

THE REFLECTION OF KEMALIST IDEOLOGY IN THE PERCEPTION OF
METU STUDENTS: A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL EXAMINATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

YILDIRIM UYSAL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

DECEMBER 2008

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer AYATA
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Kayhan MUTLU
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Kayhan MUTLU
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members:

Prof.Dr. Kurtuluş KAYALI (Ankara.U., History) _____
Prof.Dr. Kayhan MUTLU (METU, Sociology) _____
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Ayşegül AYDINGÜN (METU, Sociology) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Lastname: Yildirim UYSAL

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE REFLECTION OF KEMALIST IDEOLOGY IN THE PERCEPTION OF METU STUDENTS: A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL EXAMINATION

Uysal, Yildirim

M.A., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Kayhan Mutlu

September 2008, 115 pages

This thesis aims to examine Kemalism perception of METU students. Author intends to display how METU students imagine and think Kemalism. Thesis first examines the ideological journey of Kemalism to indicate the main notions of Kemalism to the reader and by doing so, explains the intellectual ground of the statements which were used in the survey of thesis. The way how Kemalism was constructed, the stages that Kemalism passed through the past, the connections of Kemalism with other ideologies, the formation and standing of current Kemalism and the arguments of Kemalism against globalization, European Union, Kurdish issue and Islamism will all be analyzed.

Keywords: Kemalism, Modernization, Turkish Modernity, Neo Kemalism

ÖZ

KEMALIST IDEOLOJİNİN ODTÜ ÖĞRENCİLERİNİN ALGISINDAKİ YANSIMASI: TEORİK VE PRATİK BİR İNCELEME

Uysal, Yıldırım

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Kayhan Mutlu

Eylül 2008, 115 Sayfa

Bu tez, ODTÜ öğrencilerinin Kemalizm algısını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yazar, ODTÜ öğrencilerinin Kemalizmi nasıl düşündüklerini ve hayal ettiklerini göstermek istemektedir. Tez okuyucuya Kemalizmin temel nosyonlarını göstermek için öncelikle Kemalizmin ideolojik yolculuğunu incelemekte ve böyle yapmakla, tezin araştırmasında sorulmuş olan ifadelerin düşünsel zeminini de açıklamaktadır. Kemalizmin nasıl inşa edildiği, geçmişte hangi aşamalardan geçtiği, diğer ideolojilerle olan ilişkileri, bugünkü Kemalizmin yapısı ve duruşu ile Kemalizmin küreselleşmeye, Avrupa Birliğine, Kürt sorununa ve dinciliğe karşı argümanları analiz edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, Modernleşme, Türk Modernitesi, Neo-Kemalizm

Hayatım boyunca benim için çaba gösteren ve bana emek harcayan insanlara adanmıştır. Bu insanların arasında dostlarıma özel bir parantez açmak isterim. Daima yanımda duran ve beni destekleyen bu insan grubu, benim belli bir noktaya gelmemde en büyük paya sahiptir.

Hayatlarında bana yer vermekle beni onurlandıran dostlarımda bendeki görünmez katkıları ve izleri adına.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deeply gratitude to my supervisor, Prof.Dr. Kayhan Mutlu, for his professional academic support and kind assistance which encourage me to carry out such a study.

I would also like to thank to my research assistant friends who contributed to my thesis with their invaluable suggestions and comments.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF KEMALISM.....	8
2.1 Ideological Character of Kemalism and Kemalist Method.....	8
2.2 The Relation between Kemalism and Positivism.....	13
2.3 The Relation of Kemalism with Modernity.....	18
3. INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF KEMALISM	25
4. CLASS CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE IN KEMALISM	33
5. KEMALISM AND POLITICS	41
6. HISTORICAL CIRCULATION OF KEMALISM	49
6.1 Right Kemalism	50
6.2 Left Kemalism.....	57
6.3 Neo Kemalism.....	70
7. THE EVALUATION OF RESEARCH.....	81
8. CONCLUSION.....	103
REFERENCES.....	106
APPENDICES	111

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1: Age Group, Gender Group, Department Group, Education Group	82
Table 2: Thinking Lines of Kemalism statement group	83
Table 3: Right Kemalism statement group	86
Table 4: Left Kemalism statement group.....	89
Table 5: Neo Kemalism statement group.....	91-92

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The place and the importance of Kemalism in our society and politics are so clear. More or less, every individual living in the Turkish society has had a mental relation with Kemalism, either directly or indirectly. Everyone has a perspective or an idea about Kemalism.

The thesis tries to understand what the reflection of Kemalism is in the minds of METU students. The reason why we chose Kemalism for this thesis is that Kemalism is the dominant ideology in Turkish society. As regards the reason why we chose METU, METU is one of the leading and most-known universities in Turkey.

My thesis has two main divisions / angles. These are theoretical and practical sides. The theoretical side makes up the most part to help construct the mental / theoretical notions in the imagination of the reader. The theoretical side is being dealt with in all parts of thesis except for Introduction, Evaluation of Research and Conclusion chapters. It can be considered as the part giving knowledge about Kemalism and displaying the basis where the statements are sourced that are analyzed during the research.

The rest of the thesis is the research side which can be considered as core of the thesis which leads us to the conclusion. This part comprises a survey which was answered by 300 METU students. It is a survey with 30 statements and each expression aims to question a different notion related with Kemalism. This part is the most important side of the thesis because our basic concern is not instructing the reader on Kemalism but trying to examine how METU today students understand and imagine Kemalism.

Modernization and Turkish modernity terms are the basic terms in my study. Modernization process began in Ottoman times with the intention to reach the level of Western civilisation with political applications and societal changes. Turkish modernity is a term which is used for that modernity process in Anatolian geography,

which is a process almost all non-Western countries have passed through. Actually, it is hard to base this modernization process solely on a political structure, on a social identity or a geographical area because since 19th century, our past has witnessed a lot of and important changes. The political regime was changed; it was turned from empire to republic. Our societal identity changed, it was transformed from a religious / multi-cultural form to national / mono-cultural identity, as modernity required. Our geographical wholeness changed from wide empire areas to smaller nation-state. It would be hard to explain our modernization process with a concept or a place but commonly, all the events which happened in Anatolian geography and Istanbul city are accepted to have formed the modernization process. The modernization process began officially with The Rescript of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı) in 1839 and continued with Rescript of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) in 1856 and Ottoman Constitution of 1876 (Kanun-i Esasi). However, it should be noted that the endeavors of Ottoman intellectuals intensified in the last 25 years of 1800s and they got the result of their endeavors at 1908 with the declaration of 2nd constitutional monarchy. The concepts such as ‘being Turk’, ‘nationalism’, ‘laicism’, ‘Republic thought’ which were specified more sharply later in Kemalist time first came out at the time.

The thesis has an assertion which is to be a guide for the reader to display the short background of Kemalism, the connections between pre-Republican time intellectuality and constructing of Kemalism, and the parallellism between the continuation of modernity and Kemalism. This parallellism is of significance because modernization process and Kemalism had a slight break after 2nd World War and this break got deeper in time. Modernization has become varied and the society realized that modernization does not necessarily ave to be realized as Kemalism sanctioned. The more the participated society in modernization, the more Kemalism moved away from the society and became the ideology of the state. In other words, it turned into a rigid and static ideological standing but Kemalists has never accepted the claims about distance between Kemalism and society, and Kemalism is just the official ideology of state.

The thesis moves from the intellectual roots of Kemalism to Neo Kemalism, which is the current form of original Kemalism. I divided the thesis to eight parts to make my work and the following of the reader easier. After the introductory chapter, the second chapter will focus on the ideological basis of Kemalism, the method of

Kemalism and modernity. Kemalism should be seen as a mixed ideology which was influenced by Western modernity and the conditions of Turkish society at the same time. This chapter will try to explain the relation between Kemalism and modernity, which from the core of Kemalism and which method is used by Kemalism in its relation with society and political system. This chapter has three subsections which discuss better the above mentioned notions: Ideological Character and Kemalist Method, The Relation between Kemalism and Positivism, and The Relation of Kemalism with Modernity.

The third chapter is related to the intellectual background of Kemalism. This chapter will examine the events and occurrences which composed the background of Kemalism. This chapter lightens our view by displaying the intellectuals who affected and formed Kemalism with their contributions. These intellectuals which chapter talks about lived at the first term of Kemalism and took part premier roles in the shaping of Kemalism. These first term thinkers affected the way of Kemalism, but also, they reflected in their opinions what state expected from them to enforce the new Republic and the new ideology of young Republic.

Fourth chapter will peruse the class understanding of Kemalism, and class structure of Turkish society to some extent. This view helps to see that social structure from Kemalism arose and what kind of relation between Kemalism and its class basis.

Fifth chapter is related to the political standing of Kemalism. When it is said Kemalism, it is remembered a political ideology in Turkish society. Where as, Kemalism is not a political ideology entirely; political discourses of Kemalism are consisted only a face or a dimension of it. As the founder ideology of Republic and the official ideology of state, political affects of Kemalism have always been so strong in Turkish politics. The one who desires to examine and understand Turkish politics must drop by to Kemalism and it is expected from that chapter that displaying the political understanding of Kemalism and the relation of its political philosophy with other political views.

Following chapter, the sixth one, may be the most important and most striker part of thesis. This chapter contains three different parts: Right Kemalism part points out the right interpretation of Kemalism, state concept in Kemalism and communism fear. Left Kemalism part is subjected the relation of Kemalism with left thought and

how socialist line affected Kemalism. This part will work to see the differences between left interpretation of Kemalism and left thought. Third part of this chapter will focus on Neo Kemalism, the new form of Kemalism today. This term has been used by some social scientists firstly and has become common in current agenda of social sciences. Neo Kemalism part can be seen the most important part of this chapter because it is concerned with today conditions. The view of Kemalism which has gained today is important in regards of today political discourses and also, the converting of society.

Some people can think that Kemalism has not different interpretations or Kemalism has not interaction with other political lines. They can perceive Kemalism as a homogeneous, neutral ideology which exists only its own limits and its own structure but the reality is not like that. Kemalism was constructed by affecting a lot of different thinking lines and thinkers; these influencings in Turkish modernization process go along to the middle of 19th century. So it can be said that, the background of Kemalism was formed from 1850s to 1910s. The outlook of this modernization process is named as Kemalism during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1920s and 1930s but modernization process has important break at this phase because modernization concept gained an official identity turned into an official ideology. In Ottoman times, the ones who defended the modernization process were the opposites of the regime and they challenged through the political system but by the new Republic, modernization became an official policy under the name of Kemalism. Furthermore, Kemalism continued to be affected and has been affected other different ideologies after founding of Republic, in Atatürk's time and later. During the whole history of Republic, Kemalism did thinking marriages with different ideologies and concepts, and this made Kemalism alive due to the circumstances and conditions of the day.

What can we achieve to discuss all these notions about Kemalism? Our target is to construct a knowledge accumulation in the mind of the reader. This knowledge wholeness about Kemalism will assist understanding what Kemalism has said in its own intellectual history and how it has been converted in the same time phase. Thus, examining the expressions in survey would find a more right place in the perspective of the reader.

The seventh part of thesis is the part which analyzes the results of survey. Survey is the main part of thesis. According to me; the most useful side of survey is giving an idea about how the students of METU, which is one of the rooted and old universities of Turkey, think on Kemalism and related issues. Understanding the view of these students to Kemalism is important in respect to two sides: firstly, the most successful students in the national university entrance exam select METU and this situation makes METU a leading university. Second one, METU students take part in the life with considerable roles, they are promoted to the leading statuses of society in public and private sectors. Learning the thinking style of future elite stratum will be beneficial in regards of how a future elite man thinks in his younghood times; the ideas of the people who convert and administrate society in the futurity can be an important point in regards of sociology.

The last and eighth part of thesis is conclusion chapter. This chapter will have a short look to whole thesis and try to produce an interpretation which is rested on the data thesis provides to us.

A foreign man who is unfamiliar to the structure of Turkish society and politics can ask himself that why an ideology which was composed at 1920s and 1930s is still strong and affective such this extent on Turkish society. This situation should not be explained with the power of Kemalist ideology but the today circumstances and needs of society. It can be said that Kemalist people think to owe Atatürk and Kemalism all the notions they had which come from Western world. This thought results in automatically in the minds the coupling of the modernization and Kemalism terms. Kemalism represents itself anti-Eastern, anti-conservative, anti-rural values and that is why the people who consider themselves in Western life style support Kemalism that much.

As it will be discussed lengthy in Neo Kemalism section, there are important reasons of revival of Kemalism still today. All of them are resourced from the crisis of nation state and the people who want continuation of current system support Kemalism and behave conservative. Mostly, the ones who describe themselves as Kemalist are the ones who are disturbed from the threats through the structure of nation state or whose interests are / would be damaged from the transformation of nation state.

The prediction is not so hard that Kemalist line will thicken and harden after now. Although I am not expecting that a dichotomy and polarization like right – left situation in 1970s, Kemalist and anti-Kemalist line will be in a struggle on the red lines of nation state. The existence of globalization and the process of European Union membership trigger Kemalist consciousness and make its defenders as if they are in a 2nd Independence War. Kurdish issue and Islamism are other concepts which Kemalists think about them that they violate the main borders of Kemalism. Thesis will do a significant but small job by examining that Kemalist struggle particularly in METU environment.

Methodology

We will try to understand the point of view of METU students to Kemalism in this thesis. Our hypothesis is **Kemalist thought is powerful among METU students**. We are especially to be assisted by the research of thesis to test our hypothesis.

Survey is the main and the target application of our thesis. Research is formed by 30 statements which question the ideas of the research participants about the various dimensions of Kemalism. Between 0 and 10, the research has a measure system and 10 represents the strongest confirmation and 0 represents the strongest disapproval. We apply this research to 300 people and all those 300 people are METU students. We can denominate this research as methodological ‘non-probable group administered’.

We chose to group statements as four main categories. We named it as **Thinking Lines of Kemalism, Right Kemalism, Left Kemalism and Neo Kemalism**. The students who join to research did not know these categories during the answering because the questions were scattered as mixed through the research. This grouping makes our work easier to evaluate the questions which are related to parallel subjects.

Second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters are constructing the theoretical side of the thesis. They should be perceived as means to form the background of the survey and imagine what Kemalism is in the mind of the reader. Although all these

chapters are longer than evaluation chapter, they have secondary importance and should be thought ancillary parts of thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF KEMALISM

2.1 Ideological Character of Kemalism and Kemalist Method

Kemalism was born due to a need which had arisen from social / historical conditions like every ideology in the history. All the change process which occurred since the beginning of the 19th century in Ottoman State resulted in Kemalism at the beginning of the new Republic. Since its nascency, Kemalism has been the collimator ideology in Turkey. It has been considered the official ideology of the state and bureaucracy.

Kemalist ideology was shaped more explicitly in 1931 at People's Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) congress and it was declared in constitution in 1937. Program counts and defines six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism and revolutionism. Parla states that Kemalism found its strongest expression in 1935 in People's Republican Party programme and was registered as 'Kamalism' in accordance with existent Turkish grammar rules (Parla, 1994:13).

Kemalism is thought as the founder ideology of Republic of Turkey and it is considered as the dominant thinking line of in the world of Turkish politics. Bora – Gültekingil claims that it is an ideology of the ideal of national modernization, which a large segment of society shares intensively (Bora – Gültekingil, 2004:15).

National independence, populism, popular sovereignty, anti-Turanism, anti-PanIslamism, anti-Ottomanism can be showed as the initial concepts of Kemalism (Kili, 1969:40). These concepts can be accepted as the natural notions of an imported modernity which was seen all Third World / Non-Western countries; nevertheless, the concepts like anti-Turanism, anti-PanIslamism, anti-Ottomanism were resourced from the realities of our country and Kemalism did not give place to them in its ideological formulation.

Akyaz underlines that it was seen for long years that when Kemalists talked about Kemalism, they used 'life view' or 'thinking system' locution instead of 'ideology'. The most affective reason for that was its reminding the unwanted ideologies such as communism and fascism when it is said 'ideology' (Akyaz, 2004: 183 – 184).

During whole thinking history of Republic of Turkey, Kemalism has been very dominant to determine the general line of history of thinking. Any kind of thinking line could not exist without structuring a relation with Kemalism directly or indirectly (Belge, 2004:30). This affect has been usually negative. It has not respected any thinking line; moreover, Kemalism has prohibited the political / intellectual ways which are not proper for its own interests or discourses.

Kemalism can not be reduced only to one definition or only to one understanding, so it would be true that many Kemalisms exist (Bora – Gültekingil, 2004:14). Like in all ideologies, Kemalism contains a lot of different comments and lanes. Köker argues that therefore, in the past, it was seen that some Kemalists blamed some other Kemalists by 'betrayal to Atatürk' or 'trampling the testament of Atatürk'. The distinction of 'real Kemalism' and 'imitated Kemalism' is the endeavor which tries to prove its own interpretation is more paramount than the other ones (Köker, 2004:97).

For Uyar, the common point of all Kemalisms is that all of them are authoritarian and eclectic (Uyar, 2004:219). İnsel suggests that the dominant feature of Kemalism is authoritarianism. The ideal of Kemalist thought is authoritarian democracy. A disciplined freedom, an ordered society and absolute obedience to state authority are the basic characteristics of that authoritarian democracy. Pluralism is perceived as fitfulness and indiscipline (İnsel, 2004:23). Kemalism wanted from individuals an unarguable consent to authority, order, army, modernist understanding and capitalist economy (Cizre, 2004:173).

It can be accepted that revolutionism has a binary function principle in Kemalism. One of these two functions is protecting the successes of national independence movement and the other one is continuing the metamorphosis until reaching contemporary civilization level (Çelik, 2004:87).

Kemalists claimed that Kemalism is an integral ideology. It is understood that Kemalism aims to press its own internal contradictions and inconsistencies by this discourse (Erdoğan, 2004:590). Presenting Kemalism as an integral and eclectic

ideology empowers the backboneless / pragmatic feature of Kemalism because whichever ideology is highlight ideology due to the conditions of the day, Kemalism could realize an intellectual marriage with it.

Kemalism heeds its face which looks to West against pre-capitalist originated political thoughts such as political Islam. At the same time, it was embracing an attitude which was nationalist, defending status quo and defending nation state against political views of post-capitalist phase such as globalization. The pragmatist standing of Kemalism has played the lead role at its continuation which comes from 1920s to 2000s. Kemalism has continued its ‘the ideology for all seasons’ identity by making temporary marriages with favorite political lines of the day.

It is also said that Kemalism caused arising of several subject positions in the system, however, all these subjects had to be articulated to central subject. This central subject in ideological platform is Kemalism (Çelik, 2004:90). As Çelik argues, Kemalism can be comprehended fragile and occurrential. It has a historical structure because it had important relations with the political forces which were kept out during their conversion by Kemalism (Çelik, 2004:75).

According to Kemalists, Kemalism is not an ideology or doctrine; it is a life view which was purified from dogmas. It gained an application feature which goes to eternity thanks to its revolutionism principle (Akyaz, 2004:185). One of the claims which is told by Kemalists is that Kemalism is an eternal ideology. Hereby, it has a speciality which is exempt from time. For Kemalists, another speciality of Kemalism is that it is superior than other ideologies. Kemalism is the place which will be arrived earlier or later by people who spend and waste their time with other unnecessary ideologies. According to Kemalists, it is the wholeness of postulates which is the most true and the most realist for Turkish society and politics.

For Kemalists, this superiority of Kemalism which comes as ‘a priori’ makes it most ascendant ideology than all other ideologies throughout the world. In this way, the one who declares himself as Kemalist would not need to learn other thoughts because he is already the member of most excellent thinking system. Not every Kemalist comments Kemalism extremely like that but usually, it is possible to say that Kemalism behaves that it has a special value which could not be seen in other ideologies.

It would not be wrong to assert that Kemalism has stayed for a long time ‘a crust ideology’. The moral power on wide masses which was produced by Atatürk’s personal charisma and new-founded Republic has weakened after Atatürk’s death gradually. Thus, Kemalism converted to an official ideology which is supported by only political institutions and bureaucracy class. We can see the Kemalist declarations in official publications after 1960s as an endeavor which tries to keep Kemalism alive in intellectual way. This endeavor resulted in Kemalism increasingly becoming an ideology which belongs only to a specified class; military and civil bureaucracy.

According to Steinhaus, the ideology which was embraced by Kemalism was completely antithetic with the political ideologies which were known before war or the ideologies which were known after war. It is understood a pragmatic systems community but not a closed theoretical system when it is said Kemalist ideology. The content of this system which was changed continuously has been concreted even in the time (Steinhaus, 2002:101).

Especially, Kemalism became almost the balance point of the society during 1960s and 1970s when radical right and radical left were rising. Akyaz support our thought that Kemalism was a criterion which society had to follow in every sort of unsteadiness and ambiguity of political institutions. (Akyaz, 2004:184) Niyazi Berkes claims that Kemalism is not an ideology but a historical event and a view on that event. Kemalism is finding the true path of modernization stream which has continued for 200 years (Berkes, 1975:93 – 94).

It is claimed that Kemalism has never claimed to be a people movement, a base movement. Kemalism realized all changes from up to down. In that respect, the decisions of Parliament in the first term of Republic can be questioned because their legitimacy is not sourced from compliance of society; their legitimacy comes from their own substance (Çelik, 2004:88). This situation is problematic especially with populism principle.

It is possible to say that Kemalism is an indicator of non-Western modernization. Increasing the ideological marriages in Kemalism and other ideologies has clouded the line between Kemalist identity and other political identities. Center politics (Kemalism) always has had hegemony on other ideologies and has not permitted any discourse which violates its ideological power district. This situation shows clearly

the distance between ‘order’ and ‘arrangement’ (Çelik, 2004:90). Instead of following Western-style democratic thinking freedom, Kemalism wanted that all thoughts would stay in the interior of Kemalist principles. İnel says that Kemalism aimed to form a modern society and also, it targeted to compose a human type whose definition of cultural and historical roots would be under control of the state (İnel, 2004:18).

It is not wrong to say that Kemalism follows the positivist methodology. Kemalism finds its power in a line which can be called academic positivism and Kemalism has Young Turk (Jön Türk) sciencism in its historical background. This intellectual approach contains its inside three main notions: Objectivity, Progression and Tutelage.

**** Objectivity:** It claims that the duty of scientific method is to discover the regularities or rules which facts display.

**** Progression:** It suggests that science is an activity which aims to reach universal laws by objective examining of partial facts. These laws are called ‘the laws of social change’. This approach says that the changes in the history of societies occur due to some patterns which display specified regularities. The duty of social sciences is to show these regularities objectively. This feature provides an ability which can say what will happen in the future to positivism (Köker, 2004:100).

Kemalism could foresee why and how to pass from agricultural society to industrial society by gaining positivist character because in accordance with positivism, positivism can govern not only today but also tomorrow.

**** Tutelage:** Kemalism is the product of the same intellectual climate with Order and Progress Party (İttihat ve Terakki Partisi). This intellectual ground presents the state as the real power which can make the social progression real. It delays slipping off the authoritarian identity of the state and passing through the democratic structure unless mature rational citizens emanate (Köker, 2004:101).

According to non-Kemalists, Kemalism has pragmatist character and it has neither epistemology nor method. Its thinking depth is so shallow and its thinking structure is so sparse that it has made Kemalism adapt to new times and conditions and made other political thoughts internalize it with different comments (Bora – Gültekingil, 2004:14).

Kemalism is shallow ideologically and pragmatic methodologically, so, it represents a political standing more than content. Activity is always primary before theory in Kemalism. Kemalism can produce periodical absolute rights in respect to the needs of every era (Bora – Gültekingil, 2004:15).

It is claimed that Kemalism was not systematized sufficiently while Atatürk was alive and this situation leads to that Kemalism presented ambiguous standing ideologically (Akyaz, 2004:183). The political method of Atatürk is Jacobenist, his attitude to people is paternalist (Ünder, 2004:142).

Recognizing the doctriner principles of Kemalism and systematizing Kemalism were realized later (Kazancıgil, 2004:235). Therefore, Kemalist revolution did not practice the concepts which were discussed before on the paper; it defended the social realities which happened moment by moment by systematizing on the paper later. So, it is different from Soviet revolution which was realized under effect of Marxist thought.

Of course, this does not show that Kemalism did not have an ideological infrastructure. All the people who affected Kemalism, first of all Atatürk, had a certain intellectual accumulation and view of life. But none of the revolutionist cadre tied themselves to a specific verbal manifesto or an ideology; on the contrary, actions of Kemalists formed the process of systematizing of Kemalist thought.

2.2 The Relation between Kemalism and Positivism

Positivism locates in empirical method which Kemalist theory prefers. It forms the rest of the claim that Kemalist theory is scientific. Positivism has a privileged place among the notions which should be discussed while examining Kemalism as a whole (Köker, 2004:102). Although positivism is a total ideology and a main lane in sociology, it affected the modernity discussions in Turkey only from the perspective of religion. One of the reasons for this is that religion plays an important role in the societal fiction of Ottoman State. The other reason is that new Republic is considerably decisive to demolish traditional society type and religious – based thinking style. Kemalist philosophy wanted to break this societal structure by the sovereignty of mind and help of positivism.

The relation between positivism and Turkish intellectuals was developed as to be on the side of positivism or to be on the side of religion. Choosing positivist side meant choosing Western civilization and rationalism; being on the side of religion displays that being on the way of traditional relations and society type also. Namely, positivism – religion dichotomy means more than an intellectual argument; being which side you stand on specifies your life style and life philosophy. That is a black and white dichotomy; there is no grey area in this discussion in the early times of Republic.

Positivism is a product of Enlightenment Philosophy which accepts that human mind could realize and apprehend such ‘progression’ if human mind is let free. Positivism foresees that if societies would organize due to positivist scientific principles, ‘change’ could gain ‘progression’ character. Positivism is an ideological system in social sciences but it was inspired from positive sciences and technological developments which constituted the basics of industrial society in the 19th century. The order and mechanical working of industrial society affected the ‘progression in order’, which is one of the main concepts of Auguste Comte’s sociological understanding (Köker, 2004:104).

It can be called that Kemalist thought was affected by Durkheim in the relation between Kemalists and religion because on the contrary to Comte’s extreme attitude against religion, Durkheim represents moderate positivism which accepts the importance and function of religion in social life. Society insisted on not giving up Islam; therefore Kemalism had to take a closer standing to Durkheim’s line than Comte’s.

Başkaya considers the positivist understanding of Durkheim as the method of positivism which has no relation with revolutionism. Furthermore, it is completely conservative because it considers social events the same as natural ones and views both of them as identical. These notions, however bended and wrenched, or however soft, can not be changed by demand and consciousness (Başkaya, 2007:262).

In Başkaya’s perspective, Comte’s positivist line is that positivism enforces public order by developing the instinct of resignation. A genuine resignation, a permanent submission through undefiable badnesses can not be achieved without a concession. The badnesses are the necessities of natural laws and positivist

philosophy is only the philosophical way which has a function that teaches resignation to people (Başkaya, 2007:263).

Ottoman intellectuals discussed a lot and feverishly the religion – modernity relation. Zürcher shows Ahmet Rıza as an example who was known as the first representative of positivist thought in our history, accuses harshly the clergy class with obscurantism but he seems also to believe ‘a real Islam’ which is completely harmonious with science and materialism. Another thinker, Yusuf Akçura, is on the side of an Islam which is Turkicized. That means an Islam which uses Turkish for religion practices instead of Arabic. Akçura defended the rehabilitation of Islamic education in religion education institutions (medrese) but not to cancel all these education structures (Zürcher, 2004:47). Ziya Gökalp gave an important place to Islam as the founder notion of Turkish national identity. He saw the Turkish nation state as the shelter for both Islam and Turkish worlds. He claims that Islam should be Turkicized and, he accepted the religion as the power unit for constructing a nation (Zürcher, 2004:49).

Ottoman State was a kind of political regime which was not a state rested on religion but a religion which rested on state. As Zürcher states, at the 1st World War religious tensions decreased in comparison with the past in Ottoman geography and religious tones were more intensified in Ottoman politics. It is so clear that Anatolian population was mobilized for war on the base of Islamic solidarity. At first, in that respect, it seems astonishing that new Republic chose the positivist laicism instead of Islamic regime (Zürcher, 2004:50). Actually, Kemalist laicism is the expected result of Ottoman laicism process because the efforts for a laic structure began in Ottoman State times. But there was an important difference between Young Turks (JönTürkler) and Kemalists: Kemalist regime shut down all religion education schools but Young Turks only suggested the rehabilitation of these institutions (Zürcher, 2004:48).

Çelik asserts that laicism in Kemalism purposed that replacing religion and traditional values with laic, rational and scientific values (Çelik, 2004:85). Laic discourse is a kind of project which tries to embed positive and empirical view to the basis of society. Kemalist laicism behaves skeptical to Islam and tries to limit the social role of Islam in social life (Çelik, 2004:86). Kemalism embraced the positivist

comment of religion. Positivist comment of religion means Jacobin tradition and it is not atheist but deist (İnsel, 2004:22).

Kemalism preferred to understand laicism in positivist way. This way represents French positivism and rationalism. The other way in laicism is English / liberal style. This style is known as Anglo – Saxon secular understanding; and also known as ‘secularism’. The main difference between these approaches is their relation with religion. French way does not allow religious symbols and appearance in social life. It desires to see all people of society in mono style dressing and thinking line. That is the rigid and clear reflection of homogeneity logic of modernism on religion platform. English – style laicism is open to different social identities and it does not insist to unite people on the same point in regards to laicism. Its feature is giving chance to individual differences and it does not press to the individual to obey to the social norms, including religion understanding.

The preference of Kemalism was affected by French style but that reality is not valid for only the field of religion; The French Revolution and the view of Enlightenment orientated Kemalist reformation process in all social areas in a great proportion. Furthermore, the era which Kemalist reforms occurred, French positivism was more preponderant than English liberalism. Although modernity contains inside English liberalism and German romanticism, Kemalism made its choice on the side of French line. “Turkish Revolutionary leaders, in general, appropriated the French historical legacy and adapted it to their own context” (Mateescu, 2006:228).

Atatürk defends Islam as ‘the most rational and natural religion’ among all religions (Zürcher, 2004:46). All the effort of Atatürk was not on the way of quitting Islam; it was to locate Islam in a positivist mould. Atatürk and his revolution emphasized the side of Islam which glorifies science and knowledge. By doing so, they thought to construct a bridge between Islam and positivism.

Kemalist revolution attacked feverishly to social role of clergy class (Zürcher, 2004:46). In respect of its institutional role in society, religion is a threat for secularist steps but in another perspective, religion plays an important role as a social consolidator if political regime is in the process of constructing a new society.

As the natural result of these thoughts, the Kemalist worry concentrated on the empowerment of the religion and ecclesiastics. Kemalism was afraid that clergy

would gain social power and form an alternative power focus to laic political power (Tunçay, 2004:95). Actually, Kemalism contains three different standings in its relation with religion: The first one considers Islam religion as the real enemy of Republic and represents an excluding logic against religious subgroup of society (Çelik, 2004:87). This Kemalist endeavor for erasing Islam from public life resulted in politicization of Islam.

The second way is to limit the area of religion. This approach goals a laicization action which is closely related with ‘acceptable Islam’ concept. An Islam which is personalized, rationalized and purified from politics was described as an acceptable belief form. Moreover, official discourse claims that this sort of Islam represents ‘real Islam’ which has rational and scientific essence (Çelik, 2004:87). It can be seen here that official ideology tries to make religion compatible with positivist character of Kemalist ideology. That would be true that explaining Atatürk’s saying that Islam is mind and logic religion.

Third strategy refuses not Islam but fundamentalist Islamists (Çelik, 2004:87). Kemalism is very insistent about the fact that it is not against any kind of religion because of laic character but at the same time, Kemalism is very decisive in fighting with totalitarian Islamist politics.

Islam is considered by some Ottoman intellectuals an obstacle that prevents progression on the way of civilization. Positivistic logic thinks that to choose one of two ways is unavoidable. Positivistic logic reflected itself in two channels: one of them, like in Lutheran Protestant Church, is translating the holy book to national language. When the Holy Bible was translated to national language, then Christianity joined the way of civilization, so, the same thing could be done for Islam (Tunçay, 2004:94). This is a method of reform which is under affect of nation state political model. How every societal institution depends on national discipline, certainly, religion should be reformed in accordance with the dynamics of nation state. Islam should be Turkicized. For Tunçay, the other canal is following the Soviet style; refusing religion totally (Tunçay, 2004:94).

2.3 The Relation of Kemalism with Modernity

Modernity is the wholeness that is used for all social and technological productions in Western world by Western civilization. It is accepted generally that modernity has begun at the end of 18th century. Köker declares that modernity, with its dictionary meaning, refers to social relations wholeness which marches through modern society. Modernization in social sciences is an evolutionary phase which marches from traditional society type to a modern one. A society type which embraces rationalist culture and is industrialized and is directed by democratic representative system is purposed (Köker, 2004:102). Traditional ties were replaced with rational and scientific ones. Hereby, on one hand, succeeding the modern citizenship was realized, and on the other hand, producing a gigantic state apparatus was achieved (Çelik, 2004:84). Modernization was used to condense the resources on the way of societal development (Steinhaus, 2002:102).

Modernization theory is the narrative of social change. Social change is expressed to reach to modern society which is an inevitability that was almost programmed before (Köker, 2004:105). ‘The idea of progression’ contains concept of ‘compulsive laws of social change’. According to modernity, modernizing societies can not complete democratization without gaining economical and cultural features of modern society (Köker, 2004:107). Hereby, modernity is a phase which every society – especially non-Western societies - has to pass through.

Secularization thought had existed for 100 years at least in Ottoman State. Imperial Rescript of Gülhane phase included the modernization of state and transformation of all institutions by the affect of Europe. Kemalist line is the continuation of Order and Progress Party which is also a ring in the modernization chain of Ottoman world.

Atatürk’s time is the most radical period in modernization process of Turkey which has begun by Tanzimat. Atatürk founded a Western – inclined state by terminating traditional institutions and the mentality which supports them by his charisma which he gained as a redeemer (Ünder, 2004:150). It can be told that an overlapping between general pre-acceptances of modernization theory and state model of Kemalist ideology took place (Köker, 2004:103). Kemalism faces a lot of

important problems which were resourced from the sultriness of political traditions that Kemalism inherited and also, the internal tensions of modern society structuring.

There is a clear tension between the modernization goal of Kemalism and the democratization which expresses political dimension of modernization (Köker, 2004:107). This situation results in a continuous distance between society and state. By that way, Political area was kept away from touching of different social groups and was left to the control of state bureaucrats.

Kemalism was revealed with an ideology character from a heap of ideas which are rested on progression understanding. Kemalism tried to apply societal change phases which modernist ideology goals to explain as scientific. It is accepted that this progression concept had to be realized mandatorily much shorter for non – Western countries (Köker, 2004:106). This manner coheres extremely with authoritarian and Jacobin attitude of new regime because what should be done is to inject the norms which are already known as true to society.

The point which must be cared at here is that the democracy understanding is not on an advanced level even in Western world when our Republic was founded first. Democracy is commented on authoritarian / positivist way in Western world also. Republic of Turkey is a continuance of statist / oppressive politic tradition of Ottoman Empire and therefore, it was not difficult to transfer the Western – type political understanding. The current democracy understanding has occurred and begun to develop in Western World after 2nd World War. In parallel, a clear softening was seen which was going to allow democratic notions more in Turkish politics.

The main reason of being fearful democracy for Kemalist ideology is that they were worried that they would lose the control of the state. Today, Kemalist ideology is keeping alive the paranoia for fundamentalist Islam and always underlining the separating threat in Kurdish issue. The reason of these claims is not that they really believe that all these stuff happen but they think that Kemalism would lose its official ideological position. In the case of losing the official ideology position, Kemalism would turn on an ordinary ideology and would lose the privilege ideological statue in comparison with other ideologies. Kemalism can empower itself in the view of state and people by sustaining the fears of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism.

So, we can see that liberalism is the most contrastive ideology with Kemalism. Liberalism considers the individual at center; it views human rights and democracy as basic concepts but Kemalism perceives society more important than individual, gets order and stability to foreground because Kemalism has positivist substance. So it can be said that Kemalism and liberalism are the ideologies which are standing furthest from to each other.

“Kemalism, is premised on the equation of modernity with progress, that is, on the making of a modern nation through the introduction and the dissemination of Western reason and rationality into what was regarded as traditional and backward social relations” (Keyman, 1995:97). Kemalism could be seen as the denomination in Turkey geography of the endeavor of Eastern societies which had the worry to reach the point that Western societies achieved by modernity. Kemalism is the modernist intention in substance but on the other hand, it is the systematized inductive standing of Eastern world which tries to display straight and honored pose against Western world.

Civilizationism (Medeniyetçilik) is the basic component of Kemalism (İnsel, 2004:17). Kemalism heeds civilizationism much which is sealed by the inferiority complex against West (İnsel, 2004:21). Kemalism desires that Turkey would be a Western country and quit from its all Eastern characteristics. We can perceive ‘medeniyetçilik’ term here as equal meaning of modernism. According to Nilüfer Göle, for Kemalists, secularism, republicanism and gender equality are the key indices of Turkish modernity (Göle, 1996: 143 – 144).

It can be said that modernizing by Westernizing composes the core of Kemalism (Çelik, 2004:84). Belge says that Kemalism considered itself as the ideal and ideology of national modernization (Belge, 2004:38). Kemalism was observing itself as the only and the true path to reach modernization. The main goal and the problematic is modernization of the society; to emplace modernist logic and institutions on society. Considering themselves as the one and only representative of modernization redounded with an opinion which Kemalists could do whatever they want to do. In their logic, they are the premier (may be, the one) owner of whole country and their administration right on rest of the society could not be interrogated (Çelik, 2004:84).

Westernization / modernization are the expression of progression project. The belief that progression can be realized if only social unity and harmony could be achieved results in a political structure which is closed to different identities and different social groups of society. This approach stiffened the sovereignty of elites which has been since Ottoman times in Turkish politics (Çelik, 2004:78). So that, politics and state did not feel itself compulsive to obey or to answer the demands of society; on the contrary, society had to obey the ideological discourse of state.

Kemalist politics are interpreted by some social scientists as the last phase of reform policies which were started by Ottoman State (Zürcher, 2004:44). Kemalism is the continuer of the modernization steps at the last phase of Ottoman State and at the same time, it is representative of an important break from Ottoman State. Kemalism is so close with Jacobin tradition. French Revolution and Jacobin tradition is one of the most important inspiration sources of Kemalism (İnsel, 2004:22). However, Atatürk had a line which is legitimist and endeavor to produce institution. That should be appreciated if it is compared uncontrolled arbitrary of Order and Progress Party (Belge, 2004:41).

The reformist elite of late Ottoman and early Republic were affected much from Gustave LeBon's ideas about the psychology of masses. These ideas contain that masses would have irrational behavior which is not orientated by an intellectual elite. A systematic conversion which is directed top-down is ideal for Kemalists instead of a rebellion from bottom-up; Kemalists had same idea with late-phase Ottoman reformists on this subject. For instance of the application of this idea, monarchy was abolished but governing situation of political elite or retaining situation of landlords was never interrogated (Zürcher, 2004:51).

Kemalism had to change content of mind of the society before changing the working styles of mental mechanisms. But in one view, this was not a situation which happened in Turkey only. All Third World modernizations brought modernist concepts top-down and made the wide masses embrace the values of new regime (Belge, 2004:38).

In my view, we can not say today this Western / modernist style thinking patterns has located completely into Turkish society. Belge's opinion is supporting my thought: Kemalist thought was affected negatively by Kemalist elites because these elites were coming from dogmatic thinking way but not critical. Intellectual

secularization is harder than institutional secularization because institutional secularization could be achieved only by a law arrangement but intellectual secularization is depended on realizing an ability of thinking critically (Belge, 2004:37).

Isolationism of country has a vital importance for Kemalism today but like all concepts in Kemalism, its interpretation has always been changing. For instance, independence is a basic concept for Kemalism but it was commented at Cold War times that it could not be thought without NATO. Today when globalization became a worldwide notion, Kemalists claim insistently that Turkey has to be ‘fully independent’ (Belge, 2004:41). This is a good example for changeable structure of Kemalism. The backboneless and pragmatic style of Kemalism displays itself mostly in its relation with Western world. If the case requires, Kemalism wraps into its Western identity and defends the Westernization; if another case requires, Kemalism tends to its national characteristic and thickens the line between being Turkish and being Western.

One of the biggest contradictions of Kemalism is while imposing the goal of Westernization through society, at the same time, it efforts that this Westernization stays as specific Westernization for Turkey (İnsel, 2004:23). Kemalism is double sided at that point: One side goals the Westernization to modernize the society and other side insists to protect our nationalistic characteristics and structure of our national identity. First way realizes that society should gain yields of modernization and second side is under affect of nation state discourses which gather the society around one nation identity. This double sided character of Kemalism becomes clearer at Ziya Gökalp’s theory, civilization (medeniyet) and culture (hars)

Kemalism has never aimed a revolution; they intend reformism mostly. In that respect, the article of Revolutionism in Kemalist principles stays away from the real meaning of word. French Revolution inspired Young Turks and Kemalists a lot but that does not show that they were revolutionist. The main matter for them was how the regime could be changed without ‘any revolution’ (Zürcher, 2004:51).

Çelik alleges that the one of the biggest paranoias of Kemalism is suspicion for collapse of all modernist institutions. Kemalists thought that all their endeavors would miscarry and political regime was going to decline (Çelik, 2004:84). According to Steinhaus, state found the solution of this matter that modernization

steps of state should be stronger in Turkey than similar innovation movements which were seen a couple of centuries ago in European countries because how historical load is so much in Turkey's geography against societal development which was wanted to reach (Steinhaus, 2002:124).

Kemalist movement applied to actions which could be accepted as radical to close the societal distance soon as possible with the West. The applications which could be seen as authoritarian not only for today but also at that time led to negative attitude of society, especially in rural side, toward Kemalist ideology. If we explain with a basic example, Kemalist regime imported the law system of Republic from Western Europe but it did not do anything to make structure of Turkish society harmonious with the structure of Western societies. As Steinhaus claims, if it is considered the socio – cultural and socio – economical differences between European societies and Anatolian society, it is seen that the law system which was produced by modernist societies could be adapted to Turkish society in a very limited way (Steinhaus, 2002:127).

As İnönü said in a radio programme at the 25th anniversary of Atatürk's death, the leaders of revolution never thought a rooted change in social structure (Eliçin, 1970:39). It is claimed also that if literacy percentage would have been more than %10, alphabet revolution could not be realized. Alphabet revolution is owed to illiteracy of Anatolian society. These realities of the revolution can be perceived the proofs that Kemalist revolution is a kind of modernization movement which was done top-down.

Kemalists used the Western arguments by choosing and taking; it is out of the question a totally espousal. They produced 'an elective modernity' for Turkey by getting the sides of modernity which are concordant with them. The appearance that they reduced modernity to an only positivist society engineering but modernity is not composed only from Auguste Comte; there is Adam Smith and there is Karl Marx, too (Parla, 2004:314). Kemalism perceived modernity exceedingly monolithic. Whereas, modernity had deeply conflicts in Western world where occurred. The actors which conflicted in modernity and besides, the conflict which modernity had with the pre-modern elements has been away always the interest and care of Kemalism. Modernity was not being seen a project in Kemalism which could be shaped by the participation of people; it was being assumed that citizens will be

enlightened by a project which its limits were recognized before. That case refers a 'tutelage democracy'. That kind of democracy understanding was clinched to populism principle, and political participation ways of society were closed (Taşkın, 2004:570).

CHAPTER THREE

INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF KEMALISM

If we have a look to intellectual roots of Kemalism, we face Order and Progress Party and the endeavors of Young Turks (JönTürkler). At the end of 19th century, Young Turks arranged a meeting in Paris. Two main streams became clear after this assembly: one of them is positivist line which was under affect of French thought and Ahmet Rıza was the leader of this stream. The other one is liberalist wave which was impressed by English intellectuality and Prens Sabahaddin was the symbol of this wing. Another wing is romantic nationalist wing and this line was affected by German romantic nationalism. This wing managed the state later by Order and Progress Party during the 1st World War. Ottoman State joined in the 1st World War and chose to be on the German side.

It can be said that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk can be seen in French / positivist wing. As it will be seen after the foundation of Republic, French Revolution, its values and positivist philosophy premises affected the reforms of Kemalist modernization a lot.

We can get the clues of French positivism in Kemalism. A belief for an intellectual elite who converts society thanks to science and education, regular reform and progress process, and a society type which rests on solidarity show positivist character which stems from French positivism. Zürcher claims that an ideological dress which is sewn by Kemalism stipulates an ideal society which is based on regularly progress, division of labor in society structure and guidance of scientific elite. These notions were compiled all from Pierre Laffitte (Zürcher, 2004:52).

The psychology of masses was making liberal bourgeoisie scared a lot (Zürcher, 2004:53). As dominant class, bourgeoisie wanted to keep its dominant position in society. The rest of society, namely the masses, should be kept under control. According to Zürcher, system needs law and order to keep whole society in 'cosmos'. This idea was defended by Le Bon. Le Bon believed that democracy is

non-applicable in an industrial society which refers to science as basic notion. This understanding is harmonious with Comte's authoritarianism. Mussolini, for instance, embraced these approaches in his fascist regime (Zürcher, 2004:53).

Sciencism is main line which led the social scientists such as Renan, Durkheim, Le Bon and Boutroux but all of them were not totally connected with core positivism, namely The Church of Humanity. But all of them shared some common points with positivist ideology: contrariness to clerical, sciencism, biological materialism, authoritarianism, intellectual elitism, deeply mistrust to masses (society) and Darwinism (Zürcher, 2004:54). It is not wrong to say that Kemalist ideology was affected much from all these concepts and this approach affected its actions in accordance with positivist understanding.

Atatürk did not want to form a doctrine during in his whole life. He said that 'we would freeze' against a question about why his own party does not have an ideology although realizing reforms (Belge, 2004:36). Although he avoided in his whole life to structure Kemalism as a doctrine but after 1980, Kemalism gained a doctrine outlook by Kemalists (Belge, 2004:41).

The hegemony which Kemalism structured over intellectual world of Turkey resulted in that intellectual attempt feels a necessity that has to be Kemalist or at least, intellectual attempt endeavors to make a tie with Kemalism in a way. As Parla argues, Kemalism, as content, pervade into the texture of both the social psychology and individual psychology (Parla, 2004:313).

Military commanders were totally politicized in the last era of Ottoman State. So, they followed all the discussions which are connected with society and politics with a great interest (Belge, 2004:33). Maybe, they were prepared for a political career without their knowledge. Atatürk was also one of these commanders and he was deeply interested in politics and societal transformation.

Atatürk was deeply influential in shaping the meaning world of new Republic. He did not only win the Independence War and found a new political regime but also founded a new life style. That is the reason why he was so efficient for the intellectual world although he was not a thinker. Most of intellectuals in his era participated in his actions and thoughts gladly and this confirmation was not sourced only from admiration to his personality. The reason was mainly that these people were grown in the same intellectual climate with him (Belge, 2004:30).

However, we can not say that Atatürk determined all ideological substructure of Kemalism or produced entire notions of new Republic. Some Turkish and foreign intellectuals leaded and affected Kemalist revolution without their willingness and preference. Shortly, it can be said that Kemalist revolution followed the main and general intellectual structure which is valid in its era. Nevertheless, all intellectual import was interpreted again to adapt it to the conditions of Turkey.

Ziya Gökalp is the first and foremost intellectual who has the strongest ideological affect on Kemalism. He is considered as the father of Turkish nationalism. He was a good synthesizer, he compiled a lot of thoughts but he did not present all of them as separate postulates; he produced a synthesis from all these thoughts (Belge, 2004:31). Atatürk said that the father of his emotions is Namık Kemal and the father of his thoughts is Ziya Gökalp (Belge, 2004:33).

Like in Atatürk's saying 'We, resemble to ourselves', Gökalp is so fastidious to protect the thick line between being Turk and being non-Turk. Being internationalized in regards of civilization but being nationalized in respect to culture is an ideological attitude which is fulfilled with contradictions that can not be overcome.

Gökalp claims that there is no disharmony or contradiction between "Türkleşmek" (Turkicization) and "Muasırlaşma" (modernization) (Belge, 2004:34). However, Gökalp produced a dualist structure to define the sort of Turkish style modernization. This structure is composed by 'hars' (culture) and 'medeniyet' (civilization). He tried to limit Westernization by civilization just and he thought that Turks should protect their own society structure under the name of 'hars'.

Gökalp softened the line between culture and civilization and he made modernization concept take first scene. It is fairly known that everything which can be interpreted in modernization started in army institution (Belge, 2004:32). 'We are a mass which is classless, without concession and coalesced' is the sentence of Atatürk and this is like a summary of which corporatist order is told by Gökalp. Another side, 'the most true pilot is science' is also Atatürk's sentence and this is also reflects the soul of positivism. Positivism is the methodology which is embraced by Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp benefited a lot from Emile Durkheim and Auguste Comte (Belge, 2004:34). If we think the effect of Gökalp on Atatürk, we can see easily the positivist essence of Kemalism.

Gökalp is severely against to all modes of liberalism and that affects much the cold relation among Kemalism and liberalism. Liberalism is one of the four main enemies of Kemalism: the other ones are communism, Islamism and Kurdish issue at the first times of Republic (Belge, 2004:34). That situation sources from historical enmity between positivism and liberalism. How much liberalism is on the side of freedom and pluralism, on the contrary, positivism supports order and unity.

Kemalist nationalism contains cultural nationalism more than ethnic nationalism. Gökalp's affect is seen so clear at that point because Gökalp declared aforetime that ethnic root can not be the basic concept of nation. Gökalp warned also that Turkish nationalism should not be aggressive and imperialist. Gökalp always defended the peaceful nationalism. In his perspective, the struggle zone of nationalism against other countries is not on battle war; it must be on economical, cultural, social areas. That is 'muasırlaşma' (modernization) (Belge, 2004:33). His peaceful nationalism logic can be followed in Atatürk's sentence: 'Peace in the country, peace on the world'.

Recep Peker was the basic thinker of Kemalist thought. He was the architect of the programs of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (People's Republic Party). He developed the 'statist capitalism comment' of Kemalism. He prepared 1931 and 1935 outline plans of party and he made the program statements of party. He got one of the biggest slices on formation of Kemalist ideology. The ideological formulations of Peker reflected completely to CHP party programs (Yıldız, 2004:58).

Peker was affected so much from fascist regime in Italy and national socialist regime in Germany. As the third man of regime in regards of ideological side, Peker added a lot of fascist notions to Kemalism. He commented Kemalism mostly by fascist view. Yıldız says that he defended party – state identicalness. The basic principles of his program were going to add at 1937 to Constitution. Peker was fascinated excessively from both of these regimes due to their tremendous success to activate big masses and important advances in industrial production (Yıldız, 2004:60).

Hegel's affect can be seen so clearly in Peker's thoughts. He was the main person on shaping German romanticism and he considers the state as essence of life. State is not a political institution according to him; it is a substance which surrounds all society, moreover, it is a something that is over all social concepts and society itself.

It is source of the life, it is the goal which people should sacrifice themselves for it. As Yıldız argues; in Peker's words, 'party works with state, Republic of Turkey is a party-state'. According to Peker, democracy is not an ideology which can not be changed. There is no absolute definition how democracy is imported. It is a concept which should be applied in accordance with the need of every country (Yıldız, 2004:60).

Peker believed that a disciplined freedom which is structured around an authoritarian regime. He also confessed that the new regime of Turkey was impressed from fascism, Nazism and communism but he declared that the notions which could be harmful in these ideologies for togetherness of society must be cleaned out in intellectual level (Yıldız, 2004:61). The common characteristic of these ideologies were their totalitarian identity but we can not claim that Kemalism has a totalitarian identity. In my thought, Kemalism is authoritarian but it is not totalitarian. But approximately, all of the political regimes have imperious nature between 1st and 2nd World War because liberal thought and diversification were so away the discourse of political regimes.

'Chief' word got into political discourse at 1930 and it ensconced (Ünder, 2004:145). The first thinker who used to 'National Chief' term was Recep Peker. Gathering around a superior chief is necessary to achieve national superiority in accordance with his opinions. Chief is the father of the nation. After party – state identicalness in 1936, 'chief' term became the adjective which is most used for Atatürk (Yıldız, 2004:61). This idea is seen also in Josef Stalin as 'atyets u nasi' (the father of the nations). It can be claimed that 'gathering around one man' idea was inspired from Thomas Hobbes because he defenses monarchy as political regime to provide permanence of society.

According to Peker, state is organized nation. He draws an explicit picture of Kemalism which does not allow an autonomous area for individual against state. The leader cult which is constructed around Atatürk, perceiving the purge of dissidence as a national mission and considering whole citizens as the member of CHP are the apparent representations of totalitarian character of Kemalist state (Yıldız, 2004:62).

In Peker's opinion, everything must be referred to state, everything should be for state and everything should be in state. He defended fascist – authoritarian state understanding and struggled feverishly through liberal wing of party who did not

embrace the “classless, without concession society structure” which belongs to populist doctrine. Peker represents political and economical statism and ethnicist nationalism (Yıldız, 2004:59).

Nationalism forms the soul of party program of CHP in 1930s. CHP was totalitarian in its discourse and authoritarian in its actions. Peker heeds much to inject nationalism through not only party but also state. Peker considers that anarchism, Marxism, fascism, internationalism and caliphate institution are extremely baleful for new regime. Nationalism has uniting feature for Turkey (Yıldız, 2004:62).

Peker refused the Ottoman past and made an ‘out of history’ nationalism portrait by referring to ‘loftiness in the blood of Turkish nation’ (Yıldız, 2004:62). We see here again the impression from fascist and Nazi understanding. It differentiates from cultural nationalism or rationalist nationalism; this color of nationalism cares firstly race and blood concepts to structure a nation.

Another person who made important contributions to Kemalism was Falih Rıfki Atay. Özkan describes his discourse like that: ‘We are neither communist nor fascist; we are Kemalists. We appreciate in Soviet Russia and Italy the revolutionist education and development methods.’ He sees Kemalism ‘as a revolution which have not been finished yet; it is a kind of revolution which is still walking, stirring, searching. It is alive and frisky.’ He accentuates insistently on systematizing Kemalism because he fears much that Kemalism could be abused if Kemalism is not structured seriously as an ideology (Özkan, 2004:66).

He complains that every party wears a Kemalist dress but they hide their real targets under the Kemalist costume. He stresses that Kemalism is an ideology peculiar to Turkey. How fascism was come out due to the conditions of Italy, how state communism was arisen due to the conditions of Soviet Russia, Kemalism is the result of particular conditions of Turkey. He claimed that Kemalists are not theory memorizer; they are the men of life and reality. Atay accented always young and new national state theme which is against corrupt and putrid old political regime (Özkan, 2004:67).

According to him, Kemalism is rejection of every kind of irredentism. He considers religious fundamentalism as the biggest enemy of Kemalism. He could reduce the revolutions of Atatürk in one word: Westernization. Like a lot of Turkish intellectuals in the first times of Republic, Atay was affected much from fascist and

communist political models. Their authoritarian discipline systems seemed to him the only way which mobilize and educate the great masses for the goal of production of new human type. Atay criticized feverishly parliamentary democracy in his writings in 1930s. According to his logic, a principle which debilitates the nation is not true if even it would be democracy. He claims that nations need sometimes dictators and he embraces the powerful state concept. He resembles Italian fascists to Kuvayi Milliye forces, defends the application of corporatist economy in Turkey (Özkan, 2004:68).

In his words: ‘Kemalism would prevent the sicknesses of the democracy in a country which has not yet the class struggle in itself’ (Özkan, 2004:68). ‘We would like Westernization of all classes but we do not desire that they would get the illnesses of the classes in Western world.’ Atay’s thoughts had been changed in the time and he slightly altered his opinion about Kemalism. He considered Kemalism as the source of discipline and authority in 1930s but in 1960s, he talked about Kemalism as the guarantor of freedom and democracy (Özkan, 2004:69).

He was also one of the supporters of the ‘leader cult’ concept which intensifies on his personality. Same political concept can be followed in Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler - with some differences among them - but Atatürk never chose a totalitarian way (dictatorship) to express himself. That would be more true if we say Atatürk was an authoritarian leader.

If it is examined these three main intellectuals of Kemalism, it could be seen that all these men are the productions of same intellectual climate. They are not only collimator of Kemalism but also, the first generation whose minds were shaped by modernity action in Ottoman geography. They were feed intensively from positivist – core modernist understanding and it is not predicted hard that they followed the way of Comte and Durkheim. Peker is differentiated from other ones with his extreme thinking line which is closer to fascism and under affect of German romantic nationalism. His approach is accepted as radical by Kemalist frame and Kemalism preferred to stay inside of Gökalp’s moderate vision. However, Peker is accepted as the first man of Right Kemalism but he was not respected as Gökalp and Atay as.

Gökalp seems the most intellectual one among this group with his style which takes as an example the thinkers like Comte and Durkheim. Gökalp’s affect took

place on Atatürk more than other two men and this affect can be seen Atatürk's discourse.

Gökalp, Peker and Atay underlines to stay 'we' while being modern and Western. That is their common point and became the one of the main notion of Kemalist theory. Peker's attitude of exalting the state also can be accepted one of the affects of these thinkers on Kemalism.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLASS CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE IN KEMALISM

Kemalist ideology was against class concept by the effect of corporatist and fascist thoughts. Class concept is accepted by liberal and Marxist ideologies; furthermore it is the main notion for Marxist ideology but Kemalist line refused it feverishly because Kemalism considered class notion as contradictory to entirety of state and society. As Steinhaus states that the objective rules of class conflicts were seen as crime in respect to criminal law because of denying the class concept (Steinhaus, 2002:158).

Recep Peker underlined clearly that regime targets to prevent ‘emanating and existing of class consciousness’ at his speech in parliament (Karpas, 1959:109). Peker is one of the important opposites of class thought in Republic history. For Steinhaus, he was a major representative of right wing of Kemalism and he had a great tendency to totalitarian ideologies (Steinhaus, 2002:159). Kadro journal which composed the left wing of Kemalism at the first times of Republic defended that there were no social contrarinesses in Turkey, too (Aydemir, 1968:255).

In fact, these definitions reflect much what official ideology would like to hear than telling the social reality. Both holding together the Republic which was founded new and continuing the society style which was controlled by state and inherited from Ottoman State, it was not permitted to regard social differences. As Steinhaus argues, state was going to take neutral attitude through the interests of various groups and it was going to be administrated by elitist intellectual staff. State, in the same time, was going to realize modernizing country and administrating ignorant people masses (Steinhaus, 2002:159).

The amount of workers increased 10 times much at the end of 2nd World War in comparison with its amount at 24 years ago but worker class did not carry out any improvement in political action area (Steinhaus, 2002:160). Class consciousness did not occur and this was making easier that Kemalism could insist the classless society

structure idea. It is possible that talk about only two social groups which gained class conscious: these were bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. These two classes whose interests conflicted with each other separated in themselves two parts: bureaucracy are two divisions as civil and military bureaucracy. Bourgeoisie is separated for two parts as conservative bourgeoisie which rests to county region and liberal bourgeoisie which rests to urban region.

Social strata had emancipated rapidly from 1920s to 1940s. This manner reflected itself on political institutions although it was realized lately. As a natural consequence of that, bourgeoisie got the political power by 1950 elections (Steinhaus, 2002:163). The bureaucracy – rooted parliamentarians were 54 percent at 1923 – 27 phase, they decreased to 48 percent at 1935 – 39 period and the rate had continued to fall: 47 percent at 1943 – 46 term, 36 percent at 1946 – 1950 term, 22 percent at 1950 – 1954 term. On the other side, the rate of bourgeoisie class was 38 percent at 1923 – 27 period; it increased to percent 48 at 1935 – 39 term and 50 percent at 1943 – 46 term. They pulled the wires in parliament fairly effective by 62 percent at 1946 – 1950 term and 78 percent at 1950 – 54 term (Frey, 1965:170 – 176). This parliament view is contradictory for the interests of Kemalism because Kemalism was got the biggest support from bureaucracy class. Decreasing the number of parliamentarians who come from bureaucracy means decreasing the power of Kemalist ideology on administration division.

Kemalist ideology purposed to produce also a national bourgeoisie which is under control of national state. This idea was affected by the thoughts of Yusuf Akçura and Alexander Helphand (Zürcher, 2004:52). Statism could be qualified as most appropriate development way for Kemalist movement which tried to apply capitalist economical model but devoided bourgeoisie class (Steinhaus, 2002:148). Statism which is the economical system of Kemalism is not an entirely separate system from capitalism (Sarç, 1948:61).

State precautions were assisting the occurrence of enterprising class (Fischer, 1955:128). In fact, bureaucrats sabotaged their monopolist influence which they had on state mechanism by leading the construction of private sector (Steinhaus, 2002:163). This situation actually was the one of the paradoxes of Kemalism. Capitalist / modernist system ascended on bourgeoisie class in European countries and bureaucracy, took part in society as extension of bourgeoisie which does not

violate interests of bourgeoisie. Whereas, there was not a bourgeoisie class which was classified and dominant in Turkish geography but Turkey that wanted to integrate to capitalist production relations had to produce a class like that. This obligation means that bureaucracy cut the branch where it mounts. It had to allow occurrence of bourgeoisie because capitalist system needed it but in the other hand, the occurrence of bourgeoisie class was destroying the dominant position of bureaucracy in the society.

This was the starting point of latent power battle which has continued all Republic history long. This latent contestation between bourgeoisie and bureaucracy classes has showed itself over the dichotomy of Kemalist CHP and right parties. CHP has been always the defender in political platform of bureaucracy class and official state ideology; right parties took on the spokespersonship of conservative – rural and liberal – modernist bourgeoisie.

Liberal bourgeoisie had not enough power to seize and to pursue political power by itself alone. So that, it had to make an agreement with pioneer strata of agricultural, commerce and religion fields in Democrat Party time. Bourgeoisie class provided to these strata political and cultural concessions. Thus, liberalism covered only the market area. The ideologies which were not reconciled with modernity were active on other social areas. The continuation of a society structure like that means quitting from modernist revolution without accomplishing (Steinhaus, 2002:182).

The point which Kemalism rested much while it was defending to increase authoritarian notions and to decrease democratic notions in political regime was the thought that anti – modernist fronts are always a threat for regime. Empowering of anti – modernist fronts were threatening also the interests of bourgeoisie because bourgeoisie owes its own existence to modernist life, too. Bureaucracy and bourgeoisie have behaved antithetical to each other in the modernist frame but they behaved together while there was a threat through modernism.

If it is looked in that respect, the latent support of bourgeoisie can be discerned easily although army (uniformed bureaucracy) realized the 1960 military coup. Steinhaus notes that the most important result of 1960 coup is to develop bourgeoisie democracy to some extent (Steinhaus, 2002:184). It is interesting that opening the ways of improvement and inveteracy of bourgeoisie by a military coup. In the same time, it is another interesting point that it was tried to bring freedom and democracy

by army which rested on authoritarian and prescriptive Kemalism but bureaucracy had to bring modernist – type society and its dominant class because it adhered to modernism; bureaucracy is another production of modernity, too.

Kemalist bureaucracy condoned the stress which bourgeoisie did to freedom and individual rights although Kemalism was not fond of these concepts. Bourgeoisie class overlooked also the coups which army executed when the political regime lost its balance, whereas, parliamentary system and representative election system is indispensables for bourgeoisie democracy. Bourgeoisie acquiesced against Kemalist interventions from out of politics to protect its dominant position in the system. This view was resourced from social realities of Turkey; otherwise, it is out of question that bourgeoisie class shows tolerance to a military coup.

Statist tradition which Kemalism rested and the the habit of not to lean on society was a case which inherited from Ottoman State. Steinhaus argues that feudal classes in Ottoman Empire were disintegrating without raising a new power which could replace them. There were not any social groups which could seize political power at the result of economic collapse which was happening due to that integrating. Naturally, in a case like that, a class absence occurred. State preferred to fill that gap by own itself and to use that gap instead of filling that gap from a societal aspect (Steinhaus, 2002:189 - 190). ‘The bureaucrats can administrate a society in which a class consciousness has not occurred yet’ is the thought of Marx and it is the true assessment which befits with political structure of Turkey (Mazıcı, 2004:556).

May be, the main question must be that what gave courage to Turkish revolutionists to compose bourgeoisie – capitalist industrialist society without provided by a strong bourgeoisie class (Steinhaus, 2002:10). Turkey did not display any bourgeoisie society indication although it had bourgeoisie state tendency in respect to political structure in 1920s and 1930s. Bourgeoisie state was born before bourgeoisie society in Turkey (Steinhaus, 2002:123).

The large amount of society was keeping its structure which they had before revolution (Steinhaus, 2002:116). This panorama shows that revolutions did not penetrate into social strata. Revolution had a Jacobin character as application. That characteristic resulted in that revolutions were embraced by very limited number people.

There is a deeply difference between application type and theoretic definition of populism principle of Kemalism. Timur sees this point, considering people equal in regards of political and judicial was compatible with bourgeoisie – republican understanding but organizer – statist opinions predominated comment and application of populism. That is why it is not true to recognize populism principle as ‘social development philosophy’ (Timur, 1968:103).

Regional feudalism could not be pressed. Authoritarian community and family structures could not be changed. These situations were preventing the independency of rural people and their joining to revolution movements (Steinhaus, 2002:116). Kemalist ideology preferred to share political authority with traditional and conservative county side by time to time agreement; later, by a permanent agreement (Steinhaus, 2002:115).

The duty of preventing class differences and class conflicts was ascribed to state (Köker, 2004:109). Society had not a structure which was rested on class concept at the phase when Kemalism was founded firstly. This situation empowered the ‘classless society’ thesis of Kemalism. Non-existence of classes was a normal result in a society which had not an industrial revolution and which did not differentiate in respect to production relations / occupations. Classes which are natural results of capitalism became much clear after 2nd World War and this manner caused to multi – party political system.

There are two main power points in Turkey like in whole world. These are bureaucracy and bourgeoisie classes. Albeit the bureaucracy class founded the Republic, bourgeoisie class which is getting stronger in the time looked for its interests especially over right parties at the multi party term.

Citizen equality for Kemalism means refusing the status privileges (Köker, 2004:110). Actually, the fact given in populism principle that individuals / social sub-groups would give up their interests / rights for the general frame which is drawn by state. That ‘common interest’ thought of populism is concordant with the concept of ‘common welfare’ concept of corporatist economic model. Köker believes that bureaucratic centralist tradition tells that a superior wholeness ideal that all citizens are equal at servant position in front of this ideal (Köker, 2004:110).

The claim that ‘ political class makes country into crisis with abortive quarellings’ is the prop of concreting the control powers of civil and militarist bureaucracy over

parliament. In this way, the ‘appointed’ empowered their positions against ‘the ‘selected’ (Taşkın, 2004:573). The class feature of bureaucracy which still continues today depends on that it is an inheritance from Ottoman State and also depends on that there is no class consciousness in society.

The militarist elites of new Republic were the members of Order and Progress Party. Atatürk approved this situation by his declaration as ‘all of us were its (Order and Progress Party) members’ (Zürcher, 2007:281). This situation enforced the argument which claims that Cumhuriyet Halk Party is the continuation and extension of İttihat and Terakki Party. The militarist / bureaucratic structure were constructed again after National Independence War with the same persons.

Kemalist elites have a character anti-imperialist, nationalist, populist, secularist and republican tenets (Kili, 1969:4-5). These features which Kemalism would like to see on their members but Kemalist elites follow these attributes more sensitively than other people in society.

The opponents of Kemalism who are moderate to Ottoman traditional system commented the laicism more democratic. The interesting point is that traditional forces defended the democracy more in comparison with revolutionist cadre. Traditional forces preferred to embrace democracy to possess the political power but not much to stay on the political power. Revolutionist staff was going to tend to authoritarian and ‘without opposition’ politics, by paternalist style. This style, if it needs, could behave as ‘for people, in spite of people’ (Ünder, 2004:142). Actually, we can follow this contradiction today. The conservative forces which were positioned at periphery by Şerif Mardin in the center – periphery dichotomy believe to democracy and consider the freedom concept much. They pursue liberal line like that, on the contrary, Kemalist line is more authoritarian, and conservative about politics; advocates an order and obedience politics more than democratic pluralism.

At this dissidence, the attitude which Kemalism considers itself as ascendant than democracy and exempt from democracy can be seen easily. In the same time, this logic makes traditional forces which are fed from periphery progressive and transformative, and makes Kemalist mentality which is at center closed to metamorphosis and subject of power.

The alteration which Kemalism has had as subject is important in this respect. Kemalism terminated the absolute monarchy which is the symbol of traditional

feudal society structure at 1920s and it is a revolutionist ideology but it wraps an outlook which is rather static and protective in 2000s. This manner reminds us that the situation of bourgeoisie class which was revolutionist and led other classes in society at 1789 French Revolution but it gained power and static features when the time came to 1839 working class rebellions. All ideologies and classes which become power ossify are getting conservative and having a status quo identity.

The administrative staff of national movement was from inside of state with a great extent (Kazancıgil, 2004:236). This military – based cadre usually decided the improvement of revolution and that made revolution an elitist / Jacobin movement. Jacobin elite oftenly considered societal structure and expectations albeit revolution was not a movement of people. The success of Kemalism is involved in at the beginning of Republic that revolutionist elite did not do any revolution preferences which sociological structure of society could not stand on. In other words, revolution owed its triumph to make choices in accordance with the expectations of people. Herewith, Kemalist transformations were approved by people. In my opinion, Kemalism neither did change society 100 percent nor did protect former system 100 percent. It made a transformation which was constructed on old society type but forwarded it a lot of steps. So, it will be more true that to denominate Kemalist applications as ‘transformation’ at this period.

Revolution preferences which did not meet the expectations of people were erased and disappeared in the time. The numbers of that ‘erasing’ kind of revolutions are limited and they are some thoughts and applications about religion and language. The rule in social sciences which ‘political regimes do not decide the social structure; social structure shapes political regime’ worked once more.

The thing which Atatürk and his friends did firstly was to organize an association. This association could seize state / power by its actions and decisive standing; after that, it could convert society by using state (Alpkaya, 2004:489). This situation can be associated with that a pioneer class does the necessary innovations instead of society in the societies which society is more dysfunctional about its own future. In the societies which had industrial revolution, the actions which are through out the society are basic, the concepts such as politics and state have instrumental feature. Politic institution and state turns on to a goal in non – Western countries that had not industrial revolution. The stratum which controls the state rules and orients the

society, too; this stratum is formed by to be voted politicians and to be promoted bureaucrats. This political structure often results in that abasing of society and believing of bureaucracy class that they know everything best.

Kemalist understanding accepted division of labour concept instead of class concept (Steinhaus, 2002:159). We can see here that Kemalism wanted to get the ideas of Durkheim, who is one of the main persons of positivism, instead of the ideas of Marx. Kemalist thought preferred neither Marxist nor liberal line; it felt itself close to positivist way and followed especially the French positivists, like Durkheim and Comte.

CHAPTER FIVE

KEMALISM AND POLITICS

The political project of Kemalism considered Republic as the best political regime which applies and represents national sovereignty ideal in one way; and in another way, Kemalism realized the politics which prevent the political participation of great masses for protecting the Republic against any sort of internal and external threats (Çelik, 2004:78). By the leading of Kemalism, Turkey becomes a country which resembles to developed countries figural / visional / institutional but essentially, it is so away democracy, human rights, freedoms and contemporaneity. Democracy in Turkey accepts as one of the basic arguments that the majority of people would not insist on a wrong way (authoritarian politics) in a long term and democracy would ensconce in society slowly (Tunçay, 2004:96).

The approach of Kemalism results in continuous tension between ‘republic’ and ‘democracy’ (Köker, 2004:101). A composition which called republic does not need to obey the necessities of the democracy. Especially today, a time phase when postmodernist postulates are felt strong and democracy, human rights and more moderate laicism understanding are developing. In these conditions, the Republic concept which is Kemalism-based, authoritarian / rule – insister stays so away to reply the demands of society.

In my project, I do not believe that Kemalism delayed the absolute representative democracy until arising of people who embrace democracy. If even Turkish society would have reached a complete Western level democracy, it does not seem so possible that Kemalism would leave its dominating ideological position and consider itself like any other ideology. With Kemalism, state and bureaucracy also could go on their controlling position on the society.

The thesis of the final goal of Kemalism is democraticization is so away being cogent (Köker, 2004:108). At the first times of Republic, Kemalism considered the democracy as a threat for its hegemony. In the time, democracy has been absorbing

by Kemalism. At the first times of Kemalism, Kemalist ideologists refused the democracy strongly and claimed that it has a lot of weaknesses in comparison with one-party administration and authoritarian structure. Kemalism has converted in its relation with democracy. It adapted itself to democracy and tried to assimilate democracy into its own ideological structure. By doing so, Kemalism attempted to not to tear from developments in political postulates. World politics has given more importance democratic openings since 1950s, so Kemalism had to make important changes in their discourses.

Kemalist thought does not refuse the democracy but it reduces democracy to populism and limits democracy by principles of republic. Democracy should be limited because people are not mature or pubescent yet (İnsel, 2004:20). We can see here that Kemalist bureaucracy alleges an excuse as people are not mature yet and by doing so, they show their passion to not to want to give up power to society.

CHP which was the representative of Kemalism in political platform had the principle of 'union of forces' (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı, pg.4). Kemalism also was on the way which is closer to union of forces and rested only to duty differentiation rather than separation of forces (Koçak, 2004: 119). Kemalism is more inclined to authoritarian state model which the will of elector is dependent to the actual forces of state. It is seen easily from this situation that Kemalism does not contain 'separation of forces' but 'union of forces' (İnsel, 2004:19).

Kemalist discourse disclaims the differences and antagonisms in the society. Nation exists as a whole, there is identicalness between nation and state and this identicalness is represented by power which is sole, whereas, power is structured as an 'empty space' in modern democracy (Erdoğan, 2004:588 - 589). In Kemalist regime, it was tried to squeeze into Kemalist mould of 1930s the institutions which made regime gain pluralism and the ones which overflow that mould were purged (Mazıcı, 2004:568). In regards of democracy understanding, there are a lot of common points for Kemalism and Islamism: both of them goal a society that could be guessed; both of them recognize state as a power point which should be obeyed; both of them want to moralize politics with its own values, Kemalist or Islamist (Cizre, 2004:172).

At the first times of Republic, it was seen that more than 90 percent of people stayed out of the representative parliamentary system. The effect of the wide masses

to political system was realized so less because of socio – cultural and political underdevelopment of Anatolian geography. If it is compared with West European parliamentary system, the effect of society through political system was so limited (Steinhaus, 2002:86). Wide people masses were kept out the revolution movement (Steinhaus, 2002:116).

Atatürk principles and reforms do not only determine the legitimate limits of politics but also legal borders. The condition of ‘loyalty to Atatürk principles’ makes all politic ways head to same center whether they want or not. Kemalist ideology is perceived as only acceptable common ground and the ones who do not share this common ground are considered as the enemies of nation and country (İnsel, 2004:27). Kemalism allows opposition only in its own political limits. Every attempt which goals to pass beyond these limits is accused by ‘divisiveness’, ‘destructiveness’ and ‘reactionism’ and it is pushed out to political area. Other blaming ways are realized as ‘betrayal to country’ or ‘enmity to state’. The demands of different sub-social groups can get response from political mechanism if and only they stay in the borders of Kemalism. That logic of Kemalism forms also the existence reason of state. This situation is called as ‘raison d’etre’ or ‘hikmet-i hükümet’. Actually, this outlook is the common peculiarity of whole nation states. Identicalness relation is done between the collective wealth of nation and the existence reason of state (Köker, 2004:98).

However, the problem in the view of masses of providing the legitimacy of system which Kemalism envisages has not solved (Ünder, 2004:150). Mazıcı says that as a result of choking of usual ways of political participation, extraordinary political participation explosions happened or illegal organizations of radical movements empowered (Mazıcı, 2004:569). I am one of the believers who think that Kemalist discipline has an important part on the choking of political participation in Turkey. Kemalism imagines society how it desires to see and does not give chance to social subgroups which are out of its borders; Kemalism assumes that politics belongs to bureaucracy class which locates at center. This ‘limitation politics’ can be watched obviously on Islamic subgroup of society. Limitation of Islamic side of society due to laicist reasons resulted in empowerment of radical / fundamentalist streams. Akyol talks about another face of the matter: these applications produced

‘radical Muslims’ later times and Erbakan movement rose on that platform at 1960s (Akyol, 2007).

It is claimed that authoritarian regimes allow to limited pluralism on the contrary totalitarian regimes (Turan, 2004:593). This manner differentiates first term Kemalism from its contemporaries; Soviet Union, Germany and Italy regimes. As Turan argues, Kemalist thinkers contend that Kemalism did not purpose to produce completely a new human type or new society type like totalitarian regimes. They show as example which supports their argument that CHP did not organize itself as permanent mono party (Turan, 2004:593).

In Kemalist understanding, only legal and legitimate authority should be state authority (İnsel, 2004:24). Especially in mono-party era, the weight of state is felt so strong in the structure of Turkish society. In fascist regimes, party commands state but in Turkey, state commands party (Uyar, 2004:81).

State has always priority in comparison with society. State got a centric role to convert the society through the modernity. State was not the expression of national values and meaning world of nation; it expresses whole notions of nation (Çelik, 2004:84). Kemalism has considered the interests of society same with the interests of state (İnsel, 2004:26). That reminds German romantic nationalism and state understanding. The German Romanticism who was the main source of national-socialism in Germany was giving priority to state before all social concepts.

For Kemalism, state-centric human and society projection always has been dominant. Forming a society for state, rehabilitating that society which is composed and projecting it in organic structure with state were the results of classless and coalesced society project of Kemalism. The political thinking which Kemalism stands closest to is corporatism because Kemalism designs nation in homogeneous wholeness (İnsel, 2004:18). According to Türkdoğan, individual – state relation composes the basic philosophy of Kemalist ideology (Türkdoğan, 1982:14).

The politic tradition which is represented by Kemalist tradition and comes from Ottoman times has always purposed to seize state but not to seize society. Whereas, the thing which they did not notice was that a political action which has not a class support and base has to be inconclusive (Gevgilili, 2004:195). This kind of logic resulted in that a state which is not got power from a societal support was emplacing

itself at a place where is over the all societal conditions. Namely, state considers itself as an existence which is over human and over society as in Hegel's thought.

Kemalism has been considered always the knot point of the order definitions by state. The four military coups were the struggles of state against political indefiniteness and disarray (Çelik, 2004:91). Centralism is sine non qua complementary notion of that state authoritarianism (İnsel, 2004:25). Kemalism also, has salient paternalistic dimension in its whole versions (İnsel, 2004:21). That feature of Kemalism could enforce the 'devlet baba' (father state) understanding.

Kemalist thought makes itself integrate with state and in the same time, it makes state subject. State is independent from society and has special interests and goals. It is a kind of superior subject. Kemalist thought considers itself as the carrier of the conscious of that subject (İnsel, 2004:22). Statism was used to prevent class struggles in Kemalism. If even the members of Turkish nation belong to different occupations, it could not be tolerated that occupation differences turned into class struggles by new regime. Homogeneity and union of interests should have been protected due to populist character of new regime (Çelik, 2004:88).

The politic elite of early times of Republic were quite sure from their 'truths'. They were not thinking to compromise the traditions; they purposed to educate masses by 'persuasion' and 'showing the true way'. The system which knows the truth, the good, the beneficial as 'a priori', does not need to come on an agreement with people. Furthermore, it can be said that the system which knows the truth enforce the society to its own truths is a moral duty. Kemalism is aware that enforcing is bootless but convincing the people is the right preference (Tunçay, 2001:96). Populism principle forms the theoretical frame of the view that state is not formed by people but state is for people (Heper, 1974:94). "Populism, for instance, is Kemalist conceptualization of Turkish republican understanding of democracy in line with the ideas of Ottoman reformists who interpreted the concept as describing a closer relation between the ruler and the ruled" (Dumont, 1984:31 – 33).

At the first times of Republic, political system was operating around mono-party system. As Çelik notes, Kemalism did not allow any political action without existence and actions of Party. So, party is understood as equal to nation, nation is equal to state, and then party is equal to state (Çelik, 2004:76).

At the Kemalist beginning, Parliament was an institution where the decisions that are taken in a small group were legitimized and became law. Parliament is rather a kind of organ which chooses to help official administration as main duty for itself than an organ which inspects the activities of government. In this wise, it implemented to serve legitimating the decisions which were taken by government (Koçak, 2004:122).

Kemalist regime must have believed that the dilemma which is between social reality and modernist state was going to be disappeared automatically. This belief of Kemalists that the dilemma between social reality and modernist state would be erased can be seen in neglecting the subjective and objective conditions which make society join to innovations and make society comport with innovations (Steinhaus, 2002:128).

Liberal thinking people and the people who are warm to sultanate regime made cooperation to Kemalist understanding at the times when Kemalism was constructed at first (Ünder, 2004:142). Liberal wing was not pleasure from the statist economy of Kemalism; in the same time it was not approving the Kemalist line which did not give importance to democracy. Conservative class was not approving the rationalist political line of Kemalism which excludes spiritual / religion values. It wanted to see Republic that heeding spiritual values more than a rigid laicist understanding.

“The sacralization of politics has been both democratic and totalitarian” (Gentile, 2000:24). This Emilio Gentile’s sentence refers to how politics is understood throughout the world between two World Wars. Politic institution is a meta – concept which ordinary people should not make his mind busy with it; it is the job of elite people. Politics contained its inside both authoritarian and democracy sides but authoritarian mode predominated in comparison with democracy.

Guthrie explained the social political behavior which considers ‘obedience’ concept as the basic notion: “people’s desire as not to know about reality pushes them in the arms of a, thus, comfortable religious definition or story of reality” (Guthrie, 1996:417).

The political regimes have Jacobin character which alterations that civil society can not carry out are realized by arranging from up to down. These regimes can be seen in a wide spectrum from Bonapartism to dictatorship. Such these authoritarian political regimes actualized the political administration work in accordance with the

interests of bourgeoisie class in exchange for an apparent worth. These authoritarian regimes were needed in a social structure where monarchy was purged and bourgeoisie had no ability which administrates society directly. A Bonapartist intervening can not be observed in a social structure which has very complex democratic formations and effective civil society (Gevgilili, 2004:193). It can be found interesting that bourgeoisie class hid behind the authoritarian, even totalitarian / fascist regimes between two World wars although the existence ideology of bourgeoisie class is liberalism / capitalism and although the base of liberal thought are individual rights / freedoms and economical enterprise freedom. I think so that perceiving this situation as a temporarily term in the frame of interests of bourgeoisie would be the right perspective.

The years in question which Kemalism was being shaped, mono party totalitarian regimes with an ‘absolute leader’ seems often in Europe. Adolf Hitler in Germany, Benito Mussolini in Italy, Francisco Franco in Spain, Josef Stalin in Soviet Union are the examples for that kind of ‘chief’. This situation was effective on favor which CHP shows to ‘chief’ adjective in its own literature (Bora – Gültekingil, 2004:134). As Koçak states that, chief system is extremely compatible with traditional Ottoman – Turkish modernization dynamic. It also serves in the same time, to not to form power and authority absence in internal policy (Koçak, 2004:135).

Authoritarian leader figure is the political representation which is desired to see by the society which is familiar for monocratic politic system from sultanate concept (Ünder, 2004:146). In that respect, changing the system from monarchy to republic did not make so many alterations in regards of political content of system except name change.

The founder generation of Republic needed ‘a national hero’ by the words of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and ‘a shepherd who gathers herd’ by the words of Ziya Gökalp (Ünder, 2004:140). Kemalism and Atatürk, as an image, are two social phenomenons which provide self-confidence to an intellectual mass and which erase inferiority complexes of the same intellectual mass which had inferiority complex, had not self confidence, had been crushed under the Western hegemony since the beginning of modernity (Cizre, 2004:157).

Kemalism has protected the power of Atatürk’s image by re-protecting it continuously in the minds of young generation (Ünder, 2004:153). Benefiting from

the area which Atatürk covers in the history has been the preference which empowers the hand of official ideology. For Ünder, commenting the revolutions of Republic as the continuation of the Westernization phase which had continued for a long time but not a beginning, considering Atatürk who was a person was produced by events but did not produce events, telling that he was not the only subject of happenings weakens his historical role. All these are kind of things which Kemalism does not desire (Ünder, 2004:139).

The flexible and pragmatic personality of Atatürk reflected to the ideology which he constructed. Every one can find a word, a tendency or an element which satisfies his view in Atatürk. Thus, every individual or social group can produce a Kemalism in accordance with its own values. Kemalism which is 'real' or 'official' is determined by power and authority relations (Ünder, 2004:154).

Atatürk said: "I do not want to die without bringing the regime of personal rule in Turkey to a close. I want to create a liberal Republic" (Kinross, 1999:450). Although Atatürk's speech and demand are on this way, Kemalist regime and one-man leadership was not displayed so much differences from a sultanate regime. Both the political tradition of Turkey and the world politics conjuncture then were proper to continue an 'one-man leadership', moreover, an authoritarian regime and intensifying political power on single person was the expected thing. "Democratic, multi-party attempts were short-lived and most analysts agree that it was both premature and dangerous in Turkey at that time" (Mateescu, 2006:238).

CHAPTER SIX

HISTORICAL CIRCULATION OF KEMALISM

We specified before that Kemalism has had different faces and interpretations at today and past. Suna Kili also underlines this fact that there are various interpretations of Kemalism which range from right wing to socialist one (Kili, 1969:2). We also touched on that Orthodox Kemalists do not accept that Kemalism has different interpretations and they are insistent on that Kemalism has one, immutable and entire structure. One of the Kemalist writers claims that Kemalism is not an ideological patch; it is tried to move Kemalism away from its core by concocting the names such as right Kemalism, left Kemalism and neo Kemalism (Arısoy, solbirlik.net, 9 Şubat 2007). Ayhan Bilgen, who is a non-Kemalist writer, asserts that Kemalism on equal distance to right line and left line: “Kemalism is not close to right or left. The imagining one is monolithic ideology of monolithic society. So that, no one heard the words like right or left from Atatürk’s mouth.” (bianet.org, 14 Mayıs 2005).

In spite of these claims, our opinion is that Kemalism is separated to different compartments like in every ideology. Different Kemalist intellectuals have analyzed Kemalism and the result of that, different Kemalism reflections have arisen. We evaluate Kemalism in three different main lanes; these are right, left and neo Kemalisms.

We can interpret these three lanes is the tendency of Kemalism to the thoughts which take part in these political lines. Nevertheless, it can be commented also the affecting or shaping of right, left and today political thinkings on Kemalism. However the interpretation would be, it does not seem realistic to us that Kemalism has had not any idea or interpretation exchange with other thinking streams.

6.1 Right Kemalism

It can be said that Kemalism has its inside elitist, atavist and fascist notions. This feature makes Kemalism is an authoritarian ideology which is open to right thought. Kemalism has a kind of nationalism with ethnicist sides. Right Kemalism is a discursive – politic legitimization but we can not say it is an entirely doctrine. Such the notions (religion, traditional relations, the structure of Ottoman which was based on the communities etc.) were removed from social life by the constructing of Kemalism and it can be assumed that Right Kemalism is a frame which was prepared to substitute for all these notions (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:529).

Progressionism, pragmatism, technician approach and particularly, economic speciality are the basic characters of Right Kemalism (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:532). Right Kemalism converted its admiration for industrial society to a working which goaled to reach that kind of society soon as possible. This endeavor, in the same time, is rapprochement try with industrial bourgeoisie which became more invisible since 1950s in Turkey. Bora – Taşkın assert that Right Kemalism was rested on urban middle class. Right Kemalism believed to the liberal thought more and it liked the policies which were applied before statist economy that began at 1932 (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:531).

Apart from these features, organic and inequivalent society imagination, backing up another type of capitalism behind the criticism of liberal capitalism, constructing its own societal ideals on the axe of social order but not on social equality, its technological (instrumental) modernization paradigm which considers order and technology sides of modernity more than the faces of modernity like emancipation, participation, the mobilization of people and its suspect against social revolutions (cosmetic revolutionism) can be showed the other notions of Right Kemalism (Mollaer, Radikal, 13 Ağustos 2006).

We can show Recep Peker, Celal Bayar, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Süleyman Demirel and Kenan Evren as the main people of Right Kemalism. Although they interpreted Kemalism with different right notions, it is sufficient to show all of them in the right side of Kemalism because of the common facts that they have.

Political regime featured protecting the new regime from the phase which Republic was founded to multi – party elections and this choice caused to weaken the ties between society and political area. Kemalist regime tried to balance political reform and participation attempts which were weakening increasingly by dashes which affected to superstructure. Kemalism has been reactive since its foundation against societal actors which want to force political area whose limits were specified initially (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:544). We can see Right Kemalism as a response against joining of other political thoughts to political area which has begun at 1950. It can be commented as Kemalism's try to protect its dominant ideological position in the system. Kemalism, as the official state ideology, has been getting conservative a bit more with the every passing year after 1950 and it has made its conservatism rest to state. Right Kemalism is the most obvious representation of this conservatisation.

Kemalism is not in an open opposition situation with conservative principles and it is the follower of bureaucratic conservatism which was developed in the leading of the state in Ottoman modernization process (Mollaer, Radikal, 13 Ağustos 2006). Non-Kemalist standing slide right parties to left wing and being Kemalist made CHP a right and conservative party. The determination of 'right is left and left is right in Turkey' is corrected by this view.

Another feature of Right Kemalism is that allowing religious symbols and motifs in its political line (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:533). Right Kemalism accepts religious facts as the part of society and gives place in its political discourse unlike Left Kemalism. Kenan Evren displayed most apparent examples of this notion of Right Kemalism. He made compulsory religion lessons in primary and high school. He repeated almost in his every speech that Kemalism is reconciled with religion. By doing so, he tried to erase the image of Kemalism which does not get along with religion.

The interest of Kemalism, especially Right Kemalism, to religion is keeping pious section of society and organized Islamic actions under the control of the state and if it is necessary, blocking them by intervening. The Directorate of Religious Affairs has been an institution which is attached to state. That is a kind of application which was inherited from Ottoman State and which assimilates religious authority in political

authority. Besides, this application reflects control desire of Kemalism over pious sub – group.

Another notion in Right Kemalism is exalting the statism. The concern of ‘placing state constant and strong base’ is a sense which is felt deeply in every module of Kemalism (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:532). The love of Right Kemalism for state causes separation of Right Kemalism and bourgeoisie class but also, Right Kemalism becomes closer with idealistic type (ülkücü) nationalism due to that love.

Right comments of Kemalism have had always an extreme worry about the future of state and regime. This approach which can be named as ‘Republican conservatism’ claims that society has not enough mature to carry the regime and tells that democracy produces a structural anarchy threat (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:533). This amount of freedom is rather much for this nation’ sentence which was told by Kenan Evren after September 12th reflects typical right Kemalist reflex.

The locomotive term of Right Kemalism is nationalism. Right Kemalism also focuses the protecting of regime and state authority. It is possible to say that Right Kemalism was composed by the notions from the right thought of Turkey which do not collide with Kemalist main lines. Right Kemalism is agreeable with idealistic nationalism about nationalism subject and also, it is corresponding again with civil right understanding on authoritarian state / disciplined society structure. For instance, Turhan Feyzioğlu, considers Kemalist nationalism is not racist but depends on citizenship principal; but this kind of nationalism was hardened by national culture and loyalty to state. According to Feyzioğlu, there was state before democracy; his political understanding embodies the nation and makes state a ‘per se’ value (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:538). This state understanding was affected from German romanticism; it perceives state over society, democracy and every kind of human right.

Kemalism considers state one and only modernizer subject (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:544). The impact which March 12 coup hit to Left Kemalism caused that Right Kemalism became popular. The approach between Right Kemalism and non – Kemalist, nationalist – conservative right at before and after September 12 empowered their collaboration especially on Kurdish nationalism. Both of these right politics combined their visions on the ‘future of state’ concept (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:545).

The target of Right Kemalism became communism after 1960 coup (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:534). Right Kemalism took on the protecting of regime voluntary against left movement which was growing increasingly in 1960s. Right Kemalism had a character which was against communism in paranoid degree. This fear shows itself particularly in Celal Bayar's sentence, 'communism will come at this winter'. Furthermore, Right Kemalism is the Kemalist wing which bourgeoisie class could affect and this manner, increased that fear. Another reason could be the endeavor of Kemalism which was trying to separate itself Soviet – type socialism.

Turhan Feyzioğlu, who is one of the leading names of Right Kemalism, has an alarmist perception under his 'freedom in prudent and reasonable limits' understanding (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:535). Feyzioğlu claimed that Left Kemalism lay up the spreading of communism and by doing so, Left Kemalism removed Kemalism from its real form. Feyzioğlu said that it can be struggled with communism only by the weapon of communism. This can be realized only by providing social justice and terminating the poverty. Kemalism already has this social justice perspective with its mixed – economy model (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:536).

Bonapartist power which was formed by 1980 coup regime wanted both to empower Kemalism on account of doctrine and to convert it a popular project. Conservative structure of county overlapped with conservatism of Right Kemalism in this process. The target of gaining conservative majority to Republic project was tried to realize over conservative thought (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:540 - 541). Perhaps, the best answer is Right Kemalism to joining of society to a line which frightens from politics after coup. Kemalism was replying the apolitic expectations of society that tries to keep away ideologies as a thinking line 'from us' and not involved in any ideology 'from outside'.

Bora – Taşkın declares that a right understanding which synthesizes conservative societal notions with Kemalist authoritarian / statist core controlled the political area along 1980s (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:541). The point which Right Kemalism and nationalist – conservative right depart is that Right Kemalism supported the all revolutions, whereas, nationalist – conservative right refuses the revolutions which it defends incongruous to society structure.

Hasan Bülent Kahraman views Right Kemalism as a concept which has come with September 12th. According to him, Right Kemalism is a static, statist-nationalist

understanding and misses a lot 1930s period which can be accepted a Golden Age for Kemalism. Kahraman considers the period between 1980 and 1997 a right Kemalist timeline, moreover, he evaluates the phase since 1997 to today an extension of this right Kemalist period. The difference of this last period right Kemalism from the previous one is a kind of model which is based on much more to symbols and ceremonies like in the first years of Republic (Kahraman, Sabah, 29 Mart 2008).

Unification of Kemalism with a wide nationalism, a moderate Islam and an exalting state means repeating the concepts which exist inside of Kemalism. Also, this situation brought that Kemalism made connection with the right notions which Kemalism does not contain (Kahraman, Sabah, 28 Mart 2008). The rapprochement of Kemalism with non-Kemalist right notions is a necessity of the social composition after 1980 in accordance with Kemalism. Kemalism tried to reach by this way an eclectism and unification which it has never reached in its own history and it aimed to combine the societal notions which were collapsed at 1960s and 1970s by the hand of state and reconciliation of Kemalism.

Right Kemalism of September 12th period took some measures due to perceiving a culture understanding which is independent from state as a threat through the existence of state (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:542). Right Kemalism tried to pull Kemalism from authoritarian line to totalitarian line. Sliding from authoritarian politics which controls only political area to totalitarian politics which controls all institutions of society was not accepted by society. The reason of that is civil society actions and societal sub – groups / sub – cultures have developed much from the first times of Republic and they did not accept a political control over themselves.

Celal Bayar, who is the third President of Republic, is the most marked character of Right Kemalism. Bora – Taşkın underlined that Bayar is a classical Kemalist in respect of repeating the general Kemalist discourses. He talked about pragmatic actionism of Kemalism by praising and said that: 'the important one is not program but doing'. He underlined the uniqueness of the reality of our country and according to him, there is no meaning to compare our country with other experiences. Bayar exalts action against thought and he specifies that Kemalist is not a system but methodology (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:532).

According to Bora – Taşkın, Bayar did not give up from Kemalism ever. He became means for engaging of Kemalism to central – right political discourse during

Democrat Party government at 1950s. Bayar perceives Democrat Party line as a view which walks on the way of Atatürk and goals to complete his achievement. Completing his work is passing to democracy, going through civilization (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:531).

A classless and coalesced society is ideal of Bayar which he could not give up. Furthermore, he was thinking that Turkey is more real republic than Western ones because Turkey had not classes. He considered class contradictions artificial, and a big national threat notion. He does not abandon solidarist middle-class populism (Bora – Taşkın, 2004:532). The point which should not be mistaken for the ones who read our study is that being in right wing made Bayar a liberal. Bayar was not a liberal ever and never. The economical understanding he was defending was entrepreneurship in corporatist system but he was separated from the statism of Left Kemalism by his support to individual economical attempt.

The universal and modernist aim of Bayar inosculates with the essentialist – nationalist claim. Bora – Taşkın claims that Bayar's thought is that Turkish nation will overcome West by resting its own characters. Moreover, democracy is more proper regime for Turkey in comparison with Western world because there are no classes in Turkey. He talks about that how existence of classes degenerate the parliamentary regime in Western world and he adds also Turkey has to embrace democracy because of its classless society structure (Bora, 2004:550).

Celal Bayar's and Recep Peker's claims that Turkish society is classless are unreal. Albeit, it is natural that classes do not become crystallize in a society which had not Industrial Revolution, this does not mean that classes did not exist or will not exist ever. Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is not any society which had no classes. Every society has its own classes; may be, these classes can not be the ones which belong to capitalist society type. The issue which Kemalism talked about must have been a society which had not class consciousness but not a society which had not classes. Turkey has a society structure which does not know to express its societal interests over class consciousness and this situation has not changed since the foundation of Republic to present.

Bayar also has a tendency which belittles theory and regards action and this tendency exists in entire Kemalism. Bayar stipulated that the social – class axial of modernization process will slide from bureaucratic ground that rests to patrimonial

tradition to a bourgeoisie ground (Bora, 2004:550). Time has confirmed Bayar's thought. Bourgeoisie class got stronger and became more important than bureaucracy class. That is expected result in a society which tries to turn itself to a modernist society because the bourgeoisie class is leading class in all modernist societies. Bourgeoisie class has limited the power and affect of bureaucracy class but could not zeroized; bureaucracy has protected to some extent its power which is inherited from Ottoman centralist political understanding. Bayar's distant looking to bureaucracy institution and his demand to see society but not state as the subject of modernity can be commented the affects of liberal thought on him. However, the civil society thought of him which bourgeoisie class leads is a society model which is emplaced in Kemalist principles.

Bayar's democracy understanding is that majority represents wholeness. He pictures a democracy that does not violate the principle of strong state. The absolute power of parliamentary government which is composed by elections is enough definition for democracy according to Bayar (Bora, 2004:552). The open structure of democracy to individual preferences and social subgroups was never existed in Bayar's view; also, it has been never existed in Kemalism. The democracy which Bayar talks about is majority democracy. Majority democracy term is in the thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau, who is the one of the important names of French Enlightenment which is the ideological way that affected Kemalism mostly. Majority democracy is the contrary of minority democracy concept which belongs to John Locke, who is the one of the symbol names of the liberal line of England and liberal thought is furthest ideological line to Kemalism.

Bayar is one of the people who are in search of 'fastening the state on strong and constant ground' which is inherited from Ottoman to Republic. His belief to 'strong state' concept turns to authoritarianism time to time (Bora, 2004:551).

Bayar, as a statist right supporter, supported always Kemalism on the contrary of societal right which has usually distant to Kemalism. This right understanding which will continue later with Süleyman Demirel is reconciled with state and it greens in state. This approach is a balance notion between Kemalist elitism and populist thinking. Right Kemalism tried to give an answer in accordance with its arguments to the distance between state and society but Right Kemalism has always standed close to state on the line between society and state.

Anti – communism which exists generally in Right Kemalism takes part very essential in Bayar’s political discourse . Communism threat is a notion which comes from fear against Soviet regime more than politically / ideologically content of communism. This fear resulted in engaging of Turkey to United States. Turkey looked for international support against Soviet threat in exchange for its strategic mission in global anti – communist line (Bora, 2004:553). The communism paranoia of Right Kemalism was a paranoia which arised under affect of bourgeoisie. Bourgeoisie was the leading actor of the front against communism because it frightened to lose its property and scared also that Soviet Union imported its regime to Turkey. Right Kemalism was contradicting with the nationalist and anti – imperialist feature of Kemalism while drawing into West in anti – communist line. Especially that deeply admiration through United States was going to repeat itself later in Turgut Özal, another name of Turkish right who is non-Kemalist.

6.2 Left Kemalism

Left Kemalism is a kind of political line which embraces the Enlightenment philosophy philosophically, supports Kemalism ideologically, chooses totally development as development model (Alpkaya, 2004:479). Nationalism, developmentalism and self-especialism are three basic impulses of Left Kemalism (Günel, 2004:483).

Socialism was a popular ideology in the environment of 1960s. The endeavor of synthesising left thought with Kemalism seemed attractive to especially urban middle classes at these years (Macar, 2004:163). This circulation which İsmet İnönü has made start with ‘left of the middle’ concept continued later with Bülent Ecevit. Kemalism wanted to take share from left dynamism which was occurred in 1960s and 1970s; at least, it goaled to seem sympathic to left masses. This ideological marriage which was produced by articulating socialism to Kemalism is a synthesis try. Ideology synthesis targets already to speak to the supporters of both of these ideologies in the same time. Another reason is the antidote identity which Left Kemalism owns against to radical left. It was presented as acceptable and reasonable preference to the masses which were in left searches on the contrary, radical left movements were considered as big threats to the political regime then. How the

marriage of Kemalism with socialism became so powerful, it is claimed that March 9th 1971 action which was planned to do before March 12th 1971 military coup had completely socialist character. Some thinkers think that in the case of this attempt which was under command of General Faruk Gürler would have succeeded, Turkey would have turned to a socialist country similar to Yugoslavia or Cuba; state socialism.

The basic notions of Left Kemalism are ‘anti – imperialism’ and ‘full independence’. It has a vision that reconciles the situation of ‘to overcome being underdeveloped by rapid development’ with socialism (Macar, 2004:162). The Jacobin character of Kemalism and the style of socialism which rests on the low – economical groups seem completely opposite. In fact, Kemalism contains populism; people are perceived equal and entire theoretically but it is like that in only theoretical. People concept for Kemalism is something which must be claimed and must be directed like a child than to be a source and collimator of action. ‘People’ is thought mostly uncanny, a floating mine which is unpredictable what it will do while it is not controlled.

“Left of center is not a class movement but it expresses the necessity of a just distribution of national income” (Kili, 1969:210). Relatively freedom environment and increasing of socialist ideology resulted in that inequality in distribution of income was questioned more and that situation enforces Kemalism to give more importance social justice notion. That must be one of the reasons of occurrence of Left Kemalism.

Bureaucracy considers state as the reason of its existence and state appreciates bureaucracy its own protector. The thing which Left Kemalism tries to do is that to make this situation permanent (Alpkaya, 2004:490). The process when socialism engaged itself to state and appreciated state as a shelter place against bourgeoisie continued in all 19th and 20th centuries. The thought that state would represent the interests of society although socialism is a thinking type which is based on masses has been one of the main lines of left thought. Especially Friedrich Engels was defending the state-based socialism in his books compactly and he gave inspiration to statist socialism, and Josef Stalin had important contributions to state socialism concept which were named as Stalinism. Statist economic understanding is the one of the points which was borrowed by Left Kemalism from state socialism because it

was cohering with the attitude of Kemalism which considers state more important than society.

Capitalism was a threat of foreigners and their collaborators in Turkey to society and to state which defends the interests of society (Alpkaya, 2004:490). Left Kemalism wanted to make permanent this national struggle movement against these enemy sides (Alpkaya, 2004:491). This mentality affected later deeply the left student leaders like Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan. Although it contradicted with universal dream of socialism in respect to locate resisting through capitalist West on a national ground, they did not matter this and they were continuing their opposition with a 3rd Worldist mentality. Attila İlhan, Uğur Mumcu, Toktamış Ateş, Doğu Perinçek have been the theoretic spokesmen of this approach.

The only circumstance of protecting the independence of Turkey was to make Turkey resemble to the countries who wanted to make Turkey a colony. The way of this target was the industrialization. Only instrument which could form capital cumulation which could provide industrialization was the state. Statism, in that respect, was also the instrument of industrialization and Westernization (Alpkaya, 2004:491).

The goal which Left Kemalism tried to realize was that to make ‘being classless situation’ perpetual by using state or try to prevent the occurrence / empowering of classes as possible as (Alpkaya, 2004:492). This understanding is completely opposite to ‘class’ and ‘class contradiction’ concepts which are the ones of the basic concepts of Marxism. At this point, it is seen that Kemalism moved away absolutely from Marxism and engaged to ‘classless society ideal’ of Kemalism. For a society which did not have Industrial Revolution and did not have capitalist classes which are peculiar to capitalist society, this application of Kemalism seems compulsory. Even the countries which had capitalist type classes tried to make blurred these class differentiations in the period between two World Wars. The affect of positivist / corporatist notions like authoritarian political regime – statism – universal society model at this endeavor can be seen.

The left understanding of Left Kemalism is the statist point of view and Third Worldist perspective which fights with capitalist Western. It can not be said that Left Kemalism contributed new things to Kemalism because Kemalism had had already all these notions. It can be assumed that a new discourse was improved by the ones

who look from Marxism to Kemalism but not the ones who look from Kemalism to Marxism. Particularly, radical left used the independency character of Kemalism during 1960s and 1970s by translating it to anti-imperialist language seems more realistic than left Kemalism endeavor at the first years of Republic.

Turkish left consider Kemalism as an anti-imperialist standing and viewed the Kemalist actions which can overcome feudal structure of Turkey (Çelik, 2004:90). Left thought had a great admire to industrial economy, especially the one in Eastern block. In this frame, overcoming the feudal society structure and reaching the industrial society type was the primary goal for left wing in Turkey at these times.

Albeit 'Left Kemalism' has become common as a term in intellectual circle after 1980s, Kadro journal at 1930s can be accepted as the first example of this line (Alpkaya, 2004:477). The thing which Kadro journal wanted to realize that to combine the specific conditions of Turkey and the industrialization experience of Soviet Union which was very successful in a phase when capitalist system was in crisis due to 1929 economic depression in all over the world (Alpkaya, 2004:478).

The second comment of Left Kemalism arose by Yön journal in 1960s. Yön movement can be seen as re-commenting of an ideology which was formed in One Party period in multi-party conditions if it is compared Kadro movement. Yön journal defended a line which was composed from the composition of nationalism, statism and socialism concepts but with an important difference; while Kadro followed a publication line which disclaimed class struggle, Yön did not refuse the class struggle and it preferred a journal policy which was open to various colors of socialism (Alpkaya, 2004:478). This situation can be associated to two reasons: First, the core of Kemalism which resists class struggle did not allow to a contrary thought in the authoritarian atmosphere of One Party term. Other reason is that left thought made itself visible with its utmost power and its all types in Turkey at 1960s. Macar notes that Kemalism in 1960s which had left tendency has been compared oftenly with left Kemalist structuring in 1930s. The result is that Left Kemalists in 1930s used Marxism for Kemalism and Left Kemalists in 1960s used Kemalism for Marxism (Macar, 2004:163).

Another feature of Left Kemalism in 1960s is that it emerged 'synchronous' with BAAS movement which was state socialism experiment in Arabian countries (Alpkaya, 2004:497). At this term, Left Kemalism believed the revolution and it had

a kind of belief and dynamism which Atatürk and his friends had in National Independence War. However, CHP did not display any extra rapprochement to these regimes. As Mazıcı states, CHP in 1960s, had a dream of national and original left. It was against the socialist movements which came from Soviet Union, the left movements of some Arabian countries, China and radical left line in Western world. The most proper candidate for this left construction was European social democracy because it did not violate Kemalist main lines (Mazıcı, 2004:566).

Atatürk declared to a foreigner newspaper at 1920 that Ankara parliament is not a socialist system. “We are not Bolshevik and we are not communist. We can not be one of them or other one.” (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1959: cilt 2, 51). The anti – attitude of Kemalism through socialism can be followed easily after National Independence War. Kemalism underlined passionately anti – imperialism mental but anti – capitalist attitudes moved away from the state slightly. This situation is another proof for the part of bourgeoisie class in Kemalism.

However, bourgeoisie preferred to not to move away so much from the safety wings of state at the first period of Republic. Sertel stresses the experience which Turkey had between 1923 and 1929, and World Economic Crisis warned Kemalists against the objections of liberal economy (Sertel, 1969:29). In fact, statist economy politics is a perfect environment for bourgeoisie class to improve itself because then, it was so weak and so away from a strong class standing. Another left Kemalist, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, was benefiting statist politics environment and criticizing wild capitalism. According to him, liberal capitalism caused class conflicts in industrial countries and colonization slavery in non-industrial countries (Aydemir, 1959:473).

In fact, Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) is the expression of end of the alliance between CHP and statism with city bourgeoisie at 1942 (Karpas, 1959:115 – 117). Bourgeoisie has not needed any more to state and state protection. It could go on its way as alone, moreover, its interests displayed a clear conflict with state and its class, bureaucrats. As Sertel stated, landlords also had a great breaking with CHP due to 1945 land reform (Sertel, 1969:58). The interests of bourgeoisie and landlords were not with Kemalism anymore; this situation was the most important reason for the multi-party system after 2nd World War.

CHP tried to make reforms and changes which damage the economical interests of various external and internal groups (Ecevit, 1966:12). This step is an important breaking point in the history of Kemalism in 1960s. Ecevit and ‘left of the middle’ logic tried to converted CHP from a static, ‘the representative ideology of bureaucracy class’ situation to a revolutionary party, a party which is the spokesman of wide masses. This endeavor stayed abortive; CHP could not integrate with the wide masses and could not estimate the left wave which was so strong in Turkish society like all over the world. The failure which tried to get the wide masses inside of CHP and protecting them to become extreme resulted in the radicalizing of left masses. Radical left waves became so powerful and forbidding, left thought turned to be underground. CHP gained an identity again state party and being away of society from the official political area caused big bloody fights on the streets due to right – left dichotomy. The people who could not express themselves officially began to look for their rights and interests on the streets, informal and brutal. We can see that Ecevit had intuited the social explosion before it happened and he tried to construct the bridges between people on the streets and political platform / Kemalism but statist elites did not tolerate that and kept Kemalism under their control; they did not let Kemalism to be an alive and ambitious ideology which is shared by society like in Atatürk’s time.

On the contrary, important names of Kemalism underlined feverishly that CHP is not a Marxist party. Orhan Öztrak claimed that ‘left of the middle’ is a safety wall against Marxist and collectivist streams (Milliyet, 8 Kasım 1966). Turhan Feyzioğlu said that CHP declared its character and specified certainly that it is not a Marxist party (Milliyet, 12 Kasım 1966).

The angle between socialists and Left Kemalism narrowed in 1980s but in 1990s, Kurdish nationalism and Islamism got participation in social scene importantly and that made left Kemalists closer to state (Soydaş – Lök, 2004:516). The primary difference of Left Kemalism from socialist line is the statist side which is sourced from its Kemalist core. Left Kemalism can live in safe bosom of state by the confidence that Kemalism is the official ideology of the state. This leftist state understanding is reconciled with state but more estranged to society and democracy.

Anti – Kemalist leftists claim that Kemalism and socialism are two different ideologies which can never be compatible with each other. It is claimed by Bilhan

that anti-Kemalists consider Kemalism is anti-thesis of social democracy. Kemalism is militarist, not flexible, not compatible with the realities of the era and insisting of an authoritarian administration style to today (Bilhan, 2007).

Non – Kemalist socialism considers Kemalist revolution and National Independence War as the struggle of national bourgeoisie against Western imperialism. Mao Zedong thinks that: Turkey’s National Independence War that our national bourgeoisie succeeded with a great triumph to defeat Greeks but proletarian class had not taken part in this challenge because it was so weak and limited (Zedong, 1992:361).

Another socialist thinker, Şefik Hüsni thinks also that the motivate power of National Independence War was national bourgeoisie. Hüsni claims that the goal of the bourgeoisie was to seize its own country economically (Hüsni, 1995:132). The method of the nationalist bourgeoisie was differentiating from comprador bourgeoisie, nationalist bourgeoisie tried to seize national economy by using internal production relations but comprador bourgeoisie took help from foreign capital and companies.

The Jacobin applications of Kemalism can be associated with the big difference between ‘existent’ agricultural society and ‘should be existed’ industrial society. Lenin underlined the fact that the bourgeoisie revolution must be more rooted and must produce necessary conditions for the fastest social development because of the contradiction between the capitalism which was relatively-developed in industry and awful backwardness in rural regions (Lenin, 1969:55). Bureacracy had to make an alliance with the powers else itself during and after National Independence War. This situation insisted itself as a historical obligation. A state which is constructed on bourgeoisie base has to produce a bourgeoisie class and has to empower it (Başkaya, 2007:52). As Attila İlhan said, army and bureaucracy make war, construct state and protect state but they can not make revolution. Furthermore, if they find an opportunity, whether they distort the revolution or they make revolution conservative by adhering very tightly.

The anti-imperialist character of Kemalist ideology is questioned a lot of times by some socialist thinkers. For Başkaya, there is not any revolutionary and strong bourgeoisie in non-Western countries at 1920s. Puny Turkish bourgeoisie had no serious disagreement with English and French imperialisms (Başkaya, 2007:120). In

these circumstances, socialist thought claims easily that there is no serious reason that Kemalism is in a disagreement with Western imperialism and also, there is no reason that Western imperialism is against through Kemalist regime.

We can accept that the beginning person of Left Kemalism is Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. Uyar says that Bozkurt claimed that liberal economic system is not proper to Turkey by criticizing the liberal applications and he propounded that the system which should be applied is statism. The statist model which is the common point of Soviet-type socialism and fascism is also the economical line which Kemalism follows. Uyar's opinion about Bozkurt that Bozkurt was asserting that the scientific equivalent of statism is 'state socialism'. This is a kind of understanding which allows private property and enterprise but refers the dominant role in economy to state. Bozkurt also accepts that Turkey has a class structure even though it is not so blazing. He is different at that point from Populism principle (Uyar, 2004:217).

For Uyar, Bozkurt tried to realize the synthesis of nationalism and socialism on Kemalist ground. Kemalism had already nationalism in its constitution as a principle and it is close to socialism by statist economic model. Left Kemalism which was represented by Bozkurt affected Left Kemalist comments in 1960s and also, it affected 'National Left' (Bülent Ecevit, Mümtaz Soysal) thought and 'Nationalist Socialism' (Attila İlhan, Doğu Perinçek) way, too (Uyar, 2004:219).

Although Bozkurt is accepted as the beginning person of Left Kemalism, his political thoughts is so close to National Socialism. Bozkurt says in his own words, Kemalism in an authoritarian democracy and its roots are in the people. Turkish nation resembles to pyramide; its base is people and its top is people again who come from people and this denominates as 'chief' in Turkey. Chief takes his authority from people and democracy is not anything else but this one (Bozkurt, 1995:136 – 137).

Although he represented leftish ideas, he displayed some times ethnicist discrimination and slided to fascist tones in his discourse: "Turks are the only masters and owners of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock have only one right in this country; the right to be servants and slaves" (Ensaroğlu, 2007).

The symbol name of Left Kemalism in 1960s was Doğan Avcıoğlu. He delivered his ideas to wide masses by Yön journal. He perceived Kemalism a revolutionary – class ideology although Kemalism is against social science understanding which is rested on 'class' concept. He and his roadmates stayed in hesitance about which class

would assume advance and Kemalist – socialist revolution. According to Macar, Avcıoğlu has a classical anti – imperialist theory that underdevelopment is the result of Western exploitation (Macar, 2004:165). Doğan Avcıoğlu has deeply trust to army in the same time. He thinks that army could be leftish political power. Furthermore, he prepared a programme that a probable military coup converts to a revolution which he would like to see (Macar, 2004:167). Avcıoğlu improved ‘national revolutionist development way’ as an alternative to Soviet-type socialism and American capitalism. This inclination is the new version of ‘third way’ and ‘self peculiarism’ concepts at the first term of Kemalism (Macar, 2004:168).

Attila İlhan, another important name of Left Kemalism, perceived Kemalist movement as an anti – imperialist movement and perceived Atatürk as an anti – imperialist leader (Köksal, 2004:489). In this respect, he did not concern critics which leftist thought has through production relations and he considered left as a political standing but not an economic critisizing. He was affected deeply from Third Worldist, international left line which was trying to locate the political opposition of non-Western countries on a socialist line against Western-centered politics of capitalism.

The dilemma which Kemalism had here was that it embraced the modernism which Western world has produced like that but in the same time, it was oppenent such that through West. It is understood from this attitude that Kemalism recognizes modernism a societal conversion but exactly does not see a political adaptation. The view is that a completely modernized society but on the other side, a country which is completely against Western world politically. A perspective like that produces a thought which considers modernism an instrument and independent nation state a target. Kemalism heeds modernist conversion but it does not realize this conversion to engage Western world; on the contrary, it realizes that by having a hard and honored standing to Western world. Namely, playing the game with the rules of West and shoot it by its own gun.

The anti – imperialist discourse of İlhan turned to anti – globalist discourse at 1990s. As what Lenin said, capitalism passed over from imperial phase to global phase and the exploitation of countries over other countries transformed to the exploitation of international companies over societies. Köksal says that İlhan, defined globalism a continuation of imperialism but his perspective, is not

economical but political again. He considered this situation a threat to full independency of our nation state (Köksal, 2004:489).

İlhan is a Marxist in regards of his history perspective. He has a belief which defends the modernity project of Kemalism (bourgeoisie class rooted) will be transformed to a democratic socialism in the time. He repeats thesis – antithesis thought of socialism for Republic of Turkey: National / capitalist / bourgeoisie culture is in contrariness with the feudal culture which is before it and it has also contrariness with proletarian culture which will come after it. According to İlhan, Marxist dialectic will process and Kemalist revolution which has begun is going to evoluate to a real democracy by oncoming generations (Köksal, 2004:492).

İlhan, considered Atatürk more a leader who organizes people-based (democratic) structure of Anatolian movement (Köksal, 2004:491). Later, Bülent Tanör was going to repeat the same assertion: Kemalist movement began as a people movement and people chose as leader Atatürk. Erzurum and Sivas congresses, the first national assembly in Ankara at 1920 were always the reflections of society's will and actions.

He also accepts that a coalition which was formed by military bureaucracy, well-educated civilians and specific clans of society realized the revolution in the absence of masses (because of Industrial Revolution did not happen) who could carry out the revolution. The most important determination of Attila İlhan is that populist – equalist stresses of revolution discourse are contrary to endeavor of producing bourgeoisie class by means of state (Köksal, 2004:492). At this point, it can be criticized the concept of 'producing national bourgeoisie by means of state' because some social scientists claim that national bourgeoisie was not produced by hand of state but in spite of opposition of state. This argument shows as proof that the foundations of Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) and Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In accordance with the claim, these parties were founded to defend the interests of bourgeoisie class but they were closed due to fact that bourgeoisie class was not so strong to be locomotive class for a political party. Another reason is claimed that bureaucracy class did not want an opposition party which could be a rival against his monolithic and unarguable political power. If we follow what İlhan said and common acceptance in this subject, national bourgeoisie was produced by means of state and this makes Attila İlhan's saying right. Kemalism stays in a contradictive situation.

İlhan, in the same time, supports the idea of Sultan Galiyev which anti – imperialist revolution (socialism after capitalism?) will arise in downtrodden Third World countries but not in capitalist West. In this respect, according to him, Kemalist revolution is an anti – imperialist revolution. İlhan thinks that Kemalist revolution has a leftish (revolutionary) identity. Although Revolutionism is one of the six Kemalist principles, Kemalism has had always distance with socialism on the contrary of İlhan’s thought and has stressed keenly that it follows a different line from socialist line. However, İlhan’s affection for socialism and his desire to not to give up from Kemalism, caused a synthesis search between Kemalism and socialism which is seen in other left Kemalist intellectuals. Köksal underlines that İlhan’s socialism is a kind of left understanding which rests on nation state and struggle against anti – imperialism but not on class struggle, production and property relations and socialist international (Köksal, 2004:493). The national left mentality which İlhan made contribution to its construction is the pioneer of the political line which Bülent Ecevit configured later as a political line. The point which Ecevit is separated from İlhan is underlining the inequality of income distribution and giving place in his politics the interests of low-income class.

Another stronger name of Left Kemalism is Uğur Mumcu. Uğur Mumcu’s left line, similar to İlhan’s one, consider the contradiction between imperialism and downtrodden countries by imperialism as basic axis but not the contradiction between capital and labor. This is a concept which compounds the patrimonial state understanding of Kemalism and Third Worldism after 1960 (Günel, 2004:482).

According to Mumcu, whole society must be Kemalist. In this sense, Mumcu embraced an attitude which refuses different life styles, different identities and social groups in society. He wants that everyone in society must accept Kemalism like the state. This militant / fundamentalist position of Mumcu continued until his death and made him most extreme / radical Kemalist intellectual among Kemalist intellectuals. For Günel, the red lines of Kemalism, political Islam ve Kurd nationalism began to rise after 1980 and this situation made him more insistent on the thought that Kemalism must be embraced by whole society. According to Mumcu, it could be obeyed to state if even Kemalists rule the state; otherwise, even a coup would be legitimate (Günel, 2004:484).

Mumcu was also known his decisive attitude against defraudations. His strong belief which barely Kemalism can achieve a society ideal that such illegal situations do not exist can be seen a proof that he did not consider Kemalism not only a political ideology but also a societal rehabilitation platform. Günel says that in his own logic; it should be struggled against West by Westernizing, without giving up the unique features which belong to us and with a Kemalist standing (Günel, 2004:485).

Mumcu was standing frosty to socialism as a classical Kemalist. Günel states that he expressed to defend a participant and liberalistic socialism although he was opponent to Soviet-type socialism (Günel, 2004:485). In my personal view, it can be said about Mumcu or other Kemalist intellectuals that they are, at most, affected from socialist ideology. All intellectuals who had Kemalist core their inside were affected from Kemalism at 1960s and 1970s when socialism had intellectual dominance. They tried to produce a 'Left Kemalism' by collating Kemalism and the left notions which could be compatible with Kemalism. The point which should be cared here is that Kemalist ideology but not socialism is the base platform for this synthesis ideology. The main stream is Kemalism and the notions which come from socialism are added to this line.

Fundamentally, Kemalism and socialism have very different intellectual arguments else the other one. This 'constrained nuptials' between them serve to the endeavor of Kemalism which tries to benefit from socialism more than the worry of socialist thought which tries to add itself to official ideology. The other dimension of the event is that the periphery politics against Kemalism at center is accepted as 'right' because of it has conservative / inwardness values. If periphery politics is accepted as right, automatically, Kemalism would wear left identity and this manner is seen by me as extremely erroneous evaluation. The reason is for that neither Turkish right is a right which shows Western right feature and nor Turkish left is a left which shows Western left feature. Because of Industrial Revolution did not happen in Turkish geography, capital and labor classes which capitalist society contains have not arisen. As a result of that, right political line which rests on liberal ideology and which defends the interests of bourgeoisie class and left political line which rests on socialist ideology and which defends the interests of proletarian class did not form in Turkey. Instead of these classes, a political dualism has been formed

between bureaucratic elites which conglomerate at center and base their dorsal on state and conservative bourgeoisie which has small and middle-size enterprises at rural side.

Mumcu is in classical Kemalist line which consubstantiates Islam religion with Arabs and he supported the nationalist attitude of Kemalism which used in its distant standing to religion. Mumcu exemplified from the politic culture of Kemalism which does not like mediatory while saying ‘Kemalism is impossible with concession politics, laicism can not be defended by bargaining politics’. He has an understanding which refers the chaste and unspoiled situation of army to the reason that army comes from Kemalist tradition. According to him, army did not form permanent military junta and returned to democracy after every coup which it did because of its Kemalist character (Günel, 2004:486).

Mumcu was not only a Kemalist intellectual; it is the existing formation of the citizen model who does not give concession from Kemalist principles, hardworking, idealist, honest and modernity-defender. This citizen model is goaled to produce by Kemalist project. He was the most fanatic representer of a militant laicism which is candidate for the place of religion and a national independency movement whose nationalist tone is extremely intense. He did never accept that Kemalist has a problematic relation with democracy and law concepts (Günel, 2004:487). There is a civil love which is through his personality in 1990s. In 1990s, Kemalists tried to prove that Kemalism is not something which is claimed by state but society. They claim that Kemalism belongs to a civil action. Mumcu is most known and important proof for Kemalists that Kemalism can be lived in and reflected to our daily life practices. Mumcu was the leader figure at 1980s and 1990s of civil Kemalist standing which continues today strongly.

İlhan Selçuk is another name of left Kemalism. Selçuk accepted Kemalism on left side at right-left dichotomy which divided political life in 1970s. The separation of mind and faith, the separation of science and religion is not the first condition of politics only; furthermore, it is also first requirement of civilization. He has seemed in an authoritarian and statist attitude about Kurdish issue and political Islam by not moving away the classical Kemalist line (Soydaş – Lök, 2004:513).

His basic themes are Enlightenment ideal, independence and anti – imperialism. According to him, Turkish modernity is the reflection of Enlightenment on Anatolian

geography. The resource of such development ideal is positivist Western thought. All problematics (democracy, human rights etc.) except development problem have secondary importance. Turkish Westernization was started by imitation but it was transformed to a 'real Enlightenment revolution' by Atatürk and Kemalist revolution. İlhan thinks that there is no need to ask the opinion of people to determine the common interest of society because the question is only that whether rational / universal norms are applied or not. In my perspective, these sentences remind us the classical logic of Kemalism which is 'in spite of people, for people'. Democracy is not something which is needed because Kemalist principles and the political elites who apply them already know the truth and the good. Soydaş – Lök declares that society can participate to country administration if only it matures in respect of politically; the realization of this manner depends on the developing of country (Soydaş – Lök, 2004:514).

The common reference point of the Selçuk's articles is Enlightenment and the cumulation which Enlightenment produced. Turkey passed beyond Third World countries which are so away modernization by Enlightenment thought which Kemalism brought. Realizing a revolution which rests on Enlightenment philosophy in a non-Western society at the first time in history is the fact which is underlying the success of Kemalism. According to him, Kemalism is an ideology. Kemalism has scientific dimension, the limits and the direction of Kemalism are specific like other ideologies. Selçuk refers a total character to Kemalism (Soydaş – Lök, 2004:516).

6.3 Neo Kemalizm

Kemalists intellectuals got important lessons from 1970s and needed to revise and defend Kemalism. Benli underlines that they criticize that Kemalism is displayed as static and dogmatic ideology. They claim that there is universality ideal on the base of Atatürk's heritage. It is claimed that Kemalism should be questioned as an interactive, open system but not an intellectual system which is imprisoned in a limited frame and is reduced to an ideology (Benli, 2007). The important thing is here that Kemalist are persistent about not to see Kemalism as an 'ideology'. Kemalism is something else for Kemalists but not an ideology; by doing so, they think to keep Kemalism from the disadvantages of 'being an ideology'. Ideology

concept means for Kemalists as a static and dogmatic cumulation which obstructs the civilization development.

Kemalism was used as antidote against communism, fascism and Islamism at the period after 1980. Kemalism wanted to educate Turkish youngs with its own principles towards to these 'out – rooted' ideologies which were thought not to be belonged to Turkey. Kemalism seemed as ideal option for ideological rehabilitation of the society (Akyaz, 2004:188).

Kemalism was not fed up from the being of official ideology of state after 1980, it was seen as the sign of the missing for union, harmony and fear for politics. The authoritarian ideology of Kemalism became a very good answer to polarization and segmentation of society in 1970s (Çelik, 2004:91). This is the most important role of Kemalism in accordance with society which has played along the history of Republic. When politics get into a congested position, Kemalism is considered by society and political system, especially politic system, as a redeemer instrument, such as life ring.

Achieving by September 12th is the losing seriously of self-confidence and energy about modernization of society by its own resources and preferences (Taşkın, 2004:582). September 12th Kemalism is contradictive with itself in that respect because the main target of Kemalism is that nation state would reach its targets by its own energy and resources but at that period, Kemalism did not object neo – liberal policies which were applied after 1980, so, this proves that Kemalism did not disturb foreign capital which got into the country.

September 12th movement arranged the center of the politics due to the frame of Kemalist principles. The target is not only that Kemalism gets the control again, but also producing a homogeneous base which believes Kemalism in the same time (Taşkın, 2004:572). This base must have been away right – left wing dichotomy. It must have been an apolitic generation which recognizes only Kemalism as political approach. In economic side, it was needed generations which embraced capitalism / free market economy completely.

The depolitization of young generations by Kemalism resulted in with two consequences: The first one, apolitic young people became apathetic to politics and left the political area to bureaucracy class / state. Other consequence is that young

people embraced a hedonist life style and have made contribution to the construction of capitalist consumption society.

Conservatism is the most dominant ideological line at the societal platform and it controls daily life practices of Turkish society. Conservatism became a dress which Kemalism could wear easily in 1980s phase. The reason is for that conservative thought would not allow to individual openings and target a communitarian society structure.

It can be said that Kemalism has a conservative core except first era Kemalism which got power from Atatürk's charismatic and original personality. The dynamic Kemalism which was leaded by the idealist and hardworking character of Atatürk has stagnated with the every year passed away after his death. One of the factors which lied under that stagnation is that Kemalism is the official state ideology and it can survive its existence in the safety bosom of state. Another factor is that the authoritarian nucleus of Kemalism is more inclined to stability than changing.

Since 1980s, Kemalizm has converted to fairly conservative ideology. Globalization has made its weight feel in social life more. The defenders of today order (nation state logic) and the one who are on the side of change decomposed. Today, Kemalists advocate isolationism against to globalization. They became the center of front which is against globalization by their authoritarian – conservative feature. In that respect, Western world is not anymore a target which should be caught under the name of 'muasırlaşma' (Westernization) but is an enemy which should be struggled. Kemalism lost its revolutionary identity which it had during the first times of Republic and gained static character. Belge believes that this is an inverse situation to the Kemalism which its basic qualifications are 'conversion' and 'change'. Kemalism wants from society that to look the values of our society but not Western ones (Belge, 2004:40). This 'status quo' defending is sourced from the dominant position of Kemalist and Kemalism in system, especially in bureaucracy and state. They scared to lose their commanding position in the system due to global alterations. The cooperation of civil and statist faces of conservatism prevented the production of an alternative politics in society. Non – existence of alternative and opposite politics constituted a perfect platform for spreading of neo – liberal economy.

Taşkın states that September 12th Kemalism is the redefinition with a conservative content by leaving its modernizing inheritance of a project which accepts state as the modernizing subject (Taşkın, 2004:570). İnsel corrects the conservative identity of today Kemalism by saying that today Kemalism has not a claim which tries to convert society. Moreover, it has distinction to this claim and it limits its force by struggling through Islamism and Kurdish nationalism (İnsel, 2004:25).

Kemalism got closer after 1980 coup extreme nationalism and conservative thought and religion line and understanding of free market economy. This rapprochement is the evidence that Kemalism was surrendered completely by right thought. Having parallel situation of Kemalism with all four wings of right thought does not surprise in a Turkey where left thought was erased entirely from political area. Left Kemalism gave the hardest response to Neo Kemalism which inclined wholly to right thought after September 12th. As Erdoğan states, Nadir Nadi, one of the columnists of Cumhuriyet, replied this manner by saying that ‘I am not a Kemalist’ (Erdoğan, 2004:588).

Religion has got publicized increasingly since 1980s, on the contrary, laic state ideology has got privatized in the same time period (Özyürek, 2008:9). After 1980 military coup, Kemalism looked for the ways to make peace with religion. The new discourse accepted Islam as the part of Turkishness and assumed to compromise with it. By doing so, Kemalism in 1980s redefined the laic, rational and modernist Kemalist composition (Çelik, 2004:91).

A great change in the history of Kemalism has taken place in 1990s years. Kemalism has converted a ‘civil Kemalism’ which had been known and accepted until 1990s as ‘official state ideology’ (Erdoğan, 2004:584). Kemalism moved away being the official ideology of state in 1990s and converted to a civil society movement (Günel, 2004:487). Kemalism left out from the state level and got on to the streets. Civil Kemalism got stronger gradually against threats of Kurdish nationalism and Islamism. Civil Kemalism was presented as a clean and powerful option to young generation instead of 1980s apolitic political line. Özyürek adds that Kemalists both individualize the official ideology and refer to end of a term which state elites have monopolized Kemalist ideology (Özyürek, 2008:32).

In fact, it is not wrong to say that the infrastructure of this manner was prepared at 1980s. Kemalist dynamics noticed that the distant line of Kemalism which is away

society is something which was terminating Kemalism gradually and they endeavored to make Kemalism reconciled with society. They wanted that Kemalism is produced directly by people but not political focuses. They preferred that Kemalism is possessed by people. ‘The civilianization of Kemalism’ does not refer only to diffusion desire of Kemalism to streets; in the same time, people from civil society feel the concerns individually which have been felt by Kemalism in the state structure until today. Kurdish nationalism and Islamism have begun to frighten people more than in every time. When European Union candidate process and the destructive economic effects of globalization added this fear, Kemalism became more much precious in the view of civil society.

The most important component which guides Neo – Kemalist subject is ‘the platonic love which guards state from out of state’ (Erdoğan, 2004:588). Kemalism already has been always a people movement since its beginning according to some Kemalist thinkers. They defend that Kemalism is not elitist and Jacobin movement but it is a people salvation movement. It is an anti - imperialist emancipation struggle which comes from the lowest strata of society but especially for non – Kemalist intellectuals, Kemalism is a distant ideology to society; it belongs to state but not society. Another reason for the popularity of Kemalism in that great extent is that the absence of political stableness and the absence of strong political leader in 1990s.

The pacifist revolution understanding which is based on the re - suggestion of official Kemalist discourse with defensive – reactionary and authoritative style is the new face of Kemalism which gained in 90s. Gathering the popular consent which was going to be accompanied to Kemalism and developing a civil Kemalist pedagogy are the concepts which belong to 1990s (Erdoğan, 2004:585).

Another fact which current Kemalists underline is that the Kemalist campaigns of September 12th regime is spurious and coercible but today Kemalist excitement is eminently heartfelt and desirous (Özyürek, 2008:136). That is a point which Kemalists specify particularly because they use this fact to prove how today Kemalist reaction is very strong to external and internal threats.

‘New Kemalist identity’ is recognized on a civil collective volition axis which can construct Kemalist hegemony (Erdoğan, 2004:588). Kemalism did not want to rest the totalitarian democracy / authoritarian style concepts which were formed its nucleus to state anymore but society. We can use ‘manufacturing consent’ term

which was founded by Noam Chomsky for capitalism at that point about Kemalism. Desiring the conglomerating of society on the Kemalist axis refers to a civil authoritarianism. Civil authoritarianism is more invisible than state authoritarianism and in the same time, it is more overall than state one. This context could explain affiliate of Kemalism with conservative thought after 1980 coup.

The squeeze between modernist core of Kemalism and postmodernist discourse reminds us the thoughts of Slavoj Žižek. As Erdoğan argues, in Žižek's thought, modernist ideology says that 'how ever you feel, do not ever indulge to factious, destructive, fundamentalist ideologies' and postmodernist discourse insists on that 'you must give up old, rigid, totalitarian ideologies and you should get taste from that' (Erdoğan, 2004:591). This imposition is the transition from modernist visible authoritarian mode to postmodernist invisible authoritarian mode. It is passing through from authoritarian of modernism which is rested on political regime / state to authoritarian of postmodernism which is rested on society. Kemalism wants to achieve by Neo – Kemalism civil society-based 'manufacturing consent' which capitalism carried out in the frame of liberal ideology. Kemalism was successful on that point to some extent.

The homily of national union and togetherness transformed to the desire of civil union and togetherness. In that respect, Neo – Kemalism has an attitude which reduces the public area and depolitizes the political platform against postmodernism discourse which defends multi – identity (Erdoğan, 2004:591). In fact, the discourse that Kemalists developed in 1990s is militant. They divided the society white and black regions like laic / anti – laic, Republicanist / the enemy of Republic, contemporary / obscurantist, nationalistic / schismatic (Erdoğan, 2004:586). Kemalism was affirming itself and dispraising all other ideologies and social groups except itself. This manner, actually, is the representative of Kemalist approach which considers itself as unique and peerless.

Kemalist nationalism still marks the ideological and formative foundations of official discourse in Turkey (Aral, 1997:78). Kemalism consecrated and monopolized the concepts like laicism, contemporaneity, nationalism and made stable them. Kemalism also, perceived such concepts imperialism, divisiveness, reactionism, neo – liberalism as various appearances of 'betrayal to country' (Erdoğan, 2004:586). 'Armization of the people, peoplization of army' concept wants to re-

construct the atmosphere which made every citizen the missionary of Kemalism in 1930s at 1990s again (Erdoğan, 2004:590).

Chatterjee claims that non-governmental organizations and elite class in 3rd World countries have a pedagogical function which aims to civilize the wide masses. Non-governmental organizations realize a teacher function instead of uniting themselves with public and take on a so-called duty which tries to reduce modernist values to society (Özyürek, 2008:195). Like Kemalist non – governmental organizations as Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği ve Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği carried civil Kemalism to organizational level. These associations did not only organize civil Kemalists but also provided the societal support which official Kemalism needed when it was necessary (Erdoğan, 2004:585). These Kemalist associations have a function which Chatterjee mentions above. The people from these associations are upper-middle or upper class people and they have Kemalist sensitive. They also try to spread their Kemalist sensitivity to whole society with the help of these Kemalist organizations.

Neo – Kemalism has tried to attach itself to contemporary agenda by taking the concepts which Kemalism was not acquaintance to its contexture. It has showed effort to engage to the concepts like citizenship consciousness, women rights, social welfare and justice, the standing against human right violations, democratic demands etc. (Erdoğan, 2004:588). We can see again that the backboneless ideological standing of Kemalism. Kemalism actually is frosty to democracy but it needs to get closer to favorite concept of today.

Another point is that most of these concepts did not exist when Kemalism was constructed. Kemalism reviewed itself like neo – Marxism, neo – liberalism or neo – conservatism in today conditions and blended itself with contemporary social concepts to produce Neo – Kemalism. Erdoğan argues that Neo – Kemalism has ‘abusing democracy’ suspect too, like in Kemalism (Erdoğan, 2004:589). The reason is for this suspect not much that worrying on losing the societal earnings which modernism brought; it is the fear of losing the nation state structure which its borders were specified by Kemalism. Democracy has been always a doubtful concept that does not exist in the nature of Kemalism for Kemalism. Kemalism thought that it would lose its dominant position in the system by the empowering of democracy.

Another face of Kemalism is its jointing to popular culture in 90s years and becoming a pop - ideology. Kemalism became an ideological area which feeds popular culture elements from necklaces to rings, from rosettes to posters. Another point of Erdoğan is that becoming Kemalism written surface of contemporary life was realized to make Kemalism adapt to today life more than to make the components which belong to current life adapt to Kemalism (Erdoğan, 2004:590). Kemalism benefited a lot from nationalist wave which was empowered in 1990s. However, it is required to separate Kemalism and pop – nationalism which belongs to streets because street nationalism is more vulgar and aggressive. At the same time, pop – nationalism devoid of an ideological and institutional platform; it rests on spontaneous social actions. Singing the national anthem whether it is necessary or not, soldier farewells with drums and clarion, spilling through streets after every winning of national soccer team converts a challenge to Europe show that these nationalist feelings are a mass hysteria. The nationalist side of Kemalism was added this nationalist line but it did not become wholeness of nationalist wave but did become only a part of it.

It is clear that today Kemalist young people have an identity that they are from middle classes, urbanized and non-religious (Özyürek, 2008:119). This mass, may be, the people who display loyalty to Kemalism with their whole hearts. Özyürek examples this fact by saying thousands of university students were fulfilling open air discos in summers and they were dancing with 10th Year Anthem which they also were singing by yelling and shouting (Özyürek, 2008:219).

The ceremonies have been moved away from the official atmosphere of stadiums to downtowns of the cities in Neo Kemalist period. An accessible and civilian atmosphere has been formed for the celebrations in downtowns for any one (Özyürek, 2008:184). The civilianization of the celebrations caused the spreading of Kemalist feeling easier and faster to the people even are not Kemalist. A lot of people have found a part of themselves in these celebrations and have been affected much from Kemalist / nationalist atmosphere.

Neo – Kemalists find feeble ‘democratic tolerance argument’ against opposite politic streams (Erdoğan, 2004:589). According to them, the facts which stay out of the red lines of Kemalism are threats for society and state. This approach is a parallel line with the attitude of Kemalism which does not give value any ideology except

itself and the attitude of Kemalists who do not give value any social subgroup except themselves. Especially, Kurd ethnic root was blamed with Kurd nationalism and religious people were blamed with Islamism and they have been always two suspicious social sub-groups for Kemalists with a fundamentalist view.

Nevertheless, it is not new that searching for democratization by staying in Kemalism (Turan, 2004:592). We saw that Kemalism and democracy are not so reconciled concepts with each other at the previous parts of study but today world, democratization and human rights have huge popularization as independent from national borders and Kemalism had to review itself in these respects.

It is underlined in Kemalist thought by some thinkers that populism could not accord with pluralist democracy. Also, it is claimed that modernist mono – identity fiction does not allow to be recognized various sub – identities and to be protected by law (Turan, 2004:594).

Some thinkers claim that Kemalism is authoritarian but not totalitarian. This feature of Kemalism makes it a proper ground for a potential democratization. In accordance with that claim, the infrastructure which was founded by Kemalism in Mono Party phase smoothed the way through democratic politics later (Turan, 2004:593). This claim inflames again an argument which is involved in Kemalism: According to some intellectuals, Kemalism has been authoritarian but not democratic since its beginning to today and it is so, now. According to another some, it was authoritarian at the beginning but it has converted to a democratic identity by having an evolution. This wing contends that we owe the democracy which we have today to happening of Kemalist revolution then.

A lot of Kemalists who have modernist understanding of 1930s whose citizens gather around the state do not embrace the modernity description which Europe presents today (Özyürek, 2008:21). Kemalistler can find the modernity which is in their minds neither in today Europe nor in Turkey and the only phase which provides the modernity view they have is the Mono Party era of 1930s (Özyürek, 2008:22). The main matter for Kemalists is that Kemalism is a modernist ideology and it belongs to the first three quarters of 20th century. Current world is discussing the postmodernity and post-modern values. These values are contradicting the modernist ones. Kemalist individuals are in contradictory situation with post-modernist world by defending a modernist ideology because modernity is a time period which stayed

in the past. Özyürek underlines that this attitude of Kemalists for 1930s makes Kemalist mentality childishness and refers to the utopia which could not be realized as ‘completely Westernized Turkey’ of 1930s (Özyürek, 2008:51).

Feeling European Union norms much more on Turkey resulted in that Kemalism questioned itself. Nation state needed to review itself against developing global conditions and it understood that it can not keep going a rigid political presentation anymore.

In the name of Kemalism, some thoughts are developed to revise Kemalism. Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, a columnist who defends that Kemalism should gain its esteem again, claims that today Kemalist nationalism takes emotional and core ground from right wing but its theoretical language and intellectual ground is the continuation of Turkish left tradition completely. He thinks that this type of Kemalism has deflected much from Kemalist line which was formed in 1920s and 1930s. According to him, Kemalism must be on a point which is defended by an internal consistency and intellectual credit because Kemalism has moved away from a position which can be defended in Turkey and also, in abroad. It is not perceived a perspective which is prestigious and has a meaning. It became a so-called ideology which tries to benefit from every argument for not disappearing, uses every notion which it believes to support its legitimacy and lost its imperturbability (Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, 3 Aralık 2007, Star).

A Kemalist thinker, Anıl Çeçen, thinks that how Kemalism made Turkey nationalized, Neo Kemalism will regionalize Middle Eastern countries in a similar way. Middle Eastern countries will gather under the frame a new Sadabat Pact which was leaded by Atatürk. By doing so, Middle Eastern countries will head to a regional order in new century with Kemalist state model and principles by forming solidarity in regional unity (Çeçen, add.org.tr).

“One interesting feature of Kemalism is that it does not conceive globalization simply in terms of financial flows and economic networks. It understands that globalization also entails a reordering of the place of the nation state in the world order, a challenge to the dominance of state over society, and the generation of multiple popular identities at the expense of an official national identity” (Rumford, 2003:383 – 384). In one side, Kemalism tried to review itself but in one side,

globalization is considered as an enemy by Kemalism which is a serious threat to nation state but not only an economical movement.

Kemalist mentality is so different also on the matter of Kurdish issue. Göle points out Kemalists are not receptive to European Union attempts to recognize Kurds as a minority with attendant status, rights and claims to democratic inclusion. Kemalist democratic imagination is not instinctively pluralistic (Göle, 1997:84). Nilüfer Göle has also different suggest about religious people unlike official discourse: being both Muslim and modern without wanting to give up one for the other one is possible and this is the demand of Islamic side (Göle, 2002:182).

Particularistic identities, cultural distinctiveness and self-determination are legitimated by reference to the essential, indisputable rights of persons, and thus, are recast as world level, postnational rights (Soysal, 1994:160). All of the notions and perspectives of Kemalism - under the name of Neo Kemalism - can be perceived as the endeavor of adaptation of Kemalism to postmodernity. Soysal mentioned here 'postnational rights'; this is term also sources from postmodernity. 'Particularistic identities, cultural distinctiveness, self-determination' are the concepts of postmodernity against mono-dimension identities, cultural togetherness and society / system determination concepts. All these contradictions are also the breaking points of Kemalism through global values.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EVALUATION OF RESEARCH

At the first statement of *Thinking Lines of Kemalism* group, the statement is that **Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society**. It is seen that an important amount of 300 persons approve the statement. % 65.3 of persons takes part between 6 – 10. Median is 7.00 at this question and this median degree already support the approvement. The result shows that METU students which joined to research are aware of the Jacobin character of Kemalism.

The second statement of this group is that **The demand of Kemalism for being Western and standing of Kemalism against Western world to some extent composes a contradiction**. People do not approve this expression by %60.1 and median is 3.00. The percent of the ones who sign this expression as 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 put forth the disapproval. Mode is 0 and Mean:3.61 are the other proofs of that disapproval. This result displays to us that METU students do not see any contradiction between being Western and being against Western world. In fact, this situation is internal contradiction of Kemalism. That can be seen as the classical behavior of Kemalists; in one side, it is goaled to adapt modernist life practices but in other side, Kemalist ideology follows a strong standing politically, against Western imperialism.

The third expression is that **Kemalism is not a system (subject) which transforms society; it is a method (instrument) which is used to transform society**. The statement is approved by 73.3 percent and median is 7.00. Kemalism is not commented as an ideology or a system by participants; it is seen as a method. According to me, the participants want to produce a difference between Kemalism and other ideologies, especially the ones which were so dominant in 1970s in Turkey. Ideology concept is animated in the minds of Turkish people as something which says much but does not do so much things. Kemalism is appreciated in that

way by people; it is seen as a practical way and method to reach to the true targets but not an useless ideas cumulation.

However, at the next statement, the fourth one, participants do not think that Kemalism is a backboneless ideology. Their support and belief express itself by % 79.4 to the expression which is **Kemalism is a pragmatic and backboneless(non-systematic, without principles) ideology** and median is 2.00.

Table 1: Age, Gender, Department and Education Groups

Age Group

18 – 22	168	55.9
23 – 27	120	40.1
28 – 32	10	3.3
33 – 36	2	0.6

Gender Group

Female	156	52.0
Male	144	48.0

Department Group

Social Sciences	137	45.7
Natural Sciences	163	54.3

Education Group

Undergraduate	279	93.0
Graduate	14	4.7
Doctorate	7	2.3

Table 2: Thinking Lines of Kemalism statement group

	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society	13	9	14	19	12	37	29	43	49	35	40
	4.3	3.0	4.7	6.3	4.0	12.3	9.7	14.3	16.3	11.7	13.3
	Mean: 6.36		Median: 7.00		Mode: 8						
The demand of Kemalism for being Western and standing of Kemalism against Western world to some extent composes a contradiction	71	32	45	23	9	31	19	20	21	12	17
	23.7	10.7	15.0	7.7	3.0	10.3	6.3	6.7	7.0	4.0	5.7
	Mean: 3.61		Median: 3.00		Mode: 0						
Kemalism is not a system (subject) which converts society; it is a method (instrument) which is used to convert society	12	8	12	10	8	30	36	49	52	44	39
	4.0	2.7	4.0	3.3	2.7	10.0	12.0	16.3	17.3	14.7	13.0
	Mean: 6.68		Median: 7.00		Mode: 8						
Kemalism is a pragmatic and backboneless (non – systematic without principles) ideology	98	44	48	27	21	20	8	6	14	3	11
	32.7	14.7	16.0	9.0	7.0	6.7	2.7	2.0	4.7	1.0	3.7
	Mean: 2.48		Median: 2.00		Mode: 0						
Kemalism has weakened today by moving away its original position which it had at the first years of Republic	7	7	10	10	20	29	39	50	46	37	45
	2.3	2.3	3.3	3.3	6.7	9.7	13.0	16.7	15.3	12.3	15.0
	Mean: 6.72		Median:7.00		Mode: 7						
Kemalism has been abused since Atatürk's death by various persons and institutions	3	2	2	5	7	16	27	34	40	56	108
	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.7	2.3	5.3	9.0	11.3	13.3	18.7	36.0
	Mean: 8.11		Median: 9.00		Mode: 10						
Affiliating to European Union is realizing Westernization concept which Kemalism contains	43	35	40	19	19	47	28	18	23	10	8
	14.3	11.7	13.3	6.3	9.7	15.7	9.3	6.0	7.7	3.3	2.7
	Mean: 3.90		Median: 4.00		Mode: 5						

They think about Kemalism that it is a consistent and principled ideology. Their thinking is completely contradicted with the arguments of intellectuals whom thesis did quotations from.

At the fifth statement, people think that Kemalism has been weakening since the first times of Republic. **Kemalism has weakened today by moving away its original position which it had at the first years of Republic** is the statement and participants of research supported that idea with 72.3 percent. Median is 7.00 in that statement.

Sixth statement of that group has the biggest percent support of whole research: **Kemalism has been abused since Atatürk's death by various persons and institutions.** % 88.3 of participants approve the idea of abusing of Kemalism. 108 person gave 10 points to this question and this means % 36 of whole participants. That is, also, the most 10 approval for a statement in whole search.

At the next statement, the seventh and the last one, people support the expression by 55.3 percent. That is slightly majority. The expression is **Affiliating to European Union is realizing Westernization concept which Kemalism contains.** Median is 4.00 and people seem that they are not so desirous to consider Westernization concept and affiliating to EU are not the same things. It would be useful to underline here at this point, the 5 degree which could be commented as 'have no idea' has 15.7 percent. The percent of the participants who confirm is %29 just.

If we comment the picture we have above from this statement group, people believe that Kemalism was realized by the dominance of high classes. The participants give very sharp Kemalist reflex and show that they perceive Western world sociologically different and politically different. The participants are thinking that Kemalism has been getting weaker and abused.

These comments exemplified so clear the Kemalist character of participants. They support Kemalism largely and think that it is still a good model in the socio-economic and political realities of today.

The second group of statements is named as **Right Kemalism**. These statements evaluate claims and arguments of right side of Kemalism. The expressions focus on mostly state concept, democracy and Kemalist political terms.

The first expression of this group is that **Kemalism should be accepted at right wing in the political spectrum of our country.** 64.3 percent of participants do not

approve this statement and that means, people do not perceive Kemalism in right wing. Median is 3.00 at this question.

At the next expression, people demur to the sentence by % 72.3. **The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy** is the statement and people think that Kemalism do not prevent democratic steps or logic. Median is 2.00 at that question.

Kemalist applications prevent the democratic consciousness and democratic improvement is another statement of Right Kemalism group and it is parallel sentence with the previous statement. People response this statement by 72.2 percent negative and interesting point is that the result number is almost same with the the result of before question. Median is 2.00 here, too.

Kemalism is a state ideology which is disconnected with society is the next statement. Participants do not approve this statement by % 71. Median is also 2.00 at this question. They see Kemalism is something which does not belong to state; it is the something which society have.

The next expression examines the religion – Kemalism relation in the view of people. **Kemalism had an attitude in past or has an attitude now against religion** is the expression and people do not agree this expression. The percent of disapproval is 59.3 and median is 3.50. It displays that the disapproval of this expression is weaker than previous statements in that group. People has a strong refuse about the claim that Kemalism contains obstacles for democracy inside but refuse falls down when Kemalism – religion relation is interrogated.

The only statement which is approved in Right Kemalism group is **The One Man Cult(the place which Atatürk covers in Kemalism) in Kemalism makes character gain to Kemalism an authoritarian character**. This median of this expression is 7.00 and % 68.4 of participants approve the statement. This situation can be considered a bit weird because the other statements evaluated with Kemalist view; research results are compatible with Kemalist understanding but in this question, people think that One Man Cult concept makes Kemalism gain an authoritarian character.

Table 3: Right Kemalism statement group

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Kemalism should be accepted at right wing in the political spectrum of our country	73	22	41	38	19	44	21	11	14	7	10
	24.3	7.3	13.7	12.7	6.3	14.7	7.0	3.7	4.7	2.3	3.3
	Mean: 3.31			Median: 3.00			Mode: 0				
The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy	88	40	48	26	15	24	14	15	14	5	11
	29.3	13.3	16.0	8.7	5.0	8.0	4.7	5.0	4.7	1.7	3.7
	Mean: 2.83			Median: 2.00			Mode: 0				
Kemalist applications prevent the democratic consciousness and democratic improvement	85	48	46	25	13	17	14	13	17	7	15
	28.3	16.0	15.3	8.3	4.3	5.7	4.7	4.3	5.7	2.3	5.0
	Mean: 2.92			Median: 2.00			Mode: 0				
Kemalism is a state ideology which is disconnected with society	96	37	37	23	20	26	10	12	16	10	13
	32.0	12.3	12.3	7.7	6.7	8.7	3.3	4.0	5.3	3.3	4.3
	Mean: 2.94			Median: 2.00			Mode: 0				
Kemalism had an attitude in past or has an attitude now against religion	49	44	25	32	28	23	18	21	29	15	16
	16.3	14.7	8.3	10.7	9.3	7.7	6.0	7.0	9.7	5.0	5.3
	Mean: 4.00			Median: 3.50			Mode: 0				
The One Man Cult (the place which Atatürk covers in Kemalism) in Kemalism makes character gain to Kemalism an authoritarian character	14	5	22	15	14	25	33	56	53	27	36
	4.7	1.7	7.3	5.0	4.7	8.3	11.0	18.7	17.7	9.0	12.0
	Mean: 6.31			Median: 7.00			Mode: 7				
Kemalism tries to realize classless society	39	18	17	26	29	39	25	34	41	16	16
	13.0	6.0	5.7	8.7	9.7	13.0	8.3	11.3	13.7	5.3	5.3
	Mean: 4.87			Median: 5.00			Mode: 8				

It can be explained that participants consider that One Man Cult was produced later, after Atatürk's death and it damaged Kemalism with a negative approach. They must have thought that; in original form of Kemalism, there is no consecration of a person but official state behavior preferred to produce an One Man Cult to empower Kemalism and continuation of Kemalism. This structuring after Atatürk, damaged Kemalism and made Kemalism an authoritarian image. Also, One Man Cult approach accelerated the separating of Kemalism and society. But the participants who are not Kemalist can think that Kemalism has had always an authoritarian image for Atatürk. This exists in the nature of Kemalist ideology and it is one of the big obstacles of Kemalism to have democratic feature.

Kemalism tries to realize the classless society is the last statement at this group and it is the only statement whose median is 5.00, exact middle of scale. 43.1 of participants support the statement and 43.9 of participants do not support the sentence. Mind confusing can be resourced that whether Kemalism has a target such as really or not. People can think who approve that Kemalism is a corporatist ideology and it goals to reduce the class differentiations. People who do not approve can stipulate that Kemalism is not socialism and it has no worry to construct a classless society.

The next statement group is related in *Left Kemalism*. This side of Kemalism is more actual and known side. Left Kemalism consubstantiates with Kemalism today conditions although there are another and different comments of Kemalism and it is dominant version of Kemalism. The fact which lies under this situation is that being leftish is perceived as being supporter of modernist / Western life in Turkey. Modernism came to Turkey officially by Kemalism and that is why people think modernism identical with Kemalism. There are two basic objections to configure modernism – left wing like that: First, modernism is not depended on Kemalism and modernism does not have to be understood as in Kemalism. Second one, universal left thought contains very different things in comparison with Kemalism. But in generally, the people who has modernist values and Western style life are positioned in left in Turkey and that is consuetudinary pattern.

The first statement of Left Kemalism group is **Kemalism should be accepted at left wing in the political spectrum of our country**. The sentence is approved by percent 59 and median is 6.00. People think that Kemalism is on the left but it is not

thought so much that it is rather left. This thought can be rested on that Kemalism is left because it is modernist and progressive. The politics against Kemalism must be seen as right(pre-modernist) because they are traditional and conservative. Kemalism is seen as by its supporters a castle against to anti – modernist powers and the result of that question, METU students symbolize their worries about the future of modernist regime on Kemalism and they position Kemalism on left because of threats of right front. Right front is composed by Islamism / idealist nationalism / wild liberalism / conservatism. The 6.00 number in median shows the dependent of METU students to Kemalism.

The next statement is **Kemalism is a people salvation ideology which was produced by society.** % 55.7 is the percent of disapproval and median is 3.00. People are aware of the reality which Kemalism was not produced by society but it is a Jacobin construction that was made by elit political class. The result of this statement can be perceived harmonious with the result of **Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society.** People approve this statement and this approval empowers the argument that the participants of research are aware of Kemalism was produced without participation of society.

Kemalism contains democratic notions in its own hypotheses is the next sentence. People concur this sentence by % 70.9 and median is 7.00. Participants contravene **The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy** and **Kemalist applications prevent the democratic consciousness and democratic improvement** expressions and this situation shows that participants believe that Kemalism is canorous with democracy. They do not share any critics which comes from socialist or liberal wings on democracy – Kemalism relation.

Another expression of this group is that **Kemalism is a kind of ideology which is under control of of bureacracy class and protects only the interests of this class.** People do not agree this sentence by 72.4 and median is 2.00. That is one of the five questions of whole research whose median is 2.00 and participants show so strong Kemalist reflex here. They claim Kemalism and this sentence proves the Kemalist vein in their subconscious.

Table 4: Left Kemalism statement group

	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
Kemalism should be accepted at left wing in the political spectrum of our country	18	12	16	17	22	38	34	42	51	20	30
	6.0	4.0	5.3	5.7	7.3	12.7	11.3	14.0	17.0	6.7	10.0
	Mean: 5.86 Median: 6.00 Mode: 8										
Kemalism is a people salvation ideology which was produced by society	40	32	45	35	15	32	20	22	33	8	18
	13.3	10.7	15.0	11.7	5.0	10.7	6.7	7.3	11.0	2.7	6.0
	Mean: 4.12 Median: 3.00 Mode: 2										
Kemalism contains democratic notions in its own hypotheses	4	5	11	5	26	36	39	58	58	31	27
	1.3	1.7	3.7	1.7	8.7	12.0	13.0	19.3	19.3	10.3	9.0
	Mean: 6.60 Median: 7.00 Mode: 7										
Kemalism is a kind of ideology which is under control of bureaucracy class and protectonly the interests of this class	99	40	35	26	17	19	14	7	16	12	15
	33.0	13.3	11.7	8.7	5.7	6.3	4.7	2.3	5.3	4.0	5.0
	Mean: 2.90 Median: 2.00 Mode: 0										
The only way for Turkish society to reach the economical and social development of Western countries is Kemalist ideology	51	21	23	26	17	40	32	22	33	11	24
	17.0	7.0	7.7	8.7	5.7	13.3	10.7	7.3	11.0	3.7	8.0
	Mean: 4.54 Median: 5.00 Mode: 0										
Army interventions to political system four times are the endeavors to protect Kemalism and to make Kemalism alive	57	22	32	19	18	34	25	30	33	17	13
	19.0	7.3	10.7	6.3	6.0	11.3	8.3	10.0	11.0	5.7	4.3
	Mean: 4.31 Median: 5.00 Mode: 0										
Kemalist project targets to produce hardworking, idealist, honest and modern individuals	11	6	6	11	13	24	26	33	66	38	66
	3.7	2.0	2.0	3.7	4.3	8.0	8.7	11.0	22.0	12.7	22.0
	Mean: 7.13 Median: 8.00 Mode: 8										

The only way for Turkish society to reach the economical and social development of Western countries is Kemalist ideology statement is one of the statements which stay on middle; median is 5.00. 46.1 percent of participants do not support this expression and 40.7 of participants support. Kemalist – thinking minds consider that Kemalism is only and one road to reach contemporary social and economical welfare and they might to support but non – Kemalist people do not consider Kemalism as ‘only’ way; may be Kemalism does not mean to them a way which goes to universal / Western values.

Another expression of this group is that **Army interventions to political system four times are the endeavors to protect Kemalism and to make Kemalism alive.** This statement questions army – Kemalism relation and people are on the middle at this expression. Median is 5.00 and people who approve this statement is 39.3 percent and who do not approve is 49.3. It might be thought that Kemalism do not need an armed intervention to keep itself alive; Kemalism already lives in the hearts and minds of people by the participants who do not approve.

Some other people could think that some of Turkish people only understand from the language of enforcement; how Kemalism was structured by Jacobin – elitist style, it should make it continue with the same style. Anti – Kemalist thinking could rest on a reason that Kemalism has not a society support; it could be alive only with the support of state and army.

Kemalist project targets to produce hardworking, idealist, honest and modern individuals is the last expression of this group. The sentence is approved by % 76.4 and median is median 8.00. This is the statement which gains second biggest support in whole research after **Kemalism has been abused since Atatürk’s death by various persons and institutions.** People believe that Kemalism is an idealist ideology and idealize a society type which is formed by superior individuals like in antique Sparta society.

Table 5: Neo Kemalism statement group

	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
12 Eylül administration represents Kemalist understanding	84	34	32	28	16	43	19	20	9	8	7
	28.0	11.3	10.7	9.3	5.3	14.3	6.3	6.7	3.0	2.7	2.3
	Mean: 3.10		Median: 2.50		Mode: 0						
Kemalism has become a societal phenomenon (a concept which takes part on the agenda of society) since 1990s to present	11	4	18	16	20	32	40	51	51	31	26
	3.7	1.3	6.0	5.3	6.7	10.7	13.3	17.0	17.0	10.3	8.7
	Mean: 6.24		Median: 7.00		Mode: 7						
Today Kemalism can make society gain a dash and combative soul like in the first years of Republic	40	35	31	22	20	17	19	25	36	26	29
	13.3	11.7	10.3	7.3	6.7	5.7	6.3	8.3	12.0	8.7	9.7
	Mean: 4.76		Median: 5.00		Mode: 0						
Our vision which goals to be a member of European Union contradicts with Kemalist ideology	32	22	30	29	20	48	19	23	26	24	27
	10.7	7.3	10.0	9.7	6.7	16.0	6.3	7.7	8.7	8.0	9.0
	Mean: 4.86		Median: 5.00		Mode: 5						
Kemalist politics is necessary and sufficient circumstance which can hold Turkish society together	38	22	31	23	19	28	27	40	27	19	26
	12.7	7.3	10.3	7.7	6.3	9.3	9.0	13.3	9.0	6.3	8.7
	Mean: 4.86		Median: 5.00		Mode: 7						
Kemalism has been included to popular culture since 1990s	12	4	17	16	15	56	45	55	42	20	18
	4.0	1.3	5.7	5.3	5.0	18.7	15.0	18.3	14.0	6.7	6.0
	Mean: 5.92		Median: 6.00		Mode: 5						
Today Kemalism is the right standing at the contestation against globalization ideologically	34	12	19	20	19	45	28	37	44	14	28
	11.3	4.0	6.3	6.7	6.3	15.0	9.3	12.3	14.7	4.7	9.3
	Mean: 5.32		Median: 6.00		Mode: 5						

Table 5 (Continued)

Kemalist arguments are the best politics against Kurd nationalism today	52	26	17	24	15	37	22	28	29	22	28
	17.3	8.7	5.7	8.0	5.0	12.3	7.3	9.3	9.7	7.3	9.3
	Mean: 4.72		Median: 5.00		Mode: 0						
Kemalist arguments are the best politics against Islamism today	52	24	19	19	12	29	18	23	34	25	45
	17.3	8.0	6.3	6.3	4.0	9.7	6.0	7.7	11.3	8.3	15.0
	Mean: 5.09		Median: 5.00		Mode: 0						

The last and fourth group of the research is *Neo Kemalism* statement group. In fact, the area which research focused mostly is this group because this Kemalist style is current Kemalism type of Kemalism and the answers are closely related with actual matters.

The first statement of this group is that **September 12 administration represents Kemalist understanding**. People do not agree with this expression by 64.6 percent and median is 2.50. 1980 coup and coup administration did not make society pleasure with its politics and its view to Kemalism. Especially Kemalists have thought that Kemalism was abused and was presented totally wrong. We can follow this unsatisfaction at this question.

The ones who approve this question might think that coup administration was a new and sequent ring in Kemalist chain. Kemalism made itself alive by the hand of army as how it happened at 1960 and 1971 interventions. With 1980 coup, Kemalism entered a new era in its ideological journey.

Kemalism has become a societal phenomenon (a concept which takes part on the agenda of society) since 1990s to present is the next statement of the group. Participants confirm this sentence by % 66.3 and median is 7.00. Participants are noticing the renaissance of Kemalism since 1990s in the sight of society. Whether to be a Kemalist or not, if people are aware of that rising, that is important in regards of the place of Kemalism which covers in their minds and in their view of life.

Another expression is that **Today Kemalism can make society gain a dash and combative soul like in the first years of Republic**. The median of this sentence is 5.00. 49.3 percent of people do not confirm the sentence and 45 percent of people

confirm the sentence. This expression is one of the expressions which public opinion stays undecided. The side which does not confirm might evaluate today Kemalism different from Kemalism at the first times of Republic. If they do not identify Kemalism like Kemalism in Atatürk's time, they might not to believe that today Kemalism could contribute exciting soul to society.

The ones who applaud the sentence could believe in Kemalism sincere. They have hope and dependency from the ideological standing of Kemalism. They support Kemalism that it works.

The next statement is **Our vision which goals to be a member of European Union contradicts with Kemalist ideology**. This expression's median is also 5.00. People who approve this sentence are % 39.7 and who do not approve is % 44.4. The ones who do not approve can consider European Union as the stereotyped manner of Atatürk's goal, which was described as 'contemporary civilization level'. Other side could perceive European Union as the biggest threat to our land wholeness and the process of European Union is a great betrayal to heritage of Atatürk.

This statement's result is important about displaying the mind confusing of the participants on European Union subject. Also, it can be accepted the showing of differentiating in interpretations of Kemalism. Some participants consider this affiliating process as the fruition of Kemalist ideals but some others resist European Union that it can damage Kemalist core. Whether the participants define themselves Kemalist or not, Kemalism – European Union relation seems problematic ideologically in the minds of METU students.

The median of next expression is 5.00. The confirmation rate is 46.3 and the protesting rate is 44.3. The statement is **Kemalist politics is necessary and sufficient circumstance which can hold Turkish society together**. Mind confusing which exists in other statements is going on in this statement, too. People who confirm the sentence might think that nation concept depends on founder ideology of nation state. If Kemalism does not exist anymore, Turkish society could not continue to its way as Turkish society.

The side who does not confirm might think that Kemalism filled up its time and it has no use for whole society as an ideological support. At this side, people can think that Kemalism has not any function anymore to be an ideological platform to empower the social texture.

People confirms the statement by 60 percent which is **Kemalism has been included to popular culture since 1990s**. Median is 6.00 at this expression. It seems a weak approval near to middle point and it can be accepted a proof that some participants have question marks in their minds about Kemalism became an element of popular culture and media or not.

The next expression is **Today Kemalism is the right standing at the contestation against globalization ideologically**. Confirmation rate is 50.3 and disapproval rate is 34.6. Median is 6.00. That seems also grudging confirmation. It could be showed as a significant that the participants believe that today Kemalism is true prescription against global movements but with a low percent support.

A Kemalist could be the person which does not believe that ‘today’ Kemalism contains right solutions to protect nation state. We know that a lot of Kemalists have become estranged and moved away from 1980 coup Kemalism and they do not recognize this type Kemalism as real Kemalism. So, they might have not expectations from today Kemalism. Other people who do not approve can be anti – Kemalist persons.

The ones who confirm the sentence are more than the ones who do not confirm and that shows Kemalism keeps its strong image in the perspectives of people.

The next expression is related with Kurdish issue. **The statement is Kemalist arguments are the best politics against Kurd nationalism today**. 42.9 percent of participants believe this statement but 44.7 percent refuse. Median is 5.00 again. People are on the middle of the values again but the ones who do not confirm are ahead with a bit difference.

People must be thinking that Kemalist solutions are not true solutions for Kurd matter. This argument can be valid for whom do not confirm. Or, they do not think that they are the ‘best’ solutions although they can be accepted a kind of solution. However, 42.9 percent of corroboratives could be considered much. This side of sentence must be believing endless to all kind of solutions due to condition that they must be coming from Kemalist logic.

The last statement of this group peruses Kemalism – Islamism relation. The expression declares itself **Kemalist arguments are the best politics against Islamism today**. Median is 5.00 in this sentence, too and people who approve are % 48.3 and who do not approve % 41.9. At this expression, on the contrary the

statement related with Kurdish issue, corroborative side is more than the side which does not approve. This can be showed a proof that the participants trust more to Kemalism in Islamism issue than Kurdish issue.

5 of 9 statements in Neo Kemalism division returned with 5.00 median. That is an important and interesting point. This result shows that the participants have serious mind confusing and question marks about where Kemalism should stand in current world and what its role must be. The participants numerate easier the previous group expressions; especially about the concepts such as democracy, state ideology and Kemalist targets, the research replied so definite answers but today Kemalism has not been shaped in the minds such absolute like that.

Another point that we can get from the research is that the participants consider Kemalism at 'left'. The idealist nationalism / conservatism / Islamism are accepted as right wing in Turkey conditions and Kemalism is considered as left against all these political views. Actually, Kemalism is seen the representer of modernist / Western culture by its believers and that is why it is positioned on left. In fact, there is not any similarity or common point between Kemalism and universal socialism. Moreover, Turkish right can not be defined like in universal right understanding, either. These left and right definitions are espezialized to Turkey and they are shaped in accordance with to social values and life style but not to economical interests.

Although a lot of political definitions have changed since then in Western world, classically, right wing represents the owners of capital and the left wing represents the owners of labour. This opposition can ensconce in Marxist classification but in Turkey, it has never happened on this way. One of the reasons for that is Turkey has never had an industrial revolution so that economical classes were not specified as clear as in Western world. Classes prefer to express itself over the social values and meaning world.

This situation results in a dualist politic structure: One side is Western / modernist / away religion pratics / city culture and other side is non – Western / away modernist pratics / like religious logic and pratics / rural culture. At first, modernism under affect of Kemalism resulted in this dichotomy but in the time, this dichotomy has changed much. Especially, non – Western side has had serious adaptations to modernist life but this alteration has not changed that modernist people consider Kemalist ideology as the protector of their life style.

The participants accept that Kemalism is a Jacobin construction by approving **Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society** and by disapproving **Kemalism is a people salvation ideology which was produced by society** but the answer in another statement, **Kemalism is a kind of ideology which is under control of bureaucracy class and protects only the interests of this class** makes this point more complexive. The disapproval rate of this expression is 72.4. The disavowal shows that people do not accept that Kemalism is official state ideology although it was produced by elit class. They think that it is owed by masses and it has been spread into the society. Political / bureaucratic class was only the beginning platform of Kemalism but the process got off from their control and it appertains to society any more.

The participants of research make median 7.00 or over in 8 statements. These statements:

**** Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society**

**** Kemalism is not a system(subject) which converts society; it is a method(instrument) which is used to convert society**

**** Kemalism has weakened today by moving away its original position which it had at the first years of Republic**

**** Kemalism has been abused since Atatürk's death by various persons and institutions**

**** The One Man Cult (the place which Atatürk covers in Kemalism) makes character gain to Kemalism an authoritarian character**

**** Kemalism contains democratic notions in its own hypotheses**

**** Kemalist project targets to produce hardworking, idealist, honest and modern individuals**

**** Kemalism has become a societal phenomenon(a concept which takes part on the agneda of society) since 1990s to present**

Kemalism has been abused since Atatürk's death by various persons and institutions statement got 9.00 degree in median and this is the highest median degree in whole research but this does not display that only Kemalists give approve to this question; also non-Kemalists could think Kemalism has been used to restrict the societal area of themselves. Kemalists could have commented this sentence

Kemalism has been used by non-Kemalists as pretending to be Kemalist to reach their interests or Kemalists has benefited from Kemalism without the idealist purposes of Kemalism.

Other statement is **Kemalist project targets to produce hardworking, idealist, honest and modern individuals** and it reaches 8.00 median. It is not so hard to estimate that this expression got the support of Kemalist-thought individuals. In fact, the statements which are approved by high percentage do not contain anything which violates Kemalist principles. The statements such as **Kemalism contains democratic notions in its own hypotheses** or **Kemalist project targets to produce hardworking, idealist, honest and modern individuals** get big support of participants and that can be accepted a proof for the support of participants to Kemalist thinking. There is only one exception which is different other statements: **The One Man Cult (the place which Atatürk covers in Kemalism) in Kemalism makes character gain to Kemalism an authoritarian character**. This sentence's median is 7.00 and approval percent is 68.4. The perspective of this sentence can be considered contrary to Kemalist ideology because Kemalism can not accept Atatürk image as an authoritarian figure.

The participants are looking to Kemalism – democracy relation so clear: They do not see any contradiction between Kemalism and democracy. **The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy** statement is refused by 72.3 percent, **Kemalist applications prevent the democratic consciousness and democratic improvement** got 72.2 percent refusal and **Kemalism is a state ideology which is disconnected with society** 71 percent. The interesting side of this view that the percentages of refusal are so close to each other. This situation proves that people perceive all these statements similar and reply them similar by their answers. Another fourth expression in Kemalism – democracy subject, **Kemalism contains democratic notions in its own hypotheses** return by 70.9 percent approval, this statement gives same percentage approximately, too.

An interesting relation can be determined between **Kemalism is not a system(subject) which converts society; it is a method(instrument) which is used to convert society** and **Kemalism is a pragmatic and backboneless (non-systematic, without principles) ideology**. People approve the first statement by 73.3 and refused the second one by 79.4. That can be showed a proof that people consider

Kemalism as a practical method but not a system which pledge somethings theoretically. Participants think about Kemalism that a way which reaches to societal goals directly. Even if it is thought an ideology, participants are insistent that it is a consistent ideology which has principles that targets to be useful to Turkish society but not a self seeking and against the interests of society.

The statements which are related with Westernization and European Union give interesting clues about Kemalist thinking. People are seperated as being Western / modernized and standing against West politically. This is typically Kemalist thinking style but in other side, participants do not consider affiliating European Union as taking place of Kemalist ideals.

People who take part in research are extremely undecided (Median is 5) that Kemalism is the only way which is through expected society model that should be reached but with a little difference (46.1 – 40.7), it is refused. In another expression, there is an undecided view (Median is 5 again) ‘whether Kemalist ideology conradicts affiliating European Union or not‘ concept but with a little difference(44.4 – 39.7), it is rejected. There is mentality in question which does not consider European Union in the borders of Kemalism in one side and in other side, does not consider affiliating European Union as contradictive with Kemalism. This logic does not matter any difference between to be a member of EU or not; but in the same time, accepts that Kemalism has its own discipline and goals else EU.

The participants are aware of returning of Kemalism to our social life. **Kemalism has become a societal phenomenon (a concept which takes part on the agenda of society) since 1990s to present** got % 66.3 support and confirmation and **Kemalism has been included to popular culture since 1990s** reached 60 percent degree for confirmation. Kemalism converted to a form which we were not used to see; it became a societal notion and moved away being the official ideology of state. This awareness can be commented an affirmation for this conversion; people are seeming more happy and satisfied from a Kemalism which occurs in daily life practices than a static and dull Kemalism which is remembered only in national days.

Another point which was interrogated during the research the standing of Kemalism through the issues of today. **Today Kemalism is the right standing at the contestation against globalization ideologically** gave a result 34.6 percent resisting and 50.3 percent confirmation. Although median is 5.00, this confirmation

rate can be seen that participants believe in and trust to Kemalism as a medicine-ideology against the destructive effects of global movements.

In other expression, statement is replied by 44.7 percent refusal and 42.9 percent approval. **Kemalist arguments are the best politics against Kurd nationalism today** is the statement and this statement is the only expression which is refused in all these three statements. Although the median is 5 again, people think that Kemalism is not the good way against Kurdish issue and find the arguments of Kemalism insufficient on this issue. The interesting side of this view, people need and believe Kemalism more in the struggle to Islamism than Kurdish issue. It can be commented that an important amount of participants are waiting for new ideas else Kemalism on Kurdish issue considering the suggestions of Kemalism but this expectation is not an exact expectation but a hesitant one.

There are some statements which got rather clear rejections. These expressions are evaluated by 2.00 in median:

**** Kemalism is a pragmatic and backboneless (non-systematic, without principles) ideology,**

**** The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy,**

**** Kemalist application prevent the democratic consciousness and democratic improvement,**

**** Kemalism is a state ideology which is disconnected with society**

**** Kemalism is a kind of ideology which is under control of bureaucracy class and protects only the interests of this class**

It can be seen easily that all expressions criticize Kemalism and participants feverishly resisted these statements. This situation displays that participants support Kemalism to the utmost and have rather distinct Kemalist perspective. They do not accept that Kemalism is a pragmatic ideology; according to them Kemalism is a kind of ideology which has principles. They do not recognize that Kemalism has problems with democracy concept; they see Kemalism eminently harmonious with democracy. They do not perceive Kemalism a state ideology and they accept themselves alive proof that Kemalism exists in societal spiral. Also, they do not accept that Kemalism is a kind of ideology which belongs to bureaucracy class; they think that Kemalism has acceptance on society wide and a lot of people which are from various classes support Kemalism.

The METU students who join to research are mixed from the social science disciplines and natural science disciplines. I predicted that this situation could produce differentiation in the answers and the results corrected my prediction.

Today Kemalism can make society gain a dash and combative soul like in the first years of Republic statement is evaluated different by social science and natural science students. The mean of social sciences is 3.91 and the mean of natural sciences is 5.48. This result shows that natural sciences students believe and confirm this statement but social sciences students do not confirm.

The only way for Turkish society to reach the economical and social development of Western countries is Kemalist ideology is another expression which took different rates from these groups. Natural science students rated this expression by 5.26 and social science ones 3.69. Natural science believes with a little different in Kemalism that it is the only way for Turkey but social science students do not approve this statement.

Kemalism tries to realize classless society expression got 5.69 points by natural sciences and 3.89 points by social sciences. Natural science students must be believed to corporatist society model of Kemalism which minimizes the class differences but social science students do not share the same opinion with them.

Social science students approve by 3.43 mean **The statist mentality of Kemalism sabotages democracy** expression. Natural science students signed this expression by 2.33. In **Kemalism is a state ideology which is disconnected with society**, the reply is 3.53 in social science students and 2.44 in natural science students. Social science students gave 3.69 and natural science students gave 2.23 as mean to **Kemalism is a kind of ideology which is under control of bureaucracy class and protects only the interests of this class** statement.

Kemalist politics is necessary and sufficient circumstance which can hold Turkish society together is evaluated by social science students with 4.18 and natural science students with 5.43. Natural science students support more this statement by Kemalist worries.

The evaluations of some statements display that both of student divisions evaluate these statements so close to each other. For instance, **Kemalist revolutions were the revolutions which were reduced from high level political platform to society** got 6.48 from social science students and 6.26 from natural science students. Alike,

Kemalism has weakened today moving away its original position which it had at the first years of Republic supported by social science students with 6.62 and by natural science students with 6.81. **Army interventions to political system four times are the endeavors to protect Kemalism and to make Kemalism alive** expression is replied by social science students 4.45 and natural science students 4.19 and **Affiliating to European Union is realizing Westernization concept which Kemalism contains** is evaluated 3.91 mean by social science students and 3.90 mean by natural science students. This last expression has the closest mean values of both sides to each other.

As it is seen, two student groups separate clearly in the commentary expressions about Kemalism but they are near to each other in the description statements which are related with the history of Kemalism or an event which occurred in the past of Kemalism. The student groups are on the different commenting way while the concepts are questiones such as democracy, democracy – Kemalism relation, ideology, Kemalism – bureacracy class relation, classless society type but they are getting closer while it is questiones that how Kemalism was arisen and constructed, Kemalism's ideological journey, army coups or the approach of Kemalism to European Union.

The point which is seen that natural science students support and defend Kemalism more than social science students do. That can be explained by two ways: The education which social science students take results in that they can look the concepts / matters / ideologies in social sciences (for instance, Kemalism) more criticising and more distinctive. The other reason could be that the education which students get during the primary and high school sessions are under affect of Kemalism as the official ideology of the state. This situation causes that an important amount of youngs are grown in Kemalist principles and their minds are molded by Kemalist ideology. They become a strong defenders of Kemalism in their later life; Kemalism is the main part of their political views or in other word, Kemalism is the only thing which they know all about the political science.

It can not be said that Kemalism is a conscious preference here. Kemalism is reduced to subconsciouses of young people since their young ages. People can think only parallel with Kemalism because they do not know any other political ideology

else Kemalism. This ideological affect can be seen easier on natural science students with their response to research statements.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The research which we realized in METU resulted in how we expected and predicted before. Actually, I was expecting that METU students would give a clean reflex in the survey. METU students showed that how they are loyal heartedly to Kemalism with answers that they gave.

Basically, Kemalism seems today to take over the responsibility of presentation of the people who consider themselves in modernist culture. METU students who believe modernity recognize Kemalism as a castle against conservative – nationalist values of the rest of the society. Although Kemalism contains some non – democratic notions and the application which contradict current universal values, METU students who support Kemalism ignore these realities and continue to support Kemalism as a core representer of modernist values.

It might be seemed interesting and weird that the concepts such as freedom, freedom of choosing life style, being Western and to be on the side of Western thinking style are considered in Kemalism by an importan extent of society. This situation can make us think two probabilities: Firstly, METU students assume that Kemalism contains such these notions its inside or second way; METU students have no worry that Kemalism has or has not these notions while representing the modernism, they think modernity without these concepts and consider Western world how Kemalism perceived in 1920s and 1930s.

The first probability seems more logical but this thinking style is problematic because thinking Western world with 1920s and 1930s concepts would not be true. There have been so many changes in Western world and Western intellectuality has produced postmodernity after modernity. The concepts which we underlined above have arisen through postmodernity and Kemalism could not be familiar with these

terms at its first time but we saw at Neo Kemalism section, the endeavors of Kemalism to engage the actual politics terms.

Some other Kemalists believe that Kemalism had not democratic applications in its first times but it is a source for birth and emplacement of democracy in Turkey at later times. It seems to us a baseless claim. Kemalism was constructed on an authoritarian base; it is expected that happened on this way because of the circumstances of the time and, political atmosphere of Turkey and World. Kemalism had no worry or goal to emplace democracy in Turkey; appointed Kemalism a reason for later political democratic steps seems untrue.

The try of catching the current social / political values does not reflect the real core of Kemalism because Kemalism is an ideology of modernity. It was constituted at modernist era under the influence of positivism and it can be understood that it has problems with postmodernity. Kemalists separate at that point to two different ways: One division is persistent that Kemalism must be protected with its original form, how it was formed at the early time of Republic. This side requires from whole society to obey and to follow to Kemalist discourse and does not accept any changes or violations which are not proper with Kemalism. The other side can be seen more moderate; they accept changes if they are in the limits of Kemalism. Actually, Neo Kemalism was born from this change desire and to make Kemalism more compatible with today conditions.

Also, it can be another interesting point which should be underlined that METU environment re-acted to the survey with a great Kemalist reflex. May be, this survey would have been realized in Gazi University or Bilkent University or another university in Anatolia, the results would have been so different. The students of other universities would not have resisted with that extent to anti – Kemalist changes or if they would have, they would not have rested their opposition to Kemalism. We know that European Union or globalization or Kurdish issue disturb also a lot of different sub-groups in the society but these sub-groups do not use Kemalist ideology in their opposition discourse. In that respect, METU students seem to share same worries with classical middle or upper-middle / white collar class and they give a clue that they are from this class.

We can see that the phase after September 12th is so successful to grow the individuals who are apolitic and politically, only appreciate Kemalism. The students

in survey think like Celal Bayar who we examined in thesis: Kemalism is not a system but method.

METU displays a center-left identity, a social democrat appearance. The interesting point is that people who consider themselves as Kemalist consider themselves on left, too and being leftish means being Kemalist. This situation reminds us the manner which is displayed at Left Kemalism. Being leftish, being Western and being modernist are overlapping and this complex identity is claimed by METU students as the expression of their life style and it is named as Kemalism.

It can be said this view is problematic: Western world has had an unbelievable change since modernist times and it is in postmodernist time. Modernist discourse was passed away with a great extent: mono-identity political and societal life, homogeneous society model, an economical model which is rested on industry. Postmodernity has multi-identity social standing, heterogeneous society model and its economic model is rested on services economy. Besides, as we discussed at the previous parts of thesis, left thought and Kemalism are completely different each other.

In my opinion, it can be understood this mixed – identity is born due to need which Kemalist people want to give up none of concepts. They would like to be leftish, Western and modern in the same time and they perceive this intellectual cacophony compatible. We showed all these notions are resourced from different thinking sources along whole thesis and we displayed the contradiction and disharmony among these concepts but Kemalists or in other words, the survey people who we describe as Kemalists, are insisted to combine these different features under the name of Kemalism. This attitude can be named as a mind confusing or ignorance for social sciences or an obligation of feeling themselves such that. However it is denominated, Kemalist line does not seem to disturb from this complex situation and we can expect from future the new faces of Kemalism which enrich with the various notions of the time in question.

REFERENCES

- AKYAZ, Dođan. 2004. Ordu ve Resmi Atatürkçülük. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- AKYOL, Mustafa. 2007. Türk İslamı nasıl modernleşti ?. *Radikal Gazetesi*, August 31.
- ALPKAYA, Faruk. 2004. Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: ‘Sol Kemalizm’. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ARAL, Berdal. 1997. Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism. *Mediterranean Quarterly* 8 (1).
- ARISOY, Altan. February 9, 2007. *Kemalizm Yama Değildir*. http://solbirlik.net/haber_detay.asp?haber_id=962&yid=73. (Accessed September 22, 2008).
- *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri Cilt 1 ve 2*. 1959. Ankara:Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- AYDEMİR, Şevket Süreyya. 1968. *İnkılap ve Kadro*. Ankara:Bilgi Yayınevi.
- AYDEMİR, Şevket Süreyya. 1959. *Suyu Arayan Adam*. Ankara:Öz Yayınları.
- BAŞKAYA, Fikret. 2007. *Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş*. Ankara:Türkiye ve Ortadođu Forumu Vakfı / Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı.
- BELGE, Murat. 2004. Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- BENLİ, Kaan. 2007. Atatürk toplumu ve ideoloji. *Radikal Gazetesi*. August 17.
- BERKES, Niyazi. 1975. *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu*. Ankara:Bilgi Yayınevi.
- BİLHAN, Murat. 2007. Kemalizm, sosyal demokrasi ve anayasa tartışmaları. *Radikal Gazetesi*. September 14.
- BORA, Tanıl. 2004. Celal Bayar. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- BORA, Tanıl and GÜLTEKİNGİL, Murat. 2004. Sunuş. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- BORA, Tanıl and TAŞKIN, Yüksel. 2004. Sağ Kemalizm. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- BOZKURT, Mahmut Esat. 1995. *Atatürk İhtilali*. İstanbul:Kaynak Yayınları.

- Bugünkü CHP. *Milliyet Gazetesi*. 8 Kasım 1966.
- CİZRE, Ümit. 2004. Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir Analiz. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ÇEÇEN, Anıl. *Post Kemalizm mi, Neo Kemalizm mi*. http://www.add.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=122&Itemid=31 (accessed on September 22, 2008)
- ÇELİK, Nur Betül. 2004. Kemalizm: Hegemonik Bir Söylem. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı*. 1935. Ankara.
- DUMONT, Paul. 1984. The Origins of Kemalist Ideology. in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed.Jakob M. Landau. Westview Press.
- ECEVİT, Bülent. 1966. *Ortanın Solu*. İstanbul:Kim Yayınları.
- ELİÇİN, Emin Türk. 1970. *Kemalist Devrim İdeolojisi*. İstanbul:Ant Yayınları.
- ENSAROĞLU, Yılmaz. 2007. Siyasetçilik söylemi olarak 'kurumlar arası mutabakat'. *Yeni Şafak Gazetesi*. April 30. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?t=30.04.2007&i=19432>. (Accessed September 22, 2008).
- ERDOĞAN, Necmi. 2004. Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- FISHER, Sydney Nettleton (ed.). 1955. *Social Forces in the Middle East*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- FREY, Frederick. 1965. *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge: M.I.T Press.
- GENTILE, Emilio. 2000. The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 1 (1).
- GEVGİLİLİ, Ali. 2004. Kemalizm ve Bonapartizm. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- GÖLE, Nilüfer. 1996. *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- GÖLE, Nilüfer. 1997. The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity. in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. S.Bozdoğan and R.Kasaba. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- GÖLE, Nilüfer. 2002. Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries. *Public Culture* 14 (1).

- GUTHRIE, Stewart Elliot. 1996. Religion:What Is It ?. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35 (4).
- GÜNAL, Asena. 2004. Uğur Mumcu. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- HEPER, Metin. 1974. *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği*. Ankara:ODTÜ İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları.
- HÜSNÜ, Şefik. 1995. *Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye – 5, Yazı ve Konuşmalar*. İstanbul:Kaynak Yayınları.
- İNSEL, Ahmet. 2004. Giriş. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- KAHRAMAN, Hasan Bülent. 2008. Sağ Kemalizm ve Çeteler. *Sabah Gazetesi*. March 28.
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/03/28/haber,1B031F1A2F664DD2945100B9AAD A5B84> (Accessed 22 September 2008).
- KAHRAMAN, Hasan Bülent. 2008. Atatürk/çülük ve Politika. *Sabah Gazetesi*. March 29.
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/03/29/haber,624CE3F54CB3457E84AC5BB9F2E4 BE4B> (Accessed 22 September 2008)
- KARPAT, Kemal. 1959. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton:Princeton University Press.
- KAZANCIGİL, Ali. 2004. Anti-emperyalist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- Kemalist CHP. *Milliyet Gazetesi*. 12 Kasım 1966.
- KEYMAN, Fuat. 1995. On the Relation between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of Islamic Identity in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey* Fall issue.
- KINROSS, Patrick. 1999. *Atatürk – The Rebirth of a Nation*. London:Phoenix Giant.
- KİLİ, Suna. 1969. *Kemalism*. İstanbul:School of Business Administration and Economics – Robert College Press.
- KOÇAK, Cemil. 2004. Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şeflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef/Milli Şef. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- KÖKER, Levent. 2004. Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük:Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.

- KÖKSAL, Duygu. 2004. Attila İlhan. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- LENİN, Vladimir İlyiç. 1969. *Toprak Meseleleri*. Ankara:Sol Yayınları.
- MACAR, Elçin. 2004. Doğan Avcıoğlu. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- MATEESCU, Dragos. 2006. Kemalism in the Era of Totalitarianism: A Conceptual Analysis. *Turkish Studies* 7 (2):225 – 241.
- MAZICI, Nurşen. 2004. 27 Mayıs, Kemalizmin Restorasyonu mu. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- MOLLAER, Fırat. 2006. Muhafazakâr Janus ve görme yitimi. *Radikal Gazetesi*. August 13. http://www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=6141. (Accessed September 22, 2008).
- ÖZKAN, Hande. 2004. Falih Rıfki Atay. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ÖZYÜREK, Esra. 2008. *Modernlik Nostaljisi: Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Gündelik Hayatta Siyaset*. İstanbul:Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi.
- PARLA, Taha. 2004. Kemalizm Türk Aydınlanması mı. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- PARLA, Taha. 1994. *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Cilt 1, Atatürk’ün Nutku*. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- RUSTOW, Dankwart. 1959. The Army of the Founding of the Turkish Republic. *World Politics* 11.
- SARÇ, Ömer Celal. 1948. Economic Policy of the New Turkey. *Middle East Journal* 2.
- SERTEL, Yıldız. 1969. *Türkiye’de İlerici Akımlar ve Kalkınma Davamız*. İstanbul:Ant Yayınları.
- SEVİMAY, Devrim. 2005. Kemalizm, Sosyalizm, Kapitalizm. *Vatan Gazetesi*. November 14. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kategori/siyaset/70168/kemalizm-sosyalizm-kapitalizm>. (Accessed September 22, 2008).
- SOYDAŞ, Mehmet and LÖK, Atilla. 2004. İlhan Selçuk. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- SOYSAL, Yasemin. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago:Chicago University Press.
- STEINHAUS, Kurt. 2002. *Türk Devrimi*. İstanbul:Örgün Yayınevi

- KÜTAHYALI, Rasim Ozan. 2007. Kemalizm neydi, ne oldu nasıl kurtulur?. *Star Gazetesi*. December 3. <http://www.stargazete.com/acikgorus/kemalizm-neydi-ne-oldu-nasil-kurtulur-11890> (Accessed September 22, 2008).
- TAŞKIN, Yüksel. 2004. 12 Eylül Atatürkçülüğü ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon Teşebbüsü Olarak 12 Eylül. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- TİMUR, Taner. 1968. *Türk Devrimi: Tarihi Anlamı ve Felsefi Temeli*. Ankara:Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları
- TUNÇAY, Mete. 2004. İkna (İnandırma) Yerine Tecebbür (Zorlama) in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- TURAN, Ömer. 2004. Son Dönemde Kemalizme Demokratik Meşruiyet Arayışları. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- TÜRKDOĞAN, Orhan. 1982. *Kemalist Modelde Fert ve Devlet İlişkileri*. İstanbul:İstanbul Kitabevi Yayınları.
- UYAR, Hakkı. 2004. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- UYAR, Hakkı. 2004. Şükrü Kaya. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ÜNDER, Hasan. 2004. Atatürk İmgisinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- YILDIZ, Ahmet. 2004. Recep Peker. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ZEDUNG, Mao. 1992. *Seçme Eserler, Cilt 2*. İstanbul:Kaynak Yayınları.
- ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan. 2004. Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları. in *Kemalizm*, ed.Ahmet İNSEL. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.
- ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan. 2007. *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*. İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEZ ANKETİ

Yıldırım UYSAL / 141 08 77

Aşağıdaki anket, sizin bazı konulardaki düşüncelerinizi öğrenmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu sorulara vereceğiniz cevaplar hiç bir şekilde şahsınızda değerlendirilmeyecektir. Bu nedenle kişisel bilgiler istenmemektedir. Soruların içerdiği ifadeye en yüksek onay 10 ve en yüksek karşı çıkma 0 puandır.

Doğum Yılı :

Cinsiyet :

Bölüm :

İçinde Bulunulan Öğrenim Seviyesi:

Lisans ()

Yüksek Lisans ()

Doktora ()

Sorular

1. Kemalist devrimler, toplumumuzun üst düzey yönetim kademesinden topluma indirilmiş devrimlerdir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Kemalizm, ülkemiz siyasi yelpazesinde sağda kabul edilmelidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Kemalizm, ülkemiz siyasi yelpazesinde solda kabul edilmelidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. 12 Eylül yönetimi, Kemalist anlayışı temsil etmektedir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. Kemalizmin Batılı olma arzusu ile bir ölçüde Batı'ya karşı bir duruş sergilemesi hususu kendi içinde bir çelişki oluşturmaktadır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6. Kemalizmin devletçi anlayışı, demokrasiyi baltalamaktadır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. Kemalizm, toplum tarafından üretilmiş bir halk kurtuluş ideolojisidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8. 90'lardan günümüze Kemalizm, toplumsal bir fenomen (toplumun gündemine oturmuş bir kavram) haline gelmiştir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9. Kemalizm, toplumu dönüştüren bir sistem (amaç) değil, toplumu dönüştürmede kullanılacak bir metottur (araç).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10. Kemalist uygulamalar, toplumdaki demokratik bilinci ve demokratik gelişimi engellemektedir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Kemalizm, kendi postülalarında demokratik unsurlar içermektedir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

12. Günümüz Kemalizmi, topluma Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarındakine benzer bir atılım ve mücadeleci ruh kazandırabilir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

13. Kemalizm, pragmatik ve omurgasız (sistemik olmayan, prensipleri olmayan) bir ideolojidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

14. Kemalizm, toplumdan kopuk bir devlet ideolojisidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

15. Kemalizm, bürokrasi sınıfının kontrolünde ve yalnızca bu sınıfın çıkarlarını savunan bir ideolojidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

16. Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olma vizyonumuz, Kemalist ideolojiyle çelişmektedir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

17. Kemalizm, günümüzde Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarındaki orjinal halinden uzaklaşarak zayıf düşmüştür.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

18. Kemalizmin kendi tarihinde dine karşı bir tavrı hep olmuştur.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

19. Türkiye toplumunun Batı ülkelerinin ekonomik ve sosyal ilerlemişliğini yakalaması için tek yol, Kemalist ideolojidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

20. Kemalist siyaset, günümüz Türkiye toplumunu bir arada tutabilecek gerekli ve yeterli koşuldur.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

21. Kemalizm, Atatürk'ün ölümünden bu yana çeşitli kişi ve kuruluşlarca istismar edilmiştir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

22. Kemalizmde yer alan Tek Adam Kültü (Atatürk'ün Kemalizm'de kapladığı alan), Kemalizme otoriter bir karakter kazandırmaktadır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

23. Ordunun şimdiye kadar 4 defa siyasal sisteme müdahale etmesi, Kemalizmi koruma ve yaşatma çabasıdır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

24. Kemalizm, 90'lar itibariyle popöler k0lt0r0n iine dahil olmuřtur.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

25. Avrupa Birlięi'ne 0ye olmak, Kemalizmin ierięinde bulunan Batılılařma kavramının gerekleřmesidir.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

26. Kemalizm, sınıfsız toplum idealini gerekleřtirmeye alıřmaktadır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

27. Kemalist proje, alıřkan, idealist, d0r0st ve modernleřmeci bireyler 0retmeyi amalamaktadır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

28. G0n0m0z Kemalizmi, k0reselleřmeye karřı m0cadelede ideolojik y0nden doęru bir duruřtur.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

29. G0n0m0zde K0rt milliyetilięine karřı en doęru politika, Kemalizmin arg0manlarıdır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

30. G0n0m0zde dincilięe karřı en doęru politika, Kemalizmin arg0manlarıdır.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10