

ECEVIT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONALISM:
A UNIQUE POSITION OR A SYNCRETIC VISION?

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is the analysis of Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism. It also involves a review of contemporary theories of nationalism and academic works on nationalism in Turkey. The thesis is organised as analysis of Ecevit's nationalism within time intervals in order to elaborate on the consistency of his conception nationalism along his long political life. The major source for analysis is Ecevit's speeches in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, his books, articles and declarations. In this sense, Ecevit's meaning giving process to nationalism is researched.

Keywords: Bülent Ecevit, Nationalism

ÖZ

ECEVİT'İN MİLLİYETÇİLİK ANLAYIŞI: ÖZGÜN BİR DURUŞ MU, SİNKRETİK BİR GÖRÜŞ MÜ?

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Bu tez, Bülent Ecevit'in milliyetçilik anlayışının bir analizidir. Tez ayrıca çağdaş milliyetçilik kuramlarının ve Türkiye'deki milliyetçilik üzerine yapılan akademik çalışmaların bir incelemesini de içermektedir. Tezde, Ecevit'in milliyetçiliği zaman aralıkları içinde incelenerek O'nun milliyetçilik anlayışının uzun siyasal yaşamı süresince tatarlılığa sahip olup olmadığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Ecevit'in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde yaptığı konuşmaları, kitapları, makaleleri, açıklamaları analizin temel kaynaklarını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Ecevit'in milliyetçiliğe anlam verme süreci araştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bülent Ecevit, Milliyetçilik

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism has been an important dimension of Turkish politics. But, it is not possible to talk about a single ‘nationalism’. On the contrary, there are ‘nationalisms’ in Turkish politics and Turkish political thought. As a momentous political character in Turkey, Bülent Ecevit’s conception of nationalism needs to be analysed in comprehensive manner to depict its peculiarity. In this thesis, my attention is centred upon the analysis of both Ecevit’s attitude towards nationalism and the nationalist dimension of his political discourse.

The thesis has four major chapters in addition to the introduction and the conclusion. In the introduction section, there are two main points to be identified. The first one is the description of the thesis in which I outline the sources that are used and the main problem of my thesis. In the introduction, I also discuss my methodology. The second chapter is an evaluation of academic literature on nationalism in two dimensions, i.e. a general discussion on nationalism and specific discussion on Turkey. The following chapter has two sections. The first component of this chapter is a brief narration of Bülent Ecevit’s political life and discourse. The second part of this chapter covers the evaluation of Ecevit’s nationalism up to 1966 until he becomes the secretary general of Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the forerunner of a political movement known as the ‘left of centre’. I find it reasonable to refer to the period up to 1966 as the early-political period of his political career. The other two chapters are designated as time intervals. The period from 1966 to 1980 is analysed in the fourth chapter. This period covers also his leadership in the CHP. The fifth chapter encompasses the period from the 1980 coup to his death in 2006.

1.1- Description of Thesis

In this section, I point out my research topic, the problem to be investigated, sources to be used and methodology in my thesis. In the first part, there are some arguments with which I try to justify the relevance of analysing my research problem. In the second part, I briefly introduce my methodology covering ontological and epistemological structure of my thesis, my research method, research strategy, and research paradigm.

To begin with, it would not be an exaggerated argument to state that nationalism has been one of the most determinative parameters of Turkish politics. Yet, it is always problematic to categorise political movements, political leaders or ideologies as 'nationalist' without identifying the type. Nationalism cannot be conceived as a specific category because it includes various outlooks, ideologies or movements having substantial differences. In fact various perspectives have to be considered even theoretically and conceptually.

In my thesis, I analyse Bülent Ecevit's nationalism to discuss its peculiar characteristics. The characteristics of his nationalism would help me to locate his position within very broad category of nationalism: Is Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism a unique position or a syncretic vision?

I strongly believe that analysing Ecevit's understanding of nationalism with its cultural, social, political and economic aspects seems to be relevant for a reasonable academic research.

Having an inclusive national identity conception, the emphasis on full independence in political and economic realms, strong adherence to national interests and pride could be regarded as major components of his nationalism. I will look into whether there have been common grounds on which both Atatürk and Ecevit articulated nationalisms and to what extent Ecevit's nationalism is a

rearticulation of Atatürk's nationalism. For example, in this context the concepts of national identity and 'Turkishness' can be used as examples of comparison. Ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, historical and territorial accounts of Turkishness would vary as the strength and intensity change in the perception of nationalism. Especially in the 1990s and onwards, while sub-identities gained importance and sometimes these sub-identities claimed the upper hand, Ecevit's conception of national identity might appear both to defend the '*status quo*'¹ and to deny cultural variations. The reasons for such a perception concerning Ecevit's nationalism need to be evaluated. In this respect, it might be assumed that in the face of the Kurdish movement organised around an adherence to a distinctive Kurdish identity Ecevit insistently distances himself and his party (DSP) from this movement, and such position may be explicable by reference to the above-mentioned perception.

Another point of analysis will be the concept of economic nationalism. Ecevit once claimed, "Nationalism in Democratic Left sense requires, also, nationalism in the economic field; it is against external exploitation, as well as internal exploitation" (1975b: 6). Economic nationalism might be an important aspect of his nationalism and this point requires elaboration as well. How far this economic nationalism is to be related to the understanding and arguments of Third World nationalism and/or dependency school will be one of the issues to be researched.

By claiming the economic dimension of his nationalism in the Democratic Left sense he implies an attempt to encounter the problem of exploitation with the project of nationalism. In this context, being a leftist or social democratic leader,

¹ For the advocates of this outlook, 'status quo' means strong adherence to 'Turkishness' as the national identity in Turkey. For example, Baskın Oran (2004: 38) focuses on the concept of 'minority' and he tries to justify the inconvenience of the formal declaration of Republic of Turkey depending on the Lausanne Treaty in which only non-Muslims are declared 'minorities'. The major argument is that the identities of the so-called 'minority' groups such as Kurds, Alevi, Arabs, etc. are in conflict with 'Turkishness' as the national identity in Turkey. Oran argues that the 'Turkishness' needs to be replaced by *Türkiyelilik* as the supra-identity (Oran, 2004: 134).

Bülent Ecevit conceptualised '*ulusal sol*' (national left).² *Ulusal sol* is a principle ratified in the General Congress of Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) in 2004. However, compatibility of such a conceptualisation with internationalist views or claims of social democracy or leftist outlooks in general, should be discussed. In other words, treating nationalism and internationalism as mutually exclusive concepts might result in a contradiction within the discourse of the *ulusal sol* conceptualisation. The meaning and elements of Ecevit's *ulusal sol* should be examined carefully to understand such a dilemma. It is also relevant to put forward whether Ecevit's *ulusal sol* is an ideology of nationalism. Moreover, distinguishing Ecevit's conceptualisation of '*ulusal sol*' among other leftist is an important point. It is necessary to analyse whether Ecevit has a unique understanding of *ulusal sol* or his ideas resemble other *ulusal sol* political movements in Turkey. It is also necessary to see interaction and tensions between him and his contemporaries concerning *ulusal sol* ideologies.

Indeed, the historical and intellectual background of nationalism in Turkish political and intellectual life dates back to the last decades of Ottoman Empire. Especially the foundation of the Republic of Turkey accommodates such an influence. Following the foundation of the Republic, the Republican People's Party (CHP), of which Ecevit was the chairperson from 1972 to 1980, represents a 'nationalist' modernisation project.³ Some intellectual circles, to which the CHP or Ecevit himself is close, encompass left and 'national' ideals. *Kadro* and *Yön* are the most prominent examples of them. The former refers to 1930s and the latter (*Yön*), in which Ecevit takes part, survived in the 1960s. Setting up the relationship between them is important to understand the ideological context associated with 'nationalist' and socialist features. Because of this, the influence of

² In this thesis, I use the term *ulusal sol*, rather than its English translation (national left) since in Ecevit's discourse; it has a peculiar meaning that the English translation might not cover properly.

³ I use the term 'nationalist' to describe the modernisation project of CHP since there was an aim of creating 'Turkish citizens' in contrast to being Ottoman subjects. I will turn back to this discussion in the conclusion chapter.

that historical and intellectual background should be examined in order to understand the process through which Ecevit articulated 'nationalism'.

The other important point to be analysed is the relationship between Ecevit's nationalism and populism. Ecevit is known with populism and identified with the famous catchword of '*Halkçı Ecevit*', meaning populist Ecevit. Moreover, the metaphor of '*Karaoğlan*', is associated with Ecevit, is a combination both patriotic and populist reflections. However, it should be noted that my thesis would not entail a comprehensive evaluation of populism. I would rather limit my research to the points of interaction of populist and patriotic elements of Ecevit's discourse.

Another question I will ask: whether there are any differences within Ecevit's discourse in different time intervals regarding his nationalism. Moreover, has the intensity of the nationalist pattern in his discourse changed over time? If so, what are the economic, social and political conditions, or atmosphere in which Ecevit grips on nationalist patterns? Testing a consistent and coherent conception of nationalism in Ecevit's thinking would help me to clarify it in a more comprehensive manner.

I will also refer to the policies and practices of the various Ecevit governments, as well as his discourse, to exemplify his understanding of nationalism. In this regard, I will examine, for example, his intervention in the Cyprus issue in 1974 and his consequential policy; his coalition government with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP) following the April 1999 elections. The coalition with two right wing parties, one of which claims to monopolise Turkish nationalism, may have had important repercussions on the nationalism of Ecevit government. I also assume that the limitations on the commitment to nationalism in the era of neo-liberal hegemony and intensified tendency for globalisation during his last premiership between 1999 and 2002 exemplify a fluctuant situation.

To put it briefly, my major concern is underlining the basic components of Ecevit's nationalism in order to argue for its peculiarity. His speeches, books, articles, poems, declarations, electoral manifestos, party programs, policy proposals and implementations are the major sources of this analysis. These sources are evaluated as the first-hand materials on which I construct my thesis. At this point, I would like to introduce my methodology in a more detailed way.

1.2- Methodology

Methodologically speaking, idealist ontology together with a constructionist epistemology along with an interpretive methodology will be used in this research. In the idealist ontology, the external world is perceived as consisting of representations created by individual minds. The reality is made or constructed by the human beings themselves. Social action is not merely behaviour but has a process of meaning giving. In researching Ecevit's conception of nationalism, it is important to analyse how he gives meaning to nationalism. In this sense, there will be commitment to a constructionist epistemology.

The inter-subjectivity of such knowledge requires an interpretive method. I believe that by interpreting Ecevit's discourse, I can reach a conclusion concerning his conception of nationalism. Therefore, I will use a combination of inductive and abductive research strategies. This combination would be relevant as far as my research problem to be investigated is representing the basic needs for it.

The texts written by Ecevit, the speeches given by him, the policies implemented or proposed by him need to be analysed and interpreted in a critical manner in order to depict the meaning giving process. Therefore, abductive research strategy which "involves constructing theories that are derived from social actors' language, meanings and accounts in the context of everyday activities" (Blakie, 2007: 89) seems to be convenient. In this respect, for example, I analyse Ecevit's speeches in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey between 1959 and 2002.

This research strategy takes into account the meanings and interpretations, the motives and intentions that social actors make use of in their lives and direct their behaviour. As Blakie (2007: 90) puts it, “the social world is the world perceived and experienced by its members, from the ‘inside’. The social scientist’s task is to discover and describe this ‘insider’ view, not to impose an ‘outsider’ view on it”.

Hermeneutics as a research paradigm that is based on interpretation of texts is useful in this thesis. For Blakie (2007: 117), “however, the relevance of hermeneutics to contemporary social science lies in the possibility of regarding as texts the records made of social life, and in the application of these approaches to their interpretation”. Besides, interpretation of textual sources, Ecevit’s discourse should not be disregarded as well. Developing a healthy interpretive model would be responsive to my need in this research.

In conclusion, I introduced my research problem and some aspects of it in the first part. The peculiarity of Bülent Ecevit’s conception of nationalism is my research topic in this thesis. The second part is composed of the methodological points in my research. As I noted above, idealist ontology, constructionist epistemology, interpretive method, combination of inductive and abductive research strategies, hermeneutics as a research paradigm are the methodological features of my thesis.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

This section consists of two major parts. In the first part, there are general discussions on the theories of nationalism with reference to some significant scholars of this subject. For example, Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolic approach involves a sound categorisation of nationalisms to which I refer in the whole thesis. In the second part, there is a discussion on Turkish nationalism(s). In order to argue for the peculiarity of Ecevit's conception of nationalism, it is relevant to put forward some major nationalist outlooks and movements in Turkey beforehand. These discussions provide me with the essential theoretical framework of this research.

The academic literature on nationalism encompasses variety of different outlooks, theories, paradigms, and typologies. In this sense, there is a 'rich' academic resource. In this thesis, there is an annotated review of literature for the purpose of analysing Ecevit's perspective on nationalism. In order to slightly move on to the subject matter of this thesis, it would be proper to refer to some theories on nationalism very briefly.

In relation to the evaluation of Ecevit's nationalism, I focus on some key concepts and notions. For example, I will make use of Gellner's, Kohn's, Hobsbawm's, Smith's and Anderson's definitions of 'nation' and 'nationalism' in this research. The typologies of nationalism, the relationship between nationalism and patriotism,⁴ national unity, economic nationalism, the relationship between his

⁴ The Turkish term of '*yurtseverlik*' with the meaning of 'love of country' is translated in English as 'patriotism'. I use 'patriotism' with reference to *yurtseverlik* throughout this research.

conception of populism and nationalism, Turkishness, *Türkiyelilik*, Anatolianism, imperialism, colonialism are the key concepts and notions of my research.

2.1- Theories of Nationalism

It is not possible for the concept of ‘nation’ to date its modern use back earlier than the 18th Century (Hobsbawm, 1993: 17). And in this research, I will focus on the modern connotations of nation. Since analyses of the concepts of nation and nationalism are interdependent, I will concentrate on their relationship. In this part of this section, I will elaborate more on the works of late-20th Century scholars. There are two sets of academic discussions on the precedence of nationalism or nations. I believe that nationalism precedes modern nations. In this sense, I firstly elaborate on the usages of nationalism.

The term nationalism reflects many usages in today’s world. Anthony D. Smith (2001: 5-6) exemplifies these usages as such: “a process of formation, or growth, of nations; a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; a language and symbolism of the nation; a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular”. As these usages imply, nationalism is a very wide concept to analyse.

In the 19th Century, there are two postulated tendencies. The first one is sympathetic to nationalism and the other one is against it.⁵ Nevertheless, the first intention should be to understand nationalism properly, rather than defending or discrediting it. It should be noted that, emergence of nationalism as an object of inquiry corresponds to the 20th Century. In this context, referring to 20th century theories of nationalism would be useful.

⁵ In *Milliyetçilik Kuramları-Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, U. Özkırımlı (2008: 42-43) mentions this distinction by naming the first approach as ‘partisan’ and the latter as ‘critical’. The first group is usually composed of historians like von Treitschke and Michelet. Marxists who perceive nationalism as a temporary phase in the historical development process usually accept the second approach.

There are two kinds of works on nationalism, in the first half of 20th Century. The first group of works focus on the histories of certain nationalisms. The characteristic of these researches is the lack of inquiry concerning the presence of nationalism (Özkırımlı, 2008: 59).

The second group of works are the definite typologies of nationalism. For example, Hayes' (1931) typology consists of humanitarian, traditional, Jacobin, liberal, economic and integral nationalisms. For Smith (1999: 36), this typology “describe(s) pure types rather than concrete trends or instances, which in practice mingle the different strands, they do sensitise us to the complexities of nationalist ideology”.

Smith (1999: 36) considers Hans Kohn's typology that is based on ‘dichotomy of Western-voluntaristic and Eastern-organic nationalism’ as having more influence. ‘Rationalist, optimistic, and pluralist’ character of nationalism in France, England and America differentiates it from authoritarian and more emotional nationalism in the East. As Smith (1999: 37) notes it, Kohn sets this distinction on the basis of strength and aspirations of middle classes.

Kohn (1944: 16), seeing “nationalism and nationality closely interrelated” defines nationalism as such:

Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognises the nation-state as the ideal form of political organisation and nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare.

This definition of nationalism above mentions the link between nationalism as a state of mind, nationality as a cultural source, nation-state as a political organisation, economic well-being and loyalty of man. This comprehensive and multi-faceted definition of nationalism would signify a shift to a new era in the researches on nationalism following the Second World War.

After the Second World War, in the second half of the 20th Century, there is an intensified interest in researches on nationalism with the collapse of colonial empires and emergence of new nation-states. In this era, the initial works usually belong to the researchers of modernisation school. Process of 'nation-building' is the major focus of these works that draw attention to the distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies and to the transition from former to latter. Apter, Coleman, Binder, Halpern, Pye, Geertz, Emerson, Lerner, Deutsch, Gellner and Benedict Anderson are seen as modernist theoreticians (Özkırıklı, 2008: 62-67).

To illustrate, Brendan O'Leary (1997: 191) says that Gellner's theory is a remarkable modernist explanation of nationalism. Departing from congruency of political and national entity, Gellner (1983: 1) perceives nationalism as a political principle implicating to be a sentiment or a movement.⁶ This line of thought prevents nations from being seen as 'given' and unchanging categories. Nationalism takes pre-existed cultures and converts them into nations.

For Gellner (1964: 169), "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist". Nationalism sometimes invents nations, and usually distorts existing cultures (Gellner, 1964: 43). In this sense, nationalism precedes nations. This means that state or nationalism is not created by nation, but the reverse is prevailing (Hobsbawm, 1993: 24).

After these brief introductory notes concerning theories of nationalism, now I will focus on Anderson's and Smith's theories of nationalism in a more detailed manner. Since Anderson's book is published before Smith's book, namely,

⁶ Gellner discerns sentimental aspect of nationalism. This aspect will be referred to in the analysis of Ecevit's perception of nationalism as a sentiment in the following chapters. At this point, manifesting Gellner's definition of nationalism in his words would be meaningful. He (1983: 1) says, "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind."

'National Identity', I will firstly focus on Anderson's approach. Through the end of evolution of Anderson's theory, I will also refer to the dependency approach.

2.1.1- Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities

Regarding researches on nationalism, Benedict Anderson's 'Imagined Communities' is an important work published in 1983.⁷ According to Anderson (1993: 20), things become complicated when nationalism is categorised as an ideology. It would be uncomplicated if it is understood as if it is related to 'kinship' or 'religion' (Anderson, 1993: 20). In this sense, his definition of nation is improved with an anthropological intention. As Anderson (1993: 20) puts it, "it (nation) is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".

There are four components of this definition. Firstly, for him, the nation is *imagined* since "the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 1993: 20). He makes a comparison between Gellner's term of 'invention' concerning nations and his term of 'imagining'. He says that Gellner uses 'invention' closer to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation' (Anderson, 1993: 21). Secondly, the reason for the *limited* nature of this imagination is that beyond even the largest nation in the world there are finite boundaries that are demarcating other nations (Anderson, 1993: 21). It is impossible for a nation to imagine itself matching up with the all humanity (Anderson, 1993: 21). Thirdly, imagining the nation as *sovereign* is related to the birth of this notion in the era of Enlightenment and Revolution in which the divine legitimacy of hierarchically ordered dynastic realm were eroded (Anderson, 1993: 21). Lastly, imagining the nation as a *community* is due to a comradeship of its members (Anderson, 1993: 22). It is this

⁷ Anderson's book was published in 1983. In this thesis, its Turkish translation (*Hayali Cemaatler*) published in 1993 will be referred to.

feeling of horizontal fraternity which is above any kind of inequality or exploitation in the eyes its members that renders the voluntary martyrdom possible (Anderson, 1993: 22).

For Anderson (1993: 26), the cultural roots of nationalism have vital significance and role in understanding the source of great sacrifices for the sake of the limited imaginations. Rather than perceiving nationalism as a political ideology in the first place, his proposal is to examine nationalism not with reference to broad cultural systems that came before it and gave way to the birth of it (Anderson, 1993: 26). For Anderson, the imagination of nations became possible at the time and place in which three basic and unquestioned cultural perceptions lost their significance and influence.

The first one is the thought of a sacred script-language, which was an exclusive bridge to the ontological truth of the divinity since it was a component of it. Different from nationalism, as the truth-languages, Church Latin or Quranic Arabic had the capacity of 'alchemic absorption' through conversion (Anderson, 1993: 29). It was due to this capacity of the sacred language when Hadrianus IV (Nicholas Breakspear) as an 'Englishman' became the Pope or Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim became the Khalif as a Turk.

Secondly, it was believed that the divine source of monarch's legitimacy placed him at the highest rank of natural organisation of society (Anderson, 1993: 51). The loyalty to the ruler was same as the sacred-language since it was inherent part of the truth. Anderson (1993: 36) writes, "many dynasts had for some time been reaching for a 'national' cachet as the old principle of legitimacy withered slightly away".

The third one is about association of cosmology and history with a temporality perception. He (1993: 39) argues that

What has come to take place of the medieval conception of simultaneity-along-time is (...) an idea of homogeneous, empty time, in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.

This transformation in apprehensions of time is important for the emergence of the nation as an imagined community and this can be seen in the “basic structure of two forms of imagining which first flowered in Europe in the 18th Century: the novel and the newspaper” (Anderson, 1993: 39). Changes in economic, scientific discoveries and spread of new and rapid communication systems eroded the interlinked certainties mentioned above while breaking history off from cosmology (Anderson, 1993: 51).

The impact of print-capitalism in this process was profound.⁸ Capitalism had stimulated vernacularization in a revolutionary way through which national consciousness was strengthened. At the first place, the character of Latin language started to change after it had gained an esoteric aspect. This was due to a differentiation from Church Latin as the trans-European intelligentsia’s interest on literature of antiquity increased (Anderson, 1993: 54). Secondly, there had been an effect of print-capitalism on the success of Protestant Reformation, which destroyed the stronghold of Latin by vernacularization (Anderson, 1993: 54-55). Thirdly, some monarchs made use of vernacularization for strengthening administrative centralisation (Anderson, 1993: 56). This also eroded the position of Latin language. In the historical process, the print-capitalism helped vernaculars to become more stable and uniform. To put it briefly, Anderson asserts the correlation between national consciousness and lingual diversification through vernacularization.

Anderson refers to Tom Nairn’s approach in order to address the populist nature in the birth of nationalism. Nairn (2003: 328) says, “the new middle-class

⁸ Print-capitalism refers to mass publication of books, newspapers, religious texts, etc. following the invention of mechanical printing press.

intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood". In spite of its coherence when making an account of vernacularization in Europe, I have to point out the fact that Nairn refers to populist resort in the quotation above to describe the situation in anti-colonialist movements. Anderson here seems not to indicate the contextual difference in Nairn's explanation. For Anderson (1993: 98), the populist character of the first European nationalisms was evident: abolishing of serfdom and slavery, prompting mass education, broadening suffrage, recognising the vernaculars as formal languages, etc. In this context, the popular nationalisms became models of independent nation-states in the second decade of 19th Century.⁹

As Anderson (1993: 99-128) notes it, official nationalisms came to the fore as a response of multi-national empires to the popular nationalisms. Especially, in the second half of the 19th Century, while general acceptance of idea of 'nation' had increased in all over Europe, there emerged a tendency of coming closer to a national identity in the European-Mediterranean monarchies to the extent that they recognised which vernacular as language of the state (Anderson, 1993: 101). For example, the dynasties of Romanov, Hanover and Hohenzollern discovered that they had been Russian, English and German (Anderson, 1993: 101). This process gave birth to the 'official nationalism' as Seton-Watson conceptualises.¹⁰ For Anderson (1993: 102), the Russification policies of Romanovs are the best-suited illustration of official nationalism. The conservative if not retrogressive policies of official nationalism seemed to be a harbour of ruling classes not only in Europe but also in regions of Africa and Asia while the distinction between dynastic realm and nation was attempted to be hidden (Anderson, 1993: 126-127). This had not been a smooth process. On the contrary, there emerged many contradictions in

⁹ Hobsbawm (1993: 64-101) names this similar historical situation 'popular proto-nationalism'. He evaluates the role of vernacular languages, ethnic and racial patterns, religion, culture and the elite in relation to the advance of proto-national identifications.

¹⁰ In the fourth chapter of his book, *Nations and States*, Seton-Watson refers to multi-national empires of Eastern Europe and makes the conceptualisation of 'official nationalism'. Anderson borrows this conceptualisation from him in order to use it in a broader context rather than limiting it to the Eastern Europe.

the whole world as there were Slovaks to be Magyarized, Indians to be Anglicised, Koreans to be Japanified, etc (Anderson, 1993: 127).

In the 20th Century, there appeared the last wave of nationalism in the colonised regions of Africa and Asia. The characteristic of this last wave was that they were combination of both vernacular-based popular nationalisms and imperial-official nationalisms of Europe (Anderson, 1993: 157). The bilingual intelligentsia in these regions had copied and adopted this model with combining different components of it and then they imagined their own communities in national terms. This last wave is considered to be a reaction to the global imperialism, which was resulted from the success of industrial capitalism. The anti-imperialist, Third World nationalisms of the 20th Century can be categorised within the last wave of nationalism. Since there is a temporal overlap of the last wave and my thesis subject, I would like to elaborate more on this issue.

The economic aspects of nationalism are worth mentioning if we intend to understand the conditionality behind the schools of thought reflecting an anti-imperialist approach. The dependency theory is one of the most influential among these schools of thought. The dependency theory emerged as a critique of modernisation school (Leys, 2005: 112).¹¹ The dependency theory scholars

¹¹ In order to understand the nature of the dependency theory, we need to touch on its relation to early modernisation school. In the post-second-world-war era, there emerged a classification of countries as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd worlds. Early modernisation school dealt with the 3rd world with the aim of preventing the 3rd world countries from taking the ‘wrong’ side and of showing the way to become the 1st world countries. There were increasing numbers of studies envisaging what then should be the new world order.

Peace, prosperity and order for all people were the basic intentions of the new world order. Therefore, decolonisation had to be achieved. However, the experience was different than the formulation of one, new world order and bipolar world occurred. It was imperative from the western point of view that the newly emerging powers, which were the 3rd world countries, should be incorporated with the 1st world, at least in a ‘limited geography’. According to the containment strategy of the US, this limited geography should be expanded (Kissenger, 2008: 427-453).

The 1st world had been described as ‘free world’ and then the 1st world tired to make 3rd world to believe that it could be like the 1st world. In this context, “modernisation referred to the process of transition from traditional to modern principles of social organisation” (Leys, 1996: 66). In the categorisation of traditional versus modern societies, there had been some features attributed to

argued that one could not identify or analyse ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies independent of each other. The modern societies had exploited the traditional ones and they became developed. For them, this was the basic *explanan* for the underdevelopment of the traditional ones. They called the traditional societies ‘satellite’ or ‘periphery’ whereas the modern ones were ‘metropole’ or ‘core’. They asserted that the traditional societies had been dependent upon the modern ones with an asymmetric relation since core countries were capital-surplus countries while the periphery ones were capital-deficit countries. Leys (2005: 112) summarises the basic argument of dependency as such:

It saw metropolitan policy as maleficent, not beneficent; inflows of foreign investment were seen as giving rise to much greater interest and profit outflows; ‘modernising elites’ were really compradors, lumpen-bourgeoisies, serving their own foreign interests, not those of the people; world trade perpetuated the structures of underdevelopment rather than acting as a solvent of them. Capitalist development (...) offered nothing to the periphery; the solution lay in reducing links to the metropolises and bringing about ‘autocentric’ national economic growth.

The dependency school became the basis for nationalist ideologies, such as The Third World nationalism. Simply, the Third World nationalism as a non-western nationalism took anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist outlook for granted (Dawa, 1992: 6). In this thesis I will refer to nationalist approach that was derived from analyses of dependency theory as economic nationalism. In the context of this work, the basic motivation of economic nationalism refers to strong adherence to the economic national interests of an underdeveloped or developing country in order to achieve, in Leys’s words, ‘national economic growth’. The means of reaching national economic growth may change as the contexts differ. For

each category and the absent features in traditional societies were analysed and dealt with. In other words, they made an ideal typical characterisation of modern societies.

Political development and industrialisation were the two facets of modernisation for its scholars. Institution building as state-building and nation-building became the key issue of this approach. The formulas set by the modernisation school were put into practice. However, some scholars focused on the gap between the theory and reality. Then, critics of modernisation school emerged. The dependency theory drew its attention on economic system and its critique. It was a critique from outside the modernisation school. “The early 1970s”, for Leys (2005: 112), “became an era of dependency theory”.

example, while dependency school scholars, like Samir Amin, prescribe de-linking from capitalist system, more moderate politicians would see economic protectionism sufficient.

Although I discerned the contextual use of economic nationalism in this thesis, I think that it would be more comprehensible if I touch on the pioneering use of the term. Hobsbawm (1993: 45-46) refers to arguments of American federalist Alexander Hamilton as he saw state, nation and economy interconnected.¹² Hobsbawm (1993: 46) says that Hamilton's list of 'Great National Measures' were purely economic in which "nation implied national economy and its systematic fostering by the state, which in the 19th Century meant protectionism". For Friedrich List (1856: 283), who was inspired by Hamilton, national economy had to "furnish the economic development of the nation and to prepare it to take its proper place in the universal association of the future". Hobsbawm (1993: 45-47) considers these ideas as the basis of economic nationalism or national economy.

The other related concept is imperialism. Philip Marshall Brown (1945: 84) defines imperialism in its original meaning as "the attempt of any nation to extend its control for purposes of exploitation over other peoples not at the moment included in the metropolitan area". In this sense, resisting economic and political domination of some developed countries like the US and the UK would be regarded as an anti-imperialist stance. Although I acknowledge the types of imperialism, such as political, economic, cultural, I will refer this concept in economic terms (Galtung, 1971: 81).¹³

¹² Economist Hamilton lived between the years 1757 and 1804.

¹³ Galtung (1971: 81) simply defines imperialism as "dominance relation between nations". For him (1971: 83), "Imperialism is a relation between a Center and a Periphery nation so that (1) there is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nation and the center in the Periphery nation, (2) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations, (3) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation."

The interaction of Marxist-inspired theories of dependency, independence, anti-imperialism, national economy or economic nationalism makes the relationship between socialism and nationalism blurred. The perception and identification of 'socialism' with reference to 'internationalism' result in an irreconcilable dilemma. I think, the reason behind this fact is stemming from the tendency of disregarding the variations of socialism. In other words, a doctrinal understanding of socialism with the influence of Marxist orthodoxy precludes alternatives within the left, at least in academic sense. Hobsbawm (1993: 149) argues and exemplifies how the appeals of nationalism and socialism are not 'mutually exclusive' in order to subvert the common impression.

Benedict Anderson (1993: 16) acknowledges Hobsbawm to be right since he argues that the Marxist movements and states became nationalist not only in their forms, but also in their essences, and there is no implication to think about the end of this tendency. Anderson (1993: 17) also appreciates Nairn for admitting the historical failure of Marxism in relation to theory of nationalism. In this sense, according to Anderson (1993: 17) nationalism is an 'anomaly' for Marxism.

2.1.2- Anthony D. Smith's Ethno-Symbolism

After elaborating on economic aspect of nationalism in the context of dependency, at this point, I would like to turn back to the discussion on theories of nationalism by focusing on ethno-symbolic approach. Ethno-symbolists are considered to be critical to the modernist hegemony in the academic literature on nationalism (Özkırıklı, 2008: 208). Anthony D. Smith is identified with ethno-symbolism and he is in an attempt of synthesizing with modernism (Özkırıklı, 2008: 209). Smith (1998: 226) explains his approach as such:

The conditions of modernity clearly favour the replication of nations, national states and nationalisms in all parts of the globe. This would also allow us to accept the ethno symbolist contention that most nations are formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties and sentiments, even if in

time they go well beyond them, and their nationalism necessarily use those ethnic symbols, memories, myths and traditions which most resonate with the majority of the designated 'people' whom they wish to mobilise.

Smith (1998: 226) notes that this synthesis is useful in the interpretation of some "post-modern concerns with globalisation, ethnic fragmentation, and the revitalisation of ethnic ties". Smith's definition of nation is broader than the previously mentioned definitions in a sense that it includes ethno-symbolic components. For him (2007: 32), nation is "a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members".¹⁴ The "complex and abstract nature of national identity" is well cooperated in this definition (Smith, 2007: 32).

In Smith's (2007: 121) theory, nationalism is seen as ideological movement on behalf of a people whose some members supposed to establish a 'nation' currently or potentially, with the aim of acquiring and sustaining autonomy, unity and identity. This approach involves three essential concepts within nationalism: national autonomy, national unity and national identity. In the ideological framework of nationalism, maintenance of these concepts for a nation is the major goal of nationalists. Besides that the ideological framework of nationalism "places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being" (Smith, 2001: 9).

At this point, how Smith perceives the concept of 'nation' needs further elaboration. For him (2001: 11), since there are some 'pre-modern nations' that precede "the advent of nationalist ideologies in the late 18th Century", the definition of 'nation' as a concept should be released from nationalist ideology. His definition of the concept of 'nation' mentioned above reflects this premise. Despite the lack of clear-cut lines of demarcation between them, he also

¹⁴ This definition is cited from Smith's book, namely *National Identity* (1991, London: Penguin Books). In this work, Turkish (*Milli Kimlik*) translation of this book is referred to.

distinguishes the nation from an ethnic community:¹⁵ the latter has frequently no political inclinations, public culture and territoriality (Smith, 2001: 12). Having a proper name, common myths and shared memories/history are the similar attributes of nations and *ethnies*. However, firstly, while cultural differentia is an attribute of an *ethnie*, common public culture is seen in a nation (Smith, 2001: 13). Secondly, while an *ethnie* has a link with homeland, a nation occupies a homeland (Smith, 2001: 13). Thirdly, while an *ethnie* reflects some solidarity, a nation is based on common rights and duties, and a single economy (Smith, 2001: 13).

The relationship between ‘ethnic cores’ and nations has to be taken into consideration in order to understand the process of formation of nations. Smith (2007: 67) notes that flux and durability exist together in the context of ever-changing cultural manifestations within differing social and cultural parameters. This situation becomes a heritage and traditions passed on generations while at the same limiting the outlook of the community (Smith, 2007: 67). “A certain tradition of images, cults, customs, rites and artefacts, as well as certain events, heroes, landscapes, and values come to form a distinctive repository of ethnic culture, to be drawn upon selectively by successive generations of the community” (Smith, 2007: 68). The ‘ethnic core’ comes into existence gradually in such a framework.

As distinctive *ethnies*, they also constitute the cores of the kingdoms and states of the early medieval ages (Smith, 2007: 69). According to Smith (2007: 70), such ethnic cores accounts for the subsequent character, shape and boundaries of the nations in the process of their emergence. Most of the contemporary nations built up on a multi-ethnic ground that at the beginning, the dominant *ethnie* incorporated or attracted other *ethnies* into its state the name and cultural content of which is given by this dominant *ethnie* (Smith, 2007: 70). The nations always require ethnic components that can be re-treated (Smith, 2007: 71).

¹⁵ Smith usually uses the French term of ‘*ethnie*’ instead of ‘ethnic community’.

Smith (2007: 89) makes an ideal-typical distinction between ‘lateral’ and ‘vertical’ *ethnies*. This distinction is useful not only for clarifying the “source of ethnic conflict and ethnic survival in pre-modern eras”, but also for pointing out the different kinds of ethnic cores around which nations are built, and dealing with two main routes through which nations are formed (Smith, 2007: 92). The former is named ‘lateral’ due to being limited to the upper strata which tend to spread out by forming close ties with the upper ranks of contiguous lateral *ethnies* (Smith, 2007: 90). Common sense of ethnicity in this type of *ethnie* is often “bound up with its *esprit de corps* as a high status stratum and ruling class” (Smith, 2007: 90). When compared to the ‘lateral’ ones, the ‘vertical’ type of *ethnie* seems to be ‘more compact and popular’ as the ethnic culture is inclined to “be diffused to other social strata and classes” (Smith, 2007: 90). There is a unique historical culture which “unites different classes around common heritage and traditions” (Smith, 2007: 90). Consequently, the ethnic bond tends to be intensive and exclusive as the admission to the *ethnie* is marked with higher barriers (Smith, 2007: 90).

In Smith’s (2007: p. 102) theory, the two main routes of formation of nations are bureaucratic incorporation in ‘lateral’ *ethnies* and vernacular mobilisation in ‘vertical’ *ethnies*. Administrative, economic and cultural revolutions in the West served incorporation of distant places, the *ethnies* living there and middle and lower classes into the distinctive culture of the dominant lateral *ethnie* by means of bureaucratic state (Smith, 2007: 102). Establishment of system of public mass education led to the ultimate consequence of intensive political socialisation programme (Smith, 2007: 102). That is creation of secular, mass nations (Smith, 2007: 102). Above all, long before that, there was also a gradual diffusion of an aristocratic ethnic culture which began to turn into an inclusive, civic national culture as the scope of legal and civil rights broadened in the kingdom (Smith, 2007: 102). The strong states, such as England and France, enabled the emergence of the new concept of nation around more or less homogeneous *ethnies* as they managed to embrace resistant ethnic cultures (Smith, 2007:102).

The second route is vernacular mobilisation. This was more popular when compared to bureaucratic incorporation. Through vernacular mobilisation, this route “started from smaller, demotic communities whose ethno-religious self-conceptions had to be exchanged for more activist, political ones” (Smith, 2007: 113). In spite of their differing attitudes towards westernisation and modernity, the major aim of small intellectual domains of educators was to mobilise and purify the people by addressing to the alleged ethnic past of their community (Smith, 2007: 113). To realise that, they made use of some moralities and maps derived from golden ages the *ethnie* (Smith, 2007: 113). Thus, they hope that they could transform the backward *ethnie* to a dynamic and indigenous, political nation (Smith, 2007: 113).

There seems to be a historical and conceptual overlap of nations and *ethnies* (Smith, 2007: 71). Nevertheless, there is a possibility of emergence of nations without ethnic past. America, Argentina, Australia and states in sub-Saharan Africa are examples of this. This means that the relationship between modern nations and any ethnic core is problematic and ambiguous (Smith, 2007: 73). Then the reasons for seeking the roots of a nation in pre-modern ties in which not every modern nation could find an ethnic base behind itself are as such:

Firstly, historically speaking, the first nations came into existence on the basis of pre-modern ethnic cores, and lately, as they were culturally influential and strong, they became models to nation-building processes in the other parts of the globe (Smith, 2007: 73). The second reason is about fertility of ethnic model in sociological sense (Smith, 2007: 73). The ethnic model increasingly gained popularity since it is easier to comprehend the community that prevails up to the modern age as in its form of pre-modern ‘demotic’ community (Smith, 2007: 73). Thirdly, the nation-formation process could fall apart if there were no ethnic roots (Smith, 2007: 73). That is to say, in this process even communities having fabricated or vague ethnic ties and backgrounds there is a need for creation of mythology and symbolism in order to assure national survival and unity (Smith, 2007: 73). Although there could be some kind of resemblances, the nation is

different from ethnic states of pre-modern times. In other words, the ideal type of nation is concomitant with the modern era. The three points mentioned above reveal the link between nations and modernity. Smith's differentiation between *ethnie* and nation helps us to conceptualise this subject matter.

2.1.3- Autonomy-Identity-Unity

After elaborating on Smith's definition of the concept of nation, it is to the point to touch upon his evaluation of nationalism. As he (2007: 118) notes, nationalism can function in several levels such as a form of culture, as well as a political ideology and a type of social movement. The role of nationalism on the formation of national identity cannot be understood without analysing its cultural and social matrix which owes many things to the presence of pre-modern ethnic communities and progressive emergence of national states in the West (2007: 118).

As mentioned above, there are three key elements in Smith's definition of nationalism: autonomy, identity and unity. For Smith (2007: 121-122), nationalism is the ideology of the nation not of the state as it places the nation at the centre of its concern. Its description of the world and its prescriptions for the collective action are all corresponding to nation and its individuals (Smith, 2007: 122). It is not necessary or universal to think that nations could only be free if they have their own sovereign states (Smith, 2007: 122). Moreover, not every nationalist movement give priority to have particular state (Smith, 2007: 122). The majority of Catalanian, Scottish and Flemish nationalists are more inclined to the issues of having autonomy in a multi-national state and cultural equality rather than acquiring full-independence (Smith, 2007: 122). It is a general perception that every nation must have its own state; however, it is not an imperative to be derived from the core doctrine of nationalism (Smith, 2007: 122). It reflects the fact that "nationalism is primarily a cultural doctrine or, more accurately, a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre" (Smith, 2007: 122).

The concept of ‘self-determination’ in relation to the concept of autonomy is an important pillar of nationalism. Every nationalist is concerned with autonomy (Smith, 2007: 125). With Fichte, Schlegel and other German romantics, ideal of autonomy led to “a philosophy of national self-determination and collective struggle to realise the authentic national will –in a state of one’s own” (Smith, 2007: 125). Therefore, though the realisation of authentic national will the community is “able to follow its ‘inner rhythms’, heed its own inward voice and return to its pure and uncontaminated pristine state” (Smith, 2007: 125-126).

The other element of nationalism is ‘identity’ and it is understood as ‘sameness’ in a direct manner (Smith, 2007: 122). As members of a group dress, eat similarly and speak the same language, they manifest differences from other groups that are dressing, eating and speaking diversely (Smith, 2007: 123). They represent sameness in relation to their differentiation from other groups. This representation of similarity and dissimilarity is one of the meanings of national ‘identity’ (Smith, 2007: 123). The ethnic past provides the relevant sources to bring out the authentic identity of ‘collective self’ with the help of philology, history and archaeology (Smith, 2007: 123).

There is also a perspicuous and esoteric meaning of ‘unity’ in nationalist sense (Smith, 2007: 123-124). Basically it means “unification of the national territory or homeland” (Smith, 2007: 124). In the case of disunity it refers to bringing the nation together within the homeland (Smith, 2007: 164). Nationalists make use of a more philosophical approach to this point: they perceive the nationals that are outside their homeland as ‘lost’, and the lands they live as ‘unredeemed’ (*irredenta*) (Smith, 2007: 124). For them, these lands has to be ‘redeemed’ as seen in late 19th and early 20th Century Italian, Greek and pan-German nationalist movements of irredentism (Smith, 2007: 124).

Another meaning of ‘unity’ in nationalist sense dates back to the French Revolution. The French patriots emphasised the concept of fraternity with reference to “the brotherhood of the all nationals in the nation” (Smith, 2007:

124). The metaphor of family here emerges as the basis of geological ‘nation’ understanding (Smith, 2007: 124). Smith (2007: 125) notes that as a consequence of nationalist ‘unity’ conception, cultural divergences are dealt with the envisaged nation for the sake of conformity and indivisibility of the nation. Coercive policies of political integration aim at creation of a ‘political community’ and ‘political culture’ by replacing ethnic cultures of heterogeneous inhabitants in a country.

The cultural matrix of nationalism is crucial in the process of emergence of a secular and modern equivalent of pre-modern sacred myths of ‘chosen peoples’. To put it in another way, the doctrine of chosen peoples implies the uniqueness of every single nation. The Israelis/Jews are a sound example of chosen peoples. There are more or less similar myths for the *ethnies* of pre-modern times. As Smith (2007: 136) notes it, while in pre-modern times chosen peoples were chosen by their gods, today due to their cultural heritage, they are invited to be unique and individual nations by an ideology and symbolism which is valid in global level of reality. This summarises the role of nationalism in the formation of modern national communities. The intellectuals such as poets, piece writers, musicians, anthropologists, philologists helped the development and spread of nationalist conceptualisations and discourses by giving meaning to suitable images, myths and symbols (Smith: 150). Therefore, the birth of cultural nationalism owes much to the intellectuals.

2.1.4- Smith’s Typology

Making a comprehensive account of nationalism as whole does not mean that Smith is insensitive to the variations in itself. On the contrary, he (2007: 129) notes that prominent differences between nationalisms can be seen when we focus on the goals of respective nationalist movements. As Smith (2007: 129) describes it, like a chameleon, nationalism gets its colour from its context. In other words, every pattern of nationalism could only be understood within its specific context. The specificity of contexts leads to some typologies of nationalisms. To illustrate,

Smith classifies nationalism within two categories. These are territorial and ethnic nationalisms. Both categories have two sub-categories: pre-independence and post-independence movements (Smith, 2007: 133-134).

The territorial nationalist pre-independence movements are anti-colonial; and their conception of nation is fundamentally civic and territorial (Smith, 2007: 133). The territorial nationalist post-independence movements are integrationist and they have civic and territorial conception of nation through which ethnic differences of the population tried to be integrated to a new political community (Smith, 2007: 134). The ethnic nationalist pre-independence movements are secession and *diaspora* nationalisms and they have an ethnic and genealogical conception of nation. Secession from a political unit and formation of a new ethno-nation is their basic motivation (Smith, 2007: 134). The ethnic nationalist post-independence movements with an ethnic and genealogical nation conception are in search for a larger ethno-national state by uniting 'kinsmen' and their lands outside. These are irredentist and pan-nationalisms (Smith, 2007: 134).

Following the evaluation some theories of nationalism, I would like to make a remark about the relationship between Smith's and Anderson's approaches. In Smith's theory of nationalism it striking that he attributes a great deal of attention to the ethnic aspect of a nation. Although both Anderson and Smith emphasize the importance of cultural aspect in nationalism, Smith's inclination to the role of *ethnie* distinguishes him from Anderson. Anderson (1993: 167) points out the fact that nation is comprehended through departing from 'language', not from 'blood', and a person could be 'invited' to this imagined community. In this respect, it would be good to mention his evaluation of the relationship between racism and nationalism briefly.

Anderson (1993: 166) rejects any claims that racism and anti-Semitism spring up from nationalism, and fascism tells much about nationalism more than any other historical event. He (1993: 167) writes that:

(...) nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history. (...) The dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristocracies.

In this sense, it is not astonishment for him that the fathers of modern racism were not petty-bourgeois nationalists. In addition to that the reason why racism and anti-Semitism had emerged within national boundaries was not to vindicate external wars, but "to justify domestic repression and domination" (Anderson, 1993: 168).

2.1.5- Patriotism and Nationalism

The last point that I would like to discuss is the concept of 'patriotism' in the literature of nationalism in global scale and its relation to nationalism. In this sense, I would like to ask some questions concerning this relationship: are there any essential differences between patriotism and nationalism? Is patriotism a naive concept when compared to nationalism? Is it meaningful to make a substantial differentiation of patriotism and nationalism? By dictionary definition, patriotism is simply 'love of one's country' (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009). This is seen as the 'heart of patriotism' (Nathanson, 1993: 35).¹⁶ In this sense, it is associated with *patria*, fatherland or country.

It is not unusual that nationalism and patriotism are used in substitution.¹⁷ However, Elie Kedourie is one of a few scholars who try to draw the lines of demarcation between them. Kedourie (1993: 68) notes that while patriotism as a

¹⁶ Nathanson's (1993: 34-35) definition of patriotism involves four components: "(1) Special affection for one's own country; (2) A sense of personal identification with the country; (3) Special concern for the well-being of the country; (4) Willingness to sacrifice to promote the country's good." He (1989: 535) also associates patriotism with national loyalty.

sentiment does not “depend on a particular anthropology and (...) assert a particular doctrine of the state or of the individual’s relation to it”, nationalism does both. Nevertheless, this approach is incapable of setting clear-cut lines. On the contrary, in this kind of approach it is not certain that whether there can be variations of territorial nationalisms reflecting very same features. Moreover, “there is much overlap between country and nation, and therefore between patriotism and nationalism” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009).

Perceiving nationalism and patriotism as related phenomena; Gary R. Johnson (1986: 135) uses patriotism “to refer to those behaviours (including speech) which reflect love of or loyalty toward one's political community”. As it stresses the shared history and culture, patriotism is a politically useful tool for creating sentiments of unity like nationalism; however, it does so without any reference to the ethnicity (Caballero, 1999: 595; Canovan, 2000:415). This point shares a common ground with what Smith conceptualised as territorial nationalism.

To sum up, in this part, I mainly elaborated on some theories of nationalism. Among these, I elaborated more on the theories of Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith. By doing so, I have tried to analyse the symbolic, imagined, cultural, varying aspects of nationalism. I made use of Smith’s categorisation of nationalism in two sets: territorial-civic and ethnic-genealogical.

Also the definitions of nation and nationalism derived from several authors such as Kohn, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Kedourie enriched the discussion. Besides the concepts of nation and nationalism, I analysed some other key concepts relevant for my thesis. Dependency, Third World nationalism, imperialism, patriotism and racism are examples of these key concepts. So far, the theoretical framework for evaluating nationalism in Turkey (or Turkish nationalisms) in following part is completed.

2.2- Nationalism in Turkey

Before moving on Ecevit's nationalism, there is also a need for mentioning discussions of nationalism in academic circles in Turkey. The critique of the relevant literature has to be general in a sense that the scholars do not directly address my research problem. In this part, I will mainly focus on evaluations of Turkish nationalisms to discern Ecevit's specificity.

To begin with, the connotations of the concept of 'nation' in the historical process in Turkey changed in time. The Ottoman/Turkish translation of 'nation' is '*millet*' and it referred to religious communities of the empire. In the *II. Meşrutiyet* era, the concept of nation was started to be used in political sense rather than religious meaning (Berkes, 2005: 408). In other words, *millet* was evolved to a political community with '*ittihatçı*'s.¹⁸ This evolution of the concept of *millet* represented an emergence of a new type of politics in Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkism.

2.2.1- Akçura and 'Three Types of Politics'

In 1904, Yusuf Akçura writes an article with the title of 'Three Types of Politics' and identifies these new types of politics as unity of Islam (unity of Muslims under the leadership of Ottoman Khalif), unity of Ottomans (unity Ottoman citizens regardless of their religious community-*millet*) and unity of Turks (Berkes, 2005: 401).¹⁹ In that context, pan-Islamism, pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism are the alternative ideologies all of which had the intention of saving the state.

¹⁸ *II. Meşrutiyet* era is the period of constitutional monarchy in Ottoman Empire between 24 July 1908 and 5 November 1922. *Meşrutiyet* means constitutional monarchy in English. Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* in Turkish) ruled the country between 1908 and 1918. The word *ittihatçı* means member or supporter of Union and Progress.

¹⁹ Yusuf Akçura is considered to be an important figure concerning Turkish nationalism. The original title of his article mentioned above is *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, meaning three types of politics.

There are four currents that Akçura's line of thought reflects. The most influential figure on Akçura is Tatar intellectual Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Georgeon, 2008: 506). His famous motto is “unity in language, thought and deed” (Georgeon, 2008: 506). Gasprinskii influences Akçura on the matters: attaining the unity of Turks despite the censorship of tsarist regime; struggling in cultural field rather than political; the significance of the role of women in social progress (Georgeon, 2008a: 506). The point that distinguishes Akçura and Gasprinskii is their emphasis on Turkishness and Islam: while Gasprinskii gives priority to Islam over Turkishness, for Akçura it is destiny of Turkishness to have primacy (Georgeon, 2008: 506). Second important current that influenced Akçura is cultural Turkism. It is a perception of nationalism limited to cultural, lingual and historical spheres (Georgeon, 2008: 507). The third current that influenced him is social Darwinism (Georgeon, 2008: 508). While attaching importance to power and progress, he tries to find a political system for the Turks to resist every kind of hegemony of Europe (Georgeon, 2008: 508). Pragmatism is the fourth current that affectes Akçura as seen in his analysis of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism in relation to their benefits to the Ottoman Empire (Georgeon, 2008: 507).

Following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, there seem to be important shifts in the thoughts of Akçura. He no more mentions Turks of Russia and he focuses on the problem of empowering and disseminating the Turkish culture and language (Georgeon, 2008: 512). For him, that is bound to the development of Turkish economy and economic unity of Turkey.

The term Turkism comes to the use in Ottoman Empire with intellectuals who are coming from Russia, such as Akçura. At the beginning, these intellectuals name their opponents with the terms of ‘Westernist’ and ‘Islamist’. As a reaction to this, their opponents name the Russia-originated Turkish intellectuals ‘Turkist’ to derogate them (Berkes, 2005: 411). While Westernists and Islamists maintain their commitment to Ottomanism, some of these Turkists are endorsing Armenian, Greek, Albanian and Arabic nationalist movements in Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 2005: 411). Turkism attains prestige with Ottomanist scholar Ziya Gökalp as he

distances this term from Russia Turkism and organise it within Ottomanism (Berkes, 2005: 411).²⁰ Hence, Turkism becomes westernist-Islamist-nationalist joint ideology of Union and Progress (Berkes, 2005: 411).

2.2.2- Ziya Gökalp

Ziya Gökalp's approach is based on a distinction between 'culture' and 'civilisation'. The way he (1970: 68) defines his social ideal reflects this distinction: "I am from Turkish nation, Islamic *umma* and Western civilisation". This kind of thinking makes it possible to take Western technology and science for industrial development while rejecting Western lifestyle and morality (Parla, 2001: 58). For him, contemporary civilisation is civilisation of nations (Berkes, p. 423). Therefore, seeing civilisation at international and culture at national levels is the basic characteristic of this line of thought.

Taha Parla (2001: 72) notes that Gökalp's nationalism is clearly a lingual and cultural one. Turkish nationalism should be respected and has to live in peace with other nationalisms in the world (Parla, 2001: 72). The welfare and bliss of the Turkish nation has ultimate philosophical value for him (Parla, 2001: 72). Gökalp defines Turkism as advancing the Turkish nation (Parla, 2001: 74). He rejects arguments of 'racist nationalists' that equate race and nation (Parla, 2001: 74). For him, race has no relation to nationalism that is unity of all social characteristics (Parla, 2001: 74). In addition to that, he criticises the 'ethnic nationalists' since they confuse nation with kinship (Parla, 2001: 75). However, ethnic group or kinship is about genetic. He cites territorial nationalism, geographical nationalism. And for him, 'geographical nationalism' was mistaken when it had defined the nation as the totality of all people in a country (Parla, 2001: 75). He argues that

²⁰ Ziya Gökalp is seen as one of the founding fathers of Turkism in the *II. Meşrutiyet* era. He had a role of ideology production in the Committee of Union and Progress.

this definition is insufficient as there could be other groups of peoples having different cultures and languages (Parla, 2001: 75). He exemplifies this by referring to Ottomanism as a geographical nationalism (Parla, 2001: 75).

His definition of the concept of nation reflects his own approach of nationalism. For him, nation is a group or community that its common language is the basic unifying element; it is based on social unity and solidarity; it is educated in the same way; it has common ideals, sentiments, religion, moral values and aesthetics (Parla, 2001: 75-76). Perceiving religion as a component of nation conception distances him from secular and civic understandings of nationalism.

In economic field, Ziya Gökalp proposes principle of ‘national economy’ by making use of Friedrich List’s ideas on creation of ‘national bourgeoisie’ (Ünüvar, 2008: 33). For Gökalp, corporations have significant role in directing the national economy (Ünüvar, 2008: 34). As economic life develops, corporations become important in societal and political affairs, and corporatism starts to emerge out of this process (Parla, 2001: 87-90).

In Gökalp's thinking there is a distinction between Turkism and pan-Turkism/*Turanism* as well. He defines Turkism, which is, for him, cultural unity of Anatolian Turks, as realised ideal. However, the unity of all Turks in the world is defined as a distant ideal or attractive dream (Parla, 2001: 76). Parla (2001: 76) writes that his understanding of *Turan* (unity of Turks in the world) is not very different from design of cultural unity of Anglo-Americans.

As I have tried to exemplify, imagination of the ‘Great Turkish Nation’ dates back a hundred years. Following the First World War, the pan-Turkist line of thought in Ottoman Empire turns its face to Anatolia as a ‘national home’ or shelter. The foundation of Republic of Turkey after the War of Independence (between 1919-1922) reflects the gathering of intellectual Turkish nationalists around Atatürk’s territorial nationalism.

2.2.3- Turanism to Territorialism

In 1921, Mustafa Kemal declares “Neither Islamic union nor *Turanism* may constitute a doctrine or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of new Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey’s own sovereignty within its national frontiers” (Landau, 1981: 72). This attitude reveals the reason for most of the pan-Turkists’ sudden internalisation of territorial nationalism. At this point, I would like to elaborate on nationalism in modern Turkey.

Tanıl Bora (2008a: 15) writes that exceptionalism and specificity are dominant sides of nationalism in Turkey.²¹ As nationalism tends to emphasize the discrepancy, if not the superiority, of a national identity and a national character, specificity is the basis it depends on. In Turkish nationalism, this feature is especially prominent since arguing for its uniqueness is a general tendency (Bora, 2008a: 15). Not peculiar to Turkish nationalism, it is argued that exceptionalism conceals different point of views, theses or outlooks since it focuses on the idea of ‘nation’ (Lindisfarne, 2008: 202).

Nancy Lindisfarne (2008: 202) claims that idea of ‘nation’ is defective in two senses. Firstly, it is an abstraction that cannot explain complex social processes and dialectics of social life (Lindisfarne, 2008: 202). She (2008: 202) describes it as an illusion. Secondly, it makes the object of inquiry a material and homogeneous essence but at the same time working on ‘nation’ means strengthening nationalist discourse and racist dimensions of national identity (Lindisfarne, 2008: 203). She (Lindisfarne, 2008: 203) refers to Benedict Anderson’s work despite the fact that he does not evaluate nations as exceptionalist units. On the contrary, as it is mentioned above, Anderson criticises Gellner for seeing nations as ‘fabrication’.

²¹ Tanıl Bora is the editor of volume of a series with the topic of nationalism as one of the major dimensions of political thought in Turkey. The name of this series is *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce* (2008, İstanbul: İletişim).

Bora (2008a: 15) observes that nationalism has an effect of a kind of fundamentalism in Turkey. Furthermore, it is like a basic principle beyond politics and above ideologies (Bora, 2008a: 15). It presents itself as a ‘natural sentiment’ and a tie of primordial belongingness (2008a: 15). Except for minor groups internalising socialist/communist internationalism or radical Islamic *ummahism*, nationalism is seen as a positive value in all political discourses in Turkey (2008a: 16).

For Bora (2008a: 16), in order to analyse the ideological dominance and fundamentalist function of nationalism, one should consider it together with *Kemalism*.²² Despite the existence of different interpretations of the relationship between nationalism and *Kemalism*, it is symbiotic in a sense that marking both formal and civil political ideology areas of daily life in Turkey (Bora, 2008a: 16).

It should also be noted at this point that the relationship between modernisation and nationalism in Turkey could be linked to *Kemalism* as well. Bora (2008a: 18) describes the lineage of modernisation and nationalism as ‘firm’ and ‘tight’. The firmness and tightness of this link is related to the tension between two conceptions: one, regarding nationalism as a process of modernity; and the other, regarding modernity as a lever to the development of nation/nationalism and to comprehend itself (Bora, 2008a: 18). The disappointment results from troubles and discomfort of modernity could make nationalism a shelter. This is the aperture of nationalist-conservatism (Bora, 2008a: 18).

Bora (2008a: 18) underlines the fact that while dealing with nationalism in a nation-state or a country, it would be more appropriate to talk about *nationalisms* since there cannot be a monolithic understanding of nationalism. He (2008a: 19-20) classifies Turkish nationalisms as such: formal nationalism or Atatürk’s

²² *Kemalism* is usually referred to as formal ideology of Republic of Turkey or a doctrine. This ideology is assumed to be derived from principles (such as republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism and reformism) of Kemal Atatürk. In Bülent Ecevit’s line of thought, *Kemalism* is not favoured as a notion or term. He generally uses *Atatürkçülük* (Ataturkism) instead of *Kemalism* since he does not perceive Atatürk as founding an unchanging doctrine.

nationalism, *Kemalist* left-nationalism or *ulusal sol*, liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism, conservative nationalism. Now I will elaborate on these nationalisms one by one.

2.2.4- Atatürk's Conception of Nationalism

Formal/Atatürk's nationalism functions as a 'state and order' ideology and based upon founder/liberator Atatürk mythos. This modernist ideology is a compulsion of an authoritarian loyalty (Ibid, p. 19). Concerning the role of Atatürk's nationalism over other nationalisms in Turkey it is argued that every single Turkish nationalism tries to legitimise itself through Atatürk's nationalism (Koçak, 2008: 37). For Koçak (2008: 37) it can be argued that *Kemalist* Turkish nationalism has a simple geographical and cultural framework; however, it has also an ethnic dimension to an extent. This argumentation is in line with Anthony D. Smith's categorisation of territorial and ethnic nationalisms and their coexistence with differing ratios.

Smith (2007: 163) notes that Atatürk's secular and westernising nationalism reflects a non-irredentist Turkic ideal. For him (2007: 164), Atatürk aims at creating a 'compact territorial community' based on Anatolian Turks while at the same time disowning Ottomanism and Islamic roots and promoting reforms in social and cultural fields. This 'nation-building' necessitated cohesiveness around a national-cultural identity. However, exaggerated concentration on Turks' Central Asian origins in order to strengthen the ethnic dimension weakened the necessary cohesiveness. As far as I am concerned, this is the most controversial aspect of Atatürk's nationalism in the early Republican era.

Koçak (2008: 39) writes that Atatürk's Turkish nationalism has changing points of departure from time to time. For example, he quotes a passage written by

Atatürk in 1934 about the ‘enemy’ soldiers died in Gallipoli in 1915.²³ This passage shows the humanitarian and universal values of Atatürk’s nationalism (Koçak, 2008: 39). On the other hand, he mentions some other passages that reflect the influence of blood and race theories emerged in continental Europe (Koçak, 2008: 40). Although emphasis on different components of Atatürk’s nationalism is contextual, the essence and basis of it is territorial and civic. Atatürk’s definition of Turkish nation shows this basis: “the people of Turkey that founded Republic of Turkey is called Turkish nation” (Afetinan, 2000: 28).

Anatolianism²⁴ shares a great deal of common basis with Atatürk’s territorial nationalism. As for the roots of Anatolianism, there are two different explanations. Mithat Atabay’s approach is an example of seeing its roots in the Empire. For Atabay (2008: 515), this movement is initiated in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the Turks has two alternative and competing ways to follow during the emergence of nationalist thoughts: while the first way to vitalise national awaking is to penetrate into the roots of neglected motherland in the Ottoman era, the second way is to vitalise the spirit of empire on national basis (Atabay, 2008: 515). The former is *Anadoluculuk*, and the latter is *Turancılık* (*Turanism*). Atabay (2008: 515) argues that Anatolianism comes to the fore as Ziya Gökalp's critique and anti-thesis.

For the second group, Anatolianism emerges out of the movement of populism/peasantism and reflects significant influence of humanist current (Yörük, 2008: 319). The pioneers of Anatolianism regard being Anatolian with its whole history as a less problematic source of identity than relying on Central Asian Turkic origins (Yörük, 2008: 319). They also perceive Anatolia of that time

²³ The passage written by Atatürk is: “Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country, therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears. Yours sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land, they are our sons as well.”

²⁴ The Turkish translation of Anatolianism is ‘*Anadoluculuk*’.

as a product of alienation (Yörük, 2008: 319). It is argued that Anatolianism and Turkism spring up from two poles of Turkish History Thesis²⁵ (Yörük, 2008: 319). The first pole is the hypothesis that all civilisations have Turkic origins while the other pole represents the emphasis on pre-Islamic roots of Turkish history (Yörük, 2008: 319). However, it seems to be very problematic to link the emergence of Turkism and Anatolianism to Turkish History Thesis. Turkist and Anatolianist lines of thoughts preceded the History Thesis. Besides that the History Thesis can be seen as an attempt of systematisation of Turkist and Anatolianist arguments. In other words, the History Thesis is not a reason for, but a result of Turkism and Anatolianism.

2.2.5- The Left and Nationalism

Kemalist left-nationalism/*ulusal sol* sees modern ‘nation’ as a historical subject of secularism, development, independence, anti-imperialism, and sometimes construction of unique and domestic socialism (Bora, 2008a: 19-20). For example, research on *Kadro* movement usually has the underlying assumption of merging the left outlook with nationalism. The specific example of such an approach is the research of Mustafa Türkeş on *Kadro* movement. Türkeş (1999: 13) identifies the movement that occurred in the early republican era as ‘a national left current’. However, the major discussion in this book turns around statism, not around nationalism. As Türkeş (1999: 152) notes it, the nationalism of *Kadro* is regarded as ‘social nationalism’. In my opinion, the background and historical evolution of such nationalism is not evaluated in a comprehensive manner.

For Koçak (2008: 42), the left finds its formulation of full-independence in 'National Struggle' era between 1919 and 1923. In this sense, Atatürk's conception of nationalism embodies full-independence and ending external domination

²⁵ The Turkish History Thesis refers to an interoperation of history encouraged by Atatürk in 1930s.

(Koçak, 2008: 42). Thus, it is anti-imperialist and, as if a result of a natural process, it is anti-capitalist (Koçak, 2008: 42).

Haldun Gülalp's evaluation of dependency theory in relation to *Kadro* movement is a good example of setting the link between the left and nationalism. Since he is the major theorist of *Kadro*, Gülalp focuses on Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's ideas.²⁶ As Gülalp (1998: 953-954) notes, Aydemir replaces Marxist proletariat revolution with national revolution and attaches importance to the state and intellectual cadre to stress 'classlessness'. Emancipation of humankind is doomed to national revolutions in the Third World, not to working classes of the First World since the striking conflict is between First and Third Worlds (Gülalp, 1998: 953-954). In this sense, Turkish national liberation movement and revolution represent a nationalist link between *Kemalism* and the left.

Yön movement of 1960s is another example of Kemalist left.²⁷ Like *Kadro*, *Yön* is a nationalist, statist and developmentalist circle. Doğan Avcıoğlu, who is the primary scholar of this movement, adopts a non-capitalist and national-revolutionary way of development (İnsel, 2008: 775). National and populist economy, and extensive planning in a mixed-economic model are the basis of their developmentalist-nationalism (İnsel, 2008: 775).

2.2.6- Economic growth as national pride

Liberal nationalism sees construction of a strong capitalism and market society as the major goal of nationalism. The steps towards these goals come into prominence as objects of national pride (Bora, 2008a: 20). The most prominent

²⁶ *Kadro* was a monthly journal, which was published between 1934 and 1936. Gülalp (1998: 953) says, "(*Kadro*) set out to develop an analytical framework to interpret the Turkish revolution and thereby serve as a source of ideology for the nationalist regime." For Gülalp (1998: 953), Aydemir and *Kadro* "anticipated most post-war Third Worldist thinking" as well.

²⁷ *Yön* was a journal, which was published between 1961 and 1967. The founder of journal was Doğan Avcıoğlu.

politician that implements New Right policies in Turkey is Turgut Özal. He underlines the necessity for Turkey to become a ‘regional power’, and then in the long run a ‘world power’ (Arslan, 1998: 424). Özal’s liberal nationalist discourse, which is dominant in the governments of 1990s as well, isolates the economic development from its social-political content and reduced it to a technical issue (Coşar, 2008: 729).

In this context, economic development is seen essential in order to make Turkey ‘powerful’ and sustain its history and culture (Coşar, 2008: 729). The ‘liberal’ quality of the conceptualisation of liberal nationalism is concerned with market economy, and commitment to the liberal-political values is seemed to be secondary. The stress is on economic growth with national enthusiasm.

2.2.7- Race and Turkish Nationalism

In ethnicist nationalism, the source is the Turkist/*Turanist* current, which defines Turkishness on the basis of cultural ethnicity (Bora, 2008a: 20). Nihal Atsız is an extreme example of this group. He defines Turkism as the ones believing in the supremacy of Turkish race, and *Turanism* as the goal of Turkism to be realised in the short run (Bakırezer, 2008: 353). He is not comfortable with Islamic and *ummahist* connotations while he is in Alparslan Türkeş’s Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (CKMP).²⁸ Atsız and his followers are eliminated from the party due to their discomfort about Islamic tones of discourse. After their elimination, this group loses its influence in political arena.

The MHP as one of the parties having an ideology constructed on the basis of Turkish nationalism has dual discourse, one for its militants and the other for its electorate (Ağaoğulları, 1987: 196). In this sense, it is difficult to locate this party or movement within the categories of Turkish nationalisms. While racist discourse

²⁸ CKMP changed its name to Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in 1969. This party has been the major political organisation of extreme-right Turkists.

is prevalent in books and journals given to young militants, racist ideology is not used in the official discourse of the party in order to reach wider electoral base (Ağaoğulları, 1987: 196-197). The party also uses a similar discourse and ideology to Italian fascism in 1970s. Defending fascist-corporatism, and hierarchical and non-egalitarian order are components of its ideology (Ağaoğulları, 1987: 196). However, from 1980s on, the ideology of MHP has been evolved to the centre. The coexistence of Turkist, Islamic, secular and liberal motives in its discourse represents ideological and identical confusion of the party.

2.2.8- Articulation of Islamic Values

Conservative nationalism is usually in resonance with Islamism, and religion is thought to be the major (or first among the equals) component of nationalism (Bora, 2008a: 20). In conservative-nationalism, nationalism is given meaning as the way of restoration of tradition. Exclusion of religious values and symbols in Atatürk's nationalism composes the basis for the emergence of conservative-nationalism (Mert, 2000: 67). The degree of the link between nationalism, Islamism and conservatism is unsteady and “the deepest representation of this is the term ‘nationalist-moralist’ (*milliyetçi-maneviyatçı*)” (Can, 2000: 354).

Through the end of 1970s, a new form of conservative-nationalism emerges: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis replaces Atatürk's nationalism after the 1980 Coup d'état and it becomes the formal ideology of the new regime (Copeaux, 2008: 44-48). This conservative nationalist current argues for a perfect conformity of Turkishness and Islam, and for the only possible way of realisation of Turkish identity within Islam (Copeaux, 2008: 46). This ‘synthesis’ is not an open rejection of Atatürk's nationalism, but it represents a conservative nationalist outlook that aims at articulating Islamic values to Turkish nationalism (Copeaux, 2008: 47).

With the aim of linking conceptions of nationalisms to historical and social contexts, Bora (2008a: 20-21) makes a periodization as such: national liberation and foundation of the Republic, single party era, 1950-60, 1960-80, 1980-90, post-1990. This periodization seems to be important in a sense that every single nationalism would have used different ‘repertoires’ in different historical contexts (Bora, 2008a: 20).

To sum up this part, I have elaborated on the emergence of idea of Turkishness and diversification of nationalist outlooks in Turkey. In this sense, Akçura and Gökalp are mentioned as Turkist thinkers preceding Republican era. Then, evolution of pan-Turkist imaginations to territorial Turkism of Republic is analysed. I referred to Tanıl Bora’s categorisation of Turkish nationalisms. Kemalist left-nationalism is evaluated in relation to movements *Kadro*, *Yön* and Anatolianism. I also referred to Gülalp’s analysis of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir since he anticipates the dependency theory in 1930s. Perception of nationalism as a pride of economic growth since 1980s is named liberal nationalism. The ‘liberal’ quality of this term was analysed as well. Nationalist approaches having racist overtones were exemplified with reference to Nihal Atsız. Then, articulation of religious, moral and social values of Islam to Turkish nationalism was elaborated as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

The concepts and theories of nationalism that I outlined in the first part of this section will help me to clarify whether Bülent Ecevit has a theoretically systematic and ideologically coherent nationalism conception. The compatibility of the concepts defined here and the way Ecevit gives meaning to them will be a concern in the following sections. The second part, which is composed of Tanıl Bora's categorisation of Turkish nationalism, will be useful in comparing Ecevit's nationalism and the Turkish nationalisms. In this sense, the familiarities and dissimilarities among them will be analysed.

The affinity of Ecevit's conception of nationalism to Anatolianism will be given special interest. However, this does not mean drawing an early conclusion in a

sense that Ecevit's nationalism is within the boundaries of Anatolianism. On the contrary, despite some affinities to other Turkish nationalisms the specificity of Ecevit's nationalism conception is my topic of inquiry.

Before moving to Ecevit's nationalism, it will be useful for me to construct an analytical tool for evaluation. I develop this analytical tool on the basis of theoretical framework outlined above. The benchmark of analysis has two dimensions: domestic and external.

The domestic dimension is about nationalism within the boundaries of the Turkish nation-state. The concepts that are associated with the domestic dimension are national unity; Atatürk's nationalism as the definition of Turkish nation; Anatolianism; territorial and ethnic nationalisms; national culture; appraisal of Turkishness and Turkish nation; attitude towards racial, ethnic and religious differences and conflicts within society; and ideas about Turkish language. These concepts are all relevant to the understanding of Turkish national identity. I will elaborate on *national unity* in a sense that how he perceives it and to what extent relies on this concept. This is also in a close interaction with *Atatürk's nationalism* understanding as the founding principle of Turkish nation-state. *Anatolianism* covers the role and degree of Anatolia, and ancient Anatolian culture, civilisations and history in the formation of 'modern' Turkish identity. Typology of *territorial* versus *ethnic nationalism* suggests the evaluation of the weight of territorial/civic and ethnic components in a nationalist discourse. His *attitude towards racial, ethnic and religious differences* within society is associated with his understanding of national unity as well. The relevant point here is whether he disregards and rejects these differences or not. *National culture* implies how Ecevit perceives national culture. With *appraisal of Turkishness and Turkish nation* I mean looking at to what extent he refers to appraisal of the nation. His *ideas about Turkish language* are relevant for me to understand his position within the discussion about the national language.

The external dimension of nationalism is about a political principle which is concerned with foreign affairs of the Turkish nation-state, international conditions within which foreign policy is formed, and the character of foreign relations. The relevant concepts for the evaluation of external dimension are independence, economic nationalism, patriotism, national foreign policy, national defence, approach to international pacts and organisations, conception of national honour, and attitude towards globalisation. The aim of looking at his understanding of *independence* is to analyse the importance of autonomy of Turkish nation within the global system for Ecevit. The *economic nationalism* encompasses many components. These components that I grouped within the topic of economic nationalism are dependency, natural resources and nationalisation of resources, attitude towards foreign capital, colonialism and imperialism. *Patriotism* meaning love of country will be analysed in a sense that whether Ecevit makes use of patriotic discourses in a considerable weight. I will focus on how he defines *national foreign policy* and his attitude towards its formation, and his understanding of *national defence*. His *approach to international pacts and organisations* will be evaluated to understand whether there are considerable changes within different time intervals. For example, how his attitude towards the NATO changes in different contexts will be useful for me to comment on if he is categorically opposing to these kinds of organisations or not. How he conceptualises *national honour* is relevant for me to analyse whether or not it could be considered as a principle of his foreign policy. His *attitude towards globalisation* will help me to elaborate on his stance in the discussion on sovereignty of nation-states in a globalising world. Hence, his definition of globalisation will be searched for.

After mentioning my theoretical benchmark to evaluate Ecevit's nationalism, as I separated the topic into three time intervals, now it is time to focus on the first interval, which is Ecevit's early-political period.

CHAPTER III

BÜLENT ECEVIT AND EARLY-POLITICAL PERIOD

This section of this research is composed of two parts. In the first part, I elaborate on Bülent Ecevit's political life. His political career as well as his discourse is focused on. In the second part, there will be an analysis of his conception of nationalism in the early-political period.

3.1- Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006)

Before starting the analysis of Ecevit's conception of nationalism, it is necessary to elaborate on Bülent Ecevit in general sense. Therefore, in this part, I will focus on the main themes of his life. Bülent Ecevit is among the most significant figures in the contemporary Turkish political scene. Ecevit as the leading actor of a movement rose in the Republican People's Party formulated a populist discourse, namely, Democratic Left.

Bülent Ecevit is a sophisticated figure in Turkish politics. He grew up in an upper-class family in Istanbul. He went to Robert Collage having an Anglo-American system of education. He was appointed to the United Kingdom by the state he also studied in the United States before he entered politics in Turkey. He was a journalist-columnist in *Ulus*²⁹ when he was elected as Ankara Deputy in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) in 1957. He was interested in philosophy, literature and art. He was a member of Turkish Philosophical Society.

²⁹ *Ulus* is the newspaper of CHP (Republican People's Party). *Ulus* means 'nation' in pure Turkish. In this newspaper, party followers write articles. Bülent Ecevit, too, was an *Ulus* writer during the Democratic Party (DP) rule.

Also, he was a poet and translator. He was fluent in English. He translated works of Ezra Pound, TS Eliot, Dylan Thomas, Rabindranath Tagore.

George Bernard Shaw, Henrik Ibsen, Kemal Tahir, Olaf Palme are examples of the persons who have influenced his worldview. Ezra Pound's individualism and praise of self-development (Lan, 2005: 187) can be seen in Ecevit's poems as well. Cengiz Aytmatov says that the credo of Ecevit's universal 'self' is seen in his poem, namely, 'Mağara' (Cave). This poem exposes how the inner impulses of a man for the first time led him to a self-conception of being artist and creative in pre-historical era (Aytmatov, 199?: 182).

Aytmatov (199?: 182)notes that for Ecevit one's self-effort is at the first place is for human, and the things that a poet discovers in his/herself means a discovery for all humanity. For Aytmatov (199?: 184), Ecevit's views on art accommodate many components of Eliot's, Pound's, Tagore's world of irrational and pantheist conception. Besides Sanskrit and Sanskriti attracted Ecevit in a sense that he transferred some elements of this culture to his own life. Inner-ascetic tendency, reference to individual's capacities, pacifism, and humanism are the reflections of this culture on Bülent Ecevit.

Mithat Paşa³⁰, who took part in Ottoman-Turkish modernisation, is also an important figure for Ecevit. He states that in the 19th Century, the Ottoman reformers gave weight to the modernisation of army, regime, public administration and education, and introduction of changes in judicial order and ownership rights while they neglected the necessity to change economic conditions and situation of the people (Ecevit, 1993: 1). For Ecevit (1993: 1), Mithat Paşa was a unique Ottoman reformer since he attached importance to the reforms in economic sphere and organisation of the people. Therefore, as the

³⁰ Mithat Paşa's original name is Ahmet Şefik and he is Hacı Hafız Mehmet Eşref Efendi's son, who migrated from Rouse (Ruşçuk) to İstanbul. He was born in İstanbul in 1822. Abdulhamid II exiled him to Taif and he was killed there on the night of 8th of May 1884. He was 62 when he was killed.

initiator of changes in economic structure and democratisation process in Turkish society, he could also be regarded as the pioneer of social democracy (Ecevit, 1993: 1).

For Ecevit, organisation on the basis of cooperatives, development that starts from the peasantry, initiation of agricultural credit cooperatives, agricultural tax system, building first railways of the Empire, building first petroleum refinery in the Empire, building vast irrigation projects in the Mesopotamia, initiation of river transportation in Danube were the examples of Mithat Paşa's success. Bülent Ecevit also considers these kinds of efforts important in order to change the economic structure in Turkey. Especially he emphasizes the development of peasantry through the implementation of policies similar to Mithat Paşa's. Ecevit's famous project of 'Köy-kent's, meaning urban villages, is an example of this.

His struggle for power both within his party and in Turkey is a formidable one. The first protuberant in his way through the power was a historical personality, that is İsmet İnönü. İnönü was the leader of the CHP when Ecevit and his followers initiated their challenge. As İnönü put it 'either him or me', the contestation had two sides: On the one side there was a hero of National Independence War and Atatürk's companion İnönü, and on the other side there was a young but determined, rebellious but confidential rhetorician Ecevit. Maybe the other most challenging 'drawback' of Ecevit was the etiquette of his movement, that is the 'left'. This label was associated with communism with which the Turkish people had been horrified from the early republican period onwards. The third challenge was the deep-rooted and ingrained CHP tradition, which was on the edge of becoming conservative. Ecevit confronted the internal ideological dynamics of the CHP in the way to the formulation of a leftist discourse. But the eventual triumphant was Ecevit's movement.

His political career started in 1957. At that time in Turkey there was the Democratic Party (DP) government and Ecevit's party was the main opposition

group in the TBMM. Until 1960 military intervention, there was a political suppression by the DP government. Ecevit as a young politician demanded fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedoms of speech and press. As I analysed his articles published in *Ulus*, I think that his views were like a mainstream Anglo-American politician, and he did not have an outstanding leftist agenda at that time.

After the 1960 coup, he became a member of Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for the preparation of the new constitution. He says that although he had met the military intervention with joy at the beginning, as he saw some of the practices of military government, he started to take an opposite stance (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 78).

In 1961 General Elections, his party achieved to get 36.7 percent and became the first. Ecevit was elected to the TBMM as a deputy of Ankara again. The relationship between him and the leader İsmet İnönü had developed before he became the Minister of Labour at the age of 36. He stayed in office for three and a half years, and during this time he succeeded to pass trade union rights with collective bargaining, right to strike and lockout. Ecevit considers this achievement as the most important advance that he managed to realise throughout his political career (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 107). Emergence of movement of the Left of Centre in the CHP was in such an atmosphere.

At that time, scholars and politicians addressed the social character of political base of the CHP and its identity problem. For example, Prof. Dr. Turan Güneş, who was also a prominent figure of the Left of Centre movement, argues for the conflicting interests of social groups and the need for a determination of the groups to be appealed to (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 81). For him, the party should have gone closer to the people and have stooped being the notables' party (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 81). As the Left of Centre movement consolidated itself within the party, the addressed problems reached their resolutions.

The 1965 General Elections signified a novelty in Ecevit's political life: as a result of mineworkers' demands, he became deputy of Zonguldak province, which is a mining city. Bülent Ecevit's name began to be identified with masses. During the campaign in this election, main theme of the CHP was the Left of Centre. At that time it was a new and vague concept for Turkish politics. After the elections, the Left of Centre was blamed for the decrease in the votes of the CHP. The opposition of new paradigm gained strength. However, Ecevit and his friends like Turan Güneş, Haluk Ülman and Besim Üstünel griped on the new concept in order to clarify and extend its scope of interaction. The new paradigm helped to create synergy and a new team within the party. Ecevit wrote the 'manifesto' of the Left of Centre. The new team decided to make Ecevit their leader.

The new team achieved to get the majority of party council memberships in the 1966 General Congress of the CHP. In this Congress, Ecevit came to the platform after İnönü and attracted the attention of the whole delegates and audience. His leadership was settling down day by day. In the party council, '*Ecevitçi*'s (meaning Ecevit's supporters) had the majority, but İnönü was not very willing to see Ecevit as the secretary-general. İnönü proposed Ecevit to accept Kemal Satır as the new secretary-general and to become his deputy. Ecevit rejected this proposal and became the Secretary-General of the CHP. Then, Ecevit and his colleagues initiated a transformation within the CHP: membership profile of the party started to change rapidly from notables to labourers; the party started to turn its face to the people as its name suggested; leftist paradigm gained strength; new financial sources were searched rather than getting financial support of the notables; social activities of the party were opened to the people... The party reflected the left outlook with Ecevit's catchwords such as 'land to the tiller, water to the user'³¹, 'corrupt order must change; just order must come.'

The process of transformation of the CHP from the state's party to the people's party was initiated at a rapid pace. The political heritage of the party was

³¹ In Turkish it is '*toprak işleyenin, su kullananın*'. Ecevit's this catchword Ecevit spread out very quickly and in some regions peasants began to occupy lands.

reviewed with a populist outlook. In other words, Ecevit's interpretation of Atatürk and his modernisation project resulted in a cleavage between him and conservatives of his party. He identifies two dimensions of Atatürk's reforms: concrete and abstract dimensions. For him, there are concrete and abstract natures of Atatürk's revolutionism. The concrete reforms are the ones like changing form of state and judicial order; secularism revolution; scriptural revolution; women's rights revolution; revolution about clothing; revolutions that end privileges of some; above all, revolution of independence that ensured political and economic independence of Turkish nation (Ecevit, 1970: 17). These are the reforms or revolutions that were realised while Atatürk was alive.

Ecevit (1970: 18) notes that Atatürk believed in the progress of Turkish nation through revolutionary ruptures, not through an evolutionary path, and Atatürk's revolution cannot be limited to the concrete reforms. His revolution needed to be furthered through permanent revolutionary ruptures. This is the abstract dimension of Atatürk's revolutionism. He (1970: 18) conceptualises Atatürk's understanding of such revolutionism as 'permanent revolutionism'. He argues that one can be a revolutionary in Atatürk's sense, if he internalises both of the dimensions of Atatürk's revolutionism. In this sense, he criticises the conservatives within the party. For Ecevit, the reforms made by Atatürk were 'super-structural' reforms that did not, to a large extent, affect social and economic conditions of the Turkish people. Ecevit believes in the need for 'infra-structural revolutions' to sustain and promote concrete revolutions. This means that the order must be changed; land reform must be implemented; economic and social conditions of the masses must be improved (Ecevit, 1970: 38-46).

In his political discourse, there is an antagonism of corrupt order versus just order. This antagonism is the major characteristic of his populism. The defenders of corrupt order are monopolistic capital, landlords, exploiters, and oppressors as dominant classes. He considers these groups as the parasitic sectors of society. In Gramscian terms, the defenders of corrupt order are the power block. On the other side of the antagonism, there are the productive sectors of society such as

workers, peasants, and national-real industrialists. These are the defenders of the people and supporters of the formation of just order that would be based on people's power. In his discourse, the popular-democratic interpellations are made use of in order to articulate different classes within society. The democratic people's revolution would bring exploitation, economic dependence, bureaucratic elitism, and privileges to an end. Ernesto Laclau (1985: p. 189) conceptualises this kind of populism as 'populism of the dominated classes'. Besides that ideal of 'going to the people' is another feature of his populist discourse.

Turkish Islamic Sufi tradition inspired Ecevit as well. The humanitarian ideals of this tradition are inline with his leftist worldview. He rearticulated Atatürk's principle of secularism as 'secularism respectful to the religious beliefs'. Ecevit exalts the Turkish people by referring to some of its characteristics like respecting democratic and egalitarian ideals, peace loving, and good faith. For Ecevit the Turkish people invented the project of 'people's sector' with the tradition of '*imece*' meaning collective work of the people. The people's sector is to be organised as the third sector economy together with public and private sectors. The basic motivation of this third sector would be to increase the economic power of the masses since the classes that have the economic power also acquire political power. In other words, economic power and political power go together. Ecevit's populist ideology led to the perception of him as the man of the people. The masses identifies him with mottos of '*Halkçı* (populist) Ecevit' and legendary saver of the people '*Karaoğlan*'. His symbols and lifestyle helped this identification as well: his *kasket* (peasant's cap), Ecevit's blue, his parka, his honesty, his poor and not corrupted life, the white dove...

There was an obvious and drastic change in the CHP's perception of 'populism' with Ecevit. Both Berkes and Karpat emphasize the term 'people's sovereignty' or 'national sovereignty' as an indicator of adherence to populism in the early republican era (Berkes, 2005: 503; Karpat, 1991: 54). However, Karpat (1991: 47) acknowledges that new republican government's 'Programme for Populism' was an 'intervention from above'. In this respect, Ecevit's new stance of 'for the

people, by the people' aimed at transforming elitist perception of the CHP, which was 'for the people, in spite of the people'. Aydemir (1971: 39) argues that the spirit of CHP programs has been 'for the people, in spite of the people' as the real populism, and he perceives principle of 'for the people, by the people' as a new formula but not the real populism. Since it involves two contradictory understandings of populism, this example is very justificative for Laclau's (1985: 156) argument that populism is an elusive and recurrent concept.

There is also another aspect of discussion of populism in the context of the CHP: classes. Ecevit (1968: 98) asserts that the new approach of the CHP –i.e. the left of centre- is a democratic, peaceful and populist way of reducing profundity of class struggle. As Necmi Erdoğan (1998: 27) puts it, Ecevit's Democratic Left movement showed a break with the classical CHP discourse, which had not been recognising social classes and antagonisms. With Ecevit, the party faced a shift in its electoral base from elitist coalition to a class-based alignment (Tachau, 1991: 99).

For Necmi Erdoğan (1998: 29), Ecevit's success in gathering great mass support while adhering to the left politics and presenting Kemalism as a 'hegemonic project'³² made his discourse an exception. However, the basic motive of Ecevit's hegemony project was not Kemalism. It was a people/power bloc antagonism having class-context and this was a common feature, for example, in most of the Latin American populist discourses. It may appear as an exception in Turkish political scene, but not in global scale. Laclau (1985: 212) rightfully argues "Classes cannot assert their hegemony without articulating the people in their

³² The concept of hegemony is a Gramscian term. For Gramsci, in the state and civil society relations, hegemony implies togetherness of consent and coercion. Consent is related to general will and coercion is a capacity of the state. Institutions like religion, family and media have important roles in hegemonic sense. Hegemony project refers to assertion of hegemony of a class-alliance. Hegemony crisis refers to crisis of state in which the ruling classes are unable to provide intellectual and moral leadership. A passive revolution may occur in order to minimise the possibility of a counter-hegemonic strategy. In passive revolution, coercion has more role than consent (For further information, look at: Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Londra: Lawrence and Wishart; Gramsci, A. (1985) *Selections from Cultural Writings*. Londra: Lawrence and Wishart). 1980 coup in Turkey can be regarded in this context.

discourse; and the specific form of this articulation in the case of a class which seeks to confront the power bloc as a whole, in order to assert its hegemony, will be populism”.

Following the line of Laclau’s argument, we can argue that populism was Ecevit’s hegemony project and articulation of ‘the people’ does not necessarily exclude class-nature of the discourse. And for Ecevit the ones, who perceive themselves privileged, think that it is necessary to have privileges that others cannot benefit or already got those privileges and use them to take imbalanced share from the surplus value of labour or can acquire power further than equality principle of democracy, putting their power into the conduct of society excessively, are out of the concept of ‘the people’ (Ecevit, 1975a: 9). Again for him, the people, to a large extent, is the totality of humans who are in a position to earn their livings by physical and intellectual labour; and have no possibility to bring their power into the society and governing of the state sufficiently with the opportunities they have on their own (Ecevit, 1975a: 9). This shows how an antagonism is attached to Ecevit’s discourse.

To further the discussion, I would like to refer to Boratav’s argument. For Boratav (1983: 7), “populism illuminates the connections between political regime and economic policy that is aimed at relations of redistribution”. During the single party rule, the CHP had no policy regarding redistribution since there was not any aim at extending domestic market. Hence in Boratav’s account, the CHP in the single party era was not ‘populist’.³³ However, in Ecevit’s Democratic Left movement, the populist hegemony project is completed with an economic policy in which ‘the people’ was placed at the heart of economy. In the 1976 Program of the CHP (1976: 88), it is stated that ‘the people’s sector’ would be in a prior position concerning state support and also would be the strongest sector of the economy. Moreover, the aim of this sector is presented as such: “preventing the concentration of the economic power and political power resulting from economic

³³ Boratav (1983: 7) perceives the period between 1962-1976 as ‘populist’ period since there is a redistribution policy. In this sense, for Boratav, CHP in the single party rule is not populist.

power in the hands of the state or limited segments of society” (CHP, 1976: 88). The party or its leader Ecevit thought that diffusion of capital to the base could be realised by the peoples sector.

After elaborating on his major political discourse, I would like to turn back to the discussion of his political career. Through the 1970s, Turkey slid into political turmoil and the youth was politicised as the left and right fronts were sharpened. The power hubs in the army were in the edge of polarisation and the internal structure of the army was threatened as well. In this environment, the March 12, 1971 military intervention took place. Ecevit was definitely against the intervention and he believed that the intervention would tear down their efforts of establishing a democratic culture in Turkey. He opposed the idea of his party’s participation in the militarily directed government. Henceforth, Secretary-General Ecevit contradicted with his leader İnönü and resigned over this contradiction.

This resignation led to dissolution within the group of the Left of Centre. However, he was aware of the fact that the people would not support the intervention and the opposition would gain strength in the short run. His retreat provided him with extensive power in order to sustain their movement within the party. In this process, *Ecevitçis* won provincial congresses of the CHP. On the other side, İsmet İnönü was in the preparation of challenging Bülent Ecevit in an extraordinary congress. Nevertheless, his historical personality and charisma were unsatisfactory to preclude the demands of novelty, change and trill. In the extraordinary congress, Ecevit made a significant speech. He says: “The decision you will make is this: shall we be either a democratic party’s members respecting law or otherwise the *‘kapıkulu’s*”³⁴? Will the law or command operate in the CHP?” (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 153). Following İnönü’s resignation, on the 14th of May 1972, Ecevit was elected to the CHP leadership and he became the third chairman of the party after Atatürk and İnönü.

³⁴ *Kapıkulu* means Ottoman sultans’ slaves.

In the 1973 General Elections, his party came out on top with the 33.3 percent of the votes. This result implies a coalition government. Bülent Ecevit's CHP and Necmettin Erbakan's MSP (National Salvation Party) came to an agreement about the coalition protocol. MSP was an Islamic party. Therefore, this coalition was seemed to be a difficult one for the bases of both political parties. However, new Prime Minister Ecevit described the coalition as such: "an attempt to end artificial discrepancies stemming from historical delusions" (TBMM, 1974b: 364). The lifespan of this coalition government was very short. It lasted only almost 8 months. However, within this very short time, there were two important events that increased Ecevit's popularity very much. These are abolishment of ban on plantation of hashish and Peace Operation on Cyprus.

The military-directed cabinet made after the March 12, 1971 Memorandum had prohibited the plantation of hashish in Turkey with the pressure of the US. This decision affected tens of thousands of people's livelihood in Anatolia. On the 10th of July 1974, Ecevit's government abolished the ban on hashish plantation despite the threats of the US. Ecevit's this initiative made him a confidential personality for the peasants and proved his commitment to the independency of Turkey.

The junta administration in Greece perceived this as an opportunity and organised a coup in Cyprus on the 15th of July 1974. Makarios administration in Cyprus was overthrown. The Greek junta was in favour of annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The violence against the Turks in the island was triggered before the coup and the coup would have increased this violent attitude. Ecevit's government decided to intervene in Cyprus with guarantor rights that stemmed from the 1959 Agreements. Then, the Peace Operation took place on the 20th of July 1974. This event made Ecevit a 'national hero'.

Through the end of the September 1974 Ecevit resigned due to the disaccord in the coalition government. Following Ecevit's resignation, the rightist parties formed another coalition government, namely, Nationalist Front government under the prime ministry of Süleyman Demirel.

Ecevit's party got 41.2 percent of the votes in the 1977 General Elections, and had 213 deputies. However, this amount of deputies was not sufficient to form a CHP government on its own since the party lacked 13 deputies to reach vote of confidence. Thus, the second Nationalist Front government was formed. In the Nationalist Front period, tension and terror in the country were triggered.

Some independent deputies supported Ecevit to form a government and on the 31st of December 1977, he formed the new government. This government had to cope with intensified economic crisis, black-market and shortages. Furthermore, political violence raised high levels. On the one side, there were high hopes of the people associated with Ecevit regarding change of order, prosperity, social justice and peace. On the other side, there were deficit of foreign currency, rising inflation, strong opposition of TUSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) and international capital against Ecevit.

There were huge gaps between the people's demands and expectations and economic conditions. In order to end political violence and restore public order, Ecevit declared martial law. Undemocratic and unpopular policies were seen as remedy for public order. But these policies had not been remedy in real sense and the tensions rose. The discourse of change of order was replaced with restoration of order, but it was not realised either. In the economic, social and political turmoil of the 1970s, both Ecevit and Nationalist Front governments lost their support and credibility in a short time. Due to a sharp decrease in the votes of the CHP in the by-elections for partial Senate memberships in October 1979, he left the office. Then, Demirel formed the third Nationalist Front government. This government made the Decisions of January 24, 1980 to overcome the economic crisis. This new policies were against the labour movement, and were for liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation. The state would no longer be a protectionist state and the income redistribution policies would end.

By the end of the 70s, the crisis and chaotic situation led to a crisis of hegemony. The army intervened in political process and September 12, 1980 military coup

took place. Through the 1980, planned economy and import substitution had become obsolete in the world and it was impossible to implement 'new' system within democratic political process. In this sense, the 1980 coup had much to do with the implementation of January 24 decisions. Ecevit (1993: 176) emphasised the link between January 24 and September 12. Political parties were closed down and politicians were deprived of their political rights. Ecevit struggled for the establishment of liberal democracy, restoration of fundamental rights and freedoms during the military rule. He was sent to prison for several times due to his efforts to this end.

On November 14, 1985, he established the Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the leadership his wife Rahşan Ecevit and continued his political career. He became the chair of the party when his political rights were given back. His new party was different from the previous one. For him, the CHP had composed of different groups and factions. These separations into factions had usually resulted in discord and uproar within the party.

Ecevit was very sensitive to prevent his new party from factions and corruption. However, this led to other problems within his new party. The party was organised around the leader's charisma and personality. It was a leader-oriented party rather than depending on membership base and organisation. Therefore, some members and deputies questioned the issue of intra-party democracy several times. Ecevit perceived intra-party democracy and democracy in general sense as different issues (Akar and Dündar, 2008: 380).

Starting from the scratch, within 10 to 15 years, he achieved to come to the power in Turkey in 1997 with his *sui generis* Democratic Left Party. At the beginning of 1999, political parties represented in the TBMM except for Deniz Baykal's new CHP, supported Ecevit to form a minority government with his party. The major task of this government would be to bring Turkey to general elections in a healthy atmosphere. This confidence of parties and some organisations of Turkish civil society in Ecevit reflected in the results of the 1999 General Elections and his

party became the first with 22 percent of the votes. Following the elections, Ecevit formed a coalition government with Devlet Bahçeli's MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and Mesut Yılmaz's ANAP (Motherland Party). This was Ecevit's last prime ministry.

The coalition government worked between 1999 and 2002. During this time, Turkey faced economic crises. Ecevit's last government worked on dealing with the crises and initiating economic, social and political reforms. Also, Turkey became a candidate for the full membership in the European Union. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 in the US, Ecevit's government participated in the international coalition to end radical Islamist Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, Ecevit opposed the US plan on occupying Iraq. Relations with the US were again under tension. In the beginning of 2002, 77-year-old Ecevit's health was broken-down. In the Early General Elections of 2002, which was held in this atmosphere, coalition partners DSP, MHP and ANAP failed to pass the 10 percent electoral threshold and to enter the TBMM.

On the 19th of May 2006, despite his health problems, he attended the funeral of Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin, who was a higher judge in the Council of State and assassinated by Alparslan Arslan who was a lawyer. Ecevit's participation resulted in stroke and then he went to coma. He was in coma till he died on the 5th of November 2006.

Bülent Ecevit's political life reflects examples of almost every situation that a leader would come across: summit and ground, everything and nothing, success and failure, hope and frustration, threat and obedience, masses and loneliness, crises and tranquillity, war and peace, progress and retrogress, accord and discord... He and his Democratic Left movement left their distinctive mark on Turkish politics. In this part, I have tried to elaborate on this distinctive mark with reference to Ecevit's political life, worldview and thoughts. In the following part, I will move to the analysis of his conception of nationalism.

3.2- Ecevit's Nationalism Before the 'Left of Centre' Movement

Bülent Ecevit's early-political period encompasses the time until he became the secretary-general of the CHP in 1966. The process of Left of Centre movement is not included in the early-political period. And analysis of his book on the Left of Centre, namely *Ortanın Solu*, is left to the following chapter although it bears a date that is in the early-political period. The reason is that I do not want to separate the evaluation of this movement.

The major sources for depicting out Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism are his articles in print media and his speeches in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. We see roots and foundation of his conception of nationalism in this period. There is no straightforward discussion on nationalism or no evident attempt of asserting certain understanding of nationalism. In other words, nationalism in this period was not a controversial issue of Turkish politics. The ones referring to nationalism intend more or less similar meanings.

3.2-1. Political Conditions in his Early-Political Period

To begin with, I would like to elaborate on the basic characteristics of this period. The Democratic Party rule, which started in 1950 and ended with 1960 military intervention, covers most of Ecevit's early-political period. While the DP referred to national will as a source of legitimacy, the 'legitimacy' of the CHP was based on the War of Independence. The DP rule began following the single party era. Rising classes provided the DP with relevant social support to come to the power. The discourse of DP was organised around reference to national will against military-civil bureaucracy. The rising classes were results of introduction of capitalist agriculture. In the beginning of the 1950s, there was not a unified domestic market yet. The commercial bourgeoisie was the first segment of society demanding unified national market. The DP was a party of commercial bourgeoisie and DP relied on extensions of commercial bourgeoisie in the

periphery. Cem Erođul (2003: 93) argues that the class base of the DP was the dominant classes such as big land owners and commercial bourgeoisie. For Erođul (2003, p. 94), the DP was the political organisation of parasitic dominant classes, which intended to make a people's movement their instrument in order to acquire power in a full sense following the Second World War.

The basic motives emphasised in the process of establishment of the DP were liberalization and democratisation. For example, the founding figures of the DP – Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü- applied to the CHP group administration demanding some democratic steps such as real scrutiny of the nation over government, guarantees on basic human rights and freedoms, abrogation of antidemocratic provisions, ending the pressure, etc (Erođul, 2003: 28-30). This shows that founders of the DP attacked the authoritarian nature of the CHP single party rule. The major ideological instrument of the opposition years of the DP was the concept of 'democracy' and this concept almost gained an enchanted meaning (Erođul, 2003: 89). However, their commitment to the principles of democracy was controversial between 1950 and 1960. The political rights, fundamental freedoms were curtailed during the DP rule. In this period, then, the CHP opposition demanded freedoms and progress for democracy. Through the end of the 60s, the DP rule gained an authoritarian nature. The coup put an end to the DP oppression and restored liberal democracy.

The last 6 years of the early-political period were in a liberal environment. In this environment there were rising left ideologies, movements and parties. Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) was the prominent example of these movements. Between 1961 and 1965 there were coalition governments, which were headed by the CHP leader İsmet İnönü. Ecevit was Minister of Labour in these coalitions.

After this brief introduction of political framework in Ecevit's early-political period, now it is time to move on to evaluation of his discourse in relation to his nationalism perception. I will begin with analyzing his articles published in *Ulus*.

3.2.2- Articles in *Ulus*

In one of his articles in *Ulus* bearing the date of November 10, 1953, Ecevit (1953) writes that Turks betray Atatürk in a sense that the language he established, his view on history and secularism are abandoned. This implies that at that time, Ecevit is sympathetic to Atatürk's view on history (the Turkish History Thesis) and his efforts on purification of Turkish language. In 1950s, indications of a feature of his nationalism, which is attitude towards Turkish History Thesis and pure Turkish, could be seen narrowly.

In another article dated May 3, 1955, he examines the spirit of national struggle during the War of Independence. In this article, he compares this spirit with the force of army in the Ottoman Empire. He (1955) says that army in the Ottoman era did not take its courage from the Turkish people's nationality feelings or social consciousness. However, contrary to the Ottoman era, the national independence movement reflects Turkish people's faith in griping on its national destiny and developing a sense of social consciousness (Ecevit, 1955). The peculiarity of this consciousness was that it was deemed to the emergence of foreign threats against the independence of Turkish homeland (Ecevit, 1955). Therefore, it remained as a force which is mobilised only when the independence and integrity of the homeland was in danger (Ecevit, 1955). This dormant national commitment has to be wakeful in peacetime as well (Ecevit, 1955). As in the years of national struggle, it is necessary again to turn back to the Turkish people and to call out spirit of national struggle (Ecevit, 1955). When making a comparison of Ottoman era and national struggle years, he does not elaborate on whether there were national tendencies among Turks at that time.

Ecevit's examination of emergence of national consciousness could be analysed by following Smith's typology. As mentioned above, Smith categorises nationalisms as territorial and ethnic lines. Pre-independence and post-independence movements are the common sub-categories. 'Independence' seems to be a privileged notion in Ecevit's discourse. Ecevit constructs his nationalist

conception on foreign threats against the independence of homeland. The National Pact of 1920 demarcates this motherland and the War of Independence is realised for the sake of this pact. In this sense, Ecevit's conception is closer to territorial nationalism as a pre-independence movement. But it does not mean that there are not any ethnic components.

In the early-political period, Bülent Ecevit has a universalistic understanding of freedom. For example, in his article dated November 12, 1956, he describes freedom as an ideal that unites humanity. He (1956) writes that continuity of reciprocal national interest relationships is no more a substantial basis for international agreements. For him (1956), the number of people that would sacrifice their national interests for the sake of freedoms of other nations in other parts of the globe is increasing day by day. The humanity attaches importance to freedom more than ideal of peace and concern of security ever after (Ecevit, 1956). Therefore, freedom becomes an international grand purpose. Placing a universal principle, such as freedom, above national interests is an important aspect of Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism at that time. But Ecevit's attitude towards universal values seems to be romantic, exaggerated and redundant.

In Ecevit's discourse, 'imperialism' is not a frequently used term to describe international politics. Nevertheless, in the early-political period, he refers to imperialism in one of his articles. The title of the article written on May 18, 1957 is 'Turkey and Colonialism'. In this article, his ideas concerning this title could be summarised as such: In the expansion era of the Ottoman Empire, the most important mistake of the Turks was to try to make Europeans accept the leading role of them without internalising to be 'European' (Ecevit, 1957b). Therefore, Turks could have never get rid of being a foreign tribe that forced Europe to be under the rule of 'barbarian' Asia in the eyes of Europeans (Ecevit, 1957b). In 1950s, Turkey repeats the very same mistaken method in the Middle East (Ecevit, 1957b). For seven years, the Turks without espousing Middle Eastern character they try to impose their leading role in the region (Ecevit, 1957b). As a result of this, Asians see Turks as a foreign nation that wants to sustain rule of 'imperialist'

Europe over Middle East (Ecevit, 1957b). In order to get rid of this negative impression, Turkey seems to make its lifestyle oriental while keeping on its Western-guided foreign policy (Ecevit, 1957b). This concession leads to a more problematic situation as Turkey becomes lonely (Ecevit, 1957b). Neither Europeans, nor Asians regard the Turks close to them (Ecevit, 1957b).

He (1957b) notes that in a world, which is becoming smaller as civilisation and culture differences between East and West lessen, Turkey could be a bridge between Asia and Europe. The most appropriate way for Turkey is the one that was followed by the CHP governments: Adopting Western lifestyle and world view and becoming a natural member of community of European nations at the same time differentiating its foreign policy in the Middle East from that of the West which tried to sustain its political and economic sovereignty in the region (Ecevit, 1957b). Thus, Turkey could show the way of westernisation without sacrificing their independence and national honour to the Muslim countries of the Middle East (Ecevit, 1957b). This kind of approach would mean that in Ecevit's conception of nationalism modernisation is an important component.³⁵ Westernisation is not seen as subordinate to national honour. On the contrary, westernisation as a process of modernisation is combined with national sensitivities (Ecevit, 1957b). Ecevit (1957b) presents Turkey as a model of national modernisation.

When there are nationalisms that do not precisely fit either to the civic or ethnic categories, it is argued that a third category of modernist nationalism is conceptualised (Akman, 2008: 82). For Gellner (1997: 235), the Third World nationalisms are marked with a dilemma stemming from antagonism of westernisation and populism: modernisation and the claim of uniqueness of national culture. In my opinion, this is the rationale behind Ziya Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation. Levis (1968: 3) argues that Turkish nationalism turned out to be an attempt for bringing the whole nation from one

³⁵ In the early-political period, it is observed that Ecevit prefers the term of 'westernisation' to the term of 'modernisation'.

civilisation to another. In other words, nationalism in Turkey functioned as an ideology and practice of modernisation (Keyder, 1996: 116). In the introduction chapter, I referred to the CHP as the representative of 'nationalist' modernisation project.

Ecevit (1957b) refers to the selection of the term '*sömürgecilik*' instead of '*müstemelekecilik*' in Turkish. Ecevit (1957b) says that the ones that made language purification in Turkish opted for the word '*sömürgecilik*', which comes from the root '*sömürü*' (exploitation), while '*müstemelekecilik*' in Ottoman Turkish means colonialism.³⁶ For Ecevit (1957b), this preference shows the mentality of the Turkish revolutionaries concerning their stance against imperialism. Ecevit (1957b) writes that with the help of this preference, hostility to every kind of imperialism is transmitted to Turkish language. Ecevit (1957b) compares the DP government's attitude with Turkish revolutionaries in the early republican era.

He (1957b) criticises the DP, as it gets closer to the imperialist policies of the West. He (1957b) illustrates this by referring to the newspaper of the DP. He (1957b) says that this newspaper seems as if it is the spokesman of Western colonialism in the Middle East leaving 'imperialist' *Daily Express* of London behind in making the propaganda and justification of English imperialism not only to the Middle Eastern people but also to the English people. Ecevit (1957b) emphasises that this attitude of the DP towards Western imperialism in the Middle East could not be tolerated by the new Turkish generations that name colonialism as '*sömürgecilik*'.

Ecevit is sympathetic to the independence movements of other nations and to their fight against colonialism. On April 24, 1961, he condemns the French rebellion in Algeria in 1961.³⁷ He (1961c) says that the French rebellion in Algeria is deprived

³⁶ The root of '*sömürgecilik*' is '*sömürü*' in pure Turkish. '*Sömürü*' means 'exploitation'.

³⁷ By April 21, 1961 leading groups of the French army that are opposing the independence movement of Algeria staged a coup in Algiers. Ecevit writes about this French revolt in Algeria.

of any primary matters of respectfulness or legitimacy. The French rebels aim at sustaining colonialism under Europe's very nose and continuing the exploitation and oppression of millions of Algerians (Ecevit, 1961c). They oppose openly not only to the Algerian nationalists, but also to the principles of humanity (Ecevit, 1961c). They betray on the paramount ideals that France introduced to humanity (Ecevit, 1961c). He (1961c) writes that if the ones that follow humanitarian and liberal principles of French culture were the majority in France, they would make no demur to give freedom and independence to the Algerian people.

In his another article dated September 27, 1957, he comments on approach of the DP government to the Soviet-supported Syria 'threat'. In this article, the frequent use of 'patriotism'³⁸ is striking. In the following sections, there will be an evaluation of the term 'patriotism' in Ecevit's line of thought. At this point, suffice it to say that in the early-political period, Bülent Ecevit does not indicate discomfort with this term. Later, there would be a shift in his attitude towards the use of this term, especially when some thinkers use it to dispraise 'nationalism'. In this article, he (1957d) writes that in every democratic country of the world, the government parties treating national security above all of the minor domestic political calculations see the foreign threats as a means of preventing the tensions among patriot parties and cooperate with them. In other words, they do not abuse these threats to oppress patriotic opposition parties (Ecevit, 1957d). He (1957d) recommends the government party to invite the opposition party, which asserted its patriotism in many tests, to cooperate on equal basis.³⁹ As far as the DP executives prioritise patriotism over partisanship and collaborate with the CHP, the foreign threats would easily be overcome (Ecevit, 1957d). This insight of Ecevit is an important component of his conception of nationalism: Collaboration of political parties in national or national security issues would mean going

³⁸ I use 'patriotism' as English translation of '*vatanseverlik*' in Turkish.

³⁹ In 1990s, Ecevit will follow the same insight by calling for forming national policy beyond left-right differentiations. For example, one of the main themes in Democratic Left Party Electoral Manifestos in 1990s is 'national policy formation'. This is the implication of compromise.

beyond domestic political struggles for the sake of securing national unity. In later years, Ecevit would name this point ‘formation of national policy’.

In the early 20th Century, there emerges a new nationalist school of thought known as Anatolianism. In the early-political period, Bülent Ecevit’s conception reflects familiarity with Anatolianism in some respects. Strong commitment to Anatolia as a territory and its ancient past is perceived in some of his articles in early-political and later periods. Some scholars see Anatolianism as an alternative to both Atatürk’s nationalism and pan-Turkist *Turanism* (Atabay, 2008: 532). However, Ecevit’s conception cannot be easily regarded as an alternative to these. In one of his articles dated April 18, 1957, he criticises some outlooks that does not interiorise ‘Anatolia’ with its ancient civilisations and territoriality. In this article, he (1957a) writes that before coming to and settling down in Anatolia, they (meaning the Turks) considered ‘homeland’ and ‘*yurt*’ (nomad tent) equal.⁴⁰ It is difficult to say that the Turks interiorise Anatolia on which they live more or less for a thousand years (Ecevit, 1957a). For centuries they perceived Anatolia as a place for encamping and they invested their time and energy to conquer and keep other lands under control (Ecevit, 1957a).

Ecevit (1957a) writes that love and loyalty to Anatolia among Turks emerged after they lost the other lands and when they were forced to fight for keeping and saving it for themselves. Even in the 20th Century, Turks’ sense of history links them either to beyond or before Anatolia (Ecevit, 1957a). Most of their historical memories before the War of Independence are in territories that no more belong to them such as Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa, East or Central Europe (Ecevit, 1957a). Through the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, foreigners had taken the monuments, relics and ruins of ancient Anatolian civilisations and rebuilt them in their countries (Ecevit, 1957a). Some Turks today get angry to the Ottoman sultans that condoned this situation (Ecevit, 1957a). However, prohibiting the smuggling of these souvenirs today does not make them Turks’

⁴⁰ In Turkish, the word '*yurt*' both means nomad tent and homeland. Ecevit comments on this homonym.

(Ecevit, 1957a). Unless they interiorise, get to know and comprehend the ancient history of Anatolia, the monuments, relics or ruins would not belong to the Turks (Ecevit, 1957a).

Ecevit (1957a) suggests that the Turks should get closer to this history and try to gather some moral values from it, and then integrate them to their culture. In this case, the meaning of ‘yurt’ would make sense (Ecevit, 1957a). He (1957a) complains that Turks see themselves as ‘watchman’ of Anatolian culture and history not its ‘heir’. While there is an attempt of westernisation in Turkey, the Turks are not aware of the fact that Anatolia is the richest source by which the West was enlightened (Ecevit, 1957a). These ideas show that in Ecevit’s conception of Turkish nationalism, grassroots Anatolian culture and the image of ancient Anatolia are important components. These components demonstrate the territorial aspect of Ecevit’s nationalism while at the same time Turkishness as an ethnic reference is not dismissed thoroughly. In Smith’s conceptualisation, the Turkish ‘ethnic core’ can be seen in Ecevit’s approach to Turkish nation to an extent.

In another article dated August 19, 1960, he explains his views on ‘Turkishness’ and the idea of belonging to Turkey.⁴¹ He (1960b) says that a Western intellectual tries to get to know Anatolia in order to understand the West since Anatolian culture is one of the prominent sources of Western culture. Most of the civilisations that constitute Western culture lie in Anatolia in layers (Ecevit, 1960b). Nevertheless, the Turks usually do not take care of the sources of Western culture that are in Anatolia while they endeavour to westernise their country (Ecevit, 1960b). This means that the Turks are not successful in dealing with the feelings of being foreigners to Anatolian culture (Ecevit, 1960b). He (1960b) refers to Atatürk’s Turkish History Thesis as an attempt of defeating these feelings of foreignness and of developing an interest on this culture. This interest

⁴¹ The title of his article is ‘*Türklük ve Türkiyelilik*’. ‘*Türklük*’ means Turkishness and ‘*Türkiyelilik*’ is the idea of belonging to Turkey. *Türkiyeli* is a geographical identity. Since there is no proper English translation of *Türkiyeli* and *Türkiyelilik*, I use them in Turkish.

is the only remedy to prevent Turkish westernisation from being a shallow imitation (Ecevit, 1960b).

As Ecevit (1960b) writes it, according to the point of view in Atatürk's History Thesis, the cultural currents coming from Asia and the sources that bring about Western cultural currents are tied and coalesced in Anatolia to a large extent. For the Turk that sees this, westernisation is not moving away from him/her (Ecevit, 1960b). On the contrary, for the Turk who is interiorising his/her real place that makes up the Western culture, westernisation means uniting Turkishness, *Türkiyelilik* and the idea of being Westerner (Ecevit, 1960b). In contrast to the opinions of retrogressive thinkers in Turkey, westernisation, Anatolianism, nationalism and universalism are not contradictory to each other (Ecevit, 1960b). They are consistent and harmonious in Atatürk's History Thesis (Ecevit, 1960b). He (1960b) admits that scientists might mark some errors in the details of this thesis; however, the most important thing is the perspective in it.

Ecevit (1960b) argues that Atatürk's historical perspective is not only relevant for the Turks to go beyond a mere imitation of the West in the process of westernisation, but also it would help them to prevent their worldviews from the limits of racial or religious factions. In Ecevit's (1960b) point of view, for the coalescence and unity of different components having various racial, religious or sectarian origins under the idea of a single nation with the sense of Turkishness, the people of Turkey should see their place in history from Atatürk's standpoint. Unless they give up the behaviour of seeing discrepancy between Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik*, Turkish history and history of Turkey, the people of Turkey would neither completely be Westerner nor in national unity (Ecevit, 1960b). This attitude makes it clear that Ecevit is in an attempt of avoiding ethnic or racial boundaries of Turkishness and affiliating a territorial-national meaning to it. Therefore, Ecevit merges Turkishness with *Türkiyelilik*. Attributing his views on Turkishness to Atatürk's History Thesis brings his conception of nationalism closer to that of Kemal Atatürk.

Ecevit's approach to Turkishness and '*Türkiyelilik*' should be regarded as an 'imagined community' in Anderson's sense. As noted in the previous chapter, for Anderson his definition of a nation has four features: being imagined, limited, sovereign and political community. Ecevit *imagines* the Turkish nation as heir of Anatolian civilisations. For Ecevit Turkish nation is *limited* since he perceives it with the idea of belonging to Turkey (*Türkiyelilik*). As mentioned in his article bearing the date of May 3, 1955, he tries to merge emergence of national consciousness with National Struggle for independence. Therefore, the Turkish nation is a *sovereign political community*.

The issue of nation-building needs to be referred in order to account for the basis of the 'imagination'. There are two major ways for 'nation-building': the French model and the German model (Aktar, 2008: 78-79). The French model is universalistic, inclusive and legal, and it indicates a nation having civilisation objective for the future (Aktar, 2008: 78-79). The understanding that 'if one says he/she is a Turk, then he/she is Turk' is inline with this model (Aktar, 2008: 79). The German model is hereditary/genealogical, historicist and culturalist. The attempts of creating a Turkish uniqueness, for example with the Turkish History Thesis, are in-line with this model (Aktar, 2008: 79). Moreover, while the former can be referred to as civic nationalism, the latter can be conceptualised as ethnic nationalism.

Atatürk's nationalism is closer to the French model, but it also includes marks and effects of the German model. It has to be closer to the French model as there are so many ethnic and religious components in Turkey. The artificial French model seems to be waiting for to have content with the concrete German model (Aktar, 2008: 79). This is the basic reason for interconnectedness.

Ecevit's approach to the United States of America in the early-political period needs to be evaluated as well. On the 17th of June 1957, in one of his articles, he mentions the relationship between Americans and Turks. In this article Ecevit (1957c) asserts the difficulty for a nation of doing other nations a favour without

rousing hostility. To be forced to accept the favour and guardianship of a nation expressing its alienated nature and staying away from others by overlooking them results in mortification (Ecevit, 1957c). As a response to the favour and guardianship, this mortification also leads to the feelings of enmity and revenge (Ecevit, 1957c). Ecevit (1957c) perceives the position of the USA as such. For him (1957c), it is awkward while in other nations that have close relationships with the USA there are explosive sentiments against this country; in Turkey there is not any kind of reaction to the United States. Ecevit (1957c) argues that the common sense of Turks could easily harmonise their deep-rooted tradition of sovereignty and high national pride with their calculation of national interests. Therefore, receiving help from America does not lead to animosity (Ecevit, 1957c).

Ecevit (1957c) also argues that in the Ottoman era, the Turks were forced to feel responsibility to help Muslims in Asia and Africa, and to restore state of peace for Christians that were under the suppression of Papacy. According to Ecevit (1957c), the USA is in a similar situation. He (1957c) reproaches some nations for showing greater respect to the colonialist nations when compared to the US that rejects colonialism and the Turks that have never been imperialist. In the Ottoman era, the Turks lived in Europe as foreigners for centuries (Ecevit, 1957c). While entitling the native people to equal rights and freedoms and not depriving them of tolerance and justice, the Turks alienated from native Europeans' culture, beliefs, customs and lifestyles (Ecevit, 1957c). On the other hand, the Turks were not capable of presenting a more charming lifestyle or a more deep-rooted culture (Ecevit, 1957c). The climbing antagonism of the Muslim Arabs against the Turks could be explained in terms of worsening of Ottoman rule, rising nationalism amongst Turks and sedition of Europeans (Ecevit, 1957c). Nevertheless, the Europeans' feelings of revenge and enmity against Turks could be explained in terms of Turks' alienation (Ecevit, 1957c). For Ecevit (1957c), Americans are in a similar handicap despite their goodwill. The reasons for scarcity of feelings of alienation between Turks and Americans are due to the American professionals' capacity and the state of cultural change in Turkey (Ecevit, 1957c).

Following the visit of the US president Eisenhower to Turkey, on December 8, 1959 he writes an article about the speech of the president. Ecevit (1959) appreciates the president since he is aware of the fact that Atatürk initiated series of reforms and changed his country rapidly. For Ecevit (1959) the president's attempt of underlining the principles of Republic is more important than the military responsibilities of Turkey. He (1959) writes that as long as the friendship between Turks and Americans is based on values and principles of modern world, this would survive forever.

In an article dated June 23, 1961, he writes about the falsity of the DP government in granting privileges to the American NATO personnel in Turkey. He (1961d) argues that there might be too many lessons that the Turks should learn from their Western friends and allies. However, concerning understanding of justice, the Turks are not inferior to the Western nations (Ecevit, 1961d). Along history, against every kind of disaster, wrongfulness, tyranny, the trustworthiest base of the Turks has been their understanding feeling of justice (Ecevit, 1961d). For the ones who try to gain the friendship of the Turks, it would be a vital error to distrust their justice (Ecevit, 1961d). Granting substantial privileges about the judgement of the American-citizen NATO personnel, who commit an offence or crime in Turkey, shows how far the DP government is from national consciousness (Ecevit, 1961d). Ecevit (1961d) perceives this situation similar to brining the capitulations back in Turkey. His ideas in these articles reveal that he is not sceptical about Americans or he is not against the US beforehand. He opts for putting the blames on the DP government about some grievous mistakes in the US-Turkey relations rather than criticising the US openly. His attitude towards the US would be evaluated in the following sections in order to depict whether there are any changes.

In another article bearing the date of April 2, 1958 he comments on Arab nationalism. He (1958a) argues that communism is against Western nationalism; however, the Soviet Union has no difficulty in stimulating and taking advantage of newly emerging Arab nationalism against the West. While the US makes use of

its close relationship with Saudi Arabia to restrain Arab nationalists, America loses the opportunity to gain confidence and sympathy of the nationalists and brings about isolation of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world (Ecevit, 1958a). According to Ecevit (1958a), although it is the wealthiest of the Middle East, its ideology, state system, life and cultural level prevent Saudi Arabia from grasping the leadership of the Arab nationalism and converting it to the favour of the Westerners. He (1958a) recommends the US to abandon the policy of using Saudi Arabia against the alliance of Syria and Egypt. The only way to convert Arab nationalism and Arab revival to the favour of the West is to appreciate the strings in the Arab world (Ecevit, 1958a).

On July 16, 1958, he writes that feat of strength is no more a solution. Therefore, the new policy should be respectful and considerate to the Arabs' nationalism and their goal of economic independence (Ecevit, 1958b). As a result of this respectful and considerate policy of the West, if the Arab nationalists were fair enough to limit their goals and passions with their interests, their 'impartiality' would change into a closer position to the West (Ecevit, 1958b). He (1958b) perceives the most convenient way that Westerners should pursue is to come to an agreement with Egyptian leader Nasser and Arab nationalists if they show goodwill, and to find a way to reconcile Western interests with the objective and merciful goals of Arab nationalism. In these articles, it is clear that on the one hand, he does not show bias about either Arab nationalism or the West. On the other hand, he is not in a position of impeding Arab nationalism for the sake of Western interests. He also points out the contradictory nature of the relationship between Soviet communism and nationalism. This contradictory relationship would be further illustrated in the following chapters as well.

Since 1960s, Bülent Ecevit does not conceal his discomfort concerning Western type doctrinal socialism. In one of his articles bearing the date of September 6, 1960, he notes down his comments on this issue. He (1960a) writes that in addition to a different worldview and lifestyle with various values, westernisation movement in Turkey brings about some cliché and formula. Some intellectuals

who are in desire of imitating the West are trying to adopt these cliché and formula without considering different social realities and historical development of these realities in Turkey (Ecevit, 1960a). Ecevit (1960a) criticises these intellectuals about this emulation and their lack of knowledge in Turkish economic and social history. He (1960a) explains how conditions and development of events are different in Turkey. Therefore, a doctrinal socialist movement imitating Western discourse would not go beyond being an intellectual fantasy (Ecevit, 1960a). He (1960a) refers to the principles of the CHP such as populism and revolutionism in order to assert a political position, which is not doctrinal. Mentioning these points is relevant for me to argue in the following sections that his *ulusal sol* outlook has its roots in the early-political period. This outlook is based on the specificity of social conditions and realities in Turkey. In the following chapters, the *ulusal sol* understanding would be evaluated in detail.

In one of his articles dated January 2, 1961, he writes about a soldier's funeral in a church. This was a Turkish soldier who has Greek origin and died in a fire in Erzurum. For Ecevit (1961a), this soldier is an ablaze symbol of humanity uniting every single discrepancy. Ecevit (1961a) says that this Turkish soldier with a Greek origin is a human being before anything else. Considering this fact would preclude the religious, racial, sectarian or ideological discrepancies to 'empoison' the world (Ecevit, 1961a). On the contrary, these discrepancies would be a factor that enrich and beautify the country in question (Ecevit, 1961a).

He (1961a) makes a quotation from poet David Mallet's piece the name of which is Mustapha. He (1961a) says that in the 18th Century, Mallet regarded this kind of humanitarianism suitable for the Turks. Departing from Mallet's piece, he (1961a) says that even it might have different components; a nation would be united like a single bunch of flowers. He perceives Turkish nation as such.

On the 11th of April 1961, he writes another article about religious minorities in Turkey. He (1961c) criticises that although in the secular constitution there are equal rights entitled to everyone, there are *de facto* inequalities between Muslim

and non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. For example, state employment or promotions are restricted to non-Muslim citizens (Ecevit, 1961c). For Ecevit (1961c), the reasons of these factual inequalities are understandable since some memories of sad events of the recent past increases sensitivities and apprehensions. Otherwise throughout history the Turkish society and state have kept away from feelings and behaviours of racism and disrespect to other religions or sects (Ecevit, 1961c). While these kinds of feelings and behaviours set so many nations fighting, at those times the Ottoman Empire was the stronghold of tolerance and equality (Ecevit, 1961c). So many religious minorities and groups took refuge in the Ottoman Empire due to its governance insight (Ecevit, 1961c). Through the collapse of the Empire this accord was broken-down (Ecevit, 1961c).

However, in present time the Turkish nation should do its best to restore the same accord and fraternity rather than concentrating on the reasons of this breakdown (Ecevit, 1961c). According to Ecevit (1961c), the nation and nationalism understanding, and principle of secularism coming with the Republic offer a very fertile ground for such an attempt. The only obstacle for this is the sad memories of the recent past, but these memories are covered with ashes (Ecevit, 1961c). This point of view concerning the sad memories is similar to that of Ernest Renan's emphasis on the need for common oblivion to become a nation (Renan, 1947: 892).

These articles show that Bülent Ecevit is sensitive to the rights of non-Muslim citizens who are called 'minorities' regardless of their race or religious beliefs.⁴² I should also note that in his articles, there are no references to Muslim groups that could be seen as minorities. He implicitly shows that he is not very comfortable with the term of 'minority' even when talks about non-Muslim communities.

⁴² In these articles and in the articles with the same subjects, Ecevit uses the expression of "the so-called 'minority' groups" instead of using the term 'minority' on its own. He might intend not to refer to the ones who see themselves as equal members of Turkish nation as 'minority'.

3.2.3- Speeches in the TBMM

When we look at his speeches in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) between the years of 1959 and 1966, there is almost no reference to the principle of nationalism with the only exception of the speech on the 26th of February 1959. In this speech, he (1959a) comments on the notion of ‘homeland’.⁴³ He (1959a) criticises the DP government for establishing a front with the name of ‘front of the homeland’. Ecevit (1959a) argues that a notion like ‘homeland’ is a common value of a nation. Any party cannot try to monopolise such a ‘holly value’ Ecevit, 1959a). If a political party in power names its supporters as members of ‘front of the homeland’ this would mean that it is a kind of separatism that damages national unity in the country (Ecevit, 1959a). Nevertheless, for Ecevit (1959a), both the DP and the CHP are nationalists.

In another speech made on the 27th of February 1960, he mentions broadcastings of the public radio. The public radio makes separation of supporters of front of the homeland and front of faction and treason (Ecevit, 1960). Ecevit (1960) says that this harms national unity. While evaluating Cyprus issue, in his speech dated February 18, 1959, he suggests that the foreign policy of Turkey should become a national policy on which political parties in power and opposition reach a consensus.

As a general evaluation of his speeches in the TBMM, I see that among 42 speeches, there is only one speech with reference to the term of ‘nationalism’ directly. There are four speeches out of 42 in which he refers to national unity or ‘national’ issues.

⁴³ In this text, ‘*vatan mefhumu*’ is translated to English as ‘notion of homeland’. The term ‘*vatan cephesi*’ is translated as ‘front of the homeland’.

3.3- Conclusion

Following the evaluation of Ecevit's writings and speeches in his early-political period, at this point I would like to analyse this period with reference to my theoretical benchmark. As I explained in the previous section, my benchmark has two dimensions: domestic and external.

Firstly, as domestic dimension of his nationalism in this period, it is seen that he is critical to the DP governments concerning their attitude towards Turkish History Thesis and language purification. For him, the DP betrays Atatürk. His views on this issue imply that he is for a distinctive Turkish identity having its roots in Anatolian territory and having a language that shares less commonality with Arabic and Persian. Fichte's ideas about language that it should reflect national spirit, and purification by removing foreign words would mean purification of national spirit (Özkırımlı, 2008: 38-39). A more or less similar attitude is seen in Ecevit's understanding. His views also reflect familiarity with Anatolianism. For him, the modern Turks should behave as if they are heirs of Anatolian civilisations. The new Turkish national culture would be Western in a sense that it is all about internalisation of Anatolian cultural heritage, which is the basis of Western civilisation as well. And his attitude towards the definition of Turkish nation seems to be parallel to Anderson's concept of imagined communities. As for the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, he is critical to the *de facto* inequalities. He is an advocate of full integration of minorities to the Turkish nation. For him, the Turks have kept away from racism and intolerance.

Secondly, the external dimension is composed of an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist discourse, but at the same time a positive approach to the USA in general sense. In Ecevit's line of thought, Turkish people's nationality feeling emerged when independence of their homeland was under threat. This approach shows the importance of external dimension in his conception of nationalism. For him, hostility to every kind of imperialism is seen as the basis of Turkish revolutionaries' attitudes during national struggle. He criticises the DP

governments since they give an impression of safeguarding European imperialism in the Middle East. Therefore, Ecevit argues that the DP deviates from Turkish revolutionaries' road. In France-Algeria conflict he supports Algerian independence movement. He recommends that the policies of the West should be respectful to the Arab nationalists' goal of economic independence. This signifies that in his early-political period, Ecevit supports economic nationalism of nations. For Arab nationalists, he perceives Turkey as a model of westernisation without sacrificing independence and national honour. In domestic politics, he suggests the collaboration of 'patriotic' political parties against foreign threats and formation of 'national policy'. In this context, he sees nationalism as a common ground of political parties, whether they are in opposition or in power. Therefore, the external dimension of his conception of nationalism shows that for him, national interests are above the issues of domestic politics. Concerning external dimension, another characteristic is his commitment to the universal ideal of freedom. For him, this ideal unites the humanity and it is prior to national interests of nation-states.

As a brief and general evaluation of Ecevit's nationalism conception in his early-political period, I would like to say that nationalism is not perceived as a hotly debated issue of his speeches or writings. The most outstanding fact about this period is that rather than griping on ethnic aspects of Turkishness, he emphasizes the significance of territorial and civil virtues. In this chapter, I focused on the resemblance of Ecevit's nationalism to Anthony D. Smith's categorisation of territorial nationalism.

As a further evaluation, I can also argue that there is a successful balance between universal values of humanity and nationalism in Ecevit's line of thought. Adherence to universal values such as democracy, freedoms and rights and loyalty to Kemal Atatürk's perception of Turkishness and Turkish nation are features of his standpoint. His moderate and sometimes warm attitude towards the USA stems from his commitment to the universal values of the 'free world'. For the

discussion of domestic and external dimensions in this period, I conclude that the weight of external dimension is more than the domestic dimension.

In the following chapter, I will discuss Ecevit's conception of nationalism between 1966 and 1980.

CHAPTER IV

1966-1980 PERIOD: CHP LEADERSHIP

Bülent Ecevit became a leading figure in the CHP with the rise of the 'left of centre' movement. Through the end of 1966, Ecevit was elected as the secretary-general of the CHP since he was the forerunner of this movement. In this chapter, I focus on the years in which Ecevit was in struggle for the CHP leadership and he was in the leadership of the party. Therefore, the process through which he became the secretary-general included in this period. I prefer elaborating on the left of centre movement with respect to nationalism in this chapter.

This chapter begins with a brief introduction on the political and economic conditions during this period. Then, I firstly elaborate on his books: *Ortanın Solu, Bu Düzen Değişmelidir, Atatürk ve Devrimcilik, Perdeyi Kaldırıyorum, Ecevit'in Söylev ve Demeçleri, Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar, Demokratik Sol-Dünya-Türkiye-Milliyetçilik, Başbakan Ecevit'le Sohbet, Zorbalığa Karşı* are the books that I analyse. After analysing nationalism in these books, I move to his speeches given in the TBMM. I also refer to some of his poems. For example, his famous Turkish-Greek Poem is mentioned to evaluate his feelings about a neighbour of Turkey with which there are conflicts. Although it is written in 1968, I leave evaluation of his poem '*Pülümür'ün Yaşsız Kadını*'⁴⁴ to the next chapter since his explanation on this poem is in 1980s. After mentioning his speeches in the assembly, I will look at the consistency of his conception of nationalism and program and manifestos of his party.

⁴⁴ It means 'Ageless Woman of Pülümür'.

4.1- **Conditions in this Period**

To begin with, I would like to mention economic conditions very briefly. Protectionism, domestic market orientation and import substitution were the characteristics of the economic model in this period (Boratav, 2008: 118). The foreign dependency of the Turkish economy increased in this period as well (Boratav, 2008: 120). The period of 1977-1979 was years of economic depression. Ecevit came to power during this depression. He dealt with huge economic problems that had been inherited from the previous government (Boratav, 2008: 141). The international capital and social democratic governments in Europe, which Ecevit deemed his friends, ask for an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a precondition for new credits (Boratav, 2008: 141). However, the Ecevit government believed that charging the working classes for the economic depression was a 'political suicide' and he tried to resist the demands of the foreigners (Boratav, 2008: 141). The government was not prepared for implementing an alternative economic policy or model (Boratav, 2008: 141). The third Nationalist Front Government proposed the alternative model with its January 24, 1980 Decisions. The 1980 Coup seems to come to 'help' the politicians who intended to implement the new and costly policy.

After this brief evaluation of economic conditions, I can move to the political sphere. The most outstanding facts about this period are instability, political tensions and violence. Political competition among political parties usually turned around left-right divide. On the one side, political parties like the CHP and the TIP represented left outlook. The CHP was transformed into a party in the left of centre. The basic trend of transformation dated back to the 1957 General Elections. The electoral manifesto of the party had included the principles of a liberal democracy that were put into affect with the 1961 Constitution. Especially, social rights were emphasized during this transformation.

With the movement of the left of centre, the party got closer to leftism in the mid-60s. However, İsmet İnönü used the term left of centre in general and elastic sense

as a macro economic policy. In the 1969 General Elections, the CHP faced a fiasco. At this point, Ecevit-İnönü confrontation occurred with the arguments on whether the left of centre remained inadequate or proved to be unsuccessful. The situation of the CHP after adapting the left of centre attitude resembled to its situation in 20 years before when it enacted the law of land reform (Ahmad, 1994: 316). In both situations, the defenders of status quo in the CHP became mobilized in order to weaken the influence of the reformists (Ahmad, 1994: 316). While in the former, the disagreement led to the foundation of the DP; in the latter there appeared a great internal conflict. This conflict led to another party. In 1967, Member of Parliament Turhan Feyzioğlu left the CHP and formed the Confidence Party (GP). The Memorandum of March 12, 1971 led to a discrepancy between Ecevit and İnönü. Then, the left of centre movement challenged İnönü's leadership in the CHP. This process ended with Ecevit's victory within the party.

On the right side of left-right continuum Justice Party was the major party. It was the strongest representative of the DP tradition after the 1960 Coup. It was also the representative of capitalism and speaker of big businessmen in Turkey (Ahmad, 1994: 298, 305). This party had a developmental discourse. Its chairman Süleyman Demirel became prime minister several times during this period. After Ecevit's resignation from office, Demirel formed the first Nationalist Front government. Till 1980 Coup, Demirel became prime minister of three Nationalist Front governments that he formed with rightist parties like CGP, MSP, DP and MHP.

During this period, Ecevit formed three governments. Although his party became the first in the elections, he stayed in office totally 31 months in 1970s. These are the most important examples in relation to nationalism when he was in office: Cyprus intervention, allowing hashish cultivation, nationalizing some mines.

4.2- **Ecevit's Books**

In 1966, Bülent Ecevit writes a book as a manifesto of the movement of Left of Centre.⁴⁵ It would be more appropriate to begin this chapter with the analysis of this book. In the analysis of this book I will focus mainly on these topics: Turkish nation and lack of tradition of servitude; racial discrimination and the Turks; national identity and culture; the political parties and nationalism; the need for protection of national values; national defence and national foreign policy; Left of Centre and national honour; and economic nationalism. The first five topics are related to the domestic dimension of Ecevit's nationalism and the latter three topics are examples of external dimension.

To begin with the lack of tradition of servitude among Turks, he (1966: 40) writes that Turkish people cannot comply with a state order that oppresses or despises them. He (1966: 40) illustrates this by stating that Ottoman Turkish history is full of external wars, but it is also full of internal revolts and wars when the state tends to oppress the people. For him (1966: 40), the peoples that have the habit of being submissive and the tradition of servitude to their rulers or dominant groups, or to other nations, could bear dictatorships. Nevertheless, for him (1966: 40), even if it is for its benefit, the Turkish people cannot bear a dictatorship or too much of an authoritarian absolute rule. Ecevit tries to attach a certain quality to the Turkish people. However, if we do not regard the autonomy of the people to a certain degree, this seems to be contradictory when we consider the fact that during Ottoman rule, the people of the Empire was the 'subject's of the Ottoman sultan.

The second topic that I would like to mention in this book reflects his perception of threats to the unity of the Turkish nation. For Ecevit (1966: 44), there is a contradictory situation that is resulting from bifurcation of the secular institutions of education and increasingly seen religious institutions of education. As he (1966: 44) notes it, this contradiction leads to dangerous dualities and discords in

⁴⁵ The Turkish name of the book is '*Ortanın Solu*' meaning Left of Centre in English.

social life, national culture and human thoughts, and disintegration in national unity of the Turkish people. He (1966: 44) argues that this disintegration of national unity is accelerated as racial discrimination, which is foreign to humanity and nationality understandings of the Turks instigated internally and externally. According to Ecevit (1966: 44), national independence is in danger as some foreign forces exploit the functioning democracy to penetrate Turkey. Caring for the national unity seems to be an important aspect of Ecevit's conception of nationalism. The need for coddling the unity is sustained with reference to some internal and external 'threats' to it. The perceptions of both threat and unity are in accordance within a nationalist discourse.

For Ecevit (1966: 124-125), Turkish national identity and culture should flourish in the direction that in Turkish society, individual's identity, thinking and creativity are empowered to render Turkish nation contributing to the development of humanity. He (1966: 125) argues that Turkish national identity and culture should be protected from foreign influences that might result in foreign domination or penetration, loss of self-confidence and creativity, and dampen individuals' identities. Nevertheless, he (1966: 125) notes that it is necessary to refrain from some conservative ties and influences which would lead to alienation to contemporary developments and to becoming unproductive in intellectual life. For him (1966: 125), national identity and culture should improve in line with a progressive understanding of humanity and democratic worldview. In addition, parallel to Anatolianism, Ecevit (1966: 125) argues that cultural heritage of Anatolia should be nationalised and internalised to achieve a Turkish cultural renaissance, which would help the Turkish nation to reach a sound history understanding, and consciousness deeply rooted in the territory it lives on.

In this book there are also evaluations of political parties in relation to nationalism. Ecevit (1966: 76) sees the Justice Party (AP), which is in power, as being against the homeland in a sense that it lays off the patriotic persons who try to save the natural resources of the country from the exploitation of foreigners. For him (1966: 76), this party is opposing independence and nationalism in a way

that it blames the ones who try to prevent independence against new methods of colonialism of the new age for 'betrayal'. The AP is against national unity as it promotes party and religious sect discriminations in order to grip on power (Ecevit, 1966: 76). In this context, Ecevit perceives nationalism in relation to anti-colonialism and independence.

For Alparslan Türkeş's CKMP, Ecevit criticizes the use of the term 'democratic-nationalist-socialist' by the leading cadre of the party to define their political orientation. For Ecevit (1966: 25), this label evokes some right or wrong doubts of Nazism. Ecevit (1966: 25) writes that this also reflects the contradiction of far-right and far-left metamorphosis.

Concerning the CHP he (1966: 77) writes that as being the founder of the state and democracy, the duties of the Republican People's Party are to ensure the collapse of the governing party within democratic procedures, and to prevent the collapse of democracy, state, national unity, independence and structure, and well-being of the society. To this end, he (1966: 77) recommends the CHP to protect all national, social and institutional assets and values, which are under the threat of demolition.

The issue of national defence and national foreign policy is dealt with in a comprehensive manner. He (1966: 122) writes that defence policy should give priority to independence and security of Turkey, and should rely on the national foreign policy which regards serving to the regional and the world peace as a requisite to security of Turkey. The foreign links and organisations constructed for security concerns should not contradict with national defence policy of Turkey, and should not limit independence of Turkey (Ecevit, 1966: 122). He (1966: 124) is against concessions and privileges given in foreign relations in case they might insult the nation and damage independence. There should not be any military bases that are not under full authority and control of Turkish Armed Forces (Ecevit, 1966: 122). The foreign aids and grants should not be to the extent that might limit the freedom of national decision-making (Ecevit, 1966: 122). In

sustaining domestic security, he is against collaborating with foreign security organisations (Ecevit, 1966: 124). In public institutions, foreign professionals and advisers should be less in number and they should have authority and influence (Ecevit, 1966: 124). He (1966: 123) perceives the Turkish Armed Forces as the major guarantee of national presence in peacetime and wartime. He (1966: 123) also attributes a role to the army in the internalisation of revolutions and reforms by the nation. He (1966: 123) emphasizes that foreign policy of Turkey should be based on an ideal of humanity in which interest of Turkey is seen within the rise of peace, freedom and happiness of all humanity. For Ecevit (1966: 123), the basic condition for defending national honour and independence is associated with protection of individual's honour and freedom in Turkish society.

Ecevit (1966: 49) relates the need for the success of the Left of Centre to make democracy living in Turkey and render Turkey living with democracy which is free of foreign pressure and penetration. Resulting from contemporaneous indirect attack and indirect colonial methods, the exploitation of the people and national natural resources, damaging independence, national presence, national unity and national honour would come to an end if the Left of Centre becomes successful (Ecevit, 1966: 49). National independence, presence, unity and honour are merged with an anti-colonialist leftist discourse. This point seems to have affinity to Kemalist left/*ulusal sol* nationalisms discussed in the second part of the second chapter. The influence of *Yön* movement throughout 1960s is evident here.

Concerning economic nationalism, the book has substantial arguments. For example, Ecevit (1966: 124) asserts that it is essential to be awakened in order to prevent the penetration of new economic colonialism. He (1966: 124) writes that none of the economic, fiscal or commercial relations with foreign states, international economic or fiscal organisations, and foreign enterprises should be in the nature which might directly or indirectly limit economic and political independence of Turkey, bind its destiny to a certain side, and affect domestic politics. He (1966: 122) argues that strategic minerals and raw materials and oil should be processed and refined nationally.

His book '*Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*' (This Order Must Change) written in 1968 is a critique of economic order to a large extent.⁴⁶ He refers to the need for economic nationalism. While analysing problems of the Eastern Anatolia, he mentions Kurdism and Turkism very briefly. As economic nationalism is one of the major arguments in this book, the external dimension of his nationalism is evident and very strong. In analysing the book, firstly I will elaborate on the domestic dimension with Kurdism-Turkism discussion, and then move on to economic nationalism.

In his book, Ecevit focuses on the 'corrupt order'. He also elaborates on the repercussions of the 'corrupt order' in the Eastern Anatolia. He perceives the problems of the Eastern Anatolia within economic grounds. For him, there is not a problem of 'Kurdism'⁴⁷ in this region. He (1978: 243) writes that while touching upon the problems of the East, he would like to mention the claims and concerns about current of 'Kurdism' in the Eastern Anatolia. He (1978: 243) argues that there could be some individual Kurdistans in the East; however, there is no movement of Kurdism having roots among the people.

According to Ecevit (1978: 243), the people of the region desire to be part of Turkey, not to be separated from Turkey; they want to learn Turkish, rather than speaking Kurdish. He (1978: 243) refers to a statement that he listens to in a small meeting in the Eastern Anatolia: "Our grand purpose is not Kurdism-Turkism, it is struggling with beggary". He (1978: 244) notes that the people applaud this statement in tears. He (1978: 244) argues that the ones betraying Turkishness should not be looked for among the sacred people of the region who sacrificed their lives for the defence of the homeland. For him (1978: 244), the betrayers of Turkishness are the 'crack-brained's who reduce Turkishness to the calculation of skull, and insult the people of the region with their publications.

⁴⁶ In this work, I refer to the fifth publication of the book in 1978.

⁴⁷ I use 'Kurdism' as the English translation '*Kürtçülük*'.

Concerning economic nationalism Ecevit focuses on issues foreign capital and development, and natural resources. He (1978: 185) argues that the amount of foreign capital coming to Turkey is very limited and generally Turkey does not benefit from it. He (1978: 186) refers to a research indicating that foreigners receive credit in Turkey more than they bring as capital. He (1978: 186) writes that foreigners realise excessive profits when compared to the capital they brought. He (1978: 189) also notes that his party is not against foreign capital and it is outdated to oppose foreign capital; however, there is a need for addressing the problems and dealing with these problems. Otherwise, foreign capital would be a new form of foreign exploitation by bringing capitulations back in Turkey (Ecevit, 1978: 189).

For Ecevit (1978: 190), as seen in the First World War, the underground resources of Turkey attract attention of the foreigners. He (1978: 191) criticizes the post-1950 governments for giving the underground resources of Turkey, which were saved with blood in the War of Independence to trans-national companies. He (1978: 191) illustrates this with the Oil Law enacted in 1954. Concerning oil refineries, he (1978: 195) perceives the concessions given to the foreign capital as indicators of how Justice Party government is far from considering national benefits and nationalism in economic sense. Ecevit (1978: 200) argues that some bureaucrats who oppose exploitation of underground resources of Turkey are dismissed from office since they are patriots and nationalists.

He (1978: 200) writes that in contemporary world and Turkey, any party that is not nationalist in oil, boron, copper, wolfram and in all underground resources and in all of the economy, cannot be regarded as 'nationalist' in any field. He (1978: 201) emphasizes that the CHP would nationalise all underground resources and expropriate the important ones; and end foreign exploitation in this sense. He (1978: 201) summarizes this attitude with a slogan: 'populism at home, nationalism against outside'.

In 1970, with his book '*Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*' (Atatürk and Revolutionism), he elaborates on Atatürk's reforms and the need for new reforms in Turkey. This book reflects vibrant arguments concerning external dimension of his nationalism. He touches upon the domestic dimension quite shortly. He (1970: 65) suffices it to say that in order to pass to the phase of infra-structural revolution, initially the Turkish society had to be brought to the status of being a 'nation' having integrity and national unity through Atatürk's principle of nationalism and his revolution. In this context, Ecevit perceives becoming a nation and national unity as preconditions for economic and social reforms.

In this book, again the external dimension is composed of economic nationalism to a large extent. He (1970: 25) assures that every measure, reform and revolution which would accelerate the shift of Turkey to become an independent industrial society would be in the direction of Atatürk's revolutionary understanding and Atatürk's nationalism. The insufficiency of these kinds of steps led to increased foreign economic dependency and foreign exploitation (Ecevit, 1970: 25). He repeats the economic nationalist arguments in '*Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*'. He (1970: 26) writes that in order make Atatürk's revolution of independence real and permanent, it is necessary to liberate economy of Turkey from foreign dependency and its underground resources from foreign exploitation through implementing new reforms and realising new revolutions. For him (1970: 26), the most urgent ones of these new reforms are changing system of foreign capital and nationalisation of all underground resources.

In June 21, 1974, he comments on foreign policy issues like the NATO and Common Market. Especially, his attitude towards the NATO and Common Market seems to be positive and optimistic. For example, he says, since its foundation, the NATO has been successful in preventing the two blocks from fighting (Ecevit, 1974: 44). During his premiership in 1974, ban on cultivation of hashish in Turkey as a result of American interference is abolished. Concerning abolishment of prohibition on hashish planting, his arguments reflect securing economic independence of Turkey. Implying the US, he (1974: 62) says, "Nobody

can interfere with the issue of what to cultivate in which part of Turkey other than Turks". For him (1974: 62), to decide this is the right of Turkey and no one in the world would respect a nation that cannot defend its rights.

As a response to the ones claiming that the operation on Cyprus is a 'trick of imperialism' Ecevit (1974: 104) asserts that Peace Operation of 1974 ends exploitation of Turkish Cypriots by world capitalism. Following intervention on Cyprus, he (1974: 74) says there are not any politicians in Turkey talking about annexation of the island to Turkey. He (1974: 75) links this to Atatürk's doctrine of none-irredentism and being a more realistic nation when compared to Greeks.

He (1970: 75) notes that Atatürk did not intend to occupy a land that would have led to a permanent strife among neighbours. According to Ecevit (1970: 75), nevertheless, starting from school desks, the Greeks engage themselves being in struggle with their closest neighbour due to their dreams of Turkish territory. He (1970: 75) mentions that if initiating friendship among Turkey and Greece is aimed at, it has to start from school desks and the children should grow up with feelings of friendship rather than anger. In London, in 1974, he writes a poem about Turkish-Greek friendship.⁴⁸ His poem shows his pure feelings of brotherhood and friendship with Greeks.

In his book in which he explains basic concepts in Democratic Left sense he comments on 'people', 'nation', 'populism' and 'nationalism'. He compares concepts

⁴⁸ English translation of 'Turkish-Greek Poem': "You become aware when you feel homesick / That you are brothers with the Greek; / Just look at a child of / Istanbul in foreign land / when he hears of a Greek song. / We've sworn at each other / In the free manner of Turkish. / We've drawn knife on blood / Yet a love inside us / Hidden for days of peace like these. / What if in our veins / Were not the blood of a same race? / From the same air in our hearts / The crazy wind blows. / So generous like this rain / And warm like the sun. / The armfuls of goodness of spring / That surge from within. / Our hostility is like a drink / Distilled from the fruit of the climate / As harmful and as tasteful as any drink. / From this water from this taste have we sinned. / A blue magic between us / And this warm sea / And two nations on its shores / Equals in beauty. / The golden age of the Aegean / Will revive through us / As with the fire of the future / The hearth of the past comes alive. / First a merry laughter comes to your ear / Then some Turkish with a Greek accent. / Nostalgic about the Bosphorus / And you remember the Raki. / It is when you are homesick / That you recall you are brothers with the Greek." London, 1974

of 'nation' and 'people'. He (1975a: 7) notes that 'nation' is a political concept while 'people' is a social concept. For him (1975a: 7), these concepts do not contradict, but complement each other. He (1975a: 7) exemplifies how Atatürk harmonized nationalism and populism: before the War of Independence initiated, in Istanbul, there were some nationalists other than Atatürk; however, they did not consider going to the people and getting power from the people in order to realise the requirement of their nationalism. They did not consider it necessary and expect such a source of power (Ecevit, 1975a: 7). In Istanbul, there were some persons believing that with some plans, reconciliation or concessions, they could achieve goals of their nationalism (Ecevit, 1975a: 7). For Ecevit (1975a: 7), one should not have doubts about their nationalism and goodwill, but Atatürk's superiority over them is merging together nationalism with populism. It is also relevant for me to note that in Ecevit's line of thought, nationalism and independence cannot be separated, and each of them cannot exist in the lack one the other (Ecevit, 1975c: 39).

Ecevit's (1975b: 18) other example of merge of populism and nationalism is as such: populism is to care for the working people, peasants, workers and public employees. For him (1975b: 18), as he allowed the cultivation of hashish and save the peasantry, at the same time with that decision he saved honour of Turkish nation in the external world. In this context, his conception of populism means trusting and protecting the people, and going to the people as a source of power, and his conception of nationalism means love of homeland, national honour, and independence. The external dimension is seen here as well.

Ecevit's views on economic nationalism usually resemble to the arguments of dependency school. For example, he (1975b: 6) says that nationalism in Democratic Left point of view requires nationalism in economic sphere, and opposition to external exploitation as well as domestic exploitation. For him (1975b: 6), an economic policy preventing external exploitation does not mean to obstruct opening to the external world, but to prioritise national benefit. However, the ones who defend capitalism in a developing or an underdeveloped country,

willingly or unwillingly, give rise to external exploitation (Ecevit, 1975b: 6). Having affinity to arguments of dependency school about de-linking from capitalist system (Amin, 2003: 130), Ecevit (1975c: 36) writes that due to their concerns about losing their political independence if their economic dependency reaches a higher level, the developing or underdeveloped countries opt for staying out of the area of influence of capitalist-liberal countries, and they either be non-aligned or get closer to the socialist bloc.

He (1975b: 13) asserts that extreme advocates of private entrepreneurship cannot be nationalist vis-à-vis the reality of multinational companies, especially in developing countries. For him (1975b: 14), in contemporary world, the right is more and negatively internationalist than the left due to adherence to the multinational capital. He (1975b: 35-36) writes that a government having extremely capitalist-liberal tendencies in an underdeveloped or developing country cannot be nationalist beyond a degree since this tendency requires close relationships with multinationals and acceptance of their hegemony. Ecevit (1975b: 36) argues that this contradicts with nationalism.

Concerning imperialism, he (1975c: 30; 1975d: 113) notes that in the contemporary world, strong states do not see it necessary to take their colonies under their direct sovereignty since the characteristic of imperialism becomes solely economic. He (1975c: 31) writes that the heirs of some old empires find the means of economic exploitation of their ex-colonies even if, they ceased their colonial rule.

Following Ecevit's resignation from prime ministry in 1974, 'Nationalist Front' governments are formed. At that time, nationalism is seemed to be an issue of discussion in domestic politics. Some of Ecevit's speeches and writings reflect this. He usually argues that politicians of the 'so-called' Nationalist Front are not 'real' nationalists. For example, he (1975e: 5) criticizes the AP government for attempting to create a youth of 'middle ages' in opposition to Atatürk's real nationalist youth aiming at defending Turkish independence against economic

imperialism of the contemporary age. For him (1975e: 26), the Nationalist Front Government is a pseudo nationalist, and it equips their youth with guns, encourages the so-called commando youth to commit offences in streets. He (1975e: 32) argues that the government, which pretends to be 'nationalist', divides the nation into fronts, forces them to fight each other, and incites conflicts of religious sects. He (1975e: 38) also comments on and ionises the Nationalist Action Party leader Alparslan Türkeş's nationalism:

We have never had the youth of our nation killed in the name of nationalism. We have never made the youth shout 'either partition or death' in the name of nationalism. We have never had lapidated or pillaged the shops of our tradesmen in our own cities. We went to Cyprus, quietly and unobtrusively, and we have met the necessity of nationalism there. At that time Cyprus-born 'great nationalist' chieftain Türkeş was not interested in Cyprus. He was scolding us for 'allowing hashish cultivation without asking permission of America'. Of course Cyprus is a minor issue for him; he and his commandos will grow up and rescue Central Asia (!).

About fascism, he emphasizes the irony of it in relation to nationalism and he argues that it is pseudo nationalism. He (1975e, p. 38) notes that there are fascists in Turkey; however Turkey will not be a fascist state. He (1975e, p. 38) says that the Turkish people will not accept the fascism of pseudo nationalists who submit to foreigners, but pretend to bully Turkish people; and this people will not consent to a regime other than democracy. In this context, he differentiates between fascism and his conception of nationalism with respect to adhering to universal values such as democracy.

He (1975d: 90) also sees the idea that in Turkey, democracy and democratic freedoms in Western sense cannot function; or function in a harmful way as a great unfairness to Turkish nation. For him (1975d: 90), even the Turkish society is not developed in economic and educational terms, it has a level of advancement in its own historical context, and there are a few countries that can compete with this level of advancement. As an important characteristic of domestic dimension of Ecevit's nationalism, his commitment to universal values like fundamental

rights and freedoms and democracy is very strong since for him the Turkish nation has internalised them and deserves high standards of these values.

His book '*Uygulamada Demokratik Sol*'⁴⁹ published in 1979 emphasizes differences of his 'Democratic Left' from other leftist outlooks in terms of basic issues like liberal democracy, democratic business management, private ownership, views on statism, democratic revolution, conditions in Turkey. In some parts he discusses nationalism and left. Concerning leftism, Ecevit usually refers to the conditions of Turkey. For him (1979: 12), some leftist groups in Turkey are not aware of these conditions and they are trying to imitate leftisms of other countries. Ecevit thinks that leftism of his party draws away from most of the other leftists in a way it approaches to nationalism and to democracy (1979: 13).

For Ecevit (1979: 14), the ones who presume that protecting national benefits and national unity contradicts with leftism or socialism are *soi-disant* leftists, and they are unaware of the facts of the world. He (1979: 14) writes that the strong nationalisms of socialist countries are very evident and no one could disregard them. He (1979: 14) links the nationalisms of the socialist countries to their unique directions and models arising from their own conditions. He (1972: 28) states that he proposes a program for change of order, which is not an imitation of foreign model since they do not fit to the conditions of Turkish society. These points are the basis of his understanding of leftism peculiar to Turkey, which he will conceptualise as '*ulusal sol*' later.

Regarding separatism and leftism, he (1979: 15) says,

Attempting to separate the Turkish nation, which has lived as a single entity throughout history, has no relation to historical development or leftism. This is, at most, intentionally or unintentionally, being deceived by various forces that want to separate Turkish nation since previous century.

⁴⁹ It means 'Democratic Left in Practice'.

For Ecevit (1979: 15), attributing this separation to racial differences is rude racism and primitive 'ideology of skull measuring'⁵⁰. He (1979: 15) states that this kind of racism could only lead to fascism, but not to socialism in any case. He (1979: 17) evidently shows his discontent with separatist slogans of some minor groups in some of CHP meetings. Ecevit (1979: 17) defines the major mission of the CHP organisation as stating their differences from other left by emphasizing their conception of nationalism. For Ecevit (1979: 17), it is necessary not only for the interest of the party, but also for national benefit and well-being of the democracy.

Ecevit (1979: 15) declares that Atatürk's nationalism, which is the basis of republic, is one of the most humanitarian currents of nationalisms in contemporary world as it rejects racial, religious, religious sectarian discriminations. For him (1979: 15), after all, these kinds of discriminations are against the historical traditions of Turkish nation. According to him (1979: 15), Atatürk's nationalism departs from the fact there are numerous ethnic groups united and integrated throughout centuries in Turkish territory. Besides, he (1979: 15) states that Atatürk's nationalism is not selfish, on the contrary, seeks well-being of all humanity, and demands peace at homeland and in the whole world.

Ecevit (1979: 15-16) thinks that the reason for rising concerns about nationalism in the left other than his party is the groups that define themselves as 'nationalist', but reject Atatürk's nationalism and have ideology of skull measuring. He (1979: 16) addresses the MHP that it has separated the members of Turkish nation as 'Turks and non-Turks', and provokes discrimination of religious sects. He (1979: 16) argues that real nationalism is not a nationalism that separates the nation from within and stir up conflicts; the real nationalism is a nationalism that reinforces national unity and domestic peace.

⁵⁰ I translate Turkish term of '*kafatasçılık*' as 'ideology of skull measuring'. *Kafatasçılık* is a racist outlook which evaluates people with the shape of their skull.

Economic nationalism is seen in this book as well. He (1979: 27) complains about industrialisation policy of Turkey since 1950 as it fostered foreign dependency. He (1979: 44) describes economic policy of his government in 1979 as a struggle for economic independence. Nevertheless, his attitude towards foreign trade seems to be more moderate when compared to his arguments raised in 1975. He (1979: 34-35) mentions his effort in finding new markets for Turkey and Turkish companies in order to increase exports and revenues. He (1979: 35) argues that without being dependent on a single country or a single group of countries, and without submission, Turkey could find out wider markets in the region and in the world. In this context, his economic policy while he is in power appears to be more export-oriented.

4.3- **Speeches in the TBMM**

Following the analysis of his books in relation to his conception of nationalism, at this point I would like to move to the evaluation of his speeches given in the TBMM between 1967 and 1980. In this period, he gives 53 speeches in the Assembly. In 18 of these speeches, he directly refers to the term of 'nationalism'. During 70s, the epithet of Demirel's coalition governments with the rightist parties is 'Nationalist Front'. As this epithet suggests, nationalism is a very hotly debated issue in this period. The right grips on nationalism contrary to rising left with the popularity of Bülent Ecevit. However, Ecevit refrains from the epithet of Demirel governments and uses 'Front Government' to refer to these rightist governments. His 10 speeches are about the domestic dimension of his nationalism with reference to national unity. 14 of the 53 speeches are about economic nationalism and 20 speeches are associated with the external dimension of his nationalism. He frequently stresses foreign dependency of Turkish economy. In the following part, I will elaborate on these speeches in two groups. In the first group is the domestic dimension, and the second group is the external dimension.

On February 17, 1969, he criticizes the acts of so-called 'nationalist' youth and he refers them as bullies (TBMM, 1969a: 487). He criticizes the martial law government for patronising the 'commando youth' which is pretended to be 'nationalist' (TBMM, 1973: 110). He is critical to the Front Government for this reason as well. For him, these groups are political bandits (TBMM, 1976b: 118). He also condemns the rightist parties for provoking religious sect conflicts and clashes (TBMM, 1979: 314). As an indicator of his discontent with separatism, he states that he refrains from using the term 'people' plural as 'peoples' to refer to different communities in Turkey and he uses 'people' singularly (TBMM, 1971: 841). He argues that nationalism primarily requires trusting in the nation, and deeming the nation worthy of the high standards of freedoms; however, as Demirel government lacks this trust, it sticks to the epithet of 'Nationalist Front' so as to hide its complex of distrust (TBMM, 1974c: 631).

In Government Programme on June 28, 1977, he states that the conventional method of weakening, making dependent and exploiting a nation is to separate it into hostile fronts; and the previous two years are marked with this act of separation with the attempts of Front Government (TBMM, 28). For him, a nation is strong with respect to its unity (TBMM, 1977b: 28). In this sense, the Front Government contradicted one of the primary requirements of nationalism (TBMM, 1977b: 28). In the same programme, he says that as a prerequisite of humanity, national unity and nationalism, his government will keep the duty of strengthening feelings of fraternity and solidarity among the citizens having different religions and sects TBMM, 1977b: 43). Realising domestic peace is seen as another precondition of national unity and requirement of nationalism (TBMM, 1977b: 45). Two of the basic objectives of national education are to strengthen national unity and independence, and to improve deep rooted and rich national culture with contemporary culture of humanity (TBMM, 1978a: 271).

Regarding external dimension of Ecevit's nationalism, firstly I would like to focus on economic nationalism. He argues that nationalism conception in the contemporary age is economic nationalism (TBMM, 1974b: 516). He says that

allowing hashish cultivation means realisation of national policy (TBMM, 1974e: 348). He criticizes the ones who collaborate with the foreigners to rob Turkish people as they increase dependency of Turkey (TBMM, 1969a: 593). For the bureaucrats who defend national interests and oppose to foreign dependency, he uses the term 'nationalist' in order to praise them (TBMM, 1973: 98; TBMM, 1974b: 512, 516).

He is distant to profit transfer and foreign capital, but not to Common Market (TBMM, 1974b: 606). While he explains new world order and cooperation among countries, he states that he is not against foreign capital, and he seeks for balance of different components for foreign aid and capital (TBMM, 1974f: 370). For him, while Turkey is in the doorstep of the Common Market it is necessary to strengthen national industry; however, Turkey becomes an area of foreign exploitation and market for foreign capital (TBMM, 1969c: 917-918). He says, “(Front) Government will spend the independence of Turkey in the markets of foreign capital” (TBMM, 1969c: 926).

He argues that the government tries to create a youth which is guard of interests of foreign capital and their domestic collaborators, in opposition to the real nationalist youth defending Turkish independence against economic imperialism of the contemporary age (TBMM, 1969c: 927). He states that the reason for Front Government not to be able to take courageous and determined steps in foreign policy is, increasing foreign dependency of Turkish economy (TBMM, 1976a: 63). For Ecevit, using foreign debt responsibly and decreasing foreign dependency are associated with nationalism (TBMM, 1978b: 251). He says that the real basis of independence and nationalism in contemporary sense is economic independence (TBMM, 1978b: 269).

Regarding membership of the CHP in the Socialist International, when speaker of Justice Party argues that socialists cannot be nationalist, leaving aside social democrats or democratic socialists, Ecevit asserts impossibility of claims about non-nationalism of even the communist countries like China, Romania and

Albania (TBMM, 1980a: 67). Addressing the January 24, 1980 Decisions⁵¹ of the Nationalist Front Government, Ecevit states that actual going away from nationalism is to be integrated with international capital that does not have a nationality (TBMM, 1980a: 68). He says that he cannot deny reality of foreign capital; however, the new economic policy to be implemented with January 24 Decisions of the Front Government would open Turkish economy to foreign capital above the necessary level (TBMM, 1980a: 68). While elaborating on the new economic model that would come with these decisions, he makes a distinction within private sector and says that not only working sectors of society, but also really national and dynamic segments of private sector which are small and medium sized industrialists, Anatolian industrialists are in state of complaint (TBMM, 1980b: 667).

In foreign policy, he usually refers to formation of national policy. The content of national policy is related to the concept of national unity. In this sense, if it is necessary to form a national policy in order to overcome vital problems, the nation will be responsible for leaving different views in domestic politics aside (TBMM, 1977a: 81). For him, it is a requirement of real nationalism for the sake of national security (TBMM, 1977a: 81). For example, he says that the parliament showed instance of national unity in Cyprus issue (TBMM, 1974g: 91).

His foreign policy attitude reflects a discourse of peace and fraternity as well. To illustrate, while he is responding interferences about his Turkish-Greek Poem, he argues that defending rights of Turkish nation in Cyprus and Aegean does not contradict with calling for fraternity and peace among nations (TBMM, 1974d: 223).

⁵¹ January 24, 1980 Decisions of Nationalist Front government aimed at liberalisation of Turkish economy. On the 20th of February 1980, Ecevit explains his ideas about these decisions. For him (1993: 176), with these decisions, the danger is in the step of becoming real, and it entered from the door like the Trojan Horse. Even it appears to be an economic model, a different regime model and model of international relations come out of this Trojan Horse (Ecevit, 1993: 176). With this evaluation, Ecevit addresses to the authoritarian regime of 1980 Coup d'état.

4.4- **Nationalism in the CHP Program and Manifestos**

When we look at electoral manifestos and 1976 Program of the CHP, there are parallelisms with Ecevit's discourse. For example, the Electoral Manifesto of 1969 seems to have affinity to his book, namely '*Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*' concerning economic nationalism, and attitude of being populist at home and being nationalist outside the country (CHP, 1969: 13).

The Electoral Manifesto of 1973 has more concrete goals when compared to the previous manifesto, and there are not any striking references to nationalism; however, there are references to the Turks living in other countries and emigrant Turks (CHP, 1973: 221-222).

The 1976 Program of the CHP is almost totally reflecting Ecevit's discourse and outlooks. It mentions that there is a need for becoming integrated with the cultural heritage of the homeland (CHP, 1976: 197). This is similar to Ecevit's views about embracing Anatolian civilisations.

In foreign policy there is an emphasis on adhering to humanity and nationalism conceptions of the Democratic Left (CHP, 1976: 270-271). By adding 'humanity', to the conception of nationalism, there seems to make a specific attribution to it.

The program writes that in the Democratic Left order that CHP would form, populism would be the source of nationalism and freedom would be the base of independence (CHP, 1976: 276). These examples show the consistency of Ecevit's discourse and documents of his party concerning nationalism conception.

4.5- **Conclusion**

To conclude, in this chapter I have elaborated on Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism between 1966 and 1980. This period starts with his general-secretariat

in the CHP as the leader of left of centre movement and ends with the September 12, 1980 Coup d'état. In the first part of the chapter, there is a brief introduction about the economic and political conditions of this period. Then, there is evaluation of his books, his speeches in the TBMM, and program and manifestos of his party.

The most noticeable conclusion to be drawn regarding his nationalism conception in this period is the external dimension. Discussions turning around issues of economic nationalism are the weightiest component of external dimension here. He makes a distinction between his 'real' nationalism adhering to independence very much and pseudo nationalism of the right. He perceives the nationalism of the rightist Nationalist Front as pseudo since it does not have economic nationalism and divides the nation into fronts of ideologies or religious sects. For him as the rightists has no intention in coping with 'economic imperialism' of the contemporary age, they cannot be real nationalists. His criticisms on January 24 Decisions are also based on arguments of economic nationalism.

Besides his emphasis on independence and defence of national interests, his discourse has emphasis on peace and fraternity among nations. He does not see these as contradicting. His famous Turkish-Greek Poem exemplifies his feelings about this. In my opinion, the point in writing this poem at the time of Cyprus intervention is to give a message to the world about his peaceful intentions besides his nationalist inclinations in Cyprus issue.

Through the end of 1970s, his discourse reflects emphasis on the domestic dimension, especially on national unity as separatist inclinations come to the fore. In the following chapter there will be special importance attached to this issue. In the following chapter, I will look at the last period, which starts with the 1980 Coup and ends with his passing away.

CHAPTER V

1980-2006 PERIOD

In this chapter I will elaborate on the final period: 1980-2006. This period is relatively long when compared to the previous ones. However, there is a continuity of the conditions both in global and national levels. The final period starts with the 1980 Coup and ends with Ecevit's decease.

This chapter is composed of the following sub-sections other than introduction and conclusion: (1) conditions of and basic events in this period; (2) his articles in journals of *Arayış*, *Nokta* and *Güvercin* in 1980s; (3) his books in 1990s; (4) nationalism after 2000; (5) analysis of his speeches in the TBMM; (6) nationalism in the statute, programs and electoral manifestos of the DSP. In most of these sub-sections, his nationalism is analysed in two sets as domestic and external dimensions.

In this chapter, due to the emergence of new issues and changes in the world, there are some new points that Ecevit dwelled on. For example, the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia; Armenian issue; Northern Iraq and Iraqi Turks; Turkish immigrants from the Balkans, especially from Bulgaria; the Central Asian republics; globalisation; process of the Eurasia are the most prominent ones among these new points. After this brief introduction, I would like to move to the conditions of and basic events in this final period.

5.1- Conditions and Basic Events

The devastating event with which I start this period is the September 12, 1980 Military Coup d'état. Nevertheless, I also believe that this event cannot be

considered without reference to the January 24 Decisions since these decisions would have found their political and social ground required for their implementation. Introduction of neo-liberal order was realised by the civilian Nationalist Front government; however, its implementation was left to the depoliticised environment of authoritarian rule of the military.

Before moving to the neo-liberal economic order, I would like to elaborate more on Turkish military. It is argued that the most distinguishing feature of Turkish military from armies of other Third World countries was its “acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule” (Sakallıoğlu, 1993: 153). The forms of intervention were different in this sense: “Turkish armed forces refrain from direct involvement” and opt for vetoing political initiatives (Sakallıoğlu, 1993: 153). However, this kind of argumentation is substantially verifies the anti-democratic spirit of the army.

The lack or inability of institutions of political and legal system to secure its functioning through the principles and with the framework established by the constitution in Turkey opened the ground for the armed forces to intervene in politics. Nevertheless, the armed forces avoided guaranteeing such kind of precautionary instruments in the 1982 Constitution in order not to relinquish its influential position in Turkish social, political and institutional establishment. Even if there was a guarantee within constitutional system that is not out of the civilian control, military manipulated it as well. For example, when the CHP government in 1978 declared martial law in 13 provinces, the results were proved inefficient. The contradiction here is that after the September 12 Coup, all of the terror ended up in one night. To put it another way, the Turkish military did not want to act within the civilian boundaries, made use of, and sustained terrifying atmosphere in order to prepare an environment suitable for intervention.

Especially after the 1960 Coup, the military became an important economic actor as in the case of OYAK. Moreover, the social and economic statuses of armed forces officers increased significantly. Vaner (1987: 251) names such a situation

as 'bourgeoisification of the military'. Hence, military seems to behave as a middle class which tried to prevent the interest of the classes benefiting from the economic order. If the economic order was not compatible with the interests of powerful classes, the interventions, as in the case of 1980, aimed at promoting views of those classes. Here the argument is that the military sought civilian leaders and governments to cooperate within the functioning of economic order or market, and enjoyed autonomy.

The January 24 Decisions aimed at free market internally and externally, and strengthening international and domestic capital vis-à-vis labour (Boratav, 2008: 148). However, the Nationalist Front government had lacked necessary instruments to implement anti-labour program, and in this sense, the coup realised the required change of regime (Boratav, 2008: 148). The neo-liberal ideology became hegemonic in this context (Boratav, 2008: 156). The export-oriented new model (Boratav, 2008: 149) was practised within a seemingly 'liberal' economic order and in politically one of the most authoritarian periods of Turkish political history (Boratav, 2008: 157).

The last moment of liberalisation of foreign commerce policy was the Customs Union with the EU (Boratav, 2008: 172). With the process initiated in 1980, the control of Turkish economy shifted to international finance capital step by step (Boratav, 2008: 173). Articulation of Turkey to the world markets was regarded as process of globalisation (Topal, 2002: 80). While for the capital borders of the nation-states became pervious and its free-flow was realised, it was not the same case for the labour. In other words, labour becomes increasingly disadvantaged vis-à-vis capital. In this context, the discourses on economic nationalism lost their political credibility and validity.

With this process, class-based politics was replaced by identity politics with which struggles were organised around gender, religious sect, race, etc. (Topal, 2002: 68-69). The regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia became an issue of political debates with relation to identity politics.

Definition of this conflict with 'Kurdish issue' is related to the rise of this identity politics. Ecevit's approach to this issue will be analysed in this respect. The Alevis also became an issue of political competition in relation to attitudes towards their identity.

The rise of political Islam is another characteristic of this final period. The rise of political Islam was related to the factors such as: (1) globalisation and neo-liberalism influence distribution policies, increase in inequality, led to poverty of the rural areas; (2) with tendency towards cultural relativism, identity politics replaced the conventional left-right divide; (3) the military supported the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a 'barrier' to sources of 'instability' like the left (Öniş, 1997: 746-752).

With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and dissolution of Federation of Yugoslavia, new independent states and new ethnic or border conflicts came to the fore. Between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Nagorno Karabakh and Naxcivan conflicts emerged. Abkhazia conflict of Georgia, Chechnya conflict of the Russia, Bosnian and Albanian/Kosovo conflicts of the former Yugoslavia are examples of these new conflicts. The newly independent Muslim or Turkish countries of the Central Asia increased the interests on Turkish world. The concept of the Eurasia emerged with the implication of merging East and West or Europe and Asia together.

As a panorama of this period I would like to put forward the basic points of Ecevit's political life in this period: Till 1987 Ecevit struggled for establishment of a functioning democracy and freedoms. His party was founded in 1985 and he became the chairman following the removal of the political ban on him with the referendum held in 1987. With the foundation of the DSP, it had to compete not only with the right, but also with the left, as there had been other social democratic parties like HP, SODEP, SHP and finally CHP. In this sense, political fragmentation within right and left was the basic political characteristic of this period.

Ecevit's party achieved to pass the 10 percent threshold and enter the parliament in 1991. In these elections, his major rival the SHP made an alliance with Kurdish party of the HEP. In 1995, his party achieved to be the major party of the left and in 1999 DSP became the major party of Turkey. His party became a coalition partner in 1997 and he became the prime minister following the 1999 Elections. In 2002, he faced a huge electoral defeat when he was the prime minister.

After the introduction of conditions of and basic events in this final period, I will elaborate on analysis of Bülent Ecevit's conception of nationalism within intervals of 1980-90, 1990-2000, 2000-2006. And also, I will analyse his speeches given in the TBMM between 1991 and 2002, and basic documents of his party.

5.2- **Ecevit's Articles in 1980s**

In 1980s, Ecevit's articles are published in journals such as *Arayış*,⁵² *Nokta* and *Güvercin*⁵³. His articles in the early 1980s, which are coup years, are published in *Arayış*. In 1984, his article concerning Turkish nation and Turkishness is published in *Nokta*. And in the late 1980s, his articles and writings are published in journal *Güvercin*. Firstly, I would like to focus on the domestic dimension of his nationalism conception in these articles.

In *Arayış* on February 28, 1981 Ecevit elaborates on the level of development of Turkish society with its historical qualities and he writes that Turks merit democracy. As Turkish society do not have race or decent discrimination in its nature, 'nobility' or 'servitude' in its tradition, consciousness of class discrimination, and have feeling of egalitarianism in its spirit, it could only bear the pains of industrialisation in a democratic regime (Ecevit, 1981a). This article

⁵² *Arayış* means pursuit in English. It is Ecevit's journal with which he upholds opposition to the military rule after the 1980 Coup.

⁵³ *Güvercin* is his journal started to be published in the late 80s. *Güvercin* means dove in English and white dove symbolizes his political movement.

shows the link between universal values, such as democracy, and characteristics of Turkish society in Ecevit's thinking. In this sense, adherence to universal values is a component of Ecevit's nationalism.

In *Arayış* on March 21, 1981, there are Ecevit's two articles, both of which are about territoriality of Ecevit's nationalism. Similar to his ideas in his article in *Ulus* bearing the date of May 3, 1955 Ecevit (1981b) links the formation of national consciousness in becoming a nation in contemporary sense to the wars in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Ecevit (1981b) refers to Gallipoli Campaign⁵⁴ in 1915 during the First World War as it led to rise of feelings of national solidarity and confidence, and to determination of identity of Turkish nation and its place in the world. He (1981b) writes that the inseparable component of concept of 'nation' is its dimension of 'homeland' and it is articulated to Turks' nationalism. He (1981b) states that this war resulted in registration of the name of their nation as Turkish and their homeland as Turkey.

In this article, Ecevit (1981b) repeats his ideas about the meanings of '*yurt*' in his article on April 18, 1957 in *Ulus*. He (1981b) asserts that with Battle of Çanakkale a new era for the Turkish nation started: the era of taking roots in a homeland, integration with the culture and civilisation of that homeland, leaving its mark on that culture and civilisation, and interiorising this homeland with its whole history. He (1981b) thinks that with Battle of Çanakkale, Troy was won as well and no one could perceive the Turks as aliens to their own homeland. He (1981b) notes that as well as with its mosques, minarets, bridges, caravansaries, that territory became theirs with its Troy, Ephesus, Hagia Sofia.

Ecevit (1981b) also comments on Atatürk's nationalism: while Atatürk was forming the contemporary Turkish nationalism, he brought up contemporary world culture and civilisation. For him (1981b), that nationalism conception

⁵⁴ The Gallipoli/Dardanelles Campaign is known as *Çanakkale Savaşı* (Battle of Çanakkale) in Turkish. This took place during the First World War and the Entente Powers aimed at capturing Turkish homeland. This war ended with Turkish/Ottoman victory on March 18, 1915.

would be a melting pot for everyone without any discrimination who consider themselves Turkish. As Ecevit (1981b) notes, for that nationalism conception it is very happy for the one who says he/she is Turkish without asking his/her race, religion or sect. He (1981b) writes that with the Battle of Çanakkale, the Turkish national identity, which is composed of inseparable union of nationalism and patriotism and which discerns the homeland with its whole history as well as present, was born in the territory of Turkey.

In this article, there is an association of domestic and external dimensions as the formation of Turkish national identity is linked to the threat of occupation. In this sense, this kind of nationalism has affinity to Smith's category of territorial nationalism as a pre-independence movement. Another important feature of the article is familiarity to Anatolianism as integration to Anatolian territory with its cultural heritage and civilisation. The following article in *Arayış* bearing the same date has similar arguments. It is written as a response to an article published in a newspaper about Ecevit's poem, namely *Pülümür'ün Yaşsız Kadını*.⁵⁵

In this poem Ecevit says that he refers to Hittites, Seljuks, Armenians and Kurds with past tense and to Turkishness with simple present tense: “She was an Hittite she was a Seljuk / She was an Armenian she was a Kurd /She is a Turk” (1981c). He (1981c) states that by doing so, he links the present time people that is remains of thousands of years old jointed civilisations to 'Turk' (Ibid). For him (1981c), the 'Turk' with simple present tense indicates appealing to the past, present and future. His poem ends with “I was crowned with the grace of *Türkiyelilik* (belonging to

⁵⁵ On March 13, 1981, Güneri Cıvaoğlu, who is a columnist in newspaper of *Tercüman*, writes an article and mentions Ecevit's poem that was written in 1969 (Özdemir, 2004: 71). However he distorts the poem by omitting a line of it. This poem is about Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik*. '*Pülümür'ün Yaşsız Kadını*' means 'Ageless Woman of Pülümür'. Pülümür is a poor and small town in the Eastern Anatolia. English translation of his poem is:

I met her in a mountain village of Pülümür / I asked her age she smiled as a secret / Some said eighty some said hundred / I turned to her she smiled as a secret
She held a stick for a sceptre / She wore the velvet cloak / Of a faded kingdom / She was an hittite she was a seljuk / She was an armenian she was a kurd / a turk
I asked her age she smiled as a secret / Graciously taking me by the arm / Dragging her cloak in the dusty road / She took met o the single room palace / Of her village hut / I lost with her the sense of time / I reached with her the times lost / In the earthen-floored palace of exalted poverty / I was crowned with the grace of belonging to Turkey

Turkey).” He (1981c) says that at the time he wrote this poem, the concept of *Türkiyelilik* was not being used as an instrument of ethnic discrimination. Besides that he (1981c) would not have left this 'crown' and richness to the ethnic discriminatory persons even if it had such implications. He (1981c) asserts that as he cannot consider 'nation' and 'homeland' separately, he cannot make a distinction between 'Turkishness' and '*Türkiyelilik*'.

Ecevit's approach to Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik* as seen in his poem *Pülümür'ün Yaşsız Kadını* and in some articles having Anatolianist attitudes imply that he attempts to ground the roots of nation on ancient times and civilisations. This seems to be reflecting a perennialist approach, which sees the nations as present extensions of togetherness for many centuries (Özkırımlı, 2008: 87). The Turkish History Thesis, as it has the intention of arguing for the perennality of Turkish nation (Coperaux, 2008: 47), can be regarded in this context.

For Zafer Yörük (2008: 319), Anatolianism is a version of the Turkish History Thesis, but it excludes Central Asian past of the Thesis. It tries to unify the 'divided subject' implying different ethnic components in Turkey, and to embrace Anatolian civilisations (Yörük, 2008: 319). When compared to such an understanding of Anatolianism, Ecevit's conception does not exclude Central Asian past, but he does not see having Central Asian origins as a necessary condition for Turkishness.

Ziya Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation indicates that Turkish nationalism and Islam can comply with the Western civilisation (Gerorgeon, 2008: 31-32). In Ecevit's line of thought this kind of approach is irrelevant since merging Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik* together means that ancient Anatolian civilisations and cultures, which are the basis of Western civilisation as well, articulated to Turkish nationalism. In this sense, Turks should not see themselves as foreigners to Western civilisation. This point is one of the major ruptures between his nationalism and far-rightist Turkism.

In the same article published in *Arayış* on March 21, 1981, Ecevit refers to the testimony of his speeches given in the Eastern Anatolia on October 23, 1967 as an example of his anti-separatist stance even in 1960s. In that speech, Ecevit (1981c) talks about the ones who aim at dividing the Turkish nation. He (1981c) says that these could be from Turkey or outside the country. He (1981c) condemns the supporters of ideology of skull measuring for discriminating the Turkish nation by looking at people's skulls. In that speech he (1981c) argues that their nationalism, which is Atatürk's nationalism, is not a nationalism of the Central Asia; on the contrary, it is territorial, and every person of their territory is dignified in equal manner. He (1981c) says that Atatürk called Sumerians, Sumerian Turks; Hittites, Hittite Turks as he perceived every resident of the homeland as Turk. The ones who are not like this, who reject such a territorial nationalism, the supporters of ideology of skull measuring, and the ummahists are betraying their nation (Ecevit, 1981c). In this speech he (1981c) emphasises the point that their nationalism sees the ones who have been living in Turkey for thousands of years and the ones who came from Central Asia are equally Turks since they are *Türkiyeli* (belonging to Turkey) on equal basis.

He also reminds his speech in the TBMM on January 29, 1971. In that speech, he (1981c) objects to the slogan of 'peoples' since it aims at dividing the people of Turkey into 'peoples' and to have them slaughter each other. In this sense, for him (1981c), his objection to the slogan of 'peoples' seems to be 'left ideology of skull measuring' implying racism, and like rightist ideology of skull measuring, it is against Atatürk's nationalism.

In 1984, upon the discussions of removing Hittite Monument in Ankara, in order to oppose that attempt, he writes an article to the journal of *Nokta* with similar arguments mentioned above. In this article, Ecevit discerns Atatürk's nationalism conception by analysing his definition of 'nation', understanding of Turkishness, and cultural heritage of Anatolia. The message of the article is clear: how much the post-1071 of the homeland is Turkish, the previous history is that much Turkish as well (Ecevit, 1984: 24). Because Turkishness and Turkey, Turkish

history and history of Turkey are inseparable; and for him (1984: 24), how much a *Yörük*⁵⁶ rug is theirs, the Hittite Sun is that much theirs as well. I would like to elaborate more on this article as it is comprised of his basic ideas on nationalism.

Ecevit (1984: 21) writes that Central Asian Turks' Malazgirt victory against Byzantine Empire in 1071 is known to be the beginning of Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia. Since they were not narrow-minded, the Seljuk Turks, who initiated Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia, internalised Hittite, Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and many others' cultural heritage in Anatolia (1984: 21). And they reached a new synthesis as they mixed their culture and art, which were enriched by the contributions of Chinese, Indian, Persian, Arabic sources with the cultural heritage of Anatolia (1984: 21). The ones coming from Central Asia were also merged with the people coming from Caucasus, Georgia, Crimea, Middle East, Balkans and Africa as well as the residents of Anatolia (1984: 21). As Ecevit (1984: 21) notes it, the Turkish nation is the tree, which grew on these roots. For him (1984: 21), Atatürk's nationalism is an understanding that comprehends and is proud of these roots.

Ecevit refers to Atatürk's definition of 'nation', which does not presume that racial, religious, or lingual unity is a requirement for being a 'nation'. As Ecevit (1984: 23) notes, Atatürk states the characteristics of a definition of nation as such: (1) having a rich heritage of memoirs; (2) sincerity in common desire and concurrence of living together; (3) having common will about saving the common heritage. For Atatürk a 'nation' is the union of the people having these characteristics (Ecevit, 1984: 23). Ecevit (1984: 23) also refers to Atatürk's definition of Turkish nation: "The people of Turkey founding the Republic of Turkey is called Turkish nation". For Ecevit (1984: 23), while Atatürk recalling 'people of Turkey', he does not make any discrimination of origins. Implying Turkish History and Language Theses in the early-Republican period, Ecevit (1984: 24) also comments on some enforcements of unity of origin or language.

⁵⁶ *Yörük* means nomad Turks usually living on Toros Mountains.

He (1984: 24) writes that in as short time the unnecessary and unrealistic sides of these attempts were realised.

Ecevit (1984: 23) argues that 'Turk' is beyond the name of a race, a tribe or an ethnic community. It is the name of a nation that embraces many races, descents, tribes, ethnic communities, civilisations and cultures coalesced in thousands of years (Ecevit, 1984: 23). It is not an occupying power, which came to Turkey in this or that time, or it is not a guest in Turkey (Ecevit, 1984: 23). It is the host internalising whole civilisation and cultural heritage of Turkey (Ecevit, 1984: 23). For him (1984: 23), Atatürk was aware of the fact that any other approach would not guarantee the integrity of the nation or the state.

Ecevit (1984: 23) states that Atatürk too, believed in the coalescence of Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik* to the degree that he considered the beginning of Turkish history in Turkey two thousands years earlier than the known history of the Sumerians. In this sense, it is not a racial coalescence; it is the coalescence of homeland and nation (Ecevit, 1984: 23).

For Ecevit (1984: 22), in Atatürk's line of thought, nationalism and humanity are in an inseparable entirety as he stated, "Turkish nation takes pride in preserving the honest place of humanitarian feeling in its heart besides national feeling". As Ecevit (1984: 24) perceives it, for Atatürk being a 'nation' is an issue of conscience and morality. In other words, to be a member of a nation, one should decide it with free will (Ecevit, 1984: 24). He (1984: 24) refers to one of Atatürk's speeches on Christian and Jewish citizens in order to argue for how Atatürk embraces them if they link their destiny and fortune to Turkish nation with desires of their conscience.

For Ecevit (1984: 24), if the supporters of ideology of skull measuring, who cannot comprehend this kind of humanitarian and unifying 'nation' and nationalism conception, try to divide the history of the homeland or nation with lines of demarcation of occupation or conquest, the present and future of the

homeland, nation and state will drift to threat of separation. Ecevit (1984: 24) argues that the real threat of separation results from this and this also strengthens externally led provocations.

This article is Ecevit's the most detailed and clear argumentation on Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik*; Atatürk's nationalism and views on 'nation'; Anatolian history and cultural heritage. His ideas here as well are close to Anatolianism; however he does not refer to such a conceptualisation.

His political propaganda speeches in different places of the country, his press statements, interviews with him are published in *Güvercin*. I classify the domestic dimension in *Güvercin* within three groups: Kurds, Alevis, and arguments on nationalism.

Concerning the Kurdish Iraqis taking refuge in Turkey, he says that from a humanitarian point of view, it is inevitable for Turkey to accept their citizenship requests (1988a: 4). He (1988a: 4) emphasises that Turkish nation is against racial segregation. He (1988a: 4) notes that there is no discrimination among the people having Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Syrians, Sunni, Alevi or Christian origins. He (1988a: 4) says that since he knows the diversity of origins in Turkey, he refrains from elaborating on citizens' origins. Besides that for him (1988a: 4), the tendency of presenting every Turkish citizen as having Turkish origins is a racist approach and he states that he is always against these kinds of attitudes. Concerning ban on some mother tongues such as Kurdish, he (1989a: 4) criticizes the situation on the grounds of human rights.

The Alevis become an issue of his speeches in the late-1980s. He (1988b: 30) says, "I hear that some members of the SHP (Social Democratic People's Party) get about the lie and defamation of 'Ecevit is hostile to Alevis' in places densely populated by Alevi citizens. This is one of the most disappointing defamations for me". Ecevit (1988b: 30) states that he has never discriminated between Alevi-Sunni and he has always objected to discriminatory actions. He (1988b: 30) says

that he has devoted himself to Atatürk's secularism principle and with secularism, discriminations between religious groups or sects has been removed in Turkey.

Ecevit (1989b: 18) describes the Kahramanmaraş Events⁵⁷ of 1978 as the darkest and painful sides of the Turkish history. He (1989b: 18) writes that during the War of Independence, the people of Kahramanmaraş proved their adherence to national unity without any discrimination between religious sects or races; however, at the end of 1978, due to the incitement of some forces behind the scene, the people of Kahramanmaraş came to the edge of internal clash.

He (1990a: 5) also criticizes President Turgut Özal's statements in which he tries to give the impression that the Muslim population of Turkey is purely Sunni, and by which he contradicts with the secular characteristic of the Republic. Ecevit (1990a: 5) argues that Özal's approach is based on rejecting the existence of millions of Alevis, and on omitting them from the comprehensiveness of 'Turkish nation'.

After elaborating on Kurds and Alevis, at this point I would like to move to Ecevit's arguments on nationalism in *Güvercin* between 1988 and 1990. The first point that I would like to mention in relation his attitude towards nationalism is his evaluation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. He (1988c: 39) perceives this as an 'artificial' synthesis and he refers to its inner contradictions. He (1988c: 39) says that in ideological sense, the so-called 'Islamic' groups do not accept nationalism and even the national differences by arguing that Islam does not permit it. He (1988c: 39) asks, “How could they synthesize with the ones claiming to be 'nationalist' in racist sense?”

When some rightist groups claimed to merge Turkishness and Islam, he objects to these kinds of attitudes. He (1988d: 31) says that it was Atatürk who proved the coexistence of Turkishness or nationalism and being Muslim with his

⁵⁷ During Ecevit's premiership, at the end of 1978, in Kahramanmaraş, there are incidents in which the far-rightist groups massacre leftists and Alevis.

understandings of secularism and nationalism; and being secular and nationalist is sufficient to sustain this coexistence. He (1988d: 31) notes that one could be nationalist either in the right or in the left. He(1988d: 31) invites the rightist groups that try to monopolise nationalism to find another concept to define themselves, and to leave nationalism to the whole nation.

The second point is to be mentioned is racist tendencies. During the immigration from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1989, he (1989a: 4) says, “We should not discriminate between Turks, Pomaks, and Gypsies; because our nationalism is not a racist nationalism. Having whatever origin, the one who say 'I am Turkish' is Turkish”. In this context, while he (1989a: 4) says 'our nationalism' he refers to Atatürk's as nationalism of Turkey. This is consistent with his above-mentioned call to the rightists not to monopolise nationalism and leave it to the whole nation. He (1989a: 4) describes the theories of racial unity as to be in the line of fire. He (1989a: 4) argues that while struggling with racism and separatism of racists, one should refrain from the zeal of being scientific which has racist impressions. 'The zeal of being scientific' with racist inclinations means asserting Turkishness of the citizens having Kurdish origins (Ecevit, 1989a: 4). In this sense, for him, rejecting Kurds' origins and trying to prove their Turkishness are racist tendencies.

The third point in relation to his attitude towards nationalism is leftism. For him (1990b: 3), some groups of leftists in Turkey seem to be in a situation that they dispraise nationalism in terms of 'Turkish nation'. He (1990b: 3) says, “Of course there are a lot of leftists who are not like that; however, some leftist groups in Turkey leave nationalism to the monopoly and exploitation of the rightists.” When he explains characteristics of the left to which Turkish people would support, he (1988e: 30) argues that in his understanding of left, the people is not divided into groups of 'Turkish-Kurdish' or 'Sunni-Alevi'; and everyone's language, religion and religious sect is respected and embraced.

After analysing the domestic dimension, at this point, I focus on the external dimension of Ecevit's articles or published-speeches in the journals of *Arayış*, and

Güvercin. In *Arayış*, the external dimension is all about 'independence'. For example, Ecevit (1981d) writes that the ones having the intentions of dividing Turkey, making it a satellite country and damaging national independence, tried to abuse the concept of 'independence' by abstracting it from its essence. In my opinion Ecevit implies the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for abusing leftist youth. Ecevit (1981d) also writes that the ones aiming at exploiting Turkey by dividing it abused an outdated and pseudo 'nationalism', which could tear up Turkey. Here Ecevit (1981d) addresses the West. In this context, he argues for impossibility of thinking nationalism and independence separately.

The external dimension in *Güvercin* is composed of foreign policy issues like: Cyprus and Greece, Bulgaria and immigrants, Azerbaijan, and the Eastern Mediterranean and Palestine-Israel conflict. To begin with Cyprus issue and Greeks, he (1988f: 36) argues that the Cypriot Turks has the right of founding their own state. He (1988f: 36) writes that while so many societies of which the level of national consciousnesses are behind the Cypriot Turks', have founded their own independent states, the Cypriot Turks cannot be deprived of their rights and their rights cannot be denied. He (1989c: 21) notes that Turkey and Cypriot Turks have been waiting for the federal solution, which has become the most valid solution, for fifteen years; however, if the federal solution is continued to be impeded by the Greeks, the Cypriot Turks has the right of self-determination.

At this point, Ecevit (1989c: 21) refers to the foreign policy of Greece and he says that Greek foreign policy has irredentist objectives while Turkey has been limiting itself in geographical sense to the degree that Atatürk conceded to leave even his birth place, Selanik, out of borders of Turkey without any hesitation. He (1989c: 21) says, besides that the government party in Greece is 'Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement', but in Turkey, if there had been a 'Pan-Turkic' or 'Pan-Turanic Socialist Movement' or party, the whole world would have qualified it as a fascist or Nazi party. For him (1989c: 21), these are sufficient proofs of the unfairness of characterising Turkey and the Turks as 'falcon', 'aggressive', 'irredentist' or 'occupier'.

When the conflict arises in 1989, Ecevit focuses on problems of Turks of Bulgaria and issue of immigrants from this country. He (1989a: 3) characterizes the regime of Bulgaria as racist. He (1989d: 1) says that Bulgaria is the legal homeland of the Bulgarian citizen Turks or Muslims, and the ones who want to live in their legal homeland should benefit from human rights and international agreements to which Bulgaria is a party. He (1989d: 1) writes that Bulgaria claiming to be 'socialist' should respect the social rights of the people who it forces to emigrate and should transfer these people's social security rights to Turkey. For him (1989d: 1), if Bulgaria does not do this, it will have added despoilment to its cruelty and genocide. He (1989a: 2) notes that since 1985 he has been recommending the Turkish government to make a worldwide campaign of economic and commercial embargo against Bulgaria.

Ecevit (1989a: 3) objects to the claims of Bulgarian government that Bulgarian Turks were Turkified communities by force in the Ottoman era. He (1989a: 3) argues that other than 'child levy'⁵⁸ Ottomans did not Turkified or Islamized any ethnic community by force; on the contrary, they sustained the multi-national characteristic of the Empire.

Ecevit (1989a: 1) says that the Turks of Bulgaria has put up with being beaten, oppressed, expelled and killed; however, they has not consented to forget their identity, Turkishness and religion. Ecevit (1989e: 13) asserts that the Turkish reality in the history of Bulgaria and national identity of Turks of Bulgaria cannot be eradicated. He (1989e: 13) perceives the attempts of Bulgarian government to eradicate Turkish existence and culture, and national identity of Turks in Bulgaria as ungratefulness. For him (1989a: 1), the reason for attempts of Bulgarian government to Bulgarize the Turks is the not increasing population of citizens having Bulgarian origins and rapidly rising population of the citizens having Turkish origins. He (1989a: 1) proposes that Turkey could accept some amount of Turkish immigrants every year within humanitarian rules and procedures in order to keep the ratio of Turkish population constant. He (1989a: 3) also refers to

⁵⁸ I use 'child levy' to refer to '*devşirme*' in Turkish.

Atatürk's motto about immigrants: "Immigrants are national memories of the lost territories". Turkey has been a safe shelter for the immigrants as seen in this case, and the role of immigrants in Turkish nationalism is important (Georgeon, 2008: 36).

Through the collapse of the USSR, Azerbaijan conflict arises. Upon Azerbaijan issue, entrance of Red Army to Baku and opening fire on the unarmed citizens, Ecevit (1990b: 3) says, "In the West, some groups head towards prejudiced evaluations... There is a prejudice in the West about both Muslims and Turks. We have to consider this as a disappointing data." He (1990c: 4; 1990d: 16) argues that Turkey might face with the threat and pressure of West-Russian alliance like the one occurred through the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

He (1990c: 4) says that some democratic states of the West claiming to be respectful to the human rights have a similar attitude towards Azerbaijan events with Moscow. The President of the US and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community encourage and agitate the administration of the USSR to assault on Azerbaijani Turks who resist for their freedom, human rights and territorial integrity (Ecevit, 1990c: 4). The President of the European Commission Jacques Delors's presentation of this resistance as an instance of 'Islamic intolerance' is, for Ecevit (1990c: 4), an example of their prejudice and ignorance.

Ecevit (1990d: 1) notes that Turkey has to be prepared for irredentist intentions of Armenia on Naxcivan and Nagorno Karabagh within the confines of international agreements. When President Özal exclude the Azerbaijani Turks by saying "They are Shiite, we are Sunni. They are more closer to Iran than to us", Ecevit (1990d: 3) states that Özal's statements contradicts with the reality and leaves Azerbaijan alone.

In respect to the problems of Cypriot Turks, Turks of Bulgaria and Azerbaijani Turks external dimension of Ecevit's nationalisms seems to be stronger than a 'territorial nationalism' in Smith's sense. If we regard the 'outside Turks' as an

ethnic component of Ecevit's nationalism, then the consistency of Ecevit's territorial definition of Turkishness would be problematic. However, Ecevit's attitude towards problems of Kurdish people of Northern Iraq is not different than his approach to the Cypriot, Azerbaijani and Bulgarian Turks. In this context, I see his approach as being sensitive to and interested in the problems of neighbouring fraternal and kin communities. My description of these communities as 'neighbouring fraternal and kin communities' would be less problematic when we consider his territorial definition of Turkishness in relation to *Türkiyelilik*. When I compare Atatürk's nationalism with Ecevit's conception of nationalism, I think that Ecevit's approach is a reflection of Ottoman heritage. While Atatürk drew clear lines of demarcation to Ottoman past, this heritage seems to be surviving in Ecevit's line of thought to an extent. With Ottoman heritage I mean perceiving Turkey as having a central or leading role in the region due to its imperial past and geographical location.

Ecevit's evaluation on conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean has some implications concerning his nationalism conception. He (1989f: 25) notes that 'historicist'⁵⁹ ideologies and attitudes are spreading in some Eastern Mediterranean societies. For him (1989f: 25), the historicist ideologies and attitudes reflect the nostalgia of 'golden age' of the past with the intentions of avoiding disadvantages of lagging behind the contemporary age; relieving the pains of the past; disposing of the feelings of being insulted; or revitalising the powerful situations of the past time. Ecevit (1989f: 25) argues that the indications of this nostalgia are seen in the fundamentalist tendencies of some Muslim countries of the region, in orthodox Jews of Israel, and in Greek '*Megali Idea*' or 'pan-Hellenic' movement.

For him (1989f: 26), religious and national identity conflicts in some groups or societies of the region become a serious problem as they prolong irrational

⁵⁹ Ecevit (1989f: 27) uses 'historicism' as such: The tendency of giving priority to history while explaining events... Sacrificing present time for the sake of revival of the values of the past... The extremism of culture of history paralysing life and action.

attitudes and obstruct reconciliation. He (1989f: 26) says that with the secular Republic, Turks managed to solve problem of religious and national identity, and the Palestinians solved this problem too since there are radical nationalist Christians and secularism is an imperative for them. In this sense, Ecevit perceives secularism as an imperative for solving problem of religious and national identity and realising national unity.

Concerning Palestinians, Ecevit (1989f: 26-27) argues that in time, they came to the terms with being a particular 'nation' through their national consciousness different from mythological, mystical and historicist single 'Arab nation' understanding. He (1989f: 27) proposes a solution to Israel-Palestine conflict: a secular federal or confederate state structure based on equality of the two peoples. He (1989f: 27) says to achieve this, the Israeli Jews has to leave their traditional and historicist understandings of state and nation, and by this way they could get rid of being dependent on painful past.

He (1989f: 26) notes that there are ethnic conflicts in most of the world; however, the countries of other regions like Spain, Belgium, Northern Ireland, the USA, Canada could deal with their ethnic problems on their own, whereas in the Middle East or Eastern Mediterranean, the ethnic problems are getting harder with the interventions of the extra-regional countries. He (1989f: 26) exemplifies this with reference to Cyprus, Kurdish and Armenian issues of Turkey.

When I look at the articles and speeches in *Arayış*, *Nokta* and *Güvercin* in general sense, I point out that the ratio of domestic and external dimensions of Ecevit's nationalism becomes more balanced in favour of domestic dimension. The most influential reasons for this shift are: the discourse on economic dependency loses its strength and weight in 1980s. Also Kurds, Alevis and immigrants become new topics of his speeches in relation to sustaining national unity.

5.3- Ecevit's Books in the 90s

In this part of this chapter I will elaborate on Bülent Ecevit's books and booklets published in 1990s. These books and booklets are: *Siyasal Yaşamı Tıkanıklıktan Kurtarma Yolları* (1990), *Toplumsal Kültürün Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkisi* (1990), *Değişen Dünya ve Türkiye* (1990), *Karşı Anılar* (1991), *Neden ve Nasıl Demokratik Sol* (1992), *Mithat Paşa ve Türk Ekonomisinin Tarihsel Süreci* (1993), *Ürünü Derme Zamanı* (1994), *Bölge Merkezli Dış Politika* (1995). As it is based on an interview with Ecevit, I will also refer to Süleyman Yağız's book, *Ecevit Hep Haklı Çıktı* (1997).

In *Siyasal Yaşamı Tıkanıklıktan Kurtarma Yolları*⁶⁰, other than terror problem, there are issues related to the external dimension. Even terror problem has external dimension: he (1990d: 5) says that the terror is triggered with internal and external instigations. He (1990d: 6) notes that there are some groups in the West that want to resuscitate the Treaty of Sévres⁶¹. It seems that fear of separation becomes an important aspect of Ecevit's nationalism. Despite his doubts about the West, he (1990d: 4) is concerned about Turkey that it might lag behind and outside the rapidly changing world. For him (1990d: 15), the changes in the relations of East and West force Turkey to form a new national security strategy and to base its foreign affairs on new balances. To realise these, Ecevit (1990d: 11-12) argues for the necessity of forming national policy.

The issue of 'outside Turks' is another important aspect of external dimension of Ecevit's nationalism. He (1990d: 19) describes this as non-utilized opportunity. He (1990d: 19) writes:

⁶⁰ This means 'the ways of getting rid of deadlock in political life'.

⁶¹ At the end of First World War, the Treaty of Sévres was signed by the Ottoman government in İstanbul, but rejected by the Ankara government which was for national struggle and independence. This treaty set forth division of Turkey. In this sense, Ecevit refers to it while talking about problem of separation.

It was revealed few years ago that changes in the world would have brought about a problem of 'outside Turks' for Turkey. By forming a policy which is away from any kind of chauvinism and irredentist tendencies to solve this problem, Turkey would have gained great political and cultural weight in the world even if its importance in relation to security of the West was decreased.

In this context, for Ecevit, the outside Turks would have facilitated the process of Turkey's gaining power in the international relations. Ecevit wants Turkey to play active role in the international relations by getting involved in issues of neighbouring fraternal or kin communities.

In *Toplumsal Kültürün Türk Siyasal Yaşamına Etkisi*⁶², Ecevit elaborates on the roots of social culture and Turkishness during the Ottoman rule. The issues that he refers to are about the domestic dimension of his nationalism conception. Firstly, I will focus on his evaluation of Ottoman era. Secondly, I will look at his ideas about social culture in the Republican era. I will refer to Benedict Anderson's conceptualisation of 'popular nationalisms' which I mentioned in the second chapter. Therefore, the aspect of 'vernacularization' will be analysed while moving from Ottoman era to the Republican era.

While describing the political and cultural conditions of Turks in the Ottoman Empire, Ecevit (1990e: 22-37) explains the way in which the Turks and Turkishness were excluded from political sphere. Ecevit (1990e: 24) notes that only the inborn Muslim Turks were to limit and supervise the Ottoman power, and for this reason, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror aimed at excluding Turks from governance of the state. There were lingual, religious and cultural obstacles to prevent the Turks from participation in the governance of the state (Ecevit, 1990e: 24). For example, Ottomans formed an artificial language, namely Ottoman Turkish, as a mixture of three different languages: Arabic, Persian and Turkish

⁶² It means 'influence of social culture on Turkish political life'.

(Ecevit, 1990e: 25). Ottomans used the artificial language as a barrier for the Turkish people's participation (Ecevit, 1990e: 25).

The Ottomans wanted to make the Turks ineffective inasmuch as that their Turkishness tried to be made forgotten, and the state was attempted to be isolated from Turkishness (Ecevit, 1990e: 30). He (1990e: 30-31) says that the states in the modern age were named after their main ethnic component; however, Ottoman Empire was named after the ruling dynasty. Ecevit (1990e: 31) states that Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror entitled himself '*Kayser-i Rum*' meaning Roman Caesar, not Turkish Emperor.

Since at that time there were not conception of nationalism in contemporary sense and the Ottoman Empire was a multi-national state, there is no point in regarding these things as odd by judging them with contemporary values (Ecevit, 1990e: 31). Ecevit (1990e: 32) writes that following the Reform Bill of 1839, with the influences of progresses in the world, consciousness of being nation and nationalism began to awaken in Ottoman nations; however, these were impeded among Turks: despite the negligence of Turkish culture, leaving the Turks ignorant, and formation of an artificial language (Ottoman language) during hundreds of years endured Ottoman rule Turkish language and culture could not be defeated by the Ottoman language and culture. On the contrary, language of the people (vernacular language) prevailed over the language of the state (Ecevit, 1990e: 32).

In Ottoman era, the Turkish people were not only left ignorant, but also they were despised and accustomed to humiliate themselves (Ecevit, 1990e: 36). François Georgeon (2008: 23) also notes the negative connotations of the word 'Turk'. Ecevit (1990e: 37) thinks that Atatürk's one of the most important contributions to Turkish people was his attempt to decontaminate this 'poison'. For him (1990e: 38), Atatürk opened the way of modernisation not only by abolishing the sultanate, realising equality of women and men, but at the same time by imbuing feelings of self-confidence and relying on its capacities to Turks; developing national conciseness and contemporary nationalism which is apart from

chauvinism; and introducing secularism. He (1990e: 38) writes that Atatürk achieved these things on the basis of populism by replacing 'divine will' with the will of the people. For Ecevit (1990e: 38-39), when the so-called 'progressivist intellectuals' could not conceive this, there emerged discord and cultural contradiction between 'intellectual' and the people.

At this point, Ecevit touches upon the distinction between patriotism and nationalism in a critical manner. He (1990e: 41) argues that even the Turkish people had been forced to see itself as an 'ummah' and had intended to be deprived of conscience of being a nation, with the secular Republic, they could easily internalise contemporary nationalism when compared to some 'progressivist intellectuals' of the left. He (1990e: 38) writes that not all of the Turkish socialists, but some of them discredit Turkish nationalism and see it not befitting the dignity of socialism. He (1990e: 41) says,

They do not discredit Arab nationalism, Greek nationalism in Cyprus, communist Ceaușescu's Romanian nationalism, nationalisms of communist Albania or China; however, they find Turkish nationalism contradicting with socialism; they say that they are *Türkiyeli*, but they are unwilling to say that they are *Turkish*. They talk about *patriotism*, but they frown on *Turkish nationalism*. Such people are '*nation-unloving homeland lovers*'.

He (1990e: 41) criticizes them for not getting rid of Ottoman cultural conditioning, which is based on humiliation of the Turks and prevention of their national consciousness. He (1990e: 41) argues that these kind of attitudes resulted in giving rein of nationalism to the marginal groups that reject Atatürk's nationalism and glorify a mixture of ummahism and racism-chauvinism. For Ecevit (1990e: 42), this conceptual ambiguity makes it difficult to strengthen an understanding of nationalism which suits democracy and contemporaneity.

It is seen that in Ecevit's line of thought, the antagonism between patriotism and nationalism is rejected. For Coperaux (2008: 44), this contrast emerges from the ambiguity in their definitions. For Coperraux (2008: 45), Atatürk's nationalism implies a tautological definition -nationalism is love of nation- as the values

associated with patriotism attributed to nationalism; however nationalism is about unity and togetherness. In Ecevit's argumentation on the inexpediency of distinction between patriotism and nationalism, he regards nationalism as 'love of nation', and patriotism as 'love of homeland', and argues that it is meaningless if one loves the homeland and feels nothing about the people living on. The 'homeland' is a territory having an identity as an indispensable component of nation-building (Nalçaoğlu, 2008: 296).

It is argued that in the West, in the intellectual presumptions, the notion of patriotism is privileged, and its natural ties with nationalism are cut off (Öz, 2008: 752). It is also a fact that nationalism in Atatürk's and Ecevit's sense is not only love of nation, but also unity and togetherness. In my opinion, it is not a tautology to articulate 'love of nation' to unity and togetherness in the sense of nationalism; it is treating patriotism as a component of nationalism.

The process of advance of national consciousness among Turks and Atatürk's 'populist' achievements and attempts that Ecevit narrates are an example of popular nationalism in Benedict Anderson's sense. In my opinion, Ecevit's reference to the victory of people's Turkish language against the elite's Ottoman language in the advent of Turkish nationalism is 'vernacularization' and appropriation of vernacular language by the nationalists in order to expand the popular base. Atatürk's 'decontamination of poison' of self-abuse; his promotion of self-confidence in Turkish people's capacities; and adherence to popular will are, for Ecevit, characteristics of Atatürk's populism. I think that these are also resorts of 'popular nationalism'.

Following the foundation the Republic of Turkey, the 'popular nationalism' turned into an 'official nationalism'. I do not mean to use 'official nationalism' as Anderson does: in Anderson's theory, 'official nationalism' is used in the context of empires. To illustrate, for Anderson, Russification policies of Romanovs are considered to be 'official nationalism' of the Tsarist Russia. However, I refer to

this conceptualisation as Atatürk's nationalism or his conception of 'Turkish nation' became a constitutional principle.⁶³

*Değişen Dünya ve Türkiye*⁶⁴ includes both domestic and external dimensions of Ecevit's nationalism, but issue of national unity is emphasized more than the external dimension. His conception of national unity reflects secular characteristics. For example, criticizes the ones arguing that religion makes it easier to sustain national unity (Ibid, p. 100). He argues that when religion gains political content in a country, the national unity is usually damaged with the conflicts among religious sects and brotherhoods (Ibid, p. 100). He notes that the bloodiest wars were stemmed from these kinds of conflicts (Ibid, p. 100). For him, the Turkish people understood that secularism is the most substantial guarantee for both democracy and national unity, and the Sunnis and Alevis got closer with secular Republic (Ibid, p. 100).

At the beginning of 1990s, the PKK⁶⁵ terror in the regions of Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia was triggered. There are different identifications to refer to conflicting situation in Eastern and South-Eastern part of Turkey. The identifications vary as the ideological and political positions change: some prefer 'Kurdish issue', while others use 'issue of South-Eastern Anatolia'. 'Kurdish issue' implies and emphasizes aspects of identity and cultural discrepancy. Ecevit is reluctant to use identification of 'Kurdish issue' and he prefers to use 'issue of South-Eastern Anatolia'. I will use the identification of 'ethnic and regional conflict' since I consider this to be a more neutral and comprehensive identification.

⁶³ In the Constitution of 1924, Turkish nation is defined as such: 'the people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are called Turkish nation'. This definition reflects the basis of Atatürk's nationalism. And as it became a constitutional principle, it means it is the official nationalism of the Republic of Turkey. In the constitutions of 1961 and 1982, this official nationalism is repeated. In the Constitution 1982, this attitude is referred to as Atatürk's nationalism.

⁶⁴ This means 'changing world and Turkey'.

⁶⁵ PKK is the name of terrorist organisation having references to Kurdishness.

Ecevit (1990f: 24-25) makes distinction between acts of PKK terrorism and mass movements of the people in the region. He (1990f: 26) argues that social and economic problems are the reasons of mass movements and also terror in the region. Ecevit (1990f: 26) writes that mass movements indicate the danger of social explosion. Ecevit (1990f: 30) mentions his visit to the region: he says that he had a lot of conversations with the people in the region and they did not talk about Kurdishness or separatism; they complained about unemployment, poverty, being suspects in the eyes of state officials, and oppression of terror on the one side and of the state on the other side. For Ecevit (1990f: 35), the quasi-feudal structure of the region is the basis of the conflict and the practices of the government strengthen this structure. The quasi-feudal structure is associated with the land regime: the landlords continued to be owners of the land and most of the villages in the region. The state in the mid-1980s initiated the system of village guards and Ecevit (1990f: 35) addresses this practice as a way of strengthening the quasi-feudal structure of the region due to their relations and links to the landlords.

He (1990f: 37) argues that it is a mistake to approach to the problems of the region as concerns of security only. He (1990f: 37) says that he deals with the 'issue of South-East' with its dimensions of both security and development. He does not mention ethnic or cultural aspects of the problems in the region. In his approach to this ethnic and regional conflict of Turkey, Ecevit (1990f: 5) is very much concerned with the aspect of threat to the national unity.

Ecevit explains and elaborates on the external dimensions of this conflict as well. He (1990f: 42) says the external source, the organisations behind the scene, the supporters, the objectives of the terror in the region are all evident; the objective is to divide Turkey. He (1990f: 43) notes that in the past, there were some specific states behind the separatist terrorist movements and acts in the South-Eastern Anatolia with the intention of dividing Turkey or stimulating turmoil in the Middle East; however, in the present time, in addition to them, there emerged organisations and 'institutes' in Western Europe, and they direct thousands of

Turkish citizens, who went there as a result of 'asylum', to terrorist groups with the justifications on the grounds of 'human rights'. He (1990f: 43) argues that as a result of this, the conflict or issue is tried to be made an international issue beyond being domestic problem of Turkey; and this encourages the terrorist acts in the region.

In this book, Ecevit evaluates *glasnost* and *perestroika* processes in the USSR and democratisation in Eastern Europe. His evaluation is comprised of some views related to nationalism. At his point, I would like to focus on this aspect. He (1990f: 65) notes that in the USSR, communism is deeply rooted and has a wide base since it stemmed from a mass movement and revolution in this country. On the other hand, except for Yugoslavia and Albania, in Eastern European countries communism was introduced by foreign military force and pressure (Ecevit, 1990f: 65). Therefore, communism in those countries could not be deeply rooted and gain a 'national' characteristic (Ecevit, 1990f: 65). Yet in those countries, the breaking up with communism means acquiring full independence (Ecevit, 1990f: 65). This point is important as it implies the possibility of having 'national' characteristic in communism of a country and this 'national' characteristic is linked to having mass base and deep roots in that country.

Ecevit (1990f: 65) states that the USSR is a multinational country and is facing increasing ethnic conflicts and nationalisms. For him (1990f: 67), the USSR is a multinational empire in the appearance of a federation, in the contemporary era, it is the last remain of imperial age that ended long time ago. For this reason, it contradicts with the realities and necessities of the contemporary age, and the break-up of this empire is inevitable (Ecevit, 1990f: 67). He (1990f: 68) thinks that Gorbachev might find it beneficial to Russia: as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's preference for a state based on national unity rather than a multinational and widespread empire, Gorbachev might prefer a consistent and harmonious state.

Since 1987, through the collapse of the USSR, Ecevit emphasizes the issue of the Turks in other countries. In this book, he (1990f: 70) writes that the Turkish

population of the USSR is more than the population of Turkey and as the dissolution of the USSR becomes evident, the consciousness of being a nation, the movements of independence and autonomy emerge. He (1990f: 70) says that this resulted in rising interest in Turkishness in the world and some specialists in the West anticipates that Turks will be influential in the international relations. For this reason, Ecevit (1990f: 70) argues that there is an urgent need for Turkey to form a national policy in this field, and to readjust its attitudes towards international issues. He (1990f: 70) writes that if Turkey does not do these or it falls behind, it will have missed a significant opportunity.

Regarding this issue, he (1990f: 71) criticizes the 'marginal groups' for their irredentist slogans like 'Army to Baku' and leaving Turkey and Turkish nation in a difficult position. He (1990f: 71) describes these groups as being in nonconformity with non-irredentist, non-chauvinist and contemporary nationalism of Turkey.

He (1990f: 72) says that Turkey cannot refrain from paying attention to the Turks who are nationals of other countries; otherwise others will be interested in these Turks. He (1990f: 73) argues that if Turkey is not interested in the Turks in the USSR within certain limits and with the consciousness of responsibility, Iran will fill this vacuum. He (1990f: 73) believes that it will not be for the benefit of humanity (Ibid, p. 73). He (1990f: 73) notes that in the contemporary age, the democratic nations react to the oppression of nations or ethnic groups, to which even they do not have any kinship, and infringement of their human rights.

For Ecevit (1990f: 73), it is an example of solidarity of humankind. He (1990f: 73) writes that this solidarity of humankind is no more seen as an intervention in the internal affairs of a country if it is within certain limits. He (1990f: 74) proposes that Turkey should help the oppressed nations or communities having Turkish origins or not. He (1990f: 74) also says that Turkey should approach to this issue with sense of responsibility and realism of Atatürk's nationalism

understanding not with Enver Paşa's adventurism.⁶⁶ For him (1990f: 74), Turkey should not appear to be pursuing irredentist, racist and chauvinist goals and should refrain from an inflammatory discourse and manner. He (1990f: 76) warns that Turkey should never bring the issue of breakaways in the USSR and uniting with the Soviet republics to the agenda, otherwise, the problems of the USSR would jump to Turkey.

Improving cultural relations and ties with the Turks living in other countries, especially in the USSR, is Ecevit's another major concern. For him, the language is the most important aspect of this. He (1990f: 75) writes that there is a need for restraining the process of differentiation of Turkish language from country to country as much as possible, and attempting to make Turkish language of Turkey prevalent, or at least, comprehensible among outside Turks in order to reinforce lingual unity. This approach shares some common grounds with Tatar intellectual Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's ideas on unity in language among Turkish communities of Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Empire.

Ecevit (1990f: 133) argues that some Western states produce futurist scenarios for uniting all of the Turks in the world under one state or confederation with the leadership of the Republic of Turkey; however, these kind of scenarios do not attract attention of public opinion in Turkey as every sane citizen in Turkey knows that these are unrealistic and provocative scenarios. Moreover, as the Turkish people aware of the fact that it is a coalescence of different races, it will be very dangerous for this people to define its national identity with a racial approach (Ecevit, 1990f: 133). He (1990f: 133) notes that it is out of question for the Turkish people to jeopardise its national unity for the sake of a utopian dream. He (1990f: 133-134) writes the Turkish nation in Turkey keeps away not only from racism, but also from chauvinist and irredentist tendencies. For Ecevit (1990f: 134), the reason for *Turanists'* being an unimportant and infective minor group in Turkey is related to this.

⁶⁶ Enver Paşa aimed at unifying Turks in the Central Asia and in the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, Ecevit refers to him as 'adventurer'.

In this book, Ecevit mentions his observations while he was in the USSR. He (1990f: 111) notes that in the USSR, there are some groups perceiving nationalism as the basis of their ethnic identity and freedom, whereas some other groups converting it to racism and anti-Semitism. He (1990f: 120) writes that in some republics, some nationalist currents turn into the demands of breaking away from the Soviet Union. In this sense, he addresses the role of nationalism in separatist movements. Ecevit (1990f: 120-121) argues that forming a real federation, confederation, or voluntary integration of independent states as seen in Europe could be a remedy for the Soviet Union since it is impossible to sustain the outdated form of the empire in the context of nationalist currents gaining strength.

*Karşı Anılar*⁶⁷ is his book written as a response to Kenan Evren's⁶⁸ memoirs. In this book, Ecevit compares his attitudes towards regional and ethnic conflict in the South-Eastern Anatolia to the attitude of the military. Evren describes him as “In his nature, Ecevit is very polite, humanitarian, poet-spirited, and he always refrains from harmfulness and austerity... However, statesmen should get rid of these kinds of attitudes when the state is under threat” (Ecevit, 1991: 27). In this sense, Evren is critical to Ecevit's attitude towards 'Kurdism'.⁶⁹ For Ecevit (1991: 26-31), being humanitarian and a statesman do not contradict. As a response to Evren's criticism, Ecevit (1991: 29) quotes from Chinese philosopher Lao Tsu's pacifist verses in order to show the wisdom of being humanitarian statesman.

Ecevit elaborates on the conflict in the South-Eastern Anatolia in the end of 1970s and compares the results of his attitude and the attitude of the Nationalist Front Government and the junta administration following the Coup d'état. He (1991: 28) writes that after his resignation from office, in periods of Nationalist Front

⁶⁷ It means 'counter-memoirs'.

⁶⁸ Kenan Evren was the chief of general staff and head of junta administration who made the coup of 1980.

⁶⁹ Evren uses the Turkish term '*Kürtçülük*' referring to the terror in the South-Eastern Turkey. I translate this term as 'Kurdism'.

government and military government, the separatist movement and violence gained strength. He (1991: 28-29) notes that following the coup, there were some acts of state and tortures, which offended and hurt the people of the region and damaged the prestige of the nation in the world. He (1991: 29) argues while during his term of office, the separatist movements could not find a popular base, from September 12, 1980 on, these movements evolved to social movements.

There are some arguments about general characteristics of Turkish nationalisms on the intimacy of militarism and nationalism as complementary ideologies; the myth of 'army-nation' is one of the basics of it (Altınay and Bora, 2008: 140). However, this characteristic is not prevalent in Ecevit's conception. He asserts the opposite of this by attaching importance to liberal democracy and freedoms. His book *Karşı Anılar* has the most obvious indicators about it, and he (1991: 42) clearly criticises the claims of 'army-nation' as well.

Neden ve Nasıl Demokratik Sol is about the comparison of his 'contemporary, unique and national' Democratic Left and Marxist-originated social democracy; and the unique conditions of Turkey. This booklet includes the most comprehensive account of his '*ulusal sol*' understanding. Ecevit opts for the concept of 'Democratic Left' rather than 'social democracy' since for him (1992: 14), his movement has not got Marxist origins and it is contemporary, unique, and consistent with characteristics of Turkish society and conditions of changing world. He points out some features that lead to his differentiation between Democratic Left and social democracy.

Firstly, while social democratic parties and movements having Marxist origins in the West depending exclusively on the labour movement, in Turkey, peasants compose the most oppressed segment of the society (Ecevit, 1992: 15). Secondly, the majority of Turkish society is conservative in their private lives, but it is at the same time in accordance with secularism and it is for social justice and democracy (Ecevit, 1992: 15). Thirdly, the majority is associated with Atatürk's nationalism without having fascist, racist or irredentist tendencies (Ecevit, 1992: 15). For

Ecevit (1992: 16), due to these features, he generated and adopted the concept of 'Democratic Left' rather than 'social democracy', which is a Western affectation . These are the basic justifications of his understanding of '*ulusal sol*'.

Murat Belge (2008: 191) argues that xenophobia is at a very high dosage, even more than the right, in '*ulusal sol*'. However, as the most prominent leader of the left, Ecevit has no implication of xenophobia. On the contrary, he dwells on and criticizes Europeans' racism and tendency of xenophobia. It is argued that in the advent of Turkish nationalism, Ottoman intellectuals were not interested in racism which emerged in Europe since they had come from Ottoman tradition, they had been Muslims, and Turkish culture had never involved racism (Köseoğlu, 2008: 224). It is also argued that Turkish word '*ırk*' in Turkey of 1930s implies a 'national' community, not in a biological sense; and this word is transformed by the Nazis in the 20th Century and turns into connotation of 'race'⁷⁰ (Çağaptay, 2008: 261). For Ecevit too, the Turks have never been racist.

At this point I would like to focus more on the third feature that he notes: nationalism conception of Turkish society. According to Ecevit (1992: 15), most of the Turkish society is against imperialism; however, social democrats of the West pretend to internalise Marxist internationalism, while at the same time they are protecting all of their gains from the imperialism of the West. Therefore, the social democrats of the West are stuck in between imperialism and internationalism (Ecevit, 1992: 15). Nevertheless, for him (1992: 15), the Turks even in the Ottoman era, have never been imperialist in colonialist sense. On the contrary, the most excluded, oppressed, suppressed, underdeveloped component of the Ottoman state, which is called 'empire', was the Turks, and they did not have any imperialist accumulation to be 'protected' (Ecevit, 1992: 15).

Ecevit (1992: 15) emphasises the point that the Turks had been despised in the Ottoman age and left deprived-of their national consciousness for centuries. For

⁷⁰ '*ırk*' means 'race' in English.

him (1992: 15-16), the remains of this attitude is prevalent in the present time as well: some groups naming themselves 'intellectuals' define the behaviours that they want to dispraise and humiliate as '*alaturka*' meaning 'Turkish style'. Ecevit (1992: 16) does not think that there is another nation using such an expression to humiliate itself.

He (1992: 16) also mentions the situation of Turkish language in the Ottoman age: the Ottoman 'intellectuals' wanted to have Turkish beaten down by the Arabic-Persian mixture Ottoman language for centuries. Intellectuals of Reform Bill era and some groups in the early-Republican era promoted 'occupation' of French words and terms (Ecevit, 1992: 16). He (1992: 16) complains that in the present time, most intellectuals have the same attitude concerning domination of English. For Ecevit (1992: 16), these are the indicators of Turkish intellectuals' feelings of inferiority. He (1992: 16) asserts that Atatürk attached importance to nationalism, which is not fascist, racist and irredentist, in order to avoid such feelings of inferiority.

In *Mithat Paşa ve Türk Ekonomisinin Tarihsel Süreci*⁷¹, Ecevit's views related to his nationalism could be seen in two contexts: his appraisal of Mithat Paşa as he was proud of being Turkish, and his arguments on forming a non-Marxist national social democracy. He (1993: 36) writes that Mithat Paşa was critical to some Europeans who despise the Turks since they are 'Muslims' and consider them a nation unable to accommodate democratic and contemporary values. He (1993: 38) says Mithat Paşa was a religious Muslim, a Turk proud of his nation, and a democrat and an open-minded European. Ecevit (1993: 39) appreciates Mithat Paşa as he successfully harmonised being European and democrat, and being Muslim and Turk. Also, he (1993: 50) objects to the ones pretending to be 'nationalist' and criticise such a patriot Mithat Paşa.

⁷¹ This means 'Mithat Paşa and historical process of the Turkish economy'.

As for a non-Marxist national social democracy, Ecevit (1993: 115-116) notes that at the beginning, in most of the Western countries, social democracy was inspired by Marxism; however, in time, it had moved away from Marxism, and most of the social democratic parties in the West broke up with Marxism completely. He (1993: 116) says that Democratic Left movement and its party, which adopted social democracy, comprised of non-Marxist origins, took successful practices of contemporary social democracy; however, at the same time, regarded characteristics of Turkish society. Ecevit (1993: 116) argues this is, in other words, a contemporary and a national understanding of social democracy.

In *Ürünü Derme Zamanı*⁷² Ecevit explains 'Democratic Left culture' of his party and his political movement. He also touches upon current issues like regional and ethnic conflict in the South-Eastern Anatolia. He (1994: 3) argues that Democratic Left could not have only been a political current, an ideology, a political program, a party; it should have constituted its own 'culture'. For him (1994: 3), this culture should have been compatible both with universal principles of the left internalising democracy such as especially advocacy of freedoms, egalitarianism, humanitarianism, populism, solidarism; and structure, values and beliefs of the Turkish society. This culture should have been in a character of while being in conformity with the structure of the Turkish society, but at the same time should have transformed and modernised that structure, and should have been open to innovation (Ecevit, 1994: 3).

He (1994: 3) says, “Democratic Left culture should have been unique, rather than being an affectation; should have been national as well as being universal.” In addition to that for Ecevit (1994: 4), that culture should have included '*ulusalcılık*'⁷³, that is Atatürk's nationalism: rejecting racial discrimination;

⁷² It means 'time for harvesting'.

⁷³ Ecevit begins to use the new concept of '*ulusalcılık*' having similar meaning with '*milliyetçilik*' in Turkish. Both concepts are Turkish translations of nationalism; however, '*ulusalcılık*' is pure Turkish, while '*milliyetçilik*' having Arabic root. Although '*ulusalcılık*' and '*milliyetçilik*' are literally same, '*ulusalcılık*' evokes more secular and territorial meanings. I believe that '*ulusalcılık*'

internalising territory of Turkey and its thousands years old history; being pacifist and integrative. Ecevit (1994: 4) thinks that his political movement has realised these objectives in constituting Democratic Left 'culture'.

Concerning regional and ethnic conflict in the South-Eastern Anatolia, he (1994: 10) claims that if the DSP were in power, or their advices were kept, the people living in this region would have arrived at peace, freedom and welfare. For him (1994: 10), this conflict could not have been resolved by smashing, vandalising, ruining, burning down, and setting the people and the state at odds; on the contrary, it could have been resolved by peaceful solidarity of the people and the state. He (1994: 13) attaches importance to the economic aspect of resolving this conflict and eradicating the quasi-feudal structure of the region.

He (1994: 14) criticizes the ones claiming incompatibility of patriotism with nationalism, and nationalism with leftism. He says that he defines them as '*nation-unloving homeland lovers*'. For him (1994: 14), these are the ones who could not get rid of the Ottoman era's behaviour of humiliating themselves yet. He (1994: 14) says no one can dedicate him/herself to love of humanity without loving his/her own nation, and there is no point in loving the homeland without loving the nation living on it.

He (1994: 14) notes that some 'globalists' who think that they are 'contemporary', and some old-fashioned leftists or the ones supposing themselves leftists object to his approaches to the issues of South-Eastern Anatolia, Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Cyprus by arguing 'Ecevit is nationalist, but leftists cannot be nationalist'. He (1994: 14) states that no one takes seriously these tactless people's claims that he is a 'national socialist'. For him (1994: 14), the claims on discord of nationalism and being contemporaneous are not valid as the contemporary age is the age in which nationalism is revived. He (1994: 14) also argues that he has not come across any leftist not being intensely nationalist in any other country.

and Atatürk's nationalism could be used interchangeably. As far as I am concerned, Ecevit too thinks in the same way.

The external dimension of his nationalism is seen in his approach to foreign and global issues. For example, he (1994: 5) complains that Turkey becomes a beaten country within the last few years. He (1994: 5) argues that Turkey is put to sleep with the globalisation tale; instead of globalisation, Turkey faces with 'satellisation'.

*Bölge Merkezli Dış Politika*⁷⁴ is the booklet in which Ecevit explains his foreign policy approach. It is about the external dimension of his nationalism. He (1995: 3) defines his approach as 'regional-oriented foreign policy'. This approach is based on the successful foreign policy of Turkey in 1920s and 30s (Ecevit, 1995: 3). The basic principle of this pacifist foreign policy is to form a security zone around Turkey by prioritising the good relations and solidarity with neighbours and regional countries; and to open out to the West and to the other regions by taking strength from the healthy position in the region (Ecevit, 1995: 3). He (1995: 19) asserts that there is an urgent need for regional-oriented foreign policy as the bipolar world ends and Europe and Asia become integrated with the concept of 'Eurasia'.

In this process, for Ecevit (1995: 14-15), Turkey would have many opportunities; however, his proposals were not considered, and he was criticised by the ones claiming incompatibility of nationalism and leftism. He (1995: 13) also mentions a dialogue between him and Romanian Prime Minister Manea Mănescu: Mănescu says, "Tell the socialists in your country that a socialist has to be nationalist before all else". While Turkey missed the opportunities due to incapability and lack of knowledge of its governments, Russia formed the new Russian imperialism by abusing racist and religious components (1995: 17). Ecevit (1995: 17) sees this dangerous for Turkey, the Caucasus and the Central Asia.

⁷⁴ It means, 'regional-oriented foreign policy'.

*Ecevit Hep Haklı Çıktı*⁷⁵ is written by Süleyman Yağız and it is based on his interview with Ecevit. Ecevit argues that the military intervention of 1980 damaged national honour of Turks and prestige of Turkey (Yağız, 1997: 40). In this sense, for him, democracy and freedoms seem to be important for national honour of the Turkish nation. On '*ulusal sol*', he notes that he uses '*ulusal*' with the meaning of 'understanding of leftism beyond affectation or imitation and being compatible with characteristics of Turkish society' (Yağız, 1997: 71).

For him, the claim of 'impossibility of being nationalist if one is leftist' is a lie of exogenous forces (Yağız, 1997: 72). Some nationalist states make these tales up in order to make other countries like Turkey their satellites (Yağız, 1997: 72). In democratic countries of the West and in the ex-socialist countries, both leftists and rightists were and are nationalists; however, nationalisms differ from one another: on the one side, there is an irredentist, racist and militant nationalism; on the other side, there is a pacifist, humanitarian, civilised and non-racist nationalism (Yağız, 1997: 72). He says that their nationalism (his and that of Turkey) is the latter introduced by Atatürk (Yağız, 1997: 72).

Regarding foreign policy issues, Ecevit argues that Turkey would not have missed the chance of being in the leading role in the region if it had not been unprepared to the events in the USSR, Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia (Yağız, 1997: 78). In the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey could have played a key role, but it missed that chance (Yağız, 1997: 79). In Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and Chechnya conflicts, although Azerbaijanis, Abkhazs and Chechens wanted to draw attention of Turkey, Turkish government remained apathetic (Yağız, 1997: 78-80). He says that in the Yugoslavia event, he warned the government to engage in and try to prevent dissolution (Yağız, 1997: 80). He says that there are millions of Muslims other than Turks: Bosnians and Albanians who perceive themselves as Turks having Bosnian or Albanian origins after they immigrate to Turkey (Yağız, 1997: 80).

⁷⁵ It means 'Ecevit is always justified'.

Ecevit's attitude towards foreign policy issues in the region reflects the impression that he dwells on cultural, religious, ethnic and kinship ties of communities and peoples in the region with Turkey. Taking these ties into account forces Turkey to form a new paradigm in its foreign policy and Ecevit seems to be aware of these changing conditions.

5.4- **Ecevit's Nationalism in 2000s**

In this section, I shall discuss Ecevit's nationalism in 2000s with reference to domestic and external dimensions of his attitudes. In the first part, there is the domestic dimension, and in the second part, there is the external dimension of his nationalism conception. His speeches, interviews with him and his statements and declarations in this last period are analysed here.

The points that I would like to mention in relation to the domestic dimension are the debate on the issue of execution of Öcalan's death penalty and the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia; Alevi-Bektaşî culture and faith; and his 'minority' definition.

Concerning the debate on the executing Abdullah Öcalan, he argues that Öcalan's living body can no more damage Turkey, but his death might damage Turkey internally and externally (BBM, 2000a: 38). He notes that his party has always been against the death penalty in principle (BBM, 2000a: 64). For him, having death penalty and not executing it is a contradiction; and this should be overcome by abolishing the death penalty (BBM, 2000a: 46).

He criticizes the racist and ethnicist approaches to the problems of the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, and he argues that in Turkey, there is no racial discrimination (BBM, 2000a: 351). He says that most of the deputies of Eastern and South-Eastern provinces of Turkey have Kurdish origins, and Kurds come to the highest ranks in civil administration and in the armed forces (BBM, 2000a:

352). No one feels the necessity to ask the ethnic origins of the others (Ibid, p. 352). He notes that he has never asked or wondered about whether his ministers have Kurdish, Laz, Alevi or Bosnian origins (BBM, 2000a: 352). For him, this is the general attitude of Turkish society (BBM, 2000a: 352).

Regarding Alevi-Bektaşî culture, he says that as the prime minister, he is very happy and proud of contributing to the development and spread of this culture (BBM, 2001: 180). For him, 13th Century is the era of Anatolian enlightenment and merge of Turkish culture and Islam (Ibid, p. 181). He says that as a result of that synthesis, Alevi-Bektaşî culture emerged with tolerance, love of humanity and respect for women (BBM, 2001: 181). For him, this resulted in unique structure of contemporary secular and democratic Turkey (BBM, 2001: 181). He states that the reason for Turkey being the pioneer of democracy and secularism in the Islamic world is the existence of Alevi-Bektaşî culture (BBM, 2002: 196). For him, Alevi-Bektaşî understanding is beyond being a religious order or sect; it is a culture and faith accumulation (BBM, 2002: 196). For him, Alevis are guarantees of secular-democratic Republic and Atatürk's principles (2003b, p. 4).

His 'minority' definition is restricted to non-Muslim communities. He argues that minority conception changes from person to person, group to group, country to country (BBM, 2000c: 35). He says considering international agreements, religious groups benefit from the status of minority (BBM, 2000c: 35). With 'international agreement' he might have been referring to the Lausanne Treaty in which only non-Muslims were regarded as 'minority'. He illustrates the changing attitudes towards 'minority' understanding by addressing France, which has minority definition similar to Turkey (BBM, 2000c: 35). He notes that in Turkey there is no racial discrimination between Armenian, Greek or Jewish minorities (BBM, 2000c: 35-36). He says that Turks and Kurds are inseparably merged together, and he objects to racial discrimination between them (BBM, 2000c: 36).

After touching upon the domestic dimension, the points that I would like to refer to in relation to the external dimension of his nationalism after 2000 are

nationalism and *ulusal sol*; convergence of East and West; Turkish schools in foreign countries; Chechen and Armenian issues; relations with Greece, the EU; globalisation; racism in Europe; attitude towards the US and occupation of Iraq after his premiership.

In the 5th Congress of the DSP, he states that his party has been '*ulusal sol*', rather than being an imitator of leftisms of other countries (Ecevit, 2001: 22). In this sense, his *ulusal sol* is leftism unique to Turkey. He (2003d: 9) says that he was impressed by Scandinavian social democracy and aimed at forming a left understanding unique to Turkey. Before 2002 General Elections, he invited all the supporters of *ulusal sol* to take part in his Democratic Left Party (BBM, 2002: 227). He criticizes some intellectuals who regard leftism and nationalism irreconcilable, and he argues that being nationalist is not a shame; it is a natural outcome of protecting one's own nation (BBM, 2002: 233).

For him (2005: 13), being nationalist is equal to being humanitarian and to protecting the people's right of living humanely in one's own country. He (2005: 13) states that nationalism is not an ideology; it is the duty of humanity. Benedict Anderson (1993: 20) also argues that nationalism cannot be classified as an ideology. Ecevit (2005: 13) argues that the communists are actually nationalist in humanitarian sense; however, they do not regard nationalism as racism of democratic countries of the West. For him (2005: 13), a socialist first of all, has to love his/her homeland and nation. This nationalism and *ulusal sol* understandings include both domestic and external dimensions. However, in my opinion, as the patriotic aspect seems to be stronger, it is more closer to the external dimension of his nationalism conception.

In his visit to India, Ecevit talks about the affinities between Turkish and Indian cultures, and the role of Mughal Empire, which had Turko-Mongol origins, in the formation of Indian nation as a synthesis of different components (BBM, 2000b: 13). For him, both Turkish and Indian nations proved that democracy is not in the monopoly of developed countries of the West (Ibid, p. 14). And both nations

proved, contrary to Rudyard Kipling's prediction, East and West could come together; and also contrary to Huntington's theories, civilisations and cultures are getting closer rather than conflicting (BBM, 2000b: 14).

Ecevit supports foundation of Turkish schools in foreign countries as they have significant functions in the spread of Turkish language and culture (BBM, 2000a: 357). This point is important as it implies cultural hegemony of Turkey in the region. Ecevit aims at the spread of Turkish of Turkey, especially within Turkish communities in the world. In this sense, Turkish schools founded by Turkish civil society, groups in Turkey or Turkish state serve this mission. It is argued that these kinds of Turkish schools have a prominent 'missionary' approach of teaching 'Turkishness' and 'Islam' to the elite of the future (Özdoğan, 2008: 403). Ecevit seems to be interested in its aspect of 'Turkishness', rather than religious aspect.

He says that he is not happy with the attitude of the Russian Federation in Chechnya (BBM, 2000a: 11). He notes every state has the right of protecting its territorial integrity; however, suppression of the innocent and unarmed civil people at the degree of a genocide is unacceptable (BBM, 2000a: 11).

Concerning the Armenian issue, he says that along history, till the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, there had not been any problem between Turks and Armenians (BBM, 2000c: 38). When Russia and some other states urged Armenians to revolt, Ottomans had to take some precautions; but that precautions cannot be labelled as 'genocide' (BBM, 2000c: 38-39). He asserts that historical facts are disregarded and without reading and knowing anything, some people believe or pretend to believe in made-up claims (BBM, 2000c: 68).

He notes that regarding this issue; Ottoman archives are open to every academician, including Armenian historians (BBM, 2000c: 39). For him, if this archive documents had been examined objectively, it would have been understood that it was not a 'genocide' (BBM, 2000c: 39). He says that Armenians and Turks shared the same culture and values for a long time; and if these kinds of claims

and Armenian occupation of 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territory end there will be good relations and economic cooperation between Armenia and Turkey (BBM, 2000c: 39).

He also criticizes the countries that enact legislation on the 'Armenian genocide' with the pressure of Armenian lobbies. For example, when the Committee on International Relations in the US Congress, he says if the House of Representatives approve such an unjust proposal, there are some sanctions which they will enforce (BBM, 2000c: 11). He notes both the US and Turkey want to have good relations; however, some politicians in the US are under unethical pressure of some ethnic lobbies, and this conflicts with political ethics (BBM, 2000c: 11). He claims that some members of the US Congress have material gains from Armenian lobbies (BBM, 2000c: 11).

The relations with Greece enter a process of recovery during Ecevit's premiership. He says that the Second World War hurt feelings of both French and German peoples, but journalists of both countries contributed to friendship and avoidance of hostility (BBM, 2000c: 20). He expects the same attitude from Greek and Turkish journalists (Ibid, p. 20). The sensitive issues in the Aegean, for him, are in the processes of solution by means of friendly dialogue (BBM, 2000c: 20). He says that he has always believed in the need for close collaboration of Turkey and Greece (BBM, 2000c: 20).

When the European Commission declares the Accession Partnership Document in November 2000 and mentions Cyprus issue as a political criterion, he demands it to be taken out from the document (BBM, 2000c: 127). He argues that border issues and Cyprus cannot be political criteria of the EU; otherwise, his government will reconsider the relations with the EU (BBM, 2000c: 127). For him (2005: 13), Cyprus is an inseparable part of Turkey along history. He (2003e: 42) argues that any solution attempt should not disregard the fact that in Cyprus, there are two different languages, religions, cultures, states and nations.

His approach to international economy and globalisation seems to be different from the conditions of 1970s. Economic nationalism loses its weight in Ecevit's discourse almost completely. He perceives globalisation as an inevitable consequence of developments especially in the communication technologies (BBM, 2000a: 261). For him, borders are being exceeded in economic sense as well (BBM, 2000a: 261). He notes that globalisation cannot be left on its own due to social imbalances (BBM, 2000a: 261). He argues that with globalisation the nation states will continue to exist in disadvantageously increasing numbers as a result of spreading ethnic nationalisms (BBM, 2000a: 262). He notes that cultures will be reconciled and at the same time, diverse cultures will survive with their specific features (BBM, 2000a: 262).

For him, it is a fact of contemporary world that not only economy, but also law is globalising, especially among the democratic states; and in the context of human rights, the law is becoming universal (BBM, 2000a: 43). He says that with the constitutional amendments, Turkey strengthened international arbitration; and this is an indicator of his government's attempts to adjust to the globalisation in economic and legal fields (BBM, 2000a: 43-44). He argues that the most important thing is to consider the sensitive balance between globalisation and national sovereignty (BBM, 2000a: 44).

In World Economic Forum, in Davos he addresses the negative impacts of globalisation, and for him, negligence of the social aspect stimulates the negative impacts (BBM, 2000a: 144). In this forum, he also attaches importance to the flow of foreign capital to Turkey (BBM, 2000a: 150). For him, the lessons to be taken from the 20th Century are: firstly, ethnic nationalism, religious and ethnic radicalisms led to huge problems and resulted in instability in the international relations (BBM, 2000a: 151). Secondly, scientific and technological developments brought about environmental problems as well, and these problems need no be overcome by international cooperation and solidarity (BBM, 2000a: 151). Thirdly, globalisation and free market economy showed that social precautions has to be taken between countries in a sense that more egalitarian

distribution of welfare and decreasing unemployment in the world scale have to be achieved by revising globalisation and free market economy (BBM, 2000a: 151).

He says that in the past, racist currents like Nazism and fascism resulted in great troubles in the world (BBM, 2000a: 250). For him, it is very worrying that some public opinion polls indicate that racist and xenophobic tendencies in the EU are very high (BBM, 2000a: 194). When a racist party gets considerable amount of votes and have a chance to become a coalition partner, Ecevit says it is very important for him that Austrian government should be very sensitive about avoiding impressions of racism and xenophobia as there are many Turkish citizens (BBM, 2000a: 194-195). He also argues that for him and for Turks, it is difficult to understand the continuation of racist threats in Europe since there is not any notion of 'racism' in Turkish society (BBM, 2000a: 195).

Ecevit (2003c: 7) states while he was prime minister before the 2002 elections, he was against the US occupation in Iraq; and this was contradicting with the interests of the US. He (2003c: 7) says there were some groups that want to get rid of him, and the US administration was not happy with him as well. Regarding the US objectives in Iraq, in the beginning of 2003, he (2003e: 62) declares that the emergence of a new wave of imperialism in that region should not be permitted. After the US occupation in Iraq, Ecevit (2003a: 3) states the conditions of Turkey are similar to the conditions following the First World War: the US is playing the 'Kurdish card' and it is going to play the 'Armenian card' as well. The 'Kurdish card' is about the US objective of strengthening the *de facto* Kurdish state in Northern Iraq (Ecevit, 2003a: 3). He (2003a: 3) thinks that the US is not sincere to Turkey and it plays a double game. He (2003a: 7) says that he does not trust and believe in the US concerning its objectives in Northern Iraq. He (2003a: 12) argues the American authorities play with Turkish Turkey nation's honour and dignity, and they try to threaten the national unity and integrity of. For him (2003b: 11), the attitude of the US is hostile to Turkey.

He also talks about Atatürk's will about Mosul province of Iraq. He (2005: 13) states that Atatürk told his will about annexing Mosul, which is within the boundary of Turkish territory announced in the National Pact of 1920, to İsmet İnönü, and İnönü told this to Ecevit. Ecevit (2005: 13) says that he told this will to the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, but the AKP government was not interested in this will.

5.5- **Speeches in the TBMM**

Following the analysis of his books and articles in relation to his conception of nationalism, at this point I would like to move to the evaluation of his speeches given in the TBMM between 1991 and 2002. In this period, he gave 79 speeches in the Assembly. In 5 of these speeches, he directly refers to the term of 'nationalism'. In one of these 5 references, he talks about 'Croat nationalism'; in one of them he mentions 'Arab nationalism'; there are 2 references to Atatürk's nationalism; and the other reference to nationalism is made upon Prime minister Tansu Çiller's emphasis on her 'nationalism'. He does not elaborate directly on his conception of nationalism in the TBMM.

Nevertheless, most of Ecevit's speeches reflect domestic and external dimensions of his nationalism: there are 12 speeches in which he only talks about issues of domestic dimension. 29 of his speeches are about external dimension without references to domestic issues. Moreover, in 17 speeches, he mentions both domestic and external dimensions. In this sense, 58 speeches are indirectly related to his conception of nationalism. The the most weighty issue of domestic dimension is the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia; and most of the speeches which have both domestic and external dimensions are associated with the domestic and external dimensions of this conflict. In 20 speeches he refers to this conflict. The majority of his speeches on the external dimension are composed of his advices and views on international events and conflicts.

I would like to first elaborate on the speeches related to the domestic dimension and then move to the external dimension. Regarding domestic dimension, there are four points to be analysed: national unity, identity and Atatürk's nationalism; conception of 'homeland' and citizen; the Alevis; and the Kurds and regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia.

Concerning national unity and Atatürk's nationalism, in the programme of his minority government, he notes that his government will reinforce national unity with Atatürk's pacifist and integrationist nationalism, which rejects all sorts of discrimination (TBMM, 1999a: 78). While declaring the programme of his last government, he perceives Atatürk's nationalism, which is based on Turkish culture and on rejection of racial, religious and religious sect discriminations, as the first and foremost guarantee of the national unity and territorial integrity (TBMM, 1999d: 173). His conception of national unity is not limited to unity of components of the nation; he uses this concept in reference to being in consensus on the national and foreign policy issues (TBMM, 1999b: 157).

He mentions the Battle of Çanakkale as having the function of transforming the 'the sultan's property land' into 'homeland', and 'the subject' into 'citizen' (TBMM, 1999c: 418-419). For him, with this war, Turkish national identity started to become evident, and the first and severest hit against imperialism (TBMM, 1999c: 418-419). He notes that the self-confidence and feeling of solidarity developed in this war led to the success of War of Independence (TBMM, 1999c: 418-419). In this context, Ecevit's approach to the emergence of national identity, conception of 'homeland' is parallel to Smith's analysis of nationalism as a pre-independence movement.

In some of his speeches Ecevit mentions the Alevis. He criticizes the government programme since there is no reference to the Alevis while touching upon religious affairs, freedom of religion and conscience (TBMM, 1996a: 51). He says that Turkish society brought tolerance to Islam, which involves tolerance in its essence, thoroughly; and before all else, Turkish society has to put into effect

tolerance and freedoms of beliefs (TBMM, 1996b: 95). Nevertheless, in Turkey, whereas the state provides Sunnis with relevant sources to meet their religious, social and cultural needs, the Alevis are deprived of these sources (TBMM, 1996b: 95).

He criticizes the Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan, who is a political Islamist, for being the voluntary lawyer of offenders of Madımak event⁷⁶ and for having hostility to Alevis (TBMM, 1996b: 95). Ecevit refers to this event as 'a genocide that has no equivalent in the history of the world' (Ibid, p. 95). In the programme of his last government, he notes that his government will do its best to reinforce the fraternity of Alevi-Sunni (TBMM, 1999d: 173).

With the outbreak of regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, and rise of ethnic terror through the end of 1980s, Ecevit dwells on this issue in most of his speeches. He criticises the ones who define the South-Eastern issue as 'Kurdish question':

Turkey has a South-Eastern problem stemming from social structure. That social structure oppresses the whole people of the region either having Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic or Syrian origins. Oppressors and exploiters have diverse origins... The foreigners who want to resuscitate the Sévres, divide Turkey have been referring to our South-Eastern issue as 'Kurdish question' for a long time. In recent years, in Turkey too, it became an *'intellectual's* ostentation to refer to South-Eastern issue as 'Kurdish question'. Then, Kurdish question turned to Kurdism; Kurdism to separatism; separatism to violence; and violence extended from South-East up to Istanbul. Consequently, in recent years, South-Eastern issue stemming from social structure became synonymous with security issue. (TBMM, 1991d: 364)

He criticizes especially some leftists for approaching to this issue not from the aspect of social and economic structure, but from racism; and for accusing others of racism (TBMM, 1991d: 365). He asserts that this issue is not an issue of being

⁷⁶ The Madımak event or Sivas massacre took place in Sivas province, in July 1993. In this event, the violence is directed to the Alevis and 33 writer, poet and thinker lost their lives in the fire of hotel Madımak.

Kurdish or Turkish; it is of exploitation, of backwardness, of poverty, of unemployment, of being landless all stemming from quasi-feudal structure (TBMM, 1991d: 368). He also argues that the ones who adopt 'racist' approach are in parallelism with the feudal forces and they are pseudo progressivists (TBMM, 1991d: 369). For him, the claim of 'everyone is of the same race' that the state sometimes brings forward is equally primitive when compared to Kurdish racism (TBMM, 1991d: 368).

He restates his definition of Turkish nation: "In the context of Turkey, 'Turkish' is not a name of a race; it is the name of a nation composed, without any discrimination, of people coming from different countries to Turkey, and having diverse races" (TBMM, 1991d: 369). This point is an example of how Ecevit imagines the Turkish nation in Anderson's sense as argued in the previous chapters as well. Ecevit says that he will continue to defend the unity of this nation without any concession, and will try to realise freedoms, equality, happiness, welfare of the citizens living in the South-East and having Turkish or Kurdish origins within national unity, which is the common strength of all (TBMM, 1991d: 369). When he comes to power in 1999, concerning programme of his government, he says that his government will cope with interregional social injustice and strengthen national unity (TBMM, 1999e: 253).

He states that an urgent duty of the TBMM is to satisfy the needs for deficiencies in the fields of democracy and human rights; and to overcome the impediments in the implementation of human rights; however, respect for human rights does not mean legitimising the acts which might cause creation of artificial minorities among equals and division of the nation or country (TBMM, 1993a: 302). And, he notes, respect for human rights does not mean providing anyone with the right of dividing the people, which is coalesced without any discrimination in centuries, into separate peoples with a racist approach (TBMM, 1993a: 302).

He also opposes the idea that separatist speeches should be regarded within the concept of freedom of thought (TBMM, 1994a: 245). For him, if speeches

promote terrorist acts, these would gain the characteristic of becoming integrated with those acts (TBMM, 1994a: 245).

Ecevit underlines the exteriority of this problem in his many speeches. For example, he says, “As long as our foreign policy is under American direction; our state is dependent on the dominant feudal powers of the region; effective steps for structural change and shift to industrial society are not taken, the separatist terror will continue climbing” (TBMM, 1992d: 352). He states that the external dimension of the problem in the South-East is very important, and some extra-regional states known to be friends and allies of Turkey support, explicitly or implicitly, separatist movements and terror (TBMM, 1991a: 69-70). He advises the government not to look at the problems from points of views of extra-regional powers (TBMM, 1991a: 70).

He objects to American 'Operation Provide Comfort' as it means accepting direction of Turkish foreign policy by the USA, and as it results in vacuum of Turkish state authority in the South-East of Turkey (TBMM, 1993d: 434). For him, America needs 'Provide Comfort' not for protecting the Middle East or the Iraqi Kurds, but for 'nailing' Turkey; and for this reason Turkey has to form a national policy regarding this issue and end dependency of 'Provide Comfort' (TBMM, 1994c: 138).

He perceives the 'Provide Comfort' as an instrument of Western imperialism to divide Turkey and Iraq, and to found an artificial Kurdish state under the American mandate (TBMM, 1994c: 136). For him, the plan of Western imperialism to divide Turkey was left half-done with Turkish War of Independence and Treaty of Lausanne, and resuscitation of Treaty of Sévres would be realised with the foundation of this artificial Kurdish state (TBMM, 1994c: 136). He argues that the Western allies of Turkey force it to discuss 'political' solution, which is division of Turkey through federation (TBMM, 1994c: 137). He advises the Turkish government to increase its attempts for realising territorial integrity of Iraq (TBMM, 1995c: 139).

The external dimension of his nationalism conception other than the exteriority of regional and ethnic conflict is mostly about foreign policy issues: regional-oriented foreign policy, European Community/European Union,⁷⁷ Western allies, Europeans' racism, the NATO and relations with the USA, Russian imperialism, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Cyprus, Turks living outside Turkey, immigrants from Bulgaria, Azerbaijan-Armenia relations, Nagorno Karabakh and Naxcivan conflicts, Abkhazia conflict, Chechnya, process of emergence of Eurasia, globalisation. I elaborate on some examples of these issues below.

Ecevit's the only reference to 'nationalism' on its own (the other four references were Croat, Arab and Atatürk's nationalisms) reflects the external dimension of his nationalism: he says the first and foremost requirements of nationalism are to prioritise national interests over interests of others, and not to let others to direct the foreign policy from outside (TBMM, 1993c: 249-250). His regional-oriented foreign policy is parallel to these requirements. He states that regional-oriented foreign policy does not mean having relations only with the countries of the regional and not opening to other regions in the world; however, if a state is in peace in its region, it will be easier for it to open to extra-regional countries (TBMM, 1997b: 468). He notes that 'regional-oriented foreign policy' is his conceptualisation of Atatürk's foreign policy (TBMM, 1997b: 468).

The issue of the EU includes his attitude towards it and his views on membership in the EU. He does not have any reservation to the membership in the EU. On the contrary, the candidacy of Turkey to the membership in the EU is realised during his premiership in 1999, and his government initiated many reforms, enforced laws and introduced constitutional amendments. He rejects the claims that he rejected the membership in the EU in 1979 while he was the Prime Minister (TBMM, 1998a: 801).

⁷⁷ I refer to European Community/Union as the EU.

For this issue he says that he established close relations with the members of the EU and made some inquiries on the basis of membership issue; however, at that time, there had been a great economic depression in the world, and this seriously reverberated through Turkey (TBMM, 1998a: 801). He notes that Turkey did not have the capacity to fulfil any conditions for the membership and could not realise the required reductions in the tariffs (TBMM, 1998a: 801). He says as a preparation for the membership, he had attempted to relieve Turkey of the shortage of foreign currency, and then he attempted to increase export revenues, to get new credits and debt relief (TBMM, 1998a: 801). As he had left the government, he could not have the chance to get the positive results of these achievements, and as the coup took place it was impossible for Turkey to apply for the membership in the EU (TBMM, 1998a: 801).

In 1991, he says that he is not against Turkey to become full member in the EU; nevertheless, he is not very comfortable about going for this issue very insistently (TBMM, 1991b: 209). For him, the reason for this is to prevent Turkey from giving pressure and bargaining power to the Westerners at the degree that would hurt national honour (TBMM, 1991b: 209-210). Other than that as Turkey goes from door to door, the so-called friends of Turkey mercilessly abuse it to get concessions in Cyprus, Aegean and domestic issues (TBMM, 1991b: 210).

He regards the Customs Union with the EU as involving the risk of being a suicide for Turkey (TBMM, 1995a: 398). He says that he is aware of some advantages of the Customs Union in the long run; however, unless there are no guarantees for some issues, the risks would prevail (TBMM, 1995a: 398). He asks the social democrat partner of the coalition government that whether they regard delicacy about the issues of Customs Union and Cyprus as being 'national socialistic' or 'fascistic' (TBMM, 1995b: 293). He seems to be pressurising the rival social democrats who argued that his foreign policy approach was 'national socialistic' or 'fascistic'. It should also be mentioned that as being very sensitive about Turkish language, Ecevit does not use the Turkish translation of 'national

socialism'. In my opinion, he makes a qualitative distinction between conceptual connotations of 'national' in 'national socialism' and '*ulusal*' in Turkish.

When his party becomes a coalition partner in 1997, he elaborates on the issue of the EU together with the process of the Eurasia. He says that Turkey will continue its efforts to be a full member in the EU without beseeching; but with making use of Turkey's power and its rights (TBMM, 1997b: 469). Besides that for the EU, membership of Turkey is not an issue of political choice; it is the legal right of Turkey stemming from 1964 Agreement (TBMM, 1997b: 469). He notes for Turks, heading towards the West without breaking away from the East is an irrevocable historical process that started centuries ago (TBMM, 1997b: 469). Both opening to the West and to the Middle East and Far East on a healthy basis would be the goal of his government (TBMM, 1997b: 469).

For him, being European is an unchangeable historical, geographical and cultural fact about Turkish nation; however, Turkish nation is not only European, it is also both European and Asian, both Westerner and Easterner, both from the Black Sea and Mediterranean (TBMM, 1997c: 126). In this sense, he says that the EU is not the only option for Turkey (TBMM, 1997c: 126). For him, the vision of the EU is limited to only a part of Europe; however, there is a wider Europe in the east of the EU (TBMM, 1997c: 126). Russia and Turkey are the two strongest countries of the wider Europe, and Caucasian and Central Asian republics having rich natural resources and cultural accumulations are in this region (TBMM, 1997c: 126). He notes that if these countries cooperate in a confidential atmosphere, many things will change in the region and world (TBMM, 1997c: 126). He refers to İsmet İnönü's saying, "When a new world is formed, Turkey will take its place there", and he argues that İnönü's prediction comes true (TBMM, 1997c: 126). For him, the Eurasia is this new world, and Turkey is the key country in this process (TBMM, 1997c: 126).

When the Bosnia conflict emerges, he criticizes the Europeans by elaborating on their religious and racial fanaticism. He argues that in the subconsciousness of

some Europeans, the crusader mentality or religious fanaticism and discrimination, and racism exist (TBMM, 1997c: 123). For him, racism is the thing that the Turks have never felt in their hearts, but some Europeans seem to be racist as seen in the Nazi Germany; in their being just an onlooker to the Bosnian genocide; and in the rise of racist parties in some European countries (TBMM, 1997c: 124). He thinks that the ones having such mentality are ambitious about making a smaller Turkey by dividing it (TBMM, 1997c: 124). He says, “We formed our boundaries in spite of the Europeans, if necessary, we would protect our boundaries in spite of our allies” (TBMM, 1997c: 124). This attitude shows that concerning Westerners, Ecevit is sometimes reserved.

In 1991, he criticizes the government parties for not mentioning even the name of Yugoslavia in the programme of government. He notes that Turkey is the country to which Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania trust in, and there are responsibilities, which stem from geography and history, of Turkey for these countries (TBMM, 1991b: 212). He warns the government that if Turkey continues to be uninterested in Yugoslavia, it might come across with a huge wave of immigration (TBMM, 1991b: 212). In 1995, he reminds that the DYP-SHP Government Programme had no reference to Yugoslavia, and for him, this shows how much Turkey was unaware of and ignorant about this issue (TBMM, 1995d: 457).

He says that the militant Serbs name their attacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina 'ethnic cleansing', and this is a declaration of genocide as they try to eradicate a nation, a religion, living and non-living memories of Ottoman-Turkish history in the Balkans (TBMM, 1995d: 455). He asserts that the Serb assaults on Bosnians turns into a Crusade (TBMM, 1992c: 107). For him, as the Western states remain neglectful, they are conscious joint offenders (TBMM, 1995d: 455). He argues if the militants had been Muslim and the ones under attack had been Christians, the Western world would have reacted long ago (TBMM, 1995d: 456).

He also criticizes the Croats as they tried to commit Bosnian genocide, and destruction of history by exploding the Ottoman bridge in Mostar (TBMM, 1995d: 425). He says, "If Serbs are devil, Croats are not angel either" (TBMM, 1995d: 425). In 1930s and 40s, with Ustashe Movement, the extreme Croat nationalism and racism cooperated with Nazis and committed Serbian and Jewish genocides (TBMM, 1995d: 425).

He notes that the nation, which is under the threat of being eradicated, is relative of Turkish nation, and there are about four million immigrants having Bosnian origins in Turkey, while there are two million Bosnians living in Bosnia-Herzegovina (TBMM, 1995d: 456). He says the 'Bosnian-Turks' are inseparable components of Turkish nation (TBMM, 1995d: 456). As their brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers and cousins live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this country is beyond being a friend to Turkey; it is a kin of Turkey (TBMM, 1995d: 456). Moreover, for Bosnians, Albanians and most of the Macedonians Turkey is their 'second homeland' (TBMM, 1995d: 457).

In my opinion, these aspects of external dimension of Ecevit's nationalism indicate two things. On the one hand, it is not limited to ethnic 'Turkishness'. On the other hand, it is beyond and different from an ordinary territorial nationalism like Atatürk's nationalism.

His attitude towards Cyprus issue has changed from 1970s to 1990s. He says that in 70s, he was for a solution based on federation, which would have satisfied the world; however, the conditions to realise a federative solution has changed: the events in the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have proved that in countries where ethnic differences are profound, it is difficult to sustain a federation (TBMM, 1991c: 299-300; TBMM, 1992c: 104-105). He argues that the new model of 'commonwealth of independent states' emerged from the USSR could be a solution which would not be found storage by the world (TBMM, 1992c: 300). In 1994, he argues that when the process of membership of Greek-Cypriot government in the EU starts, the conditions of Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots will

be very difficult; and for this reason, there should be a relation of autonomy between Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus established beforehand (TBMM, 1994b: 382).

In 1997, he talks about Orthodox enclosure around Turkey from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Greece, Russia, Caucasus and Southern Cyprus (TBMM, 1997a: 20). In this sense, he attributes a significant and strategic role for Cyprus (TBMM, 1997a: 24). In 1999, he stands for Turkish-Greek confederation in Cyprus as a solution (TBMM, 1999a: 76). He also frequently states that Cyprus issue cannot be a precondition in the membership process of Turkey in the EU (TBMM, 2000: 82). He asserts that the world should accept the existence of two independent states in Cyprus (TBMM, 2000: 83). For him, how Turkey is an important guarantee for the security of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this state is a guarantee for the security of Turkey as well (TBMM, 2001b: 93).

Nagorno Karabakh, Naxcivan and Abkhazia conflicts are important for him as well. The Armenian attacks on Azeris living in Nagorno Karabakh, for him, at the degree of a genocide (TBMM, 1992a: 589). For him, it is arguable that whether the March 16, 1921 Agreement gives Turkey the right of being a guarantor in Naxcivan conflict; however, he criticizes the government that there is no point in declaring that Turkey has no such a right (TBMM, 1993b: 399). He notes that this declaration encouraged Armenian attacks (TBMM, 1993b: 399). He argues that Turkey has to be interested in Abkhazia issue as the citizens having Abkhaz and Circassian origins in Turkey are four times more than Abkhazia (TBMM, 1992c: 108). The Turkish citizens having Abkhaz, Circassian and Georgian origins are inseparable components of Turkish nation, and they live in peace in Turkey (TBMM, 1992c: 108). For him, this enchanted atmosphere could have been sustained in Georgia as well, if Turkey had endeavoured (TBMM, 1992c: 108).

Concerning the Turkish communities living outside Turkey, he frequently gives advices and warns the government. For example, he says that unless Turkey makes multi-dimensional and realistic plans on developing cultural, educational

and economic relations with Muslim and Turkish republics in the Central Asia, there will be disappointment and vacuum; and this vacuum will possibly be filled by the Middle Eastern countries having backward and fundamentalist regimes (TBMM, 1991c: 295-296).

Also for Iraqi Turks he criticizes the government as it does not have any policy (TBMM, 1992b: 215). For him, if the Iraqi government officially recognises the Turks in Iraq, they will contribute to the territorial integrity of Iraq and to improve the relations between Iraq and Turkey (TBMM, 1992b: 215). In this sense, he says for Turkish government, there is no need to be pro-American more than the Americans themselves; and the policy on Iraq should not be determined by the USA, it should be based on the benefits and security of Turkey, and Iraqi Turks' democratic and legitimate requests (TBMM, 1992b: 217).

On 'Arab nationalism', he argues that it is an imaginary concept (TBMM, 1997c: 125). He notes each and every Arabic community is different from the others and they are in conflict and controversies between each other; however, the only point that they agree is the hostility to Turkey (TBMM, 1997c: 125). And when there emerges strife, they come up with factious complaints about Turkey (TBMM, 1997c: 125). In this context, the Arab nationalism refers to the unity of all Arabic communities, and for Ecevit it is a dream. However, he does not have such a conceptualisation for Turkish communities as 'Turkish nationalism'. He refrains from using Turkish nationalism in this context.

Concerning the relations with the USA and the NATO, through his last premiership, Ecevit moves away from his rigid attitude. He wants Turkey to be active in the NATO issues. When the EU tires to exclude Turkey from the decision-making, planning, preparation and implementation processes in benefiting from the NATO facilities in relation to European Security and Defence Identity, Ecevit opposes to and prevents it (TBMM, 2000: 83). When the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks take place in the USA, Ecevit declares support of Turkey to the USA in its struggle against terrorism (TBMM, 2001a:

264). Turkey participates in the war in Afghanistan. During his last premiership, his general attitude towards the US seems to be positive until the US President George W. Bush declares that he wants to intervene in Iraq to overturn Saddam Hussein administration.

After analysing Ecevit's speeches, articles and books in relation to his nationalism conception, now I would like to elaborate on nationalism conception in his party's statute, program

5.6- **Nationalism in the DSP Statute, Program and Manifestos**

The Democratic Left Party is founded and organised around the charismatic personality of Bülent Ecevit. The discourse, ideology, program, manifestos, and even the anthem are written or produced by Ecevit. Therefore, the DSP is totally Ecevit's creation. In the analysis of documents of his party like statute, program and manifestos, I would like to begin with the Statute of the DSP and Programs of 1985 and 2003. Then, I focus on the electoral manifestos of 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002.

In the Statute of DSP, the basic condition to become a member of the party is to internalise Atatürk's nationalism and understanding of nation (DSP, 1985a: 3). In the Program of 1985, the nationalism understanding of DSP is explained in the chapter of 'Principles and Objectives', and under the title of 'Liberty and Independence'. In this sense, as 'liberty and independence' is the basic principle of DSP and nationalism is regarded within this context, there is an implicit implication: domestic dimension is related to the concept of liberty, whereas external dimension is about the concept of 'independence'.

It is stated that the primary condition of a free society is the liberty of individuals; and the primary source of independence stems from the will of individuals to live freely (DSP, 1985b: 14). The individuals cannot be free without independence of

the country; and independence would not have the sufficient guarantee if the individuals were deprived of their liberty (DSP, 1985b: 15). A honest nation neither sacrifice liberty for the sake of independence, nor endanger independence for the sake of liberty (DSP, 1985b: 15).

Independence is also a condition for honest cooperation and solidarity among nations on equal basis (DSP, 1985b: 15). And independence becomes stronger with a foreign policy and a national security policy based on liberty of individuals, sovereignty of the nation, and national economy (DSP, 1985b: 15). The nationalism understanding, which is the basic condition of development of Turkey in peace and independence, is as such: (1) perceiving all citizens as the equal members of the Turkish nation regardless of their race, origin, religion, religious sect, native tongue, or region; (2) integrating Turkish nation with all historical and cultural heritage of Turkey, and with contemporary civilisation; (3) considering the independences of other nations as their inviolable rights; (4) seeking the well-being of Turkish nation in the well-being of the humankind (DSP, 1985b: 15-16).

Uniting national sovereignty with democracy; independence with liberty; domestic peace with world peace; nationalism with populism, and Turkey with Turkish nation are the basis of nation conception in the program (DSP, 1985b: 144). The program writes that in the constitution, the nation should not be regarded as an abstract notion superior than the totality of the individuals which comprise it; it should be the common identity and pride of all citizens (DSP, 1985b: 118). I should also note that Ecevit perceives the abstract notion of 'nation' in the 1982 Constitution as an indicator of totalitarian tendency (DSP, 1986: 15).

In the program, it is stated that attempting to make democracy real, and to broaden democratic rights and freedoms are requirements of nationalism as the only way to realise Atatürk's principle of full independence through a well functioning liberal democracy (DSP, 1985b: 58).

The Program of 2003 dwells on concept of Eurasia and globalisation. Also Alevi-Sunni fraternity is referred to as an aspect of leftism conception of the DSP. It is stated that since mid-1980s, there have been significant changes in the region: clash of civilisations was replaced with cultural dialogue and compromise; currents and events of nationalism flourished; while ethnic divergence increased, cultural merging was intensified at the same time; due to the spread of communication, cultural superiority claims of the West disappeared; as East and West got closer, the concept of Eurasia came to the fore (DSP, 2003: 9-10). As Turkey has cultural and historical ties with the countries in the axis of Eurasia, it is the key country to this process of Eurasia (DSP, 2003: 10).

Concerning globalisation, it is stated that since it stems from technological development, globalisation is inevitable; however, there should be precautions for its negative impacts (DSP, 2003: 12). Especially, a globalisation that disregards the social aspect would lead to poverty and internal conflicts in weak countries (DSP, 2003: 13). Therefore, these kinds of countries should look for benefiting from technological developments and avoiding their oppression by unevenness in the world (DSP, 2003: 13). If Turkey contends with the EU, it will become a captive of the EU and globalisation (DSP, 2003: 13). It should also make use of its relations in the region, its roots in Asia, ties with Russia and the USA to increase its foreign and economic relations (DSP, 2003: 13-14). This approach has totally different paradigms and point of views when compared to economic nationalism understanding of 1970s.

The program mentions the importance of Alevi-Bektaşî culture due to its compatibility with secularism and the Republic (DSP, 2003: 36). It is argued that in this context, leftism of the DSP is in accordance with cultural, religious, national and social values of the people (DSP, 2003: 36).

Regarding nationalism, the electoral manifesto of 1987 has an emphasis on immigrants and Turks living outside Turkey, and on foreign policy issues. There is a proposal of the foundation of 'Ministry of Immigrants and Turks living

Outside Turkey', which would deal with problems related to these people (DSP, 1987: 131-132). There is also 'Solution Program on Security and Development Problems in the South-Eastern Anatolia' (DSP, 1987: 141-160). In this program, the party deals with the quasi-feudal social and economic structure of the region free from distinctive ethnic Kurdish identity by stating that there are diverse ethnic groups in the region that live in peace for centuries; the problems cannot be solved on ethnic basis (DSP, 1987: 159).

The points related to nationalism in 1991 and 1995 electoral manifestos are the same: (1) being in unity in national issues by avoiding left-right divide (DSP, 1995: 1); (2) emphasis on national unity and nationalism understanding of the DSP based on this (Ibid, p. 2); (3) not seeing any difference between a Turk and a Kurd (Ibid, p. 3); (4) avoiding religious discriminations between Alevi and Sunni with reference to secularism understanding which is respectful to the religious beliefs (DSP, 1995: 4); (5) strong Turkey and outside Turks (DSP, 1995: 6-7); (6) benefiting from foreign capital in the process of globalisation (DSP, 1995: 46); (7) regional-oriented foreign policy based on national interest (DSP, 1995: 89). The electoral manifesto of 1999 is almost similar to the manifestos of 1991 and 1995 regarding nationalism; however, the only difference is the chapter on 'basic national compromises'. In this chapter, it is argued that the basic requirement for a people to be a strong nation is its agreements on basic issues (DSP, 1999: 5). Points related to nationalism in the electoral manifesto of 2002 are same as the previous manifestos to a large extent. The basic differences are: (1) emphasis on *ulusal sol* (DSP, 2002: 11); (2) reference to Alevi-Bektaşî culture (DSP, 2002: 119); (3) phenomenon of globalisation (DSP, 2002: 177).

In this part, I have elaborated on basic documents of Ecevit's DSP and I have seen that the degree of the nationalist tone in the electoral manifestos are more or less same. The point to be noted is the difference between programs of 1985 and 2003: while Program of 1985 emphasizes nationalism in relation to independence, the Program of 2003 refers to globalisation and process of Eurasia. The overall evaluation these documents implies that both the external and domestic

dimensions are strong. The weight of external dimension seems to be more than the domestic dimension since foreign policy issues are dealt with in a detailed manner.

5.7- Conclusion

In this chapter, I have elaborated on a relatively longer period of time between 1980 and 2006. I analysed this period in three sub-intervals: 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2006. I also analysed his speeches in the TBMM between 1991 and 2002, and documents of his party.

In the first interval, I focused on his articles in *Arayış*, *Nokta* and *Güvercin* by grouping the points of references into two: domestic and external dimensions of his nationalism conception. Regarding the domestic dimension, I touched upon Turks and democracy; territoriality; Anatolianism; Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik*, Atatürk's nationalism; Ecevit's definition of 'Turk'; Kurds and Alevis; immigrants from Bulgaria; the left and nationalism. The external dimension is composed of his approach to independence: impossibility of thinking nationalism and independence separately; foreign policy issues like Cyprus, Greece, Turks in Bulgaria, Azerbaijan conflict, Israel-Palestine conflict; his criticism of 'historicist' ideologies.

In the second time interval, I focused on his books. The domestic dimension is composed of attempts of resuscitating Sévres Treaty and fear of separation; roots of social culture and Turkishness in the Ottoman era; vernacularization and popular nationalism; emphasis on national unity; Kurds and Alevis; South-Eastern issue and the PKK terror; Turkish language and Ottoman language; Democratic Left culture and *ulusal sol*. The external dimension is about 'outside Turks'; getting involved in the issues of neighbouring and kin communities; patriotism versus nationalism; the collapse of the USSR; Mithat Paşa's nationalism; 'satellisation' of Turkey rather than globalisation; regional-oriented foreign policy.

In the third time interval, the domestic dimension is more or less similar to the previous dimensions: regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, and debate on execution of Öcalan's death penalty; Alevi-Bektaşî culture and faith; his minority definition. The external dimension is more intense than the domestic dimension: *ulusal sol* and nationalism; argument on civilisations and cultures getting closer; Turkish schools in foreign countries; Chechnya conflict and territorial integrity of Russia; Armenian issue; recovery of relations with Greece; rejection of Cyprus issue as a political criterion in the processes of membership in the EU; international economy and globalisation; racism in Europe; the US occupation of Iraq and Kurdish state in Northern Iraq; Atatürk's will about annexation of Mosul province of Iraq.

His speeches in the TBMM reveal the fact that he does not directly refer to his conception of nationalism, but most of the subjects that he brings to the agenda are about domestic or external dimension of his nationalism. When the weight or ratio of domestic and external dimensions is compared, it is seen that external dimension is weightier. The domestic dimension has four components: national unity, identity and Atatürk's nationalism; his conception of homeland and citizen; Alevis; Kurds and regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia. The last point has also external dimension for him. The external dimension other than exteriority of the regional and ethnic conflict are foreign policy issues: the EU, Western allies, Europeans' racism, the NATO and relations with the USA; Russian imperialism, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Iraq; Cyprus; Turks living outside Turkey; immigrants from Bulgaria; Azerbaijan-Armenia relations and Nagorno Karabakh and Naxcivan conflicts; Abkhazia conflict in Georgia; Eurasia; globalisation.

In the last part of this chapter, I focused on nationalism conception in the basic documents of his party DSP. In these, documents, especially in the 1985 Program of the DSP, the ideological context of nationalism conception is seen. In the electoral manifestos of the party, the foreign policy issues compose the great deal of points related to nationalism.

The overall evaluation of Bülent Ecevit's nationalism in the final period reflects some major points. First of all, the most salient thing about this period is that the external dimension continues to be dominant with changes in its content. For example, the foreign policy issues, especially the conflicts about neighbouring and kin communities in other countries dominate his discourse, whereas the economic nationalism and issues related to this disappear from the scene. Also collapse of the USSR; dissolution of the Federation of Yugoslavia; globalisation and the Eurasia processes are the reasons for his 'extroverted' discourse.

Secondly, the exteriority of some domestic issues leads to vagueness of line of demarcation between domestic and external dimensions. For example, the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia becomes 'international' after the US intervention in Iraq in the early 1990s as it leads to strengthening of regional Kurdish authorities in the North. The major reason for this is the complex ethnic, racial, religious and cultural compositions of the nation-states in the region.

Thirdly, concerning domestic dimension, the trend starting in the late 1970s in Ecevit's discourse about the emphasis on national unity continues and becomes more prevalent as the ethnic and regional conflict intensifies. His definition of 'Turk' in which he does not qualify it as the name of a race in the context of Turkey, goes together with his emphasis on national unity. He refers to Atatürk's nationalism quite frequently as the basis of the domestic dimension of his nationalism. The territorial and Anatolianist aspects of this dimension persist, but are shaded by extrovert discourse in foreign policy issues.

Fourthly, he refrains from defining the regional and ethnic conflict with reference to Kurdish ethnicity and he resists to identity politics in this respect. However, he does not have the same attitude towards Alevis and he is sympathetic to their cultural and religious demands associated with their identity. This is one of the controversial aspects of his conception of nationalism with respect to cultural, religious and ethnic identities. It is also interesting that despite his reserve to the

ethnic aspect of the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, the most controversial constitutional amendments that are in favour of Kurds are made when he is prime minister. For example, ban on Kurdish language is removed and death penalty is abolished with the constitutional amendments of 2002.

As I have finished analysis of Ecevit's conception of nationalisms within time intervals, in the following chapter, which will be the conclusion, I will elaborate more on the overall evaluation of his nationalism conception.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Nationalism is seen as one of the most controversial issues of Ecevit's political identity (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 448). Ecevit has always been nationalist; it is not a valid argument to state that he has changed and became nationalist (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 448). It is argued that in 1970s, he tries to merge together nationalism of the right and patriotism of the left with his populist nationalism emphasizing economic nationalism (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 449). This argument goes on as such: in 1980s and 90s, in Ecevit's discourse, the populist principle which brings the themes like 'nationalism', 'revolutionism', 'just order', 'liberal democracy' together as an harmonised unity, loses its centrality and becomes vague and ambiguous (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 451-452). And although the principle of nationalism has continuity since the 1960s, as it is distanced from the populist context, it started to be perceived as a new component of Ecevit's discourse (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 452).

Tanıl Bora (2008b: 649) conceptualises populist and nationalist characteristics of Ecevit's discourse as Ecevist nationalist populism. For him (2008b: 649), the slogan of 'populism at home, nationalism against outside' is the formula of Ecevist nationalist populism. As Bora (2008b: 649) notes it, Ecevit emphasizes independence as the basic condition for nationalism. Furthermore, populism means behaving for the benefit of the people, while nationalism refers to preventing the people from exploitation (Bora, 2008b: 649). The source of exploitation is regarded as the 'outside', that is imperialism (Bora, 2008b: 649). The antagonism of 'being from the *people* and being not from the *people*' is articulated to the antagonism of national and non-national, and against an external contradiction, he appeals to the 'whole people' (Bora, 2008b: 649).

For Bora (2008b: 649-650), gradually emphasis on 'change of order' declines while remark of 'national unity' strengthens in Ecevit's discourse, and after 1980, Ecevit's nationalist populism turns out to be populist nationalism. Both Dönmez and Bico's and Bora's analyses are based on populism. However, they do not refer to the reasons for change in Ecevit's populist inclinations. In other words, they are indifferent to the changing conditions after the 1980 Coup d'état, and their analyses are deficient if not void. Therefore, in my thesis, I do not treat populism as the key tool of my analysis of Ecevit's conception of nationalism.

I argue that Ecevit's conception of nationalism does not differ as the populist character of his discourse changes. In this sense, in my thesis, populism is not regarded as an independent variable; on the contrary, it is dependent on the global, social and economic conditions. This does not mean that his conception of nationalism is dependent on the global, political, regional, social and economic conditions. Rather than that I have tried to show that it is not his conception of nationalism but the points and issues he emphasizes that vary with the changing conditions.

In this thesis, I have analysed Ecevit's nationalism within two dimensions: domestic and external. The domestic dimension has some components that he repeats from time to time. His ideas on Turkishness and *Türkiyelilik* are like this. From 1950s on, he puts forward same approach. When crises that threaten national unity emerge, he grips on the domestic dimension of his nationalism. And when the tensions calm down, the domestic dimension draws away. Although its content changes, the external dimension seems to be stronger in all three periods.

It is impossible to form a general theory of nationalism, and there is not a single 'nationalism' but there are many *nationalisms*: not the Turkish nationalism, there are Turkish *nationalisms*. Ecevit too argues that nationalisms differ from one another: on the one side, there is an irredentist, racist and militant nationalism; on the other side, there is a pacifist, humanitarian, civilised and non-racist nationalism.

In Chapter II, I mentioned Tanil Bora's categorisation of Turkish nationalism(s). As an overall evaluation of Ecevit's conception of nationalism, I see that his conception is not within the confines of any category. I do not reject the existence of some common points since they are all Turkish nationalisms. Ecevit's conception shares common grounds with other *ulusal sol* ideologies and Atatürk's nationalism. Ecevit's conception, however, is unique.

As the concluding remarks of my analysis that show uniqueness of Ecevit's conception, I would like to refer to some points. First of all, for him, being nationalist is equal to being humanitarian and to protecting the people's right of living humanely in one's own country. He states that nationalism is not an ideology; it is the duty of humanity. Ecevit writes that the communists are actually nationalist in the humanitarian sense; however, they do not regard nationalism as racism of democratic countries of the West. For him, a socialist first of all, has to love his homeland and nation.

His nationalism and *ulusal sol* understandings include both domestic and external dimensions. However, in my opinion, as the patriotic aspect seems to be stronger, I think it is closer to the external dimension of his nationalism conception. Ecevit's *ulusal sol* understanding implies two aspects: (1) leftism unique to Turkey due to its peculiar conditions; (2) incorporating Atatürk's nationalism to the leftist discourse. Ecevit usually emphasizes the first aspect.

Ecevit's ideological ties with pioneering *Kadro* and his contemporary (in 1960s) *Yön* as nationalist left currents are marked with economic nationalism and independence. Rather than proletarian internationalism, Ecevit and these movements emphasise the 'national' aspect. In the non-Western world, Third Worldism is argued to be the common characteristic of the left as the basic contradiction is set via imperialist/oppressed nations, not via labour/capital. It is also argued that reference to the uniqueness of Turkey and the weakness of internationalism in Turkish left stem from Kemalism (Aydın, 2008: 448). This argument is sound, but, in my opinion, it would be more up to the point to see the

National Struggle Movement starting from 1919 influencing the left, rather than limiting it to the ideology of Kemalism.

There is a close relationship between Atatürk's nationalism and Turkish left as the idea of full independence is grounded on National Struggle years, and this can be seen as the point of departure for the Turkish left (Koçak, 2008: 41-42). The left sincerely believed in Atatürk's nationalism (Koçak, 2008: 42). In Ecevit's thinking, the role of full independence has similar grounds, but he usually identifies the concept of Atatürk's nationalism with national unity, rather than its aspect of independence. Koçak (2008: 41) argues that with the Left of Centre movement, leftist discourse of national independence homogenized with Atatürk's nationalism.

As the regional and ethnic conflict in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia becomes intensified, his emphasis on national unity increases. Concerning this issue, he refrains seeing it from ethnic and racial points of views. He dwells on quasi-feudal structure of the region and perceives it necessary to change the social and economic structure in this region. For Mesut Yeğen (2008: 888), this approach is prevalent in the left. However, Ecevit has a different attitude towards the 'Alevi-Bektaşî's having distinctive identity. Ecevit is sympathetic to this group and he does not regard them or their identity as a 'threat' to the national unity in Turkey. On the contrary, for Ecevit, Alevis are one of the major guarantees for the secular Republic. Also, his conception of minority is limited to the non-Muslims defined in Lausanne Treaty. The domestic dimension of his nationalism seems to become stronger when compared to 1960s and 1970s. The most influential reason for that is rising demands organised around ethnic and religious/sect identities. Ecevit's domestic dimension should be regarded as a response to this in 1990s and 2000s.

Nationalism is immanent in the concept of foreign policy (Alpkaya, 2008: 157). In the final period (1980-2006) the external dimension of Ecevit's nationalism is composed, to a large extent, of foreign policy issues. His foreign policy

understanding is regional-oriented foreign policy based on national interests. In this sense, nationalism is indispensable. Alpkaya (2008: 157-158) argues that there are three courses of Turkish foreign policy: (1) latent nationalism, (2) extreme nationalism, (3) ordinary nationalism. For Alpkaya (2008: 159), extreme nationalism is seen in two short periods: during the Second World War, in the programs of second and third Ecevit governments. This course is actually not involving irredentist policies, on the contrary, when the position of the state within the interstate system drifts to crisis situation, the need for national solidarity increases (Alpkaya, 2008: 159). At the time of Ecevit's second and third governments, Turkey is in a crisis situation due to political and economic dependency, and foreign policy based on independence steps in (Alpkaya, 2008: 159). Therefore, in my opinion, Ecevit's nationalist tone increases in crisis situations.

Another remark of Ecevit's conception of nationalism is related to rising interests in Eurasia and outside Turks. After the collapse of the USSR, the Eurasia process and 'outside Turks' come to the fore and external dimension of Ecevit's nationalism reflects interest in this process by seeing Turkey as a key country to this process. Ecevit dwells on the geopolitical importance of Turkey in relation to Eurasia. For Ecevit, the outside Turks would have facilitated the process of Turkey's gaining power in the international relations. Ecevit wants Turkey to play active role in the international relations by getting involved in issues of neighbouring fraternal or kin communities.

It is argued that with 1990s, increasing number of *Turanist* projects are internalised by the whole right and some of the left as 'imperial nationalism' (Aslan, 2008: 424). In my opinion, this kind approach to the Turkish right and some of the left is an over-generalisation, and this kind of conceptualisation is a mere exaggeration. Arguing for the need for cooperation and solidarity should not necessarily imply *Turanism* or unity of Turks, and dwelling on the cultural ties does not mean having 'imperial' objectives. Ecevit is a politician who attaches

importance to the 'outside Turks', but he at the same time underlines the need for getting rid of *Turanist* impressions.

The point of 'outside Turks' is the most controversial aspect of Ecevit's conception of nationalism when compared to Atatürk's nationalism. Of course the conditions and foreign policy conceptions in the 1930s and the 1990s are wholly different. The controversial aspect stems from this difference. Moreover, the priority of Atatürk's nationalism is nation-building while Ecevit, especially after 1987, prioritised effectiveness of Turkey within the region. Regional-oriented foreign policy emphasis is an indicator of a consciously made choice.

Ecevit's attitude towards the USA, NATO and the EU usually reflects the ups and downs in the relationships. For example, while he approaches to the USA positively in 1950s since he sees the 'free world' having universal values of humanity like liberal democracy and freedoms; especially in 1970s, he seems to emphasize defending national interests and honour of Turkey against the USA. In 1990s, by addressing their relations with the PKK, he argues that the Western allies of Turkey aim at dividing Turkey and resurrecting Sévres. His reservation towards the US becomes moderate when he comes to power in 1997. After 2002, he becomes strongly critical to the US again. Concerning NATO, he usually has positive attitude and regard it as successful in preventing a world war during the cold war. For him, membership of Turkey in the EU is a legal and historical right of Turkey. But he also argues that Turkey should not be contented with the EU as it is the key country to the process of Eurasia. He is against making concessions in the process of full membership in the EU. He is especially sensitive not to pullback with respect to the Cyprus issue.

On globalisation, Ecevit's arguments are not rigidly against it. He conceives it as an inevitable phenomenon. But he refers to the negative effects of it as well. The Eurasia process and globalisation are the major aspects his foreign policy approach in 1990s and 2000s.

In conclusion, Ecevit's conception of nationalism is unique and consistent as he harmonised humanitarian, civilian, democratic and universal values with national pride; Turkishness with *Türkiyelilik*; national unity with territorial integrity; social democracy with conditions of Turkey and national values; independence with freedom; the love of homeland with the love of nation; interests of the kin and neighbouring communities with the effectiveness of Turkey in the international relations.

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