

RUSSIA'S SOFT SECURITY POLICY
UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN:
2000-2008

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RUSSIA'S SOFT SECURITY POLICY
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2000-2008

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ABSTRACT

RUSSIA'S SOFT SECURITY POLICY UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN: 2000–2008

Türkoğlu, Burçin

M.S. The Graduate Program of Eurasian Studies

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This thesis aims to study Russian soft security policy under Vladimir Putin and examines the basic soft security threats which Russia has encountered and how it fought against these threats in the post-Soviet era. Contrary to the mainstream literature suggesting that Russia has focused exclusively on hard security issues within its national security policies due to its historical background and geopolitical factors, the thesis argues that Russia started to give more importance to soft security besides hard security in its national security policies since Putin's presidency. Among soft security challenges, Russia prioritizes especially terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security.

The thesis is composed of six chapters. The introductory first chapter is followed by the second chapter examining the role of soft security in Russian national security. The following three chapters discuss Russia's soft security challenges of terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security respectively whereas the sixth chapter concludes the thesis.

Keywords: Russia, soft security, terrorism, transnational organized crime, energy security

ÖZ

VLADİMİR PUTİN DÖNEMİ'NDE RUSYA'NIN YUMUŞAK GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI: 2000–2008

Türkođlu, Burçin

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Bu tez, Vladimir Putin Dönemi'nde Rusya'nın yumuşak güvenlik politikasını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Rusya'nın Sovyet sonrası dönemde karşı karşıya kaldığı yumuşak güvenlik tehditlerini ve bu tehditlerle nasıl mücadele ettiğini incelemektedir. Tez, tarihsel geçmiş ve jeopolitik unsurlar sebebiyle kendi ulusal güvenliğinde sadece sert güvenlik konularına odaklandığını savunan temel literatürün aksine, Putin Dönemi'nde Rusya'nın ulusal güvenlik politikalarında, sert güvenliğe ek olarak yumuşak güvenliğe de önem verdiğini göstermektedir. Rusya yumuşak güvenlik sorunları arasında, özellikle terörizm, ulusal sınırları aşan organize suçlar ve enerji güvenliğini öncelikli tutmaktadır.

Tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş olan birinci bölümü, Rusya'nın ulusal güvenlik politikasında yumuşak güvenliđin anlatıldığı ikinci bölüm takip etmektedir. Ardından gelen üç bölüm sırasıyla Rusya'nın yumuşak güvenlik tehditleri; terörizm, ulusal sınırları aşan organize suçlar ve enerji güvenliđi olmakla beraber altıncı bölüm ise tezin sonuç kısmıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, yumuşak güvenlik, terörizm, ulusal sınırları aşan organize suçlar ve enerji güvenliđi

In Memory of My Grandfather,

İhsan K fterođlu

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Soviet era, Russia has encountered several asymmetric threats which cannot be solved by using conventional forces¹. Especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S., Russia has recognized the importance of non-military power to find a powerful place in international system under Vladimir Putin presidency. In that respect, this thesis seeks to analyse changing Russia's national security strategy during Putin presidency and need to redefine its national security concept.

1.1 Scope and Objective

The thesis focuses on the role of soft security in Russian national security and three basic soft security threats which Russia has encountered; terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security.

During Putin era, soft security threats and actions against these threats put forward. The importance of soft security has been understood in 21st century with the emergence of globalisation. Countries have faced new threats and non-military struggle has become a necessity as these threats are asymmetric and cannot be solved by using military instruments².

In the thesis, The use of soft security is emphasized as a new tool for protecting national security and social welfare as well as hard security in the post-Soviet era. Furthermore, the concept of soft security provides opportunity to Russia in international politics. Russia needs to cooperate with other countries and Putin

¹ Julian French-Lindley, "The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century," in *Soft Security Threats and European Union*, eds. Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 2.

² Berdal Aral, "Asimetrik Saldırı Savaşları, Siyaset ve Uluslararası Hukuk," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, no.4/14 (2007): 68-9.

generated combination of hard and soft security to build strong national security in his eight-year presidency.

1.2 Literature Review

Contrary to mainstream literature on the importance of hard security in Russia, the thesis argues that soft security policy is as important as hard security for Russia during Putin era. According to the typical arguments, defining national security led to emergence of military concerns.

Bobo Lo has marked in his book *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy* continuation of the Soviet worldview of Russia. Although positive-sum outcomes with Western countries, Russia has given priority to hard security interests such as nuclear stability, proliferation of weapons and building stable and equal military relations with the U.S. and NATO³.

Luke March is another mainstream scholar who analyzes Russian national security strategy. Firstly, March emphasized Putin's book *Russia's at the Turn of Millennium* which is published in 2000 in his work *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*. According to March's interpretation, Putin's security thinking displays more continuity than change. Putin focuses on Russia's domestic crisis to maintain domestic sovereignty and autonomous development⁴. Furthermore, March mentions that Putin's national security perception was based

³ Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 72.

⁴ Luke March, "Security Strategy and the 'Russia Problem'," in *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, ed. Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson. (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 102.

on pragmatism and ensured national interest. In this context, Russia is still against the U.S./Western alliances and need to balance relations⁵.

Flemming S. Hansen focusing on the 2003 Military Modernisation Strategy stipulated that Russia had right to apply pre-emptive military strikes against military threats within its borders and destroy terrorists⁶. For Hansen, Russia has legitimized the use of all means of the destruction of terrorists after the Beslan siege and shows its real aim worldwide⁷.

Andrew Monaghan argues that Russia has poor soft security policy. For him, Russia has tendency to see soft security for wealthy countries and prefer short-term militarised solutions. Russia has small developments on as regards to cooperation with other countries about soft security issues, human rights dialogue and other soft security threats. Moreover, he criticized Russia;

Russia's position on soft security matters has often fluctuated between interest and almost complete ambivalence and after interest has remained merely rhetorical. The low prioritization of soft security matters is reflected in budgetary commitments- they remain badly financed by the Russian government and budget allocations are rarely disbursed in full. Military security remains predominant focus and will continue to be so in the near future.⁸

Donald M. Snow is another mainstream scholar who is interested in globalization and national security in his book *National Security for a New Era*. Snow defined national security as a whole perception. The military concerns are the traditional and functional matter of national security. In this context, soft security implementations are part of traditional security as under the subject of new

⁵ Luke March, "Security Strategy and the 'Russia Problem'," in *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, ed. Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson. (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 102.

⁶ Flemming S. Hansen, "In the Transatlantic Gap," *Russia in Global Affairs*, Dec.11, 2004, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/9/710.html> (Accessed Dec.21, 2008).

⁷ Flemming S. Hansen, "In the Transatlantic Gap," *Russia in Global Affairs*, Dec.11, 2004, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/9/710.html> (Accessed Dec.21, 2008).

⁸ Andrew Monaghan, Russian Perspectives of Russia-EU Security Relations, *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, Russian Series, no.5/38 (2005):5, <http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/csrc/perspectives.pdf>

additions to the national security agenda⁹. He added that there were three vital security threats which were related to globalization; energy security, environmental security and cyber security. They do not totally concern hard security but, Snow emphasized the need for non-traditional policy of national security. However, hard security does not lose its value and importance¹⁰.

In the light of above discussion, contrary to mainstream arguments, the thesis argues that the concept of soft security has a vital importance to provide strong national security for Russia in post-Soviet era. In that respect, determination of Russia's soft security threats demonstrates the necessity to cooperate with other countries, as Russia needs to establish high-level relations in order to create functional soft security protection which were created in Russia during Putin presidency.

Until the end of the Cold War, security was defined only in the military arena. According to Ullman, security is not composed of only military matters. When he wrote his article in 1983 during the Cold War era, he referred re-definition of security as changing arms like nuclear arms and techniques¹¹. Furthermore; he added that;

Over the past decade or so a vast array of public interest organizations has begun to put forward alternate conceptions of national security. Nearly, all are devoted to particular issues- limiting population growth, enhancing environmental quality, eradicating World hunger, protecting human right and the like. Some are overt lobbies expressly seeking to alter political outcomes. Other devotes themselves to research and educational activities. But they are equally concerned with governmental behavior. Jointly they have succeeded substantially raising public awareness of the vulnerability of the society to a variety

⁹ Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics* (New York: Pearson Education, 2006), 147.

¹⁰ Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics* (New York: Pearson Education, 2006), 150

¹¹ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, no.8/1 (1983): 138.

of harms non-military in nature, and of the limitation of military instruments for coping with many types of political problems.¹²

New liberal politics has compassed around the world in the 1980s and increased the value of human being as well as non-military matters. Hard security is still important for all countries¹³. In that respect, the scholars start to emphasize non-military issues much more. According to Ulmann;

It scarcely needs stating that there are vast differences between the threats to 'national security' posed by nuclear weapons and those posed by catastrophic natural disasters. Behind earthquakes and floods are no minds. They cannot be deterred. But their potential damage can be substantially reduced by application of foresight and expenditure of resource.¹⁴

It is worth mentioning to state that countries need to solve security problems not only to fight against or be protected from another states, but also to fulfil their responsibilities towards their citizens in terms of ensuring their safety Building a hard military capacity is not enough in the said process. Countries need to include other security items and actions in their programme such as laws which are considered as important outputs. For instance; saving from earthquake can only be possible by having hardy structures constructed and builders must adhere the rules how to build enduring houses and buildings.

Cooperation with other countries and mutual interdependency are basic ways to fight against soft security threats. In this respect, John Pinder emphasized in his article Russia's role in generating a common strategy to build a safe and stable world system¹⁵. After the September 11, 2001 Russia started to give importance to cooperate with regional partners and international actors for political and security

¹² Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, no.8/1 (1983): 152-53.

¹³ Torbjorn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 351.

¹⁴ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, no.8/1 (1983): 152-53.

¹⁵ John Pinder, "EU-Russia Partnership as a Pillar Building a Safe and Stable World System," in *The EU & Russia The Promise of Partnership*, John Pinder and Yuri Shishkov (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2002), 135.

issues. For Pinder, Russian willingness to cooperate and join partnerships should be supported by Western countries¹⁶.

Andrei Zagorski mentioned in his article that Russia is one of countries who try to develop its soft security policies¹⁷. Russia is ready to be a strategic partner of the European Union in terms of economic cooperation. Thus, Russia has supported agreements and scientific explorations concerning science, aircraft, space and energy¹⁸.

Having briefly discussed the literature on soft security and hard security as part of national security, the next part of the Chapter One will be focusing on the arguments of the thesis.

1.3 Argument

This thesis studies Russia's soft security policy under Putin. It examines soft security policies under national security of Russia and basic soft security threats of Russia such as terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security.

It is very difficult to give a full definition of the concept of soft security as it is generally identified with weapons, uniformed soldiers and conflicts or wars under the concept of security. It is a simple and old perception of security which was mentioned previously. Another complicated question is the term "soft". It usually thought that soft security represents more simple problems which do not need to be solved by hard security and it is simpler than wars. The concept is generally defined by considering security threats such as organized crime, illegal trafficking of drugs,

¹⁶ John Pinder, "EU-Russia Partnership as a Pillar Building a Safe and Stable World System," in *The EU & Russia The Promise of Partnership*, John Pinder and Yuri Shishkov (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2002), 139.

¹⁷ Andrei Zagorski, "Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus," in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, ed. Roland Dannreuther (New York: Routledge Francis and Taylor Group, 2004), 83.

¹⁸ Andrei Zagorski, "Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus," in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, ed. Roland Dannreuther (New York: Routledge Francis and Taylor Group, 2004), 85.

infectious diseases, environmental problems, nuclear safety, types of international terrorism and illegal migration.

According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, the military and nuclear fears of the Cold War had made security restricted. Thus, the traditional position of security studies was revealed out at the end of the Cold War. The rise of economic and environmental issues in the 1970s and 1980s and transnational crime in the 1990s made of a new wider character to security studies¹⁹. Traditionalists argue state centrism in security issues. Furthermore, military conflicts are the main threat to state centrism. In that respect, non-military challenges do not block state's security. The types of security analysis argue that security challenges have been perceived at individual, societal and state level. International system, international sub-system, units, sub-units and individuals are the new actors of world stability and security²⁰.

Julian French-Lindley mentioned in her book that soft security was perceived as an alternative as non-military actions to hard security²¹. The definition is not wrong but weak to analyze soft security. Firstly, the reason why countries necessitate the concept of soft security needs to be discussed. After World War II., countries have realized that wars really damaged their people and resources. They needed to find out new ways and means to provide stability in their countries and also in the international arena.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998), 2.

²⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998), 6.

²¹ Julian French-Lindley, "The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century," in *Soft Security Threats and European Union*, Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 2.

Craig Stapley, Suzette Grillo and Stephen Sloan analyzed new dynamics of international security in their article²². Technological developments in each and every sector increased rapidly and as a result, it generated new weapons in the security sector. Furthermore, the emergence of television and satellite communication and highly global advances in the information technologies created a new security environment²³.

Military actions can be considered for using pressure on one country or on one group in short term but it cannot solve problems in the long term. Moreover, it is not possible to understand the roots of problems by ruling only from the military base. On the other hand, soft security enables understanding problems deeply and producing different solutions.

Another method to define soft security is to analyze soft security threats. They are non-military threats which were given more importance especially after the 1990s. Security was perceived more than simple military threats. The impact and scope of non-military threats on daily lives of people and integrity of states is more often observed rather than hard security threats. At this point, soft security threats give harm to individual and public in general more than hard security threats.

Soft security threats might decrease State's welfare in national and international politics. The authority and legitimacy of the State must provide stable and secure arena for its citizens. As for Russia case, its prestige in international arena is also affected due to its reputation as "problematic country". Russia's geographic position lead to perceive soft security threats from neighbouring countries. Russia must give priority to soft security matters, as these problems have caused loss of energy of the country. Since Russia had to struggle with those threats and it lost its money, time

²² Craig Stapley, Suzette Grillo and Stephen Sloan, "The Study of National Security Versus the Study of Cooperate Security: What Can They Learn Fron Each Other," in *The Handbook of Security*, ed. Martin Gill. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2006), 49.

²³ Craig Stapley, Suzette Grillo and Stephen Sloan, "The Study of National Security Versus the Study of Cooperate Security: What Can They Learn Fron Each Other," in *The Handbook of Security*, ed. Martin Gill. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2006), 49.

and could not concentrate on dealing with developments on technology or on humanity issues.

In the post-Soviet era, soft security became a considerable subject matter for people and the states. Furthermore, countries started to generate policies to fight against soft security threats. Russia has encountered several soft security threats after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, soft security perceived as an urgent subject matter for Putin era in 2000s. Additionally, international relations scholars have recently mentioned this subject matter in the literature. A few scholars are interested in Russia's position and developments concerning soft security issues. Thus, the thesis, contrary to mainstream argument, has given importance to soft security issues and Russia's developing soft security capacity.

1.4 Research Method

Soft security policy of Russia under Putin covers series of fields including political, economical and social structure of Russia. The concept of soft security does not have a long history in international relations; on the other hand the importance of the concept has been understood in the last twenty years. The thesis will focus on the Russian perception of soft security under Putin. In that respect, it is needed to understand Russian national security and also the characteristics of Putin. Moreover, the key soft security threats of Russia will help to understand how Russia fights against soft security threats. A wide archive needs to be considered to analyse all these points.

As part of the research and data collection, primary sources, library resources including books, academic journals, newspaper archives, reports prepared by trade organizations and business councils were reviewed. Additionally, internet resources such as online journals and books, online newspapers in English, Turkish and Russian and those of business councils, state departments and ministries, embassies, research centers were utilized to a great extent.

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is organized in six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction explaining the scope and objective, the argument and the research method of the thesis. The second chapter emphasizes the role of soft security in Russian national security. It mentions Russian national security doctrines and the place of soft security in the doctrines. In this respect, five national security doctrines; Russian Security Blueprint Concepts 2000, The May 2000 Russian Military Doctrine, Concept of the World in the 21st Century, Foreign Policy of Russia and Russia's Development Strategy to the year 2010 are emphasized. In this chapter, Russian soft security policies were deeply analysed with examples on the national security doctrines.

The third chapter analyses terrorism as a soft security threat for Russia which is organized under three sub-chapters. Russia and the new face of terrorism is the first sub-chapter in which new international terrorism especially after the September 11, types of terrorism, perception of Russia are analysed. After the September 11, the perception of terrorism has changed as countries have encountered asymmetric enemies. At this point, terrorism became a subject of soft security. The second part focuses on the Chechen problem of Russia and impact on Russian national security. And finally, third part of chapter three mentions Russia and the West cooperation against terrorism. In that respect, sub-headings of the third part analyses soft security precautions and Russian perception of international terrorist organisations.

Chapter four focuses on transnational organized crime as one of soft security threats to Russian security. After mentioning the significance of transnational organized crime in Russia, Russian state institutions related to transnational organized crime such as Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Federal Security Service of the Russia (FSB) and Tax police are analysed in depth. The last part examines Russia's strategies to fight against transnational organized crime at international level. In this scope, UN Conventions and European Union agreements related to transnational organized

crime, the basic point of transnational organized crime, money-laundering and illegal drugs are mentioned.

Chapter five focuses on energy security as one of soft security threats to Russia. In this chapter, firstly, perception of energy as a security issue in Russia is analysed with the sub-headings focusing on the importance of oil and natural gas in Russia. Following this part, the key subject of energy in the scope of security issue, significance of interdependency of countries and its reflections are mentioned. In this chapter, infrastructure security and pipelines, supply and demand security are also analysed deeply.

Chapter six provides the conclusion of the thesis. Taking into account the importance of the concept of soft security for Russia, it is argued that Russia manages to fight against key threats which are mentioned in the thesis with its soft security concerns.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF SOFT SECURITY IN RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

Russian National Security Doctrines are important to emphasize all policies of Russia as the doctrines highlight the priorities of Russian Government. Moreover, the development of the country can be understood by investigating the doctrines. On the other hand, the implications of doctrines are very important. Namely, it should reflect the reality of the country.

In general, there are four basic documents to analyze national security of Russia; Russian Security Blueprint Concepts 2000, Concept of the World in the 21st Century, Russia's Development Strategy to the year 2010 and Foreign Policy of Russia. In addition to that, Russian Security Concepts 1997 and The May 2000 Russian Military Doctrine have crucial importance to see the whole picture. Under those doctrines, hard and soft security issues are analyzed.

This chapter will examine the role of soft security concept in Russian national security between 2000-2008. In the first part, Russian national security doctrines and significance of soft security threats under the doctrines will be mentioned. In the second part, Russian relations with the world including official visits, bilateral agreements and key issues will be analysed. In this scope, soft security implementations will be focused on respectively.

2.1 Russian National Security Concept (2000)

According to Russian National Security Concept (2000) which was approved by Russia's Security Council on 5 October 1999, national security of Russia is a system of view explaining how to provide security of the individual, society and the State against external and internal threats in any aspect of life and activity in

Russia²⁴. It is composed of four parts; first part is about Russia in the World community, in the second part Russian security interest is analyzed, the third part is about threats to the Russia's national security and final part is about how Russia ensures the national security.

Putin's national security policy is more realistic and brief when compared to Yeltsin's. Furthermore, security becomes more important issue during Putin era. In order to understand Putin's contribution to Russian national security, National Security Concept 1997 and National Security Concept 2000 needs to be compared²⁵. The perception of the World in the eye of Russia has become more complex and in 2000, its position became stronger than 1997. Both 1997 and 2000 versions of the National Security Concept underline the importance of economic interests²⁶. Basically, Russia has re-recognized its geo-politics and economic importance in the World. In the framework of soft security, Russia has added their doctrines several updated information such as economy, environment and new non-military threats.

In the first part of the Russian National Security Concept 2000, the new world order as a multi-polar system which shares economy, politics, technology, science, environment and information were mentioned. In addition to that, international law is the basic point to build state relations. Nevertheless, military force and violence remain substantial aspects of international relations.

The Russian National Security Concept 2000 directly emphasizes domination of the West. Western countries believe that the new world order involved the leadership of their power, especially the U.S. Therefore, based on their military capacity, they want to govern the World using their own way and own interest.

²⁴ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008)

²⁵ Jakup M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997-2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security*, no.9/4 (2000): 83.

²⁶ Jakup M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997-2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security*, no.9/4 (2000): 86.

During Putin presidency, Russia's foreign policy turned out to be more active and aggressive²⁷. Following active policies in the region and in the World, Russia has connoted what kind of policy towards the U.S. to be pursued; decision on cooperation and peaceful relations in the international arena or ignoring the region and decrease the impact of NATO.

Putin trained as a KGB spy and the KGB had always seen the U.S. as an enemy. Putin could not completely ignore his training. However, he also recognizes the benefits of U.S. for Russia. Moreover, Putin explored the multi-polar alternatives to domination of the international system by the U.S.²⁸. Russia has recognized its geopolitical and historical importance in international arena. Russia wants to be integrated to the world economy and financial institutions and fight for the same interests such as international terrorism, regional conflicts, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, illegal trafficking of drugs, ecological problems, nuclear and radiation threats²⁹.

Furthermore, Russia minds World stability and mentions protecting the environment. For example; The Duma ratified the Kyoto Protocol which is an agreement concluded under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Countries which ratify the protocol promise to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases (GHG), or engage in emissions trading if they maintain or increase emissions of these greenhouse gases on 11 December 1997 by the 3rd Conference of the Parties, which met in Kyoto, and it entered into force on 16 February 2005. As of June 2008, 182 parties have ratified

²⁷ Tom Streissguth, *Vladimir Putin, Chapter Eight: Facing Down Terrorism* (Minneapolis; Lerner Publication Company, 2005), 89.

²⁸ Elle Akerman and Graeme P. Herd, "Russian Foreign Policy: the CIS and the Baltic States," in *Russian Politics under Putin* ed. Cameron Ross. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 278.

²⁹ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

the protocol. Putin approved the treaty on 4 November 2004 and Russia officially notified the United Nations of its ratification on 18 November 2004³⁰.

Some scholars have criticized Russia for not doing anything in practice. Environmental concerns are not among the top priorities in Russia. People are worried about unemployment, poverty, gap between rich and poor than environmental problems. Moreover, the Government does not take any actions to raise awareness on protecting the environment³¹.

Second part of national security concept is national interests; its national interests are to combine individual, public and the State at economic, politic, national and international levels. There are short-term and long-term interests which are tried to be reached. It is highlighted that national interests are secured by institutions of State authority.

At individual level, Russia needs to reach constitutional rights and freedoms, including living in a secure arena with high-quality life standard. Democracy, rule of law and social state are Russia's interests at public level. Furthermore, sovereignty and ensuring territorial integrity, political, economical and social stability are Russia's interests at State level. Russian national security interest is only reached by sustainable economic development. Military capacity and State authority are necessary for people's welfare and freedom.

The doctrine directly emphasizes Russia's position as a great power and one of the influential centres of multi-polar world. Another important national interest of Russia is using information. Modern telecommunications system is the right of public. However, State's information resources are needed to be protected from unauthorized access. Its military sphere and border policy are directly related with

³⁰ "Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification," UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

³¹ Alain Bernard, Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reilly, Marc Vielle and Laurent Viguier, *Russia's Role in The Kyoto Protocol*, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No.98 (Jun.2003):4, http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt98.pdf

its national interest. Russia has given importance to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, prevention of military aggressions against itself or its allies is necessary to ensure peaceful and democratic development of State.

Russia's national interests in border policy are composed of soft security applications; the establishment of political, legal, organizational and other conditions are the ways to ensure reliable protection of the state borders³². Russia has recognized non-military matters to solve security threats in long-term. In that respect, the doctrine strongly emphasizes Chechen problem. Russia needs to generate its soft security matters to focus on Chechen problem in depth. In practice, it is seen that hard security matters are more effective on that issue which will be mentioned in Chapter three.

The third part mentions Russia's internal and external threats. All these threats set a barrier against ensuring stable gross domestic product, investments and innovation. Agriculture and banking system, as two most important sectors, have to be protected from these threats. Russia recognizes the importance of raw material for their country and the world supply as well. In this scope, Russia's internal and external threats cause security problem for all countries. The doctrine explains this point as in the following;

The condition of the national economy and incomplete nature of the system and structure of the authorities of state and of society, social and political polarization of society and criminalization of social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism and a deterioration in intercommunal and international relations are all creating a broad range of internal and external threats to the country's security.³³

Russia has not given fair quarter to ethno-egoism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism, moreover uncontrolled migration promote nationalism, political and religious

³² "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

³³ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

extremism and ethno-separatism, and create a breeding ground for conflicts, organized crime and terrorism. Territorial integrity and CIS countries' situation are the basic points for perceiving national threat, considering Russia as the largest country in the World; spread on nearly 17,075,400 km²³⁴. In relation to this point it is stated;

The scale of terrorism and organized crime is growing because of the conflicts that frequently accompany changes of ownership and also an increased struggle for power along clan and ethnic or nationalist interests. The lack of an effective system in society for preventing legal infringements, inadequate legal and logistic support for the battle against organized crime and terrorism, legal nihilism and the departure of qualified personal from the law-enforcement agencies are all increasing the impact that this threat has on the individual, society and the state.³⁵

Russia has recognized the importance of reforms at state, society and individual levels. Furthermore, internal threats are derived from the relationship between the State and public. Problems can only be solved by means of strong communication and interaction. The doctrine shows that Russia started to give much more importance to soft security to ensure stability.

In the fourth part, ways and means of ensuring national interests of individual, society and state are mentioned. It is taken place for the targets in order to ensure national interests. The doctrine mentions several points;

to promptly detect and identify external and internal threats to national security;

to take short- and long-term action to avert and remove internal and external threats;

to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russia and the security of its border lands;

³⁴ Edwin Bacon and Matthew Wyman, *Contemporary Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),3.

³⁵ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

to improve the economy and pursue an independent and socially-oriented economic policy;

to overcome the Russia's scientific and technological dependence on external sources;

The doctrine included;

to ensure citizens' personal security and constitutional rights and freedoms in Russia;

to improve the system of state power in the Russia, the system of federal relations and local self-government and legislation; to create harmonious relations between communities, and to strengthen law and order and preserve socio-political stability in society;

to ensure unwavering compliance with Russia legislation by all citizens and officials, state bodies, political parties and public and religious organizations;

to ensure Russia's cooperation, especially with the world's leading countries, on equal and mutually advantageous terms;

to increase State's military potential and maintaining it at a sufficient level;³⁶.

Russia has given much more emphasis to economy in its doctrines. Economy is an important part of soft security. What is more, Russia realizes the strong impact of economy on every sector;

to pave the way for international integration of the Russian economy;

to expand markets for of Russian products;

to create a single economic domain with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.³⁸

Russia has focused on the State as the guarantor of the individual and the society. Moreover, it should strengthen the role of the State in every sector such as military

³⁶ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

³⁸ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

and economy. Therefore, it managed to protect rights of each of the different groups. In the doctrine, Russia's multi-national structure is emphasized. In addition to that the role of individual and their rights are accepted. Those subjects are evaluated through strengthening State authority³⁹.

The importance of Russian language is mentioned to show unity of the State. Federalism is a reality of Russia. However, in order to protect the federal structure, giving importance to central mechanisms is needed. Russia wants to play active role in the World. Therefore, international and regional organizations are very important under the scope of soft security issue. Russia's wish of being one of strong powers in the World by using soft security matters is emphasized.

Efforts to fight against internal and external threats have changed since the independence. Putin has emphasized consolidation between all branches and society. Two basic parts of the soft security implementations are preventing and solving problems with non-military matters. Furthermore, some problems and conflicts are asymmetric and needs different ways to struggle. In this respect, Russia needs to establish a comprehensive system to protect individual, society and the State. However, Russian national interest requires the presence of military power sufficient for its defence; Russia prefers political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military means.

2.2 Military Doctrine (2000)

Military Doctrine 2000, which was approved in February 2000 by the Russian Security Council, is a part of Russian National Security Concept 2000. Chechen conflict caused to generate military doctrine for Russia⁴⁰, since Russia has given importance to its territorial integrity on their national security interest and perceived oppositions towards the State as a threat.

³⁹ Osman Metin Öztürk, *Rusya Federasyonu Askeri Doktrini* (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2001), 24.

⁴⁰ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Rusya'nın Yeni Ulusal Güvenlik Konsepti ve Askeri Doktrini," *Avrasya Dosyası: Rusya Özel*, no.6/4 (2001): 99.

In post-Soviet era, Russia's military aim depends on its safeguarding. Furthermore, Russia tries to integrate peace-keeping activities for universal peace. Russia has continued to develop the necessary military infrastructure to protect its citizens from military threats. On the other hand, the aim of being a democratic country has found a place on its Military Doctrine 2000. The doctrine explains that with these sentences;

The Military Doctrine is a document for a transnational period- the period of the formation of democratic statehood and mixed economy, the transformation of the state's military organization and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations.⁴¹

Under military subject, it is beneficial to mention "Security Dilemma". Citizens would like to live peaceful arena but, wars are another reality of the World. Throughout the history, wars and security have been the basic subject. Therefore, up to today, although it changes form, weapons still remain as important assets for the States. It is possible that countries' security practices could be perceived as a threat by other countries. Therefore, military doctrines are crucial for state interests. On the other hand, states have encountered several problems which cannot be solved using military matters. Under this complex prevention system, states have to prepare multi-functional documents to ensure high security in their country. Both hard and soft security is the key policies to provide comprehensive security. In the future, it is argued that planning security policies will be based on less military security⁴².

The Military Doctrine 2000 is composed of internal and external threats of facing Russia. The aim of Russian military force is not to attack any country, but to safeguard Russia. Border instability, hostile information, discrimination of Russian citizens in any country, any extremist movement based on religion or ethnicity,

⁴¹ "Russian Military Doctrine," *Arms Control Association*, (May 2000) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200005/dc3ma00.asp?print> (accessed Dec.15, 2008)

⁴² Hüseyin Bağcı, *Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde Balkanlar (1991-1993)* (Ankara:Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1994), 4.

terrorism, illegal international trafficking are the threats for Russia⁴³. The main goal of Russian military doctrine;

The Russian Federation views the safeguarding of its military security within the context of building a democratic rule-of-law state, implementing socio-economic reform, asserting the principles of equal partnership, mutually advantageous cooperation and good-neighborliness in international relations, consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive international security system and preserving and strengthening universal peace.⁴⁴

Russia has participated in some major multilateral arms control agreements and treaties: Biological Weapons Convention signed in 1972, Chemical Weapons Convention signed in 1993, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1981 and Outer Space Treaty in 1967. Furthermore, it is the member of Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Supplier Group, International Atomic Energy Agency and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are some examples⁴⁵. Russia has regarded to mutual cooperation. The Russian Military Doctrine has strongly emphasized as follows;

Russia implements international military (military-political) and military technical cooperation on the basis of foreign policy and economic expediency and the missions of safeguarding the military security of the Russia and its allies, in accordance with federal legislation and the Russia's international treaties, on the basis principles of equal rights, mutual advantage and good-neighborliness and observing the interests of international stability and national, regional and global security.⁴⁶

There are several examples to show Russian effort to ensure regional and global stability in the World with bilateral or regional agreements. Firstly, Russia has built

⁴³ "Russian Military Doctrine," *Arms Control Association*, (May 2000) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200005/dc3ma00.asp?print> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

⁴⁴ "Russian Military Doctrine," *Arms Control Association*, (May 2000) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200005/dc3ma00.asp?print> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

⁴⁵ "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile:Russia," *Arms Control Association*, (Nov.2007) <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/russiaprofile.asp> (accessed Dec.12, 2008)

⁴⁶ "Russian Military Doctrine," *Arms Control Association*, (May 2000) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200005/dc3ma00.asp?print> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

regional cooperation and it also tries to play a more active role in the cooperative structures and systems. For example, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001 to stabilize the region with its six members, sixth member Uzbekistan included in the organization later and other members are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgysytan, Tajikistan as full member and India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran having observer status⁴⁷. It is an important organization to set Russian and Chinese relations in the region. The membership of the same military organization also provides peace and decrease the level of conflict in the region. Some authors have claimed that the aim of the organization was to reduce U.S. power in the region. For example; after 2005 Summit of SCO, Kyrgysytan and Uzbekistan asked the U.S. to vacate their military base. Putin gives much importance to SCO, he emphasized that SCO was not fighting terrorism but since it is in the economic zone SCO's aim and capacity needed to be developed in 2004⁴⁸ ..

Secondly, concerning the Black Sea region, Turkey and Russia have build partnership on military and non-military issues. Black Sea Economic Cooperation is beneficial to generate soft security issues in the region such as international terrorism, organized crime, energy, transformation and disaster management⁵⁰. Moreover, in hard security issue coastal states to Black Sea have generated military relations to secure the region. BLACKSEAFOR was established in 2001 in Istanbul in which Russia participated⁵¹.

Thirdly, Putin has emphasized the importance of Far Eastern countries in this sentence; "Give importance to Far East, otherwise 50 years then today you will start to speak Chinese, Japanese and Korean"⁵². The Shanghai Five was a border negotiation between Soviet Union and China. After independence, China and

⁴⁷ İlyas Kamalov, "Rusya'nın Orta Asya Politikası," *Stratejik Analiz Dergisi*, no.8/89 (2007): 88.

⁴⁸ "Putin Calls for Closer Cooperation of Shanghai Members," Gateway to Russia (2004), http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_243211.php (accessed Dec.23, 2008).

⁵⁰ Oktay Fırat Tanrısever, "Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Rusya'nın Karadeniz Politikası," *Avrasya Dosyası*, no.13/1 (2007): 185.

⁵¹ Oktay Fırat Tanrısever, "Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Rusya'nın Karadeniz Politikası," *Avrasya Dosyası*, no.13/1 (2007): 184.

⁵² İlyas Kamalov, Rusya'nın Asya-Pasifik Seferberliği, *Stratejik Analiz*, no.8/87 (2007):77.

Russia agreed to continue border negotiations with three newly independent Central Asian countries- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moreover, China, Russia and these three countries signed an agreement on confidence-building in the military sphere in the border areas in 1996. In 1997 they signed “The Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas”⁵³.

Military- Economic provision for military security is composed of several missions which are directly related to soft security policies. One of the main missions of military-economic provisions;

Russia implements international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation on the basis of its own national interests and the need to ensure the balanced performance of the missions of safeguarding military security. International military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation is the state’s prerogative.⁵⁴

For instance; stability in Afghanistan has vital importance for Russia. NATO Forces *ISAF* have struggled with Taliban militants. Extremist Islam is one of the threats for Russia. Therefore, Russia has supported NATO, moreover Russia provided intelligence and reconstruction aid nearly \$10 billion to *ISAF*⁵⁵. Nevertheless it has pursued deliberate policy towards NATO.

2.3 Concept of the World in the 21st Century

After dissolution of the Soviet Union, successor states have encountered transition process in every area of their life and state ruling. Concept of the World in the 21st Century which was approved by presidential decree no.1300 of 17 December 1999 shows the Russian perception of the new world system. Furthermore, new threats impend national security policy of all countries. New threats in soft security issue

⁵³ Richard W.X., Hu, “China’s Central Asian Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” in *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, ed. Boris Rumer. (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2005), 135.

⁵⁴ “Russian Military Doctrine,” *Arms Control Association*, (May 2000) <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200005/dc3ma00.asp?print> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

⁵⁵ Mark John, “Russia Pledges more NATO Help in Afghanistan,” Reuters Foundation Alert Net, (Feb.9, 2007) <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L09628915.htm> (accessed Dec.26, 2008).

can be assessed. The Concept of the World in 21st Century explains new system and new threats which all countries have encountered;

With globalization, international security is becoming increasingly indivisible. In this context, a political structure of the world order should meet the requirements of its practical implementation. It is important that all states be equally protected against modern risks and threats and bear common responsibility for their elimination. Thus, the world community faces to imperative of establishing a cooperative mechanism to manage the globalization process.⁵⁶

The Cold War period became a scene of the Soviet and the U.S. power rivalry. In the multi-polar world, starting with second half of 20th Century, countries have encountered different actors such as states, unions, NGOs and international organizations. Now, the mediator of states is shown the United Nations and also it is responsible for global security and stability⁵⁷. In the article, Russia has focused common movement on common problems such as international terrorism. Russia is one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It tries to affect the decision process of U.N. In the article, Russia has emphasized the United Nations with these words;

A special role in this process is assigned to the United Nations which is the single universal mechanism to maintain international peace and security. The UN Charter serves as a foundation of the concept of a world in the 21st Century....it is also important not only to preserve the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace but to reinforce its control over emergence and management of conflict situations.⁵⁸

Interdependency of countries has determined relation between each other. Protecting country is the basic interest of any states, but in today's world; countries have decreased the possibility of struggles, especially on nuclear crisis. However, the new world has produced new types of threats which are important for states

⁵⁶ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21th Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

⁵⁷ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21th Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

⁵⁸ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21th Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

individually or globally. Russia believed that regional actors are always more effective to solve problems and wants to take responsibility pursuing global and regional stability. It is mentioned these threats under soft and hard security matters;

The extent of threats capable of destroying international security, plunging the world into a state of chaos and instability remains considerable. These threats include the danger of proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts whose numbers keep growing; the danger of a new spiral of the arms race on a higher technological and information basis; the widening gap between rich and poor countries; organized crime and international terrorism; illicit traffic of drugs; vulnerability of the natural systems, environment, etc.⁵⁹

Russia has mentioned multi-polarity of the world. Therefore, it can create collective defence against global threats. Considering Russian national security priorities; it is extremely important to increase globalization of world economy by creating interdependency. It increases the role of regional organizations, prevention of interventions which threaten the sovereignty of states. Russia has given importance to demilitarization and interdependency which are the basic points of soft security;

Demilitarization of international relations is also major political issue. Limitation of, reduction in and control over arms and armed forces constitute a material prerequisite for assuring security of States....Increasing interdependence and inter-penetration of economies and financial systems significantly reduce the risk of a large-scale military confrontation or local armed conflicts. The importance of economic and non-military dimensions of international and national security and stability is growing. This creates vital preconditions for further steps to be taken in the disarmament area.⁶⁰

Energy security policy is Russia's one of way to ensure interdependency and inter-penetration of economies and financial systems. For example; Russia and Turkey are competitors and also strong partners not only in the region but also in the World. Today as for the natural gas, Turkey who accommodates 60% of natural gas from

⁵⁹ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21th Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

⁶⁰ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21th Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

Russia is dependent on Russia in natural gas sector⁶¹. Another example; Russia has tried to build economic partnership with Pakistan on energy issue. Gazprom wants Pakistan to be included in the Iran-Pakistan and India pipeline⁶². Furthermore, Russia is not a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam as other member countries. In 2005, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signed a cooperation agreement with ASEAN countries on politics and economics for the 2005 - 2015 period. The agreement covers bilateral cooperation in the areas of small and medium sized enterprises, energy, technology, tourism, communication, environment protection and disaster management⁶³.

Future plans of states give people confidence as it provides to show continuity of their life at the same security level. In that way, states offer a prospect to their citizens who believe in their states. Russia's versatile relations with the World show the wish of being powerful country in the World with its soft security matters⁶⁴.

⁶¹ Sinan Oğan, "Mavi Akım Projesi: Bir Enerji Stratejisi ve Stratejisizliği Örneği," *Stradigma Aylık Strateji ve Analiz e-dergisi*, no.7 (August 2003): 6. <http://www.pete.metu.edu.tr/PETE/emre/photogallery/Mavi.pdf>

⁶² İlyas Kamalov, "Rusya'nın Asya-Pasifik Seferberliği," *Stratejik Analiz*, no.8/87 (2007): 83.

⁶³ "LEAD: Russia, ASEAN Deepen Ties by Signing Cooperation Agreement," *BNET Business Network*, (Dec.12, 2005) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2005_Dec_12/ai_n15957109 (accessed Dec.27, 2008).

⁶⁴ "Russia -Concept of the World in the 21st Century," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concpt21.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

2.4 The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia (2000)

The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia was approved by Putin on 28 June 2000. In Putin era, Russia has followed more confident and powerful foreign policy compared to emotional and knee-jerk foreign policy under Yeltsin⁶⁵. He pursued active foreign relations with other countries during his presidency until 2008. His activeness can be observed by looking at the document.

Russia's top priority on the foreign policy is to protect the interests of the individual and the society. Furthermore, it has main objectives on;

Ensuring reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russia as a great power, as one of the most influential centers of the modern world, and which are necessary for the growth of its political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential;

Other objectives are;

To influence general world processes with the aim of forming a stable, just and democratic world order, built on generally recognized norms of international law, including, first of all, the goals and principles in the U.N. Charter, on equitable and partnership relations among states;

To create favorable external conditions for steady development of Russia, for improving its economy, enhancing the standards of living of the population, successfully carrying out democratic transformations, strengthening the basis of the constitutional system and observing individual rights and freedoms;

To form a good-neighbor belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders, to promote elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russia;

⁶⁵ Edwin Bacon and Matthew Wyman, *Contemporary Russia*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 167.

The article also added that;

To seek concord and coinciding interests with foreign countries and interstate associations in the process of resolving the tasks that are determined by the national priorities of Russia, and on this basis, to build a system of partnership and allied relations that improve the conditions and parameters of international cooperation;

To uphold in every possible way the rights and interests of Russian citizens and fellow countrymen abroad; and

To promote a positive perception of the Russia in the world, to popularize the Russian language and culture of the peoples of Russia in foreign states.⁶⁶

The second part of the article mentions foreign relations of Russia in the scope of national security policy. Russia has assessed new world order and new threats in the article again. Russia has given much more importance to economic relations and recognized its crucial natural resources and international trade is the way to transfer its resources to the World, especially neighbouring countries and regions such as Europe, Far East. It is explained in the article this priority;

The main priority in the foreign policy of the Russia in international economic relations is to promote the development of the national economy, which, in conditions of globalization, is unthinkable without broad integration of Russia in the system of world economic ties.⁶⁷

Today, hard security issue plays an important role in all states' national security and foreign policy concepts. In addition to that, soft security threats gain importance in the framework of new global threats and non-military ways to fight against them. The article directly discusses soft security threats. The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as illegal trafficking of drugs and weapons begin to threaten global and regional stability⁶⁸.

⁶⁶ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

⁶⁷ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec. 05, 2008).

⁶⁸ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

On the other hand, there is no influence on human trafficking as a soft security threat in the article. It is known as modern day slavery, human trafficking is one of crucial problems of Russia. It includes smuggling, sexual exploitation and forced labor. According to the U.S. Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report 2008, Russia is a source, transit and destination of men, women and children trafficking. In the Report, it is criticized that Russia did not fulfil minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking⁶⁹.

The third part of the article emphasizes the priorities of Russia in solving problems. In that respect, Russia's relation with other countries has a great place to balance politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means of subjects. Putin's strategy is different from Yeltsin as it is seen in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia in 2000. Russia has turned its face not only one side, it also adopts a policy to look all over the World, tries to communicate neighbouring and far countries to introduce itself as a strong country.

Russia has highlighted the UN and its Security Council role to ensure stable system of international relations. Russia is the permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of the members of the Group of 8 of the major industrialized states. Moreover, Russia stresses the importance to build good-neighborly relations and strategic partnerships. Firstly, Russia endeavours to set relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);

Practical relations with each of them should be structured with due regard for reciprocal openness to cooperation and readiness to take into account in a due manner the interests of the Russia, including in terms of guarantees of rights of Russian compatriots....to joint efforts toward settling conflicts in CIS member states and to the development of cooperation in the military-political area and the sphere of security⁷⁰

⁶⁹ "Trafficking in Persons Report 2008- Russia," *United States Department of State*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,RUS,4562d8b62,484f9a3830,0.html> (accessed Mar, 26, 2009).

⁷⁰ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

European states are Russia's traditional foreign policy priority. In that respect, Europe is another reason for Russian willingness to generate soft security policies. Europe is one of the regions who use soft security matters in its system. Moreover, integration of this system is historical aim of Russia;

The main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation. Russia is interested in the further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will make efforts in this direction.⁷¹

NATO is another important partner of Russia to ensure regional stability with constructive interaction. Russia and NATO have dealt with some soft security issues such as environmental protection especially considering the Black Sea, nuclear safety and fight against cross-border crime. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia involves areas of consultation and cooperation, nuclear safety issues, developing on economics, environmental and scientific fields⁷².

Russia desires to develop good relations with the Baltic countries; Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Three main soft security threats identified for the Baltic countries; nuclear safety, infectious diseases, illegal migration and cross-border crime⁷³. Pursiainen, Haavisto and Lomagin regarded those soft security threats for European countries. According to the article, Russian-American interaction is the necessary condition for the amelioration of the international situation and achievement of global strategic stability⁷⁴. Although, Russia and the U.S. have not developed cooperation about the soft security issues, they have encountered on the UN Security Council for international issues and some specific regional cooperation.

⁷¹ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

⁷² Christer Pursiainen, Cooperation with Pekka Haavisto and Nikita Lomagin, *Soft Security Problems in Northwest Russia and their Implications for the Outside World*, (UPI Working Paper, 2001),29.

⁷³ Christer Pursiainen, Cooperation with Pekka Haavisto and Nikita Lomagin, *Soft Security Problems in Northwest Russia and their Implications for the Outside World*, (UPI Working Paper, 2001), 3.

⁷⁴ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008).

They agree on fighting against counter-terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security.

Developing relations with Asia is the important part of Russian foreign policy. Building cooperation with bilateral and regional agreements and organizations are the ways to build stable and peaceful soft security relations. Non-proliferation, countering criminal trafficking, the campaign against religious extremism and transnational terrorism, limiting conventional arms racing and addressing ecological disasters are soft security concerns of Russia in Central Asia⁷⁵. Furthermore, China and India are fundamental partners of Russia. Russia wants to establish economic ties with China.

Different from Yeltsin period, Putin wants to play role on subject matters concerning Middle East and Africa as one of the World's strongest countries as it is directly related with the World stability and economic opportunities. The article is the evidence of Russian wishes to be one of influential countries in the world with its both hard and soft security policies.

2.5 Russia's Development Strategy to the Year 2010

The main aim of the Russia's Development Strategy to the Year 2010 which was approved by Putin on 28 June 2000 is;

The aim of the strategy is to qualitatively raise living standards on the basis of the self-fulfillment of every citizen, to preserve Russia's independence and cultural values, to restore the country's economic and political role in the world community. It is impossible to achieve these aims without the fullest emancipation of society, this making it possible to tap its internal sources of development. An optimistic perception of the world should prevail in the country and the almost totally lost trust between citizens and the state as well as between citizens and business should be restored.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Threat Perception and Strategic Posture," *Strategic Studies Institute* (Nov.2007):17, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB829.pdf>

⁷⁶ "Russia's Development Strategy to the Year 2010," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/strategy2010.html> (accessed Dec.5, 2008).

Russia's Development Strategy to the year 2010 is the important document for soft security; this medium-term strategy is today short-term strategy and only one year is remained to be realized. In Russian Economic Report in November 2007, developments on some sectors such as construction, retail trade and manufacturing are noticed⁷⁷. In addition to economic sectors, Russia allocates funds for social policies like education and public health. For example; in Russia, budget subsidies are reduced for commodity and service producers such as housing, transportation, communication. The article has crucial importance for development in every area of Russia. Moreover, it will have reflections on soft security practices. An effective state and civil society is another part of the article;

The role of the state in civil society is to guarantee its external and internal security and the stability of the institutional environment, to ensure predictability for the activities of economic agents. The effectiveness of the state in fulfilling that role consists not only in setting clear-cut goals and assessing the possibilities of achieving them at the lowest cost, but in the degree of "approval" of these goals by society and consequently the degree of confidence in government.

It has already seen the implementations for them; Russia has deficiencies in basic social issues. For instance; the main and direct policy towards civil society of Putin, Civic Forum in 2001 who announced that in Moscow for 5000 representatives of NGOs. Evans mentioned in his book;

Civil society organizations throughout Russia into a single corporatist body to allow consultative role in government. In other words, social organizations would sacrifice their independence to represent institutionally. NGOs refused the offer. His vision about civil society is pseudo-civil society in which social organ are subordinated of state authority.⁷⁸

Civil society is an important part of soft security policy of all countries. Russia has a great deficiency in this point. Russia has given much more importance to state

⁷⁷ "Russian Economic Report November 2007," *World Bank Official Web Site*, (2007):3, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/RER15_Eng.pdf (accessed Dec.20, 2008)

⁷⁸ Alfred Jr. Evans, "A Russian Civil Society," in *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, eds. Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 109.

apparatus in order to build strong soft security. The article is based on economy and internal policy of the State. The last part of the article, it is mentioned that the strategy does not rule out an even more dynamic development of the country in the period till 2010⁷⁹. Russia has optimistic policy, but on the other hand, the article claims that it is ready for pessimistic results. It does not directly emphasize soft security threats and state implementations against them.

Russian National Security Concept-2000 and The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia indicate Russian security threats. Respecting international law, Russia follows more active foreign policy to introduce itself to the world again. After the Cold War, the U.S. has become the only superpower in the world. Today, bipolar international system has changed multiplicity after the participation of China, EU and Russia as powers in international arena. Putin prefers pragmatic foreign policy and realistic appreciation of the limitations on Russian military power⁸⁰. Thus, Russia controls its ability to build soft security matters in its national security.

To sum up, Chapter two focused on Russian soft security practices respectively. In order to understand key factors of Russian perception of soft security, Russian national security doctrines were mentioned. Moreover, Russian communication with the World was analysed under that perspective. The next chapter will be focusing on terrorism which is one of the key soft security threats of Russia.

⁷⁹ "Russia's Development Strategy to the Year 2010," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/strategy2010.html> (accessed Dec.5, 2008).

⁸⁰ Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Russian Concepts of National Security," in *Russian Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century and The Shadow Of The Past*, ed. Robert Legvold, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 329.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM AS A SOFT SECURITY THREAT TO RUSSIAN SECURITY

Terrorism is the reality of political science and international relations. Countries have encountered terrorism as internal or external threat throughout their history. The September 11 event in 2001 was the turning point of perceiving terrorism in international system. It was seen that hard security precautions were not enough at the state level.

This chapter will analyse terrorism as a soft security threat which Russia has encountered. After the introductory part of terrorism especially after the September 11, 2001, types of terrorism and new perceptions and Russia's experiences will be analysed. The second part will focus on the Chechen problem and its impact on Russian national security. Soft security precautions of Russia and Western countries and Russian perception of international terrorist organisations will be analysed in the third part.

3.1 Russia and the New Face of International Terrorism

For many years the UN has been interested in the concept of terrorism. Starting from 1963 till 1999, the universal conventions and protocols against terrorism are related with a few issues on terrorism. Those 13 universal legal instruments and three amendments signed to prevent terrorist acts. The September 11, 2001 was turning point of the perception of international terrorism. After 2001, UN has put much more importance to the subject. The Security Council adopted resolution 1373(2001) on 28 September 2001 and declared;

"...acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations". It called upon Member States to "become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols" and "to increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and

protocol".⁸¹ In 2005, the Security Council developed "Counter-Terrorism Committee" to monitor the implementations of resolutions by all states.

The General Assembly approved an expanded programme of activities for the UNODC Terrorism Prevention branch. The United Nations adopted Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 to provide technical assistance to all countries about terrorism.

The UN is interested in soft security issues highly; there are many conventions and in-depth analyses about the issue. On the other hand, countries generally prefer to imply the convention if they ratified. The UN has not any sanction towards states, only uses psychological pressure on them about the international system and its obligations. When real implementations of the convention are considered, it appears that there are many deficiencies.

Russia has involved in the UN conventions and shared the same wishes to fight against several extremist activities such as uncontrolled migration promote nationalism, political and religious extremism and ethnoseparatism, and create a breeding ground for conflicts, organized crime and terrorism⁸². The definition of terrorism in Russian law passed in 1998;

Violence or the threat of violence against individual or organizations, and also the destruction (damaging) of or threat to destroy (damage) property or other material objects...implemented with a view to violating public security, intimidating the population or influencing the adoption of decisions advantageous to terrorists by governing authorities or satisfying their unlawful material and (or) other interests.⁸³

National accord, and territorial integrity, unity of legal domain and law and order are the basic goals. Russia needs to build equal and equitable relations with other

⁸¹ "Global Action against Terrorism," UNODC, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/global-action-against-terrorism.html> (accessed Jan.11, 2009).

⁸² "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008)

⁸³ "On the Fight against Terrorism," *The Russian Intelligence-Related Documents*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm (accessed Dec.03, 2008).

countries⁸⁴. Russia has recognized the importance of international support on solving problems even if they are internal. It does not mean that Russia has let interference in its politics; but it provides political power in international arena with perceiving Chechens as problematic issue.

Terrorism is perceived as threat for many countries especially Western countries that have produced various strategies to combat terrorists. Countries' military capacities, geo-strategic conditions, economies, and technologic developments are different aspects of their national strategy. Techniques and strategies have changed in time. There are many different points of views and perceptions on this matter and therefore is it hard to categorize terrorism as a concept.

According to Bal, terrorism is a strategic expression and terror is a strategic action. Terrorism is supported by people who believe in their actions which lead to coordinated and planned bloody actions. Under this definition terror is an action so as to kill civil and policemen⁸⁵. The important question is that is it possible to think that terrorism as an ideology. According to Crenshaw, terrorism is considered as a facet of secular modern politics, principally associated with the rise of nationalism, anarchism and revolutionary socialism⁸⁶.

According to O'Kane, terrorism is not a political ideology like Nazism, communism, fascism, anarchism, liberalism or conservatism as these ideologies logically imply distinctive sets of ideas which involve critical assessment of other political ideas and realities together with alternative proposals on preferred political system and society⁸⁷ and terrorism is not limited with any ideology.

⁸⁴ "Foreign Policy Concept of Russia," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/concept.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008)

⁸⁵ İhsan Bal, "Terör Nedir, Neden Terörist Olunur?," in *Terörizm: Terör, Terörizm ve Küresel Terörle Mücadelede Ulusal ve Bölgesel Deneyimler*, ed. İhsan Bal. (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2006), 8.

⁸⁶ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism" in *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristic, Causes, Control*, ed. Charles W. Kegley. (Harlow: Pearson Education, Inc., 2003), 93.

⁸⁷ Rosemary H.T. O'Kane, *Terrorism* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 27.

Terrorism is a deadlock where politics finishes. On the other hand, it is an element of politics. The September 11 incident was the turning point of definition of terrorism perceived as a global threat. Until that time, it can be seen a various type of terrorism also which came from state, any radical movements against state and ethnical or any kind of antagonism have emanated.

The thesis is related with new global terrorism in the 21st century especially changing the strategy of fight against terrorism after the September 11 incident. The most important turning point in the 21st century is the September 11 which led to start of a new global era for terrorists.

21st Century is composed of several improvements for all countries. Developing communication skills in every stratum have both advantages and disadvantages. At the beginning of the century, the concept of Globalization was highly used to introduce new international system. Now, people can reach everything through the internet. Ironically, it gives more freedom but at the same time it steals their freedom. Everything can be learnt on internet including how to produce a bomb. Moreover, today, people can go where they want, high-tech airplanes not only provide advantage to people but also it helps easy and rapid transfer of money and property to other countries. More chance is given to capitalism in this new system⁸⁸. However, it causes a negative implication such as the huge gap between rich and poor. Economy is another reason of terrorism. Although terrorism targets civilians, the real enemies are not these people. According to terrorist point of view, States are the enemies and guilty as terrorists are generally poor and debauched from new economic system.

In retrospect, terrorism identified at least six categories; nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, left-wing, right-wing and anarchist⁸⁹. Nationalist terrorist who wishes

⁸⁸ Christopher W. Hughes, "Reflections on Globalization, Security and 9/11," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, no.15/3 (2002): 425.

⁸⁹ Information from the Council on Foreign Relations "Types of Terrorism" in *Terrorism*, ed. Craig Donnellan, (Cambridge: Independence, Educational Publishers, 2005), 2.

getting separated from state in order to establish its own national state has gained the most sympathy on international arena. Chechen separatist movement in Russia, Basque Party in Spain and Kurdistan Worker's Party in Turkey are the best example of nationalist terrorists. They have generally confused with freedom fighter or it can be said that they introduce themselves as freedom fighters in international arena. However, in reality terrorist and freedom fighter are different from each other. Freedom fighters struggle in order to gain their reasonable rights. National Liberation Front in Palestine tried to protect its own land from Israel. However, nationalist terrorists are as a threat for State's territorial integrity.

Second type of terrorism is religious. Religious terrorists believe that this is our holy aim and mission to live the world. Some of them think about they are "the chosen ones" and they are member of radical Islamic groups. Religion is both holy idea and dangerous weapon by brain washing as it addresses directly people's feelings. All mono-theistic religions have hierarchical structure and people believe to reverends as it is like a rule. When holy books such as the Pentateuch, the Bible and the Koran are considered, it is understood that they can be changed according to whoever interprets it and this is reason why religions have different sects.

Today, religious terrorism is part of international system. Al-Qaeda is the most popular one of religious terrorist groups. Islam is perceived as one of threat for Russia since the beginning of the State. It's huge territory and multi-cultural minorities are handicaps for Russia's stability and security. Furthermore, Chechen rebels are influenced from global terrorist activities. It is claimed that, Chechen rebels have been trained by Al-Qaeda militants. Al-Qaeda and Chechen rebels are synchronized ideologically and strategically. Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) killed Shamil Basayev who is known Chechen terrorist leader and Al-Qaeda commander in 2006. Furthermore, Basayev was claimed to be responsible for Beslan massacre in 2004⁹⁰.

⁹⁰ "Chechen Terrorist Shamil Basayev Killed by Russian FSB," *The Long War Journal*, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/07/chechen_terrorist_sh.php (accessed Mar.31, 2009).

Third one is state-sponsored terrorists. Some radical states supported terrorist movements in the world. Those states are generally used that people for own aim; in order to show hostility of big powers. Muammar al-Gaddafi, the president of Libya, and Mahmud Ahmedinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, are announced as radical states by Western countries. It is thought that al-Gaddafi and Ahmedinejad have helped terrorist groups. Moreover, those countries perceived as a threat for the world security. For instance; Iran's nuclear energy developments have created a fear on Western countries⁹¹.

Fourth and fifth types of terrorism are left and right wing. Narodnaya Volya was the first left-wing terrorist organization at the beginning of the Soviet Union. After collapse of the Soviet Union, socialist ideology has decreased in international politics. Moreover, it transform to other categories.

Same point of view is valid to right-wing terrorism. Now, they are turned out to be mostly religious terrorists. In retrospect, Nazi Party was the best example to show right wing extremists. Today, racist movement belongs to right wing terrorist. According to BCC news, between January and November in 2000, 13.753 right wing, xenophobic and anti-Semitic crimes were carried out⁹². The last one is anarchists; actually not all anarchists are terrorists. It is different from support as an ideology of anarchism and using as material of anarchism.

September 11, 2001 was the turning point of international terrorism. Russia has had formidable opportunity to vindicate his conception of security threats redefining global terrorism⁹³. The perception of common threat becomes closer to Russia and Western countries. Actually, there is any attack towards Russia from Al-Qaeda.

⁹¹ Massimo Calabresi, "Iran's Nuclear Threat," *Time World*, (Mar.8, 2003) <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,430649,00.html> (accessed Dec.03.2008).

⁹² "German Racist Attacks Soar," *BCC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1159888.stm> (accessed Dec.3, 2008)

⁹³ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russian's Foreign Policy, Change and Continuity in National Identity*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006),129.

However, Russia has tried to include Chechen war under the subject. Also Islam is misperceived by many countries in the world.

Traditionally, terrorism used conventional weapons such as guns, explosives and knives. New developments in the field of natural sciences are also dangerous. In the field of physics, biology and chemistry, scientists can generate new methods for illnesses and diseases. Moreover, war technology has utilized from that. Obviously, terrorists do not ignore the power of those scientific innovations which leads to three main types of terrorism; nuclear, biological and chemical.

According to Zalman's definition, "Nuclear terrorism" refers to a number of different ways that nuclear materials might be exploited as a terrorist tactic"⁹⁴. It is divided into two parts; state terrorism of nuclear energy and nuclear energy using by terrorists. Nuclear energy is a part of military services of countries, because, nation-states have not struggled so many conventional weapons until World War II. This is the new way of war in the World⁹⁵. Japanese people encountered terrific atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki which send by the U.S. Another catastrophic event was from Ukraine SSR in 1982, 1986 and 1991.

Second one is terrorist used nuclear energy for their aims. They have capacity to dispose of nuclear energy stations. Another devastating possibility is as dangerous as first one; if terrorists have nuclear weapons⁹⁶.

Bioterrorism is not a new, but today it is limited of poisons for assassinations; bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria and other germs causing illnesses or death in people, animals and plants⁹⁷. The Convention on the

⁹⁴ Amy Zalman, "Terrorists can bomb, buy or build using nuclear materials," *About.com Terrorism Issues* <http://terrorism.about.com/od/n/a/NuclearTerror.htm> (accessed Dec.3.2008).

⁹⁵ "Hiroşima ve Nagazaki: İnsanın Kaybettiği An," *Atlas*, no.108 (Mart 2002), <http://www.kesfetmekicinbak.com/kultur/tarih/01080/> (accessed Dec.4, 2008).

⁹⁶ Friedrich Steinhausler, "What It Takes to Become a Nuclear Terrorist," in *The New Era of Terrorism, Selected Readings*, ed. Gus Martin, (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 130.

⁹⁷"Bioterrorism Overview," *The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention*, <http://emergency.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp> (accessed Dec.3.2008).

Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1972 was the first agreement in this field and 162 states signed the convention⁹⁸. Russia has ratified the convention in 1975, during the Soviet era.

Chemical terrorism is considered as a type of bioterrorism. Chemicals are used in warfare by military organizations. Results of chemical agents are painfully fatal. It is derived from biological agent and use as poison. During the Putin era, Russia has encountered nuclear, biological and chemical threats. For instance, in April 2000 the Dagestani Interior Ministry claimed that Russian Special Forces worried about possessing four container of biological agent anthrax of Chechen rebels. And Chechen rebels threatened to attack nuclear facilities in Russia⁹⁹.

Women terrorism is not a new concept, but scholars do not give much importance to this subject as it is not much disseminated; women participation in terrorist groups was seen in Sri Lanka, Iran, West Germany, Italy and Japan and Turkey historically¹⁰⁰. The reason of why women use in terrorist attack is that their sensitive and fragile image in history. Women have participated in terrorist organizations for personal or ideological reasons just like men. As women are not thought to give harm to another person or nature, they are selected and preferred much more than men during terrorist attacks. When they prepared to go target, they can easily cover the bombs or such as material on their body. For instance; a series of subway bombings and the downing of two passenger airlines were conspired by Chechen women suicide bombers in August 2004¹⁰¹.

⁹⁸ "The Biological Weapons Convention," *TheUN*, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument) (accessed Dec.3, 2008).

⁹⁹ Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Globalization, 'New Wars' and the War in Chechnya," in *Chechnya: From Past to Future* ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 214.

¹⁰⁰ Karla J. Cunningham, "Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism," in *The New Era of Terrorism, Selected Readings*, ed. Gus Martin (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 90.

¹⁰¹ Sharyl Cross, "U.S./NATO-Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Toward Building a Comprehensive Strategy," *Quarterly Journal*, no.5/3 (2006):3

Moreover, public opinion considers women as victims of violence including terrorism. This is the reason why Al-Qaeda selects women as suicide bombers. Women are also taking place on central committees of terrorist organizations; Shigenobu Fusako, Founder and Leader of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Ulrike Meinroff was the member of the West German Baader-Meinhof Gang, Ashraf Rabi was Iranian terrorists¹⁰². Women are more active in the leftist organizations.

Global communication system enables to open information of states. Terrorist organizations have exploited communication system, information and funds. According to Arquilla and Ronfelt, there are two alternative model to Islamic terror; netwars and networks. The information revolution reflects the advance of computerized information communication technologies and related innovations¹⁰³. Terrorist attacks to communication and information system is easy to implement. Thus, Al-Qaeda generally prefers that method in those years¹⁰⁴.

Cyber terrorism is not so effective that other kind of terrorism considering world statistics. However, those people who have internet are generally wealthy people and they use internet not only communicate with friends or send e-mail but also use internet banking to transfer their money. Effecting from cyber terrorist attacks do not necessary using internet directly.

The FBI defined cyber terrorism; “The premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result

¹⁰² Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” in *The New Era of Terrorism, Selected Readings*, ed. Gus Martin (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 91.

¹⁰³ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming,” *Comparative Strategy*, no.12/2 (1993): 143.

¹⁰⁴ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 220.

in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."¹⁰⁵

Cyber terrorists aim to horrify people or states. In that way, they have created chaos. They can open wrapping of dams, terrorize military communication system and send misleading messages, control all traffic lights in the city, break telecommunication apparatus, oil and natural gas system, collapse of banking and financing sectors¹⁰⁶. Furthermore, Russia worries about terrorist attacks on their internal and external communication and information networks. The FSB has implied number of tools in order to protect Russian security. On the other hand, these limitations have blocked citizen's freedom of speech and access to information. Russia has built regional and global partnerships with CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the SCO governments as a part of anti-terrorism agreements¹⁰⁷. According to Hartelius, narco-terrorism has two main usages; drug gangs have used the methods of terrorists in order to block legal limitation on their operations, second one is terrorist organization in drug trafficking in order to finance their organizations, Narco-Funded terrorism¹⁰⁸.

The United Nations signed several treaties about the subject; the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, the Convention on Psychotropic Substance in 1971 and Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance in 1988 in order to be used narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance for medical and scientific purposes¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁵ Mudawi Mukhtar Elmusharaf, "Cyber Terrorism :The New Kind of Terrorism," Computer Crime Research Center, http://www.crime-research.org/articles/Cyber_Terrorism_new_kind_Terrorism/ (accessed Dec.4, 2008).

¹⁰⁶ Robert Lemos, "What Are The Real Risks Of Cyber Terrorism," *ZDNet*, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-124765.html (accessed Dec.04, 2008).

¹⁰⁷ Richard Weitz, "Citing Cyber-Terrorism Threat, Russia Explores Internet Controls," *Hudson Institute*, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5205 (accessed Dec.07, 2008).

¹⁰⁸ Jonas Hartelius, *Narcoterrorism* (Sweden: Langenskiöld Publishing Company, 2008):1, <http://www.ewi.info/pdf/Narcoterrorism%20FINAL13FEB.pdf>

¹⁰⁹ "UNODC Treaties," *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html> (accessed Dec. 04, 2008).

3.2 Chechnya as a Threat against Russian Security

Russian National Security Concept-2000 has identified threats clearly in previous pages of the thesis. As it is seen in the document, Russia has emphasized strongly its territorial integrity. In this respect, Chechnya is the basic problem of Russian national security

In early September 2004, school children in the North Ossetian town of Beslan and parent's encountered terrible terrorist attack at the first day of the academic year nearly 300 adult and children were killed¹¹⁰. Chechen terrorist leader Samil Basayev, who is estimated ties to Osama bin Laden, has claimed responsibility for several recent terrorist attacks in Russia including school attack in Beslan¹¹¹. In that period, Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov seriously warned terrorists and refused bargaining with them. Putin included this attack are not only against Russia, also against international security¹¹².

In retrospect, Chechen problem emerged during the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev era after 1985. *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* were the reforms which acceptance of the new world order as unipolarity of international system under the leadership of the U.S. until 2000s. Moreover, when it was looked at the framework of other nationalities that lived in the Soviet territory, *Glasnost* which means openness perceived as a chance to show their needs and wishes from the Soviets becoming independent¹¹³.

¹¹⁰ Edwin Bacon, Bettina Renz and Julian Cooper, *Securitising Russia, The Domestic Politics of Putin*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 3.

¹¹¹ Jill Dougherty, "Chechen 'Claims Beslan Attack'" *CNN*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/09/17/russia.beslan/index.html> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

¹¹² "Russia Considers Terror Strikes," *CNN*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/09/17/russia.utin.index.html> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

¹¹³ Bülent Gökay, "Şeyh Şamil Anti-Emperyalist Bir Kahraman mı, Yoksa Karşı-Devrimci Bir Yobaz Mıydı?," in *Çeçenistan Yok Sayılan Ülke*, eds. Özcan Özen and Osman Akinay, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002),42.

The last years of the 1980s, some nationalities demanded more autonomy from the Soviets. North Caucasian people thought to compose a confederation in 1989. However, it did not realize some reasons. Some Chechen groups formed “All-National Congress of the Chechen People” in 1990 with purpose of being union republic from autonomous republic¹¹⁴. Those years, the Soviet Union struggled with nationalist turmoil in everywhere of their territory. Gorbachev recognized that the process has never turned; therefore he accepted the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a big problem on autonomous republics and oblasts, because, union republics such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Latvia or Belarus had right to be independent country. However, autonomous republics and oblasts were a part of newly constructing Russia.

In 1991, Boris Yeltsin as the first President of Russia took the office when Chechnya declared its independence. All-National Congress of the Chechen People claimed that the presidency of Yeltsin was not legal, because it was supported by military junta. And the Congress wanted Chechen people to go political strike indefinitely and civil disobedience. They refused Yeltsin government, because Yeltsin did not accept Chechnya as an independent country. Moreover, Yeltsin send troops to Chechnya to control Dzhokhar (Djohar). After that event, Dudaev became a leader of independent Chechnya resistance until killed in 1995¹¹⁵.

When Russian military forces occupied the Chechnya, Chechens made a respond to increase nationalist feelings. Conflict between Russia and Chechnya continued until 1994. This was the first period of Russian and Chechen relations after the Cold war. Russian troops occupied Grozny in 1995. This was the end of Dudaev. Conflicts continued until ceasefire in 1996.

¹¹⁴ Bülent Gökay, “Şeyh Şamil Anti-Emperyalist Bir Kahraman mı, Yoksa Karşı-Devrimci Bir Yobaz Mıydı?,” in *Çeçenistan Yok Sayılan Ülke*, eds. Özcan Özen and Osman Akınay, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002), 45.

¹¹⁵ John B. Dunlop, *Russia confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 116.

Nearly 3 years period, Chechens were independent under the leadership of Aslan Maskhadov and the capital city name was changed from Russian name; Grozny to Chechen name; Djohar¹¹⁶. It was beneficial experience for Chechens and also Russians, furthermore all of the world especially who supported Chechen independence. Countries' preferential aim is to provide security and welfare of their citizens. Until the period of 1999, Chechen leaders did not manage to provide basic aims living in peaceful and welfare arena for whole Chechen people.

Geo-politic conditions of states have caused sometimes "Security States", because, citizens firstly live in secure arena before their freedom. Here, it may be beneficial to mention about the limits of freedom. In international relations, there is a basic explanation for the limit of freedom. Our freedom end when another person's freedom begins. In this respect, Hobbesian perspective explains that in the anarchic world, states have to balance individual wishes for common interest. Moreover if people do not live in secure, they will not be free. Considering National Security Doctrines, Putin give importance to security firstly. And terrorist attacks towards people even children have legitimized hard Russian policies. During the analysis of countries, it is obligatory to look at their geography, namely their *sui generis* features.

The existence of the Chechen terrorism has been questioned in Russia. Because of ties to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, Chechen rebels or Chechen terrorists tried to include in the concept of international terrorism. The September 11 tragedy has caused xenophobia for Muslims around the world. On the other hand, when it is looked at the historical perspective of the Chechen problem and also the aim of Chechen terrorists, it is more than the idea of *Jihad*¹¹⁷.

According to Mukhina, there are different perspectives about the Russo-Chechen conflict. Firstly, Russia's interest in the areas rich oil reserves has explained the

¹¹⁶ "Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2006," *Infoplease*, <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnyatime1.html> (accessed Dec.23, 2008).

¹¹⁷ Irina Mukhina, (2005) "Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, no.28 (2005):515.

reason of the conflict. Moreover, Chechen rebels have struggled for liberation and the nationhood. Secondly, the collapse of Chechen economy, the devastation of unending war, and the destruction of social infrastructure in Chechnya caused Chechen terrorism¹¹⁸.

Russia's long-term and past policies caused several problems and conflicts in the Caucasus. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia encountered the new world and its different system politically and economically. Economy is the spinal of the every country. And Yeltsin implied shock therapy to the economy. It is inevitable that they encountered political crisis with other regions. In that process, they struggled with huge corruption, robbery and the gap between rich and poor.

The demand of independence from Chechnya has increased in that time. On the other hand, during the first war of 1994-96 between Russians and Chechens, the economy of Chechens was exacerbated. Despite of continuing economic problems, between the years of 1997-1999 is the peaceful period for both sides. Nevertheless it was several terrorist attacks such as 2 people killed in Pyatigorsk in 1997, 13 people killed and 22 wounded in Moscow and Dagestani border with Chechnya in 1998, the year of 1999 was the horrific year of Chechen terrorism, 381 Russian people killed in several Russian cities mostly in Moscow¹¹⁹. Basayev was not only one of Chechen terrorists; but also Salman Raduyev was the important character for the Chechen resistance and had responsibility for some of terrorist attacks on Moscow and Pyatigorsk. Aslan Maskhadov, the former president of Chechnya in 1997-99, connected with those terrorists closely like the first president Dudaev.

Putin was appointed by Yeltsin as a prime minister of Russia in 1999. In his first year in the prime ministry, Chechen conflict began to flare up again. Putin ordered Russian army to invade Chechnya on 30 September 1999. Generally, in semi-presidential political systems the president is also commander of army, but here, it

¹¹⁸ Irina Mukhina, (2005) "Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, no.28 (2005): 516.

¹¹⁹ Irina Mukhina, (2005) "Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, no.28 (2005):528-9.

is seen that Putin as a prime minister had an impact on Yeltsin as well as the Russian army.

Different from other ethnic minorities in Russia Federation, Chechens produced strategic war tactics against Russians. The assertions about ties to Al Qaeda may be derived from their professional war capacities. Russia has several failures to control conflicts; first one is Russian forces did not take seriously to blockaded or sealed the city of Grozny prior to attack. Secondly, poor coordination between the forces especially it was seen on theatre attack and third failure discussed at length in the years after the war, was the loss of “the information war” for public opinion¹²⁰.

The new war technologies have changed the impact of war. Self-propelled anti-aircraft machine guns (ZSU 23-4 Shilka and 2S6), searchlights and pyrotechnic such as night vision equipments are the important developments which affected the quality of wars¹²¹. Furthermore, Chechen terrorist used highly war technologies. For example; telephone system and network can use as machine. Because it gives more chance to coordinate system¹²².

According to Stressguth, the war served on increase Putin’s popularity; because, on the top of rising crime and poverty, they now had terrorism to fear¹²³. In addition to that, Putin did not appreciate any criticism about Russian action in Chechnya. One journalist jailed not to censor his criticisms, Andrei Babitsky. But Russian did not care, because they fought their fears.

¹²⁰ Olga Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroya Center, 2001), 33.

¹²¹ Olga Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroya Center, 2001), 24.

¹²² Olga Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroya Center, 2001), 70.

¹²³ Tom Streissguth, *Vladimir Putin, Chapter Six: Into Deep End*, (Minneapolis; Lerner Publication Company, 2005), 6.

On October 23, 2002 Chechen terrorists seized a crowded Moscow Theater and detained 763 people including 3 Americans¹²⁴. They demanded Russian government to stop occupation on Chechnya. But Russian government did not accept the offer and released a gas into the theatre. They killed not only all rebels but also 118 hostages. Putin rejected criticisms on the event. He did not accept any blackmail from terrorists. Moreover he said; “If anyone even tried to use such means in relations to our country, Russia will answer with measures adequate to the threats, in all places where there are terrorists, organizations of these criminals or their ideological or financial sponsors.”¹²⁵ In addition to that, Putin administration mentioned that Chechen civilian population was not to blame for anything and their task was about destroying Chechen terrorists¹²⁶. Russia prefers using hard security matters to fight against Chechen rebels.

The second half of 2004 was born tragic results for Russians and the entire world. It can be said another example of the September 11 in the U.S. On May 9, 2004 Chechnya’s Moscow-back de facto president Akhmad Kadyrov was killed in a bombing. On August 24 just before Chechen presidential election, two planes crashed and 90 Russian passengers died. On August 29, Alu Alkhanov elected as a president who supported from Moscow¹²⁷.

The peak attack of Chechen terrorists was the September 2004 Beslan hostage-taking crisis in North Ossetia far to the South of Russia. 30 armed men and 2 women seized a school in the town of Beslan for 3 days hold 1,100 young school children, teachers and parents. Chechen terrorists demanded independence of Chechnya. At the end of the hostage crisis, Russian soldiers intervened the hostage-

¹²⁴ “Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2006,” *Infoplease*, <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnyatime1.html> (accessed Dec.23, 2008).

¹²⁵ Putin Rejects Criticisms over Theatre Raid,” *Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/28/russia.chechnya2> (accessed Jan. 03, 2009).

¹²⁶ John Russell, “*Chechnya-Russia’s ‘War on Terror’*,” (London: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 2007), 99.

¹²⁷ “Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2006,” *Infoplease*, <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnyatime1.html> (accessed Dec.23, 2008).

taking crisis; all terrorists, 11 Russian soldiers and 344 children and parents were died and more than 700 people were wounded. Samil Basayev claimed responsibility for the horrific events in Beslan.

Just before the attacks, the president had established Operational Control Groups (OCG) in each North Caucasus republic to coordinate the first response of all agencies to a terrorist attack¹²⁸. Therefore, Russia has caught the targets easily. For example; when Beslan occurred, Interior Troops commanders responded another rebels in the city of Nalchik, capital of the North Caucasian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.

Russia declared after the September 11 the war against Chechnya has been the part of war against global terrorism¹²⁹. The process has accelerated after Beslan in 2004. Russia started to build closer relations with the U.S. against global terrorism. Putin claimed that connection between Chechen terrorists and Al-Qaeda based on well qualifications and equipments. Therefore, it is easily to imply policies against Chechen terrorists. Russia needs to generate its soft security matters. Russell shows a methodology on his article, *A War by Any Other Name: Chechnya, 11 September and the War against Terrorism*. Four counter-terrorist strategies have been formed; eradication, terror against terror, containment, addressing the root causes.

Firstly, cost of eradication tends to be extremely high; estimated the cost of Chechen conflict on Russian economy range from \$1.3 billion to \$11.5 billion per year. Moreover, the conflict is a hamper on Russian democratic development. Russia has possibility to use the money on developing sectors especially on social and welfare policies. Secondly, according to Russell;

¹²⁸ Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia's System to Combat Terrorism and Its Application in Chechnya," in *Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimension in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia*, eds. Robert W. Ortung, Andrey S. Makarychev and NATO Staff, (Amsterdam: National IOS Press, 2006), 176.

¹²⁹ John Russell, "A War by Any Other Name: Chechnya, 11 September and the War Against Terrorism" in *Chechnya: From Past to Future* ed. Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 240.

Combating terrorism by employing terror tactics against the terrorists might be held to represent the 'grasp'. Like eradication, it has the propaganda value reassuring one's domestic constituency that something is being done to tackle terrorism without appearing to be weak, conciliatory or irresolute.¹³⁰

Thirdly, containment or War tested after the Second World War. Establishing law, order and security in zone conflict are based on producing policies on politics, economics, social and diplomatic initiatives. In that perspective, Russia has to block Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya as long as "those who are not with us, are with the terrorists" view is alive. Fourthly, understanding the reasons of conflicts is the half of solving problems. Therefore, Russia needs to look at root of the Russo-Chechen conflicts and what are their demands objectively. Even if, Russia does not accept their wishes, they will try to develop alternative methods such as treatment of economic and social conditions of Chechnya¹³¹.

Putin signed a new law in February 2006, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCC) formed addition to the Federal Security Service of the Russia (FSB). FSB involves counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism and surveillance. The newly established NCC replaces inactive Federal Counter-Terrorism Commission. Moreover, NCC has right to participate in international efforts to counter-terrorism¹³². Russia controls regions with its Federal Distinct Staffs. Today, it is not certain that Chechnya is normalized or not. Nearly, 9 years passed occupation of Russia on Grozny. Russia is newly interested in reconstruction of Grozny with new paving stones, shops and cafes¹³³.

¹³⁰ John Russell, "Chechnya-Russia's 'War on Terror'," (London: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 2007), 103.

¹³¹ John Russell, "Chechnya-Russia's 'War on Terror'," (London: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 2007), 106.

¹³² Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia's System to Combat Terrorism and Its Application in Chechnya," in *Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimension in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia*, eds. Robert W. Orttung, Andrey S. Makarychev and NATO Staff, (Amsterdam: National IOS Press, 2006), 177.

¹³³ Jonathan Steele, "It's Over and Putin Won," *Guardian* (2008), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/30/russia.chechnya> (accessed Dec.04, 2008).

Terrorism is as an important threat of soft security. When it is looked at European Union who used soft security items much more than other countries, Europe views terrorism primarily as a law enforcement issue whereas Russia and the U.S. generally see military issue. Europeans does not support military action to block terrorist attacks. The U.S. and Russia called War on terrorism, on the other hand Europeans called fight or battle against terrorism. EU countries have a specific law to fight terrorism varied from country to country. They identified 25 terrorist groups in the world. They believe that understanding the root of terrorism can help to destroy terrorism. Europe's Police Agency (Europol) and European Information Systems have helped to control weapons of terror and precursors. Europol is the coordinating body between member states under the EU's Terrorist Working Groups (TWG)¹³⁴. Russia and EU relations are base on common values regarding the same threats such as terrorism and organized crime and they continue to work about soft security threats for their security and prosperity¹³⁵.

Russia has preferred hard security actions rather than soft security as for fighting against terrorism. Previously, it was said that countries *sui generis* profile, on this perspective Russia has stayed in different geographic condition. And especially, the last examples such as attitude towards Georgia and North Ossetia crisis in August 2008 show that Russia is related with new technologies as a defence part of hard security.

3.3 Russia and the West Cooperation against Terrorism

Russia has recognized new threats in the new world. It has produced new solution for them. International and bilateral agreements are the way to struggle with any type of international security problems. Terrorism is the common soft security threat for every country today. Actually, the way of combat terrorism still belongs to hard security matters. What is more, this is the reason why terrorism cannot

¹³⁴ Information from the Anti-Defamation League, "The European Union Response to Terrorism," in *Terrorism*. ed. Craig Donnellan (Cambridge: Independence, Educational Publishers, 2005), 20.

¹³⁵ "A Secure Europe In A Better World," *European Security Strategy*, Brussels 12 December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed Dec.04, 2008).

control. Russia has minded cooperation with the West under Putin presidency, because of international conjuncture and his aim as a Russian president.

The United Nations signed several agreements between the member states about counter-terrorism. There were several agreements which the member states signed about security and terrorism. The thesis concerns the documents between 2001 - 2008 during when Putin was the president. "The Counter-Terrorism Committee" was established by the UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) unanimously and instantly after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.¹³⁶. Russia is the chair of Sub-Committee B. Their aim is to struggle with counter terrorist activities at home, in their regions and around the World. The Committee has mentioned financing of terrorism and the basic aim to block state support to the terrorist groups¹³⁷. The committee has established closer ties with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In addition to that, the new counter-terrorism law passed on 1 March 2006 by the Russian Parliament replicated Western legislation¹³⁸. The new counter-terrorism law is not only composed of acting terrorism but it also includes propaganda and spreading materials related with terrorism. The September 2004 Beslan host-taking crisis affected the decision of the new counter-terrorism law¹³⁹.

Russia has perceived international threats on terrorism. Therefore, it is needed to mention to Russian attitude against international and several regional terrorist groups after the September 11. Russia ratified the UN Convention of December 15,

¹³⁶ "Security Council, The Counter-Terrorism Committee," *The UN*, <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html> (accessed Dec.03, 2008).

¹³⁷ "Security Council, Resolution 1373(2001)," *The UN*, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed Dec.03, 2008).

¹³⁸ James Hughes, "The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters of Terrorists?," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, no.15/3 (2007):296.

¹³⁹ Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia's System to Combat Terrorism and Its Application in Chechnya," in *Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimension in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia*, eds. Robert W. Orttung, Andrey S. Makarychev and NATO Staff, (Amsterdam: National IOS Press, 2006), 177.

1997 for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and of March 10, 1988 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in 2002. The International UN Convention of December 9, 1999 for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism ratified in 2004¹⁴⁰. Moreover, Russia has participated in the UN Global Action against Terrorism which was adopted by the UN Security Council on September 28, 2001. It declares;

...acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations". It called upon Member States to "become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols" and "to increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocol."¹⁴¹

Russia has been part of the UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions since 2001¹⁴². Russia has chance to operate regional effectiveness by using the UN conventions and agreements mostly based on its permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Russia has interest about the subject which is related the world stability. Under that subject, Russia has taken place to terrorism and describes it;

Terrorism is transnational in nature and poses a threat to world stability. This issue has exacerbated sharply in many countries, including in the Russia, and to fight it requires unification of efforts by the entire international community, increased effectiveness of existing ways of countering this threat, and also urgent action to neutralize it.¹⁴³

In the article, it is seen more emphasize to terrorism and its effects on people's lives who live in Russia. Moreover, Military actions were based on the reason of people's

¹⁴⁰ "First Deputy Head of the MOI Legislation Department gave a talk at the international workshop on international collaboration in combating terrorism," *The Ministry of Interior of Russia*, <http://eng.mvdrf.ru/news/3085/> (accessed Jan.17, 2009).

¹⁴¹ "Global Action against Terrorism," *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/global-action-against-terrorism.html> (accessed Jan.17, 2009).

¹⁴² "The Counter-Terrorism Committee," *The UN*, <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/> (accessed Jan.17, 2009).

¹⁴³ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008)

wish. Domestic stability is assured by constitutional system, state authority and its institutions. Moreover, the way of avoiding social, inter-communal and religious conflicts, political extremism, national and religious separations and terrorism have relied on state institutions¹⁴⁴.

Russia has considered international terrorism and recognized its global impact to them directly or indirectly. In addition to the UN conventions, regional efforts have strongly importance to fight against terrorism. In that respect, NATO is one of the partners of Russia to avoid terrorism, despite of long forbidding relations. The September 11, 2001 was a turning point of Russian and NATO relations. Thus, Putin takes advantage to prove its strategic significance and Russian engagement with the West¹⁴⁵. Two days after the attack, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council adopted a joint statement condemning attacks and expressing their willingness to fight against terrorism. The Rome Declaration NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 emphasized the importance of rapprochement between the allies and Russia. New cooperative mechanisms and procedures were established.

After the Beslan school tragedy in 2004, it is apparent to need to work together to combat the terrorist threats¹⁴⁶. NRC's first mechanism about terrorism is *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Terrorism. The group has managed to develop practical cooperation with joint papers. In addition to that NRC is interested in generating scientific research on psychological and technical outputs of the state and society. Istanbul Summit in 2004 was a milestone in the development of NATO-Russia cooperation on counter terrorism. NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism rejects terrorism in all its manifestation. They agreed that terrorist attack block their shared democratic values and basic human rights and freedom. It is determined to ensure

¹⁴⁴ "Russian National Security Concept-2000," *Permanent Representation of the Russia to the Council of Europe*, <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html> (accessed Dec.05, 2008)

¹⁴⁵ Robert Hunter, "Nato-Russia Relations after 11 September," in *Strategic Developments in Eurasia after 11 September*, ed. Shireen Hunter (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 30.

¹⁴⁶ "NATO-Russia Cooperation to Counter Terrorism," *NATO Official Web Site*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art2.html> (accessed Mar.31, 2009).

its overall coordination and strategic direction. Their aim is to generate our capabilities fighting against terrorism. There are three critical areas; preventing terrorism, combating terrorist activities and managing the consequences of terrorist acts¹⁴⁷.

Firstly, preventing terrorism composes military and non-military issues. In that part, it is evaluated non-military partnership of NATO and Russia. The Action Plan considers these issues on soft security context;

Develop improved mechanisms for intelligence sharing, which is crucial to the success of efforts to combat the terrorist threat in order to exchange information on likely terrorist targets and possible counter-measures;

Continue to explore technological and scientific co-operation aimed at resolving practical issues of security in the context of anti-terrorist activities (such as development of explosive detection prototypes, protection against (including decontamination of) CBRN agents and materials, countering threats to freight and passenger transport and protection against cyberterrorism);

enhanced information exchange among NRC member states on the threats posed by the Afghan narcotics industry and trade, and on national and multilateral efforts aimed at addressing those threats;

consideration of joint training initiatives in NRC member states, aimed, inter alia, at strengthening the capabilities of Afghan and transit route states' counter narcotics units and border guards, subject to the request of these states; and organisation of conferences and workshops to explore possible additional cooperative initiatives.¹⁴⁸

Secondly, The Action Plan also mentions military implementations to combat terrorist activities. There is not any apparent soft security measure to fight against terrorist attacks. The reason of why it cannot be used non-military measures is that their aim to prevent terrorism, not solve the role of understanding the real reasons of terrorism. Anyway, in the third part, NATO-Russia partnership helps to ensure

¹⁴⁷ "NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism," *NATO Official Web Site*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b041209a-e.htm> (accessed Mar.31, 2009).

¹⁴⁸ "NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism," *NATO Official Web Site*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b041209a-e.htm> (accessed Mar.31, 2009).

stability in Euro-Atlantic region. The practical dimension needs to be enhanced. It is emphasized;

continuing to develop scientific co-operation to address the management of ecological, psychosocial and other consequences of terrorist acts, including in the areas of ecological terrorism and of risk management and minimising the consequences of terrorist attacks; and

exchange of experience and expertise in resolving hostage crises; and; organisation of a session, workshop or conference on techniques,

technologies, and lessons learned toward ensuring effective co-ordination among local and national crisis/terrorist responders.¹⁴⁹

NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism is also a proof that both of them give importance to Eurasia as their security arena. Furthermore, they are under the competitive struggle on controlling the region. Bilateral agreements have balanced the relations between NATO and Russia. It is possible to find applicable solutions to combat terrorism with soft security matters.

3.3.1 Russia and International Terrorist Organizations

Russia has encountered several threats to the best known international terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda. Today, Al-Qaeda has perceived strong asymmetric threat for all countries. It is defined as Islamic fundamentalist group who selects as target of the symbols of Western culture such as the Twin towers, HSBC. Their main feature is that they are nomadic. And it is not certain where their next target will be. In that way, they provide chronic insecurity arena in the world¹⁵⁰. Russia supports the international response to Al-Qaeda. Russia's geographic condition is determinant in that point. Afghanistan is not one of the neighbours of Russia; on the other hand it has borders with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

¹⁴⁹ "NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism," *NATO Official Web Site*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b041209a-e.htm> (accessed Mar.31, 2009).

¹⁵⁰ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 52.

Al-Qaeda has supported Islamic movements in those countries especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Islam is the strong threat for Russian culture considering the doctrines of Russia. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is the main threat of secular regime of Uzbekistan. It is estimated that the several activities in Uzbekistan especially in Fergana Valley supported by international terrorist organisations¹⁵¹.

Furthermore, *Harqat ul-Mujahidin* is one of extremist Islamic Sunni organisation which has similar activities with Taliban movement and until 1998 it is part of Bin-Laden's global Jihad movement. Chechnya is their one of location to aid and training¹⁵². In that respect, Russia has given much more importance to building cooperation with the West as part of blocking terrorist activities. There are several Al-Qaeda militants in south Russia and Russian military forces tried to control them¹⁵³.

On the other hand, Russia uses terrorism is state card to other countries. Considering Russian and Turkish relations, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Kurdish terrorist organization, has taken place an important position. Russia and Turkey are competitors in some sectors. And Russia benefitted from PKK existence in the region to create a pressure on Turkey by funding and accommodating them during 1980s¹⁵⁴. Furthermore, Russia does not support Turkish role on energy transferring. It is another reason why it supports the PKK¹⁵⁵. Putin visited to Turkey

¹⁵¹ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 86.

¹⁵² Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the International Community* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 84.

¹⁵³ "Al-Qaeda Militant Killed in South Russia- Interior Ministry," *Russian News and Information Agency*, Dec.12, 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080212/99044467.html> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

¹⁵⁴ "Russia Supports The PKK Terrorism?," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, Aug.12, 2008, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/58513/russia-supports-the-pkk-terrorism.html> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

¹⁵⁵ Mümtaz'er Türköne, "Caucasus and Russia," *Today's Zaman*, Aug.16, 2008, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=150324> (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

in 2004 and signed bilateral trade agreements. It is key point for Russian and Turkish relations, because, after independence, Putin was the first president who visited to Turkey. Russia is Turkey's second-largest trade partner and Turkey is Russia's fourteenth trade partner¹⁵⁶.

This chapter analysed terrorism as a soft security threat which Russia has encountered. First part of the Chapter Three mentioned terrorism in general term. In that part Russia's experience was apparent especially after the September 11, 2001. Types of terrorism and new perceptions were analysed under Russian soft security context. Chechen problem of Russia and impact on Russian national security analysed in the second part of the Chapter Three. Russia and the West cooperation against counter terrorism evaluated in the third part. Subheading of Russia and international organisation help to understand Russian perception of terrorism.

¹⁵⁶ "Turkey-Russia Relations," *Euractiv*, Jan.12, 2005, [http:// www. euractiv. com/ en/ enlargement/ turkey-russia-relations/article-134083](http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-russia-relations/article-134083) (accessed Dec.15, 2008).

CHAPTER 4

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AS A SOFT SECURITY THREAT TO RUSSIAN SECURITY

Organized crime is domestic and international problem of nearly all countries and related directly countries' political, economical and social structure. Especially in 21st Century, it can be easy to operate organized criminal activities; because technological advances help to promote new generation of organized crime. Criminal organizations have benefited from e-business and virtual identities to facilitate and cover up criminal activities. Organized groups have used internet pornography and prostitution. Developments of high-resolution printers and scanners have also increased the capacity of organized criminals to produce counterfeit documents. Developing technologies also provide easy and quick money transfers. Moreover, satellite systems and cellular phone give opportunity to criminals to communicate easily¹⁵⁷. One of the reasons of why organized criminal activities have increased in 1990s is advanced technologies.

This chapter will focus on transnational organized crime as one of soft security threats to Russian security. In the first part, it is analysed organized crime as domestic and international problem of Russia. In that respect, it is mentioned Russian perception of transnational organized crime and historical background. Second part will be focused on deeply Russian state institutions in order to combat transnational organized crime. The last part will examine Russia's efforts to combat transnational organized crime in international arena. In that part, it will be focused on international agreements, conventions and regional partnerships about transnational organized crime to which Russia agrees.

¹⁵⁷ Craig Stapley, Suzette Grillot and Stephen Sloan, "The Study of National Security Versus the Study of Cooperate Security: What Can They Learn Fron Each Other," in *The Handbook of Security*, ed. Martin Gill. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,2006):49 pp.45-65.

4.1 Significance of Transnational Organized Crime for Russia

There are two different opinions about Russian organized crime; Russian organized crime and deep mafia relations are heritage of the Soviet authoritarian system and the other is Russian organized crime is a part of international mafia network¹⁵⁹. Both of them have great impact of Russian organized crime. The Soviet elite had complex and deep relations with criminal activities especially domestic pollution on state institutions were the proof of it. Transnational organized crime is part of this system; it is composed of domestic and external relations of state institutions, criminals and victims as organized crime has entailed strong political relations and economic outputs.

The history of organized crime in Russia is a part of history of Russian social life. What was done in the Tsarist Russia and the Soviets is part of today's Russian organized crime. Russia has a dominant culture in every type of people's lives. Ideologically or in practice deep relations of politics and economics caused deep response from the society. According to Rawlinson, the framework of a model entitled the "Charmeleon Syndrome" called the ability of organized crime, through its interaction with the legitimate structures emerged in Russia. Considering the relationship between legitimate structure and organized crime in Russia, it is seen the different types of organized crime in different ideologies; less sophisticated gangs and teenage groups and black market in the Tsarist autocracy and the Soviet totalitarianism. Organized crime can be seen in every type of ideological system; because some people have always abused political and economical source of countries¹⁶⁰.

Difference between ideologies has also impact on their organized criminals; because countries serve different type of response to criminals. Both of them

¹⁵⁹ Phil Williams, "Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime," in *Russian Organized Crime The New Threat?*, ed. Phil Williams (London: Frank Cass & Co LTD, 1997):1

¹⁶⁰ Patricia Rawlinson "Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History" in *Russian Organized Crime The New Threat?* ed. Phil Williams, (London: Frank Cass & Co LTD, 1997),29.

commits on grave, but sometime on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes' results can be bloody. Highly motivated mafia type relations are a part of organized crime.

At the beginning of 19th Century, Russia governed with feudal system which most of population emerged self, namely slaves. The Tsarist authority was the absolute. Moreover, according to Rawlinson the centralization of power weakens other state structures destroyed trust of people to central system. High corruption in bureaucracy provided falseness in the system. In the 1880s and 1890s, Russia experienced industrial boom with its valuable minerals and raw materials. Russian businessmen adopted the advanced economic theories and practices of their Western counterpart¹⁶¹.

Organized crime after 1917 existed in the form of gangsterism. Standardization and collective property limited to people's wishes. On the other hand it could not be changed totally. Under the idea of socialism common property and sharing good at the same level was an important part, nevertheless people wanted to much more than they have, psychologically. Corruption was the basic problem of the Soviets and small groups of entrepreneurs emerged to provide special items otherwise it could not exist in the market; on that black-market was born in Russian land¹⁶².

The Soviet system was closed to their people from the late 1920s to early 1930s. The statistics about crime disappeared from public views, because it is a state secret. According to Western specialists, the Soviets evaluated crime into two parts; ordinary crime and political crime¹⁶³. The Soviet Union gave priority to their ideology; socialism. Protecting form ideological threats was more important than criminal activities. The Soviets encountered organized crime in internal and external but reaching documents was impossible about the organized crime. In

¹⁶¹ Patricia Rawlinson "Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History" in *Russian Organized Crime The New Threat?* ed. Phil Williams, (London: Frank Cass & Co LTD, 1997),34.

¹⁶² Fred Burton and Dan Burges "Russian Organized Crime," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, Nov.14, 2007 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russian_organized_crime (accessed Jan.15, 2009).

¹⁶³ Butler, W. E. "Crime in The Soviet Union Early Glimpses of the True Story," in *Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime*, ed. Mark , (Boston: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 2002),73.

the 1930s, the reporting of criminal activities was negative phenomena and prohibited on grounds of official secrecy. The Soviet system created its own enemies; class enemies which were forced to collectivization of agriculture and others. In 1963, the Soviet Union Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procurers of the Soviet Union began to pioneer sociological- criminological analyses of criminality based on the statistical records but it was unsuccessful.

In the 1980s, the Soviets were more open their people. Gorbachev's policies to adopt Western political and economical system provided openness in every arena of the State. The legislative changes enacted in 1987 allowed the disclosure and publication of statistical data relating to seven types of crime. The following year a Moral Statistics Department was re-created in the Soviets¹⁶⁴. Finally in 1989, the State Committee for statistics canceled all barriers on displaying and publication of criminal statistic of the Soviet Union. When it is looked at criminality between the years from 1961-1989, there were three groups of criminality;

Crimes committed with use of force; international homicide, international grave body injury, rape, malicious hooliganism.

Mercenary crimes such as theft and assault.

Economic mercenary crimes; abuse of official position, bribery and corruption¹⁶⁵.

In the year of 1961-65, the rates declined each year, nearly 10 percent. In 1966, it was a dramatic change of rates; increase 18 percent on preceding years. The years of 1968-87 were the most fluctuated years; the rates generally had tendency to decrease nearly each year; 9 percent. The year of 1989 by all accounts was a deplorable one. Registered crime increased by 31.8 percent over 1988.

¹⁶⁴ Butler, W. E. "Crime in The Soviet Union Early Glimpses of the True Story," in *Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime*, ed. Mark Galeotti, (Boston: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 2002),76.

¹⁶⁵ Butler, W. E. "Crime in The Soviet Union Early Glimpses of the True Story," in *Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime*, ed. Mark Galeotti, (Boston: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 2002),77.

The Soviet Union was composed of 15 union republics with their different ethnic basis and nationalities. They affected from fluctuated process highly; because they struggled with economic deficiencies. And those economic factors caused more criminal activities. After 1985, the Soviets totally lost its control on union republics. Individual crimes, rape, hooliganism, assault with intent rob, open stealing, theft of state social or personal property, theft of citizen personal property and bribery were basic issues of organized crime.

During the transition period of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union 1991, links between Russian businessmen and criminals became blurred. In that period, organized crime groups have used economic reforms and crises for their benefit¹⁶⁶. The prison population grew by 50 percent during the 1990s. Moreover, the prisons were over-crowded and criminals stayed in bad conditions about food, medicine and clothing. The mortality rate in the prisons was about 30 times the national average¹⁶⁷. This situation shows that how Russia has terrible economic conditions. The quality of prisons proves the power of state structure; because prisons are also centers of rehabilitation.

According to Burten and Burges, Russian organized crime developed from four main centers of criminality. The first one is the Soviet heritage, elites conducted privatization process of Russia. The second groups are corrupt Communist Party members; they abuse their condition and sometimes helped criminals with accepting bribes. Thirdly, various ethnic and national groups rooted of organized crime in Russia. The most influential are the Chechens, Armenians, Azeri, Dagestani, Georgians and Ingush. And lastly, compilation of disparate criminal associations has controlled Eurasia¹⁶⁸. 21st Century Association is one of example to last one.

¹⁶⁶ Fred Burton and Dan Burges, "Russian Organized Crime," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, Nov.14, 2007 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russian_organized_crime (accessed Jan.15, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Judy Twigg, "Social Policy in Post-Soviet Russia" in *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, eds. Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),210.

¹⁶⁸ Fred Burton and Dan Burges, "Russian Organized Crime," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, Nov.14, 2007 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russian_organized_crime (accessed Jan.19, 2009).

They are known as “umbrella” organizations. Their activities are related with concentration of illegal business activities. It has operation in 18 Russian regions and abroad. Moreover, it is believed that the association controls nearly 100 companies nationwide¹⁶⁹.

The Soviet authoritarianism was as a heritage to both Russia’s state institutions and Russian mafia. They have strong and complicated networks and obedience to authorities. In the Soviet Union nothing was more important than ideology of the socialism, because of this reason, nationalities, ethnic root or religion could not be important. Mafia type organizations in Russia share the same philosophy. Strong criminal groups do not feel themselves in any ethnic, nationalist or religious groups, they share only one thing and aim which is related money.

4.2 Russia’s Struggle with Transnational Organized Crime

Russia has generated new modified system after the collapse of the Soviet Union to combat with organized crime using state institutions as soft security matters. There are three important institutions; Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) or Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI), Federal Security Service (FSB) and tax police¹⁷⁰.

MVD carries out regular police functions, including maintenance of public order and criminal investigation. In addition to that it has responsible of fire fighting and prevention, traffic control, automobile registration, transportation security, issuance of visas and passports, administration of labor camps and most prisons¹⁷¹. MVD operates central and local level with estimated 540,000 personnel including regular militia based on 1996 records. The militia is divided into two parts; local public security units and criminal police. Criminal police are interested in Russian

¹⁶⁹ Guy Dunn, “Major Mafia Gangs in Russia,” in *Russian Organized Crime The New Threat?*, ed. Phil Williams, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 70.

¹⁷⁰ “Organized Crime in Russia: How to Struggle in favor of Legality?,” *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, June.10, 2005 <http://studies.agentura.ru/english/listing/organizedcrime/> (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

¹⁷¹ “Russia, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),” *History of Russians Abroad*, http://www.russians-abroad.com /russian_history_384.html (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

organized crime. Moreover, in that point MVD is the main body of Russian law enforcement which is responsible to combat with organized crime and mafia.

The Main Directorate of Organized Crime (GUOP) and the Regional Division for Fight against Organized Crime (RUOP) are the main bodies of MVD. There are several criticisms towards them. It claims that, RUOP has not been eager to destroy organized criminals; they only have protected businessmen but not free-of-charge¹⁷². Furthermore, it is claimed that RUOP has strong connection with organized groups and mafia, therefore, they protect some people's rights more than others'. Relationship between politicians and oligarchs is another proof for nepotism. Rushailo was appointed as the head of MVD by Putin in 1999 due to close relations with Boris Berezovsky. Considering the relations, when their interests from each other finished, Rushailo had to retire¹⁷³.

Another, criticism about RUOP based on Human Right Watch, according to Human Right Watch, on November 18, 1995 RUOP beat and tortured Artem Arutunian, an ethnic Armenian. Other victims of RUOP are Islan Gashayev and Olga Kurbanova encountered illegal implementation when they arrested¹⁷⁴. Organized crime creates suspicion and prejudices towards minority groups; police harassment of minorities and corruption problems.

FSB is national body which was formed in 1996. Its mission to fight to organized crime including illicit trade, drug trafficking, division of counter-intelligence in transport objects. During Putin presidency, FSB became responsible for fighting

¹⁷² "Organized Crime in Russia: How to Struggle in favor of Legality?," *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, June.10, 2005 <http://studies.agentura.ru/english/listing/organizedcrime/> (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

¹⁷³ "Organized Crime in Russia: How to Struggle in favor of Legality?," *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, June.10, 2005 <http://studies.agentura.ru/english/listing/organizedcrime/> (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

¹⁷⁴ "Human Right Watch World Report 1997-Russia," *The UN Refugee Agency*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,RUS,,3ae6a8ae24,0.html> (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

against oligarchs¹⁷⁵. The famous FSB general Zaoztrovcev was a mastermind of operations against Gusinsky, Berezovsky. After the September 11, 2001, FSB gained much more importance. In 2003, FSB was allowed to absorb a number of other agencies. FSB restructured into nine services in 2003; Counterintelligence Service, Service for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism, Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, Economic Security Service, Analysis Forecasting and Strategic Planning Service, Organizational and Personal Service, Border Service, Control Service, Science and Technical Service.

Under Putin, FSB's funding increased by as much as 40 percent in 2006 alone. Furthermore, the year of 2006 was important for scandals which is claimed to derive from FSB. Anna Stepanova Politkovskaya, Russian journalist, was killed in her apartment on October 7, 2006. She was known for her position to Putin's policies against Chechen problem. Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB officer, died of mysterious case of polonium 210 radiations poisoning on November 23, 2006. He was writing a book about the FSB's abuses during the Putin era¹⁷⁶.

It was formed in 1992 in order to limit tax crimes. The staff includes former MVD and FSB. After 2003, tax police became so powerful that it has well-organized intelligence and investigation divisions. It is real competitor of Economic Security Service of FSB. Putin stopped the activities of tax police and create a new service to fight with tax crimes especially drug traffic.

4.3 Russia's Effort to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in International Arena

Russia has been a part of international and regional agreements and conventions about transnational organized crime. Combating transnational organized crime is a

¹⁷⁵ "Organized Crime in Russia: How to Struggle in Favor of Legality?," *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, June.10, 2005 <http://studies.agentura.ru/english/listing/organizedcrime/> (accessed Jan.22, 2009).

¹⁷⁶ "Federal Security Service (FSB) FSB History," *Global Security*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/fsb.htm> (accessed Jan.22, 2009)

part of Russian soft security; because Eurasia is the open place for any type of international criminal activities.

Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Council of Europe, International Criminal Police (Interpol) and other legislative agreements in international and regional level. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has ordered several conventions. Russia displays a great effort to control transnational organized crime with its soft security matters under Putin presidency.

Russia has considered that agreements. Moreover, the conventions were ratified by Russia. In practice, several problems have been encountered, because of complex relations of Russian administration. Furthermore, most of the UN conventions about transnational organized crime have been signed in the 2000s. Because not only Russia but also all countries have perceived organized crime as a real threat after that time. Furthermore, it is a normal period, because Eurasian was newly independent in the 1990s, and they were not a part of international agreements so much. Russia had not connection of the world, only they were interested in Western part under Yeltsin period. Putin aims to be strong country in the World and in order to manage that he tries to impact over the world. The UN conventions are way to affect the process. The Conventions show how countries integrate the world decisions and their wishes about the issue.

“The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” is the main international instrument to counter organized crime which was signed in 2000 and entered into force in September 2003. The convention commits states to introduce a range of measures, including the creation of domestic criminal offences to counter the problem; the adaptation of new frameworks for mutual legal assistance; extradition; law enforcement cooperation; technical assistance and training¹⁷⁷. Organized crime is composed of different activities; drug trafficking, trafficking in

¹⁷⁷ “The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html> (accessed Jan.10, 2009).

human beings, trafficking in firearms, smuggling of migrants, money laundering, etc.

“Fourth Session of Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols” was signed on October 8-17, 2008 in Vienna. The protocols were on drugs and crime to promote the implementation of the provisions on international cooperation, to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, to prevent the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air¹⁷⁸.

Russia signed on 12 December 2000 and ratified on 26 May 2004 “The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children”, “Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,” “Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”. Russia has recognized that international conventions and agreements were necessary documents of soft security policies.

The UN has generated programme for money laundering as a part of organized crime that the Global Programme against Money Laundering has developed model legislation for countries to set up their anti-money-laundering/countering. There are two models for money laundering; “UN Model Law on Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing” in 2003 and “UNODC and IMF Model Legislation on Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism” in 2005¹⁷⁹.

Smuggling is a part of organized crime. The UNODC Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT) assists countries in their efforts to combat crime. The work of GPAT is underpinned by the “Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Anti-Trafficking Protocol” which entered into force on 29

¹⁷⁸ Fourth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/CTOC-COP-session4.html> (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

¹⁷⁹ “Model Legislation,” *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/Model-Legislation.html> (accessed Jan.10, 2009)

September 2003. The UNODC gives importance to health subject and under the subject HIV/AIDS prevention takes place a problematic issue. Moreover, the UN claims that the subject HIV/AIDS is associated with human trafficking. The UN works on preventing HIV infections and in providing care and support to people living with HIV and AIDS. The United Nations system has coordinated and directed the World Health Organization (WHO). Prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS is subtitle of the WHO.

Russia has not signed the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. There are several critics about the issue. Russia has been working with the EU in order to create “the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice” which is approved by Putin on May 10, 2005. Under the Subject of organized crime, it is mentioned that exploring the possibility to sign, ratify and implement the UN Protocol against illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Illicit drugs and its prevention process and its place in organized crime are another important issue. In addition to “Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Anti-Trafficking Protocol” is that “The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” in 1961 and amendment protocols in 1972 which was ratified by Russia on June 3, 1996 to ensure protection from illicit drugs as another transnational threat. “The Convention of Psychotropic Substance” in 1971 and “Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance” in 1988 which was ratified by Russia in 1990¹⁸⁰. According to Kremlin with ideas approved by Putin in

¹⁸⁰ “Drug Related Treaties,” *UNODC*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html> (accessed Jan.11, 2009).

2005, “Cooperate with international and regional fora, have crucial importance to fight transit drug trafficking”¹⁸¹.

The subject of border security is much more related with problematic regions and borders in the World. The agreements about the issue determine generally state-to-state level. There are several conflict areas in the World and they cannot agree on their borders.

UNODC Proposes Plan for Improving Border Security between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to improve border security on 26 February 2007 in Vienna is one of example. Antonio Maria Costa, the Head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, said during a visit to Pakistan;

“At the moment, Drug traffickers cooperate better than the regional governments.”¹⁸² He summarized the serious situation on borders and criminals. Borders are places where organized crimes have done. In addition to the UN convention about trafficking and border security, there are several bilateral agreements and treaties between countries to protect their own border and block any kind of trafficking.

Russia acts as sending, receiving and transit country for illegal migrants, who are from Central Asia and Far East prefer Russia to reach Europe and Russians¹⁸³. According to the United Nations classification, Russia was the second place in the World of receiving countries after the U.S. with a total of 12, 5 million immigrants in the 1990s¹⁸⁴. Russia Security Council declared in 2001 that scale of illegal migration has grown into a real threat to their national security. In addition to that,

¹⁸¹ “Road Map on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice,” *President of Russia Official Portal*, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/88030.shtml> (accessed Jan.19, 2009).

¹⁸² “UNODC Proposes Plan for Improving Border Security between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan,” *UNODC*, http://www.unodc.org/india/unis_border_security_27feb07.html (accessed Jan.10, 2009).

¹⁸³ Irina Ivakhniouk, “Illegal Migration: Russia,” in *Soft Security Threats and European Security*, eds. Anne Aldis and Herd P. Graeme. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 36.

¹⁸⁴ Irina Ivakhniouk, “Illegal Migration: Russia,” in *Soft Security Threats and European Security*, eds. Anne Aldis and Herd P. Graeme. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 36.

Russian people who live in bad conditions want to go Western countries to live in more high conditions and save money for their children. Labor Organization report some 2, 45 million people worldwide have been victims of a criminal human trafficking industry that supplies prostitutes and slave laborers.

The gap between developed and developing or underdeveloped countries is the main reason of trafficking. Wages are nearly 130 times higher in the richest countries than in the poorest one¹⁸⁵. Human trafficking is one of the problematic issues in transnational organized crime. Thus, there are several practices about the issue. According to Amnesty International, thousands of Russian women are reportedly trafficked to countries around the world. Each year, they forced sexual exploitation¹⁸⁶. Human trafficking and smuggling of migrants are the reality of Russia even today. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, economy of the post-Soviet countries saw the deep point. On the other hand, people continue to wish living in better life with better conditions. Being refugee is legal right of every human being. However, Western countries have not been eager to accept refugee to their countries, because of several valid or invalid reasons. On that point, illegal migration gives opportunity to that people to get rid of their terrible conditions. Today, this is a black market, and illegal organizations abuse these people's money and their sources.

Russia's new position is to be transit Euro-Asian corridor. Nearly, 300,000 transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries prefer Russia, because of its geographic conditions and being cheap. Global migrant smuggling network is in post-Soviet territories

¹⁸⁵ "EU Presses Russia on Human Trafficking," *Business Week*, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2007/gb20070223_311905.htm?campaign_id=rss_daily (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

¹⁸⁶ "2005 Annual Report for Russia," Amnesty International USA, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2005&c=RUS> (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

generally popular along the borders of Russian-Chinese, Russian- Kazakh and Russian- Ukrainian¹⁸⁷.

International smuggling of migrant and trafficking in migrants control the majority of legal and illegal labor recruiting agencies, marriage bureaus, visa brokers and other methods. According to Ivakhniouk, in counteracting illegal migration, the state does not encounter individual migrants, but strong criminal structure. Russian segment of this structure is advanced on high-quality forged passports, stamps, documents, invitations and visas and also flexible on counterborders.¹⁸⁸

European Union worries about illegal migration from southern borders and wants from Russia to control that. Russia needs to develop a comprehensive national strategy about illegal smuggling and trafficking. Moreover, it can allocate funds to combat the problem and create a central repository for prosecution, conviction and sentencing data of trafficking cases¹⁸⁹. The Government of Russia demonstrated progress in its law about organized crime.

According to Article 127, “Illegal deprivation of person’s liberty which is not related to his abduction shall be punishable by restraint of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by arrest for a term of three to six months or deprivation of liberty for a term of up to two years.”¹⁹⁰

Article 127 criticizes for low impact on people and low commitments to criminals. And it is argued that Russian government demonstrates minimal prevention effort to generate their laws. Government needs NGOs reports and media documents to fight

¹⁸⁷ Irina Ivakhniouk, “Illegal Migration: Russia,” in *Soft Security Threats and European Security*, eds. Anne Aldis and Herd P. Graeme. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 44.

¹⁸⁸ Irina Ivakhniouk, “Illegal Migration: Russia,” in *Soft Security Threats and European Security*, eds. Anne Aldis and Herd P. Graeme. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 45.

¹⁸⁹ “Reports on Russia,” *Embassy of The United States Moscow*, <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/tipreport2008.html> (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

¹⁹⁰ The Criminal Code of Russia, [http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartII/Section VII/Chapter 17.html](http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartII/SectionVII/Chapter17.html) (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

with criminals. But Russia has perceived civil society and free media as barrier on state institutions¹⁹¹.

Furthermore, According to Kremlin with ideas approved by Putin in 2005, Russia has promoted to combat against transnational organized crime in regional level. Russia has implemented EU-Russia Action Plan on Organized crime and agreed priorities. EU-Russia Liason Officer's network expands and intensifies their close relations. Russia and Europol signed an agreement on cooperation in Rome on November 6, 2003 in order to enhance cooperation to combat organized crime and also they share data and information about the issue. They need to generate relations cross border regions such as East Europe and the Baltic. The Baltic Sea Task enforces to improve operational law enforcement in the region. In that way, Europol gains a chance to develop their activities in Eurasia.

Russia considers the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering to generate their laws as another transnational threat. It is argued that Russia has failed to cooperate international fight against money-laundering. Putin mentioned their interest to money laundering; "sent a clear signal of support when he approved a national money laundering strategy in June 2005 and charged an inter-agency commission to implement the strategy in the short term"¹⁹²

Russia cooperate with EU member states within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which is an inter-governmental body to combat money-laundering of OECD. FATF has supported fighting against criminal money-laundering and financing of terrorism. Russia has generated FATF style regional bodies such as "Moneyval" to block transferring money to illegal activities¹⁹³.

¹⁹¹ "Reports on Russia," *Embassy of The United States Moscow*, <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/tipreport2008.html> (accessed Jan.17, 2009)

¹⁹² New Money-Laundering Report Gives Russia Good Marks Russia's legal framework, political will, Putin's support praised, *America.Gov*, <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/March/200603011200331CJsamohT0.9108393.html> (accessed Jan.17, 2009).

¹⁹³ "Road Map on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice," *President of Russia Official Portal*, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/88030.shtml> (accessed Jan.19, 2009).

There are several meetings, agreements and joint statements between Russia and European Union under soft security issues. They prepared a paper for “Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russia and the European Union 2000-2010” under titles of judicial cooperation and cooperation against organized crime, money laundering and illegal trafficking of drugs¹⁹⁴. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and EU (PCA) was signed in 1997 and continued to generate year by year according to subjects. PCA is composed of cooperation on environmental problems (Article 69), customs and illegal migration (Article 78, 84) and against money laundering and drug smuggling (Article 81, 82)¹⁹⁵. The Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime (APCOC) involves trafficking of drug, human beings and stolen cars signed in April 2000. It has generated into two parts; EU’S Drug Strategy (2000-2004) (EUDS) and Russia’s Special Federal Programme (1999-2000) to step up the fight against organized crime.

As it is discussed above the issue of transnational organized crime is as one of soft security threats to Russian security. The introductory part of Chapter Four analysed organized crime as domestic and international problem of Russia. In that respect, it was mentioned Russian perception of transnational organized crime and historical background. The second part focused on Russian state institutions in order to fight against transnational organized crime. The last part examined Russia’s efforts to combat transnational organized crime in international arena. In that part, it was mentioned the importance of international agreements, conventions and regional partnerships about transnational organized crime for Russian soft security policy. Having analyzed transnational organized crime, it will be analysed the last soft security threat of Russia’s in the thesis, energy security.

¹⁹⁴ Ray Allison, Margot Light and Stephen White, *Putin’s Russia and The Enlarged Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 165.

¹⁹⁵ Andrew Monaghan, Russian Perspectives of Russia-EU Security Relations, *Agentura. Ru Studies and Research Center*, Russian Series, no.5/38 (2005):5,<http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/csrc/perspectives.pdf>.

CHAPTER 5

ENERGY SECURITY AS SOFT SECURITY THREAT TO RUSSIAN SECURITY

Energy security is one of important issues in international relations as a soft security threat. Distribution and allocation of resources have been a crucial issue since people understood resources have been limited. International, regional and bilateral agreements became part of soft security in 21st Century. Furthermore, insufficient resources caused dependency of countries to each other. Countries have to build positive relations to take part of these resources.

The Chapter Five will focus on energy security as one of soft security threats to Russia. In this chapter, firstly, perception of energy as a security issue in Russia will be analysed with under the subheadings of importance of oil and natural gas in Russia. After that part, it will be analysed the key subject of energy under security issue, interdependency of countries and its implements. In that respect, infrastructure security and pipelines, supply and demand security will be mentioned as another parts of energy security.

5.1 Role of Energy in Russia

Lieber mentioned that “Energy became a security issue when the supply of oil was a matter of national survival and later when the ability to pay for this oil became a question of almost comparable gravity.”²⁰⁰ Energy is very crucial concept from which every country has profits and losses. Starting to ancient times people have

²⁰⁰ Linda B. Miller, “Energy, Security and Foreign Policy: A Review Essay”, *International Security*, no.4 (Spring 1977):116.

used energy for heat, medicine, electricity, building mortar and transportation fuel²⁰¹. Sharing energy resources has never done peacefully.

Today, some of countries have some crucial resources such as mostly consuming in the world hydrocarbon reserves such as oil and natural gas. What is more, it is estimated that Russia will cover 12% of the World crude oil demand if Russian output should level off at a maximum of 11mb/d after 2010²⁰². According to Energy Information Administration of the U.S.,

Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves and eight largest oil reserves. Furthermore, Russia is also the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest oil exporter and the third largest energy consumer.²⁰³

Russian economy is mostly dependent on oil and natural gas exports. According to IMF and the World Bank statistics, "the oil and natural gas sector generated more than 60 percent of Russia's export revenue and accounted for 30 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country"²⁰⁴.

The "Russian Bear" model argues that its relative military decline, but still Russia remains a great power with its geo-political conditions. According to Russian bear model, energy is the potential powerful weapon to put pressure on other countries' politics and economics²⁰⁵. Under that perspective, Russian energy capacity is so determinative for their position in international relations.

The discovery of Russian oil began with travelers near the Caucasus Mountains in South-western Russia in the early of 19th Century. In the 1860s Robert and Ludwig

²⁰¹ Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry*, (USA: Praeger Publisher,2005),3.

²⁰² Sadek Boussena and Catherine Locatelli, *Towards a More Coherent Oil Policy in Russia* (OPEC,2005), 92.

²⁰³ "Russia Background," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgase.html>, (accessed Jan. 26, 2009).

²⁰⁴ "Russia Background," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgase.html>, (accessed Jan. 23, 2009).

²⁰⁵ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor &Francis Group,2005),177.

Nobel brothers focused on oil production in Baku field. In 1911, Royal Dutch/Shell purchased the Rothschilds' holding for 2, 75 million Russian rubles²⁰⁶. In 1916, Grozny field was discovered and at that time, Russia increased 15 percent of the world oil production.

The October Revolution in 1917 was also at the end of foreign companies in Russian land. The Soviets seized foreign holders and played the major companies off each other while building a national oil industry. By 1959, the Soviet Union had replaced Venezuela as the world's largest oil producer at 300,000 bpd with their crucial oil refineries in near Volga River west of the Ural Mountains²⁰⁷. In 1980s, Siberian region was the main center of Russian oil with 12,5 million barrels per day in total liquids²⁰⁸.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, oil production in the region decreased rapidly nearly 6 million bbl/d. When it is looked at update statistics of today, according to Energy Information Administration of the U.S.,

With production of 9.8 million bbl/d of liquids (not including oil products), and consumption of roughly 2.8 million bbl/d, Russia exported (in net) around 7 million bbl/d. According to official Russian statistics, roughly 4.4 million bbl/d of this total is crude oil. Over 70 percent of Russian crude oil production is exported, while the remaining 30 percent is refined locally. Crude oil exports via pipeline fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Russia's state-owned pipeline monopoly, Transneft.²⁰⁹

Furthermore, according to 2007 statistics, Russian total liquid production was nearly 9,8 million bbl/d of crude oil. The most important oil fields in Russia are Samotlor, Fedorovo-Surgutskoye, Priobskoye, Romashkinskoye (Tataristan

²⁰⁶ Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry*, (USA: Praeger Publisher,2005), 215.

²⁰⁷ Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry*, (USA: Praeger Publisher,2005), 215.

²⁰⁸ Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry*, (USA: Praeger Publisher,2005), 216.

²⁰⁹ "Russia Oil," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil.html>, (accessed Jan. 27,2009).

Samara), Tevlinsko-Russkinskoye, Ust-Balyk-Mamontovskoye, Tyanskoye, Pokachevsko-Uryevskoye, Sugmutskoye, Vatyeganskoye, Malo-Balykskoye, Krasnoleninskoye, Povkhovskoye, Pravdinsko-Salymskoye²¹⁰. There are 40 oil refineries with 5.4 million bbl/d capacity in Russia.

Russia holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world with 1,680 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Next natural gas owner country is Iran which has half of reserves of Russia²¹¹. Furthermore, Russia is the largest natural gas exporter in the world. Official Russian statistics claim that in 2030, Russia's natural gas capacity will increase the total production of 31.1 Tfc.

Russia has monopoly on natural gas production and export. Gazprom is the basic state regulated company on natural gas which the state owns 50.002 percent. In 1989, the USSR Ministry of the Gas Industry was reorganized into gas concern named Gazprom. According to Gazprom officials,

Gazprom's mission is to provide effective and well-balanced gas supply to Russian customers and to safely implement long-term gas export contracts. Gazprom's strategy is to acquire the leading position among the global energy companies by entering new markets, diversifying core business activities and ensuring reliable supplies.²¹²

Gazprom is as a state company signed several agreements with other related companies in other countries. For example, Gaz de France and Gazprom signed the Agreement of Cooperation. Gazprom and Neste, Finnish company, also signed the Agreement to supply natural gas to Finland for 20 years²¹³. Although foreign investors demanded five times higher, Gazprom distributed 1, 15 percent of its

²¹⁰ "Russia Oil," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil.html>, (accessed Jan. 27, 2009).

²¹¹ "Russia Natural Gas," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html>, (accessed Jan. 27, 2009).

²¹² "Mission and Strategic Target," *Gazprom*, <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8511.shtml>, (accessed Jan. 27, 2009).

²¹³ "History of the Company 1989-1995," *Gazprom*, <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article23663.shtml>, (accessed Jan. 27, 2009).

shares in the form of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) on stock exchanges of the U.S. and Europe²¹⁴.

In April 2000, the Gazprom headquarters hosted a meeting with Putin and he became Gazprom's top management with his presidency. Gazprom is an international energy company, therefore it is related with several fields in the region and the world; Bolivia, Bovonenkovo field, Prirazlomnoye field, Sakhalin II project, Shtokman project, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yuzhno-Russkoye field, Zapolyarnoye field²¹⁵.

5.2 Significance of Interdependency of Russia

In the 21st Century, countries have to build stable relations, because it does not matter, producing or consuming natural resource, and every country dependent on each other via pipelines, ports and railroads. The balance between supply and demand creates market mechanism. Therefore, it is understood that, today economic power's of state is more impressive than military power's. In that point of view, energy security is one of subjects of soft security. Countries are afraid of destroying relation in some way by other countries. Not only bilateral security, but also regional and international security take place in the scope of this subject matter.

Russia is one of producer country of hydrocarbon reserves. In supply and demand security parts, it is mentioned how belonging hydrocarbon reserves effect Russia's status in the region and the world²¹⁶. Furthermore, Russia has recognized its energy advantage. Hydrocarbon reserves are limited in the world and demand of countries has gradually increased by depending on technologic developments and the capacity of the country. For example; developments on car industry impact on oil prices and demand. It is estimated that global demand for the fuel type sectors will rapidly

²¹⁴ "History of the Company 1996," *Gazprom*, <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article23598.shtml>, (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²¹⁵ "About Major Projects," *Gazprom*, <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article20001.shtml>, (accessed Jan,27, 2009)

²¹⁶ Kirsten Westpal, "The Eu-Russian Relationship and the Energy Factor: A European View," in *A Focus on EU-Russian Relations*, ed. Kirsten Westpal. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005),29.

increase to the year of 2017²¹⁷. Therefore, the supply of oil will be increased to 2017. In that point, diversification remains an important concept of energy security.

There are five important factors cause the perception on interdependence in the subject of energy security. Firstly, physical interdependence links countries via transportation road or pipelines. Infrastructure security is the basic problem under that subject, because there is a huge risk of disruptions. Secondly, economic interdependence is important for both consumer and producer states; stable supply of energy and energy prices are dependent variables. Thirdly, energy security creates social interdependence, because energy prices effect the wealth distribution and the volatility of oil and gas prices. Furthermore, it is a risk in front of socio-economic development. Fourthly, politics is directly related with economics, therefore energy security creates political interdependence. Mutual dependency force countries to cooperate several issues and energy trade provide comparable but stable relations with the parts. Lastly, ecological interdependence as the production, transportation and consumption of energy highly impact on environment such as environmental damage or climate change²¹⁸. This is the basic point of building soft security policies on energy security of Russia.

Infrastructure, supply and demand security are three basic sources of soft security under the concept of energy security. In that part, it will be mentioned them considering Russia and consumer countries.

5.3 Infrastructure Security and Basic Pipelines

Ports and pipelines are so important for Russian oil and natural gas export. In the last ten years, Russian crude oil export has grown from around 12 percent, total crude import to around 29 percent in 2007. Russia has exported nearly 4.4 million bbl/d of crude oil and 2 million bbl/d oil products. There are several routes and

²¹⁷ “Global Markets for Diesel –Powered Light Vehicles to 2017 Proposal for a New Syndicated Study,” *J.D. Power Associates Automotive Forecasting* (July 2007):4, <http://www.jdpowerforecasting.com/downloads/GDS%2007%20brochure.pdf>, 4, (accessed Feb.01, 2009).

²¹⁸ Kirsten Westpal, “The Eu-Russian Relationship and the Energy Factor: A European View,” in *A Focus on EU-Russian Relations*, ed. Kirsten Westpal. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005),28.

ways to transfer Russian oil and natural gas; ports and pipeline systems. These two systems impact on transit countries' security. Russia has long borders in Europe and Far East; this is both advantage and disadvantage to them and also other countries. Russia has not transferred their natural resources. Also it is a gate for Central Asian countries with Turkey. Furthermore, Russia has also used Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's oil and natural gas.

Kazakhstan is a landlocked country and need to transport its potential resources through other countries. Russia is the oldest economic partner with whom the relations started with agriculture and continued with other resources. Kazakhstan's industry and oil pipelines are highly dependent on Russia. Kazakhstan's basic route to export its oil is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), Atrou-Samara Pipeline and Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline²¹⁹. Those three pipelines connect Russia and Kazakhstan. Also pipelines give opportunity to generate relations with other countries. For example; Atasu-Alashankou pipeline enables China to reach Russian oil pass through Kazakhstan.

This triangle relation has enriched political and economical ties among the countries. Russia is the third largest energy consumer in the world therefore; it is a big market for Kazakhstan. Russian Federation also takes place nearly all projects by sharing percentage in Kazakhstan. Its companies such as YUKOS, Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosneft, TNK-BP (Russian&British) have participated in projects representing Russia²²⁰. Russia Federation is a partner and rival at the same time for Kazakhstan²²¹. The important aim should decrease dependency to Russia and build elastic relations to carry on commerce.

²¹⁹ Ailuna R. Utegenova, "Euroasian Pipelines: The Political And Economic Gordianknot For Russia and Kazakhstan." *The Harriman Institute* (2006):2, www.harrimaninstitute.org/MEDIA/00656.pdf, (accessed Jan.28, 2009)

²²⁰ Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry*, (New York: Preager Publisher, 2005),217.

²²¹ Ailuna R. Utegenova, "Euroasian Pipelines: The Political And Economic Gordianknot For Russia and Kazakhstan." *The Harriman Institute* (2006):4, www.harrimaninstitute.org/MEDIA /00656.pdf, (accessed Jan.28, 2009).

As there was no stability in the region, Turkmenistan wanted to be economically dependent to Russia and did not want to act alone in its first years of independence. Until 1993, Russia was not interested in Central Asian countries because its main concern was to turn its face to West²²². Once the difficulties of integration to West appeared, it started to be interested in the Central Asia again. In the meantime, Turkmenistan which recognized its abundant resources and the importance of its resources for other countries started to build peaceful relations with other countries like Iran, Turkey as well as the U.S.

Prior to 1997, Russia was only way to transport Turkmen gas to the world. Central Asia-Center Gas Pipeline is good example to show result of dependency how affect countries internal economies;

Although over 2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of Caspian Sea region natural gas was piped via the Central Asia Center gas pipeline in 1990, exports fell to 0.3 Tcf in 1997 when Russia's Gazprom, which is a competitor with Turkmen natural gas and owns the Russian pipelines through which Turkmenistan exports, denied Turkmenistan access to the system over a payment dispute.²²³

Gazprom which is the biggest stock company in Russia signed a 25-year agreement on natural gas with Turkmenistan in 2003. Thanks to the agreement, it takes natural gas from Turkmenistan cheaply, use in internal market and sell its own natural gas products to the world with expensive prices²²⁴.

Anyway, Turkmenistan has a relation with Ukraine regarding natural gas. As per the agreement concluded between these two parties, the pipeline contact passes through the Russia. In 2001, Turkmenistan and Ukraine signed an agreement about a major natural gas export deal through 2006 under which Turkmenistan will

²²² Elnur Soltan "Türkmenistan ve Rusya: 'Gaz' Üzerinde Kurulan İlişkiler" in *Avrasya Dosyası Türkmenistan Özel*, no. 2 (Yaz 2001):185

²²³ "Russia Background," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgase.html>, (accessed Jan. 26, 2009).

²²⁴ İlyas Kamalov, "Türkmen Gazı İçin Mücadele Artacak." *Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ASAM)*, (2006), <http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?kat1=60&ID=1346>, (accessed Jan.28, 2009).

provide Ukraine with a total of 8.83 Tcf of natural gas via Russia between 2002 and 2006²²⁵.

Baku-Novorossiysk is another pipeline which is related with Russia. Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline built is to pass Azeri oil through Black Sea and straits to Europe which is signed in 1996²²⁶. The pipeline's capacity is nearly 80,000 barrels per day²²⁷. This result causes an environmental problem in straits. On December 6, Azeri Prime Minister Artur Rasizade announced that Azerbaijan would stop transporting Azeri oil from Novorossiysk port on as of 1 January 2007²²⁸. However, there is no cutting nowadays. Novorossiysk port is debatable port both Russia and Azerbaijan, because, Transneft- Russian company controls oil which transports from Novorossiysk port to Europe²²⁹.

Turkey is another actor on Russian energy security. For developing economic relations Blue Stream has effected deeply and positively. After 30 years, one of Russian presidents, Putin came to Turkey in 2004. Putin and Erdoğan signed a declaration to develop friendship and multidimensional cooperation about peace, stability and welfare of Eurasia²³⁰. Both of them are the members of Black Sea Economic Cooperation. In Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline, Russia is not one of participants. However, at first, Turkey wanted Russia to be included in the BTC. And Turkey has never intervened Chechnya problem directly.

²²⁵ "Russia Background," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspase.html>, (accessed Jan. 28, 2009).

²²⁶ "Azerbaijan Oil Strategy," *Azerbaijan Official Web Site*, http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_OilStrategy/oilStrategy_05_e.html (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²²⁷ Metin Gezen, "Azerbaijan's Gas Struggle with Russia." *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, (2007), <http://turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2424> (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²²⁸ James Kimmitt "Confirmed: Azerbaijan to Stop Using Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline," *Eurasia Blog Official Web Site*, (2006), <http://eurasiablog.wordpress.com/2006/12/08/confirmed-azerbaijan-to-stop-using-baku-novorossiysk-pipeline/> (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²²⁹ Metin Gezen, "Azerbaijan's Gas Struggle with Russia." *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, (2007), <http://turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2424> (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²³⁰ Anil Gürtuna, "Turkish-Russian Relations in The Post Soviet Era: From Conflict to Cooperation?," *Published Thesis For The Degree Of Master of Science*, (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, The Graduate School of Social Science, January 2006), 40.

Turkey-Russia relation is always fluctuated. Changing interest causes this situation. Turkey-Russia relations especially recent years is better. Economic relations are really beneficial like Blue Stream Project. It appears that building confidence among Turkey and Russia could evolve organically based on economic interests, despite mutual prejudices and suspicions²³¹.

Blue Stream gas pipeline has affected Turkish-Russian relations and also BTC indirectly. The 750-mile natural gas pipeline started to transport Russian gas in 2002 and the peak volume over 71 bcf per year. In 2004, 113 bcf natural gas flew through the pipeline and 160 bcf in 2005. If Russia allows, the capacity of pipeline is 564 bcf per year²³². Russians are proposing to extend this line from Ankara (the existing line transports gas from Samsun port to Ankara) to Ceyhan. The plans are due to further transporting additional volumes of gas to Israel either by a subsea pipeline or by LNG tankers from Ceyhan²³³.

Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the first natural gas agreement in 1984. After introducing the natural gas, Turkish demands started to increase. The second agreement about the natural gas was with Russia in 1996. After that Turkey started to find different resources and connected with Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt and Algeria. Despite of the opportunity of diversification its resources, Turkey signed the third agreement (Blue Stream Project) on natural gas with Russia²³⁴. It is really difficult to understand why Turkey selects Russia for the third time, because before

²³¹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Between Discord and Cooperation: Turkish-Russian Relations After The Cold War*, (Ebenhausen/Isartal, 1996), 28.

²³² "Russia Natural Gas," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/NaturalGas.html>, (accessed Jan.27, 2009).

²³³ Necdet Pamir and İlyas Kamalov, "Rus Gazı ve Enerjide Bağımlılığın Bedeli," *Stratejik Analiz Dergisi*, no.6/70 (February 2006):26.

²³⁴ Sinan Oğan, "Mavi Akım Projesi: Bir Enerji Stratejisi ve Stratejisizliği Örneği," *Stradigma Aylık Strateji ve Analiz e-dergisi*, no.7 (August 2003): 1. <http://www.pete.metu.edu.tr/PETE/emre/photogallery/Mavi.pdf>

Blue Stream Turkey's dependency to Russia on natural gas nearly 66% according to 2002 statistics and after Blue Stream, it is expected to be nearly 70%²³⁵.

European Union demand their members and candidates, being dependence about energy only one country in the negotiation process should be maximum 30%²³⁶. Turkey tries to be transit country for energy through BTC, Nabucco or other projects. However, its huge dependency to Russia blocks that. Moreover, according to Bülent Aras, Russia did not want BTC due to BTC's geographical vicinity to Russia ,ethnic secessionist movements in Caucasus and reducing Russian influence on international agreements with Central Asian state and Caucasus²³⁷.

Russia is powerful country especially among Central Asian states and Caucasus. Furthermore, Russian companies have commission from other companies in different countries. This dependency affects other countries relations with international and regional powers. Especially, when the subject is pipeline construction, Russia tries to use its all sanctions on them. For instance; Kazakhstan wants to build different pipeline with regional powers like China and Turkey. However, Russian influence on the country as politically and economically affects their decisions.

Energy is the core of the relationship between Russian and EU to intensify formal and informal links between them. The EU is potentially one of the most promising and secure markets for Russian energy considering geographical conditions. This is one of soft security issues which increase the importance of "economization" of

²³⁵ Sinan Oğan, "Mavi Akım Projesi: Bir Enerji Stratejisi ve Stratejisizliği Örneği," *Stradigma Aylık Strateji ve Analiz e-dergisi*, no.7 (August 2003): 6. <http://www.pete.metu.edu.tr/PETE/emre/photogallery/Mavi.pdf>

²³⁶ Sinan Oğan, "Mavi Akım Projesi: Bir Enerji Stratejisi ve Stratejisizliği Örneği," *Stradigma Aylık Strateji ve Analiz e-dergisi*, no.7 (August 2003):5. <http://www.pete.metu.edu.tr/PETE/emre/photogallery/Mavi.pdf>

²³⁷ James Warhola and William Mitchell, "The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications", *Demokratizatsiya*, no.14/1(Winter 2006): 131.

inter-state relations²³⁸. Economization shows the importance of economy for country. Russia and EU build their relations based on their economic conditions and trade. This is the reason why they need to generate their relations.

Diversification is so important for European Union, because EU gas reserves are limited. It is estimated that indigenous production falls and domestic demand rises and it will cause 80 percent gas dependency by 2020. In 2001, EU imported natural gas from Russia (39 percent), Norway (26 percent), Algeria (25 percent) and other sources (10 percent)²³⁹. When it is looked at oil sector, in 2002, EU imported oil from OPEC (38 percent), Norway (24 percent), Russia (22 percent) and others such as Kazakhstan, Syria, Mexico and Azerbaijan (17 percent)²⁴⁰. According to Information Administration of the U.S.;

Roughly, 1.3 million bbl/d were exported to Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic via The Druzhba crude oil pipeline from Russia... The majority of Russia's oil exports transit via Transneft-controlled pipelines, but around 300,000 bbl/d of oil is transported via other non-Transneft-controlled sea routes or via rail. Because of higher world oil prices recently, almost 170,000 bbl/d of Russia's oil is transported via railroad.²⁴¹

Ukraine and Belarus are two important countries to transfer Russian oil and natural gas to Europe. In addition to Druzhba pipeline, the Pridnieper pipeline transports crude oil to refineries in southern Ukraine as well as around 200,000 bbl/d of Russian and Kazakh crude oil through Odessa on the Black Sea²⁴². There are several proposed pipeline projects to link countries via pipelines in Eurasia. What is more, Ukraine and Belarus are both heavily dependent on Russia for energy

²³⁸ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 175.

²³⁹ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 181.

²⁴⁰ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 180.

²⁴¹ "Russia Oil Exports," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil_exports.html (accessed Jan. 28, 2009).

²⁴² "Ukraine Oil," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Ukraine/Oil.html> (accessed Jan. 29, 2009).

supplies. There are several problems between these countries about debts and unpaid bills²⁴³.

Russia has ports on Black Sea and the Baltic Sea to transport oil via tankers to Europe. Novorossiysk is the basic port of Russia in Black Sea. In 2007, 885,000 bbl/d oil exported to Europe²⁴⁴. According to Energy Information Administration;

The port of Primorsk came online in December 2001 along with Russia's Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), which carries oil from Russia's West Siberian and Timan-Pechora oil provinces westward to the Russian Gulf of Finland. The port has a through put capacity of 1.3 million bbl/d of oil. Significant expansion took place in 2003, making Primorsk the Baltic region's busiest port. In 2005, further expansions increased its crude oil export capacity from 1.0 million bbl/d to 1.3 million bbl/d. Primorsk increased oil exports in 2005 by 28.7 percent to 1.15 million bbl/d, up from 888,334 bbl/d in 2004. Transneftproduct, the state owned Russian crude oil pipeline operator, and Russian Oil Company Lukoil agreed in 2006 to construct a pipeline between Primorsk and Vysotsk that will enable Lukoil to ship 69,712 bbl/d of diesel fuel annually.²⁴⁵

Rail route system to transfer oil to Asia is the important way for Russia. Rail export is composed of 5 percent of Russian crude oil export. Central Asian countries' network via pipelines to Far East is beneficial for Russia in order to participate in the market.

5.4 Supply Security

Hydrocarbon reserves are one of limited natural resources in the world. On the other hand, it is valuable, because everywhere of life, people depend on oil and natural gas. Hydrocarbon has been used for many years for fuels, electric power generation

²⁴³ Peter Rutland, "Oil, Politics and Foreign Policy", *The Political Economy of Russian Oil* in David Lane (Ed.) (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1999), pp.163-188, p.166.

²⁴⁴ "Russia Oil Exports," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil_exports.html (accessed Jan.28, 2009).

²⁴⁵ "The Baltic Sea Regional Factsheet Oil," *Energy Information Administration of the US*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Baltic/Oil.html> (accessed Jan.29, 2009).

and heating. Furthermore, the chemicals, petrochemicals, plastics and rubber industries depend on hydrocarbon as a raw material of their products²⁴⁶. There are also alternative resources to them. However, these methods are so expensive and difficult to implement.

Russia is the largest natural gas exporter and second largest oil exporter in the world. It has to communicate several countries in the region. When it is considered Russia's huge territories, Russia has advantages and disadvantages. Russia is one of the producer countries of hydrocarbon reserves. Russia firstly, responds to domestic demand of their country. After that it starts to sell its natural resources to other countries.

Supply security is important for countries which buy natural resources from other countries, because they would like to be sure if they have encountered any problem to receive natural resources politically and economically. Both producer and consumer countries have to adhere to international rules and bilateral agreements. Russia is both strong and complicated country politically. Moreover, it is a developing country. It has a different political and economical background.

There are several actors which has played crucial role on supply security. Firstly, international system can be determinant on national sectors. Global crisis effects oil and natural gas prices, therefore it is possible to change that producer country can change oil and natural gas prices. OPEC's mission to coordinate unifies the petroleum policies of member countries. Ensuring a stabilization of oil markets is important to create secure arena for consumers and producers²⁴⁷.

Russia is not a member of OPEC. Russia supports (even indirectly) OPEC's pricing policy. Furthermore, they struggle for the same aim; the growing energy demand is one of the problems of global economy. Russia and OPEC have shared a mutual

²⁴⁶ George A. Olah, "Hydrocarbons for the 21st Century- The Work of the Loker Hydrocarbon Research Institute," *Nobel Prize Web Site*, (Sept.16, 1999) http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/articles/olah/index.html (accessed Jan.29, 2009).

²⁴⁷ "OPEC's Mission," *OPEC Official Web Site*, <http://www.opec.org/home/> (accessed Jan.29, 2009).

interest on developing new supply capacities and they work on together about the stabilization of oil economy²⁴⁸.

Russia and OPEC are competitors on oil sector. It is threatened OPEC countries to increase oil capacity of Russia in international market. Therefore, OPEC needs to communicate with Russia²⁴⁹. At the middle of the rivalry, consumers have affected price policies positively and negatively. In that term, consumers have positive results; OPEC pricing policy is not effective on oil price, but also in the price of natural gas. Oil product prices strongly influence the price of natural gas. If the price of oil decreases below \$25/b, the return is realized on certain Gazprom investments²⁵⁰. Negative results are the subject of demand security for producers, namely Russia.

Secondly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, changing relations with the U.S. has had a great influence on energy security. Basic aim of the U.S in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union was to decrease Russian monopoly and prevent Iranian influence on the Gulf as a route of oil and natural gas²⁵¹. BTC is the one of main projects (with 40.50 million-tonne-capacity) which is an alternative route to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.

After the Al-Qaeda Attacks to Twin Towers in New York in 2001, The U.S. started to think the concept of “Diversification” and Turkey’s role about pipelines for Middle East and Middle Asia’s. Turkey is as a Muslim country in this area but support the West at the beginning of building. The U.S. has understood the necessary of building a counterbalance of security and energy. Today, it is seen that Central Asian countries are dependent to Russia politically and economically.

²⁴⁸ “OPEC-Russia Meet on Energy Dialog,” *OPEC Official Web Site*, <http://www.opec.org/opecna/Press%20Releases/2005/PR252005.htm> (accessed Jan.29, 2009).

²⁴⁹ Alexander Koliandre, “OPEC: Playing Russia’s Oil Game,” *BBC News*, (March.12, 2002) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1868990.stm> (accessed Jan.29, 2009).

²⁵⁰ Sadek Boussena and Catherine Locatelli, *Towards a More Coherent Oil Policy in Russia* (OPEC,2005): 94.

²⁵¹ Simon Bromley, “The United States and The Control of World Oil,” *Government and Opposition*, no.40/2 (2005): 247.

Thirdly, Russia sells oil and natural gas to several countries via pipelines, ports and railroads. Consumer dependency has created problems, because Russia has abused their natural resources, such as including their political relations on consumer countries. The basic consumers of Russian oil and natural gas are Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Serbia, Greece, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Austria, Turkey, Romania, Germany, Italy, France and China. It is understood that Russian natural resource capacity has great impact on the Baltic, the Balkans, Europe, Far East and Anatolia.

EU and Turkey have several problems about the stable relations with Russia on oil and natural gas sectors. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed in 1994 by Russian and European countries. But Russia has never ratified the ECT²⁵². Russia prefers using its opportunity of owning valuable reserves by building pressure on consumer states.

EU gas reserves are limited (20 years at current production rate) and indigenous production falls and domestic demand count rise gas dependency nearly 80 percent by 2020. In 2001, gas import from Russia is 39 percent, Norway 26 percent, Algeria 25 percent and other sources 10 percent²⁵³. The Baltic and Macedonia are dependent to Russia on gas sector 100 percent, The Black Sea countries nearly 87 percent, Central European countries 62 percent, comparing to them; France, Germany and Croatia 25 percent²⁵⁴.

During Putin period, EU and Turkey encountered several threats about Russian natural gas reduction. Europe reaches Russian natural gas via Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Political and economical relations are determinant on stable access of

²⁵² Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeeff, "The G8 and Russia: Security of Supply vs. Security of Demand," *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, (August 2006):4, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0806-1.pdf

²⁵³ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russian Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005): 181.

²⁵⁴ Mete Göknel, "Doğalgaz Krizi Türkiye İçin Fırsat Mı?," *Stratejik Analiz*, no.9/105 (2009):67.

natural gas. Furthermore, the relations between Russia and Ukraine created problems to Europe and Turkey.

Ukraine is part of 2003-2005 colored revolutions period. When Yushchenko won the presidency election after Orange Revolution, Ukraine meets to “new region”. This revolution was a door which opens to West and Western type of democracy²⁵⁵. On the other hand, it means that they would encounter Russia who did not support the revolutions in the region. Economic ties are one of the ways to show Russian unwillingness.

Natural gas reductions are the basic problems of consumer countries. In that point, Russian relations with Ukraine has increased the crisis, because high level of debt and unpaid bills cause short time cuts of natural gas. In 2004, Russian and Ukrainian governments signed an agreement about the delivery of Central Asian gas especially Turkmen gas to Ukraine and settlement of past debts. The agreement foresaw deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine of 21-25 Bcm/year for the period 2005-09²⁵⁶. It was not end of problems; on March 3, 2008 Russia reduced the gas supplies to Ukraine because of payment dispute. European fears from the dispute between Russia and Ukraine was shown Michele Cercone, spokesman for the European Commission in 2008, “to find a quick and definitive solution”²⁵⁷.

5.5 Demand Security

Providing demand security is important for producers of natural resources, because if there is no demand, it means no supply. Correlation between demand and supply show systematic market mechanism. Monopoly on a sector is advantage for producers; on the other hand, diversification on sector gives opportunity to

²⁵⁵ Henry E. Hale, “Democracy or Autocracy on the March The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, no.39 (2006):313.

²⁵⁶ Jonathan Stern, “The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006,” *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, (January 2006):2, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0106.pdf

²⁵⁷ Andrew E. Kramer, “Gazprom Shrinks its Natural Gas Shipments to Ukraine, Citing Unpaid Debt,” *International Herald Tribune*, March.3, 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/03/business/gazprom.4-232923.php> (accessed Jan.30, 2009).

consumers to select best and cheapest one. Moreover, they have chance to change their demands on other alternative sectors or other producers.

Russia does not create a monopoly on oil and natural gas sector in the world. There are several countries having these resources. Energy resources have several features; firstly, it has small or large reserves, having any energy resources is important for every country in order to meet domestic and external demands. Secondly, energy resources are limited. It is not certain that when it exhausts, therefore it has great risks. Scientists have tried to produce alternative sources to hydrocarbons such as renewable energy resources. Thirdly, it is so expensive that producers have determined stable prices. The prices also change according to conditions of the market and other countries' economic conditions.

Russia is bound to remain a heavily hydrocarbon dependent economy. More than 50 percent of Russian exports consist of oil, oil products and natural gas and other are iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, manufactured goods and others²⁵⁸. It means that Russia dependent to other countries economically. If consumer countries start to prefer alternative energy resources or other producer countries, Russian economy will impact 50 percent.

EU, for geographical reasons, is potentially one of the most promising and secure markets for Russian energy²⁵⁹. On the other hand, instability of Russian energy export to consumer states is effective on decision. European countries are so important for Russia, because they are basic consumers of Russian oil and natural gas. Fluctuated relations with Europe and European fears about Russia cause them to find alternative countries and routes to reach oil and gas. Turkey is an alternative route to Russia as a transit country to provide connection with the Caucasus. Azeri,

²⁵⁸ Rudiger Ahrend, "Sustaining Growth in a Hydrocarbon-based Economy," in *Russia's Oil and Natural Gas Bonanza or Curse*, ed. Michael Ellman. (London: Anthem Press, 2006):113. pp.105-126.

²⁵⁹ Debra Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links," in *Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations*, eds., Debra Johnson, & Paul Robinson, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005): 175.

Kazakh and Turkmen oil and natural gas are alternative to Russia and Iran for Europe and the U.S.

BTC Project is a nearly \$ 3 Billion investment which is a new route to transport the Caspian oil to the World from Azerbaijan(Baku), via Georgia(Tbilisi), to Turkey(Ceyhan)²⁶⁰.The length of pipeline is 1768 km. (443 km Azerbaijan, 249 km in Georgia and 1076 km in Turkey). The capacity of Project is one million barrels per day or 50 million tons per year. The project's design life now is 40 years.

On 16 June 2006 Kazakhstan joined the BTC Project by which 10 million tons of oil is expected to pass from the pipeline which will also increase the capacity of oil to 25 million tons as a further development²⁶¹. Nazarbaev, the President of Kazakhstan believes that this event is beneficial for Azerbaijani and Kazakh relations to develop the Caspian Sea basin²⁶². There is a huge pressure on Kazakhstan that Russia tries to persuade the Russian controlled pipeline that runs to Bulgaria's Black Sea port Burgas to Alexandroupolis in Greece²⁶³.

BTC is not the only alternative to the Black Sea ports (Novorossiyk and Supra). There are the Greek-Bulgarian-Russian pipeline as well as the Bulghas-Vlore (Albania) project. U.S. also supports this project and The Constanza-Trieste pipeline from Romania to Italia. These are also by-pass Bosphorus Strait and decrease Russian impact²⁶⁴.

Furthermore, Nabucco is a new pipeline project which is from Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The project partners are OMV Gas GmbH

²⁶⁰ "BTC-Caspian Developmet," *Momo Communications Ltd. Official Web Site*, <http://www.momo.co.uk/BTCCaspianDevelopment.asp> (accessed Jan.30, 2009).

²⁶¹ "Kazakhstan:Riding The Oil Boom," *Foreign Affairs*, no.86/1(2007):114

²⁶² "Eurasia:Kazakhstan Squeezes In On BTC Pipeline Project," *RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty Official Web Site*, June.16, 2006, <http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/1662c9c5-9b2d-4612-9e45-ad8759857a7e.html> (accessed Jan.30, 2009)

²⁶³ "Kazakhstan and Russia to By-pass BTC Oil Pipeline," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, May.11,2007, <http://turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=44983> (accessed Jan.30, 2009)

²⁶⁴ Alec Rasizade, "The Great Game of The Caspian Energy: Ambitions and Realities," *Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans*, no.7/1 (April 2005):10.

(Austria), MOL plc (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), BOTAŞ (Turkey)²⁶⁵. The basic aim of the project is to build a new route from Middle East and the Caspian region and decrease dependency only one country. Its cost will be 4.6 billion Euro which will be started in 2008 and the construction is expected to be finished by 2011²⁶⁶.

Nabucco is the third project from BTC and the SahDeniz project which takes big responsibility to Turkey as a transit country. Also the Sah Deniz Project which transports Azeri gas (Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields) to Turkey (Erzurum) via Georgia (Tbilisi) is its spine of Nabucco. When we look at the map which is on the left side of paper, Nabucco is a very big and costly project and also related with a lot of country politically and economically²⁶⁷.

Nabucco will decrease European dependency on gas sector to Russia. Because of this reason, Russia does not support Nabucco. Today, when we look at the news, we see a lot of problem about the project. Firstly, one of problem derives from USA, the intense relations between the U.S. and Iran effects the construction of project. The U.S. companies do not want to support any project which Iran includes of it²⁶⁸. According to Grace;

Despite the liabilities of over-reliance on natural resources, oil and gas continue to propel national policy. President Putin's goal of doubling the national gross domestic product by 2015 features income from oil and gas as a primary support. In its image of the nation's energy wealth,

²⁶⁵ "Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project," *Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH*, October 2008, <http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/cms/upload/press%20and%20public/presentations/Nabucco%20Project-%20Info%20folder%20Oct%202008.pdf> (accessed Jan.20, 2009).

²⁶⁶ Rupprecht Berger, "2nd Work Group Meeting on SEE Gas Industry Infrastructure Financing, Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project," Serbia&Montenegro: OMV Gas GmbH, (October.3-4, 2005):7,8,9 <http://www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/sectors/energy/documents/031005gas/Nabucco%20Presentation%20Belgrad%20Oct%202005.pdf> (accessed Jan.30, 2009).

²⁶⁷Ufuk Şanlı, "Doğal Gaz'da Kilit Ülke Olacağız," *Aksiyon*, December.11, 2006 <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=26129> (accessed Jan.30, 2009).

²⁶⁸ Sezer Kılıç, (30 May 2007) "Nabucco Projesi'nde Sıkıntı Yaşanıyor", NTVMSNBC Official Web Site, <http://ntvmsnbc.com/news/409341.asp>, 30.01.2009

Moscow sees a powerful lever to catapult itself into competition and cooperation with its European neighbors as a peer.²⁶⁹

Russian economy has transformed their natural resources to advantages in order to support their national goal. Energy security is a part of its national goal of Russia. Under the presidency of Putin, he preferred sustainable economic growth with 2-3 percent growth per year²⁷⁰. Furthermore, Russia tries to build strong and stable relations with regional countries and powerful countries in the world. As a hydrocarbon rich country, Russia would like to show its power in the world. In that process, there were several proposals for new pipeline systems and agreements to mutual cooperation on energy issue with Europe, China, the U.S., Turkey and Central Asia.

The Chapter Five focused on energy security as one of soft security threats to Russia. The chapter first analysed the perception of energy as a security issue in Russia with the sub-headings arguing the importance of oil and natural gas in Russia. After that part, the key subject of energy under security issue, interdependency of countries and its implement were analysed. Infrastructure security and pipelines is another heading which composes technical procedures and geological structure, supply and demand security was mentioned as another two parts. These two parts were related with interdependency theory.

Having analyzed the role of soft security in Russian national security, three basic soft security threats of Russia; terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security the next chapter will be conclusion.

²⁶⁹ John D Grace, *Russian Oil Supply Performance and Prospects*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.217

²⁷⁰ Harley Balzer, "Vladimir Putin on Russian Energy Policy", *The National Interest*, Nov.11, 2005 <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/November2005/November2005Balzer.html> (accessed Feb.01, 2009)

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Russia's status in post-Soviet era has continued to be a powerful country. Its geopolitical importance in the European continent conduces that Russia cannot be ignored in the new world system²⁷¹. It is obvious that today, new conditions of security start to be more important in addition to military matters²⁷². Russia perceives new developments and threats in the world which it may encounter. Moreover, Russia understands that it cannot solve problems or compete with other countries with the Cold War national security concept. Russia started to adapt its policies to the new national security concept. The concept of soft security identifies non-traditional threats and methods to combat these threats. The strong national security should compose hard and soft security policies together.

Putin is a significant politician with his dominant character and his perception of the new world. There are two main reasons why Putin was significant for Russia in the post-Soviet era. Putin was appointed acting president and following elections in March 2000 with 53 percent of vote. Furthermore, Putin has several contributions to the evolution of Russian security. Firstly, Russia decided to orient the West with building cooperation. Secondly, the recognition of the importance of soft security dimension in international relations and thirdly, his political priority to take place in multi-polar world as one of strongest country with its economy, military, political and social developments²⁷³. On the other hand, Russia has several deficiencies establishing democratic values such as human rights, freedom of speech, and

²⁷¹ Dmitry Polikanov and Graham Timmis, "Russian Foreign Policy under Putin," in *Russian Politics under Putin*, ed. Cameron Ross, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 223.

²⁷² Hüseyin Bağcı, *Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde Balkanlar (1991-1993)* (Ankara:Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1994), 5.

²⁷³ Dmitry Polikanov and Graham Timmis, "Russian Foreign Policy under Putin," in *Russian Politics under Putin*, ed. Cameron Ross, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 223.

existence of civil society. Moreover, Putin was not eager to develop these values under his presidency.

Putin believes that security is the primary subject of Russia. Russia's geo-political condition supports his ideas, because Russia has a lot of neighbours from East Europe, Far East, Central Asia, Middle East, and the Caucasus and so on. Thus, the requirement of producing miscellaneous policies and perceiving different threats from them has caused strong national security policy. In that respect, high security need pull a head of Russian national priorities.

The new policies of Putin targeting to establish powerful state in the region and the world forced Russia to move towards international cooperation and good relations with the West²⁷⁴. The thesis argued that Russia's aim to be one of powerful states in the new world system based on generating its soft security policies. Furthermore, Russia has caught the world under Putin. Besides Putin's characteristic features, Russia started to generate these policies just in time. The September 11 was the turning point not only Russia, but also every country in the World. Countries understand the importance of soft security policies.

In that respect, Chapter One of the thesis mentioned the theoretical perspective of soft security based on contrary to mainstream argument which claimed that of Russia has Soviet heritage and military is the only centre to determine the security policy²⁷⁵. It is not wrong to state that Russia has strong and developed army and military equipments with highly technological matters. On the contrary to mainstream argument, Russia has perceived non-military issues as threats against its national security. There is not much emphasis on soft security issues in the literature and only a few articles are written about Russian soft security policy. The thesis targeted to prove the importance of soft security issues for the Russia case.

²⁷⁴ Lena Johnson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia 'The Shaping of the Russian Foreign Policy,'* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 6.

²⁷⁵ Bobo Lo, "The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin," in *Russia Between East and the West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Gabriel Gorodetsky (London: Fank Cass Publishers, 2003), 14.

Russian national security doctrines are the best proofs to illustrate Russian consideration of soft security policies. The thesis mentioned five national security doctrines; Russian Security Blueprint Concepts 2000, The May 2000 Russian Military Doctrine, the Concept of the World in the 21st Century, Foreign Policy of Russia and Russia's Development Strategy to the year 2010. Russian national security doctrines demonstrate the reality of Russia. The doctrines are very much obvious that they identify all hard and soft security threats and struggle methods. The thesis focused on soft security matters. The Russian National Security Concept 2000 identified Russian priorities for its national security. Stability and security are the main aims of new Russian national security concept whereas economy, politics, technology, science, environment and information constitute the parts of Russian national security. Furthermore, Russia recognized and directly focused on soft security threats in the doctrine.

Russia emphasized its new military doctrine to mutual cooperation of states. Arms control agreements and treaties are the best proof to show Russian willingness. On the other hand, the doctrine is very obvious that in any emergency case, Russia does not hesitate to use military power. Respecting international agreements takes advantage to Russia in international arena. The SCO, BLACKSEAFOR, agreements with OSCE showed that Russia tries to be regional power with soft security policies. Other doctrines in Chapter two mentioned the importance of non-military issues especially three Russian basic soft security threats; terrorism, transnational organized crime and energy security. Russia tries to prove the world that it is ready for new world system and it can be perceived one of crucial states in the region and also in the world with its natural resources, political, military and non-military capacities.

It was focused on basic soft security threats in the thesis in order to understand how Russia combats against these threats. Firstly, it was mentioned terrorism as a soft security threat to Russian security. The September 11 was an important date for Russia, because terrorism perceived as a soft security threat after the date. Russia is

the permanent member of the UN Security Council. Thus, Russia perceives every terrorist activity against any country as a threat against itself.

Military capacity is an obligation in that point. However, without soft security solutions, military capacity expresses nothing. Thus, countries have to build cooperation and mutual relations. Terrorism has never ended but can be controlled, because some states help terrorist organisations. Interdependency of states blocked this threat. Russia has participated in several acts and conventions about terrorism.

Territorial integrity is one of national security aims of Russia. Chechen problem has been the most dangerous threat for Russia. Up to now, it is seen that Russia prefers to use military power to block that threat. There are several criticisms from the West. However, Russia's policies especially after the school tragedy in Beslan were very aggressive. Thus, Russia is not very successful using soft security practices about Chechen problem. Every country can encounter similar minority problems. Furthermore, external relations have triggered internal problems. Regarding the Chechen case, Chechen terrorists trained and funded by other terrorist organizations and a few of countries. Military problems blocked countries development. Thus, Russia needs to solve Chechen problem rooted by using soft security policies. Chapter Three focused on the issue deeply. It was mentioned several soft security implementations but comparing to other two soft security threats of Russia, there is no functional policies.

Transnational organized crime is another soft security threat for Russia. The significance of organized crime, Russia's struggle methods in internal and external level was mentioned in detail in the Chapter four. Transnational organized crime existed in the 1990s. Thus, it is a new problem for all countries. Russia's position in this subject is very complicated as it acts as a sending, receiving and transit country for illegal migrants²⁷⁶, because of its complicated but very important condition,

²⁷⁶ Irina Ivakhniouk, "Illegal Migration: Russia," in *Soft Security Threats and European Security*, eds. Anne Aldis and Herd P. Graeme. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 36.

Russia has to generate soft security policies against transnational organized crime. Different from terrorism, Russia does not have any chance to control transnational organized crime with hard security policies. There is no direct enemy in this field, so actions have to be more functional in the scope of soft security matters.

Russia signed and ratified several agreements and conventions about the issue in international arena, but it is difficult to block that illegal trafficking is related with mafia organizations. Russia's economic condition is strongly related with this subject, because the huge gap between rich and poor people causes transnational organized crime.

Generally, Russia mentioned how to prevent composed soft security problems. The important point of soft security policies is to focus on how to prevent soft security threats at the beginning. Russia has relations with the West about the issue. Furthermore, European countries regard Russia on transnational organized crime, because Russia is a gate for Central Asia and other Asian countries. Nearly 300.000 transit migrant use that route. Thus, Europe signed several agreements with Russia. This situation is an advantage for Russia in order to be closer with the West.

Energy security is the subject of Russian soft security. Countries have different positions on that issue; producers, consumers and transit countries. The Chapter Five analysed energy security as one of soft security threats to Russian security. Russia is supplier and transit country of crucial natural resources in the world; oil and natural gas. The interdependency theory gives priority to economic power and transnational actors besides states. Moreover, it claims that economic powers will be dominant in the future. Today also economic powers are dominants. Russia's assertion about the one of powerful country is based on interdependency theory. The Chapter Five focused on Russia's position in the world about the issue. Energy is a strong trump of Russia. In that respect, Russia is a soft security threat for other consumer countries.

Energy security composes infrastructure security. Pipeline system links countries. But also it creates big threats for supplier and transit country, because it opens to

terrorist attacks. The Chapter Five analysed Russian oil and natural gas pipelines to understand mutual dependency in the region. The future of Russian economy depends on progress in the high technology and science-intensive sectors²⁷⁷. In that respect, energy sector of Russia needs to use more high technologies and furthermore, Russia produces its own capabilities in that sector.

Russia's basic aim is to build applicable soft security on its national security to increase its relative power and influence in the region and also in the World²⁷⁸. In this scope, Russia does not choose to cooperate with other countries and limit its freedom of action under its society. Russia's main perspective on building national security still remain aggressive and based on hard security and soft security together. Under Putin presidency, Russia has understood that only integration to the West can help their country become a modern state²⁷⁹. Putin tried to build constructive relations with NATO, WTO, Europe and the U.S. during his presidency²⁸⁰. Although, Russia needs more soft security practices for fight against terrorism, Russian soft security policies gained ground on transnational organized crime and energy security.

²⁷⁷ Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia's Choice* (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2008),326.

²⁷⁸ Christer Pursiainen, "The Impact of International Security Regimes on Russia's Behavior: The Case of the OSCE and Chechnya," in *Understanding Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ted Hopf (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 119.

²⁷⁹ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003),262.

²⁸⁰ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003),264.

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