THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 'EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT'
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

FEBRUARY 2009

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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February 2009, 88 pages

This thesis aims to analyze the ideology of the "European New Right" (Nouveille Droite) and its attempt to establish its cultural hegemony on European integration. The revival of the radical right-wing parties after 1980s and the rise of xenophobia have emerged as a fundamental threat to European democracy. The study of such developments and the measures taken to combat right-wing extremism, however, should not be limited to political parties and activists. The intellectual framework of the contemporary radical right as a successor of historical fascism and its Europeanization necessitates a broader and deeper analysis of the ideology of the radical right. The case of "European New Right" as one of the most influential right-wing intellectual networks provides the appropriate ground to discuss on such framework and to elaborate its impact on European integration.

Keywords: European New Right, European Integration, Cultural Hegemony, neo-Fascism

ÖZ

'AVRUPA YENİ SAĞI'NIN DÜŞÜNSEL ÇERÇEVESİ VE AVRUPA ENTEGRASYONU

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Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz

Şubat 2009, 88 sayfa

Bu tez "Avrupa Yeni Sağı"nın (Nouveille Droite) ideolojisini ve Avrupa entegrasyonu üzerindeki kültürel hegemonya girişimini incelemektedir. 1980 sonrasında radical sağ partilerin geri dönüşü ve yabancı düşmalığındaki artış Avrupa demokrasisine temel bir tehdit olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu gelişmelerin teorik analizi ve aşırı sağa karşı alınan önlemler siyasi partiler ve eylem grupları ile sınırlı olmamalıdır. Faşizmin devamı olarak günümüz aşırı sağının entellektüel çerçevesi ve Avrupalılaşması, aşırı sağ ideolojinin daha geniş ve derin şekilde ele alınmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. "Avrupa Yeni Sağı" en etkili sağ entellüktüel oluşumlardan biri olarak, belirtilen entellektüel çerçeveyi ve Avrupa entegrasyona etkisini tartışmak için uygun zemini oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Yeni Sağı, Avrupa Entegrasyonu, Kültürel Hegemonya, Neo-Faşizm

To my family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ENR: European New Right

EU: European Union

FN: Front National

MSI: Movimento Sociale Italiano

ND: Nouveille Droite

RRP: Radical Right-wing Party

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

During the last decades European democracy has faced the revival of radical right movements as a forbidding threat to established democratic systems of the continent. The proofs of such threat are observed at the electoral success of the radical right-wing parties in many European countries, various examples of xenophobic violence and intellectual networks that aim to sustain a legitimate ground for the radical right ideology. Despite the fact that radical right-wing parties have not gained governmental power in any European country, the comparison between the situation after 1980s and the development of the membership and the vote for fascist parties after World War I should warn us against the possible danger (von Beyme 1988).

Considering the so-called social-democratic consensus and political stability achieved in post-war Europe with the welfare state model, revival of radical right in Europe as a threat to such consensus, gained special attention both from the European politicians and the academics working in the field especially after 1990's. Now, there is a rich literature on explaining the recent rise of radical/extreme right[1] in European countries which is taken as the 'third wave of the radical right' with response to the first wave around 1960s and the second wave in 1970s. Originating from the study of historical fascism, 'neo-fascism' has been popularly used to conceptualize these new movements. As 1980's denotes a structural shift in economic, sociological and cultural organization of society with the rapid processes of post-industrialization and globalization, study of the radical right in this era necessitates certain shifts from the study of historical fascism. A

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[1] Despite there are numbers of works on defining the terms 'extreme' or 'radical' right, there is no consensus on the use and definition of these terms. To eliminate any confusion the writer has choosen to use the term 'radical right' because of the commonality of the term and the general use of the term 'extremism' for anti-constitutional movements that include use of violence.

general overview of the literature shows that studies on radical right mostly focus on explaining the electoral success of the RRPs, their electoral base etc. and defining the characteristics of the radical right-wing party family to employ in comparative studies (Betz H.G., Mudde C., Ignazi, P. among others). These authors help us to understand the conditions that favor the rise of radical right-wing parties in the era of globalization, to analyze their role and future impact on the political system and finally, to establish a conceptual framework for further academic studies on the topic. However, understanding the importance of the threat posed to European democracy by this 'third wave of extreme right' necessitates deeper analysis of the ideological roots of such movements beyond party politics at least at two points, the metapoliticization of the extreme right; and their internationalization, i.e. Europeanization, through intellectual and organizational networks (von Beyme 1988).

This thesis aims to focus on these two core aspects of the third wave of the radical right and discuss its possible impact on European integration. Considering the complexity of actors and activities regarded under umbrella of right-wing radicalism, this study does not attempt to cover all radical right organizations (i.e. political parties, journals, activists)[2]. Among different movements, the French "*Nouvelle Droite*" (European New Right- ENR) is chosen since it has played a leading role in improving a metapolitical New Right in Europe and has influenced many political parties and journals in other European countries. This 'school of thought' is founded on the works of Alain de Benoist and the think-tank GRECE (Research and Study Group on European Culture).

The following chapter is an attempt to analyze the literature on the third wave of the radical right after 1980s, to understand the context that built up the revival of

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[2] As Griffin notes; now fascism has not only lost its mass base, but has broken down into its three basic constituents: 'respectable' right-wing democratic parties with an anti-democratic, illiberal subtext; minute associations of violent activists and self-styled cadres harbouring and sometimes carrying out revolutionary fantasies; dispersed intellectuals and artists who spurn activism and confine themselves to a 'purely' cultural or theoretical role as contributors to study circles and periodicals (2000 37).

the radical right and to examine the explanatory power of the theories on the radical right. The chapter starts with exploring the conditions that have favored the revival of the radical right in the context of the transformation from social-democratic consensus to global post-industrial society in Europe. This analysis is followed by a summary of the theories explaining the rise of the radical right and the necessity for studying the ideology and Europeanization of the radical right is pointed out.

Chapter 3 introduces the ENR as a metapolitical movement aiming to establish its cultural hegemony by redefining the European culture in terms of pre-Christian or Indo-European elements. The chapter provides a summary of the development of the ENR, its ideological roots and a detailed discussion on the elements of its ideology based on the writings of Alain de Benoist and other important figures in *Nouveille Droite*. While searching for the basic premises of the ideology of the ENR, this section has two goals; first, to see the continuities and ruptures between the ENR and the fascist ideology, and second, to configure how and which aspects of such ideology should be taken as a threat to European liberal democracies.

In Chapter 4, to be able to discuss the impact of the ENR on European integration, European Union will be taken as the political unity aiming at such integration. Then, a comparison between EU's and the ENR's approaches on issues of European identity, European integration, immigration, xenophobia and racism will be made. Such comparison will help us to realize the goal of the ENR to establish "Europe of Hundred Flags" against the EU as a supranational power. This chapter will also include an evaluation of the measures taken by the EU against racism and xenophobia and their compatibility.

The concluding chapter will give a summary of the main arguments of the thesis and in parallel to the outcomes of the previous chapters will comment on the future of the ENR and its possible impacts on European integration.

CHAPTER 2

2. THE RADICAL RIGHT IN GLOBAL ERA

2.1.   The third wave of the radical right

The radical right movements in Europe after Second World War can be analyzed under three waves (von Beyme 1988, Mudde 1996). In von Beyme's classification, the first wave corresponds to the neo-fascist movements in Italy, France and Germany around 1960's which grounded itself on opposing the regulations against revival of right-wing extremism, refugee and unemployment problems after the war and mobilization of resentment after the loss of the war. Their success was limited and temporary. The second wave, for the period between 1960s and 70s, is presented as a reaction to welfare state establishment in Europe. This wave, exemplified by Poujadism in France, was based on tax-revolts and anti-welfare state movement. However, it was absorbed by conservative mainstream political parties and could not succeed in long-term. Contrary to these short lived waves, the third wave of radical right after 1980s differs, first by having established itself in many European democratic countries, second, by legitimizing itself with a deep intellectual framework and finally by gaining a European dimension through intellectual networks and coordination of activities on European level. (von Beyme 1988)

2.2.   Conditions favoring the third wave of the radical right

Comparing these three waves brings the necessity to question the causes and new conditions behind this significant shift in success and sustainability of the radical right movements in Western democracies. Discussing the literature on the conditions favoring rise of radical right movements is beyond the scope of this thesis, however a summary of them is necessary to investigate the context the third wave of the radical right have risen. For this purpose, Unver Noi's list for the conditions for the return of radical right is useful: globalization, mass immigration to Western Europe, integration of EU as a supranational power over the

sovereignty of nation-states, economic problems risen with the transformation of welfare state, decline of left-wing politics on solving the new political problems, increasing crime rates- being related to immigrants, rise of Islamic fundamentalism between immigrant groups and preventions against radical right-wing parties by EU (2007).

There can be additions or changes on this list; still it helps us to make an overview of the context for the revival of the radical right. First, the recent wave of the radical right should be seen as an outcome of the political, socio-economic and cultural transformation brought by globalization and post-industrialization. In this process special attention should be given to the crisis of the welfare state's socio-economic model from 1970s. Second, the relation between unemployment, immigration and xenophobia constructs a core element for understanding the third wave. Third, the rise of radical right should also be discussed in accordance with the success and failure of New Left policies. Fourth, the perception of non-European immigration to Europe as a threat to cultural heritage and welfare system produces xenophobia and Islamophobia as apparent aspects of radical right politics. This brings the analysis of identity politics into the explanation of the European radical right. Finally, the deepening of European integration through EU, makes it inevitable for national radical right movements to act on European level as well, and adds radical right an international dimension. This means, from the perspective of radical right, defending not only 'Germany for Germans' or 'France for French'; but also 'Europe for Europeans'.

The next section will provide an overview of the theories on explaining the rise of the third wave of the radical right in given context. The aim of this section is to construct the theoretical ground for further discussions in next chapters and to evaluate the weaknesses of the related theoretical explanations.

2.3.   Explaining the rise of the third-wave of the radical right

During the last decades radical right-wing parties in Europe gained significant electoral successes both in national elections and elections for European parliament. As noted by Betz, this process helped the right-wing mobilization to

establish themselves in crucial number of European democracies, to increase their influence on significant socio-cultural and sociopolitical issues and to gain important political offices and positions (1998, 1). These developments attracted attention of many scholars from the field of the political party and electoral studies, to come to terms with explaining this rise of radical right-wing parties. These studies focus on the electoral support for the radical right, socio-economic transformation, political system and role of political leaders and media in explaining the rise of radical right-wing parties (Vural 2005). Here, among these studies, thesis of single-issue party, new politics of resentment, losers of modernization, party system change and silent counter revolution will be discussed due to their general acceptance and popularity in explaining rise of radical right.

The Single-issue party thesis:

This thesis analyzes the RRPs as anti-immigrant parties. By correlating the electoral success and increasing number of immigrants, immigration is taken as the single issue that explains the political support for the radical right. In this way xenophobia is understood as the core element of radical right-wing politics. In his critical article on this thesis Mudde defines single issue parties as (1) having an electorate with no particular social structure; (2) being supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue; (3) lacking an ideological program; and (4) addressing only one all-encompassing issue (Mudde: 1999, 184). By testing this definition on different cases of RRPs like French Front National, German Republikaner, Italian Lega Nord he concludes that the single issue party thesis is rejected on all counts (Mudde 1999). This means, in other words, RRPs have a complex electoral base and a comprehensive ideological program on various issues, thus they cannot be studied focusing only on a specific issue like immigration. Moreover, many empirical studies show that the number of immigrants do not correlate with voting for radical right (Minkenberg 2000). Such weakness of this thesis supports the idea of our study to put more emphasis on the ideology of the radical right in a comprehensive way.

The new politics of resentment:

Another influential scholar writing on radical right, Betz, relates the success of these parties with their ability to mobilize resentment and protest, and their capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European democracies (Betz 1993, 415). This resentment is not only a protest against unfairness and injustice of existing conditions, but also a political strategy to transform the status quo with the belief that the world could and should be other than it is. Resentment is against the immigrants, with the idea that they are threat for the job market and cultural heritage and responsible for the negative conditions. And it is against the political system and its elites with the argument that representative democracy is degenerated since it works by and for political and cultural elite who do not care about legitimate concerns of ordinary people (Betz and Johnson 2004, 313). The strategy of mobilizing the resentment of 'ordinary people' against the system and immigrants brings populism and xenophobia as crucial elements of radical right ideology. That's why these parties are labeled as 'radical populist right' by many authors.

Losers of modernization:

Basing itself on modernization theories this explanation argues that the support for the RRPs come from those social groups negatively affected from globalization, post-industrialism, international migration, unemployment, fragmentation, etc. Thus, the socio-economic transformation by 1970s onwards, i.e. from full employment to mass unemployment; industrial mass production to flexible manufacturing; labor-intensive to capital intensive; industry centered to service oriented produced a social group who feel their social improvement is blocked. Since post-industrial society or knowledge economy necessitates a certain level of social and cultural capital, i.e. education, computer and language skills etc. certain groups felt that they are losing their advantages within their society. These developments support a new electoral base for RRPs, which can be defined as 'modernization losers' (Minkenberg 2000). This approach proves the relation

between the transformation of the socio-economic model of the welfare state and the revival of the radical right. The material insecurity felt after the crisis of social welfare state prepared ground for mobilization of 'modernization losers' by the radical right. However, as Betz notes, the electoral base of the RRPs also includes the winners of such modernization that have benefit from individualization process like "new professionals" who have created their own jobs (Betz 1993, 423).

Change in party system and radical right:

Another approach which should be referred as an explanation for the rise of the radical right is the party system change. The argument is that, the socio-economic and cultural transformation after 1980s have produced new issues and priorities which are not concerned by established parties. This process, at the same time, brought disengagement with existing parties, distrust to political system and its institutions (Ignazi 1992, 6). The decline of party identification and increasing electoral volatility encouraged the emergence of new parties as a response to rise of new demands, thus supported the rise of the RRPs (Mair 1984).

Related to this explanation, the separation between 'new' and 'old' right-wing parties introduced by Ignazi is useful to understand the relation between new right parties and fascism. As he notes:

> If a party fits the historic-ideological criterion as well as the systemic one, we can think of it as belonging to the 'old right' type. If a party is not linked to fascism but has an antisystem profile, we can think of it as belonging to the 'new right'. (1992, 12)

Italian MSI is the proper example of old right type with its reference to fascist ideology and for new right type, French FN can be given. During the third wave of the radical right while old right type seems to be declining or disappearing; new right type parties are in increase (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992). Here FN case has a specific importance, since it has inspired many other new right parties in different European countries.

The disengagement with political system also gave way to the use of populist strategy by the radical right which results in degeneration of the democratic values. As Meny notes; the emergence of populism is a response to the growing gap

between what politics offers and the demands of the people. The success of populist parties in recent years is above all a reflection of the malfunctioning of political representation (Meny 2002, p.14). The populist strategy of the RRPs and its relation to xenophobia is summarized as follows:

> The core elements of the populist structure of argumentation is a pronounced faith in the common sense of the ordinary people; the belief that simple solutions exist for the most complex problems of the modern world; and the belief that the common people, despite possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom, have been denied the opportunity to make themselves heard. Core elements of the populist strategy are the claim to speak for unarticulated opinions, demands, and sentiments of the ordinary people; and the mobilization of resentment against a set of clearly defined enemies. (Betz 1998, p.4)

Silent-counter revolution:

The theories dealt with so far have certain focuses in explaining rise of radical right, each having a certain explanatory power. However, they lack a more comprehensive analysis which is necessitated. The last theory we will discuss here is an attempt to understand the radical right in the context of the New Politics of post-1980s through the opposite poles of New-Left politics. New Politics, refers to the value change with globalization and post-industrialism and the new political issues arise with such transformation; i.e. environmentalism, immigration, feminism, minority rights, multiculturalism etc. Taking into account the popularity of New Left's policies on such issues in the last decades, it becomes very logical to analyze New Right as a reaction to new-left's ideas and policies.

To conceptualize the development of new left from late 1970s as an outcome of the value change with new political alignments and movements and by omitting right pole of the political spectrum, Inglehart calls it, 'silent revolution' (1977). Following his thesis, Ignazi puts new right on the right pole as another unwanted children of New Politics, which emerged as a reaction to new-left's silent revolution. Thus he calls it a sort of 'silent-counter revolution' (1992). The polar opposition between RRPs and new-left parties on the new political issues mentioned above is also observed by Betz (1993) and Minkenberg (2000). Betz, for example, considers the new right as a materialist reaction to the new left's post-materialism:

Radical right represents a largely materialist reaction to the post-materialist aspirations of the libertarian left and the libertarian left's promotion of environmental issues, new concepts of morality, new ways of political participation, and vision of multicultural society. The reaction to this agenda has been an increased emphasis on "old politics": sustained economic growth, technological progress, economic stability, a tough stand on questions of law and order, and a return to traditional moral values. (1993, 421)

This kind of a controversy between new right and left on gaining dominance over the definition and solutions of the new political problems, brings the outcome that one's success would mean other's failure. That's why, authors like Betz (2003) and Immerfall (1998) among others, put emphasis on the left's loss of its central position in new politics in explaining the success of the new right. Betz, underlines the need for a convincing alternative from left, against the dominance of neo-liberal model; and Immerfall points that in due course radical right has re-defined two crucial issues for the left; social justice and redistribution and identity an recognition. By agreeing with this analysis, the writer thinks that it is still early to talk about one pole's success in gaining its hegemony on these issues. Considering the facts that, radical right is becoming the representative of working class in some countries (FN in France for example) and there are many intellectuals in new right circles who were socialists before 1980s; left's revival with an intellectually and politically convincing program for problems of today's society becomes crucial in discussing the future of the radical right.

After this overview of the approaches on the rise of the radical right with 1980s the theoretical ground for the context gave way to the rise of the radical right can be summed up as follows:

1. The transformation with globalization and post-industrialism meant the end of the socio-economic model of the welfare state. The decline of the so-called social democratic consensus and individualization processes resulted in increasing material insecurity for masses with increasing unemployment rates and diminishing social rights. These conditions provide the necessary environment for rise of the radical right and fascist movements as defined by Okyayuz:

> Fascist movement is an attempt to recover the loss of status of the middle class by opposing the socialism and bourgeois democracy, which also has the capacity of mobilizing the lower classes with its ambiguous and eclectic ideology. Thus, a pre-requisite for the fascist movements is socio-economic crisis with the feeling of mass insecurity, threat of losing their status and distrust to the bourgeois democracy and its political parties. (2004-2005, 200)

2. In such conditions immigrants from non-European societies (professionals, refugees and illegal migrants) are blamed by radical right politicians with scapegoat logic as a threat to the job market, welfare system and European culture. Popular slogans like Le Pen's 'our own people first' emerged as instruments of mobilizing resentment against foreigners, which proves the role of welfare chauvinism, populism and xenophobia in the radical right ideology. In addition to the economic reasons behind xenophobia, especially Islamophobia has risen as a specific form of xenophobia in terms of defending European culture and value system.

3. Post-1980s can be defined as the era of New Politics, with the value change in a so-called post-modern era, with new political issues, mainly related to identity politics. This new era can be put as the polar opposition between new-left and new-right on issues of multiculturalism, immigration, feminism, minority right, economic intervention etc. Thus, new left's success in providing comprehensive solutions on such issues has a crucial role in struggle against rise of new right.

4. This new era is also described with distrust to political system, namely representative democracy and its elites, since, in the view of the radical right, it has failed to represent the concerns of the ordinary people and could not deal with the problems rose with the transformation of the socio-economic model. This provides another opportunity for the radical right for mobilization of resentment against representative democracy. Making it more dangerous, it supports the legitimization of ethnocracy or ethnocratic liberalism as the alternative proposed by radical right.

2.4.   The necessity for studying the ideology and Europeanization of the radical right:

Overview of the given thesis' on the third wave of the radical right shows that they are mostly based on the party and electoral studies and pay rather less attention to the ideology of new right (von Beyme: 1988, Mudde 1999, Betz: 2003). As Betz summarizes:

> There is a tendency among scholars to at least neglect question of ideology in studying right-wing radical parties, as politics of the contemporary radical right has often seen as issue-driven and opportunistic. However, closer look at their programmatic propositions, statements and utterances show that radical right have a 'common core doctrine', a distinct ideological platform which can be described as 'reactionary tribalism', 'ethnocratic liberalism', 'holistic nationalism', 'exclusionary welfarism' or 'exclusionary populism'. "restrictive notion of citizenship" – "our own people first"(2003).

Mudde considers this lack of emphasis on ideology as the explanation for the lack of comparative studies in the field:

> The link between the (extreme) right and ideology has traditionally been questioned by scholars, arguing that the right is to be defined primarily as a reaction to left-wing ideology rather than as an independent ideology. Some scholars therefore speak of the right-wing extremism as an "anti-ideology" or "non-ideology". This might also be the reason for almost complete lack of empirical studies of the ERPs, particularly from a comparative perspective. However, a recent cross-national comparative study of the ideology of ERPs shows that they do have party ideologies. (1999, 187)

Still, the lack pointed by Mudde and Betz is the need to study on the party ideologies. For example, Mudde's study on the literature of definitions of right-wing extremism helps us mainly to develop tools to compare different radical right-wing parties (Mudde 1995).[3] Thus the necessity for studying the philosophical and metapolitical aspects of the radical right ideology is not mentioned. The importance of this aspect of radical right is given by von Beyme:

> Because the ideology of right-wing extremist groups has usually been irrational and diffuse, personal rivalries and factionalism have played a far greater role in these groups than other parties. This is one of the reasons why the 'scientification' of an ideology for right-wing extremist circles, as its true for *Nouvelle Droite* in France and can be observed in the era of the ideological *Tendenzwende* in Germany, has for the first time since the Second World War transformed these ideas into a threat. (1988, p.6)

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[3] In 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that are used in the literature, no less than 58 different features are mentioned at least once. Only five features are mentioned, in one or another, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state.

These critiques on the studies of the third wave of the radical right strengths the argument that these works are not enough to respond to the aims of this thesis work to conceptualize the ideology of the European New Right, to configure its aspects that make it a threat to European democracies and to discuss its impact on European democracy. Thus deeper analysis of the ideology and the Europeanization of the radical right become crucial. In the era of globalization and European integration, we cannot think of the radical right as nation-specific phenomena. Obviously, each country has its specific conditions that favor rise of the radical right; still we need to analyze the European level, at least, because of the idea that the issues brought by globalization needs to be solved beyond the level of nation-states either by cooperation of each state or establishment of supra-national bodies. Then, it becomes impossible for the national RRPs to deal with such issues like immigration and sovereignty in process of European integration. This can be seen as the motivation behind the RRPs attempt to establish international cooperation networks and gain a European context which is not being experienced for the first time in history. As noted by Ignazi and Ysmal, inside the extreme right, Europe tends to replace the old national framework and become a new space for identity. 'European nationalists', advocate the idea of a Western civilization that has to be defended against all foreign aggression, such as communism and Islam. (1992, p.113)

Another critical point is that, despite we are talking about the transformation of the radical right in a new historical era, i.e. globalization; one should not fall into the mistake of analyzing radical right in this era as a merely new phenomenon by not taking into account its ideological roots from earlier versions of fascism. Rather, the ideology of radical right today should be analyzed as adoption of old premises of fascism with new strategies under conditions of the global world.

The next chapter will be an attempt to contribute to the weaknesses of the studies on radical right. The development and the ideology of European New Right as a threat to EU and European democracy will be figured out through its intellectual roots, its anti-modernist premises and its alternative proposals on European identity, European integration, multiculturalism etc. Defining the ideology of the

European New Right will give us the tools to discuss its impact on European integration in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

3. THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT

This chapter aims to figure out the historical development of the ENR, its ideological roots and the elements of its ideology. Looking at these topics will help us to put this movement into the proper context, to get familiar with its basic premises and to observe the way it threatens principles of liberal democracy. The chapter starts with pointing out the development of the ENR, both in historical and intellectual terms; and continues with elaborating on its ideological elements with its relation to fascism and the third wave of the radical right.

3.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT

As Bar-on suggests the European New Right[4] (*Nouvelle Droite*) is the current addition to the long list of the right-wing traditions including the counter-revolutionary/monarchical tradition which completely rejected the egalitarian and universalist principles of the 1789 revolution in France, Catholic integralism, Burkean conservatism, fascism, Nazism, the German "conservative revolution," Evolianism, Gaullist republicanism, and Anglo–American neo-liberalism (Bar-On 2001). This school of thought emerged from the Groupement de Recherche et d'Etude pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE)[5], which was founded in 1968 by various French nationalist, far Right, traditionalist, and regionalist activists coming from the movement Europe Action. The aim was broadly to maintain the foundations of European culture and identity. French journalist and writer Alain de Benoist is one of the founders of GRECE and has been the leading figure of the ENR till today. The ENR embraces a large number of academics and freelance

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[4] The name "New Right" is not given by ND but commentators used this term especially in English translations. For Benoist, he would prefer "New Culture" and he is not satisfied with the name "New Right" since it connotates a political movement and is commonly used for neo-conservatives and neo-liberals (Benoist 1993-1994). And the label "European New Right" is used by commentators as ND declares its homeland in the entire European continent not only in France. (Sunic 1990).

[5] GRECE means Greece in French, which is deliberately choosen by the movement to refer to Ancient Greece and pre-Christian period of the European thought.

autodidacts, journalists, writers, and intellectuals, some of whom are associated with particular magazines, study groups, or parties, while others are essentially loners (Griffin: 2000, 170). These journalists publish their ideas mainly in journals *Elements* and *Nouvelle Ecole (Edited by Benoist)*. A list of the intellectuals within the ENR includes Alain de Benoist as the chief figure, Guillaume Faye, Julian Freund, Jean Haudry, Sigrid Hunke, Pierre Krebs, Gorgio Locchi, Robert Steuckers and Michael Walker, from different countries and academic backgrounds (Sunic 1990). The movement achieved the chance to spread its ideas to masses through media in the late 1970s by publishing its articles in dailies like *Le Figaro*. In 1978, Benoist received the Grand Prix de l'Essai from the Académie Française for his book *Vu de droite: Anthologie critique des idées contemporaines*. However, the influence of this intellectual movement is not limited to France. The ENR's ideology has inspired diverse European and international movements: the New Right in the UK, Neue Rechte in Germany, Nieuw Rechts in The Netherlands and Belgium, Nuova Destra in Italy, Imperium Europa in Malta, and the New Right of Paul Weyrich and the Free Congress Foundation of the USA (Minkenberg 2000). For 1990s journals like as Benoist's *Krisis* (France), *Trasgressioni* (Italy), *TeKos* (Holland and Belgium), and *Hespe´rides* (Spain) should be added to this list. In 1993 and 1994 the ENR again gained mass popularity in a negative way by *"The Appeal to Vigilance"* published in *Le Monde* and signed by group of European intellectuals (40 in 1993, 1500 in 1994) to warn of "the resurgence of anti-democratic currents of far Right thought in French and European intellectual life"; a revival of "National-Bolshevist" tendencies allegedly propagated by the ND throughout Europe; the dangerous legitimating strategies of the Right designed as "a big seduction campaign targeting democratic personalities, some of whom are known leftists"; and urged all cultural and media outlets to adopt the "necessary opposition" and "vigilance" against the "exclusionary" ideas of the far Right by boycotting any cultural collaboration with all those known to have affiliations with the ND (Bar-On 2001, 334).

As it can be derived from the picture above, the ENR is not a political movement, and implies a metapolitical perspective as they define themselves. It is an

opposition to the neo-liberal hegemony in global world and the intellectual hegemony of the new-left in Europe after 1960s. However with an eclectic approach the ENR is confident to give references to philosophers both from the Leftist tradition and the Right-wing tradition. As Benoist points repeatedly, this intellectual movement is beyond the Left-Right dichotomy. This might be the explanation for TELOS - a journal of new Left to delegate a special double issue for the French New Right (Winter 1993, Spring 1994) with the title: "New Left, New Right New Paradigm?" and publish Benoist's articles in different issues.

The reason behind the choice of metapolitical strategy can be seen as the search for gaining legitimacy for their right-wing ideology to open more space for radical right which has been limited due to legal measures and its negative perception in society. But, Benoist, in his interview with Warren explains his focus on culture and ideology rather than politics in a different way, which can be defined as 'right-wing Gramscianism'[6]:

> What you can say is that in world history, especially in the recent world history, in my opinion, there can be no political revolution, or even a major political event, if there had not already occurred some kind of change in the minds of the people. So I believe that the cultural revolution comes first, and the political revolution comes after that. But that does not mean that when you make something cultural, it is because you want, in the end, to make something political. This is not done by the same people, you see. If I can give an example, the French Revolution probably would not have been possible without the work of the Enlightenment philosophers (Warren1994).

The content of such change Benoist wants to achieve in peoples' minds justifies the need for emphasis on ideology of the ENR. This task is not that easy, as the ENR is a fragmented group combining different right-wing ideas, second, they do not need to present a coherent ideological program since they are not a political party and finally, from 1968 to today the movement faced certain ideological transformations and some separations within the group. To serve to the aims of this thesis, in the next section the analysis of the ideology of the ENR will be done mostly based on writings of and on Alain de Benoist and the most coherent text of

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[6] Gramsci has contributed to Marxist thought with his conception of *hegemony* pointing the significance of cultural hegemony in establishing control by consent in addition to political and economic coercion. In his analysis, the cultural and ideological sphere gains a crucial role for the struggle against established hegemony. However, it would be a mistake to disregard the primacy of economy in Gramscian thought. Thus, the ENRs so-called 'right-wing Gramscianism' is only part of their metapolitical strategy and can better be defined as 'use of Gramscianism'.

the ENR, the manifesto; *"The French New Right in the Year 2000"* by Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier. Before moving to discovering the elements of the ideology of the ENR, three ideological phases of GRECE and the intellectual roots of the ENR will be summarized.

3.1.1. Three ideological phases of the GRECE

The intellectual evolution of the GRECE till 1987 is summarized under three stages. With 1990s the movement became more fragmented with withdrawals and emergence of new journals. Thus the analysis for post 90s will be focused on Benoist's works.

The first doctrinal phase 1968-1972 is characterized by biological racism and scientism which is found also in the tradition of 'biological realism' in Europe Action (Taquieff 1993-1994, 102). During this priod theories like genetic determinism and physical anthropology were used to explain the individual and racial inequality and the superiority of western civilization as scientific facts (McCulloch 2006). For this phase, Marxism and communism became the main enemy of GRECE.

The second phase 1972-1979 emerged with replacement of biological determinism by a cultural discourse. Main theme has been the rejection of egalitarianism; which is derived from the monotheistic Judeo-Christian heritage and rebirth of Europe with revival of 'Indo-European values' (Griffin 2000a 41). This anti-egalitarianism opposed monotheism and Christianity as main ideological targets. The Christian idea that everyone was equal before God and all mattered was individual salvation resulted in irrelevance of cultural and racial differences. Such idea also has been the foundation for individualistic dynamic of modernity and universal egalitarianism of social, Marxist and liberal theories (McCulloch 2006). Rejection of Judeo-Christian values due to anti-egalitarianism and anti-universalism is followed by arguing for revival of pagan heterogeneity.

In the third phase, 1979–1987, the anti-egalitarian and anti-universalist stance moved further on a global space to defend the collective identities, i.e. nations,

ethnic groups, communities etc. against universalist threats by rooting them in historically constituted values and inherent traditions (McCulloch 2006). This ethno-pluralist and cultural relativist approach opposed liberal capitalism, reductionism, totalitarianism, Americanism, universalism and cosmopolitanism. In cultural terms 'right to difference' and 'causes of people' have emerged as the new theoretical grounds of a communitarian new right thinking.

A differentialist Third World stance with the idea to ally a (free) Europe with an (emancipated) Third World against two blocs is added to GRECE doctrine in this phase (Taquieff 1993-1994, 103). This new stance can be seen as a clue to further analysis of Europe's foreign affairs in a global world in the ENR's view, also by taking into consideration the shifts with the end of Cold-War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Also, this alliance with Third World can be observed as a strategy for restrictive immigration policy.

Taquieff warns that this kind of an idea of 'third way' might end in self-destruction of the ENR by eliminating all doctrinal differences. However, with globalization and let's say post-modernity Benoist talks of failure of grand ideologies – he offends Fukuyama's 'end of ideology' thesis as well- and mentions a new contradiction:

> Already on the international level, the major contradiction is no longer between Right and Left, liberalism and socialism, fascism and communism, 'totalitarianism' and 'democracy'. It is between those who want the world to be one-dimensional and those who support a plural world grounded in the diversity, of cultures, between those who defend the cause of peoples and those who defend the rights and duties of the citizens who constitute them (1993-1994a).

This third phase also implied an ideological separation between the metapolitical GRECE and the political wing of the ENR Club de l'Horloge, founded in 1974 by two members of GRECE. The reason behind such separation was the Club's commitment to economic liberalism and the Western Allience against GRECE's anti-egalitarianism and anti-capitalism. After 1979, the Club's position is defined by anti-communism, pro-Americanism, moral conservatism, liberalism, and a return to traditional Catholicism; and GRECE's on the other hand by, a trenchant anti-Americanism, reformulating the old refrain "Neither Washington nor

Moscow" -- the attempt to find a 'third way', 'organic democracy', anti-liberalism and anti-economism, postmodernism and a "right-wing" pro-Third World stance, the reaffirmation of paganism and the unconditional rejection of "Judeo-Christianity. Thus, Taquieff argues that the label 'New Right' should be kept for the GRECE (1993-1994).

This list of issues given by Taquieff can be accepted as the main elements of the ENR ideology which are more or less valid for the period after 1987. Due to the lack of the comprehensive studies on the period after 1987 and the fragmentation of the movement with various journals and think-tanks in 1990's the analysis for the contemporary thought of the ENR will be based on Benoist's writings and their manifesto "The French New Right in the Year 2000" in remaining sections.

For the development of the ideology of the ENR then, one can talk about a transformation from the premises of classical fascism towards an ethno-pluralist and communitarian thought. During all these phases 'defense of identity' and refusal of egalitarianism remain as the core of their ideology (Taquieff 1993-1994). At certain points, this transformation is claimed to be departure from fascism and extreme-right like the shift from biological realism to a cultural discourse. Even, New Right can be discussed as an alternative to New left politics; dealing with same problems like immigration, minority rights, environment, feminism etc. in a broader way than RRPs discussed in the first chapter. Or, as Benoist argues, the ENR can be read 'beyond right and left dichotomy' and all other modern dichotomies in a Nietzschean way. The evolvement from 1968 to today should be evaluated with reference to the contextual developments as well such as, globalization, end of cold-war, neo-liberal hegemony to make it easier to understand what is offered to Europeans in a global world. As mentioned earlier, the ENR is composed of various actors and thoughts and do not provide a coherent ideological program. This makes it difficult to analyze its ideology in a systematic way. Still, it is possible to draw the general lines of the arguments provided by the ENR and to clarify its theoretical foundations. As argued earlier, despite its emphasis on rejecting fascism and articulation of new ideas, especially from Left, the idea of this thesis is that today the ENR should be read as reformulation of the

fascist principles under the era of New Politics after 1980s. Thus, it becomes crucial to point out the intellectual references of the ENR.

3.1.2. Intellectual Roots of the ENR

As mentioned, it is a difficult task to characterize the ENR. The general tendencies for defining the ENR by European commentators can be summed under four approaches: First group defines the ENR as a continuation of the Conservative Revolution, a German anti-liberal intellectual movement of the Weimar Era which included well known thinkers like Heidegger, Spengler, Schmitt, Niekisch, Jünger, etc. A second group elaborates the ENR as a "risorgimento of the extreme right" in postwar Europe. Third tendency, lead by Pierre-Andre Taquieff who is kind of a specialist on the ENR, sees them as a distinctly postwar phenomenon that has both reformulated the Right and made significant contributions to it, by focusing on Benoist. The fourth approach, from Catholic and conservative ranks, argues that the ENR is neither new nor right-wing. (Thebaud 2004)

In addition, in his analysis of the right-wing ideological traditions Taquieff talks about three 'school of thoughts' and considers the ENR within the Europeanist conservative revolutionaries:

> Irrespective of later political associations, three ideological traditions can be distinguished, each of which can in turn be divided into "schools of thought" or intellectual orientations: first, traditional counter-revolutionaries (legitimism and/or "integralism"), integral nationalism in the tradition of Charles Maurras and Gnostic inclinations allied to [Rene] Guenon or [Julius] Evola; second, Europeanist conservative revolutionaries who are partisans of a "third way" (revolutionary nationalists, neo-fascists, and neo-pagans associated with GRECE); and third, neo-conservatives of a "liberal" stripe (the national liberalism of the Club de l'Horloge such as the "new republican, liberal national populism," the "popular capitalism" of the National Front, the anti-state libertarians, and the "new economists"). Clearly all of them can be distinguished in terms of their relation to economic liberalism (1993-1994).

From Thebaud's configuration the writer of this thesis agrees with Taquieff's position which means the ENR ideology has its roots in revolutionary conservative ideologies and has transformed them with new elements to a worldview aiming to answer the problems of today's world seen from eyes of the radical right. This way of approaching the ENR also makes it possible to investigate the validity of other arguments and to be open to their contributions; i.e. the references to thinkers

like Evola, Niekisch, Heidegger, Nietszche, the roots of the 'third way' as such in the Conservative Revolution. For sure, the ENR rejects the third school of thought in Taquieff's classification as they are defenders of economic liberalism. To sum up the discussions on defining the ENR ideology Bar-on, uses the formula "CR (Conservative Revolution) + NL (New Left) = ENR" which is an ambiguous synthesis (2007). Following this formula the intellectual roots of the ENR will be summarized below. To these main theoretical foundations we should add the Traditionalist thinker Julius Evola and French post-war fascist Maurice Barde`che who also has crucially influenced the ENR. This examination on roots of the ENR will help us to place the movement into the right context and to be able to see the correlations between the ENR and other school of thoughts when discussing the elements of their ideology in section 3.2. The other crucial figures, like Nietszche, Oswald Spengler and Carl Schmitt, which are not given in this section, will be mentioned specifically in section 3.2.

Conservative Revolution, Armin Mohler and Julius Evola:

Armin Mohler, a student of Karl Jaspers, prepared his doctorate thesis on the Conservative Revolution by collecting the ideas of intellectuals of anti-democratic thinking such as Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt, in Weimar period. In 1950 he published *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932*, which is not only a reference book but also an attempt to contribute to the Conservative Revolution, which he claims, was postponed by Nazi power in Germany (Griffin 2000b). Quoting from Mohler, Spektorowski summarizes the Conservative Revolution as follows:

> The Conservative Revolution is a counter-revolution in the sense that it primarily attacks a liberal ideology that has totally destroyed society. But it is also revolutionary because it does not believe in the possibility of restoring the past. In other respects, it in fact attacks modernity with the weapons of modernity, even post-modernity. One of the salient points about the Conservative Revolutionaries, as noted by Mohler, is the idea that humanity is approaching a magic point zero, after which the age of decadence, induced by egalitarianism, cosmopolitanism, individualism, will give way through a sudden reversal to an entirely new culture based on organic, hierarchical, supra-individual, heroic values. (2003, 119)

Here two core elements of the ENR ideology are obvious. First is its anti-modernism which is established against liberal ideology that destroys the organic

society and collective identities. Related to the outcomes of the first, second is the belief that the world is going into an age of decadence which will be reversed with the new culture defended by the ENR. As noted in the manifesto, the present is a pivotal period- a turning point or an 'interregnum', characterized by a major crisis: the end of modernity (Benoist and Champetier 1999, 118). The term 'interregnum' has already been used by Mohler, in the same way:

> The old structure of the West as a synthesis of classical culture, Christianity, and the impulses of peoples entering history for the first time has broken down. A new unity, however, has not yet emerged. We stand in this transitional period, this 'interregnum' which leaves its mark on every spiritual activity. The Conservative Revolution is conditioned by it, and at the same time sees itself as an attempt to overcome it. (1950)

A similar idea of rebirth from decadence with traditional forces can be found in Evola's thinking. For Evola, the decadence of the modern world has similar signs with Mohler, i.e. secularisation, individualism, rationalism etc. as the sign that we are in what Hindus call the 'Kali yuga', 'the black age', which must eventually give way to a new golden age when the Traditional forces re-establish themselves as the basis of the state, society, and culture. (Griffin 2000b, 40)

Mohler, in this period of 'interregnum' gives the mission of preparing the ground for the transformation of first the cultural power and afterwards the political power, which will come spontaneously, to thinkers and visionaries. This role of thinkers in the Conservative Revolution resembles the 'organic intellectuals' in Gramscian analysis. Projecting this understanding to the contemporary right, what Benoist and other ENR intellectuals are attempting is very much the same with the mission foreseen by Mohler. In interviews Benoist, deliberately do not give concrete answers to their political role. He claims that the political movement will occur spontaneously but the cultural revolution should be achieved first. It should be noted that Benoist's argument is not a deterministic way of thinking. In a post-modern way he mentions the uncertainty of successes of political movements by giving the example of French Revolution, which included attempts by various political actors and did not result in the way the Enlightenment intellectuals aimed at. So, he even does not see any political role for himself. This metapolitical position has its references also in Evola, with the concept *'apolitea'* used by Greeks. The traditional man, in a world there is nothing 'worthy of one's own true

self' has no option but to cultivate 'disinterest, detachment from everything that today constitutes 'politics'. (Griffin 2000b). This quote from Griffin combining Mohler's 'interregnum' and Evola's 'apoletia' helps us to understand the metapolitical perspective the ENR has formulated for its 'cultural war' against the modern world:

> Mohler's mythic project, conceived in the late 1940s, of the Conservative Revolution, with its submyths of the interregnum, spherical time, the primacy of a *Weltanschauung*, and the strategy of withdrawal into metapolitics corresponds closely to Evola's mythic project of the Tradition, with its submyths of cyclic time, the primacy of a 'vision of the world', and (by the early 1960s) the strategy of withdrawal into *apoliteia*. They can be seen as two dialects of the same 'metapolitical' discourse, one which allows the acutely marginalised or isolated fascist intellectual to feel part of an 'imagined community' of 'warriors against the modern world'. (2000, 41)

Evola's influence on the ENR is not limited to the metapolitical perspective. The turn to 'paganism' can be seen as a specific form of his Traditionalism. More crucial than those influences, his pan-Europeanism and call for a European Empire (a spiritual and organic one) has been inherited by the ENR thinkers, and adopted to their proposal for a federalist European Empire. Evola supported a united Europe which should not be a step for Westernization of the world but a revolt against the modern world, a Europe which is 'spiritually distinct' from other powers such as USA, a fascist, spiritual, elitist, hierarchical European Empire longs for the golden age before the Enlightenment. (Griffin 1993)

Another important figure that inspired the ENR on the idea of a united Europe is one of the French post-war fascists, Maurice Bardéche. Bardéche strongly argues for a 'third way' position for a united fascist Europe, in Cold War era, as a sovereign and independent political force against USA and Soviet Union. He was confident that a European fascism would come with "another name, another face". (1970)

Summing up this section, we can conclude that the ENR has strong ties with the fascist thought in 1920s and post-war fascism. Benoist is indebted to the Conservative Revolution for its radical Nietzscheanism, spherical view of history, warrior ethic, the belief in a particular "spiritual path" for each culture, the support for a hierarchical, organic community, and its more violent anti-materialist, anti-

liberalism than anti-Marxist credo (Bar-on 2001, 340). He should also be thankful to Evola, for his traditionalist support for an organic, spiritual European Empire. It should be observed that the pan-Europeanism of the ENR, its core idea of defending European cultural heritage against modernity and its bipolar variants, Capitalism and Marxism and the 'third way' position (other than social democracy) are not invented by the ENR but reformulated as a response to neo-liberal hegemony with globalization. In this current 'interregnum' defined by Benoist might be the new name and face for fascism, without giving reference to it and even by rejecting it, as wished by Bardéche.

The ENR and the New Left:

As mentioned earlier, one of the aims of GRECE has been to end the intellectual hegemony gained by Leftist ideas after 1968. Another point, made in first chapter with reference to Ignazi's silent-counter revolution thesis was that New Right and New Left can be seen as bipolar opposites in the era of new politics after 1980s. This kind of an intellectual and political struggle between two schools of thoughts also opened space for communication and discussion on similar issues, understandably with different perspectives. For the period since 1980s the main commonality allows possibility of a synthesis between two perspectives is that, both are against the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism and negative outcomes of globalization from their sides. Both reject the idea of economic growth as the ultimate political goal, criticize representative democracy and the frozen party system, emphasize the primacy of the ecology and harness anti-system and anti-establishment sentiments (Talshir 2005, 330). Third-worldism, gender inequality, immigration, disadvantaged groups are also common issues for both sides. However, their response to them can be seen as antagonism between inclusionary left and exclusionary right. Against the defense for a plural, multicultural society, new right offers communitarianism and ethno-pluralism with their cultural relativist principle of 'right to difference'. Thus, ironically the silent revolution of New Left on new problems provided the ground for silent-counter revolution of New right especially on identity politics.

This logic, in turn, facilitates the relegitimation of the far right by the radical left. The left started from an individualist, egalitarian, universalistic politics, deeply concerned with exploitation, injustice and disadvantaged groups, thus coming to endorse the discourse of identity. The right—collectivist, traditional, reactionary and reliant on primordial communities and authority by nature— seized the opportunity given to it by the salience of the communitarian discourse to reappropriate its natural attachment to an organic, historical national identity using the same communitarian discourse. (Talshir 2005, 331)

These discussions point the transformation of Left/Right dichotomy in post-industrial and global world. The ENR, calls for transcending such dichotomy through a synthesis of Left and Right. As noted, this aim has been an integral part of the ideas of Conservative Revolution. For the influence of Left on the ENR, may be the only direct reference is Gramsci, on the role of culture he emphasized in his well-known analysis of hegemony:

Without a precise theory, there is no effective action. … All the revolutions of history have only transposed into facts an evolution that had already occurred in spirit. One can't have a Lenin before having read Marx. … The French right is Leninist without having read Lenin. It hasn't realized the importance of Gramsci. It hasn't seen that cultural power threatens the apparatus of the state. (Benoist 1977, 19)

The context in which the primacy of culture is recognized by the ENR is also important. The cultural vacuum prepared by 'deideologization' of European polities, the loss of cultural supremacy of Marxism, incapability of liberalism to create a new myth to sway the masses helped the ENR to initiate its cultural war. (Sunic 1990, 32)

Bar-on provides a long list of issues that New Left intellectuals have been influential on the ENR. This list includes; the critiques of modernity and post-modernity, liberalism, communism, and global capitalism; the incessant attacks on technological utopianism, capitalist materialism, and bureaucratic gigantism; the valorization of regionalism, federalism, and local forms of democracy; ecological and quality of life concerns; feminist themes; the critique of liberal and socialist "New Class" forms of domination; the call for more humane, spiritual, and free-thinking European societies which are not dominated by the "thought police" of Political Correctness; and the hope for a revolutionary, post-liberal social order (2001, 344). This list nearly covers all the issues dealt by the ENR. This might be the reason for some commentators to consider the ENR ideology closer to New Left rather than right. The writer of thesis by accepting this symbiotic relation

between the new right and the new left, still insists that most of these issues have emerged in post 1980's and had to be reflected upon both political wings. Such similarities of the content of these two opposite polar comes from the historical context and their 'common enemy'; neo-liberal hegemony. Thus, we cannot talk about a foundational shift from right wing tradition to a left wing one, as the way the ENR deals with those contemporary issues still has its references in right wing ideologies. To conclude, the ENR's position should be seen as re-formulation of traditional fascist ideas to respond to the problems of a new phase of history which is globalization. This re-formulation also includes ideas from the New Left, to come to terms with understanding today's problems in relation to neo-liberalism. Thus, Bar-on's formulation for the ENR, ideology as CR+NL has validity to a large extent.

Now, we need a deeper analysis of the elements of the ENR ideology. This has two aims, first, to understand the framework of ideas provided by the ENR in a proper way. And second, to elaborate their premises that are conceived as threat to liberal democracy and preparing the ground for next chapter to discuss their alternative for European integration and EU's respond to such attempts.

3.2. IDEOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT

The best way to start presenting the ideology of the ENR is to focus on the manifesto prepared by Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier in 1999 with the title 'The French New Right in the Year 2000'. This document is an attempt to propose a coherent worldview which has been the aim since 1968. Thus, this text can be read as the final stage of the intellectual evolution of this school of thought, after the three phases discussed earlier.

It seems very logical and legitimate to derive the elements of this ideology from their words first as given in the manifesto. Then, those elements will be discussed in details with reference to other sources as well.

The manifesto is divided into three parts: Predicements, provides a critical analysis of the present- that of 'interregnum' in Mohler's words; Foundations, presents the ideas and proposals of the ENR concerning man and the world; and Positions, outlines their proposals for problems defined for the age, supporting revival of culture and identity in a futurist way. The first part starts with defining the interregnum as the end of modernity, with its processes of individualization, massification, desacralization, rationalization and universalization. Further, Christian metaphysics is given as the roots of such secular ideas. Thus, anti-modernism of the ENR turns into anti-Christianity and refusal of monotheism. After explaining the crisis of modernity this part is concluded by defining liberalism as the main enemy.

So far, the position of their ideology is founded as a reactionary anti-ideology by rejecting modernity, Christianity and liberalism. However, as its one of the main arguments of this thesis, the ENR provides a comprehensive ideology of its own, with its views on human nature, social relations, state formation etc. Such worldview is provided in the second part of the manifesto by outlining their views on human nature, society as a body of communities, politics as an art, economics against economism, ethics, technology, global world as a pluversium and the cosmos as a continuum. The third part, rests on the premises given in the second part and figures out their proposals against indifferentiation, racism, immigration, sexism, the New Class, Jacobinism, depoliticization, productivism, current economic policies, gigantism, megalopolis and unbridled technology. As can be seen, the ENR provides a comprehensive outlook to the problems of the global world in post-1980. Regarding these issues, in their own words the ENR is for clear and strong identities, the right to difference, cooperation, recognition of gender, autonomy from the bottom up, a federal Europe, strengthening of democracy, new forms of labor, an economy at the service of people, local communities, cities on a human scale, an integral ecology and independence of thought.

As can be seen, the premises of the manifesto covering such wide range of issues can easily be turned to a political program. Aiming at configuring the core

elements of the ENR ideology and the political system offered by them, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with all the issues in details. Referring to the framework provided under the section 'intellectual roots' we can sum up that the ENR defines an interregnum through which the causes of decadence of Europe; modernity, Christianity, capitalism, egalitarianism, universalism will be transcended with an Indo-European heritage, revolutionary conservatism and defense for plurality of cultural identities. Thus, the core ideas discussed in this section will be limited to anti-modernism, anti-Christianity, anti-capitalism, anti-globalization, anti-racism, defense for organic democracy and federalism, the idea of Empire against nation state, and communitarianism. The list of principal subjects given by Benoist in his official website supports these choices as well:

> Indifferent to contemporary ideological models or fashions, and rejecting all forms of intolerance and extremism, Alain de Benoist also rejects any « restorationist » nostalgia. When he criticizes modernity, it is less in the name of an idealized past than a preoccupation with postmodern concerns. His thought focuses on four principal themes: 1) The interrelated critique of individualism, universalism and nationalism (or ethnocentrism) as different forms of the same « metaphysics of subjectivity »; 2) The systematic deconstruction of market-minded reason, the conceptual basis of self-interest, as well as the multiple influences of Capital, whose global reach constitutes, in his eyes, the primary threat weighing on the world today; 3) The struggle to sustain local autonomy, linked to the defense of differences and collective identities; and 4) The clear preference for integral federalism, based on the principle of subsidiarity and the practical need for extending participatory democracy.

3.2.1. The crisis and the End of Modernity:

As the crisis of modernity or decadence of European culture has a central role in the manifesto, parallel to the traditional ideas of revolutionary conservative right, we will start our analysis from this point. Before looking at the ENR's definition of the crisis as such, we should remember Oswald Spengler's (1880-1936) cyclical view of history and differentiation between culture and civilization. According to Spengler each culture passes through various cycles or different historical "seasons"; spring for flowering, summer or fall for maturation and winter for self-destructiveness or the end of culture which calls culture. And this cyclical flow is inevitably lived by all the cultures, in different geographies and epochs. Here, Spengler distinguishes culture from civilization, the latter occurs when the all productive energy becomes exhausted and culture starts living on its own past

signed by force of the people versus massification, creativity versus decadence, geniality versus rationality. Following Spengler, the ENR argues that European culture has nowadays transformed itself into civilization that is currently being threatened by an advanced form of social, moral and political decay. (Sunic 1990, 52)

In the manifesto, the crisis of modernity is defined by betrayal of its two dominant values; freedom and equality and the exhaustion of the great narratives embodied in liberalism, socialism, communism, nationalism, fascism and Nazism. Their criticism for the value of freedom is rather communitarian as founded against individualism. With abolishment of their ties with the communities, individuals lose the meaning and form of their existence, and enjoy only a formal freedom, which is not actualized.(Formality of rights is also criticized from Left but contrary to a communitarian critique, social democracy argues for actualization of social rights. See for example, T.H. Marshall 1964). Concerning equality, the ENR argues, communism betrayed it by turning into a totalitarian regime and capitalism devaluated it by legitimating social and economic inequalities in the name of equality. Finally, the critique of grand narratives comes from their destruction of lifeworld for the benefit of instrumental reason, economic growth and material development which resulted in an unprecedented impoverishment of the spirit, thus giving rise to birth of the emptiest civilization in history. (Benoist and Champetier 1999)

The ENR sees these as signs of the end of modernity, which is followed by post-modernity, characterized by the role of 'tribes' and 'networks', revival of communities, the politics of group identities, the decline of established religions, growing opposition to social elitism etc. Then, modernity is not going to be removed by returning to the past but will be transcended with certain premodern values in a decisively postmodern dimension (Benoist and Champetier 1999). In other words, through this interregnum the ENR aims to establish the elements of Indo-European culture into a post-modern context. This statement also supports the movement's relation with the Conservative Revolution and the New Left.

3.2.2. Anti-Modernity and Anti-Christianity:

The core of the ENR ideology is the rejection of modernity and its values as outcomes of a secularized Christian metaphysics. The critique of Judeo-Christian heritage and defense for Indo-European culture rests on such equation. This revival of the Indo-European values constructs the foundation of their alternative proposals for cultural, social, economic and political spheres. According to the ENR, roots of the main characteristics of modernity; individualism, egalitarianism, progressivism and universalism are found in Christianity:

> Actually, one finds in Christianity the seeds of the great mutations that gave birth to the secular ideologies of the first post-revolutionary era. Individualism was already present in the notion of individual salvation and of an intimate and privileged relation between an individual and God that surpasses any relation on earth. Egalitarianism is rooted in the idea that redemption is equally available to all mankind, since all are endowed with an individual soul whose absolute value is shared by all humanity. Progressivism is born of the idea that history has an absolute beginning and a necessary end, and that it unfolds globally according to a divine plan. Finally, universalism is the natural expression of a religion that claims to manifest a revealed truth which, valid for all men, summons them to conversion. Modern political life itself is founded on secularized theological concepts. (Benoist and Champetier 1999, 118)

As can be seen, the anti-modern stance of the ENR at the same time corresponds to their anti-Christianity. Thus, it makes sense to start with their critique of the characteristics of modernity given in the quotation above and continue with their refusal of monotheism for paganism in the next section.

Individualism:

Benoist summarizes the development of the modern individualism through secularization and coming down to earth form 'city of God' in three stages:

> To the extent that he acquired the power to make the world conform to his values, the otherworldly individual progressively returned to the world, immersing himself in it and transforming it profoundly. The process was carried out in three main stages. Initially, secular life was no longer rejected but relativized: this is the Augustinian synthesis of the two cities. In the second stage, the papacy secularized itself by assuming political power. Finally, with the Reformation, man invested himself completely in the world, where he worked for the glory of God by seeking material success that he interpreted as the very proof of his election. In this way, the principle of equality and individuality—which initially functioned solely in the relationship with God and thus could still coexist with an organic and hierarchical principle structuring the social whole— was gradually brought down to earth, resulting in modern individualism, which represents its secular projection. (2007-2008, 11)

The anti-individualistic position of the ENR is successor of the earlier conservative intellectuals like Giovanni Gentile, Jose Streel, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera

among others who attacked the foundations of liberal "mechanistic" concept of society, that conceives of the people as a simple aggregate of individuals. (Sunic 1990, 40)

The ENR's opposition to modern individualism is in parallel to the communitarian critique of liberal principles. Their position can be broadly summarized as the rejection of the idea of the 'abstract individual' which is defined with no reference to the social and cultural context that gives the individual the essence of his/her life. As the ENR proposes a vision of a well-balanced individual, by taking into account both inborn, personal abilities and the social environment (Benoist and Champetier 1999, 121), it is understandable that they cannot accept the abstraction of individuals from their origins, their environment, the context in which they live and where they exercise their choices, from everything that makes them who they are, and not someone else. (Benoist 2002a)

The idea of the individual being prior to his ends, defended by John Rawls among others, has negative effects on the communitarian vision of society, aimed by the ENR. Their holistic idea of the society is justified with values that are inherited and shared within the society, contrary to the values established by the individual, independently from the society. For Benoist, this atomistic view of society is the reason that liberals cannot recognize the autonomy of communities, peoples, cultures and nations. Given that individual interests should never be sacrificed for the common good, communities can never have rights as have the individuals[7]. (2002a). Thus, the ENR takes the culture or community as the core unit in establishing its idea of society. In terms of identity theory the social identity that is gained through interaction with social environment and the characteristics that are given by birth have priority over the values one develops in an independent way. It

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[7] It can be argued that communitarianism has emerged as a reaction to John Rawls' well-known book "A Theory of Justice" (1971) from political philosopher like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. The debate still continues on universality vs. Particularity, individual rights vs. group rights and problems of multiculturalism. Brian Barry and Will Kymlicka can be added to the liberal side of this discussion. It should be noted that, members of both sides can vary in themselves concerning their views on these problematic. Thus, it might be misleading to define such debate as two opposite camps with no interaction.

is the values of the community that gives the meaning to his life, contrary to the individualisms argument for self-construction of values and own identity. This primacy of culture and community is at the same time the foundation of ethno-pluralism and the concept 'right to difference' that are developed by the ENR to establish and defend the rights of communities.

Egalitarianism:

For the ENR egalitarianism, both in liberal and Marxist thought, is derived from the Christian thought and with secularization, gained its modern conception that all people should be treated equal and should have the same political, social and economic rights. Benoist explains this egalitarian cycle as follows:

> According to the classical process of the development and degradation of cycles, the egalitarian theme has entered our culture from the stage of the *myth* (equality before God), to the stage of ideology (equality before people); after that it has passed to the stage of *"scientific pretension"* (affirmation of the egalitarian fact). In short form Christianity to democracy, and after that to socialism and Marxism. The most serious reproach which one can formulate against Christianity is that it has inaugurated this egalitarian cycle by introducing into European thought a *revolutionary anthropology*, with *universalist and totalitarian* character. (Benoist 1979)

Egalitarianism is rejected by the ENR, first, in parallel to Nietzschean thought, it is blamed as the source of the subsequent 'decadent' and 'materialist' ideologies; i.e. the Judeo-Christian tradition and its secular derivatives—liberalism, socialism, social democracy and communism (Benoist 1979). Secondly, egalitarianism is opposed with a 'spiritual xenophobia' since it is inherited from Christianity, which is of foreign origin. (Taquieff 1993-1994)

Then, the ENR should be read as an anti-egalitarian movement insisting on the inequalities between people in an organic society against the formal equality in liberal and multicultural society, socio-economic equality defended by social democrats and the equality of all people in a classless society of Marxism.

Progressivism:

The third element of modernity, refused by the ENR is the idea of progress with its linear conception of time giving history a meaning oriented towards the future; its claim for fundamental unity of humanity evolving in the same direction and finally its argument for man's sovereignty over nature to transform it. Not surprisingly, for Benoist, all these three elements are originated form Christianity and reformulated in secular terms with rise of science and technology in the seventeenth century (Benoist 2002b, 7). This linear conception of (historical) time is confronted by the pagan non-linear conception of history in which the past, the present and the future are not perceived as moments irrevocably cut off from each other, or following each other on the single line. Instead, present, past and future are perceived as dimensions of each actuality (Sunic 1990, 76).

In a striking way Benoist connects this idea of progress combined with scientific positivism to the rise of racism. The idea of measurement of the value of cultures in hierarchy with universal criteria gave way to perception of traditional civilizations as either permanently inferior or temporarily behind the West- which legitimized the 'civilizing mission' of the colonial powers. This, ethnocentric universalism of progress is directly linked to racism. (Benoist 2002b, 14)

Universalism and Totalitarianism:

The final characteristic of modern thought, criticized by the ENR is universalism, which is linked to totalitarianism in their analysis. It is obvious that the cultural relativism of the ENR, their defense for particularities and 'right to difference', their rejection of the idea of a common future for the world all concludes their anti-universalist stance. Basically, they are against, universalization of any particular culture or civilization becoming the overarching universal ideal for others with the belief in its superiority, which is the case for Western civilization and found illogical and tautological (Benoist 1993-1994a). Also, as Baudrillard argues in line with Spengler's view on civilization as end of culture, universalization of one culture means loss of its singularity and death. Thus, with

universalizing itself, Western civilization both destroyed others by assimilating them, and ironically, it destroyed itself by losing its singularity (1996, 7).

The idea of universalism is connected to monotheism and totalitarianism in the thought of the ENR. Blamed for reducing all social and spiritual reality to a single model, every egalitarian and universalist ideology is defined as totalitarian. And this idea is linked to monotheist belief for only one truth, only one God, and only one type of man who pleases God (Benoist 1993-1994a). As Pierre Vial, the Secretary General of GRECE also notes:

> Totalitarianism was born 4000 years ago…It was born the day monotheism appeared. The idea of monotheism implies the submission of the human being to the will of a single, eternal…God'. However, the problem is not with monotheistic religion itself. 'Monotheism is good for the Jews; it is only good for the Jews.' It becomes totalitarian with the process of universalization.

As can be seen universalization of any culture is rejected by naming it totalitarianism on the grounds that it aims to homogenization by destroying the differences and particularities. Thus, the radical cultural relativism of the ENR and their insistence on the 'right to difference' for all cultures constructs its enemy as monotheism, namely, Christian thought; the origin of universalism and totalitarianism as are individualism, progressivism and egalitarianism. In this way, the ENR simplifies the modern thought to transformation of the Christian metaphysics, governed by one God, to a secular framework through science and technology, in continuation with the very idea that there is only one truth for worldly affairs as well. Modernity as such, by disregarding the Indo-European heritage has produced a Europe dominated by a 'foreign' culture of Judeo-Christianity. That's why the ENR's search for the rebirth of European culture founded its roots in defending revival (not return to) of pagan culture (in other words; polytheism) against the monotheism (Christianity). So, we will continue our analysis of the ideology of the ENR with the dichotomy proposed between paganism versus monotheism.

3.2.3. Paganism versus Monotheism

It has already been mentioned that preserving plurality of cultural identities in a world of pluversium is fundamental for the ideology of the ENR. At the core of their rejection of universalism, totalitarianism and monotheism, stands this differentialist framework of defending each culture against homogenization through egalitarian and universalist ideologies. Here, monotheism (Christianity, Judaism and Islam), which is not traditionally European but Semitic, is described with dogmatism, intolerance and a narrow-minded dualism. For the ENR, monotheism has withdrew the pluralistic mode of thought existed in pre-Christian culture, not necessarily by consent of people but by imposition through state and church, thus can be named as cultural totalitarianism. As a result, the call for revival of paganism, first means a turn to cultural origins of Europe, which has been suppressed by the Judeo-Christian culture. Secondly, it has a strategic role in legitimizing the intellectual ground for their anti-universalism and ethno-pluralism. This debate is presented in the below quote from Benoist:

> In this sense, it is legitimate to speak of a "polytheist social arena, referring to multiple and complementary gods" versus a "monotheistic political arena founded on the illusion of unity." Once the polytheism of values "disappears, we face totalitarianism." Pagan thought, on the other hand, which fundamentally remains attached to rootedness and to the place, and which is a preferential center of the crystallization of human identity, rejects all religious and philosophical forms of universalism. (1996).

Here, it should be noted that, despite the fact that the ENR links the idea of universalism to monotheism, their main target in terms of European identity is obviously Christianity. It would not be a mistake to explain this with the political, cultural and philosophical role Christianity has played in European history. If we disregard the role of Islam, which has rather been as the other of Europe, there remains only Judaism, which does not have a universalist ideology of spreading its premises to all around the world, being an ethnic religion of Jewish people. (Walker 1986). For the ENR, in a communitarian understanding Judaism is good only for the Jews, to the extent that it does not claim for universality. Then, we cannot talk about anti-Semitism of the ENR in the sense of violence against Jewish people or rejecting their existence. On the contrary, they seem to defend the identity of any culture as a community. This is the differentialist trick of the ENR,

which we will discuss through their ideas on immigration. By defining culture as the essence of life, the ENR legitimizes the idea that each culture would like to live in a homogeneous community with shared values and beliefs. And individuals would think the same so, as culture gives them their identity and the meaning of life. Then, no one needs obvious exclusionary policies, as people and communities will voluntarily accept to differentiate themselves from other cultures.

So anti-universalism and anti-monotheism of the ENR is focused on anti-Christianity and their proposal against it is found in polytheism, namely paganism or neo-paganism. Paganism is a broad term used to describe the religious and spiritual practices of pre-Christian Europe and the polytheistic traditions. Neo-paganism dates back to Renaissance with rejection of the religious values and dogmas originating in the Bible and the universalism of Islam and Christianity. These ideas revived in Europe in 1970s marginally through various groups. Not surprisingly, GRECE, overcome this marginality by using neopaganism to legitimize its anti-universalism, inegalitarianism and differentialism. Through GRECE neopaganism became one of the constitutive elements of certain groups of the extreme right. Some of these groups include racism by supporting the ethnicist idea of a direct descent from the Indo-Europeans, the origin of the "white race". However, Benoist provides a non-racist stance by defending a communitarian model with a pagan basis and acceptance of the difference of the other (François 2007, p. 43).

So far, we have tried to figure out the linkage between the anti-modernism, anti-Christianity and defense for paganism in the ideology of the ENR. Briefly, they consider the Judeo-Christian heritage as an obstacle for the plurality of cultures due to its universalism and totalitarianism. In the light of their differentialist and communitarian approach they call for the revival of the Indo-European culture since it is open to differences and is originally European. After analyzing this core of their core ideology, we can move to discussing their views on political issues and their proposals for the political system. As an outcome of their critique of modernity it is followed by anti-liberalism mainly focusing on individualism and

economism as a threat to the organic and communitarian society defended by the ENR.

3.2.4. Anti-liberalism

For Benoist, liberalism as an economic doctrine aims to transform all social reality with the paradigm of self-regulating market, and its individualistic anthropology is based on the conception of man who is not fundamentally social. Thus, the liberal view on society rests either on contractualism (Locke), recourse to the "invisible hand" (Smith), or the idea of a spontaneous order, independent of any intention (Hayek). A member of this market society, through commodification of everything becomes either a merchant, or an owner, or a producer, and in all cases a consumer. Moreover, in the modern age, this extension of economic logic to all spheres of life; shifting family to a small business, social relations to a network of competing self- interested strategies, political life to a market where the voters sell their votes to the highest bidder (Benoist 2002a). It can be concluded that Benoist rejects liberal ideology for its destruction of the communitarian social bonds and collective identities through market mechanism and individualism. However, expecting a totally anti-capitalist stance from the ENR seems too much. Benoist do not reject the existence of the free market economy, but rather he is offended to the extension of market ideology to political and cultural spheres. He says; "I would like to see a society with a market, but not a market society" (2003-2004), thus giving clues of a communitarian type of capitalism. This can be interpreted as the call for the return of the fascist ideal; 'politics over economics', to limit the destructive effects of the market society over the organic society and social bonds.

This critique of liberalism on weakening of the organic relations of proximity, that worked as a way of social protection is turned to the welfare state, which seen as a compromise of liberalism to deal with the negative effects of modern individualism on solidarity.

> The rise of the welfare state then becomes a necessity, since it is the only power able to correct the most glaring imbalances and attenuate the most obvious distresses. This is why, as Karl Polanyi showed, every time liberalism appeared to triumph, it has been paradoxically assisted by the addition of official interventions necessitated by the damage to the social fabric caused by the logic of the market. (Benoist 2002a, 28)

The welfare state is opposed in the sense that it is seen as impersonal and external in the form of abstract, anonymous and remote machinery; contrary to the old network of concrete relations. Pointing the impossibility of such version of solidarity, the ENR defends an organic, communitarian view of society.

3.2.5. Identity Politics

As can be concluded from the discussions so far, the ENR proposals against universalism and liberalism are grounded on the idea of preserving the heterogeneity of collective identities. Thus, identity politics emerges as a core issue in understanding the ENR's position. Here, we will focus on the interrelated subjects of communitarianism, multiculturalism, immigration, ethno-pluralism and right to difference in three parts.

Communitarianism:

The ENR, with the reference to communitarian thinkers, uses the concept of the 'community' instead of 'society' as the first notes a mode of organic sociality contrary to latter's definition of social organization with mechanical relations based on individuality. As discussed under the title 'individualism' as an element of modernity, the communitarian thought has risen as a critique of the abstract individualism of liberalism and the individualistic model of society. Thus, contrary to the abstracted, decontextualized notion of individual exists prior to his ends, communitarians emphasize what constitutes the individual, thus his identity, which is gained prior to his decisions and choices and shaped in a socio-historical contest within the community. So identity, for defense of particularities, is presented as a moral value against the universalist conception of justice (Benoist 2003). This priority of identity is formulized with the concept of 'right to difference' to come to terms with the homogenizing process of globalization and oppose the idea of a multicultural society. As argued in the previous section, communitarianism is developed in the ENR as a remedy to re-establish the organic ties in community against liberalism, dissolution of social bonds and welfare state's abstract solution for social protection.

Multiculturalism and immigration:

The increasing number of immigrants in Western countries and the emergence of cosmopolitan societies including people from various ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds increased the problem of minority rights and brought the question of how to live together with all differences in those societies? Multiculturalism has born as a response to that question by advocating recognition of differences with equal status[8]. For long period legal recognition of immigrant communities has been opposed by radical right and the ENR with scapegoat logic. As discussed in the first chapter, in the third wave of the radical right the immigrants are blamed as causes for unemployment and as threats to national and European identity. Thus, most of the RRPs aimed at forcing immigrants to return to their country of origins and opposed the multicultural recognition of immigrant communities. In the end of 1990's the ENR's antipathy with multiculturalism has shifted to a communitarian position by defending 'right to difference' for those communities. This significant shift might be unexpected, but considering the ideological transformation to cultural relativism in GRECE from mid-1980's, claiming 'right to difference' to all collective identities has become a constitutive element of their ideology. As a result, due to the central ethical value given to identity, use of assimilation as a way of integrating the immigrants to the national culture is countered, since that includes a hierarchical view of culture and rejection of difference, which is defined as racism by the ENR. They have distanced themselves from the scapegoat logic as well. Against Le Pen, for example, Benoist argues that French identity is not threatened by the immigrants, on the contrary, the loss of appropriate way of thinking and identity (probably he refers to Indo-European culture) is the reason why immigrants has been perceived as threats (Benoist 2003-2004). Interestingly, this turn of the ENR is not limited to the cultural sphere but points out also the socio-economic conditions that give rise to immigration especially from the Third World. Contrary to the scapegoat logic of the RRPs the ENR blames the capitalist system as cause of immigration:

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[8] For a broader analysis of 'multicultural citizenship' see for example, Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Immigration is historically linked to capitalist expansion and to forced uprooting which is the result of structural difficulties in the Third World. It is thus a negative phenomenon and it would be wrong to think of it as inevitable: the Muslim's problems will not be solved by making a million more Muslims come to France. A healthy approach to the problem would be to have concrete solidarity with immigrants, who are its first victims (since they are the ones most at risk of losing their identity by emigrating), then to develop a profound critique of the logic of capitalism, and finally to intensify, cooperation with countries in the Third World by helping them become self-sufficient, by dispelling the illusions of "development" fostered by the World Bank and the IMF. (Benoist 2003-2004, 176)

Such stance is the base for the ENR's proposal to increase cooperation with Third World countries for the well-being of both sides. This attempt is part of their strategy in global politics to establish a coalition against the Americanization of the world, including Russia, Third world and all kinds of people who want to retain identity against a world trend that dissolves every form of identity, through technology, the economy, a uniform way of life and consumerism around the world (Warren 1994). Such good will of the ENR to help other cultures in preserving themselves against the homogenization through globalization is not that innocent. This differentialist approach should also be read as legitimization of the return of the non-Europeans to their 'communities' not by force, but by consent that they are different and to keep their identity alive they need to live in their homelands and develop better conditions for themselves (in order to prevent further migration to Europe). In other words, they should be aware that they are not wanted outside their countries of origin (Taquieff 2003-2004). The ENR argues for a restrictive policy of immigration and for those continue living in Europe, the remedy is communitarianism.

We can conclude that the ENR's view of communitarianism is not only for Europe but also for the global community. Their turn in the policy of immigration is significant to understand the transformation of racism (will be summarized in 3.2.10) and strategies of exclusion. It should be noted that this shift in their strategy is opposed by some from within, like Faye and O'Meara who still do not accept non-Europeans, that such approach will legitimize the Third World invasion and increase the problems of immigration (O'Meara 2005, 34).

Ethno-pluralism, right to difference and anti-racism:

For some authors the ethno-pluralism of the ENR is defined as 'multiculturalism of the Right' to undermine the intellectual basis of liberal multiculturalism (Spektorowski 2003, 115). At the center of the ethnopluralist thinking, against the individualist anthropology, rests on the idea that man has a natural need to identify himself with a group and his right to preserve his identity and unlikeness expresses the freedom of man. Thus, the right to preserve group's cultural identity is justified as a result of every individual's right to preserve his own identity. (Tomasiewicz). Ethno-pluralism can be defined with two concepts of 'the right to difference' and 'the causes of the peoples'. Former, is against the homogenizing forces of globalization and the latter for the allowance of distinct cultural identity for every people. Both are developed to safeguard cultural diversity as a precondition for the health of humanity (O'Meara 2003). The 'right to difference' is similar to recognition theory and politics of recognition proposed by communitarian authors such as Sandel and Taylor. This principle has value as a generalization meaning that, one can only defend his difference legitimately as long as he recognizes and respects the difference of others (Benoist 2003-2004). For Minkenberg, ethnopluralism demarcates the ideology of the ENR from old ideas of biological racism and white superiority, emphasizes the incompatibility of cultures and ethnicities, advocates the right of Europeans to be different and to resist cultural mixing and contrary to liberal multiculturalism, offers a modernized strategy against immigration and integration (Minkenberg 2003, 180). This is the way the ENR escapes from establishing hierarchy between various cultures and legitimizes their aim to preserve European culture from invasion of others, to reject cosmopolitan views and to develop itself on their own heritage. This right for every culture to live its autonomy finds its equivalence in terms of political unity, in the ethno-regionalist federalism.

Another crucial point is that, the ENR considers the denial of difference as racism, which is observed in two forms; xenophobia and assimilation. The first, is well-known as the hate against the others and the latter, 'humanitarian' version, recognizes the other as long as it loses its 'otherness' and heterogeneity. Defending

the recognition of all identities, the ENR claims itself anti-racist against both forms it has defined (Benoist 1993-1994). This anti-racist stance can be seen as a proof the shift from biological determinism to a cultural discourse after the second phase of GRECE pointed in section 3.1.1. It would not be a mistake to accept the ENR as an anti-racist movement in terms of its rejection of racial hierarchies and Nazism, as biological racism. However, the theory of racism is not limited to the biological or inegalitarian one. What is defined 'cultural racism' or 'differentialist racism' very well fits into the ENR thinking. Noted by Taquieff, this form of racism is communitarian and turns the difference or identity of a group into an absolute; dividing human race into incommensurable and incompatible closed totalities. As observed in the ENR, the differentialist racism aims to preserve the distinctiveness of the communitarian identity (1993-1994).

To conclude the identity politics of the ENR, contrary to the fascist movements and most of the RRPs we face a distance and objection to hierarchical view of culture, xenophobia and scapegoat logic. This does not mean that the ENR has accepted an inclusionary position on problems of integration of immigrants and minority rights. Legitimizing itself with the (equal) right to difference for all communities and advocating cultural essentialism as the source of the meaning of life the ENR develops a differentialist logic of a heterogeneous world of homogeneous communities. This differentialist ethno-pluralism should be understood as a new version of exclusion rather than answering the need of co-existence of differences. By introducing Third Worldism and right to difference for all, the ENR justifies its search for preserving (Indo-) European culture by excluding its others in a 'voluntary' way.

3.2.6. Anti- globalization

Benoist's article 'Confronting Globalization' (1996) provides a systematic presentation of the ENR's ideas on globalization. Broadly speaking, Benoist considers globalization as a result of modernity, which aims to mass imitation of Western economic behavior. Benoist separates two interrelated trends of globalization; the economic and the cultural ones. The first is described with the

explosion of financial exchange. Referring to Marxism, Benoist defines this process with the universalization of the market, considering creation of a world market as very part of the concept of capital. He mentions the rise of multinational companies and international organizations of IMF and World Bank over the nation-states. The limitation of the control over financial markets through nation state and rapid flow of finance across borders means deterritorialization of capital characterized as the separation of economic and political space for the first time in history. As a result, nation states, without any choice followed policies of pure competition with the expense of destruction of social cohesion. That is precisely what happened in Europe beginning in the 1980's, first under the influence of Ronald Reagan's and Margaret Thatcher's liberal theories, then as a result of Maastricht Treaty—neo-liberalism (Benoist 1996, 123). These developments also signify the end of the social democratic consensus in post-war Europe. Cultural globalization, on the other hand, is related to the homogenization effects of such universal capitalism on people's life styles and identities. Capitalism is not limited to commodification and selling; through a flood of universal images and sounds, it contributes to the standardization of lifestyles, to the reduction of differences and particularities, the conformity of attitudes and behaviors, the eradication of collective identities and traditional cultures (Benoist 1996, 125). Such homogenization pushes societies to reconstruct their particularities and results in Barber's "Jihad versus McWorld" on the one hand, a planet on the road to uniformity, progressively homogenized by the market and by global communication; on the other, regrouped under the convenient title "Jihad," an ensemble of identity spasms, of aggressive ethnic or religious affirmations, which generate civil wars and tribal conflicts all over (Benoist 1996, 134).

Globalization and the Nation-State

One of the obvious outcomes of both processes is the decline of the sovereignty of the nation states and its social contract with its citizens. In a global world, the nation state loses its control over finance markets, weakens its social protection mechanisms, become more open to external interference and faces new security problems which cannot be dealt at national level. In due process, the nation state is

challenged from below; by new social movements and from above; by world market and supranational institutions (Benoist 1993-1994b). The challenge of globalization on sovereignty of nation-states has also produced the weakening of democracy and legitimacy of the ruling class as democratic mechanisms has lost their influence over decision-making processes especially on economics and social policy. At this point, contrary to the RRPs economic nationalism and search for re-establishing the sovereignty of the nation-state against the challenges of globalization, the ENR aims at establishment of a federalist European Empire. This opposition to the nation state has two reasons. First, the homogenization process initiated with globalization is already achieved at the national level by the state. Defending the heterogeneity of collective identities, the ENR is against the nation-state model. Second, the nation-state, as a political unity, no longer has the capacity to correspond to global problems. The ENR offers the idea of Empire as a solution to this loss of sovereignty. The search for a European political authority to confront globalization is at the same time a strategy to put politics over economy against the revenge of the economy over the social and political. And organic democracy is emphasized as a response to the democracy deficit at national and European level. These proposals will be examined in coming section, which are crucial for the European integration and the principles of the liberal democracy.

3.2.7. Nation-State, Empire and Federalism

Regarding the European political history, Benoist mentions development and clash of two great models of polity; the nation and the empire. By comparing the territorial and mechanistic model of the first with the 'principle of empire' and the organic unity it provides the ENR proposes empire as a model to associate different cultures under the unity of the same idea. Referring to Evola, Benoist claims the essentiality of the 'idea of empire' contrary to the territory, language and race:

> The idea alone should represent the country . . . It is not the fact of belonging to the same soil, speaking the same language, or having the same bloodline which should unite or divide us, but the fact of supporting or not supporting the same idea. (Evola 1996)

Defining the Empire as such, Benoist reserves the word to Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Germanic Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire. He does

not count The Napoleonic Empire, Hitler's Third Reich, the French and British colonial empires, and modern imperialisms of the American and Soviet types as empires, calling them national modern great powers that want to expand by military, political and economic conquest beyond their current borders (1993-1994b). Thus, it is not the territory, language and ethnicity of the nation-sate but the common idea of the Empire that constructs the political unity at the upper level.

This 'idea of empire' is found in the differentialist principle of the ENR, with autonomy and respect for diversity. Whereas the nation builds itself upon a single culture, the empire embraces various cultures. Contrary to the individualist component of the nation-state regarding citizenship, the membership to an Empire is organic mediated through intermediate structures of local ties or states (Benoist 1993-1994b). We can conclude that the opposition of the ENR to the nation-state model has not risen with globalization. It has its theoretical background in support for an organic and communitarian model of society against homogeneity and individualization, which are corresponded with the nation state. This process of homogenization and individualization in formulation of the nation-state is read in connection to the development of the market, giving another reason to the ENR to oppose the nation-state.

Then, what kind of an Empire is foreseen by the ENR? A key role in a European empire would be a federalism which accommodates the differentialist principle of respect for the identity of others, thus allowing every group to defend its own identity 'against a global system which tries to destroy it'. The theoretical ground of the ENR's federalism is traced back to Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) who is considered as the first Federalist by Benoist. The significance of Althusius for Benoist, comes from his emphasis on the community as the base of political formations in opposition to individualist anthropology. Secondly, his advocacy of popular sovereignty and local autonomy as foundations of modern federalism explains such reference to his ideas (Benoist 1999). The idea of an ethnic federalism represents Europe's own contribution to a revolutionary politics of

identity, which should not oppose but share with other cultures outside Europe, a common struggle against liberal colonialism (Spektorowski 2003, 115). This idea of a 'federalist European Empire' is developed against the search for a supra-national European Nation State in a Jacobin model, and the economic supranationality supported by the EU bureaucrats. 'Europe of a Hundred Flags'- including the local identities suppressed by the nation-states- has become the slogan of this ethnopluralist federalism. Such a differentialist model of federalism would solve the problems of regional cultures, ethnic minorities and local autonomies, the problems arising from immigration and with its emphasis on the idea of autonomy; it will create mechanisms for grass-roots and organic democracy. As Benoist notes; imperial principle above, direct democracy below: this is what would renew an old tradition! (1993-1994b). As a result, organic democracy emerges as a key element of the federalist empire, both as a critique of representative democracy and a solution for the democracy deficit in contemporary politics.

3.2.8. Representative democracy and organic democracy

As given in section 'explaining the rise of third-wave of the radical right' (2.3), the crisis of the institutional structure of liberal democracy and the dissatisfaction with the existing political parties have increased the electoral success of the RRPs. For Benoist, in addition those observations, the end of grand narratives, emergence of new social or political movements (ecological, regionalist, identitarian), the revival of community life, all prepares the ground for recreating a fundamentally active citizenship (Benoist 2002c). This 'active citizenship' is constructed upon the organic or participatory democracy with reference to ancient Greek experience.

Using Rousseau's concept of the 'general will' and the principle of the identity of the ruled and the ruler, Benoist argues that in today's liberal democracy the representatives, who should be executing the ends determined by the general will, has gained priority and feels the right to act in accordance with his own will, justified only by being elected (2002c 20). This idea is parallel to that of the RRPs who aims to make the voice of the ordinary people heard. But, contrary to the

mobilization of resentment used by the RRPs; the ENR introduces recreation of the organic democracy within the context of its differentialist federalism.

As has been argued by scholars of the 'theory of democracy', implementation of direct democracy is possible at a certain scale of population and in a rather homogeneous society. This kind of a model fits very well into the ENR's 'heterogeneous federalism of homogeneous communities'. This turn to direct democracy is also, part of the revival of the Indo-European culture.

> Direct democracy . . . is primarily associated with the notion of a relatively homogeneous people that is conscious of what makes it a people . . . Therefore, to return to a Greek concept of democracy . . . means reappropriating, as well as adapting to the modern world, the concept of the people and community—concepts that have been eclipsed by two thousand years of egalitarianism, rationalism, and the exaltation of the rootless individual. (Benoist 2002, 7)

Ancient democracy, against tyranny and aristocracy, presupposed isonomy (equality before laws), isotimy (equal rights to accede to all public offices) and isegory (liberty of expression). This was direct democracy, known also as "face to face" democracy, since all citizens were allowed to take part in the *ekklesía*, or Assembly. Against the individualism and abstract egalitarianism of modern democracy, ancient democracy was communitarian, "holist" and organic. And 'liberty' did not mean emancipation from collectivity, but guarantee of participation into life of the city and politics. Liberty did not legitimize secession; instead, it sanctioned it very opposite: the bond which tied the person to his city. This was not liberty-autonomy, but a liberty-participation (Benoist 2002). Consequently, Benoist emphasizes the role of participation into decision-making and communal life as a request for belonging to the community as a citizen, which is not possible with representative democracy due to the scale of populations and geographies. A federalist system, combined with local autonomy and direct democracy would serve to rebirth of democracy from its ancient roots. This organic view of democracy has another function for the ENR. As the collective institutions of today's society; parties, trade unions, schools, churches etc. cannot sustain their role in social integration, direct democracy would fill this gap for recreating social bonds and solidarity.

Concluding from such emphasis on participation and direct democracy shall one think that the ENR is even more democratic than the liberal democrats? For authors like Betz, such version of a communitarian organic democracy, which is aimed at populism of the RRPs as well, is an attempt to transform liberal democracy in to a form of ethnocracy. The specificity of ethnocracy is its definition of ethnic or cultural identity as the distinguishing principle of qualified rights to citizenship. Thus, it is a challenge to liberal conception of citizenship and multiculturalism (Betz 2005). The anti-individualist and ethno-pluralist thinking of the ENR, takes the collective identities as the basis for the political formation, thus, constitute a fundamental threat to individual rights and liberties, which can be suppressed for the sake of the community.

3.2.9. The ENR and the third wave of the radical right

Given the metapolitical perspective of the ENR, the movement rejects any direct relation with any political party. This does not prevent us from comparing the ideology of the ENR and the third wave of the radical right. And it is quite known that some intellectuals within GRECE have become party ideologists in France and other countries, and some parties adopted the ENR to their programs. Since putting the ENR into the context of the third wave would not be so meaningful and is beyond the scope this thesis; this section is limited to some observations on the commonalities and differences between the political radical right and the metapolitical ENR. It should be noted that the cultural turn given in the intellectual phases of the ENR can also be found in the context of the neo-fascism of the RRPs, which can be called as cultural fascism[9].

The first observation is the similarity between the ENR's analysis of globalization and the crisis of modernity; and the conditions favoring the radical right. The

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[9] Primacy of culture is not specific to the radical right but points kind of a paradigm shift in the context of globalization, post-industrialism and rise of identity politics. Analysis of such shift is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, we can conclude that primacy of culture is not invented by the radical right. Rather, it corresponds to transformation of radical right under the influence of such paradigm shift.

quote below from Benoist, very well summarizes the context that gave rise to the third wave of the radical right:

> In addition to that , finally, the effacement of old point s of reference , the collapse of models, the disintegration of the great ideologies of modernity, the absolute power of a system of commerce that (may) deliver the means of living but not the meaning of life, raise again the crucial question of the meaning of the human presence in the world, of the meaning of individual and collective existence, and all this while the economy produces more and more goods and services with less and less labor, which multiplies exclusions in a context already heavily marked by unemployment, precarious employment, fear of the future, insecurity, reactive aggressiveness, and tensions of all kinds (2002c, 22).

Parallel to our summary in chapter two, the ENR considers the socio-economic transformation came with post-industrialism and globalization as the end of the social democratic consensus. Also the emergence of the 'two-thirds' society with knowledge based economy is understood as the reason of mass unemployment. Both issues were discussed in explaining the rise of radical right.

As already been emphasized, the relation between left and right is valid both for RRPs and the ENR. RRPs are political oppositions with the New Left but competing on the same spectrum of issues rose with new politics. The ENR, at ideological level, benefits from the new left ideology in adopting its revolutionary conservative roots to the context of globalization and new politics. Thus, both RRPs and the ENR keep their right-wing core, but use various strategies to come to terms with the problems of the new context. Emergence of neo-liberalism as the common enemy for new-left and new-right introduced the possibility of interaction between two schools of thoughts.

Another commonality between the RRPs and the ENR is found in their critique of the existing political system, as not functioning in the interest of ordinary people or general will, but serving to the interest of the political elite at national and European levels. Implementation of referendum as a mechanism for direct democracy is proposed by both actors. But their reactions to the democracy deficit differ. The RRPs use the jargon of 'being the voice of the unheard ordinary people' as part of their populist strategy and for mobilization of resentment. In doing so; they remain parts of the established party system. As discussed in previous section the ENR distinct itself from RRPs in its defend for direct

democracy as part of its transformation of the political system into a federalist Europe.

Immigration is a salient issue to compare the third wave and the ENR. We can consider the idea of defending European culture against foreign invasion common for both. The meaning of such defense distinguishes, especially after 1990s with the communitarian position of the ENR. The scapegoat logic and xenophobia found in the ideology of the RRPs are rejected by the ENR with the 'right to difference', and the policy of cooperation with the Third World. Whereas most of the RRPs keep an anti-immigrant policy through legislation-i.e. forcing them for return to the country of origin, the differentialist and communitarian view of the ENR recognizes the existence of the immigrant communities inside, and promotes voluntary return to home countries 'to live in better conditions of surviving their cultural identities'.

Another salient subject of differentiation is politics at national and European level. The ENR is obviously working at European level, with its theoretical framework on European identity and European integration; and its network of think-tanks and journals in various countries. The intellectuals of the ENR consider themselves European first, and the local or national identity comes later. RRPs due to their political function, priory has to defend the nation first and, if not opposed, the supranational identity comes later. Some of the RRPs reject the international cooperation, but with the third wave of the radical right we observe a tendency towards establishing various networks at European level, especially in European parliament. The reason behind can be given as the recognition of the difficulty to deal with the problems rose with globalization; i.e. immigration, unemployment etc. made them discover the necessity of organizing at European level. Also, those who shared the idea of defending European culture against non-Europeans; especially the Muslims as 'the Other', felt the need to collaborate internationally. These attempts keep the national identity and national interest as their core. The policies at European level are justified to the extent that they are for the solution of the problems at national level. As will be discussed in the fourth chapter, the

impact of these networks to European integration would be construction of 'Europe of Nations'; which is clearly in opposition to the federalist European Empire or 'Europe with Hundred Flags' of the ENR.

Finally, to exemplify the relation between the ENR and the RRPs we can add some notes on their correspondence with the French Front National, led by Le Pen. As McCulloch states, some of the intellectuals of the GRECE constitute an important party faction in FN (2006). Especially the idea of the 'right to difference' is adopted by Le Pen to legitimize FN's defense of the European culture against immigrants. However, with the turn to pan-Europanism, federalism and regionalism in 1990s Benoist declared Le Pen as an enemy by opposing his excessive moralism, integralism, racism and liberalism (McCulloch 2006). Benoist criticizes the strategies of populism, xenophobia and mobilization of resentment of the FN (1993-1994a). Jacques Marlaud, the president of GRECE has put the foundations of their opposition to FN as follows:

> The divergences between the extreme right and the ND appear to be insurmountable. 1- the FN is impregnated with a Catholic messianism incompatible with our paganist conception. 2- the FN's doctrine of identity is summed up in a typically narrow-minded French nationalism, whereas we are European before being French. 3- the FN is opposed to Mosques, Muslim veils. We are for the imprescribable right of peoples to remain the same; on our soil or elsewhere (1990).

Thus, the view of the ENR and the FN on European identity, immigration and right to difference are conflicting. This is another supporting argument for not calling the ENR as the French New Right.

To conclude, acting with a political perspective, it is not possible to make one-to-one correspondence with the ideas of the RRPs and the ENR, but it is logical to talk about some inspirations of the RRPs. Expectedly, there are some shared points of references. Broadly speaking, the European perspective founded in the ENR cannot be observed in RRPs, as they are political parties struggling at the national level. It would not make sense to expect a national party to base their arguments on ideology of the ENR. Having a metapolitical and European perspective is the peculiarity of the ENR, which are the reasons of taking them as the subject of this thesis. Reminding the essence of this metapolitical role and the 'interregnum',

when the time comes for the end of decadence, the intellectual influence of the ENR may found its political equivalence in these political actors to achieve the rebirth of the European culture.

3.2.10. Fascism of the ENR

After all these elaborations on the ideology of the ENR what to call the ENR; neo-fascist or post-modern right or provocatively new Left? The eclectic ideology of the ENR makes it difficult to define this school of thought. Some authors, like Tomislav Sunic, emphasize the leftism of the ENR contrary to its revolutionary conservative roots to show them as more near to left rather than right. Some seem to be convinced with their post-modern or Nietszchian position beyond Left and Right like the Telos journal. As mentioned in our analysis of their ideology, the writer of this thesis insists that the ENR should be read as adaptation of the revolutionary conservative ideas of 1920s (Conservative Revolution) to the new issues emerged under the context of globalization. Rather than a radical shift in their core elements, openness to new left comes from its power in configuring the infrastructure of the problems rose with the globalization of capitalism. As already noted, this era or 'interregnum', defined with the crisis of modernity, prepares the chance for revival of the Indo-European culture which is the new face of fascism. This argumentation is grounded on the Roger Griffin's definition of generic fascism.

The studies on fascism mostly focus on military values, mass mobilization, the leader principle and the political style as an outcome of their analysis of the Fascist experience in Italy and German fascism. This emphasis on fascism as a political regime lacks the necessary concentration on their ideology and its definition as a generic phenomenon. The contributions of Stanley Payne, George Mosse and Zeev Sternhell opened the way for defining fascism not in terms of what it opposed, but in terms of its specific ideological and cultural values. George Mosse, for example, emphasized that fascism is firmly located within European culture (Spektorowski 2003, 113). Thus, Griffin's definition of generic fascism provides us the tools to elaborate on the fascism of the ENR as a specific ideology and culture.

Griffin introduces two fundamental ideological elements; 'populist ultra-nationalism' and the myth of 'palingenesis' as components of generic fascism. Claiming emergence of a consensus in the literature on fascism on such definition in 1990's, he also emphasizes the possibility of alternative definitions that might give different outcomes in evaluating the cases like the ENR. The first component, 'populist ultra-nationalism', in Griffin's words, is a highly flexible concept which embraces a wide range of organic and hence anti-individualistic , anti-rational, anti-liberal, and above all, anti-egalitarian and anti-universalist concepts of the nation-state or the ethnic community as a primordial unit of social, cultural, and political reality. Moreover, it can embrace federal, imperial, transnational, and supranational (but not international or universal) schemes of alliances between 'nations' or *ethnies* (2000b, 37). These given characteristics are clearly found in the anti-modernism and the ethno-pluralist federalism of the ENR outlined in this chapter. Bar-on also notes the commonality of this ultra-nationalism in historical fascism, early post-war fascism and the ENR through a strong, unified, homogeneous, pan-European empire regenerated in defense against the dominant 'materialist' ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, socialism and communism (2008, 327). Then, the argument for considering the ENR as a successor of historical fascism is justified for this component.

The second component is the myth of 'palingenesis', or rebirth, which specifically denotes the vision of a process of rebirth or regeneration destined to put an end to a process of decline, decadence, or dissolution , and which can admit a vast array of diagnoses of the causes of decline and the sources of renewal (Griffin 2000b, 37). As presented, the ENR blames the materialist ideologies of Marxism and liberalism -and their egalitarianism and universalism rooted in the Judeo-Christian heritage- for decadence of European culture. Emancipation of the 'original' roots of Europe from such decadence is grounded upon the revival of the Indo-European heritage; rebirth of pagan values and re-emphasizing the ancient values. Call for this heritage does not promote a return to 'good old days' but provide sources for

the new culture that will be established after the 'interregnum'. Obviously, this framework very much fits into Griffin's myth of the 'palingenesis'.

These two complementary components provide a nationalist-holistic Third Way and imply rejection of the basic precepts of the modern Enlightenment in the name of re-establishing the European culture on its pre-Christian roots. Thus, Griffin's definition of the generic fascism, allows us to label the ENR as neo-fascist; considering it as a contribution to historical fascism and post-war fascism to be adapted to contemporary world. We can conclude this discussion with this quote from Bar-on:

> The ND's revolutionary right-wing past, its ambiguous relationship to political forces on the revolutionary Right, its anti-Christian paganism, and elitist themes will constantly leave itself defending itself from critics, which see a revived form of cultural fascism. Until the *nouvelle droite* completely breaks with the old revolutionary right-wing milieu, its themes and authors will continue to be interpreted by many critics as a revival of fascism designed to suit decidedly anti-fascist times. (2001, 346)

3.2.11. Ambiguities of the ENR

Before moving to the next chapter it is helpful to sum up the characteristics of the ENR and point out its ambiguities and critiques. Combining the outline of their manifesto 'French New Right in the Year 2000' and Griffin's (1993) remarks on Benoist's 'Vu de Droite' (1977) - the winner of the Academy Francaise prize we can outline the ideology of the ENR with following lines:

The core of the ENR ideology can be found in its cultural essentialism; defined as the system of belief grounded in a conception of human beings as 'cultural' bearers of *a* culture, located within a boundaried world, which defines them and differentiates them from others (Grillo 2003). The right of such 'cultural being' to preserve his identity, justifies the same right for the cultural identities. As a result, ethno-pluralism becomes the scientific principle for the health of humanity and the political formations. This way of thinking, justifies the defense of the cultural communities within Europe, and the distinctiveness of European culture in the world. The threats to the such heterogeneity of Europe is found in the modern principles of individualism, equality, universalism and progress rose from

Christianity; the republican nation-state and the homogenization through one worldism of globalization. Thus Europe should emancipate itself from the two modern ideological camps of capitalism and Marxism, considered as two faces of the same materialist coin. The rebirth of Europe from such decadence under modernity and Judeo-Christianity is grounded upon the revival of the Indo-European culture and paganism. The implementation of the ancient values and the traditional fascist ideas to contemporary world produces an attempt to provide a third way with proposals of a federalist European Empire with hundred flags against supra-national European Union, communitarianism and ethno-pluralism against liberal multiculturalism, organic democracy against representative democracy and argument for a heterogeneous world (pluversium) of homogeneous communities.

Such a broad theoretical framework of a metapolitical and eclectic stance naturally brings certain ambiguities and points of criticism. The first point is the ENR's denial of the fascist or extreme right label. Given the revolutionary conservative intellectual roots of the movement and the analysis made according to Griffin's definition of generic fascism such refusal of the fascist label turns into a strategy for legitimization on metapolitical basis against the legal and public measures developed against the rise of fascism. Second issue is the combination of the two polar opposite ideologies, left and right. As discussed, these ideologies are political rivalries in their proposals on the issues of minority rights, immigration, multiculturalism etc. and the radical right is explained as a counter revolution against the success of the new Left. Considering such political and cultural incompatibility how can be talked about an ideological togetherness? Similarities can be found in their anti-capitalism against the common enemy of neo-liberalism and the ENR's use of Gramscian thought to build up its cultural hegemony. Thus, considering the ENR more near to right than left can only be part of the strategy of their denial of being a right-wing movement. As a result of these two ambiguities, the ENR is criticized by the by the pro-capitalist Anglo–American Right for its anti-capitalist and anti-Western stances and the Catholic Right for its irreligious, pagan, and anti-Judeo–Christian positions (Bar-on 2001, 337).

The third critique is not specific to the ENR but on 'cultural essentialism' and communitarianism in general. The primacy of culture and equation of culture with identity from this worldview is countered from different perspectives. Neo-Marxists reject the primacy of culture considering that it as a system of control, works for reproduction of the dominant ideology as part of legitimizing its hegemony. And the essentialism of culture disregards the centrality of the inequalities and injustice resulting from the economic base. Another opposition to communitarian views rises upon the identity theory. It is generally accepted that the identity of a person is formed in relation to the social environment. And it is also pointed that identity is multifaceted and contextual. The ENR's definition of culture is rather a static one to be reproduced. Thus, taking culture as identity is misleading. Moreover, with reference to Habermas' theory of 'communicative action' and Bourdieu's theory of culture as a practice Delanty argues for a non-foundationalist and anti-essentialistic theory of culture analyzed in terms of discursivity and reflexivity, especially in the context of post-industrial society (2000). Then, culture loses its meaning as a set of values to be preserved as the core of individual and collective identity. As a result, the essence of the ENR is a wrong assumption with reification of culture.

The fourth point is related with the anti-universalist argument of the ENR. Calling any type of universalism as totalitarianism the ENR rejects, for example, the universality of human rights as a mechanism for cultural imperialism. And opposed to that it defends, with radical cultural relativism, the concept of 'right to difference'. The way they introduce this concept is like a universal principle of a world as a pluversium. Thus, they cannot escape from shaping the world around a universal concept. And universalization of the principle of the 'right to difference' means the loss of its peculiarity being part of European culture. Benoist replies to this critique by separating 'universality' from 'universalism', and arguing for the rejection of the latter (1993-1994). But still, the anti-universalism of the ENR remains an ambiguity.

The fifth critique is on the Indo-Europeanism of the ENR. Criticizing the Judeo-Christianity the ENR presents paganism and ancient life as an ideal. However, the scope of religious and political in tolerance in Ancient Greece, murderous wars and persecutions in the Roman Empire, as well as the social and political implications of 'paganism' in Nazi Germany shows the need for a detailed examination of the political experiences in 'paganist history' of Europe (Sunic 1990, 153). Thus, revival of Indo-European culture might not mean a peaceful Europe.

A final problematic for the ENR is the tension between the pan-European regionalism and the ultra-nationalism. Both grounded upon the right-wing ideologies, the opposition from the nationalist extreme right movements against the pan-European perspective is inescapable. Beyond its metapolitical position, this might be the difficulty for the ENR to create a united, organizationally mobilized, revolutionary right-wing international (Taquieff 1993-1994).

This chapter attempted to get the reader familiar with the development of the ENR, its intellectual roots and the core of its ideology. Considering its network in around ten European countries, the theoretical framework provided in the journals the impact of the ENR as a threat to European value system and EU integration should be taken seriously. Their silence in political arena should not undermine their significance in terms of aiming to establish an alternative cultural hegemony. As mentioned, Benoist might be the 'new face of a new fascism', and in a specific conjuncture this metapolitical movement might gain the chance to turn into a political revolution to re-establish European culture with reference to exclusive communitarian views.

Now that there is enough knowledge about the thought of the ENR to discuss its impact on the European integration we can move to the fourth chapter, to elaborate on the ENR's alternative vision of the European identity and European integration; its impact on EU integration and the EU's policies against the extremist threats to liberal democracy.

CHAPTER 4

4. THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Throughout the history, there have been various attempts to accomplish the European unity under the dominance of one empire, nation or religion; and there have been pan-European ideas built upon an understanding of European identity going beyond national and other collective identities. Roman Empire, Holy Roman Empire, Nazi Germany can be named among the militaristic and political efforts for unification and we can mention Eurofascism of Italian fascism, Evola's, Mosley's and Bardeche's ideas of a united Europe, Conservative Revolution's idea of Mitteleuropa (associated with Ernst Niekisch), more contemporary ideas of a "United States of Europe", "Europe of Nations", "European Federalism" and the ENR's "Europe of Hundred Flags" among the frameworks on the European unity. The aim of listing such variety of and in certain cases conflicting ideas on unification of Europe is to point out the impossibility of defining *the* theory of European integration. The outcomes of the implementation of the premises above would be a Christian Europe or a Federal Europe or a Supra-National Europe or a Fascist Europe etc. In most cases existence of one would mean the abolishment of the other. Considering that each of the political or theoretical perspectives on the European unity has its own conception of European identity; it becomes difficult to argue for *the* definition of the Europeans. This is related to the nature of the concept of identity as well:

> As identity is dynamic and historically dependent, there is plurality of histories and cultures which make up European identities rather than the concept of cultural unity (Delanty, 1995).

The popularity of the studies within the framework of issues given above do not rise from mere scientific interest on the subject but from the influence of the process of integration of the European Union, nearly in all spheres of the lives of its citizens and impact in world politics. Reserving the critiques on the EU, and certain problematic areas being faced during the process, the achievements of the

EU in sustaining peace in Europe, enlargement to 27 members, the level of integration succeeded in many policy areas deserves the label of 'ever closer union' for the EU. Thus, the focus of the contemporary studies on European identity and European integration within the framework of the EU is not surprising. However, there are some warnings to be made at this point. First, reminding the introduction above, the alternative historical experience and theoretical views on European unity should not be disregarded in these studies, by taking the EU as *the* model of European integration. Related to that, as a second point, the tendency of equating the EU with Europe, as the representative of its every element, i.e. peoples, culture, philosophy, values, art etc. is misleading. As many European thinkers argue, still Europe is more than the political unification through the EU. Thirdly, the analysis of the theories of the European integration should not be limited to pro-European views that have a common ground on the 'European values' resulted from the Enlightenment and modernity. So to say, the 'anti-European' European perspectives, namely the revolutionary conservative ones, have to be taken into account.

Within this context, this chapter aims to make a summary of the generally accepted views on the European identity and the politics of European integration in comparison to the alternative proposals of the ENR. Keeping in mind the plurality of frameworks, to be able to compare the ideas of the ENR and discuss its impact on integration process, the contemporary implementation evolved for more than half of a century, the EU model is taken as the basis of comparison. Another warning here is that, the ENR do not represent the all approaches from radical right on the EU. Thus, other organizations of radical right acting at European level will also be briefly introduced to see the similarities and the differences between them and the ENR and to observe their impact on the process of EU integration as well. Finally, the way the EU examines the ideas and activities of radical right and the measures it envisages to prevent the liberal democracy and multiculturalism against the threat from extreme right will be overviewed.

As efforts to theorize any version of a united Europe builds itself upon construction of 'the' European identity, we can start our discussion by evaluating

general discussions on European identity and the ENR's definition of 'the Europeans'.

4.1. Pan-Europeanism and European Identity

The writer of this thesis is skeptic about presentation of any kind of definition of European identity as a prerequisite of a theory of European integration. Such effort, with reference to Benedict Anderson's well-known thesis of 'imagined communities'[10], can be seen as creation of 'Europeans' in accordance with the political formation supported. As an illustration, if one overemphasizes the role of Christianity in development of European identity, a politically Christian Europe would exclude non-Christian population living in Europe. Thus, creation of European identity includes the risk of cultural exclusion and demarcation against "the others" (Karlsson 1999). Another argument for being skeptic on the relevance of inventing European identity is found in the problematic of primacy of culture discussed in the ambiguities of the ENR in relation to cultural essentialism and communitarianism. The question whether the EU needs a definition of identity for its citizens and what should it be will be dealt later. Before that, such an identity conceptualized by the EU and the ENR's position on characterizing Europeans will be outlined.

4.1.1. The EU and European Identity

The need for providing a comprehensive vision of identity for European citizens has come to the agenda of the EU politicians as early as 1970s. The 'Declaration on European Identity' by the foreign ministers of the nine member states on December 1973 was the result of that search. The declaration, within the context of Cold War era, gives the message 'peace in Europe, peace in the World'. For the elements of European identity, noting the dynamism and plurality of European society, the text lists the fundamental elements as principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights. The declaration concludes with the trust in evolution of European identity evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. Another official

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[10] Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities. Verso. London.

document to find out the values included in European identity is the 'accession criteria' known as Copenhagen criteria. These include stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities in political sphere and existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in economic arena. A final document to be referred is the European Constitution, switched to Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 after being rejected by the votes of French and Dutch citizens in 2005. Being the foundational legal document for the principles, institutions, decision-making processes of the Union, the constitution also refers to certain values shaping the EU. These are human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and minority rights (Article I-2). Pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality are also given as characteristics of the member states. Finally, in the Preamble section, the text mentions invoking the desire of the peoples of Europe to transcend their ancient divisions in order to forge a common destiny while remaining proud of their national identities and history; with reference to Europe's cultural, religious and humanist inheritance.

Concluding from these texts, it is obvious that EU constructs European identity on the principles rose with Enlightenment tradition. Although not mentioned officially, there is a general acceptance that the idea of a common history of Europe refers to Ancient Greece, Roman Empire, Christianity, Renaissance, Enlightenment, French Revolution and two World Wars. Here one should keep in mind the efforts to mention Christianity in the constitution as an element of European identity. During the process, the rules of market economy have also become a core characteristic of the Union. Especially after the Maastricht Treaty - the founder of the European Union on three pillars i.e. supranational European Community, and intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs pillars- with the introduction of "European citizenship", promotion of the Europeanism among peoples of Europe emerged as one of the main tasks of the Union. The introduction of the European flag, the anthem "ode to joy" from 9th symphony by Beethoven, the motto 'united in diversity' and

celebration of 9 May as Europe day, all are symbols of the EU, in a sense aiming to popularize the sense of belonging to a common Europe among its citizens. Despite such efforts, including establishment of the mobility programs and other policies, the Eurobarometer surveys show among citizens of Europe, attachment to the national identity is still stronger than the European one. The survey at the end of 2004 points out that people feel more attached to their country (92 %), region (88 %), city (87 %) than to Europe (67 %) (Eurobarometer 62). The low voter turnout in European Parliament elections (54% in 2004), and the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 marks the failure of the Union in gathering support from its citizens. This situation denotes the problem of 'democracy deficit' within the mechanisms of the EU, which is used by the radical right against the new elite of Europe, i.e. Eurocracts, in a populist way.

4.1.2. The ENR and the European Identity

As mentioned above elements of the European identity is mostly defined in terms of the common history of Ancient Greece, Roman Empire, Christianity, Renaissance, Enlightenment, French Revolution and two World Wars. Given the objection of the ENR to modernity, Christianity and the nation-state model, only Ancient Greece and Roman Empire remains acceptable for the revival of the Indo-European heritage and the establishment of a European Empire. The ENR constructs its vision of European identity upon the values of paganism and the ancient version of direct democracy, both of which legitimize the preservation of collective identities against modern values with the principle of right to difference. Thus, it can be easily concluded that the ENR rejects the very core values founding the EU, due to its anti-modernist and anti-western stance. Focusing on the role of 'right to difference' and anti- individualism in their ideology, liberal multiculturalism and principles of market economy implemented by the EU are taken as threats to cultural heterogeneity and organic community defended by the ENR. As a result, Benoist rejects EU as 'anti-Europe Europe' that has abolished the original European culture and produced a decadent Europe (Bar-on 2008). Maastricht Treaty has a special significance for the ENR as well. As Benoist notes:

> Although the idea of Maastricht takes cultural autonomies into consideration, and is designed to strengthen Europe's economic power *vis-a`-vis* the United States, the economic and political union is predicated on an economic and juridical state that is merely a transformation and enlargement of the bureaucratic state. Under the Maastricht conception, the market creates economic identity, which in turn is the basis for 'European identity'. (Benoist 1996, 135)

Benoist confronts the Maastricht treaty also on the grounds that it does not foresee a politically sovereign Europe determined to acquire the equivalent of what the Monroe Doctrine was for the US and criticizes the governance through liberal monetary principles by administrators and bankers who neither have a political project nor democratic legitimacy, pointing out the democracy deficit in the EU (1993-1994a). Such rejection of a Europe of politicians and liberal elite is also found in thoughts of Evola and Bardéche (Bar-on 2008).

Not surprisingly, the ENR's position is not limited to an anti-EU vision but aims to bring up revival of an alternative or original Europe in their views, against such decadent Europe. The Europe envisaged by the ENR can ironically be named as 'unity in diversity' with a contrary communitarian model against multicultural Europe. The federalist empire of 'Europe with hundred flags' is the alternative suggested for a heterogeneous Europe of homogenous communities. In other words, while the Maastricht process bears the values of individualism and transforms the liberal union into a bureaucratic super-state, a federation of cultural regions represents precisely the opposite; namely a decentralized federation of organic, ethno-cultural identities that portray the deep 'historical' spirit of cultural Europe (Spektorowski 2003). This model will be discussed under the theories of European integration.

The idea of an independent Europe as an ideological 'third way' against liberalism and socialism and a political power against USA and Soviet Union has shaped the ENR's position, especially in the Cold War era. The search of the ENR, for a reborn, pan-European empire to 'liberate' the continent from the cultural 'decadence' or 'genocide' of its rooted, homogeneous ethnicities is traced back to the pan-European tasks of the historical fascism and the post-war neo-fascism to save the continent from the materialist ideologies of the day (Bar-on 2008). The

German ideal of Mitteleuropa, defending Europe as a third force and the ethnic federation of peoples with ethno-culturalism over economism, has also inspired Benoist to argue for a strong cultural unity as the only solution for protection against globalization (Benoist 1996).

The third way of the ENR also promotes a strong Europe helping the Third World for their emancipation from imperialism and materialist ideologies by supporting preservation of their cultural authenticity. Contrary to the egalitarian principle of 'right to difference', this strategy provides a new type of world hierarchy in which an emancipated and technologically developed Europe dominates a 'proud' underdeveloped Third World. Europe, because of its organic development and because of the link between its ethno-cultural nature and its technological virtues, is considered as predestined to master technology and, as a result, to achieve world political hegemony. On the other hand, attempts by agrarian cultures to industrialize or modernize are dismissed as unnatural. Thus, with the rejection of Leftist ideas to liberate the Third World through economic independence, the ENR legitimizes the supremacy of Europe through primacy of culture. (Spektorowski 2003, 119)

To conclude, the Indo-Europeanism of the ENR implies a total rejection of the core elements of identity the EU has constructed itself upon. Re-adopting the premises of historical fascism and post-war fascism the ENR aims to preserve the peculiarity of the European culture against the threat of neo-liberalism and globalization. Pointing the commonalities of the direction of the EU with American system and principles global market, the EU turns out as anti-Europe for the ENR since it facilitates the degeneration of the uniqueness of the European culture through mix of identities with multiculturalism and the dominance of individualism with free market ideology. The call for rebirth of pagan culture, to compose the principle of the strong cultural unity of Europe within diversity, is thus proposed as the remedy for ending the decadence. What is unique about the ENR's pan-Europeanism is its regional thrust that longs for hundreds of homogeneous, regional communities in the context of a sovereign, independent,

65

hierarchical, united Europe (Bar-on 2008, 340). And a crucial ambiguity, on the other hand, for the ENR is their reference to ancient Greece for reaching an original European culture. Considering their rejection of Christianity for being foreign to Europe, how should we interpret the influence of African and Mesopotamian cultures on ancient Greece is a challenging question for the ENR. As emphasized, any attempt to define the European identity has the risk of excluding certain elements. The ENR's vision, however, excludes almost everything that so far has been known as European.

4.1.3. European Identity: Does it exist, can it survive?

As already mentioned the integration process of the EU has flourished the debates on European identity. In due course, there has been a change in the way Europe is understood. For long time, mainly beginning from modern ages, euro-centric views were dominant as they universalized European values, they provided the base for social sciences and they were influential in explaining the reasons of 'backwardness' of 'others'. As this political process necessitates unification, it is argued that rather than presenting a universal civilization, Europe centralizes itself by cultural closure and emphasizing its differences (Ertuğrul 2001). This might also be an explanation for the way the ENR attempts to define European identity in terms of its uniqueness and rejects universalization of its values as a civilization, to preserve its peculiarity. However, in a world dominated by European or Western value system, is it still possible to talk about specificity of the European culture? Moreover is it possible to define the unified Europe as such?

First of all, the theories and practices on explaining and constructing a European identity are very much influenced by the nation-building processes in 19th century (Schmidtke, 2005). The historical and social evidence in Europe on common objectives like geography, religion, language, history, culture and ascendance do not support construction of a collective European identity. Given the limits of the common objective elements then, a new level and method of identification should be promoted beyond that of nation-states. Thus, the creation of the symbols of the EU (like flag, anthem, Europe day and the motto) is far from creating citizens of a

European nation. As argued by Karlsson (1999) rather than insisting on the search for the common history originating in antique or medieval times, the 'Europe-makers' should develop political self-confidence and ability to act in line with the role of Europe in the 21st century. This will not happen by elevating the European Union to a free trade zone in accordance with British ideas, or into some kind of American style United States of Europe which is imposed on people against their will.

Secondly, as identities are built upon the differences according to premises of the identity theory, Europe should find certain characteristics to differentiate itself from the USA within the Western civilization. Considering the commonly shared values and acceptance of the principles of market economy in both entities, only strengthening of the ideal of the 'Social Europe'- as a third way from left- could serve such aim. Furthering the achievements of the welfare state consensus and establishing the necessary conditions for its survival against the neo-liberal hegemony, a European model of society based on 'social market economy' could provide an alternative. (Jansen 1999). However, the trend in the politics of the EU seems to be dominated by a neo-liberal agenda, rather than confronting it with an alternative vision. The relation between failure of the vision of the 'social Europe' and the socio-economic policies; and the rise of nationalist threats against democracy the multiculturalism is summarized by Delanty (1996) as follows:

> The crisis of national identity in Western Europe is related to the rise of a new nationalism which operates at many different levels, ranging from extreme xenophobic forms to the more moderate forms of cultural nationalism. Underlying the new nationalism in general is more a hostility against immigrants than against other nations; it is motivated less by notions of cultural superiority than by the implications multiculturalism has for the welfare state, which is being attacked by neo-liberal agendas. As a cultural discourse, the new nationalism is a product of social fragmentation. Therefore the most important challenge facing the democratic multi-cultural state in the context of European integration is to find ways of preserving the link between social citizenship and multiculturalism. Without a firm basis in social citizenship, multiculturalism will suffer continued attacks from nationalism, feeding off social insecurity.

A third problematic is the presentation of cultural cohesion as a pre-requisite for social integration as a result of the relation assumed between culture, identity and integration. Delanty's critique on cultural essentialism and equation of culture with

identity is mentioned in discussion on the communitarianism of the ENR. Emphasizing the reflexive characteristic of culture, Delanty furthers his analysis on European identity. Associated with national identity, the idea of cultural cohesion presumes too much homogeneity and is thus unrealistic, as pointed above, as well as undesirable model of Europeanization. The only viable model for European identity is one that challenges the exclusivist kind of cultural identity. A European identity is not then an alternative to nationality but is articulated in the recognition of multi-identification with the dimension of cultural pluralization. (2000)

To sum up this section, neither the EU's attempts to construct a European identity through the methods have been valid for the national identities, nor can the Indo-Europeanism and communitarianism of the ENR provide the appropriate grounds for conceptualizing the European identity. Reminding the risk of cultural exclusion for any definition, defining a version of identity by picking up certain elements and trying to convince people of Europe to feel themselves attached to such Europeanism is misleading. Rather, attachment to Europe can evolve in time with a multicultural social model, cultural pluralism and belief in a shared future. These cannot be sustained with supra-nationalism and communitarianism.

4.2.   The ENR and the Theories of European Integration

Describing and guiding the development of the integration of the EU necessitated a huge effort on theorizing the process either on the uniqueness of the EU experience or trying to explain and direct it with reference to experiences of international organizations and federalism. The problem of partition of sovereignty between member states and the Union, the necessary mechanisms to combat with the common problems at European level i.e. like environmental issues and immigration, the conflict between supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism, the tension between regionalism and the nation-states, the governance of the common market have been among the main concerns of the variety of theories on European integration. Federalism, (neo)functionalism, intergovernmentalism and

transactionalism can be given as the main theories provided to come to terms with the problematic of integrating Europe.[11] None of them has an absolute dominance in shaping the EU. It can be said that there is deliberative mechanism allowing inclusion of each theory into the discussions influence the decision-making processes. Sometimes, as in the case of the three pillar system founded with Maastricht Treaty, co-existence of two opposing positions, like supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism, can be observed. For the scope of this thesis work the analysis in this section is limited to discussion of the federalism and ethno-regionalism defended by the ENR, in the context of the theories of European integration.

Let's start with remembering the ENR's idea of an ethno-regionalist Federal European Empire referred as 'Europe of Hundred Flags'. First, the preference of Empire against the nation-state comes from the existence of the plurality of the cultures in a communitarian way in the former, contrary to the cultural homogeneity in the latter. This communitarian view rejects the republican tradition of nation-states based upon citizenship ties as free individuals. The co-existence of homogeneous organic communities in the heterogeneity of the Empire governed by the idea of 'right to difference' would sustain intermediate ties for the individuals at local level to strengthen the social bonds and solidarity. Moreover, such local communities, would able establishment of direct democracy with high level of participation in decision-making and political life. 'Europe of Hundred Flags' then, guided by principles of ethno-regionalism and ethno-pluralism, foresees a federalist Europe, including the autonomy of the collective identities suppressed by the nation-states. Thus it is not a federation of current European states, but a regionalized one, with a large number of ensembles. Emergence of such a European political authority is required for the ENR, to confront globalization effectively; both in terms of preserving collective identities against the mixture through multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and controlling the

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[11] For overview of the theories of European Integration see; Rasmond, B. 2000. Theories of European Integration. The European Union Series. Palgarve MacMillan. New York and Sangiovonni, M.E. 2006, Debates on European Integration, a Reader. The European Union Series. Palgarve MacMillan. New York.

monetary and budgetary policies with putting 'politics over economics'. The ENR promotes a single currency for Europe as an element of power and sovereignty (Benoist 1996, 137). We are not in a position to elaborate on the details of the political structure proposed by the ENR, as its metapolitical perspective allows the presentation of their framework of ideas rather than a political program. Here, federalism and regionalism emerges as two positions that have significance within the theories of European integration, but not in the way defended by the ENR.

The significance of federalist theory of integration for the EU is summarized by Chryssochoou as follows:

> Federalism as a theory of integration is much more relevant to the study of the European polity than is often confessed. And this for a number of reasons: its increased concern with the dialectics of power-sharing in a compound political setting; its emphasis on in-built democratic arrangements linking different levels of governmental authority; its often flexible interpretation of the sovereignty principle; its focus on constitutional issues including individual and collective liberties; its emphasis on legislative representation within a bicameral structure and the allocation of competences among different policy domains; and its deeper concern about how to organize in a mutually reinforcing way the concurrent demands for 'unity in diversity'. (Chryssochoou 2001, 42)

The vision provided here is rather based on the liberal principles compared to the ENR. The 'United States of Europe' foreseen by these theories aim to found a federalist Europe, parallel to the US federalism, which is not acceptable for the ENR due to its anti-Americanism. And obviously, it is not ethno-regions but the nation-states that are taken as the units of federalism. So the ENR's communitarian model of federalism seems to be unique in the framework of such theories of integration. Still, there might be some similarities in the search for solution to the democracy deficit, local autonomy and recognition of collective identities.

Finally, theory of regionalism constitutes another strong trend within the theories of integration. In the process of the EU, the regions of the member states gained a certain level of autonomy against the nation-states with their direct relations to the EU for regional development and attracting economic investment. For some, like Karlsson, attachment of these regions increasingly to the Union contrary to their nation-states can strengthen emergence of the European identity. He assumes emergence of regions abolishing the borders of the nation-states in coming 20 years (2007). The main motive of separation into regions within this framework is

the socio-economic imbalance between certain regions even in the same country, rather than ethnicity. Thus, the framework of regionalism seems to be similar to the ENR's vision at least in their increasing autonomy against the nation-state. But ethno-regionalism emerges as peculiarity of the ENR.

To conclude, the terminology used by the ENR, has its room within the theories of the European integration to a certain extent, but the content they assure is very different from the communitarian and revolutionary conservative position of the ENR.

4.3. European level right-wing organizations and the EU

The organization of right wing movements on the European level is not limited to the ENR. Considering the metapolitical stance of the ENR, the more visible and politically influential organizations of radical right parties within and outside the European Parliament should be mentioned.

In the European Parliament, the first group of the radical right organized was the Group of European Right (1984-1989) with the membership of the French FN, Italian MSI and Greek EPEN. The group was chaired by Le Pen and defended neo-fascist and conservative views. The group collapsed and succeeded by the Technical Group of European Right (1989-1994). Now the alliance included German Republikaner, Belgian Vlaams Blok and French FN on the grounds of hard-line nationalism again under the leadership of Le Pen. These experiences point out the recognition of the need for cooperation at the European level for the radical right and the prominent role of the French FN with its charismatic leader, Le Pen. The immigration issue, to be tackled at international level and the defense of nationalisms against the supra-national Europe can be given the motives behind such cooperation. The Technical Group of European Right, for example, Brought a draft resolution before the European Parliament in September 1992 expressing concern over acts of violence committed against foreigners, but also by foreigners, criticizing 'one-sided reporting in the media of these events' in Germany, and declaring that 'only a complete ban on immigration into EC states and the return of

most economic refugees and non-EC citizens into their country of origin could put an end to xenophobia and prevent the colonization of Europe by Africa and Asia (Fieschi et al. 1996, 244). The collapses of two groups, on the other hand, prove the difficulty of collaboration at European level for the radical right. After a long break, the radical right re-organized itself in the European Parliament in 2007 with a larger group of 23 members from 9 parties, under Identity, Tradition, and Sovereignty. As the name suggests, preservation of the European identity against the 'invasion' of non-European immigrants and defending the national sovereignties against the EU are the main themes of this alliance. The founding charter of this group is defined as anti-immigrant, anti-EU constitution and anti-Turkish EU membership.

There is also a wide range of coordinating structures of radical right which are not established as a group in the European Parliament. These include *Euronat, European Action, European Front National* and *Alliance for the Europe of the Nations*. The membership to these networks provides a wider range of countries from Eastern Europe as well. The ideologies of these networks vary as Third positionalism, Euroscepticism, national conservatism and ultra-nationalism. The slogan of the Euronat led by Le Pen, the *'Europe of Nations'* can broadly summarize the position of these radical right alliances.

The main elements found in this spectrum of radical right organizations can be given as xenophobia, anti-immigrant and ultra-nationalism. These alliances have a commitment to a shared European civilization to be preserved against non-Europeans. At the same time, keeping the power of national sovereignty against the centralized European bureaucracy, especially after Maastricht treaty is at the core of the ideas of these networks. Reconciliation of the national and the European interest is expressed in the formula 'Europe of Fatherlands' in contrast to that of a 'United States of Europe'. However, the lack of an alternative vision of European integration, due to the primacy of the nation, can explain the failure of the attempts to succeed in the European Parliament (Fieschi et al. 1996). At this point we can emphasize the peculiarity of the ENR once again. The ENR provides a deep analysis of the European identity and a model for European integration.

Another singularity is the acceptance of the primacy of the European identity over national and local identities. Expectedly, this position of the ENR is opposed by the radical right-wing parties. Finally, there is difference in the way they confront immigration, i.e. 'exclusion by force' for the RRPs and 'exclusion by consent' for the ENR. The ENR's proposal of cooperation with the Third World is also criticized by the RRPs on the grounds that it would legitimize the invasion of Europe by Africans and Muslims. Interestingly, the idea of cooperation with the Third World to control migration has come to the agenda of the EU as well. But, of course, it has developed as a political and economic measure rather than a cultural, communitarian one.

4.4.   Combating the threat from the radical right

Shown above and in the second chapter, the rise of the RRPs both at national and European level forms a crucial threat for the democratic principles exist in Europe. The main points of conflict emerge at the xenophobic and racist attitudes and policy proposals against the immigrants. Considering the demographic figures in European countries with low birth rates, and the European politicians' acceptance of the need for immigrants mainly for the labor market, the EU has to develop solutions for preventing the hate against foreigners and integration problems of immigrants. The results of the special Eurobarometer survey on racism and xenophobia had already warned European politicians and EU bureaucrats about these problems (November 1989). Such scientific observations, rise of the RRPs and violent crimes against foreigners facilitated the collaborative works within the EU and European Council on combating racism and xenophobia. The report, titled *'Threat posed to democracy by extremist parties and movements in Europe'* and accepted in the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council in 25 July 2003 provides a comprehensive vision against rise of extremism.

In the report extremism is defined as a form of political activity which rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy, basing its ideology and its practices on intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism. The text, explains the rise of extremism in parallel to the analysis provided in second

chapter. Mobilization of resentment, the argument for malfunctioning of the parliamentary democracy, promotion of immigration issues, new social divisions, unemployment and poverty, protection of national pride and values are given as the explanations for the rise of extremism. The difficulty of combating extremism for securing democracy is in finding proper democratic ways, without abolishing fundamental rights. As noted in the report, the best medicine against political pathologies of extremism is economic development, political democratization, and the building of institutions and a modern society. However, there is the need for urgent measures. Suggested by the Assembly, the logic of the wide acceptance of criminalization of racism, racial discrimination or hate speech, and xenophobia by domestic criminal laws for individuals can be applied to organizations, specifically for political parties. Beyond the legal provisions, the report calls for political and social campaigns to be organized by democratic political parties and civil society organizations for mass mobilization of the citizens against racism and xenophobia. Also, the need for preventive measures is pointed, which refers to education for democracy, not only as an obligation to defend the fundamental rights but also as the obligation to work systematically against extremism, intolerance, national, religious or any other form of discrimination.

Although, it targets the extremism of political parties and activist groups in a comprehensive way, the report disregards the ideological component behind those ideas and actions. Extremist ideologies are only mentioned by their contradiction with open society and free expression of human rights, and as illogical and unverifiable ideologies. Thus, such a framework of combating extremism is blind to the ENR's attempt to construct a cultural/ideological hegemony and seems to skip the threat rising on the intellectual and cultural grounds. The ENR's silence in the political sphere should not be concluded as the impossibility of the emergence of a political movement in a certain conjuncture, built up on the premises of the ENR.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

The last chapter aims to sum up the line of thought and arguments provided throughout this thesis work and make some final conclusions. The overview of the main arguments of this study can be listed as follows:

First, European democracy and the process of European integration are facing the threat of the rise of radical right and extremism in the context of socio-economic transformation being experienced after the late 1970s through post-industrialism and globalization. In due course, the RRPs have managed to establish themselves within the established political systems of European democracies with a certain level of electoral success at the national and the European level, which is analyzed as the third wave of the radical right. Despite the fact that none of those RRPs have been able to establish a single party government, the similarities between the conditions gave way to Fascism in 1930s and the socio-economic crisis of post-industrial society should warn us on the neo-fascist threat. The very recent global economic crisis can facilitate the support for the RRPs from the socio-economic middle class and mobilization of lower classes, as argued in Okyayuz's definition of fascist movement. (2004-2005).

The revival of the radical right has gained attention of many scholars from the study of political parties and that of fascism. The analysis of the third wave focuses on the definition of the radical right and the conditions favoring the radical right. The single-issue party thesis (Mudde), the theory of mobilization of resentment (Betz), losers of modernization theory (Minkenberg), thesis of party system change (Mair) and the silent counter-revolution thesis (Ignazi) are given as an overview of the theories on the third wave of the radical right. Among them, Ignazi's definition of the radical right, by not focusing on a single aspect of the third wave, presents the grounds for a comprehensive analysis. His definition of the contemporary radical right as a counter-revolution against the rise of the new

Left enables the researchers to examine radical right as the opposition of the left on issues of immigration, multiculturalism, feminism, minority rights etc. Briefly, the left can be defined on the inclusionary position on these issues of new politics, where the radical right stands on politics of exclusion. This bipolarity makes it necessary for the new Left to increase its success with a comprehensive program against the revival of the radical right.

The literature on the third wave has its strength in coming to terms with the rise of RRPs. However, they are rather weak in examination of two crucial aspects of the contemporary radical right; their ideological framework and influence at European level. Beyond the ideologies of the RRPs, the intellectual movements through think-tanks, journals, conferences etc. try to gain legitimacy and widen the space for the extremist thoughts against the legal measures and the highly negative public opinion on fascism. The ENR, with its metapolitical perspective has contributed to such goal and gained influence upon the ideologies of the RRPs and a certain level of intellectual acceptance with its think-tanks and journals. The, so to say, Europeanization of the radical right, on the other hand, is the result of the challenges from integration of the EU as a supra-national power over the national sovereignties, and the need for action at European level on certain issues, especially that of immigration. Both the intellectual and the pan-European aspects rest upon the idea of preserving the European culture against the invasion of the non-Europeans, specifically the Muslims, or that of the materialist ideologies of liberalism and socialism.

To contribute to the literature on the study of the ideology of radical right and the contemporary pan-European movements, the European New Right or the *Nouveille Droite* is choosen as the topic of this thesis work, with its ideology and impact on European integration. Founded in 1968 in France and lead by Alain de Benoist, this intellectual movement is developed through the think-tank of GRECE and journals of *Elements*, *Nouvelle Ecole* and *Krisis* and achieved to organize a network of think-tanks in European countries and also gained popularity in public with its publications in the dailies like *Le Figaro*. The Gramscianism of this

movement positioned them on a metapolitical perspective, aiming at establishing its intellectual/cultural hegemony against that of the Left in 1970s and the contemporary neoliberal hegemony. Thus, the ENR rejects any direct relation with any RRPs.

The ideology of the ENR can be formulated as the Conservative Revolution plus the New Left (Bar-on 2007). Briefly, the ENR can be understood as the re-adaptation of the premises of historical fascism and post-war fascism in the context of globalization and European integration, in relation to the framework developed by the New Left. At the core of the ENR's worldview rest the indispensability of the preservation of the collective identities in a world as a pluversium, with heterogeneity of the homogenous cultures. The concepts 'right to difference' and the 'causes of peoples' defines that core. Resulting from such premises, the modern thought, with its core elements of individualism, egalitarianism, universalism and progressivism are rejected together with its products of the materialist ideologies, liberalism and socialism to preserve the homogenous cultural identities the vision of an organic communitarian society from mixing with others, individualization through the logic of the market. Defining the characteristics of modernity as secular version of the Christian metaphysics, the ENR rejects the Judeo-Christian heritage. In doing so, they abolish almost all elements of the European identity, that were taken for granted so far. The alternative proposed by the ENR is the revival of the Indo-European culture and pagan thought as the original Europe that would allow the cultural heterogeneity. The political formation developed upon the pagan ideas and earlier Fascist ideas emerge as the defense for a 'Federalist European Empire of Communities' and 'Europe of Hundred Flags'.

After introducing the development and the ideology of the ENR, we moved to the discussions on the European identity and the European integration to respond to the aim of the thesis to evaluate the impact of the ENR on the process of the European Integration, with reference to the RRPs networks at European level and the policies of the EU. The fourth chapter began with pointing out the difficulty of

defining *the* European identity, concerning the plurality and heterogeneity of perception of its elements as a historical and social fact. With reference to Delanty, the writer has argued for the reflexive development of a European identity resting on the (social) European socio-economic model of society and belief in a shared future. Thus, the writer argued for the invalidities of the EU's attempts to construct an identity in the lines of the methods used for developing the national identities, and the ENR's version based on cultural essentialism and communitarianism. Regarding the impact of the ENR on the integration of the EU, obviously by rejecting the core values of the Union and its closeness to an American model the ENR's neo-fascist ideology should be taken as a serious threat against all the version of the theories of European integration. Despite such opposition, its ideas might influence the immigration policy of the EU towards cooperation with the Third World.

Observed with the revival of the radical right the EU and European society should be well-prepared against the extremist threat challenging democracy and humanist values of Europe. The shift of the RRPs on European level through groups and organizations within and out of the European Parliament, increases the level of such threat. The framework provided in the document of the European Council against extremism seems to have recognized the context of the rise of the radical right and the importance of the threat. However, it is weak in conceiving the revival of fascist ideology with 'new face and new name' that can turn into a political movement under certain degree of socio-economic crisis. The current economic crisis by resulting in higher rates of unemployment, social insecurity, distrust to established system and hopelessness for future carries the risk of increasing the popular support for RRPs. Although, the RRPs failed so far to develop a vision of European integration, the possible intellectual hegemony of the ENR within some of these political organizations can provide them the necessary ideological content.

To conclude, the ENR, distinguished from the third wave of the RRPs and their European networks in its pan-Europeanism and the metapolitical perspective provides a comprehensive ground for the revival of the fascist ideology into the

contemporary Europe. Benoist - as a successor of the ideas of the Conservative Revolution- dreams of achieving the cultural influence as a prerequisite for preparation of the political movements. So far, he seems to be successful in gaining a certain level of legitimacy and space for his untitled neo-fascist views in the era of 'interregnum' shaped with crisis of modernity. Taking into account the material conditions in Europe under neo-liberal hegemony, the crisis of the social model of Europe, the unsolved problem of democracy deficit, the crisis of construction of European identity as an outcome of rapid enlargement… all constitute the adequate environment for rise of fascism. Probably, in such context, Benoist is feeling the proximity of the end of the decadent Europe and dominance of his ideas in re-shaping it as an independent European Empire with the ideals of the Indo-European values.

Thus, to combat with revival of fascism, rather than tightening in the discussions on the conflicts between the national interest and that of Europe, the problems of enlargement, the unhappy experience of European Constitution, Europe needs a broader brainstorming on its vision and implementations to survive a humanist worldview, to further its democratic value system and to sustain the social citizenship and cultural plurality as a model. This can provide a distinguished 'European Dream'[12] both for Europeans and the role it should play in global politics. This can be the Third Way of Europe, not only between capitalism and communism but also against revolutionary conservatism or capitalism.

If the transformation from welfare state to neo-liberalism prepared the conditions for the revival of radical right in politics, on theoretical grounds, we can argue that the paradigm shift with the post-modern environment and the emphasis on the sphere of the civil society provided the ground for the emergence of the ENR as a prominent intellectual movement. The use of the Gramscian analysis of 'hegemony' by the ENR is not a coincidence; as such framework has inspired many political movements in the context of globalization, especially that of political Islam. Thus, the ENR develops itself on the new Left's theory building

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[12] The title of the book written by Jeremy Rifkin with the subtitle *"How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American"*. 2004. Tarcher/Penguin Books. New York.

but as a revolutionary conservative response to the premises of the new Left. The theoretical similarities on the analysis of the 'common target' neoliberal hegemony do not mean ideological collaboration between two camps. The conflicts in the core ideas of the new Left and the new Right, do not allow the argument of the ENR for going beyond left-right dichotomy. Rather, considering the current economic crisis as a sign of the crisis of the neo-liberal hegemony, the two positions can be seen as rivalries aiming to construct their intellectual hegemony on the problems rose with neo-liberalism and the framework they would be solved. Consequently, the new Left's crucial role in combating with the revival of the radical right is not limited to the politics but a rather difficult task is observed at the ideological and cultural spheres to perpetuate the humanitarian values in the minds of the European people against exclusion, xenophobia and racism.

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