

IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION ON CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS IN
GREECE AND TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION ON CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

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Studying on civil-military relations requires a multi-dimensional approach that analyzes both domestic and external factors. In this study which aims to compare the civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey and to indicate how European Union re-shapes the nature of these relations, the emphasis will be given to two important factors. The domestic factor is democratization processes of the states in question, that depend not only on domestic politics, but also the international environment. The other factor is an external one: the EU as a promoter of democracy through civilianization in politics. The general picture of the nature of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey indicates a parallelism during 1950s and 60s. However, the 1970s, characterized by centrifugal tendencies of states in Cold War conditions as well as the EU accession perspective, has brought about an alteration in the role of military in politics in Greece, whereas Turkey did not do much towards reducing the role of army. Since late 1990s, EU has been the prominent goal in Turkish Foreign Policy. The conditions for membership include democratization through civilianization and declination of military's role in policy making. Making a

projection of how EU will influence civil-military relations in Turkey might be possible in the light of the outcome of this study that utilizes the Greek case as an example.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Civilianization, European Union

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN TÜRKİYE VE YUNANİSTAN'DA SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

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Sivil-asker ilişkileri üzerine çalışmak, iç ve dış faktörleri de analiz eden çok boyutlu bir yaklaşımı gerektirir. Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki sivil-asker ilişkilerini karşılaştırmayı ve AB'nin bu ilişkilerin doğasını nasıl yeniden biçimlendirdiğini göstermeyi amaçlayan bu çalışmada iki önemli faktör vurgulanacaktır. İç faktör, söz konusu ülkelerin demokratikleşme sürecidir. Bu süreç yalnızca iç politikaya bağlı olmayıp aynı zamanda uluslararası ortamdan da etkilenmektedir. Diğer faktör ise dışsaldır; politikada sivilleşme yoluyla demokrasiyi destekleyen Avrupa Birliği. Yunanistan ve Türkiye'de sivil asker ilişkilerinin genel görünümü 1950'ler ve 60'larda paralellik göstermiştir. Ancak, Soğuk Savaş koşullarında merkezkaç eğilimlerle olduğu kadar AB

perspektifi ile de karakterize edilen 1970'lerde, Yunanistan'da politikada ordunun rolü deęişirken Türkiye'de ordunun rolünü azaltma konusunda pek az çaba sarf etmiştir. 1990'ların sonlarından bu yana, AB Türkiye'nin dış politikasındaki öncelikli hedef olmuştur. Üyelik koşulları, sivilleşme yoluyla demokratikleşmeyi ve politika oluşturmada askerin rolünün azaltılmasını da içermektedir. Yunanistan'ı bir örnek olarak ele alan bu çalışmanın neticesinde, AB'nin Türkiye'de sivil-asker ilişkilerini nasıl etkileyeceęi konusunda öngörüde bulunmak mümkün olabilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, Sivilleşme, Avrupa Birlięi

To My Family

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Role of military in politics is an under-debated issue in Turkey. Since the establishment of the republic, Turkish Military has been a privileged and respectful institution, whose influence in politics has never been questioned. The reason behind the unquestionable character of military is its heroic background that brought about public consent for the actions of military, in addition to the comprehensive legal base that provides legitimacy for military's exercises aiming preservation of the regime, which sometimes tend to cast shadow in democratic character of this parliamentary regime.

Today, Turkey has been passing through a phase of transformation in terms of democratization within the framework of European Union accession process. As the promoter of democracy, the Union expects Turkey to take relevant steps that enable civilian oversight over military. Needless to state, these steps are bound to cause further debates and concerns, particularly due to the security-based approach inherent in politics and society. EU accession of Turkey means not only integrating into the club of Western Civilizations; but also evolving from a system based on national security, towards a democracy-based one.

This study aims to explain how EU accession process has influenced civil-military relations in Turkey so far, and to figure out how the picture will look like after the accession. While answering such question, having a glance at experiences of another country whose civil-military relations have undergone a

transformation in the course of EU accession would empower the derivations of this study. In this respect, Greek case is selected as an example, which represents democratization and civilianization in a dramatic sense, in accordance with EU accession. Despite temporal differences and dynamic nature of EU policy on civil-military relations which brought to the fore new criteria to be adopted by candidate countries to satisfy membership criteria; checking experiences of a country with similar security concerns and military influence is deemed to cast a light on Turkish case.

In this study, what challenged the writer the most was fitting up Turkish and Greek cases in a specific theoretical framework. Due to shortcomings of existing theories in terms of explaining civil-military relations, which is a dynamic type of relations depending on time and circumstances, an eclectic approach that gathers selected aspects of specific theories is preferred. Moreover, challenges about gathering data on the nature of military and military actions, which would give important clues about civil-military relations has been another handicap. To be more specific, the challenge has been lack of official data and statistics about the formation of military and military expenditures, which could give idea about some patterns in civil-military relations. Nevertheless, absence of official information as well indicates lack of transparency and accountability of military, which are deemed to be important indicators of lack of democratic control of armed forces and which are evaluated by EU as significant shortcomings.

The issue of civil-military relations is a recent area of concern in EU. Accordingly, EU has not yet developed a road map for the democratic governance of security sector, nor defined the core concepts used in progress reports such as democratic control of armed forces, civilian oversight on military, etc. Finding an official document of the Union, laying down all principles and criteria that describe the ideal form of civil-military relations is

impossible. Hence, the only way to find out the “policy” of EU on civil-military relations is to check all the EU documents issued periodically, like progress reports and accession partnership. Worthy to note, these documents address country-specific problems and lack homogenous implementation in all candidate countries, just like EU’s other areas of concern about which a common policy has not yet been designed.

Despite these handicaps, checking the evolution of civil-military relations in the course of EU accession process in a country where praetorianism has been inherent in politics might give hints of Turkey’s transformation to be experienced. Avoiding from neglecting dynamic nature of politics, unclear policy of EU and military’s pragmatic and changing attitudes according to time and circumstances, this study will try to determine core points of challenges in harmonization phase, and make estimations about Turkey’s future experiences with regard to improvement of civil-military relations.

In the first chapter, the research questions and objectives of this study will be introduced. Having summarized the major points of discussion in literature regarding the topic, the theoretical framework of this study is to be described. The theoretical framework is followed by a chapter that depicts EU “policy” on civil-military relations and discusses the ways in which EU’s position have changed in time and according to different countries. Then comes the third chapter, which deals with the Turkish case. Not only is the evolution of civil-military relations, but also points of divergence with EU norms going to be discussed in this chapter. A brief overview of Greek experience is laid down in chapter four. The concluding chapter makes a comparison between Greek and Turkish cases, in addition to summarizing the outcomes of the study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Turkey's accession to European Union requires adoption of all norms and regulations of different policy areas into national legislation as well as implementation of these new norms in a proper way. Reforms in such sensitive areas will bring about departure from traditional policies, having long-term impacts upon society and politics. Among all these norms, principles, laws and regulations to be harmonized during the process of negotiations, some political areas, which in nature have incompatibilities with European principles, seem to cause harsh debates; given Turkey's sensitivity or special reservations. Civil-military relations are expected to be one of these thorny issues in Turkey's EU membership process, given the incompatibility between two parties' stances.

The purpose of this study is to determine the points of divergence between Turkey and EU as far as civil-military relations are concerned, and to make a prediction about the impact of EU accession on this field. Prior to determining the divergences, description of these two parties' positions on civil-military relations will be made. Examination of whether EU has a well-developed strategy or policy on civil-military relations will be revealed not only by looking at EU legislation or case-law, but also through checking out the Union's stance in a particular case. To make clearer EU's position on the issue, the exemplary case of Greece's accession to European Union will be used. Thus, in the light of EU's expectations from Greece during negotiations, this

case will serve as a tool of figuring out how EU will act during Turkish case; and the final point Turkey will reach after the fulfilment of the criteria. This methodology is based upon the presumptions that EU has standard, concrete and monotone expectations from any accession country; and that Greece is the most convenient exemplary case enabling to figure out the outcomes of Turkey's EU membership. But this presumption will not lead the to negligence of the fact that conditions of EU membership has changed in time; hence the criteria set in the time of Turkey's accession are significantly different from those for Greece, who joined EU in 1981.

Greece and Turkey have similarities in many respects: Firstly, similar geopolitical elements shape not only security perceptions and policies of these countries, but also other areas of policy and political way of thinking of Greek and Turkish citizens. The *strategic position* of these two countries have always been emphasized, since these countries are not only bridges linking East and West; but also have been at the heart of disputes in Cold War: two Western-Block allies sharing borders with the Eastern Block.

Secondly, building a whole mentality based upon *security-led concerns* that obligates security forces to be prudent all the time, namely a potential threat coming from the neighbouring state (Turkey for Greece and vice versa), or Communism (in Cold War years) have also reflected in security policies and military's increased importance within politics and social life. This security-concentrated perception is one of the major aspects that shape patterns in civil-military relation in both countries. Greece and Turkey have perceived threat from, even waged war against each other. This reciprocal perception of threat among these two NATO-allies puts aside a unique factor. Claude Welch hypothesizes that "neighbouring states of relatively equal power, if

characterized by mutual hostility, may expand the armed forces' strength, make them national symbols, and (in the process) enhance their political roles.”¹

Welch states that the wider the sphere of responsibilities civilians and soldiers consider appropriate for the armed forces, the greater the possibility of their active involvement in politics. A trend of widening role of armed forces since 1950 is also indicated by Welch.² His statement is verified as far as Greek and Turkish cases are concerned, as well.

As a third, role of military as an actor contributing to *modernization, nation-building and identity formation* in Greece and Turkey leads to positioning of military as significant actors in these two countries' politics. Pye argues that in newly emerged countries, armies form a sense of citizenship.³ Soldiers' active participation in nation-building process not only makes them one of the prominent important political actors *ex officio*, but also contributes in development of a positive image of military on behalf of the society as a prestigious and respectful institution. According to Welch, if the armed forces are the “most modernized public organization in an underdeveloped country,” their emergence as supreme arbiter of politics should not be unexpected.⁴ Particularly in cases like Turkey and Greece, where independence came with a war and the triumph was achieved thanks to soldiers and military agents; positive image of military is engraved in citizens' memories starting from early years of education, through the pro-military curriculum full of epic expressions that strengthen military's position in people's minds. These educational

¹ C. E. Welch, (ed.), “**Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries**,” Albany, State University of New York Press, 1976, p. 25.

² **Ibid.**, p. 30.

³ Lucian W. Pye, “Aspects of Political Development,” Boston, Little Brown; 1966, p. 182 in C. E. Welch, (ed.), “**Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries**,” Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 30.

⁴ Welch, p. 30.

instruments have another impact upon social perceptions, which is of special concern as far as Turkey and Greece are concerned: the mutual perception of hostility goes far beyond the scope of this study and is subject to another research.

Level of political institutionalism and impact of EU and US are other points where Turkey and Greece display similar characteristics. Until Greece's shift towards a pro-EU path in mid 1970s, these two countries have faced parallel experiences as far as development of political culture, institutionalism and democratization are concerned; mainly due to US-effect and Cold War circumstances. Details regarding this point will be treated in forthcoming chapters.

Existence of such similarities, three of which have been summarized above, should not lead us to think that there is a pure parallelism between Turkey and Greece in terms of political life. There are also different points causing emergence of diverse aspects in civil-military relations in these countries. The role of the King in Greece and concerns about secularism in Turkey are examples of these country-specific aspects which lead to different patterns as far as civil-military relations are concerned. These points will also be analyzed in the next chapter. What I would like to point out here is that similarities between these two countries' political spheres in some particular respects, which enable making comparison, will contribute in reaching testable outcomes with a broader area of generalization.

This study will seek to answer the following questions:

1. What are general patterns in Turkey and Greece in civil-military relations?

2. Does EU have a particular policy in civil-military relations? What does EU expect from an accession country as far as civil-military relations are concerned?
3. How did EU accession effected civil-military relations in Greece?
4. What are the possible impacts of EU accession on civil-military relations in Turkey?

Before answering these questions, laying down main theories on civil-military relations will enable drawing a picture of how debates on this area have evolved and what have been major points of concern in academia. Thus, the background upon which these case studies will be established will be clearer. Having an insight into theories will also serve us in a different manner, since the tools and elements to be used in the course of examining these cases will be derived from these theories.

2.1. THEORIES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: KEY CONCEPTS AND TWO AXIS OF DISCUSSION

Studies on civil-military relations were first conducted in 1950s in a systematic way. During early Cold War years, tendency of these studies was to reach generalizations derived from some patterns of Western Countries, particularly US. The US-focused approach was replaced by another way of thinking in late 1960s, when Perlmutter made taxonomy of civil-military relations in developing countries. The rationale behind the new trend opened by Perlmutter was that military intervention was a problem in underdeveloped countries like Latin American or Middle Eastern ones. Turkey was also among the analyzed cases, owing to 1960 coup. But Turkey has always been positioned in a different place among the underdeveloped countries under praetorian military rule. After a stagnant era in 1980s, when no new research was made, a theoretical awakening was observed in 1990s. The collapse of USSR, emergence of new states with prospective NATO and EU membership goals and the transition issue was the prominent motive that led scholars to make further research. Moreover, the paradigmatic developments in these years, like rise of post modernism, also contributed in the revitalization of studies on civil-military relations.

There are two axis of discussions inherent in all theories of civil-military relations: The first axis answers how civilian supremacy is exercised on military and why military tends to control civilians. Second one deals with typologies of civil-military relations, based on which actor influences politics, and to what extent they exert such power.

As far as these two axis are concerned, multiple theories that evaluate the issues from one dimension are remarked at first look. Indeed, each theory seems plausible in their conceptual frameworks and context; however, some shortcomings are observed when it comes to generalizing the arguments, particularly when applying old theories in new cases. This is why; lack of a “comprehensive theory (...) that encompasses the entire basket of control measures and explains the factors that shape the ongoing process of civilian choices among that basket” was spoken put by Feaver.⁵ Forthcoming paragraphs will conduct main aspects and concepts that civil-military relations theories mention with regard to these two axis of discussion mentioned, while explaining the ways in which civilian supremacy is exercised:

Theories on civil-military relations have emerged due to a central concern of democracy; how to intercept involvement of military in politics. Here, we refer to term democracy as a Western-type one, which seeks to organize a society in which people can preserve their rights and advance their interests in a political system where authorities of state are determined via democratic and free electoral mechanisms. Of course, many aspects exist inside the Western-type democracy definition. Even there is no single, common definition of democracy; there is a consensus on some features of “democracy,” urged by EU. In this type of democracy, civilian oversight over military is one of the prominent elements upon which such consensus exists.

When turned back to what led scholars to see civil-military relations as an area of concern, the paradox between the instrument designed to protect a society (military), and that society itself is remarked.⁶ Peter Feaver argues *civil-military problematic* is visible, where the coercive power to protect interests of

⁵ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” **Armed Forces & Society**, 1996, Vol. 23, No. 2, p.167.

⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 150.

one group poses a threat to that group when gets strong. Civil-military problematic brings about a tension between two concepts: protection by military vs. protection of military; as put by Feaver in such manner: “if a society pursues protection from external enemies, it can bankrupt itself.”⁷ This argument may be interpreted as follows: where protection from external enemies, in other words, security, is the core and sole responsibility of a state, this may lead to negligence of other significant needs of the society, like protection of fundamental rights. For the sake of providing security, whose definition is vague, military forces may tend to exert force over the society, in order to keep their rule and supremacy viable.

This civil-military dilemma appears to be problematic particularly in democratic societies where interests, positions or actions of the society should be respected by groups that represent state’s side. According to democratic theory, even the military has expertise in (security) issues, the power to say the last word remains at civilians.⁸ Elected authorities, elites and other groups such as armed forces representing state authority are nothing but instruments of ensuring benefaction of citizens and should not assert power on the society.⁹

Making military an instrument of providing security for the peace and quiet of society and demoting military to a neutral group without any attempt to deal with political issues is what these theories propose to prevent military interventions. So, it can be stated that treatment of political issues only by civilians in order to come over the dilemma peculiar to civil-military relations

⁷ Peter D. Feaver, “**Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations**,” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 3-6.

⁸ **Idem.**

⁹ Even the state is designed as the sole authority that possess monopoly of use of force; limits and circumstances of using this are clear and exceptional in mature democracies. Assertion of power on decisions and actions of the society is out of the scope of state’s monopoly of use of force.

is the common normative expectation of scholars who built theories in this field.

The same expectation led Samuel Huntington to develop the first comprehensive theory on civil-military relations. His book “Soldier and the State” is still the major reference point for the scholars in this field. Indeed, all theories after that of Huntington are developed based on shortcomings, criticism or verification of his propositions in *Soldier and the State*. This is why putting forward basic points made by Huntington is a convenient point to get started with the examination of theories on civil-military relations.

Professionalism is one of the key concepts used in theories of civil-military relations, since Huntington. Huntington’s formation of an indirect correlation between level of professionalism of soldiers and military interventions is still one of the most popular points of argument among scholars. What he means by professionalization is military’s disengagement from political issues and dealing with strategic and tactical military matters. Huntington states that professionalization of the military is the main method of providing civilian control; where governmental control of the military is achieved, as armed forces accept subordinate roles¹⁰.

Professionalism of soldiers refers to a situation where military officials involve only in military issues and keep themselves away from any political issue that should exist under civilian authorities’ area of activity. According to Huntington, professionalism is the way of preventing military coups and ensuring civilian supremacy through “militarization of military”. Professionalism, for Huntington and his followers, is the key instrument for

¹⁰ Welch, p. 2.

setting up *objective control*; in other words, sterilizing and neutralizing soldiers from political issues.¹¹

Here emerge two other concepts created by Huntington: *Objective* and *subjective control* are two types of civilian control as put by Huntington. His point is “in mature democracies, like those of Europe, armies lead to a non-interventionist tradition” via objective means of civilian control.¹² *Objective civilian control* is argued to be the most convenient form of distribution of authority in political field that ensures professionalism among military officers. By militarizing the military, making them the tool of state, objective civilian control achieves its end.¹³

In contrast with objective civilian control, *subjective control* has a pejorative sense. This type of civilian control politicizes military and makes military an arena of political struggle.¹⁴ By civilianizing the military and making it a mirror (not a tool) of the state, subjective control corrupts the quality of armed forces. The ideal model offered by Huntington is a system in which political sphere formulates the goals and conditions for military operations and soldiers just carry out orders. Thus, both parties don't intervene in each other.

Criticisms of Huntington's theory are concentrated on the question how to achieve civilian control. The forthcoming paragraphs will indicate how different scholars answer how civilian control is to be established upon military.

¹¹ Samuel Huntington, “**The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations**,” Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 38, 39, 71.

¹² **Ibid.**, p. 71.

¹³ **Ibid.**, p. 83.

¹⁴ Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” **Annual Review of Political Sciences**, Vol. II, 1999, p. 227.

To enable civilian control, Morris Janowitz offers formation of *constabulary forces*. This concept refers to a civil police force, which tends to use the minimum level of force and leaving space for more diplomacy.¹⁵ With adoption of constabulary forces, traditional role of the military forces shifts from “warrior” or “heroic” role to a managerial-technical role, and the military profession as a whole becomes similar to a large, bureaucratic, non-military institution; and the military becomes “civilianized”. Larson refers to Janowitzean approach and proposes that due to the changes in technology, society, and the use of force in international relations, it is more appropriate to speak about constabulary forces instead of military forces.¹⁶

The constabulary force concept does not imply a big departure from the past military traditions and experiences, and it supports pragmatic professionalism doctrine. Constabulary force embraces the whole range of military power and organization and it recognizes that there are strategic and tactical dimensions at the each range.¹⁷

Military forces transform into a constabulary force when they are continuously prepared to act, committed to minimum use of force, and support viable international relations instead of

¹⁵ Morris Janowitz, “**The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait**,” Glencoe Ill., Free Press, 1960, p. 418.

¹⁶ A. Larson, “Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations,” **Journal of Political and Military Sociology**, 1974, p. 62.

¹⁷ **Idem.**

seeking victory, because they adopt a protective military posture.¹⁸

In constabulary forces, training and education of the officer corps support civilian supremacy and limited use of initiative within armed forces.¹⁹ But, given the fact that “military mostly regards civilian leaders as unworthy, and they see politics as improved by the military staff whose training they believe to be superior to that of civilians and military professionals are always opposed to the intervention of the politicians in military administration,”²⁰ impact of formation of such acceptance among military in favour of civilian control through education will not be enough to ensure civilian control. It is having a democratic political system what determines the effectiveness of civilian control in a society.

Interest-based approach is also used by some theorists, like Nordlinger, who links professionalism with corporate interest promotion. Eric Nordlinger states military forces tend to institutionalize their *corporate interests*, and corporatism was resulted by professionalism. “Professionalism causes demands for autonomy among military officers and this is followed by their exclusiveness in a rival sense, rather than functional.”²¹ According to him, professionalism contributes in formation of corporate (institutional) identity among officers; which in turn cause emergence of common interests to maintain the military’s strong role and autonomy within the entire socio-political structure. Nordlinger argues interventionist officers’ involvement in

¹⁸ Janowitz, p. 418.

¹⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 419-426.

²⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 249-253.

²¹ Eric Nordlinger, “**Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments**,” Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 47-49.

political issues has nothing to do with low levels of professionalism. The concept he refers to explain military's political effectiveness is *praetorianism*.

Praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. (...) Military officers become praetorians when they threaten to use or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena.”²²

Likewise, in his 1977 work Amos Perlmutter indicates how praetorians act in political arena: “Praetorian soldier identifies military goals, political opinions and national interest.”²³ Perlmutter's approach is important in two respects: first, he replaces the concept of professionalism with praetorianism. He challenges *professionalism's* eligibility to ensure civilian control as a concept. Perlmutter's definition of praetorianism includes military's dominant role in political structures and institutions.²⁴

The professionalism and institutionalization of the military entails the establishment of military colleges, specialized training, the formation of a unified professional group and of a national army. Praetorian conditions are connected with professional military establishments and structures, some of which are institutionalized ahead of concomitant political and socioeconomic structures-political parties, parliaments, a

²² **Ibid.**, p. 2-3.

²³ Amos Perlmutter, “The military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers,” New Heaven and London, Yale University Press, 1977 in Elif Ç. Ülgen, “**Democratic Control of the Military in the Post Cold-War Era: EU Policy – Turkish Response**,” M.A. Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2003, p. 11.

²⁴ Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries,” **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 1, No.3, April 1969, p. 383.

centralized administrative bureaucracy, national authority, middle classes, and a national ideology. Therefore, corporate professionalism is not a guarantee against praetorianism. In fact, in praetorian polities the military interventionists are the professional soldiers, the graduates of the military academies, whose life career is the army.²⁵

Perlmutter is of importance in our study, since he has made classification of civil-military relations with praetorian character, which is still applicable to Turkish and Greek cases.

(...) In view of the general trend toward modernization, it may be said that various types of praetorianism probably represent certain stages of development. At present, praetorianism often appears in states which are in the early and middle stages of modernization and political mobilization. In underdeveloped states, the army is propelled into political action when civilian groups fail to legitimize themselves. The army's presence in civilian affairs indicates the existence of corruption that is not expected to disappear in the near future; that material improvements and ideological perspectives do not match; that traditional institutions are unable to bring about material improvement; and that modernized elites are incapable of establishing political institutions and structures which will sustain the momentum of social mobilization and modernization.²⁶

²⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 384.

²⁶ **Idem.**

Perlmutter classifies civil-military relations in praetorian states in two sub-categories: states with arbitrator praetorian armies, and states with ruler praetorian armies.

The former tends to be more professionally oriented (with a greater emphasis on expertise) and has no independent political organization and little interest in manufacturing a political ideology. The latter has an independent political organization (an instrument for maintaining order) and, in most cases, a fairly coherent and elaborate political ideology.²⁷

The table below gives some distinguishing characteristics of arbitrator and ruler types of armies²⁸:

²⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 392.

²⁸ Table is derived from Perlmutter's study: **Ibid.**, p. 382-404.

Table 1: Taxonomy of Armies

ARBITRATOR-TYPE ARMIES	RULER-TYPE ARMIES
Acceptance of existing social order: existence of an anti-revolutionary ideology	Rejecting existing order and challenging its legitimacy
Willingness to return to the barracks after civilian disputes are settled: having accepted their lack of governing skills, armies' leaving the ground for civilians after exercising their mission of providing order	No confidence in civilian rule and no expectation to return to barracks
No independent political organization and no attempt to maximize army rule	Political organization and tendency to legitimize and maximize army rule
Time limit for the rule of army until an alternative and 'acceptable' regime is established	Conviction that army rule is the only alternative to political disorder
Concern with professionalism: acting in military ethic to prevent involving in political matters that may destroy professional norms	Politicization of professionalism
Tendency to operate from behind the scenes as a pressure group	Operation in the open
Low level of national consciousness	High level of national consciousness
Fear of civilian retribution	Little fear of civilian retribution

In this study, this classification will be used to analyze nature of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey. Even no country will fit in one category with all of its distinguishing features; Perlmutter's model is the best fit to serve making derivations for these cases. Moreover, it is hard to categorize civil-military relations by looking only at this kind of static list of features. Changes in attitudes of military over time and due to conjuncture, domestic and internal factors have always to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this table will serve us examine country-specific cases in a broadly and comprehensive way.

Looking at Greek and Turkish civil-military relations from Perlmutter's perspective reveals that these countries are examples of these two distinct types. Nature of civil-military relations shows parallelism with Perlmutter's definition of arbitrator army. As confirmed by him, arbitrator-type army does not necessarily relinquish its political influence when it returns to the barracks; in fact, in many cases, it acts as guardian of civilian authority and political stability. Such is the essence of the Kemalist legacy in Turkey: the army serves as the guardian of the constitution.²⁹ However, some exercises of military while exerting power on civilians, such as designation of a new constitution that curbs social and political rights, or exemption of former politicians from elections after 1980 coup, gives signals of departure towards a ruler-type character.

When it comes to Greece, it is visible that military's attitude until 1974, which is a breaking point in Greek politics, indicates a ruler-type praetoriansim. As stated above, armies and states are not stable actors and are subjected to change and adopt in amending circumstances. The Greek case will show us how the nature of civil-military relations of a country evolved from a ruler-type of praetorian character towards a democratic civilian supremacy case parallel to liberal democratic states of the developed group of countries.

²⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 392.

Since the country-specific derivations will be made in the following chapter; forthcoming paragraphs will continue with theories of civil-military relations.

A common (or at least prevalent) point upon which many scholars agree is the importance of *institutional element*, which is deemed crucial as far as military effectiveness in any state is concerned. Huntington points out that, military interventions are resulted by lack of political and social institutions which contribute in providing peace and order in domestic political life.³⁰ Perlmutter takes Huntington's approach one step further:

In praetorian states the level of support for political organizations -that is, the number and diversity of the members of such organizations- is low. Thus, the political parties tend to be fragmented, each supported by different social groups which in them-selves are not cohesive. The labour movement is similarly fragmented: each category of worker belongs to a different union, and the unions are distrustful of one another. This phenomenon is a political manifestation of the lack of social cohesion (...) The level of institutionalization -that is, the degree to which political organizations develop their own traditions and the extent to which these organizations act autonomously- is also low in praetorian states. Traditional political institutions, incapable of dealing with social and economic changes, have been eliminated and new institutions are not yet accepted as legitimate. Their legitimacy is often hampered by the degree to which they represent particular interests, because their

³⁰ Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," **Public Administration and Management**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2005, p. 65.

values belong to a small group and are not the autonomous values of the institutions.³¹

His follower, Samuel Edward Finer also takes Huntington's arguments as a reference point and links the institutional aspects with the notion of *political culture*. According to Finer, it is easier for officer corps to play political roles in societies with low political culture, since use of power and threat by military are accepted among the population and soldiers become the sole political force where civilian authority does not exist. In such societies lacking high levels of political culture in demand of civilian supremacy, military intervention provides a more practical method of ruling, rather than electoral politics.³² Finer, while stressing the level of political culture, also points out the direct correlation between political culture of a society and the level of institutionalism.

Hence, there exists a consensus among these scholars upon the following hypothesis: underdeveloped countries suffering from belatedness of democratic transition and lacking political culture are subjected to military supremacy and intervention. But this argument needs to be complemented with other ones, since explaining nature of civil-military relations which possess a dynamic character and tendency to change over time. This is why having a look at recent theories is of importance. Even new theories do not always put a new brick into the literature; they check understudied points of the field, which might be deemed crucial in the recent political and social context.

For example, new generation scholars Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Foster, argue existence of institutions ensuring civilian order is

³¹ Perlmutter, *op.cit.*, p. 389.

³² Samuel Edward Finer, "**The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics**," New York, Preager, 1962, p. 7-70.

important, but not enough to evaluate civil-military relations in a country. Their point is, not only the establishment of relevant structures and institutions enabling democratic governance of security sector; but also the *efficiency* of these institutions in providing democratic governance has to be included in the approach.³³

Following debates on lack or dysfunctionality of civilian institutions, some scholars built their theories upon the impacts of *military institutionalism*. Emphasizing societal and institutional/organizational factors, Morris Janowitz supposes that “*organizational format of armed forces enable intervention, when civilians fail to overcome the fragmented nature of politics.*”³⁴ Military institutionalism is supposed by Peter Feaver as a means of preservation and advancing of military officials’ interests.³⁵

As a scholar who represents the interest-based approach in civil-military relations literature, Eric Nordlinger states that institutions serve as forming and organizing corporate interests of any group. He argues military forces tend to institutionalize their corporate interests. “Having established their institutions, military forces tend interventionist behaviour in politics, in the form of filling in the blanks created by inefficient civilian actors, so as to strengthen their interests through a legitimate phase of interference.”³⁶ His argument takes its roots from Amos Perlmutter’s approach: in this approach, military officers are argued to have a strong motive for intervention in politics, given the corporatist

³³ Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol. 29, No 1, Fall 2002, p. 40.

³⁴ Moris Janowitz, “**The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: a Comparative Analysis**,” Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 32-33.

³⁵ Feaver, “**Armed Servants: Agency...**,” p. 2-4.

³⁶ Nordlinger, p. 63-65.

structure in contemporary military institutions.³⁷ To put differently, military officers form a group identity, set common institutional goals, and develop a common strategy and tools for achieve these identified goals.

Not only the main arguments, but also basic assumptions shaping the Huntingtonian theory were challenged by new political scientists. Huntington's two assumptions, *diversification of political and military grounds* and consideration of a *conflict-based nature of civil-military relations* have been subjected to criticisms since 1960s. The first point made by the critical scholars was Huntington's presumption that civilian and political spheres and actors are clearly separated from each other is not valid for any country. Even the technical decisions made by military may have political repercussions with social implications in long term. Morris Janowitz state that military actions have political and social implications by nature.³⁸

Huntington's another presumption that is subjected to critique is there is a *natural state of conflict between military and civilian spheres*. This tacit assumption is not peculiar to Huntington; many other scholars having followed or even criticized him consider that rivalry, lack of cooperation and co-understanding is the natural situation of civil-military relations.

The path breaking approach with respect to the nature of civil-military relations came from Rebecca Schiff. Her *concordance theory* rejects the separation theories of Huntington, Janowitz and their followers. Her theory argues "dialogue, accommodation and shared values or objective among the military, the political elites, and society" creates a climate in which military is less likely to intervene. Concordance emphasizes agreement among the political elites, the

³⁷ Elif Ç. Ülgen, "**Democratic Control of the Military in the Post Cold-War Era: EU Policy – Turkish Response**," M.A. Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2003, p. 11.

³⁸ Janowitz, *op.cit.*, p. 32

military, and the citizenry on social composition of the officer corps; recruitment method (voluntary or compulsory) political decision-making process, and military style. If there is agreement among the three partners with respect to the four indicators of concordance, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur.³⁹ In Turkish case, a pure separation of military and political spheres is to be rejected, and Schiff's arguments will be considered to be applicable for the times of non-intervention. Indeed, there are times of convergence among military and civilian agents, i.e. upon how to deal with Kurdish issue during 1990s.

Taking Rebecca Schiff's criticisms against Huntington and other scholars who assume conflicting and distinct civilian or military areas one step further, Douglas Bland also anticipated cooperation between these two actors in decision making. Their argument that these civilian and military officials might as well be in a state of cooperation can be used as a valid theoretical scope while analyzing Turkish and Greek cases; particularly for the years when civilians and military collaborated for the establishment of a nation state and national identity. (in 1920s for Turkey and 1820s for Greece) As the leading actors contributing in nation-building and modernizing of the country, soldiers not only cooperate with civilians who voluntarily give this task to armed forces; but also enters in the civilian/political sphere while providing a sense of citizenship and appreciation of political action, in newly established states."⁴⁰

³⁹ Rebecca L Schiff, "Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," **Armed Forces & Society**, Vol. 22, No.1, 1995, p. 9-10.

⁴⁰ Lucian W. Pye, "Aspects of Political Development," Boston, Little Brown, 1966, p. 182 in Claude E. Welch Jr, "Civilian Control of the Military, Myth and Reality," C. E. Welch (ed.), **"Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries,"** Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 30.

Military subordination to civilians is examined by Feaver in a different manner: his *Agency Theory* links Janowitz-led sociological and Huntington-led institutional approach, and puts forward a *principal-agent theory* to explore how superiors control subordinates. This framework is inherited from economists: principal, as the hiring diligent agent, and the agent who works. In this strategic and hierarchical framework; there is supposed to be a social contract in which civilians give military use of force mission and a special status in the society. To make sure agents (military) does not shirk (act in laziness), principal (civilians) cooperate, monitor and/or punish its subordinates. Hence, civil-military relations are considered to be a game of strategic interaction in Feaver's theory.⁴¹ According to him, when the civilians (state) realizes their principal role and puts an oversight over military agents, intervention by the military agents is less likely to occur.

Early theories of civil-military relations have a pure West-focused approach. The US-oriented studies of Huntington, Janowitz and their followers were posited as theories applicable to all cases; but in practice, their applicability were limited to US and some other developed countries of West Block. The paradigms utilized to analyze civil-military relations also did reflect general trends in social sciences in Cold War years when dominance of realist conservative approach was remarkable.

Realist approach has been questioned in academic circles merely after the end of Cold War.⁴² Arise of post positivism and post modernism in social sciences has reflected to the field of civil-military relations, fostering a theoretically rich, interrogative and multi-disciplinary way of analysis. It was a novelty for the field, because the constructivists and others attacked all conceptions like

⁴¹ Feaver, "Armed Servants: Agency....," p. 54-58.

⁴² Anthony Forster, "New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agendas," DCAF Working Paper Series, No. 83, Geneva, August 2002.

national interest, which were not questioned earlier. Giving off the old understanding which has been shaped unconsciously in bipolar world system context was at the heart of this methodological and epistemological awakening. The scope of evaluation has evolved from conceiving social phenomenon in an “us or them?” approach to a multidimensional one, including discourse, transition or democracy-oriented enquiries.

It's in 1980s when scholars broke the West-centred point of view; and started to take civil-military relations as an issue of transition and developing countries. First studies that were conducted in 1980s concentrated on Latin American experience, Latin American armies and role of US in Latin American civil-military relations. For the Central and Eastern European Countries, studies emerged just after the end of Cold War; since transition of these countries has been a new area of concern in political and academic circles. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan are two scholars dealing with *transition to democracy* and *consolidation of democracy*, the two concepts to be referred to in this study, as well. Nil Şatana, a Turkish scholar interprets their studies as follows:

Linz and Stepan claim that democratic transition is complete when a government elected by free and popular vote has the authority to make policies and all parties accept the democratic nature of the regime. Furthermore, Linz and Stepan define democratic consolidation as the point when democracy becomes “the only game in town.”⁴³

⁴³ Nil Şatana, “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” **Armed Forces & Society**, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2008, p. 358.

Nil Şatana is among the scholars dealing with role of civil-military relations in democratization process, including transition and consolidation phases in Turkey. She argues three dimensions of democratic consolidation; constitutional, attitudinal and behavioural, are needed to be fulfilled to suppose a successful democratization. She contends the attitudinal dimension is fulfilled given masses believe in democratic processes; and constitutional dimension is fulfilled due to amendments and reforms in legal structures through EU's efforts. As scholars who studied civil-military relations in Turkey, with an EU and democratization focused perspective; Aylin Güney, Nilüfer Narlı, Metin Heper and Ergun Özbudun agree that Turkey has consolidated democracy as far as constitutional and attitudinal dimensions are concerned. The last dimension, behavioural one, however, poses visible shortcomings.

Having stated that there is need for a behavioural change in (military) elites towards a non-interventionist tradition in developing countries which have not internalized democratic consolidation; Şatana quotes Michael Desch's arguments on the importance of domestic factors.

The military in the advanced democracies of the West was concerned primarily with international threats and neither had time nor interest to deal with the everyday political issues of the country. However, the circumstances are different with developing countries where internal problems overwhelmingly pressure the civilian governments and armed forces are used to counter those issues. Having to deal with both external and internal threats, the military has little choice but to politicize.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ **Ibid.**, p. 386.

Michael Desch's work in 1998 also stresses that the role of external threat is crucial in the determination of military doctrines.⁴⁵ He contends that sound relations between civilians and military occur in countries facing external threat; since military has to engage in this threat coming from outside. On the contrary, existence of an internal threat causes military's tendency to intervene in political sphere, while military power is used in order to settle the disputes.⁴⁶

Scholars focusing on Greek Case also refer to existence of internal and particularly external threats and the way these threats influence nature of civil-military relations. Thanos Veremis, Gerrosimos Karabelias, Constantine Danopoulos always mentioned the impact of threat of communism and potential threat coming from Turkey have contributed in Greek Military's legitimization of over-empowerment and supremacy. But, once the junta regime was collapsed owing to the so-called Turkish threat in 1974, the "external threat" then contributed in civilianization of the country. As far as Greek case is concerned, the special domestic condition affecting nature of civil-military relations is affiliation of soldiers (particularly those of land forces, not the Navy or Air Forces) with right-wing political parties and the King. Xydis, Veremis, Karabelias and Constantine Danopoulos indicate affiliation of Land Forces with political right, in addition to the cleavages among military forces that overlap with the cleavages within the society. This issue will be analyzed in next chapter in a detailed way.

One of the main characteristics of early theories on civil-military relations is having a narrower scope than today's theories in many respects. Reducing

⁴⁵ Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, states and Structures: The End of the Cold war and Weakening US Civilian Control," **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol. 24, No 3, Spring 1998, p. 389-406.

⁴⁶ L Diamond and M.F. Plattner, "**Civil-Military Relations and Democracy**," Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. xiv.

down the issues to be evaluated under the title of civil military relations in terms of actors, indicators of asserting power and ways of intervention is observable in these old theories. To transcend this narrow consideration of civil-military relations, whose character is categorized mainly based on the frequency of coups, Feaver puts forward that there exist diverse mechanisms of intervention by military.⁴⁷ What is called the “power” of military does not refer only to the physical and material capability in terms of army strength; but also the potential of the military, as an elite circle or class, to determine political orientations. In line with this assertion, it should be emphasized that the tools of military efficacy is something more than coups or coup attempts. The ways of intervention of military in politics is not conducted in a narrow understanding, limited to coups. In liberal democracies, several types of influencing politics exist as far as the military is concerned. The determination of the limits of political agenda in a country by military has not as direct effects as coups, but works as a long-term instrument in shaping that country’s political life, as it is in Turkey.

Of course, civil-military relations are not just affiliated with interventions. Amos Perlmutter’s typology of military attitude in praetorian states is useful; but it has to be complemented other forms of military exercise referred in other scholar’s (new) approaches. In this context, reference to *military compliance*, a notion developed by Peter Feaver may be helpful. Military compliance seeks to answer the core question whether civilian or military authorities prevail in a policy dispute.⁴⁸ Answering this core question of who the decision-maker is, is helpful in the sense that it allows observing the frictions and prevailing parties compliance on a per case basis. Applicable in countries in which policy

⁴⁷ Feaver, “**Civil-Military Relations**,” p. 217.

⁴⁸ **Ibid.**, p.218.

disputes among actors are observable in public during decision making process, this concept may be used to examine Turkish and Greek cases.

What is left out of account by many theories is the fact that the term *civilian* does not always overlap with democracy. In USSR for instance, civilian control of army and military is observed. However this situation cannot be defined as a democratic one. Thus, either than civilian control of military, its democratic control is the case. According to Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002), in countries where low levels of preatorianism exists and the military exercises in an apolitical sense (a model favoured by EU), the case is *democratic governance of military institutions* and structures through a tripartite method: the provision of democracy in policy making, parliamentary oversight over military (i.e. accountability and budgetary control of armed forces) and wider participation of civil society in politics. They state that the practice of democratic governance will vary in terms of efficiency depending on the history and political culture of the state. In this study, this tripartite method introduced by their study will be utilized for measuring the level of civil-military relations in democratic sense.

Geoffrey Pridham theorizes the link between democratization and European integration. In his study in 2002⁴⁹, what he argues is that external actors and factors accelerate the consolidation of democracy in several ways. EU, as a regional institutional framework, serves as a promoter of democracy in Greece and Turkey.

⁴⁹ Geoffrey Pridham, "European Integration and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," **Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union 1945-1980s**, Pinto, Antonio Costa and Nunio S. Teixeira (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 183-207.

The EU has both forced and encouraged Turkish politicians to reform civil-military relations. Although democratization has been ongoing since the late 1980s, establishing civilian supremacy was not an agenda item for successive governments or for the public at large. Europeanization provided politicians with powerful leverage. They used the carrot of membership to convince political and societal actors of the necessity for reforms, yet these same reforms stopped before reaching the TAF's most carefully guarded prerogatives.⁵⁰

Having made taxonomy of influences of EU on prospective members, Pridham claims that in Turkish case, conditionality and pressure were used as key mechanisms with respect to democratization during 1980s; whereas the driving force in Greek democratization within EU framework were the elites, like Karamanlis, who had involvement in European Institutions and political figures as well as transnational networks of parties in this country.⁵¹ However, it should be stated that the major factor is the failure of Greek strategy of unification in Cyprus issue.

The instruments of influence, Pridham concludes, do not have implications on the nature of civil-military relations in an eventual, but in a gradual sense. Another conclusion derived from the work of Pridham is that domestic cleavages resulting from economic and short-term challenges might cause departures from democratization; but the risk of inversion could be gotten over with the help of political and economic elites cooperating with European counterparts to ensure liberal democracy represented by EU. Thus, EU serves

⁵⁰ Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No.5, September 2009, p. 808.

⁵¹ **Ibid.**

better to ensure democratization gradually in the phase of democratic consolidation, rather than transition since the elites' role steps in the consolidation process as documented in Geoffrey Pridham's work, which will be among the prominent academic reference points of this study.

Not only Pridham, but also Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) emphasize that the role of European Union's political conditionality tactic works as a contributing factor in reshaping civil-military relations in Central and Eastern European Countries, including Greece. But what they highlight more is the need for re-conceptualization of the relationship between democracy and civil-military relations. The shift from first generation problematic in civil-military relations – narrow problem of controlling military in domestic politics – to democratic management of defence and security policies in a broader conception, second generation problem, is the focal point of their study. The regulation of administrative structures and more participation of civil society in democratic policymaking mechanisms, as authors indicate, are supposed to facilitate the solution of this second generation problem. Needless to state, EU is the main actor and factor behind the regulations in administrative structure and more civilian participation in political life.

Scholars who make case-studies on civil-military relations, democracy and transition in Southern and Eastern Europe,⁵² refer to two main actors leading civilian control: EU and NATO. Indeed, NATO accession of the former USSR Countries requires amendments in nature of military's role in politics. However, in the cases of Turkey and Greece, NATO can not be deemed as the

⁵² See Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster (ed.), "**Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Reviewing the Transition**," NY, Routledge, 2006 and Philip H Fluri, Gustav E. Gustenau, Plamen I. Pantev (ed.), "**The evolution of civil-military relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism**," New York, Heidelberg, 2005.

motive behind civilianization, since NATO membership was realized in Cold War context with predominantly security-related worries, unlike the Central and Eastern European Countries with a Soviet past, perceiving NATO as the door opening to Liberal Western World. Thus, it should be noted that, in Greece and Turkey particularly, accession to European Union, as the symbol of Westernization, democratization and modernization -being the main political goal- is respected as the concrete source of effective impetus behind the boost for civilian primacy.

2.2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Having assumed a positive correlation between democracy, civil-military relations and European Union accession, this thesis argues that EU may contribute in the democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey, by using conditionality as the source of motivation, in line with the democratization process. The second argument of this thesis is about the resemblance of Greece and Turkey, with respect to the outcome of EU accession in the field of civil-military relations. Thirdly, the reasons behind the end of parallelism between Turkey and Greece in terms of civil-military relations are argued to lay behind the changing circumstances in Greek domestic politics and the EU. EU factor, by using certain criteria of democratization, is an important motive behind the dramatic alteration of the nature of civil-military relations in Greece, as it will be for Turkey, too. The changes in domestic factors are (also) arisen by EU and international context; so the external factors urge internal ones to emerge and create transformations in developing countries' political choices, institutions and traditions. In a normative way of thinking, EU is therefore suggested to bring about a transformation in Turkey as far as civil-military relations are concerned.

It is the same normative expectation of civilian actors' supremacy in politics what led to selection of civil-military relations as a research area. This expectation is believed to be accomplished after internalization of sound democratic consolidation process. Democratic consolidation is taken in this thesis with its broadest meaning, including not only adoption of free democratic election applications; but also embracing of all democratic values by elites in a country, being either civilian or military actors.

As far as the first axis of discussion on civil-military relations, namely the way of assuring civilian supremacy is concerned; this thesis will prefer to focus on praetorianism, as put by Perlmutter, instead of Huntington's approach based on professionalism; which seems to be inadequate to explain Turkish and Greek cases. The indirect correlation between the level of professionalism and the tendency of military to intervene can easily be denied when experiences of Turkey and Greece are considered: peak of military professionalism after the entry in NATO, coupled with US aids and trainings for military did not prevent officer corps' intervention in both countries. So, the explanatory concept is something different: a factor that gives the military a motive for intervention, when special conditions arise. That concept is praetorianism, as defined in the theories of Nordlinger and Perlmutter.

The existence of praetorianism is not sufficient enough to explain the military interventions. Since the cases of Turkey and Greece are cases of civil-military relations in democratic societies; power and willingness of military is not enough to pursue control or oversight on civilian actors. There should also be legitimacy of military interventions, which provides consent of the society; so that the military positions itself as a reliable, legitimate and powerful actor with capacity, legitimacy and right (or obligation) of maintaining the national interests. This means if military poses control over civilians in a democratic system, there has to be legal and social bases for utilizing the tools of control; which are ensured not only by laws and regulations, but also by the general belief and trust among citizens on military's right and power to provide public order. Thus, notion of praetorianism is to be complemented in this thesis by two concepts - legitimacy and consent - in order to explain civil-military relations and military interventions in democratic systems. If there is no legitimacy or consent of public, military is less likely to pursue its rule, in a democratic society. The dimension of legitimacy and citizens' approval for the military's intervention in politics (not only in the form of coups, but also

memorandums, declarations and other tools of interventions) are going to be respected as an important factors that determine the extent to which military exercises and pursues control in political sphere.

Legitimacy of military interventions is often provided by military's default obligation of preserving national security and public order. In democratic states where rule of law is respected, this obligation is codified in national laws and regulations. Legal provisions that enable armies to intervene in politics are sometimes interpreted in a broad sense. In other words, by securitizing some problems, i.e. by pointing out the riotous times that a country pass through as a ground for intervention, military can easily legitimize and rationalize its involvement in political sphere. Justification and legitimization are two important components of any intervention; so as to render the military influence necessary and viable. In this study, having inspired from the Gramscian hegemony theories, grounds of justification and legitimization of any military intervention is to be indicated; and a positive correlation is to be established between the consent of society and the viability of military rule.

Legitimization of soldiers' involvement in politics is provided not only based on public benefit or the good of the community. Sometimes, (potential) loss of reputation of military as an institution or a class is another important reason for any intervention, since military wishes to remain as one of the most respectful, strong and reliable institutions in a country. If soldiers foresee curtailment of their respectful position; this might create among officers a sensitivity and need for reminding people about military's reputation, which may result in an intervention, being in the form of a memorandum, declaration, or a coup. However, preservation of "institutional pride" can not be treated as a major motive behind any military coup. This may only be one of the reasons, in addition to other reasons associated with the public benefit.

Like reputation of military, a broader concern, institutional interests of military, can be deemed important, while explaining the reasons behind military interventions. As military evolves from a newly established tool of state towards a strong institution vested with use of force, exemption from accountability in financial terms, or more autonomy compared to other public institutions; corporate interests of military becomes more important. In time, once a respectful and privileged status is attained, military obtains the power (and sometimes right) to maintain its corporate interests, or privileged status. This is why, preservation of corporate interests and dignity is going to be taken as important factors that can explain the motive behind an intervention, like that of 1960 in Turkey.

An important point to note is lack of a stable and monotone “common interest” among military officers all the time. Like any other institution, in military, “common interest” is also subject to change in time, according to changing circumstances. Moreover, inner fragmentations may disable military to identify a single institutional interest. So, it has to be borne in mind that there are periods when there is no shared values or interests among all officers, or among different departments of armed forces, like navy or air forces. Lack of shared objectives and interests among different segments of military institution is one of the causes of counter coups or failed attempts of coups. Hence, existence or lack of a common interest within the military can be used as an explanatory factor when evaluating the success of a military intervention. Accordingly, when there are defined corporate interests and consensus over basic policy issues, the likelihood of a successful intervention (which achieves to take control of ideological state apparatus and public administration) is higher.

It should also be noted that civilian control of military is including a democratic practice of civilian oversight of military, as put in the literature by

Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, and promoted by Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.⁵³ Indicators of democratic governance of civil-military relations are accountability of military institutions and actors towards civilian authorities, openness of budgetary and financial control of the military, constitutional provisions on military's role. These indicators may also help to derive conclusions about nature of civil-military relations, extend to which military determines the scope of politics, exercises in decision making procedures and prevails in any political debate. In other words, roles of military in terms of agenda-making, identity-formation or national interest definition is going to be used as benchmarking tools to describe and categorize civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey.

Some scholars, like John Johnson, argue the social background of officer corps or class identity is determinant in military interventions. In his opinion, an army that is comprised of middle-class soldiers tend to have a modernizer and patriotic approach; and this reflects to civil-military relations. However, class-based research on Turkish officers indicates social background can not be an explanatory component to be used while analyzing civil-military relations. In Turkey, military officers come from diverse social and economic backgrounds; which also points out that Turkish military is neither elitist nor discriminative. The social profiles of soldiers in each sub-department of military, or between officers and petty officers, are diverse enough to disable a researcher to derive deductions solely by looking at this component. Moreover, the educational and formal programme of military creates a common institutional ideology and behavioural settings among officers; then it prevails against soldiers' past ideology of beliefs affiliated with their socio-economic backgrounds. For this reason, the socio-economic background of soldiers is not going to be treated as

⁵³ DCAF is the abbreviation of Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, which works in the field of security sector reform.

an explanatory factor in this thesis. As stated by Edwin Leuwen, affiliation of soldiers to their military institution is so high that they no longer feel loyal to their cultural past and socio economic background. The institutional settings that define a new system of beliefs replace all former ideas and attitudes; while helping creation of a common sense and shared values among officers.⁵⁴

When it comes to the second axis of discussion, defining the type or nature of civil-military relations in Turkey and Greece, Amos Perlmutter's theory is going to be referred once again. Categorization of nature of civil-military relations is going to be made in line with Perlmutter's taxonomy, with the assumption that Greece and Turkey possess two distinct types of praetorian states before EU accession. Turkish civil-military relations seem to be an example of arbitrator-type; whereas pre-1974 Greece shows features of a ruler-type praetorian state. As figured in Table 1, there exist several benchmarks which allow scholars to determine whether a military is ruler-type praetorian or an arbitrator-type one. Perlmutter implies existence of an arbitrator-type in Turkey; and his argument is to be justified by reviewing the benchmark points and the change of military's character in time, due to changes in some of those benchmarks. Greek case after collapse of Junta Regime in 1974 indicates an evolution towards a non-praetorian country. The same impact is foreseen to take place in Turkey, in an incremental way, as soon as new reforms in laws and regulations are adopted in line with EU norms.

To see whether this impact is going to be experienced in Turkey, three questions, what happened in Turkey so far, what EU expects from an accession country, and what happened in Greece should be answered. Next chapters deal with these questions, within the conceptual and theoretical framework summarized above.

⁵⁴ Edwin Leuwen, "**Generals Versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America,**" Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967, p. 123.

2.3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM A EUROPEAN STANDPOINT

Since its establishment, EU has pronounced civil-military relations as an area of concern, particularly for candidate states. Democratic control of armed forces and civilian oversight of security are two concepts that have been used in EU Progress Reports and other decisions of EU bodies, whereas a clear definition of both are absent in these documents. Inclusion of democratic control of armed forces into EU agenda is mainly due to the collapse of Soviet Bloc and emergence of numerous states in Central and Eastern Europe which were to pass through a democratic transition process. Additionally, the evolution and broadening of the scope of democracy as a basic principle of European Union has been another trend that explains rising significance of civil-military relations in Europe.

EU's understanding of civil-military relations is a broad one that refers to OSCE and NATO principles and norms. Accepting a set of international norms about the role of military in politics and military-society relations indirectly, non-involvement of officers in domestic policy issues as well as military's subordination to civilian and democratically elected bodies are two key principles EU accepts and expects from any candidate state to adopt and implement.

EU has not yet developed a clear policy on civil-military relations. Although adopted in principle and mentioned in various documents superficially, there is no single document that defines the benchmarks of democratic governance of security sector, or civilian oversight over military. Hence, checking what is mentioned in each document about the issue and making derivations from the

accumulation of these statements is the only way to understand EU's position about civil-military relations. Before going through these documents, a general assessment about how European Union approached the issue might be made:

Military's role in politics has direct links with democratization and democratic governance, whereas security policy is another area having an indirect relationship with this issue. In line with the focus of this study, the first sphere is to be emphasized, so civil-military relations are to be linked in a larger extent with EU's rules and principles on democracy. As stated earlier, sound civil-military relations have not been emphasized in primary law of EU as a pattern of democracy to be harmonized among member states or to be promoted towards candidate states. However, position of European Community towards Turkey and Greece during military rule (that of 1967 in Greece and 1980 in Turkey) indicates that the Community had no approval for military regime and infringement of civilian supremacy. Freezing of relations with Greece and suspending financial aid for Greek government in the course of junta regime prove EU's discontent with military rule in a candidate or associate country.

The Central and Eastern Europe Countries were to access in NATO and EU together. This is why, following the end of Cold War, transition of former Soviet Countries to democracy was handled by NATO, regarding particularly civil-military relations. The Partnership for Peace Programme of NATO introduced a plan to assist these countries' transition from communism to a democratic liberal system, where respect for civilian supremacy was one of the priorities. Parliamentary oversight, transparency in budgetary terms and accountability towards civilians has been the key benchmarks of democratic civil-military relations for a country to accede in NATO and EU. International human rights principles and *jus cogens* rules of international law as well as

principles Helsinki Final Act were also expected to be fulfilled by NATO and EU members-to-be.

Having obtained the status of full member in 1981, Greece did not have a list of measures to adopt, in order to have eligibility for EU accession. What Greece had to prove was military's refraining from politics after their long rule, and adoption of democracy in elections. Greece did well to fulfil the latter, having included all parties, including Communist ones in elections, and having had leftist governments with a long term electoral success. Limitation of military's role with defence issues, and sustainability of civilian supremacy after 1974 provided the consent of EU. Hence, Greece had been successful in democratic transition and consolidation of democracy, in a period when EU's principles were not as complicated as today, particularly in the field of civil-military relations.

As a member of NATO and candidate for EU, Turkey poses a unique case. For Turkey, the rules for civilian oversight on military are hidden in accession partnership and progress reports. Instead of being common rules, these documents contain comments of European side on specific implementations in the country in question, on per case base. Thus, it can be stated that the goal is mentioned clearly, although the ways of achieving this objective is more or less left to candidate country's exercises. The EU rather evaluates the steps taken by candidate country to achieve this objective, and mentions points of divergence from European norms.

The ultimate aim set by EU after 1980s is a more comprehensive one: "security sector reform" that covers not only armed forces, but also police, border-guards, intelligence agencies. Civil-military relations, the relations between military bodies, government, and society as a whole, lie at the core of this comprehensive objective. The political aspects of Copenhagen Criteria,

implying the fulfilment of democracy, are expected to be adopted by any prospective member, to open negotiations as a candidate state. Turkey, who has already obtained the status of candidate state in Helsinki Summit in 1999, is assumed to satisfy these criteria. However, Turkey has much to do in order to reach EU's standards and expectations. The expectations stated by European Union are summarized in the forthcoming paragraphs.

The 1998 Regular Report pointed out 'lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for concern' and cited in this connection 'the major role played by the army in political life through the National Security Council'.⁵⁵ Regular Report of 2000 went further and referred to OSCE and NATO standards and pointed out divergence of Turkish exercise: 'instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister'. Same document continued that "the Council of Higher Education (...) as well as the Higher Education Supervisory Board includes one member selected by the Chief of General Staff."⁵⁶

In 2001's Accession Partnership⁵⁷ "aligning the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States" was set as a medium-term

⁵⁵ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 1998, p.21. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf, accessed on: 3 April 2009.

⁵⁶ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 2000, p.12. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf , accessed on: 3 April 2009.

⁵⁷ Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, 2001. <http://europa.eu/old-address.htm?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32001D0235&model=guichett>, accessed on: 17 March 2009.

priority. Noting Turkey's efforts to comply with EU standards in civil-military relations ground, Regular Report of 2001 highlighted that the extent to which these steps would 'enhance de facto civilian control' would have to be monitored.⁵⁸

Underlining importance of implementation of adopted regulations in practice, Report of 2002 pointed out the budgetary control of defence and military, as well as role of military in broadcasting:

The role of the NSC in the High Audio Visual Board has been strengthened as a result of the law on broadcasting (RTÜK), which was re-adopted by Parliament following a veto by the President and is currently pending before the Constitutional Court. The Armed Forces enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy in establishing the defence budget. Details of the military budget have been made public via the press. There are still two extra-budgetary funds available to the military in spite of the efforts of the Government to close such funds and make such expenditure subject to normal budgetary procedures. The NSC has continued to be an important factor in domestic politics. The introduction of a civilian majority of members and the limitation to an advisory role, in line with the Accession Partnership priority, does not appear to have changed the way the NSC operates in

⁵⁸ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 2001, p.19. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf, accessed on: 3 April 2009.

practice. Although decisions are taken by majority, opinions of its military members continue to carry great weight.⁵⁹

Welcoming Turkey's reforms undertaken after 2002 report, report of 2003 highlighted existence of some off-budget funds that escape scrutiny and called for parliamentary control on budgetary control and auditing.⁶⁰ Following this report, radical measures were taken to provide for inclusion of hitherto extra-budgetary funds in the defence ministry's budget, to redefine, limit and civilianize the role of NSC, to disable General Staff to select a member of the High Education Board and to abolish State Security Courts. In 2004, when Turkey was agreed to fully obey Copenhagen Criteria and given a date to open negotiations with EU, tone of Regular Report was soft. However, no constructive guidance on correction had been forthcoming.⁶¹ Indeed, "it has not always been apparent which reforms the EU considers desirable and which it regards as essential."⁶²

2005's Progress Report was more constructive since it welcomed relevant amendments and implementations. The Report of 2005 spelled out the active role of military, though: declarations ore speeches of General Staff on diverse policy matters and wide margin of manoeuvre of military, based on the Turkish

⁵⁹ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 2002, p.25. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf, accessed on: 3 April 2009.

⁶⁰ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, 2003, p.16. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf, accessed on: 3 April 2009.

⁶¹ Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey, Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence, Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), the Netherlands, in co-operation with the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), Final Expert Report, Nov. 2005, p.11.

⁶² **Idem.**

Armed Forces Internal Service Law were the two points of criticism. Furthermore, call for increasing the control of Ministry of Interior over gendarmerie was stated in the same text.⁶³ Those criticisms were repeated in 2006 and 2007 progress reports, which also mentioned need for sound implementation.⁶⁴ These two reports called for amendment in Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and enabling civilian jurisdiction for military personnel.⁶⁵

The latest Accession Partnership Document⁶⁶ set the civilian oversight over security forces as a short term priority to be fulfilled within 1-2 years. According to the document, Turkey's obligations are:

- Strengthening efforts to align civilian control of the military in line with the practice in EU Member States. Ensuring that the military does not intervene in political issues and that civilian authorities fully exercise supervisory functions on security matters, including as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation,
- Taking steps towards bringing about greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs,

⁶³ 2005 Progress Report, Turkey, 2005, p.14-15.

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf, accessed on: 4 April 2009.

⁶⁴ 2006 Progress Report, Turkey 2006, p. 6-7.

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key.../2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf, accessed on: 4 April 2009.

⁶⁵ 2007 Progress Report, Turkey, 2007, p. 8-9.

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf accessed on: 4 April 2009.

⁶⁶ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:01:EN:HTML> accessed on: 4 April 2009.

- Establishing full parliamentary oversight of military and defence policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit.

In the following section on the “judicial system”, the EU demands strengthening the efficiency of the judiciary through, in particular, reinforcing its institutional capacity and adopting a new code of civil procedure. Harmonization attempts in this ground are expected to complement the measures defined above.

Parallel to the Accession Partnership, National Programme of Turkey, dated 2008, lists the priority areas as follows:

The role of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body has been redefined with the amendments on the Constitution and the related laws. The effective implementation of these reforms realized and in this framework, preparation of national security strategy and its implementation under the responsibility of the Government will continue. In accordance with the amended Article 160 of the Constitution, all incomes, expenditures and state properties of Turkish Armed Forces is subject to the audit of Court of Audits. New Draft Law on Court of Audits, prepared in the previous legislative period, includes two articles in order to fulfil all the technical regulations related to its implementation. As a part of Judicial Reform Strategy that will be prepared in line with the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, the regulations

related to the definition of tasks and competences of the military courts will also continue.⁶⁷

So far, declarations of high rank military officers through media or internet about daily policy matters continue to be the most criticized issues regarding civil-military relations. Reforms on judicial exercises on military is expected to be welcomed in forthcoming reports, which will have provisions calling for sound implementation of civilian oversight, transparency, accountability.

⁶⁷ 2008, National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42260&l=2> , accessed on: 4 April 2009.

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

As providers of security, armies are vested with the obligation and right of monitoring and punishing, which includes use of force and detection of daily life. In countries where security concerns are prominent, the strictness of military education and professional discipline that instructs ways of using the punishment and monitoring mechanism is much more visible. As a country in which security concerns led military to have a proactive role, Turkey poses such an example, where military service is obligatory, military education is tight and value system of military as a bureaucratic organization is strong. Like any bureaucratic organization, Turkish Armed Forces has its own shared values and interests that not only provide a sense of corporate unity among officers, but also reflect upon soldiers' relations with the state and society.

In democratic societies, it is state who vests specific institutions with specific roles and obligations. According to state, role of military in this regime is identified as providing public order. In Turkey, where security concerns are inherent in politics due to conjuncture and geographical location, military's oversight (and sometimes control) on the regime is adopted and assured via

laws and regulations. This regime is defined by Hikmet Özdemir as *national security regime*.⁶⁸

Turkish military has a profile of a closed group having a strong level of self-consciousness and confidence, which tends to evolve in a feeling of superiority over civilians and political actors, who are deemed unreliable and relatively inferior.⁶⁹ This common understanding takes its roots from the saviour and modernizer role, rooted in nineteenth century. As grounds for public support and legitimacy pointed to military have settled in and mounted up in Republican era, the superiority and oversight of military on civilian sphere became more immanent. To see the roots of the role of military within the regime, looking back late Ottoman Era might be enlightening, since political culture and conditions of those years reveal the rationale behind the role played by soldiers in modern Turkey.

⁶⁸ Hikmet Özdemir, “**Rejim ve Asker,**” İstanbul, İz Yayıncılık, 1989, p. 17-26.

⁶⁹ Levent Ünsaldı, “**Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset,**” İstanbul, Kitap Yayınları, 2008, **passim**.

3.1. FROM LATE OTTOMAN ERA TO REPUBLIC: LEGACY OF PREVIOUS REGIME

Under the rule of Ottoman Empire, the prominent ground where concrete measures in modernization were taken was the military. Modernization of army and introduction of a modern military school paved the way for a general perception of military officers as a contemporary group who lead modernization of the whole society. From 1800s onwards, military schools have been the units where modernist and nationalist ideas were cultivated. This trend continued in early republican era; and the military has been promoter of the values of new ideology. Aylin Güney and Metin Heper agrees that military has been both object and subject of modernization in nineteenth century. Officers trained within Western-type education system in order to be defenders of central authority of the Empire, have transformed into defenders of further modernization and Republican ideas in the end.⁷⁰ Hence, it might be stated that the common belief among soldiers on their supremacy and leadership, as far as modernization and social improvement are concerned, takes its roots from the nineteenth century.

The tradition, knowledge and experiences from past domestic and external struggles had passed on to the army of the Republic is because the largest part of the Ottoman officer corps became the nucleus of the Turkish Armed Forces. The legacy inherited from late periods of Ottoman Administration, which inseminated a modernist and rationalist perspective in military officers' minds, were coupled with the heroic attributions subjected to military in the years of

⁷⁰ Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," **Armed Forces & Society**, Summer 1996, Vol. 22, Issue 4, p. 627.

Independence War. Turkish military bureaucratic class became the most powerful interest group with political aspirations after the defeat of the Greeks. Victory in the War of Independence did not only mean the preservation of military pride, which was under threat due to defeats in Balkan Wars and First World War. Above all, the victory also created a positive image of heroic saviours of the nation.

In 1920, military was among the major players who contributed in the implementation of Ataturk's Reforms, as well as promoting Ataturk's principles to the citizens. Moreover, key ministries like defence, transportation or internal affairs were assigned to former high-rank officers. Not only in the formation of the state, but also during the designation and entrenchment of the ideology in patriot citizens' minds, was military's role indispensable. Soldiers were the prominent allies of republican cadres, with their role of securing the regime and settling sense of citizenship and nation-building. But first, the soldiers needed to pass through a national identification process.

The nationalist ideas and ideology would be imposed to the society by soldiers, who had also passed through the identity-building phase: high rank officers engraved the military ethos and self-identity in progressive soldiers' minds. In sum, the idea imposed was "every Turk is born as soldier, whose role is to take Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations, having possessed the right to detect politics, as professional members of an elite organization (Armed Forces)".

3.1.1. Military Service as an Obligation and Professionalism: a brief overview

In this context, adoption of obligatory military service is worthy to note. Considering the fact that the nation was surrounded by enemies until independence and that the country had nothing but the military to be save

people from external threat, the military should always be on alert and strong physically and morally, which could be ensured through obligatory military service and professionalization.

Premier function of compulsory military service is to install nationalist ideas and provide a (minimum) system of values that any Turkish citizen should have.⁷¹ Secondly, to invest in human capital of military through raising soldiers who are ready to be used while maintaining peace and order and in case of any conflict. Discipline and strict education is key to render soldiers and the military strong and prudent. On the other hand, military is a household where character of soldiers are reshaped: it helps male citizens to get acquainted with (minimum) virtues and capabilities in an environment where same rules are applied on all soldiers, regardless of class, social base or family. Apart from providing a sense of solidarity, military service serves as a capacity building institution particularly for illiterate and disadvantaged groups of the society. Acting as teachers and symbols of a virtuous citizen, the “father” figured commanders not only contribute in the personal development of young males, but also settle the image of a military officer, who is strong and wise. This positive image of superior commander reflects to the general image of military officers: a privileged group of wise people with uniforms, enjoying relative autonomy and the right to intervene in politics, for the sake of ensuring public order.

What is worthy to note about Turkish military is that it did not stay far from politics, as it is professionalized, like Huntington mentioned. Proof to the contrary, professionalism provided military a broader area of manoeuvre, in addition to a legitimate framework of legitimate autonomy and supra-civilian character that enabled soldiers to intervene in politics. But, it should be pointed out that, military’s right and tendency to intervene in politics can not be

⁷¹ Ünsaldı, p. 157-160.

interpreted that military has always acted against civilians or politicians and that there has always been opposition between governments and officer corps. In fact, times of alliance or parallelism among civilians and military have been experienced in many times. The first example of this accommodation is the years of Independence War and establishment of the new regime.

3.2. EARLY REPUBLICAN YEARS: TOWARDS MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

The season of alliance and accommodation among Ataturk, military officers and the civilian bureaucracy did not last long, however. Following 1923, common goal of establishing the new state has already been achieved, but since the reforms were not adopted and internalized by everyone, opposition arose. In the opponent group, there existed high-rank officers; who were counteracted in three steps⁷²: First step was a regulation in 1924, which made officer-politicians to choose between politics or military profession. The second step targeted those who chose politics: closing down the opposition party. Last step was to attempt to arrest some former-military officers, like General Karabekir, Cebesoy and Bele.⁷³ However, these steps should not be perceived as measures taken against the entire military. The aim was to protect the newly-established regime and order, which was sensitive to inner-oppositions and which needed a monist approach in order to survive.

Following these legal measures, the military was far from being a player acting against civilian leaders; it was rather supportive towards the establishment and conservation of principles of the new regime. The early republican period has characteristics of a civilian rule, coupled with military partnership and influence. Although the borders between military and civilian spheres were not clear, Ataturk's rule gave signals of the nature of civil-military relations to be pursued in the following years: supremacy would remain in civilians' hands; military would prevail over civilians only for protecting the regime and public

⁷² Ünsaldı, p.46.

⁷³ Ahmet Turan Alkan, "İstiklal Mahkemeleri," İstanbul, Ufuk Yayınları, 1993, p. 104.

order. Once the order is established, military would leave the ground for civilians.

3.3. RISE OF DEMOCRAT PARTY AND ROOTS OF FIRST INTERVENTION

In 1940s, when local bourgeoisie has already been created and newly emerged entrepreneurs sought for liberal regulations; opposition within the Republican People Party (RPP) formed Democrat Party. This new political party was at first supported by young military officers, with libertarian aspirations and the expectation of further military reform which would modernize the military. But, in time, the positive attitude towards the Party was replaced with disputes within military: the polarization between DP supporters and Republicans in military (and the whole society) became visible, particularly in 1950s.

In 1950, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes initiated an unprecedented elimination campaign in the military: more than 100 high-rank officers were retired; whereas pro-DP generals were assigned to key positions. This policy aimed to keep high-rank military officers close and under control of the ruling Party. Due to this radical alteration in military cadres, hierarchy was disorganized.⁷⁴ Worthy to note, young officers were not in favour of the ruling party, and this led to a distance between generals and low-ranked soldiers, who supported DP. One of the main reasons behind young officer's opposition was the progressive and modernist aspirations of this group, stimulated by Korean experience: those who were trained in NATO base and witnessed utilization of modern military tools, started to complain about limited material strength of military, lack of high technologies and modern instruments, as well as Turkish Military's dependence on foreign powers. The modernist aspirations of young officers opposed conservative high-rank generals who cooperated with the

⁷⁴ Doğan Akyaz, "Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi," İstanbul, İletişim, 2002, p. 59-62.

ruling party.⁷⁵ In time, DP's concessions from laïcité, like supporting associations for the construction of mosques and including "religion" courses in curricula, has been evaluated among young officers as an attempt to overthrow Kemalist principles such as secularism. Given soldiers' sensitivity towards secularism, falling from grace was inevitable for Democrat Party.

⁷⁵ Ünsaldı, p. 63.

3.4. FIRST INTERVENTION: MAY 27th, 1960

The reasons summarized above are factors which “invited” the military to take an action to re-establish the order in line with Ataturk’s principles. On the road to coup, worsening economic situation, fundamentalist actions of government, repression of fundamental rights were followed by a radical step: increasing dialogue between Turkey and Soviet Russia. This was not pleasant for USA and public which has a pejorative understanding of Soviet Bloc and communism, in the peak of Cold War years. In an environment where citizens’ support for government declined, main principles upon which the regime was established were under threat and US-support for ruling party was about to disappear, all factors were convenient and legitimate for a military intervention. Moreover, the loss of purchase power of soldiers, even in economic growth years created a common opposition among military against DP. In sum, Menderes’ policies that caused loss of life standards of military officers, lack of sound governance and end of US-support have been resulted with a coup, held by young officers on 1960’s 27 May.

The military’s declaration⁷⁶ underlined that the military rule had been temporary, military’s approach had transcended the parties and civilian rule would have been launched when public order had been re-established as soon as possible. Another remarkable point emphasized in this declaration was military regime’s commitment to Turkey’s allies, NATO and CENTO. This statement indicates military’s desire to pursue good relations with USA in Cold War context. In USA’s side, 1960 coup did not create surprise. Although there

⁷⁶ Talat Turhan, “27 Mayıs 1960’tan 28 Şubat 1997’ye, Devrimci Bir Kurmay Subayın Etkinlikleri,” İstanbul, Sorun Yayınları, 2001, p. 401-403.

are allegations of US-existence during the planning and exercise of the coup, there is no evidence proofing this argument.⁷⁷ However, it is possible that US was aware of the coup in advance, and did not take any action to prevent it. Passive stance of US towards the coup against DP, which had very close relations and commitment to US in the first years of their rule, can be explained with the Party's attempts for ameliorating relations with USSR. In time, the young Turkish officers trained in US-system in Cold War conditions became the preferred allies of USA. Accordingly, the young officers acted in line with interests of USA.⁷⁸

Support for coup among intelligentsia and public was high, since repression by government and economic challenges became more visible after 1956. Thus, the military gained legitimacy and consent of the public, as a result of a repressive political climate that invited the military intervention. With its material power, public support and approval of US, Junta initiated an unprecedented elimination process in the military. 3381 high rank officers and 255 generals, who were associated with DP government, were retired.⁷⁹ Aim of this elimination was to prevent a future fragmentation, which was believed to harm the military institution.

In line with the republican approach, having Ataturk's principles as a guide for progress, the National Union Committee (the nucleus of the team that exercised the coup) launched a series of laws and regulations, which is still defined to be the most libertarian and reformist legal amendments of Turkey. Autonomy of universities, social and syndical rights, as well as other fundamental rights were adopted in the new constitution of 1961. An important aspect of this new

⁷⁷ Çetin Yetkin, "Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika," Antalya, Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007, p. 89.

⁷⁸ **Idem.**

⁷⁹ Ünsaldı, p.71.

constitution was its provisions that aimed to decrease the power of government (executive). These provisions would be criticized by rightist parties in the following years.

On the way to coup, what unified the interventionist segments of military was their common opposition to DP. After the coup, however, disputes about how to go on occurred. The ambivalence between those who were in favour of a short-term military regime and early democratic parliamentary elections (moderates) and the fundamentalists whose idea was to launch further reforms in a longer military regime period ended up with an intra-military operation. The interventionist fundamentalists were eliminated from military suddenly, with the aim of preventing another coup. After the elimination of these 14 officers, a homogenous committee took the floor in November 1960. However, shadow of a further coup stayed alive, until Talat Aydemir, head of Military Schools and organizer of further coups, was retired and his inferiors were banished from military profession. Talat Aydemir was punished with death penalty in 1964.

3.5. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEW CONSTITUTION: ROAD TO MARCH 12

The reforms and liberal environment created after 1961 were started to be questioned, when masses were politicized in following years. On the one hand, there were leftist sectors of the society and military; on the other, rightists who sought to preserve public order against “over-politicization” of society and anarchy. Appointment of a rightist chief of general staff gave signals of rise of right and end of the parallelism between the military and Republican People’s Party, which was one of the winners of 1960 coup. This trend peaked with the rule of right-wing Justice Party, which is deemed as DP’s heir.

Strategy of Justice Party in its relations with military was different from that of DP.⁸⁰ Having taken a lesson from DP’s experience, its successor preferred to gain approval and legitimacy of military, by avoiding from criticizing the post-1960 order. To that effect, another strategy has been introduced: ending the affiliation of RPP with military. The rationale of this strategy was to weaken Republicans by eliminating the existing harmony between the two.⁸¹

In 1969, when leftist aspirations of masses were spoken out loudly, Justice Party and military were sharing the same idea: rising social movements had to be stabilized and libertarian character of 1961 regulations had to be curved in order to prevent society from getting more radicalized. In line with this idea, another military intervention that targeted the outcomes of 1960 coup was staged. Military’s memorandum in 1971 did not only target the segments of

⁸⁰ Ümit Cizre Sakallıođlu, “AP Ordu İlişkileri, Bir İkilemin Anatomisi,” İstanbul, İletişim, 1993, p. 102-103.

⁸¹ Ünsaldı, p.81.

society associated with leftist activities; but also the pro-left officers in the military. In fact, the overall objective was to prevent a deeper inner fragmentation within the military, and to provide a common minimum level of agreement. This is why, 1971 memorandum may be defined to be a regulatory intervention, which created ground for consensus between the two poles of military. Meanwhile, the government and civilians were invited to provide public order by maintaining Atatürk's principles and socio-economic reforms.

It is remarkable that the 1971 intervention has an ambiguous character: being against the outcomes of 1960 coup on one hand, and asking for reforms in line with 1961 constitution, to solidify the public order, on the other. Proofreading of 1971 memorandum reveals its vague character, as well: it calls for adoption of socio-economic reforms initiated in 1961, whereas asking the execution to sort out the groups who were responsible from the rising "anarchy". The spirit of the text and the developments before the declaration of memorandum indicate that the extensive freedom and rights granted to civilians by 1961 order, which paved the way for social unrest and anarchy, "invited" an intervention from military. Because it was the military who had the power and determination to re-establish social order, in line with the principles set by Atatürk.

Subsequently, after 1971, the government resigned and a short-lived technocratic government, headed by Prime Minister Nihat Erim was established. Under their rule, the Turkish Armed Forces appeared in control of all political developments, as well as being capable of augmenting their power in the country's political structure. Hence, when the military allowed the political parties to return to power, it appeared that the military had not only solved the basic organizational problems which had forced it to stage the coup in the first place, but had also emerged politically stronger. Quoting Nilüfer Narlı, "the army (...) refrained from assuming power outright and permitted a

succession of non-partisan cabinets to impose martial law, suppress the press, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of leftist activists, and dissolve the leftist Turkish Workers' Party and the pro-Islamist National Order Party.”⁸² This is an example of how army acted as a catalyst within the process of eliminating the opponents. Leftism, associated with communism in Cold-War years, and Islamism have been the two major opponents against the survival of order, according to the military.

When the winners and losers after the memorandum are checked, it is observed that the lead beneficiaries were rightist parties. Left wing supported the coup in the beginning, with the expectation of further reforms that favour fundamental rights; but this expectation was replaced with discontent during the government of technocrats, who imposed martial law as a tool of repression.⁸³ Following this exercise, intelligentsia, press and leftist student groups withdrew support from the military, who took a clear opposition against leftist movements.

⁸² Nilüfer Narlı, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, **Turkish Studies**, 2000, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 113.

⁸³ Kurtuluş Kayalı, “**Ordu ve Siyaset, 27 Mayıs – 12 Mart**,” İstanbul, İletişim, 1994, p. 187.

3.6. TOWARDS SEPTEMBER 12

During 1970s, Turkey was ruled by internally divided coalition governments which included centre-left, ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties. Cyprus, European Community membership, education and economic policies, martial law and corruption were the key issues in Turkish political life. It was 1970s when roots of public distrust in political figures were emerging, due to bad governance and corruption. International context was as complicated as the domestic one during 1970s. Peak of economic downturn in 1973 Oil Crisis, Iranian Revolution, Soviet Russia's intervention in Afghanistan were coupled with declined US-influence. Moreover, Greece spoke out demands for returning to NATO's military wing; for which Turkey's approval was needed. These were years when Turkey-US relations were not going well, particularly under centre-left rule of Bulent Ecevit. Any challenge in international or national environment was susceptible to radicalization and politicization. These challenges had to be managed very carefully, within a stable political and governmental framework. However, domestic politics in Turkey during 1970s was far from being stable.

Since mid-1970s, the military had been highly critical of successive civilian governments' lack of ability to cope with economic problems and advance stability. "Instability in the form of clashes between ultra-nationalist militants and radical-leftists which tended to evolve into a civil war, union strikes and a deteriorating economy in the midst of global and domestic economic crises

increased political tension”⁸⁴; invited military to exert power once more. A retired general describes the conditions that invited the coup as follows:

After 1976, political disputes between the leftists and rightists soon escalated into armed confrontations. In addition to this, falling living standards and increased political instability almost legitimised once again the call for military intervention. However, it took four years for the Turkish armed forces to respond this call. On 12 September 1980, the TAF seized power again with a well-designed plan prepared by the Turkish General Staff.⁸⁵

When military coup was launched on September 12, 1980, public was content to see high-rank military officers’ rule, which was deemed to put an end to political, social and economic instability. US support for coup was high; and it was obvious that USA was informed in advance about this intervention. USA favoured a military rule that would act in line with its interests, hence did not object the coup and Junta regime.⁸⁶ Legitimacy of this coup relied on constitutional rights of Military staff, which were described in Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces. In the declaration of coup, legal base of military intervention, and objectives of coup were explained: to preserve

⁸⁴ Narli, **op.cit.**, p. 113.

⁸⁵ Armağan Kuloğlu and Mustafa Şahin ‘The Past and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, in Faltas, Sami and Sander Jansen (eds.) “**Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey**” Papers of a project managed by the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) in the Netherlands, in co-operation with the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC). HarmoniePaper, Groningen: CESS, 2000, p. 95.

<http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmoniePaper19.pdf> accessed on: 28 May 2009.

⁸⁶ Yetkin, p. 171-176.

territorial integrity, to provide national solidarity, to prevent a potential civil war and fratricide, to re-establish state administration and to get rid of all circumstances that disabled sound exercise of democracy.

To reach those objectives, martial law was launched and government and parliament were dissolved as first steps. Further regulations and measures complemented these major steps. Before leaving the ground for civilian figures in official terms, military ensured its authority to pursue for the forthcoming years.⁸⁷ A retired navy commander, Bülent Ulusu, who had been closely involved in the coup preparations, became the head of cabinet just after the coup. Some of the ministers were also retired military officers while the rest were non-party technocrats. The bureaucrats such as undersecretaries, deputy undersecretaries, and directors general of various ministries and public enterprises were also selected from a pool of retired army officers. This measure was considered necessary for the implementation of the work of military rulers by the state administration.

After accomplishing its first task of easing the violence, the military leadership felt obliged to prepare the ground for the period which would follow its withdrawal from the political scene. Accordingly, a new constitution which abolished the Senate, reduced the membership of Parliament to 400 with an increased term of five years and enlarged the political power of the President of the Republic was adopted by a strong majority of people. With a presumption that the old politicians would try to undermine their work when the country would return to parliamentary politics, the Military Regime decided that Turkey needed 'a clean break with the past'. Thus, the existing political parties and their chairmen, general secretaries and other senior office holders were banned from any kind of relations with future political parties during the next

⁸⁷ William Hale, "**Turkish Politics and the Military**," London & New York, Routledge, 1994, p. 287-92.

ten years. Political power of the National Security Council (NSC), in which the military retained its majority representation, was enhanced as well: The government was obliged 'to give priority consideration' to the decisions of the NSC. Hence, the NSC, although not responsible to the Parliament had almost become the highest, non-elected decision making body of the state, which would play a behind-the-scenes role.

Restrictions on human rights went along with tight economic measures. Within the new design of a social and political environment, use of restrictive measures for the sake of providing security may be argued to aim preventing a potential social explosion from arising within a country suffering from high inflation and low wage rates. The economic stability measures implemented by military achieved to decrease inflation and increase foreign trade; however the social impact of the economy policy was remarkable: GDP per capita declined, and unemployment rates peaked.⁸⁸ Under these tight social circumstances, right to strike was suspended, like other restrictive measures on fundamental rights.

Military interventions are argued to have impacts on economy and distribution of wealth among different sectors of the society and the interest groups. Following 1980 coup, distribution of wealth has been reshaped in favour of commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, in contrast with the previous years' model, which favoured working classes. In this transition period, adoption of strict measures and restrictions on social and political rights enabled military rule to implement decisions of January 24, which were taken to regulate the economy.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk, "Türkiye Ekonomisi," İstanbul, Remzi Yayınevi, 2000, p. 428.

⁸⁹ Yıldırım Aktürk, *Milliyet*, 24 January 1986.

In 1980s, military, as an institution, was subjected to further professionalization and empowerment. Turkish General Staff (TGS) initiated Reorganization- Modernization project in order to help the army recover from the impact of the 1975 U.S. arms embargo imposed in the wake of the Cyprus intervention the previous year. “The project coupled with the impact of internal security concerns, elevated the professional skills of the military, which in turn enlarged the military's influence on political matters.”⁹⁰ This situation is an example where Huntingtonian argument that assumes an indirect correlation between level of professionalism and military involvement in politics seems invalid for Turkish experience.

Legitimacy and public support for 1980 military intervention was high. Since the main issue was security concerns, public support for military who would take control of security matters were in highest level. Military's steps to provide security have not been questioned, with the focal expectation of re-establishing the order. In fact, military's actions transcended the aim of re-establishing the public order; and tended to reorient the state, society, and political agenda. But the existence of public consent empowered military rule in terms of duration of the military rule and profundity of the policies of military.

⁹⁰ **Idem.**

3.7. ISLAM AND KURDISH SEPARATISM: PROMINENT ENEMIES OF REGIME

In 1983 elections, only three parties were eligible to compete, because other parties and their representatives were prohibited. In 1983, when Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister, military was not in favour of leaving the floor to civilians instantaneously. A gradual refraining from active involvement in politics was realized during 1980s. In the first years of his prime ministry, (until 1987) Özal government focused on economic matters, within a division of labour between civilians and soldiers. Economic reforms initiated in 1980 enabled him to challenge the military's primacy in the state, and to broaden the domain of the civilian government. As a central political figure throughout the initial transitional period of civilianisation, Özal managed to restructure not only civil-military relations but also the Turkish economy and politics. However, this situation should not be interpreted that Özal enjoyed a pure independence from military regime; if military had determined to sustain its regime, they would not have allowed 1983 elections. The way towards elections was also remarkable in the sense that military's role was dominant. The parties that would run in the elections were to subjected to pre-authentication of Kenan Evren.

Özal's efforts to reorder security policy, to stop relying on territorial security – which maintained the state's dominance over society - and to start relying on economic strength, was intensified after 1987, when he felt confident enough to recommend changes to the 1982 constitution, talk about the "Kurdish reality", and take the unprecedented step of rejecting the army's nominee for Chief of TGS and appointing his own candidate in 1991. Gradually, Özal took

the lead in a growing number of decisions in the security and foreign affairs. Among his actions, opening discussions about country's defence expenditures played a key role in enhancing civilian leverage.⁹¹ Özal's prime ministry was a period in which disengagement of military was observed⁹² and relaxation of restrictions imposed by military rule has been realized. Worthy to mention, Özal's relative autonomy has been possible with military's will and international political and economic circumstances: Özal was a perfect practitioner of neo-liberalist measures in Turkey.

An important point to mention about post 1980 era is the replacement of external enemies of public order with internal ones. Particularly after the collapse of Soviet Union, Communism threat was eliminated automatically. In this era, in addition to a potential threat coming from Greek side, more significant danger of Islamism and Kurdish Terrorism was put on the agenda. Since then, as increasing terrorist attacks in Southeastern Turkey were enlarged towards big cities and the "thin line between internal and external security has been blurred," Kurdish Separatism has been a prominent threat against public order and survival of the state. Turkey's European allies did not pay enough attention to help Turkey's struggle against PKK terrorism; as a result, the process of democratization was perceived to be marginalized in Turkey while the country was struggling with the threats of terrorist activities. Security-led concerns were prevailing over democratization-focused motives as far as military's struggle with PKK was concerned.⁹³

Özal government was followed by coalition governments in which Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz and Necmettin Erbakan were the key players. Among all, Erbakan's rule was the most significant one in terms of

⁹¹ Narli, p. 114-115.

⁹² Hale, p. 287-290.

⁹³ **Ibid.**, p. 92.

awakening military and taking control again. In contrary with Demirel, Ecevit or Mesut Yılmaz who paid attention to get along with military and convene on the threat of Islam, which would infringe republican, secular and Atatürkist principles; prime ministry of Erbakan opened the era when Islamist approach and explicit discourse based on religion were peaked. From the mid-1990s onward, the political influence of the military high command progressively increased as a response to the electoral gains made by the Islamists in local government and in Parliament.⁹⁴

On February 28, 1997 meeting of the NSC, the military issued an 18-point list of policy recommendations to the True Path-Welfare Party coalition government. The list focused on extending compulsory education from five to eight years and restricting the activities of religious schools and private Quran courses that were fostering anti-secular values.⁹⁵ The government refused to comply with these rules and ousted in a few months. Later on, the Welfare Party of Erbakan was banned, like its follower Virtue Party. This intervention was defined to be a sensitive balancing of democracy. The “recommendation” of NSC on 28 February represents a breaking point: military’s cooperation with Islam, which was initiated after 1980 coup to combat leftist ideology ended up with hostility to Political Islam. One of the enemies of military would be Political Islam, whereas the other would remain to be Kurdish Separatism.

Indeed, 1997 memorandum was a signal of the alteration of the ways of military involvement in politics. After that year, military preferred indirect intervention methods, like issuing declarations or announcing positions on specific problematic areas that disturb military circles. This way of indirect involvement was coupled with ongoing support from the public, who trusted army more than any other institution. Rise of civil society, trade unions and

⁹⁴ Narlı, p. 115.

⁹⁵ **Idem.**

other liberal groups paying attention to preserve secularism also relied on the watchdog function of military. Needless to mention, this sensitivity about secularism was resulted by experience of Welfare Party rule.

Soon, relations between the Yılmaz government and the military improved until the government's demise at the end of 1998. Ecevit-led coalition's policies have harmonized with those of the NSC, and there has since been broad societal agreement on the military's influence in domestic political affairs.⁹⁶ But Ecevit's rule did not last long. The economic and political crisis reduced support for government and Ecevit. Role of media is remarkable in this case: media's support ended up with a smear campaign towards Ecevit. In the following elections, there emerged a divided Islamist segment: Heir of prohibited Welfare and Virtue Parties on one hand, and Justice and Development Party, formed of a rather reformist sub-group of Virtue Party "school" on the other.

⁹⁶ Narlı, p. 116.

3.8. EMERGENCE OF A NEW ACTOR: JDP

Justice and Development Party defined itself as a conservative democratic party, which did not reject or fight global capitalism, but accepted and went along with it; utilizing religious references which brought in support from broad fragments of the society. Rural Anatolians were the major electorates of this new party. Justice and Development Party was supported also by poor and labour groups, who did not get what they expected from left in previous elections, rising Anatolian Bourgeoisie, some segments of Kurdish population and little towns. In an environment where most of other parties were “all the same”, which failed to bring prosperity in previous governments that were affiliated with corruption; Justice and Development Party was hoped to be the saviour of Turkey.

Victory of JDP was like those of Democrat Party in 1950, or Motherland Party in 1983: 34% of votes granted the Party with 363 seats of Parliament, which was enough to take radical decisions by themselves. New ruling party was the first one that did not need to form a coalition, since 1987.

After 2002, when victory of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in elections led to a watershed in civil-military relations, the containment of political Islam continued to be one of the core issues of the NSC. Opposition and military shared the main concern: ideological roots of the core cadres in JDP were parallel to Virtue and Welfare Parties, which conflicted with constitutional principles, particularly secularism. But the discourse of JDP was alleged to be different from previous Islamist Parties: Emphasizing commitment to Europeanization, liberalism and democracy, the party set itself apart from other conservative and Islamist parties. This suppressed opposition

or antagonism of military towards JDP. “Although the Islamic tendencies of the Party were well-known, the military authorities and the new JDP government soon reached a sensitive consensus.”⁹⁷ Within this consensus, there are times when military raise its voice, but finally prevail the civilians. In 2000s, military prefer to make statements through media and internet (e-memorandum) to point out its discontent. This reflects the big transformation of military’s stance in politics: instead of utilizing direct methods of intervention, military prefers indirect channels to raise its voice. Use of medias and bringing its PR department to the foreground are ways in which Turkish Armed Forces cope with the demands for transparency and accountability. Amendment in its communication strategies (i.e. weekly press conferences) does not only reflect army’s efforts to meet transparency demands. It also indicates its ability to adapt itself to the changing circumstances and maintaining its intervening role per new tools. Moreover, it might also be stated that the new communication strategy assists armed forces in the dissemination of legitimacy of military intervention: in press conferences, the military has the opportunity to share with public their position about key policy areas, particularly those which worry the army and “invite” to take an action.

“The prospect of EU accession is so popular that as long as the JDP remains actively committed to the negotiations, it can present itself as a centrist party, appeal to large segments of the population, and thus stay in power.”⁹⁸ The accession prospect is utilized by JDP in a way that it helped the party to gain outreach to diverse segments of society.

⁹⁷ Kuloğlu and Şahin, p. 98.

⁹⁸ Ersel Aydınli, Nihat Ali Özcan and Doğan Akyaz, “Turkish Military’s March towards Europe,” **Foreign Affairs**, January-February 2006, p. 90.

3.9. NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: STATE OF CONFLICT OF COOPERATION?

Since military has been undergoing a transformation both in behavioural and institutional terms, it is not easy to define state of military-civil relations of post-2002 era. William Hale argues that the military in Turkey not only gradually accepted the supremacy of the civilian power, but also admitted civilian supremacy in its own field of professional expertise.⁹⁹

As stated earlier, this study rejects the common idea that there is a state of conflict between military and civilians. Instead, as history shows, accommodation and harmony is what is observed in Turkish case, despite some exceptional periods. Firstly, military is more or less a part of the society, so it reflects the structure and aspirations of the whole society, including the political sphere. Secondly, utilization of military as a tool of state or the civilian political actors is a remarkable phenomenon. Opposition's call for military to take an action against the ruling party's applications is an example of this situation: Republican People's Party has spoken out this expectation several times. Military has also been subject to the contestation between parties, as seen when Justice Party endeavoured to end military's good relations (or ties) with RPP. Not only political groups, but also media can play an active role, inviting military to intervene in politics. Prior to 28 February 1997, media called for military to take an action persistently.¹⁰⁰ In brief, military is targeted by diverse needs and objectives. In times of crisis or transition, military becomes a desired ally of all different political groups. Like

⁹⁹ Hale, *passim*.

¹⁰⁰ Ünsaldı, p. 183-193.

the alliance of RPP and military in the course of 1960 intervention, there are times when military cooperates with a political party, against another one. Thus, militarist aspirations of political parties are used as a tool of softening up the rival party.

However, military in Turkey is not that passive to be used as a tool by civilians in any case. Despite attempts of civilians, military does not take an action just because of civilian pressure. Military rather follows a pragmatic strategy in line with the conjuncture, to reach its corporate and legitimate objective of providing the survival of the state. Since circumstances, definitions of threat and perceptions change in time, strategies and alliances of military change, as well. This is why the “enemy” against which each coup has been staged has differed in time. In 1960s, it was Democrat Party, which threatened the regime with its pro-religious and restrictive policies, whereas it was 1971 coup which initiated restrictive measures to prevent anarchy. 1980 coup complemented the restrictions adopted in 1971, and cooperated with political Islam, which was announced to be the enemy of 1990s’ military in National Security Policy Paper. As military’s overall objective overlaps that of a political group currently, it does not hesitate to form kind of strategic alliances. Hence, it might be argued that military does not have a stable uniformed objective; instead it has ad hoc reactions on a per case basis, which are framed by general principles and an ultimate aim of preserving the regime. This is why, supporters and allies of military change in time, due to needs and conditions of the period in question.

What does not change despite altering circumstances is the philosophy and rationale behind the framework that enables military to act in political ground. The constitutional and legal framework institutionalizes military guardianship

in Turkey: “Task of Armed Forces is to protect and guard Turkish country and Republic of Turkey, assigned by Constitution.”¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces, Article 35.

3.10. LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF MILITARY ACTIONS

As mentioned earlier, Turkish Armed Forces do not rely solely on its physical strength, while exerting power or oversight on civilians. What is more, it seeks for legal background (and public consent) that legitimizes its activity in civilian sphere, a sphere in which the major actors are civilians. The reason behind being committed to legality is existence of a dominant ideology of pluralist and representative democracy. Even under Junta Rule, legitimization of intervention is emphasized to keep and empower democracy.

Another proof of military's consideration of legitimacy is the duration of military rules. Military pays attention to stay in control of the regime and execution as short as possible. As Mevlut Bozdemir states in a paper, the military in Turkey is committed to democratic order and has been active in favour of maintenance of democratic system, more than any other military.¹⁰² However, the tools used in military rule sometimes tend to depart from democratic applications. But this should not be interpreted as a permanent distortion from democracy. Instead, it is a temporary situation when democracy is suspended for a while.

Use of military intervention as a method of re-establishing the order is of necessity, rather than being an arbitrary action. Military choose to maintain and guarantee its interests and distinguished position through different mechanisms, rather than direct intervention. Military rule is exceptional and temporary in Turkey. Intervention is exerted only in extraordinary

¹⁰² Mevlüt Bozdemir, "Autoritarisme militaire et démocratie en Turquie" **Esprit**, Juin 1984, p. 110.

circumstances, when existence of regime is under obvious threat. In case of an intervention, it tries to leave the ground to civilians as soon as possible. The army, being the executive authority in military regime brings in the risk of losing focal point of being vigilant and united against any threat, and dedication of significant amount of power and resources to the governing activities. This may in turn lead to weakening of military's power and capacity to cope with threats.

3.11. GUARDIAN ROLE OF MILITARY AND PERCEPTION OF THREAT AS A SOURCE OF INFLUENCE

The military in advanced democracies of West are concerned primarily with international threats and neither have time nor interest to deal with the everyday political issues of the country. However, the circumstances are different with developing countries where internal problems overwhelmingly pressure the civilian governments and armed forces are used to counter those issues. Having to deal with both external and internal threats, the military has little choice but to politicize.¹⁰³ In such circumstances in which Turkey has been an example of what Desch argued, the military elite need to change their behaviour for consolidation to be completed in democratizing countries.¹⁰⁴ The attitudinal change which would bring about democratic consolidation has been realized in 2000s.

As a political army, Turkish Military tends to play an important role in policy-making, agenda setting, and discussion-limiting. Army's powerful and efficient existence in politics takes its roots from some specific points, which in turn feeds this efficiency and autonomy. Even in case of democratization and EU harmonization that requires declination of army's say in political sphere; military institutions remained to be the most influential organization that identified the extent to which the reforms would be undertaken.

¹⁰³ Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening of U.S. Civilian Control," **Armed Forces & Society**, Vol 24, 1998, p. 389-91.

¹⁰⁴ Şatana, p. 362.

As mentioned earlier, Turkish army has positioned itself as guardian of regime and survival of state: it is thanks to military that the preservation of Atatürkist Principles and integrity of republic are realized. “The army's heroic status as guardian, the perception of external military threats from the region, and favourable portrayals in the media and in schools has facilitated the army's strong presence in society.”¹⁰⁵ As the prominent actor that helped modernization of whole society, military is associated with improvement, modernization and progressiveness: “The army has played a prominent role in Turkey's political modernization, leading the country "along a Western path," by endorsing the dynamic transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line with Atatürk's ideological commitment to the West.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Heper and Güney, p. 108.

¹⁰⁶ **Idem.**

3.12. IMAGE OF OFFICER CORPS AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY

Positive image of soldiers and military in the eyes of public is reproduced by military. The army engages in public relations work by promoting its "national security concept" to raise citizens' consciousness about internal and external threats that it identifies. As a result, for instance, military service, though compulsory for all Turkish men since 1927, is seen as a national duty and heroic mission because citizens have been socialized with values promoting the army's role as protector of the state. High standard of living of military officers provide a motive behind preference of military posts: While soldiers are motivated by patriotism, officers have additional rewards such as monetary remuneration and quality living conditions. Moreover, "despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry. This ruling style is the product of Turkey's specific cultural, social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as well as historic conflicts with neighbouring states."¹⁰⁷

Further, military has always been a trustworthy institution, unlike political figures who are deemed to be corrupting the political sphere. Military has legitimized its position on behalf of people; so it has consent, in addition to power: accountability and transparency of military are recent concepts which are not discussed openly, even in 2000s. This phenomenon is coupled with lack of strong civil society. Development of civil society is a new trend, which is under state control. According to a confidential decree, a special institution is

¹⁰⁷ Narlı, p. 119.

established to detect Turkish Associations' activities in EU and to provide their commitment to state authority. This task has soon been transferred to National Security Council.¹⁰⁸

“Located in a highly volatile area and taking advantage of its geostrategic importance for the West, senior officers have always been in favour of maintaining a large and strong military establishment.”¹⁰⁹ This is why Turkish military is one of the strongest one in the world, in terms of deterrence and physical power. Turkish Military has also a strong economic potential: due to its financial conglomerates and taking the greatest share from budget. Budgetary control of armed forces has always been a discussion point. However, any attempt of a civilian government to reduce either the financial and social status of the officer corps or the amount of military expenditures can easily result in its overthrow from power.¹¹⁰ Feroz Ahmad points out that “Turkish Armed Forces have been so intertwined with capitalism that they 'no longer can afford to be neutral or above politics’”. Military's economic activities have assisted not only in increasing the degree of the political and financial autonomy of the officer corps from the civilian government but also in developing closer, direct ties between the military establishment and leading industrialists.¹¹¹

Level of institutionalization is high in military, which also provides a common identity corporate interest-based approach for soldiers: The huge size of the armed forces constitutes such source of political power that party leaders cannot just ignore it. Moreover, unity and cohesion in the officer corps is

¹⁰⁸ Ünsaldı, p. 134.

¹⁰⁹ Karabelias, *op.cit.*, p. 140.

¹¹⁰ Narlı, p. 39.

¹¹¹ Feroz Ahmad, “**The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975**” Boulder, CO, 1977, p. 281.

ensured within a well-institutionalized structure. This common identity overlaps with a new class-identity that prevails the original classes of officers: military values reproduced in military schools that provide an indoctrination of several values and principles breed members of educated and statist elite class capable of both defending Turkey's borders and the ideas of Ataturk as well as concerning with the country's domestic problems.

3.13. ROAD TO WESTERNIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION: HOW MILITARY'S ROLE IN POLITICS TO BE EFFECTED?

From the early years of the Republic, Turkey followed a pro-Western path, where democratic values of Europe were determined as a target to be reached. One of those values, achieving democratic control of armed forces (DECAF) has been urged by EU and liberal circles in Turkish society. In a recent study, Ümit Cizre deals with validity of DECAF for Turkey and argues that DECAF is a concept designed for Central and Eastern European Countries having an undemocratic past, hence it is not compatible with Turkey's level of development and her peculiarities.¹¹² Indeed, associating Turkish case with CEECs seems to have a potential of neglecting some special features of Turkish case. Far from being a democracy-oriented term; DECAF seems to be a security-oriented term which underestimates country-specific features.

Despite some measures taken to comply with EU's unclear norms of civilian oversight over military; there is much to be done to get closer with EU standards. This issue is raised by EC who is not yet satisfied by de facto situation in Turkish civil-military relations. Since Turkey's contribution to European Security is indispensable, EU is not going to impose adoption of a lower institutional or military capacity. On the other hand, since military has still been the most trustworthy institution, defender of Republican principles and national independence; the public support for EU reforms that curb

¹¹² Ümit Cizre, "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," **European Journal of Political Research**, Vol. 43, 2004, p. 107–125.

military's physical and institutional strength will not be high in middle run. As legitimacy of military is questioned by means of investigations, cases or other operations of the JDP government; civil-military relations will evolve towards a civilian rule model where some key functions that also constitute source of legitimacy and *raison d'être* of military involvement in politics are going to be undertaken by EU incrementally. Stance of Council of Europe is parallel: As the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in *Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey* Case (application no. 44774/98) of 29 June 2004 indicates, Turkey will no longer need to use these extra measures to protect and preserve its secular and democratic system, as it will be protected by the European institutions when it becomes part of European structures.

When the EU Progress Reports on Turkey are checked, it is observed that some important points of divergence exist between the Community and Turkey. Another observation is, as mentioned earlier, lack of a well-defined and clear conception of civil-military relations. The following sections involve points of incompatibility between Turkey and EU, as far as civil-military relations are concerned. But, it should be kept in mind that EU does not still have a precise policy or a clear framework in the field of management of civil-military relations. This is why EU uses general expressions like "Turkey should improve civilian control of military" in its regular reports. Nonetheless, some specific points of incompatibility between two practices might be derived from these reports. These points are being subjected to reforms and compatibility with EU practices are tried to be achieved.

3.14. CRITICISMS OF EU

3.14.1. Institutional Aspects: National Security Council

The first point of incompatibility has been the role of National Security Council. NSC was established under 1961 Constitution, in order to recommend necessary guidelines regarding coordination and decisions in national security matters. Since limits of national security are blurred and the term has been subjected to for broadening by discourse; military is able securitize diverse issues and prepare the ground for having a say in these issues. In line with its tendency to securitize issues, Turkish Armed Forces tend to express their worries about recent research projects on civilian oversight over military. Similar study of a think-tank has been countervailed with discontent by military, which saw these studies as part of a broader plan of fraying the reputation and power of Armed Forces. This situation comprises one of the incompatibilities between Turkish exercise and EU standards.

Another point of incompatibility has been status of decisions taken in NSC, which is comprised of chief military officers, prime minister, president and national defence, internal affairs and foreign ministers. From 1960s to 2000s, outcomes of NSC meetings were designed to be more binding, having emerged from recommendation to “prior points of consideration”.

Role of NSC was empowered after adoption of NSC Law in 1983, which broadly defined the concept of national security and enhanced role of military, compared with the past. However, this tendency was reversed after 2000s, when EU-harmonization measures also involved reduction of NSC’s role in political decision-making process. Following issue of 1997 memorandum and

reveal of National Security Policy Document which defined new enemies of Republic (Islamism and Kurdish Separatism), the role of NSC was curbed. Today, after the latest reforms, number and efficiency of civilians in NSC has been increased and NSC decisions have been defined to be advisory and non-binding. Moreover, the frequency of NSC meetings is diminished.

Another institutional instrument of military organization is rather a behind the scenes actor: Department of Psychological Operations. Established in 1983, this department was designed to provide psychological support for military personnel taking part in external operations. The moral assistance task of this department also utilized as a tool of empowering the sense of solidarity among soldiers. Discussions about the role of this department arose when it was revealed that some NGOs and public figures were labelled and categorized, due to their political opinions, particularly as regards Kurdish issue, democratization and secularism. This was ended up with renaming of this department as “Information Support Department” in 2005. The main argument for this alteration was the pejorative sense of the phrase “psychological operation”, which was perceived as a reminiscent of social engineering and imposition of military’s values on the society through a deep control over mass media and communication.

The alteration of name did not bring about the role of this mysterious department. The action plan to combat fundamentalism, alleged to be prepared by the Information Support Department of the General Staff, led to the rise of tension between the government and military. While the investigations continue on this issue, the means of intervening in political and social life has been opened up to discussion. Military strictly rejected the allegations and warned about an asymmetrical psychological operation against Turkish

General Staff.¹¹³ Lately, the department was abolished and have been subjected to re-structuring. This re-structuring process, not only involves military organizations, but also police and intelligence institutions.¹¹⁴

3.14.2. Affiliation to Prime Ministry

Another point of discussion among European circles and some segments of Turkish public who are in favour of guaranteeing civilian supremacy is the institutional positioning of Turkish General Staff. TGS is under the competence of Prime Ministry. This situation, according to European Circles, supports institutional autonomy of military, which renders civilian oversight difficult to be achieved. EU expects Turkey to subordinate TGS under Ministry of National Security, instead of Prime Ministry, like it was exercised before 1961. However, Turkey rejects such application, with the argument that subordination of Turkish General Staff to Ministry of Defence would bring about patronage and politicization of Military in an unintended way in which government-led cadres and policies might breach unity of armed corps and distance of military from governments.

A very recent development gives signals of a transformation towards civilianization through alterations in institutional positioning of TGS: the National Program of 2008 included a provision that foresees linking Turkish

¹¹³ Hurriyet, 5 Aralik 2009, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/13117088.asp> accessed on: 25 December 2009.

¹¹⁴ For the latest discussions in Parliament about this department and asymmetrical psychological operation, see http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20519&P5=H&PAGE1=50&PAGE2=&web_user_id=7144098
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20519&P5=H&PAGE1=45&PAGE2=&web_user_id=7144098 accessed on: 27 December 2009.

Gendarmerie to Ministry of Interior. When the regulation, which has already announced in Official Gazette is implemented within five years, Gendarmerie forces will be headed by a civilian (police) and the corps will be professional civilian forces.¹¹⁵

3.14.3. Transparency and Accountability of Military and Military Expenditures

One of the key mechanisms of keeping military as a distinguished and autonomous institution is being exempted from control of Court of Auditors. Even this phenomenon has changes in previous years; European Union Reports indicate lack of sound implementation of budgetary inspection and auditing of military. The reason for being exempted from auditing is posited that security matters and defence issues should be confidential. As the governments hesitate to involve in military issues, military expenditures also get immunized from state control. In this environment, there exists no mechanism that detects the necessity of allocating a great deal of financial resources for defence instruments. It is often argued that selection of arms and expenditure on armament is not exercised in the most logical and economical way. Lack of pluralism and civilian say in the identification of military expenditures cause thundering amounts of national resources allocated for military.

When the defence expenditures of Turkey are compared with other countries, it is remarked that Turkey is in top 20 as far as military expenditures are concerned. Not only total amount of military expenditure, but also share of

¹¹⁵ Jandarmada AB Devrimi, **Radikal**, 17.04.2009.

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=931678&Date=17.04.2009&CategoryID=77>

military expenditures in GDP are in high levels. Worthy to note, an analysis based on official data is not enlightening, since they are far from reflecting the real numbers; there are significant differences between official and unofficial numbers. The data provided by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Ministry of Defence and ACDA (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) are below:

Table 2.1: Military Expenditures in Turkey, according to different resources

Year 1997	Military Expenditures (Million USD)	Military Expenditures / GDP (%)
Ministry	5	2,2
SIPRI	8.1	4,1
ACDA	7,8	4

Data derived from: Ünsaldı, p.249.

Even after the end of Cold War, Turkey has been one of the few NATO members that did not reduce military expenditures. This is related with the struggle with PKK and willingness to be prudent for any development in Aegean, Middle East and Caucasus. Likewise, Greek military expenditures are always at high levels, due to perception of a potential threat from external borders, particularly Turkey.

Table 2.2: Military Expenditures in Selected Countries

Country	Military Expenditure (billion USD) 2003	Military Expenditure / GDP % 2003-2006	Import of Arms (million EUR) 1998-2002 sum
United States	399,1	4.0	N A
Russia	65	3.9	N A
China	47	4.3	8 962
Saudi Arabia	21.3	10	4 431
Israel	9.4	7.3	3 082
India	29,5	2.5	4 903
France	15.6	2.6	N A
Turkey	5.8	5.3	4 764
Greece	3.5	4.3	4 022

Data derived from:

http://www.obsarm.org/main/obsarm_ventes.htm

http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_exp_per_of_gdp-military-expenditures-percent-of-gdp

<http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersfy04.html>

Not only defence budget, but also salaries and social benefits of officer corps indicate the autonomy and privileged position of military. Compared to civilians, military officers enjoy high salaries, in addition to social facilities that provide high-quality goods and services with reasonable prices. The relatively better living standards of soldiers contributed in the general perception of superiority of officers. According to the data derived from Finance Ministry and Court of Auditors, wage of a colonel is more than a professor (head of department) at the same degree and twice of a medical doctor at the same degree.¹¹⁶

Apart from welfare of the officers, an important point to highlight is the existence of military as a strong economic actor. Extra-budgetary funds of military, like Armed Forces Fund and Defence Industry Support Fund in addition to military bourgeoisie-enterprise OYAK have also been criticized by EU.

The case of OYAK (Armed Forces Mutual Fund) ties military with production instruments in a capitalist base. OYAK, which was established in 1961 (Law 205) with the aim of providing social security to military personnel is the prominent attempt of Armed Forces to safeguard the officers from the vagaries of the crisis prone Turkish economy and to increase the military's financial autonomy from the civilian administration. In the following decades, OYAK have been transformed into one of the largest financial conglomerates of Turkey.¹¹⁷ Three similar foundations, the Naval, Air-Force and Land Forces Foundations also have shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprises. Legal status of OYAK differs from other private sector companies in the sense

¹¹⁶ This statistical data is valid for 2002. www.maliye.gov.tr www.sayistay.gov.tr

¹¹⁷ İsmet Akça, "Kolektif Bir Sermayedar olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri," **Bir Zümre, Bir Parti, Türkiye'de Ordu**, (ed.) Bayramoğlu, Ali and Ahmet İnel, İstanbul, Birikim, 2004, p. 246.

it is linked with Ministry of Defence, which provides it the benefits of being a public body. But on the other hand, it is autonomous in terms of administration and fiscal issues. Even though shares of OYAK has been subjected to change in recent years, dominance of military in steering board reveals its activity in the economic structure. When affiliation of military with OYAK, unquestionable character of military budget and high living standards of military officers are considered, it might be argued that Turkish Military supports its autonomous and distinguished character in economic terms, as well. But the lack of transparency of military expenditures, methods of adoption of military items of budget and high rate of defence expenditures seem to be replaced with transparency and parliamentarian oversight over military expenditures, as EU bid continues. These points are the key points of criticism oriented to Turkey by European Union, as well as liberal circles in Turkey.

3.14.4. Military Jurisdiction and conscientious objection

Issues arising from military jurisdiction over civilians, particularly conscientious objectors have been another problematic area. Even not spoken out intensively until now, conscientious objection is expected to be urged to be put in EU reform agenda. This issue is not only urged by EU, but also UN and Council of Europe. There are ongoing cases in European Court of Human Rights on conscientious objectors. Since EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that includes a provision about recognition of this right is part of the *acquis*, Turkey will sooner or later be asked to comply with this principle.

When we turn back to the classification of praetorianism made by Perlmutter¹¹⁸, we might state that Turkish civil-military relations have fluctuated between arbiter-type praetorian democratic model and a ruler-type praetorian model. As relations with EU develop, Turkish military tends to be more subordinated to civilian authorities. It is probable that cooperation and concordance will be the main framework what drives the relations among civilian and military actors following the accession process.

Turkey may be described as the country which most closely fits the model of a praetorian army that has altered the socio-political context and created civilian political organizations.¹¹⁹ As Nilüfer Narlı argues, “this change has critical importance for the military to resolve its own paradox: the dilemma of being at the same time the pioneer of westernisation and modernisation since the 18th century and the occasional opponent of any change in the organisation of civil-military relations that would bring them in line with the contemporary standards of the European countries.”¹²⁰ One should also mention that military is not the only entity which fails to fully conform with EU norms. When the obligations of civilian sphere is checked, it is observed that nearly all civilian authorities have much to do, as far as harmonization with EU is concerned.

¹¹⁸ **Infra.**, p.19.

¹¹⁹ Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities,” **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1969, p. 404.

¹²⁰ Narlı, p. 133.

CHAPTER 4

AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE

Scholars on Greek politics agree that fitting Greek military into a theoretical framework is difficult. When key developments in Greek civil-military relations are checked, it is observed that there are significant differences between pre-1974 era and post-1974. Before 1974, military draw a profile of a disorganized and segmented institution with tendency to intervene in politics frequently. Success rate of military intervention in terms of providing peace and order was low, due to fragmentation inherent in military, which prevents it from pursuing a sustainable and decisive policy during their rule. Moreover, corruption and clientelism, coupled with instabilities in domestic politics and civil-war, as well as influence of USA had been factors that effected the relations between the government, military and the society. As far as the post 1974 period, which was started with the end of Junta regime, is concerned, military can be argued to accept a secondary role limited to defence and security issues. This new period has been parallel to democratic transition phase of Greece, initiated after the collapse of Junta Regime and motivated mainly by EU. In this chapter, evolution of civil-military relations in Greece is to be explained, with citations to US, NATO and EU factors.

According to Thanos Veremis, the interpretation of army and politics, particularly prior to democratic transition phase, produced a relationship in

which influential political figures took the initiative in applying subjective control on the military.¹²¹ Keeping in mind this general view of civil-military relations in Greece, checking out how these relations have evolved in time, might be serviceable.

¹²¹ Thanos Veremis, “**The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy,**” Montréal, Québec, Buffalo, N.Y. , Black Rose Books, 1997, p.86.

4.1. BEFORE 1967: PATTERNS IN GREEK CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, PATRONAGE AND CLIENTELISM

Before establishing their own nation state, Greek community had been among the non-Muslim entities which were exempted from military service within the Ottoman Rule. Lacking of military skills, Greeks have been supported by the Western Powers in their struggle for independence. Later on, Greeks developed their small armies, which could not be turned into European-style professional forces.¹²² Unlike European armies comprised of full-time state employees receiving modern training and equipment, Greek army had been an entity characterized with lack of professional skills.

During the years of establishment of Greek State, military was far from playing a major role in the formation of their own institutions, sustaining a struggle against Ottoman Powers and having insufficient financial resources. Due to the prominent and active role of foreign powers in the foundation and early years of Greek State, military has not involved in nation-building, regime-maintaining, modernizing or institution-building processes, unlike the Turkish

¹²² Evangelos Liaras, “**Ottoman Legacies in Civil-Military Relations: The Cases of Turkey and Greece**,” Paper Presented to the Joint Conference Sciences Po-ASN “Empires and Nations”, 2008, p. 2.

Available at:

<http://web.mit.edu/polisci/students/elias/Liaras%20-%20ASN%20Sciences%20Po%202008.pdf>, accessed on: 13 June 2009.

case. This situation brought about inability among armed units to build up an effective central organization.¹²³

As usual in any corporate group, in military, there are corporate interests deriving for intervention. What is observable in Greek military, particularly prior to Cold War, has been lack of united and long-term shared interests. Rather, “the self-interested motives of officials in a patron-client relationship framework are remarkable. It has been “reflection of lack of a general sense of responsibility towards state among groups or individuals.”¹²⁴ Thanos Veremis states that “professionalism and hierarchy were seriously impaired in the Greek army because of the corruption of its organizational patterns by clientelism.”¹²⁵ Likewise, Victor Papacosma points out the spill-over effect of corruption, patronage and clientelism from society to military institutions.¹²⁶

Patronage was so dominant in Greece that “military organizations in Greece had a weak bond of ideology and have been vulnerable to dissolution at every change in the terms of patronage.”¹²⁷ Lacking a homogenous organizational structure that brings all officers together around a common objective and shared values, Greek Military intended to form self-interested factions existing around diverse patron-client networks. The livelihood of these factions was depending on the life time of patronage. State’s inability to serve its citizens

¹²³ John Petropoulos, “Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece,” Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, quoted in Karabelias, Gerassimos, “**Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post-war Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995**,” Final Report submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), June 1998, p.42.

¹²⁴ Veremis, p. 71-72.

¹²⁵ Thanos Veremis, p.77.

¹²⁶ S. Victor Papakosma, “**The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup D’Etat**,” Ohio State University Press, 1977, p. 37.

¹²⁷ Veremis, p. 75.

without interference of the personal networks of personal patronage was another factor that empowered role of clientelism. Veremis points out that:

Since reliance on a powerful patron figure is a better guarantee for achieving an objective, compared to attachment to a corporate organization of state, clientelism is what dominates the relations between society and the organizations. Likewise, trade unionism and class-based political parties have not been attractive for civilians. “(...) the isolated nature of the relationship between patron and client discouraged group activity. (...) Furthermore, antagonisms among officers of the same political camp but of different client networks were frequent.”¹²⁸

The military interventions observed in pre-1967 era reflected “the cleavages and ambitions of political elites and the corresponding clientelism and weakness of the Greek military”, instead of stimulated professional concerns.¹²⁹ Being subjected to subjective civilian control, in Huntington’s terminology, Greek military has been an area of political struggle, which was “intertwined with patronage networks of civilian parties with conflicting ideological platforms.”¹³⁰

Both Kapodistrias’ and King Otto’s policies had as a goal the creation of an efficient, centralized bureaucracy and a well-organized national army. With regard to the officer corps, however, the two leaders tried to turn it into a client of the

¹²⁸ Veremis, p.71, 74, 81.

¹²⁹ Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Farewell to Man on Horseback: intervention and civilian supremacy in modern Greece,” in Danopolos, Constantine (ed.) “**From Military to Civilian Rule**,” London, Routledge, 1992, p. 40.

¹³⁰ Liaras, p.20.

head of the state rather than help it develop into an autonomous political institution. As a result, strong patron-client relations had developed between political and military leaders contributing to the preservation of the supremacy of the former over the latter.¹³¹

4.1.1. Praetorianism in Greek Military, Coups as Ordinary Practices

The first coup in Greece took place in 1843, when the military raised its voice with high support of public against the King. King Otto and Bavarian influence was aimed to be broken through adoption of liberal democracy. In the aftermath of this no-blood intervention, the King promulgated a new constitution and liberal parliamentary democracy. But, as Clogg argues, the regime did not fit in traditional society and discontent continued.¹³² The second coup in 1862 was to complement the previous one: Otto, who exercised a parliamentary dictatorship, was overthrown.

The major intervention from military side came in 1909, when a group of young officers initiated to take the rule of the country. The reason behind this move was predominantly the frustration towards the defeat against Ottomans in previous years and the discontent with the King. The Military League was

¹³¹ Douglas Dakin, "The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923," London, Ernest Bern, 1972 quoted in Gerassimos Karabelias, "**Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post-war Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995**," Final Report submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), June 1998, p. 42, 48.

¹³² Richard Clogg, "**A Concise History of Greece**," Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 51-53.

comprised of young Greek officers with the aim of reorganizing the military and urged King to dismiss his sons from military posts. Their professional grievances might also be supposed as an impact of the Young Turks movement in Turkey. The secret group of young officers emulating the Young Turks gathered with Colonel Zorbas to re-establish the order, which was destructed due to Greco-Turkish War, financial instability and lack of reforms. This group, namely the “Military League” could not achieve to provide social and political order, given their inability to take the lead and discordance with civilian actors. Eventually, Military League dissolved itself in early 1910.

It was not a real political movement: its ideology and programme lacked coherence; its leaders were popular but unskilled. They were above all soldiers ill at ease outside their barracks. The League had known how to link its corporatist demands to public discontent by using populist and nationalist slogans (...)¹³³

The demonstrations with public support reached to an end when Cretan Eleftherios Venizelos was appointed. During his prime ministry, economic indicators ameliorated, social reforms were adopted and military enjoyed modernization and reorganization with the help of France.

The rule of Venizelos opened a new period in Greek political life: henceforth, opposing forces, republicans and conservative-monarchists would dominate the domestic sphere. Likewise, involvement of military in civilian affairs gave sings of this dual segmentation among the society and political actors: those gathering around the King were agrarian, traditional and conservative groups.

¹³³ Apostolos Vacalopoulos, “**Histoire de la Grèce Moderne**,” Horvath, 1975, quoted in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goudi_coup#cite_ref-Vaca211_17-4 accessed on: 5 September 2009.

These groups were to be challenged by pro-Venizelist government, which sought for development of entrepreneurial spirit and creation of bourgeoisie.¹³⁴

Towards mid 1920s, Greek military's political approach based mainly on expanding the borders of the state has been replaced by a new tendency aiming to preserve the social and political order as the primary goal. This was mainly due to civilians' inability to offer solutions to social and economic problems of the country, after the WWI. Veremis argues that:

The role of the military in interwar Greece conforms largely to that ascribed by Huntington to the soldier as guardian. In a society possessing civilian élites and a developed civilian culture, the military view themselves neither as the modernisers of society nor as the creators of a new political order but rather as the guardians and perhaps the purifiers of the existing order.¹³⁵

Thus, a new behaviour emerged in the period between 1922 and 1936, when “the officer corps (especially those who supported modernizing actors) made habit of staging interventions in the country's political life every time they felt uncomfortable with the decisions of the civilian government.”¹³⁶ In 1936-1949 period, Greece experienced a dictatorship (that of Metaxas) and a Civil War between nationalists and communists.

¹³⁴ P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, “Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983,” in **“Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,”** O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (ed.s), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 140-142.

¹³⁵ Veremis, p. 89.

¹³⁶ Karabelias, **op.cit.**, p. 49.

Even before democratic consolidation, military academy graduates in Greece condemned coups in principle, but made exceptions for those they approved. Civilian society saw coups as an ordinary means of political pressure, since the coups did not threaten the social fabric. In Greece, there occurred frequent interventions, in the end of which military chose to yield the floor to civilians to rule the country.¹³⁷ This tendency might have indicated arbiter-type praetorianism among Greek military. But the incidence of 1967 coup and the way in which military strived to stay in power gives the sign of ruler-type praetorianism.

In World War II, the King and government fled to Middle East; so did the high-rank army officers. Young officers' reactionary groups (ENA-IDEA) emerged under these circumstances, and led the Greek Army to "become a homogenous, die-hard, right-wing organization no longer reflecting the contradictions of the political society" in the following years.¹³⁸ Greek regime was named as a parliamentary democracy. But, when the practice of Greek politics is checked, it is remarked that effective role of palace and strictness of parliament against leftist aspirations indicate lack of a sound democratic system. Within this system, military constituted "a central pillar of state apparatus."¹³⁹

After 1945, as Greece became part of Western Block and a significant ally of US with Turkey, US aid and impact has started to dominate the way in which military acted in Greek politics. With US-led initiatives, the army was to be

¹³⁷ Interventions by Greek military in twentieth century are as follows: 1909, 1916, 1922, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1933, 1935, 1951, 1967, and 1973.

¹³⁸ Danopoulos, p. 40.

¹³⁹ Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis, "State-International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the mid-1970s," in **"Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe,"** Pridham, Geoffrey, (ed.), Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991, p. 105.

more professionalized, to have enjoyed autonomy and a significant rise in its share in budget. While mentioning about the budget, it should be noted that US financial aid did not create a rise in welfare among citizens, since the financial resources were allocated to budget deficits. Likewise, Greece did not achieve an industrial development or growth in investments, since US aids were oriented to agriculture and debts. Worthy to note, it will not be right to defend the Huntingtonian assumption that professionalism brought about fewer tendencies to involve in politics of Greece. “On the contrary, the political influence of the military grew with an increase of bureaucratization, and a broadening of the social base of recruitment of the officer corps.”¹⁴⁰

Comprising of soldiers from broader social base seem to decrease tendency of military to act as a unified group in pursuit of common interests and intervene in politics. But on the other hand, as military became a middle-class profession, like that of Greek case, it was opened to political involvement consequently.¹⁴¹ In the mean time, Greek military was dressed up with a new mission: to preserve the status quo, act against instability, and particularly communism. This understanding shaped military’s actions during Cold War Greece, especially until 1970s.

¹⁴⁰ George A. Kourvetaris, “Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 36, No.6, 1971, p. 1055.

¹⁴¹ George Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece," in Clogg, Richard and George Yannopoulos, “**Greece under Military Rule**,” London, Secker & Warburg, 1972, p. 21.

4.1.2. 1960s: Developments Preparing Ground for Intervention and Military Rule

Some scholars argue that the shifting attitudes of the armed forces regarding the question of intervention have been influenced by factors specific to Greek history: constellation of power in the political and party system, the political divisions prevalent since the nineteenth century that split the army along a republican-monarchical axis, and the explicit identification of the army with the monarchical forces after the end of the civil war and in the context of intense Cold War rivalry.¹⁴²

As far as social and economic spheres are concerned, Greece drew a stable profile: the GNP was generated by small industry, shipping revenues and the Greeks living abroad, within agriculture based economy structure. Before 1960s, level of social mobility and political consciousness were limited, and this reflected to the way in which socio-political organization was structured: there was no diversity of political and social associations or industry-state relations. Due to the close connections among small industrial capital, finance capital and government, there didn't emerge technology-intensive production means or improvement in socio-economic terms. State politics favoured the interests of elite, who were content form this stable environment.¹⁴³ The major threat against this stable climate was communism; which was in a larger extent prevented from posing a danger, thanks to close ties with Western block and NATO membership. With the prominent role of countervailing any Communist

¹⁴² Dimitris Tsarouhas, "Explaining an Activist Military: Greece until 1975," **Southeast European Politics**, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 2005, p. 10.

¹⁴³ Fatih M. Tayfur, "**Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain**," Hampshire, Ashgate, 2003, p.42.

threat, Greek military has been staffed by Greek officials, but foreigners had the final say on its make up and operations".¹⁴⁴

Towards late 1960s, having more or less affected by the international climate, an alteration in domestic social and political environment has been experienced. Firstly, the change in components of GNP has to be mentioned: Greece has evolved from an agriculture-based economy towards a model where diversification of occupations has reflected in social sphere, as well. It is often suggested that early industrialization is negatively correlated to military intervention. Industrialization came to Greece only in the post-war period and became properly embedded in the country's changing socio-economic landscape during the 1960s.¹⁴⁵ Within a newly emerging context, in which capitalist mode of production was coupled with involvement of masses in politics, there was lack of proletariat class.¹⁴⁶

As a second factor, rise of consumerism, and stronger lines of communication were coupled with increased rates in urbanization. In this context, it was inevitable that the country was run into trouble, given the unprecedented movement of population from the rural areas to the urban ones was not followed with the democratization of the political conditions. When the role of media was also put into account as a third factor, it was no surprise that political consciousness and social mobility, which led to diversification of social and political organization manners, was augmented. This changing

¹⁴⁴ Tayfur, p. 49-50.

¹⁴⁵ Tsarouhas, p. 2.

¹⁴⁶ In Greece, industrialization has developed in a slightly different path, unlike European model. Instead of the rise of big industries, simple commodity production in small industries characterizes Greek case. For further information, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, "**Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment**," London, Macmillan, 1978, p. 113-124.

environment in state-industry relations, social and political life was deemed harmful, by military, to “moral fabric of the society.”¹⁴⁷

This wind of change did not bring about better living standards and political stability to Greece. On the contrary, economic indicators pointed out a sluggish, which was accompanied by social unrest and political instability. Coup of 1967 was legitimized with the argument to save the country from these conditions. Strengthening of center-left parties which irritated anti-communist soldiers, and the constant interventions of the Palace in the country's political life in the 1960s, created conditions of severe socio-political instability, which in due time “invited” military to intervene. Military was particularly discontent from Andreas Papandreu: his attempts to investigate the relations between Greek intelligence authorities and CIA, his call for restriction of King's power and political neutralization of military raised the tension. Allegations regarding his involvement in a left-wing group in the army, called *Aspida*, increased pro-American groups' desires to dismantle Papandreu, who were supported by public.¹⁴⁸ “Civil war and the anticommunist witch-hunting until 1974 legitimated semi-institutionalised mechanisms of repression [and] provided a pretext for the advent of the colonels in April 1967.”¹⁴⁹

(...) very particular case of the Greek Army as well as the specific conditions under which it intervened in 1967 resulted from a combination of the army's “dual” character and the socio-political uproar originating from outside forces

¹⁴⁷ Danopoulos, p. 42.

¹⁴⁸ Tayfur, p. 60-63.

¹⁴⁹ Nikos Mouzelis and George Pagoulatos, “**Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece**,” National Research Foundation (NRF), 2002, p. 1-17.

Available at: <http://www.aueb.gr/deos/papers/Mouzelis-Pagoulatos-AUEBDiscussion-Paper1.pdf>, accessed on: 11 September 2009.

(the Cold War environment) and domestic factors (the army's complete identification with the monarchy and the political right).¹⁵⁰

As Kouvertaris points out, the Greek military has identified itself with the homeland, owing to its role in securing the national sovereignty and independence of the polity in the years when level of professionalism was minimal. This identification reflected in the way a stereotype Greek soldier thinks: willing to sacrifice his life for the sacred ideals of the homeland, respecting authority, and proud of his country.¹⁵¹ After 1936, the military cultivated a self-concept inspired by contempt for officers who involved themselves in political activity and the conviction that the military were more virtuous and heroic than any civilian group.¹⁵² But after 1945, particularly after entry into NATO; impact of Western Powers became obvious, emotional behaviours of the armed forces were replaced with a more rationalist understanding of their role.¹⁵³

As Tsarouhas argues, "1967 coup was not the product of any one factor, but the result of multiple causes, including Greece's post-war political development; the network of collaboration comprising extremist right-wing elements in the Palace, the army and paramilitary organisations established during the Second World War; and finally the political instability caused by the friction between Papandreou and the King."¹⁵⁴ Moreover, worries about a civilian rule with leftist, and Communist aspirations, created a climate where US favoured a

¹⁵⁰ Tsarouhas, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Kourvetaris, p. 1045-1050.

¹⁵² Veremis, p. 70.

¹⁵³ **Ibid.**, p. 1046-1050.

¹⁵⁴ Tsarouhas, p. 9-10.

military rule with close relations with NATO and US, instead of a civilian rule with Gaullist aspirations, and pro-left ideas.

Military rule after 1967 coup was long, in contrast with Turkish experiences. During its seven year-rule, the military showed no intention to disengage from politics, unless it guaranteed its corporate interests (which were identified after 1945) in long-term. To assure their interests, military officers sought to get support of particular groups: conservative businessmen, shipping bourgeoisie and farmers.¹⁵⁵ The method of keeping their new allies close was to grant economic incentives, like loans, subventions or credits.

To keep their rule this long, Greek military also had to assure the legitimacy and public consent. To legitimize and provide support for their rule, military adopted some constitutional rights, like enabling performance of political parties or freedom of speech. But on the other hand, scope and limits of exercising these rights were determined by the military, as well. In 1968 constitution, chief of army was equipped with a broad range of competence and authority, not only in security and defence matters, but also in bureaucratic and economic/budgetary fields: Military was given complete jurisdiction over civilian affairs.¹⁵⁶ Hence, as Danopoulos argues, the strategy of military was to elevate itself to the top of the state apparatus and transform the armed forces into the country's guiding political organization",¹⁵⁷ with the parallel strategy to keep Hellenistic and Christian values of Greek society alive, and preserve dominance of Greek nationalism, whose existence contributes in legitimization of military's *raison d'être*. This strategy was compatible with US interest and policy, which favoured military instead of King or other potential proponents.

¹⁵⁵ Danopoulos, p. 42-43.

¹⁵⁶ Zaharopoulos, p. 22.

¹⁵⁷ **Idem.**

Even the military took the power with the claim of providing economic and social stability; their success in upgrading economic indicators could not be sustained in global crisis conditions after 1973. Stephen Xydis argues as long as economic indicators was fine, regime seemed to be durable. But when inflation began in 1972, support was reduced.¹⁵⁸ Decrease in agricultural production and industrial output were coupled with heavy bureaucracy, torture, ill treatment, corruption and censorship. Towards the end of Junta regime, the authoritarian military regime has transformed into a personal dictatorship of Papadopoulos. Colonels' use of media and soccer as a tool of depoliticizing the society was not enough to keep people supportive or uninterested. Old Greeks who experienced Civil War were in favour of tranquillity instead of reforms; but the young generation, having inspired by 1968 movement, was dissident: Greek Youth Action was born in these years, stemming from discontent from economic and social conditions.

Indeed, EEC was not content with the existence of a military regime in an associate country. Condemnations from EEC member states were coupled with the suspension of Association Agreement in 1967. The global economic downturn in 1973 and military's lack of flexibility, political sophistication and problem-solving capacity proved army's failure to convince masses on their success. Failure led lack of legitimacy and rise of opposition, where rightist parties were no longer eager to cooperate with Junta Regime, in contrast with previous years when right-oriented parties sought ways of cooperating with army.

Meanwhile, trend of fragmentation within the military became more visible: cleavages observed inside Greek army officers were not only based on positions about future of regime, but also banished military departments in a

¹⁵⁸ Stephen G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-73," **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 89, No.3, Autumn 1974, p. 525-526.

dramatic way. In other words, in addition to a fragmentation among officers on basis of their approach about how to sustain political stability, corporate base of distinction among armed forces were also on the agenda. Thus, navy and air forces with an elite and educated portfolio of officers differentiated more and more from representatives of Colonels' regime, in which middle-class and rural-originated officers with conservative approach were inherent. The elite navy group was in minority, like those who were in favour of an early return to civilian rule. In addition to the civilian rule supporters, two other approach formed two distinct fractions: on the one hand, there were those who aimed to pursue military rule; and on the other, defenders of gradual civilianization who gathered around Papadopoulos.

Papadopoulos attempted, in 1973, to install puppet civilian government in power. "His aim was to ease the internal and external criticism on his regime while at the same time preserving the autonomy and superiority of the military over the politicians, a change which he had brought into force."¹⁵⁹ But, the unwillingness of the hard-liners to follow his plan, and the cleavage within the military resulted with a tapple to colonels. Subsequently after this failed attempt in 1973, came a plebiscite for the adoption of new constitutional measures including civilian rights and lifting the martial law. According to some scholars, the "yes" came out in this plebiscite not only ratified the constitution; but also approved the regime.

In spite of the "yes" votes, credibility of the regime and military rule was down. Particularly when military rulers enabled US to utilize Greek territory as refuelling station en route to Israel in Arab-Israeli War, Junta regime has lost its credibility. The final stroke to junta rule came from Cyprus side.

¹⁵⁹ Karabelias, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

4.2. BREAK-DOWN OF MILITARY RULE AND RETURN TO BARRACKS

The Greek coup in Cyprus for unification (enosis) and the subsequent intervention of Turkish armed forces to Cyprus in 1974 has opened a new era in Greek civil-military relations. The clear-cut civilianization of Greece has reflected in societal and organizational spheres, as well as international relations of Greece, composition of Greek political and economic elite, and military, which enjoyed further professionalism internally.¹⁶⁰ Konstantinos Karamanlis, the ex-Prime Minister of Greece, was considered the best candidate for leading the country during the early post-junta period. After 1974, all political parties, including the Communist Party were legalized. In the following years, political competition was in a larger extent would be between two parties, under charismatic appeal of two leaders: Konstantinos Karamanlis' New Democracy, a conservative party in the right of centre, and Andreas Papandreu's PASOK, a party in the left of centre, but using a radical rhetoric.

“According to Karamanlis, military would have to disengage from politics and confine its activities to the defence of the country.”¹⁶¹ To that end, taking all those measures necessary for the re-establishment of the superiority of the political leaders over the military, Karamanlis avoided from creating professional anxieties to the majority of the office corps. Cyprus issue, memories of the seven-year military regime and the bold political decisions of the Prime Minister, which all contributed to the elimination of the sources of future instability in the country, were bound to re-orient the interest of the

¹⁶⁰ Danopoulos, p. 49.

¹⁶¹ Tayfur, p. 83.

officers towards the external threats of the Greek state rather than its internal security¹⁶²: Threat from North (USSR) was replaced by the threat from East (Turkey). In the following years, PASOK leader Papandreou paid attention to emphasize significant role of military in the preservation of national security. “By praising their total devotion to military duties such as the preservation of national independence and the protection of the country’ democratic institutions, Papandreou was attempting to underline the importance of the officers’ role towards the development of the post-junta Greek state.”¹⁶³

Papandreou maintained a carrot and stick approach towards the military establishment, emphasizing both continuity and change. First of all, he did not attempt to introduce any revolutionary changes on the existing form of civil-military relations in order to avoid making the military personnel feel uncomfortable with his administration.¹⁶⁴

Just after the collapse of Junta regime, Greek government improved relations with EEC, in a climate where economic indicators got better and urban bourgeoisie reached consensus with the government’s actions. Not only on behalf of bourgeoisie, but also among different classes, did democratic institutions of Greece acquire legitimacy. Despite demands for further steps to overcome socio-economic issues, trust in government was high. From the Greek government’s standpoint, EEC accession was important in the sense that European funds and European tourists would lead to economic growth. But, when the economic implications of EEC accession are checked, it is observed that no upgrade in the position within the world economy, (role within the

¹⁶² Karabelias, *op.cit.*, p. 51-52.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁶⁴ *Idem.*

centre-periphery structure) has occurred, due to inefficient investment strategies.¹⁶⁵

Within this political atmosphere, Greek military entered a new phase of professionalization, while dealing with problems with NATO, USA and Turkey. Given the US and CIA role in Colonels' Coup and Papadopoulos' good relations with US¹⁶⁶, the post-disengagement era was associated with anti-US approach. Military's share in budget was increased up to 20%¹⁶⁷, whereas its say was limited to defence and security matters. Welch indicated that "a consistent but limited participation of military keeps them away from barracks". Greek case after 1974, when civilians limited role of military without creating any antagonism, confirms this remark.¹⁶⁸ Indeed, the new constitutional provisions came into force under Karamanlis' government minimized the conditions of military intervention in internal issues, while dressing military up with broad social and economic benefits like special trainings, travelling abroad, foreign language courses and post-retirement career opportunities. Similar measures were taken under Papandreou's rule, as well: The entrance of new cadets were to be based on their own exceptional abilities rather than on the power of their patron(s); and the curricula of the service academies were reformed, removing stringent anti-Communist propaganda and promoting the values of pluralism and ideological diversity.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the communication networks within the military were improved.

¹⁶⁵ Tayfur, p. 88-139.

¹⁶⁶ For more information about US-role in Greek Coup, see Maurice Goldbloom, "United States Policy in Post-War Greece," in "**Greece under Military Rule**," Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (ed.s), London, 1972, p. 229-254.

¹⁶⁷ http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_exp_of_gdp-military-expenditure-of-gdp accessed on: 13 July 2009.

¹⁶⁸ Danopoulos, p. 52.

¹⁶⁹ Danopoulos, p.93.

These new opportunities changed profile of officers and rendered them more professional and kept military away from politics, with the lessons derived from Junta experience. In the new civilian era, no fragmentation of military was to be observed, in a united group of qualified and unified staff. As Danopoulos confirms, appointing Naval and Air-Force Generals to the position of the Chairman of the General Staff, “was a clear indication that the new government favoured the development of three services, equal with one another and each one independent from the other two.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁷⁰ **Idem.**

4.3. CONSOLIDATION OF CIVILIAN RULE IN LINE WITH DEMOCRACY: DOES EU MATTER?

The era between 1980 and 1995 indicated unwillingness of military to engage in politics even in cases of political disagreement. When PASOK was the ruling party, no intervention took place. Karabelias points out that the same attitude continued in 1990s, too.

(...) the non-interventionist behaviour which the military personnel displayed towards the undesired policy of the Mitsotakis in 1990 and the Papandreou in 1993 (...) revealed how strong were the roots of democratic consolidation in post-junta Greece.¹⁷¹

Unlike the period before 1970s, Greek military unified around commonly defined national interests. The identification of Communism¹⁷² with threat to Greek nationhood and territorial integrity was replaced with the threat coming from NATO-ally Turkey, due to Cyprus and Aegean disputes. Identification of the new enemy helped unification and solidarity among armed forces in post-1974 era. The bitter experiences associated with restriction of rights and

¹⁷¹ Karabelias, p. 55.

¹⁷² P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 'Politics and Constitutionalism in Greece: The 1975 Constitution in Historical Perspective', in Houchang Chehabi and Alfred Stepan (eds), **"Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies: Essays in Honor of Juan Linz,"** Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1995, Vol. 3, p. 289, quoted in Duman, Özkan and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "'Civilianization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarization' in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union," **Armed Forces & Society** Vol 32, No.3, April 2006, p. 409.

freedoms during the pre-dictatorship period “became the compass of party leaders for the construction of a new political system.”¹⁷³ Political parties in post-junta period paid attention to provide civilian supremacy so as not to infringe democratic transition. In line with this intention, development of civil society and stronger party-structures was encouraged.

Moreover, the social and economic characteristics of officer corps have been subjected to change. The new military profile has been comprised of soldiers with an urban origin, high level of professionalization and content with the profession. By themselves, military class formed an elite group, with their own corporate interests, which were respected and attempted to be satisfied by civilian governments without any military intervention.

Membership of the exclusive “club” of “developed” and “advanced” Western countries was seen as the best shield against any attempts which intended to undermine the country’s process towards democratic consolidation. However, role of EU in Greece is not as salient as it is for Turkey, as far as democratic consolidation and introduction of civilian control over military are concerned. This is due to timing of accession in the European Union. In the years when Greece improved relations with the Union and got full membership, improvement of civil-military relations were not among the pre-requisites or the criteria. It is particularly after the end of Cold War when EU and NATO urged potential members to have proved civilian oversight over military. Just as NATO has no role in the improvement of civil-military relations in Turkey; EU can not be deemed to be the major factor or actor leading to civilianization in Greece. As stated by Susannah Verney, the EU factor, is an indirect factor that made the difference by forcing various interest groups, to comply with

¹⁷³ Michalis Spourdalakis, “Securing Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Greece”, Pridham Geoffrey and Paul Lewis (eds), “**Stabilising Fragile Democracies**,” New York, Routledge, 1996, p.169.

stringent membership conditions with regard to their roles in public life. The European Union's calling for sweeping democratization in civil society and the armed forces as a precondition for membership strengthened the hand of Karamanlis, who was in favour of civilian rule, in the crucial years after 1974.¹⁷⁴ As Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas argue:

EU membership was therefore a safety valve for the irreversibility of democratic practices. The new democratic elite used the EU factor shrewdly to establish a hierarchical pattern of decision making whereby the armed forces would be subordinate to civilian leadership. (...) The military, faced with a new set of circumstances resulting from the popular government's repeated calls for EU entry and its own reduced credibility, duly obliged. Furthermore, the 'Europeanization of political perspectives' allowed Greek politicians, civil servants and officials to internalize the norms and procedures of a democratically structured polity and transmit them to the wider public.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Verney and Couloumbis, p.208.

¹⁷⁵ Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "'Civilianization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarization' in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union," **Armed Forces & Society**, Vol. 32, No. 3, April 2006, p. 413-414.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Role of military in politics is not stable and monotone. Instead, it is adoptable to changing conjuncture and altering interests of military institution. In this context, civil-military relations have undergone a wind of change in time, particularly in the phases of democratization. When the improvement of Greek civil-military relations is checked, role of European Union is worthy to note, as an assurance of civilian oversight over military. The EU brought about an evolution of military from a ruler-type praetorianism towards an arbitrator-type instrument that assures security in its narrowest definition. In Turkish case, it might be claimed that the military was far from being a ruler-praetorian type, despite some exceptional tendencies in temporary military rules. As far as the civil-military relations in Turkey are concerned, the major accelerating actor and factor in this democratization process is the European Union. EU deems itself is not only as the defender and promoter of democratic principles, including democratic control of armed forces. Above all, it identifies the rules of democratic governance of security sector as a benchmark of sound democratic system for its candidates.

Claiming that EU has developed a homogenous and uniform policy and set of rules regarding civil-military relations will not be true, for the time being. EU asks for providing civilian oversight over military and democratic governance of armed forces as a condition of membership. Even EU had a pejorative view

towards military interventions in practice; neither document nor case law of EU cited this issue in a clear way. After the end of Cold War, it is only regular reports or accession partnership documents where EU asked from candidate states to ensure civilian oversight over military through specific measures.

As an earlier member of EU, Greece has not been subjected to complicated expectations or comprehensive to-do-lists in order to convince the Union about supremacy of democracy and civilians over military. Hence, Greece passed through the examination of democratic governance of civil-military relations easily, by foreclosing legal and political mechanisms that would enable military to take the rule again. Sound operation of democratic parliamentary system also supported the hand of Greece, in terms of assuring implementation of general European norms of the period in question.

As the enlargement of EU covered former East-Bloc countries, the EU paid more attention to the adoption of democratic principles as a condition of accession. The partnership between NATO and EU to assist democratic transition of Eastern and Central European states brought about new measures to be applied in prospective member states for both organizations. Turkey, as an old NATO member and an EU candidate, poses a unique case. Turkey is subject to the criteria set by EU, which makes references to OSCE, UN and NATO principles and which accepts several benchmarks. These benchmarks are,

- Legislative and constitutional background, enabling civilian supremacy and limiting military's involvement in politics
- Accountability of military officers and institutions towards parliament
- Transparency of military expenditures and budgetary issues of military
- Transparency in decision-making mechanisms in the military

Apart from the codified rules for the assurance of civilian oversight, declarations of public figures representing EU side (EU Commissioners, European Parliamentarians, etc.) has a significant impact on the society, in terms of opening of specific issues to discussion. Limitation of military's role to security, re-definition of national security concept and education of military personnel in line with a non-interventionist approach are among the major points raised.¹⁷⁶ The expectations of these figures give hints of the EU's future policy on civil-military relations. The insistence on emphasizing civil-military relations as an area that needs to be reformed and proved to be in line with EU norms reveal that Turkey is perceived not to fulfil the EU standards. Worthy to note, the negative evaluations of unsatisfied EU figures decreases public trust in EU, in a time when significant steps are taken to reform such sensitive and controversial fields.

The process of reforming the civil-military relations has been one of the most difficult steps, like other steps taken to comply with democratic principles of the *acquis*, since it meant breaking a taboo. Being the most trustworthy institution and one of the most powerful militaries of the world, Turkish military enjoyed a privileged position, supported by a high level of public consent and legitimacy. Even the coups were seen by a great segment of public as necessary steps to re-establish public order and peace. This is mainly due to the well-defined role of military, which is constitutionally assigned to protect and preserve the nation and the territory against internal and external threats.

Not only public, but also interest groups, some segments of intelligentsia and even the politicians are in favour of preserving military's active and effective status. This is resulted from a security-focused point of view, which is not surprising to witness in a country which has a significant strategic position and

¹⁷⁶ "Lagendijk'tan Sınırlı Ordu Mesajı," CNN TURK, 22.11.2009, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2009/turkiye/11/22/lagendijktan.sinirli.ordu.mesaji/552660.0/index.html> accessed on: 28.12.2009.

which has at least two unsolved social and security-related problems: Kurdish Separatism and Islamic Fundamentalism. These two “internal threats” against the territorial integrity of Turkey and basic secular principles of Turkish Republic have been defined by military as the two major enemies with a potential to damage the survival of the Republic of Turkey. Military’s task to protect national security against these defined threats is internalized by broad segments of citizens. This public support provides legitimacy and consent for military’s actions.

Since 2003, Turkish Government accelerated its efforts to fulfil the criteria imposed by EU, through path-breaking reforms and regulations. The co-existence of EU and JDP, which has Islamist roots that were challenged by the military for a long time, paved the way for acceleration of reform attempts. But the way these reforms are undertaken gives hint of a strategy of establishing subjective control over the military, which renders army an organization whose long lasting legitimacy and dignity is curbed.

Since Turkish military does not obviously reject or block the reform attempts to improve civil-military relations, it might be stated that the attitudinal component of democratic consolidation is assured. The ongoing reform process provides another component of democratization in Turkey: the constitutional one. However, opposition arising in different segments of society or some military officials indicated lack of behavioural-level adoption of democratic consolidation.

In line with the lack of consolidation of democracy in all layers; EU, not satisfied with the steps taken, has come up with criticisms regarding the practice of these reforms and demands for further reforms in each progress report. Still, Turkey has to prove accountability of military institutions, transparency in military expenditures and limitation of military involvement in

daily political matters, in order to satisfy European circles. These initial steps constitute the core part of the reform in security sector as a whole. EU tends to interpret security sector as a concept which includes police, gendarmerie and intelligence authorities. Sensitive and radical topics like conscientious objection has not been pronounced by EU as a criterion yet, but the evolution of EU norms gives hints of dismissal of obligatory military service and inclusion of conscientious objection as new principles in long run. In this case, not only Turkey, but also Greece will be subjected to criticisms and challenges. As an EU member, Greece has not adopted elimination of compulsory military service, which is expected to be a discussion topic in EU in mid run.

With regard to democratization, civil-military relations have been an immune ground, which has not been questioned or spoken out for years. It is European Union what opened discussion and questioning about the role of armed forces in politics. Just like other attempts of democratization, role of an external actor, EU is the main motivation that pushes Turkey towards reform. Even though the reforms adopted until now has not been satisfactorily applied, initiating discussions and questioning the military's role in Turkish politics have been the most significant outcome of this long-term process. In time, as Turkey takes further steps towards harmonizing the legislation and practices with those of EU, and as the European Union determines more specific and homogenous benchmarks to reach the (not yet defined) civilian oversight over military, civil-military relations is going to be one of the well-defined key patterns of democracy, which Turkey complies with. This process does not seem to be easy, since EU is expected to find it hard to balance its security and defence needs on the one hand, and to provide democratic governance of civil-military relations on the other, as a powerful supranational organization to be.

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