MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1952 TO 2008: AN ACCOMODATIONAL AND CONFRONTATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1952 TO 2008:
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This thesis analyses the Muslim Brotherhood's fluctuated relationship with three of the Egyptian governments for the post-Revolutionary period. It is argued that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Governments were firstly accommodated each other during the legitimacy processes of the governments. However, after the Muslim Brotherhood began to use the governments' concessions to infiltrate the social and political field the Movement began to be seen as a threat by the governments and the relationship between the sides transformed to confrontation. At that point the turning points in the accommodation and confrontation relationship and particularly the political strategies of the both sides to protect their influences were analyzed by taking into account the domestic issues of Egypt, internal issues of the Muslim Brotherhood and international atmosphere.

Keywords: The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Governments, Islamic opposition.

ÖZ

1952-2008 YILLARI ARASINDA MÜSLÜMAN KARDEŞLER ÖRGÜTÜ VE MISIR HÜKÜMETLERI ARASINDAKİ UZLAŞMACI VE ÇATIŞMACI İLIŞKI

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Bu tez boyunca seksen yıldan daha uzun bir süredir var olan Müslüman Kardeşler Hareketi'nin 1952 Devrimi sonrası üç Mısır hükümeti ile yaşadığı inişli çıkışlı siyasi ilişki incelenmektedir. Bu ilişkinin, her iki taraf açısından öncelikle uzlaşma ve tavizlerle başlayan karşılıklı anlayışın hükümetlerin meşruiyetlerini kazanması ve Müslüman Kardeşler Hareketi'nin verilen tavizler neticesinde hem sosyal hem de politik nüfuzunu artırması sonucu bir tehdit haline gelmesi neticesinde karşılıklı algılamaların değişmesi ile çatışmaya dönüştüğü gözlemlenmiştir. Bu noktada her iki taraf açısından uzlaşmadan çatışmaya doğru evrilen ilişkinin dönüm noktaları ve tarafların kendi ekti ve güçlerinin devamı için izledikleri stratejiler özellikle siyasi yöne vurgu yapılarak ve gerek ülke içindeki gelişmeler gerekse uluslararası ve Hareket'in kendi dinamikleri göz önüne alınarak incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müslüman Kardeşler, Mısır Hükümetleri, İslami muhalefet.

This study is dedicated to my family…

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For almost three decades, especially since the Iranian Revolution, Islam has become more than a religion regulating the relationship between human beings and God for some Muslims. A substantial literature has thus emerged explaining the rise of "Political Islam", "Islamic Resurgence", "Islamic Revivalism", "Islamic Fundamentalism" etc. On this issue, the definition of an Islamist helps us to better understand the terms. In the broad and conveyable definition of Graham Fuller, an Islamist is:

> One who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion.[1]

In light of these arguments, when we view the definition of the Muslim Brotherhood made by its founder, Hasan Al-Banna, we see how he defined the Movement as a whole system that regulates all aspects of life. In a Congress of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1939, Al-Banna defined the Movement as: "(1) a Salafite call, (2) a way based on the prophetic model behavior, (3) a Sufi reality…; (4) a political association…; (5) an education society…; (6) an economic company…; (7) and a collective thought"[2]. As can be understood from the definition, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement was devised to have a capacity to penetrate many aspects of life, such as the social, economic and political facets, and maybe because of that strategy, its relationship with the Egyptian government has fluctuated since its establishment.

[1] Graham Fuller, *Future of Political Islam* , (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), XI.

[2] Zohurul Bari, *Re-Emergence of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt* (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1995), 24.

At that point, because of its activities in more than seventy Muslim or non-Muslim countries, and as a mother organization to many other Islamic Movements, it is not an exaggeration to say that among the other Islamic organizations the Muslim Brotherhood is the most wide-ranging. Moreover, with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, "political Islam in its contemporary, participatory and popular form emerged," in the words of Maye Kassem.[3]

Although Hasan Al-Banna benefited from the doctrines of his predecessors such as Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh or Rashid Rida, he differed from them in his support of the idea that Islamic values must affect the governmental system. Moreover, another difference was his envisagement of spreading the Islamic mission to people by following a bottom-up strategy, instead of embedding the religion in unneeded and very detailed debates; his approach transformed it into a practical system that could be applied not only by a select few, but by a wide range of ordinary people.

Because of the central position of the Muslim Brotherhood, its transformation and pragmatic survival policies for more than eighty years, this thesis analyses the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the three periods of the Egyptian government – Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak – as well as its survival policies for the period between the 1952 Free Officers Revolution and 2008. When we look at the revival of Islamism in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, we see that because of economic disillusionment and the defeat of the 1967 war, Islam became a more powerful alternative to Nasser's rigid secular and statist policies in Egypt, which was considered the heart of Arab nationalism in the 50s and 60s. With the replacement of Arab nationalist and secularist ideas by Islamic tenets in very short time, the process in which the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved in 1954 was reversed, and with the contribution of Sadat's relaxed policies, the Brotherhood entered a revival process in the 70's. Yet, the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement beginning in the mid-70s, the signing of the

[3] Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule,* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 134.

Camp David Agreement between the two countries in 1979 and the Iranian Revolution all coincided in the same period, and these years marked an important turning point for Islamists. The assassination of Sadat in 1981, the bombing of the World Trade Organization in 1993 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 were all other turning points during which Western media and academics focused on Islamists. The second man of Al-Qaeda, who was responsible from the 9/11 attacks, Ayman Al-Zawahiri; one of its commanders, Muhammad Atef; and one of the hijackers, Muhammad Atta, were all of Egyptian origin, and this increased the questions related to the perception of Islam and Islamic education in Egypt. At that point, although it had dealt with some violent events in its past, the Muslim Brotherhood drew attention to its mainstream line and condemned terrorist attacks. This presents a good example for exploring the divergence of radicalization and moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt.

Goals and Method of the Thesis

In this thesis the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian governments during the period of the post-1952 Free Officers Revolution is researched with a historical focus. Yet the Brotherhood's relationship with the Egyptian government was not limited to one of mutual action and reaction, for external and internal affairs impacted both sides; this paper attempts to analyze these factors as well.

In a country like Egypt, where religion occupies an important place in people's lives, religious feelings have been the chief sources of legitimacy for leaders. A trend toward religion increased the legitimacy of the leaders, who, especially during the years of consolidation, used it and maintained good relations with Islamic groups, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, whenever the government made an opening, the organization would use the chance to increase their sphere of influence in both the social and political field. Moreover, another investigated point in the study is the contribution of the collaborative behavior of the Movement, both with the governments and secular groups, to ensure its survival. Yet, without renouncing its "Islam is the solution" ideology and continuing to criticize the

governments for their ignorance of Islamic values, the position of the Brotherhood changed from a collaborator position to a threat. In the cycle of reconciliation and confrontation, many factors increased or decreased the time period of both sides' mutual utilization. This paper researches the policies implemented by each leader to establish his legitimacy in the first years after assuming power; in these consolidation years all of the leaders tolerated the Brotherhood and the Brotherhood tried to take advantage of this atmosphere by making concessions and softening its discourse. Second, this study analyzes the Brotherhood's policies to empower its grassroots and the turning points for the leaders after which the Brotherhood's policies began to be perceived as a threat. The mutual tactics used by both sides and how these methods influenced their rise to power were also researched. The interconnected network of relations required detailed historical explanations and an evaluation of the combined effects of many factors.

In researching the relationship between the two sides, key events with the potential to affect the situation were selected for deeper analysis. Moreover, how and with which tools each side represented their cases to the Egyptian people, as well as the arguments for the Brotherhood to obtain power and for the governments to remain in power were analyzed.

Today when one views the Arab countries it will be seen that Islamic, rather than secular, groups have taken an oppositional stance. At that point both the countries' governing systems, which are not in line with Western-style democracy, and their inadequate structures that fail to meet their people's needs led Islamic groups to define their arguments according to these problems. These Islamic groups serve as an alternative to the authoritarian regimes and give a voice to the social and economic problems of the Muslim countries, such as poverty, injustice, unemployment and lack of democracy; they claim Islam can reform the system and solve the problems. These Islamic groups have both empowered their grassroots with a bottom-up method and used the discourse of democracy since the 1990s in particular. However, whenever the Islamists discuss the issue of democracy, some doubts come to people's minds related to the compatibility of Islamic rules and Western style

democratic values. They question the Islamic groups' loyalty to the democratic values in their planned governments and the sincerity of their promises. Due to their doubts and the use of countries such as Iran and Afghanistan as examples, the Western world perceives the relatively more secular authoritarian regimes as the structures to be protected. As a result of this situation we see the struggle of the western-supported authoritarian regimes against the countries' democracy-endorsing Islamic opposition. This study draws attention to the ideological and tactical transformation of the Brotherhood against the Egyptian authoritarian regimes, which were trying to be seen as democratic, and the Brotherhood's loyalty to democratic values. Moreover, the Movement's shift to democratic behavior after the repressive policies of the Nasser period is investigated. In this regard, Wickham says, "Egypt suggests that democratic learning in non-democratic, nonwestern settings can be propelled by a mix of regime accommodation and repression. The partial opening of Egypt's authoritarian political system created opportunities for Islamists to compete for power and, as elected officials, represents the interests of a group much larger than their own ideological constituency".[4] And, according to Lisa Anderson, "The absence of a reliable, transparent institutional framework for political opposition to work within not only hampers the routinization of opposition of all kinds but magnifies the profile and broadens the constituency of 'rejectionist' or 'disloyal' parties".[5] As the Movement has not been tested yet, the question of whether the Muslim Brotherhood's approach to democratic values is pragmatic or instrumental remains unanswered.

This thesis also attempts to explain how the Movement managed to survive for eighty years under the reign of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian leaders, restrictive emergency laws and a coercive legislative structure. What concessions has the Movement made or what has it insisted upon without compromising its ideology? Is demanding democracy only a tool to gain power

[4] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics*, No.2, (January, 2004), 224.

[5] Lisa Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism," in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?*, ed. John L. Esposito, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 19.

for the future Islamic state? While Islamic tenets bring debates about equal rights for all citizens of society (including women and other religious groups), is it realistic to promise the implementation of democracy based on Islamic rules?

Another issue covered in the study is the Muslim Brotherhood's internal evolution and strife as an organization that tried to take advantage of the Egyptian government's opening policies. In this context the study tries to explain the internal debates of the Movement from the Nasser years until today.

Some academics[6] claim that the Islamic Movements' supporting role in society may be an underpinning factor for the inadequate authoritarian regimes. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is aware of this paradox, they have no alternative course of action because they cannot act as a legal organization. As Wickham points out, "authoritarian leaders typically use the administrative, legislative, and coercive powers at their disposal to limit opposition groups' access to the mass public…More generally, authoritarian regimes are sometimes willing to accommodate or are unable to prevent the existence of public institutions with a substantial degree of autonomy."[7] Yet, in fact, for an illegal or semi-illegal organization it is very difficult to find another way to survive except by spreading its grassroots network and improving its personal links. However, it may be said the results of this strategy are beginning to be seen with the increasing participation of the Brotherhood in the political system. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement has managed to survive for eighty years by evolving its role in society and by following a bottom-up policy in politics despite the constraints of the regimes. Since the establishment of the group, "preserving the survival and structural coherence of the movement has always been a top priority."[8]

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[6] Nicola Pratt, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Arab World*, (London: Lynne Reienner Publishers, 2007).

[7] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 63.

[8] Michaël Emerson, Richard Youngs, Samir Amghar, *Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean*, (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 66.

An important point regarding the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is that the representatives of the Movement have not been illiterate peasants (*fellahin*) or unemployed youth, but university students who are active and sensitive about social issues; professionals in Lawyers', Doctors' and Engineers' Syndicates; schoolteachers in social science and science university faculty; and white or blue collar workers in all of the social strata. The main active roots and contributors of the Movement have been coming from the middle and upper classes, and their efforts have been contributing to the society in which more than 40 percent are living under the poverty line and about one third of the population are illiterate. By contributing to the social sphere for years, the personal contacts of the Muslim Brotherhood increased the popularity, support and trust for the Movement. Regarding this issue Langhor argues that in the environment of authoritarian rule opposed to an Islamic agenda, due to the difficulty of operating in the political space, Islamic movements focus on social services (which would be reflected in a democratic state as seats in parliament) by doing this they undermine the government because they thus have a chance to show that they provide even basic services.[9] This thesis explains the social and welfare activities of the Brotherhood with examples of its activities in the professional syndicates and student unions.[10]

This thesis also analyses the Muslim Brotherhood's more mainstream and moderate policies against the militant Islam that emerged in the 70's in Egypt and both sides' divergence points to reach their ultimate goal of an Islamic state. For this, the book of second murshid Hasan Al-Hudaybi, Duah la Qudah, holds an important place in demonstrating the Movement's exclusion of the Qutb's ideology. The context of the book and its effect on the Movement's moderation is also investigated in this thesis. The question 'Is it an authoritarian or a democratic regime that makes an Islamic group more

[9] Langhor, Vickie. "Of *Islamists and Ballot* Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamists and Electoral Politics," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* (November 2001), 594.

[10] Antar, Noha "Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications," *(*October 2006), http://www.euromesco.net/images/51_eng.pdf, 4 (Accessed on January 10, 2008).

moderate or radical?' is also explored by taking into account the existence of both the radical and moderate sides of the authoritarian regimes of Egypt. Wickham argues that if authoritarian regimes make openings in their political systems, Islamist groups' actions will be more moderate and they will participate in elections, form parties and renounce violence. She says, "Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that enable an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of 'normal' competitive politics".[11] However, contrary to her arguments, another academic, Daniel Pipes, argues that the groups seeking an Islamic society and Islamic reform may differ in their tactics and ideologies and should therefore be referred to as fundamentalist, rather than moderate.[12]

The first chapter of this thesis explores the establishment stages of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ideology of its founder, Hasan Al-Banna, and the dissemination of this ideology under both the Egyptian Monarchy and British control. The second chapter is devoted to the Nasser period's statist and nationalistic applications and the regime's legitimization policies, such as its tacit social contract with people by providing advantages to its beneficiaries and Arab nationalism. In this chapter the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from supporting to opposing the regime, the internal strife of the Movement, the emergence of the Seyyid Qutb ideology and how the repressive policies of Nasser led to the radicalization of some members of the Movement are explained. Moreover Hasan Al-Hudaybi's efforts to soften the Movement are discussed.

The third chapter, titled *The Sadat Period and the Muslim Brotherhood*, highlights the lessons taken by both the new government and the Muslim Brotherhood from the first government of Egypt. In light of these lessons, how Anwar Sadat reproached the religious groups to establish his legitimacy and under the relatively quiet atmosphere how far the Muslim Brotherhood went to

[11] Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," 206.

[12] Denial Pipes, "There are No Moderates," *National Interest*, (Fall/1995), 48-54.

insist the application of Islamic rules, as well as the factors that collapsed and changed the direction of the relationship are explored.

The fourth and last chapter aims to explain the longest ruling government of Egypt: Hosni Mubarak's 28 years in power. This chapter divides the period into three stages: the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s. Some key events from each decade were chosen to show the transformation of the relationship from accommodation to confrontation between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood. First I summarize the legitimization policies of Mubarak and the quiet and hopeful environment of the 1980s. Later I look to some of the Muslim Brotherhood's strategies for growth and deepened infiltration in syndicates, university unions and political arena that portrayed the Movement as a threat to the Mubarak government. And lastly I explain how international events in the current decade led the Mubarak government to follow more open policies and how these policies restructured the ideology and actions of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the pragmatic actions the Brotherhood took to expand its power.

Limits and Sources of the Thesis

The thesis focuses broadly on the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood with the three different periods of Egyptian government during the period of the post-1952 Free Officers Revolution. Because of their interconnectedness, the internal issues of the Brotherhood, domestic issues of Egypt and international issues are evaluated together.

English and Arabic sources along with interviews with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were used in this thesis. Furthermore, a personal interview with the General Secretary of the Movement, Mahmoud Ezzat, from the Cairo Head Office of the Brotherhood was used.

The most important problem encountered during the thesis was researching an illegal organization that was banned 55 years ago in a country in which the secret service (muhabarat) is spread throughout the system. During my stay in Egypt for about seven months both the issue of gathering sources and speaking with people about the issue were very problematic due to the sensitiveness of the subject. Yet, observations during my visits to both the

north and south of the country, looking at old photos of families living in small villages and hearing stories from ordinary people were possibly the most important contribution to my personal knowledge; these stories gave insight into how these people have approached religion over the years. For example, when a student from Upper Egypt was proud of their resistance to the British occupation, it was easier to imagine Al-Banna's unease with the British occupation in the north. Similarly, photos of the 60s from small villages of Egypt showed the shift of people's appearance towards more religious attire. When the reason for the transformation was asked, the answer was generally the same: 'due to religion'. This experience provided a better understanding of the transformation and increase of religious sensitivity in the country since the 70s.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Having a population of almost 80 million, of which Muslims constitute nine tenths, Egypt represents the most populous Muslim country among the Arab states. Apart from its Paranoiac period, Modern Egypt has witnessed the conquests and rulers of many kinds of different alien dynasties and empires, ranging from the Assyrians, to the Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Mamluks, Ottomans, French and British. The country's Islamization and Arabization dates to its conquest by Arabs in the 7th century – the glory period of Islam. After the 7th century, Egypt's Islamic identity of Egypt continued uninterrupted. By carrying a blend of different cultural elements coming from its history, Egyptian society began to be known in the Muslim World for its Islamic education and its intellectuals, and its religious institution Al-Azhar became a symbol of Islamic education over time.

Islam has had an influential role in the lives of Egyptians since the seventh century. However, after its stagnant years during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule, Egypt witnessed the increased infiltration of the West beginning in the 18th century. After the 1798 invasion by Napoleon Bonaparte, Egypt was not only introduced to Western civilization's scientific and technical advancements, the seeds of modernism and French culture were also sown in the country. Furthermore, the British invasion in 1882 opened the country's doors to British culture. Westward-looking rulers of Egypt from Muhammad Ali Pasha to its independence also paved the way for Western Modernism, particularly for the elite strata sent abroad. For Egypt, although it won its independence in 1922, the Western prevalence in the name of 'protector' continued until the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution. During the confused political environment of Egypt's pre-revolutionary period, the country's indigenous people were still loyal to the regeneration of Islamic thought, inherited from the Islamic thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as

Sayed Jamal Ad Din Al-Afgani (d.1897), Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (d.1935).

Coming to Egypt as part of his missionary travels, Sayed Jamal Ad Din Al-Afghani's Pan Islamic ideas were based on the purification of religious belief and the political union of all Muslims for the aim of promoting and defending Islam.[13] Known as one of Afghani's most distinguished students, Muhammad Abduh believed in the need for Islamic reform, and in the years of Egypt's modernization process Abduh tried to find ways to reconcile Islamic principles and modern rationalism. While he was supportive of Islamic Reformism with the idea of openness of the "Gate of Interpretation (*ijtihad*)" he didn't follow the same reformist line for politics. After the death of Abduh in 1905 one of his students, Shayh Muhammad Rashid Rida, established the Salafiya Movement for religious reformation, but the Group more espoused Jamal Ad Din Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic program because of Abduh's position as a 'collaborator of occupiers' and under the intensive nationalist atmosphere in the country. The Movement's affinity was distant from the idea of *ijtihad* and was inclined to puritanical Wahhabi ideas, a trend that was reflected in its journal, *Al-Manar* (the Light House).[14]

When we look deeper into Egypt's conditions in the 1920s we see transformation in many fields, ranging from the more secular education system to transportation, the dissemination of intellectual communication through flourishing Arabic, French and English and telephone, telegraph and radio. Aside from the innovations, other changes in society including the visibility of women without a veil, the European-style dress of upper class men, the National Bank system allowing interest to be drawn, and, perhaps most importantly, the supplementation of a more secular civil law which framed some societal issues such as child marriage, divorce and inheritance issues all contributed to the public debates and increased the conservative orthodox Muslims' disquiet in the new process of modernization in the 1920s. Yet the

[13] Christina Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, (Hyperion Press, 1980), 117.

[14] The journal was established by Rashid Rida in 1898, before the death of Abduh. Yet, after the death of Abduh it began to follow a more fundamentalist line.

most shocking event came in 1924 from the newly established Turkish Republic: the abolishment of the Caliphate, which had been an organic part of Islam for almost thirteen centuries. In May 1926 a congress under the name of the Islamic Congress on the Caliphate (*Mu'tamar Al-Khilafah*) assembled in Cairo with the participation of thirty-eight delegates from the independent Muslim countries and Muslim Communities. And a month later another congress was convoked in Mecca. In general the issues of the feasibility of restoring the Caliphate and the methods of choosing him were discussed in the congress. Yet, the result was that the restoration of the caliphate was not possible at that time considering the conditions of political weakness, the disunity of Muslims, the position of Muslim people living under non-Muslim governments and the increasing affinity that was not for unification of Muslims but more for nationalistic ideas.

Under the debates of modernization, the Western infiltration of Egypt and the abolishment of the Caliphate Institution, some religious-political organizations were established in the country, one of which was *Jamaa Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin* (the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood), and has managed to survive until today. As the most popular Islamist movement of the twentieth century and the mother of many other Islamic movements in the world, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was established by Sheikh Hasan Al-Banna in Ismailiya in 1928.

The ideas of Hasan Al-Banna were influenced more by Rashid Rida's Salafist ideas than by Muhammad Abduh's modernist thought. In the 20th century, by the spread of a non-religious school system and literacy, Salafis were the first of the groups which were critical of the *Ulama's* deteriorating influence on social issues and defined themselves as *mutefekkirun* (intellectuals).[15] Yet, apart from the aforementioned Islamic personalities, Al-Banna had a vision of a state based on Islam.[16] Contrary to many of his

[15] Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, Muftis and Fatwas of the Dar al-Ifta, (*Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1997), 156-157.

[16] Diane Singerman, "Rewriting Divorce in Egypt, Reclaiming Islam Legal Activism, and Coalition Activism," in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization,* ed. Robert Hefney, (Princeton University Press, 2004), 158.

predecessors, he supported the idea of breaking ties to the West and ending the cooperation with colonial power.[17]

Al-Banna's project was to replace the secular state with an Islamic one and to implement the rules of *shari'a*. At another point also he deported from other modernist Islamists such as Al-Afgani and Abduh who believed that the reforms must be applied from above, but Al-Banna attached importance to mass action. He believed that grassroots mobilization and a bottom-up strategy were needed for the Islamization of the society, and only after this aim was accomplished would the capture of power be possible. Because of this difference the Brotherhood was called a *"neo-Salafi"*[18] movement. To explain the founding ideology and the improvement of the Muslim Brotherhood it is important to know the founder's personality and the conditions of Egypt in the early years of the Movement.

2.1. The Personality of Hasan Al-Banna and the Early Years of the Muslim Brotherhood

Hasan Al-Banna was born in 1906 in Mahmudiya, in the Delta region, a son of Ahmad Al-Rahman Al-Banna Al-Saati who was a graduate of Al-Azhar University and worked as an imam, a teacher in a mosque and a watchmaker.[19] The elder Al-Banna was a follower of the orthodox Hanbalite school of Islam and Hasan Al-Banna was influenced by this doctrine in his early years. Al-Banna attended the Rashad Religious School between the ages of eight and twelve. After the age of twelve he joined different religious groups and actively participated in them during his school years. According to his memoires, which were analyzed by Braynjar Lia, Al-Banna was attracted to the *dikr* ceremony in the Hasafiyya Sufi Order at the age of twelve and he later became a fully

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[17] Yohannes Okbazghi, *Political Economy of an Authoritarian Modern State and Religious Nationalism in Egypt, (*London: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 60.

[18] Schulze Reinhard, "Islamischer Internationalismus im 20.Jahrhundert," (Leiden: Brill,1990),90 quoted in Skovgaard-Petersen, *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, Muftis and Fatwas of the Dar al-Ifta, 1*56.

[19] Richard P.Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1.

initiated disciple (*murid*) of the Order. When he was a student, Al-Banna partook in three different Islamic associations. He was elected president of one, the Society for Ethical Education *(Jam'iyyat Al-Akhlaq Al-Adabiyyah)*. Here the member students were taught the rules of strict religious life, how to obey God, their parents and elders. And in the case of their 'deviation from the path of Islam' they were fined. The second association was the Society for the Prevention of Prohibited Actions *(Jamiyyat Man' Al-Muharramat).* The main function of this Association was to write letters to sinners neglecting their prayers or failing to observe their fasts in Ramadan. At the age of thirteen he became the secretary of the Hasafiyya Society for Charity *(Jamiyyat Al-Hasaffiya Al-Khayriyyah)*; the aims of the Society were the preservation of Islamic morality, condemning some behaviors such as alcohol, gambling, and prevention of missionary activities; for example, at that time three women were conducting missionary activities in Mahmudiya district and afterwards the activities were ended by the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood.[20] The head of the Hasaffiya Society for Charity, Ahmad Al-Sukkary, became a very influential person for Hasan Al-Banna in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the following years.

Between the ages of fourteen and seventeen he studied at the Primary Teachers Schools in Damanhur district, near his village. Here he immersed himself in Sufism, as, Lia notes, during his early youth years two important things had been important for him. The first was his loyalty to Sufi thought and the second was his observations during the Egyptian nationalist uprising against the British in 1919. From his memoires we learn that at the age of thirteen he was also one of the protesters in his district, Damanhur, against the British; once he read a nationalistic poem against the British in a protest and he even tried to negotiate with police officials while they were suppressing the demonstrators. When it is taken into consideration that young students were

[20] Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 144-145.

active in the demonstrations, Al-Banna's assertion in his memoires relating to his activism at that age does not seem impossible.[21]

At the age of sixteen, Al-Banna moved to Cairo and attended Dar Al-'Ulum Faculty, which served as a teacher-training school at Cairo University.[22] Sayyid Qutb, an important ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, graduated from the same faculty years later.

In Cairo, Al-Banna realized that the mosque was not enough for the spread of Islam, and he organized a group of students from Al-Azhar University and Dar Al-'Ulum Faculty to preach and offer guidance in the countryside. Following his graduation from Dar-Al-Ulum he was appointed in 1927 to teach Arabic to a primary school in Suez Canal Zone City, Ismailiya, the headquarter of the British garrison.[23] Here, besides his day classes for children, he began to conduct courses for parents at night.[24] When he was in Ismailiya he kept up his relationship with Cairo and wrote for *Majallat Al-Fath*, the magazine of the Young Muslim Men's Association, and had a relationship with Rashid Rida's *Al-Maktabah Al-Salafiyah* group and its journal, *Al-Manar*, which was later edited by Al-Banna between 1939-1949.[25] While Al-Banna was a member of the Young Muslim Men's Association since its establishment in 1927, he believed that the Association was not enough for the education of youth who were under the influence of disseminated Western customs. As a schoolteacher and a man who was an ardent and eloquent speaker, Al-Banna's aim was to furnish the people with practical knowledge of Islam because he believed that the Ulama were distant from the people and

[21] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942, (*Ithaca Press, 1998), 25-27.

[22] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 1-2.

[23] Ibid.,6.

[24] Ibid.,7.

[25] Azzam Tamimi**,** *Islam and Deocracy in the Arab World,* http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/6_islam_and_democracy.htm, (Accessed on June 1, 2009).

their discussions were too academic so their agenda was not providing much benefit to ordinary people.[26]

A well known story of the Brotherhood occurred in March of 1928 with a visit of six members of the British Camp labor force to Al-Banna and they made an oath to God to be "troops for the message of Islam"; in the meeting Al-Banna said that "we are brothers in the service of Islam; hence we are the Muslim Brothers".[27] Yet although the informal oath was accepted as the beginning of everything, the more formal establishment happened one year later.

It may be concluded that depending on the social, political and economic conditions affected by the domestic politics and continuing foreign powers in the post-First World War period many substantial issues including the colonization of the Muslim World by Western powers, the spread of Westernization in the Islamic world, Muslims' distance from Islamic values and abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 sowed the seeds for the establishment of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mind of Hasan Al-Banna in the 1920s.[28]

By the late 1920s' secular modernization process, corruption in the political order and iniquitousness in the economic system had become very apparent in Egypt and the people began to feel a need for an alternative system.[29] In Ismailia Al-Banna observed the gap between the poor Egyptians and the British people's luxury lives. Many public services such as light, sanitation, water and even the roads and entrance to Ismailia were under the control of the British Suez Canal Company, and names of some streets were not Arabic. While Europeans were enjoying their privileged positions,

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[26] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 55-56.

[27] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 8-9.

[28] Walid M. Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt, Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981,* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 33.

[29] Okbazghi, *Political Economy of an Authoritarian Modern State and Religious Nationalism in Egypt*, 58.

Egyptians were serving them. In those years Al-Banna was blaming the Sheihks of Al-Azhar for their failure to lead people to Islam and their inadequacy to prevent British and American missionaries from proselytizing Muslims. He reached the conclusion that the poverty of the Muslims in Egypt was stemming from the domination of foreigners in the country.[30]

The aim of Hasan Al-Banna was the "reform of hearts and minds, to guide Muslims back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations and conduct created by European dominance"[31]. In the periodicals of the Muslim Brotherhood three things were represented as the enemies of Islam. The first was Israel; the second was the crusade of the West and the third one was Communism. All three were alleged to weaken the "homeland of Islam".[32] According to Al-Banna, Islam was not only a religion for one's individual life but also a system encompassing all aspects of life, and the aim of the Movement was to establish an Islamic state. Al-Banna believed that Muslims had to return to the faith and the Muslim World was assaulted by the West's "abuses that have done injury to their (Muslim) dignity, their honor, and their independence, as well as commandeered their wealth and shed their blood" and, for him, the Islamic state was "more complete, more pure, more lofty, and more exalted than anything that can be found in the utterances of Westerners and the books of Europeans".[33] In this respect one of the most known slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood has been "God is our purpose, the Prophet our leader, the Qur'an our constitution, Jihad is our way and dying for God's cause our supreme objective."[34] Yet at that point Lia reminds us that contrary to some

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 48.

[32] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 42.

[33] Al-Banna, Hasan, *Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail Al-Imam Al-Ahahid Hasan al-Banna*, (Translated by Charles Wendell, Berkeley: University of California Publications: Near Eastern Studies, 1978), 48.

[34] Amira Howeidy, "Politics in God's Name," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (16-22 November 1995).

writers' inclination to portray Al-Banna as an enemy of Westerners, he did not reject the Western thought entirely; he even referenced the Western authorities in some of his writings in *Majallat Al-Fath* and later in the late 1930s in *Jaridat Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (*Newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he was against the imitation and emulation of Western customs by some Egyptian elite without question.[35]

According to Al-Banna's vision, although Western knowledge in technology was better, it was not capable of providing spiritual satisfaction. He was open to Western innovations such as the press, microphone, telephone and radio because they served the Movement's dissemination and he dressed in a European style; however, he was strictly against the Western encroachment on the Islamic way of life in the process of secularization in the Egypt. He contemplated that an Islamic state would nationalize the national resources, banks and rid the Egyptian economy of its foreign monopoly. For Al-Banna, there were three stages for a theoretical revolution. The first was propaganda activities to educate people about an Islamic revolution. For this mission, organizational branches were established and lectures, educational workshops and seminars were run. The second stage was the consolidation of the Movement including organizational loyalty, ideological clarity and proper instruments for putting their ideas into practice. The third one was the execution stage. In this stage the secular state would be methodologically replaced by an Islamic state.[36]

The first members of the Brotherhood around Ismailiya directly communicated with people via mosques, clubs, and other meeting places and even in their homes. In the words of Mitchell,

> In the first three years of the life of the society, its primary goal was the enlargement of its membership in and around Ismailya. Al-Banna and selected deputies pursued this goal by direct contact, touring the countryside on the

[35] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 31.

[36] Okbazghi, *Political Economy of an Authoritarian Modern State and Religious Nationalism in Egypt*, 63.

> weekends and during vacations, preaching the most usually in mosques but also in homes, clubs, and other meeting-places of the people. The use of the mosques gave the speakers the legitimacy and respectability they needed. Direct communication with the people in their homes, at their work, and in their places of leisure added to that legitimacy the quality of sincerity and personal touch.[37]

For Al-Banna, the caliphate was a symbol of the relationship between the state and religion and the unity of the Islamic World against the Western World. Although religion and the state were not differentiated prior to the eighteenth century, after that time the penetration of the Western thought – secularism, European style nationalization and socialism – led intellectuals and non-Muslim minorities to question the unity of Islam and the state. And the Muslim Brotherhood was seen by Al-Banna as a platform for the revival of the caliphate in the environment of divisions in the Islamic World, colonialism and the assault of the West, and Egypt would be the centre for the Islamic Umma.

More than a politician or an ideologue, Al-Banna was an organizer and an activist[38]; in this respect, in the first four years of the Movement, the Ismailiya, Port Said, Abu Suwayr and Shubra Khit branches were opened. In Ismailiya an old house was bought for a headquarters; a mosque was built in 1930 and afterwards a school for boys, a club and a school for girls were founded. The same structure was followed in building other branches.[39] At that point Lia says that with the completion of the Mosque Project and other structures the Muslim Brotherhood transformed from a 'Society' into a 'Movement'. The formal registration of the Brotherhood as an Islamic charitable society also took place in 1930.[40] Regional sections in different governorates (*muhafazat*) had increased from 4 to 15 by 1932 and the number

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[37] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 9.

[38] Mohammed Ayoob *The Many Faces of Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 70.

[39] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 9.

[40] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942,* 41-43.

of the Brotherhood's printed publications had also increased from 300 in 1938 to 2000 in 1948.[41] Highlighting the difficulty of giving an accurate count of the Brotherhood's members and affiliated services, Harris estimates the number of its Egyptian branches as reaching fifty by 1934 and five hundred by 1939. In October 1953 when one Muslim Brotherhood official visited the U.S. he asserted that the estimated number of members reached two million and its branches reached 2000, and that 85 percent of the university students enrolled in the Federation of Students were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.[42]

Hasan Al-Banna was asked by the Society for Islamic Culture in Cairo, headed by Abd Al-Rahman Al-Banna, the brother of Hasan Al-Banna, to merge the two Societies, and the Ismailiya branch later declared the Society's headquarters would be transferred to Cairo. Lia says that in July 1931 a branch was opened in Cairo and Al-Banna was able to obtain a position in a primary school in Cairo; thus the following year the Brotherhood's headquarters was opened in Cairo. According to Lia, the year 1931 was substantial because the first steps were taken for the Muslim Brotherhood in that year: first, the Society expanded to Cairo; second, Al-Banna presented himself as the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in *Majallat Al-Fath* magazine; and third, Al-Banna's first *rasa'il* (tract) to the members was printed.[43]

The move to Cairo meant the establishment of links with Islamic circles there, and the Brotherhood found a chance to reach the students in Al-Azhar, civil servants, white-collar workers, urban laborers, some officers and soldiers from the army and a large number of peasantry. Yet, after the departure of Hasan Al-Banna a putsch took place in Ismailiya due to treasury issues and the problem of finding a deputy to fill Al-Banna's position for the branch, and that situation created a crisis between 1931-1932. As a conclusion, six members expelled and the tension was solved for a time. According to Lia the internal

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[41] Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications,"(October 2006), http://www.euromesco.net/images/51_eng.pdf,, 7.

[42] Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 159.

[43] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 42-43.

crisis had a further meaning in terms of the differences between Al-Banna and these expelled members on the perceived mission of the Muslim Brotherhood. For those members the mission was simply to be a charity organization to serve people by teaching Islam and constructing mosques and other structures for that aim; nonetheless, for Al-Banna, the mission of the Brotherhood was more than other Islamic charities of the 1930s and was based on a less bureaucratic structure and procedures but a more inward loyalty. According to him, one of the main aims of the Movement was to become the prevailing ideology. Following the crisis, Al-Banna began to intervene in politics; as an example, in July 1933 the Brotherhood prepared a letter to urge the Ministry of Interior to act on the increasing prostitution in the country [44]

In May 1933 the Muslim Brotherhood conducted its first General Conference, the main issue of which was missionary activity in the country. A letter was sent to King Fuad to warn him of the missionary activities of the foreign powers and the need for reform in the country.[45] In 1934, the second conference was made and it was decided to establish a press, *Majallat Al-Ikhwan* (Newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood). In the third conference of 1935 the issue was membership criteria and responsibilities; the hierarchy and structure of the Movement were also defined.

In their 1936 program, the priority was strengthening relations among the Muslim countries to unify the Islamic world, and in 1938 Al-Banna said that the Movement's main aim was to restore the institution of the caliphate and to harmonize the educational, economic and social policies between Islamic countries by treaties and conferences.[46] In the 1930's other Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territory were also under the mandate of Western powers and those countries' victimized position also strengthened the idea of caliphate. In 1938, Al-Banna stated that:

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[44] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 60-68.

[45] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 14-15.

[46] Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt, Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981*, 34-35.

> The *Ikhwan* believes that the Caliphate is the symbol of Muslim Unity, and the link between the Muslim peoples. The Caliphate is a religious office to which all Muslims should give considerable thought and importance…The Muslim Brotherhood gives top priority to the restoration of Caliphate. At the same time they believe that this necessarily requires considerable preparation, and that the direct step to the restoration of the Caliphate must be preceded by various stages. [First of all] there must be complete educational, social, and economic cooperation between all the Muslim peoples. [These steps should then be] followed by treaties, meetings, and conferences between the Muslim countries…[47]

By inspiring the idea of the unification of Muslims and the revival of caliphate, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to establish branches in other countries, which in time infiltrated society and political activities. The first Brotherhood branches were established in 1937 in Syria and Lebanon, but it is estimated that until the end of the Second World War, branches in the Islamic world were far from working actively; rather they were representing personal relations and sympathizers of the Brotherhood in these countries. In 1946 branches in Palestine, Jordan and Sudan were established. Al-Banna's ideology included not only political unity but also Islamic unity, by neglecting discussions on the details of religion; thus, one of the main principles was to avoid debates on the different applications of religious practices.

In the second half of the 1930s a more sketched out discourse against the imperialist policies in the Islamic World was emphasized and naturally the Palestinian issue occupied their agenda. The Palestinian revolts against the British mandate between 1936-1939 influenced Egyptians as well as other Arabs in other countries. The Palestinian issue ensured the importance of the Brotherhood for years due to the victimized position of Palestinians. The partition plan of Lord Peel, Head of the Palestine Royal Commission, in 1937 revealed the possibility of a Jewish state including the city of Jerusalem (*Al-Quds*). Apart from the victimized position of the Palestinians, the possibility of

[47] Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 163.

having a Zionist state on their borders made Egyptians more sensitive to the Palestine issue and the weakness of the Egyptian government during the 1930s also decreased the legitimacy of the Egyptian government. Wafd leader Nahhas Pasha's signing of the 1936 agreement with the British under the title of independence also contributed to the perception of Egyptian-British cooperation. Concerning the increased tensions in Palestine in 1937 the Brotherhood organized a conference on the Palestinian issue, and in 1938 Arab delegates who had come to Cairo for a discussion on Palestine were accepted by the Muslim Brotherhood in its headquarters. During the conference, the Supreme Committee for Relieving Palestinian Victims was founded. Hasan Al-Banna and one of his associates were representing the Muslim Brotherhood in the Committee. All these efforts contributed the Brotherhood's infiltration of Palestine and attracted some Palestinian students studying at Al-Azhar University.

During the events there were many groups in Egypt also ready to bring the issue to the agenda and the most known among them was the Young Muslim Men's Association (YMMA). Although they collected more money than the Brotherhood, the difference was that while the YMMA's aid was mainly from the upper class or the Royal family, the Brotherhood's aid was coming from the lower-middle class or the middle class. The Palestinian events empowered the Brotherhood's relations with politics and played an acceleratory role in increasing the number of Brotherhood branches four times in the process of five years after the end of the revolts. Although some claim that during the Palestine campaigns the Brotherhood exploited the issue by not rejecting the contribution of the Palestinian events in encouraging the youth to participate in the Movement, it must be also taken into consideration that they been very sensitive towards the issue since the early 1930s and there was already continuing criticism against imperialism in its members' writings. In addition, the Movement was already active in more than a hundred villages and districts in the first half of the 1930s and it obtained approximately a thousand new members in 1935. Nonetheless, the Brotherhood's anti-British propaganda and the participation of the Egyptian government's troops with British power

in Palestine also led to the increased criticism in the Brotherhood's leaflets, books and journals against the British influence in Egypt. The Brotherhood began to make a large number of demonstrations and made hard decisions in its 1938 student congress to protest English and Jewish goods and sent voluntary members for the defense of Palestinian territories. Yet the intense campaigns led to constraints by police and the British Intelligence Agency, such as restrictions on collecting aid and police searches of the Brotherhood's head-office in the 1938-1939 period.

During the campaigns, the Brotherhood was closer to some politicians in the government, such as Abdurrahman Azzam Bey, Muhammad Allube Pasha, Ali Mahir Pasha, Seyh A-Meragi and some others. But the rapprochements were not seen as convenient by some members and led to the departure of some members from the Movement because they neither accepted the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in politics nor its use by the Royal Family against the Wafd Party under the leadership of Nahhas Pasha. The dissident members complained about Al-Banna's autocratic prevalence in the Movement as well, and they had doubts on the use of aid collected for Palestine. Hasan Al-Banna did not accept the accusations of his close involvement with politicians and highlighted the need to "bring the Islamic mission to the rulers and make it known to them".[48] Although the Brotherhood had given messages related to politics from the very beginning, the first concrete statement came in 1938 at a student conference given by Al-Banna. He highlighted the all-encompassing nature of Islam both in society and politics and the duty of Muslims to stand against the imperialists.

> O ye Brethren! Tell me, if Islam is something else than politics, society, economy law and culture, what is it then? Is it only empty acts of prostration, devoid of pulsating hearth?...O ye Brethren! Did the Koran reveal a complete, perfect and elaborate system to mankind just for this?… This narrow interpretation of Islam and these closed boundaries to which Islam has been

[48] Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 249.

> confined is exactly what the adversaries of Islam want in order to keep the Muslims in place and make fun of them.[49]

Nonetheless, Al-Banna was not supporting political parties and he thought that the Egyptian parties were artificial and were serving their own interests more than national interests. For him, the parties in Egypt were mostly representing personal disagreements rather than real political differences, and they were not contributing to the improvement of people's welfare; contrarily, their disagreements were strengthening the foreign interventions in the country. When Al-Banna supported a government without the party system (*Illa hizbiyya*) this position was harshly criticized by the Al-Wafd Party, the biggest party of Egypt at that time. Lia notes that the position of the Brotherhood does not necessarily mean that Al-Banna was against democratic principles; he was mostly against the occupation of the political field by the country's rich upper class (*ayan, ashraf*). [50]

In the late 1930s and 1940s, political life in Egypt was lively. In the fifth conference in 1939 – also the tenth anniversary of the society – Al-Banna delineated the society as "a salafiya massage, a sunni way, a sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company and a social idea."[51] Because of the opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood to secular and liberal ideologies, the Brotherhood was perceived by King Faruk as acting against opposition groups, particularly against the newly elected Al-Wafd Party. The Muslim Brotherhood's position prompted reconciliation with the state, particularly compared to another opposition party, the Young Egypt Party. The Party leaders perceived that they had been eclipsed due to the Brotherhood's criticisms against the Wafd Party, so they began to use the concepts of the revolution and tried to position themselves as the defenders of Islam. Yet, in the early 1940s the Young Egypt

[49] Quoted in Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942,* 202.

[50] Ibid., 253.

[51] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 14.

Party's cadre began to be detained while Al-Banna's Movement continued to exist because of Al-Banna's balanced opposition.

After the British entered the war the pressures against the opposition groups in Egypt increased. The British pressured the Egyptian government not to allow or tolerate any kind of anti-British activity. Furthermore, some dissident personalities including the leader of the Young Party, Ahmed Husayn, the head of the YMMA, Salih Harb, and Prime Minister Ali Mahir were also detained. In this respect, Hasan Al-Banna preferred to adopt a pragmatic position and he softened his criticism against the British, embracing a more reconciliatory attitude because even only criticizing the inadequate social policies of the government cost them the closure of their journal in 1939. Likewise, due to the high tensions in the country, the Movement shunted the issue of political involvement and decided to wait until things had calmed down; Al-Banna's strategy was to pursue a low profile. By seeing the difficulty of politics, the Muslim Brotherhood intensified its activities in society via mosques, branches and social aid; thus they managed to survive while the other dissident groups lost their influence in politics. Al-Banna defined the conciliatory period as similar to the period between the agreement of Hudaybia and the Badr War during the time of Prophet Mohammad. In this period, before the victory of Badr, the Prophet had also preferred to wait for a while. Furthermore,he did not want the members to oppose the leadership of the Movement but to submit to their decisions. However, seeing the more radical views in other parties, some groups in the Muslim Brotherhood were critical of Al-Banna's reconciliatory behavior, and they fought with police in demonstrations that resulted in their detentions. From some points Al-Banna's reconciliation policy was stemming from Mahir Ali Pasha's appointment to his new post as prime minister in 1939. It was the year when the Second World War broke out, and the voices of enthusiastic members called for fighting. Hasan Al-Banna interestingly stressed that the first fight must be an inner fight to be a better Muslim and to be a genuine believer. After the departure of a radical group called Muhammad's Youth from the Movement in 1939, the

Brotherhood continued its activities in the 1940s, and in 1941 its branches numbered roughly 500, and after three years the number was 1000-1500.

In the summer of 1940 British power forced Egypt to participate in the war, and in the fall of the same year Prime Minister Ali Mahir lost his post. After the event the discourse of the Brotherhood turned again to political issues and anti-imperialist form. Pro-British Hasan Sabri Pasha was appointed to the post of prime minister and in the spring of 1940 the government prohibited the Islamic Al-Manar journal. In the 1941 congress of the Muslim Brotherhood the anti-British nature of the Movement was raised again and for the first time in history the nationalization of the Suez Canal was brought to its agenda. A month after the congress, at the end of 1941 February, Al-Banna learned of his appointment to a country town in Upper Egypt, Kena, as a teacher; actually this was banishment due to the Movement's last actions. After Al-Banna left for Kena his position in Cairo was temporarily filled by Ahmed As-Sukkary. Actually his departure for Upper Egypt contributed to the improvement of the Movement in the south of the country. During this time some provocateurs began to pressure the government for the return of Al-Banna to Cairo. In the end Al-Banna's return to Cairo was allowed, but Al-Sukkary was detained shortly afterwards. In these days, Al-Banna saw the increasing trend of radicalism in the Movement and urged members not to go further, such as by demonstrating or giving statements, adding that if there was any provocative action he would expel those members from the Movement. Due to Al-Banna's softened attitude, Al-Sukkari was released from the prison. Nevertheless, the British were still concerned about the continuity of the Royal support for the Movement, and both Al-Banna and Al-Sukkary were detained again, whereupon 11000 signatures were collected nationwide by the members of the Brotherhood, and demonstrators took to the streets against the detentions. In the midst of the war any possible tension or any kind of attempt of a 'religious revolution' was not acceptable for the government that was concerned about the escalation of the events due to increasing tensions. Due to the events Prime Minister Husayn Sırrı Pasha decided to release Al-Banna and Al-Sukkari. After his release Al-Banna decided not to trust the Monarchy anymore, as it could

not prohibit his detention and could not provide protection for himself and for his Movement. However, while the radical view against the government and the British prevailed in the country, Al-Banna decided to soften the Movement's policies.

In 1942, as a result of a military coup supported by British Mandate, Mostafa Nahhas Pasha was appointed to the prime ministry post, and although the British forced the new prime minister to suppress the Movement, Al-Nahhas Pasha preferred not to intervene.

On the eve of the 1942 March parliamentary elections seventeen members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Hasan Al-Banna, announced their candidacy for the coming elections. After this decision Al-Banna declared himself a candidate from Ismailiya, but under the influence of the British authorities, Nahhas Pasha persuaded Al-Banna to withdraw from candidacy in return for some promises to the Brotherhood. Al-Banna didn't insist much about his participation in the elections; however he wanted a promise from the government for the freedom of the Movement for full-scale operations and action against the sale of alcoholic drinks and prostitution. Here it must be said that although there were some maneuvers in the 1940s to influence politics through public statements or limited support for groups or individuals, the overall aim of Al-Banna was the Islamization of the nation before gaining power. As Ayoob argues, both Hasan Al-Banna and his successor Hasan Al-Hudaybi did not envisage a return to the time of the Prophet but they affirmed that their envisioned Islamic State could be compatible with the existing Egyptian constitutional parliamentary system.[52]

Nahhas Pasha agreed to the demands of Al-Banna and allowed some activities of the Group, including the distribution of some publications and holding meetings. In March of the same year Al-Banna declared his support for the Al-Wafd government, but from the end of 1942, relations between the

[52] Ayyoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 71.

Brotherhood and the Wafd began to be unstable. While some factions in Al-Wafd were supporting Al-Banna others remained opposed. [53]

Al-Banna thought that not only the West was guilty; the political leaders of the Muslim World were also responsible for the backwardness and Western Imperialism in the Muslim countries. Thus, according to him, Muslims had to "stand up to the dictators of the Islamic World".[54] The Muslim Brotherhood was the first organization in Egypt to draw attention to the Zionist aim to infiltrate Palestine in the 1930s and to send volunteers and military assistance there in the 1940s.[55] The Muslim Brotherhood's contribution to Egyptian national forces to defend Palestine, Suez and to oust the British authorities from the country all increased the group's legitimacy and sympathy amongst the Egyptian people. The Muslim Brotherhood began to be a grassroots movement not only because of its Islamic ideology but also because of its cultural legitimacy stemming from Egyptian patriotism (independence and nonalignment) and the Arab national struggle (anti-Zionism and anti-Imperialism).

Since its establishment the Muslim Brotherhood has had two strategies: One has been strategic and the other has been tactical. The strategic principle has been calling for an Islamic country based on *shari'a* over the long term. According to its ideology, the current order in Muslim countries, including Egypt, was corrupted because of their non-Islamic implications. The tactical principle was that the Muslim Brotherhood has been seeking nonviolent ways for the transformation of the country by raising the consciousness among the people and the Muslim rulers.[56] In the discourse of Hasan Al-Banna, Islamic society was defined as "a society of justice based on good deeds and morals,

[53] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 27.

[54] Denis Joseph Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. the State*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 42.

[55] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 42.

[56] Ibid., 39.

but institutionalized by the state."[57] However, although the Muslim Brotherhood was established as a nonviolent organization, a paramilitary organization was formed as a secret faction in 1942,[58] and it has been claimed that the secret apparatus were involved in the assassinations of the Movement's opponents.[59] Members of the group assassinated the Judge Ahmed Al-Khazindar and Prime Minister Nuqrashi in 1948.

Al-Banna sent a letter to King Faruq in 1947 asking him to abandon imitation of the West and establish a system based on Islamic rules by applying "Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic military spirit, Islamic health traditions, and scientific studies, Islamic morality and an Islamic economic system". Banna's call for the replacement of secular law with *shari'a* (Islamic law) resulted in the dissolution of the organization by King Faruq.[60] In 1948, the Movement was dissolved based on the accusations that "the organization after it grew strong, assumed 'political goals' and the secret apparatus was created and a rover group was trained to assist it in the ultimate political goal of taking power".[61] As retaliation to the dissolution of the Movement, Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Al-Nuqrashi was assassinated by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1948. Less than three months later, on February 12 1949, despite his condemnation of the assassination,[62] the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna was assassinated.

By then the Brotherhood's members numbered one to two million people and the profile of the organization had been transformed into an

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[57] Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications," 7.

[58] Nachman Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press,2005), 25.

[59] Ninette S. Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt. State-Society Relationship*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 83.

[60] Ibid, 42

[61] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 75.

[62] Leiken, Robert S. and Steven Brooke , "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Affairs,* (March/April 2007), 108.

effective membership.[63] By 1950 its student members won a majority in some of the universities in Egypt.[64]

2.2. Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Structure (*Tanzim*) of the Brotherhood shows the inner hierarchy of the Movement. Until it was banned in 1954, its structure was known, except for its special apparatus (*Tanzim Al Khass*). Yet, after this year the structure of the Brotherhood became unclear under the repressive conditions of the country.

Amr Elchoubaki argues that the reason for the survival of the Movement after many years of conflicts is its strong structure. He says that from its establishment, the multi-tiered structure of the Movement allowed it to recruit members from different sectors of society, different ages and backgrounds.[65] It is also argued that the structure is the key center as the Brotherhood has been a mass movement.[66]

The main institutions of the Muslim Brotherhood are the Guidance Office (*Mekteb Al-Irshad*) and the Consultative Council (*Majlis Al-Shura*), which are headed by the General Guide (M*urshid Al-Am'me*). The Guidance Office comprises twelve to sixteen members. Today, most members of the Guidance Office are from Cairo and the other members of the Office are from Upper Egypt and the Egyptian Diaspora. The Consultative Council is convened twice a year by the General Guide. It is made up of seventy members that serve four-year terms. The General Guide represents the Movement to the government and the public. Moreover, he has the authority to invalidate

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[63] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 42.

[64] M. Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt, Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981,* 33-34.

[65] Amr Elchoubaki, "*Vague Comfort*," Al-Ahram Weekly, 22-28 January 2004.

[66] Hesham Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 62.

decrees of the Investigation and Discipline Committee and to suspend the members of the constituent body, the highest body of the Movement [67].

The Brotherhood's structure was fixed in the third Congress of 1935 and revised in 1948 and 1951.[68] The terms of the Guidance Office and the Consultative Council were limited to four years of Hijri calendar but there is no limit for the General Guide.[69]

Regarding the criteria for and the election of the General Guide, the Movement refers to two different documents that dictate its organizational structure and leadership. The first document is 'the articles of association of the Muslim Brotherhood', which was issued in 1945 and modified in 1948. The second document is the constitution of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'the Public Order of the Muslim Brotherhood', issued in 1982. Article 19 stipulates that the General Guide and the elected members of the Guidance Office must be members of the same constituent assembly, which is said in Article 34 to be the Consultative Council and the General Assembly of the Guidance Office. Article 17 of the Association and Article 13 of the Public Order also stipulate that the General Guide must remain at his post as long as he lives unless there is a compelling reason to give it up (in Article 13 it is stipulated as "as long as he is qualified for that"). Its meaning is that the General Guide is likely to occupy the post until he dies, as was the case for the previous Guides.[70]

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[67] Diaa Rashwan, "Jama'a Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin fi Masr" (Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), **i**n *Al-Harakah Al-Islamiyah fi Al-'Alam (Islamic Movements in the World),* ed. Diaa Rashwan, (Cairo: Al Ahram Center For Political and Strategic Studies, 2006), 31.

[68] Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications," 8.

[69] Rashwan, "Jama'a Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin fi Masr" (Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), 31.

[70] Ibid.

The founder of the Movement, Hasan Al-Banna, defined the three levels of membership in *Memoirs of a Call and Proselytizer* as below:

> 1. General membership. Candidates have to declare their commitment to piety and to fill and sign an application form, which when approved entitles them to become assistant brothers.
> 2. Brethren membership. In addition to the obligations incumbent upon general members, candidates are required to safeguard the faith and pledge obedience. They become associate brothers.
> 3. Active membership. To graduate to this level candidates are required to provide a range of detailed personal information, study MB doctrine, attend weekly Qur'anic sessions, speak Classical Arabic whenever possible, educate themselves in general social affairs, and memorize a minimum of 40 Sayings of the Prophet. This earns them the title active brother. [71]

In addition to these memberships, the fourth was jihad membership, which was for active members. However, the Movement declared its break from violent ideology in the 1970s. In addition to the abovementioned duties, the members of the Movement had to "follow the Prophet's traditions, perform extra night time prayers, lead a life of abstinence, shun un-Islamic practices in worship and business, make financial contributions to the Guidance Bureau and Call Fund, bequeath part of their estate to the Brotherhood, exhort others to piety and discourage sin, carry a copy of the Qur'an at all times and prepare themselves for a period of special indoctrination sponsored by the Guidance Bureau".[72]

[71] Amr Elchoubaki, "Vague Comfort," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, (22 - 28 January 2004).

[72] Ibid.

In his famous work on the Brotherhood, Mitchell gives the following schema for the structure of the Movement in the 1960s:



Figure 1: General Table of the Movement
(Source: Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 164.)

In an interview in 2000, senior member of the Guidance Office Issam Al-Erian explained the structure of the Movement. According to him, the following sections constitute the Brotherhood: Social services, *dawa* (religious missionary work), Students, Workers, University Faculty Clubs, Muslim Sisters, Sports Training, the Islamic World, Professional Syndicates. The Political section also includes the information committee and the parliamentary

committee, which encompasses Brotherhood members in the parliament. In the 1980s, to increase the efficiency of the group and present a stronger challenge to the despotic leader as a non-recognized organization, the Brotherhood decentralized and the Guidance Office assumed the responsibility for the main policies related to the government.[73]

[73] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 219.

CHAPTER 3

THE NASSER PERIOD: 1952-1970

As a result of the military coup on July 23, 1952, a group of young army officers, known as the Free Officers, under the leadership of Muhammad Naguib, overthrew the monarchy and after a domestic struggle for leadership, Gamal Abd Al-Nasser assumed the presidency and occupied the position until his death in 1970.

Nasser's years coincided with the second Muslim Brotherhood *murshid*, Hasan Al-Hudaybi; who served as murshid for more than two decades (1951-1973) through years of crisis and dissolution. The relationship between Nasser and the Brotherhood passed through different stages. As Omar Ashour argues, the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with Nasser ranged from alliance and coordination to differences and frustrations and then to an outright hostility.[74] In the first period, roughly between 1952-1954, the revolution was supported by the Brotherhood, and they had mutual benefits after the abolishment of the unwanted Monarch and British power. In the days following the Revolution, Al-Hudaybi met with President Muhammad Naguib and Prime Minister Ali Mahir to assert the Muslim Brotherhood's demands for civil liberties, release of political prisoners, and constitutional reform to make it compatible with Islam. Although there was a rapprochement between the Officers and the Brotherhood in the first phase of the Revolution, later on, the Officers looked to minimize the connection with the Movement.[75] The second

[74] Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalisation of Jihadists,* (London, New York : Routledge, 2009), 42.

[75] Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement,(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996), 98.

period began with the dissolution of the Brotherhood in 1954 and lasted until the 1967 defeat of the Arabs in the war with Israel. In this destructive period, the Brotherhood was compelled to move its activities underground, and there was an absence of opposition because of the restrictions of the Nasser regime. The third period occurred between 1967 and 1970, the year of Nasser's death. Following the defeat of 1967 defeat, Egypt experienced protests against the government and Nasser began to use a more religious rhetoric.

3.1. Consolidation of Revolutionary Regime

During his 18-year reign, Nasser gained legitimacy from his social policies and his struggle against "Zionism" and "Imperialism", as well as from his protracted use of nationalist, secular, and revolutionary discourse. In the first months of the revolution there was hope for a friendly relationship with the Brotherhood, but the new regime still had some mixed feelings for the Movement. Besides a "guarded optimism," fear of Brotherhood's roots and street power as well as mistrust toward the Brotherhood's leadership, particularly Hasan Al-Hudaybi, affected the regime's relationship with the Movement.[76]

As the revolution increased "consciousness" and "inspiration" among the Brotherhood ranks against oppressors of Egypt, it was greeted with enthusiasm by Brotherhood members. A declaration drafted on July 26 and released on August 1 by the Muslim Brotherhood was an indication of its support for the revolution. In the declaration, the revolution was called a 'blessed movement' by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including the father of Hasan Al-Banna; it was seen as "the prelude for a new dawn" for the country.[77]

In the late forties and early fifties some members of the Brotherhood were secretly occupying some positions in government. For a while Anwar Al-Sadat belonged to the Movement, and it is said that even Nasser belonged to the Brotherhood and hid some arms and documents with some Brotherhood

[76] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 98.

[77] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 105.

members.[78] The murshid of the Brotherhood in the seventies and eighties, Umar Al-Tilmishani, even claimed that Hasan Al-Banna established the Free Officers, and that the Brotherhood played an important role in their assumption of power in 1952.[79] Although the Officers did not hide their previous ties to the Brotherhood in the first months of the revolution, strained relations between the sides led the Free Officers to deny any role played by the Brotherhood from the history of their revolution. In this respect, the aim of the Brotherhood was to liquidate the other mass groups by cooperating with the regime to influence the system and take over the whole system in the future.[80]

In the period of consolidation after the revolution, the Nasser government and the Brotherhood benefited from each other. The regime's call for voluntary party purges and the government's appointment of regency were welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, a discord during the first months, between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, came on the issue of land reform. In August, the Guidance Office of the Brotherhood(*Maktab Al-Irshad*) approved the ceiling number of *feddans*[81] for a landowner, but in early September, before the measure became law, it changed the ceiling number from two hundred to five hundred *feddans*. The event was an indication of Al-Hudaybi's duplication, in the eyes of the Officers.[82]

As a sign of the regime's positive approach towards the Brotherhood, the Revolutionary Command Council (thereafter RCC) abolished the Interior Ministry's secret police service, including Muhammad Al-Jazzar, who was known for his attitude of hostility against the Muslim Brotherhood and was involved in the assassination of Al-Banna. "Enemies of the Brotherhood" were arrested, and in October 1952, the Brotherhood's political prisoners were released.

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[78] Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World,* (London: Routledge, 1991) 102.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., 135

[81] Feddan is a unit of area.1 feddan = 4200 square metres(m^2)= 1.038 acres.

[82] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 99.

Nasser even offered the Brotherhood three ministries, but this offer was refused by the Guidance Office of the Brotherhood. Actually, Al-Hudaybi had offered two names, Hasan Al-Ashmawi and Munir Al-Dilla, both of them were loyal to Al-Hudaybi, to the RCC without asking the Guidance Office, but they were refused by the RCC because of their lack of experience. Hasan Al-Baquri, a leader in 1930s in the activities of the Brotherhood on campuses and a potential rival to Al-Hudaybi in the Guidance Office, was approved by the RCC to be appointed as Minister of Pious Endowments (*Wasir Al-Awqaf*). His selection displeased Al-Hudaybi because he did not want to see a rival in the ranks of the government. His appointment was refused by the Guidance Office of the Brotherhood, but he had already been appointed by the RCC, and his name was announced. His appointment as a religious figure and as an old friend of Hasan Al-Banna also contributed to enhance the legitimacy of the new regime.[83] After Hasan Al-Baquri's appointment was announced publicly, he was forced by Al-Hudaybi to leave the Brotherhood's Guidance Office.

The Guidance Office's decision was later explained on two grounds: "(1) the fear that the Society would lose its 'popular' quality, i.e. sully itself with power; (2) the fear, hinted at by Neguib in his resistance to the idea of Brothers in the cabinet, of bringing down the wrath of foreigners and minorities on the regime and thus complicating its problems." The appointment's refusal was a sign of the Guidance Office's reluctance to participate in the government. Zollner argues that the Al-Baquri crisis proved that the Brotherhood was not sure about the level of cooperation with the new regime. This was an important event to show the divisions between the regime and the Brotherhood, but it was still early for the regime to abandon the support of the Movement. [84] As will be seen later, the issue came to the agenda again with the release of the September 1952 Parties Reorganization Law, which subjected parties to army control under the Ministry of Interior.[85]

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[83] Ibid, 100.

[84] Barbara H.E.Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology (*Routledge Studies in Political Islam, 2009*),* 28-29.

[85] Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation,* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 132.

After cabinet crises in October, Rashad Muhanna, a supporter of Islamic state in the post of regency in the RCC, was dismissed from his post and sentenced to life imprisonment because of a disagreement on the power conflict between the RCC and the regency. The event uncovered a disharmony in the regime and was perceived with doubt by the Brotherhood, as Muhanna was seen as a person who shared the same aims. From the beginning of the revolution, the Brotherhood explicitly and implicitly had announced the idea of an 'Islamic State'.[86] According to the Brotherhood's claims, some minor changes in the country's legal code were made; however, Nasser refused the implementation of whole shari'a in the Egyptian system.[87] To dispel the Brotherhood's doubts, the RCC appointed three members of the Brotherhood to serve on the Constitutional Committee set up on 12 January 1953.[88]

As a gesture of mutual goodwill, the Brotherhood supported the RCC when it abolished university unions in November 1952. Yet, the support resulted in antagonism from the Wafdists and Communists toward the Brotherhood, and after a member of the Brotherhood announced an "open war" against "red communism", a bloody riot took place between the communists and the Brotherhood on November 15.[89]

[86] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 107.

[87] Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 43.

[88] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 109 and Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 101. The members are stated by Mitchell as Salih al-Ashmawi, Abd al-Qadir Auda and Muhammad Kamal Mustafa but Gordon differs on the names and he states the nominated members were Salih Al-Ashmawi, Munir Al-Dilla and Hasan Al-Ashmawi.

[89] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 106.

3.2. Dissolution of Existing Parties and Internal Strife in the Muslim Brotherhood

Only six months after the revolution, on January 16, 1953, all of the existing parties were abolished by law. Eight days after the dissolution of all the parties, a corporatist political system, known as the Liberation Rally (*hay'at al takhrir*)[90], was established to "fill the vacuum between the people and the regime".[91] Mitchell says the Rally was a "people's movement" and "was also to become a nucleus of a political organization to replace the abolished parties."[92] With the slogan of 'unity', the Liberation Rally was used to win the support of students, trade unions and other groups, including the Brotherhood, against the idea of a parliamentary system[93] The Muslim Brotherhood was also invited by the regime to participate in the "direct representation".[94]

In this atmosphere the Muslim Brotherhood was exempted from the dissolutions on the ground that it was not a party, but only a religious association, and thus it became the only powerful oppositional group in the country.[95] Actually, the status of the Muslim Brotherhood was very ambiguous: was it a political party or a religious association? Brotherhood members had attempted to register the Brotherhood as a party several times. In March 1951, for example, some Brotherhood members had wanted to register as a political party to participate in the upcoming (but later postponed) elections. At that

[90] The Liberation Rally was reorganized under the name of National Union (NU) from the year of 1958 to 1961, from the year of formation of a union between Syria and Egypt until its dissolve. It was declared that candidates of the Assembly must be members of National Union. The Arab Socialist Union not so different from National Union and represented as a political organization from 1962 until 1978. Although the number and size of the professional syndicates also increased in the Nasser years, all professional association boards were dissolved, and from the beginning of 1958, board members were required to belong to the National Union and later Arab Socialist Union.

[91] Darek Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1990,* (London: Routledge, 1993), 39.

[92] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 109.

[93] Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1990, 39.*

[94] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 31.

[95] Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule,* 137-138 and Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 46-47.

time, the application process had created an internal crisis in the Movement and dissident members increased their voices against Al-Hudaybi. Because Al-Hudaybi was opposing the efforts of the members and he insisted that the Brotherhood remain as a religious association. Yet the Naguib government's September 1952 decree for the Party Reorganization Law revived the demands to form a party. The dissenting members called themselves the Free Brothers (*Al-Ikhwan Al-Ahrar*) and pushed for the discussion of the matter in late September at the Consultative Council of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Majlis Al-Shura*). They also demanded Al-Hudaybi's resignation and limiting the Murshid's term to three years. The Consultative Council of the Brotherhood met on October 4 to discuss the Brotherhood's position of becoming a political party. Al-Hudaybi was still opposed to this demand, claiming the Brotherhood was a religious association, and did not participate in the meeting on the grounds of his health complaints. In response to the increased tensions in the Movement, Al-Hudaybi submitted his resignation on October 6, and two days later the Muslim Brotherhood was registered as a political party. After a week, as a result of his supporters' persuasion, he withdrew his resignation and, without asking the Consultative Council and Guidance Office, he submitted another application to register the Brotherhood as a religious association.[96] Al-Hudaybi's application to register the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious association was accepted by the regime and the Brotherhood thus managed to be exempted from the dissolution of parties in early 1953. Zollner argues that while the Consultative Council of the Brotherhood was confident of playing an active part as a political party, Al-Hudaybi rejected the idea.[97] However, the ambiguous situation would engender disastrous results for the Brotherhood in 1954.

Internal events of the Brotherhood did not seriously affect the government's attitude toward them. The regime at that time could not afford to lose the support of the Brotherhood. Increasing tension between the regime and other parties in the fall of 1952 also necessitated the continuation of the

[96] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 100.

[97] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 29.

relationship with the Brotherhood. In return for their exemption, the Brotherhood welcomed the dissolution of all parties. After the dissolution and tacit support of the Brotherhood, a delegation from the Brotherhood visited Nasser to talk about the future of the country and, in the words of Mitchell, demanded "a commanding voice in affairs of state".[98] Gordon argues that although the regime tried to enlist Brotherhood leaders into the Liberation Rally there were still some doubts on both sides. For the regime, the Brotherhood began to be perceived as a rival demanding shared power; for the Muslim Brotherhood, although it proposed to assist Nasser to shape the government, it was concerned about being subsumed under the ranks of a secular nationalist regime.[99]

One month after the dissolution of parties, on February 13, 1953, prominent members of the regime, including Neguib and Nasser, visited the tomb of Hasan Al-Banna on the fourth anniversary of his assassination. In the same month, Al-Hudaybi accepted an offer from British officers to discuss Anglo-Egyptian affairs. Although Al-Hudaybi asserted that the Rally approved the meeting provided that the Brotherhood would report its content to the government, later, particularly in the process of the Brotherhood's dissolution in 1954, the Rally used the meeting to weaken the Brotherhood's position, claiming Al-Hudaybi granted some concessions to British. Anglo-Egyptian talks proved abortive, and in May 1953 guerrilla warfare was initiated by the regime. Although at the beginning Al-Hudaybi refrained from deploying the Brotherhood irregulars in the Canal Zone, increasing criticisms later forced him to support the regime and send "liberation squads" to the Canal Zone.[100]

Despite all the doubts, both sides continued to make concessions to show their mutual consent. In August 1953, a pro-government member of the Brotherhood was appointed as a liaison officer between the Rally and the Brotherhood, and as the Rally's new director of religious guidance.[101] In mid-

[98] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 111.

[99] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 101-102.

[100] Ibid., 102.

[101] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 111.

October almost all of the political prisoners, except those who had been convicted of arson, murder, and espionage from 1936 until the revolution, were released by the new regime. Although the Brotherhood had been involved in the assassinations of ex-Prime Minister Nuqrashi, Waftist minister Amin Uthman and judge Ahmad Al-Khazindar, the Nasser regime made a special exception, pardoning those responsible for these crimes to maintain good relations with the Brotherhood. As a measure of the compatibility between the two sides, the government renamed a street in the municipality of Alexandria as "Shari'a Hasan Al-Banna" in late October.[102]

Internally, dissident members of the Brotherhood were still questioning the leadership of Al-Hudaybi. Besides his dual behaviors in the past, such as the Hasan Al-Baquri crisis, he was still not welcomed by the ex-friends of Hasan Al-Banna and the old members of the Movement. He was a judge before his enrollment in the Brotherhood, and due to the lack of a leader and the rift within the Movement he was offered the leadership although he was not previously a member of the Brotherhood. At the beginning, he had occupied the position temporarily upon some members' insistence, but the temporary situation turned permanent. He did not have Al-Banna's charisma and was criticized for transforming the Brotherhood into "a movement of words, not action". Moreover, in the eyes of some members, such as the friends of Al-Banna, he was still not acceptable due to his pre-and post-Brotherhood behaviors, because, according to them, he was not seen as religious enough for the leadership.[103] Al-Hudaybi's reaction to the guerilla warfare in the Canal Zone and his previous meeting with British affairs were also other reasons for him to be criticized by the dissident members.

Abd Al-Halim says that the Brotherhood split into three groups in its rapprochement with the Nasser regime.[104] The first group, supportive of Nasser, was composed of Secret Apparatus members and expelled members.

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[102] Ibid., 112.

[103] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*,107.

[104] Mahmud Abd Al-Halim, "Al Ikhwan Al Muslimin: Ahdath Sana'at Al Tarikh: Ruyah Min Al Dakhil," *(The Muslim Brotherhood: Events Which Made History: View From Inside*), (Dar al- Da'wah, Alexandria: 1985), 463.

Al-Hudaybi was against the Secret Apparatus and supported more intellectual and missionary efforts; therefore, there was a disagreement between Al-Hudaybi and the members of the Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood. The second group, aware of Nasser's hostility and the coming repression of the regime against Al-Hudaybi, supported the dismissal of Al-Hudaybi. For while there was ostensibly an accommodation by the RCC towards the Brotherhood, the regime was not keen to share its power with other groups and there was a personal antagonism between Nasser and Al-Hudaybi.[105] And in the third group, the majority of the members backed Al-Hudaybi against Nasser and his regime.

Pertaining to this issue, Zollner argues that in the years of Egypt's reshaping after the revolution, the aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was to affect the political system by co-opting the government, but the internal strife between Al-Hudaybi and the Secret Apparatus of the Movement contributed to the Movement's persecution. Nasser used the division within the ranks of the Brotherhood for his aims, as he was also an opponent of Al-Hudaybi and his leadership.[106]

In late 1953, the Muslim Brotherhood began to be perceived as a disquieting factor by the regime. On December 18, 1953, the Free Officers decided that it was better not to fight explicitly against the Brotherhood, but to incite disputes inside the Movement.[107] Some of the General Guidance Office members and the Secret Apparatus of the Movement were persuaded by Nasser to oppose their leadership. Nasser promised to recognize the new leadership if Al-Hudaybi were overthrown. Actually, in the first months of the revolution the Officers had a close relationship with younger Brothers, such as Hasan Al-Ashmawi, Salah Shadi, and Sayyid Qutb, but the problem was that these members were in Al-Hudaybi's circle. In the course of time the Officers

[105] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,*107.

[106] Zollner, Prıson Talk:The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Presecution,1954 to 1971, *International. Journal of Middle East Studies,* No. 39 (2007), 411–433.

[107] Salah Shadi, *Hasad Al-U'mr: Safahat Min Al-Tarih)(Harvest of Life: Pages from History*, (Al-Kuwayt: Sharikat Al-Shu`a 1981), 224.

established contacts with Al-Hudaybi's dissenters and enemies to undercut his authority from inside the Movement.[108] Gordon says that in the early 1953 the Officers established ties with the dissidents to resume their attacks on Al-Hudaybi. The most prominent figure against Al-Hudaybi was Salih Ashmawi[109], who was the leader of the Secret Apparatus at that time. In the autumn of 1953, Nasser met with some opponents in the Movement with the aim of convincing them to act against Al-Hudaybi.[110] One of the dissenting groups from the Secret Apparatus raided Al-Hudaybi's office, and a second group went to his home to force him to resign, but the attempt was not successful. After a long conflict between the factions in the Movement, Al-Hudaybi won the debate, and dissidents, Salih Ashmawi, Muhammad Ghazali, and Abd Al-Aziz Jalal were expelled from the Brotherhood.[111]

3.3. The First Wave of Confrontation with the Nasser Regime and Dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood

While the regime had expected the internal fracture of the Movement, the victory of Al-Hudaybi after the power struggle within the Movement was a disappointment for Nasser. A confrontation took place with the Brotherhood students and government affiliated secondary school students against young members of the Liberation Rally on January 12, 1954. According to eyewitnesses' statements published in *Al-Jumhuriya* newspaper for the events of January 12, Mitchell writes*:*

> On 12 January 1954 the students of the university, led by the Muslim Brothers, met for their annual commemoration of the 'martyrs' of the university. During the speech making, an army jeep appeared carrying a loudspeaker and passengers identified as belonging to the leadership of the

[108] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Revolution,* 99.

[109] After the assassination of Al-Banna he led the Movement for about two and half years. He was also the owner and editor of Majallat al Da'wa, the journal of the Movement. He headed the Secret Apparatus after Al-Sanadi. He was the person who recruited Seyyid Qutb to the Brotherhood. After Al-Tilmisani assumed the leadership in 1973 he came back to the Movement.

[110] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 32.

[111] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers,* 124.

> government-sponsored Liberation Rally and Youth Formations. Outside the gates of the campus, members of the Liberation Rally of neighboring secondary schools gathered and waited. The jeep loudspeaker, a short way from the crowd already assembled group of Brothers was followed by an exchange of words and slogans and then a battle, which brought the students outside the gates into the campus with banners and weapons, end which ended in scores of injuries and the burning of the jeep.[112]

The confrontations were followed by a series of arrests. A day after the events the Cabinet decided to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood, which was announced on January 15, 1954. The dissolution decree claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood was registered as a political party, although it had been canceled by the application of Al-Hudaybi, so it was subjected to the 1953 Law for the abolishment of parties. After the decree, a media campaign began targeting Al-Hudaybi, attacking him more than the Brotherhood.[113]

It was announced that the Brotherhood was planning to overthrow the regime, was building a military force, and had links with British power, referring to Al-Hudaybi's meeting with British officials one year before. In the following days, 450 members of the Brotherhood, including its leaders, were rounded up. In late January, more than one hundred recently arrested members were released, but close members to Al-Hudaybi remained in detention.

Another source of Nasser's displeasure in this period of high tension was the Brotherhood's backing of President Naguib. On February 25, Nasser removed President Naguib from his post. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd members, and the other leftist groups demonstrated against Nasser's decision and called for the release of their arrested members and the return of Naguib to his post. Naguib was soon returned to his post and released the arrested members of the Muslim Brotherhood on March 25.[114] Following a conflict

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[112] Ibid., 126.

[113] Haggai Erlich, *Students and University in Twentieth Century Egyptian Politics*, (Frank Cass Publishers, London 1989), 172-173.

[114] Abd Al-Halim, Al Ikhwan Al Muslimin:Ahdas Sana'at Al Tarih *(The Muslim Brotherhood: Events Which Made History: View From Inside*), Dar al- Da'wah, Alexandria: 1985, 266-267.

between Naguib and Nasser in April, Nasser seized power again with the aid of many prominent Free Officers.[115]

In August of 1954 Nasser made his pilgrimage, which has been interpreted as an indication that although he was opposed to Brotherhood, "he was no less a Muslim than they."[116] On October 19, 1954 Nasser signed an agreement with British Minister of State Anthony Nutting for the evacuation of the British military from the Suez Canal Zone.[117] Although the evacuation was a welcomed end to British existence in the country, some groups, including the left and the Brotherhood, opposed it. The Brotherhood's criticism laid in some clauses in the agreement that allowed Britain to return in some cases and also in Nasser's acceptance of the evacuation "without a struggle," and it continued to provoke demonstrations for the end of the military regime.[118]

3.4. The Manshiya Event and Its Aftermath

October 26 is an important date for Muslim Brotherhood because of the events on that day and their aftermath. While Nasser was delivering a speech in Manshiya Square in Alexandria on October 26, 1954, a member of Brotherhood, Mahmud Abdel Latif, opened fire on Nasser. Although it is not exactly known if the Muslim Brotherhood planned the event or if Nasser used it to repress the Brotherhood, the Nasser government blamed the Brotherhood for the event though detained Brotherhood leaders denied their involvement in the incident.[119] When the events following the incident are analyzed, it seems that Nasser benefited more by getting rid of the Islamists from the RCC and portraying the Brotherhood as vulnerable. Regarding this point, Zollner recalls splits in the Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood and a possible conspiracy plot

[115] Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society*, 39.

[116] Ibid., 95.

[117] James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 46.

[118] Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society*, 42 and David W.Lesch, "Abd'al Nasser and the United States: Enemy or Friend?," in *Rethinking Nasserism Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt*, ed. Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, (University Press of Florida,2004), 210.

[119] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p 148-151, see also Ayubi, *Political Islam*, 103.

between Nasser and some radical members of the Secret Apparatus, such as Al-Sanadi and Al-Ashmawi, who turned to Nasser after they fought with Al-Hudaybi.[120] The assassination attempt, called *minha* (humiliation), was later used to push the Brotherhood from the stage, and its image was deteriorated through association with terrorist activities. Moreover, on November 15, Naguib was dismissed from the presidency under the pretext that he was conspiring with Brotherhood and was sentenced to house arrest.[121]

Tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members, including the second General Guide Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb, were rounded up. Brotherhood properties were attacked, and even ordinary members or some considered to be affiliated with the Brotherhood were arrested in very short time. While some of them were put on trial or sent to military trials on the grounds of planning and executing a coup d'état, others managed to escape to other countries, in particular Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Verdicts began to be announced on December 4. Seven defendants, Hasan Al-Hudaybi, Abd Al-Qadir 'Auda, Yusuf'Tal'at, Hindawi Duwayr, Ibrahim Al-Tayyib, Shaykh Muhammad Farghali and alleged assassin Mahmud 'Abd-Al-Latif were given the death sentence. On December 5, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was officially dissolved. The death sentences, except for Al-Hudaybi, were carried out on December 7. Al-Hudaybi was pardoned and his verdict was commuted to life imprisonment. In the following days another nine death sentences, seven of them members of the Guidance Office, were commuted to life imprisonment, and thousands of other members filled Egyptian prisons.[122]

The Brotherhood members who were on Nasser's 'wanted' list in 1954 and stood trial in 1954 and 1955 were civil servants, teachers, clerks, workers, craftsmen, professionals, police, and army officers; many were students.[123] In the remaining years of the Nasser term the Movement was suppressed in a similar way as were other political powers in the pre-1954 era.[124]

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[120] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 29.

[121] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 148-151 and Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 13.

[122] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 38.

[123] Ayubi, *Political Islam,* 81.

All the arrests and persecutions led the remaining leaders of the Brotherhood to review their relationship with the government and ways of confronting the persecutions. In the first years, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to survive without a formal network. Personal relationships in and around mosques helped them to be in contact.[125] Zolner argues that until 1957, silence prevailed in the Brotherhood as an indication of disillusionment and internal collapse; the news of deaths, torture and ill treatment of the Brotherhood members in prisons also contributed to their despair.[126]

3.5. Nasser's "Social Contract" and the Demise of the Muslim Brotherhood

While the Muslim Brotherhood was endeavoring to survive, the regime's repression was not the only reason for the absence of opposition on the societal level,. Besides his charisma, indoctrination, and nationalization policies following the 1956 Suez War, Nasser's redistribution policies were referred to as a 'social contract' between the state and the non-elite population. The all encompassing, highly centralized and revolutionary regime tackled the socio-economic problems of the country, particularly in its first decade of government. The state provided goods and services in exchange for the people's support of the regime. The policies of employment in the public sector, and subsidized food, energy, health and housing for the lower and middle class helped to increase the people's standard of living.[127]

Another part of the social contract between the state and the people was increased access to education and a guaranteed public sector job for graduates. Although the first educational priority was the primary schools, under the banner of "everyday a new primary school," to increase the literacy level among citizens following the revolution, Nasser expanded the state bureaucracy and made an effort to meet the manpower need by making higher and university education available for all the sectors of the population. By

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[124] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic,* 23.

[125] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 29.

[126] Ibid., 39.

127 Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam,* 23-24.

providing more money for education, the number of students enrolled in primary school increased by 234 percent; in higher education the number increased 325 percent; and annual university enrollments increased from 51.681 in 1952/53 to 161.517 in 1969/1970. However, after the mid-1950s independent student unions were banned in universities. After police troops were placed in the campuses in the early 1960s, the youth section of the government sponsored party became the only channel for students. In 1956 and 1961 university fees were reduced, and in 1962 all the fees were abolished and many privileges were provided for students. Thus, the university system was opened to non-elite families' children. Besides this, the 1960s' expansion of the public sector coincided with the graduate appointment policy, *siyasat al-tayin*. Between the years of 1962 and 1970 public employment increased 70 percent in the country. [128]

The state was aware that Islam could be used as a powerful legitimating tool; therefore, it turned to the ministry of Waqf and Al-Azhar Ulama for help. But as the institutions did not have the social capacity to mobilize people; it only served to destroy their prestige and empower the opposition. In the field of civil society Nasser was aware of the importance of syndicates, as they were able to mobilize the educated middle class, which was a potential risk. To eliminate the risk the government amended laws related to syndicates and appointed the syndicates' officials itself. After 1962 the regulations were changed to force any candidate for a leading position in syndicates to be a member of ASU. Toward labor unions Nasser followed more cooperative policies as they had the potential to be manipulated by opposition groups, including the Brotherhood.[129]

Banning all political parties; dissolving or reorganizing other mass movements not agreeing to co-opt with the regime, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood; and the establishment of the National Arab Union in 1957 and the Arab Socialist Union in 1962 all allowed the regime to maintain control of

[128] Ibid., 25-29.

[129] Maha Abdelrahman, *Civil Society Exposed, The Politics of NGOs in Egypt*, (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2004), 95-96.

the society's mobilization.[130] Nasser's populist and "quasi-socialist" policies tried to solve the problems of Egyptians until the mid-1960s. However, the economic growth halted with the 1967 defeat, and the increasing population and military spending also destroyed Egypt's economy.[131]

3.6. The Effect of the Sayyid Qutb Ideology and the Muslim Brotherhood

Nasser's post-1954 repressive term resulted with the exposé of radical Islamic thought, and Sayyid Qutb was the pioneering figure of this radicalism. Although the Brotherhood gradually evolved into a more moderate and centrist political movement and he is not considered as a Brotherhood spokesperson today, Qutb has been generally recognized as a leading figure affecting the Movement in its most frustrated years. Qutb had defined himself as "a friend of the Islamic call" on the eve of the revolution and joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953, when he was 46 years old. Actually Qutb had strongly supported the revolution; he met with Nasser before 1952 and he was later appointed as secretary general to the Liberation Rally.[132] In early 1953, when Al-Hudaybi was replacing old members of the Brotherhood with his own men, Sayyid Qutb was appointed to one of the most important sections in the Brotherhood, *Qism Nashr Al-Da'wa* (The Propagation of the Message Section).[133]

Qutb was arrested on November 18, 1954 and put on the witness stand in the trial of Al-Hudaybi. Qutb was not tried with other leaders of the Brotherhood in November and December; instead he was tried later for his anti government agitation and sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor in July 1955.[134] He remained in prison from November 1954 until his release in May 1964 due to his health reasons. What he saw and lived in the years of prison

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[130] Ibid., 94.

[131] Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*, ix.

[132] Ayubi, *Political Islam,* 105.

[133] Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism,* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2005), 150.

[134] Ibid., 150.

were varied kinds of torture and deaths. His experiences in prison transformed him and led to write the "most important books and the gospels of radicalism," such as *Ma'alim fi Al-Tariq (Signs along the Path* – the most famous and inspiring book for Islamists), *Fi Zilal Al-Quran, Hadha Al-Din,* and *Al Mustaqbal li Hadha Al-Din.*[135]

Qutb defined the Nasser regime as "the model of *jahiliyya*"[136] and called upon Muslims "to undertake jihad against their leaders because they had replaced God's Shari'a with their man-made law."[137] His Islamic state was "where Islamic law is executed, where the idea of Islamic rules, and where its principles and regulations define the kind of government and the form of society".[138]

The victory of Suez and increasing popularity of Nasser among the people reduced the perceived threat of the Brotherhood in the regime and Nasser relaxed policies for prisoners, such as the release of some of the short term detainees including Abd Al-Fattah Ismail, who became prominent later in the Brotherhood ranks, exchange of the prisoners, and Qutb's transfer to Turra Prison's hospital because of his health complaints. The transfer contributed to Qutb's communication with the ranks of the Brotherhood and the distribution of his ideas. Other important communication sources for the Movement were prison visits by Zainab Al-Ghazali and other female relatives of the detainees (including Qutb's sisters); all these factors contributed to provide connection and to obtain Qutb's writings, which accelerated the recovery of the Movement.[139]

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[135] Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 96.

[136] Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh,* (University of California Press, 2003), 46.

[137] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State,* 43.

[138] Ibid., 46.

[139] Zollner, Prıson Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Presecution, 1954 to 1971, *International. Journal of Middle East Studies, No.*39 (2007), 411–433.

Zollner states that from the years of 1957/1958 one group known as 'Organization 1965' was exposed. Some members gathered around Abd Al-Fattah Ismail, Ali Al-Ashmawi, Ahmad Abd Al-Majid and Shaykh Muhammad Fathi Rifa'i, who were in contact with the imprisoned Al-Hudaybi and were working to reorganize the Brotherhood. In his testimony in 1966, Al-Hudaybi said that he was aware of the group, but he urged Al-Fattah Al-Ismail to comply with the dissolution decree. It is likely that he said so not to be responsible for the activities of the Organization 1965.[140] Similar to Zollner's explanations, but in the same time with some differences on the dates, Adnan Musallam says that in the year 1962 Zainab Al-Ghazali and Abd Al-Fattah Ismail established a study group, the so-called Vanguard Apparatus, with the allowance of murshid Al-Hudaybi.[141] Ayubi says that the Brotherhood's ideas at that time "were a mixture of Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Al Mawdudi, and Malik Bin Nabi".[142] Ayubi depicts the Movement's situation: "They met regularly in the house of the Muslim Sister Zainab Al-Ghazali, discussing the corruption of the government and the evil of its president."[143] The Vanguard Apparatus was reading Qutb's writings *Fi Zilal Al-Quran(In the Shade of the Quran)* and rough drafts of *Ma'alim Fi Al-Tariq(Signs along the Path)* and with the instructions of Qutb and approval of Al-Hudaybi they decided to undergo a thirteen-year educational program until 75 percent of the Egyptians were convinced of the need for an Islamic State.[144]

Qutb was released from prison in May 1964 as a result of Iraqi President Abd Al-Salam Aref's insistence to the regime, and Al-Salam Aref offered him a chance to work in the field of education in Iraq. Qutb asked Al-Tilnmishani (who was also in prison at that time and became murshid after Al-Hudaybi in 1973) for his opinion on the issue and Tilmishani advised him to

[140] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 40.

[141] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad,* 168.

[142] Ra'if Ahmad, Al-Bawwaba al-Sawda (The Black Gate), (Cairo:Al-Zahra,1985) 235 quoted in Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam* ,103.

[143] Ayubi, *Political Islam,* 103.

[144] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism,* 168.

accept the offer. Yet Qutb decided to remain in Egypt to "defend his convictions". Zollner argues that Nasser probably released Qutb to expose and follow the remaining active members of the Brotherhood.[145] After Qutb was released from prison, Abd Al-Fattah Ismail, who was imprisoned between 1954-1956, contacted Sayyid Qutb and asked him to be a spiritual adviser to the Brotherhood. Qutb accepted this task but he later wanted to "abandon this (task) and to develop in the process the vanguard of Islamic society, envisioned in *Ma'alim* (*Maallim Fi Al-Tariq*), which requires long range Islamic education". [146] In December 1964 (or January 1965) he chose his fellow from his prison years, Yusuf Hawwash, to replace the post of spiritual leader for the group. Musallam says that Qutb wanted to change the goal of the group, vengeance for the debacle of 1954.

3.7. The Second Wave of Confrontation between the Regime and the Muslim Brotherhood

In July 1965, hundreds of the Brotherhood's suspected members were rounded up again. In the wave of the arrests, possession alone of *Ma'alim fi al Tariq* was enough to be detained. In August, Sayyid Qutb and people around him, including Youssef Hawwash and Abd Al-Fattah Ismail, were captured. Nasser charged that the members of Organization 1965 had set up an armed organization to seize the regime by force and an attack on his life was planned again but was averted by the state.[147] Military trials were established, and some members of the Movement were found guilty of planning Nasser's assassination. In February 1966 death penalties and hundreds of prison sentences were announced. Sayyid Qutb, Hasan Al-Hudaybi, Abd Al-Fattah Ismail and Muhammad Yusuf Awash were condemned to death. The death penalty of Hasan Al-Hudaybi was commuted to life imprisonment again, and

[145] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood:Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 44.

[146] Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, 168.

[147] Zollner, "Prıson Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Presecution 1954 to 1971", 419-420.

Sayyid Qutb, Youssef Hawwash and Abd Al-Fattah Ismail were hanged on 29 August 1966.

Some writers claim that the second wave of persecutions may be a result of Nasser's close relationship with the Eastern Bloc after 1962. Any inside opposition to communist and socialist ideas was not tolerated and the Brotherhood's attack on the ideas was obvious. Besides that, Zollner argues, the preparations for the 1967 War had begun, at least, in 1965 and internal security had become an important issue for Nasser. He did not want the Brotherhood to use any kind of advantage related to the planned fight against Israel.[148]

When the prison-sentenced members went to jail they were welcomed by other members as heroes. Prominent leaders, including Al-Hudaybi, his friends and members of the Organization 1965, were in Liman Al-Turra prison. Although the situation was very similar to 1954, the mood of the Brotherhood members was somewhat different.[149] The second round up and the concept of the *martyr* contributed to the spread of Qutbian ideas. However, it must be kept in mind that although in the early 1960s Qutbian ideas were tied to the restoration of the Movement, in the late 1960s the Muslim Brotherhood leadership openly rejected the ideas of Qutb.[150]

Actually, after 1965 a split was seen in the ranks of the Brotherhood on its relationship with a 'tyrannical leader', Nasser. After their return to prison, Al-Hudaybi wanted clarification from the members of Organization 1965 to know exactly if their aim was indeed to overthrow the regime, as they had a tendency toward *takwir* ideas. Although he had consented to their educational activities and revival efforts around the ideological leadership of Sayyid Qutb in the past, it is likely that, later, he wanted to establish his authority again. Afterwards he made a public speech to distance himself from the *takwir* oriented Organization 1965 members but his stance was not welcomed by more

[148] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 44.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid.

radical members.[151] The first group, the radical wing, was headed by Mustafa Shukri and they defined themselves as the vanguards of Qutbian ideas, *Al-Qutbiyun*. The second group was headed by the official murshid, Al-Hudaybi, and its members distanced themselves from the thoughts of Sayyid Qutb's *takfir* (judging others to be unbelievers), *kafir* (unbeliever), and *jahiliya* (paganism or the state of ignorance before the coming of Islam) ideas for the state and individuals. The beginning of the shift from these revolutionist ideas to Banna's more moderate ideas was dated to the late 1960s, and Hasan Al-Hudaybi's book, *Du'ah la Qudah (Missionaries, Not Judges)*, completed in 1969, contributed to the re-moderation of the Movement. The work is composed of letters written by Al-Hudaybi while he was in prison in response to the questions of members and "rejected the practice of *takfir*, thereby rejecting the rationale for active revolution and stressed that Egyptians need only to be educated in matters of Islam".[152]

Al-Hudaybi accepted the existence of some radical offshoots of the Movement. But for him, the dissolution decree and restrictive policies of the government against the Brotherhood led to his loss of control over the members of the Movement. Although questions arose if the book would be accepted as an official statement of the Movement or not, it was the Movement's leadership's first rejection of Qutbian ideas in the 1960s. The text had a great impact on the religious context against radical Islamic thought.[153] Although *Duah la Qudah* was diffused after the death of Al-Hudaybi, in 1977; it was distributed in the late 1960s among the members.

The son of Al-Hudaybi, Mamun Al-Hudaybi, Umar Al-Tilmishani, Mustafa Mashur, and Abd Al-Aziz Al-Atiya also contributed to the book. Later on, they all became murshids in the Movement and none of them followed the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.[154] For years the Muslim Brotherhood had defined itself as a tolerant movement that philosophically distanced itself from violence. The

[151] Ibid., 45.

[152] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. the State*, 63.

[153] Zollner, "Prıson Talk:The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Presecution,1954 to 1971," 412.

[154] Ibid.

Movement has condemned violence and favored institutional reform instead of Qutb's jihad understanding of "a complete armed rebellion" against *jahiliya* and secular rulers.[155]

3.8. The 1967 Defeat, Its Effects and Afterwards

The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 was an indicator of the split in the Brotherhood's ranks. Divergent rapprochements to the 1967 War divided the Movement into three: Qutbists, Al-Hudaybi supporters and those who refused the first two ideologies and were loyal to Al-Banna. Qutbists denied the legitimacy of Nasser's *jahiliya* leadership, and held that although Israel was also an enemy, its position was not immediate and Nasser should not be supported under any conditions. In contrast to the Qutbist position, followers of Al-Hudaybi and Al-Banna were more moderate. According to Al-Hudaybi, although Nasser was not a welcomed leader, a third party in the war would result in *fitna* (civil strife among Muslims). The Brotherhood members from the Al-Banna tradition were also close to Al-Hudaybi ideas.[156]

The defeat in the war paved the way for the empowerment of the *Qutbian* trend among the militant young members of the Brotherhood.[157] The Qutbist group that split from Al-Hudaybi claimed that the Qutbist ideas were confirmed by the defeat. In the words of Zollner, "they (*Qutbiyyun*) took Qutb's interpretation literally and thus adopting the idea that they lived in a state of inner *hijra* (flight) during which they were preparing for the struggle of the realization of God's absolute sovereignty (*Hakimiyat Allah*). In effect, they saw themselves exemplified as vanguard (*tali*) of which Qutb spoke." [158] Mustafa Shukri is a good example of the effect of these years' Qutbist influence on the Brotherhood and the split among its ranks. Shukri, an ex-Brotherhood Qutbist member, established *Takwir wal Hijra (the Predicament of Unbelief and the Refuge),* a militant Islamist group, after his release in the

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[155] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. the State*, 59-61.

[156] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 47.

[157] Ayubi, *Political Islam,* 142.

[158] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 46-47.

early 1970s and, as will be seen in detail, the group committed violent attacks in the country.

The year 1967 brought an end to the repressive term of Nasser and was a turning point for all the opposition groups. The military defeat against Israel led to great dissatisfaction and frustration in society and the legitimacy of the regime began to be questioned. Frustration among the youth had been rising since 1965 because of the deteriorating economic conditions. Demonstrations began to increase and although a small number of the youth were Marxist and Islamist most of the demonstrators were not affiliated with a political ideology. The country's first significant demonstration during the Nasser period since the previous major demonstration in 1954 took place in 1968 and was carried out by industrial workers in Helwan, a Cairo suburb. The reason for the protest was the light prison sentences given to senior military officials for their responsibility in the 1967 War. Cairo and Alexandria University students also joined the protests, and in the coming years they were the students who sustained the protests. These continuous student protests led the regime to concede to the students after 1967, agreeing to reduce the University Guard's authority, approve a student newspaper, and provide a looser legal framework for student activities. Leftists (Marxists, Nasserists, Communists and 'independents') were at the forefront of the protests and their foremost demand was a military confrontation with Israel to recover the lost territories of Egypt and other Arab countries.[159]

The defeat in the war provided a good ground for the Islamic groups. Islamic revival appeared following the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967; likewise, the "religious formula" began to surface in neo-fundamentalist thought across the Arab world.[160] In Egypt, the discourse was very widespread: "Only when Egypt returned to Islam would God support the nation's war against Israel."[161]

Although Nasser made efforts 'to clean' Egypt of the Brotherhood in his reign, with the resurgence of Brotherhood after the second half of 1960s, particularly after the defeat of 1967, his discourses and slogans changed to a

[159] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 33-34.

[160] Ayubi, *Political Islam*, 59.

[161] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State* , 44.

more religious tone. Nasser used the word *Allah* in his speeches more, an intensive appeal to Islamic values was used as a buttress, and hundreds of group members were even released from prisons.[162] To improve the regime's plausibility, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar preached, in favor of the regime, to decrease the Brotherhood's credibility. Nasser even said: "Precaution is pointless in the face of faith."[163] In the post-war period Islamic groups tried to display themselves as alternatives to the regime. By relating Israel's success to their adherence to Judaism, the Brotherhood empowered its idea for an Islamic state. The Brotherhood's reasons for its defeat were listed by Said Aly and Wenner as: "(1) an effective condemnation of the secular social, economic, political, and intellectual characteristics of the regime-all of which ignored or violated the principles of shari'a (2) a sign of God's revenge for the oppression which they had endured under Nasser; and, (3) God's punishment for the alliance which the government had made with an atheist state (the USSR) in order to advance its secular interests."[164]

Due to the vulnerability of Nasser in 1967, many students, intellectuals and middle class bureaucrats compromised with Islam in the post-war period and Nasser's stance changed towards the Brotherhood. After the defeat, the Muslim Brotherhood, like other Islamic groups, began to reappear in society and to be supported by the middle class. Ibrahim says that its "semiformal comeback" was symbolized by the decision to restart publication of the banned monthly magazine *Al-Da'wa.*[165] Despite Nasser's popular nationalist and social policies, after the war, the Brotherhood held its activities particularly among the students. The process continued after the death of Nasser from a heart attack in September 1970. By learning from the final years of Nasser's power, his successor, Anwar Sadat, realized the Islamic trend in Egypt and acted differently from his predecessor's policies by encouraging Islamic

[162] Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society*, 97.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W.Wenner, "Modern Islamic Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt," *The Middle East Journal*, No. 36.3, (1982), 336-361.

165 Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*, 36.

inclinations. Due to the relaxation of policies in the Sadat period many of the beneficiaries of Nasser's social contract with the people (because the government abolished fees for universities and guaranteed jobs for university graduates) and their children became members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and aftermath.

CHAPTER 4

THE ANWAR SADAT PERIOD: 1970-1981

After Nasser's sudden death on 29 September 1970, Anwar Sadat, one of the leaders of the 23 July 1952 Free Officers Revolution and Vice President during Nasser's presidency, was nominated to succeed him in the same month. In the wake of the 1967 defeat, Sadat found himself the leader of a fragmented country. Without his predecessor's charisma and with a relatively weaker character, Sadat gradually shifted from Nasser's domestic and foreign policies. Following the 1973 October War with Israel, Egypt witnessed important changes on the societal, political and economic levels during the Sadat period. Different from his predecessor, Sadat's orientation consisted of the four policies: open door economic policies (*infitah*), embodied in Law 43 of 1974; alliance with the West by moving away from the Soviets, political opening, symbolized by the formation of political parties in 1976; and normalization with Israel after 1977.[166]

From the Brotherhood's point of view, although it had lost some of its followers in the Nasser years, the resurrection of the Islamic discourse following the 1967 defeat provided the Movement an opportunity for revival, and it began to restore its grassroots networks throughout the country. Relations between Sadat and the Brotherhood may be characterized as somewhat cooperative in the first phase of the regime. Yet in the late 70s both sides began to show antagonism because of their aspirations for the future of Egypt. While Sadat attempted to contain opposition of the Brotherhood at the beginning of confrontation, tensions began to surface thereafter, and the threat perceptions continued until the early 1980s.

In the new process of Sadat, prominent new leaders, such as Mustafa Mashur and Ma'mun Al-Hadaybi (son of Hasan Al-Hudaybi), began to loom large in the Brotherhood's ranks with more traditional leaders, Farid Abd Al-Khalid and Abd Al-Qadir Hilmi. Upon the death of Hasan Al-Hudaybi at the

[166] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 37.

age of 82, Umar Al-Tilmishani, one of the prisoners released in 1971 after serving seventeen years, was elected as the new murshid in 1973.[167] Zollner argues that Al-Hudaybi engaged in missionary work during his term, and this policy influenced the Brotherhood by contributing to its social activities and restructuring; his successors did this as well.[168] Al-Tilmishani revitalized the Movement with new blood as of 1973, and Sadat's relatively more liberal policies helped to resurface the Muslim Brotherhood after Nasser's repressive years.

4.1. The Regime's Search for Legitimacy and Its Accommodation Policies for the Muslim Brotherhood

In his search for legitimacy, Sadat underlined his religious character and used the levers of the state by adopting economic incentives, such as increasing the wages of government employees. For the former aim he mainly talked about building a state based on faith and religious values, and this discourse helped religious identity to resurface in Egypt. In the first years of his term, contrary to Nasser, Islam was in the center of his policies. During the period of Egypt's re-Islamization, Sadat had a good relationship with Islamic groups, and the Muslim Brotherhood had a particularly privileged position in these years.

During his presidential consolidation period, Sadat saw Nasserist figures and leftists as a threat to his power and decided to co-opt with Islamists to remove them. To consolidate his power, he dismissed some of the Nasserists and Leftists from power between 1971 and 1977, and he undertook the relatively successive 1973 War against Israel. In his search for allies against the perceived threat from leftist and other dissent groups, he referred to his close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950's; he wanted to rebuild the old relationship with the Brotherhood, while at the same time he

[167] Although there was a tendency to elect Salih Abu Ruqayak as the oldest member, Tilmisani was chosen by the leadership.

[168] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 48-49.

was trying to constitute a favorable position with the US and oil producing countries.[169]

Anwar Sadat portrayed himself as 'the Believer President' (but Brotherhood magazine *Al-Da'wa* never referred to him with this attribution, instead, they used "the president of the Republic"[170]). He used his first name, Muhammad, portrayed himself as religious and ended his speeches with verses from the Quran. Scholars of Al-Azhar arranged programs in schools, media, universities, and Islamic Institutions as a source of legitimization; and the 1973 War against Israel was justified with religious reasons by religious institutions.[171]

He began his openings by making amendments to the constitution and gradually releasing Islamists from prisons. As a gesture to Islamists, a new constitution was drafted in 1970 and adopted on 11 September 1971. Article 2 of the constitution stipulated that "Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic is the official language and the principles of the Islamic shari'a shall be a chief source of legislation."[172] Although the article was vague and there were doubts about why shari'a was not the sole principle, after years of suppression, this step was perceived as an unprecedented action by Islamists. After the adoption of the new constitution, Sadat relaxed the government's policies and allowed the Brotherhood to be more visible in the public space.

After its dissolution in 1954 and traumatic repressions in 1965 and 1966, the Brotherhood increased its activities in the post-1967 process, particularly among the students. Some of its members started to be released from prison; the process continued in the Sadat era as well.[173] In the summer of 1971, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia mediated a meeting between Sadat and the

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[169] Ibid., 48.

[170] Abd Al-Moneim Said Aly and Manfred W.Wenner, "Modern Islamic Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt," 336-361.

[171] John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, (Syracuse University Press,1998), 213 and Nazih Ayubi, the Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*,Vol.12, No.4 (Dec.1980), 481-499.

[172] Joseph O'Kane, "Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution," *Middle East Journal* 26,(2), (1972), 137-148.

[173] Hopwwood, *Egypt, Politics and Society*, 117.

Brotherhood leaders who had migrated to foreign countries in the Nasser era. In the meeting, Sadat asserted his support for the Brotherhood in return for the Brotherhood's activities in Egypt and shared common aims with them against issues such as communism and blasphemy.[174] Sadat's adviser, Mahmud Muawwad Jami, came to an agreement with exiled members of the Brotherhood, including Yusuf Qaradawi, Dr.Ahmad Al-Asal, Dr. Salim Nigm, Abd Al-Rauf Mashur and Abd Al-Munim Mashur, to release the group's prisoners in return for letting "bygones be bygones".[175] However, Sadat never lifted the Brotherhood's ban, and although it was a public organization, its status remained 'half official'.

Imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood were gradually released, and the new atmosphere of democratic expansion in Egypt was used by the Brotherhood to rebuild its ranks and to consolidate its power, and "the calls by Qutb for *jihad* against the *jahiliyya* state [were] supplanted by calls for the enactment of political change through cooperation with the ruling power".[176] In these years, two fractions began to appear in the Muslim Brotherhood. The first was "Murshid Jadid" and was led by Rahman Al-Misiri; the second fraction was led by Zainab Al-Ghazali. The latter denounced the relatively passive policies of the former, which were centered on Al-Tilmishani's conciliatory ideas. The first group argued that the Brotherhood was in a "period of weakness" and thus abstained from open confrontation with the regime. They were aware of the need to rebuild the Group's broken organization with its amnestied remnants.

Known for his tolerance to Islamic groups, Sadat encouraged Islamic student associations in universities as well, and these groups were used by his regime as a counterweight and neutralizing tool against the Nasserist and leftist

[174] Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups," in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, ed. Martin E.Marty, F.Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University Of Chicago Press, 1996), 165.

[175] Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 145.

[176] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 44-45.

opposition groups.[177] The release of the Brotherhood members from prison at the beginning of Sadat's reign and the 1972-1973 school year activities coincided with the outbreak of the 1973 war. The Brotherhood's active visibility on university campuses also led to a growing interest in religion in universities. A general amnesty was issued in 1975, and all of the remaining Muslim Brotherhood members were released.[178]

In the 1970s, Jama'a Al-Islamiya[179] was the dominant group in the student unions of Egyptian universities. It differed by its loyalty to a more puritanical Salafi creed, while the Muslim Brotherhood was compromising between different branches of Islam, such as Sufis and Shi'ites, and it criticized the Brotherhood on ideological and behavioral bases.[180] From 1975 until 1979 Islamic groups prevailed in the student unions of Egyptian universities. The students established *Jama'a Al-Diniya* (Religious group) to enhance their religio-social and religio-political activity. In the mid-70s, their structure was

[177] Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh,* 134-135.

[178] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 48.

[179]Nackman Tal categorizes the terrorist organizations in Egypt in three main groups: Fundamentalists (Salafies), Jihad Trend(Al-Jihad, Al-Jamaa l-Islamiya, Tala'ie al-Fath), Al-Takfir Trend(Al-Takfir wal-Hijra, Al-Tawafuk wal-Tabyeen, Al-Shawkiyoun, Al-Samawiya). (Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 25-26) Al-Jamaa and Al- Jihad "rejected democracy as a secular innovation that is thoroughly unIslamic and, more importantly, cannot be Islamized."(Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 181). These groups support the idea that: "democracy gives the right to legislate to someone other than God, which is equivalent to deifying the people…The only way to reaffirm God's sovereignty is by making his laws (shari'a) the sole source of legislation." (Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*, 13) Jamaa al-Islamiya developed in Upper Egypt (particularly in Minya and Assiut) and Al-Jihad developed in Cairo and Giza. Before the assassination of Sadat, two of the organizations were coordinated and they came together under the leadership of a blind sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman. Rahman left Al-Jihad and became only the leader of Jamaa Al-Islamiya.(Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan,* 26) He is currently imprisoned in the U.S. for his role in the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Rahman rejected secular law and encouraged people in the way of expulsion of the government: "it (secular law), derived from Western thought, which is alien to the religion of Islam, must be eliminated the ruler who has replaced God's law with constitutional law 'must be fought until he returns to God's law…or he must be uprooted." (Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State,* 85) Some other details related to the 1990s and 2000s will be given in the next chapter.

[180] Omar Ashour, Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist *Movements:* The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group, *The Middle East Journal, (*Autumn 2007), Vol.61,No.4, 606.

well established, but in the problemetic summer of 1979, the unions were dissolved by a presidential decree.[181].

In 1977, Jama'a Al-Islamiya's member students won a majority in the universities' student unions, which were relatively relaxed in 1974 by Sadat when he believed that the unions would serve to weaken leftists in the universities.[182] Following the victory of Jama'a Al-Islamiya, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to recruit its emirs (leaders) in the universities of Cairo, Al-Minya and Alexandria, but the Brotherhood was unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit some leaders of Jama'a Al-Islamiya in Asyut University, Nagih Ibrahim and Karam Zuhdi.[183] Later on, some of the recruited people became very prominent members in Brotherhood, such as Issam Al-Erian, Abd Al-Munim Abu Al-Futuh and Hilmi Al-Jazzar from Cairo, Ahmad Umar and Ibrahim Al-Za'afaran from Alexandria University and Muhyi Al-Din Abu Ala Hadi from Said, who belonged to Jama'a Al-Islamiya in the seventies, and were the main founders of Islamic student movements in the Egyptian universities. They joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood when some of Jama'a Al-Islamiya's leaders were arrested and Brotherhood lawyers offered them legal defence inexchange for joining the Brotherhood in 1978.[184]

4.2. Changing Government Allies, The Infitah Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood

Sadat's economic policies known as Infitah (Infitah Al-Iqtisadiya, economic opening) aimed to liberalize the Egyptian economy with legislative measures to attract foreign investors and to encourage the private sector in the country. Beginning in 1974, the open door policy in the country provided incentive advantages to national and international investors. In six years, investments under the Law 43 totaled 3.1 billion dollars; 65 percent of

[181] Georges Sabagh and Iman Ghazalla, "Arab Sociology Today: A View From Within", *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1986: 12, 373-399.

[182] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Belknap Press, 2002), 81.

[183] Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group," 596.

[184] Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt. State-Society Relationship*, 83-84.

investments were from Egyptians, 19 percent was from Arabs and 16 percent was from other countries.[185] However, although the GDP of the country increased during his term, the economy was actually weak because the increase was particularly stemming from the oil boom in the international arena.

In the process of liberalization, Sadat moved away from the Soviets and closer to the U.S. He denounced socialist policies and threw the Soviets out of the country:[186] fifteen thousand Soviet advisors were expelled from the country between 1972 and 1974. The Soviets were criticized for destabilizing the regime and pursuing expansionist policies towards the Middle East and Africa. In 1976 Sadat unilaterally cancelled a friendship treaty between the two countries. He strengthened the economic, diplomatic, military relationship with the U.S., and it became a full-partner for Egypt. Its economic aid to Egypt since 1974 was six billion dollars, and after 1977 arms sales to Egypt increased. As leverage against the left, Sadat preferred to bolster other anti-left powers, the foremost group among whom was the Muslim Brotherhood.[187] The Muslim Brotherhood's target during the 1960s and early 1970s was the Soviets, but in the late-70s the target gradually became Israel and the West.[188]

After Nasser's nationalist and Arab socialist program with state domination, Sadat's policies affected the country in a different way. Although Islamist Labor party was opposed to the Infitah policies, which they viewed as a loss of Egyptian independence, the Brotherhood welcomed the liberal policies as it gave them a chance to rebuild the Movement with lucrative activities. Besides that many members of the Muslim Brotherhood benefited from the Infitah policies by establishing private enterprises and international

[185] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 37.

[186] Ellen-Lust Okar, *Structuring Conflict In The Arab World*,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63,115 and Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 50.

[187] Abdel Azim Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 164-165.

[188] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 45.

links.[189] Members of the Brotherhood who fled to the Gulf countries and Libya in the Nasser period returned to their homes in the Sadat years with their accumulated funds; the money and their contact with the Gulf countries encouraged them to invest in the Infitah atmosphere and increased their support of the government's economic policies.[190] The Brotherhood benefited from the environment both by investing the accumulated money and increasing their remittances in Islamic banks. Egypt's private economy was controlled by eighteen families and the Brotherhood accounted for eight of them. They had 40 percent of the economic investments, mainly in the sectors of real estate and currency speculation.[191] Even though in the past the Muslim Brotherhood's economic approach was closer to the socialist system implemented in Nasserist period and based on economic independence and economic improvement, in this new era they turned to a more capitalistic view, arguing that private property was the origin of z*akat, kaffara* and inheritance, and supported downsizing the public sector. Mainly concerned with the implication of shari'a, they paid little attention to issues of social equality because of their benefits from the Infitah policies.

However, throughout the 1980s the Brotherhood began to criticize the policies on the grounds of the Egyptian economic dependence on food imports and local industry problems. From an economic aspect, the Sadat period created a good environment for Islamists to reinforce their position in society. Yet, in these years Sadat's prestige decreased in the eyes of the public because of the increased social inequality and the rapprochement with Israel and the US.[192]

In the late 70s the Muslim Brotherhood started to emphasize (similar to the secular left) the inadequacy of the regime to find solutions for the problems

[189] Abd al-Moneim Said Aly and Manfred W.Wenner, "Modern Islamic Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt," *The Middle East Journal*, 36.3, (1982), 336-361 and Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 1999, 51.

[190] Ayubi, *Political Islam,* 142.

[191] Wickham, *Mobilizng Islam*, 97.

[192] Utvik, Bjorn Olav, Filling the Vacant Throne of Nasser: The Economic Discourse of Egypt's Islamist Opposition. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, Issue 4. (Fall95).

of education, housing, transportation, inflation and the increasing injustice via their periodicals. The January 1977 bread riots against the social consequences of Sadat's opening policies also contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse and attacks against government.[193] While Al-Azhar was trying to persuade the rioters to stop the protests with its statements saying the riots were instigated by external powers, the Brotherhood said in its Al-Da'wa magazine that "the riots were merely normal symptoms of a more profound and prevalent disease afflicting various sectors of our people".[194]

4.3. Political Opening and the Muslim Brotherhood

Tamer Moustafa argues that while Nasser was enforcing his legitimacy with the concepts of national independence, the redistribution of national wealth, economic development and Arab nationalism; Sadat used "sayadat Al-qanun" (rule of law) rhetoric to enforce his regime's legitimacy.[195] Sadat came to power with a "corrective revolution" after Nasser's death, and he promised Egyptians "a free life" and the establishment of a "state of institutions" to show the rule of law in the country.[196] Sadat promised to increase the rule of law, more political freedom and he even burned the transcriptions of phone records remaining from the Nasser period. Sadat provided limited liberalization to opponents of the regime, but at the same time he never allowed them to take power. As a part of democratization policies in the country, the constitution was amended in 1971 to provide basic civil and human rights for citizens. However, beginning in 1972, Egypt witnessed riots because of rumored austerity policies.

In the political field, the regime recognized the alternative (right, left and centre) parties in 1975 and allowed their participation in the parliamentary elections of 1976. Nevertheless, presidential power dominated the system. In

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[193] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 39-41.

[194] Barry Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Revised edition, 2002), 18.

[195] Tamir Moustafa, *The Struggle for Cconstitutional Power,Law,Politics and Economic Development in Egypt, (*Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39.

[196] Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt. State-Society Relationship*, 34.

1976 platforms (*manabir*) were allowed to be established to present their lists for parliamentary elections and after a short time they were allowed to transform into legal parties. However, in the 1977 elections Sadat's Misr Party won the elections with an overwhelming majority. In 1977 Sadat dissolved the ASU (Arab Socialist Union) and announced the transform of the ASU to the National Democratic Party (hereafter NDP). The left was represented by the Tagammu Party, the centre by NDP and the right by Al-Ahrar (Liberal Party). Two of the three newly established parties had newspapers. The Wafd Party was resurrected shortly after, and its supporters renamed it the New Wafd.[197] But there were still some restrictions to form a party. The Parties Committee established in 1976 was authorized to evaluate the applications for party formation. According to Political Parties Law 40/1977, it was forbidden to form a party based on religion (but their program should not contradict the principles of Islamic Law)[198], social class, or regional affiliation; and its program had to be different from other existing parties.[199] It is likely that,the targets of the law were Nasserists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Another restriction on parties was the level of criticism they were allowed. The criticism of the regime had to be "constructive" and parties were not allowed to attack Sadat's economic and foreign policies.[200] The new party had to be distinct from the existing parties, had to accept the principles of national unity and social peace, and the "results of social referenda and their programs should not be contradictory to the principles of the July 1952 and May 1971 'revolutions'".[201]

In this environment, although it was known that the real power was still in the hands of the strongest party, NDP, groups, including the Muslim

[197] "Egypt's Elections", *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147, Egypt's Critical Moment (Jul.-Aug.,1987), 18.

[198] Nazih Ayubi, "Government and the State in Egypt Today," in *Egypt under Mubarak*, ed. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen, (Routledge, 1989), 15.

[199] Joshua A.Stacher, "Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(2), (November 2004), 220.

[200] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 36-37 and Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 65.

[201] Ayubi, *Government and the State in Egypt Today*, 15.

Brotherhood, welcomed the policies of Sadat. Although there were some rumors that the Muslim Brotherhood was to be recognized "as a religious society", the Brotherhood seemed not interested in this formula. Following the openings of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood applied for recognition as a political entity. However, its application was rejected on the grounds that it had a religious adherence and might cause a division between Copts and Muslims in society. Despite Hasan Al-Banna's stance against establishing a party, Umar Al-Tilmishani, who was at that time murshid of the Brotherhood, felt it was the right time to establish a party. In the end, Sadat gave a leading position in the ruling party to a prominent Brotherhood figure, Salih Abu Ruqayaq. In 1976 six other members of the Brotherhood were offered leading positions both in the ruling party and the Assembly.[202] With the rejection of the application, the Muslim Brotherhood took the decision to the Constitutional Court.[203] Because of the government's reluctance to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to form a party, its leadership focused on rebuilding the organization and sought to be recognized as a legal mass movement in a wider frame.[204]

Another important issue for the Brotherhood was publishing its monthly magazine, Al-Da'wa; two views prevailed on this in the Brotherhood. The first view supported publishing Al-Da'wa for the transformation of the Egyptian society and political affairs practically. The other view supported waiting to improve the quality of the magazine. But the first approach prevailed, and the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed by July 1976 to publish its long-banned monthly magazine, Al-Da'wa, which continued until July 1981, shortly before Sadat's assassination that year. Before its closure, its circulation was estimated to be 100.000.[205] Al-Da'wa refrained from touching sensitive issues related to the implication of Shari'a while the Brotherhood was trying to

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[202] Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 167-168.

[203] Skovgaard-Petersen, *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, Muftis and Fatwas of the Dar al-Ifta*, 208-209.

[204] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000,* 55-56.

[205] Wickham, *Mobilizng Islam*, 96.

gain Sadat's confidence.[206] The magazine included advertisements from various companies, from the food sector to Islamist bookshops and imported clothes. In July 1981 even Bank Misr ran full-page advertisements in Al-Da'wa.[207]

In the late 70s the Muslim Brotherhood began to be skeptical about the democratic leap. However, Sadat claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to exist and publish their periodicals; this was evidence of democracy in Egypt. It was during these years that the Brotherhood's periodicals opened their pages to secular opposition criticizing the government about the law on shame and press regulation.

In the time of the Brotherhood's intensive criticism towards Sadat, Sadat put restrictions on parties and established a nationalist-Islamist 'loyal' party, the Socialist Labor Party, against the Wafd and Tagammu Parties in 1978. Sadat's former agriculture minister Ibrahim Shukri became the leader of the party.[208]

Sadat also introduced some restrictive bylaws on Professional Syndicates at this time, and, because of its opposition to the peace process, Sadat dissolved the elected council of the Lawyer's Syndicate in June 1981 and arrested five of its council members and its president.[209]

After a decade of Sadat's 1971 'Corrective Revolution', in 1981 the Brotherhood listed the detained and arrested people from Alexandria to Aswan who were proved innocent afterwards. They claimed that Sadat was hiding his despotic authoritarianism by using the discourse of democracy and rule of law as an alternative to Islam's shura system.[210]

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[206] Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 165-166.

[207] Ghada Hashem Talhami, *The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt*, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996), 39.

[208] "Egypt's Elections", *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147, Egypt's Critical Moment (Jul.-Aug.,1987), 19.

[209] Ibid., 58 ; for more details see Hamried Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, (State University of New York Press, 1986), 208-209 and Ninette s.Fahmy, The Preformance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian Syndicates: An alternative Formula for Reform, *The Middle East Journal*, (Autumn 1998),52,4, 551-562.

[210] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 41-42.

4.4. Relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood's Confrontation with the Government

After the defeat of 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict was "religionized", and many Egyptians began to feel that Israel's military victory stemmed from its commitment to religious values. Because of this feeling, Egypt's relatively better performance in the 1973 war was explained with religious symbols. The war was named 'Badr', in reference to one of the Prophet Muhammad's battles. There were some legends saying white angels were fighting with the Egyptians against Israel.[211] In the Brotherhood magazine Al-Da'wa it was said that the victory of the Arab-Israeli war happened because it was launched in the holy month of Ramadan and because Egyptian soldiers shouted *Allahu Akbar* before they passed the Suez Canal; it was a reward for the return to religion.[212]

After the 1973 War, Egypt witnessed an attack on the Military Technical Academy in April 1974, an attempt to carry out a coup d'état by *Shabab Muhammad* (the Youth of Muhammad), an offshoot of the Islamic Liberation Organization, but it failed. The Organization's top leaders were executed and many of its members were jailed. The Takwir wal-Hijra militant group responded by kidnapping Minister of Islamic Affairs Sheikh Mohammad Al-Dhahabi and murdering him in June 1977, an act of defiance against the government. Many of its members were arrested shortly after. Actually the arrests had begun as early as May 1975; the arrested members were accused of planning to overthrow the government, and its leader cadre, including Shukri Mustafa who had split from the Brotherhood during his prison years, were executed in November 1977.[213] The Muslim Brotherhood denounced both the coup attempt of 1974 at the Military Technical Academy and the assassination of Sheikh Muhammad Al-Dhahabi in 1977.[214] In the July issue of Al-Da'wa

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[211] Nazih Ayubi, The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.12, No.4 (Dec.1980), 490.

[212] Dominic Coldwell, Egypt's Autumn of Fury: The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process Between 1973 and 1981, (St. Anthony College, Unpublished Thesis, 2003), 71-72.

[213] Georges Sabagh and Iman Ghazalla, Arab Sociology Today: A View From Within, *Annual Review of Sociology*, (1986:12), p 373-399 and Hinnebush, *Egypt Under Sadat* , 203.

[214] Ibid.

the Brotherhood called the assassination "an awful crime, forbidden by religion and repugnant to custom; those who perpetrated this grievous crime did not have the least of religious knowledge. We condemn from the bottom of our hearts the crime, circumstances, and immediate causes of it".[215] Moreover, to distance itself from the violent groups the Brotherhood issued statements, and published Al-Hudaibi's *Du'at la Qudat* writings in the same year. Zollner argues that the function of the text changed in the years since its first draft. While it was aiming to de-radicalize the Brotherhood members in prisons in the late 1960s, in the 1970s it was used to counter Islamic radical groups.[216] Yet, the Brotherhood was still criticizing the regime for not implementing shari'a and continued to view this as illegal.

The disillusionment of the Muslim Brotherhood towards Sadat's regime began after the second half of the 1970s, particularly after Sadat's 1977 visit to Israel. These years represented Sadat's new understanding towards Israel, and many improvements in the process, such as the increasing criticism by the Brotherhood media and a general disquiet in society, led him to rein in Islamic groups during the second half of his sovreignty. Although the Muslim Brotherhood was not yet legalized by the regime, Sadat believed that the Brotherhood's publishing privileges and increasing visibility required support in return. As they did not undertake this 'task', Sadat accused them of 'treason', and in these years confrontations between the Brotherhood and government prevailed, but it must be said that in contrast to those of the other Islamic groups, such as Takwir wa Al-Hijra, Jihad, and Shabab Al-Muhammad, the confrontations were not so widespread and explicit.[217]

In November 1977 Sadat visited Jerusalem to make peace with Israel. Following this, Islamic groups' became more successful in student union elections, and they spilled over into the country. The Muslim Brotherhood also became a more brutal critic of the President. More than Sadat's failings in

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[215] Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,* 167.

[216] Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Hudaybi and Ideology,* 70-71.

[217] Raymond William Baker, *Sadat and After, Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 244-246.

democratization and open door policies, the Muslim Brotherhood opposed his vision of reconciliation with Israel. It was the first time the Muslim Brotherhood openly criticized Sadat's foreign policy[218] in their periodicals, Al-Da'wa and Al-Iltisam.[219] Following the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 and the peace treaty in 1979 the Brotherhood fell in the same camp as the Nasserists and leftists in criticizing Sadat. Contrary to other Islamist groups, although it was not accepting of rulers, Al-Tilmishani asserted that they were still against violent clashes with the government, and even after the 1979 Camp David treaty Al-Da'wa urged against attempting any kind of attack against the Israeli embassy, tourists or diplomats. However, from February 1978, the Brotherhood was outspoken about Israel's aims to gain everything from the Euphrates to the Nile and its plan to seize Palestine.[220] After the Camp David Accords, one article in Al-Da'wa said:

> The religious law of Islam states that if any part of the Land of Muslims is seized and if they are able to recover it but do not then they are sinners. And this is what has happened since the establishment of the State of Israel. It is incompatible with all divine laws to acknowledge a usurper's right to have what he has usurped. We need not, then, be afraid of war whatever its consequences would be![221]

With the signing of the Camp David Accords, Saudi Arabia decreased its support of the Sadat regime; 1979 was a very determining year for the fate of Sadat. While Egyptian affairs still occupied the central place in Sadat's agenda, other events in the international arena that coincided with the Camp David agreement spurred Islamic ideas in the country. Events related to the Islamic conciseness were the Iranian revolution in February 1979 and Sadat's

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[218] Dominic Coldwell, Egypt's Autumn of Fury: The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process Between 1973 and 1981, (St.Anthony College, Unpublished Thesis,2003), 81.

[219] Ibid., 39.

[220] Abdel Azim Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 168-169.

[221] *Al-Da'wa,* October 1978, quoted in Abdel Azim Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 168.

asylum of the Iranian Shah, the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, and Sadat's support for a liberalized law of personal status. Hinnebush says that "although Al-Da'wa denied appropriateness of a Khomeini type revolution for Egypt, it supported Khomeini and criticized the refuge given by Sadat to the Shah."[222] All of these events triggered the militant Islamic groups' demonstrations and increased violent attacks against the regime's security forces.[223] The Brotherhood did not conduct terrorist attacks against the government although they realized that the Islamization of the country had failed, and many of them were particularly disillusioned with the liberalized law of personal status and rapprochement with Israel.[224] Sadat ordered wholesale arrests when Islamic groups engaged with violence; but at the same time he appointed two religious figures (one was a former Muslim Brotherhood member and the other a sympathizer) and looked for the adoption of *shari'a* in the legal system.

Compared to other Islamic militant groups, the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the normalization process, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in a less violent way by campaigning with its magazine Al-Da'wa.[225] The regime tried to justify the treaty by comparing it to Prophet Muhammad's Peace of al Al-Hudaybiya, the Pact of Ghatfan and Prophet Muhammad's order to make peace with others if they want it, based on a Quran verse (Anfal 8:61). Yet, the treaty was still unacceptable for the Brotherhood because of Israel's expansionist efforts to dominate the Arab world and its relations with the West. In May 1979 Al-Azhar ulama issued a supporting statement, the so-called "Islamic Opinion" or "Religious Legal Verdict", for Sadat's initiative. It said:

> Egypt is an Islamic country, and it is the duty of its guardian to ensure its protection. If he considers that the interest of the Muslims lies in being gentle towards their enemies, this is permissible because he is responsible in matters

[222] Hinnebush, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat,* 202.

[223] Ibid., 76.

[224] Ibid., 200

[225] Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*, 38.

> of peace and war…and more knowledgeable about the affairs of his subjects…The existence of treaties between Muslims and their enemies is governed by clear regulations established by Islam…The Al-Azhar ulama are of the opinion that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was concluded within the context of Islamic judgment. It springs from a position of strength following the waging of the jihad battle and the victory [of October 1973].[226]

The Brotherhood said in its magazine Al-Da'wa that Israel was not looking for peace by giving the examples of three wars launched by Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1969 and Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon.[227] According to the Brotherhood, the conflict was rooted in the time of Prophet. Sadat was uncomfortable with the way the Muslim Brotherhood was attacking through Al-Da'wa and Al-Iltisam. It was easier for Sadat to encounter secular and leftist opposition with labels such as atheist, communist, importers of foreign ideologies, agents of Moscow, clients of rejectionist Arab states and so forth. However, because of his concern for the use of religion he was not able to ban the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, and there was no chance to accuse the Brotherhood because it had denounced violence. Banning the Brotherhood would be understood as anti-Islamic and anti-democratic. But sometimes he pronounced that religion and politics must be separate and that he did not allow the formation of religious parties. Al-Da'wa opposed the idea of the separation of *Din wa Dawla* (state and religion) and Islamic morality, issues related to *fiqh* and, cautiously, an Islamic state and the implication of *shari'a* were substantial issues for the Brotherhood.[228]

In 1979 Sadat talked to Al-Tilmishani in Ismailiya directly because of the increased tensions between the Group and the regime. Rumors of the Muslim Brotherhood's plans to undermine the regime had been intensified for months. Accordingly, Sadat asserted that "he wouldn't tolerate those who try to tamper with the high interests of the state under the guise of religion and

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[226] Quoted in Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society, 1945-1990,* 119.

[227] Dominic Coldwell, *Egypt's Autumn of Fury:The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process Between 1973 and 1981,* 83.

[228] Ibid., 201.

religion must not be mingled with politics", and he condemned the Brotherhood "for corrupting young people with misleading articles in *Al-Da'wa*". In response to the accusations Al-Tilmishani said briefly that the demands voiced in *Al-Da'wa* were not for their own interests but for the nation's. And Al-Tilmishani insisted on the need to return to Islamic law, adding "God's law must be applied. It is only when you do this that the masses will be with you". In addition, he did not accept the allegations of conspiracy against the government and repeated the Movement's loyalty to the government.[229] In another private and unreported meeting between Sadat and Al-Tilmishani, Sadat offered the Brotherhood registration in the Ministry of Social Affairs to extricate the group from ambiguity and offered to appoint Al-Tilmishani as the representative of the Brotherhood to the government in return for the Brotherhood alleviating its criticism. Al-Tilmishani declined both of the overtures because the first offer implied a possibility of future dissolution by the government, and the second offer meant government involvement in the leadership. So the Brotherhood preferred to remain in a semi legal status. [230] As he was very uncomfortable with the Movement's position not only as an oppositional power but also because it was transforming into a "state within state", Sadat said "We want a structure which will be principally founded on our religion – Islam and Christianity".[231]

In the early 1980s every university had an Islamic group fluctuating between Takfir and the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood began to consolidate the leaders of these student groups. A coalition outside universities among the Islamic groups made an organization called the Permanent Islamic Congress for the Propagation of Islam, and Al-Tilmishani was elected as its leader. The action was perceived by the regime as a threat. They had meetings in 1980, and after the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981 they held a rally at the Al-Nur Mosque in protest and demanded Sadat to condemn Israel. The demands of the Congress were to halt the implementation of Camp David

[229] Baker, *Sadat and After,Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul,* 244-245.

[230] Ibid. 245.

[231] Curtis, *Religion and Politics in the Middle East,* 86.

accords, withdraw the Egyptian ambassador from Israel, and expel the Israeli ambassador from Egypt, and called for jihad in Jerusalem to recover Jerusalem and Palestine and lift restrictions on Islamic groups and against independent imams preaching in mosques.[232]

In the ongoing high-tension atmosphere of 1981, sectarian clashes occurred in one of the poor neighbors of Cairo in June; dozens died and hundreds were wounded in the riots between Muslims and Copts.[233] Referring to Copts in foreign countries, particularly in America, Al-Da'wa said that Egypt was a suitable place for Copts to live happily; it presented the events as "a perfect illustration of the Crusader conspiracy against Egyptian Islam.".[234]

Sadat perceived that the threat was coming from the Muslim Brotherhood as the leader of the groups including *Takfir*. Egyptian Historian Abdel Azim Ramadan criticizes Sadat, claiming that it was a mistake for Sadat to think the Muslim Brotherhood was a representative of all the Islamic groups. According to Ramadan, about 20-30 percent of these Islamic groups saw the Brotherhood as their enemy, and even some in the Brotherhood did not approve of Al-Tilmishani's behaviours, perceiving them as cooperation with the regime. Ramadan says that the mistake cost Sadat his life. Sadat's last policies led to crackdowns and suspension of the Brotherhood publications Al-Da'wa, Al-Iltisam, Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami.[235] On 3 September 1981, 1536 journalists, writers, politicians and other important Muslim figures, including Brotherhood murshid Umar Al-Tilmishani, wellknown preacher Abd Al-Hamid Ksihk, and other leaders of Brotherhood, such as Salih Ashmawi and Muhammad Abd Al-Qudus, and some Christian leaders were arrested by security forces. Ramadan says that more than 1000 of the arrested people were from Islamic groups and, compared to the detainments during the Nasser period, these arrests were different for the Brotherhood. The arrested members

[232] Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 171.

[233] Ibid.

[234]Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 119.

[235] Mona Makram Ebeid, Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?, *The Middle East Journal*, 43, 3, (Summer 1989), 430-431.

of the Brotherhood were with some members of other ideologies, including Wafd Party members, Nasserists, communists in prisons, and the conjunction led to a connection and understanding as they were in the same side against the regime. In the following years Al-Tilmishani even described some of them as "extremely charming", referring mostly to the prominent communist figure Doctor Ismail Sabri Abdullah and Waft Party leader Fuad Siraj Al-Din Pasha.[236]

One month after the crackdowns, on 6 October 1981, one of the members of Al-Jihad under the leadership of a young electrical engineer, Abd Al-Salam Faraj, assassinated President Anwar Sadat when he was standing on the reviewing stand during a military parade. Faraj shouted "Death to Pharaoh", "I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death". Heikal describes Sadat as "the first Egyptian Pharaoh to come before his people armed with a camera, he was also the first Egyptian Pharaoh to be killed by his own people."[237]

Sadat had defined his predecessor's years as a period of materialism and unbelief and implemented de-Nasserization policies by reconciliation with the Brotherhood. Yet, he was also in a dilemma. Although there were some articles in the constitution based on Islam, he supported the separation of Islam and politics and said "those who wish to practice Islam can go to mosques, and those who wish to engage in politics may do so through legal institutions."[238] Initially his cultivation of Islamists led to him being described as a pious leader and a believer. The Islamists became more visible in society and when the balances changed and the relationship became confrontational, Sadat shifted his policies from accommodation to repression, and he paid for it with his life. The tacit agreement deteriorated over the years and like the Brotherhood's previous experiments the relationship shifted from accommodation to confrontation with regime.

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[236] Ramadan, *Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups*, 172.

[237] Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt*, 34.

[238] Hopwood, *Egypt Politics and Society, 1945-1990*, 116-117.

The assassination provided the Brotherhood an opportunity to distance itself from other Islamic groups' violence by making public condemnations. By denouncing violence since the 1960s the Brotherhood had a de facto recognition from the government although it was banned in 1954. Despite the years of Nasser and Sadat's repressive policies, the Brotherhood renounced violence under the leadership of Umar Al-Tilmishani in the 1970s and adhered to the multiparty system that was said to represent a form of the shura system.[239]

[239] Janine Astrid Clark, Democratization and Social Islam: A Case Study of the Islamic Health Clinics in Cairo, in *Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World, ed* Baghdat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, Vol 1,(Boulder CO:. Lynne Rienner 1995), 173-174.

CHAPTER 5

HOSNI MUBARAK PERIOD: (1981-)

Eight days following the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Al-Jihad, Mubarak, who had been appointed the Vice President in 1975, assumed the presidency of Egypt on October 14, 1981. Having learned from Sadat's final years and his assassination, Mubarak was aware of the need for combating radical groups, such as Al-Jihad and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya. In the weeks following Sadat's assassination, almost four thousand suspects were arrested. Instead of hanging Sadat's assassins, which could have resulted in their martyr status, the convicted were sentenced to prison.

The new administration was busy with the establishment of its popular bases and it refrained from any confrontation with nonviolent movements. In the meantime, the relationship between Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood was peaceful as they were in need of each other for the pursuit of legitimacy for both sides. Having experienced Nasser's formidable years and the encountered pressure in the last years of Sadat, there was no option for the Brotherhood except reconciliation with the government.

In the 1980s, the world witnessed a new trend towards democratization and liberalization. The third world in particular was trying to display its efforts towards democratization. Mubarak also accorded with the trend and continued adopting Sadat's liberal policies. The transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from a religious mass movement to a more politically affiliated group took place during an increased open environment in the 1980s. However, after the accommodation policies of the government during a phase for the pursuit of legitimacy and popularity, the tacit agreement broke down and another period of crackdowns and repression targeting the Brotherhood began in the 1990s. Beginning from the mid-1990s the government initiated counter-policies against the Brotherhood's societal expansionist policies. In the beginning of the new millennium, particularly following the September 11 attacks, with the affects of international events, governmental policies and discourse transformed to a more democratic leaning and the country

experienced some reforms. However, the Muslim Brotherhood's position with the government remained as a banned group and the pendulum continued to swing between two policies: accommodation and confrontation.

5.1. 1980s Under the Government of Mubarak

5.1.1 Establishment of Mubarak's Legitimacy and Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood

Despite a general acceptance of Hosni Mubarak's presidency on a societal level during the first years of his power, Mubarak was aware of the necessity for new reforms and the adoption of new policies to boast his popularity and cement his political legitimacy.[240] As Roger Owen argues after the revolution of Nasser and Infitah of Sadat, Mubarak wanted a personal contribution by using the term of *Democracy* to strengthen his position.[241] Shortly after assuming power, Mubarak stated that, "I believe democracy is the best guarantee for our future…I totally oppose the centralization of power and I have no wish to monopolize the decision-making because the country belongs to all of us and we all share a responsibility for it."[242] Throughout the early years of his presidency, Mubarak stressed the rule of law and freedom of political expression. He tried to promote the establishment of new political parties and expanded press freedom; moreover, the new President was keen to communicate with previously banned groups hoping to decrease societal tension and ease the implementation of his economic reforms.

During the first decade of Mubarak' presidency, the Egyptian political atmosphere was quite lively with the number of parties reaching thirteen. However, in the 1980s, oppositional parties were being criticized for being too detached from the grassroots efforts and for the inability to mobilize the Egyptian youth into the political scene.[243] In the meantime, activities of the

[240] Al-Awadi, A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak, 1982-2000, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, (April 2009), 216.

[241] Ellis Goldberg and Resat Kasaba and Joel S. Migdal, *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), 28.

[242] Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 54.

[243] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 66.

oppositional parties were very limited during those years and instead of reaching the grassroots they focused mainly on publishing daily or weekly newspapers as these channels were viewed as easier due to security issues. Although the opposition parties were allowed to print their own newspapers, according to Emergency Law, they were not allowed to hold meetings with six or more people for political purposes; furthermore, the distribution of any oppositional party literature in public places was banned. Due to the legislative structure (Emergency law[244] and other supportive laws) and for psychological (they saw it as inefficient and dangerous) reasons, citizens were also alienated from political life. [245]

Mubarak paid special attention in increasing his legal legitimacy too. He provided full immunity for the members of State Courts and prosecuting tribunal. Instead of choosing from members of the Ministry of Justice, Mubarak placed independent judges in the positions of the Supreme Council. Furthermore, the President placed special emphasis on the need for achieving legal reforms and launched an anti-corruption campaign[246].

Having learned from the experience of his predecessor, Mubarak was cautious not to emphasize strong Islamic values and he abstained from using Islamic symbols for the large part. However, while combating radical Islamists, Mubarak did not neglect in giving Islamic groups the green light to search for

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[244] Emergency law has been implemented since June 1967 except for the interruption between May 1980 and October 1981. Mubarak has been using his right to declare state of emergency in the country according to Article 148 and the Emergency Law 162/1958 has been implicated continuously since 1981. The Emergency Law has been renewed three years at a time since 1994. Law 162/1958 which has been putting constraints on freedom and expression allows authorities to detain dubious people and prolonged detention without charge. It was extended in May 2008 for two more years. The state of emergency in Egypt has been implemented since 1967 and 5000 persons remained in long term detention without charge under this law. The law also allows the government to prohibit strikes, demonstrations and public meetings.
Article 148**:** The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner prescribed by the law. Such proclamation must be submitted to the People's Assembly within the subsequent fifteen days in order that the Assembly may take a decision thereon. In case the People's Assembly is dissolved, the matter shall be submitted to the new Assembly at its first meeting. In all cases, the proclamation of the state of emergency shall be for a limited period, which may not be extended unless by approval of the Assembly. (sis.gov.eg, Accessed on 18 April 2009)

[245] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 66.

[246] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 54 ; for more details see Nazih Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat*, (Reading, Berks, UK : Ithaca,1991), 227.

moderate groups who will support and cooperate with his reforms. After the intense atmosphere of Sadat's final years Mubarak had no other way in making the society more stabilized. Mubarak's aim was to create a broad national unity against radical religious groups and he initiated this action by contacting different groups, including the Brotherhood and secularists such as leftists and the New Wafd Party.[247] During the fight against the radicals, not only were security forces used but also Al-Azhar was intensively utilized by the regime so not to lose religious support. The regime promoted and supported both moderate Islamist groups and Al-Azhar University. Mubarak went as far as to hold meetings with the sheikh of Al-Azhar. Moreover, visibility of several sheikhs on television increased as a part of combating policies against Islamist extremists.[248] On February 15, 1983, the Supreme Committee for Islamic Preaching was established by the government. The Committee's members were made up of the ministers of religion, education and information; and in 1987 its budget reached seven million Egyptian Pounds with the aim of reaching the young generation.[249] As a part of his concessions to moderate Islamist groups, Mubarak adopted some superficial measures as well. The government imposed heavy taxes on alcoholic consumption, did not allow programs on television which were considered offensive to Islam, organized seminars on Islamic issues, set up libraries in mosques and allowed for the publishing of Islamic books. However, the government's position pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood still referred to them as an illegal organization.

Similar to the previous two presidents, Mubarak did not neglect to release thousands of political activists from prisons, including religious leaders, students, journalists, members of professional syndicates, and trade unionists. To demonstrate the new position of the regime he issued a new law which allowed the return of the Lawyers Syndicate Council, dissolved by Sadat shortly before his assassination. The reasons for these tolerances were

[247] Hesham Al-Awadi, Mubarak and the Islamists,"Why Did the Honeymoon End" , *The Middle East Journal*, 1, (Winter,2005), 63.

[248] Ibid.. 59.

[249] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 39-40.

interpreted as Mubarak's effort to evoke support of the syndicates because of the deteriorated relationship with Israel and the U.S.; however, the Mubarak Government did not foresee the syndicates' reverse standing in the 1990s against the regime.[250] During a tolerant period, some Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Mustafa Meshur (appointed to the murshid position in 1996) were allowed to return from exile and the publications of *Al-Iltisam* and *Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami* resumed with the decision of the court. Despite all of these positive improvements, there still was no legal recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood; the court case filed in 1977 requesting to lift the ban continued to be delayed. [251]

After the release of its many political activists from the prisons in 1982 and in 1983, the Muslim Brotherhood patiently began their Islamic reform project. The project aimed at rebuilding their infrastructure and worked at improving their relationship with the society; particularly with the activities in mosques, university campuses and syndicates. The new generation of the Muslim Brotherhood was to be more open to work with society as compared to the previous generation affected by the Sayyid Qutb ideology which called for "separation and isolation".[252] In the early years of murshid Tilmishani[253], the Muslim Brotherhood began to believe they had to coexist with the government and that the transformation of society will be gradual and more peaceful. As a matter of fact, throughout the first decade of the Mubarak government, the Muslim Brotherhood had two main goals: to strengthen their structure and to become fully integrated into society and politics fully being legally recognized.[254] The regime was also aware of the state's religious establishments, such as Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments,

[250] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 57-58.

[251] Ibid., 55.

[252] Hesham Al Awadi, A Struggle For Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak,1982-2009, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, (April 2009), 216.

[253] Tilmishani was the murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood between the years of 1972-1986.

[254] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 49, 55.

and their deficiency to lead the Egyptian people. Therefore, it seemed logical that Mubarak would reach a tacit agreement with the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood to allow them to be organized without giving them political legitimacy, but the resulting strategy created a more complex relationship for the ensuing years, particularly those of the 1990s.

Mubarak took lessons from his predecessor, Sadat, and aimed at not repeating the same mistakes. He was aware that there were three foreign policy issues that undermined the legitimacy of Sadat in the country. Sadat's first policy was to have a good relationship with the U.S.; the second was the peace agreement he made with Israel and the third was Egypt's marginalization of other Arab countries after the peace agreement. Al-Awadi lists Mubarak's first decade of policies regarding the foreign affairs of Egypt and how the new policies contributed to his legitimacy efforts. First, he refrained from having a close relationship with the U.S.; for instance he refused an offer from the U.S. for $500 million to develop Ra's Banas naval military base in 1983 and he didn't agree on joining U.S. military operations against Libya in 1985 and 1986. Second, he emphasized that even though the peace agreement with Israel would continue, it was not possible for the complete normalization with Israel unless Egypt recovered the lost lands from the 1967 war and the Palestinian people regained their lands as well. Finally, he placed more attention on developing a greater relationship with the Arab World, particularly with Syria and Libya, to overcome the previous deteriorated image of Egypt since the peace agreement of 1979 with Israel. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Egypt positioned itself along side the Gulf States and Iraq against the perceived Iranian threat. This position contributed to the improved relationship Egypt had with the Gulf countries. The contribution of the worker remittances from the Gulf countries was also undeniable for the Egyptian economy.[255]

5.1.2 Muslim Brotherhood in 1984 and 1987 Elections

During the Mubarak era, six parliamentary elections were held: 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. In the early 1980s, although the Muslim Brotherhood was not prohibited from entering the People's Assembly

[255] Ibid., 52.

elections, it was still not allowed to enter the election independently because of Nasser's 1954 decree.

With the institutionalization of the multiparty elections in the period of Mubarak, the Brotherhood began to embrace a new political approach from the early 1980s. However, the issue of how to infiltrate the political system was not clear and there were different approaches within the Group. The discussion on the source of absolute authority was one issue. While at the theoretical level, the source of authority has always been God in Islam, in the Western style democratic principles the source of authority has always been human. Although it is not known exactly how it was decided, the Muslim Brotherhood chose to participate in Parliament as an organized group. The participation decision was justified by the examples of the Al-Banna's decisions to participate in the 1941 and 1945 national elections. Believing in the unity between religion and state, Al-Banna believed that besides preaching, representation on the official level could also serve to the Brotherhood's goals along the way of *dawa* and the most convenient way for the representation was to contend for seats in the People's Assembly (*Majlis Al-Sha'b*).[256] According to some of the leaders, such as Abdul Mun'em Abu Al-Futuh and Badr Mohammad Badr, the idea of entering Parliament became embodied in the murshid Umar Al-Tilmesani's mind in the early 1980s.[257] Deputy murshid Mustafa Meshur also believed that using the opportunity for the goal of the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the existing regime was legitimate.[258] According to Muhammad Badr, in 1983, representatives and officials from other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood came to Cairo for a large meeting to discuss the issue. Hesham says, "Tilmishani argued that building the *tanzim* (structure) and engaging in the political process could take place

[256] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 49.

[257] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 56-57.

[258] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 50.

simultaneously, and it was not necessary to reveal publicly all aspects of the *tanzim* and its members".[259]

The decision to participate in the 1984 elections marked a turning point for the Muslim Brotherhood's infiltration into the Egyptian political system which had allowed the implementation of multiparty elections since 1976, and in the long term the decision led to a manifestation of its political ideology. At the same time, the participation showed the Brotherhood's commitment to work in the existing political system and play the rules of the game in order to realize its goal.[260]

Between 1984 and 1990, Egypt's electoral democracy was based on three legal documents: the Constitution of 1971, the Parties Law of 1977 and the Electoral Law of 1983. The Parties Law of 1977 provided advantages to the ruling party against opposition and it banned parties based on religious, regional or class allegiances.[261] In Maye Kassem's words, the new electoral law of 1983, which prevented individuals from nominating themselves in elections, was "a breach of public right, equality, and opportunity as enshrined in Article 8, 40 and 62 of the constitution."[262] According to the law, only parties were able to enter Parliament and a party had to have at least 8 percent of the votes to be represented in Parliament. Different from other Islamic groups in Egypt, these restrictions forced the Muslim Brotherhood to follow strategies for political accommodation by making efforts to integrate into the political system.

In 1983, the ruling party passed an amendment in the Assembly stating independents were not allowed to participate in the elections because their affiliations were not being known. As a result of the new amendment, the number of constituencies changed from 176 to 48 and they put the barrage of 8

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[259] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 56-57.

[260] Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 26-27.

[261] Goldberg and Resat Kasaba and Joel S. Migdal, *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society*, 28 also see Nazih Ayubi ,*The State and Public Policies In Egypt Since Sadat*, 97.

[262] Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, 60.

percent for parties to enter the Assembly.[263] The Muslim Brotherhood strategy in the 1984 and 1987 elections was to form tactical alliances even with secular parties because of the restrictions prohibiting the Brotherhood from establishing its own party. In the 1984 elections, several reasons led the Brotherhood and New Wafd Party to form an alliance. Although there was a historical dislike for both sides, it was the fact that both had been marginalized in the post-1952 years. The alliance was seen as advantageous for the New Wafd Party to exceed the electoral requirement of an 8 percent barrage to enter the People's Assembly. Although there was no ideological uniformity, another reason to make the alliance between both sides stemmed from the leading position of New Wafd Party as a powerful opposition in the first years of the Mubarak government.[264] The main opposition argument of the Brotherhood during the 1984 elections was the amount of corruption in the government. They also focused on the democracy issue, and the application of Islam. The New Wafd Party also opposed the Camp David Accords, but did not bring up the issue during the campaigns.[265] The Wafd and Brotherhood's alliance secured 13 percent out of the total votes (fifty-eight seats out of 448 seats).

Table 1: 1984 Parliamentary Elections Results

Parties	***Seats in People's Assembly***
National Democratic Party (NDP)	390
Bipartite Alliance	
(Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood)	58 (51 Wafd, 7 MB)
Labor Party (Al-Amal)	4 (Appointed)
Liberal Party (Al-Ahrar)	-
The National Progressive Party*	-
(Tagammu Party)	
Number of Seats (Appointed)	10

Source: Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 51.
Number of Seats in the Elections: 448

[263] Ibid.57-58

[264] Hala Mustafa, "The Islamist Movements under Mubarak Government" in *The Islamist Dilemma,* ed. Laura Guazzone, (Garnet Publishing, 1995), 167-168.

[265] "Egypt's Elections", *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147, Egypt's Critical Moment (July-August 1987), 19.

In the first years of the Mubarak Government, the strategy was neither to allow the Brotherhood to establish a party nor to legitimize it as a religious organization; however, by allowing their participation in the election the government expected to balance secular and Islamist opposition. On the issue of Islamists' participation in the election, Tal and Hala Mustafa argued that the aim of the Government was to split the Muslim Brotherhood's ranks but the regime's "divide and rule" strategy backed fired, and contrary improvements were seen during the post-election process. First, the Brotherhood's alliance with the New Wafd Party strengthened instead of fragmenting, and the Brotherhood became a spearhead for other parties by imposing its ideology of alliances as was seen in the 1987 elections. Yet for the New Wafd Party, the alliance resulted in a retreat from its secular ideology. Although the election results provided the Brotherhood entry into the political process and parliamentary proceedings, the alliance led to increased discussions inside and outside the New Wafd Party because of the dilution of its secular character.[266] In this respect, another substantial issue must be noted; the new bourgeoisie of Egypt was not oriented with secular ideology but were predominantly a conservative bourgeoisie composed of wealthy Muslim Brotherhood members who returned from the Gulf countries in the 1970s. Second, in the late 1980s there were terrorist attacks committed by radical Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood also extended its grassroots efforts and infiltrated some institutions, such as student unions and professional associations.[267]

Between the 1984 and 1987 elections, the opposition continued to criticize the government for its interference in the elections (ballot box stuffing, inflation of the vote count, intimidation of voters and obstruction of poll watching). [268] During this time, Mubarak's goal was to persuade the citizens that he was not against Islamists, except for the radicals, and searched for avenues to evoke support of the moderates. However, the policy of toleration

[266] Mustafa, "*The Islamist Movements under Mubarak Government*" 167.

[267] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 53.

[268] "Egypt's Elections", *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147, Egypt's Critical Moment (Jul.-Aug.,1987), 18.

led to the opening of social, political and economic pathways for the Brotherhood within society. [269] Later, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the elections were not constitutional because independent candidates were not allowed to participate in the elections. Taking into account the state-dependent nature of the Court, one can see that the decision was a result of the NDP's displeasure with the gains of the opposition. As a result, the decision led to a rerun of the elections in 1987.[270]

In the April 1987 elections, 400 of the total 448 parliamentary seats were distributed according to parliamentary elections. In these elections, the Muslim Brotherhood formed a tripartite alliance (the Islamic alliance) with the Labor Party (Al-Amal) and the Liberal Party (Al-Ahrar). For the three parties, the alliance was more advantageous than participating in the elections separately. In terms of the Brotherhood, there was no other alternative for the Brotherhood after its alliance with the New Wafd Party ended. As for the Labor Party, which was formed in 1978 by the Sadat regime, in the following year it won 23 seats in the Assembly and thereby became the major opposition. Even though the Labor Party lost its power in the all-encompassing clamp down of opposition groups following the assassination of Sadat in 1981, it resumed its political activities once more. By the eve of the 1987 elections, the goal of the Labor Party to form a broad alliance with all opposition parties did not occur; however, it led to the tripartite alliance to ensure they exceed the 8 percent requirement in the elections.[271] Tal argues that similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Labor Party had the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state and its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood served to increase its credibility. The small Liberal Party emerged during the 1984 elections as being right winged, opposing the Government on economic issues; it was not possible to enter the People's Assembly without making an alliance with another party.[272] Moreover, both parties were not able to create a split in the

[269] Al-Awadi, "Mubarak and the Islamists,"Why Did the Honeymoon End"," 63.

[270] Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 190.

[271] Mustafa, *The Islamist Movements under Mubarak Government*, 168-169.

[272] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 52.

Muslim Brotherhood because the Labor Party had the same goal as the Brotherhood and the Liberal Party was not strong enough to realize this kind of aim.

Table 2: 1987 Parliamentary Elections Results

Parties	***Seats in People's Assembly***
National Democratic Party	348
Tripartite Alliance (Labor Party (Al-Amal), Liberal Party (Al-Ahrar), Muslim Brotherhood)	60*
New Wafd Party	35
The National Progressive Party (Tagammu Party)**	1(Appointed)
Number of Seats (Appointed)	10
Independents	5

Source: Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 52.
Number of Seats in the Elections: 448. Four hundred representatives were elected from the list, 48 were elected as independents.
*The Muslim Brotherhood- 34, Al-Amal -22, Al-Ahrar -4. In addition, 4 independent Islamists were elected.
**In order to be represented in Parliament party must gain at least 8 percent of the national vote. Therefore Tagammu Party couldn't be represented in People Assembly.

Forty eight remaining seats were for the independent or individual party nominees. Thirty nine of the seats were occupied by NDP sponsored candidates and 5 of the remaining seats were won by NDP independents. NDP won a total of three hundred and fifty three seats in parliament.[273]

Table 3: Party share of the oppositional vote, 1984 and 1987

Opposition Parties	***Percentage of Votes***	
	1984	***1987***
Wafd Party	56.0	36.2
Labor Party (Al-Amal)	26.2	56.5
Liberal Party (Al-Ahrar Party)	2.4	-*
National Democratic Progressive Party (Tagammu Party)	15.4	7.3
Total	100	100

Source: Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 279.
Note: The total oppositional vote in 1984 was 1,390,206, out of a total of 5,146,565. The total opposition vote in 1987 was 2,060,119, out of a total of 6,811,877.
*The Liberal Party allied with the Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987. Percentages in boldface indicate the percentage of the opposition vote received by the party bloc containing Muslim Brotherhood.

[273] "Egypt's Elections", *MERIP Middle East Report*, No. 147, Egypt's Critical Moment (Jul.-Aug.,1987), 17.

Wickham says that in spite of its illegal position, the Muslim Brotherhood was successful in mobilizing votes in the 1984 and 1987 elections by gaining more than any other opposition group. In the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only successful opposition group in Egypt. In the 1987 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood worked in the streets, organized meetings and rallies, and distributed campaign literature declaring "Islam is the solution" and "Give your vote to Allah, give it to the Muslim Brotherhood". [274] The slogan of "Islam is the solution" was historically used for the first time by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1987 electoral campaigns. The implication of the *shari'a* in the case of gaining power was another commitment of the Muslim Brotherhood during the campaigns.[275] Harnisch and Mecham argue that using the slogan demonstrated that although the Brotherhood was inclined to play in the existing system, there was no shift from their longstanding ideology to establish a shari'a based society and Islam plays a role in every aspect of life, including politics.[276]

Figure 2: Muslim Brotherhood campaign poster. Al-Islam Huwa Al-Hal (Islam is the Solution)
Source: Harnisch, Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 191.

The Labor Party enhanced its Islamic legitimacy by cooperating with the Brotherhood because the latter had already been known for its Islamic base. According to observers, during the elections, an extreme polarization between

[274] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 92.

[275] Harnisch, Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 191.

[276] Ibid.

Islamists and the National Democratic Party was noticed.[277] By taking part in the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood accomplished two goals: It entered the People's Assembly by legitimate means and shari'a was stipulated in the coalition platform to serve as the main source for legislation. Although their proposals were rejected by the People's Assembly's majority of NDP between the 1987-1990 term, the Brotherhood members remained focused on the application of *shari'a* as the official system of the State. The Muslim Brotherhood also presented other inquiries to the Assembly, questioning the violations of human rights such as torture under interrogation and unlawful imprisonment and called for the end of the state of emergency situation and prosecution of citizens in military tribunals. The government did not neglect to make small concessions, such as prohibition of alcoholic beverages on Egyptian airlines, but these minor changes did not make sense.[278]

Throughout the late 1980s, the democratic perception of the Movement began to transform. While the Muslim Brotherhoods' aim was to participate in the elections in order to gain power and increase their influence, in a short time they began to demonstrate their commitment towards a democratic system. Through the years, the concept of democracy began to play a central role in the discourse of the group and they called for an "Islamic civil state" (*dawla madaniyya Islamiyya*) for the efforts of application of *shraia* in a democratic system.[279]

As a sign of awareness on the issue of democracy, in February 1989, a spokesperson for the Brotherhood, Mamun Al-Hudaybi, wrote in *Liva Al-Islam* on the issue of democracy in Egypt Al-Hudaybi stating, "There is a certain degree of democracy we guard and hold on to. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are complete. It is important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice."[280] In October1990, Issam Al-Erian called the argument

[277] Mustafa, *The Islamist Movements Under Mubarak Government*, 170.

[278] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan* , 51,53.

[279] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 190.

[280] Survillian , Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. the State*, 48.

that the Brotherhood was against democracy a "great lie" and added, "the Brothers consider constitutional rule to be closest to Islamic rule…We are the first to call for and apply democracy. We are devoted to it until death."[281]

5.2. The 1990s under the Mubarak Government

The 1990s were very active and at some points very dramatic years for the Brotherhood. Al-Awadi stated that during the 1990s there were three dimensions of conflict for the government and the Movement. The first is related to the condition of Egypt in the region; second, the changes in the regime; and lastly, developments within the Brotherhood itself.[282] Towards the late 1980s, the government's animus was to break down all Islamist groups because of the increasing radical elements in society, yet due to the government's inability to lead the people towards religion, the situation helped the Brotherhood to become more successful in the Assembly and trade union activities.

Prior to the 1990 Parliamentary elections, the government passed Law 206 which was not welcomed by the Brotherhood and other opposition groups. The Brotherhood and other parties claimed that according to the Law, the regime changed the distribution of votes by adding new towns to voting districts where their position was not strong and the gerrymandering of voting districts provided a privileged position for NDP's candidates.[283] As a result, the number of constituencies changed from 48 to 222, two representatives per constituency. Another implication of the new law was the abolition of the party-list system by returning to an individual-candidacy system.[284] Due to the unfairness of the new law, opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted the 1990 elections.[285]

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[281] Ibid.

[282] Al-Awadi, A struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak,1982-2009, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, April 2009, 223.

[283] Tal , *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 54.

[284] Kasem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, 61.

[285] Muhammad M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, Violance as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement, in Quintan Wiktorowicz(Ed.) *Islamic Activism A Social Movement Theory*,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 74.

In June 1991, after the boycotted elections, opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a 10-point consensus statement to show their commitment to democracy and political reform in the country:

> 1. Commitment to the human rights and public liberties mentioned in shari'a and international law;
> 2. An end to the state of emergency and martial law;
> 3. A lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties;
> 4. The independent supervision of elections by the judiciary;
> 5. The adoption of the parliamentary system in which the executive power will be vested in the cabinet, which is selected from the party with the majority;
> 6. Guarantee the right of the People's Assembly to amend the budget; granting the Shura Council [i.e. the Upper House] powers of oversights and legislation;
> 7. Choice of the president through direct election from a list of several candidates, with a limit of two terms;
> 8. The compatibility of all legislation passed with shari'a, with emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own religious law in case of contradiction;
> 9. The independence of the judiciary;
> 10. Freedom of the press and media from government control and equal opportunities for all political parties in the official media.[286]

The statements principles mainly highlighted the implementation of political reforms and rule of law, institutional control over governmental authority, but also sought for the application of Islamic law.

In the early 1990s, the relationship became strained between the government and the Brotherhood, particularly after the radical Islamist terrorist attacks of 1992. In those years, the aim of the Brotherhood was to spread a relatively liberal atmosphere throughout the society, but in the ensuing years the government used punishment tactics to prevent its spread.

[286] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 192.

5.2.1. The Muslim Brotherhood in Trade Unions

After boycotting the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to go through other channels, such as trade unions and its social and economic grassroots to grow their political constituency.

The Muslim Brotherhood had already managed to infiltrate into the trade unions in the 1980s, during the less problematic period, and the unions became a good backdrop to continue its activities out of the People's Assembly. Their infiltration and high success in the Professional Associations elections, representing the middle and lower middle class of society, may be seen as one of the most substantial improvements for the Movement in the 1980s. A majority of union executive boards were dominated by Brotherhood members during the years of both Umar Al-Tilmishani (d.1986) and his successor, murshid Mohammad Hamad Abu Nasser (d.1996). A victory in the Medical Syndicate in 1984, encouraged members of other syndicates to take part in the elections of the Engineer Syndicate in 1985, the Pharmacist Syndicate in 1988, and the Scientist Syndicate in 1990. In 1986, the Medical Syndicate introduced a project for a subsidized health insurance program and it became very popular among the beneficiaries (including its members and their families) of the program. The subsidized health insurance plan reached 43,960 people (including family members of the union members) in 1988. The Engineers Syndicate also followed the same path and 72,000 people benefited from its project.[287] Between 1987-1990, the Brotherhood won the majority in many union boards; for example, in 1987, it won 54 out of 61 seats in the Engineering Union; in 1988 it won all 12 seats in the Doctors Union; in 1990 it won the votes of all members of the Council of Professors at Cairo University; and in the same year, the Brotherhood won ten out of twelve seats in the board of the Pharmacists Union.[288]

According to Hala Mustafa, the success of Islamists in unions was based on the ineffectiveness of political institutions and the weakness of political parties to organize the activities of the unions. However, she notes that

[287] Al-Awadi, "A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak,1982-2009," *Contemporary Arab Affairs,* (April 2009), 216-217.

[288] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 55.

the success of the Brotherhood was not represented in the Labor Unions as in Professional Associations. In the Labor Unions, the leftists continued to dominate as they focused their attention on low wages, employer and employee relations and other rights related to workers.[289]

On university campuses in the early 1980s, Mubarak increased the security apparatus in campuses and continued to apply Sadat's 1979 Student Charter amendment to dissolve student representative bodies in universities. Although in 1982, 84 student union elections were held again, the candidates were not allowed to be affiliated with any ideology.[290] After 1984, the Islamist presence in the student union elections began to increase, and by the mid-1980s, former student activists became professional activists, and control of majority of the twenty-two Professional guilds passed on to the Muslim Brotherhood.[291] In 1984, Mubarak introduced reforms for student activities. In these years, students affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood tried to repair their organizational links instead of activism. They focused on themselves in completing their academic responsibilities and organizing meetings at the university; recruitments would usually take place at the university mosque now.[292]

Beginning in 1985, teacher clubs in some universities, such as those in Cairo, Asyut, and Alexandria began to be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Awadi maintains that the main concern for teachers were low salaries, health care and accommodations, particularly for young and single teachers. In 1986, the year the Brotherhood won elections at Cairo University, the Brotherhood managed to obtain 208 flats for young teachers in their club from the university administration. In similar fashion, the Brotherhood met with university officials on the issues of low salaries and the improvement of health care services for teachers, and in general they succeeded on these

[289] Mustafa, *The Islamist Movements under Mubarak Government*, 170-171.

[290] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 60.

[291] Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 279.

[292] Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000*, 61.

issues.[293] To rescue the faculty staff from the poor conditions and difficult process of the state run health care system, the Brotherhood provided a medical card to the faculty professors so they could benefit from private hospitals at the university's expenses. Moreover, similar to the Engineers Syndicate, sales of consumer durables, such as white goods and home furnishings, were organized for the university faculty members by Brotherhood affiliated university clubs to provide for the staff's needs at subsidized prices. The sales tactic became very popular and in some areas the profit reached up to 1 million Egyptian Pounds.[294]

During the 1980s, the Brotherhood focused on providing material services to student unions instead of the religious rhetoric they used in the 1970s. These policies increased their reputation on campus which reflected itself in student union elections. In 1988, first year students in Mansura University received packets from an Islamist controlled union which listed the services they provide in addition to such things as cheap textbooks and a 30 percent discount on medical services and engineering tools. Similar applications were used in other universities and union representatives said that it was not a show but only a duty of the unions. [295]

On international issues, such as Intifada or Afghan mujahidin groups in the 1980s and the Gulf War in 1991, the faculty clubs, student unions and syndicates established platforms to meet and discuss agendas. During the early 1990s, two events, the 1991 Gulf War and the 1992 earthquake, had major repercussions in Egyptian society. The stance of the Brotherhood on those events led to confrontations with the government in the following years.

During the Gulf War, although the Brotherhood condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991, they did not support the intervention by other countries and the bombing of Iraq. The Brotherhood was absent in the People's Assembly due to their boycott of the 1990 elections, and syndicates

[293]Al-Awadi, "Mubarak and the Islamists,"Why Did the Honeymoon End"," *The Middle East Journal,* 1, (Winter,2005), 63-80.

[294] Al-Awadi, "A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak, 1982-2009," *Contemporary Arab Affairs,* (April 2009), 218.

[295] Ibid.

and university campuses voiced their criticisms loudly during the 1991 Gulf War by condemning the government's official support for the Western Coalition. They mobilized on the grassroots level and launched an escalating campaign against the Governments position concerning the war. The Committee for Coordinating the Syndicates Action issued a statement harshly criticizing the Government's stance on the war. The signatories of the statement were subjected to accusations by the state-controlled media campaigns and some officials for being 'disloyal', 'traitors' and receiving money from Saddam Husain. Syndicates and student unions joined in demonstrations against the war and the presence of Egyptian troops supporting Coalition powers. They also created questionnaires [296] to increase public awareness and to gather public opinion on the American- Israeli presence in the region.

The second event was the 1992 earthquake which demonstrated the inadequacy of the government and the power of the Brotherhood's organizational capacity. With the help of the Brotherhood and affiliated syndicates and other networks in both urban and rural areas, they were able to deliver quick relief assistance to the affected population.

The syndicates were also used as a political platform to discuss the need for political reforms by holding conferences and seminars. This was an avenue used to replace the Brotherhood's absence in the People's Assembly.[297] In gaining social legitimacy by using trade unions, syndicates and student unions, the Brotherhood proved to be a politicizing actor in the public eye. It was thought that the Brotherhood had been taking over governmental responsibilities and their expanding network among the middle class became the significant reasons for the break of convergence between the Mubarak government and the Movement, and the beginning of confrontation. For Mubarak, the abrupt departure from accommodation to confrontation was not exclusively on the grounds of increasing extremism in the country. Other moderate groups were also in the forefront of the confrontation after the Muslim Brotherhoods six years experience in the parliament and their

[296] Ibid., 219.

[297] Ibid.222

increasing mobilization in the society. Thus, beginning around 1993, the regime began to denounce the Brotherhood as an "illegal organization".[298]

On February 5, 1992, the police raided a computer company in the Heliopolis district of Cairo and found documents detailing plans for overthrowing the regime. A side from a worldwide schema of the organization along with names of activists, the documents detailed the importance of infiltrating the Army and police along with controlling the students, trade unions, businessmen, lower class public sectors and control of the media. In that atmosphere of high tension, in 1992, the Brotherhood won the most important union of Egypt, the Lawyers Union, which was a stronghold for nationalists and seculars; moreover, because of its nature, the Lawyers Union could easily be politicized and mobilize people. The Brotherhood member lawyers were sent to military tribunals and they were accused of encouraging the increased violent attacks of radical Islamists and for their function as intermediaries between the Islamic leaders in prisons and outside.[299]

Following the successes of the Brotherhood in the unions, the government was concerned with the increasing effect of the Brotherhood on the societal level. Wickham argues that in 1992, the enhanced visibility and victories of the Movement in civil society meant that the nonpolitical and tolerated groups, which were at periphery, began a shift to center by elevating their voices against the government. It was time to sound the alarm for the government.[300] As part of its assaults, the government issued the much criticized Law 100, relating to the union elections in 1993. The Law stipulated that the minimum percentage of voter participation had to be 50 percent to validate union elections, and the courts had to monitor the elections. Yet the government could not realize its aim through the Law since the Brotherhood, once more, gained the majority vote in the trade unions that same year. A year later, the regime attempted to find alternative unions by claiming that in the Brotherhood affiliated unions, the Brotherhood member's attitude was not

[298] Wickam, *Mobilizing Islam*, 214.

[299] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 58-59.

[300] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 208.

equal towards all members of the unions, but the method was not effectuated. An important Brotherhood affiliated figure from the Lawyers Union, Abdel Kharit Madani, was arrested on April 26 1994, and his home was searched while he was taken into custody for questioning. A day after his arrest, he died and his death sparked a great reaction by the Brotherhood against the government. On May 17, nearly one thousand lawyers marched in the streets accusing the government of torturing Kharit Madani, and thirty nine demonstrators were also detained during the protests. The Ministry of Interior denied the claims and asserted that Madani died as a result of natural reasons. Moreover, the Ministry declared that they found documents related to his links to radical groups and evidence of money transfers to the Al-Jihad organization. The explanations did not convince the Brotherhood ranks and they continued in their protests against the government. On May 23 1994, eighty two year old General Guide of the Brotherhood, Sheikh Abu Nasser, was brought into questioning with the charge that his signature was on illegal documents; several days later, a pro-government weekly newspaper, *al-Musawwar*, began to publish a series of confiscated documents found at a computer company and many Muslim Brotherhood members were rounded up in the following weeks.

The increasing measures against the Brotherhood were a reaction by the government against the increasing affect the group had on the societal level. Following this year, the position of the Brotherhood was considered under the same categorization with the radical Islamists. In an interview that took play in May of that year, Mubarak defined the Brotherhood as "an illegal organization, standing behind most of the fanatical religious activity".[301] The government position to classify the Brotherhood as one of the radical groups in the country was also serving to justify its pressure measures against the group.

5.2.2. Radical Groups' Attacks against the Government in 1990s and the Brotherhood

After a decade of normalization, radical Islamic terror broke out in Egypt again and the country's experiment with militant Islamist groups heated up as of mid-1992. Following the assassination of Sadat, militant groups had

[301] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan,* 55-59, 63.

been cracked down widely and the early 1990s marked a return to the conflict with Islamic terrorism. The Brotherhood was continuing its opposition with nonviolent avenues and legitimate channels. They used established political institutions to realize the same goals as the radical groups that used violence, in order to create an Islamic state. The Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from militant groups; however, it was known as the mother organization for the militant splinter groups of the 1970s. In those years, the writings of Qutb set forth the triggering factor that lead to the radical's conceptualization for the aim of an establishment of an Islamic state with the use of violence.

The terrorist attacks in Egypt coincided with Algeria's struggle between 1991 and 1992. In this respect, Kepel says that in 1992, several hundred Algerian and Egyptian "Afghans" came to their homes with the idea of *jihad*[302]and this may have also escalated the attacks in these countries. The assassination of Egyptian secularist Farag Fuda by Jamaa Al-Islamiya also coincided with Algerian extremism and the assassination of Algerian President Muhammad Boudiaf in 1992.

Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya's attacks in Upper Egypt[303] targeting Copts, tourists, police, security forces and the president himself were made public and the government became more nervous about Islamist groups. In 1990, the number of clashes reached 51 between the Islamists and security forces leading to 115 deaths on both sides. The extremist groups damaged the tourism sector,

[302] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, (Belknap Press, 2002), 277.

[303] When we talk about the Islamic groups it is important to explain the conditions of the south of the country (Upper Egypt or *Sa'id*) as it was the cradle for the many Islamic groups in the 1990s. The country witnessed the terrorist attacks against tourists and security forces in this region in the 1990s. Upper Egypt differs with its cultural, social, economical, political and historical structure from the north of the country. Their ties with the north (Bahariya) and Cairo is cut off and the percentage of unemployment is about 45 percent among the young population. From the historical perspective, opposite to north of the country they resisted against the British colonialism and it has never been colonized by the British power. And British settings were not established in Upper Egypt. (Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 14) Even today, an Egyptian from Upper Egypt may be proud with their different history from the north of the country and their traditional ties although the region sometimes has come up with blood feuds in the media. Because of the loss of ties with government, the peoples' main link became mosques. Islamic fanatic movements and terror were also born in Upper Egypt.

one of the most important economic activities in the country.[304] Tal says that in 1993, the number of wounded and killed victims reached over one thousand and at the end of the year, the regime began to implement more aggressive policies against the Islamic groups with the fear of any instability in the country. Apart from the economic effects of the clashes, they also damaged the political and social stability in Egypt.

Between the years of 1982-1992, the strategy of Hasan Abu Basha, former minister of interior, was not only to counter terrorism with the anti terror units of the government, but to also take social and economic measures against terrorists. In 1993, the new Minister of Interior, Hassan Al-Alfi, adopted a different policy based on harder sanctions and viewed the Brotherhood and other radical groups alike. Opposite of the former minister, Al-Alfi believed that any kind of economic, social or political reforms would not dissuade the Islamists from their ultimate goal of overthrowing the regime. One reason to target the Brotherhood stemmed from the threat perception, particularly in the early 1990s. With its links to other countries and organizational capability in Egypt, the Brotherhood very actively opposed the government on the civil society level. From the second half of 1994, the government changed its previous "selective containment" towards the militant groups and decided to adopt the strategy of "all out confrontation" for all Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Tal lists the main elements of the all out confrontation strategy as follows:

> 1) The transition from defense to offense, with the objective of destroying the organizational infrastructures and minimizing the Islamic threat.
> 2) Broadening the restrictions on the Brotherhood's activity, especially limiting its ability to infiltrate social and cultural institutions and trade unions.
> 4) Enlisting the support of all legitimate political parties to form a united front against terrorism and totalitarianism.[305]

[304] Al-Awadi, "A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak,1982-2009," *Contemporary Arab Affairs,* (April 2009), 220.

[305] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 281.

As part of the regime's offensive strategy, some measures were taken. For example, in May 1994, the government abrogated the right of university professors to elect their dean in the universities and instead it adopted the method of government-appointed university presidents. After two months, in a similar way, the application of elections for village heads and their deputies were abolished, and instead, the ministry of interior began to appoint people for the posts. As it was mentioned before, in 1994, many members of the Brotherhood were rounded up following the plans to overthrow the regime and tensions were strained in the trade unions. To emphasize the illegal position of the Muslim Brotherhood, the judicial system also tried to limit the activities of the Brotherhood in Parliament and in the professional unions. The trials of Brotherhood members were conducted in military courts as well.

In June 1994, the ruling party (NDP) attempted to organize a national platform to form a front comprised of other legal opposition parties. The aim of Mubarak in organizing the dialogue was to isolate the Brotherhood. When Mubarak was asked why the Brotherhood was not invited he said that "to his knowledge, there was no such group by this name". The symposiums were postponed a few times because of the debates between the opposition and the ruling party over the former's demand for political reforms, political rights and economic issues; whereas, the latter's aim was to emphasize the need of a collective campaign against Islamic groups and Islamic extremism. With the participation of nine opposition parties and different sectors made up of intellectuals, businessmen, media, academia and trade unions, the symposium opened on June 25 and some decisions were made. In order to meet the opposition's demand, to some degree amendments were made in regards to political rights and a commitment on the holding of the proportional elections under the inspection of jurists, and a resolution was drafted to campaign against Islamic terrorism. [306]

Hussein Adel, a left wing journalist and secretary general of the Labor Party, was suddenly arrested on December 24, 1994, on his return from a trip to France. He was writing articles that leaned towards shari'a for *al-Sha'ab*

[306] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan,* 63-64.

newspaper, a periodical controlled by the Labor Party. The Brotherhood was not allowed to publish its own newspaper and *al-Sha-ab* functioned as a voice for the Brotherhood during that time. The event triggered many demonstrations in public; the Lawyers Unions and Journalists Unions also launched a campaign against the arrest. A week later, the charge was asserted by the Ministry of Interior that on his plane seat, leaflets were found with his handwritings pertaining to Jamaa al-Islamiya. On January 18, 1995, he was suddenly released due to intensive public pressure. It was claimed that because of the success of the tripartite alliance in the 1987 elections, the government was working to dissolve the links between the Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood and looking for any way to eliminate the party.

Another strategy used to stifle the strength of the Brotherhood, was to destabilize the professional unions that were dominated by the group. To increase the secular effect in the Lawyers Union, the government divided its executive board into two groups. While one group was comprised of sympathizers of the Brotherhood, the second group harbored other political views. In some unions, government affiliated members demanded investigations for their claims of misleading financial activities, and in January of 1995, the examination proceedings started for the Doctors, Lawyers and Engineering Unions. While the charges were denied by the unions, Dr. Issam Al-Erian, deputy secretary general of the Doctors Union and a very prominent figure in the movement, was arrested with six other colleagues. They were charged with the involvement of rebuilding the illegal organization's underground unit and participating in activities to replace the regime with an Islamic state.

5.2.3. 1995 Parliamentary Elections

Five years after the boycott of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood announced its participation in the 1995 elections. The Brotherhood's spokesman, Mamoun al-Hudaybi, said the decision was made by the Guidance Office of the Movement.

Prior to the 1995 November elections, on November 23, eighty-two Muslim Brotherhood members that included academicians and professional

figures, went on trial and fifty-four of them received prison sentences and were sentenced to forced labor, while twenty eight members were exonerated. Among the fifty-four sentenced members accused of illegal meetings and undermining the constitution were Dr. Issam Al-Erian; Mohammad Habib, a science lecturer in Assiut University; Said Mahmoud Ezzat, professor of medicine at Delta University; and Abdul Munim Ab Al-Futuh, deputy secretary general of the federation of Arab doctors. Due to the Brotherhood's decision not to boycott the coming elections, the trial was perceived by the Brotherhood as a way to block the group from participating in the elections; and the Brotherhood announced 160 candidates for the November 23 elections with their Labor Party alliance.

None of the opposition parties wanted to make an alliance with the Brotherhood like in previous elections. For example, a senior from the New Wafd Party said prior to the elections that "It is not our interest to cooperate with an organization that is targeted by the authorities".[307] From the opposition, 682 candidates, including 150 Muslim Brotherhood members, nominated themselves for the national elections which planned to be held in two rounds. The first was on November 29 and the second was on December 6. Before the elections, many prospective candidates began to take precautions against any kind of crackdowns. With very similar views on Islam's all embracing way of life, the Brotherhood and Labor Party announced they would participate in the elections in an alliance and without the Liberal Party(Al-Ahrar), opposite to their previous alliance in 1987. The Brotherhood chose not to run with the Liberal Party because of its participation in the 1990 elections; even though the others boycotted it. The party also participated in the Shura Council elections without consulting its alliances. The Brotherhood candidates had to obtain documents from the authorities proving they did not have any criminal records since they were required by law in order to participate in the elections. There was also rumors circulating that they were being tracked by the government's security agencies.

[307] Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, 62.

Near the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Minister of Interior announced that the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, and Jamaa Al-Islamiya were all part of the same organization.[308] Members of the Brotherhood continued to be arrested with the charge they had links to terrorism up until the eve of the elections and the arrests were interpreted as government efforts to weaken the Brotherhood in the elections. One week before the elections, more than 400 supporters of the Brotherhood were arrested and although demonstrations were not legal in Egypt, the ruling party's candidates held demonstrations. Fifty one Brotherhood candidates were also arrested prior to the elections.[309]

The leaders of the Brotherhood were confident of their entry into the People's Assembly by competing with its 150 candidates[310] in 222 districts; however, the result of the elections were disastrous for the Brotherhood. The 1995 elections were a victory for the ruling party, NDP, by occupying 93 percent of the seats in the Assembly. At the end of the second round the results were announced by the Ministry of Interior: The ruling National Democratic Party won 317 seats out of 444 seats in the Assembly, independents won 114 seats ; and from the opposition, Wafd won six seats, Al-Tagammu five seats, Liberal Party one seat, and the Nasserists one seat. The Brotherhood could not obtain even one seat in the Assembly and thus the government realized its goal of banishing the Muslim Brotherhood from the parliament and legal political arena. The elections were deemed fraudulent by the Egyptian Human Rights Organization.

5.2.4. Confrontation of Generations in the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Wasat Party Initiative

In addition to the repressive policies of the government, the Brotherhood's domestic environment was also tightening and tensions were high inside. Internal disarray stemmed from the regime's consecutive

[308] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 193.

[309] Ibid.

[310] Wickham says the number of Brotherhood candidates was 156.

repressive policies and the rising discrepancy between the middle age leading figures and the Movement's old guards; this was due to the latter's autocratic and rigid policies. An example that displays the difference between the two group's thoughts is that after the 1995 People's Assembly election and its subversive results, younger cadres supported the street protests while the older cadres preferred to be moderate. The differences on the issue of response against the offensive policies of the government stemmed mainly from the older generation's underground and persecution experiences in the Nasser years and the younger generation's relatively free atmosphere.[311] The power struggle between old members, in their seventies and eighties, and the middle aged members, in their late thirties and forties, also represented the demands of continuity of the past and more modern ideology and different approaches on the issues of women rights, minority issues and the implementation of shari'a in the country.

In general, the Brotherhood's middle age generation joined the Movement in their high school or university years in the 1970s. They became active participants or leaders in student unions and later in professional syndicates. By the influence of revivalist Banna and Sayyid Qutb they saw themselves as the pioneers of the pure Islamic society with a conservative interpretation of *shari'a*. They supported a mandatory veiling and gender segregation. In the situation of *jahilliya,* Egyptian society had to implicate the law of Allah instead of Western style democracy and sovereignty. However, although they didn't accept the values of Western democracy, they participated in the electoral process of the student unions and they provided tutoring, gender segregated transportation, and other needs for the students. They refused to interact with Nasserists, Marxists, Copts and unveiled women. In later years, the generation also split among themselves. After they graduated from university, some were not affiliated with politics but they continued in the Islamic oriented jobs such as Islamic clinics, charitable centres, publishing centres and schools. Another group of graduates, particularly from Upper Egypt, thought that the country, under 'infidel rulers', was in need of jihad and

[311] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan,* 72.

they focused on underground armed activities to overthrow Sadat. Others were affiliated with politics and trade unions in the next years under the Muslim Brotherhood cadres.

The last group from the younger generations, particularly former student leaders of the group, became members of Parliament and syndicates, and they had substantial roles in other spheres of Egyptian society. In the syndicate years, as the leaders of institutions they initiated a big change in thoughts and actions since they have been in contact with governmental institutions, businessmen from other views, journalists, secular party leaders, and other segments of society including non-Muslim religious figures. They also participated in conferences and activities in foreign countries, including those in the Arab World, Europe and the U.S. The Islamists and secularists even issued several joint petitions together between the years of 1990 and 1994. At the same time they were also sharing the Marxist and Nasserist groups opposite views against the U.S. led alliance in the Gulf War. All of these events matured into today's middle-age generation, led them to shift their ideas and taught them to be more open to other world-views and dialogue with others. They experienced a political learning and changed their past statements.[312]

When discussions on the response against regime pressure were intense, General Guide (murshid) Muhammad Hamed Abu Al-Nasser was ill; and internal tensions spiked after the death of eighty- three year old General Guide Hamed Abu Al-Nasser on January 20, 1996. On the day of his burial, the previous General Guide Mamun Al-Hudaybi, who at the time was the spokesman of the group and an important figure in the Guidance Office, declared that seventy six year old Deputy General Guide Mustafa Meshur was nominated as successor of Abu Al-Nasser. The announcement was a shock for members of the Brotherhood and heightened the generational crises in the Group and the question of internal democracy while older leaders were demanding total submission. However, Mashur was directing the Brotherhood de facto for two years during Al-Nasser's illness. New General Guide, Mustafa

[312] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 206-220.

Meshour, had also served in the military section of the Brotherhood and he remained in prison for nine years after the assassination attempt against Gamal Abd Al-Nasser in 1954.[313]

The younger generation was also opposed to the method of nomination of the oldest member of the Guidance Office to the position of General Guide and the election discussions were heated about the need of a mechanism in the Movement. Diaa Rashwan lists the criteria for the post of General Guide:

> Regarding the conditions of selecting an Ikhwan General Guide, Article (13) of the Public Order set three conditions – other than the condition of being 'Egyptian' or 'the new Quraishite' (belonging to ancient Mecca's main tribe of Quraish) as some call it – for the eligible candidate for the international organization general guide's post: he should not be less than 40 years of the Hegira calendar, spending not less than 15 years of the Hegira calendar as an 'active brother', and should be qualified in terms of knowledge – especially the Shari'a (Islamic law) – and the practical and moral qualifications that qualify him for leading the group.[314]

Apart from the style of the nomination method for Mashour, there was also the matter of a difference of opinion with the new generation of the Group. Mustafa Mashour was not much different from his predecessor's moderate and non-violent line and he refrained from conflict with the government. According to him, the only way to success was through dialogue instead of what the opposition insisted; a harder response.

The 1990s' strained and repressive atmosphere against civil society and Islamists paved the way for the need of a centrist party in the minds of some dissent Brotherhood members. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood from the middle aged generation, two engineers, Abu Ela-Madi and Salah Abd Al-Karim; lawyer Isam Sultan and publisher Muhammad Abd Al-Latif declared their intention to establish a party in the year of 1995. Other founders were

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[313] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 72.

[314] Diaa Rashwan, *Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt*, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=798&SectionID=88 (accessed on May 23,2009)

composed of Isham Hashish, Umar Abdallah, Salah Abu Al-Maqsud, several women and a number of Copts.[315]

As leader of the Al-Wasat Party initiative, Abdul Ela Madi had joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1979 when he was a student leader at the Engineering Faculty of Minya University. The name of the party, Wasat, meaning centrist, also indicated there was a consensus towards the center and representing a "middle or transitional generation in the public sphere".[316] Madi defined the initiative as "a civic platform based on the Islamic faith which believes in pluralism and the alternation of power". The party's well known feature was its all-compassing nature, including different segments of society; Islamists, Copts, leftists, Nasserists. The most prominent figure of the Al-Wasat party initiative was its spokesperson and one of the founders, Coptic Rafiq Habib, son of Egypt's Anglican bishop, and a sociologist. Some criticized this action by seeing his membership as a "façade of democracy" or in the words of Mubarak as a "decor" for the initiative. Some Christians were also against Al-Wasat's strategy to include the Christians in their cadre by claiming that it will create an internal strife in the Coptic community.[317] In regards to the initiative, Rafiq Habib has said that "The reality is that there exists a very powerful Islamist movement in Egypt and we must take this force and establish peaceful and moderate channels for it to express itself".[318] The Coptic membership was interpreted as a symbol of the party's civic character and its commitment to Muslim-Christian national unity.[319]

In January 1997, 46 founding members of Al-Wasat left and decided to return to their mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. The reason for

[315] Meir Hatina, *Identity Politics in the Middle East*, (London: Taauris, 2007), 159.

[316] Meir Hatina, "The Other Islam: The Egyptian Wasat Party," *Middle East Critique*,Vol.14,No.2. (June, 2005), 172.

[317] Hatina, *Identity Politics In The Middle East*, 160-161.

[318] Hammond, "A New Political Culture Emerges in Egypt," *The Middle East*, No.255 (April, 1996).

[319] Hatina, *Identity Politics in The Middle East*, 159.

some members was the dominance of Rafiq Habib in the Wasat Party initiative.[320]

In April 1996, thirteen members of the Brotherhood, including Abu Al-Madi and two other founders of Al-Wasat were arrested. The charge was "belonging to an illegal organization", "preparing anti regime publications", "carrying out political activities without permission", and "attempting to form the Wasat Party as a front for the banned Muslim Brotherhood". Five of the members, including three founders of the Wasat Party were acquitted after five months of detention and trials in the military court.[321]

Sixty two of the 74 Wasat Party founders were formerly active in the Muslim Brotherhood.[322] The splinter group was numbered by the Brotherhood as "fewer than eight former members"; however, Madi insists that "more than 200 members, who are politically active and have a clear-cut political agenda, have left the Brotherhood over the past eight years."[323] Madi stated the reasons for their split from the Brotherhood with these words: "We, the dissenters, disagree with the Brotherhood on mixing politics with *dawa* (religious advocacy). We believe that, to achieve any of our aims, the two can not be mixed….the predominance of the old guard with its radical views…classified neither as a political party or a non- governmental organization". He asserted that he didn't think the Al-Wasat Party initiative was a threat to the unity of the Muslim Brotherhood by saying that "we have a different civil and political agenda which regards Islam as a civilization, not a religion, and accepts all people from all sects and religious backgrounds…only a few Brotherhood members would fit our political perspective." [324]

From the view of the Brotherhood, by taking into account their relationship with the government and concerning any disintegration inside,

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[320] Ibid., 163.

[321] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 218.

[322] Hatina, *Identity Politics in The Middle East*, 160; also see Hammond, "A New Political Culture Emerges in Egypt", *The Middle East*, No.255, (April, 1996).

[323]"The Brotherhood's Latest Challenge", *Al Ahram Weekly*, 3 - 9 June 2004.

[324] Ibid.

they didn't accept any link between the Group and Al-Wasat Party initiative. The reaction of the old veterans was very negative towards the initiative and they perceived the event as a schism in the Movement. At that time, it was thought that the main aim of the Brotherhood was *dawa* and a political activity would only be a "branch" of their activity. To focus on the politics would lead to distance from the aim of dawa and to close the relationship with the government.[325] Thus, Ma'moun Al-Hudaybi ordered all the members who joined the Al-Wasat Party initiative to withdraw or to face expulsion. Thirteen members, including Ela Madi resigned from the Brotherhood in August and three others joined them in November.

Al-Wasat members criticized the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood 'Islam is the solution' adding "a righteous secular ruler is better than an Islamic dictator"[326], they saw religious scholars as advisory (*ijtihad*). The thought of "there is no authority higher than the will of the people" was embraced because of the unclear situation in the case of conflicting views between the religious interpretation and the people's view. The leaders of the Wasat Party prefer the use of the *mutedil* (moderate), *mutawassıt* (centrist), *mutafattih* (open minded) instead of referring to Western terminology.[327] They highlighted the historical importance of Coptics and as a principle of democracy, equal citizenship rights without separation. The Al-Wasat Party initiative claimed that Islam was seen as a cultural framework instead of a legal code for the governmental system. For the issue of *jizye*, Madi said that it is no longer valid and the Copts will benefit from the same rights as Muslims.

According to a statement by Mustafa Meshur in April 1997, Coptics had to pay *jizye* and were excluded from the military service since "they are not of the Islamic faith and might change their localities and become enemy agents". Although later it was said that *jizye* will not be implemented to

[325] Hatina, *Identity Politics In The Middle East*, 162.

[326] Ibid., 160-161.

[327] Ibid., 222

Egyptian Copts as they have proved their loyalty to Egypt, they couldn't dissipate doubts about equal citizenship rights. [328]

Citing as a model of Islamic parties in Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Malaysia and elsewhere, referring to modernization of the Islamic Reform agenda and laying out detailed political, social and economic programs for public debate[329], the aim of the party was to include all the components of the society and to separate religion and politics by seeing Islam as a cultural framework. In the program of the party, three issues were listed:

> Citizenship that provides equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims; the right of all citizens to assume all public positions; and coexistence with other cultures on the basis of respect for cultural specificities, justice and equality, interdependence and mutual interests.[330]

With its several Copts members, the Wasat Party made a distinction between party and religion and as said before, it presented religion as a cultural framework. They said that it will reach to shari'a with democratic, peaceful and legal ways. They listed on the web page the democratic principles of the party as: "sovereignty of the people; separation of powers; transfer of power; citizenship; freedom of expression; respect for human rights".[331]

According to Political Parties Law, the leaders had to obtain permission from the Party Formation Committee which consisted of seven members-four ministers and three government appointed members-.[332] Wasat supporters applied for the license four times in 1996, 1998, 2004 and the last in May of 2009 to the Party Formation Committee but all of the applications were refused consecutively.[333] After its members applied in 1996, thirteen applicants were

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[328] Ibid., 165

[329] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 219.

[330] El-Din Shahin, "Islam in Egypt", *CEPS Working Document*, No. 266, 3cal (May 2007).

[331] Ibid., 4.

[332] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 73.

[333] Masr: Hizb Al-Wasat Yetekaddum Al-Marra Al-Rabi'a Al-Lecneh Al-Ahzab, (Egypt:Wasat Party Applied for Fourth Time to Parties Commitee), *Al Shark al-Awsat*, (20 May 2009).

arrested, interrogated and tried in military courts.[334] Whenever its members went to judiciary to gain license they were told that "the party's program was not sufficiently distinguishable from those of already existing political parties"[335]. Officials went further and said that the Party's platform is not convenient with Egyptian the constitution and detrimental for national unity and social order.[336] Similar to the Al-Wasat Party case, Hamdeen Sabahi, who was a dissident in the Nasserist Party, also formed the Karama Party which has been waiting for recognition. Ayman Nour also managed to legalize his party, Al-Ghad, after a long court fight. Contrary to the claims of the critics of Al-Wasat, Ela-Madi asserted that there was no aim to join the ranks of the Brotherhood. Even the secularist opposition was not backing the establishment of the Al-Wasat Party for the same reasons with the government. After Mubarak stated in 1998 that 14 parties were enough for the country, Rafiq Habib realized the impossibility of the establishment of their party in the near future and the group started to focus on the social and cultural activities to disseminate their ideas, which seemed more realistic.[337] Al-Wasat members applied to the Ministry of Social Affairs to form an association, Egyptian Society for Culture and Dialogue Association. The application was accepted in April 2000 and the Association has been conducting conferences, seminars, and publishing research since then. From that aspect, the meaning of the allowance for the Association was the indication of the government's preference for cultural activities instead of political infiltration. The Association's head was named as Muhammad Salim Al-Awwa and its members composed of Al-Wasat members, public figures, secular intellectuals and Copts.

The Wasat issued some policy platforms in 1996, 1998 and 2004 emphasizing issues such as democracy based on equal citizenship, civil society

[334] Tal, *Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan*, 73.

[335]Emad El-Din Shahin, "Islam in Egypt", *CEPS Working Document*, 266/(May 2007).

[336] Hatina, *Identity Politics In The Middle East*, 167.

[337] Emad El-Din Shahin, "Islam in Egypt", *CEPS Working Document*, 266/(May 2007).

and liberal economic reforms.[338] When Wasat members were questioned about their approach to democracy and about European democracies, the Muslim Brotherhood members said European countries do not represent democracy, while some of the Wasat Party members had a positive approach towards the European model because of the pluralistic nature and citizenship rights by emphasizing the different implications in the countries. [339]

For Brotherhood members there were still some reservations in European democracies about the media influence on public opinion. Examples include the effects that rumors on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had and how the media convicted people related to these rumors. Another reservation was that the source of democracy is human decision and there is no sensitivity to shari'a rules so regardless of shari'a, it is possible to legalize adultery, homosexuality, alcohol and gambling. Compared to the U.S. understanding of democracy, they welcome the model of European democracy because there is an effect of media and money on the U.S. model and it is more pragmatic, materialistic and discriminatory than the European model. Another reservation is that the implementation of democracy in Europe is also not enough and there are still problems for minorities and Muslims; they are supporting dictatorial Arab regimes while the restrictions are continuing against the Islamic resistance movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas. They believe that all of the reservations prove there is a double standard for some nations. Europe also stands with Israel, and its policies depend on the U.S. and they do not contradict U.S. interests.[340]

After more than one decade of the Wasat Party's unrecognized situation, some writers claim that it was a project of the Brotherhood to demonstrate the difficulty it takes to create a moderate party, even when its members split from the Brotherhood. However, Wickham underscores the fact that not all authoritarian regimes pressure results with a counter violence by

[338] Joshua Stacher, "Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," *Institute for Public Policy Research*, (April 2008), 14.

[339] Ibid.

[340] Ibid., 3-7.

Islamists, and some groups such as Wasat may even be more moderate than their own mother organization.[341]

As will be seen in the coming pages, in the 2000 and 2005 elections the Muslim Brotherhood proved its success by being the most populous group in the Assembly with its independent candidates. These elections demonstrated that the Brotherhood has social bases for being in politics even if it has not been recognized as a legal party.

5.3. 2000 Onwards

From the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood's opposite stance against the regime brought more pressure and clamp downs. In these conditions the Brotherhood learned how to cope with the maneuvers of the regime and adapted itself to the Egyptian political environment. There were many developments in the 1990s, such as Gulf War of 1991, and the Brotherhood's visibility with its activities in the civil society, its appeal to the middle class, and the bloody attacks of the radical Islamists all resulted with intense arrestments and confrontation by the regime.

The 2000s came as a continuation of the 1990s and there was a complicated atmosphere for Egyptian politics and many substantial international events deeply affected domestic issues. The new decade, with the reflections of external and internal developments, brought a new phase for the transition of the Egyptian political system by giving more chances to the opposition in society. The 9/11 attacks and the United States new approach, had in effect reframed the Middle East and had paradoxical results for both the authoritarian regimes and oppositional groups in the region. Although the Islamist groups have been opposed to the US stance in the Middle East; either because of its policies with Israel, the Iraq invasion or its military deployment in the Gulf, the new democracy discourse and elections in Palestine, Iraq and some openings in Egypt provided an open way to non-violent Islamists and strengthened their political position.[342] This position created a big Islamist

[341] Joshua Stacher, "*Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,"* Institute for Public Policy Research, (April 2008), 13.

[342] Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma," http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33486.pdf, (Accessed on August 1, 2009).

dilemma for both the US and Arab regimes because of possible confrontation with the Western World if the Islamists gained power. Increased emphasis on the democracy theme at the discourse of the US administration in the new dynamics of the world order and understanding of war against terrorism caused remarkable improvements. The Bush administration presented its promotion of democracy as a path to undercut the growth of radical Islamist groups and their indoctrination. However, pressure on governments to take more democratic steps and increase political reforms provided new chances for the opposition to benefit from this new environment. The allies of the US were placed in difficult circumstances with the Iraq invasion because of people's sensitivity against the war and the deteriorated image of the US.

Egypt has been an important ally of the US by receiving the largest assistance among the Arab countries and having a peace agreement with Israel since 1979. Specifically after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territory, the common interests of the US, Egypt and Israel increased because of the likely diffusion affect of the Islamist ideology.

For almost three decades, the democracy discourse of the Brotherhood is overlapping with what the US has been highlighting since the September 11 attacks. As one of the Brotherhood leaders said, "Since the early 1970s, in the context of [President Anwar]Sadat's liberalization, opening and dialogue, the Society adopted a new strategy, which relies on democracy as a means of change and as an objective. Democracy is not incompatible with Islam; *shura* [consultation] is like democracy, it forces respect for basic liberties and the rights of women. We don't disagree with the West on this, except that the West has left democracy behind."[343]

Throughout the years, the US has used diplomatic tools and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made visits to Cairo and talked about the need of political reforms in the country. In her 2005 Cairo speech, Rice told students at the American University that "for sixty years, the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East -- and we

[343] "Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt's Opportunity," Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Briefing N°13, (20 April, 2004).

achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course".[344] After 2005, the Middle East Partnership Initiative began and found some NGOs, human rights groups and secularists during the presidential and parliamentary elections. In this respect, to understand all improvements we need to look the international, regional, and domestic events which interacted all together and affected the Brotherhood from each aspect.

5.3.1 2000 Parliamentary Elections

The beginning of the new decade coincided with the Brotherhood's regeneration with the release of its prominent figures that were active in the Trade Unions. Having completed five years in prison, Issam Al-Erian and Abdul Munim Abu Al-Futuh, members of the Consultative Council and Guidance Office respectively, were released in January 2000, and returned to the Brotherhood ranks as spearhead members. The released members of the movement became the most prominent faces among the ranks of the Group and acted as the spokesmen to the media by asserting their approaches and ideological posture on the ambiguous issues like women rights, democracy and Coptic rights. Their aim was to pick up the group and rebuild ties with other political groups. The group made its annual *iftar* program in 2000 at a five star hotel with women and secular guests, and some figures such as prominent scholar sociology professor Saad Ad Din Ibrahim, who was seated at the table of Mamun Al-Hudaybi. [345]

On the eve of the 2000 elections, General Guide Mustafa Mashur supervised the groups young cadres for election campaigns, although the Brotherhood had a deep disappointment in the 1995 elections. Prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, in the summer of 2000, four National Democratic Party members were convicted of bank fraud. After that event, pressure increased on the government, and Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court announced that the previous two elections were invalid since they didn't have a full judicial supervision. On 20 September 2000, Hosni Mubarak organized a

[344] J. Scott Carpenter, "The Egypt Speech: Obama's Watershed Moment," (May 29, 2009), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3059, (accessed on June 23,,2009).

[345] Al-Ghobashy, Mona, "The Metamorphasis of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 37, (2005), 389.

meeting and declared that "the People's Assembly elections will mark a new departure, affirming that Egypt is a democratic state".[346] However, approaching the elections, the regime once more rounded up twenty would-be candidates and in the month of November they were tried and sentenced by military tribunal.

The first election in Egyptian history to be held under full judicial supervision took place in 2000. The election was held in three stages during the months of October and November and a total of 10,718 ballot stations were supervised by 9000 judges. According to the Ministry of Interior, 4,116 candidates, including 3,240 independents contested the elections in 222 constituencies. Approximately 90 percent of the independents were Islamists. In the month of May, the Labor Party's activities were frozen by the Political Parties Committee for its links to an illegal organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, receiving unauthorized funding, and "working against national unity".[347] The Brotherhood fielded only seventy five candidates, including its first woman candidate, Jihane Al-Hawafi.

The 2000 parliamentary election was much freer and fairer compared with previous elections and for the first time the regime allowed a judicial supervision of the parliamentary elections. To be viewed as a neutral state, institutions tried to provide equal chances to all parties and independents during the electoral campaigns. For example, official newspapers such as Al-Ahram, televisions and radios were allowed to broadcast political programs of the opposition.

The presence of judges minimized the malpractice issues in the elections, something that has characterized previous elections. For example, while in the 1995 elections, 80 people had died and around 1500 were wounded; in the 2000 elections, 10 people died and 60 were injured. However, in many cases it was claimed that people voted for more than ideology or party affiliations, people voted for personal charisma, family belongings, and many votes were bought. There were several instances of violence which took place

[346] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 223.

[347] Hala G.Thabet, Africa Development, Vol. XXXI, No.3,(2006), 11-24.

between Islamists and police officials. In the first round of elections, about 400 people were arrested and in the second round, nearly 1400 people were arrested. More than 1000 of the second round's arrested people were supporters of the Brotherhood and the aim was to allow them to get closer to the polling stations. The Brotherhood's only woman candidate, Jihan Al-Halafawi and her campaign team, were also confronted with the intensive pressures. The election process, under the shadow of emergency law which allows the arrests of suspicious people, also showed that as a result, NDP's hegemony continued while it was committing a more democratic progress.

During the campaigns, the Brotherhood's strategy was to refrain from being on the front and not allow itself to be subjected to any confrontation with the regime. Opposite to previous elections inclusion of a high number of candidates, in 2000, it preferred to nominate only 76 candidates. After the oppressive years of the 1990s, another tactic in the elections was to choose the less known younger candidates who were known in their districts instead of its well-known leaders, while yet another strategy was to contest in places such as the Delta region, where the Movement prevailed, instead of Upper Egypt. It also tried to abstain from competition with NDP's leading candidates in the districts.[348]

During the elections, independent candidates displayed considerable success and following the elections, 216 independents rejoined the NDP's fronts. Thereby, NDP obtained 172 seats (38 percent) in the People's Assembly, and with the participation of the independents, the number of seats that the NDP held increased to 388. The results of the election alerted the NDP to the deterioration and weakness of the party in the eyes of voters.[349] While the NDP obtained 388 seats in the parliament, the number of seats won by the Brotherhood was 17, equal to the total number of seats when the legal opposition parties were counted. Hence, the Brotherhood scored its largest victory since the 1987 elections. Thabet argues that the Brotherhood's relative success compared to other opposition parties also shows that the state-media

[348] Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 225

[349] El Anani, "Egypt: Parliamentary Elections in the Shadow of 2000," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fullissueoct_05.pdf (accessed on June 25, 2009)

had exaggerated its interpretations on the demise of the Brotherhood. Thereby, in the post-election, the Brotherhood became the main opposition in the Parliament because the other parties were in harmony on their position towards the government.[350]

After the elections, related to their non-party situation, the prominent figure Al-Futuh said that "What the Muslim Brotherhood suffered in the past years and our stance in the recent elections provides clear evidence that we prefer the public interest to self-interest. As much as we are interested in participating in political action we care for the country's security and peace." Withstanding their non-violent reaction to the oppression of the 1990s, his explanation gave the message that the group will look for a different place within the system, than that of the radical Islamists. But as Wickham points out, the reasons for Mubarak to confront the Movement did not stem from their violent methods, but their disseminating in the political area and becoming closer to the center.[351]

One year after the parliamentary elections, another election demonstrated the Brotherhood's ability to be a rival in various segments of society. In February 2001, in the first elections for the Lawyers Union since the Law 100/1993, the Brotherhood won eight seats, while NDP comprised four, Nasserists one, Wafdists one and Copts one.

The Brotherhood deputies in the Assembly investigated inquires on issues of abuse by security forces, unemployment and economic difficulties as well as culture and identity issues like state-founded racy novels, Miss Egypt beauty pageants, and distribution of feminine sanitary napkins in the junior and high schools. As the prominent figure to the assembly on such inquiries, Gamal Heshmat, a former Nasserist and a physician in training, created displeasure among the authorities who engaged in the new mechanism of electoral engineering after the 2000 elections and he was unseated from the Assembly. During those two years, his inquiries led to the dismissal of six officials, including a deputy minister of education in Beheria Province and a supervisor

[350] Ibid.

[351] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 225-226.

of the Mubarak Job-Training Program for college graduates. After Heshmat was stripped from his post in January 2003, government ordered a rerun for the election of Heshmat's election district, Damanhour. On election day, similar to Al-Halafawi's case in 2002, riot police filling 500 trucks prevented the supporters of Heshmat from accessing the polling stations and the district was won by a Wafdist member.[352]

5.3.2. Internal Debates and Reactions to the Iraq Invasion

Other than the international events and their reflections on the Egyptian political life, some improvements in the Brotherhood's domestic environment also contributed to a new understanding and transformation in the Movement. Following the September 11 attacks, the changing atmosphere in the whole Middle East coincided with some of the natural events in the Muslim Brotherhood and these improvements triggered speculations and heated debates over the question of internal democracy and the power struggle among decision making mechanisms in the Movement.

Although it was not accepted by the Movement, the struggle in the movement regarding the new Guide arose after the hospitalization of the 81-year-old Mustafa Mashur. Upon the death of the fifth General Guide, Mustafa Mashur, on November 14, 2002, it instigated the need to fill the position with a new leader and revealed the internal interactions of the Movement.

While the debates were continuing, according to some observers, it was the right time for the replacement of the old cadre with the new cadres. A political analyst, Rifaat Sid Ahmed, said that it was a good time to make the "internal renewal" for the Brotherhood like other movements in countries such as Turkey, Morocco, and Bahrain, which reached to maturity and made advancements. He argued that the Muslim Brotherhood's younger generation (1970s' generation), also reached a level of maturity via their activities in syndicates, parliamentary elections and university unions.[353] But it was very

[352] Al-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphasis of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers," 388.

[353] Hatina, *Identity Politics In The Middle East*, 160 ; Omayma Abdel Latif , The Brotherhood's Biggest Challenge, *Al Ahram Weekly*, (14 - 20 November 2002).

difficult to replace the old cadre with a new one under the atmosphere of the internal and external pressures.

The controversial issues, such as the nomination of the higher ranks in the Movement became prominent in the last decades and it is interpreted as the weakest point in the Muslim Brotherhood. Diaa Rashwan argues that as an organic religious and socio-political organization which has been living for almost 80 years, it may be considered natural to have internal clashes similar to other ideological movements. Outside international, governmental and regional events have also affected the Movement's internal issues. Rashwan says that these kinds of discussions are coming from the nature of the single person led organizations. For example, the activities of the Brotherhood were interrupted for almost 3 years between the assassination of Hasan Al Banna on February 12, 1949, and the taking over of the position by Hassan Al-Hudaybi on October 19, 1951. Others link the word of *rushd(guidance)* and *murshid(guide)* to reflect the importance of the General Guide's personal features based on individual decisions rather than the mechanism of a system.[354]

According to the Brotherhood constitution, both the Guidance Office and 100 members of the Consultative Council have to elect a new General Guide within 30 days following the absence of the old guide. After the death of Mustafa Mashur, not surprisingly the Deputy Guide, 83 year old Mamoun Al-Hudaybi, who was Deputy General Guide since 1996, decided to implicate the rules of the Movement which stipulate that in the case of disease or mental disorder which leads to amnesia, the deputy guide replaces the ex-guide.

In the same week as the death of Mustafa Meshur, the Group had their annual iftar, and both the iftar and the funeral aimed to demonstrate a continuation of strength in the Movement. After the appointment of the Deputy Guide, Mamoun Al-Hudaybi, to the mürshid position, there were many interpretations about the personality and future of the Movement. Some media interpreted that this may lead to the fragmentation of the Movement because of the hard personality of Al-Hudaybi, who was not accepting others ideas easily. Several explained his behaviors on the ground that he wants to maintain the

[354] Rashwan, "Jama'a Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin fi Masr" (Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), 30.

stability by preventing a schism in the movement. The developments were interpreted as the "struggle between generations". While the legitimacy of the first generation, represented by the General Guide, Guidance Office and the Consultative Council came from their historical loyalty to the Brotherhood; the source of the second generation's legitimacy came from their struggle against Sadat's foreign policies in universities during the second half of the 1970s. Rashwan says that the contradiction between the two generations has did not stem from the social or political differences between the generations, but the confrontation developed from the 'radical' vision of the young generation against the conservative and more zealous vision of old generation. [355]

Shortly after filling the General Guide position, another important event, the U.S. occupation in Iraq occurred within the region and it affected not only the Arab governments, but the opposition groups in the region as well. After the U.S led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Brotherhood and the Egyptian government co-acted, and they organized rallies against the war in the name of "national unity". Dia Rashwan interpreted the convenient action of both sides by relating the events with the post- September 11 atmosphere and the US' war against terrorism perspective in the region. He argued that the government was aware of the capacity of the Brotherhood to mobilize people and it wanted to prove the unity on the issue of foreign affairs despite the disputes in internal issues. After 9/11, both the government and the Brotherhood "dwell in the same camp, united in fear". [356]

In regards to the invasion, the prominent Brotherhood member Al-Erian said, "right now we are all aware of the dangers that threaten Egypt as well as the entire Arab region. The Iraqis have proven their ability to rise above their differences with their regime in order to bravely face the invaders. We don't need an invasion to understand that our strength is in unity."[357] However, after

[355] Ibid.

[356] "United in Fear," *Al Ahram*, (3 - 9 April 2003).

[357] Ibid.

April, the security forces began to crack down dominant Brotherhood figures at the anti-war rallies.[358]

After his short term in the General Guide post, Mamoun Al-Hudaybi died on January 8 2004. Al-Hudaybi was succeeded by Mohamed Mahdi Akef on January 14, 2004, who was born in the same year as the establishment of the Brotherhood in 1928. The important points for the new General Guide in the words of El Ghobasty were "the circumstantial position of "official spokesperson" carved out by al Hudaybi was scrapped."[359] Two posts of two Deputy General Guides were filled with "younger" generation Brothers, geologist Muhammad Habib and computer engineer Khayrat Al-Shater.

> Four factors were listed by Amr Elchoubaki to explain the election of Mahdi Akef for the position of Guide: He belongs to the old guard, but of that generation he is the most open to the opinions of the next generation down the line. A product of the organization's doctrinal austerity of the 1930s, and a founder of the international Muslim Brotherhood's organization, he is the exponent of the old mindset. However, that he has already declared that he would accept a Coptic woman as a member of the organization and that he was ready to make an alliance with Nasserists and Communists if need be, demonstrates that he is prepared to accommodate the new.[360]

After Akef's occupation of the position of General Guide, he reiterated the vision of the Brotherhood as to operate as a legal party and he convened a press conference on March 3 2004, to announce their political reform initiative. As the conference was conveyed by the Press Syndicate Ministry of Interior, Habib El-Adli, condemned the syndicate for hosting the illegal group in their venue. Only legal political parties are authorized to come up with reform initiatives, he said. The conference came in the midst of US pressure on Arab allies for democratization and reform in their countries and a month after the announcement of the Greater Middle East initiative. In a conference Akef stated "revoking the emergency law, ridding the information media of non-

[358] Al-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphasis of The Egyptian Muslim Brothers," 389.

[359] Ibid. 388.

[360] Amr Elchoubaki, "Vague Comfort*," Al Ahram Weekly*, (22 - 28 January 2004).

Islamic content, curtailing the sweeping powers of the president, ensuring religious, speech and political freedoms, releasing political detainees, and deepening the principle of rotation of power via elections marked with integrity". He added that the majority of people must have the political power and Copts are an integral part of the country; they are on equal footing with Muslims in terms of having equal rights, and women must be authorized to occupy all kinds of top posts. The Brotherhood was ready to change its name if that was a stipulation for becoming a political party.[361]

5.3.3. Political Reforms and Presidential Elections

The year of 2005 was a turning point due to amendments that were made to the constitution (which was in effect since 1971), and presidential and parliamentary elections were held. The last constitutional amendment had passed from the parliament shortly before the Sadat's assassination in 1980. Instead of one term of presidency as stipulated in 1971, the amendment allowed the president to run for an unlimited number of terms. These amendments were made in 2005 and elections did not meet expectations at the end, they led to heated debates in international and local media.

Beginning in 2004, Mubarak disclosed his willingness for political reform and he set himself the task of changing the Egyptian constitution under the shadow of remarkable pressure from the Western countries and domestic opposition groups. When younger ministers and the Prime Minister, Ahmad Nazif, were appointed to the government, many had thought that the new era's political reforms would be directed by the new Prime Minister, but Nazif focused more on the economic reforms, poverty and unemployment issues. Moreover, there was no intent to change the emergency law, freedom of press and freedom of Assembly or any step to liberate the creation of political parties.[362] In 2004, the son of President Gamal Mubarak became more visible in politics. Some of the veteran ministers were replaced by close figures to

[361] Brotherhood Steps into the Fray, *Al Ahram Weekly*, (11-17 March 2004).

[362]Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt, The Washington Institute, Policy Focus.51, No.2, (January 2006), www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf. (Accessed on December 22, 2008).

Gamal Mubarak hoping to empower his future plans. Although both of them, Gamal and Husni Mubarak, denied the hereditary succession of the presidency similar to Syria, the debates have heated in the last years. For example, the opposition newspaper, *Al-Dostor*, called Gamal Mubarak to follow the decision of son of Kaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Kaddafi, to distance from political life.[363]

On 26 February 2005, President Hosni Mubarak surprisingly announced his decision to implement some political reforms and embarked upon the task to make amendments in the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections among the nominees of legal parties for the first time in Egypt's history. According to the former system, the People's Assembly was responsible for nominating the presidency candidate upon the approval of two-thirds of 454 members. The Parliament agreed on the constitutional amendments on May 10, and although it was boycotted by the Tagammu Party, Nasserist Party, Wafd Party, Ghad Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, the amendments to Article 76 were approved on May 25.

These political openings were viewed by many critics as nothing but a false appearance because of the content in the amendments; and in the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, Egyptians proved their political alienation with a low voter turnout (23 and 25 percent respectively). Nonetheless, aside from the violence on the voting days, the elections were more transparent, fairer and freer than before.

Michele Dunne argues that these reforms didn't provide a real liberalization in the country and continued to prohibit other individuals or party members from occupying the presidency post; however, the reforms may also be evaluated as steps to pave the road for democratization. Dunne lists the political reforms in three categories: Constitutional changes; Creation of semi-governmental oversight bodies; Abrogation of laws or regulations impinging on civil liberties[364]

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[363] Al Dostor, 27 August 2008.

[364] Michele Dunne, Evaluating Egyptian Reform, Carnegie Papers, Number 66, (January 2006), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP66.Dunne.FINAL.pdf, (accessed on January 25, 2008)

1. Constitutional changes:

From May to early July of 2005, important amendments of constitutional articles or laws governing political activity passed from the Parliament. Constitutional Amendment to Article 76[365], calling for direct popular election of the president and an establishment of an electoral commission was the most important amendment. But the restricting conditions to be a candidate were hampering any real competition. This amendment proves that although the efforts of the political reform were there, controls and restrictions about the presidential candidates were still in place. According to this amendment, a person who is in a licensed party's executive committee for at least one year would be nominated for presidential candidacy. Its meaning is that the person who doesn't have a leadership position in the party or an independent MP will not be able to run for the presidency. As the Muslim Brotherhood members have been independent MPs in the Parliament, their candidacy was automatically not possible with the adoption of this article. The article only allows the parties which occupy 5 percent of Parliament seats to field a presidential candidate and today, except the dominate NDP; there is no party to meet this condition. Besides the condition to occupy five percent of both the People's Assembly and Shura Council (although in the 2005

[365] The most debated constitutional change was Article 76. Before the change it was stipulating:
The People′s Assembly shall nominate the President of the Republic. […] The candidate who wins two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly members shall be referred to the people for a plebiscite. If none of the candidates obtains the said majority the nomination process shall be repeated two days after the first vote. The candidate winning the votes with an absolute majority of the Assembly members shall be referred to the citizens for a plebiscite. The candidate shall be considered President of the Republic when he obtains an absolute majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. If the candidate does not obtain this majority, the Assembly shall nominate another candidate and the same procedure shall be followed.
http://www.arabdecision.com/show_func_3_14_3_1_0_173.htm
After the amendment in the constitution, Article 76 has been stipulating that:
The President shall be elected by direct, public, secret ballot. For an applicant to be accepted as a candidate to presidency, he shall be supported by at least 250 elected members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and local popular councils on governorate level, provided that those shall include at least 65 members of the People's Assembly, 25 of the Shura Council and ten of every local council in at least 14 governorates. […] Political parties, which have been founded at least five years before the starting date of candidature and have been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained at least 5% of the elected members of both the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, may nominate for presidency a member of their respective upper board, according to their own by-laws, provided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year.
(http://constitution.sis.gov.eg/en/id5.htm, Accessed on 11 June 2009)

presidential elections the condition was not fulfilled and it was allowed to all licensed parties to nominate their candidates) the amendment also set up a condition for parties to be licensed for at least five years to nominate their candidate. A candidate not affiliated with a party, including the Muslim Brotherhood MPs, must obtain signatures of 250 elected central and local government officials, including 14 percent of members of the upper and lower houses of Parliament and as the positions were dominated by NDP cadre, it was impossible to gather the number of signatures. However, it may be said that it is a step in the civilianization of the presidency which was not happened since 1952.

Article 77 of the Constitution, allows the president an unlimited number of six-year terms; however, it was not amended. Opposition groups such as the Kifaya Movement[366] and the Muslim Brotherhood, aimed to change article 76 and 77 to make it easier for entrance into elections and the limitation of the presidency term to four years and two consecutive terms. The Muslim Brotherhood claimed the duties of the president to be limited and to have a symbolic and nonpartisan authority.

-Presidential Election Law 174 of 2005, specifying campaign regulations.

-Political Parties Law 177 of 2005, changing procedures for forming parties.

The law orders the license of a party, if the Political Parties Committee doesn't object to its formation, within 90 days but still bans the parties with basis in religion or those not to 'represent an addition to political life'.

2. Creation of semi-governmental oversight bodies:

Semi-governmental organizations such as the National Council on Human Rights (NCHR) was established in 2003, and an electoral commission with Political rights, Law 173 of 2005, provided the legalization of monitored

[366] Kifaya(Enough) movement was formed in 2004 and made its first demonstration in December 2004. It began as an elite opposition movement and spread to a growing grassroots political movement against the re-election of Mubarak and his succession by his son, Gamal Mubarak It includes mostly leftists but also the Islamists, liberals, Christians, and all of the opposition groups in the country and organizes some demonstrations against the government. The silent demonstrators wore covers over their mouth with the slogan"Kifaya".

and supervised elections by civil society organizations and it played an important role in political affairs, civil and human rights. The Council has been working with civil society organizations for policy changes and in its annual report it criticized human rights conditions in Egypt, such as emergency law, prisons, police stations and torture.

3. Abrogation of laws or regulations impinging on civil liberties:

In May 2003, the government abolished the State Security Courts which were prosecuting national security issues since 1958. It has been criticized by the national and international organizations because of the lack of right to appeal and the heavy sentences given during trials. But after the abolishment, the state of emergency courts functioned as a similar duty and under emergency law, civilians are referred to conduct the trials in the military courts for terrorism charges.

While the emergency law and the opposition with weak parties has continued, the changes have not been interpreted as genuine openings and they are not seen as solutions for the long term problems of Egyptian politics.

As the amendments under the label of the political reforms did not meet the expectations to provide the free and fair elections, the parties (Al-Wafd Party from liberal wing, Tagammu Party from leftist wing, Nasserist Party from nationalist wing, Labor Party from Islamist wing and Al-Ghad Party from centrist wing) and the other political movements including the Muslim Brotherhood and secular Kifaya Movement claimed that the amendments were not guarantying the free and fair elections. A boycott was demanded by the opposition groups and parties, and the Muslim Brotherhood also supported these claims. The Muslim Brotherhood organized some demonstrations and some of its leaders were arrested prior to the elections.

Michele Dunne revealed that “Changes in law alone, however, will not be sufficient if Egypt is to move toward democracy. The pervasive influence of security forces in Egyptian life—and the fact that the regime often uses the security forces and the courts against political rivals—is an important extralegal factor that would need to be addressed. Egypt would also need to

move toward civilian oversight of the military, which so far remains accountable only to the president."[367]

On the eve of Egypt's first multi-candidates presidential elections which were held on September 7, 2005, nine nominees decided to run against Hosni Mubarak for the presidential position. However, only two of the nine, Ayman Nour from the Al-Ghad Party and Numan Gumaa from the Al-Wafd Party, were known by Egyptians. During the campaigns for the presidential elections, there were many factors aiding NDP to make it more advantageous: NDP used more media coverage and founding compare to other oppositional parties, and the campaigns began only nineteen days (on 17 August) before the elections. However, some gains are worth to mentioning here, such as the limited appearance of opposition on the state oriented media after more than 50 years and the rallies of Noman Gomaa and Ayman Nour in some provinces.[368] During the campaigns Mubarak visited some villages and industrial sites, and he tried to represent an image of a candidate who was interested in the needs of people, particularly the poor.[369]

While Tagammu and Nasserist Parties boycotted the presidential elections, the Al-Wafd Party announced its candidate unexpectedly and it was charged by its critics as being allied with the ruling party to counteract Al-Ghad's candidate, Ayman Nour, in return to obtain seats in the upcoming parliamentary elections but the charge was not accepted by Al-Wafd.[370]

According to the Egyptian constitution, the judiciary must supervise the elections and it must monitor the polling stations, but in May 2005, the Judges Club (Judges' Association) refused to supervise and monitor the elections claiming the lack of judicial independence and governmental pressure. They protested the inclusion of magistrates in the monitoring as well. Another

[367] Michele Dunne, Evaluating Egyptian Reform, Carnegie Papers, Number 66, January 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP66.Dunne.FINAL.pdf, (Accessed on January 25, 2008)

[368] Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt, The Washington Institute, Policy Focus.51, January 2006, 9. available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf.(accessed on May 21, 2009)

[369] Mariz Tadros, "Egypt's Election All About Image," *MERIP*, September 6, 2005.

[370] Ibid.

subject of complaint for the Judges Club was the supervision of 8.000 members in 54.000 polling stations in the same day. To answer this demand, PEC (Presidential Election Committee) announced a reduction of polling stations to 10.000. The first time the judges had to monitor the elections, was in the 2000 parliamentary elections, and after their experiments in the elections, some judges claimed possible irregularities because security forces interfered in the electoral process, while other members said that their monitor may help to report these irregularities. Following this decision, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary –its members are appointed by the government- announced its readiness to supervise the elections. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary also said that the Ministry of Justice's civil servants would be directed to supervise the elections and this decision was another obstructive factor for the free and fair elections.

On August 21, the Brotherhood issued a statement on the presidential elections: "All the Brothers should know that we could not support an oppressor or cooperate with a corrupt person or with a tyrant". Moreover, a leading Brotherhood member, Ali Abdel Fattah, said the statement was urging its supporters to vote for any candidate other than Mubarak. "President Hosni Mubarak has been in office for 24 years and yet he didn't cancel the emergency legislation or implement any kind of true reform," said Fattah adding, "We refuse to let the status quo continue." A week before the statement, Ayman Nour visited the head-office of the Brotherhood. He asked for the group's endorsement and stood behind murshid Muhammad Akef during the prayer session but the Brotherhood didn't declare support for any candidate explicitly. On the statement it was said that "The people should shoulder their full responsibility, practice their constitutional and legitimate rights to express their opinion" and it called for judicial supervision of the elections, the release of political prisoners and the abolition of the emergency laws.[371] At the end of August, fourteen members of the Brotherhood were released from prison and this brought up rumors on the agreement between the Brotherhood's

[371] Muslim Group Urges Voting, But Not for Mubarak, *New York Times*, August 22, 2005.

cooperation with the government to provide a high turnout in the elections, but the allegation was denied by the Brotherhood. [372]

Table 4: Egyptian Presidential Election Results, 2005

Presidential Candidates	Percentage Votes Received	Total Votes Received
Hosni Mubarak National Democratic Party	88.6	6,316,714
Ayman Nour Al-Ghad Party	7.3	540,405
Numan Gumaa Al-Wafd Party	2.6	201,891
Others	0.9	-

Source: Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt, The Washington Institute, Policy Focus.51, (January 2006), www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf, (Accessed on May 10 2009)
*Turnout of the elections was approximately 22, 9 percent, 7,060,000 out of 32 million voters.

As a result of the elections, while Mubarak secured his fifth six-year term in presidency, the main rival of Mubarak with 7,3 percent votes, Ayman Nour,[373] lost his seat in the November elections, and a month later he was charged with forgery on the party documents and sentenced to five years in prison. Completing nearly four years in prison he was released in April 2009; his release was interpreted as a gesture towards the new Obama Administration in the United States.

The restrictions and flaws derived from the constitutional amendments and inadequate campaign conditions were important factors to assure Mubarak for presidency. The low voter turnout, officially 22.9 percent was also noteworthy and it is open for interpretation as a general mistrust of people, believing that the elections would have many irregularities and the conditions were not conducive for free and fair elections.

Although there was no expectation to induce a remarkable change or the replacement of Mubarak with any other candidate because his re-election was virtually ensured, from the beginning of the year, many pledges given by

[372] Mariz Tadros , MERIP, Egypt's Election All About Image, September 6,2005.

[373] Ayman Nour was the mostly-known rival of Mubarak in 2005 president elections. He was formerly journalist, lawyer, and publisher. He was jailed for two months in 2005 for the alleged forgery of signatures needed to establish his party. After many domestic and international protests, Nour was released in March. He was formerly a member of the Wafd Party, he split with Wafd to establish the Ghad Party.

Mubarak for long awaited political reforms ended with disappointment. Neither of the reforms represented genuine steps to pave a way for democratization, and the multi-candidate presidential elections, and the 2005 parliamentary elections were held under the shadow of these disappointments.

5.3.4. 2005 Parliamentary Elections

The first parliamentary elections after the 2004/2005 political reforms were held in three stages: on November 9, November 20, and December 1, 2005. The Muslim Brotherhood issued its 44-pages electoral program on its web page in November for the upcoming parliamentary elections. It stipulated that "The members of the Muslim Brotherhood consider themselves Islamic preachers who use the wisdom and the good preaching in order to apply Allah's law as He ordered through the available peaceful means, existing constitutional institutions, and the fair ballot boxes."[374] The program described the reshaping of men and this was criticized by some as it was similar to the 20th century's Nazi and totalitarian regimes. Aside from its religious prescription for the transformation of society, the program didn't convey anything different from other opposition groups.[375]

There were still doubts about the irregularities of the coming elections and 5,414 candidates participated in the elections to compete for the 444 seats (10 seats of 454 seats are nominated by President) in People's Assembly. After a heated debate in the NDP about the nomination of candidates, almost 2.700 candidates wanted to run in the elections under the NDP banner and the party announced that only 35 percent of the candidates will be new comers, and under NDP's election list, five women and one Christian run.

[374] "The Muslim Brotherhood's Electoral Program of 2005," November 6, 2005, www.ikhwanweb.com/lib/ikhwanprogram.doc, (accessed on May 21 2009)

[375] "The Brotherhood Programme", *Al Ahram Weekly*, (1 - 7 December 2005).

Table 5: Total Number of Constituencies and Seats Contested in Each of the Three Stages of the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

Stage	Number of Constituencies	Number of Contested
First Stage (9&15 Nov.)	82	164
Second Stage (20&26 Nov.)	72	144
Third Stage (1&7 Dec.)	68	136
Total	222	444

Source: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/election.htm

Before the first stage of the elections, the opposition group constituted a united front called the United National Front For Change (UNFC) to contest against the ruling party and prepare a united list for the elections. UNFC brought together liberal Wafd Party, the leftist Tagammu Party, the nationalist Nassarist Party, the suspended Labor Party, advocators of unregistered Al-Wasat Party, unregistered Karama Party, Kefaya Movement, Freedom Now Movement, The National Coalition for Democratic Transformation, The National Alliance for Reform and Change, and The Muslim Brotherhood.[376] The Al-Ghad Party was left out officially because of internal attritions but many beliefs that the real reason was the animosity between the leader of the Wafd Party and Al-Ghad Party.

The Muslim Brotherhood announced that it will support the activities of the UNFC but its candidates will run independently because of the short history of the Front. The Muslim Brotherhood witnessed an unprecedented freedom considering the arrestments in the previous elections. However, it should also be added that the Movement didn't field candidates in the constituencies against high rank figures of the NDP and the leaders shown on the scene.[377] In previous elections, the Brotherhood members concealed their identities so as not to be arrested while covering the election campaigns until they gained the right of immunity; such as the case of being elected to Parliament. However,

[376] Fatemah Farag, "Political Wastelands," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (1 - 7 December 2005), Amira Al-Huwaydi,"United They Stand?," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (13 -19 October 2005).

[377] Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt, The Washington Institute, Policy Focus.51,(January 2006), 12-13
www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf (Accessed on May 21, 2009).

this time they did not need to conceal their affiliation and they fielded 137 candidates (during the campaigns the number of MB candidates dropped from 150 to 137) for the elections[378]. Dia Rashwan said that for the first time in the parliamentary elections they appeared in public photos as members of the Brotherhood.[379] An interview made with General Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef by state-owned Al-Ahram Arabic on October 19th also displayed the shift of policies during the elections. After the interview, Mahdi Akef talked to Al-Hayat Newspaper and said that "How are we an illegal group when the supreme guide gives interviews in the national [state-owned] press?"[380] The Brotherhood fielded one woman candidate in the election, Makarem Al-Deiri, a professor at Al-Azhar University. She was known for her statements on gender equality, remarking that "Violence against women and children in Western societies stems from going against the idea that men are superior to women." Although she could not win against the millionaire NDP candidate, Mostafa El-Sallab, in 2005 however, she gathered interest from media and scholars. [381]

A November 6th Court decision gave the right to civil society organizations to monitor the elections. After the experiment of the irregularities the September presidential elections, contrary to before, opposition demanded the international monitors in the parliamentary elections. Looking at the first two stages relatively tolerant atmosphere, observers had expected the Muslim Brotherhood, which fielded 137 candidates, to win about 100 seats in Parliament.[382]

Before the elections took place, some of the left wing intellectuals and Copts expressed their concern in the case of Muslim Brotherhood's success in the elections. The independent *Fagr* newspaper drew a cartoon of the General

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[378] Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "After the Elections," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).

[379] Amira Howeidy, "The MB Conundrum," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (10-16 November 2005).

[380] Ibid.

[381] Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections," http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-9716:1, (accessed on June 21, 2009).

[382] Amira Howeidy, Who's Afraid of the Brotherhood, *Al Ahram Weekly*, (24 - 30 November 2005).

Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef in a Nazi Uniform and a left wing historian and editor of Al-Qahira, Salah Eissa, called the Muslim Brotherhood an Egyptian Taliban. Coptic intellectual Milad Hanna said that "The day the Muslim Brothers win more than 50 percent, rich Copts will leave the country while poorer Copts will stay... maybe some of them will be converted... I hope I die before this happens." [383]

Some defined the elections as the most violent one in the history of Egypt's elections by resembling the constituencies to battlefields. There were 11 deaths and more than 1000 people wounded.[384] Judges decided to supervise the elections and report the irregularities after the promise of reforms and fairness. According to the Organization for Human Rights, in more than seventy cases the judges were attacked.[385] Intimidation tactics were implicated against the judges and the judiciary absolved its claim concerning the fraudulent results and declared the criticism of police not to prevent the violence, thugs to intimidate the voters and blocked access to polling stations. There were many appeals to the courts claiming the nullification of the elections. Although there were pledges for the fairness of the 2005 elections, many irregularities such as fraudulent, intimidations, bribery, rigged voter lists, vote buying, irregularities in the process of casting and counting of the ballots, violence against the opposition candidates and voters were witnessed.[386]

By surprisingly winning 36 seats in the first run, the Brotherhood evoked the government for pressure against the Group. Although the success of the Muslim Brotherhood was unprecedented in their banned position, the ambiguity has remained because of the continuity of the label of banned movement. In seeing the exposure of the Muslim Brotherhood as the largest opposition, NDP changed its tolerant position and began to intimidate the group in the second and third rounds. Prior to the second and third rounds of

[383] Ibid

[384] Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "After the Elections," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).

[385] Khairi Abaza, Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt, The Washington Institute, Policy Focus.51, (January 2006), www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PolicyFocus51.pdf (accessed on May 21,2009).

[386] Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, After the Elections, *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).

voting, the government arrested more than 1300 supporters of the Brotherhood. However, the Brotherhood marked its most successful election results by that time by winning 42 sets in the second round and 12 seats in the third round. The number of its members to occupy the People's Assembly reached 88 by the end of the 2005 elections.[387] The elections entrenched the belief that the long term strategy of the Brotherhood to participate in the elections didn't result in disappointment.

The turnout of the elections included about 25 percent of the eligible voters, and at the conclusion of all the rounds the Muslim Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in Parliament while NDP won 70 percent. Many of the NDP winners ran as independents and after the elections they participated on the party ticket. The other opposition parties won 3.5 percent of the seats, while the independents won 6.5 percent of them. Following the elections, Mubarak appointed five Christians and five women to the People's Assembly.

Table 6: 2005 Parliamentary Elections Results

NDP	311
Independents:	112 (88 are affiliated with the MB)
Wafd:	6
Tagammu:	2
Al-Ghad:	1
Nasserist Party:	0
Unelected Members:	10
In Contest:	12
Hizb AlAhrar(Liberal Party)	0
Total:	454

Source: Gamal Essam El-Din, Procedure and polarisation, *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).
Note: 100 of the former 444 members of the Parliament re-elected.

The 2005 parliamentary elections were a milestone in the Egyptian political life with the unprecedented success of the Muslim Brotherhood's independent candidates in the atmosphere of political reform openings and the implications afterwards. At the end of the elections, the banned Muslim Brotherhood became the main oppositional power in the People's Assembly.

[387] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 193.

After the political reforms, the presidential elections had proved the unfairness and lack of democracy in the country for many. For the success of the Muslim Brotherhood, the effects of the previous presidential elections played an important role.

One of the interesting results of the elections was that while the Muslim Brotherhood doesn't have a registered party to be in a legitimate position, it won 88 seats in the Parliament; Wafd Party, representing the legal most crowded opposition in the Parliament, won only six seats. After the elections it was seen that, except NDP, there was no party fulfilling the condition to exceed the 5 percent barrage in the Parliament to field its candidate for the 2011 presidential elections.

The government's tactic to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to run and not using its banned situation against it may be interpreted as a strategy to weaken the other parties so as not to extend the margin of the 5 percent in the Parliament to present a candidate in future presidential elections. Therefore after the elections all these events proved the regime's unwillingness to effectuate the political reforms in Egypt. Moreover, the failure of the secular opposition and the uptrend of the Islamists in the elections contributed to the justification of the regime to defend the country's relatively secular and stable position in the region when it was compared with the most prominent alternative.

Noha Antar lists the reasons for the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2005 elections under four titles: the first factor was the civic protest movements; the most important one was Kifaya Movement- they emerged more fundamentally with organized demonstrations and increased consciousness by calling for serious reforms. The second factor was the regime's contribution to the Muslim Brotherhood by tolerating the religious trends in Al-Azhar and the visibility of Islam in the communication channels. The third factor was the social structure and welfare activities of the Movement. And the last was the using of the Islamic sphere by the Muslim Brotherhood to show voting as an Islamic duty for the aim of the Islamic

state.388 In fact, for the Muslim Brotherhood, as a banned organization there are no other alternatives except the use of its grassroots network and use of social services including education, health and job-training programs, care centers for poor widows and orphans under the Islamic labels in impoverished areas. One of the Brotherhood members, Abdul Moneim Abu Al-Futuh, asserted that of the roughly 5,000 legally registered NGOs and associations in Egypt, an estimated 20 percent are Brotherhood-run and are also registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs. According to him, the Brotherhood runs 22 hospitals and has schools in every governorate in the country. For instance, one resident from the Imbaba district said after the elections that "The Brotherhood was extremely popular here, even before the election, because it stands against corruption and its people are honest and respectable," adding, "After 24 years of waiting for changes, like clean streets and workable sewage systems, people lost faith in the ruling party. The Brotherhood will deal with all these pressing issues, which are high on its agenda."389 This position contributed to the Brotherhood's social legitimacy when they were contesting against the ruling party's shaken credit because of corruptions in the government and poorness in the country.

The performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections may be interpreted as a real success for the Movement or failure of the secular opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood prepared for the elections better than the secular opposition and paid more attention to register its voters to ensure higher voter turnout at the polling stations. At the beginning of the year the group did not use the slogan of "Islam is the solution" as before and was more open to the secular opposition groups like the Kefaya Movement. The Muslim Brotherhood used the discourse of "democracy" and "political participation" in its program during the election campaigns as a political strategy.[390]. This

[388]Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications".

[389] Muslim Brotherhood Wins Over Egyptians with Charity Services, http://www.monitor.net:16080/monitor/0602a/egyptislamistcharity.html, (accessed on May 23 2009).

[390] Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications".

strategy also served to persuade foreign observers and the international community.

Many things contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood's success such as the miserable economic conditions of the people, increased corruption claims for the higher government ranks, increasing sensitivity about religion and the animosity against the West, especially against the U.S. after September 11th and the Iraq War, and the frustrations after the presidential elections in September, despite the promise of reforms in democracy. After the success of the Brotherhood the debate on the relationship between religion and politics also heated. For almost three decades the country witnessed the resurgence of the Islamic ideas and the governments contributed to this trend by seeing religion as an instrument for their aims. The reason for this resurgence was not only the efforts of the Islamist movements but also the regimes have played an important role to increase the publicity of religion by media and stressing the Islamist nature of Egypt against radicals and other opposition groups.

Some writers argued that as a result, NDP succeeded to obtain two thirds of the Parliamentary seats but failed to pass its first test after it declared the reform program and they questioned whether the government will use the majority power in the Assembly to continue failures or implement genuine reforms.[391] One may see from the discourse of Mubarak that while the main opposition comes from Islamists, he has the legitimacy to defend the relatively stable system by showing himself as the only alternative to other Arab and Western countries. Thus it can be said that the main competitive and legitimate opposition must be a liberal party with a charismatic leader and social policies.

After the elections took place the prominent figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, made a comment in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood and it was published in *Al-Ahram Weekly*. He explained his group's approach on Copts. He used the word (*hitab*) of "Coptic brethren" and offered some examples from the history of Egypt to demonstrate their respect for full citizenship and equal rights of Copts in Egypt. He also talked

[391] Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "After the Elections," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).

about the Israeli and extremist Diaspora Copts' scenarios to weaken the national unity by defining Copts as minority in Egypt and Middle East. [392]

After the elections the first declarations from the U.S. were generally positive except for concerns about the violence issues. In the U.S. media, similar to Egyptian media, some interpreted the elections as a first step towards democracy reminiscent to Bush's words and the remaining people viewed the elections as nothing more than show to guarantee the continuity of U.S aid to Egypt.

Condoleezza Rice stated U.S. support for the Egyptian government vis a vis the Muslim Brotherhood. The U.S. State Department Spokesman, Sean McCormack, also interpreted the elections as "overall an important step on Egypt's path towards democratic reform" by avoiding the explanation about the arrestments and calculating the long term alliance of Egypt in the regional issues.[393]

Sean McCormack said that the "overall the U.S. view is that the country has embarked upon a process of political reform and change". He saw the general trend towards greater political reform and openness and listed the multiparty presidential, parliamentary elections, the appointment of 31 female judges as positive elements, adding the latter would lead to a change in the Egyptian Parliament. However, at the same time he criticized the imprisonment of former presidential candidate Ayman Nour and the conviction of blogger Abdel Karim Suleiman as well as the police tactics in the 2005 parliamentary elections and said they were the negative side of the improvements.[394]

Despite the existing frauds and violence during the elections the process paved the way for the announcement of the Brotherhood's perspective on the politics and they had a chance to assert their vision on social and political problems. Moreover, after their entrance into the Assembly they would be able

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[392] Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, "One Nation One God," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (15 - 21 December 2005).

[393] "Overall Positive Says U.S.," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (8 - 14 December 2005).

[394] U.S. views on political development in Egypt, http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/070320/2007032024.html (accessed on 12 June, 2008).

to open debate decisions which are in accordance with Islamic values. Secondly, their continuing demand for greater democracy in the country has given a new type of legitimacy to them both inside and in the international area. Third, the State's position versus the Group increased the sympathy towards the Brotherhood as a political martyr group which was under the state repression although it used nonviolence avenues to participate in the system.

After attaining 88 seats in the People's Assembly, the Brotherhood members have been vocal on the constitutional amendments and they are especially known for their blocks against the government's restrictive amendments for political activities, such as the amendments of electoral law. In June of 2006, the Brotherhood members in parliament worked with the Judges Club to support the legislation to increase the Club's independence from the executive branch, although at the end, the ruling party succeeded in dismissing their proposal. The Brotherhood's members in Parliament have also been against the passing of the legislature related to the Anti-Terrorism Law which is thought to replace the State's 28 year old Emergency Law in the close future.[395]

Demonstrating 'the threat' of the Brotherhood in 2005, other ways for the restriction of the opposition were searched by the government. The most important act after the elections was the 2007 constitutional amendment in March which grants more leeway to the government for arbitrary crackdowns of the Brotherhood members and prohibits the ability of the Brotherhood to participate in politics. According to the amendment, any political activity based on religion was precluded which ensures that supporters of the Brotherhood could be arrested easily. During the time between late 2007 and early 2008, more than 800 Brotherhood members were detained consecutively without charges issued.[396] Moreover, the amendment diluted judicial supervision in the electoral process; dissolvement of the parliament by the president was made

[395] Joshua Stacher, *Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,* Institute for Public Policy Research, (April 2008), 22.

[396] Ibid. 6.

easier; and it allowed the suspension of constitutional civil liberties in cases the government felt involved terrorism.[397]

The first Shura Council (upper house of the Parliament) elections after the amendments were held in June 2007 but the elections turned into another confrontation between the regime and the Brotherhood. By referencing the new constitutional amendment, eight out of nineteen candidates from the Brotherhood could be disqualified. Moreover, the government wanted to prohibit the Movement from participating in the elections due to its campaign based on religious slogans. However, the request was turned out by the court.[398] During the Shura Council elections, in the Brotherhood stronghold districts many voters were turned away at the polling stations because of the blockage of the police forces that sealed off the stations; or the voters were told there were no elections on the day or there was no electricity at the time. While in other districts loyal to the ruling party, even 15 year old children, voted for the NDP.[399] Not surprisingly, 84 seats out of the 88 went to NDP candidates.

5.3.5. The Muslim Brotherhood's 2007 Draft Party Program

In the years following 2000, the Brotherhood issued three documents to expose their stance on the politics, economy and societal issues. As was touched on before the first document, *On the General Principles of Reform in Egypt*, it was released in March 2004. The second document was released in May 2005, prior to the 2005 elections as a campaign pamphlet titled *"The Muslim Brotherhood: Dotting the i's—Clear Positions on Specific Issues"*. The document began with the question "Who are we and what do we want?" and it was like a political framework for its candidates. In the document there were pledges to reform the government for better service to the people, to liberate the nation from foreign political, cultural and economic dominance and the

[397] Ellen Knickmeyer, "Egyptian Voters Impeded In Opposition Strongholds," *The Washington Post*, (June 12,2007).

[398] Heba Saleh, Egypt's Islamists Allege Poll Irregularities, *Financial Times*, (11 June 2007), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7ede216-1803-11dc-b736-000b5df10621,dwp_uuid=fc3334c0-2f7a-11da-8b51-00000e2511c8.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed on May 12, 2009).

[399] Ellen Knickmeyer, "Egyptian Voters Impeded In Opposition Strongholds," *The Washington Post*, (June 12, 2007).

Movement's support for the Palestinian cause.[400] The third document was released in August of 2007, and titled *Draft Party Program.* It has been the Muslim Brotherhood's most detailed party program and it sparked a debate inside and outside the movement. Although the Movement has issued different kinds of programs in the past, the latest one was the longest with 128 pages and it was seen as a forward step on the way to forming a party with detailed content and it held social, economic and political approaches differently from previous statements.

Six months before the issue of the document, General Guide Muhamad Akif had talked about their desire to publish a party program. The main aim was to explain the vision of the Muslim Brotherhood and respond to the concerns over a lack of content. Since one of the criticisms for the Brotherhood was the ambiguity of its ideology and beyond the ideological and religious slogans such as 'Islam is the solution,' there was a need for concrete details of their state project.[401] The program exposed the Brotherhood's goals and its vision for the political system, economy, social justice and cultural revival.[402] Although the Brotherhood has not had a chance to form a party, this draft showed that if there is any opportunity its frame will be in this aspect. Some writers interpreted the party platform as a milestone, because despite the Brotherhood's efforts for many years to infiltrate the political system, it was the first concrete step to demonstrate their willingness to be a party. Yet as Deputy General Guide Mohammed Habib says, the meaning of the program was not an attempt or prelude to establish a party as the conditions were known by all, but to dissipate clouds and to answers the questions about the views of the group. Yet it was carrying a big risk for criticism from the reformist wing inside and outside, and from secularists and the government. With the platform, the differences in the Organization's leaders were also exposed and opposite

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[400] Stacher, "*Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,"* 18.

[401] Mohamed Bahaa, Why Has MB's Party Program Been Delayed?, Islamonline, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=13801&SectionID=78 (accessed on May 21, 2009).

[402] Chris Harnisch, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 198.

from before, they discussed openly via media channels about the sensitive issues.

The Platform was circulated to a number of intellectuals for their comments and reviews. Stacher summarizes the platform and believes it thus supports "a political system that has a civil character and is based on a rotation of power, regular elections, and separation of branches". It also points out that judicial independence must be respected, which can be read as a condemnation of the Government's 2006 legislation that greatly diminished judicial institutional independence from the executive branch. According to Stacher, "the 2007 platform also proposes reform measures to reverse and rectify recent legislation that is perceived to have further hampered political development" and "the document is the most pragmatic yet in terms of the Brotherhood's ideas about future political reform."[403] For some political analysts, this paper is a shift in the Brotherhood's thinking.[404] While it was promoting political pluralism and freedom of expression, there were three controversial issues viewed as regressive steps in the platform which raised a great deal of discussions and led to divisions among the media and scholars. The first issue to take notice was the implementation of *shari'a* to the government by establishing an ulama council, while the others were the position of women and Copts in governmental posts.

Governing the state with religious rules has been a long standing discourse of the Brotherhood. Although the 2004 declaration was also indicating shari'a as a guideline with the words of "Our only hope to achieve progress in all the aspects of life is by returning to our religion and implementing our sharia . . . . We have a clear mission—working to put in place Allah's law, on the basis of our belief that it is the real, effective way out of all of our problems—domestic or external, political, economic, social or cultural. This is to be achieved by forming the Muslim individual, the Muslim home, the Muslim government, and the state which will lead the Islamic states, reunite the scattered Muslims, restore their glory, retrieve for them their lost

[403] Joshua Stacher," *Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,"* 19.

[404] Khalil El Anani, Brotherhood Scenarios, *Al Ahram Weekly,* (13 - 19 September 2007).

lands and stolen homelands, and carry the banner of the call to Allah in order to make the world happy with Islam's blessing and instructions" it has not exactly mentioned the issue of establishing an ulema council in detail.[405]

On the issue of *shari'a*, although the platform said the ultimate arbiter will be the elected representatives and the position of the Supreme Constitutional Court's duty will continue, another part of the platform says something different. It says that a council of religious scholars will be established from the elected scholars and it will serve as an advisory body on Islamic law. However, at the same time it says that the board of elected scholars will have an authority not only through advising but also by the coercive role.[406] Hamzawy and Brown classify the reasons to emphasize *shari'a* for the Brotherhood. First, as the Egyptian society identifies Muslim Brotherhood with Islam, it has a role to assure its implication. Second, *shari'a* is accepted as a symbol like the continuation of moral values although some may recoil with some interpretations of *shari'a*. Third, the grassroots of the Muslim Brotherhood support the movement because the Brotherhood places Islam at its center. [407]

Al-Anani notes that compared to previous statements, the last Platform was more conservative and in a "hardening tone"; its embrace of the authoritarian source of Islamic law was similar to the Taliban or Humeini regimes.[408] Nonetheless, when we look at the words of General Guide Mahdi Akef, he says that "You must care for the nations' interests and its citizens both Muslims and Copts, men and women".[409] From that point of view, it may be

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[405] Elad Altman, **"**Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood**,"** *Hudson Enstitute*, **(**December 29, 2005).

[406] Khalil El Anani, "Brotherhood Scenarios," *Al Ahram Weekly*, (13 - 19 September 2007).

[407] Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?, Carnegie Papers, Number 89, (January 2008), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp89_muslim_brothers_final.pdf (Accessed on May 25, 2009).

[408] "The Brotherhood Political Party Platform in Egypt..Iran, Taliban or Erdogan Style?" http://politicalislam.org/embed_doc.php?ArticleID=91, (accessed on June 21, 2009).

[409] Stacher, "*Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,"* 17.

said that although the Group is clear on the issue of the presidency position, their attitude on the other positions of the government will be equal to citizens. On the issue of the conservative approach of the Platform, in his words, Hamzawy argues that "The platform's detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005 electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions. It departs from the pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis was given to the *shari'a* issue. The return to a focus on *shari'a* in the platform has led to positions fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious affiliation."[410]

In his critical article, Sharq Al-Awsad Fahmi Huwaidi, known as an Islamist but at the same time a respected columnist, wrote that he received two different copies of the program at the end of August and September and the former copy was called "the first publication" while the latter was called "the first reading". Huwaydi says that the first publication did not include the debated issues. He argued that the *first publication* was emanated from the effect of political experts and the *first reading* was affected by the 'ranks of *dawa*'; and as the second one was distributed to a large scale, according to him, it shows that the decision making power is in the hands of the conservative group and the reformist group was also astonished by the latter one.[411] On the issue of the application of the *shari'a,* there is no consensus in the ranks of the Brotherhood and it leads to divergence. In the previous documents of the Brotherhood, the terminology of 'civil state', which has been boasted by the more pragmatic and moderate wing of the Movement was being used. In 2006,

[410] Amr Hamzawy, "Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood's platform?," http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=19686&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme**, (**Accessed on April 12, 2009**).**

[411] Fahmy Huwaidi, "*MB in Party Program...Wrong Doers or Wronged?*," http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14288&SectionID=78at (accessed on May 21 2009)

a relatively liberal member of the Guidance Office, Abdul Monem Abul-Futuh, had said that "a distinction must be made between religion and political life and that the affairs of the letter should be administered in a modern fashion".[412] But as Huwaidi said, the decision making is more conservative as the Party Platform highlights *shari'a*. Withstanding the orthodox understanding of shari'a, the conservative wing has justified themselves by referring to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which already stipulates that Islam is the religion of the country.

With the preparation of the last document, the conservative wing, namely Mahmoud Ezzat and Mohammad Morsy, acted against the pragmatic wing which included Deputy Guide Mohamamad Habib and another pragmatic member of the Guidance Office, Khayrat Al-Shater, who was in prison during its preparation. In a personal interview, the General Secretary and a member of the Guidance Office Mahmoud Azzat said that:

> We are a movement that adopts Islam and follow shura. Shura is not simply a matter of voting on any decision but it is a means for the better that satisfies Allah. Therefore, we use shura which is better then democracy which is based now on the numbers of higher voices and who enjoy power that enables them to make the decision. Shura is not a means of competition, but rather a means to improve and reach the better. And more importantly, it enables us to make the correct decision and therefore avoid the clash of generations.[413]

The other controversies included the discrimination against non-Muslims, which constitutes about 10 percent of the Egyptian population, and women for the post of presidency. The Platform says that a non-Muslim or a woman is not eligible to occupy the position of presidency in the country. It says that it is "unjust" for a non-Muslim to hold the post.[414] However, on the issue of Copts, in 2004, the Brotherhood document had said that "Copts are

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[412] Joshua Stacher, "*Brothers in Arms? Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,"* 15.

[413] Personal Interview with Mahmoud Azzat in Cairo Head Office of the Muslim Brotherhood, (September 18, 2008).

[414] "Egypt's Muslim Brothers: Confrontation of Integration?", Middle East / North Africa Report N°76 – (18 June 2008), Crisis Group.

part of the fabric of the Egyptian society. They are partners of the nation and destiny. Our rights are theirs, and our duties theirs".[415] In 2005, Abul Futuh had even said that:

> This nation is your nation, this land is your land, and this Nile is your Nile. Do not listen to those who want to isolate you behind walls in order to stifle your voices while raising theirs. Our history together says the contrary. Our history together says one God, one nation.[416]

Moreover, although the Brotherhood's position dealing with Copts in the 2007 Party Platform was criticized, the Brotherhood had begun to work on strengthening its relations with the Copts following its success in the 2005 elections and the Brotherhood began to communicate with the Coptic community to alleviate their concerns. After the attacks on Coptic Churches in 2006, the Brotherhood condemned the attacks and supported the Copt's protests against the low standards of state security measures to prevent these attacks.[417]

In fact it is unlikely to see a non-Muslim or a woman in the post of presidency in a country like Egypt; however the platform touched the issues based on the traditional understanding in an Islamic country. For some of the less conservative members it was not a worthy issue to come up, but the conservative wing of the Brotherhood charged the reformist wing to sacrifice the clear expression of Islam for a short term political aim., Aside from his other duties, the top person in an Islamic county who is a religious leader *(imam),* deals with religious duties; thus a Muslim male must occupy this

[415] Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives For Reform in Egypt, http://www.muslimbrotherhood.co.uk/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show&Lang=E&ID=4162, (accessed on January 26, 2009).

[416] Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, "One God, One Nation", Al Ahram Weekly, (15-21 December 2005).

[417] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 199-200.

position.[418] The expression of the 2007 Platform relating to the non-Muslims and Women was not viewed as compatible with the understanding of universal citizenship rights by its critics, and the Brotherhood was charged with classifying certain segments of society as second class citizens.

Actually, on the issue of women, it can be said that they have been an integral part of the Movement since its establishment, and particularly during the harsh years of pressure under Nasser was their importance understood. Out of its woman members, one of the most well known is Zainab Al-Ghazali.. The women make up a branch called Muslim Sisters in the Movement. Moreover, for a movement which has been banned for more than fifty years, there is no better alternative than to include the women from society; they are indispensible actors with their organizational skills that they can use to disseminate the Movement's ideas. For the Brotherhood, there is some evidence demonstrating that they are not opposed to women participation to political and social life and they have a commitment to democracy: They fielded female candidates in elections such as Jihan Al-Halafawi in 2000 and Makarem El-Deiry in the 2005 election for the People's Assembly; they wanted to implement democracy in their internal structure and even 83 members in 1995 were detained when they were running elections for the Movement's council; the alliances with other parties or backings in the parliamentary elections began as early as 1984.[419]

Huwaidi argued that there was even a heated debate, there were many positive indicators in the program and people didn't realize them. He said that people were focusing on those three issues and they approached Islamic movements with some prejudices in their minds. To defend the popular questions in the program, he argued that none of the guides in the Movement (accept the founder Hasan Al-Banna) were religiously educated people and today, almost 90 percent of the Group is composed of professionals or

[418] Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, "The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?," Carnegie Papers, Number 89, (January 2008).
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp89_muslim_brothers_final.pdf, 5.
(Accessed on May 21, 2009)

[419] Ibid.

technocrats, not clerics. In regards to the cleric council, he argued that in a democratic state there is already a Parliamentary system to verify the laws and there is no contradiction between *shari'a* and current laws. He noted that the text was not confronting the Supreme Constitutional Court, the elected Parliament is the last authority and the council will be consultative and binding. However, he worried about the women and the Copt issues from the point that there is still no reconcilement between the clerics and there is a need to make *ijtihad* about these issues. As a result, he saw the document as "Lifting the contradiction between *shura* (consultation) and democracy, and considering democracy (i.e. partnership and interrogation) as the core of *shura*".[420]

Today, the Brotherhood sees democracy as the most appropriate system for Egypt; in an interview in 2006, Mohammad Abdel Kodos, the head of the Journalists Syndicate and Brotherhood committee entitled 'Prisoners of Opinion,' stated that the Brotherhood wants to apply *shari'a* within a 'western democratic model, using an elected parliament to form legislation.'[421] But as it was mentioned before, the scope of the application will be framed with Islamic rules and it is likely that the democratic values will be applied only in the political process.

In March 1994, the Brotherhood issued the following statement to reveal its commitment to a pluralistic electoral system:

> We believe in the existence of multiple parties in the Islamic society, and the authorities ought not restrict the formation of political parties and groups as long as the *shari'a* is the supreme constitution…The recognition of multiple parties entails the consent to a peaceful transfer of power between political groups and parties by means of periodic elections.[422]

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[420] Fahmy Huwaidi, "*MB in Party Program...Wrong Doers or Wronged?*," http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14288&SectionID=78 (accessed on June 12, 2009)

[421] Chris Harnisch, Qui, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," 194.

[422] Ibid., 193

Harnisch and Mecham argue that the statement reiterated the commitment of the Brotherhood to the political system, but they had a dual call for democracy and *shari'a* and their understanding of democracy was bounded by *shari'a*.[423] The common discourse of the Brotherhood has been to demand a rule of law, good governance, and free and fair elections. This has contributed to reformist ideas; however, there are still ambiguities about the lack of a common approach on the issue of democracy. This stems from different Islamic references and no-transparent structure of the movement because of its illegal position.[424]

It has been a question for any Islamic state about the technical details of the state, and compatibility of Islam and democracy. In terms of democracy, liberty and freedom are repeatedly used in the Muslim Brotherhood's statements by the old and younger generations, and they said that the Islamic constitution and democracy are compatible. In their statements the criticism has not only been about the lack of democracy, but also the economic deterioration of Egypt, low living standards and socioeconomic justice for all citizens. Moreover, they have noticed that besides government, individuals are also responsible for helping the poor with *zekat* obligation for the socio-economic justice.[425]

On the theme of "democratic Islamism," Langohr lists the sources of skepticism. The first issue is that Islamists are accused of making *taqiyya* because they are using ballots and a discourse that democrats want to hear in order to gain power with the principle of "one-man, one-vote and one-time" and when they obtain the power, the democratic process will not be used in the country. The second doubt is based on the definition of democracy in the narrowest sense as "to value and protect the rights of all citizens equally". As the ultimate goal of Islamists are to establish a state based on *shari'a* rules as *a*

[423] Ibid.

[424] Antar, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005: Reasons and Implications," 7.

[425] Ibid., 48-50.

priori implementation of democracy, it is not possible in an Islamic state because of some issues such as women and religious minorities.[426]

Despite the differences among the generations of the Brotherhood, Sketcher believes that the internal discussion on the three issues will not lead to corrosive disputes. However, it is likely they would not argue to make concessions on the issue of presidency for a non-Muslim or a woman, but the document is open for revisions on the issue of an *ulama council* for the state.[427] Following the discussions on the platform, the Brotherhood tried to claim that the ulama council would have a consultative and not a legislative role. General Guide Akef said that "It is a consultative committee that could be part of Al-Azhar and that parliament could use as consultants. But of course parliament would have the final decision, and the Supreme Constitutional Court could also be appealed to should parliament pass legislation thought incompatible with the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution".[428]

If this prospectus takes its final form, as of this point after almost two years and still not being finalized yet, it would be the first official document to testify the Brotherhood's determination to follow through on this process. The Brotherhood declarations intending to establish a political party date to the mid-1980s; but never before has this intent been officially corroborated in a document form. The willingness of the Muslim Brotherhood to form a party extends back to the year of 1984. During that period, Guide Umar Al-Tilmishani had drafted a program for the Shura Party in 1986, and another two programs were issued for the Islah (Reform) Party in the early 1990s and in 1995, during the time of Mohamed Hamed Abu Al-Nasr.[429]

According to the Brotherhood, Islam is a complete system governing all aspects of life. Umar Al-Tilmishani, the General Guide of the Muslim

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[426] Vickie Langohr, "Islamists and Ballot Boxes", *Int. J. Middle East Studies,* 33 (2001), 591-592.

[427] Sketcher, "*Brotherhood in Arms*," 20.

[428] "Egypt's Muslim Brothers:Confrontation or Integration?," *Middle East / North Africa Report*, N°76 – (18 June 2008), Crisis Group, 17.

[429] Abdel Monem Said Aly, "Understanding Muslim Brothers in Egypt?!," Al Ahram Weekly, (October 2, 2007).

Brotherhood until the year of his death in 1987, defined Islam as "creed, worship, homeland, citizenship, creation, the physical, culture, law, forgiveness, and power." From this point of view, the phrases of (*din wa dawla)* are inseparable parts of life. According to this system of thought, the "Muslim Brotherhood describe their organization as more than either a political party or a charitable, reformist society. Rather, it is a spiritual worldwide organization that is (1) a dawa from the Quran and the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad; (2) a method that adheres to the sunna;(3) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul; (4) a political association; (5) an athletic association; (6) an educational and cultural organization; (7) an economic enterprise; and (8) a social concept."[430]

For the question of 'does the Muslim Brotherhood want to be a party and why?' the Muslim Brotherhood's position to establish a party is not the same with the founder of the Movement, Hasan Al-Banna, who had believed that "the *dawa* couldn't be confined to a party aligned with patrons of the ruling authorities. The *dawa*, according to Al-Banna, was to address the general interests of the entire *Umma*, and not just an organize segment of it." However, John Voll notes about Al-Banna, although he believed that the power to reform was inextricably linked to the power to rule, Al-Banna insisted that "the Muslim Brotherhood was committed to broad-based social reform, not to the direct exercise of political power".[431] Survilan and Kotob argue that the Brotherhood's philosophy has not been changed and the aim of the Muslim Brotherhood is not to govern the state by a Brotherhood ruler, but to provide it with a person who is to govern in accordance with *shari'a* rule. In the Islamic state, *shari'a* replaces man-made law since "none but God can be lawgiver".[432]

Some may say that there is little hope for a change in the Muslim Brotherhood's illegal position and from some aspects this situation contributes

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[430] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 45.

[431] John O.Voll, *Fundamentalism in the Sunni World* in Fundamentalisms Observed, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (Chicago and London: University Of Chicago Press, 1991), 366.

[432] Denis Joseph Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 46-47.

to the Movement because its grievance lead people to sympathize with it. Although it has an extensive societal, religious and political sphere, its participation in the presidential elections with today's constitution seems impossible.

Against the legislation which bans the formation of religious based parties, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement in June 2007, announcing that "they represent an integrated Islamic body that has historical, political and social legitimacy, and that has influence and prevalence covering all Egypt."[433]Although the Movement emphasized its nonviolent character and wish to participate in the political process, the doubts about the genuine demand for democracy have not declined over the years.

On its webpage the Brotherhood announced that the Egyptian constitution allows all Egyptians to participate in the political process and they will search for all of the "peaceful and civilized methods" convenient with the constitution as they want to form "a civil party of an Islamic authority" according to Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution.[434] The Brotherhood has used some arguments to justify its Islamic position; the first is that Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution states that the religion of the country is Islam, and second, the vast majority of the people in Egypt are Muslims. The last argument is that there are religious parties and governments all over the world. [435].

[433] "*The Muslim Brotherhood And Political Party,"* http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=809&SectionID=78, (accessed on May 28 2009)

[434] Ibid.

[435] Ibid.

Moreover, the Brotherhood listed these reasons to establish a party as below:

-Political disciplining and cultivation of the community
-Culturing and raising the political awareness of the community
-Practicing politics using all legitimate means and degrees
-Reform on the basis of a national agenda
-Strengthening the community so as to face exterior pressures.
-Forming allies, which are considered necessary for reform.
-Many other tasks.[436]

An attempt by a political party carries its costs and obstacles and Brotherhood members are still ambivalent on some questions. The first question is about the hierarchy for a prospective party. There are some options about the hierarchy:

1) The same hierarchy will continue and it will transform to a party entirely,
2) There will be a two headed separate structure; one for the Movement and another for the party,
3) Political body will be under the organization of same hierarchy of Muslim Brotherhood.

Another question is the membership and the promotion of the members in the prospective party. What will be the position of the party about the membership of Copts, and if they manage participation will they be able to promote it to the position of the leadership?

In the same announcement, the reason to choose a 'civil party' instead of a 'religious party' was explained with the idea that the meaning of a religious party is the dogmatic party. And they pointed out the following points as the reasons for a civilian party instead of a religious party:

- Recruits could be any civilian, irrespective of his/her religion or affiliation.
- The adopted program is developed by the group's members. It is not 'holy' or 'sacred', and thus could be amended or refuted.
- The adopted program is a peaceful one. It acknowledges women rights,

[436] Ibid.

liberties, peaceful conferring with the authority, elections, dialogue, allies, conferences, marches, demonstrations, mass media, etc.

- The civil party rejects all means of violence, including verbal violence.
- The civil party believes that people are the source of authority, legitimacy, and self-determination: the nation's will is the source of legislation.
- The civil party respects constitution and law, and acts accordingly.
- The civil party acknowledges liberties as well as civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
- The civil party reckons the state one entity, safeguarding its institutions and refusing any practice that would distort this.
- The civil party realizes the importance of the role of the civil community, thus is keen to boost and support the different bodies and institutions in the community.[437]

In short, today, after more than a decade from the resignation of the Wasat supporters, the Movement is trying to be legalized as a party with softer language compared to its early years. Although there have been many concessions given by the Movement over the years of authoritarian regimes, doubts still exist on the possibility of real change and the difficulty of change from a religious centralism to a more civilian character. At the same time, it is important to remember the question of ex-murshid Mamun Al-Hudaybi: "are there really any parties in Egypt, religious or nonreligious. To have parties means to alternate power. Parties compete in elections, real elections, people vote for something and they change something. Can that happen here?"[438] Regarding the issue, the Movement used the slogan of 'Islam is the solution' less frequently than in past elections, and it preferred to emphasize social and economic issues.

Some of the Western scholars have described the 1990s as a post-Islamist era in which the state repression forced Islamist politics to be moderate, and in accordance with the circumstances, the Islamists changed

[437] Ibid.

[438] Anthony Shadid, *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam, Basic Books, (*Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 257-258.

naturally.[439] It is also true for the transformation of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's dual call for basic liberties and the implication of sharia under its illegal position has made the picture more complicated for both the Movement itself and for outsiders.

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[439] Hatina, *Identity Politics in the Middle East*, 159.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Many academics believe that the Muslim Brotherhood is the, "world's oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization."[440] Some Branches that operate in other countries have managed to infiltrate political systems and have had more space to maneuver compared to the Movement within its home country. Taking this fact into consideration, this thesis analyzed the enigmatic relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian governments during the period of the post 1952 Free Officers Revolution. Since its foundation in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has had varying levels of relations with the Egyptian governments. Furthermore, when the governments have attempted to make openings, it was viewed that the Brotherhood had enhanced its influence in civil institutions and politics. All of the governments during the post-Revolution era have experienced the pressure of the Brotherhood that enjoyed social legitimacy and support. The Muslim Brotherhood has become a threat to the established order due to its much known slogan, *Al-Islam Huwa Al-Hall* (Islam is the solution) and its purpose to replace the system with an Islamic one.

This thesis argues that for the period studied, from 1952-2008, the improvements in Egypt, the Arab World and in the Western World all defined the agenda of the opposition powers, including the Brotherhood in Egypt. Due to the variety of the internal and external dynamics and telescopic nature of events, including the Brotherhood's internal improvements, each of the factors had to be evaluated both independently within itself and the effects they had on one another. Moreover, due to the complexity of the internal and external components of the political structure, it was necessary for the study to be detailed in order to make a compelling analysis.

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[440] Robert S. *Leiken* and Steven *Brooke*, "*The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood*," *Foreign Affairs, (*March/April 2007), 107.

The government and the Brotherhood have acted in years under a complex set of internal and external factors. The internal and external components may be classified under three dimensions. First, the domestic environment of Egypt includes the personality of the president, the legitimate sources of the leaders, economic conjuncture, other Islamic groups and many other factors. Second, internal issues of the Muslim Brotherhood are composed of the personalities of its prominent leaders, their approach to the country's policies, moderate or radical trends in the Movement, internal democracy discussions and other factors. Third, in the international arena, regional events such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iran Revolution, Gulf War, Iraq War, and other events such as the September 11 attacks and the U.S.' MENA project have all had an effect on the Egyptian government's stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood.

Each of the three leaders after the Revolution had policies to provide their continuation. Nasser and Sadat both ruled the country until their last breath and it is still unknown whether Mubarak will also follow the same tradition or not. During the study, another interesting point was that all of the governments conducted similar legitimization policies to constitute their power and the Brotherhood was an important collaborating actor in these consolidation periods.

For Egyptians, religion has been an integral part of their life for centuries. It has played a central role due to Al-Azhar University and its fame for the *Kıraa* (Reading) of the Quran. For this reason, many people from Malaysia, Indonesia, Europe, the old Soviet Block and other countries have been coming to Egypt to learn *Ilm* (Islamic sciences) in the medrese system or at Al-Azhar University. In a country like Egypt, particularly after the end of the Monarch in 1952, religion has been a substantial source of legitimacy and justification for the leaders. Due to the legitimizing role of religious sensitivities, during their consolidation years, at least on the surface, the governments felt they should have good relations with the Islamic Movements, with the Muslim Brotherhood being one of the most powerful.

During the legitimization periods, rulers had good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. The new leaders would organize meetings with the

Brotherhood leadership, release its members from jails, allow them to publish their magazines and both sides followed accommodation policies towards each other. Nevertheless, whenever one side deviated from the accommodation policies, confrontation would ensue. For Nasser, the alarm was alerted when the Brotherhood wanted to interfere in governmental affairs. Whereas for Sadat, the confrontation began after his rapprochement policies with Israel, and for Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the society and infiltration into the political system were the reasons to take measures against them. The Brotherhood has always wanted to participate in the political system and contest the elections multiple times since as early as the 1940s. By going beyond the Qutb's isolation and exclusion ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood has been more open to work with society since the 1970s. As an alternative to the governments, the Brotherhood participated in many sectors of society; in mosques, university campuses, syndicates, NGOs and since the 1980s, in politics too. The Egyptian governments have felt uncomfortable due to the Brotherhood's Islamic reform project and criticism over the government's secular policies.

With its ups and downs, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to exist as an illegal movement since 1954. In this thesis, the accomodationalist and oppositional functions of the Muslim Brotherhood under the control of the authoritarian leaders of Egypt, the mutual tactics and interests of the government and the Brotherhood have been examined. Although a limited liberalization took place under the Sadat and Mubarak periods in Egypt, neither Sadat or Mubarak allowed the full democratization of the country. Some legislative applications and other constraints have forced the opposition parties and citizens to retreat from political participation and led them to alienate themselves from politics. Even after the switch to a multiparty system in 1976, there was a political alienation by citizens. The most visible proof of this alienation can be seen in the low voter turnout in elections and peoples' non-affiliation to political parties. As Wickham argues, "culture of alienation" appears mostly amongst the educated youth of Egypt's cities and provincial

towns.[441] Though political reforms have provided limited participation and accommodation for other parties, the aim has not been to open the system but to guarantee the maintenance of authority.

For the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most powerful opposition and includes 88 members under the roof of the Egyptian Parliament now, its active members began to loom large in the 1980s' parliamentary and syndicate elections. This motivated the Hosni Mubarak government to take preemptive measures against the Movement. After the institutionalization of the multi-party system in the 1980s, the Brotherhood believes that the election campaigns have also provided a rise in awareness of Islamic values amongst the people. The elections have given a chance to explain the meaning of "Islam is the solution," and according to its members, the Muslim Brotherhood's presence in the Parliament is also a religious duty to force the government to be more accountable. The accommodation of the Movement by governments or its participation in the electoral process in the existing system does not mean an abandonment of the Brotherhood's aim but offers the "hopes of gradually enlightening the masses so that eventually the Islamic nation will be formed."[442]

Some members in the Movement have looked for ways of conciliation between Islam and the existing system in the country but at the expense of concessions from Islamic tenets. These members have been seen as the reformist wing of the Movement and in general the younger generation has represented this trend. This has created some crises and has even led to splits from the Movement. These splits have taken place amongst both radicals and reformists. In the 1970's, Al-Jihad and Jama'a Al-Islamiya, saw the Movement as too passive and in the mid 1990s the Movement was seen as very rigid by Al-Wasat supporters who were reformists and called for the establishment of a centrist party amidst the intense pressures of the government. The reformist's statements about the extreme ideas and the new

[441] Wickham, *Mobilizng Islam,* 77.

[442] Sullivan, Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society Vs. The State*, 58-59.

generation's refutation of the undemocratic mechanisms within the Movement are signs of change and further advancement for a more democratic view. The divergences between the old and new Islamists in the Movement also show the seeds of moderation in the Movement.

One of the results of this thesis is that the Muslim Brotherhood has not been a passive or a reactive Movement but has also had a leading role in politics and society. Under the light of a critical historical perspective, it is argued that after the abolishment of the monarchy, the Muslim Brotherhood witnessed heavy pressure under Nasser and ensuing governments. This has led to radicalized elements in the group split from the Movement and the remaining members have acted according to the "learned lessons." The limited democratic rules and the Muslim Brotherhood's pragmatic behaviors that have been adopted in order to survive and to infiltrate into politics have made it a more moderate and realistic actor. The confrontational and revolutionary stand of the Movement has gradually transformed into a more conciliatory actor throughout the years. After the 1970s, the Brotherhood has advocated liberal and democratic processes with various ways and in the 1980s, the old generation made alliance even with secular parties against the coercive restrictions. The Movement fielded one woman candidate for the 2000 election as well as one for the 2005 elections and it seems that it will continue to field women candidates as the government has announced that the number of women MPs will increase in the coming elections.

From its participation in societal activities to parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood believes that it has a religious duty to serve people in the way of God and they are aware that they have sworn the seeds today for the future. Since the mid 1990s, the Brotherhood has published documents to demonstrate their aim at playing a more active role in the political arena. The electoral program of 1995, the reform initiative of 2004, electoral program of 2005, and the draft party program of 2007, were all aimed at exposing their approach to politics and to silence critics in response to the ambiguity of their aims. The 2007 draft party program has been discussed widely both inside and outside the Movement. The draft program of the Brotherhood covered three issues that had been source of severe criticism toward the Brotherhood. Those include the role

of religious scholars in the government, the issue of women and the minority issue. Its approach to the three issues was viewed as rigid and there is still no reconciliation between the leaders of the Brotherhood. Thus it has not published a final document. Although there are ambiguities related to the Minorities, the role of the council of religious scholars in governing and solving women issues, the Brotherhood has softened its language after the 2007 draft.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Brotherhood is an untested political actor and it is still not known if the Brotherhood is genuinely committed to democracy. The Movement has not solved its own divergences. Today, the Movement is composed of three generations varied from the friends of Hasan Al-Banna to the Brotherhood's young bloggers.

The year 2010 will determine the future for the Muslim Brotherhood due to the upcoming Parliamentary elections and the expiration of its General Guide; Muhammad Akef's term in the position of *murshid*. Akef announced that he will not run for the position again, meaning there is a possibility for the Brotherhood to be governed by a middle aged member in the near future. Secondly, on the issue of the parliamentary elections, it is still not known if the Brotherhood will be able to run in the elections or not. As we have seen in 2005's three round elections, the government has seen the capacity of the Brotherhood at the end of the first round and during the second and the third round the arrests and limitations increased. At the end of the elections, the number of seats held by the Brotherhood was 88 and although it was seen as a success for many, it could have been more if the government would not have changed its position after the first round. Furthermore, according to the latest news, the Egyptian government is preparing for the amendments to the constitution, similar to the changes of 2007 which are related to the electoral system. Those changes in 2007 outlawed all political activity by groups with a religious frame of reference in order to prevent participation of the Brotherhood in the 2008 elections. It is likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will be under more governmental pressure and greater restrictions in the coming elections.

The recently published World Public Opinion survey exposed that a majority of Egyptians stated that their government should be "based on a form of democracy unique for Islam" and more than sixty percent of the people stated their positive feelings towards the Brotherhood while only 16 percent expressed negative feelings.[443] When one analyzes the results and general trends of the Egyptian people's feelings, it may not be wrong to guess that because of the heavy economic conditions and political alienation of the Egyptians, the Muslim Brotherhood's political agenda is acceptable for the ordinary people. If one talks to an ordinary Egyptian, it can be seen that it is more than just the role of the council of religious scholars in governing or the right of a woman or a Copt to occupy the presidency position that concern people. Economic inequalities and the lack of a welfare system in the country are much more important for the people. Increasing economic difficulties have gradually led to degeneration in societal life and people's alienation from politics and a decrease in their loyalty to the country. Even after the firing of the Egypt Shura Council, some writers such as Mahmud Al Kardushi have expressed a wish to have the MPs fired along with the Council.[444]

[443] "Egyptian Public to Greet Obama With Suspicion", (June 3 2009) http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/613.php (Accessed on August 11 2009)

[444] Masr Al-Youm, 25 August 2008.

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