

FACTORS SHAPING ETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG CRIMEAN TATARS,  
RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS IN CRIMEA

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YULIYA BILETSKA

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Sciences.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever  
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Sciences.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur (METU, HIST) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name: Yuliya, BILETSKA

Signature:

## **ABSTRACT**

### **FACTORS SHAPING ETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG CRIMEAN TATARS, RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS IN CRIMEA**

**BILETSKA, Yuliya**

M.A., Department of Eurasian Studies  
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydınğün

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The aim of this thesis is to define factors that are influential in the ethnic identification process of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. To better understand the current ethnic situation in Crimea, Soviet nationality policy as well as Soviet ethnos theory are reviewed. The divergence of the definitions in Soviet and Western traditions is shown. Crucial historical events that took place in Crimea are examined from the viewpoints of Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Soviet and Western historiographies. The influence of the historical myths on shaping ethnic boundaries of these ethnic groups in Crimea is shown. Main factors such as the cultural, political, economic, and global ones which are shaping the ethnic self-consciousness of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea are studied. Therefore the thesis helps us to understand the meaning of being a Russian, an Ukrainian and a Crimean Tatar in Crimea.

**Keywords:** ethnic identity, Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians, Crimea

## ÖZ

### KIRIM'DA YAŞAYAN KIRIM TATARLARININ, RUSLARIN VE UKRAYNALILARIN ETNİK KİMLİĞİNİ ŞEKİLLENDİREN ETKENLER

BILETSKA, Yuliya

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları  
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Bu tezin amacı Kırım'da yaşayan Kırım Tatarlarının, Rusların ve Ukraynalıların etnik özdeşleştirme sürecinde etkin rol oynayan etmenlerin tanımlanmasıdır. Kırım'daki mevcut etnik durumun daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için Sovyet ulus politikalarının yanı sıra Sovyet etnos teorileri de gözden geçirilmektedir. Tanımlar hususunda Sovyet ve Batı literatüründe kendini gösteren farklılıkların da altı çizilmektedir. Kırım'da meydana gelen ve tarihi açıdan önem arz eden olaylar Rusların, Ukraynalıların, Kırım Tatarlarının yanı sıra Sovyet ve Batı tarihçilerinin bakış açısı ile birlikte incelenmektedir. Kırım'da bulunan bu etnik gruplara ait etnik sınırların belirlenmesinde etkin olan tarihi efsaneler ortaya konulmaktadır. Kırım Tatarlarının, Rusların ve Ukraynalıların etnik bilincini şekillendiren kültürel, siyasi, ekonomik ve küresel etkenler üzerinde çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Böylelikle bu tez Kırım'da yaşayan bir Rus, Ukraynalı ve Kırım Tatarı olmanın ne manaya geldiğinin anlaşılması için yol gösterici olmuştur.

Anahtar sözcükler: etnik özdeşlik, Kırım Tatarları, Ruslar, Ukrayna'lılar, Kırım

*To my family*

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. Introducing the Study

The study area of this thesis is Crimea. Crimea is an autonomous republic in Ukraine. It is a peninsula in the northern coast of the Black Sea. The capital of Crimea is the city of Simferopol. The total area of the republic is 26,200 km<sup>2</sup>. According to the data of the All-Ukrainian census, the population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is 2,033,700. The ethnic structure is comprised by the following self-reported ethnic groups: Russians: 58,5%; Ukrainians: 24,4%; Crimean Tatars: 12,1%; Belarusians: 1,5%; Tatars: 0,54%; Armenians: 0,43%; and Jews: 0,22%. Other minorities are Germans, Roma people, Bulgarians, Poles, Azerbaijanis, Koreans and Greeks.




Chart 1.1 Ethnic composition of Crimea according to the census 2001<sup>1</sup>

These ethnic groups became residents of the Crimean peninsula at different times and under different circumstances. The earliest inhabitants of whom we have any authentic traces were the Cimmerians, who inhabited Crimea in the 15<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> centuries BC<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> About number and composition population of Autonomous Republic of Crimea by data All-Ukrainian population census <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>

<sup>2</sup> Dyulichev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrana, p. 21

Other ancient people of whom we have written evidence were the Tauri (9<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> centuries BC). In the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC, Scythians came to Crimea. They had dominated in the steppe part of Crimea till the 3<sup>th</sup> century AC. In the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, Greek colonists began to settle along the Black Sea coast. Later, Crimea was occupied successively by the Goths (250), the Huns (376), the Bulgars (4<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> centuries), the Khazars (8<sup>th</sup> century), the state of Kievan Rus' (10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> centuries), the Byzantine Empire (1016), the Kipchaks (the Kumans) (1050), and the Mongols (1223). Since Mongol Batu Khan has conquered North Crimea, steppe Crimea became a part of the Golden Horde. After the Mongol conquest of the Crimean peninsula, Crimean Tatars had entered the historical record as “Tatars”. For the next 200 years Crimean Tatars amalgamated with other immigrant Turkic people, and were governed by representatives of the Khans of the Golden Horde. By the 1440s they had succeeded in establishing their independent state, the Crimean Khanate, under the leadership of Hacı Giray<sup>3</sup>. Usually in the historical literature, Crimean Khanate is considered as the first political formation of Crimean Tatars. In 1475 Ottoman Empire invaded Crimea and annexed cities in South coast. Since then the Crimean Khanate came under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1774, The Crimean Khans fell under Russian influence with the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*<sup>4</sup>. In 1783, the entire Crimea was annexed by the Russian Empire.<sup>5</sup> Russian government launched the policies of integration of Crimea into imperial society which led the discrimination of Crimean Tatars in economic (dispossession of lands), political (removal from local authority), cultural (Russification) spheres. Under the pressure of these colonization policies, Crimean Tatars began to abandon their homes and move to the Ottoman Empire in continuing waves of emigration. Particularly, the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the laws of 1860-63 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 caused an exodus of the Crimean Tatars. Of total Tatar population 300,000 of the Tauride Province about 200,000 Crimean Tatars emigrated.<sup>6</sup> Russian invasion extremely changed demographic composition of Crimea. Crimean Tatars constituted 80% of total population of the whole peninsula in 1783. However, in 1920, they constituted 26%, and in 1937 it was only 21%. On May 18, 1944, Crimean

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<sup>3</sup> Lazzerini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. in *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, pp. 322-338

<sup>4</sup> Subtelny, O. 2000. *Ukraine: A History*. University of Toronto Press, p. 176

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p.176-177

<sup>6</sup> Williams, B.G. ‘*Hijra* and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire’ <http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe1800.html>

Tatars were blamed for collaboration with Nazi Germany and were deported from the Crimean Autonomous Republic to 'special settlements' in Central Asia (mostly in Uzbekistan). They were not allowed to return to their homeland until 1989. Starting with 1989 and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars began to return to Crimea. This process of repatriation still continues. Although the Crimean Tatars ethnogenesis is open to discussion, it is important to point out that Crimea is the only homeland of this ethnic group. As a result, Crimean Tatars have obtained a special status (*korennoy narod*, *korinnyi narod*<sup>7</sup> - native population) in the Ukrainian Constitution.

Russians and Ukrainians appeared in Crimea after 1774 as a result of Russian Empire's settlement policy of the Crimean lands. The main reason of resettlement was the lack of population after mass migration and deportation of Crimean Tatars. Settlers were mostly peasants and retired soldiers. The establishment of the Russian Black Sea Navy entailed the increase of Russian population in Crimea. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union some Russians (especially among military servants) began to return to Russia. Despite their numerical superiority Russians are now called as 'ethnic minority' in the official discourse.

Different size, social and economic statuses as well as political claims of main ethnic groups (the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars) define structural peculiarities of the social identity system, which in turn have influence the on social behaviour of Crimean residents.

All three ethnic groups (the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars) claim Crimea as their own homeland. This claim leads to sharp discussions about the status of Crimea among political elite as well as ordinary people, which provokes the tension of interethnic relations. As a result, ethnic identity issues become very topical.

There are several factors that shape ethnic identities of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The aim of this thesis is to define factors that are influential in the ethnic identification process for each of the given ethnic groups in Crimea. In order to achieve this aim, main tendencies and problems in cultural, political and economic spheres as well as global dimensions, that determine peculiarities of ethnic self-consciousness of Crimean residents, will be investigated. This will help us to understand the meaning of being a Russian, an Ukrainian and a Crimean Tatar in Crimea. In other words, the subject of the current research is the process of ethnic identity formation

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<sup>7</sup> First word is transcription from Russian language; second one is from Ukrainian language.

among Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea. The thesis will focus only these three groups because of two basic reasons. Firstly, these groups (Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) are the biggest communities in Crimea. Secondly, all the three ethnic groups have political claims on Crimean peninsula. The Diagram 1.1 may shed light to the interconnection of main research points. According to this diagram, the content of ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea depends on the attitudes to the Ukrainian citizenship, to the Soviet past, to the Crimea as special region. Two main religions also have influence on the identification process of these ethnic groups: Islam – on the Crimean Tatars, Orthodoxy on the Russians and Ukrainians. Circumjacent states and international organizations also participate in the identification process of each ethnic group. At the same time, ethnic identity has mutual influence on all these factors.




Diagram 1.1 Interconnections of the factors that shape ethnic identity of the main ethnic groups of Crimea

The tasks of the research are as follows: to define the Soviet nationality doctrine, Soviet nationality policy as well as Soviet ethnos theory in the framework of Soviet social sciences; to make a review of Western approaches to ethnicity (primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism); to show divergence of definitions in Soviet and Western traditions; to analyze how historical events influence the shaping of ethnic identity of each of these groups and to compare different interpretations of these historical events; to investigate the problem of statuses of the three ethnic groups in Crimea; to conduct opinion poll in Crimea for the purpose to correlate ethnic identity (belonging to a

certain ethnic group) with the most problematic issues; to elaborate the role of cultural components in the process of ethnic identification of these groups; to analyze how economical and political factors influence the process of ethnic identification of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars; to understand the importance of Crimean territory for each of the ethnic groups; to show how Soviet identity and current Ukrainian citizenship correlate with ethno-national identity of Crimean residents, and to elaborate global factors in the identification processes.

## **1.2. Methodology**

In this thesis both qualitative and quantitative research methods are used. In the framework of documentary research fundamental literature of ethno-national issues was reviewed in this thesis. Historical literature of Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar as well as western authors was used to make comprehensive analysis of given problems. Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, Constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea of 1998, several Ukrainians Laws as well as international documents about statuses of ethnic minorities and other documents were analyzed in this research. The data of the all-Ukrainian population census of 2001 were also used. In-depth interview was conducted with head of Recruiting agency “Personal” in order to understand the situation with Crimean Tatars in the labour-market.

Survey was conducted in order to know attitudes of Crimean residents towards main problems in Crimea. Data survey was correlated with ethnic identity of the respondents. The survey was conducted in the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine in May 2009. Probability sample was taken as the type of survey’s sample. In this research, we were interested in more or less stable views of Crimean residents therefore percentage of confidence probability of the survey was chosen in 90%. Confidence interval is 5%. Sampled population is 2,033,700 (it is the population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea according to census 2001). Sample size was calculated using on-line service ‘Sample size calculator’ at the Statistic portal ‘Statanalyse.org’<sup>8</sup>. Sample size is 196. There were three criteria of distribution of the sample: regional; urban-rural and gender factors.

1. Regional and urban-rural factor. The number of the urban population, according to the data of the All-Ukrainian census of the population ’2001, accounted for 1,632,400 people, or 67,6%, and that of the rural population 780,800 people or 32,4%. These data

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<sup>8</sup> ‘Sample size calculator’, <http://www.statanalyse.org/articles/8-calculator>

we have correlated with our sample (196) and we got the results: number of urban respondents in the sample: 132; number of rural respondents in the sample: 64.

Population of main cities in Crimea is 1,454,400. To calculate the percentage of respondents for every Crimean city we should make a ratio of number town dwellers in a city and all-Crimean urban population. To calculate the exact number of people for each city we should make ratio of the percentage of people and the number of urban population in the sample (132). The result is presented in the Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Number of respondents in the main towns

	City	Percent of people (ratio of number town dwellers in a city and all-Crimean urban population) <sup>9</sup>	Number of people (ratio of percent of people and Number of urban population in the sample (132))
1.	Armians'k (+Krasnoperekops'k)	3,8%	5
2.	Simferopol'	25%	33
3.	Bakhchysarai	2,3%	3
4.	Yalta (+ Alushta)	12,4%	16
5.	Yevpatoriia	8,3 %	11
6.	Saky	2,0%	3
7.	Kerch	10,8%	14
8.	Feodosiia (+Sudak)	7,8%	10
9.	Dzhankoi	3%	4
10.	Sevastopol	25%	33

The same calculations were made for the rural population (see Table 1.2). Because of recourse shortage, it was decided to conduct the survey only in the 6 biggest districts but following geographical distribution. Rural population in Crimea is 422,100 people (according to the census 2001).

Table 1.2 Number of respondents in the rural areas of Crimea

	District	Percent of people (ratio of population of a district and all-Crimean rural population) <sup>10</sup>	Number of people (ratio of percent of people and Number of rural population in the sample (64))
1.	Simferopol' district	30,2%	19
2.	Bakhchysarai district	13,9%	9
3.	Bilohirs'k/Bilohirs'k district	9,6%	6
4.	Saky district	17,7%	11
5.	Lenine district	10,6%	7
6.	Dzhankoi district	18%	12

<sup>9</sup> The data of number town dwellers in a city and all-Crimean urban population was taken form the web-site of All-Ukrainian population census <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/estimate/Crimea/>

<sup>10</sup> The data of number of population of a district and all-Crimean rural population was taken form the web-site of All-Ukrainian population census <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/estimate/Crimea/>

2. Gender factor in distribution the sample. According to the data of the All-Ukrainian census of the population '2001, the ratio of men and women in Crimea is 46% and 54% correspondently. To calculate the exact number of men and women in the sample we should correlate these percentages with our sample size. The result for men is 90 persons. The result for women is 109 persons. Now we should correlate data of gender factor with data of urban-rural factor. The number of men-respondents in urban area is 61; women – 71. The number of men-respondents in rural area is 29; women – 35. The final results of the distribution of the respondents according to regional, urban-rural and gender factors are presented in Table 1.3 and 1.4.

Table 1.3 Distribution of respondents in the cities

City	Number of people <sup>11</sup>	Ratio men/women	
Armians'k (+Krasnoperekops'k)	5	2	3
Simferopol'	33	15	18
Bakhchysarai	3	1	2
Yalta (+ Alushta)	16	8	8
Yevpatoriia	11	5	6
Saky	3	1	2
Kerch	14	7	7
Feodosiia (+Sudak)	10	5	5
Dzhankoi	4	2	2
Sevastopol	33	15	18
Total urban	132	61	71

Table 1.4 Distribution of respondents in the rural area

District	Number of people <sup>12</sup>	Ratio men/women	
Simferopol' district	19	9	10
Bakhchysarai district	9	4	5
Bilohirs'k/Bilohirs'k district	6	3	3
Saky district	11	5	6
Lenine district	7	3	4
Dzhankoi district	12	5	7
Total rural	64	29	35

During the survey 117 respondents identified themselves as 'Russians', 49 – as 'Ukrainians' and 21 – as 'Crimean Tatars'. 7 respondents identified themselves with other ethnic groups and 2 rejected to answer.

The content analysis of the regional Crimean newspapers was done between October 2005 and April 2006. In our research fourteen Crimean newspapers were analyzed: *Krymskoe vremya* ("Crimean Time"), *Golos Kryma* ("Voice of the Crimea"),

<sup>11</sup> Number of people is ratio of number town dwellers in a city and all-Crimean urban population

<sup>12</sup> Number of people is a ratio of percent of people and Number of rural population in the sample

*Krymskaya Gazeta* (“Crimean newspaper”), *Krymskie izvestiya* (“Crimean news”), *Krymskaya pravda* (“Crimean truth”), *Yuzhnaya Stolitsa* (South Capital), *Krymskiy obozrevatel* (“Crimean browser”), *Krymska Svitlytsya* (“Crimean front room”), *Yuzhnuy Kur'er* (“Southern Courier”), *Krym.ru* (“Crimea.ru”), *Vestnik Tavridu* (“Taurida’s Bulletin”), *Pervaya Krymskaya* (“First Crimean”), *Poluostro'* (“Peninsula”), *Respublika Krym* (“The Republic of Crimea”). It is the complete list of Crimean (regional) newspapers that monopolistic organization *Soyuzpechat* distributes in Crimea. Additionally, these newspapers present the whole spectrum of social reality in Crimea. Newspapers *Krymskaya pravda*, *Krymskiy obozrevatel*, *Krym.ru*, *Krymskoe vremya*, *Respublika Krym* cater for the pro-Russian reader. *Golos Kryma* and *Poluostrov* cater for the Crimean Tatar reader. *Krymska Svitlytsya* orients on Ukrainian speaking population of Crimea. *Krymskaya Gazeta*, *Krymskie izvestiya* and *Yuzhnaya Stolitsa* are the newspapers of Crimean authority. Using the data of this research it was defined how religious issues were shown in Crimean press. The main components of positive and negative image of Crimean Tatars were also defined on the basis of content analysis.

In this thesis, result of content analysis of the regional Crimean newspapers was used to define how the religious issues were treated in the Crimean press. The main components of positive and negative image of Crimean Tatars, as well as image characteristics of Mejlis, were also defined on the basis of content analysis. In our research, newspapers were analyzed through both quantitative and qualitative aspects. As Bruce L. Berg stressed it is possible if “content analysis may focus on either quantitative or qualitative aspects of communication messages”<sup>13</sup>. Content analysis of “manifest content” as well as “latent content” were done. “Manifest content” according to the Bruce L. Berg is “those elements that are physically present and countable”<sup>14</sup>. To analyze the “latent content” it is necessary to make “an interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physically presented data”.<sup>15</sup> The unit of analysis was an article in the newspapers. The “manifest” counts were: actors of message; rubric of the message (there were set 56 possible rubric); topic of the message (it is more specified rubric) and the image characteristics of the actors. The units of analysis “latent content” were the techniques that were used by authors of articles in order to make positive or negative

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<sup>13</sup> Berg, B. L. 1998. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. 3d edition, Boston, p. 225

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

image of certain actors. According to I. Vikentev, there are five main PR techniques that were count during content-analysis: positioning PR-object (creating of certain image for actor); the eminence of image (strengthening of positive image of some actors); the anti-advertising (forming of negative image of certain actors); discharge from competitors (it is combination of eminence of image of one actor by making negative image for another actor); counteradvertising (restoration of positive image which after some events became negative).<sup>16</sup>

### **1.3. Organization of the Thesis**

The thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research, explains the methodology and the organization of the thesis. In the second chapter theoretical aspects of our research are examined. The main peculiarities of Soviet and Western approaches to ethnic issues are explained. In the third chapter the process of shaping of ethnic boundaries is analyzed for each of the main ethnic groups of Crimea. Different perceptions of historical events are discussed. The fourth chapter focuses on the cultural aspects of ethnic identification: language, religion, historical memory, identification with a certain culture. The fifth chapter analyzes how economic, political and global factors influence the process of ethnic identification of the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars. The issue of the status of different groups of Crimea is studied. The importance of Crimean territory for each of the ethnic groups and the correlation of Soviet identity and current Ukrainian citizenship with ethno-national identity of Crimean residents are also shown. The sixth chapter is the concluding part of the thesis.

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<sup>16</sup> Vikentev I.L. 2002. *Priemu reklamu I public relations*. SPb: Bizness-pressa, , <http://www.triz-ri.ru/themes/method/pr/pr36.asp>

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

In this chapter the theoretical framework of the research is examined. Before analyzing ethnic identities in Crimea we should be acquainted with the context of Soviet and post-Soviet understanding of ethnic issues. Peculiarities of Soviet nationality doctrine, Soviet nationality policy as well as Soviet ethnos theory in the framework of Soviet social sciences will be shown in the first part of the chapter. The second part focuses on Western understanding of ethnicity. The main approaches (primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism) are investigated. The ideas of Russian constructivists and the main approaches to the definitions of ‘identity’ and ‘ethnic identity’ are also analyzed. On this basis, Russian and Western literature on ethnicity is comparatively discussed.

#### **2.1. Soviet approach to the ethnic issues**

##### ***2.1.1. Soviet Nationality Policy***

To understand and explain the ethnic situation in Crimea, firstly we should be familiar with the Soviet approach to the ethnic issues which was dominant during the Soviet period and still has significant effect on the current Crimean (as well as Russian) society. This approach has some peculiarities that were determined by historical events and Soviet nationalities (and/or ethnic) policy. First, it seems that Soviet nationalities policy has irreconcilable contradictions: on the one hand Soviet authority recognized the right of self-determination of nations on the other hand there were slogans about proletarian internationalism and creation of a new “Soviet man”. However, if we look into historical conditions, we understand the logic of the Soviet rulers and their actions. When the monarchical power was overthrown in Russia in 1917, the wave of national revival launched in different parts of the former Russian Empire. The independence was proclaimed by Ukraine, Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Abkhazia) and the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Movements for

autonomy sprang up and widened among the major peoples of the Volga area (Tatars and Bashkirs).<sup>17</sup> The “Whites” did not take into consideration these movements and their aim was “one and indivisible Russia”<sup>18</sup>. Therefore they had to fight on two fronts: with Bolsheviks and with nationalists. However Bolsheviks turned national movements to their own advantage. Helène Carrière d’Encausse, trying to answer the question “was Bolshevik nationality policy the product of ideology or circumstance” stresses on the two main pre-revolutionary Bolshevik’s convictions: the unitary essence of future socialist state and the of any national differences and aspirations.<sup>19</sup> However, Lenin believed that “the right of self-determination should be employed to end demands for national independence, and not to satisfy them”<sup>20</sup>. It means that under the circumstances of Civil War the best way to create a new country under the socialist idea was to find a support among enemies (nationalists) of your enemy (“Whites”). Bolsheviks understood that, in order to completely destroy the Empire, it was necessary to support self-determination of the oppressed people of the Russian Empire. Helène Carrière d’Encausse stresses on two main characteristics in Bolshevik activity: “necessity for organizing the revolutionary base and the desire to realize radical sociocultural revolution”<sup>21</sup>. These factors predetermined Lenin’s policy to the national issues. The main propositions of Lenin’s policy were: 1) equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Russian empire; 2) the right of peoples to the self-determination to the point of secession; 3) the abolition of all privileges based on nationality or religion; 4) freedom of the cultural development for the national minorities (both small nationalities and all those living outside their historic territories)<sup>22</sup>. At the same time, Lenin believed that with the elimination of exploitation on the basis of proletarian solidarity, ethnic differences, feelings and expressions also will

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<sup>17</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p.28

<sup>18</sup> Shambarov V.E. 2002. Belogvardeyshina. M: EKSMO-Press.  
<http://militera.lib.ru/research/shambarov1/index.html>

<sup>19</sup> Carrière d’Encausse, H. 1978. ‘Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy’, in ed. Azrael, J. *Soviet Nationalities’ Policies and Practices*, NY: Praeger, p. 39

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p.40

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 46

<sup>22</sup> Rywkin, M. 1994. *Moscow’s Lost Empire*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, p.162  
Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p.29

disappear<sup>23</sup>. The tasks listed above were not the ultimate aims of the Soviet nationalities policy, but rather they serve to be tools to establish a centralized state<sup>24</sup> and to create new “Soviet people”. To implement this policy, the Soviet government established a special governmental organization, entitled *Narkomnatz* (People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities) under the direct guidance of Stalin.

The Soviet rulers were faced with a difficult question as; whom to give the right of self-determination and who should not be able to deserve that right, because there were more than hundred ethnic groups at that time (Tishkov points out on 146 languages which were registered by first organized population census in Russia in 1897<sup>25</sup>). First, the Soviet government fixed the names of all ethnic groups existed in the Soviet territory. Second, they introduced in the Soviet reality terms *natsional’nost’*, which means belonging of one person to one of the ethnic groups. Here we should stress that this term is often translated into English as ‘nationality’ which refers in the Western understanding to the relationship of person to a specific state (which is an aspect of ‘citizenship’; in Russian it is *grazhdanstvo*).<sup>26</sup> However *natsional’nost’* in Russian reality does not have direct connection to the civic identity referring to the membership to a state (*grazhdanstvo*). *Natsional’nost’* means the ethnic identity of a person. It is referring to belongingness to a specific ethnic group. According to the Soviet understanding, this term has a primordial base. It is “a specific characteristic inherited from one’s parents (sometimes replaced by ‘the language one uses at home’)”.<sup>27</sup> Also it is not correct to translate this term into English as “ethnicity” because in the Western society it “was developed to denote minorities, who being mostly unassimilated, presented a ‘problem’ to ‘the authorities’”<sup>28</sup>, so it does not reflect its whole essence.

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<sup>23</sup> Tishkov V.A. 2001. *Etnologija i politika*. Nauchnaja publicistika. M.: Nauka, p. 17

<sup>24</sup> Carrière d’Encausse, H. 1978. ‘Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy’, in ed. Azrael, J. *Soviet Nationalities’ Policies and Practices*, NY: Praeger, p. 44

<sup>25</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 30

<sup>26</sup> Shanin, T. 1986. ‘Soviet Theories of Ethnicity: The Case of a Missing Term’. *New Left Review* 1(158), p. 115

Banks, M. 1996. *Ethnicity. Anthropological Considerations*. London: Routledge, p. 23

Karklins, R. 1986. *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below*. Boston and London: Allen & Unwin.

<sup>27</sup> Shanin, T. 1986. ‘Soviet Theories of Ethnicity: The Case of a Missing Term’. *New Left Review* 1(158), p. 115

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

After fixing the names of ethnic groups and citizens' belonging to these groups (Tishkov points out on 190 "different 'national' identities" which were defined by census 1926<sup>29</sup>) Soviet authority decided to whom to give the right of political determination in a certain territory. Consequently, by 1944 Stalin created the so-called "hierarchy of nations":<sup>30</sup> (53 national-state entities) 15 union and 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous *oblasts* and 10 autonomous *okrugs* were established<sup>31</sup>. The Soviet ethnic engineers used the censuses and internal passports to fix exact number and the names of the ethnic groups, and belongingness of a person to a certain national-state unit (the importance of the censuses and internal passports is discussed in details below in this chapter). Ethnic groups which became founders of union republics (except Russians) were called *titul'naya natsia* ('titular nation'). Ethnic groups within their 'own' statehood were called *korennaya natsia* ('indigenous nation').<sup>32</sup> 12<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1923) decided to provide the policy of *korenizatsiia* ('nativization' or 'indigenization'). This policy consisted of promoting representatives of titular nations of Soviet republics and national minorities on lower levels of the administrative subdivision of the state, into local government, management and bureaucracy in the corresponding national entities. 'Indigenization' promoted priority of languages of 'indigenous nations' in their 'own' territorial units (unions, *oblasts*, *okrugs*). Soviet rulers understood that in order to consolidate the new Soviet state, it was necessary to gain the support of peasants. To persuade peasants on the Soviet side it was possible only by referring to their native language. *Korenizatsiia* was implemented, as Hovancev points out, in order to overcome the language barrier between the peasantry and the working class, to make government more accessible to the ordinary people<sup>33</sup>. The status of 'titular nation' led to the perception of the territory and the state as an exclusive property of the nation who gave the name to this state.

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<sup>29</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 31

<sup>30</sup> Tishkov V.A. 2008. 'Nacional'naja politika" dovoennogo sovetского perioda' (Doklad na mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoj konferencii «Istorija Stalinizma: Itogi i Problemy Izuchenija», 5 dekabnja 2008. Moskva). <http://valerytishkov.ru/cntnt/publikacii3/vystupleni2/stalinizm.html>

<sup>31</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 34

<sup>32</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 29

<sup>33</sup> Hovancev D.V. 1999. 'O Nacional'noj Politike v Krymskoj ASSR v 1920-e gody'. *Kul'tura narodov Prichernomor'ja* 8, p. 169

To categorize their nationalities policy Soviet leaders introduced different terms for different ethnic groups with different status (the term 'ethnic group' was not widely used in the Soviet doctrine). There were three main definitions: *natsia*, *narodnost'* and *narod*. In 1913 Stalin in his work "Marxism and the question of nationalities" offered the definition of a nation as

a historically developed and stable community of people that has emerged on the basis of the community of their language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up as manifest in the community of culture... Absence of at least one of these traits is enough for a nation not to be a nation.<sup>34</sup>

Analyzing this definition Helène Carrière d'Encausse points out that Stalin regarded the nation "as a historical category that was autonomous and permanent"<sup>35</sup>. The term *narodnost'* were examined by Soviet anthropologist Yulian Bromley. According to him it was something between tribe and contemporary nation; it was used "to describe ethnic communities that have survived through the period when tribal communities had disintegrated but no nations were yet formed"<sup>36</sup>. It means that *narodnost'* mostly exists "due to a relationship with a larger nation"<sup>37</sup>. Tishkov, while explaining the differences between these two notions, emphasizes that "groups that were larger (numbering more than 100,000 members) and more modernized were labeled *natsia* ('nations'); the smaller ones became *narodnost(i)*"<sup>38</sup>. The term '*narod*' has most wide meaning. Bromley says

it is used to designate contemporary people as well as those who have vanished with history...peoples who are territorially compact and those who are dispersed over widely separated areas...narod is used to describe not only ethnic communities but also the 'toiling masses of people' or simply large crowd of humans.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p.29 (cited Stalin.I. 1951-1952. *Works*. Moscow: Politizdat, vol. 2, p. 296-297)

<sup>35</sup> Carrière d'Encausse, H. 1978. 'Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy', in ed. Azrael, J. *Soviet Nationalities' Policies and Practices*, NY: Praeger

<sup>36</sup> Bromley, J., Kozlov, V. 1989 'The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Process in Soviet Social Sciences'. *Comparative Studies in Science and Society* 31(3), p. 431

<sup>37</sup> Bromley, J., Kozlov, V. 1989 'The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Process in Soviet Social Sciences'. *Comparative Studies in Science and Society* 31(3), p. 432

<sup>38</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 33

<sup>39</sup> Bromley, J., Kozlov, V. 1989 'The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Process in Soviet Social Sciences'. *Comparative Studies in Science and Society* 31(3), p. 425

Tishkov points out that this term means “nationality or a people”.<sup>40</sup>

Whole Soviet nationality policy which could be called as policy of ethnogenesis (“initial establishment of ethnic groups”<sup>41</sup>) was built on the basis of the definitions that are listed above (*natsional’nost’*, *grazhdanstvo*, *natsia*, *narod*, *narodnost’*, *titul’naya natsia*, *korennaya natsia*). It is easy to notice that from 190 different ethnic communities in 1926 only 53 territorial units with their ‘indigenous people’ were recognized by Stalin by 1944. The question is: what happened to other ethnic groups? The answer can be given by referring to the process which was provided by the “Soviet ethnic engineers”. It was ‘consolidation’, ‘integration’<sup>42</sup>, and ‘assimilation’. The term ‘consolidation’ can be applied “to the processes which involve the merger of several ethnoses, usually ones kindred in origin and similar in language and culture, into a larger ethnic community”<sup>43</sup> and identified by a new *ethnonym*. Assimilation means the process when

a small ethnic group adopts a new language and culture and gradually merges with a more numerous, more economically and culturally developed group after coming into contact with that larger group”<sup>44</sup>.

For example, during the Soviet times such relatively large groups as Mordvinians, Komi, Avars, Khakassia, have been developed. It was a big change. In Dagestan in the nineteenth century, mostly every village was a kind of village-state, and rural-community tied prevailed over national. The separation of nationalities was conducted in 1920s and 1930s “with the help of Soviet scientists”. The formation of ethnic groups and their languages still has not been completed. Avars, for example, are divided into 15 sub-ethnic groups, so that two Avars from different villages can not understand each other. Dargin language has 10 dialects, Kumyk - 5 dialects.<sup>45</sup> Even the major nations of Central Asia, which were classified as ‘titular nations’ in the 1920s still have had the consciousness on

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<sup>40</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 33

<sup>41</sup> Shanin, T. 1986. ‘Soviet Theories of Ethnicity: The Case of a Missing Term’. *New Left Review* 1(158), p. 120

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 31

<sup>43</sup> Bromley, J., Kozlov, V. 1989 ‘The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Process in Soviet Social Sciences’. *Comparative Studies in Science and Society* 31(3), p. 434

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 435

<sup>45</sup> Todua, Z. 1999. ‘Dagestan: desjat’ let mezhdru vojnoj i mirom’. *Buntujuwaja jetnichnost*. M.: RAN.

the basis of local or tribal names. Some groups had other names, like current “Azerbaijani” were “Turk” before the Soviet Union.<sup>46</sup> Soviet government declared that the result of the policy of ‘consolidation’ and ‘integration’ would be the creation of a new identity – *Sovetskiy narod* (‘Soviet people’). This term had been used since 1930s but it did not have a political meaning. With the ideological essence this term first appeared in the official statements at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, and it was later incorporated into the Soviet Constitution of 1977<sup>47</sup>. In the Great Soviet Encyclopedia the following definition of the term *Sovetskiy narod* (‘Soviet people’) was given:

A new historical, social and international community of people with a common territory, economy, culture, socialist in content, state of the whole union and a common goal - to build communism in the Soviet Union ... The common language of interethnic communication in the USSR is the Russian language.<sup>48</sup>

As we can see this definition contains main points of Stalin’s definition of ‘nation’.

The Soviet nationality policy was realized by several tools like census, internal passport, deportation (migration and replacement), and total Russification. Census was an important tool in the state-building of the USSR, because it provided the government with important ethnographic information, and helped with the transformation from the Imperial to the Soviet society. Anastas Mikoyan argues that using census the Soviet Union was “creating and organizing new nations”<sup>49</sup>. In order to corroborate this idea Silver stresses on the absence of “the possibility of not belonging respondent to any of nationality or of belonging to more than one”<sup>50</sup>. Question about nationality in Soviet census was the tool “to seize and maintain control of abstract systems for classifying

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<sup>46</sup> Tishkov, V.A. 1990. ‘Social’noe i Nacional’noe v Istoriko-antropologicheskoy Perspektive’. *Voprosy Filosofii* 12.

<sup>47</sup> Shtromas, A. 1978. ‘The Legal Position of Soviet Nationalities and Their Territorial Units according to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR’. *Russian Review* 37 (3): 265-272

<sup>48</sup> ‘Sovetskiy Narod’. *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*  
<http://slovari.yandex.ru/dict/bse/article/00072/56800.htm>

<sup>49</sup> Mikoyan, A. 1926. ‘Natsionalniy Vopros i Natsionalnaya Kultura v Severo-Kavkazskom kraye (Itogi i perspektivy): K predstoyashchemu syezdu gorskikh narodov’, Rostov-na-Donu

<sup>50</sup> Silver, B. D. 1986. ‘The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses’. in Ralph S. Clem, Ed., *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press. p 76

social life and representing social reality”<sup>51</sup> Mentioning the role of census in state policy Kertzer and Arel refer to the Anderson’s idea about the census as one of the primary devices employed by the colonial state to impose ‘totalizing, classificatory grid’ on its territory and hence make all inside it its own.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, they argue that census is “the most visible, and arguably the most politically important, means by which states statistically depict collective identities”<sup>53</sup> The main censuses in the Soviet Union were realized in 1926, 1937, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989. The striking example of using census as a tool of the ethnogenesis was the fact that no separate category of Crimean Tatars was listed in 1959, 1970 or 1979 Soviet Census reports. Instead, Crimean Tatars appear to have been grouped with Volga Tatars into “Tatars”<sup>54</sup>. It means that for twenty years there was no such ethnic group as “Crimean Tatars” in the official discourse of the Soviet Union.

To institutionalize its nationality policy, the Soviet authority introduced the system of internal passports. On December 27, 1932 the USSR Central Executive Committee and *Sovnarkom*<sup>55</sup> issued a decree ‘About establishment of the Unified Passport System within the USSR and the obligatory *propiska* of passports’<sup>56</sup>. According to the decree of Council of Ministers of USSR, “passport of a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the main document certifying the identity of a Soviet citizen”<sup>57</sup> In the paragraphs Two and Three of this decree it was written:

Passports are produced by a single pattern for the entire USSR in Russian and the language of the union republic, and for the autonomous republics,

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<sup>51</sup> Abramson, D. 2002. ‘Identity Counts: the Soviet legacy and the census in Uzbekistan’ in Kertzer, D.I., Arel, D ed. *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge University Press, p. 177

<sup>52</sup> Kertzer, D.I., Arel, D. 2002. ‘Sensus, Identity formation and Struggle for political power’ in Kertzer, D.I., Arel, D. ed. *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge University Press, p. 5

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>54</sup> Anderson, A. B., Silver, B.D. 1989. ‘Demographic Sources of the Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union’. *Population and Development Review* 15(4), p. 616

<sup>55</sup> *Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov* (The Council of the People's Commissars) was the highest government authority under the Bolshevik system after the success of the Russian Revolution.

<sup>56</sup> ‘Passport system in the Soviet Union’.  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passport\\_system\\_in\\_the\\_Soviet\\_Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passport_system_in_the_Soviet_Union)

<sup>57</sup> ‘Polozhenie o Pasportnoy Sisteme v SSSR’. August 28, 1974 N 677.  
<http://www.zonazakona.ru/showthread.php?t=41373>

autonomous oblasts and autonomous districts in the language of the autonomous republic, autonomous region, autonomous area.

In the passport shall be made following information about the identity of a citizen:

surname, first name, *‘otchestvo’*;  
day, month, year of birth; place of birth;  
*‘natsional’nost’*.

In the passports are made notes:  
the registration and dissolution of marriage  
the attitude to military service  
*‘propiska’* and *‘vypiska’*<sup>58</sup>

As we can see, the definition of ‘passport’ that was given in this decree fixed the identity of Soviet citizens. Introducing “Soviet passport”, ethnic engineers of the Soviet Union institutionalized the existence of ‘Soviet people’ (*Sovetskiy narod*). There were records in native languages of the Union republics in internal passports. These records provided the identity of passport owners with a certain Union republic (or autonomous oblasts, districts, region). The so-called ‘fifth column’ (*pyataya grafa*) of the passport institutionalized the most important point of Soviet nationality doctrine – *natsional’nost’*. According to the third paragraph of the decree of Council of Ministers of USSR (August 27, 1974, N677):

a record of the nationality of the passport is made, respectively, the nationality of parents. If the parents belong to different nationalities, the first time in issuing a passport nationality recorded on the nationality of the father or mother, depending on the willingness of the passport owner. Further record of nationality could not be changed.<sup>59</sup>

Using *natsional’nost’* as a primordial aspect, the Soviet leaders could control the existence and number of ethnic communities in the Soviet Union. It was a tool to fix the hierarchy of nations that were constructed in the Soviet times. The ‘fifth column’ played a significant role in the lives of Soviet citizens. The possibilities in education, employment and social activities were predetermined by *natsionalnost’*. It especially concerns the ‘punished nation’. Tishkov emphasized that “carrying a passport with the special mark of deported person was, on an everyday level, a highly significant reminder of being an Ingush, Chechen, etc.”<sup>60</sup> The passports were also used to control and monitor the place of residence by means of *propiska*. Officially, *propiska* was introduced for statistical

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<sup>58</sup> ‘Polozhenie o Pasportnoy Sisteme v SSSR’. August 28, 1974 N 677.  
<http://www.zonazakona.ru/showthread.php?t=41373>

<sup>59</sup> ‘Polozhenie o Pasportnoy Sisteme v SSSR’. August 28, 1974 N 677.  
<http://www.zonazakona.ru/showthread.php?t=41373>

<sup>60</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 37

reasons: since in the planned economy of the Soviet Union, the distribution of goods and services was centralized, the overall distribution of population was to be monitored. For example, a valid *propiska* was necessary to receive a higher education or a medical treatment. As we can see Soviet passport was an instrument to secure the multiple identities that were created in the Soviet times: the identity of Soviet people, the identity with the *malaya Rodina* (“little homeland”) – the Union Republic, and ethnic identity. It also fixed people’s location and prevented people’s mobility undesirable for the Soviet leaders.

Next instrument for the executing Soviet policy was the mass deportations and replacements. The Soviet Union was not built according to the historical and territorial traditions but rather in vice versa, territorial units were designed according to the ideas of the Party leaders in compliance with which people were distributed. More than 50 ethnic communities went through deportations or replacement during the years of Soviet power. Some of them were deported in the pre-war period, for reasons of military security (Koreans, Volga Germans), or in 1943 - 1944 on charges of the mass collaboration with the occupiers (the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyk). Migrations were accompanied by redrawing or liquidation of national (self) and the administrative-territorial units (for example, in 1943, Karachay Autonomous Region has been divided between the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Stavropol Territory and Krasnodar Territory, Autonomous status of Crimea was also changed after the Crimean Tatar deportation).

The powerful instrument of the Soviet nationality policy was Russification. It was provided already with Stalin’s nationality policy. Helène Carrière d’Encausse points out that Stalin “placed the most important of the Soviet nations, the Russian nation, in a privileged position and subordinated the others to it”<sup>61</sup>. The Soviet authority used several channels to provide Russification. After the school reform of 1958 it was decided that education in native language and learning this language should be considered in a voluntary basis. Parents decided which school should attend their children – with Russian language of education or in their native language. Of course, the parents, thinking about the successful career of their children send them to Russian schools. Russian words, and especially terminology, were introduced in the vocabulary of languages of the Union Republics. After the 1917 revolution, authorities in the USSR decided to eradicate the use of the Arabic alphabet in Turkic and Persian languages in Soviet-controlled Central Asia,

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<sup>61</sup> Carrière d’Encausse, H. 1978. ‘Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy’, in ed. Azrael, J. *Soviet Nationalities’ Policies and Practices*, NY: Praeger, p. 48

in the Caucasus, in the Volga region (including Tatarstan) and Crimea. This detached the local populations from exposure to the language and writing system of the Koran. The new alphabet for these languages was based on the Latin alphabet and was also inspired by the Turkish alphabet. However, by the late 1930s, the policy had changed. In 1939–1940 the Soviets decided that the number of these languages (including Tatar, Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Azeri, and Bashkir) would henceforth use variations of the Cyrillic alphabet. It was claimed that the switch was made “by the demands of the working class”<sup>62</sup>. The resettlement of the Russians was provided in different (especially non-Slavic) regions of the Soviet Union. As a result of this policy, Russians became an ethnic majority in the Crimean peninsula. The industrial regions (like *Donbass* in Ukraine) were created on the basis of worker from different parts of the Soviet Union, so they had to communicate in the Russian language.

We can conclude that on the one hand, Soviet nationality doctrine had primordial base (it was corroborated by introducing the category *natsional'nost'* and its fixing in the ‘fifth column’ of the passport, so it was recorded only according to the parents’ ethnic belonging at age 16 and it could not be changed during the life). However on the other hand Soviet leaders artificially constructed national reality in the Soviet country by executing nationality policies which are described above. In order to understand better the theoretical aspects of Soviet national policy we should also examine the main tendencies in the Soviet social sciences tradition concerning ethnicity issues.

### **2.1.2. Soviet Ethnos Theory**

The most significant and well-known scientists in the Soviet ethnos theory were Sergey Shirokogorov, Yulian Bromley and Lev Gumilev. They, together with an army of domestic experts from 1960 to throughout the 1980s, made major contributions to what was called the ‘Soviet theory of ethnos’, and which has remind a dominant theoretical paradigm for the study of ethnicity in Russia<sup>63</sup>. The base of Soviet ethnos theory was founded by Shirikogorov in 1920s. His work was based on the suggestion that ethnographic occurrences must be examined as biological functions. Sokolovskii and Tishkov explain that Shirikogorov defined ‘ethnos’

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<sup>62</sup> Shustov, A. Kirgizija: prehod s kirillicy na latinicu kak geopoliticheskaja ideja. <http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/main/20083/3145.htm>

<sup>63</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 2

as a group of people, speaking one and the same languages and admitting common origin characterized by a set of customs and life style, which are preserved and sanctified by tradition, which distinguishes it from others of the same kind<sup>64</sup>.

Shirikogorov stressed that “the most remarkable feature of ethnos is that it is a biological unit of man in which the reproduction of species is going on and in which the process of physical changes takes place”<sup>65</sup>. Tishkov points out that according to Shirokogorov, various elements of the “ethnographic complex” exist and develop unequally with some mutual dependence and ties, “which are impossible to destroy and the magnitude of which could be changed only with the retention of balance and buoyancy”<sup>66</sup>. In order to exist, each and every person tries to keep this balance; which could be reached sometimes in the strong development of some elements at the expense of others that develop more weakly.

Bromley’s ethnos theory is based on the Russian tradition of understanding the term “ethnos”, which suppose that main features of ethnos is language and culture<sup>67</sup>; territory and ethnic self-consciousness<sup>68</sup>; peculiarity of psychic (mentality)<sup>69</sup>; common origin and state belonging<sup>70</sup>. Bromley rethinking these approaches concludes that ethnos can be understood in two senses: in a restricted sense (the main indication of ethnos) he calls it *core-ethnos*; and in a wide sense (with including minor features) *ethnosocial organism*<sup>71</sup>. Explaining the differences between these terms he gives the case of

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<sup>64</sup> Sokolovskii, S., Tishkov, V. 1996. ‘Ethnicity’. In *Encyclopedia of social and cultural anthropology* ed. Barnard A., Spencer, J. Taylor & Francis. p. 191

<sup>65</sup> Shirokogorov, S.M. 1970. *Ethnological And Linguistical Aspects Of The Ural-Altai Hypothesis*. Anthropological publications. <http://www.shirokogorov.ru/s-m-shirokogorov/publications/ural-altaic-hypothesis>

<sup>66</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo

<sup>67</sup> Kushner. P. I. 1951. *Etnicheskie territorii i jetnicheskie granicy*. Moskva, p. 6

<sup>68</sup> Cheboksarov, N. N. 1967. ‘Problemy tipologii jetnicheskikh obwnostej v trudah sovetskih uchenyh’. *Sovetskaja Etnografija* 4, p. 5

<sup>69</sup> Kozlov, V. I. 1967. ‘O ponjatii jetnicheskoi obwnosti’. *Sovetskaja Etnografija* 2, p. 26

<sup>70</sup> Tokarev, S. A. 1964. ‘Problema tipov jetnicheskikh obwnostej (k metodologicheskim problemam jetnografii)’. *Voprosy filosofii* 11, p.44

<sup>71</sup> Bromley, Y.V. 1970. ‘K voprosu o sushnosti jetnosa’. *Priroda* 2: 51-55. [http://scepsis.ru/library/id\\_836.html](http://scepsis.ru/library/id_836.html)

migrations as an example. He argues that not only migrants but also their descendants save previous i.e. ethnic characteristics. This steady features (that is not disappear after a migration) is the core of ethnic community, ethnos in a restricted sense. The features that ethnos loses during the migration is outer shell of ethnos-core. Bromley singles out the features that do not lose. First of all it is the physical differences (race: complexion, color of hair, eyes, shape of eyes, cranium) that have all this characteristics. However, he emphasizes that race differentiation does not always coincide with ethnicity and they “cannot serve as a sufficient basis for distinguishing ethnic communities”<sup>72</sup>. According to him, the activity and the results of this activity are of great importance. It is culture in a wide sense. This includes language, visual arts, folk culture, customs, rites, morals and manners etc. Reproduction of these components of culture is useful for migrants to preserve their ethnic peculiarities. Another important component is ethnic self-consciousness. This refers to the fact that all members have an awareness of belonging to the same group. Bromley argues that ethnos exists until members preserve their awareness of belonging to this ethnos. Another significant component is endogamy, because it preserves homogeneity of the group and provides continuity of the traditional culture. On the basis of this features, he defines the term ethnos in a restricted sense (core-ethnos) according to him, ethnos is a historically formed community of people that have common, relatively steady peculiarities of culture and common psychological traits (mentality), consciousness of their unity is characterized by and also characterized by endogamy, common territory and ethnonym<sup>73</sup>. Bromley stresses that in clear form this ethnos-core does not exist. It has its own “shell” which consist of natural (external) and social (internal) factors. Natural factor is landscape. Social factor is non-ethnic social phenomena (social organism). Social organism is independent units of social development (tribal in primitive society, socio-political in class society). It means historical stage or economical environment. Ethnos that lived out in a social organism is considered as *ethnosocial organism (ESO)*. *ESO* is the most important form of ethnos existing in society (in history). This formation has some kind of self-dependence which provides favorable conditions for ethnic reproduction. The main components of *ESO* are ethnic and socio-economic factors. Socio-economic factors are more mutable compared to ethnic ones. This “conservatism” of ethnic factors is important for the preservation of

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<sup>72</sup> Bromley, Y. 1974. *Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today*. The Hague, Mouton, p. 63

<sup>73</sup> Bromley, Y.V. 1970. ‘K voprosu o sushnosti jetnosa’. *Priroda* 2: 51-55.  
[http://scepsis.ru/library/id\\_836.html](http://scepsis.ru/library/id_836.html)

the same ethnos during a few socio-economical formations. Belonging to a certain social-economic formation determines the type of ethnic communities. Bromley distinguished such types as tribe, *narodnost'*, bourgeois and social nation. Tishkov while explaining Bromley's definitions points out that those who had their 'own' union or autonomous republics were considered 'socialist nations' as the highest type of nations. Those with a lower status of administrative autonomy or who did not have any status at all were dismissed as *narodnost'* (something between tribe and nation).<sup>74</sup> In this sense Bromley categorized the Stalin's hierarchy of nations.

Bromley made a correlation between social organism and ethnos on the basis of the degree of overlapping or conjunction in the territorial space, and he distinguished three types of *ESO*: 1) beyond the borders of the territory of *ESO*, ethnos is heterogeneous or exist in small homogeneous groups, which don't have socio-economical independence. (Italian, Czechoslovakian). It means that one ethnos has one *ESO*; 2) One ethnos exist in several *ESO* (Arabic ethnos has several *ESO* – Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqui; GDR and German - FGR – because of different socio-economical formations); 3) One state – several ethnos – several *ESO*. But *ESOs* in this state do not have a complete structure, because they do not have their own political superstructure (*ESO* in Russian empire (Ukrainian, Georgians) they did not have their own state).<sup>75</sup>

Western (Banks<sup>76</sup>) as well as Russian (Tishkov<sup>77</sup>) scholars put stress on primordial essence of Bromley's approach to the ethnic issues, however his ideas are difficult to be considered only as primordial ones because of the 'consciousness' component of the ethnos. It verifies the fact that he has constructivist terms in his approach. As it was mentioned in the previous subparagraph the Soviet authority was primordialist in theory but it is constructivist in practice. It gives the answer why Soviet theorists had constructivist features. Marcus Banks evaluating Bromley's ethnos theory stresses that in

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<sup>74</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 3

<sup>75</sup> Bromley, Y.V. 1970. 'K voprosu o sushnosti jetnosa'. *Priroda* 2: 51-55.  
[http://scepsis.ru/library/id\\_836.html](http://scepsis.ru/library/id_836.html)

<sup>76</sup> Banks, M. 1996. *Ethnicity. Anthropological Considerations*. London: Routledge, p. 24

<sup>77</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo, p. 1

spite of primordial core of identity it “recognizes the importance of specific historical, economic and ... political factors in shaping the expressions of ethnic identity”.<sup>78</sup>

Another representative of the Soviet ethnos theory was Lev Gumilev, whose ideas are now very popular in Russia. First of all, we should point out that he was a son of famous Russian oppositionists Nikolay Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova. During his life, Gumilev was three times arrested by Soviet government, because of his political activity and theoretical views. He worked out on the conception of ‘passionarity’. According to his theory ethnic group is a geographical phenomenon that is connected to the feeding and accommodating landscape, i.e. the place where this ethnos dwells<sup>79</sup>. Ethnos can not be a social group, because it is not directly connected with the productive forces, although its culture is a social phenomenon. In ethnic group, in contrast to the society, conscious decision does not work, because it is based on feelings and reflexes. Ethnos as well as person has to adapt oneself to the both geographical and ethnic environments.<sup>80</sup> Gumilev believed that the basis of ethnic groups is not the similarity of their members but rather the interconnections which cements the society.<sup>81</sup> He also considered that differences between ethnic groups are not determined by the mode of production, but rather by culture or the level of education. One ethnos can be distinguished from another by stereotypes of behavior that a person adopts in the first years of life from his or her parents and peers, and then the person uses them in his future life. Ethnogenesis has four phases: birth, rise, decline and death of the ethnic group. Therefore “ethnogenesis” is biogeogenesis which limits the development of the ethnos taking place, including a process of its adaptation. Gumilev’s theory of Ethnogenesis says that ethnos is not a social phenomenon, but an element of Earth’s bioorganic world – biosphere. Biological potential of man has an important role in this process. This potential produced an energy which was called ‘passionarity’<sup>82</sup>. Gumilev defined passionarity as affective surplus of biochemical energy of living material, which “generates sacrificity for oftenly illusionary

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<sup>78</sup> Banks, M. 1996. *Ethnicity. Anthropological Considerations*. London: Routledge, p. 24

<sup>79</sup> Gumilev, L.N. 1992. *Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli*. Moskva

<sup>80</sup> Gumilev, L.N. 1993. *Ritmy Evrazii*. Moskva: Progress, pp. 178-179

<sup>81</sup> Gumilev, L.N. 1993. *Etnosfera: istroija ljudej i istorija prirody*. Moskva: Ekopros

<sup>82</sup> Gumilev, L.N. 1993. *Ritmy Evrazii*. Moskva: Progress, p. 521

purpose”.<sup>83</sup> The development of ethnos depends upon energy flows which come from space. Rare and very short space radiation bursts (only nine were detected during history of Eurasia) caused genetic mutation – a passionary burst. As a result, people start consuming much more energy than they need for normal everyday functioning. Excessive energy is released in hypernormal activity, in passionarity. Extremely energetic people, passionaries, explore or conquer new territories, create new religions or scientific theories. Too many super activists on limited territory, which is favorable for their reproduction, form new ethnos. Energy from passionary parents passes to their children, as well as behaviour stereotypes, which are extremely long-living. People who have this energy to achieve their goal sometimes rebuild the ethnic system, change patterns of behavior and development. Gumilev divided ethnoses into the categories of ‘super ethnos’, ‘ethnos’, ‘sub-ethnos’, ‘ethnic reliefs’ etc. For him, ‘super ethnos’ is was the largest ethnic system. It includes several ethnoses. ‘Super ethnos’ has its own mentality and perception of the world, which is common for all ethnoses inside ‘super ethnos’. He described ‘ethnos’ as lower ethnic system. ‘Ethnos’ usually means ‘narod’. ‘Sub-ethnos’ is a part of ‘ethnos’, which was developed in special landscape. He argued that coexistence of two or more rivaling superethnic ethnoses in one ecological niche is a Chimera. Ethnos is created by one-time ‘passionary push’. When this energy is finished ethnos dies. The life time of ethnos is about 1200-1500 years. Gumilev stressed that exogamy destroys ethnic systems, especially in the ‘super ethnos level’.

Gumilev’s passionarity theory is very disputable. His most popular ideas are: 1) nature (primordial) bases of ethnic entities; 2) the close link between ethnicity and the natural environment (landscape); 3) the idea of the rhythms of ethnic group, which can not be change by activity of people; 4) the source of the ethnic group is ‘passionary push’.

After analyzing the peculiarities of the Soviet nationality policy and ethnos theory we should examine the Western approaches to ethnicity.

## **2.2. Western Approaches to Ethnicity**

First of all we should understand the origins of the term ethnicity in Western societies. The core of these terms “*ethno*” has an old story. Research studying the origins of the word stresses that it was used in ancient Greece as “ethnos” in a lot of variations

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<sup>83</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo

with different meanings<sup>84</sup>. The basic sense of understanding this term is “common idea of people or animals who share some cultural or biological characteristics and who live and act in concert”<sup>85</sup>. The most remarkable thing is that this term was used for people who are not Greeks. It was a synonym of *barbaros* or Hebrew *goyim*<sup>86</sup>. The term *ethnos* has been used since mid-nineteenth century in meaning of “group of people of shared characteristic”. In French language there are also words like *ethnie* and adjective *ethnique*. In English there is no noun for understanding *ethnie*, but there are some derivative words like ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic’. In Russian there are *etnos*, *etnicheskiy* and more recent term *etnichnost*. The term ethnicity was first used in 1950s and it was recorded in the Oxford English dictionary of 1953. But still there is no common understanding of this term. There are several approaches to understanding ethnicity in Western science tradition.

There are three main approaches of understanding ethnicity: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. These three approaches try to answer a question of essence and origin of ethnicity. The term primordialism was first used by Edward Shils in 1957<sup>87</sup>. Adherents of primordialism consider ethnicity as the initial characteristic of members that really existed in the ethnic group. It is ethnicity “in heart”, “in blood”, “in soil” therefore the basis of ethnic group is blood relationship, common descent and territory. Smith explaining essence of primordial views stresses that “ethnic communities are the natural units of history and integral elements of the human experience”<sup>88</sup>. Tishkov points out on primordial approach that awareness of group belonging is arise from genetic code<sup>89</sup>. There are two main versions of primordialism. Smith distinguishes sociobiological and sociological approaches. Russian authors of ‘*Ethnosociology*’ also stress on two versions, but they call the latter as evolutionary-historical<sup>90</sup>. Eller and

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<sup>84</sup> Smith, A. D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell, ch. 2

<sup>85</sup> *Ethnicity*. 1996. Ed. Hutchinson J., Smith A.. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, p 4.

<sup>86</sup> Tonkin, E., McDonald, M., Chapman M. 1996. ‘History and Ethnicity’. in *Ethnicity*. Ed. Hutchinson, J., Smith, A. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 19-21

<sup>87</sup> *Ethnicity*. 1996. Ed. Hutchinson J., Smith A.. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, p.8

<sup>88</sup> Smith, A. D. 1986. *The Ethnic origin of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell, p.12

<sup>89</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ocherki teorii i politiki etnichnosti v Rossii*. Moskva

<sup>90</sup> Arutyunyan Y.V., Drobezsheva L.M., Susoklov A.A. 1998. *Ethnosociologiya: uchebnik dlya vuzov*. Moskva: Aspect Press

Coughlan emphasize that all primordial terminology based on affect: attachment, bond, tie, sentiment. But this does not mean that ethnicity is a primordial phenomenon, “since emotion is not necessarily or ordinarily primordial but has a clear and analyzable sociogenesis”. They conclude that “primordialism is a bankrupt concept for the analysis and description of ethnicity”<sup>91</sup>.

Concerning the specific names of primordialists Walker Connor stresses on Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils<sup>92</sup>. Van den Berghe also can be added to this list. Russian researcher A.V. Kudrin reckons in sociobiological primordialists Yu Wong, Dawkins, Sober, Wilson and Shaw. Among cultural primordialists he marks out on Armstrong, Horowitz, Isaacs, Ch. Keyes, Connor, Smith, Stavenhagen, Schwartz and Epstein.<sup>93</sup> As for Connor and Smith in this list there are some doubts. They are most likely representatives of constructivist theory which will be explained below. Such a classification by a Russian researcher can be explained by mentioning the different understanding of what primordialism is. According to Tishkov, in Soviet sciences Shirokogorov, Gumilev, Bromley stayed on primordial viewpoints<sup>94</sup>. However, as we defined in the previous paragraph, Bromley’s approach cannot be unambiguously labeled as ‘pure’ primordialism.

Instrumentalist theories shift accents in ethnicity from origin of ethnic feeling to using them as symbolic and real capital in achievement of certain aims in the society. Adherents of instrumental approach explain ethnicity as a means of attainment of group interests, as ideology which was created by elites for a group mobilization. Ethnicity in this sense is an ad-hoc element of a political strategy, used as a resource for interest groups to get an increase in wealth, power, and status etc.<sup>95</sup>. Daniel Bell explains ethnicity as choice of individuals, which would choose other groups under different conditions to

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 48, 50

<sup>92</sup> Connor, W. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: NJ, p.103

<sup>93</sup> Kudrin, A.V. 2000. ‘Ob osnovnuh podhodah k ponimaniyu etnichnosti kak kategorii obschestvennuh nauk’. in *Rossiya: social’no-ekonomicheskie I pravovue problemu transformacii obschestva*. Perm p.287-300

<sup>94</sup> Tishkov, V. 1997. *Ethnicity, Nationality and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. The Mind Aflame. Oslo

<sup>95</sup> Cohen, A. 1974. *Two-Dimensional Man: An essay on power and symbolism in complex society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

gain power and privileges<sup>96</sup>. In group mobilization the role of leaders are emphasized, which use ethnicity as “strategic site” in gaining political and other compensation because of poor social status. The feelings that are used by politicians can be examined as primordial, but staying as latent and actualizing only during struggle for recourses. Bell stresses that ethnic belonging can suddenly appear or move to the background depending on political or economical conditions<sup>97</sup>. Instrumentalism as a theory of ethnicity appeared as a result of the crisis of ‘melting pot’ idea which was dominating in USA in 1920-50s. This idea based on building of American nation by gradual ‘melting’ of immigrants from different countries under the slogan ‘E Pluribus Unum’. Assimilation was considered as the last stage of developing of interethnic relation. But failure of nation-building in many of post-colonial countries and mass ethnic movements in America in 1960-70s led to invalidation of this theory.<sup>98</sup> New viewpoints appeared spontaneously as an outcome of the current observation. That's why there are a lot of applied approaches in this theory what is one of the object of criticism. The ideas of instrumentalism are shared by such scholars like D. Bell, H. Wolpe, N. Glazer, T. Gurr, N. Kasfir, R. Melson, D. Moynihan, J. Nagel, S. Olzak, A. Rabushka, J. Rothchild, K. Shepsle, C. Young<sup>99</sup>.

Last approach is constructivism. It is the most popular western approach to ethnicity. For constructivists, ethnicity has roots not “in the heart”, but “in the mind” of individuals, which are members of ethnic groups – “imagined communities”. The sense of this concept is described very clear by Nagel, who pointed out that “ethnicity is a socially constructed” phenomenon<sup>100</sup>. One of the first scientists who pay attention to the link between ethnic and social characteristics of the society, and who emphasized on subjective component of ethnic groups was Max Weber. Weber gave the definition of ethnic groups as “human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent

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<sup>96</sup> Bell D. 1975. ‘Ethnicity and Social Change’ in *‘Ethnicity Theory and Experience’*. Ed. Glazer, N., Moynihan, D. P.. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 171

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 171

<sup>98</sup> Glaser, N., Moynihan, D. 1996. ‘Beyond the Melting Pot’ in *Ethnicity*. Ed. Hutchinson, J., Smith, A. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp.135-138;  
Glaser, N., Moynihan, D. 1975. ‘Introduction’. in *Ethnicity Theory and Experience’*. Ed. Glazer, N., Moynihan, D. P. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

<sup>99</sup> Kudrin, A.V. 2000. ‘Ob osnovnuh podhodah k ponimaniyu etnichnosti kak kategorii obschestvennuh nauk’. in *Rossiya: social’no-economicheskie I pravovue problemu transformacii obschestva*. Perm, p. 287-300

<sup>100</sup> Nagel, J. 1994. ‘Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture’. *Social Problems* 41(1): 152-175

... this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationships exist”<sup>101</sup>. He distinguished ethnic community from kinship group. But still “ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized that inspires the belief in common ethnicity”<sup>102</sup>. Richard Jenkins analyzing Weber’s ideas considered that the belief in common ancestry according to Weber is “likely to be a consequence of collective action rather than its cause; people come to see themselves as belonging together — coming from a common background - as a consequence of acting together”<sup>103</sup>.

Fredrik Barth gave a similar definition: “Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people”<sup>104</sup>. Barth worked out the concept of “ethnic boundaries”. He argues that ethnic boundaries define the ethnic groups<sup>105</sup>. Process of shaping these boundaries depends not on cultural characteristics of society, but rather on situational factors such as migration and conquest; interaction between groups is also important in this process.<sup>106</sup> Weber in his definition of ‘ethnic group’ also emphasized on “memories of colonization and migration”<sup>107</sup>. Barth stressed that ethnic differences are maintained in spite of the increasing interethnic contacts, even if one person during his life could change his / her membership in the ethnic groups. Several ethnic groups can exist in one social system. Barth argued that the interaction of ethnic groups in social system does not lead to elimination of ethnic differences by their changing or acculturation; cultural differences can be maintained despite interethnic contact and mutuality. “The most

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<sup>101</sup> Weber, M. 1978. ‘Economy and Society’, in ed. Roth, G., Wittlich, C. *Economy and society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of Carolina Press, p. 389

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 389

<sup>103</sup> Jenkins, R. 1997. *Rethinking ethnicity: arguments and explorations*. London: Sage, p. 10

<sup>104</sup> Barth, F. 1969. ‘Introduction’. in ed. Barth, F. *Ethnic groups and Boundaries*. London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 11

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 15

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>107</sup> Weber, M. 1978. ‘Economy and Society’, in ed. Roth, G., Wittlich, C. *Economy and society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of Carolina Press, p. 389

isolated traditional group of people is probably the least ethnically self-defined”<sup>108</sup> It is important to understand which role culture plays in this process. We can say that if “ethnic identity refers to the social boundaries of a group whereas cultural identity refers to the content of these social boundaries”<sup>109</sup>. It means that ethnic boundaries (and ethnic group) continue to exist even if culture changed (or became hybrid). And the members continue to identify themselves with this group even if they do not practice the culture of this group. It would be impossible then “to define an ethnic group by its ‘objective’ cultural content”<sup>110</sup> Barth wrote in this sense that

the cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change, but the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity<sup>111</sup>.

Barth argues that “Common culture ... is an implication or result, rather than a primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization”<sup>112</sup> Only one way for defining ethnic group, according to Barth, is based on analyzing boundaries of this group, distracting from cultural content in the framework of boundaries. Ethnic boundaries are preserved through the ‘mechanisms of exclusion’ which establishes differentiation between ethnic groups. Such mechanisms particularly prohibit intergroup marriages (endogamy) they limit social and economic relations and lead to the physical isolation of the group. Sometimes groups establish mutual barriers: their members try to be isolated, none of the group is dominating. But usually members of one group dominate upon other ethnic groups that lead to unequal resource allocations and possible struggle for these resources.

Another important representative of constructivist approach is Anthony D. Smith. He defines ‘ethnic group’ (*ethnie*) as

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<sup>108</sup> Roosens, E. E. 1989. *Creating Ethnicity: The process of Ethnogenesis*. Sage Publications, p.12

<sup>109</sup> Aydingün, I., Aydingün, A. 2007. ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), p. 116

<sup>110</sup> Roosens, E. E. 1994. ‘Primordial nature of origins in migrant ethnicity’. in *The anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond “ethnic groups and boundaries”* ed. Vermeulen, H., Govers, C.. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, p. 84

<sup>111</sup> Barth, F. 1969. ‘Introduction’. in ed. Barth, F. *Ethnic groups and Boundaries*. London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 14

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 11

a named human population with myths of common ancestry , shared historical memories, one or more elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites.<sup>113</sup>

At the same time, Smith defines ‘nation’ as:

a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myth and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.<sup>114</sup>

As we can see *ethnies* share with nations the elements of common name, myth, and memories, however their center of gravity is different: *ethnies* are defined largely by their ancestry myth and historical memories; nations are defined by the historic territory they occupy and by their mass, public cultures and common laws. Smith stress that a nation must possess its homeland; an *ethnie* need not – hence, the phenomenon of diaspora *ethnies*. In the case of a nation, a mass public culture encompasses all the members, whereas in the *ethnie* it may be confined to elite segments, for which it may be a separate set of laws and a different type of education.<sup>115</sup> Nation in his views has very strong link to state. It could not exist without state.

As we can see central element of ethnic and national phenomena is ethno symbolism. Following Barth and Armstrong approaches, Smith argued “symbolic components mark out and guard the boundaries of *ethnies*”<sup>116</sup>. Particular importance has myths, symbols (like language, dress, emblems, rituals, and artifacts), and memories of ethnic origins, election, homeland, and ‘golden age’. Myth of ancestry defines the distinctive character of specific *ethnies*.

Because our research concerns the identity aspect of ethnic issues we should give some theoretical explanation of this notion. One of the authoritative scholars in identity matters is Richard Jenkins. The issues of identity are always connected to the question ‘who I am’ or ‘who we are’. But it is possible to understand ‘us’ only by contrasting to

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<sup>113</sup> Smith, A. D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Historical Society of Israel, Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, p. 65

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 14

<sup>115</sup> Smith, A. D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Historical Society of Israel, Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, p. 65

<sup>116</sup> Smith, A. D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Historical Society of Israel, Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, p. 66

'others'. Jenkins stresses that "human social life is unimaginable without some means of knowing who others are and some sense of who we are"<sup>117</sup>. But this understanding is not something constant. He emphasizes on 'active' element of identity: it "is not 'just there', it must always be established"<sup>118</sup>. Identity can not be explain as a datum that simply 'is'. It can "only be understood as process, as 'being' or 'becoming'"<sup>119</sup>. Taking in consideration this idea our research will be examined ethnic identity as a process on which different factors always have influence.

In the framework of our research it is important also to make review of Montserrat Guibernau's approach of understanding national identity. He defines two fundamental elements of national identity: continuity over time and differentiation from others.<sup>120</sup> National identity, according to his opinion, is a "collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations"<sup>121</sup>. Guibernau points out on five dimensions of national identity: psychological, cultural, territorial, historical and political. In our research these dimensions will be examined for ethnic identities of three main ethnic groups in Crimea: Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.

In contemporary Russian ethnos theory first of all constructivist approach is presented by views of Valery Tishkov. His works basically was built on the contrast of Western and Soviet ethnos theories. Ethnicity is defined as a form of social organization of cultural differences.<sup>122</sup> Ethnic group for him is a community that is based on the cultural self-identity with respect to other communities with which it always has fundamental connections.<sup>123</sup> Tishkov stresses that the term 'ethnic group' is a synonym to the Russian terms *narod* (in ethno-cultural sense), *etnicheskaya obshnost'* and *national'nost*. But it is different from the Soviet understanding of 'ethnos' as historically formed stable community of people. The main feature of ethnic community is not

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<sup>117</sup> Jenkins, R. 1996. *Social Identity*. London: Routledge, p. 5

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>120</sup> Guibernau, M. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Polity Press, p. 10

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>122</sup> Tishkov, V.A. 2001. *Etnologija i Politika*. Nauchnaja publicistika. M.: Nauka, p. 230

<sup>123</sup> Tishkov, V. 2003. *Rekviem po etnosu: issledovanija po social'no-kul'turnoj antropologii*. Moskva: Nauka, p. 115

“common descent” but rather myth about common historical destiny of its members.<sup>124</sup> The main point of ethnicity is ethnic identity, which is close to term *ethicheskoe samosoznanie* (ethnic self-consciousness) in Russian. Tishkov defines ethnic identity (belonging to certain ethnos) as arbitrarily (but not usually free) chosen or predefined one of the hierarchical substance which depends on what at this moment is considered as ethnos/ *narod/ natsional'nost'/ natsia* (in ethnic sense). He argued that there is no form, development or disappearance of ethnos, but rather other process takes place – ‘travelling’ of individual (and collective) identity between present cultural systems and sometimes these systems appear as a result of drift of identity. Ethnic identity is not only constantly changeable opinion what is ‘group’, but it is always struggle for control upon this opinion.<sup>125</sup>

After examining Soviet nationality policy, Soviet ethnos theory and Western approaches to ethnicity we should make some conclusions. Soviet ethnos theory is presented by two main approaches: Bromley’s and Gumilev’s. These approaches have some common features and at the same time differences. Bromley was official theoretic in the Soviet Union. His ideas were not much contradicted to the official ideology and Soviet nationality policy. His ethnos theory was a tool for Soviet government to explain ethnic situation in Soviet Union. It very clear reflected primordial and constructivists sides of Soviet nationality policy. His *ESO* (ethno-social organism) explained the existence of union republics (and other autonomous units within Soviet Union) and their ‘titular nations’. His views about ‘subjective’ component of the ethnos make him very close to the constructivist approach, and it explains how the Soviet policy worked. Gumilev was the opponent of Bromley. Bromley referred to the socioeconomic factors that determine the ethnos, but Gumilev stress on natural factors that shape the ethnos, especially landscape. As it was mentioned before, Gumilev’s family including him was in opposition to the Soviet regime. His conception was on the one had worked out in the framework of Soviet ethnos theory, but on the other hand it was opposite to the Soviet nationality policy. In Soviet Union there were fixed ‘hierarchy of nation’, however Gumilev’s theory gives the base for self-determination of other ethnic groups. It is clear, why his ideas have been popular especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>124</sup> Tishkov, V. 2003. *Rekviem po etnosu: issledovanija po social'no-kul'turnoj antropologii*. Moskva: Nauka, p. 116

<sup>125</sup> Tishkov, V. 2003. *Rekviem po etnosu: issledovanija po social'no-kul'turnoj antropologii*. Moskva: Nauka, p. 123

Geographical (landscape) aspect of Gumilev's theory can be used as legitimization of the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. Most of the current Russian anthropologists<sup>126</sup> evaluate his ideas as potentially dangerous for Russian territorial and political integrity, or even as a base for interethnic conflicts. Both these theories are very important for our research case. Bromley's theory is useful for us to understand the peculiarities of ethnic situation in the Soviet Union and in Crimea particularly. Soviet nationality policy was mostly in line with Bromley's ethnos theory. Gumilev's conception gives us the base to understand on the one hand territorial and political claims of suppressed nations (in our case it is Crimean Tatars), and on the other hand the awareness of Russians as 'super ethnos'.

Ethnic situation in the Soviet Union hides a contradiction in itself: official doctrine had primordial essence (ethnic belonging was considered as natural (primordial) characteristic of a person), but the Soviet nationality policy had a constructivist base (using censuses, internal passport system, replacement, deportation and so on, they, in fact, created hierarchy of nations). Therefore we believe that we should distinguish reality in post-Soviet space (particularly in Crimea) (how ordinary people understand their ethnic identities) from the way of analyzing this reality (which approach researchers should use to analyze this reality). The views of ordinary people could be primordial (as a result of Soviet policy), but in order to understand better the ethnic situation we should analyze it from the view point of constructivist approach (because of ethnic reality was constructed in Soviet times).

In this thesis, ethnic identities of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea will be examined by combining three approaches that are described in this chapter: Bromley's approach (to understand and explain peculiarities of Soviet nationality policy), Gumilev's conception (to understand behaviour of these ethnic groups, especially their territorial claims), and constructivist approach (to show how ethnic identity of each group was constructed)

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<sup>126</sup> Shnirel'man V., Panarin S. 2000. 'Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev: osnovatel' jetnologii?'. *Vestnik Evrazii*, 3 (10): 32-33

## CHAPTER 3

### HISTORY OF CRIMEA IN THE ETHNIC MYTHS OF RUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS AND CRIMEAN TATARS

In this chapter, main historical events that took place in Crimea are examined from the viewpoints of Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Soviet and Western historiographies. The main aim of this chapter is not to write true and objective history, which is quite a difficult task, but rather to show how crucial events are perceived in the historical myths of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians. The influence of the historical events on shaping ethnic boundaries of these ethnic groups in Crimea is shown. This analysis helps us to understand why three ethnic groups claim Crimea as territory that belongs to them and why Crimea is so important for the national identity of each group.

#### 3.1. Peculiarities of Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Western Historiography of Crimean Peninsula

According to Smith's approach to ethnicity, historical myths and memories play a crucial role in shaping ethnic boundaries<sup>127</sup>. He emphasizes on three possible ways in which the past may influence the present: recurrence, continuity and appropriation of history. Historical myths and ideas about "golden age" are commonplace within all nation-states<sup>128</sup>. Max Weber also stressed on "memories of colonization and migration" in his definition of ethnic group<sup>129</sup>. Similarly, Montserrat Guibernau believes that "history makes us closer to our ancestors, and strengthens the subjective belief of being part of

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<sup>127</sup> Introduction. in *Ethnicity*, ed. By Hutchinson J, Smith A. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. p.7

<sup>128</sup> Smith, A.D. 1984. 'National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent'. *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 7, p. 105

<sup>129</sup> Weber, M. 1978. 'Economy and Society'. in Roth G. and Wittich, C. (eds) *Economy and society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of Carolina Press, p 389

extended family”.<sup>130</sup> Taras Kuzio also points out that “issue of myths and history writing is largely understood as part of nation-building aspects of nation-states”<sup>131</sup>. Referring to Eriksen, Kuzio agrees that history for the anthropologists is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present.<sup>132</sup> The past is constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produced historical books in present. Therefore history can never be truly objective<sup>133</sup>. Historical myths define who ethnic “Others” are, they help to formulate image of external enemy. Idea of enemy promotes strengthening ethnic boundaries. Historical myths also participate in formation of ethnic stereotypes, which is an important element in the process of ethnic identification and perceptions of other groups. According to Barrington, stereotypes can play an important role in heightening ethnic tensions.<sup>134</sup>

The history of Crimea is described in several historiography traditions. Kuzio emphasizes on three main schools within Ukrainian borders. There are Ukrainophile, East Slavic and Russophile traditions<sup>135</sup>. To better understand all contradictions in territorial claims, we should also refer to Soviet, Western and Crimean Tatar historiography. Kuzio, using Magocsi terms, calls Ukrainophile and Russophile as “mutually exclusive” schools. It means that the same historical periods are shown as part of both Ukrainian and Russian histories. The essence of East Slavic historiography is “multiple loyalties”. Ukrainophile School is dominant within independent Ukraine and it is called as “nationalist” historiography. All school textbooks (including books in Crimea) are written in the framework of this approach. The territorial factor is the base for this historiography. It means that Ukrainian history should include all events that have taken place within its

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<sup>130</sup> Guibernau, M. 2007. *The Identity of Nations*. Polity Press, p. 20

<sup>131</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. ‘Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine’. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), p. 29

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, p. 31

<sup>133</sup> Kuzio, T. 2002. ‘History, Memory and Nation building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space’. *Nationalities Papers* 30 (2), p. 246

<sup>134</sup> Barrington, L.W. 2002. ‘Views of the Ethnic Other in Ukraine’. *Nationalism and Ethnic policies* 8 (2), p. 84

<sup>135</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. ‘Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine’. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), pp. 29 – 58

contemporary borders<sup>136</sup>. Therefore history of Crimea is a part of Ukrainian history. Ukrainian claims to Crimean peninsula are validated within this historiography. The Russophile historiography is a history of all land where Russians lived. Ukrainians as separated nations is denied in this historiography and they are shown as a Russian tribe whose only desire is to reunite with Russia<sup>137</sup>. Crimea is believed as primordial Russian territory. Soviet historiography grounds on the theory of “younger” and “elder brothers”. Common descent of Russians and Ukrainians as Eastern Slavs is argued in this historiography. The annexation of Crimea like in the Russophile history is shown as reunification of Russian lands. In Crimean Tatar historiography, Crimea is believed as indigenous land of Crimean Tatars. Ethnogenesis of this nation is strongly connected to the peninsula, therefore Crimea is considered as the only homeland. Russia is called as a conqueror and an annihilator of the Crimean Tatar state. Relying on the saying above, history of Crimea will be examined in this chapter. It is important to analyze how historical events influenced the shaping of ethnic boundaries of ethnic groups in Crimea. The link between ethnicity and territory in the case of Crimea is explained. It is a key element of understanding why Russians in Crimea differ from Russians in Russia; Ukrainians in the peninsula differ from Ukrainians in the continental part of Ukraine; Crimean Tatars are not the same as Volga Tatars and they constitute a separated nation.

### **3.2. History of Crimea from Ancient Times till the End of the Golden Horde**

The history of Crimea has ancient roots. The earliest inhabitants of whom we have authentic traces were the Cimmerians, who inhabited Crimea in the 15<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> centuries BC<sup>138</sup>. Other ancient people of whom we have written evidence were the Tauri (9<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> centuries BC). In the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC, Scythians came to Crimea. They had dominated in the steppe part of Crimea till the 3<sup>th</sup> century AC. In the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC Greek colonists began to settle along the Black Sea coast. Later, Crimea was occupied successively by the Goths (250), the Huns (376), the Bulgars (4<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> centuries), the Khazars (8<sup>th</sup> century), the

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<sup>136</sup> Popson, N. 2001. ‘The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the “Ukrainian Nation”’. *Nationalities Papers* 29 (2), p. 344

<sup>137</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. ‘Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine’. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), p. 38

<sup>138</sup> Dyulichhev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal, p. 21

state of Kievan Rus' (10<sup>th</sup>–11<sup>th</sup> centuries), the Byzantine Empire (1016), the Kipchaks (the Kumans) (1050), and the Mongols (1223).

In the mid-10<sup>th</sup> century, the eastern area of Crimea was conquered by Prince Sviatoslav of Kiev and became part of the Kievan Rus' principality of Tmutarakan. In 988, Prince Vladimir of Kiev also captured the Byzantine town of Chersones (presently part of Sevastopol) where he later converted to Christianity. Historian Andreev points out that after these events Slavs first time settled in Crimean peninsula. The cities where Slavs mostly settled were Starui Krym, Sudak, Mangup, Chersones.<sup>139</sup> Russian historians Artamonov<sup>140</sup> and Yakobson<sup>141</sup> also believe that by the 10<sup>th</sup> century there were some Russian settlements in Crimea. It did not have a great influence on the ethnic composition of Crimea at that time, but it has a significant symbolic meaning for current Slavic inhabitants of the peninsula. Citing Nadinskii's works, Vozgrin points out that in the Russian historiography there is idea about Slavs as indigenous people in Crimea.<sup>142</sup> Times of Kievan Rus' we can consider as Smith's 'golden age' for both Russians and Ukrainians. Each of these nations connects their myths of descent with Kievan Rus, what Anthony D. Smith calls as 'appropriation' of history<sup>143</sup>. Taras Kuzio says about the domination of Ukrainophile historical school in Ukraine after Soviet Union's collapse, especially in the current educational system. This historiography is defined as 'nationalist'<sup>144</sup>. It includes all events that have taken place within the borders of current Ukraine<sup>145</sup>. Kievan Rus' within this approach is understood to be a "proto-Ukrainian state", as "an example of Ukraine's "1,000-year-old" tradition of state building" to which Russia doesn't connect<sup>146</sup>. Princes (*'knyaz'ya'*) of Kiev are shown as ancestors of current

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<sup>139</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 37

<sup>140</sup> Artamonov, M.I. 1962. *Istorija Hazar*. Leningrad, p. 378

<sup>141</sup> Yakobson, L.L. 1973. *Krym v Srednie Veka*. Moskva, p.56

<sup>142</sup> Vozgin, V.E. 1992. *Istoricheskiye Sudbu Krumskih Tatar*. Moskva: Mysl

<sup>143</sup> Smith, A. D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Historical Society of Israel, Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, p. 64

<sup>144</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. 'Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine'. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), pp. 29-58

<sup>145</sup> Popson, N. 2001. 'The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the "Ukrainian Nation"'. *Nationalities Papers* 29 (2), p. 344

Ukrainians. Consequently all territorial possessions of Kievan Rus' are considered as indigenous land of Ukraine; all achievements of Kievan Princes are believed as achievements of Ukrainian nation. Striking example of such achievements is the adoption of Christianity, which brought civilization, literacy and culture. Therefore, place where Christianity was adopted by Prince Vladimir also is important spiritual element in the identity of Ukrainian Nation. Evidence of this argument we can find at the Ukrainian banknotes in denomination of one *hryvna* (issue in 1996). On the reverse of these banknotes the Ruins of Chersoneses are painted.

Times of Kievan Rus' also have powerful meaning for Russians in their identification process with Crimea and especially with current Sevastopol. According to the Moscow version of history, Kiev is the 'Mother of Russian cities' (*Kiev – mat' gorodov russkih*) and the word 'Russia' originates in the word 'Rus'. Kuzio explaining Russophile historiography refers to Nikolai Karamzin's approach, who believed that Kievan Rus' was transformed into the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal, later into Muscovy and finally into the Russian Empire. Ukraine's primary links with Kievan Rus' and its development outside Russian influence were ignored. Low level of cultural unity that existed between the Ukrainian and the Muscovite lands from 11<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> were also ignored in the Russian historiography. The Soviet as well as the Russophile schools deny any pre-fourteenth-century history of Ukraine and either, and see Ukrainians as a Russian tribe or as a wayward people whose only desire is to reunite with Russia<sup>147</sup>. All ideas about possessions and achievements of Kievan Rus' correspondingly take place in the Russian history. Vladimir's conversion to Christianity has crucial meaning for Russian Orthodox Church (it was The Church of Moscow Patriarchy that has been reconstructed in Chersones) as one of the first evidence of appearance of Orthodoxy in the Russian lands. Later, this event was a significant point of the idea that Moscow is "The Third Rome". Importance of the event led to the great significance of place where this event has taken place (Sevastopol and Crimea). Therefore this idea is one of the arguments in claiming Crimea as their own territory for both Ukrainians and Russians.

In 882 Pechenegs first time appeared in Crimea and by the middle of 10<sup>th</sup> century, they occupied almost whole Crimean peninsula except Chersones and cities in the Kerch

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<sup>146</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. 'Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine'. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), p. 38

<sup>147</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. 'Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine'. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), pp. 32; 38

peninsula<sup>148</sup>. As Milner stressed, it was “the Asiatic people of the Turk stock”<sup>149</sup>, who “displayed such a genius for commerce” and became resellers between Asia and Constantinople<sup>150</sup>. But in the 11<sup>th</sup> century Pechenegs were defeated and in the 12<sup>th</sup> century finally forced out from the Black Sea region by Polovtsians (*Polovtsy, Kipchaks*). They controlled Crimean lands except the Kerch peninsula and Chersones. Their main strategic city was Sugdeia (current Sudak)<sup>151</sup>.

In 1223 Mongols appeared in Crimea, defeated Kipchaks, plundered Sugdeia and left the peninsula for 16 years. Their second raid in Crimea was in 1239. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century eastern part of Crimea was economically developed, therefore it was attractive for Mongol raids. After 1242 they started to settle in North Crimea, which became a province (*ulus*) of Golden Horde and was governed by representatives of the Great Khans of the Golden Horde<sup>152</sup>. The capital of this *Ulus* was the city *Kyrym*, which was build in the valley of *Churuk-Su* River in the South-East of the Crimean peninsula. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century, this name started to be used as the name of whole peninsula<sup>153</sup>. We should note that these nomadic tribes are called as *Mongolo-tataru* in the Russian history, but in the Western history second part of name *tataru* (“Tatars”) is absent. English historian Milner wrote about correlation of these two terms (Mongols and Tatars):

In its present application, the term Tatar is very misleading, having long since lost all ethnographic significations, even before it was known in Europe, through popularly considered synonymous with Mongol.

It originally denotes a few obscure tribes on the Chinese frontier, who, rising to independence and power under Genghis Khan, took the proud title of the Celestial Mongols, rejecting the old name of Tata, as it implied “subjection” in their language, and was no longer applicable. But upon the Mongols extending their dominion westward to the shores of the Caspian and the East of Europe, they applied the discarded name to the subjugated nations, as it etymologically expressed their condition. Rejecting their ranks from them, the conquered populations at length acquired such a numerical preponderance in the armies of conquerors, that Western Europe confounded the two names of Mongols and Tatars as denoting the same people, and even gave the

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<sup>148</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 38

<sup>149</sup> Milner, M.A. 1855. *The Crimea, its Ancient and Modern History: The Khans, The Sultans and The Tsars*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Lonfmans, p. 116

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, p. 117

<sup>151</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 38

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 40

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p. 41

preference to the latter as the proper denomination, because it designed the great majority.<sup>154</sup>

Crimean Tatar historians stress that term *mongolo-tataru* is unscientific and it creates a fertile ground for the different speculations.<sup>155</sup>

After the Mongol conquest of the Crimean peninsula, Crimean Tatars had entered the historical record as “Tatars”<sup>156</sup>. For the next 200 years Crimean Tatars amalgamated with other immigrant Turkic people: Khazars, Pechenegs, Kipchaks and others settled inhabitants of mountain and coastal parts of peninsula: Tauri, Cimmerians Scythians and Sarmats<sup>157</sup>. Andreev points out that the first record of “Crimean Tatars” was fixed in the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century in the S. Gerbershtein and M. Bronevskoy’s works<sup>158</sup>. However, the author of ‘Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations’ stresses on 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries as time of Crimean Tatars’ emergence as distinct national group.<sup>159</sup> The Crimean Tatar historians stress that Crimean Tatars called themselves as ‘Crimean Tatars’ only when dealing with other nations. The name *kırımli* was used within their ethnic group.<sup>160</sup>

### 3.3. Times of Crimean Khanate and Ottoman suzerainty

14<sup>th</sup> century was the time of disturbances in the Golden Horde. Frequent changes of Khans took place at that period. Genoese took advantage of this situation and occupied

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<sup>154</sup> Milner, M.A. 1855. *The Crimea, its Ancient and Modern History: The Khans, The Sultans and The Tsars*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, pp. 119-120

<sup>155</sup> Kurtiev, R. 2005. ‘Etnonim “Tatar” I Etnos “Krumskie Tatory”’. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymuchpedgiz. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/index.html>

<sup>156</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, pp. 322-338

<sup>157</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 46

<sup>158</sup> Ibid

<sup>159</sup> Minahan, J. 2002. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 500

<sup>160</sup> Kurtiev, R. 2005. ‘Etnonim “Tatar” I Etnos “Krumskie Tatory”’. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymuchpedgiz. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/index.html>

whole Crimean seaboard from *Cherkio* (Kerch peninsula) to *Chembalo* (Balaklava). In commencement of 15<sup>th</sup> century, Golden Horde was broken up into separate semi-independent khanates. The exact date of foundation of Crimean khanates is still disputable. Crimean historian Dyulichhev stresses on 1443. The same date is stated in the research of Moscow historians '*Osmanskaya imperiia I strany Centralnoi I Yugovostochnoi Evropy v XV-XVII*'<sup>161</sup>. However what is more important for the research is that by the 1440s, Crimean Tatars had succeeded in establishing their independent state, the Crimean Khanate, under the leadership of Haci Giray<sup>162</sup>. The frontiers of Khanate were not clear. The basic territorial possession was Crimean peninsula, but except South coast, which was belong to Genoese and later the Ottoman Empire. Crimean Tatars also had lands in the South part of current Kherson region in Ukraine, but they did not have permanent borders.

Russian as well as Western scholars (Williams, Andreev)<sup>163</sup> stress that Crimean Tatars were not a united group. There were three groups: *Tats* (Mountain Tatars), *Yaliboyus* (coastal Tatars) and *Nogais* (nomadic population of the Crimea's northern steppe lands "displays the facial outline and expression of the Mongol race"<sup>164</sup>). They were Sunni Muslims, but had some physically and linguistically differences. The fact of existence of their statehood has a great meaning as myth in modern formation of the Crimean Tatar nation. Crimean Tatar historian Kurtiev stresses that by the 16<sup>th</sup> century the formation of the ethnic core of Crimean Tatar people were finished.<sup>165</sup>

In 1475, the Ottoman Empire invaded in Crimea and annexed cities in South coast. Starting that time the Crimean Khanate came under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Crimean Tatars had to coordinate their international policy with suzerain. Main duty was the participation of Crimean Tatar troops in the Ottoman wars of conquest. This

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<sup>161</sup> '*Osmanskaya imperiia I strany Centralnoi I Yugovostochnoi Evropy v XV-XVII*'. Moscow. 1984

<sup>162</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. 'Crimean Tatars'. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman pp. 322-338.

<sup>163</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. 'The Crimean Tatar exile in Central Asia: a case study in group destruction and survival', *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), p 287  
Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 46

<sup>164</sup> Milner, M.A. 1855. *The Crimea, its Ancient and Modern History: The Khans, The Sultans and The Tsars*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, p. 122

<sup>165</sup> Kurtiev, R. 2005. 'Etnogenez i Etapy Etnicheskoy Istorii Krymskotatarskogo Naroda'. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymchpedgiz. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/3.html>

event as a historical memory has several consequences on self-awareness of Crimean Tatars as ethnic group, and on perception of Crimean Tatars by Russians and Ukrainians. Being a part of the Ottoman Empire, which had common religion, common culture (including similar language) promotes appearance of the idea about 'common fortune' of Crimean Tatars with Turkey. Interpretation of periods of suzerainty is a base for myth about Turkey as brotherly nation and spiritual leader. Understanding of these times also has some effects on the formation of stereotypes about Crimean Tatars by Slavs. In this case, wars of the Ottoman Empire (including the Crimean Khanate as part of it) with *Zaporiz'ka Sich*<sup>166</sup>, Muscovy and the Russian Empire have key significance. It is important to know the possible influence of these events on formation of negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars. *Zaporozhye* Cossack organized their *Sich* to protect Ukrainians against the Crimean Tatar raids, which aimed plunder and taking slaves. Mentioning collaboration between Cossacks and Crimean Tatars, it is usually emphasized on facts of treachery by Khans. Similar situation took place in the case of Russia. Khanate was shown as one of the main enemy in Ivan VI and Peter's I international policies. Consequently, Crimean Tatars have image of enemy, in the historical memory of Ukrainians and Russians. Information of plunder and taking slaves influenced on the formation of stereotypes about Crimean Tatars as a cruel nation. 'Treachery of Khans' promoted stereotype about Crimean Tatars as traitors (it was especially developed during Soviet period).

### 3.4. Russian Invasion in Crimea

Next crucial moment of Crimean history was Ottoman-Russian wars in 18<sup>th</sup> century (1769-1774 and 1787-91) as a result of which, Russia annexed Crimean peninsula. In the first war (1768-1774), Russia had a great success. The main point of the disagreement in Russian-Ottoman negotiations was the issue about feature of Crimea: the Ottoman Empire did not want to give the independence for the Crimean Khanate but Russia insisted on it. As a result of the first Russian-Ottoman war in July 10, 1774, the treaty of peace was signed in Bulgarian village *Küçük Kaynarca*. Russia got *Kerch*, *Yenikale*, *Kinburn*. Also it got the right to build Black Sea Navy. Crimea got independence<sup>167</sup>.

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<sup>166</sup> It was the center of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were a power in the steppes north of the Black Sea from the 16th century to the 18th century. It was located on an island in the middle of the Dnieper River in what is now the Zaporizhia region of Ukraine.

<sup>167</sup> Dyulichyev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal, p. 216

Russian historian Kryuchkov<sup>168</sup> stressed that Crimean independence was not considered as a next stage of the future annexation of Crimea at that time. So, during the Russian-Turkish war (1768-74), Russia was not going to gain Crimean territory. One of the main aims of Russian policy in the Crimean issue was the independence of Crimea from political power of sultan and intensification of Russian influence in the Khanate. It was a way for solving problem of guarantee of more safety southern boundaries of the Russian Empire<sup>169</sup>. In another book, Fisher also argues that independence of Crimea “was no more than a sham perpetrated and perpetuated by the force of Russian arms”<sup>170</sup>. These years of independence were “difficult and tumultuous period”<sup>171</sup>. The Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* did not solve Russia’s main goal of having access to the Black Sea. But the other aim (tearing of Crimea from Turkey and as result stabilization in the south) was reached. To change the situation in the Khanate, Russia promoted support elevation to the Khan’s throne their protégé – Shagin-Girey<sup>172</sup> in 1777. He tried to carry out a lot of serious changes. He was trying to make the Khanate a great Black Sea Empire. However, his endeavour did not find support among the Crimean Tatar elite<sup>173</sup>. Russia needed the population for the lands that were conquered in the south (on the both sides of the Dnieper and from thence to the Don). In order to develop this region and “provide a Russian commerce for the Black Sea”<sup>174</sup>, Catherine removed Christian minority from the Crimean peninsula in 1778. This group played important role because they occupied all of the artisan and merchant positions and their loss was a crucial factor for the Crimean

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<sup>168</sup> Kryuchkov A.V. 2006. ‘Krum vo Vneshney Politike Rossii v 60<sup>th</sup>-70<sup>th</sup> XVIII’. *Rossiyskiy Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* 3, pp.23-29

<sup>169</sup> Fisher, A.W. 1970. *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772-1783*. Cambridge University Press

<sup>170</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 69

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, p. 58

<sup>172</sup> Dyulichev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal

<sup>173</sup> Lashkov, F. 1886. *Shagin Girey, Poslednii Krumskii Khan*. Kiev

<sup>174</sup> Milner, M.A. 1855. *The Crimea, its Ancient and Modern History: The Khans, The Sultans and The Tsars*. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Lonfmans, p. 277

economy.<sup>175</sup> 1777-78 were the period of changes when Russia shifted from the “project of independence” to the “project of annexation”.

Next important stage of preparation to annexation of Crimea, we can consider *Aynali-Kavak* Convention in March 10, 1779. It was reminder of Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*. Ottomans accepted the fact that Crimea would not be subservient to the Ottomans even in religious matters<sup>176</sup>. Under the conditions when Turkey had weak positions in Crimea and it could not put obstacles for Russia, Catherine’s manifesto to Potemkin appeared. Shagin-Girey was obliged to abdicate<sup>177</sup>. According to Manifesto 1783, Crimean peninsula, Taman and Kuban became a part of Russian Empire. Main clauses of Manifesto were: Russia gave to Tatars freedom, but did not get expected result from this independence, i.e. safety of its south borders; Crimean Tatars were incapable of independent civilized life: rebellion became frequent occurrence; Turkey had continued to make attempts of intervention in Khanate; To suppress the riots in the southern boundaries, Russia has sustained big financial losses and in order to indemnify for the future possible losses it annexed Crimea.<sup>178</sup> As we can see, Catherine emphasized in her Manifesto that Russian Empire was obliged to make this step. From the viewpoint of Crimean Tatar historians, this document destroyed the independence of the Crimean Khanate and the Crimean Tatar people were deprived of its statehood<sup>179</sup>.

There are disputes about the issue of what the main reason of annexation of Crimea was. Soviet historiography claims that the only reasons why the Russian government became interested in Crimea in the 18<sup>th</sup> century were economic ones. The increased use of the fertile lands in the south made it necessary to put an end to Crimean raids. Western author Fisher stresses also on political aspect of Russia’s interest. It was an element of “Russian desire to expand the territory of the state, and gain what they considered just

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<sup>175</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 66

<sup>176</sup> Ibid

<sup>177</sup> Gayvoronskii, A., Emirov A. 2003. *Sozvezdie Gireev*. Biblioteka gazetu ‘Poluostrov’, Simferopol: Dolya

<sup>178</sup> Vozgin, V.E. 1992. *Istoricheskiye Sudbu Krumskih Tatar*. Moskva: Mysl, p. 272

<sup>179</sup> Chubarov, E. 2005. ‘Anneksiia Krymskogo Hanstva’. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymuchpedgiz.  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/13.html>

recompense for years and centuries of Tatar aggression”<sup>180</sup>. One question which cannot be answered within Russian historiography is why Catherine did not annex Crimea immediately after Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*, but she preferred the nine-year transition period to outright the annexation.<sup>181</sup>

Principles of imperial policy took place during the inclusion of Crimea into the Russian Empire. It was the elimination of the areas of uncertainty on the borders of the empire, by including them in its composition, and typical for the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries model of integration areas into the administrative, economic, legal and socio-cultural space of the Russian Empire. The integration process of Crimea into the Russian Empire has opposite estimations among Russian and Western scholars. It is very interesting to see which words different authors use describing the relations between Crimea and Russia in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Western scholars use word “annexation”. Russian authors usually describe it as “addition” (*prisoedinenie*) or “inclusion” (*vklyuchenie v sostav*) which has more peaceful and positive shade compare to the western “annexation”. In this vein, the attitude to this event is also opposite in the Western and Russian historiography. Almost all Western scholars and also Turkish and Crimean Tatar give negative evaluation of annexation of Crimea, describing it as a policy of expansion of Russian imperialism. Crimean Tatar historian Kurtiev emphasizes that it was the time of ethnic strains and tragedies for the Crimean Tatars<sup>182</sup>. Other Crimean Tatar historian Bekirova describes it as dramatic event in Crimean Tatar history<sup>183</sup>. It is logical that the Russian authors give positive characteristics of this event, such as granting independence for the Crimean Khanate or protection of southern boundaries. Vozgin points out that some Russian historians like Nadinskii and Medvedeva stressed on annexation as historical justice, because Crimea was returned to its true owner - the Russian people, therefore the annexation had historically progressive significance<sup>184</sup>. The process of integration of

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<sup>180</sup> Fisher, A.W. 1970. *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772-1783*. Cambridge University Press

<sup>181</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 58, 69

<sup>182</sup> Kurtiev, R. 2005. ‘Etnogenez i Etapy Etnicheskoi Istorii Krymskotatarskogo Naroda’. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskikh tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymchpedgiz. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/3.html>

<sup>183</sup> Bekirova, G. 2003 ‘Problema Emigracii Krumskih Tatar v Rossijskoi Istoricheskoi Literature XIX – 30 Godov XX Veka’. *Uchenue Zapiski TNU* 5(17), Simferopol: Tavrida, pp. 68-79

<sup>184</sup> Vozgin, V.E. 1992. *Istoricheskiye Sudbu Krumskih Tatar*. Moskva: Mysl, p. 274

Crimea into Russian Empire is described by Western scholar Magocsi as “anxious to liquidate the Tatar heritage as an unwanted reminder of the former ‘Mongol yoke’”<sup>185</sup>. For this purpose, first of all, “the newly-acquired territory was almost immediately renamed into *Tavrida* and Tatar place names were replaced by Greek ones”<sup>186</sup>. Lazzarini stresses that

overall the promised benefits of colonialism remained mostly unfulfilled, while the negative consequences – economic exploitation, social discrimination and cultural imperialism – weight heavily on the local native population that stayed behind<sup>187</sup>.

Russians introduced serfdom in the Crimean society. Vozgin stresses that it had negative effects because Crimean Tatars were dropped far back in the socio-economic and national-political development.<sup>188</sup> After Russian invasion Crimean Tatar architecture was almost destroyed.<sup>189</sup> Russian scholars<sup>190</sup> have opposite opinion about the changes in Crimea after its “addition”. The Russian Empire brought economic, political and social development. They emphasize on the development of agriculture (especially viticulture), appearance of manufacture, intensification of trade, foundation educational institution etc.

The liberal policy towards Crimean Tatar nobility was emphasized in all historiography traditions. Potemkin took swear allegiance to the Russian Empire from Crimean Tatar elite. On February 22, 1784, Tatar Nobility was granted the same privileges as the Russian aristocracy<sup>191</sup>. However, Magocsi says that “very few choose to

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<sup>185</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 347

<sup>186</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 6

<sup>187</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, p. 323

<sup>188</sup> Vozgin, V.E. 1992. *Istoricheskiye Sudbu Krumskih Tatar*. Moskva: Mysl, p. 289

<sup>189</sup> ‘An Ethnohistorical dictionary of the Russian and Soviet empires’. 1994. Ed. Olson J. S. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 184

Minahan, J. 2002. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p.501

<sup>190</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk  
Dyulichhev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal

<sup>191</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 6

do so”<sup>192</sup>. In any case, a part of Crimean Tatar nobility adopts the Russians’ habits, language and ways of conducting class business.<sup>193</sup>

Catherine’s attitude to Islam has a special place in both Western and Russian historiography. Historians of both schools stress on Russians’ loyal attitudes towards Islam. According to Fisher, “Catherine viewed Islam as an impediment to social and political development, but not as a repugnant religion”<sup>194</sup>. She understood that Islam penetrated all spheres of Crimean Tatars life. To make some changes in Crimean society it is necessary to collaborate with Islam clergy. Therefore, after the annexation, government pursued a positive program towards the peninsula’s Muslims. Islamic clergy was incorporated into the ranks of imperial bureaucracy, and they were given some benefits. Muslim institutions got under the government control. Thus, Islam according to Western historiography was an instrument of Tsarist control over the Tatars.<sup>195</sup> At the same time in the Russian historiography, the loyal attitudes toward Islamic institutions are considered as tolerance of Orthodox Russians towards Muslim Crimean Tatars. However, the Crimean Tatar historians give negative characteristics about Russian actions in religious sphere in Crimea. Asanova stresses that after Russians came to the peninsula, Crimean Tatars were oppressed in their religious life. Russian government interfered in the activities of Muslim communities and strictly regulated rules and norms of Muslim religion.<sup>196</sup>

After the annexation of Crimea, Russia began to build Black Sea Navy, which is now the key element of the Russian-Ukrainian relations concerning the Crimean question. Russian invasion extremely changed demographic composition of Crimea. Crimean Tatars mass migrated to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>197</sup> There were several possible reasons of

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<sup>192</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 347

<sup>193</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 76

<sup>194</sup> Ibid, p. 71,

<sup>195</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 77

<sup>196</sup> Asanova, D. 2005. ‘Chernoe Stoletie (1783—1883)’ . . in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymuchpedgiz.  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/14.html>

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, p. 89

Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 347

this migration. Andreev stresses on revival of ideas about Turkey as country with the same religion, and on Russians' fear of Crimean Tatar loyal attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire as it was during Russian-Ottoman Wars<sup>198</sup>. Other Russian historian Dyulichev defines main reason in dispossession of lands<sup>199</sup>. Sheehy and Nahaylo consider that first wave of migration was excited by Crimean Tatar fear of annexation of Crimea by Russia Empire; cause for next wave was "Turkey's formal recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 1792, which deprived the Crimean Tatars of their last home of regaining their independence"<sup>200</sup>. This migration according to the same authors was "conformed to the wishes of Russian authorities"<sup>201</sup> By the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century 80,000 people had left Crimea<sup>202</sup>. There were more several migrations. Crimean war 1853-56 excited one of large-scaled. According to Sheehy and Nahaylo, Crimean Tatars had taken no part in the war, but they had been unable to conceal their sympathy for Turkey, and fear of reprisals<sup>203</sup>. The war with Ottoman Empire in 1877 provoked another massive Tatar emigration.<sup>204</sup> By 1897, there were only 180,000 Crimean Tatars, what consisted only 34% of peninsula's population<sup>205</sup>.

Responding to the mass emigration from Crimea, the Russian government began to provide policy of resettlement from Russia and Ukraine to the peninsula. Mostly, it was state peasants. During the period 1783-1854, 92,242 people were resettled to Crimea<sup>206</sup>. It consisted 45% of total population. Consequently, Russians and Ukrainians appeared in

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<sup>198</sup> Andreev, A.R. 2002. *Istoriia Kryma*. M: Belyi Volk, p. 91

<sup>199</sup> Dyulichev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal, p. 244

<sup>200</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. 'The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities'. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 6

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>202</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 347

<sup>203</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. 'The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities'. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 7

<sup>204</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 93

<sup>205</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 347  
Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. 'The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities'. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 7

<sup>206</sup> Dyulichev, V.P. 2005. *Rasskazy po Istorii Kryma*. Simferopol: ID Kvadrantal, p. 244

mass in Crimea in a short space of time and became ethnic majority at once. Russian government began to provide a policy of assimilation<sup>207</sup>, Russification<sup>208</sup> (Russifying) and integration of peninsula into the “Russian World”. Starting 1860, Russian government enrolled the Crimean Tatar children into the Russian schools<sup>209</sup>. In the Russophile historiography, this fact is interpreted as introduction of the public education into the peninsula. In their judgment, it was an indubitable step towards the development of retrograde region. However, Western scholars consider this fact as destruction of Crimean Tatar culture by using general Russification.

Last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was signified by all-Muslim and all-Tatar awakening in the Russian Empire, particularly Crimean movement as well.<sup>210</sup> One of the greatest representatives of the Crimean Tatar national revival was *Ismail Bey Gasprali* (*Gasprinskiy*). Fisher stresses on two main points of *Gasprali*'s ideas: integration into the Russian society and renewal of Islamic and Tatar society through an acceptance of Western (Russian) forms enclosing an Islamic and Tatar content.<sup>211</sup> *Gasprali*'s ideas and activity had very important impact on shaping ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars.

There were three main branches in the Crimean Tatar national movement: 1) *Gasprali*'s followers, who supported Russian Pan-Turkic and Pan-Muslim ideas; 2) Young Tatars, who were revolutionary and they reacted against *Gasprali*'s political inaction; 3) Crimean Tatar nationalists (it emerged after 1907). Activity of these groups became a base for the broad popular nationalist movements among Crimean Tatars that came into the open after Russian revolution in 1917<sup>212</sup>. During First World War, Crimean Tatar situation was difficult. Russian Empire had considered Crimean Tatars as “potential Muslim fifth column”.<sup>213</sup> By 1917, as a result of discriminatory policy, Crimean Tatars

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<sup>207</sup> Minahan, J. 2002. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 501

<sup>208</sup> ‘An Ethnohistorical dictionary of the Russian and Soviet empires’. 1994. Ed. Olson J. S. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 184

<sup>209</sup> Minahan, J. 2002. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 501

<sup>210</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 94

<sup>211</sup> Ibid, p. 101

<sup>212</sup> Ibid, pp. 104-105; 107

<sup>213</sup> Ibid, p. 109

“were psychologically prepared to support any movement to eliminate the Tsarist regime”.<sup>214</sup> At this time, the nationalist group of Crimean Tatars made attempt to establish independent Crimean Tatar state in Crimea under the leadership of *Noman Çelebi*. On November 24, 1917, they founded Crimean Tatar National Constituent Assembly (*Kurultay*) and accepted a new Constitution for the Crimean state<sup>215</sup>. But Bolsheviks immediately prevented this attempt and killed nationalist leader *Noman Çelebi*.<sup>216</sup>

### 3.5. Crimea During Soviet Times

On March 21, 1918, Bolsheviks proclaimed The Soviet Republic of Crimea. But a month later Tatar revolt occurred in Crimea and all local Bolsheviks were removed or killed. The new Government of the German occupation forces was established in Crimea under the leadership of Suleyman Sulkiewicz<sup>217</sup>. During Russian Civil War 1918-21, Crimea became a major arena for struggles between conflicting groups. In April 1919, Bolsheviks made second attempt of the creation of Socialist Soviet Republic of Crimea. Dmitriy Uliyanov<sup>218</sup> became the chairman of *Revkom* (Military Revolutionary Committee<sup>219</sup>). This government paid much more attention to the Crimean Tatars. They granted many governmental positions for Crimean Tatars and new Bolshevik’s newspaper was in the Crimean Tatar language. But this regime did not exist long time and it was replaced by Baron Wrangel’s forces.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 111

<sup>215</sup> Ibid, p. 115

<sup>216</sup> Aydingün, I., Aydingün, A. 2007. ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), p. 115

<sup>217</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 121

<sup>218</sup> He was a brother of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin)

<sup>219</sup> Military Revolutionary Committee was the name for military organs under the soviets during the period of the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War.

<sup>220</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, pp. 127-129

In October, 1920, the Bolsheviks occupied Crimea for the third time. The *Cheka* (Extraordinary Commission<sup>221</sup>), led by Bela Kun, arrived in Crimea to eliminate all local opposition to the new regime. On October, 18, 1921, Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established within Russian SFSR.<sup>222</sup> The term “Tatar” was not used in the name of republic under pretence that only a small percentage of Tatars lived in peninsula<sup>223</sup>. Nevertheless, their language was considered to be an official language of the republic<sup>224</sup>. These years almost all authors consider as ‘golden age’ within their Soviet experience.<sup>225</sup> Veli Ibrahimov, former leader of left-wing of the nationalist party *Milli Firqa*, became the chairman of the Crimean Central Committee. Fisher considers three main directions in Ibrahimov’s policy.<sup>226</sup> First of all he introduced Crimean Tatars into the all level of the Crimea’s government. Most of the new officials were, like Ibrahimov himself, former members of *Milli Firqa*.<sup>227</sup> Second direction of Ibrahimov’s policy concerned economic life of peninsula. He returned back lands to their former land-owners. During 1925 – 1927, Crimean Tatars, who fled during the Civil War, were granted amnesty and encouraged to return home.<sup>228</sup> Finally, in cultural sphere, he

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<sup>221</sup> ‘*Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya*’ (Extraordinary Commission) was the first of a succession of Soviet state security organizations. It was created by a decree issued on December 20, 1917, by Vladimir Lenin

<sup>222</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, p. 324

<sup>223</sup> Aydingün, I., Aydingün, A. 2007. ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), p. 115

<sup>224</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), p.290

<sup>225</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, pp. 324-325

Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 135

Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 579

Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 7

<sup>226</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 139

<sup>227</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 580

<sup>228</sup> Ibid

promoted the policy of *korenizatsiya* (nativisation)<sup>229</sup>. Despite the numerical inferiority of Crimean Tatars (they consisted no more than 25% of total population) in Crimea, *korenizatsiya* meant ‘Tatarization’. Ibrahimov provided re-opening of national Tatar-Run school; institute for study Crimean Tatar Language in Taurida University was established, different cultural institutions (museums, theatres, libraries, reading rooms) were opened;<sup>230</sup> Crimean Tatar national pride was boosted by archeological excavations which revealed the high standard of culture achieved by the Crimean Khanate<sup>231</sup>. Times, when Ibrahimov headed Crimean ASSR, had great importance for shaping national identity among Crimean Tatars. Williams points out, that “a whole generation of Crimean Tatars came to believe in their immutable link to a security defined, Crimean homeland and to identify with their officially recognized Soviet territory as the primary marker of their identity”<sup>232</sup>. Crimean Tatars masses were, for the first time, made to feel that Crimea was their national homeland-republic. During the 1920s and 1930s, Crimean Tatars had made greater strides in the development of the political national identity, with all of its requisite features. At the same time, early years of Soviet regime brought also negative consequences. Crimean Tatar historian Chubarov stresses on the famine between 1921 and 1923. In 1923, 76,000 Crimean Tatars were dead. From 1921 to 1923, the population decreased from 719,581 to 569,510 people. In *Karasubazar* population decreased to 48% in Staryi Krym – to 40,8%, Feodosiya- to 35,7%, and in Sudak – to 36%.<sup>233</sup>

Nevertheless, the times of this ‘golden age’ were made an end with the coming of the Stalinist revolution in 1928. In January 1928, Ibrahimov was arrested, ostensibly for disagreeing with Moscow’s decision to settle a few thousands Jews from Belarus in

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<sup>229</sup> This term means "nativization" or "indigenization", literally "putting down roots", was the early Soviet nationalities policy promoted mostly in the 1920s but with a continuing legacy in later years. The primary policy consisted of promoting representatives of titular nations of Soviet republics and national minorities on lower levels of the administrative subdivision of the state, into local government, management and bureaucracy in the corresponding national entities.

<sup>230</sup> Lazzarini, E. 1990. ‘Crimean Tatars’. In *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. Graham. Smith, London and New York: Longman, p. 325

<sup>231</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 7

<sup>232</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), pp. 285-317

<sup>233</sup> Chubarov, E. 2005. ‘Anneksiia Krymskogo Hanstva’. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymchpedgiz.  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/13.html>

Crimea. He was accused of being a bourgeois nationalist and soon executed<sup>234</sup>. All achievements of his policy were immediately eradicated. Pre-revolutionary Crimean Tatar intelligentsia was eliminated in a year after Ibrahimov's removal. During 1930s, all Crimean Tatars were removed from government positions<sup>235</sup>. The policies of 'Sovietization'<sup>236</sup>, 'dekulakization' (*raskulachivanie*)<sup>237</sup> and 'collectivization'<sup>238</sup> were implemented. As a result of the struggle with kulaks (wealthy peasants), 35,000 – 40,000 peasants were deported to the labor camps in Urals and Siberia. The result of collectivization, which was accompanied with governmental confiscations of grain, was a prolonged famine between 1931 and 1933 and the loss of close to 100,000 lives (Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and other inhabitants of Crimea<sup>239</sup>). Sovietization in a large measure meant Russification of Crimea. Crimean Tatar schools were closed and replaced by Russian education system. The traditional Arabic alphabet was changed in the Latin alphabet in 1928. Fisher stresses that it was deliberate act of some Crimean Tatar intellectuals, because "Latin alphabet is a better conveyor of the Tatar language than earlier the Arabic" and also because of the same reform was taking place at the same time in Atatürk's Republican Turkey<sup>240</sup>. In 1938, the Latin alphabet was again replaced by the Cyrillic one. Such rapid linguistic changes were "pedagogical confusion and the eventual isolation of a new generation of Tatars from the wealth of the pre-revolutionary and early post-revolutionary Tatar literature in the traditional Arabic script"<sup>241</sup>. Intelligentsia eliminating and total change of written language played a significant role in the future corroboration of negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars. Making

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<sup>234</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 580

<sup>235</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, pp. 142, 146

<sup>236</sup> This term means mental and social changes within the population of the Soviet Union and its satellites which led to creation of the *new Soviet man*.

<sup>237</sup> It was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies

<sup>238</sup> It was policy of organization of land and labor into large-scale collective farms (*'kolkhozy'*)

<sup>239</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 580

<sup>240</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 142

<sup>241</sup> Magocsi, P.R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 581

conclusion about results of Bolshevik's policy in Crimea, Fisher points out that 150,000 Crimean Tatars (it is 50% of Crimean Tatar population) "had either been killed or forced to leave Crimea" between 1917 and 1933.<sup>242</sup>

Next crucial event in Crimean history was the Second World War. In autumn 1941, German divisions under General Manstein entered Crimea and set the occupation regime. One of the most debatable question concerns situations with Crimean Tatars and their role in this regime. There are several possible viewpoints on this issue. According to the Soviet historiography Crimean Tatars were 'traitors' of Motherland (USSR) and during all war (1941-44) they collaborated with Germans occupation regime and fought against the Red Army and the Crimean partisans. They were officially accused and during the night of 17-18 May, 1944, all Crimean Tatars were deported from the Crimean Autonomous to Central Asia. Crimean Tatar historian Asanova stresses that according to the *NKVD*'s<sup>243</sup> data, 191,014 Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea, according to Communist Party sources – 194,111. 47,000 Crimean Tatar families left the Crimea. After the War, demobilized Crimean Tatar men were sent to them<sup>244</sup>. They were put in 'special settlements' and they were not allowed to return to their homeland. Most of the authors try to answer two main question concerning deportation: whether this accusation was true ('did Crimean Tatars really collaborate with Nazis?') and whether this was the real reason of the deportation ('was the collaboration just pretence?'). Fisher stresses, that Soviet historians points out the privilege position of Tatars during occupation regime. But he refutes this information by list of facts. First of all according to the Nazi doctrine Crimean Tatars (as well as Mongols and Kyrgyzs) were "synonym for subhuman". Second Fisher's argument concerns Hitler's decision that Crimea "was to become a purely German colony from which all foreigners were to be deported or evacuated". Third evidence against the opinion about Crimean Tatar's privileged position shows that there was only one Crimean Tatar in the occupation government (minister of cultural affairs). Only Russian and German were used as languages for official communications. Crimean Tatars were allowed to establish Muslim Committees, but they didn't have any

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<sup>242</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 145

<sup>243</sup> '*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*' (The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was the public and secret police organization of the Soviet Union that directly executed the rule of terror, including political repression, during the Stalinist era.

<sup>244</sup> Asanova, D., Chubarov, E., 2005. 'Deportation'. in *Ocherki istorii i kul'tury krymskih tatar*. ed. Chubarov, E. Simferopol': Krymuchpedgiz.  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Ocherki/23.html>

real power.<sup>245</sup> Trying to refute the Soviet idea about Crimean Tatars as “traitors”, historians stress on the mass collaboration during Second World War not only among Crimean Tatars. People who took Nazi side were among different nationalities. Williams says about “hundreds of thousands of Slavic Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who also fought against the Soviet Motherland in so-called ‘Great Fatherland War’”<sup>246</sup>. Some authors also stressed, that people who were deported were not collaborators, because Crimean Tatar battalions which fought against Soviet partisans were evacuated with the German forces in 1944<sup>247</sup>. Crimean historian Polyakov admits Crimean Tatar collaboration, but he stresses that they were forced to do it. Crimean partisans robbed Crimean Tatar villages. Nazi took occasion and armed Crimean Tatars with weapon to defend partisans. Later these “units” were used in punitive expedition and at the front.<sup>248</sup> Greta Uehling emphasizes that “Crimean Tatar participation in the German battalions was not necessarily voluntary, often being secured at gunpoint”<sup>249</sup>. She also adds that “severe hunger and disease in the Soviet ranks led people of all nationalities to desert and join the Germans”.<sup>250</sup>

There were many Crimean Tatars who served in the Soviet army. Referring to Pisarev, Fisher points out that nearly 20,000 Crimean Tatars fought on the front during the War.<sup>251</sup> There were four Generals in the Red Army, more than eighty colonels and more than hundreds lieutenant colonels<sup>252</sup>. Fourteen Crimean Tatars (Fisher says about

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<sup>245</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, pp. 152-159

<sup>246</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), p. 293

<sup>247</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p.8  
Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), p. 293

<sup>248</sup> Polyakov, V. 1998. *Krym. Sudby Narodov I Lyudei*. Simferopol  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/sudba/13.html>

<sup>249</sup> Uehling, G. L. 2002 ‘The Crimean Tatars’ in *Encyclopedia of the Minorities*, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/krimtatars.html#footnote>

<sup>250</sup> Ibid

<sup>251</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 161

<sup>252</sup> Polyakov, V. 1998. *Krym. Sudby Narodov I Lyudei*. Simferopol  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/sudba/13.html>

nine persons<sup>253</sup>) were given the highest award for bravery, the title of Heroes of Soviet Union. Ahmed Khan Sultan was twice awarded this order. The commander of partisans Mokrousov was hostile towards Crimean Tatars; therefore he refused to allow them to join the partisan group under his direct command<sup>254</sup>. But after the Mokrousov's removal in 1942, there were a lot of Crimean Tatars among partisans (Polyakov says about 598 Crimean Tatar partisans<sup>255</sup>).

Consequently, almost all authors conclude that collaboration with Nazi was not a real reason of deportation. As Williams stresses, charges of mass national treason were “simply a pretext for cleansing the Soviet Union's borderland of non-Slavic, predominantly Islamic, population”.<sup>256</sup> Greta Uehling also argues that deportation “was not the real reason for Stalin's order”<sup>257</sup>. She explains real reason:

Stalin wanted complete control of Crimea because it formed an important part of the Soviet military strategy. Specifically, the Soviet Union planned to gain access to the Dardanelles and acquire territory in Turkey. The Crimean Tatars, who had ethnic kin in Turkey, were once again viewed as potentially disloyal. The Soviet authorities also wanted to continue to develop Crimea as a health resort area for the Soviet Union, particularly for the benefit of party officials.<sup>258</sup>

In the secret speech 1956 Khrushchev mentioned that Stalin's claims about collaboration of certain nationalities with Nazis had been wrong. But this fact was not widespread among the Soviet masses and during long time this “official reason” was producing in the Soviet society and, of course, it left consequences on identities of inhabitants. Information that Crimean Tatars were traitors of Motherland had impact on the attitudes to them from Slavs. As a result, negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars as “traitors” and “untrustworthy people” had appeared. After the dissolution of the Soviet

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<sup>253</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 161

<sup>254</sup> Ibid, p. 159

<sup>255</sup> Polyakov, V. 1998. *Krym. Sudby Narodov I Lyudei*. Simferopol <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/sudba/13.html>

<sup>256</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), p. 294

<sup>257</sup> Uehling, G. L. 2002 ‘The Crimean Tatars’ in *Encyclopedia of the Minorities*, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn. <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/krimtatars.html#footnote>

<sup>258</sup> Ibid

Union and creation of independent Ukraine, the same myth but about western Ukrainians as “traitors of Motherland” was produced in Russia and among Russians in Ukraine. Consequently, historical myth about Russians as only winners of the Great Fatherland War was widely spread among Russians.

The results of deportation were deplorable for people. 46% or some 110,000 of their number died during deportation and the following 18 months.<sup>259</sup> According to eyewitness accounts that were given in the book about deportation local people met Crimean Tatars with strong hostility, because government said them that Crimean Tatars were traitor and cannibals<sup>260</sup>. Deported people were not allowed to leave their place of settlement. It was difficult to get even primary education and the higher education was almost impossible for Crimean Tatars. A whole generation was doomed to be serfs of the Soviet State<sup>261</sup>. As it was mentioned above, Khrushchev admitted that deportation was a crime. It was allowed to return for some of the nationalities, but not the Crimean Tatars had this right. The decree of rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars appeared only on September 5, 1967. But they were still not allowed to return to Crimea. Sheehy and Nahaylo claim a strategic area of Crimea as main reason why repatriation was not made to Crimean Tatars<sup>262</sup>.

After the deportation and before the returning to Crimea they did not exist in the official discourse as ‘Crimean Tatars’. In Soviet censuses term ‘Tatars’ were used without adjective “Crimean”. In official documents they were called as “Tatars formerly residents in Crimea”. During the period of exile they did not loose their identity but rather their identity became much stronger. Deportation had played an important role in shaping Crimean Tatar national identity. Awareness of deportation of the whole nation as common trouble that bring together had led to awareness of unity of nation. The result of the deportation was loss of homeland. It increased the perception of the myth about homeland. It seems that living among Turkic nationalities and sharing of the same religion with them may lead to weakening the boundaries of Crimean Tatars. According to Ayşegül and Ismail Aydingün, Crimean Tatars “always perceived themselves as *guests*

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<sup>259</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 8

<sup>260</sup> *Deportatsiya Krymskih Tatar. Kak Eto Bylo*. 2005. Simferopol: Odzhak

<sup>261</sup> Polyakov, V. 1998. *Krym. Sudby Narodov I Lyudei*. Simferopol

<sup>262</sup> Sheehy, A., Nahaylo, B. 1980. ‘The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities’. *Minority Rights Group Report* 16. London, p. 9

in Central Asia”<sup>263</sup>. Common idea of returning to homeland became a central element of shaping national identity. A strong national movement for returning home appeared among Crimean Tatars in exile. This movement became a base for political activity of Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Crimean Tatars were excluded not only from the political elite of Soviet Union but also from all of the important positions that involved decision making. Ayşegül and Ismail Aydıngün stress that this discriminatory policy of the Soviet state is most important factors in strengthening of ethnic identity<sup>264</sup>. Referring to the Barth approach, we could say that deportation was a situational factor in strengthening ethnic boundaries. During the exile, Crimean Tatars had nostalgic feeling towards their homeland and culture, and this ‘symbolic ethnicity’ helped to maintain the boundaries of the group<sup>265</sup>. As a result of living together with Uzbeks and other Central Asian people and under the policy of Sovietization (Russification), Crimean Tatar culture became hybrid; however “hybrid identity did *not* emerge, since an Uzbek-Crimean Tatar or Russo-Crimean Tatar identity does not exist”<sup>266</sup>. Therefore, the result of exile was a hybridization of the cultural identity and a strengthening of ethnic identity.

In a year after deportation, Crimean ASSR was transformed into Crimean *oblast*. This event led to decreasing political but not cultural rights of Russians. They became an absolute majority in the peninsula. Next crucial event occurred in 1954, when Crimean oblast was given by Khrushchev from the jurisdiction of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR “as a symbol of 300 years of friendship between Russia and Ukraine”<sup>267</sup>. Main part of Ukrainians in Crimea came to the peninsula after this event during policy of resettlement. At that time, the fact of transfer of Crimea from jurisdiction of one Soviet Republic to another one did not have influence, since it was done within the Soviet Union. The importance of this event became understandable only after the dissolution of USSR. The fact of legal transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR is the main argument of Ukrainian government when they claim Crimea as region that legally belongs to Ukraine. In the Russophile historiography this event was shown as illegal. Russian politician

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<sup>263</sup> Aydıngün, I., Aydıngün, A. 2007. ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), p. 122

<sup>264</sup> Ibid, p. 119

<sup>265</sup> Ibid, p. 117

<sup>266</sup> Ibid, p. 118

<sup>267</sup> Dawson, J. I. 1997. ‘Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea’. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30(4), p 432

Zatulín argues that annexation of Crimea to Ukraine was a tragedy and continuation of being of Crimea under Ukraine's authority is a historical injustice. He calls the decision of 1954 as a doubtful even from the viewpoint of observance of norms and procedures of Soviet legislation.<sup>268</sup> To transfer Crimea to the possession of Ukrainian SSR, Soviet authority was to make referendum about this issue. Russians especially stress that Sevastopol stays illegally under the Ukrainian jurisdiction. Their arguments based on the fact that Sevastopol in 1948 was transformed into an independent administrative center. Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was a closed military city, which was financed by the Ministry of Defense of USSR. There were no documents about assignation of Sevastopol to Ukrainian SSR. There is also important fact that Crimea during Soviet times became a resort for Party leader. It led to perception of a special importance of their homeland.

Perception of the Soviet times plays important role in historical myth of each ethnic group. Kuzio points out that communism and Soviet era are seen as "Russian". Guilt for the crimes of communism against Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars is blamed upon "Russians", not communist ideology<sup>269</sup>. In the Soviet historiography, Russians were a positive "others" with whom Ukrainians as well as Crimean Tatars always wanted to be in unity as with "elder brothers". In current Ukrainian historiography Soviet times are defined as "foreign enslavement"<sup>270</sup> for both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Russia became a common enemy for Ukrainians and Tatars in their national self-determination. In both cases Russians have begun to play a role of "negative others". This idea of common enemy was used during the President Election Company 2004 and Orange Revolution. Ideas of "Oranges" in Crimea were oriented mostly on Crimean Tatars.

In the 1989, Crimean Tatars were officially allowed to return to Crimea. This strong idea of homeland is provided by the fact that many of repatriated left comfortable life in Uzbekistan, came to Crimea and lived in places for the necessary facilities. We can conclude that returning to Crimea does not have just economical reason. Idea of homeland plays a central role in this process. Basing on the strong perception of Crimea as their homeland and special status as native population (*korennoy narod* which is

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<sup>268</sup> Zatulín, K. 'Peredacha Kryma k Ukraine bula ne spravedliva I nezakonna' [http://news.km.ru/peredacha\\_kryma\\_ukraine\\_byla\\_nes](http://news.km.ru/peredacha_kryma_ukraine_byla_nes)

<sup>269</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. 'Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine'. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), p. 37

<sup>270</sup> Ibid, 39

established in Constitution of Ukraine) they demand from state piece of land in their homeland. Problem with the provision of the necessary facilities is still not solved. Crucial question is land distribution. From the viewpoint of Slavs repatriation and land demanding had only economic reasons. It led to formation of stereotype about Crimean Tatars as “self-seeking” and “cunning” people. After the repatriation of Crimean Tatars, Russians at first have started to feel threat for their ethnic boundaries.

### 3.6. Crimea as a part of independent Ukraine

After the dissolution of USSR in 1991 and establishment of Ukrainian national state, Russians in Crimea felt their ethnic identity under a big threat. There were several reasons for this: fear of Ukrainian nationalist policy towards other ethnic groups, repatriation of Crimean Tatars and it was supplemented by economic crises and stagnation. The result was the mass immigration to Russia (amount of immigrants to Russia is 3,800 people including. 3,000 Russians)<sup>271</sup> and appearing a bulk of the pro-Russian movements. According to Williams between 240,000 and 250,000 of Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea by 1993 (almost half of total population)<sup>272</sup>. According to official information of Central Administration of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea 253,950 people who have status “deported” live in Crimea at the moment of January 2009. 249,700 are Crimean Tatars and 4,200 – people of other nationalities (98,4% and 1,6% correspondently).<sup>273</sup> The processes of repatriation still have not finished and it is one of the problematic issues in contemporary Crimean society.<sup>274</sup>

After the All-Crimean Referendum was conducted on January 20, 1991, the Crimean *oblast* was transformed into the Crimean ASSR as part of the Ukrainian SSR and the city of Sevastopol was granted special governmental status in the USSR. In the Ukrainian referendum on independence on December 1, 1991, 54,19% of residents from

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<sup>271</sup> Kolesnik, V.I. 2003. ‘Press-reliz: Russkiye na Demograficheskoy Karte Kryma’. Press release: Russians on the demographical map of Crimea. Portal Autonomous Republic of Crimea. <http://www.ark.gov.ua/index.php?v=9&tek=17&par=9&art=2464>

<sup>272</sup> Williams, B. G. 1998. ‘The Crimean Tatar Exile in Central Asia: a Case Study in Group Destruction and Survival’, *Central Asian Survey* 17(2), pp. 285-317

<sup>273</sup> Dannue MVS Ukrainu. January, 2009. Crimean inform agency. <http://www.kicenter.crimea.ua>

<sup>274</sup> Issue of repatriation will be analyzed in detail in the Chapter 5

Crimea and 57,07% from Sevastopol city voted in favour of Ukrainian independence.<sup>275</sup> Based on the resolution of the *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea (the Crimean parliament) on February 26, 1992, the Crimean ASSR was renamed into the Republic of Crimea. Crimea proclaimed self-government on May 5, 1992, and on the next day passed the first Crimean constitution. In 1992, under the influence of this pro-Russian movement, there was attempt to declare Crimea as an independent state. But in two weeks later the compromise of provision of greater autonomy was reached with the Ukrainian government. On January 30, 1994, Yuri Meshkov became the president of Crimea. He implemented a policy of closer relations with Russia (even Moscow time zone was established) and lobbied dual citizenship<sup>276</sup>. This idea about possible independence and close relations with Russia led to strengthening pro-Russian public mood. But in 1995, post of President was canceled and Ukrainian government tried to strengthen its influence in Crimea. Bulk of different pro-Russian organization appeared as result of this policy<sup>277</sup>. Crimean scholar Oleg Gabrielyan stresses that from January 1994 till spring 2008 (elections in Supreme Council of Crimea) it was time of political instability in Crimea when the criminal came into the power.<sup>278</sup>

On October 21, 1998, the second Constitution of the Crimean Republic was adopted. This constitution changed the status of Crimean government. According to Article 1 of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine. The *Verkhovna Rada* of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is the representative body of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and it realizes representative, normative, control functions and powers within the limits of its competence. The Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is the executive body of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and it implements executive functions and powers within the limits of its competence. In accordance with the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution 1998<sup>279</sup>, use and protection of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and

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<sup>275</sup> Gabrielyan, O.A. 2000. *Politicheskiye processy v Krymu*. Simferopol: Tavriya

<sup>276</sup> Lakiza-Sachuk, N., Melnichuk N. 1996. 'Ukraine after Empire. Ethnicities and Democracy'. in *Ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet world: case studies and analysis*. Ed. Drobizheva, L. M., Sharpe M.E., pp. 109-127

<sup>277</sup> Political organizations will be analyzed in detail in the fifth chapter of this thesis.

<sup>278</sup> Gabrielyan, O.A. 2000. *Politicheskiye processy v Krymu*. Simferopol: Tavriya, p. 18

<sup>279</sup> Constitution of Autonomous Republic in Crimea.  
[http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder\\_constit.html](http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_constit.html)

languages of other nationalities are provided along with the state language. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russian language, as the language of the majority of people and as acceptable language to the interethnic communication, is used in all spheres of public life<sup>280</sup>. National and language issues were intensively used during orange revolution. Orange-blue division was built on the ethnic bases. Yanukovich and “Blues” were oriented towards Russians. Yushchenko and “Oranges” relied upon Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea.

Last elections in Crimea were conducted in 2006. Eight political blocks and parties took seats in the Crimean Parliament as a result of the 2006 elections. The distributions of deputies are the following: block *Za Yanukovycha!* (‘The Party of Regions’ and ‘Russian Block’) – 32,55% (44 mandate), the Party *Soyuz* - 7,63% (10 mandates), Block of Kunitsyn – 7,63% (10 mandates), the Communist Party of Ukraine – 6,55% (9 mandates), *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny* (the People's Movement of Ukraine) – 6,26% (8 mandates), ‘Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko’ – 6,03% (8 mandates ), Block of Natalia Vitrenko *Narodnaya oppositsiya* (People's opposition) - 4,97% (7 mandates), the Block *Ne tak!* - 3,09% (4 mandate)<sup>281</sup> Political situation in Crimea will be analyzed in details in the fifth chapter of the thesis.

As we can see each of the ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) have played an important role in the Crimean history. Each group has its own historical myth and memories to give proof of claims to the peninsula. After all saying above, we can make a conclusion about the territorial claims of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars basing on these events. Crimean Tatars claim Crimea as their indigenous land, because they were emerged as separated nation in this peninsula and this land was the territory of their first state the Crimean Khanate. The Russian Empire gained this land by force, destroyed traditional social and economic structure, supplanted original Crimean Tatar culture by the Russian lifestyle. Soviet times are seen as the most difficult period in the Crimean Tatar history. Soviet government committed a crime against whole Crimean Tatar nation – deportation from their homeland. Almost half of the Crimean Tatar population was died during deportation and during their efforts to combat with difficult conditions in Central Asia. They were infringed in cultural, educational, economical and

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<sup>280</sup> Language issue will be analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis

<sup>281</sup> ‘Oglashenu rezultaty vuborov v Verhovnyi Sovet Kryma (Ukraina)’, 19.04.2006, ИА REGNUM, <http://regnum.ru/news/626150.html>

political spheres. In the exile, the idea of homeland became a central element of their national identity. When the Soviet regime collapsed, the process of repatriation and restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatars has begun. Because the deportation was recognized as illegal act of Soviet authority, Crimean Tatars demand land in their homeland.

Ukrainian claims to Crimea are based on the so-called Ukrainophile historiography. They refer to the times of Kievan Rus' and *Zaporiz'ka Sich*. It is argued that navy of Kievan Rus' (ancient Ukrainian state) "sailed in the Black Sea and controlled Crimea before the arrival of the Tsarist Empire in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century"<sup>282</sup>. In the similar manner, it is claimed that "*Cossack' chayky* (long boats) sailed The Black Sea from the 1490s, nearly two centuries before the Black Sea Fleet was build by the Tsarist Empire in Crimea"<sup>283</sup>. Ukrainian historians in their claims on the Crimean peninsula neither can "point to a time in which Ukrainians made up the majority of the Crimean population", nor emphasize "that Ukrainians represent an indigenous people in the region".<sup>284</sup> Their claims are mainly based on remoteness of appearance of Ukrainians in the Crimean lands and also on the fact that "Ukrainians hold greater attachment to the land than Russians"<sup>285</sup>. They refer to the legal transfer of Crimean *oblast'* from the jurisdiction of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR (1954).

Russian territorial claims to Crimea also refer to the period of Kievan Rus'. In Russian historical myths Russian annexation of Crimea was an "addition" of Crimea to the Russian Empire. Analyzing Russia's claims to Crimea, Fisher refers to the Soviet historian Nadinskii, who argues:

The Crimea is no way may be considered a colony, because The Crimean land was from ancient times Russian land, and therefore the annexation of the Crimea to Russia was not the conquest of foreign land but was the reunification and reestablishing of the rights of the Russian people to its own land.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> Kuzio, T. 2005. 'Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine'. *Nationalities Papers* 33 (1), p 48

<sup>283</sup> Ibid

<sup>284</sup> Dawson, J. I. 1997. 'Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea'. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30(4), p. 431

<sup>285</sup> Ibid

<sup>286</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 81

Russia is shown as a rescuer of Crimean Tatars which emancipated them “from the Slavery of the Porte”<sup>287</sup>. Catherine the Great granted the independence for the Crimean Tatar state. But due to the slow economic development of the Khanate and poor experience of independent governance of the country, Russian Empire had to take Crimean state under their control. According to the Russian version of history, prior to the Russian conquest,

the peninsula was inhabited by a nomadic and uncivilized population. The Crimean Tatar population is viewed as a barbarian society and their claims to a tradition of independent statehood are rejected by Russian historians who stress the dominance of the Turks in the region prior to the entrance of Russia in 1783<sup>288</sup>.

Russia brought civilization to retrograde region, promoted development and prosperity. “The economic development of the Crimea was accomplished by Russians, the towns were built by Russians workers, and the fields were tilled in the great majority by Russian peasants”<sup>289</sup>. Russian claims to Crimea are also based on the documents like Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*, *Aynali-Kavak* Convention and Catherine’s Manifesto. Shifting from the Ottoman vassalage to independence of the Crimean Khanate and then Russian annexation of Crimea or more exactly perception of these events in historiography had crucial importance in formation of ethnic stereotypes among Crimean population. In Russian and especially in Soviet historiography times before Russian conquest of Crimea is showed as “barbaric times”. Tsarist and Soviet historians claimed that “Crimean Tatars were no more than nomadic brigades”<sup>290</sup>. Also they stressed on “barbarous and savage nature of the Crimeans”<sup>291</sup>. Under the influence of these myths, Russians whom had been resettled in Crimea identified themselves as culturally more higher than barbarian Crimean Tatars, and considered that they brought civilization to peninsula. Minahan stresses on “deep

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<sup>287</sup> Ibid, p.54

<sup>288</sup> Dawson, J. I. 1997. ‘Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea’. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30(4), p. 431

<sup>289</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 81

<sup>290</sup> ‘An Ethnohistorical dictionary of the Russian and Soviet empires’. 1994. Ed. Olson J. S. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 184

<sup>291</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p.52

Slavic hostility toward the newly conquered nation”.<sup>292</sup> Negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars such as they are illiterate and retrograde had appeared. Especially this message was cultivated in the Soviet history and it had serious affects on the ethnic identification of Soviet generation of Russians and Ukrainians. Russian historians do not recognize the transfer of Crimean *oblast'* from the jurisdiction of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Especially Russians stress on illegal staying of Sevastopol under the Ukrainian jurisdiction. Their arguments are based on the fact that this city in 1948 was transformed into an independent administrative center and there were no documents about the assignation of Sevastopol to the Ukrainian SSR. Presence of Russian Navy in Sevastopol also gives the base for claiming Crimea as Russian territory.

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<sup>292</sup> Minahan, J. 2002. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: S-Z*. Greenwood Publishing Group, p.501

## CHAPTER 4

### CULTURAL DIMENSION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY OF RUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS AND CRIMEAN TATARS IN CRIMEA

In this chapter, the analysis of main cultural factors that determine the peculiarities of ethnic identification of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea is done. The aim is to define basic factors that influence the ethnic identification and to show attitudes and opinions of the Crimean residents to them. In this chapter the following issues are investigated: language issue (the role of language in the process of ethnic identification; language problems in educational sphere; and Ukrainization), religious matter (importance of religion for ethnic groups in Crimea) the role of historical interpretation in the ethnic identity; the identification with a certain cultural tradition and its influence on the ethnic identity; the level of interethnic tensions; and mechanisms of preservation of the ethnic boundaries.

According to the poll results that was conducted on May 2009 in Crimea<sup>293</sup>, 59,7% of respondents identified themselves as Russians; 25% – as Ukrainians; 10,7% – as Crimean Tatars. 3,6% associated themselves with other national and ethnic groups; 1% of respondents remained undecided or gave no answer. There were also many cases when respondents pointed out on their ethnic belonging (“Russians” or “Ukrainians”) and at the same time they stressed on their Slavic identity (“I am Russian, but also I am Slav”).

The correlation of age and ethnicity is shown in the Chart 4.1. As we can see, Russians and Ukrainians are relatively elder, than Crimean Tatars. The biggest index has a group of people at the age 60 and over. There are several possible reasons for this: external migration of younger people, natural reduction, or self-identification with the titular nation. Last reason can also explain the high index of the young generation among Ukrainians. It means that Ukrainian state policy influences self-identity of new generation. The situation with the age group distribution among Crimean Tatars can be

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<sup>293</sup> See the information about opinion poll in the introduction to the thesis; and the questionnaire - in the appendix B.

also explained by two main factors. Old people did not repatriate to Crimea because of the difficulties they can face during and after migration. The reason of the high rates of young generation among Crimean Tatars is higher fertility rates. Different levels of fertility among Slavs and Crimean Tatars led to high percentage of Crimean Tatars among infant population. According to the Ukrainian census of 2001<sup>294</sup>, the ethnic composition of every 100 children under age 15 are respectively 58 Russians, 20 Ukrainians, 17 Crimean Tatars, and 5 children of other ethnic groups. Average size of a Crimean Tatar family is about 3,5.




Chart 4.1 Correlation of the ethnicity and age in Crimea

#### 4.1. Cultural Elements of the Ethnic identification

Almost all scientists stress on culture as an important component of ethnicity. To describe the peculiarities of culture in Crimea, we should specify some tendencies. Crimea was a part of the Soviet Union, where one of the main aims was the creation of ‘Soviet person’ (*Sovetskiy chelovek*). Some features of this Soviet culture remain till now.<sup>295</sup> Another important tendency is the deportation, the exile in Uzbekistan and repatriation of Crimean Tatars. Dissolution of the USSR and appearance of the independent Ukrainian state had also inefaceable influence on culture of Crimea. Russians became an ethnic majority (according to official discourse) in the peninsula, where active policy of Ukrainization took place. Ethnic/national identities of Crimean residents come into contradictions with citizenship.<sup>296</sup>

<sup>294</sup> ‘Deti v AR Krum’, Glavnoe Upravlenie Statistiki v AR Krum, <http://www.crimea-portal.gov.ua/index.php?v=9&tek=17&par=9&art=5237>

<sup>295</sup> Soviet identity it will be discussed in details in the fifth chapter

<sup>296</sup> Correlation between ethnic identity and citizenship will be discussed in the fifth chapter

#### 4.1.1. The Significance of Language

First of all we should analyze the situation with languages among ethnic groups in Crimea. According to the All-Ukrainian population census' 2001 data<sup>297</sup>, 10,1% of the population of Autonomous Republic of Crimea have indicated Ukrainian as their native language, 77,0% of population indicated Russian as their native language and 11,4% of population indicated Crimean Tatar. Detailed distribution of languages among ethnic group is shown in the Chart 4.2.




Chart 4.2 Ethnic groups and native Language (All-Ukrainian population census' 2001 data)

Distribution of languages among ethnic group according to the survey data is shown in the Chart 4.3.




Chart 4.3 Native languages among ethnic groups (poll 2009)

Next step is to analyze practicing language of own ethnic group (Russian among Russians, Ukrainian among Ukrainians, Crimean Tatar among Crimean Tatars).

<sup>297</sup> 'Linguistic composition of population Autonomous Republic of Crimea. according to All-Ukrainian population census data', <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Crimea/>

According to the survey data (see Chart 4.3) more than 95% of Russians consider Russian as their native language. Almost all Russians are fluent in Russian<sup>298</sup>. For this ethnic group language is a significant tool of national identity (idea of “great, powerful Russian language” (*Velikiy Russkiy Yazuk*)). During the Soviet times, Russian was the language of Party apparatus. If one was fluent in Russian, s/he could get a good education and a prestigious job, and especially, one could obtain quite good positions in governmental posts. It was considered in USSR, if one did not speak Russian (usually it is rural population), but speak local language, s/he was illiterate. Russian language was used (and still is used) in 1/6 of land as language of interethnic communication and this fact gives the base for claiming Russians as a great nation and self-identification with this great nation.

The situation with practicing languages is different among Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Less than half of Ukrainians (see Chart 4.3) in Crimea consider Ukrainian as native language. Russian is considered as native tongue for more than 60% of Ukrainians. 44,9% speak Ukrainian fluently and 6,12% do not know it at all (See Appendix A). Only 8,16% (from all Ukrainians in Crimea) speak Ukrainian at home. It means that only half of respondents who considered Ukrainian as their native language spoke Ukrainian at home (see Chart 4.4). Consequently, there is a big gap between ethnic identity (Ukrainians) and practicing Ukrainian language. These facts mean that, for Ukrainians language is not a basic tool for ethnic identification and practicing language of ethnic group does not influence the ethnic identity of the members. Therefore we can assume that Ukrainian language in the case of Ukrainians has a symbolic meaning. Walker Connor trying to understand the place of the Ukrainian language in the self-definition of Ukrainians put a question:

Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation or it is merely a minor element which has been elevated to the symbol of the nation in its struggle for continued viability?<sup>299</sup>

Consequently, he came to conclusion that language in case of Ukrainians is a type of “tangible symbols”.

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<sup>298</sup> See Appendix A: Results of Opinion Poll about knowing languages

<sup>299</sup> Connor, W. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ, p. 44




Chart 4.4 Correlation of survey results on questions about native language and language that is spoken at home (Ukrainians)

Correlation of “ethnic identity – language” has some peculiarities in the Crimean Tatar case. In contrast to Ukrainians, 85,71% of Crimean Tatars (survey 2009) consider the Crimean Tatar language as their native (see Chart 4.3). 80,95% of Crimean Tatars fluent in the language of their ethnic group and only 4,76% do not know it at all (see Appendix A). Percentage of Crimean Tatars who speak the Crimean Tatar language at home is 19% less than the percentage of people who consider Crimean Tatar as their native language. This reduction occurs mostly in favour of the Russian language (see Chart 4.5). However, the fact that Crimean Tatars widely speak Russian language does not influence their ethnic identities. Consequently, Crimean Tatar language also plays a symbolic role among Crimean Tatars.




Chart 4.5 Correlation of survey results on questions about native language and language that is spoken at home (Crimean Tatars)

As we can see there are only two quantitatively significant language group in the Crimea - Russian (spread among all ethnic groups in Crimea) and Crimean Tatar (spoken by Crimean Tatars). Ukrainian language is not widely spoken even among Ukrainians in Crimea and it is at the periphery in all spheres. The real situation with the Ukrainian

language in Crimea is contrasted to its public status. According to the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 10), the only state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. However, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.<sup>300</sup> Article 10 of the Crimean Constitution proclaims that Crimea, along with the state provides to its territory of operation, development, use and protection of Russian and Crimean Tatar languages, and languages of other nationalities. Indeed, the Russian language as the language of the majority population and favorable for international communication is used in all spheres of the public life. In Article 11 it is declared that, according to Ukrainian legislation, official documents that claim the status of citizen should be work out in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, and on motion of citizens in the Crimean Tatar language.<sup>301</sup> Consequently, there are problems with the status of Russian and Crimean Tatar languages in Crimea. Practically they are widely spoken in Crimea, and their development is granted by both constitutions, but they do not have any official status. Especially, the issue of the status of Russian as the second state language is debatable. This issue is the most popular tool of pro-Russian political organizations and parties during election time.

However, lack of official status of a language not always lead to limitation of its use. Regarding to the restrictions in the use of native languages (see Chart 4.6), the most difficult situation is among the Crimean Tatars, most of whom perceive limitations in everyday life - at work, in education, in social activities, communication with government, law enforcement officers, judicial authorities (more often), medical workers, trade and public services. Most respondents of other ethnic groups (Russians and Ukrainians) such restrictions did not indicate.

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<sup>300</sup> Constitution of Ukraine, 28.06.1996 № 254к/96-ВР.  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html>

<sup>301</sup> Constitution of Autonomous Republic in Crimea.  
[http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder\\_constit.html](http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_constit.html)




Chart 4.6 Ethnicity and limitations using native language

Problem with language restriction in education sphere has one of the biggest indexes. Possibility of satisfaction of the educational needs is an important factor of the social wellbeing of citizens and safeguard of ethno-national identity.

Real situation with the rights of residents of Crimea to study in their native language is shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Quantitative indicators of education in different languages in the Crimean schools<sup>302</sup>

Type of educational institution	total amount of students	Studying in Ukrainian	Studying in Russian	Studying in Crimean Tatar
Comprehensive school	177 863	12 860 (7,2%)	159 359 (89,6%)	5 644 (3,2%)
Night school	5 916	-	5 818 (98,3%)	98 (1,7%)
institute of higher education (I-II levels)	8 600	348 (4%)	8 252 (96%)	-
institute of higher education (III-IV levels)	58 981	6 170 (10,5%)	52 811 (89,5%)	-
Total	251 360	19 378 (7,7%)	226 240 (90%)	5 742 (2,3%)

As we can see, the main problems concern education in the Crimean Tatar language. Basic factors of this situation are disproportion in the number of schools, lack of textbooks and training teachers. The chairman of the National Committee on Nationalities and Deported People Saliyev announced in May 2008 that to satisfy the requirements of the Crimean Tatars it should be build 10-12 schools with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction and reconstructed 15-20 schools<sup>303</sup>. The main obstacle of

<sup>302</sup> 'Third report of Ukraine about implementation of Council's of Europe convention about defense of national minorities, 2009'  
[http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art\\_id=131306](http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=131306)

<sup>303</sup> Komitet ARK u spravah deportovanih: U Krumu neobhidno vidkrutu sche ne menshe 10-12 krumskotatarskuh shkil. UNIAN, 28 Travnja 2008. <http://unian.net>

this aim is the lack of resources due to lack of political will to identify the real priorities and focus resources on their achievement. Another problem is the lack of teachers in Crimean Tatar schools. Today they are prepared in the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University in the field of “Teacher of the Crimean Tatar language and Russian”, “Teacher of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages”, “Crimean Tatar and English language teacher”, “Primary school teacher”; in Taurida National V.I.Vernadsky University - specialty “Teacher of Crimean Tatar language and literature”<sup>304</sup> Another important issue concerning the education, development and dissemination of the Crimean Tatar language, is the lack of higher educational institutions of the Crimean Tatar language of instruction. The situation with education in Ukrainian is also unsatisfactory in Crimea. However, if young Crimeans who study at schools with Ukrainian language of instructions have the opportunity to continue education in higher educational institutions of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars don’t have such opportunity. In addition, it is clear, if language is not used in higher education, it is extremely because of the limited capacity of Crimean Tatar development as the language of science, policy, administration and justice. It can be useful only in an everyday conversation. Therefore the motivation to learn their native language is significantly weaken.

Issue about preferable language of children’s education is shown in the Chart 4.7. Most of the respondents of all ethnic groups prefer Russian as a language for children’s education. It shows us that Russian still has strong positions as a language of prestige, like it was during Soviet Union. However, 28,57% of Crimean Tatars prefer native language in this issue. Percentage of Ukrainians who would like to study their children in Ukrainian is low as the percentage of Ukrainians who consider Ukrainian as their native language.

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<sup>304</sup> Third report of Ukraine about implementation of Council’s of Europe convention about defense of national minorities, 2009, p.66,  
[http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art\\_id=131306](http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=131306)




Chart 4.7 Ethnicity and language of children's education

Last stage in 'ethnic identity – language' analysis is to consider the opinion among ethnic groups about obligatory languages (see Chart 4.8). There are some disparities concerning this issue. Opinion about Russian language is the most coincident compare to other languages. The overwhelming majority of all respondents believe that Russian must be known by every resident of Crimea. However, there are big differences concerning Ukrainian language as obligatory for each Crimean resident. More than half of the Crimean Tatars believe that Crimean residents should also speak Ukrainian. Percentage of Russians concerning this issue is 10%. However, the opinion about Crimean Tatar language has even greater disparities among Crimean Tatars and Russians.

Obviously, Russian is recognized as language of interethnic communication in the Crimea. Whereas Russians and Ukrainians respondents tend to conserve linguistic situation in the peninsula, the Crimean Tatars support the prevalence of their native and state languages. The Crimean Tatars almost two times more often (than respondents of other ethnic groups) consider mandatory use of Ukrainian language in public areas. This fact shows their positive attitude to the Ukrainian state. They believe that the state will be the institution which provides full integration of Crimean Tatars in the historic homeland. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars perceive Ukrainians in Crimea, as people that largely lost their national consciousness, because they do not speak native language in their own country.




Chart 4.8 Ethnicity and opinion about obligatory languages

As we can see from our analysis, Ukrainian language has a weak position in all spheres, but Ukrainian government tries to integrate Russian speaking Crimea into Ukrainian social space and for this purpose it applies a strong policy of Ukrainization, which mostly becomes apparent concerning language issues. However, Crimean residents very sensitively perceive these attempts of Ukrainization. Respondents of all ethnic groups agree with the existence of this phenomenon (see Chart 4.9, 4.10). Percentage of Crimean Tatars is also not as high as among Russians and Ukrainians. Almost equal percentage of respondents among all ethnic groups believe that the Ukrainization takes place in the Halt of the broadcast of Russian TV channels, which programs were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation. Also, about half of population points out the translation of recipes, instructions, notes in Ukrainian and duplication of films on television and in cinemas. More than half of respondents, with the exception of the Crimean Tatars, see Ukrainization in the translation of business documents into Ukrainian.

It was indicated that not only the Russians but also Ukrainians do not support policy of Ukrainization. Crimean Tatars perceive Ukrainization (which first of all concerns language issue) more positively, but with the proviso that it must be accompanied by the development of Crimean Tatar language. Otherwise, Ukrainization can only hurt the Crimean Tatar people.




Chart 4.9 Ethnicity and the problem of Ukrainization




Chart 4.10 Spheres of Ukrainization

Next important factor for identification is religion.

#### 4.1.2. The Role of Religion in the Ethnic Identification

In this part of the chapter we will try to recognize how religion influences the ethnic identity of different groups in Crimea. Smith in his book ‘National Identity’ stresses on the correlation between “religious identity” and “ethnic identity”. He points out that in some communities “religion criteria of differentiation” can be the base for ethnic identity of these groups<sup>305</sup>. Religious identities according to Smith “are based on alignments of culture and its elements – values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in customs and ritual”<sup>306</sup>. Religion can “divide an ethno-linguistic population” or it can be the factor that brings together different ethnic groups. In this sense it is possible

<sup>305</sup> Smith, A. D. 1991. *National Identity*. London : Penguin Books, p. 7

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, p.6

to define three main options of correlation between religious and ethnic identities: common religious identities but different ethnic identities; different religious identities and different ethnic identities; different religious identity but common ethnic identity. Therefore religion could influence on interethnic distance. In this part we will try to understand these interrelations in Crimea.

According to Committee of Religious Issues in Crimea there are more than 40 confessions. But the main are: 1) Ukrainian Orthodoxy Church (Moscow Patriarchy) (UOC-MP): 489 religious organizations, 478 communities, 6 monasteries, 93 schools, 2 periodical publications; 2) The Religious Board of Muslims of Crimea: 324 religious organizations, 318 communities, 6 monasteries, 5 schools (*madrasah*), 1 periodical publications. 3) Ukrainian Orthodoxy Church (Kyiv Patriarchy) (UOC-KP): 29 religious organizations, 26 communities, 6 monasteries, and 2 schools<sup>307</sup>. As we can see Christianity (Orthodoxy) and Islam are the dominant religions in Crimea. However there are some distinctions among Orthodox Churches in Ukraine (and in Crimea particularly). However these distinctions have mostly geopolitical bases. One of the main Churches (Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy) is subordinated to Moscow cleric leader. Other Church (Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy) is subordinated to Kyiv. According to this data we can create a model of ethnic-religious relations. It is shown in the Diagram 4.1. The quantitative characteristics of these interconnections will be defined on the base of survey data.




Diagram 4.1 Interconnection of religious and ethnic identity

<sup>307</sup> Compete of Religion in Autonomous Republic of Crimea, <http://www.comrelig.crimea-portal.gov.ua/rus/index.php?v=5&tek=0&par=0&l=&art=31&date=>

According to survey data (see Chart 4.11) the percentage of believers is higher among Crimean Tatars compare to Russians and Ukrainians. 90,48% of Crimean Tatar, 74,36% of Russian and 67,35% of Ukrainian respondents consider themselves as believers. We can see that percentage of atheists is higher among Slavs. It can be explained by the strong position of Soviet culture in Crimea.




Chart 4.11 The degree of religiousness of main ethnic groups of Crimea

Based on the survey data, we can agree that the level of religious observance is rather low. Percentage of people who observe religious rituals is small (see Chart 4.12). Most of the Crimean residents observe it occasionally or in special cases. Among Slavs, the percentage of respondents who do not observe rituals is higher than percentages who observe it regularly. Among Crimean Tatars percentage of observant people is higher than the percentage of people who do not observe religious rituals.




Chart 4.12 Observance of religious rituals among ethnic groups

Distribution of believers among different confessions is presented on the Chart 4.13. The absolute majority of Crimean Tatars belongs to Sunny Islam. The situation among Slavs is more complicated. Absolute majority of Russians and half of the believers among Ukrainians consider themselves as believers of “Orthodoxy” or “Russian

Orthodox Church”. But according to the Committee of Religious Issues in Crimea<sup>308</sup> there is no such confession. Therefore we can conclude that the majority of Orthodox believers in Crimea still belong themselves to traditional Russian Orthodox Church and they do not know much about division in Orthodoxy. However, among Ukrainians more respondents recognized this distinction. Half of Ukrainian believers belong to one of the confessions (UOC-MP or UOC-KP). It should be specified that a lot of respondents asked interviewers to explain the differences between this confessions, however, it was forbidden for interviewers to do this, in order not to influence the answers of the respondents. Some people answering the question about belonging to a certain confession followed such logic as “if I’m Ukrainian and I live in Ukraine I should belong to Church of Kyiv Patriarchy”. However, after respondents have answered this question by following such logic, interviewers asked them where exactly their church is. After the verification it was found that mentioned churches usually were the Churches of Moscow patriarchy. It once again gives the evidence that people do not know much about division in the Orthodox Churches. We can see that there is very low percentage of Islam believers among Slavs. Islam in Crimea is practiced only by Crimean Tatars. Muslims are the religious minority in Crimea. It means that Crimean Tatars constitute a minority in both senses – ethnic and religious. We believe that it increases the level of social distance of Crimean Tatars with other ethnic (and/or religious) groups in Crimea.




Chart 4.13 Ethnic identity and belonging to certain confession

To understand the level of religion’s influence on ethnic identity respondents were asked the question about their connection of ethnic and religious affiliations (see Chart 4.14). Absolute majority of all respondents agree that ethnic and religious affiliations

<sup>308</sup> Compete of Religion in Autonomous Republic of Crimea, <http://www.comrelig.crimea-portal.gov.ua/rus/index.php?v=5&tek=0&par=0&l=&art=31&date=>

should be corresponded to each other (according to stereotypes). The degree of agreement is the highest among Crimean Tatars and lowest among Ukrainians.




Chart 4.14 The level of belief in ethno-religious connection

Next part of research concerns possibility of religious conflict in Crimea (see Charts 4.15, 4.16, 4.17). The percentage of people who supposes that religious conflict could occur in Crimea is not higher than 28,57%. Russians are more than others consider that religious conflict is possible in Crimea (71,79%). Absolute majority of Crimean Tatars and Russians who suppose that religious conflict could occur indicates that the conflict could occur between “Orthodox and Muslims” (see Chart 4.16). It means that in this case, it is not only religious conflict, but rather ethno-religious, because division on Orthodox – Muslims coincides with ethnic division Slavs – Crimean Tatars. Conflict between Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchies of Orthodoxy is considered as possible only by 24,49% of Ukrainians, 9,40% of Russians and 4,76% of Crimean Tatars. Degree of readiness to participate in religious conflict does not exceed 11,11% (see Chart 4.17). This analysis gives us the evidence that religious (inter-confessional) relations in Crimea are rather tolerant. If religious issues are not used as political tools, the possibility of conflict is very low.




Chart 4.15 Possibility of religious conflict in Crimea




Chart 4.16 The actors of possible religious conflict




Chart 4.17 Degree of readiness to participate in the religious conflict

Base on the content-analysis (2005-2006) we will show how religious issue is presented in Crimean Press. First of all, we will define which newspapers used religious topics (see Charts 4.18, 4.19). There are no governmental newspapers on the Chart 4.18 (data 2005) but in 2006 (Chart 4.19) 7% of all religious messages were published in governmental newspapers (*Krymskaya gazeta* and *Krymskiye izvestiya*). It can be interpreted as politicization of religious issues on the eve of election. However in both governmental newspapers religious themes were used only the positive context.




Chart 4.18 Religious topics in Crimean Press in 2005




Chart 4.19 Religious topics in Crimean Press in 2006

As we can see in 2005 and 2006 almost half of all articles with religious subject were published in *Krymskaya pravda*. In that time chief editor of *Krymskaya pravda* was Michail Baharev, who was also a head of Crimean branch of organization *Nasledniki Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo* (Followers of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy). The head of all-Ukrainian branch of this organization was Leonid Grach. Grach was also a head of Communist Party of Crimea. This newspaper is positioned as “social and political independent Russian newspaper”. Therefore we can suppose that it expresses the views of pro-Russian oriented political forces: ‘Followers of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy’ and Communist party of Crimea. Maybe 10 years ago combination Communists and religion could be seemed like nonsense. But now it is usual and explicable reality. The most striking example of orientation Communist party to religion (Orthodoxy) is Leonid Grach’s article in *Krymskaya pravda* (10.09.2005): ‘Orthodoxy and communists: we need unity’. Author tries to prove that church and communism in reality peacefully coexisted and even collaborated during Soviet times. Because they (communism and Orthodoxy) still have stayed as faithful servants of the people, they should unite against existing rulers<sup>309</sup>.

Next stage is to analyze PR techniques that were used by *Krymskaya pravda* and *Krymskoe vremya* in relation to religious actors<sup>310</sup>. *Krymskaya pravda* and *Krymskoe vremya* basically used “the anti-advertising” what promotes negative image of the actors (see Chart 4.20).

<sup>309</sup> Grach, L. ‘Pravoslavnuye I kommunistu: nam nuzhen soyuz’. *Krymskaya pravda*, 10.10.2005

<sup>310</sup> There are five main PR techniques (according to V. Vikentev) that were count during content-analysis: positioning PR-object; the eminence of image; the anti-advertising; discharge from competitors; counteradvertising




Chart 4.20 PR techniques concerning religious subjects in Crimean Press

Religious actor whose image was elevated was Ukrainian Orthodoxy Church of Moscow Patriarchy. It is easy to explain: if Communist party follows pro-Russian course, it will support Moscow Patriarchy. On the Chart 4.21 we can see actors against which the “anti-advertising” was used in the religious topics. The main actors were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy, Yushchenko and Mejlis. Negative image was used mostly against Mejlis but not against Muslims. For example in article “Police promises to settle the conflict in Bakhchesaray” (*Krymskaya pravda*, 09.12.2005) it was written that Police intervened in the conflict about lands near Dormition monastery “between orthodox believers and Mejlis”. Author of the article “Strategy of Mejlis in the context of the political situation in the ARC” (*Krymskoe vremya*, 5.01.2006) consider Mejlis as main factor of instability in peninsula and he also agrees that Mejlis oppose the building of orthodox churches in Crimea. In another article ‘*Medzhlisovets* offers Orthodox abbot of the monastery voluntarily give up the land’ (*Krymskiy obozrevatel*, 20.12.2005) it was stated that *medzhlisovets* (person who belongs to Mejlis) made an attack on orthodox sacred place. It means that there is no significant conflict between Christianity and Islam. There is conflict in political but not religious sphere. Even leader of Communist Grach condemned cartoon of Mohamed. In Crimean Tatars press (*Golos Kryma* and *Poluostrov*) there was no any negative information against other religious actors. The main topics are information about opening new mosques and censure of cartoons of Mohamed.




Chart 4.21 Negative images of actors in the religious topics

#### 4.1.3. *The Significance of Historical Memory*

Besides the issue of language and religion, there is another problematic issue in the cultural context. It is the problem with revival of historical memory (review of historical events, reconstruction of historical sacred places, changing names of settlements, erection and re-erection of monuments). Historical memory which covers a specific interpretation of the historical events and processes, the pantheon of heroes and eminent persons of the enemies and allies has very important meaning for the ethnic identity. Issues of historical memory attract big interest and expressive emotional reaction even among people who are not much interested in history because these issues touch symbolic and value spheres of consciousness. Steadiness of group identity needs permanent preservation and actualization of historical memory, which expresses in symbolic objects (texts, monuments, significant places, names of settlements etc.). On the other hand, the historical memory is part of the social and individual consciousness, and thus it motivates the social behavior of the groups and its individual representatives. Therefore, satisfaction of rights on preserving historical memory of ethnic groups has influence on the relationship between these groups, and on general integrity of society.

Analyzing the situation in Crimea, we can conclude that there is some kind of the struggle for historical memory between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities and sometimes even between the Russians and the Ukrainians. Therefore, the critical importance has issue of the return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of religious buildings and memorial structures; establishment of religious symbols and monuments of famous historical figures; changing names of settlements and reappraisal of historical events.

One of the parameters of historical memory is the issue of assessment of history and history rewriting according to the political needs. This problem was examined more detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Essence of this question has three-dimensional basis. There are pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Crimean-Tatar versions of history. Main contradictions can be defined between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian versions on the one hand, and pro-Slavic and pro-Tatar versions on the other hand. One of the striking example is the interpretation of Crimean Tatar and Cossack's acts in Ukrainian historical books. Crimean Tatar acts are described by authors as "conquests" and "foray" (*zavoevanie, nabeg*), but Cossack's acts - as "campaign" (*pohody*). The same situation can be observed in the deportation of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups. According to the Soviet historiography this act was a compulsory measure to protect the motherland from the traitors. However, according to Crimean Tatar and Western versions of history, it was illegal, incongruous with human rights. In other words it was a kind of cruel crime of the Soviet authority against whole Crimean Tatar nation.

Concerning attitudes of Crimean residents to deportation of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, respondents were asked the question: 'Do you agree that deportation of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups was an act that Soviet authority had to do?' According to poll's results (see Chart 4.22) most of respondents do not agree with this statement. However, we should mention that there is no direct positive or negative appraisal in this question; therefore it was possible that respondents did not fully understand its essence. It is possible that some of respondents understand it as question "do you agree or do not agree with deportation?". Even if we take into consideration this remark we can conclude that en masse Crimean residents do not agree (with deportation or with statement that it was an act that Soviet authority had to do). The opinion of Crimean Tatars concerning this question is quite homogeneous when compared to Russians and Ukrainians. Opinion of Ukrainians keeps intermediate position compared to Crimean Tatar and Russian opinions.




Chart 4.22 Ethnicity and attitudes towards deportation<sup>311</sup>

Other side of historical memory is the so-called “war of monuments”. It is the conflict among symbols of Imperial, Soviet, and Independence periods and historical symbols of the Crimean Tatars who also try to create their own “national” history. Contradictions in the line of ‘Slavic-Tatar’ claims we can find in satisfaction (or not satisfaction) of revival of religious buildings. There were several big conflicts on this basis. One is the conflict in 2001 and 2004 between Dormition cloister (*Uspenskiy monastr*) and Muslims about the territory where old *madrasah* took place. The object of another territorial conflict in Bakchesaray in 2006 concerns removing current market from territory of former Muslim cemetery. There was one more conflict among Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian organizations in Feodosia in 2006. The reason of conflict is the establishment of monument of Andrey Pervozvanuy. Consequently, we can assume that government supports only Slavic claims in symbolic space. However, at the same time, there are also contradictions among pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian symbolic claims.

There were sharp discussions about the construction of the Mosque (Juma Jami) in Simferopol. In 2004, Muslim community appealed to the City Council requesting to build the mosque in the Park Vorontsovka. They appealed to the events of May 1944. This park was the place where Crimean Tatars were gathered before deportation. The City Council refused on this requirement under the pretext that it is forbidden to build in the green areas of the city. The construction land of the mosque was given on the outskirts of the city. However, in 2007 City Council reversed its own decision about this territory. At the same time Aleksandr Nevsky Cathedral was rebuilt in the center of Simferopol. This

<sup>311</sup> Variant “agree” is sum of “agree” and “rather agree”; variant “don’t agree” is sum of “rather don’t agree” and “don’t agree”

reconstruction was provided by Leonid Kuchma (former President of Ukraine) and some pro-Russian organizations in Crimea.

There were also wave of conflicts which were called *Krestopoval*. The first such conflict took place in October 2000 in the village of Morskoe near Sudak, where the local Orthodox community has established a giant metal cross on the site of ancient Crimean Tatar cemetery. The local Crimean Tatars were perturbed by such situation and they pushed the cross. Later in a few months in 2001, unknown persons demolished several crosses in different parts of the peninsula.

There are several monuments which symbolize period when Crimea was a part of Russian Empire. Commemorative stone of Catherine II was set in Simferopol in 2007. The initiators were Simferopol municipality, the municipality of Moscow and the Cossack units of Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries. Monument of Catherine II was opened in Sevastopol in June 2008. There are also discussions about possible set of the monument of Stalin in Livadia. Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities ardently protested against it.

“War of monument” also exists between pro-Russian and Pro-Ukrainian forces. In 2007 Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) established three-meters Steles of memory of victims of the OUN-UPA<sup>312</sup> in Simferopol. It is written on this monument: “In memory of the victims of the Soviet people, fallen at the hands of fascists – solders of OUN-UPA and other fascist collaborators”. Consequently the question of historical memory in the region is extremely motivated by geopolitical factors. One more example concerns recent events about the Day of Victims of Famine. In particular, members of international action “unquenchable candle” brought on the Crimean Peninsula 200 kg symbolic candle. Representatives of the CPU tried to prevent this action, interpreting it as a charge of Russia and Russian people in the genocide of Ukrainians<sup>313</sup>.

Another different problem is the usage of different toponyms by Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities. Each of the toponyms is a kind of an interpretation of the history. In 1944, over 90% of place names of the settlements were renamed by special decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to “erase” the memory of most of the Crimean Tatars. According only one Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the

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<sup>312</sup> OUN-UPA - Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a Ukrainian political movement in the Western part of Ukraine

<sup>313</sup> ‘12 lystopada 2008 roku v ramach zahodiv prusvyachenuh tragicchnum podiyam 1932-1933rr v Ukrayini proyshov Krumskuy etap Mizshnarodnoyi akcii ‘Nezgasuma svichka’. Ministerstvo Kultury I Turizmu Ukrayinu, <http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/mincult/uk/publish/article/127285>

RSFSR, of 18 May, 1948, 1,062 settlements in Crimea were renamed<sup>314</sup>. Toponymic of Crimea, reflecting its history, was destroyed.

The name “Taurida” (Tauria province) was awarded to the Crimea after its annexation to the Russian Empire. This name appeals to the Greek culture (excluding Crimean Tatar stage of history). Consequently Slavic community uses place names that appeared after Crimean Tatar deportation or toponyms that belong to Russian Empire times. Instead, the Crimean Tatars prefer the old, mostly Crimean Tatar toponyms, and not only concerning relatively large cities such as *Akmescit* (Simferopol), Kefe (Feodosiya) Kezlev (Evpatoria), Karasubazar (Belohorsk), but even in the cases of villages and towns which were settled by the Russians and the Ukrainians after the War. The requirement to restore Crimean Tatar toponyms last sounded in the mourning meeting on the occasion of 65th anniversary of deportation in Simferopol. The head of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dzhemilev, encouraged to raise funds and to set at the entrances to each settlement the pointers of historical names.<sup>315</sup>

Opinion about reasonability of renaming toponyms is contrary among Crimean Tatars from one side and Russians from the other side (see Chart 4.23). More than 70% of Crimean Tatars believe that renaming places is a rational act. Almost the same percentage of Russians considers this act as not rational. Ukrainians are more loyal to this issue compared to Russians. But still majority of Ukrainians are against the renaming of places. This is a debatable issue for ethnic groups in Crimea because the change in toponyms means changing the symbolic space of Crimea in favour of one of the group. Possession of this symbolic space substantiates the possession of all material space including all resources.

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<sup>314</sup> Bobrovitsa, N. ‘Yazuk zemli ili ... ukaza? Toponimika Kruma: istiriya, poetika, politika...’. *Avdet*, 13.01.1997. [http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/Avdet/1-10\(97\)/3.html](http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/Avdet/1-10(97)/3.html)

<sup>315</sup> ‘Krumskie Tataru ustanavlivayut na poluostrove ukazateli s krumskotatarskimi nazvaniyami gorodov’. Media gruppa “Zavtra”, 18.05.2009. <http://www.zavtra.com.ua/news/1/121735>




Chart 4.23 Ethnicity and the renaming of places

#### 4.2. Identification of Ethnic Groups With Different Cultures of Crimea and Interethnic Relations

Next issue of analysis concerns identification with one or another cultural tradition. In interviews (survey 2009) respondents were asked “To which culture do you label yourself?” The result is shown in the Chart 4.24.




Chart 4.24 Ethnicity and cultural traditions

According to survey data, Russian culture is dominant in Crimea (58,16%). 13,27% of total population identify themselves with the Soviet culture. Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures have approximately the same percentage of adherents (9,69% and 8,67% correspondingly).

In terms of ethnic identity, Russian culture was considered as their own by absolute majority of Russians (73,5%) and relative majority of Ukrainians (46,93%). Ukrainian culture as primary was claimed by less then a quarter of Ukrainians and by approximately 4% of Russians and Crimean Tatars. Maximal coincidence ‘Ethnic group – culture’ is observed among Crimean Tatars. 85,71% of Crimean Tatars belong themselves to

Crimean Tatar cultural tradition and only 4,76% - to Ukrainian and 9,52 – to Russian culture.

The survey data about forecast of future dominant culture are shown in the Chart 4.25.




Chart 4.25 Ethnicity and future dominant culture in Crimea

Positions of Russian culture will be reduced in the opinion of Crimean residents. European culture will be increased. 49,57% of Russians and 34,69% of Ukrainians believe that Russian culture will dominate in Crimea. Majority of Crimean Tatars consider that their cultural tradition will prevail in the peninsula. If we compare current identification with cultural traditions and forecast about dominant culture we can notice that among each ethnic group forecast about the dominant culture of other ethnic group is higher then the current identification with this culture. Ukrainians’ forecast about the domination of Crimean Tatar culture is higher then current identification of Ukrainians with Tatar culture. At the same time opinion about future positions of one’s culture is more pessimistic than present identification. Russian culture also will lose positions in opinion of the Ukrainians. Situation among Russians is a little bit different. In case of own culture they think about decreasing positions. But in case of Ukrainian and Tatar cultures Russians predict their growth. These forecasts about dominant positions of another's cultural tradition in future indicate possible fear or threat of other culture. But it is interesting to notify that Ukrainians don’t predict growth of Russian culture compared to the current situation. It corroborates the idea that Russian culture is native for most Ukrainians in Crimea. Crimean Tatar opinion about future positions of Russian and Ukrainian cultures is not so different from present identification.

Concerning assessments of opportunities to practice culture of the ethnic group, we can analyze responses to a question about opportunities of children’s education in the cultural traditions of one ethnic group (see Chart 4.26). Most of the Crimean Tatars and

more than half of the Russians stress on the lack of sufficient opportunities for education of children in cultural traditions of their ethnic groups. Only 23,8% of the Crimean Tatars and 29,06% of the Russians consider that they have such opportunities. Opinion of the Ukrainians is almost the same in both cases.




Chart 4.26. Ethnicity and opportunities of children’s education in the framework of cultural tradition of ethnic groups

After a detailed review of cultural situation in Crimea, we can conclude that as a result of historical events (Soviet Union, deportation, resettlement, independence repatriation) cultures of ethnic groups were influenced by some changes and in some cases became hybrid. Soviet culture still has strong positions among Crimean residents (mostly among older generation). It is important to notice that “Soviet” is usually associated with “Russian”. Besides Soviet remnants, Russian culture in Crimea (it is usually called as ‘Russian World’ (*Russkiy Mir*)), became a little bit hybrid because of the Ukrainization policy. State institutes work only in the Ukrainian language; TV programs, movies are also translated into Ukrainian. Classes in schools where whole education is conducted in Ukrainian are opened. 88% of Russians in Crimea understand and even 19,66% of them are fluent in Ukrainian (see Appendix A). Most of the Soviet holidays are canceled and new state holidays are established. However, Russian culture still has a dominant position and Russian is still language of interethnic communication in Crimea.

Crimean Tatar culture also has elements of hybridization. Ismail Aydıngün and Ayşegül Aydıngün<sup>316</sup> stress that Crimean Tatar culture became a hybrid in several ways. It can be observed in Soviet and post-Soviet times “since the objective of the nationalities policy was the creation of a socialist cultural content without destroying (and instead

<sup>316</sup> Aydıngün, I., Aydıngün, A., ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), (January 2007): 113-128

strengthening) ethnic boundaries”<sup>317</sup>. There was some hybridization with Uzbek culture, so “Crimean Tatars stress that they feel close to Central Asian people”<sup>318</sup>. But according to self-ascription in the framework of cultural traditions absolute majority of Crimean Tatars describe themselves as adherents of Crimean Tatar culture (see Chart 4.24). Ismail Aydingün and Ayşegül Aydingün also specify that “hybridisation is not valid for all cultural elements” It is mostly observed “in food, music and language” and also in “certain customs such as birthdays and new-year celebrations”<sup>319</sup>.

Ukrainian culture in Crimea is the most hybrid culture when compared to the Russian and Crimean Tatar cultures. Absolute majority of Ukrainians consider Russian as their native language and less than half of Ukrainians fluently speak Ukrainian. Russian cultural tradition in two times prevails among Ukrainians than Ukrainian one. The facts of practicing Russian language and culture by Ukrainians give the base to consider that the Ukrainians don’t constitute a nation that separated from Russian. The opinion of Crimean residents about this issue is shown in the Chart 4.27.




Chart 4.27 Russian and Ukrainians are one nation or different

Majority of Crimean Tatars does not see the differences between these two nations. Usually they perceive Russians and Ukrainians as one Slavic community. The opinion of Russians and Ukrainians (concerning this question) is diametrically opposite. More than 65% of Russians believe that Russian and Ukrainian are one nation, and almost 30% think that they are different nations. Instead, more than 60% of Ukrainians believe that they are two different nations. It once again approves the idea that losing linguistic and

<sup>317</sup> Aydingün, I., Aydingün, A., ‘Crimean Tatars Return to Home: Identity and Cultural Revival’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (1), (January 2007), p. 119

<sup>318</sup> Ibid, p. 122

<sup>319</sup> Ibid, p. 119

cultural identity of own ethnic group does not necessary lead to losing ethnic identity. Some part of respondents (26,53%) identifies itself as Ukrainians but at the same time they believe that Ukrainians and Russians constitute one nation. This situation indicates existence of such identity as Slavs. They did not lose their ethnic identity (“Ukrainians”) but at the same time they feel quite close to the Russian culture. In some cases they perceive Russian culture as “mother nation” or greater culture which gave the base for Ukrainian nation.

In the framework of this chapter the level of interethnic tensions and the mechanisms of preservation of ethnic boundaries also are investigated. The evaluation of interethnic tensions in Crimea is shown in the Chart 4.28. Using five points scale (1 – there is no tensions 5 – high degree of tensions) respondents assessed current situation between ethnic groups in Crimea. Interethnic relations between Russians and Ukrainians were estimated as less tense by all ethnic groups. However Crimean Tatars see a little bit intense tensions in relationships between Russians and Ukrainians than it was estimated by Russians and Ukrainians. Relationships between Russians and Crimean Tatars were considered as most tense in Crimea. However indexes do not reach critical points. Russians see these relations more tense than Crimean Tatars.




Chart 4.28 Estimation of the ethnic tensions in Crimea

Analysis of interethnic marriages could help us to understand the level of the interethnic distance in Crimea. According to the survey data, ethnic groups in Crimea have different attitudes toward interethnic marriages. (see Chart 4.29) In general the Crimean Tatars have more negative attitudes to interethnic marriages compared to the Russians and the Ukrainians. Absolute majority of the Crimean Tatars answers “I don’t criticize interethnic marriages, but I have never married to the representative of other nationality”. The percentage of the Crimean Tatars who are “against interethnic marriages” is higher than percentage of Russians and Ukrainians who gave the same

answer. Russians and Ukrainians mostly stress that possibility of their interethnic marriage “depends on nationality”.




Chart 4.29 Ethnicity and attitudes towards interethnic marriages

The estimation of possibility of interethnic marriages in Crimea is shown in the Chart 4.30. Respondents estimated (using five point scale 1- impossible 5 – absolutely possible) possibility of marriage with representatives of other ethnic groups. Like in the previous chart, opinion of the Russians and the Ukrainians is similar, but the opinion of the Crimean Tatars is opposite to the opinion of Slav community. Russians and Ukrainians indicated the possibility of marriage with Crimean Tatar person higher than Crimean Tatars did with Russians and Ukrainians. These two charts (4.29 and 4.30) show that the endogamy among Crimean Tatars is stronger than among Slavs.




Chart 4.30 Possibility of interethnic marriages

Karina Korostelina considers that the percentage of mix marriages between Crimean Tatar man and Slavic women is not higher than 10%, and between Slavic man and Crimean Tatar women don't exceed 7%<sup>320</sup>. One of the evidences of blaming and banning mix marriages is article titled “Mistakes in youth became pain in old age” in

<sup>320</sup> Korostelina, K. 2003. *Sotsialnaya Identichnost' I Conflict*. Simferopol: Dolya

newspaper “*Golos Kryma*” (13.10.2006). There is a discussion about Crimean Tatar man Elvis who dated a Russian girl Tatyana in spite of mother’s ban. This girl broke with him just after he has been jailed. His mother “wants to protect her son against representatives of other nation”<sup>321</sup>. Process of assimilation was discussed in this article. Author argues that there is an impression that every second Crimean Tatar family executes mix “marriage” in the meaning of “defect” (There is play of word: in Russian words ‘marriage’ and ‘waste’ or ‘defect’ are the same). Author argues that “our young people connect their lives not with best representatives of other ethnic groups”. He concludes that “90% of mix marriages finished by divorce”<sup>322</sup>. This article shows how strong the idea of endogamy (desire to save boundaries) among Crimean Tatars.

To conclude, it is possible to say that there are only two quantitatively significant language group in the Crimea – Russian (includes representatives of all ethnic group in Crimea) and Crimean Tatar (consist only from Crimean Tatars). Majority of the Crimean residents (of all ethnic groups) speaks Russian language. For Russians their language is a significant tool of national identity. There is a considerable presence of Russian language in the Crimean Tatars’ and especially Ukrainians’ everyday lives. However it doesn’t have an influence on their ethnic identities. Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages play a symbolic role for the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars respectively. The situation with Ukrainian language is complicated because the Ukrainian language is at the periphery in all spheres of Crimean life, but it is the only official language in Ukraine and in Crimea particularly. Therefore, the real situation with the Ukrainian language in Crimea is contrasted to its public status. All attempts of Ukrainian government to provide practicing Ukrainian in public spheres meet with dissatisfaction of all ethnic groups in Crimea, including Ukrainians. There are sharp discussions concerning problems with statuses of Russian and Crimean Tatar languages in Crimea. Practically, they are used in Crimea widespread, and their development is granted by both constitutions, but, in fact, they don’t have any official status. Especially sharp is issue of status of Russian as second state language. This issue is the most popular tool of pro-Russian political organizations and parties during election. The main problems with language in educational sphere concern teaching in the Crimean Tatar language.

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<sup>321</sup> ‘Oshibki molodosti stanovyarsya bolyu v starosti’, *Golos Kryma*, 13.11.2006

<sup>322</sup> Ibid

Religion is also a significant factor for ethnic identification, because in the case of Crimea religious differences overlap with ethnic identity. There are two dominant religions in Crimea: Islam and Orthodoxy. Most of Crimean Tatars are Muslims; and most of Slavs are Orthodox. Crimean Tatars constitute a minority in both senses – ethnic and religious. Therefore religion serves to be an additional component of ethnic identity, which could also increase the level of social distance between ethnic (and/or religious) groups in Crimea. There is a division in Orthodox Church. The main sects of Orthodoxy are: Church of Moscow Patriarchy and Church of Kyiv Patriarchy. However this division has rather geopolitical and economical reasons than spiritual ones. Both of these churches are politicized and included into election campaign. But they do not have a real influence on people, because the majority of Orthodox believers in Crimea still feel themselves belonging to Russian Orthodox Church (which is traditional name) and they do not know much about the division in Orthodoxy. Therefore we can conclude that religion is also a symbol in the processes of ethnic identification of ethnic groups in Crimea. Ethnic-religious overlapping of identities predetermines the peculiarities of conflicts in Crimea. Because of Orthodox – Muslims division coincides with ethnic division Slavs – Crimean Tatars, it is almost impossible to distinguish where ethnic and where religious conflict (tensions) is, especially if it is supplemented by economic factors.

Concerning the role of history interpretation in the ethnic identity, we can conclude that some struggle for historical memory exists between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities and sometimes even between the Russians and the Ukrainians. Therefore, the critical importance has issue of the return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of religious buildings and memorial structures; establishment of religious symbols and monuments of famous historical figures; changing names of settlements and reappraisal of historical events. However, if one ethnic group considers such changes as the restoration of historical justice and the realization of religious rights, the other groups usually consider this act as aggression and humiliation of their national or religious feelings.

There are very significant positions of Russian culture among all ethnic groups in Crimea. Crimean Tatar and especially Ukrainian cultures became hybrid in a large measure. However it does not lead to losing their ethnic identities. Crimean Tatars have stronger mechanisms for the preservation of ethnic boundaries compared to Russians and Ukrainians. Degree of endogamy among Crimean Tatars is higher than Slavs.

## CHAPTER 5

### ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN CRIMEA

This chapter analyzes how economic, political and global factors influence the process of ethnic identification of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Discussion about minority-majority relations in Crimea and the issue of status like “Ukrainian People”, “Ukrainian Nation”, “Citizens of Ukraine”, “National Minorities”, “Indigenous People” and “Deported Nation” will be elaborated. The importance of Crimean territory for each of the ethnic groups; the correlation of Soviet identity and current Ukrainian citizenship with ethno-national identity of Crimean residents will be also discussed.

#### 4.1. Socio-Economic Factors of Ethnic Identification

Dissolution of Soviet centralized economic system led to prolonged crisis in socio-economic sphere of independent states. Re-allotment of resources, cessation of manufactures and high level of unemployment especially has an influence on the living standard of people. Ukrainian society was rapidly divided into two – the very rich and the very poor people. Poverty increased. Under these circumstances Crimean Tatars began to return. Neither Ukrainian nor local Crimean governments were able to realize this process properly. For Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars were a nation which they had never seen before. They were known from the Soviet history books as illiterate, retrograde nation and traitors of motherland. And, this nation was demanding pecuniary aid and land from the government. In such a difficult economic situation, Crimean Tatar demands were perceived as an injustice against Slavic population of Crimea. Economic problems were superimposed with ethnic identity. As a result of this, it can be said that ethnic relations in Crimea were partly shaped by the economic conditions. The most debatable question in society and research circles concerns the main reason for Crimean Tatars’ claims regarding land and resources. From the Slavic perspective, the hidden motive of Crimean Tatar demands is only economic, and the spiritual component is only screen for it. From the Crimean Tatar perspective however, their demands are to be

perceived as restoration of justice. Kotugorenko stresses, there are two main lines of tension in Crimea: between Crimean Tatars and government, and between Crimean Tatars and other nationalities<sup>323</sup>. There is a struggle of economic interests among different ethnic groups in Crimean. Especially tensions in the ethno-economic sphere exist between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community.

The main problems in economic sphere are governmental support of the processes of repatriation; settlement of repatriates in the urban-rural areas in Crimea and land provisions; processes of integration of Crimean Tatars to the Crimean society and their socio-economical status (housing conditions, poverty level, unemployment and discrimination). To understand which of these problems are the most important, it is possible to use the results of content analysis<sup>324</sup>. The units of the research were ‘Crimean Tatars’. The main subjects (topics) of newspaper’s messages where ‘Crimean Tatars’ were presented in negative and positive images are shown in the Chart 5.1 and Chart 5.2 correspondently. In both cases the main issue is the problems with land and also solving problems of repatriates (housing, provision of the necessary facilities).




Chart 5.1 Topics of negative images of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean press<sup>325</sup>

<sup>323</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005 *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, pp. 71-72

<sup>324</sup> Detailed information about content analysis see in the Introduction

<sup>325</sup> Negative image consists from such techniques as anti-advertising and discharge from competitors (in this case where Crimean Tatars are the actor whose image is worsened




Chart 5.2 Topics of positive images of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean press<sup>326</sup>

The process of repatriation concerns several generations of Crimean Tatars as well as other deported ethnic groups (Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans). According to the official information of Central Administration of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea 253,950 people who have the status “deported” live in Crimea at the moment of January 2009. 249,700 are Crimean Tatars and 4,200 – people of other nationalities (98,4% and 1,6% correspondantly).<sup>327</sup> But Crimean authority was not able to provide repatriation process in the proper way. Provision of the necessary facilities for repatriates according to experts<sup>328</sup> needs 20 billion dollars, but Ukrainian authority assigned only 2,8 billions dollars. Besides lack of resources for repatriation there is another problem – distribution of pecuniary aid among deported ethnic groups. According to the decision of Council of Ministers (June 1995) 83,53% of facilities for supporting repatriation processes should be given to Crimean Tatars and 16,47% - for other deported nationalities.<sup>329</sup> This disproportion was used by Mejlis as argument of discrimination of Crimean Tatar nation<sup>330</sup>.

<sup>326</sup> Positive image consists from such techniques as positioning PR-object, the eminence of image, discharge from competitors (in this case where Crimean Tatars are the actor whose image is raised, counteradvertising.

<sup>327</sup> Dannue MVS Ukrainu, January, 2009, Crimean inform agency. <http://www.kicenter.crimea.ua>

<sup>328</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p. 72

<sup>329</sup> *Deportovani krumski tataru, bolgaru, virmenu, nimtsi: zbirnik dokumentiv avtonomnoyi raspubliki Krym (1989-1999)*, 1999. Kyiv, p.353-354

<sup>330</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p. 75

Because of difficulties in the organization of repatriation processes the great mass of the repatriates before middle of 1990s settled in piedmont part of peninsula (Bakhchysarai, Bilohirs'k, Kirovskiy, Dzhankoi, Krasnogvardeyskii and Simferopol districts)<sup>331</sup>. According to the data of the All-Ukrainian census of 2001, the ratio of Crimean Tatar rural and urban population consists 2:1; ratio of Russians in rural-urban area - 1:2,4; for Ukrainians it is 1:1,4<sup>332</sup>. Today approximately the 72% of Crimean Tatars live in rural area<sup>333</sup>. In 1990, Crimean government accepted plan of repatriates' settlement according to which percentage of Crimean Tatars should not be more than 23-25% in any of Crimean district.<sup>334</sup> Such a deconcentration led to dissipation of pecuniary, material and other resources which are necessary for development of municipal infrastructure in the places of Crimean Tatar compact settlements. According to the report of Remzi Ilyasov (head of Crimean Supreme Council Committee of interethnic relations), 3/4 of villages where Crimean Tatars live are provided by water and 98% by electricity; gasification level not more than 15%, roads with hard surface – only 12%. The problem with transport connection is still unsolved.<sup>335</sup>

The situation with housing among Crimean Tatars is also complicated. During 1991-2008, approximately 6,100 repatriate families got houses at the expense of state-financed resources and 36,700 families solved this problem for their own account<sup>336</sup>. Till 2002, provision of the necessary facilities of Crimean Tatars was realized in the framework of yearly plans and programs of different orientation (housing, communal

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<sup>331</sup> 'Krumskui socium: linii podilu ta perspyktyvu konsolidacii'. 2009 *Natsionalna bezpeka I oborona* 5(109)

<sup>332</sup> About number and composition population of AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA by data All-Ukrainian population census  
<http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>

<sup>333</sup> Dopovid' Direktora Departamentu u spravah kolushnih deportovannuh za natsionalnoyu oznakoyu 'Realizaciya Programu rozselelynya ta oblashtuvannya deportovannuh krumskuh tatar I osib inshyh natsionalnostey scho povernylusya na prozhivannya v Ukrainu, yih adaptacii ta integracii v ukrainske sypilstvo', May 8, 2009. Official web-site of State Committee of Nationalities and religions, <http://www.scnm.gov.ua/article/132148?annId=132149>.

<sup>334</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p.76

<sup>335</sup> 'Report of head Crimean Supreme Council Committee of interethnic relations at the Congress of Crimean Tatar people'. <http://hatanm.org.ua/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=1827.0>

<sup>336</sup> 'Information of Republican Committee on Nationalities issue and deported people about fulfillment of Program 2008' <http://www.comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua/rus/index.php?v=1&tek=5&par=0&l=&art=180>.

services, roads etc.). However, after 2002, medium-term programs for deported people were provided<sup>337</sup>. Now, two programs are realized in Ukraine: the program that was accepted by the Council of Ministers of Ukraine (№618, May 16, 2002) and the program that was accepted by *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea (№102-5 June 21, 2006). Under the circumstances of high rate of inflation (23,2% - 2008; 8,9% - May 2009<sup>338</sup>) and rapid growth of property prices (45% in a year -2008<sup>339</sup>) we cannot speak about improvement of repatriates' situation with housing for.

The sharpest problem in economical sphere is the land-connected one. Unequal distribution of repatriates in peninsula (more than 70% live in rural area), where low job opportunities exist and the life conditions is too difficult led to migration of Crimean Tatars to cities. The Crimean Tatars claim that before the deportation they lived in seacoast but now they have to live in rural steppe area where necessary facilities are very limited. To set the justice, Crimean Tatars started to make self-acquisition of lands. However, self-acquisition of lands was made not only by Crimean Tatars. According to Mejlis information, Crimean Tatar self-acquisition consists only about the one third from all self-acquisition in Crimea<sup>340</sup> but the actions of Crimean law machinery mainly directed only against Crimean Tatars.<sup>341</sup> From viewpoints of Slavs Crimean Tatar self-acquisitions were made only to get a profit (or the purpose of future selling) and they do not lack of the land<sup>342</sup>. Position of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea is that land issues should be solved regardless of ethnic identity of citizens. According to this logic Crimean Tatars

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<sup>337</sup> 'Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv 'Pro zatverdzhennya Programu rozselennya ta oblashtuvannya deportovanyh krumkskyh tatar I osib inshih nacionalnostey scho povernulusya na prozshyvannya v Ukrainu, yih adaptacii na integracii v ukrayinske sypilstvo na period do 2005' №618 May 16, 2002' [www.kmu.gov.ua](http://www.kmu.gov.ua); Postanova Kabinetu Ministriv 'Pro zatverdzhennya Programu rozselennya ta oblashtuvannya deportovanyh krumkskyh tatar I osib inshih nacionalnostey scho povernulusya na prozshyvannya v Ukrainu, yih adaptacii na integracii v ukrayinske sypilstvo na period do 2010' №637 May 11 2006 [www.kmu.gov.ua](http://www.kmu.gov.ua)

<sup>338</sup> 'Riven' inflyacii za 2008-2009', Derzhavnuy komitet statystyky, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

<sup>339</sup> 'Vse operatoru prognozituuyt s 2008 goda aktivnuy rost tsen (do 50% v god)'. Nedvizhemost' v Krymu. <http://freehouse.com.ua/9>

<sup>340</sup> 'Golova Medzhelisu rospoviv hto zahoplyue zwmlyu v Krymu I skilki ii v deputativ'. Ukrainskaya Pravda, March 17, 2009. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/3/17/91470>

<sup>341</sup> Kas'yanenko, M. 2008. 'Dzherela lerybanu', Den', 24 January 2008. <http://www.day.kiev.ua/195154>

<sup>342</sup> 'Vitse primer Krymu: V Krymu netae mizhnacionalnoi voroznechi, a ye pragnennya lideriv krumkskuh tatar stvorytu konflikty'. UNIAN, August 10, 2006

do not have special rights to get a land.<sup>343</sup> At the same time Crimean Tatars do not admit with data of Republican authority that they well provided with land.<sup>344</sup> Crimean Tatars stress that they do self-acquisitions because of unsatisfactory economic position and the sense of injustice during land distribution in favour of people who take place in the power.<sup>345</sup> According to Ministry of Environment protection, 74 cases of illegal self-acquisitions with total area of 1 700 ha were fixed at the moment of April 2009<sup>346</sup>.

However, the problem with using land in the commercial aims is really existed. Shadow businessmen, knowing about economic difficulties among Crimean Tatars buy up Crimean Tatar lands for a trifle.<sup>347</sup> There are also cases where Crimean Tatars also took part in the shadow machination with land.<sup>348</sup> It is the main argument of Slavic population when they dispute Crimean Tatar self-acquisitions. To eradicate self-acquisitions, *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine accepted Law “About corrective action to Criminal code of Ukraine about criminal liability for self-acquisitions of the lands”.<sup>349</sup> However, Mejlis leaders were against this law, justifying it by the fact that this law could be applied selectively: avoiding businessmen and clerks who got large plots, but using it against ordinary people who could not get the land by legal way for building houses. There is still no common land cadastre in Crimea in spite of numerous Presidential decrees.

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<sup>343</sup> ‘Krumskiy parlament schitaet chto situaciya s raspredeleniem zemli na poluostrove ne uluchshilas’ I imeet tendenciyu k yhudsheniyu’. Interfaks-Ukraina December 20, 2006

<sup>344</sup> ‘Krumski tatory perekryvali dorogu na trasi Yalta-Simferopol vumagayuchi vuriwennya zemel’nogo pytannya’. UNIAN, March 17, 2007

<sup>345</sup> ‘Golova Medzhelisu rospoviv hto zahoplyue zwmlyu v Krymu I skilki ii v deputativ’. Ukrainskaya Pravda, March 17, 2009. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/3/17/91470>.

<sup>346</sup> ‘V Krymu zafiksirovano 74 nezakonnuh samovolnuh zahvata zemli obwey plowadyu 1,7 ga’. Inform agenstvo RBK-Ukraina, April 15, 2009 <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/newslines/2009/04/15/531519>

<sup>347</sup> Ryabov. M. 2009. ‘Medzjlis rasskazal skolko zemli v Krymu u Yanukovicha I kak Rossiya skupaet poluostrov’ RIA, Novuj region Krym. March 17, 2009 <http://new-region-2.livejournal.com/39748338.html>

<sup>348</sup> ‘Rossiyane skypayut Krym, prikruvayas’ tatarami’, Informacionnoe agenstvo Rossbalt-Ukraina. March 17, 2009 <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/03/17/626354>

<sup>349</sup> Zakon ‘Pro vnesennya zmin do deyakyh zakonodavchih aktiv Ukrainy scho do posulennya vidpovidalnosti za samovilne zaynyattya zemelnoyi dilyanky’ January 11, 2007. <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/>

Last stage of analysis in the framework of economic issues is the socio-economic status of the ethnic groups in Crimea and their living standards. This factor is very important in the processes of ethnic identification because it defines the place of ethnic group in the society. First of all, economic status of people is defined by their education. Correlation of ethnicity and education is shown in the Chart 5.3. Russians and Ukrainians have higher percentage of people with Higher education when compared to Crimean Tatars. The reason of this situation is discriminatory Soviet policy against Crimean Tatars. It was difficult to get good education or to hold any high post because of nationality (*natsionalnost*). It is very important to notice that in spite of most Crimean Tatars lived in urban area before repatriation and high percentage of them had professional qualifications, after returning to Crimea they had to live in rural area. According to the Kotugorenko's research<sup>350</sup> in 1999 72,6% of Crimean Tatars were unemployed. Only 23,4% expected the job according to their professional qualifications, and 53,3% searched any job which could provide them with necessary facilities.




Chart 5.3 Correlation of ethnicity and education

The high level of unemployment also was aggravated by the discrimination policy of employers. In the interview head of the Recruiting agency *Personal Ayshe Ibragimova* stress that most of non-Crimean Tatars employers do not want to hire Crimean Tatars<sup>351</sup>. *When our agency received application for searching professional people, some of employers stressed on non-Tatar nationality of candidates and they were not ashamed to tell me (as Crimean Tatar representative) why they do not like Crimean Tatar workers. Even if we have found really good Crimean Tatar professional, they did not agree even to*

<sup>350</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p. 79

<sup>351</sup> Interview were taken in October 2008, in recruiting company "Personal" (Prospekt Kirova 42, ofis 5, Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine). Expert - head of agency Ayshe Ibragimova

have interview with this person. Some of employers did not say this openly but during the interviews with Crimean Tatar applicants we could understand their attitudes to them. The main arguments why they do not want to hire Crimean Tatars employers were *Crimean Tatars are not the people to be trusted, they are sly and they are bad professionals*. The discrimination policy against Crimean Tatars is also proved by poll's results (see Chart 5.4). The situation is very different among Crimean Tatars and Slavic part of the population. As we can see there is no significant discrimination among Russians and Ukrainians. But the percentage of self-estimation of discrimination among Crimean Tatars is four times higher. The opinions about existing Crimean Tatar discrimination are also opposite among Crimean Tatars and Slavs (see Chart 5.5). Absolute majority of Crimean Tatars admitted the existing of discrimination. The absolute majority of Russians and Ukrainians did not believe in Crimean Tatar discrimination. It is interesting to notice that the percentage of Ukrainians who think that discrimination exist (or rather exist) is higher than among Russians. We can say that Ukrainians have a little bit more loyal attitude to Crimean Tatars compared to Russians.




Chart 5.4 Ethnicity and discrimination in the employment sphere




Chart 5.5 Ethnicity and the problem of Crimean Tatar discrimination

All the factors that were described above give us the idea about socio-economic positions of Crimean Tatars. According to the information of World Bank the level of the poverty in Crimea is one of the highest in Ukraine.<sup>352</sup> According to the survey data, Crimean Tatars characterize themselves as relatively poor than Russians and Ukrainians. But it is interesting to notice that absolute majority of

ethnic Russians believe that Crimean Tatar living standards are higher than theirs ... These data reflect the widespread perception among the ethnic Russian population that Crimean Tatars receive undeserved preferential treatment from the Ukrainian government<sup>353</sup>.




Chart 5.6 Ethnicity and standards of living

As we can see, because of lack of clear and considered migration policy, absence of land and housing policy, financial difficulties, the problems of repatriates are still not solved. It has influence on the interethnic relations and social tensions in society.

## 4.2. Political dimensions

### 5.2.1. Role of elite and political forces in the ethnic identity

Political dimensions plays very important role in the processes of ethnic identification. Elite defines, shapes and defends interests of their own ethnic group. Presence in power defines the position of the groups in society. The more power they have, the more their interests are taken into consideration. Supporting (or opposition) certain political groups (political identification) influence on the mechanism of ethnic

<sup>352</sup> Ukraine Poverty Assessment, World Bank, December 2005: 10 et sqq.

<sup>353</sup> Graumann, S. 2007. 'Crimea: From Conflict Prevention to Development' *Development & Transition* 6, p.6

identification. In this part of the thesis we will define how ethnic groups of Crimea are presented in the Crimean (for Crimean Tatars also in the Ukrainian) level of government; what the political preferences of ethnic groups are and, do the Crimean residents participate in ethno-national organization.

Eight political blocks and parties took seats in the Crimean Parliament as a result of the 2006 elections. The distributions of deputies are following: block *Za Yanukovycha!* ('The Party of Regions' and 'Russian bloc') – 32,55% (44 mandate), the party *Soyuz* - 7,63% (10 mandates), Block of Kunitsyn – 7,63% (10 mandates), the Communist Party of Ukraine – 6,55% (9 mandates), 'Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny' (the People's Movement of Ukraine) – 6,26% (8 mandates), 'Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko' – 6,03% (8 mandates), Block of Natalia Vitrenko *Narodnaya oppositsiya* (People's opposition) - 4,97% (7 mandates), the block *Ne tak!* - 3,09% (4 mandate)<sup>354</sup>. There are 8 parliament's groups and 5 non-fractions deputies. According to ideological background of these blocks 5 parliament's groups (including Communists) adhere to the Pro-Russian policy. There are two fractions that could be called as 'pro-Ukrainian (pro-Kyiv)': 'Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko' and *Kurultai - Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny*. Most of pro-Russian political groups are regional branches of all-Ukrainian political parties but with some special regional peculiarities. As we can see there is no problem with the presence of Russians in the Crimean authorities. Majority of Crimean deputies are Russians. The presence of Ukrainians in the power is quite difficult to define. They do not have special peculiarities except their ethnic identity. The surnames of deputies can not help us to distinguish who is Russian and who is Ukrainian in Crimean Parliament. Ideological characteristics also could not be an indicator in ethnic issues, because in most cases they are defined by economic recourses. For example being a member of "pro-Kyiv" party does not necessary mean being "Ukrainian" by ethnic identity.

The Crimean Tatars are weakly presented in government compared to the Slavs. There is only one Crimean Tatar deputy in *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine 6<sup>th</sup> convocation – leader Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemilev. Previous Parliament convocations had no more than two Crimean Tatar deputies. In 1999, the Council of representatives of Crimean Tatar nation was created under Presidents of Ukraine.<sup>355</sup> When Leonid Kuchma was the President of Ukraine, meeting of this Council occurred more or less regularly. However,

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<sup>354</sup> 'Oglashenu rezultaty vuborov v Verhovnyi Sovet Kryma (Ukraina)', 19.04.2006, IА REGNUM, <http://regnum.ru/news/626150.html>

<sup>355</sup> Ukaz Prezidenta Uktayiny 'Pro Radu predstavnykiv krumskotatarskogo narody' N518 May 18, 1999. <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4954.html>

not all of orders of this Council were executed. During Victor Yushchenko presidency, the Council of representatives of the Crimean Tatar nation had only one meeting in 2005 and only one document concerning formal aspects of its activity was issued by the President.<sup>356</sup> There is also Council on ethnonational policy under the Presidents of Ukraine. Only one Crimean Tatar representative is a member of this Council.<sup>357</sup> But this Council does not have influence on policy in ethno-national sphere. As we can see, interactions of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian government still come only to Crimean Tatar participation in consultative bodies under the Presidents of Ukraine. The activity of these Councils has mainly declarative character.

According to the Law of Ukraine about elections of deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea<sup>358</sup>, deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea are elected on the base of proportional election system. Any direct or indirect benefits in elections right for example on the bases of ethnic origin are prohibited in this Law. As a result of last elections (2006) seven Crimean Tatars were elected as deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea. On the elections 1998 (after revocation of national quota) only one Crimean Tatar was elected to Supreme Council of Crimea, moreover he was proposed by Republican branch of Communist Party of Ukraine. In 2002 eight Crimean Tatars became Crimean deputies, and six of them were proposed by *Kurultay* of Crimean Tatar people. It was in two times more than local experts had predicted but in the judgment of the Crimean Tatar leaders it was in two times less than percentage of Crimean Tatar population in Crimea. Standing Commission of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea on interethnic issues and problems of deported, people has three Crimean Tatars members (out of 15) including head of Commission Remzi Ilyasov). Other Standing Commission on issues of rehabilitation of rights of deported has one Crimean Tatar member (out of 9). There is a Council on human safety issues under the Speaker of *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea (as consultative body in interethnic relations). It

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<sup>356</sup> Ukaz Prezidenta Uktayiny 'Pro vnesennya zminu do Polozhennya Pro Radu predstavnykiv krumskotatarskogo narody' N767 September 21, 2006  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4954.html>

<sup>357</sup> Ukaz Prezidenta Uktayiny 'Pro Radu z pytan' etnonatsionalnoyi polityku' N428 May 22, 2006.  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4389.html>

<sup>358</sup> Zakon Ukrainu 'Pro vubory depytativ Verkhovnoyi Radu AR Krum, mistsevyh rad ta silskyh, selyshnuh, miskih goliv' 06.04.2004 № 1667-IV <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1667-15>

has two Crimean Tatar representatives.<sup>359</sup> Crimean Tatars hold relatively high position in Executive body of Crimea: the Minister of Labor and Social Policy, the Deputy Minister of Housing, Deputy Minister of Economy, Deputy Minister of Culture and Arts, Deputy Minister of Education and Science, Deputy Minister of Health, chairman and deputy chairman of the National Committee for International Relations and Deported nationals, head of the National Committee on Information, chairman of the National Committee of the water construction and irrigation agriculture, the deputy chairman of the National Committee for Land Resources, Deputy Chairman of the National Committee for Religious Affairs. But this representation has mainly political or even personal base. Taking into consideration the fact that Council of Ministers is formed by *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea, we can understand that Crimean Tatar presence in the Crimean Executive body mainly depends from political will and interests of majority in Crimean Parliament. There are 140 repatriates who work as government employees. 27 Crimean Tatars work at Republican executive bodies. On the level of local administrations Crimean Tatars are presented in districts where their numbers are relatively significant. Eighteen repatriates hold the posts of chairs and assistants chief at District public administrations. Totally there are 165 Crimean Tatar government employees at District public administrations<sup>360</sup>. Thus, the Crimean Tatars do not have enough representation in both Ukrainian and Crimean governments. Their possible influence on the authorities in matters concerning their interests is limited. This encourages the representatives of the community to use other forms of assertion in favor of their interests, including those that may increase conflict between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community in Crimea.

Next stage is the analysis of civic organizations of the main ethnic groups of Crimea. There are 589 registered and 205 legalized by notification Crimean NGOs, local branches of the all-Ukrainian or international NGOs. More than 100 of them were created on an ethnic basis. We are going to take into consideration only NGOs of the three dominant groups in Crimea: Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians. Clash of interests of these organizations has affects not only on the current situation, but also on the future of Crimea. Ukrainians' NGOs is poorly represented in the socio-political space of Crimea. They do not represent a force that can really affect on the socio-political situation

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<sup>359</sup> Third report of Ukraine 'About executing Convention of European Council about protection of national minorities', 2009. Official web-site of State Committee on national and religious issues in Ukraine. [http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art\\_id=131306](http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=131306)

<sup>360</sup> Ibid

of Crimea<sup>361</sup>. There are two more or less active Ukrainian organizations: Crimean organization of People's Movement of Ukraine (*narodnuy Rukh Ukrayiny*) and Crimean republican organization of All-Ukrainian Union 'Freedom' (*Svoboda*). Thus, our attention will be focused on pro-Russian (Slavic) and Crimean Tatar associations of citizens.

Among pro-Russian NGOs most influential are 'Russian community of Crimea' (*Russkaya obschina Kryma*) (RCC), the Popular Front 'Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia' (*Narodnyi Front Sevastopol-Krym-Rossiya*), National Front 'Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia' (*Natsionalnuy Front Sevastopol-Krym-Rossiya*), the Crimean regional organization of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (CRO PSPU) and 'Russian Block' (*Russkiy Blok*<sup>362</sup>), Crimean branch of the Eurasian Union of Youth (EUY), and the organization 'Breakthrough' (*Proruv*). These organizations are oriented to the pro-Russian part of population. Their common goals are the formation of social consciousness that Crimea legally belongs to Russia and contemporary affiliation to Ukraine is an accident and temporality; Crimea is a part of Russian socio-cultural and geopolitical space; about inadmissibility of spreading Ukrainian language and culture in the Crimea. According to these ideas Slavic community in Crimea might feel and they may realize that they are the only full and legitimate owners of the Crimean land. Therefore, Ukrainian linguistic and cultural presence in Crimea as well as Crimean Tatar territorial claims in Crimea are considered as illegitimate from the Russian viewpoints. Spreading these ideas are implemented through various activities of NGOs: seminars, round tables, Press, dissemination of propaganda publications, participation in representative government, especially *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea, and in the executive authorities, the cooperation with Russian organizations and government; mass action (rallies, demonstrations, pickets); counteraction of governmental decisions, which are opposite to these ideas.<sup>363</sup>

Cossack Association is a separate category of Slavic NGOs. The most active is Crimean Cossack Union, Association of Cossacks in Crimea *Krumskaya Palanka*, the Union of Cossacks of Feodosia region, Cossack community *Sobol*. The goals of Cossack

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<sup>361</sup> 'Informaciya pro stan mizhnacionalnuh vidnosun v AR Krym' Internet portal AR Krym. Інтернет-портал *АР Крим*, <http://comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua>

<sup>362</sup> Russkoe dvizhenie Ukrainu I partiya Russkiy blok. [http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26](http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26)

<sup>363</sup> 'Krumskui socium: linii podilu ta perspyktyvu konsolidacii'. 2009 *Natsionalna bezpeka I oborona* 5(109)

associations are a little bit different from the goals of pro-Russian organizations which were mentioned above. If the goals of pro-Russian organizations have political nature and they try to integrate Crimea at least in the sphere of Russian geopolitical influence, the goals of the Cossacks are the creation of public consciousness about Crimea as an integral part of Russian cultural and spiritual space, protection of the Slavic population from the attacks of adherents of a different faith (first of all Muslims (Crimean Tatars)); promotion the spread of religious and commemorative symbols in Crimea that have association with the idea of unity of Ukraine and Russia. The main mechanisms of the realization of these objectives are: education and upbringing activities, public events, participation in mass actions of other pro-Russian organizations, direct counteraction with Crimean Tatars, security actions during political and religious actions; cooperation with the Russian Cossack organizations, especially with the Union of Cossack Forces in Russia. Cossacks' actions have aims to protect memorial objects or to oppose to the erection of other monuments. There are several examples: the protection of St. Andrew the First-Called's monuments in Feodosia (2006) and Catherine II in Sevastopol (2008), preventing the erection of memorial plaques in honor of 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of hoisting the flags of the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet on the Grafskiy dock in Sevastopol (2008), escorting religious holy moves to the Eastern Crimea (since 2005) etc. These actions can be described in the framework of 'symbolic war' which aims to transform certain territory where ethnic group lives on symbolic-value space of this ethnic group; and to prevent the formation of symbolic value spaces of other national groups in this territory<sup>364</sup>. Cossacks also plays symbolic role for the Slavic population as the Christian warriors, defenders of Russian lands and Orthodox faith of Crimea. Orthodox Church in this case plays role not as a real religious institution but rather as a national symbol which consolidates the Russians of Crimea. Image of the Crimean Tatars as 'extremist' is also playing a symbolic role in this context, embodying itself all negative stereotypes about Muslim world. Press-service of the Union of Cossacks mentioning about St. Andrew the First-Called's monuments in

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<sup>364</sup> 'Zachem povtoryat Krumskie voynu' OBKOM. May 29, 2007 <http://www.obkom.net.ua>; 'Sevastopolskoe protivostoyaie. Donskoe kazachestvo obyavilo pohod na sevastopol'. Interfaks [http://www.interfax-russia.ru/r/B/eventday/438.html?menu=5&id\\_issue=1208](http://www.interfax-russia.ru/r/B/eventday/438.html?menu=5&id_issue=1208); 'Iz Topl'u v Feodosiyu' web-site Russkaya Liniya December 8, 2008r., <http://www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=113565>; Bogomolov O., Danilov S., Semivolos I. 'Islam I politika identichnostey v Krymu: vid simvolichnuh voyn do vuznannya kulturnogo rozmuttya. Analitychna dopovid, Kyiv, 2009

Feodosia<sup>365</sup> stress that ‘This is the same monument, which began last year confrontation of Cossacks with *busurmanami*<sup>366</sup>’. Thus, Crimean Tatar residents of Feodosia who in early June 2006 made a picket against construction of the monument were turned on into *busurmany* - representatives of historical enemies of Christianity. Crimean Cossack organizations are also play the role of outpost for the Russian Cossacks who is united in the Union of Cossack Forces in Russia and abroad. In spite of bulk of pro-Russian organizations during all post Soviet times, they do not present a united political force. As Gwendolyn Sasse stresses ‘the Russian secessionist movement ... was constructed around a confused Soviet-Russian identity with blurred political goals’<sup>367</sup>.

The most active and influential Crimean Tatar socio-political organizations are the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, ‘the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement’ (OCTNM), Party *Adalet*, Civil organization *Avdet*, ‘National Movement of Crimean Tatars’ (NMCT), party *Milli Firka*. Their common goals are the Crimean Tatar returning and provision of the necessary facilities in their homeland, socio-economic, national, spiritual and cultural development of the Crimean Tatar people, the restoration of its political rights. Some organizations (*Adalet*, *Avdet*) make a special emphasis on the revival of Islam in Crimea as one of its priority goals. Achievement of these goals is realized through: the national representative bodies (the Mejlis and local Mejlis); activity in the representative and executive authorities of Crimea and Ukraine (representatives in these bodies are mainly members of Mejlis); participation in the consultative bodies of the authorities; education and human rights work; the organization of mass actions (rallies, demonstrations, pickets); organizing self-acquisition of the lands and its following legalization; active cooperation with international organizations (primarily the OBSE) and socio-political structures of other countries (especially Turkey). *Adalet* has certain elements of the radical ideology. It conducts the training of power paramilitary groups - *Askeru*. *Avdet* organized self-acquisition of the lands that had negative reaction from the Slavic community. Statement of one of its leaders gives evidence about possible

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<sup>365</sup> ‘Meszhdunarodnuy forum kazachey kultury v Krumu’, Vserossiyskiy Monarhicheskiy centr. June 6, 2007  
[http://www.monarchruss.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=664&Itemid=30](http://www.monarchruss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=664&Itemid=30)

<sup>366</sup> *Busurmany* is a abusive word for identification of adherent of a different faith, particularly Muslims

<sup>367</sup> Sasse G., 2007. ‘Crimea: Conflict-Prevention through Institution-Making’ *Development & Transition* 6

radicalization of this organization. R. Shaymardanov: “If Ukraine considers that problems of Crimean Tatars are not important, we do our best to make this problem a major issue in Ukraine... We block the way of Ukraine to European Union”<sup>368</sup> *NMCT* and *Milli Firka* have pro-Russian orientation. They deny the legitimacy of *Kurultay* and Mejlis. In spite of their activity has peaceful character, it promotes the political disorientation of Crimean Tatars and increasing anti-Ukrainian sentiment among them. However the experts of Ruzumkov Center stress that these organizations have less conflict potential compare to Russian organizations and Cossacks units<sup>369</sup>. There are some ideological confrontations among these organizations, in particularly about the status of Mejlis.

Status and positions of Mejlis are very debatable questions in the Crimean society. Therefore we should more dwell our attention on this issue. Mejlis was founded in 1991, to act as a representative body for the Crimean Tatars which could address grievances to the Ukrainian central government, the Crimean government, and international bodies.<sup>370</sup> Mejlis still does not have any official status in Ukrainian reality. Authority does not agree to recognize it as “representative body for the Crimean Tatars” and give it the status of ethnic local government. All propositions to register it as political party or social organization were categorically rejected by Crimean Tatar leaders because it will be a demotion of its real status in society. The Tatar leaders maintain that, unlike political party or a social organization representing interests of a limited group of people, Mejlis and *Kurultay*, being democratically elected by all Crimean Tatars, represent the interests of the Crimean Tatar people and should be recognized as such<sup>371</sup>. As far back as 1991 Supreme Council of Crimea approved the resolution N 83-1 ‘About meeting of Crimean Tatar representatives’. *Kurultay* and its decisions were estimated as actions that have strongly pronounced nationalistic character and contradict the Law of Ukraine. As for Mejlis they declared that it could not present the interest of Crimean Tatar people.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> Kapustin, M. 2009. ‘U Medjlisa poyavilsja konkurent’, *Sobutiya*. June 12, 2009

<sup>369</sup> ‘Krumskui socium: linii podilu ta perspyktyvu konsolidacii’. 2009. *Natsionalna bezpeka I oborona* 5(109), p.64

<sup>370</sup> ‘Statute on Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people’, Center of the Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/mejlis/mejlis.html>

<sup>371</sup> Shevel, O. 2001. ‘Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of politics, the use of law, and the meaning of rhetoric’. *Krimski Studii* 1(7): 109-129 <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/oshevel.html>

<sup>372</sup> *Deportovani krumski tataru, bolgaru, virmenu, nimtsi: zbirnik dokumentiv avtonomnoyi raspubliky Krym (1989-1999)*, 1999. Kyiv, p. 14

The attitudes of Crimean residents towards the status of Mejlis are shown in the Chart 5.7. Attempts of legalization of Mejlis as representative body of Crimean Tatars were supported by 76,19% of Crimean Tatars. This index among Slavic population is completely opposite. The percentage of Ukrainians who agree with legitimating (14,29%) was two times higher than the percentage of Russians (7,69%). But in any case absolute majority of Russians and Ukrainians (65,81% and 55,10% correspondently) were against granting the Mejlis status of representative body of Crimean Tatars.




Chart 5.7 Opinions about legalization of Mejlis as representative body of Crimean Tatars

To understand the attitudes towards Mejlis in the Crimean society we can use the data of content analysis. The image characteristics of Mejlis in Crimean press were as following: ‘Illegal ethnic parliament’<sup>373</sup>, ‘it is unable to get any sense out of it’<sup>374</sup>, ‘they are the threat for national security of Ukraine’<sup>375</sup>, ‘it fights for economic reasons’<sup>376</sup>, ‘self-acquisitions have only economic profit, this land will be sell in future’<sup>377</sup> ‘got stuck in corruption’<sup>378</sup> ‘Mejlis frighten off tourists’<sup>379</sup> ‘they are committer of self-acquisitions’<sup>380</sup>

<sup>373</sup> ‘Pravoslavnye stjagivajut sily k Svjato-Uspenskomu monastyrju’. *Krumskaya Pravda* 06.12.2005

<sup>374</sup> ‘Komu raj komu peklo’. *Krumskaya Pravda* 09.12.2005

<sup>375</sup> ‘Medzhlis uzhe 15 let ugrozhaet nac bezopastnosti Ukrainy’. *Krymskoe vremja* 15.12.2005

<sup>376</sup> ‘Medzhlis vojuet protiv Svjato-Uspenskogo monastytja iz kommercheskih soobrazhenij’. *Krym.ru*. 16.12.2005

<sup>377</sup> ‘Krymskie tatary zamahnulis' na Moldovu’. *Krymskoe vremja* 17.12.2005

<sup>378</sup> ‘Zhil'e nalevo Medzhlis v centre’. *Krymskij obozrevatel'* 20.12.2005

<sup>379</sup> ‘Ni zhary ni snega , ni stabil'nosti!’. *Krym.ru* 21.12.2005

‘Mejlis are main factor of political instability in the peninsula’, ‘Mejlis is against of erecting Orthodox churches’<sup>381</sup>, ‘Mejlis is protégé of Al-Qaeda’<sup>382</sup>, ‘sully its name’<sup>383</sup> ‘do illegal acts’, ‘grab the titbits on the seacoast’<sup>384</sup>, ‘blackmailed the authority’<sup>385</sup> ‘threaten to make a crime’<sup>386</sup>, ‘make extremist actions’<sup>387</sup>, ‘discredit itself’<sup>388</sup>, ‘they agitated in election day’<sup>389</sup>, ‘used violent types of fight’<sup>390</sup>. As we can see Mejlis has negative characteristics in Crimean discourse. It is described as main perpetrator of self-acquisitions and its actions make situation in Crimea instable. Although, Pro-Russian forces blame the Mejlis for its illegal status they have to take into consideration its views.<sup>391</sup>.

There are some organizations that set the goals of religious revival of Crimean Tatar. One of these organizations is *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. It should be mentioned that the existence and the activity of this organization is one of the most speculative issue in Crimea, and in order to be comprehensively examined it needs detailed analysis. However the framework of our thesis does not give such opportunity.

The political preferences of ethnic groups are shown in the Chart 5.8. Russians and Ukrainians mostly support Party of Regions in Crimea and still there are approximately 10% of Communist Party supporters among them. 28,57% of Crimean Tatars support

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<sup>380</sup> ‘Zemel'nyj shabash v Sudake’. *Krumskaya Pravda* 30.12.2005

<sup>381</sup> ‘Strategija Medzhliisa v kontekste politicheskoy situacii v ARK’. *Krymskoe vremja* 05.01.2006

<sup>382</sup> ‘Tol'ko s kommunistami mozžno nadejatsja na realizaciju prorossijskij nastroenij ljudej’. *Kommunist Kryma*, 06.01.2006

<sup>383</sup> ‘Krymskotatarskij blok prezentoval svoju taktiku’. *Golos Kryma*, 13.01.2006

<sup>384</sup> ‘Referendum ob avtonomnom statuse Kryma: vzgljad v proshloe i vidy na buduwee’. *Kommunist Kryma*, 19.01.2006

<sup>385</sup> ‘Medzhliis shantazhiruet vlasti i ugrozhaet teraktami’. *Krumskaya Pravda* 28.01.06

<sup>386</sup> ‘Milicija obnaruzhila v medzhlise terroristov’. *Krumskaya Pravda*, 01.02.2006

<sup>387</sup> ‘Musul'manskoe domino’. *Krymskoe vremja*, 09.02.2006

<sup>388</sup> ‘Resul' Veliljaev ja idu v mjery Belogorska chtoby imenno s menja nachalos' vozrozhdenie goroda’. *Golos Kryma*, 17.03.2006

<sup>389</sup> ‘Vybory : kak jeto bylo’. *Krymskij obozrevatel'*, 28.03.2006

<sup>390</sup> ‘Muzhestvennyj demokrat Dzhemilev’. *Krymskoe vremja*, 18.04.2006

<sup>391</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p.178

‘Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko’ and 14,29% - ‘Bloc Our Ukraine – People’s defense’. At the same time the level of distrust to political parties is the highest among Crimean Tatars.




Chart 5.8 Supporting of all-Ukrainian political forces by ethnic groups of Crimea

There is very low level of trust to NGOs in Crimea (see Chart 5.9). Almost 40% of Slavs and 30% of Crimean Tatars do not trust any of these organizations. There is clear ethnic differentiation among supporters of NGOs. Slavic community supports pro-Russian NGOs. The most popular organization among Russians as well as Ukrainians is Russian Community of Crimea. 42,86% of Crimean Tatars trust the Mejlis. Second Crimean Tatar organization has little level of supporting. However, the level of participation in NGOs is very low. It is not higher than 6 % in each ethnic group (see Chart 5.10).




Chart 5.9 The level of trust public organizations among ethnic groups in Crimea




Chart 5.10 Participation in national organization

To make a summary about political dimension of the process of ethnic identification, we can say that three ethnic groups are not proportionally (to their size) presented in Crimean politics. Ukrainians do not have strong political party with nationalist ideology. They are mostly supporters of pro-Russian political forces. Crimean Tatars are not presented in authority as they wish. There are two main camps of socio-political organizations in Crimea: pro-Russian and Crimean Tatar ones. The goals of these political organizations are mutually contradictory and even conflict exists among each other. The object of the contradictions has political, economic and also symbolic base. The activity of these organizations influence national identity and national consciousness, and therefore any action of opposite groups are perceived as painful and aggressive. Especially debatable is the issue of status of Mejlis. Among Slavic, and as well as among Crimean Tatar political forces there are significant socio-political differences and contradictions, which, on the one hand, reduce the effect of their activity

and on the other hand - politically confuse citizens who are their social base and make the violations of socio-political stability.

### ***5.2.2. Issue of status of different group in Crimea***

Status issue is important for each of the given ethnic group. The first question concerns who is majority and who is minority in ethnic terms in Crimea. There are contradictions in each case. Two main documents define the status of ethnic groups in Ukraine: Constitution of Ukraine<sup>392</sup> and Law of Ukraine ‘About national minorities in Ukraine’<sup>393</sup>. There are four basic terms which concern ethno-national relations: “Ukrainian People” (*Ukraiynskiyi Narod*), “Ukrainian Nation” (*Ukraiynska Natsiya*), “Citizens of Ukraine” (*Gromodany Ukraiynu*), and “National Minorities” (*Natsional’ni Men’shyny*). According to the Preamble to the Constitution of Ukraine term “Ukrainian People” means “citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities”<sup>394</sup>. There is no clear definition of term “Ukrainian Nation” in the both documents. But in Article 10, 11 of the Constitution of Ukraine and in the Preamble to the Law of Ukraine ‘About national minorities in Ukraine’ term “Ukrainian Nation” is used with term “National Minority” as homogeneous parts of the sentence:

Article 11. The State promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, ... and also the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.<sup>395</sup>

Therefore we can conclude that these terms (“Ukrainian Nation” and “National Minority”) are mutually exclusive. We can find explanation of the term “Ukrainian Nation” (*Ukraiynska Natsiya*) in Official Interpretation of Points of Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine in the Constitutional Court Decision:

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<sup>392</sup> Constitution of Ukraine, 28.06.1996 № 254к/96-BP  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html>

<sup>393</sup> Zakon Ukrainu “O natsionalnyh menshinstvah Ukrainu”, 25.06.1992 N2494-XII ,  
<http://www.ccssu.crimea.ua/crimea/etno/law/law1/index.htm>

<sup>394</sup> Constitution of Ukraine, 28.06.1996 № 254к/96-BP  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html>

<sup>395</sup> Ibid

Ukrainian nation ... is a nation that historically resided in Ukraine, composes the absolute majority of the population and gave the official name of the state.<sup>396</sup>

The term “Citizens of Ukraine” (*Gromodany Ukrainy*) is used as synonym for “Ukrainian People”. This term includes “Ukrainian Nation” and “National Minorities”. Term “National Minorities” is used in the Constitution, but there is no clear definition of it. Explanation is given in the third article of the Law of Ukraine ‘About national minorities in Ukraine’:

Article 3. National minorities are the groups of Ukrainian citizens who are not Ukrainian by nationality with a sense of national identity and community among themselves.<sup>397</sup>

Correlation of these terms is presented below in diagram form (see Diagram 5.1).




Diagram 5.1. Correlation of ethno-national terms in Constitution and Law of Ukraine ‘About national minorities in Ukraine’

All these definitions correspond to the situation of whole Ukrainian state. But these terms have controversial meaning within the Crimean reality. Official terminology doesn’t reflect real ethnic situation in peninsula. In sociology a minority status does not necessarily correlate to population. In some cases one or more so-called minority groups may have a population many times the size of the dominating group<sup>398</sup>. However, as we could see above, in Ukrainian law the term ‘National minority’ includes: “Ukrainian citizens who are not Ukrainian by nationality”. This divergence of sociological meaning, definitions in Ukrainian law and real situation in Crimea led to sharp discussions concerning the question ‘who should be called as “ethnic minority” in Crimea?’.

<sup>396</sup> Ofitsiyne tлумachenya poloszhen stati 10 v Risheni Konstitutsiyynogo sudu N 10-pp/99 ( v010p710-99 ) vid 14.12.99

<sup>397</sup> Zakon Ukrainu “O natsionalnyh menshinstvah Ukrainu”, 25.06.1992 N2494-XII , <http://www.ccssu.crimea.ua/crimea/etno/law/law1/index.htm>

<sup>398</sup> ‘Minority’. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 29 Aug. 2009. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/384500/minority>

According to the official Ukrainian terminology Russians are “national minority” (*Natsional’ni Men’shyny*), but in fact they constitute a numerical majority (58,5%)<sup>399</sup> in Crimea. They are well represented in all levels of Crimean government (it is difficult to analyze ethnic identity of Crimean deputies, but according to ideological membership of the *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea, five parliament’s groups (including Communists) adhere to the Pro-Russian policy), therefore they constitute also majority in the sociological sense. However, Russians come out against calling them as ‘minority’. They could be a minority in the All-Ukrainian context (but it is also debatable question) but not in the Crimean peninsula. Ukrainians are titular nation, but in Crimea they constitute only the 24,4%<sup>400</sup> of the population (a numerical minority). They are weakly presented in politics. There is only one parliament group that can be count as loyal to Ukrainian authority (“Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko”). It gives base for calling Ukrainians as a minority in Crimea also in sociological sense. Crimean Tatars compose only 12,1% of total Crimean population and there are only eighth Crimean Tatars in *Verkhovna Rada* of Crimea (one of them was elected as member of Communist Party). Therefore they are a minority in both numerical and sociological senses. However, the status as “ethnic minority” is also debatable from their viewpoint. They emphasize that status of ‘national minority’ diminishes their real positions in Crimea. Because the Crimean Tatars have historically developed as a national group on the territory of Crimea and, unlike other minorities in Ukraine and in Crimea, do not have a homeland or a kin state outside of Crimea<sup>401</sup>; and “only in their historical homeland they could hope for preserving and developing native language, national traditions and culture”<sup>402</sup>. Their main demand is to recognize them in the Ukrainian law as “Indigenous People” (*Korennoy Narod, Korenuy Narod*) and “Deported Nation” (*Deportirovanuy Narod, Deportovanuy Narod*).

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<sup>399</sup> About number and composition population of AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA by data All-Ukrainian population census  
<http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/>

<sup>400</sup> Ibid

<sup>401</sup> Shevel, O. 2001. ‘Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of politics, the use of law, and the meaning of rhetoric’. *Krimski Studii* 1(7): 109-129  
<http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/oshevel.html>

<sup>402</sup> Bekirov, N. ‘Osobennosti statusa Krymskih Tatar v konstitutsionnom kontekste Ukrainy’. Center informacii I dokumentacii Krumskih tatar.  
<http://www.cidct.org/ru/publications/Krimtat/8.html>

Status “Indigenous People” (*Korennoy Narod*) is already fixed in Ukrainian Constitution (Articles 11, 92, 119)<sup>403</sup> While Article 11 of the Constitution of Ukraine recognizes the existence of indigenous peoples in Ukraine, along with the titular nation and national minorities, Article 92 of the Constitution leaves it to the laws of Ukraine to specify the rights of indigenous peoples. However, there is no mention about indigenous people in the Crimean Constitution. It specifies only the following categories of people: citizens, foreigners, and stateless persons; nationalities; and “citizens deported from Crimea” (Article 18, paragraph 21)<sup>404</sup>. Oxana Shevel stresses that the latter category “signifies that formerly deported people are considered as a collection of individuals, not as a group or even a number of groups”<sup>405</sup>. Kotugorenko points out that for the first time this status was proposed in 1993 by Panin’s Moscow Center of ethnopolitical and regional researches that worked out the document “The ways of self-definition of Crimean Tatar people”. Authors suggested calling repatriates as “indigenous people”. It was *sui generis* compromise to Crimean Tatar claims of political self-definition in peninsula. This idea was approvingly accepted by Crimean Tatar elite<sup>406</sup>. However, this status provokes most sharp discussions among Slavic part of Crimean population, because it gives the base for claiming Crimea as special territory which ought to belong to Crimean Tatars. Nadir Bekirov, the Chairman of the Foundation for Research and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, points out that opponents of this status mostly stress that there is no such status in international law and by this fraise they show their ignorance and incompetence concerning this problem<sup>407</sup>, because the status of “Indigenous People” was officially recognized in international law. There are two main

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<sup>403</sup> Constitution of Ukraine, 28.06.1996 № 254к/96-BP  
<http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html>

<sup>404</sup> Constitution of Autonomous Republic in Crimea.  
[http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder\\_constit.html](http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_constit.html)

<sup>405</sup> Shevel, O. 2001. ‘Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of politics, the use of law, and the meaning of rhetoric’. *Krimski Studii* 1(7): 109-129  
<http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/oshevel.html>

<sup>406</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p.185

<sup>407</sup> Bekirov, N. ‘Osobennosti statusa Krymskih Tatar v konstitutsionnom kontekste Ukrainy’. Center informacii i dokumentacii Krumskih tatar.  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications/Krimtat/8.html>

documents: ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2007)<sup>408</sup> and ‘International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989, No. 169)’<sup>409</sup>. In the article 2 of last document it is written:

Self-identification as indigenous (or tribal) shall be considered as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply. In other words, no State or group has the right to deny the identity of an indigenous or tribal individual or collectivity.<sup>410</sup>

The principle of self-determination is also reflected in the text of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states in Article 8:

Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such.<sup>411</sup>

Self-identification of the Crimean Tatars as indigenous people is reflected in a number of statements, speeches and other documents, including those published by their main organs of self-government - *Kurultay* and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people<sup>412</sup>. Crimean Tatar leaders have declared about the necessity of adjustment of official-legal status of Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Law almost immediately after repatriation beginning. In 1992 Mejlis worked out the Draft Law ‘About measures of practical restoration of the Crimean Tatar people and the minorities who were deported and genocide during the Second World War’<sup>413</sup>. It contains claims of recognition of Crimean Tatars Rights on self-definition and restoration own state on the basis that their nation was formed in the Crimean peninsula (but the term “indigenous people” was not used directly in this Draft). Crimean Tatar political activist worked out draft of “Conception of

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<sup>408</sup> ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 2007.  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>

<sup>409</sup> ‘International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention’ 1989 (No. 169).  
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/mdtsanjose/indigenous/derecho.htm>

<sup>410</sup> Ibid

<sup>411</sup> ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 2007.  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html>

<sup>412</sup> ‘Indigenous peoples as the object and subject of international law’. 2002. *Krimski Studii* 1 (7) January-April 2002. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/en/studii/7/6.html>

<sup>413</sup> Center of information and documentation of Crimean Tatars  
<http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications>

Government policy of Ukraine about indigenous people”<sup>414</sup>. Since 1999 two bills “About the status of the Crimean Tatar people” was introduced in the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine. First of them is the project of Roman Bezsmertny (deputy of Ukraine of III convocation) N4041 of September 10, 1999. The main points of this bill are defining the legal status of the Crimean Tatar people as indigenous people of Ukraine; the creation of the registry of the Crimean Tatar people (on a voluntary basis); guarantee of representation of the Crimean Tatar people in the parliaments of Ukraine and Crimea (at least 15% of the total number of deputies); recognition of *Kurultay* and representative bodies of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. But this Draft of law was not introduced on the agenda of the Supreme Council and, accordingly, was not considered. In April of 2000 there were parliamentary hearings about the problems of legislative regulation and implementation of public policies to ensure the rights of the Crimean Tatar people and national minorities, who were deported and voluntarily returned to Ukraine.

Next Draft of Law ‘About the status of the Crimean Tatar people’ was suggested by the deputies of Ukraine of IV convocation (Roman Bezsmertny, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Viktor Taran, Refat Chubarov) N4098 of September 3, 2005<sup>415</sup>. This bill basically repeats the previous one. Among reasons of recognition of Crimean Tatars as “Indigenous People”, authors stressed on the fact that Crimean Tatar homeland now is a part of Ukraine and there is no ethnically identical national state or homelands outside Ukraine. Therefore, Crimean Tatars must save their ethnic identity that is different from the identity of titular nation. However, this Draft of Law has received critical opinion of the scientific expertise of Parliament. Kotugorenko stresses that some points of the bill contradict to Ukrainian Law and if it was adopted, there would be inevitable conflict.<sup>416</sup> In case of adoption of this bill it is possible that representatives of other ethnic minorities will require the adoption of similar laws on their people. In June 2005, under new political conditions, the Draft of Law ‘About the status of the Crimean Tatar people’ was defined by President Yushchenko as urgent, but it was not considered by Parliament. There are no such kinds of Drafts of Law in Parliament of this convocation.

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<sup>414</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p.185

<sup>415</sup> Draft of Law ‘About the status of the Crimean Tatar people’  
<http://195.230.149.70:7777/pls/zweb/webproc34?id=&pf3511=15737-&pf35401=39288>

<sup>416</sup> Kotugorenko, V.O. 2005. *Krums'ko-tatarski repatryanty: problema socialnoyi adaptatsiyi*. Kyiv: Svitoglyad, p. 186

Issue about the status of “Deported Nation” (*Deportovanyy Narod*) has similar problems in Ukrainian reality. In 2004 two Drafts of Law ‘About the restoration of the rights of persons deported by nationality’ № 4526 and № 4526-1 were introduced to the *Verkhovna Rada* by Cabinet Council and by Deputies Dzhemilev and Chubarov. The bill was approved by parliament and submitted for signature to President Leonid Kuchma. The President returned it with reservations and suggestions. One of the most significant reservations pointed out that the Act

granted the special status of deportees and determined the compensation of their respective losses, based on persons belonging to the Crimean Tatar people, but not because of the facts of human rights violations. This is directly contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and may call into question the constitutional definition of the Ukrainian people as a community of citizens of all nationalities<sup>417</sup>.

If President’s suggestions had been taken into account, the law would be adopted. However, because of political developments in late 2004 - early 2005, this did not happen. In 2005, deputies of Ukraine Syatyneyu and Ratushnyak introduced Draft of the Law ‘About restoration of property rights of individuals for property, forcibly alienated by Soviet authorities’ № 8332 of 21 October 2005. It received a negative opinion of Cabinet of Ministers and was not considered by the Parliament.

In 2008 the Draft of the Law “About restoration of the rights of persons who was deported by nationality” № 3142 of September 11, 2008, was introduced to the *Verkhovna Rada* by Cabinet of Ministers. The category of deported was defined as “citizens of the former USSR who during the period 1941-1944 were deported by nationality from the places of their permanent residence, which is the territory of modern Ukraine, and were settled in the special settlements”. Thus, the nationality is not used to determine the status of deported person. In general, the Draft of Law is quite concise. In contrast to the Draft of Law that was approved in 2004 (but it was put a vetoed by president of Ukraine - Leonid Kuchma), it contains only general directions of state policy about restoration of the rights of deportees, and defines the powers of authorities and government with its implementation without defining specific measures. That is, from the standpoint of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people, it, compared to the previous, could be step backwards. 13 May 2009 Draft of the Law ‘About restoring the rights of persons deported by nationality’ № 3142 was reviewed by the *Verkhovna Rada* Committee of European Integration. Draft of the Law was recognized as not contrary to

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<sup>417</sup> Yakymenko, Y., 2009. ‘Polityko-pravovi problemu krumskotatarskogo narodu: pidhodu do vuriwennya’. *Natsionalna Bezbeza I Oborona* 5: 84-88

European law. It was recommended to make some corrections and to submit it to the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine.

As we can see several attempts were made to regulate legislative statuses of Crimean Tatars as “Indigenous People” and as “Deported Nation”. However, problems in this sphere are still not solved and these Drafts of Law are not adopted in the framework of Ukrainian legislative system. Yakymenko stresses that uncertainty of situation becomes a factor for tension between authority and Crimean Tatar political elite<sup>418</sup>. The position of the Crimean Tatar leaders is characterized by clear strategic objectives, activity and perseverance in their implementation. The main tools of achieving the goals include legislative initiatives through representation in government, the presence in the public political space (statements, declarations, forums) and relations with international organizations. Acquiring the status of “indigenous people” is considered by the Crimean Tatars leaders as a critical precondition for the preservation of identity of the Crimean Tatar people and the full realization of their rights. Institutes to ensure the rights of Crimean Tatars should be institutions of local government – *Kurultay* and *Mejlis* which should be recognized by the state<sup>419</sup>.

The position of the Ukrainian authority can be characterized as relatively passive. In the legislative sphere, it manifests itself in “response” to the legislative initiative of the Crimean Tatars not showing practical interest and it is not making practical efforts to solve existing problems. In particular, the Crimean Tatars stress that

the Ukrainian government during the years of independence has not taken any legislative act to restore the political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Crimean Tatar people. It is actually maintenance of inequality and discrimination of Crimean Tatars<sup>420</sup>.

These assertions is true concerning major political and legal requirements of the Crimean Tatars, because of legislative acts of restoring rights of immigrants and about the status of “Indigenous People” have not been adopted in Ukrainian Law. Such a position of power could be the result of: lack of a holistic vision of solving problems, fears the possible consequences of their adoption (socio-political and socio-economic), assessment of their

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<sup>418</sup> Yakymenko, Y. 2009. ‘Polityko-pravovi problemu krumskotatarskogo narodu: pidhodu do vuriwennya’. *Natsionalna Bezbeka I Oborona* 5, p. 84

<sup>419</sup> ‘Rezolutsiya vsekrumskogo traurnogo mitinga pposvyaschenogo pamyati zhertv genocida krumskotatarskogo naroda – dtportatsii 18 Maya 1944 I desyatiletii ego nasilstvennogo ederzhaniya v mestah izgnaniya’. May 18, 2009 <http://kirimtatar.com>

<sup>420</sup> Ibid

own resources as insufficient to provide certain legal measures to meet the requirements of the Crimean Tatars. Clearly, political factor also plays an important role in this problem. There can be no doubt of necessity of restoration of deported people because it directly concerns the basic human rights. However opposition to the solution of this question can be mostly explained by the struggle of certain powers for natural resources.

The opinion of ethnic groups about the issue of “Indigenous People” status is quite contrary (see Chart 5.10). Absolute majority of Crimean Tatars (80,95%) support recognition of Crimean Tatars as “Indigenous People”. At the same time absolute majority of Russians (70,94%) and Ukrainians (61,22%) against the granting this status to Crimean Tatars. To understand why Slavs in Crimea afraid of granting this status and why pro-Russian politicians stay on the position against it, we should refer to the ‘International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989, No. 169)’ where it is stated that indigenous peoples

have the right to decide their own development priorities and to exercise control over their own economic, social and cultural development.<sup>421</sup>

This article give to the Crimean Tatars legal right to create their own National autonomy and also it legalizes their territorial demands. But these issues are the core of main conflicts between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups in Crimea. Therefore pro-Russian political forces understand that if this status is adopted, the main discussions in the Crimean society will be solved in the favor of Crimean Tatars.




Chart 5.11 Ethnicity and status of Crimean Tatars as “Indigenous People”

<sup>421</sup> ‘International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention’ 1989 (No. 169). <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/ampro/mdtsanjose/indigenus/derecho.htm>

### 5.2.3. *Regional (territorial) identity*

First of all we should clarify what we understand under the term “regional”. Encyclopedia Britannica gives the following definitions of term region in the social sciences:

a cohesive area that is homogeneous in selected defining criteria and is distinguished from neighboring areas or regions by those criteria. It is an intellectual construct created by the selection of features relevant to a particular problem and the disregard of other features considered to be irrelevant.<sup>422</sup>

In the Crimean local discourse politicians, scientist, journalist and ordinary people use word “region” concerning Crimea. It describes the attitude to Crimea as a special territory in political, economic and cultural senses. Crimean political scientist Oleg Gabrielyan stresses that in case of Crimea the term regionalism means such processes as: ethnic rights; separatism; decentralization of state structure; transnational collaboration of neighbor administrative-territorial units; mutual augmentability of industrial units which works within this territory.<sup>423</sup> Regionalism shapes regional consciousness. It is opposed to cosmopolite center, and paradoxically entails it by uniqueness.<sup>424</sup> Term regional identity in this case is very close to term “little Motherland”. In regional identity aspects of space (toponyms) combine with ethnic identity.

To understand the role of territorial factor in identity formation we should refer to survey results about primary and secondary identity of Crimean residents. As we can see in Chart in the Appendix B for each ethnic group the most widespread identity is “Crimean residents” (*Krymchanin*). 48% Russians as well as Crimean Tatars and 31% of Ukrainians chose it as primary identity. 29% of Crimean Tatars and 21% of Russians labeled ethnic identity as their main one. 27% of Ukrainians put “Citizen of Ukraine” in the first place. It is interesting to correlate primary and secondary identities. For this purpose we count main secondary identities for two main primary identities (“Crimean resident” and ethnic identity). The results for Crimean Tatars we can see in the Chart

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<sup>422</sup> “Region”. Encyclopedia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 01 Sep. 2009 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/496048/region>.

<sup>423</sup> Gabrielyan, O.A. 2001. ‘Krym kak problema regionalizma’ . *Uchenye zapiski TNU* 11(45)

<sup>424</sup> Gabrielyan, O.A. 2000. *Politicheskiye processy v Krymu*. Simferopol: Tavriya, p. 9

5.12. As we can see, majority of Crimean Tatars who consider themselves first of all as Crimean residents put ethnic identity in the second place. For Crimean Tatars whose ethnic identity is a primary, second important identity is regional (Crimean Resident) and religious.




Chart 5.12 Correlation of primary and secondary identity of Crimean Tatars

The results for Russians we can see in the Chart 5.13. The situation among Russians is almost the same. There is a strong correlation between regional identity (“Crimean resident”) and ethnic identity. If person has chosen regional identity as primary one, he (or she) also chose ethnic as a secondary, and vice versa. The main distinction of Russians’ case from Crimean Tatars’ case is presence of Soviet identity in both primary and secondary levels.




Chart 5.13 Correlation of primary and secondary identity of Russians

The case of Ukrainians (see Chart 5.14) is different because their ethnic identity is not as salient as among Russians and Crimean Tatars. Second important identity for Ukrainians who put regional type in the first place is citizenship (“Citizens of Ukraine”). As in the case of Russians, there is still strong position of Soviet identity.




Chart 5.14 Correlation of primary identity “Crimean resident” and secondary identity Ukrainians

We can conclude that main components for identification process of Russians and Crimean Tatars are ethnicity and territorial belonging. It means that when they identify themselves in terms of ethnic identity they refer to the region they live – Crimea. Russians consider themselves not only like an ethnic group in the framework of Ukrainian state, but rather like Russian territory with Russians within Ukraine. Crimean Tatars believe that they are not just “an ethnic minority”, but rather as “indigenous people” in their own land, which is now part of Ukraine. In both cases the idea of homeland plays a crucial role in understanding who the Crimean Tatars are and who the Russians are.

*Ethnic + regional is base for identity of ethnic groups in Crimea*

Majority of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars believes that all Crimean residents, regardless of ethnic origin, have common features, which distinguish them from ethnic groups outside the Crimea (see Chart 5.15). We tried to find these common features so we asked respondents to estimate how important for them different factors to consider themselves as Crimean residents. The result is shown in the Table 5.1. Although relative majority of all ethnic groups believe that common features exist, the set of these features is different for each group. For the Slavic community first five positions are: (1) “common language of majority of Crimeans – Russian language”, (2) “positive attitudes towards Russia”, (3) “aspiration for seeing Ukraine in the union of Russia and Belarus”, (4) “common Motherland – Crimea, (5) “negative attitudes towards NATO”. Main values for the common Crimean community Slavs connect with Russia and identification of Crimea as part of “Russian world”. Negative attitude towards NATO are present in this list, in our opinion, because NATO is usually perceived as a geopolitical alternative to the “Russian world”. For the Crimean Tatars first five features which characterized being a “Crimean resident” are: “a common Motherland – Crimea”, “own territory – Crimean peninsula”, “historical names of places and geographical names”, “tolerance attitudes

towards representatives of all nationalities and religions which live in Crimea”, “Ukrainian citizenship”, i.e. common territory, common history, tolerance and sharing Ukrainian citizenship. However, if we are talking about historical names of settlements, it means a restoration of the Crimean Tatar name. But this idea, as it was shown in the Chapter 4 of this Thesis, is not perceived by most members of other ethnic groups in Crimea.




Chart 5.15 Common features of Crimean residents

Table 5.1 Importance of different factors to feel themselves as Crimean residents

<b>How important the following features to feel themselves as Crimean residents? (1 – not important; 5 – very important)</b>	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians
Common language of majority of Crimeans – Russian language	4,29	4,87	4,26
Common motherland – Crimea	4,75	4,69	4,16
Positive attitudes towards Russia	4,11	4,76	3,96
Own territory – Crimean peninsula	4,69	4,62	3,86
Negative attitudes towards NATO	3,82	4,67	3,86
Aspiration for seeing Ukraine in the union of Russia and Belarus	3,58	4,73	3,88
Tolerance attitudes towards representatives of all nationalities and religions which live in Crimea	4,52	4,50	3,95
Common Crimean Holidays	4,32	4,50	3,59
Aspiration for strengthening autonomous status of Crimea	4,21	4,50	3,80
Famous historical personalities connected with Crimea	4,22	4,51	3,68
Common history	4,39	4,44	3,76
Common traditions, customs	4,10	4,40	3,43
Crimean authority, Crimean Constitution, Symbols of Crimea	4,19	4,34	3,64
Belonging to Orthodoxy	3,57	4,42	3,20
Historical names of places and geographical names	4,53	4,16	3,53
Negative attitudes towards staying Crimea in Ukraine	3,65	4,25	3,22
Positive attitudes towards Soviet past	3,75	4,11	3,62
Common psychology and national character	4,33	4,05	3,35
Ukrainian citizenship	4,46	3,44	3,22

The 2006 election campaign of Socialist Party of Crimea was built on the idea about introducing new official status for all Crimean residents – *Krymchanin*. They argue that this status is important for “implementation of the principles of solidarity, for unification of effort on the way of solving our common Crimean problems, and for reducing interethnic tensions on the Crimean land.”<sup>425</sup> According to our survey (see Chart 5.16) 43% of Crimean Tatars, 37% of Russians and 29% of Ukrainians believe in possibility of formation of integrated community (Crimean nation). But still majority of Crimean residents do not consider it as possible and they do not believe that ethnic identity could be razed.




Chart 5.16 Opinion about formation of Crimean nation

#### 5.2.4. Attitudes towards Citizenship

In this part of the thesis we are going to analyze the role of citizenship in the process of ethnic identification. It is important to understand which identity (with an ethnic group or with a state) is more salient in the system of social identities of Crimean residents. It helps us to understand how well ethnic groups in Crimean are integrated into Ukrainian state. It also shows us does the “Ukrainian Nation” (in Western (civic) understanding) exist. For this purpose, survey results concerning questions about respondents’ belonging toward “*Ukrainskiy Narod*”, attitudes towards Ukrainian citizenship, willingness to change it or to get the second citizenship of another country will be elaborated.

The attitude towards Ukrainian political nation (“Ukrainian people”) is very different among ethnic groups in Crimea (see Chart 5.17). Russians more than other ethnic groups reject their belongingness to “Ukrainian people”. At the same time absolute

<sup>425</sup> ‘Predvybornaja programma Krymskoj respublikanskoj organizacii Socialisticheskoy partii Ukrainy’. Krymskoe informatsionnoe agenstvo. <http://kianews.com.ua/node/9136>

majority of Ukrainians believe that they are the representatives of Ukrainian political nation. It should be mentioned that when Ukrainians answered “No”, they usually gave two arguments: there is no real political nation (“Ukrainian People”) in Ukraine or they think that “Ukrainian people” are only Ukrainians by their ethnic origin. The case of Crimean Tatar is especially interesting: absolute majority of them (57%) do not decide. The percentage of people who do not consider themselves as representatives of “Ukrainian people” is higher than the percentage of people who believe in their belonging. Less than half of Russians as well as Crimean Tatars consider Ukraine as their Motherland. Consequently absolute majority do not perceive Ukraine as the Motherland (totally rejected this idea or have not decided yet). The situation among Ukrainians is different (for 55% Ukraine is Motherland), but still almost 25% do not think so (see Chart 5.18). It is interesting that the percentage of Russians and Ukrainians who consider Ukraine as Motherland is higher than the percentage of people who belong to “Ukrainian people”. Therefore, politico-territorial factor (which is Motherland) is more important for them than just political one. Absolute majority of Russians (53%) and about 43% and 41% of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians (respectively) do not consider themselves as “Patriots” of Ukraine (see Chart 5.19). Absolute majority of Crimean residents have only practical attitudes to Ukrainian citizenship (see Chart 5.20). Among Russians compared to Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians there are more people (16%) for whom Ukrainian citizenship is burden and there are less people who are proud of it (only 10%). Russians more than others ethnic group want to change their citizenship (see Chart 5.21). Country of preferable citizenship is Russia (84% of all who would like to change it). 77% of Ukrainians (from all who would like to change their citizenship) also prefer Russian one (see Chart 5.22). Crimean Tatars are less (compare to Russians and Ukrainians) disposed to change their citizenship. Majority among all ethnic groups also supports the idea of dual citizenship. But among Russians this idea is more popular. (see Chart 5.23)




Chart 5.17 Ethnicity and belonging to “Ukrainian people”




Chart 5.18 Attitudes to Ukraine as a Motherland




Chart 5.19 Attitudes to the Ukrainian patriotism




Chart 5.20 Attitudes to the Ukrainian Citizenship




Chart 5.21 Disposition to changing citizenship




Chart 5.22 Preferable citizenship<sup>426</sup>




Chart 5.23 Opinion about introducing dual citizenship in Ukraine

This data give us the base to argue that all Crimean residents are characterized with very low level of identification with Ukrainian citizenship and with “Ukrainian People”; and as result they are hardly integrated into Ukrainian state (but the extent of integration is a bit different). Reasons of this situation are not the same for each ethnic group but they have common origin – Soviet nationality policy and in some cases it is the result of the policy of independent Ukraine. Soviet Ukraine was built basing on the principle “one nation – one state”. As we mentioned in the chapter two of this thesis the term “nation” was understood as ethnic group that has their own statehood. So, it means ethnic origin of titular nation. Soviet passport system strengthened the coincidence of name of the state and the name of the titular nation. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Ukraine, in fact, continues this policy (in Ukrainian constitution the differences of Ukrainians by nationality (*Ukrayins’ka Natsiya*) and Ukrainians are recorded as citizens of all nationalities (*Ukrainskiy Narod*) are fixed). The granting of official status only to the Ukrainian language put contradictions in ethnic identity and citizenship.

It seems that ethnic identity of the titular nation (Ukrainians) should coincide with the citizenship of independent Ukraine where they also constitute the titular nation. However it does not take place in Crimean reality. Of course the Ukrainians in comparison with the other ethnic groups have the most positive attitudes towards

<sup>426</sup> This question answered only people who would like to change their citizenship

Ukrainian citizenship. 26% even consider citizenship as primary identity (see Appendix B). However a significant part of Ukrainians who do not belong to Ukrainian nation in civic sense (*Ukrainskiy Narod*) (39%), do not consider Ukraine as Motherland (45%) and do not consider themselves as patriots (61%). As a result they have only practical (65%) or even negative attitude towards Ukrainian citizenship and they are disposed to change it (45%) on the citizenship of Russia (77%). In our opinion such tendencies among titular nation could be explained by the fact that Soviet policy was especially successful in the Crimean peninsula where the level of Russification was (and still is) the highest. The evidence of this also is given in the part about Soviet identity.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and new independent Ukraine was created the process of granting Ukrainian citizenship for Russians that lived in its territory was relatively easy, it was rather a formality. However, it was not so unambiguous in the consciousness level of ordinary people. 73% of Russians do not consider themselves as a part of *Ukrainskiy Narod*; 66% do not view Ukraine as Motherland and 77% do not consider themselves as patriots (61%). As a result 73,5% have only practical and 16% negative attitude towards Ukrainian citizenship. They are largest ethnic group (66%) who is disposed to change Ukrainian citizenship (45%) on the Russian one (84%). The last point could be explained only by linguistic and cultural links as well as close family, friendship and professional relationships with Russians in Russia but also by the difficult economic situation in Ukraine and fear of tendencies in foreign policy of Ukraine (discord with Russia and closer relations with NATO and EU). On this basis we could mention not only about the low level of citizenship identity but rather about the contradictions or even the conflict of ethnic and citizenship identities.

In case of Crimean Tatars, we can conclude that they are the least integrated ethnic group into Ukrainian society. Only 3,4% of Crimean Tatars put identity with Ukrainian citizenship in the primary position (see Appendix B). High index of people, who do not know whether they are part of “Ukrainian people” or not, is the evidence that Crimean Tatars are in the process of this integration. Except problems in consciousness level (like in case of Russians) Crimean Tatars have had problems with legal recognition of them as Ukrainian citizens. Oxana Shevel stresses that out of approximately 260,000 Crimean Tatar who returned to Ukraine, 108,000 who returned after the Ukrainian citizenship law entered into force on 13 November 1991 did not receive Ukrainian citizenship automatically, and had to go through an affiliation procedure. More than 25,000 were de jure stateless, and their access to Ukrainian citizenship was facilitated by April 1997 amendments to the Ukrainian citizenship law. 83,000 were not able to acquire Ukrainian

citizenship because of financial, legal and other problems they faced forfeiting citizenship of the states where they used to live before returning to Crimea (for 62,000 it was Uzbekistan). On August 1998, as a result Ukrainian-Uzbek agreement, the procedure for the renunciation of the Uzbek and acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship were simplified for the formerly deported people.<sup>427</sup> Making a summary of this subparagraph we would like to stress that in order to build strong civil society in Ukraine it is very important to integrate these ethnic groups (especially who know nothing for sure about attitude toward their Ukrainian citizenship) into “Ukrainian nation” (in Western meaning) on the civic base. But this integration in most cases depends on future decisions and actions of Ukrainian government.

### **5.2.5. Soviet identity**

In this part of the chapter the intensity of Soviet identity among Crimean residents will be examined. As we can see from the Chart in Appendix B there is still strong position of Soviet identity among Slavic part of population. This type of identity took third place (by relevance) among other identities. 16% of Ukrainians, 14% of Russians and 4% of Crimean Tatars considered themselves as “Soviet people” (as main identity). It is interesting to compare this data with Chart about belonging to a certain cultural tradition (see Chart 4.24 ‘Ethnicity and cultural traditions’ in the Chapter 4 of this thesis). The same percentage of Ukrainians identifies themselves with Soviet culture. Similar situation among Russians (the difference approximately is 1,5%). Soviet culture and the identity of the Soviet people are not so expressed among Crimean Tatars.

Attitudes to the Soviet past can be divided into two groups: Slavs and Crimean Tatars (see Chart 5.24). Crimean Tatars have mostly negative attitudes to Soviet past. Among Russians and Ukrainians positive attitudes prevail over negative ones.

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<sup>427</sup> Shevel, O. 2001. ‘Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of politics, the use of law, and the meaning of rhetoric’. *Krimski Studii* 1(7): 109-129  
<http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/oshevel.html>




Chart 5.24 Aptitudes to the Soviet Past

Next step is to define the main characteristics of Soviet identity in Crimea. For this purpose we correlate ethnic identity and soviet identity (for whom it is primary) with the main problematic issues. Soviet identity for Russians means (it was taken into account only answers that were common in absolute majority of respondents) that they:

1. support Natalia Vetrenko’s Bbloc “People’s opposition” and Communist Party;
2. belong to the Soviet culture;
3. consider Russian language as native and speak Russian at home;
4. Together with Russian identity they stress that they are Slavs;
5. point on tensions between Slavs and Crimean Tatars;
6. have negative attitudes towards Ukrainization;
7. consider Russians and Ukrainians as one nation;
8. agree with the opinion that Soviet rulers had to deport Crimean Tatars from Crimea;
9. against renaming places into Crimean Tatar names and against the granting the status of indigenous people for Crimean Tatars. They do not think that problem of Crimean Tatar discrimination exists;
10. do not consider themselves as representatives of Ukrainian people (*Ukrainskiy narod*); their attitude to Ukrainian citizenship is only practical and they do not consider Ukraine as their Motherland, so they are not patriot of Ukraine;
11. support dual citizenship in Ukraine and if it would be opportunity the change their citizenship into Russian one;
12. consider themselves as believer but I do not belong to any of church or they state that they are atheist;
13. believe that ethnic and religious affiliations of a person should be connected and correspond with stereotypes;

14. stress on possibility of religious conflict in Crimea;
15. support foreign policy with Russian and CIS countries;
16. definitely against Ukraine to join NATO and EU;
17. believe that Crimea should secede from Ukraine and join Russia;
18. they estimate soviet past positively or rather positively (there were some negative moments, but in whole there were positive).

In case of Ukrainians with salient Soviet identity the situation is rather similar, but there are some distinctive points: for most Ukrainians native language is Ukrainian; they have more positive (compare to Russians) attitudes toward Ukrainian citizenship and they consider themselves as members of Ukrainian people (*Ukrainskiy narod*).

We can conclude that people with salient Soviet identity are characterized by positive attitudes to Soviet times, to Russia and Russian language. They have negative attitudes to Crimean Tatar issues (renaming places, status of indigenous people), to Ukrainian statehood (mostly Russians) and towards relations with EU and NATO in Ukrainian foreign policy. It is also important to notice that the coexistence of ethnic and Soviet identity one more time gives the evidence about the essence of Soviet nationality policy and also about its success. We can conjecture that during Soviet times Russians had stable positions in Crimea and after the dissolution of Soviet Union and creation of independent Ukraine positions of Russians outside the Russia were reduced. But why Ukrainians in Crimea still have Soviet identity. In our opinion Ukrainians in Crimea were one of the most successful results of Soviet nationality policy: on the one hand they developed their ethnic identity (Ukrainians), but on the other hand they were completely Russified and they easily accepted the new Soviet identity.

We have already analyzed the significance of historical memory for identification but in this part we also would like to stress on some symbols which are the evidence of salience of Soviet identity in Crimea. Three main squares in center of Simferopol have names that connected to Soviet times: Lenin's square (*Ploschad' Lenina*), Soviet square (*Ploschad' Sovetskaya*) and Kujbyshev square (*Ploschad' Kuybysheva*). In the centers of Simferopol and Sevastopol there are still Lenin's monuments. Every city and every village in Crimea has Lenin Street (In Simferopol there are Lenin Street and Lenin Boulevard). There is no evidence about changing streets that were named in honor of Lenin. The process of street renaming was started only in 2008. Roza Luxemburg Street was renamed into Alexander Nevsky Prospect, Karl Liebknecht Street – into

Dolgorukov Street, October Street – into *Petropavlovskaya* Street<sup>428</sup>. It is very important to notice that initiator of this renaming was Russian Community of Crimea. All the names that they suggested are connected with times of Russian Empire (pre-Soviet). This action is conducted under the slogan “Let’s restore to the streets their historical names!”

### 5.2.6. *Role of the global factor*

Crimea has always been in the zone of geopolitical interest of different countries and now it is a region of interaction of economic, political and cultural interests of representatives of different civilizations: Russia, Turkey and USA. Of course it has influence on the Crimean residents and on the process of their ethnic identification. We tried to schematize this issue and the result is presented in the Diagram 5.2.




Diagram 5.2 Ethnic groups and international actors

For each ethnic group these actors play first of all symbolic roles. They are the part of historical memory, actors of wars and conquest. These symbols participate in the friend-or-foe identification system. For Russians Russia is a Motherland but they were separated from it. It is very important to notice that for them they were separated not only like part of “people” but rather like Russian territory with Russian people. As we could see from the part of this chapter about regional factor of ethnic identity territorial factor plays main role in the ethnic identification process of Russians in Crimea. It means that they consider themselves not like an ethnic group in the framework of Ukrainian state, but rather like Russian territory within Ukraine. At the same time other global actors like USA and Turkey play role of “enemy” in their symbolic system. In case of Turkey the reason of this situation lays in historical events (like wars with Ottoman Empire) and in current claims of the same territory by Crimean Tatars (as Turkic people). In case of USA

<sup>428</sup> ‘Simferopol’ pomenjal Rozu Ljuksemburg na Aleksandra Nevskogo’. Novuy Region Krum. 27.05.08; 17:12. <http://pda.nr2.ru/crimea/179900.html>

the reason is Soviet Foreign Policy especially during Cold War and contemporary world opposition between USA and Russia. Russian interest in Crimea first of all could be characterized by Black Sea Navy which is located in Sevastopol. Also Russia has economical interest in Crimean resort resources. Similar situation exist with Crimean Tatars and Turkey. For them Turkey is a close country in terms of culture, first of all in language and religion matters. Turkey is interested in Crimea lay in religion and economic sphere. Interest of Western actors (USA, EU, and NATO) is defined by geostrategical location of the peninsula and its closeness to Russian borders. In this sense official Ukrainian Foreign policy plays significant role. It is important to understand how the geopolitical inclinations of ethnic group in Crimea go with official Ukrainian foreign policy. The degree of their coincidence will define the level of integrity of these ethnic groups into Ukrainian society and the popularity of separatist movements.

Michael Grossman analyzing foreign policy of Post-Soviet Ukraine stresses that it can be characterized “by confusion, a lack of clear directions and a great deal of wavering”<sup>429</sup>. He also points that in 1995, “Ukraine’s foreign policy focus shifted from securing its independence from Moscow to more aggressively pursuing relations with Europe and West”<sup>430</sup> and Ukraine’s leadership openly embraced the idea of greater cooperation with Europe. President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma became a stronger supporter of NATO expansions. Pro-Western orientation of Ukrainian governments was clearly reflected when Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that priority aim of Ukrainian Foreign Policy was to gain associate member status in the EU. New President Viktor Yushchenko continues dual policies of distancing Ukraine from Russia while moving towards integration into European Institutions. He also has started to do some steps for gaining membership in NATO. While arguing that he still sees Russia as ‘strategic partner’, he has noted that integration with the West will supersede any integration within the Russian dominated CIS.<sup>431</sup>

To define which line of foreign policy is supported by ethnic groups in Crimea we will use survey data (see Chart 5.25). As we can see the priority tendency in foreign policy is relations with Russia. However this line is most popular among Russians. They

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<sup>429</sup> Grossman, M. 2007. ‘Ethnicity and National Identity Externalized: Impact of Identity on Foreign policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine’. in *The Politics of Ethnicity and National Identity* ed Santosh C. Saha. New York: Peter Lang publishing, p. 42

<sup>430</sup> Ibid, p.43

<sup>431</sup> Grossman, M. 2007. ‘Ethnicity and National Identity Externalized: Impact of Identity on Foreign policy in Post-Soviet Ukraine’. in *The Politics of Ethnicity and National Identity* ed Santosh C. Saha. New York: Peter Lang publishing, p. 44

chose this answer almost unanimously (80%). It also should be mentioned that the percentage of people who do not define their positions is very low. Foreign policy issues are widely used during the election companies of pro-Russian forces so it also helps to strengthen a unified opinion among Russians. Among all ethnic groups relations with EU countries are mostly supported by Crimean Tatars (24%). Only 16% of Ukrainians support this line. Crimean Tatars are most dispersed group in terms of supporting foreign policy. There is 15% who have not defined their preferences in this question.

Next block of questions will concern the attitudes toward Ukraine’s joining in the EU, NATO and the Union of Russia and Belarus (see Chart 5.26). Absolute majority of Russians (60%) is against Ukraine to join the EU. These tendencies are supported by majority Crimean Tatars (48%) and only 31% of Ukrainians agree with it. Most of Crimean residents do not support Ukraine to join the NATO (see Chart 5.27). Almost all Russians (88%) are against the NATO. Among Ukrainians there is 12% who supports Ukraine’s accession to NATO, but still absolute majority (77%) is against this accession. As in previous cases Crimean Tatar opinions are not as unanimous as we can see among Slavs. 28% support Ukraine to join NATO, however 38% is against it. The attitude towards the Union of Russia and Belarus is quite opposite (see Chart 5.28). Majority of Russians (85%) and Ukrainians (74%) and Crimean Tatars (38%) support this Union. The same percentage of Crimean Tatars who supported NATO, answered against Ukraine to join the Union of Russia and Belarus.




Chart 5.25 Preferences in the tendencies of Ukraine’s foreign policy




Chart 5.26 Attitudes towards Ukraine's membership in the EU




Chart 5.27 Attitudes towards Ukraine's membership in the NATO




Chart 5.28 Attitudes towards Ukraine's membership in the Union of Russia and Belarus

Next stage of research is to understand the opinion of ethnic groups in Crimea about geopolitical and cultural positions of Crimea (see Chart 5.29). Most of the Ukrainians think that Crimea is part of Ukraine (27%) or it is both part of Ukraine and Russia (27%). 19% of Ukrainians believe that Crimea is neither Ukraine and nor Russia. Majority of Russians consider that Crimea is part of Russia. It is another evidence that territorial factor plays extremely important role in the identification process of Russians.

It is interesting to notice that opinion of Crimean Tatars was mainly divided between two opposite ideas. The biggest part of Crimean Tatars (34%) believes that Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia. It is corresponded to Crimean Tatar view on Crimea as their only homeland where they should have their own national statehood (at least national autonomy); they stress that other ethnic groups in Crimea have their statehood outside the Crimean peninsula, but for them there is no other territory where they could exercise cultural, political and economic rights of their nation.

The opinion about the future of the geopolitical position of Crimea (see Chart 5.30) shows that most of the Slavs would like Crimea to become a part of Russia. For Russians the most acceptable alternative is to join to Russia, Russian national autonomy within Ukraine or preserving current status (52%). Opinion of Ukrainians almost coincides with Russian one. For Crimean Tatars the most acceptable future of Crimea connects with Crimean Tatar national autonomy (48%) and preserving current status (52%). As we can see current status of Crimea is convenient for majority of Russians and Crimean Tatars (52%) and only for 28% of Ukrainians. The variant of independent state was supported only by 30% of respondents from each of ethnic group.

We can conclude that most of Crimean residents support rather pro-Russian line of foreign policy of Ukraine. The views of Slavs are more established when compared to Crimean Tatars who has high percentage of people who do not decide on the order of foreign policy priorities. Russians and Ukrainians (especially Russians) do not support Ukraine to join EU and NATO, but they support joining the Union of Russia and Belarus. It means that Russians and Ukrainians do not support current line of Ukraine's foreign policy (orientation on the West), but Crimean Tatars are more loyal to it. It is very interesting because in the subparagraph about attitudes to citizenship we find that they are less integrated group into Ukrainian society, but here we see that they are at the same time loyal to Ukrainian government and its political course. Probably it takes place because of Crimean Tatars during elections orient on the Pro-Ukrainian (in some cases right-wing) parties (*Rukh*, *Block Timoshenko* and '*Nasha Ukraina*').




Chart 5.29 Opinion about current geopolitical position of Crimea




Chart 5.30 Opinion about future geopolitical status of Crimea

In brief, economic, political and global dimensions of ethnic identity of ethnic groups of Crimea are elaborated in this chapter. Difficult economic conditions led to strengthening ethnic identities and as a result, entail the appearance of interethnic tensions. Especially the first years of independent Ukraine could be characterized by economic and political crises and stagnation. Under these conditions Crimean Tatars began their repatriation to Crimea and the government was not able to assist this process in a proper way. As a result, a lot of problems concerning repatriation appeared, such as land distribution housing, provision of the necessary facilities and unemployment. In such a difficult situation Crimean Tatars were obliged to do self-acquisitions of land which caused resentment among Slavs and a new wave of so-called Slavic self-acquisitions.

Such kind of overlapping of ethnic identity and economic problems is a potential base for conflict between Slavic community and Crimean Tatars.

Economic difficulties are accompanied by tensions in political sphere. In contrast to Russians, Crimean Tatars do not have enough representation in both Ukrainian and Crimean governments. Their possible influence on the authorities in matters concerning their interests is limited. In political sphere there is alliance of right-wing parties and Crimean Tatar elite. Russians are presented by bulk of political parties and organizations which mostly have orientation towards Russia. But at the same time this movements are very segmented and dispersed and do not have strong support among population. It is proved by very low degree of participation and confidence to political organization among Russians. Ukrainians in Crimea do not support political parties with national ideology. They are mostly supporters of pro-Russian political forces. Crimean Tatars has their representative body Mejlis, but it has not recognized officially neither by Crimean authority, nor by Slavic community. The recognition of Mejlis (as representative body of Crimean Tatars) means for Slavic community recognition of Crimean Tatar demands on Crimean peninsula and establishment of Crimean Tatar national autonomy. Therefore pro-Russian organizations and Mejlis are two main contradictory centers in Crimea what promote the tensions between Slavic community and Crimean Tatars.

There are also problems with statuses of ethnic groups in Crimea. Official Ukrainian terminology does not reflect Crimean reality: Ukrainians are representatives of Ukrainian nation (titular nation, according to Soviet terminology) which is the base of Ukrainian statehood, but in Crimea they are minority in both numerical and sociological senses. Russians are “national minority”, but in fact they are majority in all sense, so they do not agree with this status and demand the granting to the Russian language a status of state language or at least “official”. Crimean Tatars are minority in all sense but they also do not agree with this status and they demand the granting them all rights as “indigenous people”. But this status still has not been granted for Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian law, because of government fear of political self-determination of Crimean Tatars.

Territorial identity and idea of Crimea as a homeland plays the main role in the identification process of each ethnic group in Crimea. Russians consider themselves not only like an ethnic group in the framework of Ukrainian state, but rather like Russian territory with Russians within Ukraine. Crimean Tatars believe that they are not just “an ethnic minority”, but rather as “indigenous people” in their own land, which is now part of Ukraine. In case of Russians this core of ethno-territorial identity is also supplemented by remains of Soviet identity and in case of Crimean Tatars – by religious belonging.

Ethnic groups in Crimea (including Ukrainians) are characterized with very low level of identification with Ukrainian citizenship and with “Ukrainian People”; (*Ukrayinskiy narod*) and as result they are hardly integrated into Ukrainian state. The reason of low integration of Russians lies mostly in the consciousness level, but in case of Crimean Tatars consciousness level is overlapped with problems of their official recognition as citizens of Ukraine. As a result, Crimean Tatars, on the one hand, are less integrated group into Ukrainian society; on the other hand, they are the only supporters of pro-Ukrainian (pro-Kyiv) political forces. Russians and Ukrainians do not support current line of Ukraine’s foreign policy (orientation on the West), and Crimean Tatars are more loyal to it. Ukrainian integration into supranational blocks and organizations (first of all EU and NATO) is one of the important factors for strengthening ethnic identity of Russians. For Russians and Ukrainians the most acceptable future for Crimea is to join Russia, in other words Russian national autonomy. For Crimean Tatars, it is Crimean Tatar national autonomy or preserving the current status. Also, we should stress the high degree of uncertainty among Crimean Tatars what gives the base to argue that their opinion could be changed under different factors in the near future.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this research we put forward the hypothesis that ethnic identity of each ethnic group of Crimea (Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) is a process which occurs under the influence of many different factors, however some factors are more important. To define these factors, we made an analysis of main tendencies and problems in cultural, political and economic spheres as well as global dimension and in this thesis it is realized that ethnic identity of each of the given ethnic group has its own peculiarities, which determine interethnic relations in Crimea. This ethno-national identification is, first of all, a result of historical and political events that took place in different times, especially during the Soviet period. Therefore, firstly we have to understand the peculiarities of Soviet nationality policy. In 1917, Bolsheviks were faced with a dilemma: how to create a socialist centralized state after the former Empire fell under the domination of nationalist movements. They decided to take advantage of these nationalist movements. To gain the support of nationalists they began to provide the right of self-determination for certain ethnic groups. To implement this policy they established their own doctrine. Soviet government introduced *natsional'nost'*, which was ethnic identity in primordial sense (it could be defined according to the parents' ethnic belonging at age of 16 and it could not be changed during the life). *Natsia* in Soviet doctrine means ethnic group which has its own statehood. The term *narodnost'* was used referring to the ethnic groups that do not have their own statehood. Consequently, based on this doctrine and using the policy of ethnogenesis ("initial establishment of ethnic groups"<sup>432</sup>), the "hierarchy of nations" was created. It seems that Soviet nationalities policy shelters an irreconcilable contradiction: on the one hand the Soviet authority recognized the right of self-determination of nations, but on the other hand there were slogans about proletarian internationalism and the creation of a new "Soviet man". This contradiction could be easily explained. Soviet rulers realized that if some of the nations

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<sup>432</sup> Shanin, T. 1986. 'Soviet Theories of Ethnicity: The Case of a Missing Term'. *New Left Review* 1(158), p. 120

(which were loyal to the Soviet State) obtain their own statehood they would prevent any other national movements on the territory of their own state in order not to lose it. So, on the one hand the Soviet government solved the problems by using strong nationalist movements and on the other hand they established some kind of “status quo”. Ukrainians got their own Union republics and they became a “titular nation”. For Crimean Tatars, their official territory was not granted and at the end of the War they were deported from their homeland and the name of their ethnic group vanished from the official discourse. Soviet nationality policy was realized by several tools like census, internal passport, deportation (and migration, replacement), and total Russification. Internal passport was an instrument to secure the multiple identities that were created in the Soviet times: the identity of Soviet people, the identity with “little homeland” (Union Republic) and the ethnic identity. It also fixed people’s location and prevented people’s mobility which was undesirable for Soviet leaders.

In order to understand and explain Soviet nationality policy, the review of Soviet ethnos theory was done. Soviet ethnos theory is presented by two main approaches: Bromley’s and Gumilev’s. These approaches have some common features and at the same time differences. Bromley was official theoretic in the Soviet Union. His ideas were not much contradicted to the official ideology and Soviet nationality policy. His ethnos theory was a tool for Soviet government to explain ethnic situation in Soviet Union. It very clear reflected primordial and constructivists sides of Soviet nationality policy. His *ESO* (ethno-social organism) explained the existence of union republics (and other autonomous units within Soviet Union) and their ‘titular nations’. His views about ‘subjective’ component of the ethnos make him very close to the constructivist approach, and it explains how the Soviet policy worked. Gumilev was the opponent of Bromley. Bromley referred to the socioeconomic factors that determine the ethnos, but Gumilev stress on natural factors that shape the ethnos, especially landscape. Gumilev’s family including him was in opposition to the Soviet regime. His conception was on the one had worked out in the framework of Soviet ethnos theory, but on the other hand it was opposite to the Soviet nationality policy. In Soviet Union there were fixed ‘hierarchy of nation’, however Gumilev’s theory gives the base for self-determination of other ethnic groups. It is clear, why his ideas have been popular especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Geographical (landscape) aspect of Gumilev’s theory can be used as legitimization of the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. As we can see from our case ethnic groups in Crimea claim the territory following (not necessarily referring to)

Gumilev's approach. It is understandable why current Russian anthropologists<sup>433</sup> evaluate his ideas as potentially dangerous for Russian territorial and political integrity, or even as a base for interethnic conflicts. Both these theories (Bromley's and Gumilev's) were used to understand case of Crimea. Bromley's theory helps us to understand the peculiarities of ethnic situation in the Soviet Union and in Crimea particularly. Soviet nationality policy was mostly in line with Bromley's ethnos theory. Gumilev's conception gives us the base to understand one the one hand territorial and political claims of suppressed nations (in our case it is Crimean Tatars), and on the other hand the awareness of Russians as 'super ethnos'.

In this thesis we came to the conclusion that ethnic situation in the Soviet Union hinders a contradiction in itself: official doctrine had primordial essence (ethnic belonging was considered as natural (primordial) characteristic of a person), but the Soviet nationality policy had a constructivist base (using censuses, internal passport system, replacement, deportation and so on, they, in fact, created hierarchy of nations). Therefore we believe that we should distinguish reality in post-Soviet space (particularly in Crimea) (how ordinary people understand their ethnic identities) from the way of analyzing this reality (which approach researchers should use to analyze this reality). The views of ordinary people could be primordial (as a result of Soviet policy) and they are understood from viewpoint of Gumolev's approach; but in order to understand better the ethnic situation we should analyze it from the view point of constructivist approach (because of ethnic reality was constructed in Soviet times).

In this thesis, ethnic identity of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea was examined by combining three approaches: Bromley's approach (to understand and explain peculiarities of Soviet nationality policy), Gumilev's conception (to understand behaviour of these ethnic groups, especially their territorial claims), and constructivist approach (to show how ethnic identity of each group was constructed)

Using censuses, internal passport system, replacement, deportation and so on Soviet government created hierarchy of nations. After detailed analysis we realized that the Soviet nationality policy led to the formation of three different cases of ethnic identity in Crimea: Russians in Crimea, Ukrainians in Crimea and Crimean Tatars in Crimea.

Almost all authors (Weber, Barth, Smith) who worked out the constructivist approach stress on the importance of historical memory and historical myths ("memories

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<sup>433</sup> Shnirel'man V., Panarin S. 2000. 'Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev: osnovatel' jetnologii?'. *Vestnik Evrazii*, 3 (10): 32-33

of colonization and migration”<sup>434</sup>) in the ethnic identity process. At the same time, it is very important to remember Gumilev’s ideas about ethnogenesis of the ethnic group in the certain territory as a process that consists from several phases (from the birth of ethnos as a result of ‘passionary push’ to attenuation of passionarity which leads to the death). This theory is especially explains Crimean Tatar case. The main point of the Crimean Tatar historical memory is based on the idea that ethnogenesis of Crimean Tatar nation took place within the territory of Crimean peninsula; therefore they are the “indigenous people” of Crimea. It is the main argument when they claim the Crimean territory as their homeland. However, it is necessary to mention that in this thesis it is not important in what degree it is true or false (whether the direct connection between modern Crimean Tatars and their ancestors exists), because, as we remember from Weber, “it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationships exist”<sup>435</sup>, for us, it is much more important if only that people believe in this or not (“a subjective belief in their common descent”). The times of Crimean Khanate was seen as the so-called “golden age” of this nation they have developed a society and a culture. Russian conquest and annexation of Crimea is viewed as quite tragic. As a result of this conquest Crimean Tatars lost their own statehood and their traditional social and economic structure were destroyed and supplanted by Russian lifestyle. Soviet times are seen as the most difficult period in the Crimean Tatar history. Soviet government committed a crime against whole Crimean Tatar nation, deported them from homeland. Almost half of the Crimean Tatar population was died during the deportation and due to the hard conditions in Central Asia. They were exposed to discrimination in cultural, educational, economical and political spheres. In the exile the idea of homeland became central element of their national identity. Starting with the year 1989 and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars began to return to Crimea. This process of repatriation has a special symbolic meaning such as the restoration of justice for whole repressed nation.

Russian territorial claims to Crimea also refer to times of Kievan Rus’. In Russian historical myths Russian annexation of Crimea was an “addition” of Crimea to Russian Empire or “reunification and reestablishing of the rights of the Russian people to its own land”.<sup>436</sup> Russia is shown as rescuer of Crimean Tatars which emancipated them “from

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<sup>434</sup> Weber, M. 1978. ‘Economy and Society’, in ed. Roth, G., Wittich, C. *Economy and society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of Carolina Press, p. 389

<sup>435</sup> Ibid

<sup>436</sup> Fisher, A. W. 1978. *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, p. 81

the Slavery of the Porte”<sup>437</sup>. Crimean Tatars are perceived as “nomadic and uncivilized population” and the period before Russian conquest of Crimea is shown as “barbaric times”; Russia brought civilization and promoted the development and prosperity. Russian claims to Crimea are also based on the documents like Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*, *Aynali-Kavak* Convention and Catherine’s Manifesto. According to official document (Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*) Russia got the right to build their Fleet on the Black Sea. Under the influence of these myths, Russians whom had been resettled in Crimea identified themselves as culturally more higher than barbarian Crimean Tatars, and considered that they brought civilization to peninsula. Negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars such as they are illiterate and retrograde had appeared. Especially this message was cultivated in the Soviet history and it had serious affects on the ethnic identification of Soviet generation of Russians and Ukrainians. Russian historians do not recognize the transfer of Crimean *oblast’* from the jurisdiction of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Especially Russians stress on illegal staying of Sevastopol under the Ukrainian jurisdiction. Presence of Russian Navy in Sevastopol also gives the base for claiming Crimea as Russian territory.

Ukrainian claims on Crimea are based on the so-called Ukrainophile historiography. Ukrainian historians refer to times of Kievan Rus’ and *Zaporiz’ka Sich* (as old Ukrainian states) and argue that Ukrainians appeared in Crimea before Russians. They do not claim Ukrainians as indigenous people in the peninsula, but rather refer to the legal transfer of Crimean *oblast’* from the jurisdiction of Russian SFSR to Ukrainian SSR (1954), and also to the geographical belongingness of the peninsula to Ukraine.

In the frame of this thesis, the main factors of shaping ethnic identity of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea were analyzed. Concerning the language issue we can conclude that as a result of the Russification policy during the Soviet period in Crimea, Russian language became dominant in all spheres of society. It was the language of prestige for each ethnic group in Crimea. If one was fluent in Russian, s/he could get a good education and a prestigious job, and especially, one could obtain quite good positions in governmental posts. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of independent Ukraine, Russian language still has had primary positions among all of the ethnic groups in Crimea. Therefore most of the Crimean residents prefer Russian as a language for their children’s education. Although Russian is widely used in all spheres of Crimean society, it does not have any official status. For Russians, their

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<sup>437</sup> Ibid, p.54

native language is a significant tool of the ethnic identification. Ukrainians less than other ethnic groups practice Ukrainian or even consider it as their native language. Ukrainian language is at the periphery in all spheres of Crimean life, but it is the only official language in Ukraine and in Crimea particularly. Therefore the real situation with the Ukrainian language in Crimea is contrasted to its official status. All attempts of Ukrainian government to provide practicing Ukrainian in public spheres meet with dissatisfaction of all ethnic groups in Crimea, including Ukrainians. Crimean Tatar language is perceived as native by most of the Crimean Tatars, however it is less spoken at home. Other ethnic groups do not speak Crimean Tatar and, as in the case of Russian, it does not have any official status. Therefore Crimean Tatars have limitations in practicing native language almost in all spheres of life. However it doesn't influence on their ethnic identities. We can conclude that Crimean Tatar language for Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian for Ukrainians plays a symbolic role in the process of ethnic identification.

Religion is also a significant factor for ethnic identification, because in the case of Crimea religious differences overlap with ethnic identity. There are two dominant religions in Crimea: Islam and Orthodoxy. Most of Crimean Tatars are Muslims; and most of Slavs are Orthodox. Crimean Tatars constitute a minority in both senses – ethnic and religious. Therefore religion serves to be an additional component of ethnic identity, which could also increase the level of social distance between ethnic (and/or religious) groups in Crimea. There is a division in Orthodox Church. The main sects of Orthodoxy are: Church of Moscow Patriarchy and Church of Kyiv Patriarchy. However this division has rather geopolitical and economical reasons than spiritual ones. Both of these churches are politicized and included into election campaign. But they do not have a real influence on people, because majority of Orthodox believers in Crimea still feel themselves belonging to Russian Orthodox Church (which is traditional name) and they do not know much about the division in Orthodoxy. Therefore, when Russians and Ukrainians identify themselves in the framework of “we-they” dichotomy (in the cases when “we” are “Russians”, “they” are “Ukrainians” or “we” are “Ukrainians”, “they” are “Russians”) confession factor does not play a significant role. Religion factor becomes important for Slavs, when they contrast with Crimean Tatars and, in this case, it is always stressed on differences in both ethnic and religion belongingness. Absolute majority of Crimean residents believes that ethnic identity should be corresponded to a certain religion (according to the stereotypes). Therefore we can conclude that religion is also a symbol in the processes of ethnic identification of ethnic groups in Crimea. Ethnic-religious overlapping of identities predetermines the peculiarities of conflicts in Crimea.

Therefore, in most cases, we could not distinguish where ethnic and where religious conflict (tensions) is, especially if it is supplemented by economic factors. Concerning religious issue, our research indicated tensions between Ukrainian Orthodoxy Church of Moscow Patriarchy and Mejlis. There are also some tensions between the branches of Orthodox churches. However it does not have real influence on people, because majority of Orthodox believers in Crimea still have belonged themselves to Russian Orthodox Church (which is traditional name) and they do not know much about the division in Orthodoxy.

Concerning the historical memories, perceiving of historical events and other symbols which, according to Smith, “mark out and guard the boundaries of *ethnies*”<sup>438</sup>, we defined some kind of the struggle for historical memory between the Slavic and the Crimean Tatar communities and sometimes between the Russians and the Ukrainians. The special importance has been put on the issue of return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of religious buildings and memorial structures; establishment of religious symbols and monuments of famous historical figures; changing names of settlements and reappraisal of historical events. However, if one ethnic group considers such changes as the restoration of historical justice and the realization of the religious rights, the other group usually considers this act as aggression and humiliation of their national or religious feelings.

Making a conclusion about cultural components, we should stress on significant positions of Russian culture among all ethnic groups in Crimea. Crimean Tatar and especially Ukrainian cultures in a large measure became hybrid. We can find explanation of this situation in Barth’s approach (the boundaries is more invariable compare to the cultural context. Therefore, loosing (or hybridization) of Crimean Tatars’ culture does not lead to a weakening of their ethnic identities. Crimean Tatars have stronger mechanisms for the preservation of their ethnic boundaries compared to Russians and Ukrainians. The degree of endogamy among Crimean Tatars is higher than among Slavs. It is also correspond to Gumilev’s idea about pernicious consequences of exogamy for ethnoses.

Concerning the economic factor, we can conclude that it also makes a contribution to the process of ethnic identification. The economic condition in Crimea leads to the strengthening in ethnic identities and, as a result, this entails the appearance of interethnic tensions. Crimean Tatar repatriation to Crimea concurred with the times of economic and

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<sup>438</sup> Smith, A. D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Historical Society of Israel, Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, p. 66

political crises and stagnation in whole Ukraine and in Crimea particularly. Neither Ukrainian, nor Crimean governments were able to provide the process of repatriation and provision of the necessary facilities in a proper way. As a result, a lot of problems concerning repatriation appeared, such as land distribution, housing, unemployment. In such a difficult situation Crimean Tatars were obliged to do self-acquisitions of land which caused resentment among Slavs and a new wave of so-called Slavic self-acquisitions. Such kind of overlapping of ethnic identity and economic problems is a potential base for conflict between Slavic community and Crimean Tatars.

Political factors also play very important role in the process of ethnic identification. In this thesis we paid special attention to such political dimensions such as the role of elite in the identification process and the presence of ethnic groups at Crimean (and Ukrainian – for Crimean Tatars) level of government, political preferences of ethnic groups of Crimea and the participation in national movements. We also analyzed how ethnic groups are labeled in official Ukrainian discourse. The level of overlapping of ethnic identity of each group with citizenship as well as regional and Soviet identities was discussed. We show how global dimension influence the process of the ethnic identification. The main point that predetermines all political relations in Crimea is disproportional (to their size) presence of three ethnic groups in politics. In contrast to Russians, Crimean Tatars do not have enough representation in both Ukrainian and Crimean governments. Their possible influence on the government in matters concerning their interests is limited. There are two main camps of parties and NGOs in Crimea: pro-Russian and Crimean Tatar ones. Ukrainians do not support parties and NGOs with nationalist or at least pro-Ukrainian ideology. They usually support pro-Russian political forces. The goals of pro-Russians forces (parties and NGOs) and Crimean Tatar organizations are mutually contradicted and even conflicted with each other. The object of the contradictions has political, economic and also symbolic base. The activity of these organizations has influences on national identity and national consciousness, and therefore any actions of opposite groups are perceived as painful and aggressive. However, at the same time, we should mention that pro-Russian movements are very segmented and dispersed and do not have strong support among population. Crimean Tatars has their representative body Mejlis, but it has not recognized officially neither by Crimean authority, nor by Slavic community. The recognition of Mejlis (as representative body of Crimean Tatars) means for the Slavic community the recognition of Crimean Tatar demands on the Crimean peninsula and the establishment of Crimean Tatar national autonomy. Therefore pro-Russian organizations and Mejlis are two main contradictory

centers in Crimea that provoke the tensions between Slavic community and Crimean Tatars.

For ethnic identity of each group, how the group is called in official discourse, which status it has serves to be an important element. Official Ukrainian terminology does not reflect the Crimean reality: Ukrainians are the representatives of Ukrainian nation (titular nation, according to Soviet terminology) which is the base of Ukrainian statehood, but in Crimea, they are minority in both numerical and sociological senses. Russians are “national minority”, but in fact they are majority in all sense, so they do not agree with this status and demand the granting to the Russian language a status of state language or at least “official”. Crimean Tatars are minority in all sense but they also do not agree with this status and they demand the granting them all rights as “indigenous people”. However the Law about “indigenous people” still has not adopted in the Ukrainian law, which means that Crimean Tatars could not demand any rights as “indigenous people” of Crimea. The main reason of this situation is that government fears of political self-determination of Crimean Tatars.

Concerning regional (territorial) identity it was defined as a main factor in the identity formation process of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Smith idea about importance of the homeland for ethnic identity (or/and national identity) is especially powerful to explain this situation. The idea of Crimea as a homeland predetermines the main peculiarities of identification process of each ethnic group in Crimea. Russians consider themselves not only like an ethnic group in the framework of Ukrainian state, but rather like Russian territory with Russians within Ukraine. Crimean Tatars believe that they are not just “an ethnic minority”, but rather as “indigenous people” in their own land, which is now part of Ukraine. For Ukrainians, “regional” identity is also prevailed. Majority of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars believes that all Crimean residents, regardless of ethnic origin, have common features, which distinguish them from ethnic groups outside Crimea.

Ethnic groups in Crimea (including Ukrainians) are characterized with very low level of identification with Ukrainian citizenship and with “Ukrainian People”; (*Ukrayinskiy narod*) and as a result, they are hardly integrated into Ukrainian state. The reason of low levels of integration of Russians lies mostly in the consciousness level, but in the case of Crimean Tatars consciousness level is overlapped with problems of their official recognition as citizens of Ukraine. Crimean Tatars, on the one hand, are the less integrated group into Ukrainian society, but on the other hand they are the only supporters of pro-Ukrainian (pro-Kyiv) political forces. There is no strong Crimean Tatar political

party, even if there exist one, it could not find any place in the Ukrainian Parliament because their potential supporters constitute only 12% of the Crimean population. Therefore Crimean Tatar political movements have to collaborate and make a block with other political forces. Most of the political forces are Pro-Russian, the alternative is Pro-Kyiv (or even nationalist) movements. Head of the Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemilev (2006) and Refat Chubarov (in previous election) were elected in the *Verkhovna Rada* as representatives of the party *Narodnyy Rukh Ukrainy*. In elections the 2004, and during the “Orange Revolution”, Crimean Tatars supported Viktor Yuschenko. In the Parliament election 2006, the votes of Crimean Tatars were divided between *Nasha Ukraina* and “Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko”.

After eighteen years of Ukrainian independence, there are still strong positions of Soviet identity among Crimean residents. Identification with Soviet past is mostly widespread among Slavic community in Crimea. People with salient Soviet identity are characterized by positive attitudes of Soviet times, to Russia and Russian language. They have negative attitudes towards restoring the Crimean Tatar place names, to Crimean Tatar status as indigenous people, to Ukrainian statehood (mostly Russians) and towards relations with EU and NATO in Ukrainian foreign policy. Salient Soviet identity among Russians is explained by threat that Russians feel after Soviet Union collapse and also by difficulties with introducing market economy in post-Soviet Ukraine. Salient Soviet identity among Ukrainians could be given as evidence that Ukrainians in Crimea were one of the most successful results of Soviet nationality policy: on the one hand they developed their ethnic identity (Ukrainians), but on the other hand they were completely Russified and they easily accepted their new Soviet identity.

Global factors also have influences on ethnic identity of Crimean residents. For each ethnic group global actors play first of all symbolic roles. They are parts of historical memory, actors of wars and conquest. These symbols participate in the friend-or-foe identification system. It is important to understand how the geopolitical inclinations of ethnic groups in Crimea go with official Ukrainian foreign policy. The degree of their coincidence has an influence on the level of integrity of these ethnic groups into the Ukrainian society and on the popularity of separatist movements. Russians and Ukrainians do not support current line of Ukraine’s foreign policy (orientation on the West), and Crimean Tatars are more loyal to it. Ukrainian integration into supranational blocks and organizations (first of all EU and NATO) is one of the most important factors for strengthening ethnic identity of Russians. For Russians and Ukrainians the most acceptable future for Crimea is to join Russia, Russian national autonomy within. For

Crimean Tatars it is the obtainment of the Crimean Tatar national autonomy or preserving the current status. Also we should stress on high degree of uncertainty among Crimean Tatar that gives the base to argue that their opinion could be changed under different factors in the near future.

Based on the results of this research we can argue that ethnicity and belongingness to Crimea (territorial identity) is the base for identification process of ethnic groups of Crimea. Historical memory is also one of the primary factors for shaping ethnic identity of each group. In case of Russians the core of ethno-territorial identity is also supplemented by the importance of Russian language and remains of Soviet identity. In case of Crimean Tatars, important factors are historical memory, ethnicity, territory (idea of Crimea as the only homeland) and religious belonging. Ethnic identity of Ukrainians is not as salient as it is among Russians and Crimean Tatars. They feel very close to Russians of Crimea and their behaviour almost coincides with Russian one. In some cases we could be able to mention the fact that there is an existing not separated “Russian” or “Ukrainian” identity but rather there is a common “Slavic” identity. At the same time they have citizenship identity, however it does not necessary mean positive attitudes to Ukraine. Strong positions of Soviet identity, weak ethnic identity and loss of culture give us the base to argue that Ukrainians in Crimea were one of the successful result of the Soviet nationality policy.

The primary task for future investigations is to conduct a qualitative research, first of all, in-depth interviews and focus-group, in order to corroborate and expand some results of this thesis, and to describe the system of stereotypes (self-perception and perception by others) of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. We already concerned correlation between ethnic identity and citizenship in this thesis, however we believed that future research should pay more attention to the problem of integration of ethnic groups of Crimea into Ukrainian civic nation. It will help us to answer the question “what will be the future of Crimea: consolidation of all ethnic groups around the idea of building Ukrainian civic nation, or Crimea as ethno-national project of one of the dominant ethnic groups?”.

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
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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF OPINION POLL ABOUT KNOWING LANGUAGES



**APPENDIX B: PRIMARY IDENTITY FOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN CRIMEA**



## APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY

Translated from Russian version

**1. What social group do you identify yourselves with firstly and secondly?**

- a) Crimean residents
- b) Representatives of own ethnic group (Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars etc)
- c) Representatives of religious group (Orthodox, Muslim etc)
- d) Citizens of Ukraine
- e) Soviet people
- f) Inhabitants certain settlement
- g) World citizens
- h) Europeans
- i) Asians
- j) Rossiyane (citizens of Russia)

**2. Do all Crimean residents, regardless of ethnic origin, have common features, which distinguish them from other groups outside Crimea**

- a. Yes
- b. Rather Yes
- c. Rather No
- d. No
- e. Hard to say

**3. Do you think that the existence of common features may lead to the formation of an integrated community of Crimean people in perspective?**

- a) Yes
- b) Rather Yes
- c) Rather No
- d) No
- e) Hard to say

**4. How important are the following features for you to feel yourselves as Crimean resident? (1 – not important; 5 – very important)**

a)	Common language of the majority of Crimeans – Russian language	
b)	Common motherland – Crimea	
c)	Positive attitudes towards Russia	
d)	Own territory – Crimean peninsula	
e)	Negative attitudes towards NATO	
f)	Aspiration to see Ukraine in the union with Russia and Belarus	
g)	Tolerant attitudes towards representatives of all nationalities and religions that live in Crimea	
h)	Common Crimean Holidays	
i)	Aspiration to strengthen the autonomous status of Crimea	
j)	Famous historic personalities connected to Crimea	
k)	Common history	
l)	Common traditions, customs	
m)	Crimean government, Crimean Constitution, Symbols of Crimea	
n)	Belonging to Orthodoxy	
o)	Historic names of places and geographic names	
p)	Negative attitudes towards Crimea as a part of Ukraine	
q)	Positive attitudes towards Soviet past	
r)	Common psychology and national character	
s)	Ukrainian citizenship	

**5. How well do you know the following languages?**

	Fluent	Do not know at all	Understand and can speak but encounter some difficulties	Understand in general but do not speak
Crimean Tatar				
Russian				
Ukrainian				

**6. To which culture do you belong?**

- a. Crimean Tatar
- b. Russian
- c. Ukrainian
- d. Soviet
- e. European
- f. Other

**7. Which culture will dominate in Crimea in future (in 20-30 years)?**

- a. Crimean Tatar
- b. Russian
- c. Ukrainian
- d. Soviet
- e. European
- f. Other





**37. Do you agree with the stereotype that ethnic and religious affiliations should correspond to each other? (Russian – orthodoxy, Crimean Tatar – Muslim, Jew – Judaism)**

- a) Yes b) No c) Exceptions are possible d) Rejected to answer

**38. Can a religious conflict occur in Crimea in the near future?**

- a) Yes b) No c) Hard to say

**39. What actors can the conflict occur between?**

- a) Orthodoxy-Muslim b) UOC-MP – UOC-KP c) Other \_\_\_\_\_ d) Hard to say

**40. If religious conflict begins, will you participate in it? (Only for the persons who think that the conflict is possible)**

- a) Yes b) No c) Hard to say d) Rejected to answer

**41. What foreign policy line of Ukraine do you support?**

- a) towards Russia b) towards the EU countries c) towards other CIS countries  
d) towards other countries e) hard to say

**42. Should Ukraine join the EU?**

- a) Yes b) No c) Hard to say

**43. Should Ukraine join The Union of Russia and Belarus?**

- b) Yes b) No c) Hard to say

**44. If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next Sunday, how would you vote?**

- a) Support accession to NATO b) Against accession to NATO c) Hard to say

**45. Would you like Crimea to...? (Mark all variants that you agree)**

- a. secede from Ukraine and become an independent state  
b. secede from Ukraine and join Russia  
c. secede from Ukraine and join Turkey  
d. preserve its current status with existing rights and powers  
e. become Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine  
f. become Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine  
g. become one of the regions/oblasts of Ukraine as it was before 1991

**46. Which of the following statements do you agree with?**

- a. Crimea is part of both Ukraine and Russia  
b. Crimea is part of Russia  
c. Crimea is neither part of Ukraine nor of Russia  
d. Crimea is part of Ukraine  
e. None from these  
f. Hard to say

**47. How do you estimate the Soviet past**

- a. positive  
b. there were some negative moments, but in whole it was positive  
c. there were some positive moments, but in whole it was negative  
d. negative  
e. neutral  
f. Hard to say

**48. How do you estimate your standard of living?**

- a. Poverty – money is insufficient even for food.  
b. All money is spent on food, it is difficult to buy other goods  
c. It is enough for life (well-provided), but it is difficult to make some savings  
d. Well provided, but it is difficult to buy some expensive goods (car, flat ets.)  
e. Can buy anything I want

**49. Have you faced any ethnic discrimination in the employment or educational sphere?**

- a) Yes b) I'm not but some of my acquaintances have faced c) No

**50. Do you think that discrimination against Crimean Tatars (and other deported people) exists?**

- a. Exist  
b. Rater exist  
c. Rather doesn't exist  
d. Doesn't exist

**Demographical part**

<b>51. Your sex</b> a) Male b) Female	<b>52. Your Age</b> a) 18-29 b) 30-39 c) 40-49 d) 50-59 e) Elder 60	<b>53. Your education</b> a) Incomplete secondary b) Secondary or secondary vocational c) Higher or incomplete higher	<b>54. Your citizenship</b> a) Citizen of Ukraine b) Citizen of Russia c) Citizen of other Country d) No citizenship e) Didn't give the answer
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**Place name**

**Type of settlement** a) City b) Town type village (*poselok gorodskogo tipa*) c) Village