-Yerli |

114. a) Ülkede herkesi ilgilendiren kararları vermede en etkili olan gruplar hangileridir?

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1()Seçmenler | 4()Askerler |
| 2()Doktor-avukat-mühendis vb meslek sahipleri | 5()Büyük işadamları |
| 3()Hükümet ve politikacılar | 6()Bürokratlar |

b) Hangileri olmalıdır?

115. AKP hükümetinin politikaları hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Katılıyorum Kısmen Katıl. Katılmıyorum Bilmiyorum Neden

- 1 () Özelleştirme
- 2 () Yeni iş yasası
- 3 () AB ile ilişkiler
- 4 () Ekonomi politikaları

116. AKP hükümetinin çıkardığı yeni iş yasası hakkında bilginiz var mı?

1()Hayır 2()Evet-> Bu yasanın getirdiği olumlu-olumsuz uygulamalar nelerdir?

117. İslam’ın işçi haklarının geliştirilmesinde olumlu bir rolü olacağına inanıyor musunuz?

1() Evet 2() Hayır->neden?.....

118. a) Serbest piyasa ekonomisi () rekabet ve bolluk getirir

() halkın çoğunluğunun ezilmesine sebep olur

b) KİTler () verimsiz çalışmaktadır, özelleştirilmelidir

() halkın malıdır, iyileştirmek hükümetin görevidir.

c) Sendikalar () politikaya karışmayıp yalnız işçi hakları ile uğraşmalıdır

() işçilerin haklarını alabilmek için politikayla da uğraşmak zorundadır

d) Okullarda din eğitimi () zorunlu olmalı

() zorunlu olmamalıdır

119. Sizce gecekondular gerekli midir? 1() Evet 2 () Hayır->neden?.....