

THE RELATION OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE TO THE TRUTH AND THE  
GOOD IN KANT

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## ABSTRACT

### THE REALTION OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE TO THE TRUTH AND THE GOOD IN KANT

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This thesis aims to explore the role and significance of the aesthetic experience in Kant's philosophy. To accomplish this aim; firstly, the role of aesthetic power of judgment is discovered in subject's production of truths about the sensible world which is attributed to the cognitive power of understanding. Secondly, the role of aesthetic power of judgment in subject's representation of the good and in formation of moral judgments is demonstrated. Aesthetic power of judgment which enables both the reception and production of the beauty as a necessary harmony and unity brings an aesthetic and intuitive determinability to the acknowledged transcendent field for knowledge. The thesis is concluded by the affirmation that aesthetic power of judgment as an orienting interpretative power is a necessary condition for the subject, who is limited in knowledge and sensibly conditioned in the realization of moral purposes, in order to know and to have a moral life.

Key words: Aesthetic Reflective Power of Judgment, Aesthetic Experience, Schematism, Highest Good, Freedom

## ÖZ

### KANT'TA ESTETİK DENEYİMİN HAKİKATLE VE İYİYLE İLİŞKİSİ

Avcı, Nil

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışmada, estetik deneyimin Kant'ın felsefesindeki rolü ve öneminin açıklanması amaç edinilmiştir. Bu rol önce estetik yargı gücünün öznenin anlama gücüne atfedilen duyulabilir dünyaya dair hakikatler üretmesinde keşfedilir. Sonra, ahlaki öznenin iyiye dair tasarımı ve ahlaki yargıların oluşturulmasında bulunur. Güzelin bir uyum ve birlik duygusu olarak alımlanmasını ve yaratılmasını sağlayan bu estetik güç, bilgi alanına aşkın olan alana estetik bir belirlenebilirlik getirir. Tez, estetik yargı gücünün, yönlendirici bir yorumlama gücü olarak, bilgisinde sınırlı ve ahlaki amacın gerçekleşmesinde koşullar bulunduran öznenin bilgisi ve ahlaki yaşamı için zorunlu koşul oluşturduğunun bildirilmesiyle bitirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Estetik Yargı Gücü, Estetik Deneyim, Şemacılık, En Yüksek İyi, Özgürlük

To my Parents

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to explore the role and significance of Kant's conception of beauty in the web of critical philosophy by means of elucidating the relation of aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment to cognition and morality. To accomplish this aim, the link of *Critique of Power of Judgment* [*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*] to previous critical studies is shown in terms of Kant's differentiation of cognitive faculties as pure understanding, sensibility, imagination, and in terms of reason's theoretical interest and practical acts. I introduce the concept of niche with its rich content which was the starting point of this study, shaped and underlined it. This notion will help to understand the role of the beauty and to uncover the special power of the subject with respect to its aesthetic dimension.

The figure of niche makes its first appearance in association with Kant's term "gulf" [*Kluft*]. He uses this term in introducing the primary importance of *Critique of Power of Judgment* [*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*] for critical philosophy by drawing a geographical sketch for concepts and respective theoretical and practical legislative capacities of reason in terms of field [*Feld*], territory [*Boden*], domain [*Gebiet*] and dwelling place [*Aufenthalt*] (KU 5: 175; 13-5).<sup>1</sup> With the critical barrier set in knowledge, Kant explains, a gulf between the domain of the concept of nature referring to the sensible knowable object and the domain of the concept of freedom referring to the supersensible unknowable object is fixed, too, "as if they were two different worlds" (KU 5: 175; 13-4). A connection of these

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<sup>1</sup>Immanuel Kant, "Kritik der Urtheilskraft, in *Kants Werke (Akademie Textausgabe V)*, (Berlin: Walter de Guyter and Co., 1968). Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). Throughout the study all references to Kant's works are given in parenthesis in the following order: name, volume and page number of Akademie edition, page number of the translated text except the references to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In references to *Critique of Pure Reason* the customary format (A/B) is used.

two domains should be supplied since freedom “*is to have an influence on the first, i. e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoyed for its laws*” (KU 5: 175; 13-4). However, practical reason cannot determine this possibility, since it cannot legislate for the sensible world. Nor can understanding throw a bridge by means of its mode of discursive knowledge, since knowledge of this connection requires knowing something about the sphere which is beyond its domain. Kant writes that the object of the concepts of reason constitutes the field when it is not investigated according to whether our cognitive faculty is adequate or not adequate to know this object and there is the territory of experience where both of the domains “set up.” Therefore, Kant writes that these domains can be bridged in so far as there is a cognitive power which can renew the map such that the object of the field can be made possible to be determined.<sup>2</sup> This power is placed in-between these powers, since it is a mediatory power, but it can supply this determinability through an experience and within the territory of experience, since the mediation should concern the link of sensible world to the world of freedom and from the concept of those no link can be derived. Hence, the gap between the cognitive powers creates a gap for Kant’s philosophical investigation to discover a new power of reason.

One of the meanings of niche is an empty place in a wall used usually in order to place an architectural sculpture. This meaning can be regarded to apply to the gap for a new power which is created by the gap between the cognitive powers: a niche for a reflective power of judgment on the side of the subject and niche of beauty and organized beings as its objects; consequently, a niche for a transcendental justification of the principle of this newly introduced power. In addition, in the second critique, before the mention of the gulf, Kant also speaks of some “vacant places” or voids [*Lücken*] in the critique of pure reason which directs the investigation to the concept of freedom again. He wants to stress the lack of a positive determination for the concept of freedom as a spontaneous law-giving act of pure reason whereby it becomes practical. He asserts that

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<sup>2</sup> See also Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason*, (West Lafayette, USA: Purdue University Press, 2005).

reconsideration of these gaps for the sake of grounding morality “should not be regarded as an interpolation which might serve only to fill up gaps in the critical system of speculative reason (for this is complete for its purpose), or as like the props and buttresses that are usually added afterwards to a hastily constructed building, but as true members that make the connection of the system plain” (KprV 5: 7; 6).<sup>3</sup> The same purpose of making the system plain can be connected to the third *Critique*, too. Kant directs the investigation again to a gulf even after having grounded theoretical and practical knowledge and he wants to show that there can be found a power of reason mediating them. But neither this power, nor the field of the indeterminate object of a concept are external additions to the system of speculative reason. It means that this power has already had its role in the completed critical system. In *Critique of Power of Judgment*, Kant investigates this power to clarify its role. As mentioned already, its role is to determine positively the object which is strictly unknowable from the perspective of understanding. Moreover, if it is not an external addition to the legislative roles of the mind, then, there follows the first question: Can we find more niches for reflective power of judgment in the constitution of understanding of the sensible world and in the relation of practical reason to the sensible world where the power is necessitated? These niches can be not acknowledged by Kant or they can be acknowledged and be filled by means of the acts and powers under different titles, such as transcendental imagination and its act.

Secondly, we can question the affirmation that, the speculative reason is complete for its own purpose. Kant’s investigation of the speculative reason can be interpreted as the effort of the reason to know itself. In this sense, the reason’s being complete itself for its own purpose refers the knowledge of the unity of its powers. Reason can never be completed by itself and by its determinate concepts as a far as there is the gulf. Then, there is the next question: can we have a Copernican view on the notion of niche with respect of the concept of grounding?

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<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Instead of issuing a wall as ground of the niche, we can view the niche as the ground of the wall, considering that a wall is built by nothing but filling of niches; or, indeed, that the reason of wall's being there is the niche itself. The wall refers to the unity of cognitive powers (the unity of reason) and the niche refers to the place of the power of judgment. The question asks the possibility of regarding the power of judgment as the constituter of the unity of these cognitive powers which means it completes the reason. Its role in grounding will be that of the niche containing an in-between place supplying the necessary harmony between the cognitive faculties.

The answers of two questions above moved the entire study and throughout it the aesthetic power of subject is encountered with a more articulated form to occupy all niches that the critical philosophy left or the critical philosophy fills but does not acknowledge. The study is interested in aesthetic reflective power of judgment rather than the teleological reflective power of judgment. By means of being witness to the places where the subject shows its aesthetic power, the connection of aesthetic experience and the attainment of beauty to the conception of right act or to the generation of the primary truths about the sensible world are also articulated. The most interesting thing indeed is the indeterminacy that hangs on the aesthetic power and its elusive position to which has given so important roles. Aesthetic reflective power of judgment, though is a power and though is a legislator, has no determinate rules and one always necessitates attaching the phrase of 'but subjectively' to it. The reason most probably is that it is the only power to express something about the unknowable in-itself. Therefore, the aesthetic power's attachment to a subjective sphere is a kind of superiority, since it can communicate something about the thing in itself which reason always wants to know and is aware practically as its fact but only as its own fact. The next remark is connected with the former is that I tried to demonstrate the aesthetic aspect of the subject referring to the intelligible character, but I take it not referring to the moral character. The importance of the moral character for both the intentions of reason and those of Kant is undeniable. The question of gulf marks it clearly. Nevertheless, the aesthetic power has

independence both from theoretical and practical interests of reason and displays something more about the truth of the subject in its relation to, to say, the other. Perhaps what Kant wants to capture is something beyond the differentiation of the object and subject, but to point it we have only the subjective sphere.

The first chapter starts with a general view of critical transcendental idealism and passes to the necessary conditions of experience and to the constitution of synthetic truths of sensible world or to the constitution of nature in terms of necessary principles of understanding. Though already received quite a lot commentary, the critical falling apart of the sensible condition and intellectual condition contributed by receiving sensibility and discursive understanding to the constitution of knowledge and its object is given in detail while the difficulty in achieving their necessary relation is shown. Transcendental power of imagination to produce schemata is discussed, as Kant does, in the context of the transcendental judgment. It is shown that the very production of schemata includes a special judgmental act, given that the model of determinative judgmental procedure of subsumption creates an infinite regress in proving the rightness of subsumption or unification. The specialty of the judgmental act comes from the apprehension of the rightness of the application without any other further rule; that is, categories as rules of unification can have no other rule but the spontaneous act of transcendental imagination. In this chapter, I have an intense discussion and conversation with the owners of different proposals, Henry Allison and Beatrice Longuenesse. It was necessary on my part to face with contrary looks to have right to assert that the production of schemata is an aspect of aesthetic power of judgment and to give reasons why it is neither a syllogism nor a potency of discursive reflectiveness, though both of them are modes of judgmental reasoning. In addition, the explication of their perspectives created a space for addressing some connections, problems and topics which should have been dealt in any way. The result is that judging act manifesting its self as schema production; that is, the production of the necessary harmony between the unity in intuition and logical unity of thought, is interpretive, lawful without law, and purposive without a purpose all of which are the features of the aesthetic

reflective act of the power of judgment; hence, schemata production refers to the aesthetic subjectivity. It also gives the possibility that such a harmony can be produced in different ways too in case that there is no demand for knowledge. The big conclusion is that a possible construal that the aesthetic power of judgment is necessary to warrant the objective reality of categories as a priori concepts of objects and is necessary to warrant the a priori generation of the principles of the understanding concerning the sensible world. It is the subjective common transcendental condition of both appearances and the categories. Aesthetic power finds its niche in the production of truths about the sensible world.

Kant's investigation of the reflective power of judgment *qua* legislator with an a priori principle which is posited among the understanding and practical reason is the area swarmed with gaps that Kant leaves untouched in the prior critiques or, again, touches under other titles. Second chapter is devoted to the beauty and the aesthetic reflective judgments, yet it starts with the manifold and complex role of the reflectively judging faculty in general with which Kant wants to cover lots of different topics: teleological judgments of organized and living beings, teleological judgment of the whole world, aesthetic judgments, judgments concerning the empirical laws of diversity, judgments producing empirical concepts. Moreover, this diversity of topics makes one doubt about the identity of the a priori principle of this faculty. I untangle them with a differentiation of the principle into that of purposiveness with a view of an end and that of the purposiveness without a purpose, yet the special mode of the legislation of the reflective power of judgment remain the same. It is not autonomy which understanding and practical reason have. It is heautonmy: legislation for the condition of its own act without a determinate rule. Only with respect to this legislation, judgment can spread a different perspective on things. The other common feature of these different employments of the power is the lawfulness that it demands in objects themselves which understanding is incapable to provide. Turning back to the differentiation, the difference in terms of ends and lack of ends refers to being motivated by interests of reason; to wit, to be in the service of discursive understanding shaped by means of the reason in turn or to be

motivated by practical interest. The principle, therefore, is differentiated with respect to the ends of reason. When judgment reflects on the empirical diversity, it does so with a purpose of scientific knowledge and its systematization. The power of judgment has in view the structure of the body of knowledge which it systematizes in hierarchical order of notions or principles and in order to continue its discoveries on nature, it necessarily presupposes that the sensible world given without is in harmony with its structure of knowledge, thus gives itself in an organized and systematic way. The type of givens cannot be accounted by the conceptual unities of understanding which determine a sensible object in general. Therefore, reflective judgment addresses to the intelligible or in-itself character of nature. I link this form of reflective judgment to the regulative function of ideas in their empirical employment, so that the subjective principles of the reflective judgment is shown to be at work in the regulative function of ideas except that the reflective power of judgment gives a subjective ontological support to the projected task. In other expression, the epistemic task of reason cannot be posited as a right task, if there is no presupposition and subjective condition that nature in its unknowable aspect is or acts in sync with the form of intellectual capacity extended with the ideas to a system of knowledge. The principle of purposiveness without purpose receives a determination in its end: furtherance of knowledge-seeking. The former is what governs the aesthetic experience in all relations that could be detected and the latter is a specification of this principle. The aim of scrutinizing the relations of principles and the net of connections is to reveal the free character of the aesthetic judging act and the free character of beauty; mainly, the recovery of the spirit of beauty from the technical artistry of the reflective judgment. Nonetheless, the aesthetic power finds its niche again, though submitted to an aim and regulated, in employment of the ideas of reason for furtherance of knowledge.

The other usage of the notion niche is to describe an exedra, a curved open place made of stone at the ending of the stoa in Greek architecture where people sit, speculate and communicate their ideas. Reflective judgmental act of the aesthetic subject establishes such a niche when beauty is felt with connection of a

necessity to be felt universally and collectively. The second section of the second chapter starts with Kant's contemporary rationalist and empiricist aesthetic theories. Though this part is too general and reductive, it is indispensable, provided that Kant wrote a critique. The moments of his own investigation of aesthetic judgment follows by an elimination of alternative views that feeling beauty is based on an agreeable sensation or it is based on a concept of perfection. Kant gives four conditions the forth one of which is the expression of the formers. Aesthetic judgment is disinterested to that which is encountered, it is an expression of universally felt value, it is an expression within a judging activity through which there arises the awareness of free, purposive, spirited and self-furthering attunement of imagination and understanding with respect to the purposiveness of the object without a further purpose, and lastly aesthetic judgment is an example of necessity. Aesthetic experience is constituted by the relation of free but lawful presentation of imagination to the understanding which is free from the task of categorical determination for knowing or from the task of employing its concepts for production of discursive knowledge. For Kant, beauty is not a concept but the expression of the conformity of a presentation to the harmonious free play of cognitive faculties which he calls the life of the mind. The possibility of forming aesthetic judgment which are related to feeling and still claim universality is explained by the universality of the harmony of imagination and understanding as a subjective condition for any cognition and for any communication shared by all subjects. From this assertion Kant entails that the feeling of beauty can be shared universally who judge with reference to awareness of the spirited cognitive state and aesthetic judgment has right to claim universal validity. Judging without a determinate rule (a concept), but with an apprehension of conformity to universality without any external criteria, but is itself the necessary criteria, is the description of the reflective aesthetic power of judgment. Thus, formed aesthetic judgment is the example of the type of necessity belonging to the aesthetic power itself. Though Kant tries to make reference to his taken-granted conditions of experience, since it is shown to belong the aesthetic power of subject in the first chapter, it is the aesthetic power of judgment itself with



reference to which the claim for a right is accounted. The last form of the aesthetic power of judgment takes is the form of *sensus communis aestheticus*, a collectively shared insight in how and what can and ought to be common or uniform. In the context of antinomy of aesthetic judgment, Kant points that this insight of commonness or unity does not only refer to the sphere of subjects and to the feature that they share, but to the common feature or unity of the world in its intelligible aspect and the subject in its intelligible character which is commonly felt. Aesthetic judgment is formed by referring beyond both phenomenal world and subject and their unity. Thus, aesthetic subject creates its own niche, in the given second meaning of the concept of niche, through presenting the possibility of a look to thing in itself, but subjectively.

In the section entitled “Genius and Aesthetic Ideas” I explain the possibility of the interpretation of genius, the ultimate principle of creation and art, to an aesthetic subjectivity as such which covers the possibility of aesthetic judgment too. In order to accomplish this aim, the sameness of the mental activity included in production with that which is necessary for assessment and judgment is brought in light. The motto of this section is Kant’s definition of genius as “the exemplary originality of a subject’s natural endowment in the *free* use of his [/her] cognitive powers” (KU 5: 318; 186). The features of genius are following ones: The rule of its production escapes the conceptual knowledge of both the creator and the assessor because it creates by means of a free spirited mental attunement lawful without law. Its production has originality. It is an example of the rule of creation. Lastly, it is a power of exhibiting and communicating aesthetic ideas. Introduction of the notion of aesthetic idea leads to revisit of the beauty and to a reformulation of it: beauty is the exhibition of aesthetic ideas. Except the last one they all are other manifestations of the judging ability. Aesthetic idea has different senses. Firstly, it is defined by an inner intuition that impossible to be captured by a determinate concept and refers to an object of an idea. It is *the* aesthetic idea. Secondly, art in general is defined as an occasion of opening up a horizon to the mind with respect to which one can correlate the thoughts and intuitions in different ways by presenting aesthetic ideas and can communicate them. In this

sense, every artwork presents a different aesthetic idea, a thematic content, a meaningful whole of aesthetic attributes expressing what the artwork is meant to convey. In relation to both of them, aesthetic idea exemplifies the power of finding the right manner of presentation necessary to posit the mental attunement in a meaningful way. With connecting these definitions to the interpretation that aesthetic judgment has in view the thing in itself and that beauty is expression of aesthetic idea, it might be a possible proposal that self-given inner intuition which is impossible to capture under a concept refers the ability of aesthetic subject to judge without a rule and aesthetic judging is always at the same time the production of the aesthetic idea. Since this inner intuition refers to the idea of thing in itself all those niches that aesthetic subject fills are different ways that subject exhibits the aesthetic idea. In other words, the subject *qua* aesthetic subject knowing and acting within a sensible world first produces the aesthetic idea of, in Kant's word, supersensible and carries it along all the tasks and conducts. This construal also opens the way to the view that the reading of the appearances or interpretation of what is given or receiving the sensible is shaped always by the presence of the aesthetic idea, or includes the production of it subjectively. Moreover, aesthetic power makes possible to create different particular aesthetic ideas to exhibit different ideas in connection to morality too. Aesthetic subjectivity absorbing the power of genius refers the power of the subject to present its world in possible ways that makes sense to it. The conclusion of the section of genius is again with the reference to the intelligible character of the aesthetic subject by means of the emphasis that the rule-giving aspect of genius and its exhibitory power is hidden and refers to the intelligible aspect of subjectivity.

The last chapter explains the reason of our "constant preoccupation with doing the right thing" or of taking ourselves responsible for our acts according to Kant.<sup>4</sup> It consists of two sections. First section takes the history of freedom from where it starts; that is, from the antinomy that reason is caught in its speculation of

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<sup>4</sup> George Di Giovanni, *Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2205), p. 165.

a cosmological idea. Then, it passes to the *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals* in order to show how Kant shapes the justification of a pure morality. The notion of pure morality refers to the possibility of pure reason's being practical such that it gives a law from itself which in turn is capable of being a pure motive for action. In *Groundwork* the answer of the question is given through an analysis of notions of free will and moral law. Following Kant, this section clarifies the notions of duty, good will, and categorical imperative as the supreme law of morality. The analysis is concluded by demonstrating that a will can only be free under the condition that it is autonomous as a law-giver and a law can be a pure law of morality if it commands nothing other than conforming to its character of expressing a law. These clarifications exclude any theory of morality which gives the priority to the good and tries to show why the good ought to be willed. On the contrary, for Kant, good is brought about by the character of will and by the character of intention which intends for the sake of duty only or which intends only to the "ought to". Though Kant gives definitions of freedom and moral law, he admits that the reasoning about rational agency ultimately rolls in a circle. It is because the subject or the self is regarded to be free in order to infer the possibility of moral law, since only the autonomy makes possible an unconditionally binding law, however, after that, in forgetfulness, freedom is inferred from the conception of a pure law, since pure law expresses the necessity of being a universal law giver. Though Kant solves the circle by pointing the double character of the self and the possibility of looking two different perspectives, who looks from these perspectives is still the human individual without knowledge of the reality of her own freedom. In second critique, a reciprocal relation is established between freedom and the law. Moral law would not be there if there were no freedom, but moral law is there for our consciousness of it so that we warrant our freedom. Moral law enters into the picture this time as a fact of reason, as something reason itself does by being practical and by means of its pure practical intention. Thus, the reality of freedom for the human being as a rational being is proved as a practical necessity brought about by the mode of rationality. Therefore, as far as human being is rational, it is a responsible agent as

well, lives with a feeling of obligation to make the right thing, it has the power of establishing an unconditional lawfulness and manifests the reality of an original and an atemporal causality belonging to the intelligible universe of thing in itself which is left as a vacant place in speculation. Is there a niche for aesthetic subject in moral universe?

The reason of the stress on the different formulations of the categorical imperative in the second chapter is that they all are created by the aesthetic subject. Moral law becomes a universal natural law, human being becomes an end itself, and human being becomes a member of kingdom of ends for the moral agent. It is the aesthetic subject *qua* metaphor creator who makes possible to present something as something other or carries a relation from one context to another. In order to understand how to act with conformity to a universal law, aesthetic subject imagines a universe in which the moral law prevails and in which every member acts according to this law and in which the acts are organized in relation of ends. No matter imagination is dismissed from pure morality because there is no time for time, with the aesthetic power it is welcomed. Instead of the schema production of imagination, Kant offers the typic production for moral concepts. This production consists of taking the concept of lawfulness from understanding and of presenting it as a type of the moral lawfulness. Production of typics works in a reciprocal transformation in the sense that both the sensible nature is presented as a type of moral and rational nature and the moral law is presented as type of natural law. In addition, it is connected to subject's presenting its moral character as if it is a second nature of it; hence, it is connected to internalization of the practical rules or maxims and creating the moral character as if it is the second nature of the individual. This is how intelligible aspect of both the nature and the subject becomes intelligible or supersensible *nature*. The power of metaphor creation is explained by means of the hypotyposis [*hypotypose*], a mode of power of exhibition or intuitive presentation. Furthermore, aesthetic power of judgment has also a role in making possible to conceive the highest good via aesthetic presentation of the sensible universe purposive without a purpose in the first hand so that the purposiveness of

it can be determined in harmony with the purposes of moral subject by means of a teleological reflective judgment. This presentation also refers to the power of aesthetic subject who carries with it the presentation of unity of thing in itself and extends it to a unity which makes meaningful to hope for the highest good or produce the presentation of it as possible by the conduct of the moral subjects in the sensible world. Even the infinite striving is the metaphorical creation given that morality is a sphere out of time and even this infinity is the only way to make sense of our vocation.<sup>5</sup> Thus, without aesthetic power of subject we can understand little what the law command in commanding to will that our principle of action should be a universal law.

My study ends with a visit to different selves and different modes of the subject's self-awareness that were encountered throughout and with the possibility of the unity of them. In addition, I turn to the unity of reason which Kant affirms to be established by introduction of the power of reflective judgment. The unity of thinking subject refers to a transcendental condition and simply means the power to add all representations a higher representation "I think" whereby subject is conscious in thought of it's being the one who thinks. Through it, nothing is known by the subject. Following Melisa Zinking, I demonstrate that the self making the synthesis or the self in the form of combiner (who makes possible the production of knowledge through thinking) can be interpreted as the aesthetic subject who is conscious of itself as a theme.<sup>6</sup> This unity is a qualitative and poetic unity necessary for the evaluation or an intuitive discrimination of a manifold as combinable according to commonness without a concept. Hence, aesthetic subject, beside all its roles, emerges as a condition for being aware of thinking. On the other hand, moral agent though aware of the moral law as its fact of rationality, it really does not know who acts, because as a moral agency it belongs to an intelligible world. As such, it presents the sensible world or nature

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<sup>5</sup> See also Gary Banham, *Kant's Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Melisa Zinkin, "The Unity of a Theme: The Subject of Judgments of Taste," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 14 (2006), pp. 469-488

as heteronomy and tries to remove it while this try ultimately will lead both the abolishment of its own acts as sensible and the awareness of the “ought.” At the same time, it lives in the sensible world from the perspective of which it carries the moral agency in itself as an unknown something. The aesthetic power of subject, in this case, moves away the otherness of the sensible world while bringing the intelligible character in intuition subjectively as well. At last, aesthetic reflective power of judgment unifies the knowing self and succeeding form of it; the system-seeking self, with the self who is a moral agent when it produces for the unknown aspect of nature an aesthetic determinability whose being the sensible object of knowledge is legislated by understanding. This possibility of aesthetic and subjective determination is linked both to the moral values and ends of moral agent and its interest of knowledge. This determinability means the achievement of the unity of reason. The world niche etymologically comes from Latin word *nidus* which means a nest. It is also used to refer a formation of environment and to potency for origination. This meaning has resemblance to the first meaning of the niche which I converted. This conversion can be seen as the conversion of the question of the gulf. It is not the question of the reason itself but the question of the human being. Kant’s critical philosophy can also be read as a try to find a vocation for human being, then this reading should be finalized by the assertion that human being creates its own vocation, for when the aesthetic subjectivity and the beauty is absent, the subject remains as rifted which is impossible to merge. The aesthetic power of subject helps the construction of the sensible universe and the moral universe as well as allowing their unification too. To conclude, human being *qua* aesthetic subject creates the sensible world as its own *nidus* with respect to both the thinking self and the moral self through the beauty.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE POWER OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND THE TRUTH

#### 2.1 Sensibility and Pure Intuition

Kant's critical line starts by assigning a duty "from which nobody who wishes to make any a priori judgments about things can claim exemption" (A 263). Indeed, this duty bears to every philosophical enterprise of speculating on the nature of experience without the exception of those which has a skeptical perspective on any a priori. Kant names this duty as transcendental reflection. Transcendental reflection finds to which faculty of the mind the representations belong and determines the objects of these representations respectively, if any knowledge about these objects is to be claimed. This description goes hand in hand with Kant's transcendental limitation of knowledge to objects considered as appearances and with his criticism of transcendental realism belonging both to rationalism and empiricism so far as these philosophical standpoints wrongly equates the objects as appearances and as they are in themselves, leading to the view that cognition is always cognition of objects in themselves.<sup>7</sup>

Leibniz and Locke, representatives of two varieties of transcendental realism, receive their due critique, since

Leibniz *intellectualised* appearances, just as Locke, according to his system of *noogony* ..., *sensualised* all concepts of understanding, *i.e.* interpreted them as nothing more than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations, which, while quite different, can supply objective valid judgments of things only in *conjunction* [*Verknüpfung*] which each other, each of these great men holds to one only of the two,

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<sup>7</sup> See Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism," in Graham Bird (ed.), *A Companion to Kant* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), pp.111-25.

viewing it as an immediate relation to things in themselves. The other faculty is then regarded as serving as only to confuse or order the representations which this selected faculty yields (A 271/ B 327).<sup>8</sup>

Kant affirms that the relationship of thought (concept) and reality in cognition cannot be taken neither as the first reached the latter as removing the confusion attached the representation, nor it does so by ordering the representations. Such a relationship is forbidden because the capacities of mind, sensibility and understanding, yield representations different in kind, function differently in cognition with respect to representations and thus have different principles in their activities. Moreover, these different activities condition the experience such that the reality independent of these conditions cannot be attained. Kant appreciates the recognition that only through the union of the capacities knowledge can arise, but he says that this unitary model of knowledge cannot be counted as a reason for a reduction of the different contributions to each other; rather, the unity in knowledge is “a strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other” (A 52/B 76). Hence, for Kant, the demanded union is not a union at all, if the separateness of the elements is not granted. The separateness of elements demands the demonstration of their composing a union in turn, if knowledge is taken to be generated by means of working of two different independent capacities. Since representations of sensibility (intuitive representations) and those of understanding (conceptual representations) originate in separate faculties, instead of sensualizing the concept and intellectualizing the intuition, the true explanation for Kant is to demonstrate how “to make our concept sensible, that is to add the object [*Gegenstand*] to them in intuition” and how “to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts.” (A 51/B 75)

The answers given to “How possible?” questions are the other ways of expressing how Kant deals with the problem of theoretical knowledge, moral or aesthetic consciousness, in other words, with the nature of experience in general.

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<sup>8</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kempth Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).



In the *Critique of Reason* Kant analyzes both the sensible and conceptual conditions of knowledge by proving them as necessary in order there to be a possibility of knowledge. Transcendental Aesthetic in *Critique of Pure Reason* constitutes the part where the sensible conditions and the share of sensibility in cognition with both its purely formal and material characterizations are discussed. Transcendental Logic, on the other hand, is the place where conditions of thought and the contribution of understanding to cognition are focused on. With regard to second assumption above, it can be said that sensible conditions are conditions relative to an object's being sensibly represented; determining it as an object of sensible intuition (Kant names this form of object as *Gegenstand*) and conditions of the understanding are relative to the object's being logically thought (*Objekt* is the term Kant uses).<sup>9</sup> The basic problem is to account for how they are added to each other necessarily for the possibility of object's becoming phenomenon; the object of knowledge; so that an objectively valid actual experience occurs. Thus, Kant's primary motive to focus on pure reason with respect to experience is the possibility and impossibility of knowledge via explicating the constitution of the known and the knower from a transcendental viewpoint. From the transcendental perspective within a transcendental reflection the realm of the truth (objectively valid knowledge) and that whose truthfulness should be the concern is clearly drawn.

Sensibility joins to the generation of experience and knowledge under the title of a capacity of being affected in a certain manner. Only by being affected in sensible manner, it supplies intuitions. Kant also specifies this manner as

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<sup>9</sup> Allison calls the *Objekt* a judgmental or logical conception of object, "an object in sensu logico," because it is linked to the judgment and objective validity. It is a broad notion of an object including everything which can serve as subject of a judgment. *Gegenstand*, on the other hand, related to the objective reality and refers to the actual entity or states of affairs; an object of possible experience. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism (An Interpretation and Defense)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p.135. Rudolf A. Makkreel argues that such a distinction can not be followed through the text. For example, Kant uses the term in phrases "*Objekt* distinct from me" (B158) and "*Objekt* of intuition" (B 156). Therefore, *Objekt* can be as real as *Gegenstand*. Everything sensed or thought can be an *Objekt*. The difference between the *Gegenstand* and the *Objekt* is that the first points the status of object as unmediated by imagination and the latter points the status of object as mediated through the transcendental schema of imagination. Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 39-41.

necessitating the object to be given rather than as a form of creative sensibility. It passively receives and produces intuitive representations, therefore it is called faculty of representations (A 19-20/ B 34). An intuitive representation is classified as having a direct relation to its object which is single; therefore sensibility allows direct contact in contrast to spontaneous understanding and its discursive representations. Intuition, on the objective side; that is as that which is intuited, for Kant, can also be analyzed into two pieces; its form and its matter. Empirical intuitions are the contents of *a posteriori* knowledge and their object is called as undetermined appearance. Sensations constitute the matter, but sensations cannot be posited unless they are ordered and related. They should be carried from being an undetermined manifold of appearance to a determined appearance appearing in a form, though not conceptually determined, so that they can be represented to a subject. This form of appearance cannot be sensation itself, since in it sensations are ordered; therefore it comes from the side of subject. By discerning an a priori element even in empirical intuition or a posteriori knowledge (in the most basic fact of receiving sensations or connecting perceptions) as a necessity (making reception possible), Kant concludes that the manner of receptivity isolated from understanding must be isolated further from the sensations and must be studied only with respect to the form that it brings to the representations of objects and with respect to the intuition which does not contain any sensation, so pure.

How Kant finds the necessary a priori form that the sensibility determines for the possibility of experience and how it can be a pure intuition can be better understood, if Kant's other description of the faculty of sensibility is brought forth. He differentiates sensibility into inner sense and outer sense with regard to being aware of sensations as either referring to inner life or outer world (A 23/ B 38). The subject can only become conscious of its sensations as referring to an external object by means of representing this object spatial or in space. In the same way, the inner life can be distinguished and attended only as temporal or in time. Therefore, any perception of outer objects as outer (outer intuitions) and inner determinations as inner (inner intuitions) is possible only through the sensibility's a priori representing time and space. Time and space, in that sense

are necessary forms of sensibility (the certain manner of sensibly intuiting). Being such, firstly, under the name of necessary sensible condition of any experience, they determine the nature of object as being a sensible object (object of possible sense experience) and secondly they determine how the manifold of appearances are ordered; for example, objects of outer intuition are represented in different spaces in relation to each other by means of having a particular place and inner intuitions are represented as occurring in different times. Thus, the form of sensibility brings a structure or form to the appearances a priori; that is, a temporal and spatial order. In Kant's words;

Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to being affected by objects, necessarily must precede all [empirical] intuitions of this objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind *a priori*, and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain prior to all experience, principles which determines the relations of these objects (A 26/ B 42).

What is explained so far finishes at the second 'how' of the quotation. Before continuing, a significant point should be stressed. Time and space occupy the same status as a priori condition of appearances. However, the representation of time gains priority, since all determinations happen on the side of the subject (Kant uses the term *Gemüt*, conscious 'human' faculty) and through its cognitive activities. Time is condition of any inner activity and state as such. Therefore, time is said to be "an *a priori* condition of all appearance whatsoever" (A 34/ B 50); that is, the very possibility of any representation depends on time, since the very possibility of any representation depends to the fact that there is conscious active subject. Further, Kant specifies subject's relation to time as immediate whereby the outer appearances, or appearances as outer, are mediated. Now we can turn to the second part of the above quotation and see how Kant drives the representation of space and time as pure intuitions in addition of their being form of all appearances which can contain principles for determinations of relations.

It is plain from the fact that all empirical intuitions presuppose the representations of space and time, that they themselves cannot be empirical intuition of particular objects. Neither they can be derived from such intuitions and be empirical concepts. Kant also clarifies this impossibility by addressing the differences of how a concept and an intuition relates to their objects. This clarification serves also to exclude the third alternative that the representations of space and time are a priori concepts leading to the idea that the conditions of experience belonging to sensibility can be discerned conceptually. The immediacy of intuition and the need of the mediation for the side of the concept are already mentioned. The difference gets deepened when concept's mediating relation to what it represents defined as a subsumption of the object under the concept resulting in an incomplete representation (presentation of a characteristic [*Merkmale*]) of the unique object. Logic demands that these incomplete representations have priority to the content of the concept taken as forming a possible complete whole "which thus through a synthesis of several parts is to *complete* itself."<sup>10</sup> In contrast, space or time as "an original representation" precedes the parts which are constructed and so presented in that whole. It also explains why an intuition and a concept, though referring to some infinitude, do it in different ways. Concept contains infinitude either by means of having a character of principle to be applicable an infinite number of particular objects (distributive unity) or by collecting marks as a description which are in principle indefinite for complete determination (a deficient collective unity). However space or time contains the infinitude within itself, for example infinite spaces can be drawn or representable in this individual whole, so that infinitely possible parts are contained in it. Thirdly and lastly, Kant adds to the infinitude contained in the a priori representation of space their objective mode of being given as "an infinite *given* magnitude" (B 40) and that of time as "given as unlimited" (B 48). From these expositions, Kant concludes that, in the representations of space and time an immediate reference to a single unitary whole is contained, therefore those

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<sup>10</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwartz (New York: Dover Publications, 1974), p.64.

representations are intuitions and this kind of intuition is pure intuition, given that nothing attending to sensations or materiality (particular sensuous spatial regions or sensations filling them) is included. If we turn to characterization of space and time as constituting the form of appearances in transcendental explanation, their pureness is also connected with their being intuitions of a certain universal and necessary form of appearance. Space and time as particular forms are purely intuited.

Kant's clarifications with regard to the capacity of sensibility, no matter how in a simplified manner stated, create problems as much as they solve. It depends firstly to the fact that Kant has different objectives in *Transcendental Aesthetics*: grounding the a priori and synthetic status of mathematical knowledge, discerning the conditions of possibility of ordinary experience and arguing about the nature of space and time against alternative metaphysical speculations (of Leibniz and Newton). Secondly, no matter how strictly the concerned capacity is announced as isolated from conceptual capacity it still should be thought and evaluated in connection with it and Kant's elaborated account. The first problem concerns the definition of pure intuition as an a priori mode of knowing (*Erkenntnis*, cognition or re-cognition) and the second one is related that which this epistemic import brings about to the determination of objecthood of space and time with respect to their being forms of intuition. It can be said that Kant wants to save the status of pure intuition as a priori knowledge for the sake of grounding the accountability of science, when this mode of knowledge concerns with certainty, necessity or universality. On the other hand, the power of a priori intuition and pure intuition as its product belongs to capacity of sensibility and sensibility all alone is incapable of asserting that which it provides is a genuine knowledge, since knowledge demands conceptual thought in virtue of the basic principle of transcendental philosophy. Most importantly, sensibility is a capacity to be affected and general definition of intuition is immediate representation yielded by affection. By analogy with empirical intuitions as immediate representations of objects, what affects the sense to yield pure intuitions? The analogy breaks also, since no object can be encountered as an

infinite complete totality and apprehended at once. Kant makes it plain that such an encounter is not possible for us. The idea of totality refers to a transcendent object and its object is impossible to intuit when he shows the error included in the knowledge-claim on God or on world both of which contain the cosmological idea of the totality. In addition to it, when Kant starts to discuss the necessary unity of consciousness which gives unity to representations by means of some principles as to ground objective validity of them, he asserts that nothing unsynthesized or uncombined can be conceived and the synthesis belong to the active part; that is, to the act of understanding. Therefore, seemingly contradictory claim against the conception of intuitive representations of space and time as given totalities is that space as an extensive magnitude can be represented only by means of a synthesis is one of the necessary axioms of intuitions (B 202-3) and a synthetic unity cannot be simply given. Kant holds that a pure synthesis of apprehension is needed in order to have the a priori representations of space and time (A100). Kemp Smith blames Kant's proposal of pure intuition in *Transcendental Aesthetics* as a certain immediate contentful knowledge as "the traditional, Cartesian, semi-mystical worship of mathematical truth", since pure intuition explained in above paragraph defined as providing a pure content a priori and Smith thinks that such a definition suggests that space or time "as a representation lies ready in the mind from the very birth of consciousness."<sup>11</sup> He continues by stressing that consciousness in any kind necessitates that the unity is referred to the self's spontaneous conceptual activities as necessary condition and any content that can be present should be constituted by a sensuous manifold of experience rather than a mystical pure content since there is the limitation of necessity of being affected by actual empirical objects.

Such criticisms can be avoided in two ways. The first one is placing the emphasis on space and time's being necessary form of intuitions in the sense that their function is both grounding and constraining. The second one is differentiating the degrees of consciousness respectively. In relation to sciences of

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<sup>11</sup> Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.92-93

geometry, algebra or kinematics the intuitive representations of space and time provides an intuitional framework which makes possible the constructive mathematical activity and constrains it from empty conceptual representations. As clearly shown by Micheal Friedman, Kant proposes a model for proofs of geometry which is closely connected with his claim for synthetic and a priori character of mathematical knowledge.<sup>12</sup> Geometry requires a pure intuition to exhibit the single objects (circle, rectangular etc.) a priori in it, so that it determines the characters and relations of these objects in an a priori fashion through the characteristics of this pure intuition. The geometrical intuitive activity is a constructive process in which proof or rule of construction itself becomes a spatial and temporal object (presented) in pure intuition. A triangle is drawn by means of motions of points to form enclosed lines as interpreted to express what the concept of triangle should contain. Such a mathematical activity is possible when it is grounded on an intuitive grasp of the condition of this activity itself which also provides the work-place to present or construct pure sensible intuitions of different spatial determinations. As Lisa Shabel puts into words “the construction of the basic spatial regions that become the objects of investigation for the pure geometer originates and proceeds in accordance with constructive warrants and constraints that are themselves determined by the content of the original concept of SPACE; codification of these warrants and constraints provides the basis for an *a priori* science of space.”<sup>13</sup> Thus, nothing mysterious about the pure intuition of space and time and intuitive mathematical principles, given that pure intuition conveys the sense of condition for the activity within the activity, makes possible particular constructions and provides an intuitive insight into necessity.

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<sup>12</sup> Micheal Friedman, “Kant’s Theory of Geometry,” *The Philosophical Review* 94(1985), pp.455-506.

<sup>13</sup> Lisa Shabel, “Reflections on Kant’s Concept (and Intuition) of Space,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 34 (2003), pp.45-57; see, p.48. Though she argues that space is a pure sensible aesthetic concept functioning as an intuitive rule or principle through her article, she writes that the content of this concept can only be grasped intuitively.

Being necessary and universal ground and condition of any sensible intuition belonging to sensibility of mind, space and time are pre-geometrical, pre-constructive and pre-conceptual. They allow the construction of figures or numbers. In addition, space or time in its being a given object as a one whole is also can be construed as pre-intuited object or pre-intuition for experiencing consciousness in the sense that it cannot become actual object of sensible intuition, but should be immediately grasped as an original (necessary) condition whenever a partial space or point of time is represented.<sup>14</sup> The clarifications with regard to the status of a priori representations of space and time capture the implicit distinction in Kant's notion of pureness or apriority of intuition which Paton makes explicit.<sup>15</sup> He suggest that pure intuition of space and time has not only a universality and necessity as condition of the possibility of appearances, but with respect of being a kind of knowledge that when the whole is known, what the parts should be also known apart from any reference to actual or partial experience. This sense of apriority is valid for all cases when space and time are thought as single wholes and as specially as an abstract system of relations which science is occupied. To sum up, because the *power* of pure intuiting of sensibility leading to intuitive representations conditions any experientiality of actual objects or apprehension of them, science gains its status as providing objective truth, not vice versa and apart from this characteristics representations of space and time, though free from "everything empirical, however certain it is that they are represented in the mind completely a priori, would yet be without objective validity, senseless and meaningless" (A 156).

Smith's worry about a non-conceptual or intuitively informative stage in the constitution of the objective knowledge and the problems of the pure intuition concern us because of two reasons though it is an early stage for a full

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<sup>14</sup> Allison uses the phrase "pre-intuition" following Arthur Melnick. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism (An Interpretation and Defense)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p.95. Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) p.11.

<sup>15</sup> See H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, vol. I (London: Routledge, 2002), pp.328-35.



consideration yet. The first is that in a very early stage of Kant's investigation they point out that the difference of the sensibility as receiver from the understanding as the owner of spontaneity and of right of imposing objective validity cannot be sustained, particularly at the time when a power (act) and representative function is attributed to pure intuition. Such an intuitive act constitutes the sphere where all concepts and truth claims can have a sense. Indeed, apart from this significance, the certainty on the flow of time or the truth that 5 is not the result of the addition of the 2 and 2 would mean nothing. Secondly and connectively the notion of pure intuition, intuitive grasp of necessity and presentational power of intuition have a merit, because such a model that the notion of pure intuition provides will be needed in the solution of the problem of judgment and transcendental schematism. The model mentioned above enlightens the objective of the schematism of the understanding. Thirdly, the construal of pure intuition as an immediate grasp of an original condition is also a reason to question whether such a grasp can manifest itself differently, not with respect to partial spaces and times, but with respect to all appearances objectified as parts of a sphere constituting experience. The question concerns the possibility of grasping a condition not only for intuition but unitary condition both the intuitive and conceptual capacity and its different manifestations. A future oriented settle can be done now by signing the fact that the faculty of understanding will be shown to be in need of an interpretative schematic act in respect to pure intuition of time in order to fill the niche posited between its originally pure concepts and sensible intuitions. Kant suggests a model of presentation or cognition alike immanent in theoretical thinking for the generation of synthetic principles of the understanding a priori.<sup>16</sup> In that sense, Kant's investigation of mathematical thought, truth and the nature of pure intuition became a part in this study. Lastly, the objecthood of space and time familiarize us with a different kind of presence from the presence of actual empirical sensible things, which is a presence making the latter kinds present in such a way that they can have an intelligibility. It is also an intuition of

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<sup>16</sup> See also Sarah L. Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 70-8.

a necessary presence of wholeness different than the partiality necessitating that whole.

Turning to the second way of defense, a detailed examination of the phenomenology of consciousness in Kantian sense is required to be able to prove that how consciousness develops on the side of the subject and what degrees the objectivity of the content of cognition has before the consciousness contained in the strict sense of the conceptual knowledge of an object is manifested. A deeper clarification of *subjective* subjective condition, rather than objective subjective condition is needed. Kant explicitly addresses the different degrees of representative states for consciousness among which the first is to present something to oneself called simply representing (*vorstellen*) excluding any conscious act.<sup>17</sup> The second is to perceive (*wahrnehmen*) explained as to present with consciousness, most probably with sensuous consciousness and the third one is to be cognizant or being acquainted (*kennen*): “to present something to oneself in conscious comparison with other things both as *identity* and *disparity*.” There is still a level under the level of the understanding (*verstehen*) through concepts and Kant calls it *erkennen*, which can be translated as intuitive recognition or knowledge of an object which is not conceptualized. Thus, it is a wrong conviction to regard that the only way of existing for consciousness is through the categorical principles of the faculty of understanding and without a relation to them no conscious apprehension is allowable. We can have pure intuitions which contain a mode of awareness and a presence of a content, though not comprehended with an involvement of explicit comprehension of apperception; that is, being conscious through concepts while being aware of itself as the subject of knowledge by means of the employment of the conceptual faculty of the mind which are required for the strict determination of the object as object of knowledge. Therefore, it can be still said both either that pure intuition presents to mind a pure ‘matter’, ‘manifold’, data or content in immediate relation to

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<sup>17</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwartz (New York: Dover Publications, 1974), p.71.

something which may possibly have another unity than the categories of understanding conceptually unifies with its categories of unity, plurality and totality or another non-conceptual spontaneous activity (the power of imagination) is involved to produce unities in conformity with the needs of understanding; and that the subject might have another kind of self-consciousness rather than being conscious of itself as the logical subject of conceptual acts, that is, as a knower, though as transcendental condition of any experience, as it will be seen when the juxtaposition of the faculty of understanding is made, transcendental consciousness or apperception should be always presupposed. The other important question is of course whether the transcendental consciousness can be regarded as one mode of consciousness for subject in addition to its being a logical principle of theoretical knowledge and theoretical criteria of truth or this principle is the primary ground of all modes of self-image. The question can be answered when the moral subjectivity and the subject in its noumenal character is also taken into consideration.

To sum up, Kant states that sensibility's conditioning responsibility depends on its being a mode of intuition which has an "absolutely necessary" inherent form which allows sensible objects or intuitions to be given or to appear by structuring them with the forms of time and space (B 60). This form of sensibility is a form of affection and the a priori form that it gives to all appearances is known a priori by being intuited purely. There are two such forms constituting intuitive representations, time and space. So, time and space are at once forms of intuitions or of appearances and pure intuitions. Since they are as forms necessary and universal condition of the possibility of any and every object of sensible intuition, what is known by pure intuition, whatever relation, principle or axiom is determined with respect to this form has objective validity and immediately contained in the intuition. Nevertheless, the primary function comes from being a limiting condition in that the form is absolutely necessary only for human being and determines the object as related to this sensible condition leaving aside any question of knowledge apart from the knowledge of this mere relation and the object as appearance. In a sense, we are powerful enough to

intuitively know the necessary condition (pure intuition has this condition as content), but this knowledge is attained under the same known condition.

## **2.2 Understanding and Categories**

The faculty of understanding conditions the experience and the object with its own different kinds of modes of a priori knowledge than the sensible conditions which are contained in necessary intuitive representations of the capacity of sensibility. This a priori modes of knowledge Kant calls pure concepts originating from the understanding itself. As pure intuition relate in an a priori way to its object as sensible object, a pure concept relate a priori to the object and determines it as thinkable. Pure concept contains “the form of the thought of an object in general” (A 51/ B75). With regard to that thought of an object in general the pure concepts can be employed purely. In the employment of pure concepts, understanding has a logical use and function which is to judge by means of them according to a normative system of pure logic. So, the first characteristic of the understanding is to produce propositions in universal logical forms of judging. Judgments are secondary (conceptual) representations of a combination or unity of plurality of representations, just as concepts are mediate representations by means of which we recognize what we encounter (the concept of cat to recognize Mia) and which comprise other particular similar things (the cats on the street). In the words of Kant, “all judgments are functions of unity among our various representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object” (A69/ B94). Therefore, pure concepts of understanding are possible predicates of judgments which are necessarily used in recognition of an object in general, or in thinking an object for the intuitions. Since the understanding is a faculty which is responsible of conceptualization and its main function is judging, the object in general it thinks has some different ways of representing its identity and uniformity (common marks of being an object;

predicates) discovered in the different forms of judgment, which Kant also calls different moments of understanding.

However, the judgmental activity of understanding and its pure concepts produced on this logical function of understanding are not so “generally” or abstractly logical and empty in the sense that the produced concepts serve merely as analytic unities manifesting a common character or included in every thought of an object in general analytically as only as a form of thought. Kant emphasizes the oneness of spontaneous act [*Handlung*] of mind and the sameness of the understanding in its functions both in logical comprehension and determining an object for knowledge in relation to intuition which is its transcendental-logical function. Pure concepts, if they should be proposed as a priori modes of knowledge needs a reference to an intuition in general through which something is given to think about; the concept should know a priori something about the object of *experience*. The object as determined as thinkable according to the principles of understanding which impose an objective validity to the thought should be the thought of an object having the possibility to be given in an intuition in general. This is the positive criterion concerning the content for any claim to knowledge. The transcendental content brought to the pure thought of an object by means of an act of the mind is the fact that the act which leads a conceptual unity of representations in a statement is at the same time conceived as a rule for the unity of the combination of an intuitive manifold. Kant writes:

The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity, in its most general expression; we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produces the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general (A 79/ B 105).

By being pure concepts of an object which is possible to be given in an intuition, the concepts are necessary rules for the synthesis (combination) of appearances in an intuition in general. The consciousness that the combined appearances in intuition are combined necessarily is the consciousness that they are combined according to a rule and it is identical to think an object or to have a concept of an object in general; therefore, Kant says that the object which is referent point of appearances “is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis” (A 106).

The necessary form of thought of an object which expresses a necessary synthetic unity of a plurality of representations on the objective side of the experience implies the necessity of consciousness which apperceive itself through the manifold of representations and which Kant calls transcendental apperception. The necessary consciousness of the act of thinking and the necessary representation of the universality and identity of the one who thinks is involved in every formation of objectively valid judgments. Kant thinks that the single thought of an object in general presupposes that this thought, which is a combination of different elements but single, belongs to a single consciousness and vice versa. In other words, what is combined and represented as an object is combined in one universal consciousness, if it should be count as representation belonging to someone or representing something to someone. The identity of the thinking consciousness is necessary both in order to recognize the identity of the object through time or in order to recognize that different aspects thought simultaneously belong to the thought of the same object, since the consciousness thinking of the object at different times is the same and the consciousness thinking different aspects is not different with respect to the each aspect but the same. If we take this necessary togetherness of object and subject as the general form of thought as a condition for the occurrence of experience, then the elements included are labeled as transcendental object and transcendental consciousness. Moreover, since the possession of concepts belongs to spontaneous and actively functional part of the mind, Kant takes the generation of the representation of ‘I think’ as a transcendental act which is operative through the judgmental function

and logical forms of judgments, so through the pure concepts of the understanding. Here, we have the other characterization of judgment as “nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception” (B 141). The combination of the manifold of representations are brought under one identical objective and universal consciousness through the logical functions; that is through the categories (in so far as something to be categorized is thought to be given); hence what is given in intuition is necessarily subject to the condition of transcendental apperception and to the a priori concepts of the understanding in order to represent an object.

There should be placed three concluding remarks with respect to the intellectual form or condition brought to the experience by the faculty of understanding. The first one is that the pure concepts that the understanding provides relate to an intuition or a givenness of something in an intuition which is too general and lack of limit with respect to total determination of the specific intuitive nature of its object. Their employment “extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual” (B 148). Therefore, Kant says in the link of the categories and unity of apperception, categories remains as rules for an understanding whose act consists in *thought of an intuition* without care of the specific form of this intuition. For such a pure understanding, categories represent a necessary *intellectual* synthetic unity of a manifold (B 150). The notion of the uniform synthetic nature of the manifold here can be interpreted either as the thought of the necessary togetherness of the category and the consciousness; or the thought of an object itself which is a conceptual representation of togetherness of a manifold of representations; or the necessary togetherness of the thought of an object and the thought of an intuition in general. In all three interpretations, pure concepts contain an intellectual synthesis or they are discursive representations of the unity of the synthesis demanded by the form of thought, if this form is to have a determinative transcendental function included in knowledge.

The second remark is that the niche between the faculties of understanding and sensibility; their supply of intuitive unities and conceptual unities widens

when Kant mentions the possibility of unconformity of the given appearances to the conceptual unities wanted by the categorical thought at the start of the investigation of the share of the understanding in conditioning the experience. The problem of the possibility of unconformity indicates two related issues encountered with the categories of understanding. The one is their difference from the pure intuitions. Pure intuitions has the priority of having a presentational power and immediacy in realization of what they contain or refer, therefore Kant do not concern for their objective reality. Time and space, as purely intuited condition directly refers, if it is allowable to say, to an existence of otherness and they do not need a rational warrant to ascertain their reality. Their reality in that sense can be regarded as a given because of the nature of sensibility and the nature of an intuition. Categories, on the other hand, due to their conceptual nature, lack immediacy in ascertaining and presenting their own objective reality. Consequently, they are wanted of a broadened transcendental proof with an additional introduction of a mediate third thing which ground that they relate to a possible experience and with it to the reality that this experience can give for the object thought in addition to the proof of their possession based on logical processing of understanding or on a logically demanded unity of consciousness. It is not incompatible with the above claim that they relate to an intuition or a unity in an in intuition in general given that the reality of this intuition is not determined; it is not shown that it is the intuition of space or time of whose reality and unity the certainty is gained. This is the problem facing from the perspective of pure understanding and its concepts. The importance of this problem in fact comes from the liberty of the thought from the knowledge. The object can be an object of thought and have a concept without having the necessary corresponding determination of that object as the object of intuition, therefore as the object of knowledge.

Secondly, connected strictly with the first, relates to the status of appearances. It is entailed that appearances as objects of sensible intuitions have first-hand dependence to the conditioning form of intuition; while as appearances they may be free from what understanding wants them to conform. Kant says that



“objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions” (B 112) or again “since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less presents objects to our intuition” (A 91). Hence, facing with an appearance which eludes conceptualization and the possibility of given appearances’ radical incompatibility point out the fact that Kant actually should have demonstrated that the appearances have also a first-hand dependence or link to the pure concepts of understanding. This is the problem facing us from the perspective of sensibility and intuition. We can here differentiate two meanings of the term of an appearance’s being given: givenness to the intuitive capacity and givenness to the conceptual faculty, as Kant differentiate between “appearance in intuition” and “appearance in experience” (A 110). Kant says that in the former it is under the forms of space and time. To be regarded as the latter it must be represented as under the unity of the apperception and therefore to be given to the understanding as *subsumable* under the concepts. Intuitive conditions’ providence of openness to such a conceptualization is questioned again, though the openness is there, because no matter how the manifold can have an intuitive unity due to pure intuition; it actually should have that one which is proper to the understanding’s categorizing unity. Suppose that the synthesis of a manifold of sensible intuition is produced in accord with the rules, that is, the categories as the rules of such a synthesis. Further, suppose that this synthesis is produced by means of an intuition or by means of the rules of imagination rather than taking these rules belonging to understanding. To such a synthesis no necessity can be attached from the part of the categories of understanding, so pure concepts of understanding lose their a priori conditioning function. We can glimpse again the need of a revision of the aesthetic part of the cognition in order to proof the status of the pure concepts of understanding in knowledge. Indeed, the givenness of appearances as subsumable under the categories and their conformity to them is supplied by means of the power of imagination and a transcendental act of this power results in the link of the categories to the form of intuition belonging to

human sensible intuition; to the time, so to the empirical intuition, thereby proving the reality of categories and producing a priori principles concerning the objects of intuition. To sum up, the originally driven pure concepts of understanding both from the judgmental activities (forms of conceptual combinations) and from the unity of thinking consciousness should also be proved to be originally related to the intuitive capacity of cognition in order to be count as knowing specifically something about object of experience, therefore should belong to an original synthetic unity of consciousness. It would be easier if Kant started from this original synthetic nature of the unity as the source of the a priori knowledge, but most probably it would result in the deprivation of the difference of the intuitive and conceptual mode of cognition belonging different cognitive powers. Let me now investigate how the link between empirical intuitions and categories are supplied by means of the transcendental imagination so that the later are proved to be applicable to the sensible object.

The power of imagination is introduced by Kant with an emphasis on its synthesizing and productive function which places it on a transcendental level in producing an objective experience. The imaginative synthesizing act necessary for experience has the essential duty of synthesizing sensibility and understanding or those that these faculties originally yield from themselves (concepts and intuitions). Therefore, imagination as a power has a mediating role. Due to this mediatory quality, imagination itself wears a double face. Kant sometime describes it as from of inner sense receptive to the act of understanding and thought (B 152) and sometime as the chief spontaneous faculty for synthesis and synthetic unity of aesthetic part and conceptual part of cognition (A 78/B 103). I shall discuss the contexts and reasons why a primary transcendental act of imagination should be regarded both an act of understanding and not and how it results in deprivation of the original characters attributed to sensibility and understanding. Now, if we accept the critical principle of separation of capacities, the need for an independent power whose strength comes from its being neither of the mentioned capacities in being both and whose freedom comes from its independence in being dependent, though strange, is plain. This is the 'in-between

position' that I chose the metaphor of niche: constituting a niche in the cognitive process between two different faculties. Imagination is an intuitive capacity in that it is immediately or directly presentative. It presents also intellectually in that it works as a judgmental faculty in deciding how to present sensible manifold according to some schemata that it produces in the view of the demand of the understanding for knowledge. The act of imagination through its schemata becomes the ultimate and grounding condition of an experience in that it conditions the apprehension of a sensible manifold in the way that the categories can be applied and manifests themselves. On its other face, the same act conditions the pure thought in that it specifies the intuitive condition for the real employment of understanding by giving content and direction to its concepts in judgmental activity. In a nutshell, transcendental imaginative act is a realizing act occasioning the determinate objectification of the appearances by allowing their categorization on the one hand, which means it supplies an object *of* intuition, occasioning real employment of the categories by making them applicable to appearances on the other. With a transcendental imaginative dimension of the mind, the necessary transformation of the notion of the object is accomplished. Intuitable object becomes another nature as conceptualizable (intuitions are made intelligible) and the object thought in the concept determined as intuitable (concepts are made sensible). To see how imagination transcendently function in production of knowledge we should turn to newly emerging title of understanding, pure schematic understanding, in connection with the broadened notion of transcendental power of judgment, though Kant writes somehow paradoxically that neither we nor the imagination itself can see its act, because imagination is "blind" to its own act and it is so concealed that its "real modes of activity nature hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze" (A 78, B 181).

### **2.3 Schema Production as a Dimension of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment**

Kant discusses the schematic aspect of the understanding and power of imagination forming the schemata needed by turning back to the specialty of transcendental logic and the judgmental function of the mind. In this context, Kant suggests a different trio under the name of the “higher faculties of knowledge”, understanding, judgment and reason, all of which he says to be referred by the general title of understanding with respect to their being logical processes of thought (B 169). After repeating that categories are only logical forms and cannot be pure concepts with a certain content unless they are employed in relation to the possible experience and empirical intuitions, he differentiates understanding as the possessor of formal rules from the power of judgment as the faculty of “subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule” (A 132/B 171). The necessity of this distinction of the power of judgment is explained by the threat of the infinite regress in the process of following rules. Since for deciding that a case is subsumable under rule necessities another rule in turn and it goes to infinity, the power of judgment becomes spontaneous and practical talent in its part without a further articulation of the rule that it uses in determining right employment of the rules possessed. The mention of the issue of right employment which has the logic of truth, though differentiated from the dialectic of reason which has the logic of illusion, is connected with it, for transcendental logic undertakes the negative task of securing the employment of the pure concepts which reason tends to refer to thing in itself with a transcendent use beyond possible experience. Therefore, power of judgment is related to pure reason’s demand of totality, its ideas and knowledge claims too in the project of critique and transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy, says Kant, can “formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these [pure] concepts” and can demonstrate that pure understanding judges

synthetically by means of its pure concepts under specified sensible condition; thus, generates necessary principles of experience a priori (A 136).

The sensible condition shown to be necessary for any appearance to be given is the form of time and a specification and transcendental determination of its pure intuition; the ways that it should be intuited, will give the instance to which pure concepts of understanding can be applied as rules. So, we know that as form of the sensible intuition, time is the condition of the object to be given, but in this simple form, it does not say that the object is given *harmoniously* with the concept of understanding. Kant in clarifying the aesthetic part of cognition says that the appearances are in harmony with the time intuition itself, because the purely intuited unity of time accounts for that. However, now, Kant says that this purely intuited unity, in order to count as cognitively significant, should accord to the conceptual criteria of knowledge in order to be something for the transcendental consciousness. I mean, the objective status of time should be determined by deciding whose time it is. In the intuitive unity of time, transcendental imagination will be shown to be responsible to give right to the pure concept to claim that time belongs to them and fully objective. We also know that pure concepts are necessary conditions of any thought and but we do not know how they should be used in experience. Schematism then concerns how appearances are given in intuition in such a way that they manifest lawfulness and can be unified by using schemata both intuitively, since schemata cannot be conceptual rules because of the infinite regress; and universally with necessity, since the unification leading to subsumption should be according to pure concept conceived as rule. In addition, to stress again, the problem of heterogeneity of the concepts which are used in thinking the object in its general aspects and with “those which represent it [the object] *in concreto*, as given” is included as a part of the justification of the truth of the Kant’s philosophical doctrine itself, or concerns the pure reason’s critique of itself, since the removal of this heterogeneity is the justification of the pure concepts of understanding’s necessary employment. Though Kant says that the schematism belongs to the pure

understanding's demand to understand anything and know determinatively, the schema is the transcendental product of imagination (A 142).

Given that transcendental act of imagination is an objectifying act and its primary concern is pure time intuition, then time itself should be determined as to how it should be thought or categorized for knowledge. Different aspects of this transcendental determination of time; such as, generating it extensively as having a serial character (time-series), anticipating intensively that the reality produced through it has a uniform and continuous quality (time-content) or ordering the manifold in it as reversible or irreversible (time-order) express sensibly different aspects of the necessary uniform nature of a given manifold in general thought in the concept of an object and correspond the pure concepts of the understanding (extensive magnitudes expressive of quantifications, intensive magnitudes expressive of qualifications, ordered moments expressive of relations and time itself expressive of modalities). It is already mentioned that time cannot be perceived as an object in experience; therefore its determinations as an object pertain to the manifold of appearances encountered in it and produce the determination of them as the objects of knowledge. From such a transcendental determination, some a priori principles concerning objects as appearances in time (the objectified time as understood the context of experience) follow as the truth or knowledge of the true phenomenal nature. In addition to the empirical events and objects in nature, these principles of understanding are necessary basic principles of nature itself as the object of knowledge which is itself an appearance in contrary to thing itself of the transcendental standpoint and justify the truth of mathematical scientific view of nature as a mechanistic world of causally connected and changing accident of one permanent substance. Therefore, Kant takes the understanding as making nature itself possible as an appearance but knowable object, since the basic law of the conformity to law is derived from the understanding itself a priori, that is, the togetherness of the transcendental consciousness as knower and the transcendental imagination excludes the possibility of the existence of appearances in a status of unintelligible aggregate or in a uniformity which is contingent. The act of imagination which brings a

necessity and objectivity inherent in notion of nature grounds other specified natural laws of science by grounding the law-governedness of the nature.

The overall conclusion reached with the schematism and the justification of the pure concepts of understanding and the legacy of theoretical reason can be concluded as follows: There is one time, one experience concerning one nature, and one unity of consciousness. The knowledge of time as a sensible condition for givenness and intuition of it as a given in its indeterminacy which also hangs on the manifold that it is supposed to open up falls short for the objectivity of the possible objects of knowledge. Time intuition gains its determinacy by means of imaginative act, which can be taken as a transcendental apprehension of time as belonging both to the sensibility and to the self that knows. Therefore, the intuitive unity of time belongs to the imagination and presumably it is the same time of the aesthetic section, that is, that of inner sense. This determination leads to the production of schemata to conceive any manifold according to the categories of understanding. Schemata have the status of both the products and the rules for imagination, because it has the power of judgment to use its own rules. It should have otherwise the production and presentation of the intuitive unities or sensible combination *as corresponding* to the concepts is not possible. It is “directed merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in categories” (B 152). The categories, then, are also justified to be necessary conditions of objects of experience. Their justification is constituted by demonstrating them to be applicable to appearances by means of the imagination’s supply. Objects of inner sense are necessarily objects of imagination, because imagination determines the unity of inner sense (time) and so they necessarily are objects of understanding, since this determination is, Kant writes as the final of the section of schematism, is the affect of the understanding (B 185). On the side of the subject, since the categories are basic forms of thought, they are rules for any judgment, and they function according to the necessary principle of transcendental unity of consciousness, then the manifold of intuition is to be shown to be determined with respect to it by the mediatory role of imagination. “[W]ithout the distinction of

intuitions it is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold; and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental, if it is represented as a priori necessary in relation to the original unity of apperception (A 118).” What is significant above all is that schematism is again, like every condition, constitutes both the possibility and a restriction. Pure concepts of understanding gain their status as referring to some object, or they mean something for us as knowledge-seekers only when they are restricted to a temporal manifold which is pure and when they contain the time-condition as part of their content which lies outside of the understanding. The characteristics of pure intuition (especially it’s being a pure content supplier) are combined with the power of imagination. Therefore, pure concepts cannot be taken to represent thing in itself or produce knowledge by application to thing in itself. Pure concepts have their objective meaning from sensibility by means of schemata “which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it” (B 187). The investigation of pure understanding which starts with the notion of transcendental content that Kant affirms as the specialty of transcendental logic’s concepts ends with the same notion, but this time transcendental imaginative process are disclosed as the source of it: “All of all our knowledge falls within the bounds of possible experience, and just in this universal relation to possible experience consist that transcendental truth which precede all empirical truth and make it possible” (A 146).

Kant did not follow the presentation that I chose in my writing. He introduces the schematism after he closed deducing the necessity of categories for constitution of knowledge and its object. He even starts from the simple case of sensory apprehension and shows the necessity of act of productive transcendental imagination and pure concepts for the recognition of cognitive unity of an empirical intuition of an object (for perception) and for construction of the uniform nature as the collective objects and events in the first version of the transcendental deduction. It is generally known as the theory of threefold synthesis and it is mostly criticized because of its offer is a transcendental psychology. Kant himself also admits its hypothetical form and says that he included a part in his enquiry dealing with “pure understanding itself, its



possibility, and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so deals with it in its subjective aspect.” To ask how the faculty of thought is possible; is to concern with the constitution and relation of ‘lower’ faculties (mental faculties) of the mind, is to “search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent is somewhat hypothetical in character” (A xvi). Therefore, he formulates some grounding transcendental acts as pure syntheses anchored to transcendental powers as shadows of empirically working mental faculties of the human thought. For a perceiving and conceiving subject, the necessity of the use of categories in recognition of an empirical intuition as an object or comprehending the objective connection of perceptions pertaining to an event are grounded on the transcendental rule-governed productive power of imagination and the transcendental apperceptive power of the self; hence, objective validity of the categories are proved.

Surprisingly, Kant’s description of the hypothetical speculation covers more properly his explanation in the second version, where he is supposed to be eliminating the psychological overtone and hypothetical character, because Kant mentions there the affect of understanding to inner sense or “synthetic influence of understanding upon inner sense” explicitly (B 154). There, Kant’s discussion of the productive synthesizing act of imagination is immersed in the context of explaining auto-affection of the self or subject. The self in its empirical character is reduced to sensibility and to the passivity of the inner sense (“*subjective* unity of consciousness, which is a *determination of inner sense*” or “empirical unity of apperception” (B 139-40)) in contrast to the diversified mental acts. To be clear, since the context is the internal or immanent dimension of the consciousness of a transcendental ego, what relates to the empirical is the passive part of it; sensuous consciousness. Kant thinks that transcendental imagination is the unique power which allows the manifold to be taken into the sensuous consciousness both as belonging to the inner sense and as belonging to a universal thinking consciousness (transcendental ego). It is the same act that Kant mentions in the schematism chapter; that is determining the inner sense (the present context’s sensuous consciousness) in such a way that the sensible manifold intuited

corresponds to the structure of the thought so that categories become applicable. However, Kant reduces this determination ultimately to the pure understanding which he thinks to be originally in relation to the universal consciousness of the transcendental ego. Therefore, transcendental imagination's capacity to be receptive to the understanding's working is stressed and is used to explain how the self can be receptive to its own acts. Moreover, the same process also explained as a specification of the intellectual synthesis which constitutes the content of pure concepts of understanding as they represent the unity of a manifold in an intuition in general. To differentiate the humanly form or aspect of the intuition Kant introduces an aspect to the transcendental imagination: figurative synthesis. Transcendental imagination is figurative since it concerns with a special sensible intuitive unity, the unity of time belonging to the inner sense and the synthesis belonging to the imagination is the synthesis of the intuited manifold in time. Thus, the represented unity in pure concepts of understanding is specified as belonging to the time intuition of the sensibility of the human being and have defined primarily and originally expressible in intuition. Given these clarifications in transcendental deduction, one might ask why Kant posits a problem of applicability of categories to appearances or that of presenting corresponding intuitions to pure concepts and composes a further section with a different title given to already clarified role of transcendental imagination.

With regard to above consideration, the encountered troubles can be stated as follows. Firstly, we have a dilemma, which can be called a methodological dilemma: either Kant fails to justify the necessity of the categories for the constitution of an objective experience or the schematism section is unnecessary. Secondly, we have a different picture of the subject's consciousness of its self than the analytic principle of the unity of the transcendental apperception. To remember, the analytic principle of the unity of transcendental apperception was that every thought of an object demand the thought of the self of itself as the thinker and human understanding can produce such a unity only through its categories. As such, it is a representation of the thinking subject as a universal or

general mark as it is with other conceptual representations. However, Kant appeared to say that there is an original consciousness of synthetic unity of conditions of intuitions and conditions of thinking as a knowledge condition and it grounds the analytic principle itself. As such, it is not a conceptual representation of understanding as the logical presupposition of thinking, but the necessary awareness of the self as the intuiter and the thinker allowing the subject to identify it's self as the thinker. This principle suggest that a genuine apperception can be attributed to the transcendental imagination, or the self should say "I am imagination" in order to be conscious the unity of its conceptualizing or thinking and the intuiting. This principle is also necessary for the object's recognition or identification that it is the object given in intuition and not the object only thought that the self claims to know. The identity principle should govern not the identification or recognition of the self as itself, given that it is the thinking self, but the identification of the self as the other; as the one imagining and intuiting. The third one is Kant's formulation of the starting question of schematism section in terms of a logical model of subsumption or application. It is related intimately to the methodological dilemma but slightly different from it. We should differentiate two models of synthesis as a cognitive act which Kant appoints to and wants to combine to each other which Beatrice Longuenesse calls as the mathematical model of synthesis and construction, and the logico-discursive use of understanding which work with concepts as reflected and abstracted universals and combination of them in judgments.<sup>18</sup> The need for schematism is the result of the latter epistemological model, though the general critical point is to demonstrate that object of knowledge is constructed by means of a synthetic act of understanding. We should keep in mind the motto that it is the same spontaneity which gives unity to the representations in a judgment gives the unity to the synthesis in an intuition. However, if categories have this role of constructive synthesis in intuition, the question of their application cannot possibly arise, since their application is constitutive and presupposed for any occurrence of any unified

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<sup>18</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 30-5

intuitive synthesis, any experience. Schematism, then, is a case of begging the question, because it accepts the scope of experience of objects which it in fact responsible to prove.

Since all of three problems' elimination is connected to the rescue from the first mentioned dilemma, I will focus on it and the issue of hermeneutical choice brought with it. The mentioned dilemma can be avoided by means of different strategies of interpretation. One can both affirm that categories' necessity is justified transcendently by deduction and the doctrine of schematism is genuine, either by means of discerning a proof structure of deduction to deny that its completeness is ever mentioned and schematism is included as a necessary part in the deduction or by means of accepting the completeness and addressing to the schematism the regressive or introspective clarificatory role with addition of the specifying different time-conditions for the plurality of pure concepts. In a sequel, I will turn these solutions. Except them, the dilemma itself can also be regarded as a pseudo one with the recognition that deduction of the categories of understanding concerns the constitution of experience and takes the categories as *explanans* rather than as *explanandum*.<sup>19</sup> I, on the contrary, think that this recognition is pseudo recognition. If the explanation of the genesis of the categories should be taken the only place where we can find their status as things to be explained, then we find that they are necessary as the logical forms of the functioning of understanding. However, the transcendental deduction wants to explain them as functioning transcendental-logically in the primary construction of an object of knowledge, an objective experience and perceptual world. Showing that they have a priori origin is not showing their legitimacy. For example, reason spontaneously and a priori produces ideas as well, which are illegitimate to have a role in knowledge. Indeed, that the categories and thought are so separate in their origination from the intuition and the objects that it presents is the primary reason that Kant needs a further explanation that through the categories what is thought is the object of intuition and that the categories

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<sup>19</sup>T. K. Seung, *Kant: A Guide for The Perplexed* (New York, London: Continuum, 2007), pp.45-51.

have objective validity. Therefore, it is not a perplexity to expect from the transcendental deduction and the schematism an explanation of categories, since their true explanation is their being a necessary condition of experience and objectivity; their relation to the transcendental imagination and forms of sensibility. Though ultimately Kant needs a built-in relation between the intuitions and pure concepts, such as that the givens of sensibility should be in accord with the categories or the categories should be the proper and the only ones to think about them, that is, to contain the condition of intuition as part of their content, Kant's initial premise of the independence of thought and intuition is the rejection of such a relation. Further, for knowing such an original synthesis of thought and intuition we are devoid of a tool given that we would either reach it by intuition or by concept and neither of these achievements counts as knowledge. We would have to have an intellectual intuition or an intuitive understanding.

Another similar suggestion for the non-existence of the dilemma comes from Karl Ameriks. He thinks that there are different readings of the transcendental deduction depending on what the main premises of the argument of Kant. Ameriks divides these hermeneutical choices into two camps: the one pursuing a strongly regressive and the other choosing progressive reading, following Kant's own opposition of analytic and regressive method or synthetic and progressive one respectively (P, 4:264, 13).<sup>20</sup> This hermeneutical choice, in fact, concerns also the criticisms of which one example is Smith's mentioned one about to pure manifold. If Kant follows an abstractive and regressive method that he announces as the start of his investigation, it means that the knowledge of pure manifold is gained by means of a philosophical reflection the result of which is a conceptual and discursive knowledge. But pure manifold is the content of pure intuition and this pure manifold as intuited and as the content of time intuition is shown to be the necessary non-conceptual 'conscious' ingredient in the legitimate use of the understanding in construction of objective experience. What is reached by regression becomes an original given for the constitution of knowledge and the

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<sup>20</sup> Karl Ameriks, *Interpreting Kant's Critiques* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p.8.

explanation turns to be a synthetic one. Either pure intuition is already a conceptual representation, or there is a need for a transcendental intuition belonging to a living and intuiting transcendental or philosophical consciousness.

Ameriks explains the regressive method different than this one. The strongly regressive explanation's given fact is pure scientific truths and tries to give account to these truths by means of cognitive powers. Strongly progressive approach is left with a solipsist subject and its givens as appearances or a sensible manifold are converted to be on an a priori level. He suggests that Kant adopts a modest regressive explanation rather than a stronger one. For him, the Kantian notion of experience is the empirical knowledge which has a relative objective truth value as the routine everyday experience. This notion excludes the notions of experience as the inner life of consciousness or the receptions of simple sense data or the one in which we affirm the physical symmetry law in the action and reaction of the forces in nature. Such a conception agrees with Kant's definition of experience as "objectively valid empirical cognition" (P, 4: 302, 54) or as "knowledge by means of connected perceptions" (B 161) or again as "a knowledge which determines an object through perception" (B 218).<sup>21</sup> Therefore, Ameriks says that critical stand point begins with "relatively thick" first-level perceptual experience which is not private events and can be justified true or false. Transcendental deduction does not question the possibility of such objectivity, but concerns with the objectivity of the categories. Their application to perceptions is a second-level problem. Consequently, schematism should also be evaluated to be secondary in comparison to the perceptual awareness and its objects. The thickness metaphor, which is also used as "weighty" objects by Strawson against the "thin" representations of Descartes is problematic. It seems that Ameriks uses it to express the independently existing objects of a shared world against the mental representation of an object which is taken to be private. However, in contradiction to this, he writes that it is possible that there are "thick states of self-consciousness", which are neither psychological nor ontological, but include a

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<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1997, 2004).

cognitive representation with a semantic significance in which the 'I' claims that "truly is something specific there 'for me'".<sup>22</sup> In that case, the involvement of a non-solipsistic object is left undecided. To be weight for an object or a state of consciousness, then, means that it has a semantic significance including an undetermined independence. Hence, the ordinary weighty experience of objects and the awareness of the subjects of themselves are interpreted as the cases of 'seeming to me' or 'taking as' which has a judgmental form, a "qualified quasi-objective state". Ameriks says that it brings the advantage of making possible to mistake in a Kantian world, to being consciousness of oneself in a different way than as the universal subject of the knowledge and to have some desires which are not morally accepted. Firstly, although the exemplar kind of regression that I gave before explicating Ameriks' non-strong interpretative approach accepts too the ordinary judgmental experience as the given, but reaches to an a priori intuitive content with regard to receptive part of the cognition and that supplies the true independence (given status) of the object. Secondly, Ameriks' suggestion comprises only a distinction between implicit and explicit reference to pure rules or concepts in experience. We are allowed to a type of experience or as he calls it, of a mental life, which is implicitly rule-governed and objective, but not instantiates explicitly the higher form of objectivity. The capacities which are taken legislative and autonomous, considered as transcendently, still determine the form of experience immediately, but they are not recognized immediately and explicitly. However, the higher form of objectivity that the transcendental determination conveys makes the other form of objectivity possible. We should question the ground and the way of such a transcendental determination in its immediacy since ultimately every perception and perceptive awareness depends on it and empirical truth is justified by it. In other sense, the questions are how this transcendental determination itself functions and how this function is justified such that it is shown to be making possible experiencing something truly or such that it makes the implicit quasi-objective states and facts possible. According to

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<sup>22</sup> Karl Ameriks, *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*, p.14.

Kant's deduction of the categories, this determination must be possible only when the categories originally derived from logical forms of judgments are shown to be the pure concepts representing rule or necessity for the synthetic unity of a pure or a priori manifold and so to be used in combining perceptions (the manifold of empirical intuition). The solution is the part of the legitimacy of the objectivity of the categories. Hence, Ameriks' solution has a value in so far as an interpretive understanding or judgment in the form of "taking as" is explicated, but unhelpful in that the notion does not cover the transcendently grounding act. In Kant's argument this interpretative activity can belong only to the transcendental imagination which we equate to the power to take what is present as "present as." Transcendental schematism and imagination is precisely for this reason poses a question and it is not secondary but primary in all aspects of objectivity. As J. Michael Young argues, the characteristic of the act of imagining in Kant's theory is that "it is the capacity for construing or interpreting sensible awareness as the awareness of something other, or something more, than what is immediately presents itself in being. ... In perceiving a face, for example, we construe our awareness as the awareness of something that could be viewed from other angles, which might exhibit a variety of expressions, etc."<sup>23</sup> The transcendental imaginative act is such that it construes the given as categorizable, therefore it determines what is there to be semantically significant. Since production of a schema is the same with this activity, schematism is a necessary for any perception of empirical manifold. It supplies the objective reality of the categories which depends on the schematism.

In the next section, I will continue to have conversation with those contemporary interpreters of Kant's thought who suggest different perspectives on the topic of schematism. It is necessary to avoid a reductionist view on the basic act of imagination that reveals a judgmental power different than the determinative one. It reveals a determination though, but in a sense it stays undetermined compared to the universal determination by concepts. Such a power

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<sup>23</sup> J. Micheal Young, "Kant View of Imagination", *Kant-Studien* 79 (1988), pp. 140-164.



will also manifest itself in aesthetic experience and constitutes the justification of our aesthetic judgments. This act elevated to a sphere where it can express itself fully to belong to a power in the family of the legislative powers. In third *Critique*, too, it is placed to an interregnum akin to the imagination. This time it occupies the middle place between the understanding as power to know and practical reason as power to act. Such elevation, then, results in the possibility of figuring out the deepest conditioning factor of experience which should be already present in constitution of knowledge. It unifies the conditions for knowledge and practice. Therefore, even we can detect in schematic act an aspect of the power of judgment, independently investigated in Kant's third critique, we should be cautious in that there is the possibility of the ruin of the specialty of this act in reducing it only to function of power of determinate knowledge or discursiveness which also means the ruin of the autonomy of the aesthetic experience and its mediatory role, precisely because of this autonomy (though expressed differently) would be lost all together. The forth-coming discussion will also help to explain the aspects of schematic act with those terms that Kant uses in the clarification of the constitution of aesthetic experience through the aesthetic power of reflective judgment.

#### **2.4 Discussing Other Proposals: Allison and Longuenesse**

If we turn to the first resolution of the dilemma claiming that transcendental schematism is necessary for the proof of the objective reality of the pure concepts of understand, we find the shared ideas of Longuenesse and Allison on the schematic understanding. They agree in that the importance of the production of schemata is related to the context of transcendental judgment and also share the fear of losing the legacy of such a transcendental and conceptual determinative capacity of pure understanding. As a result both of them exclude the role of transcendental imaginative power by reducing it to that of understanding and its normative subsuming acts. Allison thinks that subsumption is the right term to formulate the link between intuitions and concepts, but to

construe this activity as basic logical form of a subject-predicate proposition is a mistake. Kant, in order to clarify what the subsumption means and how it supplies the adequate homogeneity between the concept and the intuition, gives the example of the pure concept of circle and the empirical intuition of a plate. Pure concept of the circle is possible to be exemplified in a pure intuition, in other words, we understand what circularity means through intuition without any empirical aid. This pure content is present in every empirical intuition of a plate and it is the part of what we think through the empirical concept of the plate. Then, the example is supposed to point out how the empirical intuition of the plate is subsumed under the concept of the circle, through the pure example of circularity that belongs to both concept of circle and the concept of the plate. Allison criticizes the view which holds Kant's example as an example of the relation between a class concept and the member of it, since a relation between concepts fails to explain the relation between the object (the plate itself) and the pure concept of the circle.<sup>24</sup> There should be something for connection about either the plate as an object given in empirical intuition or the pure geometrical concept of circle. Allison puts the stress on the possibility of the exhibiting the pure concept of circle in pure intuition and the homogeneity of this pure intuition and the empirical intuition rather than stressing the homogeneity involved in the classification of the concepts. Most probably, because of the difference between the mathematical proofs and philosophical proofs in ascertaining the objective value of the principles and concepts that these sciences work with which Kant investigates in the methodological part of his study, Allison shifts the issue to the syllogistic reasoning of philosophical thought and says that the syllogistic rather than judgmental notion of subsumption is the right analogy for understanding of the application process of pure concepts. The model of mathematical demonstration as an analogy for schematism which Kant also uses in explaining how the single intuition of triangle stands for the schema of all constructions of

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<sup>24</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism (An Interpretation and Defense)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), pp 176-7.

possible intuitions is dropped, too (A 141). Allison admits that “Kant hardly wished to construe the application of the categories to appearances as a bit of syllogistic reasoning.”<sup>25</sup> However, syllogistic reasoning expresses the third thing which transcendental viewpoint seeks after in order to connect appearances and categories more properly given that original concepts of understanding share the less with the pure concepts of mathematics belonging to an intuitive power than with the logical and discursive process of reason.

In a categorical syllogistic inference, reason works with the conditions in a similar way that transcendental schematism works with sensible conditions or cases which should be subsumed under the pure concepts. The triad is composed of a major premise with a conditional assertion, a minor premise through which the condition given in the major premise is affirmed to be met and which is understood as a case subsumed under the condition. A conclusion is arrived by means of application of the rule asserted in the major premise to the subsumed case. Allison chooses the example of Kant which states firstly with that everything composite is alterable. The condition to have the quality of being composite is attained in the case of bodies and minor premise states that all bodies are composite. Then, it applies the rule to the case of bodies with the conclusion that bodies are alterable. The importance is that the instance (that all bodies are alterable) is arrived by its subsumption under the condition of a rule which is stated in the middle term and not under the rule itself. Allison claims that this middle term is analogous to the transcendental schema which connects the pure concepts of understanding taken as universal rules with the appearances as instances. Allison’s effort of clarification points out the difference between a ‘subsumed case under a condition’ and ‘application’ of a rule to this subsumed case. Appearances are subsumed under the schemata rather than the categories and as being subsumed cases they become ready to application of the rule. I think that Allison wants to capture the dual role of the transcendental schema which is the condition for a rule-application from the stand point of rules and is a condition

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p.178.

for appearances to be given or to which they are subsumed from the stand point of appearances. Allison also highlights the fact that the middle term as the condition of the given judgment is taken as the condition for the possible judgments, because he himself formulates a plurality of “schema judgments”. The reason for such an invention is that concepts are possible predicates of judgments and in schema judgments they are transformed in temporal terms. For example, the logical rule in the category of substance for the intellectual synthesis is that the subject in the judgment is the substance. The possible schema judgment says that the schema of the substance is the permanence of the real in time. So, schemata are semantic rules for the categories. Kant’s own example of syllogism in the text belongs to the part where Kant discusses how speculative reason arrives at its ideas (A304/ B306, A330/B 387). Firstly, the steps of the inference for Kant are themselves conditions and are *acts* of the mind. He differentiates the first act belonging to the understanding, the second act to the power of judging and the conclusion is arrived when the reason relates the two. Therefore, the importance of the middle term comes from its belonging to the act of judging not its being a subsumed case, since the act of judging defines the middle term’s possibility of being understood as subsumed. In syllogism, reason in its purely logical working not the power of judging is responsible for application of the rule. Correspondingly, the invention of the number of judgments under the title of schema judgments hardly clarify how they are arrived though suggests a relation between synthesis in categories and synthesis in intuitions. Schema judgments, in turn, need a justification and deduction and the syllogistic reasoning is caught up in the infinite regress again. To remember, Kant should attach and attaches both the production of schemata and their use as rules to a transcendental activity of imagination which is endowed with a power of judging, since applicatory act should be different from that of reason because of the thread of infinite regress. Even if we discriminate that Allison’s clarification holds for Kant’s reasoning and not the cognitive act involved in knowledge itself, then we can still question the principle of philosopher’s imaginative act because the conclusion that categories

apply to the sensible objects are already arrived, but it should be the case that they could not be arrived without the knowledge of the middle term.

In addition to the analogy of syllogism, Allison's other thesis is that the transcendental schema is a pure intuition. The instance that the transcendent philosophy affirms to have in possession beside the rule or concept is time itself and time is said to be the general schema sought after. Time should be shown to be the 'subsumed case' in transcendental reasoning on which the rules of objectivity are applied. Therefore, Allison turns to the objectifying process of pure intuition of time and asserts that transcendental schema is a pure intuition which is conceptualized or conceptually determined. We can trace the hint of the trust to another analogy in this thesis between the indeterminate object of empirical intuition which Kant name appearance and the indeterminate object of pure intuition. The appearance as the object of the intuition is indeterminate in the sense that it saves its givenness, but is not subsumed under a concept and not taken to be representing an object. Within the very act of determination of the intuition, the concept is also gains an objective reality. An example to the determinate pure intuition, for Allison, is the "actual representation of space (as in geometry), which is *formal intuition*."<sup>26</sup> He also thinks that this determinacy of the intuition is central to Kant's thought by referring the necessity of the act of bringing any manifold to the unity of consciousness in order that manifold to count or yield an "actual content" for cognition. Since bringing to the self-consciousness include the categories, pure intuition gains a universal and necessary determinacy according to the categories. The transcendental determination of time is the same with the mentioned a priori determination of an intuition governed by an a priori concept and it is the means for referring time to an object and for objective reality of the concept included. Therefore, schema is a determinate pure intuition. And he continues by mentioning that "presumably" this representation is affected by the transcendental synthesis of imagination, and therefore schema can be regarded as the product of imagination. Finally, he points

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<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 181.

out the conditioning function of the schema for the sensible intuition or sensibility and says that it is a subjective specified formal condition of sensibility. To conclude, Allison argues to capture all the characteristics of the schema that Kant aligns: its being a mediating third thing as representation for subsumption of appearances, a pure sensible condition for application of concepts, a transcendental product of imagination and its having the distributive universality of a conceptual determination.

Unfortunately, construing the transcendental schema as conceptualized pure intuition deviates from the primary goal of Kant in contextualizing the schematism issue with the discussion of the power of judgment. Allison's thesis does not go further than being a repetition of the claim that pure concepts have a necessary application to intuition or that time should be subsumed under the pure concepts of understanding so that the sensible manifold given in it becomes correspondingly synthesizable. As Gibbons remarks "if schemata are pure intuitions (conceptualized or not), it seems that they would require their own 'third things' to mediate their relation to pure concepts, unless the schematism of the understanding has already been achieved, in which case Allison is doing little more than asserting that the categories do apply to intuition."<sup>27</sup> There is the assumption that categories govern the determination of intuition of time to produce the needed pure intuition which is the schema, but schematism chapter is written to explicate how this governing happens. How is the production of schemata without further reference to concepts possible so that the categories become applicable or applied to sensible intuitions? The need of a different look to the power of judgment to understand how categories both should guide and be result of a schematic act is acknowledged by Longuenesse more fully and she suggests that Kant's last critique, the critique of power of judgment, may help to understand the needed aspect of the judgmental power. The deduction of the pure concepts of understanding and their role in knowledge and cognition demands both a reflective aspect and a purposive activity of cognitive faculties which are the primary topics of the critique of the power of judgment. Hence, Kant's

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<sup>27</sup> Sarah L. Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, p.56.

concern in explicating a power of judgment whose paradigmatic cases are aesthetic and teleological judgments fills the niche of the epistemic structure of cognition. The reflective use of the judgmental power grounds the primary project of the showing that pure concepts are applied to the object given distinctively when they are the necessary rules followed in apprehension of any object. Though Longuenesse discerns such a purposeful structure in the constitution of the cognitive powers and a reflective aspect of the power of judgment and she makes references to the third critique, she is interested more in logical reflection and transcendental reflection. In other words, she identifies the topic of the third critique with the notion of logical reflection and transforms the aesthetic act of judgment and the aesthetic state of consciousness for generating knowledge to the logical act of reflection which she thinks to be the necessary part of transcendental reflection, too.

According to Longuenesse, the discrepancy created between the primary introduction of the concepts as universal representations and which are grounded on the logical forms of judgments or logical functions of understanding (independent logical activities of forming conceptual unities in judgments) on the one hand; the proof of their necessarily grounding any experience in being a priori related (being applicable) to the sensible object which should be given distinctively (their transcendental deduction) on the other hand; can be understood only with a stress on a broadening notion of the logical and discursive activities of thought (comparison, reflection and abstraction) which ground the necessary lending of the appearances themselves to the categories. The necessary agreement of the unity of the synthesis of appearances in intuition and the unity of the discursive synthesis in judgment are ultimately interpreted as the function of the *reflectively* determination of the judgmental capacity of the discursive thought. The judgmental capacity has the *purpose* of the realization of the conceptual combination in a judgment rather than being a function of the transcendental imagination spontaneously creating correspondence. She defends this thesis by noting the twofold meaning of the notions of concept, of understanding and of form of intuition. There is the difference between the capacity of judgment

(*Vermögen zu Urteilen*) of the understanding and the actualization of this capacity, the becoming of the potentiality a power or force (*Kraft*): the power of judgment (*Urteilstkraft*).<sup>28</sup> This actualization always depends on the external sensible condition. She based this difference on the doctrine of the epigenesis of reason or original acquisition of the a priori representations. Correspondingly, the meaning of the notion of the concept is also twofold. One is the known meaning of the term as the reflected and universal representation; the other is the obscure or clear consciousness of the unity of an act of a synthesis. This differentiation also reflects the rule character of the concept. In the latter case, such a consciousness functions as the universal rule of any sensible synthesis; a rule or procedure for the generation of the pure form of the sensible synthesis (schema). In the former, in a discursive sense, “[i]t is a rule in that thinking an object under a concept provides a reason to predicate of this object the marks that define the concept.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, concepts are first the schemata in the state of the consciousness of the unitary act of the synthesis of an intuition and they become explicit discursive rules for subsumption of the same synthetic unity of the intuition in so far as the concepts’ formation includes the synthesis as reflected. “[O]nce one has generated a schema, one can obtain a discursive rule by reflection and apply this rule to appearances.” Longuenesse says that schema as the rule for apprehension of a unity, of which the concept is the general representation, is immanent in the sensible. The concept is already present in the intuitive state in an indeterminate manner as an obscure rule for the synthesis of intuitive manifold; therefore the act of apprehension of an intuitive unity is presentation of a still indeterminate concept, though it is presentation of a schema. The schemata are unreflected, ‘potentially there’ concepts. A clear consciousness of universality, which points the determinacy of the concept results by the acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction which Kant defines as the main operation of the mind in its logical use in his lectures on logic and which are further carried up to the transcendental-

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<sup>28</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp.118-9.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46-7, p. 50.



logical activities of the transcendental consciousness by Longuenesse only in so far as they are performed under the added condition of sensibility.<sup>30</sup>

Longuenesse grounds all of her argument on the doctrine of the original acquisition or epigenesis of reason which he thinks underlies Kant's philosophical thesis. This doctrine both points that neither the representations of space and time nor the concepts of pure understanding are innate, they are acquired on the occasion of the experience or on the affection of the sensibility by an unknown something, however they are originally acquired in the sense that they condition any representation of particular objects and they have their seeds on the original capacities of the mind. With this view, she thinks that like every concept the pure concepts are also achieved as clear and full-fledged concepts of objects by means of the activities of comparison, reflection and abstraction in the judgmental activity concerning the sensible perceptions. Such an interpretation, she thinks, may be objected, since in the derivation of the categories the movement of the thought should start from the a priori concepts down to the sensible representation and demonstrate that the sensible manifold is somehow determinate to conform to the concepts. In fact, the movement that seems to start from the sensible given to derive the categories which Longuenesse suggests is also determined from top to down if we accept that the forms of judgments from which the pure concepts are derived are identical with the forms of reflection on the sensible given. They belong to the original transcendental discursive capacity to judge; they implicitly guide the sensible synthesis and make possible the explanation to start from down to top. In addition, the logical form has the objectifying function in that it is the form of the transcendental unity of apperception. By means of the logical reflective use of the understanding the sensible representations are subordinated under the common concepts such that an object is thought for an appearance in order to constitute it as the objective correlate of the transcendental subject. There is a purposiveness in that activity of the mind. The purpose is simply to produce

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<sup>30</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwartz (New York: Dover Publications, 1974), p.100. Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 118-9.

discursive knowledge by means of the synthesis of concepts in a logical form. The purposiveness of the activity of the mind is revealed when one accepts that the categories are mere forms of the analysis (comparison, reflection and abstraction) before any synthesis. However, they “govern the synthesis of what they are to analyze” under the title of the transcendental imagination. Hence, the synthesis of transcendental imagination is prior to the discursive activity of the judgment and it is the condition of the generation of the unities in the sensible given which are susceptible to being reflected as concepts. These intuitive unities, as we saw, are nothing other than the schemata. Schemata, then, are also originally acquired, and their acquisition is necessarily happens on an empirical sphere. Therefore, she thinks that the conformity of the appearances to categories are ultimately made possible by the original capacity to judge which has a *conatus* and guides every mental operation and finds its ultimate realization in the discursive synthesis of the conceptual representations in explicate judgments. In the end, the original acquisition of the pure concepts means no more than their “determinative application in reflective comparison.”

Comparing her own view with Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Kant, she says that the question of the critique is not about a common root of the discursive unity and intuitive unity (an original projected unity of the transcendental imagination), but the unity of the synthesis in intuition is originated by means of the regulation of discursive thought. Discursive thought has an end to realize itself in a judgment. The unity is produced by imagination only under the unity of apperception whose form is the logical form of judgment. Thus, the question is what it means that I am capable of judging and having clarity in discursive thought. Longuenesse argues that Kant pays attention to the power of imagination and its transcendental function for the answer to this question in order to explicate the logical function of discursive thought and not the reverse. We have one transcendental function of the discursive thought from which both the logical forms of reflective use and the pure concepts of understanding emerge instead of the spontaneity of pure productive power of imagination. Firstly, unfortunately, Longuenesse easily dismisses the point that Kant explains the

original apperception by saying that beside the manifold of representations, their synthesis and the concepts of combinations (pure concepts of this synthesis); there should be a unity which does not point to the unity which is represented by means of pure concepts and writes:

This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity (§ 10); for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts, is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes the combination. We must therefore look higher for this unity (as qualitative, § 12), namely that which itself contains the ground of the unity of the diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of the possibility of understanding, even as regards to logical employment (B 131).

Thus, the synthetic unity of apperception is not the form of the discursive thought, nor the unity in the sense of the numerical identity gained by means of the categories of an analytic unity. Secondly, to try to connect the intuition and concept by discovering a purposiveness in the cognition does not need the reduction of the reflective judgmental act to the determinative judgmental act with its own purpose. This purposiveness can be construed as an aspect brought about by the aesthetic reflective power of judgment rather than determinative judgment and discursive thought. The purpose of this purposiveness, respectively, can be maintained as indeterminate. Aesthetic judging means a constitution of an attunement of imagination and understanding which is purposive without a determinate purpose. It can also be appreciated that the purposiveness should not be limited to the purpose of knowledge when viewed from a wider perspective or when viewed from the perspective from which Kant views the reflective power of judgment. If productive imagination is an aspect of the reflective power of judgment (which should be because of the infinite regress), there can be still a purposiveness as the principle of this activity and we can interpret this purposiveness as an indeterminate one: a “purposiveness without a purpose” (KU 5: 241; 92). To conclude, the imaginative act with judgmental function is

disclosed as revealing the characteristics of the aesthetic power of reflective judging, which will be explained in the second chapter. It is a lawful act without a determinate law. It should be a judgmental production without a law. It generates an interpretative pattern (schemata) satisfying the demand of discursive understanding, which is explained most explicitly when Kant writes that imagination is the “originator of the chosen forms of possible intuitions” [*Urheberin willkürlicher Formen möglicher Anschauungen*] (KU 5: 240; 90). By means of it, we can also find a purposiveness in the production of knowledge, but this purposiveness can be left indeterminate and can be referred to the harmony of cognitive faculties to each other.

I also want to present how Longuenesse relates the judgmental power of knowledge and the aesthetic power of judgment of Kant’s third critique with a short introductory step to the latter. The first reason of this presentation is that she exemplifies the view that the point of the third critique’s introduction of reflective judgmental power is to solve the contingency of the empirical particulars, empirical concept formation and the particular empirical scientific laws’ lack of a system. Kant explicitly mentions the problem of system construction in scientific activity and the possibility of a chaos among the empirically formed judgments given as laws in both the first introduction and the second one of the third critique. It is the same problem of transcendental judgment occurring in an empirical context. However, I think that the systematic unity sought by the theoretical reason or scientific consciousness is concerned either in the power of teleological reflective judgment or with the reflective judgment bound to theoretical interest of reason, rather than aesthetic one because with regard to the first the purposes are clearly drawn both with respect to the objects and to the activity. The principle of purposiveness is introduced in the third *Critique* as a solution to contingency. Contingency can be detected when something view from the perspective of understanding or from the perspective of knowledge. Aesthetic judgment of power on the other hand sees a necessity. The second one is that it touches to the cardinal problems of basing the cognition on the aesthetic judgmental act when the latter is seen as an aspect of determinative objectifying judgment. Either the

aesthetic experience is seen as an uncompleted state of this determination or all objects are aesthetically valuable.

Kant starts the critique of the aesthetic and teleological judgments with the differentiation between the determinative and reflective roles of the power of judgment and with the sharpened underlining of the place of the capacity of judgment within the higher capacities of the mind having a priori principles. The difference from the first critique is that the power of judgment will be taken with respect to its reflective aspect and its capacity of giving an a priori principle to itself; to its act. The mediatory role is stressed not with respect to the link between sensibility and understanding, but with respect to the link between understanding capable to have knowledge and which has already mediated and connected to the sensibility, and to practical reason. In that sense the mediatory role can be taken as still between sensibility and reason, but between the sentience of the subject rather than the sensible character of the object. Third critique clarifies the taken-granted achieved mediation with regard to knowledge whose absence is presently dealt with. Kant says that judgment functions as the subsumption of the particular under the universal when the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given determinatively “even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must be met for subsumption under the universal to be possible” [KU 5: 179, 18]. On the other hand, the power of judgment is reflective when the particular is given and the judgment should find a universal for it. According to Longuenesse, since neither the a priori concepts are simply given determinatively as formed concepts with respect to both their form and their matter which is introduced by the a priori functioning of figurative synthesis (original acquisition), nor any particular can be given without the conditioning role of this synthesis as well, in every determinative use and application of concepts there is included a reflective use which is identified with the interconnected universalizing logical operations of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Indeed, it is the same activity through which the statement of the a priori condition (schema) to be met with is made. Therefore, there is a continuity between the conception of power of judgment of the first critique and the third

one; neither one of them is concerned only with one of the aspects of the judgment. The aesthetic and the teleological judgments are purely and merely reflective, “because the effort of the activity of the judgment to form concepts *fails*.”<sup>31</sup> The specialty of the aesthetic judgment, for example, is not that it is reflective but it is purely reflective in that the agreement of the imagination and understanding is of such a nature that it cannot be reflected under concepts. Given that the primary constitutive purposive principle of mind is conceptualizing, interpreting the aesthetic act as a failure is unavoidable. The aesthetic act and judgment cannot be interpreted as failure or as inferior to the determinative judgment, because such an act is constitutive of the context which allows the a priori concepts to have applicability and meaning without any further reference to a rule. It is the condition of subsumption.

She also completes showing the continuity of the notions of the power of judgment by clearing how it fits to the difference that Kant’s mentions between the judgments of perception and judgments of experience in *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* [P: IV 298-9; 50-1].<sup>32</sup> Kant writes that the former taken as an ordering of perceptions; for example, the ordering of sunshine and the heating of a stone in a hypothetical form, can be transformed to the latter by addition of the category of cause and effect. A subsumption of this ordering under the pure concept as clear universal concept is done. Only with this subsumption Kant claims can the judgment be taken as having right to claim of objective validity for the discursive connection in judgment. One of the characteristics of aesthetic judgments is that they cannot claim to an objective validity and by Longuenesse they are taken as the same order with the judgments of perception with the difference that the ordering of perceptions in logical form (judgments of perception) is related still to the object and have an “organic unity” with the judgments of experience which brings this order under the unity of apperception.

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<sup>31</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 164.

<sup>32</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1997, 2004).

It objectifies the associative ordination.<sup>33</sup> The question that such a view should face is why one kind of combination of appearances are reflected as proper for conceptual application and the other which is an aesthetic comprehension of appearances cannot be reflected so, though all of the sensible manifold should be taken into the unitary synthesizing and analyzing activity of transcendental consciousness and though what reflects on them is the same power of reflective judgment, since there is one power of judgment which is both determinative and reflective. The determination happening through reflection can be regarded not the “silent” determination guided by the categories, but it is an intuitive discriminative determination even underlying and conditioning the representation of appearances as qualified representations for a conceptualization, since there should be a ‘free’ intuition which is impossible to conceptualize. It is what the imagination does, it is done intuitively, and it is done not for the sake of conceptualization but for making conceptualization as one of the possibilities in comprehending the phenomenon. A plenty of examples for defense of such a view can be found in the critique. Kant writes that every representation should be coupled with the representation of “I think” and otherwise there would be something represented which could be not thought and conceptualized and would be *nothing* for a consciousness determined as knower (B 132) or that perceptions without the unity of consciousness would not belong to any experience and would be a *blind* play, nearly nothing (A 112) or again something X that should be thought as underlying the synthetic unity of that appearances which should be met in any knowledge claim is nothing to us (A105) because we do not have a “determinate intuition” of that something, not because they are actually nothing but because they mean nothing to the self as the knower (emphasis is added). In the similar fashion, Kant writes that there is a necessary objective “transcendental affinity” among the manifold of appearances introduced by transcendental power of imagination which grounds their being a priori combinable according to universal rules of nature and all possible appearances as representations capable

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<sup>33</sup> Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 171.

of synthesis as such belongs to the “totality of possible self-consciousness” (A 113). It might be that the possible totality of self-consciousness should not necessarily be identified with the numerical (quantitative) identity of the self apperceiving itself as the thinker. It can mean that the manifold is qualified with respect to one kind of affinity. The manifold is affinite to each other as being synthesizable *for* knowledge according to the one kind of unity of the self; subject as the theoretical knower. They are made alike by means of producing transcendental schemata. If the possible totality of the self-consciousness is construed as including the self-consciousness of the subject in its status as moral being or rational agent as well, then it should mean that the introduction of the different kinds of affinities in agreement with different “qualitative unities” of or differently qualified unities of the subject is possible.<sup>34</sup> Hence, transcendental imaginative act is constituted by its free presentation of the phenomenal world with the possibilities of objectification of the theoretical comprehension and of a world with moral worth. Neither can the normative character of its activity be conceptualized further, nor is the reflection involved the same with the reflection needed for conceptualization, empirical or a priori. To last to say, aesthetic reflective judging includes a reflection in intuition or through intuition and the universality is not in terms of concepts.

To sum up, we start with the necessity of the apartness of the different capacities, their different conditioning aspects taking part of the constitution of knowledge and of what to know. We arrived their necessary togetherness and harmony grounded on the imagination’s spontaneous intuitive act problematically explained with the difference of “knowing that” and “knowing how” in the context of judgment. The power of judgment here is attached to the imagination. This power is the power of the following a rule without a rule in the right manner (lawfully) where pure concepts of understanding are accepted as rules and irreducibly heterogeneous with the empirical intuition on which they are supposed

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<sup>34</sup> Melisa Zinkin, “The Unity of a Theme: The Subject of Judgments of Taste,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 14 (2006), pp. 469-488



to be applied in order to have right to know something about the object. In a sense, imagination has the power of giving law to its own act. We also disclosed that the judgmental activity is necessarily creative. It is the production of proper transcendental schema for theoretical understanding. The production of transcendental schema and its specifications are what makes the manifold of appearances to be subsumable (to be presented as subsumable) under concepts. It presents the reality of the concepts. The transcendental determination of the appearances' conformity to the human comprehension and the relation of the categories to the sensible object a priori are based on this judgmental act of imagination. The rule of this creation is indeterminate, cannot be conceptualized and must be so in order to escape the infinity of the conceptual discursive procedure. However, the indeterminacy of the rule that imagination follows or that it knows how to create the corresponding schemata needed for theoretical comprehension threads the justification of the a priori determinative roles and the necessity of the categories since schemata are the conditions of meaningfulness of the a priori concepts of the understanding. Therefore, there emerges the non-rationality, contingency and indeterminacy immanent to the very rationality, in the proof of the objective reality and necessity of the self-produced class of concepts of understanding and in production of truth no matter how much strong they are metaphysically deduced from logical forms given that schematism and production of schemata are necessary for the deduction of the categories as priori concepts of objects. For example, we can question both the reason of the necessity of the schemata for particular concepts (the possibility of different schemata) and the reason for the necessity of this class of categories. We can even question the necessity and value of construction of nature as the object of knowledge by means of the given a priori synthetic principles of understanding.<sup>35</sup>

Allison's and Longuenesse's interpretations of the role of imagination in transcendental schematism and of the role of schematism in justifying the use of

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<sup>35</sup> For other views of the place of schematism and for the destructive results of it for the legacy of transcendental philosophy see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Philosophical Legacies (Essays on the Thought of Kant, Hegel, and their Contemporaries)* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), pp. 17-33.

categories were fully given. The reason of the choice and the long explication of their proposals is that they contextualize the question of the ground of the fit, of the togetherness or of the unity of intuitive capacity and discursive one producing the possibility of knowledge and of the constitution of the notion of truth; in other words, the question of transcendental schematism, in terms of the topic of transcendental judgment in the same way that Kant does. They both try to safeguard the legacy of the concepts of understanding which is criticized. Allison suggests that the transcendental schema is conceptually determined pure intuition; consciousness of the unity of time is a priori in conformity with the categories, but cannot explain how such determination is possible. Neither succeeds his analogy of the process of determination with the syllogistic reasoning. Longuenesse explicitly writes that giving the list of the schemata and saying that categories have corresponding sensible correlates and are therefore applicable to the sensible given means nothing further than explicating the schematism as a result. What is important is turning to the figurative synthesis of imagination in intuition by means of which it produces or makes possible the presentation of such schemata (taking the schematism as a production). However, she argues that the necessity that is involved in the production of schemata can be grounded only on the reduction of the imaginative act as the effect of the understanding on the sensibility. More clearly, the power of judgment and grounding act of imagination is interpreted as the semi-actualized potentiality of the reflective discursive capacity to form judgments. Understanding as both reflective and determinative capacity to judge is actualized by being effective in reflection on the sensible given. In order to avoid the contingency, she proposes that the production of schema is a purposive act aiming the total actualization of conceptual comprehension and discursiveness. I argued against Longuenesse. The judgmental act is an intuitive and aesthetic act revealing an intuitive insight; therefore the power of aesthetic judgment and aesthetic creation has the primary significance in the epistemology and doctrine of cognition. The truth thought as the conformation or correspondence between intuition and concept, what is given and what is thought, world and mind, ultimately depends on the act of imagination which

firstly constitutes and presents two spheres as relatable and in harmony. The purposiveness of this harmony will be handled later and will be clarified that this purposiveness can be specified as a purposiveness *for* knowledge, if it is purposiveness *of* knowledge. However a purposiveness is encountered when the aim of knowledge is strictly suspended and imagination rather than the discursive understanding actualizes its potential.

With a u-turn through Longuenesse's doctrine of epigenesis of reason and the broadened notion of the capacity to judge involving the logical reflective act on the sensible given, we are where we started in the very beginning of this chapter. Longuenesse both intellectualizes the sensible and sensualized the intelligible. Either the schemata are the concepts and there are produced by sensible apprehension of the figurative synthesis of imagination at the occasion of the sensible impressions, or the categories are deduced as pure concepts of objects at the same occasion through the formation of empirical concepts and through the combination of them in judgments of perception. I also stressed the problems connected to the unity of the transcendental consciousness as an abstract logical structure or limiting the consciousness of the 'I' only to the conceptual domain. Instead, we found the possibility of constitution of the qualitative unities through imagination which makes possible different interpretations of what is given. But the unity of the consciousness of these differently qualified unities will also be shown to be constituted by the aesthetic subject. Hence, more determination of the in itself character of both the subject and object is needed. Indeed, though Kant leaves it to his second and last critique and to different powers, it is argued that such a determination is needed for the constitution of experience. It is the aesthetic power of judgment that finds its niche in the doctrine of knowledge. The unity from the side of the object is the result of this act and will be elaborated in terms of the relation of aesthetic power of judgment to the ideas of reason in the next chapter given that cosmological ideas are illegitimate in the sphere of knowledge and theoretical objectivity, though they are subjectively or existentially indispensable because of their signification of the unknown in addition to its being negative limitation. The more subjectivity and existentiality

we encounter, the closer we become to the thing in itself. I want to conclude this part with David Bell's idea of the "art of judgment". He writes that we ultimately have no choice but to ground the rationality of the theory of a judgment and objectivity of thought on a spontaneous act which judge with an awareness of a non-conceptual significance or meaning: regarding the judgment as an art rather than a science. His sentences are worth to quote;

That our thought conforms to the rules, principles, concepts, and criteria constitutive of objectivity, but that is also be grounded in a spontaneous, blind subjective awareness of intrinsic but inarticulable meaning\_ these are not conflicting requirements. On the contrary the one is the necessary condition of the other; for when I follow a rule, although ultimately I do so blindly, I do not do mindlessly, or merely mechanically. A middle path needs to be charted between the pessimism of the belief that all human thought is ultimately ungrounded and arbitrary, and the incoherence of the belief that it can be given a final justification in terms of the existence of objective rules for application of which we would require still further rules, and so on. This middle path avoids the mindlessness of a mechanical rule-following by taking seriously the idea that there is an art of judgment and thought; and it avoids the regressive infinity of rules by introducing the notion of an awareness of 'intrinsic', 'intransitive', or 'immediate' significance or sense. The model for this awareness is the purely aesthetic response to a work of art or other aesthetic object.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> David Bell, "The Art of Judgment," *Mind* 96(1987), pp. 221-44; see, p. 241.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE POWER OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND THE BEAUTY**

#### **3.1 The Complex Role of the Reflective Power of Judgment**

By means of introduction of a new power of the mind and a new transcendental principle Kant wants to cover a plenty of seemingly different issues with this faculty. The first aim includes criticizing the old theories of taste and beauty by means of elucidation of the conditions of judging aesthetically, of a priori principle of the performance of such a power and describing the aesthetic experience. The second one is to encourage the reason as well as science against the object's contingency and individuality, for those characteristics undermine the universal and necessary aspect of science and its principles. The hope for reason comes from the judgment that what is external to the mind ought to behave in corporation to the purposes and interests of reason; that is, power of judgment presents a lawfulness which would view the particular, diverse, and contingent existences, states or acts and the particular empirical propositions thinking them as necessary ones. Nature as the totality of the appearances is presupposed to possess an intrinsic purposeful unity for cognition by and for the mind especially when theoretical reason tries to systematize, classify and organize the things and the knowledge. Power of judgment deals with the nature "in itself" rather than its apparent character, because the concepts of understanding falls short to give the necessity specified for the particular natural things and particular principles of their acts, organization or relation and there is need to look for another ground or to consider the same ground differently, since understanding's a priori conception of the sensible object and notion of nature remain too abstract and formal to any deduction of the particular forms and laws. Under the type of particular existences

that escapes necessity of the categorical understanding fall the living beings, their development and their relation to each other too which express a lawfulness. Therefore, Kant wants to establish a principle for comprehension of them in terms of a unity in the internal organization of nature, too. This time, the unity of nature is extended to a system of means-end relationships expressing something about the unknown aspect of the nature. The third role of the power of judgment is concerned by the revelation of the power of judgment as a member of the family of the higher cognitive powers endowed with a priori principles of legislation: presenting the indeterminate ground of the nature as determinable in such a manner that it can accept a practical determination leading to the view that nature is purposive for the morality. Power of judgment opens up the possibility that nature as the domain of theoretical knower can be presented such that the unknown of it is felt or intuited as in unity with the practically known but nonintuitable free character of the subject in itself. Thus, the power of judgment completes the investigation of powers of reason by filling the niche in Kant's sought system of philosophical investigation uniting together the theoretical reason and the practical one with reference to the thing's in itself character. If we think the prohibition on the thing in itself for the theoretical reason, the move through the third critique seems very strong. However, Kant moderates it by ruling out any objectivity for the judgments of this cognitive power and it is fair enough given that the standard notions of objectivity, truth, knowledge and reality of the theoretical reason or of the understanding are vacuous for the thing in itself. He writes that "when experience manifest in things a lawfulness that understanding's concept of the sensible is no longer adequate to [help us] understand or explain, judgment can find within itself a principle that refers the natural thing to the uncognizable supersensible, though judgment must use this principle for cognizing nature only in relation to itself" (KU 5: 169-70; 7).

Among all three roles of the power of judgment, I leave the topic of the unity of Kant's philosophical investigation and the unity of reason to the end of my study, since we have not entered yet into the world of the moral actor and practical realities of the mind. Teleological judging is one manifestation of the

power of judgment and functions with determinate purposes in its reflective act. The concept of purpose itself is taken as given, specified and used purposively or teleologically in the service of reason (as a regulative principle for knowledge). Investigation of the teleological judgment overlaps the aim of this study. For one thing, Kant states that the aesthetic judgment constitutes the essential part of the critique of judgment because only it can lay the principle of this power a priori (KU 5: 192; 32), that it is constitutive of a special kind of feeling (KU 5: 196; 37), that the teleological kind of judging is a logical judgment according to concepts and critique of this kind of judgment aims at furtherance the restriction of the metaphysical speculation as an appendix to the theoretical concerns of the mind (KU 5: 170; 7). Aesthetic power of judgment “is a special power of judging things according to a rule, but not according to concepts” whereas teleological judgment is conceptual comprehension of certain objects (self-developing living organized things and their internal and external purposive aspects) (KU 5: 194; 34). Since this study aims at disclosing how an aesthetic act underlies both the constitution of different kinds of subjectivity, presentation of the respective objecthood, construction of the truth and realization of the good (the theoretical reason or understanding and the phenomenal nature for instance, or the practical reason and presentation of the nature as capable of acting morally) and how these different constructions are related, the aesthetic act of the power of judgment rather than the teleological one is the concern. Indeed, Kant concerns with the aesthetic power of reflective judgment too since the reason for the start of the third *Critique* is to find a power which cannot be identified with the already defined works of understanding or reason. It is the third role aligned above. In spite of the irrelevancy of the part of the teleology, I will deal with how the first and second roles of reflective judgment might be interpreted so that the power of aesthetic judgment and its condition (which it gives to itself) of judging a thing in a relation of purposiveness without a purpose can have a status that makes the other roles of reflection possible when they relate to the nature. These two roles will be connected to the regulative function of the ideas of reason.

I have already offered a short introduction to the reflective power of judgment in the first chapter. It is a power to think the particular as contained under a universal in cases that we do not have any universal at hand. This power is connected to a way of comprehension needed for forming empirical concepts and hence empirical laws of nature to comprehend particular objects and their behavior in both introductions of Kant. In order to engage with such formations, a fit between the nature and the capacity to produce universality is necessarily presupposed. More truly expressed, nature and its products in their diversity and particularity is assumed to be in accord with the manner of knowing, that is, of comprehending the particular contained in the universal. Secondly, Kant also elaborates “thinking particular under the universal” into the systematic organization of the concepts or empirical laws in terms of genus-species relationship. Then, the fit that is presupposed between nature and the power of judgment becomes the fit between the real relation and organization of things and the capacity to form a logical system in terms of principles of unification and specification. This aptness of nature to the faculty of judgment is called by Kant the formal purposiveness of nature for the power of judgment and he writes that it is the transcendental principle of reflective judgment used in its reflection on nature. He defines the notion of transcendental principle as “one by means of which we think the universal *a priori* condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition in general” (KU 5: 181; 21). The concept of objects that are subject to this principle is described further as “the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition in general and contains nothing empirical.” This description is a specification of the concept of a knowable object by means of a further addition to it the determination of being a possible object of empirical cognition meaning that the object’s possibility is determined further by a transcendental principle of the faculty of judgment. This transcendental principle should be understood as not a new one, since the specification is the necessary one for empirical constitution of nature which is the only experiential field for us. Thus, Kant says that for empirical cognition we ought to present



nature as lawful and coherent with respect to what is different in it as well; we ought to present it as having a cognizable empirical order too. He writes:

we must necessarily presuppose and assume this unity [unity of experience as a system in terms of empirical laws], since otherwise our empirical cognition could not thoroughly cohere to [form] a whole of experience; for though the universal natural laws do make things cohere in terms of their genus, as natural things as such, they fail to provide them with specific coherence in terms of the particular natural beings they are (KU 5: 183; 23).

The stress on the role of reflective judgment in empirical concept formation and classifications of the concepts or rules according to genus-species is in order to reveal the underemphasized subjective condition of the possibility of nature which allows it to be logically comprehensible by means of concepts. It should be clear from the detailed argument of the previous chapter that creating schemata includes always the adaptation of what is given and what is thought; that is for the possibility of presenting the appearances in intuition as subsumable under a priori concepts or determinable by means of them. Here we encounter the problem of this harmony with respect to the empirical particulars and the drive of the mind for a logical systematical ordering. To remind, the principle of the power of judgment in reflection nature is not that nature constitutes a coherent unity of its specification and unification of things, but the coherency of the natural things and the laws governing them is attributed to nature by means of the necessary but objectively unwarranted principle of the harmony of this unity of nature with the unity of the systematic order of the discursive knowledge. This harmony is the meaning of purposiveness. We necessarily interpret nature as if it has an underlying rationality and is formally purposive both for our discursiveness and logical system construction. This harmony is a specified harmony in view of knowledge. Indeed, the underlying rationality is a theoretical rationality, since it is for the sake of the satisfaction of the need of understanding or rather as a result of the “necessary aim” of the understanding (KU 5: 184; 23). In order to explain that

the principle of purposiveness which Kant holds as the a priori principle of the power of reflective judgment is a specified one with regard to the specific aim, interest, or purpose of reason of which Kant does not abandon to mention through all its writings and in order to appeal to its link to the principle of aesthetic judgment we should clarify the notion of systematic unity presupposed in being with respect to thought.

The concept of systematicity and certain principles constituting it which expresses the form of a body of knowledge are not foreign to the critical investigation. The last part of the critique of pure reason is devoted to show how reason, instead of the power of judgment, regulates by means of these forms the acts of understanding in investigation of its object. The notion of the systematic unity is addressed in there in the part where Kant rejects the metaphysical knowledge claims by demonstrating how reason deludes itself through paralogisms, antinomies and an ideal. Such a delusion Kant says cannot be avoided and has two reasons. The one is that the categories even without the sensible condition and the specific mode of intuition still signify the form of thought through which the manifold of a possible intuition is united in one consciousness and therefore they contain the potential of referring a possible intuition to an object. In the same way understanding thinks for itself a thing in itself but it thinks it as a transcendental object, not in the status of the appearance and is totally ignorant with respect to it. Then there is the illusion that the thing in itself can also be known and determined as objective reality through the categories which are the only tools of the understanding. Kant calls such determination hypostatization of a new realm of purely intelligible entities and repeats that categories can only be employed empirically through schemata, however he offered a new notion for the thing in itself: noumenon. The notion noumenon referring to thing in it self functions as a limit expressing the particular sensible mode of human knowledge. It has also a positive meaning when there is the possibility of different modes of intuition than the humanly sensible intuition, but neither the possibility nor the impossibility of neither such a cognitive mode nor the reality of its object can be asserted. Therefore, Kant says that the mode of

being of the thing which the representation of the noumenon refers is a problem for us. With respect to thing in itself we have only a problematic, therefore indeterminate concept (B 344/A 287). With the distinction of the phenomenon and noumenon, the transcendental object leaves its mere being a logical presupposition in the structure of knowledge and starts to take shape though very indeterminately as the ground of the appearances or the intelligible aspect of the appearances when it refers to the thing in itself.

Kant connects this illusion with the second reason of the illusion of the mind which is to regard the subjective logical maxims of the mind guiding the understanding as referring to objectively real objects. Transcendental ideas of reason arise from the desire of reason to reach the unconditional in its explanations. Such unconditional is taken either to be the ground of the totality of conditions or the complete totality of conditions is itself thought to be the unconditional. Reason constructs some ideas about the unconditioned in the form of complete knowable unconditioned given totality. The ideas refer the metaphysical infinity for the ground of everything finite or conditioned. In the end, we have the ideas of subject, world and God taken as known real objects. The referents of ideas can only be the in itself character of the thing according to the doctrine of Kant, since whatever can be experienced is necessarily conditioned. Therefore, Kant thinks that reason cannot employ them transcendently by a transcendental subreption to refer to the thing in itself while using the language of the phenomenal objectivity. The legitimacy of the ideas is safeguarded by the transformation of them to a utopia for theoretical comprehension meaning that reason does not relate to any object directly but indirectly through serving the understanding in the organization of its rules thereby supplying coherency and consistency of its employment. This is the subjectively regulative function of the ideas. They cannot be constitutive of any experience by directly determining its object precisely because they would be constitutive of the thing in itself as the object and another realm for theoretical comprehension in addition to the phenomenal one would be open.

How do ideas function as subjective logical maxims for the understanding? With the answer of this question we arrive at the intimate relationship between the power of judgment used for the sake of theoretical comprehension and the reason with its ideas. It should be kept in mind of course that the ideas are used for completion of explanation with a theoretical demand, though they have practical significance and practical necessity for morality. Ideas function by describing the organization of a complete systematic unity of a manifold and prescribing it to the understanding. The systematic unity of reason is a form of the whole of knowledge which determines a priori the conditions of determinate knowledge of every part, its position and relation to other part. They resemble the form of intuition that the partial knowledge gained by concepts can never attain. Every idea of reason; the idea of the subject, of the totality of the world and the being of all beings, are thought to be as constitutive single principles not of their objects but of their respective scientific branches of psychology, cosmology and theology so that they guide the systematization of the knowledge, rules or notions belonging to the branch. The criteria of the successfulness of the coherency and completeness of the particular rules are further determined with some special principles of the homogeneity, of the specification (the diversity of that which is homogeneous), and of the continuity of the aspect which points the difference in degrees. Kant writes that each of these principles demands the maximum employment of itself in order to reach the projected form of the unity (A 665/B 693). So, the completeness contained in the ideas is converted to the maximum. Metaphysical infinity is transformed to mathematical unlimitedness. They refer maximum unity, manifoldness and affinity among the ingredients of the body of knowledge. Paradoxically, the idea which is the underlying first principle as the thing in itself is placed ahead as end with respect to knowledge. In brief, we have a reason which has the right to set the task of reaching a logically complete system in terms of three special principles by means of viewing the idea as the first principle and prescribing it to the understanding as an end in order to further the empirical investigation. What Kant later questions is the conclusion that reason has right to such a logical prescription without the necessary assumption

that the object is open to such a unity. For instance, the cosmology or psychology though constitute an ordered system they still investigate the world or the subject. Does the logical unity of reason accord with the constitution of the object as the object of knowledge? The answer is that a priori assumption of the object as necessarily having such a unity prescribed by the idea is a transcendental principle and the three specific laws are also transcendental principles, since otherwise reason contradicts its very rationality by both prescribing a unity and having the contrary conception of its object. The transcendental laws of reason have objective validity but an undetermined one. For instance, with regard to the unity either of thinking or of the corporeal nature Kant writes that

[t]he law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In order, therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we have no option save to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary. (A651/ B 679)

Further, he explicitly claims that without the homogeneity of the manifold of the appearances, neither the law of genera, nor the notion of genus, nor any concept, nor understanding would be existent. Diversity in the same way is necessary in the constitution of the object, since without it understanding would find no occasion to exercise (A 654/B 682).

To conclude, the problem that Kant deals with is the same in both the first critique and the last one. In the first, he considers the presupposition of a systematic unity in nature from the perspective of the ideas and the demand of reason while in the last he views it from the given status of the manifoldness of the appearances and the relation of them to the power of judgment. There is a difference though in that while all ideas refers to inner constitution of their referents and demands a systematic unity, power of judgment in introductions to the third critique is spoken to deal with the inner constitution of the thing “without us” and therefore is enclosed to the systematic organization of the nature. In

addition, the emphasis on the principle as a necessary presupposition even for forming empirically valid judgment and empirical concepts manifests that this principle is not only the demand for systematization but also for any taking unification under concepts, though not noticed till one asks more comprehensive questions in wider context. Further, important than being the maxims for praxis of science is that the principle in the status of the principle of power of judgment concerns with some ontological possibility referring to the ground, to the thing in itself and stresses it more firmly in comparison to the regulation of the idea. Reason cannot demand that there should be a unity in the field of knowledge without also presupposing that independent and unknown ground of the possibility of the givenness is in harmony with the criteria of its systematicity such that the manifold appearances in general is given in the organized form too. There is a circle in rejecting the knowledge of the infinite or unconditioned and introduction of it again for the consistency of reason with the difference that it is a subjective necessity and remain objectively indeterminate. The transcendental principle of reason is in fact the principle of the reflective power of judgment. Conversely, what Kant takes as the necessary principle of the power of judgment in introduction is the principle of power of judgment adopted for the sake of theoretical comprehension; under the aim of theoretical consciousness and is connected with the interest of reason for knowledge and explanation. Hence, the purposiveness of nature is the necessary assumption of this power when this purposiveness itself is purposive for an end; it is regulated, for the sake of the scientific articulation and with respect to the extended discursiveness in system construction. It can also be entailed from the sameness of the transcendental function of the principles of the reason; principles of the unity, diversity and affinity with those of reflective power of judgment; principles of genus, species and the continuity of the unity of those which shows difference with respect to species. Actually, Kant does not imply but affirms that judgment is under the aim of the understanding, because it is the necessary purpose of the understanding that contingency is rendered to necessity under some universal principle (KU 5: 187; 26). In brief, power of reflective judgment with its subjective transcendental

principle supports the functioning of the idea of the totality of the world in its empirical employment by means of allowing the interpretation of nature in such way that the idea referring to the unconditioned has some meaning, not only as projected unity (epistemologically) but also a ground (ontologically). Most importantly, without the latter, the task that reason gives to the understanding is not possible. The principle of judgment is a necessary presupposition of the constitution of nature in its empirical manifoldness for the possibility of its unity for experience which includes conceptualization. The principle of reason states the same unity for the possibility of an organized body of knowledge. Both of them refer a subjective but necessary condition. Therefore, there is no inconsistency to identify the presupposition of reason with the purposiveness of nature for the subject's capacity to know. For the aim of the third critique, the power of judgment acting under the aim of the understanding (only subservient to conception of the theoretical knowledge in the first *Critique* is only a part though necessary but not sufficient. I mentioned it as a specification of the aesthetic power of judgment, since the purposiveness is a determined one. We should see how the power of judgment acts in its freedom which I take to be an aesthetic intuitive act and which manifests a purposiveness without purpose. It was necessary to connect this act not as hindering and contradicting the aims and conditions of understanding but as pointing beyond and making the channeling of intuitive insight into the aim of theoretical reason. But, it is narrowing its sphere. What is revealed so far is a conception of the nature as purposive as a technician in its correlation to the purposeful technical working of judgment, though they have the aspect of the artistry (KU 5: 205; 394). The spirit is lost in the technic, though it is the primary aspect of aesthetic reception through judgment and aesthetic creation, as it will be explained in the sequel.

### **3.2 Aesthetic Judgment and the Beauty**

The orientation of Kant in the explication of the reception of the beauty through aesthetic judging (the question of how feeling has an immediate presence

in such an experience through the principle of the power of judgment) is the same with Kant's general critical attitude. He elicits his own conception of beauty by elimination of rationalist and empiricist accounts of it. The entire analysis of beauty, in addition to the reading of it to supply its role for Kant's own philosophy, thus, has a parallel reading. It is based on the identity of the demonstration of the conditions of forming aesthetic judgment with the elimination of other given alternatives of its conception so that a demanded purification is gained, though some aspects of both accounts are shown to be retained. For the sake of familiarization with the context and the forth-coming discussions of Kant I will give a very short and too general view of those different alternatives. Moses Mendelssohn, exemplifying the rationalist party, defines beauty as pleasurable sensuous knowledge of perfection at the boundary of clearness and obscurity. Beauty or sensuous perfection can be attended in both natural things and artistic works in the form of a whole in which all multiplicity is sensed as perfectly in agreement. The sensuous perfection is an inferior kind of expression compared to the intellectual perfection whose notion includes the highest good as well and therefore beauty is something we encounter in our effort to reach the intellectual perfection. Further, though it belongs to the side of the intuition and sentiment, the standard of representation of the ideal beauty which the artist engaged with can be reduced to some a priori rules and attained by means of the critics, since ultimately the source of the beauty is in the human soul and can be known in distinct concepts by means of inferences.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, David Hume, representing empiricist party, stresses the value of sentiment (passion and emotion) and of the sentiment's very subjectivity in aesthetic judging, though he allows a standard to discriminate the properness of sentiment. However, the standard of taste is not something a priori, but gained through experience, practice, inquiry and comparison of different beautiful or, in Hume's word, deformed objects. There is a reciprocal relationship between our sentiment

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<sup>37</sup> Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstorm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 10-15; 169-75. Though Kant criticizes the rationalistic conception of beauty, his own theory and that of Mendelssohn have very striking similarities rather than differences.



and the learned standard in the test of the soundness of our aesthetic judgments. Ultimately, no standard can attain the status of setting a norm and always relative both to the psychological make-up of one and to her culture, historical place and nation. In brief, Hume says that “[b]eauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.”<sup>38</sup> Since Kant classifies aesthetic judgments as judgments of reflection rather than determinate judgments, he rules out any determination of beauty either sensuous or intellectual perfection as an objective property, though aesthetic judgments asserts a necessity. On the other hand, the feeling of pleasure issues in aesthetic experience in the subject, but not as a pathological kind or a mere sense impression in the way that Hume thinks it. In Kant words, “a judgment of taste determines its object in terms of our liking (beauty) [but] makes a claim to *everyone’s* assent, as if it were an objective judgment” and simultaneously “a judgment of taste, just as if it were merely *subjective*, cannot be determined by bases of proof” (KU: 282-284; 145-147). An aesthetic judgment shares both different characteristics that are focused on by differently minded philosophers by being neither of them.

The starting point of the analysis of the beauty is the strict differentiation of the aesthetic judgment from cognitive judgment through which a representation is comprehended as an object through the concept. Kant shows this difference in two ways. The first is that we do not have a concept of beauty under which we recognize the object as beautiful, which also means that we do not have determinate rule or principles to ground the beauty or lack of it. It is connected to the reflective capacity of judgment. Second one is to demonstrate that aesthetic engagement is also not one which pursues a production of concept; that is it is free from the task of cognition whose purpose is to determine a manifold under a concept. The first one is established as follows. In an aesthetic engagement all determination or rather reflection is under the control of imagination which refers the representation to the subject’s state of liking or disliking in order to reflect the

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<sup>38</sup> David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” *English Essays: Sidney to Macaulay*, ed. by Charles W. Elliot, in *The Harvard Classics*, vol. XXVII (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14).

aesthetic character of the representation. The feeling of pleasure or pain which the subject refers the representation to is called subject's feeling of life. The feeling is a consciousness of the life of the "entire presentational power" (KU 5: 204; 44). Aesthetic reflection then consists of an intuitive comparison of the representation with the vitality of the entire presentational power. The life means how intense the dynamic relation of imagination and understanding is; whether the one is obstructed or promoted by the other, in other words, whether they reciprocally animate [*beleben*] each other and carry further the kind of harmony established. We do not have any concept of this relation, hence the reference of the object to the life our cognitive powers in aesthetic judging is not the discursive comprehension of ourselves akin to non-conceptual comprehension of the object. Beauty is not a concept of an object; it does not refer to conceptual representation of the spontaneity either. It is the sensuous manifestation of the life of the consciousness (entire representational powers) in engagement with the object. The lost spirit of technical judgment is in aesthetic experience.

The attunement of imagination and understanding that we are acquainted from the first chapter is stated explicitly as that which is needed for cognition in general and it is a condition "under which alone we can use the power of judgment objectively" (KU 5: 224; 412). Indeed, Kant writes that it is the same relation which is gained through schematism of imagination necessary for objectivity but which is considered in terms of its sensuous manifestation:

[I]n the power of judgment we consider imagination and understanding as they relate to each other, [and we can do this in two ways:] We can consider that relation objectively (as was done in the schematism of judgment), or as belonging to cognition; but we can consider this same relation between [those] two cognitive powers merely subjectively, in so far as these cognitive powers further or hinders in the one and the same presentation and thereby affects one's mental state, so that we consider that relation as one that can be sensed. (KU 5: 223; 411)

In the context of the problem of the infinite regress in judgment and in the context of the necessary independence of sensibility and understanding where any determining factor coming from concepts or sense are excluded for judging that appearances are subsumable under the categorical thought, imagination is shown to adapt the two each other in its own lawfulness which is free. It is the same relation under the name of the life of the cognitive powers which is recognized through feeling and leads to an aesthetic evaluation. In metaphor, the necessary correspondence of understanding and sensibility as the result of imaginations exhibition the object in intuition harmoniously with understanding which is a necessary subjective condition of constitution of experience and is present in experience like pulse. Pulsation is always present, but we become aware of it when the beat is high at the occasion of excitement, in tasting the beauty.

The second way of capturing the non-conceptual nature of the aesthetic act is to describe imagination and understanding in mode of a free play without any constrain of the determined concepts which are accepted as ends for a cognitive activity. Freedom of the imagination consists of the imagination's "schematism without a concept" (KU 5: 287; 151). Indeed, schematism without a concept has reference to the role of the understanding than the imagination's role. We should look how understanding functions. Kant describes understanding too, in a free active state relived from the task of cognition to produce rules for combination of the manifold of appearances. Understanding is under the inspiration of imagination not the reverse way, but they reciprocally relate to each other and imagination does not have the purpose of cognition, though it does not break the lawfulness needed for cognition in general. Being purposive without a purpose, thus also describes the activity of the cognitive powers (KU 5: 241; 91-92). In order to cognize something; the purpose of the activity is the determination of what we are presented (the manifold of appearances) in the form of an object under a concept supplying the rule, however in an aesthetic engagement the activity which is carried on is indeterminate with respect to its end, and what is felt is "free and indeterminately purposive entertainment [*Unterhaltung*] of the mental powers" (KU 5: 242; 93). Thus, firstly, the aesthetic act of the power of

judgment leading to assertion of the beauty is explained in terms of the identical aspects that we discover in the schematic act of the imagination as necessary for constitution of experience, indeed for transcendental grounding. Secondly, the reflection is also an aesthetic one and it is not logical reflection leading to production of determinate concepts, because it is not purposiveness with a purpose, though it makes the logical reflection of understanding possible. In addition, it is relieved from the aim of reason which shapes the understanding, yet the aesthetic act by going beyond the determinate categorical comprehension opens up the possibility of the presentation of the totality of appearances as nature in a systematic unity. Thirdly, the reflexivity of the act becomes apparent in addition to its being reflective. The notion of reflexivity was also addressed with the notion of heautonomy of the power of judgment. Lastly, though the aesthetic presentation neither based on a theoretical concept, nor can be explained with the notion of purposiveness specifying the purpose as purpose of knowledge, it is still an act which concerns making something present with a significance. The pleasure that we feel is connected “with the mere exhibition or the power of exhibition” (KU 5: 244; 97). One way of interpretation of this assertion is that the pleasure felt is connected to experiencing the power of presenting or producing the world in possible meaningful ways. Now we can specify these general aspects of aesthetic judgment and the lived aesthetic experience in detail with respect to quality, quantity, relation and modality contained in it with the explained historical orientation of Kant in mind.

With respect to the quality, aesthetic evaluation differs from other value attributions as being conditioned by a free liking or free pleasure arising through a disinterested contemplation. The kinds of depended pleasures are those which arise either when we find something agreeable with an interest of sense (inclination) or when we respect something with an interest of reason (purely practical liking). Both of the pleasures express a determination of desire and want to possess the object occasioning the feeling. Kant contrasts the disinterestedness to the interest in the existence of the object and writes that in the contemplation of the beauty we suspend the existence of the object, the point is that the beauty is

not as object of desire, it does not matter whether our desire is determined purely by law of practical reason or we desire it on a pathological stimuli, the desire is paused. This disinterestedness is another reason why we should differentiate the aesthetic act from the interests of reason. Kant mentions the specialty of the existence as the mode of receiver as well. An irrational animal being is stimulated by the senses as well and good is a value for that who/which is rational. However, only human being both animal and rational can have a liking for the beauty; because only being human makes to be determined in neither way possible in having pleasure and determining the beauty. The situation of human being “leaves us the freedom to make an object of pleasure for ourselves out of something or other” (KU 5: 210; 52). In a converse expression, if something is desired, then it means that we had already an interest in it. The good’s being predicate of the object or of an action gives also the reason why judgments asserting the good are out of the sphere of the aesthetic judging. Judging something as good includes knowing what kind of thing it is meant to be and that requires a determinate concept of the thing. In the similar manner Kant states later in his analysis that the concept of perfection includes cognition of an extrinsic or intrinsic objective purposiveness in the object which the cognition of the good also presupposes (KU 5: 226-227; 73). In light of the notion of the good and its exclusion, we can turn back to the object and articulate it. The phrase “what the thing is meant to be” means the utility of the thing or the thing itself as purpose to itself. Hence, we can connect the explication of the mode of existence with the inner possibility of objects which is determined by concepts. When Kant writes about quality he refers the quality of the feeling on the side of the subject, but since he forbids any interest in the existence of the object in order to make possible the arousal of disinterested liking, the inference is that the inner possibility of the thing which refers to a concept do not interests us, we do not form teleological judgment. For one thing, aesthetic judgment receives the manifold by presenting it in intuition out of the categorical classifications that determines the objectivity. Reality belongs to the a priori category of quality which Kant also names “thinghood” and aesthetic presentation do not present according to the determined category of

thinghood (A 143). Therefore, with regard the existence of object, it is sounder to say that what the judged one is meant to be is necessarily excluded if this “meant to be” is formed according to one kind of comprehension; theoretical or scientific knowledge, according to what understanding want it to be. The result of the analysis of the “first moment” of aesthetic judgment is that “[t]aste is the ability to judge an object or, a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest” (KU 5: 211; 53).

The logical function of the category of quantity has also a different role than it has in forming determining judgment similar to the category of quality, since aesthetic experience is always a lived engagement and aesthetic judgment is always a singular judgment. Therefore, there cannot be an extension of merit to all or some objects unless we make a logical inference out of the context of aesthetic experience, though it does not entail that we present the context aesthetically too. Kant aims to capture the universality in aesthetic judging and the beauty captures it by being extended not over the sphere of objects but over the sphere of judging persons. Aesthetic judgments have an “aesthetic quantity of universality” (KU 5: 215; 59). Judgment includes in his content the assertion of a subjective universal validity, rather than objective validity. However, it does not mean that the judgment affirming the beauty is converted to the postulation of the fact that everyone finds the presentation beautiful. It postulates an ought for everyone to conform to the value it states and do it by resting on that it is an instance of the felt value unmediated by concepts. The claim that I attend the beauty is the claim that I am an instance of a universal voice of an immediately felt value.

Kant also justifies the universal validity with reference to the harmony of the cognitive powers which is a necessary condition of cognition in general. Since the relation of imagination and understanding in a proportionate attunement is always necessary for cognition and since it is a condition which is shared by all human beings, a universal validity for the state of free play of those cognitive powers can also be claimed. Kant repeats that the harmony of imagination and understanding is noticed by an inner sense, by an inner feeling of the life of the cognitive powers rather than the intellectual consciousness of this harmony by

means of the unifying role of thought The analytic unity of the transcendental apperception which is described as self-awareness of the subject in the form of thinking self is irrelevant for an aesthetic act of judgment, if the aesthetic consciousness or aesthetic unity of the subject is constituted without any determinate thought through concepts. The question of the self-consciousness is addressed by means of this non-conceptual awareness of the significance in and through the act of judging itself. As we are familiar, there is the possibility that the subjectivity when conceived in its relation to the transcendental power of imagination is not conditioned by the unity of the thinking 'I', but unity of thinking 'I' is made possible with respect to the unity of the self which is qualified as imagining self which still carries with it a unity and lawfulness. Now, this subjectivity is clearly articulated to be an aesthetic and judging subjectivity. Therefore, though Kant tries to justify the universally valid character of judgment on the cognitive powers and their relation that he investigated and established in his first critique, the relation is indeed the reverse way. The relationship of the cognitive powers is that one which should be attained in and through aesthetic act and which is the basis of cognition and the aesthetic judgment is ultimately justified by the act of the power of judgment itself. I should call the feeling is mine and should attribute this feeling to all who satisfies the conditions of the arousal of this feeling, the condition of disinterestedly engagement with the object through which imagination and understanding are attuned only for the attunement itself, for the activity. I want to conclude by repeating that aesthetic judgment has a universal subjective validity without any concept precisely because it is a concrete realization (instance) of the aesthetic reflective power of judgment which can be regarded shared by all judging subjects. Aesthetic judgment presents its own possibility by simply being performed.

Under the name of the relation, aesthetic judgment is analyzed with respect to the relations of purposiveness included in aesthetic experience. We find three purposive relationships in the aesthetic experience. One concerns the beautiful object's ontological possibility as an individual whole, the other is the link between the object and the subject and the last one is the relation of imagination

and understanding. The first kind of purposiveness is called by Kant as objective purposiveness, where the concept unifying the manifold includes the basis for the inner possibility of the object. Realization of the concept (object's realizing itself) is the purpose of this thing; it is the unifying and actualizing principle. This objective purposiveness is identical to things qualitative perfection. We should have the concept defining the purpose in the first hand to cognize an objective purposiveness or to judge that the object is a realized purpose and perfect. Kant says that what is attended in aesthetic experience is the form of purposiveness, that is, we see that the manifold is in harmony to form a unity but what kind of unity it is undetermined. Therefore, what we can sense is only an appeal that is involved in the apprehension of the form of object under the name of the subjective purposiveness. Hence, contrary to the rationalistic view, beauty is not confusedly cognized perfection whose clear cognition is the cognition of the good. This appeal constitutes the second kind of harmony or the purposiveness: the relation of the presentation of the object to the relation of the cognitive powers to each other. The presentation in which object is given is cognized as purposive for the furtherance or hindrance of the harmonious working of the mind through the very consciousness of the later. The last relation is the reciprocally purposive relation of understanding and imagination to each other which is identical to pleasure or displeasure. The last relation is also described as a state of play with an inner causality which keeps the receiver in the engagement of the thing and in the state of the play without any further aim. It is strictly connected with the second one given that what is given to us is actually what imagination presents and it presents the given in intuition in the way that understanding's demand of lawfulness is confirmed but not with the means of the determinate concepts of understanding but still open to other concepts that understanding is not in possession or can never be in possession. Those three kinds of purposiveness are all belongs to the notion of the purposiveness without the purpose as the nucleus of Kant's whole analysis. In the object we concern only with the form of how the manifold is unified to make possible a unity and we intuit a purposiveness in the organization of the object, though we do not judge the object itself as an objective



purpose through the concept of it, that is we do not understand the object as purpose (purposiveness without a purpose). The relationship with the object is also a form of purposiveness without a purpose in the sense that we intuit the appeal of the object's form not because we are determined in advance to use the intuition for a further aim but because we refer the presentation to our subjective state (purposiveness without a purpose). And lastly, our play is purposive only for the play itself which describes a self-producing and self-preserving cognitive state of animation carried further by its internal causality. In brief, beauty is a special presentation of purposiveness which can arise only in full aesthetic engagement of subject and object.

The last thing we should concern is how the beautiful necessarily conceived as connected to a universal feeling without basing its necessity on a concept as a determinate and objective rule. The last moment revealing the necessity included in the judging is also a culmination of all three conditions of purely aesthetic judging as supplying "the supreme condition" (KU 5: 240; 90).<sup>39</sup> Alternatively said, Kant concludes all the aspects in one ground. Since this transcendental ground is the conditioning power of aesthetic judgment itself, we find another description of this power. We saw that the necessity included in the judging is the necessity that everyone is demanded to give assent to the feeling of the beauty. In addition, it was clarified that this necessity is not the objective necessity of a theoretical judgment nor is it an unconditional necessity prescribed by a determinate objective moral law. The ground of the possibility of the necessity in aesthetic judging, Kant writes, is the indeterminate common sense [*sensus communis*] which should be presupposed to be shared by all human beings given that they are aesthetic subjects. The reason that the judgment cannot claim an unconditional necessity comes from the fact that the principle of common sense is not an objective ground that can be taken as theoretically determinate. In

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<sup>39</sup> This perspective belongs to Allison and I followed him. There are also alternative views too connected to what a transcendental deduction can possibly prove provided that the notions of universal subjective validity and necessity are already explained in the analysis of the beauty. See Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 141-160.

other words, the necessity could be unconditional if we could determine what this power of common sense ultimately addresses. The necessity contained in the judging activity is exemplary, in the sense that judgment made is an instance of a rule which cannot be stated conceptually. Hence, contrary to the first impression that aesthetic judging activity has deficiency in comparison to the structure of the objective theoretical and practical judgments both in terms of its subjectivity, necessity and its connection to feeling, it is indeed a kind of equality or even superiority given that it concerns with an activity and a power which is beyond the parameters of objectivity and necessity and therefore it manifests itself subjectively in feeling and under the name of the indeterminate idea of common sense. Kant writes that the power of aesthetic judging is rightly called a sense or intuitive power if we pay attention on the feeling rather than the activity of the harmonious cognitive powers which is in fact identical with this feeling and which is in fact the subjective condition of all experience, knowledge, and the communication of thoughts.

Kant connects the common sense to the universal voice of the power of judgment and we encounter the grounding role of such a power for another reason as well. It postulates the possibility of the silent communication of feeling or intuition to which no adequate concept can be found among aesthetic subjects. What is communicated from the other-without-us is communicated through the other-within-us to us and among us since we share the otherness in us. The other within me is both the character of the self that I become conscious intuitively and the other subject which has the same character within her. Therefore, Kant writes aesthetic power of judgment is a power which allows us “to put ourselves in the position of everyone else,” to avoid the privacy, to concern only with the conditions that makes the judgment universal and necessary (KU 5: 294; 160). To conclude, what is communicated through the beauty to someone should be communicated collectively as well. Beauty once communicated or felt requires legitimately to be communicated collectively by all since power of judgment constitutes an indeterminate power (common sense) shared communally as transcendental ground and justifies the claim that beauty necessarily felt

universally. Common sense [*Gemeinsinn*] is not the common and sound understanding and does not refer to the constitution of an empirical (psychological) subjectivity, it is directly stands for the aesthetic reflective power of judgment as a higher cognitive faculty, because it is the shared “ability to judge something that makes our feeling in a given presentation universally communicable without mediation by a concept” (KU 5: 293-296; 160-162). With the subject’s power of aesthetic judgment as common sense, human being finds its niche in a community by making this community possible. Let’s articulate the notions of this other within and without by means of the dialectics of the aesthetic judgment.

Kant does not want to dispense with his analytic of the beauty and with the justification of the necessary synthetic nature of the aesthetic judgment (the presentation of beauty necessarily in connection with a universal feeling) without resolution of the antinomial stand of seemingly contradictory principles of the aesthetic judgmental faculty, because this antinomy invites doubts on the possibility of the a lawful power of judgment itself advocated by means of Kant’s own theory. The principle of aesthetic judgment cannot be theoretically grasped. Two parties of this stand refer two contradictory perspectives on the functioning of taste (of power of aesthetic judgment). One party argues that aesthetic judgments are based on private feelings rather than on concepts. The reason is that we aesthetically value the same thing differently and discuss about the properness of this value, however we cannot prove our judgment. Proving means entailing the necessary agreement of the other with us, but proof needs the objective concept that we ground our judgment. Therefore, everyone has its own taste and there is no universal validity. The other party argues that aesthetic judgment is based on concept otherwise it would be not possible to discuss or quarrel about the disagreement. The fact of discussion presupposes that it is possible to agree. This presupposition is presupposition of the universal validity inherent in aesthetic judgment. Therefore, we have a power of judgment functioning according to concepts. The resolution of the antinomy is gained when it is accepted that both

sides of the stand are right. They are consistent not contradictory. They express different peculiarities of the aesthetic judgment.

Each side of the antinomy uses the notion of the concept differently which in fact addresses an indeterminate concept which in turn is nothing under than an idea. If the principle asserting that aesthetic judgment is not based on concepts is read means that the aesthetic judgment is not based on the determinate concepts of understanding, then two principles do not conflict. Kant's solution of the antinomy ends with a reformulation of his doctrine as well. He says that the right of power of judgment to claim a necessity for universal validity for its judgment is based on "reason's pure concept of the supersensible underlying the object (as well as underlying the judging subject) as an object of sense and hence an appearance" (KU 5: 330; 212). He also makes a specification for the supersensible belonging to the subject by writing that "the basis that determines the judgment lies, perhaps, in the concept of what may be considered the supersensible substrate of humanity." The idea of reason is intrinsically indeterminable by theoretical cognition. Therefore, it cannot be used to prove, test and explain the judgments. Therefore, we cannot have an objective principle of aesthetic judgment, but only a subjective one. If we would, we would cognize the thing in itself theoretically and objectively. If we regard ourselves and the objects as sensible beings, appearances, than our character as supersensible and the object's supersensible character (the "in-itself" aspect) can be called the other within us and without us. The antinomies are for every cognitive power in possession of a priori principle. Theoretical reason and practical reason have antinomies as well. However, there is a difference between the dialectical conflicts of reason and that of the aesthetic power of judgment. The first one is for limitation of the knowledge claims of speculation and the second one is for the limitation of the practical knowledge of the highest good. They are discussed after their possessions of legitimate knowledge are justified. The antinomy of aesthetic judgment is for affirmation of the power of judgment itself, since denying the a priori principle referring to a necessity in judging activity is a self-negation of power of judgment. Secondly, the principle of power of judgment is not concerning the status of the legitimacy

of knowledge from one determinate perspective. From the perspective of understanding we have a transcendental determination of phenomenon ignoring the thing in it self, whereas from the perspective of practical reason we have the transcendental determination of the subject in its intelligible aspect as free while leaving aside the concern of the ground of phenomenon other than the free subject. In the sphere of the aesthetic judgment, the relation of the object and the subject is considered in such a way that they necessarily exceed transcendently determined phenomenal character of the object (there is no determination by means of concepts of understanding) and of the subject, but also subject is not viewed as a moral subject as it is necessitated from the perspective of practical reason. Kant writes that “there can be no doubt that in a judgment of taste the presentation of the object (and at the same time of the subject as well) is referred more broadly [i.e., beyond ourselves], and this broader reference is our basis for extending such judgments [and treating them] as necessary for everyone” (KU 5: 212; 339). With the aesthetic judgment and its resolved antinomy, we reach the intelligible or supersensible mode of object different than which Kant says we do not know anything about theoretically and a mode of subjectivity different from the intelligible character of the subject which can be known only as determined by practical law, though Kant mentions “humanity” which is closely connected to morality. If we take the spontaneity included in the aesthetic act referring beyond both phenomenal objectivity and noumenal subjectivity, it can be interpreted as an act which constitutes the internal relation or connection between the separateness of the intelligible character of the nature as the sensible world and that of the subject. This act can be construed as a constitution of the unity allowing, firstly, the determination of the internal relation of subject’s faculty of understanding to the sensible world. Secondly, it enables the determination of subject’s moral worth as sensible being within the sensible world. The intelligible character of the aesthetic subject does not primarily refer to the constitution of the subject in its moral character, but it refers to the subject with the power of judging universally without a rule in the context of the antinomy of the aesthetic judgment. This intelligible character will also be revealed with the notion of genius. We shall

consider in the next section the necessities in the creation of art. Genius as the productive power of art and as the power of aesthetic ideas; and the link between production and assessment will be dealt in order to see what aesthetic power of judgment as an art of judgment bears more and in order to explain how *sensus communis aestheticus* can be understood as a lower degree of the talent or power called genius. I delay the conclusion of this section firstly for the sake of avoiding over-repetition and secondly without the idea that beauty is the exhibition of aesthetic idea the clarification of aesthetic act is not complete.

### **3.3 Genius and Aesthetic Ideas**

Separating the production of an art work from nature's operation, craft and science is the starting point of Kant towards the exploration of creation of the beauty. A work of art presupposes the purposeful (intentional) and free act contrary to nature's operation. Craftsmanship or mechanical art concerns actualizing a possible object according to the determinate concept of it. Art shares this feature with it by simply having an academic form and correctness. However, creative production has no end other than the pleasure through aesthetic reflection, while mechanical or technical production seeks other purposes and has constraints external to the activity. Fine art's standard is the aesthetic reflective power of judgment. Kant says that an art work can only be an art work when the rules are followed for and through production in the way it is followed to create the thing as it is intended to be. Therefore, it is not possible that we judge an object according to these rules without knowing what these rules are and what it is intended to be except being conscious that we are faced with an art work. Later Kant will explain that the artist herself does also not comprehend any rules for her creation though her production is lawful. The theoretical incomprehensibility of the rules of production explains also the difference of fine art from science. The rules of creation cannot be formulated and prescribed to any other producer or receiver (judge) and can only be communicated through the work itself which exemplifies its own rule of being what it is intended to be. Artist communicates through the

mental attunement aroused in aesthetic appreciator in proportion to her own in the same way that pure beauty is communicated universally.

With this general introduction we encounter the difference of nature's free beauty and the beauty of art while pointing out their similarity as well. Kant himself detaches them when he precludes the relation of concepts from the aesthetic judging of nature. He says that to judge an art work we necessitate the concept of artwork as an object and should be aware that what we encounter is a realized purpose. On the other hand, the beauty of nature's objects is the paradigmatic case for the pure aesthetic judgment. Art creates a beauty depended or adherent to a concept and should be judged so. However, the purpose of the artist cannot be accepted as realized, if it fails to produce the free harmony of cognitive faculties of the receiver, though the object can be classified as an artwork, since the aim of creation is not that of craft but to arouse the aesthetic feeling. Therefore, as Guyer writes, "[b]ecause what the concept of fine art requires is only the intention to produce pleasure through the free play of the cognitive faculties, there is no way in which recognition of the intention alone can determine the response to a work of fine art; yet precisely where the intention is successfully accomplished, it will also be the case that no mere concept alone can be seen as fully determining the response to the work."<sup>40</sup> Secondly, given that Kant tries to analyze the conception of an artwork and he focuses on genius as the condition of production, the final arrived is that every artwork is unique to itself, has its own rule as a model and is an example with respect to how an art work can be produced provided that the art work is a genuine one. Thirdly, the artwork is a kind of something in the way that a tulip (as the object of free or pure aesthetic judgment) is a kind of something. In judging both of them we consider them purely abandoning our categories. As Kant write both an artwork and product of nature can be seen potentially as adherent or as free beauty (KU 5: 231; 78). Lastly, while nature should appear as an art work to be judged purely beautiful, art should appear as nature to be judged purely beautiful. The difference is that in the

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<sup>40</sup> Paul Guyer, "Kant's Conception of Fine Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 52(1994), pp.275-285, see p. 278.

first case we do not know whether nature itself is a self-developing or made art work \_ conception of nature as having the principle of genius itself\_, in the latter we know that the art work is produced but we cannot claim that it is produced in total awareness of intentions of the artist with a deliberate purpose, as we will see below. Art work seems as nature because it is the product of nature of the subject. Ultimately, if nature should be viewed as art, it is still the creative capacity of the subject which allows nature's presentation other than its conception as a mechanically composed whole.

As the aesthetic judging requires to be lawful in order to add necessity to its activity, while at the same time the rule of such an aesthetic act cannot be stated, art, too, presupposes rules in order its inner possibility to be grounded and "fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product" (KU 5: 307; 174). The lawful but free dimension of art is grounded on the dimension of the subject which is named genius. The rule of art is simply is that there is a mental attunement of the subject as creator which makes the production of the art work possible. This mental attunement, identical the mental attunement established by aesthetic power of judgment, is between imagination and understanding, but Kant articulates it with new aspects. Genius, as the giver of law to the act is "the innate mental predisposition (*ingenium*)" of the subject (KU 5: 307, 174). Kant writes that the principle of the artistic act of creation or of art is the subjective, aesthetic and unconditional purposiveness and this principle is based on the genius which cannot be explained as the capacity of production with deliberate and determinate purposes and whose nature cannot be understood by determinate rules or concepts. Genius is the intelligible nature of the subject, "the supersensible substrate (unattainable by any concept of the understanding) of all his [her] powers" (KU 5: 344; 217).

The first feature of genius, connected to its being a talent whose principle of working cannot be theoretically grasped and be explained by means of concepts from the perspective of the receiver or spectator, is the originality. Genius should be witnessed as the source of the principle (rule) of creation and its work should be regarded as exemplification of it in the concrete realization. However, it is



possible that genius originates non-sense depending on the indeterminacy and unawareness of its activity and rule. In order not to produce something non-sense, genius should create models both for the receivers and other producers. The model, writes Kant, is to arouse the feeling of other creator's or artist's originality and allows art to acquire new rule (KU 5: 318; 187). What genius creates is an example of standard of judging or valuing. This is its second feature. As aesthetic power of judgment exemplifies itself through judging and has an exemplary necessity, genius is characterized in the same way. The third one is the unawareness of the artist herself and her procedure in a conceptual way. It is due the fact that genius is the nature (supersensible) of the mental powers and it is not possible for subject herself to get contact with its intelligible character through the concepts. And the last one, connected to the third, is genius' difference as principle of artistic production from the scientific practice and understanding which should always work with given and determinate principles. Thus, genius is "the exemplary originality of a subject's natural endowment in the *free* use of his cognitive powers" (KU 5: 318; 186). We have explained the necessary cognitive powers constituting genius (understanding and imagination) akin to the constitution of the aesthetic power of judgment. In the latter, aesthetic judgmental act is explained to be manifested as the intensified and inspired (animated), free and purposive movement of those powers in sync. How do they relate to constitute the productive genius?

The part where Kant answers this question starts with a definition of spirit which Kant says to be present and felt in some art works and not in others:

*Spirit [Geist]* in an aesthetic sense is the animating principle in the mind. But what this principle use to animate [or quicken] the soul, the material it employs for this, is what imparts to the mental powers a purposive momentum, i.e., imparts to them a play which is such that it sustains itself on its own and even strengthens the powers for such a play. (KU 5: 313-4; 181-2)

The paragraph describes the experience of the beauty with a difference that Kant speaks of an employment of a material this time and continues

Now I maintain that this principle is nothing but the ability to exhibit *aesthetic ideas*; by an aesthetic idea I mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no [determinate] *concept* can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it. It is easy to see that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a *rational idea*, which is, conversely, a concept to which no *intuition* (presentation of imagination) can be adequate. (KU 5: 314; 182)

Presenting aesthetic ideas belongs to the free productive imagination creating “as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it,” it processes that material into something different that “surpasses nature” (KU 5: 314; 182). Through such an activity, imagination sometimes follows the principles of reason as well. Aesthetic idea has a hybrid nature. They are aesthetic and are creatively given by imagination (power of intuitions), “inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate,” yet they are entitled as ideas by saying that they go beyond the experience and they try to exhibit the transcendental or rational ideas. They go beyond experience in a different way as well, when they present an archetype of something, for example, of love, which we can only partially and imperfectly experience. As an instance, Kant speaks of a paint and a sculpture expressing the same aesthetic idea (original image) of something in different forms and offering it to spectator with the aim of the arousal of the imagination in harmony with understanding (KU 5: 322; 19). This is the other meaning of an aesthetic idea.

Though Kant should clarify the creation of an art work which presents aesthetic ideas, he takes the perspective of the aesthetic evaluator in order to explain how aesthetic ideas function. An aesthetic idea consists of aesthetic attributes of a concept or an idea, or rather, aesthetic attributes yield aesthetic ideas which are not conceptual contents (logical attributes) used in analyzing and understanding a concept. As it is clear already, they cannot be placed under determinate concept, though they are still related to the exhibitory power of

imagination. These aesthetic attributes horizons an “immense realm of kindred representations” attached to a concept, the realm where imagination is free in presenting what concept implies or what it has with other concepts beyond the logical spheres of concepts. Aesthetic attributes, being formed in an aesthetic idea or in an aesthetic unity, “aesthetically expands the concept itself in an unlimited way” (KU 5: 315; 183). The relationship of understanding and imagination of a subject encountering with an aesthetic idea is animated (spirited) as a result of the imagination’s spread over this realm of new meanings and new ways of comprehending. Since aesthetic idea continues opening itself and presenting new attributes, the momentum of prompting the relationship between intuitions and concepts saves itself. Kant also writes that imagination keeping creative and free all the way in its aesthetic intuition and also in harmony with the understanding; in addition to supplying “a wealth of undeveloped material for the understanding which the latter disregarded in its concept,” it sets the reason with its ideas into motion, too (KU 5: 315-317; 163-165). When someone reads or hears the sentence “The sun flowed forth, as serenity flows from virtue,” Kant says, the degree of the intensity of the feelings and intuitions one lives through by means of the expansion of the concepts included can never be attained through a conceptual grasp. Not only is the meaning of the virtue, but also that of the sun reshaped through this relationship. So far, all of the dimensions of aesthetic act of “pure” judging given in the analysis of the beauty which Kant attributes to the nature and the aesthetic engagement with an artwork are given isomorphic. By means of an extension of the notion of the intuited purposive form, the primary act of presentation of aesthetic ideas is included in the judging. Subject cannot feel the beauty without being aware of the self-originated and self-preserving attunement of the cognitive powers. Such an attunement can only happen when imagination freely presents appearances as purposive for its relationship with the understanding without any further aim. Without the primary act of imagination which can be regarded as an interpretive act making possible to take appearances and unify them differently to constitute an aesthetic idea, which also means that producing another nature or presenting the given differently, we cannot feel

beauty and be intuitively aware that we have such a power. In Kant's words "[w]e may in general call beauty (whether natural or artistic) the *expression* of aesthetic ideas" (KU 5: 320; 189). Indeed, neither the aesthetic act of judging is a simple contemplation or judgment, nor aesthetic act of creation is without judgment. In order to show how evaluation includes a production and production includes an evaluation; I will pass to the relation of aesthetic power of judgment and creative power of artist. They point to the same subjective capacity, though genius is different in degree. We shall also clarify the production of artistic beauty from the perspective of the producer.

Kant does not trace the relation of aesthetic power of judgment and genius as the artistic capacity through a straight path, though he takes the judgmental power as necessary to the creation of art works. We find him affirming that an artwork should show itself both as a product of taste and of genius (KU 5: 320; 129). The first aspect belongs to the judgmental capacity of artist and the second her imagination. Though free imagining is an indispensable condition for presenting original aesthetic ideas, artist still should imagine commensurate to the lawful character of understanding. This commensurateness is obtained by means of the power of judgment. Such affirmations imply that genius and judgment work in contrasting directions: one works as the supplier of material (aesthetic presentations) and the other works as disciplining the spirited imaginative state of artist. However, genius' functioning is described in the same way in which the power of judgment is described. The link of the genius and the power of judgment can be detected easier, when we look at the link between imagination and understanding or reason, rather than contrasting artist's imaginative inventory aspect to the judgment understood as limiting. We have discerned with the notion of aesthetic ideas that both the rational ideas referring beyond the experience and knowledge, in short, the idea of supersensible, and some concepts (virtue, love or death are Kant's examples) are exhibited in intuition by means of unlimited relations and aesthetic attributes, though the object of the idea cannot be cognized theoretically. Such an act of making intuitable is permissible, given that we are not thereby supplied with theoretical knowledge. In order to exhibit the concept or

thought, artist apprehends the presentations of imagination and form an aesthetic intuitive unity; that is an aesthetic idea. The essence of the power of forming aesthetic ideas is that artist “hits upon” a way that is proper to express rational idea. In Allison’s words, “genius is not the capacity to invent the appropriate attributes and unify them into a cohesive, aesthetically pleasing whole, but also the grasp the aptness of this creation (the aesthetic idea or cluster thereof) to express symbolically or metaphorically the underlying idea of the work.”<sup>41</sup> Though Allison implies that the creation and seeing or intuiting the properness of this creation are two different acts, the formation of the aesthetic idea is already the intuition of this attunement in the same way that the schematic act presents proper schemata to the concepts through the very production of these schemata.

Genius is constituted by the same structure of the imagination and understanding; imagination’s free harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in a portion that makes possible to produce aesthetic ideas and communicate them. Aesthetic idea manifests such a mental attunement which is communicated through the work to the others. The work produces the same harmony in the assessor when it is attended, meaning that it is judged aesthetically. At last, Kant grounds the possibility of artistic creation to the supersensible nature of the subject for which no rule can be given in the same way that the rule of the power of judgment cannot be known but is grounded on the shared capacity of aesthetic sense. Both the aesthetic judgmental power of judging without a rule but lawfully and the power of genius to create lawfully but without a rule point to the same subjective condition and to the productive power of the subject. An art work can be interpreted in possible ways by uniting the aesthetic attributes in an aesthetic idea. Art work can be assessed to be meaningful by means of different possible qualitative unities pointing to an idea, since the meaning of an art work is indeterminate (aesthetic idea as the content of artwork cannot be captured in concepts). The nature itself is presented by means of the transformation of its formed concept to something else that surpasses it and shows

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<sup>41</sup> Henry Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, p. 285.

that subject is free and powerful enough to create the meaningfulness in possible ways according to the principle of its own act. Thus, the principle of genius is the principle of the aesthetic power shared by all aesthetic subjects (judges) and the difference is that artist uses language, musical notes or plastic material to express her intuitive power. As Gibbons writes, by means of its reference to productivity, to exemplarity and to the same mental attunement, the nature of genius is identical to the nature of aesthetic common sense with the difference that capacities constituting them heightened in degree.<sup>42</sup>

The total conclusion of Kant's analysis of the beauty and the power of aesthetic judgment as a kind of intuitive reflection and of the production of beauty is as follows. Aesthetic judgment affirming beauty has two aspects that Kant wants to account with a reflective power of judgment as a higher faculty possessing its own a priori principle. The first is it connects a representation with the aesthetic feelings of pleasure or pain whereby the beauty is attended. They are evaluative. The second one is that they do it normatively. This normative aspect neither fit to the theoretical objective normativity which is justified by demonstrating that a concept is applied through the judgment, nor an unconditional moral "ought" determining the practical acts, because beauty is not a concept. The necessary value given to the representation is determined by means of the reference of representation to the consciousness of the subject's mental life. This act of reference is constituted through an aesthetic reflection where both object and subject's presence purified from the external aspects that an object or the subject's interests can bring and only their relation is determined. By means of act of aesthetic reflection both the object is apprehended as purposive and the subject feels her cognitive powers in an attunement. Since apprehension belongs always to the imagination, then it means that imagination freely harmonizes with the understanding which is also free from the task of theoretical comprehension and from determining the object. This subjective state can be attributed to all subjects since the relationship of understanding and imagination is the subjective

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<sup>42</sup> Sarah L. Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, pp. 114-116.

condition for any objective experience and for the communication of cognitions. Every judging or aesthetic subject ought to feel the self-perpetuating purposive attunement of the cognitive powers without purpose, which is nothing other than the judgment, if they aesthetically engage with the object, which is nothing other than attainment to the relation (purposiveness) of the object with the power of judgment. The requirement of universal validity is supplied, at the end, by the aesthetic power of judgment itself which can give law to its own act. It becomes both a subject and object of the law. Indeed, it becomes not an object but still a subject to itself, given that it gives law to all subjects, not to object.

The power of judgment as the ground of the judging without any external standard, (without any subsumption of under determinate concepts) is called an aesthetic common sense, because it is a power to feel the beauty through awareness of its own power. Aesthetic common sense ultimately refers to in-itself character of the subject. The thing-in-itself character of the subject is then connected to the nature of genius and its ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas to animate the cognitive powers to an attunement. This ability is to open up the mind to an aesthetic world of connection of intuition and thought by means of internal intuition which can never be a determinate cognition. Aesthetic idea does not refer to an object, but refers to a unity of aesthetic attributes to an idea. This internal intuition also refers to an intuition of a fit between an idea and its way of presentation, meaning that when this fit is produced one can form different aesthetic ideas still expressing the same unitary relation between an idea and its way of presentation. The assessment of beauty than is revisited as the exhibition of aesthetic ideas. Schematic act is described as “art concealed in the depths of the human soul” with the description of the power of judgment which is a talent which shows itself in practice and lack of a determinable rule (A 144/ B 181). The aesthetic power of judgment is also described to judge something without a rule, a common aesthetic sense and ultimately stems from “a deeply hidden basis, common to all human beings” (KU 5: 232; 79). It is the presentation of the given in the way that the understanding can find unites for its rules. Genius itself is a talent to give to rule to its own act by means of presenting an original aesthetic

unity (the aesthetic idea) which expresses the relation of aesthetic attributes (imaginative intuitive representations) to the understanding and to the reason; that is, to conceptual thought in general in such way that the possible unifications of intuitions and concepts are multiplied. The possibility of the adaptation of the appearances to the rules of understanding leading the conception of nature is first established by the presentation of an aesthetic idea. The basic notion of subjectivity with its spontaneity should be conceived, as an entailment of these two chapters, as an aesthetic subjectivity with an intuitive power of spontaneously constituting its relation to the object such that this relation makes possible the mutual determination of both (as the theoretical thinker) and the object (as the nature by understanding and science). Kant writes that ideas are representations related to an object in accordance with either subjective principle or objective one and neither case they can become a cognition (KU 5: 342; 215). In the first case they are aesthetic ideas and as such they are intuitions referred to the object with the subjective principle of mutual harmony of cognitive powers. There might be added that the mutual harmony is the necessary condition of cognition as its subjective principle; therefore an aesthetic idea is always present whenever an object is referred, though as expressing the harmony of the object to the subject and as a presupposition of their determinate relation, it can never become a cognition.



## CHAPTER 4

### THE POWER OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND THE GOOD

#### 4.1 Practical Reason and Moral Law

Kant's first appeal to the notion of freedom which is the *ratio essendi* of morality is in terms of reason's antinomies in the first *Critique*. The antinomy, like others, is a result of seeking the unconditioned for the completeness of explanation and its solution is proposed with the critical distinction of considering the thing as it is an appearance and can be known as it appears; and thing as it is in itself which cannot be reached by theoretical reason in the first critique. The antinomy concerns the relation of the reality of freedom as a form of spontaneous causality (not caused by something else, but original efficiency) and nature which does not allow a place for its reality as an event in the web of the determined form of the succession of causes and effects (A 444/ B 474). Reason, on the one hand, denies the possibility of freedom on the basis of the break in the lawfulness of nature, it demands such a cause (first cause) as an unconditioned condition for attaining the unity in understanding the world on the other. The antinomy is resolved by pointing out that the explanation sought with reference to the cosmological idea is a kind of dynamic explanation rather than the mathematical one with addition that we can view the same thing both as an appearance and as a thing in itself. The first clarification includes thinking a series of events in appearance whose condition should not be a part of the series again. This thought leads to the possibility of thinking a condition which is empirically unconditioned. It satisfies the demand of reason for the completeness. The second clarification includes the possibility of thinking this unconditioned condition with a determination of its intelligible aspect as to have absolute spontaneity in its

causality conceived as a thing in itself. It satisfies the practical interest of reason. From this cosmological idea, Kant passes to consider the freedom proper to the human agent and says that human being as an appearance and as a part of nature is determined with the laws of nature, but it is possible to think such a being free and cause of its own action in its intelligible character. The logical possibility of the freedom is proved. Beside the antinomy, we have also some supporters of the thought of the freedom. Human being “who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of senses” (A 546/B 574). Hence, through active faculties of the understanding and reason, especially the latter capable of producing ideas independent of the experience, human being is an intelligible being. What independent of experience (independent of “what is, what has been, what will be”) reason supplies is an idea of “ought to happen” that can never have a meaning in the course of the nature and produces an alternative conception of necessary action to the necessary actions in nature. Kant writes that

Reason does not here follow the order of things as they present themselves in experience, but frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they have never taken place, and perhaps never will take place. And at the same time reason presupposes that it can have causality in regard to all those actions, since otherwise no empirical effects could be expected from its ideas. (A 548/ B 57)

Hence, reason, as reason of a human being, though spontaneously creates an idea of order for its self where necessary actions explained by freedom, it still should *presuppose* that it has such a causality to bring the idea in actuality in the sensible world. Kant calls this world moral world at the same time being an intelligible world, which “can be” according to freedom of the human being, because it “ought to” be according to the moral law (A 808/ B 836). This moral order has an

objective reality insofar as it is practical and ought to influence the sensible world by transforming it according to itself. The reality of the subject is not that it finds itself as effected, but it finds itself as effecting. There is a shift in the relation of causality. Thus, even we are satisfied to find an immanent and regulative role for ideas in ascribing a systematic whole to experience; we still have practical interest for the idea of freedom in its constitution of our moral agency, conduct and volition to action. The question is then whether we can prove that reason is practical, in the sense that it can produce moral laws a priori and prescribes it to action in an absolute manner which is connected to the question of the will capable of a positive determination by the moral law. We are concerned with the reality of practical freedom, therefore with the reality of practical reason which is identical to free will.

To answer this question Kant starts his *Groundwork* which is preliminary to his second *Critique* with an analysis of the moral notions belonging not to philosophy but to society. He wants to show that people already have understanding of what being a moral agency means though they do not formulate abstractly the supreme principle of morality by recognizing it explicitly. He also wants to clarify the basic concepts of his own pure moral philosophy such as pure will, obligation, categorical imperative and his conception of humanity (GMS: 389; 56).<sup>43</sup> With the notion of good will Kant's general idea of moral worth is given. An action is good because of the character of willing rather than because of the result of the act (or because of the act as a result), since for Kant it is not that there is the good and we want it therefore we are moral, but we are moral and ought to will the good therefore there is the good. In his second *Critique*, he makes the same point by starting from a priori principle of morality and by passing to the concept of the good as the object of the will or practical reason. "[W]hen moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see" (GMS: 389; 56). The inner principle of willing the good then clarified as possible only by means of

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<sup>43</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964).

acting according to the pure thought of duty and for the sake of it, excluding any externality which can be taken as the reason of the action. The pure concept of duty expressing an obligation to act in a certain and determined way is recognized with a kind of necessitation on the subject which is painful but at the same time with an arousal of a kind of feeling of reverence, given that the source of the thought of duty is the subject's own rationality. Hence, for Kant an absolutely good will would be necessarily in conformity with itself, but when the will is not necessarily in conformity with itself, there arises the obligation and a feeling of inhibition. "Ought" and "will" would be identical in the formal case whereas for human beings they are not identical, because humans have different conditions due to their earthly being (being finite), though they also as rational beings go beyond their conditioned nature. We are forbidden to look for any reason for the act except the duty which analytically contains a command to will as the sole ground of moral value. Only in that way willing can have the character of necessity and universality that we presuppose as the characteristic of moral value. Therefore, the command itself should be formulated in a self-reflecting principle. The moral law commands the act whose reason of performance can at the same time to be desired or willed to become universal. This is what we are left with if we take the content of the principle to express its own commanding character. Law commands universally the conformity to its power of commanding universally. The command is to be faithful to the law-giving rationality. Reason cannot escape from the command without annihilating itself as practical reason, since the choice of rebellion to the command either is still an expression of law giving rationality or there is no moral agency and a moral universe to make any sense of obedience or rebellion at the first hand. This necessity will be clarified through the articulation of the moral agency and the command of reason for the highest good. To remind, this results are driven from an analysis of the moral concepts and the idea of a lawfulness belonging to the concept of rationality or rational being capable of determining the will a priori. They are not driven from the particular and conditioned being of human, nor they justify the possibility of pure reason's being practical meaning that the thinking subject's spontaneity can

be proved to be capable of the actualizing itself as moral spontaneity of pure willing.

To the pure principle of morality is given by Kant the name of categorical imperative. It has the aspect of imperative, since it is received as a command. It is categorical, since it is not conditioned and it does not command the action for any further purpose to be attained by means of the conduct. It does not mean that moral principle is devoid of any purpose or end, but acting according to the principle means the end of acting is the moral act itself; that is, acting in conformity with the necessity conceived in the form of the moral law. As we will see later, it is also connected to the aim of the realization of the highest good which is the aim of to establish moral universe and developing it as far as possible to such a level that we as moral subjects become through our moral conduct worth to be happy. It also does not mean that we do not have other principles for our conduct in the form of imperative. It means that only the law commanding to act on a maxim through which to will the universality of the maxim is made possible too meets the criteria established by the concept of duty. Kant wants to make the concept of duty more concrete by giving different formulations for the moral imperative. First, one necessitates viewing the law as a universal law of nature. It is made possible by thinking or rather imagining that we have such a power that through our will the maxim of our action would become a universal law of nature. The moral law commands us to act as if our deliberate act is immediately creative of a nature in which our principle prevails as the universal law. After this formulation, Kant gives some maxims, which do not meet the check of the formulated law, and in these examples, he uses the concept of nature as a systematic purposeful unity rather than a mechanical nature. For example, in a system of "nature" a feeling functioning or purposive for furtherance of life cannot simultaneously have the aim of killing (GMS 4: 422; 89). As another instance, the concept of promise would be empty where the universal law of breaking promises prevails. Promise inhales the highest level of purposiveness and commitment. Hence, the moral law, in its formulation does not only command to think it as a universal law of nature but necessitates to think another

nature in which existents as parts acts purposively in conformity to law necessarily. It means that moral law thought to be applied to the sensible world by means of a universalization of the maxim should have a presentation of the sensible world different from the concept of nature that understanding brings with in order to know. When it is decided that a maxim is impossible to be a universal law as an objective moral principle, this decision is neither because of a logical contradiction, nor because it cannot be a law of already presented and known nature, but because it does not fit the internal logic of the working of the sensible universe viewed as a moral universe. Frederick Copleston writes in his construal of Kant's moral theory that Kant is not clear about what does the possibility and impossibility of willing a maxim as universal law refers and about what is the criteria despite the particular examples; a worry possibly yielded by the dissatisfaction of the formality and abstractness of the principle of morality.<sup>44</sup> The answer is that: the universality of subjective principle is made possible (decided to be possible) to be willed and instituted against the threat of the non-sense status of our moral existence in the world. We will see that the formulations of categorical imperative supply the possibility of understanding what the category demands from the perspective of sensible human being. The concept of promise should make sense in the sensible world as far as there is the possibility that the sensible world can be viewed as a moral universe. This point is advocated by means of the next shape of the categorical principle more strongly. The last to say, pure morality, for Kant, can be established in strict contrasting with the sensible nature which understanding forms to understand it and which also includes the person as a subject with sensible desires, inclinations, and impulsions. This view is from the perspective of practical reason and pure morality. However, even in the first formulation of the moral law, we are faced with a necessity of a power for viewing the sensible world such that in it the law can be thought to be a universal law. And secondly, the very formulation of the categorical universe seems to have a reciprocal enhancements in the idea of moral order and the natural order in the

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<sup>44</sup> Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. VI (Great Britain: Burns & Oates, 1960), p. 324.

sense that we should both a view of nature as purposive and we should view the moral law to be the universal law of the sensible world.

Categorical imperative in the next form commands that one should act with a view of both herself and of the other as bearers of absolute value. Since every action is intended for some end, this form of categorical imperative requires finding an objective end and the only end, which can be objectively stated, is the person impossible to be viewed as a thing, given that it is the source of the all possible ends as an intentional agent. The absolute value comes from human being's status as an end in itself. Conceiving one's existence as an end in itself, if the value is absolute, requires that it should accept no comparison, and it should turn to rational agent itself to find the source of being an end in itself. Kant actually takes the value as given and proposes it without any argument for the concept of rational nature and for that of humanity at first, but then clarifies the meaning of being an end in itself with the autonomy principle. A person can be responsible for its own being an end, only when she accepts herself powerful enough to be a law setter. It is the power of law; that is, having to power of establishing the absolute value by producing morality that makes the rational being an end in itself and absolutely valuable. The command of acting in view of absolute value is strictly linked to the command to act in the way that the person ought to treat herself as the universal lawmaker, which is another formulation of the categorical imperative. Because, if one cannot aware of itself as the universal lawgiver to its own will, one cannot realize the absolute value of its existence. Rational being with a will gives the end in itself status to itself. Hence, "law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity\_ that is unconditioned an incomparable worth. ... *Autonomy* is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (GMS 4: 436; 103).

The last expression of the imperative makes explicit the universal grounding function of the concept of end within the relation to other persons who are lawmakers themselves *qua* rational beings; thus, they are end in themselves. Society as a whole should be treated as a unity of authoritative self-legislators whose subjective ends are also made possible in the organization of all means and

ends belonging to human conduct. The subjective aims of moral individuals are conditioned with the objective aim of the constitution of an objective organized unity. This society Kant entitles kingdom of ends, “a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws” (GMS 4: 433; 100). This order is different than the kingdom of nature and the latter one, to repeat, is presented in virtue of the power of the subject viewing it in harmony with the reason’s or subject’s attitude to itself as morally practical. Such a system is possible if the individual has a “point of view” of herself, her maxims and her actions. The individual is also a member of this union like other individuals at the same time being the head. The ordered unity is the only union where the rational being is not a mere means for the other’s will and can be regarded as an end in itself. It is “admittedly only an ideal,” because we cannot know the reality that the order of nature is that of the order of rational agent, meaning that it’s order makes or will make place for humanity in itself, though knowing the reality neither deprives nor increases the worth of the rational being. However, it is necessitated for the human being when it is viewed as not a purely rational being. The human being as an actor is not in a position to know it, but the agent as *qua* aesthetic subject indeed feels and makes possible such an adaptation between the intention and its object. In conclusion, morality consists of the law setting through which alone everyone is equal by being different in that they make law and have free will.

Kant concludes his investigation of the possibility of a universal and necessary moral principle as follows. If morality should be rescued from being a phantom of the brain, we should accept the categorical imperative and the autonomy of the will (freedom of the will), since every other moral theories is based the heteronomy of will. They find the basis on a natural feeling or on moral feeling or on the perfection as a possible effect of the will or on the God as the determining cause of the will. To be moral means to be responsible for the action, and when we placed the responsibility to the other, the very possibility of autonomy, hence morality, is destroyed. However, Kant also detects a form of circularity of his analysis of the moral principle. The attribution of freedom to the self starts when the self in the order of the natural necessity is thought to be free



of the determination of sensible causes and is described as capable of a spontaneous causal relation to its act. This attribution is done in order to view the self as being the subject of the moral law in the order of ends, which is originated by the idea of the subject as such too. Then, forgetting that the freedom is already assumed and moral law is inferred from it, the moral law is used to explain that the subject has the free will by asserting that the subject itself gives the law that is given. Hence, in one case, the moral law in the form of autonomy is inferred from the freedom which is not proved but assumed; in the other free will is inferred from the principle of autonomy which is not proved but based on an assumption. Hence, “it looks as if, in our idea of freedom, we have in fact merely taken the moral law for granted\_ that is the very principle of the autonomy of the will\_ and have been unable to give an independent proof of its reality and objective necessity” (GMS 4: 103; 117). Kant questions the applicability of the analysis to us as human beings. The circle though is not superseded, is made understandable by means of given a reason to the subject to think itself free by turning to the appearance-thing in itself, sensible-intelligible and passive-active state of consciousness. This distinction, given in the solution of the antinomy as well, makes possible that the subject as rational can have a view of itself as active belonging to the intellectual (intelligible) world and insofar as the subject’s home is there she necessarily conceives the causality of her own will under the idea of freedom. It is followed by the principle of autonomy forming in the idea the ground of the all the actions of rational beings. Since what we need for the proof of free will is the self-consciousness of the agent with regard to the action, this shift between the different aspects of the subject helps us to understand how such a thinking (though not knowledge) is possible. When we think ourselves free, we move to the intellectual world, become a member and have right to call our causality a will. However, when we think ourselves in the sensible world, we think ourselves as an appearance. Moreover, in the sensible world, we feel ourselves under the obligation. Furthermore, regardless of the thought, because of the determination of our existence in the sensible world we feel an “ought;” that is, the laws of the intelligible world are imperative for us. In short, it can be said

that in this section Kant presents how the in-itself aspect of the subject loses its theoretically undetermined status by being determined as spontaneity capable of determined to be will. However, the subject still *thinks* its action under the idea of freedom and is aware of its agency with respect of this thought. What is needed is that the subject becomes conscious of its reality as a free actor. To accomplish it, we should turn to a new aspect of rationality with its new horizon of intentionality working according to its own purposes which are practical rather than theoretical. With this aspect we can also explain how self as an agent can be constituted only as a free existence because this conception of self is a practical necessity. In this sphere what issues is not determining a necessity for a theoretical cognition of an object and it brings with it the possibility that reason is the power of determining something non-sensible, and so a priori cognition of the freedom as the fact, or as the deed of the pure reason itself is made possible.

Given that Kant already provides us with the basic moral principle, *The Critique of Practical Reason* has importance in those aspects that, firstly, Kant clarifies the mutual relation of freedom and the moral law and warrants by this relation the reality of the freedom. He says that freedom is the reason of being (*ratio essendi*) of the moral law while moral law is the reason of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) that the subject is free, an autonomous agent. In Gary Banham's expression "[i]t is because there is freedom that is possible for there to be moral law, but if it were not for our awareness that there is a moral law we could never justify the notion of freedom."<sup>45</sup> The consciousness of the moral law is described as a fact of reason, a "sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving," because a law commanding unconditional practice in the sense that it commands to act by means of leaving aside every empirical given data cannot command to a will which is sensible. It cannot have a model of act in the sense of sensible event (cannot derive this act from experience), nor can it be inferred from freedom which we are conscious beforehand, if so, then, by giving the moral law, reason announces itself as free or makes itself free, since it

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<sup>45</sup> Gary Banham, *Kant's Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 96.

necessarily constructs this law from itself. Pure reason manifests an intelligible causality as practical, since it gives itself a law of causality in the name of law of freedom, and therefore justifies itself a priori to be practical. Therefore, pure practical reason has autonomy. Hence, the reality of the freedom (intelligible) is self-given to the subject, not thought problematically but as determined practically. The deduction of the validity and objectivity of law refers indeed to transcendental deduction of freedom of the reason itself. Practical reason, in turn, gives immanent justification of the moral law, because with the reality of freedom we conceive a purely moved will towards pure practical object grounding morality.

The second importance of the second critique for my aim is that Kant, after giving the justification of the moral law, introduces a notion called type or typic of judgment when he explains how it is possible to apply the “categories of freedom” by means of subjecting “a priori the manifold of *desires* to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law, or of a pure will” (KprV 5: 62; 54). The categories of freedom refer to the form of pure will unlike the categories of understanding which refer to form of thought. Moreover, these practical a priori concepts (categories of freedom) have an immediate meaning without, Kant writes, waiting intuition, since “they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer” (KprV 5: 66; 57). Their reality of course, is a practical reality and the immediate meaning they have is for the practical reason. This immediate meaning is grounded on the fact that moral law transcendently proving the freedom also proves the possibility that there is a moral universe; rational or intelligible world, where freedom functions, but the reality is not reality of the sensible world. The good as the practical object of practical reason is supersensible while a possible action or being that should be judged practically as good is events or more truly the character in the sensible world. It is solved by stressing again that the concern is with the determination of will a priori, not the result of this determination. Therefore, in pure practical judging as a kind of schematism or application of our moral concept in order to judge actions and conceive their being right or wrong we should seek a schema of law for an act

instead of a schema which makes possible the presentation of sensible objects. The idea of freedom has its power precisely because it refers to the intelligible and so it cannot be made intuitable. Kant ultimately says that we should look to the understanding and its form of lawfulness in general to present a world in which our moral values make sense. The rule of practical judgment is to take the law of nature as a type of a law of freedom. Instead of production of schema we have production of type of concept, meaning we produce a type of law. “Hence it is also permitted to use the *nature of the sensible world* as the *type of an intelligible nature*” provided that the form of lawfulness is not cognized a priori “for any purpose than the pure practical use of reason” (KprV 5: 70; 61). I have posited different formulations of the categorical imperative in discussion of the *Groundwork*. On the context of the type of judgment, Kant again mentioned the use of law of nature or the sensible world in which we see ourselves as a part of the nature as well. We link this law and sensible world to a law of freedom and of a rational world by means of a transformation for practical purpose of universalization. We have one general formulation this time. But, I think the other formulations are also types, since in the categories of freedom that Kant aligns there is included, for example, the aspect of an action to be dutiful or contrary to duty; or perfect and imperfect duty. Therefore, the formulation in which we imagine to behave in an order composing of individuals as ends themselves is still a type that we produce concerning morally relevant duties. I shall turn the relation of the aesthetic power of reflective judgment and the use of nature as the type of practical judging later.

The last topic that should be stressed is the pure motivation that practical reason provides by means of making possible the realization of an end which is the supreme object of the practical reason: the highest good. Kant wants to prove and to postulate the validity of this concept as practical purpose but explain it in terms of the dialectic of practical reason. He differentiates two meanings of “the highest”. One refers to the unconditioned condition, the supreme good, and the other refers to the completeness, the complete good. He writes that the supreme good as the unconditioned condition of all desires and states is to have worthiness

to be happy, to be virtuous. However, as such, it is not the complete good as the object of the finite but rational being. The possibility of a whole world or nature or life in which all those who take the highest good as their supreme principle are assured to be happy should be necessarily added to the concept of the highest good. We need the reality of the connection of being worth to be happy and to be happy as a causal relation that virtue's producing the happiness should be a new element in awareness of being virtuous. If it is morally necessary to produce the highest good in us in the first sense, then it is also a practical necessity that the production of the other is possible through the action or through freedom of the will. If the connection is given in the concept of the highest good which is the object of the practical reason and the object of our will commanded by the moral law, then the impossibility of the object entails that moral law commands us something impossible, directs us to an empty end. Kant wants to connect the phenomenal world and the freedom in the sense that we can produce such a state by action or we hope so. For the realization of this end, we should judge nature to be purposive for our moral existence as agents and for our ends. Though this actually concerns the teleological judgment where the purpose of nature determined as in unity with the purpose of the humanity, it is the aesthetic power of judgment that makes first possible the presentation of the indeterminate purposiveness in the sensible world by means of aesthetic judging. Aesthetic power is power of producing the possibility of a unity that goes beyond the categories and refers to an idea; hence, aesthetic subject produces a subjective unity in the intelligible ground for the consistency of willing the practical object. Thus, aesthetic subject and the relation of aesthetic power to practical reason are necessary in order to cognize the possibility and necessity of the highest good, though it is the practical reason which determines in-it-self character of the subject. The highest good in the sense of a moral world is indeed once established when moral law commands the act such a way that we make the moral union of law-givers in their systematic relation to each other possible. Highest good brings to this act the consciousness that happiness proportioned to the moral worth is possible. If everyone is worth to be happy, necessarily everyone is happy.

The reason that Kant mentions the schematism in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is that Kant wants to demonstrate a kind of adaptation between the look to the appearances and the reason in terms of the pure principle of categorical imperative, as the schematic act of imagination supplies the reality of the pure categories. This time Kant wants to find a link between the subject as appearance, its actions as events, and its desires, to the concept of freedom. We have one pure category belonging to morality which is the a priori concept of causality, but which is transformed to the supersensible idea of freedom by means of practical reason. Therefore, imagination's construction of time as the order of successive states in order to apply the a priori category of causality is not possible. Though the intuition of time has no role, Kant links again the understanding with respect to its determination of principles of nature's being a sensible object and the presentation of a rational world. The first inconsistency on the objective side of this type of representation is that the rational universe represented as moral universe should be presented as such that in which we can cognize ends, since it is the universe of will which is intentional and it is the universe of moral individuals both as end in themselves and as end-setters and means-organizers. However, we cannot present and understand the nature except in the order of successive series of causes. The nature that understanding is capable to grasp is not a nature in which actions are determined with an end, nor are the objects are represented as end themselves or they constitute end-means relations. Such an apprehension belongs to the reflective power of judgment when it concerns the living organisms or when it concerns the whole world as a living being. That the law of nature used in practical judgments cannot be as a type of law of freedom in the form that understanding supplies. Secondly, we saw that schematism is constituted by means of judging act contained in the very production of schema which is rule-governed but the rule is not a further concept. Later, we described this act as the act of the aesthetic power of judgment. We feel that we conform to a law which cannot be stated. Different formulations of categorical imperative were given as different typics or rules of judgments. Then it is possible to name their production as a kind of non-rule governed production by the aesthetic power. By means of

positing typical production, we encounter with a new mode of power of aesthetic creation. Kant calls it hypotyposis and describes this production as a power of indirect exhibition of ideas in intuition (KU 5: 352; 226). It can also be called metaphor creation, in the sense that relations, connections and operations are transformed from one context to another independent context. Mark Johnson rightly affirms that, in Kant's practical philosophy, practical reasoning cannot be a simple conceptual process and we necessarily use the imagination in evaluating both our characters and acts according to supreme moral law.<sup>46</sup> According to him, deliberation on moral law includes metaphorical understanding by means of which we indirectly present rules of the realm of freedom. There should be added a further remark that the realms that indirectly related are reciprocally shaped instead of an analogy in which an indeterminate concept is presented with another object which is given in intuition and is categorized. This is a symbolic relation and where the object is the symbol of the concept. Aesthetic power of judgment presents the idea within a metaphor which is appropriate to appoint to the interactionist construal of metaphor creation, though Kant mentions it as a symbol creation.<sup>47</sup> According to the former view, metaphorical relation extends the meaning of both of the concepts related. The changes in meanings cannot be exhausted and there can be found no rule of creating the metaphors. Moral agent uses the lawful operation of nature and the universal prevail of the law in the nature as a type of the law of freedom. Since the casual law of nature is directly opposed to the freedom, through the aesthetic power of exhibition both of the universes is interpreted and is adapted to each other. Thus, in addition to the assertion that law of freedom is the law of nature, the assertion that the moral agent is a member of kingdom of ends and the other formulations are also metaphors. Through them, both a moral significance is attributed to the sensible world and the order of the intelligible world is understood. Aesthetic power of

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<sup>46</sup> Mark Johnson, "Imagination in Moral Judgment," *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research* 46(1985), pp. 256-280.

<sup>47</sup> Kirk Pillow, "Jupiter's Eagle and the Despot's Hand Mill: Two Views on Metaphor in Kant," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59(2001), pp.193-209.

judgment through production of metaphors is a necessary part of understanding what the law commands to will and of judging moral value.

#### **4.2 Different Selves and Aesthetic Unity of Reason**

Throughout the study different forms of selves and their different roles are encountered which are modeled with respect to the different contexts and different questions that Kant handles. In the context of the possibility of a priori truths of the sensible world and of the possibility of experience the constitutive form of self is described as the thinking self; the condition of generation of truths. This form is dealt with in *Critique of Pure Reason* with an addition that the self of the knowledge has a capacity to form systematic bodies of knowledge, possesses also some ideas referring to unconditional, is interested in the furtherance of knowledge and sometimes loses its direction in knowledge. These additions transform the knower to a speculator and to an enlightened scientist removed from false claims. In the context of the possibility of pure morality and practical knowledge (knowledge of the good), on the other hand, the self emerges as a responsible moral agent. This shape of the self is described in terms of its interest in the possibility of realization of moral purposes, too. The last form of the self is the aesthetic self who has the power of aesthetic judgment and creation; and is investigated with regard to the question of the beauty. In addition, though the teleological reflective judgment was beyond the aim of this study, Kant also adds to the self the power of reflecting nature as a teleological system, which is needed because the limits of the cognitive faculties of the subject. The contingencies in nature are encountered because the discursiveness of the understanding cannot determine nature as whole in its manifoldness. Therefore, they are accounted with a subjective principle of teleological systematic of nature. Moreover, the setout of the critique of power of judgment is the idea that the reflective power of judgment constitutes a mediating link between the understanding with its concept of nature as the sensible object of knowledge and the reason with its concept of freedom referring the non-sensible, because both of the realities of those cognitive faculties



refer to different spheres impossible to be bridged. Therefore, the power of judgment is introduced also as a faculty which brings a unity to reason with regard to its legislative part. Hence, the selves above are given in terms of the reason's different dimensions which are connected to the spontaneity: theoretical understanding capable of bringing with itself the notion of knowledge and its object, and practical consciousness of freedom bringing with itself the notion of intelligible causality and what ought to be produced. The object [*Objekt*] of the practical reason, for Kant, was determined precisely as that which cannot become a sensible object [*Gegenstand*]. In other words, freedom is not something to be intuited or grasped by means of intuition. What is shared by both of these domains is that what is beyond the sensible. The field of the "beyond the sensible" is impossible to be determined and known by understanding; it is the limit. However, it is still thought as the ground of the sensible, while reason is directly involved with it to determine the subject as free and even supplies a law. It legislates, to the "beyond the sensible." "So there must after all be a basis *uniting* the supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically" (KU 5: 176; 15). The reflective power of judgment, another dimension of reason, brings about the possibility of determination, subjectively, the intelligible character of the sensible world to be in unity with the intelligible character of the self as free. Neither a theoretical cognition nor a practical one but a viewpoint or a way of thinking [*Denkungsart*] is brought about by this reflective capacity. It is, indeed, a world intuition [*Weltanschauung*].

The unifying role of power of judgment is mostly interpreted to be offered by the power of viewing nature as a teleologically organized and hence systematized whole and by the concept of an intentional causality. Intentional causality thought to be underlying the purposive relations judged to be hold between the parts of the nature, since the idea of the whole should be present as the ground of the possibility of the existence of such a systematic unity. Kant discusses the teleological view of nature with respect to the subjective but necessary condition that power of judgment carries onto the understanding of internal organization of living beings and their external relations to each other.

The constitution of nature as a system of purposes leads to the idea of an ultimate purpose and ultimate purpose leads to a notion of a purpose or an end in turn which is unconditional, meaning that the existence of something is not purposive for another thing within the link of purposes. Such a being as “end in itself,” as we have seen, is the human being in its moral existence out of the sphere of beings as natural purposes. So, Kant concludes that though the teleology of nature conceived in totality as a living being is possible to be explained by means of an internal purposiveness, there is demanded an external and intentional causality if we seek to conceive the aim of this internal purposiveness itself in terms of an unconditional or to an end in itself. Therefore, the nature as a whole is viewed to have a reference to the intelligible ground shared with the free being of the subject and has share in the moral purposes that the free being necessarily adopts. Thus, the whole world as an appearance and its events can be reflected as working with their own laws and in accordance with the principles of freedom simultaneously akin to the double aspect of the subject. This teleological view can be read to be an extension of the principle that nature is in harmony with the cognitive faculties when this harmony is also reflected with respect to not knowledge but moral act too. It also refers to a divine knowledge and offers a subjective encouragement to think a divine being by means of an ethico-teleology.

What I want to accomplish in this section is not to find the unifying principle in an idea of teleologically organized system whether covering the architectural plan of philosophical investigation or the structure of reason itself or the constitution of nature in relation to moral agency. I want to draw attention to the aesthetic dimension of the self and its unifying function in the self-knowledge of the subject. In order to demonstrate it, I will turn to the constitution of the unity of the self with respect to the unity of the knowable sphere and show what aesthetic subjectivity means in reciprocal link between the subject as knower and the world as knowable. Then I will pass to the awareness of the moral agent of itself and the world which it should produce with its action while acting in the sensible world. At last, I will point out that because the aesthetic subjectivity is separately involved in the consciousness of both the subject’s being a knower and

an actor; it allows the unity of those different selves. Aesthetic self can be described as a self capable of creation of an aesthetic idea of the unknowable. This aesthetic idea constitutes the condition of both theoretical acts and thoughts, and practical acts and purposes and has significance especially with regard to being human. In all contexts, we discovered the necessity of detachment of the powers of the subject from each other. The falling apart of the intuiting and thinking part of the subject rises in another form when Kant detaches the practical reason strictly from all sphere of constitution of the unity of appearances and from intuition. This detachment is the detachment of the subject both from its sensible character and from nature as constituted and warranted reality for knowledge. Regardless of these dualities blooming in every corner, there is one territory of experience for the human being and there is one human being aware of the truth, of the good and of the beauty. Aesthetic production, as Angelica Nuzzo beautifully expresses, allows the human being to live its human condition differently than both what the theoretical knowledge and the moral consciousness offers.<sup>48</sup>

In the first chapter, it was mentioned that the ultimate intellectual condition for the possibility of experience is the necessary unity of the thinking consciousness as a transcendental condition. Kant firmly tries to refuse the idea that the self as it is in itself is a possible object of knowledge; for example, the idea that we know ourselves as souls in terms of the category of the substance is an illusion. The self-consciousness refers merely to the necessity of the possibility that one attaches to all representations the thought that one is the identical one who thinks them. The necessity refers to the necessity of the unification of all representations by means of a common representation; “I think.” Kant also names this unity as an analytic unity which is necessary for subject’s awareness of the thoughts or representations as belonging to itself. Through this thought or representation the self can have no knowledge, but it is an awareness in thought.

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<sup>48</sup> Angelica Nuzzo, *Kant and the Unity of Reason* (West Lafayette, USA: Purdue University Press, 2005), pp.135-6.

As Heinz Heimsoeth calls it, it is a logical personality which is empty.<sup>49</sup> What Kant calls the synthetic unity of consciousness or apperception, on the other hand, necessitates the togetherness of transcendental imagination and understanding. This synthetic unity makes the analytic unity possible, since there should be a synthesis in intuition or combination in intuition so that the 'I' can recognize itself as thinking or so that an "I think" can be attached to that combination. The motto of Kant is no combination or synthetic unity is a simple given without the involvement of the act of synthesis. Therefore, the synthetic unity of apperception through which both the unity of manifold is constituted in intuition in a necessary manner and the unity of thought and thinking self is constituted can not belong to the thought, to the discursive and logic of thought alone. It must include the spontaneous act of the imagination as the faculty of synthesis *par excellence*. I called this necessary unity of the self as the unity of the imagining self since the necessary rule-governed constitution of the appearances in intuition and the cognition of such a unity is possible only by means of the transcendental imagination. However, the self-consciousness included in such an act is not the awareness gained through the categories and conceptual rules; hence, through the combination of the representations in discursive judgments. This kind of consciousness and its corresponding unity is precisely the question of the aesthetic realm, for aesthetic awareness neither refers the subject's self-consciousness with respect to its discursive and thinking activity nor refers to the cognition of object by means of a category or a concept.

Melissa Zinkin identifies the aesthetic unity of the self; or aesthetic apperceptive self with the synthetic unity of apperception necessary for the constitution of experience and knowledge. She calls this unity of apperception a qualitative, poetic or thematic unity with reference to Kant's mostly ignored explanation and critique of the scholastic statement: "every being is one, true and good" (B113).<sup>50</sup> Kant denounces this statement because of the ontological

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<sup>49</sup> Heinz Heimsoeth, "Consciousness of Personality an thing in itself in Kant's Philosophy," in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. and trans. by Moltke S. Gram (Ohio, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 237-277, see p.267.

<sup>50</sup> Melisa Zinkin, "The Unity of a Theme: The Subject of Judgments of Taste," pp. 469-488.

overtone, since these categories are stated to be transcendental predicates of things, but he accepts that the one, the good, and the truth are categories to qualify the knowledge and they are criteria of knowledge. They together are involved in knowledge and production of concepts of synthetic unities, but themselves are not a priori concepts of objects. Being qualitative unities, they combine a manifold in one consciousness. The qualitative unity then defined by Kant in terms of the examples of the “the unity of the theme (*Thema*) in a play, a speech, or a fable” (B114). Zinkin thinks that this unity of the theme first makes possible a manifold to be combinable and it is a necessary condition for the establishment of the identical thinking ‘I’. Further, another aspect of the theme is that the presentation of the possibility of synthesis determined according to the theme is the presentation of the possibility and necessity of the unity according to a viewpoint. The theme constitutes a viewpoint which unifies the manifold. Therefore, the subject is characterized not with respect to its thinking and to its rules of knowledge, but it is characterized as the one having the power of evaluation and judgment without a determinate rule but with a theme. Hence, it is the description of the aesthetic subjectivity, since the power of aesthetic judgment is described as judging with necessity without a concept or rule, but with an intuition of the attunement of the presentation to the harmony of the cognitive powers. Zinkin writes: “the theme is *me*; someone who has her own ‘her point of view.’ The subject of a judgment of taste is thus a self that can evaluate what is to count as meaningful for him or her and thus worth considering as a possible object of thought.”<sup>51</sup> What the subject takes as its theme of “me” is the point of view of aesthetic self who recognize itself as such (as capable of taking a point of view) at the same time producing an aesthetic unity in appearances which can never be conceptualized, but which have a necessity from the point of view. This view has the universality too, since to have the power of aesthetic judgment is to have the power of taking a universal viewpoint. If we connect Zinkin’s ideas with the conception of creation of the aesthetic idea and given reformulation of it, we can

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<sup>51</sup> Melisa Zinkin, “The Unity of a Theme: The Subject of Judgments of Taste,” p.482.

conclude that the necessary condition of the constitution of experience and of meeting the criteria of the unity of consciousness is the production of an aesthetic idea. The aesthetic idea, as a theme, refers to the in-itself; that is, it is a view of the thing in itself. The in-itself as an aesthetic idea, though still is theoretically undeterminable and unknowable, is included in the constitution of objectively valid experience and the consciousness of the self as thinking self. In other words, there is the necessary presence of an aesthetic idea in cognition which refers to the inner harmony or attunement between the given and the thought. The subject as the knower and the world of appearances is related to each other within and by means of an aesthetic idea which is produced by the aesthetic aspect of the self.

The unity between the sensible world and the subject *qua* knower is made possible again when the sensible world becomes a complex of diversities and the knower is regarded as the scientist capable of construction of systems. This time, the aesthetic power of judgment gives the harmony between the constitution of the nature in its diversity and the self as organizer of the knowledge. The sensible world is judged to be in attunement with the conceptual systems and nature is presented as if it purposively organizes itself such that its real working principles can be comprehended by means of a system. Viewing the relation of the sensible world to the reason having theoretical demands is made possible by means of the aesthetic judgmental power which makes possible the recognition of a purposiveness without a purpose. This purposiveness without a purpose can be shaped, then, in a direction of theoretical intentions. It cannot be known that the manifoldness of the sensible world forms a system, since the concept of nature belonging to the understanding do not include any necessity with respect to the unity of the diverse in nature except the necessary laws that appearances in general should follow to form an objective realm. The view of nature is produced by means of an aesthetic and intuitive determination of the nature in itself or, more truly, by means of the aesthetic freedom allowing the possibility of determination of the thing in itself as always constituting a unity with the demands of reason. One manifestation is that it is presupposed to form a unity with the theoretical needs of reason.

George Di Giovanni gives an excellent metaphor of the sprit in which Kant justifies the human situation in its moral existence.<sup>52</sup> The sprit belongs to the Venice of the doges. In Venice governed by the doges, people are told that they are accused of a crime and are put in the darkness in the jails, however neither their crime nor their last punishment are told to them with the justification that if they were informed, they would become desperate about never being able to meet the daylight. Being hopeless is an eternal sin. Thus, being ignorant is actually their salvation. Though Giovanni writes that it might be objected as a misrepresentation of Kant's moral ideas given the significance that Kant attributes to freedom, to self-legislation, and to autonomy; the ultimate picture of the self-knowledge of the human being in its moral existence, is the same with those situation of the criminals, since no determinate knowledge of the thing in itself is possible and even ignorance in theory is necessary. Therefore, the first necessity with the moral consciousness is that the knowledge of the thing in itself should be banned so that to acknowledge of the possibility of the moral act is possible. We are ignorant of the ultimate constitution and principle of things. We might be living in a very deterministic world; that is to say, the world in its intelligible aspect might be intellectually intuited as a network of causally interconnected things. In that case, there would be no point of endeavor to establish a moral system in the world or to seek and to encourage meeting the conditions for the highest good, because what we know as ought to be is already accomplished or will be accomplished in any way regardless of our knowledge and labor. Indeed, there would be no meaning of "ought to." Knowing what ought to be (or what ought to be done) arises by means of its discrimination of understanding what there is. Hence, as the ones in the darkness in Venice, ignorance is necessary. Not knowing the thing in itself does not mean that there is security in the moral consciousness. The ones kept in darkness, though they are forbidden to know in order to be saved from an eternal darkness, are still in prison. To see how exactly Kantian freedom matches with

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<sup>52</sup> George Di Giovanni, *Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors*, p. 160.

this metaphor and how aesthetic subjectivity takes a role, we should turn to the dilemma of the moral self.

In the moral sphere, the subject is aware of its obligation and conscious of the moral law as a fact of its own rationality. Morally responsible subject knows practically what ought to be done. However, moral subject is a rifted subject. When it takes the intelligible universe as its home, it should cope with the heteronomy that the sensible world presents. As a moral subject it strives to eliminate its desires originating from its sensible nature. The striving is to eliminate the laws of the sensible world which are contrary to the law of freedom. However, the elimination of the sensible world as the world of appearances means the annihilation of the consciousness of the “ought” arising in the subject as a finite being living in the sensible world. Both its acts which should be in the status of effects in the sensible world and the concept of the “ought” would be lost. As a sensible being taking the phenomenal world as its own home, it knows its obligation, but the moral existence becomes an unknown something that it carries in it. In this circle, it is impossible for the subject to know to whom the act belongs. Being free is still for the subject to be in a prison without information. Aesthetic subjectivity helps the constitution of moral agency firstly presenting the nature as purposive without purpose and it brings the intuition that nature is amenable to the ends of the moral subject. Secondly, with metaphorical creation, the moral and intelligible character is interpreted to be a second nature, while nature is also shaped. Thus, aesthetic power of the subject reciprocally eliminates the alien character of the sensible constitution for moral selfhood and the total alien character of the moral selfhood for the sensible constitution. If the unity of reason can be constituted neither by means of understanding nor by means of practical reason, and if Kant introduced a third power to give a mediation, this mediation can be given by aesthetic subjective power.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

This thesis study aimed to demonstrate the role of aesthetic power of judgment and aesthetic experience in Kant's philosophy. The first role was shown to be in the constitution of the knowledge of the sensible world by means of investigating *Critique of Pure Reason*. The second role was shown to be in the representation of the good and articulation of the knowledge of the moral law by means of investigating *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*. These roles were examined to be different manifestations of the primary role of aesthetic power of judgment in supplying an independent interpretative perspective of the unitary ground of sensible world and freedom. Power of judgment offers this perspective by enabling the subject to attend an intuitive harmony and unity expressed by the feeling of beauty. The thesis was concluded by demonstrating that aesthetic power of judgment is a necessity for the subject for orientation of the theoretical and moral intentions so that knowledge and moral life is made possible.

In *Critique of Power of Judgment*, Kant's aim is to give a unity to the reason. Kant considers the possibility of this unity with a mediating power in the family of cognitive powers of the subject. In *Critique of Pure Reason*, he explains how understanding functions as legislative faculty with its a priori concept of nature. Justification of the legislative power of understanding is demonstrated by determining for it a domain of objects. This domain is drawn by a limit that the objects of understanding are sensible objects (objects of possible experience). The limit introduces a necessary ignorance of what is beyond it. Thus, theoretical knowledge is generated by means of the understanding, when its concept is restricted to a concept of object possible to be presented in intuition. In addition,

the legislation of understanding still allows the thought of the beyond its domain. In *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant demonstrates how reason functions as a legislative faculty with its concept of freedom. The domain of practical reason is the thing in itself which is beyond the theoretical knowledge. This domain is drawn with a limit, too. This time the limit is that the concept of practical reason determines its object necessarily as being not givable in intuition, because if it were determined as a sensible object, it would fall in the domain of understanding and under its law.

The law that understanding legislates for nature is the cause-effect principle, while freedom refers to the causality which is not temporal and which can originate an act without being preceded by another cause. These two different and contrary principles belong to different perspectives: perspective of knowledge and perspective of moral act. Kant concludes that two domains are separated from each other as if they are two different universes. However, both of the domains share the concept of the thing in itself on the one hand and they concern the territory of experience on the other. The objects, when they are viewed in a disinterested attitude in which they are not determined as to their being possible objects of knowledge, for Kant, constitute a field. The territory of experience posits a problem for practical reason, since freedom should show its effect in the territory of experience. The object of the concept of thing in itself poses a problem for understanding because it is not its object. These domains can be related to each other neither within the perspective of the understanding nor within the perspective of practical reason. Kant mentions this limit as a gulf. Kant starts the third *Critique* with the declaration that the cognitive power investigated there can supply the mediation between understanding and practical reason. Mediation of the cognitive faculties is offered by the perspective of the power of judgment placed in between of these faculties. The perspective of the power of judgment does not bring any change of the concepts and of the legitimate objectifying functions of other two faculties and their use. Neither has it a concept in the status of an objectifying principle prevailing in a domain. It legislates for its own perspective from which the thing in itself or the supersensible can be viewed

independently as the unitary ground of both nature and freedom. Judgment of the thing itself is possible, if this judging establishes a possibility of *experience* of the unity, since by means of concepts of reason, of their objects and within an investigation of the possibility of knowledge, whether theoretical or practical kind, the unity cannot be established.

The study took the reappearance of the gulf after Kant's finishing the justification of the theoretical and practical knowledge; and the idea that reason in its purpose of knowledge through concepts can never be united as its basic premises. Therefore, Kant's will to find a power of reason was interpreted as finding a power which has the following characteristics. Firstly, the power, though a power of reason is not a power for knowledge described either by the criteria of practical reason or understanding. Secondly, since the reason is described by Kant with its purpose of knowledge, the power should be without a determinate purpose. However, since it belongs still to reason, it should work with a principle of purposiveness. Thirdly, the power should establish a possibility of experience, since, by means of already offered concepts of reason, driving a unity for reason is not possible. Fourthly, as a cognitive faculty, it should be lawful. However, its lawfulness should refer to the relation of the cognitive faculties, since Kant wants to establish the possibility of unity as a mediator. Therefore, the unity that is sought between the understanding and reason can be established if they can be shown to be in functioning in reciprocal harmony. Finally, if the reciprocal harmony is to be established with a link to the world of experience and through an experience, then the power should be such that it gives the possibility to understand the sensible world with a necessity that the understanding cannot grasp. In addition, this power should make different interpretations of the sensible world possible which can be used for the function and purposes of practical reason. These necessary aspects are satisfied by the aesthetic power of reflective judgment. Therefore, the thesis was concerned with the aesthetic power of judgment and with the aesthetic experience. With regard to the above characteristics, aesthetic power of judgment or the aesthetic subjectivity revealed by it was interpreted to be a power to give the intuitive orientation to the relation

of the subject to its world with regard to knowledge and to moral conduct. Other reflective roles of power of judgment were discussed to be necessarily conditioned by aesthetic power of judgment in their relation to the sensible world, since their relation is determinate either with a theoretical purpose or with a moral purpose of reason. They were still clarified to have a role when they relate to the phenomenal world, but they fail meeting the criteria of viewing the thing without any determinative perspective.

The aesthetic power of judgment is a reflective judgment rather than a determinative judgment which is used to subsume the given intuitions under concept in order to understand them theoretically. Rather, it supplies a reflection in the absence of the universal law or rule. It is explained by the principle that it can supply a law from itself to its reflective act which has no determinately objectifying function and; hence, the power cannot be accepted to be in the legislative status of understanding or practical reason. The specialty of aesthetic judgments shows this characteristic. Judgments of beauty are normatively evaluative judgments, whose norm cannot be discerned conceptually but can be discerned through the aesthetic experience they make possible and through the engagement with the object. In appreciating the beauty there is included an awareness of form of purposiveness which do not have a determinate purpose except for the judging activity and the relation of the cognitive powers. Aesthetic judgment asserts the harmony between the object and the cognitive faculties of the mind as a necessity with reference to the harmony of the cognitive faculties disinterestedly. The norm, which is the harmony of the faculties, since it cannot be attributed to any power other than the aesthetic power of judgment, establishes a special kind of universality spreading over the judging subjects on the basis that the relation of the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding is a necessary condition for a cognition and communication. It is explained as a common power of the judging subjects. This power was also evaluated as the power of genius giving the principle to the art and producing the beauty. With this addition, the aesthetic power of judgment was construed as making possible the expression of the necessary harmony of the cognitive faculties, which was taken

as the unity of reason, in different relations and contexts with respect to the theoretical or moral purposes. Since the unity of understanding and practical reason is, on its other face, for Kant's philosophy, is the common ground of the intelligible aspect of the sensible world or nature with that of the freedom, the thesis clarified the necessary role of the power of aesthetic judgment in the constitution of the legitimate truths about the sensible world at first. It investigated how it functions with regard to the aspect of this world that understanding is incapable to determine.

Discursive understanding's being limited in its legislation is manifested in its own domain as its inability to determine the sensibly given, its separateness from the intuitive capacity and the origination of its categories from its pure logical functions. All these aspects can be referred to the understanding's having a judgmental function which works with a subsumptive procedure in its determination. However, in order to have a right of legislation, understanding should be proved to be related to the intuition in a necessary and universal manner. In other words, the possibility of understanding the given by means of subsumption under categories necessities a determination of the given as subsumable, but this cannot be done by the discursive understanding again. The function of transcendental imagination introduced as a solution of this situation was discovered in the thesis to be an aspect of the aesthetic power of judgment making possible the presentation of the sensible world according to the demand of understanding and a necessary condition for the realization of understanding. However, since aesthetic power of judgment is precisely a power making possible the mediation of understanding and reason, I demonstrated that what is accomplished by this power in the realm of knowledge is not the possibility of the constitution of the sensible world in order to know it, but the possibility of the interpretation of the given in indifferent ways. This establishment also was an establishment that there is included a necessary aesthetic determination of the unknown aspect of the sensible world even with respect to the domain of understanding, however this determination is not only for knowing.

With respect to the domain of the practical reason, I explained how aesthetic power of judgment takes a role in making possible the interpretation of the world of experience to be open to moral purposes. The moral demand of reaching the highest good is brought about by the practical reason without any regard to the sensible world or the sensibly conditioned nature of the human being, since practical reason's legislation and its determinative power is separated from the understanding with a clear cut. Aesthetic power of the judgment, given above specialties, is discovered as the necessary condition included in the command of the practical reason to realize the highest good in the sensible world and for its legitimacy. The universe of the highest good is a moral universe where there is a necessary relation between being worth to be happy and to be happy. This connection was discussed as to its possibility of being grasped from the perspective of the human being. Aesthetic judgmental power makes possible the interpretation of the sensible world to be amenable to an interpretation such that it is meaningful to seek the highest good. The practical reason was offered to supply a relation to the sensible world as well, when the aesthetic power of judgment is necessarily included in grasping what the moral law as a categorical imperative commands. The moral universe, when it is spontaneously produced by the practical reason, is spontaneously produced by the aesthetic power of judgment with respect to its possibility to be understood as applicable to the sensible world.

To conclude, the thesis offered an interpretation of the power for the unity of reason that Kant pictures within staying in the boundaries of the critical philosophy. It discovered the aesthetic power of judgment as the making the unity possible if and only if it can be a power of expression the necessary harmony between the subject and its world both in knowing act and moral act with respect to the demands and intentions of the reason, provided that it is a mediatory power in between them. Third *Critique* opens a way to interpret that the unity of reason sought to be reached cannot be accomplished unless the reason knows itself. In that case, the determination of the supersensible ground would be a case of knowledge of the identity of reason with this ground. Since this determination is supplied by the power of judgment, the identity with the power of judgment and

reason would be affirmed. On the other hand, it also opens a way to the construal that the question of unity of reason is meaningful only when asked from the perspective of human being and refers to an existential concern. The study tended towards the latter. Since the unity is supplied by the aesthetic power of judgment when the subject becomes aware of itself as the producer of this unity, it becomes aware of its aesthetic subjectivity and it is the common subjectivity that is used in producing the world as possible to know and the world as possible to dwell in for the moral agent.

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