SECURITY THROUGH INTEGRATION:
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

SECURITY THROUGH INTEGRATION: THE EU AS A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY

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This study is primarily concerned with the evolution of the EU as a pluralistic security community throughout the course of European integration. Its main purpose is to examine how the EU member states have managed to renounce the use of force in their relations with one another and consequently succeeded in establishing a lasting peace in Western Europe following World War Two.Within the scope of the study, the EU's attempts to extend its zone of peace and stability beyond its immediate borders by using some foreign policy tools such as the enlargement and the recently launched European Neighbourhood Policy are also explored .Finally, the thesis attempts to evaluate the potential contribution that Turkey would make to the EU security community in the post-Cold War era upon her membership in the EU.

Keywords: Security Community, Pluralistic Security Community, European Integration, European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement

ÖZ

BÜTÜNLEŞME YOLUYLA GÜVENLİK: ÇOĞULCU BİR GÜVENLİK
TOPLULUĞU OLARAK AB

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Bu çalışma, esasen, Avrupa bütünleşme süreci boyunca, AB'nin çoğulcu bir güvenlik topluluğu olarak gelişimiyle ilgilidir. Çalışmanın asıl amacı II. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından, Batı Avrupa Devletlerinin birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerinde askeri güce başvurmaktan nasıl vazgeçtiklerini ve böylelikle kendi aralarında kalıcı bir barış ortamı sağlamayı nasıl başardıklarını araştırmaktır. Çalışmanın kapsamı içinde, AB'nin kendi barış ve istikrar sahasını ,genişleme ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, gibi bir takım dış politika araçları aracılığıyla mevcut sınırlarının dışına teşmil etme girişmleri de incelenmiştir. Son olarak, tez, AB'ye üyeliği durumunda, Türkiye'nin AB Güvenlik Topluluğuna yapacağı potansiye katkıları değerlendirmeye çalışmıştır.

Key Words: Güvenlik Topluluğu, Çoğulcu Güvenlik Topluluğu, Avrupa Bütünleşmesi, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Genişleme

To the memory of my grandmother and my beloved cat, Bıcır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Right from its inception, the European Union (EU) has been highly credited for preventing disputes between its own member states from escalating into violent, armed conflicts. After all, the post-WWII European integration movement was largely inspired by the belief that after generations of bloody warfare, Western European powers has to draw some important lessons from their past, set aside their long-standing hostility towards each other and engage in new forms of institutionalized cooperation in order secure lasting peace and stability on the European continent. Accordingly, a key reason for creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (the forerunner of the current EU) in 1951 was to prevent future violent conflicts between the ex-belligerent Western European powers, in particular between France and Germany. Thus, ensuring peaceful and stable inter-state relations in Europe was the EU's foremost original goal. As one observer aptly argues,

> The EU was a security policy from its inception. Even with the calculated exculsion of military defence, the process of integration itself bound the member-states in a network of interdependence which made recourse to military means of resolving disputes progressively more difficult.[1]

The EU which came into existence largely as a peace project, has proved to be quite successful in overcoming the ancient hatreds and mistrust between the European powers. It could safely be argued that following the end of the Second World War, the European integration process became the foremost factor fostering stable expectations of peace among the Western European States. In particular, the project of European integration has generated, with some remarkable success, the necessary material and cognitive conditions of permanent peace in Western Europe. On the material side, it has provided an institutionalized framework for cooperation and

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[1] Bill McSweeney, *Security Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.7.

interdependence among Western European States which in turn made recourse to war a highly infeasible strategy. On the cognitive side, it facilitated the emergence of a sense of collective identity based upon liberal democratic values and fostered feelings of mutual trust and consideration among the EU member states. The process of European integration also urged Western European powers to eliminate their existential threat representations vis-à-vis each other through a process called de-securitization.

The main argument of this thesis is that the EU is a "security community", that is to say, a group of states which neither expect nor prepare for the use of force against one another. Among the EU member states, recourse to war as a means of settling disputes is simply inconceivable today. Throughout the course of European integration, the EU member states have developed dependable expectations that their problems would be resolved through peaceful procedures and without resort to violence. Although largely taken for granted today, this is an extraordinary achievement which needs to be analyzed in depth.

This study aims to explore, how the EU member states, after a history of recurrent bloody conflicts, have managed to renounce war in their relations with one another and thereby succeeded in developing a pluralistic security community among themselves. To this end, the first chapter of the thesis starts with a discussion on the origins of the concept of "security community" which dates back to a 1952 study by Karl Deutsch and his associates. Thereafter, the chapter proceeds with an overview of the idea of security communities as revisited and reformulated in the post-Cold War era by different schools of thought. By paying due attention to the most important contributions that have been made to theory of security communities, the recently revamped literature on the topic is broadly classified as follows: Democratic Peace Hypothesis and Security Communities, Social Constructivism and Security Communities and finally Copenhagen School of Security Studies and Security Communities. After having presented their main premises, each of these approaches have been applied to the specific EU case in order to find out the extent to which they could account for the EU's evolution into a pluralistic security community over time. The chapter also highlights a number of peculiar factors that facilitated the EU's development into a security community throughout the Cold War period.

The second chapter of the thesis aims to investigate how, why and through which policy tools the EU strives to extend the existing European Security Community on Europe's peripheries in the post-Cold War period. For this purpose, the chapter will first try to outline the security considerations that motivated the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Thereafter, it will attempt to assess the security community-building potential of the EU's enlargement process with particular reference to the European Union's eastward expansion. By drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, this part of the thesis will also strive to show how security-related arguments played a crucial role in legitimizing the EU's eastern enlargement process. What follows is a critical assessment of the different treatment that Turkey has received during its accession process to the Union in comparison with the Central and Eastern European Countries. Here particular emphasis will be placed upon the question of why security-related concerns that are at play in the Turkish case did not generate a firm EU commitment to Turkey's membership in the Union unlike the case with the CEECs. At end of the chapter, a quite recently launched policy initiative by the European Union, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), will be discussed briefly as an ambitious EU attempt to extend the existing European Security Community on Europe's peripheries by means other than accession to the Union.

The third chapter of the thesis tries to evaluate the potential contribution that Turkey would make to the EU security community upon her entry into the European Union. With this in mind, the chapter will first trace the evolution of the EU's and Turkey's security cultures respectively and sometimes in comparison with one another. Thereafter, Turkey's contribution to security-building in Europe throughout the Cold War period will be discussed briefly to see whether it is possible draw some useful lessons from the past with a view to strengthening Turkey's profile vis-a-vis the European Union in the post-Cold War era. Finally, at the end of the chapter, a brief assessment of Turkey's potential contribution to the EU security community will be presented

CHAPTER 2

THE EU AS A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY:

2.1. The Origins of the Concept of "Security Community":

In their seminal work entitled *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957), Karl Deutsch and his associates made prominent the concept of security community which was first introduced by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s. The main thrust of this project was to contribute to the "study of possible ways in which man might someday abolish war."[2] In furtherance of this goal, the scholars undertook a thorough investigation into the emergence and operation of what they term security communities -political communities in which the possibility of warfare among the participating units is completely eliminated. The inquiry was informed by the transactionalist perspective to international integration with its emphasis on the importance of communication processes and interaction flows among diverse agents (states, societies, and people) for laying the basis of lasting peace in certain regional settings. From this perspective, the problem of war endemic to international relations cannot be solved through the containment or transcendence of the nation-state.[3] Instead, sovereign nation-states could entertain "dependable expectations of peaceful change" in their relations with one another only if they become successfully integrated by attaining a sense of community. Thus, the conception of integration advanced by Karl Deutsch and his associates was quite different from those espoused by federalists and neo-functionalists. It did not necessarily involve the formal merger of separate governments (amalgamation). Rather, integration as they put it "requires expectations of security based on a large measure of sense of community among

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[2] Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr. Martin Lichterman, Raymand E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.3.
[3] Ben Rasmond, *Theories of European Integration*, (New York: Macmillan Press, 2000), p.42.

politically active groups."[4] Accordingly, the threshold for successful integration is crossed when states cease to consider resort to war as a tenable option for the settlement of their disputes: that is to say, when they establish among themselves security communities.

According to Deutsch *et al.*, "a security community is group of people which has become integrated", where integration is defined as "the attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population." By sense of community it is meant "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change." Lastly, the term peaceful change indicates "the resolution of social problems normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force." In short, a security community is "one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically , but will settle their disputes in some other way."[5]

For Deutsch *et al.*, security communities could either be amalgamated or pluralistic. Amalgamated security communities are constituted through "the formal merger of two or more independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of government after amalgamation."[6] Deutsch gives United States as a prime example of this type. On the other hand, in pluralistic security communities, member states retain the legal independence of their separate governments but have become integrated to the point that they enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change. The most widely acknowledged instance of a contemporary pluralistic security community is the one existing in EU-based Europe. Plainly speaking, in both cases fellow community members do not suspect each other of aggressive intentions. They not only regard the use of force among themselves as inconceivable but also desist from preparing to fight one another. Thus, dependable expectations of peaceful

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[4] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, p.84.
[5] Ibid., p.5.
[6] Ibid., p.6.

change stand out as the benchmark of security communities whether amalgamated or pluralistic.

For sure, relations between states in all political communities are not guided by "dependable expectations of peaceful change." Some political communities could rule out recourse to force as a means of settling disputes among its members while some could not. Yet, Deutsch was convinced that if the conditions and processes leading to the establishment of security communities could be identified, it would then be possible to extend them over larger areas across the globe.[7] Taking this presupposition as a point of departure, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, roughly four decades after Deutsch's original work, edited a volume on the possibility of security communities to develop in different regions of the world. While revisiting Deutsch's original ideas, the scholars gave the theory of security communities a social constructivist tone, and offered a rich agenda for further research. A more detailed discussion on this latter study will follow in the appropriate sections of this chapter but before that it seems mandated to present the necessary requirements that Deutsch provided for the emergence of security communities.

On balance, Deutsch *et al*, have found pluralistic security communities as more viable and efficient pathways to the elimination of war than their amalgamated counterparts.[8] In practice, amalgamated security communities require quite stringent conditions to come into existence and they proved to be more vulnerable to unfavorable, disintegrative forces. For instance, "excessive military commitments", "increase in ethnic or linguistic differentiation", "prolonged economic decline", "delay in economic, social or political reforms expected by the population" are but a few of the conditions that tend to destroy amalgamated security communities.[9] On the contrary, pluralistic security communities have shown themselves easier to attain and potentially more durable over longer periods of time when compared with the cases of amalgamation.

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[7] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, p.4.
[8] Ibid., pp.66-69.
[9] Ibid., pp.59-65.

Again for Deutsch there are only two necessary conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community. The first of these is "the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making."[10] Deutsch was particularly interested in the social and political values "incorporated in political institutions and in habits of behavior" and "held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units."[11]A part from the issue of integration; major values are those that occupy central importance within the domestic politics of each constituent actor. One such a value is the "basic political ideology", that is "democracy" in the North Atlantic area.[12]

In essence, compatible major values refer to "values that are tolerant of one another and capable of co-existing, values that are not mutually exclusive, and values that are rather mutually tolerated by their carriers."[13] Because of these attributes, they help generate predictability of behavior and even expectations of security among the community members. Here, Deutsch seems to have deliberately refrained from setting the "commonality" or the 'sameness' of values as a prerequisite for the formation of pluralistic security communities. He might have seen one of the strengths of pluralistic security communities in their capacity to recognize and acknowledge some degree of difference among their members.[14] That is perhaps why he has determined not complete but only "partial identification" with one another "in terms of self images" as a component of sense of community that leads to pluralistic integration.[15] Also, the emphasis placed on the "compatibility of major values" makes pluralistic security communities potentially inclusive constructions. It indicates a relatively open-minded attitude towards non-members who are holding some other values that do not collide with those attached to within the community. Thus, in Deutsch's analysis, the study of security communities is not restricted to some set of particular values commonly hold in specific regional settings. As he underscores adherence to the same set of values could turn out to be a superficial commitment: "the populations of different territories might easily profess verbal

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[10] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.66.
[11] Ibid., pp.46-47.
[12] Ibid., p.124.
[13] Frank Möller, "Capitalizing on Difference: A Security Community or/as a Western Project", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.34, No.3, September 2003, p.318.
[14] Ibid., pp.317-318.
[15] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.36.

attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to political integration." [16]

The second necessary condition for the creation of pluralistic security communities is "the capacity of the participating political units to respond to each other's needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to large scale violence."[17] This latter condition refers to what is called mutual responsiveness that requires "in each participating state a great many established political habits and of functioning political institutions favoring mutual communication and consultation."[18]

From the vantage point of Deutsch and his associates, capabilities linked to the responsiveness of constituent units are essential to secure integration at any given point of time.[19] In that sense, responsiveness is not simply a consequence of willingness to interact on the part of the political actors. It has a lot to do with the actual capabilities of the actors who are interacting with one another.[20] A properly functioning system of interaction which could be underpinned by communication facilitating technology obviously facilitates the achievement of responsiveness which Adler and Barnet later defined as "a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of we-ness" within the community.[21] The other broad kind of capability relevant to integration is related to the power of the units concerned and includes elements such as "size", "economic strength", "administrative efficiency" and the like. [22]

However, capabilities cannot assure a sustainable momentum towards integration if they are overburdened by the loads and demands placed upon the resources of governments while building-up a security community. Deutsch have found out that the requirements for establishing and maintaining pluralistic or amalgamated security communities imposes some burdens upon the resources of the participating units. These include, "military or financial burdens", "drains on man power or wealth";

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[16] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.36.
[17] Ibid., p.66.
[18] Ibid., p.66.
[19] Ibid., p.40.
[20] Ben Rasmond, *Theories of European...,* p.44.
[21] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective", in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.7.
[22] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.40.

"the burden of risk from political or military commitments";"costs of social and economic readjustments, such as the establishment of a customs union "[23] Such kind of loads placed upon political units could distract their attention away from the needs, messages or actions of their partners in the integrative process. The resulting decline in the level of mutual responsiveness would, in turn, upset the drive towards integration. In this crucial respect, Deutsch identified integration as "a process depending upon a balance between political loads upon a government and its capabilities for maintaining amalgamation, or its capabilities for maintaining integration within a pluralistic security community."[24] For it to be attained successfully the latter should prove or grow strong enough to cope with the former-that is to say, the capabilities relevant for integration should remain ahead of the demands claimed from the political units that are to comprise a security community.

The importance attached to capabilities led Deutsch to conclude that security communities usually develop around "cores of strength" formed by "larger, stronger, politically, administratively, economically advanced political units."[25] In the historical cases of integrative process he studied, those units were found to function as poles of "economic or political attraction" or to assume "leadership" roles.[26] Although Deutsch did not offer much guidance on these observations, it is possible to suggest a number of explanations for further clarification. Firstly, larger and stronger political agents have, obviously, a higher potential to withstand the requirements and demands placed upon them during the process of security community building. Secondly, "states that possess superior material power, international legitimacy and have adopted norms and practices that are conducive to peaceful change tend to confer increased material and moral authority to the norms and practices they diffuse and thus may also induce their political adoption and institutionalization."[27] Thirdly, the integrative process which develops around "cores of strength" tends to have a magnetic effect on other weaker units that aspire to benefit from their inclusion into the emerging order. This is so because; powerful

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[23] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.41.
[24] Ibid., p. 59.
[25] Ibid., p.38.
[26] Ibid., pp.38-39.
[27] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities", in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 44-45.

states which are generally associated with the "positive images of security and material progress" could exert a power of attraction on other agents.[28] Therefore, security communities are created in the existence of high power asymmetries among the participating political agents. In essence, integration within a pluralistic security community could be seen "as a nuclear process attracting a widening area around an initial core."[29]

In Deutsch's sense, just like the case in all political communities, what prepares the ground for the creation of security communities is sustained interaction (including trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges ect...) between the relevant agents- interactions states and interactions between societies. Such transboundary movements he suggested, generate "reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests and even collective identities"- in short, a set of conditions and relations that , overtime, instill in the participating agents a sense of community.[30] The attainment of a sense of community among a group of states would, in turn, radically alter the way security politics is traditionally practiced in the international sphere. The logic of anarchy, which is considered almost as a law of nature by realists would give way to the logic of community. States dwelling in a security community will be confident that their differences will be resolved short of war and thereby give up military preparations for fighting each other. Such a view of international politics, though might be seemed as idealistic against the backdrop of the Cold War, was posing a significant challenge to the core tenets of realism. As it is commonly pointed out, realists underline the ever present possibility of military confrontation due to the anarchic structure of the international system. From this perspective, although states do not wage wars against each other all the time, they should always remain prepared for the worst contingency. Within this picture, there are basically two available strategies to be pursued in order to achieve and maintain peace. States could either balance the power of their neighbors through forming temporary alliances or coalitions or otherwise they could enjoy the stability provided by a predominant hegemonic power within the system.

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[28] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.40
[29] William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), p.28.
[30] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in...", p.14.

On the contrary, Deutsch was particularly interested in the processes and conditions leading to the development of political communities at the international level and the way that they could foster pacific relations between the constituent states. Drawing on the experiences of certain groups of states which have permanently eliminated war in their relations with one another, he envisaged security community building-via inter societal and interstate transactions as the most promising route to stable peace. Alliances and coalitions could break up due to the shifting interests of the participating agents; however, the members of a security community enjoy a lasting peace based on a shared sense of community which is indeed:

> A matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling," trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self images, accordance with it- in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs and responsiveness in the process of decision making.[31]

In order to illustrate how security communities have been established in certain regions throughout the history, Deutsch's research program focused on quantifying transaction flows, interaction processes and communication networks. Indeed the leading assumption behind his transactionalist perspective was that a sense of community among a group of states is a function of the level of communication between them.[32] In that sense, he regarded the "sense of community" which is crucial for the achievement of integration as something that could be measured by the indices of communication and thus, observed the existence of security communities in settings where transactions among states and transactions among societies have occurred frequently and in significantly high volumes.

The sense of community requires, from Deutsch's point of view, some particular habits of political behavior which are gained through the process of social learning.[33] Obviously, the most important lesson that states should learn while making up a (pluralistic) security community is "the increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war. War becomes unattractive because it promises to be both devastating and indecisive."[34] Communication and transaction networks are the key mediums

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[31] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.36.
[32] Ben Rasmond, *Theories of European...,* p.44.
[33] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* p.37.
[34] Ibid., p.115.

through which such messages could be diffused among societies, eventually paving the way for the development of security communities. Yet, "the learning of habits of integrative political behavior" does not take place all of a sudden, more often than not; states need some time to internalize the lessons and messages they receive from their fellow community members. In the mean time, the messages from other member governments or units should be understood, given real weight in the process of decision making and responded to quickly and adequately in terms of political and economic action. Thus, Deutsch seems to have tied the process of social learning to the development of mutual responsiveness within the community. [35]

As Adler and Barnett contend, "Deutsch did not explicate in detail how and why learning is important for the development of security communities."[36] Yet, he seems to have given a strong clue on this point while arguing that in all political communities, compliance with the rules is to a great extent voluntary. For instance, adherence to the principal rule of security communities-that is, the settlement of disputes among community members without recourse to military force- is based on voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance is a matter of habit which is acquired through the process of social learning.[37] Security communities do not normally possess enforcement mechanisms to ensure adherence to their norms and rules. Nor do they rely on a supreme overarching authority to monitor the participating units' behavior against each other. War becomes an inconceivable option for the settlement of disputes in such a system because the constituent agents learn and habitualize to practice peaceful change in their relations with one another. As Bellamy argues, "states learn to act in particular ways when they think that their relationships with neighbours are framed by rules of the security dilemma, for instance. They learn to act differently if they perceive those same relationships in terms of shared membership of a security community."[38]

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[35] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison and History" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.421.
[36] Ibid., p.421.
[37] Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and their Neighbours*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.8.
[38] Ibid., p.8.

Although Deutsch does not say much about the role of institutions in the development of security communities, in reality, security communities should be institutionalized. Adler and Barnett highlight the importance of international organizations and institutions for the building of security communities as follows: International institutions encourage transactions between states, establish norms of behavior, act as sites of socialization and learning and most importantly may contribute to the formation of collective identities and mutual trust among their member units.[39]

As the title of his study -*Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*- suggests, Deutsch examines the idea of integration for a single geographic area- the North Atlantic. According to his definition, the North Atlantic area contains 19 countries 13 of which were members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[40] Deutsch chose this particular area as the focus of his study primarily because "it includes all major powers of the free world; it is the leading alternative to Western European integration and it includes Western Europe."[41] Deutsch's main preoccupation was to find out whether and under which conditions North Atlantic area could transform itself into a security community. For this purpose, he analyses the state of integration in the North Atlantic Area and assesses the extent to which the necessary requirements he foresaw for the emergence of security communities have been fulfilled in this particular area. Deutsch also makes some references to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which at the time of his study, was comprising six member states that are all located in the North Atlantic area. However, he does not deal with the specific question of whether the members of the ECSC would be able to form a security community among themselves in the foreseeable future. Deutsch just prescribes some policy lessons derived from the ECSC experience of the six Western European states that might be useful to promote integration in the wider North Atlantic area.[42]

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[39] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett,"A Framework for the Study ...", pp.42-43.
[40] According to Deutsch's definition, North Atlantic Area covers the following 19 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Except for Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Spain all the remaining countries of the North Atlantic area were NATO members.
[41] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, p.9.
[42] For instance, according to Deutsch, it is not wise to promote amalgamation at a very early stage of integration since this might give rise concerns over national sovereignty and independence among the

Recalling Deutsch's definition of a security community as "a group of people which has become integrated", it could be maintained that his research agenda was not as much state-centric as it is usually portrayed to be. While mapping out the conditions of security community formation, he attached utmost importance to transnational bonds and affiliations that are to emerge between societies through intensive, reciprocal transactions. Yet, at the same time, his transactionalist account prioritized nation-states in two respects. Firstly, Deutsch conceived security as simply the absence of war among states. Secondly, his theory of integration sought to preserve the nation-states as the most predominant actors in the international system.[43] On this ground, he seems to have favored pluralistic integration which occurs without an institutional merger of separate governments over amalgamation as the method to be pursued for the cessation of military conflict in the international arena.

To sum up, security communities come into being whenever states have achieved a high degree of mutual trust, a sense of community or of we-feeling and even a collective identity so that they regard the use of force against each other as unthinkable and hence, give up preparations for fighting one another. However, this is not to suggest that, security communities are, for all the time, conflict-free zones. Although, sometimes disputes could well arise among the community members, they never escalate into large-scale physical violence. Therefore, commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, which is reinforced by the belief in the utter destructiveness of war, constitutes the essence of a security community.

Within the context of the Cold War and largely due to the dominance of the realist paradigm in international relations, Deutsch's pioneering ideas remained dormant for many years. Instead of contemplating the development of transnational communities that could foster a stable peace among states, the scholars of international politics preferred to focus on the most pressing issues of the time such as deterrence, arms

political units concerned. As an intermediate step to either amalgamation or pluralism, Deutsch proposes functionalism which in practice implies the delegation of some governmental functions of the participting units to functional organizations on a low or high level of decision-making. In this context, Deutsch gives the ECSC an example of an advanced functional organization with a high level of decision-making capacity. He futher argues that the strengthening or weakening of functional arrangements would have important implications for the state of integration in the North Atlantic area in the future.Karl W. Deutsch *et al.,* pp.187-189.

[43] Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European...*, p.46.

race, nuclear confrontation and so on. Yet, the end of the Cold War together with the theoretical developments that unfolded thereafter, most notably the constructivist turn in international relations spawned a renewed interest in the study of security communities.

It is increasingly argued that Deutsch's observations concerning security communities seem to be quite relevant in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians and statesman from all over world are referring to the importance of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows-as emphasized by Deutsch 50 years ago-for securing a more stable and peaceful international order. [44] In particular there has been a growing temptation to associate the condition of stable peace to development of communities among states which share common values and are interlinked by transnational bonds. Such developments have also found reflection in terms of "a movement in international relations theory away from rationalism and materialism toward explorations of the role of identity, norms and the social basis of global politics."[45] Within this context, considerable effort has been spent to reformulate the concept of security community by reifying some perceived deficiencies in Deutsch's original formulation. The following will attempt to broadly categorize this recently revamped literature by underlining the most important contributions that have been made to the theory of security communities.

Although Deutsch's original ideas were reinterpreted from a variety of different angles, it is quite striking that the interested scholars have, all in common, concentrated on the study of pluralistic security communities instead of dealing with their amalgamated counterparts. This could be attributed to the fact that pluralistic security community is the form "that is theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and international relations theory."[46]

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[44] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda For the Study of Security Communities", *Ethics& International Affairs*, Vol.10, 1996, p.64.
[45] Ibid., p.69.
[46] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in ...", p.5.

2.2. Security Communities Revisited in the Post-Cold War Era

2.2.1. Democratic Peace Hypothesis and Security Communities.

Although not cited much in the literature, one of the first attempts to improve on the concept of pluralistic security community came from Emanuel Adler in 1992. From his perspective, Deutsch's analysis was incomplete because he has overlooked a critical intervening variable that promotes "dependable expectations of peaceful change" among the members of a security community.[47] The creation of strong civil societies, which is facilitated by democratic values, was the critical intervening variable that Adler had in mind.[48] As has been mentioned above, Deutsch established the compatibility of major values as a precondition for the creation of pluralistic security communities but did not specify which values are more conducive to attain peaceful change than others. According to Adler, however, "members of pluralistic security communities hold dependable expectations of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values and allow their societies to become interdependent and linked by transnational, economic and cultural relations."[49] In making this assertion, Adler linked the idea of security communities to the democratic peace thesis-the belief that democracies do not wage wars against each other. He presumed that the political organization of societies along liberal democratic principles, which makes them less war- prone against each other, is a precondition for the development of security communities. Yet, this linkage effectively confined the applicability of the security community concept to Western Europe where liberal democratic values are commonly upheld. Consequently, the expansion of the Western European security community became dependent on the dissemination of essentially "Western" values, institutions and procedures associated with the rule of law, market institutions, democracy, respect for and protection of human rights among the former socialist Central and Eastern European countries.[50] This way of thinking has also rendered the possible development of security communities with some other kind of values

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[47] Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community", in Beverly Crawford (ed.), *The Future of European Security*, (University of California, Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1992), p.293.
[48] Ibid., p.293.
[49] Ibid., p.293.
[50] Frank Möller, "Capitalizing on Difference...", p.316.

inconceivable. As a matter of fact, the concept of security community came to be portrayed as if it were peculiar to Western Europe only. Indeed, security communities are communities of values but not necessarily communities of liberal democratic values. The only indispensable criterion for the existence of a security community is that the member states must believe in and be committed to peaceful change. This means that, in a security community, security as a value is prioritized over democracy. Therefore, states that do not possess a shared liberal democratic culture but have nevertheless ruled out recourse to physical force for the resolution of their mutual conflicts could well form security communities among themselves. In the absence of a shared commitment to liberalism and democracy, other intersubjective ideas could promote the development of security communities. For instance, a shared developmentalist ideology among a group of states, (like the one pursued by the South Asian states) could create common purposes around which a shared identity and later dependable expectations of peaceful change might emerge.[51] For instance, in his analysis of the ASEAN (Association of the South East Asian Nation) case, Amitav Acherya has found out that the states in the region are on the way of building a security community without liberalism. [52]

Democratic peace hypothesis, Russett underlines, depends "on particular normative perspectives on the rightness of fighting others who share a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, and on the absence of need to fight those who have political institutions that support peaceful conflict resolution internationally."[53] From his perspective, democratic peace proposition applies only to liberal democracies and that is why these states are best suited to form security communities. In his analysis, Russett does not pay much attention to the original dynamics of security communities such as a sense of we-feeling, mutual trust, and collective identity that inhibit the propensity for warfare. More precisely, he does not explain why liberal democracies are more inclined to develop a sense of community among themselves so that they completely and permanently rule out war as an option for the settlement

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[51] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.41.
[52] Amitav Acharya,"Collective Identity and Conflict Mangement in Southeast Asia" in Emanuel Adler and Micheal Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.198-228.
[53] Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations in Building Security Communities" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.372.

of their disputes. To sum up, the democratic peace hypothesis could well be supported by the relevant record of the liberal democracies. However, as far as the development of security communities is concerned, there is a need to better specify why and how liberal democratic values are more compatible for the attainment of a sense of we-feeling, mutual trust and collective identity among their holders.

Unlike Russett, Adler establishes a clear cut connection between liberal democracy and security communities. According to him, liberal democratic values facilitate the creation of strong civil societies that, in turn, promote community bonds, common identity and trust among states which are to comprise a security community.[54] For instance, civil societies contribute to the diffusion of practices that promote human rights and environmental protection which help to consolidate community bonds and common identity.[55] In short, civil societies reinforce interdependence and linkages between liberal democracies that are to constitute a security community. Moreover, liberal democracies tend to develop pacific dispositions against each other because they "transfer their domestic mechanisms of peaceful –conflict resolution to the international arena, turning them into both legitimate and habitual practices."[56] Domestic norms of liberal democratic states entail the resolution of political conflicts on the basis of constitutional principles. Since these norms and the corresponding practices are constitutive of the political culture of liberal democracies, they tend to be externalized out of habit or commitment.[57] However, outside the community of liberal democracies, the anarchic structure of the international system still reigns and thus, the relations between states continue to be framed by power politics and security dilemmas. Another scholar who connects the democratic peace hypothesis with the idea of security communities is Frank Schimmelfennig. From his vantage point, a shared liberal democratic culture among a group of states could well provide the necessary groundwork for the emergence of a pluralistic security community:

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[54] Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order…", p.293.
[55] Ibid., p.294.
[56] Ibid., p.291.
[57] Frank Schimmelfennig, *EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.78.

When democracies interact, they perceive each other as sharing same values, norms and practices. These perceptions foster positive identification between liberal states. In particular, the knowledge that other liberal states share their culture of non-violent institutionalized conflict management enables liberal democratic states to develop dependable expectations of each other's peaceful behavior. In time, liberal democracies develop pluralistic security communities in which states positively identify with one another and neither expect, nor prepare for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.[58]

Explicit in these observations is the belief that since Western liberal democratic values predispose their holders to settle their differences in a non-violent manner; these values should be regarded as preconditions for the creation of pluralistic security communities. Yet, a complete turnabout in Adler's stance could be observed in one of his later studies where he admitted the possibility for security communities to develop with some other inter subjective ideas that could well be prone to promote a collective identity, mutual trust and eventually peaceful change among their adherents.[59] As diametrically opposed to his initial argument, Adler has even pointed out that "the democratic peace literature has by definition coupled the absence of war to a particular type of state, and thus has considerably narrowed the Deutschian framework."[60] Following this way of reasoning, the number of case studies which explore the existence of security communities in non-democratic settings has been increasing in recent years.[61]

In the literature, no single account analyses the evolution of the European Union as a pluralistic security community solely from the democratic peace perspective. This appears to be quite puzzling given the EU's widely acknowledged conceptualization as a value-based community founded on liberal democratic principles such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Yet, as Larsen points out, in the Union's discourse the validity of the democratic peace hypothesis is taken for granted.[62] The root causes of international and regional

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[58] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the…*, p.78.
[59] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.41.
[60] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical…", p.13.
[61] Donald K. Emmerson, "Security Community and South East Asia: Analyzing ASEAN", *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol.9, No.2, 2005 ,pp. 165-185., Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, (London: Routledge, 2001).
[62] Henrik Larsen, "Concepts of Security in the European Union After the Cold War*", Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.3, 2000, p.345.

security problems are frequently linked to the lack of liberal democratic values. As the following chapter of the thesis will attempt to show, the EU tries to expand the existing European security community by exporting its core liberal democratic values to the candidates for membership as well as to other actors on its periphery. For this purpose, it basically uses foreign policy tools such as enlargement and the recently launched European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).

2.2.2. Social Constructivism and Security Communities:

Despite some earlier efforts to amend the concept of security community, it was not until Adler and Barnett's well-known study of 1998 that it actually started to be reconsidered with real vigor. In their analysis, Adler and Barnett re-conceptualized the idea of security communities from a social constructivist perspective, identified the conditions under which they might come into existence, contemplated their possible development in different regional settings, and thereby offered a new analytical framework for research. Moreover, a number of well-known scholars have contributed to the volume with their case studies showing that the development of security communities across the globe is not so much a remote possibility as it is generally considered to be. Arguably, the study constitutes the most comprehensive and influential attempt to refine Deutsch's original ideas in the post-Cold War era.

While re-working on the concept of pluralistic security community, Adler and Barnet recognize that "the Deutschian contribution is to highlight that states can become embedded in a set of social relations that are understood as a community and that the fabric of this community can generate stable expectations of peaceful change."[63] Nevertheless, they justify the need for a new approach to the study of security communities by pointing to the certain conceptual and methodological shortcomings in Deutsch's research agenda that ultimately discouraged further interest in the concept.

For Adler and Barnett, the transactionalist perspective to international integration was excessively dependent on behavioral reasoning.[64] Therefore, while attempting to

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[63] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical…", p.6.
[64] Ibid., pp.8-9.

demonstrate how security communities have been constructed in specific regional settings, Deutsch relied on quantitative methods in his research into intersocietal and interstate transactions. As Rosamond notes,

> Deutsch was "preoccupied with the achievement of security communities through intersocietal transactions. Furthermore he was convinced that those transactions could be measured and quantified. So his attention was focused on measurable indices of communication such as international telephone calls and the cross-border traffic of tourists."[65]

Actually, the mass data on such transboundary movements that took place within the geographical area of his survey sometimes overshadows the main argument of his project. Furthermore, Deutsch does not provide a clear-cut explanation regarding the relationship between the growth of transactions and the creation of common identities and mutual identifications. He just presumes that intensive interactions between states and societies would eventually produce common identities, mutual trust and identifications, thereby leading to the development of security communities. As Adler and Barnett argue, although "Deutsch's behavioral methodology was able to capture increased transboundary movements that suggested greater interdependence, it could not detect a greater sense of cohesion and community based on mutual responsiveness, value orientation and identity."[66] In short, Deutschian framework fails to explain the transformation from the condition of interdependence to community-building. The renewed in interest in the study of security communities, Adler and Barnett contend, should take into account "the social relations that are bound up with and generated by those transactions" and the ways in which "international organizations, transactions and social learning processes can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations."[67] That is why both scholars consider constructivist scholarship as convenient to analyze the development of security communities across the globe.

According to Adler and Barnett, Deutsch unreasonably assumed that all political communities generate the assurance of non-violent dispute settlement.[68] In that regard, they criticize Deutsch for being imprecise in distinguishing a security community from other kinds of political communities. To overcome this perceived

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[65] Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European...*, p.169.
[66] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", pp.47-48.
[67] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical…", pp.8-9.
[68] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.13.

shortcoming, Adler and Barnett establish "dependable expectations of peaceful change" as the core norm of a security community. However, contrary to their interpretations, Deutsch was also aware of the fact that "a political community is not necessarily able to prevent war within the area it covers."[69] From his perspective, a security community is just one particular form of political community that eliminated war and the expectations of it within its boundaries. Deutsch regards political communities as "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance."[70] Only political communities that could foster "dependable expectations of peaceful change" among their member units could qualify as security communities as he repeatedly points out. In that sense, Adler and Barnett seem to be repeating the original argument of Deutsch on the distinctive feature of security communities.

Within the framework of the constructivist reconceptualization, the community is characterized by "identities, values and meanings" shared by its members.[71] It is considered as an "imagined" or a "cognitive region" whose boundaries may or may not be congruent with traditional geographical borders.[72] In imagined political communities, such as a nation, all community members do not come into direct contact with another or meet each other, but they still share a sense of community.[73] Accordingly, security communities are described as "socially constructed cognitive regions or community regions whose people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end."[74] It follows then that dependable expectation of peaceful change in a security community is tied to the existence of actors that need not inhabit the same geographical space, but nevertheless possess common values and a shared identity. Thus, a pluralistic security community turns out to be a "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."[75] This reading opens up the possibility that security communities could emerge between non-contiguous states.

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[69] Karl W Deutsch *et al.,* p.5.
[70] Ibid., p.5.
[71] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.31.
[72] Ibid., p.33.
[73] Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities...*, p.32.
[74] Emanuel Adler, "Imagined Security Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,*Vol.26, No.2, 1997, p.250.
[75] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.30

Yet, a security community based on common values and shared meaning diverge significantly from the original Deutschian emphasis placed on compatible values. Whereas the compatible values imply values that are tolerant of one another, common values refer to an identical set of values hold in a specific transnational setting.

Adler and Barnett also distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic security communities: Loosely-coupled and Tightly-coupled. The loosely coupled security communities exhibit the above- mentioned definitional properties of a pluralistic security community and no more. On the other hand, tightly-coupled security communities are more demanding constructions in that they set up collective security and even defense arrangements in the face of an external threat and that they "possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional centralized government."[76] Tightly-coupled security communities, in which "mutual aid" among the community members becomes a matter of habit, resemble something like a post-sovereign system. According to this definition the EU could be characterized as a tightly coupled security community whereby the member states have agreed to delegate some of their sovereignty to common supranational institutions. As captured in the notion of European Governance, the EU has "a regional integrated system of rule in which the member states are no longer the exclusive possessors of legitimacy and authority."[77] Moreover, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (which provides for the eventual framing of a common defense policy that might in time lead to a common defense) becomes an increasingly institutionalized part of the EU, the EU is developing into an increasingly more tightly coupled community.[78] It seems likely that, concomitant with the deepening of integration, the EU will continue to strengthen its profile in this direction. The inclusion of a mutual aid function, namely the solidarity clause into the Draft Constitutional Treaty is in conformity with this expectation.[79]

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[76] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…",pp.30, 56-57.
[77] Knud Erik Jorgensen, "Introduction: Approaching European Governance", in Knud Erik Joregensen (ed.), *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1997), p.2.
[78] Pernille Rieker,"The Europeanization of Norway's Security Identity", *NUPI Working Paper*, No.619, December 2001, p.5.
[79] The solidarity clause which was included in Article 42 of the draft Constitution states that "the Union and its members shall act jointly in a sprit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources available by the Member States, to prevent the terrorist

In order to delineate the factors leading to the emergence and development of security communities, Adler and Barnett develop an analytical framework organized around three tiers: Precipitating conditions (tier one), facilitating conditions (tier two) and the necessary conditions (tier three). By taking stock of some important points in the history of European integration, the following paragraphs will attempt to show that, this three-tiered framework applies in part to the case of security community building within the EU. Yet, the evolution of the EU as a pluralistic security community during the Cold War period has also been facilitated by a number of peculiar factors that this standard framework could not cover. These would be presented in the appropriate sections of this chapter as well.

The first tier comprises the precipitating conditions that "propel states to look in each other's direction and to (…) coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage."[80] Although precipitating conditions are generally followed by modest "initial encounters and acts of cooperation", they could provide the necessary push for further, more promising interactions and make the development of trust and mutual identification a possibility between the states at a later phase. Eventually, successful outcomes achieved at this stage would provide the necessary impetus for the cooperating units to proceed with the tier two. The most important precipitating conditions presented in Adler and Barnett's framework include: changes in technology, demography, economics and environment, the emergence of common external threats and the development of new interpretations of social reality.[81] This last condition is particularly important because, "in the absence of human agents that could provide alternative readings [of their situation], actors may remain oblivious to changes enumerated above, thereby failing to take cooperative measures that could possibly be to their mutual advantage." [82]

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threat in the territory of the Member States , protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack, assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack and assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster."

[80] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.38

[81] Ibid., p.38.

[82] Pınar Bilgin, "On the (Ir)relevance of Theory in Middle East Studies:The Security Community Approach and Middle East Politics", *Paper Prepared for the Pan-European International Relations Conference*, The Hague, September 9-11, 2004, p.12.

The identification of common problems and threats by the Western European powers at the end of the Second World War could be regarded as the first tier of security community building within the EU. At this stage, the Soviet threat, the problem of economic recovery combined with the fear of an unchecked, resurgent Germany, induced Western European states to coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage and eventually led to the foundation of the ECSC. Additionally, the desire to have an independent voice among the superpowers (the US and the USSR), commonly referred to as the "third force syndrome", encouraged the Western European powers to join together within the framework of EEC and assert their distinct position in an increasingly rigid bipolar world.[83] The development of new interpretations of social reality by the founding fathers of the EU also played a crucial role at that stage. Rather than the traditional mechanism of balance of power, they espoused economic integration and cooperation as a much more reliable alternative to secure a lasting peace in the post war Europe. The dominant way of thinking at the time was that the European states should learn important lessons from their history and seek for ways to prevent the repetition of the devastation that occurred during the two world wars. In that context, economic integration was envisioned to "(…) avoid the security concerns of the European powers being directed at each other (…)" that has, for most of the time in European history resulted in fragmentation and eventually war.[84] Therefore, this original "security through integration" argument could be seen as a novel reading of the situation in Western Europe after the war. On the road to the foundation of the ECSC, the indirect approach to peace via economic integration was expressed quite explicitly in the Shuman Declaration of 1950: The placement of Franco-German Production of Coal and Steel under a common High Authority would not make war between the two merely unthinkable but also materially impossible.[85]

The second tier embodies conditions that facilitate the development of a collective identity and mutual trust. In the absence of these two, dependable expectations of peaceful change among a group of states could not be procured. The facilitating

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[83] William Wallace, *The Transformation of…,* p.20.
[84] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.83.
[85] For the full text of the Shuman Declaration see, Cristopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.13-14 .

factors are categorized as structural (power and knowledge) and process (transactions, international organizations and social learning) variables. Regarding the category of structure, Adler and Barnett follow Deutsch in emphasizing that power and knowledge occupy a central place in the process of security community building. The importance of power stems from the fact that security communities, as Deutsch have pointed out, usually develop around "cores of strength". Yet Adler and Barnett's conception of power includes not only the material resources of states but also the ability to determine shared understandings and thereby foster a sense of we-feeling within the community. [86]

In the case of European integration, the Franco-German rapprochement after the Second World War seems to have created a core of strength if one relies on the conventional understanding of power. (in terms of size, economic efficiency, military prowess and the like). Indeed postwar politicians such as Monnet and his collaborators imagined a core of Europe that consists of France and Germany.[87] By bringing these two countries into a closer Union, the expectation was that Britain would be eventually drawn into the enterprise.[88] This would be followed by the participation of the Benelux countries since they were highly dependent on France and Germany. Given the postwar Italian government's determination to revive its political and economic links with the Western European democracies, it was expected to take part in the project as well. In short, Monnet and his collaborators, as Wallace notes, foresaw the development of European integration around a core of strength (just like the way Deutsch had envisioned): "the political dynamism displayed by their core group , the rules and institutions they established, serving to pull hesitant neighbours in."[89]

Yet, it is quite hard to pin down how the sense we-feeling within the Community has emerged. One possible explanation could refer to the construction of a distinctive European identity based on shared liberal democratic norms during the

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[86] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.39.
[87] William Wallace, *The Transformation of…,*p.20.
[88] In the immediate post-World War II years Britain was quite reluctant to participate in European Integration projects. It preffered to retain strong links with the United States instead and play a balancer role in Europe by preventing any single European state from being too powerful. For a detailled discussion on this topic see, Robert A. Jones, *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), pp.7-8.
[89] William Wallace, *The Transformation of…,* p.28.

Cold War. As an illustrative example, the Copenhagen Report on European identity which was issued in the early 1970s stressed the "unity of the nine member states" and their attachment to "common values and principles "of "representative democracy", "rule of law", "social justice" and "human rights" that constitute the "fundamental elements of European identity." [90] Regarding the identity construction process of the EU, Fierke and Wiener underline the importance of the Cold War context in which the liberal democratic political order of Western Europe was to "a large extent established and sustained by negative definition with the other side of the iron curtain, the Communist East." [91] Hence, the articulation of a totalitarian Eastern "other" constituted a reference point against which the liberal democratic identity of the then EC and NATO could be contrasted and asserted. A reasonable assumption therefore is that, the Cold War divide between Western and the Eastern Europe has played a crucial role in the development of a common identity and a sense of we-feeling within the EU.

The EC's southern enlargement which culminated in the accession of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 also testifies that the Community "came to represent shared values, norms and codes of behavior among its member states." [92] Additional membership criteria for future candidates were introduced in this enlargement round such as adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.[93] In determining the expansion of the European Community political considerations started to gain priority over economic concerns.[94] Indeed, southern enlargement was motivated by the belief that accession of these three countries would help them consolidate their nascent democracies.[95] In short, EC's southern enlargement could be considered as an important episode in the EU security community building process. It demonstrated that the liberal, democratic identity of the EC became so deeply entrenched to be reflected in the above mentioned political criteria of full membership in the Community.

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[90] The full text of the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity is available at, http://www.ena.lu/
[91] Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional Interests:EU and NATO Enlargement", *RSC Working Paper,* No.99/14, September 1999, p.5.
[92] Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", *Turkish Studies*,Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, p.5.
[93] Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European…", p.5.
[94] Ibid., p.5.
[95] Ibid., p.5.

The other component of the structure, knowledge, is also crucial for the development and maintenance of security communities. By knowledge, Adler and Barnett are referring to cognitive structures-shared meanings and understandings −which constitute and constrain state action by determining the limits of legitimate activity.[96] Of particular interest is "those cognitive structures that facilitate practices that are tied to the development of mutual trust and identity and analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution."[97] From Adler and Barnett's perspective, the political ideas and meanings associated with democracy and liberalism are well-suited to form the cognitive structure upon which a security community is built. However, the authors also note that democracy is not a must for the formation of security communities.

Right from the outset, European integration project was inspired by a shared commitment to liberalism and democracy: "Only a union of the liberal democratic states would be able to create a lasting peace among them, strengthen their domestic as well as international ability to resist totalitarianism, and make Europe's voice felt in international affairs." [98] During the Cold War, Western Europe, under the protection and leadership of the United States, constituted itself as a community of liberal democratic values and in the process defined its normative ideals in opposition the Eastern half of the continent. Starting from the early 1970s, these liberal democratic values and norms are all embraced as the definitive elements of EU's collective identity as clearly pointed out in the above mentioned Copenhagen Report on European identity. Today, the EU is widely recognized as a regional organization of Western international community in which a shared liberal democratic culture determines the principles of legitimate conduct for the member states.[99] Among other things, the liberal democratic values hold by the EU member states require domestic and international conflicts to be managed and resolved without violence. The constitutive liberal values of the EU, which are observed by all member states, are perhaps most clearly stated in the Article 6 of the TEU: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights

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[96] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.40.
[97] Ibid., p.40.
[98] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (ed.s), *The Politics of European Union Enlargement :Theoretical Approaches*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p.158.
[99] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the...*, p.4.

and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to member states." Therefore, it could be argued that in the presence of shared understanding and meanings that have facilitated the creation of a common identity and promoted practices of non-violent dispute settlement, the second tier of security community building within the EU seems to have proceeded rather quite smoothly.

Alongside the structural conditions of power and knowledge, the second tier of Adler and Barnett's framework also includes process variables-transactions, international organizations and social learning-that contribute to the development of mutual trust and a collective transnational identity among the would-be members of a security community. Here, social learning (and socialization) is designated as the key process variable since it "explains why transactions and institutional actions can encourage the development of mutual trust and collective identity."[100] According to Adler and Barnett, social learning helps political actors to see each other trustworthy by "promoting the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action and regional boundaries."[101] Moreover, it is through the mechanism of social learning that shared understandings, values and norms could be diffused among societies, eventually leading up to creation of common identities.

The origins of the socialization process among the constituent units of the EU security community could be traced back to the establishment of European Communities which provided an institutionalized setting for an increasing number of national ministers, officials and interest-group representatives from the member countries to interact with each other.[102] In essence, the institutions of the European Community (and later the EU) have acted as sites of socialization whereby constant communication and consultation between the member state representatives took place. This was accompanied by an increasing level of mutual trust among the members of the Community. As *Eurobarometer* polls indicate "the most remarkable development between 1970 and 1986 [was] the increase in trust between France and Germany." [103]

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[100] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.45.
[101] Ibid., p.45.
[102] William Wallace, *The Transformation of…*, p.79.
[103] Ibid., p.33.

The growth of we-feeling and mutual trust among the EC member states could also help explain why they chose to cooperate and consult on foreign policy issues, rather than acting unilaterally or through other organizations. A case in point is the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism in 1970 which reflects the desire of the six EC member states to speak with a common political voice in international affairs. Established outside the EEC treaty framework, the EPC (the precursor of CFSP) has generally been interpreted as an example of intergovernmental cooperation whereby the member states were in full control of decision making.[104] Generally speaking, such a control is highly valued because foreign policy is traditionally considered to be the cornerstone of state sovereignty. However, the intergovernmental attributes of EPC could not impede the development of a "coordination reflex" among its participants: they acquired a habit of consultation among themselves before taking a stance on international developments or launching national initiatives on issues of mutual concern.[105] This is a sound illustration of the process of socialization that was at work. As Dehousee and Weiler argue:

> It is widely acknowledged that since 1970, European Political Cooperation has gained credibility owing essentially to its efficiency as a socialization process. Member states have got used to consulting each other on major international issues, to profiting from each other advice and paying due attention to each other's concerns. Such a collegial sprit would not have been possible had they not had reasonable hopes to see their partners follow the mutually agreed code of conduct.[106]

Here it is noteworthy that the "code of conduct" (acquis politique) is imposed on member states not only through formal rules or agreements.[107] For instance, Smith argues that before acquiring a full legal status with the SEA, the EPC functioned

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[104] In terms of its actual achievements the arrangement remained rather modest for mainly tworeasons:Firstly, consensus was sought in all decisions to be made meaning that any one member state could block or water down a proposal. Thus the policy output is often described as a reflection of "the lowest common denominator".Secondly, EPC had no facilities of its own in terms of resources, policy tools or staff. For a more detailled discussion on this topic see, Michael E. Smith, Brian Crowe and John Peterson, "International Interests: The Common Foreign and Security Policy", in John Peterson and Michael Shackleton (ed.s), *The Institutions of the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.255-257.
[105] Karen E.Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World,* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2003), p.9.
[106] Renaud Dehousse and Joseph Weiler, "EPC and the Single Act: From Soft Law to Hard Law?", *EUI Working Paper EPU*, No.90/1,1990, pp.17-18., quoted in Knud Erik Jorgensen,"POCO:The Diplomatic Republic of Europe" in Knud Erik Jorgensen (ed.), *Reflective Approaches to European Governance,* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.175.
[107] Knud Erik Jorgensen, "POCO: The Diplomatic...", p.172.

largely as body of soft law.[108] Informal agreements and procedures (such as the Luxembourg [1970], the Copenhagen [1973] and the London [1981] Reports) effectively regulated intergovernmental foreign policy cooperation among its participants even if they had no legal status.[109] Furthermore, the consensus-based decision making within the EPC was not necessarily a process leading to insurmountable deadlocks as one might assume. "Officials did not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, but tended toward compromise and median position in the hope of reaching agreement." [110]

In conformity with Adler and Barnett's expectations, the process of socialization seems to have played a crucial role in promoting the "appropriate way" of behavior among the members of the EU security community. This is perhaps evident more than anywhere else in the realm of foreign policy cooperation. Even in the absence of judicial enforcement, the participant states often found themselves bound up with the policies adopted within the EPC framework. The development of mutual trust also appears to have created reliable expectations that the informal "codes of conduct" on foreign policy issues would likely be observed by all. As Lak once put it, such unwritten laws constituted a "morally binding non-legal foundation for EPC."[111] Through these sorts of processes the member states became more likely to identify with one another and hence started to perceive common European interests.

In Adler and Barnett's framework, tier three represents the end stage of security community building. Here, the proximate necessary conditions of peaceful change- mutual trust and a common identity- are expected to flourish. The outstanding feature of this tier is that "states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and beliefs about each other."[112] For instance, the withdrawal of France from the integrated command of NATO in 1965,

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[108]Micheal E. Smith, "Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.39, No.1, March 2001, p.83.

[109] Knud Erik Jorgensen, "POCO: The Diplomatic...", p.172.

[110] Simon. J. Nutall, *European Political Cooperation*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1992), p.12., quoted in Micheal E. Smith, "Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, No. 1, March 2001, p.87.

[111] Lak, M.W.J. "The Constitutional Foundation" in Rummel, R. (ed.), Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community (Boulder, CO: Westview: 1992), p.42 quoted in Micheal E. Smith, "Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, Issue 1, March 2001, p.88.

[112] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.46.

Adler and Barnett argue, was not interpreted by other allies a threatening development. [113]

Without much precision, it could be maintained that the EU had reached the third tier of security community building by 1990s. The decision taken to grant the EPC a formal treaty status with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA), the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers, the provision of co-operation procedure to the European Parliament all attest to the high degree of mutual trust accumulated between the member states up to that period. Furthermore, the establishment of the CFSP as the pillar of the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the subsequent efforts to build common institutional structures and shared capabilities in security and defense were important developments that signify an advanced stage of security community building within the EU. For some observers, it was unrealistic to expect the member states to develop a common foreign, security and defense policy since integration in this field of so-called High Politics would simply mean "surrendering sovereignty" altogether.[114] However, contrary to those expectations, significant steps to strengthen the EU's security and defense capacity were taken by member states especially following the "St Malo Declaration" of 1998.

Moreover, as a result of their participation in the CFSP, member states have discernibly changed the way they formulate their foreign policies. Although they still retain their discretionary powers in this area, Sjursen argues that the participants of the CFSP increasingly take into account the common interest not only their self interest when drawing up their policies.[115] National foreign policies are now being formulated in interaction with European partners within the CFSP and, a result a, "norm of consultation" seems to have emerged among the member states.[116] Before launching national foreign policy initiatives, each member state increasingly considers the perspectives and interests of others and in some occasions individual

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[113] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study…", p.46.
[114] Helene Sjursen, "Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocks", *Arena Working Paper*, 9/03, 2003, p.1.
[115] Helene Sjursen, "Understanding the Common ...", p.8.
[116] Ibid., p.8.

self interests are being curbed for the sake of reaching common positions.[117] All of these became possible because of the high degree of mutual identification and trust that have developed between the member states throughout the course of European integration. As a consequence, dependable expectations of peaceful change among the EU member states became stabilized. This state of affairs is summoned by Agenda 2000 in the following manner:

> Over the last two decades and in line with the basic intentions of Europe's founders, the Member states have developed between them a real community of security within which it is inconceivable that there would be slightest threat of recourse to force as a means of settling disputes.[118]

2.2.3. Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS) and Security Communities:

Although the notion of security community consists of two terms (security and community), the analysis presented so far is overwhelmingly community-driven at the expense of the concept of security. In particular, factors that are conducive to development of mutual trust and a collective identity are often highlighted as necessary to obtain stable security relations among a group of actors, but the question of what is meant by the term "security" is largely ignored. In fact, as Bilgin points out, in the literature on security communities that has been briefly reviewed up until now, the concept of security remains largely undertheorized.[119] As has been noted earlier, the original Deutschian formulation was embedded in a quite narrow conception of security: The absence of war among states. Although Deutsch attached much importance to non-military means (transboundary transactions and bonds between states and societies) for the formation of security communities, his main preoccupation was the elimination of interstate violence. According to his original formulation, the condition of "absence of war" is sufficient to designate a region as a security community therefore, Waever later re-named a security community as a non-war community and criticized Deutschian security concept for being "at odds with the most ongoing efforts to redefine and broaden it."[120]As Bendiek points out, Deutsch's security concept is under heavy fire from two directions. Firstly, it has increasingly been argued that a military- focused understanding of security (the

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[117] Helene Sjursen, "Understanding the Common ...", p.8.
[118] Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, Vol I- Communication, DOC/97/6, July, 1997, Strasbourg, p.39.
[119] Pınar Bilgin, "On the (Ir)relevance of…", p.18.
[120] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.76.

absence of existential threats that states pose against each other) has passed its prime, giving way to a broader concept that incorporates a number of new dimensions such as human security, environmental security, and economic security and so on. Secondly, it is considered that the state is not the only referent object of security, though it might continue to be the most prominent one.[121] The democratic peace approach employs an even narrower understanding of security: the absence of war among a particular type of states, liberal democracies. In Adler and Barnett's social constructivist version, the increasing prominence of "new, (non-military) security issues that revolve around economic, environmental and social welfare concerns" is mentioned but other than that there had been no serious effort to conceptualize the term security. [122]

The students of the Copenhagen School (CS) of International Relations are the first to introduce a rather broader conception of security while revisiting the idea of security communities. According to their perspective there could be no objective, fixed definition of security. "The senses of threat, vulnerability and (in) security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent."[123] What is security then? CS claims that security is a "speech act", more centrally "a specific way to frame an issue".[124] An issue becomes a security issue when it is labeled as one. Yet, the security discourse is marked by a special quality. Something is "presented as posing an existential threat to a specific designated referent object" (traditionally the state).[125] Security is thus a "self referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue-not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat."[126] When something is cast in security terms, it acquires an "existential quality" and hence becomes dramatized as having "absolute priority." In short, "security is the move that takes politics

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[121] Annegret Bendiek, "Cross-Pillar Security Regime Building in the European Union: Effects of the European Security Strategy of December 2003", *European Integration Online Papers (EIOP)*, Vol.10, No.9, 2006, p.2.
[122] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical…", p.5.
[123] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A Framework for Anlaysis*, (London: Lyne Rinner, 1998), p.57.
[124] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.80.
[125] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A Framework…*, p.21.
[126] Ibid., p.24.

beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics."[127]

An issue is made a matter of security through what CS calls the process of securitization. The securitization of an issue begins when a securitizing actor (most typically a state representative) designates it as an existential threat to the survival of a specific referent object. Thereafter, he claims a right to use extraordinary means to tackle the threat since it might be too late if the threat is not fenced off swiftly and immediately. Here, by extraordinary means it is meant those countermeasures that "break the normal political rules of the game" (e.g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations of otherwise inviolable rights) [128]When an issue is presented as a security issue (a matter of survival in the face of an existential threat) it is removed from the realm of normal politics and transferred into an emergency mode. As a result, it gains great importance and urgency vis-à-vis other issues. The pursuit of some extreme procedures that would otherwise be deemed as intolerable is legitimized on such basis. However the rhetoric of existential threat employed by the securitizing actor does not by itself create securitization. It only constitutes what the CS calls a "securitizing move". An issue becomes securitized only when it is accepted by the audience as such.[129] On the other hand, CS is quite skeptical about the merits of securitization. The contention here is that "security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics."[130] It is better to have issues de-securitized in the long- run at least. De-securitization is basically a strategy of de-escalation and normalization. In order to achieve it, the securitizing actor uses a discourse to remove the previously securitized issue out of the emergency mode and place it in the realm of normal politics. In conclusion, as CS claims "de-securitization is the optimal long-range option since it means not to have issues phrased as threats against which we have countermeasures but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence into the ordinary public sphere."[131]

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[127] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A Framework…,* p.23.
[128] Ibid., p.24 .
[129] Ibid., p.25.
[130] Ibid., p.29.
[131] Ibid., p.29.

Copenhagen School offers a compromise between the two contending views of security studies. On the one hand, for wideners, security agenda should be broadened to include "issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal sectors" alongside the "military-political ones that define traditional security studies."[132] Thus, from wideners' perspective, security is not necessarily a matter of survival in the face of a military threat. Wideners focus on the non-military sources of security threats to referent objects in different sectors. On the other hand, according to traditionalists, security is about the survival of the state (the only referent object of security) and the field should be concerned solely about the threat or the use of military force. A key argument of the traditionalist position is that "the progressive widening endangered the intellectual coherence of security, putting so much to it that its essential meaning became void."[133] According to CS, this complaint should be taken seriously and security issues should be distinguished from other problems according to a strictly defined criteria: For something to be counted as a security issue it has to be framed as an existential threat to a specific referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generate endorsement of recourse to extraordinary measures for its eradication.[134] On the other hand, CS disagrees with the traditionalist position that the only or the best way to deal with the incoherence engendered by the progressive widening of security agendas is to confine security to the military sector.[135] CS applies the above mentioned distinctive condition of security issues for identifying the most likely existential threats and their corresponding referent objects in the following five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

According to the Copenhagen School, the European integration process constitutes an outstanding example of de-securitization in contemporary international politics. This observation rests on the premise that after the Second World War, the European integration project was launched as a means to avoid a return to Europe's own violent past which is widely seen as a security threat to Europe itself. The securitization of Europe's own history in this manner (the labeling of a return to Europe's war torn past as a security threat to Europe itself), has led to a de-

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[132] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A Framework…,* p.1.
[133] Ibid., p.2.
[134] Ibid., p.5.
[135] Ibid., p.4.

securitized impact in two forms. Firstly, it impelled the continuation of integration. Throughout the Cold War period and also in its aftermath, European elites have frequently warned against the heavy costs of non-integration such as the fragmentation of the EU, the rise of nationalism and a return to Europe's previous balance of power system and war.[136] These threatening scenarios were constructed and invoked primarily to push forward the process of integration by adding to it a sense of urgency. Consequently, "integration is made an aim in itself" because its alternative, that is, fragmentation is a "self –propelling process that by definition will destroy 'Europe' as a project."[137] Secondly, in order to prevent the repetition of future violent conflicts on the European continent, Western European powers have successfully de-securitized their relations and formed among themselves a pluralistic security community. This is the topic that that we now turn to.

2.1.3.1. Security Community Building through Successful De-securitization:

Following Waever's analysis, most scholars agree on the observation that the EU has achieved the status of a pluralistic security community through a process of de-securitization- "a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues."[138] In a security community formed by the dynamics of de-securitization, actors "still compete and feel challenged now and then, but this is dealt with as normal political, economic ,environmental and societal problems- not as matters of security, i.e., threats to survival that mobilize extreme countermeasures" such as recourse to physical violence.[139] If relations between a group of actors move into this kind of complete de-securitization, then reasonably, they would neither expect nor prepare for the use of force as a means of settling their disputes. In other words, actors would start to entertain "dependable expectations of peaceful change." Here, it is noteworthy that, the classical Deutschian formulation of security communities rests on the non-imaginability of war among the participating agents. As Buzan and Waever argue, "this would imply the complete de-securitization form

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[136] Atsuko Higashino, "For the Sake of Peace and Security? The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.39, No.4, 2004, p.350.
[137] Ole Waever, "European Security Identities", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1, 1996, p.123.
[138] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.69.
[139] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of the International Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.56.

of security community" because actors would stop imagining war only when they forget their security concerns all together.[140]

In the course of European integration, the process of effective de-securitization, Waever points out, took place, in the 1960s and 1970s.[141] During that period, the EU officials deliberately refrained from labeling the problems (such as human rights abuses, ill treatment of minorities or illegal immigration) they encountered as security issues. They rather chose to represent their concerns as ordinary political issues.[142] Here, the aim was to avoid the securitization of relatively sensitive issues such as human rights[143] for it was the "Cold War security concerns that dominated security agendas throughout the Europe."[144] As Bill McSweeney has argued

> It was only with the Single European Act in 1987 that we find explicit reference to 'security in the legal instruments binding the member states in a Community, and then only in respect of what was termed its 'economic and political aspects.'[145]

This strategy of avoiding the language of "security" became so successful that in the 1980s and 1990s, the EU officials had a quite hard time in explaining to the public of the new members (such as Britain and Denmark) that security had once been central to the rationale of European integration.[146] After all, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were founded in 1952 as a primarily economic enterprise with a strong security purpose. The overarching aim of the founding fathers was to secure a lasting peace among the ex-belligerent powers of Western Europe by placing their war- making industries (coal and steel production) under the control of a common, supranational authority, the High Authority. The participants of the ECSC agreed to delegate their decision making powers in a limited sectoral field (coal and steel industry) to the common supranational High Authority whose decisions were binding on all the member states. It was deemed that integration

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[140] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers ....*, p.57.
[141] Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, security…', pp.86-87.
[142] Pınar Bilgin, 'Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinde Güvenlik Kültürünün Rolü', in Cem Karadeli (ed.), *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Avrupa ve Türkiye*, (Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 2003), p.203.
[143] Ibid., p.203.
[144] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the European Union on Security", in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (ed.s), *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, (Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), p.37.
[145] Bill McSweeney, *Security Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.7, quoted in Pınar Bilgin," Clash of Cultures?...", p.37.
[146] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.86.

between the member states in this area of low politics would beget its own impetus and would eventually lead to integration on issues of high politics (i.e. security and defense). Thus, the ECSC was largely a functionalist experience with its greatest achievement being the reconciliation of the two historic enemies-France and Germany- on the European Continent.

Arguably, de-securitization of state-to-state interactions in the context of European integration was primarily accomplished through the politicization of potential security concerns. Here, the logic was that, if potential security problems were cast in political terms it would be more difficult for the European powers to conceptualize them as security issues which would legitimize threat or use of force in their eradication.[147] Accordingly, as Smith rightly points out, expressing and resolving disputes between the EU member states became "the stuff of politics, comparable to what takes place in the domestic political process."[148].As a result, "expectations of peaceful change" within the then EC and later the EU were stabilized. In short, through effective de-securitization of their relations, Western European powers stopped seeing each other as threats and instead developed mutual pacific dispositions.

In part, de-securitization was the result of the "success of the neofunctionalist strategy of solving security problems by focusing on something else."[149] During the course of integration, Western European states started to concentrate on matters such as economic cooperation and politics, stopped thinking in terms of security or insecurity and hence they moved amongst themselves towards a state of asecurity.[150] That is why Waever also dubs the security community in Western Europe an "asecurity community" and further claims that the "EU has secured (it) not by upgrading joint security initiatives but, on the contrary, by doing some other

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[147] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "An Anlaysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership of the European Union from a Security Perspective", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.34, No.3, 2003, p.287.
[148] Karen E.Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy...*, p.148.
[149] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers...*, p.355.
[150] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.86. According to Waever, "If the situation is taken out of the realm of security conceptualization, the situation might inelegantly be described as one of asecurity . Since a security community is defined by the impossibility of imagining violence, it is at least as likely to built on asecurity as on security, because in the case of security, one imagines the violence but also believes one has a countermeasure." Ibid., p.81.

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things"[151], most notably by promoting functional integration among its member states.

Does de-securitization of state-to-state interactions require a particular context to come into fruition? Although it goes largely unnoticed in the literature, an institutionalized context plays a key role in that regard. During the course of European integration, Western European powers have not only established a stable peace among themselves but also a unique set of institutions and a legal order. The strength of rules governing relations between the EU member states and their delegation and pooling of sovereignty to common supranational institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank) are by all means unprecedented in the history of international organization.[152] The European law takes direct effect and possesses supremacy with regard to national law and is enforced by an independent supranational court, the European Court of Justice, whose decisions are binding upon member states.[153] In such an institutionalized setting underpinned by the rule of law, interstate disputes would be resolved through legal procedures and peaceful means and without resort to physical force. This, in turn, would make de-securitization of state- to state relations easier to achieve.

Supranationality has also played a key part in the de-securitization of relations between EU member states. The idea of integration was originally inspired by the belief that sovereignty is a malign and dangerous force which encourages selfish and insular behavior.[154] Indeed, the post -World War II European federalist movements promoted the idea of a Federal European government to put an end to the long-established pattern of wars between sovereign European nation states.[155]However, on the road to foundation of the ECSC, it was accepted that the most feasible way to achieve integration in Western Europe is by incremental steps, starting with areas of low politics (coal and steel production) where the issue of national sovereignty is not

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[151] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, security…", p.92.
[152] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU,NATO...,*p.84.
[153] Ibid., p. 84.
[154] Robert A. Jones, *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), p.36.
[155] Sonia Mazey, "The Development of the European Idea" in Jeremy Richardson (ed.) *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*,(New York: Routledge, 1998), p.27.

so much contentious when compared to areas of high politics (security and defense matters). In retrospect, the ECSC experience has demonstrated the efficiency of functionalist integration. The pooling of French and German coal and steel production to the common supranational High Authority have made bloody conflicts on the European continent ever less likely. In addition to the High Authority of the ECSC, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, are generally considered to be supranational bodies which carry out functions on behalf of the Union as a whole and do not specifically represent the interests of the individual member states.[156]   In such a polity where sovereignty is highly diffused, potential security concerns are more easily seen as political issues because constituent units tend to reach "compromise solutions" to such problems through discussion, negotiation and consensus building.[157]

From one perspective, security community building through successful de-securitization could also be considered as an identity building process. As Rumelili points out, "identities are always constituted in relation to difference, because a thing can only be known by what it is not."[158] There exist basically two forms of differentiation involved in the construction of political identities. The first one is the Westphalian, modern mode of differentiation. In the modern, territorial nation-state system, the identity construction process relies, to a considerable extent, on a clear cut distinction between the self and the other.[159] Predominantly, the self is differentiated from other on the basis of geography. The implications of this (spatial/external) mode of mothering tend to be rather exclusionary and antagonistic against the out groups since the outside is constructed as inherently different from and even as a threat to the identity of the inside.[160] In short, "because of their strong territoriality, modern (nation) states tend to securitize very much in inside/outside terms."[161]

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[156] Robert A. Jones, *The Politics...,* p.37.
[157] The Role of the EU in Turkish- Greek Relations, *Ankara Paper*, 2003, p.5.
[158] Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.30, 2004, p.29.
[159] Ibid., p.27.
[160] Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vo.17, No.2, July 2004, p.320.
[161] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers...,* p.23.

On the other hand, a post-modern form of differentiation does not involve the construction of firm lines of boundary between the self and the other. For a number of observers, the European Union constitutes the best example of a post-modern collectivity in contemporary international politics because the once clear-cut self/other distinctions between its member states have been replaced by overlapping and mutually constitutive identities.[162] Accordingly, the conduct of international politics among the EU member states has taken a remarkably different shape from modern nation-state politics since no member state see the other as inherently different and as a threat to its own identity. In that respect, it could be argued that the above-mentioned processes of de-securitization have greatly facilitated the EU's development into a post-modern entity. Through de-securitization of their relations, the EU member states stopped seeing each other as security threats, developed mutual pacific dispositions and thereby, the once clear-cut self/other distinctions between them became more and more ambiguous.

While attempting to substantiate the EU's post-modern nature, some scholars also place emphasis on the distinctive way in which the European Union relates to its outside. From their perspective, in stark contrast with the modern nation-state, "the EU's collective identity is founded not on the fears of 'others' but on the shared fear of disunity, and that the EU does not erect firm lines of boundary around itself but 'large zones of transition' and 'frontiers'."[163] As opposed to the spatial /external mode of othering prevalent in the modern nation-state system, it is argued quite frequently that the dominant form of othering in the case of European integration is temporal/internal. The strongest advocate of this proposition is Ole Waever, who argues that since the end of the Second World War, the most significant other in the construction of a European political identity has been Europe's own violent past rather than any outsider actor.[164] From this perspective, the temporal form othering prevalent in the case of European integration is "self-reflexive" because "it does not represent another group as a threat but rather self's own past."[165] According to the

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[162] Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity…", p.28.
[163] Ibid., p.28.
[164] Ole Waever, "The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections From aPessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders", in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (ed.s), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.280.
[165] Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others…", p.321.

advocates of this position, the temporally based form of othering, and focusing on oneself rather than any external danger, has offered the possibility of constituting an identity for the EU through less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than those commonly found in the modern nation-state system.[166]

To sum up, while relations among the EU member states was successfully de-securitized following WW2 (they stopped seeing each other as threats), their own war-torn history became highly securitized (fragmentation or a return to Europe's own violent past became their main threat perception.) In Buzan and Waever's terms, the EU security community was "built on a meta-securitization: a fear of Europe's future becoming like Europe's past if fragmentation and power balancing are allowed to return."[167]

The fear of fragmentation is associated with the configuration of Europe as a balance of power system throughout its modern history whereby a number independent power centers (Europe's major nation-states) competed for influence.[168] The attendant consequences of such an order were rivalry, conflict and recurrent wars. However, Waever contends that following the Second World War, European integration became the "chief mechanism providing order and stability" on the continent "by replacing Europe of many power centers with a Europe of a single center" (that is symbolically located in Brussels but actually is in the Franco-German coalition).[169] Due to the power of magnetism it is capable of exerting, the core or the dominant power center ensures that Europe's smaller powers and all other relevant peripheral actors are arrayed in concentric circles around itself. Although the political units circled around the dominant power center are still independent actors, they are all subject to the influence of the core at varying degrees. The more remote these actors are located geographically and politically from the center, the more they experience independence from its influence. For Waever, this center-periphery

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[166] Pertii Joenniemi, "Towards a European Union of Post-Security?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.4, No.2, 2007, p.132.
[167] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers...*, pp.352-353.
[168] Ole Waever, "European Security...", p.121.
[169] Ole Waever, "Integration as Security: Constructing Europe at Peace", in Charles A. Kupchan (ed.) *Atlantic Security: Contending Vision*s, (New York, 1998), pp.54-55.

structure in Europe has a quasi-imperial quality and is "distinctly post- sovereign" in character. [170]

A number of peculiar factors have also contributed to the construction of the EU security community via successful de-securitization. Indeed, it could be argued that the EU as a security community has been a part of the Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order/structure. Following the onset of the Cold War period, the main threat perception of Western Europe became directed at the Eastern camp. "Any danger of a reversion after the Second World War to the pattern of territorial rivalry, nationalist animus and an uncertain military balance which has followed the previous war was forestalled by the rise of the Soviet threat."[171] Since the major security concerns of the Western European powers were defined externally, the escalation of their mutual problems to the stage of military conflict was effectively discouraged. Concerning this point, Marshier argues that "a powerful and potentially dangerous Soviet Union forced the Western Democracies band together to meet the common threat. Britain, Germany and France no longer worried about each other, because all faced a greater menace from the Soviets."[172] Additionally during the Cold War, the superpower rivalry overlaid the whole European continent. Regional security dynamics were suppressed and European security was defined, organized and handled by external superpowers (USA in the West and the Soviet Union in the Eastern and Central Europe.)[173]

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[170] Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security...", p.100. According to Waever, the post-WWII security order in Europe is post-sovereign because, it is a centered but higly assymetrical geopolitical formation rather than a collection of equal sovereign nation-states. The EU's major member states (France and Germany) constitute the core of Europe or more precisely the inner circle of the concentric circle formation in Europe. The major initiatives throughout the course of European integration have emerged generally as a result of France's and Germany's joint efforts. The remaining EU member states are, in turn, arrayed in concentric circles around this all dominant power center. The candidates seeking admission into the European Union form outer circles around the EU. Then comes the actors located in Europe's peripheries. For Waever, due to its power of magnetism, the EU keeps all these political units oriented towards Europe. However its influence fades gradually as the of distance of the units concerned to the core power center increases. For instance, the EU exerts a much more decisive transformational influence on the candidadate countries seeking membership in the Union than on Europe's other peripherial actors. Ibid., pp. 99-101.

[171]Ian Gambles, "European Security: Integration in the 1990s", *Challiot Paper 3*, November 1991., available at http://aei.pitt.edu/447/.

[172] John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, pp.46-47.

[173] Frédéric Charillon, "The EU as a Security Regime", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.10, 2005, p.519.

Throughout the Cold War period, the most prominent security organization in Western Europe was NATO whereas the EC was considered as an economic and a political actor but not as an international security actor in the traditional military sense. Lacking sufficient military capacity for self- defense, the EC has relied on the US and NATO nuclear and conventional forces for its security. Based on the High/Low politics distinction, there was a division of labor between the two organizations. While NATO has assumed issues of High Politics, that is security and defense, the EC has mainly been responsible for the issues of low politics, that is, political and economic integration albeit with intra-European security implications. Western European powers were provided with hard core security guarantees by NATO and the US against the Soviet threat and therefore they had much opportunity to focus on other areas of mutual interest such as economic and political cooperation. As Price once put it, "the European Community was a classic example of a free-rider benefiting from the security provided by others."[174] However, one should not underestimate the contribution that the EC has made to intra-European Security during the Cold War period. The European Community had successfully managed to rule out war as an instrument of statecraft among the former adversaries of Western Europe.

The American military presence in Western Europe throughout the Cold War period also had a pacifying impact on the EC member states. [175] According to Mearshimer, the US "not only provided protection against the Soviet threat, but also guaranteed that no EC state would aggress against each other."[176] This in turn contributed to de-securitization of relations among the members of the European Community. For instance, "France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed, because the American presence in Germany meant that the Germans were not free to attack anymore."[177] Thus, the EU as a security community has matured during the Cold War, under the supervision of the US security guarantee against possible Soviet aggression. Taking this point into consideration, some commentators expressed their skepticism regarding the durability of the war-free relations between the Western European

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[174] Adrian Hyde- Price "The EU, Power, and Coercion: From Civilian to Civilising Power*", CIDEL Workshop,* 22-23 October 2004, p.5, available at, http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Hyde-Price.pdf.

[175] Josef Joffe, " Europe's American Pacifier", *Foreign Policy,* No.54, 1984, pp.64-82.

[176] John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future...", p.47.

[177] Ibid., p.47.

powers out of the Cold War context. As a leading example, Bull, writing in the late Cold War era, regarded the idea that "Western European nations constitute a security community" as "mere wishful thinking." According to him, after a history of "endemic conflict", these states have developed a "habit of collaboration" among themselves "under the shadow of American presence" and "threat from the East".[178] On the whole, his argument portrayed the state of non- war, not as a permanent and sustainable situation for Western Europe.

To sum up, Copenhagen School's explanation of EU security community building via successful de-securitization considers the main threat image of Europe as its own violent history characterized by rivalry, power balancing and recurrent wars. Thus, in the aftermath of WW2, Europe needed "integration in order to avoid fragmentation"[179] and conflict. According to this account, to prevent a return to their own war-ridden history, Western European powers normalized/de-securitized their relations and successfully established patterns of institutionalized cooperation associated with the European integration process. Consequently the EU had emerged as a security community among the members of which war became inconceivable option of dispute settlement.

However it seems as if this argument partly accounts for the EU security community building process through successful de-securitization. A complementary explanation could be based upon another significant threat perception of Western Europe that has emerged with the onset of the Cold War period, namely the Communist East. Fierke and Weiner's examination of the EU's identity formation via the otherness of Eastern Europe could be taken as our starting point. According to both scholars, within the context of the Cold War, the then EC has managed to develop "a specific western identity that was embedded in the construction shared democratic norms."[180] To a large extent, these norms were constructed through "the definition of the democratic western political order as different from the Communist eastern political order."[181] Therefore, contrary to Waever's observations, the EU's identity building also

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[178] Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol.21, No.2, 1982, p. 163.
[179] Ole Waever, "European Security...", p.121.
[180] Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional...", p.2.
[181] Ibid., p.2.

involved a process of negative othering on ideological grounds. While contrasting its constitutive liberal, democratic values with its close totalitarian neighbour, the EU had consolidated its own identity vis-à-vis its eastern other.

In order to guard against the potential security threats emanating from the Soviet Union, the Western European states had to normalize/de-securitize their relations .Only by doing so, they could have concentrated their energies on supporting the US in its efforts to contain the Soviet power. Until the critical juncture of détente, "the states of the East, in contrast were fearful of threats from below, they regarded almost all societal interaction with the West as potentially dangerous and destabilizing."[182]

Since the threat perceptions on both sides of the Iron Curtain were directed against each other, relations between Eastern and Western European states were highly securitized during the Cold War period. Yet it should be noted that, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which started in 1973 and culminated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, could be considered as a remarkable attempt at de-securitization in East-West relations. The Helsinki process was aimed at reducing East-West tensions and consolidating détente through promoting cooperation, negotiation and confidence among its participants. The Helsinki Final Act as containing three Baskets[183] set forth the common principles and standards which should guide the relationship between the Eastern and Western European states. The crucial norm and standard-setting role played by the CSCE during the Cold War period could be summarized as follows:

> It broadened the scope of accountability to include… environmental issues, information, culture, economics, education, and human rights as well as more traditional military and security issues. It also served as a constant reminder to the East that a full normalization of relations would require fundamental internal reforms. It can also be credited with reducing military tension through confidence-and security-building measures, creating transparency in arms control and routinization in arms inspection.[184]

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[182] Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in Ronnie D. Libschutz (ed.) *On Security* , (New York, 1995), p.59.

[183] Basket I of Helsinki Final Act was about ensuring cooperation in Europe on matters of security. Basket II addressed cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and enviroment. Basket III dealt with cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.

[184] Walter A. Kemp, "The OSCE in a New Context: European Security Towards the Twenty-first Century", *RIIA Discussion Papers*, No.64, 1996, p.14, quoted in Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful

Some observers draw striking similarities between the Helsinki process and Euro-Mediterranean policy initiatives (such as the Barcelona Process or the European Neighbourhood Policy) launched by the European Union. Like the Helsinki Final Act, the Barcelona Declaration and the ENP's action plans intend to enlist the commitment of the states concerned to a set of principles such as democratization, liberalization, human and minority rights and good neighbourly relations.[185] Furthermore, as Pardo and Zemer observe, the architectural design of the Barcelona process, containing three baskets of cooperation for its participants in the fields of security and politics, economics and humanitaranian issues, was largely inspired by the Helsinki Model.[186] Likewise, the action plans of the ENP are designed to foster cooperation and dialogue on three levels as in the case with the Helsinki process: Political Dialogue and Cooperation, Economic and Social Cooperation and Development and Civil Society Cooperation.[187]

Some other observers trace the EU's commitment to enlarge eastwards back to western promises embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. According to Fierke and Wiener, by signing the document the Eastern Communist regimes simply promised to respect liberal democratic values, in particular the primacy of human rights.[188] In that respect, despite its legally non-binding status, the Final Act created a moral obligation for the signatories to comply with the principles it contain. The principles of Helsinki Final Act encouraged dissident movements in Eastern European countries which exposed the discrepancy between the promises of the Eastern Communist governments to respect human rights on the hand and their corresponding abusive practices on the other.[189] Within the context of the Cold War, Western leaders, in turn, acknowledged their moral obligation and responsibility to assist the Eastern European dissidents who were acting on the democratic liberal ideals of the West.

Change: the OSCE's Security Community-Building Model" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed.s), *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 126.
[185] Sharon Pardo and Lior Zemer, "Towards a New Euro-Mediterranean Neighbourhood Space", *European Foreign Affairs Review,* Vol. 10, 2005, p.44.
[186] Ibid., p.45.
[187] Ibid., p.45.
[188] Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional...", pp.5-6.
[189] Ibid.,6.

The eastern dissident movements bolstered by the CSCE process highly contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist order. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of the same dissident movements, many of whom became state leaders, started to demand massive support for the transition of the CEECs into democracy and seek membership in the prominent Western institutions such as the EC and NATO. In order to back up their demand for accession, the CEE governments expressed their aspiration to "return to Europe" after decades of "artificial division" of the continent. In the immediate post 1989 era, the EC's response to CEECs was quite lukewarm however. The question of "widening" was deliberately put off in order to give priority to the "deepening" of the existing Community. The association agreements concluded between the EC and the CEECs in the early 1990s did not refer to the promise of full membership for these countries. In spite of its initial reluctance, why did the EU soon offer the CEECs the option of full membership?

As Fierke and Wiener argue, after the end of the Cold War, Central and Eastern European countries condemned the European Community for failing to deliver on its past promises and for erecting new boundaries to keep them out.[190] From 1989 onwards, Central Eastern European governments challenged the EC to make good on its responsibilities by assisting their recovery and transition into democracy. In response to this challenge, the EU felt an obligation to act consistently with the ideals it stood for throughout the Cold War period and hence decided to grant the promise of eventual membership to the CEECs. As Fierke and Wiener observe, a failure to keep Cold War promises to the CEECs came to be perceived as an increasingly destabilizing risk both by the EU and NATO. It would have undermined the popular support for the Western type democratic institutions and free market economy and became a potential source of instability in the Eastern part of the European continent. Most significantly, excluding the CEECs from these two Western organizations came to be perceived as a threat to the liberal, democratic identity of both institutions.[191]

In a similar vein, according to Schimmelfennig, the decision to integrate the CEECs in to the EU is the result of "rhetorical entrapment" as actors with an interest in

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[190] Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional...", p.7.
[191] Ibid., p.13.

eastern enlargement (the CEECs, the Commission and some member states such as Germany) strategically used norm-based arguments to shame the opponents within the Union into accepting it.[192] Particularly, the proponents of enlargement exposed the inconsistencies between the original commitment of European integration to the ideology of pan-European community liberal democratic states on the one hand, and the reticent attitude of the EU towards the CEECs on the other. [193]As a result, the EU came to the conclusion that dragging the issue of eastern enlargement would destroy the credibility of its own identity and the constitutive liberal, democratic principles upon which it is based. This way of thinking is clearly reflected in the following statement of Joschka Fischer: "Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the EU has to open to the East; otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually self-destructed."[194] The next chapter of the thesis will focus on how enlargement is used by the EU as the most efficient tool to expand the existing European Security community eastward.

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[192] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap...", pp. 142-171.
[193] Ibid., p.143.
[194] Joschka Fischer, "From Confederancy to Federation-Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration", Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May2000.

CHAPTER 3

THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

3.1. The Link between Security Considerations and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU:

It is widely acknowledged that security considerations have played a prominent role in shaping the EU's decision to enlarge eastwards. Right from its beginning, the eastern enlargement of the European Union has been justified as a means to attain sustainable peace and stability in Europe. For instance, at the Cannes European Council of 26-27 June 1995, the security motivation of the EU's eastern enlargement process was expressed quite forcefully in the following manner: "Externally, the Union is determined to work towards stability and peace of the continent of Europe, by preparing for the accession of the associated European Countries."[195] Likewise, at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the EU confirmed "the importance of the enlargement process launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity for the entire European continent."[196]

Contrary to expectations, the end of the Cold War did not bring peace to Europe. With the disappearance of the EC's Cold War threat perceptions directed at the Soviet Union, the new risks and insecurities originating from Europe's peripheries gained prominence.[197] Following the collapse of the Communist bloc, in particular, there arised a serious concern among the EU leaders that political instability, ethnic conflicts, social unrest and economic hardships prevailing in the Central and Eastern European countries could have spill-over effects on the EU. A possible relapse to authoritarian tendencies in the newly democratic CEECs as well as problems relating

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[195] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Cannes (26-27 June 1995), available at, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm
[196] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Helsinki (10-11 December 1999), available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#intro
[197] Sevgi Drorian, "Rethinking European Security: The Inter-regional Dimension and the Turkish Nexus", *European Security*, Vol.14, No.4, 2005, p.424.

to illegal immigration, drug smuggling, human trafficking and organized crime raised grave worries among the EU circles. Indeed, the emergence of these new sources of instability on Europe's eastern periphery came to be perceived as posing a serious threat to European security in the immediate post Cold War era.[198] As a result, the EU came to the conclusion that the accession of these transitional countries to the Union would drastically reduce the risks of instability spreading to Western Europe. Considering the immense costs of political and economic instability on the peripheries of the EU, it has been acknowledged that, European security as a whole cannot be guaranteed without the consolidation of democratic transition and economic development in the Central and Eastern European Countries.[199] In this respect, the enlargement process of the European Union was regarded as the most effective alternative through which the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe would receive considerable economic, political and moral support for improving their political and socio-economic systems in accordance with the EU standards. In particular, the promise of EU membership was effectively used by the Union as a transformational policy instrument to induce the CEECs carry out a massive democratic reform process. As regards the security benefits of the EU's eastern enlargement process, the European Commission in 2000 noted that:

> The political stability in Central and Eastern European Countries is rooted in common European values -democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities-and that is precisely why it is set to last. The immediate effects are a dramatic improvement in the security situation of Europe... Both the existing EU Member States and the prospective members benefit equally from political stability. Outbreaks of trouble become less likely, causes of conflict, such as minority issues and border problems, are removed, and integration removes the potential for conflict[200]

The link between security considerations and the eastern enlargement of the European Union came to forefront when the EU put forward a policy instrument in 1995-The Pact for Stability in Europe-that was devised to foster cooperation among the CEECs, encourage them to resolve their outstanding border disputes and minority problems before being admitted as members. Originally, the Pact (prompted by

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[198] Henrik Larsen, "Concepts of Security….", p.342.
[199] Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), p. 20.
[200] European Commission, Political Documents Related to the Enlargement Process: Strategy Paper 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_2000_en.htm.

France) was foreseen to be an exercise in preventive diplomacy and de-securitization: The EU membership would be offered to those CEECs that have resolved their outstanding problems which could threaten European security by concluding good-neighbourly agreements.[201] Thus, through the Pact, the EU sought to minimize the risks of instability that could be imported through the eastern enlargement process. In essence, the Pact could be considered as a crucial EU attempt to prevent violent conflicts among future members before they occur and thereby to secure a successful expansion of existing European Security Community. The Pact helped the EU induce Hungary and Romania, and Slovakia and Romania, to conclude "good–neighbour" agreements.[202] Also, over 100 agreements signed between its participants on issues such as the treatment of minorities, border disputes and good-neighbourly relations were attached to the Pact.[203] Moreover, the Pact served for the development of a soft, ad hoc "good neighborliness" pre-condition for accession in the EU as Smith argues.[204]

3.2. Enlargement as (Security) Community- Building:

With the admission of new member states, the EU expands its zone of peace and security. Indeed, the enlargement of the European Union could be considered as the most efficient instrument through which the existing European Security Community is extended on Europe's periphery.[205] The argument is premised on the widely acknowledged conceptualization of the EU as the primary community-building institution in Europe. Generally speaking, the distinguishing feature of community-building institutions is that "they explicitly promote, induce and socially construct a sense of collective identity among their members."[206] As has been emphasized in the previous chapter, the positive implications of collective identity construction for the

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[201] Karen E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.156.
[202] Karen E. Smith, "The EU and Central and Eastern Europe: The Absence of Interregionalism", *European Integration,* Vol.27, No.3, September 2005, p.353.
[203] Karen E. Smith, *The Making...,* p.159.
[204] . Karen E. Smith, "The EU …", p.353.
[205] John O' Brennan, " 'Bringing Geopolitics Back In' Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.19, No.1, 2006, p.160.
[206] Bahar Rumelili, "Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community Building by the EU", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.9, No.2, 2003, p.215.

attainment of sustainable peace among a group of states pervades the literature on security communities. To reiterate once more, what makes recourse to war unthinkable within a security community is primarily the attainment of a sense of collective identity. Thus, through promoting the process of collective identity formation, community-building institutions directly and actively contribute to the cultivation of peaceful-relations among their member units. As a logical corollary, an increase in the membership of such institutions would lead to an extension of the zone peace and stability they help generate. In such a case, the enlargement process itself could be considered as an effective community-building instrument through which the constitutive norms and values of the organization's collective identity are transmitted to the newcomers.

As far as the enlargement of an international organization is concerned, the process of community-building works basically through what is called 'international socialization". According to constructivists, it is through the processes of socialization or social learning, that actors gain shared understandings about the essential nature of an entity, which altogether reflect its identity.[207] As defined by Schimmelfennig, "socialization means the internalization by a social actor, of the rules of a community, and internalization consists in the adoption of social identities, values and norms into the actors' repertoire of cognitions and behaviors."[208] In the case of the EU, enlargement facilitates the diffusion of EU's norms and standards to the candidate states so as to ensure that the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law- the building blocks of the EU's collective identity- are respected and observed throughout the expanding Union. However, international socialization is by no means an automatic activity. To a considerable extent, its success depends on the degree of congruence between the values and norms already held by a state and those held by the international organization it aspires to join.[209] Thus, it could be assumed that the more acquainted a candidate state is with the EU's rules and practices, the more the process of socialization has a chance to become fruitful. In other words, within context of EU enlargement, the process of

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[207] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.39.
[208] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO...*, p.73.
[209] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union ...*, p.39.

socialization or social learning is greatly facilitated by the resonance of the norms being transferred from the EU to the candidates.[210]

International organizations pursue different strategies of international socialization and community-building while incorporating new members:

> 1. The *inclusive strategy* of community-building aims at socialization from within.The community organizations first admit external aspiring countries and then teach them the community rules. Together with their accession to a community organization, the new members take on the obligation to learn and internalize its rules.
> 2. The *exclusive strategy* of community-building consists in socialization from the outside. The community organizations communicate their constitutive values and norms to outsider states and then tell them to what extent they have to internalize them before being entitled to join. After fulfilling the requirements, an outsider state is regarded as "one of us" by the community members and admitted to community organizations.[211]

The EU follows a predominantly exclusive strategy of international socialization within the framework of its enlargement policy.[212] In order to become an EU member, the applicants are required to learn, follow and adhere to core EU norms (the constitutive liberal values of the EU) prior to accession. Originally, the basic condition for membership in the Community was enshrined in the Article 237 of the Rome Treaty which accorded any European state the right to apply for membership. However, this vaguely defined criterion is supplemented over time by a number of more precise conditions established through subsequent EU declarations, practice and legal acts.[213] Consequently, at the European Council in 1993, the EU announced the so-called Copenhagen Criteria which embody a clear list of conditions to be fulfilled by the prospective entrants.[214] Although initially established within the specific context of eastern enlargement, Copenhagen criteria have become

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[210] Johh O'Brennan, *The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,* (Routledge: New York, 2006), p.178.
[211] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO...,* p.74.
[212] Ibid., p.85.
[213] Ibid., p85.
[214] Copenhagen Criteria states that the candidate state has to show:
  - the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for and protection of minorities; (Political Criteria)
  - the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (Economic Criteria)
  - the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.(Acquis Criteria)

entrenched as the general prerequisites of membership in the European Union. [215] As Hillon suggests, "the Copenhagen criteria broadly echo the conditions of admission to the EC/EU, which had previously been established by the institutions and the Member States."[216] For instance, the origins of the Copenhagen Political Criteria could be traced back to the more or less implicit political requirements connected with membership in the European Communities.[217] However, the application of political membership conditionality was first materialized explicitly within the framework of the EU's southern enlargement whereby the accession of the candidate countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) to the Community was made conditional on their acceptance and establishment of democracy.[218] Thereafter, the Maastricht European Council of 1991 clearly laid down the political conditions to which the accession of new members to the Union would be subject:

> The European Council recalls that the Treaty on European Union, which the Heads of State and Government have now agreed, provides that any European State whose systems of Government are founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become members of the Union.[219]

The political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria were partly "constitutionalised" with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. [220] However, one might argue that the Copenhagen Political Criteria imply more demanding accession conditions than the corresponding provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. Whereas the Copenhagen Criteria refers to "respect for and protection of minorities" as an element of political conditionality, no such condition is included in the relevant articles (Article 6 and Article 49) of the Amsterdam Treaty.

The EU's approach to Copenhagen accession criteria have significantly changed over time. Previously, for accession negotiations to be opened, the candidate state had to meet the Copenhagen political conditions and prove "ready to take the necessary

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[215] Christophe Hillon, "The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny", in Christophe Hillon (ed.), *EU Enlargement: A Legal Apoproach*, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p.15.
[216] Ibid., p.10.
[217] .Ibid., p.4.
[218] Ibid., p.4.
[219] Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Maastricht, (9-10 Decemeber 1991), available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/maastricht/ma1_en.pdf
[220] Article 6(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates that "the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states." According to article 49 TEU, any European state which respect these principles may apply to become a member of the Union.

measures to comply with the economic criteria."[221] However, at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the EU representatives decided to soften this threshold and open accession negotiations with those candidates (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) that have fulfilled the Copenhagen Political criteria only.

Here it is also worth noting that the membership rules of the EU precisely reflect its own collective identity as based on liberal democratic values and besides, the substance of its enlargement policy indicates a strong commitment to disseminate these values internationally. To this end, "the European Commission constantly monitors and regularly assesses the learning results and the internalization of the EU norms in the candidate states."[222] The level of compliance with EU's rules and standards, the efforts undertaken to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and the reforms enacted for this purpose are evaluated for each candidate state through the annually published regular progress reports. The decision to precede with the accession negotiations could be taken only after a judgment by the Commission that the candidate state has sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria for membership. In short, the exclusive strategy of international socialization constitutes a crucial element of the EU's enlargement activity whereby the applicant states are required to internalize the core liberal values of the Union prior to being admitted as members.

The EU's expansion to the CEECs clearly exposed the (security) community-building potential of the EU's enlargement process. As Brennan argues, during this last round of enlargement, "the EU expanded the framework under which lasting peace and reconciliation was achieved in Western Europe after 1945 to the eastern part of the continent which had been cut off from those developments involuntarily for the duration of the Cold War."[223] The transmission of EU's constitutive liberal democratic values to the CEECs constituted the centerpiece of this ambitious endeavor. Through exporting the value system upon which Western European powers structured their cooperative relations, the EU sought to replicate its

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[221] Christophe Hillon, "The Copenhagen...", p.19.
[222] Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO...*, p.100.
[223] Johh O'Brennan, *The Eastern Enlargement...*, p.176.

successful peace-building model in Eastern Europe.[224] The aim was to socialize the CEECs into the EU's liberal democratic order and thereby secure a successful extension of the existing European security community to Eastern Europe.

In order to foster democratization in the CEECs, the EC/EU has adopted two main approaches: it laid down political conditions for closer relations and eventual membership and provided these countries technical assistance and financial aid mainly through the PHARE programme.[225] Arguably, the policy of conditionality which generally refers "to the linking of perceived benefits (e.g. political support ,economic aid, membership in an organization) to the fulfillment of a certain program", provided the Union with an effective leverage over the course of domestic political reforms in the CEECs. [226] Right from 1988 onwards, the EC strived to encourage democratic reforms in its eastern neighbours by making trade and cooperation agreements, aid and association (Europe) agreements conditional on fulfilling certain criteria, such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights.[227]After the enunciation of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, the EU started to apply membership conditionality with respect to the associated Central and Eastern European Countries to urge them undertake the necessary political and economic reforms before being entitled to join the Union. From Community's perspective, the liberal democratic reform process in the CEECs was essential to secure stability and security in Europe, a stance reflective of the traditional liberal internationalist view.[228] In that respect, as Smith rightly argues, the use of conditionality vis-a-vis the CEECs "was largely a security strategy and an indication of the Community's assertiveness in trying to shape post-Cold War Europe." [229]

The EU sought to eradicate the root causes of conflict and thus spread stability in Central and Eastern Europe mainly by employing its civilian instruments (such trade,

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[224] Johh O'Brennan, *The Eastern Enlargement...*,.156-157.
[225] Karen E. Smith, *The Making ...*,p. 138.
[226] Paul, "International Norms, The European Union, and Democratization: Tenatative Theory and Evidence",in Kubicek (ed), *The European Union and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2003),p.7.
[227] Karen E. Smith, "The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality", in Marise Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union* , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.121.
[228] Ibid., p.121.
[229] Karen E. Smith, "The Evolution and Application of …", p.121.

aid and eventual membership) on a conditional basis.[230] Undeniably, the promise of EU membership granted to the CEECs and the ensuing application of membership conditionality greatly enhanced the EU's ability to influence the transformation of Eastern Europe. The prospect of EU membership acted as the most powerful incentive for the Central [231]and Eastern European countries to adopt the liberal democratic standards that the EU is committed to promote. Thus, the eastern enlargement of the European Union fulfilled a dual purpose: it functioned both as a powerful democracy-promotion program [232] and a quite ambitious security- building project at the same time.

It could also be argued that the community- building process in the CEECs owed much of its success to the power of magnetism that the EU has over its neighbours. It was primarily the allure of membership that induced the CEECs to embrace the liberal democratic standards that the EU upholds. In other words, the prospect of membership has prompted the CEE governments to yield to the Union's painstaking demands. This provides compelling evidence for the observation that "the EU is more powerful because of what it is-a geopolitical magnet- rather than for anything it actually does."[233] In effect, the EU centered pluralistic security community has been acting as a powerful magnet that pulls the actors on Europe's periphery towards itself since the end of the Cold War period.

Furthermore, as Waever argues, " the EU not only acts as a magnet, pulling Europe's periphery towards its center, but it also induces periphery to resolve preemptively issues that would otherwise be likely to produce security competition."[234] This is the silent disciplining function that the EU performs in its near abroad, without resorting to "the traditional instrument of security policy-the use (or threat of use) of military force."[235] As stated above, the prospect of EU membership has effectively induced the CEECs to conform to certain principles of conduct (for instance, on issues such as the treatment of minorities and the handling of border disputes). In that respect,

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[230] Karen E. Smith, "The Making of...", p.163.

[232] Milanda Anna Vachudova, "Historical Institutionalism and the EU's Eastern Enlargement" in Sophie Meunier and Kathleen R.McNamara (eds.), *Making History European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.105-106.
[233] Michael E. Smith, Brian Crowe and John Peterson, "International Interests:...", p.264.
[234] Ole Waever, "Intergration as Security…", p.55.
[235] Ibid., p.56.

the EU has proved to be quite successful in eradicating the potential sources of conflict on its eastern periphery "by creating incentives for Europe's new democracies to resolve disputes that would otherwise fester."[236] For instance, the EU's silent disciplining influence has induced the Hungarian and Romanian governments to come to an agreement on their long standing border disputes and minority problems in 1996.

According to Brennan, the EU's discourse on the eastern enlargement process also indicates a strong attachment to the notion of an expanding security community.[237] In particular, the European Commission's discursive framing of the eastern enlargement process deserves special attention. Right from its earliest stages, the European Commission has been an ardent advocate of the EU's eastern enlargement. Yet within the confines of its formal treaty- based powers, the Commission's ability to garner widespread support for the eastward expansion of the EU was relatively limited. Thus, the Commission has sought to exert a more decisive influence over the process through acting in an informal capacity also. To this end, it deployed a normative discourse that underscored the merits of EU's expansion to CEECs. This normative discourse, Brennan argues, was based on two distinct pillars. The first one, which is quite relevant for the present purposes, "presented enlargement as a vehicle for the expansion of the EU value system and legal and democratic norms to Eastern Europe."[238] In essence, this first strand of the Commission's enlargement discourse centered on the notion of extending the European community of values and thereby the existing European security community to the Eastern part of the continent. On the other hand, the second pillar of the Commission's normative discourse on eastern enlargement, which will be explored further in the following sections of this chapter, stressed the EU's special responsibility for and its kinship based duty to the CEECs.

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[236] Ole Waever, "Intergration as Security …", p.56.
[237] Johh O'Brennan, *The Eastern Enlargement...*, p.156.
[238] Ibid., p.84.

3.3. The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: A Series of Successful Securitizing Moves.

By drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, this part of the thesis will attempt to explore how security-related arguments played a crucial role in pushing forward the process of EU's eastern enlargement. As has been mentioned above, the need to achieve lasting peace and stability in Europe has been a central motivation behind EU's expansion to CEECs. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the various kinds of uncertainties that surfaced in Central and Eastern Europe were framed as existential threats for the entire European continent by certain EU actors. From an analysis of the official EU documents, Higashino has found out that, some of the most commonly expressed threats to European security between the years 1993-1999 were conflicts in ex-Yugoslav Republics, potential instability of Russia; the Kosovo crisis and the possibility that such turbulence might spread to whole of the Balkan region."[239] In a similar vein, Brennan argues that, inter-state border conflicts and the ill-treatment of minorities in most CEECs as well as issues of cross-border crime, transnational drug smuggling, and people trafficking and potentially large scale emigration to Europe were regularly cited by EU representatives as disruptive challenges.[240]

The discursive act of framing such kind of problems as security issues is a typical example of what is called a "securitizing move" by the Copenhagen school of Security studies. The "securitizing moves" made within the context of eastern enlargement were intended to dramatize instability in the CEECs as a matter of absolute priority for EU (i.e. through labeling the numerous kinds of problems faced by those countries as existential threats to the security and well-being of the whole European continent) and thereby justify the use of extraordinary measures for countering this perceived danger (i.e., through presenting enlargement to CEECs, despite all the difficulties and complexities it could bring about for the EU, as the most viable mechanism for stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe).The original advocates of EU's eastern enlargement namely the Commission and some member

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[239]Atsuko Higashino, "For the Sake of 'Peace ...", , p.353.
[240] John O' Brennan, "Bringing Geopolitics Back...", p.164.

states such as Germany and Britain, were the securitizing actors throughout the process.[241] They routinely highlighted existential threats to European security as emanating from CEE and called for an immediate action in response, namely the enlargement of the European Union. In particular, the securitizing actors addressed the leaders of the member states as their audiences who were quite uneasy on the issue of expanding the Union to CEE.[242]

The European Commission has acted as the foremost securitizing actor in the Eastern enlargement process since its very earliest stages. Initially, it sought to persuade the reluctant EU member states to come to an agreement on enlargement, at least on principle. To this end, the Commission has convincingly argued that granting a clear perspective of future membership to the CEECs is of outmost necessity for reducing instability and tension which emerged in the Eastern part of the European continent following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The European Commission's securitizing move was accepted by the member states at Copenhagen European Council in 1993 where the accession of the CEECs was explicitly established as an EU objective.[243] Furthermore, the Copenhagen European Council laid down a set of accession conditions which should be fulfilled by the prospective entrants.

Between the years 1993 and 1995, "a rhetoric that highlighted 'eastern enlargement for security and stability in the whole of Europe emerged and was successfully implanted in the official language of the EU in order to justify actions toward enlargement."[244] For instance, at the Essen European Council in 1994, the European Union decided to launch a pre-accession strategy to prepare the associated CEECs for future membership in the EU which, it was claimed, would help ensure "the lasting peace and stability of the European Continent and the neighbouring regions."[245] At the Madrid European Council in 1995, it was stated that the Commission should expedite the preparation of its opinions on the applicant countries and also embark on the

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[241] Atsuko Higashino, "For the Sake of 'Peace ...", p.354.
[242] Ibid., p.354.
[243] Ibid., pp.354-355.
[244] Ibid., p.357.
[245] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Essen (9-10 December 1994), available at, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm

preparation of a Composite Paper on enlargement. [246] According to the Presidency Conclusions of the same European Council: "Enlargement is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe. It will ensure the stability and security of the continent and will thus offer both the applicant States and the current members of the Union new prospects for economic growth and general well-being."[247]

In 1997, the European Commission presented its opinions on the ten applicant countries and recommended the commencement of accession negotiations with only five of them that were deemed to be closest to fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria: Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. This decision divided the associated CEECs into two groups as the first and second-wavers of eastern enlargement. Accession negotiations with the first-wavers began in March 1998 and the second-wavers including Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia were simply told to speed up their efforts for meeting the EU's accession conditions. The selection of five CEECs for accession talks in 1997 was justified on the grounds that the enlargement process should comply with its main rule: Accession negotiations could start only with those candidate states that have fulfilled all the Copenhagen criteria .Meanwhile, an inclusive "accession-process" (comprising all the associated CEECs plus Cyprus) was launched at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 in order to minimize the negative effects of differentiating between two groups of applicant countries.

The EU's enlargement strategy has significantly changed in the following two years. At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with all the second-wavers. This marked a clear departure from its 1997 decision to make the second-wavers wait until they fulfill all the accession conditions. In such a short time span, the candidates' level of compliance with the EU's standards and values could not have changed so fundamentally. Especially, progress towards meeting the EU's conditions were seriously lagging behind in Bulgaria and

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[246] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Madrid (15-16 December 1995), available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm
[247] Ibid.

Romania.[248] So what might have urged the EU to re-consider its previous decisions on eastern enlargement?

As Higashino argues, the out-break of the Kosovo Crisis in 1999 was specifically instrumental in bringing about a fundamental shift in the EU's enlargement strategy. The crisis was cogently represented by the Commission as an existential threat for the whole European continent with particular emphasis on the daunting possibility that it could well spread to the rest of the Balkan region if no preventive measure is taken swiftly.[249] This securitizing move made by the European Commission provided a good justification for modifying the existing rules of enlargement.[250] The presentation of Kosovo crisis as an existential threat for the whole European continent legitimized the use of extra-ordinary measures breaking the established rules of the enlargement process. As a result, in 1999, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations with all the second-wavers. As a justification for its decision, the Commission argued that these candidate countries have fulfilled the Copenhagen Political criteria if not the other conditions. Despite their serious shortcomings in implementing the EU's democratic liberal norms, Romania and Bulgaria were not excluded from the accession talks. As Smith points out, leaving these two countries out of the process became an untenable option "when war erupted between Serbia and NATO over the treatment of Kosovo Albanians in March 1999."[251] Given the instability prevailing in their neighbourhood and the support they provided for NATO action, the EU refrained from isolating these two countries further.[252] Thus, arguably, during the eastern enlargement process, "the EU appeared ready to privilege political and security considerations over the strict application of membership conditionality."[253]

To conclude, the stark sense of urgency that characterized the above-mentioned securitizing moves succeeded in generating the desired "de-securitized impact", that is the accession of the ten associated countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) to the

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[248] Atsuko Higashino, "For the Sake of 'Peace ...", p.361.
[249] Ibid., p.360.
[250] Ibid., p.360.
[251] Karen E. Smith, "The Making of...", pp.185-186.
[252] Ibid., p.186.
[253] Ibid., p.186.

EU in 2004 and later the entry of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union in 2007. Although the eastern enlargement of the European Union has been presented as an extraordinary measure for addressing instability in the CEECs, enlargement has also been a regular, routine activity of the EU since its inception.[254] Thus, the whole process could be considered as an example of de-securitization through which the previously securitized threat of instability in CEE is normalized as a problem that could be handled by the standard political procedures of the EU.

The foremost threat perception of the European Union, that is, a return to Europe's own war-torn past, also found expression in the EU's conceptualization of the eastern enlargement process. As an example, the following brief excerpt from the presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 2002 could be considered: "The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe."[255] As Diez argues, after the end of the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe "became the incarnation of Europe's past, a past that West had overcome, and a zone of war and nationalism that was stuck in history."[256] The pattern of conflict and instability that was prevailing in the CEECs at the time was reminiscent of the pre-1945 situation in Western Europe. Within this context, the cost of non-enlargement was conceived to be the recurrence of fragmentation and war on the European continent as has been tragically manifested in Yugoslavia.[257]

As mentioned earlier, after the Second World War, the process of European integration was assumed to be the primary solution to conflictual inter-state relations that marks Europe's history. In order sustain the momentum of integration, especially after the end of the Cold War; European elites have frequently reiterated the likely devastating consequences of non-integration and disunity. The most commonly pronounced scenario is that if the process European integration were to stall, Europe's future would probably resemble Europe's past. The continuation of integration is thus the de-securitized effect of the previously securitized threat, a return to Europe's

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[254]Atsuko Higashino, "For the Sake of 'Peace ...", pp. 351-352.
[255] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Copenhagen (10-11 December 1999), available at, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf
[256] Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others...", p.326
[257] John O' Brennan, "Bringing Geopolitics...", p162.

violent past.[258] The same logic applies to the case of EU's eastern enlargement. In order to avoid the repetition of conflicts and wars on the European scene, the EU chose to incorporate the CEECs as members thereby extending its zone of peace and stability eastwards.

3.4. Turkish Membership in the EU: A Non-Securitized Accession Process.

Even if the processes of securitization were employed as a "legitimization strategy" for the eastward expansion of the European Union,[259] it is difficult to argue that the same mechanism has been applied so fervently to push forward Turkey's EU accession process. As discussed above, after the end of the Cold War, the perception that instability in Central and Eastern Europe poses a serious threat to European security has played a key part in the EU's decision to enlarge eastwards. In order to achieve lasting peace and security in Europe, the risks of instability that could spread from the East were to be neutralized through the enlargement of the European Union.

On the other hand, as Arıkan argues, "this security motivation of the EU's enlargement policy has not been an element in the EU's policy towards Turkey" despite the fact that Turkey was also grappling with new sources of instability in the immediate post-Cold War era, including "Kurdish nationalism, the spread of religious extremism, notably Islamic fundamentalism, political turmoil and economic hardships."[260] In the early 1990s, just like most CEECs, Turkey was facing problems that could potentially have severe spill-over effects on the prosperous and stable EU countries. [261] However, "instead of immediately suggesting a future accession as the solution, the EU did not consider Turkey to be ready for such considerations."[262] Said otherwise, unlike the case with the CEEC, EU has refrained from using enlargement as a stabilizing device for Turkey. Furthermore, whereas a failure to integrate the CEECs was often presented as increasingly destabilizing for the EU, no such sense of urgency has been attached to the issue of Turkish membership in the European Union.

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[258] Nuray. V Ibryavoma, "Security, Borders and the Eastern Enlargement", *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, Vol. 4, No. 15, May 2004.
[259] Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others...", p.326.
[260] Harun Arıkan, "Turkey and the EU…" pp.19-20.
[261] Asa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More European than Others?", in Helene Sjursen (ed*.) Questioning EU Enlargement :Europe in Search of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.132.
[262] Ibid., p.132.

This became quite clear when, at the Luxembourg European Council of 1997, the EU decided to exclude Turkey from the list of eleven candidates (including ten Central and Eastern European Countries plus Cyprus) that were given a pre-accession strategy. Although its eligibility for membership was confirmed, Turkey was found out to be far from satisfying the Copenhagen Political Criteria to be recognized as a candidate state for membership in the EU. The decisions of the Luxembourg summit created a feeling of deep resentment within the country. According to most Turkish policy-makers of the time, Turkey was treated rather inequitably when compared to other applicants since countries with relatively poor economic and political records, such as Romania, were included in the accession process while Turkey was not. Moreover, given that Turkey has also been facing security challenges like most CEECs that could pose security threats to the EU; the EU's approach to Turkey seems to have been incompatible with the declared security motivation of the enlargement process.[263]

A commonly raised concern regarding Turkey's prospective membership in the EU should be noted here. After the end of the Cold War, "it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to present Turkey as a consumer and not a producer of security in Europe."[264] Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey was conceived to be a producer of military security due to its strategically important geographical location, the size of its army and its role as a staunch NATO ally against possible Soviet aggression.[265] Primarily, it was the prevalence of military-focused understandings and practices of security during the Cold War era[266] that enabled Turkey to sustain its security-producer role in Europe. East-West ideological conflict kept traditional/hard security concerns high on the agenda for about 50 years. In order to contain Soviet power, Turkey's military capacity and its critical geopolitical location were deemed to be valuable assets. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, conventional security threats to Europe have diminished in significance and Turkey's role in the new security environment of Europe began to be questioned. With the decline of NATO's significance for security-building in Western Europe,

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[263] Harun Arıkan, "Turkey and the EU…" , pp. 20-21.
[264] Pınar Bilgin,"Turkey & The EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?" *EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre*, ISBN 1-903584-30-2, May 2001, p.38.
[265] Pınar Bilgin,"Turkey & The EU...", p.39.
[266] Ibid., p.39.

Turkey geostrategic importance also seemed to decline.[267] Moreover, the post-1989 developments brought about a wide-ranging set of political, economic and social problems and sources of instability in Europe's southern and eastern peripheries. Accordingly, the concept of security acquired a much broader connotation than just a military-focused meaning and consequently more and more issues (such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, environmental degradation, organized crime and so on) started to be labeled as soft security threats to Europe. Soft security issues are transnational and trans-regional in nature that cut across national and regional boundaries. Within this context, there emerged a rising tendency in Europe to consider Turkey as a security consumer mainly for the reasons of its internal uncertainties or problems of instability and its geographical proximity to conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus.[268] Accordingly, Turkey's membership in the European Union came to be seen as more of a challenge that could expose the EU to additional unnecessary security risks.[269] From Bilgin's perspective, the 1997 decision to leave Turkey out of Agenda 2000 is indicative of the then widespread view among the European policy makers that Turkey is a burden rather than an asset for building security in Europe.[270] Arguably, such an approach is in direct contradiction with security- related justifications put forward by the EU throughout its eastern enlargement process which presented expansion to CEECs as an essential strategy to achieve lasting peace and stability in Europe.

Two years later, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey's candidacy for EU membership was finally endorsed. For some observers, the EU's decision to grant candidate status to Turkey was driven primarily by strategic considerations and indeed "reflected a broad recognition of the need to repair relations with a country that had long been considered a 'strategic partner' (but not necessarily a part) of Europe."[271] Arguably, the Helsinki Summit decisions on Turkey were motivated, at least in part, by the EU's security concerns. In the follow-up to the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, Turkey-EU relations hit a quite low point. In response to the EU's decision not to

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[267] Pınar Bilgin, "A Return to Civilizational Geopolitics in the Mediterranean?Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post Cold War Era", *Geopolitics,* Vol.9, No.2, 2004, p.281.
[268] Sevgi Drorian, "Rethinking European Security...", p.433.
[269] Atilla Eralp, "Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki", Perceptions, Vol.5, No.2, 2000.
[270] Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey & The EU...", p.42.
[271] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union* ..., p.143.

recognize Turkey as a candidate state, Turkish government partially suspended its relations with the European Union. Probably, the EU actors were not expecting to receive such a kind of a serious backlash from their Turkish counterparts. Given the pivotal role Turkey plays in the stabilization of Europe's turbulent neighbourhood, the EU leaders might have realized that alienating Turkey further is not a cost-effective strategy to be pursued.

Yet, these observations do not necessarily suggest that the EU's ambivalence towards the issue of Turkish membership was finally over. Even after the commencement of accession negotiations in October 2005, alternatives to full membership for Turkey such as "privileged partnership" are seriously implied by certain EU actors. Arguably, "the idea to offer privileged partnership to full membership is designed to prevent the EU from falling victim to "rhetorical entrapment" so that accession talks inevitably lead to membership."[272] Since all the previous negotiations with the candidates have resulted in their eventual accession, the EU felt the need to stress that this unwritten rule of enlargement may not apply to Turkey. Thus, in the Negotiating Framework adopted in October 2005, accession negotiations with Turkey was described as an "open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand."[273] Furthermore, the same document also includes "an escape clause for the Union if it wishes to back out of the accession process"[274]: "While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not is in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond."[275]

As Kubicek argues, "if security concerns ranked among the reasons for expansion to the East in an effort to prevent a repeat of war in Europe, then expansion to include a pro-Western state in an area of world far more likely to breed conflict today than

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[272] Paul Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union:Challanges and Opportunities for the 'New Europe", *Paper Prepared for Workshop, 'The New Europe'*, Center for European Studies, University of Florida, Paris, France, February 2005, p.14.
[273]Negotiating Framework: Principles Governing the Negotiations, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf
[274] Gülnur Aybet, "Turkey and the EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Intenal and External Policy Challanges", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.37, No.4, 2006, p.538.
[275] Negotiating Framework: Principles Governing the Negotiations, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

Central Europe would make good strategic sense."[276]However, it seems as if such kind of an understanding has not engendered a firm EU commitment to Turkey's prospective membership in the Union. One possible reason for this could be that according to predominant perceptions within the EU, Turkey does not seem to be considered as a natural/integral part of Europe.

In the case EU's eastward expansion, security- related justifications for enlargement were complemented by some other pressing normative commitments that have never been extended to Turkey. A strong feeling of cultural affinity with Eastern Europe has been stressed quite frequently in arguments aimed at mobilizing expansion to CEECs. In the documents and speeches from the early 1990s, the close ties between the EC/EU and CEECs were repeatedly described as rooted in a 'common history', 'a common culture' and 'common values'.[277] In essence, the Eastern and Western Europe were portrayed to be the two parts of the same entity which had been kept apart artificially throughout the Cold War period. The underlying message tried to be given was that the Eastern Europe is a part of us, it is the "Kidnapped West", that must now be returned.[278] With the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, the EU would, at last, be able to end the division in Europe or in other words, re-unite it through incorporating the post-communist Central and Eastern European Countries as members. This conviction implied a moral commitment to eastward expansion as clearly expressed in arguments that underscored the EU/EC's special responsibility to assist the democratic reform process in the CEECs. Furthermore, a sense of kin-ship based duty has been a constant factor in the EC/EU's policies towards these countries since the end of the Cold War period. Alongside the security arguments mentioned earlier, these normative considerations have been frequently reiterated as a sound justification for admitting the CEECs into the EU. In particular, as an ardent advocate of the eastern enlargement process, "the European Commission regularly stressed the notion of a special EU special responsibility (...)as something located in a shared historical experience, a common cultural repertoire and the sense of kinship duty that linked Western to Central and Eastern Europe."[279]

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[276] Paul Kubicek, "Turkish Accession...", p.13.
[277] Asa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey...",p. 135.
[278] Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy", *Journal Of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40. No.3, 2002, pp.503, 505.
[279] Johh O'Brennan, *The Eastern Enlargement...*, p.85.

When describing its relations with Turkey, the EU has never referred to common cultural values, a shared historical background or a common European heritage. Turkey is rather assigned the role of representing difference and Islamic culture as Lundgren aptly puts it.[280] For some prominent European politicians, such as Nicolas Sarkozy and Angelina Merkel, Turkey's cultural differences with Europe (in particular it's predominantly Muslim population) constitute an insurmountable impediment to her membership in the EU. Previously, Turkey's Islamic culture has not been perceived as a barrier to its associate membership of the EC or to its membership of NATO. This relatively recent emphasis on Turkey's non-Western (Islamic) identity seems to indicate that the EU is increasingly taking on the quality of an essentially civilizational project built upon the Judeo-Christian tradition where countries with a predominantly Muslim population have no place.

The culturally-based objections to Turkish accession are also suggestive of a return to traditional forms of othering in the discourse on European identity. According to Diez, although Europe's own violent past has been the most prominent other of the contemporary European Union, since 1990s geographic and cultural otherings in European identity constructions are on the increase.[281] Diez goes on to argue that "the representation of Islam as the other of the Christian Europe" has a long history, and even "during the predominance of temporal other" in the post 1945 discussions over a European identity, "the other of Islam played at worst a secondary and at best a silent background role".[282] Today, "the discursive site where most of the othering of Europe against Islam is performed is Turkey"[283] and indeed there is an ongoing intense debate in Europe on whether Turkey's accession into the European Union would lead to the Islamization of Europe.

Furthermore, in contrast to the case with CEECs, it is hard to discern a moral commitment, on the part of the EU, to Turkey's accession into the Union. The special responsibility and the kin-ship based duty that the EU is argued to have towards the

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[280] Asa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey...", p.136.
[281] Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others…", p.319.
[282] Ibid., p.328.
[283] Ibid., p.238.

Central and Eastern European Countries is never extended to Turkey.[284] "While the aim of the policies towards Eastern Europe was to overcome the division and fulfill the aspiration of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to re-join Europe, Turkey is described as an important partner to Europe rather than as a natural part of the European family".[285] As Bretherton and Vogler argue, "Rather than discourses of return and responsibility, with their implications of a shared fate, there has long been, in the case of Turkey, a discourse of strategic partnership implying cooperation without duty or kinship." In discussions over enlargement to Turkey, the country is frequently designated the role of a strategic partner to Europe, a partner that is well-equipped to help the EU in its efforts to stabilize the troubled neighbouring regions.

> The recent geopolitical developments has strengthened Turkey's strategic role as a secular and democratic partner of the EU in the unstable Middle East neighbouring region. Turkey plays a moderating role in this region. Continuing reforms in Turkey on the way to the EU will strengthen Turkish stabilizing role in the relations between the EU and its neighbours and will thus contribute to our security.[286]

> Turkey remains a key country for Europe, as it was during the Cold War. But the tearing down of the Iron Curtain did not reduce Turkey's strategic value. On the contrary, Turkey became more important to us. Look at the news on TV – be it about Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, the energy crisis or the dialogue with the Muslim world, news reports constantly demonstrate that we need Turkey with us, as an anchor of stability in the most unstable and dangerous region, and as a benchmark of democracy for the wider Middle East. The high stakes of the Cold War have been replaced by other, more complex challenges, in which Turkey remains a vital strategic partner in Europe.[287]

As Redmond argues, "while Turkey's strategic value is widely accepted within the EU, there remains a school of thought within which the country is seen as an outsider to the European mainstream, condemned to irresolvable difference from its western neighbours on historical religious and cultural grounds."[288] The EU's conceptualization of Turkey as a "security partner" to Europe reflects this prevalent understanding quite accurately. On the one hand, for many in the EU, Turkey's membership in the

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[284] Asa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey...",p.136.
[285] Helene Sjursen, "Enlargement in Perspective: The EU's Quest for Identity", *ARENA,Working Paper*, No.5 February 2008, p.10.
[286] European Commission, *Enlargement Questions and Answers*, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/questions_and_answers/turkey_en.htm.
[287] Olli Rehn, "Turkey's Accession Process to the EU",Lecture at Helsinki University, Speech 06/747, November 2006, Helsinki,
[288] John Redmond, "Turkey and the European Union: Troubled European or European Trouble?" *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.2, 2007, p.306.

European Union is simply unacceptable and inconceivable due to cultural, religious and geographic factors. However on the other hand, due its strategic importance to the West and the role it plays in stabilization of the EU's troubled neighbourhood, Turkey is considered as a country that needs to be nurtured and consoled by the Union.

To conclude, the securitization processes employed by the EU in an effort to justify expansion to CEECs have been overlooked for Turkey, though the security threats involved in both cases were of the similar nature. Arguably, the need to achieve lasting peace and stability in Europe has provided the EU with a sound rationale to expand eastwards. However, stability and security concerns, important as they are, could not account, by themselves, for the relative ease and rapidity with which the EU's eastern enlargement took place.[289] Here, one might point to some cultural and normative factors that have played a crucial role in creating a firm EU commitment to the process of eastern enlargement. Despite their authoritarian political heritage, economic backwardness and democratic shortcomings, the CEECs were considered by the European Union as a natural part of Europe. It is because of this reason that the EU did not hesitate to use enlargement as a tool for addressing the problem of instability which emerged in the Eastern part of the continent following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there are widespread concerns within the EU about cultural and religious differences between Turkey and the current EU membership and there remain to this day serious doubts on the question of whether Turkey is really a European country.[290] Since Turkey is not perceived to be an integral part of Europe or a natural member of the European family of nations, the EU has refrained from using enlargement as a stabilizing device in the Turkish case. Indeed, it seems hard to understand the EU's different treatment of Turkey and the CEECs, countries that were broadly at the same level of economic and political development and that were facing similar security challenges in the early 1990s, without making reference to cultural and religious factors.

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[289] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity : Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.3, 1999, p.116.
[290].John Redmond, "Turkey and....", p. 306.

3.5. The ENP as a Security-Building Project Outside the Context of Accession to the EU

The enlargement process is not the only foreign policy tool that the EU utilizes for the purpose of extending the existing European Security community. The EU is also engaged in building security in its neighbourhood without offering perspectives of future membership. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a case in point.

The ENP was formally launched in 2003 by the European Commission as an assertive initiative to provide an encompassing new framework for the EU's relations with the Southern and Eastern (non-candidate) neighbours.[291] Plainly speaking, through the ENP, the EU aims to set up a kind of privileged partnership, with its old as well as new neighbours, without offering a perspective of future membership. Here, the notion of privileged partnership between the EU and its neighbours envisages economic integration and political cooperation built upon a mutual commitment to shared values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development).[292] Much emphasis is also placed upon ensuring cooperation between the EU and its neighbouring partner countries on Union's key foreign policy objectives such counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[293] The ENP covers a wide geographical area and applies to a diversity of countries that are EU's neighbours by land or sea.[294]

In the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, security and strategic considerations have played a critical role. As far as the ENP is concerned, the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003, declared that "building security in our neighbourhood" is one of the three strategic objectives of the EU, the other two

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[291] Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", Communicarion from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003)104 Final, Brussels, March 2003, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf

[292] What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?, European Commision, European Neighbourhood policy webpage, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm .

[293] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.11, 2006, p.140.

[294] Originally, ENP was devised for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and in the Mediterranean, for Algeria, Egypt, Isreal, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Syria, Morocco and the Occupied Palestinan Territory. In 2004, it was extended to include countries of the South Caucasus : Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

being, the promotion of "an international order based on effective multilateralism" and " addressing the threats" to European Security. [295] The Strategy further indicated that "the integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations."[296] Given the transnational nature of soft security challenges that EU has been facing in the post Cold War era, there emerged an immediate necessity to ensure that the enlarged Union would not import instability from the turbulent regions at its vicinity. Sealing off instability behind even tighter borders was not an effective strategy to be pursued[297] since soft security threats could easily pass through even most fortified boundaries. From the EU's perspective, addressing the root causes of insecurity in the Wider European neighbourhood by promoting democratic and economic reforms makes much more sense. Thus, through the ENP, the EU seeks to disseminate liberal democratic values and encourage reforms in the neighbouring countries with the ultimate aim of extending the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond its borders.

The so-called "enlargement fatigue" is another important factor behind the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy.[298] Throughout its history, the EU has embraced a "logic of generosity" whereby the perspective of membership has been offered quite altruistically to promote political and economic transformation in the applicant states.[299] Undeniably, the golden carrot of prospective membership has proved to be the most effective EU leverage for inducing the desired political and economic reforms. However, the EU simply cannot go on enlarging forever. Especially after the 2004 "big-bang" enlargement, there emerged a widespread concern that further expansion would threaten the dynamics of integration and would

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[295] A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 2003, Brussels, pp.6-10. In the ESS, the key security threats facing Europe are enumerated as follows: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crime.
[296] Ibid., p.8.
[297] Sevilay Kahraman, "The European Neigbourhood Policy: The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions,* Vol.10, Winter 2005, p.4.
[298] Ronald Dannreuther, " Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.11, 2006, p.187.
[299] Ibid.,p.188.

put the previous accomplishments of the EU at risk.[300] In that sense, the key question for the EU became how to sustain its transformative power over the neighbours without offering them a perspective of future membership. As a response to this challenge, the ENP was designed to provide the EU with some kind of a "silver carrot" − a new source of influence- in its relations with the neighbours.[301] The incentives offered by the ENP to spur political and economic reforms in the neighbouring countries that were denied the golden carrot of membership include: increased financial assistance (right from 2007 onwards through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument-ENPI), technical assistance, a stake in the Single Market and participation in EU policies and programmes. Thus, as Smith points out, the EU offers "'all but the institutions' to the neighbours as much as it can do without actually enlarging."[302] However, increased economic integration and political cooperation with the EU is offered on a conditional basis. The neighbouring partner countries are expected to demonstrate progress in their commitment to shared liberal democratic values in exchange for enjoying closer relations with the EU. For each partner country, the Action Plans set out an agenda of economic and political reforms with short and medium term priorities identified by the EU. Differentiation is the key approach adopted in the Action Plans which reflect "the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities as well as common interests."[303] Progress in meeting the priorities laid down in Action Plans is evaluated through the country reports and is rewarded with additional incentives. On the basis of those reports, a European Neighbourhood Agreement could be concluded with the partner country which has significantly approximated to EU's values and standards by enacting the required political and economic reforms.

It should also be noted the ENP is an attempt to avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe. Although the eastern enlargement of the European Union had the explicit aim of re-uniting Europe, it nonetheless had exclusionary implications for the EU's neighbours that were temporarily or permanently excluded from the accession

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[300] Sevilay Kahraman, "The European Neigbourhood..", p.3.
[301] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, "The European Union ..", p.149.
[302] Karen E. Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol.81, No.4, 2005, p.763.
[303] European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, *Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 Final,Brussels*, May 2004, p.3., available at, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

process. Thus, the ENP has been proposed as a framework for the development of mutually satisfactory relations between the EU and its neighbours which would forestall the destabilizing processes of inclusion and exclusion.[304] Accordingly, in the European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper adopted in 2004, it was indicated that:

> The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities (…)[305]

In short, the ENP is the newest foreign policy tool of the EU that aims to extend the existing European Security Community to the EU's Southern and Eastern neighbours by means other than accession. Through the ENP, the EU expects to encourage political and economic reforms as a solution to the problems of instability and insecurity in the neighbouring countries as in the case with the eastern enlargement process. To this end, the ENP offers a sort of privileged partnership to EU's neighbours based upon a commitment to shared values. However, it seems quite dubious whether the EU would be able to maintain its transformative influence over its neighbourhood without creating expectations of future membership.

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[304] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, "The European Union ..".,p138.
[305] European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 Final,Brussels, May 2004, p.3., available at, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf.

CHAPTER 4

THE EU SECURITY COMMUNITY AND TURKEY

4.1. The Evolution of Security & Strategic Culture in the European Union

In his well-known study entitled "Of Paradise and Power", Robert Kagan traces the evolution of Europe's and United States' strategic cultures in comparison with one another and clearly exposes the growing divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic in this regard. From Kagan's perspective, ever since the end of the Second World War, Europeans have not only developed a "post modern" notion of power based on the rejection of military force in international affairs but have also moved into a condition of what Immanuel Kant ideally describes as the "perpetual peace" .[306] The relatively new peaceful and stable order in Europe has been realized through a successful process of integration which effectively replaced the balance of power of mechanism and the pursuit of power politics among European powers with a strong commitment to the primacy of the rule of law, interstate cooperation and peaceful co-existence. Accordingly, as Kagan argues, Europeans have adopted an immensely peaceful strategic culture with particular emphasis on "negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism."[307] Furthermore, from Europeans' perspective, their own experience of creating and preserving stable peace could be replicated in different parts of the World. This conviction indeed has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice. [308]

The United States, on the other hand, still believes in the utility of military force as a tool of international relations and does not much hesitate to use it even unilaterally vis- vis its perceived or real enemies. Americans unlike their European counterparts

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[306] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Random House, 2003), p.57.
[307] Ibid., p.55.
[308] Ibid., p.61.

do not also pay much heed to international law and attach less importance to cooperation with other states or international organizations in pursuit of common objectives. In short, at the current stage, the United States and Europe came to hold two different world views and divergent perspectives on the notion of power in international affairs. To use Kagan's analogy, today Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus. Whereas the US prefers to rely on its on its military might in what it considers as an anarchic Hobbessian world, the EU has adopted in its "post modern paradise" a Kantian approach to international relations prioritizing soft, civilian means of influence over military capabilities.

According to Kagan, the growing disparity between Europe's and the United States' strategic cultures is attributable to two main reasons. The first of these is Europe's relative military weakness when compared to the United States. Throughout the Cold War period, Europeans took comfort of the security guarantee provided by the US and NATO against the Soviet menace. This deprived the Europeans of the incentive to build-up their own military power even for self-defense purposes. The disappearance of Soviet threat after the end of the Cold War has made Europeans even more unwilling to devote significant resources to offset their military impotence. Notwithstanding the quite recent attempts of the European Union to build credible a military capacity mainly for crisis management purposes, the military power gap between the United States and Europe remains to be too wide to be bridged today. [309]

Secondly, the repudiation of resort to military force in Europe has got some ideological roots. After generations of bloody warfare, Europeans have become increasingly critical about the utility and morality of the use of military power. They have drawn some important lessons from their own historical experience of recurrent conflicts triggered by excessive reliance of military power, the pursuit power politics and the balance of power policies. As a result, unlike their American counterparts whose historical experience tell a quite different story about the utility of using military power in international affairs, Europeans have developed a tendency to refrain from resorting to brute force. In essence, for Kagan, "the modern European

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[309] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and…*, pp.12-27.

strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of European past, a rejection of the evils of European Machtpolitik. It is a reflection of the Europeans' ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past."[310]

One could argue that the emergence of a peaceful strategic culture in Europe following World War II has greatly facilitated the creation of an internal identity for the EU as a security community among the members of which resort to military force against one another has became all the more unthinkable. As has been mentioned earlier, the EU security community has been formed largely by a process of de-securitization, that is, by the representation of potential security concerns among member states as ordinary political issues. Based upon this Cold War legacy, the EU's security culture "put stress upon building security without using the language of "security" for the fear of revoking military responses."[311] As Bilgin points out, this approach is heart of EU policy makers' demand from their Turkish counterparts to address human rights as ordinary "political" rather than "national security" issues.[312] However, "human rights" is still perceived to be a "national security" issue by some actors in Turkey in so far as it is considered to be used by external powers as a pretext to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs. [313]

On the side of the coin, the EU's widely held external (international) image as a civilian power also seems to be in part a product of Europe's peaceful strategic culture. The civilian power Europe idea as first coined by Francois Duchéne in the early 1970s described the then EC as a:

> group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force whose primary interest is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states , including those of its member states and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past associated exclusively with 'home' and not foreign, that is alien, affairs.[314]

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[310]Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and…*, p. 55.
[311] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?...", p.38.
[312] Ibid., p.34.
[313] Ibid., p.43.
[314] Francois Duchéne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence", in M. Kolistamm and W.Hager (ed.s), *Nation Writ Large: Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Communities*, (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.19-20.

The notion of Civilian power Europe stresses the primacy of the civilian, non-coercive means of influence (economic or political) over military capabilities in the pursuit of Union's foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, it ascribes a domesticating (civilizing) mission to the then EC which envisages the "international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards" and the promotion of values that belong to its "inner characteristics" such as "equality, justice and tolerance"[315] so as to encourage the renunciation of resort to military force in the international system. Seen from this perspective, what constitutes the EU's novelty as an international actor is its ability to export its own model of ensuring peace and stability through economic and political rather than military means.

The potential civilizing role assigned to the European Community by Duchéne is explored further by Ian Manners in a quite recent discussion about the EU's distinctive international role. According to Manners, the EU is a distinctive type of an international actor, best characterized as a normative power which has the ability to shape the conceptions of normal in international relations through asserting and projecting its values and shaping the practices of other parties.[316] In that sense, a normative power strives to impose on other actors what it considers as the appropriate way of state behavior in international relations by relying basically on the power of norms not on material capabilities. Manners examines the EU's international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty as a case study to illustrate the EU's normative power in world politics.[317] Today, the EU's normative power could best be observed within the context of the European Union's enlargement process whereby the candidate countries adopt their socio-economic and political structures to existing EU standards and norms in order to become members.

Starting from the early 1990s, the EU has embarked on an ambitious project of developing its own military capacity mainly for tackling future Yugoslav-type crisis in and around Europe. This provoked a fierce debate on the question of whether the EU is on the way of abandoning its distinctive civilian power image. For a group of observers, the recent steps taken to endow the European Union with a military

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[315] Francois Duchéne, "The European Community …", p.20.
[316] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No.2, 2002, pp.335-358.
[317] Ibid., pp.245-252.

dimension would inevitably destroy the EU's profile as a civilian power and bring about a number of potentially serious costs According to Smith, for example:

> (...) the stated intention of enhancing the EU's military resources carries a price: it sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be used to further the EU's interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too little.[318]

On balance, however, it could be claimed that the EU continues to uphold its image as a composite civilian-normative power in the international arena. If one considers the EU's Security Strategy (ESS) where the "new threats" to European security are identified, it becomes clear that resort to military force is still regarded as a last resort. As argued in the Security Strategy, since none of the new soft security threats that Europe faces today is purely military, the strategies devised to deal with them could not be based upon military force alone.[319] From the EU's perspective, the new soft threats to European security tend to have socio-economic and political root causes that could not be eliminated completely by the use of military force. Thus, in order to root out the underlying structural sources of instability in Europe's peripheries, the EU prefers to rely on its wide-ranging set of civilian instruments. Accordingly, in the ESS document, trade and developments policies are regarded as powerful means to promote reform and thus help ensure stability in Europe's neighbourhood and economic instruments and civilian crisis management activities are underlined as important tools to serve reconstruction in the post conflict phase. Furthermore, according to ESS, assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures stand out as important features of the EU's security strategy.

To conclude, as Bilgin points out, the EU's security culture priorities issues of soft security (low politics) and seeks to address these issues through non-military instruments.[320] Thus, the conception of security rooted in the EU's security culture is a rather broad one that encompasses a number new of dimensions such as human security, environmental security, and economic security and so on. Although today's Europe no longer faces any conventional security threat, a number of problems

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[318] Karen Smith, "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?", *The International Spectator*, Vol.35, No.2, April-June 2000, p.28.
[319] A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 2003, Brussels, pp.7.
[320] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?..", p.39.

ranging from immigration to terrorism are securitized in the post-Cold War security agenda of the European Union. The securitization of this broad range of issues that threaten the pace and success of integration is linked to the EU's main fear, that is fragmentation.[321] Viewed from this perspective it becomes more understandable why the EU policy makers, starting from the early 1990s, began to perceive Turkey as a burden rather than an asset for building security in Europe. Turkey's own domestic problems coupled with the perceived difficulties of integrating a country with a predominantly Muslim population raised grave worries among EU circles who consider fragmentation as an imminent threat to Europe's future. [322] According to some EU actors, Turkey's possible accession to the European Union would slow down the ongoing integration process and thus would pose serious challenges to the "security as integration" principle of the EU's distinctive security-building model.[323] What follows is a brief analysis of the evolution of security and strategic culture in Turkey.

4.2. The Evolution of Security&Strategic Culture in Turkey

There exist basically three elements constitutive of Turkey's security culture. The first of these is the critical geographic location of the country. Turkey is located in one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. It sits at the nexus of Balkans, the Black Sea Basin, Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus and beyond to Central Asia. This makes the country highly vulnerable to both hard and soft external security challenges. For example, Turkey perceives Russia's aggressive policies in Central Asia, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as threats to its security.[324] The volatile geographic location of Turkey is one of the most important factors shaping its security concerns and corresponding policies. However, since the EU-policy are inclined to interpret security issues from their own perspective which evolved during the Cold War period in a relatively stable environment provided by NATO and US security guarantee, they appear to be rather insensitive to security needs and interests of those countries, such as Turkey,

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[321] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?..", pp.23-39.
[322] Ibid., p.39.
[323] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.23, No.3., 2002, p.63.
[324] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective…", p.292.

which still face conventional type of security challenges emanating from outside their national boundaries.[325] This in turn raises some serious problems haunting Turkish-EU relations.

As identified by Karaosmanoğlu, the remaining two factors that play a prominent role in Turkey's security culture are the tradition realpolitik and the process of Westernization.[326] Turkish Republic inherited the realpolitik security culture from the Ottoman Empire. Up until the late 17th century, the realpolitik security culture of the Ottoman Empire was offensive in nature which stressed the maximization of power through territorial expansion.[327] However, when the military balance between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire began to tilt in favor of the former in the late 17th century, defensive realpolitik diplomacy started to characterize the Ottoman security culture.[328] The Defensive Realpolitik security culture which emphasizes the "balance of power diplomacy" has also been embraced by the Turkish Republic since its foundation in 1923. This culture attaches utmost importance to the protection of national independence and territorial integrity against foreign interventions. This partly explains why some Turkish policy makers conceive the demands of their EU counterparts on issues of human rights for example and in more general terms the policy of conditionality pursued by the Union as interference in Turkey's domestic affairs.[329]

The last element of Turkey's security culture is Westernization. The process of Westernization which started in the late of Ottoman era with the objective reviving the Empire's great power status, gained a fresh momentum after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic and the ensuing reform period. The process of Westernization (understood as Europeanization in the Turkish context) has traditionally been a security strategy on its own right. During the late Ottoman period, for instance, a Western-inspired internal reform process was launched not only to catch-up with the technological and military developments in Europe but also to avert European

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[325] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?...", p.40.
[326] Ali.L.Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, Fall 2000, pp.201-206.
[327] Ibid., p.201.
[328] Ibid.201.
[329] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?...",p.42.

interference by improving the legal status of the Christian subjects.[330] Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Westernization process continued with a renewed pace. From the perspective of the Republican elite, Turkey's overall security could best be preserved through setting- up cordial relations with Europe's major powers.[331] The expectation was that "if the European states perceived Turkey as European, they would not have to construct their relations on the basis of self-other dichotomy."[332] Ever since then, the policy of westernization has been pursued quite eagerly to substantiate Turkey's European identity and it's belonging to the Western State system. Throughout the Cold War period, Turkish policy makers also sought to assert Turkey's western identity through highlighting its membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the NATO.[333] As a part of this strategy, Turkish intellectuals and politicians alike presented NATO not only as a military alliance but also as a community of values founded upon the liberal democratic principles (including democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law) shared by the Western powers.[334] Turkish membership in NATO was in turn seen to demonstrate the country's dedication to Western ideals and thereby its place in the European family of nations. It is commonly pointed out that Turkey's prospective membership in the European Union would represent the culmination point of its Westernization efforts. Viewed from this perspective, any obstacle encountered on the way of EU membership is generally interpreted in Turkey as a severe setback for the country's long-standing quest for Western identity.[335]

Turkey's realist security culture has traditionally been embedded in a military-focused, state-centric understanding of security.[336] Although in the post-Cold War era some soft security issues including terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking has entered the Turkish security agenda, others, such as environmental degradation, remain to be peripheral concerns.[337] Furthermore, Turkey's

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[330] Ali.L.Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National...", p.207.
[331] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "An Anlaysis of Turkey's Prospective…", p.291.
[332] Ibid., p.291.
[333] Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's Western Identity during the Cold War", International Journal, Winter 2005-2006, p.39.
[334] Ibid., pp.52-53.
[335] Pınar Bilgin, "The Pecularity of Turkey's Position on EU-NATO Military/Security Cooperation: A Rejoinder to Missirolli", Security Dialogue, Vol.34, No.3, 2003, p.345.
[336] Pınar Bilgin,"Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinde Güvenlik...", p.213.
[337] Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures?..", p.43.

geographical proximity to unstable regions such as the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans suggests that the country still faces military threats unlike most of its European counterparts. Thus, hard security considerations retain a prominent place in the strategic calculations of the country. Most importantly, the main security referent in Turkey has remained relatively unchanged over the last couple of decades. Turkey's main threat perceptions are about the protection of the secular, homogenous character of the Turkish nation state and its territorial integrity against both external and internal challenges. Because of this reason, Islamic fundamentalism and the Kurdish separatism are viewed as the greatest internal security problems facing the country. Besides, Turkey values the use military force for addressing security threats stemming from terrorist activities for instance. As Oğuzlu points out "until quite recently, the official security strategy was hostile to the politicization of nationally sensitive issues as a possible approach to their solution."[338] On the other hand, as argued earlier, what has made the EU a security is primarily the politicization of possible security concerns by the member states through a successful process of de-securitization. Yet, it appears as if de-securitization of some security issues might not be attainable and indeed beneficial in every context. For instance, de-securitization of security concerns originating from terrorist activities could severely constrain the scope and effectiveness of the counter-strategies that a target state could employ. Such reservations might appear to be incomprehensible to those countries that have not suffered from terrorist incidents as seriously as Turkey.

4.3 Turkey's Contribution to Security-Building in Europe throughout the Cold War.

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's and the EU's threat perceptions converged on a common enemy, the Soviet Union. During that period, Turkey was viewed as a producer of military security in Europe due to the significant role it played in the containment of the Communist threat. Since the Cold War period witnessed the prominence of military-strategic considerations, Turkey's place in European Security

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[338] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.23, No.3, 2002, p.66.

was seen to be a function of its NATO membership, its pivotal geopolitical location and its sophisticated military capabilities.[339]

However, from another perspective, Bilgin argues that Turkey has also contributed to security-building in Europe during the Cold War period by helping to consolidate the collective identity of the "West" as a security community and by attracting some other developing countries to join the "Free World as a Western-led alliance system."[340] From her perspective, what gained Turkey NATO membership in 1952 was not only her military capabilities and geopolitical location (Turkey's military/security card) as it is usually assumed to be but also her contribution to the constitution of a Western identity especially in the early Cold War years.[341] Bilgin makes her point more clear with a specific example:

> (...) Turkey's participation in the Korean War was instrumental in its joining NATO not only because of Turkish military contributions to the war effort but also because Turkey helped to constitute the West and strengthen Western solidarity at a time when these were rather fragile.[342]

Thus, Turkey's contribution to European security during Cold War should not be understood merely in military-geostrategic terms. Equally important was the role she played in reinforcing the spirit of unity among the Western European powers in the face of communist expansionism. Some important lessons could be drawn from this alternative reading of the past with a view to strengthening Turkey's profile vis-a-vis the European Union in the post Cold War era. With this in mind, the following will attempt to assess Turkey's potential contribution to the EU security community upon her accession into the European Union.

4.4. Turkey's Potential Contribution to the EU Security Community in the Post-Cold War Era

In an attempt to highlight the benefits that Turkish membership in the European Union would bring about, Turkish policy makers and some academics alike have overemphasized the potential contribution that Turkey would make to the EU's

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[339] Sevgi Drorian, "Rethinking European Security…", p.432.
[340] Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey & The EU...", p.40.
[341] Pınar Bilgin, "The Pecularity of ...", p.348.
[342] Ibid., p.348.

fledging security role. It has often been assumed that as the European Union began to acquire a security dimension starting from the early 1990s; it would sooner or later become more forthcoming on the issue of Turkish accession into the EU. Indeed, according to some observers, the 1999 decision of the European Union to grant candidate status to Turkey reflects the recognition of Turkey's importance for the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. According to Baç for example,

> (...) an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey's status to that of a candidate country is the EU's evolving security role. In other words, the estimates of the potential security benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU's policies towards Turkey.[343]

Such assessments are generally based upon the misleading assumption that Turkey's military capabilities and its critical geographic location (the military/security card) would bolster its EU candidacy just as in the way they helped secure NATO membership for the country approximately five decades ago. Probably, stressing Turkey's potential contribution to a newly emergent EU military force is the easiest way of sustaining the image of the country as a security provider in Europe in the post Cold War era. However, the EU policy makers do not seem to value Turkey's military and geopolitical assets as intensely as their Turkish counterparts. This is so because, right from its inception, the process of European integration has prioritized non-military, civilian instruments for addressing security problems and sources of instability in and around Europe. Today, one of the most overarching objectives of the European Union is to promote peace and stability in its neighbourhood through the dissemination of liberal democratic norms. Thus, from the EU's perspective, if Turkey really wants to carve out a significant role for itself in European security matters, it should, first of all, consolidate its liberal democratic credentials.

Moreover, using Turkey's military/security card with the objective of securing a more favorable attitude from an EU which considers itself as a "security community" seems at best a futile attempt. As pointed out earlier, the EU security community has been formed by the transcendence of power politics and classical military-

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[343] Meltem Müftüler -Baç, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue*, Vo.31, No.4, 2000, p.489.

geostrategic considerations among the member states. Even if today the EU has developed a Rapid Reaction Force (dubbed as the European Army) within the framework of the ESDP, this mainly aims to carry out the so- called Petersberg tasks[344], not to project military power beyond the borders of the European Union. Since the EU does not envisage the creation of an European Army with war- fighting capabilities that is deployable in any part of the globe but only aims to tackle future Yugoslav type crises in and around Europe, Turkey's geopolitical and sophisticated military asserts do not seem to be considered as indispensable for the achievement of the EU's strategic objectives.

Does the foregoing discussion suggest that it is hard to justify Turkey's prospective membership in the EU from a security perspective? No. On the contrary, the following paragraphs will attempt to show that other than its military capabilities and geostrategic location Turkey has much to offer to the EU security community in the post Cold War era.

Firstly, Turkey is increasingly seen by the West as a model for democratization and political reform in the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general. The notion of Turkey being a model for Islamic countries which emerged forcefully in the wake of the September 11 attacks became a central component of the US security strategy especially after the adoption by the Bush administration of the Greater Middle East and North Africa Initiative in 2004. In the US view, the Turkish case which demonstrates the compatibility of Islam and democracy could be a source of inspiration for the rest of the Muslim world. However, "Turkey as a model" argument provoked strong resentment among the Turkish secular elite. Serious concerns have been raised on the question of whether branding Turkey in such a manner would strengthen the role of Islam in Turkish politics.[345] It is also pointed out quite frequently that Turkey is a unique case rather than an example to follow and that the role of Islam is non-existent in the secular modernization process carried

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[344] Petersberg tasks cover humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.
[345] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.2., No.1&2, p.46.

out throughout the history of the Turkish Republic.[346] According to some other observers, such an externally ascribed role "would situate Turkey in the Middle East, as opposed to Europe which Turkey has trying to become a part of."[347]

Despite such reservations of the Turkish secular establishment, the significance of Turkey's contribution to Western efforts aimed at stabilizing Middle East is highly acknowledged. As Oğuzlu points out, "just as the EU has contributed to peace and stability in the Central and Eastern part of Europe through its enlargement process, Turkey tries to contribute to regional stability in the Middle East by helping to project the European norms of international relations onto the area."[348] Turkey's efforts in this regard are of great importance for European security interests. In the present context, the EU is well aware of the fact that, its security could not be ensured unless the so called failed or weak states surrounding Europe are transformed into liberal democracies and thereby become well-governed states. The European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004 with these considerations in mind indeed. However, given the transnational and trans-regional nature of security threats originating from Europe's peripheries, cooperation with other actors is necessary if decisive counter measures are to be taken. Thus, the EU needs the support of regional partners such as Turkey to stabilize its neighbouring regions, the most chaotic of which is undeniably the Middle East today. Turkey's cultural, historical and economic ties with the Middle Eastern countries provide Turkey with some kind of an edge to influence the transformation of the region along democratic principles. On the other hand, the effectiveness of Turkey's "soft power" in the Middle East, that is, its ability to attract and persuade the regional actors to carry out political reforms[349] hinges on some other factors also. The first of these is the will to act as a soft power.[350]As Tank shows, the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, unlike its predecessors, is quite eager to embrace the role of Turkey as a model for democratization in the Middle East.[351] From the perspective of

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[346] Tarık Oğuzlu, "The Future of Turkey's Westernization: A Security Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.9, No.3, 2007, p.53.
[347] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Model ...", p.46.
[348] Tarık Oguzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.61. No.1, pp.81-97.
[349] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Model ...", p.55.
[350] Ibid., p.56.
[351] Pınar Tank, "Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey's Identity?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.6, No.4, p.473.

the AKP, Turkey's relevance and importance for the West could best be demonstrated through contributing to the Western efforts aimed at tackling security threats with a Middle Eastern origin.[352] The AKP aims to reflect Turkey's soft power in the Middle East as a valuable asset for building security in Europe's southern periphery. Secondly, for Turkey's soft power in the Middle East to be effective, it should also be credible. In the last couple of years some significant developments[353] produced positive results in this direction. Arguably, Turkey's prospective membership in the EU would bolster the credibility of Turkey's soft power in the Middle East by proving the success of the Turkish democratization process in the eyes of the Arab world. In particular, Turkey which has a predominantly Muslim population and has adopted a strictly secular democratic parliamentary system would have reinforced its image as a model for the Islamic world upon her accession into the EU. The more Turkey becomes a credible soft power, the more it will have the ability to induce democratic reforms in the Middle East. It goes without saying that both Turkey and the EU security community would enormously benefit from such an eventuality.

Moreover, Turkish membership in the EU would send an important message to the Muslim World. It would erode the EU's image as a "Christian Club" of economically advanced European States, would strengthen the EU's hand against the charges of cultural exclusivism and thereby help remove the ongoing tension between the West and the Muslim World. Conversely, a great opportunity to promote a constructive dialogue between different civilizations (and to disprove Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis) will be missed if the EU turns its back on Turkey in the years to come.

Furthermore, Turkey's EU accession process stands out as an important test case to see whether "Europe" is in reality an inclusive concept with no fixed definition and pre-defined geographical and cultural limits. It has some important implications for

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[352] Tarık Oguzlu, "Soft Power in...", p.89.
[353] For instance, the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow the stationing of US troops on the Turkish soil during the Iraq war, the improvement of Turkey's relations with some Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, the election of a Turkish secretary general to the Organization of Islamic Conference could be considered as important developments that increased Turkey's soft power in the Middle East. For a more detailled discussion on this topic see, Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Model ...", pp.57-58.

the way in which the notions of "Europeaness" and "European identity" are defined today. As Rumelili shows, within the context of Turkey-EU relations, European and Turkish identities are undergoing a continuous process of reconstruction and negotiation.[354] In that respect, Turkey's accession to the EU would show that, the concept of European identity as promoted by the European Union is really based on universally valid principles such as the primacy of the rule of law, democracy, human rights, justice and equality rather than on specific cultural, religious or geographic factors. Additionally, Turkey's EU membership would prove that European Union does not define culturally different entities as a threatening other to its own identity and thereby help substantiate its claim to be a post modern entity in contemporary world politics.[355]

Obviously, the EU security community has a significant interest in the pacification of its turbulent surrounding regions including the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Caspian region. Quite frequently, Turkey is portrayed as a barrier, as an insulator state which prevents soft security threats originating from those areas from spilling over into the EU's zone of peace and stability. However, such kind of an understanding is quite misleading given that the present international context is marked by the trans-regionalization of security issues and the increasing erosion of traditional distinctions between European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian regions on security matters.[356]Thus, keeping Turkey outside the EU would make latter feel more secure. Turkey which has strong ties with the regions mentioned above could well play a bridge role for the EU to extend its normative power for stabilization of those areas. As an EU member state, Turkey would more effectively

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[354] Bahar Rumelili, "Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perpective", *Insight Turkey* Vol.10, No.1, January-March 2008.

[355] The EU's post modern nature is often stressed as a distinctive attribute that helped the European Union to transform itself into a security community. As mentioned earlier, the EU's post-modernity derives from two basic sources. The first of these is the distinctive way in which international politics is being conducted among the member states. Whereas in the modern Westphalian nation-state system, states tend to see each other as potential threats to their survial, the EU member states have developed among themselves a post-modern order whereby self/other distinctions between them have been blurred and reciprocal threat perceptions completely eliminated. This in turn, facilitated the EU's evolution as a security community among the members of which resort to military force over time has became an unthinkable option of dipute settlement. Secondly it is argued by some group of scholors that the EU is a post modern collectivity because it does not define any outsider state or actor as a threatening other but only considers a return to its own past as an immanent danger for Europe's future.Therefore, according to this understanding, while conducting its external relations with the outsiders, the EU also refrains from producing a strict self/other dichotomy.

[356] Atilla Eralp, "Turkey in the Enlargement Process...".

project European values in its neighbourhood and therefore would directly contribute to EU's security interests.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study is primarily concerned with the evolution of the EU as a pluralistic security community throughout the course of European integration. It sought to explore how the EU member states have managed to renounce war in their relations with one another and succeeded in establishing a permanent peace in Western Europe after a history of endemic conflict. The thesis also tried to analyze the EU's attempts to extend its zone of peace and stability beyond its immediate borders by using some foreign policy tools such as the enlargement, and the recently launched European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, it has attempted to evaluate the potential contribution that Turkey would make to the EU security community in the post-Cold War era once it becomes a member of the EU. In the following, some tentative conclusions reached within the scope of this study are presented.

The concept of "security community" which was pioneered by Karl and his associates approximately a half century ago refers to a group of states which has permanently eliminated war and the expectations of it in their relations with one another. The emergence of a security community is marked by the development of "dependable expectations of peaceful change", or more simply, by the creation of long-term assurances among the community members that their differences would not be settled through war. Today it is widely acknowledged that the European Union constitutes an outstanding example of a security community in contemporary international politics.

The EU security community has been formed largely by a process called de-securitization. In the context of European integration, de-securitization of state-to-state interactions has been accomplished primarily by the politicization of potential security concerns among the Western European powers. To politicize a potential security issue means to frame it in non-security, political terms in order to allow for the continued pursuit of "normal" procedures of the everyday life. According to

Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the most important factor that shaped the process of security community-building within the EU via common attempts at de-securitization was Europe's own war-torn past. In order to avoid the repetition of conflicts on the European sconce in the aftermath of the Second World War, Western European powers chose to represent their problems as ordinary political rather than as security issues because when something is cast in security terms, it could revoke extraordinary responses such as threat or the use of force. As a result of this effective de-securitization process, the EU has emerged as a security community in which disputes between the member states are handled through the defined rules of EU politics rather than through the use of brute force.

However, it is argued in the thesis that this standard explanation of the EU security community-building process through successful de-securitization is incomplete. In addition to an overall concern about a possible return to Europe's own violent past, the emergence of a common external threat, namely the Soviet Union, has also played a crucial role in the development of the EU as a security community throughout the Cold War period. In order to address possible Soviet aggression, Western European States had no choice but to set aside their differences and cooperate within the framework of the NATO's collective defense scheme under the leadership of the US. Also the presence of the Unites States in Western Europe during the Cold War era has greatly facilitated the above-mentioned processes of de-securitization by exerting a decisive pacifying impact on the Western European powers.

Arguably, the identity building process within the EU via the otherness of Eastern Europe also occupies a prominent place in the EU's development into a security community during the Cold War period. As constructivists argue, what fosters dependable expectations of peaceful change within a security community is primarily the attainment of a sense of collective identity. Throughout the Cold War period, the liberal, democratic collective identity of the then EC was largely formed and maintained through the representation of the Eastern communist political order and its ideals as inherently different from that of the West. Therefore, the most significant other in construction of a political identity for the EU is not only the Europe's own war torn past as some observers argue but also the Communist Eastern Europe. Through constructing and sustaining such a clear cut-boundary between the "Free"

West and the "Communist" East, the EU has effectively consolidated its own liberal, democratic identity during the Cold War era.

Western Europe's perceptions of its Eastern other started to change with onset of the Détente and the ensuing CSCE process which started in 1973 and culminated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The CSCE was initially devised as a pan-European discussion forum to promote East-West dialogue and cooperation with a view to strengthening security and stability in the region extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It has effectively stimulated a de-securitization process in East-West relations through promoting confidence-building measures and disarmament aimed at increasing military transparency. Furthermore, throughout the Cold War period, the Helsinki process not only facilitated the transmission liberal values, norms and practices of Western Europe to the Eastern part of the continent but also proved to be instrumental in creating dissident movements in the Communist regimes of the East. Largely inspired by the Helsinki principles, the Eastern dissident movements have effectively pressurized their Communist governments to comply with the liberal, democratic ideals of the Final Act. Finally, the CSCE process highly contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union by peaceful means.

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet menace did not make Europe a more secure place. The war which erupted in the former Yugoslavia in the mid 1991 was followed by a series of violent conflicts breaking out in the disintegrating Soviet Union and some serious tensions developing in the region on issues such as the treatment of ethnic minorities.[357] Within this context, the European Union has adopted a quite pro-active approach aimed at improving its own long-term security through shaping and transforming its near abroad in a manner that resembles the liberal-democratic environment of the EU model itself.[358] A case in point is the liberal democratic transformation process that the ex-communist Central and Eastern European Countries have undergone during their accession process to the Union. The prospect of membership has effectively induced the Central and Eastern European Countries to carry out a massive democratic reform process to meet the EU's standards. By transmitting its core liberal democratic values to the CEECs, the EU

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[357] Karen E. Smith, "The Making of...", p.135.
[358] Frédéric Charillon, "The EU as a Security..", p.531.

sought to eradicate the underlying causes of instability and tension prevailing in those states.

As could be deduced from the foregoing, the EU's original commitment to promote lasting peace and stability in Europe has encouraged its members to extend the existing European security community to eastern part of the continent in the immediate post-Cold War era. In fact, the EU's eastern enlargement process stands out as a remarkable success story which expanded the EU's zone of peace and stability to the former socialist Central and Eastern European Countries. Here it's also worth noting that as a part of this project, the EU has effectively induced the CEECs to settle their outstanding disputes with their neighbours before being entitled to join the EU through a policy tool called the Pact for Stability in Europe.

The "need to achieve lasting peace and stability" in Europe provided the EU with a strong rationale to expand eastwards. However, as argued in the thesis, this security motivation of the EU's enlargement policy was absent in the European Union's approach towards Turkey despite the fact that Turkey was also grappling with some serious problems of instability in the early 1990s that could have serious implications for European Security . The EU's prioritization of the Central and Eastern European Countries over Turkey within the framework of its enlargement-related decisions seems to indicate that, apart from security considerations, cultural factors also play a quite prominent role in shaping the EU's attitude towards the applicant countries.

The EU also attempts to extend the existing European Security community on Europe's peripheries without incorporating new member states. A case in point is the EU's recently launched European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP is post-enlargement strategy designed to provide an institutionalized framework of mutually satisfactory relations between the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours that were permanently or temporarily denied the prospect of full membership. Through the ENP, the EU the seeks to create friendly milieu, a ring of well-governed states around its borders through promoting political and economic reforms in neighbouring countries However, without creating expectations of full membership, it seems to be quite debatable whether or to what extent the EU would succeed in fulfilling this ambition.

As argued in the last chapter of the thesis, the EU security community would benefit enormously from Turkey's prospective membership in the European Union. As an EU member state, Turkey would bolster its credibility as a soft power inducing democratization and political reform in the Middle East in particular and in the Muslim World in general. Furthermore, Turkey which sits in midst of the EU's troubled neighbourhood would probably play a more active and decisive role in stabilization of those troubled regions upon her membership in the EU. Turkey's EU membership would also show that the European Union is in reality a multicultural entity in which different traditions could co-exist peacefully. This would in turn help undermine the idea of an inherent clash between the "West" and the "Islam"- an achievement of paramount significance in the context of post-September World Politics. Time will tell whether the EU policy makers will come to realize such significant benefits that Turkey's EU membership would bring about for building and maintaining security in Europe.

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