

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, AS A HEGEMONIC PROJECT?:  
THE CASE OF UKRAINE

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SİBEL ELİF ÖZDİLEK

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---

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha B. Altunışık  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts/Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman	(METU, ADM)	_____
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş	(METU, IR)	_____
Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel	(AU, FPS/IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Kibaroğlu	(METU, IR)	_____

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Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY, AS A HEGEMONIC PROJECT? THE CASE OF UKRAINE**

Özdilek, Sibel Elif

Ph.D., Department of International  
Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

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This thesis attempts to analyze the European Neighbourhood Policy from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, mapping transnational power relations in Europe and identifying the historical-specific articulations between economic, political and (civil) societal processes in the specific case of Ukraine. Thus the thesis attempts to show how the EU's hegemonic project is formed and applied, it also explores whether there are redefinitions of the EU hegemonic project and ask whether it is sustainable or not. It is contended that the European Commission's neo-liberal strategy is designed to transform the region into a space in which the free flow of capital, goods and services is secured, but the free movement of people is heavily restricted, and no commitment is made towards full membership for its partners.

In fact, this study explores whether or not the ENP as a hegemonic project is likely to establish an historic bloc; whether the ENP is sustainable or not with the consent of its partners. This study focuses on social power relations and their organisation and articulation within the structures of the state/civil-societal complex at the national and transnational levels in order to analyse the degree and manner of both coercion and consent given to the EU's hegemonic project, which in turn will allow for an assessment of the project's likelihood of success. The EU's general strategy towards its neighbours is shown to be a hegemonic project spearheaded by an intellectual and moral leadership directed by conflicting political and cultural agents and organisations.

Key Words: European Neighbourhood Policy, Hegemonic Project, Ukraine

# ÖZ

## AVRUPA KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI: BİR HEGEMONYA PROJESİ Mİ?: UKRAYNA ÖRNEK ÇALIŞMA

Özdilek, Sibel Elif

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Bu tez, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını, Avrupa'daki transnasyonal güç ilişkilerini de ortaya koyarak; ekonomik, siyasi ve toplumsal süreçleri tarihsel değişimleri ışığında, Ukrayna örneğinde Neo-Gramscian perspektifte incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Tez, böylece Avrupa Birliği Hegemonya Projesinin nasıl oluşup uygulandığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca bu projenin yeniden tanımlanmaları olup olmadığı ve kalıcı olup olmadığı da sorgulanmaktadır. Komisyon'un neo-liberal stratejileri ile bölgenin serbest sermaye, hizmet ve mal dolaşımının güvence altına alınabileceği bir bölgeye dönüştürüleceği, fakat kişilerin serbest dolaşımının kısıtlı tutulacağı ve üyelik taahhüdünde bulunulmadığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Gerçekte, Tez, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının tarihsel bloğa dönüşüp dönüşmeyeceğini ve tarafların rızası ile kalıcılığının sağlanıp sağlanamayacağını araştırmaktadır. Bu çalışma, toplumsal güç ilişkilerine, onların örgütlenmesine ve ulusal / transnasyonal düzeyde devlet sivil toplum kompleksi içerisinde, Avrupa Birliği hegemonya projesinde hangi derecede güç ve rıza kullanıldığını analiz etmektedir. Bu sayede projenin başarı olasılığının ne olabileceği değerlendirilebilecektir.

Avrupa Birliği'nin komşularına karşı genel stratejisi, çatışan siyasi ve kültürel ajanlar ve örgütler tarafından idare edilen entelektüel / ahlaki liderlikle oluşan bir hegemonya projesi olarak gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Hegemonya Projesi, Ukrayna

*To the most valuable three men in my life, my husband and my two sons  
born during this period*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Action Plan
BACs	Business Advisory Councils
BECs	Business Enlargement Councils
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CEE	Central and Eastern European Countries
CEEP	European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation and Enterprises of General Economic Interest
CEI	Central European Initiative
CES	Common Economic Space
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Common Wealth of Independent States
COREPER	Council of Permanent Representatives
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union Development
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Communities
ECB	European Central Bank
ECU	European Currency Unit
EEA	European Economic Area
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	European Monetary Union
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EMI	European Movement International
EMP	European Mediterranean Policy
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
ERT	European Round Table of Industrialists

ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ETUC	European Confederation of Trade Unions
EU	European Union
Euro Fed	European Federation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FNPR	Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
FPU	The Ukrainian Federation of Trade Unions
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GINGO	Government Interested NGOs
GONGO	Government Organised NGOs
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IER	Integrated Economic Region
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KPU	Communist Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MEEI	Ministry of Economy and European Integration (Ukraine)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ukraine)
ND	Northern Dimension
NDI	Northern Dimension Initiative
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OECD	Co-operation and Development
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
SEA	Single Economic Act
SEM	Single European Market
SES	Single Economic Space
SPU	Socialist Party
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU	Treaty on European Union

TKK	Temporary Co-ordinating Commission
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
UASG	UNICE Advisory and Support Group
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employers' Organizations
WNIS	Western Newly Independent States
WNIS	Western Newly Independent States

# CHAPTER 1

## *Introduction*

The collapse of the Soviet Union represented the dawn of a new era in international relations, bringing about a change in borders and a geo-political transformation, specifically in the European Union (EU hereafter). The 2004 enlargement pushed the borders of the EU towards the 'still unstable' former Eastern bloc forcing the EU to diversify its policies. Since the territory where prospective problems could arise was that of the former Eastern bloc member states, EU assistance was required to assist these countries in making their transition to a market economy and in democratizing their political systems. Otherwise, the conflicts stemming from these countries could threaten EU stability. The EU thus felt obliged to export stability, economic prosperity and democracy, in other words, it was an attempt to reshape these countries in line with the EU requirements.

The EU seems to prefer foreign policy via bilateral relationships, as reflected in its dense network of bilateral agreements with countries in both Eastern and Southern Europe.<sup>1</sup> The most obvious manifestation of this preference is the accession process. That is regarded as an asymmetrical one sided process based upon an interlay one-sided projection of norms and values.<sup>2</sup> The application of the EU's normative hegemony is confined with the EU members, with the promise of an eventual membership status. However, the EU has negotiated and completed eleven Partnership and Cooperation Agreements out of the fifteen states within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP hereafter). Here, lies a crucial difference, which is the lack of promise of membership.

The European Neighbourhood Policy initiative, a British inspired proposal in April 2002, targeted the East-European countries that would become EU neighbours as of May 2004. This policy, which was first outlined by the Commission in its 'Communication on Wider Europe' of March 2003, demonstrates the high priority that the Union accords to

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<sup>1</sup> Hiski Haukkala, "A Normative Power or a Normative Hegemon? The EU and Its European Neighbourhood Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, November 2008, p.24

<sup>2</sup> Vinod Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty, "Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism, *EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism*, ed. Vinod Aggarwal and Edward A Gogarty, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.231.

shaping the future relations with their neighbours. The Commission presented a strategy paper and country reports on 12th May 2004 which is an important step in setting out in concrete terms how the Union can work more closely with its neighbours and extend some of the benefits of enlargement. The official documents on the ENP are the Communication of March 2003, the Commission's Strategy Paper on 12 May 2004 and European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT hereafter) documents. Also according to the Strategy Paper, the Action Plans will establish key priorities to be addressed in the years ahead.

Initially known as the 'Wider Europe' and 'Proximity Policy,' the ENP was created as an extension of existing regional and bilateral relationships that had been established with non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region through the Barcelona Process and in Eastern Europe through various Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs hereafter). With the ENP, the EU sought to address certain problems encountered inherent in these existing agreements and bring them up-to-date with the current political climate. To be more specific, the EU aimed to 'develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – 'ring of friends' – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations'.<sup>3</sup>

The ENP became the EU's primary framework for handling a range of problems and relationships with its new neighbours. By adopting a single framework for relations with all the neighbouring countries, the EU hoped to reduce concerns among its neighbours about their relative status to each other and mitigate internal EU divisions about prioritising relations among the partners.<sup>4</sup> It also enabled the EU to offer its partners a range of incentives and cooperative mechanisms for solving various problems, all bound up in an institutional framework that could be tailored to the needs of individual

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<sup>3</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A new framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Brussels 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun, "Governing Europe's Neighbourhood", (ed.) *Conclusion: the ENP and external governance in theory and practice*, Manchester University Press, 2007, p.220.

countries, which is the fundamental principle of the European Neighborhood Policy. Hence it is not possible to ignore the differences between the partners.<sup>5</sup>

This thesis attempts to analyze the ENP from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, mapping transnational power relations in Europe and identifying the historical-specific articulations between economic, political and (civil) societal processes in the specific case of Ukraine. Thus the thesis attempts to show how the EU's hegemonic project is formed and applied, and ask whether there are redefinitions of the EU hegemonic project and ask whether it is sustainable or not. It is assumed that the Commission's neo-liberal strategy is designed to transform the region into a space in which the free flow of capital, goods and services is secured, but the free movement of people is heavily restricted, and no commitment is made towards full membership for its partners.

In fact, this study explores whether or not the ENP as a hegemonic project is likely to establish an historic bloc; whether the ENP is sustainable or not with the content of its partners.

In line with the focus of the thesis, *Chapter 2* presents the theoretical framework of the study. Neo-Gramscian analysis focuses, in general, on the national and transnational level, seeking to understand how hegemony is organised and structured. In contrast to realist theory, which views hegemony as secured by force, Gramsci defines hegemony as an interplay between coercion and consent. In line with this point, this study focuses on social power relations and their organisation and articulation within the structures of the state/civil-societal complex at the national and transnational levels in order to analyse the degree and manner of both coercion and consent given to the EU's hegemonic project, which in turn will allow for an assessment of the project's likelihood of success. The EU's general strategy towards its neighbours is shown to be a hegemonic project spearheaded by an intellectual and moral leadership directed by conflicting political and cultural agents and organisations. *Chapter 3* highlights how this hegemonic project has been constructed by social forces whose moral, intellectual and material resources permit them to occupy a leading role within the EU. The ENP in particular is interrogated whether it is the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social

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<sup>5</sup> EU representatives discussed the initiative during a conference that for the first time gathered ministers

forces in Europe and their interactions with the EU institutions and how these social forces are formed. Moreover the thesis attempts to identify the different forms of social forces at local, national and transnational level both in the context of the EU and specifically in the case of Ukraine. The chapter explores the emergence of the ENP from the Barcelona Process, and offer a preliminary evaluation of its performance. The chapter examines whether and to what extent these kinds of social forces representing EU Capital are also influential in the decision-making of ENP process. This chapter will also look into the role of the international, transnational civil societies and institutions (such as ERT; EMI and Business Europe) assume. It also aims to analyse the internal structure of the EU and its external dynamics and their relationship in the decision taken for the ENP. The chapter finally questions the sustainability of the ENP.

*Chapter 4* examines Ukraine as a case study for the ENP. The reason why Ukraine is chosen among the ENP countries is that Ukraine is one of the largest and most populous states on the continent of Europe, Ukraine is ‘sandwiched’ between Russia and the EU in the centre of a European sub-region that has been characterised by great instability since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Ukraine itself has great potential to either stabilise or destabilise the region. Therefore, the question of Ukraine’s future orientation is of crucial importance for European security in general. Alexander Motyl prioritizes the characteristics that he believes will ensure Ukraine a central role in the future of Europe, beginning with Ukraine’s impressive physical size, economic potential and resource endowment, and including its defining impact on Russia, which makes it important for the stability and security of Europe.<sup>6</sup>

Ukraine is distinct among the EU neighbourhood countries that it possesses rich mineral wealth, it has a major ferrous metal industry, produces cast iron, steel and its chemical industry produces coke, mineral fertilizers, and sulphuric acid. It has important energy sources, such as coal, and large mineral deposits and high-quality human capital. Ukraine is one of the world’s leading energy transit countries, providing transportation of Russian and Caspian oil and gas across the territory. Not only does Ukraine occupy a space between the East and the West on the edge of Europe, it also occupies a space at the edge

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from all 16 members of the ENP, 03 September 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Alexander J.Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993:, p.1.



of a cultural boundary.<sup>7</sup> The religious fault line between Catholicism and Orthodoxy runs through Ukraine. As the second largest country in Europe with the fifth largest population in Europe, Ukraine has a geo-strategic importance not only Europe, but for the United States and the Russian Federation as well. Due to its geo-strategic location and being in between contested hegemonies, Ukraine is the leading actor within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and plays a critical role in the former Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. Ukraine also has a ‘special relationship’ with Russia, thanks to their historical and cultural interconnections and their common Slavic ancestors.<sup>8</sup>

Ukraine is different from the other neighbouring countries. Regarding the Visegrad countries, Ukraine has a peculiar place in the perception of these countries. Hungary and Slovakia share a common border with Ukraine, and Hungary and Slovakia as well as the Czech Republic all have either sizeable Ukrainian minorities in their territories or sizeable numbers of their own ethnic groups in Ukraine. Poland’s mission to modernise and democratise Eastern Europe has made it a particular champion of Ukrainian membership in the EU. However, the other Visegrad countries have their own interests and priorities; hence their contribution to the ENP in general and to Ukraine in particular is unfocused and unstable. The Baltic countries also have historical and geographic ties with Ukraine, and they tend to support the ENP in general out of their desire to strengthen their own power and reduce the influence of Russia in the region, increase the reliability of the energy supply, and solve frozen conflicts, virtually all of which are directly or indirectly related to Russia.<sup>9</sup> The Baltic countries also have strong ties with the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in general, and they have recently started to use the ENP as the main vehicle for their activities towards the region. However the cornerstone of a more solid success would require reconciling their

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Elif Şimşek, *Post-Soviet Political Transformation in Ukraine (1991-2004)*, unpublished Masters Thesis submitted to METU, November 2005, p.2.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Kratochvil, “New EU Members and the ENP: Different Agendas, Different Strategies”, *Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy*, 42:4, July/August, p.194

strategies with sometimes outright antithetical measures taken by the biggest player in the region – the Russian Federation.<sup>10</sup>

There are also a number of other fundamental distinguishing aspects of Ukraine. Compared to the Balkans and the Mediterranean, Ukraine has been a relative zone of stability, having experienced no major wars in the 1990s. The longevity and immediacy of Ukraine's Soviet past is deeply reflected upon Ukrainian social, political and economic life. As Alexander Motyl has put it, the gap between these states and the rest of Europe is systemic,<sup>11</sup> not because their identities are accepted as being non-European and, therefore different, but precisely because they are 'European-plus' – plus Slavic, plus Russian, plus *unique*.<sup>12</sup>

It may be argued that Ukraine is the focal point for different interests and strategies in the region regarding Russian Federation and the European Union since Ukraine has the potential to contribute to stability as well as polarization and thus further instability in the Black Sea region.

The thesis initially elaborates on the historical experiences of Ukraine. The study evaluates how the state develops its position in accordance with the changes at the global level and questions how Ukrainian policy is shaped and redefined. The political instability and its reflection upon the relationship with the EU will be studied so as to show where and when the hegemonic discourses were formed. The study aims to examine to what extent Ukrainians are content with the EU's incentives on several issues, such as the energy problem, the visa and asylum issues.

The second part of the chapter looks into the nature of two competing hegemonic projects: Russia and the EU hegemonic projects. The former aims to create 'Single Economic Space' within the context of CIS which aims at reconstructing the old regional

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>11</sup> Alex J. Motyl, "Ukraine, Europe and Russia: Exclusion or Dependence?", in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin (eds.), *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003, p. 38.

<sup>12</sup> Dov Lynch, "The New Eastern Dimension of the Enlarged EU", ed. Chairlot papers No.64, September 2003, p.35.

dominance. The latter is the EU's hegemonic project, 'Integrated European Economic Space'.

*Chapter V* summarises the main conclusions of the thesis and states its logical consequences.

Together with the secondary sources that consist of published and printed materials, primary research was also conducted to enhance the theoretical part. In order to undertake a rewarding field-work; Brussels, as the decision making body of the ENP and Ukraine, as the specific application of ENP were chosen. Primary research was conducted in Brussels in 2006 and 2007 respectively. In order to have structured and beneficial outcome; all in-depth information interviews were categorized in such a way that, different perceptions with different interests, priorities and expectations were analyzed from every possible angle.

To understand well the process that lies beneath the formation and implementation of ENP; the interviews were conducted with the policy makers; such as the Commissioners, Members of the Parliament and other Eurocrats, so that the inner political conjuncture can be best understood from their point of view.

Policy analysts, academics, journalists, technocrats, foreign diplomatic mission representatives and specialists were interviewed, to test the early findings of research and to benefit from their most qualified analytical perspective to evaluate ENP in terms of the strengths and weaknesses as well as the opportunities and threats it possesses.

Apart from the European context, national perspective was also required to analyze the policy comprehensively. Therefore, diplomatic mission representatives were interviewed to examine how the neighboring states perceive ENP as a part of their foreign policies.

Finally, representatives from civil societies and business organizations as representing the social forces were central to the theoretical framework of the thesis. Hence both national and transnational civil society members who were once the high level Eurocrats were asked for their valuable opinions. Thus this enabled to gather both the internal and external insights to ENP dynamics.

The research findings presented in the thesis are based on data (mainly interviews and documents) collected during research trips to Kyiv and Brussels in March and September 2007, respectively. The in-depth information interviews with the Ukrainian policy makers, opinion makers, political party representatives, technocrats, academics, journalists and foreign diplomatic mission representatives helped to test the early findings of research before utilising in the thesis.

## CHAPTER 2

### *Theoretical Framework of the Study*

#### *2.1 Introduction*

In the twenty-first century, concern arose among EU theorists regarding, exactly how to study the European Union and European Integration as different definitions of integration arise and as there is the rapidly increasing knowledge of the EU. The changing agenda and the conjuncture following the last eastern enlargement began to create problems, leading to new EU policies and hence a multitude of corresponding new theories. The 1990s can be characterized as a period of multi-theorising.<sup>13</sup> EU theorists concentrated less on the grand questions regarding the development of an integrated Europe and more on the understanding of particular aspects of this integration. The study of Europe had become less *sui generis* and more commonplace. In addition to international relations, other disciplines, including those that could be placed broadly under the heading of comparative politics, had entered the fray. European studies had thus become an academic area where theories about politics with wider applicability could be tested and developed.

Some traditional theories of European Integration for instance may not be applicable for today's political and economic conjuncture. Differentiation is an important characteristic of the twenty-first century which should be taken into consideration. Consensus was still the main condition of agreement. This proved hard to achieve among the thirty States with diverse interests and divergent economies and in absence of effective leadership. Increasingly, the behaviour of the EU members forced towards greater difference and diversity.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Jurgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections of the Future of Europe", *Praxis International*, 12:1, 1992, p. 1-19.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Taylor, *The End of European Integration: Anti-Europeanism Examined*, Routledge 2008 p.168 (See also: Renato Holub, *Antonio Gramsci Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism*, Routledge, 1992, p. 3, 6-15).

Gramsci's theoretical approach to understanding the process of social contestation can be extended to encompass multiple social actors competing for influence over the rules, institutions, norms, and policies that structure markets and economic relations. The neo-Gramscian framework provides a perspective that is theoretically grounded, reflects material, discursive, and organizational dimensions of power, and points to the importance of strategy in effecting change within complex social systems. The framework provides an integrative approach that overcomes the dichotomy between market and non-market strategies. The neo-Gramscian perspective draws insights from other theoretical approaches, but offers a particular contribution to institutional theory by presenting a framework which addresses some of the tensions of the agency-structure relationship, provides a concept of ideology that avoids problems of elitism and essentialism, and incorporates dynamics endogenously. Moreover, the Neo-Gramscian framework presents a strategic notion of power which suggests how actors can gain at least partial comprehension of and influence over complex social and political systems.

The continuities and departures in historical experiences affected the tendencies of integration in the 1990s. As Bieler argues, the transnationalisation process in each country of Central and Eastern Europe differs, as does the internationalisation of neo-liberal restructuring through various forms of State.<sup>15</sup>

Hence this thesis examines the European Neighbourhood Policy from Neo-Gramscian perspective. In examining today's emerging world order and regional integrations such as the EU, IR Gramscians look at political and cultural spaces in which both coercive and consensus-forming elements of an emergent State are ill-formed, and may never form, but in which both international civil society and any emergent international State proper exist in an identifiable, real relationship with each other.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Andreas Bieler, "European integration and eastward enlargement: the widening and deepening of neo-liberal restructuring in Europe", *Queen's Papers on Europeanisation* No 8/2003, p.6, available at <http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesPhilosophy/FileStore/EuropeanisationFiles/Fileupload.5264.en.pdf> (accessed in March 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Craig N. Murphy, "Understanding IR understanding Gramsci; Why Gramsci's ideas about civil society are relevant to the current era?", *Review of International Studies*, 24:417-425 Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 421.

Gramsci developed his conceptual approach within the context of a nation-State, the Italian State, through his political analysis on the history of Italy's late development of a unified State. Gramsci's approach to totality intends to avoid the determinism of the structural approaches and Marxist 'economism' where both approaches assume that changes within the socio-economic level can not determine but create conditions within which social struggles at the political level takes place.<sup>17</sup> Neo-Gramscians place the class forces formed in the process of production at the centre of their analysis. By grounding state power in class relations, the neo-Gramscians are consistent with both Gramsci's view that international relations follow fundamental social relations and his conception of States as terrain of struggle. Moreover, against realism, Neo-Gramscian theory argues that the essential entities of the international system are not States but State-society complexes, and that the international system should be understood not as an inter-State system but as an articulation of social forces, forms of State and world orders.<sup>18</sup>

Gramsci was a man of thought and action. Gramsci believed in the unity of theory and practice, "Every action is the result of various wills, with a varying degree of intensity and awareness and of homogeneity with the entire complex of the collective will, it is clear that the theory corresponding to it and implicit in it will be a combination of beliefs and points of view which are equally disordered and heterogeneous"<sup>19</sup>, Gramsci perceived development between the economic 'structure' (base) and political, legal and cultural 'superstructures' as connected with each other within a real historical process representing a social totality in a reciprocal relationship. The approach to totality is best emphasized by Gramsci through his analysis of the historical bloc.

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<sup>17</sup> Andreas Bieler, "The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical Materialist Analysis of European Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9:4, August 2002, p.580.

<sup>18</sup> Adam David Morton, "Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy", *Rethinking Marxism*, 15:2, April 2003, p. 155.

<sup>19</sup> See the Antonio Gramsci Internet Archive on [www.marxist.org](http://www.marxist.org) for the online version of Antonio Gramsci, *Selections for the Prison Notebooks*, translated and edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971) The quotation is from online version of the book. [http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/editions/spn/study\\_philosophy/ch01.htm#s16](http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/editions/spn/study_philosophy/ch01.htm#s16). (Accessed on 23 June 2007)

*Material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely indicative value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.*<sup>20</sup>

Hence, regarding the changes taking place within EU, what emerges as reform and transformation processes are discerned as results of social struggles fought within the social totality, where the historically specific constitutive forms within the social totality are themselves subject to change in the dialectics of the actual processes.

The move to apply Gramsci's work to global politics has been devised by the recent works of Robert Cox, who moved to place the Gramscian notions of hegemony and historic blocs into international practices by inter-relating the global notions of social forces, States and world order with the hegemonic characteristics of material capabilities, ideas and institutions. These interrelated organs combine at a global level and contribute to global norms.<sup>21</sup>

This chapter examines why and how neo-Gramscian perspectives may be applied to European Neighbourhood Policy and attempts to examine the way in which the formation of hegemonic discourse of ENP is produced. It also attempts to analyse whether or not these hegemonic discourses may lead to a historic bloc.

This study analyzes whether the European Union's strategy towards the neighbouring countries can be sustained or not as well as underlining the problems associated with the current strategy. It argues that the strategy may be sustained for a while with consent of its partners.

Despite their considerable differences, in many important respects the prevailing theoretical perspectives suffer from an excessive focus on institution and ideas, while

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<sup>20</sup> David Forgacs (ed.), *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p.200.

<sup>21</sup> Robert W. Cox, *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* New York Columbia University Press, 1987, p.137.



paying insufficient attention to the ways in which these institutions and ideas have during the last decade promoted a neo-liberal agenda that has served to re-cast relations between capital and labour. The limitations of mainstream theory were perhaps more salient in the early years of the Union than at the present time. The focus on elite decision making, institutional spillover, and interstate bargaining made more sense when the European Project itself had limited engagement with national societies and the content of comparatively modest European initiatives was consistent with the main political and economic contours of the postwar settlement. Prior to the completion of the single market and the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, EU was not an important independent factor in European affairs or in world affairs.<sup>22</sup> The common problematique of these mainstream approaches is that they are rather narrow and they exclude adequate considerations of important socio-political questions about European Politics and they emanate from a common premise, that market forces are expressions of human nature and constitute the realm of freedom in political affairs. Power and special interests are strictly contained in the discrete realm of interstate affairs.

The debate concerns the degree to which the anarchy of the international system manifests itself as an objective external reality that constrains the possibilities of realizing the alleged inner rationality inherent in market forces and free trade.<sup>23</sup>

Intergovernmental and realist theories signifying the State and their relations and stressing the role played by interstate bargaining ignores the role of the transnational institutions in the decision making particularly the Commission which is also supported by several transnational actors.<sup>24</sup> State-centric theories claim that EU's re-launching was independent from any pressures of any of Europe's supranational institutions and their leaders, or from transnationally organized business groups. Indeed, in the realist State-centric ontology of intergovernmentalism social forces are

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<sup>22</sup> Alan Cafruny, Magnus Ryer (eds.), *A Ruined Fortress Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p.5.

<sup>23</sup> Ryner Magnus, Henk Overbeek, and Otto Holman, "Neoliberal Hegemony and the Political Economy of European Restructuring", *International Journal of Political Economy* 21, 1-2, 1998: p.4.

<sup>24</sup> Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, (eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

all excluded from the analysis.<sup>25</sup> Conventional integration theories tend to focus largely on the institutional form of the integration process, thus ignoring the question of its socio-economic content, or the ‘social purpose’ underlying European order.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand critical political economy recognises the power relations, special interests, and arbitrariness contained in market forces and civil societal relations and it seeks to relate these to State power.<sup>27</sup>

Gramsci revised classical Marxist accounts of the State’s role in society, culture and ideology, and stressed the autonomy of the political process from the economic base.<sup>28</sup> Gramsci argued that in the West, the political power of the ruling class does not rest on the control of the coercive apparatus of the State, but is diffused and situated in the myriad of institutions and relationships in civil society. This form of class rule, hegemony, is based on consent and is backed up only in the last instance by the coercive apparatus of the State. Gramsci’s most significant insight was that the persistence of social and economic structures in the face of the inequalities and alienation of early twentieth century capitalism is not dependent on coercive control by small elite. Rather, hegemony rests on a broad base of consent, which relies on coalitions and compromises that provide a measure of political and material accommodation with other social groups, and on ideologies that convey a mutuality of interests Gramsci rejected deterministic and economic interpretations of Marx, which proposed that the ideal superstructures were more reflective of the economic base.<sup>29</sup> Gramsci understood the realm of culture and ideology to be somewhat autonomous.

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<sup>25</sup> See Andrew, Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act”, *International Organisation*, 45:1, 1991 p. 64-65.

<sup>26</sup> See John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, *International Organization*, 36:2, 1982, p. 382.

<sup>27</sup> Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek, and Magnus Ryner, “Theories of European Integration: A Critique” Alan F. Cafruny and Magnus Ryner (ed.), *A Ruined Fortress, Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p.19.

<sup>28</sup> Jonathan Moran, ‘Two Conceptions of State: Antonio Gramsci and Michael Mann’, *Politics*, 18:3, September 1998, p.159.

<sup>29</sup> David Levy and Daniel Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations”, *Journal of Management Studies*, 40:4, June 2003, p 806.

Hegemony is rooted in the institutions of civil society, such as the church, the academy, and the media. Hegemony plays a central role in ideological reproduction, providing legitimacy through the assertion of moral and intellectual leadership and the projection of a particular set of interests as the general interest.<sup>30</sup>

Hegemony, thus, can be understood as a form of class rule linked to a particular configuration of social forces within a framework for action or a historical structure. Historical structures are ‘persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity’.<sup>31</sup> Hence, hegemony in the Gramscian sense is constructed on a world order which provides a universalistic conception with the interest of most States. However, it is not merely an order among States – as conceived by the mainstream approaches based on the dominance of one country over the others but an order with a dominant mode of production within the world economy and a complex of social relations at the global level.<sup>32</sup>

The nature of neo-liberal hegemony involves complex and dialectic relationship that is reflected between neo-liberalism as process and neo-liberalism as a project of global re-structuring. This involves a simultaneous process of disintegrating embedded structures of political and socioeconomic organisation and the process of integrating material, political, social and cultural life at the global level as a process driven by the process.

Understanding the social purpose underlying the emerging European order necessitates an analysis of its social underpinnings, which remain hidden from established perspectives in as much as these narrowly define power in terms of political authority of either States or supranational/international public bodies. In order to overcome this narrow focus, a concept of social power should be added, in both its material and ideological dimensions, deriving neither from political authorities nor from the State,

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p.807.

<sup>31</sup> Cox, *op. cit.*, “Production, Power and World Order”, p.4.

<sup>32</sup> Robert W.Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”, in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Stephen Gill (ed.) New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.61-62.

in a narrow sense, but rather from the social forces underpinning State power. It is, thus, the problematique of the social purpose of European Union calling for an alternative approach to the study of European order.<sup>33</sup>

European Union, with all due recognition of the complexity of multileveledness, is being subordinated into a much larger neoliberal, transnational, structural and institutional ensemble. The politics of Europe, which today has to assign central importance to EU, is more open-ended and contingent on social struggle and compromises between social forces. EU is developing in response to a complex interplay of material, ideational, and military factors (relations of force).<sup>34</sup>

The study examines how the present neo-liberal global order has come about with the aim to understand structural change taking place at the global as well as the European level. Re-structuring at the global level also reflects changing forms of integration. Thus, our study claims that an understanding of changes in the global political economy, the historical forms of the particular period that the neighbourhood countries in and the historical forms of the particular period that the EU in should be correctly analysed. Gramsci argued that in the West, the political power of the ruling class does not rest on the control of the coercive apparatus of the State, but is diffused and situated in the myriad of institutions and relationships in civil society. This form of class rule, hegemony is based on consent<sup>35</sup> and is backed up only in the last instance by the coercive apparatus of the State. The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways; as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally. As applied to the ENP, the thesis argues that the EU's Hegemonic Project to neighbouring countries also is the combination of force (coercion) and consent,

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<sup>33</sup> Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Order*, London: Routledge, 2002.

<sup>34</sup> Van Apeldoorn, Overbeek, and Ryner, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>35</sup> The consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group (ie, through their intellectuals who act as their agents or deputies); this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. Special function of intellectuals is to organize the consent of the masses in support of the dominant class.

simultaneously. The attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied. Between consent and force stands corruption and fraud.<sup>36</sup>

Gramsci is talking about the ‘dual perspectives’ of consent and force in terms of the ‘dialectic unity of the moments of force and consent in political action.’<sup>37</sup> They are the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the propaganda, tactics and of strategy, etc.

Gramsci quotes in *Prison Notebooks* that;

*Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic – corporate kind. But there is also doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise can not touch the essential.*<sup>38</sup>

According to Gramsci, an historic bloc refers to a

*‘solid structure that is created when a hegemonic order is in place, its formation being dependent on the hegemony, which in turn ‘binds’ or ‘glues’ together all the parts of society into a relationship which recognises homogeneous norms of political economic practices and culture’. The conception of historical blocs in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely dialectic value, since the material forces would be unconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material force.*<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.80. (See. Hoffman., *op.cit.*, “Coercion, Consent and the State under Socialism”, p.170)

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p.169.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p.161.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p.377.

Ideological and moral elements play a crucial role in cementing the historic bloc – that is, the synchronic and equilibrated configuration of economic structures- as shaped by a paradigmatic set of productive forces and sociopolitical superstructures that draw on these productive forces to maintain social order and thereby also provide the necessary institutional framework for the economic structure.<sup>40</sup> From a Gramscian perspective, it is emphasized that ideas must be located in social practice, and thus, ideas can not be separated from the social structures in which actors are located and that shape their agency. Ideas are produced by human agency in the context of social power relations, and are as such bound up with the strategic action of social actors.

Gramscian approach is an epistemological and ontological critique of the empiricism and positivism. It is specific for its non-structuralist historicism nature. In other words, historical change is the consequence of collective human activity. There is historical necessity in the way Gramsci approaches. The historical necessity implies that social interaction and political change take place within, what can be called, the ‘limits of the possible’ are not fixed, but they exist within the dialectics of a given social structure, comprising the intersubjective aspect of ideas, ideologies and theories, social institutions, and a prevailing socio-economic system and set of power relations. The dialectic aspect of this is historical; although social action is constrained by, and constituted within, prevailing social structures; those structures are transformed by agency.<sup>41</sup>

To paraphrase Andre Drainville:<sup>42</sup> European integration can neither be simply derived from structural developments nor from highly abstract concepts and ideas developed at the drawing table. Instead, it takes place as a ‘succession of negotiated settlements’. This means that European integration may be framed and driven by clear-cut ideologies and strategies. Eventually, however, it always implies ‘concessions, to the rigidities and dynamic structures, as well as the political stabilities of the moment.’<sup>43</sup> Andre Drainville’s research on neoliberal restructuring is applied to the process of

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<sup>40</sup> Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>41</sup> Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Palgrave: Macmillan, 2003, p.13.

<sup>42</sup> Andre Drainville, “International Political Economy in the Age of Open Marxism”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 1:1, 1994, p.115.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p.116.

European integration. Ideologically these elements are applicable to the European Neighbourhood Policy. As Bieling argues every political project inspired by bright and practical ideas and it is impossible to think of a successful political project without considering corresponding ideas and discourses. He also claims that projects with strong political support are primarily based on consensus rather than on compromise. Since consensus is rarely achievable some form of material concessions, which brings about elasticity, are given. Another dimension inspired from the Neo-Gramscian theory is that many different social and political actors are directly and indirectly involved in the political process, especially in the initial stages of problem definition and agenda setting, less so in the formal decision-making procedure. Within the EU system, there are many different access points which might be taken into consideration.<sup>44</sup>

EU's strategy towards the policy involving new neighbours can be viewed as a hegemonic project with the insight provided by the Neo-Gramscian perspective. Gramsci's variant of philosophical realism, identifying the intellectual process as a creative, practical and open-ended, continuous engagement to explain a social reality, fits the logic of EU's European Neighbourhood Policy as a Hegemonic Project. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is the dialectic relationship between hegemony (consent= support), it involves persuasion and relatively legitimate forms of rule and domination and further it entails an intellectual and moral leadership, directed by conflicting political and cultural agents/organisations.<sup>45</sup>

Hegemony in Gramscian sense must encompass not only ideas but also institutions and material potentials but also a whole way of life. Gramsci uses hegemony to explain how legitimacy is wielded through economic and socio-cultural forms which transform over time. In his studies of civil society in Italy, Gramsci found that a form of 'consent' was fashioned between the ruling and the subordinate classes. This consent is arrived at through a series of struggles, in which the dominant social group makes certain compromises with other groups in order to promote some general interest. This

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<sup>44</sup> Hans-Jürgen Bieling, "Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy: The Case of Financial Market Integration", *New Political Economy*, 8:2, July 2003, p.207.

<sup>45</sup> John Hoffman, "The Politics of Consent and the Crisis of Marxism", *The Gramscian Challenge*, Basic Blackwell, 1984, p.14

general interest serving as the hegemonic norm, under which norms and practices are developed and become saturated into civil society and popular culture.<sup>46</sup>

Gramsci's concepts of hegemonic orders are aided by his conceptions of 'historic bloc' and 'passive revolution'. Since a historic bloc depends upon the strength of its hegemony, a hegemonic order is ideologically challenged by the concept of 'passive revolution'. 'Passive revolution' refers to how one hegemonic order is challenged and replaced by another. A hegemonic social structure, or a 'historic bloc' in Gramscian terms, rests on a specific configuration of societal groups, economic structures, and concomitant ideological superstructures. A historic bloc exercises hegemony through the coercive and bureaucratic authority of the State, dominance in the economic realm, and the consensual legitimacy of civil society. Gramsci used the term 'historic bloc' to refer to alliances among various social groupings and also, more abstractly, to alignment of material, organizational, and discursive frameworks which actively constitute perceptions of mutual interests.<sup>47</sup>

Gramsci's analysis of state, civil society and the politics of consent has become famous more for its descriptive content than its prescriptive recommendations. His theory of hegemony entailed a broad analytical framework aimed at realistically plotting the process of revolutionary advance and as such it enabled a more focused analysis of the role of the superstructures in class domination.<sup>48</sup> Gramsci's notions of differentiation and open-endedness also fit to the case of the ENP and Ukraine. *He argues that*; in any state the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly imposed, the consent of the broad masses, or huge masses have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which in their disorganic whole constitute revolution. A 'crisis of authority'

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<sup>46</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.52.

<sup>47</sup> Levy and Egan, *op. cit.*, p.806.

<sup>48</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 88.



is spoken of, and this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general the crisis of the state.<sup>49</sup>

Gramsci's argument above will be used to examine and identify the dynamics of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. As a consequence of the changes in the contemporary societies, the sovereign nation-state is itself increasingly under pressure from both outside and inside its legal boundaries. A globalizing economy reduces its capacity to regulate national investment autonomously. The state's internal legitimation by a national community is undermined by a growing multi-cultural society. As contemporary societies diversify, conflicts arise not merely within moral traditions but between them. Gramsci's notions of hegemony, political society, civil society, historic bloc, hegemonic project may be applied to the transformed conditions of contemporary societies with some revisions. Hegemony particularly remains a useful concept in political analysis with its two dimensions of both consent and coercion. The main cognitive interest of a Neo-Gramscian approach is to map transnational power relations in Europe and identify the historical specific articulations between economic, political and societal processes. European Union and its hegemonic project 'ENP' is argued to be best described by the Gramscian theory due to the fact that hegemony is not restrained on force but defined as an interplay between force and consent and the attention of the approach lies on social power relations and how they are organised and articulated in the structures of the state/civil-societal complex at national, international and supranational level.

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<sup>49</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.238

## 2.2 *The Gramscian Conceptualization of ‘Civil Society’*

Civil society is central to Gramsci’s thought. More important, it is also central to his notion of revolutionary transformation, for it links his notion of hegemony to his concept of the State. Many of the conceptual tools Gramsci used to understand the failures of liberalism and socialism, as well as his attempts to formulate new ways of looking at social and revolutionary change, can be understood only in relation to, and arising out of, his idea of civil society.<sup>50</sup>

Gramsci’s thinking was rooted in Marx and Lenin. He made all the Marxist assumptions about the material origins of class and the role of class struggle and consciousness in social change. He also took Marx’s notion of bourgeois ‘hegemony’ in civil society and made it a central theme of his own version of the functioning of the capitalist system. This hegemony, in Gramscian terms, meant the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes; it is, in the words of one analyst, “an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations.”<sup>51</sup>

Gramsci argued that, in the West, the political power of the ruling class does not rest on the control of the coercive apparatus of the State, but is diffused and situated in the myriad of institutions and relationships in civil society. This form of class rule, hegemony, is based on consent and is backed up only in the last instance by the coercive apparatus of the State.<sup>52</sup> The State was much more than the coercive apparatus of the bourgeoisie, the State included the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure.

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<sup>50</sup> Benedetto Fontana, “Liberty and Domination: Civil Society in Gramsci”, *Boundary 2*, 33:2, 2006, p.51.

<sup>51</sup> Ralph Milliband, “Poulantzas and the Capitalist State”, *New Left Review*, 1/82, 1973.

<sup>52</sup> van Apeldoorn Overbeek, and Ryner, *op. cit.*, p.36.

It was in his concept of civil society and his elevations of bourgeois hegemony to a predominant place in the science of politics that Gramsci went beyond Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. In doing so, he emphasized much more than earlier writers the role of the superstructure in perpetuating classes and preventing the development of class consciousness<sup>53</sup>. Civil society, in Gramsci's view, has a dual existence. As the ideological arena in which hegemony is secured, it represents part of the 'extended State', complementing the coercive potential of State agencies. The institutions of civil society represent a key source of stability.<sup>54</sup> Gramsci's dyads, consent/force, persuasion/coercion, and State as educator/State as night-watchman, ethico-political/economic/cooperative acquire concrete meaning and direction within the context of civil society.<sup>55</sup>

Analysing the commonalities and differences between Marx and Gramsci regarding their understanding of civil society; for both Marx and Gramsci, civil society is the key factor in understanding capitalist development, but for Marx civil society is structure (relations in production). For Gramsci, on the other hand, it is superstructure that represents the active and positive factor in historical development; it is the complex of ideological and cultural relations, the spiritual and intellectual life, and the political expression of those relations that become the focus of analysis rather than the structure. The Marxian concept of civil society as the structural moment can be considered as the point of departure of Gramsci's analysis. But Gramsci's theory, according to Bobbio, introduced a profound innovation in the Marxist tradition: civil society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural moment, but to the superstructural one.<sup>56</sup>

Gramsci assigned to the State part of this function of promoting a single concept of reality (bourgeois) and therefore gave the State a more extensive role in perpetuating class. He gave the mass of workers much more credit than Lenin for being able to

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<sup>53</sup> Jacques Texier, "Gramsci, Theoretician of the Superstructures". *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* Mouffe, Chantal, (ed.) London: Routledge and Kegan Haul, 1979.

<sup>54</sup> Levy and Egan, *op. cit.*, p. 806.

<sup>55</sup> Fontana, *op. cit.*, p.53.

<sup>56</sup> Bobbio Norberto, "Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society", *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* by Chantal Mouffe, (ed.) London: Routledge and Kegan Haul, 1979.

develop class consciousness themselves, but he also saw the obstacles to consciousness as more formidable in Western society than Lenin had imagined: it was not merely lack of understanding of their position in the economic process that kept workers from comprehending their class role, nor was it only the 'private' institutions of society, such as religion, that were responsible for keeping the working class from self-realization, but it was the State itself that was involved in reproducing the relations of production. Hence, the State was much more than the coercive apparatus of the bourgeoisie; the State included the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure.<sup>57</sup>

Gramsci identified the victory of fascism and the failure of revolution in the nature and type of relation between State and civil society, and thus in the type of structures prevailing within the civil society of advanced bourgeois countries. The difference in this relation, and the difference in societal structures, would explain the different political outcomes in different countries.<sup>58</sup> The thesis applies this into the specific case of Ukraine where the State is everything and the civil society is underdeveloped and lacks cooperation and conscious action and whereas in the West there is a proper relation between the State and civil society.

Applying Gramsci to the contemporary period, the study contends that the political contestation within the EU States, Europe does not take place in isolation from the global and social forces emerge and are shaped by the dialectic process of global/local interaction. The changing social relations since 1970s point to the fact that the 'political' form of the State – which constitute political society and civil society and the ideological contestations inherent therein transcend borders of the State 'for the borders of the State itself is being transformed as the new hegemony is being constructed and new ways of organizing social relations are being learned.'<sup>59</sup> Hence a new concept of global hegemony stemming from forces within a powerful economic State, or from a crisis within differing States emerged. Once consolidated, the

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<sup>57</sup> Martin Carnoy, "Gramsci and the State", *The State and Political Theory*, Princeton University Press, 1984, p.66.

<sup>58</sup> Fontana, *op. cit.*, p.55.

<sup>59</sup> Mark Rupert, "(Re-) Engaging Gramsci: A response to Germain and Kenny", *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 24, 1998, p. 427-434.

hegemonic order contains a 'dominant mode of production that penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. This is then further founded on a construction of a 'global civil society', in which a mode of production of global extent brings about links within the social classes of the countries encompassed by it.<sup>60</sup>

Gramscian concept of historic blocs can be applied at the global level from this global civil society. 'Global civil society' is a new concept emerged in 1990s. It is the new awareness, stimulated by the peace and ecological movements, of ourselves as members of a fragile and potentially self-destructive world system; the widespread perception that the implosion of Soviet-type communist systems implied a new global order the world-wide growth spurt of neo-liberal economics and market capitalist economies; the disillusionment with the broken and unfulfilled promises of post-colonial States, and the rising concern about the dangerous and misery-producing vacuums opened up by the collapse of empires and States and the outbreak of uncivil wars.

Keane makes an ideal type of 'global civil society' definition as:

*A dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth, and that have complex effects that are felt in its four corners. Global civil society is neither a static object nor a fait accompli. It is an unfinished Project that consists of sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched Networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who organise themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways. These non-governmental institutions and actors tend to pluralise power and to problematise violence; consequently their peaceful or 'civil' effects are felt everywhere, here*

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p.136.

*and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level itself.*<sup>61</sup>

It is a wide-scope definition. When divided into its components; non-governmental structures may be the charities, think-tanks, prominent intellectuals, campaigning and lobby groups, citizens' protests responsible for 'clusters of performances'<sup>62</sup> small and large corporate firms, independent media, interest groups, social groups, trade unions, international commissions, parallel summits and employers' federations, professional associations etc. It comprises bodies like Amnesty International, European Movement International (EMI), UNICE, European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), FIFA, the International Red Cross, News Corporation International, American Society of Public Relations (PRSA)etc.

These institutions and actors constitute a vast, interconnected and multi-layered non-governmental space comprising a large number of more-or-less self-directing ways of life. All have in common: across vast geographic distances and despite barriers of time, deliberately organise themselves and conduct their cross-border social activities, business and politics outside the boundaries of governmental structures.<sup>63</sup> Particularly there is a tendency that their numbers are tremendously increasing due to the fact that the threat is also globalised: terrorism, money laundering, ozone layer, global warming etc.

There are different definitions and arguments for the concept of 'civil society'. David Skidmore defines 'civil society' as the intermediate forms of social organisation that stand between, and partially independent of, both State and market. He argues that both neo-liberals and the statist sometimes do focus on the role that civil society plays in economic development; they both come to the conclusion about the negative

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<sup>61</sup> The theory of the 'internationalization' of civil society and the terms 'cosmopolitan civil society' and 'global' or 'transnational' civil society in John Keane, 'The Future of Civil Society', in Tatjana Sikosha, *The Internationalisation of Civil Society* (The Hague, 1989) and in Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society", *Millennium*, 21:3 (1992), pp.389-420. in John Keane, 'Global Civil Society', 2003, p.2.

<sup>62</sup> Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements", in Marco Giugni et al. (ed.), *How Social Movements Matter*, Minneapolis and London, 1999, p.263.

<sup>63</sup> Keane, *op.cit.*, "Global Civil Society", p.9.

assessment of the economic impact of associationalism. Statists fear that a vigorous civil society will press multiplied demands upon the State. Neo-liberals see matters in similar terms. Societal mobilisation usually entails collusion among rent-seeking agents who seek to transfer income from other segments of society by manipulating markets or State policies.<sup>64</sup> The term also refers to the varied forms of social organisation that lie between the individual and the State. Civil society manifests itself in an almost infinite variety of social groups ranging from sports clubs to political parties. Civil society is an expression of the basic human desire to socialise with others through voluntary association.<sup>65</sup> For some, the concept of civil society is narrowed to exclude profit-seeking enterprises, i.e. business firms. The interrelation among the State, market and civil society is worth analysing since the realm of social life is based upon a differing cardinal principle: the State is built upon coercion, the market upon competition and civil society upon cooperation.<sup>66</sup>

It is argued that when States and markets are embedded in civil society are more likely to play a constructive role in the developmental process in other words; State, market and civil society as mutually embedded, each play complementary roles in enabling the economic and social development of a society. Peter Evans states, “One way to explore the effects of civil society on economic performance is by reference to the concept of social capital which is defined as the wealth producing potential that flows from various forms of collective association. It is better understood how civil society and social capital affect development, strategies for giving practical expression to such findings must be devised. Three potential agents of change present themselves: States and local governments; international organisations; and transnational social networks. Developing country governments can seek out partnerships with societal groups in prioritising and providing public services more effectively.<sup>67</sup> These societal groups

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<sup>64</sup> David Skidmore, “Civil Society, Social Capital and Economic Development”, *Global Society*, 15:1, 2001, p. 53.

<sup>65</sup> Julie Fisher, *Nongovernments: NGOs and Political Development of the Thirds World*, Kumarian Pres 1998, p.11-12.

<sup>66</sup> Norman Uphoff, “Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development: Opportunities with Diminishing States and Expanding Markets”, *World Development*, 21:4, p. 607.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Evans, “Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence for Synergy”, *World Development*, 24:6, 1996, p. 1119.

may be transnational, as well. Transnational social networks can create linkages among groups with similar concerns across national boundaries.<sup>68</sup> Doing so can provide non-governmental organisations, that are part of such networks, with better information and models of successful social changes from elsewhere. Transnational Social Networks can also serve to balance the growing power of internationally mobile capital perhaps also strengthening the bargaining position of States in the process.<sup>69</sup>

As Skidmore emphasizes; “Strong States need strong societies. State economic planners and bureaucrats lack the practical knowledge of local conditions that is often necessary to plan effective economic intervention. Such detailed local knowledge can be provided only in partnership with organised societal groups. An organised civil society also plays an important function in monitoring State performance and, especially in democratic settings, exerting pressure to enhance State responsiveness to social needs”.<sup>70</sup>

In 2001, European Commission identified the need to reform European governance against the background of a mismatch between, on the one hand, the concrete achievements of European Integration and, on the otherhand, disappointment and alienation of ‘Europeans’. The idea of European civil society is developed which may help to bridge the gap between the structures of transnational governance and society.<sup>71</sup> The white report of 2001 was entirely criticised. EU White paper granted civil society a leading role in providing more inclusive and accountable Union policy building. However, social experts heavily criticised this document claiming that, in reality, these proposals would not bring European civil society any closer to the EU governance. The heaviest criticism was targeted at the non-legally binding nature of the White Paper’s inclusion proposals. According to Irina Michalowitz, limiting the inclusion method solely to consultation placed the Commission in opposition to the models of associative

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<sup>68</sup> Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>69</sup> Thalia Kidder and Mary McGinn, “In the wake of NAFTA: Transnational Workers Networks”. *Social Policy*, Summer 1995, p.14-21.

<sup>70</sup> George David Skidmore, “Civil Society, Social Capital and Economic Development”, *Global Society*, 2001, p. 71.

<sup>71</sup> European Commission, ‘*European Governance*’: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final.



and deliberative democracy aiming to delegate tasks from governing institutions to civil society.<sup>72</sup>

European civil society can be seen primarily as an attempt to complete a process of democratisation of which the development of representative democracy through the European Parliament marked the initial transformation of the elite system. European civil society is open to a more plural form of membership than is currently offered by EU citizenship (e.g. the inclusion of non-EU nationals as members of a transnational civil society) European Parliament acquired its greatest role under the co-decision procedure<sup>73</sup> at a point when alternatives to the ‘Community method’ of inter institutional (legislative) decision making began to emerge (social dialogue) or found new vitality (comitology).<sup>74</sup> Comitology is the Council’s authority to transfer formal powers of legislation to the Commission and particularly to the around 450 special committees which are established by a Council decision and officially composed of people representing the member States. There are three categories of special committees: *Advisory Committees*, comprising roughly half the total number, can only advise on implementation proposals from the Commission. This has to give the utmost attention to the advice, but remains free to do what it proposes. *Management Committees*, which manage a policy field and *Regulatory Committees*, which act as regulators, have a formally stronger position. By qualified majority voting, they can express their disagreement with the Commission. Under ‘delegated legislation’ 38 directives, 606 regulations and 557 decrees have been produced.<sup>75</sup> By the year 2000, the Commission had become an apparatus of about 22.000 civil servants. About 80% of them hold a statutory position. Two-thirds of the others are temporarily contracted persons and one-third national civil servants working on secondment.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Hrvoje Butkovic, “European Union and its Civil Society: A Neverending Search for Accountability?”, *Political Thought: Croatia Political Science Review*, May 2004, p. 95.

<sup>73</sup> Article 251 EC (Article 1896). Maastricht Consolidated Version

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p.105-106.

<sup>75</sup> European Commission *The European Union in 2000*. General Report 2000.

<sup>76</sup> Rinus van Schendelen, *Machiavelli in Brussels: the Art of Lobbying the EU*, Amsterdam University Press, 2003, p.56.

Cox stated; “the meaning of civil society has evolved considerably since its use in the context of the 18th century European Enlightenment. It signified the realm of private interests, in practice the realm of the bourgeoisie, distinct from the State. Others view civil society, rather, as the emancipatory activity of social forces distinct from the State and capital. Antonio Gramsci’s thought embraced both meanings: civil society was the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also that on which an emancipatory counterhegemony could be constructed.”<sup>77</sup>

According to Gramsci, civil society is the realm in which the existing social order is grounded, and it can also be the realm in which a new social order can be founded. His concern with civil society was, first, to understand the strength of the *status quo*, and then to devise a strategy for its transformation. The emancipatory potential of civil society was the object of his thinking. Civil society is an elastic concept, having different connotations in different passages.<sup>78</sup> For example, Cohen and Arato comment favorably upon Antonio Gramsci’s appreciation of the ‘dynamism and flexibility of civil society as the terrain of social movements’ while pouring scorn on Marx’s supposed ‘hatred for modern civil society’<sup>79</sup> In Gramscian terms, civil society is fundamentally divided into various groups and factions, in which harmony and community are rather more ideals to aspire to than social realities. As Gramsci says, ‘the supremacy of a social group is manifested in two ways: as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’.<sup>80</sup>

Civil society appears as a function of the State as in the frequently quoted equation; ‘State=Political Society+Civil Society’, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.<sup>81</sup> Cox argues; that ‘civil society appears to have autonomy and to

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<sup>77</sup> Robert W.Cox, “Civil Society at the turn of the millenium: Prospects for an alternative world order”, *Review of International Studies*, 1999, p. 3.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> Jean L.Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992, p.147-159.

<sup>80</sup> Fontana, *op. cit.*, p.55.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p.263.

be more fundamental than the State, indeed to be the basis upon which a State can be founded. Civil society is both shaper and shaped an agent of stabilization and reproduction, and a potential agent of transformation. The spirit of voluntary association thus became a significant aspect of the concept of civil society. Civil society is no longer identified with capitalism and the bourgeoisie but now takes on the meaning of a mobilized participant citizenship juxtaposed to dominant economic and State power.<sup>82</sup> As Christine Buci-Glucksmann pointed out many years ago in *Gramsci and the State*, a work that remains to this day the most thorough and authoritative study of the subject, one of Gramsci's most original contributions to political theory consists precisely in his expansion or enlargement of the concept of the State: the State, as defined by Gramsci, 'encompasses both civil society and governmental institutions.'<sup>83</sup> In the *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci stated:

*In Russia, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled through a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks; more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying – but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country.*<sup>84</sup>

For Gramsci, the proper relation between State and civil society suggests that the State should rest upon the support of an active self-conscious and veregated civil society and should, in turn, sustain and promote the development of the constructive forces in that society. The organic intellectual was, for Gramsci, the key link in this process. Since Gramsci made his analysis, there have been significant changes affecting the relationship of State to civil society and in the development of civil society in different parts of the world. The 1970 world capitalism crisis and then the collapse of 'real socialism' in late 1980s seemed to herald a possible rebirth of civil society in those

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<sup>82</sup> Cox, *op. cit.*, "Civil Society at the turn of the millenium: Prospects for an alternative world order" p.6.

<sup>83</sup> Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, trans. David Fernbach, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980, p.esp.chap.3, "The Gramscian Expansion of the Concept of the State", p.69-110.

<sup>84</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

countries where civil society had been eradicated by the Party State. New independent organizations of protest grew into the political space that was opened by the disruption and uncertainty of political authority. In both cases, the political and social space in which civil society could develop was expanded.<sup>85</sup> What distinguishes hegemony from domination is precisely the symbiotic relationship between the government (which is frequently identified with the State) and civil society, a relationship, then, that can not be analyzed in any meaningful way if one starts with a conception of civil society as something separate from and opposed to the State. No one explained this more clearly than Gramsci in his *Prison Notebooks*.<sup>86</sup>

With the program of the Single European Market (SEM), it has become clear that the old socioeconomic configuration and European support for national state interventionist, sometimes even Keynesian policies are being replaced step by step by a new, more aggressive configuration, which basically is neoliberal, in favour of broadened and intensified market competition and monetarist anti-inflation and austerity measures.<sup>87</sup> Due to restructuring of production and world order, civil society today is not the realm of economic interests, as has stated by Hegel and Adam Smith. Civil society is now usually understood to refer to the realm of autonomous group action distinct from both corporate power and the State. The concept has been appropriated by those who foresee an emancipatory role for civil society. Gramsci argued, in his critique of economism, ‘that ‘popular beliefs’ and similar ideas are themselves material forces’<sup>88</sup> and that conflict over language is the ‘cultural struggle to transform the ‘popular mentality’ and to disseminate philosophical innovations’<sup>89</sup>. A prerequisite for social change is the development of consciousness among subordinate

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<sup>85</sup>Cox, *op. cit.*, “Civil Society at the turn of the millenium: Prospects for an alternative world order”, p.6. (See Norberto Bobbo, Jacques Texier, *Gramsci ve Sivil Toplum*, Savaş Yayınları, 1982)

<sup>86</sup> Joseph A. Buttigieg, “The Contemporary Discourse on Civil Society: A Gramscian Critique”, *Boundary 2* 32:1, Duke University Press 2005, p.37.

<sup>87</sup> John Grahl and Paul Teague, 1992 –*The Big Market: The Future of the European Community*, Lawrence & Wishart: United Kingdom 1990.

<sup>88</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.165.

<sup>89</sup> Sergio Benedetto, *Hegemony and Power: on the Relation with Gramsci and Machiavelli*, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1993, p. 38.

social groups, which requires a prolonged process of constructing educational, cultural, and political institutions in the limited autonomous space within civil society.<sup>90</sup>

In 2001 yearbook of Oxford University, it is stated that;

*Gramsci unlike Marx and Hegel divorces the notion of civil society from economic interactions. He views civil society as consisting of cultural institutions, notably the church.....but also schools, associations, trade unions, and other cultural institutions. Gramsci is ambiguous about his civil society of his. On the one hand, it is through this cultural 'superstructure' that the bourgeois class imposes its hegemony, using it to keep the working class in its place. On the other hand, it is a kind of wedge between the State and the class-structured economy, which has the revolutionary potential of dislodging the bourgeoisie.*<sup>91</sup>

There is a crucial misinterpretation of Gramsci in the phrase, 'the bourgeois class imposes its hegemony'. Hegemony, as theorized by Gramsci, is not imposed; quite the opposite, the governing class achieves hegemony or becomes hegemonic through leadership and persuasion, so that instead of imposing itself on the subordinate or subaltern classes, it acquires their consensus. This leadership is not exercised solely or even primarily from the seat of government, but also much more importantly within the sphere of civil society where consensus is generated. Moreover, Gramsci explains, civil society in the modern liberal State is the arena where the prevailing hegemony is constantly being reinforced, and not just contested. The observation about the ambiguity of Gramsci on civil society reflects nothing but a fundamental incomprehension of the core element of Gramsci's theory of the State and civil society.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Levy and Egan, *op. cit.*, p.806.

<sup>91</sup> Joseph A. Buttigieg, 2005. "The Contemporary Discourse on Civil Society: A Gramscian Critique." *Boundary 2*. 32:1, p.13.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p.38.

Civil society has become the comprehensive term for various ways in which people express collective wills independently of established power, both economic and political. Gramsci regarded civil society not only as the realm of hegemony supportive of the capitalist *status quo*, but also as the realm in which cultural change takes place in which the counter hegemony of emancipatory forces can be constituted. Civil society is not just an assemblage of actors, i.e. autonomous social groups. It is also the realm of contesting ideas in which the intersubjective meanings upon which people's sense of 'reality' are based can be transformed and new concepts of the natural order of society can emerge.<sup>93</sup>

Two different directional processes of civil society exist: 'top-down' which the dominant economic forces of capitalism form an intellectual and cultural hegemony, without including the powerful economic forces, civil society in the late twentieth century, though generally viewed as potentially emancipatory and transformative of the social order, can be seen to reflect the dominance of State and corporate economic power and the second being 'bottom-up' which is led by the strata of the population which are disadvantaged under the capitalist order and try to build a counterhegemony so as to replace the existing order. In a 'bottom-up' sense, civil society is the realm in which those who are disadvantaged by globalization of the world economy can mount their protests and seek alternatives.<sup>94</sup>

Regarding the 'top-down' sense civil society, States and corporate interests influence the development of this current version of civil society towards making it an agency for stabilizing the social and political *status quo*. The dominant hegemonic forces penetrate and co-opt elements of popular movements. State subsidies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) incline the latter's objectives towards conformity with established order and thus enhance the legitimacy of the prevailing order. This concord with a concern on part of many people to survive in existing conditions rather than transforming the social order.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Bobbio, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>94</sup> Laura Macdonald, *Supporting Civil Society, the Political Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Central America*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

In Gramscian context, a two-track strategy is proposed: first, continued participation in electoral politics and industrial action as a means of defensive resistance against further onslaught of globalization; and second, but ultimately more important, pursuit of the primary goal of resurrecting a spirit of association in civil society together with a continuing effort by the organic intellectuals of social forces to think through and act towards an alternative social order at local, regional and global levels. Gramsci defined hegemony as ‘an intellectual and moral leadership directed by contradictory political and cultural agents and organizations and he called these organic and traditional intellectuals’. Organic intellectuals represented the interests of working classes whilst traditional intellectuals represented the interests of the bourgeoisie.<sup>96</sup>

Application of a Gramscian understanding of civil society to ENP and Ukraine illuminates aspects that regard civil society as autonomous from the State, Gramsci recognised that civil society may constitute a space in which the State is engaged in a struggle with other actors to dominate popular ideas, values and norms; thus civil society is an ‘arena of contestations’ like in the case of Ukraine squeezed between two contested hegemonies of Russia and EU. The outcome of this analysis is to suggest that Gramsci’s theory does indeed illuminate important aspects of civil society in the ENP countries and specifically in Ukraine. It draws attention to the notion of civil society as a realm of ideas, values and norms; the essentially political nature of civil society; and the potential for civil society to be a terrain for struggle over, and transformation of the State. It has to be acknowledged that Gramsci’s theoretical framework has generally been applied most successfully to Western political regimes with liberal-style civil societies. It is principally for this reason that Gramsci’s theory is of greater assistance in understanding State-society dynamics in ENP countries and especially in post-communist countries and specifically in Ukraine.

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<sup>96</sup> Cox, *op. cit.*, “Civil society at the turn of the millenium: prospects for an alternative world order”, p.15.

Gramsci does not presuppose, as many liberal theorists do, that ‘the State and civil society are necessarily on antagonistic terms’. Rather, he supposes that there is an integral relationship between both in enforcement of domination.<sup>97</sup> Gramsci sees civil society as ‘an arena of contestations of ideas and thoughts.’ This provides the thesis also with a way of understanding social conflict and tensions in Ukraine and to understand State-society relations. It is also worth analysing the role of civil society in promoting the transparency, accountability, elimination of corruption, coercion and nepotism and a respect for human rights, since civil society is a medium through which the tools of democracy are brought about. Applying Gramsci’s theoretical framework, it is possible to identify values, ideas and norms within civil society that compete with the dominant discourse and ideology. Despite the legal and institutional safeguards that have been erected for civil society in Ukraine, the arena still continues to be the subject of fierce and sometimes violent struggles between various State and social actors. This ‘contestation’ is exemplified through the experiences of Ukrainian trade unionists. After the Westernization trend in Ukraine, freedom of association is a legally recognised as a right, despite the murders of the journalists and death threats to many others. Regarding the trade unions in Ukraine, there are by far the biggest such organisations in civil society, with millions of members. The trade union movement is dominated by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). It has arguably been successful in re-shaping itself into a genuine representative of the workers. Much of the FNPR’s activity in protests, lobbying and political campaigning, has been in concert with managers of enterprises and employers’ organisations, and this can cast doubt on how far the unions have succeeded in becoming a *voice of workers*.<sup>98</sup> The Ukrainian Federation of Trade Unions (FPU) formed in 1990, is the dominant trade union in the country. The successor of the Soviet-era unions, it unites 40 branches and 26 regional unions and, in 2001, it claimed 14.4 million members down from 26 million at its creation.<sup>99</sup> There are some smaller, new trade unions in

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<sup>97</sup> P. Ramasamy, “Civil Society in Malaysia: An Arena of Contestations?”, in Lee Hock Guan (ed.) *Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, p.199.

<sup>98</sup> Gordon, Nadezha and Walter Connor, *Tattered Banners: Labor, Conflict and Corporatism in Postcommunist Russia*, Boulder: Westview, 1996.

<sup>99</sup> Paul Kubicek, “Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54:4, 2002, p. 603.



Ukraine. For the most part, they are in the same sectors – mining and transportation – as in Russia.<sup>100</sup> They have been plagued by many problems; lack of resources, pressure from management and internal divisions. Since the unions are limited in their ability to articulate a coherent strategy to deal with many of the common problems they face, they can not force the government to pay more attention to social issues, implement a ‘more civilised’ form of privatisation, uphold the rule of law and take action on problems such as the wage arrears crisis. The reforms were minimal, lacking a well-developed social dimension, and they served the interests of only a few, without popular input, creating a political economy, which is now the primary barrier to democratic consolidation. Ukrainian democracy is not built upon popular participation, and ‘social partnership’ has been impossible, given the fact that capital and labour do not meet as anything close to equals in current circumstances.<sup>101</sup> From Neo-Gramscian perspective, for the hegemonic project to be achieved, consent is needed which is problematic in Ukrainian society. Ukrainian society is an elite-dominated polity and shows the limits of elites’ ability to craft a democracy, given the marginalisation of popular representatives. Trade union weakness, far from serving any project of marketisation or democratisation, reveals the shallowness of the democratic transition, because formally democratic institutions are not supported by the democratic practice in the country.<sup>102</sup>

Gramsci argues that in each historic bloc, there are different hegemonic characters, and with these, a separate set of popular beliefs, institutions, and assumptions. As an historic bloc depends upon the strength of its hegemony, when a hegemonic order is ideologically challenged then the bloc begins to wither away. He explains ‘passive revolution’ as a result of this transformation. ‘Passive revolution’ refers to how a hegemonic order is challenged and replaced by another. For a hegemonic order to change, counter-hegemonic forces persist to challenge the overall ideology of the hegemony, and then serve to transform it over time. In tandem with the process of

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<sup>100</sup> Christopher Marsh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Civil Society and Russia’s Elusive Search for Justice: Concepts, Traditions, and Contemporary Issues”, in. Marsh and Gvosdev (edt), *Civil Society and The Search for Justice In Russia*, Lexington Books: Lanham, Maryland 2002, p.4

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p. 15.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*.

hegemony building, the process of passive revolution continues with the dominant social forces, responsible for the hegemonic challenge, unable to gain consent for their continued movement forward to meet their ideological aims. The final process of transformation occurs when certain compromises are made with the resistant groups so that a consolidation process can take place, in which the former resistant groups become saturated into the new hegemonic order, and accept its conditions once this structural building of a historic bloc commences.<sup>103</sup>

The study intends to focus on the challenges that Ukraine faces, due to the fact that Ukraine is in between two opposing hegemonic forces: EU and Russia as EU's counter-hegemonic force. The study will be concerned with the social purpose underpinning political authority in the contemporary global economy, which drives the global and European readiness to adopt these neighbourhood countries despite their adaptability problems and economic weaknesses and the readiness of these neighbourhood countries to carry out their duties despite the lacking of membership perspective. It is important to understand the internalisation of historical forms of power and domination through the politics of conditionality inherent within various mechanisms in order to overcome the internal-external divide. This stems from the recognition that relations of power and authority in the neighbourhood countries are constructed not only within the national context but also in interaction with social forces beyond the national scope. The developments at the global level provide a historical framework incorporating the states of the region within global relations of power and authority and thus, restructuring their politics, economy and society through various mechanisms of the process. The study emphasizes the fact that these kinds of social forces representing EU Capital are also influential in the decision-making regarding ENP. In this study social forces will be represented as European Round Table of Industrialists, UNICE and EMI which are materially or socially influential in the decisions concerning ENP. This also aims to analyse the internal structure of the EU and its external dynamics and their relationships in the decisions concerning ENP.

The study intends to provide an account of how hegemonic powers promote internationalisation of neo-liberal restructuring through the emerging form of State

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<sup>103</sup> Owen Worth, "The Janus-like Character of Counter hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism", *Global Society*, 16:3, 2002.

against a background of global order. It is important to point to the changing form of State with the process of globalisation where states play a crucial role in bringing about the changes at the national level promoting the globalisation of production. By concentrating on the State, the study intends to contend for the transmission of hegemony through the State and question the medium of framework states provide for struggle through which social forces attempt to establish their particular interests and ideas. Such an approach conceives a social totality – which defines the social relations of production as its main unit of analysis.

Gramsci's approach to totality intends to avoid the determinism of the structural approaches and reductionist version of Marxist economism. Both approaches assume that changes within the socio-economic circumstances themselves produce political changes. In Gramscian sense, changes at the socioeconomic level can not determine but create conditions within which social struggles at the political level takes place.<sup>104</sup> Gramsci was a man of thought and action<sup>105</sup> who perceived development between the economic structure (base) and political, legal and cultural 'superstructures' as connected with each other within a real historical process representing a social totality in a reciprocal relationship. The approach to totality is best emphasised by Gramsci through his analysis of the historical bloc.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) may be viewed as the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe, and EU's strategy towards its 'new neighbours' vis-à-vis this policy may be viewed, in Neo-Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic project. Thus, in examining ENP from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, this chapter emphasizes how decision-making with regard to the ENP, is influenced by the social forces representing EU Capital and analyses how the EU's internal structure, as well as its external dynamics, affect ENP. In other words European Neighbourhood Policy proposed a definable policy, expressing its willingness to support neo-liberal restructuring in the identified region. This chapter also attempts to answer the question as to whether ENP can continue to be a sustainable policy without offering a membership perspective.

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<sup>104</sup> Bieler, *op. cit.*, p.580.

<sup>105</sup> Gramsci *op. cit.*, p. 261.

## ***2.3 Social Forces Representing European Capital***

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

In the early 1980s, a coalition was forged between big business, the Commission, and member governments in order to set in place forms of agreed and transnational regulation. The shared aim was to enable economic operators within the EC to maximize their market opportunities within Western Europe and also to create better chances for these operators to compete in international markets. The leading firms endeavoured to increase their leverage on the European policy process through the transnational networks.<sup>106</sup> As Wolfgang Wessels argues “there has been a ‘fusion’ of national and European levels of governance, so much so that one can no longer distinguish the boundaries between them or an inbuilt hierarchy of influence”.<sup>107</sup>

As Apeldoorn argues the social forces underpinning European order are not necessarily internal to the EU or its member States but must rather be located within a global political economy in which capitalist production and finance are undergoing transnationalization and globalization, reflected inter alia in the increasing dominance of the Transnational Corporations as actors in the world economy and the concomitant growing structural power of transnational capital.<sup>108</sup>

European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), Business Europe (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Organisations (UNICE) have been renamed as ‘Business Europe since 23 January 2007), European Movement International (EMI), European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), European Federation (Euro Fed), Government Interested NGOs (GINGO), Government Organised NGOs (GONGO), may be some of these social forces influential in EU’s decision making implicitly or explicitly. These efforts

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<sup>106</sup> Helen Wallace, *Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997, p.5.

<sup>107</sup> Wolfgang Wessels, “The Growth and Differentiation of Multi-Level Networks: A Corporatist Mega-Bureaucracy or an Open City”, in Wallace Helen, (eds.) *Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford, 1997, p.19.

<sup>108</sup> Van Apeldoorn, “Transnational Class Agency and European Governance – The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists” *New Political Economy*, 5:2, 2000, p. 158.

are largely directed at broad measures to liberalize the internal European market. The Commission, neither a monolith nor an introverted bureaucracy, has set about developing open and often open-ended relationships with external interlocutors, sometimes with direct clients of its attempted policy plans, but also with a wide range of intellectual and political partners.<sup>109</sup> From Neo-Gramscian perspective, in order to sustain the historic bloc, organic and traditional intellectuals together with the relevant national and transnational social forces are involved in EU's Hegemonic Projects. According to Crowles, the Neo-Gramscian school brings together both the constructivist and critical elements of IR/IPE.<sup>110</sup> However, Neo-Gramscians such as Van Apeldoorn set themselves apart from the liberal constructivists' preoccupation with NGOs and societal groups precisely by focusing on multinational firms and their social construction of norms and discourse.<sup>111</sup> In compliance with the Neo-Gramscian perspective, the perception of the problems, challenges and political solutions is always mediated by specific discourses which, specifically under the leadership of the European Commission and the transnational business community, are influenced by a range of social and political forces. So far, some of these social forces are highly supportive of the European Neighbourhood Policy based on the liberal principles have been politically and discursively predominant.<sup>112</sup>

Some scholars stress the decision-making capacity of national governments<sup>113</sup>, others emphasize the role of supranational institutions and actors, above all the European Commission<sup>114</sup>, and others again point to the misleadingly ignored impact of organised

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<sup>109</sup> Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>110</sup> Maria Gren Crowles, "Non-state actors and false dichotomies: reviewing IR/IPE approaches to European integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10:1 February 2003, p.111.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Hans-Jürgen Bieling, "Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy: The Case of Financial Market Integration", *New Political Economy*, 8:2, July 2003, p.203.

<sup>113</sup> See Andrew Moravcsik, *Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, 1988.

<sup>114</sup> See Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance* Oxford University Press, 1998.

transnational forces, mainly the transnational European business community.<sup>115</sup> Besides this, there is a complementary dispute about whether and to what extent European governance is determined by reflexive or social constructive factors such as ideas, discourses and values compared to more rationally determined factors, such as material interests, strategies and available power resources.<sup>116</sup> As Cox argues; if the powerful interest and strategies are hegemonic, it is unthinkable without some form of ideational support, ideas and will always be stultified if they are not being seized by economically, socially or politically powerful forces. It is crucial that there is the particular articulation and institutional mediation of material capabilities and ideas.<sup>117</sup> The organisational capacity to create consensus as the foundation of hegemony can be analysed at two interacting levels. One level is that of historical structures which on the basis of a long-term organic mode of reproduction of structures and superstructures might form what Antonio Gramsci called a 'historical bloc'.<sup>118</sup> This level refers to the way popular consent is created and reproduced over a longer period of time. The other level of political projects highlights more explicitly the political process by which given historical structures and institutional settings are reproduced and transformed. Thus, the focus is, above all, on the process of consensus formation between transnational political and economic elites. As Bieling argues; whether projects are hegemonic depends not only on the consensus of the transnational elites but eventually also on their acceptance by large parts of population.<sup>119</sup>

As compared to the *World Investment Report 1997*, indicating that there are about 45 000 transnational corporations (TNCs) in the world; estimated that the 600 largest TNCs are producing more than a fifth of the world's real net output of industrial production whereas about 40% of employment in the industrialised world depend

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<sup>115</sup> See Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Order*, London: Routledge, 2002.

<sup>116</sup> See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory", *World Politics*, 50, 1998, p.328.

<sup>117</sup> Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10:2 1981, p.129.

<sup>118</sup> Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, International Publishers, 1971, p.137.

<sup>119</sup> Bieling, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

directly on TNCs.<sup>120</sup> *UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2002*<sup>121</sup> whose focus is *Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness* addresses the significance of transnational corporations (TNCs) keep expanding their role in the globalising economy. Recent estimates suggest that there are about 65,000 TNCs today, with about 850,000 foreign affiliates across the globe. Their economic impacts can be measured in different ways. In 2001, foreign affiliates accounted for about 54 million employees, compared to 24 million employees in 1990; their sales of almost \$19 trillion were more than twice as high as world exports in 2001, compared to 1990 when both figures were roughly equal; the stock of outward foreign direct investment, reached \$6.6 trillion compared with \$1.7 trillion in 1990. Furthermore, foreign affiliates now account for one tenth of world GDP and one-third of world exports. Finally, if we take into account the value of TNCs' non-equity relationships (e.g. international subcontracting, licensing, and contract manufacturers) they would account for even larger shares in the global aggregates mentioned above. TNCs also played an important role in expanding exports in a small group of 'winning' countries, In fact, the role of TNCs in the world economy is not diminishing, on the contrary, economies regarding the role TNCs may play in the enhancement of export competitiveness and in the advancement of development objectives in host countries, sustaining competitiveness requires continuous upgrading towards higher value-added activities. It is important to analyse the strategic role of the transnational social forces as engendered by the capitalist production process – in the shaping of European socio-economic governance and in the political and ideological struggles over European order.<sup>122</sup>

It may be appropriate to point to the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), Business Europe (UNICE) and European Movement (EMI). The political activities of transnational enterprises and their industrial coalitions have changed the face of policy-

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<sup>120</sup> *World Investment Report 1997: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy*, United Nations, 1997.

<sup>121</sup> "Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness", A summary and comment by Thomas Andersson and Georgina Schemberg, IKED, 2002.

<sup>122</sup> Stephen Gill, "Gramsci and Global Politics: towards a Post-Hegemonic Research Agenda"(ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge University, 1993. p.15. See also Kees van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, Routledge, 1998 and Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

making in Brussels. Transnational capital is well organised at European level. Members of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) spell out their industrial agenda in private meetings with heads of State and government and in public documents. Hundreds of company representatives in the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (EU Committee) which is one of the most powerful lobbying organizations in Brussels operate a legislative intelligence network. Transnational Corporations occupy key policy positions within the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and, through the UNICE Advisory and Support Group (UASG), contribute funding directly to the European peak association.<sup>123</sup>

### **2.3.2 European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT)**

ERT is one of the most crucial of these transnational social forces as an elite forum which brings chief executives and chairmen of major multinational companies of European parentage together in order to shape European policies and mediates the interests and power of the most transnationalised segments of European Capital. ERT has played a significant role in shaping European governance in as much as it has successfully articulated and promoted ideas and concepts that have at critical times set the political agenda, and, beyond that, has helped to shape the discourse within which European policy-making is embedded.<sup>124</sup>

The transnational capitalist class engendered by the globalisation of capitalist accumulation is not conceived here as a unitary actor. In fact, significant differences in ideological and strategic orientations may exist within the ranks of the class and differences related to structural divisions within capital. Most fundamental are the functional differences between financial and industrial capital as well as differences in what we call the geographical scale of operation of capital, where even within the elite of large transnational corporations, we find more important differences as some firms are more global than others which may limit their transnational activities only to a

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<sup>123</sup> Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>124</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, "Transnational Class Agency and European Governance – The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists", p. 83.



single region of the global economy. ERT, ETUC, UNICE may be given as examples since the European region is signified in the transnational organisations which are the concern of the thesis.<sup>125</sup> Through the political organisation of capitalist class elites, a unity of purpose is achieved, and a role is assigned to the transnational class in European governance. A unity may then be elevated to a higher plane that constitutes an appeal across different groups and classes and class fractions, thus entering into the struggle for in Gramscian terminology ‘hegemony’.<sup>126</sup>

According to Schendelen, Europeanisation has different vectors from the European public sector to the national public sector, from the European public sector to the national private sector, from the European private sector to the national private sector and finally from the European private sector to the national public sector. The federations and institutions referred to the fourth vector, may seek to influence national public organisations. The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), (a forum of around 45 European Industrialist leaders aiming at promoting the competitiveness and growth of Europe’s economy. Members cover a wide range of industry sectors, with headquarters situated in 18 European countries. Their combined turnover is 1400 billion Euros and they employ around 4 million people worldwide and it is the political and ideological agency of an emergent European transnational capitalist class in the socioeconomic governance of the European Union. As Apeldoorn argues, ERT is a constitutive element in the construction of a new European order in which governance is geared to serve interests of a globalising transnational capitalist elite, and hence to the exigencies of global competitiveness.<sup>127</sup> Apeldoorn’s ERT study reveals how the group’s discourse production shaped EU socioeconomic governance and policy making in the 1990s.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, Routledge, 1998, p.98

<sup>126</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op.cit.*, “Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists”, p.159

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83.

ERT only maintains a small office in Brussels to coordinate its activities. The main strategy is direct lobbying of the Commission and individual governments by the CEOs directly. Its main focus is on increasing competitiveness via benchmarking of best neo-liberal practice, further de-regulation, flexible labour markets and transport infrastructure investment.<sup>129</sup> Industrialists believed that changes which would require both national and EU involvement in government regulations were needed.

At European level, the ERT has contacts with the European Council, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Every six months ERT strives to meet the government that has the EU presidency to discuss priorities. In other words, the ERT's aim is to set the agenda at the highest levels of the EU, most notably the European Commission. The evidence of two decades suggests that it has been successful. The role of the Commission as policy formulator, or agenda-setter, in the European system of governance is, of course, crucial; it is thus a kind of magnet for those who seek to influence the policy outcomes. The Commission itself needs those external interlocutors in order to make sensible and focused proposals and subsequently to turn them into operable regulatory arrangements.<sup>130</sup>

A socio-political framework was necessary to develop a more positive business environment in Europe. The ERT strategy was, in effect, to offer a 'new Europe', one that could effectively develop and market high technologies, one that could create jobs through wealth-creation, and one that could compete successfully in the world market.<sup>131</sup> From Neo-Gramscian perspective, the ERT is an institution which provides a platform for organic intellectuals, who formulate a coherent hegemonic project for transnational European capital, which is at the same time able to transcend the particular interests of this capital fraction to attract wider social forces towards the formation of a historical bloc,<sup>132</sup> 'bringing about not only a unison of economic and

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<sup>129</sup> Andreas Bieler, "What future Union? The struggle for a Social Europe", Paper presented at the workshop *Concepts of the European Social Model* in Vienna/Austria, 9 June 2006, p 12.

<sup>130</sup> Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>131</sup> Maria Crowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33:4, 1995, p. 504.

<sup>132</sup> Bieler, *op. cit.*, "What future Union? The struggle for a Social Europe", p. 23.

political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity on a ‘universal’ plane.<sup>133</sup> The ERT embarked on a level of transnational political activism unprecedented for the European industrialists. The CEOs promoted their single market agenda through widely publicized projects such as plans to create a European infrastructure.<sup>134</sup> ERT was the main driving force behind the Internal Market programme. In January 1985, the ERT chairman Wisse Dekker (Philips) published the report; ‘Europe 1990: An Agenda for Action’. Three days later, the new President of the Commission Jacques Delors gave a speech at European Parliament with very similar content. In fact, the Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, published in June 1985, resembles very much to Dekker’s report. The only real difference is the postponement of the deadline from 1990 to 1992.<sup>135</sup>

There are very concrete examples for ERT’s contribution to the shaping of the EU’s governance. As an example, ERT addressed its well-known 1984 campaign for an open EU common market directly to the national governments, which decided accordingly in their 1986 Single European Act (SEA). ERT was very active during the 1990-1 Intergovernmental Negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, meeting regularly with Commissioners and national policy makers. As Jacques Delors noted, “the success of the 1992 programme was due largely to ERT who made a lot of it happen”.<sup>136</sup>

In 1993, ERT industrialists prepared a report warning that ‘a hard core of persistent unemployment will remain into the next century’, but added that this core might yet be reduced if Europe is willing to flexibilize and upgrade the supply of labor.<sup>137</sup> In addition the report envisages the fact that a consensus is needed on the European level that only a healthy, efficient and competitive private sector is able to provide sufficient

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<sup>133</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.181.

<sup>134</sup> ERT, European Round Table of Industrialists, *Missing Links* (Brussels: ERT 1984).

<sup>135</sup> Belen Balanya, et. al. *Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power*. London: Pluto Pres, 2000, p.21.

<sup>136</sup> Axel Krause, *Inside the New Europe*, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1991, p.86.

<sup>137</sup> ERT, European Labour Markets: *An Update on Perspectives and Requirements for Job Generation in the second half of the 1990s*, European Round Table of Industrialists, 1993, p.8.

jobs, and that markets should be left to allocate labour efficiently.<sup>138</sup> This new consensus means that existing social balance has to be changed. In Neo-Gramscian sense, the Hegemonic Project of Europe's transnational capitalist class is articulated as that of 'competitiveness'.<sup>139</sup>

Recently, ERT's report on the European Neighbourhood Policy is also influential in shaping the policies of the EU towards its new borders. In 2004, 'ERT's Vision of a Bigger Single Market' presented its contribution to the debate on the future direction of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The position paper argues in favour of the EU's increased economic integration with the neighbouring countries, in the long run offering the possibility of their participation in the EU's Single Market subject to fulfilling certain conditions.<sup>140</sup> Much of the ERT's work is done by Working Groups established in Plenary Sessions. Since most ERT companies have substantial investments in neighbouring countries, they value the benefits of their increased integration with European Union. ERT proposes that the EU's neighbourhood policy should aim at moving towards an 'Integrated Economic Region' (IER). A step-by-step approach to implementation, allowing individual countries to move at their own speed, would result in the Union's neighbouring countries' gradual integration into the Union's Single Market, culminating in achievement of the "four freedoms".<sup>141</sup> From a Neo-Gramscian perspective, ERT underlines the EU's hegemonic Project of 'Integrated Economic Region' (IER) and emphasizes the incrementalist (gradual) and differentiated characteristics of the Project. The report also envisages the fact that one of the basic requirements for participation in the IER should be that the countries concerned achieve WTO Membership as a sound basis for trade liberalisation within the WTO framework.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>139</sup> van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, "Transnational Class Agency and European Governance – The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists" p. 172.

<sup>140</sup> ERT, *ERT's Vision of a Bigger Single Market*, May 2004, see [www.ert.be/working\\_group.aspx?wg=3](http://www.ert.be/working_group.aspx?wg=3) (Accessed on 25 August 2008.)

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, p.2-5.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, p.6.

Most regulatory changes spurred by the Single Market programme at best enabled the liberalisation of financial markets, but attempted to advance the emergence of an integrated European financial market. Hence, the integration of European financial markets will would drive forward reform in the established markets and thus improve corporate investment conditions. The basic message was and still is that integration of European financial markets will enhance European competitiveness by bringing down the costs of capital. Regarding the integration of financial markets ERT prepared a report and argued that Europe needed an integrated economic and financial area, if it was to remain competitive.<sup>143</sup>

ERT Enlargement Working Group was set up in 1997 and pressed European and national leaders to proceed with enlargement negotiations for the sake of a more competitive and prosperous Europe. From 1997 onwards, ERT intensified its lobbying urging the EU to reform its institutional structure in order to facilitate enlargement and to work closely with the governments of applicant countries towards meeting the EU membership conditions. Moreover, ERT has worked towards the establishment of so-called Business Enlargement Councils (BECs) in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEE). The Hungarian BEC, as an example, brought together representatives from the head offices of ERT companies with senior management officials of local companies, as well as government and Commission officials and had the task to facilitate accession.<sup>144</sup> This is clearly one trajectory of compromise of the ‘embedded neo-liberalism’, transferred to CEE and transnational capital’s interest in neo-liberal restructuring has become internalised in CEE forms of State.<sup>145</sup> As cited by Bohle and Husz<sup>146</sup>, another good example may be given from the analysis of the Hungarian-EU negotiations on membership. Close contacts between business

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<sup>143</sup> Bieling, *op.cit.*, p.215.

<sup>144</sup> Otto Holman. ‘The Enlargement of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe: the role of supranational and transnational actors’, in A.Bieler and A.D.Morton (eds.) *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: the restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy*. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, p.174.

<sup>145</sup> Bieler, *op. cit.*, “What future Union? The struggle for a Social Europe”, p.21.

<sup>146</sup> Dorothee Bohle and Dora Husz, “Whose Europe is it? Interest group in action in accession negotiations: the cases of competition policy and labour migration”, *Politique Européenne*, 2005, Vol.15: 88, p. 112.

organisations and here especially the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and the Hungarian government, direct negotiations between TNCs themselves and government ministers and Hungarian chief negotiator plus direct structural pressure of possible exit and legal challenges by TNCs led to a convergence of interests between the Hungarian government and its major foreign investors in a process of transnational class formation. This implied a direct impact of transnational capital on the formation of the Hungarian negotiation position, in which the Hungarian government mediated between transnational capital and the Commission on behalf of the TNCs.<sup>147</sup> A report was prepared by the Commission whose suggestions were in line with the ERT.<sup>148</sup>

Moreover in another report of the ERT, ‘The East-West Win Business Experience’, it is argued that, ‘economic opportunities must be accompanied by a common set of rules and regulations to guarantee a level playing field for foreign and domestic firms’.<sup>149</sup> This report also mentions the recommendations to overcome the obstacles and to secure the full benefits from enlargement which are addressed to policy makers and to companies in EU and in the candidate countries.<sup>150</sup> The Working group from 2003 to 2007 accompanied the accessions of 12 new Member States of the European Union, supporting opening of accession negotiations with Turkey and spearheading ERT’s focus on the Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It also supported the Business Advisory Councils (BACs) in seven South-East European countries.

Michael Emerson, in his book, *The Prospect of Deep Free Trade Between the European Union and Ukraine* mentioned the above stated report and signified the report and its findings and also implied that the ERT is part of the EU apparatus: ‘The European business community has a broad interest in expanding the EU’s Single Market into neighbouring non-member States. This would only mean openness for

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<sup>147</sup> Bieler, *op. cit.*, “What future Union? The struggle for a Social Europe”, p.22.

<sup>148</sup> ERT, *Job Creation and Competitiveness through Innovation*, European Round Table of Industrialists, 1998, p.22.

<sup>149</sup> Paolo Cecchini, Eric Jones, and Jochen Lorentzan, “Europe and the Concept of Enlargement” *Survival*, 43:1, Spring 2001, p.161-162.

<sup>150</sup> European Round Table of Industrialists, *The East-West Win-Win Business Experience*, Brussels:, 1998, p.25.

trade and investment, but also a favourable business climate and regulatory framework based on European standards. The European Round Table, a powerful group of 45 leading EU companies with a combined turnover of 1,500 billion Euro and 4,5 million employees), produced a monograph in 2004 on the ERT's Vision of a Bigger Single Market, which advocates a step-by-step progression from WTO accession to free trade for all neighbourhood countries and ultimately full inclusion in the Single Market in the long term.<sup>151</sup>

ERT has less diverging interests to balance and can act with relative speed and flexibility. Another strength of the ERT is that the members themselves are the Round Table and that these members control Europe's biggest companies and ERT's elite character allows it to play a more strategic and proactive role. An exercise of ideological power is what distinguishes the ERT most clearly from more traditional business lobbies. The ERT is an elite organisation of business industrialists defining and propagating the interests of this class which has played a significant role in not only giving the integration process a new boost by mobilising big business behind the completion of the internal market, but also in developing and promoting ideas and concepts that have helped to shape Europe's emerging regime of socioeconomic governance. In other words it serves the interests of a globalising transnational capitalist class.<sup>152</sup> ERT is part of the industrial coalition that continues to serve as important policy actors in EU regulatory matters. Their roles and relations with EU institutions have evolved considerably, as have their relations with one another. It is called the 'big business troika' which has emerged in EU policy-making. It is made up of the ERT, UNICE and the EU Committee.<sup>153</sup> However, ERT is not an interest association in contrast to corporatist organisations. ERT has no members either to represent or to discipline. Rather, the ERT is its members. UNICE is an association of interest representation, ERT is a forum in which European business leaders meet and

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<sup>151</sup> Michael Emerson, *The Prospect of Deep Free Trade Between the European Union and Ukraine*. Centre for European Studies, 2006, p. 116.

<sup>152</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, "Transnational Class Agency and European Governance – the Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists", p. 95.

<sup>153</sup> Wallace, *op. cit.*, p.130.

ERT is a private gathering of people who discuss themes and then try to arrive a common opinion.<sup>154</sup>

ERT is not a lobby group resembling the other lobby groups such as environmental or human rights groups. Rather, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the ERT is an institution which provides a platform for the industrialists, who formulate a coherent hegemonic project for transnational European capital, which is at the same time able to transcend the particular interests of this capital fraction to attract wider social forces towards the formation of a historic bloc, ‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity on a ‘universal’ plane.’<sup>155</sup> Moreover, it is emphasized that ideas must be located in social practice and thus can not be separated from the social structures in which actors are located and which shape their agency. Ideas are produced by human agency in the context of social power relations and are, as such, bound up with the strategic action of social actors.<sup>156</sup>

With the mainstream theories as Crowles argues; having re-examined the role of the ERT, it is not easy to explain the activities of the key non-state actors. The single market programme was not merely the result of conventional statecraft; nor was Member States’ actions predicated solely on the basis of domestically defined interest group activity.<sup>157</sup> ERT played a leading role in setting the agenda and providing policy alternatives for the EU policies and programmes. By the time government leaders came to the bargaining table, a substantial amount of prior work had been accomplished by the multinationals.<sup>158</sup> It reveals the fact that today ERT and the other non-state actors particularly multinational enterprises are influential in EC policy-making at both

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<sup>154</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, “Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists”, p.164.

<sup>155</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p.181.

<sup>156</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, “Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists”, p.158.

<sup>157</sup> Crowles, *op. cit.*, p. 522.

<sup>158</sup> James Caporaso and John Keler, “The European Community and Regional Integration Theory” in Mazeyy, S. and Rhodes, C. (eds.) *The State of the European Union*, 3, Boston: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.45.



national and EU level.<sup>159</sup> Thus, Crowles argues that due to the increasing role of the non-State actors in EU decision-making, the traditional theories of European integration which can not capture the political role of non-State actors in EU regulatory policy-making, an alternative approach giving significance to the influence of these non-State actors is necessary.

ERT is a transnational capitalist class in the socioeconomic governance of the EU and an elite forum mediating the interests and power of the most transnationalized segments of European capital. Since it has played a significant role in shaping European governance in as much as it has successfully articulated and promoted ideas and concepts that have at critical times set the political agenda and beyond, have helped to shape the discourse within which European policy is embedded.<sup>160</sup> The ideological and strategic orientation of the ERT gradually shifted away from a protective Europeanism and towards a neoliberal globalism. The broadening of ERT's membership with the addition of many prominent exponents of the globalist fraction also allowed the Round Table to develop more into an elite forum for the whole of an emergent European transnational capitalist class. The ERT of the 1990s thus became a forum within which this class came to redefine its interests along neoliberal lines and from which it has sought to shape European governance accordingly.<sup>161</sup> The emphasis on the positive role of market forces has never been so strong as in current Round Table discourse. The ERT of today stresses that we live in a new world, in which 'nothing can be done today the same way as we did it yesterday; that is what we mean by 'flexibility' and 'freedom'.<sup>162</sup> It reveals the fact that the ERT's discourse has become more explicitly neoliberal.

One of the main challenges of the ERT may be that the top managers, with intimate knowledge of their own companies' needs and problems, rubbing up against colleagues at

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<sup>159</sup> Crowles, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

<sup>160</sup> Van Apeldoorn, *op. cit.*, "Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists", p.157.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.* p.169.

<sup>162</sup> ERT, *Beating the Crisis: A Charter for Europe's Industrial Future*, European Round Table of Industrialists, 1993, p.28.

similar levels of expertise and responsibility but from very different working backgrounds and traditions, yet all of them constrained to reach a common analysis and a common set of proposals.<sup>163</sup> Richardson argues, “ it is naive to imagine that single discussions or papers, however well argued, will turn policy round.” That is not how things happen. The overriding goal is to deploy valid arguments based on practical experience, and then by constant repetition to build up a climate of opinion, inside member states as well as in the Brussels institutions, in favour of some very general thesis, for example that a single market will strengthen Europe's economy, that free trade is better than protectionism despite the problems it brings, or that creating new jobs is better than protecting old jobs as a way to fight unemployment. In this way, you build a reputation, people start to take you and your ideas seriously, and then you find that ministers themselves turn and ask you for your advice, because they face pressure everyday from trades unions and protectionists and anti-business groups in general. Ministers and Commissioners want to hear countervailing arguments, they need to feel the pressure from business, and on European matters the high-level voice that counted was increasingly the ERT.<sup>164</sup>

In the 1990s the discourse is often accompanied by the discourse on benchmarking which was strongly promoted by European business, above all by the ERT and the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE).<sup>165</sup> This can be seen with respect to a whole range of European initiatives such as SEM, EMU, financial market integration and ENP. Many discussion fora, all associations of the financial and non-financial sector emphasise the strong link between changes in the capital market and competitiveness. The ERT is also eager to assert that ‘ in an integrated pan-European capital market would drive down the cost of capital, increase financing options, lower the cost of doing business, increase the yields on investment and pension funds for all

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<sup>163</sup> Keith Richardson, “ Big business and the European Agenda”, *SEI Working Paper* No: 35 Sussex European Institute, 2000, p.22.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid*, p.20.

<sup>165</sup> Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Order*, London: Routledge, 2002.

citizens.<sup>166</sup> Hence ERT regards all these European initiatives as a ‘win-win’ strategy, from which Europe can not afford to abstain. They are not only represented as an essential requirement to mobilise resources for technological innovation, but also as a leverage to boost investment, create more jobs.<sup>167</sup>

### **2.3.3 Business Europe (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Organisations -UNICE)**

UNICE is the official European federation of national employers’ associations and as such has a public and formal corporatist role to play vis-à-vis the Commission and as a ‘social partner’ in the dialogue with the European Trade Union Federation (ETUC). It is another crucial transnational social force shaping the European governance. It is an alliance for a competitive European industry. It is the official voice of more than 20 million small, medium and large companies. Active in European affairs since 1958, UNICE’s members are 36 central industrial and employers federations from 30 countries, working together to achieve growth and competitiveness in Europe. Peter Kettlewey, the Communication Adviser of UNICE, stated in my interview conducted with him on 16 April 2006, that: “The European economy is challenged not only by the United States or Japan but also more by emerging regions with a young and skilled population. In the new world order, the EU is losing prosperity because it has failed to change into a more competitive economy. Hence in order to regain the economic prosperity of EU, attempts from the business sector have been accelerated by some non-governmental institutions representing business and capital.” When he was asked UNICE’s concrete contribution to the EU’s decision-making, Kettlewey gave a very recent example from the EU history. “In 1999 political referendum, we called for competitiveness to be placed at the top of the political agenda. In Lisbon, the heads of States and governments proclaimed the aim of making Europe the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world by 2010. UNICE assumed that the Lisbon Strategy meant a real commitment to trigger all policies towards the achievement of that goal.” Kettlewey enumerated the reasons why Europe should change: ‘Globalisation has

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<sup>166</sup> ERT, “Will European Governments in Barcelona keep their Lisbon Promises”, *Message from the European Round Table of Industrialists to the Barcelona European Council*. European Round Table of Industrialists, 2002, p.7.

<sup>167</sup> Bieling, *op. cit.* p.215.

developed a new dynamism, Europe must face up to an ageing population, Europe's economy lacks growth, Enlargement is a golden opportunity to boost Europe's competitiveness' and as an alternative he listed the solutions as follows: "Better governance, better regulation and better communication." Although ENP is not a direct concern for UNICE, their scope and 10 key messages reveal the fact that they implicitly not fully support the ENP since they have doubts whether it may be disadvantage for the small and medium-sized enterprises who are the main concerns for the UNICE. Small and medium-sized enterprises and regionally rooted firms are more reserved towards the Neighbourhood Policy since they fear that some aspects of transnational regulations and the new comers with the free flow of labour will put them at a competitive disadvantage.

There is a parallelism between the evolution of the EU and Business Europe. As the EEC broadened and deepened, BUSINESS EUROPE also grew. In 2008, there are now 40 members from 34 countries, including the European Union countries, the European Economic Area countries and some central and Eastern European countries. There are seven main committees: economic, international relations, industrial affairs, social affairs, legal affairs, entrepreneurship and internal market.<sup>168</sup>

UNICE is the official European federation of national employers' associations that as such has a public and formal role to play vis-a-vis the Commission, and as a social partner in the dialogue with the European trade union federation (ETUC). When integration was at a low-point in the early 1980s and growing global competition threatened the position of large sections of European industry leading members of Europe's business community began to perceive the need for a European-level political initiative. As Marie Green Cowles argues; "Europe's official employers' organisation, BUSINESS EUROPE (UNICE), was deemed ineffective. BUSINESS EUROPE (UNICE)'s relative weakness, was one background factor which caused the formation of the ERT."<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> [www.buinesseurope.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=418](http://www.buinesseurope.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=418) (Accessed on 25 September 2008.)

<sup>169</sup> Cowles, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

### **2.3.4 European Movement International (EMI)**

EMI is another transnational civil society whose main focus of attention centres on influencing political, social and cultural arenas within the framework of European Civil Society. The first major achievement of EMI was the creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949. European Movement was also responsible for the creation of 'College d'Europe' in Bruges and the European Centre of Culture in Geneva.

One of EMI's major functions during 1950's through to 1990's was the setting up of think-tanks and a network of mobilization in the democratic countries of Europe and in countries subjected to totalitarian regimes. Since 1948, the European Movement has played an essential role in the process of European integration by exercising its influence on European and national institutions. It fought in favour of the direct election of the European Parliament by all European citizens, in favour of the Treaty on the European Union and also for European Constitution.<sup>170</sup>

EMI has key issues to discuss such as constitutional affairs, enlargement, Euro-Med relations, European Neighbourhood Policy etc. Regarding ENP, 'The EMI has taken a very active role in the dialogue between the North and South of the Mediterranean area. The same importance is given to the relations with the immediate neighbours to the East. The working group looks into questions related to the role of the civil society in both areas, possible stronger cooperation and common political and practical agreements. The interview made with Pat Cox as the President of EMI and ex-president of European Parliament in Brussels 5 May 2006- Pat Cox briefly gave information about the creation of the idea of 'European Movement' and how much the international civil societies specifically the EMI was influential in the formation of the European Union:

"In the Hague 1948 the meeting was held and the idea of the international civil society arose. It is the oldest and the widest pro-European civil society of its kind in 40 different territories that is bigger than EU like the Council of Europe." Cox reviewed the mission of the civil societies and called them as the important agents of defining, refining public policy. He gave information about the 'Comitology' which was one of

the important concerns of the interview. He acknowledged that ‘Comitology is the composition of national government experts who make the secondary European law’. It is not classically domain of civil society but a technically detailed compiled of expertise which proves the fact that the supranational organisation of the EU, Commission requires to coordinate with the non-state actors in the EU’s decision-making.

Although EMI is one of the oldest civil societies which was very influential in the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), it is not as effective as the ERT in the EU’s decision-making. Regarding ENP, EMI has a committee dealing with the issues of the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, the committee works are not coordinated and effective in the decisions taken.

After the French and Dutch referenda for the Constitution, European Union realised that the decisions taken at the higher levels of hierarchy without getting the ‘consent’ of the people, creates ‘*us vs others*’. Hence, Commissioner Margot Wallstram presented a 3D Plan<sup>171</sup> in order to bring these parties closer. The Plan initiates involvement of civil societies of member states together with the European civil societies such as European Movement International, Euractiv so on.

At the European Council on 18 June 2005, the declaration on ‘*the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*’ was adopted. This declaration called for a ‘period of reflection’ following the negative votes in France and in Netherlands. This period of reflection will be used to enable a broad debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties. The declaration argues that; ‘Any vision of the future of Europe needs to build on a clear view on citizen’s needs and expectations’. This is the purpose of *Plan-D*.<sup>172</sup> The reason why the Commission has proposed a Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, is to stimulate a wider debate between the European Union’s

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<sup>170</sup> [www.europeanmovement.org/history.cfm](http://www.europeanmovement.org/history.cfm), (Accessed on 23 July 2006.)

<sup>171</sup> The ‘3 D’ represents: Debate, Dialogue and Democracy.

<sup>172</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Commission’s contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate.

democratic institutions and citizens.<sup>173</sup> The recent Eurobarometer survey<sup>174</sup> has shown that public approval (consent) of the European Union has steadily decreased over recent years. While being a member of European Union has steadily decreased in citizens' eyes with only 47% of respondents giving positive responses. Trust in the Union has dropped from 50% of citizens trusting the EU in autumn 2004 to 44% in spring 2005. The Commission believes that the debate must not be limited to the political leaders and traditional stakeholders. The Commission shares the views of Heads of State and Government that these debates should involve 'civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties. The EMI had the mission to create rapprochement among the people of the Europe for getting their 'consents' for the EU initiatives.

In the interview I conducted with Marc Gray<sup>175</sup>, the main topic was the European political debate among civil society networks and developed strategies to raise the awareness and information level of Europe's citizens in the Member States in respect to European politics. The three day workshop for project managers / general secretaries of the European Movement network and its close partners aimed at professionalisation of European communication and cooperation among civil society networks. According to Gray, these kinds of seminars contribute to the improvement of the European political debate and development of strategies to raise the awareness and information level of Europe's citizens in the Member States in respect to European politics. Exchange of best practices and open innovative methodology enabled the participants to strengthen civil society communication on national and international level and to develop concrete activities in the framework of "Plan D". Combined with discussions with experts, practitioners and representatives of the EU institutions, the seminar provided a manifold and pragmatic approach to the complex realm of European civil society communication.

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<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>174</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.htm). (Accessed on 13 February 2008)

<sup>175</sup> He is the member of the cabinet Margot Wallstrom . The interview was conducted during a three day seminar "Towards Better European Communication: Civil, Democratic, Transparent" held by European Communication Policy in cooperation with the European Movement International (EMI) in Brussels, on 11-14 November 2005.

EMI in spite of not being as influential as the ERT, is in favour ENP. EMI has traditional networks with the EU's bureaucracy and ex-members of the parliament and technocrats who have the expertise and experience in the EU institutions. Yet, in the EU's decision-making, it is not effective.

### 2.3.5 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)

ETUC was formed in 1973 and made up of national confederations from across Europe, European Industry Federations, and Interregional Trade Union Councils.<sup>176</sup> The Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the ETUC as an official social partner alongside the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) AND THE European Center of Enterprises with Public Participation and Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP). The EU placed an obligation on the EU to consult the social partners prior to the implementation of new policy measures. It enables the social partners to engage in autonomous dialogue and conclude EU-wide agreements on employment and social protection issues. As Zagelmeyer argues, progress has been limited by the unwillingness of UNICE to enter negotiations and a desire by employers to maintain collective bargaining at national level.<sup>177</sup> The ETUC mirrors the intergovernmental form of the EU, and its strategy and identity is closely bound up with developments within and between national confederations and their respective nation states.<sup>178</sup>

While the ETUC has gained opportunities to influence specific details of European social policy it has been excluded from decisions on more fundamental questions regarding the

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<sup>176</sup> E. Gabaglio and R. Hoffman, *The ETUC in the Mirror of Industrial Relations Research*. Brussels: ETUI, 1998. (See. ETUC 'Johannesburg: Creation of jobs and active social policies, conditions for a sustained economic progress' 3 September 2002; <http://www.etuc.org/en/>) (Accessed on 12 March 2008.)

<sup>177</sup> Stephan Zagelmeyer, "The Evolution of Collective Bargaining Systems in Euroland: Structure, Conduct, Performance", *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 12, 2006 p. 165.

<sup>178</sup> William Osterheld and W. Olle, "The Internationalization of Trade Unions in Western Europe and the Development of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)". *The ETUC in the Mirror of Industrial Relations Research*. E. Gabaglio and R. Hoffman, eds. Brussels: ETUI, 1998. See ETUC 'European Social Forum: The European Social Model at the service of economic and political relations on a global scale' (6 September 2002); <http://www.etuc.org/en/>; (Accessed on 12 April 2004.)



form of governance associated with European integration.<sup>179</sup> The commitment of the ETUC to European integration has made it difficult for it to oppose its specific trajectory, even where this had a negative impact on employment and social protection.<sup>180</sup>

In the manual book of the ETUC, it says that;

*ETUC aims to put 'Social Europe' at the heart of Europe's political priorities. ETUC defends fundamental social values such as solidarity, equality and cohesion. The European trade union movement opposes all forms of exclusion and social injustice and insists on the need to consult and inform workers'.*

*The pressures resulting from the Internal Market and EMU (European Monetary Union) are unevenly distributed. While capital gained flexibility and new room for manoeuvre, states gave up the possibilities to stimulate the national economy via currency devaluations and lowering of interest rates. The introduction of the single currency in combination with the deregulatory and monetarist bias of EMU as well as the lack of social re-regulation at the European level facilitates the comparison of different national systems of industrial relations regulations. As a result, workers and trade unions with lower levels of productivity may be pressed to accept lower wages and a cut-back in working conditions, left as the only possible adjustment mechanism in struggle for remaining a competitive location for industry and FDI. Employers seek price advantages, no longer attainable by currency depreciation, through wage and benefit cuts instead.<sup>181</sup>*

Regarding the ENP, ETUC has no direct reference to be made. However, it is implicitly stated that the ETUC is anxious to avoid a two-speed cohesion policy, although some

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<sup>179</sup> Richard Hyman, "Redrawing boundaries of solidarity? ETUC, social dialogue and the Europeanisation of trade unions in the 1990s". *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 5:1, 1999, p.89-110

<sup>180</sup> Graham Taylor and Andrew Mathers, "Social Partner and Social Movement? European Integration and Trade Union Renewal in Europe", *Labor Studies Journal*, 27:1 Spring 2002, p.98.

<sup>181</sup> Andrew Martin and George Ross, "In the Line of Fire: the Europeanization of Labor Representation", in Andrew Martin and George Ross (eds.) *The Brave New World of European Labor: European Trade Unions at the Millennium*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books. p.345.

priorities are acceptable for those new-comers in a different status without the membership status. In order to realize its vision of a ‘social Europe in the global economy’, the European Union (EU) aims not only to modernize the European social model but also to ‘disseminate, beyond the values and the borders of the Union, the EU values and experience of a model of development combining growth and social justice’. Even though this social model can not simply be transposed to other parts of the world the European Commission considers certain aspects are of interest to the Union’s partners. It has declared ‘the incorporation of the European social model into external dialogue and measures at bilateral, regional and multilateral level as an objective of external relations and seeks co-operation on this issue ‘firstly with the candidate countries, neighbouring countries and other third countries.<sup>182</sup> European integration was supported as such, but additional social policy measures.

were demanded. However unions had only symbolic Euro-corporatism in where unions can participate in discussions without having the chance of making a more significant impact on individual proposals.<sup>183</sup>

In the ETUC’s 5-6 December 2005 dated resolution ‘towards free movement of workers in an enlarged European Union: review of the transitional measures applicable to the free movement of workers from the new EU Member States’, the transitional measures have been introduced by member states to protect their labour markets. Some ETUC affiliates, especially in the border regions with the new Member States, have reported that the transitional measures have had a positive effect for them, because they have reduced the pressure of migratory flows from the new member states, in a situation of stagnating economic growth and growing unemployment rates that are especially high under migrants and their descendents, thereby allowing their labour markets to gradually adapt without creating major shocks and imbalances. However, other ETUC affiliates have reported to the ETUC that the transitional provisions with regard to the free movement of workers in their Member States seem to have an adverse effect: they create and maintain

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<sup>182</sup> Sieglinde Gstöhl, “The social dimension of EU neighbourhood policy”, *The EU and the Social dimension of Globalization: How the EU influences the work*, Jan Orbie, Lisa Tortell (ed.), Routledge/Garnett Series: Europe in the World, p.62.

<sup>183</sup> Magnus Ryner and Thorsten Schulten, “The Political economy of labour-market restructuring and trade union responses in the social democratic heartland”, in H. Overbeek (ed.) *The Political Economy of European Employment: European integration and the transnationalization of the (un)employment question*, London/New York: Routledge, p.54.

a situation of second and third class citizenship for workers from the new Member States, or make legal admission for work impossible for them, thereby stimulating: unfair competition on wages and working conditions to the detriment of the working classes in the old Member States, an increase in undeclared work and false self employment which disturbs local and sectoral labour markets, exploitation and discriminatory treatment of workers from the new member states<sup>184</sup>. Hence ETUC is critical about the recent policies of the EU and the new-comers may be regarded as a threat by distorting the competition: free movement of labour may be a threat for welcoming the cheap labour from these countries as the tool of neoliberal re-structuring.

## 2.4 Overview

This chapter examines why and how neo-Gramscian perspectives may be applied to European Neighbourhood Policy and attempts to examine the way in which the formation of hegemonic discourse of ENP is produced. . It is argued that the Neo-Gramscian analysis gives the most comprehensive political-economic explanation of the EU's hegemonic project of the ENP towards the neighbouring countries.

The state, for instance, should be understood, not just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public sphere (government, political parties, and military) but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions. It can therefore be argued that the State in this conception is understood as a social relation. The historical, dynamic and open-ended aspect of the Gramscian theory best explains the European Neighbourhood Policy as the EU's hegemonic project. The framework illuminates a number of aspects of the case study of Ukraine as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy which are not well explained by other approaches. Efforts by the European Union to preserve its hegemonic position, via European Neighbourhood Policy in terms of market dominance, can be understood in terms of a 'war of position' in which actors coordinate sources of power and build alliances. In particular, the Neo-Gramscian approach points to the crucial role of civil

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<sup>184</sup> ETUC Resolutions 2005, *Towards free movement of workers in an enlarged European Union: review of the transitional measures applicable to the freemovement of workers from the new EU Member States*, 5-6 December 2005.

society in the formation of the EU' s hegemonic project. Of course, the current situation is just one phase in a protracted war of position. New sources of tension are not hard to find. It remains to be seen whether the new terrain of contestation sustains the position of the EU and its hegemonic project of the ENP or provides new strategic opportunities for challengers.

Gramsci examined the complicated class structure of West European societies and the role of 'intellectuals' in ideologically unifying different groups and classes. According to Gramsci, 'intellectuals' serves as an interpretive category which permitted him to analyse social change in terms of the recomposition of society around intellectual divisions of labour specific to different economic classes. In the thesis, intellectuals are taken as 'organic' and serve to sustain 'the moral and intellectual leadership'. The intellectuals are those individuals with a direct role in the economic activity of a class; like capitalist businessmen, economists, industrialists. In addition to their technical role, they are also in position to influence other individuals at different levels of the economy such as fellow businessmen, local politicians and so on. Their superior function and consequent social status put them in a position to 'organize' and 'lead' others and it is in his capacity that their role in providing a social identity to their class is exercised. The focus of the intellectual's role in mediating state and society is a major contribution to the subject. The thesis within the theoretical framework mentions the intellectuals as the educator of the society, shaping the policies, influencing the bureaucratic decisions taken both domestically and internationally. The function of intellectuals is argued to be discerned by the social relations that fundamentally dominate any society: the social relations of material production.<sup>185</sup> ERT, Business Europe (UNICE), ETUC, EMI are taken as the representative of European Capital. Their different perceptions towards the ENP are examined to understand their roles in the EU's decision-making.

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<sup>185</sup> James Martin, *Gramsci's Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, Palgrave 1998, p.45.

## CHAPTER 3

### *The Formation of ENP as an EU Hegemonic Project*

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The EU, with all due recognition of the complexity of ‘multileveledness’, is subordinating into a larger neoliberal transnational, structural and institutional ensemble. The politics of Europe, which today has to assign central importance to the EU, is more open-ended and contingent on social struggle and compromises between social forces. The study examines how the present neo-liberal global order has come about with the aim to understand structural change taking place at the global level as well as the European level. Restructuring at the global level also reflects the changing forms of integration. Thus, the study claims that an understanding of the changes in the global level in and the historical forms of the particular period that the EU in are necessary to correctly analyse. The EU has built the ENP on the assumption that national institutions matter and that they will be crucial for policy reforms in line with the ENP guidelines. Therefore, keeping on debating whether the incentives the EU offers to its neighbours are sufficient to bring about policy change may turn out to be a sterile debate. This debate does not offer a complete picture to understand the complex dynamic between international and domestic factors. In contrast, elaborating on the insights developed by IPE scholars, as the insight on national distinctiveness, may provide well-developed theoretical toolkits and empirical cases to draw on to assess the potential influence of the ENP.<sup>186</sup>

*The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) may be viewed as the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe, and the EU’s strategy towards its ‘new neighbours’ vis-à-vis this policy may be viewed, in Neo-Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic project. Hegemony in the Gramscian sense entails an intellectual and moral leadership directed by conflicting political and cultural agents and organisations. Thus, in examining the ENP from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, this chapter emphasizes how decision-making with regard to the ENP is influenced by the social forces representing EU capital and analyses*

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<sup>186</sup> Manuela Moschella, “An International Political Economy Approach to the Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP from the Enlargement and Mediterranean Perspectives”, *European Political Economy Review*, No.7, Summer , 2007, p.173-174.

*how the EU's internal structure as well as its external dynamics affect the ENP. In other words European Neighbourhood Policy proposed a definable policy, expressing its willingness to support neo-liberal restructuring in the identified region. This chapter also attempts to answer the question as to whether the ENP can continue to be a sustainable policy without offering a membership perspective; it is argued that the strategy of the ENP may be sustained for a while with consent of its partners; however it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc.*

Bieler points out the need for research on how exactly transnational class formation takes place across ENP countries in Europe. Also which production sectors have become transnationalised and which political alliances have been forged between transnational capital and national state elites as well as the emerging bourgeoisie.<sup>187</sup> Another area of research suggested by van Apeldoorn aims to analyse the emergence of the transnational social forces such as the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as an elite forum and the ways how this shaped European governance.<sup>188</sup> ERT as an important actor, identifies the transnationally oriented capital, namely business organisations, European Movement International (EMI) and Business Europe. These organisations aim to increase transnational oriented capital's competitiveness in the European and global markets by having access to comparatively cheap and skilled labor. Moreover Shields and Bohle focus on the emerging new elite replacing the old regime nomenklatura and how they become an integral part of the transnational capitalist class.<sup>189</sup> As Bohle argues, the post-communist countries such as Ukraine, did not possess a domestic bourgeoisie, the neo-liberalization process led to a very high degree of foreign penetration in important segments of the Economy.<sup>190</sup> Due to the lack of a domestic bourgeoisie and a developed civil society, neo-liberal economic

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<sup>187</sup> Andreas Bieler, "The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical materialist Analysis of European Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.9, No. 4, August, 2002. p.585.

<sup>188</sup> van Apeldoorn, (ed), "Transnational Class Agency and European Governance – The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists", *Dimensions of a critical theory of European Integration. New Political Economy*, 5:2, 2000, p. 157-181.

<sup>189</sup> Dorothee Bohle, "The ties that bind the New Europe: Neoliberal restructuring and Transnational actors in the deepening and widening of the European Union" Working paper presented at Workshop, *Enlargement and European Governance*, ECPR Joint Session Workshops, Turin 2002.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

restructuring had to be secure externally through Europeanization which is explained with the concept of ‘passive revolution’.

### ***3.2 Background to the ENP: From EMP to ENP***

In order to better understand the ENP as a hegemonic project in support of a neo-liberal restructuring of the region it addresses, an historical perspective must begin by overviewing the formation and contents of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and examining the main objectives and motivation surrounding the EMP, which may be considered as another EU Hegemonic Project and a precursor to the ENP. Neo-Gramscian Approach specifically question which social forces were in favour of the ENP and how the formation of a pro-EU historical bloc took place.<sup>191</sup>

So as to analyse the EMP from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, it should be regarded as the EU’s Hegemonic Project and also be viewed as the product of dynamic, complex relationships between uninfluential social forces in the Mediterranean, and the EU’s strategy towards these Mediterranean countries vis-à-vis this policy may be viewed, in Neo-Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic project. Hegemony in the Gramscian sense entails an intellectual and moral leadership directed by conflicting political and cultural agents and organisations. Thus, in examining the EMP from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, this part of the chapter emphasizes how decision-making with regard to the EMP is influenced by the social forces and analyses how the EU’s internal structure as well as its external dynamics affected EMP. This part of the chapter analysing the EMP or the Barcelona Process as a precursor to ENP also attempts to answer the question as to whether the EMP could be a sustainable policy with chronic underdevelopment, disparate political cultures, multilateral relations envisaged by the EU and without the EU carrying out its promises.

It is argued that it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc since EU had internal problems and was incoherent in acting cohesively and decisively, moreover the EU had institutional and structural problems within the framework of EMP, there was no necessary institutions to carry out the Project, the various national, sub-national and

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<sup>191</sup> Bieler, *op. cit.*, p. 594.

supranational institutions involved in the EMP programme were often unable to challenge the multi-layered transnational governance a coherent way<sup>192</sup> and also the EU member states had different perceptions towards the EMP<sup>193</sup>, in addition, the Project had limited financial assistance and there was lack of clarity in EMP's definition on key issues, also the heterogeneous structure of the EMP countries with different levels of socio-economic development and socio-political systems caused the lack of confidence.<sup>194</sup> In addition there was overlapping interest and mission in the region (EU, NATO and OSCE) therefore, in both so-called 'high' and 'low' politics areas, the agenda for a Euro-Mediterranean regional integration project raises a number of questions regarding its underlying logic- particularly when Mediterranean partners do not have the option of becoming part of the EU governance system through formal accession<sup>195</sup>. Moreover the imbalance between the two signatory parties: on one hand, the EU acting as a single entity on behalf of its member states and on the other hand an individual Mediterranean Partner Country (MPC) acting on its own behalf<sup>196</sup> and economic challenges that the Mediterranean countries still persist, political challenges, remain abundant: undemocratic political systems, poor governance, bad human rights records, regional conflicts and political violence<sup>197</sup> and last but not the least the underdeveloped civil society in the Mediterranean partner countries.<sup>198</sup> In other words, social forces such as the Southern Mediterranean societies are not eager to support the project. Any rapprochement between countries could not function on the basis of elite preferences and without the 'consent' of the southern Mediterranean societies. As

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<sup>192</sup> Frederick Volpi, "Regional Community Building and the Transformation of International Relations: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Politics*, 9:2, Summer 2004, p. 16.

<sup>193</sup> Fred Tanner and Heiner Hanggi, "Promoting Security, Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood", *Institute for Security Studies*, European Union, Paris, 1996, p. 63.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*, p.141.

<sup>195</sup> Amichai Magen, "The shadow of enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy achieve compliance?", *Columbia Journal of European Law*, 12:2, Columbia University: European Legal Studies Center, 2006, p. 389.

<sup>196</sup> Bechir Chourou, "Arab Regional Integration as a Prerequisite for a successful Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Politics*, 8:2/3, Summer/Autumn 2003, p. 195.

<sup>197</sup> Michelle Pace, "Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the South?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20: 4, December 2007, p.664.

<sup>198</sup> Amichai, *op. cit.*, p. 384-427.



Anne Showstack Sassoon has outlined, the existence of hegemony should be on a universal plane that Gramsci had in mind was the creation of hegemony of fundamental social group over subordinate groups. Hegemony would therefore be established 'if the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion.'<sup>199</sup> As Pace quoted from Ivan Martin, of the University Carlos III in Madrid, Spain, urged the need to go beyond the artificial division between the three baskets of the EMP. This has led to an excessive institutional complexity with a simultaneous gap in terms of involvement of social actors. He argued that the biggest contradiction of the EMP is that it intends to promote democracy, bring about development and enhance mutual knowledge among the peoples of the Mediterranean by purely intergovernmental methods, without giving any say to the people affected<sup>200</sup>. From Neo-Gramscian perspective, since hegemony is a form of dominance referring to a consensual order, an expression of broadly based consent manifest in the acceptance of ideas, supported by material resources and institutions,<sup>201</sup> without the consent of the citizens in the Mediterranean states, it is unlikely to establish historic bloc.

During the 1980s, the state of the world economy was characterized by increased competition. After the global economic crisis of 1970s, national economies were reformed based on deregulation and restructuring imposed by the developed states and world economic and financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The construction of regional trade blocks was accepted as unavoidable by many governments. Hence, the EMP, initiated in 1995 and commonly known as the Barcelona Process, is appreciated as the right attempt to integrate the economies of the entire region in a trade block in order to become stronger in the face of world economic competition.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> A. Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 , p.123.

<sup>200</sup> Michelle Pace, "The Impact of European Union Involvement in Civil Society Structures in the Southern Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, 10:2, July 2005, p.239.

<sup>201</sup> Robert W Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations of theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2): 1981, p.136.

<sup>202</sup> Fulvio Attina, "EU Relations with the Southern Mediterranean Neighbours", *Intereconomics*, July / August, 2007, p.199.

The EMP did not start from scratch in building its relations with the 16 partner countries. In 1995 the European Community established a policy called the Global Mediterranean Policy, which was the first noteworthy attempt to formulate a strategy for the region.<sup>203</sup> EC policy toward the region was significantly reinforced by the accession of the Northern Mediterranean states of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). Then Mediterranean Forum launched by Italy and Egypt in 1994 has survived the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in November 1995.

Especially with regard to the countries of the Mediterranean region, the ENP draws on a long history from the EC/EU Mediterranean countries, or at least offered them. In comparison, the EU policy of partnership and cooperation agreements (PCA) with its Eastern European neighbours is much younger in terms of its legal, institutional and procedural arrangements.

The EMP or Barcelona Process provides the general framework for the relations between the European Union, its member-states, and the countries situated outside the EU in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. The initial agreement adopted by the parties consisted of a declaration and work programme that launched a partnership in three spheres: a) political and security; b) economic and financial; and c) social and cultural. The EMP is innovative with its three baskets: political and security, economic and financial and social, cultural and human. The combination of two dimensions – bilateral/economic and multilateral/political and security – was another innovation. These two features of the EMP were interrelated with the aims of promoting development and reforms through Association Agreements and financial aid and establishing multilateral regional dialogue and conflict-resolution throughout the region.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Gomez Ricardo, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy*, Aldershot: Asghate, 2003, p.113.

<sup>204</sup> Martin Ortega “A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean?”, in Judy Batt et al., *Partners and Neighbours a CFSP for a Wider Europe*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No.63, September 2003, p. 88.

Prior to the Barcelona Declaration, the EMP had been based on political rather than legal documents. The last important document was released on 28 November 2005 by the Barcelona Summit celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Partnership. The programs conducted within the EMP framework are prepared and implemented by a large and varying number of bodies comprised of representatives of government and civil society. When the EMP was launched, these bodies were also expected to develop decentralised cooperation. As my interview made with Pat Cox, Ex-President of the European Parliament and currently President of the EMI, Brussels on 5 May 2008, he pointed out the fact that:

*Another important concern was the comparison of ENP. Barcelona Process is stronger in its definition than its delivery. The main weakness is the 'All being equal' was not appropriate for the Mediterranean countries thus Barcelona Process never met the conditionality. Another important weakness was that those countries never wanted to be democratised. These Arabic countries were not giving importance to the free media, free expression of opinion, participation of women, initiative of civil society. Hence Barcelona Process did not achieve its ends. On the other hand the bilateral agreements of the ENP and the willingness of these countries to democratise would make it different but it is a 'Let's wait and see!' approach.*

However, at the heart of the Barcelona Process and the 'engine of the EMP' was the 'Economic and Financial Partnership' that committed the signatories to establishing, by 2010, one of the world's largest free trade zones.<sup>205</sup> In fact, the establishment of such a Euro-Mediterranean regional grouping – with a potential marketplace of 800 million people – sought to reach beyond the economic horizon by intensifying cross-Mediterranean cooperation in the political and social spheres as well.<sup>206</sup>

The EMP was framed in a language of 'shared norms' and by the vision of the eventual development of a secure, stable and peaceful Euro-Mediterranean space. Thus, the

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<sup>205</sup> Gomez, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>206</sup> Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffe, "Towards Euro-Mediterranean Regional Integration", *Mediterranean Politics*, 5:1, Spring 2000, p.3.

logic of regionalism embedded within the EMP may be viewed as an EU mechanism for maintaining order in the new international context and expected to operate through normative, spill-over and functionalist effects from ‘inside’ the EU to ‘outside’ its borders.<sup>207</sup> The projection of EU norms, to be emulated by its Mediterranean partners, was perceived as a means of extending the EU’s influence in the South through non-coercive instruments, including dialogue with the 12 Mediterranean partners.<sup>208</sup>

In the hegemonic discourse, a normative power/hegemon defines what is normal as well as those that must be normed.<sup>209</sup> Michelle Pace argues that the EU’s regionalism in the Mediterranean has been primarily a regional project based on normative ideas. Although EU actors repeatedly emphasize the importance of ‘shared norms’ and ‘common values’, the EU is not able to enforce normative pressure on Mediterranean partners to endorse its own principles. This may be due to the fact that the identity of a normative power does not tally with coercive means and by attempting to forge such an identification, the EU forecloses more hard power means of addressing its southern partners in the EU’s quest for the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean regional space. This issue was discussed in an academic debate<sup>210</sup> which was again quoted by Pace; ‘Various contributors attempted to ‘normalize’ the EU normative power debate by arguing that even if the EU draws upon coercive means, the normative exercise of power by the EU remains legitimate.<sup>211</sup> As cited from Darbouche’; ‘We cannot ignore the historically and contingently produced discourses that shape the subjectivities of Mediterranean actors in their interactions with EU actors’.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Pace, *op. cit.*, “Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the South”, p. 660.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup> David Forgacs (ed.), *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*, New York: New York University Press, 2000.

<sup>210</sup> European Union Studies Association Conference, 2007.

<sup>211</sup> Pace, *op. cit.*, “Norm Shifting From EMP To ENP: The EU As A Norm Entrepreneur In The South?”, p. 665.

<sup>212</sup> Hakim Darbouche, “A daunting past? Europe’s colonial legacy and its failure to ‘promote democracy’ in Algeria”, paper presented at a workshop on *Europe’s legacy? From colonialism to democracy promotion: The case of the Mediterranean*, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, 21–22 April 2007.

In examining the role of civil society in Euro-Mediterranean Relations, the Barcelona Process may be viewed as a framework for civil society cooperation, which the EU viewed as an important component of EU-Mediterranean security. From the EU's perspective, civil society consists of a set of valuable actors who assist in political and socioeconomic transformation, acting as watchdogs guarding against anti-democratic action and human rights abuses as well as providing crucial expertise for the design and implementation of reform programs. It is for these reasons that the EU has often professed itself to be eager to duplicate their experience elsewhere. This declared faith in the reformative capacity of civil society may be one reason why cooperation was made such an important component of the EMP when it was launched in 1995,<sup>213</sup> and in the aftermath of 9/11, intercultural dialogue and civil society co-operation across the Mediterranean space is given increased importance.<sup>214</sup>

The EU obliged the Mediterranean countries to introduce the civil society element in the Barcelona Process. Barcelona Declaration laid claims to the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Civil society dialogue and exchange of ideas was made the centrepiece of the Declaration's third chapter devoted to the social, cultural and human affairs partnership. As the third basket has persistently lacked a commonly shared discourse on civil society, there was tension and conflict about the way how to put this civil dialogue into practice. It is believed that intercultural dialogue is still in the making and civil societies in the North and South are still evolving. Cultural dialogue should be given significance.

Historically, the countries of the southern Mediterranean rim moved from Ottoman hegemony to that of European Imperialism, and, in the post-colonial phase, to one-party republican or monarchical government. While each of these stages was characterized by the centralization of power and an absence of Western-style democratic institutions, these countries are now compelled to grapple with the

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<sup>213</sup> Elisabeth Johansson Nogues, "Civil Society in Euro-Mediterranean relations: What success of EU's normative promotion?", *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Mediterranean Programme Series*, RSCAZ No. 2006/40, p. 1.

<sup>214</sup> Pace, *op. cit.*, "The Impact of European Union Involvement in Civil Society Structures in the Southern Mediterranean", p. 239.

challenges of democracy and market economics, mostly as a result of exogenous factors, namely the need to integrate into the global economy and the associated external pressure to introduce political reforms. The endogenous factors include domestic socioeconomic challenges, which whip up dissent and pressure for change at the grassroots level following years of stagnation. Neither mature democracy, let alone its functioning institutions, nor fundamental freedoms as constitutionally enshrined and practised in most Western democratic countries has existed in these countries. The absence of democracy, tolerance and pluralism has in turn stifled the emergence of a strong civil society, which is one of the prerequisites for the construction of a democratic order.<sup>215</sup> Freedom of speech and the press is severely restricted in the majority of the Arab world. As part of the EU's Hegemonic Project to the Mediterranean region, the Barcelona Declaration underlines a strong commitment to upholding human rights and democratic principles, and the bilateral free-trade agreements concluded thus far also include human rights clauses. However, there appears to be a general reluctance of the union's short-term interests.<sup>216</sup>

The main achievement of the EMP is that it was able to secure all the EU member-states as advocate of the policy and it was the most systematically implemented project in the region with the problem identification, selection of intervention logics, programming, anchoring the policy reforms. Barcelona's main attainment has been the awareness for reducing asymmetrical perceptions and developing a common identity between the two shores of the Mediterranean.<sup>217</sup> The other achievements may be listed as follows: The EMP was the first trans-Mediterranean cooperation arrangement to succeed in moving beyond the theoretical stage of development. Also, the participation of Israel, Syria and the Palestinian Authority gave the Barcelona Process a unique status in the region as this is the only forum in which their politicians and officials

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<sup>215</sup> Roderick Pace, Stelios Stavridis and Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Parliaments and Civil Society Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 2004, p.78.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid*, p.76.

<sup>217</sup> Attina, *op. cit.*, p. 501-518.

would routinely sit together at the same table.<sup>218</sup> The Barcelona Process provided a diplomatic safety net in Middle East Peace Process.<sup>219</sup>

Over the last 14 years of the Barcelona process, the situation in Mediterranean partner countries has been rather dismal. The events of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the heightened tension in the Middle East and the declaration of the US-led war against terrorism have all had a negative impact on the major foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Mediterranean, desperately needed to implement many economic programmes.<sup>220</sup>

The absence of Western-style democratic institutions, these southern Mediterranean countries' historically being passed from the hegemonic rule of the Ottoman Empire to that of European imperialism, the associated external pressures to introduce political reforms, the endogenous factors include domestic socioeconomic challenges, immature democracy, the lack of tolerance and pluralism have all prevented the emergence of a strong civil society, which is one of the pre-requisites for the establishment of the Hegemonic Project.

Last but not the least, civil society is still underdeveloped in the Mediterranean partner countries and has, so far, played a weak role over the course of the EMP's third basket's implementation process. Therefore, in both so-called 'high' and 'low' politics areas, the agenda for a Euro-Mediterranean regional integration project raises a number of questions regarding its underlying logic- particularly when Mediterranean partners do not have the option of becoming part of the EU governance system through formal accession.<sup>221</sup> In Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic project of the EU, the EMP is unlikely to transform into a historic bloc, since social forces such as the Southern Mediterranean societies are not eager to support the project. Any rapprochement

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<sup>218</sup> Gomez, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>219</sup> Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.11 No.1, Winter 2000, p.89.

<sup>220</sup> Michelle Pace, *The politics of regional identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean*, London: Routledge, 2007.

<sup>221</sup> Amichai, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

between countries could not function on the basis of elite preferences and without the ‘consent’ of the southern Mediterranean societies. Some analysts also warn about the risk of de-stabilization caused by the accelerated reforms needed to achieve the objective of the free trade area and they warn also about the risk of excessive reliance on the ability of the European Union to manage all the problems connected with the free trade agreements.<sup>222</sup>

For those who had hoped that it might provide a viable strategic approach that would go beyond the European Union’s long-standing concentration on trade and economic issues, the Barcelona Process has proved a disappointment. As Emerson stated;

*It has been a valuable systemic institutional advance in Euro-Med relations and a valuable confidence-building measure on a large scale. Yet, it has not been a sufficient driving force to have created a momentum of economic, political and social advance in the partner states. Nor is it evident what might have been the potential domestic drivers of change with which incentives of the Barcelona Process might have connected with greater effect in recent years.*<sup>223</sup>

Barcelona Declaration is targeted at the establishment of the Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the Year 2010 and invites cooperation on a broad range of political, social and economic affairs. A lack of tangible results at partnership building is causing early reservations on the potential of the project to change into criticism and invitation to reform the principal aspects of the project. Experts and policy-makers doubt the power of the process to meet the Barcelona goals, and assess negatively the EU’s current actions and attitudes towards the partners. Analysts look at the EU initiative with scepticism and question the appropriateness of applying the conceptual and analytical tools of regionalism to the Mediterranean area. They underline the plural form of this would-be region and deal with it as being less a region and more a geographical

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<sup>222</sup> *Ibid*, p.394.

<sup>223</sup> Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues”, *CEPS Working Document*, No.220/March 2005, p.21.



aggregate characterized by discontinuous dynamics and sub-areas of interactions with great problems and strong identities of their own.<sup>224</sup>

The increasing perception of the Mediterranean as a region is not without contest and debate among analysts. Two main positions have been singled out in a previous study.<sup>225</sup> On one hand, the EU's action in the Mediterranean is interpreted as a European attempt to hegemonise the Mediterranean area, on the other hand, EMP is seen as Med-partners' socialization to the globalised economy in order to make the Euro-Mediterranean space.<sup>226</sup> However, it is difficult to adapt these countries into the world economy by modernisation attempts of the EU since there are diversities among these countries. It is also debatable whether these countries may cope with their domestic problems while simultaneously they are dealing with their social structure and domestic politics.

Although the existence of political conditionality allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of regime failure, it also exposes the Mediterranean partners to the good will of the Europeans, and thus undermines their demand for equal partnership.<sup>227</sup> There is a belief that regional cooperation provides the basis for peace, economic development and prosperity. However, the EU also has other interests in fostering regional cooperation, including facilitating trade and investment by EU economic actors. On the other side fostering regional cooperation and partnership has also been widely used as a practice to cope with the Union security concerns; security issues linked to migration- drug trafficking or organised crime – and energy security matters.<sup>228</sup> Despite their success, regional cooperation initiatives are frequently

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<sup>224</sup> Fulvio Attina, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2003, p.182.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>226</sup> Attina, *op. cit.*, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views", p. 196-200.

<sup>227</sup> Alfred J'neumann, "Europe's Interrelations with North Africa in the New Framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Provisional Assessment of the Barcelona Concept", *European Union in a Changing World, report of the Third ECSA-World Conference*, 19-20 September 1996, Brussels Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998, p. 373-383.

<sup>228</sup> Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge: Policy Press, 2004, p. 84.

criticized either because they have had little impact in key areas such as regional stability and intra-regional trade growth, or because ambitious plans and declarations concrete forms of cooperation fail to be implemented (such as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The most obvious example of limited achievement is South-Eastern Europe, which despite numerous cooperation initiatives suffered five military conflicts. Many initiatives on regional cooperation did not really get off the ground while others were accepted only with scepticism.<sup>229</sup> Hence the regional analysis seems to be inappropriate in analysing the Mediterranean dynamics since cultural and institutional homogeneity are preconditions for regional cooperation.

In June 2007, the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs informed in the report 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of EU Neighbour Countries' that the priorities of the European Union has tremendously changed recently hence the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation space also has been renamed as the 'Euro-Mediterranean Neighbourhood Space' indicating the fact that it is now part of a wider policy aiming at achieving better economic and trade relation in order to socialise the markets of the partner countries to the world economy, and integrate them into the European economy.<sup>230</sup> The paper criticizes the slow path of integration of these economies into the European economy and stipulates the improvement of the governance systems in these countries. According to my interviews made in an ENP panel in Brussels,<sup>231</sup> the analysts all agree that the difference between ENP and EMP is that the latter is a multilateral approach whereas the former is a bilateral programme however; the main commonality is that both have the normative dimension in principle. Regarding the norms, the EU associated the ENP with the policy success in central and Eastern Europe, allowing little space for the development of ideas and reflections on how norms are conceptualised and how the EU's model operates within southern countries. Moreover, the ambivalence of EU's sanctions, in case of

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<sup>229</sup> Milica Uvalic, "Regional Cooperation and the Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons Learned?", *International Political Science Review*, 23:3, 2000, p.323.

<sup>230</sup> Occasional Paper, No.30, June 2007.

<sup>231</sup> This panel was held by Centre for European Policy Studies on 21-22 April 2006. Theme of the panel was "Perspectives on the European Neighbourhood Policy" and titled "The First Challenge Training School".

incompliance with the predetermined goals, makes the EU's Hegemonic Project to the Southern Mediterranean countries ineffective.

The Barcelona Process is aimed at achieving the same goals as the European integration process, i.e. economic growth. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation strategy should be as progressive, flexible and varying as the strategy of the European integration process has always been. Accordingly, EU institutions and governments did not hesitate to ask the Mediterranean partners to accept the new mechanisms of the Neighbourhood Policy that seemed to them to be more appropriate than the EMP mechanisms for achieving the Barcelona Declaration goals. Benchmarking between ENP and EMP may be meaningless since these two different regions with their peculiarities may require different strategies and tactics. The lack of effective use of conditionality is the main difference between the EMP and ENP, as an example.

### ***3.3 ENP: Objectives, Rationale and Incentives***

Globalization and specific events led to a redefinition of space and changed the concept of 'securing inside' Europe. "*Securing inside*" has been part of the European political tradition, but this political tradition was relativized as a result of a number of significant developments that echoed through the world scene, from the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the September 11 Attack in the United States and the 'Big Bang' Enlargement in Europe. Globalization has led to a complex and dynamic process of 'debordering' and 'rebordering' space, and as a result, the constitutive relationship between borders, territory and sovereignty has been brought into question. This relativization and uncertainty has made it increasingly hard to distinguish between 'internal' and 'external', 'here' and 'there', and a struggle for the re-definition of space has emerged along with that of security.

Blurred borders' have made isolation impossible and led to institutional changes in multiple areas. While historical, geographical and political characteristics allow Europe to preserve its 'Europeanness', multiple borders tie the Europe of today to other parts

of the world.<sup>232</sup> The coexistence and comingling of languages, religions and cultures that characterize globalization have paved the way for a transnational citizenship in a globalizing era that has had institutional consequences, including the democratization of border controls, the generalization of multiple citizenship status and the inclusion of migrant languages into the linguistic and educational landscape of Europe. As no territorial unit can be seen in isolation from the world societal context in which it is embedded with functional, territorial and symbolic borders and stand in mutual relationships with respect to the bordering, every unit got involved in an adaptation process to the new challenges imposed by new encounters around borders and trans-borders, through issues of security, migration, terrorism, environmental issues.<sup>233</sup>

The EEA (European Economic Area) became the framework for governing EU's relations with neighbors in order to adapt to post-Cold-War relativizations and security concerns. The post-Cold-War relations between the EU and its neighbours can also be read as a record of EU efforts at adaptation in the face of the ambiguity caused by the relativization of the relations between certain components of the European political tradition.<sup>234</sup> Following the Cold War, an intensive debate was launched on the new security architecture for Europe and whether or not there was a leading role for the EU in this strategic transformation. The shared view within the Community was that a hasty commitment to enlargement would endanger the renewed deepening process. Several ideas were floated to frame relations with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as an alternative to accession in the short term. In September 1990, President Mitterand called for a 'European Confederation' to engage the CEE countries in a parallel and distinct institutional framework.<sup>235</sup> Alternatively, Commission President Delors put forward his vision of a Europe of concentric circles, of which the innermost were to be the CEE countries and the Soviet Union. To differentiate the CEE

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<sup>232</sup> Etienne Balibar, "Europe as Borderland", *The Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in Human Geography*, University of Nijmegen, November 10 2004, <http://socgeo.ruhosting.nl/colloquium/Europe%20as%20Borderland.pdf>. (Accessed on 18 June 2005)

<sup>233</sup> Stephan Stetter, "Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Debordering and Rebordering in the Mediterranean", *EUI Working Papers, RSCAS*; No.2005/34, 12 February 2006 at <http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/3830/1/2005-34+Stetter.pdf> p.8. (Accessed on 23 April 2007.)

<sup>234</sup> Karen Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs*, 81:4, 2005, p. 757.

<sup>235</sup> Simon Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000, p. 39-44.

countries from those of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Delors proposed the creation of a European Economic Area (EEA) as a new form of partnership with the latter<sup>236</sup> which is the most advanced multilateral arrangement the EU has concluded with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries reflecting both their proximity to and their long-standing ties with the Union.<sup>237</sup>

The European Economic Area is a special arrangement for those European neighbours which enjoy a higher level of political and economic development. The EEA arrangement with its distinctive features does not seem to be a relevant model for the EU's near neighbours. According to the Commission,<sup>238</sup> the long-term goal is an arrangement whereby the Union's relations with neighbouring countries ultimately come to resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with the EEA. Although the ENP partners would be given an opportunity of partial economic integration -short of four freedoms- in return for domestic reform, this objective remains a long term commitment of the EU.<sup>239</sup> According to Egmont Paper, the European Union through the accession process has been able to create stability in its proximity. By its force of attraction, and not through coercion, it has succeeded in neutralizing the forces of minority disputes and border conflicts that looked particularly destabilizing less than a decade ago. Applicant states have either been the subject of or been co-opted into a series of initiatives designed to fulfil the security interests of the EU member-states. Now the task for the European Union is to repeat this success in a wider proximity since a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for EU's

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<sup>236</sup> Sevilay Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New - Engagement Towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions*, Winter 2005, p.6.

<sup>237</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 765.

<sup>238</sup> European Commission., *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the <sup>238</sup>(Continued) European Parliament, 11 March 2003, COM (2003) 104 Final, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf) .(Accessed on 12 May 2005.)

<sup>239</sup> Marius Vahl, "Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The EEA and the Northern Dimension", *CEPS Working Document*, No.218, February 2005, p. 10.

own security and promoting stability in its neighbourhood is a must.<sup>240</sup> However it is very difficult to create an area of attraction without the incentive of membership.

ENP is the direct outcome of EU eastern enlargement. Although not a state or a federation, the EU has operated within a relatively stable territory, delimited by its member-states and geopolitical, institutional, legal, cultural and transactional boundaries of post-war Europe. Notwithstanding earlier expansions, the need to define its future borders represented a new challenge for the Union that emerged with the 2004 eastern enlargement,<sup>241</sup> which is, without a doubt, the most obvious reason as to why the ENP came about. The decision taken at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 to change track in the Eastern enlargement process, was the first important step taken by the Union to liberate itself from a matter that had consumed substantial quantities of both the EU and the member-states' institutional energies for close to a decade. The post-Berlin-Wall deliberation among member states on whether or not to admit 10 CEE countries to the EU had been a drawn-out affair. As described by Friis, the process was "full of tensions, hampered by internal pay-offs and, subject to considerable uncertainty regarding scope and timetable."<sup>242</sup> Since the EU member states started to go beyond enlarging their borders to the east and take stock of existing relations with neighbours such as Russia and non-EU Mediterranean countries, they became concerned. By the late 1990s, public patience regarding matters of justice and home affairs had grown particularly thin, with reports of corruption and transborder organised crime trafficking in everything from drugs to arms and human beings having become a mainstay of newspaper headlines and news media programmes across Europe. Crime and illegal immigration had increasingly become associated with the

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<sup>240</sup> Egmont Paper 1, "A European Security Concept for the 21st Century", Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, April 2004, p.11 at <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep1.U560.pdf>. (Accessed on 13 May 2005.)

<sup>241</sup> Sandra Lavanex, "EU External Governance in Wider Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11:4, August 2004, p. 682.

<sup>242</sup> (See) Lykee Friis, *When Europe Negotiates: From Europe Agreements to Eastern Enlargement?*, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen:, 1997.

Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, and the electorates in the EU member-states had begun to demand more preventive measures by their respective governments.<sup>243</sup>

Current events highlighted the need for better relations between the EU and the Middle East. By far the most chaos in the international arena chaotic was due to the rise of violence in the Middle East with the outbreak of the Second *Intifada* in late 2000, which seemed to permanently derail the Middle East Peace Process that had been launched in 1991. September 11 prompted further calls for measures against global terrorism and the international networks of money laundering that sustain it. The globalization of ‘threat’, i.e., the borderlessness of terrorism, triggered considerable ‘soul-searching’<sup>244</sup> in countries like France, Germany and the Netherlands regarding the integration of Muslims living in their societies and prompted the widespread feeling that the EU needed to improve relations with its Arab neighbours.

At the same time that these problematic relations with their neighbours came to prominence, a subtle set of forces started to work within the European Union, bringing about a re-evaluation of the Union’s role as an international actor. As Howorth argues, the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict converged “in such a way as to impart new momentum to the development of the European foreign policy and to raise the possibility of an almost revolutionary change in member state commitments” toward such a policy.<sup>245</sup> The EU was aware that it should play a more decisive role in foreign policy pursuits, especially when it came to its geographical vicinity. Following Kosovo and the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (May 1999), the member-states reflected upon recent developments at the Cologne European Council:

*The European Council recalls that at its Vienna meeting it called on the Council also to prepare common strategies on Ukraine, on the*

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<sup>243</sup> John D. Occhipinti, “Justice and Home Affairs: Immigration and policing”, *Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood*, ed.by Katja Weber, Michael E.Smith and Michael Baun, 2007, p 116.

<sup>244</sup> Elisabeth Nogues, “The EU and its Neighbourhood: an Overview”, *Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood*, edited by Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun, Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2008, p.22.

<sup>245</sup> Jolyon Howorth, “European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?”, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, *Chaillot Paper*, No.43, 2000.

*Mediterranean region, specifically taking into account the Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process, and on the western Balkans. The six months since the Vienna meeting have, in various ways, again clearly brought out the importance of all these regions to the European Union not only as partners in external relations but also for the stability and security of our continent and its immediate neighbourhood.*<sup>246</sup>

As a step forward, the Common Strategies was put forward as the basis for such a new strategic approach towards third countries – beginning with Russia and Ukraine in 1999 and including the non-EU Mediterranean countries in 2000. The Common Strategies restated the existing bilateral and regional relations without adding anything decisively new, nor did they provide the Union with more than a blurred vision of how these relations would henceforth develop.<sup>247</sup> As an example, Common Strategies also accentuated the simmering rivalry between member states regarding the EU's prioritisation of different neighbourhoods.<sup>248</sup> As William Wallace has stated, the EU had reached a point where continuing to enlarge would threaten cohesion to the extent that solidarity, shared decision-making, common prosperity and security would cease to exist.<sup>249</sup> Also externally, the EU is very unlikely to offer future membership to the ENP countries which are located around the enlarged Union. These countries, east of the EU, are economically and politically too underdeveloped to qualify for membership.<sup>250</sup>

Several proposals were put forward for dealing with former Soviet Republics on EU's eastern border. In January 2002, Britain submitted a proposal to the Commission

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<sup>246</sup> European Council. "Presidency Conclusions", Cologne, 3-4 June 1999.

<sup>247</sup> Claire Spencer, "The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6:3, 2001, p.519.

<sup>248</sup> Esther Barbe, "Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions", in J. Zielonka (ed.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, La Haya: Kluwer Law International, 1998.

<sup>249</sup> William Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbours: Responsibilities for the EU-25", *Notre Europe Policy Paper*, No.4, July 2003, p.1.

<sup>250</sup> Hishi Haukkala, "A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU's New Neighbourhood Policy", *UPI Working Papers*, No.41, 2003, p.2.



suggesting a differentiated, ambitious and long-term approach to the new eastern neighbours, particularly Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Commissioner Romano Prodi and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw proposed offering “a kind of special neighbour status” to these ex-Soviet republics.<sup>251</sup> One month after the British proposal, a Swedish ‘non-paper’ authored by then-Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and then-Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky, emphasized the need for a broader and more active policy towards the neighbours in the bow-shaped area ranging from Russia and Ukraine to the Mediterranean.<sup>252</sup> Since the text was too general regarding the Common Strategies of Russia and Ukraine, urgently more specified and tailored policy was needed in order to integrate the Union’s immediate neighbours into a European economic and social partnership.<sup>253</sup> A joint letter was prepared and sent to the Danish Presidency.

At the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 15 April 2002 a first official Exchange among the member states took place in regards to ‘Wider Europe’, and the Council tasked the High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner with drawing up a primary proposal.<sup>254</sup> The Solana-Patten memo was the first coherent blueprint to outline the new policy and examine the existing relations between the EU and its various neighbours. The letter is visionary, revealing a willingness to look to the medium and long term. It recommends the creation of an economic and political space. The letter was presented to the GAERC on 30 September, where the ministers decided, however, to concentrate their efforts on Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, although they noted that, ‘beyond the question of Eastern neighbours, the broader question of ‘wider Europe’ deserved consideration<sup>255</sup> that had no crucial impact upon the neighbourhood initiative. At that time eastern

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<sup>251</sup> Hishi Haukkala and A.Moshes, “Beyond Big Bang: The Challenges of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the East”, *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Report 9*, 2004.

<sup>252</sup> Lindh Anna and Leif, Pagrosky, “EU’s relationship with its future neighbours following enlargement”, *Council of the European Union*, 7713/02, 8 April, 2002.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>254</sup> Council of European Union, 2421st Council Meeting, Press Release 7705/02, Luxembourg, 15 April 2007.

<sup>255</sup> Barbara Lippert, “The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union”, *Intereconomic*, July/August 2007, p.183.

enlargement was taking place, a series of outstanding EU-Russian issues became increasingly more urgent to deal with. The initiative was debated by Council organs, including the Council of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Political and Security Committee and COEST (a unit dealing with Eastern Europe and Central Asia). A more thorough discussion among ministers took place in the GAERC on 18 November. This Brussels Council meeting took the geographical coverage of the initiative a step further, recommending that the policy not only target Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, but also be viewed in conjunction with the EU's strong commitment to deepening co-operation with the Russian Federation.<sup>256</sup> Then referring to the Lindh and Pagrotsky suggestion, the initiative should be extended to the other partners in other bordering regions such as Union's southern Mediterranean partners.<sup>257</sup> Romano Prodi outlined a policy that was no longer reserved for the EU's eastern neighbours, but, as proposed by Paten and Solana earlier, included the Mediterranean as well.<sup>258</sup>

In March 2003 the Commission presented to the EU Council its communication *Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with the Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, which outlined the basic principles of the ENP. In June, the Thessaloniki European Council endorsed the Commission's *Conclusion on Wider Europe*. The idea originated in the Agenda 2000 Document by focusing the idea that stability is only ensured through cooperation with wider Europe. It offers progressive integration into the Internal Market and its regulatory structures (health, consumer and environmental protection), including those pertaining to sustainable development.<sup>259</sup> The Commission emphasized that the EU's Neighbourhood Policy was not aimed at further enlargement, but at materialising an 'Integrated Economic Region'. This view is shared by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) which is an influential

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<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup> Romano Prodi, "Europe and the Mediterranean: Time for Action", speech at Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 November 2002.

<sup>259</sup> European Commission *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 11 March 2003, COM (2003) 104 Final, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf). (Accessed on 12 May 2005.)

agent of Capital in EU, which is an influential force affecting the decisions of the European Commission regarding the ENP.

ENP is composed of countries in the East: ‘Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (then in 2004 Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were included) and in the South: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Palestinian Authority. Although the policy originally focused on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the Commission in Wider Europe Communication of March 2003 broadened the geographical scope of the policy to include the Barcelona partners. This decision was a response to the concerns of the EU’s southern member-states that 2004 enlargement would shift the balance Eastern neighbours at the expense of the Southern partners when a more intensive cooperation was deemed all the more necessary in the post 9/11 environment.

Although the ENP seems to be a new, innovative policy, there are methodological similarities between the ENP and Enlargement. As Judith Kelley has noted, the similarities between the ENP and enlargement policy are partly because many of the Commission officials who worked on enlargement transferred to the ENP. The ENP now falls under the new External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner whose title has indeed been amended to Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.<sup>260</sup> However, the ENP has its own task force, headed by Michael Leigh, who also used to be the Director in DG Enlargement. Leigh’s assistant Helen Campbell has an enlargement background as a country desk officer for Bulgaria. Also from the enlargement team is Rutger Wissels, now the Deputy Head of the ENP taskforce, and Axel Wallden, now in charge of political and conceptual issues for the ENP. The top task force officials thus all have enlargement backgrounds. This led to some direct mechanical borrowing from enlargement experiences. The evidence for the policy transfer therefore lies not only in individual positions, but also in the evolution of key documents and the final policy’s similarities to enlargement.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Helly Damien, “The EU’s Influence in its Neighbourhood: the Example of Crisis Management in the Caucasus”, *European Political Economy Review*, 2007.p.27

<sup>261</sup> Judith Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy”, *JCMS*, 44:1, 2006, p.30.

Even though the ENP has drawn on the methodology of the EU's policies towards outsiders, including enlargement, it emerged as a new strategy of 'Europeanization without accession'. As Kahraman put forward; 'it is a new policy in the sense that it aims at combining the traditional EU approaches of stabilization and integration towards neighbourhood... It offers privileged partnership, as which is less than full membership but more than associate membership', old and new, in exchange for their commitment to shared values.<sup>262</sup> The ENP seeks to enhance the strategic presence of the enlarged Union in wider Europe and beyond. Hence, the ENP remains a test case for the implementation of an effective and coherent foreign and security policy towards changing neighbourhood and will have significant implications for the international actorness of the Union.<sup>263</sup> The lack of strict conditionality, weaker incentives and internal tensions of the ENP, however, raises doubts about the Union's ability to spur reforms and transition in wider Europe.<sup>264</sup>

The ENP was modelled on the EU's existing and previous policies of the EU. Before the launch of the ENP, the EU had introduced several initiatives for both Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and the non-member Southern Mediterranean countries to encourage regional stability and cooperation in the region.<sup>265</sup> Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), agreed on by each of the WNIS countries in the 1990s, have provided the major framework for relations with the EU. Financially, the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) PROGRAM (main instrument designed to support EU relations with these states and to promote these objectives) which was regarded as not sufficient for the progressive

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<sup>262</sup> Rosa Balfour and Alessandro Rotta, "Beyond Enlargement, The European Neighbourhood Policy and Its Tools", *The International Spectator*, 1:2, 2005, p.9.

<sup>263</sup> Kahraman, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid*, p.19.

<sup>265</sup> Roland Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 2006, p.189.

development for those countries and the limited market access aims at enhancing the transition process in these countries.<sup>266</sup>

Security was the motivating force behind the ENP. Neighbourhood is a new strategy which was motivated by The EU's need to secure its environment was the motivating force behind the new strategy towards its neighbourhood and may, in fact, be regarded as a means of injecting new impetus into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).<sup>267</sup> As Fabrizio Tassinari quoted, "EU addressed the neighbourhood challenge essentially by oscillating between integration and security. It either focused on security and by stabilising its peripheries and largely by keeping neighbours at arm's length or it focused integration by promising membership, and thus by inviting neighbours into the European project."<sup>268</sup> Cremona claimed that EU leaders had to make a choice: whether to export stability and security to its near neighbours, or risk importing instability from them.<sup>269</sup>

The condition of security interdependence with the neighbours and the task of extending the zone of security, stability and prosperity across Europe were explicitly acknowledged by High Representative Javier Solana in his paper on the European Security Strategy.<sup>270</sup> It is also stated that

*It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflicts, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states will increase*

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<sup>266</sup> Dov Lynch, "The New Eastern Dimension of the Enlarged EU", in Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (ed.), *Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a wider Europe*, *Chaillot Paper*, No.64, September 2003, p.43.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>268</sup> Fabrizio Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism", *CEPS Working Document*, No.226, July 2005, p.1.

<sup>269</sup> Marise Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", *CDDRL Working Papers*, No.25, 2 November 2004, p.3.

<sup>270</sup> Kahraman, *op. cit.*, p. 4

*our security but they also bring Europe closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.*<sup>271</sup>

In *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, the heart of the political and security aspects of the ENP (as the July document on the Neighbourhood Instrument is in the economic and technical area), the security component is highlighted, as follows:

*Since the ENP has a strong foreign and security policy component, it pursues the primary goal of creating stability, security and welfare on the EU's eastern and southern borders through positive interdependence. The fight against common threats, such as international terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration as well as cooperation with the resolution of regional conflicts are at the forefront.*<sup>272</sup>

Although the issue of EU security strategy has been on the agenda for many years, the timing of the Solana paper was partly a European response to the post 9/11 security priorities of the US and partly an exercise in healing the division within the Europe over Iraq War.<sup>273</sup> This security-driven rhetoric, as distinct from the original discourse on 'increasing the neighbours' prosperity, stability and security necessitated a parallel shift in the methodology of the ENP. The new EU rhetoric has emphasised the principles of partnership and shared values than the principle of conditionality and

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<sup>271</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, "Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)", Com(2004) 795 Final Brussels, 9 December 2004, p.2.

<sup>272</sup> European Council: "A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12.12.2003, p. 7-8.

<sup>273</sup> Antonio Missiroli, and Gerrard Quille, "European Security in Flux" in Cameron, Fraser, (ed.) *The Future of Europe Integration and Enlargement*, Routledge: London, 2004, p.118.

strong incentives.<sup>274</sup> Although the issue of EU security strategy has been on the agenda for many years, the timing of the Solana paper was partly a European response to the post 9/11 security priorities of the US and partly an exercise in healing the division within the Europe over Iraq War.<sup>275</sup> Thus, with this shift in preference and instrument regarding external relations under the impact of global securitization of ‘Muslim others’ in the aftermath of the September 11 Attack and as a result of enlargement fatigue, the EU declared its decision, through the ENP, to stabilize the surrounding neighbours instead of internalizing them through membership.<sup>276</sup>

Although the European Security Strategy is a useful first step, it does not lay down a clearly agreed and understood set of principles and guidelines for the use of both co-optive and coercive power.<sup>277</sup> Therefore the Solana Paper can be seen as a ‘pre-concept’ that states what is important for Europe but does not say what Europe is prepared to do about it.<sup>278</sup>

Enlargement has been perceived from those outside the process in the European periphery as a form of exclusion. It is about extending a normative and institutionalized wall, which will isolate them from the rest of Europe.<sup>279</sup> The ENP can be taken as a means to extend the governance of the EU to the regions beyond its borders.<sup>280</sup> Through the ENP, the Union seeks to tackle the governance of the wider Europe.

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<sup>274</sup> Nathalie Tocci, “Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?”, *International Spectator*, No. 1, 2005, p. 21-32. (See Petr Kratochvil, *The EU and its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities*, Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2006).

<sup>275</sup> Missiroli and Quille, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>276</sup> Michael Emerson, “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?”, Centre for European Policy Studies, *CEPS Working Document*, No.215, November 2004, 25 September 2005 at [http://shops.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item\\_id=1176](http://shops.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1176). (Accessed on 13 May 2005.)

<sup>277</sup> Sven Biscop, “Opening up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehensive and Cooperative Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security”, *Security Dialogue*, 34:2, June 2003, p.26.

<sup>278</sup> French J. Lindley, “The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century”, *European Security*, Vol.13, 2004, p.5.

<sup>279</sup> General Affairs and External Relations Council, Presidency Conclusions on the New Neighbours Initiative, 18 November 2002. par.1 at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st14/14078en2.pdf>. (Accessed on 14 May 2006.)

<sup>280</sup> Lavanex, *op. cit.*, p. 682.

Shutting the door of the Union once and for all may foster feelings of exclusion on its immediate periphery and instability across the border. However keeping the door permanently open to possible new entrants makes a definition of a common security and especially foreign policy a bit difficult.<sup>281</sup> Arguably, the enlarged EU is experiencing a shift from the ‘politics of exclusion’ to ‘politics of inclusion’ in wider Europe.<sup>282</sup> Therefore the ENP should not be considered as only part of the European Foreign Policy but it contributes to the deepening of the EU integration process. Thus both ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ are being organized in a complementary manner.<sup>283</sup>

The German Presidency confirms that the ENP remains a core priority of the EU’s foreign policy.<sup>284</sup> Benito Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy makes the point clear: ‘in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the amalgam created to establish relations with the neighbouring third countries was enlargement. Yet it became clear that the EU could not enlarge ad infinitum’.<sup>285</sup> In 1998 the Polish government at the time still an applicant country, addressed the neighbourhood as a potential insolvable problem. In 2002, the pressure became more consistent as Great Britain and Sweden urged the European Commission to think of a more substantial strategy vis-à-vis the EU prospective neighbours.

It was then in 2003, that the Commission put forward some concrete proposals for a new approach of the Union towards its prospective neighbourhood, which resulted in the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).<sup>286</sup> It is new EU

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<sup>281</sup> Antonio Missiroli, “EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP”, *European Integration*, Vol.25, 2003, p.3.

<sup>282</sup> Michael Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1, 1996, p.5-289.

<sup>283</sup> Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petito and Ben Torna, , “Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union’s ‘Near Abroad: Cooperation and Conflict’”, 35:4, 2000, p.391.

<sup>284</sup> European Commission, *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 4 December 2006 COM(2006)726 Final, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/strengthening\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/strengthening_en.htm) .(Accessed on 12 January 2007.)

<sup>285</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11, 2006, p.130-142.

<sup>286</sup> European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, *Strategy Paper*, Brussels, 12 May 2004.



member states that are usually seen as the most emphatic bloc of proponents of further enlargement. Consequently, new members are often attributed with almost metaphysical unity in their attitudes towards the East – they are all supportive of further enlargement, they are all very critical of Russia, and they are all dissatisfied with the ENP in its present form.<sup>287</sup> The only country that expressed a serious interest in shaping the ENP before 2004 was Poland. Some political analysts even believe that the whole Eastern Dimension of the EU's external relations was 'a Polish invention'.<sup>288</sup>

The scope of the policy was not as it is intended today; Polish proposal was more concentrated on the countries of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova excluding Russia. This was related with the newly rediscovered Polish self-understanding as a regional power whose main tasks include the democratisation of Eastern Europe, particularly in Belarus and Ukraine. Modernisation and democratisation of the region gradually developed into Poland's primary foreign policy, with most of its attention focussed on Ukraine. Part and parcel of the historical reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine has been, however, Polish advocacy of Ukrainian EU membership.<sup>289</sup> Once Poland's own future in the Euro-Atlantic institutions became clearer Warsaw emerged as Ukraine's key advocate and tried to influence the EU's Eastern Policy through several policy papers.<sup>290</sup> The Europeanization of an independent, Western-leaning Ukraine and its eventual accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions has long been regarded as a fundamental objective of Polish national security.<sup>291</sup> While Poland argued that the ENP should Grant the Eastern neighbours a special status and serve as an instrument for

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<sup>287</sup> European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 11 March 2003, COM (2003) 104 Final, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf). (Accessed on 12 April 2006.)

<sup>288</sup> Iryna Solonenko: "Eastern Dimension of the European Union-Invented Policy with no Clear Prospect", *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*, 2005, [http://www.boell.de/downloads\\_uk/SolonenkoJEAS05.pdf](http://www.boell.de/downloads_uk/SolonenkoJEAS05.pdf). (Accessed on 14 April 2007.)

<sup>289</sup> Barbara Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p. 6.

<sup>290</sup> Mathias Roth, "EU-Ukraine Relations After the Orange Revolution: The Role of the New Member States", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8:4, December 2007, p.505.

<sup>291</sup> Katarzyna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, "Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, 2002.

their eventual accession, Warsaw's proposals only had a minor impact on the development of ENP. When it is analysed by referring to the Eurobarometer 67, it is clearly seen that Poland is the leading country that supports further enlargement with 76%.<sup>292</sup>

The ENP calls for a comprehensive single strategy for the neighbours of the enlarged EU, which former EU Commission President Romano Prodi referred to as a 'ring of friends' surrounding the Union. ENP is different from the existing strategies but has some common elements with many of the previous strategies and attempts to complement the others. It is planned as a 'single, inclusive and coherent policy framework' for all of the 16 neighbour states.<sup>293</sup> While the Council and the Commission point to the advantages of this comprehensive approach,<sup>294</sup> critics see its primary deficiency in its geographical arbitrariness.<sup>295</sup>

South-East conflict within the single and coherent character of the policy, the implementation should take the specificity of the partner countries into consideration. Hence differentiation is the main distinction. The countries addressed by the policy present different social, political and economic patterns and cleavages. The level of ambition and the substantial offers of the EU should correlate with the performance of the ENP partner countries, particularly with their progress in implementing the priorities set out in the Action Plans which are the most important short-term instruments in the ENP and they are developed and agreed upon between the two parties (the EU and the respective ENP country). They are also based upon differentiation and are thus oriented in their timing and content toward the specific interest and capacities of ENP countries. Despite their specificity, the Action Plans follow a general scheme and cover some specific areas such as political dialogue and

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<sup>292</sup> Question: QA27.4 what is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it? Option: Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years. Answers : For Source: Eurobarometer67, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb\\_67\\_first\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf) .(Accessed on 27 September 2007.)

<sup>293</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p. 5.

<sup>294</sup> European Commission, *op. cit.*, "Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy", p.2.

<sup>295</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Neighbourhood Policy of European Union", p.13

reform, economic and social reform and development, cooperation in questions of justice, freedom and security, cooperation and reformist areas such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research, innovation, people-to-people contacts and cooperation in the areas of education, public health and culture.<sup>296</sup>

The EU has adopted stabilization approach whose logic central to the member states' interest in the security challenges of the neighbourhood. In the East where the enlarged EU shares a land border with the new neighbours, the European Union is faced with many soft security challenges ranging from illegal trafficking of various kinds, organized crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation to environmental degradation, hence the need for managing its external borders.<sup>297</sup>

The ENP accounts for this diversity by dealing with each of the partners individually, in a bilateral way, negotiating and agreeing upon specific country programmes and 3-to-5 years Action Plans for each of the neighbours. As again according to former EU Commission President Romano Prodi, ENP is designed to offer 'more than a partnership and less than a membership' and to share with the partner countries 'everything but institutions' in exchange for internal reforms.<sup>298</sup>

ENP is viewed as a developmental and fluid process. The EU has explicitly used the promise of future membership in order to promote stability along its borders. Drawing final borders therefore poses the EU with a dilemma of how it will promote stability and security in its neighbouring regions if the carrot of enlargement is no longer available. There is the optimism that the policy framework can achieve its goals is evident in the policy's proclaimed ambition that the neighbouring countries a

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<sup>296</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p. 18.

<sup>297</sup> Roberto Aliboni, "The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 1:16, 2005, p.1.

<sup>298</sup> Romano Prodi, "Europe and the Mediterranean: Time for Action", speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission at the Belgian Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 November 2002.

benevolent and stable ‘ring of friends’<sup>299</sup> with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood<sup>300</sup> In the academic literature on the ENP such optimism has been contentious. As Scott notes:

*Analyses have been polarised between those that view the ENP as driven by neo-liberal-neo-imperialist assertions of economic hegemony, and those that champion it as ‘a potentially progressive form of ‘post-Westphalian’ and ‘post-modern’ regionalism’. In this respect, the tendency has been to view the ENP as a reflection of a rather fixed geopolitical vision of what the EU is about and how it aims to run and organise the broader European space.*<sup>301</sup>

William Walters<sup>302</sup> conceptualises a series of different geopolitical strategies (geo-strategies) employed by the EU in regard to its borders and near abroad. Geo-strategies can be seen as sets of competing and overlapping discourses concerned with how to organise territory and space at the border, and how to relate to the otherness beyond. On the other hand Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi<sup>303</sup> argue that whilst particular geopolitical models or visions may lend themselves to particular geo-strategies, there is also considerable fluidity present, with the EU at times emphasising one geo-strategy over others, or emphasising different ones in different geographical context which enables to tell a more dynamic story regarding the developing nature of the ENP, of some of the criticisms it has faced, and not least regarding what the ENP experience may say about the evolving nature.

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<sup>299</sup> Commission’s March 2003 Communication on the Wider Europe: The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.....’

<sup>300</sup> European Commission, 2003:4, working document on civil protection that aims at a “safety impact assessment”.

<sup>301</sup> James Scott, “The EU and “Wider Europe: Towards an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation?”, *Geopolitics*, 10:3, 2005, p. 430.

<sup>302</sup> Walters William. “The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective”, *Geopolitics*, 9:2, 2004, p.674-698.

<sup>303</sup> DIIS Working Paper, Danish Institute for International Studies 2007 September, p.4-5.

Browning and Joenniemi also argue that the geopolitical visions and geo-strategies adopted at different points along the border ultimately means that the geopolitical nature of the EU looks different depending on whether one is looking from a southern, eastern or northern perspective. Conceptualising the ENP in such discursive terms leaves space for seeing the dynamism present within the ENP, as well as for highlighting the critical role that outsiders and those on the margins can play in not only shaping EU border policies, but also geopolitical visions of Europe more broadly.<sup>304</sup> Browning and Joenniemi define three geopolitical models and label the ENP as an exercise founded on an imperialist geopolitical model.

Despite notions of ‘differentiation’, ‘interdependence’ and ‘joint ownership’, ENP commentators have criticized that the emphasis is rather on standardization and homogeneity. Standardisation is evident in the ENP’s overall aim of consolidating the Union’s policies towards its near abroad. Instead of having a variety of policies such as the Northern Dimension Initiative as part of the external policies of the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and so forth, the initial aim has been to supersede these with the single ENP. The misleading perception that a similar, although differentiated, relationship model suits all the countries and glosses over the fact that such a ‘broad strategy does not respond to the specific aims of the neighbours’<sup>305</sup>. Similarly, the previous proliferation of financial instruments<sup>306</sup> will be ended with their amalgamation into a single financial instrument – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) –which has been started since 2007. The ENPI will be a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the Action Plans and harmonisation to EU policies. ENPI is innovative not only in its proposal for a single new regulation but also in bringing together regions of the member states and of the partners sharing a common border under joint programmes. In that way, the new borders will no longer be seen as a barrier but as an opportunity for cross-border cooperation.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> *Ibid*, p.5.

<sup>305</sup> Roberto Albioni, “The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10:1, 2005, p.2.

<sup>306</sup> TACIS, Interreg, MEDA.

<sup>307</sup> Rosa Balfour and Alessandro Rotta, “Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighborhood Policy and Its Tools”, *International Spectator*, Vol. XL, 2007, p.19.

It should also be stressed that the ENP has so far been premised on bilateralism rather than multilateralism or regional approaches like the previous policies of the EU. As such the new neighbours have been targeted individually instead of being encouraged to coalesce as a group in negotiating with the EU. The justification for such an approach is that it enables the Union and its partners to tailor cooperation to the specific needs of individual countries. However, from a more Realpolitik perspective critics note that bilateralism accentuates the power asymmetries that exist between the Union and its weaker neighbours and makes the stress on ‘bilateralism’ appear little more than a cover for EU unilateralism.<sup>308</sup>

ENP is not a regional policy. Although there is the tendency towards standardisation, homogeneity and a one-size-fits-all approach is a problem to be remedied by the bilateral agreements between the EU and individual partner countries. In this respect Smith has been keen to point out that with its emphasis on bilateral agreements, little space has been provided for more regional perspectives. As Smith puts it, ‘the EU has evidently concluded that the way to foster peace and prosperity in the neighbourhoods is to foster reform in each neighbour first’<sup>309</sup> and states out the reason why the EU has not inserted a strong regional, much less multilateral component in the ENP.

According to Manuela Moschella, ‘Given the inadequate instruments of regionalism in the ENP, it will be difficult for some neighbours to assert their ‘Europeanness’ through a sense of joint ownership. The lack of a sense of common identity might induce neighbours to negatively perceive their asymmetrical relations with the Union and challenge their view of the ENP as a partnership of shared values. Built on the idea of increasing security through closer integration, the European neighbourhood project is not just about sharing material benefits but is also a far-reaching project of a shared future.’<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> Marius Vahl, Fabrizio Tassinari, “The EU and Black Sea regional cooperation: Some challenges for BSEC”. *CEPS Commentary 15*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, p.57.

<sup>309</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, “The outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy”, p. 771.

<sup>310</sup> Manuela Moschella, “EU’s Regional Approach Towards Its Neighbours: the ENP vis-a-vis the EMP” in *Fulvio Atina and Rosa Rosi (eds.) European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*, Jean Monnet Centre ‘Euro Med’, University of Catania, 2004, p.31.

European Union has a comprehensive network of relationships with countries and groups of countries all over the world. These relationships range from narrow bilateral agreements to intensive inter-regional agreements covering a wide scope of economic and political issues with explicit or implicit security concerns. Within the framework of these relationships, EU offers an unofficial hierarchy of agreements. In ascending order, these are Free Trade Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Customs Unions, Association Agreements and Europe Agreements.<sup>311</sup> ENP seems to be designed as a blend of these different sorts of relationships with conceptual, geographical and operational implications.<sup>312</sup> Together with its differentiated financial support mechanism ENPI, the ENP does not resemble any of the existing strategies, but picks elements from many of them and attempts to complement their inputs.<sup>313</sup>

Since differentiation is one of the basic features of the ENP, it is unfolding in different points along the EU's border and different categorisations within the neighbourhood could be made such as the Eastern Neighbourhood, Southern Neighbourhood and Northern Neighbourhood. 2004 Enlargement entailed the accession of countries: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and also initially Russia as well.<sup>314</sup>

The inclusion of Russia, however, became perceived as problematic for all sides. Russia for example complained that its inclusion would equate it with countries such as Belarus and Moldova and worried that the homogenising bilateralism of the ENP, which promotes equality among partners, contradicted Russia's aspirations of devising a privileged with Brussels.<sup>315</sup> Russia upon request was excluded from the ENP in

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<sup>311</sup> Sevilay Kahraman, "Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) Komşuluk Politikası", ATAUM Haber, Year: 5, No.1, Winter 2005, p.3.

<sup>312</sup> Gökhan Yandaş, *The European Union and its Neighbours: An Inquiry for a Theoretical Ground in Analysing the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University, 2005, p.3.

<sup>313</sup> Fabrizio Tassinari, "EU Neighbourhood, Foreign and Security Policy", Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, 14 July 2006, at [http://www.ceps.be/wp.php?article\\_id=17](http://www.ceps.be/wp.php?article_id=17), p.7. (Accessed on 12 March 2007.)

<sup>314</sup> European Commission, *op. cit.*, "Wider Europe"

<sup>315</sup> Derek Averre, "Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?", *European Security*, 14:2, 2005, p. 175- 202.

favour of developing a separate bilateral ‘strategic partnership’ that has based on the development of four common spaces’ and that has therefore helped maintain the appearance of Russia as *primus inter pares* in the EU’s relations with its neighbours.<sup>316</sup>

From Russian perspective, the strategic partnership signals Russia’s distinctiveness and greater importance in comparison to other ENP countries, whilst it is also taken to imply a more genuinely equal relationship with the EU since the ‘road maps’ promoting the common spaces are to be based on principles of reciprocity, rather than EU-dictated conditionality.<sup>317</sup>

In the academic literature there are important questions which ENP is unlikely to answer:

1) How to avoid the alienation of its new neighbours? 2) How to promote reform when the EU’s primary carrot of future membership is no longer available? 3) How to avoid the EU external border becoming a line of exclusion and negative othering? Various analysts argued that for a ‘soft’ power to exert influence in its periphery, it needs to offer substantial incentives to attract a keen commitment towards co-operation.<sup>318</sup>

Romano Prodi’s speech at a Conference in Brussels<sup>319</sup> contained a concept of ‘Everything but Institutions’. As to the interview made with Dimitri Gorchakov - the European Commission’s Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, on 12 September 2006, Gorchakov, with a cliché statement, stated that Ukraine is not ready for the EU membership. ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ should be replaced with a more broadened agreement which would create a more concrete type of relationship. For the Orange Revolution to actualise its mission, the EU should give more clear messages with the support of the member countries. It is not only the Commission who makes

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<sup>316</sup> Grzegorz Gromadzki, *Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?* Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2005. (See also: Dov Lynch, “What Russia sees”, Chaillot paper no74, Institute of Security Studies, 2005.)

<sup>317</sup> Natalia Zaslavskaya, “EU Enlargement Creating a Framework for the Eu-Russian Rapprochement”, *Journal of East-West Business*, Routledge 11:1, 2005, p. 45-66.

<sup>318</sup> Pace, *op. cit.*, “Norm Shifting From EMP To ENP: The EU As A Norm Entrepreneur In The South?”, p. 669.

<sup>319</sup> The Sixth ECSA-World Conference, *Peace, Security and Stability – International Dialogue and the Role of the EU* on 5-6 December 2002 in Brussels.



the decision. ‘Everything but Institutions’ is an approach which may lead to a crisis since conditionality and socialization require the promise of membership’.

The statement ‘Everything but Institutions’ clearly reveals how much they are keen on holding those ENP countries distant from membership. Germany due to its historical and geographical ties supports the ENP specifically for the Eastern European states. United Kingdom is more neutral and argues principally in country-specific and geopolitical terms. France, like Italy and Spain favours the Mediterranean region, but without the risking the perspective of membership. Recently French President Sarkozy issued the idea of a Mediterranean Union,<sup>320</sup> which aims at changing the agenda and weakening the commitment to a strengthening of the ENP as a single and coherent policy framework. France and Germany also have the common opinion in mind that they should not jeopardise the strategic partnership with Russia while expanding the ENP. Although old and new European member states have different perceptions about ENP, the 27 states all agree that they should improve their offers to the ENP countries along seven action points.

During the German presidency, progress reports intend to offer more to those ENP countries regarding the deeper and more comprehensive free trade area (which German presidency was successful in proposing to focus on ‘partners’ comparative advantages and thus feature elements of asymmetry)<sup>321</sup> and the opening of EU programmes and agencies to ENP countries, visa facilitation, support of people-to-people exchanges, last but not the least the new financial instrument ENPI (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument).

The strengthening of the financial cooperation is to improve the capacities of the neighbourhood to absorb funds specifically through the participation in the EU programmes, agencies and partnerships for the transfer of administrative know-how (twinning and TAIEX). A peculiar, new fund is governance facility fund (43 million Euros annually). The successes and efforts in the implementation of national

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<sup>320</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, “The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions”, p. 4.

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*

reform agendas and the Action Plans will be rewarded by the EU. The first two countries which will receive financial assistance from the governance fund will be Ukraine and Morocco, as a result of the progress they made in building institutions, observing human and civil rights and improving governance.<sup>322</sup>

However, creation of a specific fund for the ENP named as ‘Neighbourhood Investment Fund’ and also pretending as if the EU were taking some concrete steps is to create a positive image of the policy and public opinion in order to get the ‘consent’ of the people in the neighbouring countries.

The aim of neighbourhood investment fund is also to make the ENP more visible and popular as a policy anchor and as a point of reference for reform elites and public opinion and strengthen domestic reform constituencies in the target countries. Moreover it will combine EU money and money for member states. The EU also wants to mobilise other international financial institutions like the World Bank (IBRD) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to give loans.<sup>323</sup>

Foreign and security policy, development and enlargement policies, as well as the sectoral foreign trade approach are the components of the ENP. The Commission and the European Parliament are assigned as sources for further conceptual and practical development. The complex nature of the ENP as a composite policy strengthens its already notorious strategic ambivalence, and the finality of the ENP will remain controversial.<sup>324</sup>

### ***3.4 Instruments of ENP***

The basic instruments of ENP are the Strategy Papers, Country Reports and Action Plans. The Strategy Papers reflect the vision of the ENP and the main components. Country Reports are more country-based reports which assess the bilateral relations

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<sup>322</sup> *Ibid*, p.6.

<sup>323</sup> Barbara Lippert, *op.cit.*, “The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union”, p.183.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid*, p.181.

with the country, analyze the political, economic, social and institutional situation of the relevant neighbouring country, and describe the current affairs in areas of particular interest to the ENP. Country reports are more scope wider and they are the points of references for the Action Plans. Action Plans are the basic political documents of the ENP that indicates the tactics and strategies for the coming three to five years. Action Plans are created as a result of the conciliation of both the European Commission and the neighbouring country. In the interview conducted with Dimitri Gorchakov, the European Commission's Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, on 12 September 2006, Mr.Gorchakov mentioned the disturbance felt in the country. He said that, the public opinion has no confidence for both the ones who caused the Orange Revolution – and the ones who led the Orange Revolution. It is also important how these internal developments will be reflected upon the European Public Opinion. Yanukovych's being selected as the prime minister may also create ambiguities since he was the targeted person to whom the Orange Revolution was made. That made create loss of motivation in the Ukrainian public opinion. Gorchakov categorised the Europeans into three: European idealists, European realists and European pesssimists. These three categories have different priorities and expectations.

The Action Plans were drafted by the Task Force.<sup>325</sup> They schedule the activities and it is an outline of mutual, social, political and economic commitments between the EU and the neighbouring country. The criteria for all the neighbouring countries are standard. Benchmarking is very important for those types of countries. These action plans, which function as key policy instruments in the medium term, are also indicators to help to decide whether to move towards further contractual links. The concrete stage of the contractual relationship is the signing of the European Neighbourhood Agreement. The Commission will report periodically on progress accomplished. On the basis of this evaluation, the EU, together with partner countries, will review the content of the Action Plans and decide on their adaptation and renewal. Decisions may

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<sup>325</sup> The work on the elaboration of the Action Plans had begun shortly after the Thessalonica European Council. For the Commission the new policy would mean a complex task, spanning the institutional expertise of many different Directorate-Generals (DGs) and their specialized departments. Hence, Thessalonica would give way to a specialized 'Wider Europe Task Force' set up in the seat of the Commission, drawing together officials predominantly from DG Enlargement and DG External Relations. Then the Task Force has since been dissolved. The ENP is currently coordinated by External Relations' Directorate-General.

also be taken, on this basis, on the next step in the development of bilateral relations, including the possibility of new contractual links. These could take the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements whose scope would be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plans.<sup>326</sup>

The Action Plans are the main mechanisms of the ENP and will be negotiated and are to be agreed jointly. They are tailored to each neighbour. They list hundreds of actions that the neighbour is expected to undertake. As mentioned before, Joint ownership and differentiation are two main principles regarding the implementation of the Action Plans. Joint ownership means that priorities will be defined together with partner countries, and will differ from country to country means that differentiation entails tailoring process. In other words, each country will be evaluated in accordance with its own strengths and weaknesses.

The main step for implementation of the objectives set by the ENP partners was laid out through Action Plans: key political documents for the further development of the EU's relations with its neighbours for the further development of the EU's relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis. Despite shortcomings, the action plans are striking for two main reasons: First they give prominence to political objectives, including, most notably, respect for human rights and democratic principles.<sup>327</sup> Although the Euro-Mediterranean relations are based upon respect for human rights, thus far there has been little by way of implementation of these stated goals. The challenge for the EU, however, remains how to put pressure on Mediterranean governments to aim for 'common values'. The ENP Action plans lack clear strategies, procedures and timetables required to entice these governments to develop domestic institutions and their own will and commitment towards the enhancement of their peoples' economic, social and political lives. The EU remains somewhat trapped between its emphasis on intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-

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<sup>326</sup> Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373 final, p.10.

<sup>327</sup> Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Marius Vahl and Richard Youngs, "The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as promoter of democracy in its neighbourhood", Brussels: *Centre for European Studies*, 2005.

border co-operation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours' and the ideal of associating southern peripheries in their own time.

Joint ownership is mentioned in the document as; 'Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues. There can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country'<sup>328</sup>. Differentiation is also mentioned in the Strategy Paper as follows: 'The Action Plans will draw on a common set of principles but will be differentiated, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests. The level of ambition of the EU's relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.'<sup>329</sup>

The principle of differentiation, as expressed by the Communication, was essentially intended to assuage the fears of neighboring countries, e.g. Morocco, striving for more advanced relations with the Union, by reiterating that they would all be treated with due attention to their individual circumstances in the framework of the new policy<sup>330</sup>. However, a few weeks later the principle of differentiation had become a key concept to alleviate growing tensions within the EU on this same point. After the official presentation of the 11 March 2003 dated Communication, some EU members became concerned that the new neighbourhood policy would not pay sufficient homage to their wishes on the EU agenda. There were also some who were alarmed that the new policy would serve to dilute advances already achieved with certain third countries. On 14th April 2003 the CFSP High Representative nevertheless made clear that the principle of differentiation was a crucial element of the new policy and would have to be applied rigorously. Solana signalled that different countries would have to be treated

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<sup>328</sup> Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373 final, p. 3.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid*, p.5

<sup>330</sup> Nogues, *op. cit.*, "The EU and Its Neighbourhood: An Overview", p. 27.

differently as circumstances warranted – e.g. Ukraine needed a boost along its way towards democracy and market economy, Moldova needed help to resolve its Transnistria conflict – and the Barcelona Process upgraded economic and political relations with the EU.<sup>331</sup> This meant that although there was one policy, with one final objective (cooperation), prioritisation of one country over another according to member states' wishes would still be possible. This 'tailoring process' is announced as what makes it different from the Barcelona Process and it relieves that each individual neighbouring country would be able to move as fast as slow as it fit, and that future upgrading of relations with countries proving determined to reform would be judged on an individual basis.

Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) is another EU strategy that draws much of its impetus from a post-cold war rapprochement between the EU and the countries of the Baltic Sea Region. Its beginnings are to be found in Nordic and Baltic Sea regional attempts to manage post-cold war economic, political and social transformation as well as deal with the environmental problems of the Baltic Sea in the first half of the 1990s.<sup>332</sup> The EU's NDI policy builds on recognition of growing economic interdependence between the enlarging European Union, Russia and other states of the Baltic Sea region<sup>333</sup>. The NDI is part of the EU's external and cross-border policies aimed specifically at raising the EU's profile in Northern Europe. It is conceived as a way of working with the countries of Europe's northern regions to increase prosperity, strengthen security and resolutely combat dangers such as environmental pollution, nuclear risks and cross-border crime.<sup>334</sup> Northern Dimension Initiative embracing all 11 countries in Northern Europe – four EU states (France, Sweden, Denmark and Germany), four EU new-comers (Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) and three others (Norway, Russia and Iceland) was launched in 1997.

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<sup>331</sup> European Report, 16 April 2003.

<sup>332</sup> James W. Scott, "The EU and the 'Wider Europe: Towards an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation?", *Geopolitics*, 10, 2005, p. 442.

<sup>333</sup> Urpo Kivikari, "The Northern Dimension-One Pillar of the Bridge between Russia and the EU", [\*Russian Economic Trends\*, Vol. 11, 2002, p. 26-30.](#)

<sup>334</sup> Kari Alho, "Economics of the Northern Dimension", *ETLA*, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Finland, 2000.

From Neo-Gramscian perspective, it is also regarded as another hegemonic Project which is an attempt to show the ability of the small EU states to exert influence. EU membership created a new medium for protecting national interests, promoting ‘smart’ ideas and forging wider networks and alliances. Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) was Finland’s first political initiative as an EU Member State. The NDI was ostensibly designed to enhance the influence of Northern Europe as a political actor by coordinating the work of the various cross-national initiatives that emerged there in the 1990s. The NDI urged the need to improve co-operation between the EU and outside organizations and to increase co-ordination between different programmes and pillars within the EU.<sup>335</sup>

In Brussels, from an EU Commission perspective, there were elements in the NDI that were new and caused suspicion. The strong commitment to transnational co-operation with ‘partner countries’ outside the Union was one of them. The existence of indigenous peoples’ organizations and an appreciation of the vast natural resources located in Northern Europe.<sup>336</sup> Several of the manifest objectives of the NDI have not been achieved. For example, the proposition that it would serve to get the Commission more actively involved in the new regional organs in Northern Europe has not been borne out in fact. The EU is a reluctant member in the initiative. Lack of resources is a proof for EU’s reluctance. Moreover there remains a general lack of interest in the Northern Dimension outside the region. When the NDI concept was new, it was perhaps inevitable that attempts were made to accommodate it within existing EU programmes, but it became so integrated into them that it lost its own profile.<sup>337</sup>

The role of the ND as an instrument of European integration is still taking shape. Russia had a high priority on the ND agenda from the outset, and EU enlargement will accentuate Russia’s importance. But the ND has to compete with various Russia

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<sup>335</sup> David Arter, “Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland’s ‘Northern Dimension Initiative’”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, December 2000, p. 677.

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid*, p. 693.

<sup>337</sup> Hanna Ojanen, “How to Customize Your Union: Finland and the ‘Northern Dimension of the EU’”, *Northern Dimension 1999 Yearbook of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Forssa, 1999*, p. 15.

related programmes of the EU. In every field of ND policy, there are one or more other alternatives for developing EU-Russia relations. Often these programmes are overlapping. EU enlargement makes a thorough reformulation of ND policy necessary. Otherwise the ND will suffer from a surfeit of Russia instruments and lack of distinguishable profile. The best possible future for the ND would be as a Pioneer of new developments. There is scope for such a future since, as a consequence of EU enlargement, the 'Eastern Dimension' the relationship with new neighbors; Ukraine and Belarus are currently of key interest to the EU. Although Russia is not an applicant for membership of the European Union, it is linked to European integration in many ways. The EU TACIS programme, started at the beginning of the 1990s, provided early assistance for Russia's transition to a market economy and market oriented international integration. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, which came into force in 1997, was a milestone, as were mutual cooperation strategies developed by each of the sides at the end of the 1990s..Current steps towards creation of the Common European Economic Space, uniting the EU and Russia, represent a new level of cooperation. Hence it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc.

### 3.5 Overview

European Union being the foremost example of regional integration and not pursuing the goal of regional integration in its neighbourhood may well be considered a paradox. Moreover, ENP's ability to promote domestic change in the neighbouring countries is a function of a misleading comparison with the enlargement because of their different *finalite*. Whereas the enlargement's goal is integration with the Union, the neighbourhood's goal is association with the Union.<sup>338</sup> Comparing the ENP with a similar neighbourhood policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and assuming that EMP is a precursor for the ENP will be more logical. Also it is possible to identify the elements of continuity and change in the relationship between the EU and its neighbours.

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<sup>338</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership", *Chaillot Paper*, (64), Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2003.



ENP does not constitute a revolutionary change in EU external relationships. The ENP reflects European traditional foreign policy objectives such as the promotion of security, stability, and common values and adopts EU traditional foreign policy instruments such as the promise of aid and economic integration. The ENP is innovative neither in its goals nor its instruments. The only main difference is its emphasis on differentiation that makes the ENP distinctive from past. While the EMP emphasises ‘multilateralism’ as the prevalent approach,<sup>339</sup> the neighbourhood policy emphasises the principle of differentiation according to which the level of cooperation and association with the Union is a function of bilateral relationships between the Union and each neighbour. The two policies are similar in important respects. Both policies use the discourse of creating a zone of peace and prosperity that include the Union and its partners. Both adopt a similar set of incentives that place the greatest emphasis on political dialogue, trade and technical cooperation. The ENP followed the EMP. The Commission clearly stated that the ENP does not replace the EMP rather the two policies complement each other.

The Thessalonica decision of 2003 by the EU to launch new relations with its immediate geographic neighbours suggest that, after years of inaction, the EU is aware of the fact that it needs to play a larger role to secure peace and prosperity on the European continent. The Eastern enlargement is without doubt the most obvious reason why the ENP came about.

Some argue that with the ENP the EU seeks to establish a form of external governance to make the vast hinterland beyond its borders more manageable. Here it is argued that the EU’s strategy towards the policy involving new neighbours is viewed as a hegemonic project with the insight provided by the Neo-Gramscian perspective. ENP is the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe. Emphasis is placed on the construction of hegemonic project which is formed by social forces with moral, intellectual and material dimensions occupying a leading role within the EU.

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<sup>339</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, “The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union”, p.184.

The area immediately surrounding the EU is the area where it can expect to have most influence in the international area. The period of reflection, induced by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, makes the ENP all the more timely. The success of the ENP whether the EU's Hegemonic Project will be sustained or not is a question with significant implications not only for the EU and its immediate neighbourhood but for the entire international system. However, for some reasons the ENP is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc such as the lack of adequate funding, incoherent design and implementation, insufficient incentives for partner countries to alter their behaviour and adopt EU norms. Since the mid-1990s, the application of conditionality by the EU has become associated with preparations for accession. Therefore membership is regarded as the only award that justifies the EU's demand for, and involvement in, reforms of state structures and policies of non-member states.<sup>340</sup>

The strategy of the ENP may be sustained for a while with consent of its partners; however it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc. The two strategies hegemonic projects of the EU's as 'Integrated European Economic Space' and Russia's 'Single Economic Space' are in the process of being formed as two contested hegemonic projects. The former is the ring of the EU's set of economic relationships with its neighbours with whom the EU does not seek to further enlargement; the latter is a more compact core group, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan aiming at deep regulatory convergence and ultimately a customs union for Russia to regain its old regional dominance. These contested strategies can only transform the existing problems. Ukraine as a focal point which will be analysed as a case study on the next chapter has the potentiality to contribute to the stability as well as polarization and thus further instability in the region. It remains to be seen where Ukraine is to head for.

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<sup>340</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning & Ulrich Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 2005.

## CHAPTER 4

### *The Competing Hegemonic Projects over Ukraine*

#### *4.1 Introduction*

The chapter examines the historical experiences of Ukraine. The study elaborates how the state develops its position in compliance with the changes at the global level and interrogates how Ukrainian policy is shaped and re-defined. Ukraine is chosen as a case study due to the reasons stated out in the introduction. The political instability and its repercussions upon the relationship with the EU is examined in order to show where and when the hegemonic discourses are formed. The chapter also analyzes to what extent Ukrainians are content with the EU's incentives on several issues, such as the energy problem, visa and asylum issues. It is also investigated whether it is likely to form a historic bloc or not in spite of the fact that Ukraine is squeezed between two hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia. The chapter analyses how and where these competing hegemonic projects of Russia and EU undermine each other. The former is the ring of the EU's set of economic relationships with its neighbours, the latter is Russia's 'Single Economic Space' which aims to reconstruct the old regional dominance, a more compact core group, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan aiming at deep regulatory convergence and ultimately a customs union. This thesis argues that Ukraine will be the focal point of these contested strategies.

Ukraine is chosen as a case study for the ENP. Ukraine is distinguished from the other neighbouring countries since it is one of the world's leading transit countries, providing transportation of Russian and Caspian oil and gas across the territory. Ukraine has geo-strategic importance being located between East and West. Ukrainian domestic and international politics have the potential to challenge the stability in the region.

Ukraine is the leading actor within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and plays a critical role in the former Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. Ukraine has also another peculiarity regarding the theoretical perspective of the thesis. It bears some resemblance to Gramsci's Italy which was a semi-developed country with deep internal differences between north and south, industrial areas and countryside, modern and

ancient. It possessed a labouring mass at widely divergent stages of development in different parts of the country, a proletariat with a broad rural base, a large, essentially conservative peasantry, a preponderance of intellectuals in the working-class leadership, and a style of politics at once bombastic and conspiratorial, conditioned by centuries of fragmentation and foreign domination.<sup>341</sup> Ukraine resembles Italy concerning the importance of its geo-strategic position, east-west division rather than the north-south division and cultural background and domination of Ukraine may be the other reasons for the selection of Ukraine as a case study. Its ethnic roots having relationship with Russia and the considerable existence of Ukrainian identity in Eastern Europe brings Ukraine closer to the EU and differentiates it from other neighbouring states.

#### ***4.2 Brief Background of Politics in Ukraine***

According to Kuzio, Ukraine has been transforming from a subject of empire to an independent state, from an ethnos to a population nation, from a commands administrative system to a market economy, from totalitarianism to democracy.<sup>342</sup> The political transformation in Ukraine began after perestroika and glasnost, as the socialist ideology lost its influence. In March 1990, elections were held for the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR and for the local councils as well. Many new political figures, mostly adherents of reform, appeared on the political scene. The nationalist democratic parliament managed to reach an accord with important segments of the Soviet Ukrainian establishment on how Ukraine should respond to the events in Moscow, after the elections.<sup>343</sup> As a result, on July 6, 1990, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, which was approved by the Supreme Soviet on August 24, 1991. Presidential elections were held in Ukraine simultaneously with a referendum confirming the Bill of Independence Announcement of Ukraine on December 1, 1991.

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<sup>341</sup> Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*, Clarendonpress, Oxford, 1987, p.2.

<sup>342</sup> Taras Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: an Identity Transition", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 2:4, 1996, p.582-608.

<sup>343</sup> Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and The Break Up of The Soviet Union*, Hoover, California: Institution Press, 2000, p. 300-321.

Leonid Kravchuk was elected the first president of independent Ukraine. According to Kuzio, the election of Kravchuk reflected the inability of democratic and nationalist leaders to obtain majority support from the population, particularly in the Russian-speaking south and east.<sup>344</sup> Hence, Kravchuk's election did not imply that the transformation process had begun, as it had in the Baltic States. However, having begun in July 1990 by adopting the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, this document ratified the principles of sovereignty, democracy, inviolability of the territory of Ukraine, power division into legislative, executive and court branches, equality of citizens and state guarantee of their rights and liberties.<sup>345</sup> The constitutional processes implied the beginning of the transformation process, since constitutional and legislative organs as well as clearly drawn state borders are among the most important determinants of 'stateness'. However, Kravchuk was supposed to deal with the international problems.

With the referendum, Ukraine had become an independent nation that would establish relations with the rest of the world outside of the Union's umbrella. However, the political transformation process was complicated by problems still unsolved after the fall of the USSR, such as the division of military ports, energy dependence and the structure of the mode of production that had all former members dependent upon the Union.<sup>346</sup> On December 8, 1991, Presidents Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus met in Belovezha to sign a statement of denunciation of the Union Treaty and to agree on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was to replace the USSR. Nonetheless, Ukraine and Russia were unable to reach a compromise regarding the nature of the CIS. The disagreement was not related to the structure, but the content of the agreement. Eventually, a consensus was reached, and on December 21, at a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Leonid Kravchuk and 11 former presidents of republics of the USSR signed a protocol for the formation of the CIS. Four days later, Gorbachev resigned as the last president of the USSR. The government of Ukraine was no longer able to maintain its popularity after a heavy defeat

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<sup>344</sup> Taras Kuzio, "History", *Regional Surveys of the World: Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia*, Europa, 1:1, 2000, p .5-329.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>346</sup> Alan Mayhew, Nathaniel Copsey, (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy: the Case of Ukraine*, Sussex: University of Sussex, SEI Seminar Papers no.1.

in a vote of no confidence of Rada, the prime minister resigned. Leonid Kuchma was elected as prime minister.<sup>347</sup>

Under Kuchma, the new government aimed to promote radical economic reforms. A new currency reflected Ukraine's transformation into a democratic state with a market-oriented economy. Nevertheless, when economic problems started to threaten the implementation of planned reforms, the parliament granted Kuchma emergency powers that allowed him to rule by decree for a period of six months. The first dissatisfaction against Kuchma bided on extension of the period. In response, President Kravchuk tried to force the parliament to grant him the extraordinary power to head the Cabinet of Ministers, which prompted Kuchma to tender his resignation. On September 9, 1993, polarisation and dissatisfaction within the ruling elites resulted in the resignation of Kuchma in protest to a continued parliamentary opposition. His third resignation was accepted by the parliament. On September 22, 1993, Kravchuk appointed Yuhym Zvyahilsky, a proponent of increased state involvement in the economy, as the new prime minister of Ukraine.<sup>348</sup>

The political atmosphere directly shaped Ukraine's economic indicators, which had never been in a worse conjuncture. The inflation rate increased to nearly 9,000 percent. Trust in the government dropped dramatically throughout the nation due to ongoing problems, the rise of an opposition to Kravchuk and strikes in the industrial, pro-Russian eastern part of the country. As a result, Kravchuk had to call early parliamentary and presidential elections, which took place on March 27, 1994. In the first round of voting, the Communists won the largest number of seats, 86, and their allies, the Peasants' Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), won 18 and 14 seats, respectively. Rukh secured 20 seats, and 112 seats remained unfilled, although this number was reduced in subsequent rounds of voting. SPU leader Oleksandr Moroz was elected as Chairman of Parliament, and in June, Vitaly Masl, who had served as prime minister between 1987-1990, was re-elected to the post.<sup>349</sup> Ukraine and specifically Crimea

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<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>349</sup> Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 2:31, July 1993.

showed the deficiencies of the reforms in the transition. The main problem in Ukraine was directly related to the lack of confidence regarding the future of the reforms.

The electoral campaign for the Ukrainian presidency began in 1994. Among the candidates for the presidency, Kuchma refrained from calling Ukraine a Central European country and stressed Ukrainians cultural and historical ties with Russia over those with Central and Western Europe. Kuchma's campaign focused on pro-Russian priorities: he promised recognition of the Russian language as the second official state language alongside that of Ukrainian, education in the Russian language in the eastern parts of Ukraine, and integration and good neighbourliness with Russia over a bid to 'become European' – the latter of which was the priority area of Kravchuk's pro-Western election campaign. Kuchma received most of the votes in the eastern regions because of his pro-Russian tendency, and he was supported in the western regions because of the ongoing economic crisis.

As a comparison, the concept of Europeanization accepted as the most important factor influencing the electoral behaviour in the presidential elections in 2004 in which pro-Kuchma candidate Yanukovich could not succeed to be elected as president, while moderation played the most important role for Kravchuk's election and the economic illness for Kuchma.

In July 1994, Kuchma won the run-off election for president over the incumbent. The West voted heavily for Kravchuk, the Centre represented the most balance between Kravchuk and the Central represented the most balance between Kravchuk, the East more so than the South Oblasts of the eastern and southern regions, contain nearly 60% of the nation's population, while the western region oblasts, which voted more than 60 percent for Kravchuk, contain only about 20 percent of the nation's population<sup>350</sup>. The fact that the majority of Ukrainians voted for Kuchma underscored the importance of economic issues in deciding the elections.<sup>351</sup> In fact, the results of the 1994 elections reflected the

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<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>351</sup> Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Rfe/RI Research Report*, 3:32, August 1994.

dissatisfaction of the electorate with short-lived cabinets under Kravchuk's presidency more than confidence in Kuchma's program and personal victory.

Kravchuk was third-in-command in Ukraine's CPSU leadership before the fall of the Soviet Union. He attempted to achieve and strengthen Ukraine's formal sovereignty and develop its relations with the West. Under Kuchma, strategic foreign-policy objectives such as Euro-Atlantic integration, outlined in election platforms were often disconnected from subsequent foreign policy orientations. Although he was elected in July 1994 on a pro-Russia platform, Kuchma's foreign policy shifted towards a pro-Western stance once he came to power.<sup>352</sup> Kravchuk definitely became a negative figure in Ukrainian history because of his economic policy. He failed to avoid corruption in the privatization of the country's industry and did not promote effective financial decisions. Holding office between 1990-1994, President Kravchuk failed to increase his powers despite a strong showing in the elections and the prospect of serving as the unifier of the nation as the first President of post-communist Ukraine. Kravchuk's attempts to gain greater power at the expense of the parliament were consistently rebuffed by the majority in parliament.<sup>353</sup> Due to political crises and the rapid circulation of the parliament, Kravchuk was unable to hasten the speed of the reforms. That is to say, both the problems left behind from the USSR and the problems related to post-Soviet state-building remained untouched during the Kravchuk era. Kravchuk could not solve the majority of these problems, including the political crisis within the Rada, whose members were unable to reach a consensus on the Ukrainian constitution. The problems and high tension within the Rada led three times to Kuchma's resignation and Kravchuk's call for early elections. Kravchuk was unable to implement a well-designed reform packet that might improve the economic situation in Ukraine. As a result of this lack of strategy, Kuchma was elected as the second elected president in the 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine. However, Kravchuk era signalled that Ukraine would not be Belarus which is ruled by an authoritarian regime.

The general political conjuncture during Kuchma's first and second terms in office was distinct, with specific problems. Many Ukrainians living in western Ukraine viewed

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<sup>352</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?", *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2006, p.91.

<sup>353</sup> Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers", *Post-Communist Presidents*, (edt) Ray Taras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90-91.



Kuchma as a man oriented towards a fraternal union with Russia.<sup>354</sup> In contrast to expectations, Kuchma, surprisingly, changed his priorities soon after his election. In October 1994, he announced a reform program to accelerate the transformation to a market economy, stabilize Ukraine's monetary and financial systems and integrate Ukraine into the world economy. However, he stressed that Ukraine would continue to maintain strong ties with Russia and CIS. Kuchma changed his priorities because the economic problems and the government's inability to sustain the reform process forced him to search for foreign investment and support. There were also other reasons driving his political orientation towards a more moderate stance than what he had announced in his election campaign. First, Yeltsin's change in Russia's foreign-policy orientation towards Eurasianism received a negative response from Ukrainian society. Second, integration with the East was no longer effective, while its substitute, the West, was bringing many advantages, including financial aid. Third, Poland and Hungary came to recognize that Ukraine would play a key role in the evolving European Security System, and they signalled that the CEE countries would try to assist Ukraine in rejoining Europe. Central and Eastern countries' support for returning to Europe could be caused later to Western Europe's support for the country. Nevertheless, refraining from the possibility of being criticized by his supporters, Kuchma found a third way. In line with this Ukrainian 'third way', he visited six of the G-7 states in 1994-95, while at the same time imposing direct rule in Crimea, which remained in force until 28 August, on April 4, 1995<sup>355</sup>. However, as Sherr has pointed out, "Ukraine's political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration or simply by joining and participating in international organizational and political clubs rather than by undertaking concrete structural changes."<sup>356</sup>

In September 1996, in accordance with the reform program, a new currency, the Hryvnia, was introduced, indicating Kuchma's commitment to improving the economy. At this time, the people of Ukraine still were reluctant to trust institutions, especially political

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<sup>354</sup> Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p.146.

<sup>355</sup> Foreign Economic Policy Guidelines Detailed Infobank' (Online). Available: [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/Ukraine/index.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Ukraine/index.html) (accessed on 9 June 2007).

<sup>356</sup> James Sherr, *Ukraine's New Time of Troubles*, Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1998.

parties. The pessimistic idea nobody is waiting for us in the West had been the driving motive of the society. Moreover, regardless of whether it was an ally or an enemy, Russia was geographically closer to Ukraine than the rest of the Europe. For this reason, membership in the Central European Initiative (CEI) had no meaning for the Ukrainians and was not enough to change their prejudices. (In fact, CEI's precedence was transportation, energy, science and technology; one of its most important objectives is to prepare non-EU Members for participation to the EU, a mission which Ukraine could benefit considerably. In fact, nobody was waiting for Ukraine in Europe, but nobody wanted to leave Ukraine. Within this framework, approving Ukrainian membership in the CEI in September 1995 meant Europe's need for time in order to see what would happen next in Ukraine. Kuchma received this message, and by mid-1996, he started to refer to Ukraine as a Central European country,<sup>357</sup> turning his face to the West.

Regarding NATO membership, Ukraine's progress in establishing relations with the EU is unlikely to parallel the progress it made with NATO. EU membership is not a divisive issue in Ukrainian domestic politics. All non-Communist parties within Ukraine support EU membership because of the benefits it would bring in terms of democratization and improved standards of living. NATO, on the other hand, is perceived differently. Decades of Soviet propaganda against NATO, coupled with NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, continue to cause regional divisions over attitudes toward NATO membership. For example after March 2006 elections, three of the five party factions in the newly elected Ukrainian parliament are against it.<sup>358</sup>

Ukraine's relations with NATO started to develop under Kuchma, and in 1994, Ukraine became the first CIS state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Ukraine's multilateral cooperation within the PfP framework and bilateral cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom remained at high levels throughout Kuchma's decade in office. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed a charter confirming these close ties; the only other country with which NATO signed a similarly important agreement was the Russian Federation.<sup>359</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> Lidove Noviny, "Czech Commentator Views Polish-Ukrainian Relations", *Fbis-Eeu*, 46:1, 1996.

<sup>358</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?", p. 90.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid*, p.206.

In 1998, Kuchma first outlined Ukraine's desire to join the never sought EU membership.<sup>360</sup> However, Ukraine's relations with the EU, NATO and the United States stagnated during Kuchma's second term. Domestic and international scandals coupled with Kuchma's growing dependency on the oligarchs led to Ukraine's increasing isolation from the West.

During these years, Russian leaders were not willing to treat Ukraine as an equal partner. Kuchma was able to sign an agreement with Russia on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet on May 28, 1997 and finally, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership.<sup>361</sup> With this agreement, Russia recognised for the first time the sovereignty of Ukraine.

In 1998 parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine under the protection of the new electoral law, which provided for a combination of proportionally and directly elected seats and approved by Kuchma. Before the election, Kuchma might account that he would be elected by attracting the votes of the electorates who does not want the other candidate's success. Despite successful transformation in some arenas, allegations of corruption, tribal affiliation, very existence of a *raison d'etat*, and media censorship, as well as Kuchma's alleged financing by newly emerged post-Soviet oligarchs was decreasing his credibility on the eve of presidential in 1999. There was chaos in the parliament, which was composed of two camps: the pro-Kuchma oligarchic centrist factions who backed the 'Ukrainian Third Way' and the anti-Kuchma. Rapid circulation of the cabinet of ministers resulted in the half finished implementation of the reforms for the transformation.

Kuchma's election campaign focused on three areas. First, he targeted the oligarchs, including the former prime minister, less for corruption than for his willingness to back Kuchma's opponents. Second, he coerced the government and regional elites into supporting him in order to prevent a repetition of the defeat of the incumbent in the summer 1994 elections. Finally, independent media outlets were put under pressure and

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<sup>360</sup> *Ibid*, p. 91.

<sup>361</sup> Wilson, *op. cit.*, "The Ukrainians, Unexpected Nation", p.199-200.

either closed or bought out by supporters of Kuchma. According to many scholars, Kuchma's game plan was similar to the tactics used in the Russian 1996 election.<sup>362</sup> Kuzio claims that Kuchma acted as the leader of the reformist side by accusing all other candidates on the left of being a threat to both the reform process and an independent Ukraine.<sup>363</sup>

Ukrainian-Russian relations played a less important role in the 1999 presidential elections campaign, whereas EU membership played a key role. Andrew Wilson has suggested that "the common Soviet heritage has led to similar patterns in the exercise of power emerging in the two states" and that "Ukraine may be even prone to the authoritarian rule of the former Soviet Bureaucratic elite."<sup>364</sup> Nevertheless, Kuchma surprised him, by appointing Viktor Yushchenko as the new prime minister. Kuchma was prompted to appoint Yushchenko to the post because of the 1998 economic crisis in Russia, which had a dramatic impact on Ukraine's economy. Yushchenko would be a role model, reflecting the reformist vision of the new government, which would help Ukraine acquire prestige and credibility. Yushchenko's reformist point of view was supported by Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko was attempting to take measures to prevent the theft of Russian gas in order to clean up Ukraine's energy sector and reduce Ukraine's debt for Russian energy supplies, which was needed in order to hold open tenders for the privatization of gas distribution companies. Kuchma and Yushchenko were ultimately able to implement their reform packet.<sup>365</sup> Kuchma promulgated the law which abolished the death penalty. The reform packet seemed to address its purpose, according to the IMF and the World Bank, which emitted good signals, praising Yushchenko's success in implementing the reform programme; nevertheless, the

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<sup>362</sup> *Ibid*, p. 200.

<sup>363</sup> Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian'", *Foreign Policy*, 2 June 2002, (Online). Available: <http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html>. (accessed on 2 August 2006).

<sup>364</sup> Wilson, *op. cit.*, "The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation", p. 204.

<sup>365</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Analysis Ukraine's Little Russian Foreign Policy Proclaims to Europe with Russia" (Online). Available: <http://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/2002/250204.Shtml>. (accessed on 8 August 2006).

financial and structural aid from international financial institutions were suspended after a disinformation campaign against Yushchenko.<sup>366</sup>

President Kuchma planned to hold a referendum consisting of six questions on April 16, 2000, which he claimed was necessary in order for him to speed up the reforms. However, the referendum was attacked, particularly by the left and the Communist Party, who called for an additional referendum to abolish the presidency. Moreover, the Constitutional Court announced that two of the six questions were unconstitutional. The referendum results provided an ambiguous outcome that would lead to greater executive power and a reduction in parliamentary influence. Coupled with the decline in independent media, Ukraine would have been set to move into an authoritarian era. After the referendum, growing dissatisfaction and distrust of Kuchma started to become visible, not only in the Rada, but in the wider Ukrainian society. In late 2000, opponents and students started to organise via the internet, since there was strict censorship over media and the freedom of speech as well as distribution of information. For the first time in Ukraine's political history, Ukraine's centre-left and centre-right allied against the oligarchic centre.<sup>367</sup> On April 30, 2001, the Ukrainian parliament passed a no-confidence motion against Yushchenko's government.<sup>368</sup>

Yushchenko and his party, Our Ukraine joined the opposition bloc headed by Tymoshenko, who began her involvement in the opposition bloc and started to play a leading role in the organisation of civil society. The three actors of the revolution; Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and the youth organisations, started to attract more supporters, and many forums began to take place in Ukraine. Our Ukraine, KPU, the Socialists, and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc were able to coordinate mass protests calling for early presidential elections. This was the first time that four opposition groups were able to organise a mass mobilisation, despite pressure by Kuchma.

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<sup>366</sup> Taras Kuzio, "End Note: Who's Behind KuchmaGate?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, RFL/RI Newline, 14 December 2000.

<sup>367</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Kuchmagate Continues to Dominate Ukrainian Politics", *Jamestown Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1, 2001.

<sup>368</sup> Taras Kuzio, "The Curtain Falls on Reform efforts to Eliminate Corruption Suffered: A Serious Blow Last Week with the Ouster of Viktor Yushchenko", *Radio Free Europe*, Radio Liberty, Rfe,RI Reports 30 April 2001.

Kuzio notes that Kuchma would no longer be active in the political scene, if the elections were held without fraud. On the eve of parliamentary elections in 2002, two-thirds of Ukrainians did not believe that the authorities would ensure free and fair elections.<sup>369</sup> The Voter's Committee of Ukraine reported that three-quarters of election irregularities were undertaken by the pro-Kuchma party.<sup>370</sup> Following the elections, President Kuchma's candidate, Viktor Yanukovich was appointed Ukraine's 10th prime minister.<sup>371</sup>

Yanukovich issued a programme that combined a socially regulated market economy with political authoritarianism.<sup>372</sup> The outcome of the 2002 parliamentary elections marked an apparently significant change in the electoral choices of the population. On one level, the pro-reform bloc, 'Our Ukraine', led by Victor Yushchenko. The elections also indicated a change in the fortunes of the left-wing parties: for the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the reformers, rather than the left, emerged as the winners from a parliamentary electoral contest in Ukraine. However, on another level, the elections did not deliver the expected breakthrough in terms of a change in the balance of power. Although the reformist bloc had won the popular mandate, it soon lost ground in the legislature to the 'parties of power'.<sup>373</sup>

After the parliamentary elections of 2002, Kuchma announced his intention of changing his policies and attitude towards the state apparatus and institutions by backing the opposition's call for a fully proportional election law, although he had always supported a

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<sup>369</sup> Taras Kuzio, 'End Note Ukraine Debates The Role of Civil Society' *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Rfe/RI Newslines Vol. 6, No.31, 15 February 2002.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>371</sup> See: 'Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, official web page' (online) Available: <http://gska.2.rada.go.ua/control/en/index>. (Accessed on 23 March 2004).

<sup>372</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma Replaces Prime Minister and Appoints A Possible Successor", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, *Rfe/RI Report*, Vol 4, No. 45, 26 November 2002.

<sup>373</sup> Kataryna Wolczuk, "Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union", *EUI Working Papers*, RSCAS, No.2004/15, p. 4.

presidential system.<sup>374</sup> During these years, Kuchma's popularity decreased, whereas Yushenko's ratings increased up to 25-30 percent.<sup>375</sup>

The institutional power asymmetries in Ukraine have enabled the dominant power elites, grouped around the presidency, to exploit opportunities for exploitative, rent-seeking behaviour, even though this is detrimental to the Ukrainian state and society. The experience of such self-serving 'reforms' and 'state-building' has, in turn, deepened society's disillusionment with politics in general and reforms in particular, leaving Ukrainian society politically disfranchised. Under Kuchma's presidency, Ukraine fulfilled many of the criteria for being classified as a dominant power regime.<sup>376</sup>

The political crisis in Ukraine revealed the urgent need for a free and organised civil society if political transformation was to occur. As a reaction to the problems of democratic consolidation in Ukraine, this civil consciousness started to become visible.

Under Kuchma and Yanukovich, many opposition activists and university students were arrested by the authorities, who equated demonstrations against Kuchma with demonstrations against Ukraine's government. The European Union, Council of Europe and many international non-profit organisations condemned these arrests and began to show more interest in what was happening in Ukraine, but Ukrainian officials and Kuchma stressed that this jamming was their internal affair.<sup>377</sup> However, Kuchma's attempts to ban the demonstrations were in vain, since he had been discredited as a leader, and the institutions in Ukraine had lost the trust of the people.

The distrust towards public institutions, elites and the government led to rapid organisation of the masses. Moreover, the university students viewed themselves as a post-Soviet generation with no links to the past or socialism, and they were more

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<sup>374</sup> Taras Kuzio, "End Note Can Glasnost Save President Kuchma And His Regime?", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Rfe/RI News line* (30 August 2002).

<sup>375</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma Replaces Prime Minister and Appoints A Possible Successor", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Rfe/RI Report*, 4:45, 26 November 2002.

<sup>376</sup> Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, 13:1, 2002, p. 5-21.

<sup>377</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, "End Note Ukraine one Year after Kuchmagate".

nationalistic and identified themselves as more European. The alliance between Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko's National Salvation Front acted as a catalyst in organising the masses. People were afraid that unless they did something, Ukraine would become an authoritarian state like Belarus.

Regarding the political parties and 2004 elections, although in recent years, Ukraine has witnessed the emergence of a multi-party system, in reality, this system does not ensure effective representation of the genuine interests of the bulk of the entrenched electorate. Although around 15 parties are involved in election campaigns, there is political apathy. Lack of articulate expression of the citizen's interests impedes the development of the party system. Due to the traditional factors, post-Soviet citizens are not used to demanding consensual relations but preferring deep social stratification and public passivity often go hand-in-hand in Ukraine. At the same time, all sorts of differing social values have become quite widespread and have been brought to the surface.

In the 2004 presidential elections, three of the four major opposition groups registered candidates: Yushchenko, Symonenko, and Moroz. The Communist Party (KPU) and the Socialist Party (SPU) were the opponents of Kuchma during the period between 1993 and 2001 when KPU again was legalized as a political party.<sup>378</sup> The new president in 1994 did not have a deep effect on the state or society, as there was no alternative. Likewise, the presidential election in 1999 and parliamentary elections in 1998 and 2002 did not encourage a transfer of power by the will of the voters because the government deliberately interfered in the elections to achieve the desired result. In 2004 the opponent of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma's hand-picked heir, was not a member of the Communist Party, but popular opposition leader Victor Yushchenko aspired to establishing closer EU-Ukraine relations, besides proclaiming the goal of fighting the country's widespread corruption and the overbearing influence of the nation's economic clans. After parliament issued a no-confidence vote against Yushchenko's government in April 2001, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Party took its part in the opposition. Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the National Salvation Front, participated in the opposition bloc

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<sup>378</sup> Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and the Orange Revolution", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 52, No.2, 2005, pp. 10-20 at <http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2005/3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html>. (Accessed on 18 June 2007.)



and started to play a leading role in the organisation of the civil society. Tymoschenko was the only principal opposition leader who did not run for the elections.<sup>379</sup>

The presidential elections in 2004 were viewed in Ukraine as a crossroads: Ukraine could either continue to follow the post-Soviet, 'Eurasian model' currently pursued by the 'parties of power', or it could alter its trajectory and shift to a 'European path of development'.<sup>380</sup> In the re-run of the second round, Victor Yushchenko was the winner, with a lead of almost eight percent. From the very beginning of the election campaigns, it is understood that there were two main rival camps: The pro-Yushchenko camp and the pro-Yanukovych camp. However, these camps were divided into sub-groups; after the first round of the elections, the group opposed to Yanukovych managed to unite, just as they did during the Kuchmagate crisis. The 2004 elections represented a dilemma between two political cultures: Eurasian Yanukovych, the former prime minister, is known as a representative of the powerful Donetsk clan, which is synonymous with being more 'pro-Eastern', and he therefore posed less of a threat to the previous regime; and European Yushchenko, who had proved himself a reforming force during his term as prime minister and, during the election debates, had made progressive comments and vehemently criticised the shortcomings of Ukrainian democracy, stating that a truly parliamentary democracy was needed, criticising media censorship and supporting a roundtable forum for open dialogue among various sectors of society and the government. In addition to these key differences, the 'Kuchma factor' was a driving force in keeping people from voting for Yanukovych, whose candidacy was perceived as 'Kuchma's unfinished business'.<sup>381</sup>

Yanukovych's image suffered from three shortcomings. First, he had been in prison twice, and his criminal past dogged him throughout the campaign. Second, he hailed from Donetsk, a region that has a reputation for criminality, brutality and heavy-handed business tactics. Third, he was unable to attract young voters because the majority of university students had suffered from his strict policies during the demonstrations against

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<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>380</sup> *Ukrainian Monitor*, No.38, 15-21 March 2003.

<sup>381</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and the Orange Revolution", p. 13.

Kuchma.<sup>382</sup> Surveys indicate that in comparison to older Ukrainians, more Ukrainians under the age of 30 favours the idea of an independent European Ukraine. Between 1994-2004, the overall percentage of those supporting Ukrainian subordination within a Russian-dominated eastern Slavic Union increased from 53 percent to 63 percent.<sup>383</sup> In 2003, even Russian-speaking high-school students from eastern Ukraine who expressed sympathy towards Russians simultaneously expressed suspicion of Putin's government and were in favour of Ukrainian independence.<sup>384</sup>

The election campaigns did not have a major effect on the results. When Yanukovich's election program is examined, it can be said that Yanukovich's election program included every positive policy. Indeed, as Kuizio has said, "No politician, Yushchenko included, would ever be able to implement most of Yanukovich's program."<sup>385</sup> Among other things, Yanukovich called for upgrading Russian to an official language, just as Kuchma had in 1994. Whether Yanukovich would implement this following the election is subject to debate, since Kuchma ignored this issue after the 1994 election.<sup>386</sup>

For his part, Yushchenko focused on domestic issues, although he did not forget to mention his support for EU and NATO membership.<sup>387</sup> Yanukovich took an anti-NATO position as part of his attempt to play the Russian card, even though his government had declared NATO membership to be one of its objectives in 2002.<sup>388</sup> Yanukovich also portrayed the goal of EU as unrealistic and to be pursued only as an afterthought to Ukraine's deep integration with the CIS. Nevertheless, Yanukovich's Eurasian political

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<sup>382</sup> *Ibid*, p.10-20.

<sup>383</sup> Velychenko (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>384</sup> Rodgers, *op.cit.*, p. 157-74.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>386</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Russian and Ukrainian Authorities Resort to Inter-Ethnic Violence to Block Yushchenko", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, [http://www.jamestown.org/publicationsdetails.php?volume\\_id=401&issue\\_id=3001&article\\_id=2368166](http://www.jamestown.org/publicationsdetails.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3001&article_id=2368166) (accessed on 23 February 2006).

<sup>387</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Deep Contradictions Cloud Yanukovich's Foreign Policy", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* November 12, 2004, at [http://www.taraskuzio.net/academic/elections\\_orange\\_revolution.pdf](http://www.taraskuzio.net/academic/elections_orange_revolution.pdf) (Accessed on 10 March 2006.)

culture was criticised for being only a way to find a home in the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>389</sup>

Democracy is one of the most important cornerstones of reform. Carrying out elections in a timely and reasonable fashion is perceived as an important milestone, showing further progress on the domestic front and determining the future for international relations with Ukraine. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Former American Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, stressed the international relevance of the election by highlighting the importance of a free and fair election process. Considering that Ukrainians will decide at the ballot box whether to support those who favour integration into NATO and the European Union, or those who favour realignment with Russia and Belarus, the statements go far beyond the usual comments on free and fair elections.<sup>390</sup> Before the Orange Revolution election returns were the result of documented coercion, intimidation and covert operations. Parties resort to criminal methods to produce votes. They threatened students with expulsion for not voting as ordered, given known Yushchenko supporters pens with disappearing ink to use when voting, or included the dead in voters list. They used the same methods before and during the 2006 parliamentary elections – though on a smaller scale and within fewer regions. Two weeks before the election in March 2006 officials in neo-soviet Russophile dominated regions were still reporting intimidation, fraud and outright attacks against Orange Coalition activists.<sup>391</sup>

Election observation groups originally reported the evidence of serious fraud and massive violations intended to aid Yanukovich. US and EU leaders regretted that the presidential election in Ukraine did not meet a number of requirements to be considered democratic, noting that during the pre-election period, there was a lack of fair conditions for all

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<sup>388</sup> Richard Holbrooke, “From Tent City to NATO”, *Washington Post*, 14 December 2004, at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A623\\_50-2004\\_Dec\\_13.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A623_50-2004_Dec_13.html) (Accessed on 25 December 2005.)

<sup>389</sup> Taras Kuzio, *op. cit.*, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine’s Presidential Election and the Orange Revolution”.

<sup>390</sup> Madeleine K. Albright, “How to help Ukraine vote”, in *The New York Times*, March 8, 2004.

<sup>391</sup> Stephen Velychenko, “Behind the Scenes in the Provinces”, *The Ukraine List*, 2004-2005 [www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukraine\\_list.html](http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukraine_list.html) #316, 19 December; #329, 22 December; #322, 11 January. (Accessed on 12 January 2009.)

candidates.<sup>392</sup> This obvious deception exceeded the limits of the population's tolerance. In the wake of the Nov. 21, 2004, debacle, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, stood up for their democratic right to free and fair elections, and started what was to become known to the world as the Orange Revolution. Ukraine's fledgling civil society helped coordinate the masses and scored an unlikely and remarkable landslide victory for democracy.<sup>393</sup>

The influential civil movement, the mediation efforts of the international community and the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine to invalidate the results of the November 21 presidential run-off vote cleared the way for fresh elections on December 26, 2004.

One NGO, the Committee of Voters, claims that massive voting abuse in the presidential elections, much of it related to absentee ballots, resulted in 2.8 million false votes for Yanukovich.<sup>394</sup>

According to the results of the second round of the presidential elections held in 2004, Viktor Yanukovich won 49 per cent of the total votes cast, while Viktor Yushchenko succeeded to attract 46.71 per cent of the votes<sup>395</sup>. The official results increased the number of the participants of the demonstrations, and a great mass mobilisation against the government started to be organised. Most of the demonstrators were wearing an orange ribbon or a flag, which is the symbol of solidarity with Yushchenko's movement in Ukraine. Hence orange became the symbol of this uprising.

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<sup>392</sup> Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on the presidential elections of Oct.31, 2004 in Ukraine, at [www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS\\_ITEM=987B&A310E8C4173BC45E72D9A412X1X66772X44](http://www.eu2004.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=987B&A310E8C4173BC45E72D9A412X1X66772X44), (Accessed on 12 March 2006.)

<sup>393</sup> Helmut Kurth and Iris Kepme (eds), *Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine's Transition*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:Kiev, 2005. p. 5.

<sup>394</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Is a Free Election Possible in Ukraine?", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 13 (July 2004): [http://www.ualberta.ca/~csp/cas/nletters/nletter\\_fall\\_2001.pdf](http://www.ualberta.ca/~csp/cas/nletters/nletter_fall_2001.pdf)-(Accessed on 14 July 2006.)

<sup>395</sup> These results are taken from the 'Distribution of the Votes in the Second Round of the 2004 Elections'. available: [http://www.infoukes.com/orange\\_revolution/election\\_data/geographic\\_distribution](http://www.infoukes.com/orange_revolution/election_data/geographic_distribution). (Accessed on 15 July 2005.)

### ***4.3 The Orange Revolution***

The Orange Revolution is a transition process that started soon after the release of the official results of the second round of the 2004 parliamentary elections, which differed from the results of exit polling. It traces its root back to Kuchmagate; run-off results, protests began.

In 2004-2005, Ukraine's 'Orange Coalition' and Yushchenko's government briefly neutralized 'old-regime' neo-Soviet Russophile politicians.<sup>396</sup> From the Neo-Gramscian perspective, the Orange Revolution is regarded as a suspension of Russia's hegemonic project. Although it seemed to be a turning point in Ukrainian history, the post-revolution period proves that the only achievement was the transformation of the problem from one platform into another. Gramsci focuses on the superficiality of consent within the capitalist system, by drawing attention to the frequent incompatibility between a man's conscious thoughts and the unconscious values implicit in his action. The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity and which unites him with all his fellows in the practical transformation. In the interpretation of the dynamics of the Orange Revolution, it is worth analysing the 'notion of consciousness'. According to Gramsci the 'active-man-in-the-mass' lacks the means with which to formulate the radical alternative 'implicit in his activity'. On the other hand, his education has never provided him with the ability to abstract symbols, to think clearly and systematically.<sup>397</sup> Gramsci defined the situation as the 'contradictory consciousness' which means the thinking of the common man is neither coherent nor consistent over time; it is instead 'disjointed and episodic': elements of intellectual and moral approbation coexist in unsteady equilibrium with elements of apathy, resignation, and even hostility. There are different types of 'consent' or in other words 'compliance' stemming from the fear, habit, indifference, acquiescence, positive attachment which are all interwoven in different ways in the social personalities of the individuals.<sup>398</sup> The concept of 'complicated consciousnesses and the 'unconscious compliance' may be the indicators to understand why Orange Revolution was only a suspension of the two contested hegemonic projects. Ukraine as a post-Soviet country is

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<sup>396</sup> Velychenko (edt), *op. cit.*, p 17.

<sup>397</sup> Femia, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45.

composed of people who are not capable of making decision about their future with their free will.

However, Orange Revolution brought about changes in Ukrainian society. As an example it highlighted the re-emergence of civil society.<sup>399</sup> There were two actors of the Orange Revolution that reached a consensus. The first actor was the opposition group, which was composed of civil and political organisations, as well as the protestors. The opposition bloc came into being in 2002, when Yushchenko and Our Ukraine joined the ongoing demonstrations, and Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were able to unite the opposition bloc and start to enlarge the scope and environment. The second actor was youth NGOs in Ukraine, which notable for their important role in organising creative non-violent resistance.<sup>400</sup>

Tekleshun, a political scientist and Kuchma's advisor, argues that the Orange Revolution was not a revolution, but a social metamorphosis.<sup>401</sup> Regarding the developments after the Orange Revolution, it may be claimed that there have been some changes in Ukraine and in the EU-Ukraine relationship. However it can not be regarded as a transformation but only a redefinition of the problems. The EU explicitly supported the democratic opposition in the 2004 presidential elections, which became an important watershed in EU-Ukraine relations. Yushchenko was inaugurated to the post of president in late January 2004, and he appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister. Tymoshenko's cabinet was composed of reform-minded ministers. The harmonised structure displayed by the newly appointed government and the reform-minded majority of parliament had never been seen since Ukraine's declaration of independence and is considered to be the dawning of a new era. The first act of the newly elected president was to institute constitutional changes that increased the powers of the prime minister at the radical expense of the presidency.

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<sup>399</sup> Kataryna Wolchuk, "Ukraine after the Orange Revolution", *CER Policy Brief*, 2005.

<sup>400</sup> Such information was also confirmed by leading members of NGOs whom I made indepth interviews in September 2006.

<sup>401</sup> Erhan Başıyurt, "Turuncu Devrim'in Gizli Mimarları", *Aksiyon Dergisi*, Vol:526, 01 March 2005.

Historically and geographically Ukraine seemed to be divided into two. As Mykola Riahchuk put it, ‘The problem is traced to the 19<sup>th</sup> century when two different options appeared before Ukrainian national and territorial elites: either to embark on a ‘central-east European’ project of nation-building or to benefit from a regional role in ‘Great Russian’ or later, Soviet East Slavonic empire-building.’<sup>402</sup> Anyone who visits the extreme eastern and western parts of Ukraine will inevitably feel the profound differences between the two regions and might even think they belonged to two different countries and two civilizations. While the eastern part of the country rejects EU membership, since this implies the end of Russian hegemony in Ukraine, the western part supports EU membership, and increasingly so since the Orange Revolution. As Riahchuk notes, Western Ukrainians never internalised communism, never perceived the Soviet Union as their own’ country and never believed that the Soviet army liberated them.<sup>403</sup> In a cycle of political pamphlets published under the title, *On the Threshold of the New Ukraine*, the prominent Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky tried to outline the basic principles and parameters upon which the nascent Ukrainian state should be built. Hrushevsky examined the army, culture and government bureaucracy, as well as the various aspects of Ukraine’s international politics, quintessentially defined in the title of one of his essays as ‘Our Western Orientation’.<sup>404</sup> Hrushevsky argued that since the end of the 18th century, Ukrainian contacts with the West “had weakened and declined under the pressure of forceful Russification of Ukrainian life, and Ukrainian life and culture had been drawn into a Russian, Greater Russian period.”<sup>405</sup> Moreover, until 2005, the European Union (EU) neither played nor endeavoured to play a role in domestic change in the Soviet successor states. The EU pursued a Russia-first policy in the former Soviet Union, lacking the vision, commitment and effective instruments to affect the domestic

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<sup>402</sup> Mykola Riabchuk, “Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why Ukraine is Trapped Between East and West” eds. Stephen Velychenko *Ukraine, The EU and Russia*, 2007, p.70.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid*, p.78.

1.1.1 <sup>404</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevsky, “M. Khto taki ukraintsi i choho vony khochut?”, *Znannia*, Kyiv, 1991, p.141.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid*, p.144.

political and economic trajectories of the Soviet successor states. With the eastern enlargement in 2004, the EU has sought to project its 'transformative power'.<sup>406</sup>

According to Wilson, Ukraine and Russia developed independently of each other until Muscovy politically incorporated Cossack-Ukraine in the late eighteenth century. Afterwards, Russia could not economically integrate its Ukrainian lands until it began building the paved roads and railways in the later nineteenth century, while massive Russian immigration to Ukraine began in the 1930s. Accordingly, there is no particular reason to see Ukrainian lands on the southern river-network defined by the Dnipro, Dnister, and Donets rivers, as the 'southern part of Russia' or the 'western part of Asia'. They are better understood as the eastern part of Europe<sup>407</sup> There is failure to distinguish between Russia and its empire also reinforces the view that Ukraine is or should be 'part of Russia'. Russian neo-eurasianists are perhaps the most outspoken advocates for the restoration of Russian rule in what was its empire. Seemingly oblivious to the fact that every other modern country that had an empire and lost it is still 'alive', a leading proponent of this modern obscurantism, Alexander Dugin, claims that if Russia repudiates what it controlled before 1991 the result will be civil war and the destruction of the Russian nation.<sup>408</sup> Formulated in the early 1920s Eurasianism claims that the territorial unity of the old tsarist empire has to be maintained and dominated by a hybrid Russian-speaking nation composed of all the peoples of the empire who supposedly have more in common than differences with each other.<sup>409</sup>

According to Ilnytzkyj, if Ukrainians were becoming 'Russians', it was not in the 'national' sense but the 'imperial' which left room for a Ukrainian sub-loyalty and identity. The notion that Ukrainians disappear from the cultural scene by being 'Russified', and that only 'Russians' occupy the ground of imperial culture ignores this

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<sup>406</sup> Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York, Palgrave: Macmillan 2006.

<sup>407</sup> Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. Yale University Press: New Haven, 2000, p. 281-283.

<sup>408</sup> Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitike*. Arktogeia Publishers: Moscow, 2000, p. 198-201.

<sup>409</sup> Stephen Velychenko, "Introduction. Ukraine: EU Member or a Second Belarus", in *Ukraine, The EU and Russia, History, Culture and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Velychenko, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe: Palgrave, 2007, p.3.



fact and that Russian and ‘Little Russian’ elites coexisted. The big difference between Ukrainians and Russians as Ilnytskyj argues is that whereas the former began developing a distinct non-imperial national identity in the nineteenth century, the latter did not, and still confuse their particular national identity with the old imperial/soviet supra-national identity.<sup>410</sup>

Ukraine’s first post-Soviet census, conducted in 2001, showed the population to consist of 77.8 percent ethnic Ukrainians (up from 72.7% in 1989), 17.3 percent ethnic Russians (down from 22.1% in 1989) and 4.9 percent ‘other nationalities’ (down from 5.1% in 1989). Among ethnic Ukrainians, it showed 85.2 percent (66.3% of the total population) considered Ukrainian to be their ‘native tongue’, whereas the remaining 14.8 percent (11.5% of the total population) considered Russian to be their native language. Among ethnic Russians, nearly all (96 percent) cited Russian as their ‘native tongue’. This is understandable, given Ukraine’s centuries-long subjection to Russification. Overall, more than two-thirds of Ukrainian citizens (67.5%) claimed their ‘native tongue’ to be Ukrainian (2.8% more than in 1989) and 29.6 percent claimed their ‘native tongue’ to be Russian (3.2% less than in 1989).<sup>411</sup>

Public opinion polls conducted in 2005 showed 53.6 percent of respondents among an all-Ukrainian sample in 2005 favoured joining the union of Russia and Belarus, compared to 47.2 percent who favoured joining the European Union, and that 29.3 percent gave priority to strengthening the Eastern Bloc (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) compared to 17.9 percent who gave priority to establishing relations with developed countries in the West.<sup>412</sup> Polls have not only highlighted the radical division in Ukrainian society on virtually every fundamental issue, they’ve also shown that both rival groups, i.e., the ‘Russophiles’ and ‘Ukrainophiles’, are minorities, and that the real majority is Ukrainian regions between ‘Lviv’ and ‘Donetsk’ highly heterogeneous, each with its own

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<sup>410</sup> Oleh S. Ilnytskyi, ‘Imperial Culture’ and Russian-Ukrainian Unity Myths”, in *Ukraine, The EU and Russia, History, Culture and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Velychenko, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe: Palgrave, 2007, p. 53.

<sup>411</sup> <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/Perepis/Pidsper.html>, (accessed on 14 July 2007).

<sup>412</sup> Natalia Panina, *Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring*, Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: Kiev, 2005.

peculiar combination of ‘Ukrainianness’ and ‘Russianness’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Sovietism’ but also individual Ukrainians can be ambivalent about their ideological preferences, orientations, and thereby vague and nebulous concerning their identity. Riahchuk categorises this third group as the ‘third Ukraine’. The third category is for the most part invisible, mute, uncertain, undecided, ideologically ambivalent and ambiguous. Opinion polls prove the fact that Ukrainian society is not just radically divided on virtually every fundamental issue. They also show that rival groups, ‘Russophile’ and ‘Ukrainophile’ or more precisely ‘pro-Soviet’ or ‘pro-European’ are minorities, while the real majority is an amorphous group of those who ‘do not care’, ‘are uninterested’ ‘feel undecided’, ‘failed’ to respond. The randomly made interviews at Kyiv streets (16-20 September 2006 dated) reveal the fact that most of the Ukrainians even have no idea about what the European Union will contribute to their lives. There is another category of Ukrainian advocates of neutrality. They advocate the neutrality similar that of Switzerland or Sweden. This was supported by those who feared that differences between pro- and anti-Russian groups could split the country, and that neutrality was the best way to guarantee independence and territorial integrity. The fact that Ukraine then possessed the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal made this option particularly attractive. This ambiguity which is called as ‘multipolarity’ by Roman Serbyn or ‘multi-vector policy’ by Mykola Riahchuk<sup>413</sup> and is defined as below by Lynch:

*One moment, the country’s leaders have proclaimed their desire to be included in Western institutions; the next, they have suggested closer integration with their Eastern neighbour, Russia. One minute, these leaders have appeared to covet regional power status; the next, they have shrunk from actions that would help them reach that goal. To explain these apparent contradictions, officials in Ukraine have talked of a ‘dual’ and ‘bipolar’ foreign policy, and suggested that the country’s most important goal should be ‘creating a safe zone of peace and stability’ around it. Unfortunately, this refusal to choose a clear distinction for its foreign policy meant that the country*

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<sup>413</sup> Riabchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

*remained in a type of limbo, hovering ineffectually between East and West, easily swayed and manipulated by both sides.* <sup>414</sup>

As Libman defines; ‘Today Ukraine still confronts a difficult choice between the Common Economic Space (CES) or Single Economic Space or the EU.’<sup>415</sup> Kuzio also argued that ‘Although Kuchma is fond of stating that Ukraine’s foreign policy is neither ‘pro-Western’ nor ‘pro-Russian’ but ‘pro-Ukrainian’, it is in reality more ‘pro-Kuchma’, in that it almost exclusively serves to further the interests of the executive and its oligarch allies’<sup>416</sup>

As Mykola Riahchuk explains at the beginning of the century as much as one – third of Ukraine’s citizens considered themselves ‘local’ or ‘Soviet’. Between a pro-EU primarily Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian minority on one side and primarily Russian-speaking and/or Russian minority on the other, this linguistically and nationally ambiguous mass could swing either way.<sup>417</sup> Riahchuk notes that while in 1991 two-thirds of voters supported the neo-soviet candidate Leonid Kravchuk, thirteen years later the percentage of the neo-soviet vote had dropped to 45 percent. Regarding the elites and their expectations, as Grinberg puts it, the post-Soviet elites are willing to follow the Russian ‘rules of the games’, but are reluctant to support integration with Russia and they are willing to support EU integration, but reluctant and not able to live under European rules of transparency. <sup>418</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> Dov Lynch, “Post-Election Return to Foreign Policy Status”, *The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review*, Vol.7, No.9, 2002.

<sup>415</sup> Alexander Libman, “Institutional Competition and Evolution of Perception of Norms”, *Institute for International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, Paper prepared for the EAEPE Annual Conference „A New Deal for the New Economy? Global and Local Developments, and New Institutional Arrangements”, Bremen, Germany, November 10-12, 2005.

<sup>416</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Elites Not Interested in Healing Divisions in Society”, *Kyiv Post*, 17 May 2002.

<sup>417</sup> Riabchuk, *op. cit.*, p.78.

<sup>418</sup> Ruslan Grinberg, *Russia in the Post-Soviet Space: Search for Rational Behaviour and Prospects of Economic Integration*, Paper presented at the UNECE Spring Seminar on ‘Financing for Development in the ECE Region: Promoting Growth in Low-income Transition Economies’, Geneva, 21 February 2005.

There are some specific reasons which create the tendency towards a pro-EU historical bloc. First is the increase in the number of those who claim a territorial Ukrainian loyalty and identity since 1991. Second is the young Ukrainian generation favouring the West. Surveys indicate that more of those under than over thirty favour the idea of an independent European Ukraine. More of those under the age of 30 saw Ukraine as 'western' than did those over 30, fewer saw it as 'eastern' and in 2003 even Russian-speaking high-school students from eastern Ukraine expressing sympathy towards Russians simultaneously expressed suspicion of Putin's government and considered Ukrainian independence desirable.<sup>419</sup> Third reason is that the pro-Russian political parties in Ukraine are not reflecting the interests of the Ukrainian citizens but the interests of the 'mafia', of Russian capital and the interests of Ukraine's oligarchs.<sup>420</sup>

As Moscow's authoritarian coercive neo-imperial policies alienate Ukrainian Russian-speakers, they could conceivably turn Ukraine into an eastern-European Ireland. As to the 16 September 2006 dated interview made in Ukraine, a Ukrainian Russian-speaking Russian has claimed that increasingly people like to identify himself as Ukrainian patriots because they find Putin's domestic and Ukrainian policies disgusting. The main actor to start the debate was the Ukrainian League of Industrialists. They are the representative of national capital in Ukraine. They are Ukraine's oligarchs.

With the changing political climate in Ukraine, it is explicitly felt that there are redefinitions, transformations and suspensions. A policy analysis prepared by the International Centre for Policy<sup>421</sup> suggests that in order for the EU's hegemonic project to be realized, certain preconditions need to be met, including government reform, promotion of entrepreneurial initiatives and development of small and medium enterprises, reform of the budget process to ensure the efficiency of public expenditures, social security reform, improvements in education and human capital, promotion of competition in the agricultural sector and the construction of a civil society. The above-

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<sup>419</sup> Peter Rodgers, "Understanding Regionalism and the Politics of Identity in Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands", *Nationalities Papers*, No.2, May 2006, p.157-174.

<sup>420</sup> <http://unian.net/ukr/news/news-175204.html>. (Accessed on 23 June 2006).

<sup>421</sup> Vira Nanivska et. al. (eds.), "Ukraine's Future: A Plan for the President". *Policy Studies*, No.9, November 1999.

mentioned report is one of a number of publications that aimed to establish a basis for discussion that had not previously existed. Officials of TNCs and bodies like the Round Table of Industrialists (which includes the chief executives of European TNCs and represents the interests of TNC), Chamber of Commerce and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the European Movement International (EMI) and the Ukrainian League of Industrialists can be regarded as ‘organic intellectuals’ of internationally oriented capital. These transnational, national and international bodies use these social forces as an institutional platform in order to formulate their social group a pro-membership(hegemonic project), or deep free trade which went beyond mere economic issues by including neutrality and constitutional problems. While transnational social forces supported the government’s position, national social forces continued to regard the EU as a threat to Ukraine’s relations with Russia. The strategy of these social forces did not lead directly to membership; nonetheless, it provided a coherent project around which various fractions of social forces could rally.

Ukraine’s tendencies towards the Russian and EU hegemonic projects have been asymmetrical and have varied with the political party in power. In 2004-2005, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s government briefly neutralized the ‘old regime’, neo-soviet Russophile politicians. In December 2004, Yushchenko made clear that EU relations took priority in Ukraine’s foreign affairs and signalled that his government wanted the country to enter the global economy as an EU member-state.<sup>422</sup> What is clear from both party internal struggles is that, international forces of capital and labour successfully rallied the parties and public opinion around a strategy towards EU integration that was based on the neo-liberal rationale of opening up Ukraine’s industry to international competition in order to overcome economic recession. With the return of the Regions and Yanukovych as Prime Minister in July 2006, Ukraine’s commitment to the EU fell into doubt, and it appeared Yanukovych had begun preparing a place for Ukraine alongside Belarus in the CIS/CES.

Whereas Russia’s hegemonic project gained significance for Ukraine with Yanukovych it lost significance with Yushchenko, Russia’s interests remain unchanged regardless of which government was in power in Ukraine, namely, to keep the country within the

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<sup>422</sup> Velycenko (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Russian sphere of influence. While Russia's political tactics and the degree of coercion to be imposed varied depending upon the behaviour of the Ukrainian government, Russia continued to influence Ukraine through economic levers and energy, by manipulating internal conflicts and through its military presence.

Without EU and NATO support, Ukraine's democratic politicians, can not be expected to rebuild the institutions and practices they inherited from the USSR. The Yanukovich government can not be expected to favour 'big business' and it is unlikely to be able to regulate deleterious social consequences of 'McCapitalist' neo-liberal monetarism or predatory oligarch capitalism even if it wanted to.<sup>423</sup>

After centuries of control by different powers, social groupings and social organizations essential for the sound formation of public opinion have not been able to develop in Ukraine. It is therefore hard to find active and effective social pressure groups that favour some ideas and policies on domestic issues and foreign affairs as well.

The push for EU membership by the pro-European political parties signifies that neo-liberal restructuring has, to some extent, become internalized within the Ukrainian form of state in view of domestic economic recession. Against the background of globalization, some recently formed organisations such as the Trade Union Confederation and Confederation of Professional Employees all supported the quest for membership. However, historical ties have kept some non-profit organisations among the Ukrainian national social forces from weakening their relationships with Russia. Trade unions have been split regarding EU membership, with transnational, industrial unions and unions in export-oriented sectors in favour of membership, and national unions opposed to membership.

Ukraine's economy did not perform as expected in the post-Orange Revolution period. From January-April 2006, Ukraine's GDP grew 4 percent, and as of June 2006, the inflation rate was 6.7 percent. Foreign investment grew at a record pace however, the unsystematic 'reforms' of 2005 led to a drop in investment. The hegemonic project

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<sup>423</sup> On post-Soviet administrative reforms see: Valerie, Sperling (ed), "Building the Russian State: institutional crisis and the quest for democratic governance", Colorado: Boulder, Westview Press, 2000.

devised by organic intellectuals does not seem to sustain itself since the politicians are not decisive in their tactics and strategies and neither of the competing coalitions have clear plans for reform. As Cox points out, the formation of a historic bloc and the establishment of hegemony is a national phenomenon.<sup>424</sup>

Political debate is not focusing on economic policy, and budget scarcity is making expensive reforms impossible. The reforms required for EU accession are not being made systematically, since there is no promise of membership from the EU's perspective. Hence the EU's hegemonic project is unlikely to turn into an historic bloc without justification and people are unwilling to give consent to the EU's conditionality. According to the Index of Consumer Confidence, expectations regarding economic development are falling among voters, who are unhappy with the way democracy is working in Ukraine. The level of satisfaction with democracy was no higher in 2008 than it was in 2004. Voter confidence in political institutions and politicians dropped from 2004 to 2008. Internally, the lack of constitutional court allows all politicians to interpret their constitutional powers for their own benefit. The political stand-off between the president, the opposition and the coalition and between the central government and local councils is growing.<sup>425</sup>

Regarding the impact of the domestic factors, Ukraine's willingness to 'go West' is still not matched by consistent domestic reforms, while its strategic position in the energy supply market makes it a crucial partner for both Russia and the EU.<sup>426</sup> Being squeezed by the two competing hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia, Ukraine has real problems for the future. As Libman argues there is increasing disintegration resulting from a lack of coordination of policies in the fields of economics and security. Moreover there are inefficient and powerless regional initiatives that are not implemented and

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<sup>424</sup> Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.168, 174.

<sup>425</sup> <http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Consumer+confidence+index>. (Accessed on 13 December 2008.)

<sup>426</sup> Olexander Pavliuk, "An Unfulfilling Partnership: Ukraine and the West 1991-2001", *European Security*, 11:1, 2002, p.81-101.

remain on paper. According to Libman, the formal agreements exist and provide a good basis for bureaucratic activities without socially useful outcomes<sup>427</sup>

The problems affecting the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine are the dynamics of the Orange Revolution, but the Orange Revolution does not imply the end of the transition to democracy, since transformation is an open-ended dynamic process. Since Ukraine is part of the EU's hegemonic project (ENP), it is the visible activity to replace the party in power by the people in power in Ukraine. Emergence of a politicised civil society is an access to democracy but not an end of the transition in Ukraine since there are redefinitions and transformations. On the 15 September 2006 dated interview made with Olexandr Hanenko, historian in Ukraine, he argued that 'Orange Revolution is not actually a revolution but a democracy search and exercise. It is re-acquiring of the freedoms and it is a mass movement against Kuchma regime.' According to Hanenko, Yushenko evoked the nationalism which is already existant in the Ukrainian people. Hanenko argued that Orange Revolution originated as a reaction to the ongoing problems and supported by international actors such as NGOs and the media organs which are operating in the supra-national arena and transformed the East-West dichotomy into two clearcut divisions. This east and west division is an outcome of two different ideologies and feelings of belongingness. The industrialized east prevented the east Ukranian citizens feel themselves as part of Europe which handicapped the EU rapproachment process. He argued that street protests appeared to be the only way to challenge the regime.

When Ukraine's transformation started in the early 1990s, the country was faced with three simultaneous challenges: national consolidation, the establishment of democracy, and the development of a market economy. Political actors had to consolidate a fragmented and heterogeneous state. Independence was threatened by Ukraine's dominant neighbour, the Russian Federation, and by a rather weak civil society and equally weak democratic traditions. Along with these problems, a very high degree of

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<sup>427</sup> Alexander Libman, "Regionalisation and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications for Institutional Development", *Europe Asia Studies*, 59:3, May 2007, p. 421.



corruption hindered fast and sustainable political reform, and the special interests of economic groups appeared stronger than their interest in modernizing the country.<sup>428</sup>

There were also problems related to the efficient functioning of public institutions, consolidation of fair, socially acceptable market-economy structures, and development of organizations mediating between society and government, and the rule of law. Regarding the latter, although the Ukrainian Constitution provides for an independent judicial branch, in practice, the dispensation of justice is impaired by the weakness of the judiciary, whose activities are systematically disrupted by the president's instruments of power.<sup>429</sup>

In the absence of the rule of law, corruption has flourished, impeding democracy and restricting opportunities for generating economic growth through direct investment. According to the Corruption Perception Index, Ukraine has been among the most corrupt countries of the world for several years.<sup>430</sup> Corruption has practically become the norm in life. Among the most corrupt institutions are the militia, the tax authorities and the customs service, as well as the entire systems of higher education and health care. The bodies of state power have exercised systematic pressure on representatives of the opposition and on NGOs that are dedicated to the promotion of democracy. All elections over the past years have been conducted with significant deviations from universally accepted democratic norms.

Since this study's analysis will be within the framework of the Neo-Gramscian perspective, in order to understand the transformations and redefinitions, it is useful to examine the Ukrainian history to see how the hegemonic projects have been sustained for a while with consent of its partners but the problems could only transform the existing problems:

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<sup>428</sup> See Country Report Ukraine, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003: [www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de). Such information was also confirmed by leading members of NGOs whom I made in-depth interviews in September 2006.

<sup>429</sup> Olaf Hillenbrand, "Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building – A Framework for Democratic Transition", (eds) in *Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine's Transition*, 2005, p. 22.

<sup>430</sup> *Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads*. Country Report Ukraine, p.438.

*Ukrainian literature since independence has witnessed the demise of the system of symbols, corresponding to the priorities of the USSR, that oriented geographical, historical and political space toward Moscow. In its place have arisen two competing spatial rhetorics, each imagining itself as articulating the needs of the independent Ukrainian state. One adopts a severely local focus, seeking to reveal the dignity of the nation as flowing from its people and the places where they live. The other conceptualizes the dignity of the national self as possible only within an international context and professes an affinity with Europe and the West.*<sup>431</sup>

Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991, the Orange Revolution in December 2004 and the post-2004 period prove that there are redefinitions and the problems still exist, although they have been transformed onto another platform.

In order to show how the processes of intellectual production were themselves in dialectical relation to the processes of historical change, Gramsci developed the unique concept of the 'organic intellectual'. For Gramsci, history and political economy are not understood as a sequence or series of discrete events or moments which, when aggregated, equal a process of change with certain governing regularities; for Gramsci, the basic unit of analysis of history and political economy is the ensemble of social relations configured by social structures. Specifically, with regard to Ukraine, the role of national as well as transnational organic intellectuals will be examined in order to understand their interrelation with the government and with decision-makers. Examples of social forces in Ukraine will include the Ukrainian League of Industrialists on the national level and ERT, Business Europe and EMI on the transnational level. Moreover, the newly emerging elite structure in Ukraine with the transnational class structures by pointing out that most powerful people in the post-communist era are 'bank managers, managers of investment funds, experts in the Ministry of Finance, IMF and World Bank advisers, and experts working for foreign and international financial agencies'.<sup>432</sup> Neo-

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<sup>431</sup> Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Rhetoric of Geography in Ukrainian Literature", (edt) Stephen Velychenko, *Ukraine, The EU and Russia*, Studies in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave: Macmillan 2007, p.89.

<sup>432</sup> Colin Shields, "Reconsidering the relevance of Marxist state theories to European integration", *Paper to be delivered to EPSNet Conference*, Prague, June 2004.

Gramscian school also criticizes the popular stereotype of ‘nomenklatura capitalism’, with powerful ex-communists substituting political privileges for economic privileges after 1989.<sup>433</sup> Regarding Ukraine, as Shields defines for the post-communist countries,<sup>434</sup> a new locally recognized middle class is emerging to replace and dilute the old regime nomenklatura and become an integral part of the transnational capitalist class. These types of redefinitions and transformation may take time and contribute to the ambivalence in the country. To what kind of state transformation these changes will lead is also another important question for the Neo-Gramscian School.

The Gramscian approach explains the nature of the state in terms of the complexity of state-civil society relations and shows how the nature of state power is related to the strength of the dynamic synthesis between the key forces in the economy and society, operating politically on an inclusive basis. The synthesis between these forces creates what Gramsci called a historical bloc, which may at times have the potential to become hegemonic. For ethical hegemony to be possible, the state must, necessarily, be constituted primarily by general legitimacy and active consent, which implies inclusion of the interests of the subordinate elements within the system. According to Bieler, the transformation of the state is related to the transnationalisation,<sup>435</sup> and goes on to say that transnational forces of capital have become internalised within the forms of state through the state elite’s co-operation and the transnationalisation of production structure via foreign direct investment (FDI).<sup>436</sup> In Gramscian terms, this transformation in Ukraine may be called as ‘a passive revolution’ since there is no structural change as a result of domestic development. Rather, Bohle argues that the domestic social relations of production restructured through the incorporation of international ideas and adoption of foreign production methods by national cadre elites.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>435</sup> Andreas Bieler, “The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical materialist Analysis of European Integration”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9:4, August, 2002, p.591.

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*, p.588.

<sup>437</sup> Dorothee Bohle, “Neoliberal hegemony, transnational capital and the terms of the EU’s eastward expansion”, *Capital & Class*, No:88, 2006, p.59

Gramsci used the term ‘passive revolution’ to refer to the situation where a new form of state emerges in a process that is characterized by the absence of the hegemony of a leading class.<sup>438</sup> Passive revolution, according to Gramsci, occurs when transnational bourgeois class formations increase their social power in locations where bourgeois hegemony has not been consolidated. In the former communist states, following the political domestication of the forces that propelled revolutions to overthrow communist power in 1989 and 1990, a process developed that allowed the restoration of the power of capital. Passive revolution can occur either without mass participation, often at the prompting of external forces, as in ‘a war of movement’ or a rapid overthrow of a regime. Passive revolution can also take the form of a slower, more ‘capillary’ or ‘molecular’ social transformation, whereby the most progressive class cautiously advances through a long-term ‘war of position’. The concept of passive revolution and its two related strategic concepts (war of movement and position) are derived from what Gramsci calls ‘two principles of political science.’<sup>439</sup> With regard to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, whether this occurred as a result of intervention by external forces or the actions of organic intellectuals within the country is a matter of debate.

Ukraine shows how the challenges to prevailing institutional and political arrangements by counter-hegemonic forces complicate the achievement of hegemony within a particular social formation. Hegemony is even more difficult to achieve at the international level, where there are both national and international actors exist together with social forces. With respect to the international context, the positions of third countries like the United States and Russia had a certain impact. In line with the geopolitical vision of a Western-oriented Ukraine, the US administration had strongly supported civil society in Ukraine, in general as well as the opposition’s call for repeat elections, in particular.<sup>440</sup> On the other hand, the role of Russia hampered efforts to increase support for closer EU-Ukraine integration. It was evident from the tense atmosphere during the EU-Russia Summit in November 2004 that Moscow disliked the

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<sup>438</sup> Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Palgrave: Macmillan 2003 p.52.

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>440</sup> Iris Kempe, Iryna Solonenko, “International orientation and foreign support”, in: H. Kurth & I. Kempe (eds.), *Presidential Elections and Orange Revolution: Implications for Ukraine’s Transition*, Kiev: Zapovit 2005, p.109-148.

EU's engagement in Ukrainian affairs.<sup>441</sup> Moreover several large member EU states were not inclined to pursue closer EU-Ukraine integration at the expense of relations with the Kremlin, Moscow's interests within the framework of Russian's Hegemonic Project played a constraining role.<sup>442</sup> Hence, both the international and domestic factors are of considerably great influence in the outcome of the decision-making process regarding the ENP: As Roth argues, at the international level; the Southern member's opposition to any kind of differentiation between Eastern and Southern ENP partners, which ruled out making more generous offers to Kiev without passing them on to all other partners, the uncertain budget future of the EU budget, the fatigue of enlargement, problems of absorption capacity, different views of the old and the new members<sup>443</sup> and on the domestic level; political ambivalence, the impact of the two contested hegemonic upon the public opinion, newly emerged civil society and other domestic social forces and remnants of a post-communist country all constrained the formation of a historic bloc in Ukraine.

Hegemony is not to be understood as simply a relation of dominance between states in the inter-state system; rather, it involves the construction of a relatively consensual form of politics within the sphere of reference, with its combination of power and leadership giving due weight to subordinate forces in a series of institutionalized political settlements. Hegemony is forged in a complex set of historical blocs that link public and private power within and across nations in transnational political networks that seek to sustain, regulate and rule an increasingly global capitalist order.

The state can be viewed as both 'restricted', i.e., comprised of formal governmental institutions and legal-coercive apparatus, and 'extended', i.e., comprised of both 'political society' and 'civil society' or 'hegemony' armoured by 'coercion', although of course, the use of coercion by the armed forces and police implies their consent.<sup>444</sup> In Ukraine,

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<sup>441</sup> Mathias Roth, "EU, Russia clash over response to Ukraine crisis", *RFE/RL*, 25 November 2004.

<sup>442</sup> Mathias Roth, "EU-Ukraine Relations after the Orange Revolution: The Role of the New Member States", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 8. No.4, 505-527, December 2007, p. 517.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid*, p.519.

<sup>444</sup> Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, p.262.

the use of coercion can be observed at specific times, as, for instance, in Russia's threats and coercion regarding natural gas prices set by Gazprom. Political society refers to the state in the restricted sense, which is similar to the realist view of the state. The idea of civil society refers to the social forces normally considered to be private, and which rely on 'indirect domination' (for example, through the use of market power) and consent (through the use of periodic elections in a parliamentary or liberal democratic system). Hegemony implies that the coercive face of power recedes and the consensual face becomes more prominent. Thus, the hegemony of a particular class, or faction of a class, requires continuing success in persuading other classes and groups in civil society to accept its intellectual and moral leadership as well as most of its key values. Hegemony is exercised through the development and mobilization of a trans-class politico-economic formation or coalition of forces in an historical bloc<sup>445</sup>. Specifying the Ukrainian case, it is argued that orange revolution intensified the consciousness of the notion of civil society. As Polese claims, the Orange Revolution regardless of its political outcome has prompted a conversation of informal into formal social capital that is now active at the social and political levels.<sup>446</sup> With such development of social capital, the political opportunities of 1990-1991 provided a framework for collective action in the country.<sup>447</sup> All those movements had a really strong youth component. Since the 1990s a prime role in political activism was played by the younger generations, more open to change and more reactive than their elders. Civil society was present before the 2004 events, however, it was fragmented, without the precise direction, still trying to organize, and distant from both the people and politics. The civil society movements were supported by resources available from abroad. But money is only part of the story. Connections were also important and the alignment of Ukrainian organizations with their foreign counterparts was also crucial to the development of new ideas and confrontation with alternative ideas. In other words, Gramscian sense, as part of the super structure intellectual leadership gained significance in Ukraine. Consensual relationship rather than the coercive relationship gained significance.

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<sup>445</sup> Gill, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>446</sup> Abel Polese, "Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Coloured Revolutions", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.25, No.2-3, June-September 2009, p. 273.

<sup>447</sup> Mark Beissinger, "How Nationalism Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift", *Social Research*, 63:1 1996, p. 99-146.

The Gramscian concept of hegemony is thus both theoretical and historical and refers to a congruent ‘fit’ between the major social forces in a national and transnational context. Gramsci advanced the proposition that some societies appeared to display a strong compatibility between these social forces whereas others did not. In those that did, the state could be viewed as being ‘organically’ rooted in and protected by the ‘fortresses and earthworks’ of the institutions and practices of civil society. In Tsarist Russia, civil society was underdeveloped or primordial and largely separated from and dominated by the centralized state<sup>448</sup>.

Social forces consist of nationally oriented social forces as well as internationally oriented social forces and globalization-engendered transnational social forces. The focus on social forces and the sphere of production does not imply that the state is overlooked. Neo-Gramscian perspectives distinguish several forms of state, which are defined in terms of the apparatus of administration and of the historical bloc or class configuration that defines the *raison d’etat* for that form.<sup>449</sup> Importantly, production is to be understood in a wide sense as including the production and reproduction of knowledge, institutions and the social relations involved in the production of physical goods.<sup>450</sup> The relations that organize material production are, thus, considered to be crucial for the wider institutional level, which allows us to perceive entities such as ‘state’ and ‘market’ as different forms of the very same capitalist social relations of production. Neo-Gramscian analysis is open-ended through an emphasis on class struggle. It “rejects the inter-class as the heuristic model for the understanding of structural change.”<sup>451</sup> Hence it is argued that there are ambiguities in Ukrainian domestic and international politics and that the existence of two contested hegemonic projects only helps to transform problems from one platform to another. For instance, the Orange Revolution is only a suspension of the Russian hegemonic project; however, when Yanukovich became the prime minister,

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<sup>448</sup> *Ibid*, p. 85.

<sup>449</sup> Robert W. Cox, “Production, the State and Change in World Order”, in *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, edited by Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989, pp.37-50.

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>451</sup> Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

his message in Brussels regarding NATO reveals that the EU and NATO are not on the agenda. Nonetheless, Yanukovich implicitly made pro-EU statements during his 2006 visits to Brussels and Davost, and no public promises to Putin during their August 2006 meeting. But his party's program still calls for legislation to tie Ukraine to the Single Economic Space (SES) and give Russia official status. Both the organic and traditional intellectuals as his top advisors,<sup>452</sup> after coming to power, systematically removed all the pro-EU officials. Nor does the Region's program mention 'EU membership for Ukraine'. The party normally opposes NATO when out of power and then supports cooperation when in power.<sup>453</sup> Ukraine's richest oligarch and Region's supporter, Rikhnat Akhmetov favours EU business ties, however his influential Russian-language newspaper (Segodnia) and TV station (Ukraina), promulgate pro-Russian messages.<sup>454</sup>

These kinds of dual messages are observable in Ukrainian politics. In 2004 Yuschenko began removing 'old regime' politicians and bureaucrats, defined as the traditional intellectuals in Neo-Gramscian sense, from positions of influence. But the Party of Regions under Yanukovich came back to power in August 2006 in a well-orchestrated initiative that amounted to a coup. By the end of that year it had restored its people at all levels back into the government.<sup>455</sup> In May 2007 Yuschenko had succeeded in dissolving that parliament and calling for new elections.

For Gramsci, the form of state consists of 'political society', i.e. the coercive apparatus of the state more narrowly understood, including ministries and other state institutions, and 'civil society', made up of political parties, unions, employers' associations, churches.<sup>456</sup> In sum, the form of state is regarded as a structure through which social forces operate. The Neo-Gramscian concepts of historical bloc and hegemony are crucial for the understanding of class struggle. Various social forces may attempt to form a historical bloc to establish preferable forms of governance at the national and/or international level.

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<sup>452</sup> Such as Anatoly Orel, who is known for his pro-Russian bias.

<sup>453</sup> Taras Kuzio, "Dialogue and Debate", *The Ukrainian Observer*, No. 224, October 2006.

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>455</sup> Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism*, Oxford University Press, 2005.

<sup>456</sup> Gramsci, *op. cit.*, p. 63, 257, 271.



It is however more than simply a political alliance between social forces represented by classes or class fractions. It indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society, “bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity... on a universal plane.”<sup>457</sup> A fundamental class exercises a hegemonic function when it transcends particular economic-corporate interests and is capable of binding and cohering diverse aspirations, interests and identities into an historical bloc. As representatives of a class or class fraction, organic intellectuals play a crucial role in achieving hegemony. More than simply producing ideas, it is their task to organize the social forces from which they stem and to develop a hegemonic project capable of transcending the particular interests of this group so that other social forces will give their consent. In order to result in a stable hegemonic political system, such a hegemonic project must be based on ‘organic’ ideas that stem from the economic sphere, but must go beyond economics into the political and social spheres, incorporating ideas related to issues such as social reform, moral regeneration and national security.<sup>458</sup> “It brings the interest of the leading class into harmony with those subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms.”<sup>459</sup> In other words, neo-Gramscian perspectives avoid economic reductionism through a focus on political aspects as part of a hegemonic project. It is especially in times of crisis resulting from contradictions in the production process that hegemonic projects may result in the formation of an historical bloc and obtain a hegemonic position at the form of state and/or world-order level leading towards structural change.

With regard to the ENP, it is important to note that a neo-Gramscian perspective, rejecting economic determinism, does not argue that globalization caused the emergence of the ENP. Rather, a neo-Gramscian analysis must first investigate the way in which production is organized in the neighbouring countries in order to identify the relevant social forces. In the case of Ukraine, the structure of production has been characterized predominantly by small-scale industry and the absence of significant transnational

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<sup>457</sup> *Ibid*, p.181-182.

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid*, p.63, p. 257-271.

<sup>459</sup> Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay on method”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2, 1983, p.168.

corporations. The transitional and ill-functioning economy, low growth rates, budgetary deficits, corruption and strong dependence on Russian resources limits the way in which Ukraine can shape its policies. As Taras Kuzio argues, “The weaker the economy, the greater the likelihood of economic pressure, foreign influence, dependence on imports, and an inability to pay for budgetary outlays on defence.”<sup>460</sup>

During the tenure of President Kravchuk, Ukraine largely pursued policies aimed at nation-building. Although the economic transformation was well-planned, it fell short of bringing prosperity to the Ukrainian people. Leonid Kravchuk’s failure to initiate economic reforms has been attributed to the domination of the communists in the parliament and their resistance to market-economy-oriented reforms.<sup>461</sup> Inefficiency has also had much to do with the country’s unexpected independence and the lack of a common consensus as to whether Ukraine would go West or East. The country’s weak economic performance has strengthened the hand of those circles questioning independence<sup>462</sup> and favouring unification – at least economically – with Russia since Russia still dominates the soviet-era industrial/energy, and financial/banking networks outside the Ukrainian oligarch controlled eastern provinces.<sup>463</sup> Even Ukraine’s dairy industry is 40 percent Russian owned. Russian corporations control extracting and processing directly as monopoly suppliers. What makes Russian ownership abroad unique is that many Russian companies are not independent of their government and their business policies are entangled with foreign policy. The Chairman of Gazprom was the first deputy prime minister. The chairman of *RosNeft* was Putin’s deputy chief of staff and related by marriage to Russia’s Attorney General. *Lukoil*, which finances Ukraine’s *Russian Radio* and had representatives in Ukraine’s pre-2006 parliament, was independent but in 2005 it signed a ten-year-partnership with *Gazprom*. Russian Aluminium seems to be independent, yet it financed Ukraine’s separatist communist politician Leonid Grach. Over 75 percent of Ukraine’s military production (270 firms)

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<sup>460</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, Praeger Publishers, 1995, p. 43.

<sup>461</sup> Charles R. Wise, and Trevor L. Brown, “The Consolidation of Democracy in Ukraine”, *Democratization*, 1743-890X, 5:1, 1998, p. 127.

<sup>462</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>463</sup> Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Russia’s Integration with the West and the States ‘in Between’”, in *Russia’s Engagement with the West*, edited by Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble and Lilia Shevtsova, New York – London, 2004, p.194.

still depends on Russian orders, and all Ukraine's nuclear reactors depend on Russian fuel rods.<sup>464</sup>

#### ***4.4 The EU's Hegemonic Project Applied***

The end of the Cold War became a turning point in EU-Russian relations. The Soviet officials considered the European Communities to be an economic partner of NATO, the major ideological opponent of the USSR, and up until nearly the very end of the Cold War, no official relations had existed between it and the EC. In 1994, in order to better reflect changing EU-Russia relations, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between the EU and Russia indicating political cooperation, trade and economic cooperation as the major areas of cooperation. The PCA granted Russia a transit economy status, abolishing quantitative restrictions for Russian goods, with the exception of steel, textiles and nuclear materials. The EU enlargement in 1995 facilitated further cooperation between the EU and Russia and created a new framework for EU economic assistance to Russia, as new member-states suggested the development of a 'Northern Dimension' in order to promote economic growth and social stability in the bordering area.<sup>465</sup>

During the first years of Ukraine's independence, the country was practically treated as an international pariah because of its possession of Soviet-era nuclear weapons, slow progress in political and economic reform and international support for Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. This would begin to change in 1994, with the election of Leonid Kuchma as president of Ukraine. Breaking with some expectations, Kuchma quickly positioned himself as a champion of reform and of a 'multi-vector' foreign policy. Ukraine's stock rose in Western capitals when it began to express greater interest in trans-Atlantic and European structures, actively participating in NATO's PfP, joining the Council of Europe, signing a charter with NATO in 1997 and concluding agreements with the EU. Ukraine assumed a new geopolitical importance, with one analyst famously dubbing the

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<sup>464</sup> *Ibid*, p.134.

<sup>465</sup> Tatiana Romanova and Natalia Zaslavskaya, "EU-Russia: Towards the Four Spaces", *Baltic Defence Review*, 2:12, 2004.

country the ‘keystone in the arch’ of European security.<sup>466</sup> EU-Ukraine relations go back to the 1994 signing of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which gave the start to crucial annual Ukraine-EU summits, ministerial level meetings and exchanges between the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament. Working committees were established to tackle issues such as trade and investment, customs, energy, nuclear issues, crime, technology, education and economic development. The PCA also included a provision allowing for the development of a free-trade area in the future.<sup>467</sup>

Ukraine has had the declared aim of joining the European Union since 1994 under President Kuchma, who, in 1998, proposed a ‘Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union’. However, the Kuchma period was indecisive, as he was elected in a pro-Russian atmosphere, only to shift his foreign policy towards pro-Western strategies after taking office.

Kuchma’s second term was a time of democratic regression. He became increasingly reliant on Ukraine’s oligarchs as his domestic base of support, which combined with domestic and international scandals to lead to Ukraine’s increasing isolation from the West.<sup>468</sup> As an institution with limited interest in security and geopolitics, the EU was unconcerned about Ukraine’s possible reorientation toward Russia, a threat that Kuchma was able to use successfully with the United States and NATO, but not with the EU. The West perceived the 2003 formation of the CIS Single Economic Space (SES) by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as a signal that Ukraine had dropped its objections to deeper integration with the CIS. Under Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s chosen successor, Ukraine appeared to favour deeper integration into the CIS SES and was opposed to NATO membership.<sup>469</sup> On the other hand after the election of Yushchenko and with his right diplomacy, Yushchenko managed to initiate a break in which Ukraine had first expressed himself.

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<sup>466</sup> Garnet Sherman, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington D.C. : Carnegie Endowment, 1997.

<sup>467</sup> Paul Kubicek, “Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Can the EU help the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?”, *East European Quarterly*, 51:1, March 2007, p.3.

<sup>468</sup> Taras Kuzio, *op. cit.* 2006, p.92.

<sup>469</sup> *Ibid*, p.93.

Due to the internal problems of the EU, ENP and, Ukraine within the Policy having the leading role, have no priority for the EU. Although refusing to open the door to EU membership, Ferrero-Waldner was forced to admit that they have to recognize this new political reality in Ukraine.<sup>470</sup> Following 2006 elections, the European Parliament forced the Commission to upgrade the Action Plan.

Regarding the influence of the social forces such as the interest groups, civil society and trade unions in Ukraine, Ukraine's recent social and political development has been characterized by the formation and strengthening of powerful informal groupings that, for the most part, have emerged as a result of self-organization of the elite remaining from the ranks of former Soviet officialdom and industrialists. The latter have managed to take control over the processes of state-building and privatization. These groups exercise control over the media, which they use aggressively to manipulate social and political processes.

The victory of democracy in Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections is entirely agreed to be the result of massive intervention by civil society. As Carothers notes, "Civil society is the connective tissue that transitional countries need to join the forms of democracy with their intended substance, to ensure that new democratic institutions and processes do not remain hollow boxes and empty rituals."<sup>471</sup> Trade unions as also part of the civil societies are subjects for analysis which is also a puzzling on several grounds. First, in all post-communist states, trade unions are by far the largest organisations in civil society.<sup>472</sup> Second, trade unions and working-class movements – the Gramscians' 'organic intellectuals' – have been identified as crucial forces for democracy.<sup>473</sup>

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<sup>470</sup> Ahto Lobjakas, "Ukraine: EU Commissioner Pours Cold Water on Kiev's Immediate Membership Hopes", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News Features*, February 16, 2006.

<sup>471</sup> Thomas Carothers, "Aiding Democracy Abroad", Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, p. 248.

<sup>472</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54:4, 2002, p.603.

<sup>473</sup> David Collier and Ruth B., Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991.

‘Civil society’ as a concept may define different things in accordance with different ideologies. Carothers notes that there is a certain “romanticisation of civil society” by many in the West, insofar as it is viewed as “town hall politics writ large” and composed of “legions of well-mannered activists who play by the rules, settle conflicts peacefully, and do not break any windows.”<sup>474</sup> However, in certain cases, a vibrant civil society can undermine democracy. According to Kubicek, groups in civil society need not be ‘civil’, but can include radical nationalists, fascists, communists and others who ‘do break windows’ and who do not wholly embrace democratic or liberal values. The quality, not quantity, of civil society therefore is central to any debate.<sup>475</sup>

At first glance, it might appear as if the Orange Revolution put in doubt a conventional transitological conclusion about the weakness of civil society in the post-Soviet countries in general and in Ukraine in particular.<sup>476</sup> Apart from the Orange Revolution, civil society in Ukraine has developed slowly for a number of objective and subjective reasons. Horizontal social links have been significantly weakened, and neither a political nation as such, nor civic self-identification of the Ukrainian people has yet to completely form. Only one in four Ukrainians believes they possess sufficient skills to live under the new conditions. The readiness of citizens to demonstrate their social activity and stand up for their rights remains low.<sup>477</sup> Until recently, the country has only seen some isolated pockets of independent civic activity that do not represent an all-embracing social force or critical mass that would be capable of determining social sentiments.

The Orange Revolution was the beginning of a ‘chain reaction’ of mass manifestations against brutal violations of the procedures and results of the presidential elections in has been cheered by some reporters and politicians as the birth of civil society and of a

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<sup>474</sup> Carothers, *op.cit.*, p. 248.

<sup>475</sup> Paul Kubicek, “Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54:4, 2002, p.603.

<sup>476</sup> Marc Howard, *Free not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*, Glasgow, UK: University of Strathclyde Press, 2000, p. 571.

<sup>477</sup> See Ukrainian society in 1994-2004: sociological monitoring. The Institute of Sociology under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, ‘Socis’ Gallup poll unit – Centre for social and political studies, ‘Democratic Initiatives’ Foundation. Kyiv 2004, p.p 26,18.

political nation in Ukraine.<sup>478</sup> A new, European-style model for the formation and functioning of NGOs has begun to take shape slowly, overcoming the impediments created by the authorities. Data collected through public opinion polls from 2003 indicate that Ukrainians perceived the slow development of democracy and civil society in their country to be a result of the following: corruption of power and tight control over the media (33%); inertness of Ukrainian society (24%); lack of genuine economic reform (23%); imperfect legislation (8%); state wipaternalism (6%); and linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of the population (5%).<sup>479</sup>

Ukraine was chosen as a case study because, as the most advanced country in the EU's eastern neighbourhood in terms of ENP implementation, the challenges that the ENP faces become most obvious here. As a proof the Action Plans for Ukraine and Moldova were adopted in February 2005 and those for the Southern Caucasus on 14 November 2006. Ukraine's Action Plan was built upon the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in force since 1998 that formed the basis of the first contractual relationship between the EU and Ukraine.<sup>480</sup> After the Orange Revolution, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was required to be complemented with a '10 Point Plan' to intensify cooperation. The Action Plan puts specific emphasis on the creation of a free trade area, stabilisation of the Transnistrian conflict, gradual approximation to EU norms and standards and visa facilitation, as well as exchanges in science and education.<sup>481</sup>

Although it is far from the expectations of the Ukrainian society, there seems to have considerable progress in EU-Ukraine relations over the years. In a 2006 interview, Andreas Herdina, the EU's -ENP Sector Coordinator, expressed hope that combining traditional links based on geographic proximity into a joint Europe-wide policy would

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<sup>478</sup> Victor Stepanenko, "Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the framework of Corrupted Sociality?", *East European Politics and Societies*, 20:4, 2006, p. 571.

<sup>479</sup> See Grassroots. Civil Society in Ukraine: Status and prospects for development. 'Europe – XXI' Foundation. Kyiv 2003, p. 17.

<sup>480</sup> Judith Bürger, "Implementing the Neighbourhood Policy in the East" in Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds), *Europe's Near Abroad; Promises and Prospects of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy*, European College, Brussels 2008.

<sup>481</sup> European Commission, *EU-Ukraine Action Plan.*, EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, 21 February 2005 [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/ukraine\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf). (Accessed on 24 August 2007.)

bring the relationships to a new level and would support the Barcelona Process. In enumerating the differences between the EMP and the ENP, Herdina underlined ENP as a tool to help build awareness of the region's significance for the European Union. The interviews made in Brussels with the Commission officials Mary Teresa Moran-Coordinator (Commission-Specialist), Andreas Herdina(Commission-Head of the Unit-ENP Sector Coordinator), Vibeke Roosen Bell (European Commission-Seconded National Expert Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova European Neighbourhood Policy on 6, 7, 8 May 2006 revealed the fact that ' The latest enlargement of the European Union to the present 25 Member States compelled the EU to scrutinize its relationships with neighbouring countries. Whilst recognising the existing regional policies, such as the European Economic Area, the Stabilization and Association Process for the Balkans or with states aspiring for membership. Herdina gave information about the progress of the procedure. He stated that 'Although based on existing documents, the policy is a move away from bi-lateral treaties to a joint foreign policy that draws on the experience of the recent enlargement. The action plans are currently being discussed by European Institutions and their fast adoption by political elites will be crucial so as to launch new assistance in 2007.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is the starting point for Ukraine in its relations with the EU. The *Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union* is the document that shows Ukraine's willingness to move to the West. The PCA is a document that has the potential to improve the relationship between Ukraine and the EU; however, its provisions were not implemented by both parties accusing each other. One European Commission official lamented that Ukraine's compliance was "at most hesitant and at times even ebbing," as Ukraine was "in breach of virtually all key provisions on trade in goods."<sup>482</sup>

The Orange Revolution was a catalyst in the EU-Ukraine relationship. While Kiev's declarations about its European choice had not been backed up with credible reform efforts under President Kuchma, the Orange Revolution arguably changed Western perceptions of Ukraine. On my 15 September 2006 dated interview with Volodymyr

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<sup>482</sup> Klaus Schneider, "The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU- Idea and Reality", in *Ukraine on the Road to Europe*, edited by L.Hoffman and F.Mollers, (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001).



V.Volynets Vice-Rector, International Links Dean, Faculty of International Relations - Kyiv University of Tourism, Economics and Law, he mentioned that Ukraine could not create a concerted and coordinated lobbying initiatives towards membership perspective among the old and new member states since they have different perceptions and priorities. Internally academic environment was advocate of the idea behind the 'Orange Revolution' however, they have ambiguities about the post-revolution period and the frustration that Euro-supportives felt after the revolution. On my 14 September 2006 dated interview with Dr.Igor Mingazutchinov, he argued that the expectations of Ukraine are directly correlated with the incentives presented by the European Union. Since Ukraine has historical ties and benefits with Russia, Ukraine has a challenging position squeezed between Russia and the EU.

The pivotal role played by Poland and Lithuania in the mediation efforts also bolstered the assertiveness of the new member-states.<sup>483</sup> During the presidential election campaign, the question of Ukraine's international orientation gained a certain prominence.<sup>484</sup> The non-violent mass protests during the Orange Revolution, the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the repeat elections appeared to remove the most important stumbling block from EU-Ukraine relations. The EU's close engagement in the crisis and its praise for the repeat elections further raised Ukrainian expectations.<sup>485</sup> Kiev launched a lobbying campaign to realise its aspirations of market-economy status, support for WTO accession, an EU-Ukraine free trade agreement and a simplified visa regime.

After the Orange Revolution and the ascent of Victor Yushchenko, who campaigned on 'a move to the West' platform, joining the EU became a priority objective of Ukraine's foreign policy, and the country petitioned the EU for accession status. After his election in January 2005, Yuschenko challenged the EU to embrace the new Ukraine. First, he argued that the EU should recognize Ukraine as a market economy; second, he said the EU should support Ukraine's membership in the World Trade Organization, a step that

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<sup>483</sup> B. O'Rourke, "EU: Poland says Ukraine crisis proves merit of EU's new Eastern members", *RFE/RL*, Prague, 10 December 2004.

<sup>484</sup> Marius Vahl, "Fast-forward for EU-Ukraine Relations", *CEPS Policy*, Brief No. 57 Brussels: CEPS, 2004.

<sup>485</sup> Matthias A. Roth, "Ukraine: Interview with Borys Tarasyuk, Yuschchenko's Foreign Policy Adviser", *RFE/RL*, Kiev, 30 December 2004.

would allow Ukraine to create a free-trade zone with the EU; and third, he said the EU should upgrade Ukraine from its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, stating that Brussels should offer Ukraine EU membership.<sup>486</sup> As the official Mission of Ukraine to the European Communities clearly states, “European integration is a key and irreversible priority of Ukraine’s foreign policy.”<sup>487</sup>

In response to the Orange Revolution, several actors, including civil society and non-profit organisations, became involved in renegotiations for upgrading the EU’s Action Plan with Ukraine, which tried to upgrade the PCA to a different form of association that would offer Kiev a clear membership perspective.<sup>488</sup> However, in its immediate response to the Orange Revolution, the EU carefully avoided either offering or excluding a membership prospect, limiting itself to updating the Action Plan through a relatively modest addendum.<sup>489</sup> External Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner early on rejected any demands for revising or negotiating the Action Plan. While she ruled out membership discussions, the Commissioner also continued the EU’s policy of deliberate ambiguity by stating that “it is clear that we are not closing any doors.”<sup>490</sup> High Representative Solana underlined that it was not the right time for discussing membership, but emphasised the prospect of concluding a new type of agreement in 2008. Throughout 2004 and 2005, the governments holding the EU Presidency continued to try and dampen Kiev’s expectations. After the crisis, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker stated that he could only warn against offering Ukraine the prospect of full membership.<sup>491</sup> Ukraine’s March 2006 elections were recognized as free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the EU and the United States. On the 13 September 2006 dated interview with Dymtro Shulga -Manager of the European Programme, and Iryna Solonenko -Director of European Programme, International Renaissance Foundation argued that Ukraine should have closer relationship with the EU.

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<sup>486</sup> Taras Kuzio, *op. cit.*, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?”, p. 89-90.

<sup>487</sup> See <http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/publication/content/1983.htm>, (accessed on 30 September 2006).

<sup>488</sup> Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

<sup>489</sup> Vahl, *op. cit.*

<sup>490</sup> Euractiv, *What does the future hold for EU-Ukraine ties*, Brussels, 6 December 2004.

<sup>491</sup> *Ibid.*

According to Solonenko, 2006 March elections were not fair and since the elections are one of the indicators of democracy, she comments that Ukraine could be called as a 'defective democracy'. The Council of Europe continuously criticized it for corruption, media suspension and abuse of human rights. She criticizes the EU by saying that in line with its declared foreign policy objectives the EU could have played a stronger and more consistent role in supporting democratic transformation in Ukraine. The government at that period is a mixture of Oligarchy and the Orange Revolution. In spite of this, the EU still has not offered anything substantial to Ukraine's democratic progress.<sup>492</sup>

Apart from EU documents and other publicly available sources, the empirical analysis is based on interviews with Commission officials, Eurocrats, member-state diplomats, political observers, business environment, academics, and representatives of social forces, such as the civil societies in both Brussels and Ukraine. The views of these different segments of society and the positions of the various actors help to identify the positions of various actors and analyse their interplay in the decision-making process.

On the 8 May 2006 dated interview with Vibeke Roosen Bell who is the European Commission-Seconded National Expert for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, European Neighbourhood Policy stated out that Ukraine is a test model for the ENP. ENP is searching for alternative but there is no discourse of ENP. Ukraine is appreciated due to the fact that Ukraine made the most programs and with the Orange Revolution Ukraine is closer to EU. She is also content with the argument that the results of the elections in the Ukraine should be monitored. The future of the Ukraine depends upon their efforts and eagerness for accession to the European Union. Her comments reveal the open-endedness and ambivalence of the EU's Hegemonic Project. It also implies it is not likely for the Project to turn into a historic bloc.

Only with the specific agreements with countries in the European Neighbourhood, mentioned in the constitutional treaty (Ar. 1-57 TCE) and to be included in the envisioned reform treaty, has the Union hinted at a new, though substantively vague, model for an agreement. Indeed the new reform treaty would not create new material

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<sup>492</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?"

foundations beyond those of the relevant articles in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC).<sup>493</sup> The enhanced agreement currently negotiated with the Ukraine is expected to serve as a model and flagship for other successor agreements to the PCAs.<sup>494</sup> At the heart of this advanced type of agreement is a comprehensive deep free trade area, which includes the convergence with parts of the EU acquis and its regulatory sector. Despite the currently critical domestic political situation in the Ukraine, for the time-being the country shows more progress and also more potential than Moldova, the Southern Caucasus countries and, of course, Belarus. In the 14 September 2006 dated interview with Olga Shymylo-(Head of European Integration and Foreign Affairs Programme), she put forward the barrier in front of Ukraine regarding the EU and Ukraine relationship. The political instability and the ambiguities caused by the EU's incentives in the ENP. Moreover she mentioned the working group on the idea of 'Deep Free Trade Area'.

The discourse of the new and enhanced agreements for the Eastern and Southern Caucasus countries concretely implemented in the Ukraine case<sup>495</sup> underlined one of the main weaknesses of the European Neighbourhood Policy, namely, its strategic ambiguity for those countries in question in the Southern Caucasus and Eastern Europe who explicitly seek a membership perspective.

Although it is left open to ENP countries to refer to the "relevant provisions of the EU Treaty"<sup>496</sup> for the accession of new members, as Lippert states, "At present, we are only witnessing a 'ceasefire' inside the EU between supporters and opponents of an EU membership perspective for Eastern ENP partners."<sup>497</sup> The ENP is designed to cover 16

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<sup>493</sup> Barbara Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union", p.183.

<sup>494</sup> European Commission, *Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 4 December 2006 COM(2006)726 Final [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/strengthening\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/strengthening_en.htm). (Accessed on 23 February 2007.)

<sup>495</sup> Lippert, *op.cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p.18.

<sup>496</sup> Treaty of European Union (TEU) Article 49.

<sup>497</sup> Jason Bush, "Whither Ukraine?", *Business Central Europe Magazine*, 2001, June at <http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/whitherukr.htm>. (Accessed on 30 February 2006.)

countries, 12 of which to date have been the subject of ENP activity.<sup>498</sup> Perhaps because none of the other ENP countries share a common border with the EU, only Ukraine and Moldova have expressed interest in joining the EU, and they would appear without question to meet the geographic requirements of membership specified in Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union. Thus, for these two countries, the ENP is a disappointment, as it separates them from aspirant countries in the Western Balkans and groups them with countries that have no prospects for membership. The term ‘Neighbourhood’ itself is objectionable to many Ukrainians, since it implies that Ukraine lies outside Europe.<sup>499</sup>

Out of fear of worsening relations with Russia, and as a result of economic regression and Leonid Kuchma’s authoritarian regime, Ukraine never improved its strategy toward the European Union. On the September 2006 dated interview made with Dmytro Bespalov, who is the director of International Relations Department of Ukrainian League of Industrialists and Entrepreneur a non-profit but influential organisation representing 30,000 corporations, Ukraine will remain dependent upon Russia and closer to it than to the EU as long as Ukraine has business contacts with Russia, specifically in the areas of energy, hi-tech, security and the food industry. A representative of Ukrainian capital, Bespalov follows the slogan, “Russia in the short- and medium-term, and the EU in the long term’.

In the specific case of Ukraine, the EU’s enhanced pseudo-promise of membership is entirely similar to association agreements, but defined as such. The European Parliament criticised this with the Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on a negotiation mandate for a new enhanced agreement between the European Union and its member states on the one part and Ukraine on the other part.<sup>500</sup> In the words of the enhanced agreement with Ukraine, “The Council and the Commission recall that the European Union has acknowledged Ukraine’s European aspirations and

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<sup>498</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>499</sup> Paul Kubicek, “Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Can the EU help the Orange Revolution bear fruit?”, *East European Quarterly*, XII, No.1, March 2007, p.1.

<sup>500</sup> A6-0217/2007 final, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Michael Tomasz Kaminski, Strasbourg, 8.6.2007, p.5, point 6.

has welcomed Ukraine's European choice in both the Council conclusions and in the Ukraine Action Plan<sup>501</sup> proving that the neighbourhood policy has no membership perspective.

The EU wants to have differentiated relationships and agreements of different kinds on cross-cutting sectoral themes, such as energy networks, with each individual neighbourhood country. For example; the EU aims to integrate Ukraine and Moldova into the Energy Community of Southeastern Europe.<sup>502</sup> Ukraine and Morocco will be the first two countries to receive money from the governance fund, as a result of the progress they have made in building institutions, observing human and civil rights and improving governance.<sup>503</sup> However, creation of a specific fund for the ENP named as 'Neighbourhood Investment Fund' and also pretending as if the EU were taking some concrete steps is to create a positive image of the policy and public opinion in order to get the 'consent' of the people in the neighbouring countries.

The Neighbourhood Investment Fund aims to make the ENP more visible and popular as a policy anchor and reference point for reform elites and public opinion and to strengthen domestic reform constituencies in the target countries. Moreover, it will combine EU money and money from member-states. The EU also wants to mobilise loans from other international financial institutions like the World Bank (IBRD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).<sup>504</sup>

It should be noted that in line with its geopolitical vision of a Western-oriented Ukraine, the US administration had strongly supported civil society in Ukraine in general, as well as the opposition's call for repeat elections, in particular.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> Adopted on 21 February 2005 / Council of the European Union: Relations with Ukraine – Council Conclusions, 2776th Council meeting. General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 22.1.2007, p.6.

<sup>502</sup> Cf. Council of the European Union: Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy- Presidency Progress Report, *op.cit.*, p.5.

<sup>503</sup> Cf. European Commission: ENP Progress Report MOROCCO, SEC(2006) 1551/2, Brussels, 4.12.2006; European Commission: ENP Progress Report UKRAINE, SEC (2006) 1505/2, Brussels, 4.12.2006.

<sup>504</sup> Lippert, *op.cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p.18.

<sup>505</sup> Iris Kempe and Iryna Solonenko, *op. cit.*, p.109-148.

#### **4.4.1 Assessment of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Common Strategy Paper and Action Plans**

The ENP is open-ended, based on clear differentiation between countries and neighbours and includes regular monitoring of progress. The process is built on a set of bilateral relationships between the individual neighbours which is similar to the Eastern Enlargement and the EU, and scholars seem to be in agreement that this is a deliberate choice on the part of the Union to maximize its leverage over the neighbours.<sup>506</sup> Moreover, the strategy of the EU is not to give any meaningful say to the neighbours in setting the agenda. The objectives and the means are non-negotiable, and the only place where the partners are consulted is in setting the benchmarks and timetables of their individual Action Plans. In this way, the Union is offering economic benefits according to the individual neighbour's ability and willingness to implement the Union's normative agenda. The EU is willing to give its neighbours a say only on when – but not how – to implement the Union's demands.<sup>507</sup> These weaknesses of the project help to acknowledge the future achievements of the projects. Although it seems as if the consent of the people were taken, the real weighed instrument imposed is coercion which can not bring about the historic bloc without 'consent'.

The ENP as an EU hegemonic project has negotiated eleven Partnership Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the so-called new independent states of the former Soviet Union. The Union has sought the asymmetric bilateral approach, but with a crucial difference, as accession has not been in the cards. Political conditionality, the key component of the Union's active leverage, has been weak and inefficient.<sup>508</sup> The March 2003 Communication clearly stated that the ENP was meant for countries that did not enjoy the perspective of EU membership. However, the document took great pains to make the case that Eastern enlargement was not about exclusion and new dividing lines

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<sup>506</sup> Karen Smith, op.cit., "The outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy", p.762-3.

<sup>507</sup> Federica Bicchi, "Our size fits all : normative power Europe and the Mediterranean", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13:2, 2006, p.288.

<sup>508</sup> Richard Young, "European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6:3 , 2001, p.357.

in, but that it would bring tangible benefits to the new neighbours. Hence there are promises of the EU aiming at supporting the regime changes in these Black Sea countries and having the extension of neo-liberal restructuring by the help of the EU and international organisations. The EU's promise is of enhanced relations and closer integration based on shared values between the Union and its neighbours. The mechanism is simple: in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning national legislation with the EU *acquis*), the EU will grant closer economic integration with its partners.

In 1994 the EU and Ukraine signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that contains a footnote referring to the possibility of free trade between the two parties. The overarching aim of the PCA was to bring Ukraine into line with the legal framework of the single European market and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).<sup>509</sup> The delay of nearly four years in ratifying the PCA by the member states caused the first frustration in Ukraine. The PCA no longer satisfied the Ukrainian expectations. In Kuchma presidency, his reorientation to Russia seriously damaged Ukraine's reputation. Foreign Affairs Minister Hryshchenko confirmed Ukraine's orientation but, at the same time, criticized EU policy towards Ukraine and described the CES as a positive opportunity for Ukraine.<sup>510</sup> These double messages after the Orange Revolution show the indecisive nature of the Ukrainian politics due to the two competitive hegemonic projects neither of whose promises are unsatisfactory to form a historic bloc. The messages coming from the EU also consist of indecision. The ambiguity in both Ukraine's and the EU's politics impede the formation of a historic bloc. Despite the ups and downs in the EU-Ukraine relationship which was reflected upon the interests of the EU officials and of the Russophile Ukrainian high officials, the EU continued to endure its relationship with Ukraine and approved the Common Strategy policy document in 1999. The document outlined the following main objectives: 1) support for democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine, 2) joint solution of European problems, 3) mutual cooperation in the context of EU-Enlargement. The document states: 'the EU will study the conditions which could

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<sup>509</sup> R. Petrov, "The Balkans and the NIS", in *Handbook on European Enlargement*, edited by Ott, A. and Inglis, K., The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2002.

<sup>510</sup> Konstantin Hryshchenko, *Guidelines of the foreign policy CAPS of Ukraine*, 2003: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi> (accessed on 17 January 2004).



enable a free trade zone between Ukraine and EU in the future<sup>511</sup> although this strategy promised to become a crucial point in development in the EU's attitude towards Ukraine and since Ukraine's independence in 1991, Ukraine has undergone many changes. Another important EU document is the European Commission Neighbourhood Policy. It was initially proposed as a substitution or addition to the PCA, it was criticized by Ukrainians during the Hague Summit of July 2004 because they disliked being included into the same group with Mediterranean countries with no mention of a definite option of future membership.<sup>512</sup> As Semeniuk argues there were periods when it was actively promoted, periods when it was not considered as a priority, periods of euphoria and high expectations, and periods of disappointment and disbelief. But the EU alternative has slowly emerged both de jure and de facto. It has now become a clear alternative to a pro-Russian policy and the government must make a clear final decision one way or the other and act accordingly.<sup>513</sup>

Another important document listing the required measures is the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (AP). EU conditionality helped change the opportunity structure by providing an external reference point for domestic actors to pursue domestic reforms. In Ukraine although the AP led to change in parts of the state administration, particularly those with responsibility, stakes and expertise in European integration, in general progress has largely been down to the efforts of individuals within key ministries. This has delivered uneven and limited results. The scale of changes resulting from the implementation of the AP between 2005-2007 has been insufficient to transform state structures and policies or to prepare Ukraine to derive benefits from closer integration with the EU.<sup>514</sup>

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<sup>511</sup> EU Common Strategy on Ukraine, 1999 [http://www.mfa.gov.ua/data/upload/publication/mfa/ua/2822/general\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.ua/data/upload/publication/mfa/ua/2822/general_strategy.pdf) (Accessed on 1 June 2006.)

<sup>512</sup> Official Statement of Ukraine on the EU-Ukraine summit in the Hague on 8 July 2004: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/ua/publication/content/3000.htm> . (Accessed on 2 July 2007.)

<sup>513</sup> Oleksiy Semeniuk, "Ukraine's European Policy as an Alternative Choice – Achievements, Mistakes and Prospects", edited by S. Velychenko, *Ukraine, The EU and Russia*, 2007, p. 132.

<sup>514</sup> Kataryna Wolczuk, "Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2009, p.188.

The Ukraine-EU AP which was adopted in February 2005 for three years, and then in 2007 Ukraine and the EU agreed to extend the AP for a maximum of one more year, until February 2008, consists of two parts. Following a short introduction in section one, the second section contains a list of priorities, which tend to be divided into several tasks, that Ukraine is required to pursue. The priorities are organised into six chapters with the following headings: ‘Political Dialogue and Reform’; ‘Economic and Social Reform and Development’, ‘Trade, Market and Regulatory Reforms’; ‘Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs’; ‘Transport, Energy, Information Society and Environment’; and ‘People-to-People Contacts’.

The AP priorities range from holding free and fair elections and reforming the judiciary to revising company law and adopting a nuclear waste strategy. Thus the AP envisages projecting not only Community norms and values, such as democracy and human rights, but the standards of the Union as a whole. Thus the ENP follows the enlargement strategy of the simultaneous application of polity conditionality, or reforms of political and economic structures and processes such as democracy, minority rights, and policy-oriented conditionality that is the adoption and implementation of the *acquis* during the enlargement process.<sup>515</sup> The effectiveness of the ENP has been questioned, mainly on the grounds that the incentives offered by the EU are too weak to entice its neighbouring countries into domestic reforms. The leverage of the EU is weak not only because of a lack of membership perspective because it is ultimately unclear what the actual award for enacting EU conditionality is.<sup>516</sup>

A mobilisation of powerful domestic actors is required as European integration is a complex, long and drawn-out process involving virtually all parts of the state.<sup>517</sup> In order to succeed, the enactment of EU-defined polity and policy changes requires not only consistent, visible commitment and support from the highest state authorities, but it also

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<sup>515</sup> Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States”, *Living Reviews in European Governance*, 1:3, 2006, available at: <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3>, (Accessed 2 May 2007.)

<sup>516</sup> Jose G. Escibano, “Europeanization without Europe? The Mediterranean and the Neighbourhood Policy”, *EUI RSCAS Working Papers*, 2006/19 Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.

<sup>517</sup> Alan Mayhew, Laura Cremona and Piotr Serafin, “Ukraine’s European Choice: A Review of the Report of a scoping study for the Government of Ukraine”, unpublished paper, 2005.

needs to be institutionalised in an appropriate coordinating framework and accompanied by the development of considerable administrative capacity. This is necessary for the application of EU law and in practice has some bearing on almost every aspect of public policy making and implementation.<sup>518</sup>

Another important document outlining the goals and strategy vis-à-vis the EU, namely the ‘Strategy for Ukraine’s Integration with the European Union’ of 1998 and ‘The Programme of Ukraine’s Integration with the European Union, of 2000, were adopted by presidential decrees without the consent or involvement of the parliament.<sup>519</sup> The fact that the intention to join the EU was initially voiced solely by the presidency without much discussion or opposition reflected not only the latter’s dominant position in Ukraine and the resulting institutional asymmetries, but also the relative impotence of other institutions, especially the parliament, in foreign policy issues in general and European integration in particular.<sup>520</sup> Another reason why EU’s hegemonic project is unlikely to be realised that the consent of the citizens and the representatives of the citizens (RADA) are not taken.

Regarding the domestic challenges for the implementation of the ENP, the low priority assigned to the ‘European choice’ was reflected in the detachment of institutions other than the presidency and the weakness of the institutional framework devoted to European integration. As in Soviet times, the Cabinet of Ministers played a highly circumscribed role in foreign policy matters.<sup>521</sup>

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<sup>518</sup> Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 December 2001, p.105-108.

<sup>519</sup> Decree by the President of Ukraine on the Approval of the Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration to the European Union’, No.615/98, 11 June 1998, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en /846.htm>, (Accessed on 11 November 2008); and ‘Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Programme of Ukraine’s Integration with the EU’, Integration with the EU’, No. 1072/98, 14 September 2000.

<sup>520</sup> Kateryna Wolczuk, “Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and Its Policy Towards the European Union”, *EUI RSCAS Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute*, No. 2004/15, Florence.

<sup>521</sup> Oleg Protsyk, “Domestic Political Institutions and Their Responses to EU Enlargement in Ukraine and Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36:4, 2003.

Due to the political conjuncture, historical ties and geopolitical position, Ukraine is not expected to be able to make such a concrete decision since both the hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia are not able to carry out their promises entirely and meet the expectations of Ukraine. Ukraine will not become a full EU-member in the near future; its membership in the CES has not considerable importance for as long as it does not enter the Customs Union. Ukrainian EU policy is strongly influenced by both internal and external factors. In Ukraine the euphoria of the Orange Revolution has faded away and many remain pro-Russian. In the EU itself, there is growing mistrust towards EU institutions, the rising influence of the Right, budget difficulties and growing problems with non-European immigrant minorities, difficulty to get the consent for the adoption of the Constitution, increasing rate of unemployment and fatigue of enlargement are all impediments for the realisation of the EU's hegemonic project.

According to Kravchuk, Ukrainian ministers exercised 'vast amounts of 'micro-management'', expending so much time and energy on administrative minutiae that ministers and senior officials were not able to properly scrutinise the large number of decisions that were routinely made in their names. As a result, key officials devoted precious little time to policy planning and development.<sup>522</sup> The Cabinet accepted the presidential leadership on European matters nonetheless it lacked the commitment and capacity to assist in the process. As Wolczuk notes, the 2002 parliamentary elections brought the first change within the *Verkhovna Rada* related to European integration when a Parliamentary Committee on European Integration was created on the initiative of Borys Tarasiuk, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. As head of this committee, Borys Tarasiuk sought parliament's endorsement to pursue EU and NATO membership, and coordinate parliamentary measures related to European integration. However, he failed to secure the necessary permanent powers for the Committee, equal to those of other standing committees, something which resulted in its weak standing within the parliament.<sup>523</sup> Despite all these institutional initiatives, the lack of coordinating mechanisms and a clear strategy rendered the initiatives largely ineffective. The lack of a coordinating mechanism resulted in competition. As to the 2006 September dated

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<sup>522</sup> Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, Paul J. D'Anieri, *Ukrainian Politics and Society*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999.

<sup>523</sup> Wolczuk, *op. cit.*, "Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 194 .

interviews made with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Economy and European Integration (MEEI) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Ukraine, they may have entirely different perceptions since two ministries may belong to different political parties in coalition governments. For example, when the ‘Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood’ Initiative was launched by the EU in 2003, the MFA’s response was lukewarm as the initiative failed to live up to expectations. For the MFA, at best, it was a mere stepping stone to acquiring membership. In contrast, the MEEI responded more enthusiastically to the EU’s proposal, regardless of the fact that it failed to address Ukraine’s officially proclaimed goal.<sup>524</sup>

It is important to address how much the intellectuals are involved in the accession process within the legal framework of the EU documents. In order for the EU’s Hegemonic Project to actualise, the intellectual and moral leadership should be attained. Political elite, state bureaucracy and non-governmental sector have to be mobilised so that consistency and coordination should be realised. Regarding the non-governmental sector, International Centre for Policy Studies, which prepared an impact assessment of the creation of the Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU and Razumkov Centre, International Renaissance Foundation, The Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, which have organised an independent monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plan by the Ukrainian government can be given. Despite these changes, the state apparatus was starved of skilled civil servants competent in various aspects of European integration; the problem was exacerbated by the lack of a comprehensive and systemic programme of training.<sup>525</sup> The institutional framework for European integration was created in the context of Ukraine’s state apparatus which remained unreformed, and hence subject to inefficiency, poor coordination, lack of strategic planning and resources it had long been plagued by.<sup>526</sup> Even though several institutional actors involved in Ukraine’s EU integration emerged, no clear priorities were agreed, implemented and monitored either by the EU or the Ukrainian government.

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<sup>524</sup> “Ukraine-EU on the Road to 4 Freedoms”, *Analytical Report ordered by Ministry of Economy and European Integration of Ukraine*, AHT Consulting Group, June 2003.

<sup>525</sup> Wolczuk, *op. cit.*, “Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy”, p. 196.

<sup>526</sup> *Ibid.*

#### ***4.5 The Russia's Hegemonic Project: the Single Economic Space***

The end of the Cold War became a turning point in EU-Russian relations. The Soviet officials considered the European Communities to be an economic partner of NATO, the major ideological opponent of the USSR, and up until nearly the very end of the Cold War, no official relations had existed between it and the EC. In 1994, in order to better reflect changing EU-Russia relations, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between the EU and Russia indicating political cooperation, trade and economic cooperation as the major areas of cooperation. The PCA granted Russia a transit economy status, abolishing quantitative restrictions for Russian goods, with the exception of steel, textiles and nuclear materials. The EU enlargement in 1995 facilitated further cooperation between the EU and Russia and created a new framework for EU economic assistance to Russia, as new member-states suggested the development of a 'Northern Dimension' in order to promote economic growth and social stability in the bordering area.<sup>527</sup>

The Russian Federation has a special position due to its large population, territorial potential and vast resources of energy raw materials. As the largest nuclear power, the leading exporter of arms and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the EU's policy towards Russia is based to a larger extent on tailor-made solutions adapted to the country's ambitions and potential. The EU-Russian summit held in St. Petersburg in 2003 was a turning point in EU-Russian relations. At this summit, the decision was made to create a Permanent Partnership Council in the area of economic cooperation. At that time it was an important step forward from the country with a state economy status caused certain problems.

The Russian Federation has a very clear strategy towards the Black Sea Region. Russia reacts to the European Neighbourhood Policy since from their perspective, ENP is regarded as the accession process where the Union in effect uses its economic and

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<sup>527</sup>Tatiana Romanova and Natalia Zaslavskaya, "EU-Russian: Towards the Four Spaces", *Baltic Defence Review*, 2:12, 2004.

normative clout to create a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relations between itself and the - candidates where the projection of norms and values is entirely one sided.<sup>528</sup> In recent years, EU-Russia relations have become problematic. This has been reflected in Russia's growing insistence on a more equal role with the European Union that would be consummate with its regained sense of power. Russian reactions to the ENP should be examined. The bureaucratic and political necessities of bringing the various strands of the Union's proximity policies have gotten a nod of approval from the Russians.<sup>529</sup>

Russia aims to re-establish its former regional dominance, and to do so, it has adopted the strategy of establishing relations on an issue basis. The Russian Federation does not want to give a free hand to enhance the US presence in the Black Sea Region at large. For this reason, it is against NATO involvement in the Black Sea Region and is satisfied with the role played by the BLACKSEAFOR.<sup>530</sup>

Russia's counter-hegemonic project with the neighbouring countries is known as the 'Wider Russian Neighbourhood Policy: The Single Economic Space', which aims to bring Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia closer together economically.<sup>531</sup> However, the establishment of the Single Economic Space has been problematic, due to the other contested strategies in the region.; therefore, it is unlikely to materialise, and may try to redefine itself. The open-endedness of the Russian strategy and the other strategies is problematic. The Russian strategy also faces questions regarding its

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<sup>528</sup> Vinod Aggarwal and Edwar A., Fogarty "Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism", in Vinod Aggarwal and Edward A.Fogarty (eds)., EU Trade Strategies Between Regionalism and Globalism Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.231.

<sup>529</sup> Ivan Kravchenko, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs*, 53:1, Moscow, 2007, p.46.

<sup>530</sup> BLACKSEAFOR is a Turkish initiative in the Black Sea context. It is a tangible outcome of Turkey's vision of bringing together the naval forces of the littoral states for the realisation of certain tasks at sea. All the Black Sea littoral states signed this Agreement, as mentioned above, on 2 April 2001 in Istanbul. The fact that this Agreement was finalised in a relatively short period of time is testimony to the strong determination of all the littoral states in this regard. It aims at fostering peace and stability in the Black Sea as well as promoting regional co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces of the littoral states.(See for details the official BLACKSEAFOR at <http://www.blackseafor.org>. Although it is composed of naval forces, BLACKSEAFOR is not purely a military organisation. Nor is it directed against any state, or intended to be a military alliance. This is clearly set forth in the Agreement. Similarly, the parties undertake that BLACKSEAFOR activities are consistent with the purposes and the principles of the UN Charter 8.

<sup>531</sup> Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada parliament ratified the agreement in April 2004.

sustainability because Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria have largely turned their faces towards the United States and the EU. The failure of the US and EU strategies towards Ukraine has allowed the Russian Federation to try and regain its privileged position in the country.<sup>532</sup> Ukraine's Orange Revolution suspended the Russian Hegemonic Project; however, the post-revolution period did not go as the EU expected. Thus it was a failure from the EU perspective .

At the same time, Russia reacted positively because it realized that it could now develop a stable policy towards Ukraine.<sup>533</sup> Russian-Ukrainian agreements were concluded in 2000 and 2001 regarding military cooperation, aerospace technology and joint development and sales of weapons.<sup>534</sup>

Ukraine's approach towards Russia changed significantly after 2000, mostly because of Kiev's international isolation brought about by its domestic scandals. The explicit support from Russia helped Kuchma to remain in office while drawing both countries even closer together.<sup>535</sup> Mr.Gorchakov mentioned the strategic importance of Russia. He acknowledged that Ukraine can never refrain from keeping in touch with Russia due to their everlasting relationship specifically due to gas and energy needs.

Russia's role in Ukraine hampered Kiev's efforts to increase support for closer EU-Ukraine integration. The tense atmosphere during the EU-Russia summit in November 2004 made it evident that Moscow disliked the EU's engagement in Ukrainian affairs.<sup>536</sup> While one might assume at first glance that Yanukovych, as prime minister and the candidate supported by the state apparatus, was the best option for Russia, Yanukovych

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<sup>532</sup> Mustafa Türkeş, "Contested Hegemonies in the Black Sea Region", *Current Problems of the International Relations*, edited by L.V.Hubersky, Volume 61, Part 1, Kiev National Universtiy, Taras Shevchenko Institute of International Relations, Kiev, 2006, p.35

<sup>533</sup> Leonid Polyakov, "Current Russian-Ukrainian Rapprochement or Backward? A Rejoinder", *Security Dialogue*, 33:2, 2002, p.175.

<sup>534</sup> Borys Varyvoda, "Ukraine's Dynamic Place in the System of International Security: Political and Economic Dimensions", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol.57, No. 3-4, 2001, p.184.

<sup>535</sup> Interview made with Dimitri Gorchakov - The European Commission's Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, on 12 September 2006.

<sup>536</sup> Mathias Roth, *op. cit.*, "EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution: The role of the new member states", p. 505-527.



owes his political career first and foremost to the ‘Donetsk’ clan and their personal interests.<sup>537</sup> It is argued that a Yushchenko victory will be only a victory for western Ukraine, and could even threaten to divide the Ukrainian nation, whereas Yanukovich would contribute to national stability. Regardless of who is in the office of the president in Ukraine, Russia’s interest is in having access and being taken seriously.

As part of the Ukrainian politics, recent developments in the Black Sea also should be taken into consideration. The Black Sea is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by six littoral countries: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.<sup>538</sup> The only maritime exit to the open seas is through the Turkish Straits. This region, in which Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, the Eastern Balkans, and the Caucasus converge, brings together some of the most important challenges that shape the security of today and tomorrow’s Europe: from illegal migration to environmental degradation, from the security of energy supplies to illicit trafficking of drugs and weapons and to ‘frozen conflicts’.

Although the EU has tended to organise its relationships with the states of Wider Europe on a bilateral basis, since the end of the Cold War, the Union has also sponsored or supported several multilateral regional initiatives, including the Barcelona Process in the Mediterranean, the Northern Dimension in Northwest Europe and the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe.<sup>539</sup> All the regions within Wider Europe that have historical and geographical identities, but which overlap today’s main remaining political and economic divides, have become the subject of this new type of European regionalism. Although the Black Sea region shares some common features with the other regions, it is unique in that it has not been the target of an EU regional initiative, but has its own regional organisation – the BSEC – which is the product of the states of the region. Not only is the BSEC’s ‘home-grown’ quality important in terms of its political legitimacy, the introduction of a cooperative structure in a region beset by serious conflicts or tensions also represents a distinct political achievement. However, the BSEC also has the

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<sup>537</sup> Taras Kuzio, “Why Russia gains from a Yushchenko Victory”, *The Moscow Times*, 30 June 2004.

<sup>538</sup> Although Moldavia also has a tiny coast, it is not regarded as a littoral country.

<sup>539</sup> Thomas Christiansen, Petito Fabio and Tonra Ben, “Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union’s ‘Near Abroad’”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 35:4, 2000.

disadvantage of being limited by the minimal budgetary resources that most member-states are able to provide. Although Turkey bore the main costs of setting up the BSEC, its subsequent operating budget has been tiny. Additional problems stem from the fact that several core functions of cooperation are handled on an ad hoc basis outside the BSEC by organisations such as the Black Sea Environment Programme, Black Sea PETrA (transportation issues) and TRACECA (energy issues).<sup>540</sup>

The Black Sea region has been looked at as both a bridge and a boundary. It is an energy bridge, enabling the passage of oil and gas, as well as a strategic bridge, the site at which many sources of instability in today's Europe are located. At the same time, it is a geopolitical boundary dividing Europe from the Greater Middle East and protecting it from illicit drugs and weapons.<sup>541</sup>

The Black Sea has always been important for the livelihood of the littoral states and for the whole region, providing east-west and north-south passage. The end of the Cold War had a considerable impact on the strategic significance of this sea. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, so too fell the ideological walls that had long divided not only the continent but the whole Euro-Atlantic region. The Black Sea was no exception to the overall rapprochement. The elimination of the ideological divide offered new opportunities for the promotion and joint action between Black Sea countries, which had formerly belonged to opposing blocs – Turkey, a member of NATO, and the other littoral countries, members of the Warsaw Pact.

In his article *Contested Hegemonies in the Black Sea Region*, Türkeş defines four distinct strategies towards the Black Sea Region: the Turkish, the Russian, the EU and the US strategies. Mitchell argues that during the last eight years there have been several major developments that have had enormous impact on US security and other strategic concerns<sup>542</sup>, two of which are particularly relevant to the Black Sea Region. He argues

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<sup>540</sup> Terry Adams, Michael Emerson, Lawrence Mee, Marius Vahl, *Europe's Black Sea Dimension*, Brussels 2002, p.31.

<sup>541</sup> Alyson Bailes, "Opening Remarks in the Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge? Implications of EU and NATO Enlargement, and the Regional Security", *SIPRI seminar report*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 28 November 2003.

<sup>542</sup> Mitchell Lincoln, "More than location: crafting a US policy for the Black Sea Region", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 8:2, June 2008, p.131.

that the two groups of strategies – the Turkish and Russian strategies on the one hand, and the EU and US strategies on the other – are in the process of being formed as two contested hegemonic projects. Whereas the former two want to preserve the existing power relations in the Black Sea region, the latter two are assertively attempting to transform power relations into more tension in the Black Sea region, and Ukraine is at the focal point of these contested strategies. He argues that each strategy may be sustained for a while with the consent of its partners; however, it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc. The Turkish and the Russian strategies, or hegemonic projects were, challenged in 2004 by the EU and the US strategies, and they failed to turn into a historic bloc.<sup>543</sup>

The Black Sea is clearly emerging as a decisive crossroads for the future of the Wider Europe,<sup>544</sup> and the EU enters the scene as a major Black Sea power in any mainstream scenario. Black Sea Cooperation has been given significance due to changing circumstances. Multilateral cooperation in the region takes place in several forms – in the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, The Black Sea Forum and the so-called Black Sea Synergy (under the umbrella of the ENP).<sup>545</sup> The German presidency has joined forces with the Commission on establishing a Black Sea Synergy, which could be perceived as a multilateral approach of a kind that did not exist in the East while in the Mediterranean the multilateral Barcelona process has been established for more than ten years.<sup>546</sup>

Any examination of the Black Sea region must take Russia into consideration the ‘elephant in the room’. This view has been adopted predominantly by old EU-member states, namely France, the UK, Germany and Italy, which seek a cooperative policy with Moscow and do not want the ENP to jeopardise the difficult process of building a strategic partnership between the EU and Russia.<sup>547</sup>

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<sup>543</sup> Türkeş, *op.cit.*, p.36.

<sup>544</sup> Fabrizia Tassinari, “A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative”, *CEPS*, 2006, p.1.

<sup>545</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, “The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions”, p. 5.

<sup>546</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>547</sup> Lippert, *op. cit.*, “The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions”, p.18.

For many years, the countries of the Black Sea belonged to two totally opposing political and military blocs. With the end of the Cold War, the countries of the region jointly decided to revive the cooperative spirit by setting up the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), despite the fact that the Black Sea area is one of the most diverse regions in the world.<sup>548</sup> The eleven member states of the BSEC (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) have concluded that their common interests should prevail and that they can better promote them through cooperation.<sup>549</sup> The BSEC's diversity makes it also very convenient to play the role of a bridge between Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. It possesses huge deposits of natural, particularly energy, resources. It is also very important for the transportation of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the rest of the world. Its geo-strategic importance is substantial since it includes Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the countries of the Caucasus among its members.<sup>550</sup>

Although BSEC is the only multi-purpose arena for regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region, there are several multilateral projects and programmes in the region that take place outside the BSEC framework. Cooperation in the field of environment, transport, energy, soft security and, in the near future, fisheries are particularly important in the context of EU-Black Sea relations.

The EU's present official position is that its cooperation with BSEC should proceed on an ad hoc basis, without institutional links. The different types of status for the EU mean different operating policies and programmes, legal bases and financial instruments: The negotiating accession candidates, Romania and Bulgaria, receive economic and technical assistance from the EU through the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programmes aimed at preparing them for EU membership. Turkey has a special financial protocol with the EU, which has only recently been activated after years of suspension. The non-candidate states of South Eastern Europe, including Albania, are

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<sup>548</sup> Adams, et.al., *op. cit.*, p.32.

<sup>549</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>550</sup> Adams, et.al., *op. cit.*, p.33.

beneficiaries of the CARDS programme of financial and technical assistance. The CIS states are beneficiaries of the TACIS programme. They have distinctions regarding the amounts allocated, different aid programmes and different assistance, the differences in the form of technical assistance, different technical regulations and programming cycles and different administrative departments.

The German presidency has joined forces with the Commission on establishing a Black Sea Synergy, which could be perceived as a multilateral approach of a kind that did not exist in the East while in the Mediterranean the multilateral Barcelona process has been established for more than ten years.<sup>551</sup>

In accordance with its importance in the region, Russia is the key actor around which international games are played. Black Sea Region will increasingly gain importance with the changing dynamics of the global world. Moreover, Russia is the largest country in the post-Soviet space with significant economic and political power and the largest share of population and economic potential of the region. As D'anieri argues, the fear of Russian hegemonism combined with the need to compensate for economic interdependence leads to the dominance of bilateralism without consent and more proportionately with coercion instead of multilateral integration.<sup>552</sup> Russia has done little to influence effectively the development of the post-Soviet states. Regarding the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, Russia's attitude in the 2004 elections or the 'gas conflict' between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 demonstrated how ineffective Russia was during the crisis.

The major feature of Ukrainian-Russian relationships since 1991 has been ambiguity. On the Ukrainian side, this can be explained, in part, by the Russophile attitudes of some of its citizens, including some of its political and economic elite. This was reflected in each of the last three presidential elections, during which the relationship with Russia played an important role. Nevertheless, at crucial moments, some higher officials were able to

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<sup>551</sup> Barbara Lippert, *op. cit.*, "The Discussion on EU Neighbourhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions", p. 6.

<sup>552</sup> Paul D'anieri, "International Cooperation among Unequal Partners: The Emergence of Bilateralism in the Former Soviet Union" *International Politics*, 34:4, 2007.

successfully resist pro-Russian pressure – even after President Kuchma agreed to the initial concept of the Common Economic Space (CES).<sup>553</sup>

CES is one of the post-Soviet projects which are formed by the Russian-centric structures with similar functions, underlying ideas and strategies. According to Libman, none of these international unions achieved even a modest success and the processes turned out to be a kind of ‘ink on paper’ integration because despite formal agreements member countries introduced new restrictions on trade, investments and migration. As an example pipes, meat or sugar between Russia and Ukraine may be given.<sup>554</sup> CES includes certain features of a more flexible institutional and organisational structure. For example CES did not create its own supranational bodies. The organisation is based on a more pragmatic set of goals, which are mostly restricted to the abolition of barriers for trade and investments and the establishment of a customs union.<sup>555</sup> Due to the fact that Ukraine is squeezed between two contested hegemonic projects, it is reluctant to accept any treaties beyond the free trade area which makes any advancement of the CES project questionable. However, due to the traditional ties and commonalities among these post-Soviet countries, Ukraine can not refrain from enduring its relationship with Russia. Moreover these countries including Ukraine receive a significant investment inflow from Russia without the need to reform its economic and political institutions. These nations share common values and principles; people in different countries of the former Soviet Union are connected through social networks and informal communication channels. The major source of these interrelations is the relatively high social integration of the post-Soviet countries.<sup>556</sup> According to the Barometer of Eurasian Integration, 35% of the Russian population, 57% of the Ukrainians have relatives in neighbouring post-Soviet countries.<sup>557</sup>

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<sup>553</sup> Semeniy, *op. cit.*, p.124.

<sup>554</sup> Alexander Libman, “Regionalisation and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications for Institutional Development”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59:3, May 2007, p. 401-430.

<sup>555</sup> *Ibid*, p.403.

<sup>556</sup> Alexander Libman, “The Role of Economic Integration and Disintegration in the Post-Soviet Space: A Quantitative Analysis”, *Studies on Russian Economic Development*, 17 May 2006.

<sup>557</sup> See *Ekonomika Ivremya*, 5 July 2005.

Two features of post-Soviet Ukraine that are the continuity of the power elites and the dominance of the executive, embodied in the presidency, over other branches of power have created strong incentives for widespread rent-seeking behaviour and militated against sustained implementation of reforms by the ruling elite grouped around the presidency. As Gel'man puts it, "a typical feature of the post-Soviet countries like Ukraine is that they have 'semi-authoritarian' institutions, which means having the formal presence of democratic institutions, which are unable to influence the current political decisions and to transfer power from incumbents to the opposition." He argues that this result is achieved by permanent interventions in the democratic mechanism, from simple election cheating to more sophisticated legal changes and ideological campaigns, including the creation of a pseudo-opposition (counter-hegemony) loyal to the current regime.<sup>558</sup> Moreover, coercive measures against the informal sector make the formal institutions even less appropriate for the private actors and only support the expansion of the shadow economy. As Beicheit and Pavlenko pointed out in the fall of 2000, when the president himself was allegedly involved in the Gongadze murder, and in January 2004, when attempts were made to carry out political reform by unconstitutional means, Ukraine almost had its membership suspended.<sup>559</sup>

Russia has been eager to move into the Ukrainian market, especially in the energy and metallurgical sector, and it offered the prospect of lower prices for energy and the lowering of trade barriers as incentives for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Community (comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and, later, the CES, (comprised of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), the latter of which Ukraine joined in September 2003. Dependency on Russian energy supplies and access to the Russian market has prompted Ukraine to seek closer economic cooperation, particularly market access, but to eschew political integration.<sup>560</sup> CES or Russian Hegemonic Project is not only a process of real institutionalisation of international cooperation, but also a defence mechanism used by elites to achieve their internal and

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<sup>558</sup> Vladimir Gel'man, "Post-Soviet Transitions and Democratisation: Towards Theory-Building" *Democratisation*, 10:2, 2003.

<sup>559</sup> Timm Beichelt and Rostyslav Pavlenko "The Presidential Election and Constitutional Reform", in Helmuth Kurth and Iris Kempe (Eds) *Presidential Election and Orange Revolution, Implications for Ukraine's Transition*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Kyiv, 2005 p.50-85.

<sup>560</sup> Kuzio, *op. cit.*, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future?", p. 13.

external goals. Although they are very sceptical towards the CES, the dissolution of the economic integration is expected to damage the country.

According to Libman, CES and the other post-Soviet integration projects are also regarded to have a psychological effect, mostly for Russia, but also for several post-Soviet countries. He argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have caused a wave of nationalistic movements in the states of the region and a large population of ethnic Russians in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, disputable borders and a feeling of humiliation in at least part of the Russian population and elites because of its lost superpower status. The existence of CES and other post-Soviet integration projects offered a kind of softening instrument which demonstrated the apparent unity of the post-Soviet republics for the population and apparent preservation of Russian influence for the elites. Libman emphasizes the fact that the gradual process of disintegration became less 'visible' and therefore prevented a negative reaction.<sup>561</sup> However, this is not valid in recent Russian policy. Russian political elites and the Russian population seem to be less interested in the preservation of the 'visible' integration without any political or economic consequences. Russia's gas pricing policy and the 'gas war' against Ukraine in 2005-2006 is a sign of a more pragmatic approach but also the 'coercive instrument' imposed upon Ukraine as a punishment for its political re-orientation.<sup>562</sup> Another tendency of Russian political elites is to justify the fact these two contested hegemonic projects are in fact complementary with each other and the EU rapprochement is an instrument for the adoption of EU standards. However, these two hegemonic projects taking their priorities, expectations, boundaries and conditions into consideration can not be regarded as complementary but due to the conflict of interests, different actors and agency, they are contested. As Semeniý argues the CES and the EU which in theory seem similar, in fact are very much different from each other. The latter, unlike the former, has in principle democracy, rule of law, and does not have one single dominant member.<sup>563</sup> Semeniý defines the EU as an economic and the CES as a political project. As a matter of fact, in both Hegemonic Projects politics and economy are influential in decision-making.

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<sup>561</sup> Libman, *op. cit.*, "Regionalisation and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications for Institutional Development", p. 414.

<sup>562</sup> *Ibid*, p.415.

<sup>563</sup> Semeniý, *op. cit.*



As an example the CES provides certain economic benefits, which are subject to Russian political interests as the 2005 gas crises clearly demonstrated. The EU seems to promise greater benefits in the long run since it has a bigger market and more available investment capital than the CES but without the promise of membership and the precondition of infrastructure improvement, when compared to integration, considerably low EU assistance, lack of strategy and inconsistency between its declared goals and implemented policies which challenge the EU's Hegemonic Project (ENP) to Ukraine.

According to Global Witness, Russian businessmen have the tendency to work with less efficient institutional structures and they often continue to use them as a competitive advantage against multinationals and local enterprises. There are many cases of untransparent investment mechanisms used by Russian corporations in the post-Soviet world. Gazprom partners and subsidiaries in Ukraine, ITERA, Eural TransGas and RosUkrEnergo, established to re-sell the Turkmen gas, are a good example of these dubious relations. All of these companies were accused of corruption and clandestine deals.<sup>564</sup> Regarding the gas and oil dependence, since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, no overall security scheme has been realized in the Black Sea Region. The energy security of those countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Russia has the world's largest natural gas reserves, and it is the largest gas producer and exporter. The gas sector is one of the pillars of Russia's economy, and an important instrument of the Russian Federation'. The role of the gas sector in Russia's budget, the role of gas in the Russian Federation's energy balance, the gas monopoly and the social role Gazprom plays and also exporting gas provides some opportunities in terms of international cooperation and strengthens the country's position.<sup>565</sup>

The chief objectives of Russia's gas policy are to maintain its presence and increase the market share of Russian gas. In order to achieve these objectives Gazprom has to ensure stability and reliability of gas supplies. However, Gazprom is not a transparent company;

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<sup>564</sup> Global Witness, *It's a Gas – Funny Business in the Turkmen – Ukraine Gas Trade*, Washington: Global Witness Publishing Inc. 2006.

<sup>565</sup> Agata Loskot, "Security of Russian Gas Supplies to the EU – The Question of Infrastructural Connections", *Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich*, February 2005.

just how it forms its prices and establishes the line between profit and loss is ultimately a matter of assertion and opinion.

At present, Europe is the only major consumer of Russian gas. In general, the EU is Russia's most important and most profitable market, and Russian gas occupies a strong position within this market. From time to time, Russia imposes gas-related sanctions on both Europe and Ukraine. Russian gas reaches Europe via three major land routes. The most important system of export trunk pipelines runs from the Russian Federation across Ukraine and Slovakia to countries in Western Europe. The second route, the Yamal Pipeline, runs via Belarus and Poland to Germany, and the third route runs to the Balkans and Turkey. One of the basic objectives of Russia's gas policy is to diversify export routes, which are currently diversified to a very small degree, leaving the transportation of Russian gas to EU markets dependent on third countries (mostly Ukraine and Belarus). Among all current new gas pipeline projects two seem to be the most important: the Yamal gas pipeline and the North European gas pipeline (also referred to as the 'Trans-Baltic pipeline'). The Yamal gas pipeline project was popular in the 1990s.

The dependence of the New Member States on Russian gas supplies is several times higher. On average, Russian gas accounts for 73 percent of their annual gas consumption, although a large number of new EU members are completely dependent on Russian gas. 'Russian analysts known for their objectivity have echoed the view that Gazprom has become instrumental to the aim of restoring Russia' to the capacity of a global centre of power and the establishment of a 'sphere of predominance for Russian interests'<sup>566</sup> Russia is well aware of the fact that a country's geopolitical influence is to a large extent determined by its role in world energy markets, and it has used its energy richness as a political tool. Vladimir Putin cut the supply of oil to Ukraine for the fifth time since 1991, on becoming Acting President of the Russian Federation. The taps stayed off until April 2000, when President Kuchma took the first steps to meeting Putin's political demands. During the winter of 2000 and the spring of 2001, Ukrainian and Russian energy interests played an influential role in securing the dismissal of Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and, eventually, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. In

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<sup>566</sup> James Sherr, "Security in the Black Sea Region: Back to Realpolitik?" *Southeast and Black Sea Studies*, 8:4, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2008, p.141-153

August 2004, the relationship re-emerged in inverse form when Gazprom and Naftohaz Ukrainiy signed a supplementary agreement to their 2002 contract, setting a five-year price. Gazprom's methodical efforts to acquire ownership of pipelines and other infrastructure in neighbouring countries are economic and political tools that may be imposed to meet political demands

Since 1991 Russia's intentions have been to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence as part of a broader desire to maintain Great-Power status after the collapse of the USSR. Initially, this was understood as reconstructing the USSR, but by 2000, Russia had settled on trying to maintain its influence by incorporating Ukraine into various Russian-controlled supra-national political and economic structures, the CES today being the most significant of these institutions.<sup>567</sup> From the point of view of official statistics, the annual outflow of Russian investments increased by more than 4.7 times from 1999 to 2004. In 2005 Russian investments were unequally distributed in the post-Soviet countries: as of 1 October 2005, 48% of accumulated investments were placed in Ukraine.<sup>568</sup> As to the 17 September 2006 dated interview made in Ukraine, one of the expert opinion indicates that Russian corporations unofficially control about 80% of the oil processing industry, 60% of the metallurgy, 90% aluminium industry, 30% machine building industry and the banking sector, 30% of milk product market, 50% telecommunication sector in the country. UNCTAD (2004) also shows that Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the top six targets for Russian FDI projects abroad.<sup>569</sup>

According to Perepelytsya, Russia has three main interests in Ukraine: it wants a united Eastern-Slavic geopolitical area; it needs Ukraine's human resources; and it needs Ukraine's transport and communication networks.<sup>570</sup> In Ukraine, the psychological sense of kinship many of the country's citizens feel towards Russia is at odds with the reality of the political and economic differences between the two countries. At the beginning of the

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<sup>567</sup> Sonja Margolina, "Das unsichtbare Dritte", *Internationale Politik*, January 2005, p.89.

<sup>568</sup> Kalman Kalotay, "Outward FDI from Central and Eastern European Countries", *Economics of Planning*, 37:2, 2004.

<sup>569</sup> UNCTAD *World Investment Report 2004: The Shift towards Services*. New York & Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

<sup>570</sup> Russia – Ukraine cooperation evaluated by the Ukrainian Citizens, National Security and Defence, 1, January 2003, p.41

century, Ukrainians were more pro-Russian than pro-CIS, and popular opinion differed from that of elite researchers and politicians with regard to relations with the eastern neighbours. During the following years these differences lessened, but they still remain.<sup>571</sup>

According to Semenyi, Ukraine-Russia relations since 1991 may be divided into four phases: Permanent conflicts threatening the stability of the whole continent (1991-94); Conclusion of agreements and a legal framework for further relationships (1994-97); Interim period when Ukraine's opposition tried to impeach Kuchma(1997-2001); Exploitation of Russia's international isolation of Kuchma (reversing the Odessa-Brody pipeline)(2001-2004)<sup>572</sup>

Russia considered the results of the 2004 elections as a defeat and intensified its efforts to keep Ukraine within its hegemonic sway, as seen during the December 2005 gas crisis when Putin attempted to trade energy for vassalage – although natural gas is only one means Russia has at its disposal.<sup>573</sup>

Because Russia imposed a variety of tactics, including coercion, to maintain close contacts with Ukraine, Ukraine's Russian policy was inconsistent as well. Russian businessmen in Ukraine do not regard the country as a place to dominate, but rather, as a base for entering European markets. On the other hand Ukraine's oligarchs do not like Russian oligarchs owning assets in their country. They keep Russian ownership in their eastern provinces to a minimum, and presumably not all of them will betray independence in the interests of private business dealings with Russia.<sup>574</sup> These men supported Yushchenko, and the relationship suggests the possibility of a moderate, thought-out policy of bilateral relationships between Ukraine and Russia. Russia is the Ukraine's second trade partner, whereas Ukraine is the third trade partner of Russia.

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<sup>571</sup> *Ibid*, 43

<sup>572</sup> Semenyi, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>573</sup> Alexander Rahr, "Der kalte Frieden", *Internationale Politik*, March, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>574</sup> Tor Bukvoll, "Private Interests, Public Policy. Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement", *Problems of Post-Communism*, No.5, September-October 2004, p. 15-21.

As a factor of influence over Ukraine's 'vector of development', Russia today regards itself in a position of advantage. It has resources, history and will on its side. As many Russians see it, the EU's advantage is simply one of attraction. Doubtless, their perspective is distorted: Ukraine's trade turnover with the EU is greater than that with Russia. Nevertheless, as recent events have demonstrated, Ukraine depends upon Russia for its energy, and over the short-to-mid term, there is nothing that the EU or United States can do to change this. Moreover, whilst Ukraine's policy towards the EU and NATO is clearly foreign policy, language, inter-elite ties and a common business culture make Russia a structural component of internal politics in Ukraine. Finally, Ukraine's course is deemed a vital interest by Russia, but only an important interest by most EU and NATO member-states. These asymmetries between the EU and Russia have been made clear to every Ukrainian government. When Ukraine speaks of integration with Europe, the EU erects 'conditionality' and standards. When Ukraine seeks closer relations with Russia, the Russians erect no standards except 'firm good neighbourliness'. Hence, the EU proceeds to construct its Schengen frontier, hence Russia refuses to demarcate its border, until 2003 refusing to accept even the principle of demarcation on the grounds that borders "should unite and not separate the people of our countries."<sup>575</sup> Subservience to Russia does not require effort. Integration with the EU requires too much. This contrast does not strengthen pro-EU sentiment in Ukraine. If conditionality were seen as preparation for membership (as it is between Ukraine and NATO), rather than rejection, the impact might be very different. The comment of Leonid Polyakov in 2001 (now First Deputy Minister of Defence) remains telling: "So far, Russian officials, unlike NATO's have never voiced their concern about the weakness of Ukraine's defence or the slow pace of its military reform. One might infer that Ukraine's problems in building its armed forces are simply more acceptable to Moscow than Ukraine's success in that area."<sup>576</sup>

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<sup>575</sup> Statement issued by RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 August 2001.

<sup>576</sup> Leonid Polyakov, 'The Russian Factor in Ukraine's Relations with NATO', June 2001.

## 4.6 Overview

The EU has been unable to outline coherent strategic objectives towards Ukraine. The EU merely knows what it does not want Ukraine to do and its support is a means by which to encourage it to not complete joining any new Russia-backed unions. But such a policy is insufficient.<sup>577</sup> They regard it as ‘half a policy’. This incomplete policy does not answer the more fundamental question of where Ukraine should fit into the newly emerging European architecture. The EU’s ambivalence towards Ukraine’s strategic objectives is matched by an equally ambivalent Ukrainian foreign policy of ‘multi-vectorism’.<sup>578</sup> Ukraine is argued to be the focal point in the contested strategies or hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia. The former wants to be more self-confident to transform the power relations into tension, the latter wants to maintain its existing relationship and dominance with the creation of ‘Single Economic Space. The EU, with the initiative of the neighbourhood policy in March 2003, would bring about a new framework for analysis within the wider Europe. The objective of the ENP, as outlined, in March and June 2003, is not to seek further enlargement but to create ‘Integrated European Economic Space’ in EU’s neighbourhood. Unlike the other strategies, the EU has focused on free and fair elections, democratization and the rule of law in the region. Such a discourse was helpful during the ‘coloured revolution’ in Ukraine, however, lost its pace after the process of change.<sup>579</sup>

Due to the interplay of external and domestic factors, no political leadership on European matters emerged in Ukraine under the ENP.

Each strategy may be sustained for a while with the consent of its partners, but it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc. The EU has so far focused on transition issues. Like many of the other international organizations and larger western NGOs, the EU involved in; supporting the regime changes in Ukraine. The EU’s strategy seems to be an extension of neo-liberal restructuring that is to be secured externally via the EU and

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<sup>577</sup> Taras Kuzio and Jennifer Moroney, “Ukraine and the West: Moving from Stability to Strategic Engagement”, *European Security*, 10:2, Summer 2001, p.111.

<sup>578</sup> *Ibid*, p.112.

<sup>579</sup> Türkeş, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

international organisations.<sup>580</sup> As Epstein and Sedelmeier argue, the underspecified and open-ended nature of the award under the ENP poses the interesting question of whether the policy employs conditionality in the form of the conferral of reward in exchange for compliance<sup>581</sup>

Ukraine is not only the most important state and the largest country to the east that is a focus of the ENP, but also the country that has been most dissatisfied with the framework for relations with the EU, having expressed membership aspirations since the 1990s. As Jacoby argues, in comparison to accession countries the transformative effect in Ukraine has been slower and more limited. The policy has failed to focus the political class in Ukraine on the need for sustained reforms, in contrast to the role of enlargement in the reform process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).<sup>582</sup> Although the promise of the EU's Hegemonic Project's objective was the transformation of the society with the promise of change, the only change occurred was the elite transformation and old nomenclature is transformed into new NGOs.<sup>583</sup>

The coincidence of the launch of Orange Revolution with the ENP also shaped the expectations. The Orange Revolution created such high expectations vis-à-vis the EU that the new framework for relations with its focus on pragmatic aspects of cooperation without spelling out the end goal of relations could not satisfy them.<sup>584</sup> From a positive perspective, some of the authorities regarded the ENP as suitable for a pre-candidate phase of Ukraine's relations with the EU. The political instability and competition between the elites was another impeding factor preventing the creation of a historic bloc. In particular, the cohabitation of two protagonists from the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovich as prime minister and Viktor Yushenko as president, during the 2006-2007 following the parliamentary elections in March 2006, exacerbated the political instability

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<sup>580</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35.

<sup>581</sup> Rachel Epstein and Ulrice Sedelmeier, "Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Post-communist Europe after Enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15, 6 September, 2008.

<sup>582</sup> Wade Jacoby, "Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution. External Influences on Post-Communist Transformations", *World Politics*, 58:4, July 2006. p.623

<sup>583</sup> Türkeş, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>584</sup> Kravchuk, *op. c.t.*, p.198.

in Ukraine. The unclear distribution of power witnessed a political conflict over competencies between the prime minister and the president. In the accession countries the parliaments were largely marginalised in terms of managing EU-related affairs, because decision-making was concentrated on the executive. Their compliance and cooperation, however, was vital in the process of transposing the *acquis* into national legislation.<sup>585</sup> In contrast Ukrainian parliament did not assume such an enabling role in the first three years of the ENP. Law making remained a poorly structured process and Ukraine's obligations vis-à-vis the EU under the ENP hardly impacted on the legislative priorities.<sup>586</sup> Another challenge was the lack of political will and policy-making capacity necessary to override domestic opposition to change, no effective leadership on European issues was evident during the 'Orange' elites. The regulatory documents concerning the EU-Ukraine relationship were vague and outdated. For example, the Strategy, adopted for a 10 year period, listed the key priority areas for integration and envisaged that by 2007 'preconditions would be created for, obtaining by Ukraine a full-fledged membership status of the European Union'.<sup>587</sup> The uncoordinated policies without the comprehensive strategy, were dictated in the three-year Action Plan. During Rybachuk's tenure, as the deputy prime minister responsible for coordinating European integration, the first annual so-called 'Road Map on the Implementation of the AP' was adopted. The Road Map listed 177 measures indicating how, when and by which institutions the priorities of the AP were to be enacted.<sup>588</sup>

In 2006 with the government led by Viktor Yanukovich, the progress with implementation slowed down in comparison to 2005. Without clear political leadership on European issues and an effective coordinating mechanism within the government, the implementation of the AP was effectively conducted by, and left to the discretion of, middle-level civil servants.<sup>589</sup>

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<sup>585</sup> Barbara Lippert, Umbach Gaby and Wessels Wolfgang, "Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power", *Journal of European Policy*, 8:6, 2001.

<sup>586</sup> Razumkov Centre, Report on EU, 2005, p.15-16.

<sup>587</sup> Decree by the President of Ukraine on the Approval of the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration to the European Union', No.615/98, 11 June 1998, available at:<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/846.htm>, (Accessed 10 October 2008.)

<sup>588</sup> Razumkov Centre (2005) Ukraine-EC, p.3.

<sup>589</sup> Wolczuk, *op. cit.*, p. 202 .



Unlike enlargement, not only is the membership perspective absent but the actual award and specific conditions required for achieving it have not been clearly defined by the EU. Ukraine's participation in the ENP was seen as a transition by the Orange government, which took key decisions resulting in the 'domestication' of EU conditionality. In Ukraine the ENP has had a tangible empowering impact on actors other than the political class, most of all the state administration. This contrasts with the experience of the accession countries, where the political class became the most important 'coalition partners' of the EU.<sup>590</sup>

In Ukraine, there has been no transformative impact of the ENP in domestic policies due to the domestic and external factors. ENP as a hegemonic project of the EU is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc due to the fact that neither the EU nor Ukraine are willing to carry out their obligations. Enactment of EU-specified polity reforms and, especially, policy conditionality, amounting in essence to the adoption of the *acquis* requires coordination across a number of institutions and political will which are lacking both in Ukraine and in the EU as the actors involved in the Project.

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<sup>590</sup> Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p.624

## CHAPTER 5

### *Conclusion*

This study presented European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as a market-oriented, neo-liberal hegemonic project and conceptions of neighborhood policy as a socially-constructed process containing conflict and contradictions, power relations, and efforts to mediate conflict in order to produce a social order. It benefited from the insight given by the Neo-Gramscian perspectives overcome the limits and deficiencies of the mainstream approaches and account for the constitutive role of the global and the internal, in a dialectical relationship. European Neighborhood Policy was defined as the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe and the European Union's strategy towards its 'new neighbors' in Neo-Gramscian terms, as a hegemonic project.

The thesis was focused on European Neighborhood Policy's decision-making process and how this process is influenced by the social forces. European Neighborhood Policy supported neo-liberal restructuring in the region. Global restructuring pointed to an increasingly transnationalized system of production with changing material capabilities, ideas and institutions, which is an outcome of struggle. The rise of transnational corporations, as significant actors in the global economy, was an important aspect of the changing social relations of production. The change led to a dialectical process to redefine the role of states, which have largely been subordinated to the needs of emerging transnational forces by welcoming and encouraging the growth of Foreign Direct Investment and trade as essential components of development. Yet, this did not mean an erosion of the power of state but a reconfiguration of its role. European Union was considered to be an important agent in restructuring of relations in the neighboring countries.

The study provided an analysis of restructuring at the European level in relation to the general framework of globalization with an aim to understand the social purpose of European Union conditionality. The adaptation of the European Union conditionality became the embodiment of integration into global political economy, yet, without the

promise of membership. The neighborhood process, with reference to the free trade area, provides an important indication of increasing neo-liberal tendency in EU.

The thesis analyzed, with a Neo-Gramscian perspective, the transformations and redefinitions. It was useful to examine the Ukrainian history to see how the hegemonic projects have been sustained for a while, with consent of its partners but the problems could only transform the existing problems.

In Gramscian terms, Orange Revolution in Ukraine is regarded as the suspension of the Russia's hegemonic project and moreover, by the term used 'contradictory consciousness', a term to best describe the Ukrainian people, since they were indifferent, apathetic and unaware of the interpretation of the situation in Ukraine. Thus the 'consent' given by the masses was not a conscious one but rather an 'unconscious compliance'. However, Orange Revolution brought about changes in Ukrainian society. The emergence of civil society representing one segment of the social forces was one of the biggest changes in society.

The push for EU membership by the pro-European political parties signifies that neo-liberal restructuring has, to some extent, become internalized within the Ukrainian form of state in view of domestic economic recession. Against the background of globalization, some recently formed organizations such as the Confederation of Professional Employees supported the quest for membership. However, historical ties have kept some non-profit organizations among the Ukrainian national social forces from weakening their relationships with Russia.

It was assumed that the Commission's neo-liberal strategy is designed to transform the region into a space in which the free flow of capital, goods and services is secured, but the free movement of people is heavily restricted, and no commitment is made towards full membership for its partners. Hence the strategy of European Neighborhood Policy may be sustained for a while with the consent of its partners; however, it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc.

*Chapter 3* highlighted how this hegemonic project has been constructed by social forces whose moral, intellectual and material resources permit them to occupy a leading role

within the EU. The Neighborhood Policy, in particular, was interrogated whether it is the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe and their interactions with the EU institutions and how these social forces are formed.

The thesis aimed to examine to what extent Ukrainians are content with the EU's incentives on several issues, such as the energy problem, the visa and asylum issues. With regard to the *movement of persons*, it is already highly positive for both parties that Ukraine has scrapped visa restrictions for EU citizens. Visa facilitation negotiations have begun for Ukrainians traveling to EU. However, based upon the conditionality and monitoring, EU attempts to keep Ukraine within the Neighborhood Policy by giving some concessions but still without providing the free movement of people. Conditionality, not in the sense of 'membership', has been instrumental in the restructuring of state-society relations and the social institutions that were embedded in the state socialist structures. Regarding membership, linking certain incentives and offers to reform processes, the politics of conditionality played the utmost role in restructuring of the states. Nonetheless, in the neighborhood policy, without the incentive of membership, it is not that much influential.

The thesis also emphasized the fact; global restructuring points to an increasingly transnationalised system of production with changing material capabilities, ideas and institutions, which are the outcomes of a struggle. The rise of transnational corporations as significant actors in the global economy was an important aspect of the changing social relations of production. The thesis analyzed the transnational corporations representing the European Capital such as European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), Business Europe (UNICE) and European Movement International (EMI). Also, European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as a transnational corporation representing the European Labour was studied. The thesis showed the different perceptions of these institutions about ENP due to their different missions and role behaviors in society. ERT advocated the ENP due to the fact that the more the EU creates a stable and secure environment, the more efficient the business atmosphere will be. Business Europe is skeptical about the policy since it may threaten the competition and challenge the small and medium-size enterprises. On the other hand, representing the European Labor, ETUC is critical about ENP.

*Chapter 4* underlined the fact that states are the main agents for internalizing various historical forms that reflect changing social and power relations in the global political economy. Hence, states play a constitutive role in the globalization of production. Such conception of the role of states helps to perceive transformation and integration processes as dialectical processes within the unity of totality of the broader historical and social processes. Here, conditionality is again helpful to provide a link between coercion and consent which the states encounter during their transformations. Also, the chapter elaborated on how the state develops its position in compliance with the changes at global level and interrogates how Ukrainian policy is shaped and re-defined. Moreover, the study intended to provide an analysis of historical experiences of Ukraine with the aim of presenting how political and economic structures were shaped through their interaction with the structure within the international context. The political instability and its repercussions upon the relationship with EU is studied in order to show where and when the hegemonic discourses are formed. It was also analyzed to what extent Ukrainians are content with the EU's incentives on several issues, such as the energy problem, visa and asylum issues.

It was also investigated whether it is likely to form a historic bloc or not, in spite of the fact that Ukraine is squeezed between two hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia. *Chapter 4* analysed how and where these competing hegemonic projects of Russia and EU undermine each other. The former is the ring of the EU's set of economic relationships with its neighbours, the latter is Russia's 'Single Economic Space' which aims to reconstruct the old regional dominance, a more compact core group, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan aiming at deep regulatory convergence and ultimately a customs union. This thesis argues that Ukraine will continue to be the focal point of these contested strategies.

Since 1999, there have been substantial changes in the context for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine: EU has enlarged to 27 member states, with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania all directly bordering Ukraine, due to follow soon. European Union has developed a new European Neighborhood Policy which embraces Ukraine and greatly extends the agenda of Union –Ukrainian integration measures, including a stake in the internal market. Over the past five years, Ukraine's economy has impressively resumed economic growth, compensating for the heavy losses of the early

period of independence. Therefore sustainable sources of economic growth are required. Ukraine's accession to World Trade Organization has been integration to the globalization and would satisfy a major prerequisite for opening negotiations for free trade with EU. Ukraine has seen its dramatic Orange Revolution, which aimed at making a decisive break in favor of sound democratic governance, followed by the announcement of ambitious objectives for European integration. Nevertheless, subsequent developments are a reminder that the objective of democratic stability is not achieved overnight. The thesis also pointed out that the Orange Revolution was only a suspension of the Russia's hegemonic project.

Ukraine faces a crucial choice: either to integrate more closely with the EU through a deep Free Trade Area while seeking to maintain and extend the existing free trade agreements with CIS countries (for example, by reducing the list of goods exempted from free trade); or it could opt for deeper CES (Common Economic Space) integration with its envisaged customs union and institutional provisions. In the latter case, improvements in EU-Ukrainian trade relations might be limited to what would come with World Trade Organization accession, such as an end to the quota system for steel products and the granting of market-economy status, which would make it more difficult to impose anti-dumping tariffs on Ukrainian exports to EU. It is notable; however, that Ukraine's political declarations since the Orange Revolution have excluded Ukraine's accession to the customs union of the CES.

There is significant scope for greater trade in all parts of the energy sector and the inclusion of Ukraine in the Energy Treaty (signed on October 2005) concluded by the EU and the south-eastern European countries should be considered. With over 80% of Russia's gas exports and a substantial proportion of its oil exports to Europe transiting Ukraine, pipeline issues are another important area for the bilateral energy partnership. Ukraine has already signed up to the Energy Charter Treaty, but further collaboration regarding pipeline investments and management are needed. For the EU, the main concerns in this context are security of supply and the question of who controls the pipelines, whereas Ukraine's prime interests are the lucrative transit fees and a desire to reduce its dependency on Russian energy imports. Following the economic decline after independence, Ukraine currently uses only about half of its generation capacity domestically and has significant potential for electricity exports. Some of that potential is

used for exports to Russia, but power trade with western neighbors is precluded by a lack of interconnection between the former CIS and the continental European grids. The Ukraine's situation in between with the traditional links to Russia and prospects for the EU complicates the situation.

The free movement of people is a natural complement to free trade, especially for trade and investment in services. A beginning has been made with Ukraine's scrapping of visas for EU citizens and the opening of negotiations over EU visa-facilitation. There is much to be done in improving working conditions in many Ukrainian industries, but little case for Ukraine to seek to become compliant with EU labor market law as part of an FTA. Ukraine took the important step in the summer of 2005 of abolishing visa requirements for EU citizens. This step will surely be positive for Ukraine, for the tourism sector, for business connections and for people-to-people contacts in general. It is also a clear strategic signal for a positive 27. An accompanying measure would be to ease the bureaucratic burden of obtaining work permits for EU nationals entering Ukraine. There are criticisms levied by members of the European Business Association in Kyiv in this regard. The EU and Ukraine have now opened negotiations over possible visa facilitating measures for Ukrainian citizens to travel to the EU. Negotiations over the possible lifting of visa requirements for short-term stays will for the EU side be linked to broader issues, such as illegal migration and security concerns since corruption as an endemic condition in post-communist societies has defied simple or rapid remedial action. Yet over the medium-term results can be achieved as other European countries have shown. For ordinary people – rather than diplomats and business people – the ability to travel freely in other countries is one of the few unambiguous benefits of the end of communism. Even for the many people in wider Europe who have not traveled or worked abroad, knowing that the possibility exists for them and their children is very important. It fundamentally shapes their view of the EU. However, in future, member-states may well adopt an increasingly restrictive approach to allowing people into the Schengen zone of passport-free travel, owing to terrorism and illegal immigration fears. The EU needs to work fast in designing better travel and visa-issuing systems for its neighbors, before domestic political pressures cause its member-states to close their doors even more tightly. The politics of the movement of people could get harder rather than easier to handle. But the EU could help neighboring countries by working more intensively with the neighbors to ease the burden on ordinary travelers and catch more illicit trade and

illegal migration. But to get the neighbors cooperate, the Union needs to promise to ease various travel restrictions, in return. The Commission's vague promise to look at the reveals the fact that the EU intends to put Ukraine in distant without permitting them to stay the neighborhood framework.

European Union has many excuses not to carry out her promises as Ukraine is characterized by widespread state ownership, an oligarchic business structure; a big part of the economy is controlled by a few industrial clans, inefficient bureaucracy and endemic corruption. Therefore Ukraine is argued to have a long way to go between two contested hegemonic projects having different ties and obligations. The thesis also underlined the fact that these two hegemonic projects are not mutually exclusive since Ukraine could not establish deeper relationships with both EU and Russia. For instance, free trade area with the EU does not prevent the type of economic integration with Russia. However, the deeper types of integration such as the customs union may force Ukraine to make her choice.

Based upon my interviews made in Brussels, the European business community has a broad interest in expanding the EU's Single Market into neighboring non-member states. This would not only mean openness for trade and investment, but also a favorable business climate and regulatory framework based on European standards. While Russia is clearly the biggest neighboring market, Ukraine perhaps presents itself as a more willing partner to converge on EU standards, as signaled politically by its 'European choice'.

EU's internal complexity seriously reduces its external impact. The neighbors need to hear a coherent message from all parts of the EU. But instead, they receive different signals from different EU institutions and governments. Even the Commission often sends mixed messages. For example, the Directorate-General for External Relations tries to encourage the neighbors by proposing trade concessions, but is often blocked by the directorates for agriculture and trade. The gap between the technocratic approach of the Commission and the political approach of the Council also leads to incoherent policies. The differences in timetables and priorities between EU institutions cause huge confusion in the neighborhood, where the Union's demands are often a combination of conflicting requirements. Member-states are to blame, too. For example, the EU puts suspension clauses into its aid and trade agreements, on human rights and democracy, but it has



never used them but it undermines the EU's credibility. A few suspensions could have a powerful effect in showing that the EU means what it says. The large member-states need to stop giving special concessions such as market economy status and the prospect of visa-free travel. Despite the evident difficulties of dealing with large countries, the EU needs to speak with one voice in its whole neighborhood, and it needs to keep saying the same thing year after year. These contradicting messages make the EU's hegemonic project improbable to turn into a historic bloc. On the other hand, regarding the impact of the domestic factors, Ukraine's willingness to 'go West' is still not matched by consistent domestic reforms, while its strategic position in the energy supply market makes it a crucial partner for both Russia and the EU. Being squeezed by the two competing hegemonic projects of the EU and Russia, Ukraine has real problems for the future.

Specifically, with regard to Ukraine, the role of national as well as transnational organic intellectuals were examined in order to understand their interrelation with the government and with Ukraine shows how the challenges to prevailing institutional and political arrangements by counter-hegemonic forces complicate the achievement of hegemony within a particular social formation.

Hence it was argued that there are ambiguities in Ukrainian domestic and international politics and that the existence of two contested hegemonic projects only helps to transform problems from one platform to another.

The EU wants to have differentiated relationships and agreements of different kinds on cross-cutting sectoral themes, such as energy networks, with each individual neighbourhood country. In *Chapter 3*, the origins of the ENP were taken as the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It was also defined as EU's hegemonic project which was not able to turn into a historic bloc. Neighborhood Policy does not constitute a revolutionary change in EU external relationships. The ENP reflects European traditional foreign policy objectives such as the promotion of security, stability, and common values and adopts EU traditional foreign policy instruments such as the promise of aid and economic integration. The ENP is innovative neither in its goals nor its instruments. The only main difference is its emphasis on differentiation that makes the ENP distinctive from past. While European Mediterranean Partnership emphasizes 'multilateralism' as the prevalent approach, European Neighborhood Policy emphasizes the principle of

differentiation according to which the level of cooperation and association with the Union is a function of bilateral relationships between the Union and each neighbor. The two policies are similar in important respects. Both policies use the discourse of creating a zone of peace and prosperity that include the Union and its partners. Both adopt a similar set of incentives that place the greatest emphasis on political dialogue, trade and technical cooperation. ENP succeeded EMP. European Commission clearly stated that ENP does not replace EMP rather the two policies complement each other. The Thessalonica decision of 2003 by the EU to launch new relations with its immediate geographic neighbors suggest that, after years of inaction, EU is aware of the fact that it needs to play a larger role to secure peace and prosperity on the European continent. The Eastern enlargement is without doubt the most obvious reason why the ENP came about.

Here, it is argued that EU's strategy towards the policy involving new neighbors is viewed as a hegemonic project with the insight provided by the Neo-Gramscian perspective. ENP is the product of dynamic, complex relationships between different social forces in Europe. Emphasis is placed on the construction of hegemonic project which is formed by social forces with moral, intellectual and material dimensions occupying a leading role within the EU.

The success of the ENP whether the EU's Hegemonic Project will be sustained or not is a question with significant implications not only for the EU and its immediate neighborhood but also for the entire international system. However, for some reasons the ENP is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc such as the lack of adequate funding, incoherent design and implementation, insufficient incentives for partner countries to alter their behavior and adopt EU norms. Since the mid-1990s, the application of conditionality by the EU has become associated with preparations for accession. Therefore membership is regarded as the only award that justifies the EU's demand for, and involvement in, reforms of state structures and policies of non-member states.

It may be argued that Ukraine is the focal point for different interests and strategies in the region regarding Russian Federation and the European Union since Ukraine has the potential to contribute to stability as well as polarization and thus further instability in the Black Sea region. It should be noted that it is difficult to make general statements about the 'Eastern dimension' of the ENP which was very recently launched on 7 May

2009 covering six countries around the Black Sea region – Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – just by analyzing Ukraine as a case study, since these countries differ significantly from one another in terms of history, size and potential problems. While they are all ‘European’, at least geographically, the ‘new’ Eastern neighbors are distinct from all other potential EU members and partner in their relationship with – and to a certain extent their dependence upon – Russia. Hence, it may be claimed that these countries are located between the hegemonic projects of the European Union and Russia, as was clearly exemplified with the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008.

All in all, the strategy of the Neighborhood Policy may be sustained for a while with consent of its partners; however it is unlikely to turn into a historic bloc. The two strategies hegemonic projects of the EU’s as ‘Integrated European Economic Space’ and Russia’s ‘Single Economic Space’ are in the process of being formed as two contested hegemonic projects. The former is the ring of the EU’s set of economic relationships with its neighbors with whom the EU does not seek to further enlargement; the latter is a more compact core group, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan aiming at deep regulatory convergence and ultimately a customs union for Russia to regain its old regional dominance. These contested strategies are open-ended.

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## APPENDIX

### 1.1

### TURKISH SUMMARY

#### AVRUPA KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI: BİR HEGEMONYA PROJESİ Mİ? UKRAYNA ÖRNEK ÇALIŞMA

##### **Türkçe Özet:**

Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü, uluslararası ilişkilerde yeni bir dönemin başlangıcını, sınırlarda değişiklik yaparak ve özellikle Avrupa Birliği içinde jeopolitik dönüşüm yaratarak getirmiştir. 2004'teki genişleme, AB'nin sınırlarını, 'hala istikrarlı olmayan' eski Doğu Bloku'na doğru itmiş ve AB'yi politikalarını çeşitlendirmeye itmiştir. Potansiyel sorunların çıkabileceği alan eski Doğu Bloku üye devletleri alanı olduğu için, bu ülkelerin Pazar ekonomilerine geçişlerinde ve siyasi sistemlerini demokratikleştirmede AB'nin yardımına gereksinim duyuyorlardı. Aksi takdirde, bu ülkelerden kaynaklanan çatışmalar, AB'deki istikrarı tehdit edebilirdi. Dolayısıyla, AB 'istikrar, ekonomik refah ve demokrasi' ihraç etmeye mecbur kaldı. Diğer bir deyişle; bu çabalar AB'nin gerekliliklerine paralel olarak bu ülkelerin yeniden şekillendirilmesine yönelik girişimlerdi.

Avrupa Birliği, Doğu ve Güney Avrupa ülkeleriyle olan yoğun ikili anlaşma ağında görüldüğü gibi, dış politikada ikili ilişkileri tercih eder gibi görünmekteydi. Bunun da en açık göstergesi üyelik sürecidir. Bu, norm ve değerlerin tek taraflı yansıtılması olarak kabul edilen asimetrik ve tek taraflı bir süreçtir. AB'nin normatif hegemonyasının uygulanması yalnızca AB üye ülkeleriyle sınırlıdır ve bu süreç sonunda üyeliği vaadeder. Ancak Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası çerçevesinde onbeş devletten onbiri ile müzakere etmiş ve Ortaklı ve İşbirliği Antlaşmalarını tamamlamıştır. Burada üyelik vaadinin eksik olması önemli bir fark olarak görülmektedir.

2002 Nisan'ında İngilizler tarafından önerilen, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası (AKP) insiyatifi, 2004 Mayıs'ında AB'ye komşu olacak olan Doğu Avrupa ülkelerini hedeflemekteydi. 2003 Mart'ında, Komisyon tarafından, 'Communication on Wider

Europe' ta ana hatları belirtildiği üzere, Birliğin komşularıyla olan gelecekteki ilişkilerini şekillendirmeye yönelik verdiği yüksek önceliği göstermektedir. Komisyon, 12 Mayıs 2004'te bir strateji dökümanı ve Birliğin komşularıyla nasıl daha yakın çalışabileceği ve genişlemenin yararlarını nasıl arttırabileceğini gösteren ülke raporları hazırlamıştır. AKP'ye ilişkin resmi dökümanlar, Mart 2003'te Communication, 12 Mayıs 2004 tarihli Komisyon Strateji Raporu ve Avrupa Sanayicileri Yuvarlak Masa (ERT) dökümanlarıdır. Ayrıca Strateji Raporu'na göre; Eylem Planları, gelecek yıllardaki anahtar öncelikleri belirleyecektir.

Önceden, 'Wider Europe' ve 'Proximity Policy' olarak bilinen AKP, Barcelona süreci kapsamında Akdeniz'deki AB üyesi olmayan ülkeler ve Ortaklık ve İşbirliği anlaşmaları ile temas kurulan Doğu Avrupası ülkelerle oluşturulan bölgesel ve ikili ilişkilerin bir uzantısı olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. AKP sayesinde, AB yukarıda sözü edilen antlaşmalarda gizli olan bazı problemlerle yüzleşmeyi ve bunları mevcut siyasi iklimle paralelleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Daha özel belirtmek gerekirse, AB, 'AB'nin yakın, barışçı ve işbirliği ilişkileri kurabileceği bir refah ve dostluğa komşuluk bölgesi geliştirmeyi' amaçlamaktadır.

AKP, AB'nin yeni komşularıyla karşılaştığı sorunları ve ilişkileri ele alırken kullandığı birincil çerçevedir. AB, bütün komşu ülkelerle ilişkilerinde tek bir çerçeve benimseyerek komşularının diğerlerine görelerine göreceli konumlarıyla ilgili kaygılarını azaltmayı ve ortakları arasındaki ilişkilerdeki öncelik vermekten kaynaklanan bölünmeleri önlemeyi amaçlamaktaydı. Ayrıca bu çerçeve AB'ye, ortaklarına çeşitli sorunları gidermek bir dizi teşvik ve işbirliği mekanizmaları vermesini sağladı. Bunların hepsi de, AKP'nin temel prensibi olan her bir ülkenin ihtiyaçlarına göre özel düzenlenmiş kurumsal bir çerçeve içinde sağlandı. Dolayısıyla ortaklar arasında farklılıklar olduğunu yok saymak da istemiyoruz.

Bu tez, AKP'yi Avrupa'daki transnasyonel güç ilişkileri örtüşmeleri ve Ukrayna özel örneğindeki ekonomik, siyasi ve (sivil) toplumsal süreçlerdeki tarihsel perspektif içindeki artikülasyonları, Neo-Gramscian bakış açısıyla analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Böylelikle bu çalışma AB'nin hegemonya projesinin nasıl oluştuğu ve uygulandığını göstermeyi, bu projenin yeniden tanımlama olanağının olup olmadığını ve sürdürülebilirliğini sorgulamaktadır. Burada Komisyon'un neo-liberal stratejisinin bölgeyi serbest sermaye,

mal ve hizmet akışlarının sağlandığı ancak kişilerin serbest dolaşımının katı bir şekilde kısıtlandığı bir bölgeye dönüştürmek üzere tasarlanmıştır ve ortaklarının tam üyeliklerine doğru hiç bir vaat bulunmamaktadır.

Gerçekte bu çalışma AKP'nin hegemonya projesi olarak tarihsel bir blok oluşturma olasılığını, bu projenin ortaklarının rızası ile sürdürülebilirliğini araştırmaktadır.

Tezin odağına paralel olarak Bölüm 2'de çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi sunulmaktadır. Neo-Gramscian analiz, genelde ulusal ve transnasyonel düzeyde hegemonyanın nasıl oluşturulduğunu ve yapılandığını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Hegemonyanın güçle güvence altına alındığı görüşünü savunan realist teoriye karşıt olarak, Gramsci, hegemonyayı güç ve rıza arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşim olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu noktadan hareketle, çalışmamız AB'nin hegemonya projesine verilen güç ve rızanın düzeyini analiz etmek için, sosyal güç ilişkileri ve bunların devlet/sivil-toplumçerçevesindeki kuruluşlarını ve artikülasyonlarını tanımlamaya odaklıdır. Bu yaklaşım da projenin başarı olasılığının değerlendirilmesini sağlayacaktır. AB'nin komşularına karşı genel stratejisinin çatışan politik, kültürel ajanlar ve kuruluşlar tarafından yönlendirilen entelektüel ve ahlaki liderlik üzerine oturan bir hegemonya projesi olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bölüm 3, bu hegemonya projesinin, ahlaki, entelektüel ve maddi kaynaklarının onlara AB içinde lider bir rol oynamalarını sağlayan sosyal güçlerce nasıl oluşturulduğuna işaret etmektedir. AKP'nin özellikle Avrupa'daki çeşitli sosyal güçler arasındaki dinamik ve karmaşık ilişkilerin ürünü olup olmadığı, bu ilişkilerin AB kurumları ile etkileşimleri ve sosyal güçlerin nasıl oluştuğu sorgulanmaktadır. Bu bölüm AKP'nin Barselona sürecinden sonra ortaya çıkışını araştırmakta ve projenin başarı düzeyinin bir ön değerlendirmesini yapmaktadır. Bu bölümde AB sermayesini temsil eden sosyal güçlerin AKP karar verme sürecinde ne derece etkili olduğu sorgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca bu bölümde uluslararası ve transnasyonel sivil toplumların ve kuruluşların Avrupa Sanayiciler Yuvarlak Masası (ERT), Uluslararası Avrupa Hareketi (EMI) ve Avrupa Özel Sektör Konfederasyonu (UNICE- Business Europe) oynadıkları roller incelenmiştir. Yine bu bölümde AB'nin iç yapısı ve dış dinamikleri ve bunların AKP için alınan kararlarla ilişkileri analiz edilmiştir. En son olarak bu bölümde AKP'nin sürdürülebilirliği sorgulanmaktadır.



Bölüm 4, AKP'nin bir örnek çalışması olarak Ukrayna'yı incelemektedir. AKP üyesi ülkeler içinde Ukrayna'nın seçilme nedeni Ukrayna'nın Avrupa kıtasındaki en büyük ve en kalabalık devletlerden bir olmasıdır. Ukrayna, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından bu yana büyük ölçüde istikrarsızlık özelliği olan bir Avrupa alt-bölgesinin ortasında ve Rusya ve AB arasında sıkışmış konumdadır.

Ukrayna'nın bölgeyi istikrara ya da istikrarsızlığa götürmek için büyük bir potansiyeli vardır. Bunun için Ukrayna'nın gelecekteki yönelmesi Avrupa Güvenliği için hayati bir önem taşımaktadır. Alexander Motyl; Avrupa'nın geleceğinde oynayacağı merkezi rolü belirleyici özelliklerine öncelik vermektedir. Motyl, Ukrayna'nın etkileyici büyüklüğü, ekonomik potansiyeli ve kaynaklardan gelir sağlama, Rusya üzerindeki etkileri yoluyla Ukrayna'nın nasıl Avrupa'nın güvenliği ve istikrarı için önemli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Ukrayna zengin maden kaynakları, demir endüstrisi, kimyasal endüstrisi ile AB Komşuluk ülkeleri içinde ayrı bir yere sahiptir. Ülkenin kömür ve geniş maden yatakları gibi önemli enerji kaynakları ve yüksek kalitede insan sermayesi vardır. Ukrayna, Rus ve Hazar petrol ve doğal gazının taşınmasını sağlayarak, dünyanın önde gelen enerji geçiş yolu ülkelerinden biridir. Ayrıca Ukrayna, Avrupa'nın sınırında doğu ile batı arasında bir alan kaplamakla kalmayıp, kültürel bir sınırın üstünde yer almaktadır. Katolik ve ortodoks dünyalarının dini ayrışması da Ukrayna içinde yer almaktadır. Avrupa'nın yüzölçümü açısından ikinci, nüfus açısından beşinci büyük ülkesi olan Ukrayna, yalnızca Avrupa için değil Rusya ve Amerika açısından da jeo-stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. Jeo-stratejik konumu ve iki karşılıklı hegemonyanın arasında yer almasıyla Ukrayna, Baltık ülkeleri arasında lider bir aktördür ve eski Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa arasında kritik bir rol oynamaktadır. Ayrıca Ukrayna, ortak Slav geçmişten gelmesi, tarihi ve kültürel bağlantıları sebebiyle, Rusya ile 'Özel bir İlişkiye' sahiptir.

Ukrayna, diğer komşuluk ülkelerinden farklıdır. Visegrad ülkelerine bakıldığında Ukrayna'nın değişik bir konumu vardır. Ülke, Macaristan ve Slovakya ile ortak bir sınırı paylaşmakta ve Macaristan, Slovakya ve Çek Cumhuriyeti içinde Ukraynalı azınlık gruplar yer almaktadır. Aynı şekilde Ukrayna'da diğer üç ülkenin etnik grupları yaşamaktadır. Ukrayna'nın AB'ye üye olması, Polonya'nın Doğu Avrupa'yı demokratikleştirme ve modernleştirme misyonunu desteklemektedir. Ancak diğer Visegrad ülkelerinin kendi ilgi alanları ve öncelikleri vardır. Bunun için bu ülkelerin

genelde AKP'ye ve özelde Ukrayna'ya katkıları sürekli olmamaktadır. Baltık ülkeleri de Ukrayna ile tarihsel ve coğrafi bağlara sahiptir ve bu ülkeler kendi güçlerini arttırmak, Rusya'nın bölgedeki etkisini azaltmak, enerji arzının güvenilirliğini arttırmak ve dondurulmuş çatışmaları çözmek için AKP'yi destekler görünmektedirler. Baltık ülkelerinin GUAM (Gürcistan, Ukrayna, Moldova ve Azerbaycan) ülkeleri ile güçlü bağları vardır ve bu ülkeler yakın zamanda AKP'yi bölgedeki çalışmaları için ana araç olarak kullanmaya başlamışlardır. Ancak daha kalıcı bir başarı için bölgedeki büyük oyuncu, Rusya Federasyonu'nun aldığı katı önlemlere karşı stratejiler geliştirmeyi gerekli kılmaktadır.

Ayrıca Ukrayna'nın çok temel ayrıştırıcı özellikleri vardır. Balkanlar ve Akdeniz bölgesi ile karşılaştırıldığında 1990'lardan beri büyük bir savaş görmeyen Ukrayna, göreceli bir istikrar bölgesi olmuştur. Ukrayna'nın uzun Sovyet geçmişi ülkenin sosyal, politik ve ekonomik yaşamında kendini göstermektedir. Alexander Motyl'in belirttiği gibi bu ülkeler ve Avrupa'nın geri kalanı arasındaki uçurum sistemiktir ve bunun nedeni onların kimliklerinin Avrupa dışı kabul edilmesinden değil ancak bu ülkelerin artı-Avrupalı, artı-Slav, artı-Rus ve artı-tek olmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Ukrayna'nın istikrara, aynı zamanda kutuplaşma ve Karadeniz Bölgesi'ndeki ileride doğabilecek istikrarsızlığa etkileri olabileceğinden dolayı, bu ülke Rusya Federasyonu ve AB arasında değişik çıkarlar ve stratejilerin odak noktası haline gelmiştir.

Bu tez, öncelikle Ukrayna'nın tarihsel deneyimlerini ayrıntılandırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Ukrayna'nın küresel düzeydeki değişimlere paralel olarak, konumunu nasıl geliştirdiği değerlendirilmekte ve Ukrayna politikasının nasıl şekillendiği ve yeniden tanımlandığı sorgulanmaktadır. Hegemonik söylemlerin nerede ve ne zaman oluştuğunu göstermek amacıyla, ülkedeki politik istikrarsızlık ve bunun AB ile ilişkilere yansımaları incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma Ukraynalıların, AB'nin enerji sorunu, vize ve iltica konularındaki kararları ile ne kadar tatmin olduğunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu bölümün ikinci kısmında iki çarpışan hegemonya projesi olarak Rusya ve AB hegemonya projeleri incelenmiştir. Rusya projesi eski bölgesel hakimiyeti yeniden kurmak amacıyla, Baltık ülkeleri içinde, 'Tek Ekonomik Alan' kurmayı amaçlarken, AB projesi ise, 'Bütünleşik Avrupa Ekonomik Alan'ı kurmayı planlamaktadır.

Bölüm 5'te tezin ana sonuçları ve mantıksal çıkarımları özetlenmektedir.

Basılı ve yayınlanmış materyallerden oluşan ikincil kaynaklarla birlikte, teorik bölümü güçlendirmek için birincil bir araştırma yürütülmüştür. Saha çalışması için AKP'nin ana karar verici mercii olarak Brüksel ve ENP'nin özel uygulama alanı olarak Ukrayna seçilmiştir. Birincil araştırma Brüksel'de 2006 ve 2007 yıllarında yapılmıştır. Yapısal ve yararlı sonuçlara ulaşılması amacıyla bütün detaylı mülakatlar değişik ilgi grupları, önceliklerin her açıdan analiz edilmesine olanak verecek şekilde kategorize edilmiştir.

AKP'nin kuruluşu ve uygulanmasının altında yatan süreci iyi anlayabilmek amacıyla, mülakatlar Komisyon üyeleri, Parlamento üyeleri ve diğer Avrupa Birliği Kurumları bürokratları ile yapılmıştır çünkü iç politik konjonktür ancak onların bakış açılarından anlaşılabilir.

Politik analistler, akademisyenler, gazeteciler, teknokratlar, yabancı diplomatik misyon temsilcileri ve uzmanlarla, AKP'nin güçlü/zayıf yanları, oluşturduğu fırsatlar ve tehditler açısından değerlendirmelerini almak amacıyla mülakatlar yapılmıştır.

Avrupalılık bağlamından farklı olarak politikayı bütünüyle analiz edebilmek için ulusal görüş açılarına da ihtiyaç vardı. Bunun için komşu devletlerin AKP'yi nasıl dış politikalarının bir parçası olarak algıladığını incelemek amacıyla diplomatik misyon temsilcileriyle de mülakatlar yapılmıştır.

Son olarak; tezin teorik çerçevesinin merkezinde sosyal güçleri temsil eden sivil toplum ve iş kuruluşları temsilcileri yer almaktadır. Dolayısıyla ulusal, transnasyonal sivil toplum üyelerine görüşleri sorulmuştur. Bu kişilerin pek çoğu daha önce üst düzey AB bürokrati oldukları için, AKP'nin dinamiklerine içsel ve dışsal görüş açıları belirtmişlerdir.

Tezde sunulan araştırma sonuçları Mart 2007'de Brüksel ve Eylül 2007'de Kiev'e yapılan araştırma gezilerinde toplanan verilere (özellikle mülakatlar ve belgeler) dayanmaktadır. Ukraynalı politika yapımcılar, kanaat önderleri, siyasi parti temsilcileri, teknokratlar, akademisyenler, gazeteciler ve yabancı diplomatik misyon temsilcileri ile

yapılan mülakatlar, tezde kullanılmadan önce araştırmanın erken bulgularını test etmeye yardımcı olmuştur. Bu tez, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını, Avrupa'daki transnasyonel güç ilişkilerini de ortaya koyarak; ekonomik, siyasi ve toplumsal süreçleri tarihsel değişimleri ışığında, Ukrayna örneğinde Neo-Gramscian perspektifte incelemeyi hedeflemiştir. Tez, böylece Avrupa Birliği Hegemonya Projesinin nasıl oluşup uygulandığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca bu projenin yeniden tanımlanmaları olup olmadığı ve kalıcı olup olmadığı da sorgulanmaktadır. Komisyon'un neo-liberal stratejileri ile bölgenin serbest sermaye, hizmet ve mal dolaşımının güvence altına alınabileceği bir bölgeye dönüştürüleceği, fakat kişilerin serbest dolaşımının kısıtlı tutulacağı ve üyelik taahhüdünde bulunulmadığı varsayılmaktadır.

Gerçekte, Tez, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının tarihsel bloğa dönüşüp dönüşmeyeceğini ve tarafların rızası ile kalıcılığının sağlanıp sağlanamayacağını araştırmaktadır. Bu çalışma, toplumsal güç ilişkilerine, onların örgütlenmesine ve ulusal / transnasyonel düzeyde devlet sivil toplum kompleksi içerisinde, Avrupa Birliği hegemonya projesinde hangi derecede güç ve rıza kullanıldığını analiz etmektedir. Bu sayede projenin başarı olasılığının ne olabileceği değerlendirilmiştir.

Bu çalışma Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını piyasa odaklı, neo-liberal hegemonya projesi ve komşuluk politikası kavramlarını da sosyal oluşum odaklı süreçlerle içinde çatışma ve çelişkilerin olduğu ve sosyal düzenin oluşması için güç çatışmalarının çözümüne aracı olan güç ilişkileri ve çabalar diye tanımlar. Geleneksel teoriler yerine, Neo-Gramscian perspektifin prensiplerinden yararlanır. Dialektik ilişkiler içerisinde, küresel ve iç dinamiklere birarada açıklama getirir. Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, Avrupa Birliği içerisindeki farklı sosyal güçlerin dinamik, kompleks ilişkilerinin ürünü olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada ayrıca Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının karar alma süreci ve bu sürecin sosyal güçleri nasıl etkilediği incelenmektedir. Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası, bölgedeki neo-liberal yeniden yapılandırılmasını desteklemektedir. Küresel yeniden yapılandırma; çatışmanın sonucu olan değişen materyal beceriler, fikirler ve kurumlarla gittikçe artan transnasyonel üretim sistemlerini işaret etmektedir. Transnasyonel örgüterin küresel ekonomide önemli aktörler olarak yükselişi, üretimin değişen toplumsal ilişkilerinin önemli bir sonucudur. Bu değişim devletlerin rolünün yeniden tanımlandığı bir dialektik bir sürece neden

olur. Devletin deęişen bu rolü, oluşmakta olan transnasyonel güçlerin yabancı dış sermayeyi teşvik etmesinden ve gelişimin ana bileşeninin ticaret olduğundan daha az önemlidir. Fakat bu devletin yokolduęu anlamına gelmez; sadece devletin rolünün yeniden derlenmesi demektir. Avrupa Birlięi komşu ülkelerle ilişkilerin yeniden yapılandırılması ile ilgili en önemli ajan kabul edilmektedir. Bu tez, Avrupa Birlięi koşulluluęunun sosyal boyutunu anlamak amacıyla ve küresleşmenin genel çerçevesi içerisinde, Avrupa düzeyinde yeniden yapılanmayı analiz etmektedir. Avrupa Birlięinin koşulluluęunun adaptasyonu entegrasyonun küresel politik ekonomide şekillenmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat bu süreçte üyelik taahhüdü bulunmamaktadır. Serbest ticaret alanını öngören 'Komşuluk süreci' Avrupa Birlięi içerisindeki neo-liberal eğiliminin arttıęının bir göstergesidir.

Tez, Neo-Gramscian yaklaşımı içerisinde yeniden tanımlanmaları ve dönüşümleri analiz eder. Ayrıca tarihi perspektifi ile inceleyerek, hegemonya projesinin belirli süreler içerisinde ancak tarafların rızası ile varlığını sürdürdüęü fakat problemin muhafaza edildięi belirli bir düzlemden başka bir düzleme taşındıęı incelenmiştir.

Gramscian tanım içerisinde; tez içerisinde 'Portakal Devrimi' Rusya'nın hegemonya projesinin belirli bir süre ile askıya alınması anlamını taşımaktadır. Gramsci'nin kullandıęı 'çelişkili bilinç' kavramı da Ukrayna halkının Portakal Devrimi ile bilinçli bir rıza göstermedięi bunun 'bilinçsiz bir rıza olma anlamına geldięi vurgulanmaktadır. Bunun sebebi de halkın siyaseten ilgisiz, tecrübesiz ve yeteri kadar eğitilmiş olmadığı gerekçe olarak gösterilmektedir. Buna rağmen Portakal Devriminin Ukrayna toplumu üzerinde olumlu etkileri olduęu da yadsınamaz. Bunlardan en önemlisi 'sivil toplum' anlayışının ilk temellerinin atılmasını sağlamasıdır. Gramsci'nin devlet, sivil toplum ve rıza siyaseti anlayışı buyurgan tavsiyelerden ziyade betimleyici nitelikte olmuştur. Hegemonya teorisi geniş analitik bir çerçeve gerektirirken, gerçekçi olarak devrimsel bir gelişim sürecini göstermeyi hedeflerken buna baęlı olarak da sınıf hakimiyetinde üst yapıların rolünün daha detaylı odaklanarak analiz edilmesini de sağlamıştır. Gramsci'nin farklılaşma ve açık-uçluluk prensipleri Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasına ve örneğinde de Ukrayna'ya koşullar itibariyle uymaktadır. Gramsci'ye göre içerik aynı olsa da, hangi devlet olursa olsun süreç farklılaşır. Gramsci'de sivil toplum yapısal değil, fakat üstyapısal iki büyük düzeyi ayırmaktadır. Bunlardan birtanesi 'sivil

toplum', yani genellikle özel diye anılan organizmalar bütünüdür. Diğeri ise 'siyasal toplum' ya da 'devlet' diye adlandırılabilir. Gramsci'nin Marx'tan en belirgin farkı, Marx ve Gramsci'nin her ikisinde de sivil toplum, tarihsel gelişmenin etkin ve olumlu anını temsil etmektir. Gramsci'de sivil toplum, Marx'da olduğu gibi altyapı uğrağına değil, ama üstyapı uğrağına ilişkin olduğuna göre, içeriği de, maddi ilişkiler bütünlüğünü değil, ama daha çok ideolojik-kültürel ilişkiler bütünlüğünü; ticari ve sınai yaşam bütünlüğünü değil, ama daha çok tinsel ve zihinsel yaşamı kapsadığı söylenerek belirtilmiştir. Gramsci bilinenin aksine sivil toplum kavramını Marx'tan değil Hegel'den almıştır. Marx'taki sivil toplum anlayışı daha ziyade yapısaldır. Marx'ın sivil toplumu yapı ile özdeşleştirmesine karşın, Gramsci tarafından, sivil toplumun 'yapı'dan 'üstyapı'ya aktarılması, yapı ile üstyapı arasındaki ilişkilerin Gramsciye uygun yapı ile üstyapı ilişkileri sorunu, kendisinin buna verdiği öneme karşın, yeterli dikkati çekememiştir.

İçerik aslında yöneten sınıfın hegemonyası ile ilgili yaşanan krizdir. Bu iki sebepten olabilir. Birincisi Ukrayna'daki Avrupa taraftarı siyasi partilerin Avrupa Birliği'ne verdikleri destek, neo-liberal yeniden yapılanma sürecinde ulusal ekonomik bunalımın da etkisiyle Ukrayna tarzı devlet anlayışında içselleştirildiği söylenebilir. Küreselleşmenin ışığında, Çalışanlar Konfederasyonu örneğinde olduğu gibi Avrupa Birliği'ne destek vermektedirler. Fakat, tarihi bağlardan dolayı kimi geleneksel sivil toplum örgütleri Rusya ile bağlantılarını koparmamakta direnmişlerdir.

Tezde, Avrupa Komisyonu'nun neo-liberal stratejisinin, serbest sermaye, mal ve hizmet dolaşımına izin veren fakat kişilerin serbest dolaşımını engelleyen ve üyelik sözü vermeyi reddeden bir alana dönüştürmeyi hedeflediği varsayılmaktadır. Teze göre; bu şartlar altında bu strateji tarafların rızasıyla bir süre için sürdürülebilir fakat tarihsel bloğa dönüşmesi mümkün değildir.

Bu çalışmada aynı zamanda küresel yeniden yapılanmanın değişen materyal yeterlilik, fikirler ve kurumlarla transnasyonel sistemi işaret ettiği ve bunun da mücadelenin sonucu olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Transnasyonel kurumların küresel ekonomi içindeki öneminin artışı değişen toplumsal ilişkiler üretiminin de önemli bir parçasıdır. Tez transnasyonel kuruluşları, Avrupa sermayesini temsilen ERT, UNICE - Business

Europe ve Avrupa Hareket başlıkları altında analiz etmektedir. Ayrıca Avrupa iş gücünü temsilen de Avrupa Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (ETUC) incelenmiştir. Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasına karşı duruşlarını inceleyerek sosyal güçlerin karar alma mekanizmasında ne ölçüde etkili oldukları ve Avrupa Birliği tarafından finanse edilen bu tip kuruluşların hangi misyonla kuruldukları da gene tezin teorik çerçevesi içerisinde analiz edilmiştir. ERT, Avrupa sanayisinin güçlenmesi, Avrupa'da istihdamın ve gelir düzeyinin yükseltilmesi doğrultusunda politika alternatifleri oluşturmak, AB Komisyonunun yaptığı çalışmaları izlemek ve gerektiğinde yine aynı amaçla bu politikaların oluşmasına katkıda bulunmak misyonunu üstlenmiştir. Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını desteklemektedir. Sanayicileri ve Avrupa sermayesini temsil eden kuruluş, bölgede daha istikrarlı ve güvenilir bir ortam yaratıldığı takdirde kazan-kazan prensibiyle bundan hem büyük ölçekli şirketlerin hem de bölgenin menfaat sağlayacağı söylenebilir. Nitekim Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının temelleri atılırken, görüş niteliğindeki raporlarından birtanesi de AKP'nin hangi çerçevede ve hangi stratejiler benimsenerek uygulanması gerektiği konusunda bir rapor da yayınlanmıştır. Bunun yanında Business Europe hernekadar sermayeyi temsil etse de daha orta ve küçük ölçekli işletmeleri temsil ettiği için rekabet edebilme gücünü kaybetme endişesiyle AKP'ye karşı daha şüpheli bakmaktadır. ETUC ise Avrupa'nın işgücünü temsil eden kuruluş olma özelliğiyle, AKP ülkelerinden gelebilecek ucuz işgücü tehdidi ile Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'na daha tereddütle bakmaktadır.

Bölüm 4'te ise çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi de gözönünde bulundurularak, küresel siyaset ekonomisinde toplum ve güç ilişkilerini yansıtan çeşitli tarihsel formların içselleştirilmesi için devletler en önemli ajanlardan biridir. Dolayısıyla devletler üretimin küreselleşmesinde en yapıcı rolü oynarlar. Devletlerin rolünün bu şekilde algılanması, dönüşüm ve entegrasyon süreçlerinde daha geniş tarihsel ve sosyal çerçevede dialektik olarak görülmesini sağlamaktadır. Burada koşulluluk, devletlerin dönüşüm sırasında karşılaştıkları rıza ve güç arasındaki ilişkiyi kolaylaştırmaktadır. Ayrıca bu bölüm devletin konumunu global düzeydeki değişikliklere uyumla nasıl geliştirdiğini ayrıntılı olarak ele almakta ve Ukrayna'nın politikasının şekillenme ve yeniden tanımlanmasını sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, ülkenin uluslararası çerçevede politik ve ekonomik yapılarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini tanımlamak amacıyla Ukrayna'nın tarihsel deneyimlerinin bir analizini vermektedir. Hegemonik söylemlerin

nerede ve ne zaman oluřtuklarını gsterebilmek amacıyla, politik istikrarsızlık ve bunun AB ile iliřkilerdeki yansımaları da alıřılmıştır.

AB, ok katmanlı karmařıklığı ile daha byk neo-liberal transnasyonel yapısal ve kurumsal bir rgt haline dnřmektedir. Avrupa siyaseti bugn AB'ye merkezi bir rol atamaktadır ve bu siyaset sosyal mcadeleye ve sosyal gler arasındaki uzlařmalara olanak vermekte ve daha aık ulu olmaktadır. Bu alıřma mevcut neo-liberal global dzenin global dzeyde ve aynı zamanda Avrupa dzeyinde yeralan yapısal deėiřikliklerin nasıl anlayabildiėini incelemektedir. Global dzeyde yeniden yapılanma, deėiřen entegrasyon Őekillerini de yansıtmaktadır. Bylece bu alıřma global dzeydeki deėiřikliklerin ve AB'nin iinde bulunduėu zel dneme iliřkin tarihsel formlarının anlaşılmasının, doėru bir analiz iin gerekli olduėunu vurgulamaktadır. AB, AKP'yi ulusal kuruluřların nemli olduėu ve bu politikanın ana hatlarıyla uygun olarak bu kuruluřların siyasi reformlar iin vazgeilmez olduėu varsayımı ile kurmuřtur. Bunun iin AB'nin komřularına nerdiėi kolaylıkların tartiřılması, kusursuz bir fikir ortamı oluřabilmesi iin gerekli politika deėiřikliėini beraberinde getirecektir. Bu tartiřma, uluslararası ve yerel unsurlar arasındaki karmařık dinamiėi anlatan bir komple resim sunmamaktadır. Aksine uluslararası siyaset ekonomisi dřnrlerinin geliřtirdiėi grřlerin detaylandırılması teorik ıkıř yolları ve AKP'nin potansiyel etkilerini deėerlendirmek iin deneysel vakalar saėlayacaktır.

Bieler, Avrupa'daki AKP yeleri arasında transnasyonel bir sınıfın nasıl oluřtuėunu gsterecek bir arařtırmanın gerekliliėine dikkat ekmiřtir. Ayrıca Bieler hangi retim sektrlerinin transnasyonel olduėunu ve hangi siyasi ittifakların transnasyonel sermaye, ulusal devlet elitleri ve ortaya ıkan burjuvazi arasında sıkıřtıėını belirtmiřtir. Van Apeldoorn tarafından nerilen bir bařka arařtırma alanı ise, Avrupa Sanayiciler Yuvarlak Masası benzeri transnasyonel sosyal glerin bir elit platform olarak ortaya ıkıřını ve bunun Avrupa'nın ynetimini nasıl Őekillendirdiėini analiz etmeyi amalayan bir arařtırma alanı nermiřtir. Burada ERT nemli bir aktr olarak transnasyonel ynelimli sermayeyi ve zellikle Uluslararası Avrupa Hareketi ve Business Europe gibi iř kuruluřlarını tanımlamaktadır. Bu kuruluřlar, greceli olarak ucuz ve kalifiye iř gcne eriřerek, transnasyonel ynelimli sermayenin, Avrupa ve kresel pazarlardaki rekabetini arttırmayı amalamaktadır. Ayrıca Shields ve Bohle eski rejim nomenklaturasının ortaya



çıkan yeni elite yer deęiřtirmesine ve bu elitin nasıl transnasyonel kapitalist sınıfın bir parçası haline geldięi konularına odaklanmaktadır. Bohle'nin tartıřtıęı gibi Ukrayna gibi post-komünist ülkeler yerli bir burjuvaziye sahip deęildiler ve neo-liberalleşme süreci ekonominin önemli segmentlerine yüksek düzeyde bir yabancı girişine yol açtı. Yerli burjuvazi ve gelişmiş bir sivil toplumun olmayışına baęlı olarak neo-liberal ekonomik yeniden yapılanma, 'pasif devrim' kavramıyla açıklanan Avrupalılařma ile saęlanmak zorundaydı.

AKP'yi hitap ettięi bölgedeki neo-liberal yeniden yapılanmayı destekleyen bir hegemonya projesi olarak daha iyi anlayabilmek için bir tarihsel bakıř açısı, Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklıęı'nın oluşumu ve içerięini gözden geçirerek işe başlamalıdır. Bu bakıř açısı bir dięer AB hegemonya projesi olarak görülebilecek ve AKP'nin başlangıcı olan Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklıęı'nın ana hedefleri ve motivasyonunu incelemek zorundadır. Neo-Gramsci yaklaşıma özel olarak hangi sosyal güçlerin AKP'yi destekledięini ve AB yanlısı bir tarihsel bloęun oluşumunun nasıl gerçekteledięini sorgulamaktadır.

AKP'yi Neo-Gramsci bakıř açısıyla analiz edebilmek için AKP bir AB hegemonya projesi olarak ele alınmalı ve bu proje Akdeniz'deki etkisiz sosyal güçler arasındaki dinamik ve karmařık iliřkilerin bir ürünü olarak gözlenmelidir. Neo-Gramsci yaklaşımla, AB'nin bu Akdeniz ülkelerine karřı olan stratejisi ve AKP politikası bir hegemonya projesi olarak tanımlanmalıdır. Gramsci bakıř açısıyla hegemonya, çatıřan politik, kültürel ajan ve kuruluşlar tarafından yönlendirilen bir entellektüel ve ahlaki liderliktir. Dolayısıyla, AKP'yi Neo-Gramsci bir bakıř açısıyla analiz ederken, Bölüm 3, AKP'ye göre karar verme sürecinin nasıl sosyal güçler tarafından etkilendięini ve AB'nin, iç yapısı ve dıř dinamiklerinin nasıl Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklıęı'nı etkiledięini analiz etmektedir. Bölüm 3'ün bu kısmı AAO'nı ve AKP'nin bir öncüsü olan Barselona sürecini analiz ederken aynı zamanda AAO'nın, kronik az gelişmişlik, ümit vadetmeyen politik kültürler ve AB tarafından öngörülen çok taraflı iliřkilere raęmen, sürdürülebilir bir politika olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır.

Bölüm 4, Rusya ve Avrupa Birlięi'nin hegemonya projelerinin nasıl ve nerede çarpıřtıęını analiz etmektedir. Avrupa Birlięi hegemonya projesi, Birlięi'n komřularıyla ekonomik iliřkilerini belirleyen bir çember olmasına raęmen, Rusya

projesi ‘Tek Ekonomik Alan’ ise Rusya, Belarus, Ukrayna ve Kazakistan’dan oluşmakta ve daha derin yakınlaşmayı ve nihai olarak gümrük birliğini gerçekleştirmeyi .bu yolla daha önce varolan tekelini yeniden oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Tez, Ukrayna’nın bu iki çarpışan hegemonya projesinin ortasında odak noktasında olmaya devam edeceğini vurgulamaktadır.

1999’dan bu yana Avrupa Birliği-Ukrayna ilişkilerinin konteksinde önemli değişiklikler kaydedilmiştir. Avrupa Birliği, Polonya, Slovakya, Macaristan ve Romanya ile birlikte 27 ülkeye genişlemiş ve böylece sınırları Ukrayna’ya ulaşmıştır. Avrupa Birliği Ukrayna’yı da içine alacak Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını oluşturmuş ve Birliği’n gündemini de Ukrayna’nın Avrupa Birliği’ne ekonomik ve politik yakınlaştırma stratejileri, üyelik perspektifi verilmeksizin koşulluluk prensibinin uygulanması ve iç pazara dahil etme gibi konularla genişletmiştir. Son beş yıldır Ukrayna’nın ekonomik büyümesinin devam ettiğini ve ilk yıllardaki Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması ve bağımsızlığı kazanması sürecindeki kayıpları da büyük oranda telaffi ettiği söylenilebilir. Bu yüzden sürdürülebilir kaynaklara ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Ukrayna’nın Dünya Ticaret Örgütü’ne üye olması, küreselleşmeye olan entegrasyonu anlamına gelmektedir ve Avrupa Birliği ile serbest ticaret bölgesi oluşturabilmek için bir ön koşul kabul edilmektedir. Ukrayna’nın Portakal Devrimi Ukrayna açısından bir kırılma noktası olarak değerlendirilebilir. Neo-Gramscian söylemde de Rusya’nın hegemonya projesinin askıya alındığı bir süreç olarak düşünülebilir. Demokratik yönetim ve arkasından da Avrupa Birliği entegrasyon sürecine dahil olma, Ukrayna açısından olumlu gelişmeler olarak algılansa da, demokratik istikrarın bir gecede gerçekleştirilemeyeceği, gerekli altyapının oluşturulması gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır.

Ukrayna iki önemli tercih arasında kalmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği ile derin bir serbest ticaret alanı oluşturmak, Baltık ülkeleri ile varolan serbest ticaret anlaşmalarını daha genişletmek ya da ‘Ortak Ekonomik Alan’ı (CES) öngörülen gümrük birliği ve kurumsal hükümler çerçevesinde genişletip daha derin bir entegrasyon sürecine dönüştürmek. Bu tercihlerden Avrupa Birliği yönünde olanı Ukrayna’nın Dünya Ticaret Örgütüne üye olması ile sınırlıdır. Buna örnek çelik ürünlerindeki kotanın kaldırılması, pazar ekonomisi statüsünün verilmesi örnek gösterilebilir. Bu da Ukrayna’nın AB ihracatında anti-damping uygulamasını zolaştırmaktadır. Ancak

Portakal Devrimi'nden bu yana Ukrayna politik deklarasyonlarında Ukrayna'nın CES'le olan entegrasyon sürecini derinleştirmesi fikrini eskisi kadar benimsememektedir.

Enerji sektörünün her bölümünde daha fazla ticaret için belirgin bir potansiyel vardır. Avrupa Birliği ve Güney Doğu Avrupa ülkelerince sonuçlandırılarak 2005 Ekiminde imzalanan Enerji antlaşmasına Ukrayna'nın dahil edilebileceği de gözönüne alınmalıdır. Rusya'nın %80'den fazla doğalgaz ihracatının ve Rusya'nın Avrupa'ya petrol ihracatının önemli bir kısmının transit ülkesi olan Ukrayna düşünüldüğünde, boru hattı konuları ikili enerji ortaklıkları için diğer bir önemli alan oluşturmaktadır. Ukrayna, enerjiye ilişkin anlaşma daha önce imzalamıştır. Ancak boru hattı yatırımları ve yönetimine ilişkin daha fazla işbirliğine ihtiyaç vardır. Bu bağlamda Avrupa Birliği için asıl kaygılar, güvenlik ve boru hatlarının kimin tarafından kontrol edileceği iken, Ukrayna'nın öncelikli kaygıları ise çok yüksek transit taşıma ücretleri ve ülkenin Rusya enerji ithalatına bağımlılığını azaltma isteğidir. Ukrayna, bağımsızlığı takip eden ekonomik çöküşten sonra şu anda yerel kapasitesinin yarısı düzeyinde kullanırken elektrik ihracatı için de çok önemli potansiyele sahiptir. Bu potansiyelinin bir kısmı Rusya'ya ihracat için kullanılırken batılı komşuları ile olan enerji ticareti, eski Baltık ve kıta Avrupa'sı ile olan etkileşimin az olmasından ötürü yeterli ölçüde gerçekleşmemektedir. Ukrayna'nın Rusya'ya geleneksel hatların arasında konumlanması ve Avrupa Birliği beklentileri durumu zorlaştırmaktadır.

Kişilerin serbest dolaşımı özellikle hizmet ticareti ve yatırımları için serbest ticaretin doğal bir tamamlayıcısıdır. Burada Ukrayna'nın Avrupa vatandaşlarına vizeyi kaldırması ve AB'nin vize kolaylıkları ile ilgili müzakereleri açmasıyla ilgili bir başlangıç yapılmıştır. vardır. Ancak, Serbest Ticaret Alanı kapsamında yeralan AB işçi hakları yasalarına uyumlu olabilmek için Ukrayna gereken düzenlemeleri yapmakta gecikmiştir. Ukrayna, 2005 yazında AB vatandaşlarına vize koşulunu kaldırarak önemli adımı atmıştır. Beklenildiği gibi bu adım Ukrayna'nın turizm sektörü, iş bağlantıları ve kişilerarası iletişim için çok olumlu bir gelişmedir. Bu adım ayrıca Avrupa Birliği açısından açık bir stratejik sinyal olarak nitelendirilebilir. Bu düzenlemeye paralel olarak Ukrayna'ya gelen AB vatandaşlarının çalışma izin işlemlerindeki bürokratik yükün hafifletilmesi gerekmektedir. Kiev'de yeralan Avrupa İşadamları Birliğinin de

bu yönde eleştirileri vardır. AB ve Ukrayna AB'ye seyahat edecek Ukrayna vatandaşlarının vize işlemlerinin kolaylaştırılması için müzakerelere başlamışlardır. Ancak kısa dönem kalışları için vize gerekliliğinin kaldırılması müzakereleri, yasadışı göç ve post-komünist sonrası toplumlarda ortaya çıkan yozlaşmaya bağlı güvenlik kaygıları nedeniyle basit ve kısa dönemde çözülecek gibi görünmemektedir. Ancak yine de diğer Avrupa ülkelerinde olduğu gibi orta vadede sonuçlar alınabilecektir. Diplomatlar ve işadamları dışındaki sıradan vatandaşlar için komünizmin bitişiyle ortaya çıkan en önemli olumlu sonuçlardan bir tanesi seyahat özgürlüğüdür. Gerçekte yurtdışında çalışmamış kıta Avrupasındaki birçok kişi için, böyle bir özgürlüğün kendileri ve çocukları için varlığının bilinmesi çok önemlidir. Bu özgürlük kişilerin AB'ye bakışını temelde şekillendirmektedir. Ancak gelecekte üye devletler kişilerin pasaportsuz seyahate izin veren Schengen bölgesine girişte, terörizm ve yasadışı göç korkularıyla artan kısıtlamalara gidebileceklerdir. AB üye devletlerin sınırlarını daha katı olarak kapatmalarına neden olan yerel politik baskılarla karşılaşmadan önce komşuları için daha iyi seyahat ve vize verilmesi sistemlerini tasarlamak zorundadır. Kişilerin dolaşımına ilişkin siyasal kararlar kolaylaşmak yerine gittikçe zorlaşacaktır. Ancak AB komşularıyla daha sıkı işbirliği içine girerek sıradan vatandaşların yolculuklarındaki zorlukları hafifletebilir ve yasadışı ticaret ve göçleri önleyebilir. Bunun karşılığında komşu ülkelerin işbirliği yapabilmesi amacıyla, Birlik çeşitli seyahat kısıtlamalarını kaldırmayı vaat etmek zorundadır. Komisyonun bu konudaki açık olmayan vaadi, AB'nin Ukrayna'yı komşuluk çerçevesinde yer almasına izin vermemek ve ülkeyi uzakta tutmak niyetini açığı çıkarmaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği'nin, Ukrayna'nın yaygın devlet mülkiyeti, oligarşik iş yapısı, ekonomisinin büyük bir kısmının az sayıda endüstriyel klan tarafından kontrol edilmesi, verimsiz bürokrasisi ve ülkedeki içsel yerleşik yozlaşma nedenlerine bakıldığında, vaatlerini tutmaması için çok sayıda mazereti vardır. Bunun için Ukrayna'nın, iki çarpışan hegemonya projesi ve bunların getirdiği çeşitli bağlar ve yükümlülüklerine bakılarak daha katedeceği çok yol olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Bu tez, Ukrayna'nın hem AB hem de Rusya ile daha derin ilişkiler kurabileceğine bakılarak bu iki hegemonya projenin birbirinden bağımsız olmadığı gerçeğini de vurgulamaktadır. Örneğin AB ile serbest ticaret bölgesi, Rusya ile ekonomik bütünleşmeyi önlememektedir. Ancak, gümrük birliği gibi daha derin entegrasyonlar gerektiğinde Ukrayna'nın seçimini yapması gerekecektir.

Brüksel'deki mülakatların ışığında Avrupa iş çevrelerinin AB tek pazarının komşu üye olmayan devletlere açılımına ilgi gösterdiği gözlemlenmiştir. Bu gelişme yalnızca ticaret ve yatırımlar için açıklık ifade etmemekte ve ayrıca AB standartlarına dayalı yasal düzenleme çerçevesi ve güzel bir iş iklimi anlamına gelmektedir. Rusya'nın en büyük komşu pazar olmasına rağmen Ukrayna, ülkenin 'Avrupalılık seçimi'nin politik sinyallerini vererek AB standartlarına yaklaşma yolunda daha gönüllü bir ortak olarak görülmektedir.

AB'nin iç karmaşası dış yansımalarını ciddi şekilde azaltmaktadır. Komşu ülkeler AB'nin bütün bölümlerinden uyumlu mesajlar duymak istemektedirler ancak bunu yerine üye olmayan komşu ülkeler değişik AB kuruluş ve hükümetlerinden farklı sinyaller almaktadırlar. Komisyon bile çoğunlukla karışık mesajlar göndermektedir. Örneğin, Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü, komşu devletlere ticari imtiyazlar önererek onları teşvik etmeye çalışırken bu tutum, tarım ve ticaret müdürlüklerince çoğunlukla engellenmektedir. Ayrıca Komisyonun teknokrat yaklaşımı ile Konseyin siyasi yaklaşım arasındaki uçurum tutarsız politikalara yol açmaktadır. AB kuruluşlarının öncelikleri ve zaman koşulları arasındaki farklılıklar komşu devletlerde büyük tereddüt yaratmaktadır. Burada üye devletlerin de sorumluluğu vardır. Örneğin, AB, Birliğin yardım ve ticaret anlaşmalarına ve insan hakları ve demokrasi koşullarını askıya alma düzenlemeleri getirmekte ancak Birliğin güvenilirliğini zedeleyebileceği düşüncesiyle bunları hiçbir zaman kullanmamaktadır. Ancak çok az sayıda askıya alma AB'nin gerçekte neyi istediğini ifade etmesi açısından güçlü bir etkiye sahiptir. Burada AB'ye üye büyük devletlerin pazar ekonomisi statüsü ve vizesiz seyahat olasılığı gibi özel vaatler vermekten kaçınmaları gerekmektedir. Büyük devletlerle ilişkilerdeki karşılan zorluklara rağmen AB, bütün komşuları için tek bir sesle ve zaman içinde tutarlı bir şekilde davranmak zorundadır. Çelişkili mesajlar Birliğin hegemonya projesinin tarihsel bir bloğa dönüşmesini imkansız kılmaktadır. Öte yandan yerel unsurların etkileri düşünüldüğünde, Ukrayna'nın 'batılılaşma' gönüllülüğü ülkedeki yerel reformlar ile tutarlı olmamaktadır. Ayrıca ülkenin enerji üretim pazarındaki stratejik konumu Ukrayna'yı hem Rusya hem de AB için çok önemli bir ortak yapmaktadır. Ukrayna AB ve Rusya hegemonya projelerinin arasındaki sıkışmış konumuyla gelecek için gerçek sorunlar taşımaktadır. Özellikle Ukrayna açısından, hükümet ile ilişkilerini anlamak ve ülkenin karşı hegemonik güçlerinin, belirli bir sosyal çerçevede

hegemonyanın başarıya ulaşmasını karmaşıklaştıran kurumsal ve politik düzenlemelere karşı nasıl mücadele ettiğini anlamak bakımından, ülkedeki ulusal ve transnasyonal entellektüellerin rolleri incelenmiştir.

Böylelikle Ukrayna'nın ulusal ve uluslar arası siyasetinde belirsizlikler olduğu ve iki çarpışan hegemonya projesinin varlığının, yalnızca sorunların bir platformdan diğerine dönüşümüne yol açtığı tartışılmaktadır.

AB her komşuluk ülkesi ile, enerji şebekeleri gibi bütün ülkeleri ilgilendiren sektörel konularda farklılaşmış ilişkiler ve anlaşmalar yapmayı istemektedir. Bölüm 3'te AKP'nin kökenin Avrupa Akdeniz İşbirliği (EMP) olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Ayrıca, bu bölümde Birliğin, tarihsel bloğa dönüştüremeyen hegemonya projesinin AKP olduğu tanımlanmıştır. Komşuluk Politikası, AB'nin dış ilişkilerinde devrimsel bir değişiklik oluşturmaktadır. AKP, Avrupa'nın, güvenliğinin artırılması, istikrar gibi geleneksel dış politika hedeflerini ve AB'nin, yardım ve ekonomik entegrasyon vaatleri gibi geleneksel dış politika enstrümanlarını ve ortak değerlerini yansıtmaktadır. AKP, hedeflerinde ve enstrümanlarında yenilikçi değildir. Bu politikanın tek farkı geçmişten olan farkları vurgulamasıdır. Avrupa Akdeniz İşbirliği, ana yaklaşım olarak 'çok taraflılığı' vurgularken AKP ise Birlik ile işbirliği ve bağlantıların düzeylerine göre farklılaşma prensibini uygulamaktadır. İki politika da önemli açılardan benzerlikler göstermektedir. İki politika da, Birliği ve ortaklarını kapsayan bir barış ve refah bölgesi yaratma söylemini kullanmaktadır. İki politika da, politik diyalog, ticaret ve teknik işbirliğini vurgulayan benzer teşvikleri benimsemektedir. AKP, EMP'yi takip etmiştir. Avrupa Komisyonu açıkça AKP'nin EMP'nin yerine geçmediğini ancak iki politikanın birbirlerini tamamladıklarını belirtmiştir. AB'nin 2003'te Selanik'te aldığı, yakın coğrafi komşuları ile yeni ilişkiler başlatma kararı, Birliğin, uzun eylemsizlik yıllarından sonra, Avrupa kıtasında barış ve refahın sağlanması için daha büyük bir rol oynaması gerekliliğinin farkına vardığını göstermektedir.

Burada AB'nin yeni komşuları kapsayan politikaya karşı stratejisinin hegemonik bir proje olduğu Neo-Gramsci görüşü doğrultusunda tartışılmaktadır. AKP, Avrupa'daki değişik sosyal güçlerin dinamik ve karmaşık ilişkilerinin bir sonucudur. Bu bölümde, AB'de lider rol oynayan sosyal güçlerin ahlaki, entelektüel ve maddi boyutları ile bir hegemonya projesinin inşası vurgulanmıştır.

AKP'nin başarısı, AB'nin hegemonya projesinin sürdürülebilir olup olmamasına bağlıdır. Bunun AB ve AB'nin yakın komşulukları için belirgin etkileri sorgulanmaktadır. Ancak, yeterli fonun bulunamaması, tutarsız tasarım ve gerçekleştirmeler ve ortak ülkelerin AB normlarını benimsemek için tutumlarını değiştirmelerine yönelik teşviklerin yetersizliği gibi belirli nedenlere bağlı olarak AKP'nin bir tarihsel dönüşmesi beklenmemektedir. 1990'ların ortalarından beri AKP'nin koşullarının uygulanması üyelik hazırlıkları ile bağlantılandırılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, üyelik, üye olmayan devletlerin devlet yapılarında ve politikalarındaki reformlarla AB'nin taleplerini karşılamanın bir ödülü olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Bölgede, Rusya Federasyonu ve Avrupa Birliği dikkate alındığında Ukrayna'nın çeşitli ilgi alanlarının ve stratejilerinin ortak noktasında olduğu tartışılabilir. Bunun nedeni Ukrayna'nın Karadeniz bölgesindeki istikrara, kutuplaşmaya ve daha da ötesi istikrarsızlığa neden olabileceği kaygısıdır. Burada belirtmek gerekir ki Mayıs başında başlatılan ve Karadeniz bölgesindeki Belarus, Moldova, Ukrayna, Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan'dan oluşan altı ülkeyi kapsayan AKP'nin 'doğululuk boyutu' hakkında genel ifadelerde bulunmak zorluk getirmektedir. Çünkü bu ülkeler diğerlerinden tarih, büyüklük ve potansiyel sorunlar açısından belirgin farklılıklar göstermektedir. En azından coğrafi olarak 'Avrupalı' olmalarına rağmen, 'Yeni' doğulu komşular diğer potansiyel AB üye devletlerinden, Rusya ile olan ilişkileri ve bir ölçüde Rusya'ya olan bağımlılıkları ile ayrılmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla bu ülkelerin, 2008 Rusya-Gürcistan çatışmasında açıkça görüldüğü gibi Avrupa Birliği ve Rusya hegemonya projeleri arasında konumlandığı iddia edilebilir.

Sonuç olarak, Komşuluk Politikası stratejisi, üye devletlerin rızasıyla kısa bir dönem için sürdürülebilir. Ancak, bu politikanın tarihsel bir bloğa dönüşmesi olası görülmemektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin, 'Bütünleşik Avrupa Ekonomik Alanı' ve Rusya'nın, 'Tek Ekonomik Alan', hegemonya proje stratejileri, çarpışan iki hegemonik proje olarak oluşum sürecindedir. AB'nin projesi, genişleme perspektifini vadetmeden, Birliğin komşularıyla olan ekonomik ilişkilerinin bütünü gösterirken Rusya'nın projesi ise, Rusya, Belarus, Ukrayna ve Kazakistan'tan oluşan çekirdek bir grup ile Rusya'nın eski bölgesel hakimiyetini yeniden kazanmasını sağlayacak bir gümrük

birliđini oluřturmak nihai hedefine y6nelik yasal d6zenlemelerin yapılmasını 6ng6rmektedir. Bu iki 6arpıřan strateji a6ık u6lu olarak ele alınabilir.



# CURRICULUM VITAE

## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Özdilek, S.Elif

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 7 September 1967, Ankara

Marital Status: Married

Phone: +90 312 290 50 30

Fax: +90 312 290 54 80

Email: [sibelif@bilkent.edu.tr](mailto:sibelif@bilkent.edu.tr)

## EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Bilgi University-International Relations	2000
BS	METU Political Science and Public Administration	1990
High School	TED Ankara College	1985

## WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2000- Present	Bilkent University-Department of Business Information Management	Instructor
1997 July	World Bank	Master Trainer
1990 August	Ministry of Education-Department of International Relations	Consultant

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent Italian

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCES

1. April 2006, Field research in Brussels.
2. March 2007, Field research in Brussels.
3. September 2007, Field research in Ukraine

## ASSOCIATIONS

European Movement International (EMI) Turkish National Council – Secretary General (2005-Present)

TED Alumni Association (1987-Present)