THE QUESTION OF THE WEST IN THE IDEOLOGY OF REVIVALISM:
PERSPECTIVES FROM
MAWLANA ABU'L-A'LA MAWDUDI, SAYYID QUTB AND
AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI

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—————————————

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

—————————————

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

—————————————

Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı	(METU, IR)	————————
Prof. Dr. Şaban Çalış	(SELÇUK, IR)	————————
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür	(METU, IR)	————————

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Name, Last Name : Esra Aras

Signature　　　　　:

ABSTRACT

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Aras, Esra

M.S., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. İhsan D. Dağı

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This thesis surveys the response of the ideology of 20th century Islamic revival to the West and the Western-inspired regimes at home. Based on J.S. Mill's "method of difference", it compares the ideological perspectives of the prominent figures of Islamic revival: *Mawlana Abu'l-A'*la Mawdudi in Indio-Pakistan, Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. In this context, it analyzes the appraisal of Islam as a total way of life in order to refute the Western tradition and refuse its interference into the socio-politics of the Islamic world in the ideal order proposed by those ideologues. The question of the West is the dependent variable of the comparison and is searched through two independent variables: (1) ontology/epistemology of the ideal Islamic order which necessitates a socio-political transformation from "jahiliyya" to "hakimiyya" and (2) the methodology to attain the ideal order which is based on activism. In this perspective, it questions the revivalist proposal of "Occidentalism" as a reaction to the Western-originated system of governance.

To this end, the thesis firstly explores the characteristics of the independent variables – the epistemology/ontology and methodology- of Islamic revival from a historical point of view. Then, it continues with comparing how Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini

respectively regard the West in the theory of ideal Islamic order which reads a process from "jahiliyya" to "hakimiyya" through activism.

Key words: Islamic revival, the West, Western-inspired regimes, ideal Islamic order, jahiliyya, hakimiyya, activism.

ÖZ

İSLAMİ UYANIŞ İDEOLOJİSİNDE "BATI SORUNSALI: MEVLANA EBUL ALA MEVDUDİ, SEYYİD KUTUB VE AYETULLAH RUHULLAH HUMEYNI'DEN PERSPEKTİFLER

Aras, Esra

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, 20 yüzyıl İslami uyanışının Batı'ya ve Batıcı rejimlere karşı geliştirdiği ideolojiyi incelemektedir. J.S. Mill'in "farklılık metodu" temelinde, İslami uyanış hareketinin önde gelen isimlerini – Hindo-Pakistan'lı Mevlana Ebul ala Mevdudi, Mısır'lı Seyyid Kutub ve İran'lı Ruhullah Humeyni- ideolojik perspektifleri bağlamında mukayese etmektedir. Bu çerçevede, söz konusu ideologlarca önerilen ideal düzende, Batı geleneğini çürütmek ve Batının İslam dünyasına sosyo-politik nüfuzunu reddetmek amacıyla, İslam'ın bütüncül bir yaşam tarzı olarak değerlendirilmesini analiz etmektedir. Batı sorunsalı, mukayesenin bağımlı değişkenidir ve iki bağımsız değişken – (1) "cahiliye"den "hakimiye"ye doğru bir sosyo-politik dönüşümü gerekli kılan ideal İslami düzenin ontolojisi/epistemolojisi ve (2) bu ideal düzeni gerçekleştirmeye yönelik, aktivizme dayalı yöntem - vasıtasıyla incelenmektedir. Bu açıdan, tez uyanış hareketinin Batı kökenli yönetişim sistemine bir tepki olarak geliştirdiği "Oksidentalizm" önerisini sual etmektedir.

Bu amaçla, tez öncelikle İslami uyanış hareketinin bağımsız değişkenlerini - ontoloji/epistemoloji ve yöntem- tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla araştırmaktadır. Sonra, Mevdudi'nin, Kutub'un ve Humeyni'nin aktivizm temelinde "cahiliye"den

"hakimiye"ye geçiş süreci öngören ideal İslami düzen teorisinde Batıyı nasıl değerlendirdiklerini sırasıyla mukayese etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İslami uyanış, Batı, Batıcı rejimler, ideal İslami düzen, jahiliye, hakimiye, aktivizm.

To my mother and the memory of my father...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Islam itself was born as a religion which is drawn out in the Holy Scripture -Quran[1]- and the traditions of the messenger[2] -Prophet Mohammed. Its central theme is the oneness of God who is the creator and thus the lord of the universe.[3] Certain divine rules and obligations[4] ensure sole obedience to the ultimate sovereignty of God. Those obligations are incumbent upon mankind and shed light on the sole truth of life. Therefore, Islam points out the path to become a pious believer at the end of which is there an endless bliss God bestows in the transient world and in heaven after death.

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[1] Quran, meaning "recitation" in Arabic, conveys message of God to mankind which was revealed to Prophet Mohammed by angel Gabriel in aural form and completed in 23 years. It was put into its present form by caliphate Uthman after the death of the prophet. With 114 chapters –surahs- on subjects such as belief in God, good and evil, mankind in society, mankind in private life, eschatology, it is the guideline of Islam proposing a system that perceives private and public domains as interconnected. See: Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Quran*, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1989.; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islam: Religion, History and Civilization*, New York: HarperSanFirancisco, 2003, pp. 37-43.

[2] Having the very distinctive personality, Prophet Mohammed is the perfect man taken as the model for being benign and virtuous. To love the prophet is incumbent upon all Muslims. Herein, *Sunnah* which is the record of the sayings –Hadith- and acts of Prophet Muhammad is central to Islam as it has undertaken a supplementary role to the Holy Quran in the practical life as a source of the Islamic religious law. See: John L. Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 13-14.; Nasr, *Islam: Religion, History and Civilization*, pp. 46-58.; Rahman, op.cit., 1989, pp. 80-106.

[3] Quran mentions "God" over 2.500 times. God is defined as the creator, and sustainer of the universe and of the man, giving the man the guidance to obey and ruling the universe on a merciful justice. The straight path leads to God and all other paths are deviant (16:9). Therefore, there is none other than God who knows everything. God is defined as the merciful and compassionate, the sovereign, the holy, the one with peace and integrity, the keeper of the faith, the protector, the mighty (59:22-24). The Prophet heralds the oneness of God (18:110). See: Rahman, op.cit., 1989, pp. 1-16.

[4] Islam brings about five basic duties for Muslims which reveal their devotion to the creator: the *iman or Shihada* which means profession of faith, *Salat* which is practiced by praying five times a day, *Zakat*-alms giving by paying certain percentage of earned income in a year to aid the poor, *Ramadan*-fasting from dawn to dusk during the holy month, *hajj*- pilgrimage undertaken to the holy places of Islam at least once during lifetime.

The praxis since the inception proves that Islam, somehow, has undertaken roles that transcend the boundaries of a religion.[5] The course of events, in line with the content of Islamic revelation which pertains to both public and private sphere[6], culminated to a unique tradition of Islam. Then, it has covered various aspects of life such as law, theology, philosophy, branches of arts and sciences, political economy, education and social structures. It has also played a role of identity-building for its followers.[7] Prophet Mohammed is believed to have introduced an all-embracing umbrella which offered a transcendental identity based not on blood, ethnic or cultural ties, but on religious faith.[8] Hitherto, appealing to a big part of the world, Islam has signified a transcendent culture and political worldview as well as the religious identity uniting all Muslims to some extent.[9] From this point of view, it could be argued that Islam has functioned as social glue gathering people in its geography.

One evaluation of the academic surveys on Islam is that Islam has constituted a total way of life.[10] Specifically pertaining to its involvement in politics, the roles and functions of Islam have been disputed for long. One could bring forward that, Islam meant much more than a religion from the beginning. This is because it has determined the basis of governance of the Muslim territories with varying degrees throughout history. To epitomize, from the inception, Mohammed set up the state

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[5] Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1993.; Seyyed Hussein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1987, pp. 75-95.

[6] Nasr asserts that Islamic teaching refers to the Quran as related to both praxis and the domain of intellection and cognition. See: Nasr, op.cit., 2003, pp. 43.

[7] It is proposed that Islam as a faith system offers a basis for identity-formation in the way that any adherence to Islamic belief embraces the discourse of power and politics internally and externally. See: Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp. 9-16.

[8] Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, *Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Mohammed Sa'id al-Ashmawy*, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001, pp. 70.

[9] Douglas Pratt, *The Challenge of Islam: Encounters in Interfaith Dialogue*, New Zealand: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 137.

[10] John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 159.; "Islamic totalism" as a typology is used to denote Islam's further roles and functions in social, political and economic fields, transcending the boundaries of a religion. "Islam as a total way of life" is usually thought to bring about acclamation of an Islamic state. See: William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1987, pp. 308.

tradition in full compliance with the message of God which is known as the Medinian rule.[11] Then the four Caliphs –Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali- who were the companions of the prophet kept on with the Islamic bases of the state and society. Since then on, Islam has continued to involve in socio-political sphere especially via the caliphate system which remained until early 20th century. [12]

Dealing with Islam's totality in respect of the scope of this thesis, "Islamic Revival" [13] as a social phenomenon of the 20th century has had its own characteristics in elucidating Islam's appeal to earthly affairs. The term "revival" points out that Islam has been re-construed with the aim of bringing the true Islamic tradition back. The point, here, is the willingness to re-discover Islam as in the form of the Medinian period.[14] Expectations from a religion appeared high as seen in the proposal that Islam as a total way of life could diagnose the ills of the society and persist against things associated with evil.[15] So, as was the case in Medina, Islamic revival also had an understanding of Islam exceeding the extents of a religion.

Among the basics of Islamic revival is there the encounter of "the tradition and the modern"[16], "the religious and the secular", "Islam and the West and Western-

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[11] Medinian state is the first Islamic-based state which was established by Prophet Mohammed after *hijra* –migration- to Medina in order to protect the lives of Muslims from the aggression of Meccanians. Afterwards, Medina became the centre for struggle in the name of God. See: Youssef Choueiri, "The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movement", in *Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed(s) Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 28-29.; Tibi regards the Medinian experience as the establishment of *Pax Islamica* of the *ummah*. See: Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics*, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 1-2.; Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988, pp. 62-64.; See also, William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, New York: Routledge, 1988, pp. 89-91.

[12] Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy and Unholy Terror*, New York: The Modern Library, 2003, pp. 17, 20.

[13] This study uses certain expressions such as *Islamic revival*, *Islamic Awakening*, *Islamic Resurrection* and *revivalism* interchangeably to express Islam's, as a religion, re-introduction into socio-political life of Muslim world that encounters with the second half of the 20th century.

[14] Recent Islamic movements refer to Medinian state as the ideal model. See: Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2004, pp. 37-40, 45-50.

[15] Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Introduction", in *Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed(s) Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 6.

[16] The relationship between "modern" and "Western" is not in the scope of this study. Still, it is essential to clarify whether Islamic revival perceives modernity identical with the West. Sayyed concludes that if the West is taken as a project to disseminate its identity rather than a geographical

influence". Starting from the early 20th century, the modernization projects undertaken by the Western-inspired regimes were challenged by the ideological and functional transformation of Islam in politics. Muslim countries imported the Western tradition with an aim of adaptation to the modern standards. Simultaneously, revivalist ideologues questioned the compatibility of Western political culture deriving much from secularism, democracy and nationalism with Islamic tradition. Herein, the swift failure of the Western-inspired regimes to meet the needs and demands of the society helped the revivalists suggest Islamic authenticity as the way out. Islam's historical legacy and role of identity-building paved the way for Islam to transpire as orthodoxy with political premises and promises.[17] Meanwhile, the West and the adoption to the Western tradition were refused.[18]

Over decades, the rise of Islamic revival continued at the expense of the Western-inspired regimes. In the post-colonial period, the ideology and activism of Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamat-i Islami in Pakistan and Fedayan-i Islami could engender a sort of socio-political project whose objective was the transformation of the society on the basis of Islamic precepts and anti-Westernism.[19] The prominent success of Islamic revival was undoubtedly of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that ended the Western-inspired, Shah regime in favor of an

area, modernity is an indispensable character of Western heritage in cultural, economic and political domain. See: Bobby S. Sayyed, "A *Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*, New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1997, pp. 99-105.; In this case, the response of Islamic revival to modernity is changeable. If modernity is grasped through its broad meaning covering manner, science and technology, revivalism appears to have incorporated various aspects of modernity into its ideology and methodology. For instance, Islamist activism has made use of the opportunities of modern techniques like media means and has been founded upon modern political tenets originated in the West as seen its jargon based on revolution, people as political agents and mobilization. Hereby, what Islamic revival claims to deny is the West itself and its cultural influence. If modernity is conceived in cultural terms, Islamic revival refuses it with a view to terminate the imposition of Western culture upon Muslim world, but still by deriving from Western jargon of revolution, people as political agents and mobilization.. See: Jean-François Mayer, "Sayyid Qutb and His Influence: Interview with Professor Ibrahim Abu-Rabi", 8 November 2001, http://www.religioscope.com/info/dossiers/textislamism/qutb_aburabi.htm. 10.08.2008.

[17] It is argued that the resurrection of Islam was hinged on the perception that alien cultures would undermine the authentic culture. See: Said Amir Arjomand, "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1986, pp. 401.

[18] It is claimed that there are Islamist voices that regard the West as the enemy trying to humiliate Muslims and destroy Islam. See: Tamara Sonn, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam", *History Compass*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2006, pp. 181-185.

[19] İhsan D. Dağı, *Ortadoğu'da İslam ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 2002, pp. 22.

Islamic state. Iran refuted the validity of Western-style modernization process in the Islamic world by re-Islamization.

In addition, since the post-Cold War period, the universality claim of the Western political culture which has taken place in the globalizing world went on contending with revivalism. Claimed to have emerged as the ultimate political goals of the global setting under the leadership of the USA, democracy and freedom have occupied the discourse of the 1990s. They were thought to be the victorious values that would usher in a new and Western-led world order. Greater peace and broader human rights would spill over to the whole world and eventually do away with unfriendly and authoritarian regimes, which were prevailing in the Islamic world. Democratic order was anticipated to be the reply of much debated question of political science: "What is the best way of governance?". Scholars proposed the theoretical framework of the US-led international environment in various ways. Among them, "the end of history"[20] by Francis Fukuyama which claimed the universal validity since then on was very assertive.

Unlike the above-mentioned predictions for a universal and even infinite Western order, the West met various challenges pertaining to issues like ethnicity, race, human rights and as well religious radicalism. Among other challenges, the USA, which, as the hegemonic power, has taken upon itself the role of peace-building and democratizing, had serious problems with certain radical movements like al-Qaeda acting in the name of Islam. Those Islamist activists targeted the West and its values of the new world. Violence against the West initiated by such movements started to accelerate in the 1990s onwards. To illustrate; the US military was attacked in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and in 1996, American embassy was attacked in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, suicide attacks targeting foreigners in Egypt in 1997 were some of anti-Western violent events by Muslim groups.[21] The bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993 was followed by another attack on the US at home which was

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[20] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, No. 16, 1989.; Fukuyama insisted on his assertion even in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. See: Francois Fukuyama, "The West Has Won", *The Guardian*, 11 October 2001.

[21] A. G. Noorani, *Islam and Jihad: Prejudices versus Reality*, New York: Zed Books, 2002, pp. 6-7.

the tragedy of 9/11, 2001. In this perspective, rising extremism leading to terror challenged the optimistic atmosphere of the end of the Cold War.

In this sense, the tragedy of 9/11, 2001 has pointed out a milestone. In the atmosphere of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islam has apparently gained as much attention as the liberal policies have. Conspicuous events engendered the conception that violence and terror have taken place in the name of and for the sake of Islam. Bombings such as in Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 have scattered fear among innocents. Such kind of a violent environment in the aftermath of 9/11 bombings brought forth disputes on Islam's nature whether it culminates in extremism and even terrorism.[22]

Recently, the image of the Islamic world in the eyes of the West has been deteriorated seriously. The attitudes towards Muslims have become full of doubts on whether such violent events would reiterate. Thus, the West led by the USA engaged in a war on terrorism. It has been clarified that the war they engaged in was not against the Muslims or Arabs, but against the enemy, the infidels.[23] Hereby, Lewis makes a clarification that most Muslims are not fundamentalist and most fundamentalist are not terrorist but most present-day-terrorists are Muslims".[24] So, does this mean that Islam incites people to violence?

In the form of recent activism, Islamist politics and politics pertaining to Islam dominate the agenda of the world in two dimensions. At the first hand, many have

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[22] Esposito, op.cit., 2002, pp. 119.

[23] The President Bush addressed the Americans and the world in the aftermath of the bombings. Whereas he later regretted using the word "crusades" which recalled the historical religious wars between the Islamic and Christian world, in his early reaction, he stated that 9/11 re-commenced the "crusades" as they were dedicated to the war which would stop terrorism. See: "Infinite Justice, out - Enduring Freedom, in", 25 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1563722.stm., 20.05.2008.; Lewis, op.cit., 2003, pp. xv.; Trancski clarifies that the war is not against Islam which has a peaceful nature, but against fundamentalism which makes use of Islam. See: Robert Trancski, "A War against Islam", 29 October 2001, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7398, 21.07.2008.

[24] Lewis, op.cit., 2003, pp. 137.

associated Islam as a religion with terror and cruelty.[25] The phenomenon of Islam in the context of fundamentalism has resulted to prejudices characterizing Islam as radical and wicked.[26] The second approach refuses such definite judgments rendered for Islam by putting forward a more positive understanding of Islam and Islamism. Herein, Islam is evaluated as a challenge to the Western society, not its enemy, in cultural, political and ideological terms.[27] Esposito clarifies that Islamic ordinance does not permit use of violence as revealed in the Holy Scripture which underscores peace as the norm.[28] Then, he draws attention to the common violent acts committed by Muslims such as bombings, suicide attacks and organization of terrorist groups. He concludes that Islam provides a prominent incentive for Muslims to gather around a cause which could be defined as resistance to the "other", the West, which was found responsible for backwardness, political turmoil and social tensions Islamic world has been experiencing for long.[29] Also, Esposito underlines that the authoritarian leaders and governments exert the influence of Islam to mobilize support for expanding their influence abroad and ensure their stability at home.[30] Anyway, Islam emerges as the subject matter of the debates related to the significance of religion and extremism in political matters, relations between the Orient and the Occident.

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[25] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990.; Daniel Pipes, "Militant Islam: The New Global Threat", *Jerusalem Post*, 11 April 2001.; Pratt, op.cit., pp. 172-175.

[26] Xing Li, "Dichotomies and Paradoxes: The West and Islam", *Global Society*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, pp. 403-404.; Said proposes a historical context of Western view of Islam which concludes Islam as inhuman, devastating and prone to terror. See: Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, pp. 59-62. and Ken Shulman, "Q&A/ Edward Said: Roots of the West's Fear of Islam", 11 March 1996, http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/03/11/qanda.t.php, 20.06.2008.; Noorani makes an analysis of the recent approach to Islam and claims that there are works such as "The Rage of Islam", "The Global Intifada", "The Roots of Muslim Rage" and "The Holy Killers of Islam" and TV films like "The Sword of Islam" that incite antagonism towards Islam. See: Noorani, op.cit., pp. 6.

[27] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2004, pp. 2.; Pratt, op.cit., pp. 2-3.

[28] Esposito, op.cit., 2002, pp. 123.

[29] Ibid, pp. 122-134.

[30] Ibid.

Still, the above-mentioned question related to the nature of Islam is deep-rooted and has culminated in subjective conclusions and prejudices.[31] In various aspects, economically, politically and socially; things Islamic have always been in the sphere of the interest of the West; among politicians and in media and academic circles. In his book *Orientalism*, Edward Said makes a full analysis of Western approach to the Middle East which is the heartland of Islam.[32] He argues that Western perceptions and evaluations have stood in the forefront in looking at the Muslim tradition.[33] If this is so, what has been the response of the Muslim world to the Western perspective of the Orient? In other words, has there been a doctrine of "Occidentalism" encountering with Orientalism?

In order to come up with a response to the question, cited above, it is necessary to take a picture of Islamist understanding of the West. In this context, unlike the general tendency which focuses on the Western perspective on Islam and Muslims, Said asserts in his work, *Orientalism*; the concern of this thesis is going to be an analysis of the image of the West in the Muslims' eyes. To this purpose, the mentality of the recent political manifestation of Islam towards the West is going to be focused on.

In this context, the ideological perspectives by *Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi* in Indio-Pakistan, *Sayyid Qutb* in Egypt and *Ruhollah Khomeini* in Iran are going to be the scope of this study. The former who founded Jamaat-i Islami in 1941 simply urged the community to return to the true path of Islam. This was to bring about *Hakimiyya* –sovereignty- of God. In the light of Mawdudi's thoughts, Sayyid Qutb defined the existing world order as *jahili* which denoted a state of ignorance of Islam's truth. Qutb also proposed a universal social system based on *Hakimiyya* as the way to sweep away *jahiliyya.* He pursued an activist strategy especially after

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[31] The 9/11 attack on the USA culminated to the conclusions by Western radical groups and Christian Rights that Islam emerged as the new enemy of the West. See: Ali Rahnema, "Contextualizing the Pioneers of Islamic revival", in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed(s) Ali Rahnema, New York: Zed Books, 2005, pp. xvii. ; To illustrate the extremist points of view regarding Islam, the Evangelist Reverend Franklin Graham attacked on Islam stating that Islam is a very evil and very wicked religion. See: "Christian Evangelist Franklin Graham Blasts Islam, Says will Rebuild Churches in Sudan", *International Herald Tribune*, 9 October 2006.

[32] Said, op.cit., 1979.

[33] Ibid, pp. 49-73.

joining the Muslim Brotherhood in the late years of his life. Lastly, Ayatollah Khomeini led the vanguard religious revolution of the Muslim world in general and within Shi'ite world in particular. Thus, he provided a unique paradigm of Islamic revolutionary change. This is to state that, Khomeini's set of ideas resulted to a more concrete outcome in praxis which is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The theoretical framework which was set by those revivalist ideologues is supposed to propose a full analysis of Islam's socio-political and cultural retort to the Western tradition. As those ideologues equipped their interpretation of revivalist worldview with praxis they suggest a solid basis for an in-dept analysis of the universality claims of Islamic revival against the universality claims of the Western legacy.[34]

1.1 Research Question

Islamism appears, if not a direct threat, at least as a challenge to the West.[35] It challenges universality and supremacy claims of the Western socio-political culture by articulating an alternative. Islamic values are supposed to introduce the true path mankind should follow to overcome the evil associated with the Western heritage.[36] Thereupon, an analysis of the West from the point of view of Islamic resurgence is vital in order to take a full picture of the mentality of Islamic awakening.

The prominent leaders of Islamic revivalism - *Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi*, *Sayyid Qutb* and *Ruhollah Khomeini* - whose ideological orientations constitute the focal point of this thesis- envisage and set forth the roadmap to realize the ideal form of socio-politics. Hereby, what is common to all is the fact that they regard the existing order as non-Islamic –ignorant of the true path of God. The sole diagnosis proposed for the defects of the society which are caused due to the deviation from Islamic way

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[34] Tibi propounds that the universality claim of revivalism collided with that of the West. See: Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 8-10.

[35] Sayyed, op.cit., pp. 88-99.

[36] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy", *Democratization*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, pp. 92.; Sonn, op.cit., pp. 182-183.

of life is "Islam" per se. In this sense, the activist angle of their ideologies targets to re-shape the order in conformity with the message of God revealed via Islam.

From this point of view, the object of this study is to analyze the basics of re-Islamization of the political sphere which confronts with the universality claim of the Western political system as well as the failed political establishments at home which modeled the West. Departing from its designation as a reaction to the West and its influence on the Islamic world, the analysis of Islamic revival this study employs is going to revolve around two questions:

- *What is the proposal of Islamic revival as "Occidentalism" to replace the Western-originated political system of governance?*
- *Can it constitute an alternative to and an image of Western models?*

With regard to the first one of the above-mentioned questions, it is planned to make an analysis of the place of the West in the revivalist epistemology and ontology. Islamic world has experienced a dichotomy amid traditionalist/religious and modernist/secularist segments of the society which can be defined through the metaphor of "either to Mecca or through mechanization".[37] Therefore, the political domain was preoccupied with a dialectical process which derived much from the direct rule of the West in the colonial period. There was a political struggle between the Westernists/modernists and conservatives.[38] Herein, the latter rooting for Islamic revivalism has obviously tried to stop Western domination upon the native culture. The proposal was the revitalization of religio-politics entailing an Islamic state based on *Shariah* against the Western model. In this proposal, by concentrating on Mawdudi's, Qutb's and Khomeini's thoughts, this thesis aims to pinpoint the place of the West in the revivalism's theory of the ideal Islamic order which is hinged on both the refusal of the West and re-Islamization.

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[37] John L. Esposito, "Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century", in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, ed(s) Azam Tamimi & John L. Esposito, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, pp. 10.

[38] Li, op.cit., pp. 404, 413-418.

In this spectacle, pertaining to the second question above, could the Islamic world propose an analysis of the notion "Occident"? Has revivalism been efficacious in conceptualizing *Occidentalism* denoting a thorough image of the West?

There is obviously a clear-cut delineation of the West and the Western tradition associated fully with a discourse of imperialism, in economic, political, cultural, military and communication terms.[39] According to Roy, Muslim response to *Orientalism* has been in three ways: (1) nostalgia which advocates Islamic roots of the civilization in the West, (2) rejection that opposes to the superiority of the West, (3) apologia which embraces Islam as a total way of life to get rid of the evils. The hypothesis of this study revolves around the latter in the sense that Islamic revivalism seeks for recreating the authenticity of Islam by modeling the Medinian period.[40] Based on a language of "the materialist West of capitalism versus the moral and dignified East of Islamic precepts", revivalism calls for liberation from Western hegemony and conversion into a true Islamic manner.[41]

To expose the fact that Islamic revival has created recourse to "anti-Westernism", the aim is to grasp the theoretical framework of political re-manifestation of Islam in order to comprehend its mentality related to the question of the West. Engaging a comparative approach, this study deals with what Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini propose regarding the roles and contributions of Islam's totalism and its refusal to modernity associated with the West. From the angle of these figures, Islam's socio-political and cultural retort to the secularist/Westernist regimes is in consideration.

While looking into the mentality of revivalism which excludes the West, this thesis departs from limitations for time and space. Regarding the *time limit*, the period under consideration is mostly the second half of the 20th century onwards. In this period of time, revivalist ideology attributed Islam *politically activist and revolutionary* roles with the goal of eliminating the exotic culture of the West from the authentic one.

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[39] Ibid, pp. 413-416.; Tibi, op.cit., 1988, pp. 19.

[40] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 11.

[41] Cemil Aydın, "The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and West", *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2004, pp. 93.

In addition, the *space limit* which will apply to Islamic world as well as the West will ignore their polyphonic nature. This is to state that, whereas that is for sure that both have socio-political structures and tradition with varying degrees and shapes internally, this work has a holistic glimpse of "Islamic world" and the "West" with no concentration on individual characteristics of single states -even Iran, Egypt and Pakistan from where the three ideologues come.

To respond where the West and Islamic world are, the reference point of this study is the proposition of Salvatore. Salvatore points out the necessity of a negative reference for constructing one's own "universe" which is held in terms of trans-cultural constructions[42] and, from this point of view, sees the West as unique in creating its own path.[43] A uniform West, in turn, creates an external uniqueness to refer that is the "other" or called the "Orient":[44]

> "The making of a generic "Islam" is therefore strictly dependent on the making of the "West". The joint construction of the West and Islam through trans-cultural dynamics is the result of the imbalanced interaction between two different paths of essentialization, the one more offensive, the other constrained to a quite defensive stance, yet both grounded on the same kind of intellectual distinction."

In essentializing the "other", Said talks about "imaginative geography" which refers to the process of Orientalization of the Orient in the viewpoint of the West.[45] Said's perspective implies that making of the "West" and the "East" has been Western-originated.[46] This study is, in contrary, an evaluation of whether rhetoric of "Occidentalism" as the equivalent of "Orientalism" has been embodied in the philosophy of Islamic revival.

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[42] Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity*, Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1997, pp. 69.

[43] Ibid, pp. 23.

[44] Ibid, pp. 67-68.

[45] Said, op.cit., pp. 49.

[46] Touching upon the genesis of essentializaton of Islam from Western perspective, Salvatore makes a critical analysis of Weberian point of view of Islam that comes up with a religio-cultural classification in a quest for the essence of Arabism and Islam. For Salvatore, Weber's attitude towards Islam reveals his target to prove the universal uniqueness of Western rationalization by introducing Islam as the villain of his "Protestant Ethic" thesis. See: Salvatore, op.cit., pp. 97-112.

1.2 Methodology

Departing from Bryman's assertion that the logic of comparison can not be applied to only country studies but to a variety of situations in political science research[47], this study is a *comparative analysis* of the question of the West in the philosophy of the 20th century Islamic revivalism with *three cases*: Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi in Pakistan, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. At this point, it employs the *"qualitative method"* to identify and grasp the basics of the perception of the West in the theoretical perspective Islamic revival deploys at a micro (or individual) level of analysis.[48]

To briefly explain *why* those ideologues of Islamic revival are compared derived its reply from the advantages the comparative method provides:[49]

- Contextual description in order to get information,
- Classification for grouping
- Hypo-thesis testing to get a conclusion from the data gathered through describing and classifying.

These three, enables to establish familiarities and differences of every case included in a study, helping researchers comprehend the interaction among their cases.[50] In other words, Comparative research explains how the different parts of each case - those aspects that are relevant to the investigation - fit together and diverge. In turn, it offers the opportunity to explore the diversity, theoretical explanation and grouping which clarify the situation under consideration efficiently.

In this light, as spelled out previously, this study aims to expound the basic tenets and the logic of re-politicization of Islam with its theoretical framework which

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[47] Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 54.

[48] Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 4-21.

[49] Ibid, pp. 4-10.

[50] Jonathan Hopkin, "Comparative Methods", in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed(s) David Marsh & Gerry Stoker, London: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 249-250.

claims to respond to the modernist political culture of the West. In the revivalist response to the central question of political science: "what is the best way of governance?", the theoretical framework appears to be designed to refute things associated with the West and refuse the influence of the Western political system upon the Muslim world. In this context, when contemplated in terms of the question of the West in the ideology of revivalism, the comparison of the perspectives of Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini is expected to provide a through assessment of the place of the West in the revived Islam.

At this point, touching upon *how* to make the comparison in this study, J. S. Mill's "method of difference" is going to be applied.[51] The method aims to compare the similar cases in many respects, but one phenomenon which is observed in the study. In other words, the cases compared appear to be similar in every other aspect but differ in respect of the absence or presence of the phenomenon which is searched. At this juncture, the departure point of the revivalist ideologues this study focuses on is the Islamic ordinance whose administrative practice encounters with the Medinian state established by Prophet Mohammed. In the light of the prophet's practice of Islamic rule, they seem to have a tendency to deconstruct the existing political establishment in order to come up with a theocracy-based response to the ontological question of the relationship between the state and society.

In the comparison of the three ideologues to grasp the place of the West in their minds that differs at certain points through the method of difference, this thesis will concentrate on the place of the West in the theory of government and praxis of Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini. Employing this method does not imply that they have similar revivalist ideologies at every point which differs only regarding the West. As will be reflected throughout the thesis, there are similar and, at some points, different presuppositions in their ideologies. The goal in appealing to the method of difference is that this method is supposed to bring about an in-depth analysis of how they did deal with the West by pointing out the differences in theory and practice. Therefore,

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[51] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, London: Savill & Edwards Printers, Vol. I, 1888, pp. 428-429.

the revivalist understanding of the West is the *dependent variable* of the comparison which is checked through the following independent variables:[52]

- The ontological and epistemological basis of the political system proposed for an *Islamic state* and anticipated as *Islamic ordinance* and the *West* as the source of deviation from Islamic path.

- The methodology to attain the Islamic-based political establishment which is *activism.*

In analyzing the endeavors of the revivalists to deconstruct the Western characteristics of the Islamic society and reconstruct the ideal Islamic order, this thesis touches upon four topics. Firstly, it deals with the basics of revivalist thought with its historical background. The fundamentals of revivalism are supposed to highlight the mentality of the revivalist reaction against the West. In this light, the following parts of the thesis focus on the perspectives of Mawdudi's, Qutb's and Khomeini's political thought respectively to figure out the confrontation between the Western political culture and the revivalist manifestation of politics from a comparative point of view which is also dealt with in a generic perspective in the conclusion.

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[52] Landman, op.cit., pp. 29-34.

CHAPTER 2

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

The genesis of Islamic revival has a history of 200 years. It derives much from the encounter of traditional authentic culture with the Western tradition hinged on an economically capitalist and politically expansionist configuration.[53] The upshot in praxis signalized the social bifurcation between the traditional order declining on the one hand and the sociopolitical outlook transforming in parallel with the inputs of European political culture on the other.[54] The latter covered bureaucratization, establishment of modern military and modernization of educational institutions. The immediate repercussion was on intellectual pursuits. The newly emerged intellectual circles targeted to draw out a roadmap for getting rid of the downward movement of Muslims relative to the West. In doing so, those intellectual circles rejected the culture of the West, not its science and technology[55], if adopted in compliance with the authentic Islamic culture.[56]

In this perspective, since the inception of the colonial period, the West has penetrated into the agenda of the Islamic world through a binary opposition between Islamist/traditionalist and secularist/Westernist discourse. The manifestation of Islam with a modernist view was replaced by a Westernist-secularist retort which, at the

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[53] Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History*, London: Pluto Press, 2004, pp. xv, 10-11; See also, Hussein Kassim, *Legitimizing Modernity in Islam: Muslims Modus Vivendi and Western Modernity*, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005, pp. 19.

[54] John L. Esposito, "Foreword", in *What Is to Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance*, ed(s) Fahrang Rajaee, Texas: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986, pp. ix-x.; Mansour Moadel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 1.

[55] Moadel, op.cit., pp. 1.

[56] Robert D.Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, pp.13-18.

final phase, was confronted by Islamic revival.[57] In this context, Islamic resurrection as a phenomenon of the 20th century has become the preoccupation of academic circles, politicians, media and even ordinary people as it heralded a new step in the interaction between the Islamic world and the West. For the latter, the regime exportation which was one of the objectives of the post-revolutionary Iran turned the debate on "Islam as political" into "threat to the West". Furthermore, Islamist politics have been linked to extremism and fundamentalism especially in the post-9/11 period. In this sense, there is substantial academic work asserting that Islamic revival has somehow threatened the West.[58] Then, what does the West mean in Islamic revival that has led up to the debate on the linkage between the Islamic world and the roots of contemporary fundamentalism and terrorism?

This chapter discusses the basics of revivalism which derives much from the imbalances between the West and Islamic world and underscores the collision between the exotic Western tradition and authentic way of life. To this purpose, it is going to look into the Islamist intellectual developments of the modern era. As Pratt suggests, the recent ideological options of Islamic world are categorized as (1) Islamic modernism of the 19th century, (2) secularist Westernism of the early 20th century and (3) Islamic revival of the late 20th century which is currently associated with religious fundamentalism and extremism.[59] As it depicts the roots of re-politicization of Islam, the historical context is supposed to provide the opportunity for a better assessment of the image of the West in the philosophy of Islamic revival.

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[57] Clinton Bennett, *Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates*, New York: Continuum, 2005, pp. 18-24.

[58] Fred Halliday, "*Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East*", New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996, pp. 107-108.; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 218.; Lewis, op.cit., 2003, pp. 137.; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.; Tibi, op.cit., 1988, pp. 19.

[59] Pratt, op.cit., pp. 148-156.

2.1 Islam and Politics in Modern Era

Traditionally, Islamic discourse classifies the world among (1) abode of Islam -*dar al-islam*- where *Shariah* governs, (2) abode of war –*dar al-harb*- where Muslims are the minority groups struggling for their religious rights and (3) abode of peace –*dar al-sulh*- where Muslims are enjoying the state of peace and freedom to practice their religious duties.[60] In the history of the conflict between the worlds of the West and Islam going back to crusades, the content of the conflict started on the basis of religion. Within the contention between Christianity and Islam, Islamic world was perceived as Oriental despot[61] while the West was placed in the abode of war to be removed away. So, the crusades underlie psychological effects on today's perceptions between Catholic and Protestant West and Eastern Orthodox world.[62] Starting from the 19th century, mutual conceptualizations based on religion changed drastically. This was the age of colonialism and the then Europe was conqueror with imperial ambitions.[63] The post-Christian and enlightened West which was socio-politically inspired by secularism and economically boomed by industrial and technical advances proved its absolute superiority. Encounter with the West of the 19th century presented the backwardness of the Muslim world for consideration. The question of how to catch up with the West initiated a search for independence from the Western domination as the cause of Muslims.[64] The centerpiece of relations was preoccupied with the concern of preserving the "self" image. The outcome was a defensive reaction to systemic alterations in trans-cultural relations with the West.[65] As a result, the substance of the relations between Muslims and the West transformed into a collision between the universality claims of the latter and counter ideological initiatives of the former which is dealt with in its historical context below.

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[60] Lewis, op.cit., 1990.; Nasr, op.cit., 1987, pp. 75-76.

[61] Sayyed, op.cit., pp. 114.

[62] Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, New York: Palgrave, 2003, pp. 148-149.

[63] Rahnema, op.cit., pp. xxvi.

[64] Watt, op.cit., pp. 47.

[65] Salvatore, op.cit., pp. 169.

2.1.1 Islamic Modernism

As an intellectual initiative by a group of ideologues[66] with analogous world views, Islamic modernism is regarded as the first ideological reaction to the politically imperial, economically advanced and culturally dominant West.[67] Islamic modernism emerged when the decline of the absolute power of state and Islamic orthodoxy coincided with the superiority of the Western political system.[68] This gave rise to Islamic modernist school of thought. Basically, the objective of the Islamic modernists was to stand against the colonialism of the West. To this purpose, they searched for the restoration of Islamic socio-political realm and societal unity against the West.[69]

The essence of Islamic modernism for the scope of this work lies behind the fact that it triggered the preliminary steps inspiring revivalism. Departing from the presupposition that modernization encapsulating science, technology and reason ascertains secularization as the precondition, delimitation of Islam as a religion to the private sphere becomes inevitable.[70] However, Islamic modernism as a reformist movement aimed at accommodating Islam to modernization process. To this goal, it insisted on religion-based fabric by proposing the absolute obedience to the rule of God as the sole solution. Therefore, in undertaking the initiative for Islamic renaissance to catch up with the economic, social and scientific developments in the West, the modernist had a selective tendency.[71] They searched for *islah* -reform- from within Islamic ordinance favoring technical modernization, not cultural aspect

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[66] The reformists of the 19th century such as Jamal al-Din al-Afgani (1839-97) in Afghanistan, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) of Egypt and Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1902) of Syria who searched for diagnosis for the decline of Islamic world fall into this category. Bechir Chorou, "Islamism: Roots and Prospects", *The International Seminar on 'Governing Stability across the Mediterranean Sea: A Transatlantic Perspective'*, Rome, 21-23 March 2002.

[67] Moadel, op.cit., pp. 2.

[68] Ibid, pp. 29.

[69] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future*, pp. 101, 103.

[70] Esposito, op.cit., 1998, pp. 225.

[71] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 8.

of it which entailed secularization.[72] This is to state that reformist response to things Western focused on adaptation to the West, only by embracing Islam in socio-politics in line with modernity.[73]

From this point of view, Islamic modernism highlights a dual glimpse. It both tries to reinforce the place of Islam as a total way of life and draws out consistency with modern values of the Western tradition.[74] As a consequence of the sense of inadequacy and weakness culminated by the interaction with the superiority of the West, the scope was proposed as to introduce a modernistic theological doctrine which both questioned the disabilities of the traditional establishment and re-interpreted Islam for its adaptation to the modern character of socio-politics. For instance, modernist intellectuals worked on educational programs reflecting both modern and authentic nature. Subsequently, the reformers challenged both the traditional ulama resisting against change and the young Westernists whose object appeared to Westernize the society.[75]

The prospects Islamic modernism pledged denoted profound systemic changes in the Islamic world that would re-define the role of religion in governance. Heralding new forms of reference to religion in politics, the process of social transformation refined traditional face of state structure as well as social stratification granting the religious class privileges in governmental affairs. This is to state that ulama as the religious class interpreting the Islamic bases of governance lost its unchallenged status. In addition, Islamic modernism paved the way for the emergence of anew social class which is the secularist intellectuals and aimed at an ontology seeking for modernism instead of tradition.[76] It was a clear-cut attempt to secularize the source of political authority which dominated the agenda of the Muslim world until the 1960s.

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[72] Nelly Lahoud, *Political Thought in Islam: A study in Intellectual Boundaries*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp. 15-17.

[73] Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud, "The World of Islam and the Challenge of Islamism", in *Islam in World Politics*, ed(s) Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud, New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 11.

[74] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 40.

[75] John L. Esposito & John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 19.

[76] Ibid, pp. 12.

To summarize, Islamic modernism developed in two branches. First, modernist intellectuals such as Rashid Rida and Muhammed Abduh behaved carefully when incorporating modernity into Islam in order not to articulate Western culture. Second, the intellectual appealing to secular world view set forth a much more Westernized socio-political fabric. In this spectacle, reformists formed the basis for the binary opposition of 20th century intellectual debate in the Islamic world. One is the Westernist/secularist movement which initiated Westernization projects and the other is the antithesis of secularist class which evolved on the ground of re-manifestation of Islam in politics[77] and is the focal point of this study. Therefore, Islamic modernism unleashed the dialectical pattern of 20th century ideological orientation between two extremes of the Westernists seeking for adaptation to an exterior frame and the proponents of re-politicization of Islam as the theme of authentic self and as unique by deriving from history and tradition.[78]

2.1.2 Secularist Westernism

Secularism pinpointed a theory of life freeing politics from the domination of Islam. It entered into the Muslim world concomitant with modernism and Westernism as derivative of colonialism.[79] Insisting on a break with the past[80] and turning into an anti-religious and anticlerical position[81], a fundamentalist understanding of secularism emerged under the auspices of the ideology of Islamic modernism.[82] Then, in practice, simultaneous with the decline of the traditional intellectual ulama interpreting governance on Islamic basis, a secularist/Westernist class became influential in guiding the political establishment on the way of the West.

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[77] Ibid, pp. 19.; Watt, op.cit., pp. 51-53.

[78] Lee, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

[79] Azzam Tamimi, "The Origins of Arab Secularim", in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, ed(s) Azam Tamimi & John L. Esposito, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, pp. 13.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Esposito, op.cit., 2000, pp. 9.

[82] Tamimi, op.cit., pp. 17-22.

Following World War I, modernization as a project which was put forward by Westernist intellectuals accelerated through a secular totalitarian imposition.[83] Western-originated political values dominated the agenda of many Muslim countries. The result was the experimentation of Western-inspired politics on the basis of secularization in the Muslim world. Especially after World War II, various forms of radical Westernist politics emerged. Islamic world tried Western way of policy-making which, in a short period of time, proved to be unviable among Muslims raising the question on Islam's compatibility with Western political culture.

At the outset, regime-importing from the West seemed to be viable for governance. Nevertheless, political independence from Western yoke brought about a political vacuum in the Islamic world. Taking over the rule from the Western rulers urged the Muslims to a quest for political actor-ness and system that would fill this vacuum. However, political experience was limited for self-administration. Furthermore, the problems faced were deep-rooted such as economic underdevelopment and social dislocation. Therefore, the consequence was inadequacy of the new secular pro-Western regimes to meet the needs of the society in any kind and to promise better living standards. In addition, the masses stayed aloof from the exotic political features such as secularism, nationalism, individualism and sovereignty of people

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[83] The prelude to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire commenced a new phase in Muslim politics. Above all, the Republic of Turkey which came into existence through a salvation war against Greece abolished the caliphate in favor of a secular, Western-inspired regime. This was the beginning of a process which shifted the source of political authority by decentring Islam as a transcendental bond and building a new nation-based, secular, Westernist and modernist state. In this perspective, academics such as Masud assessed that modernization project launched by the national leader of Turks -Mustafa Kemal Atatürk- was held identical with Westernization. Another sort of secularism in Islamic world came from the Arabs who backed up secularism in order to get rid of the authority of the Ottoman caliphate. Arab secularism was backed up by the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, which dominated pan-Islamism seeking for revival of the caliphate, until 1967 Arab-Israel war which ended with Arabs' defeat. Besides, secularism was experienced in India as synonym with Hindu-Muslim unity against British colonialism which proved its impossibility when the Muslims looked for their own salvation from not only the British colonialism but also the Hindu domination by initiating the process with the foundation of the Khilafat Movement to revive the caliphate contrary to Atatürk's abolition of it. In a general outlook, the political formation in many third wordlist Muslim countries either by opposing to or by imitating the colonial governance hinged on a cluster of secularism, modernization and Westernization practiced through a top-to-down strategy by the secularist elite. See: Muhammad Khalid Masud, "The Construction and Deconstruction of Secularism as an Ideology in Contemporary Muslim Thought", *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, pp. 363-368.; Sayyed, op.cit., pp. 52-72.; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Religion and Global Affairs: Secular States and Religious Opposition", *SAIS Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1998, pp. 33.

which were introduced by those regimes. Thus, the question turned into the legitimacy of the Western-inspired political system.[84]

Soon, Western-inspired regimes started to come down by provoking the antagonism against the removal of Islamic bases from political foundation. Tibi determines that Westernization culminated to alienation in Islamic world which he describes as "cultural anomie".[85] This resulted from the loss of socio-cultural roots when the epistemological premises of governance were secularized by the Westernist elite. Meanwhile, the authority reclamations for Islam in political domain engendered simultaneously. The preliminary defense against the West and the Westernists came from Egypt when Hasan al-Banna established Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s. It was the vanguard radical Islamist organization calling for the establishment of an "Islamic state". This indicated the fact that secularist fundamentalism created its antithesis from the outset which would gradually become ripe for driving away the Western influence.[86]

Revivalism which was the retreat from modernist politics in any sort could easily return to the scene to cancel out the Western-originated traits. Islamic tradition was not alien to the Muslims; it had deep roots in any aspects of Muslims' existence. Thereupon, Fuller asserts that Islam returned as the only thorough alternative institutional structure in theoretical, legal and social domain.[87] Islamic awakening has come up with practical proposals to the arduousness of colonial heritage. The balance of power could easily change in favor of Islamism. In short, Islam's recent form of interference into politics owes much to the whirlpools of Western-inspired regimes in practice. Withstanding those regimes, Islamic revivalists could easily get involved in the struggle in the name of their goal to establish the ideal "Islamic

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[84] According to Esposito, by 1990, it was understood that such kind of a transformation of Muslim communities was frankly not likely. See. Esposito & Voll, op.cit., pp. 13.

[85] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 78-81.; Tibi, op.cit., 1988, pp. 47.

[86] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 106.

[87] Fuller, op.cit., pp. 149.

state". Hereby, Iranian Revolution opened a new phase in the political fabric of the Islamic world by revitalizing the appeal to religion in stately affairs.[88]

Consequently, based on the binary opposition between traditional alternative and exogenous Western model[89], re-manifestation of Islamism functioned in a way Keddie sets: (1) the anticipation of Islam as the solution to the problems inherited from various forms of secular regimes and (2) gaining political power with a view to establish religio-politics.[90] Henceforth, the scope of this chapter covers a thorough account of revivalist set of thoughts drawn out as an antithesis of Muslim type of secularism.

2.2 The Ideology of Revivalism

Abu-Rabi's makes a classification of Islamic manifestation of politics that displays (1) *pre-colonial Wahhabi awakening* in Arabia which, as an internal movement, did not take into consideration the West in its set of ideas, (2) *colonial awakening* that proposed religio-politics as a frank reaction to European domination from the 19th century till early 20th century and (3) *post-colonial awakening* which derives much from the legacy of the second phase in responding to Western domination.[91] The mentality of revivalism this study concerns was based on the post-colonial awakening. It nurtured upon the goal of renewing the socio-political roles and functions of Islam whose hub is the reaction to the penetration of Western culture. Referring to the West, Islamic awakening questions the interaction between modernization as the imposition of Westernization and Islamism as the substance of authenticity. Within this perspective, this part of the chapter concentrates on the cognition of Islamic revival with regard to its genesis, basics and prospects as a counter ideology to Westernism.

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[88] Esposito, op.cit., 2000, pp. 3.

[89] Fuller, op.cit., pp. 149.

[90] Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When and Why do 'Fundamentalisms' Appear?", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1998, pp. 697.

[91] Mayer, op.cit.

2.2.1 Revivalist Modus Vivendi

Established upon a theocratic basis, Islamic revival is regarded as religio-politics that turns over a new leaf in the interaction with the Western values.[92] Theological rhetoric of Islamic revival has: [93]

- a twofold ontology first of which is the *analogy of jahiliyya,* state of ignorance, to be diagnosed in order to get free from things evil and second of which is *hakimiyya* which is the rule of God based on the epistemology of Islam covering the one-ness of God and his messenger to preach to people as exhorted in the holy book,
- a methodology hinged on a revisionist *activism* appealing to jihad, either defensive or offensive.

2.2.1.1 The Ontology of Revivalist Religio-Politics

Jahiliyya as an Arabic term is derived from the root 'j-h-l' and is a characteristic denoting the ignorance of the pre-Islamic Arabs as is used in the Quran.[94] Islam was messaged by God to invite mankind to the true path. Elevation of God's message points out the realization of the ideal Islamic order within the Arabic society which is called the "Medinian State".

Medinian period commenced in the 7th century and eliminated the *jahili* situation by opening the Islamic period in Arabia and its beyond.[95] Then, faith and power in company constituted the foundation of the system. The prophet as the head of the

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[92] Esposito, op.cit., 1998, pp. 158-162.

[93] This categorization is made in line with the context of this study. *Jahiliyya* is central to Sayyid Qutb's thought is to be replaced by *hakimiyya*, as taken place in Mawdudi's interpretation of revivalism. Activism is the strategy for Islamic resurrection to be employed in transforming the *jahili* structure into the absolute supremacy. The best practice of the strategy is the Iranian Islamic revolution under the leadership of Khomeini. See: Thomas J. Butko, "Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Study*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2004, pp. 42-43.

[94] William E. Shephard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 35, 2003, pp. 522.

[95] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2004, pp. 37-40.

state was both the spiritual leader of the society and ruler of the state politically, economically and militarily in the name of God.[96] Put differently, he handed in the leadership of both the state and faith.[97] After the prophethood period, the state was run by the successors -Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali. In the appraisal of the success of the Medinian state in sustaining the ideal situation of Islamic society, the four-caliph period is also esteemed. In the eyes of the revivalists, starting from the fifth caliph, Mu'awiya who founded the Umayyad dynasty, the Islamic society was exposed to other cultures. In early times, it was influenced by Byzantine and Sassanid Empires. Over time, Western influence entered into the practical life of the Muslim people, first technically and then culturally. Western culture overran the Islamic world especially when Turks were running the Islamic world. Turks imported much from the Western system which is believed to have drawn the Muslims apart from the Islamic culture significantly.[98] In this context, *jahiliyya* is supposed to have turned back after the era of the prophet and his companions and has persisted till present as a barbaric or extreme pattern.[99]

The reason why *jahiliyya* captured the life lies behind the fact that after the era of the Medinian rule, nobody could succeed the prophet or his companions as the vanguard to drive the society. The lack of leadership caused the re-emergence of the state of unconsciousness of God's message. As a result, the non-believers who were exposed to the *jahili* tradition of the West directed the system that made the Muslim society infidel –*kafir.*

From this point of view, idealist aspect of revivalist ontology comes to the fore. *Hakimiyya* denoting the realization of full sovereignty of God against the infidelity of the deviant regimes is set forth to transform socio-politics in conformity with Islam and hence eradicate *jahili* atmosphere. It is derived from the Arabic root *h, k, m* and closely related to the nouns *hukm* meaning to govern, *hakim* meaning someone exercising judicial authority, governor or ruler. So, *hakimiyya* denotes a system of

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[96] Ibid, pp. 38.

[97] Ibid, pp. 48.

[98] Sayyid Qutb, *Islam: The Religion of the Future (Urdu Islam Ka Rausdin Mustaqbil)*, Delhi: Ishaat-e-Islam Trust Publications, 1996, pp. 6-7.

[99] Shephard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 522.

government in which the important question is "who rules?". Quoted in Khatab, the unanimous agreement –ijma- of the Muslim community defines *hakimiyya* as the highest political and legal authority that belongs to God.[100]

In assessing the *hukm* of God in revivalism, Quoted in Fuller, Steven Bruce states that:[101]

> "Only when religion does something other than mediating between man and God does it retain a high place in people's attention and in their politics."

At this juncture, Islam has somehow been an integral part of politics in the course of history. Rule in the name of God with the ordinance of Islam as written in the scripture and in the way the Prophet Mohammed epitomized have been the core of governance with varying degrees. Fuller asserts that Qur'an and Hadith which have been the bases of political norms and justice since 7th century are the Magna Carta in Islamic society.[102] Departing from Fuller's thesis, it can be argued that Islam perceives religion and government as intertwined from the beginning.

The 20th century has been a landmark inviting Islamist politics back to the scene. The search for re-forming the Islamic world with the goal of raising socio-economic standards and achieving good governance within the system has triggered re-formulation of political extensions of Islam.[103] So, what does Islamic awakening stand for, differing from the genesis?

Islam from revivalist point of view is attributed transformed peculiarities and functions. Its context is obviously consonant with tradition.[104] In other words, recent Islamism, or Islamic revival, does not constitute any prejudices to the basic

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[100] Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2002, pp. 145.

[101] Fuller, op.cit., pp. 13.

[102] Ibid, pp. 25.

[103] Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam*, London: SAQI, 2005, pp. 25.

[104] Fuller, op.cit., pp. 25.

philosophy of Islamic manifestation of politics whose cause is the establishment of an ideal Islamic state and whose sole objective is to base this state on *Shariah Law*.[105] Accordingly, revivalism regards Islam as the way of salvation from the ills and evils of the time. It offers a political programme which delineates *obedience to God* as the ultimate obligation. It has been set forth as a political ideology with definite objectives and ideals designed to mobilize the believers around a certain cause. In this sense, it has a revolutionary character, tries to re-structure social and political establishment in line with the command of God.

The revivalist intellectual contributions operate as the guidelines in calling for Islamic tenets back to the socio-political system. Theoretical blueprints to realize ideal Islamic order have been prominently drawn out by pioneering revivalist figures of the 20th century such as *Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi* in Indio-Pakistan, *Sayyid Qutb* in Egypt and *Ruhollah Khomeini* in Iran. What is to be highlighted regarding revivalism in general and these ideologues in particular is the debate on the interaction between extremist anti-Westernism and Islamic authenticity in politics. Hence, the ideological framework is essential to grasp how Islamic revival defines the relationship between state, society and religion in order to cope with the evil, or put another way the West and its penetration.

Islamic revival these ideologues led discredits Western socio-politics. As Pratt formulates, the philosophy of Islamic revivalism can be drawn out as (1) the return of *Islamic authenticity* to overcome the overriding Western hegemony over the Islamic community in political, economic and socio-cultural domains, (2) *merging religion and politics* to eradicate the mentality of secularism invented by the West and imported by domestic sympathizer to the Western order, (3) the *realization of divine rule of God-Hakimiyya* to countermand the democratic nature of the Western order which places sovereignty of individuals at the centre of political system and (4) *Islamic universalism* as a glue which gathers mankind under the same faith and common fate and refutes Western nationalism that divides people on the basis of artificial boundaries and in nation-states, and imposes individualist mentality.[106] So,

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[105] Sidahmed & Ehteshami, op.cit., pp. 9.

[106] Pratt, op.cit., pp. 156-158.

the proposal of revivalism was the Islamic state based on communal solidarity provided by religion and indirectly refusal of the Western tradition.[107]

In the light of and in parallel with this theoretical setting, the path of Islam is introduced as sine qua non.[108] Revivalism highlights the reason why Islamic world is backward as the deviation from the right way enlightened by Islam. Herein, it could be inferred that revivalism regards the West as responsible for such a deviation which is to be obliterated only by making the religion integral to politics. In other words, revivalism comes up with an obligation to wipe out things un-Islamic through struggling in the name of God and a system of "religio-politics" as a solution.[109].

In running the state, God is attributed the supremacy and sole authority as the creator. Governance is legitimate only if it is in the name of and with the permission of God. The state of play in Islamic world necessitates embarking on a systemic restructuring in line with the Islamic law. In this sense, Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini have managed to orientate the course of Islamist politics via either radical organizations or political activism which incarnated a revolutionary movement against Westernization (*jahiliyya*) and for the sake of Islamization (*hakimiyya*).

2.2.1.2 Realizing Islamic State: Revivalist Methodology

Revivalist activism owes much to the external and domestic dynamics of the time which have already been touched upon in a way:[110] (1) the history of colonialism which culminated to the confrontation between the East and the West, (2) the establishment of Israel as a continuation of the existence of the West, (3) domestic dynamics which reflect the inadequacy of the existing regimes as well as the social stratification between the marginalized and secluded have-nots and dominant elitist

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[107] Ibid, pp. 156-158.

[108] Esposito, op.cit., 1998, pp. 165.

[109] Ibid, pp. 159.

[110] Fluehr-Lobban, op.cit., pp. 79-90.; Mansoor Moaddel, "The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 28, 2002, pp. 370-374.; Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 119-126.

group[111], (4) the Iran Islamic Revolution as the zenith of revivalism. The displeasure arising from those domestic and external reasons urges the masses to look for alternatives. Islamic revival emerged as protest politics against the exploitation of the West and the existing ruling regimes mostly under the auspices of a leading group, organization or figurehead.[112]

In this perspective, based on the thoughts of S. Qutb, M. Mawdudi and R. Khomeini, the theme of Islamic revival revolves around the rejection of the un-Islamic West and Western-inspired regimes and the re-activation of Islam in the social, cultural and political field. To this goal, Mawdudi led Qutb and Khomeini when re-interpreting the declaration of a universal jihad in a world divided into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb.[113] Herein, modeling the Medinian jihad which armed for self-defense against the hostilities,[114] those leading figures of revivalism introduced a revolutionary and revisionist interpretation of struggle in the name of Islam.[115] Qutb involved in a harsh confrontation with the existing political establishment, Mawdudi tried to transform the society by acting in line with the rules of the existing order and Khomeini organized a broad revolutionary social support in his struggle against the order. From this point of view, it could be claimed that the modus operandi of revivalism has set jihad as a religious duty against the un-Islamic world and culture.[116] Only in this way, the ills of modern world could be diagnosed and the ideal "Islamic order" could be realized. So, what is jihad in the mentality of revivalism?

Jihad is defined in the Arabic dictionary as "to make the utmost effort to attain something beloved or to save oneself from something disliked".[117] In line with the objective to serve for Islam, jihad has historically been appealed in different forms.

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[111] Thoman Butko, "Unity through Opposition: Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2004, pp. 34-39.

[112] Choueiri, op.cit., pp. 416.

[113] Noorani, op.cit., pp. 71.

[114] Ibid, pp. 52-57.; Fluehr-Lobban, op.cit., pp. 113-114.

[115] Douglas E. Streusand, "What Does Jihad Mean?", *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1997.

[116] Karim H. Karim, *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence*, New York: Black Rose Books, 2003, pp. 45.

[117] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2004, pp. 161.; Streusand, op.cit.

For example, in the Medinian period, it was employed to save the Muslims against non-Muslims as well as to emancipate one's soul from evils. Starting from the era of the caliphate system, jihad became the strategy to expand Islam. Revivalism has also employed jihad as its methodology to bring back the authentic Islam into governance. In this perspective, comprehending the world as "black and white" between *jahiliyya* and *hakimiyya*, Islamic resurrection interpreted jihad as the way to preserve and extend the boundaries of the latter in the light of the legacy of the Medinian period.[118]

Jihad as understood by the revivalists is ascertained to bring about a radical milieu.[119] It develops an "anti" position towards both the colonialist Western influence and the political establishments which derive from the West substantially.[120] Put another way, it is externally anti-Western and internally anti-elitist. Departing from an anxiety of Christian conspiracy against the Muslims, it calls for an explicit and requisite struggle against unbelief and unbelievers who try to move the Muslim world away from Islamic authenticity.[121] Within this framework, it appeals to a much violent doctrine which resumes a crusader mentality against the West, particularly the USA.[122] This is to state that jihad has recently acquired an extremist/ fundamentalist substance against the West[123] which has been labeled with al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden since September 11.[124] Herein,

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[118] Noor Mohammad, "The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction", *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985, pp. 394-395.

[119] Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*, New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 92.

[120] Dan Wessner, "Addressing Fundamentalism by Legal and Spiritual Means", *Human Rights and Human Welfare*, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 62.; Guilain Denoeux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, pp. 67-69.; Noorani, op.cit., pp. 16-18.

[121] Chorou, op.cit.

[122] Andrew Sullavin, "This is a Religious War", *The New York Times*, 7 October 2001.; Osama Bin Laden, "World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad against Jews and Crusaders", 23 February 1998, http://www.ciaonet.org./cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_28html, 08.07.2008.

[123] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2004, pp. 29-30.; Robert A. Pape, "Dying to Kill Us", *The New York Times*, 22 September 2003.

[124] Bin Laden calls for struggle against the Zionist-Crusader alliance which denoted the collaboration between Israel and the USA. Those powers are claimed to annihilate the authenticity and totality of Islam either by force or infiltration and to suspend the *Shariah*. Bin Laden depicts the occupation of the land of holy places as the zenith of the Western exploitation of Islam and the Muslims. He hereby

as the holy war declared against the crusader West in the eyes of the Islamists, jihad has recently denoted the war of terrorism in the eyes of the Westerners.[125]

Jihad in the path of God is dedicated to topple the illegitimate regimes worldwide and to sustain the Islamicity of governance.[126] To do so, jihad has been configured as: greater/lesser[127] and defensive/offensive[128] jihad.

Firstly, the division between the greater and lesser jihad replies against whom it is waged. The former is the jihad against the one's self which emancipates the soul from the domination of anything un-Islamic. It is incumbent upon every human being anytime in order to be a true Muslim. The latter denotes the holy war engaged against the adobe of war collectively. The Muslims are obliged to wage lesser jihad when the Islamic world is under an attack.

Second division reveals the objective of the jihad revolving around either war or self-purification. To preserve the adobe of Islam against the external and internal evils, defensive jihad is waged. Gramcian approach of hegemony seems instrumental in explaining the defensive nature of revivalism.[129] As mentioned previously, the pre-revivalist political map of the Muslim world underwent an immense transformation process under the auspices of the Western-inspired secularists. The hegemony of the secularists was perceived as a serious threat to the authenticity of Islamic culture

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summons every Muslim to start jihad to push the USA and Israel out of the adobe of Islam. See: Laden, op.cit., 1998. & Osama Bin Laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places", 23 July 1996, http://www.outpost-of-freedom.com/opf980830a.htm, 20.07.2008.; See also, Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 313-322.; John Calvert, "The Islamist Syndrome of Cultural Confrontation", *Orbis*, Spring 2002, pp. 333-334, 345.; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "Osama bin Laden Creates an International Terror Movement", in *The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed(s) Philip Margulies, New York: Greenhaven Press, 2006, pp. 152-163.

[125] Chorou, op.cit.

[126] Mohammad, op.cit., pp. 395-397.

[127] Noorani, op.cit., pp. 16-18.; Roxanne L. Euben, "Killing (For) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action", *Political Theory*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002, pp. 12.

[128] Kassim, op.cit., pp. 49.; Lewis, op.cit, 2003, pp. 31.

[129] Butko, op.cit., 2004, pp. 41-51.

which incited the emergence of a counter-hegemonic movement. As a response to the modernization initiatives of such regimes, Islamists pretended to emancipate the Muslim world from evil-doing and to revive Islam as a total and all-embracing way of life.[130] Activation of Islamist politics meant a shift from secularism to pan-Islamism which rejected Western heritage to maintain Islamic authenticity in the political fabric.[131] This would bring back the ideal universal moral order.

Jihad is waged for offensive purposes, too. Herein, the objective is to preserve and spread the authenticity of Islam to the adobe of war. Being timeless and borderless, jihad lasts until realizing the cause with any means including violence which needs dedicated Muslims to fight for Islam's sake.[132] By flourishing a cult of martyrdom, this reads jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.[133] According to Pipes, the ultimate goal of offensive jihad which is to extend the Muslims dominion to the whole world engenders violence and terrorism.[134] The violent extension of jihad has recently acquired a global perspective which declares struggle against the infidel world to be undertaken till the whole world becomes the abode of Islam.[135]

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[130] Nasr, op.cit., 1998, pp. 32-37.

[131] Sami Zubaida, "Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, pp. 409-413.

[132] Esposito, op.cit., 1998, pp. 165.

[133] Mawdudi argued jihad as the 6th pillar of Islam. See: Noorani, op.cit., pp. 74.

[134] Daniel Pipes, "What is Jihad", *New York Post*, 31 December 2002.

[135] Daniel Pipes, "Jihad through History", *New York Sun*, 31 May 2005.; Sarah E. Zabel, "The Military Strategy of Global Jihad", 2007, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, 15.05.2008.

CHAPTER 3

MAWLANA ABU'L-A'LA MAWDUDI

Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) from Pakistan is an Islamist ideologue who has contributed to a great deal to the foundation of Islamic awakening, and thus is attributed profound reputation.[136] He has influenced his successors substantially including Sayyid Qutb and the going-on of revivalist activism.[137] His intellectual propagation has extended from Morocco to Malaysia, but been efficacious especially in South Asian countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan where he comes from.[138]

According to Nasr, Mawdudi is crucial to comprehend the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism thoroughly as reading his biography tells about the nature and logic of re-discovering Islam in religio-politics.[139] Mawdudi insisted on a new and holy Muslim community, embracing every human being, including all marginalized and secluded people of the system. This is because of the reason that Mawdudi firstly, tried to provide protection to the believers from the elite class of the existing regime who ignored the interests of Muslim community and pursued their own interests. He secondly concerned with stopping submission of Muslims to non-Muslims. This is to state that he came up with a revolutionary ideology which stood against the West; the British colonialism in India in the early 20th century and the Western-inspired

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[136] Krishna Kumar, "Religious Fundamentalism in India and Beyond", *Parameters (US Army war College Quarterly)*, 2002, pp. 22.; Malik B. Badri, "A Tribute to Mawlana Mawdudi from an Autobiographical Point of View", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 494, 501.; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism", in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed(s) Ali Rahnema, New York: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 98.

[137] Esposito, op.cit., 1999, pp. 154-5.; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 2, 1995, pp. 265.

[138] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 98.

[139] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 4.

governments in Pakistan after 1947. As a revivalist, he started with dealing with how to preserve the rights of Indian Muslims in the Hindu-dominated India after the British domination. Upon the partition of India, his focus shifted to how to make Pakistan an Islamic state against M. Ali Jinnah and subsequent leaders who had similar Westernist/secularist ambitions.

When considered in term of the methodology of the thesis, Mawdudi proposes his own epistemology/ontology of the ideal Islamic society and the Islamic Party - *Jamaat-i Islami (JI)-* as the means to realize it. Meanwhile, his point of view of the West is characterized in line with the circumstances in the period of time in India and then in Pakistan. In India, while his concern of the West revolved around his opposition to colonialism in his early career, he started to pay attention to the continuation of the Western tradition via the Western-inspired regimes in the 1920s onwards such as that in modern Turkey which abolished the caliphate and modeled the West. Then, in Pakistan, unlike his universalistic discourse of Islamism, his activism was mostly dedicated to make Pakistan an Islamic state by interacting with the regimes, even if they were Westernist, through the electoral process. In this context, this chapter seeks to analyze what Mawdudi brings about in his revivalist ideology and activism with regard to the West and the Western tradition after introducing his biography in general to grasp how his attitudes towards the West was shaped.

3.1 A Short Biography of Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi

Mawdudi was born in 1903 in Aurangabad located in South India. He had a well-known family with a proud heritage due to its roots in the family of the prophet - *ahlu'l-bayt*. He derived his piety, religiosity and idealism from the legacy of his family. He studied various fields from traditional to modern subjects starting from the early years of his education. In 1915, he moved to Hyderabad with his family and continued to Daru'l-'Ulum. As a result of his own endeavors[140], he became

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[140] "Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979)", http://jamaat.org/overview/founder.html., 20.03.2007.

acquainted with Western thinkers such as Plato, Aristo, Kant, Comte, Hegel, and Marx and alike in order to grasp the scope of modernism and modern scientific ideas as well as traditional Islamic subjects like tafsir, hadith, fiqh, mantiq which provided him a clear understanding of Islam. Studying natural sciences together with religious subjects provided him the opportunity to revolve his ideology around both Western and Eastern thoughts.[141] The course of time proved that his thoughts and works evolved on the basis of Islam.

Regarding his theoretical works, he disseminated his religio-political ideas as a journalist, writer and editor. He wrote in various journals and newspapers such as *Taj* in Jubalpur in early times of his career, *Zamindar* of Lahor that had nationalistic and anti-colonial stance, *Muslim* of the Society of Ulama in India -*Jam'iat-i Ulama-i Hind*. He also published *Tarjumanu'l-Quran* as a forum for his views. In his writings, he came up with a discourse of Islamic politics which has contributed to the re-definition of the social, political and economic roles of Islam in the process of Islamic revival.

His efforts and initiatives were not limited to writing. In parallel with his theoretical studies, he acted as an activist to realize such ideas reflected in his articles starting from the 1920s. In the early years of his interest in politics, he took part in the foundation of the Society for Assistance to Muslim Prisoners -*Anjuman-i I'nat-i Nazarbandan-i Islam*- which helped the Muslim political prisoners and wrote about Indian nationalism in order to mobilize the masses against the foreign rule. He also worked together with the traditional ulama in *Jami'at-i Ulama-i Hind*. Meanwhile, his political sentiments came closer to the nationalist Congress Party of Mahatma Gandhi.

Over time, as his emphasis on religious matters intensified he participated in the Khilafat Movement[142] to preserve the caliphate as the vanguard of the Islamic

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[141] Abdul Haq Ansari, "Mawdudi's Contribution to Theology", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 522.

[142] The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) was a political campaign launched mainly by Muslims in South Asia to oppose to the British hegemony and to protect the Ottoman Empire during the aftermath of World War I. It dissolved together with the abrogation of the caliphate by the modern Turkish state. It could be viewed as a prelude to the consciousness of a Muslim unity in India. See: Seyyed Vali

society. Involvement in the Movement had a crucial role in shaping his thoughts. The appeal to pan-Islamism, efforts to reflect Islam as uniting force of Muslims, advocacy of the institution of caliphate, and hence support to Turkish defense against the European adversaries in Anatolia which would serve for the maintenance of the caliph were the ideas he derived from the ideology of the Movement.[143] Likewise, in the formation of his revivalist stance, the Movement provided him the chance to apprehend what the West meant for the Muslims with its colonialist system and efforts to exploit the Islamic world in cultural, economic and political terms.[144] Therefore, Mawdudi's anti-Western position began to acquire its shape in line with the ideology of the Movement.

His departure was from the critics of nationalism.[145] After joining the Movement, Mawdudi evaluated nationalism as something wrong, misguiding the Muslims such as in Turkey and Egypt as well as in India. In his country, he became anxious about Hindu nationalism which he sympathized hitherto. Then, he objected to the nationalist mentality on the ground that it would override Muslims' interests. Additionally, Mawdudi's opposition to Westernism derived much from the debate on democracy.[146] As a Western input in politics, democratic order would undermine the statuses of Muslims by reinforcing the position of the Hindus because of the demographic imbalances in favor of the Hindus. Therefore, his anti-Western stance urged him to draw apart from the existing order of his country; both from traditional ulama of the *Jami'at* because of its support to Indian nationalist movement which was high likely to serve for Hindus and from the nationalist Congress Party. He generated his own direction in his struggle for the interests of Muslims and with a scope of "neither the traditional establishment nor the Westernists".

Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, http://www.ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/t9j49p32/, 02.05.2008.

[143] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 19-20.

[144] Ibid, pp. 20.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ibid.

In this picturesque, Mawdudi's re-interpretation of Islam evolved through an all-embracing worldview to be realized in an Islamic state based on a religious epistemology.[147] This is to state that he himself envisaged erecting a normative system in which Muslims could enjoy the freedom of living in accordance with their faith. He dealt with achieving the ideal form of governance, but by benefiting from the legacy of the traditional establishment and deriving from Western setting.[148] To this end, he suggested a roadmap based on Muslim communalism against the individualist character of nationalism. In his communalist discourse, Mawdudi ascribed a radical character to his religious revivalism calling for a separate cultural homeland for Islamic community in India which was to break up all of Muslim ties with Hindus in order to purify Islam.[149]

In the light of Mawdudi's theoretical and political thoughts, his activist initiatives which were dedicated to the reconstruction of Islamic way of life brought about more far-reaching repercussions. He institutionalized his ideas through the formation of Jamaat-i Islami with a number of young ulama members and activists. He established the organization in 1941. When Pakistan separated from India in 1947 he migrated to Pakistan to pursue the aim of establishing the true Islamic community. Jamaat also split into several groups such as Jamaat-i Islami Hind, Jamaat-i Islami Bangladesh, autonomous groups in Kashmir and Sri Lanka. The one headed by Mawdudi until 1972 when he suffered serious health problems is called Jamaat-i Islami Pakistan. His revolutionary hallmarks to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state cost him arrests and prisons. Because of his opposition to the then Western-inspired governments, he was sentenced to death in 1953 which was later converted into life imprisonment and cancellation. He died in 1979.

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[147] Ibid, pp. 68.

[148] Ibid, pp. 66.; Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 106.

[149] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 103.

3.2 The Ontological/Epistemological Premises of Mawdudian Political System

When putting forward the basics of the revivalist mentality in his various works and activities, Mawdudi concerns with the persistent social decline and political suppression of the Muslim world. This urges him to focus on the cause of and perpetual solution for the long-standing troubles of Muslims. He asserts the reason to be the deviation from Islam's path due to the domination of the West.[150] Thus, Islamic resistance to the West appears as the solution in Mawdudi's view. Herein, he makes a classification of the world between *jahiliyya* and *hakimiyya* which later inspired and was elaborated by Qutb. Defining the West as *jahili* and opposing to the penetration of its *jahili* system into the Islamic world, he searches for the way to sustain and extend *hakimiyya* against *jahiliyya*. Like Khomeini, he does not concentrate on explicating the characteristics of a *jahili* system. He searches for the way to realize *hakimiyya* which would wipe out *jahiliyya* automatically.

He proposes an Islamic ideology which is revisionist against the expansionist and *jahili* Western world. To clarify the place of the West in Mawdudian ideology, it is important to pay attention to Nasr's argument that Mawdudian revivalism cultivates Islamist politics on the basis of modern political system:[151]

> "Mawdudi's formulation was by no means rooted in traditional Islam. He adopted modern ideas and values, mechanisms, procedures, and idioms, weaving them into an Islamic fabric, thus producing an internally consistent and yet hybrid ideological perspective. Mawdudi's vision was not modern through and through, but purported to modernity; he sought not to resurrect an atavistic order but to modernize the traditional conception of Islamic thought and life. His vision represented a clear break with Islamic tradition and a fundamentally new reading of Islam which took its cue from modern thought."

So, it is inferred from the argument that while presenting Islam as the viable socio-political force that could bring about salvation from the Western yoke, Mawdudi draws out an epistemological framework which adapts the Western tradition to some

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[150] Sajjad Idris, "Reflections on Mawdudi and Human Rights", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 548, 550-552.

[151] Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

degree. In this spectacle, this part of the chapter is going to question how Mawdudi deals with the West and the Western tradition in his theory of government.

3.2.1 The Islamic Genealogy of Mawdudian Ideology

Mawdudi re-interprets the socio-political foundation by elaborating Islam's extensive inclusiveness and totality. From the aspect of theology, law, philosophy and mysticism, he develops an Islamic ideology with a holistic character arranging any aspect of life via religious premises.[152] In addition, he envisions Islam as to embrace everyone without discrimination. This is to state that, in addition to its functions falling into private sphere, Islam offers an ideological set of earthly issues which is ordained to re-shape the society in conformity with the rules it sets.[153] Within this framework, Mawdudi aims to Islamize the outlook of the society in an era when the Westernist/secularists were initiating to Westernize the Muslims.

In the revivalist conception of the world divided into two –Islamic –*Dar al-Islam*- and un-Islamic –*Dar al-Harb*- with clear-cut boundaries between what is Islamic and what is not. He hereby presupposes that even the existing Islamic society has defective characteristics that drive it away from Islamic true path. In this content, Mawdudi's goal is to search for the formula to re-define –*tajdid*- the Islamic society and wipe out *jahiliyya* of the un-Islamic world, the West, completely.[154] He points out the ideal form of Islamic state as the way to attain justice, welfare and hence the ultimate bliss.[155] Put differently, taking Islam as central nurtures the qualifications of purity, beauty, virtue, goodness and prevents injustice, turmoil, cruelty and alike.[156]

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[152] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2005, pp. 26.

[153] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –Al-Tawhid-*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_tui/, 15.12.2007.

[154] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 52-57.

[155] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims - Real Criterion of Islam*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch2top9.html, 10.04.2008.

[156] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Moral System of Islam*, http://www.witness-pioner.org/vil/Article/tazkiyah/themoralsystem.html, 16.05.2008.

Therefore, the Islamic state is introduced as the sole way for the establishment, maintenance and promotion of the virtues that God reveals in Islam and eradication of the evil which exists in the West.[157]

In his theory, such kind of a state is not restricted to geographic boundaries. Instead, its roots are thought to grow into ethics and cultural field.[158] In this sense, opposing to the Western secular culture, Mawdudi does not think of politics and religion as separate phenomena. The logic here lies behind the belief that unless state control is not captured, Islam may be pushed to the margins.[159] So, deriving from the legacy of the prophet's state as the model of pure Islamic form, revival of Islam is ascertained to be the mechanism to overcome such a risk of marginalization for Islam. Mawdudi herewith outlines the roadmap for the realization of the state based on Islamic revelations as to merge political sphere with religion on the basis of:[160] (1) the one-ness and uniqueness of God -al-tawhid, (2) the prophethood meaning that Mohammed is the messenger of God –risala, (3) the institution of the caliphate which represents the unity of the Muslim community -khilafa.

These are described as the fundamental principles of the Islamic state and the body of Mawdudian ideal form of society. They are altogether incorporated into the conception of "God's sovereignty –hakimiyya-" around which Mawdudi's revivalist identity has been shaped.[161] Hakimiyya obviously ensures Islamic transformation of the society in connection with the obedience to God's message to mankind. God is worshipped as the supreme authority and the creator of the universe. This is to state that faith in Islamic intellect forms the boundaries of political ideology and religious works become social actions to attain the ideal socio-political order as a result of which the distortion of authentic Islamic culture by the West and its tradition could

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[157] Ibid.

[158] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 84.

[159] Ibid, pp. 81.

[160] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Political Framework of Islam*, http://www.witness-pioner.org/vil/Article/politics/political_framework_of_islam.htm., 16.05.2008.; See also, Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 89.

[161] Lahoud, op.cit., pp. 51-52.

be automatically overcome. So, Mawdudi's *hakimiyya* thesis could be argued as a thorough counter ideological proposal against the Western political values, especially secularism.

3.2.1.1 Al-Tawhid

Al-tawhid figures out Mawdudi's perception of the world and life.[162] The universe with its flawless existence and adjustments functions perfectly. Organic and inorganic; every creation is designed in a harmony which is the outcome of the command and willingness of the all-knowing, all-wise, all-powerful; omnipotent and omnipresent God who is infinite.[163] Thus, God is the lord of the universe as the creator, designer, controller, governor of the universe.[164] No human and material object is a partner or assistant of him in the process of creation and arrangement of the universe.[165] He is the unique authority deserving worship and obedience.

Within this framework, Mawdudi determines three criteria for godhood by deriving from Quran:[166] (1) Everything is the reflection of the will of the creator which controls the entire universe with immeasurable might. Mankind is not capable of discerning its beginning or end as well as the harmony of its functioning. (2) This might is indivisible, as is held by one sovereign –the creator- who is sole and unique. All authority vests in the hands of him. The sun, the moon, the stars, animals, birds or fishes, matter, money, any man can not have such inexorable power as they are all transient, mortal. (3) So, godhood is exclusive to him and chanting the faith in God is appropriated via *La ilaha illalah* meaning "there is no deity but God". It is *kalimah* as the signpost that human beings are not unbeliever -*kafir (mushrik)*, but true

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[162] Ansari, op.cit., pp. 524-525.

[163] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Four Basic Quranic Terms-Meaning of Ilah*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/shariah/ilah.htm, 10.05.2008.; See also, Ansari, op.cit., pp. 523.

[164] Mawdudi, *Four Basic Quranic Terms-Meaning of Ilah*.; See also, Ansari, op.cit., pp. 524.

[165] Mawdudi, *Four Basic Quranic Terms-Meaning of Ilah*.

[166] Ibid.; See also, Aziz Ahmad, "Mawdudi and the Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1967, pp. 370-372.

Muslims.[167] In this sense, *kalimah* denotes the awakening from ignorance of the divine reality of life or from Mawdudian understanding of *jahiliyya*.[168] Vanquishing the situation of ignorance, *tawhid* incarnates consciousness of the qualities God owns.

Tawhid clearly shows the way to attain tranquility, peace and prosperity in life by resulting to:[169]

- conscious of comprehending the complexity and beauty of the universe which is solely the outcome of a divine will,
- highest degree of self-respect and self-esteem as mankind knows that nothing is above his creator,
- a sense of modesty and humbleness as mankind knows that merit is due to the willpower of God and hence is fearful of shirking,
- the virtuous character,
- prevention of pessimism,
- bravery,
- peace and tranquility.

To cap it all, servitude is due solely to God. It is not for people to decide upon their faith, their existence or ruling of the world. It is the decision by Allah. Therefore, his orders declared in Islam constitute the law to be obeyed. This is the divine knowledge that provides the ultimate bliss and is superior to all other kinds of knowledge.[170] So, the question, hereby, is how to attain this knowledge to grasp the authenticity of life which draws attention to *risala*.

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[167] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –Tawhid: Faith in the Unity of God*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/aqeedah/mautaw1.html, 16.05.2008.; Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims - The Meaning of Kalima Tayyiba*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch1top4.html, 10.04.2008.

[168] Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –Tawhid: Faith in the Unity of God.*; See also, Kumar, op.cit., pp. 22.

[169] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –Effects of Tawhid on Human Life*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/aqeedah/mautaw2.html, 16.05.2008.

[170] Mawdudi, *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam.*; Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims - Essentiality of Knowledge for Being a Muslim*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch1top1.html, 10.04.2008.

3.2.1.2 Risala

While evaluating the conditions encompassing the Islamic world of his time, Mawdudi describes a situation of chaos arising from ignorance of the true knowledge of Islam.[171] Mankind is described with limited independence to attain knowledge which is almighty and related to existence in Mawdudi's understanding.[172] In other words, one needs a vanguard to find out the true path in life as he can not on his own. From this point of view, it makes sense that Mawdudi puts forward "prophethood – *risala-"* as an indispensable input of the ideal Islamic state. *Risala* arises from the need for guidance to arrange the relations between the creator and the created.[173]

In addition to the obvious need of mankind to attain the divine message, Mawdudi reckons the conditions which lead up to the necessity for a prophet:[174] (1) the distortion of the message sent with the earlier prophets as they failed to disseminate God's message thoroughly, (2) the need for a prophet who would leave a trustworthy book of true knowledge. Under such circumstances, prophet Mohammed was assigned to tell the commands of Allah and the deeds to perform or to refrain from. Ultimately, human beings could become capable of differentiating between the believer and unbeliever. This is to state that God's message reached to the whole world with no distortion or falsification which underlines the importance of prophethood.

Covering *risala, kalima -La ilaha Illallah-* is extended to *"La ilaha Illallah Muhammadur Rasulullah"* which means "there is no god but God and Mohammed is the prophet of God". This means that God has appointed Mohammed as his messenger to disseminate his orders and to expound the points written in his book. So, *risala* offers the believers the sole guidance which lights the way for the true

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[171] Mawdudi, Mawlana Abu'l-A'la, *The Finality of Prophethood*, Lahore: The Islamic Publications Limited, 1994, http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/prophet/final prophet.html, 18.04.2008.

[172] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –The Prophethood-*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_tui/chapter3.html, 15.12.2007.

[173] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Message of Prophet's Seerat*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/sunnah/message_of_the_prophets_seerat, 18.04.2008.

[174] Mawdudi, op.cit., 1994.

life.[175] It is intermediation between God and his servants through which human beings learn what their creator wants them to do.

Mawdudi puts forwards two ways for prophet's revelations.[176] First one is the dissemination of the message of the unity of God, of prophecy, of life-after-death and of the fundamental rules and principles life is hinged upon. Second way is signified as revealing adopted rules and obligations to the constantly changing conditions of life. By doing so, he makes Islam a rational religion which prevents dogma and promotes life standards convenient with the needs and demands of mankind. In this sense, Islam clearly makes life easier.

From this point of view, prophethood as such a holy duty is bestowed on Mohammed who is the model for virtuousness, piety and honesty and thus possesses all qualities to be a leader of a whole community as a result of which he undertakes his mission perfectly.[177] Following Mohammed's revelations, in Mawdudi's point of view, provides the opportunity to overcome the chaotic situation arisen due to deviation from Islam and thus remove away the evils.[178] Believing in Mohammed's finality in the line of God's prophets, Mohammedan way is signified to realize the Islamic true path.[179]

3.2.1.3 Khilafa

The concept of *khilafa* relates to the question of who rules in the name of God. It is the delegation of authority by God to the caliph. Then, the caliph rules the mankind in the name of God, in Mawdudi's mind. The caliph exercises the divine authority

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[175] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims -The Purpose of Affirming Faith in Kalima Tayyiba,* www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch1top6.html, 10.04.2008.

[176] Ansari, op.cit., pp. 525-527.

[177] Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam –The Prophethood*.; See also, Ansari, op.cit., pp. 526.

[178] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims - What for Obedience to God?*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch2top10.html, 10.04.2008.

[179] Mawdudi, op.cit., 1994.

granted to him in clear-cut limits when administering the state:[180] (1) The real owner of the estate does not change upon delegation of administration. (2) The administrator is appointed for certain duties the owner instructs. (3) The administrator acts within the limits prescribed by the owner. (4) The administrator executes the will and command of the real owner; he is not authorized to fulfill his own intention. These four conditions, when they are fully fulfilled, guarantee the existence of a just political system as *khilafa* is checked and balanced on the basis of accountability and legitimacy.

Representation of the believers by the caliph stands to be of great importance in Mawdudi's thought. This is because the caliphate system is delineated as a guarantee to the incorporation of the Islamic rules and values within the body of the government which removes the defects of the society.[181] This is because the institution of caliphate affirms the sovereignty and supremacy of God on earth. *Khilafa* in Mawdudi's mind is not attributed to any person, class, dynasty as no one is privileged before God in Islam.[182] It is thought to be an Islamic political system bestowed on the whole community which meets the above-mentioned conditions and is bound with *al-tawhid* and *risala*.[183] So, Mawdudi's theory of state which is based on absolute subordination of society to the *Shariah Law* is realized only through *kilafa.*

Touching upon Mawdudi's involvement in Khilafa Movement with regard to the concept of *khilafa*, he points out the cause of the 20th century turmoil for the Islamic world as the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the doom of the institution of caliphate. Muslim lands were under the military occupation of the West. Very soon, Turkish salvation proved to be an illusion due to the fact that the Western military was dismissed from some part of ex-Ottoman territories; however its socio-political legacy swept away the Islamic dynamics of the system. With the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, newly-born Turkish state cut down the unity of the Muslim world

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[180] Mawdudi, *The Political Framework of Islam.*

[181] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 89-90.

[182] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 94.

[183] Mawdudi, *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam.*

represented by the caliph under the umbrella of same faith and destiny. In addition, most of the Muslim countries were under the colonial rule. The West, by dominating the Islamic world culturally and politically, demolished Islam's heritage and this dragged the Muslims into a long-standing deviation from the true path Islam recommends.[184]

Succinctly, Mawdudi theorizes Islamic basics of political system which are *al-tawhid* reifying one-ness of God, *risala* disseminating God's qualities to mankind and *khilafa* exercising God's authority within the boundaries of *Shariah;* form *hakimiyya* of God. So, Mawdudian proposal for a state necessitates the integrity between politics and religion. In this state formation, Mawdudi's thought provides a solid understanding of the revivalist treatment of the Western political culture. This is because Mawdudi's *hakimiyya* thesis was a strict refusal and thorough refutation of secular traits of the Western tradition.

3.2.2 Mawdudian Islamic State: Opposition to and Derivation from the West

In concern of the reality that mankind has deviated from the straight path of Islam; in his works and activities, Mawdudi longs for returning to Islam in its purified form which is articulated in the Medinian period. To this end, he employs revolutionary roles for Islam that seeks for re-forming the universal social order. The concept of universality, here, implies that he is against restricting Islam to a certain piece of land where Muslims constitute the majority. Embracing every individual and appealing to anything, Islam in the eyes of Mawdudi is to be extended to the whole world by transforming the un-Islamic into Islamic.[185] Hereby, Islamic manifestation of politics in Mawdudi's view is contrary to Western-inspired order hinged on national sentiments, secular way of living and democratic preferences.[186] Still, his vision for the ideal Islamic state revolves around Western orthodoxy. He adapts the Western

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[184] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_UTMV/chapter_one.htm, 16.05.2008.

[185] Mawdudi, *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam.*; Nasr, "op.cit., 2005, pp. 105.

[186] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 4.

tradition while designing the machinery of government.[187] This part of the chapter includes an analysis of in what way Mawdudian theory of Islamic state confronts with and derives from Western legacy.

Mawdudi's definition of the West is shaped in the atmosphere of the 1920s and the 1930s –the interwar years when the West was in turmoil. Worse still; Western unrest extended into the overseas. To epitomize in line with Mawdudi's concerns, the Ottoman Empire was under Western domination which jeopardized the institution of caliphate. Furthermore, South Asia including Mawdudi's homeland India, became subject to the demise of Muslims and the domination of British colonial rule. It was a traumatic experience for the Muslim world that orientated Mawdudi's anti-Western ideas with regard to the dangerous potentialities and incompatibilities the West and Western-inspired settings caused in the Muslim world. By pointing out the West as the source of evil and the horrid fate of the globe, he refused its legacy as a whole.[188]

Mawdudi's opposition to the West is twofold.[189] At first, he is frankly against the Western rule in general and British rule in particular which penetrated into South Asia. Nevertheless, this is not Mawdudi's main anxiety. He draws attention to the fact that the direct rule of the Muslim countries by the West would end together with its military occupation some day. The peril, therefore, lies behind something different which is related to the second aspect of Mawdudi's anti-Western position. Secondly, he is critical of conversion of socio-political order of the Muslim world, Islamic way of life, into a Western-inspired sort. Put differently, the problem is the interference into and conquest of the Islamic tradition by the Western way of life. The consequence for Muslims is the deviation from the true path revealed by the all-wise God. Here, Mawdudi is anxious about invasion of Islamic socio-politics and culture by the permanent influence of the Western tradition. Quoted in Jan, Mawdudi states that:[190]

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[187] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 106.

[188] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam (Jihad fi Sabilillah)*, Chapter 5. http://www.ukim.org/dawah/jihad.pdf, 05.06.2008.

[189] Tarik Jan, "Mawdudi's Critique of the Secular Mind", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 503.

[190] Ibid, pp. 504.

"Even where Muslims are free and sovereign, their freedom is illusionary as they suffer from mental servitude- their academic institutions, their offices, their bazaars, their homes, and even their bodies speak of the West's stamp on them. Whether knowingly or not, they think with borrowed eyes and treads borrowed paths. They have this notion mounted on them that the West alone has the truth. All else is false. Thus, their manners, their standards of decency and morality are of Western origin. Whatever satisfies this yardstick, they take as true."

So, it is inferred from Mawdudi's set of ideas that the freedom of the Muslim world is misleading as it could not manage to get rid of the ideological influence of the West. Hence, Muslims have developed a glimpse of the world and even themselves from the Western point of view. This implies Mawdudi's rejection of Orientalist approaches to the Islamic world.

He emphasizes that the way to emancipate from the West is to cope with it. The Western ideologies can be vanquished only through an intellectual battle which could be won by launching a jihad of word and pen.[191] Jan clarifies that Mawdudi tries to do away with the West and the Western tradition in three ways:[192]

- understanding Western thought,
- establishing Islam's supremacy via Islamic state,
- restoring the morale of the Muslims to re-establish self-esteem of Muslims through removing away degradation of Muslims by the West. In other words, he pinpoints the revitalization of the authenticity of Islam.

In what way Mawdudi grasps Western understanding of the world is grounded on nationalism, secularism and democracy as major inputs of Western political system. While developing the bounds of an ideological state stemming from Islamic principles, he suggests an Occidentalist approach to the West revolving around a

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[191] Badri, op.cit., pp. 494, 498.

[192] Ibid, pp. 503.

discourse of imperialism and distorted culture which was a conspiracy against Islam in socio-political life.[193]

To start with Mawdudi's point of view of *nationalism*, it is defined as the curse resulting to catastrophes for mankind:[194]

> "The catastrophe to which this concept led was witnessed by the world in the form of the First World War. The worshippers of nationalism whose greatest mission in life was to work for the domination of their nation over the rest of the world and who had exalted the nation-state to the position of a god and considered sacrificing all human values at its altar, the acme of human achievement, had to wage a horrible war from 1914 to 1918 during which they turned into beasts thirsty for one another's blood. Entire populations were annihilated and countries laid waste humanity, morality, civilized behavior- all values were trampled under foot."

So, making a division between the strong and weak nations, he warns Islamic community that nationalism as imperialist game figures out power struggle among certain groups of people at the end of which one subordinates to the other and, virtue is sacrificed to ambitions and the realization of interests.[195]

Mawdudi articulated his ideas on nationalism when India was under the influence of Indian national consciousness. Independence from Britain, if attained via Hindu nationalism, would be illusionary as Muslims were in minority demographically.[196] Therefore, the success of Hindu nationalism would not make Muslims masters of their own country. The only difference would be the replacement of the British by the Hindu yoke. Therefore, his opposition to nationalist interpretation of politics was a response to Hinduism and raised the Muslim conscious that they were a nation on their own and integration with Hindus would be improbable. In this sense, nationalism applies to his fear for a culmination to the relative rise of Hindu power in

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[193] Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*.; Jan, op.cit., pp. 512.

[194] Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Abdul-Majid Jaffry, "Mawlana Mawdudi's Two-Nations Theory and the Struggle for Pakistan", http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/mawdudi2.html, 16.05.2008.

the country which, in turn, causes to the marginalization of the Muslims. Converging anti-Western sentiments with Hinduism, he refuses nationalism which he regards as an outcome of British imperialism.[197] So, nationalism is elaborated by stressing on the preservation of Islamic identity from Hindu domination within the framework of *"Two-Nation Theory"* [198] as by Mawlana Mawdudi.[199]

In his years in Pakistan, Mawdudi envisaged the state on the basis of Islam instead of secularist and territorial nationalism of the West. This is to say that, the place of Islam is emphasized in his quest for a national identity: [200]

> "A Muslim is not a Muslim because of belonging to a particular racial group, but because of accepting Islam; and if he renounces Islam he ceases to be a Muslim. Any person who may be a Brahmin, or a Rajput, an Englishman or a Jat, a Punjabi or a Negro, will be incorporated in the Muslim community on accepting Islam, while another person born in a Muslim home is expelled from the Muslim community if he gives up Islam, though he may be the son of a Sayyid or a Pathan."

So, nationalism as an outcome of the Western ideology which distorts the universal harmony of life by inserting strife into socio-political domain under the name of competition and rivalry is refused.[201] Instead, Mawdudi re-formulates nationalism by emphasizing the universal and divine truth that gathers mankind around the same fate

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[197] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World −The Task before the Muslim Summit*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_UTMV/chapter_two.htm, 16.05.2008.

[198] Two-Nation Theory is expressed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1940 in Lahore to clarify the distinctiveness of the Indian Muslims from the Hindus. Based on the legacy of Syed Ahmad Khan and Mohammed Iqbal who are Islamic modernists of the 19th century forming the basis of South Asian Muslim awakening, the theory concludes that the Indian Muslims would not be safe in a Hindu-dominated state system as these two separate nations have divergent needs and interests with different social customs and historical consciousness despite 1000-year of shared life. In this perspective, this theory could be claimed to have been the basis of partition of India for the establishment of Pakistan as an independent Muslim state in 1947. See: "March 23, 1940: The Lahore Resolution", *Pakistan Times,* 23 March 2005.; Samina Mallah, "Two-Nation Theory Exists", *Pakistan Times*, 29 May 2007.; For an evaluation of Hindu- Muslim relations, See. Abduh Adnan, "Pakistan: Creation and Genesis", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 96, 2006, pp. 201-217.; Kumar, op.cit., pp. 25-32.

[199] Jaffry, op.cit.

[200] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslim - Essentiality of Knowledge for Being a Muslim*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch1top1.html, 10.04.2008.

[201] Kepel, op.cit., 2003, pp. 34.

and faith.[202] In this sense, he argues that when considered in terms of the concept of nation, Islamic community is a group of people who are gathered around a common cause. It is *ummah* that needs the umbrella of Islam for unity and integrity as a supranational identity which is ensured via *hakimiyya*.[203]

As the second concern, Mawdudi underlines that one of the chief peculiarities of Islam is its definite contrariness to the *secular mind* of the West. It is derived from the indispensable bonds between Islam and politics as the spiritual and the mundane are intertwined. In examining the moral systems to point out from where the evil is arising, Mawdudi makes a classification between systems based on belief in God and systems devoid of any idea of God.[204] The former has two branches; first one is *"polytheistic morality"* which undermines the principle of *al-tawhid* by adhering to deities other than the omnipotent, omnipresent and supreme God[205], second sort of morality derived from belief in God is *"morality of asceticism"* which provides undoubted moral purity and a noble character to mankind as long as they contemplate the totality of religion arranging any aspect of life.[206] Those systems devoid of any idea of God and arise from secular mind refuse to follow the true path of God by restricting the role of religion to the private sphere of life. This is secular world view which deviates humanity from social morality introduced by Islamic foundation of the system and is completely rejected.[207] Mawdudi's response to secularism is the *hukm* of God which has been surveyed previously.

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[202] Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World.*

[203] Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World –The Task before the Muslim Summit.*

[204] Mawdudi, *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam.*

[205] Mawdudi defines servitude to three sources other than God: servitude of self, servitude of forefathers (family and tribe), servitude to the people including wealthy persons, rulers, religious leaders and alike. See: Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims –"Islam"*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch2top7.html, 10.04.2008.

[206] Making a division between partial Muslims who believe in God but restricts the role of religion to a section of life and full Muslims who appeal to religion as a total way of life, Mawdudi favors the latter due to the reason that believers are obliged to serve for making Islam a universal socio-political order by which the extension of kufr could be stopped. See: Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims –Real Criterion of Islam*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch2top9.html, 10.04.2008.

[207] Jan, op.cit., pp.515-517.

The third point in Mawdudi's critique of as well as adaptation to the West is related to *democracy*. Mawdudi's glimpse of democracy is substantially different from that of the West. Western democracy is based on popular sovereignty which means the source of sovereignty is the individual. People follow their own path and make their own choices. On the other hand, Mawdudi's assertion of democracy is connected to his thoughts on *khilafa*. It is derived from popular *khilafa* which denotes God as the source of sovereignty. Hereby, every individual is the caliph, representative of the creator on earth and in the political establishment. The point is that who follows the true path of Islam which is based on *al-tawhid* and *risala* has the right to get involved in the *khilafa* system. Thus, Mawdudi's vision of democracy is also the derivative of the *hakimiyya* thesis.

Where Islamic sort of democracy begins in *khilafa* system is the suggestion of equality to all mankind. The state is run by the equal participation and agreement of these individuals.[208] The conditionality for realizing Islamic sort of democracy is to implement the command of God. In other words, human beings are required to abide the *Shariah Law* through popular will which can be attained within the Islamic state.[209] As a result, contrary to the Western-style democracy in which the aim is the satisfaction of individuals, Islamic democracy urges the governments to fulfill the will of God. This is Mawdudi's system of theo-democracy.

Mawdudi behaves pragmatically in appealing to democracy. This is to say that democracy from Mawdudi's point of view can be incorporated into the system only if it preserves the rights of Muslims. Hence, in India he opposes to democratic form of governance whereas he favors democratic model in Pakistan. The reason is completely about demography. Mawdudi is against the establishment of democratic order in India as most of the Indians are non-Muslim. Therefore, freedom of self-determination would mean deviation from Islamic rule. In Pakistan, however, he favors democratic model due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim and granting people with the democratic rights would result to

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[208] Abdul Rashid Moten, "Mawdudi and the Transformation of Jama'at-e-Islami in Pakistan" *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 392.; Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 107.

[209] Ibid.

the establishment of the ideal Islamic state.[210] This would be a prelude to change from un-Islamic to Islamic rule in the country. In short, Mawdudi supports democracy as long as it serves for *hakimiyya* and refrains from democracy under circumstances which are likely to culminate in a Western-inspired *jahili* system of government.

In his evaluation of the Western world, Nasr states that Mawdudi's ideal was based on the image of the past but in the shape of the present, modern.[211] Mawdudi's set of ideas has a hybrid character. What he objects to is blind Westernization which is argued to sweep away Islamic identity.[212] He does not refuse modernization when adapted to the Islamic settings. In other words, he wants to Islamize modernity while opposing to the West in cultural terms. This means that Mawdudi borrows much from the West while articulating an anti-Western point of view. To epitomize, he employs a discourse appealing to the West as the other –*kafir*- and an epistemology grounded on revolution, vanguard, ideology, democratic caliphate and theo-democracy which are all related to the Western politics.[213] He envisions a modern form of governance based on Western-inspired system of separation of powers: an elected president, a parliament, a judiciary branch.[214] Also, Mawdudi thinks of a constitution which organizes the relationship among these branches of government in accordance with checks and balances which is guaranteed by the *Shariah*.[215] Nasr claims that such kind of a state resembles a modernized system of traditional doctrine of caliphate in which rulers derive legitimacy from the popular will of the *ummah*.[216] The function of this state -*dawla*- would be to orientate the world -*dunya*- in the light of Islam -*din*.

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[210] Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, "A Meeting with Mawlana Mawdudi", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 95, 2005, pp. 121-122.

[211] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 51.; Nasr, op.cit, 1994.

[212] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 52.

[213] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 106-111.

[214] Ibid, pp. 106.

[215] Badri, op.cit., pp. 499.; Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 90-91.

[216] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 80, 93.

To cap it all, Islam as Mawdudi regards has the command to do away with the un-Islamic orders by incarnating a revolution to alter the outlook of life and mentality of mankind. This is the prelude for the ultimate bliss of mankind. This also eliminates disorganization, indiscipline, anarchy, disunity, injustice and social imbalance all of which result to immorality and evil.[217] In praxis, Islam itself manages through statehood. What Mawdudi suggests for realizing the ideal state based on Islam is to reject Western rationalism based on positivism which restricts religion to spiritualism by defining a separate mundane, nature-based sphere that invests on individualism. So, secularism which is the milestone of rationalism would be eliminated in reinforcing the supremacy of God to create one Islamic nation, *ummah*, to be governed by Islamic-based democracy.

3.3 The Methodology to Realize the Ideal Islamic State

Mawdudi announces a revisionist strategy against the abode of war including not only the West but also the political establishment in the Muslim world exposed to the Western influence. He favors an Islamic revolution via jihad dedicated to the incarnation of the universal Islamic state. Whereas he puts forward the theoretical aspect of jihad with a universalistic trait, his performance does not transcend his state. In addition, notwithstanding the call for a revolutionary religious activism, Mawdudi's works in praxis does not rise against the state. Differing from Khomeini and Qutb, he calls for an Islamic movement which necessitates being a part of Pakistan's political system in order to Islamize the state from within the system. Therefore, Mawdudi concentrates on Pakistan in respect of geography. He does not pay attention to the rest of Pakistan. His goal is to balance the relations of JI with the ruling regimes in order to incorporate Islamic precepts into the system. In doing so, he expects to sweep away the Western influence upon Pakistan.

Taking into account the fact that Mawdudi's focal point is Pakistani politics, it could be argued that in spite of the universality claim of Mawdudian methodology in rhetoric, it does not target the West directly. Instead, his methodology delimits its

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[217] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam-Moral System of Islam*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_EVI/part2.htm, 16.05.2008.

aim to de-Westernization of Pakistan's socio-politics. To this goal, what kind of a strategy does Mawdudi envisage to cope with the Westernists? As well, what can be inferred from the roles and influence of JI in Pakistani politics during Mawdudi's leadership regarding the characteristics of Mawdudian methodology in responding the Western-inspired regimes?

3.3.1 Mawdudi's Precepts for an Islamic Revolution

Islam as a revolutionary doctrine aims to achieve a universal application under the umbrella of independent statehood freed from the evils and foreign interference. Mawdudi's concern is to find out how to realize such statehood in a constant warfare against the un-Islamic world. In this sense, jihad as holy war is regarded to be the roadmap to struggle against as the unholy world. That is why Milton-Edwards explains Mawdudi's understanding of Islam within the framework of revolution and struggle as a transition from Islamic modernism of the 19th century, described as pre-fundamentalism, to fundamentalism or the process of Islamic resurrection.[218] In addition, Jaffry calls Mawdudi as one of the most vigor crusaders for the cause of Islam with his contributions to the recent rise of Islamism as a scholar, reformer, revolutionary, leader and Islamist thinker.[219] Still, Mawdudi does not stand against the West itself, but the Western-inspired regimes at home. Also his opposition through an Islamic revolution does not entail a radical strategy in its premises contrary to Qutb's and Khomeini's methodology.

In this context, collaboration between cognition and activism is required for a revolution.[220] The former relates to Islamic knowledge of *tawhid*, *risala* and *khilafa*. In establishing the true Islamic state, Mawdudi's revolutionary ideology seeks for the removal of the existing *jahili* societal structure to exclude the West in favor of

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[218] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2005, pp.20-30 & 92-99.

[219] Jaffry, op.cit.

[220] Badri, op.cit., pp. 493.

Islamization of the society.[221] Activism is necessary to eradicate cultural and moral degradation as well as political unrest which are integral to the Western tradition. Mawdudi believes that it is the duty incumbent upon every Muslim to serve for God –*ibadat*- and to fight against the un-Islamic world.[222] From this point of view, he puts forward forms of action which attributes revolutionary character to revivalism by calling for a new sort of jihad.[223] So what is the strategy to found such a state?

Mawdudi does not purport a violent method, instead favors re-formation of the socio-political conglomeration to purify it from the exotic, Western tenets.[224] At this juncture, Nasr comments that demonstrating the influence of the West upon his activism, Mawdudi envisions an evolutionary path through activism inspired by European-style political parties.[225] He established Jamat-i Islami in Pakistan to realize his theory of theo-democracy which has acted in legality in national politics.[226] This implies the fact that he aims to transform the socio-politics from within constitutional order of the system.[227] He also calls the prophet as the greatest revolutionary, but by referring to his patience and pacifism which makes the process smoother than that of a revolution. So, the method to be employed gains a gradual character in Mawdudi's mind.[228]

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[221] This implies the fact that Mawdudi's political theory proposes a down-to-top process in which the state formation is managed by the previously Islamized society. See: Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 106-107.

[222] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Four Basic Quranic Terms-Ibadah*, http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/M_four_term/t4_ibadah.htm, 10.05.2008.; Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims –"Salah" (Prayer)*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch3top12.html, 10.04.2008.

[223] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims –"Jihad"*,, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_foi/ch7top28.html, 10.04.2008.

[224] Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam (Jihad fi Sabilillah)*, Chapter 1.

[225] Kepel, op.cit., 2003, pp. 35.; Despite resembling Western-style political parties, JI has viewed itself as a community of Muslims, not a political party. See: Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 113.

[226] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 69-72.

[227] Moten, op.cit., pp. 69.

[228] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution –The Method of Islamic Revolution*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_PIR/part2.htm, 16.05.2008.; See also, Kepel, op.cit., 2003, pp. 24.

In its gradual path, Mawdudian sort of revolution is carried out through both offensive and defensive jihad.[229] Offensive jihad encompasses the whole world in order to succeed universal applicability of Islam as a total way of life.[230] Thus, Mawdudi recalls fight against the un-Islamic world to transform the political system in line with God's sovereignty.[231] Defensive Islamic struggle is delineated to target the corrupt governments in order to exterminate wrong-goings such as usury, injustice, oppression and alike.[232] It is political struggle to capture the authority which is necessary to come up with the ideal Islamic socio-political order.[233] However, Mawdudi complains about the fact that Muslim world does not recognize those who are known as benefactors, are not serving for Islam, get involved in an unholy war.[234] They fight not in the name of God and in conformity with Islam, but for the sake of their earthly interests. That's a point in his struggle against the Westernist regimes which, according to Mawdudi, pursue their self interests at the expense of the needs and demands of the society.

Henceforth, it is essential to analyze how Mawdudi's activism has been put into practice against such regimes. This is going to clarify Mawdudi's and hence JI's influence upon Pakistani politics when interacting with secularist as well as Islamist government.

3.3.2 Mawdudian Revolution in Praxis: Jamaat-i Islami

Jamaat-i Islami which became Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan in 1947 is the institutional platform Mawdudi drew out. By JI, he envisaged to initiate a mass movement based on Islamic revelations, inspired by prophet's experience and revolved around strong

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[229] Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam (Jihad fi Sabilillah)*, Chapter 3.

[230] Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam (Jihad fi Sabilillah)*, Chapter 3.; Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, "Has the Prayer Lost its Power?", http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/ibadah/plp.html, 16.05.2008.; See also, Moten, op.cit., pp. 393.

[231] Mawdudi, *Let Us Be Muslims –"Jihad"*.

[232] Ibid.

[233] Ibid.; For Mawdudi, jihad which means struggle, not war in the name of Islam would be legitimate only when is declared by the government. See: Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 74.

[234] Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam (Jihad fi Sabilillah)*, Chapter 1.

and central leadership with a view to undertake the Islamic revolution.[235] He drew out an activist role for JI to Islamize the politics in newly-established Pakistan through a number of roles and functions and a Western-style organizational character, but against the secular worldview of the dominant Muslim League.[236]

To start with the organizational chart of JI which was shaped throughout the 1950s and is still in force, it gives prominent clues about the nature of Mawdudian activism.[237] Revolved around a constitutional basis, JI bureaucratized at both national and local levels. At the centre were there (1) the *ameer* as its head, (2) *majlis-e-shura* -the consultative assembly- commissioned to balance the acts of *ameer,* (3) *majlis-i amilah* -the executive council– as the arbiter between the *ameer* and the *shura*, and (4) the secretary general together with *karkun* -the workers– to administer the day-to-day activities of the organization. Local structure modeled the hierarchical order of the centre in its institutional structure. Resembling to his democratic caliphate thesis, the institutionalization of JI revealed the centrality of a vanguard to direct the masses by receiving its legitimacy from the consultation in the assembly and through direct vote by the members of the Jamaat.[238] In addressing the masses, popular support grew tremendously in the course of time in three categories; by first getting familiar with JI's message, second being influenced by its message and third sympathizing its message.[239] As a result of its intensive activities, JI's appeal extended both geographically in the whole country and thematically covering all the societal rights and concerns of women, students, workers and alike.[240] This demonstrates the fact that JI has regarded itself as representing the *ummah,* but through Western-originated circles.[241]

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[235] Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution –The Technique of Islamic Revolution*, www.witness-piooner.org/vil/Books/M_PIR/part3.htm, 16.05.2008.

[236] According to Nasr, JI played a central role in legitimating the governance in Pakistan on the basis of Islam when the state was in need of relying on Islam as the very social glue for the national unity. See: Nasr, op.cit., 1995, pp. 268-270.; Nasr, op.cit., 1994.; See also, Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 374.

[237] For a thorough evaluation of organizational structure of JI, see: Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

[238] Nasr, op.cit., 1996, pp. 77.

[239] Moten, op.cit., pp. 392.

[240] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 112.

[241] Ibid.

As well as the organizational structure, the nature of activism of JI also derived from the West. At first, following the partition of India in 1947, JI made up its field of activity through a nation-state approach. It appealed to the nation-ness concept whose basis was the common Islamic identity within the boundaries of Pakistan.[242] Even the branches of JI in India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the missions in the UK and the North America defined their field of activity within the territorial boundaries of states they settled in.[243]

In this context, the second Western-inspired peculiarity of activism Pakistani JI employed comes to the fore. It involved in the system as a political actor similar to those in the West. Pakistani JI aimed at reforming individual and societal life and the government as set by the 1949 Objectives Resolution that defined the characteristics of the future constitution and was accorded in the four-point plan of 1951. To this end, JI has involved in the political process starting from the Punjab provincial elections of 1951 and arranged its relations with the governments on the basis of their reference to Islam.[244] As well, it acted as a pressure group via public meetings to mobilize the massive support for the objective of Islamizing the state.[245] In the aftermath of Machi Goth affair which encountered with the release of Mawdudi from the prison, JI ramped up its efforts to become a part of the political system and focused on the elections in order to make more influential pressure upon the regime and not to be pushed out of the constitutional process.[246] The Jamaat was active in the making of the 1956 constitution in order to enunciate the religious character of the state through Islamic constitutionalism.[247] This denotes the fact that Mawdudi's strategy was reified as "politicizing for Islamizing" rather than confrontation with the system. So, unlike the strategy of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that obviously confronted with the regime and met with the harsh and oppressive policies of the

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[242] Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

[243] Nasr asserts that activating the doctrine of universalism of Islamic politics at the national level reveals the conundrum of Western influence upon JI and Mawdudi. See: Ibid.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Moten, op.cit., pp. 394-395.

[246] Ibid., pp. 396-397.; Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

[247] Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and the Constitutional Problem of Pakistan", *Studia Islamica*, No. 32, 1970, pp. 275-287.

government, JI longed for capturing the political authority by involving into the system. This was expected to be much more efficacious to realize ideal Islamic order. Going ahead with the political fluctuations of Pakistan, the governments checked and controlled the activities of JI whenever it raised its impact on politics. For instance, in 1958 when JI won 19 seats in Karachi elections which were assumed to be an incrementally increasing political success for the organization[248], a coup by General Iskandar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan came up with a martial law and a new constitution in 1962. JI's relations with Ayub Khan did not push the organization to the margins. This is due to the reason that though Ayub Khan overwhelmed the country with a secularist perspective, JI's all endeavors to challenge the authority of the regime was through political means.[249] For instance, it took place in the Combined Opposition Parties to participate in the presidential elections of 1965.

JI had to wait till the end of the 1970s when a religious coup by Zia ul-Haq was undertaken. The 1970-71 restoration of civilian government which promulgated the third constitution of Pakistan in 1973 did not mean that Islamic bases of the system would be reinforced. In spite of the incorporation of Islamic moral orders into the constitution and of "Islamic" as part of the official name of the state, the political power vested in the hands of Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto introduced an Islamic socialist world view which could be claimed to have vanquished the moral orders of Islam in praxis.[250]

The rejection of the Pakistanis and the opposition by a 9-party coalition including JI under the name of "Pakistan National Alliance" brought the Bhutto regime to the end in 1977. The elections held in 1977 resulted to 9 seats of the Alliance's 36 seats on the side of JI in the parliament. Furthermore, the military intervention led by Zia ul-Haq in 1977 was a turning point for the Islamization of Pakistan as well as JI's effectiveness in politics. Sympathizing Mawdudi's ideas, Haq collaborated with the Islamic parties together with JI. Thus, the organization could find the opportunity to

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[248] Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Bhutto's manifesto of Islam regards Islam as the faith, democracy as the polity and socialism as the economic system of the state. See: Ibid.

be an influential political player to Islamize the state.[251] Yet, Haq's dictatorial imposition of Islam diverged with the goal and strategy of JI which sought for launching the democratic process from 1988 onwards.[252]

To conclude, its evolution within the system shifted the revolutionary character of JI's activism to political competition with a religio-political programme as a political party.[253] JI transformed into a legal opposition movement while demeaning on Islamization of Pakistani politics.[254] Mawdudi's delineation of activism to revive Islam as politics differs much from the experience in Iran and Egypt in the sense that he opted for involving in the system rather than imposing a direct challenge to it through violent means.[255] Even in concern of the Ahmadi people in Pakistan who regard themselves as Muslims with a belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim that he experienced the divine revelation, Mawdudi did not back up the violent opposition to these people.[256] Instead, departing from the argument in his book "The Ahmadi Problem -*Qadiyani Masalah*-" that Ahmadi people were non-Muslim and deviated from the seal of the prophet; he claimed that Islamization of Pakistan would make them purely Islamic by introducing the seal of the prophet into their lives.

So, deriving some certain peculiarities from the Western tradition, Mawdudi's activism was mostly about the adjustment of JI's relations with the political regimes at home according to their worldview, whether Islamist or Westernist. However, the strategy to Islamize Pakistan from within the system seemed not to have a big impact on Pakistan's political atmosphere when taking into account JI's limited success in the elections.

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[251] For an in-dept analysis of JI's relations with Haq regime, see: Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamaat-i Islami, 1977-1988", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1993, pp. 261-281.

[252] Abdullah Ahsan, "Pakistan since Independence: A Historical Analysis", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, 2003, pp. 364-365.; Moten, op.cit., pp. 400.

[253] Nasr, op.cit., 1995, pp. 273-274.

[254] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Islamic Opposition in the Political Process: Lessons from Pakistan", in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform*, ed(s) John L. Esposito, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 136-138.

[255] Nasr, op.cit., 2005, pp. 120-121.

[256] Nasr, op.cit., 1994.

CHAPTER 4

SAYYID QUTB

Sayyid Qutb İbrahim Husayn Shandili (1906-1966) from Egypt is accepted as one of the leading figures in inciting fundamentalism.[257] He shed light on the revivalist movement through his works that draw out an ideal system relying on Islamic ordinance. The hindrances to his ideal lead up to a condition which he calls "ignorance". In Qutb's understanding, mankind suffers the danger of a complete *jahili* condition caused by the absence of the morality and vital values for a healthy life and development.[258]

In this framework, the Western tradition is introduced in Qutb's thought as bankrupt and exerting its corrupt culture.[259] Qutb purports that Western-inspired way of life draws the Muslim world apart from the straight path enlightened in Islam. Therefore, he opposes to any cultural influence of the West on the Islamic community. This is why he strictly criticizes the Muslim community in general and Egyptian society in particular when imitating the West. As a way out, he re-interprets Islam's role in man's life in order to call the human beings for back to the absolute justice and bliss Islam offers.

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[257] Calvert, op.cit., 2002, pp. 335-349.; Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 93.; Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror", *New York Times*, 23 March 2003.; Ronald Nettler, "A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb's Introduction to the Tafsir, fi Zilal al-Quran", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1994, pp. 102.; Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 521.; William E. Shepard, "The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of Social Justice in Islam", *Die Welt Des Islam*, Bd 32, Nr. 2, 1992, pp. 196.

[258] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-milestone.pdf, 10.02.2008, pp. 1-7.

[259] Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb*, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1995, pp. 26-29.

So, this chapter is going to evaluate the role and influence of Sayyid Qutb to figure out where the West is placed in the mentality of Islamic resurrection. The first part will concern who Sayyis Qutb is in general. Second part will deal with the ontology of his ideological orientation which revolves around a division between *jahiliyya* – ignorance of Islamic way of life- and *hakimiyya* –the ideal Islamic order. In this spectacle, Qutb underlines the West as a part of the former driving the Muslim world away from Islam. Within this framework, Qutb proposes jihad as the methodology to defend against the West and to build up the ideal Islamic order.

4.1 A Short Biography of Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb was born in 1906 in Musha -a village in Asyut province located in southern Egypt. He belongs to a family which was making life through land and bound with a thorough religious worldview. He involved in religious matters at early ages. For instance, he memorized the Quran when he was ten. He received a distinctive education. He finished his primary education in the village at a school sponsored by government and then moved to Cairo to complete his education. In his autobiography -*A Child from the Village-*, Qutb depicts the aim of leaving the village for Cairo as a prelude to his struggle in the name of God he involved in later in his life:[260]

> "The time came for him to leave the village…There was a task that awaited him, and he was like a soldier prepared for the struggle, drafted for this task… things had quieted down and he had become strong, and the task for which he had been drafted urged him on, so let him travel with the blessing of God."

In Cairo, he studied at a teacher's college until 1928. After the college, he continued his education in Dar al-Ulum, a Western style university, until 1933. When he graduated, he started his career initially as a teacher and then worked as an inspector at the Ministry of Education until 1953 when he resigned.

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[260] Sayyid Qutb, *A Child from the Village (Tifl min al-Qarya)*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004, pp. 135.

Sayyid Qutb was originally a Muslim secularist.[261] During his education and his professional life, Qutb took place in the modernist trend of Egypt. Egyptian modernism of the time was depicted in the literature which focused on individual expression and innovation and it was in sharp contrast with tradition.[262] Qutb took part in Egyptian modernist literature by composing poetry in European Romantic-style and making up anthology of them. Such early works were based on a frank predilection of the "*modern*" to the *"traditional"*.[263] However, they were not the works of him that brought him the great reputation.

The 1930s and the 1940s were the decades when he dwelled upon the theme of Islam by getting involved in political debates regarding the role of Islam in Egypt. Qutb brought forward a moralist approach to the issue by discussing the reasons for moral decline of Egyptian society and pointing out greater awareness of ethics based on Islamic values as a solution. It was an introduction to his glance signifying an Islamic community.[264] At the same time, he was exploring the connection between the practical life of mankind and the promise of Islam to the community. In this context, such ideas evolved into a cause which called for an Islamic foundation.

Towards the end of the 1940s, the Ministry of Education sent him to the USA for a research on the Western methods of education. In the USA, he studied at Wilson's Teachers' College and won a MA degree at the University of Northern Colorado. His experience in the USA from 1948 to 1950 orientated his thoughts substantially. "*The America I Have Seen*" that he wrote in the light of his experiences in the USA reflected his approach to the West and the Western culture. Qutb's idea of the West was twofold; technically developed but culturally primitive and backward, put differently *jahili*.[265] He had a definite response to such a system: *to be rejected*.[266]

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[261] Shepard, op.cit., 1992, pp. 199-200.

[262] John Calvert, "The Individual and The Nation: Sayyid Qutb's Tifl min al-Quarya (Child from the Village)", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 90, 2000, pp. 112.

[263] Ibid.

[264] Charles Tripp, "Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision", in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed(s) Ali Rahnema, New York: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 156-57.

[265] Luke Loboda, The Thought of Sayyid Qutb, Ashbrook Statemenship Thesis, 2004, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/thesis/loboda/loboda.pdf, 12.07.2008, pp. 1.

The 1950s was the turning point in Qutb's career. He underwent most of his initiatives as an ideologue and an activist of the Islamism movement of the 20th century. In this period, Sayyid Qutb influenced Islam's role and influence in the political sphere both with his writings and as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)–*Jamaat-al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*. Upon his return to Egypt, Lobodo claims that, his rejection of the West made him join the MB whose ideological foundation was anti-Westernist.[267] Also, he started producing his profound writings which shaped the frame of "Islam" as a comprehensive political way of life, not only a spiritual phenomenon. His works were gradually becoming radical in criticizing the existing order in the then-political system of Egypt. His target was obviously the Western-inspired secularist regimes in power.

The relationship between the MB and the state directed the way for Qutb in building his career. From the inception, the organization challenged King Faroq's secularist monarchy with its Islamist and anti-Western cause. Therefore, the King banned the MB in 1949 and sentenced its leader al-Banna to death. Qutb succeeded al-Banna in a short time.

Meanwhile, although it had divergent stance regarding the role of Islam in society, the MB acted in close cooperation with the Free Officers' Movement[268] to topple the monarchy. After a successful coup d'etat at overthrowing the King in 1952, the Free Officers separated themselves from the MB. Furthermore, Gamal Abd'al Nasser, -the then nationalist leader of the state- arrested its leaders including Qutb in 1954. It was the beginning for Qutb's imprisonment as well as the most productive years. He

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[266] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 74.

[267] Ibid, pp. 2.

[268] Upheld by young army officers and led by Gamal Abd'al Nasser, the Free Officers' Movement was established in 1949 with the goal of toppling the pro-British monarchy in favor of a republican rule. To this end, the Movement undertook a successful coup d'etat on 23 July 1952, known as July 23 Revolution. After 3-year transitional period, the legal framework of the new regime was set froth with the 1954 Constitution. A presidential system was founded in 1956. to guarantee the new system, the Movement purged the opposition as well as the MB. The 23 July Revolution opened a new phase in Egyptian history which was marked out by Arab nationalism and socialism. It also did inspire many third world countries in involving in an anti-colonial struggle against the existing corrupt regimes. See: Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1992.

matured the notion of a thorough Islamic community and his strategy to attain this holy goal which turned into a radical gaze over time.

The full picture appeared in his book *"Milestones"* or *"the Signposts on the Road - Ma'alim fi al Tariq*. The content of Milestones laying the foundation of Qutbian genre of radicalism became instrumental in the upcoming Islamic radicalism. The struggle Qutb called for in Milestones in the name of God –*jihad*- was comprehensive covering the regime at home and societies all over the world in order to realize *hakimiyya* of God dubbed as to establish the universal Islamic community. This associated him with extremism that justified any means including armed struggle to realize the Islamic regime.[269] Thus, Outb was perceived as a threat to the Pan-Arabist regime at home. He was accused of committing a conspiracy to overthrow the regime. Thereupon, he was hung in 1966.

4.2 The Ontological Premises of Outbian Political System

Sayyid Qutb is an ideologue inspiring the Islamic awakening in the 1960s onwards. In Qutb's set of ideas, there are two questions discussed regarding the world order: "what is?" and "what is to be done?". In this context, he firstly makes a comprehensive ontological analysis of the existing world. Put another way, he makes an interpretation of the world which takes shape on the basis of his key concept, the age of ignorance; *jahiliyya*. Qutb brings up this term as a condition which overruns the whole world by making mankind suffer primitiveness and backwardness in cultural sphere; for this reason, should be removed away in order to offer ease and spiritual satisfaction to mankind.

Departing from the *jahili* structure, he takes into account the second question. Namely, Qutb takes on a normative role as an ideologue. He searches for the diagnosis for the ills of the society culminated by *jahili* conditions. Qutb urges mankind to the absolute return to Islamic order which is the unique and sole basis of

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[269] Berman, op.cit.

the ideal Islamic community or the *ummah*. This community is bound with the command of God; *hakimiyya*.

In this respect, Sayyid Qutb divides the world into two: *jahiliyya society* persisting all over the world and *Islamic society* as a goal to be attained. All the systems hinged on any foundation other than Islam is called *jahili*. The concept of *hakimiyya* is central to the issue of *jahiliyya*. Once *hakimiyya* of God is established and reinforced upon mankind, the state of *jahiliyya* can be overcome. So, there is obviously a situation of "either/or" in Qutbian system which presumes a confrontation between and refuses any sort of mixing of *hakimiyya* and *jahiliyya*.[270] Hereby, Western culture is included in the evil side resulting to *jahiliyya* and as to be removed away to realize Islamic ordinance. Henceforth, it is essential to make an analysis of Qutbian interpretation of the world in terms of *jahiliyya* and premeditation of an ideal Islamic society within the limits of Islamic law by taking a full picture of the West in the eyes of Qutb.

4.2.1 The State of Ignorance -Jahiliyya

Jahiliyya as contemporary condition does not originate, but is further developed in its final and radical form in Qutb's ideas.[271] Touched upon in mostly the late works of Qutb, *jahiliyya* means that the contemporary world is guided by a source other than Islamic rules and values. Hereby, Qutb's contribution to *jahiliyya* thesis is to adopt the *jahili* condition of pre-Islamic era to modern times. For Qutb, the "state of ignorance" which was dominant in pre-Islamic Arab world embodies the contemporary Islamic world due to the absence or refusal of Islam's main message.[272] He claims that modernity brings about alienation due to the fact that the spiritual dimension of mankind which seeks to discover the divinity of universal order is ignored as human beings have become creatures driven by economic,

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[270] Sayyid Qutb, "The Right to Judge", http://islamworld.net/docs/justice.html, 18.04.2008.; Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 525.

[271] Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 523-524.

[272] Mayer, op.cit.; Shephard equates "state of ignorance" with barbarism and a tendency to move through extremes. See: Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 522.; William E. Shepard, "The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb", *Religion*, Vol. 27, 1997, pp. 255.

political and social needs only.[273] Mankind, in this sense, is claimed to have forgotten Islam's totality and hence the source of authority which is the supremacy of God as the creator of the universe. So, modern version of *jahiliyya* is asserted to have links with social, organizational and collective matters characterized by frivolity which tears people away from their fundamental nature.[274] *Milestones starts* with Qutb's explanation of the sufferings of contemporary societies under these circumstances:[275]

> "Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of destruction which is hanging over its head …but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary for its healthy development and real progress."

The term "value" recalls what Islam has introduced and all other systems are destitute of. As is the case in revivalism, Outb perceives the world on the basis of a binary opposition between the true Islamic system and all other systems categorized according to the way people worship God, his omnipotence, creatorship and divinity.[276] In a constant struggle against each other, Islamic order manifests the cause to call people for straight path of God whereas other systems would lead people to deviant ways.[277] He herewith claims that all current societies are surrounded by the state of *jahiliyya*[278] and classifies them in *Milestones as*:[279]

    i.   *Communist regimes*[280] that refuses the existence of God and prefers to explain the universe in terms of dialectic materialism. History is defined as a class struggle between the labor force and the capital owners which

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[273] Lee, op.cit., pp. 86-87.

[274] Ibid, pp. 87-88.

[275] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp.1.

[276] Qutb, op.cit., 1996, pp. 8-9.

[277] Ibid.

[278] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 14, 75.

[279] Ibid, pp. 75-81.

[280] Ibid, pp. 75.

constitute the core of life and guides the course of history with an expectation for victory of the Communist Party to be submitted. The practical consequence of such thoughts is the comprehension of a world order without the spiritual nature of mankind which is in need of the divine rule. This reduces mankind to the status of an animal which does also have no spiritual needs. Therefore, a communist regime is obviously *jahili*, ignorant of the command of God.

ii. *Idolatrous societies*[281] which worship gods other than God and are guided by laws and rules whose source is not divine.

iii. *Christian and Jewish world*[282] falls into *jahili* category. Despite, as the people of the book, worshipping the supremacy, divinity and omnipotence of God and they have distorted the original beliefs by shirking from the one-ness of God which is the unforgivable sin in Islamic ordinance. Both religions attribute the qualities of God to other beings. For instance, Ezra in Jewish belief and the Messiah in Christian belief are ascribed sonship of God who is not born and does not bear (Quran 9:30). In addition, man-made rules and values of the Christian world such as secularism, nationalism, and democracy are entirely deviant from Islamic conception of a just and faithful society.

iv. *Current Muslim societies*[283] that are not in compliance with divine command as they drew apart from the true path Islam signified in the Medinian state in the 7th century.

So, *jahiliyya* covers Qutb's perception of the West, the Nasser's regime at home and the whole Muslim world and also the Soviet Union whose shared characteristics are the ignorance of the true knowledge of Islam and preference of other sources of authority to divine authority. All those systems which are far from Islamic tradition are claimed to have come to grief to provide mankind the ultimate bliss. This is because such systems bring about servitude of man to man by challenging the rule of submission to God, either by refusing him or believing in other deities which, in turn,

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[281] Ibid.

[282] Ibid, pp. 76-77.

[283] Ibid, pp. 77-78.

offers nothing more than darkness caused by false opinions, superstitions, alienation, untrue desires and moral principles.[284]

The way out of *jahiliyya* is introduced as the ability of human beings to get rid of their ignorance of the divine truth by modeling the Medinian experience.[285] To reincarnate the Medinian soul, Qutb asserts, mankind should comprehend the reasons of the prophet's success. Those reasons are summed up as (1) to take the Quran as the guideline of Islamic faith as well as practical life in order to avoid the influence of untrue sources and (2) to show decisiveness to cut off *jahiliyya* by struggling against anything that violates the Islamic-based life.[286] Then, the Islamic state emerges to highlight the laws and regulations that Muslims need to meet their spiritual as well as the physical needs.[287] This is to state that the true Islamic knowledge is the cure for *jahili* structure of societies. From now on, in the light of the clarifications related to Qutb's analysis of the existing nature of world societies, the place of the West as *jahili* is going to be further discussed.

4.2.1.1 Negation of the West in Qutb's Epistemology

Qutb ignores the diverse nature of Western tradition including for instance, capitalism versus Marxism, Christianity and Judaism, fascism versus democracy. He regards the West as a single cultural entity and places the Christian West in *jahili* system at the opposite of which is there Islam and the East.[288] The West not only is unaware of the divine truth of the universe but also undertakes efforts to disperse its system of ignorance all over the world. So, in his search for the way of preserving

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[284] Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 526.

[285] Lee, op.cit., pp. 88.

[286] Hendrik Hansen & Peter Kainz, "Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, pp. 60.

[287] Shahrough Akhavi, "The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1997, pp. 381.

[288] Lawrence Wright, "What Turned Sayyid Qutb Against America?", *History News Network*, 1 January 2007, http://hnn.us/articles/31478.html, 15.07.2008.

Islamic culture, honor and language from the Western threat[289], Qutb, in the later years of his career, develops a two-dimensional approach of the Western system: (1) the cultural distortion stemming from its systemic characteristics which are un-Islamic and (2) its penetration into Muslim way of life that results to demolition of authentic Islamic tradition. In this perspective, Qutb defines two sources of enmity for Islam, one is foreign, or the West dubbed as imperialist, colonialist, capitalist, crusader and missionary and the other is indigenous, Western-inspired regimes.[290]

4.2.1.1.1 The West as Foreign Enemy

To elucidate cultural degeneracy of the West, Qutb's image of the West owes much to his educational experience in the USA from 1948 to 1950.[291] In the light of what he observed in the West he re-discovered Islam and re-evaluated the world.[292] To Qutb, the West, mostly associated with America in his mind[293], appears to be the geography of corruption and backwardness in moral terms regardless of its scientific boom.[294] This is to say that the West appears as technologically improved but culturally distorted. The persistent cultural dearth of the West overrides morality and ethics which are the sine qua non of the ideal governance. This causes the lack of social unity and harms healthy development.[295] Quoted in Siegel, Qutb writes in *The America I have Seen* as follows:[296]

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[289] Calvert, op.cit., 2000, pp. 113.

[290] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 121.

[291] Shepard, op.cit., 1992, pp. 198-199.

[292] Kepel, op.cit., 2005, pp. 39.

[293] Tripp, op.cit., pp. 158.

[294] Frederic Volpi, "Understanding the Rationale of the Islamic Fundamentalists' Political Strategies: A Pragmatic Reading of their Conceptual Schemes during the Modern Era", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2000, pp. 82.

[295] Calvert, op.cit., 2000, pp. 115.; Nettler, op.cit., pp. 111.

[296] Robert Siegel, "Sayyid Qutb's America", 2003, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796. 13.03.2008.

"The primitiveness can be seen in the spectacle of the fans as they follow a game of football…or watch boxing matches or bloody, monstrous wrestling matches… This spectacle leaves no room for doubt as to the primitiveness of the feeling of those who are enamored with muscular strength and desire it."

Within this framework, he refuses any sort of Western legacy which is short of spirituality since it adores the seductive atmosphere of the materialist world of money, cars and movie stars fallaciously.[297] To Qutb, even in Greenly, Colorado where he went to State College of education, he argued that people were distant from spiritual aspect of religion at the greatest in spite of the prohibition of alcohol and frequent attendance to the church ceremonies.[298] This is because the West begets a culture of degeneracy which he utters through gender relations as:[299]

"The American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and the shapely thighs, sleek legs… and she shows all this and does not hide it.

To further predicate, in *Milestones*, he summarizes what he saw in the USA:[300]

"Look at these concepts of Trinity, Original Sin, Sacrifice and Redemption, which are acceptable neither to reason nor to conscience. Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury…; at this individual freedom…except under the force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deaden the spirit;… like animals, which you call ' Free mixing of the sexes', at this vulgarity which you call 'emancipation of women'….These facts, when seen in the light of Islam, made the American people blush."

This glimpse urges him to claim that even the West is aware of the fact that the Western system fails to provide a way out of the existing corruption.[301] His

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[297] John Calvert, "The World is an Undutiful Boy!: Sayyid Qutb's American Experience", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2000, pp. 94.

[298] Ibid, pp. 97.

[299] Siegel, op.cit.; See also, Calvert, op.cit., 2000, pp. 96-100.

[300] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 125.
[301] Ibid., pp. 1.; Qutb supports his argument by epitomizing Bertrand Russell –a well-known Western liberal thinker- who asserts the end of the supremacy of the Western culture. See: Qutb, op.cit., 1996, pp. 42-43.

experience of American culture contributed substantially to his subsequent vision of religious order which seeks for virtue. He warns the Muslims that America and the West are constitute a severe hazard for Islamic civilization.[302] Thus, there are no tenets in the distorted Western culture that could be imported or inspire them.

At this juncture, Qutb stresses on the inconvenience of Western tradition with the ideal Islamic order. Similar to Mawdudi, he makes an evaluation on three main topics. First one is *nationalism* which draws imaginary boundaries within humanity and threatens the unity of the *ummah.[303]* Nation-state system based on secular nationalism as conceived and practiced by the West and on Arab or Egyptian nationalism as adopted by Muslim world by recognizing artificial segregations of Muslims are claimed to be *jahili.* Such a system rejects Islam as the primary identity of all human beings by birth.[304] On the other hand, Islam has supranational and universal characteristics that gather mankind on the common ground of "created by God" and in turn "servant to God". Hence, Islam confronts categorization of mankind according to their color, race, language and nationality.[305]

The second critique of the Western setting developed by Qutb derives from the debate on Islamism's incompatibility with *secularism*. Secularist understanding delimits the sphere of influence of the religion via a separation of spirituality from the mundane and restriction of the religion to the former between God and the man. From this point of view, secularism violates totality of Islam which is central in Qutb's thought as it pushes religion out of socio-political field.[306] However, unlike the proposal of secularism, Qutb advocates the great unity established upon the

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[302] John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004, pp. 228.

[303] Zafer Bangash, "Remembering Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic Intellectual and Leader of Rare Insight and Integrity", *Muslimedia*, 1-15 September 1999, http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/features99/qutb.htm, 18.04.2008.

[304] Sayyed Qutb, "What are Arabs without Islam?", http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/arabs.htm, 22.05.2008.; Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 94, 2004, pp. 219-222.

[305] Ibid, 220, 223-224.

[306] Khatab, op.cit., 2002, pp. 157.

interconnection between the spiritual and material domain. In this context, Qutb longs for establishment of an Islamic state that accommodates harmony between the two spheres of creation through divinely-set rules which assures full submission to God and prevents servitude of man to man.

According to Qutb, what the West has resulted to is the invention of a new political order which deviates from the true path of God by refusing the real boundaries of religion. The thesis of "hideous schizophrenia" which underscores the erroneousness of secularism is proposed to refute secular understanding that obliterates Islam's unifying and comprehensive nature in socio-politics.[307] Qutb justifies his assertion in his evaluation of the experience of Christianity in the medieval ages. The strictness of the church regarding asceticism, imposition of taxes, monopolization of interpreting the Bible; moral setback of clergymen and the struggle for political power between the church and the king starting from the 11th century culminated to re-questioning of the totality of religion. This fostered secularism to emancipate from the wrong-doings of the church.[308] While the church and the clergymen were committing the crime of separating religious ideal from social order, the eruption of rationalism and scientific developments came up with a great success against the religious dogma of the church and the clergymen.[309] As a result, a new system of pseudo-scientific intellectualism which drives the world into *jahiliyya* emerged.[310]

The third theme of Qutb's ciriticism of Western political system is related to *democracy*. To him, democracy violates the principle of sovereignty in Islam as it creates a sort of idol-worship or an illusion that sovereignty belongs to the people.[311] It is also an implication of dismantling of the Islamic source of governance through the involvement of human beings in the process of legislation. Put differently, democracy necessitating man-made rules and regulations confronts with the *Shariah*

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[307] Qutb, op.cit., 1996, pp. 24-25.

[308] Ibid, pp. 31-36.

[309] Ibid, pp. 38-41.

[310] Ibid, pp. 53.

[311] Dinesh D'Souza, "Osama's Brain Meet Sayyid Qutb, Intellectual Father of the Anti-Western Jihad", *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 7. No. 32, 2002.

Law. Shephard asserts that Qutb's perception of East-West interaction is a predecessor of his distinction between Islamic and *jahili* society heralding a confrontation between *Shariah* of God and law of mankind and between the party of God and the party of satan.[312]

In common, nationalism which threatens the unity of *ummah*, secularism which crops the earthly power of the religion and democracy which undermines the divine source of authority distort the establishment of the ideal Islamic social order. Instead, those Western settings nourish *jahiliyya* through ignorance of the true knowledge of Islam. For this reason, Qutb calls the Muslims for drawing apart from the encroachment of the Western tradition. This introduces Qutb's opposition to the penetration of Western characteristics into Muslim life which constitutes the second source of conspiracy against Islam for him.

4.2.1.1.2 The Hazard of Imitating the West: "Westoxification–Gharbzadegi"

Having an impact on Qutb's perception of the West, his relations with the then-Egyptian regime starting from the 1950s is essential to signify his reaction to Western influence. By joining the MB as a leading figure just after turning back home from the USA, Qutb frankly demonstrated his position in the political course of the country. In line with the world view of the MB, he came up with deep spite against the West and proclaimed hostility against the monarchy under the influence of the West. Hence, with the goal of coping with the ills of the system caused by importation of corruptness of the West, Qutb played active role in the collaboration between the MB and the Free Officers to overthrow the pro-Western regime.

However, the course of events after the coup against the monarchy proved that the Free Officers would not meet the expectations of Islamists. The subsequent government which was established under the leadership of Nasser was not much different from the non-Islamic attitudes of the monarchy. It was based on "pan-Arabism" which drew much from secular and nationalist values of the West. This new system made it impossible to re-introduce Islam as a total way of life by

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[312] Shepard, op.cit., 2003, pp. 532.

confining it to the private piety. For Qutb who delineated Islamic-based governance in the aftermath of the military coup, these tenets were of a *jahili* system. *Jahiliyya* of the pro-British monarchy was overthrown by *jahiliyya* of secularism as the new regime targeted to generate a godless society by pursuing Western values.[313]

Another change occurred in the shift from British to American influence which is identified in the metaphor of "Americanization of Islam".[314] Within the conjuncture of the Cold War which generated the need for the surveillance of America for protection from the communist bloc, Islam was exposed to American influence.[315] The Muslims became Americanized, closed their eyes to the eradication of freedom, equality and justice by the imperialist nature of American domination.[316] Influenced by Mawdudi, Qutb, hereby, attaches attention to the division between political/military domination and intellectual/spiritual colonialism the latter of which is detrimental to Islamic way of life as it threats freedom of consciousness.[317] One reflection of Qutb's reaction to intellectual interference of the West is his refusal of the Western education system in the Islamic world that would result to Westernization of Muslim mentality.[318]

The method Qutb proposed was to fight in the name of Islam against the new Western-inspired, un-Islamic regimes. For him, either with the Book or, if necessary, with sword, struggle was inescapable to re-discover Islam[319] which is threatened by the continuous international conspiracy of the West through socio-political interference.[320] Such ideas, serving for the goal of protecting Egypt from the cultural degeneration of the West within the framework of the image of "orient and occident"

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[313] Calvert, op.cit., 2000, pp. 101.

[314] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 131.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Ibid, 131-132.

[317] Ibid, 125, 132-137.; Reuvan Paz, "Islamists and Anti-Americanism", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2003.

[318] Ibid, 101-103.

[319] Kepel, op.cit., 2005, pp. 55.

[320] Zimmerman, op.cit., pp. 229.

in his mind[321], urged the new establishment to perceive the MB as a threat to the legitimacy and sustainability of his regime. The outcome was the persecution of the MB which commenced the prison years for Qutb. The upcoming atmosphere of the relations between the establishment and the Islamists incited Qutb to more radical thoughts in calling for the establishment of Islamic order which cost him his life in 1966.[322]

To sum up Qutbian anti-Western stance, he puts forward a global vision of fundamentalism for which the roots of *jahiliyya* that harms the true Islamic culture exist in the outside world, the West.[323] Qutb indicates the life style introduced via Western scientific and technical progress as the cause of the relapsing cultural backwardness. The result is the bankruptcy of the West.[324] In this respect, the West appears to violate what Islam has offered by kicking the religion out of earthly issues with its comprehensive and unifying character. He, in addition, appears anxious about the penetration of the exogenous culture at home by drawing attention to the government that encourages Western cultural distortion at home inserting sexy movies into the cinema, alcohol into restaurants.[325] Qutb as an ideologue of recent Islamism thinks that the revival of Islam in any aspect of life is crucial in order to salvage the Muslim community from man-made traditions which triggers off various inaccurate laws and values.[326] Hence, the West with its culture and system took its place as the target to be destroyed and expelled from the Muslim world in Qutbian thought in order to find out the universal truth.[327] Henceforth, it is necessary to

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[321] Calvert, op.cit., 2000, pp. 90-91.

[322] Austine Cline, "Sayyid Qutb: Father of Modern Islamic Extremism", http://atheism.about.com/od/islamicextremismpeople/a/qutb_2.htm, 15.09.2008.

[323] Ronald C. Kiener, "Gushist and Qutbian Approaches to Government: A Comparative Analysis of Religious Assassinations", *Numen*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1997, pp. 239.

[324] Qutb, op.cit., 1996, pp. 42-52.

[325] Ibid, pp. 238.

[326] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 6.

[327] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 131.

clarify how Islam is regarded as an emancipatory movement from *jahiliyya*.[328] By doing so, the locus of Qutb's thought in the recent Islamic movements will be grasped thoroughly.

4.2.2 The Divine Rule of God - Hakimiyya

Hakimiyya that appears in the works of Qutb of the late 1940s reflects the influence of Mawdudian understanding of Islamic-based order on Qutb.[329] Mawdudi's thesis on divine government sheds light on Qutb's envisagement of governance that underscores full servitude to God.[330] Departing from an in-dept analysis of the existing *jahili* order, Qutb comes to his normative conclusion by encapsulating the exegesis of Quran in his theory of state[331] that searches for the way of exterminating *jahiliyya* and erecting the ideal form of governance.[332] The way to cut off *jahiliyya* is introduced as to embrace purity of Islam[333] as revealed in the legacy of the golden age of Islam in Medinian State.[334] Islam sweeps away the *jahili* state of society since it makes mankind conscious of the supreme authority of God. Then, mankind can turn his life into the true circle emerged once in history during the prophet's era. In short, Islam is proposed as the mere diagnosis for the ills of the ignorant society in Qutb's thought. From this point of view, it is obvious that Qutb's sole target is to get rid of the *jahili* social structure by establishing the "Ideal Islamic Social Order". The political boundaries of Islamic order are reflected in "*aqidah*" thesis and its economic essence is the social justice.

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[328] Ahmed Bouzid, *Man, Society and Knowledge in the Islamist Discourse of Sayyid Qutb*, Virginia, 1998, http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-3398-184043/unrestricted/Final.pdf, 15.07.2008, pp. 50.

[329] Ibid, pp. 116.

[330] Ibid, pp. 116-118.

[331] Nettler, op.cit., pp. 102.

[332] Ibid, pp. 13.

[333] Ibid.

[334] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 175-182.

4.2.2.1 Creed -Aqidah

To attain the ultimate bliss grounded on morality and ethics which necessitates obliterating *jahili society*, the roadmap in Qutb's political construct is the sovereignty –*hakimiyya*- of God who holds the sole servitude –*ubudiyyah*- of mankind as the creator and the supreme authority in the framework of the universality of Islam -*alamiyyat al-Islam*.[335] Then, all human beings are supposed to gather around the just system of the divine rule arranged in *Shariah*. This is called the Islamic community -*ummah*. So, what is the method in Qutb's mind for the realization of the divine rule?

Looking into the way to *hakimiyya* and as Mawdudi does, he focuses on the theme of the creator's role in the universe and his relations with mankind. He points out the *"great unity"* in the universe as the divine principle of the creation and the affinity between the creator and the universe, mankind and the state.[336] Qutb clarifies how Islam assures great unity:[337]

> "Islam as faith has laid down the nature of the relation between the Creator and His Creation, the nature of the man's relation to the universe and to the world, and of man's relation to his own soul; it has laid down the relation between the individual and society, between different societies and mankind as a whole, and the relation between one nation and another. All these teachings are expression in different aspects of one universal, comprehensive theory which relates to one another all the separate aspects. All of which together is Islamic philosophy."

The proclamation of the great unity denotes the idea that there is a perfect and absolute harmony the universe is hinged on. The unity is originated through the will of the supreme authority; put differently *hakimiyya* of God. Qutb, by referring to the Quran, introduces God as the supreme authority, in other words the *hakim* of the universe as the highest governmental and legal authority. Therefore, *hukm* is the command of God who executes all affairs alone.

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[335] Khatab, op.cit., 2004, pp. 218.

[336] Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam (Al-Adalah al-Ijtima 'iyyah fi al-Islam)*, Washington D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953, pp. 150-152.; See also, Khatab, op.cit., 2002, pp. 151-153.; Tripp, op.cit., pp. 166.

[337] Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp. 18.

Qutb asserts that Allah is the creator with no expectations and purposes, but creates for his subjects who could realize its integrity between the needs of the body and the desires of the soul in one unity.[338] In this sense, God obliges people to apprehend the nature of life which has two indispensable components: the materialist and spiritual spheres.[339] This means that human beings are the creatures who have both spiritual desires through the heaven and bodily needs met on earth. These two merges into the eternal harmonious unity which reflects the great will of God[340] and *fitrah* which denotes the unchangeable constitution of the creation of man, life and the universe via Islam.[341]

Mankind is obliged to accommodate him to the great unity which is possible only by *aqidah*, obeying the divine rule. One should comprehend that there is no partner or successor of God. The Prophet is commissioned to declare the message that there is no god but God who holds the authority as the supreme ruler, the creator and the sustainer. In this regard, Islam conceptualized comprehensively sets forth the true knowledge which is generated in the Quran and with the exhortations of the Prophet. In Qutb's thought, Islam bestows an all-encompassing system –*nizam*- of life in all its spheres ranging from political system with its tenets and ruling mechanisms, to the values and morality of the social order, to the institutional and philosophical foundation of the economic field and to the conduct of international relations.[342] This thorough nature of Islamic knowledge is attained through a dual method of mental understanding and psychological interaction depicting the necessity to become conscious of Islam's message and accordingly to urge mankind to action –*amal*- on the way to God.[343]

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[338] Ibid, pp. 31.

[339] Ibid, pp. 22-25.

[340] Ibid.

[341] Khatab, op.cit., 2004, pp. 218.

[342] Qutb, op.cit., 1996, pp. 5.; See also, Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 70.

[343] Moussalli criticizes that Islamic knowledge appears as given and is strictly closed to any debate in Qutb's political thought on the ground that true knowledge is to be accepted as true knowledge of God. However, for Mousalli, it is left unclear in Qutbian understanding of Islam that what happens when mankind is incapable of comprehension or action which are jointly the method to have Islamic knowledge. See: Ibid., pp. 76-79.

The nature of the true Islamic creed is depicted through one-ness of God, *al-tawhid*. The interpretation of *al-tawhid* in Qutb's thought brings about a political system which is (1) *comprehensive* in arranging spiritual, material and social domains of life; (2) *unique* denoting Islam's distinctiveness among other systems; (3) *universal* as an all-encompassing system appealing to the whole human beings and (4) *pure and simple* in appealing to practical life and preserving Islamic ordinance from deviation.[344] His concern is to re-structure the existing *jahili* societies by revitalizing Islamic creed. From this point of view; he puts forward the goal of reviving the analogy of the Medinian state as the pure form of an ideal Islamic community in which *hakimiyya* of God was entirely accomplished.[345] Islamic orthodoxy overhauls the ills of the societal life of Nasserism and Westernism and found the ideal Islamic society which is aware of the great harmonious unity of the universe created by the sovereign God.[346]

In Qutb's theory of state, political epistemology is based on *aqidah* which envisages the progress of God's sovereignty and divinity on earth. It is proposed to halt individual alienation which is caused by getting away from Islam due to Western domination and its repercussions on socio-politics in Muslim world.[347] The question of ontology, on the other hand, seems to be untouched due to the fact that Qutb presumes the social order of Islamic system, when attained, could pave the way for shaping necessary institutions.[348] In this sense, he differs from both Mawdudi and Khomeini as he refrains from suggesting certain governance forms.[349] As an eternal and equal political system, Qutbian Dar al-Islam is grounded on the collaboration between the ruler who is to be just in applying *Shariah Law* and the ruled who are obliged to obey the laws.[350] Along with the religio-politics ensuring the emancipation

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[344] Bouzid, op.cit., pp. 121-139.; Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 70-125.; Nettler, "op.cit., pp. 105-107.; Shepard, op.cit., 1992, pp. 203-216.

[345] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 154, 176, 179-182.

[346] Ibid, pp. 164.; Khatab, op.cit., 2004, pp. 151.

[347] Lee, op.cit., pp. 95, 97.

[348] Ibid, pp. 106.

[349] Ibid.

[350] Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp. 93-98.

from *jahiliyya*, Qutb appropriates consultation –*shura*- but still leaves the method unanswered.[351] So, unlike the theme of Qutbian Islamic state which is "theo-"[352], the organizational aspect of it is left open-ended to be shaped in line with *aqidah*.[353]

4.2.2.2. Social Justice

Unlike Mawdudian political theory, Qutb's Islamic order concerns with the economic foundation by drawing out the concept of social justice which embraces both the spiritual and the mundane[354] through three criteria:[355]

    1. Freedom of Conscious

Once mankind attains the knowledge that he has the ability to worship God who is the lord of the universe he gains the freedom of conscious. In other words, believers are to grasp that the going on of life is in the hands of God and man is the servant of Allah.

Islam frees man's conscious from the servitude of one to another as the servitude belongs only to God who is the *hakim* of the universe.[356] Islam guarantees a complete emancipation of conscious with the rules and values it introduced. Mankind is called for adherence to the boundaries set up by Islamic way of life. Then, he becomes the noblest man in the sight of God[357]

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[351] Lee, op.cit., pp. 107.

[352] Ronald A. T. Judy, "Sayyid Qutb's figh as-waqi'i, or New Realist Science", *Boundary 2*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2004, pp. 114-115.

[353] Lee, op.cit., pp. 107.

[354] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 114.

[355] Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp.29-30.

[356] Ibid, pp. 32.

[357] Ibid, pp. 37.

as he brings an end to his bondage to earthly things such as fear of death, regard for outward appearance, and the values of the society.[358]

Purifying the hearts of people from worshipping anything other than God emerges as the prerequisite to establish the ideal Islamic society.[359] This will embody those with purified hearts from deviant beliefs and guide to the *ummah* through "*La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammadan Rasul Allah*".[360] Hence, freedom of consciousness stands as the ultimate way providing the real equality among people as one's superiority on the commonalties is forbidden and human beings are accepted to be equal before God. This will cut off humiliation of man by man, submissiveness of man to man.[361]

2. *Equality of Human Beings*

Islam paves the way for human beings to get the knowledge of the one-ness, omnipotence and omnipresence of God. Within the limits of this divine knowledge, man is created from one soul, and his mate is created from him.[362] Namely, all the human beings come into existence from one soul, two ancestors. Therefore, everyone is equal before God.

Islam permits no sorts of discrimination.[363] In the spiritual domain, everyone is accepted to be equal. In earthly affairs, people can have different physical capacities which result to different social roles and statutes.[364] For instance, granted full equality with men before God in spiritual matters, women are granted certain social roles. For Qutb, they have the opportunity to participate

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[358] Ibid, pp. 41-44.

[359] Ibid, pp. 44.

[360] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 73.

[361] Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp. 44.

[362] Ibid, pp.46-47.

[363] Ibid, pp. 47-49.

[364] Ibid, pp. 49-54.

in social life with the most extended sphere of freedom and rights in Islam than in any other systems such as protection from exploitation by men, especially physically, the right to work, to earn and alike.

To Qutb, piety is the sole basis making difference among people. The noblest is the most pious in the eyes of Allah. This implies the close link between "worship- *al-ubudiyya*" and "sovereignty- *al-hakimiyya*" as is the case in Mawdudi's thought.[365] God's unique sovereignty on the Muslim polity as the sole deity prohibits suppression of man by man. It also offers a life which is shaped by equality not tyranny because the absolute power in the hands of God is the guarantee for the ruled against the discretionary power of the rulers who can be ambitious for more and more power and deviate through tyranny easily. Finally, all beings have nobility based on piety before God which can not be degraded.[366]

3. Mutual Responsibility within the Society

In Islamic tradition, collectivity shapes life. Individuals are perceived as equal units of *ummah* under the common truth of life. They are loaded with responsibilities which set forth the shape of the societal structure and could be regarded as the social glue of *ummah*. In this sense, man is (1) responsible to God with the sole servitude; (2) responsible to the society with the aim of promoting common welfare, feeding the poor and staying away from social crimes such as theft and usury; (3) responsible to his family in being kind to parents, in protecting the values on the basis of which family structure stands and in bearing pious children; (4) responsible to himself (his soul) which brings about freedom from appetites and hence draws man closer to the paradise.[367]

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[365] Kepel, op.cit., 2005, pp. 47.

[366] Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp. 54.

[367] Ibid, pp. 56-67.

In turn, since life is hinged on a collective process which embraces all human beings, people are provided protection from the evil-doers. As long as those responsibilities are carried out in a good manner, the obstacles preventing the formation of the Islamic society in Qutb's ideas are removed away. Then, together with freedom of consciousness and full equality of mankind, absolute justice is ensured.[368]

To cap it all, those three conditions of social justice provide societal equilibrium through principles such as (1) fair distribution of wealth, (2) the principle of public welfare which authorize the state to re-distribute wealth in favor of the poor, (3) the precautionary measures taken to fight against corruption and usury, (4) nationalization of public resources and abolition of monopoly and luxury, (5) Zakat which prevents hoarding.[369] From Qutb's point of view, social justice is attained only through Islamic orthodoxy which grants the mankind the opportunity to comprehend the true knowledge and in turn virtue. As a result, equality of human beings is obtained.

4.2.3 The West as Appropriated in Qutb's Epistemology

As cited previously, there is no doubt that Qutbian discourse refuses anything Western in *hakimiyya*. Still, Western trajectory in the epistemological premises of the Islamic social order in Qutb's mind needs further elaboration. This is crucial in the sense that he is claimed to be Western in so many ways like dress, love of classical music and Hollywood movies, interest in the works of Darwin and Einstein, Byron and Shelley and in French literature, especially Victor Hugo.[370] So, the response of in what way acquaintance with the West influenced his works could have a constructive as well as negative dimension while framing *aqidah* and social justice in political and economic domains respectively.

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[368] Ibid, 68.

[369] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 127.; For the basics of economic theory in Islam, see: Qutb, op.cit., 1953, pp.100-138.

[370] Wright, op.cit.

In respect of Western influence on Qutbian political theory, Shepard's classification of acceptance of, adaptation to and rejection of Western progress by Muslim world in the historical context is significant when appealed to Qutb's perception of the West.[371] In line with the evolution of Qutb's thoughts from secularism to radicalism, he first argued the necessity of Western-style progress, but its cultural/sexual tenets, in the early period of his career. Then he moved to the position of adaptation of the Western tradition to the Islamic basics due to the assumption that Western experience could contribute to revitalization of God's sovereignty in spite of its spiritual corruption. Encountering with the confrontation with Nasser's new regime, Qutb became rejectionist of the West in order to get rid of *jahili* conditions.

Along with the strict refusal of imitating the West in the rhetoric[372], Qutb makes re-conceptualizations of certain Western traits in compliance with Islamic basics. To epitomize, similar to Mawdudi, he re-defines nationalism in accordance with Islam's comprehensive and unifying nature embracing all aspects –economic, social, political, intellectual, and modern- of practical human life. He envisions the theory for one-ness of Islamic nation-state belonged to the one Islamic nation, *ummah*.[373] In addition, he Islamized the ideas of freedom and equality of the French Revolution on the basis of fraternity of Islam.[374] In this framework, realization of God's sovereignty is believed to end servitude of man to man by nurturing Islamic civil society which is superior to government.[375] As well, Qutb underscores the essence of legitimacy of government. It is possible only by universal Islamic law binding the ruler and appealing to the whole *ummah,* and by *shurah* which reflects the consent of all.[376] According to Moussalli, this draws Qutbian political system near to democratic form by making authoritarian systems impossible.[377]

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[371] Shepard, op.cit., 1997, pp. 257-263.

[372] Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 167.

[373] Sayyid Qutb, "A Muslim's Belief and Nationality", http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/nationalism.htm, 22.05.2008.; Khatab, op.cit., 2004, pp. 217-239.

[374] Shepard, op.cit., 1997, pp. 259.

[375] Muqtedar Khan, "Syed Qutb –John Locke of the Islamic World?", *Globalist Paper*, 28 July 2008.

[376] Ibid.

[377] Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 166.

Concerning the link between Qutb's theory of economics and Western economic system, Qutb appropriates justice as Quranic concept –*adala*- to the distributive justice of socialism whereas Qutb is extremely critical of it on the ground that it is ignorant of *hakimiyya*.[378] His "social justice" thesis whose primary concern is to raise the life standards of the have-nots is closely connected to socialist worldview.[379] Abu-Rabi's classification of social problems in Egypt in Qutbian thought proves Qutb's proximity with Marxist understanding: (1) inequity in the distribution of property and wealth, (2) problems of work and salaries, (3) lack of opportunities, (4) corruption in the workplace and low production.[380] Once, harmonious and balanced relations are established within humanity on the ground of mutual responsibility, economic equality of man could be attained.[381]

4.3 The Methodology: From Realization to Activation

One crucial aspect of Qutbism is the fact that its epistemology necessitates "realization" of the true Islamic society.[382] To this purpose, Qutb validates activism or revolution in the light of his theoretical framework. Joining the MB depicts his ambition for active involvement in re-constructing the socio-politics. The MB provided him the platform for transmitting his Islamist ideals to the masses and mobilizing them. The method of jihad Qutb explains in the *Milestones* is hinged on (1) the goal of abolishing *jahili* societies, (2) a step-by-step process to re-form the socio-politics, (3) the unchanged content of submission to God (4) obligation of all other systems to obey or at least accept Islamic truth.[383] Departing from the analogy of the Islamic revolution of the Medinian period which realized Muslim individual,

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[378] Akhavi, op.cit., pp. 383-386.

[379] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 123.

[380] Ibid., pp. 125.

[381] Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 172-174.

[382] Laith Al-Saud, "The Qutbian Project", http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/journal/is-01/qutb1.doc, 05.09.2008.

[383] Qutb, *Milestones (Signposts on the Road -Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq)*, pp. 49-50.

Muslim society and Islamic state from a tribal, *jahili* and polytheistic society, Qutbian activism serving for *hakimiyya* seeks for a similar revolution to sweep away contemporary *jahiliyya*.

Put another way, as is the case in Mawdudi's thought, knowledge and action are indispensable in Qutb's strategy. He hereby asserts to maintain jihad as the 6th duty of Islam in spiritual, military, doctrinal, political and social terms and to be launched externally against the West and internally against the regimes exposed to the influence of evil-doers.[384] At this juncture, Qutb converges with Mawdudian interpretation of jihad again in the sense that both refuse Orientalist perception of Islam which ascribes a scholastic nature and engenders illusionary linguistic, racial and national segregations within *ummah*.[385]

Zimmerman's categorization of Qutb's works according to the degree to which they are radical which elicits the first phase of his literary critics of the 1930s, the second phase of strict adherence to Islamic ordinance from the late 1940s onwards and the third phase of his prison years when he made the invitation for overthrowing all the un-Islamic regimes to realize worldwide application of *Shariah*, he attributes both defensive and offensive meanings to jihad.[386] Qutbian jihad denotes both defense against *jahiliyya*, and the West[387] and erection of a Muslim camp to be always prepared to undertake the holy war for the realization of *aqidah* universally.[388] Regarding the former, Qutb's radical ideas revolve around emancipatory revolution against Americanization of Islam and Arab nationalism which has a doctrine of extending Dar al-Islam.[389] From the offensive aspect, formation of a Muslim camp underscores the collective action whose necessary elements in Qutb's strategy are the determination of a vanguard Muslim group guided by the Quran, awakening of its group consciousness whose central element is Islam, extending the influence of this

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[384] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 154, 193; Hansen & Kainz, op.cit., pp. 63.

[385] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 195.

[386] Moussalli, op.cit., pp. 206.; Zimmerman, op.cit., pp. 223.

[387] Volpi, op.cit., pp. 84.

[388] Abu-Rabi, op.cit., 1996, pp. 184.

[389] Ibid., pp. 130.

group to the whole world to incarnate the *ummah* through activism.[390] Succinctly, jihad as an offensive or defensive duty is incumbent upon every Muslim to emancipate from evils and realize ideal Islamic order.

Attention to Qutb's ideas about activism calling for jihad, holy war or revolution has increased tremendously especially, in the post September 11 period. The discourse on Islamic terror has searched for the intellectual roots of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in Qutb's perception of the West on the ground that his interpretation of Islamism provided the radical Islamist movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria and al-Qaeda the philosophical foundation for defense against the identified enemy.[391] From this point of view, it can be ascertained that Qutbian ideas are capable of directing the violent activities of radical Islamists, perpetuating the clash taking place between the West and the Muslim world through a link between martyrdom in the name of Islam as a glorious type of death and contemporary suicide bombings.[392]

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[390] Lee, op.cit., pp. 104.

[391] Zimmerman, op.cit., pp. 238-242.

[392] Loboda, op.cit., pp. 3, 18-23, 34.

CHAPTER 5

AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI

Imam Ruhullah al-Musavi al-Khomeini (1902-1989) -an Iranian religious and political leader- is among the senior ideologues of the 20th century Islamic revival whose performance could be asserted beyond that of S. Qutb and M. Mawdudi. What makes him distinctive in the recent Islamist movement is that Khomeini is the first in putting his theoretical setting into practice. He is the ideologue of the theory of Islamic government which proposes the guardianship of the jurists or clerical authority. In line with his proposal, he, as a practitioner, succeeded in transforming the socio-political establishment of Iran. Khomeini became the architect of the world's first Islamic republic –Islamic Republic of Iran- which is the outcome of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In this content, acting as a spiritual leader, he exerted profound influence within Shi'i world[393] and on Islamic resurrection.

At this juncture, there is an ongoing academic debate on the characteristics of political prism formulated by Khomeini. On the one hand, Iranian Revolution as the great vestige of Khomeini is evaluated to be modern in shape.[394] This is because it occurred as an urban movement of a socio-economically developed society. It was also carried out through the endeavors of Iranians, not with the help of outsiders. In addition, it was conducted as political confrontation rather than armed conflict. Its substance, on the other, was to make use of native Islamic sources and to challenge the ideological and political course of the contemporary world, by Islamizing the

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[393] Currently, among the countries where the Shi'i people are densely populated such as Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Bahrein; Iran has the highest percentage with 92 %. There are also countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and India where Shi'ites are the minority population. See: Dağı, op.cit., pp. 45.

[394] Halliday, op.cit., pp. 47.

outlook of Iran and beyond.[395] Therefore, Khomeini has been associated with "fanaticism", "radicalism" and "religious fundamentalism" challenging the modern flow of history. In reply to such assessments, Abrahamian defines Khomeinism as a flexible political movement. It brings about an activist worldview not restricted to theological dogma and traditional religious order, but based on a form of populism that is prone to change and accept modernity to some extent.[396] This is to state that regardless of his refusal of modernity in many respects, his ideology had a pragmatist appeal to things associated with "modern".[397] So, it could be concluded that Khomeini merged tradition with modernity in his theory.[398]

This chapter is going to search for the place of the West in Khomeini's perspective. After an overview of his life, the focal point is going to be twofold in line with the method this study employs. First theme will be the survey of how Khomeini contemplates the West and its tradition in his proposal for the ideal Islamic state. Second one will discuss Khomeini's activism to realize the theocratic system of governance in order to illustrate his attitudes towards the West in praxis.

5.1 A Short Biography of Khomeini

Khomeini was born in Khomein in central Iran. He is the son of a religious family that traces the descent of the 7th imam of Shi'i tradition –*Musa al-kazem*. Both his grandfather (*Sayyid Ahmad* known as al-Hindi as he spent time in India) and father (*Ayatollah Mustafa* murdered during when Iran was experiencing a political

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[395] Mansour Farhang, "Foreword: Iran and the Prism of Political Culture", in *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic*, ed(s) Samih K. Farsoun & Mehrdad Mashayekhi, New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. ix.

[396] Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic*, London: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 1-3.

[397] Roy argues that Iranian revolution is a synthesis of traditionalism and Marxist ideology. See: Roy, op.cit., 1994, pp. 168-169.; Evaluating in what sense Khomeinism is in conformity with modernism, Abrahamian comes to the conclusion that Khomeini envisions a Shi'i Islamic order which derives much from socialism, nation-state system, Western technology and law-abiding. See: Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 13-17.; On the contrary, Halliday assesses Khomeinism as a rejection of modernity in many respects in bringing about the Islamic government which is a universal reversal of historical progress. See: Halliday, op.cit., pp. 44.

[398] Dağı, op.cit., pp. pp. 58.; Halliday, op.cit., pp. 47.

transformation through constitutionalism) were religious scholars. Khomeini's childhood encountered with the political turmoil within the country which resulted in the Constitutional Movement of 1905-6. A series of anti-establishment protests by the ulama, middle class associated with the bazaar and modern educated reformists urged the Pahlavi rule to declare the Western-style parliamentarian regime.

In the atmosphere of political restlessness demanding for change, he started his education by learning Arabic, Persian poetry and calligraphy at a local government school - *makta*. Later, he kept on with his religious education under the guidance of Shayk 'Abd al-Karim Ha'iri. Ha'iri introduced Khomeini with the legacy of the established religious tradition which appraised political activism. In the 1920s, Qom emerged as the theological capital of Iran when Ha'iri, together with the then Iranian clerics with high reputation in many branches of Islamic learning, moved to the city. Khomeini followed his scholar, Ha'iri, to Qom where he received an in-depth research in theology and Islamic principles.

He studied law, jurisprudence, Islamic jurisprudence –*fiqh*-, ethics and philosophy related to the Islamic traditions *irfan* and *hekmat* in Qom.[399] Khomeini involved in mysticism held in conformity with Islamic thought and *Shariah*. Mysticism was the way to God in his understanding. In the 1930s, he thought topics related to moral and spiritual topics. In turn, he was promoted to the leadership of the learned: being a *mujtahed* that granted him the moral authority to make judgments accepted as just and definite. Such a distinctive power upon Iranians paved the way for involving in the political life. Algar purports that, revealing the awareness of Khomeini's influence in the spiritual realm, Iranian Revolution derived much from ethics and morality.[400] From this angle, it could be inferred that Khomeini laid the foundation of

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[399] *Irfan* means "gnosis" in Arabic. It is knowledge of inner world of man which is particularly interrelated with Shi'i tradition. Obtaining the knowledge is the prelude to virtue and nearness to God. Therefore, Erfan guides the believer to become the perfect man –saint or *arif*- who reveals the true path to mankind. *Hekmat* provides a logistical and scholastic system of thought and explores the nature of ultimate reality which is divine. Hekmat sets the intellectual bases of Erfan. See: Baqer Moin, "Khomeini's Search for Perfection: Theory and Reality", in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed(s) Ali Rahnema, New York: Zed Books, 2005, pp. 69.; Vanesa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran*, New York: I. B. TAURIS, 2007, pp. 31-47.

[400] Hamid Algar, "Introduction by the Translator", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 15.

his career during his education and teaching years. Upcoming years heralded him a status of being a leading teacher of Islamic philosophy and ethics, and via activism, practitioner of militant Islam.

As a practitioner of politics, his major contribution is the re-interpretation of *vilayet-al fiqh* which can be dubbed as vice-gerency of the theologian, the governance of the jurist or the guardianship of the juristconsult.[401] It calls for *Hukumet-i Islami,* a theocratic system of governance. The concept sets forth the Islamic state as the precondition of an ideal Islamic society in which justice and morality would be realized. Within the theoretical framework deriving from theocracy, Khomeini played a key role in transforming socio-politics in his country. Taking *Shiism* as the reference point in his activities, he pinpointed the Pahlavi regime as the source of decay and dissent. The wrongdoing was indicated as the elimination of the religious roots of the government in Iran which caused the socio-political and economic malaise overriding the country.

His initial reactions came about after the White Revolution in 1963 by which the Shah undertook various measures to re-form the social, political and economic domains of Iran. The reform package included land reform, nationalization of forests, sale of state-owned enterprises, allowing non-Muslims to hold office, profit sharing in industry, literacy campaign in schools and electoral rights of the women. It was an attempt to transform Iranian societal outlook intensely.

It also denoted a clear-cut end to the autonomous power of the clergy. It put the *waqf* system under the control of the state. The education system was secularized and hence the political power of the mullahs was limited substantially. Therefore, the clergy reacted against Shah's modernization movement which was regarded as a prelude to intensify the domination of the USA upon Iran. Herein, Khomeini frankly alleged the Shah to subordinate to the interests of the US and Israel in 1963, too.[402]

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[401] Moin, op.cit., pp. 89.

[402] Ruhullah Khomeini, "The Afternoon of Ashura, June 3, 1963", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 177-180.

The Shah's response was the arrest of Khomeini which made him the political leader of the Iranian clergy in the eyes of the public.

The Shah's further privileges to the USA such as the legal immunity to the US troops within the country led up to his stronger condemnation of the regime. Then, the Shah sent Khomeini to exile in 1964.[403] While being in exile, respectively in Turkey, Iraq and France, the Ayatollah continued to expand his penetration within Iran by preaching. Through sermons and speeches denouncing the regime on the ground of social corruption, economic discomfort and political unrest, he successfully organized and mobilized his followers against the unjust rule of the Shah. Referring to the influence the Ayatollah exerted upon Iranians regardless of his geographical distance from the homeland, Algar claims the centrality of Khomeini in the revolutionary movement from the inception.[404]

Starting from January 1978, the social tension which was caused by mass demonstrations and deemed to abolish the Shah regime and establish an Islamic republic gained impetus. The Shah was compelled to leave the country thank to the unified and persistent struggle of the revolutionary movement.[405] On February 1st, 1979, Khomeini returned from the exile and undertook initiatives to proclaim the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Articles 107 and 112 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sanctified the Ayatollah as the highest authority of the newly-born political establishment until his death in1989 by setting up *vilayet-al fiqh.*

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[403] Ruhullah Khomeini, "The Granting of Capitulatory Right to the US –October, 27, 1964", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 181-188.

[404] Algar, op.cit., pp. 19.

[405] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Declaration upon the Arrival at Tehran, February 1, 1979", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 252-253.

5.2 The Ontological Premises of Khomeini's Political System

Based on the Shi'i belief, Khomeini departs from the illegitimate, oppressive and idolatrous governments –*taghut*- which is the Shi'i equivalent of *jahiliyya*.[406] He searches for the way to realize the Islamic government against *taghut*. He longs for the promotion of the good and prohibition of the evil. Herein, unlike Qutb, Khomeini does not come up with an in-depth analysis of the basics of *taghut*. Instead, he points out the West as deviant from God's true path and refuses its imperialist plans over the Muslim world, especially the penetration of Western socio-political tenets into the Islamic world via the Western-inspired regimes. That's why the Shah regime appeared to be the first target to cope with in his agenda. To this end, he starts his works by concentrating on the ontology/epistemology of the ideal form of governance that would replace the Shah regime over time.

When setting forth the ideal Islamic government, Khomeini makes use of the Shi'i ideology. Shi'i in Arabic means "party". The followers of Ali call themselves as Shi'at Ali denoting "Ali's party" and practice *Shihada* as "There is no deity but God and Mohammad is his prophet, and Ali is the executor of God's will – *La ilaha Illallah Muhammadur Rasulullah wa Alian waliallah.*[407] Shi'i people apostrophize Ali as the Lord of the Faithful and the Lion of God. They believe that the rule legitimately belongs to Ali and the imams.[408] In this sense, Shiism deals with the issue of succession following the death of the prophet which has culminated to schism within the Islamic world. According to the Shi'i tradition, Ali had already

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[406] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 119, 150.

[407] For an in-depth description of Shi'i belief, See. Nasr, op.cit., 2006, pp. 31-61.

[408] Twelver Shiism is a belief in twelve divinely ordained Imams as the successors of the prophet to lead the society in compliance with the Islamic orders. Those Imams are respectively Ali ibn Abu Talib, Hassan ibn Ali, Hussein ibn Ali, Ali ibn al-Hussein, Muhammad ibn Ali, Ja'far ibn Muhammad, Musa ibn Ja'far, Ali ibn Musa, Muhammad ibn Ali, Ali ibn Muhammad, Hassan ibn Ali, Muhammad ibn al-Hassan. The twelfth, Muhammad ibn al-Hassan, is a savior figure called Mahdi. He was believed to be in occultation since 872 and to come back when God wills to relinquish the sources of evil and establish divine justice on earth. During the Safavids ruling which nurtured the scholarly works on Shi'i faith in Iran, the political doctrine of Twelver Shiism revolved around the political doctrine that precluded the believers from imposing a direct challenge to the Sunni authorities and urged them to wait silently until the return of the Imam for the legitimate and just rule. See: Nasr, op.cit., 2006. pp. 63-80.

been appointed by the prophet himself.[409] However, Ali's succession of the prophet as the *khilafa* awaited that of respectively *Abu Bakr*, *Umar* and *Uthman* due to the vote of the *shura.* The disillusionment on the part of the Shi'i community emerged as the corollary of the challenge to Ali's authority that came from *Mu'awiya* –a member of Utman's descent- and resulted to Ali's murder in 661.[410] This tragic event was followed by the Karbala trauma in 680 of the murder of *Hussein* –Ali's son and Prophet's grandson- and his family. It marks out the superiority of the Sunni Islam via the authority of the Umayyad (660-750) and Abbasid (750-1235) dynasties. Hitherto, Hussein has been esteemed by the Shi'i community as the lord of all martyrs –*shahid*- and oppressed –*mazlum*-, signifying the legend of sacrifice and bravery.[411] Khomeini's reference to the martyrdom of Hussein in Karbala serves for reinforcing his presumption of a constant battle between "just" and "unjust", "oppressed" and "oppressor" when confronting with *taghut*.[412]

When dealing with the Khomeini's ideal form of governance, another crucial aspect which is to be highlighted to question the place of the West in Khomeini's vision of revivalism is that the influence of Shi'i belief on Khomeinism has somehow got along with the influence of Western philosophy upon his thoughts. To illustrate, while setting the theoretical framework of the Islamic government he re-interpreted the mystic precepts of Shiism in the lights of Greek philosophy. Therefore, similar to Mawdudi and Qutb, Khomeini also appropriates certain elements of the Western civilization in his theory, as pointed out below.

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[409] Shi'i belief accepts that the Prophet Mohammed, himself, stated that "whomever I am the authority over, Ali is also the authority over". See: Mateo Mohammad Farzaneh, "Shi'i Ideology, Iranian Secular Nationalism and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, pp. 89.

[410] Ruhullah Khomeini, "The Incompatibility of Monarchy with Islam, October 31, 1971", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 200.

[411] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 47.; Farzaneh, op.cit., pp. 90-91.

[412] Farzaneh, op.cit., pp. 89.

5.2.1 Hukumet-i Islami

Ayatollah Khomeini has a work titled "*Hukumet-i Islami –Islamic Government-*" denoting the features of Islamic form of government. It is a book covering Khomeini's lectures in Najaf between January 21 and February 8, 1970. It argues Islam as a religion bringing about rules for government and commits mankind to establish an Islamic state.[413] Only the government of the Islamic precepts could ensure the just social order which is purified from *taghut* of the Shah and the West. In this sense, *vilayet-al fiqh* explains the form of the political system Khomeini envisages and *irfan* constitutes the logic of *vilayet-al fiqh*.

The governance of the *faqih* is central to Shi'i belief[414] and was re-interpreted by Khomeini due to the fact that he believed in the necessity of activism to halt the domination of the un-Islamic world which could be possible only under the leadership of someone as influential as the imam.[415] From this perspective, Khomeinian governance appears to be established upon (1) the centrality of the vice-gerent and (2) the unity and harmony of the *ummah* under the leadership of the vice-gerent to promote the good against the evil.[416] He presupposes that the rightly-established collaboration between the *faqih* and Muslims could be efficacious against the oppressing regimes and foreign exploitation.[417] So, it seems meaningless to Khomeini to wait for the ideal Islamic order until the return of the imam in occultation.[418]

Khomeini starts with explicating how compulsory the existence of Islamic government is to assure the unity of the *ummah*. First, Islamic government stabilizes socio-economic interactions and removes away moral corruption, anarchy and chaos

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[413] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Islamic Government", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 35, 37.

[414] Ibid., pp. 124.

[415] Ibid., pp. 116.

[416] Ibid., pp. 117.

[417] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 24-25.

[418] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 120-122.

within the society.[419] This, in turn, assures justice within the system.[420] To this purpose, Islamic government guarantees the application of *Shariah* to regulate the economic, political, cultural and social affairs of the society.[421] Lastly, Khomeini advocates that only the establishment of an Islamic government could preserve the rights and interests of Muslim people against the un-Islamic world.[422] The religious rulers and institutions within the system liberate the world of Islam from foreign penetration and the puppet governments aping the imperialists. As a result, the unity of the *ummah* can be maintained.

Thereafter, he goes ahead with revealing the need for a vanguard to execute Islamic order.[423] In this sense, leadership appears to be essential in Khomeini's theory of state. The leader is expected to ensure the superiority of common good upon self-interest, to get organized against the enemies and to safeguard the religion itself from wrong or incomplete praxis and interpretation. From this point of view, the idea of the guidance of a leader is closely linked with his invention of a perfect man who attains the divine truth of life.

Khomeini's mystical vision is a reflection of his search for the "Perfect Man" which later in his career urged him to act as the "Perfector of Mankind".[424] The concept of "Perfect Man" signifies the way out of the social decay in Khomeini's mind. The Shi'i treatment of "Light and the Perfect Man" presumes that the "Light" belongs to the prophet and outlines the method of Islamic governance.[425] It passes to imam Ali and to the subsequent imams after the prophet's death.[426] The "Perfect Man" is deemed to be God's great sign, incarnated in the image of God. In his search for the

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[419] Ibid., pp. 40.

[420] Ibid., pp. 40-42.

[421] Ibid., pp. 43-46.

[422] Ibid., pp. 46-50.

[423] Ibid., pp. 52-54.

[424] Moin, op.cit., pp. 64.

[425] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 40-41.

[426] Moin, op.cit., pp. 72.

"Perfect man", he points out the path of becoming a perfect man via four mystical stages:[427] (1) "from mankind to God" –*min al-Khalq ila-al-Haqq*- which helps mankind attain the virtue and "truth" of life by overcoming the human limitations, (2) the journey of "God in God" which brings mankind to the beauty and bless of the God, (3) the one through which the traveler returns to mankind, being aware of his distinction, (4) the last part of the journey is to lead the society in the journey to comprehend the oneness and dignity of the God. This stage is called "vice-gerency - *velayet*" which attributes the traveler the omnipotent task to grasp God's message. After the completion of the journey, the perfect man becomes capable of guiding mankind through faith in the one-ness of God which, in turn, brings about the absolute perfection.

Reflecting the influence of Western thought upon him, Khomeini's understanding of "Perfect Man" is evaluated to derive from Greek philosophy. It is equated with Plato's "Philosopher King" in the sense that both presupposes the validity of esoteric sort of knowledge which is possessed by the virtuous leader.[428] Khomeini estimates the role for the "Perfect Man" as to run the Islamic government in conformity with the divine law. In this context, centrality of *irfan* and *hekmat* to the works and studying of Khomeini constitutes the essence of the character of the ruler –*ma'rifat*- which grants him the truth of the universe linking the creation to the creator.[429] In this sense, it is *irfan* that bestows the qualities of leadership to the vice-gerent of God. So, Khomeinian theory of state is a re-interpretation of Shi'i belief in the sense that it anticipates the possibility of the perfect government to secure the rights and interests of the Muslims even in the absence of the imam.

Leadership in Khomeini's mind adapts the doctrine of *vilayet-al fiqh.* The *faqih* is entrusted with the same tasks of the prophet and the imams. Thus, the *faqih* acts as the trustee or legatee of the prophet in the occultation of the imam and in a way Plato's philosopher king did.[430] The *faqih* is attributed with certain qualifications like

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[427] Ibid., pp. 73.; Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 33-34.
[428] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 34.; Nasr, op.cit., 2006. pp. 126.

[429] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 36.

[430] Ibid, pp. 72, 77-79.

(1) expertise in matters pertaining to law and justice in Islam, (2) capacity to act as a judge that obliges him to be just and (3) ability to undertake the responsibility of leadership as in the way the imam performs.[431]

The collaboration between the rank and file Muslims and the supreme religious leader reifies the rule of Islamic ordinance. Khomeini refuses all existing systems of governance with a claim that they all lack legitimacy. In this regard, it is proposed that governance is to be through the command from and in the name of God. Acting within the limits Islamic law sets, the ruler can institutionalize the sole sovereignty and *tawhid* of God on earth which eliminates the evil from any domain of life. This is possible only when the *faqih* who grasps the divine knowledge of the law and justice is submitted.[432]

Consequently, as is the case in Qutbian and Mawdudian thought, Khomeini also embarked in taking an ahistorical ideal as his model. He derived from the legacy of the prophet as well as Ali. After the revolution, he changed his mind on the ground that Islamic Republic in Iran surpassed the ideal orders[433] and hence Mahdi would find the Muslims living in a purely Islamic order when turning back.[434] At this juncture, after the revolution, he initiated the establishment of the new system on the basis of the absolute justice Islamic ordinance draws out. While doing so, he fortified the doctrine of *vilayet-al fiqh* in re-organizing the port-revolutionary Iran.[435] As quoted in Moin, Mehdi Ha'eri Yazdi – a student of Khomeini- comments that Khomeini introduced himself as to have completed the whole journey and had the truth to tell mankind.[436] Khomeini acted as the religious leader to bring back the Islamic socio-political order against disenchantment, moral degeneration and social decay. The point here is that when bringing back the Islamic rule he appealed to the Western organizational structure of government as the next part of the chapter

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[431] Ibid, pp. 83-84.
[432] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 60.

[433] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

[434] Ibid., pp. 32.

[435] Sami Oğuz & Ruşen Çakır, *Hatemi'nin İran'ı*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, pp. 36-38.

[436] Moin, op.cit., pp. 74.

concerns. In this sense, he converged with Mawdudi. While both the *faqih* of the new Islamic state and the *ameer* of Jamat-i Islami based their ideology on anti-Westernism, the outcomes of their activism made use of modern Western traits to some extent.

5.3 The Methodology: Mobilization of the Oppressed against the Oppressor

In praxis, to establish the theocratic system, Khomeini set out the Shah's *taghut* as the target around which he managed to create a broad societal consent. He employed an activist strategy based on Shi'i discourse.[437] He started his propaganda with his lectures on ethics, philosophy and mysticism. His activism was based on instruction and propagation at the initial stage and on psychical revolt by a massive movement at the terminal stage. Then Khomeinism came to a fruitful conclusion in 1979. This emerged as the sole way to attain the ideal government and social life for Iran in Khomeini's mentality.

Taking into consideration the fact that Khomeini managed to create the Islamic government in Iran this part is going to introduce Khomeini's methodology in two dimensions: the pre-revolution and post-revolution phases. While doing so, the place of the West in his methodology is going to be contemplated in three respects. Firstly, Khomeini's reaction against the West as *taghut* targeted the Shah regime at home in the pre-revolutionary phase. In the port-revolutionary phase, as the supreme leader of the new Islamic state he urged the country to involve in a direct struggle against the West itself and its influence in third Muslim countries. Secondly, during the organization of both the revolution and the Islamic state, the Western tradition has somehow been an input of Khomeinism. However, this does not bring about prejudice to his anti-Western stance as was seen in his active reaction against the West, especially the USA and Israel, in the international affairs. Therefore, the third aspect of how the West was regarded in Khomeini's Iran is the struggle against the West to wipe out its influence in the whole Islamic world as well as Iran.

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[437] Dağı states that rebellion against the unjust and illegitimate government is the core asset of Shi'i tradition which was successfully made use of by Khomeini against the Shah on the path of the Revolution. See: Dağı, op.cit., pp. 48.

5.3.1 The Path to the Revolution

Ayatollah Khomeini involved in politics from the 1940s onwards. "The Discovery of the Secrets *-Kashf al-Asrar-"* in 1942 was a critique of the Pahlavi dynasty.[438] Yet, despite being critical of it, he was bound with the quietist strategy of the clerical leaders *-marja-e taqlid-* Shaykh Abdul-Karim Ha'eri and Ayatollah Mohammad Hussain Borujerdi respectively.[439] This is why he embarked his political concerns following Borujerdi's death in 1961. Since then on, he underscored the necessity of activism to get rid of the unjust, un-Islamic rule of the Shah under the leadership of the *faqih*.[440] He called people for an uprising in the name of God.[441] As a result of the widespread activism he initiated, as Algar expounds, Iran was inescapably driven to a revolution:[442]

> "Despite all the savagery the Shah employed, including the slaughter of thousands of unarmed demonstrators, the torture and abuse of detainees, and massacres of the wounded in their hospital beds, and despite the unstinting support he had received from the United States and other foreign powers, the corrupt and murderous rule of the Shah was approaching to its end. ….the Shah left Iran for the last time on January 16, 1979."

The early form of Khomeinian activism is based on propagation and instruction to disseminate the divine message to the people which, in turn, would provide widening support against the Shah. Khomeini says that it is the duty of the *faqih* to teach Islam to people in order to prevent its distortion by the imperialists and their puppet

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[438] Khomeini made a speech as a warning to the nation in 1941 which summarizes the content of this book. In his speech, denouncing all existing forms of governance as coercive and unjust, he ascertains the legitimate basis of a system of government as the realization of God's law, *Shariah*. The roadmap, hereby, is proposed as the cooperation of the religious men with the government that imitates the Western-style social life for progress. This is a frank attack on Shah's regime based on secularism and modernism. See: Ruhullah Khomeini, "A Warning to the Nation -1941", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 169-173.

[439] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 9.; Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 48-49, 53-56.

[440] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 126-149.

[441] Moin, op.cit., pp. 78.

[442] Algar, op.cit., pp. 20.

governments at home.[443] In addition, for proper instruction of Islam, religious education institutions are proposed a reform package including the improvement of their syllabus and methods. Other religious institutions such as the mosques are also regarded vital for instruction, propagation and leadership. Depending on the dedication to and endeavors for the truth of Islam, concerted activism of the society becomes vital to overthrow the illegitimate government of the Shah; Khomeini preaches. Such an activism is expected to improve mankind spiritually and equip them with divinity, justice and purity of souls. Collective action under the guidance of the *faqih* would cut off the relations with the Western-inspired rulers, waylay cooperation with or aid to them and thus create the Islamic governmental apparatuses.[444]

Notwithstanding the economic boom, the second phase of Khomeinian activism evolved over the 1970s. The increase in oil prices during the 1973 economic crisis engendered the idea that Iran was becoming "Asian Germany".[445] Yet, the students, middle class and urban poor -mostly emigrated from the countryside- remained devoid of the benefits of growing economy. The political unrest of the social splits which was caused by the Shah's modernization project deepened. Then, the sudden decrease in oil prices which worsened the economic indicators and deepened the social distress in 1975 onwards came up with serious challenges to the regime. The expiration of the Pahlavi dynasty was incrementally approaching. So, beneath the course of events driving the country to 1979 revolution, there was the failure of the Shah regime to meet the needs and demands of the masses.

To figure out the outcomes of the modernization project as a whole, pre-revolutionary Iran suffered societal bifurcation.[446] On the one hand, there was the collaboration among the state notables, foreign capital and domestic comprador

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[443] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 126-128, 137.

[444] Ibid., pp. 126, 146.

[445] Nahas Maridi, "State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini and the Middle East", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1985, pp. 521.

[446] Arjomand, op.cit., pp. 388-398.; Samih K. Farsoun & Mehrdad Mashayekhi, "Introduction: Iran's Political Culture", in *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic*, ed(s) Samih K. Farsoun & Mehrdad Mashayekhi, New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 7-12.

bourgeoisie. On the other, the rank and file Iranians were secluded from enjoying economic prosperity. They suffered from increasing income inequality, bankruptcy of small-scale enterprises which failed to compete with foreign capital, and undermining of agricultural production that provoked migration from rural to urban centers. Hence, they failed to keep up with cultural phase of the modernization project and stayed aloof from the socio-political realm. As a result, the Iranian society was fragmented between the *core* of the political and economic elite and the *periphery* including the bazaar, the urban poor, the clergy and the reformist young. The growing gap between the social groups and the simultaneous search for rebuilding the society to integrate the isolated masses into the system constituted the prelude to the revolution.[447]

The polarized structure of the society led up to an organized activism towards the end of the 1970s. Farzaneh evaluates that the revolutionary cooperation within the Iranian society embracing the different societal classes was the legend of Iranian genre of politics.[448] The ulama which was supported financially by its devout bazaar orchestrated the collaboration among the opponents of *taghut* of the Shah.[449] Including all the secluded societal segments, the opposition contained not only the religious but also the secular viewpoints. Revolutionary solidarism was built to the extent that the political participation by ordinary citizens rose to the highest level in the history of Iran.[450] The incentive for the pre-revolutionary mass politics was to secure the authentic nature of the political culture and religion.[451] Specifically, while the traditionalist allies sought to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Iran, the young reformists targeted the authoritarian dictation of the Shah.[452]

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[447] Ali Shariati, *What Is to Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance*, ed(s) Fahrang Rajaee, Texas: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986, pp. 2.

[448] Farzaneh, op.cit., pp. 87.

[449] Mehdi Mozaffari, "Islamism in Algeria and Iran", in *Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed(s) Abdel Salam Sidahmed & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 240.

[450] Mohsen M. Milani, "Political Participation in Revolutionary Iran", in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform*, ed(s) John L. Esposito, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 83-84.

[451] Arjomand, op.cit., pp. 401.

[452] Farzaneh, op.cit., pp. 87.

Herein, Islamist thought emerged as an ideology of opposition to the regime.[453] The clergy in general and Khomeini's commentary of Twelver Shiism in particular were instrumental in social mobilization.[454] Ayatollah activated the Shi'i doctrine anew by setting people in motion on the account of the goal of Islamic government. He called for doing away with the passivity of Shiism. Put differently, he gave up looking forward to the return of the Mahdi for eventual salvation from things associated with the evil and for perpetual dignity and divinity. Instead, Khomeini proposed the possibility of legitimate governance even during the imam's occultation provided that a perfect man with certain qualifications, cited above, was entrusted with the same authority and tasks as that of the Mahdi.

In gendering the collective and activist mentality against Reza Shah, Khomeini harmonized the Shi'i doctrine with the Western political traits. He had recourse to populism based on social justice, third worldism, socialism and nationalism in his address to the society.[455] Connected to his populist strategy, Khomeini put the blame of the upheavals on the Shah's policies. He pointed out the day-to-day issues pertaining to the economic problems such as wasting oil resources; ignorance of the countryside in terms of social services like health, school and electricity; the failure of giving land to the landless peasantry and support to the bankrupting bazaar. He, hereby, strictly criticized the Western domination which was alleged to leave Iran backward by appealing to the discourse of third wordlist nationalism. Deriving from Iranian sort of nationalism which historically matured in the light of Shi'i belief in the oppression of the imams, Khomeini uttered the social injustice splitting the society between the oppressed –m*ostazafin*- and oppressor –*mostakberin*-, the have-nots –*foqara*- and the rich -*sarvatmandan*.[456] He drew attention to the interaction between the oppressed nation –Iranians- and the Satan's government implying the Shah regime under the control of the US. It also demarcated the upper class supported and lower class oppressed. While doing so, Khomeinian doctrine

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[453] Farsoun & Mashayekhi, op.cit., pp. 11.

[454] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 49.

[455] Farsoun & Mashayekhi, op.cit., pp. 3-4.

[456] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 27, 47-50.

incarnated a harmony between nationalism and religion against the West and the Westernists.[457]

Another characteristic of Khomeini's activism was the appeal to the revolutionary rhetoric while organizing the masses against the Shah regime. Regardless of sharp cleavages in the worldviews between socialism and Islamism, Khomeini was firstly sensitive to and collaborator of the ideological stance of the socialist circles in Iran.[458] He benefited from Ali Shariti's thoughts which blend Shi'i belief with Marxist creed of revolution and class struggle.[459] Khomeini overlapped with Shariati's analysis of "where", "for what purpose" and "how" to initiate. As Shariati did, he longed for transforming the society to bring back justice and condemn the evil in the light of the religious precepts under the auspices of the enlightened leader.[460] Secondly, he had recourse to the culture of martyrdom in Shi'i belief which derives from the sufferings of the Imams.[461] Whereas Khomeini did rarely mention martyr –*shahid*- in his early career, he defined the ones who were killed during riots against the Shah as *shahid*. The mentality of martyrdom served for finding volunteers for sacrifice in the struggle against the evil.[462] Its logic also helped Khomeini demonstrate the hypocrisy of the Western values such as the human rights which

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[457] Haggay Ram, "Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path between Pan-Islam and Nationalism", in *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East*, ed(s) Bruce Maddy- Weitzman & Efraim Inbar, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 12.; Halliday, op.cit., pp. 64.; Suzanne Maloney, "Identity and Change in Iran's Foreign Policy", in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, ed(s) Shibley Telhami & Michael Barnett, London: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 102.

[458] Nasr, op.cit., 2006, pp. 86.

[459] Gilles Kepel, Iran's Islamic Revolution, in *The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed(s) Phillip Margulies, New York: Greenhaven Press, 2006, pp. 89.; Nasr, op.cit., 2006, pp. 126-130.; Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, "Khomeini's Workers' Day Message", *MERIP Reports*, No 98, 1981, pp. 25.

[460] Shariati, op.cit., pp. 1-26.

[461] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Muharram: The Triumph of Blood over the Sword, November 23, 1978", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 242-245.

[462] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Declaration on the Occasion of 'Id al Fitr, September 6, 1979", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 233-236.; Ruhullah Khomeini, "Message to the Pilgrims, September 27, 1978", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 237-241.; See also, Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 127.; Mozaffari, op.cit., pp. 237.; Shaul Shay, "Islamic Fundamentalists' Increasing Use of Suicide", in *The Rise of Islamic Fundamnetalism*, ed(s) Philip Margulies, New York: Greenhaven Press, 2006, pp. 134-136.

were violated by the Westerners and Westernists by abusing the right to life.[463] Then, the third revolutionary aspect comes to the picture. The social movement in Iran was based on Islamic universalism as well as anti-colonialism. This assigns the duty to spread the revolutionary ideas against illegitimate authorities. The goal of the revolution, in this sense, could be pinpointed as to re-arrange the state-system with a spill-over effect.[464]

To conclude, Khomeini both as an ideologue and an activist could manage to lead the massive opposition against the Shah even in exile. After the revolution, he returned to hand in the whole control of Iran as the supreme leader. There is currently a consensus that the Iranian Revolution was an outstanding success with both its organizational phase and outcomes. Kepel assesses that the Iranian Revolution marks a turning point in the recent Islamic revival as it triggered the worldwide awareness about militant Islam.[465] Then, how Iranian Islamic Republic perceived the rest? To respond the question, it is necessary to look into the Islamic government in Iran.

5.3.2 The Praxis of Khomeinism: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Starting from the 1960s, Khomeini laid down the basics of the Islamic government. With the opportunity for praxis of his political theory which the revolution granted, Khomeini organized the Islamic state. He introduced a theocratic system into the modern conception of policy-making. The government would make the totality of Islam real. It would unify the Iranians in the light of *tawhid* and withstand the economic and cultural imperialism. As a challenge to his renunciation of all man-made rules, it harmonized the religious precepts with the Western political pattern in structuring the state as well as the philosophy of Islamic government and the revolutionary movement.

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[463] Ruhullah Khomeini, "In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution, February 19, 1978", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 212-227.

[464] Maridi, op.cit., pp. 521-522.

[465] Kepel, op.cit., 2003, pp. 106.

Theocracy was the form of the state introduced in the legal as well as the organizational structure. The constitution of the Islamic republic adopted Twelver Shi'ism as the official religion of Iran. The stability and sustainability of the Islamicity of the government was guaranteed by the concept of the *vilayet-al fiqh* in the occultation of the Mahdi.[466] As well, designated in the constitution, the political system displayed a form of consultative government under the control of the juristconsult.[467] Herein, with the esoteric knowledge of Islam and understanding of justice it held, the clergy was assigned the key role in ensuring the implementation of the law in accordance with permissible rights, communal unity, justice and interests.[468] To do so, the clergy was envisaged to supervise the system with its wide-ranging authority.[469] *Vilayet-al fiqh* was the sole way to wipe out *taghut,* the Western-inspired political culture.[470]

From this point of view, the institutional division of labor was designated to offer the clergy the opportunity to dominate the system. Khomeini reinforced the theocratic nature of the state. To this end, the organizational chart was designed on the basis of: (1) ideological setting of the Islamic Republican Party, (2) the defense of the Corps of Revolutionary Guards, (3) the prevention of wrong-doings by the police and gendarmerie forces, (4) the assurance of the implementation of *Shariah* by the Revolutionary Courts, (5) the government's dedication to raising the life-standards of the masses, (6) the obedience to the Islamic governance by the masses, (7) the recognition of the centrality of religious leadership for the sake of the Muslims and Islamic government by the media, the Mostazafin Foundation[471] and the

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[466] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 34.; Mehran Tamadonfar, "Islam, Law and Political Control in Contemporary Iran", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2001, pp. 215-216.

[467] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 55-57.; See also, Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 108.

[468] Tamadonfar, op.cit., 2001, pp. 206-208.

[469] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 108.

[470] Ibid., pp. 160.

[471] *Bonyad-e Mostazafin*, translated as the Foundation of the Underprivileged, is a semi-public foundation originally founded in 1979 with the assets of the Shah's family. Its objective was defined as to operate a wide variety of charitable activities such as agriculture, hotels, soft drinks, auto-manufacturing, shipping for the sake of the poor. It controls 30 % of the economy with at least 400 companies and approximately 65.000 employers. The Bonyads (companies) are entitled to provide social services to the have-nots. Private economic actors find it hard to compete with autonomous and

universities.[472] In this institutional design, the Council of Guardians consisting of Islamic jurists had the key role in ensuring the theological nature of the regime with its intense authority in interpreting the constitution; supervising the elections; approving the candidates of the parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts and reviewing the bills to submit to the parliament. Herein, the Assembly of Experts which also included the clerics was formed to elect the *faqih* and supervise his activities.

One characteristic of the new political fabric was its both derivation from and objection to the Western political culture.[473] Initially, it was based on constitutionalism. However, constitutionalism here was not regarded as in the form of law-making procedures in democratic regimes. In Khomeini's mind, it implied a process of Islamization of law on the basis of the primary sources and interpretations of the jurists. It also employed the sovereignty of God, not the arbitrariness of mankind inspired by the West.[474] Secondly, it recognized the popular will in the preamble of the constitution. Popular will would legitimate the government through popular vote. Yet, it was limited by the divine will for the sustenance of the system. Thirdly, it entitled God-given rights and freedoms as well as the duties to the Iranians which were similar to those of the Western political culture but defined within the limits of the *Shariah*.[475] Also, it structured the system by deriving from Western-originated separation of powers; the executive headed by the president, the judiciary with appointed judges, the legislative body formed by the elected parliament.[476] Still,

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privileged economic power of the Bonyads which affect the conduct of economy in any field of the country. This is because the Foundation does not pay taxes, hence is not under direct government control. It is directly responsible to the Supreme Leader. See: Abbas Bakhtiar, "Ahmedinejad's Achilles Heel: The Iranian Economy", *LondonEconomics*, 25 January 2007, http://www.payvand.com/news/07/jan/1295.html□, 30.06.2008., Bülent Keneş, "Bu Mustazaflar da Nerden Çıktı?", *Bugün*, 29 Nisan 2006.

[472] Ruhullah Khomeini, "New Year's Message, March 21, 1980", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 286-294.; See also, Milani, op.cit., pp. 83-85.; Tamadonfar, op.cit., pp. 215.

[473] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 59.; Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 120.; Oliver Roy, "Islamists in Power", in *The Islamism Debate*, ed(s) Martin Kramer, Cairo: Tel Aviv University, 1997, pp. 71-72.

[474] Tamadonfar, op.cit., pp. 208-211.

[475] Ibid., pp. 206-208.

[476] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 33.

the centrality of the clergy was the control mechanism of the policy conduct.[477] Therefore, the incorporated modern/Western traits were dominated by the Islamic identity of the newly-born Islamic regime. The revolution incarnated an Islamic, not a Western republic. In this context, Khomeini's theory of state as the basis of the Islamic republic was a rejection of the content of the Western political culture even though it borrowed from the West seemingly. To Khomeini, Western politics was illegitimate as it was directed by the will of the people which abolished the divine authority from politics.[478]

Concomitant with institutionalizing the theological regime, Khomeini concerned with preservation of it. He safeguarded the religious premises of the system by suppressing the former allies. As cited previously, the revolutionary movement was supported by every segment of the society and this was at the highest level of political participation Iran had ever witnessed.[479] Following the referendum on the Islamic republic, the preparations of the constitution brought about societal cleavages. Objections came from the secularists, leftists and Sunni minority on the ground that the new system implied a theocratic dictatorship.[480] Then, as the first *faqih* of the Republic, Khomeini crushed the opponents of the new order step-by step.[481] First, the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan which had a secular tendency and was in favor of rapprochement with the West resigned. Abdolhassan Bani Sadr –the first president- was the next to be removed away because of his Marxist tendencies and opposition to the Islamization of government. Subsequently, the political parties other than the Islamic Republican Party of the clerics and Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shariatmedari who was critical of the *vilayet-al fiqh* were persecuted.

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[477] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 59.
[478] Vanessa Martin, "Religion and State in Khumaini's Kashf al-asrar", *Bulletin of the School of the Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 56, No.1, 1993, pp. 43-45.

[479] Milani, op.cit., pp. 83.

[480] Kepel, op.cit., 2006, pp. 90.

[481] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 57-58.; Kepel, op.cit., 2006, pp. 113-116.; Milani, op.cit., pp. 84-85.; Milt Freudenheim & Barbara Slavin, "The World in Summary; Khomeini Signals an Open Season on Bani Sadr", *New York Times*, 14 June 1981.; Moin, op.cit., pp. 229-244.

Eventually, there was no opposition to build a religious national identity. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Khomeini managed to remake the state in a theocratic form of governance. The state was based on the objective of perfection of the society under the auspices of the wise supreme leader, on the strategy to centralize the system under the full control of the clergy and on the boundaries of the *Shariah*.[482] Shi'i clerics became the guardians of the Islamic government replacing the secularist elite of the Shah regime.[483] This was a transformation from secularist-modernist authoritarianism to the theological one.[484]

The striking point here is that it collided with the secular nation-state system which regarded theocracy as pre-modern.[485] Thus, the institutionalization of Islam through the doctrine of *vilayet-al fiqh* brought about debate on the collision between modern and pre-modern forms of governance. In this perspective, Iranian revolution has been consequential and popular in the sense that it opened a new phase in the Islamic revival as well as the political fabric of Iran. Furthermore, it revealed to what extent the Western tradition could penetrate into the organization of an Islamic state a revivalist ideologue set forth.

5.4 Iran and the Rest

The Islamic Republic of Iran managed to realize the historic ideal of Islamists and brought about governance of Muslims, for Muslims and by Islamic ordinance.[486] After getting organized internally, revolutionary Iran sought for deconstructing the illegitimate rules and reconstructing the Islamic government through world-shaking and world-legitimating functions.[487] To this purpose, the Islamic state came up with

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[482] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 172.

[483] Fahrang, op.cit., pp. xii-xiv.; Nasr, op.cit., 2006. pp. 126.

[484] Fahrang, op.cit., pp. xii-xiv.

[485] Abrahamian, op.cit., pp. 56.

[486] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2005, pp. 82.

[487] Güneş Murat Tezcür &Taghi Azadarmaki, "Religiosity and Islamic Rule in Iran", *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2008, pp. 220-221.

anti-Westernism and universality claims. At first, the discourse of the new regime revolved around third worldism. The constitution prohibited colonialism and the slavery of man to man for which the West was blamed. In this respect, revolutionary foreign policy had an anti-Western character which later turned into a slogan of "neither the East nor the West". It underlined the borders between Dar al-Islam of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Dar al-Harb covering the rest of the world. In this perspective, the new state searched for the viable way to liberate the Muslims from the tyranny of man-made rules. Khomeini believed in the unity of the Muslim world which alerted for new Islamic revolutions. Notwithstanding the cleavages between the Shi'i and Sunni world, he aimed at exportation of the regime starting from the near abroad. To this purpose, he also summoned the Iranians to form the "Mobilization of the Oppressed –*Baseej-e Mostazafin*". The Baseej was a paramilitary organization with all the male Iranians who are too young and old for military service and the women to preserve the values of the revolution. It had branches in every part of the country. Such post-revolutionary initiatives of Khomeini created anxiety particularly in the West on the ground that a fundamentalist Comintern would come into existence.[488]

So, could it constitute a serious challenge to the Western political culture and the West itself? Would its repercussions reach beyond the boundaries of Iran? The response of such questions lies beyond the conduct of international relations of the Islamic republic.

5.4.1 The West Negated

The "West" in Khomeinism was instrumental throughout the praxis of the Iranian revolution. As mentioned previously, Western legacy constituted a reference point where needed in the pre-revolutionary phase and also the organization of the new regime while sustaining the anti-Western discourse. The Ayatollah behaved pragmatically and made use of the Western values where needed to realize the goal of Islamic government. He derived much from *nationalism* against imperialism and foreign influence, *social justice* dealing with the relationship between the oppressors

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[488] Milton-Edwards, op.cit., 2005, pp. 80.

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and the oppressed and *liberty and justice in Western sense* to be achieved via third worldist revolutionary mentality of the 1960. The legal and institutional structure of the newly-born state was also Western-originated, at least in shape. Succinctly, Khomeini adopted Western political traits to his theory of Islamic government where functional.

Still, antagonism remained to be the essence of Khomeini's perception of the West. While calling the Muslims for coping with it, the Ayatollah clarifies the place of the West in his political thought in one of his speeches as:[489]

> The will of Almighty God, decreed the release of this oppressed nation from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from the yoke of the domination of oppressive powers, especially the government of the world-devouring America, and to unfurl the banner of Islamic justice over our beloved country. It is our duty to stand up against them, provided that our intellectuals give up their fascination with Westernization or Easternization and follow the straight path of Islam and nationalism.

Khomeini obviously blames the West to keep the Muslim world backward through corrupt plans[490] and opposes to the regimes in the Islamic world that deviates from the true path of Islam via secularist Westernization mistake.[491] Khomeini proposes Islam as the way to cope with the imperialists in all spheres of life and through concerted action.[492] All the troubles dominating the Iranian society is linked to the relations with the USA and its staunch ally Israel.[493] He, hereby, intensified his

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[489] Ruhullah Khomeini, "We Shall Confront the World with our Ideology", *MERIP Report*, No. 28, June 1980, pp. 22.

[490] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 34.; Farhang questions whether revolutionary Iran is used to blame foreigners for its own flaws and failures. See: Farhang, op.cit., pp. xiv.; Tamadonfar, op.cit., pp. 205.

[491] Khomeini, "Islamic Government", op.cit., 1981, pp. 35.

[492] Ibid., pp. 28.; Ruhullah Khomeini, "Message to the Muslim Students in North America, July 10, 1972", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 210.; Ruhullah Khomeini, "Message to Pilgrims, February 6, 1971", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 195-199.; Ruhullah Khomeini, "Message to Pilgrims, September 24, 1979", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 275-277.

[493] Khomeini, "The Granting of Capitulatory Right to the US –October, 27, 1964", op.cit., 1981, pp. 187.

endeavors to sweep away the Western influence upon Iran. He warned the Western-inspired doings of the Pahlavi regime not to bestow immunities and concessions on the enemies which undermined the independence, self-esteem and honor of the nation.[494]

Therefore, anti-Westernism associated with anti-Americanism became the negative incentive to pave the way of the revolution. The cordial relations between the USA and the Pahlavi regime did never please the periphery. Starting from the coup against Dr. Mosaddagh's rule in 1953 backed by CIA, American penetration in Iran was comprehended as a threat to the political and cultural independence of the country.[495] In this perspective, Khomeini's initial reaction to the USA encounters with the Shah's granting of capitulatory rights to the US troops in Iranian territories which resulted to his exile.[496] Substantial antagonism towards the USA came about on the eve the revolution. The then president Nixon proposed the USA's ambitions on the Middle East to be employed via military bases and facilities in Iran. In addition, national intelligence and security service of Iran -SAVAK- re-organized thank to the support of CIA. The result was the growing demand for freedom and independence.

In the aftermath of the revolution, Iran under Khomeini conducted its foreign policy in the light of anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism. The objective was to safeguard the Islamic purity of Iran's new political fabric from any sort of interference. It pursued a strategy expounded as "neither the East nor the West". Rejection of the rest of the world was a precaution against Westoxification which denoted the distortion of authentic culture through Westernization.

In this perspective, upcoming events heralded the rise of the tension between Iran and the rest. The USA was the initial target. The revolution came up with a new

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[494] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Open Letter to Prime Minister Hoveyda, April 16, 1967", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 189-194.

[495] Daniel Pipes, "Khomeini, The Soviets and U.S.: Why the Ayatollah Fears America", *The New York Times*, 27 May 1980.

[496] Khomeini, "The Granting of Capitulatory Right to the US –October, 27, 1964", op.cit., 1981, pp. 181-188.

political jargon including "Death to America" and "War till Victory" and anti-American political acts such as burning of American flags and identification of America and Israel as the national enemies. The USA was dubbed as the "Great Satan" prompting "unjust" rules in the Islamic world

Hostage crisis in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was the prominent case demonstrating the anti-American position. When the Shah fled to the US in 1979, revolutionary Iran started its anti-US campaign in no time by deriving from "Great Satan" metaphor of Khomeini.[497] Then, it seized the US embassy with 63 hostages to persuade the US government to hand the Shah over to Iran for trail. Khomeini demanded the USA not to guard Mohammed Reza who was responsible from the oppression of the Iranians for decades. He also condemned the USA for its intimidation of Iran through military means and economic sanctions for its pseudo intention to protect rights and freedoms such as that of the Shah who was responsible for sufferings of the Iranians.[498]

Hostage crisis was regarded to be the praxis of war against the pagans which Iran under Khomeini's authority declared from the inception.[499] The essence of the crisis lies behind the fact that it heralded the gradually radicalizing nature of the relations with the West and the Islamic revival. To epitomize, the Shi'i suicide attack on American embassy in Lebanon on April 18, 1983, destroying foreign barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1987, murder of the president of the American University of Beirut on January 19, 1989 paved the way for radicalization process which reached its zenith in the 9/11 period.[500] It is also important in the sense that despite all the efforts of Carter administration such as the economic sanctions and political initiatives to mobilize the UN Security Council and its NATO allies to take precautions against radicalizing Iran, the hostages were liberated after 444 days.

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[497] "Revolution in Iran", *Current Events*, 8 September 2006.

[498] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Address to Monsignor Bugnini, Papal Nuncio, November 12, 1979", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 278-285.

[499] Matthias Küntzel, "From Khomeini to Ahmadinejad", *Policy Review*, Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007, pp. 69-71.

[500] Küntzel, op.cit., pp. 76.

Apart from the USA which was the primary enemy in his mind, Khomeini pointed out Israel as equally harmful to the unity and integrity of the Islamic world. Similar to the views of Qutb and Mawdudi, Israel was regarded to be the staunch ally of the USA in the region. In his speech "The Afternoon of Ashura, June 3, 1963", Khomeini makes an assessment of the objectives of Israel on Iran and its place in the eyes of Pahlavi dynasty:[501]

> "Israel does not wish the Quran to exist in this county. Israel does not wish the ulama to exist in this county… Israel is still assaulting us, assaulting you, the nation…It wishes to remove… anything it regards as blocking its path… In order to attain its objectives, the government of Iran has continually affronted us in accordance with goals and plan conceived in Israel."

In this context, Israel was identified as the "Lesser Satan"[502] representing the interests of the US at the expense of the Muslim unity and tranquility in the region. Therefore, Khomeini called the Muslim world for unified action against Israel starting from the 1960s onwards.[503] The attitudes of the post-revolutionary period towards Israel remained to be anti-Zionist.[504] Iran under Khomeini did not recognize Israel and actively supported Islamist organizations against Israel such as Hizballah. It also spoke of liberating Jarusalem from Zionism. All such antagonistic postures resulted to the cut-off of the mutual official relations.

The last but not least vestige of anti-Western worldview of Khomeinism was the Rushdie Affair. Salman Rushdie is the author of the book "Satanic Verses". The book ridiculed or criticized everything such as the West, the political leaders and beliefs.[505] It engendered fury within the Islamic world and raises the tension of radical Islamism in the sense that it was regarded to be cynical about the authenticity

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[501] Khomeini, "The Afternoon of Ashura, June 3, 1963", op.cit., 1981, pp. 177-178.

[502] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 71.

[503] Ruhullah Khomeini, "In Commemoration of the Martyrs at Qom, April 3, 1963", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 176.

[504] "Khomeini's opposition to Israel was Unconditional*", Tehran Times,* 2 June 2008.

[505] Daniel Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah and the West*, London: Transatlantic Publishers, 2003, pp. 41-69.

of Islamic belief. Khomeini's reaction was so harsh that he summoned the Muslim world not to condone Rushdie and sentenced him to death even by disregarding the jurisdiction of the Islamic courts.

To Khomeini, Rushdie was an apostate insulting the virtue of Islam as a religion with his blasphemous book. Therefore, in his *fatwa*, he judged that the murder of Rushdie was incumbent upon every Muslim. The Muslims were obliged to carry out this holy duty in the name of Islam. This was necessary to preserve Islam from the enemies of Islam. Hereby, the West was claimed to act in collaboration with Rushdie.[506]

5.4.2 The Islamic World to Be Islamized

After the Islamists seized power in Iran and Islamized the regime by institutionalizing *vilayat-al fiqh*, Khomeini as the *faqih* of the new state undertook a normative role of transforming the whole Muslim world. This was a reflection of the universality claim of the revolutionary values. Khomeini aimed at spreading the Islamic premises of the new regime in Iran to the Muslim world. This would sweep away the domination of the West, especially the USA, in the Middle East. In addition, Khomeini longed for the leadership of all Muslims. To this supranational end, he played down the Shi'i nature of the revolution in order to gain the sympathy of Sunni world. Identification with Shiism would obviously restrict the repercussions of the revolution in the Muslim world.[507] Therefore, Khomeini claimed to have realized the Islamic, not Shi'i, revolution which was the objective of the Sunni revivalists as well.[508]

According to Nahas, Iranian Revolution, similar to the 1952 Egyptian Revolution of pan-Arabism, has resulted to an ideological challenge to the Middle Eastern state system on the basis of pan-Islamism.[509] The rise of pan-Islamism at the expense of pan-Arabism could not be explained solely by Iranian Islamic revolution, but it

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[506] Ibid., pp. 123-136.

[507] Peter Morris, "The Ayatollah Khomeini", *History Today*, Vol. 31, No. 6, 1981, pp. 40.

[508] Nasr assesses this process as "Sunnification of Shiism". See, Nasr, op.cit., 2006. pp. 160.

[509] Maridi, op.cit., 1985, pp. 507-508.

reached its zenith in praxis due to the Islamization of a government even if it was backed by the USA. Iranian revolution became a source of inspiration for the Islamist movements to a greater or lesser extent.[510] This challenged the authority of the existing Middle Eastern regimes which had already gone into legitimacy crisis for their failure in regulating the socio-economic conditions to the advantage of every citizen.

The plan was to overthrow the un-Islamic governments in order to engender the unity of the *ummah*.[511] Initially, the post-revolutionary Iran exerted the influence of the Islamic revolution upon the Shi'i population in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Gulf States and Afghanistan. It employed the strategy of clerical propagation to inspire the Shi'i people in the Gulf region.[512] Lebanon was the country where regime exportation did really work. Benefiting from the civil strife from 1975 onwards which weakened authority of the state substantially; Iran inspired the Shi'i awakening in Lebanon. It appealed to the hardships of the Shi'i people such as the socio-economic backwardness and political imbalances in the governance compared to the Maronite Christians with the permanent presidency and the Sunni group with the presidency of the council of ministers.

Within this framework, penetration of Iranian clergy into Lebanese politics started when Musa Sadr went to Lebanon to establish the "Movement of the Disinherited – *Harakat al-Mahrumin*- known as Amal. Until his disappearance in Libya, Sadr introduced activism instead of passivity of Shiism which indoctrinated the waiting for the Mahdi. In the aftermath of the revolution, Iran paved the way for the formation of the Party of God –Hizballah- to fight against Israel by adopting the cult of martyrdom of Shiism. The objective of Hizballah was to establish an Islamic Republic of Lebanon similar to that of Iran. Hizballah became the satellite of Iran's interests in Lebanon.[513] Iran backed the organization financially, militarily and politically. For instance, it dispatched revolutionary guards in Beqaa Valley,

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[510] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 95.

[511] Ram, op.cit., pp. 7.

[512] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 104-105.

[513] Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon –At the Crossroads", in *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East*, ed(s) Bruce Maddy- Weitzman & Efraim Inbar, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 93.

provided arms and paid the salaries of the members of the organization. Unlike its preliminary scope for action based on Islamic radicalism to safeguard the lives and interests of the Muslims, Hizballah's methodology changed drastically simultaneous with the constant weakening of Iran. Similar to JI's strategy in Pakistan, it enhanced its maneuver to move through involvement in the political system of the country over the 1990s.

Iran's expansionist creed made it unavoidable to confront with neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq. At first, post-revolutionary Iran came up with a claim to be the spokesman of the interests of the Islamic world. This culminated to the contestation with Saudi Arabia which had the historic claim to represent the orthodoxy of Islam. Iran was decisive to challenge Saudi Arabia. Khomeini's government regarded Saudi Arabia as the collaborator of the Great Satan and Saudi regime as illegitimate. Hence, it was critical of Saudi penetration to the Islamic world in any respect. To sweep away the influence of Saudis, it initiated to gain the support of the Organization of Islamic Conference and Muslim World League in which Saudi regime had already captured profound respect. It also despised Saudi funding of Islamism on the ground that the USA-backed, illegitimate regime of Saudi Arabia was destined to fall.[514]

In turn, Saudi regime responded by containing Shiism through propagation against Khomeinism. It benefited from Saudi Arabia's good reputation in resisting against secular Arab nationalism. Appealing to most of the Muslim world, it supported the countries like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian countries against Shi'i expansionist claims. It also invested in intellectual developments worldwide. That is why Nasr ascertains that radicalization of Islamism over the 1990s derived much from Saudi policies to contain Iran.[515] Furthermore, it made use of Wahhabi ulama to preach in the seminaries, mosques, academies and alike. In addition, it funded Sunni students to nourish Sunni ideology.

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[514] Nasr, op.cit., 2006. pp. 150-151.

[515] Ibid., pp. 158.

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Hajj in 1987 was the turning point with regard to the tension between the two countries. The usual hajj propagation of Iranians against Saudi Arabia resulted to hundreds of Iranians' death due to the counter attack of the Saudi police. Iranian search for support from the Muslim world, in the League as well as the Conference, remained in vain. Saudi Arabia succeeded in introducing a quota system for pilgrim which Iran objected by boycotting pilgrimage as a whole and cutting off the diplomatic relations with Saudi kingdom.

The disappointment was followed by the involuntarily concluded ceasefire with Iraq. Post-revolutionary Iran did not respect the 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq and commenced its Shi'i activism in Iraq which urged Saddam Hussein to attack on Iran in 1980. From the inception, Khomeini regarded the war as a gift to assure the leading role of Iran to liberate the oppressed Muslims by toppling un-Islamic tyrannies. In the light of its expansionist discourse, the Islamic Republic of Iran found itself in isolation from the world. As a result of the war, Iran suffered economic and arms embargo imposed by the West while Iraq enjoyed direct support from the world; most importantly the US, Europe and the Soviet Union (SU). In addition, Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt provided financial and logistic support to Iraq. Against this containment, Khomeini summoned the Muslim world to unite regardless of cultural, ethnic, sectarian or linguistic differences and disseminate the Islamic regime against the oppressor powers.[516] He hoped support especially from Iraqi Shi'i population which never came. As a result, the ceasefire came in 1988 which Khomeini called "chalice of poison".

The failure of the preliminary initiatives to promote Islamic governance abroad did not seem to have discouraged Iran in pursuing its universalistic ambitions. Even after Khomeini, expansionist tendency continued. Benefiting from the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the collapse of the SU, Iran aimed to exert its influence through North-South route.[517] It took over Abu Musa which is an island in the Strait of Hormuz and

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[516] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Message to the Pilgrims, September 12, 1980", in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Khomeini*, ed(s) Hamid Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 300-306.

[517] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 69.

the Tunb Islands in 1992 to Persianize the Gulf. Namely, it remained dedicated to the objective of Islamizing governments abroad.

All in all, foreign policy priorities of post-revolutionary Iran had two characteristics which suggest a glimpse of the place of the West in Khomeinism when put into practice. Firstly, it was nationalist to preserve the interests and full independence from the yoke of foreign actors, especially the USA. To this end, Iran pursued a third wordlist, non-aligned foreign policy. The response to the imperialist powers was radical and violent as was the case in the hostage crisis. Secondly, it had universal ambitions to lead the Islamic world in their uprising against the un-Islamic regimes at home and the West in the international arena. In its effort to export the Islamic regime, Iran appealed to both violent and non-violent strategies. Leaving aside the war with Iraq, Iran under Khomeini did not necessitate the use of sword in its address to the Muslims. It appealed to the much peaceful way of propagation and the influence of the *faqih*.[518] For instance, it politicized the hajj platform in order to propagate the Islamic ordinance. Succinctly, the result appeared to be far from satisfying Iran which had great expectations such as the leadership of the Islamic world. Still, post-revolutionary Iran engendered prominent repercussions in the international environment. The revolution itself was a historic event, especially with regard to anti-Westernism in the Islamic world and the relations between the East and the West.

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[518] Ibid., pp. 63.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Comparing Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini

This thesis has evaluated the reaction of Islamic resurrection against the interference of the colonialist culture of the West into the Muslim world. Fuller asserts that the clash of interests paves the way for ideological clashes.[519] Departing from Fuller's assertion, the thesis has discussed the Western tradition from the point of the revivalist ideology in line with the contentious relations between the West and the Islamic world. In this respect, the thesis has demonstrated that concomitant with the secularist modernization projects of the Western-inspired regimes, the revivalists appeared with a counter ideological claim of restoring the authenticity of Islam. Li suggests that societal reformation necessitates an acquisition of the hardware (economic and military power) and the software (the ideological foundation of the state).[520] The revivalists re-activated Islamist politics as the software to challenge the hardware of the existing Westernist regimes. They pursued a process of Islamization of epistemological foundation of socio-politics. This was an initiative to de-Westernize, to eradicate the epistemological domination of the West.[521]

In this perspective, Tibi's glimpse of Islam as a "model for reality"[522] appeared to provide a solid basis to understand the mentality and objective of Islamic revival. This is to state that Islam has been uploaded normative roles in engendering a counter movement against the Western domination of the Islamic world in any way. It was re-politicized with the goal of re-shaping the social, cultural, political and

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[519] Fuller, op.cit., pp. 92.

[520] Li, op.cit., pp. 417.

[521] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 138-141.

[522] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 28-34.

economic domains. Basically, revivalism suggested a system hinged on three "D"s - *din* (religion), *dunya* (way of life) and *dawla* (the state) - with the aim of a return to the pure Islamic governance of the Medinian period.

To this end, revivalism has undertaken an activist/revisionist strategy to shift from Westernization to Islamization of the Islamic world. Among various initiatives such as the establishment of Islamist organizations and their networking endeavors, Islamic Revolution in Iran meant a turning point for the counter movement which was initiated by revivalists against the West itself and its socio-political penetration into the Islamic world. Firstly, its success proved the possibility of overwhelming the Western regimes at home. It also defied the West through resolute events like the hostage crisis. This is to state that the West was challenged by the Islamic world to such an extent for the first time.

Also, the post-Cold War period has drew out a substantial milieu for Islamic revival with regard to the reaction of the Islamic world against the West. Huntington's thesis of "clash of civilizations"[523] has pinpointed the essence of those prospects. Huntington argued that in a globe of the USA's hegemony, clash between the Islamic culture and the West would characterize the essence of international relations. Lewis has taken one step forward and developed a proposition on the clash of Islamic and Western cultures. Lewis advocated that the Islamic world has been in a crisis with modernity which, in turn, pointed out the West as the scapegoat of whatever went wrong with the Muslims.[524] Contrary to Lewis, it is claimed that the demise of the Soviet bloc as the communist-dictatorial adversary to capitalist-democratic system of the West necessitated the emergence of a threatening, but inferior, "other" in the eyes of Western civilization.[525] Leaving aside the roots of the confrontation between the West and Islamic world, the atmosphere of 9/11 has revealed that political Islam was still influential in the Middle East, opposing to the liberal-democratic transformation

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[523] Huntington, op.cit., pp. 22-49.

[524] Bernard Lewis, "*What Went Wrong?: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*", New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 151-160.; See also, Adam Sabra, "What is Wrong with What Went Wrong", *Middle East Report*, 2003.

[525] François Burgat, *Face to Face with Political Islam*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003, pp. xiii.; Halliday, op.cit., pp. 109-110.

of the world politics.[526] This time, Islamic totalism is asserted to have functioned as an ideological instrument in the form of "religious radicalism".[527] It questioned the place of the West in Islam's authenticity.

From this point of view, the theory of Islamic order set by Mawlana Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini has been surveyed from a comparative point of view. Based on the morality of Islam, the leading ideologues of revivalism, Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini, came up with their respective theories of governance which serve for the same ideal, but through slightly different ways. Mawdudi incorporated religious piety with political authority which influenced subsequent thinkers.[528] Then, Qutb developed Mawdudi's interpretation of political Islam in a radical manner[529] and Khomeini solidified the place of religion in governmental affairs. The conclusion they drew out signified the West as: (1) the cause of the socio-economic grievances persisting in the Islamic world and (2) the target to be wiped out. They came up with certain rhetoric of the West dealing with *colonialism* and *Westoxification*. Then, they focused on how to deconstruct the existing un-Islamic order and reconstruct it by modeling the Medinian state. This would sweep away the Western defects automatically. Herein, this thesis made an elaboration of the theory of Islamic government and the strategy to realize it in order to better indicate how the question of the West was dealt with in the revivalist ideology.

In this perspective, the question of the West in the minds of the revivalists, whom this study has concerned, has been analyzed in order to highlight to what extent revivalism has engendered the counter ideology of the universality claim of the Western tradition. So, in what sense did the thoughts of M. Mawdudi, S. Qutb and R. Khomeini reacted against with the West?

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[526] Dağı, op.cit., pp. 21.

[527] In Shephard's typology, Islamic modernism denotes that Islam provides an ideological foundation for socio-political life which is flexible compared to the authoritarian secularist regimes and has different branches like socialist modernism, liberal-nationalist modernism and third-world radicalism. Radical Islamism and secularism are equivalent with revivalism and secularist Westernism respectively. See. Shephard, op.cit., 1987, pp. 307-317.

[528] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 134.

[529] Ibid., pp. 134.

In general, those activist intellectuals of revivalism were acquainted with the West. According to Pipes, these revivalists were modern individuals in a trial of transforming the society and the state on the basis of Qur'an and against Westernization.[530] Pipe goes further by claiming that they were more aware of Western life than of their own.[531] Esposito proves Pipes by stating that Islamic revival was an urban not a rural phenomenon as its activists were educated and professional, namely modern.[532] Sayyid Qutb lived in the USA for two years; Mawdudi did not live in the West but learnt the Western thought. During the exile, Khomeini also had experiences of the Western-style of life. They picked up with Western languages, cultures, art and technology. Hereby, while the other two seemed to have concentrated on how to realize the ideal Islamic government, Qutb, in his works, came up with an intense analysis of the distorted, *jahili* nature of the Western culture.

Formed on the basis of the experience of the West, they recreated an Islamist rhetoric confronting with Western imperialism. They objected to *secularism* by establishing a religio-political system, to *nationalism* by denying imagined boundaries among human beings and to *democracy* by claiming sole obedience to God. Firstly, the three figures came up with a proposal establishing a theocratic system of governance which is an explicit refusal of "secularism". Theology, when involved in politics, refuses the socio-political fabric of the West which is an evolution of what the Westphalia system resulted in. To refute the validity of secularization, revivalist objective was to prove Islam as a total way of life, arranging the earthly affairs entirely. This could be regarded as an attempt to Islamize the world by establishing the just Islamic order; to re-create Dar al- Islam against Dar al-Harb, commonly associated with the West. This implies that the post-Christian political culture of the Christian world which pushed religion out of the political sphere was refused completely.

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[530] Daniel Pipes, "Western Mind of Political Islam", in *The Islamism Debate*, ed(s). Martin Kramer, Tel Aviv: Dayan Center Papers, 1997, pp. 52-54.

[531] Ibid.

[532] Esposito, op.cit., 2000, pp. 3.

Meanwhile, those ideologues falling into the scope of this study adopted the nationalist and democratic tenets to the political system they proposed. In theory, their proposal for government had certain similarities with those Western political values. From this point of view, it could be argued that revivalist activism was influenced by modernity in a way. Therein, this was somehow paradoxical as the revivalists proposed a theocratic government which would model the Medinian state while re-defining it on the basis of certain political values of the modern times.

Regarding nationalism, it was re-interpreted in the light of religious ties instead of ethnic and linguistic ones. The *ummah* denoting the unity and integrity of Muslims was the form of how nationalism was adapted. To the revivalist ideologues, the world was composed of two nations: the Muslims living Dar al-Islam and the non-Muslims living in Dar al-Harb. Moreover, they compared the Muslim world with that of the Medininan period and came to the conclusion that the existing Muslim world deviated from the true path of Islam. *Ummah* nationalism, in this sense, was expected to re-form *hakimiyya* in the Islamic world against the non-Muslim world.

In respect of their endeavors to realize the ideal Islamic government for the *ummah*, one point to be highlighted is that although they came up with universality claims of Islamic authenticity in theory, their activism could hardly transcend the boundaries of their countries. Mawdudi worked for Pakistani nation even by getting along with the secular Muslim League when necessary, Qutb coped with Nasser's regime under the auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini managed the Iranian Islamic revolution against the Shah. Herein, Qutb was an ideologue whose theory overtook his practice. On the contrary, Mawdudi's conception of nationalism was distinctive in the sense that he activated his ideas efficiently when serving for the rights of the Indian Muslims who later became Pakistanis against the Hindus. This was a resonance of the two-nation theory. In addition, he had an influence in defining the role of Islam in Pakistani identity. Khomeini's efforts were more fruitful in the sense that he set up a political movement which coped with the problems of the masses and was flexible enough to embrace different societal segments.[533] This made Khomeinian sort of nationalism third wordlist defending the have-nots against the

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[533] Butko, op.cit., 2004, pp. 34.

wealthy elite ideologically dominated by the West. As a result, he led the revolution against the Shah and succeeded in Islamization of Iranian state. So, dissimilar to what their ideology set forth, their activism stayed domestic. In this regard, Khomeini differed by undertaking initiatives to export the revolutionary values which were not as efficacious as those of the Iranian revolution.

Also, democracy was adapted with the aim of embracing every Muslim within the system. All the three revivalists claimed to re-structure the Islamic government to incorporate the rights and wealth of the whole *ummah*. It is hereby essential to reiterate that the source of sovereignty was defined as divine, not mundane. Therefore, the motto of democracy in Western tradition which is the rule of people, by people and for people changed in the revivalist form drastically. Revivalism put forward the rule of people within the boundaries of the divine will. Therefore, the rule by the vanguard, the caliph or the *faqih* was expected to ensure the place of Islam in socio-politics which would introduce the true path revealed by God. In practice, popular will was expected to be functional for the legitimacy of the rule and assured via elections as was the case in the Iranian Islamic Republic and the theo-democracy model of Mawdudi.

Struggle for equality of the secluded, disadvantaged commonality with the dominant elite could be evaluated as another dimension of democracy as understood by those revivalists. They all made use of the societal upheavals of the post-colonial systems at home when proposing Islam as the solution. Appealing to the discourse of third worldism, their reaction turned against both the West itself and Westoxification. Then, they proposed Islamic authenticity as an efficacious reformation by which the Muslim could acquire a bottom-to-top trend against the top-to-down process of modernization put into practice by the Westernist elites. The goal was to attain high economic standards and literacy rate and orientate the periphery to the political participation. To this purpose, Qutb developed the social justice thesis which benefited from socialist worldview which preferred collectivism to individualism and collaboration to competition. Mawdudi concerned for the preservation of the Indian Muslims against the Hindus and subsequently the Muslim identity of the Pakistanis against the secularist regimes. As Mawdudi did, Khomeini also incorporated democratic tradition into the organizational structure of the Hukumet-i Islam.

So, when developing their revivalist theory of state which reacted against the West, they incorporated or adopted relevant aspects of the Western tradition to the political system they figured out. From this point of view, discussing the revivalist proposal of an Occidentalist approach to the Western political culture, it could be concluded that anti-Westernism co-existed with Westernization to some degree. It is true that revivalism came up with a certain and negative picture of the West in mind. Still, socio-political outlook of the West has somehow continued to be internalized even during the heydays of Islamism in its revived form. For this reason, Shephard claimed that the discourse of opposition to the West did not seem to have halted the Westernization process.[534] Tibi was more assertive when arguing that the refusal of the West derives substantially from the dependence on the West.[535] However, this time, was different in the sense that imitation of the West by the Westernist/secularist regimes was obviously refused and challenged seriously as was the case in Iran. What the revivalists did was to adapted some points of the modern political values originated in the West.

By and large, as they had a similar definition of the world between black and white, the adobes of war and Islam; they served for the same target: to liberate the self as well as the society. To this purpose, the ideologues analyzed in this study have drawn out a mission as corrective to anything associated with *jahiliyya* or *taghut*. At this juncture, they develop an anti-Western/Occidentalist discourse refusing the universality claim of the Western tradition. The proposal instead was based on the universality claim of the authentic culture of Islam. They recalled the system of *hakimiyya* which proposes the true path of Islam to be the basis of socio-politics. Herein, Mawdudi's theo-democracy thesis inspired both Qutb's social justice system and Khomeini's *vilayet-al fiqh*. The central theme of all such theories of government has been the neo-absolutist nature of revivalism[536] whose focal point was to rebuild ideal Islamic order of *tawhid* for the *ummah*.[537] This order was designed to be guided by the vanguard and guaranteed by *Shariah*.[538]

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[534] Shepard, op.cit., 1987, pp. 315.

[535] Tibi, op.cit., 1988, pp. 1-8.

[536] Tibi, op.cit., 2001, pp. 22.

[537] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 135.

Islamic precepts do not offer an organizational scheme for government.[539] Therefore, when setting up the Islamic government, Mawdudi and Qutb came up with an in-depth analysis of Islamic beliefs while Khomeini concerned much more with how to make them central to the government and dedicated his endeavors to this purpose. Mawdudi proposed the theological nature of the government which was later developed by Qutb. Among the three revivalists, Qutb made a full analysis of the West which mostly related to the socio-cultural deterioration it suffered. Put another way, Qutb shed light on why the West was associated with *jahiliyya* or *taghut* and Westoxification was to be refrained from. Khomeini, in this sense, took further steps to reveal how to do so. Mawdudi's methodology differed from that of both Qutb and Khomeini in the sense that he opted for becoming a part of the existing system in order not to be marginalized and get the chance to influence the system within it. Succinctly, Qutb and Khomeini opted for direct struggle against the West and the Western-inspired regimes while Mawdudi's confrontation was through getting along with the Western-inspired regimes at home.

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[538] Butko, op.cit., 2004, pp. 51-56.

[539] Martin, op.cit., 2007, pp. 138.; Roy, op.cit., 1994, pp. 61.

GLOSSARY

adala: justice.

ahlu'l-bayt: the family of the Prophet Mohammed.

alamiyyat al-Islam: the universality of Islam.

al-tawhid: the one-ness and uniqueness of God.

amal: action on the way to God.

ameer: the head.

aqidah: creed.

dar al-harb: abode of war where Muslims are the minority groups struggling for their religious rights.

dar al-Islam: abode of Islam where Shariah governs.

dar al-sulh: abode of peace where Muslims are enjoying the state of peace and freedom to practice their religious duties.

dawla: the state.

din: religion, Islam.

dunya: the world.

faqih: the supreme leader.

fiqh: jurisprudence.

fitrah: the unchangeable constitution of the creation of man, life and the universe via Islam.

foqara: the have-nots.

gharbzadegi: Westoxification.

hadith: the record of the traditions (sunnah) of doings and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.

hakim: someone exercising judicial authority, governor or ruler.

hakimiyya: the sovereignty of God.

hajj: pilgrimage undertaken to the holy places of Islam at least once during lifetime.

hekmat: a logistical and scholastic system of thought.

hijra: the migration of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina.

hukm: to govern.

hukumet-i Islami: Islamic government.

ibadat: to serve for God.

ijma: the unanimous agreement.

irfan: gnosis, knowledge of inner world of man.

islah: reform.

jahiliyya: the state of ignorance specifically applied to the pre-Islamic community in Arabia. It is re-interpreted in the ideology of Islamic revival to define the un-Islamic nature of existing human beings.

Jamaat-i Islami: Islamic party.

Jamaat-al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin: the Muslim Brotherhood.

jihad: exertion, striving, struggling.

kafir (mushrik): infidel, unbeliever.

karkun: worker.

Kashf al-Asrar: the discovery of the secrets.

khilafa: the institution of the caliphate which represents the unity of the Muslim community.

La ilaha Illalah: there is no deity but God.

La ilaha Illallah Muhammadur Rasulullah: there is no god but God and Mohammed is the prophet of God.

La ilaha Illallah Muhammadur Rasulullah wa Alian Waliallah*: it is the Shi'ite form of Shihada meaning "There is no deity but God and Mohammad is his prophet, and Ali is the executor of God's will".*

majlis-i amilah*: the executive council.*

majlis-e-shura*: the consultative assembly.*

makta*: school.*

marja-e taqlid*: clerical leaders.*

mazlum, mostazafin*: oppressed.*

mostakberin*: oppressor.*

nizam*: an all-encompassing system of life.*

Quran*: the Holy Scripture of Islam given in a series of recitations.*

ramadan*: fasting from dawn to dusk during the holy month.*

risala*: the prophethood meaning that Mohammed is the messenger of God.*

salat*: praying five times a day; morning, midday, afternoon, evening and night.*

sarvatmandan*: the rich.*

satan*: the evil.*

shahid*: martyr.*

shariah*: divine law of Islam.*

shihada (kalimah)*: the profession of faith.*

shi'ite*: party in Arabic which denotes the followers of Ali.*

shura*: consultation.*

sunnah*: customary practices, or traditions of the Prophet Mohammed.*

surah*: a chapter of Quran.*

taghut*: it denotes government by oppressive and idolatrous regimes and correspond jahiliyya of Sunni belief.*

tajdid*: re-definiton of the Islamic society.*

ubudiyyah*: the sole servitude of mankind to God.*

ulama*: Muslim religious and legal scholars who are regarded as the custodian of faith.*

ummah*: a single Muslim community which identifies a unique Islamic nation.*

vilayet-al fiqh*: vice-gerency of the theologian, the governance of the jurist or the guardianship of the juristconsult.*

zakat*: -alms giving by paying certain percentage of earned income in a year to aid the poor.*

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