

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AND THE NATIONALIST PARTIES
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
EURASIAN STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2008

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ABSTRACT

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NATIONALIST PARTIES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

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Master of Science, Eurasian Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

July 2008, 109 pages

This thesis is an endeavor to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the relationship between international and local actors in the post-Dayton state-building process in Bosnia. While state-building in Bosnia has received a considerable amount of attention and study, apprehension and depiction of the relationship between the international community and Bosnian governing officials has remained relatively homogeneous. This dominant account of the relationship has been that it is a contentious and oppositional one. To criticize the approach I highlighted two of its problematic aspects. These were the conception of the state, in the abstract, as a highly unified and cohesive entity. And, the depiction of internal and external as isolated and fixed actor-identities. The central argument of this thesis is that the international community and the nationalist parties (representing respectively the external and internal state actors) have become united in a mutually advantageous and mutually-reinforcing process of sharing power, responsibility, and blame. This process has been apparently oppositional but effectively cooperative, so that the outcome of twelve years of state-building has been the continued relevance and effective entrenchment of both the international community and the nationalist parties in the Bosnian state.

Keywords: Bosnia, international intervention, state-building, international community

ÖZ

ULUSLARARASI TOPLULUK VE BOSNA-HERSEK'TEKİ MİLLİYETÇİ PARTİLER ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLERİN YENİDEN KAVRAMSALLAŞTIRILMASI

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Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Prof. Mustafa Türkeş

Temmuz 2008, 109 sayfa

Bu tez, Bosna'daki Dayton sonrası devlet inşa sürecinde uluslararası ve yerel aktörler arasındaki ilişkilerin kavranışını derinlemesine ve bütün incelikleriyle irdeleme çabasıdır. Bosna'daki devlet inşası ciddi derecede ilgi çeken ve üzerinde çalışılan bir konu olmakla birlikte uluslararası topluluk ile yerel milliyetçi partiler arasındaki ilişkinin analizi nispeten yüzeysel kalmıştır. Bu ilişkinin niteliği her zaman tartışmalı ve muhalefet edilen bir husus olmuştur. Bu yaklaşımı eleştirmek için iki problematik bakış açısını öne çıkarttım. Bunlar devletle ilgili kavramlardır; teorik olarak, yüksek derecede tekleştirilmiş ve birleştirilmiş bir varlık; yalıtılmış ve sabit aktör kimlikleri olarak içsel ve dışsal betimler. Bu tezin temel argümanı, uluslararası topluluğun ve milliyetçi partilerin (ki bunlar, dışsal ve içsel devlet aktörlerini nispi olarak temsil ederler) karşılıklı olarak avantajlı ve birbirlerini destekleyen gücü, sorumluluğu ve suçlamayı paylaşma sürecinde birleşmiş olduklarıdır. Bu süreç dışardan çatışmalı gözükmemektedir ama gerçekte işbirliğine dayanmaktadır; bu yüzden devlet inşasının on iki yılının sonucu hem uluslararası topluluğun hem de Bosna devletindeki milliyetçi partilerin hâlâ etkin bir şekilde varlıklarını sürdürmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bosna, Dayton Barış Anlaşması, devlet inşası, uluslararası topluluk

To my parents.

For their encouragement and support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank, first of all, my professor and supervisor Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş for his guidance, support, criticism, and encouragement during my research. He has been an excellent advisor, and I am deeply grateful.

I would also like to thank the other members of my examining committee: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever and Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel. I greatly appreciate the time and effort they spent in considering my research and the comments and criticisms they contributed during my defense.

For their part in helping to make the writing process more enjoyable, my sisters have my warmest gratitude.

Finally, I want to thank Priya Surya. Her friendship and encouragement were invaluable and she has my sincerest appreciation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the consequent war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) took place within a confluence of events that simultaneously ended the Cold War and shaped the foundations of the post-Cold War period. The end of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, including the demise of a unified Yugoslavia, attracted attention and close study throughout the various fields of the social sciences. Meanwhile, the attention and resources of Western governments, no longer fixed on the specter of the Soviet Union, were freed to turn to new areas to explore and exploit. In turn, policy experts and analysts rushed to discover all the ways the ‘peace dividend’ could be spent. Liberated from the constraints of strict ‘balance-of-power politics’, concepts like ‘universal human rights’ and ‘democratic transition’ could be given more serious consideration. More serious consideration involved asking how universal human rights really were, and how they interacted with other international norms like state sovereignty.

The war in Bosnia was relevant for every one of these new fields of investigation. Bosnia became one of the first, and most notorious, cases of international ‘humanitarian’ intervention. As an original, and ‘laboratory’, case of the new¹ practice of international intervention and subsequent state-building, Bosnia has formed the subject of an exhaustive amount of research. Numerous books, monographs, and articles have been written on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the causes and nature of the war, the nature of the peace, and the state-building process that has continued unabated since its inception in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. On top of works exclusively related to the Bosnian case, literature on broader topics such as ‘international intervention’, post-communist transition, human rights, state-building, and state

¹ How new of course is a contested subject. See: Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson, eds., *State-Building: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2007).

sovereignty, typically include analysis of Bosnia. This thesis will make extensive use of this body of literature but will depart in important ways from what has become the dominant interpretation of state-building in Bosnia. In this thesis I will seek to explore the nature of the relationship between the state-building ‘international community’ and the nationalist parties that represent the new sovereign Bosnian state. My main research question will be: to what extent can government rule and the process of state-building during the twelve years since the Dayton Accords be attributed to either international or national actors?

The international administration of Bosnia has often been described as a laboratory case for state-building policy. It should be no surprise then that many of the central problems of post-Dayton Bosnia also figure prominently in the theoretical literature of state-building.² One such issue is the highly contentious question of who should take the lead and bear the responsibility in the long and difficult task of constructing a stable, peaceful, and preferably democratic state; the people and their elected leaders, or some variant of the international community. Within this basic question are found a multitude of aspects and considerations that complicate the matter. Is the society a multi-ethnic one? Is there a strong tradition of authoritarianism? Is there a civic or ethnic understanding of nationality? How strong is civil society? How established are social institutions like the rule of law and private property?

These and numerous other concepts and questions are given varying degrees of consideration and precedence and accordingly shape the answer to the question that inevitably remains. For whatever institutions are necessary, and whatever the best way to go about building a state, discussion returns to who is responsible in practice. On one side, it is argued that “democracy cannot be imposed by outsiders”. “The international community is another name for imperialist powers.” “Elected leaders are ultimately the only actors capable of building a legitimate and lasting political structure.” “The Bosnian (or Kosovar, or Timorese, or Iraqi) people must take ‘ownership’ over the

² Ibid.

process of state-building in their country.” Of course, these assertions aren’t all universally and simultaneously made, they are variations of the same fundamental assumption that the state cannot, or should not, be built by external actors.³ On the other side, arguments are made that society may not be ready to support and preserve a peaceful and democratic government. Or that the local political elite are too corrupt and self-interested and consequently cannot be trusted to respect democracy and human rights. These arguments all generally lead to the conclusion that the assumedly liberal international community should involve itself in, if not lead, the development of weak and failing states.

The question who should build the state rests on a categorial distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ actors. This distinction extends beyond a mere descriptive label of identity and bears a set of assumptions concerning the actors’ motivations and behavior. The category of internal is applied to local elite and contains two critical inferences: (1) that he or she as a member of the local society holds the same collective interests as the rest of the community, and (2) that as a local, he or she can be chosen by the public. Thus internal actors are assumed to be best able to represent society and to democratically govern. Alternatively, however, local elite could be holdovers from the period of conflict or misrule that predated the international intervention, in which case they are potentially corrupt and are barriers to good governance and the state-building agenda. On the other side, ‘external’ denotes membership in the international community. International administration is justified either, or both, by legal standards, under United Nations sanction and/or the permission and request of the local state (as in the Bosnian case), or by its ‘international’ rather than national, and therefore self-interested, character. Consequently external actors are expected to exhibit minimal corruption and to defend the ideals of democracy and the universal human rights of the local population.⁴

³ See for example: Chandler, David. *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. Second Edition 2000 ed. London: Pluto Press, 1999; And, Elizabeth M. Cousens, and Charles K. Cater. *Toward Peace in Bosnia. Implementing the Dayton Accords*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

⁴ P. Ashdown, ‘What I Learned in Bosnia’, *New York Times*, 28 October 2002.

It is not my intention to focus here on the particular assumptions that follow the identity categories of internal and external but rather to emphasize the generally clear distinction that is made between the two. The ideal goal, both in the theory of state-building and ostensibly of the international administration in Bosnia, is that the particular actors in both categories will work together to build the state and that the international community will consequently withdraw and leave the responsibility and power of governance entirely to the local state. This goal has clearly not been met in Bosnia and the relationship between the international administration and the local politicians has been commonly recognized as contentious and obstructive. Whether the blame for the lack of success in Bosnia is laid at the feet of corrupt nationalist politicians or inept or authoritarian (or both) international actors, throughout the literature the relationship between them is assumed to have been antagonistic.

It is this assumption that I will question in this thesis. I will argue that international and indigenous actors in Bosnia have, since the Dayton Accords, continued to act in an apparently oppositional but effectively cooperative process. Beneath the superficial divisions that appear in media and academic literature and that are used to condemn one side or the other, the international administration and local state actors have operated in a mutually reinforcing manner. Moreover, the effects of their policies have been to reinstate and preserve the other's importance and hold on power.

The argument of this thesis falls under no abstract theory of international relations. Although the topic of state-building may be considered within the realm of the study of international relations, I am interested here in the particular process of building a state in Bosnia and thus in the particular and local characteristics and context of the political process in Bosnia. In this sense, this thesis may be considered more an historical investigation of a specific succession of human actions and consequences than a predictive explanation of an international process within a theoretical model of an international system. This is not to say that lessons cannot be drawn from Bosnia for other contemporary and future international state-building endeavors or that the behavior of international or local actors cannot be explained within the broader context

of international relations. An immense amount of available literature testifies to the opinion that they can.

However, there is also much to be said for attempting to understand and relate the individual and distinctive nature of the process of state-building in Bosnia. I have tried to step away from the explanations and expectations of how state-building is expected to unfold in theory and instead observe its practice. As a student of Bosnian history I am sympathetic to the claim of Rusmir Mahmutcehajic that “the histories of the peoples interweave, permeate and clash in the Balkans, creating an enigma to which there is no answer. Attempts to apply a logical framework meet the fate of all utopias, for they fail to grasp one aspect or element of the complex reality of the Balkans.”⁵ In this thesis I seek to explore the relationship between particular international and ‘Bosnian’ actors during the years 1995-2007. In doing so I recognize two key difficulties: (1) that the actions and relationships I am exploring form only part of a connected process that had its beginnings in the Yugoslavian and conflict periods and is still very much ongoing and perhaps far from approaching anything like conclusion and (2) that the particular actors and their actions ‘on the ground’ in Bosnia are also very much situated within a broader context of regional and international relations and politics.

While recognizing the very real nature of these difficulties, I believe that they may be dealt with and overcome successfully enough to achieve the limited ambition of this thesis. All historical ‘periods’ and delimited ‘events’ and ‘processes’ are to some extent artificial divisions. The actions of historical actors through their consequences and lessons run into later generations and events are always the product of earlier events. The roots of contemporary Bosnia may be sought, and have been, well into what are called the ‘medieval’ ages of Europe and the decisions and policies enacted in the years between 1995 and 2007 will no doubt continue to influence future actors for many years to come. Nevertheless, the first twelve years of post-Dayton Bosnia represent a

⁵Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, "Bosnia, Supreme Archipelago," in *Sarajevo Essays: Politics, Ideology, and Tradition* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003).

significant period of time in which the relationship of external and internal state-builders has developed and it is this development that I wish to investigate.

Again the lines drawn between non-governmental and governmental, and national and international are to some extent imposed on the universal society that comprises all of humanity and can and should be questioned and critiqued as such. Indeed, I will criticize in the following pages certain aspects of the distinction between internal and external or local and international. However, such distinctions have some use in allowing a more systematic understanding of the different roles and powers that individuals take on and utilize within society.

In this thesis I examine the relationship between actors that are divided by their geographical/socio-political places of origin and permanent residence but which are united by their positions and roles within the Bosnian state. Bosnian politicians may share citizenship with and be elected by their fellow Bosnians but to a distinct extent, their position and consequently their interests, are different because of their identity as state-actors. Similarly the High Representative (HR) and other international administration officials are selected by distant international actors and bodies, but they are also distinct from those bodies because of the responsibilities and powers they take on as actors within the Bosnian state. The HR may be removed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board, but while he remains in his position he represents a crucial part of the 'legitimate' monopoly of power within Bosnia.

In the next chapter I will begin by providing a brief account of international involvement in Bosnia stretching from early interventionist policies in 1991 to recent developments in 2007. Providing this short historical overview is important because it will allow me to characterize the important aspects of the state-building process that significantly affect the relationship between international and local actors. My goal will be to demonstrate that the sources of conflict and disruption in Bosnia form complicated and interconnected patterns of perception and behavior that have proved difficult to disentangle for the Bosnian people, for local elite, for foreign states, for international

administrators, and even for supposedly detached and objective academics. This confusion has important implications for assigning blame, responsibility, and power in the post-Dayton context and I will try to describe some of the more significant of them. Finally, I will depict what I believe has been the dominant response to this historical, political, and moral confusion within the academic and policy literature and explain and criticize the ‘dualist’ perspective that this response represents.

In the third chapter I will establish my thesis that the relationship between international and national actors is only apparently oppositional and effectively cooperative and mutually-reinforcing. Beginning with an inquiry into the nature of the state I will then explain the basis for my assertion that external and internal are unified by their shared responsibility and power as state-builders and in effect, in their role as the legitimate monopoly of force, as the Bosnian state. I will then identify the actors and organizations that compose the international, or ‘external’, and local, or ‘internal’, components of the state and will conclude by explaining what role the Bosnian-public play in both the relationship between international and local elite and in the process of building a state in Bosnia.

As I will explain in chapter three, this thesis is not directly concerned with nationalism either as group identity or ideology. There is a large and excellent body of literature on nationalism and specifically on its manifestations in southeastern Europe, including the volume *Nationalism* edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. During and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, many politicians, academics, and other public figures increasingly utilized nationalist discourse and ideology to gain the support and adherence of the respective ethnic groups they claimed to represent. However, it is the argument of this thesis that the professed ideologies of the nationalist political parties are less important than their aggressive pursuit of state power.

In chapter four I will set the background for my thesis by explaining how the original military and diplomatic interventions during the 1991-95 conflict in former Yugoslavia helped lead to, and necessitated, further interventions; how nationalist forces co-opted

these interventions and attempted to turn them to their advantage; and how a sort of dialectical process emerged between the international community and the nationalist parties that made them jointly dependent on the others' existence. I will then proceed to examine the actual Dayton peace process and treaty. Building upon the emergent dialectical process of the conflict period, I will show how this system of reciprocal dependence facilitated the peace treaty and was instituted within the conditions of the treaty and within the new Bosnian constitution. The sustained existence of the nationalist parties, for instance, was essentially guaranteed by the utilization of ethnicity and ethnic identity as foundational elements of the new Bosnian state.

In chapters five and six, I will substantiate my thesis by describing the interdependent relationship between nationalist politicians and international administrators during the twelve years between 1995 and 2007. In order to avoid an awkwardly broad and vague analysis of a relationship that is undoubtedly far too large and multifaceted to be completely captured in a thesis of this length, in chapter five I will center my investigation around three critical aspects of the Dayton-implementation/state-building process between 1996 and 2002: (1) Internal security and stability, (2) elections and electoral engineering, and (3) economic development and reform. Chapter six will address the transition from 1996-2002 Dayton-implementation and democratization phase of state-building to the 2002-2007 phase of European integration as the framework for the state-building process. It will also describe how the dialectical relationship between internal and external state actors continued and developed within the compass of the process of European integration.

In the conclusion I will sum up my argument and suggest ways the general argument I have made in this thesis could be further substantiated with closer analyses of particular aspects of Bosnian state-building. I hope that by revealing the compatibility and dependence between them, analysis of state-building in Bosnia can move beyond the limiting and flawed perception of dichotomy between external and internal forces. By recognizing that the international and Bosnian authorities essentially depend upon each

other for their continued existence, the significant problems of state-building in Bosnia may perhaps be better understood.

CHAPTER 2

THE LABYRINTH OF STATE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

2.1. Introduction

Much of the recent state-building literature focuses on the technical and structural aspects of constructing economic, legal, and political institutions of government. In doing so it often draws on the work of earlier, and broader, nation and state-building research which considered post-colonial and newly independent states and the former Soviet Republics. However, a key difference separates international state-building and administration from that carried out by independent and sovereign states – the former heavily involves, even depends on, the presence and assistance of international actors.

This centrality of the international community's role has invited comparison to colonial rule and the older idea of trusteeship.⁶ Generally the analogy is used to criticize the imperious tendencies of international administrators. Indeed even the most proactive and ambitious arguments for international intervention and administration are cognizant of this criticism and carefully distinguish their conception of the international community's role from older colonial and imperialist policies. Although one is unlikely to find arguments that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence”⁷, international administration is nevertheless characterized as a temporary and transitional affair. More

⁶ Ralph Wilde, "Colonialism Redux? Territorial Administration by International Organizations, Colonial Echoes and the Legitimacy of the 'International'," in *State-Building. Theory and Practice*, ed. Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007).

⁷ “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, in *Basic Documents in International Law*, ed. Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 300.

pointedly, questions like “When does ‘benign’ administration become neocolonialism and how is it to be avoided?”⁸ tend to arise.

To avoid the charge of neocolonialism,⁹ international state-building is presented as a partnership between local leaders and international and non-governmental organizations. The Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, in its influential 1997 Report, emphasized that: “The Commission believes that the primary responsibility to avoid the reemergence of violence once peace has been achieved belongs to the people and their legitimate leaders; they must resume complete responsibility for their own affairs at the earliest opportunity.”¹⁰ But after colonialism is rhetorically rejected, the question remains, how are the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ and the local legitimate leaders’ ‘primary responsibility’ balanced in practice? And, “how are the aims of the international community and those of the local parties to be reconciled when they conflict?”¹¹

This is indeed a difficult question. The idea even seems somewhat paradoxical. A sovereign and independently sustainable state is to be built under the direction (and authority), and with the resources, of foreign powers (states and/or international bodies). If the job is to be done, and if conflict between internal and external actors is to be avoided, there is an evident necessity for a clear and understanding relationship with definable lines of authority and responsibility. In any case this would be difficult to

⁸ Mats Berdal, and Richard Caplan, "The Politics of International Administration," *Global Governance* 10 (2004).p.3.

⁹ See: Michael Chossudovsky, "Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Covert Action Quarterly* (Spring 1996).; And, Richard Caplan, "From Collapsing States to Neo-Trusteeship: The Limits to Solving the Problem of 'Precarious Statehood' in the 21st Century," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007).

¹⁰ Carnegie Commission On Preventing Deadly Conflict, "Final Report," (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997). p. xxi.

¹¹ Berdal, "The Politics of International Administration." p.3.

achieve, in Bosnia it has thus far proved essentially impossible.¹² International reconstruction typically occurs after violent conflict and/or a general break-down of state authority that leaves social and economic destruction in its wake. The more technical tasks of state-building usually follow and include the process of conflict resolution and as Norman Cigar noted, “the misrepresentation of a conflict will in all probability induce inappropriate policies that are bound to fail.”¹³ Recognizing how the sources of conflict in Bosnia have remained unclear and controversial for policy-makers and even for ‘disinterested’ academics is an important first step for understanding the problems of ‘shared responsibility and authority’ between local and international actors in Bosnia.

2.2. Understanding and explaining the conflict

It is often noted that the Balkans seem destined for division and conflict, or at least that that is the common perception in the West. The very name is used, in its modified verb form, to mean: to divide into small, quarrelsome, ineffectual states.¹⁴ In the 1870s popular outrage in Britain was provoked by newspaper accounts of the massacres of Bulgarians by local Muslims and Ottoman forces. The “Bulgarian Horrors” provoked, or offered a pretext for, Russian intervention in 1877 and after Great Power mediation resulted in the establishment of Bulgarian *de facto* independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Another ‘infamous’ event that is used to characterize the Balkans is the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 which helped spark the First World War. Whether or not conflict is an exception or the rule in Southeastern Europe, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest it is the exception, it seems to be the dominant image in Western popular imagination. This general picture of division and

¹² Kristof Bender and Gerald Knaus, "The Worst in Class: How the International Protectorate Hurts the European Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1 Special Supplement (2007).

¹³ Norman Cigar, "Paradigms and U.S. Policymaking for Bosnia (1992-1995)," *Forum Bosnae* 15 (2002). p. 60.

¹⁴ balkanize. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/balkanize> (accessed: July 06, 2008).

clash provides a poor foundation for understanding the complex causes of the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter Yugoslavia). And the conflict in Bosnia is virtually inseparable from that process.

Yugoslavia is perhaps best known in the West for its founder and leader Josip Broz Tito and his role in the non-aligned movement during the Cold War. It is also known for representing a “third way” between Western capitalism and Soviet communism. Yugoslav socialism even produced a system of “worker self-management” that purported to avoid the Stalinist centralized command system of the Soviet Union. But outside these more famous aspects of Yugoslavia, for much of its existence its complex political and economic system and delicate interethnic balance remained behind a veil of ignorance in the West. It is not surprising therefore that the reasons for its dissolution remain a highly contentious subject in policy and academic literature, especially since there isn’t even a dominant understanding of what kept Yugoslavia together for as long as it did.

In *Balkan Tragedy*¹⁵ Susan Woodward argued that a complex system of political and economic balance between the several republics and nationalities had allowed Yugoslavia to successfully exist until global economic shifts in the 1980s destabilized it and precipitated its downfall. After noting the many contradictions that have plagued Yugoslavia’s ‘miraculous’ existence, Stevan Pavlowitch wrote in 1988 that “Yugoslavia does exist, without a perceptible alternative...And since 1918 Yugoslavia has survived, however improbably. She has, in fact, survived in spite of the problems and the crises. She has been destroyed, and has come together again.”¹⁶ Sabrina Ramet offered a more straightforwardly negative and conclusive take on the “Yugoslav experiment” in her book *The Three Yugoslavias*:

What was evident as of early 1991 – though it had surely been obvious by summer 1989, if not earlier – was that the old Titoist program to defuse the nationalities problem, a problem which had been created by the illegitimate politics of the interwar kingdom and powerfully

¹⁵ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).

¹⁶ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918-1988* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1988). p. 154.

reinforced by the sanguinary fratricidal conflict of 1941-1945, and to fashion a “subjectively legitimate” state had completely failed.¹⁷

But uncertainty over what kept Yugoslavia together has not prevented extensive analysis of what forced it apart, with explanations so disparate and contradictory one could almost describe them as balkanized. One much maligned and generally discredited account that nevertheless heavily influenced many important politicians and policy-makers in the West during the early 1990s is that deep-rooted ethnic divisions and a culture of hatred and violence marked the Balkans, an area cursed with an ill-fated amalgamation of ethnic groups, empires, and religions. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was thus merely the unfortunate but unavoidable result.¹⁸ The direct influence of this view on the process of state-building in Bosnia is evidenced by its appearance in the memoirs of Carl Bildt, the first High Representative in Bosnia.¹⁹ Richard Holbrooke offered a slightly more nuanced and accurate explanation in his memoirs of his work as the United States’ lead negotiator during the Dayton Peace Accords: “Yugoslavia’s tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of bad, even criminal, political leaders who encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, political, and financial gain.”²⁰ This is also the argument of Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic as editors of *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, although they are more specific in identifying the “well-planned and long-prepared” policies of Belgrade and “to a lesser extent” Zagreb.²¹

¹⁷ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006). p. 378.

¹⁸ See: Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador, a Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (1995).; David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (Great Britain: Victor Gollancz, 1995). p. 3; Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

¹⁹ Carl Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998). p. 371.

²⁰ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999). p. 23.

²¹ Branka Magas, and Ivo Zanic, ed., *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). p. xxv.

Some authors have emphasized the economic aspects of the dissolution.²² Michael Chossudovsky claimed that “the (economic) reforms imposed by Belgrade’s creditors wreaked economic and political havoc leading to the disintegration of the industrial sector and the piece-meal dismantling of the Yugoslav Welfare State.”²³ Explanations that refer to broader global-political trends and changes in the international system are also popular. Contrasting his version with “reigning conventional wisdom”, Gordon Bardos viewed “the Balkans conflicts over the past decade as the last part of a long European historical process of nation and state building.”²⁴ Michael Mandelbaum claimed that the break-up was the product of the incompatibility of the two international norms of ‘self-determination’ and the inviolability of “existing sovereign borders.”²⁵ This incompatibility had been suppressed during the Cold War but surfaced when the Soviet Union collapsed. Most scholars and commentators (including many of those I have referenced here) recognized that multiple factors contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia but they disagreed emphatically over how to prioritize those factors. And prioritization is not something that can easily be dispensed with, at least not if one wants to answer the questions that seem unavoidable in light of the wars that accompanied the end of Yugoslavia. Could the break-up have been avoided? Should the break-up have been avoided? Was the war in Bosnia its avoidable or inevitable result?

From a detached perspective the answers to these and all the other questions regarding Yugoslavia need never be absolutely and finally resolved. History allows for multiple interpretations and a matter as fraught with complications as modern Yugoslavia is not likely to be explained without referring to innumerable factors and causes. The

²² Milica Z. Bookman, "Economic Aspects of Yugoslavia's Disintegration," in *Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003).

²³ Chossudovsky, "Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia-Herzegovina." p. 2

²⁴ Gordon N. Bardos, "International Policy in Southeastern Europe: A Diagnosis," in *Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003). p. 152.

²⁵ Michael Mandelbaum, "The Future of Nationalism," in *Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003). p. 42.

difficulty, however, is that it is nearly impossible to maintain a detached perspective because for most involved the conflict in Bosnia is a problem to be solved not an academic subject to be discussed and most of the developed Western states are involved in the job, in some way or other.²⁶ As Brendan O'Shea put it:

Throughout the wars of dissolution, and in the conflict-resolution phase thereafter, attempting to establish the 'truth' of what happened became an almost impossible task. Each party had their own concept of the truth, their own version of events, and their own interpretation of Balkan history. Equally, those internationals who came to help brought with them a variety of preconceptions and agendas, and, depending on what they actually experienced on the ground, then went away to write their memoirs doggedly determined to support one side or the other. Very few found themselves in positions whereby they could monitor the big picture and thereby offer balanced objective assessment and evaluation.²⁷

How one interpreted the conflict in Bosnia to an extent determined the strategy for its resolution. For Alan Kuperman, the early Western attention to the emerging problem in Yugoslavia in 1991 was "actually a causal variable in exacerbating their violence."²⁸ For U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, "the refusal of the Bush Administration to commit American power early was our greatest mistake of the entire Yugoslav crisis. It made an unjust outcome inevitable."²⁹ Norman Cigar does an excellent job of documenting how the dominant perception of the conflict in the U.S. government was that it was a 'blood feud' or a 'religious war' and that it had its roots in the medieval ages. This perception lent itself to the conclusion that outside interference would be useless and that the conflict was basically insoluble.³⁰ Another common claim is that Germany's early recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence precipitated the

²⁶ The Peace Implementation Council charged with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords comprises 55 countries and international agencies.

²⁷ Brendan O'Shea, *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005). p. 1.

²⁸ Alan J. Kuperman, "Transnational Causes of Genocide, or How the West Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict," in *Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003). p. 55.

²⁹ Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books, 1996), p. 216.

³⁰ Cigar, "Paradigms and U.S. Policymaking for Bosnia (1992-1995)."

conflict.³¹ Because the matter is typically perceived as of practical importance, at some point assigning blame becomes a moot point and focus shifts to resolving the problem. But at that stage the wide disparity of opinions regarding the war's root causes and primary instigators is merely transformed into disagreement over appropriate solutions and legitimate authorities.

2.3. The role of the Dayton Peace Accords

The Dayton treaty was not the first peace plan to be proposed during the war in Bosnia. In fact, throughout the four years of conflict several peace plans were proposed, discussed, and successively rejected or dropped. These plans have been reviewed and appraised many times over and it is not necessary to go over them again here.³² It is sufficient to say that the problems that plagued the resolution process and the international mediation efforts were similar to those that so thoroughly complicated earlier analysis. Moreover, minimal understanding of the problems lent itself to unhelpful, contradictory, and counterproductive international mediation.

In their fascinating account, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Laura Silber and Allan Little describe how initial European efforts to prevent conflict overlooked the structural causes of contention and seemed to assume that “the conflict was caused by no more than some ill-defined...Balkan temperament, a south Slavic predisposition – either cultural or genetic – toward fratricide.”³³ Saadia Touval argues that European mediators' use of economic incentives and disincentives was unhelpful when dealing with nationalist politicians whose “primary preoccupation was with their nations’

³¹ Susan L. Woodward, "War: Building States from Nations," in *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade*, ed. Tariq Ali (London: Verso, 2000). p. 212.

³² See: Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour. Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).; Jeanne M. Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution That Wouldn't Go Quietly* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006).; Steven L. Burg, and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).; O'Shea, *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995*.; Laura Silber, and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Revised 1996 ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

³³ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 159.

physical security.”³⁴ This seems to hold some weight in the light of statements like that made by the Serbian nationalist Milan Martić in Knin:

...you have forgotten one fact. Yes, it is nice to live well, to have good pay, to have good clothes, a good car. However, there is something which money cannot buy. What cannot be bought is our Serb dignity. We would rather go hungry, as long as we are together with our Serb people. We will eat potatoes and husks, but we will be on the side of our people. We will remain human.³⁵

When international efforts did have an effect they often had a counterproductive one. Ramet asserts that the UN’s assistance allowed the Serbs to persist in the war for longer than they could have alone.³⁶ Many have argued, including Phillip Corwin, a UN official during the conflict, that the “Bosnian government’s tactics in trying to draw NATO into the conflict often went beyond the bounds of strategy and crossed the line into provocation and reckless endangerment.”³⁷ Croatian president Franjo Tuđman is also recognized to have attempted to use international recognition to achieve independence.³⁸ My point here is not to overwhelm the reader with multiple and contradictory accounts of the peace process and of who was right and who was wrong. But if it is overwhelming, the difficulty of creating a helpful and universally acceptable peace agreement will become much clearer. It will also be evident how easy it would be, if the agreement that is eventually accepted goes wrong in any way, to claim that failure was inevitable from the very beginning because the peace began on the wrong footing and with the wrong resolution. And for many, Dayton has gone wrong, and this is exactly what has happened.

Disagreement about Dayton begins with its purpose. What was Dayton constructed to do? What were its objectives? Lord Paddy Ashdown, a former High Representative in

³⁴ Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. The Critical Years, 1990-1995* (New York: Palgrave, 2002). p. 21.

³⁵ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 99.

³⁶ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. p. 444.

³⁷ Phillip Corwin, *Dubious Mandate. A Memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). p. xiv.

³⁸ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 170.

Bosnia, claimed that “Dayton was designed to end a war, not build a state.”³⁹ An opposite view is held by Lord Ashdown’s predecessor Carl Bildt, the first High Representative. Bildt claims that “The peace agreement for Bosnia is the most ambitious document of its kind in modern history, perhaps in history as a whole. A traditional peace treaty aims at ending a war...while here it is a question of setting up a state on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a bitter war.”⁴⁰ Richard Holbrooke, who is credited with engineering the agreement, was more ambiguous in his expectations for Dayton and left its value to be determined by history.⁴¹

If one can establish Dayton’s intentions, it is still another matter entirely to evaluate the fulfillment of those intentions. Silber and Little note that after the signing of Dayton “none of the parties was ready to back the political goals of the Dayton Accord.”⁴² Even if Dayton had noble intentions, even if the nationalist politicians in Bosnia and the international community were committed to implementing its terms, Dayton’s structure itself affords reason for criticism. Richard Caplan argued that “the Dayton Accord was beset by so many internal contradictions that it was not clear what kind of peace it would establish if it could succeed in sustaining peace at all.”⁴³ The Dayton Project group lays the fault of Dayton’s lack of success at the feet of nationalist political parties placing their narrow political interests above the goal of building a unified and

³⁹ Lord Paddy Ashdown, ‘International Humanitarian Law, Justice and Reconciliation in a Changing World’, The Eighth Hauser Lecture on International Humanitarian Law, New York, 3 Mar 2004, at www.nyuhr.org/docs/lordpaddyashdown.pdf.

⁴⁰ Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*. p. 392.

⁴¹ Holbrooke, *To End a War*. p. 335.

⁴² Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 377.

⁴³ Richard Caplan, "Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 2 (2000).

prosperous Bosnia.⁴⁴ David Chandler counters this assertion with the argument that the “Dayton agreement has, in fact, facilitated external regulation.”⁴⁵

Once again a repeating pattern emerges of contradictory accounts of the nature of the problem and numerous, mutually exclusive solutions. All of the questions and points of contention covered in this section are interesting matters in themselves and no doubt worthy of independent and thorough consideration. But here I have tried only to demonstrate the immensely complex and entangled nature of the conflicts (and solutions) that have brought so much misery to the people of Bosnia. The ramifications of the labyrinthine context of post-Dayton Bosnia have shaped the state-building process.

2.4. Responsibility and accountability in governance

The ambiguity of power and responsibility in post-Dayton Bosnia is clearly in part a result of the disorder of assigning responsibility and culpability during the war. The self-interested and disingenuous relationships between the nationalist parties of Croatian, Serbian and Muslim Bosnians and between them and the international community left their mark on the institutions established by the Dayton Accords and still permeated the politics of state-building in the twelve years since Dayton. The puzzling business of state-building hasn’t helped to introduce clarity either. As David Chandler observed, “There is a growing network of international institutions and *ad hoc* bodies involved in the policy-making process, this complex inter-linking of different agencies does not make it straightforward to delineate responsibility for policy development and implementation.”⁴⁶ But the problem of overlapping, insufficient, and

⁴⁴ Dayton Project Bosnia-Herzegovina Study Group, "A Roadmap to the Future: Realizing a Stable and Democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina in Europe," (Medford, MA: The Dayton Peace Accords Project, 2007).

⁴⁵ David Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe," in *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia*, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006). p. 30.

⁴⁶ David Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*, Second Edition 2000 ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1999). p. 55.

contradictory delineation of responsibility affects more than just the creation and implementation of policy. The delegation of surprising degrees of power coupled with the inability to trace the consequences of a policy to its source (because of the entangled layers and spheres of authority) results in the absence of accountability.

In post-Dayton Bosnia real accountability in governance seems virtually nonexistent. Under the terms of the Dayton agreement Bosnia is a sovereign state. Although elections have been held under international supervision several times since 1996, their validity has never been very extensively accepted. A European Stability Initiative report in 2000 asserted that “the nationalist regimes are not dependent on elections or parliaments for their power.”⁴⁷ As Bosnia’s elected leaders are not perceived as sufficiently accountable to the Bosnian people the international community under the auspices of the *ad hoc* international organization led by the High Representative has stepped up to represent the ‘true interests’ of the people. The High Representative meanwhile is also not accountable to the Bosnian people. In fact, as High Representative Carlos Westendorp pointed out in 1997: “if you read Dayton very carefully, Annex 10 gives the final interpretation of Dayton to the High Representative. Annex 10 even gives me the possibility to interpret my own authorities and powers.”⁴⁸

Yet as the International Crisis group noted in one of their reports, “The High Representative can command, but he cannot actually implement reforms. For this he needs the genuine engagement of the domestic authorities.”⁴⁹ The balance of power and division of authority in Bosnia between the international community and the local Bosnian government, and its various divisions, are unclear and variable. Consequently success is still far off for Bosnia’s state builders. In February of 2007 the Peace Implementation Council announced its plans to close the Office of the High Representative by June of 2007. A few months later the closure was delayed until June

⁴⁷ European Stability Initiative, "Elections in 2000. Risks for the Bosnian Peace Process," (Berlin - Brussels - Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, 2000). p. 1.

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building," (Sarajevo/Brussels: Balkans Report No. 146, 2003).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

of 2008. But again in February of 2008 talk of extending the deadline began again. In an interview with the *EU Observer*, High Representative Miroslav Lajcak said “closing his office remained a priority but only when Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a ‘peaceful, viable state irreversibly on course for European integration’.”⁵⁰

2.5. Explaining failure: the dualist approach

The conventional response to the complex and opaque division of power in Bosnia between local, or nationalist, and international actors has been what I characterize as the ‘dualist’ approach. According to the traditional discourse of state sovereignty, international relations are conducted between independent states and voluntary associations of states (i.e. the United Nations). A main characteristic of sovereignty is the ‘law of non-intervention’ whereby states have historically agreed to mutually respect and refrain from interfering in domestic concerns. In the post-Cold War period, sovereignty has been increasingly reconsidered and international intervention has become a familiar event in international relations. In the wake of these international interventions, international administrations (composed of associations of states and/or international bodies) have shouldered, to varying degrees, the traditional responsibilities and powers of the original, local state.

However, analysis of international intervention and administration has maintained a clear distinction between national parties (the ‘internal’) and international parties (the ‘external’). Sumantra Bose’s assertion in his book *Bosnia After Dayton* provides a typical example of this approach: “Indeed, it has become increasingly obvious that the main faultline of conflict in post-Dayton Bosnia has not been between the three Bosnian national groups, but that the ‘main line of confrontation has been between Bosnians (of

⁵⁰ Elitsa Vucheva, *International Envoy Expresses Concern over Bosnia* (EU Observer, 2008 [accessed 4 April 2008]); available from <http://euobserver.com/15/25742>.

all three groups) and (representatives of) the international community'."⁵¹ Power is seen as divided between these two spheres, exchanged between them, and as utilized in concert or in opposition, but the actors themselves and their use of power are exclusively identified as external or internal. The process of state-building in Bosnia, however, may be better understood as produced and continued through a new synthesis of these traditionally differentiated identities. This synthesis will form the subject of the next chapter.

⁵¹ Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002). p. 6; And, Susan L. Woodward, "Transitional Elections and the Dilemmas of International Assistance to Bosnia & Herzegovina," in *Three Dimension of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Finding from Usip-Sponsored Research and Field Projects*, ed. S. Riskin (Washington, DC: 1999). p. 9.

CHAPTER 3

A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY and THE NATIONALIST PARTIES

3.1. Introduction

In the post-Dayton period the Bosnian economy has become heavily dependent on international aid. Between 1995 and 1999 international aid to Bosnia amounted to \$5.1 billion.⁵² This ‘unprecedented’ level of foreign aid was accompanied by calls, like that made at the 1998 PIC Madrid meeting, for Bosnia to strive to become “ready for life with a reduced level of foreign aid.”⁵³ Despite falling levels since 2000, aid has continued to play a large role in Bosnia’s economy. Bosnia’s May 2004 *Strategy for Economic Development* aspired to draw \$1.5 billion in donor grants by 2007.⁵⁴ And influential policy groups like the International Crisis Group (ICG) still vigorously argue for sustained international support.⁵⁵ Similarly, although less often recognized, Bosnian politicians have become dependent on international administrators.⁵⁶ Indeed, some scholars have noted that nationalist politics have become institutionalized in Bosnia

⁵² International Crisis Group, "Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? An Overview of Impediments to Investment and Self Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era," (ICG Balkans Report No. 64, 21 April 1999). p. i.

⁵³ Annex to the Madrid Declaration, Peace Implementation Council, 16 December 1998, section IV. 1.

⁵⁴ *Strategy for Economic Development of BiH*, Government of BiH, Sarajevo, May 2004.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy," (Europe Report No. 180, 15 February 2007).

⁵⁶ Ivan Lovrenovic, "Who Actually Governs Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Bosnia Report* New Series no. 32-34 (December-July 2003).

because of and through international presence and activities.⁵⁷ But this dependency is not a one-way street. The international community has always necessarily relied to some extent on local acquiescence and support to achieve its objectives.⁵⁸ More specifically, in this thesis (in chapters 5 and 6) I will seek to show that international administrators have become tied to nationalist politics in Bosnia.

The central argument of this thesis is that the international administration and nationalist parties have become united in a mutually advantageous and mutually-reinforcing process of sharing power, responsibility, and blame. Moreover, they have both benefited from the continuance in academic and policy discourse of the familiar dichotomy between internal and external. This dichotomy has prevented widespread recognition of their shared culpability in the failures of state-building, resulting instead in continual attempts to fault one side or the other amid the hopelessly entangled governmental and authoritative structure and existence of post-Dayton Bosnia. The assertion of a dialectical union between internal and external does not exclude the fact of differences between them. The very real and distinct characteristics of the identities defined as 'internal' and 'external' were briefly discussed in the introduction. But after revealing the interdependent process that has emerged between international and local actors, the differences between them become relatively less important secondary characteristics. This dialectical process has resulted in the augmentation of power within the institution of the 'Bosnian' state encompassing both 'internal' and 'external' actors.

⁵⁷The Bosnia Institute, "Emancipating Bosnia," *Bosnia Report* New Series, no. 32-34 (December-July 2003).; Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia after Dayton: Transforming a Compromise into a State," in *After the Peace. Resistance and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building." p. ii.

3.2. Understanding interdependence

The interdependence that has emerged between the nationalist parties and the international community in Bosnia has two main pillars. The first is the common goal of the exercise of power within the territorial borders of post-Dayton Bosnia. The second, which I will cover further below, is the advantage that accrues to both parties through the process of apparent opposition and actual cooperation. The first source of interdependence follows from their mutual interest in monopolizing the use of legitimate force in Bosnia.

In discussing Bosnia scholars have so intently focused on what is called ‘state-building’, they have effectively neglected serious and comprehensive analysis of what constitutes the state in Bosnia at present. That is, the conventional approach seems to accept that the Bosnian state is, in fact as well as according to international law, what was instituted under the Dayton Accords. Thus, the Bosnian state consists of the two entities the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniac-Croat Federation (FBiH) and their respective governments. This assumption is partly enabled by use of the verb ‘building’, which turns attention to the future end-state or result of the state-building process. Focus is placed on the ‘state’ that is the final intention of state-building efforts and a distinction is maintained between the builders and the ‘state’. Thus international administrators are never characterized as ‘the state’ but rather as state-builders – detached from and relatively ‘disinterested’ (at least as far as their own immediate ‘selfish’ interests are concerned) in the final product of their construction.

Yet closer analysis reveals the flaw in this assumption. Whether or not international administration is a ‘temporary’ affair, as long as the indigenous institutions and local actors are acting under the tutelage or guidance of the international community, they do not represent the entire state – for they do not hold anything approaching a monopoly on legitimate force. In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, the German Sociologist Max Weber argued that an institution could be identified as “a ‘state’ if and

insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its orders.”⁵⁹ The Bosnian ‘state’ instituted under the Dayton agreement does not fulfill this definition in and of itself but rather forms a part of the state that is completed by the international community. Even a brief review of the international administration of Bosnia since 1995 demonstrates this assertion.

As David Chandler noted in 2006, “BiH is administered directly through ad hoc mechanisms institutionalized under the powers of the EU Special Representative, and policy-making is essentially the preserve of Brussels, implemented with the assistance of the EU-funded and advised Directorate for European Integrations.”⁶⁰ This rule of the international community and the High Representative⁶¹ is backed up by the presence of an international military force. The European Union Force (EUFOR) is “tasked with ensuring that BiH adheres to the military aspects of Dayton. The force works closely with Slovakia’s Miroslav Lajcak, the double-hatted UN’s Office of the High Representative (OHR)/EU Special Representative in BiH (EUSR), who oversees the civilian aspects of Dayton.”⁶² Joel Migdal provides an astute definition of the state that accurately and adequately describes the Bosnian state so that both local and international components are accounted for:

an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.⁶³

⁵⁹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (1964). p. 154.

⁶⁰ Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe." p. 40.

⁶¹ Who is also the EU Special Representative.

⁶² European-defence.co.uk, *Military Operations: Bosnia-Herzegovina* (2007 [accessed 7 April 2008]); available from <http://www.european-defence.co.uk/thebalkans.html>.

⁶³ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). p. 19.

Once it is recognized that the state within Bosnia encompasses no less than the local Bosnian government and the international community led by the OHR, analysis can move beyond a relatively rigid dichotomy between the two originally distinct entities.

The dominant tendency to view state-building in Bosnia as essentially a bitter contest between local nationalist forces and the international community, what I have called the dualist perspective, is built on a flawed understanding of state actors and power. In order to move away from the dualist perspective it is necessary not only to remove or see through the sham, or at best irrelevant, distinction between local and international, it is also critical to develop a more thorough account of the state. The dualist perspective is built on a naive assumption that the state is a more cohesive and dominant force in society than it really is. For scholars and analysts concerned with state-building in Bosnia, “the focus all too frequently has been on the very top leadership, the elites in the upper echelon of the state organization, as if they alone are the state, as if their wills are re-created faithfully through out the labyrinth of state branches and bureaus.”⁶⁴

Thus the struggle between local and international state-builders has been depicted as if it were simply over these upper echelons of the state, over whose ‘will’ will prevail, the self-aggrandizing nationalists or the democracy-concerned international community.

If this assumption is not dismissed than an attempt to discard the distinction between local and international will lead to a puzzling dead end. That is, if state-building in Bosnia is perceived as a prize-fight between nationalists and the international community with ‘ultimate’ state-power as the prize, simply combining the two fighters into one presents an almost absurd picture because the context of a prize-fight remains. The most obvious solution would then be to only restage the contest as one occurring within the state, and the need for two identifiable and separate contestants would bring about the renewed differentiation of local and international, only now competing ‘within’ the state instead of ‘for’ the state.

⁶⁴ Joel Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 115.

To overcome the dualist perspective then, this thesis depicts state-building in Bosnia as a multi-layered and fragmented process. Though the state is a delimited organization within Bosnian society, “there is certainly little guarantee that the sum of actions of the various components of the state, each facing distinctive struggles within the particular arenas in which it engages other social forces, will represent some harmonious mesh.”⁶⁵ This recognition allows for accounts of state-building on multiple levels; of individual international actors and agencies operating in opposition to one another, of local politicians more concerned with maintaining and exercising power in small territorial areas than with resisting international authority, of alliances between certain local nationalists and members of the international community, and many other narratives that cannot be accounted for, and must be ignored or brushed over, in the dominant model of distinctive contest between a unified international community and nationalist controlled parties.

Analogous accounts may be found in other studies utilizing aspects of the state-in-society approach. Writing of Maoist China Vivienne Shue provides an exceedingly pertinent example: “Frontline officials, despite their status as agents of the state, frequently found it advisable, or easier, or more natural, or just in accord with their own convictions, to throw in their lot with local people and departmental associates, against the impersonal requirements of the state bureaucracy above them.”⁶⁶ In his study of British rule in Palestine⁶⁷ Niall O. Murchu found that

despite British Leaders’ continued call to overseas bureaucracies to impose order, those elements of the state that were supposed to impose a solution found themselves with cripplingly limited knowledge about local groups and woefully insufficient resources to do the job. In both cases, parts of the British state located in the territories tried to overcome these deficiencies by forming quiet coalitions with local agents in society. In fact, they

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 117.

⁶⁶ Vivienne Shue, "State Power and Social Organization in China," in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 71.

⁶⁷ Niall O Murchu, "Labor, the State, and Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Study of British Rule in Palestine (1920-1939) and Northern Ireland (1973-1994)" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 2000).

became dependent on the Jews and Protestants for capital, local knowledge, skilled manpower, security personnel, and more.⁶⁸

These examples clue us to what the real process of state-building in Bosnia may look like. From this perspective the nationalists and international community become subsumed within the process they are engaged in, the process of forming and wielding power within society, the process of the state. Domestic and international state actors are engaged in a mutually-reinforcing process because they are all struggling to use and expand the particular positions in the state that they inhabit. The aggregate effect of these individual struggles is to expand the overall state and the potential power that nationalists and international parties, as members of the state, will be able to exercise in the future.

From shared participation in the institutions of state proceeds a shared goal: the exercise of power within society.⁶⁹ The primacy of this goal follows automatically from the fact that no end or aim of government (e.g. provision of public security, or the reduction of poverty) can be achieved without a minimum use of power. If state policy did not require the use of power, than the apparatus of force and compulsion (police, military, etc.) maintained by every recognizable state would be unnecessary and would disappear as resources would be shifted to fund other services. The importance of the state's ability to maintain and exercise power has recently received much attention. Indeed, as Neil Robinson has pointed out, "it has become conventional wisdom...that a major, and perhaps principal, threat to peace and security globally is the breakdown of state power."⁷⁰ Weak states are defined as those without "capacities to penetrate society,

⁶⁸ Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. p. 28.

⁶⁹ Henceforth I will use the word power, unless otherwise indicated, to refer to coercive force (either its actual use or the threat of use) legitimated by the authority and identity of the state. This is not to deny other reasonable definitions and interpretations of power. But here I am primarily interested in the unique quality of the modern state that it is the only entity within society that consistently, openly, and freely uses force or the threat thereof to implement and sustain its actions.

⁷⁰ Neil Robinson, "State-Building and International Politics: The Emergence of a 'New' Problem and Agenda," in *State-Building. Theory and Practice*, ed. Aidan Hehir, and Neil Robinson (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007). p. 1.

regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”⁷¹ Reconstructing these states and enabling them to preserve a monopoly of legitimate force within society and to use this power to implement policies has become a primary justification for international intervention and administration.

The importance of power for both the Bosnian government and the international community has been demonstrated since the earliest international interventions. During the early years of the war in Yugoslavia, prior to more extensive NATO and U.S. interventions in 1995, the international community was criticized heavily for its refusal (or inability) to take action to stop the war.⁷² Policy based on “rhetoric”, utilizing negotiation, persuasion, and compromise, was seen as deficient and inferior to action, backed up by force. To this effect Richard Holbrooke claimed that “the best chance to prevent war would have been to present Yugoslavia with a clear warning that NATO airpower would be used against any party that tried to deal with ethnic tensions by force.”⁷³

The ineffective policies of the international community were often contrasted with the effective (although perhaps morally repugnant) nationalist parties whose “willingness to use any means whatever to retain power ensured that they would remain factors to be considered.”⁷⁴ Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic made clear the importance of maintaining power in 1991 when he proclaimed that “I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty.”⁷⁵ Referring to the Dayton process Carl Bildt demonstrated the

⁷¹ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. p. 4.

⁷² David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul. Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002). p. 16.

⁷³ Holbrooke, *To End a War*. p. 28.

⁷⁴ Warren H. Switzer, "International Military Responses to the Balkan Wars: Crises in Analysis," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas, and Ivo Zanic (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). p. 282.

⁷⁵ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 211.

importance of power for the international community: “No-one thought it wise to submit the constitution to any sort of parliamentary or other similar proceeding. It was to be a constitution by international decree.”⁷⁶ The paramountcy of power for state actors in Bosnia is best illustrated by the words of former High Representative Carlos Westendorp: “You do not have power handed to you on a platter. You just seize it, if you use this power well, no one will contest it.”⁷⁷

The significance of power for the state (i.e. for the individuals and organizations that comprise the state) remains regardless of which particular ends it uses its power to pursue. Politicians may seek to consolidate and increase their power for personal gain and aggrandizement. Or they may cling to power because they sincerely believe that they know what is best for the public and want to act to further the public interest. Moreover, whether for private or public betterment the state will require more rather than less power. As Nobel winning economist James Buchanan wrote of politicians, “Although their reasons may differ, the ideologue, the seeker after public acclaim, and the profiteer each will be motivated to expand the size and scope of the governmental sector of the economy.”⁷⁸ One final piece of evidence that indicates the growth of power under the state is the fairly remarkable increase in the size of the Bosnian government (and especially the international component) during the twelve years since its re-establishment in 1995.⁷⁹ But while both Bosnian and international parties have a general interest in enlarging the state, their interests have become even more closely aligned.

⁷⁶ Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*. p. 139.

⁷⁷ J. Rodriguez, “Our Man in Sarajevo,” *El Pais*, 29 March 1998 (trans. Office of the High Representative).

⁷⁸ James M. Buchanan, *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan*, 20 vols., vol. 7, *The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999-2002).

⁷⁹ David Chandler, "Introduction: Peace without Politics?," in *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia*, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).

In *The Anatomy of the State* political economist Murray Rothbard noted that “once a State has been established, the problem of the ruling group...is how to maintain their rule. While force is their *modus operandi*, their basic and long-run problem is ideological.”⁸⁰ This is an enormously apt description of the problem for the Bosnian state. For the international community nearly every factor (e.g. their own domestic considerations, international opinion, national interests, etc.) eliminated the possibility of maintaining their role and influence in Bosnia or of furthering their goals solely, or even primarily, through force. International state-building since the end of the Cold War is largely dependent on ideological justification.⁸¹

Similarly, as I will show in the next chapter, from the very beginning of the war, the Bosnian nationalist parties were dependent in some way on the international community. The end of the war, despite some protestations to the contrary, was to some extent seen as necessary to their interests by all three of the nationalist sides. Once the Dayton Peace Accords were signed and the international military force was present, outright force was no longer a feasible way of maintaining their power. The ambiguous and vague structure of responsibility and authority in Bosnia and the common perception of a determined conflict between nationalist and international have provided the ideological justification for the power of the state (including both internal and external components) in Bosnia.

In the last chapter it was seen that responsibility and accountability in governance in Bosnia is prevented and confounded by the ambiguous and complicated structure of authority in the post-Dayton framework. This perplexing situation has enabled what Philip Cunliffe has termed ‘the exercise of power without responsibility.’ Cunliffe argued, in reference to the international community, that “as more and more societies have fallen into the orbit of the Western states, paradoxically, in order to continue exercising power without accountability, Western states have had to build strong states

⁸⁰ Murray Rothbard, "The Anatomy of the State," in *Egalitarianism as a Revolt against Nature and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974). p. 37.

⁸¹ David Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006).; Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul. Human Rights and International Intervention*.

in the developing world – in order to avoid being encumbered with the institutions of direct domination.”⁸² Bosnia is a perfect example of these ‘strong states in-waiting’ which are officially and legally independent and sovereign but are still heavily dependent upon the international community underneath the guise of a state-building international administration.

But the benefits of ‘power without responsibility’ are also available to the nationalist parties in Bosnia. By strongly denouncing the ‘international regime’ Bosnian leaders are able to present themselves as the defenders of the true and local interests of their constituencies.⁸³ Another variant is to hand-off legislation and policy to the international community in order to avoid the responsibility for its potential failure.⁸⁴ The appearance of difference and opposition allows both the nationalists and the international community to perpetuate the idea that they are struggling for progress and development but are woefully obstructed by the corruption and incompetence of the other. Consequently, both parties operate under the potent incentive of maintaining a façade of struggle between them and of keeping the structure of government sufficiently muddled so that their actual commonalities are hidden. In response to the question, “who actually governs Bosnia?” Ivan Lovrenovic characterizes this process precisely:

Anyone who wishes to answer this question in a rational and consistent manner is faced with an impossible task. After having listed all the (innumerable) institutions and levels of the domestic governing system, and added to the list all the institutions and functions of the international government, when one tries to analyse the whole thing in its mutual interconnectedness in order to establish its meaning and purpose, and especially any potential it may have for taking society forward, one is left with the impression of a monstrous and hypertrophied structure that has escaped its initial meaning if it ever had one, and that - unproductive and parasitic - has continued to multiply almost organically, guided solely by the desire to keep itself in existence. The whole purpose of the model, so far as one can see, is to prevent Bosnia’s own political structures from developing in the direction of full independence, with a concomitant awareness of their responsibility for and duty towards their country. It is designed to keep domestic political forces in a state of permanent immaturity, but not to the extent that the all-powerful international complex is forced to

⁸² Philip Cunliffe, "State-Building: Power without Responsibility," in *State-Building. Theory and Practice*, ed. Aidan Hehir, and Neil Robinson (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007). p. 52.

⁸³ Associated Press, *Bosnia's Muslim President Condemned a Top US Diplomat* (Associated Press, 9 May 1998 [accessed 9 April 2008]); available from <http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/twatch-1.html>.

⁸⁴ Christophe Solioz, "Quest for Sovereignty: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Challenge," *Helsinki Monitor* 2 (2003).

assume open responsibility for running the country. This labyrinthine structure, because devoid of any real and transparent responsibility, is also left without any clear task - a state of affairs that maximizes its capacity to act in an voluntaristic and ad hoc manner whenever it feels the need.⁸⁵

But where Lovrenovic depicts a more passive and weak local political structure dominated by the 'model' of international administration, this thesis argues that local politicians play a more willing part. Domestic political forces are not immature; they are aware of the advantages of complicity in international rule and are eager to maintain their power without attendant responsibility.

At this point it is useful to identify more closely the nationalist parties and the international community in Bosnia. I have deliberately avoided beginning with a precise identification of them because this thesis is more concerned with the dialectical process between them than in either of them individually or in theoretical isolation.

3.3. The nationalists: desperation and manipulation

In this thesis I am primarily interested in the dialectical relationship between what are perceived as external and internal components of the Bosnian state. Thus the particular ideologies or goals of the local, or nationalist, members of the state are less important here than the means, state power, which they exercise. As Susan Woodward wrote:

The label of nationalism is not sufficient to describe a situation or predict behavior, however, because of its empty-vessel character – its absence of programme outside the insistence on political power for some imagined community. It can therefore ally easily with others, including dispossessed communists who believe in a strong state against international exploitation or who hold bureaucratic positions. Such allies may be ideologically contradictory groups from far left to far right joined only by political expediency.⁸⁶

Post-Dayton Bosnia has seen, and later chapters will describe, just such alliances between nationalists and 'non-nationalists', between 'liberals' and international actors, between nationalists and international actors, etc., based on the importance of exercising

⁸⁵ Lovrenovic, "Who Actually Governs Bosnia-Herzegovina."

⁸⁶ Woodward, "War: Building States from Nations." p. 204.

and maintaining state power. The changing and amorphous character of the nationalist identity and the preeminence of political expediency were evidenced by the support the international community gave ‘moderate’ and ‘non-nationalist’ Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik between 1998 and 2000 “despite obvious evidence by 1999 that the ‘moderate’ government headed by Dodik...was incompetent, deeply corrupt and almost as hostile as previous SDS (Serb Democratic Party) regimes toward minority, particularly Bosniac, returns to the RS.”⁸⁷ That even supposedly liberal and progressive parties reinforce the state in conjunction with the international community was demonstrated by the ineffectiveness and political posturing of the brief rule (2000-2002) of the coalition of parties known as the Democratic Alliance for Change.⁸⁸

The group of actors I identify as the nationalists in Bosnia is comprised of the three main nationalist parties of Bosnian Serbs (the Serb Democratic Party, SDS), Croats (Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ), and Muslims (the Muslim Party of Democratic Action, SDA). This group has largely maintained power in Bosnia during the Yugoslav War and the post-Dayton state-building process. As Steven Burg and Paul Shoup noted, “the nationalist leaders retained the loyalties of their respective groups throughout the conflict. Indeed, they continue to command such loyalty even today. It was the nationalists with whom international negotiators had to deal...in imposing a solution on the warring parties in Bosnia.”⁸⁹ Except for the brief period between 2000 and 2002, the nationalist parties have been repeatedly re-elected, and have largely controlled the local Bosnian government and bureaucracy.

Using the comprehensive and generalizing term ‘nationalists’ does not mean that there are no identifiable differences between and among the nationalists. Indeed, as Woodward pointed out the term ‘nationalist’ is largely empty of substantive content.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 231.

⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change," (Sarajevo/Brussels: ICG Balkans Report No. 132, 2 August 2002).

⁸⁹ Burg, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. p. 13-14.

⁹⁰ Woodward, "War: Building States from Nations." pp. 203-205.

It is true that there are non-nationalists voters and politicians in Bosnia and some of them are quite influential. Similarly, there are differences among the three nationalist parties (and within them), not least that they represent three distinct ethnic/religious groups.

However, these differences do not prevent us from recognizing their commonalities. Individuals may come and go but the structures of power and interest they act within and on have continued and been reinstated in the post-Dayton period. The goal of all three nationalist parties was to monopolize and maintain power as the state and it is this common goal that allows them to be collectively identified. In this light, David Owen's point that "there were no innocents among the political and military leaders in all three parties in Bosnia-Herzegovian"⁹¹ is accurate.⁹² Thus I use the term nationalists to denote the local state actors for two reasons. (1) Because the nationalists have effectively retained power within the state in the post-Dayton period. And, (2) because, as I described in the first part of this chapter, the 'identity' of nationalist is an important part of the ideological justification and legitimation of the 'external', or international, component of the Bosnian state.

3.4. The international community: partnership and ownership

In this thesis the label of 'international community' represents the individuals and institutions which are foreign to Bosnia but who have acted in concert, and in conflict, within Bosnia since 1991. At its broadest level the international community consists of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an ad hoc organization comprising 55 countries and international organizations, which was formed at the Peace Implementation Conference in December 1995 in London. The PIC was effectively the continuation of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which had handled mediation efforts during the war. The PIC is managed by the Steering

⁹¹ Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*. p. 47.

⁹² And perhaps equally applicable to aspects of his own pursuit of the 'cantonization' of Bosnia.

Board which includes the US, Russia, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, the European Union Presidency, the European Commission, and Turkey. The six foreign states that exercise the most influence in Bosnia (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the US) compose the Contact Group which “regularly carries out preparatory work for PIC Steering Board discussion and decision.”⁹³ The United Nations also maintains a presence in Bosnia through several of its agencies which are involved in Dayton’s implementation.

The authority and direction of these larger, international institutions are generally funneled through agencies and offices that operate on a daily basis, directly within the territorial borders of Bosnia. Among these include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) mission to Bosnia which was established in December of 1995 and was tasked with “the organization and supervision of elections, the furtherance of democratic values, monitoring and promoting human rights, and the implementation of arms control and security-building measures.”⁹⁴ Until 2004 NATO also operated through the original Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) which were tasked with maintaining security and stability and implementing the military points of the Dayton agreement. NATO was replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR) in 2004 but continues to exercise influence in Bosnia. Without doubt the most influential and important member of the international community in Bosnia is the United Nations Office of the High Representative (OHR). Dayton designated the OHR the “final authority in theater regarding interpretation” of the treaty and gave him authority to “monitor the implementation” and “coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”⁹⁵

Besides the international organizations and agencies in Bosnia, several of the most powerful of the governing bodies of Bosnia’s state are directly influenced by members

⁹³ Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. p. 57.

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery," (Sarajevo/Brussels: ICG Balkans Report No. 121, 2001). p. 2.

⁹⁵ Dayton, Annex 10, Article II, 1a and 1c; and Article V.

of the international community. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of nine judges, “of whom four are selected by the FBiH’s House of Representatives, and two by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska. In effect, this has meant two Bosniacs, two Croats and two Serbs. The other three judges are appointed by the president of the European Court of Human Rights...they cannot be citizens of BiH or of any neighboring state (Article 6.1).”⁹⁶ The Governor of the Central Bank, instituted under Article VII of the internationally imposed constitution,⁹⁷ was also to be appointed by the International Monetary Fund and not to be a citizen of Bosnia or any neighboring state, and remained a foreigner until 2005.

The international community is clearly neither homogeneous nor especially unified. As the European Stability Initiative described it, it is a “honeycomb of power centres, with multiple actors pursuing their individual goals with substantial autonomy.”⁹⁸ The multiplicity of power centers and overlapping areas of jurisdiction within the international community makes it difficult to weigh and compare the different interests that are wrapped up in the international administration of post-Dayton Bosnia. US interests are definitely influential, as a statement from former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998 demonstrates: “to a great extent the Dayton Accords and the peace process they built were made in America.”⁹⁹

The interests of the nations and agencies that comprise the PIC are furthered through the authority they hold over the OHR. The OHR is also “required to report regularly to the

⁹⁶ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 65.

⁹⁷ Carl Bildt, the first High Representative, wrote of the constitution: “No-one thought it wise to submit the constitution to any sort of parliamentary or other similar proceeding. It was to be a constitution by international decree.” Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*. p. 139.

⁹⁸ European Stability Initiative, “Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part Two. International Power in Bosnia,” (Berlin - Brussels - Sarajevo: 30 March 2000). p. 22.

⁹⁹ United States Department of State, “Statement on Bosnia before the House National Security Committee, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Washington, D.C., 18 March,” (Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 1998).

UN secretary-general.”¹⁰⁰ Although influential from the very beginning, since 2000 the EU has accumulated significant power and authority in Bosnia.¹⁰¹ It is not within the compass of this thesis to outline the specific interests and objectives of each of the many individual members of the international community. These interests and objectives no doubt often conflict. That the international community has been able to exist and generally coordinate its work is due to the common overall objectives of the Dayton process. David Chandler characterized these as “safeguarding the highest international level of democratic and human rights.”¹⁰² This universal goal was described by the OHR in 1997 as the transfer of authority and responsibility to the Bosnian people and their elected representatives as soon as possible.¹⁰³

This thesis is more concerned with those members and agencies of the international community that are actively and consistently engaged in the process of governing within Bosnia than in the interests or objectives of the distant powers represented by states and grand international organizations like the UN or the EU. It is easily recognizable that the aims of large international committees like the PIC are never simply enforced at the local level but rather are funneled, amended, and distributed through gradually descending layers of public authority and private influence. But more specifically, this interest stems from Migdal’s argument that

struggles for domination in society are not simply over the question of who controls the top leadership positions of the state. Nor are such battles always among large-scale social forces (entire states, social classes, civil society, and the like) operating on some grand level. Struggles for domination take place in multiple arenas in which the parts of the state are related not only to one another but each is a single force in a field of interacting, at times conflicting, social forces. The individual parts of the state may respond as much (or more) to

¹⁰⁰ Richard Caplan, "International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Global Governance* 10 (2004). p. 61.

¹⁰¹ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia," (Sarajevo/Brussels: ICG Europe Briefing Paper, 20 June 2003).

¹⁰² Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. p. 37.

¹⁰³ Office of the High Representative, "Speech by the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, to the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn, 9 December," (1997).

the social field in which they operate – the other social forces in the arena – as they do to the rest of the state organization.¹⁰⁴

Through their interaction with local state actors and Bosnian society, the governing members of the international community become shaped by the local context they help to shape. It is this dialectical process in which international actors become ‘localized’ and local actors become ‘externalized’, through their participation in the Bosnian state, I am interested in exploring in the following chapters. I will end this chapter by briefly introducing the ‘social field’ of Bosnian society which the Bosnian state operates within and by explaining the role it plays in the process of state-building in Bosnia.

3.5. The Bosnian public: capturing consent

The argument that the Bosnian state is an amalgamation of domestic and international actors and institutions does not place the state on a plane above and outside of society. The Bosnian state is a part (if a parasitic one) of Bosnian society and ultimately reliant on the acquiescence of the Bosnian public. In this section I will outline the role I believe the Bosnian people play in the maintenance of the problem-ridden state. However, before doing so it is important to clarify the role the public does not play; it does not determine the legitimacy of the Bosnian state. In her analysis of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 2005 Sabrina Ramet asserted that a state is “subjectively legitimate to the extent that its citizens believe that it is objectively and procedurally legitimate.”¹⁰⁵ This is not the role I argue that the Bosnian public plays.

For post-Dayton Bosnia a more appropriate definition of legitimacy is provided by Arthur Stinchcombe. As Stinchcombe wrote, for legitimacy “the person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders.”¹⁰⁶ Charles Tilly

¹⁰⁴ Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. p. 100.

¹⁰⁵ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. p. 22.

¹⁰⁶ Arthur L. Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), p. 150.

described legitimacy similarly: "Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. Other authorities I would add, are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also a desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule."¹⁰⁷ Thus for the international community, popular consent is not as important as the consent and participation of indigenous politicians and those politicians confirm the international administration because of their desire to maintain a stable rule.

Nevertheless, although the Bosnian state as I have defined it is not immediately reliant upon the Bosnian public, it is extremely unlikely the state could continue in its present composition if the people of Bosnia in large numbers were to demand a change. Why then are large protests and demonstrations absent? Because of the weight of the three primary factors of 'habit, privilege, and propaganda.'

Many scholars have noted the importance of custom (or tradition) and habit in the formation and development of social, political, and economic institutions.¹⁰⁸ This importance has been used to argue that the Bosnian people are not 'ready' for democracy or a market economy. While this is suspect as an excuse to delay democracy, it does hold some merit as an assessment of the importance of habit in society. As Sumantra Bose notes in regards to the place of ethnicity and nationalism in Bosnia, "historical and institutional precedent combine to make national distinctions an overwhelming reality – and problem – in Bosnia after Yugoslavia."¹⁰⁹ Bosnia's long

¹⁰⁷ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). p. 171.

¹⁰⁸ On this in regards to Bosnia, See: "Introduction and Assessment: An Ecological Approach to Disintegration" in P.H. Liotta, *Dismembering the State. The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters* (Boulder: Lexington Books, 2001).; Adam B. Seligman, "Trust and the Problem of Civil Society," *Forum Bosnae* 15 (2002).; Drazen Pechar, "Civic Elements of Compromise and the Crippling of Dayton," *Forum Bosnae* 15 (2002).

¹⁰⁹ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 45.

and intimate experience with corrupt and venal politicians and an oppressive state makes it less likely that further corruption and oppression will cause any public outcry. The French political philosopher Benjamin Constant notes to this effect that “government mistakes are a serious nuisance...men, being forced to resign themselves to them, adjust their interests and behavior to them too. Then, when the error is recognized, it is almost as dangerous to destroy it as to let it continue.”¹¹⁰ Habit seems to have been a powerful support for international presence in Bosnia as each year since Dayton it seems less likely the international community will detach itself from the Bosnian state.

The privilege afforded by international presence is also a huge incentive for popular complacency. The Bosnian economy has been heavily dependent on international aid in the post-Dayton period, “in total, the international community committed nearly \$5.25 billion”¹¹¹ between 1995 and 1999. International, and especially EU, presence also offers the possibility of EU accession. “Membership of the EU means for most of them (Bosnians) prosperity, peace, and freedom to travel and work in Europe.”¹¹² But the Bosnian state is also able to offer more pronounced privileges to gain the support of important constituencies of Bosnian society. Described by Timothy Donais, in Bosnia

what has emerged in the post-war period is a complex web of alliances between mafia and criminal formations, nationalist political parties, and elements of the old socialist nomenklatura. These alliances, which have collectively maintained control over much of the economic and political power in Bosnia throughout most of the post-Dayton period, have benefited from the very slow restoration of the rule of law, the absence of fundamental economic reforms, and ongoing tension across ethnic dividing lines.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Benjamin Constant, *Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments*, trans. Dennis O’Keefe (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003).

¹¹¹ Elizabeth M. Cousens, and Charles K. Cater, *Toward Peace in Bosnia. Implementing the Dayton Accords* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). p. 88.

¹¹² Ana E. Juncos, "The Eu's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (Re)Inventing the EU?," *Southeast European Politics* 6, no. 2 (2005). p. 91.

¹¹³ Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005). p. 69.

Indeed much has been made in the literature, of the corruption endemic in post-Dayton Bosnia and of the manipulation of privatization and economic reform in order to further private interests. This private aggrandizement has enabled and been enabled by the Bosnian state.

The last major method of capturing public consent used by the Bosnian state is the use of propaganda.¹¹⁴ The international community seeks to reassure the public in its rule through what Richard Caplan notes as “the effort...to communicate via the publication of various newsletters, reports and press releases, television programmes and the convening of public meetings.”¹¹⁵ Besides information, fear (inspired largely by dire predictions of disaster only stopped by the international community) also allows the state to maintain its power. International reports and studies conducted by research groups and institutions like the International Crisis Group consistently warn of impending doom and break-up if the international community withdraws from Bosnia.

In a well-known article in the *Journal of Democracy* Gerhard Knaus and Felix Martin characterize the ever-shifting ‘threat’ that the international community uses to justify its continued involvement. “When the High Representative today speaks of an “emergency,” he refers not to hate-filled radio broadcasts inciting violence against peacekeeping troops but rather to inefficient tax collection, the excessive regulation of private business, corruption in the public utilities, or technical drawbacks in the court system.”¹¹⁶ While this is not the place to fully analyze the character or role of the Bosnian public in the process of state-building in Bosnia, I have tried to show here that the vague and opaque structure of Bosnian government, and the misunderstanding and

¹¹⁴ Although the term ‘propaganda’ is often used with a negative connotation in fact it merely means: “the systematic propagation of a doctrine or cause or of information reflecting the views and interests of those advocating such a doctrine or cause.” (<http://www.dictionary.com>). Thus, government propagation of information is propaganda regardless of its truth or falsehood.

¹¹⁵ Richard Caplan, "Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia," in *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia*, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006). p. 162-163.

¹¹⁶ Gerhard Knaus, and Martin Felix, "Travails of the European Raj," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (July 2003). p. 64.

confusion it engenders, is an important factor in the effective cooperation of local and international actors within the Bosnian state. In the following chapters I will seek to demonstrate my thesis with a closer and more empirically detailed account of the dialectical process between local and international authorities that has emerged and developed between 1991 and 2007.

CHAPTER 4

FORMATION OF THE BOSNIAN STATE

4.1. Introduction

The dialectical relationship between local and international institutions of government in Bosnia has its origins in the international mediation efforts and humanitarian interventions that took place during the 1992-1995 war. It is unlikely that in the early 1990s either the nationalist parties or the international community foresaw international administration for Bosnia, much less the particular variant that has developed.¹¹⁷ Indeed, one could argue that most of the policies and particular moves taken by all the relevant actors during the war were reactive, largely unplanned responses to events and actions taken by others involved. The institutionalized, but masked, cooperation between the international community and nationalist parties in Bosnia that characterizes the post-Dayton period is to a significant extent the consequence of their ad hoc interaction during the war. In other words, beginning in this chapter I will explore the idea that the two originally distinct groups have turned compulsory, case-by-case collaboration into a perpetual system of mutually-beneficial relations and have consequently merged together to form the contemporary Bosnian state.

The effort to isolate an historical process to a certain, delimited 'period' will always be one fraught with difficulties. The purposeful actions that compose historical events are always informed and shaped by previous individual choices and social contexts. This certainly holds true for any analysis of the war and the post-Dayton state-building process in Bosnia. In this chapter I will begin the discussion of the emerging relationship between nationalist parties and the international community with the nationalists' ascent to power in the 1990 election in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia. However, it is important to note that international involvement in Bosnia and

¹¹⁷ Although Lord Owen notes in his memoirs of the peace process that the idea of UN trusteeships was "much in vogue" as early as 1992. Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*. p. 64.

Yugoslavia began much earlier and there are strong arguments to the effect that that involvement played an important role in producing the war. Nevertheless, whatever or whoever (if causal factors can be so ‘simply’ identified) significantly contributed to the nationalist parties’ rise to power in the 1990 election – that outcome will be used as the starting point for the emergence of the dialectical process between nationalists and the international community that will be described in this chapter.

The rise of nationalism and virulent nationalist politicians in the 1980s is often cited as a decisive cause of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.¹¹⁸ To an extent, the phenomenon of nationalism was apparent throughout the several republics and two provinces of Yugoslavia and was everywhere a main alternative to the dominant and entrenched communists. Many of the more powerful nationalist politicians, in fact, were formerly communist leaders who turned to nationalism either because they no longer believed in communism, or more pragmatically, because they realized that nationalism would provide a more stable base for preserving their status and power in the coming years.

Academic analysis of nationalism in Yugoslavia is characterized by the now familiar ambiguities and contradictions that plague study of all aspects of Yugoslavian politics, society, and economy. It is difficult to disentangle nationalism in the Bosnian republic from the other republics of Yugoslavia or to identify whether the success of nationalist ideologies and politics was more due to popular acceptance or to the manipulative actions and policies of certain elites. A useful and accurate explanation of nationalism in Yugoslavia would certainly make use of some combination of these factors. In chapter three I described the role of the Bosnian public in the state-building process in post-Dayton Bosnia and characterized the factors of habit, privilege, and propaganda as important for state actors’ gaining the consent of Bosnian society. These factors also contributed to the nationalist parties’ public support before and during the war years.

¹¹⁸ See for example: Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, *The Denial of Bosnia*, trans. Francis R. Jones and Marina Bowder (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).; Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1995).

The argument that ‘deep ethnic hatreds’ were endemic in Bosnian society has already been dismissed as an unreflectively shallow understanding of Bosnia’s diversity and intra-societal differences. Yet nationalism in Bosnia cannot be dismissed as merely the creation of a small group of power-hungry madmen. Instead, it is informative to recognize the traditional aspects of society and areas of habit that were conducive to nationalism. To this effect Sumantra Bose noted that “community-based identity and perception of difference remained innocuous while the Yugoslav framework was stable, but became the basis of political mobilization as that framework crumbled.”¹¹⁹ Similarly Laura Silber and Allan Little described the “tradition of separate communities growing up side-by-side, while preserving – at least in part – their distinct identities”¹²⁰ as potentially amenable to nationalist manipulation.

Of course habit cannot be isolated as the primary factor in nationalism’s success. Nationalist politicians from all three ‘ethnic’ groups in Bosnia attempted to use their power to gain security and privilege for their respective power bases. The well-known scholars Steven Burg and Paul Shoup characterized the extreme cases of this use of privilege where “two parallel societies emerged: one privileged, in power, and controlling the assets of the community; the other, made up essentially of second-class citizens.”¹²¹ But public support among the three ethnic groups for their respective nationalist parties was also drummed up using the age-old technique of fear.¹²² The popular memory of historic cases of violence and oppression was used by nationalist elites to gain the support of rural populations for their nationalist policies. Fear, for their lives and livelihoods, was a strong incentive for rural peoples to arm in defense and even to engage in ‘preemptive’ violence.

¹¹⁹ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 17.

¹²⁰ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 209.

¹²¹ Burg, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. p. 64.

¹²² Milan Podunavac, "Fear and Politics," *New Balkan Politics*, no. 2 (2001). And, Robert Higgs, "The Political Economy of Fear," *Mises Daily Article*, May 16, 2005.

Providing a thorough account of nationalism in Bosnia is not the goal of this thesis, rather it is important here only to point out the power and influence of the nationalist parties in Bosnia and their success in the first democratic elections in the republic's history in 1990. In the two years that followed, prior to the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the nationalists maintained control of actual governance in Bosnia, at first in cooperation and then in opposition which turned into the war in Bosnia in 1992. The nationalists' power is important because it positioned them as the actors the international community would be forced to deal with in their mediation efforts and eventual interventions.

4.2. Intervention and reaction in the war years

It is important to emphasize that what this thesis describes as the mutually beneficial process of apparent opposition and effective cooperation between the international community and the nationalist parties in Bosnia is not an entirely foreseen or planned one for either side. The dominant tendency within the social sciences to see social entities like 'the state' and 'the international community' as primarily coherent and organized, purposive associations and to focus on the relatively significant power these associations wield within society can often lead to a misleading perception of social processes as normally the designed outcome of these associations. In other words, this thesis steps away from the common propensity to attribute to the state a seemingly infallible and overwhelming ability to achieve the desired goals of state policies. Joel Migdal's 'state-in-society' approach to the analysis of the state is a helpful corrective to this tendency and informs the approach I have taken in this thesis.¹²³

With this in mind, it is certainly true that the international community became involved and continued to involve itself in Bosnia with its own, disparate, interests in preeminent

¹²³ Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*.

consideration.¹²⁴ It would not be accurate however to assert that the international community recognized during the war in Yugoslavia the use it would later make of the nationalist parties. Similarly, the nationalist parties engaged the international community at first only out of necessity, either in need or in fear of international power.

The international community was an important consideration for the nationalist parties from the very start of their participation in government in 1990. This is true simply by nature of the international system of nation-states. As Joel Migdal noted, “states face severe, if more subtle, constraints from the world arena in what they can do domestically as a result of the particular niche their society occupies in the world economy.”¹²⁵ But the international community affords potential assistance as well as constraints for state actors. In Bosnia, indeed in all the republics of Yugoslavia, the nationalist parties saw the international community as a possible source of support and of legitimation.

As early as 1991, Slovenian President Milan Kucan set the precedent by appealing for international support against the “brutal” federal Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA).¹²⁶ Later, when Croatia’s turn came to secure its separation and independence Croatian President Franjo Tudjman “placed his faith, as he had done from the beginning, not on military readiness but in winning international goodwill.”¹²⁷ Bosnian President and Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic also counted on international recognition to ensure Bosnia’s statehood and to prevent inclusion in what he perceived would be a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Paul Williams, "The International Community's Response to the Crisis in Former Yugoslavia," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas, and Ivo Zanic (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001).

¹²⁵ Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. p. 62.

¹²⁶ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 163.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 170.

¹²⁸ Burg, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. p. 97.

'Recognition' moreover, was not the full extent of international involvement desired by the nationalists. Silber and Little wrote that "Croatia had appealed for international troops to be deployed almost from the beginning" and the Serbs too, under Milosevic, "saw that foreign deployment could be turned to their advantage."¹²⁹ According to Brendan O'Shea, in 1992 President Izetbegovic and other Bosnian officials "appealed directly to the UN to deploy troops immediately in Bosnia as a pre-emptive measure."¹³⁰ Rather than an unwanted presence and a meddling interference, the international community and international intervention were perceived by the nationalist parties, from the very beginning, as a potential aid in their attempts to capture power and authority in Bosnia. The variation and differences between the nationalist parties regarding their eagerness or fear of international intervention depended to a large extent on their power in relation to each other and thus changed and adapted according to circumstances throughout the conflict period.

The European Community's (EC) early efforts at mediation in the Yugoslav crisis have been widely criticized as almost completely ineffective and often even counterproductive. Mediators' initial determination to 'bang heads together' soon dissolved into desperate and pleading attempts to secure agreement between the nationalist parties. Moreover, the mediation efforts had the unintended consequence of often reconfirming the nationalists in their contradictory positions. As an example of this, Saadia Touval asserted that "the uncertainties that the Western policies created led each of the contending Yugoslav parties to believe that its action would...be accepted and perhaps supported by the Western governments."¹³¹ This belief that eventually they would receive international support, or at least consent, caused the nationalists to persist

¹²⁹ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 197.

¹³⁰ O'Shea, *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995*. p. 30.

¹³¹ Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. The Critical Years, 1990-1995*. p. 22.

in aggressive policies longer than they otherwise might have and/or to resist negotiation longer than would have been possible without Western assistance.¹³²

There were also more immediate consequences of international involvement including “persuasive evidence that the EC decision (to ‘recognize’ Bosnia) contributed in a major way to the outbreak of fighting.”¹³³ In an article in *The Nation* Anthony Borden and Richard Caplan wrote of the 1992 London Conference that it ratified aggression and confirmed the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines.¹³⁴ The international community thus reinforced the nationalists’ hold on power in Bosnia during the early years of the conflict.

We have seen that international intervention was to a large extent sought after and requested by the nationalist parties at various times before and during the war in Yugoslavia. Initial international mediation and intervention in turn aided and reconfirmed the likelihood of war and the nationalists’ positions of power. But this was only the beginning of the dialectical process between local and international actors. For besides its immediate and direct effects, international intervention was also actively “manipulated for military and political advantage by the warring parties.”¹³⁵ Croats requested the deployment of international forces for protection against the Serbs and Serbs wanted deployment to preserve their territorial gains and to establish new *de facto* borders.¹³⁶ International mediators made much of Izetbegovic’s persistent hampering of international negotiations because of his belief that he could hold out for better terms under the promise of U.S. support.

¹³² Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*. pp. 147, 377.

¹³³ Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. The Critical Years, 1990-1995*. p. 81.

¹³⁴ Anthony Borden, and Richard Caplan, "Ratifying Aggression in Bosnia," *The Nation*, October 12, 1992.

¹³⁵ Burg, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. p. 200.

¹³⁶ Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. The Critical Years, 1990-1995*. p. 96.

Once international forces under the auspices of the UN were installed in Bosnia they became potential, and literal, hostages of the Serbs. References are rife throughout the literature on the war period, to the ways in which the UN forces became a barrier to and problem for successful negotiation. International protection enabled the Bosnian government to hold out against successive peace agreements and simultaneously enable the Serbs to threaten international troops and thereby hold the international community captive to its demands. Peace proposals like the Vance-Owen Peace Plan validated the Bosnian Serbs basic aim of achieving “a viable Serbian state on Bosnian territory.”¹³⁷

It is certainly not possible to argue that the international community was the ideal ‘partner’ for any of three nationalist parties, that international intervention met all the needs of the nationalist parties, or even that any of the nationalist parties would have preferred international presence over its absence if given the choice. The international community imposed conditions and forced agreements on the nationalist parties that they doubtless would have avoided if possible. But what this thesis argues is that once the international community became involved, rather than diminish the roles of the nationalist parties, the nationalists remained just as ensconced in power as they were in 1990¹³⁸, and that they consistently sought to use and manipulate the international community to further their aims. It will be seen below and in the last chapters, how the interdependence between the nationalists and the international community became institutionalized through the Dayton Agreement and grew through the post-Dayton state-building process.

It is conventional wisdom that the international community’s strategy in dealing with the conflict in Yugoslavia and Bosnia was primarily an *ad hoc* and reactive one. It is less widely pointed out however that each time the international community reacted to the nationalists its policies ultimately served to strengthen the nationalists’ respective

¹³⁷ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 279.

¹³⁸ Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*. p. 375.

positions and consequently ensured the continued need for international intervention.¹³⁹ An excellent example is the often criticized arms embargo placed upon Yugoslavia prior to its dissolution and maintained throughout the war. As Warren Switzer noted, “the embargo’s first result was to ensure a considerable initial advantage to the Serbs and to place the Croats and the Bosniaks at a disadvantage.”¹⁴⁰ The Serbs’ subsequent military advantage allowed them to make extensive territorial conquests and carry out their program of ethnic cleansing. In response to this military predominance the international community then needed to maintain a military presence in order to sustain some semblance of security and protection for the Bosnian Muslims.

Another example is the unintended consequence of humanitarian aid. “There have been assertions that were it not for humanitarian aid, which functioned as a logistics support system for the combatants, the ability to sustain combat operations would have been significantly restricted, and the war would have ground to a halt.”¹⁴¹ Besides providing such indirect support for the nationalists,¹⁴² the international community occasionally found they were dependent on and interested in the nationalist parties’ continued existence and actions. In fear of Serb retaliations for international air strikes, Silber and Little report that at one point the international community ‘ironically’ ended up “hoping that Karadzic (the Bosnian Serb leader) would remain in command.”¹⁴³

It has also been argued that the Dayton Agreement was based on, and required, the Croats’ and Muslims’ military successes against the Serbs in the fall of 1995. Sumantra Bose put it thus: “the cold, sinister, yet thoroughly compelling logic of ‘ethnic cleansing’ provided the essential framework for the General Framework Agreement on

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 377.

¹⁴⁰ Switzer, "International Military Responses to the Balkan Wars: Crises in Analysis." p. 296.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 299.

¹⁴² Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. p. 444.

¹⁴³ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 305.

Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina.”¹⁴⁴ Indeed, in his memoirs of the peace process, Richard Holbrooke recounts his reliance on the successful military advances of the brutal Croat nationalist Gojko Susak: “Gojko, I want to be absolutely clear, I said. Nothing we said today should be construed to mean that we want you to stop the rest of the offensive, other than Banja Luka. Speed is important. We can’t say so publicly, but please take Sanski Most, Prijedor and Bosanski Novi. And do it quickly, before the Serbs regroup!”¹⁴⁵

Ultimately, the peace agreed upon for Bosnia through the Dayton Accords was one that confirmed and institutionalized the principles of ethnic cleansing that had been the policies of the nationalist parties during the war. Towards the end of the war, as Burg and Shoup wrote, the Americans gradually came to the “realization that outside actors could not simply impose a settlement on the parties by force. Settlement would require both military and political initiatives.”¹⁴⁶ Consequently, some of the interests of the nationalist parties, including the Serbs, would have to be met. One particularly stark example of this is that the Serbs were allowed to keep the name Republika Srpska despite the clear and determined attachment to separation and independence the name represented.¹⁴⁷ The international community also thus ensured that its own involvement would be required in the years to come. The interdependent relationship between the nationalists and the international community would be institutionalized in the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the war.

¹⁴⁴ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 53.

¹⁴⁵ Holbrooke, *To End a War*. p. 166.

¹⁴⁶ Burg, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. p. 313.

¹⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement," (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report No. 80, 28 October 1999). p. 20.

4.3. The Dayton Peace Accords: institutionalizing the relationship between local and international state actors

The Dayton agreement established the framework for the Bosnian state and must therefore form an important part of any analysis of the post-Dayton state-building process. But the point here will not be to conduct an exhaustive, detailed review and account of Dayton but rather to emphasize some of the general conditions and principles it was founded upon and that have shaped its implementation. This approach is informed by the argument that Dayton was a generally amorphous document that has been openly amended by the international administration and covertly manipulated by the nationalist parties in Bosnia since 1995.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, an informative investigation of the Bosnian state cannot be undertaken using a static image of the 'Dayton state' but only by seeing, as Migdal put it, the state as 'becoming'. I have thus attempted to incorporate some of the methodological concerns of Migdal's state-in-society approach as he described them in *State in Society*:

The approach here is one that focuses on process rather than on conclusive outcomes. This is not a prize-fighter model in which each combatant remains unchanged throughout the bout and holds unswervingly to the goal of knocking out the other. Instead, the state-in-society approach points researchers to the *process* of interaction of groupings with one another and with those whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence. This is an important distinction. The dynamic process changes the groupings themselves, their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting... Like any other group or organization, the state is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with others. It is not a fixed entity; its organization, goals, means, partners, and operative rules change as it allies with and opposes others inside and outside its territory. The state continually morphs.¹⁴⁹

Thus rather than merely assume the Bosnian state is actually a manifestation of the Dayton model, this thesis argues that the Bosnian state is an institution that is continually shaped by the ongoing dialectical relationship between international and local state actors. To conclude this chapter, rather than examine the individual points

¹⁴⁸Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe." pp. 30-31.

¹⁴⁹ Migdal, *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. p. 23.

and annexes of Dayton, I will underline the important principles Dayton instituted and upholds.

The first thing it is critical to recognize is that Dayton established, and internationally legitimized, the nationalist parties as the Bosnian state.¹⁵⁰ This is true regardless of whether the international community had any other choice in the matter, or whether they were simply acknowledging the reality on the ground. As Silber and Little perceptively observed:

the ambitious agreement envisaged Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified state with two separate entities, roughly one half to the Muslim-Croat Federation and the other to the Serbs. Each of the country's three national groups would keep its army, although the Bosnian government and the Croat forces were in theory supposed to merge into one Federation force...Now it was up to those very leaders who had waged war to implement the agreement crafted by the West. In 1996, all six presidents who had led Yugoslavia into open conflict in 1991, were still in power.¹⁵¹

However, that the West placed 'its faith' in the national groups in Bosnia and expected their fulfillment of the 'terms' of Dayton does not by any means guarantee that the nationalists would return the favor or would 'do its part'. In fact, by imposing the agreement on the parties the international community essentially ensured the opposite would occur. As early as immediately after signing President Izetbegovic is reported to have said "My government is taking part in this agreement without any enthusiasm, but as someone taking a bitter yet useful potion or medication."¹⁵² The actual leaders of the Bosnian Serb entity, meanwhile, were not even allowed to sign the agreement but were 'represented' by Slobodan Milosevich, president of the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia). It is no surprise then that they have been less than enthusiastic supporters of Dayton's implementation. "The Bosnian state's chronic legitimacy crisis", Bose has observed, "is perpetuated by the fact that in the post-Yugoslav era, Bosnia's three communities have very different preferences on fundamental issues of

¹⁵⁰ And the 'state' was recognized as the legal continuation of the state that had been given international recognition in 1992, thus providing Bosnia with the 'sovereignty' that would be used by the international community to avoid 'legal' responsibility for its policies in Bosnia.

¹⁵¹ Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*. p. 377.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* p. 377.

allegiance and identity.”¹⁵³ What the nationalists’ combined ‘international legitimacy’ and internal dissatisfaction means for the state-building process is the ‘necessity’ of long-term international administration to prevent the conflict and dissolution that Dayton supposedly prevented. Or at least that is how the international community has interpreted it.

Besides legitimizing the separate parties, Dayton institutionalized the division it purportedly sought to overcome.¹⁵⁴ Croatian political scientist Mirjana Kasapovic wrote of this point:

Thus the territorial autonomy of the national segments is constitutionalized on two levels: at the level of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of the entities, and at the level of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the forms of the cantons. The territorialization goes hand in hand with a strong political institutionalization of the national segments that ranges from the almost state-like status of the entities to the broad cantonal political autonomy.¹⁵⁵

Integrationists have made much of this fact in their criticisms of the Dayton Accord. Again, whether or not there was ‘any other choice’, this partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines has made sure of the continued existence of the nationalist parties in the post-Dayton state-building process. And to prevent the completely independent rule of the nationalist parties and *de jure* partition, it will be necessary for the international community to maintain its presence in Bosnia for the foreseeable future.

Besides dictating the structure and process of local and national government in Bosnia, the terms of Dayton provided for an unprecedentedly large and powerful role for the international community in terms of both military and civilian concerns. This role was established by Dayton and included means to ensure its continued existence. As David Chandler has convincingly argued:

¹⁵³ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. pp. 47-48.

¹⁵⁴ See: Caplan, "Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

¹⁵⁵ Mirjana Kasapovic, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy?," *Politička misao* XLII, no. 5 (2005). p. 4.

the Dayton agreement has, in fact, facilitated external regulation, rather than restricting it. The framework created at Dayton was an extremely flexible one, which has enabled international actors, unaccountable to the people of BiH, to shape and reshape the agenda of post-war transition. Dayton's flexibility has been the key factor enabling the external powers to permanently postpone any transition to Bosnian 'ownership'.¹⁵⁶

Annex 1-A of Dayton covers the military aspects of the treaty and the implementation process and Article 6 of the annex reveals the tremendous powers given to the Implementation Force (IFOR). Besides the extensive tasks associated with the strictly military aspects of Dayton, IFOR was also directed to assist the civilian aspects of the treaty. Moreover, section 4 allows new duties, not present in the treaty, to be assigned to IFOR by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), under which IFOR operated. Section 5 gives the IFOR Commander the right to interpret and judge his duties and role and Appendix B to Annex 1-A provides all IFOR and NATO personnel with complete immunity. The civilian aspects of the implementation of Dayton were allocated in Annex 10 to a number of different non-governmental organizations and transnational institutions. The implementation of these civilian aspects was placed under the final authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Article 5 of the annex declared: "The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement."¹⁵⁷

It is tempting to accept the viewpoint that post-Dayton Bosnia is essentially an international protectorate and that the international community wields unlimited and ultimate authority within Bosnia's territorial borders.¹⁵⁸ This view, however, is an oversimplification of the complex nature of power and the state in post-Dayton Bosnia. Despite its growth and the expansion of its power in the twelve years since its inception, the OHR remains far too small and limited to exercise the powers and responsibilities involved in a protectorate. Moreover, throughout the war, the peace process, and the

¹⁵⁶ Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe." pp. 30-31.

¹⁵⁷ Dayton, Annex 10, Article 5.

¹⁵⁸ See for example: Matthew T. Parish, "The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* Volume 1 Special Supplement (1 December 2007).

period of state-building, the nationalist parties have maintained their power and status to a considerable degree and have thus played an active role in Bosnia since 1990. To characterize Bosnia as an international protectorate would ignore or overlook this fact. The indigenous components of the Bosnian state claim ‘sovereignty’ and Dayton and the international community in Bosnia are “legitimated by the principle of consent.”¹⁵⁹

It is this combination of Bosnian ‘national’ sovereignty and consent-based legitimacy that allows the OHR to exercise power within the Bosnian state without the trappings of accountability and responsibility. Meanwhile, the presence and final authority of the OHR, instituted by Dayton, is what allows the nationalist parties to maintain their power and authority within each of their individual ‘statelets’ and within the larger state of Bosnia and Herzegovina without the usually attendant responsibility. By appearing weak and helpless in the face of the greater power of the international community the nationalists can avoid the responsibility of honest government and of formulating and implementing positive policy and instead focus on personal aggrandizement and power-grabbing. This is not to say that the nationalists are universally supportive of the presence of the international community, but rather that they have recognized that “it is in their strategic interest to participate in the state on the most favorable terms.”¹⁶⁰

Dayton did not create the interdependent relationship between nationalists and the international community. To assert that it did would be to take a static-oriented approach to historical and political analysis which is contrary to the state-in-society approach I have worked from in this thesis. The relationship between local and international in the Bosnian state is nothing less than a ‘process’ or way of interacting that has emerged from the mutual inclusion of local and international actors in the post-Dayton Bosnian state. Dayton was built on this process as it emerged, and incorporated and institutionalized the process in its principles. The relationship only reached a mature and systemic materialization in the post-Dayton state-building period. In the

¹⁵⁹ William Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). p. 150.

¹⁶⁰ European Stability Initiative, "Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia, Part Three: The End of the Nationalist Regimes and the Future of the Bosnian State," (2001). p. 18.

next two chapters I will describe this maturation and systemization through analysis of four critical aspects of the state-building process between 1995 and 2007: (1) the creation and maintenance of internal security and stability, (2) the process of elections and the politics of electoral engineering, and (3) economic development and reform.

CHAPTER 5

AD HOC STATE-BUILDING: 1996-2002

5.1. Introduction

The first six years of post-Dayton state-building are strongly characterized by the official emphasis the international community placed on the importance and necessity of its withdrawal and the concurrent actual entrenchment of its role and presence in Bosnia. The goal of Dayton and the international community's role in Bosnia was to create a 'democratic and free society' that would allow Bosnia's different ethnic groups to live together peacefully.¹⁶¹ This official vision did not include long-term, international regulation or administration. The wide-spread concern that the international community would exceed its mission and harm the Bosnians' ability to shoulder the powers and responsibilities of democratic governance¹⁶² was expressed by the UN Secretary-General's 1996 *Agenda for Democratisation*:

Each society must be able to choose the form, pace and character of its democratization process. Imposition of foreign models not only contravenes the (UN) Charter principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, it may also generate resentment among both the Government and the public, which may in turn feed internal forces inimical to democratization and democracy.¹⁶³

Yet despite this concern, the first six years of Dayton's implementation witnessed consistent increases in the international community's power and role. The vaguely articulated deadline (or aimed-for endpoint) for the international community's withdrawal in the Dayton agreement was approximately one year and after the first

¹⁶¹ Carl Bildt, "Bosnia: Don't Delay the Vote," *Washington Post* 12/6/1996.; Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. p. 37.

¹⁶² Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. pp. 1-3.

¹⁶³ United Nations, "Agenda for Democratization: Supplement to Reports on Democratization," (20 December 1996).

election of state and entity authorities in September 1996.¹⁶⁴ A key aspect of the Dayton accords, however, is that it was an agreement between the three ‘Bosnian’ parties (and between Bosnia’s neighbors Croatia and Serbia). As no members of the international community were signatories to the agreement, it did not hold any authority over them. As Paul Szasz noted, “Evidently the parties to the GFA (General Framework Agreement) and the ancillary agreements could not bind these external actors...nor, of course, are these external actors precluded from taking steps not foreseen in these texts.”¹⁶⁵

Thus the international community was not limited by the treaty; it was free to exercise its own discretion in judging when the objectives of Dayton had been fulfilled. David Chandler perceptively described the consequence of this lack of restrictions:

The pattern of ad hoc and arbitrary extensions of international regulatory authority was initially set by the PIC itself as it rewrote its own powers and those of the High Representative at successive PIC meetings. The most important of these were the initial strategic six-monthly review conferences: at Florence, in June 1996; Paris, in November 1996; Sintra, in May 1997; and Bonn, in December 1997.¹⁶⁶

But despite the significant extensions of the powers of the international community, the nationalist parties also remained in power. Some analysts blamed this on the international community. The ICG claimed that “implementation has been characterized by international appeasement of the ethnic cleansers, which has resulted in the ethnic cleansers cementing their power via the ballot box and with international approval.”¹⁶⁷ But this criticism overlooks the reality that the international community’s power and capabilities were necessarily limited by the complexities of power on the ground. In fact, as HR Carl Bildt pointed out, however extensive their power became

¹⁶⁴ Peace Implementation Council, "Chairman's Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council," (Florence: Office of the High Representative, 13-14 June 1996).

¹⁶⁵ Paul Szasz, "Current Developments: The Protection of Human Rights through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia," *American Journal of International Law* 90 (1996). p. 304.

¹⁶⁶ Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe." p. 34.

¹⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement." p. 2.

the international community would always necessarily rely, to some extent, on local state actors.¹⁶⁸

As I have suggested, the international community consistently justified its continued presence and authority in Bosnia through its recurrent reinterpretation of Dayton's objectives and by depicting the local state actors as corrupt nationalists determined to expand their own powers at the cost of the Bosnian state and society.¹⁶⁹ By magnifying the nationalists' strength, the international community legitimized its own expansion. For their part, Bosnian bureaucrats and politicians saw their power expanded and cemented under the protection and financial support of the international community.¹⁷⁰ For all its faults, international administration ensured a degree of stability and financial aid that the nationalists' would be reluctant to give up.¹⁷¹ Moreover, as HR Carlos Westendorp recognized, the HR's extensive powers released them from responsibility.¹⁷² As long as the international community was committed to Bosnia's 'success', the nationalists would not have to operate under the usual constraints of an independent and sovereign state.¹⁷³ Cognizant of the mutual advantages of blurred cooperation, the international community and the nationalist parties conducted the tasks of state-building.

¹⁶⁸ Carl Bildt, "Implementing the Civilian Tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement," *The NATO Review* 2/9/1996.

¹⁶⁹ Chris Hedges, "Diplomat Rules Bosnia with a Strong Hand," *New York Times* April 10 1998.

¹⁷⁰ Mike O'Connor, "West Fears Bosnia Funds Aid Hard-Line Serbs," *New York Times* February 16 1998.

¹⁷¹ Marius Soberg, "Empowering Local Elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Dayton Decade," *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 3 (May/June 2006). p. 49.

¹⁷² Asked what he thought the reactions of the Bosnian politicians would be to the wider use of his powers Westendorp replied: "Believe me, I think that no one would object. Because it will be my decision and not theirs, so they will be released from part of the responsibility." -High Representative in BiH Interview: Carlos Westendorp, "Carlos Westendorp Reveals His Opinion About the Bosnian Politicians," *Slobodna Bosna* 30/11/1997.

¹⁷³ Alix Kroeger, "Nationalists Prosper in Struggling Bosnia," *BBC News WORLD EDITION* October 7 2002.

In this chapter I will explore this dialectical relationship between international and local state officials and bureaucrats as it developed through the process of state-building in the key areas of establishing internal security and stability, elections and electoral engineering, and economic development and reform.

5.2. Internal security and stability

The Dayton agreement was first and foremost a peace treaty meant to end a war. As such one of the central concerns of its implementation was the creation of real and sustainable peace within Bosnia. Peace meant that organized acts of violence would cease and no longer need to be a concern of Bosnian citizens. Stability meant relations between Bosnia's three main ethnic groups that were harmonious and unlikely to be the cause of any future conflict. The creation of peace and stability fell under the military part of the agreement. Annex 1A and 1B detailed the military aspects of the treaty, including NATO's role, the formation of the IFOR, and the 'military' goals of the treaty. The military objectives of Dayton were unusually concise (compared to the opaqueness of the rest of the treaty) and were fulfilled in the first few years after the agreement was signed. Because of this apparent success, the security side of the international administration has received considerably less attention than the civilian side and the OHR. However, the role of NATO and the IFOR in the Bosnian state should not be overlooked for it provides clear examples of the dialectical interaction between local and international state actors. In this section I will discuss state interaction through consideration of NATO's expansion and the Train and Equip program.

Like all the governmental components of the international community, NATO and the IFOR were expected to have completed their mission within a year after Dayton and be able to withdraw by the end of 1996. U.S. President Clinton even promised that IFOR would close after a year. Instead NATO still plays a role in Bosnia in 2008, IFOR was reformed as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December of 1996, and SFOR became the European Union Force (EUFOR) in 2004. While the actual number of international

troops in Bosnia has fallen since 1995, their scope and function has markedly increased so that it seems very unlikely that the international military force will leave Bosnia in the near future. In 1998 an article in *Slobodna Bosna*¹⁷⁴ revealed that NATO was involved in building “a huge military complex speculating that such an investment would not be made if NATO had not had plans to stay for the next fifty years.”¹⁷⁵ Nationalist-provoked violence and the threat of renewed conflict if international force was withdrawn have consistently served as official reasons for the extension of exit-deadlines but closer investigation reveals a more complex process of local and international dialectical reinforcement.

First it is important to dispel the perception of NATO as a completely unified entity that typically acts coherently and fulfills a collective will (decided upon by the upper elite). In her study of NATO and Yugoslavia Joyce Kaufman noted one significant instance of internal division within NATO: the disagreement between Richard Holbrooke and the first IFOR Commander U.S. admiral Leighton W. Smith over the proper limits of IFOR’s mission.¹⁷⁶ Holbrooke had assumed “the IFOR commander would use his authority to do substantially more than he was obligated to do” but Smith “made clear that they intended to take a minimalist approach to all aspects of implementation other than force protection.”¹⁷⁷ This disagreement exemplifies the differences between Dayton’s designers and implementers, and between the different levels and areas of authority, that would shape the state-building process. Under increasing pressure to exercise far more authority and force, when IFOR was transformed into SFOR it was “charged with helping local authorities to rebuild Bosnia.”¹⁷⁸ But divergence in the

¹⁷⁴ *Slobodna Bosna* No. 98 (Sarajevo, October 3, 1998), pp. 14-15.

¹⁷⁵ Senada Selo Sabic, *State Building under Foreign Supervision: Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2003*, ed. Maj Ernst M Felberbauer (Vienna and Zagreb: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence; National Defence Academy, Vienna and Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, May 2005). p. 167.

¹⁷⁶ Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia. Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002). p. 140.

¹⁷⁷ Holbrooke, *To End a War*. p. 328.

¹⁷⁸ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia. Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*. p. 143.

exercise of its 'mission' continued to characterize SFOR and attracted widespread criticism. A 1998 report from the International Crisis Group asserted that "While certain armies in SFOR, in particular the British, have already taken a pro-active role to create a secure environment for minority returnees in their sector, most have so far chosen to stick to an extremely rigid and restricted interpretation of their mandate. This has to change."¹⁷⁹ The resolution of differences in interpretation of the Dayton agreement typically resulted in the extension and expansion of the state.

While civilian components of the international administration called for NATO to remain in Bosnia and vigorously exercise its mandate, the military similarly provided justification and appeals for a larger civilian presence. A 1996 Pentagon security assessment reported that the "prospects for the existence of a viable, unitary Bosnia beyond the life of the NATO deployment are 'dim' without a large international program to revive Bosnia's war-shattered economy."¹⁸⁰ NATO officials also claimed that "the Bosnia peace accord...has not given international civilian authorities a broad enough mandate to establish a united and integrated Bosnia. Unless a powerful NATO force remains in the country for two years, and perhaps longer, the fighting will probably resume."¹⁸¹ This dialectical pattern of mutual reinforcement would typify the relations between all levels of the Bosnian state.

Ostensibly it was the military components' job to quell and contain the extreme nationalists and while there were certainly cases of conflict and opposition between the two (as there were within NATO and within the larger international community), interdependence also characterized their relationship. George Kenney wrote of this:

¹⁷⁹International Crisis Group, "To Build a Peace: Recommendations for the Madrid Peace Implementation Council Meeting," (Sarajevo: ICG Balkans Report, No. 52, 15 December 1998). p. 9.

¹⁸⁰ Philip Shenon, "Pentagon Report Predicts Bosnia Will Fragment without Vast Aid," *New York Times*, March 20 1996.

¹⁸¹ Chris Hedges, "NATO Drafts Plan to Extend Its Mission in Bosnia by Two Years," *New York Times*, September 11 1996.

While Bosnian Serb interest in NATO has mainly to do with military calculations, the Muslims gain both economically and militarily from NATO's presence. Economic benefits are the direct descendant of wartime aid, particularly of the role that it played in allowing the Bosnian government, more precisely, Sarajevo authorities – to allocate hundreds of millions of dollars worth of resources to its army that it otherwise would have had to squeeze out of a desperate population.¹⁸²

In 1998 a *New York Times* article reported on the support Bosnia's nationalist political parties received from NATO's presence:

United States, Britain, France, Germany and other countries may be spending as much as \$40 million a year in rent for their bases in Bosnia and Croatia... Interviews with company and local government officials, as well as financial experts working for Western governments in Bosnia and Croatia, indicate that much of the money is going to the Bosnian and Croatian Governments, which funnel it to political parties. Foreign diplomats suggested that in Bosnia, the money effectively buys good relations between NATO forces and local and national leaders.¹⁸³

Meanwhile, despite its superior force NATO did not always exercise complete dominance over the nationalist parties.¹⁸⁴ Even 'buying good relations' did not ensure the nationalists would always cooperate. In one of many instances, American troops withdrew in September 1997 "from a guard post at the bridge in the town of Brcko where crowds, many bused in from outside, injured two soldiers with bricks and clubs. They also handed back a television transmitter to pro-Karadzic policemen rather than risk further violence after a stand-off with a mob that gathered at the site."¹⁸⁵ The nationalists' strength on the ground ensured that analysts and members of the international community would keep up their calls for increased powers and the determination to stay as long as necessary.

Even when NATO fulfilled its mission according to plan and successfully implemented the objectives laid out in the Dayton agreement, there are strong arguments that the

¹⁸² George Kenney, "U.S. Policy Snarls in Bosnia," *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Winter 1998), p. 59.

¹⁸³ Mike O'Connor, "Political Parties Opposed to Bosnia Peace Get Millions in Rent from NATO," *New York Times*, October 13 1998.

¹⁸⁴ John Pomfret, "Rivalries Stall Reconstruction of Bosnia," *Washington Post* October 10 1996.

¹⁸⁵ Chris Hedges, "Bosnia Jitters: West Fearful of Having to Use Force," *New York Times*, September 11 1997.

unintended consequences of its role were to deepen Bosnia's ethnic divisions and thereby secure the nationalists' positions in power.¹⁸⁶ And whether NATO was successful or unsuccessful in its mission, it seems the result would have been fairly equally the same. As P.H. Liotta wrote:

S-FOR, with the direct ability of NATO forces to respond with military force, has created one certain contradiction that the framers of the Dayton Agreement did not perhaps intend for it to do. NATO force provided an essential anchor of stability, one so successful that potential reintegration and growth in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems unlikely without such an element of 'external' power. Although policy makers were reluctant to often publicly admit it – perhaps because of the political consequence such an admission would bring – but NATO and S-FOR were in the Balkans for the long haul.¹⁸⁷

In other words, in seeking to utilize the coercive power it held, NATO contributed to the expansion and solidification of the state (including both its international and nationalist components) in Bosnia.

Looking deeper into the military aspects of state interaction in Bosnia confirms the general trends found in the broader issue of NATO's expansion. One particular case worth noting is the U.S. 'train-and-equip' program. Although the program was not entailed in the actual Dayton agreement, it was initially a side-deal with the Bosnian Muslims to ensure their and U.S. congressional support for Dayton, it was soon thereafter made public and officially instituted.¹⁸⁸ Besides potentially being in conflict with the arms-reduction sections of Dayton, the train-and-equip program offers many examples of creating the necessity for state expansion. Kenney, a former State Department official, noted in this regard:

According to Ambassador James Pardew Jr., the State Department's man in charge of the equip-and-train, the goal is to create a balance of conventional forces that deter aggression. During the war, however, the Serbian and Muslim forces were in more of a balance than the administration will admit, the Serbs having an advantage in heavy weapons, the Muslims in numbers of men under arms – these relative advantages canceling each other out. Raising the Muslims' number of weapons (and their quality, unassessed under Dayton's arms controls

¹⁸⁶ Woodward, "Bosnia after Dayton: Transforming a Compromise into a State." p. 144.

¹⁸⁷ Liotta, *Dismembering the State. The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters.* p. 260.

¹⁸⁸ Woodward, "Bosnia after Dayton: Transforming a Compromise into a State." p. 147.

rules) now gives them a significant overall advantage, estimated by independent military analysts at two- or three-to-one.¹⁸⁹

This advantage removed the Muslims' incentive to keep the peace as they had much to gain by war and were undoubtedly dissatisfied with the terms of the peace¹⁹⁰ – making it only more necessary for international military forces to remain and keep the peace. Illustrative of this was Alija Izetbegovic's words to the second congress of his Party of Democratic Action in 1997, "There is no turning back to a conflict-free and non-national Bosnia."¹⁹¹ Charles Boyd claimed of the program that "nothing the United States is doing in Bosnia today is so clearly destabilizing or unlikely to foster an enduring peace as this program." But whatever its effect, "the program had taken on a life of its own, propelled by the congressional requirement that launched it, the bureaucratic momentum that sustains it, and the business it brings to the American contractor that executes it."¹⁹² The train-and-equip program clearly demonstrated the personal interest government figures have in expanding the 'public sector'.

5.3. Elections and the politics of electoral engineering

Elections are a key component of the political system of any modern liberal democracy. As such, the construction of an electoral system and the holding of elections have been the focus of considerable attention in the theory and practice of state-building in Bosnia. Elections and the politics of electoral engineering have also been key arenas for the dialectical expansion of the Bosnian state. This expansion may be recognized in both the overall politics of electoral engineering in Bosnia and in the actual elections held in the post-Dayton period. In this section I will discuss both the development of electoral engineering and the elections of 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2002.

¹⁸⁹ Kenney, "U.S. Policy Snarls in Bosnia." p. 64.

¹⁹⁰ Edina Becirevic, "If the Refugees Do Not Return Next Year, the World Will Tolerate That as Well!," *Slobodna Bosna* September 21 1997.

¹⁹¹ Quoted in Lenard J. Cohen, "Whose Bosnia? The Politics of Nation Building," *Current History* 97, no. 617 (March 1998). p. 112.

¹⁹² Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1998. p. 49.

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, during the first few years after Dayton, important members of the international community often and publicly emphasized their goal of returning power and responsibility to a democratically elected Bosnian government that would represent all of the three ethnic groups. It was with this intention that international authorities decided to carry out national elections in the fall of 1996. HR Carl Bildt proclaimed in an article in *The Times* that “the longer we wait for elections, the longer the forces of ethnic separation and partition will prevail.”¹⁹³ Elections were characterized as an important first step towards the reconciliation and integration of the three ethnic groups into a unified Bosnia. The day before the elections, a press release from the OHR, the head of the OSCE, and commander of IFOR stated that “The governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation and the Republika Srpska have co-operated with each other and with us in order to create the best possible conditions for everyone to be able to vote in peace and security.”¹⁹⁴

But despite this best effort, the 1996 election (and nearly every other election in the post-Dayton period) resulted in the democratic confirmation of the rule of the nationalist parties, the very result the international community had attempted to prevent.¹⁹⁵ The international community rejected this electoral victory, attributing it to corruption and manipulative politics, and ramped up their regulatory efforts to ensure a result that accorded with the Dayton objective of a united and peaceful Bosnia.¹⁹⁶ Electoral engineering allowed the international community to exercise and inflate its role in Bosnia and the actual elections gave a democratic mandate to the continued rule

¹⁹³ Carl Bildt, "Bosnia Can Have Free Elections," *The Times*, June 13 1996.

¹⁹⁴ OHR Press Release, "Message from High Representative, Carl Bildt, Head of the Osce Amb. Frowick and Commander of Ifor, Admiral Lopez to the Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina," (September 13, 1996).

¹⁹⁵ International Crisis Group, "To Build a Peace: Recommendations for the Madrid Peace Implementation Council Meeting." p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. p. 114.

of the nationalist parties.¹⁹⁷ Thus proceeded the dialectical process of state-building through electoral engineering, which resulted in the entrenchment of nationalists and the international community within the Bosnian state.

The 1996 general elections were viewed by the international community as necessary and important for the transfer of power and authority from the international community to the Bosnians themselves. However, for this transfer to occur the elections would have to result in a new government; one not composed of the nationalist politicians and leaders who had dragged Bosnia into war in the first place. Thus as Susan Woodward noted, the elections were “seen as the last step in the defeat of Bosnian Serbs.”¹⁹⁸ In *Bosnia Faking Democracy After Dayton*, David Chandler described the extensive regulatory framework that the OSCE, in cooperation with the OHR, set up and maintained to ensure the 1996 elections achieved the international community’s objectives.¹⁹⁹ Yet despite intensive efforts the international community only attained limited success. While certain figures, including Radovan Karadzic, were forced to resign their offices, the overall elections resulted in “a democratic mandate to many of those people who were themselves responsible for the outbreak of war in the first place.”²⁰⁰ The nationalists’ success meanwhile, ensured that the international community would need to remain in Bosnia after the elections and exercise an even greater degree of power in the future.

The international community considered the municipal elections in 1997 an opportunity to succeed where they had failed in 1996. Indeed, as Chandler wrote, “the postponement of the municipal elections, from September 1996 to September 1997,

¹⁹⁷ Chris Hedges, "Bosnia's Nationalist Parties Dominate Election Results," *New York Times* September 22 1996.

¹⁹⁸ Susan L. Woodward, "Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning," in *Brookings Discussion Papers* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, May 1996). p. 11.

¹⁹⁹ Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. pp. 114-122.

²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, "Doing Democracy a Diservice," (ICG Balkans Report No. 42, September 1998). p. 4.

provided the PEC [Provisional Election Commission] and the MEC [Media Experts Commission] with opportunities to expand their staff and their remit.”²⁰¹ As evidence of the extensive regulation by the international community, Betty Dawson, the OSCE Press and Public Affairs Officer, claimed of the 1997 elections that they would be “the most supervised elections ever, anywhere.”²⁰² The ICG described the OSCE nationwide regulation system, less positively, as “a giant process of ethnically motivated election engineering.” The elections however, did not prevent the nationalists’ electoral victory. Rather, “during the 1997 municipal elections ruling nationalist parties won 129 out of the 136 municipalities that their ethnic groups controlled militarily. This occurred in spite of OSCE financial support to select opposition parties, which totaled \$1.5 million.”²⁰³ Kasim Begic claimed that “the international community have in effect permitted certain local parties to continue their original aims – directed at succession and the break-up of Bosnia-Hersegovina.”²⁰⁴ The international community’s predictable response to this outcome was to again increase its role and authority in Bosnia, further demonstrating the dialectical growth of power between the nationalist parties and the international community.

The international community’s attempts at electoral engineering, in the pursuit of a win for non-nationalist parties, continued unabated in 1998. Somewhat belatedly, as if 1996 and 1997 had not been evidence enough, the ICG reported that “during 1998 it became obvious that OSCE was not acting as the impartial international referee envisioned by DPA.” Instead it was actively involved in trying to unseat the nationalist parties.²⁰⁵ In spite of these efforts the nationalists won the elections again. In Republika Srpska, “hard-line (non)Bosnian Serb Nikola Poplasen, with a ‘decorated’ war career as a

²⁰¹ Chandler, *Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton*. p. 116.

²⁰² Quoted in *Ibid.* p. 122.

²⁰³ International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement." pp. 13-14.

²⁰⁴ Kasim Begic, "Using Elections to Achieve a Final Decision," *Bosnia Report* 19 (June-August 1997).

²⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement." p. 15.

Cetnik paramilitary leader, was elected President.”²⁰⁶ Illustrating the fragmented character of the state, “Moslem hardliners in the Moslem-Croat federation...told absentee voters to support Mr. Poplasen as a way of halting the process of ethnic integration through refugee returns.”²⁰⁷ The silver-lining on this defeat, of course, was that the nationalists’ victory was justification for increased regulatory powers. The PIC declared at its December 1998 Madrid meeting that it would work “to develop a new electoral law which will promote a democratic and multi-ethnic political process and make the elected officials accountable to the voters.”²⁰⁸

While the nationalist parties continued to fulfill their role of ‘obstacles’ to Dayton-implementation, receiving democratic mandates in return, the international community, and especially the OSCE, re-committed itself to state-building in Bosnia. In 2000 the OSCE “organized, financed and supervised the third general election in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the cessation of hostilities in November 1995.”²⁰⁹ Again the nationalists largely retained power, and again their wins inspired resigned pronouncements from the international community that “were it not for the significant international presence in Bosnia, and especially the NATO presence, the Dayton Peace Accords would rapidly unravel.”²¹⁰ But the 2000 elections were not a complete sweep for the nationalists, in early 2001 relatively moderate parties formed a ten-party coalition the Democratic Alliance for Change. This coalition government was the result of “energetic lobbying and arm-twisting” by the American and British ambassadors to Bosnia, rather than of any real interest on the part of the individual parties.²¹¹ The

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Guy Dinmore, "Bosnia: Radical Nationalist Set to Win Poll," *The Financial Times* September 16 1998.

²⁰⁸ Peace Implementation Council, "Madrid Declaration," (16 December 1998). Section 12.4.

²⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Sumbles," (Sarajevo/Brussels: ICG Balkans Report No. 104, 18 December 2000). p.1.

²¹⁰ Ibid. p. ii.

²¹¹ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change." p. 1.

shallow and shifting foundation of the Alliance was revealed in its clear defeat in the 2002 general elections.

The 2002 elections were significant for Bosnia because they were the first “for whose organization and implementation local authorities were fully responsible.”²¹² But rather than a simple transition to local control, the 2002 elections were an example of the pursuit of power without responsibility. As the ICG pointed out:

The 2002 polls took place in an environment in which the international community continued to have the final say in most aspects of political life, including the electoral process. The HR imposed significant changes to the executive branches at different levels of government both before and after the elections.²¹³

Whoever was in control, the result was the return to power of the straightforwardly nationalist parties in Bosnia. Nationalist politicians took “all three seats for Bosnia’s joint presidency”²¹⁴ and the big-three nationalist parties regained control of state and entity parliaments.²¹⁵ The dialectical pattern of nationalist electoral victories and consistent international regulation was once again revealed in the 2002 elections. But elections were only one component of the interdependence of local and international state actors. In the next section I will investigate the key state-building process of economic development and reform.

5.4. Economic development and reform

It is generally recognized that poverty and economic failure are closely linked with civil conflict and consequently that economic development comprises a central role in

²¹² Open Society Fund Bosnia & Herzegovina, "Democracy Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina," (Sarajevo: 2006). p. 135.

²¹³ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building." p. 2.

²¹⁴ Daniel Simpson, "Nationalist Parties Set to Regain Power in Bosnia," *New York Times* October 8, 2002.

²¹⁵ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building." p. 1.

post-conflict reconstruction and state-building efforts.²¹⁶ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss economic development in Bosnia in any great detail; such research moreover has been done in other places.²¹⁷ However, it is useful to draw attention to the general results of key aspects of the political-economic features of state-building in Bosnia. These results provide further examples of my thesis that local and international actors have operated in an apparently oppositional but effectively cooperative manner that has ultimately resulted in the continuing expansion of the Bosnian state in the post-Dayton period.

One of the key components of economic development in Bosnia since the end of the war has been the massive influx of foreign and international economic aid. Indeed, the Bosnian economy has been almost entirely dependent on economic aid for most of the 12 years since the Dayton agreement ended the war.²¹⁸ Between 1996 and 2000 Bosnia received approximately \$5.1 billion in foreign aid.²¹⁹ Yet despite this aid Bosnia has experienced minimal growth in the post-Dayton period. The European Stability Initiative in its report *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, argued:

The international reconstruction effort did not “kick-start” the Bosnian economy, as its authors had hoped. High growth rates reported in the period from 1996 to 1999, averaging 40 percent of GDP annually, proved to be shallow. These numbers were registering the direct effects of international spending, and were driven in part by the rapid increase in *public* sector salaries, all against the disastrously low post-war GDP. This form of economic growth generated little new employment outside the public sector. It was the equivalent of a temporary oil boom, driving up imports and prices without changing the structure or competitiveness of the economy.²²⁰

²¹⁶ Dominik Zaum, "Economic Reform and the Transformation of the Payment Bureaux," in *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia*, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006). p. 44.

²¹⁷ See for example: Michael Pugh, "Transformation in the Political Economy of Bosnia since Dayton," in *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia*, ed. David Chandler (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).; Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*.

²¹⁸ European Stability Initiative, "Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part One: Bosnian Power Structures," (14 October 1999). p. 13.

²¹⁹ International Crisis Group, "Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? An Overview of Impediments to Investment and Self Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era." p. 5.

²²⁰ European Stability Initiative, "Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation," (Berlin-Sarajevo: 2004). p. 20.

Besides the unintended consequence of creating an aid-dependent economy, foreign aid helped to solidify the division between the economies of the two entities, thereby deepening the ethnic divisions nationalist parties used to maintain their power.²²¹ The funds provided by the international community subsidized the nationalists' economic power and that power "enabled...the large mono-ethnic parties to sustain their party apparatus and exert their influence at all levels in society."²²²

In addition to shoring up the economy, aid primarily serves to fund the institutions of the Bosnian state, and enable its expansion. As the European Stability Initiative noted of the early economic reconstruction efforts:

it has strengthened the war-time regimes and their capacity to oppose the state-building agenda. The rebuilding of bridges and roads, hospitals and schools, and even the distribution of humanitarian aid, reinforced the war-time regimes by giving them access to material resources and by building their credibility with the local population. Local leaders benefited materially from the aid programme through control of local companies contracted for reconstruction work, and through the supply of goods and rental premises to international agencies. They benefited politically, not just from being able to provide their constituency with international aid, but also from the ability to direct aid according to political criteria. By the time the international community became aware of the nature of the power structures it was dealing with, they had become well entrenched and highly resistant to external influence.²²³

Aid has been so useful to the nationalists in government primarily because the objectives it was designated to achieve are viewed as public goods. Accordingly, aid is funneled through the state. Patrice McMahon illustrated this point with the example of the World Bank in Bosnia:

²²¹ European Stability Initiative, "Taking on the Commanding Heights: Integration of Network Industries as a Tool of Peace Building, a Proposal for the Peace Implementation Council," (Berlin - Brussels - Sarajevo: 3 May 2000). p. 1.

²²² David B. Dlouhy, "On Corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Statement before U.S. House International Relations Committee, 15 September 1999," *Bosnia Report* New Series, no. 11/12 (August-November 1999).

²²³ European Stability Initiative, "Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part Two. International Power in Bosnia." p. 15.

When the World Bank entered Bosnia, for example, it did so on the basis of its "post-natural disaster" model, which meant that assistance was seen as a public good and that support was channeled through existing government conduits. The unintended result of the West's rushed, apolitical approach to political and economic development was that moderate politicians were not given an opportunity to develop a constituency and nationalist politicians gained even more control over scarce jobs and housing. Not only did nationalists profit materially from aid monies and the international community's recognition of them as legitimate leaders, but their ability to influence which companies were chosen for internationally funded reconstruction projects helped them gain loyal political followers. International assistance has profound political effects, and the outcome of working with national elected officials regardless of their political orientation is a society that still relies on connections and remains divided along ethnic lines, rather than one based on equal opportunity and the rule of law.²²⁴

It has even been pointed out that those areas of the country that have received the most aid have been most resistant to reform.²²⁵ As one example, the Bosnian Muslims were accused of being "tremendously obstructionist in blocking...transparent, honest privatization laws...because they find it a lot easier to sit back and enjoy the benefits of international economic aid...[and] because they basically believe in state control and party control."²²⁶ Thus while publicly pressuring the ruling nationalist parties to seriously commit to economic reform and development-friendly policies, and condemning their consistent resistance, the international community has effectively supported the nationalists and ensured their continuous rule.

While the benefits of aid for the indigenous officials and institutions of the Bosnian state are obvious, the advantages of aid for international components of the state are less often recognized or noted. When the international organizations and actors in Bosnia provide "aid" and other forms of funding, they are not "losing" money. They do not produce wealth, they disburse it. Thus the provision and administration of aid packages is one of the primary justifications for their existence and a principal source of their power.

²²⁴ Patrice C. McMahon, "Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or Avoid?," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (2004-05). p. 581.

²²⁵ European Stability Initiative, "Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part Two. International Power in Bosnia." p. 44.

²²⁶ Carol Giacomo, "U.S. And Allies May Turn Off Bosnia Aid Tap," *Reuters* November 9 1998.

In Bosnia, a significant section of the international community has arisen around the provision and administration of aid packages. Demonstrating again the mutual reinforcement of both local and international components of the Bosnian state, foreign aid requires the international community to preserve, increase, and vigorously exercise its power within Bosnia. The ICG noted in a 2007 report that “Nearly every ambassador Crisis Group interviewed as well as the head of the World Bank mission called assistance inadequate.”²²⁷ It is not remarkable that officials would press for increased funding for their division or sector of government. The aggregate effect of this is the continual expansion of the state. Thus:

Despite the severity of economic conditions, all levels of government in Bosnia except cantons and municipalities in the Federation increased their budgets steadily. The international community, led by the OHR, contributed to the problem through institution-building strategies which attracted qualified staff into key institutions by offering unsustainable salaries. The year 2000 marked the intensification of international efforts to build up the institutional capacity of central government...An OHR decision in 2000 more than doubled the salaries of judges across the country...Each of these initiatives were seen as a key state-building objective, and pushed by the international organizations. Collectively, they added considerably to the cost of government and reinforced the problem of public-sector wage inflation.²²⁸

While the state grew, the nationalists’ hold on power kept pace, which resulted in the need for the international community to remain in Bosnia, and continue to play its own role in the state. “International policy, informed by good governance principles, starts from the assumption that elected government is an opportunity for corruption and inevitably leads to the conclusion that corruption-busting is therefore a task for the West.”²²⁹ Since Dayton the international community has shown itself eager and willing to tackle it. This task involved significant exercise of power, but little attendant

²²⁷ International Crisis Group, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy." p. 24.

²²⁸ European Stability Initiative, "Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation." p. 17.

²²⁹ David Chandler, "Building Trust in Public Institutions? Good Governance and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Ethnopolitics* 5, no. 1 (2006). p. 94.

responsibility. The local state actors, meanwhile, freed from the constraints of limited budgets and preserving popular legitimacy that typical sovereign states face enjoyed the internationally funded exercise of power (limited by the necessity of a minimum level of cooperation) that international administration afforded. When complaints came their way they passed them on or blamed the problems on the offensive power of the international community.²³⁰ Thus the end result of state-building in Bosnia during the first six years was an increase in the size and power of both the international community and of the nationalist parties through their participation in the Bosnian state.

²³⁰Dr. Milorad Zivkovic, "Letter to the Council of Europe from the Speaker of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly House of Representatives, Dr. Milorad Zivkovic," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1, no. Special Supplement (1 December 2007).

CHAPTER 6

FROM OWNERSHIP TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 2002-2007

6.1. The Passing of Dayton

The Dayton Peace Accords was a compromise agreement constructed and written by the international community and accepted by the three nationalist parties as representatives of the three ethnic groups which comprised Bosnia. In chapter four I described how the dialectical relationship of interdependence between the international community and the nationalist parties emerged during the war in Bosnia. As I argued in that chapter, the Dayton agreement was an outcome of the development of international-local interdependence and also served to institutionalize the relationship in the post-Dayton period. Some have argued that the Dayton treaty was written by the nationalist parties and enabled their preservation and exertion of power since 1996,²³¹ but this argument is incorrect. Yet Dayton was not imposed on the nationalist parties either; they voluntarily signed the agreement and invited the international community to assist in its implementation.²³²

The key to understanding the Dayton agreement is in realizing the benefits it offered to both the nationalist parties and the international community, and the mutually advantageous structure of cooperation that it institutionalized. For the nationalists Dayton provided international legitimacy. As signatories to the treaty, the nationalists were internationally recognized as the legal government in Bosnia. Beyond this initial legitimacy, Dayton preserved territorial divisions thereby ensuring a role in the new state for all three ethnic groups. The international community meanwhile, gained

²³¹ M. Kaldor, "One Year after Dayton," in *Dayton Continued in Bosnia Herzegovina* (The Hague: Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Publication Series 11, 1997). pp. 28-30.

²³² Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power*. p. 150.

significant powers of state-building. Dayton, in fact, facilitated the extensive powers of regulation and administration that the international community exercised and expanded in the post-Dayton period.²³³

Most importantly, Dayton institutionalized the interdependence between the nationalists and the international community. By simultaneously establishing the official legitimacy of the nationalist parties as the sovereign Bosnian state, and the international community as an administration with extensive powers of their own the treaty made it inevitable that internal and external authority would come into conflict. This problem has been depicted in the state-building literature as one that required a reconciliation of the powers and interests of local state actors and international administrators.²³⁴ Many scholars have argued that in Bosnia, opposition between the international community and the nationalists has remained perhaps the most significant obstacle to effective and successful state-building.²³⁵ This thesis has offered an alternative explanation of state-building and the relations between the international community and the Bosnian government.

The relationship institutionalized by Dayton between external and local actors has been only apparently oppositional and effectively cooperative. State-building in Bosnia cannot be usefully understood as a prizefight for power between homogeneous contestants characterized as 'internal' and 'external'. The Bosnian state is a multi-layered and fragmented process of legitimizing and exercising the monopoly of power within Bosnia, and as such it subsumes both internal and external actors. But the fiction of conflict between internal and external has been an effective strategy to distract from the real expansion of the Bosnian state encompassing both nationalist Bosnian politicians and bureaucrats and administrators from abroad. Thus we have seen consistent, mutually beneficial interaction between international and local actors and

²³³ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 124.

²³⁴ Berdal, "The Politics of International Administration." p. 3.

²³⁵ Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. p. 6.

nearly every apparent conflict between them result in the growth of the Bosnian leviathan.

Dayton also set the objectives for state-building in Bosnia. Above all the treaty was intended to end the war. Beyond that limited military objective, Dayton's authors hoped to create a free and democratic society that would allow the peaceful co-existence of Dayton's three ethnic groups. As a democratic society there would be no room for a permanent international presence that would interfere with the democratic self-rule of the Bosnian people. Therefore an important objective was the departure of the international community, at the very least in their capacity as 'governing' actors. But that goal was clearly incompatible with the mounting incorporation of the international community into the Bosnian state or with the interdependence that developed between them and the nationalist parties. This incompatibility revealed itself in the discordance between the international community's publicized intentions of leaving and the actual "vast increase" of their "international powers of administration."²³⁶

A significant advantage of Dayton for this dialectical relationship was its amorphous quality which allowed continual reinterpretation and redefinition of its rules and intentions. David Chandler has pointed to how this vague quality revealed itself in the frequent references figures in the international community made to the 'spirit of Dayton' to justify their powers.²³⁷ The nationalists were also aware of the benefits of Dayton, as Rory Domm pointed out, "one of the main defenders of Dayton is the nationalist *Srpska Demokratska Stranka* (SDS)" party.²³⁸

But by the first years of the new millennium the international community had extended and exercised its powers to such an extent and with so little 'success' that it was increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction of Bosnian sovereignty and international

²³⁶ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 123.

²³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 131.

²³⁸ Rory Domm, "Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 2007). p. 162.

detachment. Marianne Ducasse-Rogier observed that the third HR, Wolfgang Petritsch, who served between 1999 and 2002, took office promising to scale back the activity of the HR and help deconstruct the Bosnian officials' political dependency on the international community. But "far from being reduced, the dependency dilemma then reached a climax: more than 200 decisions and dismissals were imposed by the High Representative between 1999 and 2002, exceeding by far the previous record."²³⁹

By 2002 the international community's role in Bosnia was being loudly and frequently questioned. Perhaps the most well-known example of this trend was the article *Travails of the European Raj* by Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin. In that article Knaus and Martin noted:

Seven years after the end of fighting, and despite possibly the most democratisation assistance per capita ever spent in one country, the international mission to BiH has arrived at this paradoxical conclusion: What Bosnia and Herzegovina needs is government by international experts. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the political agenda (now the norm throughout Eastern Europe, as governments aspire to join the EU). They *set* that agenda, *impose* it, and *punish with sanctions* those who refuse to implement it.²⁴⁰

As the significant powers of the international community drew more and more attention the international administration in Bosnia began to openly question the suitability of the Dayton agreement. In a 2003 ICG report it was observed that

The view that the Dayton constitution has just about exhausted its usefulness is gaining ground. Many domestic and foreign speakers at a colloquy hosted by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 19 May opined that the constitution is becoming a principal obstacle both to Bosnia's EU ambitions and to its development as a functional state. There are those in OHR who agree.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Marianne Ducasse-Rogier, "Recovering from Dayton: From 'Peace-Building' to 'State-Building' in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Helsinki Monitor*, no. 2 (2004). p. 84.

²⁴⁰ Knaus, "Travails of the European Raj." p. 89.

²⁴¹ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 4.

A March 2005 report from the Venice Commission similarly noted that "...a central element of the first stage of constitutional reform has to be a transfer of responsibilities from the Entities to BiH by means of amendments to the BiH Constitution."²⁴²

But questioning the relevance of Dayton did not mean that the international community was ready to leave Bosnia or hand over its power and authority to local actors. As the ICG put it, "Yet if everyone recognizes that reliance on OHR has to stop if Bosnia is to make substantive progress towards the EU, few want OHR to depart any time soon."²⁴³ In 1998, when faced with electoral defeat, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik hoped "for more support from the U.S." and a few months later received it when the HR removed his opposition Poplasen from power.²⁴⁴ In 2007, this time protesting the power of the OHR, Dodik saw "the future of BiH being the member of EU and NATO, and that the European course has no alternative", perhaps because he was sure "that the EU will understand [the] need to preserve the Republic of Srpska and its institutions within Bosnia and Herzegovina."²⁴⁵ Dodik had moved with the times. And indeed, when the 'spirit of Dayton' began to lose its value, rather than begin preparations to leave Bosnia, the international community began to construct a new framework for the state-building process. Rory Domm described this shift excellently as "a shift to a new 'exit' strategy (often referred to as an 'entry' strategy), comprising a push for BiH's successful inclusion into the EU accession process and Euro-Atlantic structures as evidenced by SAA and PfP membership, respectively."²⁴⁶

²⁴² OHR Press Release, "OHR Welcomes Venice Commission Report," (14 March 2005).

²⁴³ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 10.

²⁴⁴ Guy Dinmore, "West Clings to Bosnia Hopes," *Financial Times* September 25 1998.

²⁴⁵ Milorad Dodik, "Letter to the EU Parliament from Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1 Special Supplement (20 November 2007). p. 69.

²⁴⁶ Domm, "Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 163.

6.2. Towards European Integration

The change in emphasis from Dayton-implementation and democratization to European integration and EU accession between 2000 and 2002 has been widely commented upon in the literature on Bosnia.²⁴⁷ Europe's participation in the state-building process in Bosnia had long been limited to supporting the stronger and more interventionist position of the United States. "At the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, then head of the EC (European Community) Presidency, declared that the organization would intervene in Yugoslavia because it was 'the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States'."²⁴⁸ But Europe's early interventions were noticeable failures and the U.S. soon stepped in and took the leading role. During the first years of state-building moreover, Europe only slowly emerged as a significant player through the OHR.²⁴⁹

Beginning in 2002²⁵⁰ significant formal and structural changes, as well as a shift in discursive strategies, began to appear that indicated the 'push' of the Bonn powers was being replaced by the 'pull' of Europe.²⁵¹ Among these changes was the 2002 decision to attach the High Representative to the European Union and to combine his role with that of the European Union Special Representative, "meaning that the High Representative's powers - which include the authority to impose legislation and to dismiss elected representatives and government officials without any right of appeal -

²⁴⁷ Danijela Majstorovic, "Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative's Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Discourse & Society* 18, no. 5 (2007). p. 628; Domm, "Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 172; Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 126.

²⁴⁸ Juncos, "The Eu's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (Re)Inventing the EU?." p. 88; Phillip H. Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security* 22, no. 3 (1997/1998). p. 75.

²⁴⁹ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 129.

²⁵⁰ Other scholars have dated this transition to 2000 and there are certainly good reasons for this earlier date. I have chosen to date the shift to 2002 for reasons I will explain within the text.

²⁵¹ Majstorovic, "Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative's Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 648.

can be used both under the aegis of upholding the Dayton peace agreement and of facilitating the reforms necessary for EU membership.”²⁵² Another significant change was the 2002 reform of the Council of Ministers. Described by the ICG, the Council “has made Europe its first priority. Enlarged and reformed in structure thanks to the High Representative, the former and ineffectual Ministry of European Integration has become a Directorate for European Integration (DEI) under the Chairman of the CoM (whom Lord Ashdown prefers now to refer to as the Prime Minister).”²⁵³ David Chandler argued that the DEI has become “the key executive body of the Bosnian government, supported in its operational structuring and institutional linkages by funding directly from the European Commission.”²⁵⁴ In January 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from the UN’s police monitoring role. In December 2004 the NATO SFOR was replaced by the EUFOR, the European Union’s largest military operation.²⁵⁵

A detailed analysis of the formal and structural changes that comprised the transition to Europeanization and EU accession would not be appropriate here. Such research has been competently done and will very helpfully inform the arguments made here. This thesis is concerned rather with a broad argument about the informal and *ad hoc* relationship between internal and external actors within the Bosnian state. On this level then, the transition from democratization and Dayton implementation to Europeanization is an adaptation and development of the dialectical relationship between the international community and the nationalist parties. The goal of state-building in Bosnia has shifted from setting up an independent and sovereign Bosnian state to integrating Bosnia into Europe and, more formally, its accession to the EU. Previously the international community intended to withdraw after Dayton had been fully implemented. After 2002 it developed a new ‘exit’ strategy: the IC would depart

²⁵² David Chandler, "Introduction: Inside the Bosnian Crisis," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1 Special Supplement (1 December 2007). pp. 1-2.

²⁵³ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 4.

²⁵⁴ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 137.

²⁵⁵ Juncos, "The Eu's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (Re)Inventing the EU?." p. 99.

after Bosnia had become a member of the European Union.²⁵⁶ But this exit strategy soon revealed its tremendous potential as an entry strategy.

During the first phase of state-building in post-Dayton Bosnia, the international community and the nationalist parties appeared to act in conflict. As I argued in previous chapters this apparent opposition offered a scapegoat for both the international community and the nationalists. The international community blamed the nationalists for obstruction and the nationalists accused the international community of imperialism, neocolonialism and of overstepping its authority. By characterizing the failure of state-building as the fault of one side or the other, much of the literature has missed the very real expansion of the state, including both internal and external actors, that has occurred under the aegis of state-building. This apparent opposition has continued into the phase of European integration.

In his introduction to a special journal supplement on the recent (2006-2007) political crisis in Bosnia over police reform David Chandler noted the depiction of conflict by scholars and members of the international community in Bosnia:

Even more striking, is the allocation of blame, not to EU policy but to the Bosnian political elite, described as comprising: ‘an obnoxious mix of ruthlessly single-minded masters of obstruction and brinkmanship; short-sighted obsessives; and corrupt, feeble-minded provincials lacking in strategic vision, political judgement and courage. Their politics are not irrational, but their rationality is patently not that of EU integration.’²⁵⁷

In this vein HR Miroslav Lajcak claimed in a 2008 speech at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies that “a decade and a half after the war, the vast majority of BiH politicians continue to view almost every issue through a nationalist prism.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Thomas Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally-Led Security Reform," *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1 Special Supplement (1 December 2007). p. 56.

²⁵⁷ Chandler, "Introduction: Inside the Bosnian Crisis." p. 7.

²⁵⁸ High Representative Miroslav Lajcak, "Speech at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies," (Washington, DC: May 21, 2008).

In the framework of Europeanization, nationalism and nationalist politicians still present an excellent target for international criticism and blame.

On the other side, criticisms continue to be made of the international community's extensive powers in Bosnia. The HR has been represented as a European Raj²⁵⁹ and the European Union has been described as pursuing 'empire in denial' through its state-building activities.²⁶⁰ In 2007 both the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska and the Speaker of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly House of Representatives wrote letters to EU governing bodies containing serious criticisms of the HR's exercise of power during that year.²⁶¹ As during the first phase of state-building in Bosnia, this opposition masks what effectively amounts to cooperation between the internal and external agents of the Bosnian state.

The shift in official rhetoric from emphasizing Dayton implementation to promoting European integration has been accompanied by disclaimers that the international community is still extremely important for the process of European member state-building and that it has no intention of leaving Bosnia in the near future. The ICG asserted that "as a ward of the international community, Bosnia requires reassurance, in effect, that the EU will step in as OHR bows out."²⁶² The United States Institute of Peace similarly argued that the EU accession process requires "an active, empowered European Union Special Representative (EUSR – as opposed to the passive SAA role traditionally played by the EC), along with continued intensive international engagement from the U.S. and key allies."²⁶³ Just as the amorphous nature of the

²⁵⁹ Knaus, "Travails of the European Raj."

²⁶⁰ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*.

²⁶¹ Dodik, "Letter to the EU Parliament from Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska."; Zivkovic, "Letter to the Council of Europe from the Speaker of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly House of Representatives, Dr. Milorad Zivkovic."

²⁶² International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 6.

²⁶³ Edward P. Joseph and R. Bruce Hitchner, "Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession Is Not Enough," (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008). p. 2.

Dayton agreement allowed the international community to repeatedly reinterpret its role in Bosnia, the EU accession process is similarly vague and open to amendment. The “OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP), approved by the PIC in January 2003, sets no dates or deadlines for transition. Rather, it establishes benchmarks for determining when domestic capacities have developed to the extent that will warrant the transfer of power to local authorities in the various core areas.”²⁶⁴ Indeed, as Rory Domm concludes, “For all the rhetoric on local ownership, the leverage provided by EU conditionality has allowed for the transition administration to make the period 2002–2005 the most interventionist to date.”²⁶⁵

Yet despite sustained levels of significant international participation in the institutions of state in Bosnia, it is important to recognize that the nationalist parties have fully retained their power within the Bosnian state. Matthew Parish wrote in this regard that “Nationalist rhetoric became ever more vocal in advance of the October 2006 countrywide elections, which saw leaders elected on uncompromising ethnic platforms.”²⁶⁶ The international community’s strong interventions, moreover, have continued to create gridlock and benefit the nationalist parties.²⁶⁷ Sustained in power, the nationalists continued to access all the advantages of their former interaction with the external actors. Thus “local leaders became used to resting on the shoulders of international staff, while they would themselves spend most of their time criticizing the international community or reviving nationalism – and occasionally filling their pockets with public money.”²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 11.

²⁶⁵ Domm, "Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 172.

²⁶⁶ Parish, "The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate." p. 17.

²⁶⁷ Domm, "Europeanisation without Democratisation: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 167

²⁶⁸ Ducasse-Rogier, "Recovering from Dayton: From 'Peace-Building' to 'State-Building' in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 80.

The nationalists further demonstrated their interest in continuing their association with international actors through their official support for the new agenda of European integration.²⁶⁹ As the ICG wrote, “The big-three nationalist parties have nonetheless been able to make pursuit of European integration their common and core policy since their return to power. They may be at odds with one another about much else, but the Council of Ministers (CoM) formed in January 2003 has made Europe its first priority.”²⁷⁰ In 2003 President Dragan Cavic of Republika Srpska said during parliamentary debate: “We don’t want to stand as an obstacle on the road to Europe, because otherwise someone might just push us off the road.”²⁷¹ In fact, all the major political parties have publicly conveyed their support for the EU accession.²⁷² But agreement on integration does not mean that ‘conflict’ between external and internal will cease. The EU recently released a document asserting that “the eruption of the long-simmering political crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina has painfully exposed the failure of the most intensive effort ever at internationally-supervised state building.”²⁷³ But if the past is any indication, it is just such failure that will inspire renewed and committed efforts at state-building in Bosnia.

I will conclude this chapter by providing a few examples of the general integration of international and local actors within the institutions of the Bosnian state.

As I argued in chapter three, the Bosnian state is a multi-layered and fragmented process of the political use and expansion of the legal monopoly of power within Bosnia. This process involves contest and cooperation at all levels and in all branches

²⁶⁹ Majstorovic, "Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative's Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 631.

²⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 4.

²⁷¹ Caplan, "From Collapsing States to Neo-Trusteeship: The Limits to Solving the Problem of 'Precarious Statehood' in the 21st Century." p. 236.

²⁷² Juncos, "The Eu's Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (Re)Inventing the EU?." p. 91.

²⁷³ Chandler, "Introduction: Inside the Bosnian Crisis." p. 1.

of the state apparatus. Moreover, this process encompasses both international and local state actors, differentiating them both from distant international agencies and foreign governments, and from the domestic population of Bosnia. Through the exercise of state power, international actors are localized and take on, to varying extents, the identity of the Bosnian state. In the same process Bosnian politicians are externalized, again to varying extents, from Bosnian society.

The Police Restructuring Commission (PRC), comprising international and local officials and set up by HR Ashdown, provides an apt example of this process. To ensure that the PRC arrived at conclusions acceptable to the broader international community an international expert was flown in to chair the commission for a brief period of time. But the ‘external’ chairperson soon came into conflict with “international community representatives who had been in the country for much longer, saw themselves as ‘real’ experts and sought to ‘remote-control’ the flown-in international community representative.”²⁷⁴ Here was a classic case of the ‘localization’ of international actors within the Bosnian state. But these localized actors also jealously guarded their political prerogatives from any intrusion by domestic politicians. Thus “Council of Ministers chairman Zlatko Lagumdžija underlined that ‘partnership’ between the Peace Implementation Council and ‘its’ government was not working. ‘Lower-ranking international officials do not like the partnership concept, as it undermines their role’.”²⁷⁵ As if to reinforce this localization, the ICG claimed that “It is probably easier for Bosnia citizens to imagine their country without a Presidency, CoM or state parliament than without OHR. The High Representative is the unwritten but functional part of the constitution.”²⁷⁶

On the flip side of the relationship, through their interaction with the international community and their exercise of state power, local politicians were often

²⁷⁴ Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally-Led Security Reform." p. 59.

²⁷⁵ Knaus, "Travails of the European Raj." p. 63.

²⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, "Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia." p. 10.

‘internationalized’. Sometimes this happened through the international community’s efforts to hire Bosnians to fill formerly ‘international’ positions.²⁷⁷ Consequently “The Office of the High Representative (OHR) became a major bureaucracy, employing hundreds of people in the exercise of drafting, consulting, debating and enacting...decisions.”²⁷⁸ Otherwise, domestic divisions of government were internationally funded or subsidized. One example of this is the State Border Service which “was established, initially with foreign funding [and] by 2002 it was the second largest budget entity in the central government at KM 52 million.”²⁷⁹ In 2000 an OHR decision increased the salaries of judges throughout Bosnia by more than one-hundred percent.²⁸⁰ To increase its capacity and capabilities, the EU sent “civil servants from EU member states to work as advisors” and provide technical assistance to the DEI,²⁸¹ thereby also giving it greater ‘international’ legitimacy.

State-building in Bosnia is still very much ongoing. The years between 2002 and 2007 have been oriented around the goal of European integration and accession into the EU. In this chapter, rather than present a detailed and comprehensive analysis of state-building in Bosnia I have attempted to present a broad argument regarding the dynamics of the relationship between international and domestic state actors in Bosnia. In this way it is possible to see the continuities between these later years and the earlier phase of democratization and Dayton-implementation. Throughout the post-Dayton period relations between the international community and the nationalist parties in Bosnia have been mutually supportive. While public conflicts and opposition seem to have characterized their relations, these apparent conflicts consistently resulted in the expansion of both international and domestic offices and power.

²⁷⁷ Ducasse-Rogier, "Recovering from Dayton: From 'Peace-Building' to 'State-Building' in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 86.

²⁷⁸ Parish, "The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate." p. 15.

²⁷⁹ European Stability Initiative, "Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation." p. 14.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Chandler, *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building*. p. 140.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis was an endeavor to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the relationship between international (external) and local (internal) actors in the post-Dayton state-building process in Bosnia. While state-building in Bosnia has received a considerable amount of attention and study, especially during the early years of the process, apprehension and depiction of the relationship between the international community and Bosnian governing officials has remained relatively homogeneous. This dominant account of the relationship has been that it is a contentious and oppositional one. The interests of the international community and of the ruling nationalist parties are represented as contradictory. The logical result of this account is that from these clashing interests emerge antagonistic and obstructive actions and policies.

The ostensible goal of state-building in Bosnia is a peaceful, stable, unified, independent, and sovereign nation capable of taking its place in the international system. This objective apparently has thus-far, twelve years after its initiation in the Dayton treaty, not been met. This failure is typically characterized as the outcome of opposition between national and international state-builders. Blame is then accorded to either the nationalist Bosnian leaders, the international community, or in some cases to both.

This 'oppositional view' of state-building in Bosnia, described above, seems limited in explanatory value. At the abstract level it provides an organized and tidy framework: two basic parties (international and local) interact, both cooperating and competing, in order to formulate and implement decisions and policies that will build a state in Bosnia capable of governing Bosnian society. Thus two subjects, local and international, compete to control an object, the state. This framework is highly simplified and those

empirical accounts of the state-building process that operate within it do allow for degrees of complexity and aberration. Nevertheless, studies that work from this framework allow for only limited conclusions, both in theory and in practice. These conclusions generally return in the end to the original dichotomy between local and international actors and place blame with one and their solution for state-building, consequently, with the other.

In this thesis I termed the view described above the dualist approach. To criticize the approach I highlighted two of its problematic aspects. These were the conception of the state, in the abstract, as a highly unified and cohesive entity. And, the depiction of internal and external as isolated and fixed actor-identities.

To see the state as a single, primarily cohesive, entity is to take a static approach. In legal terms the state is conceived as the direct materialization of the terms and constitution outlined in the Dayton agreement. In practical terms the state is the ability to claim and exercise power above and over Bosnian politics and society. My alternative, as I explained it in chapter 3, was to take a process-oriented approach. Hence, the state is a multi-layered and fragmented socio-political field in which multiple actors exercise power in cooperation and in opposition. These state actors are identified not so much by their 'direction' or 'ideology' as by the activity they are engaged in, namely the exercise of power. From this understanding of the 'state', in theoretical terms, comes the realization that the Bosnian state encompasses both international and local actors.

When state actors enter the field they carry initial identities describing geo-political points of origin. The external actors are members of the international community in Bosnia and the internal actors are Bosnians themselves, whether Croat, Serb, or Muslim. Once upon the field those identities, while continuing to influence the players' ideas, interests, and modes of action, become subsumed within the larger process of exercising power in Bosnia. The identities and interests of the individuals who comprise the state converge in their mutual use and dependence upon power.

The central argument of this thesis, then, has been that the international community and the nationalist parties (representing respectively the external and internal state actors) have become united in a mutually advantageous and mutually-reinforcing process of sharing power, responsibility, and blame. This process has been apparently oppositional but effectively cooperative, so that the outcome of twelve years of state-building has been the continuing importance, if not necessity, of both the international community and the nationalist parties in Bosnia.

I hope that this thesis, by revealing the compatibility and dependence between them, can free analysis of state-building in Bosnia from the limiting and flawed perception of a strict dichotomy between external and internal forces in the country. The studies and reports of academics, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations often suggest ways that the international community and the Bosnian political parties can better work together. These suggestions and policy prescriptions overlook or miss the reality that these two supposedly distinct actors already work together, indeed that their continuing importance after twelve years is fundamentally reliant on their effective cooperation. Recognizing this convergence is an important and necessary first step for both better understanding the state-building process in Bosnia and for more successful policies in the future.

The logical conclusion of my thesis, then, is that the activities and policies, rather than the identities, of state actors are the appropriate foci of analysis and criticism. In Bosnia, the success or failure of a policy is less likely to be determined by the identity of its particular implementer than by its suitability in solving the relevant problem.

This conclusion forfeits the easy task of picking a side, local or international, and cheering it on and returns analysis to the difficult undertaking of the construction and criticism of policy. When policies fail, responsibility must be placed with the state builders, both local and international. In the short term this will entail a loss of specificity, meaning that politicians and bureaucrats will be held responsible for policies

that were perhaps not theirs. But in the current labyrinthine context of Bosnian government, this is necessary and appropriate. It is necessary because specified criticism is impossible with the present absence of clear lines of authority and responsibility and only provides perverse incentives for groups to make individuals scapegoats for the groups' failures. It is appropriate because when state actors realize they will be held responsible for their peers' failures, they will have the incentive to hold each other accountable.

Ideally, Bosnia will one day again be governed democratically and will have a prosperous economy no longer dependent on foreign aid. Presently, however, Bosnia's state comprises a complex and inextricable amalgam of local and international actors. By recognizing this reality, analysis can hopefully move on and address the unique problems and possibilities this reality confers.

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