

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ;  
THE CASE OF ERBIL

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ; THE CASE OF ERBIL**

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The purpose of this study is to discuss the role of the religion and language, Islam Kurdish, in the process of Kurdish identity formation in Northern Iraq and to find out the most imperative factor/s in the existing identification of Kurdish identity by relying on the field research conducted in Erbil.

The current discussions in the literature generally either emphasized the role of religion by focusing on the tariqat relations, and/or the role of feudal structure of the Kurdish society by focusing on the tribal relations, and/or the role of the culture by specifically focusing on the language as way of identification. In this study, the results of the field research conducted in Erbil are being compared to the arguments in the existing literature that explain the Kurdish identity in relation to the religion and the language.

The study aims to discuss whether there is a shift from the religion, which had a significant role in history regarding the Kurdish identification, to the language, as a marker of modern Kurdish identity formation in Erbil. The research that conducted

for this thesis has indicated that while the role of religion lost its historical role, the Kurdish language became the indicator of the identity of the Kurds in Erbil. In addition, this study will examine, in historical context, how the Kurdish language became the core issue of the Kurdish identity. The findings of the field research have been analyzed by using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software program.

Keywords: Iraqi Kurds, Ethnic, Identity, Religion, Language

## ÖZ

KUZEY IRAK'TA ETNİK VE DİNİ KİMLİKLER;

ERBİL ÖRNEĞİ

Kaplan, Muharrem

Yüksek Lisans, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

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Bu tezin amacı Kuzey Irak'ta Kürt kimliğinin oluşum sürecinde dinin ve dilin, İslam'ın ve Kürtçe'nin, rolünü tartışmak ve mevcut Kürt kimliğinin tanımlamasında en önemli olan faktör ya da faktörleri Erbil'de yapılmış olan saha çalışmasına dayalı olarak bulmaktır.

Literatürdeki mevcut tartışmalar ya tarihat ilişkilerine odaklanarak dinin, ya aşiret ilişkilerine odaklanarak feodal yapının, ve/veya bir kendini tanımlama biçimi olarak dile odaklanarak kültürün rolünü öne çıkarmışlardır. Bu çalışmada, Erbil'de yürütülmüş saha çalışmasının sonuçları Kürt kimliğini din ve dille açıklayan literatürdeki mevcut argümanlarla karşılaştırılmıştır.

Tez, tarihte Kürt kimliğinin tanımlanmasında önemli bir rolü olan dinden, Kürt kimliğinin oluşmasında dile doğru bir kayma olup olmadığını Erbil şehri üzerinden tartışmaktadır. Bu tez için yapılan araştırma göstermiştir ki, dinin tarihsel rolünü

kaybetmiş, Kürtçe ise Erbil'deki Kürt kimliğinin göstergesi haline gelmiştir. Ayrıca Kürt dilinin tarihsel süreçte Kürt kimliğinin esas meselesi haline nasıl geldiği de araştırılacaktır. Saha çalışmasının bulguları SPSS (Sosyal Bilimler için İstatistik Paketi) yazılım programı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Iraklı Kürt, Etnik, Kimlik, Din, Dil

To My Parents

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The intellectual movements in modern thought that were first emerged as a result of the changes happened in Europe and become wide spread through out the World, have changed the self-identification of people as well as the other changes. These movements were emerged in Europe because of natural and sequential events, yet appearance of these movements were not as natural in rest of the World as they were in Europe. The external interventions to the Middle East by the European Powers and the perception of these thoughts and movements by internal policy makers and intellectuals as necessary steps for the development, as well as partly natural events, resulted in imitation of these thoughts and movements in the Middle East region. These natural or partly artificial events and changes in the region also transformed the self-identification of people.

Even though the effects of the European nationalist ideologies and movements on the Middle East were observed in the late 19th century and through out the 20th century, search for identity by the local people is still in process. Since the boundaries of the countries in the Middle East were drawn artificially by the outsiders and the structure these, so called, nation states were designed according to the interests of the occupiers, the problems of identity regarding nations and nationalisms or religion remained not only unsolved but also became even more complex. The formation and identification of Iraqi Kurdish identity examined within this thesis, is located in the core of the political conflicts.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and continuation of the British and French supremacies over the remains of the Ottoman heritage up to World War II have generated acceleration, redirected, and reshaped the social and political developments in the Middle East.

Withdrawal of the armies of these powers from the region did not reduce this effect; nevertheless, they continued to control these artificially created states through different means, because they left behind the regimes that they could control.

The creation of the state, called as Iraq, by bringing the three old Ottoman provinces, Mosul Baghdad and Basra, according to the interests British Empire/Britain is a perfect example of this political design. Actually, these provinces have very different social and political structures, as well as tremendous cultural differences.

The second division of the Kurds<sup>1</sup>, who live far away from the central government under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, between Syria, Turkey and Iraq caused the Kurds to experience different social and political practices in these countries. The region that we call nowadays as Northern Iraq, which was called as *Wilayat-i Mosul* during the Ottomans and part of the *Misaq-i Milli* at the beginning of establishment of the Republic of Turkey was left to the domination of British Empire due to developments at that time. In this region, how did the process that mentioned above happened? In other words, how did the transformation of self-identification of people that emerged first in Europe but become widespread to the whole World emerge in the Northern Iraq and from which phases did it overtake in the Northern Iraq? More clearly, how self-identification of the Kurds living there did changed through historical periods. Even if answering these and similar questions is not the aim of this thesis, it provides some clues in responding the main research question of this thesis.

Depending on a single quantitative research conducted in a specific city on specific time, it is impossible to construct a narrative explanation on Kurdish nationalism in whole of the Middle East. Since Kurdish policy of the countries in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran Iraq, Syria and Ex-Soviet Union republics have been different from each other, Kurdish nationalisms in these countries have different experiences. Even though there are similarities of these policies, yet, the differences cannot be ignored. This thesis is not aiming to tell a story about all Kurdish identities, rather it focuses on the Kurdish identity in Northern Iraq, by examining the case of Erbil.

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<sup>1</sup> The first division had been occurred during the long wars between the Sunni Ottoman and the Shiite Safavids in 17th century.

How much are cultural dynamics, the religion and the language, which are usually emphasized especially by Western scholars in formation of Kurdish identity, effective in identification of Kurdish identity in Northern Iraq? This thesis is going to study this subject and tries to answer this question. Are these factors significant in understanding the issue? Which factor, the religion or the language, is more important than the other is? Are there any different factors that can effect the formation of Kurdish identity? If one of these two dynamics is more central than the other one, then what can be the reason/s for that?

In the thesis, the language spoken at home has been differentiated from the one that is taught at school. Since some of the people who live in Erbil speak a different language at home and another one at school, these two were regarded as two different variables and the relationship of these variables in relation to identity variables were examined separately in the analysis.

The studies carried out so far about the identity of the Kurds living in Iraq usually were short of field researches, indeed except a few anthropological surveys there is almost no any field research. Since other issues in the Middle East, such as Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Gulf War or Iran Iraq War, were more notable than the Kurdish issue, it remained far away from the attention of the researchers. Another reason for this shortage of involvement of field researches concerning the Kurdish identity is the existence of serious security problems. Instability of the region and tremendous amount of migration movements of the Kurds, also, did not paved way to conduct researches about these people in the region. Therefore, the issue was supported usually by news reported newspapers or other mass media devices and examined by using the second-hand and even third-hand sources of information. Hence, the arguments that brought into discussion do not seem to be scientific enough and therefore, they cannot free from the distortion due to the devices that they had based on. Furthermore, the information that was reproduced was not derived from the people themselves who were the very subject of the information reported. The American invasion of Iraq and the social, economical and political changes emerged there due to this invasion attracted the attention of social

scientists and researchers. What is more, the transition of Northern Iraq into the Safe Haven paved way to conduct researches about the issue.

The research that was conducted for this thesis is one of the exceptional field researches that carried out in the region. In addition, its attempt to observe lots of variable at the same time in the field is increasing its value. It also includes huge amount of descriptive variables that helps to understand the society, ethnic and religious groups especially in relation to each other. This research was performed in randomly selected 20 quarters of 60 quarters in Erbil city of Northern Iraq. In each quarter, 25 households were randomly selected therefore; the sample totally included 500 households in the capital city of Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Having such a big sample for a city makes the survey even more valuable, more reliable and valid. Selecting the city of Erbil for this research was not an arbitrary. There were rational reasons for that. These reasons can be listed as follows:

The first reason is that Erbil is the capital city of Kurdistan Region of Iraq. All political movements and ideas can be observed there. Therefore, it is more representative than Sulaimaniyya and Duhok. Even though it is commonly known as the headquarters of KDP, which is the case, yet Erbil is also the capital city of the Region and the Presidency Palace, the Parliamentary Building and Regional Assembly of Iraqi Kurdistan and all other governmental buildings established there.

Second, it is a safe city where both researchers and respondents need to be in secure for the research to be scientific, because if the respondents do not feel safe, then their responses will not be reliable and the researchers cannot complete their studies. For instance, it was also possible to conduct the research in Kirkuk instead of doing it just in Erbil. However, it would not be as reliable as this research, because Kirkuk was not safe enough to conduct an objective research. In addition, there are enormous changes in the structure of the city of Kirkuk. These changes should not be regarded as stable changes as those that are observable in Erbil. Since complex discussions and conflicts on the future of Kirkuk are still going on and the trend of the changes is not clear yet, any data gathered from the city cannot be taken as reliable. Therefore, Erbil is better for collecting the data than Kirkuk.

Third, Erbil is ethnically and religiously more heterogeneous than Sulaimaniyya and Duhok, that makes it possible to make observation of the Kurdish ethnic identity in relation to others. There are different ethnic and religious groups like Kurds, Turcomans, Arabs, Assyrians, and Caldeans and Muslims and Christians, and with very rare portion of Yezidi temporary migrant workers. It is also helpful to predict the situation of Turcomans, which is not the aim of this research, in case, the cities like Kirkuk and Tell Afar, where Turcoman population is dense, join the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In short, due to these reasons, the research was accomplished in Erbil, and some of the findings that will be used for this thesis are presented in the third chapter and are referred for comparison in conclusion of this thesis.

In the second chapter of the thesis, the historical roots of the Kurds are examined. Starting from antiquity to the modern times by reciting the historical experiences of the human groups that called as Kurds, the claims on the term Kurd and the reality of the modern Iraqi Kurdish society was discussed. By doing so, it is not aimed to indicate that the Kurds are historical nation or claiming them as primordial. It does not aim to narrate or reproduce their history or to claim that the Kurds are the heritage of these old human groups. Yet, it assumes that it is impossible to understand enough the modern Kurds without knowing their historical roots.

In the third chapter of this thesis, the arguments about the role of the religion and the language to understand the formation of the Kurdish identity in the existing literature are being discussed and examined. Even though they are not generally based on empirical studies, these arguments are valuable because some of them were based on the field observation and some anthropological studies. However, most of these studies are not updated. The role of the religion in the formation of Kurdish identity is brought into discussion almost by all researchers and anthropologists from the early studies. This role even was complained by almost all of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Kurdish nationalists. Is it possible that the role of the religion, which Kurdish nationalists have perceived as a barrier for the formation of Kurdish identity, has been exaggerated? Alternatively, is the role of the religion that had remarkable effect on the Kurdish identity losing or increasing its significance due to the developments that were the Kurds have

experienced? If it lost its meaning in the formation of identity, is this because of the developments due to possible secularization in social life? In other words, is it because of secularization of individuals' life or is there any other reason for that? If it is increasing its role, then what are the reasons for that? The other important question of the thesis is whether there is a significant relation between the language and identity formation of the Iraqi Kurds. The present arguments in the literature are being discussed and compared. In what respect is the language important and remarkable? The perception of the language by the Kurds and the authors are also presented in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter of the study is focuses on the field research. It gives information on the stages of the implementation of the research in the field, the technique of the sampling and the reasons why those methods were used. In addition, the significant relations between the variables and the statistical analyses of the research that was conducted in Erbil were presented, as well as some of the graphs and frequencies. By doing so, the information that was gathered in the field and the significant relations between the variables were demonstrated in order for the interpretations to be more elaborative and discernable for those who have no educational background in statistics. Depending on the structure and the sort of the variables, the techniques of the examination of the relation of the variables, chi-square, crosstabs, and ANOVA, etc., were performed when needed.

The fifth and the last chapter focuses on the discussions on the comparison between the findings of the research that presented in the forth chapter and the arguments in the existing literature that presented in the third chapter. How the religion and the language factors were reflected them in the current Kurdish society in Northern Iraq are being discussed and explained. The existing arguments of the authors are also being criticized.

In the thesis, the discussions on whether the Kurds constituted a nation or not, were not included and questioned. Since the Kurds in Iraq are mentioned usually as a nation in the referred literature and furthermore, for such a discussion it is necessary to discuss also the concepts of the ethnicity, nation and nationalism, the Iraqi Kurds were regarded as a nation when the authors mentioned them as such, in accordance with common usage in

the literature. In addition, since the Iraqi Kurds include smaller ethnic groups in itself, the conceptual usage of term nation was perceived as more appropriate.

In the thesis, there is no any theoretical discussion on the concept of identity, as there is no any discussion on the religious and ethnic identity. The reason for that is that all of these discussions necessitate more place that we can provide in this master thesis and that this is not the aim of this thesis.

The questions of who the Kurds are, and the discussions on that the Kurds include whom and exclude whom were seen as unnecessary questions to respond, because they are out of the intention of this thesis. Furthermore, focus of this thesis is not to make an argument about the all Kurds in the Middle East, rather it focuses only the Kurds in Iraq, even the Kurds in Erbil. Since this discussion, which is very common in the existing literature, do not include the Kurds in Erbil, therefore it is not necessary to make an argument on that. If it is thought that the groups under the discussion of whether they are the Kurds are not, are living periphery of the Kurdish inhabited areas, it is easy to understand why this discussion was not hold in the thesis.

During the preparation of the questions, all of the questions in the questionnaire were directed to the people, by using participant and non-participant observation methods and by doing interviews, to foresee their reaction. In doing so, the implementation of the whole research before the interviews was tried to be taken under quarantine. Since in the pilot research asking about the differences in Kurdish dialects were regarded as annoying by some of the respondents those questions were not included. Even if both of them, Bahdinani and Sorani, are observable in Erbil, the differences in the dialects of the Kurdish language, and their relation with the identity could not be included in the research and the thesis. Even if these questions are incredibly important for detecting the differences, if there exist, they were eliminated taking the safety of the research.

Additionally, school materials, official or non-official documents or other pressed materials were not investigated, because this was out of the question of this thesis and it necessitates other survey techniques. Because the research is focused on the private

space, where there is no direct control of the Kurdish Regional or Iraqi Federal Government, there was no need to use such a technique.

Because of the technical reasons in the questionnaire, in the third chapter for some variables, separate analyses had to be implemented. The reason for that, is not emphasizing the differences between the male and the female, but it is because some of the respondents were females whereas the others males depending the existence of the head of the households during the interviews. This had to be done in that way, in order to prevent exclusion some of the households from the analysis. This did not aim to make an argument on the gender differences in identity perception however; some interpretations were made where there is a significant difference between the males and the female respondents.

The other important point that should be mentioned is that only the groups of variables that had significant relations with identity are presented in the third chapter. Presenting all of the findings would be useless for the thesis, because it would be too long to do that. Therefore, there is no so much presentation of insignificant variables for our aim in this thesis.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

When does the history of the Kurds start? Obviously, this question necessitates answering who the Kurds are. It is possible to argue that since all nations, if we assume that the Kurds constitute a nation, are modern phenomenon, therefore, the examination of the history of the Kurds should also start from the time that the world had faced modernity. However, this interference prevents us from understanding why some faced modernity earlier and why others did not. Second, it implicitly assumes that before the emergence of 'nation', there were no any national elements. Third, it hampers understanding the causes of this emergence. Fourth, it leads us also to assume that all nations only can be understood by examination of nationalism and so on. Without discussing whether the nations are modern phenomenon or not, which is not the aim of this study, and bearing in mind that the term nation that is used here, will not be used in its political meaning, but will only refer to the Kurds as people, it is helpful to study the origin of the Kurds in history.

The term 'Kurdistan' that is used in this study, does not refer to any political entity if not stated so. Since the authors that used the term in their works used it to refer a geographical and cultural entity, it should not be confused with its common political usage in today's political conjuncture.

The stories and histories written about the Kurds are not free from subjectivity of the narrative tellers. One can claim that this statement might be true for all societies or groups, yet, there is, most probably, no any other society that fitted better than Kurds.

This does not mean that the stories told us do not reflect the reality about the Kurds but reveal that these stories are not the absolute reality of these people and that either the ideologies or cultural, social or political perceptions of the storytellers fabricated the stories shaped and constructed accordingly.

There are two kinds of handicaps for us in writing such a history. First, the histories of the Kurds have been written by hegemonic political powers, which ruled over the Kurds. In Turkey, where the majority of Kurdish population lives, the official state policy was the denial of even the term Kurd and Kurdish names. In Iran, slightly better than Turkey, the official state policy was the acceptance of the term Kurd and even Kurdistan, but perceiving them as part of the Iranian nation. In Iraq, there was the acceptance of existence of Kurdish ethnicity but with the fear of the division of the country. In Syria, the Kurds have been in the worst position, because until very recently the policy of the Syrian government regarding the Kurds was refusal of the Kurds even as citizens.

The second handicap is being trapped into Kurdish nationalist discourse while escaping from the discourse of these hegemonic states. In this thesis, I tried to escape from these two discourses while studying, especially, on the history of the Kurds, and I believe that through more studies and researches we can avoid such handicaps.

Since, on the one hand, the denial requires putting it out of sight, distortions, manipulation and hiding, on the other hand, nationalism, as usually, does exaggeration, it is not easy to reach the reality of a certain ethnic or national entity.

Is this thesis free of such constructed story telling? Absolutely it is not; however, its writer is well aware of this and does not claim that he would tell a pure and completely objective discourse on the subject.

## **2.2 KURDS BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMANS**

The authors writing on Kurdish history start it from different periods. Mehrdad R. Izady<sup>2</sup> in his book states that the name of Qutil may be the earliest version of the ethnic term

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<sup>2</sup> Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University

*Kurd*.<sup>3</sup> He also claims that some of the names of modern Kurdish tribes can be found in Sumerian writings, such as Subiru or Saubaru as Zibari tribe, living near to Erbil, and the name of an important king of the Qutils, Trigan, as Tirikan tribe, living in Northern Iraq.<sup>4</sup> The Babylonians named the people who were living in Kurdish Mountains, including Medes, as Qutils.

But they also maintained a parallel, and more recent, designator for the Kurds, which was Qardu or Qarduk, likely from the same ancient term *Qutil*. The element *Qard* in the name may have some connection with the Semitic Akkadian word *qard* and the Indo-European Persian word *gurd*, both of which mean a hero, or a warrior.<sup>5</sup>

Izady states that Talmud and Old Testament mentions about the Qardu or Kardu. To him the early good sources for the origins of the Kurds are the Old Testament and the Talmud. The other source that he presented is the late Akkadian tables.

The Late Akkadian tablets dated around 1400 BC (cf. the Amarna archives of Egypt) report a mountain kingdom of Qorties of Kortie to the North of Mesopotamia all the way to the shores of Lake Vân, as being one of the regions conquered by their Kassite rulers. Three centuries later, during the reign of king Tiglath-pileser I (r.1114-1076 BC), the Assyrians sources also report these Kortei as inhabiting the neighboring mountains which were the conquered by him.<sup>6</sup>

Arfa also makes a connection between the Kurds and the *Kur-ti-e* people with whom the Assyrian King Tiglath Pileser fought.<sup>7</sup> The Aryans came from the North of the Caucasus and the Kurds were aryanized around 900 BC.<sup>8</sup> The Medes are constituted from these aryanized Kurds and extended their power to almost all Middle East in the 7<sup>th</sup> century

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<sup>3</sup> Mehrdad R. Izady, *the Kurds: A Concise Handbook*, (Washington: Taylor & Francis, 1992), 28.

<sup>4</sup> Izady, 30.

<sup>5</sup> Izady, 31.

<sup>6</sup> Izady, 31.

<sup>7</sup> Arfa, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Arfa, 2.

BC. This expansion of the Medes paved the way to the establishment of other Indo-European states, such as the Mitanis and the Hittites.<sup>9</sup>

In the 4<sup>th</sup> century, 10.000-strong Greek Army passed the Kurdish inhabited regions and mentioned the people living there as *Karduchoi*. The march of the Alexander the Great to the east through the region made deep impact on the region. The 5<sup>th</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> centuries AD are crucial for the Kurds, because; “The ethnic designator Kurd is established finally, and applied to all segments of the nation.”<sup>10</sup>

After over a millennium of Aryan nomadic settlements, and rejuvenated by the infusion of the Aryan ethnic element, independent and vital Kurdish kingdoms resurfaced after three centuries of eclipse under Achaemenian and Seleucid rule.<sup>11</sup> Arfa states that Kurdish settlements that existed in Iran during Sasanian Dynasty moved to the North West Iran and mixed the people living there, *Kurdu*, and were united with these people.<sup>12</sup> Expansion of the Kurds to the almost all Middle East and interacting with other ethnic groups surrounding them resulted in the assimilation of them through the Roman Empire and Byzantine Empires. However, during the Parthian-Roman Empire ages, another important event happened. The Kurdish Kingdoms that would preserve at least their names emerged. For instance, the name of the Kingdom of Mard was preserved as Mardin, Shahrazur as Shahrazur, Karkhu as Kirkuk, Mukran as Mukran or Mukriyan, etc.

The 6<sup>th</sup> century is also another turning point for the Kurds, since expansion of Islamic religion through the almost all Kurdish inhabited areas completed. Most of the Kurds left their old religions like ‘*Cult of Angels*’ that continue its effect in Yezidism, Alevites and Yarsanism.<sup>13</sup> This century is also important due to the appearance of the term of the

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<sup>9</sup> Izady, 31.

<sup>10</sup> Izady, 34.

<sup>11</sup> Izady, 35.

<sup>12</sup> Arfa, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Izady, 43.

Kurd, as its common usage in modern times, however, the Kurds themselves did not use this term, instead they continued to define themselves with their tribal names.<sup>14</sup>

According to Nezzan, the Kurds had a distinctive Kurdish identity for centuries.<sup>15</sup> He claims that Medes are the ancestors of the Kurds and even if they had not this identity in that period, when the Great Seljuk Empire came in to power in the near Middle East, they had a different identity that can be detectable and differentiate from other societies.<sup>16</sup> The Seljuk Sultan Sanjar called the region as 'Kurdistan', or the lands of the Kurds, because he was well aware of the distinctive personality of the Kurds.<sup>17</sup>

The Kurds usually joined the powerful Islamic states in this period however there were some Kurdish dynasties such as Daylamites, Buwayhids (932-1062 AD) in the areas from Anatolia, through Mesopotamia to Indian Ocean.<sup>18</sup>

By the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> Kurdish period of Islamic century had closed, and there began four Turkic centuries. Kurdistan-in fact all Asiatic parts of the Middle East- entered into four centuries during which was inundated by Turkic nomads, who wiped out many cultures and ethnic groups.<sup>19</sup>

In this period, Izady claims while bigger Kurdish dynasties misplaced, smaller Kurdish principalities continued their political entities. To him, even Mongol invasion could not diminish the self-rule of the Kurds because Mongolian attacks on Kurdish inhabited regions were brief and weak, most probably due to its geographical difficulties. During this invasion years under the leadership of Muzaffar al-Din Kukborid<sup>20</sup> the Kurds fought

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<sup>14</sup> Arfa, 6.

<sup>15</sup> Kendal Nezzan, "The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background." in *Kurdish Culture and Identity*. ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London: Zed Books: 1996), 10

<sup>16</sup> Nezzan, 10.

<sup>17</sup> Nezzan, 10.

<sup>18</sup> Izady, 43.

<sup>19</sup> Izady, 46.

<sup>20</sup> Also known as Muzaffar Ed-din Kökbörü in Turkish

with Mongolians, yet Kukborid was captured by Mongolians and sent back to the Kurds in Erbil to attract them.<sup>21</sup>

Other important dynasty was the Ayyubids (1169-15<sup>th</sup> century). Its power was stretching from the Libya and Egypt in the west, covering all Middle East to Georgia in the north and Iran in the east.<sup>22</sup> Even though widely believed that Saladin Ayyubid was Kurd, however it is still under discussion whether the Ayyubids should mention as Kurdish state or not.

The disappearance of Ayyubids and re-emergence of Persians under the leadership of the Safavids opened the way for the continuous attacks in the Kurdish regions, due to sectarian wars between the Sunni world and the Shiite world. Expansion of the Shiite forces of the Safavids even to the central region of Anatolia caused the Ottomans and Kurdish Prince Idrisi Bitlisi<sup>23</sup> to unify their powers against Shiite the Safavids. This cooperation did not continue long. Indeed Sultan Selim the 1<sup>st</sup> permitted an autonomy that had provided wide area in internal politics for the Kurds. Hassanpour even claims that Selim the 1<sup>st</sup> recognized the 16 government of Kurdish principalities.<sup>24</sup>

The Ottoman promise of fair conduct soon was broken too, in fact by the Selim himself. Toward the end of his reign, large numbers Kurds were forcibly removed to central and Northern Anatolia, where they became the nucleus of the large Kurdish enclaves now there. Some were deported as far as Bulgaria.<sup>25</sup>

Up to the final agreement between Ottomans and the Safavids in 1639, the attacks and temporary changes between the Ottomans and the Safavids continued time to time. The Qasr-i Shirin Agreement ending the continuous war between the Ottomans and the Safavids was resulted with the lasting division of the Kurds, the division that was to

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<sup>21</sup> Izady, 47.

<sup>22</sup> Izady, 46.

<sup>23</sup> In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Idris Hakim Bidlisi (d.1520) wrote his book, Hasht Bahasht "The Eight Paradises", the first history of the Ottoman dynasties, in Persian.

<sup>24</sup> Amir Hassanpour, Kürdistan'da Milliyetçilik ve Dil 1918-1985, trans. İbrahim Bingöl and Cemil Gündoğan (Istanbul: Avesta, 2005), 124

<sup>25</sup> Izady, 52.

have an effect on the Kurdish politics of the modern nation states in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century in the Middle East. The famous history book on the Kurds of Sharafnamah by Bitlisi<sup>26</sup> was written in such an atmosphere between 1594 and 1597 during this period. Furthermore, this atmosphere of the war between the Ottomans and the Safavids paved way Mem û Zîn to be put pen to paper in 1694, by Ahmad ê Khanê<sup>27</sup>, whom some of the authors claimed to be a Kurdish nationalist. Because almost all of the wars between these two empires took place in the region where the Kurds live, as can be understood from his sentences Khanê was protesting these wars;

*I leave it to God's wisdom  
 The Kurds in this world's state  
 Why are they deprived of their rights?  
 Why are they all doomed?<sup>28</sup>  
 Look from Arabs the Georgians,  
 The Kurd become like towers.  
 The Turks and Persians are surrounded by them.  
 The Kurds are on all four corners.  
 Both sides have made Kurdish people  
 Targets for the arrows of fate  
 They are said to be keys to the borders  
 Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark  
 Whenever the Ottoman Sea and Tajik Sea  
 Flow out and agitate,  
 The Kurds get soaked in blood  
 Separating them like an isthmus.<sup>29</sup>*

Khanê might not have expected a unitary Kurdish state in modern meaning, yet it is clear that he believed that all Kurds should be governed under one powerful Kurdish King in order not to be squeezed between two empires, namely the Ottomans and the Safavids. Interestingly, in Mem û Zîn, Khanê uses the word *Rûm* (Rum) for the

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<sup>26</sup> Prince Sharaf Khan Ibn Shams al-Din Bidlisi (d.1604), the ruler of the Principality of Bidlis, used Persian to write his Sharafname (1596), a history of the Kurdish principalities that is still outstanding and the main source for the medieval history of the Kurds and Kurdish regions.

<sup>27</sup> Ahmad ê Khanê, Ahmed-i Hani, Ahmed-i Xani, was born in Hakkari in 1951; He had classical religious education background from Madrasa. His famous works is Mem û Zîn, which is a love story and conveys political ideas of Khanê. He has also written some storybooks for children, Arabic-Kurdish dictionary and some religious books.

<sup>28</sup> Philip Kreyenbroek, & Christine Allison, *Kurdish Culture and Identity*, (London: Zed Books, 1996)

<sup>29</sup> David McDowall, *A modern History of the Kurds*, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000)

Ottomans and *Ajam* (Acem) for the Safavids, instead of using the directly words of the Ottomans and Safavids. Unlike Khanê's Mem û Zîn, Bitlisi's Sharafnamah, Izady claims, did not offer any unified Kurdish political entity or the idea of a unified Kurdish government.<sup>30</sup>

With the abatement of Perso-Ottoman hostilities after the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, this prototype of modern nationalism among the Kurdish intellectuals fell upon the deaf ears. Declining levels of culture and literacy, and the extinction of the once-vibrant urban middle class spawned an ever-widening intellectual gap between these luminaries and their impoverished, largely nomadized compatriots of the following generations.<sup>31</sup>

It is not clear why Izady argues that the level of literacy level had fallen, because he does not give any source for this argument. If we look at the poems of Khanê, he is complaining that either Kurdish Princes did not attach enough importance to protection of the Kurdish intellectuals or that Kurds lacked powerful kings to protect the language and intellectuals. *“Do not say that our money [Kurdish language] is worthless. It is deprived of coins of the kings.”*<sup>32</sup>

Bruinessen confess that he was suspicious about whether some parts of the poem of Ahmad ê Khanê, Mem û Zîn, were added in modern period or not, because his ideas about Kurds, their language, culture and political situation were so nationalist in modern meaning that one can easily claim it was written much later.<sup>33</sup> However, Bruinessen also admits that the sentences that we are mistrustful are recorded by M. A. Rudenko in 1731 and 1732<sup>34</sup> and therefore we should believe that these sentences had been written by Ahmad ê Khanê himself.<sup>35</sup> According to Bruinessen, even though Ahmad ê Khanê was

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<sup>30</sup> Izady, 52.

<sup>31</sup> Izady, 53.

<sup>32</sup> (Khanê, 1968, 65)

<sup>33</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, Ehmedê Xanî'nin Mem û Zîn'i ve Kürt Milli Uyanışının Ortaya Çıkışındaki Rolü, in Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri, trans. by Fahriye Adsay, Ümit Aydoğmuş, Sema Kılıç, ed. by Abbas Vali, (Istanbul: Avesta, 2005), 64

<sup>34</sup> Bruinessen makes a reference to Rudenko in his articles mentioned above, (Ahmad ê Xanê, Mem û Zîn. Kritecisky tekst, peroved, predislovie i ukazatelî M:B: Rudenko, Moskva:NAUK,1962, s.13-16 )

<sup>35</sup> Bruinessen, Ehmedê Xanî'nin Mem û Zîn'i, 64.

aware of his Kurdish identity and proud of that, however he was not a Kurdish nationalist and did not think of national state.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, what is in his mind was a Kurdish King, but he should have been thinking the necessity of unification of Kurds in order to have/obey to more powerful King.<sup>37</sup>

Izady quotes from the French traveler Tavernier, who traveled the region in 1676. According to this quotation, Tavernier mentions from the prince of Bitlis ‘recognized neither Shah nor Padishah, and could not put into the field a force of 20-25.000 cavalry’.<sup>38</sup> It seems that Kurdish princes were benefiting from the geographical advantages of their habitué and, therefore, had relatively big autonomy. Even if the Padishahs and the Shahs sometimes occupied the region, their control over the region was very limited and short-lived.

First, the rise of the Afsharids of Iran, and later the Zand Dynasty with their new powers brought about wars on the Kurdish regions of the Ottoman territories. The wars that continued for years, according to Izady, caused to disappearance of the already poor Kurdish literature in number and destruction of very old Kurdish culture and national heritage.<sup>39</sup>

Izady sees the 19<sup>th</sup> century for the Kurds as an awakening century. Since some parts of the Kurdish regions entered under the rule of Russians due to the wars between Russia, the Ottomans and Iran, the Kurds were influenced by the western ideas of the Russians. Izady calls this effect as re-awakening effect of the Russians on the Kurds. It showed itself as an ethnic nationalism appeared in some of the Kurdish elites including intellectuals and the princes, the attempts and works of Hajji Qadiri Koyi<sup>40</sup> Kurdish

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<sup>36</sup> Bruinessen, Ehmedê Xanî`nin Mem û Zîn`i, 64.

<sup>37</sup> Bruinessen, Ehmedê Xanî`nin Mem û Zîn`i, 64.

<sup>38</sup> Izady, 53.

<sup>39</sup> Izady, 54.

<sup>40</sup> (1817-1897) Kurdish Mullah and poet from Northern Iraq, one of the pioneers of Kurdish nationalism, despite his madrasa background has secular ideological standpoint in politics.

national movements of the Bedirkhan family<sup>41</sup>, respectively, appeared at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>42</sup>

Similar interpretation on the Russian effect that Izady made has been mentioned in a different way by Özoğlu<sup>43</sup>. According to Özoğlu, fear of invasion of Kurdish regions of Ottoman territory and the desire to use ‘Vilayet-i Kurdistan’ against both Russia and Iran made the Ottomans deal with Kurdistan more than even Mosul.<sup>44</sup> In 1867, the Ottomans changed the name of the ‘Vilayet-i Kurdistan’ as ‘Vilayet-i Diyarbakır’ in the State Sâlname of 1867, and he adds there is no clear explanation why they have changed this name.<sup>45</sup> He claims that this change, first naming the *wilayat* as Kurdistan and then changing it into Diyarbakır, caused the leaders of Kurdish intellectuals to think more on an ‘independent Kurdistan’ state rather than ‘an autonomous administration of Kurdistan’.<sup>46</sup>

Different from the nationalism in Balkans, nationalism among the Ottoman Kurds emerged not to divide the Ottomans, yet, as a response to the division of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>47</sup> Özoğlu does not accept the revolts in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Kurdish regions as nationalist revolts, but the revolts against the new administrative arrangements of the Ottomans, or the resistance to the other nationalist movements, namely the Armenian nationalism and the Nestorian movement.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Bedirkhan family is one of the pioneer of Kurdish nationalism in history, the hereditary rulers of the Botan region, and one of the oldest rulers. They claimed descent of the Khalid bin Valid in Islamic history

<sup>42</sup> Izady, 56.

<sup>43</sup> Hakan Özoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Kürt Milliyetçiliği*, trans. by Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, Azad Zana Gündoğan (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005) The original name of this book is *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Involving Identities, Competing Loyalties and Shifting Boundaries*, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004, Translated by Nilay Özok-Gündoğan, Azad Zana Gündoğan

<sup>44</sup> Özoğlu, 83

<sup>45</sup> Özoğlu, 84

<sup>46</sup> Özoğlu, 90

<sup>47</sup> Özoğlu, 91

<sup>48</sup> Özoğlu, 97-98

Certainly, the Kurdish national awakening cannot be perceived only because of this occupation. There were some other changes in the region, the collapse of the Ottoman Millet system was one of them. The idea of millet was quite different from the idea of the nation. The term Millet was referring to religious categorization, yet the term nation has ethnic referring. Therefore, Millet was including all of the Muslim groups, such as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, etc.; however, the nation referred only to the Turks. Since the Kurds perceived themselves as a part of the Millet, when Abdulhamid II implemented Islamization policy, they were quite dependent to the Sunni Sultan. Their dependency to the Sultan was more powerful than even to the Ottoman state. This was the case from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards when Muslim World divided between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shiite Safavids.<sup>49</sup>

McDowall states that in the Ottoman territories like other Muslim nationalists, such as Turks and Arabs, the Kurds also started to perceive themselves as an ethnic community, because of the collapse of the Ottoman Millet system based on religious differences. When this Millet system collapsed, Kurds found themselves in competition with Turks in Turkey, with Persians in Iran and with Arabs in Iraq and Syria.<sup>50</sup> This collapse of Ottoman Millet system resulted in revolts in the Kurdish regions.

In Ottoman Kurdistan, their wrath turned first against the Yezidi Kurds. Massacres perpetrated against them, with the tacit support of Ottoman authorities and religious leaders, forced into Russia most of those they did not kill. The ruthless massacre of the 5000 Assyrians in 1842 at the hands of the chieftain Nurullah heralded a campaign against the Christians. Then came the Shi'ites, Alevis, and finally Jew and the Babis.<sup>51</sup>

One of the biggest revolts was of Sheikh Ubaydullah's. The revolt of Sheikh Ubaydullah, in 1880, which was based in Bitlis, turned an aggression against non-Sunni Muslim

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<sup>49</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Ağa Şeyh Devlet*, trans. by Banu Yalkut, ed. by Ömer Laçiner (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), 392

<sup>50</sup> David McDowall, *A modern History of the Kurds*, ( London: I.B.Tauris & Co ltd, 1996), 2

<sup>51</sup> Izady, 57.

Kurds. Through the revolt, especially the Kurds who belong to Yezidi religion or Alevite sect, either were exiled from their own hometown or killed in some regions.<sup>52</sup>

While McDowall perceives the collapse of the old Ottoman millet system as the main reason for the emergence of these revolts, Izady claims that they were result of the abolishment of old order of local government.<sup>53</sup> Since the Ottomans started to centralize the Kurdish region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and for that, they abolished the Kurdish autonomous principalities, which caused the emergence of religious leaders as new leadership centers. Izady does not mention the possibility of the effect of this collapse on the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in his book<sup>54</sup>. There should be two-sided effect of this. First effect is the emergence of religious leaders as political leaders, as McDowall mentioned; the second effect should be the search for a secular leader among non-religious or religiously diverted Kurds.

According to Izady, unlike traditional Kurdish princes, the newly emerged religious leaders lacked any tolerance towards other religions, sects and beliefs. In 1858, an American Protestant mission had been established in Bitlis, and Bible had been translated to Kurdish. As said by Izady, this was an indicator of tolerance level of the Kurdish princes. However, the abolishment of Kurdish principalities opened way to religious fanatics.

Bruinessen<sup>55</sup>, unlike Izady, claims that Sheikh Ubaydullah's revolt was a national Kurdish movement that had an aim of establishment of independent Kurdish state. The Sheikh went on riot against the Iranian government together with the Kurds there, but he could not succeed. When he came back to Ottoman territories, he was arrested and sent to exile. According to Bruinessen, this was the first Kurdish revolt that had a nationalist

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<sup>52</sup> Izady, 56.

<sup>53</sup> Izady, 57.

<sup>54</sup> Izady,

<sup>55</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*, (Istanbul: İletişim: 2002), p.90

aspiration and, ironically, the thing that makes possible the idea of the Kurdish state was an Armenian massacre.<sup>56</sup>

Secular Kurdish nationalists were very small in number to create national aspirations or ethnic affiliations. Furthermore, the young intellectuals like Koyi and Bedir Khan had no any noteworthy effect on Kurdish masses, because the Kurdish society was more interested in trying to conserve the Islamic law (Shari' a) and the millet system, which were being abolished by Turkish nationalists in Turkey, by British colonial powers in Iraq.

When the first secular young Kurdish nationalists started to resurrect old Kurdish religion, Zoroastrian and Yezidi that had rooted in the Cult of Angels, they had lost their already potential followers. They were just trying to do exactly what Arab nationalists did in Egypt and Turkish nationalists in Turkey. As a result, there was no any important step for their ideological aim, because the religion, it seems, was more important than the national aspirations among the Kurds at that time. Since nationalist Kurds could not affect the Kurdish masses, as McDowall also stated, the Kurds, unlike their counterparts, did not really began to think and act as an ethnic community before 1918.

### **2.3 IRAQI KURDS BETWEEN 1918 AND 1991**


Occupation of three provinces of the Ottomans by Britain, Mosul Baghdad and Basra, following the World War I and collapse of the Ottomans was a new age for the Kurds who lived in massively in *Wilayat-i Mosul*. The Kurds living in this province previously did not play an important role in revolts as other Kurds in Bitlis, Diyarbakir, or Iran. Now, the Kurds of Mosul governed by a Wali appointed by the Ottoman Government resided in Istanbul had to obey British Occupiers.

Unlike the Ottomans headed by the Caliph that his legitimacy established through the ages, British occupiers had no such legitimacy over the Kurds. Indeed, British powers are controlling Baghdad and Basra, but their desire to include the province of Mosul into

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<sup>56</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet, 393

the state, which would be named later as Iraq, was because of its rich oil reserves.<sup>57</sup> They could not have occupied the whole province before the Armistice of Mudros, because the Sulaimaniyya was being controlled by Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji, the Kurdish leader of both a respectful tribe and the *Naqshibandi* Tariqat. At the same time, Kurdish tribes and notables in the North districts of Northern Iraq wanted to join Turkey and therefore, they were calling on Turkey to fight against British.<sup>58</sup>



Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas\\_middle\\_east](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas_middle_east)

Figure 1. Ottoman Administration of Province of Iraq before 1914

The Treaty of Sevres offered local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas and even an independent Kurdish state, if the residents of the region wanted to do so. However, both Turkey and Britain wanted to rule the province. According to Chalian, Turkey launched a campaign in the province to annex it to Turkey under the leadership of a Turkish officer Ali Shafik, and the revolt achieved its goal in Sulaimaniyya and Kirkuk. British response was to use Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji who had the only enough

<sup>57</sup> Gerard Chaliand, *The Kurdish Tragedy*, (New Jersey: Zed Books: 1994)

<sup>58</sup> David McDowall, "The Kurdish Question", in *the Kurds A Contemporary Overview*, ed. by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, (New York : Routledge, 1992) p.25

power that could overcome Ali Shafik's forces.<sup>59</sup> In 1918 British power had already confirmed that Berzinji as governor of Sulaimaniyya division.<sup>60</sup> However, Berzinji offered Kurds liberation from the British rule, either to join Turkey or to have an independent state. Whereas for Chalian, Berzinji was a nationalist, to McDowall, however, Berzinji was not a nationalist but the revolt became more apparent in the most nationalist places.

It is significant that Shaykh [Sheikh] Mahmud did not waste his time appealing to nationalist sentiment. He was a sayyid<sup>61</sup>, and the language his constituency understood was the language of Islam. In 1919, he appealed for a jihad, not a national liberation struggle. Furthermore, his style was to use kin and tribal allies and his aim was the establishment of a personal fiefdom.<sup>62</sup>

The British power in Iraq clearly did not want the existence of an independent minded powerful religious and tribal leader like Berzinji. Such a strong political figure could create serious problem for British oil interests in Iraq. Because of that, they offered just lingual autonomy in primary school in Sulaimaniyya, but not in Kirkuk and Mosul. While British officer in Iraq was offering autonomy to him in Sulaimaniyya, he was demanding full independence for all Kurds. While British wanted to use Sheikh Mahmud against Turks<sup>63</sup>, he cooperated with Turks against the British occupiers. However, his revolts against British forces were not successful because, while Berzinji were fighting on horses, British were using planes in the war against Berzinji. The war continued with guerrilla attacks until the repression by British rule in Sulaimaniyya.

When this state was created and recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, Mustafa Kemal broke his promises of Kurdish autonomy and dissolved the National Assembly, which had included seventy-five Kurdish

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<sup>59</sup> Chaliand,

<sup>60</sup> McDowall, *a Modern History*, 156.

<sup>61</sup> Person who is from descendants of the prophet

<sup>62</sup> McDowall, *a Modern History*, 158.

<sup>63</sup> Gerard Chaliand, *The Kurdish Tragedy*, (New Jersey: Zed Books: 1994), 52

representatives. He even closed Kurdish schools and forbade all expressions of Kurdish culture.<sup>64</sup>

Nezzan claims that because Iraqi Kurds learned from this experience, in League of Nations mission of inquiry in January and February 1925, they refused to return to the Turkish sovereignty or annexation to Iraq, rather they claimed independent Kurdish state.

In the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain and Turkey agreed in principle on that both sides would not use the Kurdish question against the each other.<sup>65</sup> Later, Britain, Turkey, and Iraq, agreed to co-operate on minority issues in Turkey and Iraq in Tripartite Treaty in January 1926.<sup>66</sup> Turkey was to make an agreement with Iran about the same issue in 22 April 1926.<sup>67</sup> This created a conjuncture for the British power to apply its own policies in Mosul province about the Kurds. On the other hand, in the Treaty of Lausanne, while Inonu was claiming that the province should join to Turkey and stating that the Arabs constituted just minority, on the other hand Britain was claiming that Turks constituted the minority, therefore the province should be the part of Iraq. The numbers regarding the population according to ethnic and religious groups in Mosul province claimed by the Ottomans and Britain is shown below.

Table 2.1

The Numbers Presented by Ismet Inonu in the Lausanne

	Kurds	Turks	Arabs	Yezidi	Non-Muslim	Total
Sulaimaniyya	62.830	32.960	7.210	0	0	103.000
Kirkuk	97.000	79.000	8.000	0	0	184.000
Mosul	104.000	35.000	28.000	18.000	31.000	216.000
Total	263.830	146.960	43.210	18.000	31.000	503.000

Source: Suphi Saatçi, *Tarihi Gelişim İçinde Irak'ta Türk Varlığı*, (Istanbul: Tarihi Araştırmalar ve Dökümantasyon Merkezleri Kurma ve Geliştirme Vakfı, 1996)

<sup>64</sup> Kendal Nezzan, "The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background." in *Kurdish Culture and Identity*. ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London: Zed Books: 1996), 11

<sup>65</sup> Suat Parlar, *Türkler ve Kürtler Ortadoğu'da iktidar ve isyan gelenekleri*, (Istanbul: Bağdad Yayınları: 2005), 688

<sup>66</sup> Lioara Lukitz, *IRAQ The Search for National Identity*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 45

<sup>67</sup> Parlar, 688.

Table 2.2

The Numbers Presented by British Representatives in the Lausanne

Numbers of People in Mosul (Total inc. Sulaimaniyya Kirkuk and Mosul)

Kurds	452.720	Christians	62.225
Arabs	185.763	Jew	16.865
Turks	65.895	Total	785.468

Source: Semih Yalçın, *Misak-ı Milli ve Lozan Barış Konferansı Belgelerinde Mosul Meselesi*, paper presented as part of symposium *Musul Meselesi* (Ankara: Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış Politikasında Mosul Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1998)

After the treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, the council of the League of Nations sent an international commission of inquiry to the vilayet of Mosul. The commission stayed there from January to March 1925 and established undeniably the existence of a Kurdish language and a Kurdish identity. In the end, on 16<sup>th</sup> December 1925, the council of the league of Nations decided in favor of the attachment of Mosul to Iraq and fixed the frontier between Iraq and Turkey.<sup>68</sup>

Clearly, the statement made by Inonu in Lausanne failed. The autonomy that was expected by the League of Nations was not realized by the British government, but after invitation of British representatives by third sides to the League of Nations to report the situation of Kurdish autonomy, in 1926, Britain just allowed the Kurds to have primary education in their own language and print books in Kurdish. They had excluded strategically the important province of Mosul and the oil rich region of Kirkuk from this relative autonomy. As can be seen from the map (Figure 2), the Northern Iraq where majority of the people is Kurdish and specifically Kirkuk region is very rich in terms of its oil resources. “The decision to homogenize the area by turning the dialect spoken by the Kurds in three liwa’s,<sup>69</sup> into main category of political reference seemed a step towards to Kurdish cultural unification.”<sup>70</sup> However, “It proved in fact to be a device for


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<sup>68</sup> Chalian, 52.

<sup>69</sup> Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimani,

<sup>70</sup> Lioara Lukitz, *IRAQ The Search for National Identity*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 43

the administrative annexation of Kirkuk and Erbil and Sulaimaniyya and the further subordination of the whole area to Baghdad.”<sup>71</sup>



Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas\\_middle\\_east](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas_middle_east)

Figure 2. Regions of Oil Reserves of Iraq.

The map of geographical position and transportation of northern Iraq, which is shown in the map (Figure 3), indicates how Mosul both strategically and economically is important. These two, having rich oil reserves and controlling strategic position, appealed the British to give special importance to the region.

<sup>71</sup> Lukitz, 43.



153 titles annually for the 1985 year.<sup>73</sup> Depending on the economic and political situations, these numbers has changed through the years yet, it has always showed trend in increase. From the very beginning, the books published by the local Kurdish people had been covering content that is more religious; however, the journals had content that is more political and implying nationalist affiliations.

Unlike Turkey and other countries where Kurds inhabit, but similar to Armenia, publications in Kurdish have found more free places to itself in Iraq, though depending on political circumstances political compress showed itself in their contents.<sup>74</sup> However, publications like the historical books and stories continue to be published despite financial difficulties. There was a powerful motivation among some Kurdish intellectuals in order to develop Kurdish, as a language of literature among Kurds and usually these attempts were the result of making sacrificing for the Kurdish Community.

In the artificially created Iraq, the Kurdish struggle headed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani situates so important place that some see it equivalent to the Kurdish nationalism in 20<sup>th</sup> century. His older brother and another religious leader Ahmad Barzani was a leader of tariqat, just like Sheikh Said, Sheikh Ubaydullah, and Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji, who are the leaders of the revolts among the Kurds. Failure and capture of Ahmad Barzani in 1934 opened way for Mullah Mustafa Barzani in his leadership.

In 1943, Barzani tried to take advantage of the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Soviet Union and launched a rebellion against Iraq. His local revolt in the Barzan region, from where the name of his tribe comes, paved the way to his political mobilization. He first was exiled to Sulaimaniyya and was held under house arrest. After his escape from house arrest and 2-years revolt in which he played a crucial role in Sulaimaniyya, he went to the Iran.<sup>75</sup> His contribution to the establishment of Mahabat Republic ended with

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<sup>73</sup> Amir Hassanpour, "The Creation of Kurdish Media Culture," in *Kurdish Culture and Identity* ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London: Zed Books: 1996), 62

<sup>74</sup> Hassanpour, *The Creation of Kurdish Media Culture*, 54

<sup>75</sup> Kerim Yıldız, *The Kurds in Iraq*, (London: Pluto Press, 2004)

the long walk to Soviet Union where he would stay for 11 years.<sup>76</sup> Barzani went to Yerevan, but from then on, 'Iraqi governments followed a practice of trying to include at least one Kurd in each cabinet'.<sup>77</sup>

Apart from the tribal resistance to the government, there were only few Kurdish intellectuals, almost all of whom were students in Baghdad and members of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Their political demands were including promotion of Kurdish language and literature, and political rights for Kurds. Their small number increased in a very short time and they became an organization that had members in all Kurdish towns in Northern Iraq, but specifically with powerful branches in Sulaimaniyya, Kirkuk and Erbil.<sup>78</sup>

McDowall states that these young Kurdish nationalists needed a powerful tribal leader like Mullah Mustafa Barzani for his peshmerga forces and tribal power. According to McDowall, Barzani was not a nationalist man and his ongoing struggle against the Government was aiming to increase his personal power in the North as an agha.<sup>79</sup> "Certainly, there is no indication that Mulla Mustafa's escape and rebellion was motivated by anything other than the acute hardship the government foolishly inflicted on his brother and himself."<sup>80</sup>

However, Barzani's demands from the Iraqi Government such as 'to detach the Kurdish qadhas from the Arab administration of Mosul', 'the appointment of Kurdish commissioner in Baghdad with veto powers over any government order affecting Kurdistan', 'release of Kurdish prisoners in Baghdad', indicate that he was playing for a

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<sup>76</sup> David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, Opportunity Mobilization and Identity*, Cambridge: New York, p. 130

<sup>77</sup> Mathew Elliot, *'Independent Iraq': The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958*, (New York: Tauris Academies Studies, 1996), 20

<sup>78</sup> Nadir Entesar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, (London: Rienner, 1992), 56

<sup>79</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 290.

<sup>80</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 290

national leadership. “It also seems that, rather than Mulla Mustafa choosing nationalism, the nationalists choose him.”<sup>81</sup>

The left oriented and anti-imperialist party of Hiwa that they had established was disintegrated due to bickering. The former Hiwa followers and the party of Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation) joined the party that Mullah Mustafa Barzani would establish.<sup>82</sup> The new party would be called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP-Iraq) which was influenced by the Iranian KDP that had a crucial role in Mahabat Republic. Barzani believed that all of the Kurdish parties in Iraq should gather their power under the umbrella of a single party together with tribal and religious leaders. To him, as he learned from Mahabat experience in Iran, Kurdish tribal support is imperative in order to be successful. As a result, whether Barzani was persuaded by young Kurdish nationalists, or Kurdish nationalists were persuaded by Barzani, he established the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq.<sup>83</sup> The KDP held its first congress in Baghdad. The party program included ‘oil nationalization and Kurdistan’s claim to a fair share of oil revenue and heavy industry’<sup>84</sup>

The defense agreement between Turkey and Iraq in 1955 against the Soviet threat created tension among all opposition groups, including the Kurds. It was perceived as another interstate agreement against the Kurds between Iraq and Turkey just like the 1937 tripartite Treaty of Saadabad between Turkey, Iran and Iraq.<sup>85</sup> This perception helped that almost all of the Kurdish intellectuals and other oppositional Kurdish groups be unified under the umbrella of the KDP.

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<sup>81</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 293

<sup>82</sup> According to Entessar in 1946, but according to McDowall in 1945

<sup>83</sup> KDP changed its name in its third congress formed Kurdish Democratic Party to Kurdistan Democratic Party. KDP-I was referring to KDP-Iraq while KDP Iran was more powerful than KDP-Iraq, yet, it was used for KDP Iran, when KDP Iraq became more powerful than KDP-Iran.

<sup>84</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 296

<sup>85</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 299

In 1958, the Free Officers under the leadership of General Abdul Karim Ghassem made a coup against the monarchy of King Faisal. The new constitution recognized ethnic identity of Kurds and declaring the Arabs and the Kurds as partners. Barzani returned from Soviet Union to Iraq as a national hero.

At the beginning, there was a symbolic relationship between the government and the Kurds. This symbolic relationship showed itself in the arm of the new republic, Arabic sword and the Kurdish dagger, referring to partnership of the Arabs and the Kurds.<sup>86</sup> Entessar claims that this was not only symbolic, because it turned into a political cooperation between Barzani and General Gasseem. Indeed, this cooperation between two leaders had not turned into cooperation of the nationalisms. While Gasseem was trying to repress the reference to Kurdish autonomy in the party's program, Barzani was resisting in Kurdish autonomy at the north. It became apparent that free officers and Gasseem would not tolerate autonomy for Kurds, because Gasseem banned Kurdish language newspapers and then armed conflicts started again. The planes started to bomb Kurdish populated plain areas like Erbil and Kirkuk, Barzani peshmerga forces went back to mountains and Barzani turned his face to Soviet Union again.

In 1963, when the General Gasseem lost his power to the Ba'ath Party because of coup, Kurds hoped that there might be an agreement with the new regime on autonomy, because 'they had had previous assurances from both Barzani and the KDP leaders that if they were successful the Kurds would announce a ceasefire. However, the Ba'ath party did not want to leave Kirkuk and Mosul regions under the control of the Kurdish autonomous rule.

With the failure of these talks, the Ba'ath regime initiated a policy of crushing the Kurds through military might and began 'Arabisation' process that continued until the end of the Ba'athist regime in 2003.<sup>87</sup> Expelling the Kurds from Kirkuk and bringing Arabs instead from the South was not the only way of Arabisation. Some administrative maneuvers were applied for oil rich regions.

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<sup>86</sup> Chailan, 57.

<sup>87</sup> Yıldız, 17.

The assumption of power by the Ba'ath party led to two innovations: a massive strike in order to defeat the rebels by military means and a policy for the Arabisation of the Kurdish regions. 40,000 people were expelled from Kirkuk area (strategic because of oil). The Kurds, up against the weight of a modern army, took refuge in the mountains to limit their losses.<sup>88</sup>

In order to overcome the Kurdish Question, the Ba'ath Party used power struggles between the Kurds whenever it is possible. For instance, in 1966, Jalal Talabani together with other ex-leaders of KDP-Iraq joined the Iraqi government. Indeed, to McDowall the Ba'ath party was trying to increase its own position by declaring to solve the Kurdish question peacefully.

While it held effective power in the revolutionary Command Council, the Ba'ath wanted to create the illusion of a broader representation in government in order to neutralize the threats that might arise from the Kurds and the Communists, the two constituencies strong enough to threaten the Ba'ath position.<sup>89</sup>

Why Talabani and Ahmad Ibrahim did accept to do so? To McDowall, Talabani and Ahmad Ibrahim ideologically were close to the Government and they were trying 'to displace Mulla Mustafa as representative of Kurdish national aspirations'.<sup>90</sup> Barzani was seen as too traditional to be a leader. For Mullah Mustafa, on the other hand, 'Talabani and Ahmad were agents for anyone who pays'.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, the Government or the Ba'ath Party used so many times some of the Kurdish tribes, which were closer than before, against Barzani. While the Ba'ath party was using the Kurds against the Kurds, Barzani started to take artillery from Iran and help from CIA.<sup>92</sup> Barzani was bombing oil fields in Kirkuk and the Ba'ath could not stop it. When it realized that this conflict might

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<sup>88</sup> Chailan, 58.

<sup>89</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 324.

<sup>90</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 325

<sup>91</sup> Ghareeb, Mullah Mustafa interview, 28 September 1968, quoted in Ghareeb, *The Kurdish Question*, p.75, quoted in David McDowall, *A modern History of the Kurds*, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 1996), 325

<sup>92</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 326

cause to lose its position in Iraq as it happened before, offered very strong autonomy that never been offered to Kurds up to 11 March 1970 in Iraq.<sup>93</sup>

According to this accord, the Ba'ath Party had offered a real solution that Kurds could accept. However, implementation of some articles of the accord constantly was being delayed. Furthermore, Saddam was refusing the Shi'i Kurds involvement in Kurdish region and claiming that these people are Iranian. According to the Article 8 of the March Manifesto, the inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages were to be repatriated to their places; however, Saddam expelled 40.000 or 50.000 Kurds from Baghdad and oil rich region Khanaqin.<sup>94</sup> In a year, Barzani asserted that Ba'ath Party was continuously implementing Arabisation policy in Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Sinjar, all of which had a strategically importance of their own. It seemed that the Ba'ath was playing for the time.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, Saddam was claiming that Kurds are still in relation with Iran and the USA. Furthermore, assassination attempts that made against both Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Mullah Mustafa's son, Idris Barzani, who was seen a potential leader after Mullah Mustafa Barzani, triggered the conflicts between the sides. Saddam offered an autonomy law in 1974. "It is clear that these articles allowed Baghdad to retain powers, which, by judicious exercise, could effectively strip the autonomous region of any real self-control. This is what the Kurds feared and this is what actually happened."<sup>96</sup>

Having signed the Algiers Accord with Iran, Saddam started attacks on Kurds again. Under this agreement, Iran halted its support to Barzani in return for joint usage of the Shatt al Arab River and the transfer of some land to Iran.<sup>97</sup> Kurds lost their power. 600.000 Kurds were expelled to the South of Iraq and Barzani was exiled first to Iran and then USA and died there of cancer in 1979. The policy of the Ba'ath party was

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<sup>93</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 326.

<sup>94</sup> Michael Gunter, *The Kurds in Iraq Tragedy and the Hope*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 17

<sup>95</sup> Chailan, 60.

<sup>96</sup> McDowall, *A modern History*, 336.

<sup>97</sup> Gunter, 18.

clearly Arabisation of Kurdish region on the one hand, assimilation the Kurds by sending these Sunni minority to the Shiite Arab populated to the South Iraq on the other.<sup>98</sup>

On 1 June 1975, Yekiti Nishtimani Kurdistan (YNK), in other words, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), was formed by Jalal Talabani. His intellectual background was based on socialist and secular ideology. It was not difficult for him to bring other Kurdish opponent groups, like the Komala and the Socialist Party of Kurdistan, under his direction. The objective of the PUK was set as ‘the acquisition of autonomy for the Kurds and democracy for Iraq’, and ‘asked all progressive forces to join the PUK in an attempt to overthrow the Iraqi regime’.<sup>99</sup> On the other hand, Idris and Masud Barzani formed KDP-Provisional Leadership. This time struggle within the Kurds themselves started. Absence of Mullah Mustafa Barzani had caused a war not against the ‘enemy’ but against their own people. Islamic revolution in Iran and the war between Iran and Iraq gave way to another war between these two parties, who are both are aiming to lead the Kurds. Even if usual perception of these two parties is classification KDP through tribalism and conservatism, PUK through socialism and secularism, yet they cannot be differentiated according to ‘sociologically based or principled ideological differences’, because, to Stansfield, through the time they became more similar to each other, socially and ideologically.<sup>100</sup>

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was helping KDP-Iraq against Iraq and at the same time, Iraq was helping KDP-Iran against Iran. While PUK was supporting the KDP-Iran against Iran in order to stop Iranian help to KDP-Iraq, KDP-Iraq was fighting with KDP-Iran in return for support of Iran for the war against Iraq. Both sides lost their legitimacy in the eye of the Kurdish society itself and at international level. The conflicts continued until 1986 when KDP and PUK were brought together by Iran against Iraqi

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<sup>98</sup> William L. Cleveland, *History of Modern Middle East*, (Colorado: West View Press, 1999), 366

<sup>99</sup> A. Manafy, *the Kurdish Political Struggle in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, a Critical Analysis*, (Oxford: University Press of America, 2005), 92.

<sup>100</sup> Gareth Stansfield, *Governing Kurdistan: The strengths of Division*, Ed. by Brendan O’leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 196

government and they got financial and military help from there<sup>101</sup>. When Al-Majjid<sup>102</sup> used chemical weapons against the Kurds, then, cooperation increased between the KDP and the PUK.

When the peace agreement in August 1988 between Iran and Iraq was reached, the Ba'ath regime together with pro-government Kurdish tribes increased its war on Kurdish region at the North. Since there was not Iranian support anymore, the results was shocking for not only peshmerga forces but for civil people, too;

Supported by the Kurdish Ja[h]sh<sup>103</sup> group, the Iraqis responded by launching a full attack against Kurdish forces, which resulted in the destruction of 478 villages, the gassing of seventy-seven other villages, and the displacement of 100.000 Kurds. The West, the so-called champions of human rights, supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons. The United States sold 'sensitive equipment' to Iraq hoping to defeat the Iranian revolution.<sup>104</sup>

During the war between Iran and Iraq, the struggle with the Ba'ath Party and the Kurds continued. Iraq from 1984 and onwards was using chemical weapons against its enemy Iran.<sup>105</sup> Depending on the situation, Iraqi Air Forces bombed the Kurdish regions many times and caused death of thousands. In the most tragic attacks made on the Kurds, chemical weapons were used against civilians. This was not the only chemical attack against the Kurds by the Ba'ath Party. According to Human Rights Watch records<sup>106</sup>, there happened eight operations called as Anfal Operations<sup>107</sup>, in which chemical weapons, such as mustard gas and the nerve gas Tabun, were used many times in each.

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<sup>101</sup> McDowall, A Modern history, 350.

<sup>102</sup> Hassan Ali Al-Majjid, is called as Chemical Ali in Iraq, cousin of Saddam Hussein, member of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq

<sup>103</sup> Jahsh means donkey (foal) but it was used to refer pro-government Kurds who are used by the Iraqi state against Kurdish oppositional groups. In that sense, it meant the collaborator.

<sup>104</sup> Manafy, 95.

<sup>105</sup> Jabr Muhsin, George Harding and Fran Hazelton, Iraq in the Gulf War, ed. by CARDRI, Saddam's Iraq,

<sup>106</sup> Human Rights Watch, Middle East Watch, Irak'ta Kürtlere Karşı Soykırım Harekatı, trans. by Akın Sarı-Orhan Akalın-Umut Hasdemir, (Istanbul: Aram yayıncılık, 2004), 424

<sup>107</sup> Amir Hassanpour, "The Kurdish Experience," *Middle East Report*, No.189 (July- Aug.) 1994: 2-7 +23

Only in 1988, 2000 villages<sup>108</sup>, according to the Kurdish authorities this number is 4000, were destroyed and nearly 200.000 people either killed or lost (According to Olson the exact number for murdered people is 183.000).<sup>109</sup> The real situation of the Kurds could be understood only after Halabja massacre, when the famous photos of the massacre were published. The Ba'ath Party, claiming that the Kurds were collaboration with Iran in its invasion of the town, had used chemical weapons against civilians, around 5.000<sup>110</sup> people had been killed and many more were wounded. Operations were held usually around Iran-Iraq boundary and in Duhok region, which places Iraq-Turkey boundary.<sup>111</sup> The masses escaped to the Iran and Turkey due to fear of chemical attacks.

According to Manafy, the Kurds are victims of the World system. Both regional and international powers used them 'as the agents of the capital accumulation and the instruments in a regional balance of power' and when they have finished their job, Kurds were left alone.<sup>112</sup> The realization of Kurdish political and human rights cannot be attained under the arrangements of the existing world system, which chooses capital's right over human rights.<sup>113</sup>

Deadly mistake for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, international response against Iraq, and the results of the Gulf War created new opportunities for opposition groups. Insurrection of Shi'ites at the South opened way to the Kurds at the North. Fear of the usage of the chemical weapons by Saddam against Kurds, was preventing an open revolt against him.<sup>114</sup> Izzat Ibrahim<sup>115</sup> warned the Kurds against any revolt by saying that: 'If

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<sup>108</sup> Human Rights Watch, 38.

<sup>109</sup> Robert Olson, *The Goat and The Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq since the Iraqi War*, (California: Mazda Costa Mesa, 2005),

<sup>110</sup> Estimation changes between at least 3200 to 7.000 (HRW)

<sup>111</sup> For the maps indicate regions where chemical weapons were used, please look at the Human Rights Watch book.

<sup>112</sup> Manafy, 37.

<sup>113</sup> Manafy, 37.

<sup>114</sup> McDowall, *A Modern history*, 370.

<sup>115</sup> A member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council

you have forgotten the Halabja, I would like to remind you that we are ready to repeat that operation.’<sup>116</sup> However, Kurdish common people together with Jash tribes either revolt or moved toward to the South. To both McDowall and Ciment, the revolts were unplanned and unorganized.<sup>117</sup> Even if Kurdish leaders did not want to make such a rebellion, most probably due to fear of failure, people themselves went on uprising.<sup>118</sup> Kurds regained all Kurdish towns even including Kirkuk from the Ba’ath Party. However, Saddam’s response to these revolts caused almost all of the northern people including Turcomans, Assyrians, Yezidis and Caldeans to flee, because of the fear of the usage of chemical weapons and new Anfal campaigns. While 1.5 million people went to the Iran, nearly 600.000 people came to the Turkey.<sup>119</sup> This was the beginning of, first, the period of safe haven, and then, de facto semi-independent Kurdish state.

#### **2.4 NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF THE IRAQI KURDS AFTER 1991**

This huge number of migration worried the Turkey. The refugees who came to Turkey after Halabja Massacres were still in refugee camp in Turkey and did not want to turn back to Iraq, because who went back to Iraq disappeared there. Because of that, Turkey did not want to accept all of the new refugees waiting at the boundaries. Furthermore, there was a fear of acceleration of the PKK attacks in South East Region of Anatolia where majority of people are Kurdish.<sup>120</sup> Instead, Turkey called international help and started some diplomatic attempts to solve the issue. In addition, wide propaganda of efficient Kurdish organizations in the West made the issue well known and provided the Western support for the problem.<sup>121</sup> Turgut Ozal offered that UN has to involve in this issue and create a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds to protect them against Saddam. After

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<sup>116</sup> International Herald Tribune, 25 January, 1991, quoted in David McDowall, *A Modern history of the Kurds*, (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 370.

<sup>117</sup> McDowall, *A Modern history*, 370.

<sup>118</sup> James Ciment, *The Kurds State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran*, (New York: Facts on File, 1996),

<sup>119</sup> Chaliand, 108

<sup>120</sup> John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *No Friends But the Mountains, The Tragic History of the Kurds*, (New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 29.

<sup>121</sup> Bulloch and Morris, 31.

diplomatic negotiations and discussions, the Coalition announced the creation of Safe Haven in Iraq. Over the 36<sup>th</sup> parallel in Iraq was announced as no-flight area for Iraqi air forces.

At the same time, negotiations between Kurdish leaders and Saddam have started to re-establish the Kurdish autonomy region at the North. Barzani as a leader who lost lots of his followers and villagers ready to accept the autonomy that Saddam offered; however, Talabani was more skeptical in politics and Saddam agreed with Barzani and withdrew his troops to the South. Saddam's aim was to make an economic pressure on the Kurds and cut all of the salaries of the Kurdish officials.<sup>122</sup> However, international help for food and custom duties from the Turkey-Iraq boundary reassured the Kurds economically.

Throughout 1990s, there were usually two kinds of struggles: One is the struggle between KDP and PUK; another was between KDP and Kurdish Workers' Party (known with its acronyms PKK in Kurdish). According to Gunter<sup>123</sup>, whereas Turkey was giving support to KDP in return for fighting with PKK, Iran and Syria were giving supports to PKK, because these two countries did not want to permit expansion of Turkish influence in the Northern Iraq. Indeed, Iran did not want to loose its tool against Iraq, and Syria was using PKK against Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey accused the PUK of giving support to PKK.

Allied intervention and creation of de facto autonomous Kurdish political entity resulted in that KDP governed some of the North and the PUK some of the South part of Kurdish areas in the Northern Iraq. Under international protection, elections were held and the Kurdish cabinet was established. Both parties were sharing almost equal representatives, including Turcoman, Christian (Assyrian and Caldean) and socialist representatives. Then Kurdish Regional Government was formed in July 1992. In a year in December 1993, KDP and PUK peshmergas were using guns against each other. The disagreement

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<sup>122</sup> McDowall, *A Modern History*, 379.

<sup>123</sup> Michael Gunter, "The Turkish Nationalist movement in Turkey", in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, edited by Robert Olson. (Lexington: The Union Press of Kentucky, 1996), 58

was on the boundaries of the territories that they ruled and also international finance and economic aids and revenues.<sup>124</sup> While KDP concentration was at the North, PUK concentration was at the South of Iraq. The Map (Figure 4) shows the regions that were controlled by these parties.



Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas\\_middle\\_east](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/mapatlas_middle_east)

Figure 4. Division of Northern Iraq According to the Leading Parties Before 2003

This disagreement resulted in intervention of Iran and Iraq in the region again. Whereas PUK was getting help from Iran in return of helping Iran attack KDP-Iran military bases, KDP was helping Iraq attack PUK military bases. As a result, in 1996, two parties were brought together in Ankara in October 1996 for the Ankara Accord, however disagreement and involvement of Iran and Iraq in the region continued. American

<sup>124</sup> Charles Tripp, *A history of Iraq*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 272

pressure continued over KDP and PUK to end the disagreement but after Washington Agreement of September 1998, most of the things remained the same for both Kurds and the region.<sup>125</sup> Even if social and ideological differences between KDP and PUK left behind, in these years their distrusts and hate against each other remained.<sup>126</sup>



Source: [www.lib.utexas.edumapAtlas\\_middle\\_east](http://www.lib.utexas.edumapAtlas_middle_east)

Figure 5. Northern Iraq and the Region Controlled by the KRG after 2003

<sup>125</sup> Tripp, 274.

<sup>126</sup> Gareth Stansfield, *Governing Kurdistan: The strengths of Division*, 198, ed. by Brendan O'leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 198

## CHAPTER 3

### 3.1 IDENTITY OF THE KURDS: THE RELIGION

Linking the religion and the tribal relations with the Kurds is the most common effort that can be seen in the literature on the Kurds. Most of the authors who wrote about them refer to existence of the strong tariqat ties among the Muslim Kurds in the Middle East. These attempts on this linking is not limited only to the Sunni Kurds, Alevite Kurds also are examined in terms of their religious belief. Authors examine the religion among the Kurds usually by describing the religious diversity among them. Although most of the Kurds are Muslim, Kurds from other religion such as Judaism, Christianity, Yezidi and *Ahl-e Haq* also existed. Most of the Muslim Kurds are Sunni Muslims; however, there are Shiite and Alevite Muslim Kurds, as well.

Since there is no any reliable demographic data on the Kurds and all of the numbers in the literature contradict to each other, there is no need to bring them into discussion. Yet it is better to know that the majority of the Kurds are the Sunni Muslims who consist of nearly 75-80 percent of the total Kurds.<sup>127</sup> Most of the Sunnis follow the *Shafi'ite* doctrine of Islam, yet the *Hanafite* doctrine of Sunni Islam is also very wide especially living aside with the Turks and Arabs.

There are also significant numbers of Shiite Kurds mainly in Iran and in very small numbers in Iraq. Different from the Alevite doctrine, they follow the *Ithna Ashariyya madzhab*<sup>128</sup> as other Shiite groups in Iran and Iraq and more similar to Sunni Kurds in

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<sup>127</sup> McDowall, A Modern History, 2000, 10.

<sup>128</sup> The Twelvers, They follow the doctrine of the Twelve Descendants/Imams of the Prophet Muhammad and commonly known as Shiite or Jafari.

terms of rituals than the Alevites. They are concentrated in Kermanshah/ Bakhtaran region in Iran. The Shiite Kurds in Iraq are known as Fayli Kurds.

The most important minority among the Kurds are Alevites who mainly live in Tunceli, Sivas, Erzincan, Malatya, and in metropolitan cities of Turkey. They are diversified in place; however, the most extensive of Alevites are concentrated in the Dersim region, known as Tunceli. The portion and the numbers of Alevites differ so dramatically that it is almost impossible to know exactly. While some Alevites speak Dimili<sup>129</sup> dialect of Kurdish, some others speak Kurmanji dialect.

According to Bruinessen, Alevites in Dersim are more extremist and syncretistic than the Turcoman Alevites.<sup>130</sup> He claims that it is possible to observe the effects of the old religions, such as reincarnation, praying for the Sun and the Moon, and other rituals that remind Yezidi belief and rituals.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, he also claims that rituals of these Alevites are very similar to those of those who are Alevite Turcomans, because most of the *Gülbenks* and the *nefes*es are performed in Turkish.<sup>132</sup>

*Ahl-i Haq* is another version of Alevite doctrine and it differed so much from orthodox Islam that it is commonly accepted as non-Islamic. *Ahl-i Haq* followers, known as *Kaka'i* and very few among the Kurds in Iraq, claim that they follow 'esoteric sect within Shiite Islam'.<sup>133</sup> Similar to the Alevites, *Ahl-i Haq* belief is shared by both the Kurds and the Turcomans.

The Kurds who are not Muslim is very small in number in the region. There are 500,000 Yezidis at most, and most of these Yezidis live in Iraq and Armenia. Even if very small

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<sup>129</sup> Mistakenly known as Zazaki dialect but its original name is Dimili dialect.

<sup>130</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, trans. by Hakan Yurdakul, (1999, Istanbul, İletişim), 91.

<sup>131</sup> Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik*, 93.

<sup>132</sup> Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik*, 93.

<sup>133</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Nationalism and Competing Ethnic Loyalties", *Peuples Méditerranéens* no. 68-69 (1994), 11-37.

numbers of Yezidis could survive in Turkey, most of the Yezidis migrated to Europe.<sup>134</sup> The Yezidi belief can be described as ‘a synthesis of old pagan elements, Zoroastrian dualist elements, and Manichean gnosis overlaid with the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim elements’.<sup>135</sup> According to Izady, the Yezidi belief has been deeply influenced by Yarsanism, which is based on the Cult of Angels and believed to be the old religion of the Kurds before Islamization.<sup>136</sup>

The Yezidis pray for the *Êzda* and identify themselves as *êzidi* in Kurdish. Yezidis believe in *Malak-i Tawus*, Angel of Peacock, who was believed to be the chief of the all angels and they worship for him. Since, the descriptions of *Malak-i Tawus* are very similar to the Satanic image in Islam, the Yezidis are believed to be the satanic people. Their horrifying image among the Muslim Kurds still was constructed as believer of the Satan among the common Kurdish people. This image was paving way for the Yezidis to be killed easily when there was a problem between the Muslim and Yezidi people.

Judaism is the first monotheistic religion that was seen in the Northern Iraq. When the Jews were exiled from Palestine, this region was one of the first regions that the Jews came to. According to Kreyenbroek, even though there might possibly be some influences of Judaism on the religious culture of the Kurds, yet the existence of Islam and Christianity prevents to make an argument on this effect.<sup>137</sup> However, there may be some effects of Judaism over Yezidi and Alevite beliefs. Like Judaism, Yezidi and Alevite people do not accept convergence to their religion and do not accept outsiders into their religious communities. According to McDowall, after the Zionist migration around 1948, almost all of the Jew migrated from Iraq to Israel and the Jew who migrated to Israel still identify themselves as Kurds.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, 14.

<sup>135</sup> McDowall, A Modern History, 11.

<sup>136</sup> Izady, 43.

<sup>137</sup> Philip Kreyenbroek, “Religion and Religions in Kurdistan,” in *Kurdish Culture and Identity* ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London: Zed Books: 1996), 88

<sup>138</sup> McDowall, A Modern History, 2000, 12.

Unlike Judaism, the effect of the Christianity in Kurdish inhabited areas, according to Kreyenbroek, is very clear and existence of Armenians, Caldeans and other Christian communities before and at the time of arrival of Islam to the region, affected deeply the Kurds.<sup>139</sup> The Assyrian/Nestorian church was established after its separation from Western Church in 431 CE.<sup>140</sup> He claims that especially the Yezidi and the *Ahl-e Haq* religions were affected in their perception and image of the God, and their symbolism in belief and religious rituals.<sup>141</sup>

Yezidis were refused to be Kurd by the Muslim Kurds, because they were not Muslim. This perception of Kurdishness and Islam as if these were the same thing was so powerful among the Kurds that there was no differentiation between Kurmanji speaking Yezidi and Armenian speaking Gregorian communities during Kurdish Sheikh Ubaydullah's uprising in 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, Yezidis defined themselves as Yezidi but not as Kurd at that time. Interestingly, Bruinessen states, Muslim Kurds did not accept Yezidi people, who speak Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish, as Kurds due to their belief.<sup>142</sup> In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Yezidis were more concentrated and crowded but due to suppress, forced conversion and migration, their number decreased dramatically.<sup>143</sup>

Yezidi beliefs about that the *Êzda* (the God) speaks in Kurdish language and the name of the *Êzda* is Kurdish are notable.<sup>144</sup> Since all Yezidi people speak Kurdish language, such kind of attribution may not be seen as interesting, however if it is thought that the Yezidi people were not accepted as Kurds, because of the fact that they were not Muslim, then the picture became more apparent. Therefore, it is obvious that both Kurds who have Islamic and Yezidi background identified themselves according to their religious belief, or at least did not differentiate their ethnic background from their religious background.

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<sup>139</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 91.

<sup>140</sup> McDowall, A Modern History, 2000, 12.

<sup>141</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 91.

<sup>142</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet, 393

<sup>143</sup> Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, 14.

<sup>144</sup> Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement Its Origins and Development (2006, Syracuse University Press, New York), 291.

Kreyenbroek states that since there is no any historical information about the religious culture of the Kurds before the emergence of Islam, we are inevitably depended on the neighboring culture in examination in order to understand their pre-Islamic religious culture.<sup>145</sup> Since the language as a means of transmitting the religious culture and Kurdish language is descended from Iranian languages, he claims, therefore, the religious culture of the proto-Kurdish tribes should be searched in Old Iranian religions that had developed in Central Asia steps.<sup>146</sup> The eastern Iranian cultural elements maintained themselves in Zoroastrian religion that would effect the religious belief of the Kurds and were to sustain in Kurdish religious culture other than Islam.

Kreyenbroek also states that there is no comprehensive information about the Islamization of the Kurds and claims that the process of Islamization developed gradually. Because of this gradual convergence to Islam and leaving the old religious beliefs slowly, Kreyenbroek claims, some of the elements of the old beliefs preserved in Islamic understanding of the Kurds.<sup>147</sup> Even if he admits that there is no any documentation of such assertion, he believes that the contemporary studies could indicate such links between the old and new religion, Islam, in the region.<sup>148</sup>

On the other hand, during the time of Saladin, the link between the identity and Islam was obvious. When the Saladin defeated the Crusaders in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the Great Mufti of Kudus/Jerusalem was grateful for victory of Saladin over Crusaders and said to him that "...Kurdish swords which defeated the Crusaders and liberated the Holly Land". Not only the Great Mufti but also Saladin himself was aware of that, as he "replied by stressing, '*not his Kurdishness, but his devotion to Islam.*'"<sup>149</sup> The religion continued to played crucial role also for the following ages for the Kurdish intellectuals.

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<sup>145</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 86.

<sup>146</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 86.

<sup>147</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 92.

<sup>148</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 93.

<sup>149</sup> Kendal Nezzan, "The Kurds: Current Position and Historical Background," in *Kurdish Culture and Identity*, ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London: Zed Books: 1996), 10

Kreyenbroek reveals that since most of the Sunni Muslim Kurds follow the *Shafi'ite* doctrine of Islam, it became an identity marker of Kurdish identity especially in Kurdish regions that they are now part of Turkey.<sup>150</sup> Indeed not all of the Kurds in Turkey follow the *Shafi'ite* doctrine of Islam. The Kurds neighboring by other Muslim groups, the Turks for instance, follow *Hanafite* doctrine, yet it is also clear that the other groups in Turkey except from the Kurds do not follow *Shafi'ite* doctrine. This fact helped to make an extra differentiation from the others for the early Kurdish movements. In these early Kurdish movements in 19<sup>th</sup> century, this difference was perceived as a distinctive feature of the Kurds. In addition to speaking the different language, following the different Islamic doctrine have helped in identity matter of the Kurds.

Most of the Non-Kurdish Sunnis of the region are Hanafites, and the Kurdish allegiance to the Shafi'ite school is significant in several ways. First of all, it contributes to a sense of Kurdish identity. In Turkey, a polite way of finding out if someone is a Kurd is to ask about his *mad[z]hab*... Moreover, the Kurdish allegiance to the Shafi'ite schools illustrates the way in which the Kurds' isolation has allowed them certain conservatism in religious matters... Lastly, the oft-heard [often-heard] assertion that 'All Kurds are Shafi'ite Sunnis' illustrates a tendency to think of religion predominantly as a communal phenomenon.<sup>151</sup>

Kreyenbroek believes that the connection between the religion and ethnic identity has so important role in Kurdish life that it was believed that being a *Shafi'i* is the same thing with being a Kurd.<sup>152</sup> However, Kreyenbroek claims, since conversion to Islam achieved through tribal decision, individuals did not internalize Islam and Sufi order that has similarities with old religion attracted the Kurds.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 93.

<sup>151</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 93.

<sup>152</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 93.

<sup>153</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 94.

Amal Vinogradov establishes his ideas on the research that he did on Shabak people. According to Amal Vinogradov, the groups in northern Iraq are differentiated according to religious characteristics, as well as linguistic ones.<sup>154</sup> Even if group of Shabak is Kurdish speaking, neither themselves nor the outsiders referred their ethnic background their religious background.<sup>155</sup> While Shabak people called themselves as ‘Ashira’, outsiders called them as ‘Taifa’, the labels both of which have religious meanings instead of ethnic.<sup>156</sup> In addition, they believe that they are, the mixed of different ethnic groups, and this itself indicates that they referred themselves as a nation ethnic group, as they use Arabic word ‘qawm’<sup>157</sup> for this definition .<sup>158</sup>

According to Bruinessen, early Kurdish nationalists had perceived that the Kurds were not as religious as the Turks, Arabs and Persians, or as more secular than these neighboring Muslim societies; because these nationalists have seen Islam as a barrier for the development of Kurdish nationalist movement.<sup>159</sup> This perception of the nationalists on the Kurds was clearly wrong because remarkable numbers of Kurdish *ulema*, clerics, did not only served in Kurdish regions, yet they also served in variety of cities outside the region, such as Mecca, Medina, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Istanbul or even very far countries like Indonesia.<sup>160</sup> He admits that religious education among the Kurds did not spread to the masses, yet, claims that the effects of these clerics, including political power, over people was enormous.<sup>161</sup> The only centre of political power was not limited

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<sup>154</sup> Amal Vinogradov, “Ethnicity, Cultural Discontinuity, and Power Brokers in Northern Iraq: The Case of the Shabak”, *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Feb., 1974), pp. 208.

<sup>155</sup> Vinogradov, Ethnicity, 211.

<sup>156</sup> Vinogradov, Ethnicity, 211.

<sup>157</sup> This term was used by Sati Al-Husri to refer to nation

<sup>158</sup> Vinogradov, Ethnicity, 211.

<sup>159</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, “Religion in Kurdistan”, in *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*, ed. by Ömer Laçiner, trans. by Nevzat Kırış, Bülent Peker, Leyla Keskiner, Halil Turansal, Selda Somuncuoğlu, Levent Kafadar, (İstanbul, İletişim, 1995), 17.

<sup>160</sup> Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan, 33.

<sup>161</sup> Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan, 34.

only with *Ulema*, also Sufi leaders of *Naqshibandi* and *Qadiri* tariqats were as powerful as this group.<sup>162</sup> These two groups were not necessarily exclusive; sometimes an *Alim* could be a Sheikh at the same time. When religious leadership was combined with tribal leadership, then political power that the leaders had was increased enormously over the Kurds. The powerful families/tribes had usually such Sufi backgrounds.

According to Kreyenbroek, unlike orthodox understanding of Islam that Ulama represented, Sufism gave opportunities to the Kurds to preserve the heritage of their old culture.<sup>163</sup>

It may well be true that the role of sheikh as a mediator between his disciples and God is more prominent among the Naqshbandis than other Orders; a tendency to regard a strong dependence on the personal authority of religious leaders as a virtue (which can of course lead to the idealization of the leader in question) appears to be characteristics of several religious groups in Kurdistan.<sup>164</sup>

Expansion of political power of the sheikhs in Kurdish regions was not an arbitrary. The main reason for this power growth was the centralization of the Ottoman in 19<sup>th</sup> century due to the Westernization policy that resulted in the destruction of Kurdish emirates and created power vacuum in the region.<sup>165</sup> The struggles between the Kurdish tribes and management of these struggles by the Ottomans for practical reasons opened way for the sheikhs to fill this space and to become powerful enough to lead the revolts.

Westernization policy of the Ottomans was not the only reason. The other reasons were the effects of the missionaries, travelers, explorers and consulates in the region, implementation of the centralization policy of Sultan Mahmud II and new reforms, *Tanzimat* Reforms, in the Ottoman political structure. His new army, *Asâkiri Mansûre-i*

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<sup>162</sup> Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan, 34.

<sup>163</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 95.

<sup>164</sup> Kreyenbroek, Religion, 95

<sup>165</sup> Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan, 36.

*Muhammediye*, entered to the region to implement new centralization policy in Eastern Parts of Anatolia where Kurdish Emirates were holding the power. In addition, the *Tanzimat* Reforms have changed the existing balance between Christians, namely Armenians and Nestorians, and Muslim Kurds, in favor of the formers against the Muslim Kurds. While the Christians gained power, the Muslim Kurds lost their positions due to Western impact on the Ottomans. This impact activated by the missionaries, consulates, churches, western schools and hospitals.<sup>166</sup> In addition to missionary activities in Kurdish regions, this foreign intervention on the Ottomans about the Kurdish regions has triggered an opposite effect among the Muslim Kurds, Sheikhs and *Ulema* and this paved way to increase in power of Sheikhs. When this reaction was combined with the Islamization policy of Abdulhamid II, then the expansion of *Naqshibandi* tariqats was not surprising.<sup>167</sup>

The growth of Islamic mystic brotherhoods, in particular the Nakşibendi and the Kadiriya, is related to the sense of insecurity engendered by the loss of traditional power structures and threats to subsistence and identity in Kurdistan. Neither the brotherhoods nor the political power of the sheikhs were new phenomena. Because of their Sunni orthodoxy, the Ottomans had favored the Nakşibendi and allowed them to figure prominently in the consolidation of the realm. By the first decades of the 19th century, the Nakşibendi had developed a program to strengthen Islam and thus counter the superiority of the West. The Ottoman Empire would be rejuvenated by “rallying its Muslim citizens around the common goal of strength through unity in belief”, by following the *sunna* and rejecting ‘bad innovations’ (*bid’a*), forcing rulers to do the same.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Martin Strohmeier, *Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity, Heroes and Patriots, Traitors and Foes*, (Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2003), 10

<sup>167</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, “The Naqshbandi tariqat as a vehicle of political protest among the Kurds (with some comparative notes on Indonesia)”, in *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*, ed. by Ömer Laçiner, trans. by Nevzat Kırış, Bülent Peker, Leyla Keskiner, Halil Turansal, Selda Somuncuoğlu, Levent Kafadar, (İstanbul, İletişim, 1995), 94 According to Bruinessen, this Islamic reaction was not limited for the Kurdish regions in the Middle East, but also it was seen in other Muslim societies.

<sup>168</sup> Strohmeier, 13.

Membership in brotherhoods was an experience in an expanded social identity, as a sheikh's following might include many tribes. Although Islam had long been the transcendental identity for Kurds, that identity was made more tangible and more emotional in rituals of the mystic brotherhoods.<sup>169</sup>

According to Bruinessen, during both World War I and the Independence War of Turkey, religion was the most important factor for the Kurds and because of that, the Kurds participated voluntarily the Kemalist movement, because the Kurds had perceived the war as a war of the Muslims against the infidels and the Occupiers.<sup>170</sup> He claims that it is not possible to separate the nationalist and religious aspirations from each other in the revolts against Kemalist reforms.<sup>171</sup>

Sheikh Ubaydullah Nehri revolted against Iranian tax collecting and bureaucracy system, however, according to Bruinessen; the main reason for this revolt was to establish a Kurdish state between the Ottomans and Iran.<sup>172</sup> Thus, it seems that he believes that religion and Sufi Order was used for political aim of the Sheikh for nationalist objectives. In his view, this was the first Kurdish movement that had nationalist character and this nationalist character preserved in later Kurdish revolts in the Ottoman.<sup>173</sup> This explanation seems to contradict with his existing arguments about first Kurdish revolts against the Kemalism, because he stated that it was difficult to separate the Islamic aspirations with nationalist aspirations in these revolts. Therefore, it is possible to claim that Bruinessen separated the Kurdish revolts against the Ottomans from the Kurdish revolts against the Kemalism, perceiving the former as more nationalists than the latter.

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<sup>169</sup> Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989): 3, and also Martin Strohmeier, *Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity, Heroes and Patriots, Traitors and Foes*, (Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2003), 13

<sup>170</sup> Bruinessen, *Religion in Kurdistan*, 46.

<sup>171</sup> Bruinessen, *Religion in Kurdistan*, 46.

<sup>172</sup> Bruinessen, *The Naqshbandi tariqat*, 90.

<sup>173</sup> Bruinessen, *The Naqshbandi tariqat*, 90.

On the other hand, Strohmeier claims that Sheikh Ubaydullah proclaimed his devotion to the Sultan and moved from the Ottoman territories to Iran and started a revolt declaring to establish an independent Kurdish state in Kurdish regions in Iran territories.<sup>174</sup> Strohmeier was not so sure about that Sheikh Ubaydullah was supported by the Ottoman Caliphate, but stated that his revolt was against the Treaty of Berlin, because it created a pressure on the Ottomans to permit the establishment of Armenian and Nestorian independent states on Kurdish territories.<sup>175</sup> In the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottomans promised to protect Armenian and Nestorians against the Circassians and the Kurds. Armenian-Russian cooperation during Russo-Turkish war, 1877, which Ubaydullah had participated triggered to fear of Armenian ascendancy in Kurdish regions.<sup>176</sup>

The claims about the aims of Sheikh Ubaydullah were contradicting to each other. While the British minister, Mr. Thompson, in Iran was claiming that Sheikh Ubaydullah's aim was to establish an independent Kurdish, on the other hand, Sheikh Ubaydullah was fighting in the Turkish-Russian War/the War of 93 in favor of the Ottomans. While it was argued that Sheikh Ubaydullah's movement targeted Christians, Armenians and Nestorians, at the same time the Sheikh cooperated with the Nestorian tribes.<sup>177</sup> It is clear that movement of the Sheikh aimed to take political power; since he could not succeed; it is not possible to be sure, what his real aim was. Nevertheless, the religion played a crucial role for unification factor among the Kurds and the Turks:

Kurdistan, then, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, presented a picture of dissolution, fractionalization and tribal conflict. If there was any unifying tendency at all, any indication of a larger, 'transcendental' identity, it was Muslim identity and loyalty to Abdulhamid, the father of the Kurds. There is

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<sup>174</sup> Strohmeier, 14.

<sup>175</sup> Strohmeier, 14

<sup>176</sup> Jwaideh, 83.

<sup>177</sup> Jwaideh, 84.

no indication that boundaries between the Kurds and other ethnic groups such as the Turks were significant.<sup>178</sup>

The other important Kurdish revolt was of Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji. As we noted earlier quoting from McDowall, Mahmud Berzinji's insurrection against the British was not a national resurrection but a jihad.<sup>179</sup> The British attempts to appoint Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji as a governor of Kurdish region failed mainly due to his loyalty to the Caliphate at the beginning. Nevertheless, collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's expectation on future of *Wilayat-i Mosul* and estimation that the old Ottoman subjects were left to the British decreased the his offerings to the Sheikh. When the British offered to the Sheikh Berzinji to appoint him as a governor of Sulaimaniyya excluding the oil rich regions Kirkuk, Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji refused this offer again. His religious aspirations and identity gave rise to the revolt against the British and his followers including the Kurds as well as the Turcomans followed him in his war.

What is the relationship between the Sufism and the politics? How could be possible these two contradicting, at least seems contradicting, concepts come together. According to Bruinessen, Mawlana Khalid Al- Baghdadi<sup>180</sup> combined these two opposite concepts, transformed the *Naqshibandi* tariqat into Sufi political movement and united Sufism with the militant Islamic law.<sup>181</sup> Mawlana Khalid had made some reforms in Sufi orders and expanded his influence in very large regions, including Indonesia and Ottoman territories.<sup>182</sup> Different from the presented Sufi orders, Mawlana Khalid included strong dependence to legal Islamic law in his Sufi training and this turned his followers to be

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<sup>178</sup> Strohmeier, 16.

<sup>179</sup> McDowall, *A Modern History*, 158.

<sup>180</sup> Also known as Mawlana Khalid Al-Kurdi, born in Shar-i Zor region of Iraq, where lots of Ulema appeared, first went to Mecca and then India, met with Dahlawi and after Sufi training came back to Kurdish regions of the Ottomans in 1811 and established the tariqa that was to emerge in the whole Ottoman territories and Indonesia. His followers were not limited only with the Kurds but with the Turcomans and Arabs as well.

<sup>181</sup> Bruinessen, *The Naqshbandi tariqat*, 96.

<sup>182</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 99.

more political in their social position in the society.<sup>183</sup> According to Bruinessen, however, it does not explain why *Naqshibandi* tariqat became so powerful among the Kurds; there should be some other reasons for this expansion.<sup>184</sup>

The reasons that Bruinessen mentioned can be summarized as follows; first, the government was using the Sheikhs to find a solution for the problems between the subject and the Government. Second, there was a strong perception about that the Sheikhs were presenting marvels and miracles, Third, works of Christian missionaries and foreigners in the region created reverse effect among the Kurds. Fourth, administrative reforms of the Ottomans changed the power balance between the Kurds and the Armenians, consequently, Armenian nationalist movements for an independent state. Russian intervention in the region has also activated the tension among the Kurds. The influence of the West over the Ottomans and its reflections on the Kurdish emirates in abolishing the emirates due to Christian minority in Kurdish region resulted in the perception of the Kurds about the Sultan as a tool of the West. All of these caused to participate to the revolts.<sup>185</sup>

On the other hand, Lukitz's claim that Sufism is related mainly to the Kurds' reaction against instituted Islam in its political manifestation is notable.<sup>186</sup> However, as we know that, the biggest Kurdish revolt of *Naqshibandi* leader Sheikh Said in 20<sup>th</sup> century, was not against instituted Islam, rather, against the abolishment or fear of disappearance of instituted Islam. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the revolt of another religious leader Sheikh Ubaydullah, again, was religiously affiliated revolt and targeted non-Muslim minorities in Kurdish Region under the Ottoman and Iran hegemony. Tariqats may be very useful tool to organize people in revolts; however, this does not mean that they determine the identity of Kurdishness of the Kurds. We should also remember how much these tariqats are strong between Turkish people, too.

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<sup>183</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 99.

<sup>184</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 101.

<sup>185</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 109-110.

<sup>186</sup> Lioara Lukitz, *IRAQ The Search for National Identity*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 39

According to Bruinessen, the religion and Kurdish nationalism cannot be separated from each other in early Kurdish movements; however, late Kurdish movements became nationalist and distinguished itself with the religion.<sup>187</sup> He explains this change by examining the transition of the societies and states that it is connected with the emergence of the new middle class among the Kurds.<sup>188</sup> The land reform is one of the most important of this transition.

In Iraq, religious identity was so powerful among the Kurds that Shiite Kurds did not involve in Kurdish movements until 1960s. Since the main character of the Kurdish movements was being religious, influenced by the Sunni doctrine of Islam, these Shiite Kurds did not support them, as we have seen in Sheikh Said Revolt in 1925.

Bruinessen states that before the collapse of the Ottomans, dependency to the leader was much more important than to dependency to the Kurdish nation for the Kurds.<sup>189</sup> However, this has changed through the time.<sup>190</sup> Most of the Sheikhs had wide lands and villagers were working on these lands. When the land reform was implemented, they lost these lands and economic relation between the Sheikhs and their defenders was ended. They became easily open target for secular state interventions. According to Bruinessen, for instance, Sheikh Osman lost all of his lands due to socialist implementation of the land reform and escaped to Iran due to pressure of the state.<sup>191</sup>

The political developments, Westernization, World War I, British Occupation and War of Independence in Turkey, etc., in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Middle East resulted in emergence of Kurdish nationalism.<sup>192</sup> Kurdish nationalist discourse among the Kurds became so wide that the nationalist leaders easily became popular not because of their

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<sup>187</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 114.

<sup>188</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat 114.

<sup>189</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet,

<sup>190</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet,

<sup>191</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet, 452.

<sup>192</sup> Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi tariqat, 115.

charisma but because of their nationalist discourse.<sup>193</sup> Religious leaders was powerful when there was no any rival yet when there appeared strong secular leaders then their temporary political power disappeared in the society.<sup>194</sup>

On the other hand, Liora Lukitz<sup>195</sup> examines sources of identity of the Kurds through a little wider concept, which is culture. She examines Kurdish identity through the cultural elements such as religion, traditions, language, symbols and sets of beliefs. Indeed, this understanding is not limited to the Kurds only but other ethnic and national elements, like Turcomans, Arabs, etc. To her, we can understand the relation between these groups only by considering these cultural traits. Because she says: “Culture embraces religion, traditions, symbols and sets of beliefs that mould the structure of human group and determine the parameters of its member’s identities.”<sup>196</sup>

She bases this idea on the idea that the identity formation had been based on the religion, which is the Ottoman Millet System.<sup>197</sup> This historical and anthropological view of understanding provides her more extensive spaces in her explanations, at the same time, prevents to see the most crucial point. First, this idea implicitly suggests that all of the subjects had perceived themselves in the eye of the governing political power in the Ottoman social life; and the second it also implicitly reduce all of the social relations into religion for the same sociality. In that sense, it is not free from the classical Orientalist perspective. In addition, she dismisses the fact that almost all of the neighboring societies are Muslim societies and therefore any binary opposition cannot be based on the differences in religion. It may be useful tool when making comparison between Turkish versus Armenian or Greek relation, or, Kurdish versus Armenian relation, however it is not well fitted into analysis of the relations between the Turks, the Arabs and the Kurds. Therefore, she tries to find out the roots of Kurdish ethnic identity

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<sup>193</sup> Bruinessen, “The Naqshbandi tariqat, 115.

<sup>194</sup> Bruinessen, “The Naqshbandi tariqat, 122.

<sup>195</sup> Lukitz, 37.

<sup>196</sup> Lukitz, 37.

<sup>197</sup> Lukitz, 38.

in mystical understanding Islam, tariqats, by pointing expansion of tariqats between the Kurds but not between the Arabs. She says: “Religion is at the basis of a whole social structure, consequently affording a different way to perceive reality...”<sup>198</sup>

In addition, A.R. Nicholson says;

The interwoven social links created by the tariqats flourishing at the time in the Kurdish areas supplied many of the motifs at the resistance against the Arab state. They helped to define a distinct a kind of identity one that bridged social differences and economic interests. This was because Sufi tariqats operating in the Kurdish areas represented as a whole network of social contracts and the influences that should be seen as a variant of their ‘modus operandi’ in other areas. Consequently, the prestige bestowed upon the tariqats’ sheikh -as the murshid (teacher) of the order’s members and at the same time as the agha of the village- was translated into political and social functions that were already transferable to outsiders.<sup>199</sup>

Thus, we cannot undermine the role of the tariqats in Kurdish political movements. Not only in Iraq but also in Turkey the Kurds are well organized in tariqats as we have seen in Kurdish revolts, yet, this does not explain why not others but the Kurds needed such religious ties and why they used tariqats in their political resistance. Lukitz does not take the role of the language in expansion of tariqats’ ties among the Kurds into consideration, either. Indeed, Kurdish language was providing strong ties between Kurds themselves, yet, at the same time, it was preventing others to enter the community where Kurdish is dominant. Therefore, almost all of the *Cemaat* or tariqat kind of religious organizations need a special language that conveys their ideas. Kurdish was providing such a base for the relation between the Sheikh (leader) and his *Murids* (followers). Therefore, belongingness to the same tariqat and sharing the same language cannot be distinguishable; rather, the existence of the former is dependent to the latter.

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<sup>198</sup> Lukitz, 38.

<sup>199</sup> A. R, Nicholson, *Islamic Mysticism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), quoted in Lioara Lukitz, *IRAQ The Search for National Identity*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 39

Eller claims that there is variation in religious beliefs among the Kurds, and therefore this variation may prevent to bond the Kurds.<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, Bruinessen claims that even if the Kurds diversify not only in terms of dialects, but also in terms of their religious faiths, they have national consciousness.<sup>201</sup> He finds it surprising and states that existence of religious education in traditional *madrassa* system in the region may be the cause of such a national consciousness, because the students were reading Arabic and Persian religious books as well as the poems of Kurdish intellectuals, such as Ahmad-ê Khanê and Melayê Ciziri.<sup>202</sup> While he emphasizes the religious curriculum of the general education in Madrasa, seems to forget to mention the Kurdish language as a tool for conveying ideas. Although madrasa was providing literacy that is necessary for attaining Kurdish literature, the students or the mullahs who read those Kurdish intellectuals' works were using the same language with these intellectuals.

Centralization policy of the Ottomans over the Kurds in the 19<sup>th</sup> century had destroyed Kurdish principalities in the region and opened way to the emergence of the Kurdish tribes, which were smaller political units that could be controlled more directly by the state. This proliferation of Kurdish politics also paved way to the empowerment of the tariqats and emergence of the sheikhs as new political leaders of the Kurds. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, some tariqat leaders had more economic and political powers than most of the Kurdish tribal leaders and they could mobilize the Kurdish masses especially between 1880 and 1930.<sup>203</sup> Because these tariqats usually had followers from different tribes at the same time, political power of the sheikhs had more than the tribal leaders. The leaders of the important revolts in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were usually these tariqat leaders, such as, Sheikh Ubaydullah, Sheikh Abdulqadir, and Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji, etc.

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<sup>200</sup> Eller, Jack David, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, (Michigan: The university of Michigan Press, 1999) Chapter 4

<sup>201</sup> Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, 11.

<sup>202</sup> Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, 11.

<sup>203</sup> Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, 11.

### 3.2 IDENTITY OF THE KURDS: THE LANGUAGE

Allison's field study on Kurdish oral traditions is outstanding when we think of inadequate number of field study in the same ground. Her anthropological survey is not only useful in understanding of Kurdish language as a tool of socio-economic, political, religious and cultural interaction, but it is a well-prepared database, too. In her study in Bahdinan<sup>204</sup>, she states that since speaking Kurdish and Kurdish literature is forbidden in the Middle East countries, it is extremely important to examine Kurdish oral tradition in order to understand Kurdish cultural identity.<sup>205</sup>

According to Allison, not only in Iraq but also in Turkey, Iran and Syria, oral traditions have helped on enormous part in the preservation and development of Kurdish cultural identity, because in many areas the publication of Kurdish languages documents were forbidden for much of the twentieth century.<sup>206</sup> Since in Ex-Soviet Republics and specifically in Armenia usage of Kurdish was not outlawed, she excludes these republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Oral tradition was a part of cultural surviving, because it was impossible to be controlled by the security forces; therefore, any serious study of Kurdish culture should not ignore the oral traditions of the Kurds.<sup>207</sup>

Allison indicates how social, cultural and religious identities are transmitted through oral literature, namely songs, tales, old stories, poets, epics etc. in her study. In addition, these oral traditional productions have been used in conveying the contemporary political issues, too. As an example, in 1992, despite the economic shortages and boycott resulting lacking of ink and the paper, Kurdish writers tried to produce new literary works, collected oral literature and other cultural heritages, and recording these materials into documentaries. These oral recordings were containing traditional and modern Kurdish songs, stories from the old people on their pasts and some others that they could

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<sup>204</sup> It is a Kurmanji speaking and ethno-religiously heterogeneous region in Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

<sup>205</sup> Christine Allison, *Old and New Oral Tradition in Badinan*, in *Kurdish Culture and Identity*, ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1996), 29.

<sup>206</sup> Allison, 30.

<sup>207</sup> Allison, 30.

remember from their youth. Kurdish television stations were showing these documentaries, and some of them were containing very tragic stories. Therefore, Allison claims that; “As in many other nationalist movements, intellectuals and politicians who wished to modernize their society also wished to empower their people by emphasizing their special Kurdish identity.”<sup>208</sup>

Furthermore, these oral productions are also indicators of belongingness.<sup>209</sup> For instance, there are some songs belong to Yezidi people and some others to Muslims. It is, then, possible to categorize these people into ethno-religious groups, even into tribes, according to the literature that they produced. She concludes that many of these people shaping the Kurdish nation now, did not learn their Kurdish history at schools, but from the mouths of older generations.<sup>210</sup>

According to Amir Hassanpour, Kurdish identity combines cultural, lingual, political and territorial identities.<sup>211</sup> For political identity, he goes back to ‘Sharafnamah-Detailed History of Kurdistan’, which was written by Sharaf Khan Bitlisi. He claims that identities and origins are part of complex relationship.<sup>212</sup> For instance, most of the leaders of the Kurdish tribes in 16<sup>th</sup> century had claimed having Islamic and Arabic origin. He does not see any contradiction in these claims because, he argues, this was a tool for gaining legitimacy over people.<sup>213</sup> As Sultans of the Ottomans and Shahs of Iran did, they were trying to find legitimacy in being close to Prophet Muhammad.

According to Hassanpour, territorial identity is clearly related to ‘the geography of Kurdistan’.<sup>214</sup> The famous map of Ali Kashgari that he prepared in 1076 indicates and

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<sup>208</sup> Allison, 45.

<sup>209</sup> Allison, 44.

<sup>210</sup> Allison, 45.

<sup>211</sup> Amir Hassanpour, “Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası,” in *Kürt milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, trans. by Fahriye Adsay, Ümit Aydoğmuş, Sema Kılıç, ed by Abbas Vali, (İstanbul: Avesta, 2005), 139.

<sup>212</sup> Hassanpour, Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası, 139.

<sup>213</sup> Hassanpour, Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası, 143.

<sup>214</sup> Hassanpour, Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası, 144.

gives a name to the region as ‘Ard Al-Akrad’ or the land of the Kurds. A century later, Sultan Sanjar of the Seljuk Empire called the region as ‘Kurdistan’. This region starts from the Persian Gulf, continues modern Northern Iraq and covers Malatya and Marash regions, according to Sharafnamah. Ottoman Sultans and Iranian Shahs were not avoiding using the term ‘Kurdistan’; however, modern nationalists not only avoided using this term but also used physical and symbolic violence to the Kurds who use this term.<sup>215</sup>

Lingual identity goes back to Kurdish poets Ahmad ê Khanê (17<sup>th</sup> century) and Qadiri Koyi (19<sup>th</sup> century). Hassanpour states that these early Kurdish intellectuals were trying to establish a literature that supposedly would create a Kurdish nation and the metaphor of the Pen and the Sword was used to claim that one would create the other.<sup>216</sup> For instance, Khanê claims that since Kurdish Kings/Amirs did not protect Kurdish language, it could not develop. While Khanê was searching for a powerful Kurdish King, Koyi searched for establishment of an independent Kurdish state in modern meaning. In his poems, Koyi was representing Franks, Japanese, Armenians, Greeks, and Serbians as models to Kurds.<sup>217</sup> He was calling the Kurds to struggle for a Kurdish state by using Kurdish language. Whereas Khanê was traditional and religious, Koyi was secularist and progressivist. Koyi, who had good religious education background in classical madrasa system in Iraq, was influenced from the ideology of Khanê. Bruinessen states that what Khanê means for Kurmanji speaking Kurdish areas, Koyi is the same for Sorani speaking Kurdish areas.<sup>218</sup>

There need to ask a very proper question: If at least some Kurdish intellectuals had nationalist idea even in their literature, why Kurdish society was so late in being confronted with nationalism? Alternatively, if they faced earlier like in 17<sup>th</sup> or 19<sup>th</sup> century, why did they fail to spread their ideas to common people?

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<sup>215</sup> Hassanpour, *Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası*, 165.

<sup>216</sup> Hassanpour, *Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası*, 147.

<sup>217</sup> Hassanpour, *Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası*, 165.

<sup>218</sup> Bruinessen, *Ehmedê Xanî'nin Mem û Zîn'i*, 72

Hassanpour had an answer for that question; According to him, since there was no printing machine in 'Kurdistan', the ideas of Khanê could not be widespread and create any national consciousness among the Kurds.<sup>219</sup> Therefore, it seems that Hassanpour perceive that lacking of printing system in the region where the Kurds had lived as a cause of why Kurdish nationalism could not be widespread there. Indeed, he refers to Benedict Anderson's connection between invention of printing machines and imagined communities. Even though he argues that in the Middle East spread of nationalism is clearly has a different root of European ones, yet, at the same time, he uses same explanations made on expansion of European nationalisms while explaining expansion of Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East. Thus, we can claim that he shares the idea that Abbas Wali presented as Kurdish nationalism as a modern phenomenon.

According to Jack David Eller ethnicity has not derived from the same origins for Kurds 'as for, say, the Sinhales or Tamils, nor has it taken the same shape nor yielded the same results.'<sup>220</sup> Some aspects of the cases are comparable –for example, the formation of political parties and the role of cultural preconditions and such modern factors as print and literacy- but unique set of the cultural preconditions and the contemporary and historical circumstances make ethnicity among the Kurds very different from among other ethnic groups.<sup>221</sup>

Eller's analysis on Kurdish identity is quite critical. He argues that any group must fulfill three requirements to be a nation; common culture, a consciousness of shared identity, and the political organization toward a national goal; however, all three of these the Kurds have lacked almost entirely until late last century or even early this century and still lack to a certain extent.<sup>222</sup> According to him, two elements of the culture that might

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<sup>219</sup> Amir Hassanpour, *Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985*, (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992),

<sup>220</sup> Eller, Jack David, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, (Michigan: The university of Michigan Press, 1999) Chapter 4

<sup>221</sup> Eller, Chapter 4

<sup>222</sup> Eller, Chapter 4

seem most immediately to bond the Kurds are language and religion.<sup>223</sup> However, Eller claims, the Kurds speak very different dialects and these differences could be regarded as those of English and German.<sup>224</sup>

Amir Hassanpour's PhD study on 'Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan' gives highly detailed and helpful information about the connection between Kurdish Nationalism and Kurdish Language. Starting from very early ages up to today, indeed he focuses on more development of Kurdish language as a product of Kurdish nationalism. He gives special importance to problems of and attempts on standardization of different dialects of Kurdish. Unlike Allison, his tendency is not on oral tradition but on especially written language, such as books, newspaper, journals, schoolbooks, scientific works, etc. Furthermore, this linguistic work also covers Kurdish television and radio broadcasting. Why and how Kurdish language could not develop earlier and in what conditions it could find opportunity to develop in 20<sup>th</sup> century are other questions that he tries to look for in his study.

Unlike Eller, who presents variation of Kurdish dialects as a barrier for Kurdish identity, Hassanpour's work on this variation and standardization of Kurdish dialects indicates that the standardization attempts of Kurdish is a process of identity formation.<sup>225</sup> Hassanpour claims that standardization of Kurdish dialect of Sorani coincides with the emergence of Kurdish society as a nation at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>226</sup> As said by most of the authors, two important tendencies appeared after 1918. First assimilation attempts of Kurds by especially Turkey, Iran and Syria and the second, the resistance of Kurds against this assimilation policies ranging from peaceful disobedience to armed conflicts. Hassanpour argues that especially the first tendency empowered the Kurdish national consciousness and asserts that only development of Kurdish literature was not perceived as an ultimate aim for the reformist Kurdish intellectuals, Khanê and Koyi,

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<sup>223</sup> Eller Chapter 4

<sup>224</sup> Eller, Chapter 4

<sup>225</sup> Hassanpour, Nationalism, 142

<sup>226</sup> Hassanpour, Nationalism, 142

rather they have seen it as a necessary step for creating a nation. However, they could not succeed due to lack of ‘sword’.<sup>227</sup>

Hassanpour’s examination of lingual identity of Kurds is limited to Kurdish written literature and tries to explain all of his ideas through these printed materials. If we realize that limited number of written materials in Kurdish literature and limited readers of these materials, then it is not wrong to argue that Hassanpour’s representation of lingual identity of the Kurds is limited. His examination should be taken into consideration as a survey of lingual identity in Kurdish Literature.

Like many others, Blau and Suleiman explain the relation between Kurdish language and Kurdish identity by making analysis on poems of Khanê and Qadiri. As Allison has also pointed, Blau and Suleiman state that, except from ex-Soviet Republics usage of Kurdish was forbidden by the hegemonic states to that the Kurds subject. These states, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, were aiming to ‘suppress of Kurdish national aspirations and identity’, therefore Kurdish language became their target to suppress these aspirations and identity.<sup>228</sup>

On the other hand, Liora Lukitz argues that;

The attempt to reshape cultural manifestation to suit political needs was doomed, as it was already clear at this stage that the clash between the Turcoman, the Kurds and the Arabs was a contest for the preservation of identities that for generations had been molded by culture in its variant dimensions.<sup>229</sup>

Indeed, this clash was created for pragmatic reasons by the British Power ‘to prevent the formation of territorial unit.’<sup>230</sup> Because Lukitz states, the British power in Iraq, was

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<sup>227</sup> Hassanpour, Nationalism, 646

<sup>228</sup> Joyce Blau and Yasir Suleiman, Language and the Identity in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. by Yasir Suleiman, (Cornwall: Curzon, 1996), 153

<sup>229</sup> Lukitz, 43.

<sup>230</sup> Lukitz, 43.

very 'successful in driving the clash between Turcomans and the Kurds and within the Kurds themselves.'<sup>231</sup>

The strife meant much more than apprehensions of tribal groups, Kurdish or other, vis-à-vis, a modern state. It meant a struggle for cultural continuity in the face of changes that endangered the very essence of their communal existence. It also became an attempt to preserve traditional personal loyalties to the sheikh, the agha and the murshid and not to renounce them for the sake of wider, more complex and not yet fully understood frames of identification. That is why the concepts of national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity implied in the state-building process could affect these ethnic groups only superficially. The possibility of uncalculating a sense of overlapping identities (necessary to transport human groups from one stage of social cohesion to another) and further of channeling these new allegiances into more specific national identities remained a difficult task.<sup>232</sup>

Since leaving Mosul could cause the Kurdish uprising and creation of Kurdish political state or similar entity, or re-annexation of Mosul by Turkey, the British power did not want to leave earlier than it should happen. In addition, they need Sunni Kurds 'to counter balance of Shi'i majority' at the South.<sup>233</sup> However, to Lukitz, the most convincing of annexation of Mosul to Iraq was protection of Christian minority. Since they thought that assimilation policy would not be successful by the British themselves, they instead preferred 'Kurds, Christians and the Yezidi to get accustomed to the Arabs.'<sup>234</sup>

Surprisingly, this was also well situated to the assimilation of the Kurds by their other neighboring societies, namely, Turkish people, in new Turkish state. Because when the discussion on Mosul province between Turkey and their British power in Iraq came to table again in 1926, just after Sheikh Said Revolt in Kurdish areas in Turkey, the sides agreed on leaving the province to under the rule of the British ruled Iraq, and cooperating on Kurdish issue of between Turkey and Iraq.

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<sup>231</sup> Lukitz, 40.

<sup>232</sup> Lukitz, 43.

<sup>233</sup> Lukitz, 44.

<sup>234</sup> Lukitz, 44.

However, the policy of prevention of Kurdish political entity itself has ended with the creation of ethnically affiliated identity problem and the political movements based on this affiliation. British attempt to keep dialects as separate to each other and prevention of unification of dialects of Kurdish, caused the consciously motivated preservation of Kurdish by the Kurds who started to see the language as a symbol and the most important mean of their identities.

This newly emerging relations between the ethnic and religious groups in old three provinces of the Ottomans were not the result of natural socio-economic factors in Iraq, as similarly we have seen in Europe during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, but the baggage of British occupiers. However, this artificial intervention to the ethnic policy of Iraq will be worked when the interests of oil and administration of the state come into face, i.e. this policy of artificial ethnic relations will be natural when the power shared according to the ethnic, religious and sectarian structure of the society.

Lukitz states that

the preservation of language and culture became the axis around which all negotiations between the government and the Kurds turned, and since language spelled identity, the government's promises to introduce Kurdish to the educational system and to the administrative one by appointing 'the Kurdish-speaking officials' (who were not necessarily Kurds) seemed to the Kurds half measures.<sup>235</sup>

This was a kind of tolerance but not 'full acceptance of a Kurdish identity in all its political dimensions.'<sup>236</sup>

Even if Lukitz admits the role of Kurdish language in formation of ethnic identity among the Kurds, she undermines its impacts on identity formation process and exaggerates the role of the tariqats in such formation. To her Kurds' reaction to the state was just ethnic, at that stage more than social and cultural.

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<sup>235</sup> Lukitz, 46.

<sup>236</sup> Lukitz, 46.

In 1931, the Iraqi government supported and guided by British made a law on language that was allowing the usage of Kurdish in northern cities including Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya in courts. The permission and banning of usage of Kurdish language based itself in the middle of the struggle between the state, Iraq, and the Kurds.<sup>237</sup> This law was intending to standardization of Arabic language and abolishing usage of the different dialects of Arabic in official text and places, but permitting to use different words based on hearings in Kurdish and Turkish. The aim of the language was clear: to unifying different dialects of Arabic into one, on the one hand; diversifying Kurdish and Turkish dialects on the other.

Another author who examines the Kurds is Joyce Blau. Blau asserts that

The Kurds had shown an extra ordinary linguistic and ethnic vitality: To him, the new blossoming of Kurdish poets, writers and intellectuals who belong to the Kurmanji group strikingly illustrates the relationship between cultural development and political freedom. The Kurds' struggle for their national rights is inseparable from their struggle for a decent life and also for the preservation of their culture.<sup>238</sup>

In his examination of Kurdish written literature and identity of Kurd, as many others, Blau starts to classify Kurdish language into its dialects.<sup>239</sup> Nevertheless, despite the most authors he distinguishes Dimili (Zaza) and Gorani dialects from Kurdish.<sup>240</sup> In other words, to him, these two dialects cannot be classified in the Kurdish, like Kurmanji and Sorani sub dialects of Kurdish. Rather, he claims that Dimili and Gorani dialects should be examined in western Iranian dialect. Blau classifies Kurdish literature in 20<sup>th</sup> century into three periods, which are;

- I.) The period between 1920-1960,
- II.) The period between 1960-1980 and,

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<sup>237</sup> Lukitz, 46.

<sup>238</sup> Joyce Blau, *Kurdish written literature*, in *Kurdish Culture and Identity*, ed. by Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1996), 27

<sup>239</sup> Blau, *Kurdish written literature*, 21.

<sup>240</sup> Blau, *Kurdish written literature*, 21.

### III.) The period between 1980 onwards<sup>241</sup>

In the first period, Blau claims for the Iraqi Kurds, since they had to live under the rule of Arabic state Iraq; they had to use Arabic scripts and therefore adopted the Arabo-Persian alphabet and started to use it in their magazines and newspaper.<sup>242</sup> The attempts to Latinize of Kurdish alphabet by some local and foreign specialists were come up with opposition in the region. His claim, that the Arabo-Kurdish alphabet was started to be used first in Iraq and then in Iran, should be revised.<sup>243</sup> The information that he gave is clearly needed to be corrected, because, as we know, many Kurdish Poets, like Melayê Ciziri and Ahmad ê Khanê the most famous ones, had written Kurdish before in Arabo-Kurdish alphabet in Ottoman period, much before 20<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, the first sample of Kurdish literature is come from Gorani speaking Kurdish areas, in Iran. Even if we exclude these productions of literature, because he excludes Gorani dialect from Kurdish, Melayê Ciziri and Ahmad ê Khanê, both had used Kurmanji Dialect in their books, were living in Kurmanji speaking Kurdish areas, which are Cizre and Hakkari, which have been in Turkey not in Iraq. Not only these two but also other poets, needless to list their names here, from the 16<sup>th</sup> century had used Arabo-Kurdish alphabet in their works. In short, Arabo-Kurdish alphabet have been using by Kurdish intellectuals in northern part of Kurdish areas, not in Iraq and much before 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Coming back to Blau's arguments in the first period, unlike Turkey and Iran, except the period of short lived Mahabat Republic, in Iraq Kurdish literature has found opportunity to develop. Poetic and narrative essays, short stories and historical legendary tales affirmed vitality of the Kurdish language.<sup>244</sup>

In 1961, in the second period from 1960 up to 1980, the equality law between the Kurds and the Arabs was challenged by the new military policies and Kurdish literature was banned. In addition, Kurdish areas were bombed by new Iraqi government. These were

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<sup>241</sup> Blau, Kurdish written literature, 21.

<sup>242</sup> Blau, Kurdish written literature, 22.

<sup>243</sup> Blau, Kurdish written literature, 23.

<sup>244</sup> Blau, Kurdish written literature, 24.

resulted in the war between the Kurds and the new nationalist Government. When the war finished with the important victories of the Kurds, this caused the empowerment of Kurdish identity in Iraq, due to this war, Blau states:

Many Kurdish intellectuals, living in different parts of Iraq and hitherto integrated into Arab intellectual life, now rediscovered their Kurdish identity. There was a remarkable emergence of Kurdish teachers, professors, historians, journalist, and scientists. The hundreds of publications that appeared during this period illustrated in a most striking way the interconnection between political and cultural development.<sup>245</sup>

For the last period, he does not mention about the development of Kurdish literature in Iraq. Indeed, especially after 1991 there should be enormous development in the literature there due to protectorate of some part of Kurdish region of Iraq by USA and Turkey.

Suleiman and Blau make good arguments on the relationship between Kurdish language and Kurdish identity. According to them, since most of the Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria lived under 'the suppression of Kurdish national aspirations and identity'.<sup>246</sup> Except small Kurdish community living in ex-Soviet Union, the Kurds were faced with the prohibition of their own language in these countries, to which they are subject. To them, since these countries and its people were Muslim and their differences were their language, the first target of these hegemonic countries was to ban usage of Kurdish. This was also the case for the age of British invasion of Mosul after WW I, 'Britain first act was to dismiss the Turkish civil servants. Seeking the break the links between the Turks and the Ottomans the British removed the Turks and replaced the Kurds instead in the administration.'<sup>247</sup> Therefore, the decision of British authorities banning the Kurdish and Turkish and their perception on the language was to be a heart issue for the Kurds in the following decades.

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<sup>245</sup> Blau, Kurdish written literature, 25.

<sup>246</sup> Blau and Suleiman, Language and the Identity, 153

<sup>247</sup> Blau and Suleiman, Language and the Identity, 154

According to Blau and Suleiman, when Ahmad ê Khanê wrote his poems in Kurdish, he knew well 'its role as an identity marker of his own people'.<sup>248</sup> By citing from Khanê, depending on Rudenko's translation, they claim that Khanê is a pioneer among the Kurdish intellectuals who instinctively knew that language and literature are culture and, albeit implicitly, nation bound. Their approach is quite similar to Bruinessen's argument. According to Bruinessen, Khanê's book, Mem û Zîn, must have been read through the ages in Kurdish intellectuals and mullahs and their religious students were reading this book and memorizing as they memorized Hafiz and Sadî.<sup>249</sup> Therefore, Bruinessen thinks, Khanê's poet must have been shaped the Kurds through these ages.<sup>250</sup>

According to Blau and Suleiman, in old Ottoman countries, since nationalism emerged on the notion that assumed the 'language as a prime factor in collective identity formation', first Kurdish intellectuals like Hajji Qadiri Koyi, tried to emphasize their Kurdishness through their own language.<sup>251</sup>

In an attempt to show the interdependence between language and identity, the poet points out a people enter history through their language, and that even the most learned among them cannot attain their position as part of the cultural elite in ethnic terms as long as they continue to use other languages for their self-expression.<sup>252</sup>

Abbas Wali emphasizes that common Kurdish nationalists are primordialist whether they had Diyarbakir, Mahabat, (Iran) or Erbil (Iraq) background and according to him,

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<sup>248</sup> Blau and Suleiman, Language and the Identity, 155

<sup>249</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet,

<sup>250</sup> Bruinessen, Ağa Şeyh Devlet,

<sup>251</sup> Blau and Suleiman, Language and the Identity, 156.

<sup>252</sup> Abbas Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri: Kürt Tarih Yazımında Ulus ve Ulusal Kimliğin İnşası, in *Kürt milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, trans. by Fahriye Adsay, Ümit Aydoğmuş, Sema Kılıç, ed by Abbas Wali, (İstanbul: Avesta, 2005), 85

this is not the case only for ordinary nationalists but also for nationalist academicians.<sup>253</sup> In his examination, he criticizes three authors: Zeki<sup>254</sup>, Nebez<sup>255</sup> and Hassanpour.<sup>256</sup>

According to Wali, when the Ottoman Millet system has been collapsed and left its place to Turanism/Turkish nationalism, Zeki tried to find out historical origins of Kurdish people. By citing from Zeki's own words, Wali claims that Zeki's work is an attempt to construct a Kurdish ancestry.<sup>257</sup> This ancestry is based on the differences of the Kurds from Turks, Persians and Arabs. According to Wali, the idea of common origins that Zeki offered is ethnicist, but he was very modern in his creation and development of nationalism.<sup>258</sup> Zeki believed that the success of the Kurdish nationalism only possible by modernization of Kurdish inhabited areas, emergence of middle class, scientific and rational intelligentsia.<sup>259</sup>

On the other hand, Wali states that Nebez believed Kurdish nationalism has been local ideology that emerged in the late 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>260</sup> Unlike the Persian and the Turks, who both were influenced by their European counterparts, the idea of nation and nationalism had been already among the Kurds since Khanê, therefore, it is not possible to claim that Kurdish nationalism was based on a certain class and class interests as we have seen in Europe. In that sense, Wali claims, Nebez is primordialist in his understanding of nationalism and his argument based on two theoretical mistakes on feudal economy and ideology; first, he undermines the pre-capitalist mode of production in Kurdish inhabited areas and treats as if there was no exploitation the second, he

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<sup>253</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 85

<sup>254</sup> Mihemed Emin Zeki was born in 1880 in Sulaimaniyya. He was an Ottoman military Officer and asisstant of M. Kemal Atatürk in Syria. His major book is 'Short History of the Kurds and the Kurdistan'

<sup>255</sup> Cemal Nebez, He has several works about Kurdish Nationalism, like 'The Ideal of Kurdish Nation'

<sup>256</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 85

<sup>257</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 101

<sup>258</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 104

<sup>259</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 104

<sup>260</sup> Wali, Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri, 105

perceive ideology as a modern and capitalist phenomenon.<sup>261</sup> Wali states, on the other hand, that pre-modern Kurdish society is not an exceptional experience.<sup>262</sup>

Wali differentiates Hassanpour from Zeki and Nebez. Wali claims that Hassanpour's approach to Kurdish nationalism is problematic and paradoxical; Since, Wali claims, Hassanpour believed that language is the most essential element in construction of nation and national identity and have seen nationalism cultural construction on the one hand; his dependency to ethnicism on the other, creates paradox.<sup>263</sup> Wali argues that claiming the existence of Kurdish nationalism from the 17<sup>th</sup> century in pre-modern society assumes that it was not a modern construction rather it is primordial. Therefore, Wali states this paradox is caused due to mind confusion of Hassanpour.<sup>264</sup>

Indeed, in his article Amir Hassanpour refers to the critics that were directed against him by Abbas Wali and gives answers to these critiques.<sup>265</sup> He declares that Wali criticized him as being deterministic by claiming the language is the most important factor in Kurdish Nationalism and that his (Hassanpour) examination is reducing Kurdish language into literature; however, Hassanpour states that he did not claim any theoretical frame for Kurdish nationalism, and that he had presented the language as an area for nationalistic struggle.<sup>266</sup>

According to Wali, Kurdish identity is completely a modern phenomenon. This identity emerged because of the relationships between the Kurds and the Turks, Arabs and Persian at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These divided relationships between 'me and the other', have been emerged in all instances of the denial versus acceptance and

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<sup>261</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 108

<sup>262</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 108-110

<sup>263</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 117

<sup>264</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 114-120

<sup>265</sup> Amir Hassanpour, "Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası," in *Kürt milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, trans. by Fahriye Adsay, Ümit Aydoğmuş, Sema Kılıç, ed by Abbas Wali, (Istanbul: Avesta, 2005), 174

<sup>266</sup> Hassanpour, *Kürt Kimliğinin İnşası*, 187

rebellions versus repression practices.<sup>267</sup> In that sense Wali claims Kurdish nation and national identity is a response to establishments of Turkish, Persian and Arabic nation states and division of the Kurdish inhabited regions by these states.<sup>268</sup>

Kurdish nationalism had a different root from the European one. Whereas Classical European nationalism triggered by modernity and resulted in democratic citizenship and emergence of civic society, however Kurdish nationalism emerged because of ignorance of Kurdish identity and disintegration of democratic citizenship and elimination of civic society in Kurdish inhabited regions. This modern and paradoxical politics of assimilation of ethnic/national elements determines the discourse of development of Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East.

The effect of Arabic nationalism in Iraq cannot be underestimated in Kurdish identity formation, because any identity can only be understood in its environment, in relation to the other identities and experiences with that they have to interact. However, usually it has been ignored in Kurdish studies. Indeed, the construction of Arab nationalism in Iraq reflected itself in Kurdish nationalism. Since assimilation of the language of minority meant the unification of the nation, therefore preserving their language became the identity marker for the minority group in Iraq. When we look at the Arabic nationalism that the Kurds had to face in Iraq, we clearly see the effect of Sati Al-Husri (1880-1968).<sup>269</sup>

The Kurds were interacting with the Iraqi Arab nationalists who were materializing their ideologies on the ideology of Sati Al-Husri. Husri, who established the Iraqi national education system based on German understanding of lingual nationalism, influenced Arab nationalist in Iraq. French approach on nationalism, according to Husri, was not applicable to the Arabs.

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<sup>267</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 133

<sup>268</sup> Wali, *Kürtlerin Soy Kütükleri*, 134

<sup>269</sup> Secular Arab nationalist, educator, ideologue, prolific author, lecturer. He was educated in Istanbul and became one of the first Muslim Arab nationalist in Arab world at that time. The collapse of the Ottomans has turned his ideological background of Ottomanism into Arab Nationalism.

The German, on the other hand, because of the divided nature of their nation until 1870, clearly distinguished between the two concepts by using the word Nationalität to express legal citizenship and the separate term Volkstum to denote social membership in a nation. Al-husri finds the German example applicable to the Arabs and explains that legal concept is included in the terms al-jinsiyyah, al-tabi'iyah, and al-ra'awiyah, while the social concept is expressed by al-qawmiyyah. Al-qawmiyyah thus refers to membership in a nation as well as to the sentiment of nationalism.<sup>270</sup>

Al-Husri believed that history and the language are two important factors that make the people a nation. According to Al-Husri, language is the most important factor to unify the Arabs.<sup>271</sup>

Language is the most important spiritual tie, which binds mankind. First, it is the means of mutual understanding among the individuals...Thus; we can say that nations are distinguished from each other first by their language, and that the life of nations is based before everything else on their language.<sup>272</sup>

The effect of Al-Husri in Iraqi nationalism showed itself in Kurdish politics of Iraq in assimilation of Kurdish language. Because Arab nationalist policy perceived the language as the most important factor in nation building, their motivation on assimilation of the Kurds reflected itself in assimilation of Kurdish language. Failure of the assimilation policy over the Kurds in Iraq, caused by various reasons, and reaction of the Kurds to this policy paved way to construct Kurdish identity based on the language. Therefore, Kurdish language turned to be the symbol of the nation and became the core issue of Kurdish struggle in Iraq.

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<sup>270</sup> William L. Cleveland, *The Making an Arab Nationalist Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati Al-Husri*, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971), 95

<sup>271</sup> Cleveland, *The Making an Arab Nationalist*, 97.

<sup>272</sup> Cleveland, *The Making an Arab Nationalist*, 100.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE FIELD RESEARCH IN ERBIL

#### 4.1 METHOD

##### 4.1.1 SAMPLING

Sampling procedure is the most crucial process in a quantitative research. Since all of the data will be based on the sampling, any mistake will inevitably cause unreliable data. Normally, if a researcher wants to make a research by random sampling, s/he takes a sample from the statistical institution available in the region or country.

In our case, because of the security issue, it was not possible to get information on Erbil from Baghdad. In addition, the data they had, if they have, is old and not updated. Furthermore, the Regional Statistical Board for the Kurdistan Regional Government is very newly established and there was no any information there, either. Therefore, the best way for choosing sample was making it the simplistic. The new map of the City of Erbil was taken and the city was divided according to quarters.<sup>273</sup> Name of the quarters were written on different piece of papers. Then by closing the pages, the 20 pages were selected by random. By distributing 25 questionnaires<sup>274</sup> for a quarter, the research was conducted in these parts of the city.

Since the questions that were to be asked are sociological, the researchers should have been sociologists, too. Otherwise, there was a danger to get biased information from the field. Therefore, the research team was selected from the sociology department of the University of Saladin (Salahaddin). Even if all of the people in Erbil can speak Kurdish, the number of the Turcomani and Arabic speaking researchers has been increased as

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<sup>273</sup> See the Appendix B for the map of the quarters of Erbil where the research was conducted.

<sup>274</sup> See the Appendix A for the questionnaire that was used in Erbil.

much as possible, in order for the respondents from the minority groups to feel more relaxed in the field. The research team was consisting three women and four men. Because the research was to be conducted in households, the women researchers were preferred to the men by paying attention to the conservative social structure of the region.

#### **4.1.2 FIELD**

This research was conducted during July of 2007 in Erbil, Northern Iraq. The names of the quarters where the research was to be conducted were selected from the updated map of Erbil. Since there was no any reliable and well-designed residence and address based system there, the households were selected in the field randomly. In other words, we went to quarters to set up the research, depending to the size of the quarter and the length of the streets, by skipping at the same size, we have made our interviews in 25 households for every quarter. Our first preference was to apply the questionnaire to the head of the household (not family but household that may include more than one family). Since the research should have been conducted in daily hours, it was thought that the head of the households might have been working, when the head of the household was not available, then it was preferred to apply it to the housewife of the head of the household or the oldest available male.

We had decided to make interviews with people who are over 20 years old and living in houses. Therefore, the data does not include people who are living in dormitories, hotels or similar places that people may also be found. There is no any questionnaire applied in the work places, like stores, or shops. It was intended to reach the data on people who are residents at Erbil.

Usually, the respondents were very relaxed in answering the questions. It may be because they are not so accustomed to answering such questionnaires. Most of the respondents were facing for the first time this kind of research in their life. Therefore, even if some of the questions extremely sensitive in the atmosphere of Iraq, there was no resistance to responses in the quarters. Only in two households, they hesitated about the questions and they called the police force. After explaining what we were doing there and our purpose

well, and showing our permission certificate, the police officers went back and the researcher continued her job.

Since the most of the questions that were used in the questionnaire are quite sensitive, the questions asked accordingly. However, some of the responses on income of some respondents may not be reliable. In wealthier quarters, as it is very common, especially the questions related with income may not reflect the reality. It is observed in a few households, that the respondents hesitated to give answers for such questions.

In addition, the questions about voting and comparison the Saddam Period with Kurdistan Regional Government might have such problem. Indeed, before the research, we were expecting fewer answers for the perception questions. However, as can be seen from the results, they did not so much hesitate as we had expected before.

#### **4.1.3 EXPLANATIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Before proceeding to the analysis of the data that was gathered from the field, it is necessary to give information on the variables that were used in the questionnaire. Since the values that we will see in all of the tables, is highly dependent to the way they were coded, it is impossible to discuss without knowing how those variables have been coded in the SPSS program.

As it can be seen from the questionnaire, when appropriate, the expected answers have been named alphabetically, such as a) Male b) Female. When the data was entered, the answers starting with 'a)' coded as 1 and 2, respectively. In this way all of the responses given by the respondents have been turned into numerical expressions into the SPSS program. Therefore, for all of the questions in the questionnaire, the explanation below is valid;

- |               |               |               |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| a) coded as 1 | b) coded as 2 | c) coded as 3 |
| d) coded as 4 | e) coded as 5 | f) coded as 6 |
| g) coded as 7 | h) coded as 8 | i) coded as 9 |

Some variables, like age or income, were not been coded like this, instead they were left as open-ended questions because of their natures.

The questions, 6, 7, 9, 14, 18, 56, 57, 59, 63, 66, 80, 88, 90, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 105, have been turned into categorical variables before they have been used. The other important point that should be mentioned is that not all of the questions were used in the analysis. For instance, the questions related with political and social perceptions in the questionnaire were left for other studies.

Since giving information for all of the questions and the responses and on how they were coded one by one is waste of time and place, the responses will also be explained in more detailed, when the related table does not seem clear enough.

## **4.2 RESULTS AND ANALYSES**

It is useful to describe the general socio-economic profile of groups in Erbil before looking at the analysis on identity. Even though this information is not directly related with the main argument of this thesis, knowing some general socio economic variables can give important ground before proceeding. This information is not limited with the Kurds in Erbil, Northern Iraq (hereafter only the Kurds), but it includes the other ethno-religious groups with those who are in contact with the Kurds in Erbil as well.

In this section, the terms of (for Kurds only) and (for non-Kurds only) will be used for abbreviation purposes. By excluding the other ethnic and religious groups, we will examine the situation of the Kurds who are the subjects of this thesis. (For Kurds Only) heading is indicates that, that analysis valid only for the Kurds alone. Having examined the Kurds, we will go further to the situation of the non-Kurds, excluding the Kurds this time and including all the others in the analysis. In doing so, it will be easier to compare the Kurds and the others to see the differences between them. In addition, in the test tables in the analysis section, the name of the variables will appear in their short form. For instance, instead of 'the schools where instruction of language is Kurdish', it is written as 'Kurdish schools'. There may be such short forms of the questions due to difficulties of SPSS program in the following section.

## 4.2.1 GENERAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF PEOPLE IN ERBIL

### 4.2.1.1 INCOME

What is the average amount of income for ethnic and religious groups in Erbil? Are there significant differences between them? The tables below give information about them.

Table 4.1

#### Report

Considering all members of your family, what is total income of your household members for a month (as US Dollar)

How do you define your	Mean	Std. Deviation
Kurd	536,21	372,887
Turcoman	927,74	540,551
Arabic	689,42	476,184
Assyrian	283,60	48,984
Caldean	1201,55	1527,989
Persian	500,00	.
Total	586,50	537,719

#### Monthly Average Income Levels of a Household from Ethnic Groups in Erbil

According to the information they have given to the questions, the mean and standard deviation of total income for households for different groups are shown in the table above (Table 4.1). These amounts are not the monthly incomes of the head of the households but total income for all of the family members for a month. As can be seen from the table above, the most privileged ethnic group is Caldean. While the Caldeans earn 1201 American Dollars, on the other hand, the most disadvantaged people Assyrians earn only 283 American Dollars for a month on average.

In the table below (Table 4.2), we can see that there is significant difference between the mean of the income of different groups, because the Sig. value of differences between groups is smaller than 0.05. (Even if there seems there is a linear relation between groups, since our variable is categorical, it is not appropriate to say that there is a linear relationship.)

Table 4.2

**ANOVA Table**

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Considering all members of your family, what is total income of your household members for a month (as US Dollar) * How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Between Groups	(Combined)	11476203	5	2295240,651	8,688	,000
		Linearity	7856028	1	7856028,232	29,74	,000
		Deviation from Linearity	3620175	4	905043,755	3,426	,009
	Within Groups		1E+008	402	264190,777		
	Total		1E+008	407			

Average Monthly Income-Ethnic Groups Mean Difference Test ANOVA Table

As can be seen from the graph (Figure 6) shown below; the differences in income between ethnic groups are very clear? There may be a class dimension of these groups in Erbil, too.




Figure 6. Mean of Monthly Income of the Households According to Ethnic groups

#### 4.2.1.2 OWNERSHIP STATUS OF THE HOUSES FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS

As can be expected these differences in income determines differences in life conditions of these groups. According the Chi-Square Test (Table 4.3), there is a significant difference between ownership statuses of the house among ethnic groups. The Cross-table between ownership status and ethnic groups in Erbil (Table 4.4) indicates the percentages for ownership status for ethnic groups. For instance, all of the Turcomans, urban dweller people as a whole, are staying in their own houses, while 25 percent of Arabs have their own houses because they are newcomers to Erbil. This percentage is 71 percent for the Kurds and 74 percent for the Caldeans. Having a house to live in it may seem contradictory with such a low monthly income; however, patronage system of Iraq provides housing for its citizens. It is important to note that none of the Turcoman seems to be a tenant.

Table 4.3

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	31,526 <sup>a</sup>	9	,000
Likelihood Ratio	32,588	9	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	,667	1	,414
N of Valid Cases	481		

a. 8 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,27.

Ownership Status-Ethnic Groups Chi-Square Test

Table 4.4

**How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity \* Q20Who is the owner of this house Crosstabulation**

		Q20Who is the owner of this house				Total
		Head of the Household	Other Member of the Household	Tenant	Other	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurd	222 51,7%	83 19,3%	111 25,9%	13 3,0%	429 100,0%
	Turcoman	18 85,7%	3 14,3%	0 .0%	0 .0%	21 100,0%
	Arabic	1 12,5%	1 12,5%	6 75,0%	0 .0%	8 100,0%
	Caldean	10 43,5%	7 30,4%	3 13,0%	3 13,0%	23 100,0%
Total		251 52,2%	94 19,5%	120 24,9%	16 3,3%	481 100,0%

Ownership Status-Ethnic Groups Cross-tabulation

#### 4.2.1.3. MARKET PRICE OF THE RESPONDENTS' HOUSES THAT THEY LIVED FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS

The report below (Table 4.5) presents the mean of the market price of the houses the respondents staying. Since conditions of the houses at some respect shows the quality of the life for different groups, it is important to know that if there is a significant difference between the groups. While, the Turcomans have the most expensive houses, 116 428 American Dollars, on the other hand the Arabs have the cheapest houses, 49 285 American Dollars.

Table 4.5

#### Report

Q21What is the market price for this house as US Dollar

How do you define your	Mean	Std. Deviation
Kurd	90675,60	149318,968
Turcoman	116428,57	228156,732
Arabic	49285,71	16938,263
Caldean	109736,84	89107,826
Total	91827,13	148936,315

Descriptive Information on Market Price for Ethnic Groups

Even if it seems that there is a difference in mean of the prices of the houses that are respondents are staying among ethnic groups, the ANOVA table below (Table 4.6)

indicates that the differences between groups are not significant, because none of the Sig. value is smaller than 0.05.

Table 4.6

**Multiple Comparisons**

Dependent Variable: Q21What is the market price for this house as US Dollar

LSD

(I) How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	(J) How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Kurd	Turcoman	-25752,976	40721,269	,528	-105825,71	54319,76
	Arabic	41389,881	57009,777	,468	-70711,95	153491,71
	Caldean	-19061,247	35203,730	,589	-88284,51	50162,01
Turcoman	Kurd	25752,976	40721,269	,528	-54319,76	105825,71
	Arabic	67142,857	69106,285	,332	-68745,08	203030,80
	Caldean	6691,729	52581,999	,899	-96703,49	110086,95
Arabic	Kurd	-41389,881	57009,777	,468	-153491,71	70711,95
	Turcoman	-67142,857	69106,285	,332	-203030,80	68745,08
	Caldean	-60451,128	66005,753	,360	-190242,30	69340,04
Caldean	Kurd	19061,247	35203,730	,589	-50162,01	88284,51
	Turcoman	-6691,729	52581,999	,899	-110086,95	96703,49
	Arabic	60451,128	66005,753	,360	-69340,04	190242,30

Average Monthly Income-Ethnic Groups Mean Difference Multiple Comparison Test

**4.2.1.4. GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS**

Table 4.7

**ANOVA**

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q24How many hours on average in a day does your house benefit from the government water system	Between Groups	188,744	3	62,915	1,011	,388
	Within Groups	28687,802	461	62,230		
	Total	28876,546	464			
Q25How many hours on average in a day does your house receive from the government electricity	Between Groups	35,284	3	11,761	1,850	,137
	Within Groups	2898,682	456	6,357		
	Total	2933,965	459			
Q26How many hours on average in a day does your house receive from cooperative electricity	Between Groups	7,139	3	2,380	,655	,580
	Within Groups	1731,639	477	3,630		
	Total	1738,778	480			

Average Hours for Benefiting from the Government Systems of Water and Electricity and also Private Cooperative Electricity System

Usually in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, but specifically in Erbil, there is an incredibly big problem in sub-structure system. In winters, people are benefiting from the governmental electricity and water systems just two or three hours in a day. In summer days, the provision of electricity is increasing to nearly eight hours due to very hot climate of Iraq. Therefore, it is very important for residents of Erbil to get these two basic facilities. Depending to wage of the households, either they are getting the electricity from sellers in their streets or have their own generators. How many hours benefiting the electricity has become an indicator for being wealthy in Erbil. Therefore, it is essential to know that whether there is a difference among ethnic groups or not.

As can be seen from the ANOVA Test above (Table 4.7), there is no significant difference between groups in terms of benefiting from the services of the government. Since the research was conducted in the city and it has no illegal constructions, it was not applicable to grasp the inequality in servicing the ethnic groups. If it had been carried out in different regions, then these questions became more appropriate to know whether there is inequality or not? These questions asked to know whether there is a hidden discrimination in basic servicing against the Turcomans or other ethnic groups; however, there have not been observed such discrimination in performance of the basic services by KRG. There may be a difference in these services between the classes, yet to find such a difference is not the aim of this thesis.

As said above since the electricity service of the government is very poor in Erbil, owning private generator is crucial for family. The Chi-Square Test (Table 4.8) indicates that there is no any difference in owning the private generator among the ethnic groups, either. Even if the income differs significantly, it does not reflect itself in owning private generator.

Table 4.8

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5,885 <sup>a</sup>	5	,318
Likelihood Ratio	6,976	5	,222
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,475	1	,225
N of Valid Cases	515		

a. 6 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,45.

Chi-Square Test for Owning Private Generator

#### 4.2.1.5 OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE CAR

The table below (Table 4.9) shows the significant value for owning private car. Likewise, there is no any difference between groups in owning private car. This may because of very low prices of both cars and gasoline in Iraq.

Table 4.9

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,725 <sup>a</sup>	3	,867
Likelihood Ratio	,741	3	,864
Linear-by-Linear Association	,001	1	,971
N of Valid Cases	484		

a. 2 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,34.

Chi-Square Test for Owning Private Car

Even though all ethnic groups show similar tendencies in owning car, the amount of gasoline differs significantly. When we look at the Multiple Comparison table (Table 4.10), we can easily see that Caldeans differ from all other Muslim groups. Considering the levels of income for ethnic groups, it is not surprising to see that Caldeans are spending more on gasoline.

Table 4.10

**Multiple Comparisons**

Dependent Variable: How many litres of gasoline do you spend for your car in a month

LSD

(I) How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	(J) How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Kurd	Turcoman	-142,791	100,887	,158	-341,68	56,10
	Arabic	-130,016	126,627	,306	-379,65	119,62
	Caldean	-523,083*	83,214	,000	-687,13	-359,03
Turcoman	Kurd	142,791	100,887	,158	-56,10	341,68
	Arabic	12,775	159,303	,936	-301,28	326,83
	Caldean	-380,292*	127,545	,003	-631,74	-128,85
Arabic	Kurd	130,016	126,627	,306	-119,62	379,65
	Turcoman	-12,775	159,303	,936	-326,83	301,28
	Caldean	-393,067*	148,741	,009	-686,30	-99,83
Caldean	Kurd	523,083*	83,214	,000	359,03	687,13
	Turcoman	380,292*	127,545	,003	128,85	631,74
	Arabic	393,067*	148,741	,009	99,83	686,30

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Average Amount of Gasoline for Month-Ethnic Groups




Figure 7. Mean of Amount of Gasoline for a Month-Ethnic Groups

## 4.2.2 LANGUAGE

### 4.2.2.1 THE LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME

The number of cases and the percentages of the languages spoken at home are shown in the tables following. Before proceeding to analyze the relation between identity and the language, it is better to know the frequencies for those languages. In the tables the most repeated answer are presented. It is also better to remember that some of the residents of Erbil speak more than one language at home; the numbers of people when added together seem more than the number of the households where the research conducted. Following tables presents the percentages of the people with regard to spoken languages.

Table 4.11

**The households using Kurdish at home**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Using Kurdish	50	10,1	10,2	10,2
	Using Kurdish	442	89,7	89,8	100,0
	Total	492	99,8	100,0	
Missing	-1	1	,2		
Total		493	100,0		

The Percentages of the Households Speaking Kurdish at Home

Table 4.12

**The Households using Turcoman at home for communication**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Using Turcoman	473	95,9	96,1	96,1
	Using Turcoman	19	3,9	3,9	100,0
	Total	492	99,8	100,0	
Missing	-1	1	,2		
Total		493	100,0		

The Percentages of the Households Speaking Turcoman at Home

Table 4.13

**The Households using Arabic at home for communication**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Not Using Arabic	483	98,0	98,0	98,0
Using Arabic	10	2,0	2,0	100,0
Total	493	100,0	100,0	

The Percentages of the Households Speaking Arabic at Home

Table 4.14

**The Households using Caldean at home for communication**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Not Using Caldean	471	95,5	95,5	95,5
Using Caldean	22	4,5	4,5	100,0
Total	493	100,0	100,0	

The Percentages of the Households Speaking Caldean at Home

**4.2.2.2 INSTRUCTION LANGUAGES AT SCHOOL**

Is there any relation between the age of people and the language of instruction in the schools that they attended? If the instruction language has been changing, then, what is the direction of this change?

Since from 1991 then on, Kurdistan Region of Iraq gained relative autonomy from the Ba'ath Regime of Saddam Hussein, two representative political parties of Kurdish people, Kurdistan Democrat Party, PDK, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, have started to use Kurdish in their formal governmental relations in Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Education language became diversified gradually. Even if Kurdish was being thought in schools in some schools in the region during the Ba'ath Period, it was very limited and Turcoman language was not being taught in schools. After 1991, when these two parties came into power they have presented themselves as the representatives of all minority groups that were under the suppression of the old regime. They added Turcoman languages courses as well as Kurdish. In addition, Kurdish became the most common language that was taught in schools. Arabic was not totally left, but it lost its old value in society.

If there is a positive relation between the variables in the correlation table (Table 4.15), then it means if the age increases then attendance to the schools increases, too. In contrast, if there is a negative relation, then it means; when the age increases, attendance to these schools decreases. When we look at the ‘The male attended Kurdish schools’ and the ‘Q5Age of the Male’ variable for the Kurds, we see that there is a significant relation between the age of the male (the oldest male in the household) and the attendance to Kurdish schools [Sig. (2-tailed) = 0.000]. The sign of the Pearson Correlation is negative; therefore, the relation is negative. It can be said that there is a significant and negative relation between these two variables. On the other hand, it cannot be said that there is a significant relation between the ‘Q5Age of the Male’ variable and ‘The male attended Turkish schools’ and ‘The male attended Arabic schools’

This simply means that younger people is taking their education more in Kurdish. The transition from the schools where Arabic is the language of instruction to the schools where Kurdish is the language of instructions is obvious.

Table 4.15

		<b>Correlations</b>			
		Q5Age of Male	The male attended Kurdish schools	The male attended Turkish schools	The male attended Arabic schools
Q5Age of Male	Pearson Correlation	1	-,246**	,040	,053
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,484	,352
	N	398	313	313	313
The male attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,246**	1	-,045	-,240**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,425	,000
	N	313	314	314	314
The male attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,040	-,045	1	,017
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,484	,425		,759
	N	313	314	314	314
The male attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,053	-,240**	,017	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,352	,000	,759	
	N	313	314	314	314

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of the Age of the Male-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the Kurds

This is the situation for the Kurds. What is the situation for the non-Kurds, for the same variables? The table below (Table 4.15) shows the situation for them. For the non-Kurds there is no any significant relation between these variables. Therefore, we cannot say that the non-Kurds are attending more to Kurdish schools than before.

Table 4.16

**Correlations**

		Q5Age of Male	The male attended Kurdish schools	The male attended Turkish schools	The male attended Arabic schools
Q5Age of Male	Pearson Correlation	1	-,087	-,249	,238
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,561	,092	,108
	N	54	47	47	47
The male attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,087	1	,224	-,343*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,561		,130	,018
	N	47	47	47	47
The male attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,249	,224	1	-,215
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,092	,130		,147
	N	47	47	47	47
The male attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,238	-,343*	-,215	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,108	,018	,147	
	N	47	47	47	47

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of the Age of the Male-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the non-Kurds

Table 4.17

**Correlations**

		Age of Female	The female attended Kurdish schools	The female attended Turkish schools	The female attended Arabic schools
Age of Female	Pearson Correlation	1	-,081	,039	,069
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,195	,530	,267
	N	450	260	260	260
The female attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,081	1	-,011	-,417**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,195		,858	,000
	N	260	263	263	263
The female attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,039	-,011	1	,060
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,530	,858		,328
	N	260	263	263	263
The female attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,069	-,417**	,060	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,267	,000	,328	
	N	260	263	263	263

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation of the Age of the Male-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the non-Kurds**

As can be seen from the table above (Table 4.17), the interpretations made for the males are not valid for the females. There is no significant relation between the age of females and the language of instruction in schools they have attended. This may be because of low education level of female among the Kurds compared to more urbanized groups in the city. As can be seen from the table (Table 4.19), there is a significant relation between the education level of female and ethnic identity. As the Table 4.18 indicated, While 40, 8 percent of Kurdish female have no literacy, on the other hand, especially Arabs and Caldeans have more education level compared to both the Kurds and the Turcomans.

Table 4.18

**How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity \* Education Level of Female Crosstabulation**

		Education Level of Female						Total
		Illiterate	Literate without schooling	Primary	Secondary	High	University	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurd	160 40,8%	10 2,6%	94 24,0%	32 8,2%	35 8,9%	61 15,6%	392 100%
	Turcoman	8 38,1%	1 4,8%	4 19,0%	3 14,3%	3 14,3%	2 9,5%	21 100%
	Arabic	1 14,3%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 14,3%	1 14,3%	4 57,1%	7 100%
	Assyrian	0 ,0%	1 50,0%	0 ,0%	1 50,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	2 100%
	Caldean	3 13,6%	0 ,0%	2 9,1%	5 22,7%	3 13,6%	9 40,9%	22 100%
	Persian	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	0 ,0%	1 100,0%	1 100%
Total		172 38,7%	12 2,7%	100 22,5%	42 9,4%	42 9,4%	77 17,3%	445 100%

Cross-tabulation of Ethnicity-Education Level of Female

Table 4.19

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	58,342 <sup>a</sup>	25	,000
Likelihood Ratio	43,104	25	,014
Linear-by-Linear Association	18,754	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	445		

a. 28 cells (77,8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,03.

Chi-Square Test for Ethnicity-Education Level of Female

There is also a religious difference in education level of females. As indicated in the Table 4.21, there is a significant relation between the religion and the education level of female. The Table 4.20 shows that educated female rates were higher among the Christians than they were among the Muslims.

Table 4.20

**What religion do you belong to \* Education Level of Female Crosstabulation**

		Education Level of Female						Total
		Illiterate	Literate without schooling	Primary	Secondary	High	University	
What religion do you belong to	Islam	169 40,3%	12 2,9%	97 23,2%	36 8,6%	39 9,3%	66 15,8%	419 100%
	Christianity	3 12,0%	1 4,0%	2 8,0%	7 28,0%	3 12,0%	9 36,0%	25 100%
Total		172 38,7%	13 2,9%	99 22,3%	43 9,7%	42 9,5%	75 16,9%	444 100%

Cross-tabulation of Religion-Education Level of Female

Table 4.21

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22,505 <sup>a</sup>	5	,000
Likelihood Ratio	20,693	5	,001
Linear-by-Linear Association	13,106	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	444		

a. 4 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,73.

Chi-Square Test for Religion-Education Level of Female

The Table 4.22 demonstrates that there are significant relations between the age variables and the attendance to Kurdish and Arabic schools however there is no any significant relation between the age variables and attendance to Turkish schools. Since the sign of the Pearson correlation value is negative for Kurdish, but positive for Arabic schools, we can say that there is a negative relation for Kurdish schools, but positive relation for attendance to Arabic schools. In other words, the transformation that we have mentioned for the head of the household is valid for the biggest children, too. The biggest children in the household are leaving the attendance to Arabic schools in order to attend to the schools where the language of instruction is Kurdish. The transition from Arabic to Kurdish in education system of Kurdistan region of Iraq is obvious.

Table 4.22

		<b>Correlations</b>			
		Age of the Biggest Child	The biggest child attended Kurdish schools	The biggest child attended Turkish schools	The biggest child attended Arabic schools
Age of the Biggest Child	Pearson Correlation	1	-,172**	,095	,307**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,003	,100	,000
	N	364	302	302	302
The biggest child attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,172**	1	-,118*	-,237**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003		,040	,000
	N	302	302	302	302
The biggest child attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,095	-,118*	1	,007
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,100	,040		,905
	N	302	302	302	302
The biggest child attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,307**	-,237**	,007	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,905	
	N	302	302	302	302

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation of the Age of the Biggest Child-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the Kurds**

As can be seen from the table for the non-Kurds (Table 4.23), there is no such transition, since there is no any significant relation between the variables. This simply means that even if Kurdish is becoming major education language in Erbil, Arabic is still keeping its importance for people. People want to learn Arabic as well as Kurdish. If we look at the answer of the 36 question, we also see that people want their children to speak Turkish and Arabic. In other words, people want to learn Turkish and Arabic as second and third languages. Because of that, they are not leaving to learn these languages. Even if, in the questionnaire, we did not ask why they are still learning Arabic as a second language, we observed that the people perceived ability to speak different languages is useful in their daily life in Erbil. In deep interviews, on the other hand, some people said that Arabic is the language of Qur'an, some other said it is a worldwide language. We should also remember that Arabic is still official language of Iraq. Therefore, people who want to be hired in state departments have to learn Arabic. In other words, these

people have to attend the schools where Arabic is the language of instruction, because this is the best way for learning Arabic for whom they do not speak Arabic at home.

Table 4.23

**Correlations**

		Age of the Biggest Child	The biggest child attended Kurdish schools	The biggest child attended Turkish schools	The biggest child attended Arabic schools
Age of the Biggest Child	Pearson Correlation	1	-,051	,200	,161
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,755	,216	,321
	N	48	40	40	40
The biggest child attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,051	1	,132	-,354*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,755		,415	,025
	N	40	40	40	40
The biggest child attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,200	,132	1	-,047
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,216	,415		,774
	N	40	40	40	40
The biggest child attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,161	-,354*	-,047	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,321	,025	,774	
	N	40	40	40	40

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation of the Age of the Biggest Child-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the non-Kurds**

The table below (Table 4.24) shows that there is a significant relation between the variables. The same transition for the Kurds is continuing, but for Kurdish schools even in an increasing rate, because the Pearson correlation value is increasing. This means that the smallest the child, the most attendance to Kurdish schools. In other words, the younger generation attends the schools where the instruction of language is Kurdish.

Table 4.24

		<b>Correlations</b>			
		Age of the Smallest Child	The smallest child attended Kurdish schools	The smallest child attended Turkish schools	The smallest child attended Arabic schools
Age of the Smallest Child	Pearson Correlation	1	-,313**	,106	,290**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,119	,000
	N	224	219	219	219
The smallest child attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,313**	1	,010	-,346**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,879	,000
	N	219	219	219	219
The smallest child attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,106	,010	1	-,023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,119	,879		,733
	N	219	219	219	219
The smallest child attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,290**	-,346**	-,023	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,733	
	N	219	219	219	219

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of the Age of the Smallest Child-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the Kurds

Table 4.25

		<b>Correlations</b>			
		Age of the Smallest Child	The smallest child attended Kurdish schools	The smallest child attended Turkish schools	The smallest child attended Arabic schools
Age of the Smallest Child	Pearson Correlation	1	-,293	,073	,372*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,122	,707	,047
	N	29	29	29	29
The smallest child attended Kurdish schools	Pearson Correlation	-,293	1	,137	-,751**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,122		,478	,000
	N	29	29	29	29
The smallest child attended Turkish schools	Pearson Correlation	,073	,137	1	-,183
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,707	,478		,343
	N	29	29	29	29
The smallest child attended Arabic schools	Pearson Correlation	,372*	-,751**	-,183	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,047	,000	,343	
	N	29	29	29	29

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of the Age of the Smallest Child-Attendance to the Schools According to the Language of Instruction, Only among the non-Kurds

As can be seen from the table above (Table 4.25), there is a tendency to leave the schools where Arabic is the instruction language, because Sig. (2-tailed) becomes significant. As we have seen above there was no significant relation for the non-Kurds. Because of that, we had said that we could not say the non-Kurds are attending more to Kurdish schools. However, when we look at the younger generation, it seems that the picture is changing. Even if, there is no significant relation for attendance to Kurdish schools, we can expect that non-Kurds can follow the Kurds in proceeding years by sending their children to Kurdish schools; because the official language of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the language for communication is social life in Erbil is Kurdish.

When we put the religion into function, the picture is becoming more elaborative. Among the non-Kurds, there are also differences between Muslims and Christians (below Table 4.26 and Table 4.27). While the Muslim non-Kurds are more open to attend their children to Kurdish Schools, the Christian non-Kurds are sending their children more to Arabic Schools.

Table 4.26

**Crosstab**

			The smallest child attended Kurdish schools		Total
			Not attended	Attended	
What religion do you belong to	Islam	Count	2	14	16
		% within What religion do you belong to	12,5%	87,5%	100,0%
	Christianity	Count	8	5	13
		% within What religion do you belong to	61,5%	38,5%	100,0%
Total		Count	10	19	29
		% within What religion do you belong to	34,5%	65,5%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation of the Religion-Attendance of the Smallest Child to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Kurdish, Only among the non-Kurds

Table 4.27

**Crosstab**

			The smallest child attended Arabic schools		Total
			Not attended	Attended	
What religion do you belong to	Islam	Count	11	5	16
		% within What religion do you belong to	68,8%	31,3%	100,0%
	Christianity	Count	4	9	13
		% within What religion do you belong to	30,8%	69,2%	100,0%
Total		Count	15	14	29
		% within What religion do you belong to	51,7%	48,3%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation of the Religion-Attendance of the Smallest Child to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Arabic, Only among the non-Kurds

#### 4.2.3 IDENTITY

Before looking at the relationship between language and identity, we should know, at least, how the respondents identify themselves.

Below, there is a table of identification list (Table 4.28). Since it is an open-ended question and all of the details are important, they are presented in the table exactly in the same way as they were given by the respondents. However, in order to make comparison this variable with other variables, the vast variety of the responses have been classified and categorized. Categorization of these responses about self-identification, as below presented in the Table 4.28, has been accomplished as follows:

- |                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1- Ethnicity,               | 2- Ethnicity as Categorized, |
| 3- Religion,                | 4- Iraqiness,                |
| 5- Social and Gender Roles, | 6- Profession,               |
| 7- Personality,             | 8- Universal Values,         |

These created variables are actually just classified version of the question of ‘How do you identify yourselves?’ Therefore, hereafter, all of the analysis will be based on this classification.

Table 4.28

Artist	Iraqi Christian	Partisan
Bad	Iraqi Kurd Muslim	Partisan Kurd
Christian	Iraqi Woman	Patriotic Kurd
Christian Iraqi	Kurd	PDK
Christian Nationalist	Kurd and member of	Personality
Citizen	PDK	Peshmerga
Comfort	Kurd Christian	Poor
Doctor	Kurd from Erbil	Poor Kurd
Driver Kurd	Kurd Muslim	Poor Kurd Woman
Engineer	Kurd Muslim	Professional
Erbillian	Partisan	Progressivist
Father	Kurd Worker	Realist Person
Free Human	Kurdish Girl	Servant
Free Kurd	Kurdish Woman	Teacher
Good	Man	Teacher wife
Hard Working	Mechanic	Tribal
Head of Household	Member of PDK	Tribal Kurd
Hopeless	Mother	Turcoman Woman
Housewife	Muslim	Universal
Human	Muslim Kurd	Winner
Human Kurd	Muslim Woman	Woman
Humble	Nationalist	Woman Teacher
I do not know	Nationalist Kurd	Worker
Iraqi	Normal Person	
	Official	
	Official Kurd	

All of the Responses Given to the Open-ended Identification Question

#### 4.2.3.1 LANGUAGE IDENTITY RELATION

Establishing a bridge between ethnicity and language is very common in literature. In a multilingual society, like Erbil, where different languages can be spoken by large amount of people, the relation between these two becomes more critical. People can speak in a language at home and study in different one at schools. Even, they have to speak another language at bazaar or streets. Which language is important in identity selection process in such a case; the language thought at schools or the language spoken at home? In the following section, we will try to find out the relation between language of instruction and identity.

#### **4.2.3.1.1 INSTRUCTION LANGUAGES AT SCHOOL-IDENTITY**

In the instruction languages at school section of this chapter, we have seen that the Kurds are sending more their children to Kurdish schools, and in near future, non-Kurds are being expected to send their children to the schools where instruction language is Kurdish. Now we will compare the variable of language instruction at schools with the identity variable.

Because, some of the respondents are female, we will do two analyses for education language and identification variables. This classification is not aiming to make an examination on the gender dimension of the issue; rather it is necessary due to structure of the questionnaire. In other words, it is not our option but the necessity. Two different analyses are as follows; one for males; male education language versus identification variables, and the other for female respondents; female education languages versus the same identity variables.

Since the table for this analysis is very wide, we will do it into two parts; the Table 4.29 indicates that there is no any significant relation between attendance to Kurdish schools and identification with ethnicity, ethnicity as categorized, religion however; the Sig. value for Iraqiness is below 0.05. Pearson Correlation value is negative; therefore, we can say that there is a negative relationship between attendance to Kurdish schools and identification with Iraqiness. In other words, the males who have attended to Kurdish schools do not identify themselves with Iraqiness.

Table 4.29

## Correlations

		The male attended Kurdish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The male attended Kurdish schools	PC	1	-,003	-,024	-,034	-,131*
	Sig		,966	,705	,593	,038
	N	290	250	253	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,003	1	,874**	,102	-,131*
	Sig	,966		,000	,063	,017
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,024	,874**	1	-,168**	-,163**
	Sig	,705	,000		,002	,003
	N	253	333	336	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	-,034	,102	-,168**	1	,033
	Sig	,593	,063	,002		,549
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	-,131*	-,131*	-,163**	,033	1
	Sig	,038	,017	,003	,549	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Kurdish, A

Table 4.30

		<b>Correlations</b>				
		The male attended Kurdish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The male attended Kurdish schools	PC	1	-,014	,101	,099	-,046
	Sig		,823	,112	,119	,471
	N	290	250	250	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	-,014	1	,040	-,069	-,056
	Sig	,823		,467	,209	,306
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	,101	,040	1	-,114*	-,093
	Sig	,112	,467		,037	,090
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,099	-,069	-,114*	1	-,132*
	Sig	,119	,209	,037		,016
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,046	-,056	-,093	-,132*	1
	Sig	,471	,306	,090	,016	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Kurdish, B

As indicated in the Table 4.30, there is no any significant relation between variables.

As can be seen from the Table 4.31, because the Sig. values are smaller than 0.05, there are two significant relations between attendance to schools in Turkish and ethnicity and ethnicity as categorized (i.e. self-identification with ethnicity but with stronger ethnic terms). Since Pearson Correlation value is negative, then, this relation is negative too. In other words, the male respondents who have attended schools in Turkish are not defining themselves with any ethnic concept. As Sig. values are not smaller than 0.05, there is no any significant relation between attendances to schools where Turkish is language of instruction and identification with religion and Iraqiness.

Table 4.31

## Correlations

		The male attended Turkish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The male attended Turkish schools	PC	1	-,155*	-,166**	,006	,087
	Sig		,014	,008	,925	,171
	N	290	250	253	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,155*	1	,874**	,102	-,131*
	Sig	,014		,000	,063	,017
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,166**	,874**	1	-,168**	-,163**
	Sig	,008	,000		,002	,003
	N	253	333	336	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,006	,102	-,168**	1	,033
	Sig	,925	,063	,002		,549
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	,087	-,131*	-,163**	,033	1
	Sig	,171	,017	,003	,549	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Turkish, A

For the male respondents, the relation between attendance to Turkish Schools and identification with universal values is significant. (Table 4.32) Because Pearson Correlation value is positive, the relation is positive, too. In other words, the male respondents who have attended schools where instruction language is Turkish are identifying themselves with universal values. On the other hand, there is no significant relation with social and gender roles, profession and personality.

Table 4.32

		Correlations				
		The male attended Turkish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The male attended Turkish schools	PC	1	-,031	-,051	,038	,167**
	Sig		,627	,425	,554	,008
	N	290	250	250	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	-,031	1	,040	-,069	-,056
	Sig	,627		,467	,209	,306
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,051	,040	1	-,114*	-,093
	Sig	,425	,467		,037	,090
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,038	-,069	-,114*	1	-,132*
	Sig	,554	,209	,037		,016
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	,167**	-,056	-,093	-,132*	1
	Sig	,008	,306	,090	,016	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Turkish, B

The Table 4.33 shows that there is a significant relation between attending the schools where Arabic is the language of instruction and identifying oneself with ethnicity, ethnicity categorized and Iraqiness. Since Pearson Correlation value for Iraqiness is positive, we can say that the male respondents who are attending schools where Arabic is the language of instruction identifying themselves with Iraqiness. On the other hand, other significant relations, ethnicity and ethnicity categorized, have negative sign, therefore, we can say that the same people are not identifying themselves with ethnic concepts. They are preferring identification with the country instead of their ethnic or backgrounds.

Table 4.33

## Correlations

		The male attended Arabic schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The male attended Arabic schools	PC	1	-,151*	-,140*	,069	,158*
	Sig		,017	,026	,276	,012
	N	290	250	253	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,151*	1	,874**	,102	-,131*
	Sig	,017		,000	,063	,017
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,140*	,874**	1	-,168**	-,163**
	Sig	,026	,000		,002	,003
	N	253	333	336	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,069	,102	-,168**	1	,033
	Sig	,276	,063	,002		,549
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	,158*	-,131*	-,163**	,033	1
	Sig	,012	,017	,003	,549	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Arabic, A

As can be seen from the Table 4.34, there is a significant relation between attendance to schools where Arabic is the language of instruction and identification with profession and personality. However, there is no significant relation between the former variable and social and gender roles and universal values variables. This means that the male respondents who are attending the schools where the language of instruction is Arabic are identifying themselves with their professions and personality.

Table 4.34

## Correlations

		The male attended Arabic schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The male attended Arabic schools	PC	1	,040	-,246**	,177**	,082
	Sig		,533	,000	,005	,198
	N	290	250	250	250	250
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	,040	1	,040	-,069	-,056
	Sig	,533		,467	,209	,306
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,246**	,040	1	-,114*	-,093
	Sig	,000	,467		,037	,090
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,177**	-,069	-,114*	1	-,132*
	Sig	,005	,209	,037		,016
	N	250	333	333	333	333
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	,082	-,056	-,093	-,132*	1
	Sig	,198	,306	,090	,016	
	N	250	333	333	333	333

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Male to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Arabic, B

Having analyzed the relation between the school languages and identification variables for male respondents, now, we will look at the same relation for the female respondents. For female respondents, there is no significant relation between attending the schools where language of instruction is Kurdish and identity variables, which are ethnicity, ethnicity categorized, religion and Iraqiness. (See table 4.35).

Table 4.35

## Correlations

		The female attended Kurdish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The female attended Kurdish schools	PC	1	-,010	-,072	,051	-,129
	Sig		,942	,605	,717	,356
	N	58	53	54	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,010	1	,890**	,029	-,127
	Sig	,942		,000	,777	,216
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,072	,890**	1	-,137	-,120
	Sig	,605	,000		,183	,243
	N	54	96	97	96	96
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,051	,029	-,137	1	,139
	Sig	,717	,777	,183		,176
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	-,129	-,127	-,120	,139	1
	Sig	,356	,216	,243	,176	
	N	53	97	96	97	97

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Kurdish, A

Likewise, there is no significant relation between attending to the schools where language of instruction is Kurdish and identity variables, which are gender roles, profession, personality and universal values. (See Table 4.36)

Table 4.36

## Correlations

		The female attended Kurdish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The female attended Kurdish schools	PC	1	-,168	,211	,078	-,063
	Sig		,230	,129	,579	,656
	N	58	53	53	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	-,168	1	-,137	-,201*	-,172
	Sig	,230		,180	,049	,092
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	,211	-,137	1	-,096	-,082
	Sig	,129	,180		,350	,424
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,078	-,201*	-,096	1	-,077
	Sig	,579	,049	,350		,454
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,063	-,172	-,082	-,077	1
	Sig	,656	,092	,424	,454	
	N	53	97	97	97	97

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Kurdish, B

We can say the same thing for the table below (Table 4.37), too. There is no significant relation between attending to schools where instruction language is Turkish and identity variables, which are ethnicity, ethnicity categorized, religion and Iraqiness.

Table 4.37

## Correlations

		The female attended Turkish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The female attended Turkish schools	PC	1	-,136	-,124	-,050	-,027
	Sig		,331	,371	,725	,845
	N	58	53	54	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,136	1	,890**	,029	-,127
	Sig	,331		,000	,777	,216
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,124	,890**	1	-,137	-,120
	Sig	,371	,000		,183	,243
	N	54	96	97	96	96
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	-,050	,029	-,137	1	,139
	Sig	,725	,777	,183		,176
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	-,027	-,127	-,120	,139	1
	Sig	,845	,216	,243	,176	
	N	53	97	96	97	97

\*\* .Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Turkish, A

On the other hand, here, as can be seen from the table (Table 4.38), since Sig. value for universality is smaller than 0.05 and Pearson Correlation value has positive sign, we can say that the female respondents who have attended schools where Turkish is the language of instruction define themselves with universal values. What is more, Pearson Correlation value is quite high. This means that correlation is strong. In other words, there is a relatively strong correlation between attendance to schools where instruction language is Turkish and self-identification with universal values for the female respondents.

Table 4.38

## Correlations

		The female attended Turkish schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The female attended Turkish schools	PC	1	-,071	-,054	-,054	,566**
	Sig		,614	,700	,700	,000
	N	58	53	53	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	-,071	1	-,137	-,201*	-,172
	Sig	,614		,180	,049	,092
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,054	-,137	1	-,096	-,082
	Sig	,700	,180		,350	,424
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	-,054	-,201*	-,096	1	-,077
	Sig	,700	,049	,350		,454
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	,566**	-,172	-,082	-,077	1
	Sig	,000	,092	,424	,454	
	N	53	97	97	97	97

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Turkish, B

Because there is no significant relation between the variables, there is no need to make an interpretation about the Correlation Test about the relation between attendance to the schools where language of instruction is Arabic and identity variables, which are identification with ethnicity, ethnicity as categorized, religion and Iraqiness. Below the Table 4.39 presents the results of the test.

Table 4.39

## Correlations

		The female attended Arabic schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The female attended Arabic schools	PC	1	-,255	-,208	,076	,244
	Sig		,066	,131	,590	,078
	N	58	53	54	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,255	1	,890**	,029	-,127
	Sig	,066		,000	,777	,216
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity as categorized	PC	-,208	,890**	1	-,137	-,120
	Sig	,131	,000		,183	,243
	N	54	96	97	96	96
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,076	,029	-,137	1	,139
	Sig	,590	,777	,183		,176
	N	53	97	96	97	97
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	,244	-,127	-,120	,139	1
	Sig	,078	,216	,243	,176	
	N	53	97	96	97	97

\*\* .Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Arabic, A

In the table below (Table 4.40), we can see that there is a significant relation between attending to schools where instruction language is Arabic and identifying oneself with profession and personality for female respondents. Because Pearson Correlation values have positive signs for both, the relation is positive. Thus we can say that the women who have attended schools where Arabic is the language of instruction identifying themselves with their professions and personal characteristics. If we look at the percentage of the value, we can also say that they are not weak relations.

Table 4.40

**Correlations**

		The female attended Arabic schools	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The female attended Arabic schools	PC	1	,061	-,316*	,482**	-,031
	Sig		,664	,021	,000	,823
	N	58	53	53	53	53
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	,061	1	-,137	-,201*	-,172
	Sig	,664		,180	,049	,092
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,316*	-,137	1	-,096	-,082
	Sig	,021	,180		,350	,424
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,482**	-,201*	-,096	1	-,077
	Sig	,000	,049	,350		,454
	N	53	97	97	97	97
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,031	-,172	-,082	-,077	1
	Sig	,823	,092	,424	,454	
	N	53	97	97	97	97

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation of Identification-Attendance of the Female to the Schools where the Language of Instruction is Arabic, B

**4.2.3.1.2 THE LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME-IDENTITY**

Different than the languages spoken at schools, the language spoken at home is inevitably related with familial relations, lineage background, ancestors, and even with tribal relations. Even if it does not always have to be so, because of some factors like, intermarriage, education, etc., the language spoken at home generally gives information on the background of the family. In this part, we will see whether there is a relation in identity selection process or not. Below we will see the correlation test table for the languages, Kurdish, Turcoman, Arabic and Caldean, respectively.

Table 4.41

		<b>Correlations</b>				
		The households using Kurdish at home	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The households using Kurdish at home	PC	1	,306**	,246**	-,027	-,289**
	Sig		,000	,000	,567	,000
	N	520	459	462	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	,306**	1	,880**	,082	-,148**
	Sig	,000		,000	,080	,001
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	PC	,246**	,880**	1	-,159**	-,166**
	Sig	,000	,000		,001	,000
	N	462	458	462	458	458
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	-,027	,082	-,159**	1	,077
	Sig	,567	,080	,001		,097
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	-,289**	-,148**	-,166**	,077	1
	Sig	,000	,001	,000	,097	
	N	459	459	458	459	459

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Kurdish Speaking Households at Home, A

As can be seen from the correlation test above (Table 4.41), there are three significant relationships in the correlation test. According to this test, since the relation between the households speaking Kurdish at home and identifying oneself with ethnic terms is significant and Pearson Correlation value is positive, we can claim that these households speaking Kurdish at home identifying themselves with ethnic concepts. This statement is also provided by other two identity variables. When we look at the both ethnicity as categorized and identifying oneself with Iraqiness, we see the same result in a different way. Speaking Kurdish is negatively correlated with Iraqiness, yet positively correlated with ethnic identification.

Below, the table (Table 4.42) presents another test with other identity variables. Here, there is only one significant value, which at the fifth column and its sign is negative. Hence, we can state that the households using Kurdish at home do not identify

themselves with their personal characteristics. Because there is no any other significance, we cannot make an argument for those variables.

Table 4.42

**Correlations**

		The households using Kurdish at home	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The households using Kurdish at home	PC	1	-,084	,061	-,164**	-,015
	Sig		,071	,195	,000	,753
	N	520	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	-,084	1	-,021	-,133**	-,108*
	Sig	,071		,654	,004	,020
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	,061	-,021	1	-,112*	-,091
	Sig	,195	,654		,016	,050
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	-,164**	-,133**	-,112*	1	-,127**
	Sig	,000	,004	,016		,006
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,015	-,108*	-,091	-,127**	1
	Sig	,753	,020	,050	,006	
	N	459	459	459	459	459

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlation of Identification-Kurdish Speaking Households at Home, B

When we test the same variables for the households who speak Turcoman at home, we can see that ethnicity, ethnicity as categorized variables are significantly correlated in negative direction with the households using Turcoman at home, (see the table 4.43). In other words, these households do not identify themselves with ethnic terms in contrast to those who speak Kurdish at home. Surprisingly, there is no significant relation with identification with Iraqiness, too. We cannot say that they are identifying themselves with Iraqiness; we cannot either argue that they do not identify themselves with Iraqiness.

Table 4.43

**Correlations**

		The Households using Turcoman at home for communication	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The Households using Turcoman at home for communication	PC Sig N	1  520	-,140**  459	-,114*  462	,034  459	,023  459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC Sig N	-,140**  459	1  459	,880**  458	,082  459	-,148**  459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	PC Sig N	-,114*  462	,880**  458	1  462	-,159**  458	-,166**  458
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC Sig N	,034  459	,082  459	-,159**  458	1  459	,077  459
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC Sig N	,023  459	-,148**  459	-,166**  458	,077  459	1  459

\*\* .Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* .Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation of Identification-Turcoman Speaking Households at Home, A**

As can be seen the table below, Table 4.44, there is a significant correlation between universal values and the households speaking Turcoman at home. Since Pearson Correlation value is positive, the correlation is positive, too. In other words, these households identify themselves with universal values. There is no any significant correlation for social and gender roles, profession and personality.

Table 4.44

## Correlations

		The Households using Turcoman at home for communication	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The Households using Turcoman at home for communication	PC Sig N	1  520	-,024  ,609 459	,037  ,424 459	-,086  ,067 459	,148**  ,001 459
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC Sig N	-,024  ,609 459	1  459	-,021  ,654 459	-,133**  ,004 459	-,108*  ,020 459
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC Sig N	,037  ,424 459	-,021  ,654 459	1  459	-,112*  ,016 459	-,091  ,050 459
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC Sig N	-,086  ,067 459	-,133**  ,004 459	-,112*  ,016 459	1  459	-,127**  ,006 459
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC Sig N	,148**  ,001 459	-,108*  ,020 459	-,091  ,050 459	-,127**  ,006 459	1  459

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

## Correlation of Identification-Turcoman Speaking Households at Home, B

Even though there is not much Arabs in our data, still enough respondents speak Arabic at home. Similar to the Arabs, some Assyrians and Caldeans and some Turcomans speak Arabic in their daily life, depending on their education background and the cities they came. (This information was gathered from observation in the field, but not tested.)

In the Table 4.45, the households who speak Arabic at home are tested with identity variables that are two ethnicity variables, religion and Iraqiness. According to this correlation test, there are significant correlations between the respondents who speak Arabic at home for communication and two ethnicity variables and identity of Iraqiness. Their Pearson Correlation signs for ethnicity variables are negative, but the sign for Iraqiness is positive. This means that while these households do not identify themselves with their ethnic backgrounds, but they do with Iraqiness.

Table 4.45

## Correlations

		The households using Arabic at home	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The households using Arabic at home	PC	1	-,165	-,145	,056	,232
	Sig		,000	,002	,230	,000
	N	520	459	462	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,165	1	,880	,082	-,148
	Sig	,000		,000	,080	,001
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different lev	PC	-,145	,880	1	-,159	-,166
	Sig	,002	,000		,001	,000
	N	462	458	462	458	458
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,056	,082	-,159	1	,077
	Sig	,230	,080	,001		,097
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with Iraqine	PC	,232	-,148	-,166	,077	1
	Sig	,000	,001	,000	,097	
	N	459	459	458	459	459

## Correlations of Identification-Arabic Speaking Households at Home, A

As we can see from the Table 4.45, there is just one significant correlation and its correlation sign is positive. Therefore, we can state that the households who speak Arabic at home identify themselves with their personal characteristics.

Table 4.46

## Correlations

		The Households using Arabic at home for communication	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The Households using Arabic at home for communication	PC	1	,007	-,042	,113*	-,003
	Sig		,886	,385	,018	,952
	N	493	435	435	435	435
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	,007	1	-,020	-,126**	-,106*
	Sig	,886		,678	,008	,026
	N	435	435	435	435	435
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,042	-,020	1	-,111*	-,094
	Sig	,385	,678		,021	,051
	N	435	435	435	435	435
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,113*	-,126**	-,111*	1	-,119*
	Sig	,018	,008	,021		,013
	N	435	435	435	435	435
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,003	-,106*	-,094	-,119*	1
	Sig	,952	,026	,051	,013	
	N	435	435	435	435	435

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## Correlations of Identification-Arabic Speaking Households at Home, B

When we look at the Caldeans for the same test, table 4.47, we see that there are significant differences in ethnic identity variables and Iraqiness variable. While the signs of ethnic variables are negative, the sign of Iraqiness is positive. This means that those who speak Caldean language at home do not identify themselves with ethnic terms; instead, they speak identity of Iraqiness.

Table 4.47

**Correlations**

		The households using Caldean at home	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness
The households using Caldean at home	PC	1	-,193**	-,143**	,025	,380**
	Sig		,000	,002	,596	,000
	N	520	459	462	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity	PC	-,193**	1	,880**	,082	-,148**
	Sig	,000		,000	,080	,001
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level	PC	-,143**	,880**	1	-,159**	-,166**
	Sig	,002	,000		,001	,000
	N	462	458	462	458	458
The person defining him/herself with his/her religion	PC	,025	,082	-,159**	1	,077
	Sig	,596	,080	,001		,097
	N	459	459	458	459	459
The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness	PC	,380**	-,148**	-,166**	,077	1
	Sig	,000	,001	,000	,097	
	N	459	459	458	459	459

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation of Identification-Caldean Speaking Households at Home, A**

If we look at the relation between the households speaking Caldean at home and other identity variables, (Table 4.48), we see that the significance level of social and gender roles and personality is smaller than 0.05 and Pearson Correlation value is positive. Hence, we can say that the households speaking Caldean at home prefer their social and gender roles and personal characteristics.

Table 4.48

		<b>Correlations</b>				
		The households using Caldean at home	The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	The person defining him/herself with universal values
The households using Caldean at home	PC	1	,104*	-,046	,142**	-,076
	Sig		,026	,326	,002	,102
	N	520	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role	PC	,104*	1	-,021	-,133**	-,108*
	Sig	,026		,654	,004	,020
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her profession	PC	-,046	-,021	1	-,112*	-,091
	Sig	,326	,654		,016	,050
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with his/her personality	PC	,142**	-,133**	-,112*	1	-,127**
	Sig	,002	,004	,016		,006
	N	459	459	459	459	459
The person defining him/herself with universal values	PC	-,076	-,108*	-,091	-,127**	1
	Sig	,102	,020	,050	,006	
	N	459	459	459	459	459

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

#### Correlations of Identification-Caldean Speaking Households at Home, B

##### 4.2.3.2 IDENTIFICATION-ETHNIC GROUPS

In the questionnaire, we had asked how questions related with identification to the respondents. The first one is Q39, which is 'How do you identify yourself in terms of ethnicity?' and the second one was the last open-ended question, which is 'How do you identify yourself?'.

In this section, we will try to compare these two identification variables each other. In doing so, we will try to understand how different ethnic groups identify themselves. In order to gain from the space we will present only the cross tables that its (Sig. 2-tailed) value is smaller than 0.05. In other words, we will present only the significant relations. In this section, we will analyze whether the variables independent to each other or not.

## Identification with Ethnicity

As can be seen from the Chi-Square Test table (Table 4.50) below, the relation between these two variables is significant. It means that identifying oneself differs according to ethnic groups. When we look at the cross table in order to observe more in detail, we see that the percentage of defining him/herself with ethnic terms was higher among the Kurds, 58.4 percent, 23.8 percent among the Turcomans. For the other groups these percentages are even fewer (Table 4.49).

Table 4.49

**Crosstab**

% within How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity

		The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurdish	41,6%	58,4%	100,0%
	Turcoman	76,2%	23,8%	100,0%
	Arabic	88,9%	11,1%	100,0%
	Caldean	82,9%	17,1%	100,0%
Total		47,9%	52,1%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation of Identification with Ethnicity-Ethnic Groups

Table 4.50

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	39,035 <sup>a</sup>	3	,000
Likelihood Ratio	41,647	3	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	30,508	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 2 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,31.

Chi-Square Test for Identification with Ethnicity-Ethnic Groups

The table below (4.51) indicates the test between the Kurds and the non-Kurds. Even if we categorize people who are not the Kurds, as if they constitute one unitary group, still the relation between the variables is significant. In other words, the Kurds and the non-Kurds differ in terms of self-identification with ethnicity.

Table 4.51

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	27,984 <sup>b</sup>	1	,000		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	26,462	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	29,171	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test				,000	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	27,919	1	,000		
N of Valid Cases	432				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24,88.

**Chi-Square Test for Identification with Ethnicity-the Kurds and the non-Kurds**

Table 4.52

**Crosstab**

			The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity		Total
			Not defining with	Defining with	
Kurdish-nonkurdish	Kurdish	Count	156	222	378
		% within Kurdish-nonkurdish	41,3%	58,7%	100,0%
	Non-Kurdish	Count	43	11	54
		% within Kurdish-nonkurdish	79,6%	20,4%	100,0%
Total		Count	199	233	432
		% within Kurdish-nonkurdish	46,1%	53,9%	100,0%

**Cross-tabulation for Identification with Ethnicity-the Kurds and the non-Kurds**

In the above table (Table 4.52), it is clearly seen that the difference is obvious when we compare the Kurds with the others, too and the relationship between the Kurds and Non-Kurds is significant (Table 4.51). When we look at the cross-table, we see that the Kurds are identifying themselves more (58.7percent) with ethnic terms; however, 20.4 percent of the others do that.

**Identification with Ethnicity Categorized**

This variable has been produced from the variable we have seen analyzed lately. Since some of the respondents identified themselves with their ethnic terms in different levels,

it was better to make distinction between the people who are giving relatively less importance to ethnicity and who feel themselves with strong nationalist emphasis. Therefore, by doing this, we tried to go deeper.

At this point, we also see that the relationship between the variables is significant (Table 4.54). When we look at the cross-table (Table 4.53) to examine it more in detail and consider the ‘No emphasis’ column, we see the differentiations between ethnic groups. The highest percentage in this column could be seen for the Arabs, 88.9 percent, and the least percentage is among the Kurds, 42 percent.

Table 4.53

**Crosstab**

% within How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity

		The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level				Total
		No emphasis	Little emphasis	In between	Strong emphasis	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurdish	42,0%	16,7%	37,9%	3,4%	100,0%
	Turcoman	76,2%	9,5%	14,3%		100,0%
	Arabic	88,9%		11,1%		100,0%
	Caldean	85,4%	2,4%		12,2%	100,0%
Total		48,5%	14,8%	32,8%	4,0%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Ethnicity at Different Level-Ethnic Groups

Table 4.54

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	56,496 <sup>a</sup>	9	,000
Likelihood Ratio	70,068	9	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	19,282	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	454		

a. 7 cells (43,8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,36.

Chi-Square Test for Identification with Ethnicity at Different Level-Ethnic Groups

Table 4.55

**Crosstab**

		The person defining him/herself with his/her ethnicity at different level				Total
		No emphasis	Little emphasis	In between	Strong emphasis	
Kurdish-nonkurdis h	Kurdish	41,7%	16,8%	38,1%	3,4%	100,0%
	Non-Kurdish	81,5%	5,6%	7,4%	5,6%	100,0%
Total		46,7%	15,4%	34,3%	3,7%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Ethnicity at Different Level-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

Table 4.56

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33,457 <sup>a</sup>	3	,000
Likelihood Ratio	37,311	3	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	21,625	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 1 cells (12,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,99.

Chi-Square Test for Identification with Ethnicity at Different Level-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

When we compare the Kurds with the others, we see that the difference is still significant, Table 4.56, which means, having looked at the Table 4.55, the non-Kurds is not emphasizing their ethnicity at different emphasis levels. Even if the Kurds identify themselves with ethnic terms, as can be seen from the previous sections, this identification is not so strong.

### Identification with Religion

There is not significant relation between the ethnic groups and identification with religious terms (Table 4.57), because the Pearson Chi-Square value is not below than 0.05. This means that ethnic groups in Erbil do not differ in terms of their identification in relation to the religion.

Table 4.57

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1,069 <sup>a</sup>	3	,785
Likelihood Ratio	1,019	3	,797
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,003	1	,317
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 2 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,90.

**Chi-Square Test for Identification with Religion-Ethnic Groups**

Even if we compare the Kurds with the non-Kurds, still there is not significant relation between them (Table 4.58). Clearly, the Kurds is not differing significantly from the other ethnic groups in terms of self-identification with religion.

Table 4.58

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,449 <sup>b</sup>	1	,503		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	,266	1	,606		
Likelihood Ratio	,438	1	,508		
Fisher's Exact Test				,536	,298
Linear-by-Linear Association	,448	1	,503		
N of Valid Cases	456				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15,83.

**Chi-Square Test for Identification with Religion-the Kurds and the non-Kurds**

Because this result may be perceived as unexpected, it is better to check it out, by performing the analysis with other variables. Since the most remarkable variable about that indicates who the Kurd is the language spoken at home, as indicated above in the analysis of 'the Households Using Kurdish at Home'-'Identity' variables, we will use cross-tabulation of the language spoken at home and identification with religion for investigation. As can be seen from the Table 4.60, there is not significant difference between the households who speak Kurdish at home and who do not, in terms of

identification with religion. In other words, we cannot claim that the people who speak Kurdish at home identify themselves with religious terminology. The table below, (Table 4.59), indicates observed percentages and numbers for this analysis.

Table 4.59

**The households using Kurdish at home \* The person defining him/herself with his/her religion Crosstabulation**

		The person defining him/herself with his/her religion		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
The households using Kurdish at home	Not Using Kurdish	52 76,5%	16 23,5%	68 100,0%
	Using Kurdish	311 79,5%	80 20,5%	391 100,0%
Total		363 79,1%	96 20,9%	459 100,0%

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Religion-Kurdish Speaking and not Speaking

Table 4.60

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,330 <sup>b</sup>	1	,566		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	,170	1	,680		
Likelihood Ratio	,322	1	,570		
Fisher's Exact Test				,628	,333
Linear-by-Linear Association	,329	1	,566		
N of Valid Cases	459				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14,22.

Chi-Square Test for Identification with Religion- Kurdish Speaking and not Speaking

It is better to check it out, by making the analysis with other variables. In the analysis above, we had executed the analysis without making the differentiation between Muslims and Christians; rather we have looked at the society as a whole. Nevertheless, it might be better to compare the Kurds with other Muslim ethnic groups in terms of identification with the religion. There may be religion differences in self-identification

with the religion and since the non-Kurds include Christians as well as Muslims and others, it is better to compare the Kurds with the Muslim non-Kurds. The table 4.61 shows the results of the Independent Samples T-test for comparison between the Kurds and a selected Muslim group, the Turcomans. T-test indicates that we cannot claim that there is a significant difference if we compare the means of religiosity levels of the Kurds and the Turcomans.

Table 4.61

		Independent Samples Test								
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	99% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
religiosity muslim	Equal variances assumed	1,657	,199	-1,168	447	,243	,8269009	70780117	-2,65789	1,004091
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,515	23,631	,143	,8269009	54593468	-2,35588	70208173

Independent Sample T-Test Religiosity Level-Muslim Kurds and Muslim Turcomans

Is this due to the differences between the religiosity levels of different ethnic groups? In order to find it out, we should also look at their religiosity levels. The correlation analysis between the Kurds and the non-Kurds points out that it is not possible to claim that there was a significant difference about the religiosity levels of the Kurds and the non-Kurds (Table 4.62). In simple terms, according to this result, the Kurds are neither more religious nor less religious than the others are.

Table 4.62

Correlations			
		kurdish-nonkurdish	religiosityboth
kurdish-nonkurdish	Pearson Correlation	1	-,002
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,957
	N	516	509
religiosityboth	Pearson Correlation	-,002	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,957	
	N	509	512

Correlation Test for Religiosity Level-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

Therefore, it is obvious that the Kurds do not identify themselves with religious terms and, as it is shown above, this is not because the Kurds are less religious than other Muslims are or than Christians are. Nevertheless, as field observations and deep interviews also supported the Kurds are religious people at least, as their neighbors, yet the religion, here Islam, do not reflect itself in identification of the Kurds.

### Identification with Iraqiness

The Chi-Square test table below (Table 4.63) indicates that there is a significant relation between ethnic groups and Iraqi identity. The highest percentage of identification with Iraqiness can be seen among the Caldeans and the least among Kurds. It is surprising to see that Caldeans define themselves with Iraq more than Arabs do (Table 4.64).

Table 4.63

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	60,560 <sup>a</sup>	3	,000
Likelihood Ratio	34,007	3	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	60,356	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 3 cells (37,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,32.

### Chi-Square Test for Identification with Iraqiness-Ethnic groups

Table 4.64

**Crosstab**

% within How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity

		The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurdish	98,9%	1,1%	100,0%
	Turcoman	95,2%	4,8%	100,0%
	Arabic	88,9%	11,1%	100,0%
	Caldean	75,6%	24,4%	100,0%
Total		96,5%	3,5%	100,0%

### Cross-tabulation for Identification with Iraqiness-Ethnic groups

The difference between the Kurds and the others as a whole is also significant (Table 4.65). In other words while the others prefer more to identify themselves with Iraqiness, the Kurds do not. The relatively high percentage for not defining with Iraqiness even for the non-Kurds is remarkable (Table 4.66).

Table 4.65

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33,110 <sup>b</sup>	1	,000		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	28,212	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	20,017	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test				,000	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	33,034	1	,000		
N of Valid Cases	432				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 1 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,50.

Chi-Square Test for Identification with Iraqiness-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

Table 4.66

**Crosstab**

		The person defining him/herself with Iraqiness		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
Kurdish-nonkurdish	Kurdish	98,9%	1,1%	100,0%
	Non-Kurdish	85,2%	14,8%	100,0%
Total		97,2%	2,8%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Iraqiness-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

### Identification with Social and Gender Roles

As can be seen from the Chi- Square Test table below (Table 4.68), the relation between variables is significant. The Table 4.67 indicates that while Arabs define themselves with social and gender roles more than the other groups, the Kurds are the least in number among who define themselves with social gender identification terms. In other words, the Kurds do not identify themselves with their gender roles significantly different from the non-Kurds.

Table 4.67

**Crosstab**

% within How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity

		The person defining him/herself with his/her gender role		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurdish	93,4%	6,6%	100,0%
	Turcoman	85,7%	14,3%	100,0%
	Arabic	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%
	Caldean	80,5%	19,5%	100,0%
Total		91,4%	8,6%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Social and Gender Roles-Ethnic Groups

Table 4.68

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15,973 <sup>a</sup>	3	,001
Likelihood Ratio	11,925	3	,008
Linear-by-Linear Association	10,350	1	,001
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 3 cells (37,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,78.

Cross-tabulation for Identification with Iraqiness-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

**Identification with Professions**

As can be seen from the Chi-Square test, Table 4.69, there is not any significant differences between ethnic groups. In other words, the ethnic groups in Erbil do not differ in terms of self-identification with their professions.

Table 4.69

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,058 <sup>a</sup>	3	,255
Likelihood Ratio	7,219	3	,065
Linear-by-Linear Association	3,271	1	,070
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 3 cells (37,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,58.

**Chi-Square Test for Identification with Profession-Ethnic Groups**

**Identification with Personality**

Table 4.70

**Crosstab**

% within How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity

		The person defining him/herself with his/her personality		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
How do you define your self in terms of ethnicity	Kurdish	86,6%	13,4%	100,0%
	Turcoman	95,2%	4,8%	100,0%
	Arabic	77,8%	22,2%	100,0%
	Caldean	68,3%	31,7%	100,0%
Total		85,1%	14,9%	100,0%

**Cross-tabulation for Identification with Personality-Ethnic Groups**

Table 4.71

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,901 <sup>a</sup>	3	,008
Likelihood Ratio	10,547	3	,014
Linear-by-Linear Association	9,459	1	,002
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 2 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,34.

**Chi-Square Test for Identification with Personality-Ethnic Groups**

When we look at the test table above, Table 4.71, we see that there is a significant relation between the variables. In other words, as the table 4.70 indicated, the Turcoman people have the least percentage with 4.8 percent in identifying themselves with their personal characteristics among the other ethnic groups.

### Identification with Universal Values

As can be seen from the Chi-Square Test table, there is no any significant relation among the ethnic groups in identification with universal values (Table 4.72). In other words, the ethnic groups in Erbil do not differ in terms of identifying themselves with universal values. This does not change when we make a comparison between the Kurds and the non-Kurds, either. (Table, 4.73)

Table 4.72

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6,740 <sup>a</sup>	3	,081
Likelihood Ratio	7,042	3	,071
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,155	1	,142
N of Valid Cases	451		

a. 3 cells (37,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,96.

### Chi-Square Test for Identification with Universal Values-Ethnic Groups

Table 4.73

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,014 <sup>b</sup>	1	,906		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	,000	1	1,000		
Likelihood Ratio	,014	1	,907		
Fisher's Exact Test				,817	,528
Linear-by-Linear Association	,014	1	,906		
N of Valid Cases	432				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,75.

### Chi-Square Test for Identification with Universal Values-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

### Identification with Tribe or Lineage

As can be seen from the Table 4.75, the Kurds significantly differ from the non-Kurds in terms of having of a tribal or a lineage relation, because Sig. value is smaller than 0.05. When we look at the Table 4.74, we see that 80.6 percent of the Kurds state that they have tribal ties, nearly half of the non-Kurds state so. Therefore, it seems that the Kurds are more feudal than the non-Kurds are. However, when we examine the relation between the tribal ties with the self-identification, then we see that the Kurds do not differ significantly in self-identification with tribe or lineage from the non-Kurds (Table, 4.77). The Table 4.76 shows that almost none of the Kurds (99.3 percent) identify themselves with their tribal relations; on the other hand, the amount of the non-Kurds who do not identify themselves with tribal connections is slightly even lower (98.8) than the Kurds.

Table 4.74

**kurdish-nonkurdish \* Are you connected with any tribe/lineage**  
**Crosstabulation**

		Are you connected with any tribe/lineage		Total
		Yes	No	
kurdish-nonkurdish	Kurdish	80,6%	19,4%	100,0%
	Non-Kurdish	55,7%	44,3%	100,0%
Total		76,7%	23,3%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation of Connection with a Tribe/Lineage-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

Table 4.75

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23,104 <sup>b</sup>	1	,000		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	21,733	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	20,570	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test				,000	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	23,058	1	,000		
N of Valid Cases	511				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18,40.

Chi-Square Test for Connection with a Tribe/Lineage-the Kurds and the non-Kurds  
Table 4.76

**kurdish-nonkurdish \* The person defining him/herself with his/her tribe  
Crosstabulation**

		The person defining him/herself with his/her tribe		Total
		Not defining with	Defining with	
kurdish-nonkurdish	Kurdish	99,3%	,7%	100,0%
	Non-Kurdish	98,8%	1,2%	100,0%
Total		99,2%	,8%	100,0%

Cross-tabulation of Identification with Tribe/Lineage-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

Table 4.77

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,264 <sup>b</sup>	1	,608		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	,000	1	1,000		
Likelihood Ratio	,231	1	,631		
Fisher's Exact Test				,496	,496
Linear-by-Linear Association	,263	1	,608		
N of Valid Cases	516				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 2 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,63.

Chi-Square of Identification with Tribe/Lineage-the Kurds and the non-Kurds

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The results of the research clearly present the developments in Northern Iraq in terms of identity. Although the identity question was compared and tested with multiple variables in the questionnaire, only the variables concerning the language differed significantly with ethnic identity variables for the Kurds. There is a transition to the Kurdish medium schools for the Kurds when we make cross-comparison between the generations; however, this transition cannot be visible for the non-Kurds for their own language. Arabic is losing its importance in favor of Kurdish among the Kurds. This interpretation is noticeable not only for the Kurds but also for the non-Kurd Muslims, especially Turcoman and in a less degree Arabs. Affinity of Christians for attending Arabic medium schools is also remarkable.

It is obvious that identification with the country, Iraq, is diminishing among the Kurds, and even among the non-Kurds who attended to the Kurdish medium schools. This may not be only related with language of instruction at schools, although it may not be valid to make interpretations on it, yet, the negative correlation between attending to Kurdish medium schools and identification with Iraqiness is clear.

The people who attended the schools where the language of instruction is Turkish or Arabic do not identify themselves with ethnic terms. While people who have attended the Turkish medium schools prefer identifying themselves with more universal values, others who have attended Arabic medium schools prefer identifying themselves with Iraqiness and their professions.

The most remarkable result can be seen in comparison between the variable of the language spoken at home and identity variables. The people who speak Kurdish at home identify themselves with ethnic terms, but do not with Iraqiness or personalities. On the

other hand, the people who speak Turcoman at home identify with universal values; the people who speak Arabic at home identify themselves with Iraqiness. These two groups do not identify themselves with ethnic terms. Remarkably, again, Christian people identify themselves with Iraqiness; significantly differ from all of the groups.

Perception of direct connection between Kurdish identity and Kurdish language is not a contemporary phenomenon for the Kurds. Even medieval poets Melayê Ciziri and Ahmadê Khanê established such a connection between the language and the identity. Not only common people who live in Erbil but also Kurdish intellectuals in history have searched the identity in Kurdish language. This perception does not belong to only the Kurds themselves, but also the rulers of the territories inhabited by the Kurds. During the emergence of the nationalism in Iraq, elimination attempts on Kurdish language in public space were caused due to such perception on Kurdish language.

The language spoken at home is a marker of the identity for the Kurds rather than the language spoken at bazaar or schools or courts. The peculiarity of the language spoken at home in identity formation process is related with that private nature of home is open places for ideological transitions, where the state cannot control. In addition, because people were carrying the stories, myths, memories, poems and all cultural and religious baggage with their language spoken at home where state and social control is impossible.

Consequently, the Kurds identify themselves with ethnic terms considerably different from other ethnic groups; however, identification with religion does not differ according to the ethnic groups. When we compare the Kurds with the non-Kurds, still we do not see any change. Clearly, the role of religion is diminishing among the Kurds comparing to the ethnicity. When we think of religious affiliation in the first Kurdish movements at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this means that Kurdish society became more secular in the process of nationalization. However, a century ago this was not the case. While, Arabs, Turks and others in the Middle East were facing nationalization process, the Kurds, on the other hand, were fighting for the caliphate and the Ottoman Millet system that was collapsed.

In the Ottoman period, for common Kurds, being from a smaller community such as a certain tribe or a tariqat was fulfilling the identity need. It had more meaning than being Kurd. Because of that, the anxiety of being ruled by non-Muslim people, like the Armenians in the Eastern Anatolia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century triggered the Kurdish revolts that were actually a series of attacks against ‘infidels’ and/or ‘heretics’. The people who were attacked during these revolts were not the people who were not Kurds, but the non-sunni or the non-Muslim people that thought to be to have a potential that could be used by Russia or Western states against Muslim society.

That the religion was the core issue of Kurdish identity prevented in development and empowerment of Kurdish nationalism in these countries. When implicit agreement between the Caliphate and his Kurdish subjects disappeared due to abolishment of the Caliphate and secularist policy in these states, implementation of this policy faced the resistance from the Kurds. When the hopes to re-realization of this old agreement by the Kurds ended, there opened the way for emergence of Kurdish nationalist ideologies and movements. Indeed, there was already a Kurdish nationalism among the limited number of Kurdish intellectuals, yet, it was not wide spread among the common people. In other words, disappearance of religious notion in political space that prevents expansion of Kurdish nationalism brought about emergence of Kurdish nationalism as a social phenomenon. Kurdish nationalism did not emerge as a nationalist movement in the Ottoman era, yet it emerged as a response to collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Religious affiliations were quite important than nationalist affiliation among the Kurds. For instance, they did not call Yezidi people as Kurds even if they are Kurds. Because the idea of Islam was more important than the idea of the Kurdish nation, they move ahead when they thought that the religion needs them. Their personal placement according to their belief was so important in their personality that religious affiliations were similar to the most nationalist movements. In other words, Kurdish movements were not nationalist but their way of behaving, or their way of organizing and going on revolts were quite similar to nationalist mode. That is why, whereas some authors claimed these movements were nationalist, some others did not. The first Kurdish movements, which are mentioned by some authors as nationalist movements in the text,

like Sheikh Ubaydullah's or Sheikh Mahmud Berzinji's for instance, should be considered in this sense.

Because the people that Kurds had to perceive as 'the others' or 'them' in order to be nationalist were Muslim people like themselves, Kurdish nationalist movement could not take any important step in the 19<sup>th</sup> or the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Since majority of the two nations who surround the Kurds are not only Muslim but also Sunni like the Kurds, Kurdish nationalism could not be wide spread among the Kurds before collapse of the Ottomans. Even if Kurdish is a West Iranian language, the other nations who surround the Kurds, Persians and Azeris, are Shiite. Therefore, the differences in religious sects preserved Kurdish identity there. For instance, because Kurdish people from Kermanshah/Bakhtaran region were Shiites, they were not involved in Kurdish Movements in Iran. On the other hand, the difference in sect prevented assimilation policies in Sunni Kurdish regions and opened way for the emergence of the Mahabat Kurdish Republic. Kurds of Mahabat region in Iran had still memories of the old Ottoman and Safavids wars; these memories were one of the factors that determine the identity of Kurds. It is not surprising to see the emergence of this Kurdish state in Sunni region in North West Iran, because the region was both Sunni and Kurmanji speaking area. On the other hand, Kurds in Kermanshah region is both Shiite and using South Kurdish Dialects.

In Iraq, on the other hand, the 'other' was the British Power who had no legitimacy in the eye of the Muslim Kurds. Therefore, it was easy to construct a Kurdish identity on British otherness. Since Britain was representing the infidel/non-Muslim hegemony, uprisings among the Kurds in Iraq were more legitimate when compared to revolts in Turkey.

Consequently, coming back to the results of the research, we obviously see that there is no any significance of the religion with regard to the identity of the Kurds. The observation and claims about identification of the Kurds with the religion could not be approved in this field research. The Kurds do not differ in terms of their religiosity levels from neither the Turcomans nor the Arabs. They do not differ from the Assyrian-Caldean Christian community in Erbil, either.

Because this result is quite in opposition to what is written about the Kurds; extra analyses were executed but the results did not change. Because the information in the literature is mostly based on the historical records, not on the field researches, these results are not actually surprising. As the other societies faced with secularization, the Kurds are facing the secularization process due to the nationalism. Even if this secularization process is late for the Kurds compared to the Arabs, Azeris, Turks and Persians, the Kurds are facing the same development. This secularization is not a profane development, yet it is exclusion of the religion in the political interaction with the other Muslim groups as well as the Christians and Yezidis.

As can be seen from the research the importance of tariqats cannot be overemphasized in Kurdish identity. Even if it needs more anthropological research to make such an argument, still, the connection to the tariqats seems insignificant. Even if the religion still has a crucial role among the Kurds, it is not possible to claim that tariqats are preserving their fundamental role in Kurdish social or political life. Based on the observation in the field, we can claim that the role of the tariqats in Kurdish political life has been diminished. There is a tendency to Islamism in Northern Iraq; yet, this new wave of Islamism is not the simple continuation of old mystic religious understanding of tariqats, rather to a certain extent it is a mixture of modern political Islamism that inspired from Middle Eastern textual fundamentalism and moderate perception of cultural and traditional Islamism. The role of the religion, depending on the observations in the field again, should be examined under the heading of the political Islam, as it is the case in other Muslim Societies. However, the security tension in Iraq makes it impossible to do it in the field.

Tribal understanding of modern people also made some confusion. Usually, we as modern people think that tribes were composed of the same familial ancestry in the history. However, the Turcomans and the Kurds had been so mixed each other that there were people in the same tribe who are using both Turcoman and Kurdish languages at the same time. This case was valid for the relations between the Kurds and the Arabs, too. Because, tribe was a political entity and had more meaning than familial meaning, language was not a tool for identification of people. Since either all of the people were

using the same language in the same environment, or were using more than one language at the same time, or even Kurdish speaking people together with Turcomani speaking people were fighting against Kurdish or Turkish speaking people, language itself was not defining people. It was possible to observe existence of Kurdish, Turcomani or Arabic speaking people at the same time in the same tribe.

According to the research conducted in Erbil indicated that even though tribal relations are continuing among the Kurds, yet, it is losing its political meaning that Bruinessen and some other authors mentioned above had stated for the Kurds for the 19th and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. It is clear that Kurdish nationalism together with the other developments in the region is minimizing the role of the tribe among the Kurds. The nation or ethnicity is more important than the tribal or lineal relations or ties.

Assimilation policies of the colonialist British Rulers and nationalist Arab politicians in Iraq, was based on the expectation of disappearance of usage of Kurdish in social life. To have a unified society and a unitary state, assimilation policy was perceived as essential by these states. This was not only due to colonialist or nationalist reflection of the hegemonic states, but also due to the continuous potential of a Kurdish revolt, or fear of Kurds to be used and agitated against 'the nation state'. This nationalist reflection and fear caused to need repression of ethnic identities of the Kurds. Because of that, assimilation or repression of the Kurds, and inevitably prohibition of Kurdish language, was seen as legitimate by the rulers. However, this prohibition of Kurdish language itself was created the results that these states did not want to face. Once these states wanted to repress Kurdish identity by banning Kurdish language, language itself became core interests of the Kurdish nationalists or core issue of the Kurdish nationalism.

Consequently, the prohibition of the language and Kurdish resistance against the state cannot explain all of the issues happened in Northern Iraq; yet, it is obvious that the ethnic identity of the Kurds in Erbil is based on the Kurdish language. The role of the religion, specifically the role of Sufism and *Shafi'ite*, in Kurdish identity has been weakening because of secular structure of politics in Iraq. Secular political implementations of nationalist Arab policy in Iraq appeared in the mirror as a secular

Kurdish nationalist reflection in Northern Iraq. Kurdish swords turned into Kurdish guns, due to not their devotion to Islam but their Kurdishness.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN ERBIL THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE RESEARCH GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATIONS

- 1) Marital status
  - a) Married
  - b) Single
  - c) Widow
  - d) Divorced
  - e) Separated
- 2) How many people are there living in your house now? .....
- 3) How many children do you have? .....
- 4) What is your sex?
  - a) Male
  - b) Female
- 5) Table of Household Characteristics

	Age	Birth Place	Education Level 1-Illiterate 2-Literate without sch. 3-Primary 4-Secondary 5-High 6-University	Education Language1 1-Kurd. 2-Turco. 3-Arab. 4-Turk. 5-Eng. 6-Other	Education Language2 1-Kurd. 2-Turco. 3-Arab. 4-Turk. 5-Eng. 6-Other	Education Language3 1-Kurd. 2-Turco. 3-Arab. 4-Turk. 5-Eng. 6-Other
Husband						
Wife						
The biggest child						
The smallest child attending school						

### INCOME

- 6) What was/is your father's profession? .....
- 7) What is your profession? .....
- 8) Do you work?
  - a) Yes
  - b) No
- 9) Where do you work? .....
- 10) What is your position in your work place? .....

- 11) In which sector do you work?  
 a) Agriculture                      b) Official                      c) Industry  
 d) Service                              e) Trade                      f) other please define.....
- 12) What is your monthly income on average from this job? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar.
- 13) Do you have any additional income except from this job?  
 a) Yes                                      b) No
- 14) If yes, what are them?  
 a).....                                      b).....
- 15) How much do you earn monthly on average from these sources? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar
- 16) Considering all members of your family, what is total income of your household members for a month? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar
- 17) Have you ever worked with foreign people?  
 a) Yes                                      b) No
- 18) From which countries are they? (Two answers possible)  
 a).....                                      b).....
- 19) Do you think that the languages that you can speak have positive effect when you were accepted to this job?  
 a) Yes                                      b) No

#### **LIVING CONDITIONS**

- 20) Who is the owner of this house?  
 a) Husband                              b) Other member of the household  
 c) Tenant (paying rent)              d) Other, please define.....
- 21) What is the market price for this house? .....dollar
- 22) (If rent is paid), how much do you pay in rent per month? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar
- 23) (If rent is not paid), how much would you have to pay to rent a house like this in this neighborhood? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar
- 24) How many hours on average in a day does your house benefit from the government water system? .....hours per day
- 25) How many hours on average in a day does your house receive from government electricity? .....hours per day
- 26) How many hours on average in a day does your house receive from cooperative electricity? .....hours per day
- 27) Do you have private generator?  
 a) Yes                                      b) No
- 28) If yes, what is your total expenditure for a month for this generator? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar
- 29) Do you have a car?  
 a) Yes                                      b) No
- 30) What is the market price for this car? .....dollar
- 31) What is your total expenditure for a month for your car? ..... Dollar or .....Dinar












APPENDIX B



**HIC**  
 UNITED NATIONS  
 HABITAT  
 International Geographical Centre - North  
 1002  
 Geneva 14 CH

**Erbil City Center Zones,  
 and Quarters Coding**

HIC Map Reference 142

The data source was provided from local authorities, the duplication of the quarter's name is normal due to the local authorities division of the quarters.

Scale: 1:50,000  
 Date: 2011

Legend:  
 - Street  
 - Study Area  
 - SWIS City Zone  
 - NE City Area

This map was produced as a reference aid only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Erbil City Center Coding**

Number	Quarter	Quarter
CE01	Chalk	Postboxes
NE01	Arbilan, A.C. Barisana	Murshaban
NE02	Arbilan, A.C. Barisana	Murshaban
NE03	South Valley, Baris	SK Baris
NE04	Shukh	Kachalabul
NE05	Shukh	Shukh
NE06	Shukh	Shukh
NE07	Shukh	Shukh
NE08	Shukh	Shukh
NE09	Shukh	Shukh
NE10	Shukh	Shukh
NE11	Shukh	Shukh
NE12	Shukh	Shukh
NE13	Shukh	Shukh
NE14	Shukh	Shukh
NE15	Shukh	Shukh
NE16	Shukh	Shukh
NE17	Shukh	Shukh
NE18	Shukh	Shukh
NE19	Shukh	Shukh
NE20	Shukh	Shukh
NE21	Shukh	Shukh
NE22	Shukh	Shukh
NE23	Shukh	Shukh
NE24	Shukh	Shukh
NE25	Shukh	Shukh
NE26	Shukh	Shukh
NE27	Shukh	Shukh
NE28	Shukh	Shukh
NE29	Shukh	Shukh
NE30	Shukh	Shukh
NE31	Shukh	Shukh
NE32	Shukh	Shukh
NE33	Shukh	Shukh
NE34	Shukh	Shukh
NE35	Shukh	Shukh
NE36	Shukh	Shukh
NE37	Shukh	Shukh
NE38	Shukh	Shukh
NE39	Shukh	Shukh
NE40	Shukh	Shukh
NE41	Shukh	Shukh
NE42	Shukh	Shukh
NE43	Shukh	Shukh
NE44	Shukh	Shukh
NE45	Shukh	Shukh
NE46	Shukh	Shukh
NE47	Shukh	Shukh
NE48	Shukh	Shukh
NE49	Shukh	Shukh
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NE68	Shukh	Shukh
NE69	Shukh	Shukh
NE70	Shukh	Shukh
NE71	Shukh	Shukh
NE72	Shukh	Shukh
NE73	Shukh	Shukh
NE74	Shukh	Shukh
NE75	Shukh	Shukh
NE76	Shukh	Shukh
NE77	Shukh	Shukh
NE78	Shukh	Shukh
NE79	Shukh	Shukh
NE80	Shukh	Shukh
NE81	Shukh	Shukh
NE82	Shukh	Shukh
NE83	Shukh	Shukh
NE84	Shukh	Shukh
NE85	Shukh	Shukh
NE86	Shukh	Shukh
NE87	Shukh	Shukh
NE88	Shukh	Shukh
NE89	Shukh	Shukh
NE90	Shukh	Shukh
NE91	Shukh	Shukh
NE92	Shukh	Shukh
NE93	Shukh	Shukh
NE94	Shukh	Shukh
NE95	Shukh	Shukh
NE96	Shukh	Shukh
NE97	Shukh	Shukh
NE98	Shukh	Shukh
NE99	Shukh	Shukh
NE100	Shukh	Shukh