A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF THE
TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF THE
TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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This thesis aims to analyze the security relations between Turkey and the European Union within the context of enlargement. In this framework, firstly, the historical background of the changing dynamics of their bilateral security relations is studied by focusing both on the Cold War and the Post Cold War periods. In this historical study, more emphasis is put on the Post Cold War period where the changing security understandings of both Turkey and the EU, major developments leading to adoption of new mechanisms by both actors and their impact on their security relations are analyzed. Secondly, after evaluating the importance of security in the European integration and enlargement processes, the security dimension of the Turkish accession, appearing in the official enlargement discourse of the EU actors and in the articles of the leading European think tanks' scholars is examined via the use of content analysis method. Following this study, a critical analysis of the given speeches and articles is made. In the last part, the different security roles ascribed to Turkey by the EU actors and scholars in the related speeches and articles are discussed within the framework of Turkey's accession process.

Accordingly, it is argued in this thesis that although Turkey's significance for European and regional security is accepted by the EU actors and scholars, this is not properly reflected on its accession process.

Keywords: Turkey's security importance, enlargement, European security, hard/soft security, speeches-articles content analysis.

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİNE TÜRK KATILIMININ GÜVENLİK BOYUTUNUN İÇERİK ANALİZİ

Sayın, Ayşe

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu tez Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği güvenlik ilişkilerini genişleme bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede, ilk olarak, hem Soğuk Savaş hem de Soğuk Savaş Sonrası dönemlere odaklanarak ikili güvenlik ilişkilerinin değişen dinamiklerinin tarihsel arka planı incelenmektedir. Bu tarihsel analizde, Türkiye ve AB'nin değişen güvenlik anlayışlarının, her iki aktör tarafından yeni mekanizmaların benimsenmesine öncü olan büyük gelişmelerin ve bunların güvenlik ilişkilerine etkisinin incelendiği Soğuk Savaş Sonrası döneme daha fazla vurgu yapılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, Avrupa entegrasyonu ve genişleme süreçlerinde güvenliğin önemi değerlendirildikten sonra, AB aktörlerinin resmi genişleme konuşmalarında ve öncü Avrupa düşünce kuruluşlarının araştırmacılarının makalelerinde görülen Türk katılımının güvenlik boyutu içerik analizi yöntemi aracılığıyla incelenmektedir. Bu çalışmayı takiben, verilen konuşma ve makalelerin eleştirel analizi yapılmaktadır. Son bölümde, Türkiye'ye, AB aktörleri ve araştırmacıları tarafından ilgili konuşma ve makalelerde yüklenen farklı güvenlik rolleri Türkiye'nin katılım süreci çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. Buna göre, bu tezde

AB aktörleri ve araştırmacıları tarafından Türkiye'nin Avrupa ve bölgesel güvenlik için öneminin kabul edilmesine rağmen, bunun katılım sürecine uygun şekilde yansıtılmadığı iddiası yer almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye'nin güvenlik önemi, genişleme, Avrupa güvenliği, sert/yumuşak güvenlik, konuşma/makale içerik analizi.

To the Memory of My Father, Mithat Sayın

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The security dimension of the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) has been important especially in the Post Cold War era like other aspects (economic and political) which are usually prioritized within the context of enlargement. During the Cold War, the relations between Turkey and the EU (the then EC) were mainly economic in nature. This was caused both by the dynamics of the European security architecture constructed by NATO and the European Community (EC), and by Turkey's traditional security culture. However, in the Post Cold War era and beyond, as a result of global systemic changes (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new types of security threats) and their reflections in the security understandings of Turkey (starting to include soft security mechanisms) and EU (starting to include hard security mechanisms), security interactions have increasingly begun to occupy their bilateral agenda. In light of these developments and the existing relationship between EU enlargements and European security, Turkey's significance for European security has been more emphasized within the framework of its accession process.

Turkey's importance for European security has been usually stressed by Turkish policy makers or élites. While this was linked to its European/Western identity in the past; it is currently linked to its future EU membership. According to some, the claim that "Turkey belongs to Europe and Turkey is a European country" stems from the place of Turkey within the European security architecture; and that the security relations between Turkey and Europe have had a role of anchoring Turkey in the European waters in cases

when Turkey's European identity was questioned.[1] In addition, many Turkish analysts supporting Turkey's EU membership argue that Turkey should be a member of the EU due to its actual and potential contributions to European security. For those analysts, Turkey is an indispensable actor in the European security system in the Post Cold War era and beyond through its contributions to regional stability, its importance for the EU's fight against terrorism, its potential contribution to the EU's energy security, its relations with the Muslim world and its military capabilities.[2] Others refer to Turkey's geopolitical location providing the EU with the possibility of being a crucial actor in the region; and underline its importance for the EU's energy security and its hard power as a contributor to the EU's peacekeeping, peacemaking capabilities. Moreover, they emphasize Turkey's potential to contribute to the EU's civilian power and identity through its "unique profile" and "constructive role" in Middle Eastern conflicts like Arab-Israeli problem.[3] Some others point out Turkey's future EU membership in the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) declared in 2003. Accordingly, an analysis searching for whether the EU's strategic foreign policy priorities and objectives as mentioned in the ESS Document match with those of Turkey, concluded that Turkey and the EU have similar threat perceptions and objectives in the Post Cold War era and "Turkey's membership is a vital part of the development of the Common Foreign and Defense Policy" of the EU.[4] There are also many

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[1] Pınar Bilgin, 'Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinde Güvenlik Kültürünün Rolü', in Cem Karadeli (ed.), *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Avrupa ve Türkiye,* Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 2003, pp. 192-220, p. 193.

[2] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, 'Turkey's Accession to the EU: Its Potential Impact on Common European Security and Defence Policy', in Giovanni Gasparini (ed.), *Turkey and European Security,* Rome and İstanbul: Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV, 2006, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_8.pdf , accessed on 25.06.2007, pp. 13-28.

[3] Serhat Güvenç and Oya Memişoğlu, 'Turkey and Regional Security', in Richard T. Griffiths and Durmuş Özdemir (eds.), *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Process of Incorporation,* İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Publications, 2004, pp. 215-230.

[4] Can Buharali, 'Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards EU Membership: A Security Perspective', *Turkish Policy Quarterly,* Vol.3, No.3, Fall 2004, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_6.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2007, pp. 1-18.

other analysts emphasizing Turkey's EU membership on the basis of its security and strategic contributions to the EU. They draw attention to Turkey's geo-strategic location, military potential, NATO's membership, relations with the countries in the region and efforts in border management, which will play crucial role for the EU's security and even for its global actorness.[5]

While examining bilateral security relations within the context of enlargement, on the side of Turkey, there is more emphasis on Turkey's EU membership by highlighting either Turkey's security contributions or the convergence of their security objectives. In this sense, there are not many studies which legitimize Turkey's accession on security grounds focusing on the EU's perspective. However, security aspect of Turkey's accession is also important for the European actors. One of the scholars writing on the European Union enlargements argues that in the enlargement toward Turkey, the only motive and legitimization used by the European élites has been a pragmatic approach based on a "unilateral" security benefits analysis, which will be brought by Turkey to the EU as a result of its membership. She continues that this pragmatic approach of the European actors comprises Turkey's possible contribution to the EU's security, its geo-strategic position, its importance as a strategic partner and its stability in the region.[6] Therefore, in this thesis, instead of giving similar arguments reflecting well-known pro-EU view in Turkey, the EU's perspective is sought by analyzing the official speeches of key European actors (as primary sources) and the articles of the leading European think

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[5] See for example, Sabiha Şenyücel and Seda Köknel, 'The Strategic Future of Turkey and the EU', *TESEV EU Watch,* No.1, November 2006, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=8FB356B2-3680-E24E-3AA8-9FE57FF926BD&lng=en ,accessed on 04.07.2007, pp. 2-5.; Şadi Ergüvenç, 'EU-Turkey Military Convergence', in Giovanni Gasparini (ed.), *Turkey and European Security,* Rome and İstanbul: Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV, 2006, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_8.pdf, accessed on 25.06.2007, pp. 75-85; Ali Karaosmanoğlu, 'Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri', *Doğu-Batı*, Year:4, No.14, February-March-April 2001, pp. 155-166.

[6] Helene Sjursen, 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No.3, 2002, pp. 491-513.

tanks' scholars (as secondary sources) in order to offer a different contribution to these types of studies in Turkey.

In fact, the idea of studying the speeches of European actors; has been a result of the existence of similar works in Europe. For instance, in a Conference paper[7] presented by a scholar in Europe, the relationship between the Eastern Enlargement and security is searched by examining the speeches of different EU actors like Enlargement Commissioners or the European states' leaders. In that paper, mainly the speeches of those actors, which refer to security aspect of the Eastern Enlargement, are focused. In addition, there is a series of publication entitled "European Worldviews Collection" conducted in 2007 at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (RSCAS). These publications provide the worldviews of certain European actors like the EU High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana or the Commissioner of External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner regarding the EU policies via the analysis of their speeches or interviews.[8] Similar to these, in a MS dissertation[9], official foreign and security policy speeches and statements delivered by Solana between the years 2000 and 2005 are examined in order to find out which foreign policy roles Solana ascribes to the EU. Although in each of the RSCAS publications and in the MS dissertation, the speeches of only one EU actor are studied, this thesis, similar to the aforementioned Conference paper, includes analysis of speeches of

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[7] Atsuko Higashino, 'Securitizing the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Project by Elite, Discourse by Elite', *Paper Presented at the Conference 'Elites and EU Enlargement'*, Bremen, 13-14 May, 2005, http://www.iaw.uni-bremen.de/~jtholen/tagungen/papers/AtsukoHigashino.pdf, accessed on 15.01.2007, pp. 1-21.

[8] Xiana Barros-Garcia, *Effective Multilateralism and the EU as a Military Power: The Worldview of Javier Solana*, Italy: European University Institute Publications,2007, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/07_08.pdf, accessed 07.06.2007. Clara Portela, *Community Policies with a Security Agenda: The Worldview of Benita Ferrero-Waldner,* Italy: European University Institute Publications, 2007, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/07_10.pdf , accessed 07.06.2007.

[9] Jimmy Persson, 'EU Foreign Policy-Role Conceptions in the 21st Century', MS Dissertation, Master of European Affairs in Lund University, Sweden, 2005, http://theses.lub.lu.se/archive/2005/06/01/1117627348-18464-449/EU_Foreign_Policy_-_Role_Conceptions_in_the_21st_Century.PDF , accessed on 27.09.2007.

different European actors like Enlargement Commissioners, the High Representative of CFSP, key European leaders and national Foreign Ministers regarding security dimension of Turkey's accession. In addition, as different from all those works, articles of leading think tanks' scholars are also examined in this thesis, because think tanks are important in terms of affecting and shaping the policies and official speeches of the EU actors.

In order to clarify analysis, there are some fundamental questions to be answered in different parts of the thesis as: Where was Turkey placed in the European security architecture during the Cold War? How has the classical security understanding changed in the Post Cold War era? Which types of developments have occurred in the security perceptions and mechanisms of Turkey and those of the EU in the Post Cold War era? How have these developments affected their bilateral relations? What is the relevance of the security dimension in the official enlargement discourse of the EU actors? Do European actors and scholars see the security aspect of Turkey's accession positively? In other words, how do they evaluate Turkey's security relevance within the framework of its accession process? Although finding clear-cut and consensual answers to these questions may not be easy, such questions are important in shaping the general framework of the thesis by providing a background of the security relations between Turkey and the EU; and also by offering insights about Turkey's security importance in the speeches and articles of the European actors.

This thesis is composed of four chapters. After a general introduction, in the second chapter, the historical background of the changing dynamics of security relations between Turkey and the EC/EU is given. This long period of evolution is divided into two main periods which in turn comprise two sections of this chapter: The first section focuses on the emergence and evolution of the Cold War security architecture of Europe. The role of Turkey in that order is not overviewed instead; Turkey's place within the established division of labour between NATO and the EC is analyzed. Since the Cold War phase of European-Turkey security relations is not the main focus of the thesis, this part

is relatively shorter. In the second section, the changing security understandings of both actors in the post Cold War period, major developments leading to adoption of new mechanisms by Turkey and the EU and their impact on their security relations are analyzed. This part is important for providing a general background for evaluating the speeches and articles of European actors and scholars. In this sense, the analysis in the second part is more detailed.

The third chapter examines firstly the importance of security in the European integration and enlargement processes (with a special focus on the Eastern Enlargement) and then the security aspect of Turkey's accession, which appears in the official enlargement discourse of the EU actors and in the articles of leading scholars. For the purpose of the thesis, speeches and articles of the European actors/scholars are chosen among those, which underline Turkey's security importance in a positive manner. In this respect, the speeches of the EU actors who evaluate the security dimension of this enlargement in negative terms are not covered in this thesis, because they are against Turkey's accession and reject its actual and potential security contributions to the EU from the beginning. Moreover, the democracy or human rights dimensions of Turkey's accession are not included within the security framework of this study; thus, the speeches and articles that are analyzed do not cover the issues of "the civil-military relations" which is related with the democracy dimension of accession. While analyzing those speeches and articles, the time period is taken as between 1999, when Turkey became officially a candidate country of the Union, and December 2007. In addition, the analysis of speeches and articles is conducted under four main themes: Turkey's importance with its regional actorness; with its geopolitical and strategic significance; with its soft security contributions and the potential security loss of the EU by rejecting Turkey.

During the conduct of this study, two research methods exist. First, qualitative research method combined with a comprehensive literature review, which investigates and describes the historical relationships, situations and developments, is used. In this study, books, articles, working papers of research

6

centers and Chaillot Papers dealing with this subject, Presidency Conclusions of the European Union Summits are used to support the study. Moreover, the Internet has become very useful in order to search for the recent official and unofficial documents of the EU, many articles and many think tank sites on European security.

In addition to the qualitative research method, in the third chapter of this thesis, a modest type of "content analysis method" is used. Content analysis is described as "a technique that enables researchers to study human behaviour in an indirect way, through an analysis of their communications."[10] It is also defined as a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words, concepts and phrases that are included explicitly or implicitly within texts or sets of texts (which can be broadly defined as books, book chapters, essays, speeches, interviews, discussions, newspapers, articles, historical documents). It involves the analysis and sometimes the quantification/frequency of the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then making inferences about the messages within the texts. [11] There may be various objectives of the use of content analysis. For instance, two of its most widely accepted objectives in social sciences are; to obtain information that describes an issue or topic and also to formulate themes (in other words major ideas) which help to organize and make sense out of large amounts of descriptive information.[12] In this research method, there are different steps that are followed: Firstly, the material, source (speeches, essays, articles, etc.) of which the content will be examined is decided. Secondly, the unit of analysis (what is to be analyzed in the related material: words, phrases) is specified. Thirdly, categories, which are aspects of the content to be

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[10] Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen, 'Content Analysis', in Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen (eds.), *How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, pp. 482-507, p. 483.

[11] Colorado State University web page, 'Content Analysis Method', http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/ accessed on 02.04.2008.

[12] Fraenkel and Wallen, *op. cit.,* p. 485.

investigated, are determined based on previous knowledge, theory and /or experience. Fourthly, the coding units (codes) are specified, via reading through the materials, as the words, phrases (the smaller parts) which are relevant to the selected categories. The groupings of these codes formulate the general themes under categories. In this sense, codes come together and form themes, which are related to categories. In coding, either the manifest (obvious, explicit or surface content like words or phrases) or the latent (the meaning underlying what is said or shown) content may exist. Finally, all the data is analyzed and at this step, counting of codes may be important in certain content analysis. However, codes and themes may be also used as aids in organizing content and arriving at a narrative description of findings. In this method, it is the researcher who determines his/her limits like the time period or the parts of texts to be used or skipped. [13]

In this respect, the main objective of content analysis used in the third chapter is to describe how do key European actors (Günter Verheugen, Romano Prodi, Olli Rehn, José Manuel Barroso, Javier Solana, Tony Blair and Joschka Fischer) evaluate Turkey's security relevance within the framework of its accession process. The speeches, statements and to a limited extent interviews, of those actors, which are accessed via the European Commission Archives web page, their own web pages or different internet sources, are examined as primary sources (the relevant *material*).

Since the main subject is related with Turkey and its accession, speeches and statements are firstly selected in terms of referring to the key word "Turkey". As a result of this selection, 45 speeches/statements of Verheugen made between March 2000-June 2004, 44 of Prodi made between October 1999-July 2004, 69 of Rehn made between October 2004-November 2007, 9 of Barroso made between December 2004-May 2007, 86 of Solana made between January 2000-December 2007, 22 of Blair made between November 2002-December 2006 and 7 of Fischer made between April 2004-November 2006,

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[13] *Ibid.,* pp. 485-488.

are found out. Some of these speeches are either directly related with Turkey or just refer to it. Phrases or sentences used by the actors in those speeches are specified as the *unit of analysis*.

In this study, only one *category*, which is the "security aspect of Turkey's accession" (that is referred positively), is determined rather than focusing on other categories like economic or political ones. In line with this category, another selection is made with regard to the concept of "security" or "concepts reminding security" such as "stability", "peace". This selection is important for determining coding units (codes). Accordingly, the *codes* used in this analysis are:

- European security, stability and peace

- Regional and international security and stability

- EU's foreign and security policy

- ESDP

- Fight against terrorism

- EU's global actorness

- Geopolitical and strategic significance

- Cultural and historical heritage

- Bridge between West and Islamic World

- Example against 'clash of civilizations thesis'

- Model for Islamic World

- Moderator between West and Islamic World

- Energy security

- Border management

- Loss of EU by rejecting Turkey

After this selection, 50 speeches/statements in total are found as those, which include sentences/phrases (units of analysis) referring to both Turkey and one or more of these codes positively. In this analysis, either *manifest* or *latent* content is coded. In other words, phrases including the codes, either which are obviously seen or which can be inferred from the sentences, are examined. For instance, while sometimes the phrases that involve obviously "Turkey's

9

contributions to *regional and international security and stability*" can be analyzed, the sentences that include "Turkey's contribution to security and stability of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans" can be also examined.

After determining these codes, they are grouped according to their common meanings. Those groupings formulate the general *themes* of the thesis, which are:

- Turkey's importance with its regional actorness

- Turkey's importance with its geopolitical and strategic significance

- Turkey's importance with its soft security contributions

- The potential security loss of the EU by rejecting Turkey

In this chapter, as the secondary sources, 17 articles of scholars from leading European think-tanks like IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali-International Affairs Institute), CER (Center for European Reform), CEPS (Center for European Policy Studies), CERI (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales-Center of International Studies and Researches), IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales- Royal Institute of International Relations), Friends of Europe, SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), EPC (European Policy Centre), ZEI (Zentrum für Europaische Integrationsforschung-Center for European Integration Studies) and 2 documents as the Report of Independent Commission on Turkey (2004) and the Commission Staff Working Document (2004) are examined by using similar method. First of all, articles are selected from the afore-mentioned think tanks' web pages as those, which were written by analysts between 1999 and 2007 and which are related with Turkey. Secondly, another selection is made in order to determine those that refer to the security aspect of Turkey's accession. As a result of these steps, articles that include the same (previously determined) codes and themes with the speeches are analyzed. However, different from speeches, not all the articles written on this subject are examined in the thesis. Thus, analysis is limited with only one or two example articles from each think tank.

Finally, both speeches and articles including the same codes are organized under the four themes and they are narratively described and commented in the light of space (context and audience) and time of speeches/articles. In fact, the codes together with the general themes constitute the different *roles ascribed to Turkey* by the EU actors, because they are all related with Turkey's efforts in terms of providing security and stability in the region.

There are some limitations in using this methodology. First of all, although most of content analysis concentrates more on the word counts and statistical analysis of codes rather than the general context, my main purpose is not to find out the frequency of appearance of those codes (in this case roles), but to understand how the European actors or scholars relate Turkey's different actual or potential security contributions to its accession process. Secondly, when the latent content is coded, this may result in the reliability problem, which means that subjective judgements may be included to some degree. However, in order to diminish the bias towards subjectivity, the coding of latent content is maintained limited. Thirdly, these speeches and articles belong to different European actors and scholars rather than one actor, thus this renders the analysis difficult and may be a little unbalanced in terms of selected people. As a matter of fact, those EU actors are selected in accordance with their positions; for instance Enlargement Commissioners are chosen since the issue is related with Turkey's accession and the High Representative of CFSP is selected as the issue is also related with the security aspect. Similarly, scholars are selected among those who write articles on Turkey and who also refer to its security contributions. Finally, when speeches and statements are taken into consideration, they may well reflect directly the EU's official view and/or they may be related with the political or personal view of the chosen actors. However, in this thesis, this difference is discounted and those views are accepted as the official diplomatic view of the EU since those actors represent officially the Union. Therefore, it is possible to argue that due to these limitations, the method used in this thesis is modest when compared to

the classical content analysis. However, there are other examples to the method used in this thesis.[14] In this sense, this study can constitute the initial step of a future work, which will focus more on the statistical part of content analysis.

Following the third chapter, the findings of the analysis are evaluated with concluding remarks. In this part, how European actors and scholars approach to Turkey's security relevance within the framework of its accession is discussed. Moreover, a table reflecting the references made in the speeches and articles in relation to different security roles (codes and themes of content analysis) of Turkey is illustrated. Finally, in the conclusions chapter, all the results are discussed in the light of the historical developments and Turkey's accession process.

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[14] For instance, in one (Xiana Barros-Garcia, *op. cit.)* of the afore-mentioned RSCAS collections, which concentrates on the worldview of Solana, 150 speeches, articles and interviews were selected and analyzed in the light of the themes relevant to the paper. Then only 50 of them were commented under the related themes. Although, the statistical analysis was lacking in that work regarding the obtained data, it also mainly concentrated on how Solana sees the world as the High Representative of CFSP. Similar to this, in the Conference Paper entitled 'Securitizing the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Project by Elite, Discourse by Elite', different EU actors' speeches made in relation to the Eastern Enlargement were examined and those which referred to its security dimension were presented by the author. Again, the main emphasis was put on the general context rather than the word counts.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA AND BEYOND

The end of Cold War is arguably one of the most crucial events, which has affected the foreign policy of Turkey, international relations of the European Union (EU) and of the global political system. While during the Cold War, key security risks were emanating from the Soviet Union, its collapse has led to the emergence of new security threats and risks around both Turkey's and the EU's geographical environment. This change has affected security understandings of both Turkey and the EU, thus leading to the emergence of new mechanisms having impact on their security relations. Accordingly, the change in their security understandings as well as their security relations in the post Cold War period have also reflected in the speeches of key European actors and in the articles of leading think tanks' analysts who emphasize the importance of Turkey's security contributions to the EU. Before starting with an analysis of the security relations between Turkey and Europe during that era, the period of Cold War relations needs to be overviewed so as to provide the reader with a complementary outlook to the transforming nature of the security relationship on a historical basis.

2.1   European Security and Turkey during the Cold War Era

Immediately after the Second World War, new types of regional institutions were established in order to protect their members against the threats of the new world order and/or to prevent the re-emergence of a new war similar to the Second World War. NATO and the EC (predecessor of the EU) can be considered as two of the most significant of these regional organizations, which were established with those purposes in mind in the Cold War and which have survived in the Post Cold War period.

NATO is accepted as the "largest, most highly organized, and most stable collective security and defence alliance" that was formed in 1949 by the United States "in response to the possible threat of Soviet military incursions into Central and Western Europe".[15] The key provision of this military security alliance is that any armed attack against any party to the treaty will be accepted as an attack against all the members. Thus in case of such an attack, all parties are obliged to assist the attacked member for the restoration and maintenance of its security. During the Cold War, NATO focused on the Soviet threat and performed both military and non-military functions to protect its members.[16] NATO became the main security organization for Western European countries during the Cold War years, when security was implying mainly hard security that was traditionally defined as "feeling secure/safe from foreign, military attacks, the invasion of foreign armies, the danger of strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destruction and brutal aggressions."[17]

After the end of Second World War, the provision of security in the European continent was also the key concern of Western Europeans and this led to their attempts of establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which was the predecessor of the European Community. As different from NATO, the ECSC was founded as a European attempt, albeit with an American support, to prevent the history from repeating itself, in other words, to eliminate the prospect of a further war among the European countries in general and between France and Germany in particular. In this sense, unlike NATO, it aimed to provide security not against the threat of Soviet Union but against the re-emergence of a threat of a future war within Europe. The project of ECSC involved the surrender of European states' sovereign control over the

[15] A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 7th. ed., London: Prentice Hall, 2002, p. 258.

[16] Robert B. McCalla, 'NATO's Persistence After the Cold War', *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 445-475, p. 448.

[17] See Colin McInees, 'The Military Security Agenda', in G.Wyn Rees (ed.), *International Politics in Europe: The New Agenda,* London: Routledge, 1993.

coal and steel industries, the two key sources of raw material of war.[18] This project required functional integration among the European countries, which had become successful as the first step of European integration and led, in future years, to the emergence of a political community with its supranational structure requiring the delegation of sovereignty of the member states. Behind this project, there was the neo-functionalist idea of "spill-over" supporting that integration in the technical/economic domain, or, the field of Low politics would spill over to High politics fields of foreign and security policy.

It is possible to argue that during the Cold War Era, economic integration among the European countries made significant progress because integration is easier to attain in low political issues that are less controversial areas compared to high political ones where it seems more difficult to cooperate around common interests. Moreover, political integration could not be successful due to the difficulty of transferring national sovereignty to a supranational authority in areas of foreign policy, security and defence. In addition to the likely resistance of European states to the delegation of their national power and resources, Europeans also felt themselves comfortable in terms of security and defence under the security umbrella of NATO and that of the US which maintained stability and provided hard security in the European continent against the Soviet threat of invasion or of military attacks.[19] In a sense, during the Cold War, while the internal security of the Community was provided through their economic integration process, their external security was provided by another organization, NATO. Although there were some attempts like the European Defence Community (EDC) that failed, European integration could not be expanded to security and defence issues. As a result, due to its growing success in regional economic integration but failure in political integration the EC was generally characterized as "an economic giant,

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[18] Stephen George and Ian Bache (eds.), *Politics in the European Union,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 57.

[19] Bilgin, *op. cit.,* p. 205.

political dwarf and military worm."[20] Moreover, it was also described as a "civilian power" or "soft power" lacking military capabilities of its own. [21] According to Hans W. Maull, "a civilian power's basic tool must be cooperation in its relations with other states or actors, in order to realize its interests it must use non-military measures, basically economic ones, and it must have the will to cede its sovereignty with the aim of making supranational arrangements."[22] In line with its civilian or soft power character, the EC developed a different understanding of security through which it supported the use of non-military means in the conduct of its external relations and especially its own integration process and other instruments like cooperation agreements, economic aid, trade relations or diplomatic tools for achieving its foreign and security interests. In this sense, it concentrated more on those instruments rather than coercive methods or military means for the solution of problems.

During the Cold War, there evolved a division of labour/responsibility between NATO and the EC. While NATO became the organization responsible from the external or hard security of Europe, the EC, as a civilian power, dealt with its own integration process. In fact, during the Cold War, NATO left time, space and resources for the Community to concentrate on the softer aspects of European security. It will not be wrong to argue that this reality also reflected in the relations of Turkey with NATO and with the EC during the Cold War. While Turkey's relations with NATO were based on military security, its relations with the EC were economic in nature. Turkey did not develop any security relations with the EC.

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[20] Former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens, *New York Times*, January 25, 1991.

[21]For further discussion; see Karen E. Smith, 'Still "Civilian Power EU"?', 2004, http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Smith.pdf. accessed on 05.01.2005, pp. 1-19; and Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.

[22]Hans W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5, 1990, pp. 92-93, quoted in Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun, 'EU's New Position in the International Order: From Regional to Global Power?', *Perceptions:Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XI, No: 1, Spring 2006, pp. 49-77.

Turkey's traditional security culture in the Cold War was one of the shaping factors of the nature of Turkey's relations with these two organizations. Turkey had a security culture that was state-centred and military focused.[23] There have been other factors shaping Turkey's traditional security culture, but four of them attract more attention: Its *Realpolitik*, Westernization process, role of military and geography. The first of these three factors are emphasized by Ali Karaosmanoğlu and constitute the historical roots of its security understanding.[24] The fourth one, geography is a commonly accepted element in the evaluations of Turkey's security culture.[25] The tradition of *realpolitik* was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. According to Karaosmanoğlu, Turkey's security culture was affected from *defensive realpolitik* emphasizing balance of power diplomacy: "The fear of abandonment and of loss of territory became a major aspect of Turkish security culture in the Empire and the same fears were inherited by the Republic" and this had a cumulative impact on the development of a hard security understanding in Turkey.[26] Westernization process, as another element in Turkish security culture, is described as a policy initiated in 18th century in the Ottoman Empire as a "mode of action" to prevent the Empire from being "an object of European great power rivalries as a land ripe for partition" and was continued during the Republican era in order to secure Turkey's place as a Western country.[27] In line with this process, which aimed to provide Turkey

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[23] Bilgin, *op. cit.,* p. 213.

[24] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 199-216.

[25] See for instance; Şadi Ergüvenç, 'Turkey's Security Perceptions', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, June-August 1998, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume3/june-august1998/turkeyssecurityperceptions.pdf, accessed on 21.02.2007, pp.1-5 ; M. Fatih Tayfur, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis', *Foreign Policy,* 1-2-3-4, 1999; Çevik Bir, 'Turkey's Role in the New World Order', *Strategic Forum,* 135, 1998.

[26] Karaosmanoğlu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *op. cit.,* p. 202.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 204.

with the achievement of Western standards in social, cultural, political and economic life, Turkey pursued Western values in its foreign policies. As a matter of fact, Westernization process has reflected Turkey's aim of being a part of European institutions like Council of Europe, NATO or European Union. The third factor in Turkey's security culture is the role of military. Karaosmanoğlu claims that Turkish military has played a significant part in foreign and security policy-making affecting the traditional security culture of Turkey, and rendering Turkey a hard power. The commonly accepted fourth factor of "geography" is also crucial in terms of shaping Turkey's traditional security understanding. It is generally accepted that Turkey is located in a geographical position which is neighbour to many conflictual regions like Caucasus, Middle East or Balkans. In its historical process, Turkey has been highly vulnerable to the threats of a destabilizing surrounding environment which led it to develop its traditional security policies.[28] After 1945, the vulnerability of Turkey's geography was increasingly associated with the Soviet threat over its territorial integrity.

During the Cold War era, the factors of *defensive realpolitik* inherited from its historical experiences, the role of *military* in its foreign and security policy and its *geography* vulnerable to the Soviet Union threat led to development of Turkey's security culture in accordance with the prevailing hard security understanding of the Cold War era. It is possible to argue that, both Turkey's security culture that was similar to hard security perception of NATO and their common threat assessment resulted in the awareness that Turkey could not survive the Cold War alone, and thus, these factors also played an important role in its alignment with NATO in 1952. Moreover, its ongoing Westernization process also played a crucial role in its decisiveness in joining NATO. This was related with the fact that NATO membership would strengthen Turkey's Western orientation by building a long-lasting institutional

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[28] Ergüvenç, 'Turkey's Security Perceptions', *op. cit.,* p.3.

link with the Western alliance.[29] In this sense, Turkey was sharing the same threat with other members of NATO due to its geographical location, and at the same time its goal of Westernization made it logical for Turkey to become a member of NATO, the only Western military security alliance set up against the Soviet threat.

Turkey's membership of NATO made Turkey automatically a part of the Western European security system. During the Cold War, as a result of this membership, Turkey contributed to the efforts of securing stability and defence of the European continent. Turkey became an active military security producer and a staunch ally of NATO via its strategically significant geopolitical location, its military capability and its pro-Western orientation that allowed its allies to make use of NATO assets when needed.[30] The Cold War relationship between Turkey and NATO was based on reciprocal interests and benefits according to Gözen who describes this relationship as: "While Turkey contributed to European security and defence against the Soviet Union in various ways, the Europeans as well as the United States extended security guarantees to protect Turkey's national and territorial integrity against the Soviets."[31] Therefore, Turkey's relations with NATO constituted an important part of its foreign and security policy during the Cold War.

In addition to its close security relations with NATO, in the Cold War period, Turkey developed relations with the EC too. In fact, seeking closer relations with the EC was also a logical extension of its Westernization process. However, its relations with the EC were mainly economic, because the Community was considered by Turkish policy makers "as the economic

[29] Karaosmanoğlu, 'The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *op. cit.,* p. 209.

[30] Pınar Bilgin, 'Turkey and the EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems', in Graeme P. Herd and Jouko HURU (eds.), *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2001, http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/special/m22/M22.pt7/, accessed on 01.09.2004, pp. 38-51, p. 39.

[31] Ramazan Gözen, 'Turkey's Delicate Position between NATO and the ESDP', *SAM Papers*, No. 1, March 2003, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/ramazan_gozen.pdf, accessed on 15.06.2007, pp. 1-82, p. 16.

axis/dimension of the Western alliance, supplementing and cementing the political pact."[32] In a sense, while NATO represented the security pillar of Western alliance, the EC was regarded as its economic pillar by Turkey. Soon after Turkey had become a member of the security pillar of the Western alliance, it sought of joining its economic pillar too. It will not be wrong to argue that in the mind of Turkish policy makers, there existed a division of labour in terms of roles of NATO and the EC for the European order and governance.

Furthermore, another reason behind the development of economic relations rather than security relations between Turkey and the EC was their different security understandings. During the Cold War, while the EC emerged as a civilian or soft power providing its internal security through its integration process and also searching for non-military methods and instruments in its international relations, Turkey was a military or hard power whose security understanding was state-centred, military focused, hence reflecting the traditional and non-EC security concept of Cold War. Therefore, from Turkish perspective there was no need for Turkey to develop security relations with the EC, which was seen as an economic entity. Turkey's relations with the EC was initiated with Turkey's application for Associate Membership of the EC in 1959 culminating in the signing of an Association Agreement called as "Ankara Agreement" in 1963. This constituted the first step of formal relations between Turkey and the EC.

According to some[33], there has been security interdependence between Turkey and the EC throughout the Cold War. In this respect, Turkey's Post World War II relations with the EC are considered as the necessary policy choice for its security needs. This means that Turkey developed closer relations with the EC, besides NATO, on the basis of its security concerns emanating

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[32] Atila Eralp, 'Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System', in Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993, pp. 24-43, p. 24.

[33] Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?*, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 198.

from the Soviet threat and territorial claim from Turkey. As regards the EC, those security concerns related with the Soviet threat seemed to be more important than the other factors in signing an Association Agreement with Turkey whose importance for the EC originated from its NATO membership and its geographical location. In 1980's with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Turkey's geo-strategic position's significance increased in the eyes of the EC policy makers, and respectively, Greece's entry to the EC and the reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU) urged Turkey's application for full membership of the EC in 1987.

Despite these security realities which have been realized both by the EC and Turkish policy-makers, it is possible to argue that they were not as dominant as the economic and political ones. From the EC's perspective; since Turkey was a member of NATO and as a member of NATO, it could provide security of the EC, there was no need for its full membership. This also affected the decision of the European Commission which rejected Turkey's membership prospects in 1989. Political and economic factors were more influential than security ones in such a decision. From Turkey's perspective, both its application for Associate membership and later full membership of the EC was affected from Greece's Associate and Full memberships (respectively in 1961 and 1981), which was seen by Turkish policy-makers as a factor affecting Turkey-EC relations and harming Turkey's security interests.[34] However, the EC did not have a security and defence structure like NATO, which would provide hard security to Turkey (in line with its Cold War security culture) and it was mainly regarded as an economic community to which Turkey should join in accordance with its Westernization process and its goal of not to weaken its political position vis-à-vis Greece.

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[34] These security interests were mainly related with the Turkey's policies in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus vis-à-vis Greek policies. Turkish policy makers thought that Greece within the EC could strengthen its hand against Turkey which would be out of the Community in relation to those policies and this has been also one of the factors behind Turkey's application for full membership. For more details on this issue, see for instance Eralp, *op. cit.*

Although during the Cold War, Turkey's relations with the EC (later EU) were economic in nature; in the Post Cold War era and beyond, security interactions between Turkey and the EU gained increasing significance. In light of the Post Cold War developments requiring a comprehensive approach to security, changes occurring in their security understandings and emergence of new mechanisms and structures have been reflected in their mutual relations. The reflections of these changes were also embedded in the speeches/articles of the European actors/scholars, especially after the year of 1999 when Turkey's accession process was accelerated.

2.2   Changing Security Understanding in the Post Cold War Era

With the end of Cold War, a critical perspective toward the classical meaning of security has emerged. Even during the 1980s, there has been a widening in the conception of security and security studies have begun to question the traditional meaning of security which was state-centred. Moreover, the traditional understanding of security caused dissatisfaction about its narrower scope that is a military perspective based on hard security. As a matter of fact, with the end of Cold War and the accelerated impact of globalization, threats to security could no longer emerge from a bipolar structure with two superpowers- where it was easy to determine the enemy and the potential threats created by it- but from anywhere. Threats were no longer conventional (states-made) in character but could appear as organized crime, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, terrorism in a globalizing world, and their sources could not be easily determined and defined unlike the threat coming from a hostile state.[35] Therefore there has been a need for redefining the notion of security; the latter should no more be defined only with a state-

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[35] Christopher Coker, 'Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the Management of Risk', *Adelphi Paper,* No. 345, 2002, Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

centred and military focus but it should also include 'soft security' issues in addition to 'hard security' issues.[36]

After the end of Cold War, a new framework for analysis in security studies has emerged besides the mainstream works dealing with hard security matters. This new framework is soft security oriented and addresses threats ranging from social and economic inequalities to the increase in the number of mass destruction weapons, international crime, ethnic conflicts, illegal migration, terrorism and so on.[37] This substantive change is also defined as "the move from a strict focus on the security of the *state* (national security) toward a broader or alternative focus on the security of *people*, either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity."[38] Hence an increasing emphasis has been placed upon a move from hard to soft security and from state to human security.

Conceptually, security has ceased to imply hard security only, the latter defined as "feeling secure/safe from foreign, military attacks, the invasion of foreign armies, the danger of strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destruction and brutal aggressions, as was the case during the Cold War", but also includes the so-called soft security, which can be defined as "feeling secure/safe from political oppression, hunger, environmental pollution, social

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[36] Pınar Bilgin, 'Clash of Cultures? Differences Between Turkey and the European Union on Security', in Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, (eds.), *Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy: Prospects and Pitfall*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 25-52, p.31.

[37] While, in the Western literature, both the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are accepted as soft security threats, there is not a consensus among Turkish scholars about their threat classification. While some like Güvenç and Memişoğlu, *op. cit.* p. 220 or Gözen, *op. cit.* p. 15 accept them as soft security threats, Uğur Ziyal, 'Re-Conceptualization of Soft Security and Turkey's Civilian Contributions to International Security', *Turkish Policy Quarterly,* Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004, http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPQ2004-2-ziyal.pdf , accessed on 15.07.2006, pp. 1-9, p. 3; or Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times'*, Chaillot Paper,* No. 92, September 2006, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf , accessed on 19.10.2006, pp. 1-110, p. 31, consider them as hard security threats.

[38] Ole Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 47-76, p. 47.

fragmentation, human tragedy, immigration, unexpected effects of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and so on."[39]

Soft security is a concept emphasizing the necessity of viewing the security challenges not just from a military perspective but also from other perspectives. This is related with the fact that the sources of threats are not always conventional including military force but also unconventional like illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation, economic inequalities and so on. In countries where there are intense economic inequalities and increasing unemployment rates, the result is political discontent and the consequent illegal migration of people to developed countries out of their search for better life conditions. This situation is not preferable by the developed countries because this results in the increase of population, unemployment rate, xenophobia and crime in their societies. For example, the increased migration flows from the South to the Western European countries has become a cause of intolerance that has been exploited by rightist political parties.[40] In addition, economic problems in poor countries also foster drug and human trafficking destroying social and normal infrastructure within and across countries. Western countries have tried to eliminate these trafficking questions but since they are non-military threats in nature, they require non-military solutions with the support of international law. Environmental degradation also has been a serious soft security problem threatening directly the human life by destroying the pure resources of water and food. Environmental conditions for human life are challenged by soil erosion, desertification leading to intensive droughts, water scarcity and lack of food that force people to migrate and even leading to violent conflicts.[41]

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[39] McInees, *op. cit.*

[40] Hans G. Brauch, *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean,* Berlin:Springer, 2003, p.246.

[41] *Ibid.*, p.246

It can be said that different soft security threats have a crucial impact on each other even causing a vicious circle. These transnational soft security problems require organized cooperation among states and non-state actors. One single state cannot be successful in dealing with such questions. Hence, there is a parallelism between the broadened understanding of security at the theoretical level and the practical need for increased international and transnational collaboration for dealing with new soft security challenges.

In the Post Cold War era, political actors have realized the necessity of dealing with the above mentioned types of security threats. International organizations like NATO, OSCE have redefined the narrow concept of security. Since there was no more a Soviet threat which was the main strategic purpose of NATO, the alliance in order to survive as a regional security and defence alliance had to redefine its security mission and responsibilities by broadening their meaning in both functional and territorial sense. Security, according to NATO, was no more just a military issue but would include also social, political, environmental dimensions; there have been new kinds of threats as ethnic- religious conflicts, civil wars, drug trafficking, people trafficking, mass migration, environmental degradation and so on.[42] Therefore the redefinition of security has also been relevant for international organizations besides states as key actors of the global system. In fact, soft security issues, comprising economic, political, environmental, social dimensions of security have never been excluded from the policy agendas of the major states; however these issues have been subordinated to hard military security associated with power politics and war.

There have emerged a new security agenda in the Post Cold War era and the emphasis over soft security has increased. While the importance of soft security has increased in the agenda of states and organizations, these developments have not undermined the importance of hard security threats and military tools to cope with them. It is often understood that there is not a clear-

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[42] McCalla, *op. cit.,* pp.445-475.

cut distinction between hard and soft security threats because they are inter-linked and they require a comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach.[43] A soft security threat can be easily transformed into a hard one. For instance, "[m]aking gains off illegal migration so as to finance their illicit activities are a good example in which terrorist organizations transform a soft threat into a hard one."[44]

Moreover, developments like regional and sub-national conflicts that have occurred in the Post Cold War era also show that just hard or only soft security instruments can not be enough to deal with these problems. It is accepted that military interventions classified as hard security instruments cannot create a long-lasting stabilization if they are not supported with civilian crisis management tools. On the other hand it is impossible to extend civilian contributions, without having credible military instruments deployed in the conflict region to control the chaos and stop the bloodshed.[45] Therefore, while the significance of soft security understanding has increased in the Post Cold War era, this has complemented rather than substituted the hard security understanding of states and other entities in the international arena. The new threats to security have necessitated an advancement of more holistic and comprehensive understanding of security in theory and in practice.

The signals of such an understanding have been apparent in the policies of both Turkey and the EU. Turkey, which was traditionally a hard power, has begun to focus on the soft mechanisms, civilian instruments to cope with new type of security problems in the post Cold War era. Contrary to Turkey, the EU that emerged as a soft power, which is described as an entity whose "strength and novelty as an international actor is based on its ability to extend its own model of ensuring stability and security through economic and political

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[43] Kofi Annan, 'AIDS is the real weapon of mass destruction' Africa Recovery, *United Nations News Releases*, December 2003, http://www.un.org, quoted in Ziyal, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[44] Ziyal, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[45] Buharali, *op. cit.,* pp.13-14.

[civilian] rather than military means"[46], has started to develop CFSP including a security and defence dimension aiming to render the EU a military security actor capable to act and speak with one voice. In this sense, in the Post Cold War era, a Turkey being a hard power with a new civilian dimension and an EU being a civilian power with a new military dimension have appeared in the international arena.

As a matter of fact, during the Cold War, Turkey's traditional security culture as supported by its membership of NATO was totally different from the civilian (soft security) approach of the European Community, and this could explain the nature of its bilateral relationship with the Community. Moreover, this situation resulted in the emergence of a gap between their security cultures throughout the Cold War. However, aforementioned developments occurring in the Post Cold War era have led to arguments such that Turkey's and the EU's security cultures have begun to come closer to each other, hence narrowing the "security culture gap" between Turkey and the EU, emanating from their different Cold War security understandings.[47]

However, it is also crucial to note that neither in Turkey nor in the EU, these new developments and understandings were introduced at the expense of their military or civilian characteristics respectively. For example, parallel to the development of soft security mechanisms in the post Cold War era, Turkey has still continued to increase its investment in the development of its military infrastructure by modernising it with the new capabilities and technologies.[48] Similarly, despite its development of the European Security and Defence Policy and its military capabilities, the EU has continued to improve its

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[46] François Duchene, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead,* London: Fontana, pp. 32-47, quoted in Helene Sjursen, 'What Kind of Power?', *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol.13, No.2, March 2006, pp. 169-181.

[47] For example, this type of argument can be seen in Güvenç and Memişoğlu, *op. cit.,* p. 221; Şenyücel and Köknel, *op. cit.*, p. 3; and also in the speeches of Duygu Sezer and Ali Karaosmanoğlu made at the European Security and Turkey Conference, on 3 April 2004.

[48] Ian O. Lesser, 'Turkey in a Changing Security Environment',*Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 183-198, p.186. In fact, two main causes of Turkey's continuing and increasing inverstment in military capabilities are its security dilemma with Greece and its non-ending problem of terrorist organization PKK since the 1980s.

civilian crisis-management capabilities and providing an alternative approach to security when compared to the US in the international system.[49] Moreover, in the post Cold War era, the EU is also described as a normative power, by putting certain standards, requirements (such as the membership criteria for the applicant countries), backed by various forms of conditionality, and promoting norms and values in its relations with outsiders. However, there is always room for discussion for the international character and identity of the EU, whether or not, after the launch of the ESDP, it still remains a purely soft, civilian (today's normative) power. In the case of Turkey, there is a reality that due to its NATO membership and strategic relationship with the US, Turkey generally developed a security culture closer to that of the US during the Cold War[50], so long as these ties and convergences remain intact in the post Cold War era, it seems difficult to expect a sudden and deep-rooted change in Turkey's security approach and understanding, that is, Europeanization of its foreign and security policies. However, change itself is a gradual process and it is also necessary to bear in mind that there is an ongoing Europeanization process in Turkish domestic politics, policies and structures, which also has some crucial effects in its certain foreign policies, notably the policy towards Cyprus.

In this respect, while it is too early to make a clear-cut assertion that Turkey's and EU's security approaches have increasingly converged with each other in the Post Cold War era, it is crucial to note that both actors have tended to look at the security issues in a more comprehensive way and from a broader perspective. This can be understood from the development of soft security measures, civilian instruments in Turkey besides its hard security mechanisms and military capabilities, including those made available to the EU under its ESDP operations.

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[49] Frédéric Charillon, 'The EU as a Security Regime', *European Foreign Affairs Review,* No. 10, 2005, pp. 517-533, p. 531.

[50] Lesser, *op. cit.,* p.197.

In the case of the EU, this process has been continuing with a different dimension even after the development of ESDP in the post-Kosovo crisis era. Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which shocked the whole world, security debates within the EU have been intensified. It has been realized that, in order to prevent such terrorist attacks, the root causes of conflicts and instability need to be addressed thus requiring a holistic approach to security problems. There has been a renewed European interest in a comprehensive, global understanding of security with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, whose details will be given in the following parts. Increasing emphasis is placed upon the emergence of new threats that required a comprehensive approach to security by not treating civilian and military aspects of power mutually exclusive, and by relying on a mix of soft and hard security mechanisms.[51]

Moreover, following the ESS which has reflected the EU's distinctive approach to security, a report called "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe" was prepared by a group of scholars and was presented to the EU High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana a year later.[52] This report has aimed to make the EU more capable by proposing a new doctrine for the implementation of the ESS. It has provided new principles and means stressing the importance of *human security*, which means "individual freedom from basic human insecurities." It has stated that:

> …the 11 September and 11 March attacks have made it clear once and for all that no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced [established] behind their national borders, and that sources of insecurity are no longer most likely to come in the form of border incursions by foreign armies. To be secure, in today's world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global security. Europe needs military forces but they need to be configured and used in quite new ways. They need to be able to prevent and contain violence in different parts of the world in

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[51] Güvenç and Memişoğlu, *op. cit.,* p. 220.

[52] The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe", Barcelona, 15 September 2004, http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/studygroup/studygroup.htm.

ways that are quite different from classic defence and war-fighting.[53]

In addition to the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the collective security understanding of Europe, the report has also referred to the failure of the method used by the US Administration after 2001 and especially in the Iraq war, by claiming that "[t]he ongoing conflict in Iraq dramatically illustrates the gap between conventional military forces and the achievement of security."[54] Hence, it has been re-emphasized that military forces are not always adequate, they are necessary but they should be configured to achieve human security, which has become a much preferred concept in European circles recently.

2.2.1 The Development of "Soft Security" Mechanisms in Turkey in the Post Cold War Era

As mentioned before, there have been different elements in shaping Turkey's traditional security culture. The four of these elements were regarded as: "defensive realpolitik", "westernization", "role of military" and "geography". The combined impacts of these historical and geographical factors led to the development of hard security culture and policies in Turkey during the Cold War. The impacts of these policies have been visible even after the end of Cold War era. Turkey, like most West European countries, belonged to the Euro-Atlantic community. In this sense, the legacy of Turkey's Cold War era security culture and impact of its NATO membership have been an important factor shaping its Post Cold War security culture.

However, despite the continuing relevance of the geo-strategic, historical realities and the aforementioned legacy affecting Turkey's security understanding, in the Post Cold War era, there have been also signs of broadening of Turkey's conception of security towards a more comprehensive

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[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*

and holistic approach.[55] This means that for Turkey, there is not a clear-cut distinction between hard and soft security, they are related to each other and they can easily be mixed. This type of an understanding has also required the development of soft security mechanisms in addition to hard security ones. In this sense, in the Post Cold War era, although hard security mechanisms persisted in Turkey, soft security policies have emerged too. [56]

There were two main reasons-external and internal- behind Turkey's changing approach to security. While the changing Post Cold War security environment and the related redefinition of security by various actors was the external reason, Turkey's quest for EU membership and thus Europeanization[57] of its policies may be considered as an internal reason.

Despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a conventional threat to Turkey's security, Turkey has increasingly found itself "in an unstable and difficult international security environment stretching from the Balkans to Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia."[58] In relation with this, NATO determined 16 potential crisis points around Turkey, that were listed as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, Chechenya, Abkhazia in Georgia, Georgia-South Ossetia, Northern Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cyprus, Vojvodina, Privlaka and Belarus, 13 of them being closely concern of Turkey.[59] Today the number of potential crisis points has increased to 23 and Turkey is located in the vicinity of 21 of them. These unstable regions emerging around Turkey have been very critical places where new types of security threats as illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking,

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[55] Personal interview with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials, November 22, 2004.

[56] Kirişçi, *op. cit.,* p.32.

[57] On this issue see Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, (eds.) , *Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy: Prospects and Pitfall*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004.

[58] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p.14.

[59] Hüseyin Bağcı, 'Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler', in İdris Bal (ed.), *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikas,* İstanbul: ALFA Basım, 2001, pp.591-615, p.596.

organized crime can be developed due to lack of serious control and authority.[60] In this respect, in the Post Cold War era, the new neighbourhood of Turkey has been identified with new threats. As a result of an increasing regional instability in a globalizing era, one of the major security problems facing Turkey has been the PKK terrorism in the South Eastern part of Turkey. This terrorist organization gained power and strength especially in one of the aforementioned crisis points, Northern Iraq, by benefiting from the instability there and also using and controlling new soft security tools mainly drug trafficking.

In this sense, under the impact of intensified globalisation, regional insecurity and instability have led Turkey's security agenda to be much more complicated and multi-faced (with different types of threats), multi-functional (with different types of instruments). This is explained by some saying "Turkey's security is influenced more by the soft security issues surrounding Turkey than by the existence of a direct military attack by an enemy" and continues as "soft security issues such as terrorism, ethnic nationalism, social and economic instabilities, refugees, weapons of mass destruction which have preoccupied Turkey's security agenda more than ever before."[61] This reality is also accepted by others like Oğuzlu who argues that Turkey has been "exposed to a multitude of new generation threats during 1990s such as illegal trade in drugs, goods and human beings, organised crime, national and transnational terrorism, environmental pollution, political corruption, the proliferation of

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[60] Besides the emergence of new security threats in and around Turkey's neighbourhood, this geographical space has been subject to real and potential transformation both from within and without. This can be exemplified with the Great Middle Eastern Project of the US and the US involvement in Iraq. Turkey also has a role (with the AKP Government) in this process. However, the relations with the US will not be analyzed in detail in this thesis because the major focus of the thesis is on the relations with the EU.

[61] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p.15. It is also crucial to note that since there is not a consensus whether terrorism is a hard or soft security threat in the literature, when it is considered as a hard security threat in nature especially in the case of PKK by Turkish policy-makers, it is logical for Turkey to use hard security mechanisms to cope with it.

weapons of mass destruction, and so on."[62] Therefore, Turkey has developed soft security mechanisms in addition to its hard security mechanisms in order to cope with its increasing number of security threats originating from Turkey's new security environment.

An important internal factor behind Turkey's development of soft security mechanisms is the process of Europeanization of Turkish institutions and policies as a direct outcome of its inclusion in the EU accession process since 1999. It can be accepted as an internal factor, because it is related with Turkey's aim of being a member of the EU, resulting in the making of necessary changes in its both internal and external policies. In a broader term, Europeanization occurs when values, norms and standards of the EU are internalized and they are subsequently applied as part of domestic politics and jurisdiction by a country.[63]

Turkey has long been a military actor giving priority to hard security concerns and pursuing a national security culture different from that of the EU. However, this reality strengthened the position of Turkey's opponents inside the EU who saw Turkey as a too hard security actor to be digested within the EU's soft security culture.[64] In this respect, the development of a soft security understanding in Turkey as a part of its Europeanization process can be said to weaken the position of the opponents of Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, Turkey's inclusion in the accession process since Helsinki and the increased EU active leverage as a result of the implementation of an accession conditionality after 2002, have led to some changes in Turkey's foreign policies with a more European outlook and by making use of soft mechanisms such as dialogue, cooperation, economic means like trade relations for the solution of problems in its relations. For example, Karakaya Polat argues that,

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[62] Tarık Oğuzlu, 'Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol.61, No.1, pp. 81-97, p. 86.

[63] Gergana Noutcheva, 'Europeanisation: Definition and Scope of Application', *CEPS Europa South Monitor, No.* 49, October 2003.

[64] Tarık H. Oğuzlu, 'An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union From a "Security" Perspective', *Security Dialogue,* Vol.34, No.3, 2003, pp. 285-299, p.289.

despite certain limitations like the persistence of scepticism towards the West and the low level of openness in discussing foreign and security policy issues in Turkish domestic politics, it is possible to observe some signs of Europeanization of Turkish foreign and security policy.[65] To be more specific, Turkey's traditional national security culture has been debated and questioned more openly by civilians. Turkey's interests and priorities more or less have begun to converge with the ones of the EU; for instance in the case of Iran's increasing nuclear power, Turkish position has been relatively closer to that of the EU that seeks a peaceful political solution rather than the US, which prefers confrontation; similarly, Turkey's Iraqi policy since 2003 has converged with the mainstream European line despite significant divisions on this matter among EU countries; and also Turkey has taken a similar approach with the EU toward the solution of Israel-Palestine conflict.[66] In addition to Middle East, Turkey's position and presence in the Balkans converges with those of the Union too.

It is possible to argue that there have been other factors that might have affected the softening and Europeanization of Turkish foreign and security policy. For example, some argue that the emergence of new actors in Turkish foreign policy-making and shaping processes, like business associations, media, think-tanks or civil society organizations have offered new and different perceptions to Turkish foreign and security policy.[67] These factors together, have culminated in a new process of transformation in Turkish foreign and security policy, which in turn, has had a crucial impact on the security arguments of key actors in the EU.

Turkey has increasingly used different types of soft security mechanisms; cooperation and dialogue are two of them. Soon after the end of

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[65] Rabia Karakaya Polat, 'Europeanization in Turkey: Searching for Impacts on Foreign Policy', *Paper for epsNET PlenaryConference "Europe in Context: Debating the Project"*, Central European University, Budapest 16-17 June 2006, Workshop: The Europeanization of National Systems, pp. 1-17.

[66] *Ibid.,* p. 12.

[67] Buharali, *op. cit.,* pp.2-4.

Cold War, Turkey has improved its relations with the ex-Soviet countries through multilateral and bilateral cooperation, which can be considered as a substantial soft security mechanism. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), initiated as a successful project by Turkey has been an important forum for the realization of multilateral regional cooperation. The BSEC, set up in 1992, could be seen as an evidence of Turkey's willingness to provide security through soft security means because it aims economic cooperation as a non-military tool for conflict prevention and encouraging the peaceful settlement of existing problems. It is important in dealing with "trade and economic development; banking and finance; communications; energy; transport; environmental protection; tourism; science and technology; combating organized crime; the illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive materials; and all acts of terrorism and illegal migration".[68] When soft security is defined as the use of non-military means to provide security and handle existing threats, it is possible to state that Turkey with the establishment of the BSEC contributed to the enhancement of soft security in the region. The reason behind this fact is that the BSEC is a regional economic organization, which enhances stability and security in the region, thus in a sense, the economic organization is used as a tool in order to provide security and stability in the region.[69] The BSEC sought common interests among the partners by supporting good neighbourly relations, preventing conflict among them and reducing soft security threats; hence this organization becomes crucial for the achievement of a stable and secure environment in the Black Sea region. According to some, in many aspects (main aims, principles, values) the BSEC is comparable to the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), an EU-led initiative. Both of them are accepted as soft security organizations, which also

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[68] M. Fatih Tayfur, 'The Turkish Vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', *EuroMeSCo Papers,* No. 8, March 2000, pp. 1-18.

[69] The BSEC, composed of different working groups specified in the above mentioned areas, is also important with its working group dealing with science and technology. It provides a successful forum for the member states to cooperate in science and technology through its annual working group meetings and through joint project funds that are allocated to science and technology projects contributing to regional economic development.

contribute to hard security through cooperation and dialogue.[70] While the EMP is an important regional organization highlighting the soft security measures of the EU, the BSEC as a Turkish regional initiative is crucial for the effort given by Turkey to provide security through soft mechanisms.

In addition to its active promotion of multilateral cooperation with the ex-Soviet countries through the BSEC forum, Turkey has also developed bilateral economic relations with them. Commercial relations with Russia augmented and Turkish companies were involved in trade relations with Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Ukraine, Georgia.[71] Except for Armenia, which has a negative attitude toward developing relations with Turkey, Turkey has a significant degree of trade relations with all its neighbours.

Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey has intensified its dialogue, as a soft security mechanism, with its Balkan neighbours. For example, Turkey solved its problems with Bulgaria regarding Turkish minorities through dialogue, and the Turkish-Bulgarian border after the end of Cold War became the first completely demilitarized border by the mid-1990.[72] Moreover, towards the end of 1990s, Turkey improved its relations with Greece in the new context of earthquake diplomacy, the notorious capture of PKK leader, the withdrawal of Greek veto against Turkish membership; and intensified bilateral cooperation in fields of tourism, trade,

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[70] See Tayfur, 'The Turkish Vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', *op. cit.,* p.13. The EMP or Barcelona Process was initiated by the EU as a multilateral cooperation framework between European and Mediterranean states in 1995. It has been aiming to increase the prosperity of the Mediterranean region, from where threats like terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking could emanate and jeopardize security of the EU, in order to provide an area of peace and stability. According to Tayfur, Turkey has been indifferent towards the EMP since its inception and has become a reluctant partner because Turkish policy makers think that the EMP reduces Turkey's status in the EU into a neighbouring country, while Turkey envisages full membership, and the EMP also considers it together with the Maghreb countries, which cannot be accepted by Turkey.

[71]Kirişçi, *op. cit.,* p.31.

[72] *Ibid.,* p.30.

drug trafficking, organized crime, environment and cultural relations.[73] Turkey has also contributed to regional integration, peace and stability in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, by involving in civilian operations.

In addition, Turkey as a member of NATO has contributed to its civilian efforts. Aiming at contributing to peace and stability in its own region, Turkey has supported the use of preventive mechanisms and soft security tools of NATO. For instance, Turkey took part in the NATO-ISAF operation by deploying its civilian personnel in Afghanistan. NATO has a "Provincial Reconstruction Teams-PRT" in Afghanistan, which is an example of civilian-military cooperation and a soft security mission and Turkey is a party to the PRT. [74] These security contributions of Turkey have led a Turkish ambassador to argue that Turkey with its significant military capabilities and a growing civilian sector that is active in humanitarian efforts has already become a net contributor to international peace and security[75].

Turkey's energy trade relations with its neighbours also have become an important soft security mechanism in the Post Cold War period. These relations have proved significant strengthening economic interdependence and cooperation and thus preventing security conflicts. Due to its geo-strategic location, Turkey acts as a bridge between the EU, Central Asia and Caucasus and it becomes a major transit country for energy resources between producing and consuming countries.[76] Turkey intends to make use of its crucial geo-strategic position in energy trade not only for its own commercial interest but also for the social and economic development of Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Within this framework, Turkey has elaborated the East-West Energy Corridor project that is mainly based on the construction of trans-Caspian and

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[73] M. Fatih Tayfur, 'The Turkey/Greece/Cyprus Security Complex and the EU Enlargement: Implications for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Eastern Mediterranean relations', *EuroMeSCo Papers,* No. 28, 2004, pp. 10-20.

[74] Ziyal, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[75] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

[76] Kirişçi, *op. cit.,* p.86.

trans-Caucasian oil and gas pipelines traversing Georgia and ending in Turkey.[77] In this sense, Turkey has played an important role in the development of Caspian energy and bringing oil of Azerbaijan to other markets, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Moreover, Turkey is recently involved in the Caspian-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project, supported by the EU as an alternative route to its energy needs and thus opening great opportunities economically and politically for Turkey.[78] Within this East-West Energy Corridor project, in July 2007, Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran in relation with both the transfer of Iranian natural gas to the EU via Turkey and also the transfer of natural gas of Turkmenistan to the EU via Iran and Turkey[79].

In 1990s, Turkey has also been successful in dealing with flows of illegal migration and human trafficking at the crossroads between the European continent, Caucasus, the Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. These issues have become serious concerns for both the EU member states and Turkey. Increased illegal migration requires collective measures to be taken by the origin, destination and transit countries. Turkey has been both a destination, origin and transit country for the immigrants. Since illegal migration is a global problem which is affecting many countries, Turkish officials have supported for more international cooperation to handle this problem.

Turkey, as being a transit country for the illegal migrants, is under serious pressure from the EU, which has declared that it would implement sanctions over the countries that are not dealing effectively with illegal migration. Surveys have indicated that each year 500,000 illegal migrants enter into EU countries and 100,000 of them are apprehended in Turkey. As a result of intensified efforts and initiatives, the trend of illegal migration via Turkey

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[77] Ministry of Foreign Affairs web page,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/EnergyIssues/, accessed on 16.07.2007.

[78] Kirişçi, *op. cit.,*, p.86.

[79] Radikal, 'İran ile "doğalgazda işbirliği imzası" atıldı, Nabucco hattının de önü açıldı', http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=227002, accessed on 15/07/2007.

has decreased and migration flows have been diverted away to other international routes in recent years.[80] For example, "preventive measures taken by the Turkish Coast Guard have seriously hindered the illegal departure of boats and vessels from Turkish ports to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The number of boats/vessels carrying illegal migrants and reaching EU countries was 19 in 2000. This number dropped to 9 in 2001 and to 2 in 2002".[81] In addition, in accordance with the EU Accession Partnership and its National Program, Turkish authorities have already initiated a process to strengthen the border controls and develop better institutional and technical capacity at the borders to prevent illegal migration. In this respect a working group within the Ministry of Interior, composed of all relevant government agencies on the management of external borders according to EU "acquis" was set up.[82] Turkey is working bilaterally with other countries and multilaterally with the EU and other international institutions together. For example, it has concluded readmission agreements with the third countries like Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania and Greece.[83] Moreover, Turkey has been involved in twinning projects 'Migration and Asylum' and 'Integrated Border Management' in cooperation with Denmark, England and France. Turkey participates in a working programme of Common Project of ICMPD-EUROPOL (European Police Office), FRONTEX (European Border Management Agency) on "Comprehensive Approach to Mixed Migration Flows" and also in the initiative of Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue

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[80] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Updated Country Report of Turkey On Illegal Migration', February 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acb/IllegalMigration.htm, accessed in December, 2004.

[81]*Ibid.*

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] Kemal Kirişçi, 'Reconciling refugee protection with combating irregular migration: Turkey and the EU', *Perceptions,* Vol. 9, June-August2004, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June-August2004/kemalkirisci.pdf, accessed on 10.07.2007, pp. 1-13.

which is executed by International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).[84]

Human trafficking has been another concern of the Turkish government and has led to some necessary measures and reforms undertaken in line with the UN Conventions of 2000 concerning the trafficking and smuggling of humans. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry Report published in 2004; "legislation has been strengthened and heavier penalties have been prescribed against criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and necessary amendments have been incorporated to the Turkish penal code, defining migrant smuggling and human trafficking and prescribing 2 to 20 years of imprisonment depending on the aggravating circumstances".[85] To deal with these soft security problems, the soft security mechanisms are highly used. A toll free/tip off emergency helpline became operational in May 2005, Turkey has also initiated projects in order to increase public awareness in relation with this issue and medical treatment free of charge is provided to the victims of the human trafficking.[86]

Besides these initiatives, Turkey has pursued a more general soft security role in its regional environment. Recently, Turkey plays the role of "a regional civil power"[87] and tries to conduct a civilizational dialogue especially since the notorious 9/11 terrorist attacks, which caused an increasing fear and prejudice toward the Muslim people. Within the context of some manifestations made against Muslim population like in the case of Danish cartoon crisis of January 2006, Turkey has come up with the idea of

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[84] Ministry of Foreign Affairs web page, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/TurkeyOnIllegalMigration/, accessed on 16.07.2007.

[85] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Updated Country Report of Turkey On Illegal Migration', *op. cit.*

[86] Ministry of Foreign Affairs web page, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/TurkeyOnTraficingInHumanBeings/TurkeyonTraffickinginHumanBeings.htm, accessed on 16.07.2007.

[87] Kirişçi, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times*, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

"civilizational dialogue" which gained support of EU leaders and leading to the publication of a co-letter with the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.[88] This heightened expectations that Turkey could help to construct a dialogue between Muslim world and the West. In addition, Turkey has favoured dialogue and diplomacy in its relations with its problematic Eastern neighbours like Iran who possess nuclear power. Although having serious concerns about the development of nuclear weapons in its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey has always insisted on the need for a diplomatic solution.[89] In line with its efforts to support peace and stability in its region, Turkey has organized 'The Conference of the Countries Neighbouring Iraq' , on 3-4 November 2007, in which participating parties pledged their support for the Iraqi government and people's efforts to restore permanent peace, stability and prosperity as well as international cooperation against terrorism.[90] This conference can be evaluated as an important attempt of Turkey to be pro-active in the promotion of regional peace, security and stability. Moreover, as a regional civil power, Turkey has aspired a role of mediation in Arab-Israeli relations. Turkey hosted a crucial meeting between the leaders of Israel and Palestine on 12 November 2007.[91] The aim of that meeting was to ease the tense relations before the significant international summit Annapolis that would relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. In this attempt, Turkey again has shown that it supports the development of stability in its region and that it is a country, which actively contributes to this purpose.

Turkey's efforts in dealing with the problems of Post Cold War era, especially by improving its relations with the countries in its region and making necessary arrangements for the solution of new security problems

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[88] International Herald Tribune, "A Call for Respect and Calm", 6 February 2006.

[89] Şenyücel and Köknel, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[90] Turkish Daily News, 5 November 2007, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=87720, accessed on 17.12.2007.

[91] *Ibid.*

clearly demonstrate its comprehensive approach to security, relying on soft security mechanisms[92] besides increased military expenditures and operations under NATO. In this sense, Turkey has succeeded to adopt its security understanding and mechanisms to the new Post Cold War environment. According to some, the end of Cold War has not diminished the security importance of Turkey for Europe as it was speculated initially, because during Post-Cold War context, Turkey's role has been transformed into a "front zone state" as a result of its renewed geographic significance and its stabilizing role in various regions.[93] This stabilizing role has emanated from its aforementioned relations depending on its use of soft security mechanisms, which increased more Turkey's regional security importance in the Post Cold War era. It is possible to argue that these have been also reflected in the arguments of key actors in the EU, who have recently put emphasis upon Turkey's potential soft security contributions to Europe, besides its well-known hard security contributions.

2.2.2 The Development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Its Impact on EU-Turkey Relations in the Post Cold War Era and Beyond

Since its inception as a crucial entity in the international arena, the EU has been regarded as a civilian actor, and a soft power. It has conducted its relations on the basis of economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments,

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[92] Within the framework of the afore-mentioned soft security mechanisms, Turkey has been also benefiting from scientific and technological researches that help to fight with the problems like illegal migration, human and drug trafficking. Different state institutions cooperate with the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), they become project partners in the projects conducted by Marmara Research Center (MRC) of TÜBİTAK. For example, in relation with the control of borders and prevention of illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, the Undersecretary of Customs has been a project partner in the GÜMSİS (Customs Border Point Security Systems) Project, which has been realized by MRC and has provided a monitoring system, which has been successful to prevent a crucial amount of drug trafficking. For further information, see the web sides of Undersecretary of Customs and MRC. http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/english/Content.aspx?cT=0&cId=0_7_3, http://www.mam.gov.tr/eng/institutes/bte/index.html , accessed on 20.07.2007.

[93] Arıkan, *op. cit.,* p. 203.

especially through the use of soft security mechanisms rather than hard ones. European integration and its successful enlargement processes have provided the EU to be a "security-community"[94] within which the use of force has no longer come to the agenda of conflict resolution. However, it is also crucial to note that while the EU emerged as a civilian power during the Cold War; there were also attempts for the establishment of a common security and defence policy like the initiative of European Defence Community (EDC) and the Western European Union (WEU).[95] While the EDC initiative failed, the WEU came into existence but remained ineffective.

The dynamics of the Post Cold War era have resulted in changes and transformation in the EU's structure and polices like in the other organizations. It is possible to claim that the new security threats emerging with the impact of globalization and the EU's awareness about its inability in dealing with the conflicts occurring near its borders have led to a need of a comprehensive approach to security. It was realized that the Union could no more continue without having common policies in high political issues. Moreover, new threats and problems of Post Cold War era could be no more dealt with only soft security mechanisms, civilian instruments, and the EU could not always rely on NATO for its security as it did during the Cold War. This awareness has led to the emergence of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the aftermath of the Cold War. CFSP has been the base for another crucial initiative; the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aiming to provide an efficient CFSP through the development of an autonomous military capability for the EU in addition to its soft power instruments. In this sense, the new conception of security by the EU, which is comprehensive, has resulted in

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[94] Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 69-118.

[95] Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

emergence of an embryonic and developing military actor, who still prioritizes the use of civilian instruments as a soft power.

The re-structuring of the EU foreign and security policies has led to renewed discussions about its soft power image, leading to different camps among scholars. Some have criticized the development of hard security mechanisms by arguing that the EU has traditionally emerged as a soft power, and differentiating itself from the US in the international system. However, these new developments were undermining its soft power character and that the EU was unlikely to remain as a civilian power in the Post Cold War era.[96] There have been also counter-arguments who supported the new developments by stressing their significance to create a more effective civilian power, preventing it from being "a tiger of paper" and also stating that even if these developments demanded for hard security mechanisms, the civilian character of the EU would still be preserved with the privileged position of civilian instruments.[97] Some analysts have preferred to characterize the EU as a "normative power"[98], in the Post Cold War era because although the EU retained its civilian character, it was becoming a security actor. On the other hand, others continued to stick to the old concept of civilian power.[99] Despite the existence of various discussions about the EU's newly emerging character, it is not easy to reach a clear conclusion regarding its re-defining international role.

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[96] See for example Mette E. Sangiovanni, 'Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe', *Survival,* Vol.45, No.3, 2003, pp. 193-206; and also Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 16.

[97] See for instance Stelios Stavridis, '"Militarising" the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited', *The International Spectator,* Vol. XXXVI, No.4, October-December 2001, pp. 43-50, and see also Richard Whitman, 'The Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power Europe?',2002,http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/PAXA MERICANA/WHITMAN.PDF ,accessed on 07.12.2004, pp. 1-16.

[98]Richard Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.42, No.2, 2004, pp.415-435, see also Manners, *op. cit.,* p. 236.

[99] Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "Venus Approaching Mars? The EU as an Emerging Civilian World Power", *Paper Prepared for the Bi-Annual Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)*, Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=31386 , accessed on 08.06.2007, pp. 1-31.

It is possible to point out that these new developments, which led to serious discussions about the EU's character and identity, have also affected Turkey's security relations with the European Union. In this sense, in the Post Cold War era, as different from the Cold War years, highly economic relations between Turkey and the EU have been transformed into a political one as a result of the accession process coinciding with the emergence of ESDP.[100] The emergence of the latter resulted in a tension between Turkey and the EU. This was not because Turkey was against security and defence development within the EU, but because these new capabilities were undermining Turkey's previously acquired rights within the European security architecture, especially within the WEU, hence excluding it from the ESDP's new structures, which was related with the EU's aim of preserving its autonomy. Thus the development of ESDP created additional strains in EU-Turkey relations while Turkey's membership process has gained pace in the same period, creating a paradox in a sense.

2.2.2.1 The Reasons behind the Emergence of a Common Security and Defence Policy in the EU

The development of ESDP, as a genuine policy, has been motivated by different reasons which can be listed under three main headings: the changing political and security landscape in the Post Cold War period, the regional conflicts and tragedy in Balkans, and the necessity for the EU to develop additional dimensions to its soft power to become a real global actor, as a part of its political integration process.[101]

First of all, the ending of Cold War in Europe have brought about some doubts among the Europeans whether the US would still continue to provide security guarantee to new Europe, because old parameters have no longer been

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[100]Özlem Terzi, 'New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations', *Southeast European Politics,* Vol.3, No.1, 2002, pp. 43-61.

[101] Nicole Gnesotto, 'Introduction ESDP: results and prospects', in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004),* Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, http://www.iss.europa.eu, accessed on 30.11.2006, pp.11-34.

valid and the future of US commitment and engagement in Europe was uncertain.[102] It is possible to argue that such a feeling of insecurity over the reliability of the US guarantee has had its roots in the 1980s. It led to the revitalization of the WEU and also to the inclusion of economic and political aspects of security under the European Political Cooperation system.[103] However, the European distrust on the US has increased with the new international security system. The EU has felt intensively the need to decrease its dependency on NATO and on the US for maintaining order and stability of the continent.

Moreover, the emergence of new types of security threats in the Post Cold War Europe also necessitated the EU to develop its own security mechanisms. It has been realized that the EU's civilian capabilities would be no more sufficient to cope with these threats, so a new security understanding that is more comprehensive has come to the agenda.

Secondly, regional conflicts especially that occurred in the Balkans, Bosnia and Kosovo, in the Post Cold War era resulted in an awareness that the EU was unable to address and to cope with these types of conflicts. In fact, from the beginning, the EU tried to solve the problem through the management of the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, which has been the only common denominator among its members, but intensified conflicts required military intervention that could be realized by the US.[104] This meant that the EU was alone now, yet its member governments could not make a choice between intervention or a peaceful solution. Even if it chose for military intervention, it did not have the necessary military capabilities. The inability of the EU to agree for a common political position and its lack of military capabilities has prevented it from intervening in the ex-Yugoslavian conflicts. Consequently,

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[102] Alexander A.C. Gerry, 'EU: US Partner or Competitor', *The Officer,* No. 77, April 2001, pp.25-28.

[103] Aybet, *op. cit.,* pp. 131-164.

[104] Jean-Yves Haine, 'An Historical Perspective', in in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004),* Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, http://www.iss.europa.eu, accessed on 30.11.2006, pp. 35-55, p.39.

the EU has tried to institutionalize its own security and defence policy alongside reforming its common foreign policy since the late 1990s.

Jean-Yves Haine explains the development of the ESDP after the Balkans tragedy as "specific European willingness to learn from past mistakes which was consubstantial with the European project": The Treaty of Rome was a reaction to the failure of EDC, the European exchange rate mechanism was introduced after the oil shocks of the 1970s and after Bosnia and Kosovo came the first acknowledgement of EU military insufficiency and the launch of St-Malo process.[105]

Thirdly, the EU has emerged and developed as an economic giant which lacked any security and defence capabilities of its own. In this respect, it could be active and influential in economic issues and forums but in terms of security issues, it could not make its voice heard. However, in line with the premises of neo-functionalism, European integration process started in low political- technical and economic- areas and with the aid of spill-over, it could be expanded into high political areas, namely security and defence issues.[106] This understanding of integration process had been predominant in the first two decades of integration, when there were attempts to provide the EEC with a defence and a political community. However, a successful security and defence capability building process could only occur with the initiatives of the 1990s.

The development of a common security and defence policy as a part of its political integration process is also related with the EU's ambition to become a global player like the US. However, this necessitated a comprehensive understanding to security, including both existing civilian instruments and military mechanisms that the EU was lacking. Javier Solana, who is the High Representative of CFSP, provides their aim of creating the ESDP as:

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[105] *Ibid.,* p.36.

[106] Carsten Storby Jensen, 'Neo-functionalism', in Michelle Cini (ed.), *European Union Politics,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 80-92.

The ESDP is not a process of militarization of European construction. My aim right from the start, at the head of this adventure, was to promote the Union as a global political player, capable of mobilising all the resources available- economic, commercial, humanitarian, diplomatic, and of course, military- to act in a coherent and above all effective manner over the whole of its international environment. Therefore, it was necessary to start by developing what did not yet exist: a minimum of instruments and capabilities, both civilian and military, which were essential if the Union was to have any international credibility.[107]

Therefore, the international credibility and ability to act as a global actor also motivated the EU to complement its integration process with the additional military dimensions, leading to the development of a common security and defence policy.

2.2.2.2 The Origins of ESDP

During 1990s, NATO has developed new concepts and strategies in order to adopt itself to the changing Post Cold War environment and one of them was the Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed at the Rome Summit of 1991 in which it raised the problem of burden-sharing inside NATO.[108] Accordingly, it was stated that: "As the security of all Allies is indivisible…The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the *equitable sharing* of *roles, risks and responsibilities,* as well as the benefits of common defence…[emphasis added]"[109] The new concept marked the beginning of NATO's transformation into a collective security (crisis management) organization, this in turn raised the possibility for European operations with recourse to NATO's assets and without participation of the US.

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[107] Javier Solana, 'Preface', in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004),* Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, http://www.iss.europa.eu, accessed on 30.11.2006, pp. 5-10, p.6.

[108] Gözen, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

[109] Article 36 of NATO's Strategic Concept 1991, in *NATO Handbook Documentation*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999.

In fact, ESDP, which has been an important policy, institution and instrument to pursue the goals of CFSP, has had its roots in this NATO concept of burden-sharing that initially led to the creation of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). At the NATO meetings of Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, it was stated that "the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within NATO as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the alliance. This would enable all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the alliance."[110] This meant that the European allies would also share the burden of NATO in terms of providing security and defence in Europe. The strengthening of the European pillar, an ESDI, within NATO would be achieved through the cooperation between NATO and WEU, because the latter was already declared as the EU's defence arm under the Maastricht Treaty; in other words, WEU would be responsible for the implementation of CFSP in cooperation with NATO principles and members.[111] In relation with this, within ESDI, the WEU would implement its security and defence tasks[112] in cooperation with NATO.

It is possible to claim that hitherto economic relations between Turkey and the EU began to acquire political and security dimensions in the 1990s with these new developments in the European security architecture. Within this framework, Turkey wanted to become a full member of the WEU, declared as the EU's defence arm, and applied for full membership of it in 1991. This application was highly related with Turkey's aim of being a part of the developing European security and defence structure and also its perception of

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[110] NATO web page: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

[111] Esra Çayhan, 'Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey?, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, 2003, pp.35-54.

[112] Following the declaration of the WEU as the EU's defence arm, in June 1992 the WEU defined its security and defence tasks, as the Petersberg Tasks, which were 'humanitarian and rescue tasks', 'peacekeeping tasks' and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making.

WEU as an important dimension of NATO's broader security architecture.[113] However, Turkey became an Associate Member, rather than a full member of the WEU in 1992. As a matter of fact, although Associate Membership did not totally fulfil Turkey's will of being a full member of all European institutions, it was seen as an important legal achievement on which Turkey could base its subsequent demands and claims in searching for participation in the emerging ESDP.

Turkey, as a result of its Associate Membership, was able to participate in the institutional and operational mechanisms of WEU. Turkey had the right to participate in the WEU Council meetings and its working groups, where it had the right to speak and submit proposals. In this sense, Turkey could take part in the decision-making process of WEU. In addition, Turkey could participate in the WEU operations, as well as it could take part in the planning and preparation of its operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were to be used.[114]

Turkey has also supported the development of ESDI by stating that "Turkey, as a European member of NATO, believes that Europeans should shoulder their responsibility better in the Alliance for the security of the continent. Thus Turkey from the outset has supported the ESDI developing within the Alliance through the WEU."[115] In fact, as stressed in the 1994 NATO Summit Declaration and restated in 1996 at Berlin, all NATO countries including Turkey, supported the development of ESDI within the Alliance by making assets and capabilities available for WEU led operations.[116] Thus within the ESDI, WEU (defence arm of the EU) would have an access to NATO assets but with the unanimous approval of NATO members. However,

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[113] Gözen, *op. cit.,* pp. 26-28.

[114] *Ibid.,* pp. 26-27.

[115] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'European Security and Turkey', web page: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.html, quoted in Gözen, *op. cit.,* p.37.

[116] Terzi, *op. cit.,* p. 45.

the issue of unanimous voting implied continuing dependency of WEU on NATO.

With the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 10 November 1997, the EU agreed for the transfer of Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making) of WEU into the EU framework. Through this transfer, a strong relationship between the EU and WEU was created. These developments also went further with the decision taken at the Franco-British St.Malo Summit in December 1998. In this Summit, US-led ESDI has been supplemented with the idea of a European defence policy and military capability. A crucial feature of the St.Malo Summit Declaration was that for the first time there has been "a reference to the necessity of *an autonomous capacity* for conducting EU's objective of a common foreign and security policy."[117]

As a matter of fact, this shared commitment of the two key EU members was supported by NATO allies at the Washington Summit of April 1999. In this Summit, in relation with the capacity of the EU for autonomous actions, it was stated as "…We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged."[118] However, NATO's support became conditional with the statement "…We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU." [119] In this sense, with this NATO Washington Summit decision, as a non-EU NATO member, Turkey's acquired rights in WEU were acknowledged.

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[117] Hüseyin Bağcı and Ali Yıldız, 'Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): From Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship' in Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, (eds.), *Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy: Prospects and Pitfall*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 79-100, p.80.

[118] NATO's Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)64.

[119] *Ibid.*

2.2.2.3 The Progress of ESDP and controversy with Turkey

The year 1999 was an important year both for the institutional-operational development of ESDP and for relations between Turkey and the EU. Decisions related with the institutional development of ESDP were taken at the European Council Summit at Cologne in June 1999. Accordingly, Javier Solana was nominated to the post of High Representative of CFSP, and a Political and Security Committee (PSC), an EU Military Committee (EUMC) and an EU Military Staff (EUMS) were created in accordance with the decisions taken at Cologne Summit.[120] The development of military capabilities providing the EU to act autonomously from NATO in security and defence issues, thus operationalization of ESDP, could be initiated only with the decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999. The Helsinki Summit set out the Headline Goal objectives for ESDP. This would be important for the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as a crucial instrument of ESDP. These Headline Goal objectives stated that; "cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces up to 50,000-60,000 people capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks" and "appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management."[121]

Moreover, the Presidency Progress Report adopted at the Summit, stated that "the EU should have autonomous capacity to make decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the CFSP."[122]

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[120] Haine, *op. cit.,* p.44.

[121] Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council: 10-11 December 1999.

[122] Annexes I-IV: The Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council in Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council: 10-11 December 1999.

From Turkey's perspective, the controversy over ESDP in fact started with those Helsinki Summit decisions. The Helsinki decisions raised concerns among Turkish policy-makers which are summarized as:[123] Firstly, there were some security risks because Turkey would be excluded from the decision-making process as a non-EU NATO member in the pre-operational phase and thus would not be able to shape EU operations when they are conducted in the geographical proximity of Turkey. Secondly, Turkey would participate in the operational phases of the EU-led operations, in which NATO assets and capabilities are not used, by deploying significant military forces. But as a condition this would be possible only with an EU decision, which cannot be easily taken due to the Greek opposition. Thirdly, the most problematic issue is that Turkey would be obliged to offer its services and capabilities to the EU, without being able to participate in the decision-making structures of the EU, in the military operations where the NATO's assets and capabilities would be used by the EU.

These concerns made Turkey a reluctant partner, even resulting in the use of its veto power in various NATO Ministerial Meetings of 2000 over giving the EU an automatic access to NATO assets (Berlin Plus arrangements[124]), while it would not have a role in the decision-making process of the former nor would it participate in the operational mechanisms of ESDP.

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[123] Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, December 2005, pp. 335-359, p.337.

[124] Based on the decisions taken in the NATO Washington Summit of 1999, in order to provide practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO's assets and capabilities "Berlin plus arrangements" were developed. Accordingly, the Berlin plus arrangements were configured by four ad hoc groups, comprising experts from both NATO and EU countries which were assembled in the spring of 2000, in line with the decision of the Washington Summit aiming to further develop the decisions taken in Berlin 1996 including "the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations". The Berlin plus arrangements would respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure. Two of the important issues in these arrangements were "the provision of assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations" and "the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations." NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm, accessed on 24.03.2008.

It is possible to state that Turkish policy makers wanted their country to take a role in ESDP mainly because not only its military assets will be used within ESDP operations conducted with NATO assets (Berlin plus operations) but also Turkey has always identified itself with all the existing European security structures and wanted to be an active player within this new EU structure.

The Helsinki Summit decisions were of dual significance for Turkey: one of them was related with the security aspect of relations and the other one was directly related with the enlargement process. On the one hand, it was decided that the EU would develop its autonomous capacity, where non-EU NATO members would not be fully engaged with the whole process. On the other hand, Turkey was given for the first time the status of a candidate state. It is possible to state that the coincidence of these two developments raised questions in the minds of analysts.

Some Turkish scholars develop a more optimistic approach by arguing that the coincidence of these two decisions in fact reflect the EU's recognition of Turkey's importance for European security, the potential role that it might play in ESDP. Accordingly, the EU gave candidacy status to Turkey in a period when it has decided to develop its autonomous military capabilities to be a security actor; security aspect of EU-Turkey relations can be important for the future.[125] This can be also explained as; Helsinki Summit decisions were taken in a period when the Kosovo crisis became an important problem for the Europeans, thus on the one hand, the EU decided to develop its autonomous security and defence capability to cope with such crises in the future; on the other hand, the EU also realized the important role of Turkey in contributing to the regional stability and security, and eventually gave the candidacy status to Turkey to be able to benefit further from its role as security provider for

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[125] A number of papers have addressed this issue, see for example Meltem Müftüler Baç, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Defence Policies', *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 31, No.4, 2000, pp. 489-502; Ali Karaosmanoğlu, 'Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri', *op. cit.,* pp. 155-166; Pınar Tank, 'Turkey as a Special Case for the EU: Will the Generals Retreat from Politics?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, pp. 217-230, p. 224, Arıkan, *op. cit.,* p. 217.

Europe. Some believe that the coincidence of ESDP and Turkey's candidacy should not be taken too far because the development of an autonomous capacity of the EU does not mean that the EU becomes an intergovernmental security actor as understood by Turkish policy makers, and the EU would prefer a soft power Turkey rather than a hard power as a partner of ESDP. More importantly, candidacy does not imply a future full membership into ESDP structures simply because only EU members can be full ESDP members.[126] Some analysts have argued that the Helsinki Summit decisions created a paradox; while giving a candidacy status to Turkey and integrating it to its political and economic order, these decisions distanced Turkey from the second pillar of the EU by placing Turkey at the margin of ESDP. This was also representing the EU's Turkish dilemma whether accepting or not its membership in the foreseeable future.[127] And some interpret this paradox in a more pessimistic way regarding Turkey's future position in the EU: The emphasis on the EU's autonomy put Turkey out of the decision-making process of ESDP, however, since the Union also wanted Turkey's active contribution in ESDP operations, it gave a candidacy status to Turkey in order not to distance it from its own security and defence process.[128] For some, the position of Turkey vis-à-vis ESDP can be resembled to its position as the Customs Union partner of the EC, in both of these paradoxical cases, Turkey is on the implementation side while not having a role in the decision-making.[129]

After the Helsinki Summit, Turkey-EU relations has developed along two parallel tracks; while on the track of enlargement, Turkey has adopted new reforms in order to be able to meet accession criteria, on the security track, the development of ESDP and Turkey's persistent will for becoming a part of this

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[126] Oğuzlu, 'An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union From a "Security" Perspective', *op. cit.* p. 293.

[127] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p. 29 and Bali Aykan, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[128] Personal interview with M. Fatih Tayfur, Academician in METU, 21 June 2007, METU, Ankara.

[129] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p.49.

new structure, dominated the bilateral agenda. The initial concerns of Turkey about ESDP did not disappear, in fact, throughout the year 2000, Turkey's disappointment continued with the Feira and Nice Summits decisions where the EU remained determined not to give non-EU NATO members the right to participate in decision-making process and in operational mechanisms of ESDP.

2.2.2.3.1 Turkey's policy toward ESDP

Turkey's arguments concerning ESDP concentrated generally around three crucial points. These were put forward by Öymen, who was Turkey's permanent representative to NATO Supreme Command Headquarters in Brussels during that period: Firstly, Turkey's acquired rights in relation with its associate membership in WEU and decisions of Washington Summit of NATO; secondly, Turkey's significant geographical situation and thirdly, NATO's role for European security.[130]

Turkey being a member of NATO and an associate member of WEU based its arguments about its will to be a part of ESDP on its acquired rights in the NATO and WEU arrangements. As stated previously, Turkey could participate to a high extent in the institutional and operational mechanisms of WEU. In a sense, "the arrangements in the WEU…provided Turkey, as an associate member, with *de facto* full membership" and they were important also because they were "based on the primacy of the Alliance."[131] Since WEU's security and defence tasks were transferred to the EU, Turkey also wanted its rights acquired in WEU to be put under the EU framework. Moreover, in accordance with NATO's Washington Summit of April 1999; firstly, Turkey would be able to participate in EU-led operations with NATO

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[130] Onur Öymen, 'Turkey and its Role in European Security and Defence', *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 3, No. 1, January-March 2001, pp.53-57.

[131] Esra Doğan, 'Turkey in the New European Security and Defence Architecture', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.1, March-May 2003, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume8/March-May2003/EsraDogan.pdf, accessed on 10.07.2008, pp. 1-18, p. 6.

support, including both its preparation and planning phases; secondly, it would be able to take part in an autonomous WEU operation if it declared its readiness to participate with a significant troop; and finally it would also take part, as a member of both NATO and WEU, in the new institutions that the EU would establish, in relation with NATO-EU mechanisms that would be built on existing NATO-WEU mechanisms.[132] Turkey insisted that the EU should establish the relevant bodies of ESDP by taking into consideration the decisions of the Washington Summit.

The importance of its geographical situation both as a threat and as an asset was also another argument used by Turkish élites against ESDP: Firstly, Turkey has always emphasized that it is located in a volatile region where there are serious security threats; hot points. In this respect, Turkey had to participate in planning and implementation phases of ESDP operations that were conducted in its geographical proximity in order not to jeopardize Turkey's "national" security. Secondly, Turkey presented its geographical position as an asset in its security relations with the EU. Turkey underlined the necessity of its participation in the institutional and operational mechanisms of ESDP by basing its arguments on the significance of its geo-strategic location for European security in the region which enable Turkey to present itself as an important *security producer*.[133] Thus, it is possible to argue that especially during the period when Turkey's participation to the newly emerging European security structure became an issue of major concern affecting bilateral relations; key actors in the EU have stressed Turkey's potential security contributions to the EU more often.

In relation with ESDP, Turkey, being a crucial member of NATO, also emphasized that NATO's role and effectiveness, coherence and solidarity should not be put under a risky situation.[134] Turkey has always been in favour

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[132]Gözen, *op. cit.,* p. 40.

[133] Bağcı and Yıldız, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

[134] Öymen, *op. cit.* P. 57.

of NATO's leading role in Euro-Atlantic security. Turkey's disappointment about EU's successive Summit decisions were also related to a perceived divergence from the Washington Summit decisions and increased concerns about the key role of NATO in the newly emerging security framework.

In relation with these three arguments concerning ESDP, Turkey's expectations were:

> Having the WEU acquis back again; The EU+6 [EU Members and Non-EU NATO Members] should have daily consultations on a permanent and regular basis and provide Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the EU; Full participation in the decision-making process of operations with NATO assets and capabilities; Respect for Turkey's national interests and security concerns in such operations without NATO assets; the right to raise Turkey's concerns in the decision-making mechanisms of EU only operations in Turkey's geographic proximity and areas of national interest such as the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, etc.; and insurance that the ESDP will not be involved in disputes among the Allies.[135]

2.2.2.3.2 The EU's position Toward Turkey's Arguments

The EU's counter-arguments regarding Turkey's position in ESDP were also threefold: first, the EU's decision-making autonomy in ESDP, secondly, European identity issue and thirdly, Turkey's position as a security consumer in the eyes of certain Europeans.[136] First of all, ESDP has been considered as an important step for the European integration process. Since its establishment, the EC/EU has aimed to develop its political and security dimension in order not to remain as a mere economic entity or a trading bloc. The attempts from the 1950s until the 1990s have not been very successful in achieving this goal. However, with the CFSP and ESDP, which have offered a new dimension and institutionalization in issues of high politics, the goal of developing political and security aspect of integration has gained real momentum. Thus the development of ESDP in fact reflects a political aspect

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[135] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p. 64.

[136] Bağcı and Yıldız, *op. cit.* pp. 89-92.

of its integration process. Based on this understanding, the EU insisted on the autonomy of the decision-making of ESDP stressing that there should be a distinction between its members and non-members. This provides the inner explanatory factor for the exclusion of Turkey from ESDP decision-making process from the perspective of Europeans.

Secondly, the idea that there is a close link between ESDP and European identity-building constituted another point on which the EU could justify its arguments for excluding Turkey out of the ESDP process. According to one Turkish scholar, the view that "Turkey cannot participate to ESDP and this can be possible only with Turkey's membership to the EU" was not satisfying, and it could be possible to find temporary institutional solutions for Turkey's full participation to ESDP until its full membership to the EU.[137] So from this point of view, the real problem stemmed from the fact that ESDP was not a simple policy to develop security and defence structures of the EU but an identity building process and that Turkey was not ready to be part of this identity. This non-readiness of Turkey was also underlined by the Europeans emphasizing that Turkey did not adequately meet the accession criteria.[138]

Thirdly, some[139] Europeans have for a long time seen Turkey as a security consumer. Their argument was based on the fact that Turkey is surrounded by problematic regions and Turkey's membership renders the EU as a neighbour to these regions and jeopardizes its internal security. Moreover, Turkey's prioritization of hard security and underestimation of soft security also have been viewed negatively from the European security perspective. The implication of these opinions for Turkey's participation to ESDP decision making has been that since Turkey is a "security consumer", it can affect

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[137] Karaosmanoğlu, 'Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-AB İlişkileri', *op. cit.* p. 163.

[138] Antonio Missiroli, 'EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', *Security Dialogue,* Vol.33, No.1, 2002, pp. 9-26, p.20.

[139] Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey', *Survival,* Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 41-57.

negatively the construction, realization and development of ESDP process, hence Turkey must be excluded.

In fact, while some Europeans have tried to use the idea of 'Turkey as a security consumer' in order to legitimize their arguments for excluding Turkey from both European integration and ESDP process, supporters of Turkey's EU membership both in Europe and in Turkey have emphasized Turkey's potential role in European security and stability. Therefore, it is worth stressing that the arguments of several actors in Europe (the Commissioners, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, High Representative of CFSP and key analysts) who accept Turkey as a "security producer" increased in volume especially during the controversy related with ESDP between Turkey and the EU.

2.2.2.4 The Impact of 9/11 Events: Towards a Compromise?

The events of 9/11, Al-Qaeda attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, constituted an important step in the ESDP controversy between Turkey and the EU. There have been serious attempts to achieve a compromise on ESDP after September 2001.

According to some Turkish scholars; like the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the post 9/11 international restructuring has increased the value of Turkey in European security and that both the US and the EU members have realised Turkey's significance in the fight against terrorism by emphasising Turkey's geo-strategic, geo-political and geo-cultural connections in those areas where the fight would be crucial.[140] This has also reflected in the speeches of key actors in the EU who underlined Turkey's security importance in the fight against terrorism. However, according to others, this positive mood of some Turkish policy-makers regarding increasing importance of Turkey for the West

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[140] See for example Müftüler Baç, 'Turkey's Accession to the EU: Its Potential Impact on Common European Security and Defence Policy', *op. cit.,* p.22 and also Gözen, *op. cit.,* p.63.

and particularly for European security, did not meet with same enthusiasm amongst Europeans.[141]

One of the important consequences of 9/11 events has been that the international security environment has been challenged by terrorism and states have realised that terrorism could not be dealt only by one state but there should be intensified international cooperation and collective action. This understanding has been reflected in the war against terrorism under NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan where Turkey and several EU countries have contributed for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. As previously stated, Turkey has participated in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Operation and PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Afghanistan. Within the framework of ISAF and PRT, Turkey has offered both military and civilian personnel/capabilities to provide security, stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.[142]

Thus it is also crucial to note that after the 9/11 events, the key European actors including Commissioners, Ministers of foreign affairs or scholars, while trying to legitimize their arguments in favour of Turkey's accession, have more frequently referred to Turkey's importance for regional and European security and in the fight against terrorism with its geo-strategic position, its cultural heritage and its relations with its neighbours and the Muslim world. In addition, many analyses have emphasized that Turkey's increased strategic importance due to the fact that it is the only Islamic member of NATO and an influential state in its region; hence its potential participation and support for the ESDP operations became much more important.[143]

There have been several ongoing attempts after the 9/11 events for resolving the ESDP impasse and for removing the veto of Turkey used against

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[141]Bali Aykan, *op. cit.,* p.346.

[142] Turkish General Staff web page: http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm, accessed on 12.03.2008.

[143] Mark Webber, 'The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the "Third Country" Issue', *European Security*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 75-100, p. 88.

EU's "guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities"[144] Following different attempts of US, Britain, the solution of the problem came with a series of decisions taken in different platforms, like in Ankara Document (December 2001), Brussels Document (October 2002), Copenhagen European Council Summit (December 2002) and NATO Council (December 2002).

As a result of diplomatic negotiations that took place between the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey throughout 2001, Ankara Document was agreed. [145] The main success of Ankara Document was that Turkey would remove its veto on the guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO's assets and capabilities in return for some given guarantees and rights. The document grouped the assets that would be used by the EU as strategic and non-strategic. Accordingly, the EU would be able to use non-strategic NATO assets; in this case, Turkey would participate in the operations. In case when the EU uses strategic assets of NATO (like command and control structures, intelligence, air and naval transport capabilities etc.), the decisions would be given on case-by-case basis and Turkey would be able to use its veto power. Turkey was also offered enhanced consultation and active participation in the operational phase of such operations. Moreover, in cases when the EU would not use NATO assets and capabilities in its operations, Turkey would be able to participate to consultation mechanism with the invitation of the EU Council. If such operations take place in areas like the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean affecting Turkey's national security interests, Turkey would participate in their preparation stage with an invitation. Turkey was given the guarantee that these

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[144] From the beginning, Turkey was against the decision accepting "guaranteed permenant access to NATO's capabilities", which was taken in Nice Summit by the EU and which was based on the decisions adopted by Washington Summit. However, related decisions of Washington Summit were saying that cooperation between NATO and the EU would be decided on *case-by-case basis*, which was not in line with the EU's demand for guaranteed access.

[145] Bağcı and Yıldız, *op. cit.,* p. 94.

types of operations would not be launched to intervene in problems between Turkey and Greece.

Since Greece vetoed the Ankara Document at the EU's Laeken Summit, at the NATO Council Meetings in December 2001 and at the EU's Seville Summit in June 2002 on the grounds that "the EU should not give any guarantees to non-EU countries and that the non-EU countries should never participate in ESDP decision-making process"[146], the Ankara Document could not be implemented. Instead, the Brussels Document was adopted with certain changes and it was introduced at the EU Brussels Summit of 24-25 October 2002. According to the new modifications adopted in the Brussels Document, under no circumstances, ESDP would be used against an Ally, and NATO crisis management would not be used against EU or its member states either.[147] In addition, in this Document, since the other part related with the modalities for participation of Turkey (in EU-led operations, in their preparation, planning and management) was adopted from the Ankara Document, this seemed to satisfy Turkish policy-makers. Brussels Summit decisions on ESDP were endorsed at the Copenhagen European Council Summit of 12-13 December 2002. Accordingly, in this Summit, Turkey was assured that Cyprus and Malta would be excluded from the EU military operations using NATO assets (Berlin plus operations).[148] These decisions were also endorsed at the NATO Council

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[146] Gözen, *op. cit.,* p. 66.

[147] The mentioned modifications were made in the Article of the Annex II: "ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies" in Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy of the Brussels European Council (24-25 October 2002), which says that "…under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its Member States. It is also understood that no action will be undertaken that would violate the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

[148] The related Article of the Annex II: "Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002" in Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy of the Copenhagen European Council (12-13 December 2002) says that "The fact that, as things stand at present, Cyprus and Malta will not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU will not, within the limits of the EU Security Regulations, affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in EU institutions and bodies, including COPS, with regard to decisions which do not concern the implementation of such operations."

of 13 December 2002 with the "EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP" providing the NATO-EU Cooperation. In this Council, it was re-stated that Cyprus would be excluded from the NATO-EU cooperation.[149]

Although the part of Ankara Document concerning the modalities for participation of Turkey in the preparation, planning and management phases of EU-led operations was unchanged in Brussels, Copenhagen Summits and in NATO Council, according to Bali Aykan, there were two setbacks in Turkish side in line with the final NATO-EU Cooperation achieved as a result of those summits.[150] These were related with two articles (Article 12 and 14) of the Annex II of Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions. Firstly, "…in the pre-crisis stage of any EU-led operation" Turkey, as a non-EU European Ally, was only assured that it would be consulted on its "security concerns" and "views" and these would be "taken into account" in a final decision which would be made by the EU members.[151] Secondly, when an "envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally", in this case Turkey, then the Council would consult with that Ally and after these consultations it would decide on its

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[149] The related paragraph (Paragraph 3) of the NATO Council Decisions says that "NATO-EU strategic cooperation and the implementation of Berlin Plus arrangements will be confined to NATO members and those non-NATO EU members that have subscribed to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document, thus becoming a party to the PfP, and that have concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO". Annex to North Atlantic Council Decision SG(2002) 1357, 13 December 2002, paragraph 3.

[150] Bali Aykan, *op. cit.,* p.351.

[151] The related Article of the Annex II: "ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies" in Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy of the Brussels European Council (24-25 October 2002), says that "Contacts at all levels with non-EU European Allies will be intensified as the pre-crisis stage unfolds through 15 + 6 consultations and other arrangements. This process will be important for discussing provisional military contributions from the non-EU European Allies during the pre-operational phase, and relevant military factors during the development of strategic military options, in order to inform the planning and preparation on which a Council decision to launch an EU-led operation will be based. This will enable the views of the non-EU European Allies, particularly their security concerns and their views on the nature of an EU response to the crisis, to be taken into account by the Council before decisions on a military option."

participation.[152] In fact these two issues were reflecting both the remaining decision-making autonomy of the EU, and also Turkey's failure of achieving guarantee for its participation in the decision-making and implementation of EU-led military operations in the "geographic proximity" of Turkey. These issues also remained in the Copenhagen Summit decisions.

It is crucial to note that there are some similarities between the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and the Helsinki Summit of 1999. First of all, both Summits were critical regarding ESDP controversy between Turkey and the EU. The Helsinki Summit can be accepted as the initiation of the problem, while the Copenhagen Summit finalized the issue with a formal solution. Secondly, both Summits were also important in terms of their decisions on the enlargement process between Turkey and the EU. While the Helsinki Summit gave the candidacy status to Turkey for the first time, the Copenhagen Summit gave the "date for date", which means that Turkey was given the date of December 2004 where the starting date of negotiations between Turkey and the EU would be eventually announced by European political leaders. In this sense, these two summits assumed significance for both processes of the ESDP problem and enlargement.

It is not easy to argue that the decisions, taken in EU and NATO summits in December 2002, offered a clear-cut solution to the problem. There is always room for discussions in relation with this solution. This has been a formal solution removing the obstacles regarding the NATO-EU cooperation

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[152] The related Article of the Annex II: "ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies" in Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy of the Brussels European Council (24-25 October 2002), says that "In the case of any EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU European Allies will be invited, upon a decision of the Council, to participate. In taking decisions on participation, the Council will take account of the security concerns of the non-EU European Allies. In a specific case when any of the non-EU European Allies raises its concerns that an envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national security interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, taking into consideration the outcome of those consultations, decide on the participation of that Ally, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union quoted above and the statement in paragraph 2 above."

(previously prevented by Turkish veto due to its will to be a part of ESDP process), however, whether it is a permanently satisfying solution for Turkey or not is not very clear. This means that Turkey has been convinced with certain changes in the EU's previous decisions resulting in its removal of veto; but Turkey did not have achieved yet its goal of fully participating to the decision-making process of the ESDP. This situation also has been reflected in the articles of many scholars writing on Turkey-EU security relations.[153] While some of them recognized that this solution was a concrete success on the part of Turkey and thus resulting in its participation in the ESDP operations, others supported that the problem still continues and that was a temporary solution, because Turkey, despite its participation in the ESDP operations, still remains out of the decision-making process. It is possible to claim that since the problem has been settled temporarily from the EU's perspective, the exclusion of Cyprus from the Berlin plus operations was to turn into a serious problem in terms of the deepening of the cooperation between the EU and NATO. This has also affected Turkey's accession process because after the EU membership of the "Republic of Cyprus"; this situation has been also added in Turkey's Accessions Negotiations Framework as an accession condition.

2.2.3   ESDP Operations and Development of European Security Strategy

Following the Copenhagen Summit and NATO Council decisions regarding the solution of ESDP problem in December 2002, the EU has taken over from some of NATO's operations in order to put its security aspirations into practice. Turkey also participated in all of the operations conducted by the EU in the Balkans, in accordance with its aim of 'supporting global peace' except for the one called as EUPAT, police advisory team, started in December

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[153] Bağcı and Yıldız, *op. cit.;* Gözen, *op. cit.;* Bali Aykan, *op. cit.;* Müftüler Baç, 'Turkey's Accession to the EU: Its Potential Impact on Commmon European Security and Defence Policy', *op. cit.*

2005 in Macedonia. Turkey was also involved in two of the operations conducted by the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Table 1: ESDP Missions and Turkey's Contribution[154]

Name of Operation	Place of Operation	Type of Operation	Date of Operation	Turkey's Contribution to Operation
EUPMBiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Police Mission	January 2003-ongoing	14 police 2 civilian personnel
CONCORDIA	Macedonia	Crisis Management and Military Operation	March 2003-December 2003	2 Liaison Team (8 military personnel) and 3 Officers to EU and NATO Quarters
PROXIMA	Macedonia	Police Mission	December 2003-December 2005	4 Gendarmerie personnel and 1 Officer
EUFOR ALTHEA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Military Operation	December 2004-ongoing	265 personnel in ALTHEA, 50 Gendarmerie personnel in EU Integrated Police Force and 5 personnel in EU Police mission
EUPOL Kinshasa	Kinshasa-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Police Mission	April 2005-ongoing	1 personnel from General Commandership of Gendarmerie
EUSEC DRC CONGO	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform	June 2005-2006	1 C-130 Military Shipment Plane with its crew composed of 15 personnel

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[154] Turkish General Staff web page, http://www.tsk.mil.tr ; Gustav Lindstorm, 'On the Ground: ESDP Operations', in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004),* Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, http://www.iss.europa.eu, accessed on 30.11.2006, pp. 111-130; Graham Messervy-Whiting, 'ESDP Deployments and the European Security Strategy', in Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds.), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy,* Zürich:ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 2006, http://css.ethz.ch/publications accessed on 11.01.2007, pp. 32-41.

It is possible to argue that Turkey's contribution to the ESDP operations has affected the speeches and articles of key European actors indicating Turkey's actual and potential security importance for the EU. For example, in April 2007, in his interview with the International Crisis Group, one European Commission official said that "we rely more and more on Turkish peacekeeping troops…The airlifting of French troops to Congo was done by the Turkish air force because we could not do it.…We were begging them to send police to Kosovo".[155]

Another important development, affecting the views of those actors in the EU, has been the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) by the 25 EU Heads of State in December 2003. As a matter of fact, the ESS, with its formal name "A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy" is generally accepted as a document consolidating the broad outlines of the global role of the European Union in the international system and it is also seen as a guide for future action by the Union and about the values upon which action should be based.[156]

It is possible to state that there have been different motives behind the emergence of such a strategy document in the year 2003. These are summed up by Alyson Bailes as: First of all, the 9/11 events increased security concerns of the EU Members and required an assessment to those threats. Moreover, in March 2003, the US decision to start a military action in Iraq without a specific UN mandate created division among the EU Members regarding the possibility and necessity of such an action. In addition, following the divide between "old and new Europe", criticisms about the EU's inability to speak with one voice towards outsiders increased. Besides these historical developments, the

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[155] International Crisis Group, *Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead*, Europe Report No. 184, 17 August 2007, http://www.tepav.org.tr/eng/admin/dosyabul/upload/184_turkey_and_europe___the_way_ahead.pdf, accessed on 22.10.2007, p. 5.

[156] Anne Deighton, 'Introduction', in Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds.), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy,* Zürich:ETH Zürich Center for Security Studies, 2006, http://css.ethz.ch/publications , accessed on 11.01.2007, pp. 9-13.

Maastricht Treaty has already provided the principles and general guidelines for common foreign and security policy of the EU, however, the overall strategic direction for CFSP was still missing. The ESS was a response to that.[157]

The ESS[158] is a document composed of five parts describing the situation in which the EU is found, assessing the international security environment, determining the strategic objectives and their policy implications for the EU. In its introduction, there is an emphasis on the EU's international actorness and its "responsibility for global security". In the first part, "global challenges" are described while stressing the importance of security for the global development. In this part, "key threats" that Europe faces are listed as "terrorism", "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", "regional conflicts", "state failure" and "organised crime". Following the determination of threats, the "strategic objectives" of the EU are clarified in the second part. Accordingly, there are three strategic objectives of the EU in order to defend its security and to promote its values. These are defined as "addressing the threats", "building security in the EU's neighbourhood" and "an international order based on effective multilateralism". In this part, the achievements of the EU in response to the key threats are given and how security in the EU's neighbourhood can be built is analyzed. There is also an emphasis on the creation of "an international order based on effective multilateralism". In the third part, the "policy implications for Europe" are determined by underlining that the EU should be "more active", "more capable", "more coherent" and "work with partners". In the conclusion of the strategy paper, today's world is described as "a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities" to which the EU can "make a major contribution."

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[157] Alyson J.K. Bailes, 'The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History', *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No. 10, February 2005, Stockholm: Ingeniörskopia, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf , accessed on 15.01.2007, pp. 1-35, pp. 6-8.

[158] Council of the European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 2003.

When the ESS is analyzed, it is easy to realize that the EU aims to be a global security player. The author of this Strategy, the High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana, also emphasizes the security actorness of the EU in explaining the strategy:

> …the strategy is, in a way, the European Union's 'strategic identity card': a global security player, vigilant as regards both terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and more traditional sources of instability-regional conflicts, the break-up of states, large-scale organised crime- especially as these different types of threat fuel one another in many parts of the world. A responsible security player convinced that its security and the promotion of its values depend on the achievement of three strategic aims: facing up to the various threats, building security in the Union's immediate neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, a credible security player, both more active in the management and above all the prevention of crises, more determined to develop the necessary military, diplomatic and industrial capabilities, and more coherent in implementing its various instruments of external action."[159]

Security developments of the Post Cold War Europe which are overviewed in this chapter have been reflected in the security relations of Turkey and the EU as well as their security understandings of each other. In the following chapter, the selected speeches of key European actors and articles of scholars will be analyzed with these practical and conceptual changes and developments in mind. It is possible to argue that the move in Turkey's security understanding toward a more comprehensive one has been crucial in terms of raising the awareness of European élites that Turkey was no more just a hard power or military actor and that it could have also soft security contributions to European security besides its existing hard ones. Moreover, the change which has occurred in the EU's security understanding with the creation of CFSP and later ESDP has led to more intensive yet still problematic security interactions between Turkey and the EU. Not only has Turkey's contributions to ESDP operations increased over time but increasingly after the

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[159] Javier Solana, *op. cit.,* pp. 6-7.

adoption of the ESS, Turkey's role and contribution in fighting against new threats has been re-emphasized.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Security has been always an important element of the EU politics. Even in the very beginning of the European integration process, behind the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), providing security and peace has been a crucial motive. When on 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman announced a plan for France and Germany to pool coal and steel production under a High Authority, he invited the European nations to join them, and he presented his plan as a contribution to safeguarding world peace, providing European unity and making war between France and Germany not only unthinkable but also materially impossible.[160] In fact, this project would enhance security and peace in the European continent.

The aim of providing security has maintained its significance throughout the European Union history and this has been also reflected in the enlargement processes. Enlargement has been seen as a significant tool to achieve security. This is also accepted by the European Commissioners responsible for enlargement. For example, in one of his speeches, Olli Rehn[161] states:

> Enlargement has proven to be one of the most important instruments for European security. It reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian power; by extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law, the EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword.

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[160] George and Bache, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

[161] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the European Policy Center, "Europe's Next Frontiers", Brussels, 10 October 2006, Reference: Speech/06/586. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

In another speech[162], he defines enlargement as "the EU's most powerful policy tools" serving "the EU's strategic interests in enhancing peace, security, liberty, democracy and conflict prevention." Moreover, sometimes the enlargement processes have been legitimized by emphasizing the additional security that they would bring to the EU. In a sense, enlargement has often been identified with the issue of security. Some European scholars also pay attention to the link between security and the EU enlargement. For instance, in one of his articles Waever claims that "the EU is a security community that enables it through its integration process" and in another of his articles he states that "the EU is a security institution, a very important security structure that provides security through creation of a strong centre, integration and intervention in conflictual situations".[163] Moreover, Missiroli also supports this idea of linkage between the EU enlargements and security, by arguing that enlargement has made instability and conflict on the European continent ever less likely by extending the EU's values and rules to successive applicants and in a sense being a "security policy in its own right".[164]

It may be possible to argue that the linkage between security and enlargement has been especially apparent in the case of Eastern Enlargement. Some scholars argue that the main motive behind Eastern Enlargement has been to extend the European security community to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and thus to achieve security and stability in the

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[162] Speech of Olli Rehn, "Implementing the renewed consensus on enlargement", Brussels, 6 November 2007, Reference: IP/071651. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/interviews/index_en.htm, accessed on 10/12/2007.

[163] Waever, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', *op. cit.* and Ole Waever, 'The EU as a Security actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders', in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community,* London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 250-295.

[164] Antonio Missiroli, 'The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, Integration and Partnership', in Roland Dannreuther (ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy,* London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 12-27.

whole European continent.[165] Others have also stated that Eastern Enlargement took place due to historical and moral responsibility of Western Europe towards the Eastern Europe, which remained under the dominance of the Soviet Union during the whole Cold War period; however despite this moral responsibility resulting in the reunification of East and West, the security aspect of this enlargement was emphasized especially by the European Commission in order to show the EU's commitment and thus make enlargement admissible for the Eastern European applicants. [166] This is also explained as "the EU initiated its enlargement strategy towards the CEECs on the ground that the security, stability, peace and prosperity of Europe can only be enhanced by fully integrating the CEECs."[167] In this sense, the provision of security through expansion has been an important part of Eastern Enlargement process.

The security aspect of Eastern Enlargement has been reflected in the official discourses of the EU actors who supported this enlargement as well. In the Presidency Conclusions of the EU Council, in the speeches of the Commission Presidents, Enlargement Commissioners, the High Representative of CFSP and also the Member States' Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the argument of "security provision through Eastern Enlargement" becomes obvious. When these statements are analyzed, it is possible to find out two types of arguments: one is related with the idea that Eastern Enlargement will provide peace and stability in the whole continent and the other one is related with the possibility that if it does not take place, this will jeopardize security

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[165] See for example; John O' Brennan, 'Bringing Geopolitics Back In: Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No.1, 2006, pp. 155-169 and Atsuko Higashino, 'For the Sake of "Peace and Security"?: The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards', *Cooperation and Conflict. Journal of Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 39, No.4, 2004, pp. 347-368.

[166] Sjursen, 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', *op. cit.,* p. 499.

[167] Arıkan, *op. cit.,* p. 225.

and stability of the whole European continent. For instance, in the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, Eastern Enlargement is accepted to "lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the European continent."[168] In one of his speeches, Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, defines the purpose of the enlargement as "to create a Europe in which all the peoples of this continent can live together in peace, security, freedom, justice and equality."[169] These statements put emphasis on the benefits in terms of security and stability that would be brought by Eastern Enlargement to whole Europe. Moreover, the then Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen also underlines in one of his speeches the security aspect of enlargement by putting forward that enlargement is the way "to secure peace and security throughout Europe"[170], similarly German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer sees enlargement as "a unique opportunity to unite our [European] continent, wracked by war for centuries, in peace, security, democracy and prosperity."[171]

In addition to the positive security implications which will be offered by Eastern Enlargement, the risk of not enlarging to the Eastern Europe is also stressed in the official discourse of the EU actors. For example, in one of his speeches, Prodi asks as: "Can we really think of achieving peace, stability and prosperity, while only reserving it for ourselves, the 15 Member States? I think

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[168] European Council (1999) *Conclusions of the Presidency,Helsinki European Council,* 10-11 December.

[169] Speech of Romano Prodi, at the European Parliament, Strasbourg,13 October 1999, Reference: Speech/99/130. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/prodi/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 17.12.2007.

[170] Speech of Günter Verheugen, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 September 2000. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/verheugen/speeches_en.htm, accessed on 17.12.2007.

[171] Speech of Joschka Fischer , at the Humboldt University of Berlin, "From Confederacy to Federation-Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration", Berlin, 12 May 2000. Available at: http://www.cie.gov.pl/futurum.nsf/0/1289AFAAE84E5075C1256DA2003D1306, accessed on 17/12/2007.

not, and the Balkan crisis shows that this is not possible."[172] Similarly, Javier Solana, the High Representative of CFSP draws a negative picture for an EU without enlargement by claiming:

> …if we want an insight into a Europe without enlargement…the experience of the Balkans provides a sobering example…Ethnic hatred rather than reconciliation, nineteenth century style power politics rather than co-operation, war rather than peace.[173]

Some also see the option of not enlarging as a failure affecting the whole future of Europe. Jack Straw, the then UK Foreign Minister, maintains that with such a failure the EU would jeopardize future generation's access to "the economic benefits created by the world's largest trading bloc" and the EU would also create "the conditions for future instability and even conflict in Europe."[174] In this respect, the linkage between non-enlargement and insecurity can be seen in the speeches of key European actors.

Some consider that the geopolitical and strategic arguments that have been used in favour of the accession of CEECs are valid for Turkey too, even more than in their case.[175] As a matter of fact, it is possible to claim that in the case of Turkey's accession to the EU, the security aspect (with both its geopolitical and strategic dimensions) is also crucial. However, this is not generally made too explicit as it has been in the case of Eastern Enlargement, where security in the European continent would be provided through the unification of the whole continent. In Turkish case, mostly the potential

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[172]   Speech of Romano Prodi, at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 14 September 1999. Available at http://www.lex.unict.it/cde/documenti/vari/98_99/prodi14_12_99en.htm, accessed on 17/12/2007.

[173]   Speech of Javier Solana, at the Utrecht Theatre, "Enlargement of the European Union-Opportunity or Threat?" , Utrecht, 19 June 2001. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=246&BID=107&DocID=66956&insite=1, accessed on 17/12/2007.

[174]   Speech of Jack Straw, House of Commons debate, 11 December 2002.

[175]   Ingmar Karlsson, 'Turkey's Cultural and Religious Heritage-An Asset to the European Union', in Micheal Emerson and Senem Aydın (eds.), *Turkey in Europe Monitor*, Nos: 1-14., January 2004-February 2005, CEPS Publications, http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=318, accessed on 02.12.2007, pp. 84-87, p. 84.

security contribution of Turkey to the EU, with its both hard and soft security assets, is emphasized. In a sense, Turkey has a more active role rather than passive one. As previously mentioned, according to some, enlargement toward Turkey is motivated mainly by security benefits that Turkey will bring to the EU via its geo-strategic position and as a strategic partner.[176] Another analyst argues that enlargement toward Turkey will be also conducted within security perspective by the European actors as in the case of Eastern Enlargement because Turkey like some other Balkan countries has more political, economic and societal problems, thus "…the economy-based rationalization for enlargement can be harder to hold, the only possibility to keep presenting enlargement-related issues as matters of security, to claim that enlargement is necessary for achieving peace and security in Europe."[177] This argument is supported by Wood's view that "…Because evidence of substantial economic gain for the present EU is sparse, arguments in favour of Turkey's accession focus elsewhere, principally on the security-strategic dimension. With its large army and high level of defence spending Turkey could strengthen the EU's nascent military component and capacity for force projection."[178] He also adds that with Turkey, the EU can become a global power. Since one of the characteristics of a global power is to have the ability to influence the whole world, it is expected that the global power has to have a strong security and defence structure. Thus, Turkey having that structure may help the EU to be a global power in a sense. In fact, all these arguments which envisage a strong relationship between enlargement toward Turkey and its security aspect, have resulted in shaping of the main question of this thesis: *What is the relevance of*

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[176] Sjursen, 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', *op. cit.,* pp. 504-505.

[177] Higashino, 'Securitizing the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: Project by Elite, Discourse by Elite', *op. cit.,* p. 19.

[178] Steve Wood, 'The EU and Turkey: Political Machinations in a Three-Level Game', *National Europe Centre Australian National University Working Paper*, No.139, November 2004, http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/Archive/EU-Turkey-wood.pdf , accessed on 21.02.2007, pp. 1-20, p. 7.

the security dimension in the official enlargement discourse of the EU actors?
Do they see the security aspect of Turkey's accession as a potential
contribution to Turkey and EU relations?

The potential security contribution of Turkey to the EU provides a strong legitimization for many European actors supporting Turkey's entry to the European Union. In this sense, the idea that Turkey can contribute to the EU's security by becoming a member of it, is reflected in the speeches of important EU policy-makers and articles of the scholars writing on Turkey and EU relations in the leading think tanks of Europe. However, this has not reached at all to the broader European public opinion because national politicians and citizens have fears and concerns about the Turkish accession to the Union.[179] In a sense, this issue is supported at a more elitist level. Therefore, in accordance with the main question of this thesis and in light of the security relations between the EU and Turkey in the post Cold War period[180], in this chapter, the speeches and statements of the EU actors like the Commission Presidents, Enlargement Commissioners, the High Representative of CFSP, some EU Member States' leaders and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs are analyzed, specifically starting with 1999, when Turkey became a candidate of the Union, and up to the end of 2007.

The speeches of the European policy makers are chosen among the ones in which the security aspect of Turkey's accession process is usually referred in a *positive* manner and is seen as a contribution to their relations. Since the issue is enlargement, the main emphasis is put on the Commissioners, on the High Representative of the CFSP and on certain Member States' leaders and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In this sense, on the Commission front, the

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[179] Heinz Kramer, 'Turkey and the EU: The EU's Perspective', *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 8, No. 4, October-December 2006, pp. 24-32.

[180] The developments in the post Cold War security relations between Turkey and the EU, changing security perspectives both in Turkey and the EU, and new dynamics emerging in their security policies have been shaping both speeches and articles of European actors supporting Turkey's entrance to the EU with security reasons.

speeches of Günter Verheugen as the EU Enlargement Commissioner and Romano Prodi as the Commission President between the years 1999 and 2004, the speeches of Olli Rehn as the Enlargement Commissioner and José Manuel Barroso as the Commission President between the years 2004 and 2009 are analyzed. Moreover, in the EU Council front, while the speeches of Javier Solana as the High Representative of CFSP since 1999 up to 2009 are analyzed, in terms of EU Member States' leaders, Tony Blair is chosen. This is mainly because the UK is one of the EU Member States where Turkey's accession process and the impact of its membership is viewed positively because of the prospects for deepening Anglo-Turkish cooperation over security issues.[181] Thus, Blair, serving as a British Prime Minister between the years 1997 and 2007, is one of the EU Member States' actors whose speeches support Turkey's accession more with security reasons. In addition, Joschka Fischer as, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany is also chosen because when he talked or wrote about enlargement, he usually referred to Turkey's accession emphasizing the security benefits.

As regards the secondary sources, the articles of scholars, writing on Turkey-EU relations and referring to its security aspect, in the leading European think tanks are analyzed. The reason why those articles have been chosen is that the think tanks are important in terms of affecting and shaping the opinions and official discourses of the EU actors.

These analyses are conducted within the framework of four main themes that form the general framework: *Turkey's importance with its regional actorness*; *with its geopolitical and strategic significance*; *with its soft security contributions* and *the potential security loss of the EU by rejecting Turkey*. Under these four main themes, it is also possible to find out different sub-themes (codes) regarding Turkey's actual and potential security role for the EU. In fact, the roles given to Turkey that are examined under these themes

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[181] Nathalie Tocci, 'Unpacking European Discourses:Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations', in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations,* Rome: IAI-TEPAV Report, 2007, pp. 7-33.

may be repeated various times. However, in order to clarify the relevance of security dimension in the official enlargement discourse of European actors, an analytical separation and organization has been needed. Moreover, in this work, both the speeches and articles are analyzed within a chronological order among each other.

3.1 Turkey's Overall Importance for the EU's Security with its Regional Actorness : Turkey's Role as an Asset and Security Provider

Turkey's importance for European security is accepted by the EU actors and it is emphasized on different occasions by using it either to legitimize their support for its membership or just to appreciate Turkey's contributions to European security without referring to its membership. While they are underlining the security importance of Turkey, they mostly refer to Turkey's regional actorness. Under this main theme, it has been possible to organize the speeches and the articles within the framework of six security roles given to Turkey as: *Turkey's importance for European security, stability and peace*; for *regional/international security and stability;* with its *contribution to EU's foreign and security policy*; *to ESDP; to fight against terrorism* and finally *to the global actorness of the EU*. However, although this categorization has been made according to the mainly emphasized security roles in the speeches and articles, there is not a strict difference among them because they are mostly referred together in same speeches and articles.

3.1.1   Turkey's Importance for European Security, Stability and Peace

In relation with Turkey's importance (role and contribution) for European security, stability and peace, there are significant references made by Solana[182], Prodi[183], Rehn[184] and Fischer[185] in their speeches.

Immediate after the declaration of Turkey's candidacy for EU membership in December 1999, in one of his speeches made to a seminar audience in Madrid[186], Solana clearly shows his support for this development by criticising "…those who question the eligibility of Turkey to join the Union…" and by stating "…Its [Turkey's] accession, I am sure, will enrich the Union." He puts emphasis on Turkey's importance for Europe by referring mainly to its security contribution:

> …And for over fifty years it [Turkey] has been decisively contributing to *European stability and security*. Turkey has always chosen to play a responsible regional role, a role *committed* to Europe's security... Turkey *continues* to choose the

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[182]   Javier Solana is the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Secretary General of both the Council of the European Union and the Western European Union (WEU) since October 1999. Solana also served as the Secretary General of NATO between 1995 and 1999. Available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[183]   Romano Prodi, known as "prominent pro-European" served as the President of the European Commission between the years 1999 and 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/prodi/index_en.htm, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[184]   Olli Rehn is the Member of the European Commission responsible for Enlargement since November 2004. He is also actively working, since 1995, in different organs of the European Union like the European Parliament and the European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/profile/index_en.htm, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[185]   Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor in the government of Gerhard Schröder from 1998 to 2005. He has been a leading figure in the German Green Party for about 20 years and he was one of the most popular politicians in Germany. Since 2006, he is working as senior fellow and visiting professor in different universities. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joschka_Fischer, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[186]   Speech of Javier Solana, at the Fernández Ordóñez Seminar, Madrid, 14 January 2000. Available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246, accessed on 29/01/2007.

European option, so vital for the security and stability of our continent [emphasis added].

Moreover, he also accepts that this candidacy is "...a debt which the Union has owed to that country [Turkey] since the Ankara Association Agreement, which goes all the way back to 1963: it is not something that was set up yesterday." This speech is important because it is one of the speeches, which refers directly to Turkey's contribution to European security by linking it to Turkey's candidacy. In addition, it also highlights the security relations between Turkey and Europe referring to the role played by Turkey in European security. There is both emphasis on Turkey's past and continued contribution and commitment to European stability. Interestingly, in this speech, there is no explicit reference to Turkey's NATO membership; however, Turkey's importance for European security is an element of continuity from the past to present.

Prodi delivers a partly similar speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly[187], in 2004 before Turkey has been given the accession negotiations date, by referring to "…Turkey's important role in *contributing* to the *security and stability* of Europe during the cold war [emphasis added]." However, he does not use any words regarding candidacy, accession or membership. He just accepts his persuasion that "…Turkey can bring a unique contribution to peace and regional stability at the beginning of this new century." It is possible to argue that although; the security contributions of Turkey are not linked to membership in this speech, since it is made to a Turkish audience, the Commissioner wants to show that they appreciate them.

In the same year, in two of his speeches, one made as an interview to a German newspaper and one made as a declaration after the Commission's October 2004 proposal, Solana links Turkey's membership and European

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[187] Speech of Romano Prodi, at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara, 15 January 2004, Reference: Speech/04/16, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/prodi/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19/01/2007.

security to each other. In the interview[188], he states: "Turkey's EU membership will strengthen Europe's stability and security" and in the declaration[189] he shows his support for the Commission proposal by stating: "Turkey should join the EU to contribute to our security." It is crucial to note that when compared to his previous speech made in 2000, there is coherence in his opinions, despite the changing context (audience and dates), regarding Turkey's membership and its contribution to European security.

Similar to Solana, Olli Rehn in a meeting[190] with Turkish business leaders in Istanbul, organized after the decision of the European Council to open negotiations with Turkey, he expresses the start of negotiations with Turkey as "a new chapter in the historic process of peacefully unifying the European continent" and he also refers to Turkey's contribution to regional and international security and stability by acknowledging that "…Turkey has the *capacity* to make a major *contributio*n to *regional and international stability* [emphasis added]." In this speech, Rehn both shows that the Council, in harmony with the Commission, has taken the right decision and links the negotiations to *peaceful unification of European continent*, which is similar to the legitimization of Eastern Enlargement made by the EU actors. Interestingly, Rehn emphasizes Turkey's contribution to international security beyond the European continent and he also attributes Turkey's contributing role for its capacity.

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[188] Interview of Javier Solana given to a German newspaper, "Turkey's EU Bid Key For Security", 16-22 March 2004, available at: http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=445, accessed on 31/01/2007.

[189] Speech of Javier Solana, "Turkey Should Join the EU to Contribute to its Security", 18 October 2004, available at: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2004/10/04x10x18.HTM, accessed on 01/02/2007.

[190] Speech of Olli Rehn, at Meeting with Business Leaders, "Common Future of the EU and Turkey: The Roadmap for Reforms and Negotiations", Istanbul, 8 March 2005, Reference: Speech/05/142, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

Fischer also pays attention to Turkey's role in European security in an interview[191] given to a German newspaper in 2006, by saying that at a time when their (EU's) security is being decided in the *Middle East*, "…Turkey will be central to European security." In fact, it is crucial to note that Turkey stands at the border of the European area of stability and the Middle Eastern area of instability, thus it will contribute to both. While in this interview, again Turkey's importance for European security is emphasized, Fischer expresses his uncertainty about Turkey's full membership and criticizes the debate on the issue of Turkey because of being "incredibly short-sided." It is possible to argue that by giving the Middle East example, Turkey's contribution to international security becomes more concrete.

Different from Fischer, Olli Rehn in his speech[192] at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, specifies the motivations behind offering the European prospect to Turkey through accession negotiations, as strategic and asserts that "Turkey's *strategic assets* have implications for the stability and security of our *continent* [emphasis added]." This is important because he accepts that the strategic assets owned by Turkey play crucial role in security of Europe and offers a base for its accession. Similar to this speech, in his interview[193] given to the EurActiv, he argues that enlargement is "a vital part of the solution to the problems that the EU will face in the coming decades", specified as "energy security, climate change, cross-border crime, ageing populations and consequent labour shortages, economic competitiveness and the rise of new economic powers" thus "the progressive and well-managed integration of Turkey and the Balkans will help the European Union manage the challenges

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[191] Interview of Joschka Fischer given to Thomas Seifert from *Die Presse*, "Turkey is 'Central' for Europe", 4 November 2006, available at: www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/Nov_4_Fischer.pdf ,Accessed on 23/02/2007.

[192] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, "A Strong Europe with its Gaze Fixed on the South-East: Our European Future", Paris, 4 October 2007, Reference: Speech/07/594, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 25/11/2007.

[193] Interview of Olli Rehn given to EurActiv, "Turkey Membership 'Vital' for EU", 23 October 2007, Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/olli-rehn-turkey-membership-vital-eu/article-167807, accessed on 25/11/2007.

ahead effectively." In this respect, Turkey's integration is seen as a solution to many problems including the security related ones, of the Union.

In terms of secondary sources, the article[194] of Giovanni Gasparini and Stefano Silvestri from Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), an Italian think tank on International Affairs, puts forwards a strategic approach to Turkey and EU security relations. While they argue that there is a reciprocal political responsibility to prepare Turkey for EU and the EU for Turkey, they state: "This is particularly true as far as the security relationship is concerned, since both players are better off when they enter a cooperative game than as lonely actors *at the border of the European area of stability* [emphasis added]." This is crucial in terms of accepting Turkey's importance for European security, stability and peace. In addition, since there is an emphasis on their security relationship at the border of the European area of stability, this can be a result of Turkey's effective role in terms of providing security and stability in the Balkans by contributing to NATO and ESDP missions in recent years. However, although their cooperation is appreciated, there is not a direct reference to Turkey's membership, and the process is labelled just as 'a cooperative game'. In addition, since there is a reference to security interdependence and cooperation as a mutual gain for both the EU and Turkey, especially at the border of the European area of stability, this may be seen as similar to Turkey's traditional role in NATO's Southern flank during the Cold War. In other words, although they accept Turkey's importance and contribution to European security, this contribution is not directed towards the core of Europe but to its outer South-Eastern borders.

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[194] Giovanni Gasparini and Stefano Silvestri, 'A Strategic Approach', in Giovanni Gasparini (ed.), *Turkey and European Security,* Rome and İstanbul: Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV, 2006, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_8.pdf , accessed on 25.06.2007, pp. 65-74, p. 66.

3.1.2 Turkey's Importance for the Regional/International Security and Stability

In terms of Turkey's importance for the regional/international security and stability, there are crucial emphasises made by Verheugen[195], Blair[196], Solana, Rehn and Barroso[197] in their speeches.

Verheugen, in his speech[198] delivered in 2000 at the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, emphasizes Turkey's constructive regional role. He states: "The Union considers Turkey as *a reliable partner* in foreign and security policy… we expect that Turkey plays a constructive role in contributing to peace and stability in the *eastern Mediterranean region* [emphasis added]." The timing of this speech is important because it was delivered a year after the Helsinki decisions and during which European expectations about the settlement of Cyprus problem were heightened. Therefore this may explain why there is an emphasis of Turkey's role in the eastern Mediterranean region. Moreover, in this speech while Turkey's importance in contributing to regional peace and stability is not ignored, it is also considered as a reliable "partner" for CFSP requiring that Turkey should confirm with good neighbouring relations; however the security issue is not linked to its candidacy, accession or

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[195] Günter Verheugen was the Member of the European Commission responsible for Enlargement between 1999 and 2004 in the Prodi Commission. He is currently serving as the European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/verheugen/index_en.htm, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[196] Tony Blair is a British politician who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from May 1997 to June 2007. He was also the leader of the Labour Party from 1994 until 2004.Available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page12009.asp, Visited on 26.12.2007.

[197] José Manuel Barroso is a Portuguese politician and he is currently the 11th President of the European Commission. He has been serving as the President of the Commission since November 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/personal/profile/index_en.htm, accessed on 26.12.2007.

[198] Speech of Günter Verheugen , at the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, "The Challenges of Expanding the EU Vision Beyond its Current Borders", Chicago, 6 April 2000. available at http://eucenter.wisc.edu/Publications/Verheugenspeech.htm, accessed on 19/01/2007.

membership bid. Interestingly, there is both emphasis on Turkey's role as a security partner and reference to Eastern Mediterranean region together.

Regarding Turkey's role of providing regional and global stability, Blair in a press conference[199] after the Copenhagen EU Council in 2002, replies a question related with Turkey's Europeanness by claiming: "I think that it is of profound importance for *Europe*, for this region, for the *wider global stability*, that Turkey is welcomed into the European Union [emphasis added]." He states that Turkey will be accepted to that (EU) club with the same rules with others. In the same speech he underlines the *global security threats* such as international terrorism too. In this sense, as a response to a question related with Turkey's Europeanness, the issue is directly linked to security threats and Turkey's importance for the regional and global security. There is dual emphasis on European security and global security and also emphasis on threats like terrorism.

In addition, Solana also underlines, in a press briefing after EU-Turkey Ministerial Meeting in Rome in 2003, Turkey's "fundamental role in the world" and says that "…In critical cases such as *Iraq, the Middle East* … the international situations which both the European Union and Turkey are engaged in, Turkey has always been an important *actor and partner* [emphasis added]."[200] He also refers to their deep *cooperation* and to his belief that Turkey and the EU will continue to work closely to solve complex problems. Interestingly, similar to Verheugen's speech made in Chicago Council, Solana also defines Turkey as a 'partner' in relation with regional issues and regarding the solution of complex problems, but there is no sign of membership.

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[199] Statement of Tony Blair, at a press conference, "Prime Minister's press conference following the EU Council in Copenhagen", 16 December 2002, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1745.asp , accessed on 14/02/2007.

[200] Statement of Javier Solana, at a press briefing after the EU-Turkey Ministerial Meeting, Rome,11 October 2003, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246 , accessed on 27/11/2007.

In evaluating the start of accession negotiations with Turkey, Rehn[201] also brings the issue to Turkey's regional role and potential contribution to stability. He states: "As a result of its *combined* strategic, economic and population *potential*, Turkey can make a major contribution to regional and international stability [emphasis added]." In the same speech, he again uses his aforementioned argument of peaceful unification of the European continent with the start of accession negotiations. Moreover, three months later[202], he again refers to Turkey's contribution to regional and international stability:

> Turkey's membership is in *our strategic interest*, if it can meet all the accession criteria. Owing to its political and economic potential, and NATO membership, Turkey can make a major contribution to *regional and international stability* [emphasis added].

It is crucial to note that in this speech, Turkey's contribution is related to NATO membership and to non-military capabilities of Turkey, while this contribution is perceived only to the EU's strategic interest. Here, the context is significant because this speech is made in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly by an EU Enlargement Commissioner, who shows the enlargement as an important security tool of the EU. Therefore, it has been significant to link Turkey's membership and the EU's strategic interest, also regional and international stability all together.

In one of his speeches, Barroso states: "…to promote stability and prosperity around us, we are currently negotiating membership with Turkey

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[201] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the European Economic and Social Committee EU-Turkey JCC, "Accession Negotiations with Turkey: Fulfilling the criteria", Brussels, 28 November 2005, Reference: Speech/05/733, available at :
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

[202] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "The EU accession process, an effective tool of the European foreign and security policy ", Brussels, 21 February 2006, Reference: Speech/06/112, available at :
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

and Croatia…"[203] In this speech, rather than directly referring to Turkey's regional stability contribution, he defines enlargement of the EU as a tool to promote regional security and stability, which is a similar legitimization used in Eastern Enlargement by European actors.

Different from Barroso, Rehn in his speech[204] made in an international symposium organized in Ankara in 2006, underlines directly Turkey's importance for "the stability and security of one of the most *unstable and insecure regions* in the world [emphasis added]" referring to the Middle East region. He also appreciates Turkey's strategic significance and involvement in the UNIFIL mission in *Lebanon*, while he is not linking the issue to the accession or membership. In another speech[205] made in French in Strasbourg, he says "…Ses atouts stratégiques touchent à la stabilité et la sécurité de notre continent. La Turquie est un ancrage pour la stabilité dans une *des régions les plus instables du globe* ..." (Author's translation: "its strategic advantages touch on the stability and security of our continent. Turkey is an anchor of stability in one of the most *unstable regions* of the world.) In this respect, he again repeats Turkey's important role for the regional security and stability. Although, in two of these speeches, the audience is different (in the former it is Turkish and in the latter it is French) regarding Turkey's regional role, he keeps his coherence.

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[203] Speech of José Manuel Barroso, at the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce , "EU-Japan – a Mature Relationship with Untapped Potential", Tokyo, 21 April 2006, Reference: Speech/06/243, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/press/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 07/02/2007.

[204] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the International Symposium on "European Social Model and Trade Union Rights within the EU negotiations", " Turkey's best response is a rock-solid commitment to reforms", Ankara, 3 October 2006, Reference: Speech/06/559, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

[205] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Ecole Nationale de l'Administration, " Le grand défi européen: comment combiner approfondissement politique et élargissement graduel? ", Strasbourg, 20 June 2007. Reference: Speech/07/410, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19/07/2007.

When the secondary sources are analyzed, in the different European think-tanks and Commission Staff Working Document, the regional security importance of Turkey is underlined. David Barchard, for instance, in his article[206] published for Center for European Reform, argues that "integrating Turkey into Europe could give the West benefits in defence co-operation, together with strategic advantages in the Middle East and the Gulf" and continues that "there are areas such as the Balkans where the European powers will find Turkey a useful and indeed essential partner" because according to him, "Muslim groups in the Balkans will always look to Turkey as a key regional friend and potential protector." In this article where Barchard examines different aspects of Turkey-EU relations after the European Council Summit in Luxembourg in 1997, he strongly supports Turkey's potential strategic interests that will be brought to the Union with membership and recognizes that the EU does not have option like drawing *"a border on its south-eastern flank and that excludes Turkey and then forget about that country* [emphasis added]." This article is important in terms of its timing, because it was written after the Luxembourg Summit, which did not provide a promising future, like Turkish candidacy, for Turkey and EU relations. In this sense, it can be asked whether this can be seen as one of the leading article that may have an effect on the shaping of EU actors' opinion toward the decision of candidacy in 1999. It is important to note that of course, there have been several other reasons leading to candidacy decision, however, an article written in such a strategic time within a crucial think-tank, might have an impact over the future decisions.

The importance of Turkey's integration into the EU for the stability of Europe's South-Eastern border has been also emphasized a decade after by Olli Rehn in an interview which has been mentioned previously.[207]

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[206] David Barchard, 'Turkey and the European Union', *Working Draft of a Future Pamphlet from the Center for European Reform*, July 1998, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p093_turkey.pdf, accessed on 22/02/2007, pp. 1-44 p. 39.

[207] Rehn, "Turkey Membership 'Vital' for EU",23 October 2007, *op. cit.*

Turkey's importance for regional and international stability is also stated in the European Commission Staff Working Document[208], written immediately before the decision of December 2004 giving the date for negotiations between Turkey and the EU:

> Turkey's accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics. These factors give Turkey the capacity to contribute to regional and international stability.

This Document is important in terms of analyzing the potential effects that Turkey's Membership will bring to the EU. In this respect, it is crucial to find a reference to Turkey's contribution for the regional and international stability with its soft security and military potential in a Document prepared before a historic decision by the European Commission Staff.

Moreover, in an article[209] published by the Center for European Policy Studies within the framework of "Turkey in Europe Monitor" project, there is emphasis on the need of *stabilization of the EU's periphery*, and Turkish membership of the EU is seen as a solution to meet this need:

> Europe must *stabilize its own periphery* to ensure that it is not affected by the problems that exist there. *Turkish membership* of the EU *would strengthen Europe* on its most vulnerable front [emphasis added].

While evaluating the Commission Staff Document, in their article[210] concentrating on the implications of enlargement toward Turkey, Annabelle Littoz-Monnet and Beatriz Villanueva Penas who are the researchers in the IRRI (Institut Royal des Relations Internationales-Royal Institute of

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[208] Commission Staff Working Document, "Issues Arising From Turkey's Membership Perspective, Brussels, 6.10.2004, SEC(2004) 1202, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/key_documents_en.htm,, accessed on 20.03.2007, p.4.

[209] Ingmar Karlsson, *op. cit.,* p. 84.

[210] Annabelle Littoz-Monnet and Beatriz Villanueva Penas, 'Turkey and the European Union the Implications of a Specific Enlargement', *IRRI Papers,* 04 April 2005, http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/050404Turquie-ALM-BVP.pdf , accessed on 19.01.2007, pp. 1-16, p. 4.

International Relations) in Brussels, state that when the *new political objectives and security concerns of the EU* are considered, "…Turkey's role can indeed be significant in terms of providing stability in the regions of the Eastern-Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus." This means that Turkey's cross-regional security role is viewed as compatible with the EU's new objectives and concerns, hence increases security significance of Turkey for Europe. Moreover, in line with the EU's aim of being an effective regional actor in all of those regions, a Turkey that becomes member of the Union will be important in providing stability and realizing its regional purposes.

Turkey's contribution to regional/international security and stability; and its importance as a member for the EU's export of stability and soft security, are emphasized by the scholars[211] like Henri J. Barkey and Anne-Marie Le Gloannec writing for CERI (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales-Center of International Studies and Researches). While they are referring to the aims of EU's security and neighbourhood strategies, they state:

> …Turkey may not only ensure the stability of energy supplies to the EU; it may also help to stabilize the environment. Both Turkey and the EU have a vested interest in securing stability in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In this article, there is again emphasis on Turkey's cross-regional role in European security.

3.1.3 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy

In terms of Turkey's contribution to the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, there is relatively more emphasis in the articles of European think-tanks than the speeches made by the European actors.

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[211] Henri J. Barkey and Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, 'The Strategic Implications of Turkey's Integration in the European Union', in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds.), *The Strategic Implications of the European Union Enlargement*, Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005, pp. 127-150, p. 145.

In a speech[212] made before a Turkish audience in March 2000, Verheugen defines the link between Turkey and the EU as a "strategic partnership" and underlines the Union's wish of "*integrating Turkey more into the European structures*" as "…a reliable partner in foreign and security policy." He adds: "…Our interest is that Turkey plays a constructive role in our common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region." In this speech, although he refers to Turkey's role in contributing to peace and stability, he does not refer to Turkey as a candidate or potential member in foreign and security policy. He just calls it as a "reliable partner". Moreover, integrating or anchoring Turkey into the European structures, especially in foreign and security policies, implies in fact further cooperation and integration between Turkey and CFSP/ESDP. Nevertheless, there is not such a direct reference.

As secondary sources, different authors from different think-tanks put emphasis on Turkey's potential role for the EU's foreign and security policy. For instance, Kirsty Hughes from Friends of Europe in her article[213] exploring the implications of the Turkish accession, states that the Turkish accession will be important in terms of extending and deepening the foreign policy interests of the EU in its surrounding regions. She underlines that Turkey, as a member of the EU, will probably want to be an active foreign policy player. She also refers to Turkey's potential contribution on the EU's security policy by stating that "…given its large army, Turkey could be in a relatively strong position to contribute to the development of EU peacekeeping forces in the context of its developing security policy." As a matter of fact, Turkey's potential

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[212] Speech of Günter Verheugen, at Bogazici University, "Turkey-The Enlargement Process and Turkey's Place in this Process", İstanbul, 9March 2000, available at: http://ec.europa.eu//comm/enlargement/speeches/gv_0903_turkey.htm, accessed on 31/05/2007.

[213] Kirsty Hughes, 'Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession', *A Friends of Europe Working Paper on the Occasion of the "Turkey's EU end-game?" European Policy Summit of 17 June 2004,* June 2004, http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Adv_Board_Netherlands_HCSS/2004/335/tabid/868/Default.aspx, accessed on 22.02.2007, pp. 1-37, p. 30.

contribution to the EU's foreign and security policy is interpreted in terms of Turkey's regional role, actorness and its impact for the EU's aim of being a more influential regional actor. It is also accepted that this can be possible with a Turkey that is a crucial actor in its region both with its geographical position and military capabilities.

Similarly, in a work[214] prepared by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, the authors try to answer the question whether the EU prefers "to become a major actor in the nearby southern and eastern neighbourhoods" or whether it prefers to isolate itself "behind the most secure possible external borders":

> If the EU truly aspires to play a stabilising, pacifying and modernising role in *its neighbourhood* beyond mere token actions, then *the incorporation of Turkey into the common external policy* offers the prospect of real advantages [emphasis added].

In this statement, Turkey's integration is linked to the EU's international actorness in the neighbourhood. It is interesting that instead of CFSP, there is an emphasis on Turkey's incorporation to "common external policy", which brings in mind Turkey as an economic partner. In the same article, they conclude that they view Turkey as "a potential asset for the EU's foreign and security policies" because "Turkey would be the bridgehead of a modern, multi-cultural Europe…" in a conflictual region (most probably Middle East). Bridgehead is literally defined as "the fortification covering the end of a bridge nearest the enemy." In the statement where Turkey is described as a bridgehead (interpreted in civilian sense by the authors), Turkey is given a civilizational role, which is protecting modern and multi-cultural values of Europe. They also argue that "…its [Turkey's] civilian, military and human resources could be integrated with those of the EU and serve as a spearhead of

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[214] Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, 'Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy', *Center for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Papers*, No. 1, August 2004, http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=318 , accessed on 20.10.2006, pp. 1-35, p. 33.

the EU's soft and not-so-soft power projection into the region." Spearhead is defined as "a body of persons chosen to lead a thrust or attack." It can be said that Turkey as a bridgehead will contribute to the EU's efforts of projecting its soft power in the Middle Eastern region, thus becoming a spearhead. In this respect, there is a link between Turkey's civilizational role and EU's civilian (soft) power role. Moreover, it is possible to point out that Turkey's Post Cold War approach to security which has not excluded the soft dimension of security, its relations with the countries in the region and its contributions to both civilian and military operations in the EU's periphery may have played a significant role in such a conclusion made by the authors.

In both of two articles of the above mentioned think-tanks, timing is crucial. Both of them have been written in the summer of 2004, before the critical decision giving the accession negotiations date to Turkey. Therefore, it is crucial to note that by analyzing the potential impact of Turkey's accession and supporting Turkey's importance for the EU's CFSP, they may have been influential on shaping the decision taken.

Turkey's importance for the EU's foreign and security policy is also evaluated in terms of Turkey's role as the 'South Eastern flank of Europe' in the article[215] of Littoz-Monnet and Penas from IRRI. In this respect, the authors underline Turkey's emergence as a regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean and its importance which has increased in recent years. They also argue that Turkey's membership is indispensable so as "to realize the CFSP and for the EU to maintain the security of its adjacent regions." In addition to *Turkey's regional role that can contribute to CFSP*, Turkey's position as a NATO member that can be useful for the EU is also emphasized: "Turkey's integration to the EU would primarily mean a fortification of the European position in the transatlantic pact." In a sense, Turkey's integration to the EU is seen as a means for Europeanization of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, this is also related with the fact that a Turkey "as a NATO-member

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[215]Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

but without EU affiliation" is seen as an obstacle to the development of a European security policy thus to the relations of the EU and NATO. Turkey's significant position in NATO and its impact on the security policy of the EU, may have affected such an analysis.

Moreover, in the same article[216], while Turkey's integration to the EU is evaluated, Turkey's location at the *border* of *the Middle East* and the *Caucasus* is described as a contribution "to offer new opportunities for the CFSP." This is explained in relation with Turkey's strong historical, cultural and economic ties with the region and thus its potential *stabilization role for Central Asia* after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a sense, Turkey's regional soft security contributions in the Post Cold War era, mentioned previously, in terms of its business relations with the ex-Soviet countries, energy-trade relations with the Central Asia and the Caucasus, and its initiative of BSEC that has been an important product of Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the region, have been reflected in this analysis. They also highlight Turkey's role as the leading *provider* of NATO's Partnership for Peace program by making a conclusion that "Turkey could be in a strong position to contribute to the development of EU peacekeeping forces in the context of its developing security policy." While there is a reference to Turkey's role for CFSP, Turkey's role and contribution to regional and international stability is also underlined.

3.1.4 Turkey's Importance for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Complementary to its role as a NATO Partner

In relation with Turkey's potential contribution to the ESDP complementary to its role as a NATO partner, it is possible to find emphasises made by Prodi, Solana and Rehn.

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[216] *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.

In Prodi's speech[217] made in Bogazici University to a Turkish audience, while he mentions Europe as a regional power from the Baltic to the Balkans, he refers to Turkey's important role in stabilising the Balkans with its active participation in EU missions in Bosnia and FYROM and its contribution to NATO forces in Kosovo. In accordance with this, he puts forward that Turkey can offer "a substantial contribution to the European Security and Defence Policy *with an effective military capability, including manpower, logistics and infrastructure* [emphasis added]." In addition in this speech, he also puts emphasis on Turkey's "vital role to play in a *region bordering the reunified Europe* that is marked by so many uncertainties [emphasis added]." It is crucial to note that Prodi underlines Turkey's contributions to regional security and stability when he refers to the *EU's increasing regional role*. There is awareness that Turkey is important in contributing to the realization of this role. However, there again is not a direct reference to Turkey's candidacy or accession in this speech although Turkey's real contribution to security is emphasized especially before a Turkish audience.

Solana also puts emphasis on Turkey's importance for the ESDP. As an answer to a question of what can be the advantages of the Turkish accession for the EU, asked by a journalist from a German newspaper, Solana[218] emphasizes two points:

> First, the country is in the middle of a partly very unstable zone - between the Near East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Turkey's EU membership would give a vigorous stabilizing impetus to the whole region and therefore also increase our security....Turkey has an enormous *potential of armed forces*. Thanks to this, it can make a useful contribution to *European crisis missions* [emphasis added].

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[217] Speech of Romano Prodi, at the Bogazici University, Istanbul, 16 January 2004, Reference: Speech/04/20, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/prodi/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 11.12.2007.

[218] Interview of Javier Solana given to Jochen Gaugele from Bild, 2 October 2004, available at:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246, accessed on 27/11/2007.

Since he is responsible from both foreign and security policy of the EU, he underlines both Turkey's potential stabilizing regional role as a part of EU foreign policy and he also appreciates Turkey's military capabilities that play crucial role in the European missions. Different from others, Solana in this speech refers directly to Turkey's EU membership and explains it as a security advantage for the Union.

Like Prodi, Rehn, in one[219] of his speeches where he evaluates Turkey's accession process, underlines Turkey's contribution to the ESDP too. He lists the ESDP operations to which Turkey has participated and links the issue to the membership.

When secondary sources are analyzed, in a report[220]; supported by British Council and Open Society Institute and prepared by an independent commission composed of former European commissioners, European Parliament members, academicians, states' presidents and ministers of foreign affairs; while Turkey's contributions to ESDP operations and its military capabilities are underlined, Turkey is seen as a potential forward base for ESDP operations. This report also lists the ESDP operations to which Turkey has participated and says: "…As one of the strongest *NATO partners*, with a clear orientation toward ESDP, Turkey would be of great value for the European defence system [emphasis added]." In this report, although Turkey's military and security contributions are appreciated and the membership of Turkey is supported with the legitimizing security opportunities, the fact that Turkey is seen as a potential forward base for ESDP operations, brings in mind the question of whether Turkey as an EU member will not be an active security

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[219] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Helsinki University Lecture, "Turkey's Accession Process to the EU", Helsinki, 27 November 2006, Reference: Speech/06/747, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 19/07/2007.

[220] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise,* September 2004, http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/report.html, accessed on 07.03.2007, p. 18.

and defence decision-maker but will be just used as a front line member to protect the Union.

The Commission Staff Working Document[221] can be considered as another document where Turkey's potential contribution to ESDP is emphasized by referring to Turkey's large military expenditure and manpower.

Similarly, Charles Grant, who is the director of the Center for European Reform (CER), in his article[222], where he evaluates the Turkish accession in terms of increasing the power of the Union, also lists the ESDP operations to which Turkey participated and stresses the importance of the military capabilities of Turkey in contributing to ESDP. He states: "In the long run, the size and quality of Turkey's armed forces could be a considerable plus for Europe's defence policy." In a sense, Turkey's contributions to the ESDP operations, listed in the previous chapter, are regarded as a crucial legitimization for the Turkish accession by European actors when the development of ESDP is taken into consideration.

3.1.5 Turkey's Special Importance in the Fight against Terrorism as a Sign of Increased Interdependence between the EU and Turkey?

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the security interdependence between the West and Turkey increased and there have been more references to the fight against terrorism. European actors like Verheugen and Fischer have placed an increasing emphasis on terrorism and the fight against it in their speeches related with Turkey and the future of Europe. For instance, Verheugen in his speech[223] made one month after the 9/11 attacks, at the inaugural Meeting of the EU-Turkey Foundation in Brussels, refers to fight

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[221] Commission Staff Working Document, *op. cit.,* pp. 10-11.

[222] Charles Grant, 'Turkey Offers EU More Punch', *Center for European Reform Comment and Analysis published by the European Voice*, September 2005, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_europeanvoice_sep05.html, accessed on 21.02.2007, pp. 1-3.

[223] Speech of Günter Verheugen, at Inaugural Meeting of the EU-Turkey Foundation, Brussels, 17 October 2001. Reference: Speech/01/469, available at : http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/speeches/arch_2001.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

against terrorism as a priority of both the EU and Turkey. He thinks that Turkey and the EU can work together to reinforce peace and stability. He puts emphasis on the EU's and Turkey's need to cope with terrorism by claiming: "In the aftermath of the *terrorist attacks*, it is clearer than ever that *Turkey and the EU need each other*. The EU is indispensable for Turkey, and Turkey is indispensable for the EU [emphasis added]." As mentioned before, Turkey has been very active in combating terrorism especially in 1990s due to increasing terrorist movements of PKK. Verheugen' s speech is important because it indicates that Turkey's potential and actual role, its experience in the fight against terrorism is realized by the EU, thus Turkey is seen as indispensable in this fight. However in this speech again, there is not a direct reference to the membership issue, in stead; Verheugen uses the words of 'working together' and 'being indispensable for each other'.

In an article[224] written on the Fischer's vision of Europe's future, Fischer's view, which was extracted from his speech, regarding Turkey's position in the EU is given. He considers that in combating terrorism the EU can renew its trans-Atlantic partnership and he says that "…the undertaking [renewal of trans-Atlantic partnership] involves bringing Turkey into the EU to deal better with the security issues at the edge of Europe's 'neighbourhood'." This step, he continues, "would mean a 'strategic victory' against terrorism." Fischer in another statement[225] argues that Turkish membership is a key way to liberate Europe from the threat of insecurity from the Middle-East and the terrorist ideas. He continues as:

> Turkey's entry would be *strategic in the long-term*…to modernise an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D- Day for Europe in the *war against*

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[224] Article on Joschka Fischer by John Vinocur, **"**Politicus: Fischer's shifting vision of Europe's grand future", *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April 2004. Available at: http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=9274, accessed on 13.03.2007.

[225] Statement of Joschka Fischer, "Turkey EU entry as big as 'D-Day'", 20 October 2004, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/3758592.stm, accessed on 20/03/2007.

terror…It would be the greatest positive challenge for these totalitarian and terrorist ideas [emphasis added].

In this statement, there is a link between Turkey's accession/reform process and the fight against "Islamic" terrorism. This may be related with the rationale behind the ESS, which aims to build security around the EU by offering incentives for reform and transformation.

In both of these Fischer's arguments, Turkey is seen as important in the fight against terrorism in two ways: Firstly, Turkey's position in the trans-Atlantic partnership, as a reliable partner of both the US and the EU, is accepted as an asset to combat terrorism. Secondly, the EU membership of Turkey, which is seen as a model for the Islamic countries, may challenge "totalitarian and terrorist ideas" by proving that Islam and Western values are not incompatible.

As secondary sources, the Commission Staff Working Document[226] also refers to fighting terrorism which is an important security challenge and emphasizes that the Turkish accession would further enhance already *existing cooperation* in this field. In this document, Turkish membership is in this sense tried to be legitimized on the basis of fighting terrorism because terrorism becomes an area of common concern.

3.1.6 Turkey's Importance for the Global Actorness of the EU

A global actor (or a world power) has the ability, will and intention to extend its influence worldwide and shape functioning of the international system.[227] The EU has recently the will and intention to become a global actor. The EU has developed a common foreign and security policy, is trying to strengthen its common security and defence structure, it aims to be influential

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[226] Commission Staff Working Document, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

[227] Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun, 'EU's New Position in the International Order: From Regional to Global Power?', *Perceptions:Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XI, No: 1, Spring 2006, pp. 49-77, p. 52.

both around its region and also in the world and for this reason it is interfering in different events occurring in various parts of the world.

Although there are not much emphasises by the European actors in terms of Turkey's importance for the EU to be a global actor, some Europeans refer to this issue. For example, Fischer in one[228] of his speeches states: "In order that the EU becomes powerful and our children and grandchildren can live in peace, Turkey needs to be a member of the EU." Turkey's membership is shown by Fischer as a criterion that should be performed for a powerful European Union.

As secondary sources, Heinz Kramer, head of the research unit 'EU External Affairs' at the SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), in his article[229] analyzing the EU perspective regarding Turkey's accession gives the reasons why Turkey's accession can be supported. He puts emphasis on Turkey's geo-strategic position's significance, and soft security contributions like energy security; its ties with Islamic countries; historical and cultural heritage and their reflection in its international relations. As a result, he underlines that "Turkey's accession would greatly enhance the EU's potential as a global actor in the world-wide competition about the right way to shape a stable and peaceful global order in the 21st century." From such a conclusion, it is possible to infer that in the world, there is a competition among different powers in choosing the right way to provide stable and peaceful global order. In such a context, an EU with a Turkey that can provide both hard and soft security contributions, in a holistic manner, may have more chance to be a global actor.

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[228] Speech of Joschka FISCHER, Hürriyet, 2 September 2004. Available at: http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/09/02/515580.asp, accessed on 20.03.2007.

[229] Kramer, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

3.2 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security with its Geopolitical and Strategic Significance

Turkey's geopolitical and strategic significance has been always an important factor of its regional actorness and its relations with other states and organisations. This significance also affects the global actorness of the EU. The EU, in order to be an influential actor on the world scene, has to be effective both around its regions and in the world in general. Turkey's geopolitical and strategic position may help the EU to realize this aim. In this respect, European actors like Verheugen, Prodi, Fischer, Rehn and Blair also stress Turkey's geopolitical and strategic importance, which can contribute to its membership efforts.

Verheugen, in one[230] of his speeches made in November 1999, immediately before Turkey's candidacy was declared, says that "…there are the geopolitical and strategic arguments that make it imperative to support Turkey's affiliation with Europe." Although in this statement Verheugen does not refer directly to Turkey's geography nor explain what those arguments are; as an enlargement commissioner, admits that geopolitical and strategic reasons make Turkey's membership necessary. However, interestingly, in stead of directly using the term 'membership' he prefers 'affiliation' that means 'association, connection, attachment or membership'.

As Different from Verheugen, Prodi in his speech[231] made before a Turkish audience in 2004, links the membership issue and Turkey's crucial geopolitical position to each other:

> We in the EU are aware of the important benefits that Turkey's membership could bring to the European Union...Its geopolitical position as a *hub between Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia,* and its close relations with many of the countries concerned make it a key actor for stability, prosperity and peace [emphasis added].

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[230] Speech of Günter Verheugen, at the conference "The Second Decade towards a New and Integrated Europe", Den Haag, 4 November 1999, Reference: Speech 99/151, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/speeches/arch_1999.htm, accessed on 31.05.2007.

[231] Prodi, Istanbul, 16 January 2004, *op. cit.*

Turkey's geopolitical position is seen as an advantage in order to provide stability, prosperity and peace in that region, thus he underlines Turkish membership. In this speech, he also specifies Turkey's location as a center between Europe, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia.

In 2004, before Turkey was given the date for accession negotiations, there has been many emphasises, made by European actors, on the link between Turkey's membership and its geopolitical and strategic position. For instance, Fischer[232] in one of his speeches supporting Turkey's membership, refers to Turkey's "extra-ordinary strategic importance for Europe" as a reality that cannot be ignored. Similar to Fischer, Rehn[233] in the same year in one of his speeches emphasizes Turkey's geopolitical and strategic significance that will play crucial role in its accession.

Blair[234], after Turkey has been given the date for accession negotiations, also refers to Turkey's accession as a crucial "welcome moment for Europe" and underlines Turkey's geopolitical position's importance for Europe: "Turkey lies at the *intersection of three are*as of strategic importance to Europe - the Middle East, central Asia and the Balkans. So a *stable and democratic Turkey* will help strengthen our influence and role in all three areas [emphasis added]." In this speech, there is an emphasis both on the geopolitical position and the transformation/reform process of Turkey. A stable and democratic Turkey located in an important geography is seen as a crucial tool that will increase strength and role of the Union in the region.

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[232] Speech of Joschka FISCHER, Hürriyet, 8 September 2004. Available at: http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/09/08/518583.asp, accessed on 20/03/2007.

[233] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Group Meeting of the Greens/EFA of the European Parliament, Istanbul, 20 October 2004, Reference: Speech/04/466, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2004_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

[234] Statement of Tony Blair, "PM's Statement on the European Council", 20 December 2004,available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page6817.asp, accessed on 16/09/2007.

Rehn, in his article[235] published in Le Monde in September 2005, after mentioning its role as a strategic partner in the Cold War, he refers to Turkey's strategic importance for Europe in today's geopolitical context when there is the problem of terrorism and fundamentalism. He also states that "…Today's *geopolitical realities call for the opening of the long-promised accession negotiations*…Once again, this is *an open-ended process not a blank cheque* [emphasis added]." In the same article, while he accepts that the accession process of Turkey is important for the EU, he defines it as "an open-ended process" and "not a blank cheque", which is a crucial discouraging factor for Turkey. In addition, what is interesting is that negotiations process is seen as a promise in itself, as distinct from membership.

Fischer, in his article[236] published in Project Syndicate in 2006 in a period when the accession negotiations were blurred, argues that Europe's interests necessitate establishing a *strong link* with Turkey, which is the cornerstone of the regional security. He finds astonishing that the EU does the opposite. He refers to crucial and risky *geopolitical position of Turkey* including Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Middle East conflict, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, and he emphasizes "Turkey's paramount importance to European security" in such a risky environment.

Rehn[237], while evaluating Turkey's accession process, puts emphasis on Turkey's *strategic value* that has become more important in the Post Cold War period than before. He refers to crucial *environment of Turkey* like Iran, Iraq, the Middle East and defines Turkey as an *anchor of stability* in the unstable and dangerous region. He also describes Turkey "as a vital *strategic partner* in Europe." In both of above-given two speeches, Turkey's geopolitical environment is shown as an unstable region, where Turkey plays a crucial role

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[235] Article of Olli Rehn, "Give Turkey a Chance", *Le Monde*, 1 September 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2005_en.htm, accessed on 29/01/2007.

[236] Article of Joschka Fischer, "Turkey and Europe: Two Trains on a Collision Course?",2006, available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fischer5, accessed on 09/04/2007.

[237] Rehn, "Turkey's Accession Process to the EU", Helsinki, 27 November 2006, *op. cit.*

in terms of providing stability and security. This increases Turkey's significance for the EU. Blair[238] also tries to attract attention to the same issue: "Turkey is placed right between the Middle East and Europe and if we needed no other reminder of the strategic importance of Turkey to the European Union."

In all of these speeches of the European actors, the common argument is that in the Post Cold War era and beyond, Turkey has become more important for European security with its crucial geopolitical and strategic position due to the developments occurring around that region. They all put emphasis on the situation developing in Iraq, Iran and the Middle East in general. They link Turkey's membership issue and its geopolitical position in their speeches.

As secondary sources, Turkey's geopolitical and strategic importance and its relation with Turkey's membership are underlined in many articles of scholars from different European think tanks. For instance, Kirsty Hughes from Friends of Europe, in her article[239] evaluating the implications of an enlargement toward Turkey, while referring to its accession's potential implications arising from its geopolitical and strategic position says: "Some argue that these potentially positive stability and *geopolitical* effects represent strong *motivations* for the Union to support Turkish membership [emphasis added]." In this sense, Turkey's geopolitical position constitutes a motivation for the EU in terms of enlargement toward Turkey.

Moreover, Heather Grabbe[240], from Center for European Reform, pays attention to another aspect of the discussion regarding Turkey's membership,

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[238] Speech of Tony Blair, Ankara, 16 December 2006, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10614.asp, accessed on 14/02/2007.

[239] Hughes, *op. cit.,* p. 1.

[240] Heather Grabbe, 'From Drift to Strategy: Why the EU Should Start Accession Talks with Turkey', in Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts and Heather Grabbe (eds.), *Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey*, London: Center For European Reform Publication, 2005, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_637_europe_emb_turkey.pdf, accessed on 22.10.2007, pp. 11-21, p. 13. Heather Grabbe is a member of the cabinet of the Commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn. She was the deputy director of CER until December 2004.

which is legitimized on the basis of Turkey's *geopolitical position*. She gives the opponents' argument that; if Turkey enters to the Union, then the EU will border the Middle East and Caucasus whose instability may spill over to Europe. She also gives the counter argument of the proponents of Turkey's membership as: "The EU will have to address the risk of instability to its east anyway. Having Turkey as a fully fledged member would be the best way to do this" if it wants to be an effective global actor. In this respect, although Turkey's geopolitical position may be seen as a potential danger for European security by some, most European scholars underline that whether or not Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the instability in the regions around Turkey may always affect the Union. Therefore, an EU with a strong Turkey in that region becomes more powerful and efficient rather than an EU without Turkey.

Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci[241], from Center for European Policy Studies, see Turkey's *geopolitical positio*n as an objective factor of the potential *advantages of Turkey's integration to the EU*, because this will open new dimensions in the European security and foreign policy in its relationship with the Middle East and Eurasia. These scholars take Turkey's geopolitical position's importance in terms of its impact on the EU's foreign policy. However, they again emphasize its integration rather than referring to its membership. As a matter of fact, when they refer to integration, they specifically mean the integration of Turkish and EU foreign policy alongside the accession negotiations. They argue that this integration process has started partly with Turkey's participation in all EU-led military operations (they call it "Turkey's association with the EU's nascent security and defence policy) apart from the one in the Republic of Congo.

Similarly, the Report of the Independent Commission[242] on Turkey also evaluates Turkey's geopolitical position as important in terms of adding new dimensions to its foreign policy efforts in such a vitally crucial region. They

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[241] Emerson and Tocci, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

[242] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-18.

think that the argument that Turkish membership will draw the EU to conflictual regions like the Middle East is unconvincing:

> Developments in this turbulent region already have profound repercussions on Europe's stability and security, whether or not the EU has direct borders with countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria. Turkey, with its pivotal position at the heart of the Eurasian region and as a western pillar of the wider Middle East, can be of indisputable benefit to European action in this area.

They explain this benefit to European action in the area in terms of Turkey's "considerable military capabilities" and "potential as a forward base" that will be important in those actions.

Amanda Akçakoca, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein from EPC (European Policy Centre), in their article[243], in which they evaluate Turkey's readiness to the EU before 2004 decision, refer to the same point. They admit that the EU will be drawn closer to politically and economically unstable regions and say: "*Turkish membership* could however be an *asset for the EU* in seeking to promote its interest in these regions [emphasis added]." In this sense, when the issue is looked from this perspective, although there may have some inconveniences, the security advantages of its membership are more important for the EU. In addition, in this statement, there is also a link between Turkish membership and the EU's international actorness.

As different from others like Emerson and Tocci, Charles Grant[244] think that Turkish membership may create problems for CFSP. However, he accepts that this can be also an asset because of Turkey's *geopolitical position* that is close to "troubled zones such as the Balkans, the Arab Middle East, the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Central Asia…" According to him, Turkey will strengthen the *EU's influence* in such places.

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[243] Amanda Akçakoca, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein, 'Turkey-Ready for the EU?', *EPC Issue Paper*, No. 16, 28.09.2004, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v21=112230&lng=en&id=10979, accessed on 08.06.2007, pp. 1-19, p. 14.

[244] Grant, *op. cit.,* p. 1.

Giovanni Gasparini and Stefano Silvestri, from IAI, in their article[245] written in a joint work prepared by both IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation –TESEV in 2006, also evaluate Turkey's membership as both a plus and minus for CFSP and ESDP. They accept that this becomes a plus when Turkey's *military capabilities* and *geo-strategic role* are taken into consideration. They see it as a minus because with the membership, the EU's common borders will enlarge toward conflictual regions. However, they also refute their own negative argument by stating that even if Turkey is not a member; the EU could not isolate itself from the Middle East especially as a result of the evolution of its ESDP. In this respect, it is not logical to oppose to Turkey's membership with that argument when there is such a reality regarding Turkey's crucial geopolitical and strategic position. Stefano Silvestri[246] defines the strategic importance of Turkey's *geopolitical position* as an important reason, "which should push the EU to look positively upon the prospect of *full Turkish integration*, and in a not excessive timeframe [emphasis added]." In this statement, again he avoids using "membership" in stead of full integration.

In an interview[247] made by Andreas Marchetti, the editor of EU-Turkey Monitor of ZEI (Zentrum für Europaische Integrationsforschung), with Graham Avery who is an important figure of European expansion and who took part in Britain's accession negotiations, Turkey's *geographic situation* is accepted as its strategic significance for Europe.

Heinz Kramer[248], from SWP, underlines that the proponents of Turkey's membership accept Turkey's enormous *geo-strategic* importance in order to realize the Union's fundamental political interest in creating a *secure*

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[245] Gasparini and Silvestri, *op. cit.,* pp. 65-66.

[246] Stefano Silvestri, 'Conclusions', in Giovanni Gasparini (ed.), *Turkey and European Security,* Rome and İstanbul: Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV, 2006, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_8.pdf , accessed on 25.06.2007, pp. 97-103, p. 102.

[247] Graham Avery, 'Three Questions', Interview conducted by Andreas Marchetti, *ZEI EU-Turkey Monitor*, Vol. 2, No. 2, August 2006, www.zei.de/download/zei_tur/ZEI_EU-Turkey-Monitor_vol2no2.pdf, accessed on 21.02.2007, p. 8.

[248] Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

and prospering neighbourhood. Turkey is seen as a useful future member for the regional stability and security with its geopolitical position and there is a link between Turkey's membership and the EU's international actorness.

In all of these articles, Turkey's geopolitical and strategic position is underlined as a crucial potential contribution to the EU's regional security actorness. Amongst scholars supporting Turkey's membership because of its geopolitical and strategic significance for Europe, there is a similar approach that is used in order to refute the opponents' argument that "Turkey's membership will make the EU as the neighbour of unstable regions thus it jeopardizes EU's security." They all refute this argument by saying that whether or not Turkey is member, the instability in those regions will always affect the EU; hence, the EU having Turkey as a member will be more effective in controlling this instability and reduce its potential damages.

3.3   Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security with its Soft Security Contributions

Turkey's efforts in the Post Cold War era to provide security around its region have been crucial especially by including soft security mechanisms. Turkey's security understanding has become more comprehensive with the development of soft security approach besides the existing hard one. Turkey's initiative as an important multilateral cooperation as BSEC forum; its dialogue with Balkan countries and peacekeeping operations under UN and NATO; its energy trade relations with Central Asian and Caucasian countries, which make Turkey as a crucial bridge and hub for energy security; its successful efforts in controlling illegal migration and trafficking in human beings; its aim of being a 'regional civil power' in line with the joint initiative of 'civilizational dialogue'; its efforts to organize conferences for a more peaceful Middle East region, all constitute important soft security mechanisms that have been also reflected in the speeches of European actors and articles of European scholars

who see security aspect of Turkey as a potential contribution to the European security and thus to Turkey-EU relations.

Of the various soft security contributions of Turkey for the EU's security three of them, which are often emphasized by the European actors and scholars are analyzed in this thesis. These are: *Turkey's importance with its cultural heritage*, *its contribution to energy security* and with *its efforts to provide border management*.

3.3.1 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security with its Cultural Heritage

Turkey has always been significant with its cultural heritage for Europe. However, it is possible to state that Turkey's importance, as a country with European values and a Muslim population, has been intensely underlined especially after 9/11 attacks and still continues to be stressed. This may be because 9/11 attacks have been considered as terrorist movements supported by extremely radical/fundamentalist Islamic groups. This reality has resulted in a prejudice toward Islamic countries, and respectively there have been movements against Western/European states in those countries. In addition to 9/11 attacks, different terrorist movements having radical Islamist origin that occurred in European capitals like Madrid (in 2003) and London (in 2005) have increased security concerns in the EU. At this point, Turkey's cultural heritage; a combination of its Muslim population and European values like democracy and secularism are considered by European actors as both actual and potential soft security contribution. Turkey's constructive role in terms of contributing to civilizational dialogue and its relations with Islamic countries provide its actual security contribution. However, Turkey, as a future member of the EU, potentially contributes to soft security of the EU that aims to develop peaceful relations with Islamic countries.

In this respect, the way how Turkey's soft security contribution emerging from its cultural heritage is underlined by European actors and scholars will be given in the following part. Under this part, it is possible to

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find out five roles given to Turkey as: Turkey is important with its cultural and historical heritage; Turkey is a bridge between the West/Europe and the Islamic World; Turkey is crucial as an example against the "clash of civilizations" thesis; Turkey is a model for the Islamic World and Turkey has a Moderator role between the West and the Islamic World.

3.3.1.1 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security with its Cultural and Historical Heritage

The importance of Turkey's cultural and historical heritage is expressed in different speeches of Verheugen. This coincides with his post of Enlargement Commissioner. In those speeches, he puts emphasis directly on the historical and cultural heritage of Turkey, which has European values with a Muslim population.

For instance, in one[249] of his speeches, made soon after the 9/11 attacks, while he underlines Turkey's indispensability for the EU, he says: "Turkey combines the richest elements of *European and Islamic culture* with the ambition of a young and *modern nation* [emphasis added]."

Verheugen, in another speech[250] referring to 9/11 attacks and made in the European Parliament, also emphasizes that Turkey is not only important due to its geo-political position but it is *unique* with its cultural and historical heritage. Similarly, in a speech[251] made in the year 2004, Verheugen again refers to Turkey's candidacy status and membership prospective, and in line

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[249] Verheugen, Brussels, 17 October 2001, *op. cit.*

[250] Speech of Günter Verheugen, at the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 24 October 2001, Reference: Speech/01/487, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/speeches/arch_2001.htm, accessed on 29.01.2007.

[251] Speech of Günter Verheugen, at the Prime Ministerial Conference of the Vilnius and Visegrad Democracies: "Towards a Wider Europe: the new agenda", Bratislava, 19 March 2004, Reference: Speech/04/141, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/verheugen/speeches_en.htm, accessed on 19.01.2007.

with these realities, he mentions the security concerns of 21st Century. He then emphasizes the importance of organizing the relations with the Islamic countries:

> …It will be one of the most important questions whether we will be able to organise relations between European countries and the Islamic world, based on tolerance and understanding, or whether there will be conflict between us. Turkey can play a crucial role as a country with a strong Muslim population, at the same time a country that shares our values of democracy, rule of law and human rights…

In this speech, there is a dual emphasis on Turkey as a Muslim and modern country; and it is interesting that Verheugen accepts Turkey's importance for the EU, which has to consider its policies in the light of the security concerns of 21st Century, by referring to its *Muslim population and European values.* From Verheugen's perspective, when the security concerns can be thought as the terrorism or opposition increasing against the Islamic countries due to terrorist movements, Turkey may be seen as a moderator between those two cultures.

3.3.1.2 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security as a Bridge between the West/Europe and the Islamic World

As it is known, the official Turkish discourse, Turkish history books and Turkish scholars generally describe Turkey as a bridge country both geographically, culturally and politically between East and West. This description is not only used by Turkish actors but also by the European actors like Rehn and Barroso, who emphasize it directly in their speeches. They underline Turkey's bridge characteristic on the basis of its relations with the Islamic world rather than the East. European scholars also underline Turkey's bridge role in the same way with the European actors.

Olli Rehn is one of the European actors who strongly emphasize Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world in most of his

speeches. In one[252] of his speeches made before the 2004 decision, he refers to Europeanization process of Turkey and its Muslim population together. He defines Turkey as "an important bridge between Europe and the world of Islam." In this sense, he accepts that Turkey with European values and Muslim population becomes a bridge between Europe and the Islamic countries, which can be an important soft security contribution.

Barroso, in his speech[253] made one day before the historic decision of 2004, strongly stresses his support for Turkey's membership and refers to Turkey's bridge role:

> …the historical decision will of course be on Turkey. Historical because if each enlargement has its specificity, Turkey because of its size, historical background, its geographical situation and its *potential role has a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world* [emphasis added] is no ordinary case. I have always been in favour of Turkey's membership. I believe EU membership is a good thing for the Union and for Turkey… If we start negotiations with Turkey it should be with full EU membership in mind."

In the same speech, Turkey's bridge role is also emphasized in accordance with Turkey's efforts in the solution of the 'Danish cartoon crisis'. The 'civilizational dialogue' idea, which has emerged after the crisis as a joint initiative of the Turkish and Spanish Prime Ministers, has affected the speeches of European actors too. Rehn, as the Enlargement Commissioner in his speech[254] made at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, accepts that Turkey has played a constructive and moderating role in the cartoon crisis and underlines that "…*a European Turkey* that respects human rights and the rule

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[252] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Euro Club 15th Anniversary Seminar, "The Challenges of An Enlarging Europe", 18 November 2004, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2004_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

[253] Speech of José Manuel Barroso, at a press conference in European Council, Brussels, 16 December 2004, Reference: Speech/04/545, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/press/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 09.02.2007.

[254] Rehn, "The EU accession process, an effective tool of the European foreign and security policy", Brussels, 21 February 2006, *op. cit.*

of law can be an ever *sturdier bridge* between Europe and the Islamic world [emphasis added]." In this respect, Turkey's bridging role between Europe and the Islamic world is related to its closer adherence to European values. Rehn[255], before a Turkish audience, also repeats his view that Turkey "…plays a central role as a bridge between Europe and Islamic world." He also underlines Turkey's importance "in turning confrontation to cooperation and integration." Turkey's constructive role is more emphasized before the Turkish audience.

Rehn, in one[256] of his speeches where he refers to the EU's decisiveness to keep negotiations on track, states that the EU needs Turkey as "an anchor of stability in one of the most unstable and insecure regions in the world." According to him, Turkey, if *it realizes its reforms*, will become "an ever stronger *bridge between civilizations* [emphasis added]." In this speech again, Turkey's role as provider of security and stability in its region is considered together with its role of bridge between civilizations. Moreover, Turkey's bridging role is seen in the context of "clash of civilizations". From his perspective, Turkey is not only in rhetorical terms but in reality seen as a bridge. On the other hand, Turkey's bridge role is not an automatic one; it is to be derived from Turkey's reform process. So, Turkey's bridge role as a soft security contribution is linked to Turkey's accession process and provides justification for opening negotiations with Turkey. Rehn, on every occasion repeats Turkey's bridge role between civilizations. In one[257] of his speeches,

[255] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Bilkent University, "Europe's Next Frontiers", Ankara, 4 October 2006, Reference: Speech/06/561, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 18.07.2007.

[256] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the European Economic and Social Committee, "Enlargement-The EU keeps its doors open for South Eastern Europe", Brussels, 17 January 2007, Reference: Speech/07/21, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

[257] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the ELDR Congress, "A Strong Europe for a free world", Berlin, 18 October 2007, Reference: Speech/07/636, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 25.11.2007.

where he defines Turkey as "a key partner" of the EU in the relationship between Europe and Islam, Rehn argues that the EU should pursue cooperation with *moderate Islam* and that how the EU handles its relations with Turkey is watched in all the Islamic countries. In this sense, besides Turkey's role in realizing its necessary reforms, he also gives responsibilities to the EU in the process in terms of its relations with Turkey because this would become an example for the Islamic countries.

When the articles of European scholars are analyzed, in an article[258], Heather Grabbe from CER argues that "Turkey's territory straddles between Europe and Asia…" Due to this fact, according to her, supporters of Turkey's membership stress that "…the country would be a bridge to the Islamic world and thus a very useful partner to help the EU achieve its foreign policy objectives." Since the EU aims to be a crucial foreign and security policy actor that is also underlined in its CFSP and ESS, the importance of Turkey, as a country with its *Muslim population and with its neighbours in two continents*, is recognized in contributing to this aim.

Turkey's soft security contribution as a bridge between the West/Europe and the Islamic world is also underlined by Littoz-Monnet[259] and Penas from IRRI. They emphasize that the membership of Turkey, which is presented as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world, could be a chance for the EU to play a role in the *reconciliation of Islam, democracy* and *West*. In this respect, Turkey's bridge role in providing reconciliation of the two cultures may retrieve the EU from the threat of their conflict.

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[258] Grabbe, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

[259] Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

3.3.1.3 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security as an Example against "Clash of Civilizations" Thesis

The "Clash of civilizations" thesis[260], which belongs to P. Samuel Huntington, briefly states that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the Post Cold War era. In this sense, Western and Islamic civilizations will conflict with each other and their reconciliation and compatibility is not possible. To the supporters of this thesis, 9/11 attacks, organized by a fundamentalist Islamist group Al-Qaeda, are presented as an event that verifies this thesis. However, there is also an anti-thesis of this argument. Turkey, as a country with both Muslim population and European/Western values, has good relations with both Islamic and Western worlds. This is a unique feature of Turkey which cannot be replaceable in the rest of the Islamic world. In addition, Turkey aims to be a part of the Western world. Therefore, Turkey is seen as a crucial example against this notorious thesis of "clash of civilizations" by European actors like Prodi, Blair and Rehn.

Prodi, in his speech[261] made at Bogazici University (Istanbul), states: "Turkey's European ambition is furthermore a valuable asset in countering dangerous pressures and arguments for creating dividing lines between the West and the Moslem world. In this context, Turkey's long experience as a democratic and secular country is a key factor." Although, in this speech, Prodi does not pronounce "clash of civilizations"; by saying "arguments creating dividing lines between the West and the Islamic world", he implicitly refers to that thesis.

Blair[262], while he evaluates the historic day of 17 December 2004 (the day when Turkey has been given the date for negotiations) emphasizes its importance as:

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[260] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 72, No.3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

[261] Prodi, Istanbul, 16 January 2004, *op. cit.*

[262] Speech of Tony Blair, at a press conference, "PM Welcomes Historic Day for Turkey", 17 December 2004, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page6807.asp, accessed on 06.09.2007.

The fact that Europe can welcome in Turkey and begin the process of negotiations for them to become a full member of the European Union is an historic event, it shows that those who believe there is some fundamental *clash of civilisations* between Christians and Muslims are actually wrong, that we can *work together*, that we can *cooperate together*, and I think that is of fundamental importance for the future peace and prosperity of my country, Britain, and of the wider world… I think this will increase the security and prosperity of Europe, of Turkey, of the wider world and region and that is why I think it is important [emphasis added].

Thus, Blair, as different from others, does not directly describe Turkey as an example that riddles the "clash of civilizations" thesis but he considers Turkey's accession negotiations as an example to refute that argument. He also links the membership issue to increasing security, prosperity of the EU in the wider world. In this sense, Turkey's membership, being an anti-thesis to "clash of civilizations" between Christian and Muslim world becomes an important soft security contribution to the EU. Moreover, still, no other Muslim country can be a candidate for the EU; hence Turkey is also a unique case from this perspective.

Rehn, in his various speeches, underlines Turkey's importance against "clash of civilizations" thesis. For instance, in one[263] of his speeches, he claims that Turkey with its unique characteristics becomes worthy in a world threatened by infamous "clash of civilizations". In another speech[264] where he describes Turkey as a "key player, as a bridge and as a proactive moderator" that the EU needs, he also says: "Turkish accession should set a powerful counter-example to the alleged 'clash of civilisations'." Similarly, in a speech[265] where he states that the fall of iron curtain did not change Turkey's strategic

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[263] Rehn "Common Future of the EU and Turkey: The Roadmap for Reforms and Negotiations", İstanbul, 8 March 2005, *op. cit.*

[264] Rehn, "Turkey's best response is a rock-solid commitment to reforms", Ankara 3 October 2006, *op. cit.*

[265] Rehn, "Le grand défi européen: comment combiner approfondissement politique et élargissement graduel?", Strasbourg, 20 June 2007, *op. cit.*

value for Europe, he defines it as having key role to play in civilizational dialogue and relations of the West and Islam. In this respect, Turkey's Post Cold War strategic value for the EU's security appears in the form of soft security contribution.

European scholars writing on Turkey and EU relations also mention this issue. For instance, Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci[266] support the view that the EU and Turkish foreign policies should be integrated during accession negotiations because "Turkey offers a number of specific potential assets…ranging from the concrete realities of location and logistics, through to matters of culture and ideology and the search for a harmony rather than clash of civilisations" to the EU. Moreover, in the conclusions[267] of the work prepared on Turkey and European Security, Stefano Silvestri from IAI argues that the entry of Turkey as an Islamic country would put an end to 'difference' of Islam and it would be also a strategic defeat against those who support "clash of civilizations".

3.3.1.4 Turkey's Importance to International Stability Constituting a Model for the Islamic World

When Turkey's relations with the Western world are taken into consideration, it is seen by some as model for the Islamic countries due to its secular and democratic structure. For instance Fischer[268], while evaluating Turkey and EU relations in a commentary, argues that Turkey, thanks to its modernization and democratization, "will export stability and serve as a model for transformation in the Islamic world." Turkey's this characteristic also becomes crucial to make a decisive contribution to European security.

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[266] Emerson and Tocci, *op. cit.,*p. 4.

[267] Silvestri, *op. cit.,* p. 102.

[268] Fischer, "Turkey and Europe: Two Trains on a Collision Course?",2006, *op. cit.*

Similarly, Rehn, in his speech[269] made in October 2007 stresses that Turkey is an important "bulwark of stability in one of the most unstable regions of the globe." Turkey, in such a problematic region, is described by Rehn "…*as a democratic example for the Middle East and the Muslim world*, from Morocco to Malaysia." In both of these speeches, Turkey is considered as an example to those countries and *anchor of stability* for the region with its democratic structure.

When secondary sources are analyzed, similarly, Heinz Kramer[270] from SWP underlines Turkey's model characteristic. He says that"…Turkey would serve as *an example* for the broader Middle East region [emphasis added]" by showing that democracy and economic prosperity is possible in a country with a huge Muslim population. Then he refers to Turkey's accession process by linking it to the security and foreign policy of Europe: "This [Turkey's accession process] would enable Turkey, as part of the EU's foreign and security policy framework, to play an *anchor-role* in its politically volatile neighbourhood [emphasis added]." Turkey, again with this characteristic is seen as a contributor to the EU's soft security.

However, regarding Turkey's model role for the Islamic/Middle Eastern countries, there is also criticism by some scholars like Steven Everts[271] from the CER. He points out that Turkey may *not be a suitable model* for the democratization of the Middle Eastern or Islamic countries because those countries regard Turkey with a certain amount of suspicion. He also notes that Turkey is much more different from those countries with its long-lasting relations with the West, its secular democratic structure and its EU membership

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[269] Rehn, "A Strong Europe with its Gaze Fixed on the South-East: Our European Future", Paris, 4 October 2007, *op. cit.*

[270] Kramer, *op.cit.,* p. 28.

[271] Steven Everts, 'An asset but not a model: Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle-East', in Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts and Heather Grabbe (eds.), *Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey*, London: Center For European Reform Publication, 2005, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_637_europe_emb_turkey.pdf, accessed on 22.10.2007, pp. 47-68. Steven Everts is an adviser to Javier Solana and former research fellow at the CER.

bid. However, he supports that because of these reasons, Turkey is also *an asset for the stability of the region* and for the EU's foreign and security policy. In addition, he underlines that the Arabs and Iranians see the EU as "a white, Christian club" and if the EU takes Turkey in, it may send "an immensely powerful signal to the contrary."

It is possible then to state that from Everts's perspective, Turkey may not constitute an example/model for the democratization of the Muslim countries because Turkey is unique when compared to them. However, Turkey can be seen important by sending the signal that in a country, Western values and Muslim population may be compatible with the condition that there is a *secular structure*, and that country having substantial Muslim population may become a member of the EU, which is not a Christian club. In this respect, it is rather a different approach to see Turkey as a model for the Islamic countries with its future EU membership and its relations with the West, in stead of the rhetoric used by the European actors who describe Turkey only as a model in terms of democracy. This is crucial in order not to over-burden Turkey with the goal of promotion of democracy to the whole region. However, it is interesting that European actors do not look at the picture also from this perspective. Then the question of "why don't they?" comes in the mind.

3.3.1.5 Turkey's Importance for the EU's Security with its Moderator Role between the West and the Islamic World

Turkey is generally accepted as a country that can play the moderator role in the relations of the West and the Islamic world. This role of Turkey has been emphasized more in recent years especially with Turkey's efforts for the solution of Danish cartoon crisis. Turkey has tried to prevent an infringement between the West and the Islamic world and has come up with the idea of civilizational dialogue that was supported by different European leaders. In line with this development, on different occasions, Rehn, Barroso and Blair underlined this moderator role of Turkey. For instance, when Rehn, in his

speech[272] made before a Greek audience, describes the start of negotiations with Turkey as a turning point, he also says:

> For those who still question the strategic value of such a step, I simply invite them to look at the news: on issues as different as the energy crisis, Iran, Iraq or the cartoons crisis, Turkey appears as a key player which we absolutely need on our side or as a bridge and *a moderator between civilisations* [emphasis added].

It is possible to claim that Turkey's constructive role in recent years may have affected this speech. Turkey's efforts in the solution of energy crisis, for a diplomatic solution of Iran's nuclear energy issue, or its contribution to the solution of cartoon crisis with the civilizational dialogue idea present Turkey as a moderator country in a sense.

Barroso[273], in an interview made with a French newspaper, while evaluating the accession negotiations with Turkey, mentions the moderator role played by Turkey after the cartoon crisis: "I find encouraging the role adopted by Turkish government in the recent crisis started by the cartoons of Mohammed both constructive and moderator….It is better that Turkey is in our side rather than in other camp."[274] This speech is interesting because although

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[272] Speech of Olli Rehn, in a public lecture at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), "Deepening and widening: the false dichotomy", Athens, 9 March 2006, Reference: Speech/06/163, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm, accessed on 29.01.2007.

[273] Interview of José Manuel Barroso given to Isabelle Lasserre from Figaro, "La Passion de l'Europe", 11 July 2006, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/press/interviews/index_en.htm, accessed on 17.12.2007.

[274] The original interview is given in French as: "Ce qui est important, toutefois, c'est que le train avance. Le processus d'adhésion à l'UE apparaît comme le " moteur " des réformes destinées à moderniser la Turquie et à stabiliser les Balkans occidentaux. À cet égard, je trouve encourageant le rôle à la fois constructif et modérateur que le gouvernement turc a adopté lors de récente crise déclenchée par les caricatures de Mahomet. Ce trait d'union entre l'Europe et l'islam servira aussi bien notre communauté que la Turquie. Mieux vaut que la Turquie soit à nos côtés plutôt que dans l'autre camp." Translation by the author: "Which is important is that the train advances. The accession process to the EU appears like the 'engine' of the reforms directed to modernize Turkey and stabilize the Eastern Balkans. At this point, I find encouraging the role adopted by Turkish government in the recent crisis started by the cartoons of Mohammed both constructive and moderator. This line of union between Europe and Islam will serve equally to our Community and Turkey. It is better that Turkey is in our side rather than in other camp."

he firstly mentions the moderator role of Turkey, Barroso as a person representing the European Union describes the West/Europe and Islam as if they are two fighting camps. This may be accepted as a problem of coherence in this speech.

As different from others, Blair underlines Turkey's moderator role not just between the West and Islam but in a more general sense, in his speeches made in December 2006 in Brussels[275] and in Ankara. In his latter speech[276], he mentions his strong support to Turkey's membership to the EU and he pays tribute to Turkey's moderator role "…in trying to bring about a resolution of the issues in the Middle East, not least in respect of Israel and Palestine." He puts emphasis on the importance of stability and security of that region, in this respect, he explains that "…European Union membership of Turkey is not just important for Turkey itself…it is of fundamental importance to the future of Europe."

Rehn in his speech[277] that he gave in Washington explains one of the reasons why Turkey is a central part of further EU enlargement. He describes Turkey's accession process "as the best way to engage with the *community of Muslims* [emphasis added]." He says that the EU has obvious interests in Turkey's integration and he lists them as "…ranging from energy security to combating terrorism, from furthering stability in the Middle East to promoting a market around the Black Sea." Although, there is not a direct reference to a moderator role, it is possible to infer that both Turkey's integration into the EU and its relations with other Muslim countries play a crucial role. The interesting thing in this speech is that since it is made before an American audience, there is more emphasis placed directly on Turkey's

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[275] Speech of Tony Blair, at the EU Council meeting, Brussels, 15 December 2006, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10610.asp, accessed on 14.02.2007.

[276] Blair, Ankara, 16 December 2006, *op. cit.*

[277] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, "What's the future for EU Enlargement?", Washington DC, 25 September 2007, Reference: Speech/07/578, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 25.11.2007.

accession/integration, radical Islam, terrorism and Middle East. There may be two reasons for this: One, Turkey's accession, integration is stressed because there is a strong support by the US for Turkey's membership. Second, the US is more interested in the solution of the problem of radical Islam; it is more engaged in the Middle Eastern questions and terrorism issue.

The Independent Commission's Report[278] prepared before December 2004, emphasizes Turkey's moderator role especially in the Middle East. It argues that although the EU is the most important provider of aid to the Palestinians, it has not been very effective in the solution of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They think that since "Turkey has good relations with both sides and enjoys credibility in Israel and the Arab world alike", its membership would contribute to the EU's role in the Middle East and to the efforts of providing security and stability in that region. In this sense, Turkey's moderator role for the solution of conflicts in the Middle East is also recognized by the Independent Commission which has had an impact on the decision that would be taken in December 2004.

3.3.2   Turkey's Importance for the EU's Energy Security

In recent years, the energy issue has gained increased significance on the agenda of the EU and also of Turkey.   When the Russian company Gazprom temporarily cut off gas supplies in January 2006, the EU has become concerned about its dependence on Russian gas, thus it has been searching for alternative sources of supply. At this point being located between countries with vast energy resources, Turkey's importance has increased in the eyes of European actors in terms of providing new routes for the transportation of sources of energy from those countries to the EU.

As mentioned previously, Turkey, especially since the end of Cold War, has developed crucial energy trade relations with its neighbours. This aimed to contribute in those states to the efforts of preventing economic

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[278] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

instability which can lead to security problems. Therefore it can be considered as a kind of soft security measure of Turkey. In recent years, Turkey has concentrated more on its energy relations with the countries around itself in order to become a major energy hub.

The energy issue is also affecting relations of Turkey and the EU. According to Katinka Barysch[279] who is the deputy director at the CER, Turkey's accession will only progress if both Turkey and the EU believe that "deeper integration and closer cooperation" would provide benefits for both sides. She argues that in energy cooperation the EU may gain "a reliable alternative supply route" and Turkey may prove that it is "an indispensable partner for, and eventually part, of the European Union." In this sense, Turkey becomes a crucial energy security provider and also a soft security contributor to the EU with its potential alternative energy routes. Turkey's role in European energy security is clearly expressed in the speeches of European actors and articles of other leading analysts.

For instance, both Prodi and Rehn have emphasized Turkey's importance for providing energy security to the EU. In a speech where Prodi[280] refers to different aspects of Turkey and EU relations before a Turkish audience in the year 2004, he underlines that "...Turkey is also providing a *strategic conduit* for the supply of energy to Western Europe and the rest of the world [emphasis added]." However, especially after the energy crisis caused by Gazprom in 2006, there has been more emphasis on the linkage between EU's energy security and its relations with Turkey. Rehn on various occasions has referred to the issue. For example, Rehn in a speech[281] where he evaluates Turkey's accession to the EU claims: "Our cooperation with Turkey on *energy will be vital* in the coming years. Turkey is turning into a *major energy hub* for

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[279] Katinka Barysch, 'Turkey's Role in European Energy Security', *Center for European Reform Essays,* December 2007, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.pdf, accessed on 24.12.2007, pp. 1-8.

[280] Prodi, Istanbul , 16 January 2004, *op. cit.*

[281] Rehn, "Turkey's Accession Process to the EU", Helsinki, 27 November 2006, *op. cit.*

supply to Europe from Central Asia, the Middle East and even North Africa [emphasis added]." In this speech, Rehn goes on to indicate different achievements of Turkey in energy transportation like Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In fact, it is important that Rehn refers to cooperation with Turkey on energy issues because as Barysch has pointed out, if Turkish and European actors are aware of the benefits of their closer cooperation, this may have a favourable impact for Turkey's progress of accession.

Similarly, in a speech[282] where Rehn indicates the essential strategic interests shared by the EU and Turkey as the reason for starting accession negotiations, he defines energy as a policy area where both the EU and Turkey can gain from deeper cooperation.

Since the energy issue has become more important in relations of Turkey and the EU in recent years, in line with this development, an energy conference was held in Istanbul in June 2007, where Rehn[283] put more emphasis on the energy security need of the EU and Turkey's role in it:

> Turkey and the EU both have much to gain from closer *energy co-operation*. Turkey can help the EU *secure its energy supply*, while integration into the EU's internal energy market will enable Turkey to build a functioning and reliable domestic energy market and the infrastructure needed for its rapid economic growth. Now is the right time to deepen this dialogue. Securing reliable and affordable energy supplies is a major challenge for Europe today. There is an urgent need for diversification and investment. Turkey has a key role to play in the *diversification of energy* supply routes to Europe. Accession negotiations are instrumental in achieving these goals [emphasis added].

Underlining the mutual benefits of closer cooperation on energy, Rehn also defines Turkey as a potential energy security provider and links the issue to the

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[282] Speech of Olli Rehn , "Turkey and the EU: Together for a European Energy Policy - High-level conference in Istanbul on 5 June" , Brussels, 1 June 2007, Reference: IP/07/748, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

[283] Speech of Olli Rehn, at the Conference on "Turkey and the EU Together for a European Energy Policy", "Why Turkey and the EU need each other: co-operating on energy and other strategic issues", Istanbul, 5 June 2007, Reference: Speech/07/362, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

accession process of Turkey. It is possible to interpret these conclusions in two ways: Either Rehn - by presenting the achievement of energy supplies' security as a challenge for the EU- shows the Union's weak card which can be used by Turkey in the accession process. Or Rehn tries to demonstrate that the EU can achieve its energy security by using accession negotiations as the only platform where the EU can coerce Turkey to achieve its goals.

The Independent Commission's Report[284] also highlights Turkey's role in providing energy security for the EU and describes it as "a key transit country":

> Turkey's *geopolitical position* and close *links* with tens of millions of Turkic people *in neighbouring countries* could help secure European access to the enormous wealth of resources in Central Asia and regions of Siberia, making Turkey *a vital factor for Europe's security of energy supplies* coming from the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and Russia [emphasis added].

In this sense, from this analysis, it is possible to infer that Turkey's role in energy security is related with its geographical location. Moreover, it seems that Turkey's energy trade relations with its neighbouring countries have constituted an effective soft security mechanism in the Post Cold War era.

According to Amanda Akçakoca, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein[285] from EPC, "[m]any of Turkey's neighbours have significant energy reserves and Turkish accession could help secure access to these resources, possibly aided by the construction of new pipelines." Turkey's accession is legitimized by the EU's energy security need referring to its neighbours that are rich with energy reserves.

In an analysis[286] of John Roberts, a specialist on geopolitics of energy with the Platts energy group, he points out that the EU's Green Paper on

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[284] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *op. cit.,* p. 19.

[285] Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein, *op. cit.,* p.14.

[286] John Roberts, 'The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security Issues', in Micheal Emerson and Senem Aydın (eds.), *Turkey in Europe Monitor*, Nos: 1-14., January 2004-February 2005, CEPS Publications, http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=318 , accessed on 02.12.2007, pp. 98-113, p. 111.

Energy Security, which stresses the diversity of sources, can be only relevant when Turkey is within the EU and a member of a common European gas market. In this argument, Turkey's membership is seen indispensable for a successful energy security project in the EU.

Similar to the Independent Commission's Report, Turkey's energy security provider role is underlined by the Commission Staff Working Document[287]. It is stated that Turkey's accession would help the Union to gain access to different energy resources and "their safe transportation into the EU single market". Moreover, it is also claimed that "Turkey would have a major role to play in the *security of energy supply* of the enlarged EU [emphasis added]." Interestingly, in this document there is also another aspect of energy security that would be guaranteed by Turkey. Turkey would be also important in the EU initiatives aiming to protect energy infrastructures against the "malicious acts", thus leading to stronger energy security. This means that Turkey is seen as important in order to protect further development of the EU's energy policies against any kind of threat or attack. The energy security argument in favour of Turkey's accession is also supported by Littoz-Monnet and Penas[288] who maintain that for both gas and oil, Turkey will be a major transit country between the enlarged EU and the Caspian region as well as the Middle East.

Henri J. Barkey and Anne-Marie Le Gloannec[289], from the CERI, examining the implications of Turkey's integration, expect that Turkey would export stability and they relate this argument to the energy security provider role of Turkey. They explain this in a different manner as: "…it [Turkey] might help to protect Europe from potential political blackmail linked to the suspension of energy deliveries." According to them, this may be possible with the alternative routes of energy supply provided by Turkey like Kirkuk-

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[287] Commission Staff Working Document, *op. cit.,* p. 9 and p. 26.

[288] Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva Penas, *op. cit.,* p. 5.

[289] Barkey and Le Gloannec, *op. cit.,* pp. 143-144.

Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines or Tabriz (Iran)-Erzurum gas line. They also appreciate Turkey's efforts to become a major energy hub in its region by claiming that "[t]here is no question that Turkey's attempts at becoming a transport node for oil and gas will enhance the perception of its importance to Europe."

Heinz Kramer[290], from SWP, also lists the energy security provider role of Turkey as one of the strategic advantages for the EU. He emphasizes that as a member of the EU, "…Turkey could *enhance the EU's energy security* by developing itself, with EU assistance, to a regional *energy hub* that would be crucial for Europe's supply with natural gas and oil [emphasis added]." In this sense, Turkey will strengthen its role in providing energy security through the EU assistance. This characteristic of Turkey is also seen as a strong argument for its membership by the pro-Turkey camp in the EU.

In a very recently published article[291] of Katinka Barysch, it is claimed that Turkey's location provides it to contribute substantially to the EU's energy security. She suggests that if the EU is serious about having diversification of energy supplies, it should do everything to unblock the accession negotiations in that area.[292] It seems that Turkey's role in energy security is crucial and will positively affect the process of accession negotiations in this respect.

3.3.3 Turkey's Importance to the EU's Security with its Role in Border Management

Illegal migration, human and drug trafficking and organized crime have been considered as crucial soft security threats that jeopardize stability of the EU and of Turkey especially in the Post Cold War period and beyond. Turkey is one of the countries, which suffers from such problems due to its location at

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[290] Kramer, *op. cit.,* p. 28.

[291] Barysch, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[292] Although Turkey has terminated its screening process, has been prepared for the negotiations and the European Commission has approved its start of accession negotiations in energy sector, it cannot start to negotiations in that sector due to blocking of Cyprus which is worried about Turkey's plans to search for oil near its coastlines.

the crossroads of different continents. However, as mentioned before, Turkey has taken measures to prevent these problems and has been successful in its efforts. Turkey's previously mentioned successful efforts have also been reflected in the speeches of European actors and also in the publications of leading think tanks.

For instance, Blair[293] states that they (probably the UK) remain supporters of Turkish membership, because it "…is firmly in the EU's interests - to help with the fight against terrorism, *people-trafficking, organised crime and drugs* [emphasis added]." Similarly, Rehn[294] accepts Turkey as an anchor of stability in its region. He also identifies Turkey as "a *key partner* in the fight against terrorism and *illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people* [emphasis added]." Although Turkey's importance is underlined, here there is still a description of Turkey as "a partner" rather than as a future member.

The opponents of Turkish membership generally criticize Turkey with its geographical position which leads the country to be the major route for people and drug trafficking. They think that Turkey's such position may put the EU's own security in danger, and in order to protect the Union from these threats, Turkey should not be a member of the EU. However this argument is refuted by the proponents of Turkey who state that the borders are never "watertight." According to Heather Grabbe[295] "the EU needs to build very good working relations with Turkey's law enforcement agencies to *combat trafficking*. Again, this task would be easier if Turkey were firmly *on its way towards EU membership* [emphasis added]." These soft security problems require the EU's cooperation with Turkey. However instead of admitting that cooperation between EU and Turkey will be easier when Turkey joins the EU,

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[293] Speech of Tony Blair, "Turkey's Accession to EU on PM's Agenda", 3 October 2006, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10138.asp, accessed on 14.02.2007.

[294] Rehn, "Why Turkey and the EU need each other: co-operating on energy and other strategic issues", Istanbul, 5 June 2007, *op. cit.*

[295] Grabbe, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

she prefers to say "this task would be easier if Turkey were firmly on its way towards EU membership."

The Independent Commission's Report[296] also stresses that new threats like illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, organised crime can be dealt with the Turkish membership that will lead to closer cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. Another document where one can find a similar approach is the Commission Staff Working Document[297]. Taking the trans-national characteristic of the new security threats into consideration, the document puts emphasis on the need for joint action. It is stated that Turkey's accession will provide increased cooperation "within the EU on *border management*, *illegal migration* and *organised crime*, including corruption, *trafficking in human beings and drug trafficking* [emphasis added]." Amanda Akçakoca, Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein[298] from EPC also list Turkey's important role in the fight against illegal migration as one of the reasons for supporting Turkey's accession to the EU.

Turkey's achievements to control its borders and reduce the above-mentioned security problems since the end of Cold War are appreciated by scholars like Barkey and Le Gloannec[299], from CERI. According to them, Turkey's opponents hope that European border management problems may be out-sourced to Turkey within the neighbourhood policy; however Barkey and Le Gloannec think that this will be unacceptable by Turkey. They describe Turkey's membership as a considerable advantage to control EU's external borders through "the synergy of Turkish and European techniques and know-how of border control and management." It is possible to argue that Turkey's ongoing experience and success in border management, with its soft security

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[296] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *op. cit.*

[297] Commission Staff Working Document, *op. cit.,* p. 41.

[298] Akçakoca, Cameron and Rhein, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

[299] Barkey and Le Gloannec, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

measures and its further cooperation with the EU on the prevention of those problems, make it indispensable for the EU.

3.4   The Possible Loss of the EU by Rejecting Turkey's Membership

In addition to discussions about security benefits and potential security contributions of Turkey and its membership inside European circles, the possible security losses of the EU, in case of non-membership of Turkey are also emphasized. The supporters of the membership often put forward the potential security risks that may emerge as a result of an EU without Turkey. From that perspective, the membership question is explained generally as a choice between short-term concerns (internal political considerations) and long-term benefits (strategic interests) of the EU or a choice between a powerful/secure EU and a Union, which looses a crucial opportunity for a more secure future.

For instance, Joschka Fischer in one[300] of his speeches where he suggests Turkey's membership to the EU, draws attention to the threat of rejecting Turkey: "We have to make a choice between a *modern, democratic and European* Turkey who protects us against radical fundamentalism and a Turkey, which has not these qualities [emphasis added]."

In a speech where the process of accession negotiations is evaluated, Blair[301] states that the EU is facing "a division between short-term political considerations … and the long-term strategic interest of Europe and the wider world". He defines the long-term strategic interests as to have Turkey inside the EU. He strongly emphasizes that everything should be done, even compromises should be given in order to allow Turkey's accession process proceed, because according to him, if a wrong signal is sent to Turkey, this will

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[300] Speech of Joschka Fischer, in Meltem-Müftüler BAÇ, 'Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerine Güvenlik Boyutundan Bir Bakış', TESEV Yayınları, Dış Politika Analiz Serisi ,4 November 2006, p.19.

[301] Statement of Tony Blair, "Doorstep at NATO Summit in Riga", 29 November 2006, available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10505.asp, accessed on 16.09.2007.

be "a serious mistake for Europe in the long-term." In this speech, Turkey's importance is again emphasized with a strategic view point. Although the type of compromises that should be given by the EU are not specified in the speech by Blair, for instance for the sake of the negotiations, as a compromise, it can be suggested that the EU may stop its insistence on Turkey's implementation of the Additional Protocol (without a reservation), which was signed between Turkey and the EU in July 2005 and which extends Turkey's Customs Union with the EU members to Cyprus representing only the Greek Cypriot Community.

Like Blair, Rehn[302] also explains the possibility of Turkey's rejection as a "tremendous missed opportunity" in his speech made in 2007. He states that the EU could have turned its back to Turkey and the Balkans, but according to him, "that would have caused instability and set back the region immensely", the transformative power of the EU would not have been used and this "would have made the EU a lesser player on the world stage." He has suggested that the enlargement process toward Turkey should continue for the sake of regional stability and for the EU's aim of emerging as a global actor on the world scene. In another interview[303] where Rehn defines Turkey as "an anchor of stability in the most unstable region", he explains the gravity of opposition to and rejection of Turkey's membership. He describes it as the possible emergence of a "nationalist or Islamist problem", similar to the situation in the Middle East, in Palestine, in Lebanon or Iraq, at the doorstep of Europe. Therefore this explanation can be understood as an official warning made to the Europeans regarding the possible dangerous repercussions of rejection of

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[302] Speech of Olli REHN, at the EPC / LES/ King Baudouin Foundation , "Europe's frontiers a dynamic concept", Brussels 19 March 2007, Reference: Speech/07/160, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/index_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

[303] Interview of Olli Rehn given to Judith Crosbie from European Voice, "EU Risks Islamic Backlash if it shuns Turkey", 28 June-4 July 2007. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/interviews/index_en.htm, accessed on 19.07.2007.

Turkey and the spillover effects of an unstable and probably a less Europeanized Turkey.

Rehn, as Enlargement Commissioner, has been always drawing attention to the risk of rejecting or stopping accession negotiations with Turkey. In his book[304] "Europe's Next Frontiers" that he wrote in 2006, he ask the question "what would happen if the EU were to withdraw unilaterally from negotiations with Turkey?" and he answers that "…it would lead to an inevitable deterioration in EU-Turkey relations, undermine Europe's long-standing strategic partnership with Turkey and stimulate Turkish nationalism. It would weaken Europe's role in the wider Middle East and probably deepen Muslim hostility towards Europe."

Amongst secondary sources, Barchard, in his article[305], stresses that for 50 years Turkey has been a strategic partner of the West, and asks the question of "…[i]f it stayed outside the EU or even became seriously estranged from it, what would be the strategic consequences?" Then he answers that as a result of this estrangement, "[t]he risk of a clash between Turks and Greeks would grow. Turkey's readiness to make logistical and strategic support available for its Western allies would diminish." In a sense, this would increase the security risks around the EU. The strategic consequences of rejecting Turkey are also underlined by other scholars. For instance, Kirsty Hughes[306] believes that the main argument of the opponents of Turkey stating that Turkey should be used as "a buffer zone", is not logical because the rejection of Turkey may result in the instability in the region and at a time when the war on terror after 9/11 attacks has created tensions and divisions in the world, rejection might be seen as a negative signal by the Muslim world. In this sense, Turkey's role both in terms of providing regional stability and as a model for the Islamic world, due

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[304] Olli Rehn, *Europe's Next Frontiers*, Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006, p. 88.

[305] Barchard, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[306] Hughes, *op. cit.,* pp. 23-24.

to its relations with the West and particularly with the EU, may be lost as a result of the rejection of Turkey.

In the Report[307] of the Independent Commission, a failure in Turkey's accession process is seen as the loss of opportunities for both sides. For Turkey, this might bring about "a serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading to political upheaval and instability at the Union's doorstep." For the EU, a potential rejection would lead to European insecurity and the Report tries to draw especially attention to this possibility. In another article[308] published in CEPS "Turkey in Europe Monitor", the termination of enlargement process without admitting Turkey is accepted again as a serious mistake and this is explained as because the EU is not "an island in the sun" that is surrounded by good, friendly neighbours, it has to stabilize its own periphery and this cannot be done if Turkey is left out of the EU.

Lorenzo Forcieri[309], from IAI, emphasizes another risk of rejecting Turkey. He thinks that Turkey is surrounded by unstable, problematic and conflictual, crisis regions, and argues that it is not logical to penalize Turkey because of this environment. Otherwise, according to him, "any distancing of the country from the European community would, indeed, aggravate these crises by rejecting the political, military, and cultural support of an allied and Westernised country with an Islamic majority" and he continues that this may lead to separation of Turkey from the Western values resulting in the empowerment of extremist elements such as nationalist or radical Islamist groups in Turkey. Moreover, like Hughes, he also underlines that such behaviour of the EU "would give a negative signal to those in the Islamic world who might look with favour upon a relationship of close collaboration

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[307] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, *op. cit.,* p. 43.

[308] Karlsson, *op. cit.,* p. 84.

[309] Lorenzo Forcieri, 'Introduction', in Giovanni Gasparini (ed.), *Turkey and European Security,* Rome and İstanbul: Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation-TESEV, 2006, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_8.pdf , accessed on 25.06.2007, pp. 9-13, p. 10.

with the West." In this article, again distancing of Turkey from the EU is presented as a security and instability risk that may affect the Union.

3.5   Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the speeches and statements of the European actors; as the primary sources, and the articles of scholars from the leading European think tanks; as the secondary sources, are analyzed in order to understand whether the security aspect of Turkey's accession is seen as a potential contribution to Turkey and EU relations. Secondary sources have been chosen from the relevant articles of the scholars because they are important in shaping the speeches and even the positions of the European Union officials.

In this thesis, the related materials are organized and commented under four main themes constituting the general framework as: Turkey's importance with its regional actorness; with its geopolitical and strategic significance; with its soft security contributions and the potential security loss of the EU by rejecting Turkey. These reflect the security roles assigned to Turkey by key actors. In fact, different security roles are interrelated with each other. For instance, Turkey's contribution to "regional and international security and stability" is also related with its importance for the "European security, stability and peace". Similarly, Turkey's "geopolitical and strategic significance" is not crucial only for the "EU's foreign and security policy" or "global actorness" but also for the EU's energy security. In addition, Turkey's cultural heritage, which is an accumulation of its Muslim population and European values, not only provides it with a bridge role but also makes it an example against the "clash of civilizations" thesis.

Through the analysis made, it is possible to find out that Turkey's actual and potential security contributions to the EU are often emphasized and a close linkage between Turkey's accession and its security contributions is constructed by European actors/scholars. In accordance with different categorisations made in the thesis, it is possible to realize that Turkey is

ascribed significant roles by the EU actors/scholars in terms of its regional actorness, geopolitical and strategic significance, soft security contributions and the potential security risks caused by its rejection. As a matter of fact, these roles emerging from Turkey's actual and potential security contributions to the EU seem compatible with the international roles assigned to the EU after a content analysis of speeches of Solana[310] prepared by Jimmy Persson. Persson's analysis is based on the reading of official foreign and security policy speeches and statements delivered by the High Representative of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana between the years 2000 and 2005. The main aim is to clarify which foreign policy roles are ascribed to the Union by Solana. In this work, it is found that ten such roles are ascribed to the EU. These are: "Model for regional integration; Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security; Global Leader; Regional Leader; Developer; Stabilizer; Liberation Supporter; Defender/Promoter of 'EU' Values; Promoter of Multilateralism and Partner".

It can be considered that Turkey with its security contributions to the EU may well become significant for the embodiment of some of these roles. For instance, there are especially six roles of the EU to which Turkey may contribute. These are: the "Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security" role, which corresponds to a global policy and refers to commitments, duties related to the promotion of peace and stability; the "Global Leader" and "Regional Leader" roles that are related with the EU's leadership, strong actorness at both global and regional scale; the "Stabilizer" role, which is related with the EU's efforts of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian aid in various regions; the "Defender/Promoter of 'EU' Values" role, which corresponds to the protection of values such as democracy; and the "Promoter of Multilateralism and Partner" role, which is related with the duties toward the United Nations and other international organizations.

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[310] Persson, *op. cit.*

Within the framework of its regional actorness, via the roles ascribed to Turkey, such as contributor to European security, stability and peace or to regional and international stability, it becomes significant for the accomplishment of the "Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security" role of the EU. In addition, as underlined by European actors, Turkey appears as a potential crucial "partner" for the implementation of foreign and security policy of the EU in the regions where country is an active player with the help of its historical and cultural relations. In this sense, with its geopolitical and strategic significance and its relations with the countries of the region Turkey may contribute to the EU's both "Regional Leader" and "Global leader" roles. In terms of the EU's "Stabilizer" role, Turkey's efforts under ESDP operations and its military/civilian contributions to regional security and stability may be considered important. The description of Turkey as a "bridge between civilizations", due to its Muslim population and European values together, corresponds to the "Defender/Promoter of 'EU' Values" role. Turkey's efforts for the solution of the problems like Israel-Palestine, Danish cartoon crisis or nuclear threat posed by Iran result in its definition as "moderator between the West and Islamic World" and this becomes also significant in relation to the "Promoter of Multilateralism and Partner" role of the EU.

Similarly, there are also correlations between Turkey's assigned role as "security provider" and two of the strategic objectives determined in the European Security Strategy[311]. Turkey's such role may be crucial as far as "addressing the threats" and "building security in the EU's neighbourhood"; two key objectives of the ESS. The earlier analysis demonstrates that Turkey can be important in "addressing the threats" which are specified in the first part of the ESS; as terrorism, proliferation of WMD's, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. In the speeches and articles, it is generally accepted that "Turkey has the capacity to make a major contribution to regional and international stability" and also "Turkey's strategic assets have

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[311] Council of the European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 2003.

implications for the stability and security of European continent". Moreover, Turkey is seen "in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks…indispensable for the EU" especially in the fight against terrorism.

Regarding the threat of proliferation of WMD's, the Middle East region is the main concern of the EU and if there is a list of countries, Iran is located at the top of that list recently because it performs the uranium enriching works, which may result in the creation of nuclear weapons. Due to its preference to use dialogue and cooperation rather than imposing sanctions on Iran, Turkey is seen important in the solution of such problems. In relation to regional conflicts, both Balkans and Middle East regions become significant. Turkey's important role in stabilising the Balkans through its active participation in EU missions in Bosnia and FYROM and its contributions to NATO forces in Kosovo are acknowledged. Similar to this, Turkey's efforts "in trying to bring about a resolution of the issues there in the Middle East, not least in respect of Israel and Palestine" are also appreciated. In terms of organized crime, Turkey's significance is again accepted by European actors and scholars who believe that Turkish membership "…is firmly in the EU's interests - to help with the fight against terrorism, people-trafficking, organised crime and drugs."

Concerning the other objective mentioned in the ESS, "building security in the EU's neighbourhood", Turkey may play a crucial role. Turkey's geo-strategic importance is referred in terms of the realization of "the Union's fundamental political interest in creating a secure and prospering neighbourhood." In addition, it is also emphasized that Turkey has a "vital role to play in a region bordering the reunified Europe that is marked by so many uncertainties." In this sense, in those speeches and articles, Turkey's security providing roles converge with the strategic objectives stated in the ESS. Moreover, in the conclusions of the ESS, today's world is described as "a world of new dangers but also of new *opportunities*" to which the EU can make a major contribution. In fact, the term "opportunity" also brings in mind that Turkey's accession is seen as an opportunity by the European actors and

scholars too. While they are defining the risks of rejecting Turkey, they claim that if the accession fails, this would be a "tremendous missed opportunity."

One of the crucial findings of this analysis is that although Turkey's importance for European security and stability is emphasized positively by actors and scholars; instead of stressing Turkey's membership, there is relatively more emphasis on Turkey's "progressive and well-managed integration", "accession", "incorporation/integration to European structures", "closer cooperation", "affiliation with Europe" or "negotiation" processes as if those processes will not necessarily end with a membership. Similarly, Turkey is described more as a "reliable", "strategic", "key partner", "important actor" and "key player" than a "would-be member". As a matter of fact, there is not consistency in terms of references to Turkey's actual and future status because while in some speeches a European official defines Turkey as a reliable partner due to its security contributions, in his another speech; when the time and audience change; it is defined as a future member. Even in the same speech, while accession of Turkey is described as a necessity for the EU, the process may still be defined as "open-ended".

There is relatively more consistency in the speeches of Solana when compared to other European actors. This may be because of two reasons: Firstly, Solana was formerly the Secretary General of NATO. His previous post may have resulted in his awareness about Turkey's role as a crucial security provider due to Turkey's successful records under NATO membership. Thus he puts more emphasis on Turkey's EU membership in security terms. Secondly, as a High Representative of "Common" Foreign and Security Policy, as different from other European actors, he has to be more consistent regarding the EU's foreign policy towards Turkey because his consistency in language will reflect the "consistent" and "common" foreign policy of the EU.

In addition to different definitions regarding Turkey's status, Turkey's strategic assets like its NATO membership, military capabilities or geopolitical position are underlined in different geographical areas. For instance it is argued

that: "Turkey's *strategic assets* have implications for the stability and security of our *continent.*" Similarly, concerning Turkey's geopolitical and strategic significance, Turkey is defined as a strategic asset for the EU especially in certain politically and economically unstable regions to which the Union can be drawn closer: "*Turkish membership* could however be an *asset for the EU* in seeking to promote its interest in these regions."

Turkey is also described as "…a reliable *partner* in foreign and security policy" in line with its potential contribution to EU's foreign and security policy in different regions. Turkey is also seen as "a strategic partner" due to its role that it played as a NATO member during the Cold War and which also continues today. Similarly, its importance as "a vital *strategic partner* in Europe" is emphasized due to its geopolitical and strategic significance for the EU. On various occasions, Turkey's role in regional context is also described as actor and partner: "…In critical cases such as *Iraq, the Middle East* … Turkey has always been an important *actor and partner.*"

In general, Turkey is described both as a strategic asset or partner in accordance with its contribution to European security and stability; to the EU's foreign and security policy; and its security contribution through its own geopolitical and strategic significance. It is possible to argue that in all of these areas there is emphasis on Turkey's important security providing role especially for the EU's *peripheral security* rather than the *security of core Europe*. This means that Turkey's security contribution is seen as an advantage especially in regions around Europe. For instance, while cooperation between the EU and Turkey is shown as a necessity, it is stated that "…both players are better off when they enter a cooperative game than as lonely actors *at the border of the European area of stability.*" When Turkey's security contributions to the EU are underlined, it is claimed that "it may also help to *stabilize the environment.*" Moreover, Turkey is seen as "an anchor of stability in one of the most *unstable regions* of the world" and thus since "Europe must *stabilize its own periphery* …*Turkish membership* of the EU *would strengthen Europe* on its most vulnerable *front.*" Similarly, while Turkey's role as the

"South Eastern flank of Europe" is recalled, Turkish membership is seen indispensable so as "to realize the CFSP and for the EU to maintain *the security of its adjacent regions*" and also when Turkey's "indisputable benefit to European action" in conflictual areas is referred, Turkey's "*potential as a forward base*" for these actions is emphasized. On different occasions Turkey's "vital role to play in a *region bordering the reunified Europe*" is referred. Any possibility bringing Turkey into the EU is defined as an opportunity "…to deal better with the security issues at the edge of *Europe's 'neighbourhood'*."

Turkey's role in providing security for Europe's peripheries appears in the form of Turkey's cross-regional role. For instance, Turkey's role in the Balkans becomes important through its contributions to the security and stability of the region under NATO and ESDP missions. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey's role is emphasized as a regional power contributing to peace and stability. In the Southern Caucasus, Turkey's significance for stability of the region through its relations with its neighbours is underlined. In addition, its role, in this region, emerges as the provider of energy security. Turkey is rather given relatively different roles in the Middle East. Since Turkey is a democracy with a predominantly Muslim population, and it pursues good relations with the Middle Eastern countries/neighbours and the West together, due to its cultural and historical heritage, its soft security importance is underlined in this region. For instance, due to these characteristics, Turkey is described as a "bridge" and also as a "moderator" between the West/Europe and the Islamic countries especially located in the Middle East. Turkey is also described "as a democratic benchmark for Muslim countries."[312] In terms of its role in the Middle East, Turkey is also seen as an example against "clash of civilizations" thesis that has been strengthened after 9/11 attacks. Moreover, Turkey is seen as an "example/model" for the Islamic countries in the Middle East due to its relations with the West, its secular and democratic structure. In

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[312] Rehn, *Europe's Next Frontiers*, *op. cit.,* p.97.

terms of the role drawn by the EU to Turkey in this region, when the speeches and articles are analysed, it is possible to argue that the EU puts more emphasis on Turkey's Muslim population and European values together. Instead of using "universal values", they refer to "European values" owned by Turkey. Moreover, when compared to the US, which emphasizes the existence of "moderate Islam" in Turkey, EU actors draw a different role to Turkey underlining its European values, rather than the type of Islam, besides its Muslim population. In addition, Turkey's role as a bridge, model or moderator in this region is linked to its own accession/reform process. Turkey's "bridge" role between civilizations is emphasized by different European actors as the consequence of "*a European Turkey* that *respects human rights and the rule of law*" and also "if *it realizes its reforms.*" Similar to this, its role as a model for the Islamic countries is underlined by referring to "*its modernization and democratization*" during its accession process.

Turkish scholars and politicians who mention about Turkey's security importance to the EU usually refer to Turkey's hard security characteristics and capabilities. On the other hand, as a result of the analysis made in this thesis, it is possible to realize that Turkey's soft security contributions emanating from different factors like its regional actorness, its geopolitical position, its cultural and historical heritage, its energy hub characteristic or its control over its borders, are more underlined, compared to its military capabilities. In addition, there is a limited degree of emphasis on Turkey's hard security characteristics. Particularly, these are referred as its strategic assets that can be used by the EU only in terms of Turkey's role under NATO or ESDP operations. This means that the Post Cold War change in Turkey's security understanding toward a more comprehensive one and the development of new soft security mechanisms in line with this change have affected the speeches and the articles of European actors/scholars.

In this analysis of the speeches and articles, it has been possible to find out various points concerning the relationship between Turkey's security contributions to the EU and its accession process. Firstly, although Turkey's

security importance for the EU is underlined positively regarding Turkey's accession to the EU, Turkey's future status vis-à-vis the EU is not usually defined as a member. Secondly, Turkey's contribution to European security is perceived as a contribution to Europe's peripheral security rather than to its core security. This is also related with Turkey's cross-regional role. Thirdly, instead of Turkey's military capabilities, its soft security potentials are relatively more emphasized. This is interesting because when its military capabilities are concerned, this may require Turkey's involvement in the EU's decision-making processes, parallel to its progress on membership, compared to its soft security contributions which may be realized easily through a strong cooperation or partnership. Despite these crucial points, Turkey's security contributions to the EU are not ignored and Turkey is seen as a significant security actor in its region. In fact, this situation brings in mind the new trends emerging in Turkey-EU relations. Recently, it is argued that if Turkey's accession to the EU becomes unsuccessful, then other ways of linking Turkey to the EU should be discussed and this is exemplified as "new alternatives" to its membership, like "privileged partnership" or "gradual sectoral integration".[313] According to these arguments, if those alternatives are not discussed, isolation of Turkey may result in the empowerment of the Islamic, radical, anti-West or Euro-sceptical forces in Turkey and "such a path towards isolation would have serious consequences for the geo-strategic environment of Turkey, and as a result, for the foreign and security policy situation along the south-eastern border of the EU." In this sense, since the possibility of failure of its accession is acknowledged and since there is awareness about the security risks that the EU will have to face in such a case, it is suggested that new policy measures must be established to anchor Turkey within the EU.

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[313] Andreas Maurer, 'Alternatives Required! European Union Membership Policy in the Context of Relations with Turkey', *SWP Comments*, No. 17, August 2007, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=4268 , accessed on 15.02.2008, pp. 1-8, p. 9.

Therefore, in the speeches and articles analyzed, while on the one hand Turkey's security importance for the EU and for bilateral relations is emphasized as a legitimate reason for its accession and also to prevent its isolation; on the other hand, instead of its future "membership" which seems open-ended, "anchoring", "integrating", "affiliating" or "incorporating" Turkey to the European structures are pronounced as possible alternatives though without clarifying much what is meant by them. Although in the speeches, what the security dimension of Turkey's anchoring in the European structures, mainly the CFSP and ESDP, would be is not explicitly mentioned, under "new alternatives" this could appear in the form of the adoption of CFSP policies-statements by Turkey, the increase of current political dialogue under the association agreement and in the long term, the possibility of equal membership to the European structures.[314]

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[314] *Ibid.* p. 5.

Table 2: References made in speeches/ statements and articles

Number of References made in Speeches and Articles	Turkey's regional actorness						Turkey's geopolitical & strategic significance	Turkey's soft security contributions							Loss of EU by rejecting Turkey
								Cultural Heritage							
	European security, stability, peace	Regional and international security & stability	EU's foreign & security policy	ESDP	Fight against terrorism	EU's global actorness		Cultural & Historical Heritage	Bridge between West & Islamic World	Example against clash of civilizations	Model for Islamic world	Moderator between West and Islamic world	Energy Security	Border Management	
Olli REHN	3	5		1			3		5	3	1	2	3	1	3
Günter VERHEUGEN		1	1		1		1	3							
José Manuel BARROSO		1							1			1			
Romano PRODI	1			1			1			1			1		
Javier SOLANA	3	1		1											
Tony BLAIR		1					2			1		2		1	1
Joschka FISCHER	1				2	1	2				1				1
CER Articles		1			1		2				2		1	1	1
CEPS Articles		1	1				1			1			1		1
IAI Articles	1						2			1					1
CERI Articles		1											1		1
IRRI Articles		1	1							1			1		
Friends of Europe Articles			1				1								1
SWP Articles					1		1				1		1		
EPC Articles							1						1	1	
ZEI Articles							1								
Independent Commission Report				1			1						2	1	1
Commission Staff WD		1		1	1								1	1	
TOTAL REFERENCES	**9**	**14**	**4**	**5**	**5**	**2**	**19**	**3**	**6**	**8**	**5**	**5**	**13**	**6**	**11**
	39						**19**	**27**					**13**	**6**	**11**
	39						**19**	**46**							**11**

This table represents the results of the analysis made in the third chapter of the thesis. As it can be seen, there are a huge number of references to Turkey's soft security contributions. These are followed also by the references to its regional actorness and geopolitical and strategic significance. As a part of its soft security contributions, the number of references to its role in providing energy security is also reflecting the current increasing attention put on energy issue in Europe. In a sense, these results provide that there is a huge emphasis on

Turkey's various contributions to regional security and stability, which are also related with Turkey's overall actual and potential soft security contributions.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the security dimension of the relations between Turkey and the EU is analyzed within the framework of the enlargement process. The historical developments of Cold War and Post Cold War eras are helpful to provide a general background for their security relations. In addition, the thesis includes a content analysis of both the speeches/statements of European actors and the articles of European analysts focusing on the actual and potential security contributions of Turkey to the EU within the context of its accession in order to clarify how this issue is viewed from the EU's perspective.

During the Cold War, relations between Turkey and the EC were economic in nature. This was because of not only the Cold War European security architecture and division of labour between NATO and the EC but also the different security understandings of Turkey and the EC. Turkey, as a result of its hard security culture corresponding to that of NATO and in line with the Cold War security threats emerging from the Soviet Union, developed close security relations with NATO and by becoming its member, it turned out to be a strong ally of the West. However, the EC, which tried to provide security through its economic cooperation and political integration process, was seen by Turkish policy makers mainly as an economic organization to which Turkey would seek eventual membership in accordance with its Westernization process. Thus it became its Associate Member and pursued economic relations with the EC complementing the security aspect of its relations within transatlantic alliance.

The end of Cold War together with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc has been one of the major events leading to the rise of new global security risks affecting both Turkey's and EU's security approaches. In the Post Cold War period, both Turkey and the EU realized that the new security threats

necessitated a complementary and holistic approach to security. Accordingly, Turkey has begun to develop soft security mechanisms while the EU has developed hard ones. In addition to this common external reason, there have been other factors resulting in changes in their security understandings and increasing security interactions among them. Within this framework, the soft security mechanisms used by Turkey; the development of ESDP reflecting the hard security aspect of the EU; the ESDP related problem that emerged between Turkey and the EU; the impact of the 9/11 on the problem and the involvement of Turkey in the ESDP operations have been evaluated in the thesis.

Although during the Cold War, Turkey as a member of NATO became an important ally and a crucial security asset providing security and defence for the European continent against the Soviet threat, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not diminish Turkey's security importance for the West/Europe. Turkey maintained and even increased its strategic significance as a "front zone country" in the Post Cold War era by developing soft security mechanisms, such as cooperation and dialogue with its neighbours and the countries around its region, besides the existing hard ones.[315] Through such mechanisms, Turkey has contributed to the regional security and stability.

Turkey's Post Cold War security contributions have been also reflected in the speeches and articles of European actors and scholars who have referred to country's importance for the EU's security within the context of its accession process. However, while for many politicians and think-tankers, the aforementioned security contributions of Turkey are plain to see, their arguments made no impact on the public opinion across the EU. This is explained by a European analyst as: "For most people, enlargement-related fears are immediate and personal: the loss of jobs, the threat of terrorism, the weakening of national culture. The benefits, meanwhile, are strategic, long-

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[315] Arıkan, *op. cit.,* p. 203.

term and abstract: future economic growth, a stronger EU foreign policy, energy security."[316] In a sense, the security discussion regarding Turkey's accession to the EU is conducted at an elitist level by focusing on its long-term strategic interests, whereas, for the European people, short-term and personal concerns are more important than the long-term ones. As a matter of fact, in the thesis, this elitist aspect of discussion is examined.

In line with the emphasis put on different security roles of Turkey, speeches and articles are analyzed around four main themes in the thesis as: Turkey's importance for the EU's security with its regional actorness, its geopolitical and strategic significance, its soft security contributions (cultural and historical heritage, energy security and border management) and the potential loss of the EU by rejecting Turkey. As the analysis demonstrates, Turkey's various contributions to regional security and stability are acknowledged by the EU actors. Moreover, Turkey's regional stabilizer role emanating from especially its soft security contributions is underlined within the context of enlargement. This may be because firstly, any instability in the region will harm not only the security of the countries in the region but also that of the EU due to the spillover of security risks. Secondly, for the EU the maintenance of security and stability in the continent has been an important objective and this has been mainly achieved via the use of enlargement tool.

Rehn argues that "Turkey has major strategic significance for Europe, both in terms of soft power, by pursuing an alliance of civilizations, as well as hard power, by providing peace-keeping capacity."[317] Similar to Rehn's argument, in the analyzed speeches and articles, although Turkey's hard power is evaluated by limiting it only to its peace-keeping capacity, its soft security

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[316] Katinka Barysch, 'What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why', *Center for European Reform Essays,* August 2007, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_kb_turkey_24aug07.pdf, accessed on 12.11.2007.

[317] Olli Rehn, *Europe's Next Frontiers*, *op. cit.,* p.100.

contributions are related with its more general security and stability providing role in its region.

In recent years, especially since the 9/11 attacks, Turkey's soft security contributions (in terms of its regional stabilizer role especially in the Middle East) are also linked to its role as "bridge" between Western and Islamic/Middle Eastern civilizations and as a "model" for the Middle Eastern countries. Some argue that Turkey's bridge and model roles in the Middle Eastern region that are ascribed to itself by the West (both the US[318] and the EU) can be traced back to the beginning of Post Cold War period.[319] Accordingly, Turkey's engagement in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 together with the West has changed Western perception of Turkey in the Middle East. In fact, while Turkey pursued a non-interventionist policy toward the Middle East during the Cold War, with such an attempt it started to be involved in Middle Eastern issues. A Turkish scholar argues that academics such as Huntington further reinforced Turkey's move toward this region, "contending that the rise of global divisions based on religious and ethnic differences after the end of the Cold War repositioned Turkey in the Middle East."[320] Turkey's involvement in the region became important especially with the Gulf War, because Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to the West and this rendered the country an important ally of the West. Consequently, Turkey was also described as a Western, secular state and a bridge between East and West. However, since the 9/11 events and the subsequent agenda of "war against

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[318] Since the main focus of this thesis has been the security relations between Turkey and the EU, a specific place has not been given to the US. However, Turkey's relations with the US are also a part of its relations with the West. Moreover, Stephen Larrabee argues that Turkey's relations with the EU affect its relations with the US, because when its relations with the EU are bad, Turkey turns to the US for support. Stephen F. Larrabee, *Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner,* Arlington: RAND Cooperation, 2008, http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG694.pdf, accessed on 20.04.2008.

[319] Pınar Tank, 'Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey's Identity?', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 463-478.

[320] *Ibid.,* p. 467. The author refers to the first publication of "clash of civilizations" thesis. Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 72, No.3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

(Islamist) terrorism", Turkey has been regarded more as a Western democratic state with a predominantly Muslim population and as a bridge between civilizations. Moreover, the decision of the Turkish Parliament in March 2003 to reject the deployment of US soldiers from Turkish soil to Iraq was a disappointment for the US but it also served to increase Turkey's credibility as a model for the Middle Eastern countries and this role has been used by the US neo-Conservatives that advocated a democracy initiative in the Middle East.[321] Following this, Turkey's model role for the Islamic countries has been also supported by the EU because Turkey as a country with Muslim population and good relations with the EU would be important to demonstrate that the EU is not a "Christian fortress". As the earlier analysis of the thesis offers, Turkey's role as a bridge between civilizations (or the EU and the Islamic world) and as a model for the Islamic/Middle Eastern countries has been also referred by European actors and scholars in the aforementioned period, when the EU has increased its focus on the Middle East. Interestingly, the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey has also coincided with that period. Then, it is possible to argue that the changing dynamics of the region, which resulted in newly shaping of Turkey's soft security roles, has also affected the EU's enlargement policy toward Turkey.

Turkey's these soft security roles that contribute to the regional stability are also linked to its accession and reform process. Accordingly, Turkey's role as a model and bridge can be sustained through its accession process, in other words, its stabilizing role is dependent on its own political stability and transformation. Rehn for instance argues that "If Turkey succeeds in its reforms and meets the EU conditions; it will become an ever stronger bridge between civilizations."[322] In fact, as mentioned in the second chapter of the thesis, the use of soft security mechanisms in Turkey which increased its

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[321] *Ibid.,* p. 470.

[322] Olli Rehn, *Europe's Next Frontiers*, *op. cit.,* p. 101.

importance as a contributor to regional stability has been a result of not only the global changes in the security architecture but also its own Europeanization process that gained pace in the mid 1990s. In this sense, the EU has tried to influence Turkey's soft security development from the start and its continuation via the use of its accession tool.

In the Post Cold War period, while Turkey has built up soft security mechanisms besides the existing hard ones in order to cope with the new challenges, the EU also tried to adopt itself to the changing security environment via its new security and defence policy. However, the fact that Turkey could not preserve its rights (as a NATO member and as a WEU associate member), especially in terms of participation to the new EU security and defence structures, resulted in a controversy between them. It can be said that in the ESDP issue, the EU considered that the existing relationship with Turkey within NATO and WEU was sufficient for the maintenance of the working relationship with Turkey, thus there was no need for Turkey's involvement in decision-making process of ESDP operations although it would offer its capabilities to them.[323] Interestingly, while there has been more emphasis in the speeches and articles on Turkey's soft security contributions to the EU within the context of enlargement, Turkey's role that it could play via its hard power in the ESDP has not been referred to the same degree. In a sense, Turkey's hard security contributions have been subordinated to its soft ones by the EU actors.

This subordination is reflected too in the change as regards the assigned roles to Turkey by Europeans. For instance, while there is less emphasis on Turkey's strategic asset role rising from its NATO membership and military capabilities; Turkey's role as a regional stabilizer emanating from its various soft contributions to regional security and stability (via its regional actorness, its cultural heritage including its bridge, model, moderator roles or constituting an example against clash of civilizations thesis, or provider of energy security

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[323] Müftüler Baç, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Defence Policies', *op. cit.*

and border management) is underlined more. From the Union's perspective, Turkey's regional stabilizer role becomes crucial within the context of its accession/transformation and reform process, because Turkey as a soft power in its region may be important in contributing to the EU's soft power (or to its regional/international actorness).

This EU approach is also similar to one that was used in Eastern Enlargement. As previously mentioned, one of the major motives behind that enlargement was to provide security and stability in European continent. Actually, enlargement is used by the EU as an instrument to provide security/stability and to strengthen the EU's international actorness and its soft power role. In both Eastern Enlargement and in the enlargement policy toward Turkey, these major goals have been common. Moreover, in both of these enlargements, transformation and reform processes of the accession countries have been crucial. However, despite these similarities, there are also differences between them. For example, in the case of Eastern Enlargement, security that is tried to be built up is the one of the European continent, whereas, in Turkish case, security is related with the one of the non-European geographical area. In addition, in Eastern Enlargement, accession which was successfully realized as the final target was more dominant over transformation when compared to Turkish case. Because in the enlargement policy toward Turkey, while transformation/reform process is more emphasized, accession is described as open-ended. In a sense, accession is subordinated to transformation/reform process. In other words, accession is just seen by the EU as a tool to trigger transformation of Turkey rather than as the final destination.

When Turkey's security relations with the West are taken into consideration, it is possible to differentiate between Turkey's soft security and hard security contributions along the EU-NATO axis. For the EU, Turkey seems more important in soft security terms, whereas for NATO/US, Turkey's value stems from its hard power. If one tends to oppose such a distinction, then there would not be anything so distinctive about Turkey's contribution to European security than its overall contribution to the Western security. In this

respect, Turkey's role as a contributor to regional security and stability via its soft security assets is acknowledged and emphasized by Europeans.

However, there may be also other reasons of such an emphasis. In a period when the EU develops its hard security dimensions, the prioritization of Turkey's soft security contributions (and ignoring the hard ones) by the EU actors and the construction of a linkage between those contributions and Turkey's accession process raise the question of whether the EU does not want a strong military/hard power structure in Turkey. Although in this thesis, the EU's suggestion that "the control of the civil authority should be increased over the military" has not been analyzed since it is related more with the internal democracy aspect rather than external security, it is commonly referred in the speeches of European actors and it also brings in mind that question. Moreover, another reason for undermining Turkey's hard security importance may be related with the EU's intention of leaving Turkey outside of the decision-making process regarding security issues and of just using it as an implementer and perhaps a follower of ESDP not only today but also in the future; because a stronger Turkey vis-à-vis ESDP hard security background besides the soft one will strengthen Turkey's hand in its relations with the EU within the context of accession. Such possibility also appears in the speeches and articles where instead of membership, the terms of anchoring, affiliating, integrating, or incorporating Turkey to the EU structures are used to define the future status of Turkey vis-à-vis the Union. Moreover, the search for new alternatives (other than membership) for the relationship between Turkey and the EU or the description of Turkey's accession process as "open-ended" can be explained with such an intention.

To conclude, although Turkey's significance for European and regional security is accepted, this is not properly reflected on its accession process. That is to say, while on the one hand Turkey's (soft) security contributions to the EU and to its region are strongly emphasized on various occasions and linked to its own accession and reform process, on the other hand its accession is not described as having a final and known destination. One Turkish scholar argues

that "…it is not clear that the EU's policy toward Turkey has been compatible with her security importance."[324] Then it is necessary to ask what might be the security implications for the EU of leaving Turkey outside of the Union at the end of the day? It is obvious that such a situation would lead their relationship into rocky waters and the status quo would no more continue as it was before. Most importantly, the security and instability risks would increase in the region harming both the EU and Turkey. For instance, such exclusion may cause political and economic instability in Turkey that may affect also the EU; it may result in rise of nationalism and hostility toward the Union and even its weakening role in the region. The risks of such an attempt, which is described as a "tremendous missed opportunity" and "loss of long-term strategic interests" are also acknowledged by European actors.

Therefore, it can be said that the EU does not want to lose or exclude Turkey which is an important country with its various security and stability contributions in the region. In line with this, it tries to maintain its relations with the country working through its accession process without providing it with an assured prospect of membership. During this process, it encourages Turkey for its own transformation which will render it a more "European" country and a soft power compatible with the EU. When Turkey does (and/or can) not realize the necessary reforms, it threatens the country with freezing its negotiation process and by always reminding that accession is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, such an EU policy that makes membership uncertain becomes an inappropriate security rationale behind the enlargement policy of the Union, because if enlargement is not realized, its security aim cannot be realized neither.

Arıkan, *op. cit.,* p. 225.

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