FROM AZNAR TO ZAPATERO; DISCONTINUITY IN THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

 \mathbf{BY}

MEHMET FATIH AK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2009

Approval of the Gradua	ate School of Social Sciences
------------------------	-------------------------------

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata Director
ll the requirements as a thesis for
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık Head of Department
I this thesis and that in our pe and quality, as a thesis for the
Lecturer Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva Supervisor
(METU, IR)
(METU, IR)
(IU, FPS, PA)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.		
	Name, Last name :	МЕНМЕТ ГАТІН АК

Signature

ABSTRACT

FROM AZNAR TO ZAPATERO; DISCONTINUITY IN THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

Ak. Mehmet Fatih

M. Sc., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Lecturer Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva December 2009, 106 pages

Spain, after successfully joining EC and NATO and consolidating itself as a respected member of the Western bloc, has been seeking to improve its status in the international political arena in the last two decades. However, during its quest to become a major European power like Germany, France and UK, Spain lost the momentum it caught in the early years of its EC membership, after Felipe Gonzalez left the Presidency of Government in 1996. The discord between the two major Parties, the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) on the broad lines of the Spanish foreign policy - that yielded to discontinuity - has been one of the reasons for this development. The main aim of this dissertation is to elaborate this discontinuity as a case study, in a middle range European power. For this purpose, the foreign policies followed by the Conservative PP Governments headed by Jóse María Aznar during 1996-2004 term is compared with the policies followed by the Socialist PSOE Governments headed by Jóse Luis Rodríguez Zapatero since 2004. Given that these policies are associated with the decisions, acts and speeches of the Party leaders, the level of analysis in this dissertation is the individual policy makers.

Keywords: Spain, Foreign Policy, Discontinuity, European Union, Party Policies

AZNAR'DAN ZAPATERO'YA; İSPANYOL DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA DEVAMSIZLIK

Ak, Mehmet Fatih

Y. Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Danışmanı: Öğretim Üyesi Doktor Özgehan Şenyuva Aralık 2009, 106 sayfa

İspanya, AET ve NATO'ya üye olmasının ve Batı bloğunun saygın bir üyesi konumunu sağlamlaştırmasının ardından, son yirmi yıldır uluslararası alanda kendisine daha iyi bir yer aramaktadır. Bununla birlikte İspanya, AET'ye üye olduğu ilk yıllarda Almanya, Fransa ve İngiltere gibi Avrupa'nın büyük güçlerinden biri olma 1996 yılında yolunda yakaladığı ivmeyi, Felipe Gonzalez'in Başbakanlığı devretmesinden sonra kaybetti. İki büyük siyasi Parti, Halkçı Parti (PP) ve İspanyol Sosyalist İşçileri Partisi (PSOE) arasında İspanyol dış politikasının ana hatları üzerindeki, bu politikada devamsızlığa yol acan anlasmazlık, sözkonusu gelişmenin nedenlerinden birisidir. Bu tezin amacı, orta ölçekteki bir Avrupa gücünde sözkonusu devamsızlığı bir örnek vaka olarak incelemektir. Bu amaçla, Jóse María Aznar'ın liderliğindeki muhafazakar PP Hükümetlerinin iktidarda bulunduğu 1996-2004 dönemiyle, Jóse Luis Rodríguez Zapatero'nun liderliğindeki Sosyalist PSOE Hükümetlerinin 2004 yılından buyana takip ettikleri dıs politikalar karşılaştırılmaktadır. Sözkonusu politikaların parti liderlerinin verdikleri kararlar, eylemler ve yaptıkları konuşmalarla özdeşleştirildiği gözönüne alınarak, bu tezdeki analiz düzeyi, politika yapan bireylerdir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İspanya, Dış Politika, Devamsızlık, Avrupa Birliği, Parti Politikaları To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to his supervisor Lecturer Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

The author would also like to thank his co-supervisors Assist. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak and Assist. Prof. Dr. Kıvanç Ulusoy for their suggestions and comments.

The technical assistance of Jóse Garcia Martinez is gratefully acknowledged.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	RISMiii
	ACTiv
	v
	TIONvi
	WLEDGEMENTSvii OF CONTENTSviii
	ABBREVIATIONSx
СНАРТІ	DRS
I.	Introduction1
	1.1. The Methodology4
	1.2. The Period Covered for the Analysis8
	1.3. PP and PSOE: Two Major Spanish Political Parties9
II.	PP and PSOE's Different Perceptions of EU
	2.1. The Europeanization of the Spanish Foreign Policy14
	2.2. Different Perspectives of PSOE and PP Towards
	EU Issues16
III	I. The Trans-Atlantic Relations; An Apparent
	"Discontinuity" in the Spanish Foreign Policy25
	3.1. The Spanish Attitude towards the Kosovo Issue36
IV	. Bilateral Relations with Morocco and Algeria40
	4.1. Ups and Downs Marks Spain's Bilateral Relations
	With Morocco41
	4.1.1.Failure in the negotiations on the EU-Moroccan
	Fisheries Agreement and Escalation of Tensions
	between Spain and Morocco in 200142
	4.1.2.PSOE Leader Zapatero's Attempt for "Mediation"
	between Aznar Government and Morocco44
	4.1.3. Spanish Territories in the African Continent; A
	Major Dispute between Spain and Morocco46
	4.2. Spain's Bilateral Relations with Algeria50
	4.3. The Western Sahara Conflict55 4.3.1.The Spanish Policy towards the Western
	Sahara Conflict
	Sanara Connict
v.	The Relations with the Latin American Countries;
	Different Approaches of PP and PSOE Governments64
	5.1. Ibero-American Summits; Aznar's Unilateralist Approach versus Zapatero's Multilateralism67
	5.2. Europeanization of Spain's Latin American Policy69

Clear Reflection of Discord Between PP and PSOE71		
VI. Conclusions78		
BIBLIOGRAPHY. APPENDICES	84	
A) Tables	99	
Table 1	Top 20 Countries in the World in Terms of Their GDP in 200899	
Table 2		
Table 3	Spanish Capital Outflows to Latin American Countries as of June 2009101	
Table 4	Spanish Capital Outflows to Latin America According to Different Periods102	
Table 5	Spanish Capital Outflows to Cuba102	
Table 6	Spanish Foreign Policy during PP and PSOE's Governance	
B) Maps	105	
Map 1 Map 2	Spanish Territories in North Africa105 The Western Sahara106	

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance)

AU African Union

CIDOB Centre d'Estudis Internacionals a Barcelona

(Barcelona Center for International Studies)

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

EC European Community

EU European Union

FRIDE Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el

Diálogo Exterior (Foundation for International

Relations and Foreign Dialogue)

G-7, G-8 Group of Seven, Group of Eight

GDP Gross domestic product

GIs Members of the US Armed Forces

INCIPE El Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política

Exterior (The International Affairs and Foreign Policy

Institute)

KFOR Kosovo Peace Keeping Force

MEDA Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)

MINURSO The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development

PP Partido Popular (Popular Party)

PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist

Workers' Party)

SADR The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

UCD Unión Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic

Center Party)

UGT Union General de Trabajadores (Workers' General

Union)

US United States of America

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy analysis has gained importance in understanding the complex and at the same time increasingly interdependent dynamics of international politics in the post-cold war era.

In this field, there are several studies on the foreign policies of leading major powers namely United States, Russian Federation, France, United Kingdom and Germany. However, these studies are not sufficient for a thorough grasp of international politics, since the medium-sized powers also take part and challenge the major powers in the making of the world politics. This is not to underestimate the importance of the major powers in the international political arena, but to underline the fact that they are not alone in this process, given that during their continuous quest for maximizing their national interests, they are not isolated from the rest of the world and they also compete/cooperate with these medium-sized powers and share the same environment.

Among these medium-sized powers, Spain has a distinct place.¹ Unlike majority of other European countries, Spain did not participate in the two World Wars, however experienced a civil war

¹ Wallerstein (1976: 465), in accordance with his "world-system analysis approach" groups the states into three categories as core, semiperiphery and periphery, US being at the top as the "hegemonic power". In accordance with this approach, Tayfur (2005: 181, 203), from a political economic point of view, describes Spain as a upwardly mobile semiperiphery state which demonstrates core like tendencies. However, this dissertation is limited with the comparative and individual based analysis of the foreign policy of Spain. Therefore, political economic analysis of Spain within the international system is not utilized.

from 1936 to 1939, which ended with the victory of the Nationalist forces that yielded to the Franco dictatorship. After 36 years of political and economic isolation from the West until Franco's death in 1975, Spain had passed through a drastic social, economic and political transformation in just two decades and has become a respected member of the Western bloc in 1990's. Moreover, taking into account its developing economy, imperial past and cultural/linguistic legacy in a broad geography (soft power), as well as its geo-strategic location, it portrays a potential candidate – as a rising middle range power - to join the league of the major powers.

However, besides this potential and growing strength on the way to become a major power, Spain has two chronic problems; first one is the separatist movements (Basque and Catalan nationalism) as threats to its territorial integrity and the second one is the lower productivity in its economy compared to the major Western powers, which drawbacks the competitiveness of the Spanish products in the international market.²

Although Spain made a significant progress in these two problems with the help of its EU membership and liberalization of its economy, a new problem, "discontinuity" in its foreign policy emerged as a third drawback, due to the break of the transition period consensus among the Spanish political elite, after 1996.³

.

² Although Spain has the 9th biggest economy in the world, in terms of its GDP (see Table 1), according to World Economy Forum's "Global Competitiveness Index 2008-2009", Spain stands in 29th place in terms of competitiveness of its economy.

³ The break of consensus in the Spanish foreign policy has been examined by Torreblanca (2004), Barbé (2005), Aixala y Blanch (2005), Arenal (2008a) and Duran i Leida (2009). According to Pereira, Spanish Foreign Policy's transition period covers the era from 1975 (the end of the Franco dictatorship) to 1986 (Spain's joining the EC) (Pereira, 2003:75).

Holsti (1982: 7) argues that, "the "discontinuity" is a characteristic seen more frequently in the foreign policies of developing and periphery countries and this constitutes the most significant difference between the foreign policies of the major powers and the others. Holsti (1982: 7) explains the reason as follows: "The developed countries are more 'satisfied' in the basic pattern of their foreign relations than are the developing states".⁴

In this dissertation, the Spanish foreign policy is chosen as a case study, to examine the roots of discontinuity.⁵ For this purpose, the discord among the two major Spanish Parties (conservative PP and socialist PSOE) for restructuring the Spanish foreign policy and the consequences of this "discontinuity" in its foreign policy since 1996 - following Spain's consolidation of its place in the international political arena - is analysed.

It is argued that, behind this discontinuity lies the fact that the driving force behind the Spanish Foreign Policy is the policy of the governing political parties rather than predetermined long-term interests of Spain. In this respect, it should be underlined that both Parties' perception of "Spain" differs from each other. While, PSOE Leader Zapatero (2008) describes Spain as a "medium-sized power" like Gillespie (2002: 23), former PP Leader Aznar prefers to use the phrase "great nation", which implies the power of Spain stemming from its historical/cultural influence beyond its borders (Aznar, 2007: 61, 63). Built on their differing perceptions and

-

⁴ According to Holsti (1982, ix and x), foreign policy restructuring "is basically an attempt to assert autonomy, to control transnational processes, to destroy the residues of colonialism, to escape from the embrace of a hegemon".

⁵ As Arenal (2008a: 2) states, it should be underlined at this point that consensus is only meaningful when we refer to a democratic state, in which, different political and ideological approaches exist in domestic and foreign policies and there is the possibility of alternation of political parties in government.

visions for the future of the country, both Parties intend to use different means to maximize Spain's interests. In this dissertation, the different foreign policy choices of PP and PSOE are elaborated in the following chapters, so as to demonstrate that there is discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy.

According to Rosenau (1978: 372) "change cannot be discerned or assessed unless it is analyzed in the context of previously constant – or continuous – behaviour. There are no discontinuities without continuities to highlight them". In line with this assumption, in this thesis, the Spanish foreign policy followed during the 1982-1996 period (when PSOE under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez governed the country) is presumed as the period when Spain had a "state policy" and consequently there was "continuity" in the area of foreign policy.⁶

1.1. The Methodology

To elaborate the discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy since 1996, the different foreign policies followed by PP from 1996 to 2004 and PSOE since 2004, will be analyzed and compared in the following chapters, with an actor-centred approach. While doing this, the policy followed in the early years of the Spanish democracy (1982-1996) will be a reference point, since it is a shared assumption among various scholars (Arenal, 2008a, Aixalá i Blanch, 2005 and Barbé, 2005), as well as the Spanish politicians (Duran i Leida, 2009) - although with some nuances - that the break of the consensus on the Spanish foreign policy began when PP, under Aznar's leadership, came to power in 1996 and became apparent in his second term as President of the Government.

⁶ The term "state policy" used in this paper refers to a consensus among the political elite of a democratic country on the broad lines of the said country's foreign policy.

Another presumption in this analysis of the Spanish foreign policy is that, the Presidents of the Governments (the Prime Ministers) and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to a certain extent are the main actors in the making of the foreign policy, although this process is a much more complex one. According to Breuning (2007:166-167):

Since the domestic and international environment, as institutions and their accompanying social facts, are the stage on which foreign policy making takes place, foreign policy analysis privileges the individual level of analysis – and with it the consideration of options and the making of decisions.

Concerning the importance of the individual actors in the Spanish foreign policy Kennedy (1999: 116) argues that, "the Prime Minister has played a particular prominent role in the evolution of foreign policy since the death of General Franco". In this respect, he cites Adolfo Suarez's tendency to take the initiative on international matters, Calvo Sotelo's enthusiasm towards Spain's NATO membership, Felipe Gonzalez's particular interest in foreign policy and especially to European affairs, Jóse María Aznar's role during the diplomatic *imbroglio* with Cuba within months of the PP's election victory in 1996. Hence, he underlines the fact that in the reassessment of foreign policy positions, the power of the Prime Minister remains considerable. In this respect, it should be also mentioned that, although it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which carries out the foreign policy of Spain, the Ministry makes this under the mandate of the Prime Minister, who controls the overall external affairs with the help of a specialized staff in the Prime Ministry (La Moncloa) (Gillespie, 1995: 204).

Therefore, in line with this presumption, in this thesis the decisions/actions/discourses of the Party leaders and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are accepted as representing *the collective rationale* of their parties. In the Spanish case, including Felipe González's period from 1982 to 1996, it is the individuals, rather than the institutions, which develop and implement the foreign policy. This inevitably leads to the fact that their personal ideologies, attitudes and communication skills play an important role in this process.

As it will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters, the foreign policies followed by liberal/conservative Aznar and socialist Zapatero clearly appear to reflect their personal ideologies; The realist/pragmatist approach of Aznar versus the universalist/multilateral approach of Zapatero (Table 6).

Moreover, Aznar, the President of the Spanish Government from 1996 to 2004, confesses the lack of institutions in Spain, admires the American, British and Swiss models and see the institutions as the guaranty of continuity in the political life of a country:

There is no way to replace institutions as a guaranty of continuity. Institutions are the updated living embodiment of countless experiences, errors and learnt lessons. To make them public, to explain them, to diffuse their meaning is a vital role of every ruler.

6

.

⁷ For the leading role of the policy makers' decisions in the recent Spanish history, it is possible to make a long list. For example, General Franco's choice of Prince Juan Carlos as his personal successor in 1969, or King Juan Carlos's role during Spain's transition to democracy. Likewise, according to Duran i Leida (2009), Spain's accession to EC would not have been possible without the efforts of the transition governments, leaded by Adolfo Suarez and Calvo Sotelo.

....No doubt, those countries which have known to preserve their institutions are precisely the ones that have managed to better ensure freedom and prosperity. Suffice it to remind cases such as Switzerland, the United States or Great Britain. Continuity has never been broken in those countries, and if ever someone tried to do it there have always been politicians with the backing of a public opinion willing to assume their responsibilities, who have known how to restore it. How much unnecessary suffering, how many quandaries, how many leaps backwards have thus been avoided... (Aznar, 2007: 55 and 60)

Hence, in this thesis the level of analysis will be on individuals' decisions. To elaborate the discontinuity and lack of consensus on the Spanish foreign policy since 1996, PP and PSOE Leaders' decisions/ assessments/choices/ will be referred.

This will be done by tracking the core issues in the Spanish foreign policy with an order of precedence: Europe, trans-Atlantic relations, bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria and lastly relations with the Latin American countries.⁸

In line with the above mentioned perspective, in every chapter, after giving the basic information with regard to the foreign policy topic and the policy followed in the early years of the Spanish democracy (1982-1996), the new policies introduced by PP (1996-2004) and PSOE (2004 - 2009) will be stated.

⁻

⁸ These four topics are chosen because there exists a general consensus among the majority of scholars (Gillespie, Powell, Arenal, Torreblanca), that these are the core issues which shape the Spanish foreign policy, although some scholars prefer to replace "bilateral relations with Algeria and Morocco" with a broader title like "Maghreb countries" or "policy towards the Mediterranean Region". However, in its foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, Spain traditionally focuses on Maghreb countries and among them, Morocco and Algeria always have priority. Spain has limited political and economic relations with the other three Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) compared to Morocco and Algeria (Amirah-Fernández, 2008: 348).

In this dissertation, the books written by the actors and the speeches they made or the statements they have given to the Spanish daily newspapers are referred as first hand resources. The relevant articles published by the scholars and researchers, which are mostly reachable through the web pages of the Spanish think-tanks like CIDOB, Real Instituto Elcano, FRIDE and INCIPE are tracked as well. The archive of the Turkish Embassy in Madrid has also been utilized.

1.2. The Period Covered for the Analysis

Rafael Grasa (1997) divides the evolution of the Spanish foreign policy after the end of the Franco dictatorship into three stages: 1) Normalization, 2) Europeanization and, 3) increasing pragmatism and realism. During the normalization phase that is from 1975 to 1986, the Spanish political elite faced with a tight agenda ahead in various areas including restructuring the country's foreign policy. Following the enactment of the new Constitution in 1978, Spain's foreign policy priorities were entering the European Community, redefining its security relations with the West and breaking the forty years long isolation of Spain from the rest of the world. These priorities, which should be defined as the policy" of "normalization" "state Spain during its "Europeanization" period, were all accomplished during the governance of Socialist Party- PSOE - from 1982 to 1996, under the leadership of Felipe González. Aixalá i Blanch (2005: 94) argues that until mid 1990's Spain in fact did not have alternatives in its foreign policy; it had to join NATO and EC; it had to participate economic and European Monetary Union. Therefore, it is a fact that the different options in the Spanish foreign policy appeared after the accomplishment of all these objectives.

Thus, in this thesis, the "normalization" and "Europeanization" period is skipped and rather focused on the period after 1996, when "pragmatism" and "realism" began to dominate the Spanish foreign policy.

1.3. PP and PSOE: Two Major Spanish Political Parties

In order to understand the roots of the break of "consensus" between PP and PSOE on the core issues of Spanish foreign policy, it is necessary to state the basic information on the history and ideology of these Parties. In this dissertation, the term "consensus on foreign policy" is used as described by Arenal (2008a: 6):

For defining an agreement among the political elite of a country, which masters and coordinates, as well as sets the basic principles of the said country's foreign policy. It refers, therefore, to the agreement on the broad guidelines of foreign policy, setting priorities and the acceptance of core values and principles.

If we leave aside the 1978 - 1982 period when Spain was led by the "Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) – The Union of the Democratic Centre" (a coalition of parties during the transition period), there have been two major political parties in the Spanish domestic politics: one on the right wing, the Popular Party (PP) and the other on the left, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). Both Parties represent the two mainstream ideologies, which have been important actors in the Spanish history; "Nationalists/ Conservatists" on the right and "Republicans/Socialists" on the left wing of politics (Preston, 2007: 4-5; Marín, Molinero and Ysas, 2001).

The PP was a re-foundation of the Popular Alliance (Spanish: Alianza Popular, AP) in 1989, a party led and founded by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, former Minister of Tourism during Francisco Franco's régime. The new party combined the conservative AP with several small Christian democrat and liberal parties. During AP's 19th Congress in 1989, the Party's name changed to Popular Party (PP) and in the 20th Congress in Sevilla in April 1990, Jóse María Aznar was elected as its new leader. 20th Congress was a milestone in its history because after the election of Aznar as the new leader, PP gained popularity among the Spanish electorate, which paved the way for the conservatives/liberals to govern Spain in 1996, after 14 years (Balfour, 2005: 146-150).

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE) was founded by Pablo Iglesias in 1879. It has had strong ties with the trade union "Union General de Trabajadores – Workers' General Union (UGT)" and it represents center left Spanish electorate in the contemporary Spanish domestic politics (Mendez-Lago, 2005:172-173).

However, the gap between the two mainstream political parties is far larger than most of the other European democracies for historical reasons: In 1936, the strife for power in governing the country turned into such an animosity that the supporters of these two mainstream political affiliations engaged in a civil war, known as the "Spanish Civil War" from 17 July 1936 to 1 April 1939, ending with the victory of the rebel forces, the overthrow of the Republican Government, and the founding of a dictatorship led by General Francisco Franco.⁹ In the aftermath of the civil war, all

_

⁹ The number of people died during the Spanish Civil war changes between 300.000 to 1 million according to various resources. Preston argues that the civil war of 1936-39 was the fourth such conflict since the 1830's, thus there were structural socio economic reasons (2008: 17).

right-wing parties were merged into the state party of the Franco regime, "Falange", which dominated the country until the death of General Franco in 1975 (Preston, 2007: 320-325).

During the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975), PSOE was illegal and it was persecuted. Its leaders and militants were assassinated, imprisoned or they were exiled to France. In the first democratic elections in 1977, it emerged as the second party of Spain, with 30 % of the votes. Hence, it is generally accepted that Spain's transition to democracy is marked by the electoral victory of the Socialists - PSOE later in 1982 (Maravall & Santamaria, 1986: 100-104).

Barbé argues that, on the same historical background, the Socialists remain to blame US policy towards Spain during the Cold War years as the main pillar, which helped the Franco regime to legitimize itself in the international arena and therefore enabled it to survive until the death of Franco in 1975. Hence, the anti-Americanism along the lines of PSOE, which continues today, has its roots going back to the Cold War years (1990:106-107).

-

¹⁰ According to Liedtke, "Ever since the US-Spanish Agreements of 1953, large sections of the Spanish political establishment and the left wing opposition have argued that Franco had bought them at the cost of national sovereignty. In return, the Spanish dictator ensured the survival of his regime by eliminating possible foreign support for democratic forces and by obtaining sufficient economic aid to keep the Spanish economy afloat" (1999: 229).

¹¹ It is generally accepted that three developments helped the Francist regime to break Spain's isolation to a certain extent, during the Cold War years: 1) The Agreement (Concordat) between Spain and Holy See in 1953, 2) The Pact of Madrid (Spain-US Agreements of 1953), which consisted of three separate, but interdependent agreements between Spain and the US. The Agreements, which marked the end of Spanish neutrality, consisted of military and economic aid to Spain, in return for the construction of US air and naval bases in the Spanish territories, 3) Close bilateral relations with the Latin American and Arab countries (Barbé 1990: 105-107).

Moreover, the Spanish Civil War remains to be a controversial issue between PP and PSOE, although PP condemns (first time in 2002) the Franco dictatorship as well (El Mundo, 21.11.2002). In October 2007, PSOE proposed a bill to the Spanish Parliament, which recognizes the victims of the Spanish Civil War and of Franco regime. The law has been criticized by PP, with the claim that the law needlessly opens up old wounds.¹²

12 The Historical Memory Law, 2007, "Ley 52/2007". The Law also comprises condemnation of the Francoist regime, prohibition of political events at the Valley of the Fallen - Franco's burial place and the removal of Francoist symbols from public buildings and spaces.

PP AND PSOE'S DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION

Europe has been the first priority in the making of the Spanish foreign policy since the end of the Franco dictatorship. According to Torreblanca (2001), the reason was that the Spaniards perceived the EC membership as the main pillar of Spain's returning to the Western values and ending the decades long isolation of the country and changing its third world perspective.

However, when Spain consolidated its position in the international arena and the Spanish GDP began to compete with the other leading EU countries', along with its growing soft power in the world, the different projections of the two major parties – PSOE and PP – for Spain, began to play the major role in the making of the Spanish foreign policy with regards to the EU issues. Hence, the consensus among the Spanish political elite on the EU (at that time EC) topics during the early years of the democracy has been replaced by discord and discontinuity since 1996 and this change especially became evident during Aznar's second term as President of the Government.

In this chapter, the reasons that lie behind this development are analyzed and its repercussions on the Spanish foreign policy are discussed.

2.1. The Europeanization of the Spanish Foreign Policy

According to Barbé (1990: 118), after the end of the Franco dictatorship, Spain's European vocation was an issue on which the Spanish political elite had a clear consensus (unlike the issue of Spain's joining to NATO). 13 During the transition period (1976-1982) and until Spain became a member of EC in 1986, this consensus helped the Spanish Government headed by Felipe González to successfully complete the membership negotiations. Powell (2001: 2) attributes this success largely to "the leadership of a highly charismatic President of Government, Felipe González, who was closely identified with the accession negotiations and the 'European project' as a whole". He also states that, unlike Portugal and Greece, in Spain the goal of EC membership had always enjoyed the enthusiastic support of all major social and political actors.

Torreblanca (2001) argues that, in 1996, ten years after EU membership, when PSOE left the government to be replaced by PP, the Spanish foreign policy had already acquired a clear EU profile: All the positions Spain had adopted in areas such as disarmament non-proliferation, multilateral trade and investment, financial international cooperation, human rights and democratization, peace-keeping or global warming, could only be understood in the framework of Spanish membership of the EU. In all these matters, Spanish preferences and interests' perception were pre-determined by its European orientation. Kennedy (2001: 107-109) enumerates the specific results of Europeanization of the Spanish foreign policy as: Spain's joining to NATO, establishing

¹³ PSOE, in early 1980's opposed remaining in NATO with the argument that the organization was dominated by US, which had been essential prop of the Franco dictatorship (Balfour and Preston, 1999: 10). Kennedy elaborates the evolution of PSOE's policy towards NATO (2001: 110-111).

diplomatic relations with Israel, distancing itself from the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara dispute and the changing policy towards the dispute on Gibraltar. He also states that the Europeanization of the Spanish foreign policy enabled the Gonzalez Governments to bring the previous Spanish policies in line with the European norms (2001:108). Concerning the same process, Barbé (1996: 113) emphasizes that "the European commitment" also provided the Spanish governments an excuse to follow policies in line with realpolitik before the Spanish public opinion, in controversial issues like the Western Sahara conflict.

According to Torreblanca (2001), the other side of this Europeanization process is that Spain has been able to transfer its policies to the EU as well. In other words, Spain has exported its own foreign policy agenda and subsequently managed to have the EU adopt its policies on certain areas, such as Latin America or the Mediterranean. In Latin America, the Spanish Governments have used the EU to increase the international status of Spain as the spokesman of the Spanish-speaking world, whereas with the Maghreb countries, especially with Morocco, Spain has utilized the EU to strengthen its position vis á vis these countries. In this respect, Spain especially utilised its EU Council Presidency terms as much as possible for this purpose.

In this context, Powell (2001:10) states that during its second EU Presidency in 1995, Spain succeeded in convincing the EU to assume the responsibility of increasing resources destined for Mediterranean cooperation, essentially through the MEDA programme (Powell, 2001: 10) with the strong support of the Commission and some other member states, notably France and Italy. Moreover, Spain was able to make the Mediterranean a priority area for EU in Barcelona in 1995. With the Barcelona

Declaration, a multilateral framework for cooperation in the economic, political, security and social fields among the Mediterranean countries has been established.

2.2. Different Perspectives of PSOE and PP towards EU Issues

From the PSOE's point of view, Spain's EC membership meant replacement of Franco years' nationalism and isolation of the country. They saw Europe as a means to change and democratize the country and therefore they promoted the Europeanization of the Spanish foreign policy. In this respect, accession to NATO was a complimentary issue to be part of the West. Hence, EC membership for PSOE was not a means but an end, to construct a new democratic Spain. Zapatero (2008) expresses PSOE's vision as follows:

I believe in a foreign policy that stems from the one developed since Spain's transition to democracy; in a basic line of continuity which strengthens us as a country and reflects the broadly shared will of successive generations of Spaniards.

So I believe in a natural foreign policy with a clear European vocation, a historic, long-range plan that makes us feel comfortable and useful when we know how to push the Union in the right direction.

For PP, on the other hand, Spain's EC membership was a means to strengthen Spain's position in the international arena, to become a major power. For this purpose, transatlantic relations had a priority, whereas economic development of Spain within EC was a complementary requirement.

According to Torreblanca (2001), two parties' different approaches towards EU were obvious in various issues they have selected as their priorities, to show their success in the field of foreign and European policy. While the PSOE has emphasized its contribution to European integration in terms of the construction of an European foreign and security identity, citizenship rights and redistributive policies (i.e.: the Cohesion Fund), the PP has emphasized more Spain's full integration into NATO's military structure, justice and interior issues, deregulation, privatization, increasing competitiveness and accession to European Monetary Union on Spain's own merit. ¹⁴

Thus, during his Presidency of the Spanish Government Aznar adopted a pragmatic and utilitarian vision of Europe. The PP Government perceived the EU much more in terms of a large and integrated market in which Spain could prosper and achieve its national goals, such as admission to the club of the richest countries (G-7, later G-8) or international recognition as the economic and cultural leader of the Spanish-speaking world (Powell, 2003: 33).

Moreover, during his second term as the President of the Government, Aznar followed a more hard-line policy towards the EU issues, at the expense of reducing its weight and bargaining power in a period in which the Union was discussing structural reforms. During the European Council meetings Aznar's strict attitude challenged the rest of the European leaders.¹⁵

¹⁴ Along with his efforts for the introduction of EURO, another successful initiative of Aznar in the economic field was his joint initiative with British Tony Prime Minister Blair, for the "Lisbon Strategy", which aims to make EU economies more dynamic and knowledge-based.

¹⁵ According to El Pais newspaper dated 22.5.2000, Aznar, as a reply to Joschka Fisher's (then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany) commends on the necessity for EU's transition to a federal

Gillespie (2002: 26) argues that, one of the reasons why the Aznar Administration was ready, under these circumstances, to run the risk of being temporarily isolated within Europe was due to the flourishing of Spain's relations with the US, particularly after the election of George Bush as president in 2001.

According to Powell (2001: 11), the reason behind this attitude was that "Aznar himself was unusually anglophile for a Spanish politician, and some sectors of his party, strongly under the influence of their 'Tory friends' in Britain, had openly embraced a Spanish variety of Euroscepticism". In this respect, for example he dismissed France's efforts to protect its language and film industry and described it as a "symptom of a culture in decline" (The Economist, 20 March 2004).

This attitude continued in the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty in June 2001. Aznar insisted for an increased voting weight and more blocking capacity for Spain in the Council. Finally, at the European Convention, Aznar's representatives systematically blocked progress and produced a stalemate. Aznar explains Spain's stance during the negotiations as follows:

There are several concepts to define what the European political union should be, and I must frankly confess that I have never had a federalist conception of Europe. For me, the European Union is a union of States with integrated and common policies, but also with a dimension of intergovernmental cooperation. I cannot figure out a state-less and nation-less Europe.

structure, reminded him that EU is a "Union of States" and called the German proposal for a "Federal Europe" as "premature".

We have to be aware of our responsibility and of the new position that Spain occupies in the World, a country that is not any longer dependant on somebody else's interests and attitudes. It depends on itself, on its own decisions and on its own international presence (2004: 187).

Apart from the core issues in the Constitution, Spain under Aznar's leadership, lobbied for the Catholic Church and argued that the European idea is linked to the Christian tradition, hence, Spain had supported the inclusion of a phrase, which refers to "the Christian roots of Europe" in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty (El Mundo, 20.06.2003). It is known that Aznar personally met Pope Jean Paul II three times between February 2003 and January 2004 (Serra i Massansalvador, 2004: 2).

On the other hand, in the same period, Spain played a major role in the development of CFSP with the help of Britain. According to Powell (2001:15) "paradoxically, this has been attributed to the replacement of the traditional Franco-German axis by a British 'motor,' which in theory should have benefited Madrid, given Aznar's 'special relationship' with Tony Blair". Barbé describes Spain's role in the development of CFSP as follows: "Spain has joined the hard core (armed forces participation) but without having performed the function of political motor, the traditional function of major players" (2000: 58).

The shift in the Spanish Foreign Policy with respect to Europe during Aznar's period became most evident in the run-up to the Iraq war. The Spanish diplomacy put its capabilities within EU into the service of the Bush Administration's unilateral policies during its EU Presidency (Powell, 2003: 34). As a result, Spain

distanced itself from the EU to an extent that Spain's "loyalty" to European affairs began to be questioned within the institution.

With the "letter of eight", under the coordination of Aznar, the Franco-German aspirations to speak for Europe was explicitly undermined in January 2003 by a pro-US Administration declaration by eight European countries, namely; Spain, Britain, Poland, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In an interview he gave to The Times newspaper during his visit to Britain on 28 February 2004, Aznar blamed France and Germany for "harbouring dangerous fantasies of making the EU a global counterweight to America". Aznar further criticized the Franco-German axis as follows:

...Another argument is that what is politically correct in Europe is to be anti-American. It is an absurdly contemptuous attitude, particularly when Europeans dare to teach lessons to the rest of the people, as explained by Jean-François Revel. One has to remember that in the XX. Century, particularly during its first half, European problems were of their own making. The First and Second World Wars were both sparked by the Europeans. Communism and fascism both surged in Europe. A good deal of the problems ailing the developing countries have their source in conflicts and ideas that surged in Europe and which were exported from Europe. It is nonsense to teach lessons to countries like the US, which has kept the stability and continuity of its democratic institutions uninterruptedly for more than two hundred years (2004: 148).

The Spanish challenge towards the Franco-German axis continued until Aznar left his office as the President of Government of Spain following March 2004 elections.

Miguel Ángel Moratinos, later the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, put forward PSOE's different approach to the EU issues on the eve of the March 2004 elections:

Spain must put a stop to Aznar's efforts to remain on the sidelines of Europe. It must get back into the middle ground, regain its position as one of the core contributors to the construction of Europe, as the protagonist of a single political –as opposed to geographical– axis on which to build today's pro-European policies.

We Socialists do not agree with a twin-speed Europe, but we will countenance strengthened and precisely structured cooperation provided it remains within the terms of the Constitutional Agreement. Only if we can promote such efforts at stronger internal cooperation, will the Union be able to play the role the vast majority of Europeans want that of providing stronger European security and defence mechanisms. World challenges demand a stronger and more cooperative Europe.

We need 'more' Europe because what is at stake is not just the stability and prosperity of our continent but a globalisation model based on a spirit of equity. Socialists are not opposed to globalisation, only to a certain idea of globalisation...It is a process that could evolve in a number of directions and the best way of stopping it from developing in unhealthy ones is by having a strong Europe. (Moratinos, 2004)

Zapatero's campaign slogan in the March 2004 elections was "return to Europe". After winning the elections, in line with this new stance, Spain's new Socialist Government changed Spain's blockade strategy in the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty and turned it into a positive attitude of cooperation. Minister Moratinos called the new era as the "rebirth of the family spirit" (El Mundo, 23.04.2004). Within a few months, the EU reached a

consensus for a new text of the Constitutional Treaty. With this move, Spain helped for an EU-wide agreement on Treaty reform - in contrast to Aznar's insistence on vetoing any amendments to the Treaty of Nice's voting rules for the EU Council. ¹⁶

Thus, following their decision to pull out of Spanish troops from Iraq, Zapatero Government entered into a rapprochement with France and Germany and distanced itself from the US and UK. Spain's bilateral relations with Poland - which had been initiated by Aznar with the aim of having an ally within the enlarged EU, especially on the financial matters and to increase the weight of middle powers - were cooled off by Zapatero. He postponed a bilateral meeting with the Polish Prime Minister in December 2004, just one day before it was supposed to take place (El Mundo, 15.12.2004).

Hence, there was big difference between the two leaders' approaches to the foreign policy issues: The photograph of Zapatero, Chirac and Schröder at the Moncloa Palace (The Palace of the President of the Government) in Madrid in September 2004 during the trilateral summit was the counter image of the one taken in the Azores, in March 2003, of José María Aznar, Tony Blair and George Bush (El Mundo, 14.09.2004).

Secondly, contrary to the PP's links with the Catholic Church and the Vatican, PSOE, with its traditional secular stance, has always been against the Catholic Church's influence on Spain (Serra i Massansalvador, 2004: 2-3).¹⁷ In line with this policy, the

_

¹⁶ Aznar blamed Zapatero Government's new policy for "removing Spain from the table of great to the table of children, where no decisions are taken" (ABC, 5.7.2004).

¹⁷ For instance, PSOE has introduced a law which allowed marriages between the same sexes. PSOE Government is destined to introduce a new law which will allow abortion under certain conditions as

PSOE Government, along with the Turkish Government cosponsored "the Alliance of Civilizations" initiative at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. The initiative seeks to stimulate international action against extremism through the forging of international, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and cooperation. According to Arenal (2008a: 24), Spain's engagement in the "Alliance of Civilizations" initiative reflects PSOE's multilateralist approach and its effort to strengthen the "soft power" of Spain. The PP, on the other hand, criticizes Spain's co-sponsorship of this initiative, accuses the initiative for being "a useless and imaginative effort which serves to the cause of Jihadists". 18

However, if we compare Zapatero with Gonzalez, we can note certain differences. According to Duran i Leida (2009: 327), Felipe González built up a foreign policy appropriate for Spain's interests. His main principle involved the excellent understanding with Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand. For this reason, he became an important support for the Franco-German axis and this brought about excellent results for Spain within the framework of the approval of Maastricht Treaty and other European agreements. He further argues that Aznar and Zapatero, on the other hand, with their obvious differences, developed more "national" European policies, in which the European vision of Felipe González has been replaced by the utilization of the Union in Spanish manner, especially under the mandate of José María Aznar.

.

well. The Spanish Catholic Church and PP have been objecting both laws. On the eve of the general elections in 2008, the Church organized demonstrations in Spain, where PSOE's such policies are criticized.

¹⁸ Mariano Rajoy (the leader of PP)'s statement published in El Mundo, dated 6.2.2006.

Therefore, the break of the Felipe González period's consensus in the Spanish foreign policy towards the EU issues began with Aznar's governance, especially after PP's victory in March 2000 elections. However, although Zapatero argues that Spain reassumed its policy that was followed during the González Governments after PSOE returned to power in 2004, there are important differences between the two Socialist leaders in terms of their attitude towards the EU issues: González's Spain was leading Europe on various important issues; the concept of European citizenship, Barcelona Process and the Cohesion Funds, which were the milestones in the European integration and development, were all initiated by Spain. However, during Zapatero's term since 2004, Spain has been demonstrating a low profile attitude in the foreign policy issues in general and EU issues in particular (Grant, 2009). Consequently, there are doubts that the Zapatero Government will be able to demonstrate a successful performance during Spain's upcoming EU Council Presidency in January 2010.

Hence, it is true that the break of consensus on the Spanish foreign policy towards EU issues began with Aznar, however Zapatero's low profile attitude in the EU issues, certainly does not coincide with the policies of Spain under Felipe Gonzalez's Presidency of the Government. Consequently, there is an apparent discontinuity in Spain's EU policy since 1996.

III

THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS; AN APPARENT "DISCONTINUITY" IN THE SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

As explained in the previous, since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 and especially after Spain joined EC in 1985, the Spanish foreign policy had acquired a clear European profile and in the early 1990's, Spanish preferences and interests' perception were pre-determined by this orientation.

Following Europe, Spain's transatlantic vocation has been the second pillar of the Spanish foreign policy after 1982. PSOE under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez did not see the transatlantic relations as an alternative to the Europeanization of the country, but as a complementary requirement for the same purpose. Felipe Gonzalez explains this as follows:

There has never existed any formal link between the two (NATO and EC membership), but it was clear even before we entered the Community that if we wished to be members of the European family in the creation of an economic space, it was difficult not to be similarly engaged in the defence of Europe, which at that time basically centered around NATO; our problem was not one of imposition, but rather one of conviction, of coherence, which became clearer the more we advanced in the integration process and the more the scope of integration grew (Kennedy, 2001: 111).

The subordination of Spain's transatlantic relations with respect to the Europeanization of the country has its roots going back to Franco years. According to Viñas (1999: 259), one reason is that the Spanish history did not match the historical experience

of the other Western European countries, which experienced the GIs (members of the US Armed Forces) as liberators from the shackles of Fascism, where people had seen the US as the unique provider of economic assistance and military security against the threat from the East (Communism). In the Spanish case, influenced by the collective memory of Civil War and the Franco regime, many Spaniards did not see the Soviet Union as an enemy. Moreover, GIs had been experienced as the incarnation of US political support for the Franco regime.

However, this consensus – subordination of transatlantic relations with respect to Europeanization - among the Spanish political elite, assumed by the previous Spanish Governments since the death of General Francisco Franco began to erode during the governance of PP after 1996 (Kennedy, 2001:106). In 2002, when Spain under Aznar's leadership aligned itself with the US Administration during the US campaign against Iraq, opposing the Franco-German axis, it was obvious that Europe had been replaced with the US as the main axis of the Spanish foreign policy (Arenal, 2008a: 21). According to Fayanas (2004:1):

Aznar sacrificed Spain's orientation of Europism and concept of Europe, on which there had been a consensus among the Spanish political elite since the death of the General Franco in 1975, at the expense of Atlanticism.

This "U" turn was a culmination of various domestic and international factors. Gillespie (2002: 23) argues that, under the weight of the success attained by a succession of Spanish Governments since the eighties, the Aznar Administration has chosen to confront the complex challenge of pulling Spain out of

the ranks of "medium-sized powers" and bring it into the elite club of the "major European nations".

Another reason was that, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the Bush Administration adopted a more hegemonic, interventionist and unilateral attitude. This neo-conservative approach, the so-called Bush doctrine, is very well known with its jargon such as "the fight against terrorism", "axis of evil", "unilateral action" and "prewar" (Arenal 2008a: 19). Apparently, the Aznar emptive government, supported by an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament, perceived this new era as an opportunity for the maximization of the Spanish interests. According to Aznar, it was time for Spain to have a strong say in the international arena and Spain should not miss this chance.¹⁹ Therefore, according to the PP government, a strategic shift in the foreign policy of Spain was inevitable, to place Spain in a higher rank in the international arena. According to PP, the unconditional support to the US invasion of Iraq provided an excellent opportunity for this. In this respect, the entry of Spain in the UN Security Council, as a nonpermanent member as of January 1, 2003, gave Spain a special role as well.

It may be argued that in Aznar's perception Spain could never acquire such power in international arena through the EU, where Spain was unlikely to change its status; always behind Germany, France and UK. France and Germany would never allow this. The pro-Moroccan position of France in the crisis of the Perejil Islet in July 2002, which was clearly at loggerheads, assaulted

-

¹⁹ Aznar's aspirations for a stronger Spain, as it was in the past centuries, is well known. His book titled "Cartas A Un Joven Español (Letters to a young Spanish)", which was published in 2007, is very helpful to understand him.

Spanish interests (Cembrero, 2006: 57). The US pro-Spanish attitude during the same crisis conversely, strengthened this perception and the wisdom of this shift in the Spanish foreign policy. The Aznar Government increasingly perceived the solidarity between France and Germany on the EU's core issues as an offence towards the interests of Spain. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacio, in her interview published in El Pais (16.07.2003) stated Spain's anxiety as, "France and Germany have made a strategic turn towards merger".

Another reason for Aznar to adopt this new policy was his scepticism on the developments within the EU. On the one hand, the PP Government supported enlargement, with the opinion that this would open new markets for the Spanish companies. However, Spain has also expressed fears that EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe might have diverted resources from the south and create a new east-west axis that would harm the interests of the countries of the Mediterranean basin (Balfour and Preston 1999: 11). 20 Moreover, after the enlargement, Spain was feared to lose weight within EU and would occupy a peripheral position, while France and Germany would gain more power. As a result, there was little or no way of changing Spain's status as a semiperipheral European power. Aznar perceived the negative attitude of Germany and France during the Intergovernmental Conference for Spain's demands regarding EU Council's voting system, as a proof of this assumption.

_

²⁰ Negotiations with the ten candidate countries were in a critical stage during Spanish Government's EU Council Presidency in 2002 and it is generally accepted that Spain performed well on the enlargement issue during its Presidency. In total 83 chapters had been negotiated with the candidates, which was a record (ABC, 30.06.2002).

Given its geo-strategic location and comparatively small size as compared to partners with a great capacity to influence the decision making process in Europe (Germany, France, UK), Spain's getting closer to US as a counterweight to leverage on the positions that favoured Spanish interests, was not a new policy. During the Cold War years, General Franco followed a similar policy to close this gap. In order to continue his dictatorship after the Second World War General Franco sought after the support of US to consolidate the regime. Under the Cold War conditions, US with a "realpolitik" approach got closer to the Franco regime, disregarding the democratic values. With the Madrid Agreements of 1953 between the two countries, Spain was included into the Western defence structure (Liedtke, 1999: 229, 237). This development also paved the way for major European powers to tolerate the dictatorship, although they did not allow Spain's accession to major European institutions until the death of General Franco in 1975.

Aznar, as well, though under a different international political setting (Post Cold war era), tried to reach his ambitions through US support, to get a better place for Spain in the international political arena in general and within the EU in particular. ²¹

Nevertheless, the structural shift in the Spanish foreign policy especially during the second term of Aznar was a clear break of consensus on foreign policy, which has been followed in democratic Spain since 1975. Aznar Government, without seeking consensus with the main political parties, which were represented in the Spanish Parliament, changed the nature of the "state policy"

-

²¹ According to a public poll held by Real Instituto Elcano in December, 2008, 78 % of the Spanish people think that Spain should have more power and influence on the international scene.

that had been until then "the Spanish foreign policy". Aznar explains this break of "consensus" as follows:

Consensus has two limits. On the one hand, one's own responsibilities cannot be replaced by consensus. The task that you have been entrusted to tackle cannot be surrendered to the parties of the consensus. In addition, on the other hand, consensus can never become the sole target of the political action. What matters are the goals one wants to accomplish. Once these goals are identified, then consensus may turn out to be a useful instrument, although this is not always the case.

Moreover, consensus also implies that the stances of parties involved must also be clear. I was ready to reach a consensus, because I have always been a person open to dialogue, but it is very difficult to reach any sort of consensus with people who do not know what they want to do. Finally, consensus is an instrument which we inherited from the UCD's political tradition (Aznar, 2004: 100).

However, this new foreign policy lacked the support of the majority of the Spanish people. This situation inevitably, conceded a serious gap between the Government and the Spanish public opinion. Despite this fact, Aznar insisted on his stance on the Spanish foreign policy until PP left the Government in March 2004. Redondo (2005: 110) argues that, "Aznar began to see Spain as a world power, which demonstrated that he lost his realism".

According to the records of the conversation between Bush and Aznar (called as Bush-Aznar memo) during their meeting in Texas, US, on 22 February 2003 (published in El Pais on 26.09.2007), when both leaders were discussing the invasion of

Iraq, Aznar asked Bush to help him change the Spanish public opinion in favour of the invasion:²²

We need your help with our public opinion. What we are doing is a drastic policy change for Spain and the Spanish people. We are changing the policy that the country had followed in the last 200 years.

According to the document, Bush responded that he too was guided by history, and that he does not want history to judge him and say that he did not do his duty. He also promised help for the Spanish public opinion.

However, Aznar (2004: 156-157) blames Zapatero, then the leader of the main opposition party, PSOE, for the break of the consensus on foreign policy and explains the reason behind his decision to change the Spanish foreign policy as follows:

...prior to the intervention in Iraq, I offered to the opposition the same collaboration that we (PP) established with the Socialist government during the first Gulf war and the intervention in Yugoslavia. I phoned Jóse Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and I put forward that in 1991, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I was the opposition leader and I went to La Moncloa (the Presidential Palace). I wanted to pursue a State Policy, not because it was my turn in power, but because at that time, Spain faced a crisis and had to respond as a nation.

Now it was the turn of the PSOE to play the same role as being the opposition. I explained him the reasons that moved me to take the decision that we had adopted. I told him that he could introduce,

^{22 1.300} Spanish troops served in Iraq until June 2004, along with 1.200 troops from the some Latin American countries, in a military brigade named "Plus Ultra" under the Spanish command.

as many nuances and even reservations as he deemed convenient during the parliamentary discussions, but that it was paramount that the opposition and the Government saw eye to eye over such a far-reaching issue.

It was at this point when the breakaway occurred. Zapatero refused to accept that position and it was then when the PSOE, the Union of the Left and all other sundry parties broke away from the consensus that had always existed in the Spanish foreign policy. A new chapter had been opened.

This change inevitably brought the replacement of principles and values in the formulation of the Spanish foreign policy. The unconditional alignment of the Aznar Government with the neoconservative Bush Administration introduced unilateral and interventionist views. The peak at this attitude was reached when Aznar met Bush and Blair at the Azores Summit on March 16, 2003. It was this Summit, which opened the door for the unilateral and preventive war against Iraq.

This shift in Spain's foreign policy also paved the way for the loss of "autonomy" in its Mediterranean and Latin American policies (Arenal, 2008a: 21). In Latin America for example, Spain sought to be the favoured US ally in the region. This was evident during the Ibero-American Summit in 2004, when Spain ratified its action as spokesman for the Bush Administration and tried to convince some Latin American countries to support the US policy.

The Socialists (PSOE) on the other hand, have clearly stated that they would change the nature of Spain's trans-Atlantic relations and they promised to bring Europe back to the axis of Spanish foreign policy during their election campaign before the March 2004 elections. In line with their ideology, multilateralism

and human rights were their core principles, instead of unilateralism and interventionism. Miguel Ángel Moratinos (2004), on 10 March 2004, just a few days before he became Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, stated this change as follows:

....Europe will provide the best guarantee of a more balanced, less submissive, trans-Atlantic relationship. The US and Europe share not only common values and interests, but also the responsibility for constructing a fairer globalised world. The new Western strategic alliance should be built on equality and mutual respect. Spain's bilateral relations with the US will continue to be governed by the alliance enshrined in the 1988 Cooperation Agreement, applied in both letter and spirit, particularly the words underlining the principle of sovereign equality.

In line with this vision, Zapatero's effort to undo what Aznar did strained the relations between Washington and Madrid in 2004. The Bush Administration was disappointed with the new PSOE Government, when Zapatero announced (El Mundo, 18.04.2004) the withdrawal of the 1.300 Spanish troops from Iraq immediately, by also giving strong political messages to the other Coalition members, which took part in the invasion of Iraq. The Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in an interview on Fox News that she was concerned that terrorists could draw "the wrong lesson from Spain" and attempt other attacks aimed at dividing the allies (The New York Times, 19.04.2004).

As promised before the elections, the withdrawal of the Spanish troops was completed on 8 June 2004. The US Administration faced with the fact that with March 11 Madrid bombings, the strategic close relation between Spain and US during Aznar's term was also destroyed.

Although the Zapatero Government later agreed to increase the number of Spanish soldiers in Afghanistan to demonstrate the Spanish Government's commitment to support the international missions approved by the UN, the bilateral relations between the two countries remained below the level which existed during Aznar's term. In fact, the relations between Zapatero and the Bush Administration were problematic even before he took power. The first clear signal was given when he, as the leader of the main Opposition Party, declined to join other Spanish officials in standing up, as a sign of protest against the US invasion of Iraq, when US troops marched past a VIP stand during a parade to mark Spanish National Day in 2003 (ABC, 13.10.2003). Duran i Leida, is the President of the External Relations Commission of the House of Deputies of Spain criticizes Zapatero's protest as follows:

The Government and the opposition have to be conscious of the repercussion of each of its actions in the international field. The famous image of the then leader of the opposition, seated while the passing of the US flag as a sign of protest against Iraq War might be understandable in the framework of Spanish internal politics, nevertheless its effects when PSOE reached the power, resulted devastating for the relations between Spain and the primary world power. (Duran i Leida, 2009: 325)

The gap between the Bush Administration and the PSOE Government has always been wide. Aznar and Bush, on the other hand, had agreed to defend "Western values" whenever necessary and were ready to act unilaterally for this purpose.²³ Moreover, Zapatero tried to get closer to Cuba, which the Bush Administration defined as a "tyranny".

_

²³ Aznar's statements during the press conference of the Azores Summit in March 2003, published in The Guardian dated 17.03.2003.

US's reaction to this drastic change in Spain's trans-Atlantic policy was apparent. Bush Administration had not invited Zapatero to the White House after taking office. Aznar, on the other hand, apart from his official visits to US, became the first President of the Spanish Government to address the US Congress in 2004.

The Bush Administration had resisted almost three years for a senior US official to visit Spain. Moreover, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice's visit to Spain in June 2007 was only an opportunity for the US Administration to demonstrate the discord between the two countries on various foreign policy issues (Arenal, 2008b: 341). In this respect, Rice especially criticized the Spanish foreign policy towards Cuba (El Pais, 01.06.2007):

There is a major transition coming in Cuba, and I think democratic states have an obligation to act democratically,

... Western democracies must not give the regime the idea that it is just going to be transitioned from one dictatorship to another.

There is no secret that we have had differences with Spain on a number of issues, but we have also had very good cooperation with Spain on a number of issues

In his reply, Zapatero told the press that:

I would be glad to discuss Spain's position on Cuba with Rice, and hope that my explanation would assuage US concerns. Countries and Governments do not have to have equal visions on every aspect of international policy. Nevertheless, it is positive that we are talking about it. Surely, when we talk, our positions will become more understandable.

The strained relations between Washington and Madrid had other repercussions, which damaged the Spanish interests. Spain, the country that was trying to find a seat at the G-8 summits during the Aznar period, became a country who had to struggle and ask the help of France and Germany to have a seat at G-20 meetings.

In this respect, the G-20 meeting in Washington in November 2008 presented another occasion of these strained relations. The Bush Administration, resisted inviting Spain to the meeting although Spain has the world's 9th biggest economy in terms its GDP (Table 1) and has 578 billion Euros of overseas investments (Table 2). Spain was only able to participate in the meeting, taking one of the two seats allocated to France.²⁴ According to Duran i Leida (2009: 325), this was one of the devastating results of Zapatero's new policy:

It was a significant mistake, nevertheless similar to the mistake made by José María Aznar, for trying to build up an unconditional pro-American policy, without previously settling the necessary interior consensus. As it could not have been in another way, the sum of these two errors does not entail the right decision but a doubly grave mistake.

3.1. The Spanish Attitude towards the Kosovo Issue

Spain, in line with Aznar's pro-Atlantist approach, took part in NATO's "Operation Allied Force" which was aimed at preventing a potential genocide by the Milosevic Government in the Albanian-majority Kosovo province of former Yugoslavia in 1999. Spanish F-18 Hornets were the first NATO planes to bomb Belgrade (El

36

²⁴ France had two seats at that time, the second one was for its Presidency of EU Council.

Mundo, 23.05.1999). Spain later participated with 620 troops to the Kosovo Peace Keeping Force (KFOR), the NATO led peace-keeping mission as well.

However, the disappointment in the US Administration for Spain's decision of withdrawing its troops from Iraq in March 2004, was repeated on 19 March 2009, when Carme Chacón, the Spanish Defence Minister, during her visit to the Spanish troops in Kosovo, announced that Spain would withdraw its troops from Kosovo until August 2009 (El Pais, 19.03.2009).

Although the negative attitude of Spain towards Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was well known by its NATO allies - which are opposite to the Western bloc - the decision given by the Spanish Socialist Government came as a surprise and caused discomfort within the Alliance (The Independent, 23.03.2009).

The Speaker of the US Department of State, on March 2009, in reply to a question about Spain's decision of pulling out its troops from Kosovo, expressed the deep disappointment of the US, NATO Spokeswoman Carmen Romero told that the then NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, had been informed of the Spanish decision prior to its announcement but felt that such a move "should have been taken as a result of a decision within the alliance". She added that NATO does "not yet" consider that "political and security conditions are in place" in Kosovo. 26

26 ABC News International (source Associated Press), 19.03.2009.

²⁵ Press briefing of Department of State on 20.03.2009.

Zapatero after a meeting with the EU leaders in Brussels on 20 March 2009 said that "We have done what was logical, what we should do, and at a quite reasonable time: things are fine, calm; we have not recognized Kosovo, and the withdrawal will be done with maximum coordination with our allies and with NATO" (ABC, 20.03.2009).

The reactions within the Alliance forced the PSOE Government to moderate its decision. Although Chacón at first said that the troops would leave Kosovo by August, the Presidency of the Government announced the withdrawal would be flexible, and would be done in stages and in coordination with NATO". ²⁷

It is known that, Spain's rejection to recognize the independence of Kosovo stems from its concerns about setting a precedent that could be seized upon by the Basque and Catalan separatist movements in Spain.

However, Spain is not the only country, which had such separatist problems in the Western bloc. Although France and Britain also had similar problems, Spain among the few EU countries (also Greece, Romania and Slovakia) which explicitly opposed the independence of Kosovo within the Western bloc. During the drafting process of all decisions related with Kosovo in EU, there are Spain's objections and therefore Spain is isolated from the overwhelming majority. Moreover, other EU Countries' perception of Spain as a country with serious separatist movements is strengthened.

_

²⁷ Press statement by the Presidency of the Government (La Moncloa) dated 26.03.2009.

Mariano Rajoy, the leader of the main opposition Party PP, criticized the evident lack of coordination within the Government as a sign that it had "still not learned how to govern" and added that:

They got the details wrong, they got the timing wrong, they are confused even within their own Government...They have surprised NATO and all our allies and have caused a problem with incalculable consequences (ABC, 23.03.2009).

Apart from the above-mentioned criticism of the conservative PP concerning the procedure followed for the withdrawal, it should be mentioned that PP as well shares the views of the Zapatero Government on Kosovo.

However, taken into account the strong trans-Atlantic vocation of the PP Governments until 2004 elections, that they demonstrated previously - to the extent that Spain confronted France and Germany during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 - and their pragmatist approach, the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the independence of Kosovo would have been the opposite, should the PP has been the Governing Party. Although both Parties argue that this issue is linked with the territorial integrity of Spain, the pro-Atlanticist PP would not be confronting the whole Western Alliance.

Therefore, the current attitude of PP is purely due to domestic political concerns and for this reason, it would be wrong to assess both Parties' common attitude towards the Kosovo issue, as a reflection of "consensus", or "state policy" of Spain.

IV

BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO AND ALGERIA

Spain is the only European country, which has land borders in the North Africa (with Morocco). Taking into consideration the underdeveloped economies, the lack of democracy and human rights, accompanied by high birth rate in the African continent, Spain's border with Morocco is a fault line between the North-South (or developed-underdeveloped) division. This geographic fact brings Spain various opportunities as well as new challenges like illegal immigration, trafficking of drugs and more vulnerability for terrorist threats. Therefore, Spain's bilateral relations with Morocco have been considered traditionally among the top priorities of the Spanish foreign policy.²⁸ Algeria, as well, for its rich natural gas resources, its geographical proximity and its status as a party to the Western Sahara dispute, is another North African country, which has been considered as important as Morocco in the Spanish foreign policy since two decades.

However, the discord between PSOE and PP towards these countries is another source of discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy.

Within the context of Spain's bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria, the Western Sahara dispute, Spain's Europeanization of its foreign policy and the competition between Morocco and

²⁸ To demonstrate the importance they attach to bilateral relations with Morocco, Felipe Gonzalez, Jose Maria Aznar and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, upon being elected as President of the Spanish Government made their first official visits to this country.

Algeria - to see Spain on their side - are have been indispensable elements. The fact that Spain's two major parties, PSOE and PP have been following different policies towards these countries and the Western Sahara dispute, makes the issue even more complex.

Moreover, the two major Parties' (PSOE and PP) policies towards this region were subject to drastic changes in the last three decades. According to Vaquer i Fanes, PSOE, which was the champion of the Saharawi cause and a sworn ally of the Polisario Front in the early days of the Western Sahara dispute, is now perceived as the most pro-Morocco of all Spanish parties; while, on the other hand, the PP, which is the heir of the right-wing parties that loathed the Algerian regime in the seventies and looked with disapproval upon the Polisario Front from its very beginning, has today distanced itself from Morocco and advocates a stronger relationship with Algeria (2007: 126).

4.1. Ups and Downs Marks Spain's Bilateral Relations with Morocco

Spain's bilateral relations with Morocco were dominated firstly, by the territorial claim by Morocco on the two Spanish enclaves in the northern coast of Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla), secondly, by the constant incidents between the Spanish fishing fleet and the Moroccan navy over fishing rights and territorial limits, thirdly, by illegal trafficking of immigrants and drugs, and fourthly, by the Western Sahara dispute.

The EU membership has allowed Spain to initiate a process of upgrading its relations with Morocco when the Socialist Governments were in power (during PP's period it was the case with Algeria). In this process, while Spain has been trying to reach

its foreign policy objectives through EU, Morocco has been searching the help of Spain for the establishment of a different and special relationship - "advanced status" - between Morocco and EU (Galvez, 2007: 3, 9). According to Powell, Spain succeeded in convincing the EU to assume responsibility of increasing resources destined for this cooperation, essentially through the MEDA programmes (2001: 10).

However, the relations between Madrid and Rabat began to worsen especially during the second term of Aznar Government and it turned out to be a crisis in the summer of 2001. The tension began with the failure of negotiations on the EU-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement, continued with the illegal immigrants' problem and reached its peak during the dispute over sovereignty of the Perejil (Parsley) Islet in July 2002.

The PP Government, as it did in Spain's policies in trans-Atlantic relations and the EU, had changed the premises of Spain's relations with Morocco and Algeria during the course of these incidents. PSOE as well, after March 2004 elections, adopted a policy, which is different from the previous PP Government's policy towards both countries. In this Chapter, these policies are analyzed to elaborate the discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy towards these countries since 1996.

4.1.1. Failure in the negotiations on the EU-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement and Escalation of Tensions between Spain and Morocco in 2001

Moroccan waters have been traditionally an essential fishing area for the Spanish fishing industry. Therefore, Spain attaches great importance to the EC-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement more than any other EU country.

According to Torreblanca, Spanish vessels represented almost 92% of the EU tonnage operating in Morocco' waters, but the EU Commission negotiated and managed the fisheries agreement and the Community budget financed the "renting" of Moroccan waters to Spanish vessels.²⁹ This spared Spain quite a few diplomatic tensions and enabled it to obtain a better Fisheries Agreement that it would otherwise have secured on a bilateral basis (2001).

However, when the last EC-Morocco Fisheries Agreement expired (1995-1999), Morocco refused to renew it unless the EU substantially increased the financial compensations. The EU Commission did not want to allocate financial aid to the Moroccan fishing fleet, which was the main driving force for Moroccans to renew the Fisheries Agreement.

After a series unsuccessful round of negotiations, the process was finally closed without agreement on March 27, 2001.³⁰ The Moroccan Government indicated that it considered the EU offer inappropriate and insufficient (Abiols and Solanilla, 2002: 296). In reply, the Spanish Government blamed Morocco for the failure of the negotiations. On April 25, the same day that the EU Council of Ministers of Agriculture were to close down the negotiations with Morocco, Aznar said to Onda Cero radio station that;

43

²⁹ According to Abiols and Solanilla this figure was 95% and 500 Spanish fishing boats (2002: 295)

³⁰ Press release by the EU Commission dated 26.03.2001.

Nobody can think that it will not produce effects on the relations between Morocco and Spain, and Morocco and the EU, and Spain's gestures that have been made before, with regard to Morocco; such as debt relief and development infrastructure, will now be very difficult to repeat (El Mundo, 26.04.2001).

The statements made by the Spanish Government on the issue were perceived by the Moroccans as an aggression and accordingly they blamed Aznar for escalating the crisis (Abiols y Solanilla, 2002: 296). On October 28, 2001, the Government of Morocco called Moroccan Ambassador to Spain, Abdeslam Al Baraka, for consultations in Rabat. The Government spokesperson, Mina Tounsi, noted that:

Certain Spanish attitudes and positions concerning Morocco justified the call for consultations, of indefinite duration of the ambassador, to take stock of the events that had marked bilateral relations in the preceding period (La Vanguardia, 29.10.2001).

The Aznar Government did not hide its surprise at the Moroccan decision and Minister of Foreign Affairs Piqué argued that, "Spain has done nothing wrong". Concerning this development the President of the Government José María Aznar said, "If the government of Morocco wants to explain any reason, they can, but the Spanish Government has nothing to say" (Obiols and Solanilla, 2002: 295).

4.1.2. PSOE Leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's Attempt for "Mediation" Between Aznar Government and Morocco

Escalating tension with Morocco in 2001 turned out to be an issue of internal political confrontation, which clearly demonstrated the break of the consensus on the Spanish foreign

policy. Zapatero, then the Leader of the Opposition Party PSOE, insisted on travelling to Morocco in December 2001 to meet the Moroccan King, as scheduled long before the crises. The Aznar Government criticized Zapatero for not delaying this visit. Aznar, in a statement told that he considers this visit "very unusual" (Gillespie, 2002: 29).

Likewise, PP Secretary General Javier Arenas spoke of "a major political mistake" and accused the Socialist Leader of lacking loyalty to his country (Obiols and Solanilla, 2002: 297). The Moroccan authorities were waiting for the Socialist Leader, with the objective of finding a solution to the crisis, which would not reward the PP Government. Zapatero said that he would go to Morocco with the aim of defending "the interests of Spain and to end the confrontation" (El Mundo, 11.12.2001). After meeting with the Prime Minister of Morocco Abderraman Yusufi, King Mohamed VI and having a dinner with seven other Moroccan Ministers on December 16-18, he returned to Spain with the desire to convey his impressions to the Spanish Government.

In other words, with this initiative Zapatero, the Leader PSOE, later the President of Government of Spain, tried to assume the role of "mediator" between the Government of Spain and Morocco. However, Aznar refused to receive the Socialist Leader and the Spanish Government considered his request as "unnecessary". In parallel, taking advantage of a debate in the Parliament, the PP accused the PSOE to maintain, "five different positions with respect to Morocco" and the accusations of "disloyalty" continued" (Obiols and Solanilla, 2002: 297).

The discord between the two major political parties on the foreign policy and the lack of a "state policy" never has been such

clear, when Zapatero tried to play the role of mediator between Spain and Morocco.

4.1.3. Spanish Territories in the African Continent; a Major Dispute between Spain and Morocco

The Spanish territories in the African continent (Map 1), and in this respect the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, have been a major problem in Spain's bilateral relations with Morocco since decades. Morocco had demanded the return of the Spanish cities Ceuta and Melilla along with several small rocks and islets off the coast of Morocco. These territories were not left to Morocco and remained under Spanish sovereignty, when Spain recognized Morocco's independence in 1956. The Perejil (Parsley) Islet is one of those islets that lie 250 meters just off the coast of Morocco, about 480 by 480 meters in size, with an area of 0.15 km² (Map 1).

The Islet's sovereignty is disputed by Morocco and Spain. On July 11, 2002, a group of Moroccan soldiers set up a base on it "in order to monitor illegal immigration", which was denied by the Spanish Government. After protests from the Spanish Government, led by José María Aznar, Moroccan navy cadets who then installed a fixed base on the Islet replaced the soldiers. This further frustrated the Spanish Government and both countries restated their claims on the Islet.

Spain called back its Ambassador from Rabat for consultations on July 17 and the next day Spain launched Operation Romeo-Sierra, a military attempt to take over the Islet (El Pais, 2002a). The operation was successful and the Moroccan navy cadets were dislodged from the Islet without any resistance to the Spanish soldiers. After mediation by the US, led by State

Secretary Colin Powell, Parties agreed to return to *the status quo* ante which existed prior to the Moroccan occupation of the Islet (Amirah-Fernández, 2008: 352). The islet is now deserted. Both Spain and Morocco claim the Islet, thus, its sovereignty remains unclear.

During the crises, except France [Later Aznar accused Jack Chirac in person, for France's attitude (Cembrero, 2006: 10 and 50)] and Portugal, Spain's objections were supported by almost all EU member states (El Pais, 2002b). On the other hand, Morocco's claims had official support from the Arab League, except for Algeria, which backed Spain's sovereignty over the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. This exception should be placed in the context of historical tension between Morocco and Algeria, combined with the fact that Spain was at that time Algeria's third biggest trading partner (mostly based on the natural gas trade).

The Spanish Government saw the crisis over the Perejil Islet as a case for Morocco to test Spain's will to defend Ceuta and Melilla in a similar situation. This crisis should be also seen as a response of Morocco to the change of the Spanish policy towards Algeria and the Western Sahara.

The crisis between the two countries had continued almost 3 years, until the VI. Spanish Moroccan Summit held in Marrakech in December 2003, with a three years delay, however did not normalize until the PSOE Government replaced the PP Government in March 2004.

After March 2004 elections, as President of the Government, Zapatero paid his first official visit to Morocco, like his predecessors. After meeting with King Mohamed VI and Prime Minister, Driss Yetu, he announced the beginning of a "new phase" in relations between Spain and Morocco. During his visit, Zapatero also expressed his desire for full cooperation and dialogue between the two countries based on mutual trust, understanding, learning and communication." He also promised to support Spanish investments in Morocco (El Mundo, 25.04.2004).

Zapatero Government tried to bring the issues of cooperation, rather than conflicts in Spain's bilateral relations with Morocco. Hence, in addition to the Western Sahara conflict, a low profile attitude towards the Moroccan claims over the sovereignty of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla has been followed. Moreover, the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement was concluded after five years of delay, by which the Moroccans were granted 144,4 million Euros EU aid for a four years term.³¹ The inclusion of the Western Sahara waters by EU in the said Agreement also demonstrated that Zapatero Government assumed a different stance vis á vis Morocco's decades long policy of annexation of the territory.

It is a fact that the Spanish capital outflows directed to Morocco has increased after Zapatero came to power in 2004. Compared to the 1,88 billion Euros of Spanish investment during eight years of Aznar's governance between 1996-2004, the Spanish investments reached to 1,44 billion Euros (Table 2) just in the first four years of PSOE's governance. No doubt, the shift in the Spanish foreign policy towards Morocco played an important role in this development.

³¹ EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, published in the official journal of the EU dated 29.05.2006, L 141.

The King of Spain, Don Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia's first official visit to the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in November 2007 constituted the only exception for the developing bilateral relations between the two countries. Before the visit, as it did during the crisis in 2001, Morocco recalled its Ambassador to Rabat for consultations (returned to Madrid later in January 2008). Moroccan authorities criticized and described the visit as a "serious provocation" of Spain (La Vanguardia, 4.11.2007). Moroccan King Mohamed VI described the visit as "counter-productive" (ABC, 6.11.2007).

Compared with the last crisis during the Aznar period, this time it cooled down in a few weeks with the efforts of the Spanish Government and did not further escalated, although Morocco once again voiced its claims on the sovereignty of Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

The IX. Bilateral Summit held in Madrid on 16 December 2008 was a demonstration of the existing solid relations between the two countries. A credit agreement worth 520 million Euros was concluded to support the Spanish investments in Morocco. This was the biggest amount ever allocated by Spain for a country. The credit would be used to finance especially the Spanish construction, telecommunications and energy companies' investments in Morocco. Moreover, Spain's development aid to Morocco in 2008 reached to 130 million Euros. During the Summit, Spain also declared that during its upcoming Presidency of the EU Council in January 2010, it will take an initiative to hold the first EU-Morocco Summit.32

49

32 From "Infomiradas", newsletter of MFA of Spain dated 19.12.2008.

-

According to Larramendi and Lopez, upon the terrorist attacks in Casablanca and Madrid, Spain's new Socialist Government believed that it could not continue hiding behind the status quo which was harming Spain's national interests. Therefore, contrary to the Aznar Government's conviction that the best way to defend Spanish interests in the region was through closer relationship with the US by defending Spanish territorial interests (Spanish territories at North Africa, Map 1), Zapatero Government believed that through strengthening of relations with France and concerted action with other EU partners, Spanish national interests in the Maghreb would be best served, with an active search for stability in the region (Larramendi and Lopez, 2004).

Therefore, the discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy towards Morocco was a clear reflection of both Parties' ideologies, as well as their priority for the main axis of the Spanish foreign policy.

4.2. Spain's Bilateral Relations with Algeria: The Difficulty To Keep The Delicate Balance

There are three pillars in Spain's bilateral relations with Algeria. These are Spain's energy (mainly natural gas) dependency on Algeria, the Western Sahara conflict and Spain's role in the EU-Algeria relations.³³

Spain, as a poor country in terms of oil and natural gas resources, traditionally attaches importance to its purchase of natural gas from Algeria, since the amount of natural gas imported

³³ Algeria had supported "The Canary Islands Independence Movement MPAIAC", a terrorist organization, during 1970's (Vinas, 1999: 252). This issue dropped from the agenda of the Spanish-Algerian bilateral relations after MPAIAC's formal declaration renouncing the "armed struggle" in 1979.

to Spain from this country reaches 32% of its total natural gas imports (in 1998 it was 60%). With the completion of the MED-GAZ pipeline between Algeria and Spain (from Beni Saf to Almeria), it is expected that this percentage will increase again (Amirah-Fernández, 2008: 354). For this reason, Spain's energy dependency on Algeria dominated the bilateral relations between the two countries in the last three decades. The first Spain-Algeria natural gas agreement was signed in 1975, when the world was passing through a deep energy crises. In 1991, Spain and Algeria signed the Euro-Maghreb pipeline agreement, which became operational in 1996.

Spain's bilateral relations with Algeria were kept at a low profile until Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected as the President of Algeria in April 1999. The main reason was the radical Islamist insurgency in Algeria – the Algerian civil war - from 1992 to 2001. During these years, Spain followed a policy, which would secure the flow of natural gas from Algeria. Therefore, the Spanish concerns on this issue, translated into a good dose of caution and retreat under the "umbrella" of the European Union (Bustos, 2007: 501).

Spain merely repeated the EU's positions during the years of violence in Algeria and only once tried to take an initiative: The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abel Matutes, in 1997 proposed the idea of an international commission to monitor the Algerian crisis. The proposal was quickly rejected by Algeria. Matutes, a few months later stated that with respect to terrorism, "the best way to defeat is an effective policy of repression, and gaining time, with a policy of political isolation of the terrorists." (Ibid. p. 501).

The election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999 as the President of Algeria, paved the way for a shift in the Spanish and the EU policy towards Algeria. The new Algerian president, in the same year paid two visits to Spain on two occasions in July and October, and met with Aznar, who described their conversation as "historically and culturally exciting". Aznar publicly praised the Algerian president and said it posed "a hope for the future security and peace of the entire Mediterranean" (More, 2002).

Aznar corresponded Abdelaziz Bouteflika's effort and made an official visit to Algeria in 2000. Therefore, the political agreement was reached to begin a closer relationship between the two countries. Aznar was the first European leader who visited Algeria after the elections (Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, 2007: 7), which also demonstrated Spain's important role for ending the isolation of Algeria and in this respect developing EU-Algeria relations.

A few months later, Spain and Algeria initialled the Agreement on Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation, which upgraded the level of bilateral relations that existed between Spain and Morocco since 1991.³⁴ According to this Agreement Algeria was included to the group of countries with whom Spain holds bilateral Summits. In these Summits, not only the Head of Governments but also the relevant Ministers are holding meetings, to solve the existing problems or further develop bilateral relations.³⁵

_

^{34 &}quot;Tratado De Amistad, Buena Vecindad Y Cooperación Entre El Reino De España Y La República Argelina Democrática Y Popular".

³⁵ Spain currently holds these summits with Portugal, France, Morocco, Italy, Romania, Poland and lately with Turkey. The first Turkish-Spanish Summit meeting was held in Istanbul on 5 April 2009.

The Spanish-Algerian bilateral agreement was a cornerstone for the Spanish foreign policy because of its timing as well: It was initialled before the disappearance of violence in Algeria, and it coincided the escalation of tensions between Spain and Morocco over the sovereignty of the Perejil Islet.

Hence, the Agreement manifested a change in Spanish foreign policy not only towards Algeria, but also towards Morocco, which inevitably shifted the Spanish policy concerning the Western Sahara (former Spanish colony) dispute. Two Maghreb countries have conflicting interests on the issue; Algeria supports the independence of the Western Sahara, while Morocco seeks annexation (Moré, 2002).

The bilateral agreement was followed by the EU-Algeria Association Agreement, which was signed in April 2002 in Valencia. Due to the Algerian civil war, which had continued until 2001, Algeria was able to sign this agreement with EU with a five years delay, compared to its neighbours; Morocco and Tunisia.

However, with the arrival of Socialist Government, relations with Algeria have cooled down sharply. "Spain's new policy" which was close to Moroccan view towards the Western Sahara was the main reason. Zapatero, by declaring his opinion "to seek a political solution based on a discussion of autonomy presented by Morocco" (El Pais, 7.3.2007) was the clear expression of the new Spanish attitude, which was no doubt favouring the Moroccan thesis in the dispute.

The reply of Algeria to Spain's new policy was in the field of energy as expected (Arenal, 2008b: 344): the three Spanish energy giant operating in Algeria, Repsol, Cepsa and Gas Natural-faced

serious problems. Aguas de Barcelona and Acciona have lost contracts as well (El Mundo, 4.9.2007). The Algerian Ministry of Energy declared that these problems were only "commercial disputes" (El Mundo economia portal, 6.9.2007). However, it is a known fact that Algeria's energy strategy is designed directly by the Presidency of the Republic.³⁶ Therefore, the tension between Madrid and Algiers for Spanish energy companies' losses in Algeria was not economic but political.

Although Zapatero tried to restore the bilateral relations during the Spain-Algeria Summit held in 2006 in Algiers, Bouteflika did not hesitate to criticize Spain's new policy towards the Western Sahara issue at the press meeting:

We would like Spain to commit itself to a stronger lead to the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front to accept the arrangements put in place a referendum on self determination and therefore, allow the expression of the sovereign will of the people of the Western Sahara, under international law...Spain can not remain indifferent to the current plight of the Sahrawi people, whom Spain had colonized from 1885 to 1975 (ABC, 13.12.2006).

Bouteflika, in an interview published in El Pais (13.03.2007), described Aznar as a big leader, referring to his contribution to the Spanish Algerian bilateral relations during his governance and eluded that he expects the same attitude from Zapatero. On the other hand, Moroccan King Mohamed VI, in his greetings card to Zapatero, for the Spanish National day, expressed great satisfaction with the "distinguished level of ongoing and

_

³⁶ Bouteflika coordinates the energy policy of Algeria through "the National Council of Energy (CNE), of which he is the chairman.

constructive political dialogue" between Rabat and Madrid (Libertad Digital Internacional, 13.10.2008). During Aznar's term the picture was vice versa, Morocco was criticizing Spanish foreign policy, whereas Algeria was satisfied.

This clearly demonstrates that, Moroccan and Algerian leaders associate Spain's foreign policy with the leaders of PP and PSOE, rather than a "state policy" of Spain on which both Parties have a consensus. Therefore, the aforementioned discontinuity in Spanish foreign policy is perceived as a "weakness" of Spain to be benefitted in their quest for their national interests. Both countries have their own instruments for this purpose, which they do not hesitate to use; for Morocco, territorial disputes, problem of illegal immigrants and economic relations and for Algeria Spain's energy dependency. Moreover, this image of Spain emerges as the principal impediment for it to be an "honest broker" for finding a solution to the Western Sahara dispute, since the discontinuity in its foreign policy discredits Spain's impartiality; Morocco associates PP as pro-Algerian, whereas Algeria associates PSOE as pro-Moroccan.

4.3. The Western Sahara Conflict

The Western Sahara issue has been another serious dispute between Spain and Morocco since Spain accepted to give up its colonial rule in 1975 with the "Trilateral Madrid Agreement"³⁷. Upon the signature of this Agreement, the power vacuum left by Spain in the Western Sahara has been filled mainly by Morocco and partially by the Polisario Front with the support of Algeria.

^{37 &}quot;Declaración De Principios Entre España, Marruecos Y Mauritania Sobre El Sahara" (Trilateral Madrid Agreement) dated 14.11.1975.

PP and PSOE's stance with regard to the Western Sahara conflict has always been a matter of domestic political debate since 1975 (Vaquer i Fanes, 2007: 126) and beginning with Aznar's second term in government, it has been another source of discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy.

The Western Sahara is located in the West Africa (Map 2) and it is known for its rich phosphate reserves and fishing grounds. The territory is in the UN's "Non-Self-Governing Territories" According to the UN's Legal Affairs division written in 2002:

The Madrid Agreement did not transfer sovereignty over the territory, nor did it confer upon any of the signatories the status of an administering Power - a status which Spain alone could not have unilaterally transferred. The transfer of administrative authority over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, did not affect the international status of Western Sahara as Non-Self-Governing Territory.³⁹

The Polisario Front began its armed struggle for the right of self-determination of Western Sahara in 1973. With the declining power of General Franco, Spain accepted to dissolve the colonial rule and promised a referendum for self-determination. On 14 November 1975, six days after Franco's death, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Trilateral Agreement. The Agreement divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania, in return for phosphate and fishing concessions to Spain. According to Vaquer i Fanes, high-ranking officials of the Franco dictatorship, unable to undertake a firm action, deterred by the French and US covert

³⁸ This list is approved by General Assembly of the United Nations in 2002.

^{39 &#}x27;Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council', United Nations Security Council S/2002/161.

support to the Moroccan move, and unwilling to make use of the force at such a crucial political moment, engaged themselves in a negotiating process with Morocco and Mauritania, that led to the Madrid Trilateral Agreements." (2007: 127).

However, since Spain left this territory in accordance with this Agreement, there has been an armed conflict which still continues without providing any benefit to Spain. Therefore, the Trilateral Madrid Agreements is considered by the Spanish public opinion to be a failure of Spain to fulfil its obligation to protect and guide the Saharawi people to self-determination.⁴⁰

When the Madrid Agreement was signed, Algeria and the Polisario Front declared that they did not recognize it and they remained committed to the Western Sahara's independence. Therefore, Algeria started supporting the Polisario Front militarily and diplomatically since 1975. The Polisario Front declared in 1976 an Algeria-based government-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which does not recognize the Madrid Agreement and claims the entire Western Sahara. This entity has been admitted as the Western Sahara's representative to the African Union (AU) and recognized by more than 70 countries (Galvez, 2007: 6).

In 1979, Mauritania was forced to retreat, abandoning all its claims to the region. The area left by Mauritania in 1979 (around 1/3 of the total territory), has been under the control of the Polisario since then. However, the clashes between the Moroccan Army and the Polisario Front continued until 1991 when a

57

⁴⁰ According to Real Instituto Elcano's survey of June 2007, 58% of the Spanish people support the right of self-determination of the Western Sahara people, whereas only 8% support the status quo.

ceasefire was reached upon UN's efforts. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been deployed in the territory since 1991. In 2000, the Personal Representative of UN Secretary General for the Western Sahara, James Baker (former Secretary of State of US), after consultations between the relevant Parties, proposed a peace plan (later named as "Baker I").⁴¹ The Plan foresaw autonomy of Western Sahara within the Moroccan state, except for its defence and foreign policies. France, US and the UK, supported the Plan, whereas Spain, Algeria and the Polisario Front rejected it. The negative attitude of Spain (PP Government under Aznar's Presidency) prompted Moroccan hostility (Vaquer i Fanes, 2007: 135).

James Baker, later in the second version of his Plan (Baker II), envisioned Sahrawi self-rule under a Western Sahara Authority for a period of five years, with a referendum on independence to follow. In this referendum, the entire present-day population of the Western Sahara would participate, including people who had migrated from or been settled by Morocco after 1975, with the condition that the interim local government (the Western Sahara Authority) would be elected only by a restricted voters' list - those identified as original inhabitants of the Western Sahara. In July 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed the Baker II Plan, something it had not done with Baker's first Plan, and unanimously called for the parties to implement it. ⁴² This time the Polisario Front and Algeria accepted the Plan, but Morocco proceeded to formally rejecting it, declaring that it would no longer agree to any referendum that included independence as an option.

⁴¹ MINURSO was established by Security Council resolution 690 (1991).

⁴² UN Security Council Resolution 1495 (2003).

Upon the failure of his peace attempts, James Baker resigned from his post. UN's later efforts to solve the conflict did not succeed either. Therefore, the dispute remains to be solved. As of September 2009, Chris Ross is the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and initiatives to bring all relevant Parties to negotiate a new Plan continues.

4.3.1. The Spanish Policy towards the Western Sahara Conflict

The Spanish policy vis á vis the Western Sahara is closely followed by both Morocco and Algeria since 1975 and both attach importance to Spain's attitude. Hence, any shift in the Spanish foreign policy to either side (Moroccan or Algerian thesis) is perceived as ominous to the other. Vaquer i Fanes argues that a positive action toward Morocco had to be counterpoised by another towards Algeria, and vice versa, as a proof of neutrality. This strategy ended up yielding negative results; the Spanish initiatives became discredited, the Government was left exposed to threats and blackmailing from its Southern neighbours, and every action adopted by Spain was perceived by one of the two states as something short of betrayal (Ibid: 132). Consequently, the decadeslong rivalry between Morocco and Algeria is reflected as a competition for shaping Spanish foreign policy on the Western Sahara issue since 1975.

Spain's traditional position from 1976 to 1996 towards the Western Sahara dispute could be summarized as follows: Spain supports the UN resolutions on Western Sahara, while maintaining a position of "active neutrality" in its relations with the Parties involved; it is a problem of unfinished decolonization issue, pending a referendum on self-determination by the territory's population; Spain, left the territory's administration, but not

sovereignty, to Morocco and Mauritania (Larramendi and Lopez, 2004).

According to Vaquer i Fanes, from 1976 to 1982 when UCD Governments were in power, some sort of consensus was reached over the Western Sahara issue –to support the UN initiatives and the recognition of the right to self-determination as the only way to overcome the decolonization impasse- (2007: 129). Due to the UCD Government's above-mentioned policy, the Spanish fishing industry suffered most due to the Moroccan retaliation as a response to Spain's policy change towards the Western Sahara dispute. The Spanish companies were not able to enter the Moroccan market in real terms either, until the Socialists came to power in 1982 (Del Piño, 2002).

During the four consecutive Governments of Felipe González until 1996, Spain entered into a sort of tacit consensus with the Moroccan Government, by which Spain distanced itself from the UCD Governments' policy, while in return, Morocco did not voice its claims on the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

However, this tacit consensus between Spain and Morocco was first broken during the governance of Aznar, when Morocco resisted renewing the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement and Spain's relations with Algeria began to develop: the PP Government adopted a new policy towards the Western Sahara, that was closer to the Algerian and the Polisario Front's arguments: the Sahrawi people's right to hold a referendum for self determination began to be voiced more strongly.

Zapatero, on the contrary, explained his Party's stance regarding Western Sahara as: "to seek a political solution based on

a discussion of autonomy presented by Morocco" (El Pais, 7.3.2007). According to Larramendi-Lopez and Galvez, therefore, Spain's traditional position of "active neutrality" and proreferendum stance has been changed when Zapatero came to power in March 2004 (Larramendi-Lopez, 2004 and Galvez, 2007: 7).

El Mundo newspaper (15.7.2004), accused Zapatero of having "a 180-degree turn in Spanish policy" with regard to the issue. Some other Spanish media see Zapatero's new policy as liable to fuel Sahrawi and Algerian fears of a Madrid-Paris axis bolstering Moroccan claims to continue their sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

SADR Minister for Europe, Mohamed Sidati criticized Spain's new policy as follows: "Spain today does not have an independent foreign policy but a policy bound by what France does. We are back to a Paris-Madrid-Rabat axis." (ABC, 16.7.2004)

Larramendi-Lopez (2004) argue that Zapatero Government decided to break the traditional "active neutrality" policy and began to intervene as a mediator in the conflict that has lasted for almost 30 years, because the PSOE Government was of the view that the conflict is a major obstacle to stability in the region, which impedes progress in the regional integration process and hinders economic development and political and social modernization, perceived as necessary for addressing the roots of illegal immigration and terrorist threats.

In accordance with this new policy, during the governance of the PSOE after 2004, unlike its conservative predecessor Aznar Governments, the Zapatero Governments have been rarely mentioning the UN's "Baker Plan" (Baker II).

During the 8th Spanish-Moroccan Summit held in Rabat in 5 March 2007, Zapatero explicitly said that he welcomed the new proposal of the Moroccan Government - to give an autonomous status to the Western Sahara within Morocco - and stated that the proposal opened as "a new period" for the disputed territory. He also made a call to Algeria and Polisario Front to negotiate the Moroccan proposal (El Pais, 7.3.2007). A few days later, Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, in his article "Breaking the Impasse" published in El Pais newspaper on 13 March 2007 explicitly stated Spain's support for the Moroccan policy as well.⁴³ Zapatero repeated Spain's support to the Moroccan proposal also during the 9th Spanish-Moroccan Summit held in Madrid in December 2008.

Another important development with regard to the new policy was related with the discussion on the "administering power" of Morocco on the Western Sahara territories and related to this, the new EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, which was signed after 5 years of negotiations in 2006, during PSOE's governance.

Ruiz Miguel argue that, although the Trilateral Madrid Agreement does not transfer the "administering power" of Spain on the Western Sahara to Morocco, with the inclusion of the Western Sahara waters to the new EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, the

⁴³ The article originally published in El Pais newspaper dated 13.03.2007 with the title "España y el Sáhara". In the English edition of the newspaper it was published with the title "Breaking the Impasse".

Zapatero Government has changed the decades-long Spanish policy towards this territory and recognized the "administering power" of Morocco on it, which will have important effects for the settlement of the conflict in the future (2006: 4-5).⁴⁴

The evolution of both Parties' policies towards the Western Sahara issue reflects in fact the difficulty of the Spanish political elite to formulate a "state policy" towards the dispute. According to Vaquer i Fanes, the PSOE, which was the champion of the Saharawi cause and a sworn ally of the Polisario Front, is now perceived as the most pro-Morocco of all Spanish parties; while, on the other hand, the PP, which is the heir of the right-wing parties that loathed the Algerian regime in the seventies and looked with disapproval upon the Polisario Front from its very beginning, has today distanced itself from Morocco and advocates a stronger relationship with Algeria" (Vaquer i Fanes, 2007: 126). Gillespie 2005: 6), as well, states that the majority of the Spanish socialist leaders are of the opinion that, the only viable option is some sort of autonomy of Western Sahara within Morocco.

Hence, the Spanish foreign policy towards the Western Sahara dispute followed the same path, with the Spanish foreign policy towards Morocco and Algeria; Aznar supported the Algerian thesis, whereas Zapatero the Moroccan, which once again demonstrated the lack of consensus on this issue and strengthened the discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy.

_

⁴⁴ The Agreement was concluded on the premise that the waters of the Western Sahara 'are under Moroccan administration' according to the 1975 agreement between Spain and Morocco. Available from the web page of the official journal of the EU, dated 29.05.2006. Article 11 of the Agreement envisages that "This Agreement shall apply ...to the territory of Morocco and to the waters under Moroccan jurisdiction".

THE RELATIONS WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES; DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF PP AND PSOE GOVERNMENTS

Latin America has always been a national priority for Spain due to the cultural affinity based on the common language, history and religion. The existence of an 'Ibero-American' community is derived from this assessment. Spain's acceptance of its Ibero-American identity, along with the European one, has enabled it to increase its profile and influence, not only in Europe and Latin America, but also in other parts of the world in the last three decades. Malamud describes this as follows:

Having European ties and a European identity strengthens Spain's role in Latin America, while having Latin American ties and a Latin American identity strengthens Spain's role in the EU. The tighter its ties with Ibero-America, the more Spain will be listened to in Brussels, in Washington and in multilateral organizations, starting with the UN (2006: 4).

Another factor for the importance of Latin America in Spain's foreign policy is the Spanish investments in the region. Just in two decades following its EU membership, Spain has become the second largest investor in the region and in some countries, such as Argentina, it is the biggest, making Spain the main non-American player in Latin America (Table 3 and 4). The importance of Latin America for Spain is even clearer if we consider Spain's main stock market index by the six biggest Spanish companies:

Telefónica, Repsol YPF, Santander, BBVA, Endesa and Iberdrola.⁴⁵ Due to their investments in Latin America, the total value – capitalization - of these companies rose significantly from 1995 to 2008. In light of the investment channelled to the region and the fact that the companies present there have a huge weight in the Spanish economy, it is likely that there will be increased trade and solid economic ties between Spain and the Latin American countries in the future: In 2008, three of the world's five largest oil and gas discoveries were by Repsol YPF in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia.⁴⁵

Since the early days of the transition to democracy, all Spanish governments, with varying degrees of success, tried to develop an active, leading and relatively independent role for Spain in their Latin American policies. This contributed decisively to strengthening Spain's presence in the region and improving Spain's international image. This search for independence was always supported, especially during the Socialist Governments, by the European dimension of foreign policy, while US Policy toward the region always acted as a conditioning factor that reduced the limits of independent action for Spain since both countries' interests do not always coincide.

According to Arenal, the result of all this was that Spain's Latin American policy was –and still is– deeply marked by the contradictions between Ibero-Americanism and Europeanism on one hand, and between Ibero-Americanism and the trans-Atlantic alliance on the other (Arenal, 2005). In fact, this overlaps the

_

⁴⁵ From the article titled: "A Good Bet: Investments in Latin America offer protection against Spain's slowdown" published in The Economist print edition dated 30.4.2009. According to the article, the top five Spanish companies' gross investments (170 billion dollars in total) generated 28,9 billion dollars of operating profit in 2008.

difference between PSOE and PP Governments' policies towards the region. While PSOE adopts a Europist approach by promoting the spread of human rights and democracy in the continent through commercial links and international aid (Balfour and Preston, 1999: 11), PP in contrast assumes the US policy with a more unilateral and strict attitude accompanied with economic and military sanctions (for instance embargo on Cuba).

5.1. Ibero-American Summits; Aznar's Unilateralist Approach versus Zapatero's Multilateralism

Spain's relations with the Latin American countries are conducted at several levels: bilateral, sub regional (Mercosur), regional (Ibero-American Summits) and European.⁴⁶

At the regional level, Ibero-American Summits has been an important tool for the Spanish governments in its foreign policy since 1991. According to Arenal (2004), taking into account the enormous differences between the countries concerned, and the key role that Spain has played since the outset together with the political and economic weight it continues to bring to bear, the Summits have effectively become the most practical instrument of relations between Spain and Latin America.

During the Aznar period, especially after 2002, in the Ibero-American summits, the Latin American countries began to identify Spain as representing the US and Europe's interests. *Faits accompli* brought into agenda by Spain during these Summits, strengthened this perception. Unilateral action, instead of

⁴⁶ Ibero-American Summits process was initiated by Spain and Portugal in 1991. The II Summit held in Madrid in 1992, commemorating the 500th Anniversary of the discovery of South America by Christopher Columbus.

multilateralism and consensus, began to be practiced by Spain during these meetings (Arenal, 2005).

Moreover, the striking, controversial and fractious behaviour of Aznar in the course of the summits, resulting in encounters with some of his colleagues was worsened after Spain's alliance with the US Administration over the war in Iraq. This Atlantic dimension suffered a spill over effect when some members (Chile and Mexico) of the Ibero-American family were publicly lobbied by Aznar to endorse the US-UK attitude in the Security Council, of which Spain was then a non-permanent member. The Ibero-American bloc was further splited by the assembly of a military brigade named Plus Ultra to participate in the occupation of Iraq with troops from El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, partially equipped and trained by Spanish command (Roy, 2006).

Therefore, Spain's traditional line of action at the Ibero-American summits since they began in 1991 had been broken. This attitude at the summits and alignment with the Bush administration in relations with Latin America had also negative affects on Spain's bilateral relations with some of the Latin American countries. As a result, these countries lost their interest for these summits.

When Zapatero came to power in 2004, although it required a special attention - because it was damaged during Aznar's period - the priority in the foreign policy was given instead to Europe, Iraq and the trans-Atlantic relations, Western Sahara issue and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Besides this subordination contrary to Gonzalez period, a return to the former Spanish foreign policy (1991-2002) was on track during the Ibero-American Summits held after PSOE took the power in March 2004.

This change was stated by Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain:

The PP believes that we are still in the 19th century and that its 'gunboat diplomacy' and 'East India Company' approach will waft it back to the days of 'Imperial Spain'. This is the underlying conceptual difference between the two programmes, the one that inevitably influences every sphere of Spanish foreign policy.

....Sovereign equality is the principle to be respected in Spain's relations with Latin America, which will continue to be the natural sphere of our foreign policy. Successive PP governments have made relations with Latin America subservient to those with the US. We must now regain Latin America as the strategic reference point for our foreign policy, which should be complementary but differentiated and, as far as possible, independent of other options.⁴⁷

This return to a consensus based, multilateral approach gave its positive results in the XV. Summit held in Salamanca (Spain) in 2005.⁴⁸ A phrase condemning the US sanctions on Cuba was also included in the Final Declaration of the Summit, with the Spanish lead, which inevitably disappointed the Bush Administration. The important developments in the context of the Ibero-American Summits process during the Zapatero period are as follows:

⁴⁷ From the speech delivered by Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, at Elcano Royal Institute on 10 March 2004, on the eve of the general elections.

⁴⁸ According to Malamud, during the early years of the Spanish democracy, the Spanish political elite, instead of considering the Ibero-American community to be the starting point for a fruitful relationship (as it was assumed during the Franco dictatorship), it was perceived as a destination – as an end in itself and this was the basis for the consensus among the Spanish political parties on the scope of Spain's action in Latin America (2006:2).

- In the XV. Summit held in Salamanca (Spain) in 2005, a new chapter was opened towards a crucial stage in the process and the term "Community of Ibero-American Nations" was used for the first time in the official declaration.⁴⁹

- The inauguration of the General Secretariat located in Madrid, which is an important step for the institutionalization of the process, has been accomplished (Arenal, 2007: 342). Moreover, in a ministerial meeting held in September 2005 in New York during the UN General Assembly annual gathering, Enrique Iglesias, an Uruguayan official of Spanish birth, appointed as the first Secretary General (Roy, 2006: 3).

In sum, with the help of the multilateralist approach of the Zapatero Government, certain improvements have been achieved in the context of the Ibero-American Summits process in the last few years, although the Latin American countries lost their interest to the Summits during the Aznar period, due to his unilateralist and "hegemonic" (Arenal, 2004) attitude.

5.2. Europeanization of Spain's Latin American Policy

Spain's relations with Latin America at European level were a success story during Felipe Gonzalez's period (1982-1996). Spain assumed the policy of turning the EU into an amplifier of its interests in Latin American countries. This was visible as early as its accession negotiations with the EC (Torreblanca, 2001).

_

⁴⁹ From Salamanca Declaration.

In the first European Council meeting in 1986, in which Spain was present, the Twelve asked the Commission to prepare a strategy to upgrade EU's relations with Latin America, which constituted the first step in this process. In 1995, during the second Spanish Presidency of the EU, a new strategy which included the signing of association or free trade agreements with the most developed countries in the region (the Mercosur group and Mexico), the opening up of EU markets to the Andean and Central American countries through the EU system of trade preferences and a substantial increase in official development aid to these countries were foreseen.⁵⁰

Therefore, in this period Spain has succeeded in tying the EU to Latin America and, at the same time, completely transforming the outlook of its relations with the region. With the help of this policy in a couple of years, it became the major foreign investor in Latin America, competing with the US. This economic presence, together with the prestige it gained from both its role as Latin American spokesman in the EU, its cultural and linguistic ties with the region, and the example of Spain's successful transition to democracy, have helped Spain to play a global role to a certain extent.⁵¹

The major setback for Spain to fully exploit this opportunity is the floating of the Spanish foreign policy from a Europist

_

⁵⁰ The EU's latest regional strategy paper 2007-2013 defines the specific areas for regional development cooperation programmes. For the 2007-2013 period, EU assistance amounts to around € 3 billion, while for the same period the European Investment Bank is authorized to lend up to €2.8 billion. At present, the EU is the leading investor in the region and the second trading partner of Latin America (from the web page of the European Commission: External relations: Latin America: Regional Programming Document 2007-2013).

⁵¹ According to Lillo, the Spanish speaking people in the world is around 400 million (Pereira, 2003: Chapter 11 "El Factor Cultural: El Español en el Mundo" by Lillo, Pedro Antonio Martinez", pp. 237-250).

approach to a pro-Atlantist one, as seen in the other core issues of the Spanish foreign policy, that yields to "discontinuity" in its policy towards the region since 2000. As a result of this floating, the Latin American countries question the leadership of Spain in the region and they loose their focus on the Spanish initiatives for more cooperation.

According to Malamud (2006: 3), the discord between PSOE and PP on Spain's Latin American policy has become a subject of internal political controversy and the Spanish and European policies (leaded by Spain) towards Cuba and Venezuela are at the hearth of the conflict. To further elaborate this argument, Spain's bilateral relations with these countries will be examined as examples of discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy towards Latin American countries since 1996.

5.3. Bilateral Relations with Cuba and Venezuela

After Spain became a member of EC, the Socialist Gonzalez Government led EC to develop a policy towards Cuba, which served Spanish interests. It combined EC protection for Spanish firms in Cuba against the Helms-Burton Act, with a strategy of "awards" for the Castro's regime to persuade Cuba to liberalize the regime (Torreblanca, 2001).⁵² Through this strategy, Spanish firms reaped the material benefits of Castro's economic reforms. At the same time as it advanced its own model of a consensual transition to democracy as the solution to Cuba's future. Throughout the decades-long US boycott of Cuba, Spain always maintained commercial relations with the country even during the period of the Franco regime. This strategy worked to a certain extent.

⁵² The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. It is a US federal law which strengthens and continues the US embargo against Cuba. The act extended the territorial application of the initial embargo to apply to foreign companies trading with Cuba.

However, this strategy was omitted during the Aznar period after 1996, when the Spanish Government, allied with the US, changed the Spanish foreign policy towards Cuba and developed relations with the Cuban exiles in US. This change in the Spanish foreign policy was linked to Spanish foreign policy shift in its trans-Atlantic relations.

The President of Government Aznar, a few days after the new government was established, while taking the advantage of an official visit by then vice-president Al Gore, at a joint press conference on May 25, 1996, stated that he would take a tougher stance on Cuba, suspending official cooperation except for humanitarian aid (La Vanguardia, 26.05.1996).

In line with this statement, Aznar totally left the former Spanish policy based on having good diplomatic relations and cooperation with the Cuban regime in order to continue the dialogue, which was supposed to pave the way for progress in human rights and democracy in the country. The new policy launched by Aznar Government towards Cuba, both at European and bilateral levels were, instead, based on the complaint of lack of democracy in Cuba and exerting pressure for progress on human rights. This change, which was also a clear alignment with the US Administration with regard to Cuba, provoked strong criticism from PSOE, as well as PP voters. This change led to a diplomatic impasse at the end of 1996, when the Cubans withdrew the Spanish Ambassador's credentials.

Arenal argues that, by acting in coordination with the US and appearing to act as a spokesman for the US Administration in Latin America, Spain lost the relative independence and distinctiveness that its Latin American policy had had until then.

Spanish interests became identified with those of the Bush Administration and Spain's image in the region deteriorated (Arenal, 2003: 189). Moreover, Aznar Government took the lead within EU for the adoption of more severe policies towards the Castro regime, to change the EU policy of Cuba from "awards" into "sanctions" as he did in the bilateral relations (Kennedy, 2001: 113).

This change in policy would lead to a profound crisis in Spanish- Cuban relations. The distancing of the two countries reached a low point after the VI. Ibero-American Summit held in Viña del Mar, Chile in November 1996, followed by the presentation of a proposal to the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels to implement political and economic measures against the Castro regime. However, this strategy did not produce any significant improvement in Cuba.

According to El Mundo newspaper, dated 25 October 1998, Aznar in a telephone call to Fidel Castro, related with the upcoming Ibero-American Summit, had openly told him that: "I have nothing against Cuba, but I am against your regime" and during a meeting with the Cuban American Foundation, explained that his policy was to move away from "the proposals that may contribute to prolonging the situation present on the island".

In 2003, following the sentencing of 75 US-backed dissidents to jail by the Cuban authorities, US launched an international campaign to isolate Cuba citing human rights violations. EU aligned with US and accepted to implement a series of political sanctions against Cuba in June 2003.⁵³

_

⁵³ According to El Mundo newspaper dated 12 June 2003, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque explicitly accused Aznar for the worsening of relations between EU and Cuba.

When PSOE won the elections in March 2004, the tough-line approach against Cuba maintained by José María Aznar's Government was replaced by a softer, more cooperative strategy. This was a return to Spain's former policy followed by Felipe Gonzalez until 1996. The Cuban regime responded this change by calling the Spanish Ambassador in Havana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officially declaring him that "the Cuban-Spanish bilateral diplomatic relations were established".

The change in Spain's view of the Castro regime played an important role to modify the EU's position as well. In fact, Spain reestablished formal contacts with Cuba and was working towards the establishment of a renewed EU-Cuba political dialogue, as well as seeking the elimination of all EU-imposed diplomatic sanctions against the regime, which were introduced during Aznar's period.

In January 2005, during the EU General Affairs and External Relations meeting, the EU foreign ministers agreed to restore normal diplomatic relations with Cuba. Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Ángel Moratinos travelled to Cuba in April 2007, as the first European foreign minister to do so since 2003, without including any meeting with the opposition in his visit program. This visit was criticized by the US Administration (Arenal, 2008b: 341).

In February 2008, Cuba released four regime opponents who had been in jail for five years, due to "their health conditions" and extradited them to Spain. Among 75 US-backed dissidents who were sentenced for 20 years by the Cuban authorities in 2003, 55 of them were still in jail then. Nonetheless, EU leaded by Spain also lifted the sanctions against Cuba in 2008, three years after it initiated the political dialogue and launched development aids to Cuba.

Spain will take over the Presidency of the EU Council on 1 January 2010. Therefore, Cuba has already made demarches to the Spanish authorities to lead EU once again for the improvement of EU-Cuba relations during its Presidency.

Therefore, with regards to Spain's foreign policy concerning Cuba, Aznar and Zapatero followed different policies in accordance with PP and PSOE's ideologies, which have been elaborated in the previous chapters. While Aznar adopted a policy in line with the US's strict attitude, Zapatero preferred to establish diplomatic and cordial relations to persuade the Castro regime to improve the human rights situation and democracy in Cuba. Nevertheless, as of September 2009, both approaches have not produced the desired end.

Another feature of Spain's foreign policy towards Cuba since 1996 is that it presented an example of bottom to top Europeanization of the Spanish foreign policy; Spain was able to transfer its policy to EU and its policies became EU policies. However, taken into account the contradiction between the two different policies of Aznar and Zapatero, we need to conclude that Spain has imported "the discontinuity" in its foreign policy to EU as well.

Like in the case of Cuba, Spain's foreign policy towards Venezuela follows the same path with its foreign policy towards Cuba, and therefore constitutes another example of the discontinuity. The contradiction between the two different policies of PP and PSOE very much resembles the one towards Cuba in the same period. PP followed the same path, which is the US perspective, and adopted the Bush Administration's perception of

Hugo Chavez's regime, whereas PSOE preferred the policy of cooperation and engagement. Aznar's pro-US approach, combined with the Hugo Chavez's allegations towards the Aznar Government for supporting the military coup d'état attempt against Chavez in 2002, further deteriorated the bilateral relations.⁵⁴

Later on the same issue, Miguel Angel Moratinos, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Government after March 2004 elections, with a strong desire to bring Spain's bilateral relations with Venezuela back on track, made a statement referring to the Aznar Government's support to the failed military coup d'état attempt against Chavez in 2002 (El Mundo dated 23.11.2004). This statement caused a crisis in Spanish domestic politics and PP called for the resignation of Moratinos, which did not happen. Nevertheless, Hugo Chavez, the President of Venezuela visited Spain in November 2004, as a demonstration to inaugurate the new era between the two countries.

In March 2005, Spain organized a conference in Venezuela, which Zapatero participated along with the Presidents of Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. The meeting's main purpose was to facilitate the rapprochement between Venezuela and Colombia, which was in a crisis because of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The summit was also a chance for Zapatero to prove his commitment to regional issues.

_

⁵⁴ The US and Spanish Ambassadors' visit to Pedro Carmona - the failed coup d'état attempt military leader in Karakas - turned into a crises between Spain and Venezuela in 2002 (Arenal, 2004).

The most important development concerning Spain's relations with Venezuela was Zapatero's visit to this country in April 2005. During this visit Spain concluded an Agreement worth 1,8 billion Dollars with Venezuela for the sale of 8 military ships and 12 military aircrafts (CASA cargo planes) (Barbe, 2006: 6 and Malamud, 2006: 8). During the same visit, Zapatero was able to secure a bigger role for Spain's largest oil company, REPSOL YPF, in Venezuela's oil-driven economy. Like the Zapatero Government's new policy towards Cuba, the sale of Spanish military ships and aircrafts to Venezuela further worsened the US-Spain bilateral relations.

However, upon US objection and the fact that the agreement also foresee transfer of technology to Venezuela, which was developed by EADS-CASA - originally developed in US - the transaction did not happen because of US veto, therefore Spain had to cancel the agreement on the sales of the 12 military aircrafts in October 2006 (El Pais, 1.2.2006).

The Spanish foreign policy towards Cuba and Venezuela represented clearly the contradictory policies of Spain during Aznar and Zapatero's governance, therefore constitutes two examples of discontinuity in the Spanish foreign policy. Until a consensus among the two major Parties (PP and PSOE) on the guidelines of the Spanish policy towards the Latin American countries will be reached, the ideological concerns and Party policies will continue to guide the Spanish foreign policy towards these countries. Moreover, taking into account the fact that the contradictory policies of Aznar and Zapatero, has been persuaded by EU as well, especially in the case of Cuba, may create difficulties for Spain's bottom to top Europeanization of its foreign policy.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

As it is made clear in the above Chapters, there is certainly a lack of consensus on the broad lines of the Spanish foreign policy among the Spanish political elite and therefore *discontinuity* marks it since 1996. The discontinuity in some topics even should be labelled as "contradictory". In accordance with the information submitted so far, the differences between the foreign policies adopted by the Conservative PP and Socialist PSOE since 1996 and their consequences are summarized in Table 6.

Here, it is not argued that either Party's policies are better than the others' are, however in both cases there is an apparent lack of consensus among the Spanish political elite. This creates question marks on Spanish foreign policy, which in return sets back both Parties' ambitions for placing Spain as an important actor in the international arena.

Discussing the necessity of "continuity" for the successful implementation of a country's foreign policy is out of the scope of this thesis. However, it is an accepted fact in international politics that, discontinuity in the foreign policy damages the credibility and accountability of that country. Duran i Leida expresses this as follows:

In any serious State that aims a respected role in the international context, foreign policy cannot change depending on the colour of the successive governments. A continuity of purpose and a slow decantation must exist that gives identity to foreign policy and

allows consolidating alliances and positions (Duran i Leida, 2009: 325).

Arenal further supports this assumption with an emphasis on the importance of consensus:

Today, in a globalized, interdependent, transnationalized, heterogeneous and complex world, with growing challenges and very different threats, a foreign policy consistent, effective, recognizable on medium and long term must necessarily rest on the consensus, tacit or explicit, between the main political parties, with the support of the majority of the public opinion and the main social and economic actors" (Arenal, 2008a: 12).

In the Spanish case, discontinuity on the one hand damages Spain's reliability and downgrades its position in the international political arena and on the other hand, weakens its power during its quest to accomplish its vital interests. This is obvious in its bilateral relations with US and Morocco, as well as its current lower profile in the EU: It is not by coincidence that France replaced Spain in leading EU's Mediterranean policy. Spain continues to have very limited influence in the discussions on the future of the Western Sahara, compared to other actors, though the territory was under Spanish sovereignty until 1975. Likewise, as elaborated in Chapter IV, Spain, by accepting the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, recognized Morocco's sovereignty - though indirectly - on the Western Sahara. Taken into account its policy towards Kosovo, especially the attitude perceived by the PSOE Government while declaring their decision to withdraw Spanish soldiers from KFOR, Spain strengthened its image as an unreliable ally not only by its NATO allies, but also in the EU.

"Continuity" in the foreign policy does not necessarily mean "always doing the same". Continuity also means adjusting to new situations and new challenges and searching for creative solutions, without replacing the core interests of a country on which the political elite has a broad consensus.

It is true that the break of the consensus in the Spanish foreign policy began with Aznar's term, especially after the PP's victory in March 2000 elections, however it would be wrong to claim that Jose María Aznar alone, is responsible for the break of the consensus on the Spanish Foreign Policy. Because, although Zapatero argues that Spain reassumed the policy that was followed during the Gonzalez Governments, after PSOE came to power in 2004, as explained in the previous Chapters, it is not the case. There are important differences between the two Socialist leaders in terms of their attitude towards the country's foreign policy issues:

Firstly, unlike Zapatero's Presidency of Government since 2004, González's Spain was leading Europe on various important issues. The concept of European citizenship, Barcelona Process and the Cohesion Funds, which were the milestones in the European integration and development, were all initiated by Spain. However, during Zapatero's term since 2004, Spain has been demonstrating a low profile attitude in the foreign policy issues in general and EU issues in particular. There are doubts that the PSOE Government will be able to demonstrate a similar performance during Spain's upcoming EU Council Presidency in January 2010 (Grant, 2009).

Secondly, compared to Zapatero, González had very good personal relations with the German, French and the British Prime

Ministers. regardless of the political affiliations of his counterparts.⁵⁵ The third difference is that, the Spanish foreign policy had never been under such dominance of parties' politics at any time since 1982, due to domestic political concerns (Grant, 2009). The Spaniard's vote in favour of continuation of Spain's membership in NATO (albeit outside the military structure) in the referendum in 1986 for example, was the result of the efforts of the González Government (Kennedy, 2001: 107), rather than PSOE voters' enthusiasm for NATO. After their electoral victory in 1982, Felipe Gonzalez government, agreed to campaign to remain in NATO in exchange for German support for entry into the EC (Balfour and Preston, 1999: 10), which clearly reflects the pragmatism of Felipe Gonzalez compared to Jóse Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, especially when we consider their attitude towards the Kosovo's independence.⁵⁶ Therefore, the discontinuity began with Aznar in 1996, but has been prevailing during Zapatero's term since 2004 as well.

It is generally accepted that during PP's two consecutive terms under the leadership of Aznar from 1996 to 2004, Spain was more visible and influential in international politics, both in EU and in the world in general. This was in part, due to Spain's EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2002, its non-permanent membership to UN Security Council in 2003-2004 term and Spain's strong support to Bush Administration for US intervention to Iraq.

_

⁵⁵ In an interview published in El Pais dated 10.06.2009, Jean-Marie Colombani, the former editor of the French newspaper "Le Monde", argues that if the Lisbon Treaty could be implemented, the French President Nicholas Sarkozy's candidate for the first Presidency of EU will be Felipe González.

⁵⁶ According to Torreblanca (2001), "to the surprise of Spanish public opinion, his European colleagues, and even his foreign minister, González emerged out of his first meeting with Chancellor Kohl in October 1983 declaring his support for the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II nuclear missiles."

Aznar's quest for formulating new foreign policy objectives for Spain could be considered as a result of Spain's transformation both in economic and political terms in 1980's and 1990's. However, the capacity (economic, military and cultural) of Spain was far behind meeting his ambitions. Moreover, it was not based on a broad consensus among the Spanish political elite. He missed the support of the majority of the Spanish public opinion, including the electorate of his own party, PP.⁵⁷

On the other hand, Zapatero downgraded Aznar's new foreign policy as the policy of the opponent Party, and adopted the mission of changing it totally and in some cases doing exactly the opposite. Thus, the victory of the PSOE in the general elections on March 14, 2004 represented a clear break with the model of foreign policy initiated by Aznar and return with some new features, the model formed from the period of transition to democracy. The soft power of Spain was in the forefront once again and Spain's focus shifted instantly from trans-Atlantic concerns to European ones.

The Spanish multinationals, on the other hand, compared to the successive Spanish Governments, have been demonstrating a far better performance in the international arena, compared to the successive Spanish Governments. According to IMF, in terms of its GDP in 2008, Spain ranks as the ninth biggest economy in the world (Table 1). Lately, Santander and BBVA, two giants in the banking sector, which have crucial investments overwhelmingly in Latin American countries, have been in the top five banks of the world in terms of their profits during the 2008-2009 period (ABC 12.1.2009). In July 2009, Spain's Sacyr Vallehermoso construction

⁵⁷ See Real Instituto Elcano Barometer of March 2004 (www.elcanoinstituto.org). According to the survey, 60 % of the respondents had a negative opinion against US and this percentage had increased (in 2003 it was 53 %) after the US military intervention to Iraq.

company in consortium with Impregilo, won the tender to build a new set of locks for the Panama Canal. The bid was \$3.12 billion, which was lower than the bids offered by the competing groups from other countries.

I argue that, the major reason behind Spain's current lower profile in the international politics, which clearly does not match its economic, military and cultural capacity, is the lack of consensus on the broad lines of its foreign policy. The need for such a consensus, at least between the two major political parties – PP and PSOE – has been clearly stated by various scholars, as well as by the leading political personalities like Josep Duran i Leida (2009).⁵⁸

From the summary made in Table 6, I argue that the ideological gap between the two major Parties plays the central role in the continuation of discord on the Spanish foreign policy since 1996. Therefore, the reasons, which lie behind this gap, need to be further elaborated. Spain did not participate in either of the world wars in the 20th century, however experienced a civil war, which stands as the main difference between Spain and the other major West European democracies. Hence, the analysis of effects of the Spanish Civil War and Franco's dictatorship on the Spanish electorate, as well as the Party leaders' discourses on this topic could be useful to elaborate the deep ideological gap between the supporters of PP and PSOE.

58 Arenal, 2008a, Aixalá i Blanch, 2005 and Barbé, 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Amirah-Fernández, Haizam, 2008, "Spain's Relations with Morocco and Algeria: Balancing Relations with the Southern Neighbours", in *North Africa: Politics, Region and the Limits of Transformation* by Zoubir, Yahia H. and, Amirah-Fernández, Haizam, pp. 348-364, Oxon: Routledge.

Aznar, José María, 2004, *Ocho Años de Gobierno*, Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, S.A.

Aznar, José María, 2007, *Cartas A Un Joven Español*, Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, S.A.

Balfour, Sebastian and Preston, Paul, 1999, *Spain and Great Powers in the 20th Century*, New York: Routledge.

Balfour, Sebastian, 2005, "The Reinvention of Spanish Conservatism. The Popular Party since 1989" in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain* edited by Balfour, Sebastian, pp. 146-168, London: Routledge.

Mendez-Lago, Monica, 2005, "The Socialist Party in Government and in Opposition", in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain* edited by Balfour, Sebastian, pp. 169-197, London: Routledge.

Breuning, Marijke, 2007, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cembrero, Ignacio, 2006, Vecinos alejados. Los secretos de la crisis entre España y Marruecos, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg.

Gillespie, Richard, 1995, *The Spanish Socialists in Democratic Spain: Reshaping External Relations in a changing world*, 1995, by R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo and J. Story (editors), London: Routledge.

Holsti, K.J, 1982, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, New York: Allen & Unwin.

Marín, José María and Molinero, Carme and Ysas, Pere, 2001, *Historia política 1939-2000*, pp. 133-207, Madrid: Istmo.

Pereira, Juan Carlos (coord.), 2003, La Politica exterior de España (1800-2003), Barcelona: Ariel.

Preston, Paul, 2007, *The Spanish Civil War, Reaction, Revolution and Revenge*, London: Harpercollins Pub.

Redondo, Juan Carlos Jiménez, 2006, *De Suárez a Zapatero: La política exterior de la España democrática*, Madrid: Dilex.

Rosenau, James, 1981, *The Study of Political Adaptation*, London, New York: F. Pinter, Nichols Pub. Co.

Tayfur, M. Fatih, 2003, Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy; the Cases of Greece and Spain, Wiltshire: Ashgate Publishing Company.

ARTICLES

Aixalá i Blanch, 2005, "La política exterior española ante los retos de su politización: del consenso a la legitimidad", *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals*, Year: 2005 No: 69, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/article/view/2842 2.

Arenal, Celestino del, 2003, "EEUU y la política latinoamericana de España", *Política Exterior periodical*, Vol. 17, No. 93: pags. 183-193.

Arenal, Celestino del, 2004, "Spanish Policy on Latin America in 2002", *the Real Instituto Elcano Working Papers* no: 23/2004, via Elcano portal, available from: "Spanish Policy on Latin America in 2002 - Elcano".

Arenal, Celestino del, 2005, "From the 2004 Ibero-American summit (San José, Costa Rica) to the 2005 Ibero-American summit (Salamanca, Spain)", the Real Instituto Elcano Working Papers, no: 5/2005 (Translation from Spanish), via Elcano portal, available from:

"http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT5-2005"

Arenal, Celestino del, 2008a, "Consenso y Disenso en la Política Exterior de España", *the Real Instituto Elcano Working Papers*, no: 25/2008, via Elcano portal, available from:

"http://www.einiras.org/pub/details.cfm?lng=en&id=95977"

Arenal, Celestino del, 2008b, "Entre la afirmación de la dimensión normativa y el reforzamiento del pragmatismo: la política exterior y de seguridad de España en 2007", in *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2007*, edicion 2008, pp. 336-350, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/anuarios/anuario_internacional_cidob/anuario_internacional_cidob_2008".

Aznar, Jóse María, 1996, "Presente y futuro de España en el mundo", *Ensayos Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE)* no: 8, via INCIPE portal, available from: "http://www.incipe.org/ensayo8.htm"

Barbé, Esther, 1990, "La transición española: Cambio y continuidad en la política exterior y de seguridad", *Revista de sociologia; Núm: 33, Política i societat a Espanya : 1977-1989*, available from:

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Papers/article/viewFile/25066/58171".

Barbé, Esther, 1996, "Spain: The uses of foreign policy cooperation" in C. Hill (editor), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, 1996, London: Routledge.

Barbé, Esther, 2005, "Disenso y adversidad: la política exterior y de seguridad de España en 2005", via CIDOB portal, *Anuario Internacional CIDOB*, No:1, pages 289-302, available from: "http://www.raco.cat/index.php/AnuarioCIDOB/article/view/42620/43510".

Barbé, Esther, 2006, La política europea de España 2005-2006, , *Observatori de Política Exterior Europea (Obs*), Working Paper 69, via Obs portal, available from:

"http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/worpap/2007/hdl_2072_4754/wp69200 6.pdf".

Bustos, Rafael, 2007, "Las relaciones España-Argelia, una mirada desde España", in *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2006*, edicion 2007, pp. 498-503, available from:

"http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/anuarios/anuario_internacional_cidob/anuario_internacional_cidob_2006_edicion_2007".

Del Piño, Domingo, 2002, "Morocco-Spain: A Relationship Difficult to Repair" (Translation from Spanish), *Real Instituto Elcano* (ARI) papers N° 106-2002.

Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, Louisa and Dris, Chérif, 2007, "Argelia-España: unas relaciones de geometría variable", *in Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2006*, edicion 2007, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/anuarios/anuario_internacional_cidob/anuario_internacional_cidob_2006_edicion_2007".

Duran i Leida, Josep, 2009, "Reflexiones sobre dos decadas de politica exterior espanola", *Anuario internacional CIDOB 2008*; edición 2009, pp. 324-335, via CIDOB portal, available from: "http://www.cidob.org/es/content/download/15227/114774/file/26_Duran_cast.pdf".

Fayanas, Edmundo, 2004, "La Nueva Politica Exterior Espanola", *El Conformista Digital*, available from:

"http://www.elinconformistadigital.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=831".

Galvez, Alejandro del Valle, 2007, "España-Marruecos: Una Relacion Bilateral de Alto Potencial Conflictivo, Condicionada por la Union Europea – Panaroma con Propuestas", *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, No: 14/2007, available from: "http://reei.org/reei%2014/Del%20Valle(reei14).pdf".

Grant, Charles, 2009, "¿Por qué pesa poco España?", article published in *ABC newspaper* dated 8.6.2009.

Grasa, Rafael, 1997, "Política exterior y de seguridad en un año de Tránsito", *Anuario internacional CIDOB*; edición 1997, pp. 29-48.

Grasa, Rafael, 2001, "La política exterior española hacia América Latina: tendencias recientes y proyección hacia el futuro", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, núm. 54-55, pp. 65-83, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/article/view/2823 3/28067".

Gillespie, Richard, 2002, *Lidiando con la ambicion: la politica exterior y de seguridad de España al inicio del nuevo milenio*, Anuario internacional CIDOB 2001; edición 2002, pp. 23-33, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.cidob.org/es/content/download/7257/72396/file/2_gillespie.pdf".

Gillespie, Richard, 2005, "España y Marruecos: ¿hacia una agenda de reformas?", working paper of *Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior* (FRIDE), via FRIDE portal, available from:

"http://www.fride.org/descarga/WP06_EspaMarro_ESP_abr05.pdf".

Kennedy, Paul, 2001, "Spain", in *Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, by Manners, Ian and Whitman, Richard G., pp. 105-128, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Larramendi, Hernando de and Lopez Garcia, Bernabé, 2004, "Nuevo Impulso diplomático en el Sáhara, in *Afkar/ideas Revista trimestral para el diálogo entre el Magreb*, España y Europa", by IEMED, via IEMED portal, available from: "<u>Afkar / ideas. Revista trimestral para el diálogo entre le Magreb</u>, España y Europa".

Larramendi, M. Hernando de and Lopez Garcia, Bernabé, 2005, "El Sáhara Occidental, obstáculo en la construcción magrebí", , *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*, Documento De Trabajo No: 15, 2005 available from: "http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/int/int_0963.pdf".

Liedtke, N. Boris, 1999, "Spain and United States, 1945-1975", in Spain and Great Powers in the 20th Century by Balfour Sebastian and Preston, Paul (editors), pp. 229-244, New York: Routledge.

Malamud, Carlos, 2006, "Spain's Policy and Strategies Towards Latin America", paper commissioned by FOCAL in the framework of the project Strengthening of the Ibero-American Conference: Likely Impact on the Inter-American System and Canada's influence in the Americas, via FOCAL portal, available from: "http://www.focal.ca/pdf/Spain's%20Policy%20towards%20LAC.pdf".

Maravall, Jóse María & Santamaria, Julian, 1986, "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy", in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Part I Southern Europe*, by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Volume 1, pp. 71-128, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mendez-Lago, 2005, "The Socialist Party in Government and in Opposition", in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain* by Balfour, Sebastian (ed.), pp. 169-197, London: Routledge.

Moratinos, M. Angel, 2007, "España y el Sáhara", in *El Pais* newspaper dated 13.03.2007, via El Pais portal, available from: "http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Espana/Sahara/elpepu opi/20070313elpepiopi_5/Tes".

More, Iñigo, 2002, "Èl Imrescindible eje Madrid-Argel", in *Real Instituto Elcano (ARI)* papers N° 61-2002, available from: "www.realinstitutoelcano.org/portal/"

Obiols, Raimon and Solanilla, Pau, 2002, "Marruecos y España: crónica de un desencuentro", in *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2001*, edición 2002, pp. 294-298, via CIDOB portal, available from: "http://www.cidob.org/es/content/download/7279/72462/file/24_obiols.pdf".

Powell, Charles, 1993, "La dimensión exterior de la transición Española", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, núm. 26, pp. 28-40, via RACO portal, available from:

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/article/

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/article/viewFile/27936/40839".

Powell, Charles, 2001, "Fifteen Years on: Spanish membership in the European Union revisited", Paper presented at the conference, From isolation to integration: 15 years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in Europe, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2-3 November 2001, via Harvard Uniportal, available from:

"http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Powell.pdf".

Powell, Charles, 2003, "Política exterior y de Seguridad de España", *Anuario internacional CIDOB*; edición 2003, pp. 28-40, via RACO portal, available from:

"http://www.raco.cat/index.php/AnuarioCIDOB/article/viewFile/33850/165660".

Roy, Joaquín, 2006, "The Ibero-American Summit Process: Prospects, Future Development and Incentives for Latin America", Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special November 2006, via University of Pittsburg AEI portal, available from: "http://aei.pitt.edu/8173/01/RoyIberoAmericanSpecNov06.pdf".

Ruiz Miguel, Carlos, 2006, "Is the EU-Morocco Fishing Agreement an attempt by Spain to legalize Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara?", *Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos GEES*, Analisis nº 97, via GEES portal, available from:

"http://www.gees.org/articulos/is_the_eu_morocco_fishing_agree ment_an_attempt_by_spain_to_legalise_moroccan_occupation_of_th e_western_sahara_6999".

Serra i Massansalvador, Francesc, 2004, "Balance of an age in Spain's politics: the Aznar Administration (1996-2004) and European identity in Special Issue: Spain in Europe 1996-2004", no: EE 15/2004, via *The University Institute of European Studies (IUEE) portal*, available from:

"http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-publicacio/119/Mja3gNDxKlV6jPpjM4TN.PDF".

Torreblanca, Jóse Ignacio, 2001, "Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy", *ARENA Working Papers*, WP 01/26, via ARENA portal, available from:

"http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_26.htm"

Torreblanca, Jóse Ignacio, 2004, "La Politica Exterior en las Elecciones Generales del 2004: Entre el Divorcio de la Opinion Publica y la Falta de Consenso entre los Partidos", *Real Instituto Elcano (ARI)* papers N° 33-2004.

Vaquer i Fanes, 2007, "España y el Sáhara Occidental: la dimension partidista", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, Núm. 79-80- La política árabe y mediterránea de España, pp.125-144, via CIDOB portal, available from:

"http://www.cidob.org/index.php/es/content/download/6552/ _65476/file/vaquer_79_80.pdf".

Viñas, Angel, 1999, "Breaking the shackles from the past: Spanish Foreign Policy from Franco to Felipe Gonzalez", in *Spain and Great Powers in the 20th Century*, by Balfour, Sebastian and Preston, Paul (eds), 1999, pp. 248-263, New York: Routledge.

Wallerstein, I., 1976, "Semiperipheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crises", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 3, No.4, pp. 461-483.

WEB DOCUMENTS

ABC News International (source Associated Press) dated 19.03.2009, Spain to Withdraw Troops From Kosovo, available from: "http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7123634".

Barometer of *Real Instituto Elcano*, March 2004, available from: "http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WC M_GLOBAL CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/barometro/oleada+05".

Barometer of *Real Instituto Elcano*, December 2008, available from "http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenid o?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/barometro/oleada 19".

Barometer of *Real Instituto Elcano*, June 2007, survey among the Spanish people concerning the right of self-determination of the Western Sahara, available from:

"http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WC M_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/barometro/oleada+15".

Declaración De Principios Entre España, Marruecos Y Mauritania Sobre El Sahara (Trilateral Madrid Agreement), via *GEE portal*, available from:

"http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-654.pdf"

EU Commissioner Franz Fischler's speech in Rabat, 9 January 2001 on Fisheries Negotiations with Morocco, available from: "http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/press_corner/speeches/archives/speeches_2001/speech01_01_en.htm".

EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, published in the *Official Journal* of the EU dated 29.05.2006, L 141, available from: "http://eur-

<u>lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:141:SOM:ES:</u> HTML".

The Historical Memory Law, 2007, "Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura", available from: "http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/152-2007.html".

Infomiradas, newsletter of MFA of Spain dated 19.12.2008, available from:

"http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Actualidad/Documents/INFOMIRADAS_NUMERO%201.pdf".

Latin America: Regional Programming Document 2007-2013, prepared by the European Commission (External relations), available from:

"http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/la/rsp/07_13_en.pdf".

Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Council, addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council S/2002/161 (12 February 2002), available from:

"http://www.minurso.unlb.org/OLA%20Advisory%20S(2002)161.pdf"

Moratinos, Miguel Angel, 2004, Una nueva política exterior para España, *Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, on 10 March 2004. available from:

"http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=859032"

Non-Self-Governing Territories listed by General Assembly of the *United Nations* in 2002:

"http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm".

Press Briefing of US Department of State dated 20.03.2009, by Robert Wood, Acting Department Spokesman, Washington D.C., his reply to a question about the Spanish Government's decision to withdraw its troops from Kosovo, available from:

"http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/03/120710.htm".

Press release by the Presidency of the Government (La Moncloa) dated 26.03.2009, La Ministra de Defensa y el Secretario General de la OTAN se reúnen para tratar del regreso de las tropas españolas de Kosovo, available from:

"http://www.lamoncloa.es/Serviciosde Prensa/NotasPrensa/MDE/_2009/ntpr20090326_repliegue.htm".

Press release by the EU Commission dated 26.03.2001 on the negotiations concerning the EU-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement, available from:

"http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/press_corner/press_releases/archives/com01/com01_19_en.htm".

Salamanca Declaration, 15.10.2005 XV. Ibero-American Summit (Salamanca), available from:

"http://www.cumbreiberoamericana.org/cumbreiberoamericana/E S/Prensa/comunicadosPrensa/15-10-2005-60.htm".

Tratado De Amistad, Buena Vecindad Y Cooperación Entre El Reino De España Y La República Argelina Democrática Y Popular", available from:

"http://www.judicatura.com/Legislacion/1148.pdf".

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), available from:

"http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/".

UN Security Council Resolution 1495 (2003) on the situation concerning the Western Sahara, available from: "http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1513%20(2003)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC"

World Economy Forum's Global Competitiveness Index 2008-2009, available from:

"http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/2008/rankings.pdf".

Zapatero, Jóse Luis Rodríguez, 2008, *In Spain's Interest: A Committed Foreign Policy*, available from:

"http://www.maec.es/en/MenuPpal/Actualidad/Declaracionesydiscursos/Paginas/discursopresidente20080616EN.aspx".

NEWSPAPERS

ABC dated 30.06.2002, España se puso el traje de faena para bregar con la política de inmigración y las reformas económicas, available from: "http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-30-06-2002/abc/Internacional/españa-se-puso-el-traje-de-faena-para-bregar-con-la-politica-de-inmigracion-y-las-reformas-economicas_110074.html".

ABC dated 13.10.2003, *El PP cree que Zapatero se descalifica como alternativa y que el PSOE debe decidir si sigue siendo su candidato*, available from: "http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-13-10-2003/abc/Nacional/el-pp-cree-que-zapatero-se-descalifica-como-alternativa-y-que-el-psoe-debe-decidir-si-sigue-siendo-su-candidato_213506.html#".

ABC dated 5.7.2004, Aznar afirma que España debe reflexionar sobre el «lamentable» nivel de poder en la UE, available from: "http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-05-07-2004/abc/Nacional/aznar-afirma-que-espa%C3%B1a-debe-reflexionar-sobre-el-lamentable-nivel-de-poder-en-laue 9622408908044.html".

ABC dated 16.7.2004, Los saharauis consideran decepcionante la renuncia de Zapatero al Plan Baker, available from: "http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-16-07-2004/abc/Nacional/los-saharauis-consideran-decepcionante-la-renuncia-de-zapatero-al-plan-baker_9622584447264.html".

ABC dated 15.12.2004, *Polonia ve «difícil» apoyar a España en la UE tras el plantón de Zapatero*, available from: "http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-15-12-2004/Nacional/polonia-ve-dificil-apoyar-a-espa%C3%B1a-en-la-ue-tras-el-planton-de-zapatero_963969533594.html#".

ABC dated 6.11.2007, Mohamed VI «condena» y «lamenta» la visita de los Reyes a Ceuta y Melilla, available from: "Mohamed VI «condena» y «lamenta» la visita de los Reyes a Ceuta y Melilla - Nacional - Nacional - Abc.es".

ABC dated 20.03.2009, Zapatero: "La retirada de las tropas de Kosovo era algo lógico", available from: "http://www.abc.es/20090320/nacional-politica/zapatero-levemejoria-acceso-200903201358.html".

ABC dated 23.03.2009, *Rajoy ve en la retirada de Kosovo «un problema de incalculables consecuencias*, available from: "http://www.abc.es/20090323/nacional-nacional/reacciones-retirada-kosovo-200903231531.html".

The Economist dated 20.03 2004, the article titled: Europe without Aznar.

The Economist dated 30.04.2009, the article titled: A Good Bet: Investments in Latin America offer protection against Spain's slowdown".

The Guardian dated 17.03.2003, Full text: Press conference hosted by US president George Bush, British prime minister Tony Blair, Spanish prime minister Jóse María Aznar and Portugal's Prime Minister Jose Durao Barroso, The Azores, March 16, 2003", available from:

"http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/17/iraq.politics2".

The Independent dated 23.03.2009, Spain's defence minister shot down over Nato gaffe available from:

"http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spains-defence-minister-shot-down-over-nato-gaffe-1651734.html".

El Mundo dated 25.10.1998, *Aznar y Cuba*, *el camino hacia el «realismo»*, available from: "<a href="http://www.elmundo.es/1998/10/25/espana/25N0025.html"." http://www.elmundo.es/1998/10/25/espana/25N0025.html".

El Mundo dated 23.05.1999, 6 pilotos españoles comandaron ayer los ataques de la Alianza contra Serbia, available from "http://www.elmundo.es/1999/05/23/europa/23N0087.html".

El Mundo dated 26.04.2001, Aznar advierte a Marruecos que su actitud en la negociación pesquera tendrá consecuencias, available from:

"http://www.elmundo.es/2001/04/26/economia/987505.html".

El Mundo dated 11.12.2001, Zapatero exige que no se le acuse de deslealtad, available from:

"http://www.elmundo.es/2001/12/11/espana/1082816.html"

El Mundo dated 21.11.2002, El PP y los demás grupos condenan la 'represión de la dictadura franquista', available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2002/11/21/espana/1275698.html"

El Mundo dated 12.06.2003, Castro acusa a Aznar de forzar el 'boicot' europeo contra Cuba, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/2003/06/12/mundo/1415517.html".

El Mundo dated 20.06.2003, *Aznar pedirá que la Constitución recoja la herencia cristiana de la UE*, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2003/06/20/mundo/1421354.html".

El Mundo dated 19.04.2004, *Zapatero anuncia la retirada inmediata de las tropas de Irak*, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/04/18/espana/1082303 152.html".

El Mundo dated 23.04.2004, El Gobierno someterá a consulta la Constitución europea - Moratinos: «El espíritu de familia entre España y Francia ha vuelto a florecer», available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/04/23/espana/1627130.html".

El Mundo dated 25.04.2004, *Zapatero y Mohamed VI pactan luchar juntos contra el terrorismo islámico*, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/04/25/espana/1628078.html".

El Mundo dated 15.7.2004, Zapatero confirma en Argel el viraje sobre el Sáhara y pide a la ONU un nuevo plan, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2004/07/15/espana/1664373.ht ml".

El Mundo dated 13.09.2004, Zapatero proclama que 'la vieja Europa está como nueva, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/09/13/espana/1095098831.html".

El Mundo.es portal dated 23.11.2004, *Moratinos acusa a Aznar de haber apoyado el intento de golpe de estado contra Hugo Chávez en 2002*, available from:

"http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/11/23/espana/1101172874.html".

El Mundo dated 6.2.2006, Rajoy pide a Zapatero que 'tenga en cuenta' los altercados al hablar de la Alianza de Civilizaciones, available from:

"http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/02/06/espana/1139250521.html".

El Mundo dated 4.9.2007, *Argelia denuncia el «fiasco» de Repsol y Gas Natural y les pide una indemnización*, available from: "http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2007/09/06/economia/2195310.html".

"El Mundo.es economia" portal dated 6.9.2007, *Argelia solicita daños y perjuicios a Repsol y Gas Natural por no cumplir lo pactado*, "http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2007/09/05/economia/1 189000737.html".

The New York Times dated 19.04.2004, *Spanish Premier Orders Soldiers Home From Iraq*, available from: "httml?fta=y&incamp=archive:article_related".

El Pais (English edition), 18.07.2002, Spain to fly flag in Perejil until Morocco guarantees not to retake it.

El Pais (English edition), 18.07.2002, France blocks EU support to Spain in bid to maintain relations with Rabat.

El Pais (English edition), 16.06.2003, *Ana Palacio: France and Germany have made a strategic turn toward merger.*

El Pais dated 01.02.2006, La CASA y Venezuela mantienen el acuerdo para la venta a Caracas de 12 aviones: La aeronáutica sustituirá el equipamiento estadounidense para evitar los recelos de Washington", available from:

"http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/CASA/Venezuela/mantienen/acuerdo/venta/Caracas/aviones/elpporesp/20060201elpepunac_7/Tes".

El Pais dated 07.03.2007, Zapatero pide al Polisario y a Argelia que negocien la autonomía del Sáhara: El presidente augura una nueva etapa tras la propuesta marroquí, que excluye la independencia, available from:

"http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Zapatero/pide/Polisario/Argelia/negocien/autonomia/Sahara/elpepunac/20070307elpepinac_11/Tes".

El Pais dated 01.06.2007, *Rice: "Las relaciones con España van entrando en calor*, available from: "http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Rice/relaciones/Espana/van/entrando/calor/elpepuesp/20070601elpepunac_1/Tes".

El Pais 26.09.2007, Texto De Referencia: Acta De La Conversación Entre George W. Bush Y José María Aznar - Crawford, Tejas, 22 De Febrero De 2003 - Llegó el momento de deshacerse de Sadam", available from: "http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Llego/momento/deshacerse/Sadam/elpepuint/20070926elpepina c_1/Tes#despiece1".

El Pais dated 14.12.2007, Felipe González presidirá el 'grupo de sabios' de la UE, available from:

"http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Felipe/Gonzalez/presidira/grupo/sabios/UE/elpepuint/20071214elpepuint_13/Tes".

El Pais dated 19.03.2009, *Chacón anuncia la retirada de Kosovo*, "http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Chacon/anuncia/retirada/Kosovo/elpepuesp/20090319elpepunac_2/Tes".

El Pais dated 10.06.2009, Entrevista: El futuro de Europa - Periodista y politólogo francés Jean-Marie Colombani: "Sarkozy quiere que González sea presidente de Europa, available from: "http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/quiere/Gonzalez/sea/presidente/Europa/elpepiint/20090610elpepiint_4/Tes".

La Vanguardia dated 26.05.1996, Aznar y Al Gore difieren sobre la sanciones a los inversores en Cuba, available via: "http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.es/preview/1996/05/26/pagina-1/33924821/pdf.html".

La Vanguardia dated 29.10.2001, *Marruecos retira a su embajador en Madrid*, available from:

"http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.es/preview/2001/10/29/pagina-15/34196602/pdf.html".

La Vanguardia dated 4.11.2007, Los parlamentarios marroquíes consideran la visita de los Reyes como una "provocación grave, available from:

"http://www.lavanguardia.es/premium/publica/publica?COMPID =53408620357&ID_PAGINA=22088&ID_FORMATO=9&turbourl=fal se "

TABLES

TABLE 1 TOP 20 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD IN TERMS OF THEIR GDP IN 2008

	Country	GDP (MILLION US DOLLARS)
1	United States	14,264,600
2	Japan	4,923,761
3	China (PRC)	4,401,614
4	Germany	3,667,513
5	France	2,865,737
6	United Kingdom	2,674,085
7	Italy	2,313,893
8	Russia	1,676,586
9	Spain	1,611,767
10	Brazil	1,572,839
11	Canada	1,510,957
12	India	1,209,686
13	Mexico	1,088,128
14	Australia	1,010,699
15	South Korea	947,010
16	Netherlands	868,940
17	Turkey	729,443
18	Poland	525,735
19	Indonesia	511,765
20	Belgium	506,392

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009, available from:

[&]quot;http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx".

TABLE 2 SPANISH CAPITAL OUTFLOWS TO MOROCCO AND ALGERIA (1.000 EUROS)

	Until 1996	Between	Since 2004	Until
		1996-2004		January
				2009
	PSOE	PP	PSOE	
	Felipe	José María	José Luis	TOTAL
	González			IOIAL
	Gonzalez	Aznar	Rodríguez	
			Zapatero	
ALGERIA	923	7.466	192.740	201.130
MOROCCO	84.220	1.884.821	1.448.185	3.417.226
	10.106.700	260 202 214	206 704 721	
ALL	12.106.733	269.282.214	296.784.721	578.173.670
COUNTRIES				

Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade of Spain, available from:

"http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal_invex.aspx"

TABLE 3 SPANISH CAPITAL OUTFLOWS TO LATIN

AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS OF JUNE 2009

(1.000 EUROS)

COUNTRY		Amount
BRASIL		39.814.848
ARGENTINA		32.292.255
MEXICO		22.134.490
CHILE		11.810.709
PERU		4.278.962
COLOMBIA		4.053.386
VENEZUELA		2.647.767
URUGUAY		1.758.044
PANAMA		1.373.415
DOMINIC REPUBLIC		1.161.246
CUBA		863.987
GUATEMALA		687.687
ECUADOR		417.816
EL SALVADOR		266.145
BOLIVIA		235.265
COSTA RICA		210.388
NICARAGUA		157.871
HONDURAS		77.443
PARAGUAY		33.074
	TOTAL	124.274.798

Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade of Spain, available from:

[&]quot;http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal_invex.aspx"

TABLE 4 SPANISH CAPITAL OUTFLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA
ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT PERIODS (1.000 EUROS)

Until 1996	1996-2004	2004-2009	Until January
	Period	Period	2009
PSOE			
	PP	PSOE	
Felipe	José María Aznar	José Luis	TOTAL
González		Rodríguez	
		Zapatero	
3.669.327	100.537.125	26.739.410	124.274.798

Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade of Spain, available from:

TABLE 5 SPANISH CAPITAL OUTFLOWS TO CUBA (1.000 EUROS)

Until 1996	Between 1996- 2004	Since 2004	Until January 2009
PSOE	PP	PSOE	TOTAL
Felipe González	José María Aznar	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	
3.659	851.327	9.000	863.987

Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade of Spain, available from:

[&]quot;http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal_invex.aspx"

[&]quot;http://datainvex.comercio.es/principal_invex.aspx"

TABLE 6 SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING PP AND PSOE'S GOVERNANCE

POLICY GUIDELINES		
Popular Party 1996-2004	Socialist Party (2004 -)	
- "Realist" approach for maximizing the interests of Spain,	- Effective multilateralism,	
- Unilateral action whenever needed,	- Assumes the existence of capable international organizations and the rule of law	
- Trans-Atlantic relations has a priority,	in the collective management of world affairs,	
- EU is a means to accomplish Spanish interests,	- International legitimacy and human rights are fundamental principles,	
- Taking the lead in economic issues and home and justice affairs in EU are important,	- Preventive diplomacy is important,	
- Intergovernmental approach towards the EU issues,	- Fighting with poverty and hunger in the world is a priority,	
- Multi-speed Europe,	- Pro Franco-German axis,	
- Supporting Spanish Multinational Companies' interests abroad is a priority.	- Cooperative and Federalist approach towards the EU issues,	
	- UN has central place in international politics,	
	- Diplomatic capacity would give Spain the role of a major player.	

CONSEQUENCES		
Popular Party 1996-2004	Socialist Party (2004 -)	
- Close relations with US and UK,	- Withdrawal of the Spanish	
	troops from Iraq,	
- Strong support to US during the		
invasion of Iraq,	- Strongly supports UN	
	operations in Afghanistan,	
- Spanish Air Forces participated in		
the NATO operation against Serbia in	- Reform in the UN is important,	
1998,		
	- Co-sponsor of the Alliance of	
- Proactive in the formulation of EU	Civilizations Initiative,	
economic policies,		
	- Rejects to recognize "Kosovo"	
- Spain met the EURO-zone criteria,	as an independent state. Its	
	policy is not in line with the	
- Spain, with Britain led the Lisbon	Western alliance,	
Strategy,		
	- It has close relations with	
- Spanish Multinational Companies	Serbia	
made substantial investments		
abroad,	- Follows the general consensus	
	on EU issues, demonstrates a	
- Preferred to center their attention	lower profile,	
on issues related to justice and home		
affairs in EU,	- Follows a more tolerant	
	approach towards the Cuban	
- A greater level of tension between	and Venezuelan regimes,	
European and national interests.	compared to the Western bloc.	

MAPS


MAP 1 SPANISH TERRITORIES IN NORTH AFRICA



Source: Wikimedia Commons, available from:

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_del_sur_de_Espa%C3%B1a.png

MAP 2 THE WESTERN SAHARA



Source: UN, available from the web portal of MINURSO:

"http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minurso.pdf"