

E-GOVERNMENTALISATION OF THE STATE:
ON THE WAY TO SOCIETY OF CONTROL?

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ABSTRACT

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In this study, the emergence of e-government as a ‘governing rationality’ (i.e. e-governmentalisation) is analyzed from the Foucauldian genealogical perspective. In that sense, the type of governing rationalities, the modes of subjectivities, the strategies of power-knowledge and the practices of normalization/inclusion and exclusion that are linked to the emergence of e-governmentalisation are emphasized. Deleuze’s essay on ‘the societies of control’ is used as a theoretical framework in which the emergence of e-governmentalisation is positioned. Different aspects of the society of control are discussed within different chapters taking into account the material transformations in capitalism, the changing mentalities of the state, changing practices and rationalities of surveillance and the changing rationalities of inclusion and exclusion. Based on these analyzes, it is claimed that e-governmentalisation has two interrelated aspects. On the one hand, it is an ‘ethico-political’ rationality which tries to transform individuals into active, techno-entrepreneurial subjects which is required for the production and re-production of the neoliberal knowledge-based society. On the other hand, it is a rationality of surveillance which tries to govern individuals through enhanced systems of surveillance such as databases. Throughout the thesis, the context of

Turkey in terms of these two aspects of e-governmentalisation is also taken into account in order to make the theoretical discussions more concrete. It is concluded that e-governmentalisation is an intensifying rationality of the state which may have an influence on the identities of the citizens, on the formal citizenship status and on practices of inclusion and exclusion.

Keywords: E-government, Governmentality, Information Society, Neoliberalism, Surveillance.

ÖZ

DEVLETİN E-YÖNETİMSELLEŞME SÜRECİ: DENETİM TOPLUMUNA DOĞRU?

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Bu çalışmada, e-devletin ortaya çıkışı, Foucaultcu soykütüksel perspektiften bir ‘yönetim rasyonalitesi’ yani ‘e-yönetimselleşme’ olarak analiz edilmiştir. Bu anlamda, e-yönetimselleşmenin ortaya çıkışıyla bağlantılı olan yönetim rasyonaliteleri, öznellik tipleri, bilgi-iktidar stratejileri ve normalizasyon/içleme ve dışlama pratikleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Deleuze’un ‘denetim toplumları’ üzerine yazdığı denemesi teorik çerçeve olarak kullanılmış ve e-yönetimselleşmenin ortaya çıkışı bu çerçeve içinde açıklanmıştır. Denetim toplumlarının farklı yönleri tezin farklı bölümlerinde tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışmalarda günümüzde kapitalizmde meydana gelen değişimler, devletin yönetim mantığında meydana gelen değişimler, gözetim pratikleri ve rasyonalitelerinde meydana gelen değişimler ve içleme ve dışlama pratiklerinde meydana gelen değişimler üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu analizlere dayanarak, e-yönetimselleşmenin birbiriyle bağlantılı iki yönü olduğu iddia edilmiştir. E-yönetimselleşme, bir yanıyla bireyleri neoliberal bilgi toplumlarının üretim ve yeniden üretimi için gerekli olan aktif, tekno-girişimçi öznelere dönüştürmeye çalışan ‘etik-politik’ bir rasyonalitedir. Diğer yanıyla ise bireyleri veritabanları gibi gelişmiş gözetim sistemleri yoluyla yönetmeye çalışan bir gözetim rasyonalitesidir. Teorik tartışmaları somutlaştırmak amacıyla, tez

boyunca e-yönetimselleşmenin bu iki boyutuna dair Türkiye bağlamından örnekler verilmiştir. Sonuç kısmında e-yönetimselleşmenin devletin giderek yoğunlaşan bir yönetim rasyonalitesi olduğu ve bu sürecin vatandaşlarının kimlikleri, resmi vatandaşlık statüsü ve işleme ve dışlama pratikleri üzerinde etkisi olabileceği vurgulanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: E-devlet, Yönetimsellik, Bilgi Toplumu, Neoliberalizm, Gözetim.

To my family

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary societies, there is a growing interest of the states in e-government. Although e-government is basically defined as a reform in the provision of public services (e.g. tax payment) through the usage of information and communication technologies (ICTs), what various discourses on e-government shows us is that the term covers much more. E-government not only indicates the will to transform state into an electronic state but also the will to transform the economy into a knowledge-based economy, society into an information society, and the individual into an e-individual. It is in this sense that e-government represents a new way 'reasoning' about the economy, society and the self. According to this new 're-configuration', a new type of economy that is knowledge-based, that is organized in flexible networks, and that is working properly according to the rules of free market competition is praised and various tactics are employed for accomplishing these tasks. On the other hand, a new kind of subject (i.e. e-individual) emerges within these discourses who is flexible, active, agile, globalized and who has technological and entrepreneurial abilities. In that sense, 'e-government' emerges not as a simple institutional reform, but as an 'ethico-political technology' which forms or aims to form a part of what we think about ourselves and others. In this way, among other factors (e.g. ethnicity) that are trying to give shape to the identity of the citizens, e-government also aims to transform citizens ethically by means of imposing certain modes of conducts to them.

On the other hand, we also witness the growing scope of surveillance activities of the state within the process of e-government such as codifying information about the citizens in the databases, obliging them to use single identification number at each citizenship transaction, storing these transactions in the databases, constructing individual computer profiles, implementing various data-matching technologies, sharing the gathered information among institutions

and even proposing to implement such surveillance instruments as electronic ID cards. Thus, the rationalities and practices of surveillance are also important parts of the process of e-government which aims to manage individuals in the databases.

Therefore, in order to understand these social facts, in this study, a genealogical path is followed, locating the emergence of e-government within a political-economic field of power interactions. Consequently, the type of governing rationalities, the modes of subjectivities, the kinds of truths and the practices of normalization/inclusion and exclusion that are linked to the emergence of e-government are the main concerns of this study. In other words, 'e-government' is taken as a 'governing rationality' (i.e. e-governmentalisation) of the state which is linked to new modes of being. To put it another way, this thesis aims to answer the following questions; what are the conditions of possibility of the emergence of e-government as a governing rationality? What type of strategies of power and knowledge are at play in this process? What kinds of subjectivities are linked to this process? What kinds of practices of inclusion/normalization and exclusion are at play in this process? Why the appropriate characteristics of individuals have started to be defined in terms of flexibility, agility, being active, having technological and entrepreneurial skills? Where does surveillance stand in this process and to what ends does it serve? In which ways is surveillance linked to these new definitions about society, the economy and the individual?

In order to answer these questions and to locate the emergence of e-governmentalisation within a historically contingent and diverse field of power interactions, a Foucauldian perspective is applied throughout the thesis in combination with the Deleuzian insights. Thus, such methodological tools as governmentality, genealogy, bio-politics and the diagram are used together in combination with each other. Deleuze's (1992) short essay on the 'diagram' of 'the society of control' which outlines the power interactions of our contemporary world is particularly used as a theoretical framework in which the emergence of e-governmentalisation is positioned. Alongside Foucault and Deleuze, the works of

other scholars¹ are also referred in order to reveal the different aspects of the society of control in a more concrete and detailed way. These different aspects are investigated within different chapters of this study (i.e. material aspects, neoliberalism, surveillance, citizenship). In the final chapter, these aspects of the society of control are investigated within the context of e-governmentalisation process of the state. The context of Turkey is also taken into account in this chapter in order to make the theoretical discussions more concrete. To provide a brief outline of the study;

In the chapter 2, the methodological issues are discussed in the light of the Foucauldian political philosophy. The definitions of such concepts as government, power, knowledge, truth, discourse, ethico-politics, technologies of domination, technologies of the self, genealogy and the diagram are emphasized and the links between these concepts are established. First, following a Foucauldian answer to the question of ‘how one governs oneself?’ the characteristics of power, the role of the state and the integrity of the regimes of truth into the government of oneself are clarified. Later, in order to give a historical dimension to these clarifications, the concept of genealogy is discussed as a method locating the emergence of ‘things’ in historically contingent power interactions and thus writing the history of the present. Finally, the concept of diagram is emphasized as the ‘map’ of interactions

¹Among others, I should mention the works of Rose (1999), Dean (1999), Fraser (2003) and Ong (2006). It should also be noted that, Deleuze’s short essay on the society of control has been interpreted in many different ways by different scholars in the literature. For instance, Hardt & Negri (2000) focus on the political-economic side of the issue in order to locate the changing mentalities of power as we pass from disciplinary societies to the societies of control. Thus, their analysis disregards the surveillance part. On the other hand, in the surveillance literature, society of control is mostly used in order to emphasize the intensification of the surveillance power of the state through computer technology. These analyses also fail to grasp the changing mentalities of power which is crucial for understanding contemporary surveillance. In this thesis, I use both sides of the society of control which is similar to Rose’s interpretation (1999: 233-273). However, I do not follow any rigid schema and extend my analysis with the relevant works, even if the term society of control is not used within them, such as work and organization literature (e.g. Boltanski & Chiapello 2002, Du Gay 1996, Fraser 2003,) political economy literature (e.g. Harvey 1990, 2005, Castells 2000), neoliberal governmentality literature (e.g. Cruikshank 1999, Gordon 1991, Lemke 2001), surveillance/risk/criminology literature (e.g. Bogard 1996, Castel 1991, Ericson & Haggerty 1997) and citizenship literature (e.g. Isin 2002, White & Hunt 2000). On the other hand, it should also be noted that these figures are not also too distinct from each other in these sense that most of them remain close to Foucauldian perspective.

between diverse elements (i.e. power, knowledges, identities, institutions, practices, strategies) in specific historical periods.

In the chapter 3, following this definition of the diagram, different diagrams of power are discussed corresponding to different interactions of power in different historical periods. First, following the works of Foucault, two diagrams are discussed: the society of sovereignty (i.e. feudalism) and the society of discipline (i.e. modernity). Thus, the changing mentalities of power are emphasized as we pass from feudalism to modernity so as to reveal the genealogy of the modern man. Such concepts as ‘governmentalisation of the state’ and ‘bio-politics’ are also discussed as parts of the disciplinary diagram. Based on these discussions, the diagram of the disciplinary society is revealed which ‘maps’ the changing interactions of power with modernity and capitalism and which shows how these changes affect the subjectivities of individuals (i.e. docile and utile subjects), rationalities of the state (i.e. governmental state, bio-politics), practices of institutions (i.e. disciplinary practices of training, enclosing, reforming) and the practices of normalization and exclusion (i.e. normalization of people in the panoptic organizations so as to transform them into utile and docile subjectivities or excluding those who cannot conduct themselves according to these norms). At the end of this chapter, Deleuze’s claims about the passage from the society of discipline to the society of control are outlined briefly. In the following four chapters different aspects of Deleuze’s society of control, which corresponds to our contemporary world, are investigated in detail. Within these investigations, the focus is to reveal the interactions between power, knowledge, identities, practices and strategies of inclusion and exclusion in the contemporary world.

In the chapter 4, the material aspects of the society of control are emphasized. That is, the material transformations in capitalism (i.e. post-Fordism, informational capitalism, information society) since the 1970s are the focus of this section. However, the analysis is not limited to structural/economical transformations but also includes the transformations in the practices of subjectification as we pass from Fordism to post-Fordism, from energy-based

capitalism to informational capitalism. Thus, the appropriate worker-subject that is required for the production and re-production of the contemporary capitalist system is emphasized in which such discourses as ‘flexibilization’ and ‘digitalization’ emerges as new strategies for constructing worker-subjects.

In the chapter 5, these new strategies of subjectification are discussed at a broader level, covering the relations between the state and the citizen. Accordingly, neoliberalism is the focus of this chapter. After clarifying the differences between different approaches to neoliberalism, neoliberalism as a governing rationality (i.e. neoliberal governmentality) is emphasized which is trying to diffuse to the society at the ‘capillary’ level through the imposition of certain ethical norms on the subjects so as to direct their conducts for certain ends in the contemporary world. In that sense, in a world in which the state no longer takes the responsibility for protecting the citizens against social risks, within such ethico-political discourses as ‘active society’ and ‘active citizen’, there emerges a kind of subjectivity who is ‘entrepreneur of himself or herself’ who continuously invests in his/her human capital and who does not require the state to assist him/her. Thus, together with the chapter 4, this chapter reveals what is being an appropriate, ‘virtuous’ subject in the society of control, providing us with an analysis for the relationships between power, knowledge and identity.

In the chapter 6, surveillance is discussed as another important part of the diagram of the society of control. After providing a historical analysis about the relationships between the modern state and the surveillance practices, contemporary surveillance is taken into account emphasizing the continuities as well as discontinuities in the rationalities of the state and the type of subjectivities that are linked to these rationalities. In that sense, although surveillance is always concerned with gathering information about individuals and using this information for the purposes of social sorting (i.e. distinguishing the ‘good’ citizen from the ‘bad’ one), in contemporary world there are some important transformations as well. The first line of these transformations is about the technical side of the issue (i.e. usage of computers and databases in surveillance). The second line is related to the other

diagrammatic aspects of the society of control such as neoliberal governmentality and the emergence of the risk discourse. In this chapter, these two transformations are positioned within the context of the society of control in which the ‘responsibilization of the self’ through neoliberal governmentality goes hand in hand with dividing the population into risk groups, so as to distinguish the responsible individuals (i.e. active, entrepreneurial subjectivities) from the irresponsible ones (i.e. unemployed masses, welfare dependents, unskilled labor), including the former while excluding and/or marginalizing the latter. Hence, surveillance functions as an important complementary element of the former parts of the diagram of the society of control in the sense that it is a tool which turns individuals into database codes (i.e. what Deleuze calls ‘dividuals’), which sort and categorize people according to their level of riskiness and which include or exclude them according to these categorizations. Therefore, this chapter shows us how the interactions between power, knowledge, truths and identities affect the exclusionary practices of the state.²

In the chapter 7, these diverse aspects of the diagram of the society of control are investigated and combined within the context of citizenship. After a brief discussion of the citizenship literature, a Foucauldian approach is applied in which the citizen is taken as a ‘social construct’. The focus in this chapter is to reveal the criteria of being a virtuous citizen in the society of control and how inclusion and exclusion to/from citizenship functions according to these criteria. Based on the previous discussions, it is argued that in the society of control the exercising of citizenship depends on two interrelated criteria: neoliberalism and a legitimate database record. Inclusion and exclusion to/from citizenship also function according to these criteria. On the one hand, the state tries to ‘include’ the individuals into the system through such strategies as ‘empowerment’ or ‘lifelong learning’ provided that the individuals become successful in establishing a

² Throughout the thesis the term ‘exclusion’ is used in a broader sense, covering all practices which affect the life chances of people in a negative way such as discrimination and marginalization. In that sense, all attempts for categorizing people through surveillance mechanisms and treating them differently according to these categorizations can be conceived as exclusionary practices.

particular relationship with themselves that is based on the model of enterprise (i.e. neoliberal criteria). On the other hand, for those who are seen as lacking the ability for self-government, for those who are seen as threats for the general good, and for those who are too risky to be integrated into society, various authoritarian surveillance instruments (e.g. databases, electronic ID cards, CCTV cameras) are employed so as to exclude them from citizenship. Thus, in this chapter both sides of the bio-political strategies of the state in the control society (i.e. fostering the life forces of some individuals while excluding and/or marginalizing the others) are emphasized and the interactions between power, knowledge, truths, identities, practices and strategies are revealed.

In the chapter 8, finally, the links between different aspects of the society of control (i.e. material aspects, neoliberalism, surveillance, citizenship) and ‘e-governmentalisation of the state’ is identified. After briefly discussing the different approaches to the term ‘e-government’ (i.e. institutional, e-democracy, developmental), the chapter focuses on e-government as a state rationality, that is ‘e-governmentalisation’, which is linked to modes of subjectivities and the strategies of power-knowledge associated with the society of control. Following this definition, e-governmentalisation process is investigated in three parts which correspond to three different aspects of the society of control. In these investigations, the context of Turkey is also taken into account in order to make the theoretical discussions more concrete. In the first two parts (i.e. material aspects/information society and neoliberalism), the focus was to identify how e-governmentalisation is linked to the material transformations in capitalism (i.e. post-Fordism, informational capitalism), to the changing mentalities of the state (i.e. neoliberal governmentality) and to the changing strategies of subjectification (i.e. flexibilization, digitalization, being entrepreneur of oneself). Concerning the other side of e-governmentalisation, namely the surveillance, the focus was to identify how surveillance functions through which rationalities (i.e. governing individuals as individuals) and through which apparatuses (e.g. databases, electronic ID cards, CCTV cameras). Besides this, the links between surveillance and the first two

aspects of e-governmentalisation is identified in order to emphasize on how rationalities of surveillance (i.e. neoliberal governmentality, the discourse of risk) are tied to the material transformations in capitalism and to the changing mentalities of the state. Based on these discussions and taking into account all the three aspects of e-governmentalisation, it is argued that, the state becomes e-governmentalised in the society of control in which people are obliged to become flexible, techno-entrepreneurs in order to satisfy the requirements of the contemporary informational capitalism and the neoliberal governmentality on the one hand. On the other hand, enhanced tools of surveillance turn them into 'dividuals' which enables the authorities to sort/categorize people in the databases, to create risk groups and even to prevent their access to certain spaces and to certain citizenship rights. Thus, in this chapter, the roles of both sides of the diagram of the society of control in the process of e-governmentalisation are identified and it is concluded that transforming passive masses into active technopreneurial subjectivities and transforming individuals into database codes (i.e. dividuals) through enhanced surveillance mechanisms go together in this process. At the end of the chapter, the potential of e-governmentalisation in defining the criteria of being a virtuous citizen and the possible social outcomes of this definition (i.e. the changing practices of inclusion and exclusion) are discussed.

Finally, in the conclusion chapter, the aims and the outcomes of the study are concluded emphasizing on the limits of e-governmentalisation and this study itself, and how genealogical approach may offer us the necessary tools to resist against the 'e-governmental power'.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The apparatus of the State is a concrete assemblage which realizes the machine of over-coding of a society

Gilles Deleuze

2.1. On the Government of the Living

One of the fundamental questions of the history of thought is perhaps ‘How one governs oneself?’ for the answer to this question reveals what one understands from ethics and politics and from the relations between these two. A Foucauldian answer to this question can be found in Foucault’s definition of ‘government’.

Foucault defines the term government shortly as “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour” (2000: 81). Government here is not limited to the political power of the state; rather it refers to all activities that aim to direct, guide and shape the conduct of subjects for particular ends. As Dean points out, government is not only about “how we exercise authority over others, or how we govern abstract entities such as states and populations, but how we govern ourselves” (1999: 12).³ This broad definition of government brings many new insights about the characteristics of power and the role of the state in society and challenges the traditional perceptions of political science deeply.

Rather than taking the state as a unified, centralized whole, as an apparatus in the hands of some groups that forces its subjects to obey its rules through either coercion or consent, the Foucauldian approach of government focuses on the

³ It should be noted that Foucault uses the term government in two senses (Rose 1996: 41- 42). In the first sense, government has a more generalized meaning which concerns the practices of government that can be found in any society, in any period as long as there is a will to “govern” subjects in an ethical way. In the second sense, government has a narrower meaning which is limited to the modern period and is linked to such modern practices of power as discipline and bio-power. In this study, I follow the first meaning of government (i.e. there are countless regimes of government and countless types of the governed in various historical periods). However, I am mostly interested in modern and contemporary forms of government that are associated with the Deleuze’s society of control.

multiple elements; power, knowledge, techniques, agencies, identities which interact with each other in complex ways and in which subjects learn how to govern and be governed within different settings. That is why the political power cannot be reduced to the external, coercive, repressive activities of the state nor it can be reduced to the domination of some group over another by means of ‘capturing’ the power of the state; political power is diffused to our perceptions about ourselves and others, our ‘truths’, our ways of governing ourselves.

That is not to say that the state as a centralized apparatus of rule does not have any function in the government of subjects. On the contrary, although it is not the sole author in shaping the conduct of subjects, it has a very critical role in establishing the links between diverse elements (i.e. power, knowledge, identities, etc.) and thus directing the conduct of subjects for particular ends (Rose 1999: 5). Therefore, the Foucauldian approach to government does not underestimate the power of the state. It rather rejects the traditional ‘political vocabulary’ which is constructed on the distinctions between “state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy” (Rose & Miller 1992: 174). In that sense, rather than taking power negatively, as a coercive force that represses individuals, power is understood in ‘positive’ terms. In Foucault’s words, “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault 1991: 194). For this reason, power does not only exist in the places where there is repression and coercion; it may also exist where there is individual autonomy and freedom of choice.⁴

Therefore, by means of conceptualizing power in positive terms and rejecting the traditional perceptions about the relations between the state and the subject, Foucauldian approach indeed offers us how the state becomes linked to the self. To put it another way, one of the main contributions of the Foucauldian

⁴ For instance, as it will be discussed in the chapter 5, neoliberalism as a mode of power does not aim to repress individuals but to govern them through their “freedom”, albeit it is a “disciplined freedom”. This is done through imposing ethical norms upon individuals so as to make them able to govern themselves in a responsible manner without requiring any assistance from the welfare state.

approach to government is its success in establishing a link between micro and macro elements of power, between the self and the state, between the ethics and politics, which is a largely neglected theme in traditional political philosophy. What is the actual relationship between these two entities (i.e. the self and the state) then? In an essay titled 'The Subject and Power', Foucault provides a concrete schema about this relation;

I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their existence, but on the contrary a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns (Foucault 1982: 214).

Thus, on the one hand there is the state as a 'technology of domination' which tries to integrate the individual to itself. The state assembles diverse elements (i.e. power, knowledges, truths, techniques, and institutions) together so as to shape and direct the conduct of individuals for particular ends. On the other hand, there is the individual who is not a passive entity. The individual also assembles his/her own technologies which Foucault terms as 'technologies of the self'. It is through these technologies of the self that individuals act upon their own conducts, cultivate their souls and bodies for particular ends "so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (Foucault 1988a: 18). Consequently, it is the interaction of these two technologies (i.e. technologies of state/domination and the technologies of the self) that one governs him/herself.

Therefore, for Foucault 'government' is a "contact point where techniques of domination [...] and techniques of self interact" with each other (Burchell 1996: 20). To put it in a more concrete manner, through this interaction of the two techniques, techniques of domination aim to form 'appropriate subjects' in order for its power to diffuse to society at the 'capillary' level. However, subjects are not passive in this interaction; what is called as 'technologies of the self' always bear a

potential to resist and refuse what the state imposes to the self. As Dean points out, technologies of domination do not directly determine the types of subjectivity. Rather, “they elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (1999: 32). It’s up to the subject to accept or to refuse the state-promoted capacities as a part of his/her identity. However, refusing what is attributed by the state is not easy task since the subjects are ‘graded’ in the view of the state according to their level of ‘internalization’ of the promoted attributes. While those who define themselves with the ‘promoted’ capacities and behave accordingly become ‘good’ citizens, those who refuse to attach the promoted labels to their identity and/or who cannot act appropriately are labeled as ‘bad’ citizens. The state may intervene to the lives of these bad citizens, through either ‘liberal’ or authoritarian techniques, in order to ‘cure’ and ‘correct’ them and to adjust them to the norms of civility. It may also exclude them, preventing their access to certain rights.

Another outcome of this relationship between the state and the self is the integrity of the ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘true discourses’ within the government of oneself. If we return to the former schema, what is imposed by the state is indeed a certain ‘truth’ about the self (e.g. being a responsible citizen, being a person with sexuality, being a hardworking student, being a knowledge professional). On the other hand, concerning our ‘inner’ world (i.e. technologies of the self), we also have some ‘truths’ about ourselves and our existence which may be compatible or incompatible with that of the state. In any case, in the end, it is through these truth regimes, ‘true’ discourses about the self in which we are judged by the state authorities, by other people and by ourselves. The sum of the attributes that we internalize as ‘true’ and that we refuse as ‘untrue’ gives us an identity and a ranking in the social life. We become ‘virtuous citizens’ or ‘risky subjects’ through these regimes of truth. As Foucault points out; “we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a

function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power” (1980a: 94).⁵

If we return to the question of ‘how one governs oneself’, the Foucauldian answer is clearer now. One governs himself or herself by means of the interaction between the technologies of domination and the technologies of the self; through internalizing or refusing the specific attributes, specific behavioral norms that are offered by the state. It is in this sense that micro and macro elements of power are tied together. How we govern ourselves is inextricable from the rationalities of the state. Ethics and politics are not two separate entities; ethics is always politics and vice versa. In fact, we can talk about only ethico-politics.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that what can be called as ethico-politics does not have an ahistorical, transcendental dimension. Political rationalities of the state and the kind of subjectivities that are linked to these rationalities change continuously due to new interactions of power. In that sense, what distinguishes the ‘desired’, ‘appropriate’ form of conducts from the ‘undesired’ ones has a necessarily historical character and is linked to the political-economic characteristics of a particular society (e.g. being a utile/docile worker or being an active citizen are appropriate form of conducts only for certain periods of time and in certain types of societies). Thus, in order to give a historical account of what we have discussed so far, a genealogical perspective should be applied.

2.2. Genealogy

Genealogy is a Nietzschean method of analyzing history. It differs from traditional historical methods substantially both in its aims and its techniques for approaching history. According to Nietzsche “anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it” (2006: 51).

⁵ It is important to point out that the production of ‘true discourses’ is not limited to the direct government of the human subjects. For instance, regarding the government of the economy, the state also thinks in terms of the ‘truths’ that are provided by the ‘true sciences’ such as economy and tries to shape the economy according to these true discourses (e.g. In our contemporary world, it tries to shape the economy according to the ‘truths’ of neoliberalism and information society).

Thus, there are continuous power interactions which try to interpret and re-interpret the 'things' throughout the history. That is the reason why, what we see today as a coherent entity is actually only a successive interpretation. As Geuss (2001: 325) points out, Nietzsche's own work on the history of Christian morality shows us that what we understand as Christianity today has little relation with the 'origin' of Christianity. As Nietzsche shows, Christianity had emerged within the combination of historically contingent and diverse factors such as the desire of priestly cast to dominate others or the hostility of the slaves against their masters. Thus, the meaning of Christianity has changed over time through various power interactions which gave it a new shape: "each historically successive interpretation/*coup de main* gives the existing Christian way of life a new 'meaning'" (Geuss 2001: 331).

It is for this reason that, there are neither single origins nor transcendental truths about things. Things are in constant flux; continuously changing and having new forms. They are interpreted and re-interpreted due to new interactions of power. Since there may be countless interpretations about the 'nature' of things, their first origin may be totally incompatible with 'what they are' now. By the same token, they may serve to different ends today even though they have originated from different needs. As Foucault points out, things have "no essence or [...] their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (1977: 142).

A genealogical study, therefore, is not interested in the origins or continuous developments since it refuses that there can be an essential truth about the origins of the things. Rather, it is interested in the interactions of power that make up things in specific historical periods. In this way, genealogy aims to reveal how things have emerged in a specific historical period and how their meaning has changed (i.e. re-interpreted) through time; how our truths about things have developed and how these truths have changed through time. The critical and revolutionary aspect of genealogical investigations also lies in here: through showing how the 'truths' are constructed socially and historically within the interactions of power, genealogy reveals us how things may have developed differently. As Foucault points out, "it disturbs what was previously considered as immobile; it fragments what was

thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (1977: 147). To put it another way, by means of showing us what we have taken for granted about our identities (e.g. being a responsible person, having sexuality, being an active citizen) have no natural or essential value and that they are only the product of power interactions of a certain period of time (e.g. modernity), genealogy provides us with the tools to think ‘otherwise’, to think ‘differently’. Thus, “the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation” (Foucault 1977: 162).

If we consider the previous schema about ‘the government of the living’ and ‘genealogy’ together, we may conclude that what the state imposes onto the self (i.e. different modes of being, characteristics, attributes etc.) has no origin and has no essential value. However, through making genealogical investigations on these state-fostered capacities, we may reveal how these attributes are linked to the historically contingent factors and to the political-economic field of power interactions. In fact, this is precisely the task of genealogy.⁶

At this point one needs a general framework in order to reveal how the state-fostered capacities have changed historically within the interactions of power; how the truths about ourselves, about others and about the external world have developed and changed through time; how the criteria of being an ‘appropriate subject’ and the criteria of ‘being a good society’ have gained new forms through time. For this task, in order to locate the relationships between the technologies of

⁶ As it will be discussed in chapter 4 about material aspects of the control society, the condition of being ‘flexible’ as a ‘truth’ has a certain political-economic background and is linked to material transformations of capitalism such as post-Fordism. In the former Fordist period, there was no such thing as ‘flexibility’, at least in the form as we use it today. Therefore, by genealogically tracing the ‘truths’ about how an appropriate worker type should be, we may reveal how these truths have no transcendental value and that they are only the result of a new interpretation of power interactions. On the other hand, genealogy is not limited to the truths about subjects; anything can be investigated genealogically as long as its emergence is located within historically contingent power interactions. For instance, as it will be discussed in chapter 6, the emergence of high-tech surveillance mechanisms is related to the continuation of a former state rationality of surveillance within historically contingent factors of our time such as neoliberalism and post-Fordism which represent the desire to distinguish the risky individual from proper citizens.

domination and the technologies of the self in specific historical periods, another concept may be useful: the diagram.

2.3. The Diagram

The concept of diagram was firstly used by Foucault (1991)⁷ and later developed by Deleuze (2006) who gave the concept a more explanatory and sociological dimension. As Deleuze points out, “the diagram [...] is a map that is coextensive with the whole social field” (2006: 30). It is a map that reveals the complex interactions between diverse elements; power, knowledges, identities, strategies, institutions, discursive and non-discursive forms that are linked to each other in loose assemblages in specific historical periods. In that sense, “the diagram [...] is the map of relations between forces” (2006: 32). Among other relations, it maps the relations between the forces of outside (i.e. domination/coercion) and forces of inside (i.e. technologies of the self) in which subjects learn how to govern themselves; how to act upon their conduct within different settings.

Thus, the diagram “produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth” (Deleuze 2006: 30) in a certain historical period in which the criteria of being an ‘appropriate’ subject and of having appropriate characteristics (e.g. having sexuality) are generated. It also gives new shapes to other social factors such as institutions and applies new strategies according to these generated truths. For instance, if we take the institution of prison as an example, although the prison existed in the feudal world, it gained a new form in the diagram of modernity (i.e. the disciplinary diagram) and its functioning became inextricable from the ‘truths’ of that diagram (2006: 35).⁸ On the other hand, such exclusionary strategies as surveillance are also linked to the generated truths, since the criteria of who is to be

⁷ According to Foucault, ‘Panopticon’ is the diagram of ‘disciplinary societies’. These concepts will be discussed in more detail in the next section, i.e. chapter 3.

⁸ As it will be discussed in the next section, prison gained a regulatory/reformatory character in the disciplinary diagram in order to turn individuals into utile and docile subjectivities which are the ‘truths’ of that period. On the other hand, it is questionable if the prison would sustain its function in the future since diagrams always change as the interactions of power changes.

included and who is to be excluded are set according to these truths.⁹ In this manner, the diagram not only defines what is to be a human being in a particular period, it also assemblages various techniques, institutions, strategies, practices that are linked to this definition.

However, as we have already identified, the generated ‘truths’ do not have any essential value. On the contrary, these truths evolve as the power interactions in that society evolve in which various struggles actively take place against the powers of domination. This is why “every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving” (Deleuze 2006: 30). Thus, a new diagram emerges each time as a result of the new interactions between forces.

Therefore, finally we can ask this question: What are the characteristics of our diagram? What are the material foundations of our diagram? What are the appropriate and inappropriate kinds of subjectivities that are linked to our diagram? How this diagram determines the functioning of institutions, practices and strategies? Which kinds of people are regarded as ‘good’ subjects and how are they rewarded? Which kinds of people become ‘bad’ subjects and how are they normalized or excluded?

We should admit that any kind of answer to these questions is limited since we cannot map all the power interactions of our world. Besides this, even if we did, these interactions cannot be generalized to other societies because “every society has its diagram(s)” (Deleuze 2006: 31). However, although our perspective is limited in many aspects, we can still try to map some of the general characteristics of our contemporary diagram by means of drawing on the works of Foucault and Deleuze, and of locating it in a historical period. Foucault himself broadly identified the characteristics of the diagram of the society of sovereignty (i.e. feudalism) and the society of discipline (i.e. modernity) in his works. On the other hand, in a very short essay Deleuze (1992) outlines the main characteristics of the diagram of the

⁹ As it will be discussed in chapter 6, neoliberalism and post-Fordism set the ‘criteria of being’ in the diagram of the control society and such surveillance mechanisms as electronic ID cards emerge in order to distinguish those who cannot obey this criteria (e.g. unskilled workers, jobless people, immigrants).

society of control which corresponds to our contemporary world. In addition to the original works of Foucault and Deleuze, there a number of scholars who have extended these analyzes to diverse contexts referring to such concepts as post-Fordism, neoliberalism, social policy, surveillance, criminology. citizenship etc.¹⁰

Therefore, in the next section, based on the original writings of Foucault and Deleuze, the main characteristics of the diagram of sovereignty and discipline will be discussed. For the rest of the thesis, the emphasis will be on Deleuze's society of control and its different aspects (i.e. material aspects, neoliberalism and surveillance). Finally, in the last chapter, these discussions about the diagram of the control society will be investigated within the context of e-governmentalisation of the state.

¹⁰ It should be noted that these scholars neither use the term 'society of control' nor follow openly a Deleuzian perspective. Therefore, the links between the society of control and the works of these figures are established in this thesis.

CHAPTER III

DIAGRAMS OF POWER

One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine—with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies.

Gilles Deleuze

Following the Foucauldian concept of ‘diagram’ which was discussed in the former part, this chapter briefly discusses different types of diagrams which consist of different interactions of power in different historical periods. For this task, Foucault’s own works on the diagrams of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘discipline’ and Deleuze’s work on the diagram of ‘control’ will be traced to understand the changing mentalities of power in each diagram.

These changing mentalities of power have a material basis for certain. In that sense, each stage of power corresponds to a stage in the relations of production and the organization of labour. Following the works of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (Hardt 1995, Negri 1996, Hardt & Negri 2000), it can be claimed that the society of sovereignty can be found in the feudal relations of production; the society of discipline depends on the first phase of capitalist accumulation (i.e. the Fordist model of manufacture and large scale industry); and finally the society of control is related to the post-Fordist relations of production.¹¹

Before the discussion of these different diagrams of power in detail, it is important to emphasize on a common characteristic of each. Despite their big differences, in each stage the rationalities of power aim to form ‘appropriate subjects’ who are necessary for its production and reproduction. In that sense, in

¹¹ The material basis of the diagram of the society of control will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (i.e. chapter 4).

each stage power 'interacts' with the subject in order to direct and guide his/her behavior. Hence, there are various types of the 'governed' in history; members of a flock, juridical subjects of law, subjects to be disciplined and even autonomous individuals to be 'freed' (Rose et. al. 2006: 85). The only difference is perhaps that the interaction between power and the self becomes more 'democratic' and more immanent to social and biological life of individuals as we move from societies of sovereignty to societies of control.

3.1. Society of Sovereignty

In his book *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault examines the changing mentalities of power through the comparison between different punishment techniques (1991). In this history of 'punitive reason', the 'body' is the central element because it is the place where the changing power relations can be traced. Power sometimes 'tortures', sometimes 'trains' the bodies as a means of punishing the individual (Foucault 1991: 25). The genealogies of the punishment techniques over the body are, therefore, crucial to understand the genealogy of the 'modern man'.

Following this framework, Foucault positions the society of sovereignty before the 18th century. According to him, until the 18th century power was exercised directly on the 'body of the condemned' through such brutish techniques as torture or public execution. In that sense, sovereignty was based on the absolute right of the sovereign to "take life or let live" (Foucault 1998: 136). As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982: 145) point out, since the law represented the 'will of the sovereign', the act of breaking the law was regarded as an attack to this will. Torture turned to be a 'political ritual' in that sense, in which "a whole economy of power was invested" (Foucault 1991: 35). This ceremony reflected the power of the sovereign over the body of the criminal. However, it was not only the body of the criminal that was the focus of power. Rather, by means of torturing the criminal, the sovereign also used to restore and reactivate his power over the watching audience.

The aim was to “make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign” (Foucault 1991: 49).

Besides being a political ceremony, the torture also had a legal aspect which consisted of certain rules (i.e. investigations, confessions, evidences etc) that were used to establish the ‘truth’ of a crime. Certain types of evidences, which were regulated according to certain types of rules, were required to be collected in order to establish the truth. These legal rituals of truth were finalized with the confession of the criminal. The confession was a crucial part of the ritual in that sense, which validated the truth of the crime. The criminal was tortured so as to make him confess and accept his crime openly.

In sum, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982: 146) argue, the ritual of public torture ties the elements of power, truth and body together. In this way, it provides us with the diagrammatic aspects of the society of sovereignty where power is exercised top-down, aims to repress individuals by means of seizing their capacities of life (Foucault 1998: 136). If we turn our attention to the economic organization of societies of sovereignty, we can see more or less similar rationalities of rule and similar types of subjectivity. Slavery and serfdom are the main characteristics of the feudal relations of production in which the peasants are forced to work in torture-like conditions.

3.2. Society of Discipline

From the 18th century onwards, we enter a new diagram of power: the society of discipline. The rise of capitalism and factories forms the material basis of this shift from sovereignty to discipline. As Çaliskan (1996: 16) argues, accumulation of capital and accumulation of men are like two sides of a coin. In that sense, the torture-like forms of rule that characterize the society of sovereignty become useless as the rise of capitalism necessitates a new form of rule which is more appropriate to govern the growing accumulation of men. As Foucault puts it;

If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection (1991: 220-221).

This new ‘calculated technology of subjection’ focuses on the ‘body’ of the individual just like the older one. However, this time the body is not tortured; rather it is “subjected and practised” (Foucault 1991: 138). Discipline becomes the main concern of power in that sense, which is aimed to form useful and docile bodies. The docility and utility of the body becomes an important economic source which cannot be assured by the harsh techniques of the societies of sovereignty. The disciplinary power uses more ‘democratic’ techniques.

The body is trained so as to make it more productive. In this way forces of body are separated and transformed (Foucault 1991: 170). Training of the body should be accompanied by enclosures in order to be more effective. For this reason, the disciplinary power encloses and distributes bodies in space. The aim is to fix and locate individuals in certain places which will make them easily controllable (Foucault 1991: 141). Imposing a time-table to the bodies forms another aspect of the disciplinary power (Foucault 1991:149). The duration must be analyzed carefully; divided into segments and organized according to analytical plans that correspond to the rhythms of the factory production (Foucault 1991: 158). McNay summarizes these disciplinary strategies under five headings; enclosure, disciplinary monotony, strategy of partitioning within enclosed space, rule of functional sites, and hierarchization of different activities (1994: 93).

According to Foucault, these diverse techniques of the disciplinary power are combined in Bentham’s ideal type of prison architecture: the Panopticon. In this circular structure, there is a tower in the center and around the tower there are cells in which the subject is enclosed and fixed in space. These cells have two windows; one of them is inside, facing the tower. Other one is outside, allowing the light to cross the cell. In this way, one is constantly visible to watcher but cannot see who is

watching. This new type of power “is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies” (Foucault 1991: 193). It operates automatically by giving a sense of visibility to whole population.

However, it is important to point out that Foucault uses the metaphor of the Panopticon not only to indicate the growing surveillance power of the state which is depended on the ‘knowledge’ of the individual, but also to define the characteristics of a new type of society and a new type of power which aims to constitute a new type of subject. As Deleuze clarifies, “the abstract formula of Panopticism is no longer to ‘see without being seen’ but to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity” (2006: 29). Thus, the Panopticon functions as a reformatory and regulatory complex to transform individuals into utile and docile subjectivities. That is, the Panopticon is not only a prison, nor is it a mechanism that represents the totalitarian tendencies of the central state. Rather, it is “the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” (Foucault 1991: 205). It is in this sense that the panoptic type of organization is not limited to prisons. Rather, it is diffused to all other social institutions; factories, barracks, schools, and hospitals (Foucault 1991: 228). Thus, as the diagram of the disciplinary society, the Panopticon serves as a ‘map’ of power interactions between diverse elements (power, knowledges, identities, institutions, discursive and non-discursive formations etc.) in the specific historical period of modernity. In this way, it reveals how the truths about being a ‘good’ subject are constructed and how these truths become linked to the functioning of the whole diverse aspects of social life; strategies, institutions, practices of normalization and exclusion.¹²

¹² In social theory the meaning of Panopticon is controversial. Some theorists take the Panopticon solely as the symbol of the growing state surveillance and tend to equate it with the Orwell’s dystopia of Big Brother. On the other hand, some other theorists, such as Rose, argue that the Panopticon is not about “producing terrorized slaves without privacy” (Rose 1999: 242) but imposing a particular mode of conduct. Haggerty (2006) also follows this line of thought when he argues that the Panopticon should be read together with Foucault’s other works such as governmentality. In this study, I agree with this Deleuzian reading of Foucault and take the Panopticon as the diagram of the disciplinary society which cannot be reduced “visibility” alone. In an interview, Foucault himself states that “the procedures of power that are at work in modern societies are much more numerous, diverse and rich. It would be wrong to say that the principle of visibility governs all technologies of power used since 19th century” (Foucault 1980b: 148).

Therefore, the disciplinary power is exercised by tying the individual to a certain mode of subjectivity which imposes a particular mode of conduct on him/her. ‘Construction of the soul’ is a crucial aspect of the Panopticon in that sense, in which individuals transform themselves and their behaviors according to the norms of civility. An ideal type of subject/individual/citizen that is both docile and utile is created in this way in order to satisfy the needs of the capitalist economy and the disciplinary society. This is why Foucault says ”soul is the prison of the body” (Foucault 1991: 30). This means that, the soul is fabricated by the power relations in such a way as to prevent the body from acting differently. In this regard, the main constraining power of the soul comes from the fact that it presents itself as the ‘truth’, as the only reality about the ‘nature’ of the body. The soul makes subjects to think about their bodies in terms of modern discourses; docility, utility, productivity, progress. It captures bodies in “rigid segmentary lines” such as family-school-army-factory-retirement (Deleuze & Parnet 1987: 124). It turns bodies into rational agents that aim to maximize their self-interest in economy, responsible citizens in nation-states, productive workers in factories, and hardworking and compliant students in the schools. In sum, the soul imposes a certain ‘truth’ about the body which prevents people to see the difference. As Deleuze says, echoing Spinoza; “there was no telling what the human body might achieve, once freed from human discipline” (2006: 77).

3.2.1. Governmentalisation of the State

Where does the state, as a centralized apparatus of rule, stands in this diagram? In the previous part we have already identified that rather than seeing the state as the sole authority of power which represses individual subjectivity, it is better to see the state as the ‘assembler’ of diverse elements (power, knowledge, identities, and institutions) so as to direct the conduct of individuals for particular ends. Within this framework, the ethical construction of a type of subjectivity which is in accordance with the rationalities of the state becomes a central concern. This is realized through imposing certain ethical norms to subjects (e.g. being a rational

actor, being a docile worker). The greater and more ‘capillary’ the power of the state becomes the more subjects internalize these attributes and make them a part of their identity.

As we pass from the society of sovereignty to the society of discipline, these roles of the state become more diffuse and more immanent to the lives of citizens. Hardt (1995: 32) argues that this transformation in the rationalities of the state corresponds to the historical process of what Foucault calls the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ (Foucault 1979).

Governmentalisation of the state, therefore, marks a certain change in the governing mentalities of the state from the 18th century onwards. The former rationality of government, namely the feudal rule of the prince, was dependent on the territory. Hence, the political rule was understood in terms of maintaining the power over that territory (Foucault 1979: 8). As the Prince was in a position of “transcendence singularity” to its subjects, the link that ties subjects to the prince was “one of violence” (1979: 8). The law represents this link and those who break the law became the targets of brutal techniques of power as we have discussed in the former section. On the other hand, for the ‘governmental state’, “it’s not a matter of imposing law on men, but rather of disposing things” (Foucault 1979: 13). In that sense, the governmental state is characterized by not its territory, but its interest in ‘things’ and the complex relation and links between men and ‘things’ (Foucault 1979: 11). These relations concern wealth, health and productivity of the population (Foucault 1979: 17). In order to manage these relations and to improve the conditions of population, the responsibilities of the state have become more immanent to life. Thus, the task of the state has begun to be understood in terms of establishing various forces of life in order to direct and guide the conducts of individuals for certain ends. This new concern of the governmental state in the forces of life can also be termed as ‘bio-politics’.

Bio-politics, therefore, represents the entrance of political rationalities of the state into the biological existences of individuals. It is the ‘politics of life’. In that sense, contrary to the former rationale of power (i.e. sovereignty) which focuses on

the ‘death’, new bio-political power begins to focus on the ‘life’ of population (Foucault 1998: 136). It is no longer desirable to waste the life forces of individuals in the torture-like conditions. Rather, bio-political power (i.e. biopower) focuses on the enhancement of the life forces of individuals, increasing their productivity and health; “a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them” (Foucault 1998: 136).

At this point, it would be misleading to assume that with the growing bio-political aspect of power, ‘death’ would fade away. On the contrary, there would be more deaths, even genocides, for those who are regarded as abnormal, those who have ‘sick’ and ‘unproductive’ bodies or souls. What has changed is that the ‘death’ of these undesirable groups has begun to be rationalized and justified in the name of the ‘life’ of the proper citizens. Thus, those who were seen as threats to the ‘life’ of the ‘good’ citizens have become the targets of brutish techniques of ‘death’ as it was the case in Nazism (Foucault 1998: 137, 149-150). In that sense, as Valverde points out, these two aspects of bio-politics (i.e. enhancing the life forces of some individuals while excluding some others) are not contradictory with each other; in effect they reinforce each other and become greater together (2007: 176).

If we turn our attention to the broader picture of the ‘society of discipline’, we should not miss the fact that the governmentalisation of the state and bio-politics evolve together with the development of disciplines which are discussed in the metaphor of the Panopticon. In effect, discipline is crucial for the governmental state in order to manage the population “in its depths and its details” (Foucault 1979: 19). Therefore, on the one hand, the body of the citizen is disciplined in the Panoptic institutions of the civil society (prison, hospital, school etc.) until it is transformed into a utile and docile body. On the other hand, the sum of these bodies, namely the population, is regulated by the state; its productivity, its health, and its wealth become the central concerns of regulation. Moreover, these two aspects of power are inextricable from each other; the “anatomy-politics” of the human body grows together with the “bio-politics of the population” (Foucault

1998: 139). The sum of healthy, docile, utile and ‘normal’ bodies would constitute a nation that is well-ordered and prosperous. On the other hand, those who are damaging this prosperity of the nation would become targets of the bio-political strategies of the state such as normalization or exclusion.

To conclude, discipline and bio-politics are two important and interrelated components of the diagram of the disciplinary society. They demonstrate the changing interactions of power within modernity and capitalism and how these changes affect the subjectivities of individuals (i.e. docile and utile subjects). They also indicate the tasks and rationalities of the state (i.e. governmental state, bio-politics), practices of institutions (i.e. disciplinary practices such as training, reforming, enclosing) and the practices of normalization and exclusion (i.e. normalization of people in the panoptic organizations so as to transform them into utile and docile subjectivities or excluding those who cannot conduct themselves according to these norms of disciplinary society).

However, as Hardt & Negri (2000: 24) argue “in disciplinary society, the effects of biopolitical technologies were still partial in the sense that disciplining developed according to relatively closed, geometrical, and quantitative logics.” For this reason, we need a new framework, a new diagram of power in order to understand the changing relations of power in the contemporary world. Deleuze (1992) provides us with the main characteristics of this new diagram in his essay titled ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’.

3.3. Society of Control

In control societies, neither the bio-political aspect of power nor its aim to shaping the conduct of the subjects ethically has ceased to exist. What has changed is that, in Hardt & Negri’s terms, “the mechanisms of command become ever more ‘democratic’, ever more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and bodies of the citizens” (2000: 23). In the disciplinary society, the idea was to discipline individuals within the enclosed spaces of civil society (i.e. panoptic organizations; prison, hospital, school, factory, army). However, in the

society of control, “we are in a generalized crisis in relation to all environments of enclosure – prison, hospital, factory, family” (Deleuze 1992: 3-4). Thus, as these panoptic organizations lose their weight in shaping the conduct of subjects, the rationale of power becomes more immanent to life and begins to cover whole aspects of it. It is no longer a matter of enclosing subjects in panoptic organizations, but of modulating their activities in open spaces. In this way (bio)power fully extracts the life forces of individuals.

The disciplinary power was aimed to capture and fix bodies in ‘rigid segmentary lines’; school-army-factory-retirement. The subject “was always starting again” by means of moving from one panoptic organization to another in a certain order. However, “in societies of control one is never finished with anything” (Deleuze 1992: 5). The body is in constant mobility, flowing from one place to another, and then flowing back to the same place again. For this reason, the rationale of power has also changed. It is no longer a matter of capturing bodies in rigid lines, the rhizomatic power of control societies modulates subjects in their mobility. ‘Nomadism’ which was once a ‘line of flight’ from the disciplinary power, now becomes captured and tamed by the free-floating mechanisms of control.

We should admit that these preliminary remarks about the diagram of the society of control are somewhat vague and tell us little about the actual relationships between power, knowledge, identities, institutions, practices and strategies in the society of control. Thus, different aspects of the society of control should be traced by taking into account its material basis, the type of governing rationalities linked to this material basis, the kind of subjectivities deemed as ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’, the kind of ‘truths’ linked to these subject positions, the strategies and practices of normalization, inclusion and exclusion etc. In other words, the question of ‘how one governs oneself’ should be answered within the context of the diagram of the society of control which would also reveal the complex relationships between these diverse elements. Therefore, in the

following chapters, different aspects of the diagram of the society of control will be investigated in detail. To provide a brief outline;

In the chapter 4, the material aspects of the society of control will be discussed taking into account the changing characteristics of production and employment as we move from Fordism to post-Fordism, from energy-based capitalism to informational capitalism. In addition, new strategies of subjectification, such as flexibilization which are linked to these material transformations will also be discussed in order to reveal the kind of appropriate worker subjectivity required for the production and re-production of today's capitalism.

In the chapter 5, neoliberalism will be discussed as a mode of power and as a type of governing rationality. The kind of citizen subjectivity that is linked to this new mode of power will be the central element of the investigation in this chapter which will show us what is being a 'virtuous' subject in the diagram of the society of control. Thus, together with the chapter 4, in the chapter 5, the interactions between power, knowledge, truths and identities will be revealed within the context of the society of control.

In the chapter 6, surveillance will be discussed as a mechanism of social sorting which forms the other side of bio-political strategies of the state (i.e. the exclusion of those who are regarded as 'poisonous' to the social body). After providing a historical analysis about the surveillance practices of the state, the links between surveillance and the other diagrammatic aspects of the society of control will be investigated in order to examine how surveillance is linked to such contemporary rationalities of state as neoliberal governmentality, risk and social sorting.

In the chapter 7, all those diagrammatic aspects of the society of control will be discussed within the framework of 'citizenship' in order to understand what constitutes being a good citizen in the society of control and how this definition affects the inclusion and exclusion practices of the state.

Lastly, in the chapters 8 these diverse aspects of the diagram of the society of control will be investigated within the framework of ‘e-governmentalisation of the state’

CHAPTER IV

MATERIAL ASPECTS OF CONTROL SOCIETY

One sees the relation between manipulating things and domination in Karl Marx's Capital, where every technique of production requires modification of individual conduct – not only skills but also attitudes

Michel Foucault

In the society of control, Deleuze argues that the factory loses its importance and become replaced by the corporation (Deleuze 1992: 4). This shift from factory to corporation, which forms the material basis of the society of control, is discussed in this section. In that sense, the material transformations that took place since 1970s in economy, work and organization are emphasized in detail, taking into account the theories of post-Fordism and information society. However, the reason that the material transformations brings new behavioral norms, new values, new virtues and new definitions about the appropriate characteristics of the worker-subjects, makes it necessary to emphasize on the process of subjectification as well. For this reason, the changing mentalities of power which accompany these material changes are also focused in this section.

4.1. Taylorism

In the beginning of his famous book, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, Taylor points out that “the whole country is suffering through inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts” (2003: 24) His propositions to put an end to this inefficiency in the economic organizations are widely known with his own name: Taylorism.

Harry Braverman, the sharpest critique of Taylorism, argues that, Taylor supported the idea that workers would soldier and slow the production rhythm as long as they have any kind of control over the labor process (2003: 34- 35) For this

reason, Taylorism can be regarded as a strategy that will give the control over the labor process to the management at each step, in the full sense of the word (2003: 35). Braverman classifies these principles of Taylorism in three parts;

- 1- The management should gather the traditional knowledge about the labor process and reduce this knowledge to standard rules, laws etc. which will end the dependency to skilled workers and their knowledge. Braverman describes this principle as: “disassociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers” (2003: 35).
- 2- The management should decide and plan the labor process and impose these plans to the workers without giving any initiative to them. This would result in simplified orders which are executed by the workers who do not have any idea of what they are doing. Braverman describes this principle as: “separation of conception from execution” (2003: 35).
- 3- Since the knowledge about the labor process is gathered in the first principle and it has become the exclusive right of management to use this knowledge in the second principle, then the third principle is about using this knowledge systematically to pre-plan the labor process by means of defining the tasks to be done at each step and defining the time required to accomplish these tasks (2003: 36). Braverman defines this principle as; “monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution” (2003: 36).

Townley argues that the emergence of these principles of Taylorism and their generalization to all other institutions in the society corresponds to the rise of disciplinary power and its application to organizations (1998: 195). In that sense, all modern organizations (i.e. factory, prison, hospital etc.) share some common characteristics that are compatible with the needs of the disciplinary power. According to Barratt (2002: 191) these common characteristics involve classification of individuals, planning their activities by means of using a time-scale and monitoring and surveillance of their activities.

In all these aspects of Taylorist-disciplinary power, the ‘knowledge’ has a crucial importance. Townley claims that, three types of knowledges are used in order to administrate the workers; knowledge of the workforce, knowledge of the activity and knowledge of the individual (1998: 194). By means of gathering these three aspects of knowledge together, the management was able to classify the workers and measure their activities according to standard rules. In this way, the whole organization was rendered visible, governable and calculable.

Miller (1998: 608) argues that the emergence of accounting as a disciplinary technology is strongly linked with these desires of management to render the organization visible. In that sense, in the beginning of 20th century, accounting began to involve not only the financial activities of the organization but also the activities of the individuals that are working in that organization. It was no longer a simple matter of calculating the cost of the production. Rather, the whole organization, including the labor process, the level of profit, the cost of the labor as well as the laborer him/herself became subjects of calculation (Miller 1998: 615). Thus, with the help of accounting, the tasks of the workers have been specified clearly and became measurable according to objective criteria. The performance indicators have been established which enabled to assess and categorize every worker within the factory.

4.2. Taylorism and Fordism

In a broader sense, the application of Taylorist principles in the organizations forms the part of the strategy of social regulation which is known as Fordism. Dassbach (2006) argues that Fordism has two aspects which have changed both the characteristics of production and the organization of the industrial society as a whole since they are introduced. The first aspect is the ‘assembly line’ that is ruled according to the Taylorist principles. In this way, not only the worker became dependent to the assembly line, contrary to the former period of production which was dependent on the skills of the worker, but also the production level has increased greatly and gained a ‘mass’ character. The second aspect of Fordism is

the 'five dollar day' which was used as a tool of control for gaining the consent of the workers against the harsh working conditions and thus reduced the high labor turnover rate (Dassbach 2006: 25-33). Besides this, through providing the workers with the sufficient funds to consume what is produced, the high level of wages has also played an important role in supporting the mass consumption which is vital for the sustainability of mass production.

After the 1929 crisis, which has originated from the imbalance between the high level of supply and the low level of demand, Ford's strategy of supporting people through high wages so as to increase the level of demand has been adopted intensively by the states. These regulatory strategies of the states were called as Keynesian welfare policies. In that sense, as Jessop points out, Keynesian welfare state had two features which distinguish it from the classical capitalist states. The first was the aim of 'full employment' which assured the sustainability of the economic system against the crisis of low demand. The second was the regulation of 'collective bargaining' which made it possible for the citizens, including those who were employed in non-Fordist sectors, to benefit from the national economic growth. This also supported the mass consumption in turn (Jessop 1994: 17). The social policies that were concerned with social security, health care and education were also widely employed as a part of these two aims of the Fordist state.

Nancy Fraser argues that these characteristics of Fordist mode of regulation in post-war welfare states are in correlation with the characteristics of a type of society which Foucault terms as disciplinary society (2003: 160). Fordism is not only a form of economic regulation that is concerned with mass production and mass consumption in that sense. Rather, it is a type of 'governing rationality', a mode of power that is diffused throughout the institutions of civil society (factories, prisons, hospitals, schools etc.) on the 'capillary' level (Fraser 2003: 162). In that sense, Fordist mode of governing distributes, organizes and manages the bodies for particular ends which are in accordance with the aims of mass production and mass consumption. This is the reason why it fixes bodies in space, imposes a time-table on them, gathers the knowledge about them and supervises their activities through

the application of Taylorist principles. In this way it tries to adjust the individuals to the requirements of the production system. In that sense, like all governing rationalities, Fordism also tries to fabricate a 'soul' for the individual so as to tie him/her to a certain mode of subjectivity since it is the only way to assure the sustainability of the system and to diffuse to the society at the 'capillary' level. As the Fordist-Taylorist-Keynesian mode of governing requires disciplined, utile, docile subjects for its production and reproduction, the appropriate characteristics of an individual was defined in terms of utility and docility. Thus, the Fordist governing rationale has succeeded to the extent that it diffused to the everyday lives of people by making them to think about themselves in terms of the needs of the Fordist-Taylorist production system.

Since 1980s there have been important material changes in the capital accumulation processes which have also triggered a change in the modes of governing and the definition of the appropriate characteristics of the worker-subjects. This new mode of capitalist accumulation process can be defined as 'flexible accumulation' which is accompanied by a particular form of social regulation that is defined as 'post-Fordism'.

4.3. Fordism to post-Fordism

At the end of 1970s, the world was facing an economic crisis which reduced the production rates and increased the level of unemployment. Although such temporary situations as 1973 oil embargo played important roles in the breakdown of the Fordist economy, the main underlying reason was more structural. In their influential book, *The Second Industrial Divide*, Piore and Sabel argue that "the [...] deterioration in economic performance results from the limits of the model of industrial development that is founded on mass production" (1984: 4). According to them, the origins of the economic crisis were strongly tied to Fordism which has reached to its natural limits and was unsustainable from then on. In other words, Fordist mode of production which relied on standard products that were produced in large quantities was unable to effectively respond to the growing diversity of

consumer demands. Thus, for Piore and Sabel, Fordism would have to be replaced by a new mode of production for a 'prosperous future'. The alternative they provided for Fordism was 'flexible specialization'. In this regard, in contrast to the Fordist-Taylorist type of production which is characterized by mass production and standardized products that were produced in big factories, flexible specialization concentrated on differentiated products in small quantities which were produced in flexible firms that could continuously adapt to ceaseless changes with the help of their highly technological structures (Piore and Sabel 1984: 17). Additionally, since the mechanisms of production became more complex to operate, these flexible firms require flexible multi-skilled workers with their innovative capacities in contrast to the Fordist system in which the worker was regarded as a part of the machine.

In that sense, as Murray (2006: 166) argues, the novelty of the post-Fordist type of production cannot be reduced to its technological capacities alone, which enabled a quick response to the market demands by means of speeding up the production processes. Rather, the main novelty of post-Fordism comes from the fact that it introduced new methods of organizing and controlling labor, which overcame the old Taylorist dichotomies between conception and execution. For instance, such new organizational approaches as Toyotaism has questioned the old Taylorist principle of 'monopolizing the knowledge of the work in the hands of the management' through placing great emphasis on the knowledge of the worker about the work processes and even encouraging them to actively participate in the improvement of the products and processes.

However, it is important to point out that, this is the case for a small core of workers compared to a large periphery. In that sense, post-Fordism brings many inequalities and widens the gap between the 'flexible' and 'inflexible' workers greatly. As Harvey (1989: 150-151) shows, the term flexibility may mean 'functional flexibility' or 'numerical flexibility' according to the worker's position in the labor market. In that sense, while functionally flexible workers are centered on the core of the economy with their highly-skilled capacities and their mobility,

numerically flexible workers are found on the peripheries of the economy that are easily replaceable according to the needs of the system since they do not have any kind of functional flexible skills.¹³ In any case, it can be concluded that flexibility becomes the new keyword under the new post-Fordist system which involves not only the flexibility of the production processes but also the flexibility of the work force (Murray 2006: 167).

Certainly these transformations in the economy and the rising dominance of flexibility discourse cannot be explained solely in terms of the crisis of Fordism. The period after 1980s is also characterized by the rapid technological innovations which influenced the organization of the society in every aspect, including the organization of work. Although this new type of society is explained in different terms by different theoreticians (e.g. post-industrial society, knowledge society, information society, informational capitalism, network society) there is a common agreement that the information and communication technologies (ICTs) form the basis of this new society and the knowledge becomes the main value-generating force.

In effect, the post-Fordist organization of work and economy share a lot of things in common with the information society, as Kumar points out (1999: 53). Thus, the links between these two concepts, which together provides the materiality of contemporary world, should be identified.

4.4. The Way through Information Society

The concept of post-industrial society or information society has become popular mostly with the works of Daniel Bell (Kumar 1999: 14). In his book, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Bell applies a stagiest perspective and identifies three types of societies; pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial. Each of these societies has distinctive characteristics (Bell 1976: 126-129).

¹³ For the sake of clarification, in terms of the characteristics of the worker, the term ‘flexibility’ will be used as being functionally flexible, being mobile, having multi-skills, being a knowledge-worker etc. for the rest of the thesis. On the other hand, being ‘numerically flexible’ will be used as being inflexible, being easily replaceable, having low skills etc.

According to him, the pre-industrial society was organized around the struggle against nature in which the muscle power played the main part. Since the natural conditions (the seasons, weather, climate, type of soil etc.) had a direct influence on the continuation of production, the rhythm of life was also shaped by these difficulties, consisting of short and long periods of work related to the availability of natural conditions. The typical form of the pre-industrial society was the agrarian society (1976: 126).

The industrial societies, on the other hand, are characterized by the mechanic work processes. The rhythms of the factory dominate all spheres of life and reduce it to rational, calculable categories that are accompanied by a linear and ordered conception of time. The semi-skilled factory worker becomes the key figure of the industrial societies which is a part of the mechanic processes. In Bell's words, the worker becomes a "human cog between machines- until the technical ingenuity of the engineer creates a new machine which replaces him as well" (1976: 127).

Finally, in the post-industrial society, "information becomes a central resource" (1976: 128). According to Bell, the main distinction between industrial and post-industrial society is the growing dominance of the service sector over the manufacture. Thus, for him, the semi-skilled blue-collar worker has been replaced by the white-collar 'professional' employee who is highly skilled and educated (1976: 128). In that sense, Bell explains the decline of the semi-skilled workforce in the economy in terms of the introduction of new technologies which requires skilled, flexible workers to operate because of their complex technical characteristics (Bell 1976: 137).

Therefore, the term 'post-industrial society' designates a world in which the knowledge has become the main value-generating force. Sveiby (1997: 3-13) gives a clear example from our contemporary world which strengthens this argument. He claims that the reason that the shares of Microsoft are exchanged at the value of 70\$, even though they are to be only 7\$ according to their book value, is the 'knowledge intensive' character of the Microsoft. In other words, despite the fact that the Microsoft has a very limited amount of tangible assets (i.e. buildings,

equipment, stocks, cash etc.) which corresponds to its book-value, the Microsoft's 'intangible' assets (i.e. its innovative capacity, its networking ability, the high level of education of its employees etc. which constitutes its future earning potential) makes its shares ten times larger than its normal value.

4.5. Information Society and Informational Economy

Castells terms this knowledge-dependent characteristic of the contemporary economy as 'informational economy'. According to him, "it is an economy in which sources of productivity and competitiveness for firms, regions, countries depend, more than ever, on knowledge, information, and the technology of their processing" (1997: 7). In that sense, Castells argues that the economic decline in 1970s has been overcome with the help of information technologies which have also changed the characteristics of capitalism substantially. This new capitalism is informational which relies on sophisticated information and communication technologies in its processes.

Besides being informational, this new type of capitalism is also global and networked (Castells 2000: 10). It is global in the sense that the core of the system has the ability to operate on the global scale, responding to the global requirements quickly. On the other hand, it is networked in the sense that the 'networked enterprise' is the key organization type of the system which is linked to the global economy as well as to the other enterprises through networks. These networks may consist of different firms or different parts within a single firm according to the requirements of the demand. The aim is to link diverse units (i.e. big corporations, small firms, subcontractors, the segments within a firm) to each other in a decentralized way. According to Castells, although network type of organization can also be found in the former periods of history, it has become the key type of organization only in the information age because of its complex technological infrastructures which are mostly supported by the application of ICTs (2000: 15). In that sense, these technologies have transformed networks and provided them with the necessary technical capacity to be flexible and adaptable. They have enabled the

organizations to respond market demands quickly by means of delivering products and services on time.

This new informational, global, networked economy has also transformed the work and employment patterns substantially. The most important characteristic of the new employment regime is the 'flexible work' which consists of "part-time work, temporary work, self-employment, work by contract, informal or semi-formal labour arrangements, and relentless occupational mobility" (Castells 2000: 11-12). In that sense, Castells also makes a distinction between two types of labor as Harvey does. On the one hand there is 'self-programmable labour' who is "equipped with the ability to retrain itself, and [who can] adapt to new tasks, new processes and new sources of information, as technology, demand, and management speed up their rate of change" (Castells 2000: 12). On the other hand, there is the 'generic labour' who is "exchangeable and disposable, and co-exists in the same circuits with machines and unskilled labour from around the world" (Castells 2000: 12).

To conclude, the concepts of post-Fordism and information society are strongly related to each other. Both of them identify the characteristics of the capitalist restructuring that has been undertaken since 1970s. As Webster (2006: 97) argues, the intensive application of information technology in global economy, within the organizations and within the work processes is integral to this new capitalist system. Besides this, the concepts such as flexibility, adaptability, mobility has begun to occupy dominant positions which refer not only to the appropriate characteristics of the organizations and the production types but also to the appropriate characteristics of the new worker.

It is precisely at this point that, we can begin to conceive the real meaning of flexibility. As Fraser argues, "'flexibilization' names both a mode of social organization and a process of self-constitution" (Fraser 2003: 169). In that sense, according to Fraser, the fact that the requirements of the new economy has evolved from 'discipline to flexibilization', does not mean that the subjectification of the individual has ended. On the contrary, the discourse of flexibility shows us that a

new strategy of subjectification has been applied by the forces of domination in order to form and reform the new appropriate worker-subject for a new world. Therefore, this new type of subject that is linked to a new process of subjectification is required to be discussed in detail in order to grasp the real meaning of the material changes that are identified above.

4.6. The Appropriate Worker of the New Economy

Boltanski and Chiapello (2002: 2) argue that the sustainability of capitalist system depend not only on its ability of capital accumulation but also on the ‘moral values’ that accompany this accumulation. In that sense, capitalist accumulation needs commitment from people in order to justify itself. They use the term ‘spirit of capitalism’ to explain the type of commitment for different periods of history. According to them, three spirits of capitalism, each having distinctive characteristics, can be identified since the advent of capitalism (2002: 3-4). The first one was formed in the 19th century in which the virtues of free enterprise and bourgeois morality were dominant values and the *entrepreneurial bourgeois* was the key figure. The second one, on the other hand, emerged in the Fordist era of mass production and big companies. The values of meritocracy were dominant within the organizations and the *salaried director* was the key figure. Finally, when we reach to 1970s, this Fordist spirit became outmoded. A new spirit was required in order to justify the new type of capitalist accumulation in terms of morality.

That is the reason why the transformations that took place after 1970s can not be explained in terms of solely focusing on the capitalist accumulation processes or the organizations. The *spirit of capitalism* has also evolved introducing new behavioral norms together with new definitions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions within the organization (Boltanski & Chiapello 2002: 11). The old spirit was a justification of a type of production which was characterized by industrial mass production, centralized, bureaucratic management and long-term planning. On the other hand, the new spirit has to justify the new type of production which is

characterized by the flexible organizations, decentralized networks, intensive usage of information technology and short-term/project based careers.

It is for this reason that innovation, creativity and permanent change became new organizational values. These new values have also influenced the assessment criteria in the organizations and the type of actions that have been considered as 'good' and 'bad'. In that sense, a new understanding of 'fairness' has been introduced which promotes mobility, the ability to nourish a network, and the ability to undertake project-type work (Boltanski & Chiapello 2002: 7). Lastly, related to these new behavioral norms, a new understanding of security has emerged in which the workers are conceived as self-managing individuals who can manage their own security by themselves in contrast to the former period which was characterized by long-term employment and relatively stable careers. Therefore, the new spirit has changed the appropriate characteristics of the worker-subject substantially. Boltanski and Chiapello summarize these characteristic of this new worker type as;

a "great one" must be adaptable and flexible. He or she is polyvalent, able to move from one activity, or the use of one tool, to another. A "great one" is also active and autonomous. He or she will take risks, make contact with new people, open up new possibilities, seek out useful sources of information, and, thus, avoid repetition (2002: 10).

Du Gay (1996: 153) touches the same point when he states that the former bureaucratic ethos which promotes the 'strict adherence to procedures' has been replaced by a discourse which favors individuals who are proactive and who have entrepreneurial skills. Thus, a discourse of 'enterprise' emerges both as a critique to the former bureaucratic ethos and as a new type of governing of the conduct of the workers (Du Gay 1996 155). This new type of governing brings its own virtues so as to constitute the new worker subjectivity. The worker becomes obliged to be flexible and adaptable in order to be counted as 'virtuous' inside the organization.

Thus, we have the flexible person whom Richard Sennett talks about in his book *The Corrosion of Character* (2002). In a world in which the bureaucratic

values are diminished and short term relationships become dominant, this person is unable to develop a single, coherent narrative for him/herself (Sennett 2002: 29). In that sense, although the discourse of flexibility emerges as a critique of the bureaucratic routine and Taylorist organization principles, it brings new forms of control and domination at the same time (Sennett 2002: 48-49).

Therefore, the fact that the Fordist-Taylorist governing mentality loses its importance in favor of flexibility does not mean that the worker is exempt from the power relations which constitute him/her as a subject. In that sense, although the discourse of flexibility opens up new emancipatory possibilities by means of criticizing the rigid Fordist system of work, it, at the same time, brings new strategies for subjectification which is in accordance with the new type of capitalist accumulation.¹⁴

4.7. Conclusion

Fordist-Taylorist system corresponds to the disciplinary society of Foucault. The disciplinary power developed disciplinary strategies which were aimed to constitute utile and docile subjects for its production and reproduction; it enclosed subjects in space, applied strict linear principles of time and put their activities under constant supervision. In other words, the type of conduct that was imposed by the Fordist governing mentality was in accordance with the Fordist production system; being utile, docile and compliant. However, when we move from Fordism to post-Fordism, Taylorism to Toyotaism, industrial society to post-industrial society, energy-based capitalism to informational capitalism, bureaucratic ethos to entrepreneurial ethos, a new type of subjectification has been deployed by the power. Deleuze summarizes these material transformations in terms of the passage from the society of discipline to the society of control. He states that;

¹⁴ According to Du Gay (1996), the new 'ethos' is even more dangerous. He argues that, within the bureaucratic ethos there was the separation of public and private life which provided the worker with a kind of freedom, at least in the private sphere. However, under 'entrepreneurial ethos' the boundaries between public and private are blurring and the entrepreneurial ethos is beginning to be generalized across the whole life of the individuals (Du Gay 1996: 163-164). We should add that, this is precisely what Hardt & Negri means when they argue that bio-political production begins to cover whole aspects of life in the society of control (2000: 22-41).

The factory was a body that contained its internal forces at a level of equilibrium, the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; but in society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and the corporation is a spirit, a gas (Deleuze 1992: 4).

Since the production system begins to depend more and more on the skills of the worker (i.e. his/her innovative capacity, technological skills, networking ability, flexibility, adaptability, mobility, ability to take risks, ability to be responsible), the contemporary power has developed new strategies. It is no longer 'productive' to discipline the workers, to fix them in space, to impose strict bureaucratic rules on them. Rather, the power requires to 'modulate' the subjects in their mobility which is more profitable and more productive.

Therefore, in control society, the flexibility becomes the new norm, the new virtue, the new truth to be imposed on the bodies. The appropriate characteristics of the worker are no longer defined in terms of docility and utility. Rather, they are defined in terms of flexibility and adaptability. As the flexibility becomes the new virtue, those who are seen as lacking this virtue are regarded as 'bad' workers. In that sense, contemporary regimes of employment are characterized by flexible, multi-skilled workers on the core of the economy together with the growing hordes of inflexible workers, who are easily replaceable, in the periphery.

In a broader sense, this new mode of governing can be defined as 'neoliberal governmentality' which covers not only the organization of the work and the economy but also the organization of the whole society at large. In that sense, the neoliberal mode of governing introduces new perceptions not only about the work and the economy but also about the state and the citizens. However, these two forms of power (i.e. post-Fordism/information society and neoliberalism) should not be taken as separate entities. On the contrary, flexibilization of the self and neoliberal governmentality has a lot of things in common since the mentalities of corporations become closer to the mentalities of the state in the contemporary world. As Olds and Thrift points out, "the kind of subject positions that are deemed worthy

managers and workers are increasingly similar to the kinds of subject positions that define the worth of the citizenry” (2005: 271). Therefore, in order to comprehend the broader picture of what is being a virtuous subject in the contemporary world, this new neoliberal understanding about the complex relationships between the state, the economy and the citizen is required to be discussed in detail. This is the main task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

NEOLIBERALISM

*It seems to me that at that very moment
it became apparent that if one governed
too much, one did not govern at all.*

Michel Foucault

Neoliberalism is a crucial part of the diagram of the control society. It introduces new ways of approaching to the economy, to the society and to the individual. However, there is no common agreement on the definition of neoliberalism in the literature. The term neoliberalism seems to mean many different things according to one's point of view. In this section firstly different approaches to neoliberalism will be discussed, taking into account both the economic and the moral side of the issue. Later, the emphasis will be on one particular approach, which is the most comprehensive one: 'neoliberalism as governmentality'. Under this part, the perspective that neoliberal governmentality introduces to such notions as subjectivity, risk, social policy and employment will be elaborated. Based on these analyzes, it will be concluded that neoliberalism is not only about economics, it is also about ethics which forms part of our identities and which brings new ethical obligations for a proper way of living. In that sense, neoliberalism is an important element for understanding the complex interactions between power, knowledge and identity in the contemporary world.

5.1. What is Neoliberalism?

As discussed in the previous chapter, the post-war period (1945-1970) was under Keynesian logic in terms of economic regulation. Keynesianism emerged as a response to the capitalist crisis of accumulation that is caused by the imbalance between the high level of production and the low level of demand, as it was the case in the crisis of 1929. In that sense, Keynesian regulatory strategies made it possible to keep the demand at a stable level by means of actively intervening to the

economic life. These interventions consisted of promoting full employment and providing welfare benefits to the citizens. However, when we reach to the end of 1970s, Keynesian approach gives its place to neoliberalism.

In terms of the changing perspectives to economy policies, this change can be traced along two lines: income distribution and employment policies (Palley 2005: 20-23). Regarding the former, the neoliberal economic approach supports that the market would better regulate the price of the labor, paying it what it is worth. Regarding the latter, the neoliberal logic supports that the market would better provide full employment by means of price adjustments. In that sense, from the neoliberal perspective, Keynesian idea of promoting full employment through interventions was regarded as both unnecessary and harmful and was accused of raising the inflation rates which was one of the most important reasons of the economic crisis at the end of 1970s. In short, instead of Keynesian interventions to the economy, the neoliberal idea of “letting market forces to solve the problem” (Palley 2005: 23) became the dominant approach to the economy. According to this, the state should keep the interventions at minimum level and should provide the suitable atmosphere (e.g. strict regulations on private property rights) for the healthy functioning of the free market economy.

Dumenil and Levy argue that the real drive behind these neoliberal economic policies was the aim of restoring the class powers of the upper class (2005). They illustrate that the gap between the wealthiest one percent and the other segments of the population were closing in the postwar era of welfare states under the Keynesian rule. However, with the neoliberal restructuring, the shares of the wealthiest one percent began to rise again, increasing the existing inequalities and widening the gap between the poorest and wealthiest sections of the population dramatically worldwide. For this reason, according to Dumenil and Levy, the emergence of neoliberalism is strongly related to a strategy of the restoration of the power of the ruling elites.

Harvey also follows this line of thought and explains the neoliberalization as a class project that is aimed at to restore the class power of the upper class which

has diminished after the economic crisis in 1970s (2005: 19). However, Harvey does not stop here and extends his analysis to the ‘moral’ side of the issue as well which provides the justification for the neoliberal policies. In that sense, he argues that neoliberalism emerged within the framework of a particular conception of ‘freedom’. This conception of freedom can be traced to the thoughts of the philosopher Hayek and the Mont Pelerin Society in which the freedom of the market was regarded as the necessary condition for the freedom of the individual. However, this conception of freedom had a class character too according to Harvey. Following Polanyi, he claims that the free market economy provides individual freedom only for “those whose income, leisure and security need no enhancing” (Polanyi 1954: 256-8 cited in Harvey 2005: 37). Besides this, as Polanyi has already showed in his book *Great Transformation* (2000: 213-214), despite the liberal motto of ‘laissez faire’, the construction and maintenance of the free market economy requires ‘active interventions’ of the state which may also include coercion and violence, as we have witnessed in the case of Chile in 1970s.

However, the point is that, although (neo)liberal conception of freedom represents the freedom of a particular class, that of bourgeoisie, in most of the western countries, it has become the dominant way of thinking not by force but by ‘consent’. In that sense, not only the upper classes but also the middle classes voted for the neoliberal parties consistently (e.g. Thatcher won three elective victories in England). In order to explain this dilemma, Harvey, following a Gramscian perspective, identifies the ways in which neoliberal logic has gained the consent of the middle classes by means of diffusing to their ‘common sense’ perceptions (2005: 39-63). In that sense, the propaganda of neoliberalism through various institutions of civil society, particularly media, universities, churches and so-called think-tanks, formed the first part of this process of gaining consent (Harvey 2005: 40). On the other hand, neoliberal discourse of ‘individual freedom’ exploited the growing critiques against the state, particularly the ones that are symbolized in 68’ movement, and turned them into a critique to the interventions of the state to the economy. In a world in which identity politics, multiculturalism and consumerism

are the dominant themes, neoliberalism, through the discourse of ‘personal choice’, found the suitable atmosphere to convince people to believe that they can exercise their freedom better under its rule (Harvey 2005: 42). In these ways, it masked its real class character.

So far we have discussed two theoretical approaches to neoliberalism. Larner classifies these two approaches as policy and ideology approaches (2000). The first one, by taking neoliberalism as policy, focuses on the economic-structural transformations that have been undertaken under the name of neoliberalism. This point of view explains the generalization of the neoliberal principles in terms of the ‘capture’ of key institutions by the upper elites which enabled an ideological domination in turn. However, as Larner points out, by means of applying the classical base-superstructure model of the Marxist critique of ideology¹⁵, this point of view fails to recognize the points in which neoliberal discourse has diffused into the various spheres of life, even into those perspectives, such as conservative and social democratic approaches, that have a critical stance towards the free market economy.¹⁶ For instance, in the case of New Zealand, “despite the apparent unpopularity of the so-called ‘free-market revolution’, many political claims are now framed in the language of choice, flexibility and the market” (Larner 2000: 9). In other words, this negative conceptualization of power, as a possession in the hands of the ruling class which represses people, and which at the same time dominates them in the sphere of ideology, fails to recognize how power actually works through the identities of the individuals. This brings us to the second

¹⁵ The main reference point of this view is Marx and Engel’s *German Ideology* and their famous statement of “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx & Engels 1968).

¹⁶ The link between neoliberalism and neo-conservatism is quite controversial and in certain cases these two views become inextricable from each other. From the perspective of ‘neoliberal governmentality’, although neoliberalism and neo-conservatism share the common principle that individuals should become responsible for their own welfare in order to be counted as virtuous citizens, they also differ from each other in terms of the techniques and instruments they use. As Dean (1999: 159-164) points out, whereas neoliberalism favors smoother techniques, neo-conservatism supports using more sovereign and authoritarian ones, such as strict regulations about immigration, enforcing marriage and heterosexual relationships, punishing the criminal rather than rehabilitating and reforming him/her.

approach to neoliberalism: neoliberalism as ideology. The term ideology now has a more Gramscian meaning which is about gaining consent in civil society through intellectual and moral leadership and representing the interests of wide range of groups. As Harvey showed, this point of view recognizes the ways in which neoliberalism justifies itself through a discourse of personal choice and thus constructs its 'hegemony'.

However, even though this Gramscian analysis of neoliberalism takes into account the relationships between the identities of the people and neoliberalism, it does not explicitly emphasize the process of identity construction. This last point necessitates a move from Gramsci to Foucault and we have the third approach to neoliberalism: neoliberalism as governmentality (Larner 2000: 12).

5.2. Neoliberalism as Governmentality

In Britain 1980, Thatcher was outlining the main characteristics of the neoliberal idea of the society and the individual;

the first principle of this government...is to revive a sense of individual responsibility. It is to reinvigorate not just the economy and industry but the whole body of voluntary associations, loyalties and activities which give society its richness and diversity, and hence its real strength ... [We] need a strong State to preserve both liberty and order... [But we] should not expect the State to appear in the guise of an extravagant good fairy at every christening, a loquacious and tedious companion at every stage of life's journey, the unknown mourner at every funeral. (Thatcher 1980: 10-11 cited in Rose 1999: 138-139).

It is clear from these words that Thatcher's idea of neoliberalism was not solely about putting an end to the inefficient functioning of the economy by means of minimizing the state interventions to the economy, privatization of the state enterprises, providing the suitable atmosphere for competition etc. Her perception of neoliberalism had an 'ethical' aspect as well which concerns one's relationship with oneself. As Thatcher said, one must be 'individually responsible' for

him/herself and should not be dependent on the (welfare) state to accompany and support him/her 'at every stage of life's journey'.

According to Colin Gordon, this ethical ideal of neoliberalism promotes a type of subjectivity who is "entrepreneur of himself or herself" (1991: 44). In other words, neoliberalism necessitates a type of subject whose relation to him/herself is structured on the model of the 'enterprise'. This type of person must be responsible for himself/herself for providing his/her own welfare by means of making "adequate provisions for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of [his or her] own human capital" (Gordon 1991: 44). Her full life must be based on these continuous investments on her human capital so as to responsibly manage her own welfare without requiring any assistance from the state. Consequently, the neoliberal idea of fostering competition is not limited to providing the suitable conditions for the market; the individuals also must become competitive and responsible in a world in which the ethical way of living was defined in terms of the language of the enterprise.

At this point, it is important to point out that, although liberalism and neoliberalism share some fundamental characteristics in common, such as the principle of free market economy and the opposition to the state interventions into economy, they also differ from each other in some ways. In terms of economics, some forms of neoliberalism does not argue that the free market economy has a natural existence (it is interesting that neoliberalism share this point of view with Polanyi) contrary to the classical liberal thought.¹⁷ Rather, it supports that the market can and should be constructed through active political interventions by means of deploying the necessary regulations (e.g. institutional regulations, law) and promoting and encouraging a certain type of subjectivity (i.e. entrepreneurial self). In that sense, according to this point of view, neither the rise of Nazism in Germany nor the monopolization of the economy in other parts of the world can be attributed to the inherent tendency of the market economy to fall into fascism and

¹⁷ This is especially the case for German 'Ordo-Liberals' who were active in the post war period. Some notable members of this group are; Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm. Works of Friedrich Hayek are also associated with this group of intellectuals.

monopolization. Since the market economy does not have a natural existence, these are the consequences of the incompetencies of the political strategies which failed to support the free-market economy (Lemke 2001: 193- 94). Related to this, in terms of their ‘appropriate subjects’ and their approach to the relationship between this subject and the state, liberalism and neoliberalism also have different perspectives. Whereas the *homo economicus* of the liberalism was conceived as an atomistic individual who is and should be exempt from the political authority, the neoliberal *homo economicus* is a “manipulable man, man who is perpetually responsive to modifications in his environment” (Gordon 1991: 43). Thus, neoliberal subject is not to be governed as an atomistic individual, rather she should be governed as a responsible member of the ‘community’ who can manage her own life through her ‘free’ choices with an aim of self-fulfillment (Rose 1996: 39). As a consequence, the activities of the neoliberal state becomes more concerned with enhancing, encouraging and empowering entrepreneurial subjectivities rather than letting them be which was the case in the classical liberal thought.

Therefore, neoliberalism not only introduces economical reforms, it also brings new definitions about the ethical way of living. To put it another way, economic side of the neoliberalism depends on its ethical ideals and vice versa. For this reason, as Lemke observes, “the neo-liberal agenda for the ‘withdrawal of the state’ can be deciphered as a technique for government” (Lemke 2001: 201). The declining role of neoliberal state as a welfare provider goes hand to hand with the promotion of a certain kind of subjectivity within the hegemonic discourses of autonomy, self-care, personal responsibility, and entrepreneurialism. In that sense, the fact that the neoliberal state ceases to assist people through welfare agencies, does not mean that it puts an end to the will to ‘govern’. Rather, it means that the state uses new tactics for the government. This new strategy for government is to ‘govern without governing the society’. As Rose points out, “once responsabilized and entrepreneurialized, they [the subjects] would govern themselves within a state-secured framework of law and order” (1999: 139). Since the subjects of neoliberalism were conceived as responsible and rational agents having the ability

to evaluate the cost and benefits of each of their acts and to choose the most rational one for themselves, the state should do nothing other than respecting these free choices. As a consequence, the subject herself, not the welfare state, becomes responsible against social risks such as poverty, unemployment, illness.

5.3. The Rise of the Active Citizen and the Active Society

In a similar manner, Cruikshank argues that a new subject emerges not only in neoliberal but also in reformist and democratic discourses in which the idea of ‘self-government’ is the dominant theme. This new citizen is ‘active’ and able to protect him/herself against “poverty, political apathy, powerlessness, crime, and innumerable other problems” (Cruikshank 1999: 1) without relying on the State. The term ‘active’, therefore, does not mean that the citizen is actively participating in the political decisions as a part of democratic rights, as it was assumed to be the case in Ancient Greece. Rather, being ‘active’ means having entrepreneurial skills; being able to conduct him/herself in the model of enterprise; being autonomous and responsible at the same time (Rose 1999: 164).

O’Malley traces this process of responsabilization of the self through focusing on the changing characteristics of risk management with neoliberalization. According to him, a new ‘prudentialism’ takes place under neoliberal mode of governing as a new strategy for the governance of risk and replaces the old socialized risk management techniques of the welfare state and Keynesian policies. This new strategy obliges the individuals to manage their own risks against health problems, unemployment, injury, old age etc., by themselves through private insurances without requiring any assistance from the state (O’Malley 1996: 196-97). For instance concerning health, the health services that are supported by the state are seriously declined, became hard to access (e.g. long waiting lines) and benefiting from these services began to be perceived as an immoral activity which results in the condemnation of those who are welfare dependent. On the other hand, private health sector grows in which the patients are served as customers (O’Malley 1996: 199). This process is also accompanied by the promotion of the virtues of

securing one's own risk by oneself. The underlying rationale behind these transformations in the management of risk is the belief that the individuals would develop their enterprising capacities better under this new regime of responsibility which will also end the dependency that is generated by the welfare state. According to this idea, "risk is a source or condition of opportunity, an avenue for enterprise and the creation of wealth, and thus an unavoidable and invaluable part of a progressive environment" (O'Malley 1996: 204). Thus, the ability to take risks began to be regarded as an inseparable part of the virtuous way of living.

In terms of social policies there is a similar trend. In the era of welfare states, the aim was to decrease the inequality between different groups by means of providing people with social citizenship rights. For this reason, social policies have introduced that are directed to support full employment and to reduce the risk levels through providing health, education etc. services.¹⁸ However, as Dean (1995) observes, when we reach to the era of neoliberalism a new approach to social policy emerges in which the discourse of 'active society' is dominant. In that sense, rather than decreasing the risk levels of the population through social policies, the attention of the government has shifted to the individual factors which limit the 'job readiness' of the unemployed and which raise the 'risk of dependence'. For instance, 'activity tests' are introduced which obliged the welfare claimants to demonstrate not only the active effort for finding a job but also to prove the active investment on their human capital through undertaking the necessary activities that are regarded as useful for the re-entry to the labor market, such as attending to language courses, participating in training programs, attending to counseling

¹⁸ However, that is not to say that all states in this period applied the same perspective to social policies. As Esping-Anderson (2006) shows, there were important distinctions between different social policy regimes in terms of their manner of 'inclusion'. In that sense, whereas the central Europe model (applied particularly by France and Germany) contained conservative and paternalistic characteristics and was based on the idea of supporting the male worker, which in turn results in exclusion of the women labor from welfare benefits, Scandinavian model provides a more universalistic approach by means of supporting female labor through such instruments as caring services and parental leave. Anglo-Saxon model on the other hand, differs from these two approaches in the sense that it neither supports nor prevents the participation of the women labor.

activities, joining in activities that are aimed to improve confidence and motivation, or participating in voluntary work (Dean 1995: 573-574).

As a result, welfare benefits are no longer provided within the framework of 'social citizenship' as it was the case in the welfare state period. New neoliberal strategies bring new patterns and obligations for the welfare claimants. Thus, a particular mode of conduct is imposed to the individuals to influence their relationship with themselves which is in accordance with the changing social policy regimes. No longer is the passive welfare dependent the key figure of social policies, the active 'job-seeker' replaces her. This active citizen becomes obliged to improve her employability through all spheres of her life so as to become entrepreneur of herself.

Therefore, as Dean summarizes, the society becomes 'active' in two respects. Firstly, it becomes active in the sense that it employs active welfare supports rather than passive income supports that are regarded to be raising the dependency of the individual to the (welfare) state. Secondly, it becomes active in the sense that it promotes an active subjectivity who is able to develop new skills and abilities against the risk of unemployment (1995: 578). Thus, the term active society designates a world in which the individuals are actively responsible against the risk of unemployment and able to develop the necessary competencies for the re-entry of the labor market.¹⁹

Therefore, as Walters (1997: 227) points out, under neoliberal governmentality, social policy becomes inseparable from the economic policies. In other words, the changing characteristics of the social policy system are in correlation with the changing requirements of the new economy. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the flexibility is the dominant theme in the new economy which includes not only the flexibility of firms but also the flexibility of the work force. Hence, the productivity of the firms becomes dependent on the

¹⁹ This definition of active society can also be found in the reports of transnational organizations, such as OECD: "The basic thrust of the notion of the 'active society' is to foster economic opportunity and activity for everyone in order to combat poverty, dependency, and social exclusion" (OECD 1990, quoted in Walters 1997: 224).

activities of their flexible, adaptable, multi-skilled, responsible, risk-taking workers. In that sense, these changing characteristics of the appropriate worker type influences the ways in which social policies are managed. Social policy system has restructured with an aim to make the workers flexible and active. For instance, in the former period, social insurance as a welfare instrument was aimed to protect the citizens against poverty and to support the family in the times of the unemployment of the male. However, new social policy strategies follow a different logic. They are directed to promote self-employment, to encourage active job seeking, to facilitate the access of large groups to benefit from training and lifelong learning so as to make individuals competent workers (Walters 1997: 228).

One of the most distinctive characteristic of this new social policy regime is the growing importance of the training sector as a solution to the unproductivity and unemployment. In an economy in which continuous change is the key notion, the individuals are required to invest on their human capital through participating in continuous training activities to obtain new skills. Thus, the role of the state becomes more concerned with facilitating this process of enterprising of the self. As Walters points out “the rationality is that public policies must invest in people, and they must assist people to invest in themselves” (1997: 230).

5.4. Conclusion

Deleuze says that in the control societies, “perpetual training tends to replace school, and continuous control to replace the examination” (1992: 5). In a world in which the virtuous way of conducting oneself is structured on the notion of enterprise, one is obliged to participate in continuous training, working on to increase his/her human capital, to become entrepreneur of himself or herself.

It is for this reason that, neoliberalism is not just an economic doctrine or a basic ideology; it is also an ethico-political rationality which forms part of what we think about ourselves and others. On the one hand, it criticizes the welfare state and favors free market competition. On the other hand, it introduces new ethical obligations for the individuals which are centered on the idea of enterprise and

competition. Thus, not only the corporations and institutions but also the individuals become obliged to be competitive and enterprising. The changing perspectives on risk management strategies, social policies, employment regimes and other spheres of government activity signals the rise of the active citizen in an active society who is able to manage her own risks and to develop new marketable skills without relying on the state to support her.

Therefore, the fact that the interventions of the state to the economy declines does not mean that the state is not interested in the governing of people anymore. On the contrary, it means that the state employs new tactics for the government. Now the idea is to ‘govern without governing’ the society through constructing a certain type of subjectivity within the discourses of free choice, being active, being entrepreneurial, being autonomous. It is believed that once this type of subjectivity is constructed, she would govern herself in a responsible manner.

It is for this reason that the success of neoliberalism can not be explained solely in terms of ideological domination. Neoliberalism has succeeded to the extent that it has been able to diffuse into the identities of the people by means of providing a new ethical way of living for them which is in harmony with the economic ideals of the market economy. The victory of right-wing political parties over the left also lies here, in their ability to develop a new rationality of government which is in correlation with a new regime of the self (Rose 1996: 60). The neoliberal power is positive in that sense, which does not represses the subjects but produces them as citizens.

Therefore, as Rose (1996: 61) points out, neoliberal idea of ‘freedom’ is not a simple “ideological fiction or a rhetorical flourish” nor it is a real freedom which would necessitate a world in which various forms of domination have been defeated and people are able to realize themselves and their difference exempt from the relations of power, in favour of life. Rather, neoliberal idea of freedom brings new techniques of domination which limits the life forces of the individuals once again. In Dean’s terms, this is a ‘disciplined freedom’ in the sense that this freedom is based on the condition of the subjection of the individual; “in order to act freely, the

subject must first be shaped, guided and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom through systems of domination” (Dean 1999: 165).

It is precisely these complex mechanisms of power that are characteristic of Deleuze’s society of control. As Deleuze points out; “many young people strangely boast of being ‘motivated’; they re-request apprenticeships and permanent training” (1992: 7). However, there is always hope, “it’s up to them to discover what they’re being made to serve, just as their elders discovered, not without difficulty” (1992: 7). Since neoliberalism is both an economic and an ethico-political rationality, the struggles against this rationality should also include both the refusal of neoliberal economy policies and the refusal of the regime of subjectification that is linked to neoliberalism.

CHAPTER VI

SURVEILLANCE

The database is an instrument of selection, separation and exclusion. It keeps the globals in the sieve and washes out the locals.

Zygmunt Bauman

Surveillance is an inseparable part of the control societies, just like post-Fordism, informational capitalism and neoliberalism. However, surveillance also has a very long history which cannot be reduced to the control societies. For this reason, surveillance should be analyzed from a historical perspective, taking into account both the continuities and discontinuities in the rationalities of the state. In order to achieve this task, in this chapter, firstly the links between the rationalities of modern states and the emergence of surveillance practices are emphasized. After showing how surveillance is strongly tied to modern states and modernity in general, contemporary surveillance is focused paying special attention to the growth of technological infrastructures (e.g. database technology) which enabled an intensification of surveillance practices and the contemporary rationalities of rule (i.e. neoliberalism and the discourse of risk) in which contemporary surveillance is shaped.

6.1. Surveillance and the Modern State

Surveillance can be defined as “the observation, recording and categorization of information about people, processes and institutions” (Ball & Webster 2003: 1). According to Giddens, surveillance is one of the four main aspects of the modernity alongside with capitalism, industrialism and controlling the means of violence (i.e. military power) which are related but cannot be reducible to any other (1985: 1-5). According to him, the surveillance function of the modern state is exercised in two ways; firstly by collecting, documenting and

storing information from citizens through such instruments as individual identification documents (e.g. identity cards) or censuses and secondly by controlling the activities and behaviors of citizens. These two aspects are strongly related to each other as the information gathering directly serves as a means for controlling the activities of citizens. In other words, “administrative power can only become established if the coding of information is actually applied in a direct way to the supervision of human activities” (Giddens 1985: 47).

Correspondingly, following a Weberian route, Dandeker argues that the modern state and corporations, namely the bureaucratic organizations, depend on the ‘knowledge of the files’ and ‘rational discipline’ (1990: 9). For this reason, modern bureaucratic organizations are the places where knowledge is produced, stored and applied (Dandeker 1990: 13). This knowledge and discipline can be assured through surveillance techniques of the state which would produce a society that is ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘demystified’, ruled according to rational principles (Dandeker 1990: 12).

What is important to underline here is that, the surveillance function of the state is not a necessarily totalitarian function, although there is a strong correlation between totalitarianism and the growth of surveillance power of the state. It is certainly not a coincidence that all totalitarian states in history (Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, Stalin’s Soviet Union to name a few) possessed enhanced and complex systems of surveillance together with the use of secret police. However, surveillance was also a crucial aspect of exercising the so-called ‘democratic’ citizenship rights in the western type liberal states. As Giddens points out, the economic citizenship which includes welfare rights requires in-depth observation of the welfare recipients by the state authorities in order to figure out if they are telling the truth or not (1985: 309). Therefore, the type of surveillance is strongly related to the type of political rule. That is the reason why surveillance can serve either to autocratic or to liberal interests. Although both types of regimes require surveillance for their functioning, the so-called liberal way chooses to do it in a smoother manner within a rational-legal framework (Dandeker 1990: 43- 46).

Surveillance and information gathering are, therefore, absolutely necessary for modern states and modern organizations. Even so, that is not to say that there was no information collecting before the rising of the modern state. States were always interested in the information about their citizens. A clear example of this was the practice of census in early times, such as the time of Roman Empire, which was used by the state to record the information about the characteristics of citizens (Lyon 2007a: 30). Besides this, in the case of Britain, Higgs shows that the information gathering function was exercised by the local feudal powers which served particular purposes even before the modern era. These purposes can be classified as; “the extraction of taxes; the provision of welfare, the prevention of crime, the general identification of citizens and state employees; and the protection of property rights” (Higgs 2001: 176). However, in the pre-modern period, these functions had a ‘local’ character as the monarchs and kings were dependent on the local feudal powers in order to practice such functions. What is changed with the rise of capitalism and the modernity in that sense is that the same functions started to be carried out by the central state rather than the local powers (Higgs 2001: 178). The shift from locality to centrality was not a simple change of the location of power for certain. The rising of capitalism and modernity increased the scope of the information gathering greatly. The limits of pre-modern surveillance were surpassed by means of the deployment of modern systems of transportation and communication. In this way, not only the dependence to the feudal powers ended, but also it became possible to collect information from diverse time-space locations (Dandeker 1990: 42).

Finally, in the twentieth century this form of information gathering by the central state became truly a means to manipulate the characteristics of the population as a whole (Higgs 2001: 192). The diverse characteristics of the population have been registered, standardized and simplified in an effort to turn society “into a legible and administratively more convenient format” (Scott 1998: 3). The rise of statistics, as the ‘science of state’ also corresponds to this same period. As Hacking argues, “it [statistics] may think of itself as providing only

information, but it is itself part of a technology of power in a modern state” (1991: 181). In that sense, the coding of information about the population in statistical form has enabled the authorities to ‘tame the chance’; to transform a qualitative world into a set of probabilistic formulations; to make it amenable to control. Moreover, by means of categorizing and classifying ‘the avalanche of numbers’ about the characteristics of the population, statistics has a direct influence on what people “think of themselves and of actions that are open to them” (Hacking 1991: 194) provided that the segmented groups make the official definition about them as a part of their identity and act accordingly. In this regard, statistics does not only transform society, it also transforms people by means of providing them with the identities based on the statistical classifications (e.g. poor people, people with high education, welfare dependents, potential criminals etc.).

It is precisely for this reason that, “the evolution of procedures for individual identification” is strongly tied to “modern concepts of individuality and subjectivity” (Caplan & Torpey 2001: 2). Therefore, rendering society ‘legible’ by means of information gathering necessarily involves categorization of individuals which constitutes some individuals as ‘desirable’ and some other as ‘undesirable’. The development of statistics as a technology of categorization and the emergence of personal identification documents (i.e. identity cards, passports etc.) are inextricably linked to each other in that sense, as both of them represent the ideals of the modern state for distinguishing the ‘good’ citizen from the ‘bad’ one. Hence, their emergence can also be traced to the same historical period of modernity. As Torpey points out, the modern states had the intention to “monopolize the legitimate means of movement” over their territory from the first times they have emerged (1998). In order to enforce this monopoly, the states were required to establish a unique identity for each individual properly. Systems of registration alongside with national identity cards and passports have been developed for this reason, so as to prevent or allow the access of certain people to certain spaces and to distinguish the citizens from the ‘others’ (Torpey 1998). Thus, having an ID card begun to indicate that the holder had a legitimate place within the borders of a given nation state.

Needless to add that, gaining access to certain citizenship rights, such as voting or public health services was strongly related to this legitimate place which was checked in terms of the validity of the holder's identity card. In that sense, the development of identification procedures cannot be conceived in solely negative terms. It has both negative and positive aspects depending on the 'desirability level' of the holder.

To sum up, surveillance is an inseparable part of the modern state and modernity, which involves both the collection and storage of the knowledge from the population through such instruments as censuses or identification documents and the categorization of the population according to the gathered information which constitutes some individuals as proper citizens and some other as unwanted masses. It is in this sense that the modern concepts of subjectivity are linked to surveillance mechanisms as it is through surveillance that the citizens are categorized within the borders of a certain nation state. Based on these categorizations, the authorities were able to decide who counts as a citizen and to treat certain groups differently, promoting some groups while excluding some other from exercising certain citizenship rights.

In our contemporary world, although these main characteristics of surveillance remain, there have been major changes as well. These changes are mostly related to computer technology which has enabled a quantitative increase in the surveillance practices of the state. However, quantitative transformations always have a qualitative part which they rely on. As discussed above, surveillance is always related to rationalities of the state which give shape to it. It is for this reason that the new surveillance, although having strong continuities with the former rationalities of the modern state, is also linked to new political-economic transformations, such as neoliberalism and the rising of the discourse of the risk. In the following parts, different aspects of the contemporary surveillance will be emphasized, taking into account both the technological side of the issue and the rationalities of the state which are linked to each other.

6.2. Contemporary Surveillance

Surveillance is an inseparable part of our lives. When we want to send an e-mail to our friends, we log into the internet by an identification code and access to our account; when we want to purchase goods, from either a bricks and mortar type business or a virtual store, we enter our credit card code which must match with the bank's database records; when we surf on the internet our consumer profile is constructed, mostly without our authorization, by the 'smart agents' which enable the seller company to offer us 'special offers' that is based on the information about our previous moves. On the other hand, concerning our relationships with the state, we are also 'connected' to the surveillance mechanisms in each of our transaction. We are required to provide our national identification number each time in order to gain access to the state services, such as receiving health care, entering into exam, or getting a residence permit. The state is able to track our previous transactions easily with the help of electronic databases. These datas about us can be used to construct our profile and to divide us into different groups based on the information about our previous transactions (e.g. being a tax debtor, being unemployed for a long time, having a risky illness, having visited a rival country, having received very low scores on exams, being a divorced woman etc.). Besides this, in the city, we are under surveillance too. The new Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras are positioned at every corner of the big cities, tracking our every move. Thanks to the rapidly growing facial image recognition technology, these cameras are able to match our face with the one that is stored in the central databases, thus linking us to our database record continuously as we walk in the streets of the city. In short, surveillance is in our everyday life which both enables us to carry on a wide range of activities and which at the same time may restrict us from doing these and other activities.

It is clear that the underlying technical structure which enabled these new forms of surveillance is computer technology. Some examples of computer-related surveillance technologies include but not limited to;

video and audio surveillance, heat, light, motion, sound and olfactory sensors, night vision goggles, electronic tagging, biometric access devices, drug testing, DNA analysis, computer monitoring including email and web usage and the use of computer techniques such as expert systems, matching and profiling, data mining, mapping, network analysis and simulation (G. Marx 2002: 9).

Gary Marx argues that these new surveillance technologies transcend the physical limitations of the old type of surveillance by means of enabling information gathering from the people in a more deep, wide and continuous manner (2002: 9). The new surveillance is mostly involuntarily (i.e. the people usually are not aware if the information is gathered from them), more remote (the electronic devices make it possible to gather information and track people from distant areas), automated (i.e. the electronic devices 'connect' people into the system continuously) and cheaper (i.e. the rapidly growing technological inventions reduce the need to employ real persons to obtain and classify the data, which respectively reduces the cost of surveillance) (G. Marx 2002: 15-16).

However, contemporary surveillance is a more complex phenomenon which can not be understood by means of taking into account only the growth of the technological infrastructures and their capabilities. Surveillance is always related to the power relations in a given society which give shape to it. The most dominant rationality, in which contemporary surveillance practices are strongly linked, is the rationality of risk.

6.3. Surveillance and Risk

Ericson and Haggerty argue that in our everyday life we are thinking in terms of risk rationalities; when we cook something we calculate its harmful effects and its the potential risk to our health; when we watch a sports game the TV announcer introduces the players in terms of their statistical risk profiles; when we buy something with our credit card, our consumer preferences together with our consuming-power and frequency are transmitted to databases which constitutes our

consumer-risk profile etc. In short “common sense is constantly altered and reconstituted by rationalities of risk” (Ericson & Haggerty 1997: 98).

In the previous chapter about neoliberalism, we have identified that with the declining of the welfare state and the generalization of neoliberal policies, risk is becoming individualized, i.e. the individual not the state becomes responsible for protecting him/herself against risks, such as illness or unemployment. It is mainly for this reason that the risk as a category gains a major importance in contemporary life. It is even argued that, by such theorists as Ulrich Beck, we are living in a ‘risk society’ in which the fundamental element of the organization of the society is the concept of risk.²⁰ In that sense, the fact that the state loses its interest in protecting the individuals against social risks does not mean that it is not concerned with the concept of risk anymore. On the contrary, a significant part of the contemporary rationalities of the state are structured in terms of risk rationalities. The idea is no longer to protect every citizen against social risks but to distinguish the ones who responsibly manage their own risk from the ones who have failed to do so. By means of distinguishing these two groups, the state aims to protect and promote its ‘good citizens’ (i.e. active, entrepreneurial subjects) from the potential threat of its ‘bad citizens’ (i.e. welfare-dependents, unemployed masses, unskilled workers, immigrants etc.). Thus, a central concern of the state becomes to identify, analyze, assess, monitor and prevent the risk. It is in this sense that the state requires a tool for the management of the risk, in order to identify and categorize people in terms of their level of riskiness. This tool is surveillance.

²⁰ As Dean (1999: 182-83) clarifies, according to Beck, although risk has existed in the first phase of the industrial society, it was regarded as the necessary ‘side-effects’ of industrialization and science and technology. The distinctive aspect of contemporary societies in terms of risk is that the risk is becoming ‘globalized’ (such as nuclear risks) and it becomes harder to avoid these risks through wealth and status. However, in this thesis, rather than applying an epochal perspective, a governmentality approach to risk is applied by means of taking into account the rationalities of risk (which are related to wider governing rationalities such as neoliberalism) and how these rationalities are linked to social and political identities (i.e. discourse of active citizen) and how these rationalities and identities affect different techniques which are related to risk (i.e. surveillance and classification of the population according to their risk levels to distinguish active citizens from the potential risky ones.) See Dean 1999: 176-197 for a detailed comparison between these two perspectives.

Surveillance and risk are strongly related to each other in the sense that it is through surveillance mechanisms (i.e. information gathering from individuals) that the authorities define who is risky and who is not. Therefore, the responsabilization of the self through neoliberal governmentality goes hand in hand with dividing the population into risk groups, which distinguishes the responsible individual from the irresponsible one.

We can see these neoliberal risk rationalities of the state in terms of its approach to crime. Castel argues that, the segmentation of people according to their risk levels signifies a transformation from ‘dangerousness to risk’ in the advanced industrial societies (1991). The desire is no longer to neutralize the dangerous individual as a part of social citizenship policies, but to prevent his/her risky actions before happening. Since the risk is regarded as “the effect of a combination of abstract factors which render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour” (Castel 1991: 287), the aim becomes to identify these factors deemed to signify the risk potential of the individual. This is mostly done through collecting information about different aspects of an individual’s life (i.e. his/her employment status, health status, place of residence, ethnic origin, marital status etc.) and combining these different aspects in computers with the help of statistical correlations. The result is a computer profile which informs the authorities with the risk level of the individual, whether he or she is a responsible citizen or not.

Bogard (1996: 27) argues this computer profile dependent aspect of the contemporary surveillance turns everybody a ‘target’ even those who have done nothing wrong. Since the contemporary risk rationalities aim to prevent things before happening, authorities continuously compare the profiles of the individuals with the risk categories that are established before by prior search and records. If any individual falls into these risk categories because of his/her age, sex, ethnic origin, employment status or a combination of these, he or she becomes a target, a suspect, a potential criminal (Bogard 1996: 27). Therefore, rather than the actual individual with his/her actual identity, his/her computer profile becomes having more ‘reality’. Hence, computer profiles simulate surveillance in the sense that they

become “more real than real” (Bogard 1996: 31). It is no longer important what type of person we are as long as we have a computer profile that represents us. Our diverse characteristics as individuals are turned into simple computer profiles, in which there is only two category: risky or not.

These risk classifications are not simply imposed by the state in a top-down way for certain. They can also provide people with a kind of identity based on these segmentations. As Ericson and Haggerty argue, risk classification may provide the basis for individuals to construct themselves and their actions if they accept the definition about their risk categories. Alternatively, these categorizations may push people to improve themselves in order to fit into a better risk category (Ericson & Haggerty 1997: 92-93). In either case, risk rationalities and risk classifications are very important parts of both what the state thinks about people and what the people think about themselves.

Thus, risk and surveillance are strongly related to each other. Since risk rationalities forms an important part of our everyday way of thinking, and that of state, the desire to prevent risk by means of computer profiling becomes a central theme in contemporary world. It is in this sense that the databases emerge as key figures in which the risk profiles of individuals are constructed through enhanced techniques. This database-laden characteristic of contemporary surveillance is called dataveillance.

6.4. Surveillance, Dataveillance and Social Sorting

The term ‘dataveillance’ was firstly coined by Roger Clarke, which indicated the database intensive nature of contemporary surveillance. Clarke defines dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons” (1988: 499). In that sense, rather than directly watching the individuals, contemporary surveillance is more concerned with information gathering and processing it in databases. Behind dataveillance is the rapid technological growth for certain, both in the database technology (e.g. data mining, profiling, matching) and other

supporting technologies, which enable to combine distinct technologies together (Clarke 1998: 500). In this way, the collected data from various spheres is integrated in a single center and it is matched with the previous records of the individuals, constructing an individual database profile which is open to editing and re-editing continuously.

There are various resources for constructing a database profile for the individual which covers almost all activities he or she undertakes throughout his or her life. Oscar Gandy identifies eleven different spheres in which the individual computer identity is constructed in 'network-linked data files' (See Table 1).

The other side of collecting data from various resources is the integration of these collected datas. Following the works of Deleuze and Guattari, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) define this characteristic of contemporary surveillance as 'rhizomatic' in the sense that it is continuously expanding without any hierarchy and becomes connected to other surveillance mechanisms easily. This new surveillance works through 'surveillant assemblages' which are aimed to "bring systems together" and to "integrate them into a larger whole" (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 610). For instance, the police databases become connected to the databases of other institutions, such as the databases of insurance companies, financial institutions, schools, or corporate organizations which enable the police to access to the information about a wide range of activities of the individuals; from exam results to the consuming habits (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 616- 617). In this way, through the interaction between diverse institutions, everyone, regardless of his/her status or wealth, is caught in a surveillance web and given a database profile.

In that sense, rather than observing only the weak and disadvantaged groups of the society, contemporary surveillance aims to integrate the whole population to the system (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 617). There are no longer corporeal bodies, but 'bodies that are turned into information' which can be compared and contrasted with the other bodies easily (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 613). If one of those 'decorporealized' bodies does not have the required credits to access to certain rights or benefits, he or she becomes digitally excluded from the system. On the

other hand, if he or she has a high-level computer profile and sufficient credentials, he or she may have unlimited access to the same rights and benefits.

Table 1: Personal contributions to machine-readable, network-linked data files

Source: Gandy (1996: 139).

1. Personal information for identification and qualification
Includes birth certificate, driver's license, passport, voter registration, automobile registration, school records, marriage certification
2. Financial information
Includes bank records, savings passbooks, ATM cards, credit cards, credit report/files, tax returns, stock/brokerage accounts, traveler's checks
3. Insurance information
Includes insurance for health, automobile, home, business, general and specific liability, group and individual policies
4. Social service information
Includes social security, health care, employment benefits, unemployment benefits, disability, pensions, food stamps and other government assistance, veterans' benefits, senior citizens' benefits/subsidies
5. Utility services information
Includes telephone, electricity, gas, cable television, sanitation, heating, garbage, security, delivery
6. Real estate information
Involved with purchase, sale, rental, lease
7. Environment/leisure information
Includes travel itineraries, recreational profiles, automobile and other rentals/leases, lodging reservations, airplane reservations, ship reservations, train reservations, entertainment tickets/reservations, newspaper and other periodical subscriptions, television/cable rating
8. Consumer information
Includes store credit cards, other accounts, layaway, leases and rentals, purchases, purchase inquiries, subscriber lists, clothing and shoe sizes
9. Employment information
Includes application, medical examination, references, performance assessment, employment history, employment agency applications
10. Educational information
Includes school applications, academic records, references, extracurricular activities/memberships, awards and sanctions, rankings
11. Legal information
Includes records of the court, attorney's records, newspaper reports, index and abstract services.

According to Lyon, this desire to categorize and distinguish people through dataveillance strategies is 'social sorting' which opens the way to differential treatment, facilitating the life for some groups while excluding some other (2003: 13). One clear example is from marketing strategies. Gandy argues that social sorting in marketing surveillance follows three steps: identification, classification and assessment (1996: 135). In the first step, the consumer is identified in order to make sure that he or she is telling the truth about him/herself. Secondly, the consumer is classified according to his/her consuming preferences together with his/her individual characteristics (age, education, work, ethnic origin etc.) and divided into different groups which reveal the consuming-power of the individual and his/her potential value to the company. Lastly, the consumer is assessed to decide whether he or she is worth for promotional activities (Gandy 1996: 136-7).

In terms of policing, there is social sorting too. Since the police officers have access to both their own database and to other databases, they may have geo-demographic information about the potential risky areas based on the previous data about that region and potential risky people based on the background information of these people (Lyon 2003: 15). This information turns some places (e.g. some districts in the city) and some individuals (e.g. immigrants, ethnic minorities etc.) to potential threats in the eyes of police officers and greatly increases the pressure on people living in these areas or people having disadvantaged background, even if these people have nothing to do with crime. Accordingly, in terms of border-crossing, we witness that some individuals (e.g. unemployed, welfare-dependent) are placed under strict control and supervision just because of their background information. Their status is continuously checked in order to figure out whether they are 'double-dipping' or not (Lyon 2003: 21). On the other hand, insurance companies use enhanced surveillance and data mining techniques to figure out if the applicant is in a high-risk segment because of his/her health or employment status (Lyon 2003: 21).

In short, as a consequence of the contemporary desire of social sorting in surveillance, some individuals enjoy the 'special offers' from advertising companies

while some other individuals become continuously targeted for crime suspicion and welfare fraud. Surveillance, thus, both facilitates the life for some people and makes it harder for some other.

6.5. Conclusion

Surveillance has a long history which can be traced to emergence of the first state apparatuses. However, it is with modernity and the modern state that surveillance gained a new form. With the help of enhanced systems of surveillance, the states, both the liberal and the autocratic ones, were able to render society 'legible' (Scott 1998) and to classify people in order to distinguish the members from nonmembers (Torpey 1998).

In contemporary world, although there is a strong continuity in these rationalities of state surveillance, there have been major changes as well, both in terms of technology and the rationalities of rule. Technological changes are mostly related to the growth of computer technology and the application of this technology by the state and other institutions for the observation and categorization of people which intensified the level of surveillance greatly. In terms of the rationalities of the state, the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and the discourse of risk influenced the surveillance practices. Since the risk is becoming individualized in the neoliberal era, the state becomes more interested in distinguishing the risky individual from the active citizen in order to prevent and to manage the risk. That is not to say that neoliberal governmentality and the discourse of risk have substantially transformed the rationalities of surveillance. On the contrary, these contemporary rationalities can be regarded as a continuation of the traditional/historical surveillance rationality of social sorting. The only difference is perhaps is the perspective that neoliberal governmentality brings to the definitions about the 'desirable' and the 'undesirable' groups. Under neoliberal governmentality, the subjects become more 'desirable' when they become more active/entrepreneurial. This definition also affects the exclusionary practices of

surveillance, i.e. exclusion of those who cannot become active and who are regarded as risky.

Databases emerge here as key figures in which the information about people is gathered, analyzed and everyone is given a computer profile. It is in this sense that, Deleuze points out that in control societies “individuals become ‘dividuals’” (1992: 5). That is to say that, there are no longer individuals with their diverse characteristics but codes, passwords, datas which represent them against the authorities according to their level of riskiness. The information about all aspects of an individual’s life is gathered through complex surveillance mechanisms (i.e. surveillant assemblages), then this information is analyzed and interpreted. Based on these interpretations, he or she is given a database profile. The aim is to classify people according to their level of riskiness and to treat different groups differently, granting some of them unlimited access, while excluding some other.

Felix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position—licit or illicit—and effects a universal modulation (Deleuze 1992: 7).

Today, Guattari’s imagination is more than real for some people. In control societies citizenship becomes linked to a legitimate database record, which increases the pressure on those who have flawed database records, especially those people who cannot conduct themselves in a neoliberal way or who can not become ‘flexible’ in their workplaces. In the next chapter, all those different aspects of control society will be combined and concluded in terms of the concept of citizenship.

CHAPTER VII

CITIZENSHIP IN THE SOCIETY OF CONTROL

In the previous chapters, we have already identified some of the ways in which the subjects are constructed as ‘appropriate citizens’ in the control society with an emphasis on material transformations in the economy (i.e. post-Fordism, informational capitalism) and transformations in modes of rule (i.e. neoliberal governmentality). We have also identified how this construction affects the changing mentalities of control and surveillance (i.e. governing individuals as individuals). In the section below, these different aspects of control society will be combined in terms of the concept of citizenship. It will be argued that, taking citizen as a ‘social construct’ enables us to see how the subjects are governed as citizens in different epochs and in the society of control, in particular. This Foucauldian approach to citizenship also reveals how inclusion and exclusion to/from citizenship functions in the contemporary era and how different aspects of the society of control are related to these strategies of contemporary power.

7.1. What is Citizenship?

Citizenship is traditionally defined as a form of relationship between the individual and the state. In its most common usage, the term citizenship refers to a kind of legal status that is granted by the state to its subjects which enables the people who are counted as citizens to benefit from certain citizenship rights and which in turn obliges the same people to perform certain citizenship duties.

In contemporary world, the concept of citizenship is a point of major controversies. According to Isin and Turner, the debates around citizenship take place on three main points; *extent* (who is to be included as citizens on which grounds and who is to be excluded), *content* (what kind of rights and responsibilities citizens should have) and *depth* (the manner of participating to these rights) (2002: 2). As Yeğen points out, these three aspects of citizenship are not

stagnant and are continuously reconfigured throughout the history (2005: 69). For instance, concerning the depth of citizenship, with the formation of modern states there is a shift from active/classical to passive/modern citizenship which transforms the manner of participation in political decisions (Yeğen 2005: 69-70). As Burchell (1995: 541) puts it, there is a contrast between active and passive citizenship in traditional citizenship theories, in the sense that the former is conceived as a kind of citizenship that is exercised in public sphere in which the communitarian impulses are dominant with an emphasis on duties, while the latter is restricted to private sphere in which the liberal/individualist impulses are dominant with an emphasis on rights.

On the other hand, the content of citizenship rights has also undergone important transformations. T.H. Marshall claims that there is an evolution from civil (such as freedom of speech), political (such as electoral rights) to social rights (such as social security) from 18th century onwards (2006). However, as Turner shows, granted citizenship rights are “clearly reversible” as we have witnessed in the declining of social rights after the process of neoliberalization (1992: 37).

Lastly, concerning the extent of citizenship, the debates around who is to be included as citizens have taken new forms in the contemporary world. The changing compositions of the nation states as a result of globalization and immigration opened the way for new claims for the recognition of different groups. On the other hand, the emergence of transnational organizations encouraged post-national claims for citizenship that are mostly based on the discourse of human rights. As a consequence, the place of the nation-state as the sole authority of citizenship rights is questioned in the contemporary era (Yeğen 2005: 70-71, Isin and Turner 2002: 4).

However, although these debates on the concept of citizenship are fruitful for our understanding of the mechanisms of power in the contemporary world, there is a different approach to citizenship which enables us to think the category of citizenship together with the political economic transformations, the rationalities of the state and the processes of subject formation. By means of taking the citizen as a

‘social construct’, this Foucauldian approach deconstructs the traditional oppositions between the citizen and the state sovereignty, the subject and the power. According to this point of view, citizenship is taken not as an ‘institution’ but as an ensemble of governmental strategies that are aimed to transform the “attributes, expectations and practices” of the citizens (Procacci 2001: 343). For this reason, “there is no such thing as *the citizen*; there exists only the specific figures corresponding to different regimes of citizenship: the citizen is an historical persona, a social creation; ways of governing people as citizens change, just as citizens’ subjectivity changes” (Procacci 2001: 347).

In that sense, rather than conceiving citizenship in active/passive, classical/modern-liberal dichotomies, this point of view enables us to see how the citizen is historically invented and re-invented through the interaction between the ‘external’ activities of the state (i.e. technologies of domination) and the ‘internal’ activities of the self (i.e. technologies of the self) and how these interactions resulted in fostering of different attributes and capacities of citizens in different historical periods, thus producing a ‘good citizen’ for each era (Burchell 1995: 549).

Therefore, as White and Hunt reminds us, the strategies for governing people as citizens are strongly related to the social and historical processes and change according to the changes in “economy, society and culture” (2000: 101). For this reason, the concept of citizenship is required to be analyzed by means of taking into account the political-economic transformations in the contemporary world. So far in this thesis, we have tried to capture these transformations within the passage from Foucault’s society of discipline to Deleuze’s society of control in which new strategies for governing subjects as citizens are introduced. Before beginning to discuss the citizenship in the societies of control and its wider implications, this passage from discipline to control should be briefly summarized.

7.2. Discipline to Control

In the second and third chapters, following Foucauldian political philosophy, we have identified that ‘government’ of oneself can be reduced to neither the free

choices of the self nor the repressive activities of the state. Rather, 'government' appears as a 'contact point' between technologies of domination and technologies of the self. The state, in that sense, interacts with the technologies of the self so as to guide the conduct of the subjects for certain ends. Since it is not a top-down type of domination, the state fosters some capacities and attributes to the subjects. It becomes successful to the extent that the subjects internalize these attributes and capacities and act accordingly.

The type of attributes that is fostered by the state has a necessarily historical character and changes according to the political-economic transformations. In order to locate these changes, following a Deleuzian reading of Foucault, the concept of 'diagram' as a point of analysis is used in order to 'map' the changing relationships between the technologies of domination and the technologies of self in different epochs which correspond to different stages of power. Three stages of power are compared in that sense; society of sovereignty, society of discipline and society of control. The last one, which corresponds to our contemporary world, is analyzed in detail by means of taking into account the different aspects which constitute it.

In the chapter 4, material aspects of the society of control are emphasized taking into account the material/economic transformations in contemporary capitalism. In that sense, since 1970s, there are important transformations in production patterns and economic organizations which also affect the type of worker-subject that is appropriate for the new economic system. When we shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism, energy based capitalism to informational capitalism discourses such as flexibility emerges which not only concerns the flexibilization of the organizations but also the flexibilization of the self. Since the contemporary capitalism requires flexible, adaptable, risk-taking workers for its healthy functioning, the state of 'being flexible' becomes a norm, a virtue. Hence, the technologies of self are under continuous raid from the technologies of domination which fosters and imposes being flexible as an appropriate attribute, as the new 'truth'.

In the chapter 5, we have emphasized this process of flexibilization of the self in a broader sense, focusing on the relationships between contemporary rationalities of the state and the citizen. Neoliberalism emerges as a dominant mode of thought, as a governing technology which not only introduces new ways for governing the state and the economy but also for governing the people in a proper manner. In that sense, the fact that neoliberal state ceases to intervene to the economy does not mean that it is not interested in governing the people anymore. On the contrary, neoliberal state emerges as a technology of domination and tries to shape a type of subjectivity that is in accordance with the principles of neoliberal economy.²¹ Thus, the ‘active citizen’ is constructed and proposed as the only ‘truth’ about being a citizen in contemporary world.²² This entrepreneurial subject is autonomous and is able to protect him/herself against social risks such as unemployment and illness without relying on the state.

In the chapter 6, we have focused on another important aspect of control societies: surveillance. Although surveillance cannot be conceived as a technology of domination, it is certainly an important ‘tool’ for governing people since its first appearance in the sense it is through surveillance mechanisms that the state has been able to ‘know’ the subjects and to distinguish the good citizens from the bad ones. In this regard, in the society of control, surveillance becomes a crucial part of governing people in a neoliberal way. By means of turning individuals into individuals, contemporary surveillance functions as a tool to sort and categorize people continuously according to their level of riskiness. The proper citizens (e.g. active, entrepreneurial subjectivities) are distinguished from the improper ones (e.g.

²¹ As White and Hunt points out, It is for this reason that, contemporary citizenship is closely related to the emergence of consumer liberalism which favors ‘individual choice’ and which introduces new ways for the citizens to conduct themselves in a proper manner, in accordance with the consumer-market (2000:105).

²² Here, the term ‘active’ does not signify being an active participant to political life as it was assumed to be in the case of classical citizenship of Ancient Greece. By the same token, being passive does not signify the modern/liberal representative citizenship with the rising of nation states. Rather, these terms designate a certain relation of a person with herself. This person becomes more active when she invests in her human capital and develops new marketable skills and more passive when she fails to undertake these investments.

welfare dependents, homeless people, unskilled workers) in this way which enables the authorities to treat different groups differently, granting access to some while excluding some other.

7.3. Citizenship in the Society of Control

Therefore, as Ong points out, in contemporary era the citizenship with all of its different aspects (rights, entitlements, territoriality, a nation) is re-defined and re-configured according to 'market criteria' both in East and in West (2006). In that sense, in the society of control, those who are conducting themselves in a neoliberal way, those who are flexible and mobile, those who are managing their own life in a responsible manner are able to exercise citizenship rights in diverse places. On the other hand, those who have unproductive and inflexible bodies, those who do not have sufficient entrepreneurial skills, those who fail to manage their own conduct according to the norms of neoliberal capitalism are excluded from citizenship even if they own the formal citizenship status (Ong 2006: 6-7, 16).

We can see the growing distinction between these two groups in the cities clearly. After all, as Engin Isin points out, it is in the city in which different groups encounter, differentiate themselves from the other groups and construct their identities based on these differentiations (2002: 49-50). Thus, while some agents constitute themselves as having 'virtuous' characteristics, they simultaneously constitute others as lacking these virtues in the city. Since virtuous characteristics are re-defined in each different epoch, according to power relations; there are new virtues of being in 21st century cosmopolises. In that sense, the 'virtues' of being a professional, an entrepreneur, an active citizen determine the 'vices' of being an immigrant, a refugee, a homeless in the contemporary cities. The abilities that are associated with being an active citizen, such as flexibility, become universal norms and the people who do not have such abilities are begun to be regarded as inferior subjects, thus excluded from citizenship (Isin 2002: 249).

Certainly the globalization and the flexible accumulation of the capital are the main underlying material conditions of this changing composition of the city

which brings these groups together. As Sassen argues, with the economic globalization and rapid immigration, there emerges a struggle between the global capital and new immigrant workforce for new claims and new rights to space as a part of citizenship (1998: 162). The global capital seems to be the winning side in this struggle so far which establishes itself in ‘metropolitan business centers’ and pushes the immigrant workforce together with other disadvantaged groups (low-skilled workers, women labor etc.) to the ‘low-income city areas’, thus excluding these groups from the city center and marginalizing their existence (Sassen 1998: 165).

This process of centralization and marginalization is closely related to the changing capital accumulation patterns as Harvey points out (1990). In that sense, the flexible accumulation strategies of the capital and the rise of the post-Fordist economy caused a re-organization of space within the cities. As the disparities between those who are employed at core of the economy (e.g. financial services, transnational firms) and those who are employed at the periphery (e.g. informal sector, low-skilled works) rises, the city centers are re-organized in an effort to promote such themes as ‘quality of urban living’ (e.g. consumption places, sophisticated entertainment etc.) while the ghettoization increases in low-income areas (Harvey 1990: 260). Thus, flexible accumulation ties the exercising of citizenship to the requirements of neoliberal capitalism and pushes those who cannot meet these requirements to the shanty towns.

Therefore, in the society of control citizenship becomes dependent on market criteria. On the one hand, there are entrepreneurial subjects who enjoy their places in the business centers of the cities. On the other hand, those who have failed to obtain such marketable competencies have no choice other than dwelling in the urban ghettos. However, it is only one side of the issue. Exercising of citizenship is not only dependent to neoliberal criteria but it is also dependent to a legitimate database record in the society of control.

In that sense, surveillance is an inseparable part of governing people in a neoliberal way as it is through surveillance mechanisms (e.g. databases, electronic

cards, passwords, codes, biometric information etc.) that the authorities are able to categorize people and to distinguish the active citizen from the inactive one. Even though surveillance is as old as the formation of the states and is aimed to distinguish the desired individual from the undesired one since its first appearance, contemporary surveillance increases this process of sorting greatly with the help of new computer technology. The authorities are able to collect, interpret and manage the knowledge of the population automatically through the databases. In order to constitute the database profile of the individuals, the data are gathered continuously from diverse institutions through 'surveillant assemblages' (Haggerty & Ericson 2000). In this way, everyone becomes 'connected' to surveillance mechanisms and assigned a database profile. Thus, with the help of surveillant assemblages, databases are able to interpret the gathered data and classify people automatically according to their level of riskiness. These classifications are used to create 'thresholds' that defines the criteria for inclusion or exclusion (Ericson & Haggerty 1997: 41). While those who have higher records than the thresholds benefit from certain citizenship rights, those who have flawed records are excluded. Thus, as Rose points out, following Deleuze, there are no longer individuals that are characterized by their personalities but 'dividuals' that are characterized by their database record, "containing a whole variety of bits of information on their credentials, activities, qualifications for entry into this or that network" (1999: 234). The individuals are under continuous interrogation; whether they have the sufficient funds to buy that particular commodity; whether they are creditworthy or whether they are criminal suspects (Rose 2000: 326). In conclusion, "exercise of freedom requires proof of legitimate identity" (Rose 1999: 240) in the society of control and those who cannot show a legitimate identity together with its legitimate database records is to be excluded from citizenship.

Therefore, exercising of citizenship is both tied to market criteria and to a legitimate identity in the society of control. These two aspects of citizenship are closely related to each other as the groups that have failed to become active citizens are usually the groups that have 'suspicious' database records. However, that is not

to say that there are no transitions in citizenship. On the contrary, power always operates within a paradigm of inclusion and exclusion. In that sense, the neoliberal state, together with other agencies, employs various tactics for promoting self-government and individual responsibility. The aim is to turn passive subjects into active citizens and to adjust them to the norms of civility.

7.4. Inclusion and Exclusion to/from Citizenship

In chapter 5, we have already emphasized the rise of ‘training’ as a normalizing technology to integrate the unemployed, unskilled masses into the circuits of control society by means of enabling them to develop marketable skills. This is not limited to training in the society of control. Rather, as Cruikshank observes, there is the rise of ‘the will to empower’ in various social service programs, social policies, political associations, philanthropy organizations and even in social movements (1999: 1-3). In each case, the aim is to help the subjects to develop a particular relationship with themselves, that is based on the model of enterprise.

According to Cruikshank, the ‘self-esteem movement’ in California, which is supported by the state authorities, provides a perfect example of this ‘will to empower’ (1996). This organization aims to promote self-esteem and self-responsibility in the participants that are regarded as socially problematic. In that sense, various types of domination that limits personal freedom, such as capitalism, racism or inequality are not questioned within these types of organizations and movements; rather the whole attention is turned to the way in which one governs oneself (Cruikshank 1996: 231). Thus, the failed subjects become obliged to change their relation with themselves, to become active citizens, to become responsible for their actions, to obtain marketable skills. It is believed that once the subjects become active in managing their own life, various social problems, such as poverty, crime and gender inequality would be automatically solved.

Therefore, in the society of control, the subjects are included to the citizenship provided that they establish a particular relationship with themselves

that is in accordance with the ideals of neoliberalism. The transformation from passivity to activity becomes the condition of citizenship. That is the reason why, the state, together with other institutions, employs various tactics for including the ‘weak’ members to the endless flows and modulations of the society of control. However, these ‘liberal’ techniques of inclusion are not the case for everyone.

We know that the liberal government always bears an authoritarian potential for those who are seen as lacking the ability for self-government, those who are seen as threats for the general good, and those who are too risky to be integrated into the society (Dean 1999: 131-148, Dean 2002). This is the ‘dark side of bio-politics’ according to Dean (1999: 139). In that sense, the fact that the contemporary rationalities of power becomes concerned with fostering the capacities and life forces of the individuals does not mean that everyone would be included into this normalizing gaze. On the contrary, for those who are seen as threats to the lives of the sovereign citizens there would be more death; even genocides. In that sense, “massacres have become vital” (Foucault 1990: 137) in contemporary era which forms the other part of governing people through freedom.

There are literally massacres in our contemporary world, which are justified in the name of life of the sovereign citizens as we have witnessed and witnessing in Gaza or in Iraq. However, the dark side of bio-politics includes not only massacres but also all sovereign instruments that are applied by the (neo)-‘liberal’ states in the name of life. Therefore, all strategies of risk management, continuous surveillance, data-tracking, CCTV cameras, gathering of biometric information, electronic ID cards etc. can be considered as part of the bio-political strategies of the state to distinguish the worthy citizen from the unworthy one, including the former, while excluding the latter, thus tying the citizenship to a legitimate database record.^{23 24}

²³ This is especially the case in contemporary border management as Walters emphasizes (2006). He argues that in society of control, “borders governs us as individuals” (2006: 198) in the sense that borders automatically classify us according to our level of desirability through complex systems of data management and gives the decision about whether to include or the exclude us automatically. Accordingly, Lyon argues that this is also the case for governing people in the city. Through such instruments as electronic ID cards, contemporary surveillance mechanisms bring “the border everywhere” and extend the “experience of otherness” to whole parts of the city for those who have

7.5. Conclusion

The concept of citizenship has different meanings according to one's point of view. In this chapter, rather than focusing on the three aspects of citizenship (depth, extent, content) and the transformations in these three aspects through time, a Foucauldian perspective is followed and 'citizen' is taken as a 'social construct' which enables us to conceive 'citizenship' together with the transformations in economy, culture and society in general. This, of course, does not mean that the depth, extent and content of citizenship are no longer important elements of analysis nor does it mean that the Foucauldian approach is necessarily at odds with these three aspects of citizenship. It is more plausible to take these different perspectives in relation with each other. For instance, the strategies of power-knowledge which construct subjects as citizens in specific periods may also have an impact on the extent of the formal citizenship status (e.g. having appropriate characteristics may facilitate the process of being accepted as a citizen to a society). On the other hand, these strategies may also fail to affect the formal citizenship status (e.g. some groups may still preserve their citizenship status even if they are regarded as 'undesirable'). However, in any case, such practices of exclusion and marginalization may affect the undesirable groups of the society in a more intensive manner even if they own the formal citizenship status. If we look from the other side, the transformations in the three aspects of citizenship may also affect the worth of citizenry. For instance, various struggles concerning the extent and content of citizenship (e.g. the discourses of human rights and social rights) may affect the strategies of power-knowledge and the definition of what is being a virtuous citizen. Therefore, the Foucauldian approach and the traditional approaches may both

insufficient records (Lyon 2005: 80). Therefore, the dark side of bio-politics is in everywhere of our lives.

²⁴ That is not to say that each of these bio-political practices has the same intensity. Being tortured is not equal to being subject to the arbitrary interrogations of a police officer for certain. However, these two examples are not also too distinct from each other in the sense that both of them are parts of the broader rationality of modern power in which the aim is to exclude those who are regarded as risky to the general good of the society.

complement or contradict each other. By the same token, each of these perspectives has their own advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage of the Foucauldian perspective is that it enables us to conceive the concept of citizenship together with the strategies of power-knowledge and the political-economic transformations. Thus, following this perspective, in this chapter, citizenship is discussed within the power relations of the contemporary world, i.e. in the diagram of the society of control. Based on these discussions, it is argued that contemporary citizenship depends on two interrelated conditions: market criteria and database record. These two aspects of citizenship are inextricable from each other in the sense that the groups that are likely to have flawed database records are the groups that have low marketable skills and vice versa. To put it another way, to become citizens, the subjects are both obliged to conduct themselves in a responsible manner that is in accordance with the principles of neoliberal economy and to have a legitimate identity which is required to be validated continuously by a legitimate database record.

From these two conditions of citizenship, we can trace two governing rationalities of the state that are linked to new modes of subjectivities. The first one, by means of imposing market criteria on citizenship, tries to make ‘active citizens’ out of the disordered masses as a civilizing strategy. Hence, governing rationalities are linked to active citizenship which imposes being active as the only truth of being in the society of control. The second governing rationality of the state tries to turn individuals into ‘dividuals’ which will make it easy to manage the people in the databases; continuously checking their status and including or excluding them from citizenship based on these continuous interrogations.²⁵

Therefore, contemporary governing rationalities both aim to turn subjects into active citizens and into dividuals. These two aspects of the society of control, as it will be showed in the following chapter, are at play in the process of what can be termed as the ‘e-governmentalisation of the state’.

²⁵ The term ‘exclusion’ is used in a broader sense throughout the thesis, which includes every practice of marginalization and discrimination. In other words, there is no ‘total exclusion’ from citizenship rights.

CHAPTER VIII

E-GOVERNMENTALISATION OF THE STATE

We are altogether building a developed and prosperous Turkey of the information age. We will continue on this way decidedly. We have the aim of reaching above the contemporaneous civilization level and we will achieve this task here. We should not run late this time about the information society as we did in the case of the industrial revolution [...] We should become one of the leaders. Our people, open to new challenges, is our biggest richness in this task.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Milliyet 18/12/2008).

8.1. Introduction

In this chapter, finally, the concept of ‘e-governmentalisation of the state’ will be discussed in detail, taking into account the previous chapters about the society of control. In that sense, after briefly discussing different theoretical approaches to the term ‘e-government’, e-government will be taken as a governing rationality, that is, e-governmentalisation. The links between different aspects of the society of control (material aspects/information society, neoliberalism, surveillance) and e-governmentalisation will be emphasized so as to locate the emergence of this new governing rationality within historically contingent power interactions. Additionally, the context of Turkey will also be taken into account in order to make these theoretical discussions more concrete. At the end of the chapter, the social outcomes of e-governmentalisation will be concluded.

8.2. What is E-Governmentalisation of the State?

In the literature, the term ‘electronic government’ or simply ‘e-government’ seems to have many different meanings according to different points of view. In its most common usage, e-government refers to the usage of information and

communication technologies (ICTs) in the public administration for the delivery of the state services. For instance, in one of the OECD reports, e-government is defined as; “the use of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve better government” (OECD 2003: 1) which is fast, efficient and cost-effective.

In a similar manner, Jane Fountain (2001) approaches e-government from the perspective of ‘organizations’ and ‘institutional change’ and focuses on how the adoption of technology changes the organizational structure of the government. According to her, “a virtual state [...] is a government that is organized increasingly in terms of virtual agencies, cross-agency and public-private networks whose structure and capacity depend on the Internet and web” (2001: 4). This virtual aspect of the government enables it to reduce the costs that are caused by the usage of paper-based documents and makes it possible for the citizens to access various state services, such as birth registrations, college enrollment, voter registration and tax payment online (Fountain 2001: 5). Moreover, e-government is not only about government-to-citizen transactions (G2C); it also facilitates the transactions between government-to-business (G2B) and government-to-government (G2G) by means of coordinating the transactions between different agencies (public, private, local etc.) in an efficient way (Fountain 2001: 6). Thus, from this perspective, e-government can be conceived as a reform in public administration in which the government services are provided to the citizens as well as to the other agencies through the use of ICTs rather than old bureaucratic mechanisms.

Another popular usage of e-government is related to the concepts of ‘e-governance’ and ‘e-democracy’ in which e-government is regarded as the technical structure for the transformation of the politics. For instance, according to Clift,

e-government and democracy, fused together, are one piece of the e-democracy puzzle. Whether it is online campaigning, lobbying, activism, political news, or citizen discussions, the politics and governance of today are going online around the world (2004: 2).

In that sense, e-democracy perspective to e-government focuses on the democratic potentialities of the implementation of the ICTs. It is claimed that e-government may enhance citizen participation in political decision making processes through such mechanisms as online voting or online consultation.²⁶

A third approach to e-government can be defined as ‘developmental perspective’. According to this perspective, e-government is regarded as a strategy for transforming economies into ‘knowledge-based economies’ and transforming societies into ‘information societies’. As Brown points out,

e-government [...] is concerned with government taking measures to promote enterprise creation and innovation in the knowledge-based economy, through regulatory and program activity and through establishment of national technological infrastructure (2005: 242).

Moreover, from this perspective, the task of e-government is not limited to the promotion of private and public sector agencies so as to transform them into knowledge-intensive organizations; individuals are also ‘promoted’ to transform themselves into digital selves. In that sense, one of the most important concerns of the e-government becomes to create a competent human resource for the healthy functioning of the knowledge economy in the information society. For this reason, “it [e-government] stresses informal and life-long learning, building on an expanded definition of literacy. It also creates new forms of cultural expression and digitization opens up new ways of holding and transmitting cultural information” (Brown 2005: 242).

In a similar manner, Arifoğlu suggests that, e-government should be understood within the broader context of ‘e-transformation’ in which not only the

²⁶ The potential of electronic technologies for building e-democracy is a controversial point and depends on what we understand from the term ‘democracy’. As Barney points out, democracy requires meaningful participation which must have a direct impact on policy outcomes. Besides, providing equal opportunity for participation is not enough; the citizens must also have the ‘ability’ to participate (i.e. having the necessary resources to participate) (2000: 22-23). Thus, the democratic potential of e-government is related to the power relations in a particular society since the manner of using and developing technology is closely related to these relations. In that sense, in this thesis ‘e-democracy’ perspective to ‘e-government’ is not followed.

states, enterprises, jobs and commerce but also individuals are to be transformed (2004: 5-7). However, the state has the central role in this process because it is the state that coordinates and leads the way for other agencies (private sector, public institutions, citizens) to go 'electronic' by means of providing the required legal instruments for the ICTs growth, promoting knowledge-intensive sectors and promoting digital citizenship.

Therefore, e-government is not only about delivering state services online with the help of the ICTs nor is it solely a technological infrastructure for a new type of participatory democracy. Rather it can be conceived as a new 'mentality' that re-defines economy, society and the citizen in the information age. We can see the traces of this new mentality also in Turkey, particularly after the election of Justice and Government Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to rule in 2002 and Turkey's candidacy for the membership of the European Union. Within this period, various plans including E-transformation Turkey Project (Prime Ministry 27/02/2003) and Information Society Strategic Plan (DPT 2006) were established and various meetings including first and second Informatics Conventions (TBS 04/09/2001, Prime Ministry 06/01/2004) were held so as to transform Turkey into an information society (See Table 2 for a general summary of the historical process of e-transformation in Turkey and see Appendix A for a more detailed historical analysis).

From this point, we can also clearly see that the Turkish State takes e-government in a broader 'developmental' context. Rather than taking e-government as a simple institutional reform for the provision of state services (such as paying taxes) through the use of internet technology (which is the most common way of approaching e-government in the literature, as we have discussed above), the Turkish State takes e-government as a broader strategy for transforming the economy, society, and the individual into digital formats.

Table 2: Information Society Programmes in Turkey

Source: OECD (2007: 125).

1990-1994	Focused on Information Society (IS) actions in education, science and technology.
1996-2000	Further emphasis placed on science and technology, for example by including “Impetus in Science and Technology” as one of the Fundamental Structural Transformation projects; preparation of the National Informatics Infrastructure Master Plan, establishment of National Informatics Technologies Council, development of Internet cafes for public use.
2001-2005	Emphasis on knowledge as the most important factor for Information Society and Turkey’s EU candidacy; important opportunity for implementing the Information Society.
2003-2004	Short-Term Action Plan (4 December 2003) with 73 items.
2005	Action Plan (launched April 2005) with 50 items.
2006	Information Society Strategy (2006-2010) approved by the High Planning Council. 11 July 2006.

It is in this sense that e-government can be conceived as a ‘governing rationality’. When the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says in the Informatics Meeting in 2003, “Turkey is a country which is sensitive and willing to adapt new technologies quickly. Our people, if they do not lose it, are able to combine their own values with the areas that are formed by the technology” (TBS 01/09/2003), he introduces new definitions about being a good, healthy society and being a good, appropriate citizen within that society. It is for this reason that, e-government is not only about providing state services online, nor is it a simple economical reform; rather e-government emerges as an ethico-political governing rationality, which is linked to new modes of subjectivities. Since every type of governing rationality requires appropriate subjects for its diffusion to the society at the capillary level, e-government as a governing rationality also tries to shape a kind of subjectivity that is required for its production and re-production. That is the reason why, e-government imposes new truths and new behavioral norms to the citizens so as to direct them to conduct themselves in a responsible manner in the

information society. The kinds of truths that are imposed on citizens by the e-government have a certain political-economic orientation and are linked to the transformations in contemporary capitalism (i.e. post-Fordism, informational capitalism, and neoliberalism). This is one side of e-government as a governing rationality which will be discussed in more detail in the later parts.

The other side of e-government as a governmental rationality derives from a different perspective but in a way connected to the first rationality, which focuses on the growing scope of the surveillance activities of the state. It is argued that, with the help of the ICTs, the state becomes able to collect a wide range of information about the citizens (e.g. tax payment, passport information, marital status, ethnic origin), store the collected information in the electronic databases and connect different databases together (e.g. criminological records, bank records, school records). Besides this, the implementation of such e-government instruments as electronic ID cards that are connected to the national searchable databases opens the way for the categorization of citizens in the databases and treating them differently according to these categorizations. As a consequence, as Navarra points out, electronic technologies that are associated with e-government puts every citizen under constant interrogations: “Who are you? Where are you? What are you doing? Even more dangerously, it can already know the answers to those questions regardless of the citizen’s readiness to share this information” (2006: 8). Thus, from this perspective, e-government can be conceived as a governmental strategy which aims to manage individuals in the databases in the information age. These rationalities of surveillance can also be traced within the context of Turkey, especially in the discourses of the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü). Within these discourses, the technologies that are associated with e-government are regarded as perfect solutions for (crime) control because of their technical capacities for creating risk groups in databases, allowing access to the former records of individuals within seconds, enabling various forms of data-matching and data profiling etc. All these are regarded as necessary in the quest for a ‘safer’ society. It is in this sense that e-government emerges as a governing

rationality that is linked to a kind of subjectivity that can be sorted, categorized, and managed easily in the electronic databases, which Deleuze calls a 'dividual'.

Therefore, we can trace two governing mentalities in the establishment of e-government: the first one is about transforming economy, society and the citizen into digital within the process of becoming an information society and the second one is about transforming the citizen into a database code as a strategy of surveillance. Taken together, it can be claimed that, these two mentalities of rule are at play in the process of what can be termed as 'e-governmentalisation of the state'.

E-governmentalisation of the state, therefore, can be conceived as a new type of governing rationality that is linked to new modes of subjectivities. In order to understand the process of e-governmentalisation and the type of subjectivities that is linked to this process, it is required to be positioned in a political-economic field of power interactions. So far in this thesis, these power interactions are discussed within the theoretical framework of Deleuze's society of control. In that sense, it can be argued that, the state becomes e-governmentalised in Deleuze's society of control in which people are obliged to become flexible, techno-entrepreneurs in order to satisfy the requirements of the contemporary informational capitalism and the neoliberal governmentality on the one hand. On the other hand, enhanced tools of surveillance turn them into 'dividuals' which enables the authorities to sort/categorize people in the databases, to create risk groups and even to prevent their access to certain spaces and to certain citizenship rights.

In the following parts, the focus will be on how e-governmentalisation of the state is related to these different aspects of the society of control (i.e. material aspects/information society, neoliberalism and surveillance) and how these different aspects of the society of control affects the type of subjectivities (i.e. flexible self, active citizen, dividual) that are linked to the process of e-governmentalisation. Besides this, particular emphasis will be given to the context of Turkey so as to make the theoretical discussions more concrete. In other words, the following questions regarding the emergence of e-government will be touched upon: Why has being a good, healthy society become closely associated with being an information

society? Why have the appropriate characteristics of the subject started to be defined in terms of mobility, adaptability, flexibility, having digital skills, and having marketable abilities? Why has the discourse of ‘lifelong learning’ emerged within the discourses of e-government and how has this emergence affected the subjectivity of the individual? How does surveillance function in this society and to what ends does it serve? What kinds of subjectivities are linked to the growing surveillance practices of the state through e-transformation? What kind of signs of e-governmentalisation are there within the context of Turkey? What can be the possible social outcomes of this process?

8.3. E-Governmentalisation of the State and Information Society

In chapter 4, we have focused on the material transformations that have taken place since the 1970s. In that sense, the Fordist system of mass production which was characteristic of the post-war period was begun to be considered as unsustainable after the 1970s (Piore and Sabel 1984) and have been replaced by a new type of capitalist accumulation process which can be termed as ‘flexible accumulation’ or ‘post-Fordism’. Instead of the Fordist-type big factories that were producing mass amounts of commodity and ruled according to the Taylorist principles of work organization, the new post-Fordist organizations were flexible, making specialized production and ruled according to the new management principles such as Toyotaism which favored a worker-type that was flexible and multi-skilled.

On the other hand, the period after the 1970s was also characterized by the intensive usage of information and communication technologies in all aspects of life, particularly in the work and economy. This knowledge/technology dependent characteristic of capitalism/society can be defined as ‘information society’ (Bell 1973) or ‘informational capitalism’ (Castells 1997, 2000). Thus, the new post-Fordist, informational economy has began to rely more and more on the application of the ICTs in the organizations and on the abilities of a workforce that is multi-skilled, flexible and technologically competent. In other words, in the information

society, the corporations have succeeded to the extent that they successfully applied and created knowledge in their processes.

This is also the case for individuals. As Johns (2008: 21-46) points out, the widening gap between the rich and the poor is closely related to the new characteristics of the 'knowledge economy' in which those who have technological skills have the chance to find well-paid jobs while those who are technologically disadvantaged have no other chance than to work in low-salary jobs that require low skill. In other words, having technological skills (i.e. ability to use internet efficiently at work, ability to use complex technological infrastructures etc.) is closely related to the economic gains (Johns 2008: 44), as it forms the biggest part of being multi-skilled, being flexible, being innovative which are regarded as 'key' factors for success in the knowledge economy. As one of the survey that was conducted in 2002 in Europe shows, "the ICTs can help people use higher skills, increase their responsibility, work more productively, better manage information flow, and better combine their work and private life" (Europa 2007: 2).

In a similar manner Negroponte (1995) claims that individuals are becoming 'digital' in the information society. Being digital means responsibly using digital technologies in all aspects of life; work, family, friendship, travel, entertainment etc. Since digital technologies are at the heart of the information society, those who are actively using these technologies in their lives (i.e. those who are able to work at any location, those who fulfill the same tasks more efficiently and faster with the help of ICTs, those who are able to develop innovative ideas continuously) become more advantageous. By the same token, those who fail to digitalize themselves become disadvantaged.

Therefore, in the information society, knowledge and particularly the usage of the ICTs are the main value-generating forces both for the corporations and for individuals. It is in this sense that, the establishment and dissemination of the ICTs nation-wide and the fostering of a competent workforce that is able to use these technologies efficiently to create innovation, become the main concerns for the states of the information society (Chung 2007). The aim is to transform the

economies into ‘knowledge-based’ economies and to transform individuals into ‘knowledge workers’. As Chung points out, this transformation consists of three levels: “a well developed ICTs infrastructure, a rich pool of human capital, and a national innovation system” (2007: 4). Similarly, Okot-Uma identifies three strategies for transformation:

- (i) putting in place the necessary national information infrastructure; (ii) developing and nurturing the necessary human resource to operate the national information infrastructure; and (iii) providing adequate financial resources to implement both the infrastructural and human resource requirements (2001).

His claim is that, the more the ICTs diffuse through society the more the economy becomes ‘knowledge-based’ and becomes globally connected to other countries. In that sense, the ICTs are regarded as crucial not only for the pure ICT-laden sectors (such as software engineering), they also become important for other information-based sectors (such as finance) as they form the required technical infrastructure for the circulation of information and knowledge both in local and global levels which is believed to be the required technical base of innovation (Chung 2007: 3). On the other hand, this transformation should not be limited to the technical infrastructures; individuals are also required to be transformed into competent knowledge workers. Thus, the task of the state becomes to promote the ICT growth together with the fostering of a competent human resource that is essential for the healthy functioning of the knowledge economy.

These new rationalities of the states in the information society can also be clearly traced in the Turkish State’s will to transform economy into a ‘knowledge-based economy’. As it is stated in Turkey’s Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010;

it is imperative to use ICT effectively in all areas of the economy and social life to ensure sustainable growth and competitiveness. Societies that succeed in making this imperative a reality have the opportunity to achieve a

strategic competitive advantage by increasing their economic efficiency (DPT 2006: 3).

Here and in other plans concerning the information society, the Turkish State authorities clearly establish the links between development, knowledge-based economy, and the growth of the ICTs. As the state becomes aware of the benefits of the knowledge-based economy, the diffusion of the ICTs in every aspect of social and economic life, the creation of the suitable atmosphere (e.g. through legal instruments etc.) for the ICTs growth and the promotion of knowledge-intensive sectors become the main parts of its future strategy. On the other hand, as we have discussed above, the ICTs growth should be accompanied by the fostering of a competent human capital in order for the states to become successful in their task towards the knowledge-based economy. This aspect of knowledge-based economy is also well-understood by the Turkish State. In the Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010, it is stated that;

Anticipated economic gains could only be achieved through the increased physical capital generated by the investments made by the citizens, the private and the public sector by regularly increasing the ratio of ICT spending in the GNP, as well as by building human capital that will exploit these technologies effectively (DPT 2006: 4).

At this point, it should be added that, although there is a strong correlation between having technological skills and being multi-skilled, being flexible, being an autonomous worker etc. as it has shown above, the competencies of the workforce required for the knowledge economy cannot be reduced to the efficient usage of the ICTs and technological skills alone. As Bresnahan (1999: 391) points out; “ICT has not been substitutable for high levels of human cognitive skill nor for ‘people skills’ in organisations.” Besides, there is no guarantee that comprehensive usage of the ICTs would directly lead to ‘innovation’ (Chung 2007: 14-15). In that sense, being technologically competent should be considered as a part of broader strategy of being flexible, being innovative, being autonomous. This general trend of

flexibilization, which is an inseparable part of the knowledge-based economy, can also be traced in the Turkish State's strategy for the information society. As it is stated in an official document which is about the action items of the E-Transformation Turkey Project;

In the transformation to an information society, employment conditions also change. New employment fields and new professions emerge, and flexible-timed, distance working methods develop. Parallel to these developments, in private and public sectors, the necessary precautions will be taken to encourage workforce employment that is appropriate to the criteria of the knowledge economy; the development of new work fields that constitute knowledge economy will be fostered and new regulations will be implemented to support new working methods (DPT 2005: 3).

Therefore, both the economy and the worker are re-configured in the Turkish State discourse on e-government and e-transformation according to the ideals of informational capitalism and post-Fordism. Under this new configuration, the markets are no longer stable but are full of competition at the global level; the organizations are no longer bureaucratic and hierarchical but are organized in networks; industry is no longer focused on mechanization and mass production, but it is focused on flexible production, digitalization, knowledge and innovation; the worker is no longer specializes on one task, but he or she is able to work in a number of roles and has a broad range of skills; the employment patterns are no longer stable, business life is full of risks and opportunities (TBS 2002a: 22).

It is precisely in this sense that the e-transformation or e-government process can be conceived within the context of 'e-governmentalisation of the state'. Thus, the state becomes e-governmentalised to the extent that it tries to transform individuals into competent and adaptable subjectivities who can use the ICTs efficiently, who can develop new innovative ideas continuously, and who can work under flexible conditions. The shift from factory to corporation forms the material foundation of this governing rationality in Deleuzian terms (Deleuze 1992: 4). As the characteristics of capitalism change (from Fordism to post-Fordism, from energy based capitalism to knowledge-based capitalism etc.), new strategies of

subjectification and new criteria of being an appropriate worker are imposed to the subjects. Thus, 'flexibilization' emerges as a new strategy of subjectification imposing new behavioral norms to the worker-subjects of the knowledge economy (Fraser 2003). In the Turkish context, this rationality of flexibilization can be clearly seen in the definition of the 'new worker type' in a governmental report concerning e-economy; "this workforce continuously educates itself; updates its skills, is open to flexible tasks, and is able to carry on extended responsibilities" (TBS 2002a: 43). Thus, the worker-subjects are re-assembled as flexible and adaptable beings who continuously develop new skills and abilities and who can accomplish various tasks in a responsible way.

As Boltanski and Chiapello (2002) have pointed out, capitalism at its every stage is in need of 'moral justification' in order to become sustainable. For this reason, as the accumulation strategies of capital changes (such as from Fordism to post-Fordism), the behavioral norms also change, which introduces new definitions about being a virtuous subject in the workplaces. That is the reason why creativity, adaptability, digitalization, innovation, permanent change become new behavioral norms in the contemporary capitalism (i.e. in the control society) and the workers are started to be evaluated according to these criteria. The more they digitalize themselves, the more they adapt themselves to the requirements of the flexible production system, the more they take risk, the more they provide their own security by themselves, the more they gain the ability to work in the networks, the more they become autonomous and make continuous innovations, the more virtuous subjects they become. "Life is conceived as a series of projects" within this new paradigm in which the subjects are obliged to move from one activity to another continuously in order to be counted as virtuous (Chiapello & Fairclough 2002: 192). Thus, as the former bureaucratic ethos diminishes, a new discourse of 'enterprise' emerges as a new type of governing rationale for the government of the conduct of workers (Du Gay 1996). Rather than being a passive individual who strictly follows the procedures of the bureaucracy, being 'proactive' is favored within this new organizational 'ethos' (Du Gay 1996: 153).

This is certainly what is occurring in the process of e-governmentalisation of the state. The state e-governmentalizes in the sense that it imposes new truths on worker-subjects to conduct themselves in a responsible manner in accordance with the ideals of the knowledge-based economy. It becomes successful to the extent that the worker-subjects internalize these truths and accept them as if these truths represent the only way of being in the world.²⁷

In a broader sense, the process of e-governmentalisation of the state is strongly related to a new type of governing rationality which is termed as 'neoliberal governmentality'. Here, neoliberal governmentality should not be taken as a distinct form of governing rationality; the virtues of digitalization and flexibilization are also at play in the process of neoliberalization. This is certainly understandable if we consider that the kind of conducts that are imposed to workers in the settings of work and economy are similar to the kind of conducts that are imposed to citizens in every aspects of their lives (Olds & Thrift 2005: 271). That is the reason why the links between neoliberal governmentality and the process of e-governmentalisation of the state should be discussed in order to reveal the broader picture of what is being a virtuous subject in the so-called information society.

8.4. E-Governmentalisation of the State and Neoliberalism

Osborne and McLaughlin identify four distinctive approaches to public services in United Kingdom starting from the 19th century (2002: 7-9). The first one is the period of the *minimal state* of the late 19th century in which the interventions of the state through providing services were regarded as *necessary evil* (2002: 7). The second approach to public services evolved in the beginnings of the 20th century in which the tasks of the state began to include the provision of minimum services such as sanitation. However, the scope of these services was limited at this stage and was shared with private and charitable organizations (2002: 8). The third one was the *welfare state* in which the tasks of the state began to cover all necessary

²⁷ That is not to say that there cannot be any resistance. The worker-subjects always have the chance to resist what is imposed on them, as we see in the various struggles against flexibilization.

services that the citizens required (2002: 8), at least in the level of rhetoric. Lastly, there was the *plural state* of Thatcher starting from the 1980s as the dominant way of thinking about the public services. Within this period, the state services were privatized and marketized and the “vision of enabling state was promoted” (2002: 9). Thus, as we pass from keynesianism to neoliberalism, the role of the state changes from ‘provider’ to ‘enabler’. In this new configuration, the state is no longer responsible for providing everyone social security nor is it responsible for supporting market mechanisms; rather, its role is re-defined as the ‘facilitator’ for people and for the private sector.

These changing rationalities of the state through neoliberalization can also be traced in Turkey, within the context of the e-governmentalisation of the state. For instance, in a governmental report about ‘e-economy’, although the role of the state as the disseminator of nation-wide ICTs infrastructure and as the promoter of an advanced education system is emphasized, its general role is defined in a neoliberal language, as the facilitator of competition. According to this, “in principle [the role of the state] is not to generate economic development and wealth, but to implement the policies that would provide the opportunity for that development” (TBS 2002a: 50). These policies include the promotion of free trade and promotion of competition in private sector and building decentralized, flexible and fast public services to accompany the ‘speed’ of the private sector (TBS 2002a: 51). However, due to Turkey’s backward position in terms of knowledge-based economy, ‘developmental’ discourses are over-emphasized in some respects. Within this paradigm, although the final aim is defined in neoliberal terms (i.e. reaching the free-market competition), the role of the state in reaching this aim has some non-liberal dimensions as well, such as constructing the market. This dilemma can be seen clearly in the following statement: “the state, if required, may take the role of constructing the market. However, the key notion is the ability of that market to govern itself” (2002a: 98).

Even so, it can be claimed that the discourse of the Turkish State on ‘e-government’ has clear neoliberal dimensions in terms of economy policies. The aim

is to facilitate a type of economy which is knowledge-based, which has global competitive power, and which is able to govern itself according to its own rules efficiently. However, neoliberalism is not limited to economic policies; it has an 'ethical' side as well, which concerns one's relationship with oneself. This is perhaps the reason why neoliberalism has succeeded so far and become the dominant governing rationality since the 1970s (see Larner 2000). As Rose points out, the success of the Right over Left also lies in here; in its ability to establish a kind of governing rationality that is in harmony with a "new regime of self" (Rose 1996: 60). Then, what kind of self is this?

First of all, in a world in which the state no longer bears the responsibility for protecting individuals, this subject becomes responsible for him/herself for providing his/her own social security, against such social risks as illness, unemployment, and old age (O'Malley 1996). Thus, we witness a process of 'responsibilization of the self'. In that sense, the decline of the state's role in providing welfare for citizens does not mean that the state is not interested in 'governing' people anymore. On the contrary, it means that the state assembles new strategies of government. Now the idea is to 'govern without governing the society'. It is believed that once a kind of subjectivity that is able to govern him/herself in a responsible manner is constructed, there would be no need for (welfare) state's governance through welfare benefits. This type of subjectivity should be 'active' in the sense that s/he can manage her/his life actively, taking the necessary steps for the protection of her/his own well-being. That is the reason why in neoliberal discourses the promotion of the active citizenship becomes a central theme since numerous social problems (crime, poverty etc.) are regarded as the consequences of the state of being in-active (Cruikshank 1999).

Being an active citizen is not an easy task for sure and requires continuous improvements and investments on one's human capital. Gordon defines this type of subjectivity as "entrepreneur of himself or herself" (1991: 44). Thus, the whole life of the subject begins to be structured on the model of the 'enterprise' in the quest of being an active citizen. The individual becomes obliged to manage him/herself as if

s/he is managing a corporation. Just like corporations are required to make new investments and to make profits, this individual is also required to invest in her/himself and to work on her/himself to increase her/his employability. It is in this sense that this subject is obliged to gain new skills and abilities and to permanently update her/himself against the risk of unemployment (Dean 1995).

It is in this context that the state becomes e-governmentalised. We can trace this new mode of thinking about the economy, society and the self in countless publications of OECD in which the strategies for societies to transform themselves into knowledge societies are emphasized. One concrete example is as follows;

Human capital is obviously a key policy area, as it is required for innovation and growth. In addition, citizens need to be able to adapt to a rapidly changing society. Government's role in providing certain types of education and training is important, but individuals and firms have their own role in training and must invest in it themselves. Human capital policies primarily focus on increasing the overall average skill level of the labour force, as this is important for facilitating the adoption and use of technologies. Frameworks for lifelong learning appear of particular importance during the current rapid technological change which is likely to require new skills. However, there is also a growing need for highly skilled individuals, *e.g.* in the science system and the ICT sector (OECD 2000: 78).

Thus, the citizen is re-defined as an enterprising subject who must continuously invest in his/her human capital in order to become an appropriate citizen of the information society. This is certainly what Deleuze meant when he said "perpetual training tends to replace school" in the control society (1992: 5). Moreover, although the role of the state is regarded as important for providing training and lifelong learning, it is, in the end, the individual who must invest in him/herself. As we have identified with reference to work of Walters (1997: 230), in the control society, the rationality of the neoliberal state becomes to "assist people to invest in themselves", not to offer non-recyclable investments. Thus, the role of the state becomes to promote a kind of subjectivity who invests in him/herself continuously, and develops new skills for the healthy functioning of the knowledge-based economy.

Such e-governmentalised state strategies as the promotion of ‘digital literacy’ can also be understood within this context, as a form of investment in the human capital of the country so as to construct the appropriate digital selves who in turn invest in themselves continuously. As Coleman points out, “what has been called ‘digital literacy’ is a regulatory project intended to cultivate a citizenry capable of responsible digital interaction” (2007: 14). Once constructed, this subject is believed to manage him/herself according to the requirements of the digital economy, without needing any assistance from the state.

Therefore, as Henman and Dean point out, the rationalities that are linked to the emergence of e-government are strongly related to neoliberal governmentality in the sense that the effective usage of information and communication technologies together with the development of other informational and cognitive skills are part of being an active citizen in the neoliberal world (2002: 8-9). Thus, the more they undertake these investments for their human capital in the information society, the better citizens the subjects become. This is where the virtues of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are fused together. As the new knowledge-based economy requires flexible, adaptable, multi-skilled, technologically competent workers for its healthy functioning, the appropriate characteristics of citizens are defined in a similar language. Thus, being a competent worker becomes closely associated with being a competent citizen since it is the main factor of being ‘active’ in a neoliberal world.

These new rationalities of rule and new criteria about being a ‘good’ citizen which are at play in the process of informatization and neoliberalization are also intensively adopted by the Turkish State. In the First Informatics Convention that is held in Ankara in 2002, the characteristics of the ‘e-individual’ are defined as follows;

- Ability to become a knowledge-professional,
- Having the necessary resources of information,
- Ability to use knowledge and technology intensively,
- Ability to develop new ideas and new approaches,

- Being well-known in important online groups,
- Ability to achieve personal globalization,
- Ability to undertake new roles in line with the purposes and ability to distribute the roles (TBS 2002b: 13).

Right after these new fresh definitions, the ‘dilemma’ of the e-individual is emphasized in this document. According to this; “the dilemma that is waiting for the e-individual is to be able to compete with himself or herself, to be renovated and being in a constant state of change” (TBS 2002b: 13). Thus, the “e-individual is someone who has assimilated e-culture, who has learnt that the interaction can be created through continuously producing and applying knowledge, and who has adapted to change” (TBS 2002b: 13).

What the Foucauldian approaches to knowledge-based economy and to neoliberalism tell us is that, within the process of informatization and neoliberalization, not only firms and corporations but also individuals are required to be flexible and competitive. The Turkish State discourses on ‘e-individual’ can be interpreted with respect to this framework in which the dilemma of the e-individual is defined as being in a continuous state of competition with himself or herself. Since being competitive can be accomplished by means of gaining new skills and abilities in the knowledge-based economy, this subject must also be technologically competent (knowledge professional, using technology and knowledge intensively), flexible (able to undertake new roles according to purposes), innovative (able to develop new ideas and approaches), and mobile (globalized). In that sense, the virtues of the new global capitalist system can be clearly traced in the context of the Turkish State. E-government as governing rationality aims to transform individuals into flexible and active subjectivities. Ordinary Turkish citizens are urged to establish a particular relationship with themselves that is in harmony with the ideals of the knowledge-based economy and neoliberalism.

As we have identified above referring to the reports of OECD, the intensive appearance of lifelong learning and training discourses can also be understood within this context of e-governmentalisation of the state. Since the knowledge-

based economy requires continuous updating of skills and abilities, one becomes obliged to re-train her/himself, and to participate in various training programs as a part of becoming entrepreneur of herself. This is also the case in Turkey. As it is stated in 2005 Action Plan for E-transformation Turkey Project; “whole sections of the society will be supplemented with the required skills for the information society through the perspective of lifelong learning” (DPT 2005: 5). This is precisely what Deleuze points out to the major changes that are occurring in the education system as we pass from disciplinary societies to societies of control. These changes are; “the effect on the school of perpetual training, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduction of the ‘corporation’ at all levels of schooling” (Deleuze 1992: 7). Thus, in a world in which the school becomes corporationalized and starts to cover all aspects of one’s life, citizens become obliged to re-educate themselves continuously through attending lifelong learning and perpetual training. This becomes a reality for ordinary Turkish citizens too. As it is stated in Turkey’s Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010; “establishment of appropriate structures and enriching digital content will be supported for self-development of individuals through life-long learning and e-learning” (DPT 2006: 26). The growing interest of the Turkish State in digital literacy or computer literacy can be understood within this context as well.²⁸ As we have discussed above, digital literacy can be considered as a ‘regulatory project’ that is aimed to construct a competent subjectivity for the information age that has the necessary amount of digital skills (Coleman 2007). In short, all those efforts of the state for promoting lifelong learning, training and digital literacy can be considered as the part of a broader strategy of turning passive masses into active and agile subjectivities. Especially the young people (both employed and unemployed) are the main targets of these normalizing techniques. As the state becomes e-governmentalised, these people become subjects of intervention; someone to be cured and corrected;

²⁸ See for instance, DPT (2006: 9, 16) and DPT (2005: 14, 46).

students, employees and the unemployed, that constitute the segments of intense ICT users, have been picked as the target audience. At the same time, these priority segments that will meet the labour demand of the changing economy in the short and medium term will be equipped with ICT access opportunities and ICT skills through training processes supported by ICT, and thus development of the human resources required by an information society will be ensured. By providing access opportunities, competency and motivation to young people, a “driving force” will be created for the transition to the information society (DPT 2006: 21).

What we have discussed so far concerning the process of e-governmentalisation of the state can also be viewed as a ‘genealogy of the e-citizen’. As Foucauldian perspective to citizenship reminds us, citizen is a ‘social construct’, an ‘invention’ (Burchell 1995, Isin 2002, Ong 2006, Procacci 2001, White & Hunt 2000). According to this point of view, who counts as a virtuous citizen is closely related to political-economic field of power interactions and to the rationalities of the state. That is the reason why, as the power interactions changes, the mentalities of the state change, which brings new definitions about being a ‘good citizen’ in a certain period of time. In this way, the criteria of ‘being’ is established and people are graded according to this criteria. It is in this sense that, e-governmentalisation of the state is closely tied to a kind of citizenship which can be termed as ‘technopreneurial citizenship’ which sets the criteria of being in the information age.

It is Aihwa Ong who firstly uses the term ‘technopreneurial citizenship’ in her anthropological studies about Singapore, in order to explain the kind of citizenship that is imposed by the Singaporean State upon its citizens (2005, 2006: 177-194). In that sense, in Singapore instead of old type of citizenship which was mostly based on the values of ethnicity and political loyalty, technopreneurial citizenship favors new values that are associated with the newly emerging knowledge economy (Ong 2005: 339). As Ong points out;

technopreneurial values, that stress a mix of technical and entrepreneurial excellence in citizen-subjects, are now detached from culture and ethnicity,

putting a premium on agile knowledge subjects who can help build a globally connected knowledge society (2005: 344).

That is the reason why the Singaporean State aims to transform its citizens into knowledge-subjects through such instruments as computer training, reskilling and lifelong learning (Ong 2005: 339). However, it is in the end that the citizens themselves who are required to invest in their human capital. The reason that being a virtuous citizen is becoming closely associated with being innovative, being flexible, being technologically competent etc., makes these investments necessary.

In terms of the formal citizenship status, the situation is more or less the same. For instance, an 'employment pass system' is used in order to determine the level of education and skill of the foreign workers. Hence, those who have the required amount of technopreneurial skills (e.g. having a university degree, having specialist skills etc.) can access to citizenship rights such as permanent residency easily. On the other hand, for those who have failed to obtain such technopreneurial skills, such as low-skilled migrants, there are strict regulations; a two-year work permit system is used, workers cannot change their jobs and are unable to obtain the permission for permanent residency (Ong 2006: 186). To conclude, in Singapore, exercising of citizenship is closely tied to neoliberal criteria. Ordinary citizens are expected to develop a particular relationship with themselves that is based on a mix of technological and entrepreneurial values. Subjects are obliged to become 'technopreneurs of themselves' in order to be counted as virtuous citizens in the knowledge-based society of Singapore.

Singapore is perhaps the most evident example in which the state becomes e-governmentalised. However, there are similar rationalities of rule in various states of the contemporary world in which 'technopreneurial citizenship' is favored and imposed upon citizens as if it is the only way of being in the information society. As we have discussed above, the Turkish State also promotes a similar kind of citizenship in various governmental documents concerning e-government and knowledge-based economy. Besides all those discourses that share a similar vision of society and self for Turkey, another concrete example for the emergence of

technopreneurial citizen in Turkey can be found in the last section of the Information Society Strategic Plan for 2006-2010. In this section, the transformation of an ordinary Turkish family (i.e. the Sencer Family) through the implementation of the Information Society Strategy is emphasized. In other words, this is a 'transformation story' (DPT 2006: 50-57).

According to this, the picture of the Sencer family and its five members in 2005 is as follows; the grandfather Ahmet Sencer: a retired civil servant; the father Kenan Sencer: a civil servant who is the only working member of the family and who has only two years left for his retirement; the mother Aliye Sencer: a housewife who has never worked outside; the eldest daughter Özlem Sencer: a successful university student at business administration who wants to open up her own business in the future; and finally Efe Sencer: an 14 year old primary school student who is keenly interested in technology and who wants to become a computer engineer. Another important characteristic of the Sencer family is the differentiated attitude towards technology and technological inventions (such as computer and internet) between the old and the young members. For instance, the grandfather Ahmet is unable to use ATMs and waits in long lines just to get his pension. The father Kenan also has a limited knowledge about technology. Although he uses computers in his job, he does not know how to use the Internet and software effectively. The mother Aliye similarly lacks technological skills; she waits in long lines even for paying the bills. On the other hand, young members of the family, Özlem and Efe, are deeply interested in technology. This is the reason that they ceaselessly try to convince their father to buy a computer which they claim is required for their education. However, the father Kenan refuses this request and argues that computers are very expensive for their small family budget. Besides, according to him there are more important things to do with money. Another debate is going between Özlem and his father Kenan about her future. While Özlem wants to be an entrepreneur and to launch her own business, her father Kenan calls this idea a 'dream' and tries to convince his daughter to work in a bank office.

However, as the years pass, things are changing both for Turkey and for the Sencer family. In 2007, the Turkish State starts a campaign to promote nation-wide computer usage. The Sencer family finally buys a computer with this campaign, and Özlem and Efe start to use this computer intensively in their education. A year later, in 2008, now the grandfather Ahmet can access to his account through the Internet, the mother Aliye can pay the bills online, and the father Kenan opens a stationary shop and hires a new staff that can use computers efficiently. However, the e-transformation process affects the young members of the family the most. Özlem becomes interested in e-commerce (i.e. doing business online) when preparing her homework. As a hobby she already makes authentic jewellery. She quickly learns how to start an online-business and starts to sell her own jewelleryes in this way. "Özlem is now an entrepreneur!" (DPT 2006: 55). The youngest member of the family, Efe, is also on his way to become a computer engineer during this period.

Finally, when we reach 2010, things have really changed for Turkey through e-transformation;

These novelties, which have changed the life of individuals and the whole society, have expedited the countries process of accession to the EU. The link between Turkish companies and foreign firms have developed, foreign investments have increased, public services have become faster and easier, and education quality has increased (DPT 2006: 56).

Thus, finally Turkey becomes an important country in the global knowledge-driven economic system. Now Turkey has strong global ties with other countries and corporations, has a global competitive power, is close to being a member of the European Union, attracts high amount of foreign investments, and has a developed education system. Besides, there is a healthy functioning free-market economy in Turkey. As the father Kenan points out in a debate with his wife concerning whether to switch their telecom operator or not; "Competition always works; let us keep track of this other firm. If it is offering better conditions, then maybe we will switch to it" (DPT 2006: 56).

If we return from Turkey to the Sencer family, in 2010; their life has also changed substantially. The grandfather Ahmet now manages his accounts through the internet easily, the father Kenan has opened another shop and become the owner of a middle-sized enterprise. Through the usage of software technology, he links the two organizations together and organizes his firm in a network-style. He is now able to use computer technology very efficiently and is able to work at home. The mother Aliye now pays the bills through the internet and helps her daughter Özlem in her work. In that sense, she has become an entrepreneur too and starts to earn her own money. Özlem extends her business both in digital and in real life; “she conducts business with countries such as India, Russia and Indonesia via the Internet” (DPT 2006: 57). Meanwhile she has also gained new skills in fashion design through attending lifelong learning (e-learning) activities. Finally, the youngest member of the family, Efe is now a university student in the computer engineering department. He is already a participant of a certificate program in the United States and plans to continue his career by doing graduate studies abroad. These changes in the Sencer family are summarized as follows at the end of the document;

The Sencer Family which consisted of 1 pensioner, 1 civil servant, 1 housewife and two students in 2005, now consists of one pensioner, 2 SME owners, one individual entrepreneur and a promising scientist in 2010. The Sencer Family is the mirror of Turkey’s changing face (DPT 2006: 57).

Concerning this thesis, what the e-transformation story of an ordinary Turkish family reveals is the adoption of the rationalities of e-governmentalisation by the Turkish State. Between the lines of this story, we can clearly see Turkey’s vision of economy, society, and the self in the information age. Within this new paradigm, an ideal economy is a knowledge-based economy that has global competitive power and that is working properly according to the rules of the market. An ideal firm within this economic system is the one that is organized in networks with global connections in which the ICTs are used intensively. Finally, the ideal

self is a mixture of technological and entrepreneurial abilities: a technopreneurial self. This kind of person is agile, flexible, able to develop new ideas continuously, able to make innovation, able to re-train her/himself, able to use technology intensively etc.

Following Richard Sennett (2002), we can also claim that the contrast between the old and the young members of the family reveals the changing value systems and changing type of characters that are associated with these new values in Turkey. In that sense, the grandfather Ahmet, the father Kenan, and the mother Aliye belong to the world of Fordism as a mode of social regulation which is characterized by big industrial factories, stable consumption norms, and stable careers. On the other hand, Özlem and Efe belong to the newly emerging world of post-Fordism and neoliberalism in which flexibilization is the main factor in the organization of social life. According to Sennett, new capitalism is no less dangerous for the human character compared to the old one, since it obliges individuals to live under continuous risk and insecurity. Under the new norms of capitalism, individuals are required to manage the risk through continuous updating of their skills, adapting to new circumstances, and undertaking project-type works. In that sense, it becomes difficult for individuals to develop a coherent narrative for themselves and for their future, which results in the ‘corrosion’ of their character. If we return to Turkey, in the following years, the social outcomes of flexibilization may also become one of the realities of the Turkish Society.

To conclude, it can be argued that, e-governmentalisation of the state emerges as a governing rationality which re-defines the economy, the society and the citizen in the information age and which introduces new ethical obligations to the citizens. It is in this sense that e-governmentalised state is linked to a kind of subjectivity who is technopreneurial and who continuously invests on his/her human capital, who develops digital skills, who increases his/her employability, who does not require the state to assist him/her, who is actively managing his/her life.

In the context of Turkey, as we have tried to show, in various governmental discourses the Turkish State also shares this new mentality and aims to re-code the society as knowledge society and to re-assemble individuals as e-individuals. However, Turkey is not a Singapore. For instance, according to e-readiness rankings of 2008, Singapore is ranked 6th in the world whereas Turkey is at 43rd (EIU 2008).²⁹ That is, there are various criticisms and problems concerning Turkey's information society strategy as well.

Naturally, most of these criticisms are not related to the aims or the visions of Turkey's Information Society Strategy. As we have identified above, there is a coherent vision in numerous governmental texts. On the other hand, regarding the technical part of the issue (i.e. implementation of Information Society Strategy) there are significant criticisms. A recent report about the progress of Turkey's Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010 may strengthen these doubts about the technical readiness of Turkey for reaching the stated aims. According to this report, by June 2008, out of 111 action items stated in the Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010, only 3 have been implemented successfully; in 45 items there are significant achievements; 32 items are in the beginning phase, and 22 items have not started yet (Milliyet 12/06/2008).

A more plausible and detailed evaluation of Turkey's e-transformation project comes from the OECD (2007). In this report, the current phase in e-governmentalisation is praised: "Turkey is making strong progress in implementing e-government" (2007: 9). It is underlined that, especially after the election of the Justice and Government Party in rule, e-government has reached a new stage in Turkey and the vision of the information society has been clearly established: "Turkey's rapid implementation of e-government initiatives is in large part a result of high-level political leadership that has established a vision" (2007: 10). However, although acknowledging these advancements, according to OECD, there are

²⁹ In Knowledge Economy Index that is published by the World Bank, Turkey is placed 52nd in 2008 (KEI 2008). In Global Competitiveness Report that is published by World Economic Forum, Turkey is placed 63rd (WEF 2008).

important problems concerning the Turkey's Information Society Strategy. These criticisms can be categorized under four headings (2007: 9- 20);

1. There is a lack of cost/benefit analysis of e-government applications in Turkey, which makes it hard to measure the progress of e-government initiatives. This may also cause duplication in e-government investments (2007: 9-10). Thus, according to the OECD, "new investments need to be guided by an enterprise architecture" (2007: 12) which would eliminate the problems concerning co-ordination, cost/benefit issues, and the duplication of investments.
2. According to the OECD, not only the central government, but also the line ministries and local governments should take the responsibility for developing e-government applications within their own fields. These parties should work in collaboration with each other in order to disseminate e-government across the country (2007: 10). Additionally, the managers in public sectors should be encouraged to gain ICT skills in order to manage ICT projects more effectively (2007: 16).
3. Thirdly, there are criticisms concerning the lack of regulatory frameworks in Turkey. It is argued that, especially regarding the issues related with data exchange, data security and privacy, there is a lack of common standards in Turkey. This may prevent effective data sharing among institutions as well as violating the privacy of the individuals. Thus, a common regulatory framework should be developed in order to facilitate the transactions between citizens, private sector and public sector (2007: 13-16).
4. Finally, according to the OECD, compared to European countries, the level of internet usage and digital literacy are still very low in Turkey. For instance, the individual internet usage is %14 in Turkey, whereas it is %47 in EU25 countries. Besides, there are significant divisions between the urban (%19) and rural (%6) areas, and between men (%19) and women (%9) (2007: 12). To solve this problem, the cost of the internet access should be reduced (2007: 12), and broadband connection should be

promoted through either privatization and marketization or the state taking a more active role in establishing the necessary infrastructures (as has been done in Korea and Sweden) (2007:11). Concerning digital literacy, although Turkey's recent attempts for teaching digital literacy has been praised, it is argued that these attempts should be extended to other sections of the society as well. Especially for people outside schools, digital literacy should be encouraged through distance learning methods or through internet cafes (2007: 10-11).

Taking into account these criticisms about the technical/implementation side of the issue, we may argue that, although there are clear indicators that the rationalities of e-governmentalisation has been adopted by the Turkish State, it is still too early to claim that the Turkish State becomes e-governmentalized. That is to say, especially after the election of the Justice and Government party, the rationalities of e-governmentalisation (information society/neoliberalism) are clearly established in Turkey and the type of subjectivity that is linked to these rationalities (i.e. technopreneurial of his/herself) is clearly emphasized.³⁰ However, compared to other countries (such as Singapore or EU25 countries), we may claim that Turkey has still a long way towards the information society. Besides this, more empirical work is required to be done so as to investigate the different aspects of the process of e-governmentalisation within the Turkish state. For instance, the e-governmentalisation process should be analyzed within the contexts of economy (to find out whether there is the promotion of ICTs sectors and knowledge work), law (to find out whether there is the promotion of a similar kind of subjectivity in the law and in the formal citizenship status), education system (to find out whether the education system is re-designed according the rationalities of e-governmentalisation, i.e. corporationalization, lifelong learning, digital literacy), or

³⁰ The roots of the rationalities of e-governmentalisation in Turkey can also be traced back to Turkey's rapid financial liberalization process in 1980s. In that sense, the election of the Justice and Government Party can be considered as a continuity of neoliberal governmentality in Turkey in a more intensive manner, with more emphasis on such concepts as knowledge-based economy and information society.

in the social policies (to find out whether there are similar requirements and obligations for the welfare claimants, i.e. activity tests, attending to lifelong learning, training activities). On the other hand, we should always take into account that e-governmentalisation process can develop in an uneven way within different parts of the Turkish State. For instance, some parts of the Turkish State may rapidly e-governmentalise (e.g. Ministry of Economy) while other parts may resist this process (e.g. Ministry of Education). Only after these empirical investigations we may have a healthier analysis about the place of Turkey within the process of e-governmentalisation of the state. Even so, we should add that, it will not be a surprise to witness the generalization and intensification of the virtues of knowledge-based society and neoliberalism in the following years if the Turkish State keeps its current pace. Thus, in the following years, among other technologies of domination (such as ethnicity), ‘digital’ technologies of domination may begin to form a significant part of being a ‘good’ Turkish citizen.

The re-codifications of society and the individual according to the norms of information society and neoliberalism form one side of e-governmentalisation as a governing rationality. On the other hand, e-governmentalisation is also the continuation of a former state rationality of surveillance in the digital age which aims to govern individuals as ‘dividuals’, as database codes. In that sense, turning individuals into dividuals is the other side of transforming subjects into technopreneurial subjectivities in the information age. Thus, the links between e-governmentalisation of the state and surveillance should be discussed in order to reveal the full picture of the emergence of e-government as a governing rationality within the context of the society of control.

8.5. E-Governmentalisation of the State and Surveillance

Surveillance can be defined as “the collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (Lyon 2001: 2). Therefore, surveillance is not limited to direct observation of individuals; rather it covers all the state activities

that attempt to identify, monitor, check, and categorize individuals. Defined in this way, surveillance is an inseparable part of the functioning of the state. Even before the modern era, through such instruments as censuses, surveillance was used to identify who lived in a particular space, to categorize these people (e.g. tax payers, property owners, landless peasants, abnormal people, non-citizens etc.), and to distinguish them from each other according to these categorizations (i.e. good citizens on the one hand and bad citizens on the other). However, in the pre-modern period, the scope of surveillance activities of the state was limited for mainly two reasons: firstly, there was a lack of central state administration (i.e. the central state was dependent on local feudal powers for gathering information about its citizens) and secondly there was a lack of technological structures (e.g. transportation, communication). When we reach to modernity, these two limitations were surpassed by the establishment of the central state administration (i.e. modern bureaucratic organizations) and the development of enhanced systems of communication and transportation. Thus, with modernity, surveillance became systematic and fully rationalized (Dandekar 1990). That is why the development of statistics as the 'science of the state' and the emergence of personal identification documents (e.g. passports, identity cards) were the inseparable parts of modernity. Through these instruments, the state authorities were able to render society governable (Hacking 1990) and to regulate the movements of the people by means of distinguishing the members from the non-members (Torpey 1998). Thus, it was through surveillance practices in which subjects were constituted as 'desirable' or 'undesirable' in the state's view. In that sense, gaining access to certain citizenship rights became linked to the surveillance mechanisms (such as ID cards) as it was through these mechanisms that the state identified whether a person was a proper citizen or a risky subject.

If we return to our contemporary world, there are very strong continuities in these rationalities of the state concerning surveillance. However, there are major changes as well which are related to the intensive usage of computer technology in the surveillance practices and to the political-economic transformations in

contemporary societies that give shape to technology. Gary Marx argues that new surveillance is mostly involuntary, more remote, automated, and cheaper (2002: 15-16). Database technology emerges as the main element of new surveillance which enables the authorities to codify information about people in databases, store and edit this information according to the new transactions, and link it to other databases. Roger Clarke calls this aspect of new surveillance as ‘dataveillance’ (1988). Thus, through dataveillance techniques, a unique database profile for each individual is constructed which is open to editing and sharing with other databases.

If we return to the broader framework of e-governmentalisation of the state, it can be claimed that this database-laden aspect of new surveillance constitutes a crucial part of it. As Henman observes, “e-government [...] is dramatically increasing the capacities of government agencies to record, disseminate and analyse data about citizens” (2005: 80). This involves but not limited to establishing central databases, codifying information about people in these databases and sharing information with other databases. The traces of this rationality of e-government can also be seen in the context of Turkey. As it is stated in the Information Society Strategy Plan for 2006-2010;

the backbone of e-government will be built by establishing databases which will include updated and reliable information such as address-records database, title deeds information system, and finally an information system based on a single ID number for legal persons as in the case of real persons (DPT 2006: 28).

However, the digitalization of surveillance has a long history in Turkey which can be traced back to the establishment of the MERNIS (Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi – Central Population Management System) project. The MERNIS as an ‘idea’ started in 1972. The proposed aims of the project were; transforming the records of the Turkish citizens into electronic databases, constructing databases in districts, linking these databases to a central database, assigning each citizen a unique citizenship number, and enabling the citizens to have access to the public services through this single, unique citizenship number. In 1976, under the SPO

(State Planning Organization), the MERNIS was turned into a real project. However, it has been thirty years after the initial start, in November 2002, that the MERNIS project actually has begun to function online.³¹ According to the website of the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, in its current form, the MERNIS holds the records of more than 130 million Turkish citizens (including the ones who are not alive) and is used by more than 2000 public agencies. The database of the MERNIS is shared with public and private agencies, which enables immediate updating of the records of the citizens from 923 district centers (NVIGM 2009a).

Thus, the functions of the MERNIS can be summarized as follows: firstly, it registers every Turkish citizen into the system and gives each citizen a unique identification number; secondly at each citizenship transaction (e.g. health, tax payment, education, criminal issues, passport etc.) the citizens use this unique identification number provided by the MERNIS. Thirdly, the MERNIS stores and keeps the track of all those transactions in its databases and make editions on individual profiles. Fourthly, these personal profiles are shared with other agencies (both public and private) when necessary (see Figure 1).


It should be noted that, more empirical work is required in order to understand how the MERNIS actually functions in Turkey. However, we can at least claim that, the MERNIS as a ‘rationality’ is similar to what Haggerty and Ericson terms as ‘surveillant assemblage’ (2000). Haggerty and Ericson use this term in order to indicate the ‘rhizomatic’ character of the contemporary surveillance which is aimed at tracking the individuals from birth to death. Thanks to the rapidly growing database technologies, new surveillance intensifies greatly in a non-hierarchical way through gathering information about individuals from distinct sources (i.e. different institutions, both public and private) and integrating the gathered information easily through the sharing of the databases. As a result, individuals become continuously ‘connected’ to the system and records about their

³¹ For a history of MERNIS see:
http://www.nvi.gov.tr/Hakkimizda/Projeler,Mernis_Dundenbugune.html.

actions become integrated to other databases easily (e.g. financial records, criminological records, educational records, consumption records, birth-ethnic records).

Figure 1: Public Agencies – KPS – MERNIS Relationship

Source: NVIGM (2009b).



As we have identified above, as a part of its information society strategy, one of the central concerns of the Turkish State is also to ‘integrate’ the databases of different public institutions together (i.e. data concerning health, education, security etc. will be integrated in the central database of the MERNIS). As it is stated in the Information Society Strategic Plan for 2006-2010: “duplication in data collection and storage in the public sector will be eliminated, and data integrity will be ensured” (DPT 2006: 34). Additionally, in the website of the General Directorate

of Population and Citizenship Affairs, it is stated that, “the information kept in the central database is shared with the public and private agencies for administrative purposes” (NVIGM 2009). However, although we can see the traces of e-governmentalisation concerning surveillance in Turkey, whether the Turkish State actually e-governmentalizes or not is another issue which should be investigated empirically. For instance, based on the findings of a field research that was conducted in 2002 about the MERNIS project, Topal concludes that “the Turkish State has insufficient global outlook and lacks the necessary technological, political, and economic resources” (2005: 91). In a similar manner, according to Uçkan, the reason that the implementation of the MERNIS project have taken so many years (i.e. 30 years from the initial start) is not the cost or the technical difficulties of the project but the lack of political will (Uçkan 2003: 290). Besides these, according to the OECD report on the e-government applications in Turkey, there are important technical problems in Turkey (OECD 2007: 94). In this report, although the attempts of Turkey for establishing data networks (such as the MERNIS) are acknowledged, three main lines of criticisms are underlined;

Firstly, although Turkey developed many information networks, such an important network as ‘Health Information Network’ is still lacking. Thus, the development of new networks should be promoted by the state. Additionally, the institutions should be encouraged to use these networks effectively (OECD 2007: 94).

Secondly, according to the OECD, “more work is needed on data and technical standards” (2007: 94). Establishing data standards is a necessity for sharing of data among institutions. Thus, Turkey should standardize and harmonize its data definitions in order to enable data sharing among institutions as well as with the European Union. It is added that, the developed data standards should also be compatible with that of private sectors’.

Thirdly, there is a lack of collaboration between the central government and local governments. The main problem is that the local agencies do not have their own electronic database structures. Although the building of local government

databases is stated in the action plans of the government, there is an ambiguity about the manner of collaboration with the local governments (OECD 2007: 98).

If we return from Turkey to the broader context of e-governmentalisation of the state, we can conclude that database-laden surveillance (i.e. dataveillance) is an inseparable part of it, albeit a somewhat neglected part. In the discourses that legitimize the establishment of databases, it is commonly argued that the databases will make everyone's life easier by means of speeding up the public services. After the full implementation of database technology it is further indicated that the individuals will be able to access public services online and they will be able to settle their affairs with a public institution easily without being obliged to provide further documents from other institutions since their individual profile will be already shared among all the public institutions. These characteristics of the databases are certainly true for some people; those who have 'proper' database records. However, the data that is gathered through these surveillance instruments can also be used for categorization purposes which may have a negative influence on people's lives; especially those people who have disadvantaged backgrounds can be digitally discriminated. As Lyon points out;

the resulting classifications are designed to influence and to manage populations and persons thus directly and indirectly affecting the choices and chances of data subjects. The gates and barriers that contain, channel, and sort populations and persons have become virtual (2003: 13).

Thus, following Lyon, we may argue that, surveillance can also be used for the purpose of 'social sorting' to categorize and distinguish the 'proper' citizen from the 'risky' subject; facilitating the life of the former, while excluding the latter.

These state rationalities of social sorting are, of course, cannot be reduced to our contemporary world. As we have discussed above, surveillance practices are integral parts of the functioning of states since their emergence as it is through surveillance mechanisms (i.e. censuses, identification documents) that the

authorities were able to constitute some people as ‘desirable’ and others as ‘undesirable’; including the former while excluding the latter. In that sense, the emergence of new surveillance technologies (such as databases and electronic ID cards) can be considered as the continuation of a former state rationality of surveillance in a faster and more efficient manner. Nevertheless, there are also strong ties between the emergence of new surveillance practices and the political-economic transformations in the contemporary capitalism which affects the definitions of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ subjects of power and the actual relationships between these two categories.

The emergence of the ‘risk discourse’ is a central element in these transformations. As we have discussed before, one of the consequences of neoliberal governmentality is the ‘responsibilization of the self’ (i.e. the individual becomes responsible for protecting her/himself against such social risks as unemployment, poverty, illness etc.). However, risk discourse has an ‘other side’ as well, which concerns the management of those who have failed to become responsible for themselves; those who are seen as risky to the general good of the society. Thus, while one side of the risk discourse is concerned with constructing competent subjectivities who can manage their own risks by themselves, the other side is concerned with identifying, analyzing, and preventing the risk.

Certainly material transformations in capitalism and the changing composition of the nation states with globalization are the main factors in the emergence of the risk discourse. On the one hand, flexible accumulation of capital (i.e. post-Fordism) produces great inequalities between the core and the peripheries of the economy (Harvey 1990, 2005). On the other hand, rapid immigration to the global cities generates a new underclass and increases the disparities between those who are positioned in the centers of the cities (i.e. professionals, active citizens, high-skilled workers etc.) and those who live in low-income areas (i.e. low skilled immigrants, welfare dependents, homeless people etc.) (Sassen 1998). However, that is not to say that there are no transitions between these two groups. A paradigm of inclusion and exclusion is always in operation. In effect, the state itself promotes

such inclusionary practices as ‘empowerment’ to ‘teach’ individuals the right manner of conducting oneself according to the ideals of neoliberal knowledge-based economy (see Cruikshank 1994). Such strategies as re-skilling, training, and digital literacy can also be considered as regulatory/inclusionary practices of the state. Through these practices, the state aims to integrate individuals into the continuous flows and modulations of the society (of control). On the other hand, we know that the liberal government always bears an authoritarian potential for those who are seen as lacking the ability for self-government, those who are seen as threats for the general good, and those who are too ‘risky’ to be integrated into the society (see Dean 1999: 131-148, Dean 2002). Thus, the state may try to exclude these ‘undesirables’ by means of preventing their access to certain areas, managing their riskiness in enclosed spaces or even outside the borders. It is precisely at this point that we can begin to understand the conditions of the emergence of the new high-tech surveillance mechanisms.

High-tech surveillance mechanisms emerge in a world in which the desire to identify individuals unambiguously becomes one of the central concerns of the state as a part of its risk management strategies. Databases emerge as perfect tools of categorization and social sorting which help the authorities to define who is risky and who is not, who is to be included and who is to be excluded. As Castel (1991) points out, as the prevention of risk becomes a central concern of the state in contemporary societies, individuals are started to be segmented into risk groups according to their risk levels in the databases. These risk levels of individuals are determined through gathering information about various aspects of their lives (e.g. employment status, ethnic origin, financial status, criminological record, current place of residence etc.) and correlating these distinct factors in the databases, thus constructing a risk profile for each individual.

If we return to the broader context of e-governmentalisation of the state, we can claim that, these surveillance/risk rationalities constitute a crucial part of it. One concrete example is from United States about the passenger prescreening system;

The new system would use information provided by the passenger, public government data, commercial databases and confidential government security data to confirm passenger identity and to assess the level of risk the passenger poses to the air travel, including hijacking and terrorist acts. Each passenger is coded according to their risk profile as either 'green' for minimal risk, 'yellow' for heightened security and scrutiny procedures and 'red' for those deemed to pose acute danger (Henman 2005: 84).

Thus, individuals are segmented into risk groups and treated differently according to their segments. While those who have 'green' profiles are welcomed to the airports, those who have 'red' profiles become subjects of endless interrogations and treated as potential terrorists. These mentalities of surveillance are not limited to airports for certain. All the surveillance activities in our everyday lives (CCTV cameras, biometric identification, data-matching, computer profiling etc.) constitute the parts of the broader strategy of social sorting; distinguishing the proper citizen from the risky subject.

In the context of Turkey, we can also see the traces of similar rationalities of surveillance, especially in the discourses of the General Directorate of Security. In the papers that are presented in the 2nd Police Informatics Symposium held in Ankara in 2005 (EGM 2005)³² and in the articles published in the Police Journal, Informatics Special Topic 2004 (EGM 2004) the 'will' to identify every aspect of individuals' lives through such technologies as data profiling, data mining, face recognition, biometric identification, data integration, data sharing, geographical profiling, CCTV cameras, mobile communication, and data searching is apparent. As the Turkish Minister of the Interior points out in the opening talk of the 2nd Police Informatics Symposium, there are many projects that are related to the usage of the ICTs in the functioning of the General Directorate of Security and of the Ministry of Interior, including;

³² The aim of this symposium is defined as: "To contribute to the process of informatics that we are currently involved, to light the way for public institutions to follow the necessary methods and policies on the way towards e-government, to define the actions that have been undertaken institutionally and their effects to the citizens, to evaluate the current level of progress, to define the problems related to security-informatics issues and their solutions, to share information mutually, and to define the steps to be taken" (EGM 2005: viii).

- MOBESE (Mobile Electronic System Integration)
- PolNet (Police Network)
- Traffic Information System
- Public Security Project
- Crime Analysis Center Project
- AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System) project
- Human Resource Information System Project
- Distance education/e-learning Project (in collaboration with Middle East Technical University)
- JEMUS (Gendarmerie Integrated Communication and Information System) project
- ILEMOD (City Inventory Modernization of Ministry of Internal Affairs) project
- MERNIS (Central Population Management System)
- KPS (Identity Sharing System)
(EGM 2005: 1-2).

It should be noted that, all of these projects should be investigated empirically in order to find out whether these systems are functioning properly or not. Additionally, the intensification of surveillance on specific groups (i.e. unemployed people, ethnic minorities) and/or in specific spaces (such as the Taksim Square in Istanbul) should be analyzed in order to provide a healthier analysis of Turkish State's level of e-governmentalisation and how this process affects the everyday lives of the Turkish citizens.

Even so, just to provide more concrete examples about the process of e-governmentalisation of the state, besides the MERNIS project, the MOBESE and PolNet projects in Turkey are particularly significant. As the head of the Directorate emphasizes, the PolNet aims at enabling the police to reach any information necessary for its tasks. In this sense, it is designed to become easily integrated with other databases, both at national and international levels. He adds that, the PolNet will also be combined with other projects such as the MOBESE or the traffic-net, and the information will be shared with other institutions, including the General Command of Gendarmerie, the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Organization, and the

Undersecretariat of Customs (EGM 2005: 5-6, see also EGM 2005: 125-131 for a more detailed information about development of the PolNet project).

On the other hand, the MOBESE is mostly concerned with the 'inner security' of the cities. It is defined as "The City Information and Security System" (MOBESE 2008). Some of the aims of the MOBESE are; locating the place of the police vehicles in the digital map, facilitating the communication between the mobile police forces and the center, and enabling each police officer to access to the police database archives at any point. The MOBESE was set in Istanbul in January 2005. Currently it functions with 3500 vehicles and 570 cameras and is integrated to 32 district police departments and 85 police stations (MOBESE 2008). It should be added that, there are various projects for establishing the MOBESE system in other cities and districts of Turkey as well.³³

According to a recent report, in 2008 in Istanbul, as a part of the MOBESE, 2.000 palmtop computers were distributed to the mobile police forces so that they are able to make search in the police databases. In 2008, the police officers interrogated the identity of 9.443.000 suspicious people with these computers through GBT (Genel Bilgi Taraması – General Information Scan) and caught 41.464 fugitives. Additionally, 17.966 stolen cars were found with the same method. In the same report, the Chief of Istanbul Police states that, by the end of 2009, they plan to increase the number of cameras to 4.080 in Istanbul and for the next year the aim is to reach 10.000 cameras (Polis Haber 06/12/2008).

As noted before, these recent developments in Turkey are not enough to conclude that the Turkish State has been e-governmentalized. Even so, we can at least locate the general aim of identifying every aspect of the individual's lives and transforming them into database codes. If we return from Turkey to the broader context of e-governmentalisation of the state, we can conclude that this rationality is one of the central elements of the e-governmental state. In effect, when a police

³³ In the action plan of the government for 2008, the generalization of the MOBESE across the country is emphasized (DPT 2008: 14). Besides, a small search in the website of 'police news' (<http://www.polis.web.tr/search.php>) reveals that the MOBESE system is already functioning or it is planned to be established in various cities across Turkey including Bitlis, Kırkkale, Ereğli, Mardin, İzmir, Ankara, Iğdır, Elazığ, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Manisa.

officer interrogates a 'suspicious' person through entering his/her identity number into the central police database, this person is automatically turned into a database code and treated as if he/she is a database code.

It is precisely in this sense that Deleuze says one becomes a 'dividual', a database code, and a password in the society of control (1992: 5). The dividual is someone who is under constant interrogation for whether s/he is a proper citizen or a risky subject and for whether s/he has enough credentials and legitimate reasons for being in that particular space or not. It is no longer a matter who individuals claim they are. Their complex characteristics as individuals are reduced to database records in which there are only two categories; desirable and undesirable; worthy citizen and potential criminal. As Bogard points out, the database code of the individual becomes having more reality than the individual him/herself because it is the database code that is continuously compared with the risk categories which are already established in the central databases (1996: 31). If one person's database profile (i.e. a combination of his/her age, employment status, ethnic origin, place of residence etc.) falls into these risk categories, s/he becomes a suspect, a potential criminal. In that sense, the aim behind the employment of various surveillance instruments is not just to identify individuals but to find out whether they are risky or not, through comparing their profiles with the already established risk categories in the databases. For instance, the category of 'potential thief' (i.e. a combination of age, employment status, ethnic origin, place of residence etc.) is generated in the databases through working on the data of the former criminals and then this category is compared with the profile of any individual to find out whether that individual is a 'potential thief' or a 'good citizen'. Thus, individuals may easily become suspects because of their disadvantaged backgrounds, even if they have not done anything wrong. To conclude, as Rose points out, "the exercise of freedom requires proof of legitimate identity" (Rose 1999: 240) in the society of control and those who do not have legitimate identities and legitimate database records are excluded from citizenship.

Another important and ‘popular’ surveillance instruments are the electronic ID cards. Throughout the world, the establishment of these ‘smart’ cards is a point of major controversies (Lyon & Bennett 2008: 5). To put it briefly, these cards have three distinctive features compared to traditional ID cards. Firstly, they are connected to national searchable databases which make it possible to store every citizenship transaction made with these cards in the electronic databases. Secondly, some of the former cards and identification numbers will be replaced by one single electronic ID card. This may oblige the citizens to use the same card to pay the taxes, to go outside the country, to receive health services, to drive vehicles and so on. All of those activities may be stored in national searchable databases as pointed above. Thirdly, some versions of these cards will have biometric data on them which may include the physiological characteristics of the citizens, such as fingerprint, DNA, iris or voice information (Lyon 2007b, Zureik & Hindle 2004). Alongside with such states as Australia, the UK, Japan and France, the establishment of the electronic ID cards with biometric information is also within the future plans of the Turkish State.³⁴

After the implementation of these cards, it would not be a surprise to see a further intensification of surveillance practices. Unlike the technical limitedness of paper-based type of identification, these ‘smart’ ID cards are both portable and virtual. Firstly, the biometric data contained on them serves to identify people more accurately. Secondly, their connection to searchable databases enables the state to access former actions of the citizens faster, within seconds. Thirdly, due to their machine-readable nature, they enable the authorities to access every detail of the citizens at any place; i.e. how old they are, what is their employment status, how many cars and what type of cars they have, which countries they have visited, which illnesses they have had, which crimes they have committed, where they went

³⁴ The project concerning the establishment of these cards was firstly announced in July 2007 by a circular of the office of prime minister (Prime Ministry 04/07/2007). In the action plan of the government for 2008, it is further indicated that these cards will be used in all the citizenship transactions, including tax, health, security, driving license, license to operate a motor vehicle, passport etc. and will replace the existing cards (DPT 2008: 23). According to a recent report, electronic ID cards are currently in the test process and they are planned to be used by 2010 (Haberaktuel 09/10/2008).

last summer for vacation, where they were living three years ago, what deviant behavior they showed when they were young etc. As pointed above, these data about people may be compared with the risk categories that are already established in the central databases and individuals (especially those who have disadvantaged backgrounds) may become 'potential criminals' in this way, even if they have done nothing wrong. Thus, following Lyon, it can be argued that, electronic ID cards would/may bring "the border everywhere" and extend the "experience of otherness" to the whole parts of the city for those who have insufficient records (Lyon 2005: 80).

To conclude, surveillance is an inextricable element of the society of control and the process of e-governmentalisation of the state which aims to govern individuals as 'dividuals'. Depending on the intensification of this process, in the following years, we may hear about people who are arrested just because of their 'risky' database record, who have been banned from receiving health services because they did/could not pay their tax debts, whose access to airports have been restricted for 'security reasons', and whose electronic ID card has been refused in the entrance gates of the consumption centers or at the gates of the newly emerging 'secure' living spaces. In this manner, the invisible barriers that divide the 'good' and the 'bad' may become more visible through the implementation of high-tech surveillance mechanisms.

8.6. Conclusion: Governmentalisation to E-Governmentalisation

Foucault defined 'governmentalisation of the state' as a certain change in the governing mentalities of the state with modernity (Foucault 1979). Contrary to the feudal rule of the Prince which was characterized by its territory, the governmental state is characterized by its interest in the population and the regulation and enhancement of the 'life forces' of the population. This bio-political aspect of modern power necessarily requires the state to become 'immanent' to the lives of the citizens. Thus, the modern state becomes concerned with regulating the forces of life in its depths through disciplinary techniques. Regulation of the

individual bodies goes together with the regulation of the population at large (Foucault 1990: 139). This is done through imposing a certain mode of conduct upon citizens that is in accordance with the mentalities of the modern state. In Foucault's society of discipline, the kind of conduct imposed by the state is being utile, docile and compliant. The subjects are enclosed in panoptic organizations and a 'soul' is constructed for them, which makes them appropriate subjects for the political-economic requirements of the disciplinary society.

What can be termed as 'e-governmentalisation of the state' on the other hand, corresponds to Deleuze's society of control in which the spaces of enclosure (i.e. factory, hospital, school etc.) are everywhere in crisis. The transformations in capitalism (i.e. post-Fordism, informational capitalism, knowledge-based economy) form the basis of this society which brings new definitions about being a good worker-subject in the contemporary economy. It is no longer desirable to construct subjects as utile and docile when we move from Fordism to Post-Fordism, from energy based capitalism to informational capitalism. In the control society, the worker-subjects are required to be flexible, technologically competent, multi-skilled, knowledge workers. In the broader manner, what constitutes being a virtuous citizen has also begun to be defined in similar terms. Under neoliberal governmentality, the subjects are obliged to establish a particular relationship with themselves that is based on the model of enterprise and that is composed of continuous investments to the human capital. It is in this context that the state becomes e-governmentalised and tries to transform society, economy and the citizen in the information age. That is the reason why the promotion of the ICTs growth in economy goes hand in hand with the imposition of new truths on the citizens of the information age to be counted as virtuous; being flexible, being active, having marketable abilities, having entrepreneurial skills, having IT skills, being technologically competent etc. The power of e-governmental state grows the more the subjects internalize these attributes and make them a part of their

identity.³⁵ Thus, e-governmentalisation is linked to a kind of citizen subjectivity which can be termed as technopreneurial that is composed of technological and entrepreneurial abilities. This is one side of e-governmentalisation as a governmental rationality in the information age.

On the other hand, e-governmentalisation of the state is also the continuation of a former state rationality of surveillance through new technological instruments. The aim is to govern individuals as individuals by means of continuously sorting and categorizing them. The subjects are no longer observed in panoptic organizations; new electronic technologies expand surveillance to everywhere of our lives, which turns us into database codes, passwords, credit cards, passports, biometric information etc. The rise of these surveillance technologies are certainly related to neoliberalization and globalization which increases the disparities between those who are conducting themselves in a proper manner and those who are failed to do so. Thus, e-governmentalised state becomes more and more concerned with distinguishing active citizens from the passive masses and employs various authoritarian surveillance instruments for this task.

In that sense, transforming subjects into technopreneurs of themselves goes hand in hand with turning them into individuals in the process of e-governmentalisation of the state which provides us with the full picture of governing rationalities of the state in the information society.

In the context of Turkey, as we have tried to show, there are significant indicators that the Turkish State has also started to think in terms of these rationalities of e-governmentalisation. However, it may still be misleading to assume that the Turkish State has been e-governmentalized. Concerning the first two aspects of the control society (i.e. material aspects/information society and neoliberalism), although numerous state discourses on e-government, e-transformation, knowledge-based economy and information society show us that the Turkish State also aims to shape a kind of subjectivity appropriate to the norms of

³⁵ However, there is always a possibility of resistance since the subjects has always the potential of refusing what is imposed to them by the technologies of domination.

information society and neoliberalism (i.e. a technopreneur of himself or herself), this process should be investigated empirically, taking into account the different dynamics of the Turkish State and the Turkish society. Since the Turkish State is not a coherent entity, some parts of it may intensively e-governmentalise (e.g. economy) while some other parts may still resist this process (e.g. education). On the other hand, e-governmentalisation process may totally fail or it may evolve to something else. Therefore, in order to provide a more plausible analysis of the e-governmentalisation process of the Turkish State, this process should be investigated empirically within such different contexts as economy, law, education or social policies to find out whether there is the promotion of knowledge-work in the economy, techno-entrepreneurial citizenship in the formal citizenship status, lifelong learning/corporationalization in the education system and being an active job-seeker rather than being a passive welfare dependent in the social policies. After these empirical analyses we may have a clearer grasp about the place of the Turkish State in the process of e-governmentalisation. Regarding the third aspect of the society of control (i.e. surveillance), although there are some indicators that the aim of governing individuals as individuals is in the process of establishment in Turkey, more empirical work is required in order to have a healthier analysis about the Turkish State's level of e-governmentalisation and how this process affects the everyday lives of the Turkish citizens. For instance, all the surveillance projects in Turkey (e.g. MERNIS, MOBESE, PolNet, electronic ID cards) should be investigated empirically in order to find out whether these systems are functioning properly or not. Additionally, the intensification of surveillance on specific groups (e.g. unemployed people) and/or in specific spaces (e.g. Taksim Square in Istanbul) should be analyzed in order to understand how surveillance functions on different groups and/or in different spaces.

If we return from Turkey to the broader context of e-governmentalisation of the state, we may conclude that 'e-governmentalisation' is an intensifying governing rationality of the state which is important in at least two respects. Firstly, it bears the potential of setting the criteria of being a virtuous citizen which may

either complement or contradict the existing criteria. In any case, e-governmentalisation seems to form at least a part of what we think about ourselves and others in the future.³⁶ Secondly, related to this, the practices of inclusion and exclusion may also alter. That is to say that, the state may either assemblage various strategies and practices (e.g. digital literacy, lifelong learning) so as to transform ordinary citizens to fit in this criteria or it may exclude ‘others’ from citizenship through enhanced surveillance mechanisms (e.g. databases, electronic ID cards), especially those people who are regarded as lacking the ability for such ‘construction’ or those who are regarded as too risky to be integrated to the society.

Therefore, we can see both sides of the bio-political strategies of ‘government’ in the process of e-governmentalisation of the state. On the one hand, it brings ‘life’ in the sense that it tries to transform ordinary citizens into technopreneurial subjectivities, thus increasing their productivity. On the other hand, it brings ‘death’ in the sense that it tries to exclude those who are regarded as risky to the general good of the society through enhanced systems of surveillance such as biometric scanning, CCTV cameras, machine-readable electronic ID cards, national searchable databases etc. At one side, there are bodies whose life forces should be fostered through various regulatory practices, whose inclusion is conditioned on the process of subjectification. At the opposite side, there are bodies that do not matter, the mass of undesirables that should be excluded in the name of the ‘life’ of the ‘proper’ citizens.

³⁶ There may be many different diagrams and many different kinds of ‘appropriate subjects’ that are linked to these diagrams within the same society. These diagrams/subjectivities may be complementary as well as contradictory with each other. In this thesis, only the kinds of subjectivities that are linked to the process of ‘e-governmentalisation of the state’ are analyzed within the diagram of the society of control. For instance, the diagrams of ethnicity or religion are still powerful which may either compete or complement with the diagram of control (e.g. In the Turkish case, there are some indicators- which should be analyzed empirically- that these three diagrams can be combined in perfect harmony, particularly after the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie in the recent years. On the other hand, there are still important contradictions between these three diagrams). In other words, this thesis does not argue that the ‘e-governmentalisation’ is the sole factor in shaping the conduct of the citizens in our contemporary world; it is just one factor among others, albeit a newly emerging and an important one.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Gonna make a jailbreak
AC/DC

In this study, the emergence of ‘e-government’ is analyzed from a genealogical perspective by means of locating it within a field of diverse power interactions of the contemporary world. According to genealogy, ‘things’ have no essence and they are continuously interpreted and re-interpreted through time, due to new interactions of power. A genealogical study, therefore, is not interested in single origins or continuous developments; rather it is interested in complex and diverse interactions of power which make up ‘things’ in specific historical periods. In this way, through showing how ‘things’ have emerged within complex interactions of power, genealogy aims to ‘disturb’ what we have taken for granted about ourselves and others. Foucault himself has undertaken many genealogical investigations throughout his life in order to show us what we have taken for granted as ‘true’ is only a successive interpretation. For instance in his book *Madness and Civilization*, he shows that the origin of ‘psychiatry’ has no relation with the humanitarian discourse or the scientific, medical advances. On the contrary, psychiatry emerged within the places of confinement of the 16th century, such as Hopital General in which the intent was to prevent and to punish idleness (Foucault 1988b: 46-47). Thus, according to Foucault, psychiatry emerged so as to serve a certain economic need of that time by means of punishing idleness and maintaining social order, which had nothing to do with ‘humanitarian psychiatry’ as we understand it today.

This line of thought may be pursued for also the case for the emergence of ‘e-government’ as a governing rationality. If we follow the common perceptions about e-government today, we may easily conclude that it is a requirement for a happy and prosperous future and that being an ‘e-individual’ is the only way for reaching

to this state of happiness. However, if we focus on the interactions of power in which e-government emerges, we can see how ‘dangerous’ it is. On the one hand, it brings new ethical obligations to people in order for them to be counted as ‘virtuous’, ‘responsible’ citizens of the neoliberal information society. Thus, as the state e-governmentalizes, citizens become obliged to turn themselves into an ‘enterprise’, making continuous investments to their human capitals and increasing their level of employability in this way, without requiring any assistance from the state. That is the reason why, what the state sees as ‘good’ for the citizens (i.e. being a ‘digital’, ‘technopreneurial’ subject), may be interpreted as a new type of imprisonment, albeit a very ‘democratic’ and a complex one. On the other hand, e-government is also linked to the rationalities and practices of exclusion through enhanced surveillance mechanisms for those who fail to become responsible citizens of the information society. Therefore, instead of praising ‘e-government’ as the requirement for a happier future, if we take into account the historically contingent power interactions in which it emerges, we may see that two interrelated rationalities of the state are at play in this process: the desire to make some people more productive and the desire to exclude those who cannot become that productive. As Nietzsche would say; “what a price had to be paid for them! How much blood and horror lies at the basis of all ‘good things’!”(2006: 39).

Therefore, the task of this study has been to ‘destabilize’ the truths that are associated with the ‘e-government’ through showing how these truths are linked to the political-economic transformations and to the requirements of the contemporary capitalism and that they do not have any transcendental value. In order to achieve this task, the focus has been on the type of governing rationalities, the modes of subjectivities, the strategies of power-knowledge and the practices of inclusion and exclusion that are linked to the process of e-governmentalisation. These interactions of power have been discussed within the theoretical framework of Deleuze’s society of control which corresponds to our contemporary world. Different aspects of the society of control have been investigated in different chapters (i.e. material aspects, neoliberalism, surveillance, citizenship) and their links with each other have been

established. It has been concluded that e-governmentalisation is an intensifying governing rationality which is important in at least two respects. Firstly, e-governmentalisation has the potential to either alter or complement the existing criteria of being a virtuous citizen in the contemporary world. Related to this, secondly, this new definition (i.e. 'truth') about being may have an influence on the formal citizenship status, on the practices of inclusion (e.g. the growing scope of digital literacy, lifelong learning, various forms of 'empowerment' activities), and on the practices of exclusion (i.e. intensification of surveillance mechanisms so as to exclude those who cannot meet the neoliberal criteria of being or those who are regarded as lacking the ability for self-government).

This is of course one possibility among many others. In this study, only the strategies of power-knowledge associated with the diagram of the society of control are investigated. There can be numerous diagrams within the same society which may be complementary as well as contradictory with each other. For instance, the diagrams of ethnicity or religion are still powerful which may either complement or compete with the diagram of control. Besides this, as Deleuze has pointed out, "every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving" (2006: 30). That is to say that, e-governmentalisation is an open-ended process which may totally fail or evolve into something else. Various struggles against the e-governmental power will also have an influence on the 'success' of this process. Therefore, there is no linear passage from the society of discipline to the society of control and from governmentalisation to e-governmentalisation. On the contrary, this passage is full of struggles, resistances (both democratic and conservative ones) and even chance events.

By the same token, even if e-governmentalisation becomes 'successful' to some extent, we should not expect that every segment of the state and the society will be equally e-governmentalised. Some parts of the state (e.g. economy or the police) may intensively e-governmentalise while some other parts (e.g. education) may still resist this process. This is also the case for the society. Some parts of the society (e.g. economically powerful cities) may intensively e-governmentalise while

in other parts (e.g. less-developed areas) there may be no trace of e-governmentalisation.

If we turn our attention to the context of Turkey, which has been emphasized throughout the thesis in order to make the theoretical discussions more concrete, we can conclude that these limits of e-governmentalisation are also true for Turkey. That is to say that, although there are some indicators that the rationalities of e-governmentalisation (i.e. transforming people into active, technopreneurial subjectivities and turning them into database codes) has been adopted by the Turkish State,³⁷ it is still too early to claim that Turkish State has been e-governmentalised. Besides this, more empirical work is required in order to analyze different aspects of e-governmentalisation (i.e. information society, neoliberalism, surveillance) within different dynamics of the Turkish State and Turkish Society. For instance, concerning the first two aspects of e-governmentalisation (i.e. information society and neoliberalism) this process should be investigated within such different contexts as economy (to find out whether there is the promotion of ICTs sectors and knowledge work), law (to find out whether there is the promotion of technopreneurial citizenship in the formal citizenship status), education system (to find out whether the rationalities of e-governmentalisation are applied in the restructuring of the education system, i.e. corporationalization, lifelong learning), or social policies (to find out whether there is the obligation of becoming an 'active citizen', i.e. activity tests, attending to lifelong learning and training activities, for the welfare claimants). Concerning the third aspect of e-governmentalisation (i.e. surveillance), although some surveillance projects in Turkey (MERNIS, PolNet, MOBESE, electronic ID cards etc.) resemble the rationalities of e-governmentalisation (i.e. governing individuals as individuals), this process should be investigated empirically in order to have a plausible analysis of the Turkish State's

³⁷ The election of the Justice and Government Party to rule in 2002 can be considered as a turning point in this process. However, the beginnings of the rationalities of e-governmentalisation (particularly neoliberal governmentality) can also be traced back to the rapid financial liberalization process of Turkey in 1980s. In that sense, the election of the Justice and Government Party should be considered as a continuity of neoliberal governmentality in Turkey in a more intensive manner, with more emphasis on such concepts as knowledge-based economy and information society.

level of e-governmentalisation. For instance, these projects should be investigated separately in order to find out whether they are working properly or not. On the other hand, the intensification of surveillance on specific groups (e.g. unemployed people) and/or in specific spaces (e.g. consumption/entertainment centers) should be analyzed in order to reveal how surveillance functions in Turkey, on which groups and in which spaces. Besides these, as discussed above, it should be always taken into account that e-governmentalisation process of Turkey may totally fail, evolve into something else or it may develop in an uneven way. For instance, some parts of the Turkish State may rapidly e-governmentalise (e.g. economy or the police) while other parts may resist this process (e.g. education). On the other hand, some areas of Turkey may intensively e-governmentalise (e.g. western parts) while in the other parts (e.g. eastern parts) this process may develop very slowly. Therefore, only after the empirical investigations we may have a clearer grasp about level of e-governmentalisation in Turkey; to what extent the different segments of the Turkish State and the Turkish society become e-governmentalized and how this process affects the everyday lives of people.

For the last words, we should admit that, in this study little emphasis is given to elaborate a detailed analysis for how we can resist against the e-governmental power. However, this should not mean that there can not be any resistance. As discussed above, just like any other form of power, e-governmental power also has a limited and fragile existence and is open to interpretations and re-interpretations. These interpretations may give e-governmentalisation either a more democratic or a more repressive dimension. That is the reason why, the democratic struggles will always have an influence on the future of e-governmentalisation. Thus, we should not fear of or fall into hopelessness before this new state rationality but work on to discover new fields of emancipation. Since 'e-government' as a state rationality is beyond the power of the state and is diffused into our relationships with ourselves and others, the struggles against this power should also go beyond capturing the power of the state. As Foucault puts it; "the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate individual from the state,

and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to state" (1982: 216).

Therefore, according to Foucault, we have to develop a new 'ethics of the self' in which the development of our capacities will be separated from the relations of power. This is perhaps what he means when he says "we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (1991b: 351). In this new ethics of the self there would be creativity, difference, and opposition to everything which stands against the life.

If we return to the passage from the societies of discipline to the societies of control which is at the heart of this study, we may conclude that in the disciplinary society the body was disciplined so as to make it utile and docile. On the other hand, in the society of control the logics of discipline fade away and the body is 'modulated' in its mobility and flexibility which is regarded as more 'productive'. In both cases, the diverse forces of body are reduced and submitted to certain ends. Therefore, the task in front of us should be the discovery of how we can use our bodies other than these two purposes, in favor of life. Only after this, the biopolitical strategies that are associated with 'e-governmentalisation' (i.e. being a technopreneurial subject) would find no counterpart in the identities of subjects and there would be no need to employ various surveillance mechanisms to classify and separate people from each other.

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL PROCESS OF TURKEY'S WAY TOWARDS THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

The election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to the rule in 2002 is one of the turning points in the emergence of 'information society' and 'e-government' discourses in Turkey. However, the beginning of Turkey's e-transformation process can be traced back to 1970s. According to the OECD's report on Turkey, e-transformation process in Turkey can be divided into four historically distinct stages (OECD 2007: 9). In the first stage, in 1970s and 1980s, although there was an emphasis on the ICTs, it was limited to facilitating and improving such state practices as census and the collection of taxes. In the second stage, during 1990s, the benefits of the information society and knowledge-based economy began to be defined and to be understood by the state authorities. In the third stage (2000-2002), the emphasis was turned into implementing these new definitions. At this stage, the state began to plan its future strategies for transforming Turkey into an information society. The First Informatics Convention was held within this period, in May 2002, in which both the state agencies and NGOs were participated. In a premiership circular signed by the former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, the aim of informatics convention was defined as developing new strategies and action plans for transforming Turkey into an information society (TBS 04/09/2001). Finally, in the fourth stage, along with the Justice and Development Party having come to the rule, the e-government started to be expanded across the country. Turkey's candidacy for the membership of the European Union also facilitated this process and pushed the government to make new reforms that were required for Turkey's integration to the Union.³⁸ At

³⁸ The e-Europe initiative was established in 1999 for the EU members with an aim of disseminating the benefits of the information society across the Union. In the 2000 Lisbon meeting, the objective of e-Europe initiative was defined as making Europe "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010" (Euractiv 21/05/2007). In 2001, e-Europe+ was established as a part of e-Europe initiative, in order to include the candidate countries. Turkey, as a candidate for the EU, has

this final stage, the state intensively planned new strategies for transforming Turkey into a knowledge-based economy. ‘E-transformation Turkey Project’ was established in December 2002 and its objectives were later set in February 2003 by a circular of the Office of the Prime Minister (Prime Ministry 27/02/2003). In March 2003, the Information Society Department (Bilgi Toplumu Dairesi) was founded within the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) with an aim of coordinating e-Transformation project and planning new strategies for achieving the goals of the information society (BTDB 2008). A short-term action plan was published in 2003 covering 73 items under eight sections for the information society strategy. In 2004, the Second Informatics Convention was held in collaboration with NGOs in order to plan further strategies (Prime Ministry 06/01/2004). In 2005, a new action plan, which included 50 items, substituted the former short-term plan (DPT 2005). Finally, in March 2006, ‘Information Society Strategic Plan’ was published by the State Planning Organization setting a detailed pathway for Turkey’s information society strategy for the years between 2006 and 2010 (DPT 2006). In short, it can be said that, especially after 2002, the aim of transforming Turkey into an information society has become one of the central concerns of the state.

become a member of e-Europe+ initiative in this way and has begun to harmonize its information society strategy in accordance with that of Europe. The harmonization areas have included providing regulatory and legal frameworks for the ICTs (e-government, e-business), nation-wide development and dissemination of a cheaper and faster internet connection, promoting investment in human resource skills, and promoting e-commerce and e-government services (OECD 2007: 38).

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