

**HEGEL AND MARX ON ALIENATION**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**SEVGİ DOĞAN**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

**FEBRUARY 2008**

Approval of the Graduate School of (Name of the Graduate School)

---

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

---

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts of Philosophy.

---

Assist. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assist. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan (METU, PHIL)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman (METU, PHIL)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Çetin Türkyılmaz (Hacettepe U., PHIL)

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name: Sevgi Dođan

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### HEGEL AND MARX ON ALIENATION

Doğan, Sevgi

M.A., Department of Philosophy  
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Barış Parkan

February 2008, 139 pages

Is alienation a process of self-discovery or is it a loss of reality? The subject of this thesis is how alienation is discussed in Hegel and Marx's philosophies in terms of this question. In Hegel's philosophy, alienation is part of the *process* of self-creativity and self-discovery. For Marx, it is the *result* of the capitalist mode of production. While Hegel explains the existence of the human being through focusing on its ontological dimension, Marx evaluates the term alienation in terms of the economic dimension which he claims that Hegel ignores. The understanding of these philosophers about how they make understandable the process, circumstances and results of alienation is significant for the subject of this thesis. The thesis concludes that, Marx, in spite of his criticisms of Hegel is closer to Hegel than is thought. An additional claim is that Marx's criticisms of Hegel complement Hegel's philosophy rather than overcoming it. The supporting analysis of the thesis is the discussion of whether Marx's criticisms related to Hegel's understanding of alienation as abstract, mystifying, and nonsense are right or wrong. Hegel's conception of alienation has thus been examined by way of Marx's criticisms.

Keywords: Alienation, Hegel, Marx, dialectic, *Geist*, labour, objectification, externalization, Feuerbach.

## ÖZ

Hegel ve Marx'ta Yabancılaşma

Dođan, Sevgi

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Barış Parkan

Şubat 2008, 139 sayfa

Yabancılaşma kendini keşfetme süreci midir yoksa gerçekliđin bir yitimi midir? Bu soru etrafında bu tezde işlenecek konu yabancılaşmanın Hegel ve Marx'ın felsefelerinde nasıl algılandığıdır. Hegel felsefesinde yabancılaşma kendini yaratma ve keşfetme *sürecidir*. Marx için ise yabancılaşma kapitalist tarzı üretim biçiminin bir *sonucudur*. Hegel insanın varoluşunu ontolojik boyutunu gözeterek serimlemeye çalışırken, Marx, yabancılaşma kavramına Hegel'in göremediğini düşündüğü ekonomik boyutuyla başka bir yerden bakar. Bu filozofların yabancılaşmanın sürecini, koşullarını ve sonucunu nasıl anlamlandırmaya çalıştıkları tezin konusu açısından önemlidir. Dolayısıyla tezin asıl savı, Marx'ın bütün eleştirilerine rağmen Hegel'e tahmin edilenden daha yakın olduğudur. Aynı zamanda diđer savım ise Marx'ın eleştirilerinin Hegel'i aşmak yerine onu tamamladığıdır. Marx'ın Hegel'in yabancılaşma anlayışına dair, bu anlayışın soyut, mistik ve anlaşılmaz olduğu yönündeki eleştirilerinin doğruluğunun ya da yanlışlığının ortaya koyulması savın destekleyici çözümdür. Bundan dolayı Hegel'in yabancılaşma kavramı Marx'ın eleştirileri üzerinden anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yabancılaşma, Hegel, Marx, diyalektik, *Geist* (Tin), emek, nesneleşme, dışavurum (dışlaşma), Feuerbach

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like particularly to thank my supervisor Assist. Prof. Baris Parkan for her professional guidance, her encouragements and insight throughout the research. Also I am deeply indebted to her for her psychological support. I also would like to thank Assist. Prof. Elif Çırakman and Assist. Prof. Çetin Türkyılmaz, who are the members of the jury, for their guidance, advice, and criticisms. Besides I am also very grateful to Assist. Prof. Paul McLaughlin who taught me how to read and evaluate Marx in standing critiques viewpoint. I would like to thank Assist Prof. Enver Orman for his advice and comments about the Hegel Chapter.

I would like to thank many people who supported me both mentally and emotionally. Here, my sincere thanks are to my family (in particular to my sister and brother) who believed in and encouraged me to conclude this study and to my friends especially to Yasemin Makbule Erdoğan and Zeliha Burcu Yılmaz whose company and continuous support is unforgettable. Here also I would like to thank Yasemin Sancar, Razan Orpak and Şafak Tan for their psychological support.

**To my parents...**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. HEGEL ON ALIENATION.....	16
2.1 Introduction.....	16
2.2 <i>Geist</i> .....	17
2.2.1 Dialectic: the movement of <i>Geist</i> .....	20
2.2.1.1 History of dialectic.....	21
2.2.1.2 Dialectic in Hegel.....	24
2.2.1.3 Dialectic as a method.....	29
2.2.1.3.1 Dialectic in the <i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i> .....	31
2.2.2 Actualization of <i>Geist</i> .....	33
2.2.3 <i>Geist</i> as mind: the relation of <i>Geist</i> to the transcendental I....	37
2.2.3.1 Hegel's departure from the transcendental idealism.....	44
2.2.4 <i>Geist</i> as spirit: the living <i>Geist</i> .....	48



2.2.4.1 Desire.....	49
2.2.4.2 Recognition.....	49
2.2.4.3 Work or labour.....	51
2.2.4.4 Intersubjectivity.....	55
2.3 Alienation in Social substance.....	58
2.4 The meaning of alienation in the <i>Phenomenology</i> .....	62
2.5 Overcoming alienation: being at home.....	63
3. MARX ON ALIENATION.....	72
3.1 Introduction.....	72
3.2 Marx and the Young Hegelian.....	74
3.2.1 Feuerbach.....	79
3.2.2 Marx's positive and negative critique of Feuerbach.....	83
3.2.3 Marx's idea on Religious and political Alienation.....	88
3.3 Marx's relation to Hegel.....	89
3.3.1 Labour or work.....	90
3.3.2 Ontological: the difference between Hegel and Marx.....	93
3.3.2.1 Inversion of Hegel.....	93
3.3.2.2 Marx's distinction between objectification and alienation.....	96
3.4 Economical critique of Marx.....	100
3.4.1 Alienation from the product of labour.....	103

3.4.2 Alienation from the labour process.....	106
3.4.3 Alienation from human nature, from species being.....	107
3.4.3.1 Arendt's criticism of Marx .....	110
3.4.3.2 Sayers on Marx.....	111
3.4.4 Alienation from fellow human beings.....	113
3.5 Marx's relation to Hegel reconsidered: overcoming alienation and feeling at home.....	114
4. EVALUATION.....	120
REFERENCES.....	133

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Alienation is a central concept in contemporary thought about the human being and her/his place in the world. After the works of Hegel and Marx, the concept of alienation has occupied a significant place in theology, sociology, philosophy, literature and psychology. When we glance at the vast body of literature about the subject, we notice that in various ways novels, poetry, drama, art, theology and philosophy are centrally interested on alienation. The concept of alienation is usually associated with Karl Marx and his critique of capitalism. It is also held by many to be prominent only in early Marx's writings when he was under the influence of Hegel. Therefore, it is also held to be a somewhat mystical concept because of its Hegelian roots which the later Marx is said to have dissociated himself from.

The topic of this thesis is Hegel's account of alienation and its effects on Marx's philosophy. The main problem of my thesis is to understand exactly what Hegel meant by 'alienation,' but the best way to bring out what is distinctive in Hegel's approach is to deal with Marx's approach to alienation. Thus my purpose is to expound the concept of alienation in terms of its importance for the philosophy of

Hegel, what Marx understood from Hegel's account of alienation, how he criticized it and whether his criticisms were right.

To this end, I will first examine the concept of alienation in Hegel's writings (such as *Phenomenology of Spirit*, etc.). In so doing, I will pay close attention to identifying the specific use of terminology in the text, so that I can later be able to clarify exactly where and how Marx's usage of this term is influenced by and differs from Hegel's philosophy. Then I will turn Marx's criticism of Hegel (especially in the *1844 Manuscripts*). While I attempt to explore and evaluate some factors shaping the issue of this thesis, there are some significant questions which arise:

- (1) Is alienation a mystifying concept?
- (2) How much is Marx in fact influenced by Hegel?
- (3) How different is Marx's conception of alienation from Hegel? Can the concept of alienation in Marx be understood independently of certain basic Hegelian ideas?

The term "alienation" (estrangement) has many different meanings in everyday life, in social science, and in philosophy. The dictionary definition of 'alienation' is "the act, or result of the act, through which something, or somebody, becomes alien to something, or somebody, else."<sup>1</sup> In everyday usage, 'alienation' often means "turning away or keeping away from former friends or associates."<sup>2</sup> In law, it usually refers to "the transfer of property from one person to other, either by sale or as a gift." In contemporary psychology and sociology, it is often used to name "an

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards, New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press Vol.1, 1967, p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.

individual's feeling of alienness toward society, nature, other people, or herself."<sup>3</sup> For sociologists and philosophers such as Marx, alienation is the same as reification: "the act, or result of the act of transforming human properties, relations, and actions into properties and actions of things which are independent of man and which govern his life."<sup>4</sup> For other philosophers such as Hegel, "alienation"<sup>5</sup> means "self-alienation" (self-estrangement): "the process, or result of process, by which a "self" (God or man) through itself that is through its own action becomes alien to itself that is to its own nature"<sup>6</sup>.

According to Lukacs, alienation is used as a loss of freedom in society by social contract and also it refers to alienation in economic relations. Lukacs defines the term alienation in his study *Young Hegel* as follows:

In themselves there is nothing novel about the terms *Entausserung* and *Entfremdung*. They are simply German translations of the English word 'alienation'. This was used in works on economic theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer the loss of an aboriginal freedom, the handing-over or alienation of freedom to the society which came into being as a result of a social contract.<sup>7</sup>

In contemporary times, alienation defines our social reality and our place in the world.

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> It has also the same meaning with objectification and externalization which is explained in Chapter II.

<sup>6</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards, New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press Vol.1, 1967, p. 78.

We can see manifestations of alienation itself in multiple “disorders such as loss of self, anxiety states, anomie, depersonalization, rootlessness, and meaninglessness, isolation, and lack of community”<sup>8</sup>. The reason why these disorders arise is due to alienation and why we feel as an alien in relation to everything because we lose our relationships with nature, past, society, its institutions and especially relation to ourselves. Thus, we are alienated from nature, our past, God, society and its institutions, work, friends and neighbours, values, our emotions, and the environment as Murchland pointed out. According to Bernard Murchland, “This condition is obvious in segments of our society—among the poor, blacks, women, students, individuals, works, the mentally ill, and dope addicts, etc.”<sup>9</sup> Bernard Murchland adds that although it can be said that in some parts of society it is less obvious, the destructive consequences of alienation which separates human beings from their own action, nature, society and other human beings equally effect all levels of society.

Alienation shows a separation between parts or the whole of personality and certain aspects of the world of experience. The separation can be seen between the self and aspects of the self that have become separated and placed over against the self (such as alienated labour), or the separation of the self within the self (e.g., the above-mentioned disorders).

In addition to philosophy, there are several sources for the idea of alienation in sociology, psychology and literature. Marx is main source in social science and it

---

<sup>7</sup>George Lukacs, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, Merlin Press: London, 1975, p. 538.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Murchland, *The Age of Alienation*, Random House: New York, 1971, p. 4

may be claimed that the concept of alienation is found in Freudian ‘psychology’<sup>10</sup>. According to Kaufman, Goethe’s *Faust* is the first treatment of this subject in literature.

In contemporary literature, Kafka’s achievement, especially his work of *The Castle*, is an important instance and expression of alienation concerning this understanding. Murchland considers *The Castle* as a significant composition which explains how somebody is alienated from her/his society, from reality and from her/himself. In this novel, Kafka mentions about a man who is unsuccessful in coping with his society. Moreover Kafka explains the failure of the novel’s hero K. for not being able to attain a satisfactory self-realization. The novel’s hero, K., enters an isolated village. This village will be his world and his place where he encounters his failure and his struggle against life. In the novel, K. tries to achieve his goal, that is, his self-realization, but at the end of the novel, it is observed that it is impossible to realize this aim. When K. comes to the village, he encounters an unexpected situation: a minor official comes and awakens him to inform that he can not sleep in the hotel where he gets rest without any permission from the Castle because that village belongs to the Castle where he has to get permission: to be there means to be in the Castle. Although K. says that he is an employee of the Castle, a phone call from the Castle does not confirm that this is the case. He will never confirm his appointment. Because of this reason, K. never gets a clear relation between appearance and reality, truth and illusion, the fantastic and the normal. The Castle, which is the symbol of alienation in the novel, is separated from him. In other words, he is alienated from the Castle which is a symbol of bureaucracy, authority,

---

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8

<sup>10</sup> C. Wright Mills, “On Reason and Freedom”, from *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 165-176.

and hierarchy of officials. Besides, the Castle is symbol of a place where people work over time and produce nothing. On the other hand, it is a mountain of forms and files. In all of these depictions on the Castle, as Murchland points out, there are the features of modern society. It can be summarized by Murchland's words, "In this world, calls are never returned, petitions always reach the wrong official, and relevant documents are lost, so that things finally become so muddled that even the simplest requirement of justice cannot be met."<sup>11</sup> In the novel, the theme is a disconnection—an estrangement between K. and the Castle. Besides, because of the problem of bureaucracy, K. encounters a problem of identity. Another example of alienation from the literature is Oğuz Atay's novel called *Losers*. In this book Atay explains alienation of novel's hero Turgut from his family, his friend, his society and the most importantly from himself. He loses himself in his own life. Actually we observe that Turgut is not satisfactory with his life because of the fact that he thinks that the life which and where (he is not happy) he lives does not belong to him. During the novel we realize that Turgut loses himself and he tries to find himself where he loses himself—in the *modern life*.

These novels are the examples of alienation in literature. In this sense it is clear that alienation is a major topic not only in social science but also in literature. The problem of alienation is also a crucial topic in the disciplines of philosophy and that is one of the reasons why I want to trace and examine how philosophy is to answer the question of what alienation is in my study.

In the book, *The Quest for Community*, Robert Nisbet claims that "at the present time, in all the social science, the various synonyms of alienation have a foremost place in the studies of human relations. Investigation of the 'unattached, the

---

<sup>11</sup> Bernard Murchland, *The Age of Alienation*, Random House: New York, 1971, p. 6



‘marginal’, the ‘obsessive’, the ‘normless’ and the ‘isolated’ individual all testify to the central place occupied by the hypothesis of alienation in contemporary social science.”<sup>12</sup>

In this context, it is necessary to investigate Hegel and Marx’s views concerning alienation as a problem or as form of existence. Marx stands in crucial place for contemporary philosophy and the development of sociological theory. The sociological viewpoint elaborates alienation as a discord between person-environment transactions. In this sense, Marx analyzes alienation as something that causes the control to be lost from hands. According to Marx alienation is an outcome resulting from political and economic conditions. Besides, he considers it a function of society and in particular of capitalistic society. Marx sees alienation as the reduction of human essence to the status of a commodity.

Alienation requires a subject and its relations with other subjects or objects. It occurs when there is a gap between the self and the other. This other may be somebody else or it can be something in the empirical world. In other words, alienation is possible if a conflictual relation occurs between the self and the other. Hegel and Marx mention in particular the conflictual relation between subject and object or the individual and his/her (social) environment.

Alienation is found where a subject transforms something into another thing. While former philosophers (e.g., the Pre-Socratics) were aware of and spoke of change, they did not have the idea of transformation. The Pre-Socratics always try to find the unchangeable within change. It might be a reason why they could not mention

---

<sup>12</sup> Robert Nisbet, *The Quest for Community*, New York: Oxford 1953, p. 15, (it can also find in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 50, No: 25, Dec. 3, 1953), pp. 788-792

the term ‘transformation’. Maybe they were afraid of transformation because then they could not mention the unchangeable entity. That’s why alienation is not found in these philosophies prior to Hegel and Marx. The nineteenth century is the first time that the problem of alienation was given explicit attention.

The dictionary<sup>13</sup> descriptions of the terms ‘change’ and ‘transformation’ underline a distinction between the two concepts. The more broad conception of change does not imply structural change, but it presents “a difference in order or regularity.”<sup>14</sup> For example, we can speak of changing the form of a room but we can not say that it is a kind of transformation. There is only apparent change but not structural. However, in the case of transformation there is “a structural change”<sup>15</sup> and through this change which results from transformation, a structure which is transformed becomes something else. For instance, water can freeze and transform into ice. Here there is a structural change. Now water is something else— ice. We can give one more example from the novel. The title of one of Kafka’s novels is titled ‘*Metamorphosis*’—i.e., transformation. As we know from the novel, the hero of the novel transforms into a spider. It is really structural change because there is a big transformation from human being to spider even if it is a symbol of alienation of human being from himself, from the system, from his family, etc. In that respect, it can be said that an understanding of transformation is necessary in order to mention alienation.

---

<sup>13</sup> Afşar Timuçin, *Felsefe Sözlüğü*, İnsancıl Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, pp.73, 99.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, pp.73, 99.

<sup>15</sup> *İbid*, pp.73, 99

Alienation has become a commonplace concept in nineteenth century thought in particular after the philosophy of Hegel and Marx. However many thinkers situate its origin much earlier. Bernard Murchland emphasizes that its origin is much earlier than then the concept of alienation in Hegelian and Marxian philosophy. According to him, some thinkers claim that the Christian doctrine of sin is an early paradigm for the modern doctrine of alienation. Moreover, he adds that other thinkers say that the Old Testament is the earliest expression of alienation and still others focus on Plato's view of alienation (from God) that maintains the physical world as a faint picture of the perfect world of ideas. According to this view, Hegel's view of nature as self-alienated from Absolute mind is found in Plato's view of the natural world which is an imperfect picture of the perfect world of Ideas. Some thinkers also attribute the source of alienation to the Greek salvation philosophers such as Stoicism, Scepticism, Epicureanism and Neo-Platonism. Again, it is interesting to observe in this regard that the chapter "Unhappy Consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology* follows the chapter "Master and Slave (Lordship and Bondage)" and the theme of alienation in these chapters can be analyzed in this light. On the other hand Erich Kahler claims that the whole history of man could be written as a history of alienation. This claim itself can be read as a Hegelian comment.

Bernard Murchland argues that the late Middle Ages and Renaissance era were the first source of our modern experience of alienation: "I have been led to detect the distinctive modern flavour of our experience of alienation in the transitional period of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. A key is to be found in the rise of atomistic nominalism and the subsequent pulverization of being."<sup>16</sup> At that point

---

<sup>16</sup> Bernard Murchland, "Some Comments on Alienation", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Mar. 1969), p. 434

Murchland claims that the experience of alienation began to take shape from the point of view of Augustinian Christianity with “its negation of life instincts institutionalized guilt and delayed hope.”<sup>17</sup> Furthermore the same aspect of the understanding of alienation can be seen in Gerhart Ladner’s work *Homo Viator: Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order* where he claims that “[t]he theme of alienation is intrinsic to Medieval Christian thought”<sup>18</sup>.

Descartes who is also seen as the first modern philosopher is regarded by some as the first person articulating the dynamics of alienation rather than Hegel. Descartes separates the world from the soul and mind. According to Descartes, sensation does not express anything directly about the outside world. Descartes differentiates ‘*res extensa*’ belonging to nature and ‘*res cogitans*’ belonging to mind (spirit, soul). In this sense both body and mind are alienated from each other because they are outside of each other. For instance, Erwin Straus argues that “the Cartesian dichotomy (...) not only separates mind from body but severs the experiencing creature from nature, the ego from the world, sensation from motion. It also separates one person from other one, me from you. The Cartesian ego, looking at the outside world, is in no contact, has no direct communication, with any other ego... Reality becomes a function of judgment.”<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Bernard Murchland, *The Age of Alienation*, Random House: New York, 1971, p. 51.

<sup>18</sup> Gerhart B. Ladner, “Homo Viator: Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order”, *Speculum*, Vol. 42, No. 2, Apr., 1967, p. 236.

<sup>19</sup> Erwin Straus, “Anaesthesiology and Hallucinations in Existence” (in *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, edited by Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, New York, Basic Books, 1958), passage is taken from *The Age of Alienation*, Bernard Murchland, Random House: New York, 1971, pp. 141-142.

Irving Louis Horowitz remarks that alienation is described as a separation. In other words he claims that the alienated world is a world in which parts are separated out; “that separation can be social, personal or scientific world.”<sup>20</sup> In this sense Descartes is seen as the first philosopher who isolated or separated consciousness from external world. Hegel, however, tries to overcome this dualistic aspect which inherited from Descartes, that is, the separation of the mind (spirit) from the external world. However Hegel thought that it was not possible to overcome this dualism by reducing the realm of consciousness to the realm of the external world. But Hegel does not reduce the realm of the external world to the realm of consciousness in the manner of traditional idealists either. Instead he tries to overcome the dualistic understanding by the process of dialectic movement and by the process of alienation.

Hegel is generally considered to be the first philosopher to present the term ‘alienation’ as an important philosophical concept. Alienation, as part of a process of consciousness, is a basic idea in Hegel’s philosophy. But Hegel considers alienation only at the level of consciousness (stages of consciousness); as Marx points out, he ignores its external dimension. For Hegel, the problem of alienation is important only as a stage of consciousness. Therefore, in contrast to the modern use of the term ‘alienation’, for Hegel, it has a positive meaning. In this sense, even though Marx took the concept of alienation from Hegel, there is a significant difference between the Hegelian understanding of alienation and Marx’s conception of alienation.

---

<sup>20</sup> Irving Louis Horowitz, “On Alienation and Social Order”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.27, No.2, Dec, 1966, p. 234.

Two questions now quite naturally occur. First what is the historical background of alienation? And, secondly how was alienation used by Hegel and how did Marx criticize alienation in Hegelian understanding? The second question is perhaps more urgent but the first question has a fundamental priority for it turns our attention back to the ideological basis of alienation. I would like to stress that one of the best ways of understanding the problem of alienation is to view it in light of certain etymological, ontological and historical determinants.

The structure of the thesis is composed of four chapters. In Chapter Two I attempt to describe the understanding of 'alienation' in Hegel's view. This chapter illustrates what Hegel means by the term 'alienation' in his philosophy. The way in which I propose to show the philosophical interest and importance of this concept for Hegel's philosophy is by first presenting a clear overview of his study which is the main resource for my thesis, namely, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. To explore the subject it is necessary to clarify some basic terms of Hegel's philosophy such as 'Geist' and 'dialectic'. The reason why I want to focus on the term 'Geist' and dialectic in terms of alienation is that the whole aim of Hegel's philosophy is to manifest and examine the development of *Geist* in its historical process through a dialectic process, that is, alienation process. The whole history of human being is in fact the alienation of *Geist*. In the next part, the relation between 'Geist' and the overcoming of alienation is examined through giving an example of alienation or experience of *Geist* in the ethical world in order to explore how it is possible to 'feel at home'.

Hegel's understanding of alienation, in the nineteenth century, attracted the attention of Feuerbach and Marx who are important figures for clarifying and understanding alienation today. Thus, in the third Chapter, I am going to explore

Marx's term alienation through examining Feuerbach's approach to this concept.

Feuerbach uses the concept of alienation to criticize religion. According to him religion is a kind of alienation that leads human beings to be alienated and severed from themselves. For him the idea of God is really no more than our idea of our own human essence.<sup>21</sup> In other words religion is the "self-alienation of the human being, the division (*Entzweiung*) of the human being from himself."<sup>22</sup>

In Chapter Three, I want to explain the notion of alienation in terms of Marx's perspective. The way in which I explain Marx's understanding of alienation is by reflecting on his major works the *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts*, the *German Ideology*, the *Communist Manifesto*. For this goal, I attempt to present the development of Marx in context some philosophers and thinkers such as Hegel, Bauer and Feuerbach who influence Marx regarding alienation. In other words, I give a brief explanation of Marx's background. I aim to discuss Marx's term 'alienation' in terms of its ontological, political and economical dimension. The way which I propose to explain alienation in Marx's philosophy is by underlining the differences and similarities between Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx in their approaches to alienation. Feuerbach criticizes Hegel's philosophy as non-material being, that is, Absolute Being, or God. In the *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future*, Feuerbach claims that Hegel's philosophy is the realization and culmination of modern philosophy, because according to him, the departing point of modern philosophy is the same as "the hitherto philosophy" due to being in relation to

---

<sup>21</sup> Feuerbach's conception of human essence had a big influence on early Marx. This connection will also be examined in my thesis.

<sup>22</sup> Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, translated by George Eliot, New York: 1957, p. 33.

theology. Feuerbach points out the contradiction of modern philosophy. The contradiction is “the negation of theology from the standpoint of theology.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, for Feuerbach, the negation of theology which is again theology is especially characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy.

According to Hodgson,<sup>24</sup> Hegel re-established the relation between theology and philosophy which had already been established and found in the Middle Ages as Feuerbach accused him to be theologian. Under the subtitle Feuerbach, I explain the influence of Hegel on Feuerbach and his critique of him and then I focus on Marx’s positive and negative interpretation of Feuerbach and especially his approach to alienation. Marx differentiates Feuerbach from other Young Hegelians for two reasons: first for his true materialism and second for criticizing Hegel rightly in comparison to other Young Hegelians’ critique of Hegel’s philosophy. Marx claims that for Feuerbach, god is self-alienation of human being whereas in Hegel’s philosophy, human being is defined as self-alienation of God. Marx criticizes Feuerbach for not mentioning and being aware of social and economical circumstances while mentioning I-thou relations. Then I try to define a relationship between Hegel and Marx by way of a critique of Marx, his use of the term alienation and his philosophy as a whole. I touch on Hegel’s concepts such as labour and work in terms of his positive and negative influence on Marx. Marx finds two errors in Hegel’s philosophy: first Hegel’s description of overcoming alienation by way of reconciliation is an act of thought and second although the path of alienation is concrete, the arrival point is abstract. After the critique of

---

<sup>23</sup> Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future*, § 21, trans: Zawar Hanfi, 1972, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future1.htm>

<sup>24</sup>Peter C. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of religion*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 2005, p. 14.



Hegel's philosophy, I explain four forms of alienation in Marx' philosophy: (1) *Alienation from the product of labour*, (2) *Alienation from the labour process*, (3) *Alienation from human nature, from 'species being'*, (4) *Alienation from fellow human beings*. Finally, I research the solution of Marx on the problem of alienation in capitalist society. In this respect, I ask how it is possible to overcome alienation according to Marx. Thus I explain what is 'feeling' or 'being at home'. All this study shows us that for Hegel, alienation is self-discovery of Spirit, for Marx, it is loss of reality. Moreover, while Hegel does not make any difference between objectification, alienation and externalization, Marx claims that objectification is a characteristic of labour or work but alienation is inevitably the result or conclusion of the system—capitalistic society or system. I criticize Marx because whatever he said about Hegel is what also he wants to attain; for example, both philosophers want to realize the universality and rationality in different ways.

Chapter Four specifically not only attempts to summarize and evaluate Hegel and Marx's similar and differential attitudes towards alienation but it also tries to answer the questions which give form to the framework of the thesis.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **HEGEL ON ALIENATION**

#### **II.1 Introduction**

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the basic work for our research in this thesis. The key concept of this thesis, alienation in Hegel's philosophy, will be discussed in terms of this study. In fact, it is quite difficult to read and understand the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as Malcolm Knox claims in his study *A Plea for Hegel*, "it was easier to revolt against him than to understand him." I would like to attempt to give a general outline of Hegel's system in this chapter by addressing this difficulty. It is usually uttered by the tradition Hegel pundits that "You won't understand anything until you've completed it all."<sup>25</sup> You can not understand it you did not get at the end of the book because it is a complete representation, so that you can not complain if you have dealt only with one part of it.

The aim of Hegel in the *Phenomenology* is to justify the philosophical point of view by starting from ordinary, non-philosophical consciousness, which is called 'natural consciousness'. The evolution is development which is progressing from

abstract and universal categories to their shaping in history and human beings, and finally to embodiment of human being's achievement in art, religion, and philosophy.

I believe that the best way to proceed to present a clear overview of the *Phenomenology* is to get clear on what Hegel means by 'Spirit' (*Geist*) and by 'dialectic'. Solomon, like many others, has claimed that the *Phenomenology* is a kind of history of *Geist* and added that it is "the autobiography of God."<sup>26</sup> It is this idea that forces me to investigate what Hegel means by the term '*Geist*'. I need to study the terms '*Geist*' and 'dialectic' to clarify what Hegel understands by alienation in his philosophical project. Let us now start with what Hegel means by the term '*Geist*'.

## **II.2 *Geist***

I should note that my aim here, under this title, is not to provide a comprehensive account of Hegel's notion of *Geist* in detail, but simply to put us in a position to think about how this concept figures in his project of *Phenomenology* in relation to the concept of alienation. It is important to comprehend the place of alienation in the process of development of *Geist* because *Geist* manifests itself by way of becoming alien to itself. Hegel thinks that the *Phenomenology* is the experience of activity of human beings which is the expression of *Geist*. In this sense, here the other important thing for us is to understand the relation between *Geist* and both human beings and nature in its alienated form.

---

<sup>25</sup>Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1983, p. 236.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid*, p. 211.

When we read the translation of Hegel's work in English language, we notice how difficult it is to understand how Hegel uses the term '*Geist*'. As Robert Williams claims, the English language lacks a suitable concept to match *Geist*.

In the *Hegel and Christian Theology*, Peter Hodgson mentions that the German term '*Geist*' takes its roots from "the idea of being moved powerfully, as in fear or amazement, a movement associated with the sudden drawing in or expelling of breath."<sup>27</sup> In this sense, he said that it is connected with the word coming from Hebrew, Greek and Latin language, 'spirit' which refers to the meaning of breath or wind. According to him, the other meaning of *Geist* as mind has a more restrictive sense than 'spirit'. Hodgson defines *Geist* as spirit "in the sense of energy, movement, life, revelation, differentiation, and reconciliation."<sup>28</sup> According to him, spirit is manifestation of God and God without spirit is absolute idea but with it absolute spirit because he said that "spirit presupposes the sensuous but transfigures it, raises it to pure thought, which is the most concentrated form of energy."<sup>29</sup>

'*Geist*' is translated into English both as 'spirit' and as 'mind'. Many translators (Baillie, Miller) utilize both terms, translating *Geist* as 'mind' in certain passages and 'spirit' in others. The term 'mind' suggests a strictly philosophical concept whereas the term 'spirit' also has theological connotations. Further, typically the concept of individuality is attached to the concept of mind whereas 'spirit' is

---

<sup>27</sup>Peter C. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of religion*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 2005, p. 19.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

thought to be the expression of the character of a group in English language.<sup>30</sup> For example, the term ‘spirited’ in ordinary English language means “lively”, and ‘spirit’ can mean “a shared sense of movement, purpose, and unity.”<sup>31</sup> Thus, the term ‘spirit’ evokes not only religion (not only the Absolute) but also the unity of all human activity and its aim. Hegel insists that the manifestation of *Geist* or actualization of *Geist* is the activities of a people, their products. That is, their physical activities in the physical world provide the expression of *Geist*.

As Malcolm Knox<sup>32</sup> emphasizes, for Hegel, the concept of *Geist* encompasses all of these connotations; it implies both the idea of *mind* and *spirit*. But what is most important to note from the outset is Hegel’s conception of *Geist* as a self-referential movement that encompasses everything. As Hegel writes in the *Philosophy of Nature*,

Mind<sup>33</sup> is, therefore, in its every act only apprehending itself, and the aim of all genuine science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth.<sup>34</sup>

The whole movement of *Geist* realizes itself by way of a dialectical movement. That’s why the best way to understand the Hegelian term *Geist* is to clarify the other Hegelian term *dialectic*.

---

<sup>30</sup> William S. Jamison, *Hegel’s Geist*, from internet site: [www.geocities.com/williamjamison/Heg/Geist.htm](http://www.geocities.com/williamjamison/Heg/Geist.htm)

<sup>31</sup> Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: New York, 1983, p. 33.

<sup>32</sup> Sir T. Malcolm Knox, “A Plea for Hegel”, *New Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy*, edited by Warren E. Steinkraus, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, pp. 1-17.

<sup>33</sup> *Geist* is translated into English language as ‘mind’ by Stephen Houlgate.

### II.2.1 Dialectic: the movement of *Geist*

Hegel believes in the truth. And he tries to find the truth in a system (as I understand, the term ‘system’ is Hegelian understanding of the complex whole) or with a system. To be sure, Hegel means that the truth is to be found within a system such that truth can only be comprehended with and in the whole.

It is only spirit in its entirety that is in time, and the shapes assumed, which are specific embodiments of the whole of spirit as such, present themselves in a sequence one after the other. For it is only the whole which properly has reality, and hence the form of pure freedom relatively to anything else, the form which takes expression as time. But the moments of the whole, consciousness, reason and spirit, have, because they are moments, no existence separate from one other.<sup>35</sup>

As we understand from the passage, for Hegel, only the whole has reality and the whole is possible by way of a sequence of moments, which are integrated in the whole.

But Hegel also states in the “Preface” to the *Phenomenology* that he does not accept any method to reach the truth. “Truth” for him “moves itself by its very nature; but the method just mentioned is a form of knowledge external to its material.”<sup>36</sup> Hegel mentions that “Truth (*die Wahrheit*) is its own self-movement.”<sup>37</sup> In this sense, Hegel claims that everything is immanent to his philosophy. Method, on the other

---

<sup>34</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Nature”, § 377 Addition, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 284.

<sup>35</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 679, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 689.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, § 48, p. 106.

<sup>37</sup> Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A study of G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1983, p. 268.

hand, is something “external”<sup>38</sup>, something coming from the outside. In the “Preface” he says:

It might well seem necessary to state at the outset the chief points in connexion with the *method* of this process, the way in which science operates. Its nature, however, is to be found in what has already been said, while the proper systematic exposition of it is the special business of Logic, or rather is Logic itself. For the method is nothing else than the structure of the whole in its pure and essential form. In regard, however, to what has been hitherto currently held on this point, we must be sensible that the system of ideas bearing on the question of philosophical method belongs also to a stage of mental culture that has now passed away.<sup>39</sup>

This is why one of the most controversial topics of discussion concerning Hegel’s philosophy is about what the method of his philosophy is: because Hegel does seem to employ, in his works, a certain way of proceeding, which has come to be known as the dialectic “method.” This discussion brings us to the word ‘dialectic’.

### **II.2.1.1 History of Dialectic**

There are two conflicting approaches to dialectic: the Platonic approach, which sees dialectic as a kind of confrontation of conflicting points of view, that is, it is a means to discover the truth (this truth is the truth behind the appearances); the second approach is the Kantian notion of dialectic, saying that “dialectical contradiction is proof (by way of a *reduction ad absurdum*) that the truth is not to be found beyond the world of ‘phenomena’”.<sup>40</sup> Now the question is how Hegel approaches these opposite notions and uses the term ‘dialectic.’

---

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>39</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* § 48, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 106.

The concept of 'dialectic' has already a big role in German idealism before Hegel. Kant had mentioned the word 'dialectic' in the "Transcendental Dialectic" which is related to Reason and its structure. Kant gives an introduction of dialectic in his first *Critique*. Kant defines it in order to comprehend and know the structure of the universe (i.e., God) and nature of self and soul. Here I want to explain briefly, how Kant differentiates the Understanding and Reason. While Understanding "can know only particular objects and finite sets of objects" by applying its concepts to the data of experience, Reason "applies these same concepts beyond the data of experience to the universe as a whole, to the self as a metaphysical entity, and God."<sup>41</sup> Reason has a tendency to go beyond possible experience and then it discovers that it falls into illusions, because according to Kant, 'pure reason' can not know metaphysical entities or God, which are beyond the experiences. Therefore, transcendental dialectic, for Kant, attempts to show this illusion or error of Reason. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant mentions that transcendental dialectic is a critique of Understanding and Reason concerning their metaphysical use. Kant uses transcendental dialectic to analyze the obstacles to Reason. According to Kant, transcendental dialectic can be defined as the "logic of appearance." The limitation of human knowledge which is restricted by experience is demonstrated by dialectic. In short, for Kant, the critique of transcendental illusion or error is possible by way of dialectic. Also according to Kant, it is the way to demonstrate the limits of Reason by transcendental dialectic in order to avoid unscientific results and to remove metaphysical dogma.

---

<sup>40</sup> Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: New York, 1983, p. 23.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76.



Hegel praises Kant's contribution for his two achievements: first, for the distinction between Understanding and Reason, and second, for the human beings' attempt to apply their concepts to the infinite. According to Hegel, Kant's dialectic of reason contributes to philosophy by mentioning contradictions or antinomies. While Hegel mentions that Kant must be praised for the discovery of antinomies, Hegel claims that there are many more contradictions than Kant mentioned.

Fichte put his own understanding of dialectic into the formulation 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis,' which many mistakenly believe to be also Hegel's formulation. This formulation, however, misrepresents Hegel's understanding of dialectic and his philosophical system.

The concept of the "dialectic" goes back to the time of the Greeks and leads us to think of the dialectic of Socrates' dialogues. In the Greeks, the term 'dialectic' referred to 'discussion'. In Socratic dialogues, the discovery of truth was possible through different and competing points of view in discussion. According to Plato, it is the "supreme science". In other words, the term for Plato is a kind of way to discover the truth. On the other hand, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the term 'dialectic' had more negative connotations and Kant mentioned also the 'illusion of dialectic'.

Kant showed in his discussion of the 'antinomies' in particular that the dialectical application of reason beyond the bounds of experience resulted in contradictions.<sup>42</sup>

Kant claimed that the method was a failure in reasoning which renders an argument invalid so that nobody could know about thing in itself.

Hegel made a combination of both understandings of dialectic. Hegel stands by Kant's notion saying that the use of reason leads the creation of contradictions or antinomies but he also agrees with the notion of Greeks claiming that "these contradictions are not a dead-end or an absurdity but rather a clue to the truth."<sup>43</sup>

### II.2.1.2 Dialectic in Hegel

Hegel's proclamation in the "Preface" of the *Phenomenology* that "the true is the whole"<sup>44</sup> is a kind of expression of his understanding of dialectic because Hegel thinks that the unity of contradictions or opposites is achieved in the whole. Hegel claims that *dialectic* "is in general the principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the actual world. Equally, the dialectical is also the soul of all genuinely scientific cognition."<sup>45</sup>

Hegel defines his term '*dialectic*' with the terms *negativity, sublation or negation*. 'To sublimate' (*Aufhebung*) means 'to assimilate ( a smaller entity) into a larger one' and its origin is: "C.19 (earlier (C.16) as sublation): from Latin (sublatus) sublat-'taken away', from sub- 'from below' + lat- (from the stem of tollere 'take away')"<sup>46</sup>. In *Science of Logic*, Hegel himself defines '*Aufhebung*' by pointing out its twofold meaning: one of its meanings is to preserve; the other meaning is to "cause to

---

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>44</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," Preface § 20, in *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 53.

<sup>45</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, "The Encyclopaedia Logic", § 177, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 92.

<sup>46</sup> *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford English Press, 2004.

cease.”<sup>47</sup> Something, which has lost its truth in immediacy, is preserved and is taken up again with its opposite when its opposite also loses its truth in immediacy and enters a higher unity with it. The sublation (*Aufhebung*) of something means that something is alienated from its immediacy and passes over into its opposite in order to make a unity with themselves. In this alienation process, something is also preserved when entering in a unity, not annihilated.

*Remark: The Expression ‘To Sublate’ (Aufhebung): To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinateness from which it originates.*<sup>48</sup>

‘To sublate’ has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even ‘to preserve’ includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated....Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a *moment*.<sup>49</sup>

Failing to take note of this twofold meaning of the term ‘*Aufhebung*,’ and comprehending the result or the movement of consciousness only in its negativity would give us only half of reality. We should not forget that *Aufhebung* also involves the negation of negation and thus a return to self.

---

<sup>47</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, “The Science of Logic: Doctrine of Being”, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 194.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid*, p. 194.

In other words, the term '*dialectic*' is used to characterize a process where something turns into other things, that is, its opposite, through itself.

We can find vivid examples of such "self-othering" or "self-differentiation" in the *Science of Logic* where the thought of being turns into the thought of nothing, or the thought of finitude turns into the thought of infinity. It should be emphasized here that the dialectic process is generated by *self*-differentiation. In other words, something turns into its opposite by way of its own nature and not by way of something outside.

Hegel exemplifies this point in his work the *Science of Logic* by mentioning the dialectical relation between *being-nothing* and *becoming*. The simple, indeterminate concept of being is the starting point of Hegel's dialectic in the *Science of logic*.

Being, which is abstracted from the whole determination, is immediate and empty being which is only equal to itself. According to Hegel, being is in fact equal to nothing because of its immediate indeterminateness and its emptiness. This indeterminateness does not allow us to differentiate being from its opposite.

But Nothing, like Being is also determined by its opposite. Being is othering for nothing which is immanent to being and nothing is othering for being. Being negates or sublates itself and passing over into nothing because it is equal to nothing in terms of its content. Similarly, nothing sublates itself and passes over into being. On the one hand being and nothing are identical to each other; on the other hand both are opposite to each other. Here there is a contradiction. This

---

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid*, p. 194.

contradiction is overcome by Becoming which Hegel defines as follows. Thus “this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished.”<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, Hegel makes clear that there is not any external thing leading to sublation or something coming from outside to sublimate or negate the other. This sublation is explained as follows;

They (*being* and *nothing*) are not reciprocally sublated – the one does not sublimate the other externally – but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.<sup>51</sup>

Hegel explains that the concept of *being* and its opposite *nothing* is the unity of *becoming*. That is, becoming is the unity of *being* and *nothing*. This unity is not the abstract form of *becoming* but the *determinate* unity of being and nothing.

What is determination or determinacy? Determinacy is defined as articulating, conceptualizing, identifying and specifying something. A thing is determined only with its contrast or with other things which are determinate.<sup>52</sup> It can be said that ‘determination and determinacy presupposes negation.’<sup>53</sup>

Since the general understanding of being which is defined without determination, contradiction or multitude explains nothing; this being must be specified and conceptualized. According to Hegel, the starting point is very simple: every

---

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, p. 194.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, p. 193.

<sup>52</sup> Micheal Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, USA, 1992, pp. 77-79.

determinateness, every quality, every differentiation requires otherness and limitedness and thus this determination can not compose an absolute and unconditional starting point. Therefore, for Hegel, there is no better beginning than that which starts from the simple indeterminate immediate being. Hegel claims that what must be done is to proceed from the indeterminacy to determinacy. This is the aim of Hegel<sup>54</sup>.

The first step to proceed to determinate being from indeterminate being is to show that the determinateness of being is its indeterminacy. Hegel says that indeterminacy of being attaches to its contrast which is qualitative and determinate. Thus being points to its beyond and it passes into its determinate being.

In becoming they were coming-to be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, a differently determined unity, they are again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their base from which they do not again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing.<sup>55</sup>

As seen here, the term ‘dialectic’ also refers to a process of particularization and differentiation of what is universal and undifferentiated. “This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-identical.”<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 77-79.

<sup>54</sup> Enver Orman, “Hegelci Diyalektikte ‘Birşey’ ve ‘Başkası’”, *Kutadgubilig: Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*, Ayrıbasım, No: 9, Mart 2006, pp. 100-107.

<sup>55</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, “The Science of Logic: Doctrine of Being”, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 195.

In Cohen's words,

many processes in which subject and object are implicated in changing relation are well conceived as transitions from undifferentiated unity, through differentiated disunity, to differentiated unity.<sup>57</sup>

Here "differentiated disunity" refers to the process of alienation. Undifferentiated unity achieves determinacy –i.e., differentiated unity— through alienation. Undifferentiated unity needs to alienate itself from itself, because as it is, it is characterized by indeterminacy. Determinacy requires the experience by consciousness of the object, which is made possible by the alienation of undifferentiated unity from itself, which may also be called its self-externalization. Differentiated unity, by contrast, has determinacy, but it is not in unity. When differentiated disunity overcomes alienation, it becomes in unity.

### **II.2.1.3 Dialectic as a Method**

Is Hegel's dialectic a method for his philosophy? There is an ongoing debate among philosophers on Hegel's term 'dialectic' as to whether it is a method or something else.

Some commentators of Hegel's philosophy claim that 'dialectic' is a method of his philosophy. However, these philosophers (e.g., Michael Forster) have in mind the *Logic* when they speak of Hegel's dialectic method. Hegel does not mention the concept of 'dialectic' very often in the *Phenomenology*, but it is used a few times (especially in the introduction). Thus, others, Robert Solomon, for instance,

---

<sup>56</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind: (The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences III)*, § 383, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 26.

<sup>57</sup>G. A. Cohen, "Marx's Dialectic of Labour", *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, Vol:3, Spring 1974, p. 237.

maintain that “Hegel *has no method* as such – at least, not in the *Phenomenology*”.<sup>58</sup>

The dialectic is more of a panorama of human experience than a form of cognitive ascension. It has its definite movements, even improvements, but it is the journey, not the final destination, that gives us our appreciation of humanity, its unity and differences.<sup>59</sup>

Some even claim that Hegel’s method in the *Phenomenology* is “radically undialectical.”<sup>60</sup> Dove claims that the philosophy of Hegel is the experience of consciousness itself. The experience of consciousness itself is dialectical, according to Dove, and Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is merely the description of this dialectical process.<sup>61</sup> This is why Hegel calls his study ‘phenomenology.’ Hegel aims to show

how true knowledge – philosophy – gradually and necessarily *appears* or ‘come on the scene’. On the other hand, Hegel demonstrates the necessity of philosophy by considering, not what natural consciousness *is*, but what natural consciousness takes itself and its objects to be, that is, the way consciousness and its objects appear to consciousness itself.<sup>62</sup>

Those who hold that dialectic is not a method seem to have the correct view. As mentioned before, method is not self-movement; method comes from outside. But in Hegel’s philosophy dialectic movement is immanent to his philosophy, that is, it is a

---

<sup>58</sup> Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1983, p. 21.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26.

<sup>60</sup> Kenley Royce Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method”, from; *G. W. F. Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 21.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21.

<sup>62</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *The Hegel Reader*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, pp. 47-48.



kind of self-movement. Dialectical movement is a way of attaining Absolute knowledge or *Geist*.

#### **II.2.1.3.1 Dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit***

To give general broad outline of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* enables us to comprehend his usage the notion of dialectic in his work. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is described as the progressive development of *Geist*. Hegel mentions three main stages in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: ‘Consciousness’, ‘Self-Consciousness’ and ‘Reason’. Each stage also includes sub-stages. Every stage (or moment) generates the subsequent one.

The general view of Hegel’s philosophy is first to describe the attitude of consciousness by itself and then to make an analysis of this description. Starting with natural consciousness in the chapter “Consciousness”, he develops, through a description of the dialectic process of consciousness itself, increasingly more sophisticated forms of consciousness (which we may also refer to as modes or *Gestaltungen*). In every stage, Hegel indicates how the previous form of consciousness is overcome and approaches the higher stage through the dialectical movement.

The mind’s immediate existence, conscious life, has two aspects – cognition and objectivity which is opposed to or negative of the subjective function of knowing. Since it is in the medium of consciousness that mind is developed and brings out its various moments, this opposition between the factors of conscious life is found at each stage in the evolution of mind, and all the various moments appear as modes or forms (*Gestalten*) of consciousness.<sup>63</sup>

To put it crudely, in “Consciousness”, the subject knows the object of sensation as outside of itself and as not identical with it. In “self-consciousness,” the attention of the subject returns back to itself, on itself as a finite consciousness. But in the stage of “Reason”, the subject sees Nature and History which it associates with itself as the objective expression of infinite Spirit.

The full account of Hegel’s discussion of phenomenology is based on and understood through experience as phenomenology “describes and discovers the meaning of experience made by ordinary consciousness”<sup>64</sup>, which Hegel calls natural consciousness. As Dove explains in his article “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method,” “experience creates new objects for itself by way of dialectic.”<sup>65</sup> The creation of the new object is based on consciousness’ reflection on itself—that is, reflection on “its knowledge of its first object.”<sup>66</sup> Upon reflection consciousness discovers something wrong with its original standard of knowledge (the concept somehow does not match the object); therefore it changes its standard. In changing the standard, it also changes the first appearance of its object. For Hegel, the forms of consciousness which are not yet real will essentially be the result of this process, which will keep going on. As will be explained in more detail below, the negation of sense knowledge of consciousness, for example, becomes a new knowledge

---

<sup>63</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, Preface, § 36, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 60.

<sup>64</sup> Robert R. Williams, “Hegel’s Concept of *Geist*”, from *G. W. F Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, Taylor & Francis Group: London and New York, 2004, p. 543.

<sup>65</sup> Kenley Royce Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method”, from; *G. W. F Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 21.

<sup>66</sup> Dove warns however that “the term ‘reflection’ [...]is misleading; it tends to suggest something which takes place immediately. But experience is a *process*, something which takes time...”

when consciousness discovers that it lost the knowledge of the ‘here’ and ‘now’ which it thought that it had grasped.

This is not only a negative movement for Hegel. If it is understood that non-reality is not reality (truth), it means that to know error is to know that reality (truth) is something else. Thus, according to Hegel, surpassing the error is a moment of reality (truth), a moment on the way to truth.

Hegel thus aims to attain Absolute *Geist*, Absolute Knowledge through different stages and moments. Every moment attains its full meaning only in the whole. Spirit possesses specific embodiment in time with the interrelationship of all these stages. It takes shape in time.

### **II.2.2 Actualization of *Geist***

Because the movement of *Geist* is essentially self-referential, the Spirit does not reveal or manifest anything other than itself. And what it is itself is precisely what it reveals or manifests. In other words, the Spirit (*Geist*) manifests its revealing. This is its actuality: its revealing or manifestation, that is, its action.

... [T]he special mode of mental being is '*manifestation*'. The spirit is not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a form distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal *something*, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', *actuality*.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>67</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences III)*, § 383, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 26.

From this quotation, we understand that *Geist* (here it is translated as “spirit”) also refers to the term of actuality. And the actuality of *Geist* is possible only as embodied. Therefore, *Geist* is actual as embodied through its own activity—i.e., *Geist* can also be defined as self-actualization. The embodiment of *Geist* is a kind of determination because now *Geist* is alienated from its own self and relates itself to its opposites, such as Nature, or human being’s products. Therefore, *Geist* actualizes itself into its othering and embodies itself through alienation movement or dialectical process.

The movement of *Geist* can also be defined as self-externalization. In other words, “*Geist* actualizes itself by expressing its self-conception in an objective (spatio-temporal) medium.”<sup>68</sup> Hegel also uses term externalization which “comes to be synonymous with ‘objectivity’<sup>69</sup> in the Preface of *Phenomenology* as follows;

The scientific statement of the course of this development is a science of the *experience* through which consciousness passes; the substance and its process are considered as the object of consciousness. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience; for what is found in experiences is merely spiritual substance, and, moreover, *object* of its self. Mind, however, becomes object, for it consists in the process of becoming an *other to itself*, i.e. *an object for its own self*, and in transcending this otherness.<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 43.

<sup>69</sup> George Lukacs, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, Merlin Press: London, 1975, p. 541.

<sup>70</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 36, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 96.

In this sense, the self-actualization of *Geist* seems not internal but it seems external, outward. What does “external” mean? It means that *Geist* finds itself in the world through the experience of consciousness and through activity (which generates new objects for itself and actualizes itself in social relationships and social institutions).

*Geist* objectifies itself in a new object through its activity and thus manifests itself in this activity and in the product of activities, such as art, religion, and then it negates this externalization or objectification by returning into itself. Hegel explains the overcoming of self-externalization in order to become the unity as follows;

This self-externalization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it *is* this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature.<sup>71</sup>

According to Malcolm, Hegel views mind and spirit as an activity which points to a reality or an object. That is, *Geist* becomes fully actual only by way of objectifying, manifesting, and actualizing itself in the world. This activity is distinct from itself (that is, it is not internal, but external). Then for the first time it achieves actuality as a spirit, achieves self-consciousness by overcoming this objectification through becoming aware of itself, by knowing this object as itself. At this point, there is a twofold activity for spirit: first the activity of creation or self-expression and second, the activity of the reconciling or self-interpretation.

Hegel with this twofold activity of *Geist* also defines how truth is possible. That is he distinguishes himself from the traditional theory of truth by the activity of externalization—objectification, alienation.

---

<sup>71</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences III)*, § 381, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 25.

Thus, Hegel adds an interesting twist to the traditional theory of Truth. In traditional theory, truth is a matter of congruence between the ideas in the mind and that which is outside. Hegel also tries to establish a congruence between “the ideas in the mind” and “what is outside.” But Hegel’s understanding of truth is different from the traditional theory of Truth because Hegel establishes this congruence by actualization or externalization of *Geist* into “what is outside” (or “what is outside” is produced by activity of *Geist*). In other words, the mind (or *Geist*) has to go out of itself, pass *through* the object and return into itself to establish the congruence between “the mind” and “what is outside.”

From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its *absolute prius*. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unity, the notion.<sup>72</sup>

The following passage also illustrates the same point:

The difficulty of the philosophical cognition of mind consists in the fact that in this we are no longer dealing with the comparatively abstract, simple logical Idea, but with the most concrete, most developed form achieved by the Idea in its self-actualization. Even finite or subjective mind, not only absolute mind, must be grasped as an actualization of the Idea. The treatment of mind is only truly philosophical when it cognizes the Notion of mind in its living development and actualization, which simply means, when it comprehends mind as a type of the absolute Idea.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences III)*, § 381, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 25.

<sup>73</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Nature”, § 377 Addition, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 284.

### **II.2.3 *Geist* as Mind: the relation of *Geist* to the transcendental I**

*Geist* can be conceived of as ‘mind’ because it is thought to refer to self-consciousness and the subject of self-consciousness.<sup>74</sup> But as mentioned above, traditionally, mind is thought of as belonging to a single individual, whereas for Hegel *Geist* is something more holistic underlying not only the subjective or finite minds but also intersubjectivity.

To make this conception of *Geist* comprehensible, some (e.g., Solomon) have tried to interpret it as a version of Kant’s transcendental ego.

What is the meaning of transcendental philosophy?

In Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the transcendental subject is the necessary condition of possible experience. The notion ‘transcendental’, according to Kant, refers to prior forms of sensation such as space and time. Without these conditions (i.e., space and time) there can not be any given sensation in our experience. The transcendental subject constructs a universal structure for possible experience which is received by our perception. The transcendental subject is distinguished from the empirical subject and determined as pure activity of subjectivity which is defined as pure subjectivity without any experience of objects.

But the general conviction is that Hegel is far from transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense. Robert Williams, for instance, while acknowledging that Hegel’s conception of *Geist* is influenced by Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception,

---

<sup>74</sup> Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press: 1994, p. 43.

argues that “it is more misleading than helpful to stress the similarities between *Geist* and Kant’s transcendental ego.”<sup>75</sup>

According to Williams, Hegel makes an introduction of *Geist* in the *Phenomenology* emphasizing that it is not a transcendental structure a priori like the Kantian transcendental ego, an ‘I think’, but, as Williams himself emphasizes, an intersubjective accomplishment. He says that the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is an intersubjective process of recognition and not a reflective transition or accomplishment that the “self gives to itself.” Williams claims that it is not a transcendental ego; instead, “Hegel speaks of an I that is also a We, and a We that is also an I.”<sup>76</sup>

Here I would like to quickly point out that even though the notion of intersubjectivity is the basic difference between the Kantian transcendental ego and *Geist*, I think in certain respects Hegel’s *Geist* is similar to the transcendental ego. Although Hegel claims that he overcomes Kantian transcendental philosophy by mentioning intersubjectivity, I think Hegel’s understanding of *Geist* is similar to Kant’s transcendental subject. In fact Hegel’s *Geist* can be defined as transcendent even though Hegel mentions the representation of *Geist* in the world through dialectical movement and alienation process. Because the main problem in Hegel is that his philosophy begins with *Geist* and ends up with it again. I think there is not any problem about how Hegel explains the manifestation of *Geist* and attainment of *Geist* but while Hegel criticizes Kant for falling into error as transcendent

---

<sup>75</sup> Robert R. Williams, “Hegel’s Concept of *Geist*”, from *G. W. F. Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 540.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, p. 540.



philosophy has done, Hegel himself falls into a similar error by mentioning the Absolute.

Nevertheless, as Williams claims, there are undeniably important respects in which Hegel moves beyond Kant's transcendental idealism. Hegel criticizes Kant for not surpassing the prior transcendent philosophy by keeping the thing-in-itself. Thus for Hegel, Kant reintroduces the subject-object dualism which he wants to go beyond.

The research on Hegel's understanding of alienation indicates that the process of alienation is the self-discovery of *Geist* (as mind or spirit). This research forces me to ask what *Geist* is. Because of the limitation of space and because of the fact that it should be argued and presented in detail elsewhere, I shall sketch briefly the discussion comparing Hegelian *Geist* to the "transcendental" in the Kantian sense. Is Hegel's philosophy an instance of transcendental philosophy? I argue that *Geist* is a version of Kantian transcendental philosophy in which there is subject-object duality.

There is a big discussion among the philosophers who think that it is not a kind of Kant's transcendental ego or unity of apperception due to the idea of intersubjectivity and other writers such as Robert Solomon and Charles Taylor<sup>77</sup> who see Hegel as a transcendental philosopher. Robert Solomon and Charles Taylor think that Hegel's philosophy is a version of Kantian transcendental philosophy. For Solomon, the term *Geist* is similar to Kant's transcendental unity

---

<sup>77</sup>Robert R. Williams, "Hegel and Transcendental Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.82, No.11, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Nov., 1985), pp. 595-606.

of apperception. On the other hand, for Klaus Hartmann, Hegel's concept of '*Geist*' is far from Kant's transcendental ego. Instead Hartmann claims that the *Phenomenology* is "one big introductory argument to transcendental philosophy."<sup>78</sup>

We can not say entirely that Hegel's *Geist* is a version of the Kantian transcendental ego because Hegel does not ignore "the relation of human beings to other human beings" and to nature. But also we can not assert without qualification that Hegel's understanding of Geist is entirely different from transcendental ego because it is a central concept of his philosophy. Everything in Hegel's philosophy seems to be generated from *Geist* just as all the categories of understanding in Kant's philosophy is generated from the transcendental ego. Kant indicates by transcendental deduction that the categories of understanding have objective validity. In other words, the categories of understanding are both conditions of our knowledge and the possibility of the objects of experience. The transcendental categories are unified under transcendental unity of apperception: "I think."

When Robert Williams differentiates Hegel's *Geist* from Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, he emphasizes that unlike Kant Hegel's philosophy is "self-justifying." Williams claims that Kant lays down "the conditions of possible experience and of possible objects of experience but he cannot or does not give an account of his ability to do so."<sup>79</sup> But in Hegel's philosophy, it is possible to see self-justification through alienation or dialectical process—that is, through experience. Hegel's departure from transcendental ego ends with dialectical holism.

---

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 595.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 596.

The *Phenomenology* should be conceived as not only phenomenology of consciousness but as phenomenology of *Geist*. One reading of *Geist* is as “a socio-cultural-historical concept” and it can be also read as “a historical transcendental subject.” Jurgen Habermas mentions two different forms of *Geist* in Hegel: the idealist and the intersubjective form. The definition of the idealist form says that *Geist* is “a living identity which divides itself, opposes itself, and returns to itself out of its otherness, alienation, division, etc.”<sup>80</sup> According to the intersubjective form, *Geist* is thought of as “an I which is a We”—that is, a social self. The attainability of this *Geist* which is “an I that is a We” is possible through intersubjective interactions. According to Robert Williams, these two forms of *Geist* can not be strictly separated as both these conceptions are defined in the *Phenomenology*. Williams also adds that these forms refer not only to different “ontolog[ies] of the transcendental region”<sup>81</sup> but also to different senses of “transcendental philosophy.” In fact when we read and evaluate Hegel’s philosophy from Williams’ viewpoint, it explicitly shows us how Hegel is big because Hegel thus looks at the world in broad lines. His philosophy consists both of a transcendental subject that is different from earlier philosophers and also the negation of it by including it differently, emphasizing real world and thus experiences. Hegel points out that *Geist* or self-consciousness can not attain or find

---

<sup>80</sup>Ibid, p. 601.

<sup>81</sup> Williams points out transcendental region in Hegel’s *Phenomenology* by differentiating it from other philosophers’ understanding of transcendental region. Saying by his own words; “...there is a transcendental region which can be entered. However, it cannot be attained all at once, or at a single stroke, as Descartes and the early Husserl thought. Instead, ordinary consciousness (or consciousness in the natural attitude) must be led to the transcendental region through a series of mediated steps. In the course of these mediations, the transcendental standpoint and the standpoint of the natural attitude will be shown not to be fundamentally different.” (*Hegel and Transcendental Philosophy*)

itself through only simple reflection and contemplation. That's why, according to Hegel, it requires intersubjective activity with which Hegel explains recognition.

I believe that Hegel does not give a simple identity of the real with the ideal ground as Williams claimed that "Hegel's concrete identity does not simply identify the real with the ideal ground" because Geist needs time and history in order to attain self-consciousness. In this context, Williams distinguishes Geist from the transcendental subject by pointing out that "Geist, as the form of a world, is historical and has a history."<sup>82</sup>

According to Williams, Hegel's term *Geist* or his philosophical project is not an instance of transcendental philosophy but it is a critique of transcendental philosophy. Merold Westphal writes that Hegel's philosophy or the *absolutes Wissen* must be distinguished from the transcendental region because of its phenomenological journey. Merold Westphal points out that we can distinguish Hegel's philosophy from earlier transcendental projects, in particular, from the Kantian one. In this context, he distinguishes Hegel's philosophy from the earlier ones in three respects: (1) dialectical movement; (2) historically intersubjective mediation of transcendental subject; (3) as a result of these two, Hegel's philosophy goes beyond of Kant's project, moving from "the condition of the possibility of the variety of human experiences to legitimate ontological claims."<sup>83</sup> Consequently,

---

<sup>82</sup> Robert R. Williams, "Hegel and Transcendental Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.82, No.11, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Nov., 1985), pp. 595-606.

<sup>83</sup> Merold Westphal, "Hegel's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.82, No.11, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Nov., 1985), pp. 606-607.

according to Westphal, Hegel's praxis transcendental philosophy is a critique and revision of previous idealist form of transcendental philosophy.

To my mind, in spite of these differences that have just been mentioned, Hegel's Geist is a version of the Kantian transcendental subject in so far as the idealist form Habermas identified obtains.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant points out that "all our knowledge begins with experience" as Hegel later claimed. Kant, thus, agrees with empiricists by mentioning experience as the root of knowledge. On the other hand, in contrast to empiricists, he tries to find out how these possible experiences can be made sense of thinking. Therefore, Kant mentions the categories in order to arrange experience and conceive it. According to Kant, only the transcendental subject has transcendental predicates. As I explained in the Marx chapter, Marx says that Hegel gives priority to the predicates instead of the subject. Similarly, Kant mentions pure activity of subjectivity in his philosophy. It enables Kant to think of the transcendental subject as pure activity without activity of objects. Thus we can say that Hegel is an idealist in the same way Kant is: they both avoid attributing activity to the proper subjects, that is, what is concrete and material. In Hegel everything develops through a spiritual process—dialectical or alienation movement. I think that it is similar with Kant's transcendental subject or transcendental unity of apperception which enables human being to get knowledge through experience.

But I should note that I cannot say there is no difference between Hegel's Geist and Kant's transcendental subject. I have tried to give a brief explanation of the similarities and differences which enable me to think what the relation between them is.

Hegel does this by writing the notion of reciprocity into the very concept of *Geist*. The term reciprocity provides a relation with experience. This relation with experience can be analyzed both in terms of (1) the concept of *praxis* and (2) Hegel's understanding of intersubjectivity.

### **II.2.3.1 Hegel's departure from the transcendental idealism**

In Hegel, there is a transition from consciousness to self-consciousness that marks a radical departure by Hegel from Kant and (traditional/transcendental) idealism. Consciousness translates into self-consciousness through *praxis* (work, labour) within the experience of consciousness. Thus, as Williams states, there is a movement from transcendental deductions to descriptive phenomenology by Hegel's philosophy.<sup>84</sup> I will briefly explain below how Hegel does this in the *Phenomenology*.

#### ***Sense-certainty:***

Hegel gives the first form of consciousness in the first section of the *Phenomenology* which is the explanation of sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is the first step of natural consciousness and the simplest form of knowledge. "Knowledge in its first phase, or *immediate* Spirit, is the non-spiritual, i.e. *sense-consciousness*."<sup>85</sup> In this first phase of consciousness, the position of the object with regard to the subject is in the context of sensation. This form of knowledge at first appears to be the truest and simplest form of knowledge because it is the

---

<sup>84</sup> Robert R. Williams, "Hegel's Concept of Geist", from *G. W. F. Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 544.

<sup>85</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit", Preface, § 27, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 57.

knowledge of what is immediate. In this first phase of consciousness, our approach to the object supposedly does not alter it. In other words, nothing is attributed to the object or nothing is omitted from the object.

We can say that sense-certainty is similar to a baby's perception that perceives what it sees "now" and "here". Consciousness, in this first phase of consciousness, is pure "I" (that is, this subject has not a complex thinking ability), and it perceives the object as a pure "This". The relation between "I" and "This" is a simple relation. "Now" and "here" complete "this" because "this" is based on time and place. Having characterized sense consciousness thus, Hegel demonstrates that sense consciousness indeed turns out to be the most abstract and universal form of knowledge. The pure "I" is universal as referring to everyone. The "this", 'now' and 'here' also require the mediation of universal concepts. They are defined in abstract form and as the universal.

In short, in the first stage of consciousness, the object is conceived only in terms of the "now" and "here," and it appears to us to have the most content and certainty. But indeed, it does not have mediation and determination. Therefore we understand the universal as a basic component of sense-certainty.

***Perception and Understanding:***

Then, the realization of this contradiction moves consciousness, -sense-certainty- into the next stage. This is the stage of consciousness of perception. Here, everything is recorded carefully, observed and classified. When we look, we perceive the natural relations among objects and we comprehend cause-effect relationship. This stage is based on understanding. There seems to be the effect of Kant in this stage. It seems that Hegel thinks of perception along the lines of Kant's

notion of understanding. In that case, in this stage, consciousness can be comprehended in terms of the transcendental ego which provides the forms and categories for collecting and organizing the variety around the world.

But Hegel charges Kant with leaving the subject outside. According to Hegel, Kant mentions the *self*, but Kant's *self* only tends to get the knowledge of objects. For Hegel, this *self* lacks individuality or personality. In other words, for Hegel, it is not possible that the *self* could think over itself. It can be explained that human being does not only try to explain the external world but also tries to understand itself. Thus s/he gives the name of "I" to that being. S/he mentions "I" by turning back on itself. To speak of the *self* depends on saying 'I' and it is only possible by way of 'Desire'. The relation between 'Desire' and self-consciousness will be explained in detail below.

### ***Self-consciousness:***

This second stage is the negation of the first stage where consciousness' thought in universal categories was immediate and undifferentiated. Thus, the second stage is alienation from the first immediate and undifferentiated stage towards meditation and difference. In this second stage, self-existence is explored in terms of the existence of the *other*. Self-consciousness is born only when self-consciousness recognizes itself in-itself and in-other-self.<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> If something is '*in-itself*' it means that it is an independent, abstract something which comes to our attention immediately. In the *Phenomenology*, in the Preface, Hegel mentions "*in itself*, that life is indeed one of untroubled equality and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the overcoming alienation, are not serious matters." (G. W. F. Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit", Preface, §19, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 53) Hegel says that this *in itself* is out of context of 'the self-movement of the form.' (G. W. F. Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit", Preface, §19, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 53)



I will elaborate self-consciousness in more detail in the next section.

**Reason:**

Self-consciousness is not the last stage of the *Phenomenology*. It is a process in order to attain the following stages. The last stage is the stage of 'Reason'. It is the negation of second one. Hegel relates spirit to reason which is thought as a truth in the *Phenomenology* and states the following;

Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.<sup>87</sup>

It is the stage where consciousness returns to the unity of first stage but this unity is much richer with differences than the first stage. This stage is the highest level among others stages. It is the reconciliation of the other stages. In other words,

---

There is something there which develops and which is hidden. There is a tendency, possibility and capacity which will become actual. Actuality is considered with determination, negation, alienation and relations with other things. It is not yet *for-itself* which is reflective and explicit and requires alienation. *In-itself* alienates from itself and passes over into *for-itself*. There is something concrete and differentiated but also there still the unity of the *in-itself*. In this case, there is a change there and *in-itself* becomes something else. It is the movement of *being-for-itself*. It is the movement of actualization of *in-itself* towards *being-for-itself*. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel explains that 'the first being is in itself determinate' and secondly 'it passes over into determinate being' which is finite being. This 'finite being sublates itself', that is, alienates itself from itself and 'passes over into the relation of being to its own self, that is, thirdly, into being-for itself' (G. W. F. Hegel, "The Science of Logic: Doctrine of Being", from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 187). *In-itself* has turned into something else, determinate or differentiated being but the *in-itself* is not annihilated and it has still maintained the unity of the original *in-itself*. It has not changed completely but it has developed. Thus *in-itself* has passed over into "being to its own self", that is, "into *being-for-itself*". There is a movement of *in-itself* towards actualization.

In other words there is an alienation from implicit (Miller translates *in itself (an sich)* as "implicit") content (Miller translates *for itself (für sich)* as "explicit") to explicit content. It refers to the movement of consciousness from the first stage towards the second stage: self-consciousness.

reason is the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity. The contradictions, or antinomies and dichotomies are overcome in this last stage of the *Phenomenology* when the finite subject arises as universal self-consciousness.

#### **II.2.4 Geist as Spirit: the living Geist**

Hegel claims that “a self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*”<sup>88</sup> which is a movement of othering. Through the movement of othering, the orientation of a self-consciousness towards another, the immediate world as it was taken up in contemplation will become mediated and reveal itself to consciousness in a more developed and adequate form. When there was an immediate relation between consciousness and its object, human being who contemplates was absorbed by what s/he contemplates. In other words, in contemplation, the knowing subject loses her/himself in the object which is known. Contemplation reveals only the object which shows itself in and by the act of knowing, but not the subject.

But a human being who is absorbed by the object can be brought back to her/himself only by way of a ‘Desire’. Human being’s ‘Desire’ tends to satisfy itself by negating – transforming, assimilating – action. But here ‘Desire’ must be different from ‘Desire’ of animals because ‘Desire’ of animals is based on saving and preserving life. The ‘Desire’ of animals is desire of object. Hence, that kind of desire, the desire of object does not return to itself as self-consciousness does.

---

<sup>87</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* § 48, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 457.

<sup>88</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, §177, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 92.

### **II.24.1 Desire<sup>89</sup>**

Hegel claims that human being is self-consciousness. S/he is conscious of her/himself, conscious of her/his human reality. Due to being conscious of its reality, human being is essentially different from animals. Therefore, human says “I” by becoming conscious of herself/himself which differentiates human from animals. The reason why human being is aware of her/himself by saying “I” is because when s/he says “I”, it means that s/he begins to think over her/himself.

For human being to be able to think over him/herself, human’s desire must be directed toward another ‘Desire.’ Therefore human beings try to satisfy their desire by recognition which requires something other (more) than the satisfaction of physical needs.

“Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in other self-consciousness.”<sup>90</sup>  
That is, for there to be self-consciousness, two self-consciousnesses come face to face. In other words, human desire generates self-consciousness.

### **II.2.4.2 Recognition**

Hegel clearly explains the struggle for ‘recognition’ in the chapter named ‘Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage.’<sup>91</sup> If we mention the notion of recognition, we see two self-consciousnesses and their mutual relation.

---

<sup>89</sup> Here, I should remark that I have been strictly influenced by Kojève’s anthropological reading of Hegel.

<sup>90</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, §175, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 91.

<sup>91</sup> This section is translated by J. B. Baillie as Lordship and Bondage.

There is a war between two self-consciousnesses. They battle for their needs. Moreover, it is not only war for needs but it is the war for ‘recognition (*Anerkennung*).’ That is, Desire which causes human being to be human being must be Desire which is able to risk losing life to attain another value. That is, human being is able to be ready to die in that war in order to gain respect.

Here we must note the importance of understanding what recognition is to our understanding of alienation. According to Williams, recognition presupposes ‘alienation’, ‘struggle’, and ‘conflict’.

Recognition is jointly brought about only by overcoming prior moments of refusal and rejection. Hence recognition essentially involves and presupposes alienation, conflict and struggle, even where such elements are not present on the empirical level.<sup>92</sup>

At the end of this struggle for recognition, there is recognition on one side. On the one-side, one of them (who ends up being the slave) recognizes the other (the master) and on the other-side, the other is recognized. “As such, the two self-consciousnesses are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.”<sup>93</sup> One of these individuals who has risked her/his life will be recognized as an independent self-consciousness. However, the individual who has been afraid of putting her/his life in a risk may be recognized as a dependent person.

---

<sup>92</sup> Robert R. Williams, “Hegel’s Concept of Geist”, from *G. W. F. Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 544.

<sup>93</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, §189, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 95.

However, the ideal goal of recognition is mutual reciprocal recognition. Therefore, Hegel thinks that the one-sided action of recognition is not enough because it is only ideal by way of the reciprocal and mutual action of both selves.

Now I shall explain how this action of recognizing (one-side slave and other-side master) and being recognized is developed in detail because I think the understanding of this recognition as also Hegel has pointed, makes the importance of alienation for Hegel's philosophy easier to comprehend.

The consciousness of master is for itself. While the lord represents the purely subjective aspects of consciousness, the bondsman represents the objective aspects. The relation of master with bondsman is mediated through thinghood or nature. This situation leads slave to be in bondage and it is the chain of slave because s/he could not venture death in order to be an independent self-consciousness individual in the struggle.

#### **II.2.4.3 Work or Labour**

In this case, here, in addition to the basic concepts 'Desire' and 'Recognition', the other concept that is basic and essential for understanding the formulation of self-consciousness is 'Work' or 'Labour.'

The relation between master and nature is also mediated through the slave. The slave is only the person who works on nature, changes and transforms it. The master just enjoys nature but master leaves the aspects of independence of nature to slave who works on nature.

Therefore the master subjects the slave to work by dominating over it or the master dominates the slave by forcing it to work. Thus the slave is an object or an

instrument for the master because the master reduces it to the position of an object. Moreover, the slave works, produces or shapes nature for the service of the master. Thus the domination of the master over slave plays an important role in the formulation of self-consciousness since the slave sees her/his reflection of own consciousness in her/his product or object through work or labour. It is the statement of the term *for-itself*, that is, the consciousness for itself. Through work and labour, according to Hegel,

in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in its own right and on its own account (*an und für sich*).<sup>94</sup>

Therefore, it means that slave is aware of or conscious of what s/he truly is by way of work or labour, that is, it becomes aware of “mind of its own”<sup>95</sup>. In other words, slave (consciousness of it) sees its own independence in the being of the object or its product. Shortly, in the relation between master and slave, the slave makes her/himself an object by way of working which translates material things. Therefore, s/he forms her/himself and s/he reaches the stage of real existence. In other words, Stanley Rosen expresses the importance of work in relation to alienation for human life as follows;

Man enlightens himself through the process of work, which is also a self-estrangement or loss of self in the various forms of spiritual interpretation. Human work is ‘the existence of the pure self as self’.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 196, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row, Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 239.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid*, § 196, p. 240.

<sup>96</sup>Stanley Rosen, *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 191.

As we have seen from the passage, Rosen gives a definition of work as self-estrangement. The self loses itself through the process of work and then it finds itself in its product. In other words, work indicates the existence of human being.

Similarly, *Geist* loses itself and finds itself through work—in its othering or object. It is the evolution or development of *Geist*. The reason why *Geist* evolves is because *Geist* at the beginning of the process is estranged from itself. That's why the evolution or development of *Geist* is to overcome this alienation and to attain self-consciousness as universal. The stage of master/slave consciousness is one of the stages which shows an attempt to overcome alienation for the evolution of *Geist*. It illustrates what Hegel means by his concept of alienation.

As I have explained the relation between slave/master above in detail, at the beginning of this stage consciousness is still alienated from him/herself. The two self-consciousnesses want to know who they are by overcoming their alienated selves. This is possible for Hegel through labour. Here slave manifests itself in his work or by his labour; it is externalization. Hegel mentions the term work and its relation to externalization in the *Phenomenology* as follows;

Labour... is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the *form* of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because it is just for the laborer that the object has independence. This negative mediating agency, the activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalized and passes into condition of permanence.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 195, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 238.

In other words, the slave shows or finds his/her essence in his product of labour. Hegel uses externalization to define the state of the slave. The slave loses him/herself in his/her work in order to find who s/he is through his/her labour. In this stage slave struggles to overcome alienation by working.

It is important to note here, however, that behind the slave's willingness work for the master, lies a concept that reveals a hidden ambiguity in Hegel's approach to work as a way of overcoming alienation: 'fear.' It is fear of the master. This fear leads human being to work or produce objects for the other who forces him/her in order to work for him/herself and also forces him/her to recognize him/her as a master. S/he has to work in order to be alive or to save her/his life. In other words, it is the fear of losing her/his life, that is, it is a fear of death.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, the conflict between the two individuals appears to have ceased, but this does not mean the general alienation of consciousness is resolved. Thus consciousness needs to proceed to the next stage.

Hegel mentions the actuality of self-consciousness and the separation between the individual and substance when "the consciousness that is driven back into itself out of this actuality, *thinks* this its insubstantiality, makes it an object of *thought*"<sup>99</sup>. This is a stoical form of thought which claims that human is independent and free in thinking even if s/he is tied with chains or on a throne. Hegel explains that stoical pure thought goes through Scepticism to find its true reality in the 'unhappy

---

<sup>98</sup>Observing how crucial the role of fear is in facilitating the master/slave dialectic might reveal a subtly ironic attitude that Hegel held towards work. This observation would therefore, lead to an interpretation of Hegel that would bring him closer to Marx.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid*, § 483, p. 506.



consciousness' where the consciousness feels estrangement from the world and also God.

By the same token, in the stage of unhappy consciousness, the consciousness feels in an equal position in the presence of god even if it is slave or master. Here, the consciousness is unhappy because there is a separation between the world and God. Therefore, there is a conflict between the world and the universal because self returns back into itself. This universality is found through actuality in social substance.

#### **II.2.4.4 Intersubjectivity**

And what is oneness without otherness ?  
John Wisdom, 'Gods'

Having looked at "Master and Slave" in detail, it is easy to see how Hegel's conception of *Geist* goes far beyond Kant's transcendental apperception also through intersubjective recognition.

In the *Phenomenology*, *Geist* as manifestation refers not only to an entity<sup>100</sup> but also refers to human agency. In other words, '*Geist*' is the term which is used to refer to "human individuals, human culture and society, and God"<sup>101</sup>. The reason why Hegel thinks, for example, of social and cultural practices as spiritual phenomena is that because for him "they express human self-understandings"<sup>102</sup>. For example,

---

<sup>100</sup> There is different argument about Geist as an entity. For example, while Knox thinks that Geist is transcendental entity, Michael O. Hardimon claims that it is different from transcendent being like the Judeo-Christian God.

<sup>101</sup> Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 42.

(ancient) Greece had its own Greece self-understanding. It was defined and constituted by its own particular self-interpretation and self-understanding it expressed. On the other hand, the idea that *Geist* is self-interpretation or it is the expression of self-understanding does not cause us to think it is mental substance. Rather, *Geist*, as we have explained above, becomes actual by objectifying, expressing and actualizing itself in the world. “*Geist* is ‘constituted’ (in the sense of actualized) by human beings engaging in the social, political, and cultural practices of their community.”<sup>103</sup>

The meaning of this intersubjectivity is based on mutual recognition among self-consciousnesses. We have mentioned the recognition, namely I-I (I-Thou) relation. Hegel defines a new level of recognition; the recognition, namely the I-We relation. As we saw, in the initial position each self engages in a struggle with the other to be recognized for recognition of its freedom. The latter level of recognition is brought about in such a reciprocal recognition. It is a new social reality in which the I becomes We as a member of the community. For Hegel, it is the new social reality called *Geist* (*Spirit*). At that point, self-consciousness is not only a simple form of consciousness which the self reflects to itself. On the contrary, self-consciousness is dependent on the mediation of others. In other words, there is a relation called intersubjective mediation. In this sense, we observe that the social self or the We goes beyond I-I (I-Thou) relation. The relation of I-I causes the We because if there is a mediation among two selves, that is, if there is twofold mediation, there occurs a third over selves. It is named the We or social self. In short, “[i]nstead of a

---

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45.

transcendental ego, Hegel speaks of an I that is also a We, and a We that is also an I.»<sup>104</sup>

But it is interesting that while *Geist* is the result of intersubjective mediation, intersubjective mediation also presupposes Geist. The presupposition of Geist forces us to think that Geist refers to something like the transcendental ego. On the other hand, Hegel rejects the transcendental philosophy by mentioning intersubjectivity.

In other words,

*Geist* is not a transcendental ego, but rather an intersubjective-social self resulting from reciprocal recognition. The introduction of the concept of recognition compels the displacement or drastic modification of transcendental philosophy by depriving transcendental subjectivity of its foundational status. The transcendental is retained, if at all, in a more modest sense of being a medium of access to other-being. Further, other-being is not merely a negation; it is a co-partner in bringing about the We.<sup>105</sup>

Hegel mentions the notion of Spirit (the concept of *Geist*) as intersubjectivity in the *Phenomenology*.

With this, we already have before us the notion of *Spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘we’, and ‘we’ that is ‘I’. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colorful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike

---

<sup>104</sup> Robert R. Williams, “Hegel’s Concept of Geist”, from *G. W. F. Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, p. 540.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, p. 546.

void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.<sup>106</sup>

Here, the notion of spirit is seen as self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Geist is not only the expression of self-consciousness but it is also intersubjectivity as I explained above by referring to quotation. Therefore, it can be said that Geist manifests or presents itself into social institutions where it enables intersubjectivity. In other words, s/he moves beyond framework of here-and-now, that is, to move beyond her/himself and to find himself in a relation with her/his othering.

From this perspective, we can explain that Hegel considers *Geist* as expression of social institutions (e.g., the family and the state) and culture (e.g., art, religion, and philosophy). The social institution of marriage which is the starting point of a contract between two independent individuals, for example, comes out in this point, that is, it comes out in this mutual recognition. This is all about *Geist*.

### **II.3 Alienation in social substance**

The section “Culture and its Realm of Actuality” in “Ethical Life” is where the most crucial discussion of alienation takes place in the *Phenomenology*. As a dialectical movement is somehow situated in every stage of the development of the *Phenomenology*, so it is also in the sequence titled “Ethical Life,” which starts with family.

---

<sup>106</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, Hegel, §177, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 92.

In that section Hegel mentions ‘*social substance*’ or ‘*substance*’ that includes social, political and cultural institutions, where Spirit finds the objective form that is essential to its actualization. Social substance is seen as the objectification of human spirit which “has come into existence ... through centuries of human activity.”<sup>107</sup>

According to Hegel, the creation of human spirit, that is, human’s product is “spiritual.” The natural world is also transformed by human activity and seen as having a “spiritual” character.

This world is a spiritual reality; it is essentially the fusion of individuality with being. This existence is the work of self-consciousness and likewise an actuality immediately present and alien to it, which has a peculiar being of its own, and in which it does not know itself.<sup>108</sup>

It can be claimed that individuality and universality are united in ethical life which includes individual and universal characteristics.

There are two fundamental factors in the life of the spirit in the social self-consciousness, in the social order or world; (1) the universal spirit and (2) individual spirit. The interrelation of the universal and individual spirit provides the spiritual existence of society. Both of these are abstract. On the other hand the realization of spiritual life is possible in and through each of them (individuality and universality).

---

<sup>107</sup> Richard Schacht, *Alienation*, with an introductory essay by Walter Kaufmann New York, 1970, p. 31.

<sup>108</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, §484, trans: J. B. Baillie, 1967, Harper & Row, Publisher: New York, p. 509.

The former starts from the compact solidarity of the social substance, and results in the establishment of separate and individually complete legal personalities. The latter process starts from the rigidly exclusive unity of the individual self and issues in the establishment of a social order of absolutely universal and therefore free wills.<sup>109</sup>

Hegel claims that “the only way in which a collectivity can attain self-consciousness is through the consciousness of its members.”<sup>110</sup> According to him, a community attains self-consciousness when its members identify themselves with its “national principle as expressive of their own self-understanding, and regard its *Volksgeist* as constitutive of their spirit.”<sup>111</sup> The self-consciousness of the national community is only possible when this national community’s members identify themselves with its institutions and practices. This practice refers to the *ethical substance* as Hegel understands. He gives a broad explanation of what ethical substance is in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: Part III*.

In the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel mentions the family, the civil society and the political constitution (state) as constituting ethical substance.

***Family:***

He describes the family “as 'immediate' or natural mind.” As mentioned above, the social institution of marriage is a contract between two independent individuals. On the other hand, in this point, the goal of this first institution is to overcome this

---

<sup>109</sup>*Ibid*, p. 507.

<sup>110</sup>Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 50.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, p. 50.

individualistic contract and thus to attain the universal. In other words, the aim is to transcend individuality to achieve universality, or universal social consciousness.

***Civil society:***

Civil society, for Hegel, means “the 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality”. Civil society is the sphere of social and economic life, that is, “the sphere of social activity where each individual pursues his/her own end”<sup>112</sup>. The principle of civil society as the sphere of social and economic life is based on the principle of subjectivity and individual freedom, or the particular person. According to Hegel, as he has claimed in the *Philosophy of Right*, in civil society the emphasis is on particularity. In civil society, individual has his/her own end as acting independent agent who is responsible for his/her beliefs and actions. But since individuals also depend on their interactions with each other even when they are pursuing their own ends, there is an implicit element of universality also in civil society.

***Political constitution (State):***

By the same token, Hegel says that the political constitution is “the self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic actuality.”<sup>113</sup> In the *Philosophy of Right*, the state is explained as denoting the reunification of independent subjects. Therefore Cohen’s definition says that the family refers to undifferentiated unity,

---

<sup>112</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Right”, §195, from *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 231.

<sup>113</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: Part III)*, § 517, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 246.

civil society to differentiated disunity, and the political constitution (state) to differentiated unity.<sup>114</sup>

In these stages and various social institutions, we can find instances of the alienation of *Geist* and human beings, because subject or consciousness as an individual alienates from itself in order to arrive the universal through civil society by way of externalizing itself. In other words, the individual externalizes itself into civil society as an independent individual and then attains the form of universality in the state through this externalization.

#### **II.4 The meaning of alienation in the *Phenomenology***

In his work the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel uses the term ‘alienation’ in the same meaning as externalization and estrangement. He thinks that the term ‘alienation’ implies the externalization (*Entausserung*) of spirit. Nature or body is the externalization of this spirit. The externalization or alienation is a moment until spirit understands itself as itself completely.

Further, as mentioned before, ‘externalization’ is used in the same meaning with objectivity, that is, *objectification*. Hegel explains that the movement of consciousness evolves through experience which is manifestation of human’s activity. Spirit or mind becomes object through the activity of experience or activity of self. It becomes object in order to be aware of its own self by transforming this object. Thus, according to Hegel, the actuality of substance is possible by way of estrangement. He also adds that the self without estrangement implies that it is without the substantial content.

---

<sup>114</sup> G. A. Cohen, “Marx’s Dialectic of Labour”, *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, Vol: 3, Spring 1974, p. 237.



Such process and activity again, through which the substance becomes actual, are the estrangement of personality, for the immediate self, i.e. the self without estrangement and holding goods as it stands, is without substantial content,...<sup>115</sup>

As Walter Kaufmann mentions in his “Introduction” to Richard Schacht’s *Alienation*, Hegel’s discussion of alienation includes a different conception of man and his place in the world, of spirit, and of the nature of reality. For Hegel, alienation is needed to raise an average person to a high level of culture. In this sense, it is a moment to attain this level. This sense of alienation can be described in two forms; ‘alienation’ and ‘dealienation.’<sup>116</sup>

Hegel uses two terms: ‘*Entausserung*’ (externalization) that is the positing of the object and ‘*Entfremdung*’<sup>117</sup>(estrangement) that experiences the object as an alien reality. In these terms, ‘dealienation’ can be understood as the overcoming of the experience of the object as an alien reality. When the individual overcomes the experience of the object as an alien reality, s/he will be “free” –i.e., at home in the world.

## **II. 5 Overcoming alienation: being at home**

The condition of being at home is related to the concept of alienation. If people do not feel they are at home in the social world, then they are alienated in this world.

---

<sup>115</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 484, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 510.

<sup>116</sup> *Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1996

<sup>117</sup> Richard Schacht, *Alienation*, with an introductory essay by Walter Kaufmann New York: 1970, p. xvii.

In the second stage of spirit, there is a contrast between the individual spirit and universal spirit which the individual seeks to remove. The aim of the individual spirit is to attain universality of spiritual existence. The opposition of the individual and universal factors permeate life. Thus it seems that there is a split in this spiritual life; the individual feels that his/her true life is outside him/her and s/he feels estranged from his/her self altogether.

The contrast and the alienation are only removed by the struggle of individuals and by their own activities. Therefore individual spirit creates a universal objective spiritual realm for him/herself by his/her activity. In this objective spiritual realm that he/she creates, the individual feels that s/he is at home and also feels as free. As he does in many other places, here too Hegel tells us that it is the movement of spirit that is at work in “every form of the individual’s struggle for a substantial spiritual life.”<sup>118</sup> And this “substantial spiritual life” contains all that we refer to by ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, and other ‘intellectual’, ‘economic’, ‘religious’ and ‘ethical’ terms.

As Richard Schacht says in *Alienation*, for Hegel the social substance is not only the creation of spirit but also its objectification/alienation. Culture manifests the development of mind through the process of alienation.

In other words, even though human beings create the world, culture/civilization, they live in; they later look at it as something external and alien. By making use of the idea that his/her world is in fact the result of the activity and self-expression of

---

<sup>118</sup>G.W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 508.

*Geist*, Hegel points out that we must overcome this alienation. That is, we must see that this world which appears external is our product, and reappropriate it.

In Hegel's words, the existence of culture

as also the actuality of self-consciousness, depends on the process that self-consciousness divests itself of its personality, by so doing creates its world, and treats it as something alien and external, of which it must now take possession. But the renunciation of its self-existence is itself the production of the actuality, and in doing so, therefore, self-consciousness *ipso facto* makes itself master of this world.<sup>119</sup>

To understand this point we should keep in mind that for Hegel man's nature does not only include the character of individuality but also the character of universality. Hegel says;

Individuals as a mass are themselves spiritual natures and they therefore embody a dual moment, namely the extreme of *individuality* [*Einzelheit*] which knows and wills *for itself*, and the extreme of *universality* which knows and wills the substantial.<sup>120</sup>

In addition Hegel says that universality is the essence of human consciousness: "Its universality is its significance and its actuality... its significance depends on its having made itself... conformable to what is universal."<sup>121</sup> According to Hegel when the individual loses its universality, he is alienated from himself. "...in part it therein alienates itself from its inner nature, and arrives at the extreme of

---

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid*, §488, p. 514.

<sup>120</sup>G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Right", from *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* edited by Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1991, § 264, p. 287.

<sup>121</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 514.

discordance with itself.”<sup>122</sup> Universality, in this sense, is attainable for Hegel only through unity with the social substance. The individual alienates from itself, from its nature by turning away from the world of social substance; that is, it becomes self-alienated and no longer possesses its essence. In other words, for Hegel, the loss of his universality or loss of being with social substance causes the spirit to be “alienated from its concrete actual consciousness.”<sup>123</sup>

Self-alienation refers to a separation between the essence of individual and its condition. This essence includes human’s individuality and universality. According to Hegel, through the culture the individual gives form to itself. He claims that “this individuality moulds itself by culture to what it inherently is, and only by so doing is it then something *per se* and possessed of concrete existence.”<sup>124</sup>

According to Schacht, Hegel uses the concept of alienation in two different ways. Hegel uses the term

to refer to a separation or discordant relation, such as might obtain between the individual and the social substance, or (as ‘self-alienation’) between one’s actual condition and essential nature...He also uses it to refer to a surrender or sacrifice of particularity and willfulness, in connection with the overcoming of this alienation and reattainment of unity.<sup>125</sup>

Firstly, alienation is described as a separation or discordant relation. That kind of alienation obtains between the individual and social substance. The first sense of

---

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, § 513, p. 535.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, § 528, p. 551.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*, § 489, p. 515.

alienation as a separation means loss of unity with social substance. On the other hand, the second sense is used to refer to sacrifice of human's right in order to make a contract with social substance to attain universal aspect. In other words, there is a unity with social substance. Schacht claims that the first sense of alienation is overcome through this second sense of alienation. In other words, this second sense of alienation is defined as surrender or sacrifice of particularity.

According to me, Schacht's analysis is similar to Cohen's definition that mentions the relations between undifferentiated unity, differentiated disunity and lastly differentiated unity. Here we can tie Cohen's interpretation to Schacht's. Schacht's expression "loss of unity with social substance" refers to Cohen's "differentiated disunity." And thus Schacht's other step "surrendering of the self" is the realization of Cohen's "differentiated unity", that is, universality.

For Hegel it is necessary to overcome these certain types of alienation (in the sense of separation). Thus Schacht says that "unity between the individual and the social substance can be restored (and self-alienation (in the sense of separation) overcome) only if wilful self-assertion given up."<sup>126</sup> In other words Hegel uses the concept of alienation in the term of renunciation. That is, the overcoming of alienation in the first sense is possible by surrendering the particular self, by sacrificing the particular interests and desires.

The truth consists in the fact that this universal accepted objectivity of self-consciousness is reality estranged from it. This objectivity is the universal actuality of the self; but this actuality is directly perversion of the self as

---

<sup>125</sup> Richard Schacht, *Alienation*, with an introductory essay by Walter Kaufmann, Doubleday & Company: New York, 1970, p. 35.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46.

well – it is the loss of its essential being. The reality of the self that was not found in the ethical world has been gained by its reverting into the ‘person.’ What in the case of the former was all harmony and union, comes now on the scene, no doubt in developed form, but self-estranged.<sup>127</sup>

From this quotation as I understand, Hegel says that the self found its actuality by reverting into its personality (particularity) but this is also a self-estrangement, that is, estrangement from the ethical world. Then, Hegel claims, the individual comprehends the substance as something alien to it. In other words, spirit achieves its actuality through being alienated and then overcoming its alienation. ‘Becoming alienated’ and ‘overcoming alienation’ are two processes which whole societies, people and historical traditions actualize their freedom by expressing themselves in otherness. Thus they lose themselves through alienation and then regain themselves through spiritual reconciliation: “Hegel’s understanding of reconciliation incorporates conflict and antagonism.”<sup>128</sup>

Hegel believes that the advance of consciousness to self-consciousness step by step is the advance to Absolute Knowledge which also refers to ‘freedom’ where the subject is not suppressed by the object anymore but where subject becomes free subject in her/his consciousness in and through the object. If somebody feels at home, it means that s/he is free to act and feel.

According to Hegel, the independence of ‘spirit’ and the possibility of freedom come on the scene via praxis, as work or labour. That is to say the *Phenomenology* or the system of Hegel is the description of evolution, that is, it is the development

---

<sup>127</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 483, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 506.

<sup>128</sup> Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 121.

of self-consciousness which is advancing towards freedom by way of experience of consciousness, through praxis.

The dialectical or alienation process of Spirit can be seen not only in the *Phenomenology* but also in the *Encyclopaedia*. We can also see the whole expression of alienation and dialectical process in the *Encyclopaedia* which explains three forms of spirit. It is the other example of Hegel's explanation of alienation. Hegel explains the development of Geist (Spirit, Mind) in the three stages in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* as follows;

(1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the *ideal* totality of the Idea - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be self-contained and free. This is *Mind (Spirit) Subjective*. (2) In the form of *reality*: realized, i.e. in a *world* produced and to be produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. This is *Mind (Spirit) Objective*. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, which essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolute truth. This is *Mind (Spirit) Absolute*.<sup>129</sup>

Hegel maintains that the first two parts of Spirit (subjective and objective spirit) demonstrate finite Spirit. He says that Spirit is infinite but here finitude refers to the disproportion between the Concept (Notion) and reality. Hegel says that the disproportion between the Concept and reality is transcended through two preliminary stages. Subjective spirit which is given to us directly is something that presents itself to itself immediately. It is similar to Being or to Nature because they also present themselves immediately. In other words, it is "self-contained."

Subjective Spirit will include such things as feeling, habit, consciousness, self-consciousness, representations, thought, and practical thought. Objective Spirit, by contrast, will include things like property, contract,

---

<sup>129</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences III)*, § 385, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 26.

wrong, good and evil, family, civil society, the state, and the world history.<sup>130</sup>

As we see from the quotation, in contrast to subjective spirit, objective spirit includes things which human beings produce. In the objective spirit, the spirit realizes itself as producing the world and being produced by the world. Here there is a kind of production, i.e., production of human. In that sense, objective spirit is produced by the human being.

Hegel indicates that these two initial parts of Spirit are necessary to Spirit's freedom and thus they are also necessary to Spirit itself. In other words, the subjective and objective spirit is manifestation of freedom, i.e., freedom of absolute.

Hegel argues that subjective item is taken by Spirit in external, objective forms in order to be itself. However, the subjective items, according to Hegel, are not simply given but spirit produces them by manifesting itself in order to be itself, to be freedom. The integration of subjective and objective spirit provides Absolute Spirit. Moving from the subjective to objective spirit is the movement towards Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit manifests itself as art, religion and philosophy.

Shortly, Hegel mentions in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that at the highest level spirit feels at home with and in its otherness through alienation as objectification. In other words, Hegel considers that objectivity—alienation and otherness are necessary for the development of spirit.

But for Marx, Hegel omits the distinction between objectification and alienation. Thus, in the next chapter, I will try to explain what Marx understands by alienation,



that is, his critique in regard to the distinction of alienation and objectification. Although Marx accepts the positive side of alienation in his philosophy, he criticizes Hegel for not mentioning economical influence of alienation. In my view, the clarification of Marx's notion of alienation is best way to comprehend the term alienation in terms of Hegel's philosophy.

---

<sup>130</sup>Robert M. Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 2005, p. 278.

## CHAPTER III

### MARX ON ALIENATION

#### III.1 Introduction

Marx is an important cornerstone for contemporary philosophy and development of sociological theory. According to the sociological viewpoint, alienation occurs when there is discord between a person and his/her environmental transactions. In this sense, Marx defines and analyzes alienation as human agents' loss of control over their action. While some thinkers claimed that the concept of alienation *is* the main theme only in Marx's early writings, others point out that alienation is the central idea in all of his studies. This latter group also claims that it is possible to see Hegelian aspects in Marx's later studies like the *Grundrisse* published in the 1850s. In the *Grundrisse*, for example which included an economical theory criticizing bourgeois economist Adam Smith and Utopian Socialist Charles Fourier, Marx criticized their treatment of 'work' from a Hegelian perspective.

The *Grundrisse*, then, are as Hegelian as the *Paris Manuscripts* and their publication make it impossible to maintain that only Marx's early writings are of philosophical interest, and that in the later Marx specialist economic

interests have obscured the early humanists vision. The concept of alienation is thus seen to be central to Marx's whole thought, including *Capital*. However concept of alienation, so central to Marx's writings, need examination, for its meaning and implications are far from self-evident.<sup>131</sup>

This quotation supports the idea that Marx followed. Sean Sayers explains the importance of Hegel for Marx as follows;

Hegelian ideas provide the basis for the historical framework which underlies every aspects of Marx's thought and within which his economic and political theories are located. Moreover, Hegelian ideas provide the organizing principles and theoretical framework for whole project of *Capital*, the summation of Marx's life's work and the major undertaking of his later years.<sup>132</sup>

Sayers saw the importance of Hegel for Marx by way of displaying and researching Hegel's trace in Marx's early and later works. Sayers claimed that Hegel's historical and dialectical thought affected Marx's economic and political ideas. But in this chapter my main resources are not Marx's later studies but his early writing, especially, the *Philosophical Manuscripts*.<sup>133</sup>

What I am going to do in this chapter is to answer what the meaning of alienation is in terms of Marx's philosophy. What is Marx's relationship to Hegel? What is Marx's relationship to Feuerbach? What is Feuerbach's critique of Hegel? What do

---

<sup>131</sup> Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, "Introduction" from *Early Political Writings/ Marx*; edited and translated by Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994, p. xxxix.

<sup>132</sup>Sean Sayers, *The importance of Hegel for Marx: Reply to Zarembka*, Historical Materialism, Volume 8, No: 1, 2001, p. 367-372(6).

<sup>133</sup> In my opinion, it is difficult, long and risky way to focus on all Marx's study in this frame. It is dangerous because it can lead us to diverge from our intention and way. But maybe it should be another topic for another thesis.

Marx and Feuerbach mean by alienation? To discuss Marx's relationship to Hegel and Feuerbach will help us to grasp Marx's own understanding of alienation, that is, the subject of this thesis. In this research I am not investigating all of Marx's works but his early studies which are significant to reveal what the concept of alienation implies for Marx.

### **III.2 Marx and the Young Hegelians<sup>134</sup>**

In 1835, Marx went to the University of Bonn to study law. Romanticism's effect was seen here and Schlegel was one of the leading lecturers. Marx was interested in literature there and he did not attend the law class. Then his father sent him to Berlin where was the centre of intellectual life and Hegelianism. He read Hegel and he joined "the fun of Hegel club"<sup>135</sup> whose members were mostly lecturers and advocates of Hegel's philosophy. "This club was the nucleus of Young Hegelian movement in Berlin and flourished in the early 1840s under the name of 'The Free Man'."<sup>136</sup> After that, Marx was not interested in law anymore, but started to concentrate on philosophy. It is difficult to find many documents about the development of Marx's philosophy in that time.

Here I will give a brief explanation of the Hegelian background of Marx's development of philosophy. I think it is the best way to understand how Marx develops his philosophical development by observing the influence of Hegelian

---

<sup>134</sup> You can find much more detail about Young Hegelians and Marx's relation to them from introduction of *Early Political Writings/ Marx* which is translated and edited by Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis.

<sup>135</sup> Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, "Introduction", *Early Political Writings/ Marx*; edited and translated by Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994, p. xii.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, p. xii.

understanding on Marx, especially on his early writings. Since Marx's philosophy or his theory develops step by step. That's why I want to touch on Hegelian's influence on Marx.

Hegel left a big system behind himself after his death and the influence of his philosophy took a great place among the philosophers, especially among German philosophical thought. Hegel's followers are divided into two: Left Hegelians and Right Hegelians. The first difference between Left Hegelians and Right Hegelians was based on theology. The 'right' Hegelians such as H.F.W. Hinrichs and Johann Erdmann employed Hegel's philosophy to defend traditional Christianity. 'Center' Hegelians such as Karl Rosenkranz and Karl Ludwig Michelet, focused on religious dogma by employing Hegelian reinterpretation.

It can be said that Strauss, with his book *the Life of Jesus* founded the Left Hegelian School. The Left Hegelians such as Strauss, Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer derived theologically radical atheistic and humanistic conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.<sup>137</sup> Although both Strauss and Bauer treat the divine as product of human activity and human creation, in 1838 Bauer made even more radical critiques about the Gospels than Strauss. Bauer made his all radical criticism on religion "as self-alienation of man."<sup>138</sup> According to Bauer, in religion, human beings objectify their own spirit as divine and thus they alienate their own spirit from themselves. Bauer gives the task of overcoming this religious alienation to

---

<sup>137</sup>You can find more detail about Young Hegelian in that study: Hegel and Marxism from *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Allen W. Wood, pp. 414

<sup>138</sup> Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, "Introduction", *Early Political Writings/ Marx*; edited and translated by Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994, p. xii.

philosophy by insisting that “humanity united divine and human natures, that in humanity, not in one unique person, subject and object were united.”<sup>139</sup>

Marx focuses on the Young Hegelians with the critique of their theological approach. Also this religious critique or theological issue is important for Marx in developing his views on the influence of alienation on human beings. At that time, Marx discussed theological issues with Bauer and gave his attention to a project including the critiques of the Old Hegelians. Marx, with Bauer, turned his attention to post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy. There are two reasons for Marx to choose the Greek period to study.

First, as he explained in the preliminary notes to his *Dissertation*, he felt that the situation of Greek thinkers after the ‘total philosophy’ of Aristotle was similar to that of Hegel’s disciples after the ‘total philosophy’ of their Master; secondly, Marx was here following Bauer, who had put the concept of self-consciousness, the human mind developing dialectically and freeing itself from enslavement to its own creation, at the centre of his own philosophy.<sup>140</sup>

Under the influence of Bauer, Marx wrote his *Dissertation* which contained a comparison of the natural philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus. This study has important influences for his later academic career.

As Allen Wood claimed, left Hegelian thought “was explicitly linked to political radicalism and the communist worker’s movement by Moses Hess in *The European Triarchy* (1841).”<sup>141</sup> Marx was among these left Hegelians as criticizing Hegel’s

---

<sup>139</sup> William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians*, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 192.

<sup>140</sup> Joseph O’Malley with Richard A. Davis, “Introduction”, *Early Political Writings/ Marx*; edited and translated by Joseph O’Malley with Richard A. Davis, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994, p. xiii.

philosophy like others. Although Marx was one of the other Left Hegelians, later he separated himself from these left-Hegelians such as Strauss and Bauer by criticizing them for still remaining “wholly within the confines of the Hegelian logic.”<sup>142</sup> In this context, in *The German Ideology*, Marx claimed that all of German critical philosophy from David Friedrich Strauss to Stirner was limited to a critic of theology.

Although Marx criticizes these Left Hegelians, he also gives importance to the critique of religion or theology. Furthermore, Early Marx also attached importance to the critical viewpoints to religion and pointed out that the criticism of religion was the starting point of the criticism of political and social relations. In *Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction*, Marx emphasized the priority of criticism of religion and claimed that “for Germany the criticism of religion has been essentially completed, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism.”<sup>143</sup>

Marx saw the negative influences of religion and private property on human beings. In this context, in 1843, he wrote *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* to criticize Hegel's understanding of the state which was, for him, irrational and reflected the contradictions in society resulting from private property.

---

<sup>141</sup> Allen W. Wood, “Hegel and Marxism” from *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, edited by Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 414.

<sup>142</sup> Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844”, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 107.

<sup>143</sup> Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction” from *Karl Marx-Selected Writings*, edited by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge, p. 27.

In 1844, Marx made connection with the first socialist and worker organization in France. At that time, he published his work named the *On The Jewish Question*. This work represents Marx's perception of religion. As he puts it, through religion, "The criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth,...the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics."<sup>144</sup>

In the *Jewish Question*, Marx tries to analyze the causes of religious alienation. He claims that the solution is not the critique of religion or even the abolition of it. Marx, thus, differentiates himself from the Young Hegelian analysis. He presents a political criticism instead of defending the abolition of religion. That is, Marx claims that the universal emancipation for every individual is possible only by a social revolution which will remove private property.

In 1843, Marx turned away from the philosophy of Hegel in order to study political economy, in particular, political economy of Adam Smith and Ricardo School. Marx collected his philosophical and economical ideas in his study of '*the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*,' which is also called '*Parisian Manuscripts*'. In the *Manuscripts*, Marx criticizes not only Hegel's dialectic but also other Young Hegelians' critique of it.

In this work and also in his other works, which he wrote with Engels, '*The Holy Family (1845)*' and '*The German Ideology (1845-46)*', Marx explains the importance of labor through constituting a difference between himself and Hegel by way of labor's economical and ontological dimensions. In these works, the key concept is 'alienation', 'labour', and 'division of labour'. In *The German Ideology*, there is an explanation of labour through which we produce our own means of

---

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27.



subsistence as the main characteristic differentiating us from animals. *The German Ideology* is also an important achievement for the foundation of Marxist terminology.

Marx sees the product of labour as appearance of labour in object, as Hegel claimed. Hegel, in the *Phenomenology* particularly in the chapter 'Master and Slave', sees the importance of labour which plays a role in attaining self-consciousness. The bondsman realizes his own labour through working on things or objects. Thus he understands his power by way of working. Objectification is the embodiment or actualization of labour power in an object. Therefore human realizes her/his own essence.

Hegel's idea of self-creation of man is the main principle in Hegel's work which influenced Marx: man's own labour. But Marx gave a different meaning to the concepts of 'alienation' and 'labor' which he took from Hegel. In the *Paris Manuscripts*, it can be seen that there is Feuerbach's influence and the critiques of Hegel's idea of self-consciousness. Here I will give an explanation of Marx's critique of Hegel's understanding of alienation in terms of two dimensions: (1) its ontological dimension, and (2) its economical dimension. In contrast to Hegel, Marx emphasizes the economic dimension of alienation.

Now I will explain the influence of Feuerbach's understanding of alienation over Marx's development of alienation.

### **III.2.1 Feuerbach**

Marx began to develop his intellectual life under the influence of Feuerbach. Feuerbach underlines the importance of Hegel's philosophy and criticizes him like

Marx. In *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future* Feuerbach thinks that modern philosophy is derived from Hegel's philosophy.

The culmination of modern philosophy is the Hegelian philosophy. The historical necessity and justification of the new philosophy must therefore be derived mainly from a critique of Hegel's<sup>145</sup>

The German philosophy when Feuerbach lived was interested in human beings, so that these aspects affected Feuerbach and he criticized the philosophy of Hegel in terms of the condition of human beings in philosophy and in the world.

In other words, Feuerbach criticized Hegel's philosophy as absolute, abstract, and religious. The philosophy which Feuerbach determined as absolute philosophy was Hegel's absolute philosophy. For Feuerbach and Marx, it was the starting point to criticize Hegel's absolute objective and subjective spirit of philosophy. According to Feuerbach and Marx, in Hegel's philosophy human being did not have a significant role so they criticized Hegel's absolute philosophy firstly in terms of the role of human being in his philosophy.

Feuerbach criticizes Hegel because of the beginning of his philosophy, that is, Hegel negates theology at the starting point but at the end of the negation of theology, the arrival point is again theology. That's why Feuerbach thinks that it is a kind of contradiction. He mentions this situation in *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future* as follows:

The contradiction of modern philosophy, especially of pantheism, consists of the fact that it is the negation of theology from the standpoint of

---

<sup>145</sup> Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, § 19, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future1.htm>

theology or the negation of theology which itself is again theology; this contradiction especially characterizes the Hegelian philosophy.<sup>146</sup>

As we can see in this quotation, Feuerbach claimed that Hegel begins with religion and theology. For Hegel, human is spirit (*Geist*). Feuerbach, in this context, thinks that for modern philosophy and also for Hegel, “the non-material being or being as a pure object of the intellect, is the only true and Absolute Being, that is, God.”<sup>147</sup> Nevertheless, Feuerbach notes a difference between earlier philosophers and Hegel because for Feuerbach, Hegel sees the relationship between “material sensuous being and the non-material being differently.”<sup>148</sup>

According to Feuerbach, the earlier philosophers separated or liberated Absolute or divine being from nature. For Feuerbach, nature refers to sensuousness or matter. Earlier philosophers mentioned self-liberation in itself without taking nature into account. But Hegel “turned the subjective activity into self-activity of the Divine Being. Even God must subject himself to this toil.”<sup>149</sup> Only through this activity, that is, matter posited in Absolute is the self-liberation of freedom from matter possible in terms of the Absolute. The absolute in this way posits itself as matter, as otherness.

Feuerbach claims that Hegel’s philosophy is the exposition of the self-alienation of the Spirit. He thus (like Marx later) differentiates his understanding of alienation from Hegel’s, because in Hegel’s philosophy, alienation is seen as the manifestation of spirit whereas, according to Feuerbach, human beings lose their

---

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, § 21.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*, § 21.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*, § 21.

control over themselves because of religious alienation. In that respect, Hegel's philosophy itself is an instance of religious alienation.

Therefore, Feuerbach aimed to translate this philosophy based on an independent spirit into a humanistic philosophy. In the *Principle of the Philosophy of Future* in 1843, he pointed that the problem was not the problem of the definition of human but the problem of how we rescue her/him from his/her idealist mud. Later he added that the main purpose was to realize the development of human philosophy, that is, anthropology. He presents his idea in the *Principle of the Philosophy of Future* as follows: "The task of the modern era was the realization and humanization of God – the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology."<sup>150</sup>

Feuerbach's critique is a kind of transition from a theological idea or a speculative approach to an anthropological perspective. From this perspective, Feuerbach questions the relation between human being and religion. Feuerbach claims that human beings' religious feelings are a kind of projection of their need for love and the love they could feel for each other onto the concept of God. He develops a humanistic philosophy by presenting the idea of mutual morality where the appropriate kind of I-thou relation would replace the need for religion. This mutual I-thou relation, as seen in the previous chapter, is already there in Hegel, but supported by the idea of the Absolute. By thus getting rid of the Absolute and giving a more anthropological account of religion, Feuerbach thus does a reversal of Hegel.

---

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid*, § 21.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid*, § 1.

### III.2.2 Marx's positive and negative critique of Feuerbach:

Marx was greatly influenced by this project of philosophical anthropology and the idea of performing a doctrinal inversion of Hegel. In *Holy Family*, for instance, he identifies with Feuerbach's humanism: "His humanism was that of the Young Hegelians – the divine was inherent in man, man was God."<sup>151</sup> Feuerbach's humanism is based on overcoming and destroying the dualism between human beings and God. The aim of Feuerbach is to resolve this religious illusion and to return the love of God to the love of humanity. This is his humanism. "...a loving heart is the heart of humanity beating in the individual."<sup>152</sup> Feuerbach claims that human feelings such as love, justice, truth, and charity are detracted from human beings and these feelings are set in God. Thus Feuerbach tried to return to humanity. "He wanted the spirit returned to man."<sup>153</sup> That is, Feuerbach tries to turn theology into anthropology. Marx's critique of the condition of the human being in bourgeois society is based on Feuerbach's anthropological ideas.

For Marx, only Feuerbach reached a serious critical perspective to Hegelian dialectic. He points out that other Young Hegelian critique of Hegel's dialectic does not go beyond (exceed) Hegel's own understanding of dialectic.

Marx explains the achievement of Feuerbach in *Manuscripts*. According to Marx, Feuerbach says that the philosophy of Hegel is no more than religion. This religion

---

<sup>151</sup>William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians*, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 148.

<sup>152</sup> Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, Introduction translated by Zawar Hanfi, 1972, remainder translated by George Eliot, 1957, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/index.htm>

<sup>153</sup>William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians*, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 148.

is a kind of movement and development of ideas. That is, it proceeds through thought. Moreover, the philosophy of Hegel itself is an instance of the alienation of human essence. Marx says that Feuerbach explained Hegel's dialectic process as follows:

Hegel sets out from the estrangement of Substance (in Logic, from the Infinite, the abstractly universal) - from the absolute and fixed abstraction; which means, put popularly, that he rests out from religion and theology.<sup>154</sup>

From this passage we understand that Marx and Feuerbach criticize Hegel's philosophy for beginning from the estrangement of substance, the abstraction of absolute, that is, from religion and theology. Then Hegel suspends the infinite and passes over to the actual, concrete, finite and particular instead of the infinite. This stage is the removal of philosophy, religion and theology. In last level, for them, Hegel "again annuls the positive and restores the abstraction, the infinite – restoration of religion and theology".<sup>155</sup>

In the *Paris Manuscripts 1844*, Marx criticized Left Hegelians such as Strauss and Bauer for not escaping from the Hegelian dialectic. He mentions Feuerbach's supremacy and achievement in philosophy due to differentiating himself from Hegel's understanding of the dialectic approach as follows.

Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the reverse.<sup>156</sup>

---

<sup>154</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 108.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid*, p. 108.

In this sense, Marx identified three achievements of Feuerbach's philosophy in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. Firstly, Feuerbach indicates that Hegel's philosophy is the rationalization of religion which is the mode of the estrangement of human essence. Feuerbach claims that human being is not self-alienation of God, but God is the self-alienation of human beings, since all divine characteristics are created by human beings, that is, human characteristics are objectified into the Divine. Secondly Feuerbach established *true materialism* and real science. It is true materialism because Feuerbach emphasizes "the social relationship 'of man to man'" as "the basic principle of the theory." Marx saw Feuerbach as a materialist because Feuerbach insisted that the task of philosophy is to deal with the external world, the real world (even though, as we shall soon see, Marx later criticized Feuerbach's materialism too). Thirdly, Feuerbach negates the negation of negation which is the expression of "the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively grounded on itself" according to Marx.<sup>157</sup> Still, in the Parisian manuscripts, Marx went beyond Feuerbach also and instead of Feuerbach's idea of mutual morality, he presented the perspective of a communist revolution which enables human beings to get out of alienation and return to themselves.

The critique of Hegelian dialectic by Feuerbach is focused on the application of his materialist critique to religious and philosophical ideology. However Marx is concerned with and extends political economy and political theory by applying Feuerbach's method. This method is Feuerbachian positive criticism. In other

---

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid*, 1978, p. 108.

words, Marx firstly is interested in the critique of alienation resulting from religion and German ideology.

In his work named *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx went into even deeper criticisms of Feuerbach. In this study, instead of the philosophical humanism based on an abstract conception of “human being” found in Feuerbach, Marx explained the social relations of human beings and their material basis. He thus criticized Feuerbach in the following words:

...the things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object, or of contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence, in contradiction to materialism, the *active* side was set forth abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.<sup>158</sup>

The *Theses* refused ‘contemplative materialism’<sup>159</sup> and Feuerbach’s humanism. According to Marx, Feuerbach was not sufficiently materialist. In this sense, in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx mentioned two kinds of materialism—‘contemplative materialism’ and ‘sensuous materialism’— and charged Feuerbach’s philosophy with being contemplative materialism. Marx disclosed Feuerbach’s narrow-mindedness in his criticism of religion and thus he underlined the ‘sensuous activity’<sup>160</sup>. He attacked Feuerbach’s abstract formulation of “I-Thou” from the point of view of Hegel’s objective spirit. Marx thought that the content of Feuerbach’s I-thou formulation was similar to Hegel’s abstract spirit. According to Marx, Feuerbach’s formulation led him to make the abstract human being who was

---

<sup>158</sup> Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”, from *The Marx Reader*, edited by Christopher Pierson, Polity Press, 1997, (from *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp.3-5), p. 92.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 13-15.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 13-15.



separated from the world the basis for philosophy. For Marx, the success of Feuerbach was only to ensure returning from “Absolute Spirit” to the natural human being. Marx claimed that Feuerbach did not go beyond Hegel’s idea. According to Marx, the form of determination of human being by Feuerbach, that is, its emotional existence and its relationship with others indicated that Feuerbach did not go beyond Hegel, because Feuerbach still thought of everything in spiritual form like Hegel. Marx charged Feuerbach for not seeing “thought as a mere material activity” and human being as “a mere product of matter”<sup>161</sup> but like all Young Hegelians, for Feuerbach, human being was both nature and spirit. Thus, for them, the aim of philosophy was to overcome the alienation of spirit from human being. Marx claimed that all Young Hegelians, also including Feuerbach, tried to get the unity of matter and spirit, or, God and human being.

According to Marx, Feuerbach was not aware of the determining role of social and economical circumstances in human’s life while mentioning the relationship between I-thou by way of ‘love’. While Marx attacked Feuerbach and defended Hegel, he said that Hegel explained the importance of facts in social movement for every individual. On the other hand, while Marx attacked Hegel, he used Feuerbach terminology.

As we will see in the following sections, Marx’s ontological critique of Hegel’s conception of alienation makes use of Feuerbach’s method of inversion. But Marx examined the problem of self-alienation and externalization not only by way of religion, but also economy and politics. Thus, he identified three different manifestations of alienation: religious, economic and political. In religious alienation, human’s natural power is translated into god’s holy power. The

---

<sup>161</sup> William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians*, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 15.

economic alienation explained the mode of commodity-production as ideological worshipping of the commodity. The political alienation is formulated by separating state and society.

### **III.2.3 Marx's idea on Religious and political alienation**

Marx's most noteworthy discussion of political alienation takes place in *On the Jewish Question*. According to Meszaros, it was his great significant intellectual development concerning Judaism. In this work, Marx

sharply criticized not only German backwardness and political anachronism that rejected Jewish emancipation, but at the same time also the structure of capitalistic society in general as well as the role of Judaism in the development of capitalism.<sup>162</sup>

But before focusing on political alienation, I want to briefly explain Marx's point of view on the Jewish problem.

Marx was interested in the Jewish problem between 1843 and 1844. He emphasized that religious emancipation is not a real solution for this problem the problem of Judaism and that the problem can be solved only by way of political emancipation. Thus Marx criticized the social and political situation in the Germany and France of his time. In bourgeois society, there is "the public citizen" and "the private individual" and man is separated from 'communal being'. Meszaros said that Marx went to beyond

from the interconnection between religion and the state to the economic, political and family relations which manifest themselves, without exception, in some form of alienation.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> Istvan Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, transcribed by Andy Blunden, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/meszaros/works/alien/index.htm>, 1970, p. 7.

Marx bases his form of alienation on positive and negative critique of Hegel and Feuerbach's approach to alienation. Thus Marx's first critique is founded on the religious and political form of alienation and then moves towards the economical form of alienation.

### **III.3 Marx's relation to Hegel**

Here under this subtitle I will explain the influence of Hegel on Marx's philosophy and in particular the influence of his understanding of alienation. Even though Marx criticizes Hegel, Hegel has also had a positive influence on Marx. Although Marx criticized Hegel because of his philosophical and political perspective, Marx never ignored Hegel's influence on his own philosophical development. Marx acknowledged that he borrowed Hegel's method and his terminology. Marx benefits from Hegel's terms such as dialectic, labour, and alienation. The following excerpt from a letter Marx wrote to Engels in 1858 is an illustration of this influence:

I am getting some nice developments. For instance, I have thrown over the whole doctrine of profit as it has existed up to now. In the method of treatment, the fact that by mere accident I have again glanced through Hegel's *Logic* has been of great service to me-Freiligrath found some volumes of Hegel's which originally belonged to Bakunin and sent them to me as presents. If there should ever be time for such work again, I should greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence, in two or three printers' sheets, what is rational in the method which Hegel discovered but at the same time enveloped in mysticism.<sup>164</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

<sup>164</sup> *Early Political Writings/ Marx*, edited and translated by Joseph O'Malley with Richard A. Davis, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994, p. xxxiv.

Marx and Engels always declared that they paid homage to Hegelian dialectic and underlined how Hegel's dialectical thought enabled them to construct their philosophy, not only the early ones but also the mature ones. The method or structure of their philosophy was established by dialectic. On the other hand, they also differentiated themselves from Hegel by criticizing his dialectical process.

### **III.3.1 Labour or work**

Marx agrees with Hegel about the vital role of work or labour for the existence of human beings in the world. Both according to Hegel and Marx, there is a vital and fundamental relationship between human being and his/her products. His/her product is a kind of expression of his/her own essence. S/he recognizes her/himself in her/his product.

The great thing in Hegel's *Phenomenology* and its final result— the dialectic of negativity as the moving and productive principle— is simply that Hegel grasps the self-development of man as a process, self-loss in the object as objectification, as alienation and the overcoming of this alienation; that he thus grasps the nature of work and comprehends objective man, real because active, as the result of his own work.<sup>165</sup>

Marx claims that the importance of Hegel is that he “conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation.”<sup>166</sup> Thus Marx says that Hegel understands the creation of labour and also he understands that human is the result of this labour.

---

<sup>165</sup> Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, trans, M. Milligan, London: 1958, p. 149.

<sup>166</sup> Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 112.

For both Marx and Hegel, “work has a social and a material aspect.”<sup>167</sup> In work, the worker comes face to face not only with the object but also with the natural world.

Recall that, according to Hegel, in self-consciousness, the human being represents him/herself to him/herself and duplicates himself/herself. But this duplication does not take place only in thought; it also has a practical form. This practical form is work for both Hegel and Marx. It is the practical form of being-for-self. Human being through work transforms, works upon and forms the objects.

According to Hegel, the material relationship between human being and nature is not an immediate relation like the relationship of animal with nature.<sup>168</sup> Human beings do not consume or annihilate nature immediately. On this point also, Marx thinks like Hegel. Marx also emphasizes the differences between human beings and animals in order to touch on the importance of labour or work for human agents. Animals consume the objects around them through the impulse of needs and desire around these needs. Animals are not free because they are dominated by the objects and their desires. They do not have free choice to determine their act and desires. Thus, the human being is different from the animal because human being produces by working and develops his/her situation. In the *German Ideology* Marx focuses on the importance of work in human life and he says that:

---

<sup>167</sup> Sean Sayers, “Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx”, *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1 (107-128), Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, also available online- [www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl), p.108.

<sup>168</sup> Kojève reads Hegel’s philosophy as anthropological viewpoint and here I accept his that perspective for my reading of Hegel.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.<sup>169</sup>

For Marx work is human's 'vital activity', his/her 'species activity', 'man's spiritual essence, and his /her human essence'.

Further, in both Hegel and Marx's philosophy work has social as well as material significance. Marx writes in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* that culture and civilization are the result of objectification of labour and action as Hegel emphasizes. Therefore other human beings recognize him/her through his/her work and product. Marx claimed that;

Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature. ... Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.<sup>170</sup>

---

<sup>169</sup> Karl Marx, "The German Ideology", in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, p. 150.

<sup>170</sup> Karl Marx, *Comment on James Mill*, translated by Clemens Dutt for the 'Collected Works' from internet:  
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/index.htm>

Here in this quotation Marx mentions that human beings realize or recognize themselves through objectifying their individuality in an object. The realization of human being or the realization of her/his individuality is possible through work. The objectification of individuality, that is, the product of human being, is its mirror. Also while s/he satisfies his/her needs, s/he creates object for other human beings. This passage shows the similarity between Marx and Hegel who also mentioned the transition from I-Thou relations to the idea 'I that is a We', through the concepts of work, production, culture, and civilization.

### **III.3.2 Ontological: the differences between Hegel and Marx**

#### **III.3.2.1 Inversion of Hegel**

The differences between Hegel's and Marx's philosophy are based on their content and method. For both philosophers, the form of their philosophies is dialectic. But Marx claimed that his dialectical method is different from Hegel's dialectical method. Marx thought that Hegel was idealist and thus he differentiated himself from Hegel's idealist thought by calling himself a "materialist". According to idealism, reality is not outside the mind but reality is possible only in and through mind. On the contrary, for materialism, reality is independent of the mind. The mind is a product of material-reality, which is not derived from the idea or mind. In the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx points out that materialist activity is concrete and real. In other words, it is not limited by mind or idea.

The aim of Marx in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript* is to explain how Hegelian dialectic is in abstract form and how Hegel reduces human beings to self-consciousness. Following Feuerbach's method, Marx shows that in Hegel, the subject and predicate are in an inverted position and need to be reversed.

The existence of predicates is the subject, so that the subject is the existence of subjectivity, etc.; Hegel transforms the predicates, the objects, into independent entities, but divorced from their actual independence, their subject. Subsequently the actual subject appears as a result, whereas one must start from the actual subject and look at its objectification. The mystical substance, therefore, becomes the actual subject, and the real subject appears as something else, as an element of the mystical substance. Precisely because Hegel starts from the predicates of the general description instead of from the real *ens* (subject), and since, nevertheless, there has to be a bearer of these qualities, the mystical idea becomes this bearer. The dualism consists in the fact that Hegel does not look upon the general as being the actual nature of the actual finite, i.e., of what exists and is determinate, or upon the actual *ens* as the true subject of the infinite.<sup>171</sup>

In other words, according to Marx, Hegel treats what are in fact predicates as an independent subject – for example, Hegel does not think of subjectivity as the characteristic of a particular subject or personality as characteristic of person. Therefore, he does not start from the real subject but from the mystical substance or idea– that is, the predicate. Thus, the predicates replace the subject. Marx claims that he inverts this abstract Hegelian thought. Therefore, he gives the priority to the empirical subject instead conceiving of the predicate as an independent being. Marx claims that if we mention predicates such as subjectivity or personality through the subject, we can escape from the mystical form of idea.

This inversion of the subject and predicate is the key to Marx's critique of Hegel's treatment of alienation. Because to speak of alienation, we have to have in mind who is alienated and what is the alienated form; to speak of overcoming alienation, we need to know where we were before we were alienated, so that we can go back there. Therefore, in speaking of alienation, the starting point is crucial. Because of

---

<sup>171</sup> Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique" *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 18.



the subject-predicate inversion, Hegel takes the Spirit as the starting point, whereas, for Marx, seeing the Spirit as the starting point is already an alienated perspective.

That is why Hegel emphasizes alienation only as part of the process and development of consciousness. Marx points out that, by supposedly overcoming alienation through the dialectic movement, Hegel bypasses the real external dimensions of it. That is, Marx argues that Hegel can not pass beyond the level of consciousness or the dimension of thought. For Hegel the problem of alienation is important only as a stage of consciousness. Therefore, in contrast to the modern use of the term alienation, for Hegel, it has a positive meaning.

According to Marx, there are two errors in Hegel's philosophy. The first error is that when Hegel speaks of the overcoming of alienation through reconciliation, this reconciliation does not take place through a real appropriation by man of his reality, but only through an act of thought. (i.e., it leaves the reality about alienation as Marx understands it un-changed.) Second, Marx argues (as did Feuerbach) that even though Hegel's concept of alienation is the path to and reveals the importance of objective reality, sensuousness, labour, social relations, wealth, the power of state, etc., at the end of Hegel's philosophy, the history of the alienation process and the restoration of this whole alienation turn out to be nothing else but the history of whole production of abstract and absolute points or ways. He thinks these only in their abstract forms.

It might shortly be said that, for Marx, Hegel reveals the idea of dialectic only at the level of consciousness or self-consciousness. Hegel's dialectic starts with abstract idea and finishes with absolute, that is, again with abstraction.

### III.3.2.2 Marx's distinction between objectification and alienation

According to Marx, Hegel emphasizes alienation as objectification but it is an error for him. Marx views alienation “as the particular response of the working man to the externality of the product he produced.”<sup>172</sup> To understand and describe the concept of alienation, Marx uses “the terms *Entfremdung* (alienation or estrangement) and *Entaeusserung* (externalization or alienation)”<sup>173</sup>. These terms are also used by Hegel. However, Marx claims that Hegel made the mistake of identifying objectivity with estrangement and objectification with alienation.

Marx evaluates objectification in a positive way. But alienation is something which human beings suffer from and must be overcome for them to actualize their full potential of being. In this context, Marx distinguishes the term ‘objectification’ from ‘alienation’ as follows;

The product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in a thing. It is the *objectification* of labor. The realization of labor is its objectification. In the viewpoint of political economy this realization of labor appears as the *diminution* of the worker, the objectification as the *loss of and subservience to the object*, and the appropriation as *alienation* (*Entfremdung*), as externalization (*Entaeusserung*).<sup>174</sup>

Unlike Hegel, Marx does not equate objectification with alienation. There is a difference between these two concepts. For Marx, objectification is the character of

---

<sup>172</sup>Irving Louis Horowitz, “On alienation and Social Order”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.27, No.2, Dec, 1966, p. 233.

<sup>173</sup> Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx*, New York: 2004, p. 3.

<sup>174</sup> Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”, *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, p. 61.

all work. This is because for Marx, nature is the ground for the whole process of production and Marx thinks of nature as a material world. Marx emphasizes the importance of the role nature plays in human life in many places in his writings. In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, he writes:

The worker can make nothing without *nature*, without the *sensuous external world*. It is the material wherein his labor realizes itself, wherein it is active, out of which and by means of which it produces.<sup>175</sup>

But as nature furnishes labor with the means of life in the sense that labor cannot *live* without objects upon which labour is exercised, nature also furnishes the means of life in the narrower sense, namely, the means of physical subsistence of the worker himself.<sup>176</sup> In short, Marx emphasizes that objectification is a characteristic of all work, because the human being who works is an objective being.

According to Hegel, on the other hand, nature is the place where consciousness presents itself in order to reach the higher level, absolute knowledge or spirit. The production of labor concretizing in object, for Hegel, is a positive stage which allows the subject to increase the reality of the subject itself or self-consciousness. It is the loss of an important reality but it is the foundation of a new reality. In other words, the loss of an important reality is the foundation of or findable in another reality, which will also be surpassed through the dialectical movement.

According to Hegel, human being as being-for-self and self-consciousness stands against an objective world. This is the negative aspect of work with nature because human beings are separated from nature by means of consciousness. On the other

---

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

hand, human beings overcome that division with nature through work, by shaping, forming and transforming it into something else. That is, it is the positive aspect of nature because now human beings are in relation to nature by working upon nature. Human beings do not purely shape and form, and they transform not only nature or their environment, that is, their world, but also they transform themselves in the world. In other words, it is a kind of process of transformation of human beings into another form.

At that point, Hegel points out that

The human being impregnates the external world with his will. Thereby he humanizes his environment, by showing how it is capable of satisfying him and how it cannot preserve any power of independence against him. Only by means of this effectual activity is he no longer merely in general, but also in particular and in detail, actually aware of himself and at home in his environment.<sup>177</sup>

As we see from the quotation, both Hegel and Marx think that nature is humanized for human's use or needs through work. But while alienation is a feature of the process of self-discovery of spirit in Hegel's view, according to Marx, the realization of labor does not have to mean 'loss of reality', but in capitalism it indicates itself as loss of reality. This is because in capitalism the laborer is deprived of his/her means of life—i.e., nature.

Marx describes the turning of objectification into alienation as follows:

So much does objectification appear as loss of the object that the worker is robbed of the most essential objects not only of life but also of work... So much does the appropriation of the object appear as alienation that the

---

<sup>177</sup> Sean Sayers, "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx", *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1 (107-128), Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, also available online- [www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl), p. 111.

more objects the worker produces, the fewer he can own and the more he falls under the domination of his product, of capital.<sup>178</sup>

The production of labor concretizes in an object, that is, it becomes object. If worker in this concretization feels that his own product of labor does not belong to him, this actualization of labor implies the loss of worker's reality, since the worker's reality is precisely that: the actualization of her/his own labor and her/his production.

Marx expresses the state of human's loss of her/his reality by these concepts: alienation, externalization, "objectification as the loss of and subservience to the object."<sup>179</sup> In other words, objectification equals alienation for Marx only when it implies "loss of and subservience to the object", but it doesn't have to imply that. In other words, objectification of labor does not have to be experienced the way it is experienced in capitalism.

Thus Marx attributes alienation to the capitalist economic system. In the capitalist system, human beings do not have any control over what to do or how to do their production. This situation, for Marx, refers to human beings who are alienated from their activity of production. To understand why this happens, we need to look at the economic critique of alienation as a feature and result of capitalism. As Sayers says

---

<sup>178</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, p. 60.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61.

alienation is a specific feature of work under capitalism. Hegel, by contrast, makes no such distinction; he treats alienation as a universal, ontological, characteristic of self-conscious spirit.<sup>180</sup>

Marx complains that Hegel treats alienation as something that remains at the level of consciousness and does not stress its external causes such as the result of capitalist production, private property, state, etc. In contrast to Hegel, Marx focuses on the problem of alienation in its social, cultural, religious and economical context and not at the level of consciousness.

### **III.4 Economic Critique of Marx**

For Marx, Hegel does not see the destruction of labor on humans in the process of capitalist production. Hegel portrays labor only in positive light in terms of the role it plays in revealing self-consciousness. Marx claims this point as follows:

We note in passing that Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps *labour* as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive side of labour, not its negative side. Labour is the *self-conscious becoming of man* within *alienation*, or the self-conscious becoming of *alienated man*. Hegel knows and acknowledges only labour of the abstractly spiritual kind. Thus, what constitutes the essence of philosophy in general, namely the *alienation of self-knowing man*, or *self-thinking alienated science (Wissenschaft)*, Hegel indeed grasps as its essence, and hence he can synthetically combine the individual moments of philosophy prior to his own and present his own as *the* philosophy. What the other philosophers did – that they grasped the individual moments of nature and of human life as moments of self-consciousness, and indeed of abstract self-consciousness – that Hegel knows to be the doing of philosophy. Hence his science is absolute.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> Sean Sayers, "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx", *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1 (107-128), Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, also available online- [www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl) p. 120.

<sup>181</sup> Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans: Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, transcribed in 2000 for marxist.org by Andy Blunden, 1959

However, Marx sees how labor under conditions of capitalist production turns human beings, their labor-power, and the value their labor produces into commodities. Marx emphasizes that labor does not only produce commodities but under capitalist conditions, it also reduces itself and the worker to a commodity. The product of labor becomes a power and an alien entity. Marx explains this point as:

This fact simply indicates that the object which labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an *alien thing*, as a *power independent* of the producer.<sup>182</sup>

Thus Marx evaluates alienation within a specific institutional context: the economy. According to Marx, human beings and society are defined by their mode of production, that is, how they produce. The mode of production, in return, is determined by the means of production. Thus ‘means of production’ is a basic element of Marx’s terminology. Means of production, together with labour and desires, make up what Marx calls “productive forces”. Means of production enable people to join together socially. Means of production is also what determines human beings’ relation to themselves and the way they relate to the physical world.

In all hitherto existing societies, there is a division between people based on ownership of means of production. It is an expression of class division. In capitalism, it is the bourgeoisie who owns these means of production and the workers (proletariat) lack these means. While class division and ownership of means of production by a certain class is characteristic of all hitherto existing societies, in the capitalist form of society, there is a fundamental change in the

relation between men and the means of production and also the material of production. This change is described in detail in the *German Ideology*. Here we can summarize the gyst of this change as “abstraction of land, labor and capital.” Before the industrial societies, human beings were directly in a connection with their products, with the land and with each other. Therefore, the exploitation of the serf by the lord, for instance, was more obvious and direct. Land was directly the means of production. With the development of manufacture and trade, the capitalist was able to accumulate huge amounts of money and to purchase all means of production including land and labor. Therefore land and labor were treated as abstract commodities. In the *Capital*, Marx also describes how land was forcefully appropriated by the capitalist.<sup>183</sup> Capitalism thus created a new class of landless labourers and a new form of exploitation. Marx relates the reason for estranged labor to this new form of exploitation of proletarian class resulting from private property.

Marx explains the results of private property as an instance of exploitation and also as a form of alienation. In this context, in the *Political and Economical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx describes four types of alienation which directly refer to the work situation: (1) alienation from the process of work; (2) alienation from the products of work; (3) alienation of the worker from himself and (4) alienation of the worker from others. In other words, the worker is alienated (separated) from his/her products become an alien to his/her environment and him/herself.

---

<sup>182</sup> Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”, *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, p. 59.



### **III.4.1 Alienation from the product of labor**

Alienation first manifests itself most explicitly as alienation of the worker from the object which he/she produces. The control of the product s/he produces does not belong to producers but it belongs to the capitalist. As a matter of fact, most of the time, the worker does not even have the money to buy and use what he/she himself/herself has produced. In Marx's words, "[t]he worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more production increases in power and extent."<sup>184</sup>

Why does the worker get poorer the more wealth he produces? To understand this, we need to understand Marx's critique of capitalism as involving a very shrewd form of exploitation: wage-labour. Wage labor which, by the industrial revolution in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, replaced other forms of payment indicates the new form of exploitation. Capitalism is based on exploitation of labour through this wage form.

Formally the capitalist and the laborers are seen as independent from each other but in reality, inevitably there are connections between them. It can be said that capitalist takes the control of means of production from the worker. Thus the worker is alienated from his/her own means of production. The only way the worker can produce is by selling his labour-power to the capitalist. In other words, with the industrial revolution, labour becomes a commodity. It is now sold on the market.

---

<sup>183</sup>Karl Marx, "Capital Vol.1 Chapter 27", *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 122.

<sup>184</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, p. 59.

To understand how wage labor allows for a very subtle and deep form of exploitation, we need to understand Marx's explanation of surplus value. Shortly, when labor appears as a commodity on the market, the capitalist buys the labor-power of the labourer. In doing so, he in fact buys the labourer himself/herself. He has control over the worker; he controls how to pay a wage and how to get the profit from production. As the value of labour-power, he pays the labourer only what is required for the labourer to stay alive. But in fact laborer in a day produces much more than s/he needs in order to stay alive. The capitalist takes advantage of this peculiarity of labour. He makes the labourer produce more than what the laborer requires to stay alive in order to save much more money for his/her own profit. In other words, he appropriates what Marx calls the "surplus value".

Now we can see why the worker gets poorer the more wealth he produces: because the wealth he produces (i.e., surplus) is appropriated by the capitalist. It goes towards making the capitalist rich and so increases the capitalist's power over the worker.

Marx goes on to write:

The worker becomes a cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. The increase in value of the world of things is directly proportional to the decrease in value of human world. Labour not only produces commodities. It also produces itself and worker as a commodity and indeed in the same proportion as it produces commodities in general.<sup>185</sup>

To produce much more means that the worker becomes a cheaper commodity. For increased production decreases the worker's value. Increased production means increased surplus value. Increased surplus value allows the capitalist to buy more

---

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59.

means of production and labor-power. As the capitalist's power increases, the worker's power decreases. Therefore increased commodity production leads to cheaper work (labour) force. This is why Marx says that the more commodities (i.e., surplus) the worker produces, the more he produces himself as a commodity. The condition of the worker depends on how much commodity produces so that the product of labour is opposed to labor.

The product of labour is independent from the producers and has a power over the producers. Because the industrial revolution brought about the abstraction of labour and capital, with the development of industrial society, it has become very difficult to relate products directly with the human beings who produce them themselves. Because the worker sells his labour-power to the capitalist he/she thereby abandons his/her control over the products that get produced. The worker is in a relation to his/her product as an alien person.

The externalization of the worker in his product means not only that his works becomes an object, an external existence, but also that it exists outside him independently, alien, an autonomous power, opposed to him. The life he has given to the object confronts him as hostile and alien.<sup>186</sup>

In light of this analysis, we can see more clearly, why Marx distinguishes between 'objectification' and 'alienation' through an economic critique. As with all cases of work, work under the capitalist conditions is also objectification. Labor is objectified into a commodity. But for Marx, this is not only objectification, but also alienation. It is not the realization of self-consciousness as Hegel claims. It is alienation because the worker is deprived of her/his product.

---

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

### III.4.2 Alienation from the labor process

In the *Manuscripts* Marx writes:

...alienation shows itself not only in the result but in the act of production, in the producing activity itself. How could the laborer come to stand over against the product of his activity as something alien unless in the act of production itself he was alienating himself from himself? The product is only the resumé of the activity of production. If the product of labour is externalization, then production itself must be active externalization, the externalization (*Entaeusserung*) of activity, the activity of externalization. Only alienation—and externalization in the activity of labour—is summarized in the alienation of the object of labour.<sup>187</sup>

Under capitalism, workers lose their control over the process of production. This is because they have sold their labor. This is why Marx says “how could the laborer come to stand over against the product of his activity as something alien unless in the act of production itself he was alienating himself from himself?” By purchasing labor-power, the capitalist also gains the right to control not only what gets produced, but also how it is produced. This is alienating enough.

But it is not the only reason why the worker feels alienated from the process of production. The new manner of production after the industrial revolution was in the manufactory where there was a strict system of discipline. There were new relationships between machines and human.

In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool, in the factory; the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him; here it is the movements of the machines that he must follow. In manufacture the workmen are parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workman, who becomes a mere living appendage.<sup>188</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61.

The important character of the factory production is the division of labour. Before capitalism there was social division of labour. In other words, every person has different branches of production. But with capitalism, detailed division of labour occurred for each branches of production.

This division of labour meant that workers had to specialize in particular tasks, a series of atomized activities, which realized only one or two aspects of their human powers at the expense of all the others.<sup>189</sup>

Therefore the worker experiences work as a very tiresome and unpleasant, unsatisfactory activity. Since, as we know, work is an essential characteristic of human beings for Marx, the alienation from the process has serious implications: it human being's alienation from him/herself.

### **III.4.3 Alienation from human nature, from 'species being'**

The worker has to sell his labor in order to make a living, there is not any voluntary production but a forced production. It means humans are alienated from species-being because of forced work. Work, for Marx, is the essence of human being and his/her species activity, that is, the activity that distinguishes human beings from animals. What does Marx mean by "species-being"? According to Cox, "Marx called our capacity for conscious labor our 'species being'."<sup>190</sup>

He says that human beings are different from animals not only because of consciousness or belief but also because of labor. Labour is the basic concept to

---

<sup>188</sup> Judy Cox, "An Introduction to Marx's Theory of Alienation", Issue 79 of international socialism, *Quarterly Journal of the Socialist Workers Party*, (Britain) Published, July 1998, International Socialism, p. 4.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

answer what human nature is. Marx points out the difference between human beings and animals especially in the *German Ideology*. In the *German Ideology*, Marx claimed that animals such as bees, beavers and ants produce their needs like building nests. On the other hand, they do not do it consciously. In the *Capital*, Marx made his famous description of this;

A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees in this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement.<sup>191</sup>

It may be objected here that Marx then also distinguishes human beings from animals through consciousness, like many other philosophers. However, for Marx, unlike these other philosophers, the development of consciousness is very closely tied to work; it takes place through it. Through work, humans translate their power or capacities into objects by objectifying themselves and by forming or shaping the world. Therefore, they recognize things as objective and real. According to Sayers, this is how work functions as a development of human's consciousness.

Moreover, hunter-gatherer peoples do not produce their means of subsistence (although they make tools). Perhaps the point that Marx is making is that being human is a matter of degree, and that labour is the main means by which human beings develop and become fully human.<sup>192</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>192</sup> Sean Sayers, "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx", *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1 (107-128), Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, also available online- [www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl), p. 109.

From this passage, we also see that, human work has a historical dimension. In contrast to animals, when human beings produce, they translate nature into something else. They add new knowledge to their accomplishments and human beings find the new way of producing human needs, translating nature into things which human beings need. That means that human beings have history. But animals do not have a history. In Cox's words, "[t]he species-nature of animal is an eternal repetition, that of man is transformation, development and change."<sup>193</sup>

Alienated labour, according to Marx, leads human beings to be far away from their species life. To be alienated from species beings means that one human being is alienated from another human being. How does human being alienate from his species?

Marx explains many times in his work about the differences between human being and animal. His aim in describing this difference is to clarify what human being loses through this alienation. Human beings produce or create objects for their needs but if it is taken from them, if they are restricted in freely producing and using these objects, they become alien to their species because, according to Marx, the object of labour is the objectification of human species life. When this object of labour is taken from his/her control, it means that human being loses his/her reality of species life because human being needs to manifest his/her species being through this labour and its object. What is important here is the social character of the production of objects which implies the social character of man as a species being. In the capitalist system, human beings as species being become the means of

---

<sup>193</sup> Judy Cox, "An Introduction to Marx's Theory of Alienation", Issue 79 of international socialism, *Quarterly Journal of the Socialist Workers Party*, (Britain) Published July 1998, International Socialism, p. 2.

individual life because of losing their collective control over their own labour.<sup>194</sup> Labor retains a significant place for Marx in terms of understanding the problem of alienation in capitalist system.

#### **III.4.3.1 Arendt's criticism of Marx**

At this point, it may be useful to mention that Marx's characterization of human beings as "animal labourans" has been seriously criticized by Hannah Arendt. Arendt criticized Marx on the idea of 'labour' by making a distinction between 'work' and 'labour'. She claimed that 'labour' is the term which means satisfying human being's physical needs. According to Arendt, it is the natural activity which animals also engage in to survive. It is in the sphere of necessity. Thus Arendt named the laboring human being 'animal labourans'. The realm of necessity which refers to satisfying bodily needs is a kind of repetitive process of natural life. 'Labour' is not creation but it is only based on satisfying human beings' natural needs. While labour produces, human beings consume it as soon as possible. Conversely, according to Arendt, work creates objects not only for consuming but also for use. That is, it produces and creates enduring objects.

According to Arendt, Marx talked about labour as work and he did not make any distinction between 'labour' and 'work'. While Marx mentioned that human beings feel themselves to be free through 'labour', Arendt maintained that it was possible only through 'work'.

---

<sup>194</sup> Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition 1976, also from internet site: <http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/books/a.php>



### III.4.3.2 Sayers on Marx

According to Sean Sayers, this distinction of Arendt's is unnecessary. These two terms, work and labour, are already combined in human productive activity. For Sean Sayers, Arendt does not understand that while human beings produce objects, they produce something beyond their needs. Human being creates something in a society, that is, in social relation. Human being also creates these social relations while producing or creating. He maintains Arendt's failure as follows.

These arguments are confused and untenable. In the first place, it is impossible to detach 'labour' and 'work' as Arendt suggests: the two are necessarily and inextricably combined in human productive activity. The 'labour' which meets consumption needs also creates a product, it is thus at the same time a form of 'work' in Arendt's sense. For such labour does not simply vanish in consumption: it creates something beyond the satisfaction of material need and the reproduction of 'life'. In its human form at least, it always takes place in a context of social relations and with them the social world. Marx, 'M. Proudhon the economist understands very well that men make cloth, linen or silk materials in definite relations of production. But what he has not understood is that these definite social relations are just as much produced by men as linen, flax, etc'. Arendt has not understood this either.<sup>195</sup>

According to Arendt's claim, labour is vanished as soon as it is produced and it does not create enduring objects. However, according to Sayers as Marx, labour does not only ensure satisfying life but also home, family and the social world are produced by labour. Besides, Sayers claims that

conversely, 'work' in Arendt's sense, the creation of enduring objects of use and a human world, cannot be separated from the activity of production to meet consumer needs. The human and social world always and necessarily arises out of and exists on the basis of productive activity

---

<sup>195</sup> Sean Sayers, "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx", *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1 (107-128), Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003, also available online- [www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl), pp. 116-7.

to meet material needs. This is the materialist theory, at any rate, and Arendt gives no good reasons to question it.<sup>196</sup>

Sayers claims that Arendt treats labour as animal activity and work for her is above the realm of material world. Thus by making the distinction between labour and work, she transcendentalises work. Labour, for Marx, already involves both meanings in itself.

In the history of philosophy, there is little remarkable approach to the role of work. In that point, Sayers differentiated Hegel and Marx's approaches to work or labour from philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Kant who attributed a lower status to labour and saw it merely as a means of meeting lower needs.

Plato and Aristotle regard a fully human life as the life of reason. This requires exemption from physical labour which they look upon as a 'lower' activity catering only to lower needs. For Kant, too, we are rational beings and our physical nature is a lower and merely 'animal' aspect of our being.<sup>197</sup>

Sayers claims that for these philosophers, the role of work carries an instrumental kind of meaning. They do not give a satisfactory definition of labour. Marx illuminates us about the place of work in human life in detail. Although the characteristic of work in capitalist society is based on alienation and thus exploitation, work is nevertheless seen as a 'creative and productive' activity of human beings in order to separate the feature of human being from animal.

---

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>197</sup> Sean Sayers, "Why work? Marx and Human Nature", *Science and Society*, vol. 69, no. 4, October 2005, p. 608.

In addition, unlike human beings, animals also do not produce freely. They only produce in accordance with their needs and to survive. Human beings also have to work on nature in order to survive. However human beings produce also when they are independent from physical needs. For Marx, human beings are not passive consumers but they have creative character to produce enduring objects in their life. That is, they do not only try to satisfy their desires and needs. Sayers uses the term of ‘productive and creative’ beings for defining human nature. He says that human beings create and produce as well as consume. It is this characteristic of human beings that makes surplus value possible—the characteristic that the capitalist exploits and alienates from human beings.

There is one last element of human production that characterizes our species being, and thus our nature. Cox says that “our species being is also a social being, as Marx explained in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript (1844)*: ‘The individual is the social being.’”<sup>198</sup> In other words, the worker does not only relate to the object of work but s/he also is in relation with other human beings through work.

This point takes us to the fourth type of alienation which Marx discusses.

#### **III.4.4 Alienation from fellow human beings**

This kind of alienation results from class antagonisms. Human beings know each other not as individual but by way of products, consuming and selling. That is, they recognize each other only by way of objects. In capitalist society, workers create value but their wages are not equal to the wealth they produce. They create more

---

<sup>198</sup> Judy Cox, “An Introduction to Marx’s Theory of Alienation”, Issue 79 of international socialism, *Quarterly Journal of the Socialist Workers Party*, (Britain) Published July 1998, International Socialism, p. 2.

than they need to be alive. Thus capitalist exploits workers to make accumulation of money by benefiting this human beings' state. Thus it means that capitalist see workers as means or objects in order to much more many. Capitalist thought only his pocket. Therefore, human beings begin to be alien to their fellow human beings because of alienating from his species being or life by becoming objects or means.

In this respect, Marx mentions the characteristic of human species or life is to be productive and creative beings. Sayers maintains that Plato and Kant thought of humans like this. But for Sayers, they thought the realm of reason was primacy place where the productive and creative activities were seen. Rather, Marx insists that humans also act productively and creatively in the material sphere. Besides, Marx adds that humans' creative activity is 'species activity.' Sayers mentions that this approach of human's activity as being based not on material productivity but also being creativity and productivity is "an original and distinctive feature of Marx's approach."<sup>199</sup>

### **III.5 Marx's relation to Hegel reconsidered: Overcoming alienation and feeling at home**

In this section, I will present an interpretation of Marx that reads him as being closer to Hegel than many realize. I think Marx thought much like Hegel about overcoming alienation because Marx takes the idea that alienation is a moment in historical development and that alienation carries the conditions for its overcoming within itself from Hegel and in the case of Marx, the possibility of overcoming alienation lies in the proletariat class which carry and shall actualize the conditions for overcoming alienation in order to attain independent reality. In other words,

---

<sup>199</sup>Sean Sayers, "Why work? Marx and Human Nature", *Science and Society*, vol. 69, no. 4, October 2005, p. 611.

Marx thinks like Hegel that this process in which the worker is alienated is a moment in historical development; but Marx also claims that it will be overcome by a communist revolution.

In this respect, we can present some similarity among Hegel and Marx. When we look at the philosophy of Hegel about this point, we can recognize that in his philosophy also, humans are distinguished from animals through work. According to Hegel, the relation of animal to nature is immediate. This immediate relationship to nature is called by Hegel as 'desire'. Animals behave only by their appetites and instincts. They only desire something in nature and consume, negate it immediately. On the other hand human is not only natural being but also has a consciousness, that is, he/she is self-consciousness being. In Hegel's respect, it can be seen as spiritual activity as Marx claims in the *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts* that productive activity is described as human beings' spiritual essence, human essence. Human beings by having feature of productive activity shape and translate the world and nature into something else. By shaping and forming the world, human being overcomes alienation from the natural world and finishes the separation between human and nature to be in harmony with nature.

The other point where I find Marx closer to Hegel is in their attempt to overcome the dualities between subject-object, labour-product of labour, abstract-concrete, etc. It means that they want to overcome alienation and these dualities referring to contradictions by aiming to reach universality and freedom.

Marx, in his doctorate thesis (1843), said that he considered himself an "idealist" who desired to transform human into genuine human. According to Hegelian Marx, human beings never felt that they were at home. Due to this reason, Marx wanted to

human beings return their essence, that is, their genuine being by way of revolution. In other words, Marx has an ideal of a society where human beings feel at home and he wants to end the kind of society where human beings do not feel free and independent through the Hegelian idea which wants to achieve unity of universality and individuality.

In addition, according to Marx, this capitalist bourgeois world is irrational reality, which does not belong to the human world and whose aim does not contain the human being. In capitalism the aim is profit, and we often neglect to see the obvious truth: that this is not a very rational aim. Thus, Marx's critique of capitalism and alienation contains a very Hegelian element: aiming at a rational world.

There is another strongly Hegelian element in Marx's thought. For Hegel, the rational world is a world which is also universal. In this context, for both Hegel and Marx, the rational world is a universal human world—that is, a world in which they are aware of their own nature as being universal.

In the previous chapter, I have explained how this universality was achieved in Hegel's philosophy step by step. Recall that in *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel perceived civil society as the system of worldly needs. Therefore, human, Hegel qualified, was the membership of civil society as the subject of worldly need. For Hegel and Marx, the determination of human like this does not compose the human universality. For Hegel, human was universal only by way of relating to 'State' which later became the form of concrete reason.

This is not a real solution for Marx. As I explained above, for Marx, the difference between the private citizen and public citizen must be criticized in terms of political alienation. In bourgeois society, there is “the public citizen” and “the private individual” and man is separated from ‘communal being’. Seeing the State as a solution to the problem of alienation is itself a problem. For example, the division between the private and public citizen would not be solved by giving some rights without changing economic reality.

While Hegel tried to discover rationality in the world as it is, Marx saw that the capitalist world is not rational and therefore has to be changed. According to Marx, social and political relations can have true reality only through a proper critique of political, social and economical circumstances.

Why is the aim of the philosophy altering the world? In the *Thesis on Feuerbach*, that is 11<sup>th</sup> thesis, Marx mentions the task of philosophy. According to Marx, to achieve ‘*being at home*,’ it is needed to invert the task of speculative philosophy into the activity of changing the world. According to Marx, the critique of German philosophy (i.e., the critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*) should be based not on the thought of speculative philosophy but on the activity of changing the world. Philosophy can change the world by criticizing social and economic relations.

According to Engels, only Marx succeeded in overcoming Hegel’s philosophy, in particular his dialectical understanding. Besides, this separation brought Marx to the materialist standpoint which is different from the Hegelian idealistic viewpoint.

The materialist view explained the real world, that is, the nature and history, the relationship between nature and history.<sup>200</sup>

Although I have mentioned the differences between Hegel and Marx, I can say that the problem is the same both for Hegel and Marx because both of them want to attain the universal human world which is not an alienated world for human beings. In other words, even though Marx criticizes Hegel, his project is Hegelian at the core. For Marx, if human was in relation with classless society, the universality would be possible in that time. This is why he often claimed (in the *German Ideology*) that the proletariat was the universal class. We can say that when Marx thought that he found a new possibility of human beings in proletariat, he had, in fact, said that he was interested in everything about human beings. The proletariat will realize the universality and equality by fighting exploitation of bourgeoisie.

For Marx, the basic theme is the reality in which we live. The realization of this reality is possible only by overcoming alienation in the capitalist society. For Marx, the overcoming of alienation is only possible through social transformation or revolution and thus we can begin to feel at home in the world not with forced work but with free creation and work.

I think the greatness of Hegel is even if all the critique of Marx concerning not only his concept of alienation but also his all philosophy, he wants to unite particularity and universality by way of not allowing for losing them from his hands or by way of being aware of them singly (one by one). While Marx charges him with being idealist because of reducing everything to mind or thought, Marx himself reduces

---

<sup>200</sup> Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, translated by Progress Publishers, transcription: Paul Taylor, online version: Marx Engels Internet Archive, 1946.



everything to material relationships. Contrary, Hegel tries to unite two of physical (matter) and spiritual in one thing without losing their place and importance for each of them.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **EVALUATION**

I have tried to explain two different and important basic approaches to the problem of alienation: Hegel's and Marx's approaches. I have emphasized the importance of the movement of alienation in the philosophy of Hegel and its relations to and differences from Marx's theory by way of an ontological and etymological analysis. Besides, in this study, I have tried to understand and explain the understanding of alienation in Hegel's philosophy by considering the historical background of alienation and by understanding Marx's critique of the Hegelian understanding of alienation.

Therefore, as is evident by now, I have attempted to find and understand some answers of these questions: first "how did Hegel and Marx approach to concept of alienation?", secondly, "what was the difference between Hegel and Marx's understanding of this term?", and thirdly, "how was it possible to overcome alienation both for Hegel and Marx?" To answer these questions I have began from Hegelian understanding of alienation and from there went, through an analysis of Feuerbach's understanding of alienation, to Marx's understanding of the term.

It is a generally held view that Hegel is the first philosopher who philosophically elaborates alienation. He mentions the concept of alienation in his work *Phenomenology of Spirit* which is the basic work for my study. Hegel approaches the problem of alienation from an internal point of view by way of consciousness, but Marx complains that Hegel treats alienation as something that remains at the level of consciousness and does not stress its external causes. In contrast to Hegel, Marx focuses on the problem of alienation in its social, cultural and economical context but not at the level of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

For Hegel, alienation leads spirit to be self-consciousness. In other words, consciousness obtains its existence by way of the process of alienation. In various forms of consciousness found in the *Phenomenology* alienation occurs when consciousness becomes distant from itself or separates itself from itself. But consciousness is continuously renewed with alienation; that is, consciousness is reformed with alienation. In the first step alienation obtains between the individual and other (such as the social institutions, other individuals and nature) and then this alienation is overcome by surrendering the self and thus unity is achieved. The concept of alienation is in fact about the whole process and activity of Spirit which is the description of the activities of all human producers.

In order to understand the development of Marx's concept of alienation, I have first presented a brief overview of Feuerbach's approach to the concept of alienation. It is not my aim to indicate what the meaning of concept of alienation is in terms of Feuerbach in detail but focusing on Feuerbach provides us with a different perspective in evaluating and understanding alienation that sheds light on Hegel and Marx's approaches to the concept. Therefore, I have tried to discuss this concept in terms of Feuerbach's perspective in order to present my thesis's issue

clearly. Feuerbach defined Hegel's philosophy as the expression of Absolute Being. Although Feuerbach criticized Hegel, he also set him apart from earlier philosophers because of being aware of the relationship between non-material being and sensuous being.

According to Feuerbach, alienation has a negative meaning because of religion which refers to the separation between human beings and god. Feuerbach criticizes Hegel's concept of alienation as an instance of religious alienation. Feuerbach tries to explain how human beings can be rescued from this kind of alienation and thus he mentions his humanist understanding which embraces human beings and God in a unity. Therefore, Feuerbach believes that religious alienation would be overcome through "the humanization of God". But for Marx, overcoming religious alienation is not the ultimate solution to the problem of alienation. For Marx, religious alienation must be overcome but he does not agree with Feuerbach's solution. Feuerbach claims that God is self-alienation of human beings in contrast to Hegel who holds that human beings are self-alienation of God. Feuerbach thus inverts Hegel's philosophy and Marx uses this method of inversion in order to criticize Hegel. But Marx claims that Feuerbach mentions only alienation of religion but he ignores the economical and social circumstances. A detailed explanation of these points I have explained in the Marx Chapter.

Marx describes his understanding of alienation especially in his early work, namely, the '*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*', where he uses "the terms *Entfremdung* (alienation or 'estrangement') and *Entaeusserung* ('externalization' or alienation)." The use of terms *Entfremdung* and *Entaeusserung* which are used also by Hegel are basic concepts to understand and describe the concept of alienation in Marx's philosophy.

Marx appreciates Hegel for two things; first for his understanding of dialectic as “self-creation of man as a process” and for his understanding of labour. As I have explained in the previous chapter, we can shortly say that the relation or similarity between Hegel and Marx’s philosophy is based on both the content (substance) and the form of their philosophy. The content (substance) is labour, and the form is dialectic.

Hegel’s concept of alienation is particularly attacked much more by Marx than any other philosopher so that understanding Marx’s conception of alienation it has made it easier for us to understand Hegel’s notion. Marx perceives that in Hegel’s thought, the concept of alienation is defined as an inherent component of the structure of the movement of Geist (i.e., dialectic). It is the manifestation of Spirit itself through dialectic movement in nature, in the activity of human beings—that is, in history, religion, art, and philosophy. The Spirit will finally be free when it overcomes alienation through all of this process. First spirit alienates from itself—that is, going outside of itself by actualizing itself into object—and then tries to overcome this alienation through reconciliation. Marx criticizes this process for being merely an act of thought. For Marx, various kinds of alienation in the *Phenomenology* are nothing else but forms of consciousness and self-consciousness<sup>201</sup>.

Hegel and Marx think differently on human’s activity. According to Hegel, human activity through which people create culture is the expression of the Spirit. And this spirit acts through people. Conversely, Marx insists that spirit is also a creation of

---

<sup>201</sup> For instance, see the *Phenomenology of Spirit: Consciousness: Sense-certainty, Self-consciousness*.

human beings. In other beings human beings are the true agents. In this respect, Marx, like Feuerbach, believes that the structure of Hegel's dialectic can be set right by inverting the subject and the predicate. Marx thinks that Hegel devalues humanity by mentioning the Absolute. For the Absolute is abstract and an alienated feature for human beings. Hegel gives priority to this Absolute instead of human beings.

Because Marx observed that alienation is an inherent component of the structure of Hegel's thought, inverting the structure necessitates a reconsideration of alienation, and a renewed analysis. According to Marx, the root of alienation is not in the mind as Hegel claimed, since he sees the human being as the true subject (and not the Spirit like Hegel). Therefore, he analyses the conditions that cause the control to be lost from the hands of human agents.

In other words, Marx sees Hegel's term 'alienation' as mystification because Hegel, according to Marx, sees the root of alienation at the level of consciousness; it is seen as a process of Spirit. On the other hand, Marx claims that the root of alienation must be analyzed by grasping material relationships such as the relationship between the labourer and her/his product. But evaluating material relations does not support the conclusion that Hegel's concept of alienation is a mystical concept because Hegel and Marx evaluate or see alienation from different viewpoints: ontological and economical. In my opinion, alienation in Hegel's approach cannot be dismissed as mystification simply because of its evaluation in the mind. Hegel's evaluation of alienation is based on an analysis of its ontological dimension.

Here we should take a glance at the dictionary meaning of ‘mystic’, what the concept ‘mystical’ means, and what ‘mystification’ refers to. ‘Mystic’ means “a person who seeks by contemplation and self-surrender to attain unity with the Deity or the absolute, and so reach truths beyond human understanding.”<sup>202</sup> And (1) ‘mystical’ is “relating to mystics or mysticism,”<sup>203</sup> (2) “having a spiritual symbolic or allegorical significance that transcends human understanding,” and (3) “relating to ancient religious mysteries or other occult rites,” and (4) “inspiring a sense of spiritual mystery, awe, and fascination.”<sup>204</sup>

From these definitions, it might be said that Hegel’s term ‘spirit’ or ‘*Geist*’ can be charged with the concept of mystification. However, alienation is only defined as a process or movement in order to attain the Absolute. While Hegel’s conception of *Geist* is hard to understand and may involve mystical elements, the process of alienation itself is not something we are not familiar with or cannot understand.

While Marx takes off from Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel, he does not see alienation in religion as Feuerbach claimed, either. For him, the root of alienation is coming from the material world, that is, from political and economic conditions. Besides, he considers it a function of society and in particular of capitalist society. In short, unlike Hegel who describes alienation as the movement or development of Spirit through nature, human beings (their achievements) and history, Marx emphasizes alienation as the result of economic conditions. Thus, Marx evaluates alienation within a specific institutional context: the economy.

---

<sup>202</sup> *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

For both Hegel and Marx, human beings create/produce their own history and reality through labour or work. In this light, we can see that Hegel, like Marx, attributes a liberating character to labour. The production of objects through labor is the realization or actualization of Spirit: the externalization of Spirit into objects by means of dialectic or the process of alienation. But because of Hegel's emphasis on Spirit, in Hegel's philosophy, the process of alienation has a positive meaning unlike Marx's understanding of it. Marx thinks that Hegel does not realize the negative side of labour and alienation. He says that Hegel only sees the positive side of labour and alienation, because he is uncritical of economic conditions and sees labour and alienation only as essentially mental processes.

While Marx criticizes Hegel's understanding of labour as abstract and mental, he emphasizes his own understanding of labour as concrete and material. In criticizing Hegel's understanding of labour as "abstract mental" labour, Marx expresses that Hegel's intellectual work is alienated from labour that is embodied in real things (objects).<sup>205</sup>

In his early writings, Marx criticizes the Hegelian concept of alienation for conflating alienation with objectification. Marx makes a distinction between these two concepts whereas Hegel does not make any such distinction. Marx sees objectification as a feature of all work, whereas alienation is a feature of capitalist production. While Hegel sees alienation as part of the process of self-realization or self-confirmation of human beings through work, Marx sees alienation as the reduction of human essence to the status of a commodity. Thus "Hegel's



*externalization* of objects becomes, for Marx, the economic production of use values and commodities.”<sup>206</sup>

Marx claims that in capitalist society human beings are alienated from their own labor because the system embraces a mode of production based on private property and the resulting class divisions. The great achievement of Marx is to see the “contradiction” in the capitalist mode of production. In capitalism, all the means of production, including labor itself, the product of labour, and the process of labour are held in the hands of and controlled by one class. Because productive forces are privately owned and controlled, this means that the labourer himself/herself does not control his/her own labour. This is a contradiction. This contradiction causes human beings to be alienated from their own essence, their own labor, the product of their own labour and their own society and relationships.

Accordingly, Marx attempts to change the world by overcoming this contradiction: class contradiction. In other words, he sees the solution for alienation in bringing an end to the capitalist society which causes alienation among human beings by removing the class antagonisms by way of the proletarians. He believes that it will only thus be possible to establish truly human relationships and a mode of production that encompasses the right process of working. This right process of working would not only ensure human beings to meet their needs but also uphold expression of their human nature, that is, their own essence which is not alienated to them.

---

<sup>205</sup> Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans: Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, transcribed in 2000 for marxist.org by Andy Blunden, 1959.

<sup>206</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner, “Alienation from Hegel to Marx”, in *The Two Marxisms*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 180.

This is the solution of Marx concerning the problem of alienation. It will be the achievement of the proletarians. When it will be achieved, human beings will begin “to feel at home”.

At this point, there occurs a question as to whether objectification as alienation is part of the process of self-actualization for self-consciousness as Hegel mentions or whether the conflation of alienation and objectification that Marx underlines in his reading of Hegelian alienation is an additional piece of mystification. In other words, it is a problem whether alienation is indeed a part of the progress of Spirit where self-consciousness eventually finds itself or it is a process where self-consciousness loses itself. As I find the answer for this question is that alienation in terms of Hegel is not only the process where self-consciousness or spirit finds itself but it is also the process where spirit loses itself. First, as I understand, spirit or self-consciousness loses itself by objectifying or embodying itself into object and then it finds itself by negation of this self-alienation by returning into itself. It is, according to, me alienation of alienation, like the statement “negation of negation.” It is like when we try to find ourselves in our experiences and sometimes we lose ourselves in them, that is, we become alienated from ourselves by immersing ourselves into our experiences and then after several experiences it is time to return into ourselves with all our experience.

Shortly, my thesis is a journey which is not only the experience of what I aim to argue but also experience of myself. At the end of this study what I understand and comprehend is that first, the term alienation in Hegel’s philosophy is not a mystifying concept as Marx thought. According to Marx, alienation in Hegel’s philosophy has spiritual meaning and discusses it in its spiritual sense. That is the

reason why Marx claims that it is a mystifying concept, but Hegel also gives a definition of spirit which implies not only an entity like God but also life energy, activity, life, etc. Similarly, in the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx himself speaks of the spiritual dimensions of human beings and their activities<sup>207</sup> as Hegel claimed. According to me, in one sense, Hegel's perspective on spirit through dialectic or alienation process is materialistic if we do not think of spirit (*Geist*) as an entity. In fact this exactly what Marx does when he inverts Hegel (i.e., he ignores *Geist*) and claims that his dialectic is an inversion of Hegel's dialectic. Notwithstanding Marx's economic critique and his critique of the starting point of Hegel, I think Marx could not ignore Hegel's concept of alienation and develop his own conception without it.

Second, I agree with Feuerbach and Marx about contradiction of Hegel that negates theology from standpoint of theology. Also Hegel negates theology and attains again theology through philosophy. In other words, we are already alienated from the starting point of Hegel, which is something we do not know. That is the contradiction in Hegel.

Third, I believe and claim that Hegel and Marx complete each other about alienation because while in Hegel's ontological viewpoint alienation as objectification refers to a self-creativity, activity and also self-discovery, Marx contributes to Hegel's idea by mentioning its economical dimension which is the result of the capitalist mode of production. Hegel mentions alienation in its historical process by describing it as objectification and externalization. Then Marx

---

<sup>207</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1994, pp. 62-63.

comes and describes it from an economical viewpoint in capitalist society, in the mode of production and in the relations of production by differentiating it from objectification.

On the other hand, according to me, Marx is mistaken in claiming that Hegel's alienation is an abstract and a mystifying concept because the experiencing and conceiving of alienation (both as objectification and also as the manner in which capitalist mode of production takes place) is already an abstract process. When we experience alienation in capitalism, even in Marx's description, what we are talking about is a mental experience. And we can say this also about objectification even. The recognition of labor's objectification is again a mental process. Therefore Marx's criticism of alienation as abstraction also applies to his own understanding of alienation.

Fourth, both Hegel and Marx want to overcome alienation in order to attain a humanistic world, that is, universal world based on equality and rationality.

In sum, my thesis arrives at two important allegations: (1) Although Marx attempts to differentiate himself from Hegel's understanding of the alienation process and dialectical movement, he remains much closer to Hegel. In other words, he has not really overcome Hegel. (2) Hegel had always said more things than Marx. That's why Marx could not go beyond him.

(1) For me, Marx could not successfully realize his project which is aimed at overcoming Hegel's so-called idealist approaches in his whole philosophy. As I understand all of my reading and research about the critique of Marx on Hegel as regards particularly his concept of alienation and dialectic, I see that Marx did not

go beyond Hegel's philosophy in the context of his ontological dimension and ontological viewpoint of alienation but he supports the continuity of Hegel's understanding of alienation. In other words, Marx's critique of Hegel's alienation is not the opposite of or a kind of critique of Hegel's alienation as objectification (which is also accepted by Marx positively). I think they simply elaborate different dimensions of alienation. One of them reveals its ontological dimensions whereas the other uncovers its economical dimension. Therefore I think they complete each other, or, to put it more accurately, Marx completes Hegel's understanding of alienation by supplementing its economical dimension.

In other words, Marx stands at a place where he is much closer to Hegel's philosophy, especially his ontology. Here I do not want to merely list their similarities but to point out how close they are in fact to each other through focusing on their differences as well as similarities. In other words, the relation between Hegel and Marx goes beyond similarity, because Marx's differing approach to dialectics and alienation completes Hegel's philosophy rather than overcoming it. For example: as Hegel (then also Marx) emphasizes the importance of labor which shapes and transforms the world, nature and human beings themselves, he puts labor at the basis of human existence; he thinks that labor is a necessary part of the process of existence. Then Marx, by his critique of the capitalist mode of production, adds the economic critique of labour in terms of the conditions of workers or human beings to Hegel's positive understanding of labor.

(2)The reason why I think that Hegel's philosophical viewpoint is not completely a kind of idealism like the earlier philosophers' is because of the twofold of meaning of his term 'spirit'. That is, 'spirit' means not only an entity like God; it also implies life, activity of human beings, vitality, experience, etc. According to me,

this kind of approach to spirit means it is always in interrelationship with the real world, the physical world and I think it also shows us that the entire process of *Geist* is not realized or actualized in the mind. Even though it is completed in the mind, the process, which is just as important as the result, takes place outside. In other words, this process is not only an activity of mind or it is not a mental activity as Marx claimed in the *Manuscripts*. On this point, I thought that Hegel is always ahead of Marx, because Hegel aims to overcome the duality between the subject and object and the duality between the real and the ideal. While Hegel struggles to overcome these dualities, he does not reduce one side to the other. Thus, while he is often read (for example by Marx) as if he reduces everything to mind or consciousness or *Geist*, he in fact tries to unify the two sides. Marx, on the other hand, puts matter at the ground of everything. In this respect, I think Hegel's ontology is more sophisticated than Marx's.

At the end of the process, I discover that I have sometimes found Hegel's philosophy to be as materialistic as Marx's. But I discover that I have achieved this journey by way of Hegel's dialectical or alienation process. That is, I alienate from Hegel and find myself in Marx's philosophy and his critique of Hegel, and finally I have discovered Hegel who at the starting point I was alien to.

## REFERENCES

- Barakat, Halim. "Alienation: A Process of Encounter between Utopian and Reality", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 20, No. 1. Mar., 1969.
- Brazill, William J. *The Young Hegelians*, Yale University Press, 1970.
- Cevizci, Ahmet. *Paradigma: Felsefe Sözlüğü*, Paradigma Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999
- Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996
- C. E. Grimes and Charles E. P. Simmons, "A Reassessment of Alienation in Karl Marx", *The Western Political quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2. Jun., 1970.
- Cohen, G. A. "Marx's Dialectic of Labour", *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, Vol: 3, Spring 1974.
- Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford English Press, 2004.
- Cox, Judy. "An Introduction to Marx's Theory of Alienation", Issue 79 of international socialism, *Quarterly Journal of the Socialist Workers Party*, (Britain) International Socialism, July 1998.
- Dean, Dwight G. "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 26, No: 5, Oct., 1961.
- Dove, Kenley Royce. "Hegel's Phenomenological Method", in *G. W. F Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Volume III, Taylor & Francis Group: London and New York, 2004.

Easton, Loyd D., "Alienation and History in the Early Marx", *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 22, No: 2, Dec., 1961.

Engels, Frederick, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, translated by Progress Publishers, transcription: Paul Taylor, online version: Marx Engels Internet Achieve, 1946.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future1.htm>

Feuerbach, Ludwig. *The Essence of Christianity*, Introduction translated by Zawar Hanfi, 1972, remainder translated by George Eliot, 1957, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/index.htm>

Franklin, Mitchell, "Aspects of the History of theory of Alienated Consciousness", *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.20, No.1, Sep., 1959.

Gouldner, Alvin W. "Alienation from Hegel to Marx", in *The Two Marxisms*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Gottfried, Paul. "On the Social Implications and Context of the Hegelian Dialectic", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 41, No. 3. Jul.- Sep., 1980.

Hardimon, Michael O. *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, Cambridge University Press, 1994

Hegel, G. W. F. "Philosophy of Nature", *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998.

Hegel, G.W.F. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row, Publishers: New York, 1967.

Hegel, G.W.F. "The Phenomenology of Spirit", in *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998.

Hegel, G.W.F. "The Encyclopedia Logic", *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998.



Hegel, G. W. F. *The Phenomenology of Mind (The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: Part III)*, trans: William Wallace, A. V. Miller with foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Hegel, G. W. F. “The Science of Logic: Doctrine of Being”, *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998.

Hegel, G. W. F., “Philosophy of Right”, in *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998.

G.W.F. Hegel, “Philosophy of Right”, from *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* edited by Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Hodgson, Peter C. *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 2005.

Horowitz, Irving Louis. “On alienation and Social Order”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.27, No: 2, Dec., 1966.

Houlgate, Stephen. *The Hegel Reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, USA, 1998.

Hyppolite, Jean. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans: Samuel Cherniok and John Heckman, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974.

Inwood, Michael. *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge, USA, 1992.

Jamison, William S., *Hegel’s Geist*, from internet site:  
[www.geocities.com/williamjamison/Heg/Geist.htm](http://www.geocities.com/williamjamison/Heg/Geist.htm)

Joseph O’Malley and Richard A. Davis, *Early Political Writings/ Marx*, Cambridge (etc): Cambridge University Press; 1994.

Kafka, Franz. *Şato*, Türkçesi: Kamuran Şipal, Cem Yayınevi, 6. Basım, Mart, 2000.

Karl Marx and F. Engels, *Alman İdeolojisi (Feuerbach)*, trans: Sevim Belli, Sol Yayınları, 1976.

Karl Marx and F. Engels, *Komünist Manifesto*, trans: Süleyman Arslan, Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları, Mart 1976.

Knox, Sir T. Malcolm. "A Plea for Hegel", *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, edited by Warren E. Steinkraus, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Kojeve, Alexandre. "The Dialectic of the Real and the Phenomenological Method in Hegel", *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Basic Books, 1969.

Kolakowski, Leszek, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, Vol. I, trans: P. S. Falla, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1978.

Ladner, Gerhart B. "Homo Viator: Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order", *Speculum*, Vol. 42, No. 2, Apr., 1967

Lukacs, George. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, Merlin Press: London, 1975.

MacGreger, David. "Marx's Relationship with Hegel", *Hegel and Marx after the Fall of Communism*, University of Wales Press/Cardiff, 1998.

Marx, Karl. "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction" from *Karl Marx- Selected Writings*, edited by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, Indianapolis/Cambridge

Marx, Karl, *Comment on James Mill*, translated by Clemens Dutt for the 'Collected Works' from internet:  
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/index.htm>

Marx, Karl. "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Robert C. Tucker 2<sup>nd</sup>, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1978.

Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans: Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, transcribed in 2000 for marxist.org by Andy Blunden, 1959.

Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", from *The Marx Reader*, edited by Christopher Pierson, Polity Press, (from *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp.3-5), 1997.

Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, trans, M. Milligan, London: 1958.

- Marx, Karl, *1844 Elyazmaları*, trans: Kenan Somer, Sol Yayınları, 1993.
- Marx, Karl. “Contribution to the Critique”, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited: Robert C. Tucker, 2<sup>nd</sup>, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1978.
- Marx, Karl, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”, *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, edited, with Introduction by Lawrence H. Simon, Hackett Publishing Company. Inc. Indianapolis/ Cambridge, 1994.
- Meszaros, Istvan. *Marx’s Theory of Alienation*, transcribed by Andy Blunden, from internet site: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/meszaros/works/alien/index.htm>, 1970.
- McLaughlin, Paul. “Negation: Bakunin and Bauer”, *Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Anarchism*, New York: Algora Publishing, 2002.
- McLellan, David. *Marx before Marxism*, Harper Row Publishers, New York, Evanston, 1970.
- McLellan, David. “Bruno Bauer on Christianity, Alienation, and the Dialectics of Religious Consciousness”, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980.
- Mills, C. Wright. “On Reason and Freedom”, from *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Mueller, Gustav E. “The Hegel Legend of “Thesis-Anthesis-Sythesis”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 19, No. 3. Jun., 1958.
- Murchland, Bernard. *The Age of Alienation*, Random House: New York, 1971.
- Murchland, Bernard. “Some Comments on Alienation”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Mar. 1969.
- Nisbet, Robert. *The Quest for Community*, New York: Oxford 1953.
- Ollman, Bertell. *Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1976.

Orman, Enver. "Hegelci Diyalektikte 'Birşey' ve 'Başkası'", *Kutadgubilig: Bilim ve Felsefe Araştırmaları*, No: 9, March 2006.

Overend, Tronn. "Alienation: A Conceptual Analysis", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 35, No: 3, Mar., 1975.

Pippin, Robert B. *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Parkan, Barış. *Alienation*, A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, Philosophy at The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 1996.

Rosen, Stanley. *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1974.

Sayers, Sean. "Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx", *Historical Materialism*, volume 11:1, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, also available online-[www.brill.nl](http://www.brill.nl), 2003.

Sayers, Sean. "Why work? Marx and Human Nature", *Science and Society*, vol. 69, no. 4, October 2005.

Sayers, Sean. "The importance of Hegel for Marx: Reply to Zarembka", *Historical Materialism*, Vol. 8, No: 1, 2001.

*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press Vol.1, 1967.

Schacht, Richard L. *Alienation*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Garden City, 1970.

Solomon, Robert C. *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1983.

Stern, Robert. *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit*, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook: London, New York, 2002.

Stewart, Jon. "The Architectonic of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 55, No. 4., Dec., 1995.

- Timuçin, Afşar. *Felsefe Sözlüğü*, İnsancıl Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994.
- Tucker, Robert C. *The Marx-Engels Reader*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1978.
- Wallace, Robert M. *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 2005.
- Westphal, Merold. "Hegel's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.82, No: 11, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, 1985.
- Williams, Howard. "Ludwig Feuerbach's critique of Religion and the End of Moral Philosophy", *The New Hegelians: Politics and Philosophy in the Hegelian School*, edited by Douglas Moggach, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Williams, Robert R. "Hegel and Transcendental Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.82, No: 11, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. Nov., 1985.
- Williams, Robert R. "Hegel's Concept of Geist", in *G. W. F Hegel Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, Vol. III, Taylor & Francis Group: London and New York, 2004.
- Wood, Allen W. *Karl Marx*, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
- Wood, Allen. "Hegel and Marxism", *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1993.