

ARCHITECTURE AS AN APPARATUS OF
“IMMORTALIZATION AND GLORIFICATION”:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WITTGENSTEINIAN [TRUE] ARCHITECTURE

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[TRUE] ARCHITECTURE**

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ABSTRACT

ARCHITECTURE AS AN APPARATUS OF “IMMORTALIZATION AND GLORIFICATION”: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WITTGENSTEINIAN [TRUE] ARCHITECTURE

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This study is an inquiry into architecture understood as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification by means of a dialectic formulation on the architecture of the synecdochic Interwar (*angst*) Period (1919-1939) based on the assumptions of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). It is claimed that a dialectical relation between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries may contribute to the understanding of the conceptions regarding ideal of [true] architecture itself.

The thesis suggests that these assumptions may maintain a critical pattern for the understanding of the architectural milieu of the Interwar Period, which was a summit for modern architecture. The structure is based on a remark of Wittgenstein stating, “Architecture immortalizes and glorifies something” and its tripartite formulation is reflected upon the framework.

In the second part, it is aimed to introduce the concepts in order to draw a framework of the milieu. This part also focuses on the remarks of Wittgenstein regarding [true] architecture.

In the third part, the aspects of [true] architecture are discussed by means of a historical study. This part also focuses on the principle of architecture as an apparatus.

In the fourth part, a dialectical relationship is maintained between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries to shed light on the [true] architecture of the *Angst* Period. The emphasis of this part is on the arguments regarding [true] architecture.

Finally, the fifth part involves arguments on the aspects of immortalization and glorification focusing on its several aspects and “something” immortalized and glorified by means of [true] architecture.

Keywords: Aesthetics, Apparatus, Ethics, Interwar Period, Wittgenstein

ÖZ

“ÖLÜMSÜZLEŞTİRME VE YÜCELTME” ARACI OLARAK MİMARLIK: WITTGENSTEİNCİ [GERÇEK] MİMARLIĞIN ELEŞTİREL BİR ANALİZİ

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Bu tezde, Avusturya doğumlu İngiliz düşünür Ludwig Wittgenstein'in (1889–1951) önermeleri temelinde İki Dünya Savaşı arası dönem (1919–1939) mimarlığı kapsamında diyalektik bir formülasyon oluşturmak yoluyla mimarlığın ölümsüzleştirme ve yüceltme aracı olma durumunun analiz edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Wittgenstein ve İki Dünya Savaşı arası (*Angst* Dönemi) dönemdeki çağdaşları arasında bu bağlamda kurulacak olan diyalektik bir ilişkinin [gerçek] mimarlığın nihai amacına yönelik kavramları anlamaya ilişkin çabalara ışık tutacağı savını ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, Ludwig Wittgenstein'in önermelerinin mimarlığın ölümsüzleştirme ve yüceltme aracı olması bağlamında Modern Mimarlığın doruk noktasını oluşturan savaş arası dönemdeki ortamı anlamak için önemli bir model oluşturduğu öngörülmektedir. Tezin strüktürü Wittgenstein'in “Mimarlık bir şeyleri ölümsüzleştirir ve yüceltir” şeklindeki ifadesine dayanmaktadır. Bu ifadedeki üç bölümlü formülasyon tezin iskeletine yansıtılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, belirli bir çerçeve oluşturmak amacıyla söz konusu döneme ilişkin olarak önemli kavramlar açıklanmaktadır. Wittgenstein'in mimari ve felsefi etkileri üzerinde şekillenen bu bölümde aynı zamanda Wittgenstein'in [gerçek] mimarlığa ilişkin ifadelerine de odaklanılmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölümde, [gerçek] mimarlık üzerine değişik bakış açıları konu bağlamındaki tezlerin ve deyişlerin tarihsel bir süreç içinde incelenmesi aracılığıyla tartışılmaktadır. Bu bölümde ayrıca çeşitli bakış açılarının analizi yoluyla bir araç olarak mimarlık olgusu üzerinde de durulmaktadır.

Dördüncü bölümde, *Angst* Dönemi [gerçek] mimarlığı üzerine ışık tutmak amacıyla Wittgenstein ve çağdaşları arasında kavramsal bir diyalektik ilişki kurulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu bölümde vurgu [gerçek] mimarlığı tarif etmeye yönelik olarak sarf edilen mimari argümanlar üzerinedir.

Son bölümde ise, ölümsüzleştirme ve yüceltme olgusuna ilişkin çeşitli bakış açıları üzerinde durulmakta, ölümsüzleştirilen ve yüceltilen "şey" irdelenmeye çalışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Araç, Estetik, Etik, İki Dünya Savaşı arası Dönem, Wittgenstein

Dedicated to Esma Turan

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I am not interested in erecting a building but in having the foundations of possible buildings transparently before me.¹

The predominant argument of this thesis is established upon Austrian-born British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) proposition, "Architecture immortalizes and glorifies something. Hence there can be no architecture where there is nothing to glorify".² This proposition was written around 1947-48 after the "*angst* period"³ dominating Europe which was at that time full of controversies and chaotic features both for humanity and for Wittgenstein himself. Although the background for this aphorism is not obvious in terms of a specific circumstance or an impact, it can be regarded as a critical statement on the foundations and chaotic features of the Second World War (1939-1945) and its consequences. The Second World War as a phenomenon is crucially notable due to its colossal effect on world culture but also due to the fact that it is a sort of multi-layered domain for various concepts to generate in architecture. As Kenneth Bayes indicates:

The Second World War split the twentieth century as neatly as a knife through butter. Nowhere was this more evident than in architecture; pre-1939: post-1945. Before the war the issue was simple – the clarity of the Modern Movement versus the fuddy-duddy traditionalists, youth versus age. Admittedly, the Modern Movement itself had gone through some changes. The austere beginnings had already been tempered by Swedish sophistication and Dutch brickwork, but the limits were still clearly defined and one knew that one stood within them.

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* (ed., by G.H. von Wright in coll. with H. Nyman and trans. by P. Winch) , Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1998 Reprinted and Revised English ed., pg.9.

² Originally in German: "Architektur verewigt und verherrlicht etwas. Darum kann es Architektur nicht geben, wo nichts zu verherrlichen ist." (Op. cit., Wittgenstein (1980))

³ Angst: A German word which means "anxiety" or "anguish." Technically, this is a term used in Existentialism which expresses the dread reality that the future is an unknown chasm; therefore, the choices that a person (the existent) makes are the determining factor in the outcome of one's future - thus, the cause for "angst." (Also see the glossary for an advanced discussion)

After the war, the Modern Movement was still there, but more in the past – not only because six years, which had seemed like sixty had passed, but also because it had somehow taken on the respectability of history. It seemed no longer the only way forward. And so it has been; the second half of the twentieth century has seen a medley of movements.⁴

This thesis is concerned with the two decades between the two World Wars (1919-1939). However, it should insistently be noted that this period is tried to be regarded in a synecdochical sense in this text in terms of having a symbolic value rather than being just a historical period. This was a transitional period where quite a considerable number of people as confused individuals tried to create something avant-garde or actually behaved experimentally without any objective boundaries. The period was credibly full of lost spirits regarding the high level of attempted suicides. Although it may be argued that this claim was valid for all part of Europe, probably Vienna of Austria best fits this definition. The two brothers of Wittgenstein were both committed suicide at very early ages and Wittgenstein himself was highly suicidal. William Todd Schultz remarks: "Wittgenstein had every reason to be preoccupied with the question of how to make death less problematical. For one thing, he belonged to a culture of suicide. Turn-of-the-century Austrians, of whom Wittgenstein was one, killed themselves at alarmingly high rates. One can speak of a virtual epidemic of suicide ideation. Members of the so-called Habsburg Empire apparently endorsed suicide as a valid, even laudable response to life's torment, a tactful "way out," so to speak."⁵

It was a period in which both Otto Weininger⁶ (1880-1903) and Karl Kraus⁷ (1874-1936) very likely prophesied its so-called filthy nature; the

⁴ Kenneth Bayes, *Living Architecture*, Anthroposophic Press, New York, 1994; pg.11.

⁵ William Todd Schultz, "The Riddle That Doesn't Exist: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Transmogrification of Death," in *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1998, vol.86, no.2, pg. 1-23.)

⁶ Weininger, Otto, (Vienna, 1880-1903, Vienna), published in 1903 *Geschlecht und Charakter*, a treatise asserting the intellectual superiority of man over woman. Though Weininger was himself of Jewish descent, the book, which was widely read, depreciated the character of the Jewish race. Weininger took his own life in the year of publication. ["Otto Weininger." *The Oxford Companion to German Literature*. Oxford University Press, 1976, 1986, 1997, 2005. *Answers.com* 20 Aug. 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/otto-weininger>]

⁷ (born April 28, 1874, Gitschin, Bohemia — died June 12, 1936, Vienna, Austria) Austrian journalist, critic, playwright, and poet. In 1899 he founded *Die Fackel*, a literary and political review, and by 1911 he had become its sole author; he continued to publish it until the year

former showed his early intolerance by committing a ritual suicide and the latter showed his far-sightedness with his 1919 play “*Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*” (The Last Days of Mankind) as a manifestation of an anti-war campaign in a satirical tone.⁸ The rhetoric of these lost spirits was so harsh that priorities were highly over-shadowed by personal traumas due to the chaotic features of the transition.⁹ Probably, the act of suicide was a sort of “way out” when art or a similar media was no more a cure for these individuals with *angst*. The highly evocative manifestation held by Weininger was probably the most predictive and individualistic judge of this milieu both as culturally and rhetorically due to the fact that it was in general an act against the chaotic features of modern life but in fact a predictive act towards the *angst* period. Therefore, it may shed a light on the “*Lebensgefühl*”¹⁰ of that period. Weininger and in some terms Kraus may also be regarded as crucial figures in order to understand the synecdochical sense of this text because although they were historical figures they symbolize a certain type of everlasting individual who are full of *angst*.

The Second World War was probably an inevitable process when conceived as a consequence of “between the wars”¹¹ period. If only the Second World War is unique in several aspects, it may be due to the chaotic features of the “between the wars” period. The occurrences of the “between

of his death. Believing that language was of great moral and aesthetic importance, he wrote with masterly precision, and his writings exercised wide influence. His works, which are almost untranslatably idiomatic, include *Morality and Criminality* (an essay collection, 1908), *Proverbs and Contradictions* (a collection of aphorisms, 1909), and *The Last Days of Humanity* (a lengthy satirical drama, 1922). [“Karl Kraus.” *Britannica Concise Encyclopedia*. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2006. *Answers.com* 20 Aug. 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/karl-kraus>]

⁸ Both Karl Kraus and Otto Weininger were very influential personas for the development of Wittgenstein. In “Culture and Value” he wrote:

“I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann Hertz Schopenhauer Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos Weininger Spengler, Sraffa†8 have influenced me. Can one take Breuer & Freud as an example of Jewish reproductive thinking?--What I invent are new comparisons.” (Op. cit., Wittgenstein (1980), pg. 16e.)

⁹ For a detailed discussion, See Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973

¹⁰ *Lebensgefühl*: experience (or awareness) of life (Also see the glossary for an advanced definition)

¹¹ Also known as the “Interwar Period”.

the wars” period may be better gestated and conceptualized by a close examination of the personal interaction between the individuals of that period because “between the wars” period was experienced by perplexed individuals.

As William J. Curtis asserts, “this was the perfect ground for the growth of Utopianism tinged with an underlying *Angst* “. ¹² What made the individuals angry were versatile; in that sense, they could not be limited with a single item such as degenerated culture ¹³, war or even alienation. Alienation was to be understood as an end instead of as a means.

In architectural terms, “the main lines mapped out by the masters and the CIAM – the *Congres Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne* – were by no means the only vital ones in Europe of the 1920s and 1930s.” ¹⁴ The parties of debate in this transitional period can be categorized in a dialectical tone and can be labeled with different terms such as “for modern - for anti-modern”, “rigorist - expressionist” or “traditionalist - avant-garde”. Above all, there was an eclectic current which, aiming to counter the technological metaphors of Le Corbusier and the aspiration of Mies to silence, offered a dogged continuity with the late romantic experiments that had flourished in Germany at the turn of the century. ¹⁵

In “between the wars” (*die Zeit Zwischen den Welt Kriegen*) period (1919-1939), Modern Architecture was at its peak. In this thesis, it will be argued that propositions by Wittgenstein on architecture declare a relatively anti-modern view on behalf of projecting an alternative way of progress. Although his *magnum opus Kundmanngasse* may at first seem modern, it should be noted that its background could not be regarded as modern in any terms due to the fact that Wittgenstein himself was against modern culture and its consequences. Architectural works chosen here for a comparison of Wittgenstein’s propositions with the views of his contemporaries and to

¹² William J. R. Curtis, *Modern Architecture since 1900*, Phaidon, London, 1999,pg.183

¹³ *Asphyxiating Culture (Asphyxiante Culture)* in terms of Jean Dubuffet

¹⁴ Manfredo Tafuri & Francesco Dal Co, 1976, *Modern Architecture/1*, Electa/Rizzoli, New York, p.142.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pg.142.

represent his views, can be regarded as buildings aiming to “immortalize or glorify” modernism not strictly in the sense of Wittgenstein but reflecting generally the alleged modernist and rationalist sense of the era under focus.

This thesis aims to analyze the proposition by Wittgenstein to conceive architecture as an apparatus¹⁶ of “immortalization” and “glorification” and to deconstruct the proposition in order to turn it into a whole of understandable pieces. This approach can be seen as conflicting with what Wittgenstein asserts while describing the possible occurrences of objects; where he insists, “[i]f I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later.”¹⁷ In this context, the “architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification” can be seen as a phenomena to be conceived beyond the possible occurrences.

As the aim of this thesis includes not the futuristic utopias but the examples of the recent past concerning architecture to be “an apparatus of immortalization and glorification”, it is contemplated that it may still be possible to apply the comprehension of Wittgenstein to the content and structure of this thesis.

The proposition “Architecture immortalizes and glorifies something. Hence there can be no architecture where there is nothing to glorify” by Wittgenstein can be seen both as an encapsulating pattern that can be applied to the historical development of individual architectural approaches (that may at first seem to be a response to the restrictions of conventional architectural practices) and as a critical pattern that can be applied to the so-called modern architecture of its time. The domination of the latter will be heavily felt throughout this text, as its aim is to develop a hypothetic dialectic between the contemporaries of the period in question. The essence of the proposition by Wittgenstein may be regarded to be an aesthetic one, with its

¹⁶ The term “apparatus” maintains a certain sense of latent feature for architecture in terms of the realization of it as a phenomenon in existence only when serving to immortalize and glorify something. (see also the glossary for an advanced discussion)

¹⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Translated by David Francis Pears, Brian McGuinness, Routledge, London, 2001, pg.6.

strong emphasis on the eternal and spiritual features of architecture. These features may remind us of some concepts such as immateriality, eternity, timelessness or sublimity. However, it should be noted that these features might refer to something different as the notion of aesthetic in Wittgenstein's philosophy can be quite regarded as an ethical one.

In proposition 6.421 of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he asserts, "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)" In his "Lectures on Ethics", Wittgenstein asserts "My subject, as you know, is Ethics and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Professor Moore has given in his book *Principia Ethica*. He says: "Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good." Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense in fact which includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics."

This dichotomy may surely be seen as a peculiarity, however when the nature of architecture at the peak of its modernist vision is taken into consideration, it may seem as a requisite of architecture rather than a peculiarity. Regarding to the reason of such a peculiarity, Maurice Lagueux asserts:

This peculiarity of architecture is due to its fundamentally functional character. It is true that other abstract arts such as music may provoke ethically charged feelings as well, but since the primary function of such arts is not to design the obligatory framework in which social life takes place, the success of a musical piece, for example, can hardly be so immediately determined by its moral impact.

Therefore, ethical problems could be said internal to its practice only if the intention of the composer is to generate such ethical feelings through music and if the fact that the work is praised or blamed depends crucially on the moral feelings it generates. But since their works are, more typically, freely chosen to be enjoyed by an audience, artists can be praised for producing works that generate whatever kind of feeling (optimistic or pessimistic, etc.) people may choose to experience at appropriate moments in their life. In contrast, since they are designing the theater in which social life necessarily takes place, architects have the duty to plan buildings that are able to generate feelings that are ethically acceptable. It is in this sense that ethical problems are necessarily an internal part of the problems they have to solve in order to achieve success in their art. One might maintain that this difference is only a difference of degree, but it is an important one, one that allows us to

understand the atypical development of debates about ethics in architecture.”
18

The period in which the proposition was written may turn it into a much more crucial phenomenon. The proposition was written in c. 1947-48 after *Kundmannngasse* was designed. It was also a period of somehow a relief from the devastations of the World War II. When compared with “Sketch for a Foreword”¹⁹, this piece of remark was surely more enigmatic due to its timeless features. It may surely be regarded as a direct emphasis on the fundamentals or “*Lebensgefühl*” of that period; however, it may also be regarded as a final prophecy of Wittgenstein regarding the symptoms of Modern Architecture. As Colin St. John Wilson indicates, it was “a time when the Modern Movement was about to enter into its inheritance as the universal mode of construction after the destruction of World War II.”²⁰ The domination of the Modern Movement was highly effective and probably it was not an expected behavior for the actors of the Modern Movement to express their views in such a critical tone as Wittgenstein.

Through the rhetoric of this text, the interwar period of 1919-1939 is regarded to be a synecdochical phenomenon. In other words, it is not only a historical period consisting of actual phenomena but also a symbolic period projecting and recalling various circumstances, which are probable to be seen both in the past and in the expected future. Therefore, the discussion of it embraces both of its features. Although the factual happenings and formations of it are highly regarded and interpreted in this text, the symbols and metaphors it projected were always kept in mind. This sort of conceptualization may lead to a more universal rhetoric in which a single period may symbolize more universal values. However, the interwar period of 1919-1939 is said to be an already symbolized period because of its immense effect on the following milieus. Its projecting aura can be

¹⁸ Maurice Lagueux, “Ethics Versus Aesthetics In Architecture,” in *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume XXXV, No. 2, Summer, 2004

¹⁹ “Sketch for a Foreword” was actually an introductory text to “Philosophical Remarks” written in 1930 and posthumously published in 1975. See Appendix B for the full version of the text and a further discussion regarding its notion.

²⁰ Colin St. John Wilson, *Architectural Reflections: Studies in the Philosophy and Practice of Architecture*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, p.55.

summarized as a permanent feeling of *angst* owing to the transitional and chaotic features of it. The crucial point here to stress is that the interwar period proposes a dozens of topics that are so crucial in terms of modern project. In this context, it is actually not a remote “symbolic” period but on the contrary a factual one still influential.

The juxtaposing factors during this era were highly versatile and this juxtaposition commits a necessity for a deliberation. However, as the deliberation in this text is based upon the treatises of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it should be insistently stressed that it is not a straightforward historical depiction. Rather, it is a critical / dialectical formulation of the discourses enrolled as avant-garde. Through the text, the synecdochical game is handled as bidirectional. While interwar period represents a universally widespread phenomenon, Wittgenstein is also regarded to be a synecdoche of interwar period. This notion surely brings a metaphorical sense of Wittgenstein that may give rise to an authentic comprehension of the text.

The architecture of Wittgenstein can be investigated apart from his propositions on architecture and architectural aesthetics in order to be practical. If we assume that, as Bernhard Leitner indicates, “Ludwig Wittgenstein never explains his architecture. Only his questions and descriptions illustrate how he built and how he found a very specific form that was validity to him and cannot be exchanged with anything else”²¹ ; then this may indicate that the propositions are utopian items or on the contrary, as Wittgenstein suggests “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” This synthesis may also indicate that architecture is entirely an autonomous field in which it is possible to grasp everything just by referring to architecture and architectural forms themselves.

Wittgenstein’s propositions on architecture and architectural aesthetics are bound up with classic aesthetics in which art is for ‘Higher Things’. However, in addition to this, for Wittgenstein it is only ‘something’ not a ‘Higher Thing’. The immortalization and glorification of something by means of architecture should be the main argument of the profession or the art of

²¹ Op. cit. Leitner, pg.10.

architecture. He continues with a negation that there should be a dichotomy between craftsmanship-side of architecture and the artistic (or aesthetic) side of architecture. In order to grasp what is the relationship between immortalization and glorification phenomenon and architecture, it may be quite useful to think Wittgenstein as a basis because he is not an architect, not a sculptor, not a philosopher, not an author but only an individual.

Architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification may sound like an experimental case. It surely is. If it can be kept in mind that Wittgenstein built only one unique building, Rudolf Steiner is same with his two versions of Goetheanum, or Cheval's "Palais Idéal" have the same uniqueness as *Kundmannsgasse*.

The evaluation of architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification share some sort of utopist roots. As having a critical standpoint; Bernhard Leitner asserts "Architecture cannot be applied philosophy. Only a clichéd misunderstanding can refer to this multi-layered, complex art of architecture as "logic translated into a house" (Hermine Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein's architecture is intended to be and indeed must be read and understood in the language of architecture. It should not be treated as philosophy translated into a building or as applied thought."²²

This text is mainly based on Wittgenstein referring that not only the propositions by him on architecture and architectural aesthetics are effective but also his whole personality and individuality are crucial for the understanding of the text. It is important that Wittgenstein himself is a non-architect. It is not possible to see, for instance, Le Corbusier and Wittgenstein within the same scope because they probably have different kinds of priorities, which are very important for this thesis.

²² Op.cit. Leitner

CHAPTER 2

PROLEGOMENON

The new type of architect has become hopelessly uncertain of himself. He glances over his shoulder at the engineer, he fancies himself in the role of the inventor and even in that of a reformer of men's lives, but he has forgotten to be an architect.²³

2.1 Architecture and Theory

This thesis with a lucid emphasis on the phenomenon of architecture based on the formations and assumptions of Ludwig Wittgenstein has a purpose of scrutinizing architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification.²⁴ In this context, the main purpose of this attempt is to maintain an evaluation of architecture not as a quasi-technical, quasi-aesthetical apparatus, but on the contrary as an entirely aesthetical / ethical one.²⁵ This evaluation is insistently relevant during our present age where there is a tendency to limit the interpretation of architecture merely to a technical matter. Emancipation of architecture can be based on this transcendentalism and therefore propositions by Wittgenstein may shed a light on the principles that architecture²⁶ should have in order to reach the requisites of [true]

²³ Hans Sedlmayr, *Art in Crisis*, trans. by Brian Battershaw, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2006, pg.110

²⁴ The unity of the terms 'Immortalization/Glorification' may suggest that they have inseparable integrity. It may be important to see them as a single term because they may suggest a process in which a building can only glorify something if it can immortalize that thing ;or both immortalization and glorification may exist simultaneously. In that case, both of the terms may be the purpose of building.

²⁵ Actually it is a philosophical aesthetic apparatus and in terms of Roger Scruton's determination, "[t]he urgent questions which confront the architect are indeed philosophical questions, and that they can be clarified, and sometimes even solved." (Scruton,1979, p.ix) Scruton's statement on the questions confronting architect is in a way very similar to Wittgenstein's statement on the problems of philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, the problems in philosophy regarding to perception and understanding depend on the complexity of language and all philosophical problems can be solved in terms of this statement. Actually; there can be nothing to solve in philosophy according to L. Wittgenstein because they arise from the misuse of language.

²⁶ Although not mentioned by Wittgenstein throughout his aphorisms on architecture, it is

architecture. The term “[true] architecture” is regarded to be a key concept in understanding of Wittgenstein’s notion of architecture in terms of his emphasis on the ethical side of architectural aesthetics. The term “true” obstinately reflects something subjective. However, there may be some objectivity in this subjectivity. The truth, which Wittgenstein manifests, embraces both architect and the architecture. The term “true” in general can be reflected upon as a metaphysical topic rather than an empiricist one.

The delimitation of architecture as a technical apparatus may be due to the technical and industrial development; however, this fact may not be an excuse for the interpretation of the art of architecture as a sole technical issue and as a sole act of building.

Evaluation of Architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification should be understood both as the evaluation of architecture as a utopia and as a historical excavation. The notion of being an apparatus of immortalization and glorification may, therefore, be regarded as a pattern for both of these types of evaluation. In this context, it may be crucial to grasp the difference between architectural theory and architectural aesthetics.²⁷ As Roger Scruton indicates “[i]t is essential to distinguish architectural aesthetics from something else that sometimes goes by the same name, but which one might call, for clarity’s sake, architectural theory.”²⁸ In general terms, what architectural theory aims is something closely related with the tectonic dimension of architecture as. “[a]rchitectural theory consists in the attempt to formulate the maxims, rules and precepts which govern, or ought to govern, the practice of the builder.”²⁹ However, architectural aesthetics exclude the area in which architectural theory is active. From this point of view, architectural theory deals with temporary issues and in addition, architectural

preferred to define the notion of Wittgenstein as [true] architecture throughout the text.
²⁷ The evaluation of architecture as a utopia and as a historical excavation by the patterns governed by the notion of architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification may differ in terms of the perspective it proposes towards architecture. It may also contribute to project a difference between architectural theory and architectural aesthetics. While architecture as a utopia may be interrelated with architectural aesthetics in some aspects, the act of historical excavation may correspond to the comprehension of the architectural theories.

²⁸ Op.Cit.Roger Scruton (1979).pg.71

²⁹ Ibid.pg.4.

theory is more relevant to architectonics than architectural aesthetics. The great treatises of Vitruvius, Alberti, Serlio and Vignola, which lays down rules for the systematic combination and ornamentation of the parts of a building, are – according to Scruton – part of architectural theory. Regarding temporariness of architectural theory Scruton asserts, “[t]he architectural theoreticians seem to know that their treatises are timeless but it is obvious that Vitruvius’ treatises were wrong as Le Corbusier’s were.”³⁰ Therefore, it may be pointed out that the point of timelessness is due to not only the architect’s own vision but also to historical progress. The reason why Scruton manifested architectural theories as wrong may be their exclusion of architectural aesthetics.

As Scruton indicates; “[s]uch precepts assume that we already know what we are seeking to achieve: the nature of architectural success is not at issue; the question is, rather, how to best achieve it. A theory of architecture impinges on aesthetics only if it claims a universal validity, for then it must aim to capture the essence, and not the accidents of, architectural beauty.”³¹.

The notion of Roger Scruton dealing with the field of influence of aesthetics seems to be quite important: “[I]t may still be thought that there is no real subject of architectural, as opposed to general, aesthetics. If philosophy is to be abstract as I claim it is, ought it not consider the aesthetic experience in its full generality, in isolation from the accidental constraints imposed by particular art forms and particular conceptions of success?”³² The notion of Scruton emphasizes on the slippery level of architectural aesthetics in which there may be no evaluation of architecture in terms of historical periods. As to the crucial aim of architectural aesthetics can be summed up as the realization and analysis of rather timeless concepts, architectural aesthetics is regarded to point out the constant features rather than the ephemeral ones. Architectural theories dealing with “the maxims, rules and precepts which govern, or ought to govern, the practice of the builder” are ephemeral because they are bound to their own *Zeitgeist*.

³⁰ Ibid.pg.4.

³¹ Ibid.pg.4.

³² Ibid.pg.4.

Therefore, architectural theories cannot generate timeless concepts but on the contrary ephemeral ones.³³ Architectural aesthetics, on the other hand, can be estimated as a field in which the concepts concerning architecture are timeless.

It can be relevant to shed a light on the question of “something” immortalized and glorified by architecture as this “something” is reasonably crucial to understand what Wittgenstein had in mind in terms of his manifestation of the *zeitgeist* of his times. The debate on architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification can only be possible if the “something” immortalized and glorified by virtue of architecture are timeless concepts. The topics regarding to immortalization/glorification can be found in various topics such as religion, politics, art or aesthetics itself. However, the concept “timelessness” should be still valid in terms of a possible relationship between immortalization / glorification and architecture. If the concepts regarding to “immortalization” and “glorification” are ephemeral, i.e. modernity or socialism³⁴, then immortalization and glorification itself should be handled as a *zeitgeist* and therefore the terms “immortalization and glorification” can be substituted with other duos such as “admiration and enchantment” or “conceptualization and appreciation”.

³³ The term “ephemeral” should be understood in a contradictory sense with the term “immortal”. While the term “ephemeral” may refer to the architectural theories, “immortal” may refer to architectural aesthetics in ethical sense.

³⁴ As both of them are post-Industrial Revolution phenomenon, they cannot be regarded as a timeless phenomenon as ‘sublimity’ or ‘humanity’. However; the terms may change but with a linguistic excavation, it may be possible to find another term relevant to these latter terms.

2.2 Wittgenstein - ‘the Integral Man’ - and His Essence

“What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics.
Only something Supernatural can express something Supernatural.”³⁵



Figure 2-1: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), an Austrian-born British philosopher, was one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century principally for his contributions to the “analytic and linguistic philosophy”³⁶ but

³⁵ Op.cit., Wittgenstein (1980).pg.3e.

³⁶ Analytic and Linguistic Philosophy, 20th-century philosophical movement, dominant in Britain and the United States since World War II, that aims to clarify language and analyze the concepts expressed in it. The movement has been given a variety of designations, including linguistic analysis, logical empiricism, logical positivism, Cambridge analysis, and “Oxford philosophy.” The last two labels are derived from the universities in England where this philosophical method has been particularly influential. Although no specific doctrines or tenets are accepted by the movement as a whole, analytic and linguistic philosophers agree that the proper activity of philosophy is clarifying language, or, as some prefer, clarifying concepts. The aim of this activity is to settle philosophical disputes and resolve philosophical problems, which, it is argued, originate in linguistic confusion. (“Analytic and Linguistic Philosophy,” Encarta Encyclopedia, Encarta, 2004)

also for his contributions to numerous subsidiary fields such as logic, art criticism and literature.

Wittgenstein is a member of a group of philosophers who “have often paid scant heed to the arguments and aims of their predecessors” as mentioned by Roger Scruton in his “A Short History of Modern Philosophy”,³⁷

Wittgenstein was born on 26 April 1889 in Vienna, the youngest son of the Austrian steel magnate Karl Wittgenstein and his wife Leopoldine. Karl Wittgenstein came from Germany and his family was of mostly Jewish origins; during the nineteenth century, Wittgensteins had completely assimilated into German Culture and acquired considerable wealth in trade.³⁸

When Ludwig was still young, Karl (Wittgenstein) withdrew from active business and devoted himself to the role of Maecenas³⁹. Ludwig grew up in surroundings, which were not so much commercially but culturally and artistically oriented, splendidly isolated from the everyday world because of his father’s wealth. The composers Johannes Brahms, Josef Labor, and Gustav Mahler were friends of the family; Bruno Walter and Pablo Casals more than once gave performances in the neo-Renaissance Palais Wittgenstein in the Alleegasse. Gustav Klimt used to call Karl his ‘Minister of Fine Art’. He also acted as a patron of the Viennese Jugendstil movement, the Wiener Secession; their exhibition building in the Friedrich Strasse, designed by Joseph Olbrich, was almost entirely financed by him. Karl paid for Klimt’s mural *Philosophie*, which depicted a sensual naked woman, after

³⁷ Roger Scruton. *A Short History of Modern Philosophy*, Routledge, London, 2003,pg.281.

³⁸ Op. cit., Wijdeveld, pg.21.

Although it seems that Wittgensteins assimilated into German Culture, the Jewishness was so important for Wittgenstein that he frequently referred to Jews and Jewishness in his remarks. In “Culture and Value” he wrote :

“In Western civilization the Jew is always measured on scales which do not fit him.

Many people can see clearly enough that the Greek thinkers were neither philosophers in the western sense nor scientists in the western sense, that the participants in the Olympian Games were not sportsmen and do not fit in to any western occupation. But it is the same with the Jews. And by taking the words of our <language> as the only possible standards we constantly fail to do them justice. So at one time they are overestimated, at another underestimated. Spengler is right in this connection not to classify Weininger with the philosophers [thinkers] of the West.”

For a detailed discussion on the Jewishness of Wittgenstein, see David G. Stern, “The Significance of Jewishness for Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,” in *Inquiry*, 43, pg. 383-402

the scandal, which led to its rejection by the University of Vienna, which had commissioned the work.

As the exclusion of Wittgenstein's personality and his works may be more relevant to the aura of himself, there may be a way to define him within a milieu. The milieu in question is "*Kakania* as captured with such perceptive irony by Robert Musil in the first documentary volume of his novel 'The Man without Qualities'".⁴⁰ The cultural aura of Habsburg Vienna was surely a vital factor for the formation of the personality and philosophy of Wittgenstein although he himself was not very fond of being associated with the Vienna Circle. Regarding to the importance of this period for the Modern Era; "The culture is," Janik and Toulmin indicates, "or appears at first sight to be, our own twentieth-century culture in its infancy; the 'modernism' of the early 1900s, represented by such men as Sigmund Freud, Arnold Schönberg, Adolf Loos, Oskar Kokoschka and Ernst Mach."⁴¹

Wittgenstein's unique personality may derive upon his chaotic family life⁴², his Jewish ancestry, his unhappy childhood or his closet homosexuality⁴³; however, he succeeded with relying heavily on his mental

³⁹ Gaius Maecenas (70?-8 B.C.), Roman statesman and patron of the arts

⁴⁰ Op. cit., Janik and Toulmin, pg.13.

This name was invented by Robert Musil, and combines two senses on different levels. On the surface, it is a coinage from the initials K.K. or K. u. K., standing for "Imperial-Royal" or "Imperial and Royal," which distinguished all the major institutions of the Habsburg Empire. But to anyone familiar with German nursery language, it carries also the secondary sense of "Excrementia" or "Shitland." Quoted in Ibid.pg.13.footnote

⁴¹ Ibid., pg.13

⁴²Wittgenstein has a very wealthy family and he has four brothers and two sisters. Although his father's wishes for him to be a businessperson (Wittgenstein is like an 'idiot' for the family members) he did not choose to be such. His three brothers committed suicide and the only surviving brother of Wittgenstein was Paul Wittgenstein – a well-known pianist who lost his right arm during the WW II but later performed a successful career with playing works composed for him to play with his left hand.

⁴³Regarding the W. W. Bartley's remarks about Wittgenstein's homosexuality, Ray Monk indicates:

One of the books that has done most to stimulate interest in Wittgenstein's life in recent years has been W. W. Bartley III's short study, *Wittgenstein*. This is an account of Wittgenstein's 'lost years' from 1919 to 1929, during which he abandoned philosophy and worked as an elementary school teacher in rural Austria. Bartley's chief interest in writing the book seems to have been to emphasize the philosophical relevance of this part of Wittgenstein's life, and, in particular, the influence on Wittgenstein's later philosophy of the educational theories of the Austrian School Reform Movement (the movement that shaped educational policy in Austria after the First World War).

abilities rather than his chaotic life conditions.⁴⁴ His notion of philosophy is heavily influenced by his way of life. As Wijdeveld insists, “[b]y this time he must have realized that the machine is the efficiently functioning mechanical system, could be the paradigm of the philosophical explanation of the world, the good and the beautiful that he was striving for.”⁴⁵ Through these circumstances, it may be satisfactory to conclude that Wittgenstein had a strong sense of ascetics⁴⁶. His ascetic vision may be realized through his first major work ‘*Tractatus*’ to his latest “Philosophical Investigations”.

Actually, it is both an ethical and an aesthetic issue for Wittgenstein and can be summarized as with the adage ‘*Simplex Sigillum Veri*’. The evaluation of simplicity as the hallmark of truth can be regarded as having a certain level of ascetic notion.

In *Tractatus*’ Preface, he wrote:

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before by another.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, he wrote:

For more than one reason, what I publish here will have points of contact with what other people are writing today. If my remarks do not bear a stamp, which marks them as mine, I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property.

The ascetic sense of Wittgenstein may shed a light on the subjects that may seem at first quite irrelevant to his main concerns. One of these topics can be the art of architecture in which it may be important to comprehend the ascetic sense of Wittgenstein in order to realize his world of vision about architecture.

Interest in Bartley’s book, however, has tended to focus, not on his main themes, but almost exclusively on the sensational claims he makes towards the beginning of it about Wittgenstein’s sexuality. The interest generated by these assertions is, in my opinion, disproportionate, but I feel obliged to say something about them. The question I was asked most during the writing of this book was: ‘What are you going to do about Bartley?’ – meaning: what response was I going to give in my book to Bartley’s claims about Wittgenstein’s homosexual promiscuity? (Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Duty of Genius, The Free Press, New York 1991, pg.581.)

⁴⁴ The final words of Wittgenstein were:
"Tell them I've had a wonderful life."

⁴⁵ Op. cit., Wijdeveld, pg. 24.

⁴⁶ The term ‘ascetic’ is not an act of derision; on the contrary, it is an act of honor.

Wittgenstein may be better understood as an individual rather than as a philosopher, linguist, mathematician, musician or an architect. It may be quite controversial to mark Wittgenstein as an architect, as he had never had a formal architectural education. However, as it is quoted in Wijdeveld's book, Wittgenstein remarked *Kundmannngasse* as 'my building' and even he had been known as an architect in the archives of Vienna Municipality for years with Paul Engelmann.

It may be quite complex to identify Wittgenstein as an individual with different identities because his identity as a philosopher may differ greatly from his identity i.e. as a mathematician or an architect. As he mentions in 'Culture and Value' "[w]here others go on ahead, I (Wittgenstein) stay in one place" or "[e]ach of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole thing, i.e. the same thing over and over again; it is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles."⁴⁷

Wittgenstein's uniqueness may also derive from his style of living and his heritage. He had an old and well-known family. Wittgenstein was not only born into a wealthy family but also into a very rich culture. Wittgenstein's Vienna was highly influential on numerous fields such as philosophy, psychology, painting, sculpture, literature and architecture.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Op.cit. Wittgenstein (1980).pg7e.

⁴⁸ As Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin indicates:

"...it is difficult in this day and age to understand exactly how central Vienna was to the Empire's entire cultural life. (The position of Paris in French Culture is, perhaps, the only comparable present-day phenomenon). Thus it comes as a slight shock to discover that Anton Bruckner gave piano lessons to Ludwig Boltzmann; that Gustav Mahler would bring his psychological problems to Dr. Freud; that Breuer was Brentano's physician; that the young Freud fought a duel with the young Viktor Adler, who had attended the same high school as both the last of the Habsburgs, Charles I, and that Arthur Seyss-Inquart, later the Nazi Commissioner of the Holland; and that Adler himself, like Schnitzler and Freud, had been an assistant in Meynert's clinic. In short, in late Habsburg Vienna, any of the city's cultural leaders could make the acquaintance of any other without difficulty, and many of them were in fact close friend despite working in quite ^{distinct} fields of art, thought and public affairs. This factor needs to be borne in mind when we discover that a whole range of intellectual and artistic creations, ranging from the music of Arnold Schoenberg to the architecture of Adolf Loos – and including in its own way, Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* – were intimately and consciously related to, and even extensions of, the critique of language and society conducted by Karl Kraus. Each of these men acknowledged the inspiration of Kraus and could be said to be a Krausian; but the integrity of a Krausian demanded in each case that the struggle against moral and aesthetic corruption be carried on by a critique of that particular

Wittgenstein still has a crucial impact on contemporary issues of philosophy (especially aesthetics), linguistics, psychology, literature and literary criticism.⁴⁹ Wittgenstein's importance for the world of philosophy derives from his unique works focusing on the limits of language and therefore the limits of understanding and perception.⁵⁰ As it is commonly mentioned and accepted, he is "the greatest philosopher of the 20th century," and "played a central, if not controversial, role in 20th-century analytic philosophy. He continues to influence current philosophical thought in topics as diverse as logic and language, perception and intention, ethics and religion, aesthetics and culture."⁵¹

Wittgenstein's significance for the universal culture should not be limited to his philosophy, but on the contrary, should be enhanced for his unique personality and devotion. The arbitrary nature of Wittgenstein's works as a probable result of this uniqueness may make them difficult to comprehend as well as difficult to approach.⁵² Actually, they are miscellaneous remarks written during a long period in which there were many changes in the world-vision of Wittgenstein. For instance, the first of his remarks on aesthetics and architecture appeared in his "Miscellaneous Remarks" in 1930 and the latest remark appeared in 1948, three years before his death. There may be a conclusion that architecture was always a considerable issue for Wittgenstein throughout his entire life. However; on

area of human experience in which the individual artist or writer was himself most at home. For Loos, this was architecture and design; for Schoenberg, it was music; for Wittgenstein, philosophy.

⁴⁹ Nowadays, there is a debate on whether his latest published work 'On Certainty' is such a revolutionary work as Tractatus or Philosophical Investigations

⁵⁰ For Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy should be to clarify language because it is the chaotic status of language that restricts our whole perception of the world.

⁵¹ "Wittgenstein," <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/>

⁵² The categorization of Wittgenstein's works still has some sort of indecision, as these works are not about only one title but on the contrary about life and the individual itself. In PI, he wrote:

"The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concept of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written down all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes fairly a long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another. It was my intention at first to bring these all together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times."

the one hand, there are relatively very few remarks on aesthetics and/or architecture by Wittgenstein when his remarks on philosophy are taken into consideration and therefore it can be quite confusing to decide whether architecture was that crucial for Wittgenstein or not. On the other hand, if his remark⁵³ on the similarity of philosophy and architecture written in 1931 three years after the completion of *Kundmannngasse* can be regarded as manifestation of architecture as a sort of philosophy, it may be clearly argued that architecture was always taken into consideration by Wittgenstein.



Figure 2-2: A Still Image from the movie *Wittgenstein* by Derek Jarman

⁵³ Working in philosophy - like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself, on one's own interpretation, on one's way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them.)

2.3 Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle

I and my public understand each other very well: it does not hear what I say, and I don't say what it wants to hear.⁵⁴



Figure 2-3: Portrait of Karl Kraus by Oskar Kokoschka, 1925

Exceptions and contradictions may be thought as crucial factors in the philosophic transformation of Wittgenstein as a considerable figure in the formation of Modern Life. What these exceptions and contradictions throughout his works refer to can be an important question as these aspects turn Wittgenstein into a thinker. His general aim to exclude philosophical questions in order to establish a new way of view is said to be an aspect of his personality, which can shallowly be summarized as “less is more”.⁵⁵ The adage “*Simplex Sigillum Veri*” (see the Glossary) meaning “Simplicity is the Hallmark of Truth” may be more relevant to the aura of Wittgenstein as it denotes much more generality. Actually, both of them can be a motto for any period of Wittgenstein regardless of the field, which they are concerned.

The architect Adolf Loos was a contemporary of Wittgenstein and there may be found similarities and associations, however; Loos cannot

⁵⁴ Reprinted in Karl Kraus, *Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pg.33.

⁵⁵ Actually, the approach of Wittgenstein can be metaphorically summarized as something between ‘less is more’ of L. Mies van der Rohe and ‘Ornament is a Crime’ of Adolf Loos.

simply be identified as an architect “who tried to put Wittgenstein’s ideas about language into architectural form” as Thomas A. Markus and Deborah Cameron put it.⁵⁶ Wittgenstein’s *Kundmannngasse* is generally explained as a Loos-like building rightfully because of its exteriors. However, some think that Wittgenstein was not actually fully understood by A. Loos although Loos once exclaimed in front of Wittgenstein; “You are me”.⁵⁷

As Paul Engelmann asserts in his memoir, “They valued each other highly. Loos had a sure instinct for genius, although he certainly did not understand Wittgenstein in many respects.”⁵⁸ The main difference between Loos and Wittgenstein is that, Wittgenstein reached towards simplicity as an aesthetic tool; however, Loos had a sense of simplicity in terms of reasonableness. As Wijdeveld puts it, “[a]lthough initially Loos and Wittgenstein believed they recognized in each other a common attitude to aesthetics it soon became apparent that their characters and the underlying motives for their ideas differed considerably.”⁵⁹ It was probably due to a general reason that Loos was a specialist but Wittgenstein not. However, the underlying reasons can be diversified as Wijdeveld asserts:

If Loos was an artist before all else (or, at any rate, a skilled designer) whose functionalist style was deeply rooted in his feeling for the practical and his love for all earthly things, for Wittgenstein, the thinker and searcher for truth, ‘functionalism’ was most literally represented in the functioning mechanism and entailed an ethical principle; as far as the aesthetic aspect of design was concerned, it was still meant to satisfy a basic need for moral justification.⁶⁰

The morality emphasized here may be a way to see the difference between Loos and Wittgenstein as it may help to realize the priorities of these two men. Wittgenstein’s attempt cannot be reduced to a pure functionalist attempt because in *Kundmannngasse* there are some points that cannot be evaluated as a pure functionalist approach but on the contrary merely a perfectionist approach. As it was mentioned in Wijdeveld’s book:

Obviously, Wittgenstein wanted the South-east window to be in the centre of both the exterior and the interior walls, which would have been impossible unless the

⁵⁶ Thomas Markus & Deborah Cameron. The Words between the Spaces: Buildings and Language, Routledge, London, 2002, pg.20.

⁵⁷ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.29.

⁵⁸ Ibid. pg.29.

⁵⁹ Ibid. pg.31.

⁶⁰ Ibid. pg.31.

wall between the breakfast room and the enclosed porch and vestibule were made twice as thick. Apart from the absurdity of wasting so much space for the sake of symmetry, an insoluble problem would have arisen regarding the placement of the door between hallway and breakfast room. The plans of the mezzanine, however, reveal a slight projection of a short stretch of the south-east wall towards its east corner so that the vertical symmetry axis of the window should coincide with the vertical symmetry axis of the south-east wall area thus shortened. In contrast to the thickened wall in Margaret Stonborough's salon, absent in the plans, this short stretch of projecting wall was certainly not executed, though the niche in the east corner was.⁶¹

It can be argued that the dissertations of Kenneth Frampton on Loos should be repeated for Wittgenstein as well; because when compared with Loos, Wittgenstein seems to be more enigmatic and versatile. Frampton asserts. "... [t]he more we dwell upon on his [Loos's] motives, the more elusive and paradoxical his achievement appears. In this respect, he may be compared to Marcel Duchamp, although his work and sensibility could not have been more different. As Loos himself was at pains to point out in 1910, the *métier* of building is far removed from that of art."⁶² Architect, for Loos, is defined as the *métier* of building. However, for Wittgenstein architecture is defined as the gesture of a building. In this context, Loos is not an individual architect but, on the contrary, a master who set the rules for modern architecture. Adolf Loos enigmatically asserts, "[o]nly a very small part of architecture belongs to art – the tomb and the monument. Everything else that fulfils a function is to be excluded from the domain of art."⁶³

The reason for such a treatise may be the epoch of that period full of rationalization efforts. Loos' treatise summarizes the crucial concepts forming Modern Architecture. It should be noted that although Loos' formal approach is heavily felt on Wittgenstein at least in terms of *Kundmannngasse*, the emphasis of Wittgenstein on the ethical and aesthetic dimension of architecture is what differs Wittgenstein from Loos and his followers.

⁶¹ (Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.107.)

⁶² Kenneth Frampton, *Labour, Work and Architecture*, Phaidon Press, London, 2002, p.197.

⁶³ Loos in his 1910 essay "Architecture". Reprinted in John Hyman, "The Urn and the Chamber Pot," in Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (eds.), *Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts*, Routledge, London, 2001, pg.141.

2.4 Prolegomena to Wittgenstein's Architecture and His *Magnum Opus* 'Kundmannngasse' (or "logic translated into a house")

It looks as if it was designed by Loos, but it cannot be by Loos. ⁶⁴



Figure 2-4: *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

In 1926, Ludwig Wittgenstein returned to Vienna and embarked upon a new career as an architect in order to design a family house for her sister Gretl in Vienna's Third District on *Kundmannngasse*.⁶⁵ On November 27, 1925 Paul Engelmann, a student of Loos, wrote in a letter to Ludwig Wittgenstein,

⁶⁴ Quoted in Op. Cit., Wijdeveld, pg. 11.

⁶⁵ As it is indicated in Leitner's 'The Wittgenstein House'; "The "Palais Stonborough," as Ludwig Wittgenstein termed his building in a letter dated November 10, 1928 to the Weber company, lies between Kundmannngasse and Parkgasse in Vienna's third district. The site Office was located in a single-story building on the Parkgasse side. Vehicular and pedestrian Access was from Kundmannngasse no. 19. Within the family and among friends the house was known as "Kundmannngasse."

a friend of his since 1916, that Wittgenstein's sister Margarethe Stonborough wanted to build a mansion in Vienna.⁶⁶

The preliminary sketches dated from early 1926 were by Paul Engelmann, the principle architect responsible for the design.⁶⁷

Paul Wijdeveld indicates:

Early in November 1925 Margaret Stonborough invited Paul Engelmann to Toscana Park and told him about her plans to build a large house for herself and her family in Vienna. As he wrote to Wittgenstein: We had long conversations on the question as to whether such an undertaking is still possible these days. I believe no rather than yes; I should, however, when I receive the commission, venture to make the attempt. I should very much like to discuss this matter (...) with you." It was to this latter that Wittgenstein enthusiastically answered: "I should also be very interested in the building of a house." Engelmann was commissioned and, while staying in Vienna during the months of April and May 1926, drew a series of sketches in close cooperation with Margaret Stonborough, which received comments from Wittgenstein. These formed the beginning of the basic design of the ground floor and of the spatial disposition of the Kundmanngasse.

However, Wittgenstein's contribution to the final plan scheme can be easily felt as "everything in the sketch plan from May 18, 1926 which was reminiscent of Loos' ideas on dwelling was eliminated"⁶⁸ and "rooms were redesigned by Wittgenstein in the spirit of the central space and 'interlocked' within his overall composition".⁶⁹

Wittgenstein's notion of architecture begins with his sympathy to machines designed just for function. As seen in the inner details for *Kundmanngasse*, his approach may at first seem rather mechanistic than aesthetic due to his strong emphasis on the structural details of the house such as doors, windows or the lift. However, there are some particular approaches appreciated *Kundmanngasse* not only as a work of mechanistic⁷⁰ architecture, but also as a work of architecture with a strong aesthetic emphasis.

⁶⁶ As quoted in Bernhard Leitner, *The Wittgenstein House*, Princeton Architectural Press, 2000, New York, p.23.

⁶⁷ Op. cit., Wijdeveld, pg.

⁶⁸ Op. cit., Leitner (2000). pg.28.

⁶⁹ Ibid.pg.28.

⁷⁰ Actually the term functionalist may have very different kinds of meanings according to its perception through the ages. Or functionalism may have the same meaning as




Figure 2-5: A preliminary Sketch of *Kundmannasse* by Engelmann showing the east perspective view




Figure 2-6: A Preliminary Sketch of *Kundmannasse* by Paul Engelmann showing the floor plan

The considerable effect of Wittgenstein was also stressed by Engelmann as in his own words he admitted that he was not actually the architect.⁷¹ As Leitner indicates “[e]ven the Loos student, Paul Engelmann, originally entrusted with the commission and who, in fact, wanted to produce

‘aesthetic’. An example given by R. Scruton can be quoted here: “Consider, for example, the ‘functional’ suit of blue denim, as this is envisaged by its more usual purchasers. This proclaims itself as an object of utility in defiance of ornament, pretension or style. That very proclamation constitutes its style; once again, ‘Reason’ reveals itself, not as an adaptation of means to end, but as an end itself, a value through which we perceive the world. What pretends to be ‘functional’ appeals precisely because it is something more than that, because functionality is expressed in its appearance” (aesthetic as a function)

a work of his own, i.e. something related to Loos, could not, as he later admitted, ‘see’ what kind of architecture Wittgenstein was creating”.⁷² In a letter he wrote to Professor Hayek; Engelmann states:

L.W., who worked as a teacher at that time, took a great interest in this project and whenever he was in Vienna offered excellent advice, so that I finally had the feeling that he understood Mrs. Stonborough’s intentions better than I. she herself took an active part in working out the design. Her participation revealed the greatest degree of taste and a high level of culture and yet the result of this collaboration was not entirely satisfactory for either party. For this reason, and as Wittgenstein found himself in a severe mental crisis after having given up his job as a teacher, I suggested him that he should carry out the building together with me. After having thought over the matter for quite some time, he accepted my idea. This solution turned out to be a fortunate one both for him and the building. From that point on, he was actually the architect and not myself. Although when he started working on the project the plans had already been completed, I view the result as his and not as my own achievement.⁷³




Figure 2-7: *Kundmanngasse*; Plan of the ground floor, first version, November 1926.

Although, the effect of Loos is heavily felt on the geometrical composition of the masses, the inner plan scheme was not in the style of Loos. Realization of the importance of Loos’ legacy for modern architecture can be versatile. As Kenneth Frampton asserts:

⁷¹ Ibid.pg.28.

⁷² Ibid.pg.33.

⁷³ Ibid.pg.23.

In the final analysis Loos's significance as a pioneer depended not only on his extraordinary insights as a critic of modern culture, but also on his formulation of the Raumplan as an architectural strategy for transcending the contradictory cultural legacy of bourgeois society which, having deprived itself of the vernacular, could not claim in exchange the culture of Classicism.

⁷⁴




Figure 2-8: Villa Moller and *Kundmannngasse*

⁷⁴ Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, pp.94-95



Figure 2-9: The Main Entrance, Kundmangasse

The general impact of his work 'Culture and Value'⁷⁵ may probably be judged as transitional as it lacks of any sort of conclusion. Wittgenstein insists upon his self-assurance and sense and relies heavily on aphorisms without any references to any other cultural pioneers or even philosophers. These are truly personal aphorisms not even need to mention however they truly represent Wittgenstein himself. For instance, his emphasis on the similarity of architecture with profession of philosophy⁷⁶ can be quite inspiring

⁷⁵ As 'Culture & Value' is an edited work by G. H. von Wright- a Wittgenstein scholar – it should be pointed out that the arbitrarily chosen propositions may not suggest a single motto. Instead, it may give a clue about what Wittgenstein had in mind while thinking architecture in relation with other disciplines such as philosophy, religion, phenomenology, aesthetics, ethics etc. . Such unsystematic values hidden in the monologues of Wittgenstein have their roots in imagination-derivative rather than tautologies. Culture is surely an important phenomenon for Wittgenstein as he recognizes culture as an accelerating item (or phenomenon). Types of culture in detail may have an impact on propositions by Wittgenstein as he declares systematic varieties and variations should change man's attitude towards social values such as religion, occult etc.

⁷⁶ Working in philosophy - like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself, on one's own interpretation, on one's way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them.)

in this context, as it is truly a personal suggestion derived from the unique manners of Wittgenstein. Actually, the proposition itself suggests a certain level of uniqueness as it insists upon the idea that working in architecture is working on one's own interpretation. What these aphorisms culturally represent as a question can be an appropriate issue as it may help to understand truly what Wittgenstein had in mind while bringing these propositions forward.⁷⁷



Figure 2-10: Aerial Photograph (1959) with the *Kundmannngasse* in the lower right

The crucial point may be the impossibility of ignoring Wittgenstein's background while trying to understand the contents of his propositions. Wittgenstein has an unaccustomed background at least in terms of his style of evolution in his works. He tried first mechanical engineering whose effect can be seen apparently in the details of the *Kundmannngasse*. Then, he tried

⁷⁷ See 'Sketch for a Foreword' in Culture and Value for detail evaluation of Wittgenstein on this issue.

mathematics and later turned to philosophy, which can be a suitable way for him to find the *Einfall*.⁷⁸

The expectations from *Kundmannngasse* can be quite different from the ones from the theoretical works. *Kundmannngasse* is a work of pure art ignoring ephemeral aesthetic styles. The notes by Wittgenstein are very limited in terms of emphasizing the theoretical and philosophical background of the work. His only direct note on the *Kundmannngasse* was:

In the same sense: the house I built for Gretl is the product of a decidedly sensitive ear and good manners, an expression of great understanding (of a culture etc.). But primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the open – that is lacking. And so you could say it isn't healthy (Kierkegaard). (Hothouse Plant)⁷⁹

This proposition shows that [true] architecture itself is a utopia and it can hardly be achieved. What Wittgenstein had in mind may suggest a way of turning architecture into an arbitrary utopia and therefore turning architecture into a complex system. When representation is a problem, Wittgenstein asserts that it is lack of perfectionism. It is not a question of abstraction but a question of systematic creation. Actually, this proposition can be regarded as a self-criticism. It seems that Wittgenstein is aware of the uninhabitable features of *Kundmannngasse*. As B. R. Tilghman suggests:

There is no question that there was much of the romantic in Wittgenstein's views about art. Great art has to spring from primordial passions. Wittgenstein is frank about the lack of passion in his one essay into architecture. Instead of passion there is the understanding of a culture.⁸⁰

It is actually possible to interrogate the opposition of passion to understanding of a culture. Understanding of a culture in architecture can be in some ways compulsory in terms of the close connection of architecture with social and cultural conventions. This sort of understanding can be seen as obedience rather than understanding. Understanding of a culture demands a more profound internalization of a culture. Internalization differs from obedience however; there may be an amalgamation while dealing with understanding of a culture.

⁷⁸ Noun. Idea, concept, notion (See the Glossary for a further discussion)

⁷⁹ Op. Cit., Wittgenstein (1980), pg. 43e.

⁸⁰ B.R. Tilghman, "Architecture, Expression, and the Understanding of a Culture" in *Philosophy and Architecture* (ed.M. H. Mitias), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1994.pg.60.

Another source for understanding the notion of Wittgenstein about *Kundmannngasse* may be his letters. In a letter he wrote to J.M. Keynes dating from summer 1927; he wrote:

Vienna III, Parkgasse 18 (summer 1927)

My dear Keynes,... (I have) taken up architecture. I am in the process of building a house in Vienna. This is causing me considerable worry and I am not even certain that I won't botch it. As ever, yours, Ludwig⁸¹

As it seems from his statement, architecture was at first a kind of hobby for Wittgenstein. However, later he called it 'my building' and he advanced his attitude towards architecture probably by maintaining a similar attitude towards architecture just like the one towards philosophy. In a letter, again to Keynes, dating from 1928, he wrote:

Vienna III, *Kundmannngasse* 19 (1928)

Dear Keynes, I have just finished my house, which has occupied me entirely over the two years.... I enclose a few photos and hope that you don't find its simplicity too offensive.

As ever, yours, Ludwig⁸²

Wittgenstein's way of building can be understood better by focusing on his views on architecture or in general on aesthetics. As Wijdeveld remarks, "[j]ust as the *Kundmannngasse* should be regarded as an example of traditional monumental architecture, though realized by the application of modern building techniques, Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the architect as an artist performing an assignment dictated by the "Higher Things" is part of the same traditional outlook."⁸³ What these "Higher Things" may suggest or evoke can be understood as the equivalent of 'immortalization and glorification of "something". Wittgenstein has the point of view that architect has a semi-God like status and he should create something in order not only to function properly but also to refer to 'Higher Things' or to immortalize/glorify something. Wittgenstein dictates that it is the responsibility of the architect to create according to the assignment dictated by the "Higher Things". Therefore; according to Wittgenstein, if an architect

⁸¹ Reprinted in Op.cit.Leitner(2000).pg.22.

⁸² Reprinted in Ibid.pg.22.

⁸³ Op. cit., pg.170.

cannot resist to every temptation then he cannot avoid to be a poor architect.⁸⁴




Figure 2-11: Details from *Kundmannngasse*

⁸⁴ Today the difference between a good and a poor architect is that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation and the good one resists it. (Wittgenstein from *Culture and Value*)



Figure 2-12: Perspective Drawing of the *Kundmannngasse* , November, 1926




Figure 2-13: 'Purified' versions of the Palais Schwarzenberg (top) and the Palais Trauthson (above), Vienna by Fischer von Erlach.



Figure 2-14: The arrangement of folding glass doors and floor slabs

Wittgenstein's notion of architecture may be based upon an amalgamation of constructive and representational features of architecture. *Kundmannngasse*, at first, seems as if it can be regarded as a synecdoche of scientific approach towards architecture. However, what make to believe *Kundmannngasse* as a work of art are not only its relatively "rational" features but also its sentimental (or gestural) features. If the notion of Alan Colquhoun is taken into consideration, the importance attributed to "rational" criteria within the total process of architectural design cannot be absolutely applied to the rhetoric embedded in Wittgenstein. Because the "rational" criteria cannot be seen as a crucial one but on the other hand, *Kundmannngasse*, relatively, cannot be thought without the "rational" criteria. The rational "criteria of Wittgenstein is heavily influenced by the fact that "ethics is aesthetics."

2.5 Notes Regarding Architectural Notions of Wittgenstein

2.5.1 Immortalization and Glorification by means Of Architecture



Figure 2-15: Front Elevation, *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

The terms immortalization and glorification are both transcendental as they suggest an afterlife activity throughout history. In general terms, immortalization indicates “making (a person, event, etc) famous for ever, especially by including them or it in a work of art or literature” and glorification suggests “giving great praise, honor, or glory”.⁸⁵

Apart from their general meaning immortalization and glorification may indicate a more concrete meaning in architecture. Besides, they can also be understood both as sacred and utopian terms. It is possible to grasp them in broader terms of art as unanimously they are related or bound up with art. As Wijdeveld puts it, [t]he difference between the work of art and an ordinary

⁸⁵ Definitions are taken from Webster English Dictionary.

object is that the maker of the former deliberately strives after perfect expression, whereas this is not necessarily the case for the latter.⁸⁶

The reification of the Wittgenstein's notion of immortalization and glorification can be possible with a verified exploration of his thoughts and treatises on aesthetics. To begin with, the treatises and thoughts of Wittgenstein may seem at first that they are not so related with the cultural aura in which he lived. Actually, the reason of such a conclusion may be due to the fact that the notion on Wittgenstein is highly personal and besides unsystematic.



Figure 2-16: Window Detail, *Kundmanngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

The background of Wittgenstein's thoughts on aesthetic addresses a few but important figures such as Karl Kraus and Otto Weininger. Therefore, his views on the notion of immortalization/glorification by virtue of architecture may have something common with their treatises. As quoted "[W]ittgenstein's friend Paul Engelmann aptly characterized Weininger (along with Karl Kraus) as the moral voice of the epoch in which he and Wittgenstein grew to manhood."⁸⁷ It is sure that the context in which Wittgenstein wrote was an intellectual one. As one of the remarkable figures of the Vienna Circle and

⁸⁶ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.168.

⁸⁷ Quoted from Paul Engelmann, Letters from Wittgenstein with a Memoir, Oxford, 1967, pg.125 in Allan Janik, Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger, Rodopi, 1985, pg.65.

therefore an antecedent of Wittgenstein, Otto Weininger committed suicide at the age of 23. The act was such a symbolic one as it happened in a room in the house in Schwarzspanierstraße 15 where Beethoven died. From the aesthetic point of view, the act may be regarded as a glorifying and immortalizing one. There may be a close connection between the Wittgenstein's notion of immortalization/glorification and the so-called cause célèbre of Otto Weininger. The morality emphasized in both of them is so crucial as it plays a central and indispensable role.

2.5.2 Architect as a Semi-God

The function of an architect for Wittgenstein can be esteemed in terms of his focus on the integral responsibility of the architect as an artist. The realization of such a connection can be valid within a highly intellectual society full of versatile actors.

The architect is the seminal figure in history but which kind of architect. Architect who succumbs to every temptation or architect who resists it. Wittgenstein labels the first group of architects as "poor architect" and the latter one as "good architect". It is the rhetoric of architect as a semi-God in general. Architect as a semi-God is the emancipation of architect for Wittgenstein. A good architect behaves as a semi-God and does not succumb to every temptation but poor one succumbs to every temptation and does not show any resistance in terms of his autonomy. Actually, the term "good" is outside the outside the space of facts for Wittgenstein as he indicates, "[y]ou cannot lead people to what is good; you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the space of facts."⁸⁸ One of his treatises on religion and religious point of view can summarize Wittgenstein's whole notion of religious features. He remarked, "[I] am not a religious man: but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Op.cit., Wittgenstein (1980), pg.3e.

⁸⁹ Rush Rhees (ed.). Ludwig Wittgenstein Personal Recollections, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. Quoted in Robert Arrington and Mark Addis, Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion, Routledge, London, 2001, pg.137.

Actually, the notion that Wittgenstein tries to point out is the ethical responsibility of an architect. The ethical responsibility of an architect is his resistance to every temptation and be a somehow conservative. Actually the notion of Wittgenstein on the ethical responsibilities of an architect can seem quite contradictory due to the fact that architecture is a social art and therefore should compromise at some points in order to share a common point with rest of the society. For Wittgenstein, an architect cannot have a chance to compromise because he has to behave as a semi-God. The notion of Wittgenstein on the similarity of a building with a living organism is apparent in his two propositions on Architecture.

Remember the impression one gets from good architecture, that it expresses a thought. It makes one want to respond with a gesture.

Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a purpose architecture.

The realization that a building has bodily features (or gestures) can be understood with Wittgenstein's emphasis on architecture as a semi-God. The architect as a semi-God has some sublime features such as creation and dictation. Architect, for Wittgenstein, is an individual rather than a social agent. Social restrictions such as style formations and economical restrictions should not be interfered with the architectural creation. Interference with social phenomenon is not relevant with the Architect. The Architect as a semi-God cannot ignore his overall autonomy on behalf of his sublime features. According to the notion of Wittgenstein about the [true] architect as a semi-God, an architect is even different from an artist. It would be much more relevant to label an artist as a semi-God rather than an architect. However, as the notion of Wittgenstein focuses on the ethical responsibilities, an architect seems more responsible than an artist is.

2.5.3 [True] Architecture; “*Tractatus Architectonicus*”⁹⁰

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, now throw the ladder away after he has climbed up it.)⁹¹

The Wittgensteinian definition of architecture depends upon the quasi-ethical and quasi-aesthetic principles. In this text, as it is from a Wittgensteinian point of view, the notion of Wittgensteinian architecture is regarded as [True] Architecture meaning, “architecture immortalizes and glorifies something”. Wittgenstein remarks that if there is nothing to glorify, such as in “Asphyxiating Culture” during the “between the wars” period (1919-1939), then there is no possibility to declare that any structure can be regarded as [True] Architecture.

2.5.4 Something’ (or ‘Higher Things’)

“What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something Supernatural can express something Supernatural.”⁹²

It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)⁹³

Wittgenstein had a sense of austerity and modesty throughout his entire life and therefore his notion of “something” (or higher things) can be regarded as an ethical issue rather than a religious issue. However, “[t]o establish a meaningful connection between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s classicizing ‘architectural gesture’ and his philosophical thinking, based on the imperative of an intuitively clear ‘rule’ of absolute beauty, we should begin with the assessment of his ideas on philosophical aesthetics during the period of the

⁹⁰ Quoted in Op. cit., Frampton (2002) p. 214. Frampton uses this term while referring to the *tabula rasa* architecture of Adolf Loos.

⁹¹ Op. Cit., Wittgenstein, pg.

⁹² Op.cit., Wittgenstein (1980).p.3e.

⁹³ 6.421 of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

design and construction of the *Kundmanngasse*’ as Wijdeveld asserts.⁹⁴ His ideas on philosophical aesthetics are very few in terms of a critical assessment. However, it should be noted that the proposition “It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed” tells so much in terms of the fundamentals of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein declares that if something cannot be expressed in meaningful terms then it can only be shown. This notion turns the ethics into a transcendently acknowledged phenomenon. Therefore, aesthetics cannot also be expressed in meaningful terms, on the contrary it can only be shown in transcendental terms. As Wijdeveld puts it, “[w]e cannot formulate an ethical ‘rule’ dealing with how to live as a good human being nor, consequently, an aesthetic ‘rule’ stating how to create beauty in objects of art.”⁹⁵

In actual fact, the spirituality of Wittgenstein itself is highly ethical in terms of its expression. His emphasis on the similarity or the equality of the ethics and the aesthetics is important in terms of his notion of immortalization/glorification of *something*. Wittgenstein seems to give the priority to the ethical fundamentals regarding the responsibility of the both the architect and the architecture. The “something” is quite regarded as embedded in the boundaries of ethics. Ethical approach is apparent in various topics to which Wittgenstein refers.

For Wittgenstein, “something” can surely be “nothing”. If there is nothing crucial for a building to immortalize / glorify, then a building may immortalize and glorify ‘*nothingness*’. It is actually in harmony with his ethical approach because it refers to sincerity and truthfulness. In architectural terms, it may be regarded that this sort of approach is not due to any formalist tendency; on the contrary, it deals entirely with the adage “*Simplex Sigillum Veri*”.

Regarding the difference between a “Higher (or Tremendous) Thing” and a “Correct Thing”, Wittgenstein asserts:

We talked of correctness. A good cutter won't use any words except words like ‘Too long’, ‘All right’. When we talk of a Symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of

⁹⁴ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.163.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pg.164.

correctness. Entirely different things enter. One wouldn't talk of appreciating the tremendous things in Art. In certain styles in Architecture a door is correct, and the thing is you appreciate it. But in the case of a Gothic Cathedral what we do is not at all to find it correct - it plays an entirely different role with us. The entire *game* is different. It is as different as to judge a human being and on the one hand to say 'He behaves well' and on the other hand 'he made a great impression on me'.⁹⁶

The role of this distinction can apparently be felt and comprehended in Wittgenstein's emphasis on immortalization /glorification rather than a uniform functionalism. It may be argued that Wittgenstein stresses the unnecessariness of finding a 'Higher or Tremendous Thing' correct. Tremendous things in Art are for Wittgenstein a consequence of immortalization / glorification of *something* by means of these things in Art.

2.5.5 'Less Is More' or "*Simplex Sigillum Veri*"

The solution of logical problems must be neat for they set the standards of neatness. Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of questions whose answers – a priori – are symmetrical and united into a closed regular structure. A sphere in which the proposition, *simplex sigillum veri*, is valid.⁹⁷

Simplex Sigillum Veri meaning 'Simplicity is the Hallmark of Truth' may be regarded as a more general version of 'Less is more' by Mies van der Rohe. It also reminds the motto 'Ornament is a Crime' by Adolf Loos whose relation with Wittgenstein is more important and more relevant than Mies. Mies' approach is probably much more ephemeral than Loos'. From Wittgenstein's personal point of view, the term 'Simplicity' may be taken as a terms used in order to describe a certain 'lifestyle'. Actually, the equation of simplicity to truth makes more sense if it is seen from the point of Wittgenstein's views on aesthetics.

The background of the aesthetic notion by Wittgenstein can be traced by emphasizing his earlier works on philosophy. However, there are little

⁹⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (ed. by Cyril Barrett), University of California Press, 1966, pp. 7-8.

evidences of ideas about the notion of aesthetics or aesthetics of architecture. In his only published work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein mentions aesthetics only once regarding its expression within the restrictions of language. The proposition 6.421 of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is as follows:

It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)

However; as Wijdeveld asserts, “[t]he coincidence of ethics and aesthetics, of the Good and the Beautiful, thus asserted would incline us to study the paragraphs on ethics, but these comprise only a few propositions.”⁹⁸ The coincidence of ethics and aesthetics are meant to be that they are both inexpressible then therefore they can only be shown. This issue is central through *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and it can be summarized as; “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” meaning ‘...everything that does not belong to the world, which therefore cannot be expressed by language is being shown’.⁹⁹ The notion of such an emphasis that aesthetics cannot be expressed may be discussed as a well-known issue for architecture. The fact that architecture is mainly a figural (or representational) art; therefore, the evaluation that the aesthetic dimension in architecture cannot be expressed by virtue of a language is valid according to Wittgenstein.

The adage ‘Simplex Sigillum Veri’ cannot be directly equated with ‘Less is more’ as it suggests a more general ethical point of view. The reduction of aesthetics (or eternal beauty) to simplicity is apparent in Wittgenstein’s notion of aesthetics. His emphasis on the necessity of simplicity in order to be ethical may be seen as a way to create a non-ephemeral motto for his entire life. The simplicity can also be taken as an act of clarification in which there can be a dialectical progress including thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis.¹⁰⁰ This act of clarification can be regarded as a

⁹⁷ Op.cit.Wittgenstein (2001) proposition 5.4541

⁹⁸ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.163

⁹⁹ Ibid.pg.165.

¹⁰⁰ As it is indicated in MIA “Dialectics is the method of reasoning which aims to understand

key actor of [true] art as it separates art from craft. As Wijdeveld suggests “[t]he difference between the work of art and an ordinary object is that the maker of former deliberately strives after perfect expression, whereas this is not necessarily the case for the latter.”¹⁰¹ Actually, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on simplicity (or clarification in this sense) may shed a light on his holistic view about life. Holism maintains that in every aspect of life there should be a certain level of harmony. Simplicity in art should be accompanied with usual habits of an individual. Simplicity, in this respect should be regarded as a lifestyle.

However, Wittgenstein seems not to be sure of him as in a letter to John Maynard Keynes he insists, “[e]nclosed you will find a few photos of my house and [I] hope you won’t be too much disgusted by its simplicity”.¹⁰² Whether it is a sign of negation or criticism, “A la Corbusier was Keynes’ reaction to the photos in a letter to his wife – a reaction that almost certainly would have infuriated Wittgenstein had he been familiar with the work of Le Corbusier”.¹⁰³ What can be the reasons that may make Wittgenstein angry due to a possible comparison of his work with Le Corbusier? One of the reasons may be the versatile styles applied by Le Corbusier. The changes in his attitude towards the end of his life may seem to Wittgenstein as an unstable act. On the other hand, the professionalism of Le Corbusier may be the point at which Wittgenstein and Le Corbusier differ most radically. Actually, at first, Le Corbusier and Wittgenstein seem that they share a similar basic understanding of architecture. Le Corbusier insists in his ‘Towards a New Architecture’ (1923) in order to define the purpose of an Architect:

The Architect, by his arrangement of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an acute degree and provokes plastic emotion; by the relationships which he creates he wakes profound echoes in us, he gives us the measure of an order which

things concretely in all their movement, change and interconnection, with their opposite and contradictory sides in unity. Dialectics is opposed to the formal, metaphysical mode of thought of ordinary understanding which begins with a fixed definition of a thing according to its various attributes. For example formal thought would explain: ‘a fish is something with no legs which lives in the water’.” (Source: Marxist Internet Archive)

¹⁰¹ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.168.

¹⁰² From a letter of Wittgenstein to Keynes quoted in Ibid.pg.42.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pg.42.

we feel to be in accordance with that of our world, he determines the various movements of our heart and of our understanding; it is then that we experience the sense of beauty.¹⁰⁴

However, Le Corbusier's emphasis on the importance of engineer's aesthetic may not be thought as a relevant to the aesthetic understanding of Wittgenstein. Because Wittgenstein asserts a more individual aesthetic approach, in which it is not the functional aspects that is crucial but on the contrary, the conceptual framework or *Einfall* in Wittgenstein's terms.

The simplicity rooted in Wittgenstein should be grasped not only as a conditional reflex. As Wijdeveld indicates, "[a]s an architect Wittgenstein was still leading the modest life he had adopted when he was teaching".¹⁰⁵

2.6 Prolegomena to the Interaction between the philosophy and the architecture of Wittgenstein

Chronologically, the *Kundmannngasse* is between his two major works: *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*¹⁰⁶ and *Philosophical Investigations*.¹⁰⁷ As it is a generally accepted standpoint, that *Kundmannngasse* is both a conceptual and a fictional bridge between Wittgenstein's former period and his later period. It is a generally known fact that *Kundmannngasse* is also a work of immortality in terms of its inner details designed solely by Wittgenstein and of conservatism in terms of monumentality deriving from symmetrical approach. If one part of its creational background derives from perfectionism, the other part relies heavily on conservative approaches resulting from symmetrical schema in every detail of the project.

"It can be imagined that Wittgenstein, who had no building experience, would refer to his already established philosophical thoughts when considering architectural issues."¹⁰⁸ The question of whether there is a direct

¹⁰⁴ Ulrich Conrads (ed.), Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999,pg.59.

¹⁰⁵ Op.Cit.Wijdeveld.pg.40.

¹⁰⁶ a.k.a Tractatus

¹⁰⁷ Posthumously published in 1951.

¹⁰⁸ Hui Zou, "The Crystal Order That Is Most Concrete: The Wittgenstein House," in Journal

connection between *Kundmannngasse* and Wittgenstein's pre-*Kundmannngasse* and post-*Kundmannngasse* philosophy¹⁰⁹ can be discussed with a notion of the effect of *Kundmannngasse* on the emergence of his later philosophy from the earlier one. As Nana Last asserted, "[t]he association, however, remains strained, based in two largely separate approaches: the discussion of the architecture, on the one hand, and the discussion of the philosophy, on the other."¹¹⁰ When Wittgenstein is in question, it may not be possible to distinguish his architecture from his philosophy and his philosophy from his architecture. As his philosophy is an instrument to draw the curtain of ambiguity and uncertainty from language, his architecture similarly manifests that "*Simplex Sigillum Veri*"¹¹¹ as an act of simplification. Therefore, the question of understanding *Kundmannngasse* within architecture demands "bidisciplinarity rather than interdisciplinarity."¹¹² The recognition of the mental state of Wittgenstein and probable multi-construction existing in *Kundmannngasse* may demand this bidisciplinarity. Bidisciplinarity can be a way to re-emerge the fact that *Kundmannngasse* is an act of architecture in terms of tectonic issues. Nana Last's suggestion is to "look beyond ways in which the philosophy is legible within the architecture."¹¹³ The legibility of philosophy within architecture can be estimated as a requisite in numerous circumstances due to the fact that architecture is a social art. The legibility of philosophy demands a certain level of awareness about the building and the philosophy behind. It should be noted as crucial that, as Nana Last suggested, the legibility of architecture is accomplished within the range of this bidisciplinarity in which the association between architecture and philosophy is spontaneous. Therefore, there is no architecture and philosophy as remote single items but rather their amalgamation. Their amalgamation is more obvious and more meaningful while trying to grasp the notion of Wittgenstein. The necessity of utter inspection of such architecture

of *Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 39, no:3, 2005, pg. 25.

¹⁰⁹ Pre-*Kundmannngasse* period is also known as *Tractatus* Period, and Post-*Kundmannngasse* period generally refers to "Philosophical Investigations" Period.

¹¹⁰ Nana Last, "Transgressions and Inhabitations: Wittgensteinian Spatial Practices," in *Assemblage*, 1998, vol.35, p. 36.

¹¹¹ "*Simplex Sigillum Veri*" can literally be translated as "Simplicity is the hallmark of truth."

¹¹² Op.cit., Last, p.36.

¹¹³ Ibid.,p.36

is maybe felt as a crucial factor to dignify it. Nana Last suggests a “spatial maneuver”¹¹⁴ in order to accomplish a sort of interaction or even amalgamation between his philosophical and architectural “remarks”.¹¹⁵ Last’s vision of the importance of architecture in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is remarkable in terms of her emphasis on the dual-interaction of his philosophy and architecture. Last not only mentions the influence of his philosophy onto his architectural aesthetic but also the probably under-estimated impact of his architecture on his later philosophy or more precisely “consideration of architecture as an integral component rather than an isolated digression of his philosophical development.”¹¹⁶ Thus, such a vision may, according to Last, “reveal the primordial role of spatial and visual thinking in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.”¹¹⁷ The recognition and the analysis of the influence of Wittgenstein’s architecture on Wittgenstein’s philosophy seems much more relevant than to reveal the impact of his philosophy for his architecture because the former one may be regarded as an “oscillation”¹¹⁸ between these two disciplines while the latter one may suggest a mediation rather than an oscillation. When captured within a more general sense, the status of architecture (or spatial thinking) in Wittgenstein’s attempts may be clearer. As Nana Last insists:

As Wittgenstein's life and work were themselves structured by a series of breaks and shifts followed by subsequent returns and reengagements--with people, places, ideas, practices, and disciplines--location and relocation came to lie at the very heart of his attempts to position the subject in relation to philosophy and philosophy in relation to other disciplines and everyday life.¹¹⁹

The notion that architecture played a vital role for Wittgenstein’s entire life of is so crucial within the context of the recognition of the symbolic impact of architecture for Wittgenstein. This sort of analysis may lead to a concept in which architecture is in amalgamation with philosophy. Therefore,

¹¹⁴ Ibid.,p.36

¹¹⁵ Remarks are the term, which Wittgenstein used while describing his philosophical texts. As to refer to the similarity of his architectural details with his philosophical Works – especially with *Tractatus* – these details may also be regarded as “remarks”.

¹¹⁶ Op.cit., Last, p.36

¹¹⁷ Ibid.,p.36

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

Wittgenstein's architecture may be grasped within a wider framework dominating the entirety of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's philosophical evolution may help to locate his architecture in this entirety. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, ethics and aesthetics are regarded to be "outside the realm of the sayable"¹²⁰ and therefore there can be no space for them in everyday life. However, "[t]he Investigations removed the limits that the Tractatus had imposed on language and philosophy by rejecting the Tractatus's view that language represents the world in accordance with the rules of logic."¹²¹ While "*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*" deals with *a priori* concepts, "Philosophical Investigations" deals more with the unstable everyday uses. Therefore; while *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* suggests a relatively more objective view, Investigations deals with the subjective and the more arbitrary features.

The notion that *Kundmannngasse* is the spatial image of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* cannot be enhanced to the point at which *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is written in the same instinctive status with which *Kundmannngasse* was designed. Nana Last's formal and historical approach seems interesting as it suggests that the structure of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* resembles the way Wittgenstein thinks in general.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Nana Last asserts:

In 1914, Ludwig Wittgenstein had built a traditional wooden house on the edge of a cliff overlooking a fjord outside of the small town of Skjolden in Norway. He lived therefore over six months working out ideas that would form the basis for the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. What makes this picture of Wittgenstein perched in his house, looking down from above to the fjord below, while defining the limits of language so alluring, is the temptation to compare the view he would have had of the world below his window, with the view of language that he constructed in the *Tractatus*. It is equally tempting to contrast this scene, to that of the scene of much of his later work, the colleges of the Cambridge University, that Wittgenstein had previously abandoned in search of isolation. If this house in Skjolden, Norway is not the image most associated with the *Tractatus*, then the text of *Tractatus* is. With its hierarchically ordered and numbered propositions calibrated to the fifth decimal place, the *Tractatus* presents a unique image in the history of philosophical texts. This structure, far more than an idiosyncratic gesture, is part of Wittgenstein's fundamental attempt to control the meaning of the text through its form. In the only footnote of the *Tractatus*, appearing on the first page of the text, Wittgenstein commented on this system:

The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition. The

2.7 Analysis of the Propositions of Wittgenstein on Architecture from the Aesthetic and Philosophical Point Of View

The propositions in question should be evaluated in integration with other propositions or even the entire work of Wittgenstein. The logic of such an approach is based on the fact that, as Wittgenstein asserts, “[e]ach of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole thing, i.e. the same thing over and over again; it is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles.”¹²³

2.7.1 Proposition no.1 (1930)

[Today the difference between a good and a poor architect is that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation and the good one resists it] [1930]

The propositions on architecture by Wittgenstein dates back to 1930, a date after he designed *Kundmannngasse*. In this first proposition¹²⁴, Wittgenstein tries to make a statement on the character of an architect. Actually, he mentions a universal and timeless statement about the profession of architecture. The architect, for Wittgenstein, is an artist so therefore he must show up his individuality. As Colin St. John Wilson indicates, “[t]his remark by Wittgenstein reminds us that architecture invites judgment in ethical terms in a way that the other arts do not. That this is points to a paradox at the heart of architecture.”¹²⁵

The way architecture invites judgment in ethical terms can be reduced to an ethical motto for the notion of Wittgenstein in terms of his obstinate

propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no. n, the propositions n. m1, n. m2 etc. are comments on proposition on no. n.m; and so on

Nana Last, Images of entanglement Wittgensteinian spatial practices between architecture and philosophy, Doctoral Thesis, Department of Architecture, MIT, 1999, p. 17.

¹²³ Op.cit. Wittgenstein (1980).pg7e.

¹²⁴ “Today the difference between a good and a poor architect is that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation and the good one resists it.” (Op. cit. Wittgenstein (1980), pg.3e)

¹²⁵ Colin St. John Wilson, Architectural Reflections: Studies in the Philosophy and Practice of

stresses on the ethical responsibility of architecture. The realization of Wittgenstein's equation of ethics with aesthetics can be better understood by his judgments on the responsibilities of architect. The domination of the social responsibilities in his propositions have all reflected this statement. Wittgenstein's judgments can be misunderstood in terms of their tendency to selfishness as he is a strong defender of individualism. However, actually Wittgenstein's defend of individualism cannot be esteemed as a selfish response to the ongoing incubus of Modern Life. Though their basis is slightly individual, the impact they project is socially concerned and realistic.

The realization of the fact that an architect should be esteemed not because of his/her collaboration but his/her resistance is quite interesting and relevant as the overall impact of Wittgenstein is provocative in terms of his evaluation of architecture as a transcendental thing. The architect as an individual should be in a god-like status in terms of Wittgenstein in order to resist the banal features of the society. The on-going features of society should not be interfered with the emancipation of the architect. Actually, Wittgenstein's definition of architect is in harmony with his definition of [true] architecture. The realization of such an amalgamation of [true] architecture with the [true] architect is important because architecture can be a way to see other thing differently. For Wittgenstein, the pre-requisite for such a [true] architecture is the resistance of a good architect or the [true] architect. As Colin St. John Wilson indicates; this realization may lead to a "dispute whether or not architecture has the status of an art at all."¹²⁶ Actually, it may be reduced to a problem that whether architecture is an in-between art or not. As the notion of resistance is generally embedded in the concepts of avant-garde art, it may be argued that the comprehension of Wittgenstein resemble with the arguments of Wilson to some extent. From the Wittgensteinian point of view, there seems to be still a difference between other arts and architecture.

Architecture, Manchester University Press, 2000, pg.21.
¹²⁶ Ibid., pg. 21.

2.7.2 Proposition no.2 (1931)

Working in philosophy- like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself, on one’s own interpretation, on one’s way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them.)] [1931]

The concept focusing on the similar structures of different disciplines is a frequently seen issue in Wittgenstein. It may be argued that his approach to philosophy embraces his approach to architecture. The realization of the inevitable subjectivity and arbitrariness existing both in philosophy and in architecture is important in terms of its radical shift from rationalist modern movement. Although, Wittgenstein was probably aware of the dichotomy in architecture, it seems that he ignores the tectonic features of architecture on behalf of an individualistic perfectionism. It may be quite strange to try to see the evidences of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in his architecture. However, there is some opposition indicating that:

Architecture cannot be applied to philosophy. Only a clichéd misunderstanding can refer to this multi-layered, complex art of architecture as “logic translated into a house” (Hermine Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein’s architecture is intended to be and indeed must be read and understood in the language of architecture. It should not be treated as philosophy translated into a building or as applied thought. ¹²⁷

Actually, Wittgenstein stresses the process in which there is a strong tendency towards subjectivity and individuality. Leitner’s emphasis in order to ignore any possible attempt to see Wittgenstein’s architecture as a direct formal translation of his philosophy can be better understood when seen from an architectonic point of view.

It may be argued that the emancipation of the architecture takes place within this proposition in terms of its specific guidelines underlying the subjectivity in architecture. The subjectivity derived from the nature of philosophy and architecture may not be taken under the same title. The demands of philosophy can probably be different from the concepts of architecture. However; for Wittgenstein, the crucial point is the concept of undertaking a similar attitude within both philosophy and architecture and

¹²⁷ Op.cit.Leitner (2000)., pg.10.

then the verbalization of it. The claiming of such a treatise needs the simultaneous experience of both philosophy and architecture.

Working in philosophy can turn out to be an apparatus to represent the integrity of an individual. In this sense, working in philosophy may differ from the process in architecture in terms of the autonomy of architecture. There is a strong opposition to the notion that architecture is (or should be) autonomous or even quasi-autonomous. Therefore, the dichotomy occurred in architecture does not exist in philosophy. It may be argued that what philosophy demands can be in touch with what architecture seeks. The philosopher as an individual can be compared with the architect as an individual in terms of the process they participate. The difference between these processes can be evaluated because of its importance in understanding of the arbitrariness in the notion of Wittgenstein.

In this sense, it is obvious that the approach of Wittgenstein is not actually rational compared with Loos. As Wijdeveld indicates:

If Loos was an artist before all else (or, at any rate, a skilled designer), whose functionalist style was deeply rooted in his feeling for the practical and his love for all earthly things, for Wittgenstein, the thinker and searcher for truth, 'functionalism' was most literally represented in the functioning mechanism and entailed an ethical principle; as far as the aesthetic aspect of design was concerned, it was still meant to satisfy a basic need for moral justification.¹²⁸

Probably, the ethics was the vital thing for Wittgenstein. As the ethics and the aesthetics is one for Wittgenstein, the ethical point of philosophy is equal to the aesthetic point of architecture. Therefore, working in architecture should be like working in philosophy from the ethical point of view.

¹²⁸ Op.cit.,Wijdeveld, pg.31.

2.7.3 Proposition no.3 (1932-34)

Remember the impression one gets from good architecture, that it expresses a thought. It makes one want to respond with a gesture. [C. 1932-34]

In this proposition, Wittgenstein assumes that [true] architecture differs from architecture because of its external features. In this context, how a building can express a thought may be an *a priori* thing for Wittgenstein. The buildings are, in some terms, nature for us and the impression we got from it can be *a priori*. One of the crucial points is the fact that Wittgenstein does not always seek a transcendental feature in architecture. As Wijdeveld quotes from Maurice O’C. Drury:

“While sitting in Trafalgar Square and talking about its architecture he denounced the historicizing classicizing forms of Canada House, just being completed: ‘That’s bombast; that’s Hitler and Mussolini.’ On the other hand, he admired the Georgian architecture of houses in Dublin: ‘people who built these houses had the good taste to know that they had nothing very important to say; and therefore they did not attempt to express anything.’”¹²⁹

In this context, it may be argued that Wittgenstein’s notion of architecture does not always seek something to immortalize and glorify but sometimes it can be “nothingness” that is immortalized or glorified. It is certainly the intentional approaches to architecture that makes this statement real. As Wittgenstein asserts “[p]eople who built these houses had the good taste to know that they had nothing very important to say”. Actually, it seems that, for Wittgenstein, the gesture embedded in architecture is more crucial than the building itself. The austerity and modesty of these buildings and their builders seem to impress Wittgenstein. The integral approach is apparent here, as Wittgenstein mentions not only the austerity of these buildings but also the consciousness of their builders.

Simultaneously with the design of *Kundmanngasse*, he was also busy with sculpture. What he sought from sculpture seems totally different from what he sought from architecture. Wittgenstein’s approach to sculpture may

be seen similar to his approach to philosophy at least in terms of his uncompromising position.



Figure 2-17: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Head of a Young Woman, about 1927

Similar to his attitude before and after the publication of *Tractatus* – as he declared there remained nothing for him to solve in philosophy – Wittgenstein seems uncompromisingly radical with his views on the function of sculpture. In a letter to sister Hermine, he wrote:

I hope that Drobil has not spoilt anything by enlarging the breast!!! The highly concave breast was **necessary**. It is quite easily possible that he has done something stupid! It so happens that the breasts and upper arms should not together form four equal shaped swellings which subsequently, taken as a whole, become an undulating oblique stage before which the rest takes place. Nor should the space between the right lower arm (the vertical one) and the breasts be reduced, since the former then will become expressionless and – so to speak – adventitious. Please, tell Drobil my objections, he will understand them (if he wants to!). That the breast was not all right is correct, but it is more than likely cannot be corrected by enlarging it and Drobil himself has, as you will recall, told me in your presence that he will not at any rate show the breast in public. **I believe it is not that simple.**¹³⁰

The reification of the function of sculpture by focusing on the expressive features of sculpture can be handled in connection with his views on architecture as a gesture. Actually, the realization of gesture as a prerequisite of [true] architecture may seem the echo of the so-called *reklamearchitektur* (see the Glossary). However, it may be difficult to find any

¹²⁹ Ibid., pg.176.

¹³⁰ From a letter by Wittgenstein to his sister Hermine. Quoted in Ibid., pg.41.

trace of the present-day version of *reklamearchitektur* in Wittgenstein as he focuses on the humanistic features rather than limited sculptural features.



Figure 2-18: The Gestural TRIO: *Kundmannngasse*, Head of a Young Woman and Wittgenstein himself

2.7.4 Proposition no.4 (1942)

[Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive moment of the human body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a purpose architecture.] [1942]

The transformation of a building to a living creature is also apparent in this proposition as it mentions the social interaction between a human being and the architecture similarly in the previous proposition. In this proposition, the role of architecture is tangled with its purpose as a media expressing a thought. This proposition may be understood as the appreciation of

“architecture in harmony with its time”. The “architecture harmonious with its time” can be estimated as a “gesture” in terms of Wittgenstein because it gives an impression that architecture is a social phenomenon and therefore should be regarded as so. Wijdeveld indicates:

True glorification in architecture, in contrast to glorification, implied freely speaking ‘the language of its time’, to quote from Margaret Stonborough’s letter to her brother, and this could very well include ornamentation.¹³¹

The ornamentation as a principle seems so unfamiliar to Wittgenstein, however it is a well-known fact that Wittgenstein admired Viennese Baroque style, especially the architect Fischer von Erlach¹³².



Figure 2-19: Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach: Karlskirche, Vienna, Austria

In this context, the notion of gesture should be understood within the concept ‘*Lebensgefühl*’. The reaction that a building can give to its environment should be in harmony with the *zeitgeist* of a period. For instance, the baroque masterpieces by von Erlach can be regarded in that context and therefore, it may be argued that they have a tendency to immortalize/glorify something. However, it can also be valid, i.e.,

¹³¹ Op.cit., Wijdeveld, pg.177.

¹³² Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach (1656-1723): the first and greatest Austrian baroque architect.

for Jules Hardouin-Mansart¹³³, Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier or even for architecture without architects in Eastern cultures. As Wölfflin assumes:

[Architecture] is an expression of its time in so far as it reflects the corporeal essence of man and his particular habits of deportment and movement, it does not matter whether they are light and playful, or solemn and grave, or whether his attitude to life is agitated or calm; in a word, architecture expresses the '*Lebensgefühl*' of an epoch.¹³⁴



Figure 2-20: The Hall of Mirrors by Jules Hardouin-Mansart, 1684



Figure 2-21: Barcelona Pavilion, Mies van der Rohe, Barcelona, 1929

¹³³ François Mansart, (1598-1666), French architect, born in Paris, and trained by members of his family. Mansart introduced a purer, more classical style into the prevailing baroque mode, evident in such early works as the Hôtel de la Vrillière (1633), a Paris town house; the Orléans wing (1635-38) of the (uncompleted) Château de Blois, done for Gaston, duc d'Orléans; and Maisons (commissioned 1642), a private estate on the Seine River.

Mansart had significant influence on the English architect Sir Christopher Wren, whom he met in Paris in 1666, and on the Austrian architect Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach.

¹³⁴ Quoted in Op.cit., Scruton (1979), pg.53.

Actually, the question of '*Lebensgefühl*' is only one side of the notion of immortalization/glorification by Wittgenstein. If it was the only criteria for Wittgenstein that is esteemed in order to decide whether a building immortalizes or glorifies something, then it may be argued that Wittgenstein should esteem even the architectural works by Albert Speer. Because, it may be argued that the works by Speer express their time regardless of their quality.

The notion of a cultural amalgamation by Colin St. John Wilson is important because of his dignity towards the relationship between the elites of Habsburg Vienna. He insists:

For instance, in accounting for the furious controversy over Loos' building in Michaelerplatz (1909-11) Kraus made the wry statement that 'he has built them an idea over there', and this statement is later echoed by Wittgenstein's note 'Remember the impression one gets from good architecture, that it expresses a thought', and the nature of that thought is illuminated at a number of points, particularly by Wittgenstein himself, of whom Loos is reported to have said 'You are me'.¹³⁵



Figure 2-22: Michaelerplatz, Adolf Loos, Vienna, 1909-11

¹³⁵ Op. cit., Wilson, p.55.

CHAPTER 3

[TRUE] ARCHITECTURE

“Architecture depends on Order, Arrangement, Eurhythm, Symmetry,
Propriety and Economy.”¹³⁶

“Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind, which
contemplates them, and each mind sees a different beauty.”¹³⁷

“Of all the arts, architecture is the one in which it is least possible to exclude the idea
of rationality.”¹³⁸

3.1 Preliminary Aspects of [True] Architecture

There can be found diversified definitions of [true] architecture in many ways throughout history concerning the problem of definition from different points of views including aesthetic, philosophical or engineering concerns. The definitions can be estimated as a definition of [true] architecture if only they are seen from their own logical perspective. If a definition is concerning architecture from an engineering point of view, it can be possible to rely on it in terms of engineering-approach.

A proposition in ‘Ten Books on Architecture’ by Vitruvius mentions uniformity as a state in which there “is a proper agreement between the members of the work itself, and the relation between the different parts and the whole general scheme, in accordance with a certain part selected as standard.”¹³⁹ This statement provokes a transcendental point of view and besides evaluates architecture as a natural and cultural value. In addition, its

¹³⁶ Vitruvius, Ten Books on Architecture, translated by Morris H. Morgan, Kessinger Publishing, Montana, 2005, pg.13.

¹³⁷ David Hume, Of the Standards of the Taste, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1965, pg.6.

¹³⁸ Alan Colquhoun, Modernity and the Classical Tradition: Architectural Essays 1980-1987, MIT Press, Mass., 1994, pg. 57.

¹³⁹ Op. cit., Vitruvius, pg.14.

emphasis on the similarity of a building with a human body stresses the notion of architecture as an apparatus (of immortalization / glorification).¹⁴⁰ The rendering of architecture as a natural phenomenon such as human body can be evaluated as a humanistic approach at least in terms of representation. Human body represents – from religious or transcendental point of view – the vision of so-called Supreme Being or in theological terms ‘God’. Therefore, an architect in charge of a tectonic creation may have a God-like status. It can be realized that it is a microcosm of ‘The Creation’. The mathematical purity or systematic perfectionism can also be handled within this process. From this point of view, the sense of perfectionism should be sensed in every detail of a building. Actually, it should also be stated that the core of architecture is latent in terms of its tectonic features. The realization of immortalization/glorification may be grasped better by comprehending the macrocosm-microcosm relation in [true] architecture.

The latent formulae of “Gestalt entity” can be excavated from this proposition of Vitruvius because of analytical exploration. It has some sort of holistic approach in terms of its projection. As a general description, the gestalt theory defines ‘whole’ entirely different from its parts.

As Roger Scruton indicates:

There are many ways of studying architecture – from the point of view of the engineer, of the historian, of the critic, of the client – and each way seems to propose its own favored concepts, and seems to arrive at an organization of the subject which, if not at variance with its rivals, at least bears no relation to them.¹⁴¹

However, there can be found some common points relating to the core of the architecture if all the attempts dealing with architecture may confirm itself as the *true* architecture. This sort of analytical approach may have a ground if it is taken up as a sort of categorization.

In this sense, the classification made by S. Giedion in his seminal work “Space, Time and Architecture” can be seen as a guide to ascertain the

¹⁴⁰ “Thus in the human body there is a kind of symmetrical harmony between forearm, foot, palm, finger and other parts; and so it is with perfect buildings” (Ibid., pg.14)

¹⁴¹ Op. cit. Scruton (1979), pg.37

historical periods and the architectural development in this historical period.

According to Giedion:

There are three stages of architectural development. During the first stage – the first space conception – space was brought into being by the interplay between volumes. This stage encompassed the architecture of Egypt, Sumer and Greece. Interior space was disregarded. The second space conception began in the midst of the Roman Period... The third space conception set in at the beginning of this century with the optical revolution that abolished the single viewpoint of perspective.¹⁴²

The ignorance of interior space can be crucial in terms of aesthetic approach as it suggests a particular way of design strategy in which it is only the exterior quality that is important. It seems that this sense of 'sculptural architecture' was seen as a summit in architecture maybe because of its highly and solely artistic and aesthetic approach. However, the thin line between architecture and sculpture was obviously a problem of architecture in this context.

As already a well-known fact that the approach of an art historian towards the origin (or etymon) of architecture can be quite different from the one by an architectural theorist or a philosopher. In this sense, it can be interesting to quote from Wölfflin in order to understand if architecture can be realized as a single phenomenon or as a historical phenomenon in strict Hegelian sense. He defines the essence of architecture:

[Architecture] is an expression of its time in so far as it reflects the corporeal essence of man and his particular habits of deportment and movement, it does not matter whether they are light and playful, or solemn and grave, or whether his attitude to life is agitated or calm; in a word, architecture expresses the '*Lebensgefühl*' of an epoch.¹⁴³

Actually, this definition of architecture by Wölfflin can be seen as a contrary to the definition of Wittgenstein focusing on the 'timelessness' in terms of 'immortalization'. The historical approach probably denies such a thing in which there can be timeless formations or features in architecture free from the *zeitgeist* of any particular period. Timelessness forces

¹⁴² Siegfried Giedion. Space Time and Architecture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 5th ed., 2003, pg.9.

¹⁴³ Op. cit. Scruton (1979), pg.53.

something non-ephemeral and announces an object-based approach rather than subject-based one.

As Scruton indicates '[I]t is often thought that, since a building is necessarily an expression of its age, the attempt to build in the style of another age must be an exercise in 'false consciousness'...". It may be argued that it can be true in a sense that it is the style of a historical period that the designer attempts to build in, however if it is a timeless style or a future projection that the designer attempts to build in then; as it is impossible to have a 'false consciousness' or actually consciousness, it may be argued that historical approach cannot be applied to timeless concepts. Scruton ascertains this point by arguing that this kind of approach can be invalid in terms of the individual intentions of the individual architects. He states:

“Such critics have systematically assumed that the attempt to build in the style of some other age will be necessarily unsuccessful; even thoroughly immoral. This is the most widely held of all the critical judgments which the Hegelian vision has manufactured, appearing in Giedion's defence of the forms of the modern movement as uniquely adapted to the spiritual reality of modern man, and in Pevsner's influential attack on the desire (experienced as it happens by almost every serious architect from the Greeks to the Edwardians) to build in the style of some preceding age. But such spurious determinism loses its force, just as soon as we realize that the 'style of an age' is not a critical datum, not something that can be identified in advance of the individual intentions of the individual architects.”¹⁴⁴

The rhetoric of digesting architecture as a historical phenomenon is quite pragmatic as it does not suggest a definition just for architecture but also for the entire '*Lebensgefühl*' – in that sense this kind of approach demands such a view restricted by historical point of view. Quite sensible as the approach from the aesthetic point of view, there are some prerequisites for this approach such as *zeitgeist* of a time that is relevant for all the issues for the entire period. If anything susceptible can be found for the historicist approach, it can be the restricted non-individualistic perspective that this view has. Therefore, Scruton may be fully right while criticizing Burckhardt. He insists, “It seemed to him (Burckhardt) that every work of art of the period must derive its significance from the same underlying spirit or idea.”

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., pg.55.

However, from this point of view the recognition of the individualistic approach to architecture is very futile because of the nature of the individualistic approach. As from these individual approaches to architecture, a radical change in epoch cannot emerge. The manifestation of such a radical break – for Burckhardt – cannot be rendered by an individual or individual approach. However, the special kind of architecture aiming to immortalize & glorify something (by virtue of architecture) is generally performed by individual architects or individual attempts such as Steiner, Wittgenstein or Boullée. The rhetoric is totally against these individualistic approaches.

3.1.1 Preliminary Visions and Dissertations on [True] Architecture

3.1.1.1 Visions and Dissertations of Hegel, Kant and Schopenhauer

The philosophy of Hegel is said to be preliminarily summarized as ‘a philosophy set out not only to explain the structure of the world and the scope of human knowledge, but also to provide a universal system of human society.’¹⁴⁵ The aesthetic vision of Hegel, although it can be hard to summarize, is generally based on his notion of “Absolute Idea”¹⁴⁶. This sort of belief maintains a conceptual framework in terms of which both the past and future could be philosophically understood. In this sense, the aim of philosophy for Hegel seems to be the “Absolute Idea”.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pg.55

¹⁴⁶ The “Absolute Idea” is both the apex and foundation of the philosophical system of Hegel. It *includes* all the stages of the Logic leading up to it; it is the *process* of development with all its stages and transitions. The Absolute Idea, or “World Spirit”, plays the same kind of role for Hegel as a deity “History is the Idea clothing itself with the form of events” (*Philosophy of Right*, § 346), and Marx rejects the need for any such concept since history is the product of people, not the other way around. Like “Absolute truth” knowledge of the Absolute Idea is an unattainable ideal, representing the whole of Nature which has developed to the point where it is conscious of itself, or the concept of Nature developed to such a degree of concreteness that it has “returned to itself” - an *absolutely* comprehensive, practical and concrete concept of the world. Hegel defines the Absolute Idea as the “unity of the Theoretical Idea and the Practical Idea”. The Theoretical Idea is the completed Notion or concrete concept of the world or object; the Practical Idea is the activity expressing this concept (practice); the unity of the two means fully “conscious practice”, people acting in true accord with their own nature. (“Absolute Idea,” in *Encyclopedia of Marxism*, MIA, 2006)

According to Hegel, art, religion, and philosophy are the bases of the highest spiritual development. Beauty in nature is everything that the human spirit finds pleasing and congenial to the implementation of spiritual and intellectual freedom. Certain things in nature can be made more congenial and pleasing, and it is these natural objects that are reorganized by art to satisfy aesthetic demands.¹⁴⁷ As it is seen from the arrangement of Hegel, the art appears to be less important than religion and philosophy. It can be useful to clarify the vision of Hegel on art because there is an absolute separation between art and philosophy and between art and religion. The separation between art and religion may be seen much more logical than the separation between art and philosophy because religion may be seen as a more social phenomenon in which it may not always be possible to treat individualistically as in art or in philosophy. However, Hegel's separation of art and philosophy is not relevant to Wittgenstein's notion of art (architecture in this sense) as Hegel's suggestion is quite deliberate in terms of its holistic vision. Wittgenstein indicates:

Working in philosophy- like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself, on one's own interpretation, on one's way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them.)

The phenomenon of history claims, according to Scruton, to see the workings of a spiritual necessity, a kind of permanent proof of one moment of history from the preceding, which moves from premise to conclusion with all the rigor and all the abstract clarity (for those able to understand it) of a mathematical theorem beneath the superficial chaos.¹⁴⁸ This so-called latent spiritual necessity seems to be the motto of that particular period. It is actually a phenomenon as in the terms of Kant; therefore, it is observable. If the workings of a spiritual necessity may confirm the phenomenon of history, then such an approach should be classified as an induction as it insists a generic point of view.

¹⁴⁷ "Aesthetics," in Encarta Encyclopedia, Encarta, 2004. Idea projects a crucial stage of Hegel's philosophy as it denotes "the complete and ultimate product of reason". ("idea." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. *Answers.com* 26 Nov. 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/idea>)

¹⁴⁸ Quoted in Scruton. *Op.cit* (1979).pg.52.

Actually, there may be an equation of 'expression of time' with Wittgenstein's notion of "immortalization & glorification of something by virtue of architecture." Actually, "time" may be regarded as an example of "something" in terms of Wittgenstein. The emphasis probably should be on the epoch of a time while focusing on the 'expression of its time'. There can be a question whether the "Expression of time" can be an explicit intention of an architect because; it is the projection of an art historian to set a standard for [true] architecture in terms of a need for the "expression of its time". Besides, the intention of an artist in order to express the time he lives in can be an important question in order to understand the Hegelian concept. The perception of *Lebensgefühl* is rather unique in the sense of this sort of approach.

Hegel's attitude towards architecture is bounded with his general view on the aesthetics of architecture. He insists:

The first of the particular arts with which, according to their fundamental principle, we have to begin, is architecture as a fine art. Its task lies in so manipulating external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an artistic outer world. The material of architecture is matter itself in its immediate externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws, and its forms do not depart from the forms of inorganic nature, but are merely set in order in conformity with relations of the abstract understanding, i.e., with relations of symmetry. In this material and in such forms the ideal as concrete spirituality does not admit of being realized. Hence, the reality, which is represented in them remains, contrasted with the Idea, as something external, which it has not penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an abstract relation.¹⁴⁹

From the proposition above, it is clear that architecture is particularly a fine art but has some different tasks than other fine arts because of its so-called dependence on material needs. Hence, the absolute spirit or in Hegel's terms 'concrete spirituality' cannot be fully sensed. Actually, the ideal of architecture according to Hegel is the so-called concrete spirituality that is set to be latent due to the materialism.

The notion of "expression of its time" as the duty or aim of architecture (or actually any other art) seems to be totally a superficial valuation because any medium of art may not express its time but can be an *objet d'art*.

¹⁴⁹ Reprinted in John Whiteman, "On Hegel's Definition of Architecture," in Assemblage,

Scruton's critics towards the Hegelian inspired *Kunstgeschichte*¹⁵⁰ depicting the cruciality of the "phenomena of history" can be realized within his emphasis on the question that appreciation of architecture exists long before the Hegelian approach historical view of art. He indicates:

Nevertheless, the Hegelian theory has been used as the sole basis for aesthetic judgment by many recent critics. Its aesthetic implications, therefore, are largely taken for granted. Of course, no-one doubts that men understood and appreciated architecture long before they fell under the spell of Hegel, indeed, long before it was possible to take an 'historical' view of art.¹⁵¹

Hegel's impact on philosophy of aesthetics can be seen through the works of some key Hegelian thinkers on aesthetics such as Burckhardt, Wölfflin, Frankl, Giedion and Pevsner. The supremacy of Hegel and his works over these art historians and theoreticians are obvious in terms of their appreciation of the a priori terms proposed by Hegel. The legacy of Hegel may be judged or criticized because of its notion of holism however; as Hegel is the last of a generation of great philosophers accompanied with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Descartes, his emphasis on the notion of history as a dialectical being can be quite crucial in terms of aesthetics. The dialectical approach of Hegel in order to understand the history may be the most crucial attempt of Hegel or it may be crucial because of the followers of the Hegel i.e. Left-Hegelians such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

The Hegelian *Kunstgeschichte* of Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) depicts a transformational process in history. This transformation takes place from a totalistic formulation to an individualistic vision. Burckhardt's admiration for the Renaissance made him actually the discoverer of the age of the Renaissance. As Giedion insists, "he first showed how a period should be treated in its entirety, with regard not only for its painting, sculpture and architecture, but for the social institutions of its daily life as well."¹⁵² This notion of Burckhardt maintains a historic judgment depicting a relative value in terms of judging a work of art. Such an approach may be in the name of

no.2, 1987, pg.7.

¹⁵⁰ *Kunstgeschichte* is a German term that literally means "the history of art".

¹⁵¹ Op.Cit.Scruton (1979).pg.53.

¹⁵² Siegfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, pg. 3.

objectivity. Regarding to the necessity and difficulty of such a holistic vision, he wrote:

To each eye, perhaps, the outlines of a given civilization present a different picture; and in treating of a civilization which is the mother of our own, and whose influence is still at work among us, it is unavoidable that individual judgment and feeling should tell every moment both on the writer and on the reader. In the wide ocean upon which we venture, the possible ways and directions are many; and the same studies which have served for this work might easily, in other hands, not only receive a wholly different treatment and application, but lead also to essentially different conclusions. Such indeed is the importance of the subject that it still calls for fresh investigation, and may be studied with advantage from the most varied points of view.

Meanwhile we are content if a patient hearing is granted us, and if this book be taken and judged as a whole. It is the most serious difficulty of the history of civilization that a great intellectual process must be broken up into single, and often into what seem arbitrary categories in order to be in any way intelligible. It was formerly our intention to fill up the gaps in this book by a special work on the 'Art of the Renaissance'--an intention, however, which we have been able to fulfill only in part.

As Scruton asserts, “[f]or the advocate of *Kunstgeschichte*, architecture is one among many cultural products, which has its own means of conveying a significance, but no unique or peculiar significance to convey.”¹⁵³ The depiction of non-autonomy of architecture is apparent here in terms of the realization of architecture as one among many cultural products. The *Kunstgeschichte* notion “become an established orthodoxy of English and American architectural scholarship, and while the Hegelian philosophy of history has been frequently attacked, in particular by Popper, it is only very recently that its consequences for the history of art and architecture have been critically examined.”¹⁵⁴ The Hegelian sense may be seen as a restrictive formulation depicting a value to architecture only in terms of being harmonious with the *Lebensgefühl* and this notion inevitably leads to a conceptualization that “the attempt to build in the style of some other age will be necessarily unsuccessful; even thoroughly immoral.”¹⁵⁵ This notion can be traced in the rhetoric of the Hegelian art historians from Burckhardt to Frankl and their predecessors Giedion and Pevsner. As Scruton indicates, “[t]his is

¹⁵³ Op. cit., Scruton (1979), pg.54.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., pg.53.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., pg.55.

the most widely held of all the critical judgments which the Hegelian vision has manufactured, appearing in Giedion's defense of the forms of the modern man, and in Pevsner's influential attack on the desire (experienced as it happens by almost every serious architect from the Greeks to the Edwardians) to build in the style of some preceding age."¹⁵⁶

Works of art speak to us as all buildings do, and yet there is difference insisted on by Ruskin and Pevsner: architecture must be thought both in relation to and also in opposition to all merely functional building.

With the suggestion that a building becomes a work of art when designed as an idealizing self-representation we seem to have left behind Pevsner's remark that what distinguishes architecture from mere building is that "it is designed with a view to aesthetic appeal."

Nelson Goodman mentioned Schopenhauer's notion of aesthetics of architecture in his 1985 essay 'How Buildings Mean':

Arthur Schopenhauer ranked the several arts in a hierarchy, with literary and dramatic arts at the top, music soaring in a separate even higher heaven, and architecture sinking to the ground under the weight of beams and bricks and mortar. The governing principle seems to be some measure of spirituality, with architecture ranking lowest by vice of being grossly material.¹⁵⁷

The problematic dichotomy - spirituality and materiality - in architecture seems to be the underlying principle in Schopenhauer's exclusion of architecture. However, if the governing principle is some measure of spirituality then actually there is no obligation of having spiritual features whether in literature or dramatic arts. Actually; if it is the obligatory or inevitable materialism that causes the negation of Schopenhauer on architecture, then one should keep in mind that this materialism might also be the pre-requisite of spirituality in architecture. The architectonic features of architecture cannot be excluded from the aesthetic features of architecture. Although Schopenhauer's approach is similar with the one by Hegel in terms of its integral character, Schopenhauer may differ with his radical exclusion of architecture. The notion of Schopenhauer can be evaluated as a romantic

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pg.55.

¹⁵⁷ Nelson Goodman, 'How Buildings Mean', Critical Inquiry, Vol. 11, No. 4. (Jun., 1985), pg.

approach because consideration architecture first as an art just like literature, music or dramatic arts then exclusion of it may be give rise to a misunderstanding of architecture. Nelson Goodman continues:

In comparing architecture with the other arts, what may first strike us, despite Schopenhauer, is a close affinity with music: architectural and musical works, unlike paintings or plays or novels, are seldom descriptive or representational. With some interesting exceptions, architectural works do not denote—that is, do not describe, recount, depict, or portray. They mean, if at all, in other ways.¹⁵⁸

The notion that architecture, like music, has generally no representative features can be a way to see architecture in limited terms. In addition, how can these interesting exceptions occur? If these exceptions may project a different kind of architecture, what should be the criterions that suggest this kind of notion? After all, it should be obvious that the degree of symbolism in architecture or music cannot be compared with paintings, novels or plays. Actually, there are some rare examples in music¹⁵⁹ aiming to denote something concretely. However, it should be noted that it is still not the same with architecture in terms of the architectonic and functionalist features of architecture. Music, from the pragmatic point of view, may have no crucial aim to exist but even the utopian architecture should have a basis for functional approach in order to exist. The reactions or the basis in architecture may denote unintentionally different from music.

The question may now be put: Do we live at present in an enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of enlightenment. Much still prevents men from being placed in a position or even being placed into position to use their own minds securely and well in matters of religion. But we do have very definite indications that this field of endeavor is being opened up for men to work freely and reduce

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¹⁵⁸ Ibid,pg.642.

¹⁵⁹ One of the early examples of this approach is 'Symphonic Poem' manifested by Franz Liszt. Actually, it is a form of 'Program Music' intended to evoke extra-musical ideas, images in the mind of the listener by musically representing a scene, image or mood. By contrast, absolute music stands for itself and is intended to be appreciated without any particular reference to the outside world. The term is almost exclusively applied to works in the European classical music tradition, particularly those from the Romantic music period of the 19th century, during which the concept was popular, but pieces, which fit the description, have long been a part of music. The term is usually reserved for purely instrumental works (pieces without singers and lyrics), and not used, for example for Opera or Lieder. (Source:

gradually the hindrances preventing a general enlightenment and an escape from self-caused immaturity. In this sense, this age is the age of enlightenment and the age of Frederick (the Great)[Frederick II of Prussia].

“What is Enlightenment?,” Immanuel Kant

If it may be possible to follow Wittgenstein as he mentions that the nature of architecture and philosophy resemble each other in terms of the principles initiated while performing philosophy and architecture, it may be argued that Kant was the first to emphasize on the philosophical / architectural aesthetics. However, “like all such generalizations the claim that philosophical aesthetics began with Kant is open to contention” as John Haldane insists.¹⁶⁰ Kant uses two terms in order to differentiate the modes of thinking and reasoning: analytic and synthetic. While analytic refers to the concepts, which can be discovered by just solely examining the concept itself, the synthetic propositions cannot be analyzed in that sense because they result from the experience of the world therefore they are subjective. Kant’s other distinction of propositions is based on perception. He argues that propositions can be labeled as empirical¹⁶¹ and *a priori* (see the Glossary). In this context, empirical refers to propositions depending on entirely on sense perception while *a priori* refers to propositions depending not on such sense perception because of their fundamental validity. Kant conceptualizes his philosophy called transcendentalism¹⁶² by merging synthetic and *a priori* propositions and declares that it is possible to make synthetic *a priori* judgments.¹⁶³ Kant argues that transcendentalism can be

"program music." Wikipedia. Wikipedia, 2005. Answers.com 08 Jan. 2007.
<http://www.answers.com/topic/program-music>

¹⁶⁰ John Haldane, “Form, meaning and value: a history of the philosophy of architecture,” in *Journal of Architecture*, Vol. 4, Spring 1999, pg. 14.

¹⁶¹ Empirical as the opposite of the term *a priori* can also be labeled as *a posteriori*.

¹⁶² Transcendentalism is a philosophy that emphasizes the *a priori* conditions of knowledge and experience or the unknowable character of ultimate reality or that emphasizes the transcendent as the fundamental reality

¹⁶³ The proposition “The house is black” can be given as an example of a synthetic judgment as it derives from the direct experience of the world. Kant’s concept is to comprehend this judgment as an *a priori* judgment meaning that it does not depend on sense perception. Wittgenstein mentions in his *Philosophical Remarks*:

“What I said earlier about the nature of arithmetical equations and about an equation’s not being replaceable by a tautology explains--I believe--what Kant means when he insists that $7 + 5 = 12$ is not an analytic proposition, but synthetic

applicable and reasonable because the objects of the material world are fundamentally unknowable; from the point of view of reason, they serve merely as the raw material from which sensations are formed. Objects of themselves have no existence, and space and time exist only as part of the mind, as “intuitions” by which perceptions are measured and judged.¹⁶⁴

Regarding to aesthetics, Kant’s aim was to “show how judgments of beauty could be subjective and yet assessable as correct or incorrect.”¹⁶⁵

The superimposition of Kant’s concepts on architecture may be evaluated as a pattern to distinguish between architectural theory and architectural aesthetics. The aesthetic notion of Kant on architecture derives its originality from its breakaway from naturalistic (or idealist) point of view and manifestation of rather an in-between position emphasizing on the equilibrium of aesthetics and function. Kant mentions:

To plastic art, as the first kind of formative fine art, belong sculpture and architecture. The first is that which presents concepts of things corporeally, as they might exist in nature (though as fine art it directs its attention to aesthetic finality). The second is the art of presenting concepts of things which are possible only through art, and the determining ground of whose form is not nature but an arbitrary end—and of presenting them both with a view to this purpose and yet, at the same time, with aesthetic finality. In architecture the chief point is a certain use of the artistic object to which, as the condition, the aesthetic ideas are limited. In sculpture the mere expression of aesthetic ideas is the main intention. Thus statues of men, gods, animals, etc., belong to sculpture; but temples, splendid buildings for public concourse, or even dwelling-houses, triumphal arches, columns, mausoleums, etc., erected as monuments, belong to architecture, and in fact all household furniture (the work of cabinetmakers, and so forth—things meant to be used) may be added to the list, on the ground that adaptation of the product to a particular use is the essential element in a work of architecture. On the other hand, a mere piece of sculpture, made simply to be looked at and intended to please on its own account, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of nature, though one in which regard is paid to aesthetic ideas, and in which, therefore, sensuous truth should not go the length of losing the appearance of being an art and a product of the elective will.¹⁶⁶

a priori.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. by Rush Rhees and tr. by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pg. 129.)

¹⁶⁴ Encarta Encyclopedia

¹⁶⁵ Op. Cit., Haldane, pg. 14.

¹⁶⁶ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*, Kessinger Publishing, Montana, 2004, pp.135-136.

Kant's distinction between the art of sculpture and the art of architecture in terms of their condition of existence can be regarded so crucial as it defines what architectural aesthetic is restricted with and what it projects.

As John Rachman indicates, “[i]n Kant’s aesthetic, architecture is the lowest, the last of beau of the beaux arts because the most constrained, the most tied to money and ‘interests’; in it genius is fettered, unable to create “purely” or “freely,” that is, on its own, from itself.”¹⁶⁷ This notion may lead to a crucial distinction of beauty by Kant as “free” and “independent”. The realization of such a notion may deter to grasp architecture as [true]; however, Kant seems to ignore the definition of such a [true] architecture as well although he admits that architecture is only possible through art. The obligation of “a certain use” in architecture leads to reduction of architecture as the last of beau of the beaux-arts; however, the question of how function should be understood is a crucial question in terms of the comprehension of architectural aesthetic that Kant dictates.

3.1.1.2 Visions and Dissertations of Viollet-le-Duc, J. Ruskin and R. Steiner




Figure 3-1: Cénotaphe a Newton, Boullée, 1784

¹⁶⁷ John Rachman, Constructions, MIT Press, Massachussets, 1998, pg.4.



Figure 3-2: Conservative thirteenth century Gothic in Provence: Basilica of Mary Magdalene, Saint Maximin la Sainte Baume.

According to M. F. Hearn:

His (Viollet-le-Duc's) explanation of Gothic architecture began with the assumption that the urge to construct high vaults had been the generating imperative. His interpretation of the statics of the high vault convinced him that the pointed arch and the diagonal arch rib had been adopted together by Gothic builders in order to facilitate the covering of rectangular and odd-shaped spaces, rather than just squares, and to guide the unavoidable lateral pressures to the corners of the vaults, where they were received by the walls. Such an ordering of vaults implied a supporting structure composed of a series of isolated points rather than a continuous mass of masonry, hence the emergence of a highly articulated bay system. Even so, the lateral pressures of vaults necessitated external resistance, arranged perpendicular to the wall, resulting in the development of the flying buttress. Because the intervals between vertical supports were thereby relieved of a load-bearing function, they could be reduced to a series of arches that connected the supports, thus permitting the evolution of a skeletal structure. The coordinated formulation of moldings on the arches and of the shafts on the supports was intended to make the composition intelligible as structure and, indeed, to serve in part as actual structure. Consequently, both the ensemble of functional elements and the decorative features – such as blind arcades on aisle walls and bar tracery in the windows – served a functional purpose. The beauty of Gothic Architecture, then, was the result of a systematically rational approach to building rather than of aesthetic or iconographical considerations. It is ironic that a subject that inspired so much romantic sentiment in other evoked such a cerebral response from Viollet-le-Duc. Yet it was this response that awakened the visionary in him, which showed itself in his ideas about modern architecture. ¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ M. F. Hearn (ed.). *The Architectural Theory of Viollet-le-Duc: Readings and Commentary*, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1995 third printing, pg.8.

As it is a general acceptance that the notion of Gothic is quite transcendental rather than trying to be functionalistic. The feeling aroused from a Gothic structure is embedded in its transcendentality. However, at first it seems quite contradictory to grasp the interpretation of Viollet-le-Duc as he suggests that the beauty or the impression of Gothic structures does not originate from their aesthetic features but on the contrary from a systematically rational approach which can be summarized as 'functionalism' in a narrow sense.

The interpretation of Viollet-le-Duc may be relevant with Scruton's view on the essence of a functionalist approach. He indicates:

The sculptural view of architecture involves the mistaken idea that one can somehow judge the beauty of a thing in abstracto, without knowing what kind of thing it is; as though I could present you with an object that might be a stone, a sculpture, a box, a fruit or even an animal, and expect you to tell me whether it is beautiful before knowing what it is. In general we might say – in partial opposition to a certain tradition in aesthetics (the tradition which finds expression in eighteenth century empiricism, and more emphatically in Kant) – that our sense of beauty of an object is always dependent on a conception of that object, just as our sense of the beauty of a human figure dependent on a conception of that figure.

The functionalist (or rational) view of Viollet-le-Duc should be understood in a wider sense in which the aesthetic or transcendental features are sub-category of that rational approach. On the other hand, from a different point of view, for Viollet-le-Duc the essence of a building lies in its holistic quality. For him, the art of designing was ultimately a rational activity in which beauty is largely a by-product.¹⁶⁹

In this sense, functionalism is quite different from the meaning of 'functionalism' in modern movement. As Scruton asserts:

Functionalism can be seen, then, as part of an attempt to reassert architectural against sculptural values. As such it has sought to extend its explanatory powers through more subtle, and more vague, presuppositions. We are told that in architecture form 'follows', 'expresses' or 'embodies' function, ideas associated with Viollet-le-Duc, with the American pragmatism of Sullivan, and with certain aspects of the modern movement.¹⁷⁰

169 Op.cit., pg.12.

170 Op.cit. Scruton (1979). pg. 10.

As Viollet-le-Duc is one of the pioneer theorists of modern movement in which functionalism is a crucial subject, it may be relevant to grasp the view of Viollet-le-Duc's on the essence of architecture.

According to Viollet-le-Duc, there are three models of key importance in the history of architecture: The Greek Doric Temple, the complex structures of the imperial Romans, and the Gothic Cathedrals of the medieval France. In his sense, the Doric Temple is a sublimely rational approach to the formulation of structure.¹⁷¹ The term 'sublimely rational approach' may be realized as a summary of Viollet-le-Duc's approach. The notion may seem at first quite contradictory as sublimity reveals something transcendental or metaphysical. However, the holistic duet of sublimation with rationality turns the notion into a different level at which the metaphysical approach should be also in rational terms.

Viollet-le-Duc's emphasis on the architecture of Greek and Gothic period is probably an expression of his admiration towards their ability to represent or show the *zeitgeist* or aura of their period. Actually, it may be better understood by analyzing the two metaphors, which was so crucial for Viollet-le-Duc to define the [true] architecture. These are "the machine and technology on the one hand and the natural organism and biology on the other."¹⁷² Viollet-le-Duc admires the architecture of these two periods because of their natural approach and rationalism. The so-called resemblance of Gothic structures to the natural objects such as trees or even human body makes Viollet-le-Duc's point of view as an admiration of natural symbolism in architecture. The notion of gesture in the resemblance of architecture with a human body or any other living creature can be seen as a humanist and a utopian approach as it emphasizes on the abstract and non-ephemeral side of architecture. The natural approach can be understood in a way that Wittgenstein describes it as the prerequisite of [true] architecture. The way Wittgenstein uses the term 'gesture' is quite similar to the natural approach of Viollet-le-Duc.

¹⁷¹ Quoted in Op. Cit. Hearn. Pg.8.

¹⁷² Op. Cit. Hearn. Pg.219.



Figure 3-3: Reims Cathedral, France



Figure 3-4: Notre Dame Cathedral, France

All beauty is founded on the laws of the natural forms.¹⁷³

[...], in the outset of the preceding Chapter, that the value of architecture depended on two distinct characters: the one, the impression it receives from human power; the other, the image it bears of the natural creation.¹⁷⁴

Ruskin's vision of architecture can be esteemed as a synthesis of function and aesthetics, which are requisites for him for the art of architecture. In his own words, "[a]rchitecture is the art, which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man for whatsoever uses, that the sight of them may contribute to his mental health, power, and pleasure."¹⁷⁵ Disposition referring to architectonic and adornment referring to aesthetics are the key concepts of Ruskin regarding his notion of architecture. The notion of utilitarianism can be straightforwardly felt as Ruskin initially emphasizes on the both physical and spiritual requirements of human beings. The dimension of adornment is based upon a naturalistic point of view meaning that the canons of natural forms determine the notion of beauty. Therefore, according to Ruskin, the disposition and adornment should be handled similar as the amalgamation of body and soul. As Kristine Ottesen Garrigan insists, "[I]t is this larger view that constitutes one of Ruskin's great legacies to modern architecture – his bringing, as he himself asserted, 'everything to a root in human passion or human hope.'¹⁷⁶ It can be argued that whether Ruskin's notion of this sort of humanistic utilitarianism was faithfully obeyed during Modern Era or not can be a tricky question as the criticisms towards Modern Architecture were mainly based on this issue. Regarding the functionalism that Ruskin adopted; Garrigan adds, "[a]rchitecture must minister to man's mind and soul, not simply to his body. This is the idea I have referred to previously as Ruskin's "visual

¹⁷³ John Ruskin, Seven Lamps of Architecture. ElecBook, London, 2001, pg. 143.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/metu/Doc?id=2001607&ppg=142>

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. pg.145.

¹⁷⁵ From Seven Lamps of Architecture. Reprinted in Kristine Ottesen Garrigan, Ruskin on Architecture, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973, pg.157.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pg.156.

functionalism,” but perhaps “spiritual functionalism” would be a better phase.”¹⁷⁷

Ruskin's emphasis on the necessity of relying upon man's nature instead of his knowledge can be seen as a religious point of view in terms of his rejection of knowledge or in general 'empiricism'. What can be said about the difference in the process of immortalization / glorification in terms of relying upon man's nature instead of his knowledge? Probably, it is the recurrence of Platonic ideas and it already seems natural as a metaphor of Holism. As the nature is an evidence of this microcosm/macrocosm entity, it is possible to argue that the nature is more than the sum of its parts. This holistic point of view is surely needed to be grasped in order to understand how immortalization/glorification is perceived. Immortalization and Glorification, therefore, can be estimated as a process in which nature is a crucial phenomenon. The point of view, which dictates that any resemblance with nature is a way of immortalization and glorification, can be traced in every forms of art including architecture. Ruskin's admiration of Gothic Architecture can be rooted in the fact that Gothic architecture realized the importance of nature as an instrument that can be used in architecture. However; this should not be the only reason for Ruskin to see Gothic Architecture as the summit of architectural experience. Gothic art is surely an imitation of nature by means of craftsmanship but Ruskin's way of seeing it not as a pure imitation of nature but as a relatively poetic and occult way of building assures that the essential function of Gothic Architecture (in general terms) is summarized as the immortalization and glorification of *something*. The relation of being in a state of beauty and the process of immortalization and glorification is quite crucial in terms of aphorisms by Ruskin.

Furthermore, Ruskin emphasized that, “[a]rchitecture is the most political of the arts, in that it imposes a vision of man and his aims independently of any personal agreement on the part of those who live with it.”¹⁷⁸ In his own words, Ruskin asserts:

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 156-157.

¹⁷⁸ Op. Cit, Scruton (1979), pg.15.

What is true of human polity seems to me not less so of the distinctively political art of Architecture. I have long felt convinced of the necessity, in order to its progress, of some determined effort to extricate from the confused mass of partial traditions and dogmata with which it has become encumbered during imperfect or restricted practice, those large principles of right which are applicable to every stage and style of it. Uniting the technical and imaginative elements as essentially as humanity does soul and body, it shows the same infirmly balanced liability to the prevalence of the lower part over the higher, to the interference of the constructive, with the purity and simplicity of the reflective, element. This tendency, like every other form of materialism, is increasing with the advance of the age; and the only laws which resist it, based upon partial precedents, and already regarded with disrespect as decrepit, if not with defiance as tyrannical, are evidently inapplicable to the new forms and functions of the art, which the necessities of the day demand. How many these necessities may become, cannot be conjectured; they rise, strange and impatient, out of every modern shadow of change. How far it may be possible to meet them without a sacrifice of the essential characters of architectural art, cannot be determined by specific calculation or observance. There is no law, no principle, based on past practice, which may not be overthrown in a moment, by the arising of a new condition, or the invention of a new material; and the most rational, if not the only, mode of averting the danger of an utter dissolution of all that is systematic and consistent in our practice, or of ancient authority in our judgment, is to cease, for a little while, our endeavours to deal with the multiplying host of particular abuses, restraints, or requirements; and endeavour to determine, as the guides of every effort, some constant, general, and irrefragable laws of right— laws, which based upon man's nature, not upon his knowledge, may possess so far the unchangeableness of the one, as that neither the increase nor imperfection of the other may be able to assault or invalidate them.¹⁷⁹

At this point, the notion of “gesture” can be taken into consideration here as the term “gesture” implies not only a humanistic vision but also a social vision, that is to say, architecture corresponds with its gestural features. If Ruskin's opposition towards the fundamentals and the consequences of Industrial Revolution can be seen from this gestural point of view, it may be regarded more substantially.

Steiner, Rudolf (1861-1925) is an Austrian philosopher and scientist, who founded a spiritual movement he named anthroposophy.¹⁸⁰ He believed that the spiritual world is accessible to the properly developed intellect; the term anthroposophy implies “knowledge produced by the higher self in

¹⁷⁹ Op. cit., Ruskin (2001), pg.

¹⁸⁰ Anthroposophy is a kind of philosophy which explains the world in terms of man's spiritual nature (based on the teachings of Rudolph Steiner)

man.”¹⁸¹ However, according to Steiner materialism due to Industrial Revolution prevents the outcome of the innate spiritual capacity of the individuals.

In his own saying, “[a]rchitecture is the art of creating an enveloping, enclosed space, with the help of a variety of materials and by means of various shapes and forms, either for ordinary activities and dwellings for religious purposes. Therefore, it is connected with the soul life of human beings. It originates from the soul, and it can be comprehended to the extent that the soul can be comprehended.”¹⁸² Steiner’s human-based approach is to be understood as a radical shift from the mainstream Modern Movement as neither of their goal is to understand architecture in mystical and occult terms. Therefore, it may be argued that “the tendency to seek out a unifying *Zeitgeist* at the core of modern culture left [him] looking for a single ‘true’ modern style.”¹⁸³ The occultism representing the core of Steiner’s architecture can be regarded as a highly anti-modern attitude and does not give much clue about some crucial notions of mainstream modern movement as “rational design” or “function”. The exclusion of Steiner from this unifying *Zeitgeist* may be due to his resistance on emphasizing the soul life of human beings rather than their material life. That is probably why “functionalist abnegations” of Hannes Meyer found a place in this *Zeitgeist* but the “mystical extravagances” of Steiner did not.¹⁸⁴ The approach of Steiner can be regarded as extravagant when compared with pure materialist Hannes Meyer, however from a mystical point of view he may be regarded as “functionalist” or “rationalist” indeed. As he argued:

I said just now that architecture was closely connected with the soul life of human beings. This naturally leads us to enquire whether architecture might not therefore also be connected with the evolution of soul life just described. If this were the case, would not the sequence of the shapes and forms in

¹⁸¹ “Rudolf Steiner” in Encarta Encyclopedia

¹⁸² From a lecture entitled “The Task of Modern Art and Architecture As Shown by a historical study of temple of architecture and the accompanying development of the human soul” given in Berlin, 5 February 1913. Reprinted in Rudolf Steiner, Architecture as a Synthesis of the Arts, Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1999, pg. 22.

¹⁸³ Op. cit., Curtis (1999), pg. 289.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., pg. 373.

architecture reveal characteristics that are in some way linked with the development of sentient body, sentient soul and so on?¹⁸⁵

The mutual connection of architecture with these spiritual features seems to derive not from the fundamentals of modern times but on the contrary, from the fundamentals of ancient times that seems timeless and transcendental in some terms. Regarding to his architectural achievements as a sequel of ancient temples he insisted, “[i]n a sense our intention is to build a temple that is also to be a place of teaching, as were the ancient temples of the Mysteries. Buildings erected to enshrine what human beings have held most sacred have always been known as temples.”¹⁸⁶ The illusion that Steiner executed with these so-called extravagances maintained rather a radical standpoint against the ephemeral arguments of modern architecture.

3.2 Architecture as an Apparatus

The timeless character of building is as much a part of nature as the character of rivers, trees, hills, flames and stars.¹⁸⁷



Figure 3-5: Reims Cathedral, France

¹⁸⁵ Op. cit., Steiner (1999), pg.24.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pg. 4.

¹⁸⁷ Christopher Alexander, The Timeless way of Building, Oxford University Press, New York, 1979, pg. 528.

“Architecture as an Apparatus” reveals that architecture cannot exist unless it purports to be an apparatus. In a clearer sense, there has to be a distinction between attempts of immortalization/glorification and the attempts of pure architectonic features. Without an intentional critic of architecture, one may not grasp the difference between these, as there can be an accompanying text or philosophical background for these [true] architectures. The accompanying notion (or structure) is so crucial in terms of a realistic consideration. The difference between “architecture as an apparatus” and “architecture as an apparatus of immortalization/glorification” can also shed a light on a better realization of the terms “apparatus” and “immortalization/glorification”.



Figure 3-6: Stonehenge, Salisbury, England, 3000 BC

The restrictions that can be experienced within architecture ensure that architecture is probably an utopist proposal and intervention, of which only some parts can be turned in reality. The general vision which emphasizes the tectonic side of architecture is surely a modernist view, however if modernism ensures a sort of rationality within architecture, it is probably an interpretation, not an *a priori* statement. As Gregotti puts it “[n]o distinction can be made between architectural monument and the specific

morphological quality of architecture.”¹⁸⁸ What is the overall essence of architecture, then? If it just depends on its function then a building needs a certain amount of time through history in order to show its quality.

Architectural monumentality can be another field for the estimation of quality of the architecture. Monumentality demands a broader view in which not only architecture plays an important role, but also other supplementary fields such as religion, philosophy and aesthetics have an impact. Monumentality can be established as the philosophical force behind the material world of architecture. Did architecture lose its transformative power by losing its poetic significance or in other terms, its power of “glorification” and “immortalization” can be a crucial question. However, it can be suggested that the immortalization/glorification power of architecture shows that architecture provokes no autonomy because it is not the architectonic quality of architecture but its aesthetic quality that ensures the legality of architecture.



Figure 3-7: Interior, *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

The question of intention can be an important point here, as it decides whether a building is “a good architecture” or “a monument” (or whether it

¹⁸⁸ Vittorio Gregotti, *Inside Architecture*, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1996, pg.61.

has the “characteristics of good architecture” or shows “monumentality”). Whether it is a good architecture or a monument, there is still a contradistinction between architecture and monumentality. As Gregotti puts generally, “When a monument becomes the content of artistic practice, subject to critical self-questioning, much of its monumental nature is denied because that nature comes from tradition. From this point of view an unresolved conflict in fact exists between monument and modernity.”¹⁸⁹

3.2.1 The Embodiment of Being an Apparatus in Architecture

The embodiment of being an apparatus in architecture is the rhetoric of architect’s intention towards a manifestation of himself/herself. The embodiment occurs, according to Wittgenstein, when a building responds with a gesture. Such an embodiment occurs only if there is a concrete building not paper architecture. Realization of this embodiment by the society can be also a gesture in terms of a dual interaction between a building and the society. The conscious of society in terms of the apparatus-ship of architecture can be another crucial issue due to the fact that this process of immortalization/glorification depends on social interaction. During the social interaction, a building acts as a social actor in terms of its efficiency. This kind of efficiency may be reflected upon another field such as ideology. When a sort of “ideological superstructure” is in charge of, this sort of embodiment may be possible. Such a projection can be held within different ideologies and in terms of architecture, it may be crucial to notice that these sort of versatilities reflect immediately upon architecture. Such terms as “utilitarian” and “formalist” used in order to define architectural approaches may also be used in order to define the ideologies themselves. El Lissitzky’s notion of this embodiment is much more advanced as he manifests that this embodiment is the core of the art itself. He wrote, “[a]rt is

¹⁸⁹ Op. Cit., Gregotti. pg.61.

acknowledged in its capacity to order, organize and activate consciousness by charging it with emotional energy.”¹⁹⁰

3.2.2 The Variations of Being an Apparatus in Architecture

3.2.2.1 Aesthetic View

As B. R. Tilghman indicates, “[a]rchitecture is said to begin with the simple necessity of providing shelter, but eventually adorns and beautifies itself to the extent that it can be placed, honorifically, beside the fine arts.”¹⁹¹ Although, “...we must remember that the term “aesthetic” was not coined until more than a century after Sir Henry Wotton wrote about architecture,”¹⁹² there were former intentional aesthetic approaches to architecture. Actually, it may be hard to define the process in this way. To begin with, it could be problematic to find out from where these aesthetic intentions derived. If what makes architecture an art is this intention of beautifying; then the realm of beautifying should be stressed in order to understand the status of architecture first as a craft then as an art. The reification of aesthetic dimension of architecture due to its beautifying features can also be misleading because of the existing differences between other arts and architecture.

Architecture with its entire elements may suggest an integral approach in order to have a full understanding of architecture. The Holistic approach designed for a full understanding of architecture and its impact can be a reliable way, as it demands a quasi-realistic and quasi-critical approach. The Gestalt Theory suggests that the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts. In order to understand architecture as an apparatus of immortalization/glorification, Gestalt Entity may provide a critical point of view. Because the realization of the fact that the analysis of each singular

¹⁹⁰ El Lissitzky, “Ideological Superstructure,” in Ulrich Conrads (ed.), Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999,pg.122.

¹⁹¹ Op. cit., Tilghman. pg.52.

part of architecture may not be enough to understand the core of architectural immortalization/glorification. It can be argued that immortalization/glorification can only be realized within an integral analysis arising from Gestalt Entity. The advantage of Holistic approach can be the guiding principle of it that may provide a multi-dimensional point of view. In this context, architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification is the input of Gestalt Entity and the output should be the integral (or holistic) understanding of [true] architecture.

3.2.2.2 Philosophical View



Figure 3-8: Upper Windows, *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

Architecture demands a rather individualistic approach in order to define an autonomous field on behalf of its emancipation. On behalf of emancipation from the so-called tectonic restrictions, architecture should transform itself into a philosophical process (or technique). Actually there can be a dichotomy while realizing architecture as a philosophical issue. The first may

¹⁹² Ibid., pg.51.

be the resemblance of architectural design and philosophical thinking. The second one is quite different from the first one as at this point philosophy may play a role in architecture as a means. For instance, the notion that *Kundmannngasse* and *Tractatus* may share some common points means that there may be some traces of *Tractatus* in *Kundmannngasse*. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that Wittgenstein followed the same route while designing *Kundmannngasse* and writing *Tractatus*. Actually, this notion arises from the fact that the need for writing a philosophical work such as *Tractatus* is not same with designing an architectural work such as *Kundmannngasse*. Another thing that has to be mentioned here is the fact that although there were no traces of *Tractatus* or any other philosophical work, one may still think that there has to be a connection between *Kundmannngasse* and *Tractatus*.

The first notion of architecture as a philosophical issue is the process that may occur both in architecture and in philosophy. At this point, philosophy seems the dominant one, as the process in philosophical thinking cannot be technical or pragmatist in any terms because of its nature. Actually, the attempt to resemble the architectural process to philosophical thinking can be a way to criticize the pragmatist (or rational or even functional) side of architecture. It should be born in mind that the critics of modernism (or the born of post-modernism) relied heavily on the pragmatist version of architecture.

The process both in architecture and in philosophy may have a core origin, as both of them are the realization of creation. Realization of creation is the overall aim of both philosophy and architecture. The mention of their core aim can be a way to understand their process better. Whether architecture nowadays have the notion that it is the function and therefore the economy that is important. The fact that the nature of architectural creation should be resemble with philosophy in order to shed a light on the *Einfall* should be noted. A philosopher sustains himself with thinking and regarding a systematic success. In the same sense, an architect may sustain himself with designing and regarding an overall empathy. The resemblance of architecture and philosophy should not be noted as a utopia but on the

contrary as a necessity or a requisite. The overall effect of philosophy in architecture is like a latent force sustaining the structure. The amalgamation occurs between architecture and philosophy when an architect becomes a quasi-philosopher but not vice-versa.

The second notion of the architecture as a philosophical issue is the usage of philosophy in architecture as an apparatus. What makes a philosophical impact in architecture? There can be some spatial arrangements that may refer to philosophical impact. Therefore, spatial analysis is important in order to grasp whether there is a philosophical reference or not. In order to realize the philosophical impact embedded in a building, one should know its background. For instance, it should be crucial to know the philosophical works and their structures in order to realize the philosophical impact in *Kundmannngasse*. Although, the knowledge of the background is a requisite for such a realization of philosophical impact, sometimes it can be seen that these philosophical impacts can be (or should be) *a priori*. The notion that the interrogation of philosophical impacts is futile, so therefore *a priori*, should be seen from the transcendental point of view. It may be a view to suppose that architecture includes sublimation and glorification in religious terms. There becomes the metaphorical side of architecture that suggests a microcosm. There can be a suspect whether architecture includes sublimation or not. However, the sublimation occurs through the usage of an architectural work not with the creation process. Architecture as a metaphor of the sublime should always be born in mind as architecture always tries to have influence on something.

3.2.2.3 Religious View

The ritual point of architecture while serving as a technological apparatus seems like a contradiction; however it is important to distinguish the intersection points at which the architecture plays a social role – at least from a religious point of view. The cry of architecture can be heard at this point as a message to humanism, occultism, mysticism etc. for which spirituality is a key issue and the understanding in all aspects is troublesome. The troublesome in understanding the conception existing within a creation

process may occur even while insisting on the rationalistic approach that can be found within this process. Therefore, the emancipation of these thoughts from architectural creation process may turn the architecture into a pure art. If we distinguish art from any other conception by this definition ; “art is commonly understood to be the process or result of making material works (or artwork) which, from concept to creation, adhere to the "creative impulse"—that is, art is distinguished from other works by being in large part unprompted by necessity, by biological drive, or by any undisciplined pursuit of recreation”; then as it can be grasped from the definition that art itself is unique in terms of different acceptances. If one of these acceptances lacks then the originality of art, therefore the instinct behind it vanishes. Culture insists upon the absolute necessity of not emphasizing on one acceptance only. The restraint of any culture on any artistic creation process denies its responsibility on the whole process.

The religion is a cultural phenomenon in which there are so much possibilities and restrictions derived from the fatalist approach of religious faith. It seems as if religion embraces all kinds of architectural experiment as far as architecture itself is a phenomenon. However, if architecture can be understood within the scope of time, then architecture may embrace religion itself. Immortalization and glorification can not be understood in a narrow way in which they are only a representation of material world. The terms immortalization/glorification may only suggest religious connotations within certain point of views whereas it should not be in that way in order to understand their status in architecture.

The discourse on the reliability of the religious effects on architecture is the possible phenomenon on the issue of immortalization/glorification. Religion as a transcendentalism manifests a thematic aura full of abstract items and manifestoes, which may then be reflected by architecture. Religion invades a certain field of architecture in which the aesthetic and sculptural approach is in effect. The emancipation of architectural forms in the name of religion can be regarded as an obvious example of architecture as an apparatus of immortalization/glorification. The seminal tone apparent in ancient times pertaining to architecture can be regarded as a transcendental

issue full of symbolic references. The symbolism is not obvious in terms of its daily understanding but on the contrary rather latent in terms of the representational power of architecture. Architecture as a religious issue is itself a direct application of architecture as an apparatus of immortalization/glorification.

On behalf of a deeper understanding of architectural symbolism, it should be noted transcendental features are not only restricted with sacred places. The religion as a contemporary phenomenon may have versatile meanings and usages when compared with ancient times. The realization of the importance of religious features for the buildings of industrial period is probably more difficult than for the ancient buildings. The intention of religion differs greatly in the modern age and the restructuring of its hierarchies occurred. However, architecture as an apparatus could not be emancipated from religion due to the fact that religion still plays a leading role in the modern society. The level of traditional manifestations may decrease but the overall effect of unchangeable religion still stands. If the level discussion is restricted with the features between the two world wars, it can be argued that the usage of architecture as a religious issue arises transcendentalism rather than sublimation. For instance; such phrases as “[t]he business of Architecture is to establish emotional relationships by means of raw materials. Architecture goes beyond utilitarian needs. . . . The spirit of order, a unity of intention”¹⁹³ may be understood in relation with sublimation and it can also be argued that these treatises may suggest a certain level of religious penetration.

The attempts in order to ignore the distinction between architecture and sculpture were frequently seen in religious architecture (sacred architecture). These ‘inhabitable sculptures’ in André Bloc’s¹⁹⁴ term have the chance of being exempted from the so-called functional obligations. A gothic cathedral can be regarded as an ‘inhabitable sculpture’ rather than a regular

¹⁹³ Le Corbusier, “Towards a New Architecture: Guiding Principles,” in Op.cit., Conrads, pg.61.

¹⁹⁴ André Bloc (1896 - 1966) was a French architect, founder of the *Groupe Espace* in 1949.

structure. The notion of Roger Scruton to interpret the sculptural features is obviously worth to discuss:

If the building is really to be understood as a sculpture, then its excellence and beauty must depend upon such factors as the balance and expressiveness of the forms employed. Success can bear no significant relation either to the effectiveness of the sculpture as a place of habitation, or to the feelings, which are the natural consequence of living, eating and working in it, rather than strolling through it as one might through a private museum.¹⁹⁵

The Gothic Cathedrals seem at first relevant to the notion of Scruton. However, some radical opposition occurred on the behalf of the notion that Gothic Architecture can be regarded as a fully functionalist attempt. According to Viollet-le-Duc, Gothic sacred architecture is not focused on sculptural features but on the contrary solely functional and rational ideals. The opposition of Viollet-le-Duc to the so-called hedonistic comments about Gothic Architecture was a rational act for Le-Duc as the arising effect of Rationalism and the Enlightenment forced him to adopt Gothic Architecture. Probably, his designs combining Gothic features with Modern functions aroused from this adoption. The notion of sacredness and immortalization/glorification due to this sacredness cannot exist in such an attempt by Viollet-le-Duc because the function was also crucial in sacred architecture.




Figure 3-9: Design for a concert hall, Viollet-le-Duc, dated 1864, expressing Gothic principles in modern materials; brick, stone and cast iron. Entretiens sur l'architecture

¹⁹⁵ Op.cit., Scruton (1979), pp.8-9

3.2.2.4 Political View




Figure 3-10: A Proposal Model, Palace of Soviets

The question of whether architecture may serve ideologies and therefore political features or not can be a key question as it may shed light on a better analysis of what Wittgenstein had in mind while referring to immortalization/glorification in terms of architecture. Subsequent to an advanced analysis of the notion of Wittgenstein; it may be argued that Wittgenstein seems to take a stand in favor of “an architecture as a political act” but against “architecture as a political apparatus”. Because “the spirit of this civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music, of present day fascism & socialism, is a spirit that is alien and uncongenial to the Wittgenstein.



Figure 3-11: Reviewing Stand of the Zeppelin Field, Albert Speer, Nuremberg

As Diane Ghirardo insists, “[t]he fact that an architect has to alter some aspects of a design to accommodate the wishes of his patron is quite common.”¹⁹⁶ Yet, it seems that architecture as a political issue exceeds this sort of relationship between the architect and his/her patron. Architecture may propose a political stand in terms of an individualistic manifestation. As to whether architecture is an autonomous discipline or not; it may be assumed that if architecture itself is a “political act” instead of being a “political apparatus”, it can be regarded as an autonomous field. The question of how architecture projects ideology is generally understood as or reduced into a meaning of styles and this may lead to a conclusion that classicism itself in architecture manifests such an argument. However, the notion of such a conclusion may be in contradiction with the fact that it is not

¹⁹⁶ Diane Ghirardo, “Politics of a Masterpiece: The *Vicenda* of the Decoration of the Façade of the Casa del Fascio, Como, 1936-39,” in The Art Bulletin, Vol. LXII, Number 3, 1980,

obligatory for a building to be in classicist tone in terms of a historicist understanding in order to project a political expression. In this context, Casa del Fascio can be regarded as a synecdoche as it exemplifies this contradiction. The notion of being a synecdoche may give Casa del Fascio a prototype status of historicist-like modern buildings.



Figure 3-12: Casa del Fascio by G. Terragni, Como, 1936

3.2.2.5 Gestural View




Figure 3-13: Chartres Cathedral, Chartres, France, 1194-1260

The features of architecture that makes it a gesture is probably the demand of an aesthetic environment but maybe moreover a sensibility full of perfectionism. A gesture is to express an idea or emotion through bodily movements and therefore a resemblance of an architectural work to a living thing occurs. This occurrence may be realized in restricted terms, as a full resemblance of a building to a body can be somehow futile. Actually, there may be a difference between being a gesture and gesticulating. The building itself can be an instrument of gesture. However, as Wittgenstein suggests, the profession of architecture should be a gesture in terms of its entire social capacity as a social art. In this sense, it is not only limited with the buildings itself but the entire notion of architecture that reflects gesticulation. The architecture may share some sort of aim with literature for instance in terms of its spirituality. Actually, gesticulation may mean to be in harmony with something. In terms of architecture, gesticulation can be understood as being harmonious of a building with the rest. As Wijdeveld indicates:

Wittgenstein believed that if there was a unifying, centripetal force inherent in the culture of a given historical period, authenticity implied its expression

through the creative individual – this was what, in his eyes, made Fischer von Erlach's architecture so great during the flowering age of baroque.¹⁹⁷

This is the notion that makes the design of *Kundmannngasse* 'modern' but not 'New Architecture'. Besides, this fact may also explain why the Lenin's Tomb¹⁹⁸ is one of the favorite modern buildings of Wittgenstein. It may be argued that it is modern in terms of its approach towards its time. The Lenin's Tomb, for Wittgenstein, speaks the language of its time just like Parthenon or Pantheon.

¹⁹⁷ Op.cit.Wijdeveld.pg.157.

¹⁹⁸ Shortly after the death of Vladimir Ilich Lenin in 1924, and despite the opposition of his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Soviet leaders built a mausoleum on Moscow's Red Square to display his embalmed body. The architect Alexei V. Shchusev designed two temporary cube-shaped wooden structures and then a permanent red granite pyramid-like building that was completed in 1929. The top of the mausoleum held a tribune from which Soviet leaders addressed the public. This site became the ceremonial center of the Bolshevik state as Stalin and subsequent leaders appeared on the tribune to view parades on November 7, May 1, and other Soviet ceremonial occasions. When Josef V. Stalin died in 1953, his body was placed in the mausoleum next to Lenin's. In 1961, as Nikita Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's cult of personality intensified, Stalin's body was removed from the mausoleum and buried near the Kremlin wall. Lenin and his tomb, however, remained the quintessential symbols of Soviet legitimacy.

Because of Lenin's status as unrivaled leader of the Bolshevik Party, and because of Russian traditions of personifying political power, a personality cult glorifying Lenin began to develop even before his death. The Soviet leadership mobilized the legacy of Lenin after 1924 to establish its own legitimacy and gain support for the Communist Party. Recent scholarship has disproved the idea that it was Stalin who masterminded the idea of embalming Lenin, instead crediting such figures as Felix Dzerzhinsky, Leonid Krasin, Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, and Anatoly Lunacharsky. It has also been suggested that the cult grew out of popular Orthodox religious traditions and the philosophical belief of certain Bolshevik leaders in the deification of man and the resurrection of the dead through science. The archival sources underscore the contingency of the creation of the Lenin cult. They show that Dzerzhinsky and other Bolshevik leaders consciously manipulated popular sentiment about Lenin for utilitarian political goals. Yet this would not have created such a powerful political symbol if it had not been rooted in the spiritual, philosophical, and political culture of Soviet leaders and the Soviet people. More than a decade after the fall of communism, Lenin's Tomb continued to stand on Red Square even though there were periodic calls for his burial.

(Source: "Lenin's Tomb." Encyclopedia of Russian History. The Gale Group, Inc, 2004. Answers.com 21 Aug. 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/lenin-s-tomb-blog>)



Figure 3-14: Lenin's Tomb by Aleksey Shchusev 1924

The gesticulation of Lenin's tomb is apparent to Wittgenstein in terms of its harmony with its environment. St. Basil's is only a few steps away.

As gesture or gesticulation is a bodily feature, there should be a notion of correspondence between a human being and a building.



Figure 3-15: Kundmannngasse, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

CHAPTER 4

[TRUE] ARCHITECTURE OF THE ANGST PERIOD

There is a word we should refrain from using to describe contemporary architecture. This is the word “style.” The moment we fence architecture within a notion of “style,” we open the door to a formalistic approach. The contemporary movement is not a “style” ... it is an approach to life that slumbers unconsciously within all of us.¹⁹⁹

The *Angst* Period of 1919-1939 was a highly fruitful period full of construction besides its highly experimental character as the devastating war caused a catastrophe not only in social terms but also in physical terms. As William J. Curtis indicates, “[t]he 1920s in Europe, Russia and, to some degree, the United States was one of those rare periods in the history of architecture when new forms were created which seemed to overthrow previous styles and set a new, common basis for individual invention.”²⁰⁰ Actually, it was not only the overthrow of the previous styles, but rather dialectic of the old and the new. Therefore, the realization of the juxtapositions occurred may be regarded as a more important issue than the realization of the singular reactions.

The architectural movements active during the *angst* period were also highly versatile and rich in terms of their responses to social developments and indeed to industrialization. It may be insisted that these responses were crucial elements of their question of conceptualizing their [true] architecture. In some manners, these responses may be regarded to be seen in a higher position than the architecture itself while in some manners architecture was seen as a ether-like phenomenon present everywhere.

¹⁹⁹ Op. cit., Giedion, pg.xxxiii.

²⁰⁰ Op. Cit. Curtis, p. 163.

The evolution of the modern architecture during these two decades was rather in a dialectical tone. As Tafuri and Dal Co insisted in a critical tone, “[t]he main lines mapped out by the masters and the CIAM – the *Congres Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne* – were by no means the only vital ones in Europe of the 1920s and 1930s.”²⁰¹ The elements of the dialectics – for the authors – are Expressionism and Rigorism. Expressionism may be regarded as a critical response to the slaughter of the war and its ongoing aura. The machine-like style of the pre-war period was not congenial with Expressionism due to the fact that machine-like style was a symbol of war and its casualties.

Although the architectural responses were fundamentally the same throughout the continent, there were surely minor differences. In Germany, for instance, two opposing approaches - Expressionism and Rationalism - emerged until early 1930s. Expressionism was once a radical output of a strong opposition to machine aesthetic due to the war’s horrible slaughter. It purported to emphasize on the emotional and expressive side of architecture rather than a mechanistic and emotionless one. Rationalism (also known as *Neue Sachlichkeit*), on the contrary, purported to define architecture as a social act and creates designs addressing social and political problems. After the rise of the Nazi power, totalitarianism was inevitably the dominant factor for architecture. In Italy, the influence of Futurism of Pre-World War I continued between the wars until the totalitarianism of 1930s. Although it was not conservative or rigorist in any terms, Futurism purported a right wing ideology full of critical rhetoric towards eclectic styles. Because Futurism, as K. Frampton asserts, was “an impulse rather than a style.”²⁰² The impulse that Futurism projected was intended to be objective as it “had proclaimed itself as being fundamentally opposed to culture.”²⁰³ In Russia, the rhetoric differed in immense sense although the same ideology seemed to dominate the cultural life. It was not until 1932 that Russian architectural responses were delivered to be in a totalitarian tone.

²⁰¹ Manfredo Tafuri & Francesco Dal Co, 1976, *Modern Architecture/1*, Electa/Rizzoli, New York, p.142.

²⁰² Op. cit. Frampton (1980), p.85.

²⁰³ Ibid. p.85.

4.1 *Kundmannngasse, the Einfall*



Figure 4-1: Exterior, *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

In this section, Wittgenstein's architectural concepts occurred both in *Kundmannngasse* and in his theoretical works will be discussed with reference to other attempts of [true] architecture in order to define the status and probable uniqueness of such an attempt of Wittgenstein. The comprehension and perception of the uniqueness of his architecture and his propositions will not be the only aim of this text as the crucial factor is the (hypothetic) dialectic between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries. The architectural works chosen for this comparison are all from the "between the wars" period. Therefore, they are all contemporaries of *Kundmannngasse* and Wittgenstein. The works chosen should be esteemed as having features symbolizing the panorama of its architect's philosophy fairly good rather than just being a building. In this context, the work and the architect should be regarded as an amalgamation. The main purpose is to see Wittgenstein's concepts and *Kundmannngasse* in a dialectical tone within their contemporaries and realize

the concepts they proposed. To begin with, neither of the chosen works have the same background with *Kundmannngasse*. Probably, Goetheanum has a philosopher-architect at least. The notion that *Kundmannngasse* is unique in terms of its background is important due to the fact that it may not be impossible to achieve such an architectural concept without such a background. *Kundmannngasse* / Wittgenstein as *Einfall* maintain a vertical comparison in which it may be possible to decide whether *Kundmannngasse*, therefore the architectural treatises of Wittgenstein, has an alternative understanding of its period.




Figure 4-2: Floor-door detail, *Kundmannngasse*, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

It may be possible, therefore, to point out a reasonable but hypothetical relationship between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries and focus on the possible consequences of such a dialectical correspondence between Wittgenstein / *Kundmannngasse* and the rest. Such an attempt will be convenient with the notion that “Wittgenstein’s architecture is intended to be

and indeed must be read and understood in the language of architecture.”²⁰⁴ However, it will probably not be possible to discuss *Kundmannngasse* just in terms of architectural references. As Wittgenstein was not an architect such as Adolf Loos or Le Corbusier; it may be, therefore, hard or rather inadequate to read and understand Wittgenstein’s architecture in the language of architecture.

The lack of a dialectical relationship between Wittgenstein/*Kundmannngasse* and the other avant-garde approaches can have versatile roots. One of them can apparently be due to the “self-referential architecture”²⁰⁵ of Wittgenstein. Therefore, self-referentiality of Wittgenstein makes him and his work “independent of the *zeitgeist*.”²⁰⁶ Actually, it was previously regarded that it should be impossible to be “independent of the *zeitgeist*”. Wölfflin asserts the “necessity of expression of the *Lebensgefühl* of an epoch” as a crucial point for architecture.

[Architecture] is an expression of its time in so far as it reflects the corporeal essence of man and his particular habits of deportment and movement, it does not matter whether they are light and playful, or solemn and grave, or whether his attitude to life is agitated or calm; in a word, architecture expresses the ‘*Lebensgefühl*’ of an epoch.²⁰⁷

The self-referentiality of Wittgenstein’s architecture seems as if it is intentional and shows the open consciousness of Wittgenstein. As he openly declared his strong and obstinate opposition to the “the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization”, it can be rather obvious to understand why *Kundmannngasse* does not express the *Lebensgefühl* of an epoch in terms of Wölfflin. The reason why Wittgenstein/*Kundmannngasse* shares nothing common with this civilization is that “[t]he spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music in its fascism and socialism”.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ Op.cit.,Leitner(2000), p.10.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p.14.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p.14.

²⁰⁷ Quoted in Op.cit., Scruton (1979), pg.53.

²⁰⁸ Op. cit., Wittgenstein (1980), p.6e.



Figure 4-3: Kundmannngasse, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vienna, 1926-28

In the same sense: the house I built for Gretl is the product of a decidedly sensitive ear and good manners, an expression of great understanding (of a culture etc.). But primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the open – that is lacking. And so you could say it isn't healthy (Kierkegaard). (Hothouse Plant)²⁰⁹

Kundmannngasse / Wittgenstein as *Einfall* manifest rather a critical standpoint towards the mainstream modernism and therefore may play not only a crucial role as a specific alternative but also as a general alternative. *Kundmannngasse* as *Einfall* probably means something quite different from Wittgenstein's "renunciation of all form as pure negative image."²¹⁰ This sort of interpretation of *Kundmannngasse* may be due to lack of a holistic approach to *Kundmannngasse* / Wittgenstein. As Wittgenstein asserts, *Kundmannngasse* is regarded to be an expression of great understanding of a culture. However, it is quite true that Wittgenstein "sought a synthesis."²¹¹ It was probably a synthesis of his own intuitions rather than a mix of his contemporaries. Regarding to the identification of *Kundmannngasse* / Wittgenstein with the *tabula rasa*²¹² architecture of Loos; Tafuri and Dal Co indicates, "Loos was not able to construct the image that would convey that

²⁰⁹ Op. cit., Wittgenstein (1980), pg.43e.

²¹⁰ Op. cit., Tafuri & Dal Co, pg. 104.

²¹¹ Ibid., pg. 104.

²¹² Karl Kraus remarked: "The others are artists in a team; Loos is the architect of the *tabula rasa*." Reprinted in Ibid., pg. 104.

intuition; only Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the house he designed for his sister Margarethe in 1928 in Vienna, would come close to it. Where Loos made a radical separation, Wittgenstein sought a synthesis, though it represented only his own renunciation of all form as pure negative image.” However, Kraus’ vision of tabula rasa may indicate a more meaningful identification for *Kundmannngasse* / Wittgenstein in terms of their being a *Einfall*.

4.2 The Dialectics

4.2.1 “Charming in its Sobriety”: Adolf Loos/Villa Moller



Figure 4-4: Villa Moller, Adolf Loos, Vienna, 1927-28

The evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian objects.²¹³

The Villa Moller by Loos may probably be the closest and most familiar example to *Kundmannngasse* in terms of its austerity and modesty. As the general reaction of majorities towards *Kundmannngasse* is “It looks as if it is by Loos, but it cannot be by Loos”; the false and thoroughly incomprehensive reduction of both work into Viennese Modern can be best analyzed by a detailed comparison of both work in terms of their symbolic importance and their scope. Loos was no doubt a man of a time in which “ornament is abandoned.”²¹⁴ As Hubert Damisch articulates, “[t]he campaign waged by Loos against ornament (ornament, if not “the fine arts,” considered as crime), was a campaign that followed a calculation, a deliberate strategy.”²¹⁵ Ornament is abandoned in favor of “concentrating entirely on the erection of buildings that were finely shaped and charming in their sobriety.”²¹⁶ The meaning of “being finely shaped” is probably the metaphorical counterpart of “form follows function”; however “being charming in their sobriety” can be quite understood as a contradictory situation in which a building should be charming while being also sober. Sobriety as a means but not as an end is truly Wittgensteinian in terms of a radical output of Wittgenstein asserting, “Simplicity is the hallmark of truth”. Loos, on the other hand, demands a broader perspective from a modernist point of view and focuses on lifestyle principles that a modern life without any ornament will bring. In that sense, it seems that for Loos simplicity is an end instead of as a means. Although, aesthetics is in a sense ethics for Wittgenstein²¹⁷, Wittgensteinian approach seems aesthetic rather than purely ethical. Loos’ statement on the evil impact of ornament – as an antithetical of simplicity- may seem a misunderstanding of what ornament can be capable of in human evolution.

The enormous damage and devastation caused in aesthetic development by the revival of ornament would be easily made light of, for no one, not even

²¹³ Adolf Loos, “Ornament and Crime,” in op. cit., Conrads (ed.), pg. 20.

²¹⁴ From a remark of Louis Sullivan quoted in Op. cit., Conrads (ed.) p. 19.

²¹⁵ Hubert Damisch, “L’Autre “Ich,” L’Autriche - Austria, or the Desire for the Void: Toward a Tomb for Adolf Loos,” in Greyroom, vol.1, 2000, pg.32.

²¹⁶ From a remark of Louis Sullivan quoted in Ibid. p.19.

²¹⁷ Ethics is Aesthetics. Wittgenstein in Tractatus.

the power of the state, can halt mankind's evolution. It can only be delayed. We can wait. But it is a crime against the national economy that it should result in a waste of human labour, money, and material. Time cannot make good this damage.²¹⁸

Loos' awareness of his status as an icon of modern architect may result in a misunderstanding of the ethical features of modern architecture. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, "Ornament is Crime" can be altered to "Being Unaesthetic is Crime". However, the notion of Wittgenstein is ethical rather than purely aesthetic. The equation of aesthetics to ethics can be understood as a way to grasp aesthetics under the general title 'ethics'. Loos' restricted emancipation of the term 'ornament' was strongly opposed by Wittgenstein due to the fact that Wittgenstein's notion of aesthetics is not restricted with the annihilation of ornament. It seems as if the ornament for Loos is a formal phenomenon but for Wittgenstein it is rather a personal, therefore behavioral phenomenon. The difference of attitudes between them can be easily and apparently felt when their inner design attitudes are compared. As it is strongly stressed, Wittgenstein's genius in *Kundmannngasse* is felt in interior rather in exterior. The interiors of Loos can harshly be criticized for their decorative features suggesting Arts & Crafts or Art Nouveau influence. If one can keep in mind that Wittgenstein even removed the carpets and curtains from *Kundmannngasse*, it may be seen obvious that Wittgenstein's ethics of aesthetics is much more deeply rooted and aphoristic. Actually, it can be regarded that Loos was highly ornamental when designing the interiors but was non-ornamental when exteriors were in question.

²¹⁸ Ibid. p.21.




Figure 4-5: Villa Josephine Baker by Adolf Loos




Figure 4-6: Villa Josephine Baker by Adolf Loos



Figure 4-7: Library, Villa Müller, Adolf Loos, Olomouc, 1926-28

The austerity lying under the works of Loos manifests (Corbusian) “machines for living” instead of (Heideggerian) “dwellings.” It seems as if this attitude is due to the general notion of Loos on architecture as he insists: “Only a very small part of architecture belongs to art – the tomb and the monument. Everything else that fulfils a function is to be excluded from the domain of art.”²¹⁹ The reason of such an assumption may derive from the fact that Loos’ “Ornament” theory must exclude everything extra. Therefore, according to Loos, if architecture can be treated as a branch of art, it should include something extra, something pointless.

Actually, Loos is not always loyal to his concepts. His proposal for the Chicago Tribune Competition can easily be regarded as a historicist and ornamental figure although for Loos, “urban architecture could not exist without a connection to its context and civic buildings and the monuments of a city should be considerate to urban and cultural history.”²²⁰

²¹⁹ Adolf Loos, “Architecture,” in Yehuda Safran and Wilfried Wang, eds, The Architecture of Adolf Loos: An Arts Council Exhibition, trans. Wilfried Wang, Rosamund Diamond and Robert Godsill, London: Arts Council of Great Britain, 1985, p.104. Quoted in *Op.cit.*, Kenneth Frampton (2002), p.197.

²²⁰ Panayotis Tournikiotis, Adolf Loos, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, p.138.

4.2.2 “The Aesthetic of Mass-Production Building”: Villa Savoy/Le Corbusier



Figure 4-8: Villa Savoy, Le Corbusier, Poissy, 1928-31

The business of Architecture is to establish emotional relationships by means of raw materials.²²¹

The Architect, by his arrangement of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an acute degree and provokes plastic emotions; by the relationships which he creates he wakes profound echoes in us, he gives us the measure of an order which we feel to be in accordance with that of our world, he determines the various movements of our heart and of our understanding; it is then that we experience the sense of beauty.²²²

The domination of Le Corbusier’s notion of architecture stands still as the domination of the effects of industrialization still exists. The dramatic effect of Le Corbusier’s works derives their source from a sort of transition. Le Corbusier’s notion of architecture as “a pure creation of architect’s spirit” may suggest a different sort of architect. The architect whom Le Corbusier

²²¹ Le Corbusier, “Towards a New Architecture: Guiding Principles,” in *Op.cit.*, Conrads, pg.59.

²²² *Ibid.*, pg.59.

defines is someone who is responsible for his/her entire creativity. The notion of function defined by Le Corbusier may derive from this responsibility as his definition of the *zeitgeist* of his times embraces a certain level spirituality with his ongoing rationalism.

Le Corbusier's vision summarizes the embracement of the technological advances on behalf of the human evolution. He was probably not a critic of modernism and on the contrary, his inspirations come from the technological progress of his time. However; as he "was the only modern architect to prescribe architectural rules for the new architecture,"²²³ he chose to make use of architectural tradition as a guide. Despite the general belief that Le Corbusier is free of tradition; as Colquhoun suggests, "Le Corbusier refers constantly to the architectural tradition either by invoking its principles and adapting them to new solutions or by overtly contradicting them in such a way that some knowledge of the tradition is necessary in order to understand his architectural message."²²⁴ As a matter of fact, it may be argued that Le Corbusier played a crucial role in this transitional interwar period by glorifying this transition. So to say, as Kenneth Frampton insists, "[i]n this way the architecture of Le Corbusier maintains its links with the past by the representation of the moment of transition from classical forms to the forms of a new architecture. Nothing shows this more clearly than his "Five Points," all of which were transformations of a traditional architectural vocabulary."²²⁵ What makes Le Corbusier unique may be his awareness of the contradictory features of this transition period. For Le Corbusier, architecture was probably neither a "pure instrument whose forms were perfectly transparent to function" nor "a pure art."²²⁶ As a full-representation of Le Corbusier's Five Points, Villa Savoy emerged as a cult figure in terms of its status as a frozen statue of this "moment of transition". Actually, it may be hard to refer to Villa Savoy as a juxtaposition of two diverse approaches summarized by Kenneth Frampton as "the one which believes that architecture should be absorbed

²²³ Leonardo Benevolo, *History of Modern Architecture*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. Reprinted in Alan Colquhoun, *Essays in Architectural Criticism*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995, pg.51.

²²⁴ Op. Cit., Colquhoun (1995), pg.51.

²²⁵ Kenneth Frampton, "Introduction," in *Ibid.* pg.13

into the production process, and the other which conceives of architecture as an autonomous aesthetic discipline obeying laws of aesthetics which are based on psychological constants.”²²⁷ Villa Savoy can be classified as an in-between creation as a result of this transitional period. The rhetoric that Villa Savoy uses is surely a modernist one however, what it implicates is perhaps more important than what it expresses formally. The notion in Wittgenstein’s prophetic proposition - [t]oday the difference between a good and a poor architect is that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation and the good one resists it – may become more crucial when the notion of industrialization in Le Corbusier’s works is taken into consideration. Le Corbusier insists that during the interwar period the Engineer’s Aesthetic was at its full height but the Architecture was in an unhappy state of retrogression.

4.2.3 “For the School of the New Art”: Design for a Lenin Tribune/El Lissitzky




Figure 4-9: Proun 99, El Lissitzky , 1925

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid., pg.13.



Figure 4-10: Design for a Lenin Tribune, El Lissitzky , 1920

A work of architecture comes into being only when the whole thing springs to life as a spatial idea, as a form that exercises a definite effect on our psyche. To do this, it is not enough to be a modern man, it is necessary for the architect to possess a complete mastery of the expressive means of architecture ²²⁸

El Lissitzky designed 'Design for a Lenin Tribune' as a *Proun*²²⁹ by means of which he "indicates an unprecedented creative realm, situated somewhere between painting and architecture."²³⁰ Actually, El Lissitzky's attempt was rather an alternative to the derivatives of the Agit-Prop culture and its architects such as Rodchenko²³¹ and Klutssis. This notion of El Lissitzky may be due to his opposition to the didactic features of the Productivists. From a more detailed point of view, it may be argued that El Lissitzky opposed the shallow functionalism of his predecessors. Therefore, he tried to maintain a totally new dimension to functionalism. His prophetic motto of "[i]t is not enough to be a modern man" seems to emphasize on this lack of Productivist era of 1920s.²³² El Lissitzky's opposition was towards the rather too much didactic structures of the early period of Post-Revolutionary

²²⁸ El Lissitzky, "Ideological Superstructure," in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, pg.122.

²²⁹ The term Proun is derived from Pro-Unovis meaning "For the School of the New Art".

²³⁰ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.170.

²³¹ Aleksandr Rodchenko, (1891-1959), Russian painter, draftsman, sculptor, and photographer. Working in a wide range of media, he was one of the central figures of constructivism, a Russian abstract art movement that emerged in the period just before the Russian Revolution of 1917.

²³² El Lissitzky, "Ideological Superstructure," in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century

architecture. The radicalism of the Lenin Tribune was intentionally unrealizable as Frampton asserts maybe because of the transitional character of that period. Its propagandist character besides its pictorial and spatial characters may show the inevitable dichotomy of both El Lissitzky and his period. The dichotomy ensuring the architectural aesthetic of El Lissitzky is apparent in his analysis of the three periods of a new architecture.

Thus we can summarize these three periods even more briefly:

- (a) Denial of art as merely an emotional, individual affair carried on in romantic isolation.
- (b) 'Objective' creation in the silent hope that the resulting product will eventually be looked upon as a work of art.
- (c) Conscious and purposeful creation of an architecture that will exercise a closed artistic effect of an objective, scientific basis that has been worked out in advance.²³³

In terms of a Wittgensteinian point of view, the collectivity El Lissitzky manifested can be perceived as a merely total opposition to Wittgenstein when he asserts “[w]orking in philosophy- like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself, on one’s own interpretation, on one’s way of seeing things. (and what one expects of them).” Although, the proposition can be understood as dialectical, its overall tone is probably individualist and therefore in Lissitzkian terms may be labeled as being in romantic isolation. However; if the emphasis on “gesture” by Wittgenstein can be understood as a merely naturalistic approach, El Lissitzky’s definition of the mission of modern art – therefore modern architecture – seems totally in harmony with him. As El Lissitzky purports, “[m]odern art has arrived by entirely intuitive and independent means at the same results as modern science. Modern art, like modern science, has reduced form to its basic elements in order to reassemble them again according to the universal laws

²³³ Architecture, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, pg.122.
Ibid., pg.122

of nature.²³⁴ The realization of an architecture as a science refers to a utilitarian evolution in which architecture cannot only exist as a means of a static source of gratification but also as a means of a social repose. Regarding El Lissitzky's statement of ideological superstructure, it may be claimed that architecture is purported to act as an apparatus within this structure that is ideological. The formula – again a scientific term – shaping this structure is:

“Each Form Is The Frozen Temporary Image Of A Process. Thus, Any Work Merely Represent A Way Station In The Process Of Becoming, And Not A Frozen Goal.”²³⁵

4.2.4 “Biomorphic Fantasies about a New World”: Einstein Tower/Erich Mendelsohn



Figure 4-11: Einstein Tower, E. Mendelsohn, Potsdam, Germany, 1917-1921

²³⁴ El Lissitzky, Russia: an Architecture for World Revolution, MIT Press, Mass., 1984, pg.

The problem of the new world architecture is:

*The finiteness of mechanics
plus the infiniteness of life.*²³⁶

Mendelsohn insists, “[m]odern man, amidst the excited flurry of his fast-moving life, can find equilibrium only in the tension-free horizontal.”²³⁷

The dynamic tension of the epoch includes the epoch-making scientific steps by such contemporaries as Albert Einstein. Mendelsohn’s world-vision was actually scientific or rather technological but apart from it his vision was solely inspired from the chaotic and unstable condition of the post-war era.²³⁸ The euphoria of Mendelsohn was probably not shared by Wittgenstein in any terms as Wittgenstein insists in his “Sketch for a Foreword” that “[t]he spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism, and it is alien and uncongenial to the author.” Actually, Mendelsohn could possibly share this world-vision later but not during the 1920s in which Adolf Behne wrote:

The most important thing seems to me to be to construct an ideal House of God, not a denominational one, but a religious one... We must not wait until a new religiosity is upon us, for it may be waiting for us while we are waiting for it.²³⁹

As a matter of fact, the euphoria of Mendelsohn may derive from his interpretation of scientific progress as a sort of religion. However, it is not so religious or spiritual in terms of Mendelsohn’s architecture as he declared, “[t]he simultaneous process of revolutionary political decisions and radical changes in human relationships in economy and science and religion and art give belief in the new form an *a priori* right to exercise control, and provide a

141.

²³⁵ Ibid., pg.141.

²³⁶ Erich Mendelsohn/B. Hoetger, “Synthesis – World Architecture” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 106.

²³⁷ Erich Mendelsohn, “Dynamics and Function” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture (ed. by Ulrich Conrads), MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 72.

²³⁸ The 1920s were rather an optimistic period for Mendelsohn. As Tafuri and Dal Co states, “[w]hen the anti-Semitic laws forced Mendelsohn to emigrate to England in 1933, the most significant chapter of his activity was brought to a close, one marked by an optimistic exaltation of the dynamic of the great city within which his commercial or public entertainment buildings were elevated to focal nodes of the urban form.” (Tafuri & Dal Co, 1976, p.144)

²³⁹ Behne in his reply in 1919 to a group opinion poll, published under the title *Ja! Stimmen des Arbeitstrates für Kunst in Berlin* (‘Yes! Voices from the Art Soviet in Berlin’). Reprinted

justifiable basis for a rebirth amidst the misery produced by world-historical disasters.”²⁴⁰ The vision of Mendelsohn may be seen as an attempt to constitute a refresh start in architecture deriving its sources and inspirations from the scientific progresses of the period rather than to constitute a cult. It should be noted that, Mendelsohn’s sensitivity was not always directed towards such experimental works as Einstein Observatory Tower. In this context, Behne’s critic of the architectural language of Mendelsohn by asserting that it is “*Reklamearchitektur* (Advertising Architecture)” may be valid and worth to debate on.²⁴¹ The traces of so-called “Advertising Architecture” can be sensed apparently within the majority of Mendelsohn’s works. However, the notion of Mendelsohn seems as if he did not agree with Behne in terms of his critic of populist and maybe formalist approach. Mendelsohn’s strong faith on the individualistic treatises may be one of his arguments against Behne. His so-called *supra-nationalism* manifesting the “embracement of the national demarcations as a precondition”²⁴² declares that “it is free humanity that alone can reestablish an all-embracing culture”²⁴³ The ideology embracing the vision of Mendelsohn turns architecture into a field full of social tasks in order to give answer to the spirit of the times.

Mendelsohn insists:

For the particular prerequisites of architecture, the reorganization of society taking place in response to the spirit of the times means new tasks arising out of the changed purposes of the buildings, which in turn result from changes in travel, economy, and religion, coupled with new possibilities presented by the new building materials: glass, iron, and concrete.²⁴⁴

The “*Reklamearchitektur*” features of Mendelsohn can be found in his emphasis on the necessity of the “response to the spirit of the times” and “new possibilities presented by the new building materials: glass, iron, and concrete.” However, the supra-nationalism may add a new dimension

in op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.118.

²⁴⁰ Erich Mendelsohn, “The Problem of a New Architecture” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture (ed. by Ulrich Conrads), MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 54.

²⁴¹ Reprinted in Op. cit., Tafuri & Dal Co, pg.144.

²⁴² Erich Mendelsohn, “The Problem of a New Architecture” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture (ed. by Ulrich Conrads), MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 55.

²⁴³ Ibid., pg.55.

including a sort of immortalization/glorification of a new society free from the restrictions of conventions.




Figure 4-12: Sketch Drawing, Einstein Tower, E. Mendelsohn, Potsdam, Germany, 1917-1921

4.2.5 “Oscillation of Poetry and Architecture”: Danteum²⁴⁵/Giuseppe Terragni

The hallmark of the earlier avant-garde was a contrived impetus and a vain, destructive fury, mingling good and bad elements; the hallmark of today's youth is a desire for lucidity and wisdom.... This must be clear...we do not intend to break with the tradition.... The new architecture, the true architecture should be the result of a close association between logic and rationality.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pg.54.

²⁴⁵ Benito Mussolini commissioned Giuseppe Terragni to design the Danteum a “temple to the greatest of Italian poets.”



Figure 4-13: Stills of the Courtyard, Inferno, Purgatory, Paradise, and Empyrean from the computer walk-through model of the Danteum

The strong opposition of Gruppo 7 towards the anarchistic and materialistic ideas of the former generation is apparent in their assessment of its aura as a vain effort oscillating between good and bad elements. Therefore, such an effort cannot be esteemed as occurred in a natural process. As the adverse of this approach, Terragni et al proposed a less-radical articulation theorizing a “logical” association between logic and rationality. One reason of why Terragni asserted such a shift may be the extreme utopianism of the earlier avant-garde of the Futurists. As Kenneth Frampton asserts, “[t]he progressive avant-garde emerges in full force, however, soon after the turn of the century with the advent of Futurism.”²⁴⁷ However, it may be argued that this progressive approach omits the notion “for human use”²⁴⁸. The highly utopian proposals may be lack of certain level of rationalism due to their arbitrary and highly sophisticated nature.

²⁴⁶ From a statement of Gruppo 7 – of which Terragni was a member – in 1926. Reprinted in Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.203.

²⁴⁷ Op.cit., Frampton (2002), p.79.

²⁴⁸ Op.cit., Frampton (2002), p.26.




Figure 4-14: Danteum by G. Terragni (The Danteum: view of the computer model (top left); proportioning system (top right); axonometric drawing (middle); plans of upper and lower levels (bottom))

Another reason of Terragni's opposition towards this progressive avant-garde may be the monumentality of this approach.²⁴⁹ It can be regarded as a consequence of the first reason because utopian approaches may inevitably or intentionally omit rationalism and logic which are crucial to Terragni's vision. Terragni's somehow traditionalist theoretical vision may interfere with his rather too symbolic and poetic attempts. As Kenneth Frampton remarks,

Despite this declaration of faith in tradition, the early works of the Rationalists, particularly those projected by Giuseppe Terragni, displayed a preference for compositions based on industrial themes. Terragni's projects for a gasworks and a steel tube factory exhibited at the IIIrd Monza Biennale

²⁴⁹ Probably, the monumentality towards which Terragni et al opposed refers to a non-functional and non-human monumentality in which the ordinary man has no privilege at all. As a consequence, it is so natural that this sort of sophistication is not for the ordinary man but on the contrary for the "Übermensch".

of 1927 seem to have more to do with the Engineer's Aesthetic than with the Architecture, to use the polarities of Le Corbusier's *Vers une architecture*, a book which exercised considerable influence on the Rationalisti after its publication in 1923.²⁵⁰

However, the later works by Terragni such as *Danteum* (1938) and/or Casa del Fascio (1936)²⁵¹ (now casa del Popolo²⁵²) purports to satisfy both the ideological and aesthetic aspirations. Their ideological strength derives from the notion of historical and cultural continuity (or basically tradition) to which Terragni attached great importance. The nuances mentioned in these projects seem to have an overall aim to stress the "close association between logic and rationality." However, the fully perception of both projects – especially the *Danteum* – by an ordinary men can be hard to realize.

²⁵⁰ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg. 203.

²⁵¹ Although one of them, the casa del Fascio, was erected; both projects reveal a certain level of symbolism and ideological approach.

²⁵² Popolo: (Italian: "people") In the communes (city-states) of 13th-century Italy, a pressure group instituted to protect the interests of the commoners against the nobility. Until then noblemen had exclusively controlled the commune governments, and the popolo was the means by which wealthy merchants sought to extend their power. The popolo in Florence controlled the government 1250–60 and again after 1282. By the beginning of the 14th century, its elders formed the supreme executive of the commune.



Figure 4-15: Casa del Fascio (now casa del Popolo), G. Terragni, Como, 1932-36




Figure 4-16: Floor Plan, Casa del Fascio (now casa del Popolo) G. Terragni, Como, 1932-36

Actually, it can be more valid for the present-day as the impact and the effect of the casa del Fascio was much more enchanting but at the same time realistic. As Thomas Schumacher insists, "Terragni's artistic development, especially from the casa del Fascio (a Renaissance palace in Modern dress) to the Palazzo Littorio, Solution A (modern forms literally suspended over antiquity) to the *Danteum* (a dynamic and modernistic plan-form to be erected in traditional materials), chronicles Terragni's use of history to create an absolute, supra-historical architecture."²⁵³ It was probably not only the materials that were traditional in *Danteum* but also the concept surrounding the entire project. The immortalization and glorification of the totalitarian and symbolic values of fascist revolutionary principles by using symbolic and provocative linkages to history. Actually according to Frampton, the glorification of the is apparent as he mentions "[t]his project, comprising progressively less dense blocks of rectangular space arranged as a labyrinth and symbolizing the stages of Inferno, Purgatory and Paradise, was in many respects an abstraction of the *parti* used for the EUR building."²⁵⁴

²⁵³ Thomas Schumacher, *The Danteum: Architecture, Poetics, and Politics Under Italian Fascism*, Princeton Architectural Press, NY, 2004, pg.86.

²⁵⁴ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.208.




Figure 4-17: Citta Nuova, Antonio San't Elia, 1914




Figure 4-18: Citta Nuova, Antonio San't Elia, 1914

As Lewis Mumford indicates, “[t]he notion of a modern monument is veritably a contradiction in terms. If it is a monument it is not modern, and if it is modern, it cannot be a monument.”²⁵⁵ The amalgamation of the logic and rationalism manifests, in this sense, a certain level of criticism to the “non-human use” of the progressive avant-garde Italian Futurist Architecture. The term “for human use” of Kenneth Frampton may remind the term inhabitation and inhabitation may obstinately refer to “uninhabitation”, a term summarizing Wittgensteinian way of habitation.²⁵⁶ Terragni’ notion of [true] architecture as a close association between logic and rationality can be interpreted not as a total critic of its predecessors or its ancestors but merely an affirmation on behalf of their rationalistic approach.

4.2.6 “Architecture as a Synthesis of the Arts”: Goetheanum/Rudolph Steiner



Figure 4-19: Second Goetheanum, Rudolf Steiner, Dornach 1926-28

²⁵⁵ Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944, p.44.

²⁵⁶ According to the elder sister of Wittgenstein, Kundmangasse is “logic translated into a house.”

The Goetheanum Project executed as “the creation of organs through which the gods speak to us.”²⁵⁷ The spiritual and cultural evolution of humankind is something crucial for the teaching of anthroposophy. Anthroposophy implying “knowledge produced by the higher self in man” is the underlying principle of the architecture of Steiner. Steiner’s description of art as “the creation of organs through which the gods speak to us” may indicate a certain level of understanding about the implications of Steiner’s architecture.

Human evolution, for Steiner, designates a new sort of humankind full of emotional depths and transcendental features. Spirituality is the guiding principle both Steiner and his Goetheanum with a range of total emancipation of the higher feelings in a human being. Steiner’s definition of the art of architecture as “the art of creating an enveloping, enclosed space, with the help of a variety of materials and by means of various shapes and forms, either for ordinary activities and dwellings or for religious purposes”²⁵⁸ indicates an important feature of Steiner’s architecture. Steiner’s emphasis on the spiritual necessity for the humankind is valid for all kind of spaces within the field of architecture. Steiner’s aim can be regarded as an attempt to harmonize the spiritual evolution of humankind with architecture. Steiner dictates, “[i]t (architecture) originates from the soul and it can be comprehended to the extent that the soul can be comprehended.”²⁵⁹

The approach of Steiner seems highly Wittgensteinian and, on the contrary, highly non-Loosian. Loos’ restriction of artistic (or aesthetic) dimension of architecture just with monuments and tombs is opposed by Steiner as he insists upon the fact that the spiritual side of architecture should be felt in every kind of buildings regardless their function in order to shed a light on the higher spirit of humankind.

²⁵⁷ Rudolf Steiner, Architecture as a Synthesis of the Arts, Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1999, p.78.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p.22.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p.22.

According to Steiner, the evolution of the soul is reflected in architecture.²⁶⁰ Probably, it can be esteemed as a version of “gesture-based” approach by Wittgenstein in which he insisted on the notion that architecture must be a gesture.

4.2.7 “Kropotkinian²⁶¹ Propositions”: Alpine Architektur /Bruno Taut




Figure 4-20: A watercolour from Alpine Architektur, Bruno Taut, 1919
The liner notes read; “das Baugebiet vom Monte Generoso Gesehen (The area where the Great Mountain is seen)

²⁶⁰ Ibid., pg.22.

²⁶¹ Peter Alekseyevich Kropotkin, (1842-1921), Russian revolutionary and geographer, foremost theorist of anarchism.
The son of a prince, he renounced his aristocratic heritage in 1871. Although he achieved renown in such fields as geography, zoology, sociology, and history, he shunned material success for the life of a revolutionist. He was imprisoned on political charges (1874–76) but escaped and fled to Western Europe. He was imprisoned in France on trumped-up charges of sedition (1883–86), and in 1886 he settled in England, where he remained until the Russian Revolution of 1917 allowed him to return home. While in exile, he wrote several influential books, including *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899) and *Mutual Aid* (1902), in which he attempted to put anarchism on a scientific basis and argued that cooperation rather than conflict is the chief factor in the evolution of species. On his return to Russia, he was bitterly disappointed that the Bolsheviks had made their

As the *Glas*²⁶² of the *Arbeitsrat für Kunst* (Work Council for Art)²⁶³, Bruno Taut emphasized on the occasion of a new revival for the evolution of architecture. Totally utopian as it seems from the drawings of him, the *Alpine Architektur*²⁶⁴ was a latter attempt of Taut after Glass Pavilion of 1914 designed in cooperation with the writer Paul Scheerbart. As a group of ambitious people including Scheerbart, Max – Bruno Taut, Adolf Behne et al., they formed a fraction called the Glass Chain with the beginning of the First World War. In Scheerbart's own words their intention was:

In order to raise or culture to a higher level, we are forced, whether we like it or not, to change our architecture. And this will be possible only if we free the rooms in which we live of their enclosed character. This, however, we can only do by introducing a glass architecture, which admits the light of the sun, of the moon, and of the stars into the rooms, not only through a few windows, but through as many walls as feasible, these to consist entirely of glass – of colored glass.²⁶⁵

Alpine Architektur was a more profound and probably more tremendous version of *Glasarchitektur* consisting of the building of glass temples in the Alps. Bruno Taut was “Scheerbart's greatest and most consistent architectural apologist.”²⁶⁶ The sort of Expressionism Taut depicts can be regarded as a counter-narrative of the war that led to a huge

revolution by authoritarian rather than libertarian methods, and he retired from politics. (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia)

²⁶² Apart from Taut, who called himself Glas (*German for “glass”*), there was Gropius (*Mass*), Finsterlin (*Prometh*) and Bruno Taut's brother Max, who wrote under his own name. (Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.118.)

²⁶³ Group of German architects and artists founded in December 1918 under the leadership of Bruno Taut; it rapidly gained a large membership, which included the architects Otto Bartning, Walter Gropius, Erich Mendelsohn and Max Taut, the painter Cesar Klein, Erich Heckel, Ludwig Meidner, Max Pechstein, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff and Lyonel Feininger, and the sculptors Rudolf Belling, Oswald Herzog and Gerhardt Marcks. It was Taut's original intention that the Arbeitsrat – unlike the Novembergruppe – should exercise political influence in the in the post-revolutionary government as an artistic equivalent to the workers' and soldiers' councils which briefly held power in November and December 1918. the founding manifesto demanded: “Art and the people must form a unity ... From now on the artist alone , as molder of the sensibilities of the people, will be responsible for the visible fabric of the new state.” No political power was gained, however, and Taut resigned from the leadership at the end of February 1919, to be replaced by Gropius. (Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani (ed.), Dictionary of the 20th –Century Architecture, Thames and Hudson, London, 1996, pg. 16.)

²⁶⁴ Actually, *Alpine Architektur* was a book consisting of the watercolour drawings of “collective buildings of glass facets, rising like crystals from glaciers and mountain peaks.” (Op. Cit., Curtis, pg. 183.)

²⁶⁵ Paul Scheerbart from *Glasarchitektur* (1914), Reprinted in Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.116.

²⁶⁶ John A. Stuart, “Unweaving Narrative Fabric: Bruno Taut, Walter Benjamin and Paul Scheerbart's *The Gray Cloth*,” in Journal of Architectural Education,

devastation. The devastating consequences of war ironically may encourage a “vision of culture elevated through the use of glass served to consolidate those aspirations towards a non-repressive sensibility that had first emerged in Munich in 1909 with the foundation of the *Neue Künstler Vereinigung*.”²⁶⁷




Figure 4-21: A Watercolour from *Alpine Architektur*, Bruno Taut, 1919
The liner notes read; “ Europa – das Helle – Asien das Hellere im Dunkel der farbigen nacht (Europe – The Light – The Asia illuminated in dark “the black night)

The monumentality in Taut’s mainly paper architecture of this period adhered to German Expressionism and therefore depicted tremendous forms affecting the whole city. The main difference from the latter totalitarian approach would be the ideological sense that Taut insists. The hierarchical formulation of these designs was heavily influenced by the anarchist and in some terms nihilist²⁶⁸ ideology of Kropotkin. As Frampton introduces,

²⁶⁷ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.116.

²⁶⁸ In 1910 edition of *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Kropotkin attributed the topic “Anarchism”. The rejection of the state may make Kropotkin both an anarchist and a nihilist:

ANARCHISM (from the Gr. *an* and *archos*, contrary to authority), the name given to

“[t]ypical of Taut’s Kropotkinian propositions was his model of a circular, radially subdivided, agricultural settlement.”²⁶⁹ However, the inevitable likeness of such a hierarchical order to totalitarian “New Order”²⁷⁰ is explicit in terms of the authoritarian objections of both. However, neither Taut nor his works can be regarded as a pioneer of the totalitarian era of mid-1930s. The hierarchy, which Taut sought in *Alpine Architektur* has some utopian references that can be assumed to be contrary to the objections of the totalitarian vision. As Frampton introduces, “[i]n its core were three separate residential sections, one for each class of citizen – *Künder, Künstler und Kinder* (the enlightened, artists and the children) – each grouped around lozenge-shaped courts. This tripartite organization led axially to the central crystalline ‘*Haus des Himmels*’ or ‘House of Heaven’, where the governors of the community convened.”²⁷¹ The organization of the people seems to be an inspiring factor for Taut while designing *Alpine Architektur*. Although the guiding principle was very different from the totalitarian regimes of the latter Nazi regime, “It is one of the paradoxes of Taut’s anarchic socialism

a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government - harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being. In a society developed on these lines, the voluntary associations which already now begin to cover all the fields of human activity would take a still greater extension so as to substitute themselves for the state in all its functions. They would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and international temporary or more or less permanent - for all possible purposes: production, consumption and exchange, communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual protection, defence of the territory, and so on; and, on the other side, for the satisfaction of an ever-increasing number of scientific, artistic, literary and sociable needs. Moreover, such a society would represent nothing immutable. On the contrary - as is seen in organic life at large - harmony would (it is contended) result from an ever-changing adjustment and readjustment of equilibrium between the multitudes of forces and influences, and this adjustment would be the easier to obtain as none of the forces would enjoy a special protection from the state. (Source: Marxist Internet Archive)

²⁶⁹ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.118.

²⁷⁰ “New Order” is a term used in order to define the objections of the Nazi Regime of Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler during the World War II. “Although, in a conversation with Speer, he had once expressed appreciation of modern steel and glass architecture referring to a big steel plant at Linz, he could never tolerate the image of technology in other contexts, such as the Party forum where he appreciated “Doric Style as the expression of the New Order.”” (Rana Nergis Öğüt, *The Autonomy of Art and Aestheticism in Architecture*, METU Faculty of Architecture Press, Ankara, 1999, pg. 129-30.

that the hierarchic, not to say authoritarian, social institutions imagined for these communities contained the seeds of a fascism that was soon to find its vulgarization in the 'blood and soil' culture of the National Socialist movement."²⁷²

The utopist sense of Glass Chain naturally weakened after the death of Scheerbart but the harsh conditions of the post-war Germany made Taut's mind to discontinue his efforts "for the achievements of Scheerbart's glass paradise."²⁷³ Instead, he chose to design low-cost housing with his brother to be commissioned by the government. Paradoxically, Taut may change his mind due to a more humanistic but also a more pragmatic point of view. Whether it is humanistic or not, the result was surely a more modest one when compared with his *Stadtkrone* vision. It can be said a dilemma to realize and analyze that Taut "succumbs" rather than "resists." His realization of architecture as a synthesis of all arts may give some clues regarding Taut's vision on his "succumbing" or "resistance" . In 1919, he wrote:

Art – that is one single thing, when it exists! Today there is no art. The various disrupted tendencies can find their way back to a single unity only under the wings of a new architecture, so that every individual discipline will play its part in building. Then there will be no frontiers between the applied arts and sculpture or painting. Everything will be one thing: architecture.

The direct carrier of spiritual forces, moulder of the sensibilities of the general public, which today are slumbering and tomorrow will awake, is architecture. Only a complete revolution in this spiritual realm will create this architecture. But this revolution, this architecture will not come of themselves. Both must be willed – today's architects must prepare the way for tomorrow's buildings. Their work on the future must receive public assistance to make it possible.
²⁷⁴

Probably, Taut sensed that *Alpine Architektur* cannot be the moulder of the sensibilities of the general public as it depicts a vision of anarchic socialism rather than a vulgar fascism.

²⁷¹ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.118-119.

²⁷² Ibid., pg.119.

²⁷³ Ibid., pg.119.

²⁷⁴ Bruno Taut, "A Programme for Architecture," in Op. cit., Conrads, pg.41.

4.2.8 “From Productivist Aesthetic to a Central Asian Tartar Tomb”: Lenin’s Mausoleum/Shchusev




Figure 4-22: Lenin’s Mausoleum, Alexander Shchusev, Moscow, 1924

The reminisces of a historical phenomenon such a concrete one as socialism is thought to be evoked by virtue of architecture. Lenin’s Mausoleum or Lenin’s tomb, apart from the fact that it was one of Wittgenstein’s favorite modern structures, can be thought to ought to have a similar effect as Lenin himself. Although, it can be argued that any features mentioning transcendentalism is not familiar with socialism as it obstinately declares a materialistic mentality. The recurrence of such a theme may seem normal in such a fascist or in a totalitarian manifestation; however the amalgamation of socialist and transcendental themes seems contradictory at least in terms of their character. As Frampton insists, “Lenin’s death in January 1924 not only brought the period of New Economic Policy (NEP)

culture to an end, but also presented the Party with the ironic problem of finding an appropriate style for his tomb.” The preliminary resolution for such a problem was a temporary wooden structure designed again by the architect Shchusev and the sarcophagus by Konstantin Melnikov. Temporariness could actually be more appropriate for Lenin not as a leader but as an individual. However, the personage dictated is the amalgamation of the man and the master. Actually, the architectural language is too much modest when compared with the design proposals of Palace of Soviets during the early 1930s. Actually, the difference between Lenin’s Tomb and the design proposals of *Palace of Soviets* Competition is somehow similar to the manifestation by Wittgenstein on the difference between Georgian architecture of houses in Dublin and the Canada House.²⁷⁵



Figure 4-23: An example of Georgian architecture of houses in Dublin

²⁷⁵ Canada House is a building located in Trafalgar Square, London. Canada House was built between 1824 and 1827 to designs by Sir Robert Smirke, the architect of the British Museum.



Figure 4-24: Canada House, Sir Robert Smirke, London, 1824-27



Figure 4-25: Scale Comparison with Highest Buildings of the World, Palace of Soviets, Iofan, 1931-1932, USSR (2007)



Figure 4-26: View of Palace of Soviets from Moscow Street, Rudnev, 1938?, USSR




Figure 4-27: Palace of Soviets, One of the versions by B. Iofan, O. Helfreich, O. Schuko. Sculpture by S. Merkulov. 1934

The dilemma of such a representation of “Lenin; the immortalized/glorified” was indicated by Frampton:

While the Productivist manner could be considered adequate for the representation of the Soviet Union at an internal exhibition of decorative art, it was much too insubstantial to enshrine the founder of the first socialist state.²⁷⁶

The Productivist²⁷⁷ manner experimented generally in order to glorify the nature and capacity of socialist ideology. However, in order to glorify a human being such as Lenin, a more classicist view has been held. Actually, towards the beginning of the fascist era, the tendency to these classicist clichés aroused. For instance, while Konstantin Melnikov’s Pavilion design for the 1925 Exposition des Arts Décoratifs in Paris manifests a relatively more modest form, the USSR Pavilion for the 1937 World Exhibition manifests itself with a more monumental and dominant representation.

²⁷⁶ Op.cit., Frampton (1980), pg.172.

²⁷⁷ Productivism was an art movement founded by a group of Constructivist artists in post-Revolutionary Russia who believed that art should have a practical, socially useful role as a facet of industrial production. The group formed to contradict Naum Gabo’s assertion that Constructivism should be devoted to exploration of abstract space and rhythm. Alexei Gan led the group which included Alexander Rodchenko and Varvara Stepanova and focused on applied arts. Productivism became the prevailing aesthetic and artists such as Kazimir Malevich, El Lissitzky and Liubov Popova designed furniture, textiles, clothing, ceramics, typography, advertising and propaganda, as well as theater set design.



Figure 4-28: Albert Speer's representation of the Third Reich confronts Iofan's USSR Pavilion. World Exhibition, Paris, 1937



Figure 4-29: Lenin's Tomb, A. Shchusev, Moscow, 1924

The symbolic value of Lenin's Tomb probably seems to exceed its modest outlook as the " "Lenin's tomb is the cradle of the Revolution" proudly acclaimed the thousands of banners streaming above an immense crowd on the day the founder of the USSR was buried."²⁷⁸ The contradiction by means of this having symbolic value is made obvious with the remarks of Joseph Stalin as "it was what Stalin called a "revolutionary relic"."²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Hélène Carrère D'Encausse, Lenin, Holmes & Meier, New York, 2001, pg.ix.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pg.ix.

CHAPTER 5

IMMORTALIZATION AND GLORIFICATION

Works of art are superfluous. It is true that it is necessary to create them, but not to exhibit them.²⁸⁰

5.1 Immortalization and glorification by means of [true] architecture

Immortalization and glorification in terms of Wittgenstein is only possible when there is something to immortalize and glorify. As Wijdeveld suggests, “[T]rue glorification in architecture, in contrast to clarification, implied freely speaking ‘the language of its time’, to quote from Margaret Stonborough’s letter to her brother, and this could very well include ornamentation.”²⁸¹

Immortalization / Glorification may surely bring a religious / philosophical notion in terms of Wittgenstein, as he may at first seem to be demanding a modernist point of view. Surely, Wittgenstein’s notion of purity and his strong support of “*Simplex Sigillum Veri*” theorem is a characteristic of his modernist point of view. However, it can be a shallow interpretation of Wittgenstein because of the lack of the overall picture.

Architecture as an apparatus of “immortalization” and “glorification” brings the exclusion of the tectonic side of architecture as it emphasizes generally on the abstract concept that a building can achieve. The distinction between immortalization and glorification idea and the object of this immortalization and glorification idea enhances the field in which architecture plays a poetic role. The lack of rules in any kind of artistic discipline then can be valid for architecture itself. It may be seen as a pure and a simple thing but it is not bound up with systematic rules. Therefore, it may not have much in common with language in which “[w]ords have meanings that allow them to

²⁸⁰ An aphorism by Karl Kraus. Reprinted in Op.cit. Tafuri & Dal. Co, pg.104.

²⁸¹ Op. cit., Wijdeveld.pg.177

be joined in propositions can be said true or false. Buildings do not make assertions. In that sense they can be neither true nor false. Their unity is therefore not like that of a sentence.²⁸²

In order to capture the essence of this immortalization /glorification idea, it should be kept in mind that Wittgenstein emphasizes not only on the timeless monumentality of buildings, but also on their “humanity”. As he declares, “[a]rchitecture is a gesture. Not every purposive moment of the body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a purpose architecture”.²⁸³

However, a gesture for a human being can be regarded as an unintentional process. This unintentional approach or this naturalism makes the term “gesture” possible. A gesture brings upon a complex structure in which there are dozens of incomes depending on the characteristics of structure. What is crucial here is that gesture (or immortalization /glorification) is not a scientific or a mathematical thing to grasp. It is probably an *a priori* or a natural thing that can be grasped within time not in a systematic but in a natural way.

The crucial thing for Wittgenstein is to grasp architecture as an apparatus of thought - expression. Whether it is intentional or not, this process can be traced throughout the history of design.

5.1.1 Interaction of Immortalization & Glorification

The difference between architecture and [true] architecture may be much more difficult to grasp as architecture itself is also somehow related with art. The notion of ‘perfect expression’ is maybe the key to the process of immortalization/glorification. What ‘perfect expression’ may suggest is also the answer of what are the aspects of immortalization/glorification. It is the intention of the artist himself that leads to the immortalization/glorification of something with art. Although it is not always crucially necessary for the artist to have an intention of immortalization and glorification, this difference may

²⁸²Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture*, MIT Press, London, 1997, pg.88.

²⁸³ Op. cit. Wittgenstein (1980), pg.16e.

turn the work of art into [true] art (in terms of Wittgenstein). As Wijdeveld continues, “The artist must necessarily be concerned with clarification, for perfect expression can only be shown. If the result is successful, the work of art achieves an effect...”²⁸⁴ The perfect expression is slightly like a bodily gesture as it cannot be verbalized but can only be shown. Therefore, the expression of immortalization/glorification cannot be told by words; instead, they have to be grasped in a visual way. The connection of this aspect of art with the propositions “What can be shown, cannot be said”²⁸⁵ and “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”²⁸⁶ is not coincidental as they both indicate that [true] art (therefore architecture) immortalizes and glorifies something.

5.1.2 Variations of Immortalization and Glorification

The variation of immortalization and glorification may be grasped in terms of the intuitive process that an architect is inclusive of. The modification of the intuitions in architecture may lead to the variations of immortalization and glorification. Actually, it may also lead to a question if the immortalization and glorification itself is more important or the objective of the immortalization and glorification is much more crucial. The constant factor may be the *Idea*²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Ibid., pg.168.

²⁸⁵ Op. cit. Wittgenstein (2001): see 4.1212.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. See proposition 7

²⁸⁷ The Hegelian sense should be emphasized here as it manifests a coherent definition of the term although the sense in this text is naturally a narrow one.

In the system of Hegel's *Logic*, the “Idea” is third and final stage of development of the Notion, the unity of the Subject and the Object, developing up to the Absolute Idea, which is the unity of the Being and the Notion.

Thus the Idea represents the mature stage of development of a principle or movement; in the beginning (i.e. in the Subjective Notion) a principle is abstract and separate and opposed to other principles (or sciences or movements, etc.); a notion gains ‘objectivity’ when it is able to merge with and transform all the other principles (or sciences or movements, etc.) in the world around it; the third, mature stage of development of a Notion, the Idea, represents a science which has totally interpenetrated other disciplines and develops as part of the whole cultural development of the community.

Thus, in forming the unity of subject and object, the Idea, according to Hegel, develops towards the unity of the notion (or theory) and being (or day-to-day immediacy), because it has concretised itself in the subject-object dialectic. This process is a kind of totalisation, holding to an ideal of culture and science in which everything becomes subsumed as moments or determinations of one single *idea*. This

sought to achieve in concrete form by means of architecture. The realization of the huge difference between the notion of immortalization and glorification in various attempts can be quite helpful in terms of the way they are conceptualized. One of the main topics for discussion may be the autonomy of architecture because it may reveal whether the notion of immortalization and glorification should be grasped in the territory of architecture itself or not. The method of, for instance, Taut may not be handled to see entirely from the architectural point of view as his suggestions on architecture reveal a certain aim of evolution rather than just an aesthetic impact. Surely, the aesthetic impact may have an evolutionary (or revolutionary) consequences but it will surely serve as a means rather than as an end. The motto by Taut “Everything will be one thing: architecture”²⁸⁸ seems quite different from something like “Architecture is a gesture” in terms of their relation with the notion of architecture and its essence. The main difference would be on the question of autonomy, as the former one seems to manifest an autonomous point of view while the latter one suggests a relatively transient role for architecture. However, the question of autonomy cannot be enough to define and analyze the former conception, as it may be understood as a projection to ignore the role of autonomy. The question of total domination of architecture may reveal that the only objective of the immortalization and glorification is architecture itself, so therefore it may come to a futile end, as architecture is the purpose of the revolution. Architecture as an end rather as a means reveals the purpose of Taut; however, during the revolution Taut insists that architecture will play a bipartite role with the spiritual realm. In his own words:

The direct carrier of the spiritual forces, moulder of the sensibilities of the general public, which today are slumbering and tomorrow will awake, is architecture. Only a complete revolution in the spiritual realm will create this

unitary conception of knowledge is one of Hegel's greatest strengths, but is also the object of frequent criticism since it excludes absolute and irreconcilable difference. Nevertheless, the Idea captures the concept of the development of theory through the unity and conflict of theory (subjectivity) and practice (objectivity), with theory being improved in the light of practical experience and practice being made more conscious in the light of theory. The stages of the Idea are Life, Cognition and the Absolute Idea. (“Hegel.” Encyclopedia of Marxism Marxist Internet Archive, 2007))

²⁸⁸ Bruno Taut; A Programme for Architecture,” in Op. Cit., Conrads, pg.41.

architecture. But his revolution, this architecture will not come of themselves. Both must be willed – today’s architects must prepare the way for tomorrow’s buildings. Their work on the future must receive public assistance to make it possible.²⁸⁹

This depiction of such autonomy in architecture may remind of another conception of immortalization and glorification in terms of the belief that immortalization and glorification is rather a way of providing a basement for an overall ethical sense and aesthetic foresight. It surely represents a permanent utopist notion, however the ethical *Idea* as the goal of immortalization and glorification points out again a certain level of reduction of architecture to a level of ethical purification. If “Architectural questions become mass questions” as El Lissitzky declared, the responsibility and impression of both the architecture and the architect increases due to the conceptualization of architecture as a dynamic social phenomenon. This notion of conceptualization is purported to give both architecture and the architect a more profound responsibility and effect. After all, it may not be argued that it is the total emancipation of architecture. Although it seems that the architecture plays a ether-like role, it inevitably bears more responsibility.

5.1.3 Prospects of Immortalization and Glorification

The acknowledgement of the spatial features of a structure is crucial in order to label it as a [true] architecture. It can be asked whether it is possible to decide if a building immortalizes/glorifies something without knowing anything about its background. As Scruton indicates:

We think of enjoyment in architectural matters as capable of evolution and transformation through knowledge: one has to know the Orders in order to take full pleasure in Roman buildings; one has to know the meaning of the sculptural details to take pleasure in the North Porch of Chartres; one has, simply, to know the use of a building if one is to enjoy it properly. There is no such thing as a pure, unmediated, sensuous pleasure in buildings.²⁹⁰

It may definitely be argued that the *Lebensgefühl* insisting upon the notion that architecture should reflect the spirit of its time may have a fundamental role in terms of the possibility of the notion of immortalization /

²⁸⁹ El Lissitzky, « Ideological Superstructure, in Op. cit., Conrads (ed.), pg.122.

glorification. The so-called impossibility of a “pure, unmediated, sensuous pleasure in buildings” may reflect a fact that there is no *a priori* phenomenon in architecture, therefore in order to define a building literally there has to be a sort of cultural derivation. This notion of the necessity of knowledge may be thought in contradiction with the idea that architecture may reflect transcendental features. The notion that “architecture is a gesture” may also reflect a sense of transcendentalist and eternal features. The “gesture” as a universal phenomenon maintains a sort of touch in eternal terms.

The other crucial notion can be the term “function” in order to comprehend and appreciate a building. As Scruton identifies, there should be an understanding of the aim of the building in order to define whether it immortalizes / glorifies something or not.

5.1.4 Interpretations of Immortalization & Glorification

Various interpretations may occur within the concept of immortalization and glorification due to the fact that immortalization and glorification may be interpreted as an end instead of as a means. It can surely be interpreted as a means to an end; however, the conceptualization may occur only when it is offered as an end instead of as a means.

These double terms can be interpreted separately, and therefore may have rather different meanings. Immortalization is rather more related with time than glorification. It can be substituted with such terms as eternity, timelessness but the term immortalization suggests a more profound meaning in terms of architecture due to the strong emphasis of architecture on time. Glorification, on the other hand, has a more political meaning due to the fact that the act of glorifying may have a basis of worshipping.

These two terms may have versatile meaning while used together and while one after the other. It may be noticed that immortalization can occur due to glorification or vice versa. The point that should be emphasized is the

²⁹⁰ Op.cit.,Scruton (1979)., pg.72.

intention of abstraction that may occur during the creation period. Immortalization and glorification can be regarded as an experiment of abstraction. The realization of abstraction is based on the cultural and personal obtainment of a subject. Immortalization and glorification should be intentional and therefore personal in terms of the realization of an overall effect.

Immortalization and glorification can be thought as deriving from different sources and therefore may have been experimented in different terms. It is a matter of fact that the immortalization and glorification of something cannot be restricted within a certain period. It can be questionable whether the perception of the circumstances of immortalization & glorification needs an understanding of their objectives or the things immortalized and glorified can be *a priori*. If they are *a priori* in terms of Kant, in that sense it is nonsense to discuss the quality of the object of immortalization and glorification, it can be insisted due to the a priori nature of the '*something*' that there is no need to know something about them beforehand. According to Hegel, the aim of architecture should be to manipulate external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an artistic outer world.²⁹¹ The cognation to mind can be grasped as a way to realize the architecture as a natural phenomenon. Cognation may occur if the human body feels not alien to the built environment around him. The cognation to mind as an artistic outer world implies the transformation of natural environment to a work of art. What makes the outer world artistic is the nature of architecture in terms of the holistic approach of Hegel. For El Lissitzky, it is rather different from Hegel in terms of his emphasis on the synthesis between the technical and the artistic. It may be rather difficult to identify which one embraced the other; however, El Lissitzky may have an aim not to construct an embracement but on the contrary to construct an amalgamation. While defining the essence of Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International*, he insists:

This represents one of the first attempts to achieve a synthesis between the technical and the artistic. The efforts of the new architecture to loosen up volumes and to create a spatial interpretation between outside and inside found their early expression in this work. Here, an ancient concept of form,

²⁹¹ Hegel from Lectures on Aesthetics. Reprinted in Op. cit., Whiteman, pg.7.

as represented for example by the Sargon Pyramid at Khorsabad, was actually recreated in a new material for a new content. This effort, as well as a latter series of experiments with materials and models, gave birth to the term constructivism.²⁹²




Figure 5-1: Sargon Ziggurat



Figure 5-2: Monument to the Third International (a.k.a Tatlin's Tower), Tatlin, 1920

²⁹² El Lissitzky, Russia: An Architecture for World Revolution, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1984, pg.29.




Figure 5-3: The Palace of Sargon II

El Lissitzky's aim is to shed a light on a newly observed concept that 'medium of matter required both a visual and a tactile perception of things'.²⁹³ Actually, it can be a motto for constructivism. A sort of recreation may occur, according to El Lissitzky, if the perception of the space could change. According to El Lissitzky, the architecture should glorify the society in terms of its representational status and power. He insists:

Buildings designed to serve all of society have always acted as a repository of the sum total of all creative energies. Depending on the prevalent social order, these have usually been of either a religious or a governmental character: the Church and the Palace. These were the power sources of the old order. Their power can only be transcended by establishing new power sources belonging to our new order.²⁹⁴

Actually, the view that buildings designed to serve all of society acted as a repository of the sum total of all creative energies may have a meaning that architecture should be social and therefore functional. In addition, the question that how can buildings show the sum total of all creative energies might introduce the notion of El Lissitzky that buildings have the abstract strength of representation.

²⁹³ Op. cit. El Lissitzky (1984), pg.29.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., pg.43.

The notion embedded in Lenin's Tomb by Shchusev is notably similar with El Lissitzky as it embodies a version of political or social commitment. The glorification of an individual is the image of the immortalization of a commitment. As a matter of fact, as Wijdeveld indicates; "Wittgenstein thought of Lenin's tomb as one of the very few well designed contemporary buildings".²⁹⁵

5.1.5 The Cultural Value of Architecture as an Apparatus

"Words are like so many objects formed and deposited by history; for those who wish to achieve a formalization, language must strip itself of its concrete content and leave nothing visible but those forms of discourse that are universally valid; if one's intent is to interpret, then words become a text to be broken down so as to allow that other meaning hidden in them to emerge and become clearly visible; lastly, language may sometimes arise for its own sake in an act of writing that designates nothing other than itself."²⁹⁶

Architecture as an apparatus projects a certain but a crucial level of cultural affinity. As a cultural phenomenon, architecture may seek guidance from different sources ranging from art to religion. In this context, architecture as an art is not for art's sake. However, this probable contradiction (or contradistinction) may be seen in occurrence through all periods of architectural creation. As Alan Colquhoun insists, "[t]here is a common-sense view that divides mental activities into the scientific, depending on reason, and the artistic, depending on feeling or intuition."²⁹⁷ In this context, some may argue that in terms of having a cultural value or social responsibility, architecture should depend on a scientific sense. However, the cultural value of architecture as an apparatus probably manifests a more intuitive role for architecture because of the fact that apart from being a social art, architecture is not "an arid combination of the practical and utilitarian, but it

²⁹⁵ Op.cit., Wijdeveld.pg.177.

²⁹⁶ Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York, Random House, 1970, p.304.

²⁹⁷ Op. cit. Colquhoun (1994), pg.57.

remains art, that is to say, synthesis and expression.”²⁹⁸ Sant’Elia’s mentioning of “synthesis” may be understood as a Hegelian scientific rhetoric as “synthesis” manifests something such as “the evolution of ideas occurs through a dialectical process—that is, a concept gives rise to its opposite, and as a result of this conflict, a third view, the synthesis, arises.” However, Sant’Elia’s emphasis on “expression” should be understood as something acquired by synthesis. The insufficiency of such a dichotomy is more apparent in terms of architecture. As Alan Colquhoun insists, “[s]uch a simple dichotomy fails to take account of both the role that intuition plays in scientific thought and the role that the judgment-forming intellect plays in artistic creation. Nevertheless, the distinction contains an element of truth – less as a way of distinguishing between science and art than as a way of distinguishing between different aspects of the artistic process.”²⁹⁹

The dialectical relationship within the media of architecture makes human beings to be in interaction with the culture they live in. Architecture as an apparatus (of immortalization/glorification) may be a way to grasp life or show the characteristics of its time. If grasping architecture as a mirror of its time is possible, then it can be seen as a macrocosm. Besides, architecture can be regarded as an expression of thought, individualism, and individual creativity but also it is an expression of a culture, of a society and of a time. Therefore, within these senses architecture is not autonomous but instead bound up with the time and the culture.

The objects of immortalization/glorification are another important field in which architecture has a cultural value. The things immortalized/glorified by architecture have generally cultural roots that are very important for the society. The society in which these ‘*things*’ are developed uses architecture as a tool to create an integrity. If this integrity may be called as ‘macrocosm’, then the secondary status of architecture can be regarded as ‘microcosm’. As Vattimo puts it “the work of art as the occurrence of a weak truth is understandable, in so many senses, as a monument. It may even be thought

²⁹⁸ Antonio Sant’Elia/Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, “Futurist Architecture,” in *Op. Cit.*, Conrads (1999), pg.34.

²⁹⁹ *Op. Cit.*, Colquhoun (1994), pg. 57.

of in the sense of an architectural monument that contributes to form the background of our experience, but in itself generally remains the object of a distracted perception.”³⁰⁰ It may be suggested that the objects of immortalization/glorification decide whether architecture is an autonomous art or not. The importance of architecture as a cultural value is closely related with its being an apparatus (of immortalization/glorification) because throughout history it has been emancipated for higher objectives such as philosophy, politics, religion etc.

On a daily basis, architecture continues to have impact on a wide range of phenomenon. The question of being a cultural value depends on this shift of impact that architecture projects through a sense of metaphysical impact. Recognizing the fact that architecture implies a cultural value should not have a meaning that it immortalizes/glorifies something. The resurrection implied by Wittgenstein may probably have a more genuine meaning in terms of his emphasis on the transcendental features projected by the art of architecture. Such a resurrection with an emphasis on individualism may emerge as a contradiction (or a contradistinction) between the individualistic features and the requisites for projection of a cultural value. It should be recognized as a unifying fact that individualism emphasized by Wittgenstein may show a certain level of contradiction with projecting a cultural value. What might be achieved as a result of this sort of contradiction may be the term “*Lebensgefühl*” introduced by Heinrich Wölfflin. The term “*Lebensgefühl*” introduces an obligatory feature of having an impact on contemporary issues both culturally or politically in terms of having a cultural value. Through such an engaged process, Wölfflin asserts, architecture may have a cultural value. However, in Wittgenstein’s terms, such an engagement may refer to a certain level of succumbing and therefore cannot have any cultural value in any terms. One of the arguments that can project to this issue is the rhetoric that Wittgenstein used in order to determine what makes both architecture and architect ethical.

³⁰⁰ Gianni Vattimo, “Ornament and Monument,” in Rethinking Architecture (ed. Neil Leach), Routledge, London, 1997, pg.159.

Such prophetic arguments declare his unique rejection of western culture but specifically to the transitional period, which he was experiencing extremely and painfully. Wittgenstein's rejection of the fundamentals of this period is due to his rejection of the unethical, therefore unaesthetic, features of it. Actually, when compared with the fundamentals and manifestations of El Lissitzky, Wittgenstein can be regarded as highly pessimistic and nihilistic. The reason for why El Lissitzky battles with architecture, or in the name of architecture, is probably entirely futile as Wittgenstein insists that it does not make any difference whether an individual does have a fascist or a socialist tendency in terms of a lack of "something" that can be immortalized or glorified. In Wittgenstein's term, these have the same goals, manifestations and characteristics and do not have ethical priority. Their priorities are, for Wittgenstein, largely immoral and not in the name of individualism. In order for having an ethical bias, a culture should be based on something different from the Western aura of the transitional Interwar Period. In this context, El Lissitzky's notion of "ideological superstructure" demands a broader view, actually a dialectical one, but probably gives the architect a role that does not fit to the fundamentals of Wittgenstein. An architect regarding the remarks of Wittgenstein supports the fact that he cannot succumb but on the contrary resist. This notion may surely bring a climax in which architect is autonomous from the "ideological superstructure." Wittgenstein's point of view does not project an architect as a pioneer or as a strong ally of the "ideological superstructure" but on the contrary rather an autonomous individual capable of resistance. In this realization, Wittgenstein's point of view can be said to be congenial to the vision of Le Corbusier as Le Corbusier's intuitive and totally modernist vision may be seen in contradiction with his emphasis on the notion that an architect is the agent of industrialism. *Kundmanngasse's* uniqueness in terms of both construction and design suggests that Wittgenstein did not adhere to the restrictions of industrialism. However, it seems quite appropriate that the way Wittgenstein envisaged is not in total harmony with Mendelsohn's vision of utopist architecture and his sense of beauty as a scientifically driven expression or even .Rudolf Steiner's vision of architect as a complete master of entire arts.

5.1.6 The scope of historical approach (or historicism) in terms of immortalization and glorification

Historicism as a tool of architectural historicism can be defined and comprehended in different ways due to the various circumstances. As Alan Colquhoun asserts, “[d]ictionary definitions (and general usage) suggest that there are three interpretations of historicism: (1) the theory that all sociocultural phenomena are historically determined and that all truths are relative; (2) a concern for the institutions and traditions of the past; (3) the use of historical forms.”³⁰¹ If the first and the last definition of the terms are combined in order to shed light to immortalization / glorification, it may be argued that the first part of the first meaning of the term can be thought in relation to immortalization and glorification as it may suggest a certain level of the term “*Lebensgefühl*”.³⁰² However, the second part suggesting that all truths are relative indicates that there can be no timeless truth in terms of an object of immortalization and glorification. Colquhoun terms the first definition as “a theory of history”³⁰³ and the last one as “an artistic practice.”³⁰⁴ The last definition may therefore suggest a more convenient ground for the formation of immortalization and glorification. However, the combination of the two corresponding meanings may result in a contradiction with the notion of immortalization and glorification as they suggest a certain level of timeless and *a priori* features in certain levels. What Wölfflin suggest with the term *Lebensgefühl* may have strong reasoning as it indicates that the scope of architecture is bounded with the social cases of a particular period. In order to be more profound regarding the scope of historicism, it may be argued that the relativity indicated in historicist approach can be treated as a theory rather than aesthetics due to the notion that architectural theory itself is relative in its nature. The impact of this relative thinking is so apparent as

³⁰¹ Op. Cit., Colquhoun (1994), pg.3.

³⁰² The term “*Lebensgefühl*” may remind another crucial term “*Lebensformen*” which can be a key term to understand the Habsburg Vienna and its impact on Wittgenstein. *Lebensformen* was a book by a Neo-Kantian philosopher Eduard Spranger published shortly after the First World War. The concepts initiated by Spranger was a re-interpretation of Kantian concepts concerning “synthetic a priori principles” and their validity.

³⁰³ Op. Cit., Colquhoun (1994), pg.3.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. pg.3

Colquhoun insists, “[t]he idea that values change and develop with historical time is by now so ingrained in common wisdom that it is difficult to imagine a different point of view.”³⁰⁵ The notion of immortalization should inherently manifest that certain values are constant and therefore cannot be rendered in relative terms. The principle that historical time and its features determine these values can be regarded as another field that may be seen in contradiction with the notion of immortalization and glorification. In addition, the values in constant change may not refer to a [true] architecture as it reinforces the idea that immortalization and glorification is *a posteriori* therefore totally relative. “History as the story of the contingent”³⁰⁶, as Colquhoun states, reflects a certain level of ephemeral features and therefore cannot be reluctant to reflect timelessness in terms of immortalization and glorification. Architecture as a socio-cultural phenomenon determines not only the fact that architecture is not inherently autonomous but also it has strong dialectical relationship with other disciplines. This notion may lead to a more rational therefore more profound understanding of architecture. The reason why architecture is not autonomous may derive from the fact that it has inevitably dialectical relationships both internally and externally. As Alan Colquhoun commits, “[t]he fact that history cannot be considered as determined and teleological in any crude sense leaves open to question the relation between the historicity of all cultural production, on the one hand, and the cumulative and normative nature of cultural values, on the other.”³⁰⁷ The historicity of all cultural production emerges as a shift between the historical periods and therefore may hinder a probable relationship (or dialectic) between these periods. As historicism would not permit such an agglomeration, the rhetoric of each particular period manifests itself as a remote discourse.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., pg.3.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., pg.3.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., pg.15.

5.2 Immortalization and Glorification of “Something” by means of [true] Architecture

Architecture with its versatile objectives can transform the act of building to an art, to a craft or to a daily routine. However, in terms of immortalization and glorification the objects of architecture can be coherently defined within the territories of philosophy, religion, politics and aesthetics.

Perception of the universe by the art of architecture can resemble with philosophy, as it can be understood as an individual effort of understanding the on-going process of life. If architecture can be credited as a way of formal representation or interpretation of one's own perception, then it can be claimed that it should be treated as a pure art as the goal of art may alternatively be defined as the individual creation and expression of representations of beauty. As beauty itself is quite an arbitrary concept, its verbal interpretation can be quite in vain because the crucial thing in question is not the interpretation itself but on the contrary the abstract beauty.

Architecture can surely be described as a technical issue in modern life; however, this same modern life can also be understood as a way of creating a new utopian style of living. Therefore, it can be argued that this so-called modern life is a “false” representation of the Modern Life and the function of architecture in the terms of modernity indicates a glorification and immortalization of a utopia or some other timeless concepts and can ignore the function or technical demands of a building. If this can be the perception of architecture in Modern Life (in utopian terms) then there can be still some question on this issue of glorification or immortalization as not the entire buildings have to immortalize something. They can show a lack of immortalization if there is nothing to glorify for a building and this time it is “nothing” that is glorified and immortalized.

Conceptual and integral part of architecture can be claimed as the summit of architecture and as Wittgenstein indicates, there can be no architecture without any conceptualization. If the term “pure architecture” can be used in order to describe the real intention of an architect as an artist, this term may be accepted to indicate only some abstract concepts not functional or pragmatic concepts. As a way of describing architecture, showing some

images of some buildings that immortalizes or glorifies something can be a reliable way. However, this “something” surely an abstract thing that is hard to represent or perceive entirely- is in fact the architecture itself.

5.2.1 The Qualities of Something Immortalized & Glorified by Virtue of [True] Architecture

Something immortalized/glorified by virtue of architecture seems as if it is embedded into architecture itself and architecture embraces all features of “something”. However, it may be argued that “something” may sometimes embrace architecture and may turn architecture into an ordinary apparatus. Actually, the notion of being an apparatus can be considered as a dual issue in which on the one hand, architecture is regarded as an art with social concerns and on the other hand, an ordinary instrument of totalitarian features as a result of certain misjudgment in utilization of architecture. There can be a valid question whether “something” shapes the process of architectural design or not. In this context, architecture is purported to be the “expression” of this “something”. According to Collingwood (1938-...), a teacher of philosophy, “expression” was the primary aim of art precisely because there could be no craft of expression.” It should be noted that the quality of “something” could be so crucial in terms of its essence on the art of architecture. Therefore, it can be argued that the “something” immortalized/glorified by virtue of architecture cannot have any further meaning apart from the expression cultivated by the art of architecture. However; if the quality of “something” embraces the expression projected by architecture, the rhetoric of this “something” may radically change due to the features external to the expressiveness of architecture.

The quality of “something” may be the transcendental of its features. Architectural aesthetics rather than architectural theory would probably be demanding such a direct relationship with these transcendental and timeless features. As the “international” features of architecture increases, its level of power to represent a manner ideology decreases. As Kenneth Frampton insists, “[t]he modernist tendency to reduce all form to abstraction made it an unsatisfactory manner in which to represent the power and ideology of the

state.”³⁰⁸ Abstraction can be quite non-pragmatic to stylize and represent a direct phenomenon as ideology of the state. Architecture as an apparatus of immortalization/glorification of ideology can be defined as a direct instrumentality of architecture rather than as a social concern. This may also lead to a systematization of social concerns focusing on the mystification of society. Architecture may sustain a sort of iconographic value for the society but the emancipation of architectural forms and theories may only exist within integrity of social concerns.

The recall of mainly a chaotic period such as the Interwar Period of 1919-1939 may surely be reduced to the discussion of these “something” as the contradistinction between these “something” may develop a sort of dialectics. It should be noted to discuss in a dialectical tone is so crucial in terms of a rational evaluation of such a period. The comprehensions manifested by the individuals or groups of this period were largely able to exist within the possibility this dialectic. The annexation of Wittgenstein into this “authentic” dialectic can be possible in many terms because although Wittgenstein seems not very interested at the formations of his period, the others seem very interested and actually were influenced by Wittgenstein. One of the main reasons for why the annexation of Wittgenstein into this dialectic is relatively hypothetical may be the lack of his systematic approach in Wittgenstein. Such a lack indicates itself within the unsystematic miscellaneous remarks of him written through a long period, full of so much aspirations but lacking a sort of systematization of including concepts. Another reason, probably a more crucial one, is the relatively radical distinction between the notion of Wittgenstein and his contemporaries. What makes Wittgenstein radically distinct from his contemporaries is probably his sense of manifestation in individualism.

³⁰⁸ Quoted in Op. cit., Scruton (1979), pg.7.

5.2.2 The Role of 'Something' In Architecture

Something as the objective of “architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification” is maintained as a radical and crucial element of this process of immortalization and glorification. The possibility of being “nothing” of something is also valid in terms of Wittgenstein as he mentioned if there is no need for a building to immortalize and glorify something, then a building might immortalize and glorify “nothingness”. The emphasis of Wittgenstein on the “functional” or “rational” immortalization/glorification sustains a better understanding of his approach by eliminating some possible romantic or shallow understandings (or misunderstandings). Therefore, the role of “something” may still exist and be regarded as crucial even though it does not exist in effective or positive form. Wittgenstein insists the unnecessary of immortalization/glorification of “something” by a building such as a factory or a hospital. According to him, such an attempt would be meaningful only in terms of the transformation of “something” into “nothing”. It is something like the notion of a humanistic ethical feature that is stressed. At this point, it can be meaningful to reveal the theory of Wittgenstein on the resemblance of a building with a human body.

The realization of a building as a “gestural entity”³⁰⁹ can be estimated as the summit of architectural abstraction. This summit involves the interaction of human bodies with architectural works of art.

5.2.3 The Role of the Architect within the Process of Immortalization and Glorification of Something

As a historically considered issue, the timeless concepts immortalized by the virtue of [true] architecture can be seen as an output of artificial ideas that are accepted by the majority of people. It may be a topic to discuss whether the majority of people are important for the individual who designs; individual in charge of [true] architecture. For instance, from the standpoint of Rudolph Steiner, majorities should not be that important as the intentional

features of his designs demand a more introverted perception. The intention in Steiner during the design period resembles to the esoteric features of a monk and it is his intention to follow this way.

The so-called true architecture can be described as a way to communicate with people in such a way a painting or a book does or expect to do. The question of representing such abstract terms like, for instance imagination, nationality, immortality or culture may derive from the inevitable necessity of giving a meaning to the environmental issues. As an anti-modern term, this glorification/immortalization can quickly replace the modern term functionality, as it is much more popular or comprehensible for the average people. If it can be claimed that the whole process is arbitrary, then this transformation of an architectural object into a timeless concept can give this architectural object extra “functions”. It is probably important to determine which image of the architectural object represents an abstract and timeless concept. It can also be argued that it is a question of future generations to determine this issue as it is their task to transform the architectural object into a representation or image of a concept. It is quite reasonable to ask if it is necessary to create such a transformation. The true architecture is then not a modern issue as it declares something beyond functionality of modern buildings. It can be claimed that the modern buildings of Modern Life can reasonably be interpreted totally in a different way and there is also a possibility, for instance, hundred years later, to interpret the concrete modern buildings as the representatives of some newly invented concepts. The so-called modern necessities for an architectural work can be therefore taken as a counterpart of the architecture defined with the terms of Wittgenstein. If the modern aura dictates a craftsmanship-like architecture, it can be argued that there has to be a necessity for it as it can be credited only as a thing demanded just for a crucial necessity. The question on the description of these timeless concepts can be seen as a non-architectural one if architecture is not intentional, however it can be very crucial if the architecture has a deep intention in glorifying/immortalizing timeless concepts. The architect, therefore, can describe what his/her intentions while

³⁰⁹ Probably, the leading “gestural entity” can be the human body.

creating his/her building with architectural terms or maybe even non-architectural terms. It can be still questionable to see the work of an architect as a representation of an abstract concept although he/she had no intention in evoking such a concept. Cultural debates on the immortalization/glorification of some concepts with architecture can be the source of this phenomenon as these concepts can usually change according to the habits of a culture. Modern culture or modern life can dictate purely functional and machine-like buildings. However, if it is the necessity that is crucial, then there can be possibility of a conceptual, purely artistic architecture. If it can be seen as a question of fashion, the problem of timelessness can be seen as an obstacle; however, “modernity is based on fashion” can be a reasonable motto at least for recent times.

It can be claimed that the description of Architecture by Wittgenstein dictates a sort of transcendentalism. It is certain that there can be at least some individuals to try this utopian process; however, the crucial thing is to keep this process going on. It can be quite interesting to predict the criteria of a building in order to see it as a monument just as Wittgenstein describes in 50 or 100 years period. As it is reasonable that this kind of prediction can be a kind of treatise in the future, this process is a philosophical one but also a political one. What has to be done in order to achieve a sort of glorification and immortalization can not be an intentional question. However there can be a possibility that this intention of the architect is not more important than the effect of the interpretation of the masses or the ongoing political and daily processes. What concepts can be used to glorify and immortalize within the terms of architecture is another side of the question. As these concepts are possibly seen as timeless but in contradiction they can evolve through history; it may not depend on anyone or any culture. These concepts rarely arise from within architecture itself. The arbitrariness of these concepts may not be a question of architecture but generally a question of the humanity itself. Therefore, architecture does not influence directly the humanity, however in contrast humanity – or the ongoing process effecting it- effects architecture. The reality of architecture in history may be seen in its power of glorifying and immortalizing some abstract and spiritual concepts, which also

affect humanity itself. The instrument-like function of architecture can be transformed into an art-like function with this glorification/immortalization process. It can be seen a resurrection of architecture in the future but also a metamorphosis of architecture. What will be the most considerable function of architecture? In Wittgensteinian terms, it can be quite a source for the representation of pure ethic without any pragmatic function as it is today. Therefore, the role of architect can be transformed into a purely artistic vision. The intention of architect in this glorification and immortalization process will be crucially important, as the role of architect will solely depend on this intention. Nevertheless, it can also be apprehended as a self-glorification of the architect.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study argues that the relation between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries of the Interwar Period may shed an indispensable light for an extensive understanding of the questions and conceptions of architecture itself. The depiction of architecture as an apparatus of “immortalization” and “glorification” definitely deters the evaluation of architecture as a merely technical issue deriving from the so-called fact that architecture must fulfill certain functions. In order to epitomize such a probably inscrutable field, it should be noted that this text was mainly concerned with a correlation rather than a direct, one-dimensional depiction of the Interwar Period. The hypothetical relation between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries can be handled in various ways due to the fact that Wittgenstein was versatile within a notion that he resisted to handle issues in a singular way. The depiction of Wittgenstein so as to define a historical period full of transition is meaningful in terms of a symbolic relevance between Wittgenstein and his era. However, the depiction of Wittgenstein from a historical point of view is assumed lack of certain level of psychological insight. Therefore, Wittgenstein himself is regarded as *Einfall* in order to give a broader sense in terms of his decisive significance throughout the text. Wittgenstein as *Einfall* rhetorically maintains a certain level of symbolic importance to Wittgenstein regarding the vision he implies. Wittgenstein was regarded neither as a philosopher nor as an architect throughout the text mainly because of an effort of giving a panorama of both the man and his era. This choice of panorama also avoided to draw such a distinction while thinking him rather as a philosopher or an architect.

The centrality of Wittgenstein is assumed to have a synecdochic value. While the interwar period of 1919-1939 literally symbolized the *angst*

period in broad-spectrum, it was regarded that he implicitly symbolized the interwar period of 1919-39. He and his architecture symbolize a remote level of individuality but still give rise to a certain sense of symbolic value. The manifestation of a pattern in terms of the architectural notion of Wittgenstein derives mainly from a more aphoristic side of Wittgensteinian philosophy so as to notice that philosophical synthesis of him may suggest that architecture played a crucial role in his thinking. Throughout the process, this guidance of Wittgenstein's aphoristic side played a latent but a crucial role in order to define the correlation between his philosophy and his.

The immortalization and glorification by means of architecture was used throughout the text as an alternative sense of architecture: architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification. Wittgenstein's notion of aesthetics as an ethical practice depicts a certain feeling of morality rather than a merely aesthetic approach in the sense of "Art for Art's Sake". The aesthetic notion of Wittgenstein is interpreted as contradictory when compared with the notion of Aestheticism in terms of the conceptual framework for the autonomy of architecture. While some concepts of Wittgenstein can be esteemed as a framework for the autonomy of architecture, his strict sense of the moral responsibility of both the architect and his/her architecture perceives not autonomy, but on the contrary a social obligation and based on versatile phenomena. In some manners, the ascetic prudence of Wittgenstein purports to be a sign for autonomy. However, the autonomy Wittgenstein projected is claimed to be a sign of his entire philosophy.

The patternistic proposition throughout the text purported to be a key to the understanding of Wittgenstein's notion of architecture. With its tripartite formulation, the intention was to analyze its parts in terms of a dialectical relationship. As the patternistic proposition by Wittgenstein is the summit of his remarks on architecture in terms of both historically and rhetorically, it served throughout the text as a mediator to correlate the approaches of the *angst* period. Wittgenstein's harsh critic of the non-ethical treatises of its time including pre-war, war and post-war periods in terms of both its social

structure and its attitude towards art in general served as the main topic of contradistinction between Wittgenstein and the other treatises. The ethical notion of Wittgenstein was handled as the main source of differences and nuances between Wittgenstein and the rest. As to whether ethics played a crucial role in the architectural treatises of Wittgenstein or not, it was argued in the text that the ethics played a crucial role not only for architectural terms but also for the entire terms in which Wittgenstein manifested himself. His sense of ethics is closely associated with aesthetics and actually, he indicated to a great extent that aesthetics can be summed up as ethics. The assessment of architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification can also be considered as an ethical approach in terms of the fact that its highly aesthetic relevance derives mainly from ethical sources. As Wittgenstein may have borrowed from Otto Weininger in his 'Sex and Character' that "[h]ow difficult it becomes to hold aesthetics and ethics apart." This notion has surely a power to give an ethical status to the concept of "architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification" rather than a merely utopist one.

Throughout the text, the correlation between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries were handled as a correlation between remote figures so as to annotate that they represent remote ideas mainly derived from the fact that Wittgenstein's understanding of architecture involves strict ethical requisites. These requisites may lead to a notion that Wittgenstein is anti-modern in terms of his relation with his contemporaries. However, throughout the text and mainly in section four, Wittgenstein was not referred to or tagged as anti-modern in order to sustain a certain level of critical standpoint. Such a tagging was thought to be irrelevant as the status of Wittgenstein may change according to other criterion and besides the term, itself is rather thought to be too rigid to define the architectural notion of Wittgenstein. The Interwar Period of 1919-1939 was strictly handled to give a clear analysis of what architecture of transitional periods are capable. In this context, whether architecture played an indispensable role or not was a question of significance throughout the text. The "[true] architecture" as a

summit of the architectural treatises of Wittgenstein is primarily treated not as a kind of architecture but instead as the only way, that architecture itself can only exist. The term [true] as a latent manifestation has a potential of having multiple meanings and derivation mainly based on the ethical/aesthetical correlation in Wittgenstein's notion of architecture. "Architecture as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification" as a diverse category of architecture can be capable of being a reply of such a question as it denotes a certain situation in which the sole function of architecture is to immortalize and glorify something. The notion that if there is nothing immortalize or glorify then there can be no architecture, is not an in-between declaration. On the contrary, it cannot condescend to any sort of compromise. The role as an apparatus implies that it can only exist within a broader mission. The principle factors for Wittgenstein while criticizing the ongoing aura of his time was primarily the question of compromise or rather the problem of "taking sides". Probably, the Interwar Period was a harsh period in which it was relatively difficult to succeed not to take a side. However, Wittgenstein's ultimate goal is to take an ethical/aesthetical standpoint for which it is impossible for unethical or utilitarian approaches to have a place. If it can be kept in mind that the Interwar Period was probably a summit for Modern Architecture, then it is more deliberate to reveal that architecture as an "apparatus of immortalization and glorification" sustains a more tangible field of comprehension. This relative tangibility derives from the fact that the era of Modern Architecture, at least some pioneers of him, revealed their status as a pioneer of a new architecture. Strictly speaking, this sort of thinking manifests an alternative way of grasping such a complicated period as Interwar Period and its inevitable consequences. The method implied throughout the text should seem to underline this alternative approach as it denotes critical aspects of Wittgensteinian [true] architecture. From the standpoint of all these conceptions, this study suggests that the uncompromising declarations of Ludwig Wittgenstein can deliberately act as an authoritative pattern for the architecture of the Interwar Period as a "synecdoche" in order to reveal their conceptualization towards [true] architecture.

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Angst:

A German word which means "*anxiety*" or "*anguish*." Technically, this is a term used in *Existentialism* which expresses the dread reality that the future is an unknown chasm; therefore, the *choices* that a person (*the existent*) makes are the determining factor in the outcome of one's future - thus, the cause for "*angst*." ³¹⁰

An acute but unspecific feeling of anxiety; usually reserved for philosophical anxiety about the world or about personal freedom. ³¹¹

While Kierkegaard's feeling of angst is fear of actual responsibility to God, in modern use, angst is broadened to include general frustration associated with the conflict between actual responsibilities to self, one's principles, and others (possibly including God).³¹²

The term "*angst*" can be highly appropriate to define "the between the wars" period of 1919-1939 and plus the war period itself. However, the source of the "*angst*" was probably this transitional circumstances giving rise to a certain level of personal crisis. This crisis, therefore, may lead to a "genesis". It may help to define both the aura of that certain period and the social actors of that period. As the devastations of the war were highly catastrophic, for some of them the period was beyond an *angst* period.

In the wake of the catastrophic war and an influenza epidemic that claimed 20 million lives worldwide, many Europeans believed, with German philosopher Oswald Spengler, that they were witnessing the decline of the West. Signs of hope, to be sure, could still be found; the League of Nations had been created, and the principle of self-determination was said to have triumphed in east central Europe. Russia had rid itself of tsarist autocracy, and imperial Germany had become a republic. The League of Nations exerted little influence, however, and nationalism continued to be a double-edged sword. The creation of nation-states in Central Europe necessarily entailed national minorities, because ethnicity could not be the sole criterion for the construction of defensible frontiers. The tsars had been replaced by Bolsheviks, who refused to recognize the legitimacy of any European government. Most important, perhaps, the Treaty of Versailles, with its war-guilt clause, had wounded German national pride, and Italians were

³¹⁰ "angst," <http://www.apologetics.org/glossary.html>

³¹¹ "angst," <http://wordnet.princeton.edu/>

³¹² "angst,": <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angst>

convinced that they had been denied their rightful share of the postwar spoils. Exploiting national discontent and fear of communism, Benito Mussolini established a Fascist dictatorship in 1922. Although his political doctrine was vague and contradictory, he recognized that in an age of mass politics, a blend of nationalism and socialism possessed the greatest revolutionary potential. In Germany, inflation and depression provided Adolf Hitler with an opportunity to combine the same two revolutionary ideologies. For all his nihilism, Hitler never doubted that the National Socialist German Workers' party was the promising vehicle for his ambition. As Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin subordinated international to national communism; proclaiming "socialism in one country," he erected a governmental apparatus that was unrivaled in its pervasiveness.³¹³

Apparatus:

(Noun). equipment designed to serve a specific function³¹⁴

The term "apparatus" maintains a certain sense of latent feature for architecture in terms of the realization of it as a phenomenon in existence only when serving to immortalize and glorify something. Therefore, it may be argued that architecture cannot be perceived as an individual concept but on the contrary as an apparatus. In a slightly similar manner, Wilhelm Reich refers to term regarding the inevitable principles of bourgeoisie. He remarks:

The bourgeois republics, even in their most democratic forms . . . inevitably remained a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, an apparatus for the exploitation and suppression of the great majority of working people by a handful of capitalists; this for the simple reason that the private ownership of the means of production continued to exist. In contradistinction, the proletarian or Soviet democracy changed the mass organization precisely of the classes which were suppressed by capitalism, the proletarians and poor peasants, the semi-proletarians, that is, the overwhelming majority of the population, making them the only basis of the total state apparatus, the local as well as the central, and from the bottom up. It is precisely in this manner that the Soviet state, to an incomparably greater extent than was possible anywhere else, made local and provincial self-government, without any superimposed authority, a reality.³¹⁵

In this sense, it may be regarded as quite appropriate to think architecture similar with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in terms of their *existence* because both of their existence is by means of a apparatus-like occupation.

Dialectics:

³¹³ "angst," Encarta Encyclopedia

³¹⁴ "apparatus," *Wordnet*, Princeton University, 2003

³¹⁵ Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, English translation by Theodore P. Wolfe, Orgone Institute Press, New York, 1946, pg.113. footnote

(Noun) a rationale for dialectical materialism based on change through the conflict of opposing forces ³¹⁶

Dialectics is the method of reasoning which aims to understand things concretely in all their movement, change and interconnection, with their opposite and contradictory sides in unity.

Dialectics is opposed to the formal, metaphysical mode of thought of ordinary understanding which begins with a fixed definition of a thing according to its various attributes.

And for dialectics, things can be contradictory not just in appearance, but in *essence*.

Dialectics has its origins in ancient society, both among the Chinese and the Greeks, where thinkers sought to understand Nature as a whole, and saw that everything is fluid, constantly changing, coming into being and passing away. It was only when the piecemeal method of observing Nature in bits and pieces, practiced in Western thinking in the 17th and 18th century, had accumulated enough positive knowledge for the interconnections, the transitions, the genesis of things to become comprehensible, that conditions became ripe for modern dialectics to make its appearance. It was Hegel who was able to sum up this picture of universal interconnection and mutability of things in a system of *Logic* which is the foundation of what we today call Dialectics. ³¹⁷

Einfall:

Noun. idea, concept, Notion

The term “*einfall*” referring a “concept” or a “notion” means something quite different or something rather much more elaborated. It defines a notion that may give inspiration to someone or something. In addition, it may define something *a priori*. The notion it gives is somehow transcendental and mystical in terms of the way it was used in Wittgenstein literature. Brian McGuinness remarks:

“Again and again (as will appear) we have the impression that he was comparatively little affected by new discoveries or advances made by others; and that, important though discussion and reflection to him, their function was to enable to him to articulate and clarify some initial insight, some inspiration or *Einfall* that had come to him in his earliest reading on a subject.” ³¹⁸

Regarding the essence of the essence of the term, Paul Engelmann asserts:

For Wittgenstein, the flash of insight (*Einfall*) was everything. ...He would never commit himself to anything that did not occur to him as a flash of insight. I believe that this was the criterion by which he decided between true or false: did it occur to him as a flash or not? And it is that which

³¹⁶ “dialectics,” Wordnet, Princeton University, 2003

³¹⁷ “dialectics,” Encyclopedia of Marxism, Marxist Internet Archive, 2007

³¹⁸ Brian McGuinness, Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein's Life 1889-1921, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pg.92.

distinguishes him from an ordinary philosopher who constantly searches through a mist, without real flashes of inspiration, for something which can only follow from an original flash of inspiration and which leads to tenable result. It is, of course, also conceivable that where there is as yet no flash of insight, one first starts searching for it. But then the flash must happen. If not everything else is hopeless. The flash of inspiration is, so to speak, the *a priori*.³¹⁹

Lebensgefühl:

1. experience (oder awareness) of life; *es steigerte mein Lebensgefühl* it made me more keenly aware of being alive; *es war ein völlig neues Lebensgefühl* it was a completely new feeling (for me etc.), I etc. felt a different person
2. (*Lebenseinstellung*) attitude towards life ³²⁰

Rudolf Carnap used the term in his “*Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*”:

Metaphysics has no “theoretical” content because it does not offer a description [*Darstellung*] of states of affairs; it merely provides the expression [*Ausdruck*] of an attitude toward life – a *Lebensgefühl*.³²¹

Regarding Kant’s attitude towards aesthetic pleasure, Béatrice Longuenesse remarks the term:

In response, I shall first note that Kant does grant that all pleasure or displeasure is the feeling of a living entity in the biological sense: a conscious corporeal being. Nevertheless, he adds, if all pleasure were a pleasure grounded on attraction or emotion, then there would be no justification for demanding of others an agreement with our own pleasure. So there has to be an *a priori* ground to the peculiar kind of pleasure that is the aesthetic pleasure of reflection. This *a priori* ground, as we shall see shortly, is a peculiar feature of the very functioning of our mind, or representational capacities. So far, all we know is that by virtue of this pleasure, the mind tends to nothing more, nothing less, than to maintain itself in its own state. Now being the cause and the effect, of oneself is precisely Kant’s characterization of life, as a capacity of corporeal things. It thus seems quite apt to say: in aesthetic pleasure, the mind is cause and effect of nothing but itself, and so aesthetic pleasure is *Lebensgefühl* in this restricted sense: feeling of the life of the mind (of the representational capacities). Nevertheless, the term “life” has at same time its most usual sense (the capacity of a corporeal being to be cause and effect of its own activity), since there would be no feeling of pleasure unless the representational capacities were those of a living thing, in the ordinary sense of the term.

³¹⁹ Reprinted in Op. Cit., Wijdeveld, pg.166.

³²⁰ “*Lebensgefühl*,” *Handwörterbuch Deutsch-Englisch*, Langenscheidt KG, 2005

³²¹ Rudolf Carnap, “*Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*,” *Erkenntnis* 2

(1931); translated by Arthur Pap as “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of

Language,” in *Logical Positivism*, ed. A.J. Ayer, Free Press, New York 1959, 238/78.

I added that this life of the mind is also the “life of the spirit” i.e. the life of a universal community of judging subjects. With this suggestion I in fact anticipated a point that finds its initial expression only in the second moment of Kant’s analytic of the judgement of taste: what it is about the state of mind that elicits the peculiar kind of pleasure that is aesthetic pleasure is the very fact that it is universally communicable, or makes a claim to the possibility of being shared by all human beings. I thus suggest that the aesthetic pleasure, according to Kant, is a *Lebensgefühl* in the additional sense that it is a feeling of the life (the capacity to be the cause and effect of itself) of an a priori grounded community of the judging subjects (a community grounded in the a priori representational capacities shared by all judging subjects, considered simply as such.)³²²

Reklamearchitektur (Advertising Architecture):

Reklamearchitektur is a term used by Adolf Behne in order to define the architectural language developed by the German-born architect Erich Mendelsohn during 1920s. As Tafuri&Dal Co insists:

“In the Schocken Department Stores of 1926-28 in Stuttgart and of 1928-29 in Chemnitz (now Karl-Marx-Stadt), and even more in the WOGA complex of 1925-28 in Berlin comprising apartments, offices, entertainment places, and the Universum Cinema, Mendelsohn refined his syntax, based on the complex play of forms that was concentrated at the sensitive points of volumes. He thereby developed a language that Adolf Behne called *Reklamearchitektur* (Advertising Architecture), E. Persico interpreted as a crystallization of the conquests of the modern movement, and B. Zevi as an Expressionistic explosion of formal tensions. What is certain, in any case, is that in the 1920s and 1930s his architecture was highly ambiguous. His emphasis on the “consumer’s city” was clever but depended on a codified system of signs of guaranteed effectiveness. The Columbus Haus (1931-32) on the Potsdamerplatz in Berlin marked the culmination of that syntax. There the classical ingredients of the international vocabulary – windows stretching the full length, volumetric purism, façades independent from structure – were set into an organic volume that was responsive to the urban setting. It was the same line of linguistic purification that Mendelsohn used again in 1931 in his competition project for the remodeling of the Alexanderplatz in Berlin. There he proposed a continuous circular edifice surmounting the streets leading into the plaza, thus shaping this fragment of the city into a distinct set piece. Behrens won the competition, however, and he succeeded in realizing only part of his plan.

When the anti-Semitic laws forced Mendelsohn to emigrate to England in 1933, the most significant chapter of his activity was brought to a close, one marked by an optimistic exaltation of the dynamic of the great city within which his commercial or public entertainment buildings were elevated to focal nodes of the urban form. It should be noted that Mendelsohn chose to work for monied capitalist clients who could sponsor projects that permitted him to enter into the quick of the urban substance. Running counter to the utopias realized by the radical architects, who in their housing projects (*Siedlungen*) in the urban peripheries attempted to modify the laws forming a

³²² Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant on the Human Standpoint*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005,

city, Mendelsohn's *Reklamearchitektur* took its place in that chaos of stimuli which is the commercial center and which, with him, could lose that anguished aspect attributed to it by Expressionism and propose itself anew as a dynamic force to the public of Weimar Germany. This was the real aim behind his architecture: it was intended not so much for the particular company or store commissioning the building as for the vital forces inherent in the contemporary metropolis.³²³

Sachlichkeit:

(*Objektivität*) objectivity; (*Nüchternheit*) matter-of-factness; *eines Bauwerks etc.:* functionalism; *die Neue Sachlichkeit* the New Realism³²⁴

The term *Sachlichkeit* may be regarded in close association with the adage of *Simplex Sigillum Veri* as they together reflect the true meaning of functionalism at least in terms of Wittgenstein. However, there can be misunderstanding of the term as it reveals something unemotional, unaesthetic. In this context, the term can be perceived in different terms such as artistic *Sachlichkeit* or functionalist *Sachlichkeit*. Regarding this issue on the basis of Bruno Taut, Kai Gutschow remarks:

In the process of starting to design the "Monument to Iron," Taut met the young art critic and former architectural student Adolf Behne, soon to be Taut's biggest supporter.²⁰ Drawing on evolving definitions of Expressionism that he had gleaned from Wassily Kandinsky, Wilhelm Worringer, and other artists and theoreticians known to him through Berlin's avant-garde Sturm gallery, Behne began to write a series of articles that all commented favorably on the "new, revolutionary," and "strict, sachlich" (objective) nature of Taut's pavilion. Basing his ideas more on feelings than visual cues, he wrote "everyone could feel that behind these spare and wonderfully energetic creations, free of all quotation, there is a truly modern and totally contemporary artist . . . What distinguishes [Taut], is his rigid *Sachlichkeit*—that is, an artistic *Sachlichkeit*, and not the *Sachlichkeit* of a 'functionalist' or of a 'purist' . . ." ²¹ The modern, spectator experience of Taut's "Monument to Iron" was especially convincing, Behne felt, in comparison to the anachronistic logo of the Leipzig exposition—a single classical column—or in comparison to the neighboring "Concrete

Pavilion"—a pastiche of the Roman Pantheon designed by the conservative architect Wilhelm Kreis.³²⁵

Simplex Sigillum Veri:

Simplex Sigillum Veri is a motto by Herman Boerhaave meaning that "simplicity is the seal of truth."³²⁶ In proposition 5. 4541 of *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein used the term as such:

³²³ Op. cit., Tafuri & Dal Co (1976), pg.144.

³²⁴ "Sachlichkeit," *Handwörterbuch Deutsch-Englisch*, Langenscheidt KG, 2005

³²⁵ Kai K. Gutschow, "From Object to Installation in Bruno Taut's Exhibit Pavilions," in *Journal*

The solutions of the problems of logic must be simple, since they set the standard of simplicity.

Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to questions are symmetrically combined – a priori to form a self-contained system.

A realm subject to the law: *Simplex sigillum veri*³²⁷

Regarding the sense of the term in Wittgenstein's literature, Wijdeveld asserts:

Philosophical problems arise when the careless use of language hides whether an assertion is properly factual and verifiable or whether it also attempts to express matters of value. If that happens the application of logic should reveal what is factual and what belongs to the realm of values. The factual then ceases to be problematic, for it can be verified. The elements trying to express value can be removed from the assertion for they are inexpressible; consequently the problem has disappeared. This approach to solving philosophical problems has been called the 'method' of logical clarification.

But then one may ask what is the criterion of logical clarity, how is it that we know whether logical clarity has been achieved? The application of logic again shows to which elements no facts can correspond and which therefore have no use. The criterion thus realized is Occam's Razor, *simplex sigillum veri*, or simplicity is the hallmark of truth, which is not, according to Wittgenstein, an arbitrary or practically successful rule but the very principle of logic, the contents of which can only be shown.³²⁸

Synecdoche:

(noun) a figure of speech in which a part is made to represent the whole or vice versa.³²⁹

As a term, "synecdoche" refers to a sense of symbolic deliberation in which a phenomenon exceeds its transitory meaning and gains a more general and symbolic one or vice versa. There can be an intention of exaggeration while referring to something in synecdochical terms. In synecdochical terms, one term may serve as a unique term suggesting that it is itself purported to be a latent factor for the period in question.

of Architectural Education, 2006, pp.63-70.

³²⁶ "simplex sigillum veri," Routledge Dictionary of Latin Quotations, Routledge, London, 2005

³²⁷ Op. cit., Wittgenstein (2001), pg.

³²⁸ Op. cit., Wijdeveld, pg.166.

³²⁹ Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (Editors), "synecdoche," Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press 2006

APPENDIX B

MANIFESTOES AND REMARKS

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Sketch for a Foreword (1930)

“Sketch for a Foreword” was actually an introductory text to “Philosophical Remarks” written in 1930 and posthumously published in 1975. An enhanced version of the text was posthumously re-published in “Culture and Value” in 1980.

The harshly critical voice of Wittgenstein can be heard in every lines of this foreword. It may be argued that the civilization of the period was in a fashion that cannot project anything positive on art or anything whatsoever. The key concepts of this text can be its radical shift from the ongoing aura of its time and declaration of a radical break from the system itself. Wittgenstein’s emphasize on the “genuine strong characters” may be seen in resemblance with the *übermensch* theory of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) manifesting an individual who opposes the “slave morality” of the traditional values and instead creating his own morality. This text also sheds light on the notion of the fact that if a culture lacks of morality in any terms than there can be no way of performing art or anything whatsoever.

In this Sketch, Wittgenstein’s interpretation of actual modern world during 1930s show how alienated and uncongenial he was. His feeling of alienation from every little feature of modern world involves especially the so-called new artistic approaches developed after First World War. It seems as if it makes no difference whether it is socialism or fascism that embraces the culture.

The aphorisms of Wittgenstein may coincide for various points however, the sincerity that can be felt throughout his sayings is apparent at any rate for the sake of a so-called cult personality. The evaluation of Wittgenstein from

the point of his views on architecture (actually on the aesthetics of architecture) can be a way to see his progress more clearly but keeping in mind the futility of such an effort due to the lack of an overall perspective may be valid. The aesthetic (or ethical) point of Wittgenstein is in harmony with his personality. Although the aim of this thesis is neither to speculate on the psychology of Wittgenstein nor to draw a subjective framework about his personality, understanding his diversity on various topics is seen very crucial for the comprehension of the dichotomy³³⁰ throughout the text.

The quoted passage from the early pages of 'Vermischte Bemerkungen' can be seen as a rare and therefore worth to discuss because Wittgenstein rarely touches on the subjects mentioned in this passage. As he rarely speculates on topics such as politics, sociology, psychology, culture or architecture; this passage may be handled as a guide to picture the overall theory of Wittgenstein on such topics.

Wittgenstein's notion of the spirit or "*Lebensgefühl*" should be grasped as a way of life (or lifestyle). The perception of such a fact that the spirit can be a guide to understand all the elite individuals of a period is apparent (or explicit) in late Habsburg Vienna in which Wittgenstein lived. The aphorisms of Otto Weininger may shed a light on the understanding of the spirit on the other hand; the principles guiding the spirit do not derive only from the individuals but primarily from the social moves. As Janik and Toulmin indicates, [i]n short, in late Habsburg Vienna, any of the city's cultural leaders could make the acquaintance of any other without difficulty, and many of them were in fact close friends despite working in quite distinct fields of art, thought and public affairs."³³¹

Wittgenstein's notion of "immortalization" and "glorification" as the prerequisites of architecture can be estimated to comprise a pre-modernist or pre-enlightenment view, as it suggests a kind of poetic or religious significance. There can be a debate on whether immortalization/glorification is crucial or the object of immortalization/glorification is more important. For

³³⁰ The so-called dichotomy exists between the dependence of the thesis on the propositions and aphorisms of Wittgenstein and their anti-thesis.

³³¹ Op. cit. Janik and Toulmin, pg.

instance, immortalization/glorification of 'nothingness' may be possible through architecture and therefore it is the process of immortalization/glorification that is important not the object of this process. According to Wittgenstein, if an architect has not an intention to immortalize and glorify something and if there is no purpose in it, it is not necessarily an architectural act.

Wittgenstein yearns for a very individualistic and somehow utopian order in which “[a] culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise’.” In general, the rhetoric throughout the passage is actually in a critical tone rather than a yearning one. He asserts that the period – between the wars - is lacking of a culture in terms of its degenerated features such as its fascism and socialism. The features of such a period, according to him, are degenerated because of its relatively unethical approach.

Ethical requisites mentioned above are stressed with their effects on art, especially on relatively more social arts such as architecture. Wittgenstein is aware of the fact that such items as industry, architecture and music cannot be isolated from the spirit (or in Wölfflin's term '*Lebensgefühl*') of the main current of the civilization in question. The civilization in question in terms of Wittgenstein is European and American civilization during early 1930s. The uncongenial side of this civilization for Wittgenstein may probably due to its totalitarian approach. The totalitarian approach is focused on masses rather than individuals and therefore individuality, which is a key issue for aesthetics or ethics, is postponed or ignored. It can be indicated that Wittgenstein openly disagrees with Wölfflin as the latter supposes, “architecture expresses the '*Lebensgefühl*' of an epoch”. Wittgenstein suggests that in corrupt times in history there would be no high culture. Therefore, there could be no [true] architecture in a corrupt time within a corrupt civilization because there could be nothing to immortalize or glorify in such a civilization. Wittgenstein's suggestion is simply to leave the arts aside and turn other things and

somehow the worth of the individual man finds expression. However, in terms of the propositions by Wölfflin, it is not the worth of the individual man that is crucial but on the contrary the totality of these individuals. This may mean that in order to immortalize and glorify something by means of art, first there should be something that can be immortalized and glorified within a certain culture (or civilization). Wittgenstein adds that spectacle cannot be something that matters or in other terms something that is worth to immortalize or glorify. Wittgenstein criticizes Western society because of its perception of its characterization with the word 'progress'. He insists, "[p]rogress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features." Wittgenstein's critique can be understood as an opposition to the pragmatism or materialism of Western culture derived from economic and technologic industrialization. He also criticizes that clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself. Clarity or simplicity, according to Wittgenstein, should not be treated as a way to be functional or pragmatic but on the contrary, they have to be the real aim of such an effort. Something spiritual or metaphysical is crucial for Wittgenstein in terms of architecture. Whether it is something transcendental, religious, technological or industrial, *something* should be glorified by virtue of architecture. The progress perceived as a [true] progress should be not only succeeding in economical or pragmatic terms; on the contrary, it can also supply a spirit of which architecture may play a crucial role.

Sketch for a Foreword:

This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism, and it is alien and uncongenial to the author. This is not a value judgment. It is not, it is true, as though, he accepted what nowadays passes for architecture as architecture or did not approach what is called modern music with the greatest suspicion (though without understanding its language), but still, the disappearance of the arts does not justify judging disparagingly the human beings who make up this civilization. For in times like these, genuine strong characters simply leave the arts aside and turn to other things and somehow the worth of the individual man finds expression. Not, to be sure, in the way it would at a time of high culture. A culture is like a

big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise. In an age without culture on the other hand forces become fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistances; it does not show in the distance he travels but perhaps only in the heat it generates in overcoming friction. But energy is still energy and even if the spectacle which our age affords us is not the formation of a great cultural work, with the best men contributing to the same great end, so much as the unimpressive spectacle of a crowd whose best members work for purely private ends, still we must not forget that the spectacle is not what matters.

I realize then that the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe.

It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand the spirit in which I write. Our civilization is characterized by the word 'progress'. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more complicated structure. And even clarity is sought as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity and perspicuity are valuable in themselves.

I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings.

So I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs.³³²

Adolf Loos: Ornament and Crime (1908)

Highly seminal and provocative in terms of its critic of a generation due to its mainly aesthetic and ethical background, "Ornament and Crime" is distinguished for its straightforward style apparent in his critic of the mischievous side of ornamentation. It should be noted as quite crucial that Loos was emphasizing not only the mischief in architecture but on the contrary mentioning the features of a social system. The requisites of a Modern World for Loos were said to be mainly accepted for a period at least in terms of architecture. However, the essence of "Ornament and Crime" may be derived from its timeless emphases. The notion of "*simplex sigillum veri*"

³³² Op.cit., Wittgenstein (1980), pp.8e-9e

is obvious both in aesthetic terms but more importantly in moral terms. Loos' attempt to define the modern man not only in formal terms but also in aesthetic and moral terms should be kept in mind in order to realize the evolution and the decay of modern architecture. It was due to the fact that Loos was a pioneer of modern architecture not in only architectonic terms but also in social terms.

The human embryo in the womb passes through all the evolutionary stages of the animal kingdom. When man is born, his sensory impressions are like those of a newborn puppy. His childhood takes him through all the metamorphoses of human history. At 2 he sees with the eyes of a Papuan, at 4 with those of an ancient Teuton, at 6 with those of Socrates, at 8 with those of Voltaire. When he is 8 he becomes aware of violet, the colour discovered by the eighteenth century, because before that the violet was blue and the purple-snail red. The physicist points today to colours in the solar spectrum which already have a name but the knowledge of which is reserved for the men of the future.

The child is amoral. To our eyes, the Papuan is too. The Papuan kills his enemies and eats them. He is not a criminal. But when modern man kills someone and eats him he is either a criminal or a degenerate. The Papuan tattoos his skin, his boat, his paddles, in short everything he can lay hands on. He is not a criminal. The modern man who tattoos himself is either a criminal or a degenerate. There are prisons in which eighty per cent of the inmates show tattoos. The tattooed who are not in prison are latent criminals or degenerate aristocrats. If someone who is tattooed dies at liberty, it means he has died a few years before committing a murder.

The urge to ornament one's face and everything within reach is the start of plastic art. It is the baby talk of painting. All art is erotic.

The first ornament that was born, the cross, was erotic in origin. The first work of art, the first artistic act which the first artist, in order to rid himself of his surplus energy, smeared on the wall. A horizontal dash: the prone woman. A vertical dash: the man penetrating her. The man who created it felt the same urge as Beethoven, he was in the same heaven in which Beethoven created the Ninth Symphony.

But the man of our day who, in response to an inner urge, smears the walls with erotic symbols is a criminal or a degenerate. It goes without saying that impulse most frequently assails people with such symptoms of degeneracy in the lavatory. A country's culture can be assessed by the extent to which its lavatory walls are smeared. In the child this is a natural phenomenon: his first artistic expression is to scribble erotic symbols on the walls. But what is natural to the Papuan and the child is a symptom of degeneracy in the modern adult. I have made the following discovery and I pass it on to the world: *The evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian objects.* I believed that with this discovery I was bringing joy to the world; it has not thanked me. People were sad and hung their heads. What depressed them was the realization that they could produce no new ornaments. Are we alone, the people of the nineteenth century, supposed to be unable to do what any Negro, all the races and periods before us have been able to do? What mankind created without ornament in earlier millennia was thrown away without a thought

and abandoned to destruction. We possess no joiner's benches from the Carolingian era, but every trifle that displays the least ornament has been collected and cleaned and palatial buildings have been erected to house it. Then people walked sadly about between the glass cases and felt ashamed of their impotence. Every age had its style, is our age alone to be refused a style? By style, people meant ornament. Then I said: Weep not! See, therein lies the greatness of our age, that it is incapable of producing a new ornament. We have outgrown ornament; we have fought our way through to freedom from ornament. See, the time is nigh, fulfillment awaits us. Soon the streets of the city will glisten like white walls. Like Zion, the holy city, the capital of heaven. Then fulfillment will be come. There were black albs, clerical gentlemen, who wouldn't put up with that. Mankind was to go on panting in slavery to ornament. Men had gone far enough for ornament no longer to arouse feelings of pleasure in them, far enough for a tattooed face not to heighten the aesthetic effect, as among the Papuans, but to reduce it. Far enough to take pleasure in a plain cigarette case, whereas an ornamented one, even at the same price, was not bought. They were happy in their clothes and glad they didn't have to go around in red velvet hose with gold braid like fairground monkeys. And I said: See, Goethe's death-chamber is finer than all Renaissance splendor and a plain piece of furniture more beautiful than any inlaid and carved museum pieces. Goethe's language is finer than all the ornaments of Pegnitz's shepherds.

The black albs heard this with displeasure, and the state, whose task it is to halt the cultural development of the peoples, made the question of the development and revival of ornament its own. Woe to the state whose revolutions are in the care of the *Hofrats!* Very soon we saw in the Wiener Kunstgewerbemuseum [Vienna Museum of Applied Art] a sideboard known as 'the rich haul of fish', soon there were cupboards bearing the name 'the enchanted princess' or something similar referring to the ornament with which this unfortunate piece of furniture was covered. The Austrian state took its task so seriously that it is making sure the foot-rags used on the frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy do not disappear. It is forcing every cultivated man of 20 for three years to wear foot-rags instead of manufactured footwear. After all, every state starts from the premise that a people on a lower footing is easier to rule.

Very well, the ornament disease is recognized by the state and subsidized with state funds. But I see in this a retrograde step. I don't accept the objection that ornament heightens a cultivated person's joy in life, don't accept the objection contained in the words: 'But if the ornament is beautiful' Ornament does not heighten my joy in life or the joy in life of any cultivated person. If I want to eat a piece of gingerbread I choose one that is quite smooth and not a piece representing a heart or a baby or a rider, which is covered all over with ornaments. The man of the fifteenth century won't understand me. But all modern people will. The advocate of ornament believes that my urge for simplicity is in the nature of a mortification. No, respected professor at the school of applied art, I am not mortifying myself! The show dishes of past centuries, which display all kinds of ornaments to make the peacocks, pheasants and lobsters look more tasty, have exactly the opposite effect on me. I am horrified when I go through a cookery exhibition and think that I am meant to eat these stuffed carcasses. I eat roast beef.

The enormous damage and devastation caused in aesthetic development by the revival of ornament would be easily made light of, for no one, not

even the power of the state, can halt mankind's evolution. It can only be delayed. We can wait. But it is a crime against the national economy that it should result in a waste of human labor, money, and material. Time cannot make good this damage.

The speed of cultural evolution is reduced by the stragglers. I perhaps am living in 1908, but my neighbor is living in 1900 and the man across the way in 1880. It is unfortunate for a state when the culture of its inhabitants is spread over such a great period of time. The peasants of Kals are living in the twelfth century. And there were peoples taking part in the Jubilee parade [of the Emperor Franz Joseph] who would have been considered backward even during the migration of the nations. Happy the land that has no such stragglers and marauders. Happy America!

Among ourselves there are unmodern people even in the cities, stragglers from the eighteenth century, who are horrified by a picture with purple shadows because they cannot yet see purple. The pheasant on which the chef has been working all day long tastes better to them and they prefer the cigarette case with Renaissance ornaments to the smooth one. And what is it like in the country? Clothes and household furniture all belong to past centuries. The peasant isn't a Christian, he is still a pagan.

The stragglers slow down the cultural evolution of the nations and of mankind; not only is ornament produced by criminals but also a crime is committed through the fact that ornament inflicts serious injury on people's health, on the national budget and hence on cultural evolution. If two people live side by side with the same needs, the same demands on life and the same income but belonging to different cultures, economically speaking the following process can be observed: the twentieth-century man will get richer and richer, the eighteenth-century man poorer and poorer. I am assuming that both live according to their inclinations. The twentieth-century man can satisfy his needs with a far lower capital outlay and hence can save money. The vegetable he enjoys is simply boiled in water and has a little butter put on it. The other man likes it equally well only when honey and nuts have been added to it and someone has spent hours cooking it. Ornamented plates are very expensive, whereas the white crockery from which the modern man likes to eat is cheap. The one accumulates sayings, the other debts. It is the same with whole nations. Woe when a people remains behind in cultural evolution! The British are growing wealthier and we poorer...

Even greater is the damage done by ornament to the nation that produces it. Since ornament is no longer a natural product of our culture, so that it is a phenomenon either of backwardness or degeneration, the work of the ornamentor is no longer adequately remunerated.

The relationship between the earnings of a woodcarver and a turner, the criminally low wages paid to the embroideress and the lacemaker are well known. The ornamentor has to work twenty hours to achieve the income earned by a modern worker in eight. Ornament generally increases the cost of an article; nevertheless it happens that an ornamented object whose raw material cost the same and which demonstrably took three times as long to make is offered at half the price of a smooth object. Omission of ornament results in a reduction in the manufacturing time and an increase in wages. The Chinese carver works for sixteen hours, the American worker for eight. If I pay as much for a smooth cigarette case as for an ornamented one, the difference in the working time belongs to the worker. And if there were no ornament at all - a situation that may perhaps come about in some thousands of years - man would only have to work four hours instead of eight, because half of the work done today is devoted to ornament.

Ornament is wasted labor power and hence wasted health. it has always been so.

Since ornament is no longer organically linked with our culture, it is also no longer the expression of our culture. The ornament that is manufactured to day has no connexion with us, has absolutely no human connexions, no connexion with the world order. it is not capable of developing. What happened to Otto Eckmann's ornament, or van de Velde's? The artist has always stood at the forefront of mankind full of vigor and health. But the modern ornamentalist is a straggler or a pathological phenomenon. He himself will repudiate his own products three years later. To cultivated people they are immediately intolerable; others become aware of their intolerable character only years later. Where are Otto Eckmann's works today? Modern ornament has no parents and no progeny, no past and no future. By uncultivated people, to whom the grandeur of our age is a book with seven seals, it is greeted joyfully and shortly afterwards repudiated.

Mankind is healthier than ever; only a few people are sick. But these few tyrannize over the worker who is so healthy that he cannot invent ornament. They force him to execute in the most varied materials the ornaments which they have invented.

Changes of ornament lead to a premature devaluation of the labour product. The worker's time and the material employed are capital goods that are wasted. I have stated the proposition: the form of an object lasts, that is to say remains tolerable, as long as the object lasts physically. I will try to explain this. A suit will change its form more often than a valuable fur. A lady's ball gown, intended for only one night, will change its form more quickly than a desk. But woe if a desk has to be changed as quickly as a ball gown because the old form has become intolerable; in that case the money spent on the desk will have been lost.

This is well known to the ornamentalist, and Austrian ornamentalists are trying to make the best of this shortcoming. They say: 'We prefer a consumer who has a set of furniture that becomes intolerable to him after ten years, and who is consequently forced to refurnish every ten years, to one who only buys an object when the old one is worn out. Industry demands this. Millions are employed as a result of the quick change.'

This seems to be the secret of the Austrian national economy. How often do we hear someone say when there is a fire: 'Thank God, now there will be work for people to do again.' In that case I know a splendid solution. Set fire to a town, set fire to the empire, and everyone will be swimming in money and prosperity. Manufacture furniture which after three years can be used for firewood, metal fittings that have to be melted down after four years because even at an auction sale it is impossible to get a tenth of the original value of the material and labour, and we shall grow wealthier and wealthier.

The loss does not hit only the consumer; above all it hits the producer. Today ornament on things that have evolved away from the need to be ornamented represents wasted labor and ruined material. If all objects would last aesthetically as long as they do physically, the consumer could pay a price for them that would enable the worker to earn more money and work shorter hours. For an object I am sure I can use to its full extent I willingly pay four times as much as for one that is inferior in form or material. I happily pay forty kronen for my boots, although in a different shop I could get boots for ten kronen. But in those trades that groan under the tyranny of the ornamentalist no distinction is made between good and bad workmanship. The work suffers because no one is willing to pay its true value.

And this is a good thing, because the se ornamented objects are tolerable only when they are of the most miserable quality. I get over a fire much more easily when I hear that only worthless trash has been burned. I can be pleased about the trash in the Künstlerhaus because I know that it will be manufactured in a few days and taken to pieces in one. But throwing gold coins instead of stones, lighting a cigarette with a banknote, pulverizing and drinking a pearl create an unaesthetic effect. !

Ornamented things first create a truly unaesthetic effect when they have i been executed in the best material and with the greatest care and have taken ilong hours of labour. I cannot exonerate myself from having initially demanded quality work, but naturally not for that kind of things

The modern man who holds ornament sacred as a sign of the artistic superabundance of past ages will immediately recognize the tortured, strained, and morbid quality of modern ornaments. No ornament can any longer be made today by anyone who lives on our cultural level. It is different with the individuals and peoples who have not yet reached this level.

I am preaching to the aristocrat, I mean the person who stands at the pinnacle of mankind and yet has the deepest understanding for the distress and want of those below. He well understands the Kaffir who weaves ornaments into his fabric according to a particular rhythm that only comes into view when it is unraveled, the Persian who weaves his carpet, the Slovak peasant woman who embroiders her lace, the old lady who crochets wonderful things with glass beads and silk. The aristocrat lets them be; he knows that the hours in which they work are their holy hours. The revolutionary would go to them and say: 'It' s all nonsense.' Just as he would pull down the little old woman from the wayside crucifix and tell her: 'There is no God.' The atheist among the aristocrats, on the other hand, raises his hat when he passes a church.

My shoes are covered all over with ornaments consisting of scallops and holes. Work done by the shoemaker for which he was never paid. I go to the shoemaker and say : 'You ask thirty kronen for a pair of shoes. I will pay you forty kronen.' I have thereby raised this man to heights of bliss for which he will thank me by work and material infinitely better than would be called for by the additional price. He is happy. Happiness rarely enters his house. Here is a man who understands him, who values his work and does not doubt his honesty. He already sees the finished shoes in his mind's eye. He knows where the best leather is to be found at the present time; he knows which craftsman he will entrust the shoes to; and the shoes will be so covered in scallops and holes as only an elegant shoe can be. And then I say to him: 'But there's one condition. The shoes must be completely smooth.' With this, I have east him down from the heights of bliss to the pit of despondency. He has less work, but I have taken away all his joy.

I am preaching to the aristocrat. I tolerate ornaments on my own body, when they constitute the joy of my fellow men. Then they are my joy too. I can tolerate the ornaments of the Kaffir, the Persian, the Slovak peasant woman, my shoemaker's ornaments, for they all have no other way of attaining the high points of their existence. We have art, which has taken the place of ornament. After the toils and troubles of the day we go to Beethoven or to Tristan. This my shoemaker cannot do. I mustn't deprive him of his joy, since I have nothing else to put in its place. But anyone who goes to the *Ninth Symphony* and then sits down and designs a wallpaper pattern is either a confidence trickster or a degenerate. Absence of

ornament has brought the other arts to unsuspected heights. Beethoven's symphonies would never have been written by a man who had to walk about in silk, satin, and lace. Anyone who goes around in a velvet coat today is not an artist but a buffoon or a house painter. We have grown finer, more subtle. The nomadic herdsmen had to distinguish themselves by various colours; modern man uses his clothes as a mask. So immensely strong is his individuality that it can no longer be expressed in articles of clothing. Freedom from ornament is a sign of spiritual strength. Modern man uses the ornaments of earlier or alien cultures as he sees fit. He concentrates his own inventiveness on other things.³³³

Le Corbusier: Towards A New Architecture, Guiding Principles (1920)

Rather as a manifestation by a Renaissance-man as Le Corbusier, "Towards a New Architecture" is unique in terms of its endeavor to oscillate between rationalism and transcendentalism. The manifestation of a new architecture for the outbreak of a new order is unavoidable for Le Corbusier in order to perceive the aura of this new period in question. The question seems arising from the notion that architecture cannot exclude itself from the *Lebensgefühl*. It may be argued that the architecture that Le Corbusier referred was not omnipotent in terms of its relation to and its impact on social life. Although, Le Corbusier still had an aesthetic guide, it should be noted that it was so far away from the expressionist or rigorist attitudes. As Frampton insists, "Le Corbusier's drive to resolve the dichotomy between the Engineer's Aesthetic and Architecture, to inform utility with the hierarchy of myth, was bound to bring him into conflict with the functionalist-socialist designers of the late 1920s."³³⁴

The engineer's aesthetic and architecture

The Engineer's Aesthetic and Architecture are two things that march together and follow one from the other: the one being now at its full height, the other in an unhappy state of retrogression.

The Engineer, inspired by the law of economy and governed by mathematical calculation, puts us in accord with universal law. He achieves harmony.

The Architects, by his arrangement of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an acute degree and provokes plastic emotions; by the relationships which he creates he wakes profound echoes in us, he gives us the measure of an

³³³ Op. cit., Conrads, pp.19-24.

³³⁴ Op. cit., Frampton (1980), pg.160.

order which we feel to be in accordance with that of our world, he determines the various moments of our heart and of our understanding; it is then that we experience the sense of beauty.

Three reminders to architects

Mass

Our eyes are constructed to enable us to see forms in light.

Primary forms are beautiful forms because they can be clearly appreciated.

Architects today no longer achieve these simple forms.

Working by calculation, engineers employ geometrical forms, satisfying our eyes by their geometry and our understanding by their mathematics; their work is on the direct line of good art.

Surface

A mass is enveloped in its surface, a surface which is divided up according to the directing and generating lines of the mass, and this gives the mass its individuality.

Architects today are afraid of the geometrical constituents of surfaces.

The great problems of modern construction must have a geometrical solution. Forced to work in accordance with the strict needs of exactly determined conditions, engineers make use of form-generating and form-defining elements. They create limp and moving plastic facts.

Plan

The plan is the generator.

Without a plan, you have lack of order and willfulness.

The plan holds in itself the essence of sensation.

The great problems of tomorrow, dictated by collective necessities, put the question of 'plan' in a new form.

Modern life demands, and is waiting for, a new kind of plan, both for the house and for the city.

Regulating lines

An inevitable element of Architecture.

The necessity for order. The regulating line is a means to an end; it is not a recipe. Its choice and the modalities of expression given to it are an integral part of architectural creation.

Eyes which do not see...

Liners

A great epoch has begun.

There exists a new spirit.

There exists a mass of work conceived in the new spirit; it is to be met with particularly in industrial production.

Architecture is stifled by custom.

The 'styles' are a lie.

Style is a unity of principle animating all the work of an epoch, the result of a state of mind which has its own special character.
Our own epoch is determining, day by day, its own style.
Our eyes, unhappily, are unable yet to discern it.

Aeroplanes

The aeroplane is the product of close selection.
The lesson of the aeroplane lies in the logic which governed the statement of the problem and its realization.
The problem of the house has not yet been stated.
Nevertheless there do exist standards for the dwelling house.
Machinery contains in itself the factor of economy, which makes for selection.
The house is a machine for living in.

Automobiles

We must aim at the fixing of standards in order to face the problem of perfection.
The Parthenon is a product of selection applied to a standard.
Architecture operates in accordance with standards.
Standards are a matter of logic, analysis, and minute study; they are based on a problem which has been well 'stated'. A standard is definitely established by experiment.

Architecture

The lesson of Rome

The business of architecture is to establish emotional relationships by means of raw materials.
Architecture goes beyond utilitarian needs.
Architecture is a plastic thing.
The spirit of order, a unity of intention.
The sense of relationships; architecture deals with quantities.
Passion can create drama out of inert stone.

The illusions of plans

The Plan proceeds from within to without; the exterior is the result of an interior.
The elements of architecture are light and shade, walls and space.
Arrangement is the gradation of aims, the classification of intentions.
Man looks at the creation of architecture with his eyes, which are 5 feet 6 inches from the ground. One can only deal with aims which the eye can appreciate, and intentions which take into account architectural elements. If there come into play intentions which do not speak the language of architecture, you arrive at the illusion of plans, you transgress the rules of the Plan through an error in conception, or through a leaning towards empty show.

Pure creation of the mind

Contour and profile are the touchstone of the architect.
Here he reveals himself as artist or mere engineer.
Contour is free of all constraint.
There is here no longer any question of custom, nor of tradition, nor of construction nor of adaptation to utilitarian needs.
Contour and profile are a pure creation of the mind; they call for the plastic artist.

Mass-production houses

A great epoch has begun.
There exists a new spirit.

Industry, overwhelming us like a flood which rolls on towards its destined ends, has furnished us with new tools adapted to this new epoch, animated by the new spirit.

Economic law inevitably governs our acts and our thoughts.

The problem of the house is a problem of the epoch. The equilibrium of the society depends upon it. Architecture has for its duty, in this period of renewal, that of bringing about a revision of values, a revision of the constituent elements of the house.

Mass-production is based on analysis and experiment.

Industry on the grand scale must occupy itself with building and establish the elements of the house on a mass-production basis.

We must create the mass-production spirit.

The spirit of constructing mass-production houses.

The spirit of living in mass-production houses.

The spirit of conceiving mass-production houses.

If we eliminate from our hearts and minds all dead concepts in regard to the house, and look at the question from a critical and objective point of view, we shall arrive at the 'House-Machine', the mass-production house, healthy (and morally so too) and beautiful in the same way that the working tools and instruments which accompany our existence are beautiful.

Beautiful also with all the animation that the artist's sensibility can add to severe and pure functioning elements.

Architecture or revolution

... In building and construction, mass-production has already been begun; in face of new economic needs, mass-production units have been created both in mass and detail; and definite results have been achieved both in detail and in mass. If this fact be set against the past, then you have revolution, both in the method employed and in the large scale on which it has been carried out.

... Our minds have consciously or unconsciously apprehended these events and new needs have arisen, consciously or unconsciously.

The machinery of Society, profoundly out of gear, oscillates between an amelioration, of historical importance, and a catastrophe.

The primordial instinct of every human being is to assure himself of a shelter.

The various classes of workers in society today no longer have dwellings adapted to their needs; neither the artisan nor the intellectual.

It is a question of building which is at the root of the social unrest of today; architecture or revolution.³³⁵

EI Lissitzky: Ideological Superstructure (1929)

The sense of emancipation through a revolutionary stand against the so-called anti-socialist, idiosyncratic principles is heavily felt in Lissitzky's utilitarian notion. Written rather during the beginning of the notorious Stalinist totalitarian era, the text seems to deal with an overall principle of social actors. The notion of dialectical correspondence is crucial in terms of understanding the notion of EI Lissitzky because it determines everything in a

sense that nothing can escape from this cycle. Its harsh critic of “*Kunst der Kunst willen*” seems highly important due to the fact that it also determines the role of an architect as a social actor. The architecture as a social actor and as a crucial part of this cycle functions as an *agent provocateur* between the society and the system.

We shall present here a few sections of a life process which, having been first brought into existence by the Revolution, is a bare 5 years old. During this time the high demands made by the cultural revolution have taken root in the feelings and consciousness of our new generation of architects. It has become clear to our architect that through his work he is playing an active part in building the new world. To use an artist's work has no value *per se*, no purpose of its own, no beauty of its own; it receives all this solely from from its relation to the community. In the creation of every great work the architect's part is visible and the community's part latent. The artist, the creator, invents nothing that falls into his lap from the sky. Therefore we understand by 'reconstruction' the overcoming of the unclear, the 'mysterious' and chaotic.

In our architecture, as in our whole life, we are striving to create a social order, that is to say, to raise the instinctual into consciousness.

The ideological superstructure protects and guarantees the work. As the substructure for the renewal that we must carry out in architecture, we named at the beginning the social economic reconstruction. It is the unequivocal starting point, but it would be a mistake to explain the interconnexions so simply. Life, organic growth, is a dialectical process that simultaneously asserts yes (plus) and no (minus). Everything that comes into being is a part of the process of social life, the result of particular facts, and itself exercises an influence on the aims that come into being in their turn. On the basis of what has come into being there is formed an ideology, a way of looking at things, there are formed interpretation and interrelationships, which exercise a further influence on what is coming into being. We may trace this dialectical process in the development of our architects.

1. Destruction of the traditional. Material production is paralysed throughout the country. The longing for a super-production. The first studio dreams. An ideology is formed containing two demands that are fundamental to further development: element and invention. A work that is to be in keeping with our age must contain within it an invention. Our age demands creations arising out of elemental forms (geometry). War has been declared on the aesthetic of chaos. An order that has entered fully into consciousness is called for.
2. The start of rebuilding. First in industry and production. Concrete problems demand solution. But the new generation has grown up in a period without architecture, has inadequate practical experience, little authority, and has not yet become an academy. In the struggle for building contracts its ideology has turned to the primary

³³⁵ Op. cit., pp.59-62

utilitarian, the nakedly functional. The slogan is: 'Constructivism', 'Functionalism'. An equals sign has been placed between engineer and architect...

3. The first reconstruction period demands a concentration of forces from the sphere of the socio-economic revolution to bring about a deepening of the cultural revolution. In the total complex of a culture, physical, psychological and emotional factors are inseparable.

Art is acknowledged in its capacity to order, organize, and activate consciousness by charging it with emotional energy. Architecture is considered the leading art and the attention of the public is directed towards it. Architectural questions become mass questions. The studio dreams of the beginning lose their individual character and receive a solid social foundation. Once again the 'Utilitarians' are opposed by the 'Formalists'. The latter assert that architecture is not covered by the concept of 'engineering'. To solve the utilitarian task, to construct a volume that functions correctly for the purpose, is only one part of the problem. The second part is to organize the materials correctly, to solve the constructive problem. A work of architecture comes into being only when the whole thing springs to life as a spatial idea, as a form that exercises a definite effect on our psyche. To do this it is not enough to be a modern man; it is necessary for the architect to possess a complete mastery of the expressive means of architecture. Thus we can summarize these three periods even more briefly:

- (a) Denial of art as merely an emotional, individual affair carried on in romantic isolation.
- (b) 'Objective' creation in the silent hope that the resulting product will eventually be looked upon as a work of art.
- (c) Conscious and purposeful creation of an architecture that will exercise a definite artistic effect on an objective, scientific basis that has been worked out in advance.

This architecture will actively raise the general standard of living.

This is the dialectic of our development, which reaches affirmation through denial; it has melted down the old iron and annealed the new steel.³³⁶

Erich Mendelsohn: The Problem of a New Architecture (1919)

With guidance of a self-esteeming behavior due to its rational conceptualization, Mendelsohn's rather naive prophecies indicate a certain level of highly utopian sense. As it was written after the decadence of a generation, the effort to project an in-between optimism arising from the

³³⁶ Ibid., pp.121-22

realization of a new spirit is highly striking. The mischievous nature of former order is balanced with the fresh features of the new order. The modest and austere tone of this manifesto seems far away from the echoes of *reklamearchitektur*.

The simultaneous process of revolutionary political decisions and radical changes in human relationships in economy and science and religion and art give belief in the new form an a priori right to exercise control, and provide a justifiable basis for a rebirth amidst the misery produced by world-historical disasters.

When forms break up, they are merely thrust aside by new forms that are already present but only now come to light.

For the particular prerequisites of architecture, the re-organization of society taking place in response to the spirit of the times means new tasks arising out of the changed purposes of buildings which in turn result from changes in travel, economy, and religion, coupled with new possibilities presented by the new building materials: glass, iron, and concrete.

When we consider as yet unknown possibilities, we must not let ourselves be misled by that dulling of vision which comes from too close a viewpoint. That which seems today to be flowing with viscous slowness will later appear to history as having moved at a breakneck and thrilling speed. We are dealing here with an act of creation!

We are only at the early beginning, but we are already faced with the possibilities of its development.

Before such a future the great achievements of historical times step back of their own accord; the immediacy of the present loses its importance.

What will happen has value only if it comes into being in the intoxication of vision.

Criticism bears fruit only if it can embrace the whole problem. Tutelage fails, because the future speaks for itself. If we wish to pass on such a faith, to convey its palpable conclusions to a wider circle as self-evident facts, we must necessarily demonstrate that the young forces in architecture draw their architectonic experiences not from history nor from heaven, but solely from the fertility of their own visions of space. In this, up to the present, three paths may be distinguished, which, though fundamentally different, follow parallel courses towards the same goal and nevertheless will one day cross...

It cannot be chance that the three recognizable paths of the new architecture coincide with the same number and nature of the new paths in painting and sculpture.

This coincidence of the volition behind them will find expression in the resulting work and will bring all the arts back into a unity. This unity will embrace the great achievements – the shrines of a new world – as well as the smallest objects in our everyday dwellings.

What today is a problem- will one day be a task; what today is the vision and faith of a single individual, will one day become a law for all.

Therefore, all trends seem necessary to achieving the goal, and hence to solving the problem of a new architecture:

The apostles of the glass worlds,

The analysts of spatial elements,

The seekers for new forms of material and construction.

Naturally, this era will not be brought into being by social classes in the grip of the tradition.

Only a new will has the future in its favour in the unconsciousness of its chaotic impetus, in the pristine vigour with which it embraces the universal. For just as every epoch that was decisive for the evolution of human history united the whole known globe under its spiritual will, so what we long for will have to bring happiness beyond our own country, beyond Europe, to all peoples. This does not mean that I am handing over the reins to internationalism. For internationalism means an aesthetic attitude with its basis in no one people in a disintegrating world. Supra-Nationalism, however, embraces national demarcations as a precondition; it is free humanity that alone can reestablish an all-embracing culture.

Such a great will unites all those who are engaged in the work.

It comes into being, it awakens an adequate religious faith only after the fusion of the ultimate achievement of all peoples.

Here we can do no more than contribute the modest measure of our own work, in faith and in a willingness to serve.³³⁷

Gruppo 7: Manifesto of the Italian Rationalism (1926)³³⁸

The limited echoes of the totalitarian regime with its dominating guidance is heavily felt in this 1926 manifesto of Gruppo 7 including Giuseppe Terragni, Adalberto Libera, Luigi Figini and Gino Pollini. Actually, the true architecture they referred to is not new either in terms of its reaction towards the milieu or in terms of its esteem for archaic styles. This esteem for the tradition may be seen in challenge with or even in coincidence with their esteem for logic and rationality because erroneous esteem for tradition may result in a nonlogical sense. The emphasis on true architecture is surely important in terms of their notion of excluding every other attempt and declaring omnipotently that it must emerge from logic and rationality.

New architecture, true architecture, must emerge from a strict adherence to logic and rationality. We don't pretend to be creating a new style, but through the constant application of rationality, by letting a building meet the needs of the problem as closely as possible, we are sure that a style will arise through this process of selection.

There is no incompatibility between our past and present. We do not want to break with tradition, with our heritage; we do not want to ignore it. Tradition transforms itself and takes on new appearances, beneath which that tradition

³³⁷ Ibid., pp.54-55

³³⁸ These extracts were taken from Op. cit., Frampton (1980) and Judi Loach, "QT8: a neglected chapter in history of modern town planning," in The Modern City Revisited (ed. T. Deckker), Taylor & Francis, London, pp. 132-33

only remains recognizable to a few people... Classical foundations and the spirit of tradition (which is quite a different thing from traditional forms) are so deeply embedded in Italy that our new architecture will be unable to leave a mark entirely its own.

The hallmark of the earlier avant-garde was a contrived impetus and a vain, destructive fury, mingling good and bad elements; the hallmark of today's youth is a desire for lucidity and wisdom This must be clear ... we do not intend to break with tradition The new architecture, the true architecture should be the result of a close association between logic and rationality.

Rudolf Steiner: And the Temple Becomes Man (1911)

As the founder of the anthroposophical movement, Rudolf Steiner seems to be excluded from the mainstream modern movement probably due to his emphatically theosophical notion restraining himself from the milieu of modern movement. His rather mystical sense of life recounts itself in the key components of anthroposophy "stressing the cultivation of spiritual nature and the way to gain spiritual awareness of a higher world."³³⁹ The amalgamation of architecture with the spiritual world of human beings sustains a state of eurhythmy cultivating the spiritual nature of men.

Now there is a certain reason why the responsibility of those who shared in the creation of ancient works of art, was made easier than it is for us to-day. In ancient times, human beings had at their disposal means of help which are no longer available in our epoch. The Gods let their forces stream into the unconscious or subconscious life of the soul; and in a certain sense it is an illusion to believe that in the brains or souls of the men who built the Pyramids of Egypt, the Temples of Greece and other great monuments, human thoughts alone were responsible for the impulses and aims expressed in the forms, the colours and so on. For in those times the Gods themselves were working through the hands, the heads and the hearts of men.

The Fourth Post-Atlantean epoch already lies in the far past and our age is the first period of time in which the Gods put man's own free, spiritual activity to the test. True, the Gods do not refuse their help, but they vouchsafe it only when by the strength of aspiration developed in the soul through a number of incarnations, men make themselves worthy to receive the forces streaming to them from above. What we ourselves have to create is essentially *new* — in the sense that we must work with forces differing altogether from those in operation in bygone times. We have to create out of *the free activity of our own human souls*. The hallmark of our age is *consciousness* — it is the epoch of the Consciousness Soul, the Spiritual Soul. And if the future is to receive from us such works of culture and of art as we have received from

³³⁹ "anthroposophy." The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1994, 1996, 2005. *Answers.com* 06 Aug. 2007. <http://www.answers.com/topic/anthroposophy>

the past, we must create out of full and clear consciousness, free from any influence arising from the subconscious life. That is why we must open our minds and hearts to thoughts which shed light upon the task ahead of us. Only if we know upon what laws and fundamental spiritual impulses our work must be grounded, only if what we do is in line and harmony with the evolutionary forces operating in mankind as a whole — only then will achievement be within our reach ...

And now let us turn to certain fundamental ideas which can make our work fruitful — for what we have to create must be basically, and in its very essence, *new*.

In a certain sense our intention is to build a Temple which is also to be a place of teaching — as were the ancient Temples of the Mysteries. Buildings erected to enshrine what men have held most sacred have always been known as Temples. You have already heard how the life of the human soul in the different epochs came to expression in the temple-buildings. When with insight and warmth of soul we study these buildings, differences are at once apparent. A very striking example is afforded by the forms of temples belonging to the Second Post-Atlantean epoch of culture. Outwardly, at any rate, very little is left of these temples of the ancient Persian epoch, and their original form can only be dimly pictured or reconstructed from the Akasha Chronicle. Something reminiscent of their forms did indeed find its way into the later temples of the third epoch, into Babylonian-Assyrian architecture and above all into the temples of Asia Minor, but only to the extent that the structure of these later buildings was influenced by the conditions obtaining in that region of the Earth.

What was the most striking and significant feature of this early Art of Building?

Documentary records have little information to give on the subject. But if, assuming that investigation of the Akasha Chronicle itself is not possible, we study the buildings of a later epoch, gleaning from them some idea of what the earlier temples in that part of the world may have been, it will dawn upon us that in these very ancient temples, everything depended upon the *facade*, upon the impression made by the frontage of the temple upon those who approached its portals. A man who made his way through this facade into the interior of the temple, would have felt: "The facade spoke to me in a secret, mysterious language. In the interior of the temple I find everything that was striving to express itself in the façade." He would have felt this no matter whether he came as a layman or as one who had to some extent been initiated.

If we now turn from these temples — the character of which can only be dimly surmised by those unable to read the Akasha Chronicle — if we now turn to the temples, the pyramids or other sacred monuments of Egypt, we find something altogether different. Sphinxes and symbolic figures of mystery and grandeur stand before us as we approach an ancient Egyptian Temple; even the obelisks are enigmas. The Sphinx and the Pyramids are riddles — so much so that the German philosopher Hegel spoke of this Art as the "Art of the Riddle." The upward-rising form of the pyramid in which there is scarcely an aperture, seems to enshrine a mystery; from outside at any rate,

a façade is indicated only in the form of a riddle presented to us. In the interior, as well as information on manifold secrets contained in the ancient mystery-scripts or what later took their place, we find indications in the innermost sanctuary, of how the hearts and souls of men were led to the God who dwelt in deep concealment within the temple. The building enshrines the most sacred Mystery — the *Mystery of the God*. The pyramids, too, are shrines around the holiest secret of humanity, namely, Initiation. These buildings shut themselves off from the outer world, together with the Mystery they contain.

Passing now to the temples of Greece, we find that they retain the basic principle of many Egyptian temples in that we have to think of the Greek Temple as the dwelling place of the Divine-Spiritual; but the outer structure itself indicates a further stage. In its wonderful expression of dynamic power, of inner forces weaving in the forms, it is whole and complete, intrinsically perfect — an Infinitude in itself. The Greek God dwells within the temple. In this building, with its columns which in themselves reveal their function as 'bearers' capable of supporting what lies upon them, the God is enshrined in something that is whole and perfect in itself; an infinitude is here embodied, within Earth-existence. This is expressed in the whole form and in every detail of the building.

The idea of the temple as an expression of all that is most precious to man, is embodied in the *Christian Temple* or Church. Such buildings, erected originally over a grave, indeed over the Grave of the Redeemer, culminate in the spire which tapers upwards to the heights. Here we have before us the expression of an altogether new impulse, whereby Christian architecture is distinguished from that of Greece. The Greek Temple is, in itself, one complete, dynamic whole. The Church of Christendom is quite different. I once said that by its very nature, a temple dedicated to Pallas Athene, to Apollo or to Zeus needs no human being near it or inside it; it stands there in its own self-contained, solitary majesty as the dwelling-place of the God. The Greek Temple is an infinitude in itself in that it is the dwelling-place of the God. And it is really the case that the farther away human beings are from the temple itself, the truer is the effect it makes upon us. Paradoxical as it may seem, this is the conception underlying the Greek Temple. The Church of Christendom is quite different. The call of a Christian church goes out to the hearts and minds of the Faithful; and every one of the forms in the space we enter tells us that it is there to receive the community, the thoughts and aspirations of the congregation. There could hardly have been a truer instinct than that which coined the word *Dom* for the Temple of Christianity, for *Dom* expresses a gathering-together, a togetherness of human beings. (*Dom* is akin to *tum*, as in *Volkstum*).

We cannot fail to realise that a Gothic building, with its characteristic forms, is trying to express something that is never as separate and complete in itself as a Greek Temple. Every Gothic form seems to reach out beyond its own boundaries, to express the aspirations and searchings of those within the walls; there is everywhere a kind of urge to break through the enclosing walls and mingle with the universe. The Gothic arch arose, of course, from a deep feeling for the *dynamic* element; but there is something in all Gothic forms which seems to lead out and beyond; they strive as it were to make themselves permeable. One of the reasons why a Gothic building makes its wonderful impression is that the multi-coloured windows provide such a

mysterious and yet such a natural link between the interior space and the all-pervading light. Could there be any sight in the world more radiant and glorious than that of the light weaving through the coloured windows of a Gothic cathedral among the tiny specks of dust? Could any enclosed space make a more majestic impression than this — where even the enclosing walls seem to lead out beyond, where the interior space itself reaches out to the mysteries of infinite space?

From this rapid survey of a lengthy period in the development of temple-architecture, we cannot have failed to realise that its progress is based upon underlying *law*. But for all that, we still confront a kind of Sphinx. What is really at the root of it? Why has it developed in just this way? Can any explanation be given of those remarkable frontages and facades covered with strange figures of winged animals and winged wheels, of the curious pillars and columns to be found in the region of Asia Minor as the last surviving fragments of the first stage of temple-architecture? These frontages tell us something very remarkable ... exactly the same, in reality, as the experience which arises within the temple itself. Can there be any greater enigma than the forms which are to be seen on fragments preserved in modern museums? What principle underlies it all?

There is an explanation, but it can only be found through insight into the thoughts and aims of those who participated in the building of these temples. This, of course, is a matter in which the help of occultism is indispensable. What is a Temple of Asia Minor, in reality? Does its prototype or model exist anywhere in the world?

The following will indicate what this prototype is, and throw light upon the whole subject. Imagine a human being lying on the ground, in the act of raising his body and his countenance upright. He raises his body upwards from the ground in order that it may come within the sphere of the downstreaming spiritual forces and be united with them. This image will give you an inkling of the inspiration from which the architectural forms of the early temples of Asia Minor were born. All the pillars, capitals and remarkable forms of such temples are a symbolic expression of what we may feel at the sight of a human being raising himself upright — with the movements of his hands, his features, the look on his face, and so on. If with the eyes of the Spirit we are able to look behind this countenance into the *inner man*, into the microcosm that is an image of the macrocosm, we should find, inasmuch as the countenance expresses the inner man, that the countenance and the inner man are related in just the same way as the facade or frontage of a temple of Asia Minor was related to its interior. A human being in the act of raising himself upright — that is what the early temple of Asia Minor expresses, not as a copy, but as the underlying motif and all that this motif suggests. The spiritual picture given by Anthroposophy of the physical nature of man helps us to realise the sense in which such a temple was an expression of the microcosm, of man. Understanding of the aspiring human being, therefore, sheds light on the fundamental character of that early Art of Building. Man as a physical being has his spiritual counterpart in those remarkable temples of which only fragments and debris have survived. This could be pointed out in every detail, down to the winged wheels and the original forms of all such designs. *The Temple Is — Man!* rings to us across the ages like a clarion call.

And now let us turn to the temples of Egypt and of Greece. Man can be described not only as a physical being, but also as a being of *soul*. When we approach man on Earth as a being of soul, all that we perceive in his eyes, his countenance, his gestures, is, to begin with, a riddle as great in every respect as that presented by the Egyptian Temple. It is *within* man that we find the holy of holies — accessible only to those who can find the way from the outer to the inner. And there, in the innermost sanctuary, a human soul is concealed, just as the God and the secrets of the Mysteries were concealed in the Temples and Pyramids of Egypt.

But the soul is not so deeply concealed in man as to be unable to find expression in his whole bearing and appearance. When the soul truly permeates the body, the body can become the outward expression and manifestation of the soul. The human body is then revealed to us as a work of artistic perfection, permeated by soul, an infinitude complete in itself. And now look for something in the visible world that is as whole and perfect in itself as the physical body of man permeated by soul. In respect of dynamic perfection you will find nothing except the Greek Temple which, in its self-contained perfection, is at the same time the dwelling-place and the expression of the God. And in the sense that man, as microcosm, is soul within a *body*, so is the temple of Egypt and of Greece, in reality, MAN!

The human being raising himself upright — that is the prototype of the oriental temple. The human being standing on the soil of the Earth, concealing a mysterious world within himself but able to let the forces of this inner world stream perpetually through his being, directing his gaze horizontally *forward* — that is the Greek Temple. Again the annals of world-history tell us: *The Temple is — MAN!*

We come now to our own epoch. Its origin is to be found in the fruits of the ancient Hebrew culture and of Christianity, of the Mystery of Golgotha, although, to begin with, the new impulse had to find its way through architectural forms handed down from Egypt and from Greece. But the urge is to break through these forms, to break through their boundaries in such a way that they lead out beyond all enclosed space to the weaving life of the universe. The seeds of whatever comes to pass in the future have been laid down in the past. The temple of the future is foreshadowed, mysteriously, in the past. And as I am speaking of something that is a perpetual riddle in the evolution of humanity, I can hardly do otherwise than speak of the riddle itself in rather enigmatical words.

Constant reference is made to Solomon's Temple. We know that this temple was meant to be an expression of the spiritual realities of human evolution. We hear much of this Temple of Solomon. But a question that leads nowhere — and here lies the enigma — is often put to men living on the physical Earth. It is asked: Has anyone actually seen King Solomon's Temple? Is there anyone who ever saw it, in all its truth and glory? Here indeed there is a riddle! Herodotus traveled in Egypt and the region of Asia Minor only a few centuries after the Temple of Solomon must already have been in existence. From the descriptions of his travels — and they mention matters of far less importance — we know that he must have passed within a few miles of Solomon's Temple, but he did not set eyes upon it. People had not seen this temple! The enigma of it all is that here I have to speak of something that certainly existed — and yet had not been seen. But so it is ... In Nature, too,

there is something that may be present and yet not be seen. The comparison is not perfect, however, and to press it any further would lead wide of the mark. Plants are contained within their seeds, but human eyes do not see the plants within the seeds. This comparison, as I say, must not be pressed any further; for anyone who attempted to base an explanation of Solomon's Temple upon it would be speaking quite falsely. In the way I have expressed it, however, the comparison is correct — the comparison between the seed of a plant and the Temple of Solomon.

What is the aim of Solomon's Temple? Its aim is the same as that of the Temple of the Future. The physical human being can be described by Anthroposophy; the human being as the temple of the soul can be described by Psychosophy; and as Spirit, the human being can be described by Pneumatosophy. Can we not then picture man spiritually in the following way: — We envisage a human being lying on the ground and raising himself upright; then we picture him standing before us as a self-contained whole, a self-grounded, independent infinitude, with eyes gazing straight forward; and then we picture a man whose gaze is directed to the heights, who raises his soul to the Spirit and receives the Spirit! To say that the Spirit is spiritual is tautology, but for all that it underlines what is here meant, namely, that the Spirit is the supersensible reality. Art, however, can work only in the realm of sense, can create forms only in the world of sense. In other words: The spirit that is received into the soul must be able to pour into form. Just as the human being raising himself upright and then the human being consolidated in himself were the prototypes of the ancient temples, so the prototype of the temple of the future must be the human soul into which the Spirit has been received. The mission of our age is to initiate an Art of Building which shall be able to speak with all clarity to the men of future times: *The Temple is — Man* — the Man who receives the Spirit into his soul! But this Art of Building will differ from all its predecessors. We now come back to what was said at the beginning of the lecture.

With our physical eyes we can actually see a man who is in the act of raising himself upright. But man as a being pervaded by soul must be *inwardly* felt, inwardly perceived. And this was indeed the case — as you heard this morning when the lecturer so graphically said that the sight of a Greek Temple “makes us feel the very marrow of our bones.” Truly, the Greek Temple lives in us because we are that Temple, in so far as we are each of us a microcosm permeated by soul. The quickening of the soul by the Spirit is an invisible, supersensible fact ... and yet it must become perceptible in the world of sense if it is to be expressed in Art. No epoch except our own and the epochs to come could give birth to this form of Art. It is for us to make the beginning, although it can be no more than a beginning, an attempt ... rather like the temple which having been once whole and perfect in itself, strove in the Church of Christendom to break through its own walls and make connection with the weaving life of the universe.

What have we to build?

We have to build something that will be the completion of this striving. With the powers that Spiritual Science can awaken in us, we must try to create an interior which in the effects produced by its colours, forms and other features, is a place set apart — and yet, at the same time, is not shut off, inasmuch as wherever we look a challenge seems to come to our eyes and our hearts to

penetrate through the walls, so that in the seclusion as it were of a sanctuary, we are at the same time one with the weaving life of the Divine. The temple that belongs truly to the future will have walls — and yet no walls; its interior will have renounced every trace of egoism that may be associated with an enclosed space, and all its colours and forms will give expression to a selfless striving to receive the inpouring forces of the universe.

At the opening of our building in Stuttgart* I tried to indicate what can be achieved in this direction by colours, to what extent colours can be the link with the Spirits of the surrounding world, with the all-pervading spiritual atmosphere. And now let us ask: Where does the supersensible being of man become externally manifest? When does an indication reach us of the supersensible reality within physical man? Only when man *speaks*, when his inner life of soul pours into the word; when the word is the embodiment of wisdom and prayer which — without any element of sentimentality — enshrines world-mysteries and entrusts them to man's keeping. The word that becomes flesh within the human being is the Spirit, the spirituality which is expressing itself in the physical human being. And we shall either create the building we ought to create ... or we shall fail, in which case the task will have to be left to those who come after us. But we shall succeed if, for the first time, we give the *interior* the most perfect form that is possible to-day — quite apart from the outside appearance of the building. The exterior may or may not be prosaic ... that does not fundamentally matter. The outside appearance is there for the secular world — with which the interior is not concerned. It is the interior that is of importance. And what will this interior be?

At every turn our eyes will light upon something that seems to say to us: This interior, with its language of colours and forms, in its whole living reality, is an expression of the deepest spirituality that man can entrust to the sphere of his bodily nature. The mystery of Man as revealed to wisdom and to prayer, and the forms which surround the space, will be one in such a building. And the words sent forth into this space will set their own range and boundaries, so that as they strike upon the walls they will find something to which they are so attuned that what has issued from the human being will resound back into the interior. The dynamic power of the word will go forth from the centre to the periphery and the interior space itself will then re-echo the proclamation and message of the Spirit. This interior will set and maintain its own boundaries and at the same time open itself freely to the spiritual infinitudes.

Such a building could not have existed hitherto, for Spiritual Science alone is capable of creating it. And if Spiritual Science does not do this in our day, future epochs will demand it of us. Just as the Temple of Western Asia, the Temple of Egypt, the Temple of Greece, the Church or Cathedral of Christendom have arisen in the course of the evolution of humanity, so must the place of the Mysteries of Spiritual Science — secluded from the material affairs of the world and open to the spiritual world — be born from the Spirit of man as the work of art of the future.

Nothing that is already in existence can prefigure the ideal structure that ought, one day, to stand before us. Everything, in a certain sense, must be absolutely and in essence new. Naturally, it will arise in a form as yet

imperfect, but at least it will be a beginning, leading to higher and higher stages of perfection in the same domain.

How can men of the modern age become mature enough to understand the nature of such a building?

No true art can arise unless it is born from the whole Spirit of an epoch in human evolution. During the second year of my studies at the Technical High School in Vienna, *Ferstel*, the architect of the Votivkirche there, said something in his Presidential Address which often comes back to me. On the one side his words seemed to me at the time to strike a discordant note, but on the other, to be absolutely characteristic of the times. Ferstel made the strange statement: "Styles of architecture cannot just be found, cannot be invented." To these words there should really be added: "Styles of architecture are born from the intrinsic character of the peoples." Up to now, our age has shown no aptitude, as did the men of old, for finding styles of architecture and of building and then placing them before the world. Styles of architecture *are* "found," but in the real sense only when they are born from the *spirit of an epoch*. How can we to-day reach some understanding of the Spirit of our age by which alone the true architecture of the future can be found? ... I shall try now to approach the subject from quite a different angle and point of view.

During the course of our work, I have come across artists in many different domains who feel a kind of fear, a kind of dread of spiritual knowledge, because Spiritual Science tries to open up a certain understanding of works of art and the impulses out of which they were created. It is quite true that efforts are made to interpret sagas, legends, and works of art, too, in the light of Spiritual Science, to explain the impulses underlying them. But so often it happens — and it is very understandable — that an artist recoils from such interpretations because, especially when he is really creative, he feels: 'When I try to formulate in concepts or ideas something that I feel to be a living work of art, or at least a fertile intuition, I lose all power of originality, I lose everything I want to express — the content as well as the form.' ... I assure you that little has been said to me through the course of the years with which I have greater sympathy. For if one is at all sensitive to these things, it is only too easy to understand the repulsion that an artist must feel when he finds one of his own works or a work he loves, being analysed and 'explained.' That a work of art should be taken in hand by the intellect is a really dreadful thought for the artist who is present, somewhere, in all of us. We seem to be aware of an almost deathlike smell when we have an edition of Goethe's *Faust* before us ... and there, at the bottom of the pages are the analytical notes of some scholar who may even be writing them as a philosopher, not merely as a philologist! How ought we to regard these things? I will try to make the point clear to you, very briefly, by means of an example.

I have before me the latest edition of the legend of "The Seven Wise Masters," published this year by Diederichs. It is an old legend of which many different versions exist. Fragments of it are to be found practically all over Europe. It is a remarkable story, beautiful and artistically composed. I am, of course, speaking here of the art of epic poetry, but the same kind of treatment might also be applied to architectural art. I cannot take you through

all that is contained, sometimes in rather unpolished phraseology, in this legend of the Seven Wise Masters, but I will give you a skeleton outline of it.

A series of episodes graphically narrated in connection with one main theme, have the following superscription: "Here begins the Book which tells of Pontianus the Emperor, his wife the Empress and his son, the young Prince Diocletian, how the Emperor desired to hang his son on the gallows, and how he is saved by words spoken each day by Seven Wise Masters."

An Emperor has a wife and by her a son, Diocletian. She dies, and the Emperor takes a second wife. His son Diocletian is his lawful heir; by the second wife he has no son. The time comes for the education of Diocletian. It is announced that this will be entrusted to the most eminent and wisest men in the land, and Seven Wise Masters then come forward to undertake it. The Emperor's second wife longs to have a son of her own in order that her stepson may not succeed his father; but her wish is not fulfilled and she then proceeds to poison the mind of the Emperor against his son; finally she resolves to get rid of the son at all costs. For seven years Diocletian receives instruction from the Seven Wise Masters, amassing a wide range of knowledge — sevenfold knowledge. But in a certain respect he has outgrown the wisdom that the Seven Wise Masters had been able to impart to him. He has, for instance, himself discovered a certain star in the heavens and it is thereby intimated to him that when he returns to his father, he must remain dumb for seven consecutive days, must utter no single word and appear to be a simpleton. But knowing too, that the Empress is intent upon his death, he asks the Seven Wise Masters to save him. And now the following happens, seven times in succession, The son comes home, but the Empress tells the Emperor a story with the object of persuading him to let his son be hanged. The Emperor gives his assent, for the story has convinced and deeply moved him. The son is led out to the gallows in the presence of the Emperor and on the way they come upon the first of the Seven Wise Masters. When the Emperor holds him responsible for his son's stupidity, he — the first of the Masters — asks leave to tell the Emperor a story, and receives permission. "Very well," says the Wise Man, "but first you must allow your son to come home, for it is my wish that he shall listen to us before he is hanged." The Emperor acquiesces and when they have returned to their home, the first of the Seven Wise Masters tells his story. This story makes, such an impression upon the Emperor that he allows his son to go free. But the next day the Empress tells the Emperor another story, and again the son is condemned to death. As he is being led to the gallows, the second of the Seven Wise Masters comes forward, begging leave to tell the Emperor a story before the hanging takes place. Again the upshot is that Diocletian still lives. The same happenings repeat themselves seven times over, until the eighth day has come and Diocletian is able to speak. This is the story of how the Emperor's son comes to be saved.

The whole tale and its climax are graphically told. And now, think of it: We take the book and absorb ourselves in it; the graphic, if at times rather crude pictures, cannot fail to delight us; we are carried away by a really masterly portrayal of souls. But such a story immediately makes people call out for an 'explanation.' Would it always have been so? No indeed! It is only so in our own age, the Fifth Post-Atlantean epoch, when the intellect predominates everything. In the days when this story was actually written, nobody would have been asked to 'explain' it. But the verdict nowadays is that explanation

is necessary ... and so one makes up one's mind to give it. And after all, it is not difficult. The Emperor's first wife has given him a son who is destined to receive teaching from Seven Wise Masters and whose soul has descended from times when men were still endowed with natural powers of clairvoyance. The soul has lost this clairvoyance but the human 'I' has remained — and can be instructed by the Seven Wise Masters, who are presented to us in many different forms. As I once said, we have essentially the same theme in the seven daughters of Jethro, the priest of Midian, who came to Moses by the well belonging to their father; he, eventually, became the father-in-law of Moses. In the Middle Ages, too, there are the seven Liberal Arts. The second wife of the Emperor who has no consciousness of the Divine, represents the human soul as it is to-day, when it has lost consciousness of the Divine and is therefore also unable to 'have a son.' Diocletian, the son, is instructed in secret by the Seven Wise Masters and must finally be freed by means of the powers he has acquired from these Seven. And so we could continue, giving an absolutely correct interpretation which would certainly be useful to our contemporaries. But what of our artistic sense? I do not know whether what I now have to say will find an echo or not! When we read and absorb such a book and then try to be clever, explaining it quite correctly, in the way demanded by the modern age, we cannot help feeling that we have wronged it, fundamentally wronged it. There is no getting away from the fact that a skeleton of abstract concepts has been substituted for the work of art in all its living reality — whether the explanation is true or false, illuminating or the reverse.

The greatest work of art of all is the world itself — Macrocosm or Microcosm! In olden times the secrets of the world were expressed in pictures, or symbols. We, in our day, bring the intellect, and Spiritual Science too, to bear upon the ancient wisdom which has been the seed of the culture of the Fifth Post-Atlantean epoch. We do this in order to 'explain' the secrets of the world. In comparison with the living reality this is just as abstract and barren as a commentary in comparison with the work of art itself. Although Spiritual Science is necessary, although the times demand it, nevertheless in a certain respect we must feel it to be a skeleton in comparison with the living realities of existence. It is indeed so. When Theosophy keeps only our intellects busy, when with our intellects we draw up tables and coin all kinds of technical expressions, Theosophy is nothing but a skeleton — above all when it is speaking of the living human being. It begins to be a little more bearable when we are able to picture, for instance, the conditions of existence on Saturn, Sun and Moon, the earlier epochs of Earth-evolution or the work of the several Hierarchies. But to say that the human being consists of physical body, ether-body, astral body and Ego — or Manas and Kama-Manas ... this is really dreadful, and it is even more dreadful to have charts and tables of these things. Thinking of the human being in all his majesty, I can scarcely imagine anything more horrible than to be surrounded in a great hall by a number of living people and to have on the blackboard beside one a chart of the seven principles of man! But so, alas, it must be ... and there is no getting away from it. It is not, perhaps, actually necessary to inflict these things upon our eyes — they are anything but pleasing to look at — but we must have them before the eyes of the soul! That is part of the mission of our age. And whatever may be said against these things from the point of view of art, they are, after all, part and parcel of the times in which we live.

But how can we get beyond this? In a certain respect we *have* to be arid and prosaic Theosophists; we have to strip the world bare of its secrets and drag glorious works of art into the desert of abstract concepts, reiterating all the time that we are “Theosophists!” How can we get out of this dilemma?

There is only one way. We must feel that Theosophy is for us a *Cross* and a *Sacrifice*, that in a sense it takes away from us practically all the living substance of world-secrets in the possession of mankind hitherto. And no degree of intensity is too great for words in which I want to bring home to you that for everything that truly lives, in the course of the evolution of mankind and of the Divine World too, Theosophy must, to begin with, be a field of corpses.

But if we realise that pain and suffering are inseparable from Theosophy, in that it brings knowledge of what is greatest and most sublime in the world, if we feel that we have in us one of the divine impulses of its mission — then Theosophy is a corpse which rises out of the grave and celebrates its resurrection. Nobody will rejoice to find the world being stripped of its mysteries; but on the other hand nobody will feel and know the creative power inherent in the mysteries of the world as truly as those who realise that the source of their own creative power flows from Christ, Who having carried the Cross to the ‘Place of Skulls,’ passed through death. This is the Cross in the sphere of knowledge which Theosophy carries in order to experience death and then, from within the grave, to see a new world of life arising. A man who quickens and transforms his very soul — in a way that the intellect can never do — a man who suffers a kind of death in Theosophy, will feel in his own life a source of those impulses in Art which can turn into reality what I have outlined before you to-day.

True spiritual perception is part and parcel of the aim before us — and we believe that the Johannesbau-Verein will help to make this aim understood in the world. I hardly think any other words are needed in order to bring home to you that this Building can be for Anthroposophists one of those things which the heart feels to be a vital necessity in the stream of world-events. For when it comes to the question of whether Anthroposophy will find a wider response in the world to-day, so much more depends upon *deed* than upon any answer expressed in words or thoughts; very much depends, too, upon everyone contributing, as far as he can, to the aim which has found such splendid understanding on the part of the Johannesbau-Verein and may thus be able to take its real place in the evolution of mankind.³⁴⁰

Paul Scheerbart: Glass Architecture (1914)

As a poet rather than an architect, Paul Scheerbart’s vision of architecture is said to depend on metaphors at least in terms of his Glasarchitektur. It was probably a radical stand against the old façade of Europe with its massive

³⁴⁰ A lecture given in Berlin 12th December 1911. Printed in Rudolf Steiner, Architecture as a Synthesis of the Arts, tr. by D. S. Osmond, Steiner Press, London, 1979, pp.3-21

and rather monotonous structures. The notion of Scheerbart in terms of his emphasis on architecture as a synthesis of the arts in social terms may be seen in resemblance naturally with Taut but also Rudolf Steiner. The grasp of an omnipotent architecture capable of changing lives is the outcome of this metaphoric architecture. *Glasarchitektur* plays a role like *deus-ex machina*³⁴¹ which is seen as a remedy for the entire Earth.

I. The environment and its influence on the evolution of culture

We live for the most part within enclosed spaces. These form the environment from which our culture grows. Our culture is in a sense a product of our architecture. If we wish to raise our culture to a higher level, we are forced for better or for worse to transform our architecture. And this will be possible only if we remove the enclosed quality from the spaces within which we live. This can be done only through the introduction of glass architecture that lets the sunlight and the light of the moon and stars into our rooms not merely through a few windows, but simultaneously through the greatest possible number of walls that are made entirely of glass - coloured glass. The new environment that we shall thereby create must bring with it a new culture.

XVIII. The beauty of the Earth if glass architecture is everywhere

The surface of the Earth would change greatly if brick architecture were every where displaced by glass architecture. It would be as though the Earth clad itself in jewellery of brilliants and enamel.

The splendor is absolutely unimaginable. And We should then have on the Earth more exquisite things than the gardens of the Arabian Nights. Then we should have a paradise on Earth and would not need to gaze longingly at the paradise in the sky.

XLI. The possibilities which iron construction renders capable of development Iron construction makes it possible to give walls any form that may be desired. Walls need no longer be vertical. Hence, the possibilities which iron construction enables to be developed are quite unlimited. The dome effects up above can be displaced to the sides, so that when sitting at a table one need only look sideways and upwards in order to observe the dome effect. But curved surfaces are also effective in the lower parts of the walls - this effect is particularly easy to achieve in smaller rooms.

Smaller rooms are totally and completely freed from the need for verticality. The significance of the ground plan in architecture is thereby greatly reduced; the design of the outline of the building acquires greater importance than hitherto.

LXII. The terraces

No doubt, a terrace formation is necessary in taller glass buildings and with several storeys, since otherwise the glass surfaces could not reach the free light-conducting air, to which they aspire, since in darkness they can fulfill their purpose only at night - not during the day.

This terrace formation of the storeys will of course quickly replace the dreary frontal architecture of brick houses.

³⁴¹ someone or something which comes to the rescue at the last moment (especially in a book or play)

LXXI. Transportable buildings

Transportable glass buildings can also be manufactured. They are particularly well suited for exhibition purposes.

Such transportable buildings are not exactly easy to produce. But let it not be forgotten that when something new is involved it is very often precisely the most difficult problem that is tackled first.

CII. The transformation of the Earth's surface

Again and again something sounds to us like a fairy tale, when it is not really so fantastic or Utopian at all. Eighty years ago the steam railway came along and actually transformed the whole surface of the Earth, as no one will deny. According to what has been said so far the surface of the Earth is to be transformed - and by glass architecture. If it comes, it will transform the Earth's surface. Naturally, a part will also be played by other factors outside the present discussion. It was the steam railway that produced the brick metropolis culture of today from which we all suffer. Glass architecture will come only when the metropolis in our sense of the word has been done away with.

That it must be done away with is perfectly clear to all those who aim at the further evolution of our culture. This is no longer worth talking about.

We all know what colour means; it forms only a small part of the spectrum.

But this we want to have. Infrared and ultra-violet are not perceptible to our eyes - but no doubt ultra-violet is perceptible to the sense organs of ants.

Even if we cannot for the present assume that our sense organs will evolve further from today to tomorrow, we shall nevertheless be justified in supposing that to begin with we may attain that which is accessible to us - to wit, that part of the spectrum which we are able to perceive with our eyes, those miracles of colour which we are capable of taking in.

The only thing that can help us to do this is glass architecture, which must transform our whole life - the environment in which we live. It is therefore to be hoped that glass architecture really will 'transform' the surface of our Earth.³⁴²

³⁴² Op. cit., Conrads, pp.32-33.