THE NEW NATO:
A STRONGHOLD AT THE DAWN OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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ABSTRACT

THE NEW NATO:
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This thesis analyzes the factors and conduct of the transformation of NATO and its likely effects on the globe. The implications of politics of the US, the EU on global security as well as enlarged threat perception will be investigated as the three main drivers of NATO transformation. The way transformation carried out will be synthesized into political and military areas. Political transformation here will be studied under three fold categorization of functional, geographical and institutional areas. The thesis will conclude with future tendencies of and within NATO.

Keywords: NATO, transformation, the US foreign policy, the ESDP, new threats.

ÖZ

YENİ NATO: ÇOK KUTUPLU DÜNYA ÖNCESİ BİR MÜSTAHKEM MEVZİ

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Bu tez, NATO'nun dönüşümünün etkenlerini, yapısını ve küresel alanda olası etkilerini analiz etmektedir. ABD ve AB'nin küresel güvenliğe ilişkin politikaları ile genişletilmiş tehdit algılamasının etkenleri NATO'nun dönüşümünün üç ana itici gücü olarak araştırılmaktadır. Dönüşümün icrası politik ve askerî olmak üzere iki alanda tartışılırken, politik dönüşüm; işlevsel, coğrafi ve kurumsal alanlarda gruplandırılarak incelenecektir. Çalışma, NATO içinde gruplara ayrılmış ülkelerin ve genel olarak NATO'nun gelecekteki muhtemel eğilimlerinin ortaya konması ile tamamlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, dönüşüm, ABD dış politikaları, AGSP, yeni tehditler.

To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACO	ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS
ACT	ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION
CFE	CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE
CFSP	COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
CJTF	COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE
EAPC	EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL
EDA	EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
EULEX	EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION
ESDI	EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE INITIATIVE
ESDP	EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
IEA	INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
IPAP	INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN
ISAF	INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
MAP	MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN
NAC	NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NACC	NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NGO	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
NRF	NATO RESPONSE FORCE

OSCE	ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION OF EUROPE
PARP	PfP PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS
PfP	PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
QDR	QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
SACEUR	SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
SCO	SHANGHAY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
SHAPE	SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
UK	UNITED KINGDOM
UN	UNITED NATIONS
US	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USAFRICOM	UNITED STATES AFRICAN COMMAND
USEUCOM	UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
WEU	WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
WMD	WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WTO	WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as a mostly defensive organization in the North Atlantic area[1] with the understanding of collective defense[2] against the Soviet threat for the purpose of maintaining and developing individual and collective capacity[3] in order to provide freedom and security of its members.

Once, its *raison d'être*, the Soviet Union collapsed at the beginning of 1990s, questions raised on what NATO should turn out. The critics sometimes focused on the relevancy of the Alliance itself, since the level of today's symmetric threats directed by the common adversary (possibility of nuclear assault, ethnic clashes, border conflicts, etc.) and of asymmetric threats caused mostly by non-state actors (terrorism, cyber attacks, piracy, drug and human trafficking, etc.) is relatively low.

Many scholars, in this sense, have argued that alliances, generally, would not last without threats[4]. Within this perspective, NATO, itself, should have limited its functions to a consultancy mechanism, if not abolished. Especially the neorealists expected that NATO would loose its importance; the Alliance would fade, or just linger as a forum for discussion.[5]

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[1] The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Preamble.

[2] *Idem*, Article 5.

[3] *Idem*, Article 3.

[4] Robert B.McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organisation,* 50:3 (Summer 1996), p.446.

[5] *Idem.* p.470.

Decision makers of NATO were sure of something. First, it could be too difficult to reestablish such an organization when the need arises. The role and tasks of NATO mutated, so as to prove how organizational integration of institutes constitutes an irreversible mechanism on our problem solving attitudes. Second, given the residual military capacity of the Soviet Union and the new threats, the survival of the Alliance was the best option.

In order to survive, NATO had to change just like living organisms as a result of generic character of the milieu in which it is. NATO needed political (conceptual), functional and geographic transformation in order to struggle in the living space of the earth[6].

But, let alone surviving, NATO has even increased its political influence and military efficiency. Today, NATO remains as the leading security organization in Europe, provides both conventional and nuclear defense for its members, projects stability through partnerships, and conducts expeditionary intercontinental missions.

Thus, despite the truth that cohesion depends upon external danger[7], not only this neorealist assumption failed, but also NATO's development went beyond the expectations.

Why NATO *did* survive and evolved reside with its reciprocal benefit providing function, the role of the United States of America (US), the NATO-European Union (EU) relations, as well as changing security perception, all fostering its relevance and effectiveness.

As to its reciprocal function for nations, NATO presents more than a pure defensive classical military alliance. It offers both political and military opportunities to its members. As neoliberal institutionalism suggests, NATO is a forum for discussion and collective security provider for its members, a mechanism for transition to democratic rule for ex-communist states, and a military-to-military

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[6] Charles B.Hagan, "Geopolitics", *The Journal of Politics*, (Harvard University, Cambridge, 1942), p.484.

[7] B.McCalla, *op.cit.,* p.451.

cooperation theatre[8]. It offers opportunities to its members and affiliates to bear their flags for providing security around the globe, which can be too difficult to realize with their autonomous assets. Empowering one another, member nations have continued and will continue to invest in the Alliance, so long as they benefit from it. Therefore, the advantage allocation feature of the Alliance should be taken into consideration as an important asset for evaluating its functionality.

As a result of the common identity, as democratic, liberal country club, and the common security understanding (established by the superpower), no other organization in place of the existing one has been ever evoked until 1990's.

Especially after the transformation began, NATO has become a great tool for each group of its members. For great and middle nations, it is a platform for bandwagoning for status and prestige. As a result of its intra-alliance functions, NATO impedes its members to be engaged in conflicts over misperception and misunderstanding[9]. Turkish-Greek relations, which have been prone to be detoriated and inflicted to a conflict as a result of almost a century long unsettlements have remained in diplomatic framework and constituted a good example of pacifying role of this function. The quasi-transparency and the veto right assures the legitimacy of NATO actions, as well as enhancement of the relations between its members.

For small nations, NATO is a security provider for those who cannot afford for it. NATO prevents conflicts in instable regions by actively engaging other nations with the alliance, through membership or partnerships. These countries know that they do not have to counter a likely external threat by their own. They guarantee their survival via placing themselves on the winning side.

Alliance serves as a forum for small or middle nations to show off in the most effective political and military arena of international community. It is also beneficial for great powers in terms of influencing leaders in various levels of other nations.

Those functions, providing more effectiveness and efficiency to the members through transformation are due some driving factors, which will be analyzed

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[8] Osvaldo Croci and Amy Verdun, <u>The Transatlantic Divide: Foreign and Security Policies in the Atlantic Alliance from Kosovo to Iraq,</u> (Manchester University, Manchester, 2006), p.25.

[9] John S.Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War", *Political Science Quarterly*, 109:5 (Winter, 1994-1995), p.774.

hereafter shortly and in-depth at following chapters in order to see the intra-state/organization relation millieu on which NATO is.

That the transformation of NATO in great scale occurred at a time when many scholars and international relations specialists thought that its functions became obsolete is the most significantly stimulating factor for the selection of this subject.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to search the main drivers of this transformation. Through demonstration of factors of change, I intend to draw a conclusion over what the future role and nature of NATO would be, and how it would continue to serve to the interests of the actors concerned. It should be noted that all factors of transformation are in fact also role of the actors of change. Actors in NATO can be divided into four categories: the US as the leading nation, the EU members pursuing a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the new members, and potential trouble makers of the Alliance, France and Turkey. Among these groups, the first two actors of change are the two main bodies of the Alliance, the US and the EU. The effect of the latter two actors on transformation has either little or negative. The third (f)actor is about their adversary, the threats. The position of Russia will be touched upon hereafter. The thesis is designed to answer two questions of NATO transformation: why and how.

In order to search *why* NATO has transformed, the chapters two, three and four of this thesis are devoted to three main drivers of NATO transformation. While the second chapter presents the implications of the existing world order in general and on NATO in particular within which the role of the US will be elaborated, the third chapter will focus on the NATO-EU relations in which the Turkish-Greek imbroglio within the European Security and Defense Architecture, and the burden-sharing issue will be assessed. The chapter four will address the existing and possible future security milieu.

As stated, the first factor is about the role of the engine of this mechanism, the US and its unipolar role. No one can deny that organizational culture within NATO is based vastly on American model, and fuel of this organization is supplied by American lion share of burden. In this sense, American risk and threat analyses,

defense priorities rank inevitably first at the agenda of NATO. In most cases, the whole rhetoric of debates in NATO meetings is drawn by the Americans.

The degree of how the US is influential in security matters of Europe is unquestionable, though mostly achieved by means of NATO. The US stick of not having NATO in its interests has also been a conditioning factor on decisions of the other NATO members including the great powers. At the end of 1980's, it was conceivable to presume that the American made integrated transatlantic relations would not be easily erased, and no one has been at a point to say that the Americans should "just pick up and leave"[10]. But, in one year, with the end of the Cold War, the threat perception, the relations between the actors and their roles have changed dramatically. The change in US priorities had great impact on theatre. The number of US troops in Europe has declined from a bulk of around 325,000 troops in 1990 to around 100,000 troops in 1996-97. The US intention is to lessen the number to 50,000 troops in future[11].

Besides addressing new threats, the US actively projects stability[12] within its sphere of influence, and prevents other countries from being drawn into conflicts[13]. Historical determinism in Marxist terminology reveals the fact that a major war in Europe can easily draw US back in stage. It should be kept in mind that it was the US that kept the alliance together vis-à-vis new threats assuming an unequal burden sharing. Nevertheless, the integrated command structure remains under American command thanks to this inequality without serious challenge. Yet, the leadership role of the US has never been put in question, but from time to time challenged by some European nations, especially by France. One of the reasons for assumption of this role is about functions of the US in Europe.

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[10] Stanley Kober, "Can NATO Survive?", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 59:3, (Summer, 1983), p.340.

[11] Frank R.Douglass, The United States, NATO and a New Multilateral Relationship, (Praeger, Westport, 2008), p.2.

[12] Duffield, *op.cit.,* p.768.

[13] *Idem,* p.769.

In this sense, unipolarity helped the US to make use of every security related international organization and non-governmental organization (NGO) adopting Western values, via controlling under NATO in pursuing its world-wide objectives. The new NATO adopting a Comprehensive Approach is the most significant sign of it. With Comprehensive Approach, NATO plans to build up mechanisms for information and intelligence sharing, tasking private military companies, NGOs or governmental organizations for overall coordination for the conduct of operations including stability and reconstruction works. The US, also, works closely with the EU, the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as like-minded countries such as, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore in NATO operations. Other NATO members have found the Alliance in their interests to keep the Alliance together (and not try to counterbalance the US military might). Most national concessions have been given to be rewarded by the US.

Of all these stakeholders, the EU is the most important partner of the US, providing, foremost, the transatlantic link to the continent. Most of these staketaking and influence building of the EU and the US is based on two major characteristics of liberalism, interdependency and rivalry within internationalism. "Complementing" and "competing" have been the debate over who should lead the security matters in Europe, either the US as it has been since World War II, or the Europeans themselves.

So, the second driving factor for NATO transformation is the nature of NATO-EU relations.

With the inclusion of ex-communist states to the Alliance and to the Union, the European efforts focused on establishing their own security and defense mechanism, constituting their share of bargain, as well as one of the most important issues that Europeans have not agreed on a common base, the CSDP. The security dilemma resided with the European resentment of American dominance and the inability of the EU (Western European Union-WEU) to fully respond to the security needs of Europe, attempts for autonomous in or out of area crisis management operations or peacekeeping/peacemaking operations with or without NATO, and the French experience are due consideration in clarification of the shape of relations of

European countries with the US, which implies the French military disengagement via Gaullist approach from the NATO[14], and NATO's evolvement over a US-Germany axis, supported by the UK. In the end, Europeans, though developing the functions of security pillar of the EU, have remained aloof from delinking the US from security matters of Europe, because, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) "cannot replace NATO", and Europe cannot be a rival to the US as a result of its inferiority in military and economic terms[15]. Today, overall belief in both sides concerning the European pillar of security is that it would "only be helpful if it supports the Atlantic bridge.[16]"

The change of the nature of the threat posed against the Alliance, and the development and the role of the US-European relationship, and foreign policy of the US, as the founder and the big financer of the Alliance, are as much important factors as the development of ESDP on determining the role of NATO.

The last prominent factor of NATO transformation can be found on what today's and future strategic environment are. Among the actors that are effective on NATO's engagements, despite their considerable contributions to the security of Europe, the OSCE and the UN are not included in this thesis, since they do not possess the visible military and organizational capability, and thus do not fall within the scope of our efforts on clarifying the *major* determinants of NATO transformation.

Also, whether Russia should still be within the framework of an analysis of security milieu in Europe has to be clarified.

Until 1980's we still see that Soviet domination of Europe has the priority on threat assessment of the Americans[17] and NATO of which the policy remains in

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[14] Frédéric Bozo, <u>Two Strategies for Europe, De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance,</u> (Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2001), p.167.

[15] Hüseyin Bağcı, <u>Zeitgeist, Global Politics and Turkey</u>, (Orion, Ankara, 2008), p.183.

[16] Giovanni Baldi, "NATO and European Security, NATO's Strategy: The New Challenge", in A.Th.Symeonides (Ed.), <u>European Security in the '90s</u>, (Fopse, Athens, 1990), p.136-137.

[17] Kober, <u>*op.cit.*</u> p.345.

deterrence[18]. At that time, the Alliance saw no need to change this strategy[19], and believes that Soviet capabilities were growing more than those of the Alliance[20], even at its peak[21].

In a decade and later, even though the Soviet threat has lost its priority on the threat list of NATO, it, yet, continued to be the only country having a big nuclear arsenal, and to have a capability to threaten its surroundings (as we have seen during the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008). Almost half of the world was scared when Russia cut gas supply to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 winters implying that Russia is capable of controlling the flow of vital sources particularly to Europe. Also Russian energy deals with Central Asian and South Caucasian countries controlling most of the natural gas and oil market has raised serious doubts on both Europeans and NATO. Consequently, the Russian threat appeared to be not totally disappeared; but only its form changed. In geopolitical terms, the Russian sphere of influence shrank, but its *marge de manoeuvre,* organizational slack expanded in economical terms. As to its sphere of influence, Russia lost some grounds and had to leave some of those regions that were once under Russian control mostly to NATO and the EU. Its fierce objection of including Ukraine and Georgia to the Membership Action Plan (MAP) of NATO, and its coercive actions against these countries certainly defines the boundaries of Western sphere of influence on Eastern Europe (west for Russia) and southern Caucasus.

Russia may not be the top priority military threat to Europe and the US, but its power of balancing around its periphery is unquestionable. In this sense, collective security provision of NATO had to remain unchanged and unchallenged within the Alliance.

In former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's words, "You don't cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on

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[18] Baldi, *op.cit.*, p.128.

[19] *Idem,* p.129.

[20] *Idem,* p.130.

[21] Robert Grey, Jr., "NATO and European Security, Burdensharing: The American View" in A.Th.Symeonides (Ed.), European Security in the '90s, (Fopse, Athens, 1990), p.141.

your street in the last 12 months![22]" Russia is still the "other" for Western camp. If one day, the skepticism of the Europeans comes true, it would be too late to form an alliance that has a full operational capability. Thus NATO, *per se,* continues to provide strategic counter-balance to Russian military power.

On the other hand, if Russia were still the main source of concern for the Europeans, the only change in NATO's role since World War II would have been that Germany has become no longer a security consumer country, but a producer one. In this thesis, Russian threat will be considered as an important reason for the Alliance to keep the "collective security and territorial integrity of the allied nations" principle alive, but nothing more on touching the transformation of the Alliance, and therefore will be off the scope of our analysis but the other emerging threats ranking first on risk perception of Allied nations. Hence, having defined Russia as a limiting factor of transformation, not a stimulating one, we will focus in Chapter four on the new threats and the NATO strategies documents setting the vision and missions of the Alliance.

The dichotomy of NATO Strategies between 1990 and 1991 represents both the Alliance's inability to foresee the events, and its ability to accommodate itself to the new challenges. New threats as the outcome of instabilities of a transforming world, such as ethnic clashes (as we have witnessed in Former Yugoslavia) terrorism, human trafficking, and narcotics production and trafficking have proved (strikingly after the September 11, 2001 assaults and the stability operations in Afghanistan) that there has been a lot to do for the Alliance. Concerning the present security environment, since the end of the Cold War, the new world structure allowed leading countries to be concentrated on forthcoming security challenges as proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), defense against terrorism, organized crime, ethnic and religious conflict, smuggling (weapons, drugs, people), illegal migration, and shortage of natural resources. Such an approach demanded fundamental reform on national structures, new relations between power blocs, and international organizations, especially NATO. The motif of transformation, being the

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[22] *US News and World Report*, 9 July 1991, 31. in Robert B.McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organisation*, 50:3, (Summer, 1996), p.455.

new threat perception, in other words the security environment from 90's onward and the future assumptions cannot be separated from agenda of the transformation.

Via investigating these three factors, we will be able to better see why NATO transformed itself from a regional security organization of which the boundaries, functions, and functional procedures have been stagnant for about fifty years to an expeditionary, enlarging, and cooperating one. At the body of analyses, what made NATO decision makers to opt for assuming global responsibilities will be researched, because the ends of the alliances are very much related to what benefits its members receive from the outsets of the Alliance.

In chapter five, I will bring forward a synthesis of specific areas of transformation to answer *how* NATO transformed itself. In this chapter, I will discuss the change in NATO in political and military areas, of which the former will be categorized into functional, geographical, and institutional areas.

In this context, the functional change has been achieved through the adoption of new tasks in addition to Article V missions. The most important reason for such decision is due lessons learned from NATO's direct response to the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These operations revealed moral effects on decision makers, as NATO is the only capable politico-military international organization that can enforce and support peace and stability in Europe and elsewhere in the world. This new function of NATO has become an instrument as effective as the traditional collective security of NATO. Wolfgan Schussel, Austrian Federal Chancellor explains the degree of benefit of this functional change as, "None of us would ever have had the chance to discuss the new NATO and the new Europe if the "old NATO" had not worked the way it did! This is simple truth that no European should ever forget"[23].

The geographic transformation is due enlargement forged through Membership, MAP, Intensified Dialogue, Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and NATO's relations with Ukraine

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[23] Wolfgang Schussel, "Europe's Security and the New NATO" in Wesley Clark and Roger Weissinger, Security Challenges of the New NATO, (Baylon, Strategic Decision Pres, California, 1998), p.55.

and Russia. Also, the troop contributions of like-minded non-NATO countries are not negligible actions showing the degree of cooperation that NATO reached.

The institutional transformation brings a new approach to relations with other actors in order to cooperate with and benefit from the civilian assets and capabilities of the other international and NGOs.

The thesis concludes with chapter six, focusing on future tendencies of four camps within NATO: the US, the EU members pursuing a Common European Defense and Security Policy, new members who cannot be militarily integrated into the Alliance, and states potentially cause procedural complication in the decision making mechanism, France and Turkey. Also, possible future role of NATO will be assessed.

Through the body of work, the theoretical assumption includes that we are passing through a semi-hierarchical post-polar world, where 1+X formula (one superpower, the US + 4 or 5 grand powers) balance is present.

The hypotheses in the thesis are supported by the major NATO summits declarations, press releases of ministerial meetings, and the EU communiqués to have an insight of the way the transformation is carried out on the ground.

The thesis will conclude with possible future role of NATO.

CHAPTER 2

THE WORLD ORDER AND THE ROLE OF THE US

At the dawn of 1990's, after about half a century long assumption of European Defense Structure under tutelage of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the core of the world has found itself in the midst of dramatic transition. Half of the European security structure would never again be described statically over Soviet hegemony as a result of its loss of power in the East Central Europe. At the structural level, since the fall of Berlin Wall in 9 November 1989, Russia has no longer been considered as a superpower. The ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, instable security environment in ex-Soviet republics in the South Caucasus and the Central Asia, and religious-ideological dissidence against the Western policies more powerfully emerging in some parts of the Middle East gave new facets to the understanding of security of Europe from a view of territorially limited defense to an uncertainty on what the new roles and responsibilities of nations are.

Many International Relations theorists and scholars have put forward formulations for such a complex international structure. A number of theories have offered descriptions of new world (dis)order. Despite most of them remained unrealistic, they drew a great attention in international relations arena. Some configurations of interstate society in the Post-Cold War period include the descriptions as: "the new paradigm of Empire"[24], " monopoly of the core" [25], "hegemonic project of transnational capitalist class" [26], "geopolitical identities in flux

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[24] Stanley Aronowitz, "The New World Order", in <u>Debating Empire</u>, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, (Verso, London, 2003), p.19-20.

[25] Samir Amin, <u>Beyond US Hegemony,</u> (Zed Books, London, 2006), p.3.

[26] William I.Robinson, "Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony", *Critical Review of International School and Political Philosophy,* 8:4, (December 2005), p.1-11.

in which there is no hegemonic understanding of the world order"[27], "US imperial dominance with little or no competition"[28] , "neoimperialist project designed through development"[29] (restoration of world economic order, decolonization, foreign aid programme, defeat of socialism); "globalization"[30](designation of neoliberal capitalist development and a global economy, and economy of free trade and free movement of capital where private sector is the driving force), "deterritorialization of world politics/end of history"[31]. Of all the arguments, the common ground agreed concerning our subject is that NATO has been a very important tool for the unipolar role of the US.

In order not to get lost in the intellectual confusion over the nature of post-Cold War world and the aims of American foreign policy[32], we will stick to the analysis of Buzan of the structure of international relations[33], which best fits to the assumptions of this thesis.

Accordingly, despite the deterritorializing effect of globalism, states continue to be major units acting within a set of structure. There exists a tripartite classification of interplay between the states; superpowers, great powers, regional powers, middle powers and small powers. The groupings of the states are determined mainly with respect to their material capabilities, because, state behavior "is largely shaped by the *material* structure of the international system" and "the distribution of

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[27] Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualizing the Human Security Agenda", *Institute of International Relations,* The University of British Columbia, Working Paper, No.30, (April 2000), p.1.

[28] John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning the World Politics, (Routledge, London, 2003), p.115.

[29] Henry Veltmeyer, Globalisation and Antiglobalisation, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hants, 2004), p.1-2.

[30] *Idem*, p.3-4.

[31] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *Reader,* (1989), p.114.

[32] William G.Hyland, "Is NATO Still Relevant?" in Clay Clemens, NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security, (Macmillan, Hampshire, 1997), p.157.

[33] Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004), p.66.

material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.[34]" according to Mearsheimer.

For the moment, "only the US fills the rank of being the sole superpower, because the US;

- Possesses broad spectrum of capabilities,
- Exercises across the whole of the international system,
- Possesses the best military and political capabilities,
- Assumes the responsibility of securitization and can exercise desecuritization on a legitimate base founded by the very universal values it defends."[35]

As to Brzezinski, American supremacy has managed to institutionalize the new world order it produced. The American system comprises;

- A collective security system (like NATO),
- Regional economic cooperation (like NAFTA) and relative institutions (like the World Bank, IMF, WTO),
- Consensual decision making procedures,
- Democratic membership within key alliances,
- A rudimentary global constitutional and judicial structure (A World Court).[36]

As to the means, the US has the most capable military in the world – its military spending is nearly 50 percent of the world total, and it is six times bigger than its nearest competitor, the United Kingdom (UK). It also has the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world with an estimated 2008 GDP of US\$ 14.3 trillion (23% of the world total based on nominal GDP and almost 21% at purchasing power parity)[37].

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[34] Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security In the Twenty-First Century, (Routledge, New York, 2007), p 172.

[35] Ibid., p.69.

[36] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (Basic Books, New York, 1997), p.28-29.

[37] "World Economic Outlook Database", International Monetary Fund (October 2008), retrieved on 03 January 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx.

The main public document describing the US' military doctrine, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the US Department of Defense, gives predictions, including the assessments that there will be no ideological competitor to democracy, no rival coalition of states to challenge the US militarily, no conventional military peer competitor beyond its immediate region (even a Russia-China-led alliance will not match US power projection capability). It is also accepted that the US will retain control of the seas and air.[38] Thus, the US is considered as the leading state in the unipolar system, capable of affecting totality of world politics. The implications of such power on the globe should be addressed to understand the limits of the politics.

As the US is not directly affected by the geopolitical constraints among the great powers, it can be "selective in what it does and can afford not to act immediately when faced with emerging threats to international order[39]". In fact, the US decision makers had searched for *isolationism* in every major global security problem from the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine to the beginning of the First World War, from time to time; it pursued the role of a *power balancer* through politics of *selective engagement*[40]. The American isolationism reappeared with the disarmament efforts of 1920s and 1930s to restrict the growth of naval tonnage with the 1927 Geneva conference to entirely outlaw the war, and with the Briand-Kellogg pact, yet all failed to prevent the outbreak of another great war. The *neo-isolationism* failed in Bosnian war which had been considered as European problem[41].

Whatever approach either internationalist, even the Wilsonist policies (globalism, international institutionalism, multilateralism) or isolationist (rejecting treaties as a threat to US sovereignty, refuse to support institutions, allow foreign wars, arousing Russophobia and treating China like enemy number one, rely solely

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[38] Sam J.Tangredi, "The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View" in Paul J.Bolt, Damon V.Coletta, Collins G.Shackelford, Jr., <u>American Defense Policy,</u> (The John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, 2005), p.48-53.

[39] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p79.

[40] Barry R.Posen and Andrew L.Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy", *International Security,* 21:3, (Winter, 1996-1997), p.19.

[41] *Idem.*, p.14.

on military defense to protect US security, a survivalist foreign policy[42]), is adopted, the main axis of US strategic interests have been resided outside of the territory of the US, either in Europe or in Eurasia. The fundamental cornerstone of the American Foreign Policy is implementing either a realpolitik of *Bismarck*, or global moral *Gladstone* foreign policy, should the occasion arise to maximize its power, to keep partners under control via alliances, to eliminate the emerging counter alliances or coalitions of alliances through diplomacy or by force if necessary, and to enlarge its dominance with international institutions, organizations, or international relations system of law, finance, and economy that it has built up itself.[43]

The US "traditional" security policy is not constant and such changes can be even observed from one administration to another. During the Cold War, the U.S. foreign policy was essentially built on one strategy: containment of the Soviet Union. Later on, while Clinton administration designed a grand strategy that bolstered the globalization and full integration of the US to security matters of Europe, the main idea on security matters was on ensuring a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe as a whole. NATO has become the major tool for such an aim[44].

The US did not want to isolate itself after the Cold War, moreover, it pursued to declare its supremacy in an environment where there is no robust enemy[45]. In order to increase its influence through increasing number of partners, the US utilized NATO so that it can reach territories beyond Europe and control the key areas for confronting, limiting or preventing the rise of Asian powers and turning into new hegemons.

In order to adapt itself to the new security environment and its prerequisites, the US forces has largely focused on transformation. The lessons learned from crisis management operations, the two Gulf Wars, and operations in Afghanistan have been the impulsive for the transformation, which was carried out by the US Joint Forces

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[42] James E.Goodby, Petrus Buwalda, Dmitri Trenin, A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community, (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 2002), p 105.

[43] Henry Kissinger, Diplomasi, (T.İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 2000), p.694-695.

[44] Goodby, Buwalda, Trenin, *op.cit.*, p 94.

[45] Çağrı ERHAN, "60.Yılında NATO", Türkiye Gazetesi, 03 Şubat 2009.

Command[46]. The US also has pushed forward for upgrading allied forces in Europe and "to strengthen alliance-wide interoperability" [47] together with the transformation of US forces. Unlike the European understanding of preemption which means "diplomatic and economic pressure, the exercise of soft power", the US uses the term for "deployment of military force, unilaterally if need be, or through a coalition of the willing, if possible"[48]. Adrian Hyde-Price considers NATO as "a useful vehicle for US influence in Europe and a military and diplomatic toolbox for coalitions of the willing"[49].

The lessons learned from the conflicts in Balkans and in Iraq led the US decisions makers to opt for *primacy and preemptive action[50]*. The George W.Bush's report on *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* released on 17 September 2002 "sets the legal basis for preemption"[51]. It lays the necessary preparation of other states to see the US *acting alone* if necessary, yielding an assertive and ambitious grand strategy, the strategy of *primacy.*

Not only the material capabilities, but also the natural systemic requirement of the international structure drew the US to be the major player of the international community. The 9/11 events simply showed that it was impossible for a superpower to enjoy *neither isolationism, nor selective engagement* in an environment where both security concerns have also been globalized. In Bush Doctrine, preventive war is considered both a "political response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and consistent with" what has become "*the tradition* (emphasize added)" "of US

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[46] Official website of USJFCOM, available at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/what.html, retrieved on 30 January 2009.

[47] Richard L.Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, "Choosing A Strategy", in Paul J.Bolt, Damon V.Coletta, Collins G.Shackelford, Jr., American Defense Policy, (The John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, 2005), p.222.

[48] Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P.Herd, Divided West, (Chatham House, London, 2006), p.7.

[49] Hyde-Price, *op.cit,* p.89.

[50] The National Security Strategy of the USA 2006, Item III.

[51] John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation" in Paul J.Bolt, Damon V.Coletta, Collins G.Shackelford, Jr., American Defense Policy, (The John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, 2005), p.38.

interventionism"[52]. For, superpower's ability to convince states to be in confrontation with the adversaries does not fall on Wilsonist principles for internationalism, but interest based.

On the other hand, the Bush administration's grand strategy was more concentrated on Asia, given the new security environment. These two steps helped NATO stay relevant, and enlarged. From Clinton administration's self limitation policy of NATO to Bush Administration's maximalist approach to NATO enlargement, the Alliance had an open support from the US for its new role, transforming "from a tightly linked" territorially limited defense organization to "a more loosely structured" collective security organization[53] in global scale.

Also, the US expansion of influence into regions of strategic importance involves a milieu shaping designed to spread values and practices. It forces "all countries to choose either balancing against or bandwagon with the USA.[54]"

Militarily, the US aims to have full spectrum dominance via pre-eminence in all categories of the armed conflict "from strategic nuclear deterrence to high-intensity mechanized warfare[55]". The US added new bases in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to its existing 725 (as of September 2001) military bases outside the US[56]. This military power is supported by US type soft power. American form of soft government is attractive and wanted to reshape the other societies along the same lines. This is necessary for a relatively overweighing dominance so as to the choices of the superpower could have the priority over the preferences of other states. The other non-military measures that US

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[52] Chris J.Dolan, <u>In War We Trust</u>, (Ashgate, Hampshire, 2005), p.9.

[53] Goodby, Buwalda, Trenin, *op.cit.*, p 97.

[54] Hyde-Price, *op.cit,* p.82.

[55] *Idem,* p76.

[56] Chalmers Johnson, <u>The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic</u>, (Metropolitan Books, New York, 2004), p.4.

use for milieu shaping are "international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements".[57]

However, its ability in exercising a free ride and providing international stability is not unlimited. It can provide stability to those under its protection in limited terms. When a state engages itself in maximizing its own interests and demands the protection of the superpower, no one can guarantee that the interests of the particular state and that of the superpower will be compatible, either. As the superpower seeks to maximize its power as well as its security, it will not respond to all security needs of its allies. In most cases, the US would prefer to be punishing rather than protective.

How does the US conduct its relations with the rest of the world? How does the US see others in security matters? Certainly superpower assessment of the security issues is not the same as other nations. The US type of security understanding is way different from its counterparts' perception, for instance from that of Russia. The US considers NATO expansion and anti-missile defense shield as expanding the zone of peace among the democratic countries. Yet, Russians see same acts as traditional power politics against themselves to have supremacy on ballistics. The language used by the US, although it is deceptive, is vague, assertive and does not limit itself territorially. However, the Russian say is certain, defensive and limited to its own territory. Obviously, "material facts and ideational motivations are not identical" [58], which makes Russia a great power, and not an equal adversary to the US.

As to the great powers, they are less capable than superpowers. They possess clear political, military and economic potential expecting to achieve a prospective superpower status. They consider themselves above the regional powers at the system-level calculations. Great powers balances are most likely to be regional rather than global[59] as they are only capable of giving attention to security needs of their larger peripheries. The "changing nature of security, threats, the duality of

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[57] Thomas S.Mowle And; David H.Sacko, "Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28:3, (2007), p.607

[58] Goodby, Buwalda, Trenin, *op.cit.*, p.102.

[59] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.* p.81.

globalization, and identity-based fragmentation, and failed and failing states[60]" are not always in the interest of great powers, but systemic dynamics of geopolitical transition[61]. After the Cold War, this rank was held by Britain/France/Germany – the EU, Japan, China and Russia.[62]

Among four great powers, three states (China, Japan and Russia) are in Asia, and obtain vast territories and large populations. Their growth trend is upwards and their close proximity to regional powers and energy sources give them a comparative economic advantage. However, despite their various differences[63], the US and the EU possess the privilege of historical and political alignment of most of these countries (except Russia).

Regional powers, define the polarity of any given security complex"[64], being small centers of attraction, like India and Pakistan in South Asia; Iran and Turkey in the Gulf and Asia Minor; Egypt and Israel in the Middle East; South Africa in Africa, and Argentina and Brazil and Mexico in Latin America. Regional powers are important actors in superpower – great power security interplay.

Middle power status is attributed to states like Canada, Sweden, Australia, which "regularly play international roles well beyond their home regions"[65].

Small states are mainly concerned with their survival. They focus mostly on their borders. Their limitation or opposition to the global ambitions of the hegemon will be implausible.

This classification is based on the assumptions that there exists a hierarchy among groups of states. Such structure is bound to an inter-group order. The maintenance of the order is not only provided by the hegemon, but the recognition of the hierarchy of states by prominent actors in the international community. As the

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[60] Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 90:1, (2000), p.168-169.

[61] Bruce W. Jentleson, "America's Global Role After Bush", *Survival*, 49:3, (Autumn 2007), p.195.

[62] Buzan, *op.cit.,* p.70.

[63] Forsberg and Herd, *op.cit.,* p.4.

[64] Buzan, *op.cit.,* p.70.

[65] *Idem*, p.71-72.

hegemon imposes the rule sets, it will benefit more than the others, since it has relatively more advantageous, more innovative, more competitive industry. And most of the time, the industries of the other countries are shaped by the demand of the hegemon. In this case, the hegemon would support the institutional infrastructure it established so long as it is in its interest in order to enjoy the disproportionate benefit of it.

In addition to the rules and behaviors set by the hegemon, the hegemon is free to choose to abide by them itself. It has the opportunity of being selective in its engagements. For example, Bush administration, while advocating democracy and human rights in Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia (ex-communist states), it might not be critical on these values in Chad, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia (states with geostrategic importance).[66]

Unipolarity is the collective understanding of allied decision-makers regarding the nature of the post-Cold War World. This has been felt even stronger when the capabilities of the EU were proved to be inefficient once again in Afghanistan after ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Germany, France, and naturally the UK assumed roles prone to those of the US, building good contact with the Bush administration. The Western institutions, which execute west-centric policies on the globe, and "the rest" continue to define the semi-hierarchical post-polar world.

As a result of rise of Asia, hierarchy will get soften among allies and linger in non-allies. The more hierarchy gets loose, the more anarchy becomes inevitably the ordering principle of the international system. Asian model appears to be threatening for western system. States in Asian model are so apt to set their security on a judicial and security mechanism that set people so ready to devote themselves for their countries. This constituted the balance between the two actors: the rule set of social and political altruistic behaviors[67] of such countries against the rule set of creating indifferent customers of global forces. It could be either called as the clash of

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[66] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p174.

[67] Auguste A. Comte, Système de Politique Positive, Vol.1, "introduction fondamentale", chapitre 3, *Introduction Directe, Naturellement Synthetique, Ou Biologic*, (1851-4), p.699-701.

civilizations[68], rivalry between politically, the West and the East; or, economically, the North and the South; or challenging point of views of the idealists against realists.

None of the above-mentioned assumptions reflect how durable is today's world order under the consequences of the capitalism's current crisis, better than a fierce defender of neoliberalism, Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama admits that of the two ideas spread by the US and helped it dominate the world, the capitalism, and the liberal democracy, former is off the rail, and the latter has long been devastated by the US unilateralism[69]. Adrian Hyde-Price, also acknowledges the global capabilities of the US, but surprisingly admits that the US is not and can neither be an empire nor a global hegemon, because of its geographical position, and is a hyperpower enjoying the "unipolar moment".[70]

How durable is such system? Also, the unipolarity, according to Kenneth Waltz "is the least durable international configuration[71]". Even those who define the US as an empire, they don't neglect that efforts of globalization just delayed the beginning of collapse."[72] Similarly, "A hegemony is a transient historical phase" wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski, accepting that "America's global dominance will fade."[73] For, it cannot be called as the "monopoly of the core" either, as there will be no "core" as a result of continental drift. Also, "relative power capabilities between the US and other great power are bound to change"[74], according to Adrian Hyde-Price.

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[68] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, 1968). "The author implies that the system of elite traditionalists should be destroyed in order to introduce a modern political system that will start development process."

[69] Francis Fukuyama, "The Fall of America, Inc.", *Newsweek, 13 October 2008.*

[70] Hyde-Price, *op.cit*, p.77.

[71] Kenneth N.Waltz, "Intimations of Multipolarity" in The New World Order, Contrasting Theories, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (Macmillan Press, New York, 2000), p.1.

[72] Johnson, *op.cit*, p.310.

[73] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, (Basic Books, New York, 2004), p. 213.

[74] Hyde-Price, *op.cit*, p.80.

What is the chance of reshaping the world with or without a major war? According to Buzan, 1 + 4 formula does not easily lead for coalition of some of the great powers against the superpower. The absence of a counter-balancing coalition can best be explained with "the deeply institutionalized role of the US in so many parts of the system and its residual universalist ideological assets"[75]. Such a coalition is assumed to promise more instability than a worldwide security. However other formulations rather than an anti-Western coalition should also be regarded possible and requires further analysis.

The point is who is going to shape or maintain the new world order for the sake of human's well-being. Kishore Mahbubani believes that the US has failed to be "the main custodian of this world order", and the other Western nations and Japan could not assume the responsibility when the US "slipped". Moreover, Asian powers emerged. Mahbubani argues that the West can no longer both "use its current domination of global institutions to preserve its own power", and "preserve the rules it established in the twentieth century"[76].

As we see today the footprints of the "post-internationalism[77], where security context would be determined over regional balanced multipolarity, what means the transformation of NATO for the global security?

Obviously, the regional balanced multipolarity[78] would dictate its own rules more apparently as much as the unipolar position of the US weaken. If the security commitments of the US vis-a-vis Europe diminish, decoupling is the first reaction to expect, unless Europe remains incapable of building the capacity of its twin institutions similarly created with those of NATO.

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[75] Buzan, *op.cit* , p.87.

[76] Kishore Mahbubani, "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System", *Survival,* 47:4, (Winter 2005–06), p.7

[77] Richard W.Mansbach, "The Making of 11 September and the Emerging Postinternational World", *Geopolitics*, 8:3, (2003), p.17

[78] Hyde-Price, *op.cit,* p82.

2.1. The Implications of Unipolarity on NATO

Three implications of this unipolar structure are particularly relevant to NATO. The first implication is that alliances are designed to and invested mostly in the interests of the leading states. Each state desires to benefit at least as much as it invests in the alliance.

In Kenneth Waltz's words "international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests"[79]. According to Adrian Hyde-Price, "By the mid-1990's, ..., it became apparent that NATO could serve a useful purpose within an American grand strategy aimed at maximizing US power and establishing its primacy in the international system.[80]" Kissinger argues that finding a diplomatic shortcut, instead of fighting is the best way to dominate a space. It avoids coalition of enemy.[81] The American foreign policy is designed to impede the counter alliances or coalitions of alliances that it may face, control the partners through organizations like NATO, and if possible, use them in parallel to its own policies, and to give members of the alliance no other chance than pursuing politics of implementing a realpolitik limited in all areas. This is how NATO serves to adapt moral and geopolitical aims of the US.[82]

NATO now serves mostly for the American interests by offering it new front bases in Central and East Europe and providing a "convenient 'toolbox' from which to assemble ad hoc US-led coalitions of the willing by facilitating joint training and multinational exercises that strengthen interoperability[83]". In such a mechanism with the easy formulation of the coalitions of the willing, the US enjoys the legitimacy of its out of area actions even when it is not provided by the UN.

NATO tool serves:

- Spreading values and practices to create a *pax Americana.*

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[79] Waltz, *op.cit.*, p.5.

[80] Hyde-Price, *op.cit*, p87.

[81] Kissinger, *op.cit,* p.641

[82] *Idem,* p.779.

[83] Hyde-Price, *op.cit*, p89.

- Enlarging its influence with outreach programmes (the more in the alliance, the more is controlled and aligned, thus the less is the coercion.)
- Spreading sphere of influence with out of area operations,

All requires capacity and capability building, thus transformation. McCalla argues, "One of the variable features of a regime is its institutionalization (the degree to which its norms and practices are formalized within a particular structure and process[84]". This feature is what sets NATO apart from other alliances[85].

The second implication is that weaker states have an incentive to bandwagon with the unipolar power, rather than balance against it.[86] Balancing is "opposing the stronger or more threatening side in a conflict…. Bandwagoning is… "joining the stronger coalition".[87] …A bandwagoning state may hope that it will win favours from the stronger state, and may fear that trying to block the stronger state will bring only punishment[88]. The bandwagoning is systemic. It is related to capabilities, intentions, and identity[89].

It is not NATO having an identity and spreading its liberal values to new member states through socialization, and interaction; it is the dominant power in the Alliance promoting liberal values and institutions, creating the underlying rules of the game, helping other members to commit themselves to these rules, making states aligned to those of it. Most strikingly "those rules are not part of the self

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[84] Stein 1983, 133; Keohane 1988, 174 in Robert B.McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organisation*, 50:3, (Summer, 1996), p.462.

[85] McCalla, *op.cit*, p.462.

[86] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit*, p.603

[87] *Idem.*, p.606

[88] *Idem.*, p.606

[89] Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, Mark Webber, "NATO's Tripple Challenge", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 76:3, "Europe:Where Does It Begin and End?" (July 2000), p.518.

understandings"[90] of bandwagoning countries. Mostly, these states are taught the interpretations of the situation and their normative understanding. Only through such learning process and international education, mutual identity and "reciprocal expectations"[91] that socialization of small states can be built.

Besides, nations who chose to become members of NATO not only sought a security guarantee against Russia, but also integration into the Euro Atlantic Community as it meant a substantial way of being inside the Club, which would help that particular state to have a rich institutionalized economic and social structure. The reason Turkey's and Greece's accession to NATO was not different from that of Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Spain or Germany. Their desire for receiving the protection of an Empire corresponded with the strategic interest of the Empire. What lie behind the macro-enlargement of NATO are the resources mobilized by the US "in the exercise of a subtle but persistent form of power."[92] The power is exercised in security matters through task allocation within NATO.

That direct US intervention or US-led NATO intervention in relatively small states or in conflicts among small states has only been realized with coalition forces does not necessarily mean that the superpower lacks military capabilities for unilateral action. According to Birthe Hansen, "the unipole attempts to commit other states managerial tasks in order to share responsibility" and in order to "spread costs", and "avoid free-riding"[93]. It is also a means of trying to influence American policy. In return, the US can offer rewards for cooperation: preferential treatment in military basing, direct president-to-president phone calls, invitations to the White House for granting the prestige of being a respected state.

The key issue is that NATO's objective is not limited to the classical Article 5 territorial defense concept, but "bringing together countries with similar values and

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[90] Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War, (Standord University Press, California, 2005), p.21.

[91] Idem.

[92] Idem., p.16.

[93] Birthe Hansen, "The Unipolar World Order and Its Dynamics", in The New World Order, Contrasting Theories, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (Macmillan Press, New York, 2000), p.118.

interests to combat global problems". NATO, today, does not need exclusively a transatlantic character. Other democratic countries are able to accede to NATO[94], via providing troops for flag bearing. Non-NATO, non-PfP contributors to the Iraq coalition have included Australia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Tonga[95]. The power of the US found easier recognition as a result of its role of influence by nations willing to be in social interaction[96] within NATO.

Third implication is that unipolar power has less interest in maintaining a tight alliance structure than a bipolar one does. It also aims to enlarge the number of value-bound states through various degrees of partnerships. Each degree creates another hierarchy and an incentive for ranking higher, where each promotion would require an increase in contribution. This includes why eligibility criteria of NATO for candidates depended largely on normative performance (e.g. market reform, protection of national minorities, human rights). Adoption of liberal democratic values had to be internalized as universally valid set of rules[97].

Instead of letting NATO disappear, the US administration opened the Alliance to new members, "extending US influence into Russia's former sphere of influence, and re-orienting the strategic rationale of NATO away from Article V security guarantees towards non-article V "crisis response operations", ensuring allied participation in US-led and directed military crisis management."…"Nonetheless, NATO has served to strengthen US influence in Europe, and has provided a useful diplomatic and military adjunct to American combat operations in Afghanistan[98]" through Comprehensive Approach. With the inclusion of the new members, Europe

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[94] Iva Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2006), p.4.

[95] Mowle, Sacko,*op.cit.*, p.606.

[96] Gheciu, *op.cit.*, p.16.

[97] *Idem.*, p.8.

[98] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p.87.

has become an effective logistical base for US forces in out of area operations[99]. Europe hosts almost half of the strategic US bases in the world[100].

The US support for a continuous enlargement of NATO served two purposes. It enforced US influence in Europe and helped US to gain some balance against the great powers in Europe, and against Russia. Between 1999 and 2004, 9 of 10 new member states to NATO are of ex-communist states. In fact, all states in the sphere of formal Soviet Union (including Russian Federation) have relations with NATO within the PfP Programme.

The new NATO members with the fear of "abandonment by their American protector" [101], gave full support and engaged actively in NATO. The inclusion of these countries in the EU added more support on US formulations of the ESDP. New EU members from Central and East Europe decreased the preponderance of "Europenisation", and increased the support for "Atlanticisation" especially in times when the US was highly suspicious about both the ESDI and the ESDP.

Via inclusion of new members to NATO that are prone to American protection, the US not only gained a relative balance against the "Europeanist" states within NATO, but also benefits substantially of the integration procedures within PfP. PfP both provides mechanisms of interoperability of equipment and troops through defense reforms of arms sales, education and training programs, and strengthens the legitimacy of US operations with troop contributions of Partners.

Moreover, the enlarged NATO "could serve as a "provider of services" for "coalitions of the willing", and it could serve as a "legitimizer" for such coalitions when they lack a UN mandate"[102].

Therefore, the role of NATO among gradually enlarging number of nations has been multiplied since the end of the Cold War, because NATO provides collective security, extends stability, manages the crises, provides services as planning

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[99] Douglas, *op.cit.*, p.2.

[100] *Idem.*, p.5.

[101] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p.88-89.

[102] Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees and Wayne C.Thompson, <u>Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations: The Challenge of Change</u>, (Manchester University Press, New York, 2004), p.74.

capabilities, intelligence, command and control, communications, and infrastructure[103]. In exchange, the hegemon gives greater attention to the preferences of cooperative allies. Such rewards would be easy to exclude from free-riders.[104]

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[103] *Idem.*, p.55.

[104] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.*, p.613

CHAPTER 3

NATURE OF NATO-EU RELATIONS

3.1. Historique of the Great Bargain from 1990 to 1999

NATO-EU strategic cooperation is a complex issue. There is a certain history behind this strategic cooperation. The premises upon which this partnership was founded needs to be underlined so that the implications of NATO-EU relations to NATO transformation can be fully comprehensible.[105]

During the Cold War, The WEU, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 served as a partially dormant European defense and security organization. NATO, then, had assumed the WEU's military tasks[106]. By the time we have witnessed the unification of the two Germany and emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe, the international bipolar system changed, so the cards had to be redistributed. The European nations reignited the flame for the development of a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) that has been sleeping since the establishment of the WEU, answering the calls of Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand for a Common Foreign and Security Policy[107]. The architectural debate had, then, restarted. The US, itself, had to reconsider where it would have to stand in the European Security Architecture.

On 06 July 1990, at the London declaration "On a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", it was confirmed that the East-West *modus vivendi* of the past 40 years

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[105] See NATO-EU Chronology provided at Appendix A for further information, also available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/chronology.html, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[106] Rob de Wijk, <u>NATO on the Brink of The New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus</u>, (Brassey's, London, 1997), p.6.

[107] Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, <u>NATO in the New European Order</u>, (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.16.

was transformed, so the Alliance had to transform itself[108]. At NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, together with the implications of the new security environment, it was declared that the ESDI had to have a "European security identity and defense role" within NATO[109]. The 1991 Strategic Concept of the Alliance reaffirmed that the development of a European security identity and defense role within the Alliance would be both beneficial for "the interests of the Europeans states" and "reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole"[110].

Despite the French-Belgian proposals of giving ESDI a more autonomous role[111], the US-Britain proposal had to be adopted that European security should be developed within NATO[112] due to inability of Europe to handle its security and defense requirements without US support. Thus, this bargain for reallocation of power on structural level included two elements: first, French-led *Europeanization* of security policy; second, Britain-led *Atlanticization* of security policy of Europe. Britain, here, has ensured that the ESDP is not pushed in an anti-Atlanticist position.

The CFSP was established on 07 February 1992 Maastricht Treaty of the EU as part of the three pillars of the Union[113]. Again in 1992, the EU assigned the WEU with the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking)[114].

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[108] London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participting in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990, Article 23, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[109] Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, issued by the Heads of State and Government participting in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Rome on 8 November 1991, Article 3, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[110] The Alliances New Strategic Concept, 8 November 1991, Para.2.

[111] Stuart Croft, "The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate", *European Security*, 9:3, (2000), p.6.

[112] *Idem.*, p.7.

[113] Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ maastricht_en.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[114] Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Ch.2 Article 4, available also at http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

The US, itself also, started to question European security initiatives that decouple American involvement. The main inquietude in the US administrations concerning the ESDP was that a stronger ESDP could undermine NATO and weaken the transatlantic link. Only with the Clinton administration, it was concluded that European integration was not a threat but complementary to American foreign policy[115]. The US clearly backed the development of a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance beginning in 1993, yet under certain conditions.

In January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit, ESDI was given full support and a shape in the form of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs)[116]. CJTF would be "a US-approved and NATO-sponsored" tool to control the development and direction of the ESDI[117]. It was also agreed that such development could be "separable but not separate" from the Alliance[118].

The European desire of creating an autonomous military structure, and its lack of necessary capacity had led to new bargains among the EU members and between the EU and the US, later on.

An agreement was reached at NATO's June 1996 Berlin and in December 1996 Brussels ministerial meetings[119]. New relations were formulated within these architectural debates. Berlin meeting reaffirmed to build the ESDI within NATO structures[120]. In Brussels, it was agreed to "satisfy" all Allies to finalize "all the necessary arrangements for the ESDI within NATO, which will allow for the preparation and conduct of WEU-led operations with the participation of all

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[115] De Wijk, *op.cit.*, p.12.

[116] Brussels Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting on the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 11 January 1994, Article 26, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt /b940111a.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[117] Paul Cornish, "European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 19944-)*, 72:4, (Oct. 1996), p.764.

[118] Brussels Declaration, 11 January 1994, *op.cit.*, Article 6.

[119] Robert E.Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor, (Rand, Santa Monica, 2002), p.21.

[120] Final Communiqué (M-NAC-1(96)63) of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, article 5.

European Allies if they were so to choose"[121]. Thus, the European pillar within NATO allowed the WEU to "borrow NATO assets and capabilities" [122] when the Alliance does not want to engage as a whole.

At the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 02 October 1997, the WEU was given an integral role by the EU of obtaining an independent defense capability. Possible integration of the WEU into the EU was also envisaged[123].

The US started to voice its concerns for autonomous EU actions as the British and French administrations agreed on a more autonomous European military capability with the St.Malo Summit in December 1998. In the Summit, the Europe was foreseen to develop a stronger defense capability independent of NATO. However, it remained to be complementing, not competing to NATO[124].

1999 NATO Washington Summit set the scene for enlargement of NATO with the participation of three new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), adoption of Open Door Policy, announcement of 1999 Strategic Concept, as well as enhancement and limits of the ESDI in response to 1998 St.Malo Summit[125].

In this view, the ESDI had to develop the way NATO Secretary General (1999-2003) Lord Robertson described with three "I"s: Improvement in capability, Indivisibility of security structures, and the Inclusiveness of all allies[126] or as

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[121] Final Communiqué (M-NAC-2(96)165) of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 December 1996, Article 2.

[122] Hunter, *op.cit.*, p.13.

[123] Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, Part One, Article j7, Amsterdam, 02 October 1997, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[124] Franco-British Summit on European Defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, Article 2, available at http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[125] The Washington Declaration, signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23-24 April 1999 released as NAC-S(99)63, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[126] NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One hundred Sixth

prescribed by the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright with three D's presented in 1999 Washington Summit, saying that such a development should avoid Duplication of existing NATO capabilities, the De-linking (or de-coupling) of European and NATO decision-making, and Discrimination against the non-EU European NATO allies. Despite the concerns, the increase in European military capacity is viewed positively by the US as it would make the alliance stronger, lift some of the increased burden as a result of continuous engagements in crisis off the US and create a partnership between the US and Europe[127].

At the European side, St.Malo Declaration of 4-5 December 1998 had brought France to a point to accept some Atlanticist provisions on NATO-EU relations in December 1999 Helsinki European Council, of which the key decisions were:

- To develop EU-led military operations in response to international crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged, avoiding unnecessary duplication and not implying the creation of a European army.
- To develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.
- To allow non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management[128].

It can be observed that each decision thereof corresponds to one of the 3 D's set (by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) in 1999 Washington Summit declaration announced eight months before the EU's Helsinki Summit. The first and second items presented here do not promise for an autonomous Security and Defense Identity, instead give an incentive for more concentrated military spending on expeditionary missions without creating a European Army which matches to "no Decoupling" and "no Duplication" clauses. The third item reiterates directly the "no Discrimination" clause of the 3 D's.

Congress, Second Session, March 9, 2000, p.6, retrieval from the statement of Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State.

[127] NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, March 9, 2000, *op.cit.*, p.3.

[128] Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Webber, *op.cit.*, p.505.

Helsinki Summit also facilitated the division of labor between NATO and the EU, allowing the EU to get involved in crisis management[129], again, only "when NATO as a whole is not involved".[130]

With 4 June 1999 Cologne Summit, functions of the WEU were set to be delegated to the EU in the area of the Petersberg tasks. (Yet, the different status of Member States with regard to collective defense guarantees would not be affected[131]). With the WEU Luxembourg declaration on 23 November 1999, the WEU as an organization have completed its purpose[132]. At the EU Council at Nice, the presidency confirmed the termination of functions of the WEU and transfer of crisis management tasks to the EU[133].

The European security restructuring has achieved important improvements in 1996-2000 spirit, such as;

- Establishing considerably large military capability targets,
- Transferring functions of the WEU to the EU,
- Launching autonomous military operations in Africa; and civilian missions at a large geography from Indonesia to Balkans, Moldova to Africa,[134]
- Attempting to build up a strategic headquarters (in Tervuren near Brussels) similar to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

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[129] Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, Article 25, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[130] F.Stephen Larrabee, "ESDP and NATO" in Lidija Čehulić (Ed.), NATO and New International Relations, (Atlantic Council of Croatia, Zagreb, 2004), p.47.

[131] Conclusions of the Presidency, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Appendix III, Item 5.

[132] Luxembourg declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, Luxembourg, 22-23 November 1999, Article 2, available at http://www.weu.int/documents/991122luxen.pdf, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[133] Nice European Council Meeting in Nice on 7-8-9 December 2000, Article V, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[134] See, Map of EU Missions provided at Appendix B.

The presidency at Nice also "created separate organs and mechanisms for the decision making and operations of the ESDP"[135]. These mechanisms were surprisingly similar to those of NATO. Table 1 below displays the duality of institutions of both organizations:

Table 1. Duplications of the EU with NATO:

NATO	EU*
Comprehensive Political Guidance	Long Term Vision
Defense Planning System	Capability Development Mechanism
NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU Battle Groups
NATO Agencies	European Defense Agency (EDA)
NATO Defense College	European Security and Defense College
NATO Satellite System (GPS)	EU Satellite System (Galileo)
Allied Movement Coordination Centre/SHAPE, Belgium	EU Movement Coordination Centre/Holland
Mediterranean Dialogue	Barcelona Process (Euromed Partnership)
NATO Support to AMIS/Darfur	EU Support to AMIS/Darfur

* Just like in NATO, the decision making mechanism in the EU is also carried out on a consensual basis.

During these developments in the European security and defense architecture, wars in Balkans, Gulf area, and Afghanistan has shaped the considerable role on transformation of these organizations. If the eventual intervention of NATO in Bosnia marked the inability of the UN to tackle such problems, the intervention of NATO in Kosovo was of a possible failure of the European forces, which did not have the necessary capacity.

The lessons learned from Kosovo events has led the EU in 1999 Helsinki Summit to take a decision of developing a Headline Goal to create a European Rapid

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[135] Ramazan Gözen, <u>Turkey's Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP,</u> (Atılım University, Ankara, March 2003), p.10.

Reaction Force with 60,000 troops by 2003 to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions[136] These 60,000 troops should be deployed within 60 days and sustain itself for up to a year. In May 2003, the force was declared operational. The EU had begun to take over military responsibility. In March 2003, the EU took over the Macedonian mission (Operation Concordia), which was completed on 15 December 2003. It has also provided police forces in Bosnia. EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) the largest civilian mission ever launched under ESDP with a staff of 3,000 man took over the task from NATO as of 4 December 2008. The Congo mission has also been carried out without the use of NATO assets[137].

NATO transformation led the organization to create a new security order. The EU, in this order, has built up "a more capable and effective security and defense policy as the European pillar of NATO's comprehensive security system"[138].

3.2. The NATO-EU Relations: a Subcontractor Role for the EU or a Less Hierarchical Coalition of Forces?

The academic discussion on the way transatlantic relations evolves are contradictory. Arguments are focused on different interests among the members of the Alliance as weakening and differentiating factors. The question is raised, especially with enlarging EU interest for ESDP missions, or, the other way around whether expansion of NATO's operations and membership undermine the EU's increasing global engagement?[139]

Some believed that the economic prominence of Europe remained inseparable from that of the US; Europe shared the same values that the US advocates among non-Western countries; the EU itself constituted a good example and pole in promotion and spread of Western values. The US stake on preserving peace and security in Europe is also significant. In addition to strong cultural and identical ties

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[136] Larrabee, *op.cit.*, p.36.

[137] *Idem.*, p.51.

[138] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.1.

[139] *Idem.*, p.6.

with the Europe, the US has had vital economic interests in the region as the Europe is the leading market for US firms[140].

But latest studies reveal a pessimistic approach as Europe's prominence in US defense policy was declining. In other words, Europe no longer occupies the central role in the US diplomacy and strategy[141] and is no longer the nexus of world politics. "Agreement on western values does not necessarily lead to agreement on policies at the global level", says Larsen.[142]

In Dassù and Menotti's analysis concerning Euro-Atlanticist vs. Euro-Gaullist division (for example, during the crisis over Iraq), European support to the US has declined, and support for a more independent ESDP has increased. [143] This division has also hampered common foreign policy objectives and appeared deliberately during the talks of Turkey's accession to the EU.

Kenneth Waltz finds the Union successful on achieving "a large measure of economic integration without a corresponding political unity". However, for him, concerning the foreign and military policy, the EU is incapable of disseminating a solid and common voice, which makes "bold or risky actions impossible". Although the Union has "all the tools – population, resources, technology and military capabilities – it lacks the organizational ability and the collective to use them.[144]

Despite its capabilities, Europe acts reluctantly when it comes to burden sharing for global problems where the US cannot tackle alone. Brzezinski considers this type of America's complaint as justified, since the collective GDP of the EU 15 is equivalent to that of America's. With a population of 375 million people (versus

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[140] Duffield, *op.cit.*, p.766.

[141] Ronald D.Asmus, "NATO's Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members" in Clay Clemens, NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security, (Macmillan, Hampshire, 1997), p.65.

[142] Henrik Larsen, "The EU's Role in the World", in The New World Order, Contrasting Theories, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (Macmillan Press, New York, 2000), p.235.

[143] Marta Dassù and Roberto Menotti, "Europe and America in the Age of Bush", *Survival*, 47:1, (Spring 2005), p.105–122.

[144] Waltz, *op.cit.*, p.3.

America's 280 million), Europe spends on defense somewhat less than half what America spends[145].

In realist terms, Europe has a subordinate position in the new institutional architecture. Its economic, strategic, and military relations are constructed by the US. The key institution serving an effective forum for discussion and tool for cooperative common action over other parts of the world is the NATO alliance. It should be noted that all NATO strategies conducted throughout its existence was drawn by the US. France, the most anti-atlanticist nation, capable of a considerable nuclear arsenal and autarkic in energy, had to establish a balance of power in Europe in a more institutionalized form than the UK formerly did as an "off-shore balancer" by mostly pursuing "perfect isolationism" in face of US influence in Europe. Yet, "both sides devoted considerable time, energy and resources to managing transatlantic relations and reducing the inevitable friction generated by anarchic international systems.[146]" Much of the EU actions are considered weak and bandwagoning in this view.

Recently, although the European leaders do not seem to like American policy, almost all of them supported it and made little attempts to raise their voices during both the Clinton and Bush administrations.[147] All NATO members gave support to the training mission in Iraq.[148] Even most of the support is symbolic; it has a significant understanding on the persuasion capability of the US.

Despite the growing unpopularity of the US, pro-atlanticists won the elections, in major European countries (except Spain – Jose Maria Aznar was defeated in 2004). Stronger figures appeared in Germany (Merkel) and France (Sarkozy) with a stress on a more capable, yet more cooperative ESDP. With the new German approach to the European security, the ESDP development had now "borders" different than Helmut Kohl politics. It is more focused on "problem-solving resources on concrete cases" and on refraining "from developing European visions

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[145] Brzezinski, The Choice, *op.cit.,* p. 89.

[146] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.,* p78.

[147] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.,* p.608

[148] *Idem.,* p.609.

broad in scope"[149]. In the Atlantic side, also, a compromise seems to be reached as the US no longer insists on two of the Madeleine Albright's 3 D's (no duplication and no discrimination) endorsed in 1999 NATO Washington Summit, which imply that the EU can only conduct crisis management if NATO chooses not to involve in, and that non-EU countries (Turkey, Norway and Iceland) would not be discriminated while the EU uses NATO's assets and capabilities.

The convergence between St.Petersberg tasks (humanitarian, peace keeping, crisis management and peace making) formulated in 1992 during a summit in Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, and Comprehensive Approach set at the Article 4 of the NATO Bucharest Summit declaration reveal the fact that much of the EU tasks in post-conflict reconstruction, policing, and mentoring complement rather than compete with NATO tasks. Larsen suggests that the EU develops a political Project and this Project, concerning the transatlantic relations, engenders the US fear of decoupling despite the common Western values. For him, "EU discourse promotes EU 'actorness', it also contributes to a politically multipolar world", hampering "'West'…being a unitary civilizational actor."[150] In this sense it can not be counted and discredited as bandwagon for the superpower.

In our views, whether the EU bandwagon or not cannot be judged through only looking at today's discussions giving estimations on the level of strength of the US, the relevancy of NATO and the EU's incapacity on certain assets. These day-to-day discussions are susceptible to temporary agendas that may seem to be final conclusions on given issue. We have to be deductive of the entirety of the picture of the past and present as well as of projections of tomorrow.

The figure below displays that if we continue to engage in de-linking the transatlantic relations today, it is because we don't face a mass threat to the whole of the Alliance.

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[149] Karl-Heinz Kamp and Carlo Masala, "The New German Foreign and Security Policy: More than a Change in Style", *Working Paper/Document, Brochure series published by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.*, No.166/2006, (Sankt Augustin/Berlin, December 2006), p.9.

[150] Larsen, *op.cit.*, p.235-236.

Figure 1. Relation Between the Degree of Solidarity and Intensity of Threat with Respect to US and EU Security Preoccuppations.

The frictions between the US and the EU's ways of handling the problems are due to differences on perceptions. Observations on discussions in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee over a reform on internal structures of NATO Headquarters for gaining efficiency on decision making reveal that the core EU nations continue to build international relations on the "balance of power" concept.

According to the 28th President of the US (1913-1921), Woodrow Wilson, the instability is created not by the absence of the balance of power, but by the will of search for it.[151] This concept is viewed by the US as anachronism. The US intends to establish a more flexible NATO, collaborating every like-minded State of organization, military or civilian actor, in combat against global threats. The EU security preoccupation increases parallel to the intensity of the threat, and search for US support is more apparent. In other words, the EU nations are closer to the US perspective when the threat is imminent. The example was set on September 11,

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[151] Kissinger, *op.cit.*, p.207.

2001 assaults of Al Qaida that the NAC, the highest decision making body of NATO, has initiated the first ever article V decision.

Especially, the Kosovo and Afghanistan experiences convinced the European policy makers to be more realistic on what they can do with the capability gap between the US and the EU. Taking more into consideration of decoupling concerns of the US, they came to the point of accepting the division of labour where Europe would concentrate mostly on civilian missions, and the US would focus on "high intensity combat operations.[152]" French position in St.Malo was not different than a pure desire for division of labor. Then, France had wanted to have a tiny little space to conduct EU-led out of area operations for extending its sphere of influence without a serious rivalry to the US. Today, the dilemma resides with today's operational requirements and capabilities that international organizations can offer. If hard power is necessary to open the door for an out of area operation, soft power is the ultimate requirement to clean the house, to provide stability, renovation, public diplomacy and reconstruction. Both types of operations are so tightly linked to each other that full cooperation is inevitable. It is not surprising to see that France, that had left the military wing of NATO in 1966, has, now, started to give strong messages on changing its policy since 1996, and aspires to assume a stronger responsibility within the Alliance. Because, the benefits offered by the superpower to the member states have increased with non article V out of area missions. What the EU needs to have is mostly the strategic lift, and intelligence gathering, processing and disseminating capacity, that only the US has within NATO[153]. It is still unlikely for the EU to increase its defense spending and build up military capacity it lacks without asking the help of NATO or the US[154].

The complexity of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan demonstrated once again how much the EU lags behind the NATO or the US capabilities to conduct such a full scale operation within "hard

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[152] Larrabee, *op.cit.*, p.53.

[153] Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Webber, *op.cit.*, p.514.

[154] *Idem.*, p.514.

power capabilities". However, it is also revealed how the US desperately needs EU's soft power capabilities within NATO.

It is not only the EU that lacks certain capabilities. The US also has to tackle with problems in theatre. These include that NATO can not raise the troops to support its mission in Afghanistan; there are national limits, called caveats on the deployment and mission types; most members ignore the US announcements for increasing the capabilities. Anyhow, it is the inner group of states of the EU that (is able to and) does give the hard power support asked for Afghanistan.

The value of European soft power is also indispensable for NATO. In today's security environment, where new threats such as global terrorism, cyber terrorism, WMD, ballistic missiles, as well as conventional warfare are present as risks to the nations, which are less visible but which require engagement in intercontinental areas, where the civilian European assets, and European missions have become more preferable.

"The EU, like the UN but unlike NATO, has at its disposal a wide array of civil assets essential in any nation-building operation[155]" says Dobbins. The EU has completed 9, and continues to perform 14 out of area operations/missions. The EU conducts operations/missions almost in all areas where NATO conducts operations. This situation requires the cooperation of both organizations in planning and implementation phases[156]. EU deployed from Balkans to Africa more than 50,000 troops on peacekeeping operations[157].

While the US drags unpopularity with its capacity of "hard security", the EU missions are more desired in problematic regions as they pose "soft security" comprised of police missions, rule of law missions, humanitarian actions. What lies behind the US consent for the development of the ESDP is that the US needs such assets as a result of the changed character of war-fighting. The new war-fighting is

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[155] James Dobbins, "New Directions for Transatlantic Security", *Survival*, 47:4, (Winter 2005-06) pp.39-54, p.44

[156] See Map of NATO and EU Missions/Operation provided at Appendix C.

[157] Nick Witney, "Helping Europe, Raising its Game on Defense", *EU Defense*, European Union Issue 10, p.62, avaliable at http://www.publicservice.co.uk/pdf/europe/issue10/EU10%20Nick%20Whitney %20ATL.pdf, retreived on 12 March 2009.

lengthy, costly, and requires stability building. Renovation and reconstruction efforts demands highly flexible civilian structures to gain hearths and minds of the people in theatre. This is what US cannot do by itself but by NATO's Comprehensive Approach and its engagements with other international organizations, mostly with the EU. New NATO would serve to "launder the unpopular direct" intervention of a particular state. New NATO would also serve to synchronize the specific assets of "like-minded states around the US". [158] We are now at a point where even the reversed Berlin Plus, usage of EU assets for NATO operations is debated. Burden sharing becomes, with the Comprehensive Approach, a division of labor, giving the EU a secondary but *primus inter pares* role among other international organizations' activities in theatre.

It might be misleading by only looking at the situation at the ongoing operations in Afghanistan where the balance between the strategic objectives of the US and the EU is on the American side as a result of the US supremacy. The effects of incapacity of the EU on full military missions and US strength in expeditionary out of area operations are not negligible on the determination of relation between the US and the EU. There, the UK and the US like to view Europe "more of a means to an end"; whereas, France does not want to reduce the effectiveness of NATO, but to increase the EU "capacity and influence"[159]. Similarly Germany no longer views the ESDP as a vehicle for European emancipation.[160] That is actually Germany that dissipated the US concerns on renationalization of European security via remaining "committed to the institutional course it developed during the Cold War"[161]. The change in EU security policy is apparently found on more realpolitik: less friction with Atlanticists to gain visibility in NATO out-of-area missions, more autonomous EU operations in areas where NATO is not engaged regionally (like Africa), and functionally (like civilian tasks).

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[158] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.*, p.611

[159] Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Webber, *op.cit.*, p.507.

[160] Kamp and Masala, *op.cit.*, p.10.

[161] Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticisim: NATO ad the evolution of European Security After the Cold War", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 22:1, (1999), p.22.

CFSP and the WEU (now the EU) may stand out as the alternatives to NATO. However, it will not be easy to develop efforts able to counter all hard threats as NATO has done successfully so far.[162] However, it is presumable that CFSP would anyway be the major sign of decoupling in the future, whereas the US would not be allowed to be involved deeply in security affairs as does NATO[163].

Bucharest Summit declaration[164] reifies that as long as the Europeans agree on "universalization" of NATO under US leadership, the US will be given more freedom at the trade-off between the US and the EU, allowing the latter to build up its solidarity on the way to be a regional player. In sum, as long as NATO is given a role to be a global security actor, Europe will be able to pursue more capable ESDP, eschewing efforts to be a counterweight to the US, unless a radical change in the existing system occurs.

3.3. The Turkish-EU Imbroglio within the European Security and Defense Architecture

Of all NATO members, Turkey has a unique position in the ESDP. Turkey's expectations have never been parallel to the development of the Policy. There are six obstacles in front of Turkish-European relations with respect to European security. Through the time, obstacles followed one another. Situation has become more complex, after marginalization of Turkey from the ESDP[165].

The first obstacle is related to distancing Turkey from the ESDP after the WEU completed its mission. Turkey was associate member to the WEU, a part of the WEU Planning Cell, and could take part in WEU operations on the same basis as full members if it committed forces[166]. As an associate member of the WEU, the *acquis* of Turkey included the right of participating in the meeting of the WEU Council,

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[162] Duffield, *op.cit.*, p.779.

[163] *Idem.*, p.780.

[164] PR (2008)049, NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by Heads of State and Government in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Item 14.

[165] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.28.

[166] *Idem.*, p.26.

submitting proposals, but not the right of blocking a decision. Turkey lost some of important *acquis* upon the transfer of functions of the WEU to the EU. Since then, the decision making processes in the WEU was limited only to the EU members.

The second obstacle is the limitation of non-EU European NATO members' engagement with the ESDP. In the EU system, all non-EU European NATO members are connected to the ESDP with a "consultative function". The EU legally promised with the Nice Implementation Document provisions, developed to draw up participation of non-EU NATO members to the ESDP missions, to include non-EU European NATO members in decision-shaping mechanism, and not decision making mechanism. Especially particular attention had to be devoted for consultation with the six non-EU European NATO members in case the EU considers an operation using NATO assets and capabilities[167]. The views, proposals and participation of these states have to depend on the non-guaranteed consideration of EU-only decisions[168]. Turkey and other non-EU European NATO members are offered "two consultations" per presidency in peacetime and "deep consultations" in times of crises[169]. Moreover, the EU has not fully abided by these provisions.

Turkish position with regards to the ESDP has become the subject of politically painful bargains. "The Berlin Plus Arrangements" – provided the EU with acceding to NATO assets and planning if NATO chooses not to get involved in a crisis[170]. Despite the agreement was signed in June 1996, Greece and Turkey has hampered its implementation in technical issues over the aspirations of Greek side to involve Greek Cypriot Government to NATO missions and concerns of Turkey to prevent it.[171]

At the 1999 Washington Summit of NATO, it was agreed that NATO-EU relations should be developed on the basis of relations between NATO and the WEU,

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[167] *Idem.*, p.32.

[168] *Idem.*, p.34.

[169] *Idem.*, p.46.

[170] "NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership", available at the Official Web Site of NATO, available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution. html, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[171] Larrabee, *op.cit.*, p.44.

and set that principles of NATO-EU strategic co-operation and the Berlin Plus arrangements should be determined by "NATO-EU Agreed Framework, SG(2003)0355", came into effect with the exchange of letters between Secretary Generals of NATO and the EU on 17 March 2003. Turkey, then, had founded a "middle ground" and was linked to the decision in the ESDI[172].

The EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 provided a per se solution, but it seems that unless the Cyprus issue is not resolved, the question will remain relevant.

The third obstacle is the different interpretations of Berlin, Washington, Copenhagen and Nice provisions between Turkey and the EU nations. The dichotomy between EU's and Turkey's interpretations of these treaties, formulating relations with non-EU European NATO nations concerning ESDP missions, derives from the imbalance between the powers of actors. While the EU is concentrated on "ready" or "assured" access clause of Article 10 of the 1999 Washington Treaty "by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily"[173], Turkey invokes that the text should be read in view of Article 9.d. of the Treaty and article 30 of 1999 NATO Strategic Concept of "fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations"[174], as clarified by Gözen [175]. In this regard, Turkey needed to be in the decision making process and to participate to ESDP missions, considering that this was an "*acquis*" of its engagements with the WEU and had to be delegated to the EU once the security pillar was established, and involved in the EU missions "to the fullest possible" extend according to the 1999 Washington Treaty.[176] Gözen, also, commented on "guaranteed access for the EU to Turkey's NATO planning capabilities as "giving blank cheque to your supplier for

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[172] Bağcı, *op.cit.*, p.312.

[173] The Washington Declaration, *op.cit.*, Article 10.

[174] The Washington Declaration, *op.cit.*, Article 9d.

[175] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.41.

[176] Mahncke, Rees, Thompson, *op.cit.*, p.40.

unpredictable and uncertain deals in the future"[177]. At the Turkish side, "the blank cheque" meant a blind concession to a partner who broke its promises in many cases. Turkey's concern is that the ESDP could be used against Turkey's interests as most of the crises have broken out around its close proximity. "Zeitgeist" will tell us that although it was not practical, Turkish diplomats have even feared that the European Army could fight against Turkey if Greek Cypriots call for it against so-called "occupied lands" of Europe in Cyprus Island, which likes to be assumed as an EU land[178].

The Ankara paper signed in 2001 between Turkey, the UK and the US in Ankara calmed some of the concerns According to the Ankara Agreement, signed by Heads of State and Government of the EU at Brussels Summit on 24-25 October 2002[179], the ESDP would be in harmony with the obligations of those states that are simultaneously members of NATO; under no circumstances may the ESDP be used against a NATO member; and if a non-EU European NATO member feels its interests are threatened by a planned ESDP mission in its periphery, the member and the EU will consult to each other. In return, Turkey removed its veto on the NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management operations.

Despite the impediments, Turkey, itself, in order to contribute to its EU membership aim in military aspects, supported the ESDP, participated some of EU operations and missions and offered important commitments to the EU Main Target[180] and Battle Groups[181]. However, as troop contribution offers of Turkey

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[177] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.49-50.

[178] Bağcı, *op.cit.*, p.405.

[179] Official web site of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ii_-turkiye_nin-guncel-nato-konularina-iliskin-gorusleri.tr.mfa, see for further detail http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72968.pdf, retrieved on 02 February 2009.

[180] Michael Smith, "Turkey Pledges 6,000 Troops to Euro Force", *Telegraph*, 19 Jun 2001, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1375241/Turkey-pledges-6000-troops-to-Euro-force.html retrieved on 18 January 2009. Turkey offered a reinforced brigade that would include an infantry brigade headquarters with support staff; two infantry battalions; an armored battalion and an artillery battalion. It would also contribute eight warships, including two frigates and a submarine; two squadrons of F-16 combat aircraft; and two large transport aircraft to European Rapid Reaction Force.

[181] The EU Rapid Reaction Force aims to put 60,000 troops into any trouble spot within 60 days with the ability to carry out a series of tasks ranging from humanitarian aid to separating warring factions.

were excluded by the EU from the main group and considered as "supplementary", Turkey withdrew its commitment on 02 May 2007.[182]

The main inquietude of Turkey as well as other non-EU European NATO members is that while contributing such large numbers of troops, it may have no say on how these troops may be deployed and on determination of rules of engagement of them. So, such contributions should be in tandem with its level of participation to the decision making process. Upon these decisions, Turkey:

- Placed no commitments for EU missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo,
- Finalized its contribution to the ESDP mission in Democratic Republic of Congo on 30 June 2007,
- Did not contribute to the ESDP missions in Chad and the Central African Republic,
- Limited its overall contribution with police mission in Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with 32 police officers in EULEX mission in Kosovo.

Turkey decided to contribute to the ESDP proportional to its participation in the decision making mechanism of the ESDP[183].

The forth impediment is about discrimination of the EU among non-EU European NATO nations which has a dividing role for efforts to resolve problems with Turkey. The "otherness" question, as well as post Cold War European reintegration, has the largest stake on this preference. No one can deny, in the very bottom of subconscious, Turk is equated with Muslim, and historical Turkish advance in Europe has been characterized with "a clash between light and darkness, between the forces of good and evil"[184]. Such perceptions can be effective, when even positivist calculations are on Turkish side. Despite in 2000, Turkey bid

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[182] "Turkey pulls military support from the EU", available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news /410467.asp, retrieved on 18 January 2008.

[183] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.61.

[184] Edoardo Boria, "One Stereotype, Many Representations: Turkey in Italian Geopolitics", *Geopolitics,* 11:3, (2008), p. 488.

a $150 bn. worth of defense spending in 20 years[185], Turkey's security relations with the EU could stay troubled with the exclusion of Turkey from European defense initiatives.

Since the WEU functions have been transformed to the EU, relations have become more complicated, as Turkey is not a member of the EU[186]. The discrimination became apparent with the inclusion of Norway to the European Defense Agency (EDA) and decline of Turkey from it. EDA is particularly important for development of defense capabilities as it was created to uphold the European defense capabilities lacking behind European ambitions, and pursues to enhance European capabilities on high technology weapon, intelligence, surveillance, and communications systems[187]. Particular concerns of non-EU European NATO nations are dealt with bilateral agreements on a case by case basis. Ankara Agreement to sooth Turkey's security concerns for ESDP missions against itself or without its consent in its close proximity or area of interest and inclusion of Norway and non-inclusion of Turkey to accede into EDA and hold a security agreement with the EU are examples of such attitude of discrimination among excluded nations of the ESDP. In this sense, keeping Turkey at arm's length has become the traditional European policy.

The fifth impediment on Turkish participation to the ESDP has appeared with accession of Greek Cypriot Government to the EU in 2004. As known, Turkey does not recognize the Greek Administration in Cyprus as the representative of the whole Cyprus Island. As a result of not including Greek Cypriot Government to NATO-EU relations, Greek Cypriots started to impose political barriers for Turkish participation to the ESDP.

The Greek Cypriot veto not only blocked improvement of the Turkish-EU relations in security matters and negotiations for full membership to the EU, but also solicited the exclusion of Turkey from the ESDP. The EU membership of Greek

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[185] Bağcı, *op.cit.*, p.347.

[186] Ian O.Lesser, "Security Relations with the West", in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, Turkey's New World, (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000), p.215.

[187] Witney, *op.cit.*, p.62.

Cypriot government also strained the Turkish-EU relations within NATO. As 21 of 26 member nations of NATO are also EU members, any NATO document implying an interaction, relation, cooperation, collaboration, any meeting that would include states without security agreement with NATO (thus Greek Cypriot government) are vetoed by Turkey.

Accession of Greek Cypriot Government to the EU, and the EU support and usage of any Greek Cypriot Government veto against Turkey detoriated the political weight balance between Greece and Turkey at the expense of Turkey. Because Greece has one veto right in NATO and two veto rights in the EU in cases of any Turkish related issue (as Greek Cypriot government would never side with Turkey on a Turkish-Greek dispute, but the otherwise is guaranteed by Greece). Moreover, Turkish veto in NATO and the Greek Cypriot Government in the EU do not have the same consequences. Turkey will not be let blocking a NATO operations, at least the allies would find a mid-way or compromise for Turkey's concerns. But once Greek Cypriot government vetoes a decision for Turkey, it may halt accession talks of political, economical, social and security matters, which breaks Turkish hopes for an eventual membership to the EU and full participation to the ESDP operations including participation to the decision making mechanism.

Whereas Turkey continues to refuse allowing the approval of any NATO document implying any joint discussion/interaction/relations with other organizations or non-NATO states "that might invoke Berlin Plus unless Cyprus was excluded"; the EU declines to watch the sovereignty of one of its members is not recognized on structural level.[188] In order for the EU to invite Turkey to the ESDP on equal foot, the conception of Turkey should be altered from a security consumer[189] to a security provider.

Such measure for impeding Greek Cypriot government to accede to NATO assets and capabilities resulted with the increase of political pressures on Turkey, as these measures contradicts with NATO's desire to interact with all non-NATO

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[188] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.*, p.602

[189] Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.53.

organizations and actors sharing similar values or intends to contribute to NATO missions.

When Turkey demands that those relations with non-NATO entities should be conducted "in accordance with the agreed framework", it means that such relations should be conducted according to the provisions of 1999 Washington Summit, Berlin Plus Arrangements, Nice Implementation Documents as well as exchange of letters between foreign ministers. Nevertheless, Turkey remains alone in its quest for finding a satisfactory place in the ESDP.

The last obstacle is changing facet of contemporary operations and the decrease in US support for non-EU European NATO nations to be discriminated in ESDP missions. As the NATO-EU relations are evolving into a partnership as a result of the Comprehensive Approach initiated by NATO, Turkish claims on conducting NATO-EU relations within the framework of Nice agreement and Berlin Plus arrangements in order to keep Greek Cypriot Government off NATO sphere are considered by other allies as preventive rather than regulator or facilitator. In this matter, great powers are "ignorant" or "frustrated"; Greek side is "understood" and thus "spoiled"; and Turkish side is "not rewarded" or simply "punished".

This marginalization deepened in parallel to the increase on NATO demand to cooperate with the EU closely in security matters and lessened American support for non-discrimination of non-EU European allies from involvement in the EU-led crisis response operations. The pressure on Turkey for not blocking NATO-EU relations is more apparent now then ever. The US support for inclusion of non-EU European allies in the EU-led crisis management operations is declining. The US major concern is that continuous blocking of NATO-EU cooperation in the field might lead the EU countries to have an incentive of duplication and even discrimination[190].

Today, Europe faces no US pressure for "Turkey's case regarding European security"[191]. Turkey is pushed more to an idea that a new formula has to be found in Turkey's quest of being more of a part of the ESDP and of not allowing Greek Cypriots to accede into NATO, since vetoing every NATO document implying

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[190] *Idem.*, p.56.

[191] Bağcı, *op.cit.*, p.301.

NATO-EU relations without the agreed framework isolates Turkey in security affairs.

Non-inclusion of Turkey to the ESDP would also pose great deadlocks in the enhancement of the ESDP as most of the crises take place in close proximity of Turkey. In each case of ESDP operation, as in the case of Kosovo, Turkey's position with the EU in security terms has to be redefined. As long as Turkey is excluded from the ESDP[192], and as long as the EU does not take lessons from its operations in close proximity of Turkey, the conduct and improvement of the ESDP will suffer. Already the EU misses its chance to fill up the number of qualified, good equipped, well trained and NATO approved full operational Turkish troops for its expeditionary missions. Would it worth to keep the stubbornness on accepting the Turks still as the "other"[193] and not in the decision making mechanism? Europeans have to know that only democracy *a-la-Turca* can be applied in the Middle East as western democracy is still considered as an entrapment for dismantling national unity and economic exploitation. Including an active Turkey in the Middle East more into the Western World would both break the "Islamophobia[194]" in the West and "Crusadephobia" in the East. Both parties have considerable advantages on bridging role of Turkey.

As to the European security structure, until all the dots are linked within the implementation of the missions through full-fledged inclusion of non-EU European NATO members into the ESDP and reentry of France in the integrated military structure of NATO, the concept of European security can never been fully integrated "in its entirety"[195] and enhanced properly. Both Turkey's status should be resolved, and division of labor between NATO and the EU in crisis management operations needs to be clarified and codified.

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[192] *Idem.*, p.506-507.

[193] *Idem.*, p.231.

[194] *Idem.*, p.648.

[195] *Idem.*, p.182.

3.4. The Burden Sharing Issue

The burden sharing and the decoupling issue are as old as the Alliance itself. It reappeared just a decade after the fall of Berlin Wall at the challenges presented in 1990 London Summit, and 1991 Strategic Concept, and at the designation attempts of NATO's new role in 1994 Brussels Summit, as well as at enlargement discussions about whom to admit and when and how, opening up the box of inclusion and exclusion of 1997 Madrid Summit[196].

It is also the key issue in understanding the US-EU relations in security matters. Each time the Europeans desire to build an autonomous military mechanism, institutions and goals, they face with American stick of the burdensharing issue, which implies the European incapacity to make it without American nuclear umbrella (and even conventional forces) which is expensive.

Thus, the American interpretation of burdensharing has been quite different from that of the European one. The Americans have assessed it over either on "dollars and cents" or presenting the will of addressing defense requirements collectively, which means either pay or serve via new force goals, modernization, logistics sustainability and assistance to less developed NATO members[197], and asked the Europeans not to expect that Americans should cover all the nuclear and a significant portion of conventional burden[198]. The US view also considers "sacrifices" of some members to help free movement, and basing of the US troops in Europe[199]. If we add to this the distribution mechanism of flag-to-post arrangements fixed over the level of financial contribution of the given country, it can be easily seen how the US controls the member states.

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[196] Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Webber, *op.cit.*, p.495-496.

[197] Grey, Jr., *op.cit.*, p.139.

[198] *Idem.*, p.142.

[199] *Idem.*, p.142-143.

The US preponderance in defense spending is unquestionable. In 1998, the US spent 266 billion dollars (3.2 percent of GDP) on defense, The eleven EU members of NATO together spent 160 billion dollars (2 percent of GDP) or 60 percent of US total. During the Kosova Crisis, the EU was only able to take on around 20 per cent of the missions.[200] In 2007, the US defense expenditure was 3,99 % of the GDP[201]. The US national defense budget for 2009 is estimated to be US$ 518,2 bn[202]. European NATO members can reach to a defense expenditure of 1.73 % of GDP as of 2007[203]. 24 European members' total defense expenditure is US $ 239,438 bn[204]. The whole NATO except US can reach to a total of US$ 310,907 bn. defense expenditure[205], which is way below only-US expenditure.

The US, by paying the most, takes the lion's share in high-ranking post distribution, most significantly commander posts of the two strategic commands. The alignment of countries through membership is, in this way, strictly controlled with internal arrangements, and policy recommendation. The member states are asked to "contribute politically and militarily", or obey the rule-set of the one providing both security, and prestige of being in the planning and execution phases of each policy (yet designed by the Americans). If nations are to "contribute politically and militarily" in exchange of collective action against the "common" threats, which leaves no room for a big scale negotiation on the table, it is arguable to what extend the veto right would give equal roles in decision making processes. For Robert Grey, Jr., Political Advisor in U.S. Permanent Mission to NATO in 1988, "the willingness to agree on facts and the willingness to work together and to assume a proportional share of the defense and political burdens are the most important criteria[206]",

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[200] Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Webber, *op.cit.*, p.508.

[201] The Military Balance, Chapter One: North America, 109:1, (2009), p.20.

[202] *Idem.*, p.19.

[203] *Idem.*, Chapter Three: Europe, p.106.

[204] *Idem.*, p.111-163.

[205] *Idem.*, Chapter Nine: Country Comparisons – commitments, force levels and economics, p.447.

[206] Grey, Jr., *op.cit.*, p.144.

implying that the Americans would continue to provide security in Europe on condition that every member pays their share politically and militarily if not financially.

For the US, the ESDP is a means of "burden sharing"[207]. In this sense, the ESDP serves ensuring coherence, and effectiveness of the contribution of European nations to NATO operations, which means burden sharing of costs of NATO operations up to a point that it should remain within NATO or as a part of Comprehensive Approach, where civilian assets of the EU are used.

The European interpretation of burdensharing has mostly been focused not only on the direct money input, but also defense capabilities. According to an estimate provided by Valinakis, the Europeans provide most of the troops in Europe (90% of the allied armed forces, 80% of the tanks, and 65% of naval forces in 1988), give shelter to American bases, contribute to the West's nuclear deterrence (France and Great Britain), purchase American military equipment, aid less developed members, and thus serve global aims of the US with their regional contributions[208]. With this calculation, the total defense contribution of the Europe "may even surpass"[209] the American one.

It doesn't matter too much even if each nation decides over the amount to be dedicated to national defense. The possible incentive of some countries for free-riding to take advantage of the common budget more than their contribution has been proved to lose its significance in 90's security environment, as put forward by the analysis of C.Pérez-Forniéz and A.Cuenca[210].

For the EU, NATO is a means of gaining efficiency and influence through EU operations with the usage of American driven capabilities presented and integrated in Europe for more than 50 years.

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[207] NATO web page handbook/2001/hb0401.htm in Ramazan GÖZEN, Turkey's Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP, (Atılım University, Ankara, March 2003), p.11.

[208] Yannis G.Valinakis, "NATO and European Security, Burdensharing: A European Viewpoint", in A.Th.Symeonides (Ed.), European Security in the 90s, (Fopse, Athens, 1990), p.148-149.

[209] *Idem.*, p.151. Note that the analysis does not include the enlargement period, but only NATO 15.

[210] Caludia Pérez-Forniéz and Alain Cuenca, "NATO in the Post-Cold War: An Empirical Analysis", *Defense and Peace Economics*, 12:5, (2001), p.495.

CHAPTER 4

BROADENING SECURITY CONCEPT

The external changes in the security environment after the fall of Berlin Wall as well as lessons identified from application of force to crises especially in close proximity of Europe required mental, systemic, monetary and procedural reforms on both nations and international organizations in transatlantic area.

It was a difficult choice for decision-makers to convince masses to undertake this mental and systemic reform that would affect their ways of life. The stimulation for transformation was not an easy task. It needed a greater understanding and alignments of shared interest, as well as common public support among the numerous nations belong to the Alliance. Changing circumstances, the unknown, unpredictable character of future security environment engendered fears. Occurrences of similar crises inside the territory of the Alliance, especially the Al Qaida linked terrorist attacks, most strikingly the September 11 events paved the ground for spreading the idea that no one was safe even home; response to these threats were imminent, and we needed to act together since the target of the enemy was not the states but their way of life. Such spread of conscious enabled all layers of the communities to give sacrifices of money and blood against aggression.

The first and foremost change came with the understanding that security could no longer be measured largely in military strength. So, national security understanding had to change to include an expanded security concept. This broader meaning of the security included the once non-military challenges: failed states, organized crime, illegal migration, smuggling (weapons, drugs, contraband, people), border protection, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of WMDs, shortage of natural resources, and counter-terrorism.

The strategies are drawn through lessons learned of the past and preparations for future. If the lessons are identified from the operations, the preparations are done

via looking at today's and future security environment assumptions. Considering its relevancy, we will look into the tendencies, and prospected security milieu.

4.1. Today's Political, Economic, and Social Tendencies

Today, although the borders are more transparent, interaction between the states are more apparent. The statesman are not only the commanders of their armies, or flag bearers of their countries in diplomatic relations, they are also mediators between the businessmen, decision makers in economics. Their image has become more important on bilateral relations. Democracy and the rule of law are, despite some different applications, the widely accepted political values. There is less difference on the structures, the institutions, or management of states. NGOs and international trade companies have become important actors sometimes negotiating directly with the statesmen.

With reference to the interstate relations, as indicated in the introduction part of this thesis, the global security environment has a structure of "1 superpower + 4 or 5 great powers". It is presumed that this (1+X) structure can linger on a couple of decades. The most important resistance against the US superpower position is expected to come from Asia and possibly from China[211].

For the moment, the biggest entrepreneurs of the world economy, the US, the EU and Japan are the most effective elements of global power struggle. Despite the ability of the EU and Japan to break the American influence on their politics, the strategic cooperation among these three is expected to continue for a while. Russia, China and India deserve to have a close look into their politics due their potential.

The US main foreign policy is said to be aiming "at protecting universal values such as human rights and democracy"[212]. These principles enable the US to be active in implementation of its politics on an international level. The US foreign policy is mainly based on preserving American power in the future. In this sense, the US pursues to establish counter measures, and to reshape its policies in order to

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[211] Barry Buzan, and Ole Woever, <u>Regions and Powers-The Structure of International Security</u>, (University of Press, Cambridge, 2003), p.445-446.

[212] Sam J. Tangredi, <u>Transforming America's Military</u>, edited by Hans Binnendijk, (2002), p. 27

- Control China,

- Build up good relations with three great forces of Asia, Russia, China, and India to be able to decrease the power of a coalition of forces,

- Benefit from the resources and markets of these countries rich in raw materials and population,

- Speed the democratization process on nations encircling Russia,

- Establish bilateral or multilateral partnerships via strengthening alliances with nations like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in Pacific region,

- Eliminate terrorist organizations against the US,

- Ensure stabilization in Afghanistan and Iraq,

- Secure the transatlantic link with constant American military presence in Europe[213],

- Increase cooperation with new EU member states for gaining support in relation to balance of power within the Alliance[214].

Having followed a similar path with the US, the EU has developed a strategy that would enable the Union to enlarge its economical sphere of influence, transform it to political and military integration, and improve relations with nations in its periphery through 'neighborhood policy'. Additionally, a group of EU nations led by France desired to decrease and balance the US influence on the EU so that the EU can turn into a global power. Today, clearly the EU has not abandoned this policy, but French tendency to reenter to NATO integrated military command is of significance.

However, the EU remains way behind the US in terms of defense expenditures. Also, new member states that are dependent on US military power for their territorial defense and strategic US partners like the UK hampers the EU to be bold on realizing

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[213] See USEUCOM's Area of Responsibility Footprint in its area of responsibility at Appendix D, from the statement of General Bantz J.Craddock, USA Commander, United States European Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, on 13 March 2008, available at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC031308/ Craddock_Testimony031308.pdf, retrieved on 08 March 2009.

[214] Thomas P.M.Barnett, Blueprint for Action-A Future Worth Creating, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 2005), p.444-448.

its autonomous actions. But this does not impede the EU following and in times being an active part of developments in Asia (as happened with French initiative after the crisis between Russia and Georgia in August 2008), and approach to this region to sustain its trade system and to increase its influence on world markets, and see Africa as its backyard.

Russia pursues a policy of using petroleum incomes for realizing a revival in economy, and military modernization. It has to be noted that Russia lately ranked first among natural gas exporters and second in oil exporters[215], and has used energy as a means of force in its foreign policy. The Russian control on energy sources, gas in particular, and Chinese high development rate bolstered by its population are the solid indicators that these states will increase their efficiencies in structural level on global power struggle in the future. Russia also made clear that it considers NATO and US actions in its periphery as suspicious, and seeks cooperation with China. President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin called for a "multipolar" world after their meeting in Moscow in April 1997[216]. The 2005 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, in this sense, can be regarded as a turning point[217] on soliciting the organization's role on security issues on a wider context. The Russian-Chinese *rapprochement* and joint military exercise first ever in the history were declared after the summit along with the announcement that the US should terminate its military presence in Central Asia. 2008 Dushanbe SCO Summit also demonstrated the discontent among rising powers for the US unilateral problem solving interventions[218].

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[215] International Energy Agency Fact Sheet-2005, p.11, 13.

[216] Bruce Russett and Allan C.Stam, "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China", *Political Science Quarterly*, 113:3, (Autumn, 1998).

[217] At the 2005 SCO Declaration "The leaders agreed to grant SCO observer status to India, Iran and Pakistan. At the end of the summit, the heads of state issued a declaration on strengthening cooperation within the organization.", available at http://english.scosummit2006.org/previous/2006-04/23/content_227.htm, retreived on 08 March 2009.

[218] 2008 SCO Dushanbe Declaration included the statement, "A comprehensive solution to existing problems can be found only by taking into account the interests of all parties involved and including them all in the negotiation process rather than isolating any of them.", available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english /2008-08/28/content_9731360.htm, retreived on 08 March 2009.

When it comes to petroleum consumption, the EU, China, and Russia respectively follows the US that holds the first rank with a quarter of whole world petroleum. Of all, China is expected to be the super petroleum consumer of the future[219,220]. Also, in case the present economic development rates continue to be the same, China is supposed to be the second largest economy by 2020, and the first by 2027. However, it doesn't seem to be possible for China to sustain the same development rate.[221]

Being on the Middle East-Far East energy route, India nevertheless seeks a balanced foreign policy between the US, Russia and China. India has made high level meetings and agreements with both the US and China in 2005 and 2008. The foreign policy choices of India in the future will have a great importance on the shape of global blocks.

Considering all these indicators, it can be assumed that the new century will be the scene of new power games played among multiple actors, half of which are in Asia. The demise of supremacy of the West that has been solicited since 19th century seems closer than it looks. Obviously, the US and the EU will do their best to postpone it. Worldwide unrest created by unilateral actions of the US has pushed statesmen of other nations, especially those rising as global actors to need to have a say on conditions upon the strategic shift. Once the challengers began feeling that they are catching up with the dominant state and ultimately surpass it, they will be dissatisfied with the portion of influence they can apply. The US will use whatever

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[219] International Energy Agency Fact Sheet-2005, *op.cit.*, p.19.

[220] China increases its relations with Africa to meet its growing energy needs. China has established close links with Nigeria, Sudan and Angola, and has petroleum research agreements with Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria, and gets its share from the production in Tunisia. Also, the US has shifted its oil dependence from Middle East to Africa. See Naumann, Klaus, et al., Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World-Reviewing Transatlantic Partnership, (Noaber Foundation, 2007), p.51, 61. Also, in order to sustain its security engagements, the US establishes the USAFRICOM, which has remained under USEUCOM area of responsibility. (See Appendix E, the USAFRICOM Presence Map, available at http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Deputies%20Cmb %20Brf%20Industry%20Day%202008%2004%2030.pdf, retrieved on 08 March 2009.

[221] International Energy Agency Fact Sheet-2005, *op.cit.*, p.54

element of power it has now before its dominant role is surpassed to prevent the rising state(s) to its level of power[222].

4.2. Prospected Future Security Environment

In parallel to these tendencies, the prospected future would tell us that

- The transparency between national borders, and economic integration will increase,
- Effects of civilian organizations will be more apparent,
- Free market economy will continue to be widely accepted globally, and global economy and global security will be interwoven.
- Considering that 90% of world population will habit in less developed countries in 2025[223], global revenue disparity will foster instability factors, predominantly terrorism,
- Migration especially from Africa will threaten the stable parts of the world,
- The communication means as a result of globalization will increase the cooperation and interaction among anti-state entities such as the terrorist and criminal organizations like narcotic traders, human traffickers, etc.

However, the new geopolitics would be more concentrated on increasing share on energy and controlling energy routes. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects energy consumption to double between 2002 and 2030. About half of this growth would come from solid fuels, 30% from oil and nearly 10% from natural gas, so that the fossil fuels contribution to higher Chinese energy supplies would be slightly less than 90%. In India, energy demand might rise by 90% up to 2030. Again, this growth is expected to be fossil fuel intensive (over 80% of the increase coming from fossil fuels: solids (nearly 40%), oil (30%) and natural gas (14%)).

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[222] Russett, Stam, *op.cit.*, p.366.

[223] ACT Report "The World in 2025-A Global and Regional Review", 07 September 2005.

The US imports three-fifths of its oil, and the share is heading up. The US also is undergoing a fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East oil. Venezuela is number one foreign supplier of the US and Africa supplies 15% of its imported oil. Canada, Mexico and Venezuela combined supply more than twice as much oil to the US as the Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).[224]

Global energy trends show that for countries that are importing and exporting energy, the energy security would be likely to a "national security" concern for the following reasons:

- Globally, in the next 20-25 years, global energy demand will increase, however, in order to increase crude oil production and refinery capacity, investment in large numbers will be needed[225].
- Global energy use in 2030 will be 71% more than that of 2003.
- For the Research and Development activities in order to meet the growing energy need parallel to global growth, approximately 568 billion USD will be needed.[226]
- Nations posing themselves as the new power cores of the globe like the US, the EU, China and India, and organizations founded by them will not be able to have "guaranteed access" to the energy resources that they will need in such gross numbers, bearing new strategic risks in the energy security.

Therefore, sustainability of secure flow of energy resources is evaluated to be one of the most important elements affecting economic and political balances of the modern world[227].

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[224] *A National Security Strategy for New Century,* available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/ NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf, retrieved on 20 December 2007.

[225] International Energy Outlook 2006, *World Energy Outlook*, June 2006. Projections in this Outlook call for cumulative investment of just over $20 trillion (in year-2005 dollars) over 2005-2030. More than half of all the energy investment needed worldwide is in developing countries, where demand and production increase most quickly. China alone needs to invest about $3.7 trillion – 18% of the world total. There is no guarantee that all of the investment needed will be forthcoming. And for Turkey, investment needed for energy requires 130 billion USD.

[226] *Idem.*

In this context, the USA has a force deployment policy of controlling the world energy sources, oil in particular, on where energy reserves are concentrated and on the transport routes of flow of energy. It is important for the US interests to control Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Caucasus, Mediterranean region, North Africa and Pacific routes of energy transport. How, then, the nations and NATO adapted to the new challenges considering the tendencies and future assumptions?

4.3. Changing Strategies

Depending on their threat perception, nations have chosen different patterns of defense policies, ranging from developing combatant mass armies together with collective action guarantees to privatization or internationalization of national armies. The US has chosen a strategy of primacy[228]. Great nations in Europe, pushed for politics of creating the ESDP, which encompasses the three fears related to power of united Germany, the US intentions, and nationalistic militarization attempts, which would engender relative power concepts and renationalization of defense[229]. Secretary General George Robertson addressed prevention of renationalization of defense in Europe during XVth NATO Workshop as one of the key principles that has to be retained in 1999 Strategic Concept[230]. Because any return to a competitive military policy could result on break of cooperation especially in economy field. For overcoming these fears, all parties used the international organizations, NATO and the WEU (EU) for their interests[231]. The US as well, as stated in the first chapter, continued practicing and enlarging its influence via a transformed NATO. The medium powers chose to stay tied to these Alliances, while maintaining and

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[227] Energy Market Regulatory Authority, *Turkish Petroleum Market Report for 2007.*

[228] See page 17 of this thesis.

[229] Robert J.Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.111, No.1 (Spring, 1996), p.3.

[230] George Robertson "The New NATO" in Wesley K.Clark, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Security Challenges of the New NATO, XVth NATO Workshop, (Center for Strategic Decision Press, California, 1998), p.47.

[231] Art, *op.cit.*, p.9.

reforming their armed forces. As to some small European countries, NATO membership provided an opportunity to depend largely on nuclear and conventional protection of the Alliance for external security, as their adversary's (Russia) territorial offensive power is immense for their small number of armies. Moreover, via transforming their armed forces into small but efficient specialized units, these countries have gained international recognition added to their diplomatic and economic visibility.

NATO, as well, has undergone a new conceptual transformation that has prepared the Alliance for alteration of its strategy. The first strategy of NATO was 'linear defense' set in 1952. The second strategy came in 22 November 1954 with "massive retaliation"[232].

Upon withdrawal of France from integrated military structure, relevancy and an in-depth review of the Alliance's aims were needed to be reset, as stated at the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting of NATO, considering the proposal of the Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. Pierre Harmel on undertaking a broad analysis of international developments since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. The report, called as Harmel Report, was approved by Ministers on 14 December 1967[233]. Harmel Report revealed NATO functions in two folds, first is the defense, maintaining territorial unity of territories with direct use of nuclear weapons as a result of Soviet supremacy in troop numbers, and "flexible response", as a result of détente, constructing "a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved" through announcement of deliberate escalation[234].

On 23 November 1989, Military Committee released a policy document, MC 314 "Military Committee Policy Guidelines for Ensuring Security During a Changing East/West Relationship" allowing NATO bodies to "carry out a study into Warsaw Pact military capacity after the implementation of the Conventional Forces

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[232] ERHAN, *op.cit*.

[233] The Harmel Report: full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance, available at http://www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel.htm, retrieved on 18 January 2009.

[234] De Wijk, *op.cit*, p.7.

Europe (CFE) Treaty"[235]. The document searched for drivers of present security environment and possible future scenarios. A German colonel, Dr.Klause Wittmann, led another study. Klause Wittmann paper concluded three facts: first, Russia is no longer a threat, second the threat has become less predictable, and third, more mobile and flexible combat units which could be quickly deployed in crisis areas are needed as "defense forces against all-out surprise attack"[236]. It, thus, recommended the review of the 1968 strategy of flexible response and the concept of forward defence. Such studies have had "an important catalytic role in changing the mind-set of a broad group of people who prepare policy."[237] Thus, they also have catalyzed the alignment of national policies in line with the context provided within NATO.

4.4. Transitional Period for the New NATO: 1990-1999

1990 London Summit came with similar expressions for transformation. The declaration issued by NATO Heads of States and Governments in London Summit on 06 July 1990 announces that

- As the Europe has changed[238], the Alliance should be "an agent of change"[239].
- The security and stability cannot only be provided by military power, therefore the political aspect of the Alliance should be developed[240].
- The Alliance "begins a major transformation"[241].

George Robertson, Secretary of State for Defense of the U.K. announced the new NATO [242] and 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO at the XVth NATO Workshop.

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[235] *Idem.*, p.13.

[236] *Idem.*, p.14.

[237] *Idem.*, p.16.

[238] Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (The London Declaration), 6 July 1990, Para.1.

[239] *Idem.*, Para.2.

[240] *Idem.*

[241] *Idem.*, Para.23.

The 1991 Strategic Concept replaced the political strategy set by Harmel Report in 1968 and the military strategy of the flexible response, reaffirming that "We had gone, in a very short time, from Cold War to Hot Peace.[243]", as Donnelly states.

In the Concept, it was reaffirmed that the role of "old NATO" has been over with the words; the political division of Europe was overcome[244] and "monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared"[245].

With 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO aimed at meeting the new security challenges via adopting a strategy focused on maintaining and embodying the transatlantic dimension of European security, acting as the Allies' primary forum for consultation on all issues of security concern, preventing the renationalization of defense in Europe.

The "new NATO"s role has also been set via indications: future risks to the security of the Alliance were uncertain[246], "multifaceted in nature, multi-dimensional, hard to predict and assess"[247], some of which would include "adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes"[248].

It was also announced that the security should take account of "global context" in addition to a territorial attack, and "of the risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of WMD, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of

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[242] Robertson, *op.cit.*, p.47.

[243] Christopher Donnelly, *Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses*, in Lidija Čehulić (Ed.), NATO and New International Relations, (Atlantic Council of Croatia, Zagreb, 2004), p.26.

[244] The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 8 November 1991, *op.cit.,* Para.1.

[245] *Idem. Para 5.*.

[246] *Idem.*

[247] *Idem.*, Para.8.

[248] *Idem.*, Para.9.

terrorism and sabotage"[249]. This security understanding shed light on the role of "the new NATO".

The strategic concept clearly defines that a peaceful Europe depends on NATO's ability to manage crises successfully. Because NATO has been the only organization that possessed standing forces available for crisis management operations and the political support, NATO has become the only recipient for such missions.[250] Having no enemies but several allies, NATO has become a *selective security* organization. NATO selects on what to engage itself or not. Its attention is directed more to the marginal security issues[251] called as new security challenges. They are new security challenges because there is no threat of mass territorial attack.

The concept also details the description of security, indicating that political, economical, social and environmental aspects of security and stability in addition to the defense dimension. In this perspective, the management of such diversity of challenges by the Alliance would require dialogue and cooperation[252].

It was true that the security agenda has widened after the Cold War. This does not mean that the territorial security was no longer important to the Allies. The Russian residual military means have still been a matter of concern. NATO has taken the lessons learned from each of the security challenges it has had to deal with in 1990s. While it took three-and-a-half years for the Alliance to intervene in Bosnia, the Alliance managed to stop fighting in Kosovo after one year. NATO deployment in Macedonia was, in a sense, a preventive action[253]. Alliance has learned to intervene in crisis management operations such as peacekeeping/peacemaking

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[249] *Idem.*, Para.12.

[250] Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem", *International Security*, 23:1, (Summer, 1998), p.81, 82.

[251] Henning Sørensen, "NATO and Its New Military Security Position", *European Security*, 7:1, (1998), p.75-76.

[252] The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 8 November 1991, <u>*op.cit.,*</u> Para.24.

[253] Christopher Bennett, *Responding to Atrocity: NATO and the Development of Strategies to Combat Modern Security Threats* in Lidija Čehulić (Ed.), <u>NATO and New International Relations,</u> (Atlantic Council of Croatia, Zagreb, 2004), p.23.

missions and adopted such tasks as its primary mission. The more the Alliance's new role has become apparent, the faster the NATO forces could fulfill the tasks in time.

It was admitted that the new security environment has changed the concept of geography. The geography was not the sole determinant of proximity of the threat. Also, the line between internal and external threats was blurred. And lastly, "Turkey replaced Germany as the keystone state for European Security.[254]"

The crisis management operations displayed that the crisis were not territorially limited and short termed, but apt to spread and create a "new global disorder"[255]. Also, military only means were not enough to respond to crisis. In addition to a military backbone, civilian efforts have a complementary role in achieving peace enforcement. NATO, therefore, had to change its internal functioning towards a force structure that will allow more flexible, able, mobile, and deployable forces, and also become more cooperative with other actors involved[256], in order to both reach public in theatre to solve ethnic grievances, and to shift the "stability" towards East, South-East and South of the Alliance territory[257].

The Concept enabled a shift on priorities. Importance was altered from "defense" to "conflict prevention and crisis management", from "forward defense" to "forward presence with reduced numbers of troops", from multidirectional defense of area of responsibility" to "intervention to regional crisis and threats". The understanding of providing security with military means was abandoned and economic and political aspects of security were added to the security and stability of Europe.

The EU nations, on the other hand, agreed to assume greater responsibility for security concerns around their neighborhood (and later on elsewhere) via creating ESDI. NATO's adaptation to this development took some years of negotiation (from

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[254] Donnelly, *op.cit.*, p.33.

[255] Klaus Wittmann, "The Road to NATO's New Strategic Concept" in Gustav Schmidt (Ed.), A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years, Vol.3 (Palgrave, Hampshire, 2001), p.225.

[256] *Idem.*

[257] *Idem.*, p.226.

1996 Berlin Ministerial to 1999 Washington Summit and 2000 Nice Summit) over clarification of the nature of relations between the two organizations.

In 1997 Madrid Summit[258], NATO heads of state and government mandated the Council to update the current Strategic Concept to adapt the Alliance to the new conditions and challenges. Thus, the strategic environment had changed since 1991, a "New NATO" was needed[259].

4.5. New NATO: 1999 and Onwards

The future of NATO has depended on achieving the difficulties of transformation. The new agreed documents had to guide the transformation. Some of important documents in this context are 1999 NATO Strategic Concepts, of which the details will be presented below, Comprehensive Political Guidance and 2006 Ministerial Guidance.

In NATO transformation documents hierarchy, below the NATO Strategic Concept, the Comprehensive Political Guidance adopted in 2006 Riga Summit sets the political direction and priorities on capabilities, planning disciplines and intelligence for upcoming 10-15 years. Comprehensive Political Guidance aims to establish an effective management and control mechanism and to ensure that the transformation is carried out in harmony. Ministerial Guidance 2006 details directive on the defense planning, and aims to procure the capabilities that would support the goals of the alliance. Here, only the Strategic Concept can be addressed, as the other documents are classified.

1999 NATO Strategic Concept[260] aims to review the security and defense policy, operational concepts, conventional and nuclear force structures and guidance of collective defense arrangements in accordance with the changing security environment. The initial conclusions of the Concept are as follows:

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[258] M-1(97)81, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Issued by Heads of State and Government on 8 July 1997, Item 19, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/ 1997/p97-081e.htm, retrieved on 08 March 2009.

[259] Wittmann, *op.cit.*, p.219.

[260] The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999.

- Power vacuum triggered conflicts where relative gain was broken, based on bipolarity providing a military and ideological balance,

- Weakness of governments became more apparent made resort to ethnic violence, way of reidentification of nations in Central/East Europe,

- Globalization losers of prosperity became the recruitment pool and their countries become training bases and safe havens for terrorists and criminal Networks,

- Non-state actors entered the arena, created uncertain security environment,

- Warfare concept was changed, required new capabilities, thus money,

- Economic crisis resulted as a systemic malfunction of liberalism weakened the legitimacy of economic system provided by the US,

- Inability of small states to tackle with new security challenges required inclusion of well-organized multinational troops into theatre giving them an opportunity to gain influence in inter-continental areas with the permission of the superstate,

- The new security environment can best be explained as a grey zone between war and peace,

- Despite the multiplication of private-military companies, it is the nation state that mobilizes them; it is the nation state that injects large amounts of capital to the financial system during the economic crisis.

In the Concept, the security challenges that the Alliance faces, and the methods for tackling with them have been enumerated.

4.5.1. Challenges that the Alliance Faces

The threats are defined, "multidirectional and often difficult to predict". Also, it is stated that security interest of the Alliance could be affected by a wide range of threats including terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and disruption of flow of vital resources. The 1999 Strategic Concept, thus, reiterates the wider description of

security[261] and such an approach would be the basis for Alliance to accomplish its tasks. It also draws the aim of the Alliance to build a European security architecture where the other international organizations are complementary and mutually reinforcing[262].

1999 Strategic Concept has detailed the risks that can affect the "collective security interests" of the allies as:

- "Uncertainty and insecurity in and around the Euro-Atlantic area"[263].
- Possibility of regional crises in close proximity of the Alliance,
- "The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance"[264]
- "Proliferation of NBC weapons"[265]
- "Terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, and disruption of the flow of vital resources"[266]
- "Movements of large numbers of people particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts"[267].

Radical religious fundamentalism, local ethnic clashes, border disputes, inadequate and failed reform endeavors within nations, breaking out of states, extremism, unresolved disputes are considered as risks that can end with regional instabilities. Also, large-scale natural disasters are among the new risks that may require response of security sector.

Some of these risks are elaborated below:

- *Terrorism:*

Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO rapidly assumed defence against terrorism, and failed states as a source of instability and a threat to allied

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[261] *Idem.*, Para.5, 25, 40, 48.

[262] *Idem.*

[263] *Idem.*, Para.20.

[264] *Idem.*, Para.21.

[265] *Idem.*, Para.22.

[266] *Idem.*, Para.24.

[267] *Idem.*

nations. Today, terrorism ranks first in NATO's priority list of threats. NATO does not limit defense against terrorism within the territory of allied nations, but undertakes it in global scale.

However, terrorism is not univocal for all nations in the Alliance. Let alone the primacy of Al Qaida in US conception of terrorism, disjunction begins with finding a common description on the term. As a result, transatlantic cooperation against terrorism has been limited caused by insufficient political will[268]. France's stance against increased US influence in Europe, the availability of death penalty in the US, absence of suitable organizations to deal with the problem, inappropriateness of the NATO forum for counter-terrorist co-operations, institutional complexity of the EU[269], and the sensitivity of migrants in Europe to be considered as potential source of such threat undermined the evolvement of co-operation on this matter. The attacks of September 11 helped to form a closer mechanism for counter terrorism. It, at least, broke the European skepticism over the US focus on Al Qaida[270] as the source of international terrorism, yet again to a certain degree. Upon the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Allies responded by invoking the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the Alliance's history. Since then, combating terrorism became one of the NRF missions. Initiatives like Prague Capabilities Commitment is designed to improve the Alliance's terrorism related capabilities.[271]

The confusion is even apparent in description for defense against terrorism. While the term "Anti-terrorism" would imply a defensive meaning that would involve "all measures taken to reduce the vulnerability at home or abroad of: people, physical objectives, communication systems; social structures, etc.", the term "counter-terrorism" would have a proactive and offensive meaning that would include to "identify and locate; deter; prevent; stop terrorist activities, whether internal or external." "Consequence management" will mostly have a say "to limit

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[268] Mahncke, Rees, Thompson, *op.cit.*, p.168.

[269] *Idem.*, p.168-170.

[270] *Idem.*,, p.178.

[271] Bennett, *op.cit.*, p.21.

the effect of terrorism; stabilize the situation; repair the damage done[272]", including post-attack recuperation and involves such elements as contributing planning and force generation, providing capabilities for immediate assistance, providing coordination centers, and establishing training capabilities. Agreement on terrorism, thus, would be too difficult even in document basis. Nevertheless, the divide is less apparent in combating organized crime and drug trafficking, yet applications in domestic problem solving remains somewhat different.

In addition to the war against terrorism, the threat posed by WMD has dominated US security thinking[273]. NATO, too, has adapted to the same rhetoric.

- *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*:

The increase in non NATO nations acquiring nuclear capability, possibility of lack of control of WMDs and increasing instability in the political structure of those nations, the probability of terrorist groups of reaching these weapons together with developments of information and technology required closer look into this threat.

Today, even if a small developing country can allocate its resources – money and energy – to acquire weapons and delivery means. Especially, dictatorial regimes or fanatics can chose this strategy as the only way for hurting great powers.[274]

- *Energy Security*:

Possible risks and threats to energy sources and transfer routes, any interruption of vital resources to allies have been in the list of risk perception of NATO. History of energy security issue dates back to 1973 oil crises and 1979 nationalization of petroleum in Iran after the revolution. It has been back on the agenda since 2006 and 2009 when Russia cut the gas supply to Ukraine. In both NATO[275], and the EU[276] energy dependency of allied nations to Russia is considered a "risk to energy security".

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[272] Donnelly, *op.cit.,* p.31.

[273] Bennett, *op.cit.,* p.20.

[274] Donnelly, *op.cit.,* p.25.

[275] Press Release (2006)150, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, Item.45

-       *Need For Cooperation and Common Solutions for Global Security and Stability:*

Although there are some conflicts of opinion on methods of struggle against the new security problems, all NATO members agree that no single nation is capable of dealing with them, and neither NATO is with a structure designed to counter conventional military threats.

For, the Alliance needs to work with the other international organizations and adapts its policies and structure to struggle with new risks and threats.

Despite different understandings of these threats in different countries, such as the US offensive approach and the EU defensive approach, for instance, to the energy security, all developing nations somehow have become the target of these new security challenges. Therefore, the efforts needed to be better coordinated.

-       *Need for Coordination Between Actors and Factors in Theatre:*

Today, non-article V missions rather than conventional ones, stability operations as well as reconstruction activities where the civilian assets need to be widely used are gaining ground. In order to implement such operations, all actors and factors (International Organizations, Non Governmental Organizations, their access and need for sharing information and intelligence) in operational theatre should be well coordinated. Both Comprehensive Approach, and Effects Based Approach to Operations serve as the conceptual infrastructure of this requirement.

4.5.2. The Methods for Tackling with these Challenges

The 1999 Strategic Concept also determines the goals and the main security tasks of the Alliance, and presents guidance on the political and military means to realize these goals and missions.

Concerning the guidelines for Alliance's forces, it has been decided with 1999 Strategic Concept that the Alliance should be ready for:

- Implementing non-article V missions in addition to article 5 missions,

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[276] Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply /* COM/2000/0769 final.

- Conducting key collective force planning, joint operation planning, establishing multinational forces and headquarters, and command arrangements appropriate for these forces and headquarters,
- Deploying forces within short notice in regions beyond the alliance territory, when necessary,
- Meeting common standards among nations and different forces in training, equipment and logistics sections,
- Sustaining Alliance forces in graduated readiness, to fulfill all ranges of missions by means of CJTFs.
- Conducting operations with partners and non-NATO nations through interaction with governmental and NGOs and civil military cooperation.

4.6. Studies Concerning Future Security Environment

As transformation is a never-ending process, NATO continues to develop new strategies according to the changing circumstances. The preparations for a new Strategic Concept to be completed by 2010 have already undergone some studies.

The "Alliances Security Declaration" that will be announced on 60th anniversary of NATO in 2009 Summit will give us more clues about the new vision of NATO. The Multiple Futures Project[277] that has been conducted by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) constitutes the basis for this vision. In this Project are "global tendencies" and "challenges that NATO may face", "possible future scenarios" as well as "capabilities that NATO should acquire" in upcoming 20-25 years.

The drivers of future security environment are likely to involve demographics, urbanization, environment, energy, national/international management, communications, terrorism/extremism, technology. Challenges that NATO may face will be new role of NATO as regional/global actor, role of non state actors, role of

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[277] NATO beyond ISAF: Complex Trends, Tough Challenges-An Overview of Themes Likely to Drive Multiple Futures Discussions (Draft), 25 April 2008.

nuclear weapons and proliferation of WMD, complexity of strategic environment, information warfare and terrorism.

It shall be kept in mind that the feeling of insecurity for future not only emanates from terrorism and religious extremism. The challenges are countless; side effects of globalization, demographic growth, and changes in environment, urbanization, national & international governance, networks & communication, technology, energy, all has to be taken into account as the number of challenges ahead of the States. Also, the role of the US increases. The interests of the US would come in parallel with its share of responsibility.

Also, a geographic shift on threat perception is more apparent on future assessments. Many of main security challenges like proliferation of WMD, terrorism, ethnic clashes stem from the instable regions in the Middle East. In this context, the security in Middle Eastern and Europe is widely interrelated. The West is expected to intervene in the Middle East for further democratization and stabilization for the coming decades.[278] Nevertheless, the discontent to the western model applications during the 19th and the 20th century especially in the Middle East triggering radical Islam and the Asian authoritative model of social life remain to be confined to the region of which the scale is uncertain.

In the end, the threats are more likely to be directed from non-state actors, failed states, poor management, criminals, terrorism and ethnic tension rather than a robust, territorially defined, and socially and economically rival entity. The internal and external risks are not clearly separable, and the threats are unpredictable.

The nature of the security environment proved that more cooperation between international institutions, other nations, political-military bodies, inter-sub-national units like ministries of other nations, as well as NGOs have been necessary.

Therefore, this new nature of security has created "a new imperative: the need to break down the barriers not only between government agencies but between those agencies and the corporate world.[279]"

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[278] Larrabee, *op.cit.*, p.51.

[279] Donnelly, *op.cit.*, p.36.

Also, the exchange of information and intelligence should be fluent between all actors in theatre.

In today's new security environment, we even need people specialized in new areas. These people should be multi-disciplinary. We need, for example, more doctors in theatre who are also specialized in military matters.[280]

Security becomes more important in economic relations. A secure country drags more foreign investment into a country under a security umbrella. It reduces the risk ratio of financial loans.

What NATO can do to adapt itself to the prospected environment is set in the co-work of five former Chiefs of General Staff of NATO, of the US, England, Holland, Germany and France[281]. Here, it was assessed that in order to increase its efficiency, NATO should:

- Restructure its decision-making mechanism, limiting the principle of consensus only at NAC level[282],
- Improve intelligence capabilities, and creating a joint intelligence fusion centre with the EU for developing exchange of information/intelligence[283],
- Rearrange command and control relations, delegating the operational units under the command responsible for the operation[284],
- Initiate a financial reform, giving an end to the principle of "costs lie where they fall", creating a joint NATO operational budget[285],
- Bind enlargement and co-operation to a well-defined and collectively defendable geography[286],

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[280] *Idem.,* p.34.

[281] Naumann, *op.cit*.

[282] *Idem.*, p.125.

[283] *Idem.*, p.126.

[284] *Idem.*

[285] *Idem.*, p.129.

[286] *Idem.*, p.134.

- Establish NATO Multinational Component Forces, of which the cadres and costs are shared multinationally in critical capability areas[287],
- Integrate NATO and the EU in defense matter, establishing Berlin Plus Arrangements in Reverse, allowing NATO to use civilian assets of the EU[288],
- Establish a "US-EU-NATO Steering Committee" at the highest level in order to ensure the necessary cooperation and coordination in case the common interests are at stake[289].

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[287] *Idem.*, p.138.

[288] *Idem.*, p.144.

[289] *Idem.*, p.146.

CHAPTER 5

NATO TRANSFORMATION

In previous chapters, we have analyzed the three major determinants of the NATO transformation: the world order after the Cold War, and foreign policy choices of the dominant power, the US; NATO-EU relations; and current and future security environment perceptions. These three chapters, analyzing the three interwoven drivers of NATO transformation allowed us to conclude *why* NATO has transformed. The answer included, first the US wanted so; then the EU revitalized its Security and Defense Policy, and chose a politic division of labor with NATO, instead of being thoroughly autonomous; and finally today's and future security environment perceptions have changed.

Especially the latter implied the dynamic change on political and security environment on global level, with threats like terrorism, which is global in scope, multidimensional and asymmetric in characteristic; proliferation of WMDs, which requires a better focus on failed states; and once civilian secondary role threats like increasing importance of energy security or cyber threats.

This chapter aims to synthesize the factors and ways to figure out *how* NATO has transformed. The scope of NATO intentions has been important in determination of its role. NATO that initially searched for staying relevant and increasing its efficiency in the new security environment aims, in the upcoming twenty years, to become an international platform to respond to the global problems and a kernel institution of global coalitions that can react to the challenges.

In order to reach these goals, the transformation has been carried out in two domains simultaneously: *political,* and *military*. Especially the political domain is of importance because the success of the alliance on not to disappear but to conform itself to the necessities of the new security environment lies on its functioning as a political organization as well. If the military portion of the Alliance gives the organization the teeth for its operations, the political pillar and its prestige giving-

task allocation functions, increasing with the number and scope of the operations, provide coalitions of the willing, thus what makes the Alliance whole in identity (ideology). Thus, both domains are closely linked to each other.

5.1. Political Transformation of NATO

NATO transforms in three political areas: functional, geographical, and institutional.

5.1.1. The Functional Transformation

The functional transformation is carried out via adoption of non article V missions, which means including the crisis management operations to the collective defense to the mission responsibilities. The major factor triggering such policy were involvement of NATO as trouble shooter in the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.

Yet, it was not an easy decision. The opposition to peacekeeping tasks within NATO were focused on arguments such as, NATO should continue to provide a territorial defense to Europe, "NATO should focus on what it knew how to do; that Alliance member states did not have national interests at stake in civil wars; that once sucked into dealing with such a situation, there would be no way out of the quagmire[290]". However, the developments in the Balkans shaped the NATO role, not the other way around.

After the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991 upon subsequent declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia (25 June 1991), Republic of Macedonia (8 September 1991), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the remaining former Serbia and Montenegro (28 April 1992), the first ethnic war in the region burst out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 as a result of Serbian domination in the Yugoslavian Federal Parliament and the instability in the wider region of the former Yugoslavia, and due to the involvement of neighboring countries Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. In July 1995, over the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, behind the capital Sarajevo, perhaps as many as 8,000 men and boys in

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[290] Bennett, *op.cit.*, p.18.

the aftermath of three-and-a-half years of siege were executed. The incapacity of the UN, and inaction of the EU towards genocides and the bloodshed at doorstep of Europe had begun a worldwide criticism of the credibility and relevance of western values – liberalism-human rights-respect for freedoms-. The EU manner of resolution of conflicts through diplomacy remained ineffective[291]. The ethnic cleansing, genocide, mass rape, psychological oppression and massacres continued until NATO air campaign Operation Deliberate Force succeeded against the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska within two months for the implementation of the peace agreement[292], signed to put an end to the war through a General Framework Agreement on 14 December 1995.

NATO-led implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed in Bosnia right after the Dayton Agreement signed on 21 December 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. Its successor was SFOR (Stabilization Force). More than 30 countries formed the coalition thanks to the PfP, from planning to deployment, including Russia. Moreover, the international community remained in Bosnia for reconstruction and reconciliation.

Another case is Kosovo. In 1989, Serb leader Slobodan Milošević had removed Kosovo's special autonomous status within Serbia and increased the oppression of the ethnic Albanian population. The open assaults of Serbs had to be countered by the Kosovo Liberation Army between 1996 and 1999 since the international community remained silent. NATO intervention started on 24 March 1999 after the decline of Serbs of the Rambouillet Accords chaired by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The Operation Allied Force continued until 10 June 1999 when the war was ended.

These successive NATO interventions in the Balkans not only have ended the discussion over the relevance of NATO, but also determined the new role of the Alliance: crisis management.

The lessons learned for NATO members of these two wars were various. One of the lessons, prescribed by the US demonstrated that the EU was incapable of

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[291] Susan L.Woodward, "Upside-Down Policy", in H.W.Brands (Ed.), The Use of Force After the Cold War, (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.111.

[292] Bennett, *op.cit.*, p.16.

tackling with the regional problems. Besides, Europeans have been too reluctant to reach a general consensus even in urgent humanitarian situations. Therefore it would be most preferable not to consult on Europeans and not to launch similar campaigns "through NATO decision-making structure"[293]. These lessons showed its effects during the Afghanistan campaign of the US. US Secretary of State Donald A.Rumsfeld clearly defined on 06 November 2001 that "…the weakest link in the chain would end the mission…in this way, the mission determines the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission"[294]. Such stance meant to say "no" to the first ever Article V decision of NATO. Facing these challenges, the EU took another lesson. For the EU, the US, through NATO was demonstrating a unipolar stance. The *ad hoc* approaches were necessary to hamper the US to take "hegemonic solutions on a hapless Europe."[295] Therefore, the EU had to develop its own military capabilities, and fill the gap where NATO leaves, which are "soft" civilian-type tasks.

Lessons identified by NATO of these wars caused a change in classical defense understanding. The military transformation will be detailed in subparagraph: 5.2.3. Changing Facet of Operational Theatre and Operational Concept.

In sum, the US use of brutal force, even it requires to act unilaterally, the EU choice for developing capabilities for civilian missions, the powerful nations' decision on upgrading their armies that will conduct expeditionary missions, small nations' bandwagoning tendencies, thus overall change in the defense concept of NATO, as well as the contribution of 41 NATO and non-NATO nations to the war in Afghanistan[296] mark *de facto* end of NATO's "out-of-area debate[297].

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[293] Croci, Verdun, *op.cit.*, p.11.

[294] Donald A.Rumsfeld, *Remarks as delivered at the Center for Security Policy "Keeper of the Flame" Award Diner on 06 November 2001 at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx? speechid=464 downloaded on 14 December 2008.*

[295] Croci, Verdun, *op.cit.*, p.12.

[296] International Security and Assistance Force and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown, available at http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf, retrieved on 08 March 2009.

[297] Bennett, *op.cit.*, p.20.

5.1.2. The Geographical Transformation

The geographical transformation takes place via enlargement, establishment of global partnerships, reaching important players that are contributing to NATO missions in financial or force terms.

It is also related to spreading the area of responsibility to the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, and Mediterranean for operations and missions, to the Caucasus, Central Asia and Gulf region for various types of partnerships, and cooperation initiatives, and to the Contact Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand for bilateral relations at a wide and deep extent.

5.1.2.1. Membership

NATO enlargement has been realized in order to foster and spread the security of the Alliance in Euro-Atlantic area at a time when filling the area of influence left by the Soviet Union, Central and East Europe, was viewed as a historic opportunity for Europe. In this sense, the enlargement had structural and geopolitical vacuum fill facets.[298]

The leading nation in this endeavor was the US. It was when the American global ambitions appeared to be higher than American capacity that the US saw the advantages of NATO enlargement, and need for the utilization of civilian, national and international organizations during a large-scale long-term campaign.

For those that cannot pursue a grand strategy, small or medium states in NATO, and the evolution of NATO, through enlargement, depend on "balance of interests", assuming that "states do not balance against power or threats but seek to increase or maintain relative gain: in other words, states seek positional advantage… States will become revisionists if they are to defend the values they already have".[299] In this sense, consensus building principle of the alliance makes nations responsive

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[298] Javier Solana, "NATO Beyond Enlargement", in Anton.A.Bebler, The Challenge of NATO Enlargement, (Preager, 1999), p.36.

[299] Sten Rynning, NATO Renewed, (Palgrave, Hampshire, 2005), p.9.

to the non-strategic demands of domestic and foreign pressures.[300] Revisionism here represents bandwagoning. Thus the degree of bandwagoning is relative to the degree of interests that nations deem receiving. The alliance model of NATO is based on application of two generic scenarios, inclusion and flexibility.[301] While inclusion through enlargement and consensus based decision-making allows the Alliance to solicit the engagements and contributions of nations in exchange of collective security guarantees, the flexibility allows conducting strategic engagements in concert with great power cooperation that suspends balance of power politics[302] and within coalitions. If the open door policy of NATO demonstrates the degree and purpose of flexibility, accession of new members and their admission by the member states should be viewed as part of balance of interest through revisionism.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO had 16 members. Considering the post-Cold War security environment, and shameful ethnic clashes in Europe, the enlargement from 94-2009 should be considered as shaping this security environment, through institutionalizing "democratic and market reforms in the unintegrated areas of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe thereby increase overall security"[303] on the periphery of inner core states of Europe. There is already a legal framework for the enlargement: the article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty[304].

After 1999 Washington Summit, the first round of enlargement was realized with the accession of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland[305] that have been negotiating the accession since 1997 Madrid Summit[306]. During Washington

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[300] *Idem.*

[301] *Idem.*, p.13,14.

[302] *Idem.*, p.15.

[303] Thomas S.Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-2015, (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001), p.15.

[304] Article 10 of The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949: "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state…".

[305] NATO Washington Summit Communique, 24 April 1999, *op.cit.,* Item 7.

[306] M-1(97)81, NATO Madrid Summit Communique, 8 July 1997, *op.cit.,* Item 6.

Summit, the mechanism for membership is also set via adoption of MAP[307]. The second round came in 2004 with the inclusion of 7 ex-Warsaw pact nations (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia) to the Alliance, beginning accession talks with Prague Summit[308], and acceding in 2004. In 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, NATO is expected to be formed of 28 members with accession of Albania and Croatia to the Alliance. Once, the name issue of Macedonia is resolved with Greece, Macedonia will also be a member of the Alliance without another voting in a Summit[309]. It was also stated in 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine and Georgia will be members of NATO in future[310], despite opposition of France and Germany.[311]

Also in the Summit, it is agreed that the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia to the MAP would be reviewed at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in December 2008, to start to Intensified Dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, and to deepen Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Serbia, and to start Intensified Dialogue upon the Serbian request, inclusion of Malta to the membership of PfP (happened on 3 April 2008), and to develop the cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative[312].

The accession of 10 more nations (12 as of April 2009) to the Alliance has been a hard decision and required international political leadership that will set the framework for membership and finance. Membership criteria both reflected the Alliances preferences, and identity, which require further analysis. Also, the cost and benefit of the enlargement will be touched upon in following items.

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[307] NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan, NATO Washington Summit, 24 April 1999.

[308] Press Release (2002) 127, NATO Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by Heads of State and Government, in Prague, on 21 November 2002, Item 2.

[309] Press Release (2008) 49, NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by Heads of State and Government, in Bucharest, on 3 April 2008), Item 20.

[310] *Idem.*, Item 23.

[311] BBC news, "NATO Denies Georgia and Ukraine" available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 7328276.stm retreived on 03 April 2008.

[312] Press Release (2008) 49, NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, *op.cit.*, Item 24, 32, 33, 34.

5.1.2.1.1. Membership Criteria

There were a lot of concerns inside the Alliance with respect to the enlargement: on who, when, how, even whether to admit new members. The US administration put an end to the debate. The US President, Bill Clinton, announced in January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit that "the question was no longer 'whether' NATO will take in new members, but 'when' and 'how'"[313], because NATO's new task was defined as 'projecting stability eastward'.[314] However, criteria for membership were needed to be determined on 'who' to admit. Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, announced at the end of May 1997, that "the US would support only three countries for NATO membership at this stage".[315] These three countries in Central Europe were the potential member states: Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary.[316]

Despite the views that Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were ready to accede into NATO, their integration became more difficult than expected. They lacked over years acquiring assets and transformation of their armed forces in terms of modernization of equipment, personnel restructuring, and meeting NATO training standards. For example, Czech Republic had only four Soviet-era combat-ready fighter jets.[317]

The membership criteria also excluded Slovakia in the first hand, because of wretched internal political situation.[318]

Later on France pushed for the membership of Romania as a result of historical, cultural and linguistic links between the two states. Italy supported

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[313] Solana, *op.cit.*, p.26.

[314] *Idem.*, p.35.

[315] *Idem.*, p.32.

[316] *Idem.*, p.29.

[317] Zoltan Barany, "NATO Expansion, Round Two: Making Matters Worse", *Security Studies*, 11:3, 123 – 157, (2002), p.127, 128.

[318] Solana, *op.cit.*, p.29.

Slovenia which was the only country that settled its independence peacefully from former Yugoslavia. However, the criteria became irrelevant.[319]

These unpromising, discouraging and even, for some, discriminating decision of inviting one country to NATO and not another was a huge question, and tended to incrementally constituting and important part of the debates over NATO's geopolitical enlargement process. The enlargements enabled NATO inner group states to realize to the primordial ideal of reaching almost a Europe whole, free and at peace. Also formation of PfP created another expectation among partner nations that PfP may eventually lead to membership.

It is declared by NATO in many occasions that the enlargement does not mean an eventual membership to NATO. It has been told that the enlargement is a long-term process; the milestones, or mechanisms intensifying the dialogue can not be considered as an *acquis*; and it is an open ended process[320].

The only commitment given by NATO to the aspiring nations is for European nations. The common expression for such commitment is "united Europe". The ideal of achieving to restore a Europe, whole, free, and at peace stems from the collective guilt for harm done to those nations at Munich Agreement, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Yalta-Potsdam Conferences, acknowledging them as shameful biggest mistake of democracies[321] and ensures the compensation through reunification[322]. NATO does not and cannot close the doors after inclusion of Central and Eastern European states into the Alliance as a result of collective guilt, not to create new lines dividing people, (as each division will end with new coalitions) and keeping hope of eventual NATO membership alive[323]. The carrot, though, includes participation to NATO

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[319] *Idem.*, p.31.

[320] Szayna, *op.cit.*, p.41.

[321] Ainius Lasas, "Restituting Victims: EU and NATO Enlargements Through the Lenses of Collective Guilt", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15:1, 98 – 116, (2008), p.107.

[322] *Idem.*, p.102.

[323] Robert J.Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 113:3 (Autumn 1998), p.383.

operations for a void prestige and does not confer a security guarantee, yet such guarantee has not been ready even for members as witnessed by Turkey in 2003.

Although the South Caucasus nations (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) seem to have a higher level in hierarchy of NATO commitments to PfP/MAP nations and PfP/MAP nation commitments to NATO as for meeting membership criteria, NATO is not ready to give a single security guarantee to them. The Central Asian nations are far away from a mutual commitment. Another factor that has to be taken into account is surely the position of Russia. Just as it appeared for NATO during August 2008 crisis between Russia and Georgia and in 2006-2009 energy crises between Russia and Ukraine, Russian factor on Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine is unquestionable. Russia did make clear its new sphere of influence and its intention to defend it when needed.

Before the candidates or 'potential' members proved their eligibility for membership, the debate over enlargement had already shifted from 'whether' to 'when', including for whoever the guilt was felt (enlargements so far), and for whoever not (Ukraine and Georgia)[324]. Moreover Ukraine is considered in Russian political spectrum as part of Mother Russia. The ideal of completion the enlargement process as far as it goes in 'Europe' owes its speed, constrain of opposition and determination to the historical mistakes and responsibilities of the great powers in the West.

However, as in Georgia example, most NATO States want the candidates to have their domestic, border and international problems solved, bilateral relations normalized before the entry is granted. In other words, the less these states needs NATO, the more likely they can become members. Also, if Russian factor is less on a European state, its eligibility for NATO membership is more likely. For Mullerson, "they will be able to join NATO only when their current and main reason for trying

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[324] Lasas, *op.cit.*, p.111.

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to join disappears"[325]. Therefore, we may assume that "the more a country needs security, the less likely that country is to be acceptable into NATO".[326]

For NATO, the potential members' military development should be compatible with NATO[327]. Given the new security environment and operational requirements, the potential members have to reform their security sector, so that interoperability, usability and flexibility can be achieved. NATO by giving the opportunity to its partners to be engaged in NATO crisis management operations encourages those nations for improving "their cooperative international behavior, strengthening its thinking in terms of collective security, and transfer military skills and expertise"[328].

Likelihood of a nation to become a NATO member would depend on its level of GDP per capita, defense expenditures in total and per troop (current European Media is at $93,607[329]), political (establishment of democratic political institutions and free elections) and economic criteria (as functioning market economy), strategic position (the ability to project power in areas of likely contingencies, the creation of interior and defendable borders, risks due to new commitments, added transaction costs[330], and composite assessment of military forces (ability to contribute to power projection missions, sufficiency for deterrence and border defense[331]).

The criteria that prospective members are to meet prior to accession set the stimulating initial conditions for membership, which is not guaranteed anyhow[332]. These criteria would include:

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[325] Rien Mullerson, "NATO Enlargement and the NATO-Russian Founding Act: The Interplay of Law and Politics", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 47:1, (Jan., 1998), p.196.

[326] Solana, *op.cit.*, p.31.

[327] Szayna, *op.cit.*, p.49.

[328] *Idem.*, p.50.

[329] *Idem.*, p.56.

[330] *Idem.* p.94.

[331] *Idem.*, p.95.

[332] See Appendix F, Overlap Representation of NATO Security Commitment With Respect to European Security Institutions; and Appendix G, Decreasing levels of NATO Security Commitment.

- A functioning democratic political system (including free and fair elections and respect for individual liberty and the rule of law) and a market economy,
- Democratic style civil-military relations,
- Treatment of minority populations in accordance with OSCE guidelines,
- Resolution of disputes with neighboring countries and a commitment to solving international disputes peacefully,
- A military contribution to the alliance and a willingness to take steps to achieve interoperability with other alliance members. [333]

The military and defense requirements asked from candidates include the acquiring new capabilities such as training, management procedures like adoption of expansion of logistics capability, defense planning, budgeting and programming, personnel management, and modernization and equipment improvement[334], which would allow them to operate alongside with other nations' armed forces.

Besides the classical criteria:

- "A consolidated democracy,
- A functioning market economy,
- Good relations with neighbors,
- Overwhelming elite and popular-level support for membership in the Alliance,
- Democratic civil-military relations,
- A military establishment reformed according to NATO desiderata"[335], another criterion on who to admit first to NATO were the national policies of stronger states within the Alliance. For example, "historical, cultural and linguistic links" between France and Romania

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[333] http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm, Chapter 5.

[334] Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Elke Krahmann, Mark Webber, Jolyon Howorth, "One in, All in? NATO's Next Enlargement", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 78:4, (Oct., 2002), p.726.

[335] Barany, *op.cit.*, p.129.

helped the latter to get the support of former regardless of its championship of deficiencies of the enlargement process[336]. Italy both supported Romanian membership and added Slovenia to the list of aspirant countries[337]. Turkey supported the membership of almost every European state, expecting to get their vote in the event of its membership to the EU.

5.1.2.1.2. Cost and Benefit of the Enlargement

The level of institutionalization of an organization is important in determining whether the organization should continue to exist and adapt to the new environment. Adapting an organization is economically preferable, because adaptation of an institutionalized organization is less costly (mainly of sunk-costs), compared to creating a new one. Upgrading the organization through enlargement brought about some costs, but brought benefits, as well.

However, estimation of the cost can be variable depending on the number of indicators taken into account. The RAND Corporation estimate of the cost of upgrading new members' forces for the first round of enlargement was approximately $42 billion over ten years. The Department of Defense estimate was $35 billion, and Congressional Budget Office's estimate was $61 billion[338].

Whatever the cost was, NATO, first of all, chose to invest in stability rather than spending money for likely conflicts.

Second, the Alliance became more institutionalized with mechanisms of membership, and partnerships. The level of institutionalization of a security coalition is very much linked to its ability to persist in the face of change in its environment.[339] NATO, not only persisted because it is less costly, but provided its

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[336] Jonayhan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision", in Anton A.Bebler (Ed.), The Challenge of NATO Enlargement, (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1999), p.31.

[337] *Idem.*, p.32.

[338] Russett, Stam, *op.cit.*, p.369.

[339] Celeste A.Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War", *International Organization*, 54:4 (Autumn, 2000), p.707, 711.

members a quasi transparency, flow of information, integration and negotiation that could be mobilized to deal with new security missions.[340]

Last but not least, NATO, during the enlargements, reappeared as the umbrella of identity. The Comprehensive Political Guidance states that the alliance is tasked to defend citizens, territory and values.[341] In this context, Alliance has systematically involved in construction of western liberal democratic norms and institutions in the former Communist States. The membership criteria concerning adapting, adopting and safeguarding these values became "a natural continuation of the struggle during the Cold War"[342], as if it has always been.

5.1.2.2. Partnerships

In order to contribute to the security and stability in and around Euro-Atlantic region, NATO developed partnerships and cooperation with non NATO nations. These partnership relations in recent years have reached a point where non NATO nations started to fill the troop gap required for ongoing NATO operations.

The partnership mechanisms of NATO are divided and carried out in terms of regions, named as PfP[343], Mediterranean Dialogue[344], Istanbul Cooperation Initiative[345], Contact Countries[346, 347]. Hence, NATO strengthens its links with nations in Euro-Atlantic, Mediterranean and Gulf Region.

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[340] *Idem.*, p.712.

[341] Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud (Eds.), <u>Denationalisation of Defense</u>, (Ashgate, Hampshire, 2007), p.83.

[342] Larsen, *op.cit.*, p.235-236.

[343] Albania*, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia*, Finland, Macedonia*, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tacikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Georgia. * candidate nations.

[344] Algeria, Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordon.

[345] Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait.

[346] Some of which include: Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.

[347] See Appendix H, Map of Member and Partner Nations of the Alliance.

5.1.2.2.1. Partnership for Peace

Besides inclusion to the Alliance of nations meeting various membership criteria, and alignment via MAP, a third round commitment is given to those that want to be linked to the Alliance. MAP remains at the top of this third round commitment. MAP, launched in April 1999 Washington Summit, is designed to advice and assist, and gives practical support to aspirant nations. Each nation in MAP prepares an annual national program, "covering political, economic, defense, military, resource, security and legal issues"[348]. Thus, granting MAP status gives these nations impetus on creating good-neighborly relations, transparency, political, military and economic reforms[349], defense reforms, and preparation of their armed forces for interoperability. The partnerships both played an important role in altering strategic environment in Euro-Atlantic area and created dialogue and cooperation[350]. The first mechanism, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) created in December 1991 to propose a new cooperative relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Launched in 1994, PfP became a means for "preparing candidate countries for membership through MAP, and encouraging defense sector reform in the post-communist East[351]", facilitating interoperability through bilateral cooperation.

NACC was terminated in 1997 in favor of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)[352]. The EAPC, formed by member and PfP nations, reaches today a number of 50 allowed NATO "to focus on individual regional security issues through ad hoc working groups on South-eastern Europe and on the Caucasus[353]" and provided a valuable forum for consultations.

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[348] NATO Handbook, (Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2006), p.189.

[349] Terriff, Croft, Krahmann, Webber, Howorth, *op.cit.*, p.716.

[350] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.,* p.193.

[351] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p87.

[352] John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, NATO After 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, (Praeger, Westport, 2001), p.91

[353] *Idem.*, p.91

The PfP states that are aspiring to be NATO members expect of a NATO membership, mainly, to have a guarantee of defense and security, sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity, and integration with the West[354] for the future. PfP also provides an opportunity and a unique framework for nations, like neutral states in Europe that do not want to be a member of the Alliance and contribute to Euro-Atlantic Security[355].

For both types of PfP members, contributing to NATO operations is a test ground for those nations' ability to conduct modern operations. The nation in question can evaluate its level of capacity and interoperability through PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP)[356]. This process also provides the right track for nations willing to reform their security sector. Since Prague Summit, IPAP[357] are introduced for addressing the reform needs of partner nations. Through IPAP, it is also possible to coordinate the bilateral assistance provided by individual NATO members or other partners[358].

The system has also created new solidarity circles within the Alliance. It helps rapprochement of neighboring regions to address regional problems together within the Alliance. The new NATO members, most of which are ex-communist states have sympathy of protecting the states that have had similar experiences like them. Georgia in this respect receives a support from the Baltic States, Poland and Romania with regards to lifting Russian pressure off. If NATO expansions offered an increase on capabilities in managing full range of Alliance missions, including confronting terrorism and instability, in return, the role of partners in NATO operations became indispensable for the Alliance. Almost all new members

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[354] Alexander Nicoll (Ed.), "Georgia and NATO", *International Institute fore Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments*, 14:01, (January 2008).

[355] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.,* p.196.

[356] *Idem.*, p.199.

[357] Currently, following countries implement the IPAP: Ukraine (9 July 1997), Georgia (29 October 2004), Azerbaijan (27 May 2005), Armenia (16 December 2005), Moldova (19 May 2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10 January 2008), Montenegro (June 2008).

[358] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.,* p.200.

supported US-led multinational operations including those conducted by NATO[359]. For example, without having any political word for an eventual membership, Georgia made the highest troop contribution relative to its size with 2000 troops in Iraq in support of US operations, committed troops to Afghanistan, and provides 150 troops to NATO's KFOR mission in Kosovo.[360]

5.1.2.2.2. NATO's Engagement with the Middle East: Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The official engagement of NATO with the Middle East has begun in October 1991 with the launch of Operation Active Endeavor, which serves to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mediterranean Dialogue has been initiated in 1994. Ten years later, in June 2004 Istanbul Summit, the partnership of Mediterranean Dialogue has been expanded, and with Istanbul Initiative Cooperation, a complementary[361] view of NATO's relations with the Middle East has been established. Also, NATO deepened its relations similarly with other nations in Central Asia for reasons that security challenges like terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed states, transnational organized crime, (especially drug and human trafficking), of Euro-Atlantic region stems from this area. The initiative also searched for overcoming prejudices, misperceptions and setting up a bridge between West and East[362]. The International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan as well as missions in countries such as Pakistan, Sudan and Algeria demonstrate the level and direction of NATO's areas of interest, "making this region its central concern[363].

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[359] James W.Peterson, "An Expanded NATO Confronts Terrorism and Instability", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 20:4, p.476 478.

[360] Nicoll (Ed.), *op.cit.*.

[361] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.*, p.229.

[362] *Idem.*, p.229, 230.

[363] Sten Rynning, "NATO and the Broader Middle East, 1949-2007: The History and Lessons of Controversial Encounters", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:6, (2007), p.905, 906.

The main purpose of both mechanisms is confidence building on a region where anti-Westernizm has become the identity of many nations, and restarting a more cooperative engagement of the West to this area through NATO's outreach programme.

5.1.2.2.3. NATO-Russian Council

Russian engagement with NATO has begun with its membership to NACC in 1991. In 1996, after signing the Dayton Peace Accord, Russia contributed troops to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina[364]. During enlargement debates, Russia was assured that "its 'loss' in Central Europe would not be translated into a Western 'gain'."[365]

In May 1997, NATO-Russian Founding Act was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Allied Leaders. Russians, through NATO-Russia Founding Act hoped to stay in the loop, given the positive approaches by Western countries towards keeping it at arms length or a closer cooperation. Some even thought about Russian eventual membership to NATO over its membership to NACC and PfP. However, issues like Kosovo and Chechnya set quickly the differences between Western institutions and Russia.

The Founding Act allowed both camps conducting their relations within a legal and mutually respecting framework.

Even though the NATO-Russian Founding Act is a non-binding agreement, it represents political commitments, because all interstate relations have a political consequence, being important statements of diplomatic policy[366]. The legally non-binding character of such agreements does not mean that they don't require *pacta sund servanda*, on the contrary, as long as the circumstances allow them to continue,

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[364] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.,* p.209.

[365] Eyal, *op.cit.,* p.23.

[366] Mullerson, *op.cit.,* p.197, 199.

they will represent the good faith of a state (For example, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe[367]).

The Founding Act recognizes the new security environment and need for interoperable forces to tackle with them. It also encourages step to lift the heat off the borders on not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. Most importantly, the Act establishes the basis for co-operation and consultation through NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council established in 1997. Relations that emerged in 1991 with joining of Russia to NACC (which was replaced by the EAPC in 1997), and to the PfP in 1994 yet had ups and downs at times. In 1999 upon NATO air campaign in Kosovo, and in August 2008 Georgian-Russian Conflict, Russia suspended its participation in Permanent Joint Council. During the 'down' periods of relations, Russia continued to cooperate in the fields of peacekeeping missions (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), sinking of Kursk submarine on 12 August 2000, defense against terrorism in Afghanistan[368]. After Russian fierce respond to Georgian operations against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, NATO froze its links with Russia, yet similarly without suspending military cooperation in critical areas of common interest like logistic support to Afghanistan. Within six months after the Georgian-Russian conflict, NATO restarted its diplomatic relations at the Secretary General level (highest level for NATO).

Hence, not having the right of veto in the Founding Act restricts Russia to have a say on NATO enlargement, but it does not bind Russia on peace and security issues[369], either.

5.1.2.2.4. NATO-Ukraine Commission

Since the independence of Ukraine in 1991 and its admission to NACC, Ukraine has had a special status among partners as a result of its strategic location and willingness to contribute to NATO operations. Ukraine signed a Charter of

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[367] *Idem.*, p.197.

[368] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.*, p.210.

[369] Mullerson, *op.cit.*, p.203.

Distinctive Partnership with NATO in Madrid on 9 July 1997, establishing NATO-Ukraine Commission[370]. The Commission meets at the level of ambassadors and military representatives regularly, and periodically at Summit levels. On 21 April 2005, in Foreign Ministers Meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, the Ukraine and NATO launched Intensified Dialogue aiming an eventual membership to NATO[371]. However, after Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008, it has appeared that NATO can only offer a soft power and stimulation to these risky states and cannot take their defense and security guarantee on as long as Russian big brother policy towards its neighbors does not change, which is implausible in foreseeable future.

The way NATO-Russian Council and NATO-Ukraine Committee[372] were designed helps both camps: it keeps both states out of NATO but with the special status given, they will be closely linked. Ukraine will feel safer, and Russia will have an opportunity to observe what NATO is doing and a forum for presenting its position at the highest level without resorting to media, yet without a veto over its actions[373].

5.1.2.2.5. Contact Countries

The Alliance incrementally increased its cooperation with non NATO countries without a formal institutionalization of relations, beyond the above groupings. Despite their territorial distance, these countries share similar values that NATO defends. They are democratic, social, market nations that have a substantial share in global economy. Their contribution to NATO operations, even in some cases, more than the member nations requires furthering the relations. If we consider that Australia ranks 9th among 41 nations contributing to the ISAF operations as of (13

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[370] NATO Handbook, *op.cit.,* p.219.

[371] *Idem.*, p.222.

[372] The agreement between NATO and Russia, entitled "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation" was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between the NATO and Ukraine" was signed in Madrid on 9 July 1997.

[373] Art, "Creating a Disaster…", *op.cit.,* p.384.

February 2009), and operates in the South of Afghanistan and participates in operations against terrorism, where many member nations consider as national caveat, including Turkey, its exclusion from the decision making mechanism would be implausible. Nevertheless, on 14 May 2008, a special session was held with non NATO troop contributing nations at the Military Committee/Chiefs of Defense meeting in Brussels. In that meeting more than 60 Chiefs of Defense from NATO members, non NATO troop contributing nations, PfP nations, the Mediterranean Dialogue nations, Ukraine and Russia were present, making the largest gathering of top-level military officers in NATO's history[374].

NATO continues to provide the most comprehensive and enlarged structure of nations entitled in main European security related institutions[375].

5.1.3. The Institutional Transformation

The institutional transformation aims to establish multiplying the number of regions, countries as well as international and non governmental organizations having political, economic and civilian type capabilities that NATO lacks to constitute a dialogue and cooperation. These organizations include the UN, the EU, the OSCE, World Bank, World Food Organization, Red Cross, African Union, Gulf Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, G-7, International Monetary Fund, etc. The primary aim of this cooperation is to use their assets in NATO out-of-area missions through achieving interoperability and concretization of legitimacy of mission. This type of approach necessitates creation of new players such as the Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.

At the Prague Summit, it was stated that increased cooperation with Partners, with a Partnership Action Plan against terrorism, with Russia in the NATO-Russian Council, with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and with other international

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[374] NATO News Release, NATO Member and Partner Chiefs of Defense Conclude Meetings, 15 May 2008, available at http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0805&L=natopres&F=P&P=1881, retreived on 10 March 2009.

[375] See Appendix I, List of Nations in Main European Security Related Institutions.

organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and EU were needed[376].

When it comes to decades long NATO-EU relations, the institutional cooperation of the two organizations is based on the policy called Comprehensive Approach. The first efforts for Comprehensive Approach were displayed during 2006 Riga Summit. Heads of State and Government in 2006 Riga Summit tasked the Council with coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic) with partners (the UN, other international organizations, NGOs, and local actors) in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future NATO operations. Also, these proposals should take the lessons learned into account, and consider flexible options for the adjustment of NATO military and political planning procedures for improving civil-military relations. [377] Main idea on this concept is pooling the highly important capabilities for non-duplication, merging force structure and procedures, and revised Berlin (+), meaning the utilizing the civilian assets of the EU in NATO missions. (The Berlin (+) required utilization of NATO assets and capabilities in EU missions where NATO is not fully engaged)[378].

In this sense, while NATO defines its position that the Alliance has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, further efforts are concentrated on facilitating information and intelligence sharing, providing large scale situational awareness between civil and military organizations and actors concerning,

   - Planning and conduct of operations,

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[376] PR (2002)127, NATO Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, *op.cit.,* Item 7, 12.

[377] PR(2006)150, NATO Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, *op.cit.,* p.3, Item 10.

[378] Comprehensive Approach of NATO presented new challenges for Turkey. Turkey is recognant of the need for Comprehensive Approach as an operational requirement, but wants that such interaction with the EU should be carried out within "agreed framework documents" with a view of not mingling Southern Cyprus Government into NATO issues. The EU nations are recognant of the agreements that they have signed, but can not stand one of their members is stigmatized. They also know that the US is not insistent on its principle of not discriminating non EU European NATO members. Canada and even Norway follows the US policies. 21 EU members of 26 NATO nations' common policy productions present coincidence with the rest of the NATO members except Turkey in the context of application of Comprehensive Approach without any limit. See page 50-53 for further information.

- Lessons learned, education, training and exercises,
- Improvement of cooperation with other actors,
- Public diplomacy.

5.2. The Military Transformation

The strategy drawn for adopting the role that NATO would play in the future and the mission it will assume are very much linked to the scope and the level of its engagements. These engagements will require new capabilities that range from doctrines and concepts, organization, training, logistics, leadership, personnel, installations, interoperability, and new politics. Besides the generic development of these capabilities, NATO military transformation is focused on mostly enhancing the capabilities such as strategic deployment, command, control, signals, intelligence, reconnaissance, missile defense, and training to increase the efficiency in operations.

The military transformation is carried out under the leadership of one of the two Strategic Commands of NATO, ACT located in Norfolk, Virginia, the USA. (The other Strategic Command is Allied Command Operations (ACO), located in Mons, Belgium.) Both of these structures are closely linked to those in the US. It is of importance that Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is dual hatted with United Nations Joint Force Command that is responsible for the transformation of the US military. That one person (currently Gen.MATTIS) is responsible for transformation of both the US military and NATO military bodies gives us a certain idea of alignment of NATO military standards with those of US military. Also, it has to be noted that the Commander of Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe-SACEUR is dual hatted with the United States European Command that is responsible for conducting full spectrum of operations within its vast area of responsibility. This area of responsibility spans Africa, Europe, and Eurasia. The name "European Command" is a misnomer that does not accurately reflect the command's assigned area of responsibility and interests in Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia. The area covers, 93 countries, 35% of earth's landmass, 60% of planets coastline, 20% of earth's waters, and 23 % of world

population[379]. The USEUCOM is the only US combatant command with a deployed forward headquarters located in Stuttgart, Germany and is also responsible for enhancing transatlantic security through NATO.

This American military transformation goes hand in hand with that of NATO. The need for military transformation mainly stems from the following facts: changing profile of the enemy; changing NATO Level of Ambition; and changing facet of operational theatre and operational concept, which required new capabilities, and internal reforms.

5.2.1. Changing Character of NATO Targets

The enemy profile of today is "modular, ephemeral, and asymmetric". They use a multitude of assets that include means both made of archaic methods and industrial age, even high-technology weapons. The new reality is that violence can also be in the hands of "sub-state or non-state actors"[380]. Asymmetric warfare's principle is finding and applying methods that will frustrate and foil an enemy that cannot be defeated by standard methods.[381] Despite the availability of lessons learned through various engagements of nations, especially the US in expeditionary missions, where Pentagon had carried out operations against guerrilla activities[382], some of which include Spanish American War (1899-1901), Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Nicaragua (1926-1933), German Werwolf Units (1944-1947), Vietnam (1955-1973), Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994), the War in Afghanistan (2001-present), the Iraq War (2003-present)[383], the non-conventional character of them continues to cause vulnerabilities. The cases, when this vulnerability became public, like Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in Japan

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[379] See Appendix D, USEUCOM' Area of Responsibility Footprint.

[380] Pavel Necas, <u>Beyond Tradition: New Alliance's Strategic Concept</u>, (NATO Defense College Monograph Series No.21, Rome, 2004), p.75.

[381] Adam B.Lowther, <u>Americans and Asymmetric Conflict</u>, (Praeger, Westport, 2007), p.vii.

[382] *Idem.*, p.4.

[383] *Idem.*, p.9.

on 20 March 1995, and September 11, 2001 attack created awareness that any one, at any time, in anywhere could be a target of asymmetric threats. Asymmetric warfare has become a phenomenon of discourses in press, academia, and military circles.

The abstract character of the enemy has forced the Alliance to develop a comprehensive and military strategy and necessary capabilities to confront these challenges.

5.2.2. Changing NATO Level of Ambition

Military structures design their strategies according to the threats posed. These different threats have required different approach. Today's paradigm of conflict resolution transformed to a form where operations are exercised not with stable, large, self-sufficient armies, but with mobile, deployable, mission specific, interoperable troops in partnerships or coalitions; not by application of forces to operation theatres on one (or more) neighboring country(ies)'s borders, but to multiple intercontinental areas where Middle Age and high technology era capabilities competes. New operations are not reactive, but proactive (or preemptive); not with regional coalitions, but with global ones[384]; not based on solely destructive military concepts, but on cooperative, comprehensive approaches giving more room to civilians in order to provide security, stability and reconstruction after the intervention. NATO, as well, had to have such units.

In Foreign Ministers Meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, it was concluded that to carry out full range of missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly wherever they are needed.

Comprehensive Political Guidance adopted in Riga Summit sets the priorities of the requirements for joint expeditionary forces and capability to deploy and

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[384] Troop contributions of non-NATO countries to ISAF operation in Afghanistan as of 28 April 2008: Australia (1085), Sweden (251), Croatia (201), Albania (138), Macedonia (134), New Zeland (130), Jordan (264), Finland (65), Azerbaijan (45), Irland (7), Ukraine (3), Austuria (2) , Singapour (2), Georgia (1); Troop contributions of non-NATO countries to KFOR operation in Kosovo as of 28 April 2008: Austuria (570), Finland (403), Sweden (212), Irland (284), Morocco (223), Switzerland (185), Armenia (34), Singapour (257); available at www.nato.int

sustain them. The guidance also details the threats that have to be collectively addressed as terrorism, and cyber attacks[385].

After the Riga Summit, the new level of ambition of NATO is set to deal simultaneously with two major joint operations and six smaller operations, including Special Operations Forces[386].

Also, militarily, the need for more deployable and reactionary forces in high readiness that can be sustained long periods in intercontinental areas is apparent. More civilian assets for consequence management and for Provisional Reconstruction Teams require more flexibility.

Moreover, future conventional high-tech capabilities and thus operational concepts would include "information superiority, long-range precision strikes and space control".[387] All is for acquiring skills "in managing complexity".[388]

5.2.3. Changing Facet of Operational Theatre and Operational Concept

Another fact that NATO and the US interventions reveal is the changing character of the operations. Today's wars are not necessarily symmetrical and not break out among great powers. The international relations and the international law have reached to maturity (stable and secure rather than aggressive and erratic young). Legitimacy of war can no longer be placed upon geopolitical claims or concerns, such as living space (*lebensraum* of Haushofer) or capturing the heartland to dominate the world (Mackinder), but on human rights issues. Only an intensive value posed upon human life can be counted as a reason for life-taking in contemporary foreign policy (ethnic clashes are considered to be stemming from young forms of

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[385] The Comprehensive Political Guidance: A Primer, *NATO Review,* Spring 2007, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/art2.html, retreived on 10 March 2009.

[386] NATO/IMS News Release – 9 September 2006, available at http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0609&L=natopres&P=1372, retrieved on 10 March 2009.

[387] Andrew Krepinwich, "Transforming American Military" in H.W.Brands (Ed.), <u>The Use of Force After the Cold War,</u> (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.213.

[388] Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Warfare", " in H.W.Brands (Ed.), <u>The Use of Force After the Cold War,</u> (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.222.

nationalism[389]). Therefore, most democratic states, sharing similar values with the unipole chose flocking, since there is no competing bipolar option of changing sides[390]. Especially small nations, including partners, today, can only expect to be included in the core group of states with respect to decision making. In exchange such state can "maintain a threshold level of defense at home"[391]. Besides, they have to prove that they share the similar values with those decisive states.

In this sense, all nations felt somehow responsible for global security issues, or at least had to cooperate with those great nations that felt so as an exchange for their conventional border security. Each nation, including the big financers contributes to the internationalization of defense by receiving "an actorness" commensurate with their level of contribution for "cost sharing". Thus, the security has been *internationalized*.

New multiplied, diffuse, unpredictable and borderless character of threats required a similar counter-approach to defeat those threats. It has been clear that no nations alone can tackle with such type of threat irrespective of its size, power and the level of being under risk. Thus the security has become *asymmetric*.

Today military-only solutions are not enough to end the war. The new operations requires enhanced, transparent, mutual civil-military interaction with non-military organizations, governmental and non-governmental actors since the lessons learned from Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan campaigns of NATO included not only the usage of brutal force but also post-conflict management, which can be summarized as a more comprehensive approach that comprises a vast approach of security including economical, political, social, cultural non-military aspects in order to achieve stability, renovation, reconstruction, security sector reform, recruitment, training and education and some health services. Thus the security has been *civilized*.

The powerful nations felt the necessity to meet both types of defense, defense home (Article V) and defense abroad (non-Article V) in order to respond all security

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[389] Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon", *The RAND Corporation*, (December 1991), p.663-664.

[390] Hansen, *op.cit.*, p.125.

[391] Matlary, Østerud (Eds.), *op.cit.*, p.72.

requirements, despite the new type of conventional armies required the usage of sophisticated high technology assets, which are becoming more and more expensive.

On the contrary, the disappearance of the imminent classical threat for Eastern and Central European nations led them reducing their defense budget, downsizing their armies[392], investing less in *tank divisions*, and personnel and more in meeting civilian portion of the burden on NATO or EU-led operations. While most of the armed forces in Europe have denationalized to overcome cost of modernized armies, foreign policies of them are militarized as a result of the prestige allocation character of the internationalization of defense. The equity is more troop contribution for more visibility, despite there was no guarantee that this would mean more territorial defense, but a trust building through psychological stability, anyhow it works.

Many nations chose to delegate meeting civilian tasks to private companies. These companies did not only provided logistics or construction business as it used to be, but also enlarged their functions like guard duties, maintenance, intelligence, support services and training[393]. They could be contracted for a period of time just as to cover the temporary crisis management situation. They are more flexible. Their personnel may receive extensive training, and prove themselves as experts for the particular area they are engaged. This outsourcing to private companies extensively in expeditionary missions proved that the divisions between the military, civilian and economic sectors are not clear cut, the security can be provided as a private good, and one of the state monopoly (of recruiting, and war fighting) is no longer considered pure collective goods[394]. Thus the security is *privatized*.

All the military indications: enhanced civil-military interaction; downsizing of small European armed forces; borderless character of the threats, and their stimulation for tackling with problems together created another question: - interoperability. Interoperability means the alignment of military and political bodies

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[392] *Idem.*, p.3.

[393] Øyvind Østerud, "The New Military Revolution – From Mercenaries to Outsourcing" in Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud (Eds.), <u>Denationalisation of Defense</u>, (Ashgate, Hampshire, 2007), p.13.

[394] *Idem.*, p.21.

as well as the security sector along with the structure of the international organization in question. In this sense, NATO initiates a security sector reform in partner states and in areas where NATO operations are conducted. NATO engagement for the establishment of Kosovo Armed Forces through renovation and transformation of security sector, including police forces, and foundation of Afghan National Army, and Police Forces are included in security sector reforms for managing interoperability.

Today, soldiers are used in peacekeeping operations, as guards for NGOs, in reconstruction during consequence management, in border and open sea security, in struggle against drug trafficking, in national and international terrorism, in police work, in mentoring and liaison, in food supply to war-torn areas, against piracy, in nation building as well as war-fighting. Also, nations are more required to supply increased the number of expeditionary units as in the case of Afghanistan. The development of national and Alliance capability requires multifaceted, professional, technology based units at a time when many nations tend to reduce the role, number and budget of their defensive forces. Many nations, especially Nordic countries, have therefore begun to transfer some of the tasks to the civilian institutions that have the necessary capability rather than including them into their military sphere. This has led to privatization or "civilizing process"[395] of the armed forces, which is a radical change especially for once Alliance's uneasy flank members such as Norway.

While the Private Military Companies (PMCs) have become more apparent in both civilian tasks (like guards), regular army functions (like mine-clearing), and war-fighting (as used by the US over Second Gulf War), it poses a several areas of problem in sensitive issues like information and intelligence sharing (especially of an Alliance where information and intelligence are pooled.), command and control arrangements and accountability[396]. It is in as much at the interest of the US that using the assets and capabilities of other international organizations, NGOs, and private companies to succeed in relatively difficult terrains as of some small

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[395] Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud, <u>Denationalisation of Defense: Convergence and Diversity,</u> (Ashgate, Hampshire, 2007), p.5.

[396] *Idem.*, p.24.

European nations in order to gain prestige in the international community. The transforming armed forces from traditional model help these countries denationalizing their armed forces, and militarizing their foreign policy[397].

5.2.4. Internal Reforms

5.2.4.1. Questioning Command and Force Structures

Works for adapting NATO Command Structure and spending the budget commensurate with the current operational requirements has begun in 1990's and made operational with 2002 Riga Summit decisions. Two Strategic Commands, one responsible for operations the other for transformation, three Joint Force Commands with two land, maritime and air component commands for each became the new structure of NATO.

The aim of the military transformation at operational level is to adapt the command and force structures continuously in order to deal with multidimensional, diffuse, asymmetric, and borderless threats in remote strategic areas, to command and control the operations effectively and to have financially affordable components.

The adaptation of forces had to include,

- Improving the "ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods" with fully deployable, sustainable, and interoperable troops.
- Capabilities like strategic air lift for deployment,
- Transformation of Special Operations Forces,
- Development of NATO Network Enabled Capability for information sharing, data and intelligence reliability and cyber defense,
- Activation of an Intelligence Fusion Center,
- Development of Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme,
- Development of counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat capabilities,

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[397] *Idem.*, p.118.

- Development of NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System,

- And internally, an effective and efficient NATO headquarters and its funding practices.[398]

The most important step to realize the transformation in NATO Command Structure is the creation of NATO Response Force (NRF). NRF is expected to provide a ready force on brigade level that would launch the initial response to a crisis. NRF is formed of declared troops and headquarters of allied nations on a rotational basis. Some of NRF capabilities have been used in Earthquake in Pakistan and in Hurricane disaster of Catherina.

5.2.4.2. Transformation of Decision Making Process and Structure

Another transformational issue is the decision making procedures. The heads of State and Government in Bucharest Summit Declaration tasked the Secretary General to chart a path forward until 2009 Summit to "achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound political, military and resource advice to support" the consensual decision making, and to "enhance the responsiveness to time sensitive operational needs, including those of NATO Commanders" [399]. Other works concerning this issue includes proposals to change the whole decision making mechanism so that the Alliance can respond to the changing security challenges in time. Accordingly, the consensus principle should be abandoned in Committees below the Council level, since if the parties can not compromise it is for political reasons. Therefore, in sub committees the decision making should depend on the decision of majority, only the troop contributing nations should have a say on operational processes, and the rest should be informed. However, such bold proposals have remained so far invalid.

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[398] PR(2006)150, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, *op.cit.,* p.3, Item.24, 27.

[399] PR/CP(2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, *op.cit.,* Item.49

5.2.4.3. Headquarters Reform

In the context of the decision making process and structure, the headquarters reform deserves attention. The adaptation and reform of NATO Headquarters structures and processes[400] is a continual work for questioning the role and relevance of Military Committee, as well as improvement of International Staff (civilian) and International Military Staff (military).

Headquarters Reform issue was proposed initially by Secretary General Lord Robertson. The headquarters reform questions the effectiveness of NATO, and ability of NATO to provide timely and accurate decisions at all levels of the Alliance. In this sense, it was argued that with the inclusion of new members, the decision-making would be more difficult, given that the increase in numbers of members would cause a likely failure on alignment all nations in one direction. It has been suggested that the consensus principle should be abolished at all levels in NATO decision making echelon below NAC including some 400[401] sub-committees. A more cooperation between the International Committee and International Military Staff, as well as reallocation of some civilian and military offices in the new NATO headquarters building are also in the agenda.

5.3. The Problems Ahead of Transformation

The difference of the opinions of every member of the alliance on expectations from NATO, the threat and risk perception, national interest definition, budgets to be allocated for defense expenditures, public opinions, national policies towards non NATO nations, and so on affects widely the decisions on the tasks that NATO should assume and the degree of the partnership that NATO should build with non NATO countries and organizations. Yet, the level of skirmish mostly stays on a low level.

The problems inside and outside NATO are numerous. The most apparent inside problem of NATO is about security commitments of the Alliance. The new approach towards East became a test ground for NATO's collective engagements.

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[400] PR/CP(2008)049, Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April 2008, *op.cit.,* Item.49

[401] Terriff, Croft, Krahmann, Webber, Howorth, *op.cit.,* p.719.

Controversial issues like granting Turkey security consultations in early 2003, engagement of NATO one way or another in Iraq in 2004, national caveats still in question for usage of troops against terrorism in Afghanistan, different approaches to engagement with Pakistan mark the fact that NATO's politics towards East are thoroughly adopted, in political level, but military-strategic relevance is questioned from time to time within the Alliance[402]. The common point of these events was that they were the US-led initiatives; thus the agenda was dominated by US interests, little consideration was given to legitimacy. Also, almost all nations have and will have conceded some of the critical posts, especially "flag posts, which carry influence, prestige and symbolism"[403] in NATO command and force structure. Other problems include, military capability gap between new and old members, declining defense expenditures of new members, interoperability questions, increase in number of countries in terms of national caveats (this has not yet been observed, as these states tend to have the US guarantee for their defenses, and tries to contribute to US-driven politics).

These events have also proved that building up unity on the basis of divergent interests may fail at any time when the interests of individual countries both in the Alliance and in the region are ill-suited or disregarded. Sten Rynning proposes a flexible mechanism of consultation and indirect cooperation using NATO as a forum for such mechanism to overcome these difficulties[404].

The most striking outside problem of NATO stems again from the NATO enlargement. The NATO enlargement, while integrating democratic and peaceful European states to the Alliance, may create new ideologically supported divisions among states between those like-minded and 'eligible' and those non-cooperative outsiders. Even Russia that have been cooperative during Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev period, it has begun applying more 'realistic' course, considering the bold

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[402] Rynning, *op.cit.*, p.919, 920.

[403] Terriff, Croft, Krahmann, Webber, Howorth, *op.cit.*, p.720.

[404] *Idem.*, p.921, 923.

initiatives of NATO threatening Russia like enlargement, missile defense, Iraq[405], and orange revolutions in its backyard. In exchange, Russia has shown its cards, consisted of energy, Kaliningrad, and influence on Ukraine and Georgia to the West. Moreover, Russian objection is likely to unite those that are anti-NATO around itself. NATO enlargement can in this sense increase distrust and weaken the cooperation between NATO and Russia[406]. NATO's eligibility criteria and non-guarantee of membership to all aspirants will help diminishing Russian fear for losing more of its sphere of influence. Inclusion of some and exclusion of others will help mitigate the damage[407] on NATO-Russian relations, yet clearing the blur in borders between the new West and East. The objections of prominent allies like Germany[408] to the admission attempts of Georgia and Ukraine should also be taken into account that global ambitions of the superpower do not necessarily fall within the interests of regional powers. The Western influence to be full fledged in Central Asian countries seems way down off the level as a result of highly integrated relations of these countries with the Russian Federation.

With respect to operations, NATO officials seem to tie the relevance of NATO to the success of out of area mission. Any failure seems to result with a loss of credibility of NATO. Especially the operations in Afghanistan are of importance. In the end, the Alliance's military assets are composed of most high technology combat-ready troops of the world, and these forces are fighting against terrorists, using not only unsophisticated weapons, but also complicated asymmetric methods. Considering NATO (and the US) military strategy in Afghanistan is based on growing the number of troops, asymmetric war can result with some surprises. Strengthening combat role of NATO in Afghanistan can mobilize militants to counter the growing foreign military presence on the one hand, national caveats can

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[405] Terriff, Croft, Krahmann, Webber, Howorth, *op.cit.*, p.717.

[406] Andrew Kydd, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement", *International Organization*, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55:4, (Autumn 2001), p.809.

[407] *Idem.*, p.821.

[408] Kamp, Masala, *op.cit.*, p.6.

increase the probability of a strategic failure[409], on the other hand. As long as the operations continue and the numbers of troops increase, the opposing forces in Afghanistan will find an ideological validation of their struggle and more militants in their cause[410]. The most fearful scenario for NATO officials is a failure of controlling the sanctuary of militants in Pakistan border, and securing the passages through these borders, that may be the breaking point of this failure. The quagmire in Pakistan-Afghanistan border began questioning credibility of NATO.

Non military fight in those countries became more in forefront with respect to "winning hearts and minds of Afghan people". At Riga Summit, NATO members acknowledged the need for greater investment in socio-economic development in Afghanistan[411]. If this war is to won, it is going to be done by the national forces. No foreign intervention under whatsoever form can make the efforts for building up a nation more legitimate than the proper national forces[412]. Thus, without a national reform or revolution, irrespective of its form, through Jacobinism (not Bonapartist) or through true enlargement, all foreign interventions are bound to fail.

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[409] Astri Suhrke, "A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan", *International Peacekeeping,* 15:2, p.214.

[410] *Idem.*, p.220.

[411] PR(2006)150, NATO Riga Summit Declaration, *op.cit.*, Item 6.

[412] Suhrke, *op.cit.*, p.232.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

As indicated in introduction, it is possible to see four categories of states acting in similar ways within the NAC: the US alone (with possible support of the UK, and the Netherlands) in the first camp, "the EU members pursuing a Common European Defense and Security Policy", "new members who cannot be militarily integrated into the Alliance" and who cannot define their position vis-à-vis the US and the EU, states potentially cause "procedural complication" like France and Turkey recently in the decision making mechanism, as formulated by Stuart Croft[413].

6.1. Future Tendencies of the First Camp in NATO, the US

Considering that the new US National Security Advisor, General (Ret.) James Jones has begun to take his daily orders from Henry Kissinger[414], it would be proper to look the possible future security behavior of the US through Kissinger window.

Henry Kissinger had actually revealed his views about the future challenges ahead of the US in an article released last year in *International Herald Tribune.* In this article, the counter-balances to the US supremacy were analyzed. These counter balances are said to be the three simultaneous revolutions occurring around the globe: "transformation of the traditional state system of Europe", and as a result decreasing opportunity of European governments to legitimize risky and bold actions; the rise of radical Islam, having a different understanding of sovereignty than that of the eurocentrique view, which is non-secular and based on "fundamental interpretation of the Koran as the basis of a universal political organization"; and the shift on the center of gravity of international affairs towards East and South Asia.

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[413] Stuart Croft, "Guaranteeing Europe's Security? Enlarging NATO Again", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 78:1, (Jan.2002), p.109.

[414] James Jones, Gen.(Ret.), The US National Security Advisor, Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference, 08 February 2009.

Kissinger puts the influence on differences on the models that States or Unions adopt, and their –might be – tendencies over global security problems. He questions if the present institutions would be adequate for accommodating these different perspectives; asking, consequently, what "the style of leadership most likely to achieve these aims[415]" could be.

The answer is given via the turn in the US policy from coercive, unilateral action to persuasion of other states with best use of its value and market projection, international law, and multilateralist relations. The rhetoric "with us" or "against us" associated with the war on terrorism not only reignites the flame of radical Islam and trendy political model in the Middle East and South East Asia (yet unable to be worldwide), but also shades doubts on adopting an empire role by the US[416]. The US Vice President, Joseph R.Biden, while explaining the tone of the Obama Administration, emphasizes that the US will give more credence to the treaties and international organizations, search for mutual interest and mutual respect, recommit to the collective security, and renew NATO.

Accordingly, the new administration will seek to enlarge partnership, dialogue and common commitment of states to tackle with these common threats. The distinction between "preemptive" (that Obama administration abandons) and "preventive" (that Obama Administration initiates) action is also set as use of "military and diplomacy, intelligence and law enforcement, economic and cultural" elements of US power, a priori diplomacy. The geographical areas of interest remain almost the same as that of Bush administration, Middle East (Palestine instead of Iraq) and Central Asia (Afghanistan plus Pakistan). Fighting against radical extremists and terrorism and WMD are similarly in the agenda. The democracy promotion policy of Clinton administration is still among the foreign policy objections of Obama Administration, yet development has been brought hand in hand with democracy. Also a very ambitious goal is set, reducing extreme poverty in half by 2015. Al Gore manner of approach to environmental issues has not been

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[415] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Debate We Need To Have", *International Herald Tribune,* 7 April 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/07/opinion/edkiss.php?page=1

[416] Buzan, *op.cit.,* p.154.

forgotten. The new US administration likes to act against climate change in pursuit of energy security. NATO is given a "cornerstone" role for common security. The provisions for NATO set in CSIS report regarding the revival of transatlantic relations and maintenance of Article 5 tasks of conducting defense against terrorism, cyber defense, energy security effectively in and out of area, and also, relations with Russia, improvement of NATO-EU relations[417] are present among the views of Obama administration concerning NATO[418].

Similarly the US National Security Advisor, General (Ret.) James Jones defines the American view on future NATO as "less rigid and more flexible…less stationary and more expeditionary...more, not less, essential to our collective security"[419].

If commitments of "working in partnership" and "acting preventively" reconcile the EU as a response to the first revolution "European integration becoming a model", "extending hand" to nations in the Middle East responds to questions of what to do for the second revolution "revival of Islam".[420]

However, as to the European revolution, the US commitment for respecting the treaties and international law would not allow us to assume that a similar approach to Europe would be adopted. Does that mean that the US will no longer act unilaterally? If we read the same speech more carefully, we will recognize that the new US administration includes working in partnership, but does not exclude the possibility to act alone when the US have to[421]. Therefore, we should not be optimist that the EU understanding and the US understanding of the international law and the use of force correspond. This is already against their power conceptions.

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[417] Daniel Hamilton (Ed.), "Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century", The Washington NATO Project, *Center for Strategic and International Studies-CSIS*, (February 2009), p.viii.

[418] Joseph R.Biden, the US Vice President, Speech at 45th Munich Security Conference, 02 February 2009.

[419] Jones, *op.cit.*.

[420] Biden, *op.cit.*

[421] *Idem.*

However, for the EU, one of the prerequisites for international use of force is respect to international law that is codified by the UN, which sets the legitimacy of actions. Because, international law has two more important functions: it helps "to stabilize certain existing patterns of behaviour"... and to create "new relations and achievement of desired political goals", according to Rein Mullerson[422]. In this context, international law is a political process allowing parties to tame negative trends, and to promote positive trends set by governing states. For the US, despite the relative mandates allowing use of force to oppose aggression across recognized international boundaries, the UN system is not and cannot effectively engage in timely intervention.[423] The inabilities of UN forces at the post Cold War challenges, including regional resentments in the Balkans proved that seeking consent of nations with different interests will not provide problem-solving in a timely and effective manner, but questions on what true legitimacy of not intervening is. Accordingly, in spite of moral and legal obligations to act, the international community stayed blind to genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia.[424] The US had already acted alone in North Vietnam in 1960s, Cambodia in 1970s, Grenada in 1983, Libya in 1983, Panama in 1988, and Iraq in March-April 2003. In all these cases, the US did not get a UN authorization for its actions[425], with respect to applying pragmatic solutions for worldwide vices to its interests. The terms preemption or prevention will have little difference when seen as the way conducting operations without UN sanctions. Therefore, in order to pre-empt or prevent the new security challenges, the legitimacy of actions should be addressed as fast as the development of the threat (like a quick decision on the NAC) and should be decided upon by the like-minded nations (not those in the US Security Council). Solving out differences with European nations, anyhow, would be the easiest challenge ahead of the US.

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[422] Mullerson, *op.cit.,* p.192.

[423] J.Bryan Hehir, "The Moral Dimension in the Use of Force" in H.W.Brands (Ed.), The Use of Force After the Cold War, (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.27.

[424] *Idem.*, p.28.

[425] Dimitry Kosyrev, "Humanitarian Intervention: the American Model", *RIA Novosti*, (11 August 2008).

As to the second revolution, NATO involvement into the problematic areas with a strong Turkish contribution would help realize mitigating counter-balances against the West without little antipathy against the US. NATO involvement to Israel-Palestine issue is likely in short or mid-term.

The third revolution indicated by Kissinger "rise of Asia" would continue to support US economy unless these nations do not ask for more political and military influence commensurate with their growing wealth. Because, given the present growth rates, China's economy by 2030 "would reach the same size as that of an expanded NATO and be far bigger than that of US alone".[426] So as to the rise of power of China would not create a new power balance, even instability[427] to the international system, the present hegemon can either "deter the challenger from adventurism", or "postpone the power transition as long as possible", or "strengthen shared values and interests with the dominant state or alliance so that the potential challenger lacks incentive to go to war or engage in aggressive behavior"[428]. Another strategy is to disengage Russia and China from justification of international intervention.

The US, through a transformed NATO, would like to achieve all these three strategies in an overlapping way. For, a multilateral approach to address the global security challenges is required.

The figure below demonstrates the four-track approach of the US for countering future challenges. The figure should be read in building block manner on a bottom up way. At the bottom of the four-track approach is political strong, enlarged and global NATO, which would set the legitimacy of actions and bridging the political gaps for interventions. Holding on to Article V and maintenance of concepts for preparedness for home missions would make NATO a deterrent force and also help partners seek refuge in exchange of troop contribution and political support for NATO operations. Out of area missions of NATO would solicit NATO

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[426] Bruce Russett, "A Basis for Peace in the Twenty-First Century" in H.W.Brands (Ed.), <u>The Use of Force After the Cold War,</u> (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.48-49.

[427] *Idem.*, p.49.

[428] *Idem.*, p.49-51.

deterrence in remote areas where rising powers cannot act as free-riders or attempt to impose an area of influence, which would at least postpone the power transition. On the top of the structure, through behavior shaping and making the rule set adopted and promoting like-mindedness in exchange of the "carrot" of task allocation in missions, a global public awareness would be given with a NATO image as an active and attractive organization.

Figure 2: Four-track Approach for the US for Countering Future Challenges

Continuation of US control is bound to usage of elements of any power belong to any entity in globe to achieve global ambitions. It requires strengthened, complex, a global NATO serving interests of all member nations at a ratio parallel to their contributions. Contributing to NATO operations would be seen as an investment for having a say on world matters. Americana supremacy in the new century cannot survive with basing "solely on American power and narrow self interests"[429].

Overall challenge is to forge the US ideology as common to humanity and the ultimate truth, because, ideology is an organizing element in public thinking about

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[429] Russett, *op.cit.*, p.55.

foreign affairs.[430] Actions should be conducted under NATO flag so that the adversaries are discouraged for action against it. Commonality of such values would radicalize the rest.

6.2. Future Tendencies of the Second Camp, the EU Members Pursuing a Common European Defense and Security Policy

Europe has long ago begun institutionally dealing with the agenda of security affairs of today. The EU not only created standards but also modeled and led those standards to be a general norm and necessity for global development. Moreover, the EU has concretized such standards with international law.

This 'societal' security perception of Europe has included the efforts to protect:
- Financial and economic stability,
- The environmental issues,
- Culture and language,
- Health (for example, fight against AIDS), and
- Physical safety and more apparent security-related issues like;
  o Uncontrolled immigration,
  o Organized crime-drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc.,
  o Fraud involving tax havens and global networks,
  o Disorder in neighborhood of the EU, instability caused by failed states,
  o Terrorism[431],
  o Proliferation of WMD.

The continuing polarity of Europe concerning its level of civilization, increasing popularity of the EU missions built on its "soft power" and the non-concentration of US application of "hard power" which is regarded as brutal, and not well-received could eventually give the EU to take bold and even more autonomous actions.

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[430] Andrew Kohut, "Post-Cold War Attitutes" in H.W.Brands (Ed.), The Use of Force After the Cold War, (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.176.

[431] Stefan Gänzle and Allen G.Sens (Eds), The Changing Politics of European Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2007), p.36.

The area of security created within EU-zone already makes the Union an attractive target for becoming a member or even a model to follow for neighboring countries. Moderator role assumed by great powers in Europe in cases like Iran's nuclear efforts, Georgia-Russia conflict, Middle East Peace Process is highly regarded and gives the EU a greater political role in maintaining and enforcing international law across the globe. The institutionalization of European security policy not only due its course to ESDP missions, and creation of military forces, but also to developed mechanisms for fighting against crime and clandestine immigration, regional programmes initiated (like Bologna, Barcelona Process, MEDA-the financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue), Justice and Home Affairs with efficient tools like Europol, Eurojust, the European Judicial Network, the Schengen System, Border Management Agency[432].

Although enlarging NATO and upgrading its role on to a semi-global political institution would help the US to concretize its security relations with nations in Eurasia, and Mediterranean Region, and Gulf States relying mostly on its bilateral agreements, the US lacks to catch the same grasp of tendencies as the EU as a result of territorial proximity and the historical connectedness thereof.

It is questionable for the Europeans that NATO is still "the primary venue where the transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies".[433] Because many members of the Alliance doubt that most of the threats that present itself in the new security environment cannot be dealt with NATO assets and capabilities irrespective of its transformation. NATO provides access to the EU to have a stronger voice and ability, via usage of US power, for global security issues.

An example of EU difference with respect to global security is British, French, German approach to proliferation of WMD in Iran. While the US supports the politics of initiating a missile defense shield despite Russian objection, the EU

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[432] Malcolm Anderson, "Internal and External Security in the EU: Is There Any Longer a Distinction?" in Stefan Gänzle and Allen G.Sens (Eds), The Changing Politics of European Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2007), p.36.

[433] Helga Haftendorn, "From an Alliance of Commitment to an Alliance of Choice: the Adaptation of NATO in a Time of Uncertainty" in Stefan Gänzle and Allen G.Sens (Eds), The Changing Politics of European Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2007), p.161.

addresses the issue in terms of convincing Iran not to enrich nuclear fuel through diplomacy.[434]

Most members believe that military stabilization provided by NATO's tough military means is necessary, but not enough to prepare and safeguard political solutions. The picture has been apparent in Bosnia, Kosovo (where the missions are transferred to the EU), and Afghanistan[435] (where NATO lacks solutions for social – increasing influence of Taliban-, political –corrupt governance-, economical – continuing increase in opium growing-, and cultural –religious radicalism.

It is like the EU allowing NATO to break the door and engage in instable areas, provide security on a virgin territory, where NATO (thus the US) would collect the hatred, and the EU would cultivate the appreciation, though the EU contributes, and/or constitutes the two organizations.

However, although EU possesses indispensable soft power capabilities that NATO needs and wishes to utilize in a "mutually re-enforcing" manner, without NATO guarantee of providing brutal force to curb the resistance, only-EU capabilities will remain void and useless. It is NATO bedrock security operations that are the key for an effective consequence management, reconstruction, renovation and humanitarian missions.

In the future, compromise between the US and the EU, and evolution of relations towards a strategic partnership is the most likely scenario.

6.2.1. The EU and the US towards a More Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

The tendencies of the parties that are "natural but ominous" were bound to once US tendency to the "unilateralism", and the EU tendency to create an "autonomous" defense policy[436]. These tendencies grew the suspicion on both sides of the Atlantic. However, new tasks beyond Europe have opened new areas of opportunities for both parties. While the US projected its power in remote areas, the

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[434] *Idem.,* p.163.

[435] *Idem.,* p.164.

[436] Stanley R.Sloan, <u>NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered,</u> (Rowman&Littlefield, Maryland, 2003), p.200.

EU could develop its military and civilian capabilities in the Balkans and in Africa. As both parties share the same understanding of values, governance practices and similar interests, it would be obsolete to fall in the trap of skepticism. Both parties remain the most important, reliable partners[437]. However, both parties have deficiencies and superiorities.

For the US, a balance will have to be found between the US aspirations and limitations beyond the bounds, and the prudency of other nations. Within the current world order, the US power is limited and can be effective only if it gets the support of other nations. The constant force/capability/value contributing nations will have a say on steering NATO.

For the EU, burden sharing issue should be clarified. Even if the European nations cannot raise their defense expenditure, they can reorganize their budgets that will allow them to spend more on expeditionary missions, as the US desires, in fulfilling the consequence management tasks that requires civilian capabilities. EDA will play a critical role[438] in supporting US projects of having "hi-technology smart weapons, sophisticated real-time reconnaissance systems and high speed data links"[439].

NATO, therefore, should be flexible and responsive[440] including the coordinated use of other necessary assets to complete its task. However, putting EU in complementing position would be a big pride bonus on EU side for a little asset granted to NATO. On the other hand, sole NATO membership without EU membership would mean little for many nations, as the relation between territorial defense and economic stability get even tighter. Having conceived that Alliance's

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[437] *Idem.*, p.207.

[438] Nick Witney, Re-energizing of Europe's Security and Defense Policy, (European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2008), p.37.

[439] Simon Duke, "The Future of EU-NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?", *Journal of European Integration*, 30:1, 27 – 43, (2008), p.37.

[440] Necas, *op.cit.*, p.106.

security was closely tied to that of Central and East Europe[441], the enlargement today seems to occur "more improvised than planned"[442].

Considering the number of EU nations among NATO members (21 of 26 are EU members), and the necessity for carrying out crisis management operations in a complementary manner between NATO and the EU, it is likely that a debate over creating a new joint Euro-Atlantic organization for crisis management operations can be established in future[443].

6.3. Future Tendencies of the Third Camp, New Members Who Cannot Be Militarily Integrated Into the Alliance

The global security vision injected into NATO by the US yields new responsibilities, new expansions of strategic domains towards the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as new burdens to other nations. Some nations do not always share the same conception of global security as the US, because their mere national interests do not correspond to that of the US. The US wishes NATO to be a solution circle of broadened security issues. However, issues like protection of flow of vital resources (energy security), protection of sea routes, terrorism, or non-proliferation of WMD does not carry the same level of prominence for all nations. The clash of interests will continue in the future. In exchange, the US will try to balance the objections to its global policies within the Alliance by giving a stronger presence to new members and PfP nations in NATO Headquarters and NATO operations in planning, preparing for contingency operations as well as in decision-making[444]. In a way, the US is buying their votes for non article V global security problems in exchange of providing article V territorial defense guarantee of NATO. Such trade off eventually lead these nations to have an incentive for global issues, which do not of their interests, despite their weight in decision making will be somewhat limited

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[441] Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995), p.91.

[442] *Idem.*, p.102.

[443] Heinz Gärtner, "European Security, NATO and the transatlantic link: Crisis management", *European Security,* 7:3, (1998), p.1, 2.

[444] *Idem.*, p.5.

compared to those providing large numbers of troops or high-technology assets. However, if future enlargement stalls, it would lead the inner core nations to include new items into the list of membership criteria. Considering that already PfP provides neither security guarantee nor an incentive for an overall reform for westernization, nor democratization,[445] what NATO (and the EU) should do to have global support for their actions is to avoid "alienating applicants by offering them second-class membership"[446].

6.4. Future Tendencies of the Forth Camp, States Potentially Cause Procedural Complication like France and Turkey in the Decision Making Mechanism

France has always become the one giving a different tune out in the chorus. French withdrawal from NATO integrated military structure and thus its refusal of committing itself to the defense of Western Europe allowed it to adopt a realist 'self-help' approach to the international system. Until the end of the Cold War, France enjoyed the American nuclear umbrella and first line defense of West Germany. In addition, France came up with a different rhetoric of denying great power protection of states and searched for a different rank in world affairs[447]. Upon the reunification of Germany, and restitution of its sovereignty and defense capabilities, a new balance in French foreign policy had to be restored. France simultaneously undertook a *rapprochement* with Germany, with the UK[448], and through NATO transformation, with the US, and increased its political weight with the end of Cold War, enjoying a relief of defense burden. Yet, France continued to pursue politics of acquiring an autonomous defense capability with regard to the US and NATO, and continue to do so until a relative balance between the ESDP and NATO was ensured. Once, the US began to express the need for a stronger ESDP of which the actions would be

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[445] Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy", *International Security,* 25:4 (Spring, 2001), p.67.

[446] William Wallace, "From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* 76:3, Europe: Where Does It Begin and End? (Jul., 2000), p.493.

[447] Anand Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol.71, No.1, (Jan.1995), p.20.

[448] *Idem.*, p.25.

complementary to NATO – the word 'complementary' ensures a certain autonomy – France explicitly obtained a new politic of *rapprochement* with NATO. The expected relative gain of France is a true Europeanization of defense structures within NATO, and regaining its political influence vis-à-vis a reunified and stronger Germany, and a more effective NATO allocating an active role to the US and partially to the UK[449].

A possible French *rapprochement* with NATO will foster a mutually reinforcing structure in European Defense Architecture, and both sooth the concerns over full US dominance on European security matters, and curb the resistance on NATO operations with regards to legitimacy questions. The US, in this way, by including opposition into the decision-making mechanism, aims to get full support of NATO expeditionary missions and eschew political pressure in the name of international law, on which the US does not have a clear record given its non-participation to Kyoto and treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo. In the end, France will have to concede its traditional position, which once defined the borders of Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" by De Gaulle including Russia and excluding the USA[450], as the success of ESDP missions depends on US "bedrock of deterrence against acts of aggression or assistance"[451].

The other country in question, Turkey, holds a particularly different specification among the regional powers, placing itself well far away from its equivalents. First, despite the tendency in European states for reducing their defense expenditures as a result of rising costs of overall modernization and dissolution of robust and solid character of the threats, Turkey remained to sustain a very large army consisted of more than 650.000 troops.

The army has been modified to tackle with challenges of both conventional threats because of unreliance of most of its neighbors and unconventional threats due to terrorist activities in the South East Turkey, and North of Iraq. Although Turkey could provide well-trained, properly equipped deployable forces to NATO missions, it lacked a certain confidence in times both on the US, due to 1964 President

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[449] *Idem.*, p.34.

[450] Wallace, *op.cit.*, p.483.

[451] Duke, *op.cit.*, p.31.

Johnson's letter, 1975 Carter administration arms embargo, the Hood event on 4 July 2003, and on the EU due to problems in Cyprus issue and Turkey's accession process to the EU, ignorance of Turkey's defense against Persian Gulf Region during the NATO Cold War contingency planning invoking Article 1 of North Atlantic Treaty.[452, 453]

The most striking testing case of the Alliance came with the Iraq war that began in March 2003[454]when the allies disagreed on the case of Turkey's request for invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (security consultations within the Alliance). In that case, Protection of Turkish territory from a possible Iraqi missile attack was not met by collective security understanding of the Alliance, but by the American pressure for engaging the Alliance into military operations in Iraq in order to gain legitimacy it lacked. The American pressure had worked for Germany and Belgium, and the issue for giving patriot missiles and AWACS systems assistance to Turkey was agreed on Defense Planning Group where France is not involved. So, French veto was bypassed[455]. It was again in Istanbul Cooperation Initiative that NATO assumed training tasks in Iraq.[456]

Today, while Turkey could continue to provide valuable assets to the Alliance as its ends and means correspond to those of the Alliance, it is regarded as an obstacle ahead of NATO's will for enhancing relations with the EU. The main problem ahead of NATO-EU relations is the lack of any apparent solution to Cyprus problem. The solution will likely to be a gradual integration of Turkey to the ESDP operations with stronger *acquis* than Turkey had at the WEU, and associate membership to EDA with a security agreement simultaneously with Turkish concessions to further deepening of NATO-EU relations. The Greek Cypriot

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[452] Article 1 of North Atlantic Treaty: "…refrain in their international relation from the threat of use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

[453] Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Turkey, the United States and NATO: An Alliance within the Alliance", *Questions Internationales,* Issue 12, (March/April 2005), p.31-32.

[454] Sten Rynning, <u>NATO Renewed</u>, (Palgrave, Hampshire, 2005), p.xi.

[455] DİB web page. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_27---20-subat-2003.tr.mfa

[456] PR(2004)96, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, Issued by Heads of State and Government, in Istanbul, on 28 June 2004, Item 3.

Government, here, will have to be given a PfP role, as the PfP does not have more role than OSCE, where the Greek Cypriot Government and Turkey co-exist. In this regard, the first step forward would be signing an agreement clarifying the double reading of Berlin Plus and Nice provisions between the EU and NATO under the US supervision. The UK should play an encouraging role for other European states to overcome their pre-judgments over Turkey, and for Turkey to concentrate on accession negotiations[457]. As for Simon Duke, Cyprus problem is the main impediment to the future of NATO-EU relations. Usage of Cyprus as a 'camouflage' will complicate any eventual solution[458].

6.5. A Future Scenario for NATO

54 heads of state and government or president/secretary general of international organizations have participated to the Bucharest Summit on 02-04 April 2008. Even this is a sign of how NATO enlarged its political and military scope towards a global scale. If we look at the way transformation evolves, it seems that NATO will continue to enlarge and establish dialogue and integration with international organizations, NGOs, and other local actors through Comprehensive Approach. Considering the sense of the latest Summit, and the likelihood of the next Summit that will be held in Strasbourg (France) and Kehl (Germany), the following assessments concerning the future of transformation can be proposed:

- NATO Summits are likely to have a more global character and host more numbers of international actors. New NATO would be helpful consolidating the power of like-minded states around the US[459]. It will also divert the unpopularity of US actions. A looser form of decision making mechanism is expected in future NATO.

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[457] Duke, *op.cit.*, p.40.

[458] *Idem.*, p.42.

[459] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.*, p.611

- Crisis managements will be conducted together with the "like-minded states", NATO command and force structure will be changed accordingly,

- Nations providing troop or finance to NATO operations will be privileged.

- Russia will be regarded as a balancer again. Relations with Russia will be improved via focusing on areas of shared interest. (Acts for area of influence should be abandoned as well.)

- New high-tech capability such as Allied Ground Surveillance or Missile Defense will be acquired[460].

- Energy security will be coming more into NATO agenda and likely to cause controversial debates among nations.

- Also, the way NATO spends money will be reassessed. The command and force structure will be reshaped.[461].

- NATO-EU relations will evolve into a strategic partnership; tasks in crisis management operations will be divided between the two organizations, the enlargement of scope of Comprehensive Approach and an approach of "reversed Berlin Plus[462]." (Usage of EU assets and capabilities in NATO operations) can be adopted.

- The UN will continue to delegate some of its missions as it has already failed to fulfill the tasks enumerated in Article 7 of its Charter.[463] This gap of utilizing hard power is to be filled by NATO; the EU and the UN will conduct the other low intensity operations respectively. NATO will provide legitimacy of its actions given its

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[460] Hamilton, *op.cit.,* p.ix.

[461] *Idem.*

[462] David S. Yost, "An Interview with General (Ret.) James L. Jones, SACEUR", *Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome,* No.34, (January 2008), p.131-132

[463] *Idem.*, p.3

effectiveness at maintaining international stability[464]role that the UN lacked.

- The new type of conducting international relations will not be on the basis of "zero sum game", but a consensual hegemonic security community.[465]

- A US-EU-NATO Steering Directorate can be established. This structure will allow nations that are both NATO members and EU members to have two votes, and NATO will be the first resort to respond to the possible challenges.[466]

- The US "will cooperate closely with particular allies on specific issues (including transnational crime, proliferation and terrorism), and engage in some multilateral efforts of "milieu-shaping" through NATO.[467]"

- Financing NATO operations will require further elaboration. The politics of "costs lie where they fall" cause troop contributing nations to have burden of both casualty and finance, and those that are not contributing to operations are awarded twice in this sense. Therefore, a formula of creating a NATO operations budget that is financed in common[468] will be found, and initiated.

- According to some pro-US scholars, conventional or large scale crisis management operations are to be launched initially by the US, the following "stability and support operations", "post conflict stability and reconstruction operations" as called forth generation warfare and "other operations rather than conventional military operations", "humanitarian support/disaster relief operations", "counter insurgency

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[464] Mowle, Sacko, *op.cit.,* p.612

[465] Charles Krupnick (Ed.), <u>Almost NATO,</u> (Rowman&Littlefield, Oxford, 2003), p.4.

[466] Yost, *op.cit.,* p.128

[467] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.,* p 93.

[468] Yost, *op.cit.,* p.128

operations" and "small scale crisis response operations" will be conducted by "System Administrators" [469]. NATO here, as seen in Afghanistan sample, has been given a role of system administrator[470].

All require "sustainment for public and parliamentary support, deployable capabilities, synergy between NATO and partners, cooperation between civil and military authorities, matching means to agreed missions".[471] Thus, NATO is indispensable but not sufficient[472].

6.6. Conclusion

It might be too early to announce the disappearance or demise of western domination and direction of world politics since 19th century. NATO transformation, in this context, cannot be evaluated without taking into the US politics, the EU approach to security, and requirement of the broadened threat perception. The US choice for pursuing assertive politics after the Cold War in an environment where there is no robust enemy resulted with both resentments, and adoption of its supremacy.[473] In order to increase its influence, irrespective of their status, for members, or partners, the need for NATO that is proved by history and transformed for efficiency in enlarged security challenges became apparent so that it can reach territories beyond Europe and control the key areas for confronting, limiting or preventing the rise of Asian powers and turning into new hegemons. As long as, the driving/leading nation's (the US) ambitions have coincided with the interests of Great nations and bandwagoning attempts of Middle and small powers, NATO will remain relevant and continue to transform itself to respond new threats, most of which are against the US itself. This is the true realist expression of conduct of business in "one for all, all for one" understanding among the major states at stage.

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[469] Barnett, *op.cit.*, p.xix

[470] *Idem.*, p.62

[471] Hamilton, *op.cit.*, p.viii-ix.

[472] *Idem.*, p.vi-xi.

[473] ERHAN, *op.cit.*

The EU, itself, is on the way to increase its share in global affairs as much as the environment permits. NATO proved to be an effective venue for such influence, yet the ESDP would register the merits on only EU credits. New threat perceptions will create an incentive for acquiring more capable and technology driven assets. However, this will deepen the gap between those providing and those buying.

The reason that NATO, under leadership of the US, transforms in three domains, functional, geographical, and institutional is due the ultimate goal of creating strong military alliances, forging its global power through out of area crisis management operations, of which the legitimacy of actions are ensured by the political strength of its members.

In order that NATO serves both "preventing an external power from trying to alter the international territorial status quo" and "preventing any of member states from wishing to do the same[474]", it has to continue its transformation. Whether NATO reached the geographic limits[475] that it could manage to hold for directing and controlling the rest of the world in both political and military means for achieving necessary coercive power is not yet clear. Wherever the enlargement goes, it should not and cannot provoke a coalition of enemies[476]. But it is clear that the alliance has to build symbiotic relations with partners in Central Asia and the Middle East so that it concretizes the stronghold against the Asian powers.

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[474] Russett, Stam, *op.cit.*, p.380.

[475] Rynning, *op.cit.*, p.183.

[476] Russett, Stam, *op.cit.*, p.382.

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Appendix A: NATO-EU Chronology

- 27 April 2006: Informal ministerial NATO-EU dinner (Sofia).

- 1 March 2006: EU Cell set up at SHAPE.

- 7 December 2005: Informal ministerial NATO-EU dinner (Brussels)

- 3 November 2005: NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff (EUMS)

- 3 October 2005: Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Liaison Team at EUMS and an EU cell at SHAPE

- 20 September 2005: Informal ministerial transatlantic/ NATO-EU lunch (New York)

- 2 December 2004: beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea.

- 18 February 2004: France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid reaction units composed of joint battle groups

- December 2003: NATO and the EU start to assess options for the possible termination of NATO's stabilization force in Bosnia (SFOR) by the end of 2004 and its transition to a new EU mission; Adoption by the European Council of a 'European Security Strategy'

- 19-25 November 2003: First joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise (CME/CMX 03) based on the standing 'Berlin-Plus' arrangements

- 29 July 2003: Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans

- 19 May 2003: First meeting of the NATO-EU capability group

- 31 March 2003: Transition from the NATO-led operation 'Allied Harmony' to the EU-led Operation 'Concordia' in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[1]

- 17 March 2003: Agreement on a set of key cooperation documents, known as the 'Berlin-Plus' package

- 14 March 2003: Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement

- 16 December 2002: EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

- 21-22 November 2002: At the Prague Summit, NATO members declare their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily

- 19 November 2001: Creation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)

- 30 May 2001: First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Budapest. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issue a joint statement on the Western Balkans

- 24 January 2001: Beginning of institutionalized relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and Ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation

- 7 December 2000: Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003)

- 19 September 2000: The North Atlantic Council and the interim Political and Security Committee of the European Union meet for the first time to take stock of the progress in NATO-EU relations

- 10 December 1999: At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU, by 2003, to deploy up to 15 brigades (50 000 – 60 000 troops) for 'Petersberg tasks' (these consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking). EU members also create political and military structures including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.

- 3-4 June 1999: European Council meeting in Cologne decides "to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence"

- 23-25 April 1999: At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the 'Berlin-Plus' arrangements

- 3-4 December 1998: At a summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU's determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

- 2 October 1997: Signature of the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam incorporating the WEU's 'Petersberg tasks'. The EU affirms the role of the WEU as an integral part of its development and envisages the possible integration of the WEU into the European Union

- 3 June 1996: in Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up an ESDI within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term "Berlin-Plus"

- January 1994: At the Brussels Summit, NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides for separable but not separate deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries

- 11 January 1994: NATO Heads of State and Government agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy

- 19 June 1992: In Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the 'Petersberg tasks'

- February 1992: the EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and "the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP). The WEU is considered as the EU's defence component; close cooperation between NATO and the WEU.

Source: http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/chronology.html

Appendix B: Map of EU Operations and Missions

Appendix C: Map of NATO and EU Missions/Operation

Appendix D: EUCOM's Area of Responsibility Footprint

Spangdahlem AB

Wiesbaden

Grafenwoehr Complex

RAF Mildenhall / Lakenheath

Aviano

Ramstein AB / Kaiserslautern

JTF-E

Vicenza Complex

NAS Rota

Naples

Incirlik AB

⭐ Forward Stationed Forces (MOB/FOS)

Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC)

Cooperative Security Locations (CSL)

Deployed Locations

Appendix E: US AFRICOM Presence Map

Appendix F: Overlap Representation of NATO Security Commitment With Respect to European Security Institutions

Source: Thomas S.Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-2015, (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001), p.31

Appendix G: Decreasing Levels of NATO Security Commitment

NATO

EU

MAP

PfP/EAPC

OSCE

Source: Thomas S.Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-2015, (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001), p.32

Appendix H: 1. Map of Member and Partner Nations of the Alliance

Legend:
- NATO
- CANDIDATE
- PfP
- MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE
- ICI

NATO Member Nations (26):

Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, İceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Polond, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US.

23 PfP Nations, three of whcih are Candidates*.

Albania*, Armenia, Austuria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia*, Finland, Macedonia*, Georgia, İrland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Mediterannean Dialogue (MD)

Algeria, Egypt, Israel
Jordon, Mauritania
Morocco, Tunusia

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

Kuwait, United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Qatar, Umman,
Saudi Arabia

EAPC : 26 + 24 = 50

MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE : 7

ALGERIA, MOROCCO, ISRAEL, EGYPT, MAURITANIA, TUNUSIA, JORDAN.

ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE : 4

KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, QATAR, UAE.

NATO : 26

BELGIUM, CANADA, CZECH REP., DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLOND, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, ICELAND, TURKEY, USA, UK. BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LITHUANIA, LATVIA, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA.

ALBANIA   MACEDONIA

CROATIA

MAP : 3

GEORGIA(ID)
AZERBAIJAN
ARMENIA
KAZAKHSTAN   UKRAINE(ID)
MOLDOVA
TAJIKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN

IRLAND
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
UZBEKISTAN
BELARUS
FINLAND   RUSSIA

TURKMENISTAN

PARP : 16

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

MONTENEGRO
MALTA

SERBIA

BİO : 24

CONTACT COUNTRIES: 16

ARGENTINE, AUSTURALIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, CHINA, INDONASIA, KOREA, INDIA, JAPAN, COLOMBIA, MALAYSIA, PAKISTAN, SINGAPOUR, SOUTH AFRIKA, MONGOLIA, NEW ZELAND.

Appendix I: List of Nations in Main European Security Related Institutions

	NATO	EU	EU Future[a]	MAP[b]	EAPC/ PfP[c]	OSCE[c]	MD[e]	ICI[f]	CC [g]
Belgium	X	X			X	X			
Bulgaria	X	X			X	X			
Czech Republic	X	X			X	X			
Denmark	X	X			X	X			
Estonia	X	X			X	X			
France	X	X			X	X			
Germany	X	X			X	X			
Greece	X	X			X	X			
Hungary	X	X			X	X			
Iceland	X				X	X			
Italy	X	X			X	X			
Latvia	X	X			X	X			
Lithuania	X	X			X	X			
Luxembourg	X	X			X	X			
Netherlands	X	X			X	X			
Norway	X				X	X			
Poland	X	X			X	X			
Portugal	X	X			X	X			
Romania	X	X			X	X			
Slovakia	X	X			X	X			
Slovenia	X	X			X	X			
Spain	X	X			X	X			
Turkey	X		X		X	X			
United Kingdom	X	X			X	X			
United States	X				X	X			
Canada	X				X	X			

	NATO	EU	EU Future[a]	MAP[b]	EAPC/ PfP[c]	OSCE[c]	MD[e]	ICI[f]	CC [g]
Austria		X			X	X			
Cyprus (South)		X							
Finland		X			X	X			
Ireland		X			X	X			
Malta		X			X	X			
Sweden		X			X	X			
Albania				X	X	X			
Croatia			XX	XX	X	X			
Macedonia			XXX	X	X	X			
Montenegro			XXXX						
Switzerland					X	X			
Others[d]						X			
Algeria							X		
Egypt							X		
Israel							X		
Jordan							X		
Mauritania							X		
Morocco							X		
Tunisia							X		
Kuwait								X	
Bahrain								X	
Qatar								X	
United Arab Emirates								X	
Argentine									X
Australia									X
Brazil									X
Chile									X
China									X

	NATO	EU	EU Future[a]	MAP[b]	EAPC/ PfP[c]	OSCE[c]	MD[e]	ICI[f]	CC [g]
Colombia									X
India									X
Indonesia									X
Japan									X
Korea									X
Malaysia									X
Mongolia									X
New Zealand									X
Pakistan									X
Singapore									X
South Africa									X

[a] X invited to EU accession talks in 1999, XX invited to EU accession talks in 2004, XXX invited to EU accession talks in 2008.

[b] X membership is expected to realize during 60th anniversary of NATO, 3-4 April 2009, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, XX invited to NATO Membership after resolving name issue with Greece.

[c] EAPC, PfP, and OSCE also include the two North American NATO members (United States and Canada), and the post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan (EAPC only), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

[d] Andorra, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino.

[e] MD: Mediterranean Dialogue

[f] ICI: Istanbul Initiative Cooperation

[g] CC: Contact Countries