

RECONSIDERING THE ANNEXATION OF THE SANJAK OF THE  
ALEXANDRETTA THROUGH LOCAL NARRATIVES

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **RECONSIDERING THE ANNEXATION OF THE SANJAK OF THE ALEXANDRETTA THROUGH LOCAL NARRATIVES**

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The main aim of this thesis is to examine the history of Sanjak of Alexandretta in the Turkish nationalist historiography. In this respect, it is important to comprehend how this region as a territory was tried to present as a homeland with ethnic-nationalist connotations and idioms through the discipline of history by Kemalist nationalists in the late of 1930s. Thus, in order to pay attention to the process of annexation of the region into Turkey requires focusing on how and by whom this nationalist history was written in order to gain different perspective. In general, the history of region has been considered on the basis of Turkish-Arab animosity. According to this approach, the history of region is the narration of encountering of these nationalist movements. On the other hand, the question of how this history was shaped by Turkish Kemalist nationalists and to interrogate the impact of the self-determination principle and mandate system on this nationalist history through which myths was created and the historical events were distorted in the process of integration of the region are also vital. Besides, while considering this local history, giving priority to the local narratives can open the path to investigate this nationalist history critically and understand the period of annexation from the view of ordinary people.

Keywords: Nationalist historiography, annexation, ethnic conflict, identity, ethnicity, French Mandate, self-determination, Hatay, Sanjak of Alexandretta.

## ÖZ

### YEREL ANLATILAR ÜZERİNDEN İSKENDERUN SANCAK'ININ İLHAKINI YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK

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Bu tezin temel amacı, Türk milliyetçi tarihyazımı içinde İskenderun Sancak'ının tarihini incelemektir. Bu minvalde, 1930'lu yılların sonunda Kemalist milliyetçiler tarafından tarih disiplini kullanılarak etnik ve milliyetçi bir dil ve yananamlarla bir toprak parçası olan bölgenin nasıl vatan-toprağı şeklinde sunulmaya çalışıldığını anlamak önemlidir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'ye ilhak sürecine dikkat çekmek farklı bir bakış açısı kazanmak için bu milliyetçi tarihin kimler tarafından nasıl yazıldığına odaklanmayı gerektirir. Genel anlamda, bölge tarihi Türk-Arap düşmanlığı temelinde ele alınmıştır. Bu yaklaşıma göre, bölge tarihi bu milliyetçi hareketlerin karşı karşıya gelmesinin anlatısıdır. Diğer taraftan, Türk Kemalist milliyetçiler tarafından bu tarihin nasıl biçimlendirildiği sorusu ve kendi kaderini tayin hakkı ve manda sisteminin mitler yaratılarak ve tasrihsel olarların çarpıtılarak inşa edildiği bu milliyetçi tarih üzerine etkisini sorgulamak da önemlidir. Bunun yanında, bu yerel tarih düşünülürken, yerel anlatılara öncelik vermek milliyetçi bir yaklaşımla yazılan bu yerel tarihi eleştirel değerlendirmenin ve sıradan insanın gözüyle ilhak sürecini anlamının yolunu açabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçi tarihyazımı, ilhak, etnik çatışma, kimlik, etnisite, Fransız Mandası, kendi kaderini tayin hakkı (self-determinasyon), Hatay, İskenderun Sancağı .

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

“Beautiful Antioch: You are not only through the common ideal, language, and history with us but also through your future.”<sup>1</sup>

Remzi Siliöz

Antioch is one of the central towns of Hatay. It is the conjunction point of trade routes and passageways between the East and West, which merged the routes connecting Mesopotamia and Egypt to Europe. This region had been controlled by at least fourteen administrations throughout the history; including Assyrian, Armenian, and Hittite Kingdoms, Kurdish tribes, Greek (Seleucid) monarchs, Roman and Persian Empires, Arab, Byzantine and Mamluk controls and Ottoman, French and now under the Turkish rule (Özgen, 2002: 47).

Therefore, this region has been denominated under different rules by their authorities. It mostly referred to as the *Sanjak of Alexandretta* in the Western literature. Whereas the name of *Liwa Iskenderun* is valid for Syrian and Arab nationalists, Hatay, named by Mustafa Kemal, was used by Turkish nationalists during and after the annexation process in order to conjure up the Turkish origin of this region. Each of these names reflects certain ideological stances towards the region.

The purpose of this study is to examine the history of “Hatay” in the Turkish nationalist historiography. The process of territorialisation of the region with highly nationalist connotations can be re-viewed through the critical reading of the region’s history. In other words, focusing on the annexation process of Hatay is crucial

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<sup>1</sup> “Güzel Antakya: Sen yalnız ülkün, dilin ve tarihin ile değil, istikbalin ile de bizimlesin.”



because there is a relationship between the rewriting of Hatay history and the phases of Turkish nationalist historiography until the annexation. In this respect, the comparison between the written documents regarding the history of the region, especially after the late 1930s, and the oral testimonies of ordinary people is considered as the way of understanding the function of nationalist history, which was utilized to create a national identity and legitimize the annexation on the international arena.

The history of Hatay, as a distinctive subject, has attracted academic interest. However, many researches focused on the politic-diplomatic and juridical aspects of the annexation process. In this respect, the social, local and cultural facets of the subject have been neglected or had limited concern in academic works for a long time. Especially state-centred view dominated in Turkish literature. The geo-political importance and the economic value of the Sanjak are primarily highlighted issues in this kind of works. It can be claimed that as a genre of an academic product of the international relations, the foremost published materials belong to Serhan Ada and Yücel Güçlü<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, the articles regarding “Hatay Issue” released by “Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı” can also be assessed in this category<sup>3</sup>. On the other hand, both Seda Altuğ’s thesis, “*Between Colonial and National Dominations: Antioch under the French Mandate (1920- 1939)*” and Esra Demirci Akyol’s study “*The Role of Memory in the Historiography of Hatay*” are important exemplary studies on the social and cultural history of the region<sup>4</sup>. The international diplomatic process was not ignored in these two theses. Altuğ and Akyol attempted to analyze the process by taking into consideration in the context of a broader picture with the local dynamics. Akyol uses oral history as a method and concentrates on the how

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<sup>2</sup> Serhan Ada, *Türk-Fransız İlişkilerinde Hatay Sorunu (1918-1939)*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005., Yücel Güçlü, *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta: A Study in Turkish-French-Syrian Relations*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> The articles are available at (<http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=92>) 30.10.2009.

<sup>4</sup> Esra Demirci Akyol, *The Role of Memory in the Historiography of Hatay*, unpublished master thesis. Sabancı University. Seda Altuğ, *Between Colonial and National Dominations: Antioch under the French Mandate (1920- 1939)*, unpublished master thesis. Boğaziçi University.

different ethno-religious groups experienced and stored the past. She explores the relationship between memory and history in the context of Hatay History. On the other hand, Altuğ employs oral history as a secondary method and used it to grasp the selected process. She tries to understand the ethno-religious separation within the context of the nationalist movements in Sancak in the late 1930s.

This study can be considered as the follower of these two studies as it endeavours to write the social history of the Sanjak in the process of annexation. Differently from the works of Altuğ and Akyol, in this thesis, the main aim was to talk to the first generation elderly and to resort to their testimonies. In order to approach the history of the region from a critical stand, the process in which Turkish history writing was shaped should be taken into account. In other words, the phases in which the Turkish historiography was shaped were the starting point in considering the local history. Moreover, there is a relationship between the Turkish historiography and the annexation of Hatay. Considering this relationship, it is significant to know how history and other disciplines such as anthropology became a tool at the hands of nationalists especially in the 1930s. In addition, as stated before, oral history is viewed as a way to demonstrate the authoritarian voice regarding Hatay history which was embedded in the written documents and the memoirs of Turkish-Kemalist nationalists. According to Hourani (1991: 134):

“They [historians] tell us what “modernizing” governments and elites wished to do and what they thought they had done, but what in fact was happening- how the process appeared to those whom the ruler were trying to change, or how they accepted the process but changed its direction- does not appear clearly...”

To understand the region’s history beyond the thought of Turkish-Kemalist nationalists in the Sanjak and the intellectuals and statesmen in Turkey, it is required view events “from below.” As a result, oral history is important to examine how people make sense of their past and how people use past to interpret their lives and how past become part of the present. In other words, oral history can be defined as a process of collecting, reminiscences, accounts, and interpretations of events from the

recent past usually by means of a tape-recorded interview (Hoffman, 1996: 87). Thus, oral history is not solely considered as a means of retrieval of information; rather, it can be seen as one of the historical reconstruction by interviewing of testimonies in the past events. As Hareven (1996) points out, this kind of reconstruction cannot be understood as simply recreation of historical events; it is rather a record of perceptions. Besides, the relationship between construction and reconstruction of identity, history, and memory was crucial to elaborate the perspective of oral history in a study. The relation between history, narrative, memory, and identity is very complex and multidimensional so that during interpretation of the interviews, this relationship should be bear in mind. Another critical point is the position of interviewer. The questions of “who live it” and “who study it” are very crucial to understand the contribution of the interviewer as an agent in the interview, contribution to the process of recall and recount. The questions were chosen and the way of asking them give clues about the approach of the interviewer. Interviews are accepted to reveal often, unknown events or unknown aspects of known events. Besides, it can be considered an opportunity for examining unexplored areas of the daily life of the non-hegemonic classes (Portelli, 1998: 69). On the other hand, memory is an active process of creation of meanings, not a passive depository of facts. Oral history is past experiences presented from the perspective of the present. In this respect, it enables us to understand present identifications, affiliations, and identity constructions of the narrators.

The aim of this study is not to achieve “historical reality” or “truth”. The individuals’ perceptions and their view regarding the annexation process are the primary concerns. It is important to understand the relationship between human experiences and social conditions or to consider this experience and their narratives within the social context. As mentioned earlier, it is possible to give priority to “ordinary people” not “captains, kings and presidents but of farmers, workers, immigrants and the like” through the oral history (Okihiro: 1996: 209). It was an attempt to make ordinary people visible through their own words, perceptions and practices in their daily life.

Strength of oral history can be discussed also in its comparison to written documents. Oral history is seen as a styled testimony, whereas the written documents referred to be dead letters. It is possible to have a dialog with the historical actor and observe human behaviour firsthand in the oral history. Oral history has a concern with power relations in its stand against the status quo (Okihiro: 1996: 211).

Oral historical interviews were conducted with twenty-nine men and women who agreed to share their memoirs on the annexation process of Hatay. The research for this project took place between March 2008 and March 2009 in Hatay. The main purpose was to speak with elderly men and women from variety of backgrounds to understand their views in the late 1930s. The focus group of the study is mainly those who were born in 1920s when the region was under the French rule and thus those who lived the annexation period in their childhood. The elderly people were chosen from different ethno-religious groups as well as different class and regional affiliations. It was not possible to reach the people from different ethno-religious groups proportionally. Namely, the interviews were conducted with twenty-one Alawis, three Turk-Sunnis, three Christians, an Arab-Sunni and an Armenian. The snowball technique was utilized while looking for the interviewees. I wrote a mail group, whose members were from Antioch and Suveydiye, and claimed that whether people know the old-aged people who could talk about the annexation period. By the feedback of the mail-group and the references of the interviewed people, I reached fifteen people.

All the interviews were arranged on the day, at an hour and the place the interviewees determined. Most of the interviews were conducted at their home. The Arab-speaking interviewees were tried to speak in Turkish because in the beginning of the interview, they thought that I was from Ankara and the state sent me. After I explained that I was a student in Ankara and an Antiochean Alawi, especially to Alawi participants, became comfortable. They asked that why I was asking them these questions and why I was wondering. They simply wanted to learn if I was a

stranger or not. Yet, after I talked about my reference, they became more sincerely. Some interviews did not conduct with the interviewee alone, their relatives, mostly their children and grandchildren, were with us. Even though some oral historians saw it as a constraint on the narrator, this circumstance was useful or advantageous in my study because the children helped to recall some stories to their fathers/mothers (Yow, 1994: 58). Moreover, they asked me whether I would use their name in any publication. I assured them I did not use their name. Thus, I changed their real names in the thesis. The information about their age, gender and ethnic/religious identities were given in parenthesis while using quotations from interviews.

There were many hindrances during the conduct of the study. One of the difficulties during the interview was to recall names or dates and to narrate coherently for the old-aged interviewees. Thus, to show some photos of 1930s and 1940s' Antioch was considered as a way for recalling. The illness and difficulties of speaking were another obstacle in the interviews, which made difficult to understand what interviewees said. In this respect, hence the children were more familiar with their stories, they helped in explaining what their fathers/mothers said. Moreover, another problem was related to the language. My Arabic was not adequate and in some interviews, I asked in Turkish, they responded in Arabic. I preferred to interview with some interviewees two or three times because at the first interview, they insisted on talking some events, such as their recruitment. I did not interrupt them because it is important to let them to talk about themselves in order to establish relationship on trust. On the other hand, this gave opportunity to understand the role of military service in their life span and its relation with the construction of Turkish identity; most of them after the annexation joined the military for four years. This interview process is also necessary to consider the "prohibited questions." For instance, the questions related to the nationalist movements of the Arabists, street fights, violence were responded with silence or as "my family was not interested in politics in this period" or "we did not know or hear such a thing." By so doing, they wanted to hide their relatives' political activity because they tried to prevent any connection between

them and the Arabists, who were presented as betrayers in the nationalist historiography.

I did not only concentrate on the personal experiences, testimonies, perceptions as an oral historian, but also I asked some traditional stories, songs, or poems that they remembered as they may give chance to understand the community sociologically (Ritchie, 1995: 16). I collected a song which had been song by the members of Affan, a neighbourhood in Antioch<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, I asked if their dressing style in rural and in the city was changed or not. Their reaction to the collective wearing European hat (*şapka*) during and after the annexation reveals both the endeavour of the Kemalists and their perceptions.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, talking about events and their life-story enabled to understand and interpret their experiences in social and historical context. It also gave opportunity to speak in enough time but I did not have time for some interviews. The interpretation of interviews is very important phase of the project. I tried to abstain from mis-representing the interviewees' meaning or change of the words inevitably there is loss in the form of presentation.

As a result, oral history provides to consider the period from 1920's to 1930s through the non-elites views. In other words, oral history is significant to give voice to the voiceless and it is an attempt to understand how people from different communities lived and experienced the period after the annexation and what their perception was about the nation-state. By examining their memories and providing information from them, it can be possible to extend our knowledge about what happened in the process of the annexation of Hatay into Turkey. In this respect, the comparison with the written documents of the nationalists in the late of 1930s exposes how nationalist ideology used history as a tool for hegemonic struggle and what were the perception of the Kemalist-Turkish nationalist regarding non-elites and non-Turks. For this study, I used the pro-Turkish local newspaper, *Yenigün*, books about the history of

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<sup>5</sup> Emsal, 18.04.2009, Antioch

<sup>6</sup> Mediha, 12.09.2008, Antioch

region written by local historians, memoirs of the Turkish-Kemalist nationalists and their autobiographies.

The first chapter attempts to present the paradoxes of nationalist historiography. In considering this kind of historiography, the process of the construction of nation-states and the effect of capitalist relations in the world are taken into consideration. Thus, it becomes possible to understand the function and misuses of nationalist historiography. At this point, it is also possible to grasp how anachronic, exceptionalist or particularist, romantic and even idiographic historiography was shaped in the context of Turkish nationalist historiography. Especially, the relationship between Turkish History Thesis and “Hatay issue” is vital to consider because its impact on the local historiography cannot be neglected. In order to prove the “Turkishness” of this region, not only the discipline of history was used and also anthropology, geography, and ethnology as well. At this point, considering the coalescence of the rise of the nationalist movements and nationalist propagandas as local dynamics in the late of 1930s with the nationalist historiography during and after the annexation is noteworthy.

The second chapter tries to give background of nationalist movements in Middle East in general and in Sanjak of Alexandretta in particular. It is an endeavour of having a glance at the local history within Middle Eastern context. Thus, before dealing with the local dynamics, the role of the mandate regime and the doctrine of self-determination, which affected the nationalist movements and even historiography, are questioned. On the other hand, it is important to avoid considering the nationalist movements on the basis of Turk-Arab animosity. For this reason, the change in the social structure and the nationalisms in the Middle East were seen more significant to note in this chapter. The leaders of nationalist movements consisted of middle class, educated, and unemployed youth, small artisans, and merchants who became bleaker after the 1929 World Depression and the political instability in Syria from 1926 to the late of 1930s are analyzed. In this respect, to question who were the history-writers or Turkish-Kemalist nationalists, the role of their memoirs in the history of

the region and their books regarding the local history led the way to examine the history of Hatay within the Turkish nationalist historiography.

The third chapter is an attempt of giving priority to the ordinary people whose words does not voice in the nationalist historiography. At this point, as mentioned earlier, the comparison of written documents and oral testimonies and perceptions of ordinary people enables us to consider the role of nationalist historiography and even national education in building the national identity. For instance, what was omitted or what was given prominence was meaningful while considering this kind of history writing. The division of local history into the periods such as World War I, Ankara Agreement and taken into account only these periods can prevent to see the continuity or changes in the local social structure. In this respect, the change or continuity in the land system or sharecroppers' perception of ağa (landowner) in the historical context becomes crucial in abstaining of the evolution of the process from solely the national struggle point of view or the eyes of the Turkish nationalists. . As a result, the complexity of land system, the nationalist movements, the cult of Atatürk, and the immigrations of anti-Turks from the region after the completion of annexation process help to consider this period through the local dynamics. However, all these dynamics are significant if they include the voice of ordinary people.



## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORIOGRAPHY AND NATIONALISM

The question of “what history is” can be answered simply in two ways: it is the “science of the past” or “story, narrative”.<sup>7</sup> Discussions about history have continued from past to present, but it can be claimed that “national history” has been particularly subject to biases and intentional or unintentional distortions. The responsibility of historians is to reveal these distortions and reinterpretations and reveal for which aims history has been used.

All human beings, collective structures, and institutions need a past, but discovering their past through historical studies can be possible only for a few of them. The past is a permanent dimension of the human consciousness. It is an inevitable component of the institutions, values, and other patterns of human society. The problem for historians is to analyze the nature of the “sense of the past” in society and to trace its changes and transformations (Hobsbawm, 1972: 3).

Myths, which demonstrate themselves as a history of ethnic culture, obviously serve nationalism. Ernest Renan asserted more than a century ago: “Forgetting, even

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<sup>7</sup> In the nineteenth century, history became a professional academic field, and in this process debates raged on whether it was science or narrative. By the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, history was beginning to establish itself throughout the Western world as an autonomous academic discipline. The 19<sup>th</sup> century is often called the golden age of historiography, and the second half of it is considered by many to be the most historically minded period in Western civilization until that time. The scientific nature of history that was claimed, discussed, and practiced in historical writing around 1800 was new in two respects. First, the very linking of the historical and the scientific was novel in empirical historical writing. Second, the new scientificity differed fundamentally from the Aristotelian concept of *scientia* that had been prevalent in large parts of Europe until far into the nineteenth century. The notion of scientificity not only changed over time; it was also contested, with different people drawing their distinctions in different places. This, in turn, had different consequences for the practical outlook of historical writing. Just as the category of history (as object of inquiry) was understood in radically different ways by different historical practitioners, so too was the concept of scientificity (Feldner: 2003, 17).

getting history wrong, is an essential factor in the formation of a nation, which is why the progress of historical studies is often a danger to nationality” (quoted in Hobsbawm, 1998: 409). Myths mystify history for the creation of the nation. Hobsbawm (1998: 409) maintains that although nations try to prove their pre-historical past with re-written histories, indeed the formation of the nation-state is a historically new structure. As a result, anachronism is an inevitable outcome for this kind of history-writing. In addition, because past events are considered without being put into appropriate political, social, cultural, and economic contexts, this gives rise to illusions and an isolationist manner in historiography in order to create national sentiments.

David C. Gordon defines history as the collective memory of a people’s past experiences, its heroes, and its great deeds, as the basis for its sense of identity. History is a reservoir upon which it can draw to give itself meaning and a destiny, as well as endow its young with a collective pride and dedication to the tribe, the state, the nation, or the religion. According to Gordon, this history is an accumulation of myths, illusions, and symbols, and these myths and symbols can restore the collective heritage and explain who we are to ourselves and to others. This type of history functions in utilitarian manner and serves for the collective interest. In order to create a national feeling and a sense of unity, as well as to inspire pride and dedication, myths, symbols, heroes, and great events of the past are resurrected, cultivated, and used to educate the present and future generations of a people (Gordon, 1971: 3, 55). According to Hobsbawm (1998: 9):

“History is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented. Indeed in the nature of things there is usually no entirely suitable past, because the phenomenon these ideologies claim to represent is not ancient or eternal but historically novel”

During the formation of the nation-state in the nineteenth century, while the existing traditional elements were researched, devised, and re-configured for the creation of the elements of national culture, such as myths, symbols, meanings and values, history as a science and as a tool was re-written in accordance to this “new” story. At this point, it is crucial to understand how newly created history was used, but first it would be meaningful to contextualize some concepts such as culture, identity, and history.

There is very close relation between culture and identity. Even though the concept of identity has been studied as a socio-psychological phenomenon, it became a political paradigm with a strong relevancy to culture after the 1980s (Aydın, 1999:131). Similar to the concept of identity, “memory” has also begun to be studied not only as peculiar issue for the individual, as a psychological phenomenon, but also as a sociological issue. Collective memory<sup>8</sup> and identity can be considered within the context of culture and history in the process of nation-building. Humans are producers of the culture and at the same time are produced by the culture within society. Sharing the same culture brings about a feeling of solidarity and cohesion between people. According to Balibar (2002: 94), all identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behaviour, and collective symbols. Although individuals cannot identify with one another and they do not ever acquire an isolated identity, the important question is how the dominant reference points of individual identity change over time and within the changing institutional environment. Today, historians and political scientists focus on the relation between identity and cultural/collective memory in order to examine how society re-constructs its past in accordance with today’s needs. At this point, a reference to either the real or

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<sup>8</sup>The term “collective memory” itself is controversial and there is no agreed upon definition. The concept of collective memory is not only used for the small community in which people know each other, but also for ethnic groups, nations, and states. According to Halbwachs (1985: 121), an individual’s memory also has a social dimension so that memory depends on social conditions. The collective memory can exist only with people who have it, so it can be related to a living and real community (Sancar, 2007: 41).

“constructed” past has a crucial role in building identity. This kind of history and memory is constituted by texts, pictures, monuments, anniversaries, and rituals (Sancar: 2007, 18). Cultural identity, which coincides with the emergence of the nation-states and nationalism, is affected by the perception of this solidarity and past. According to Smith, nationalism is not only an ideology or social movement, but also a cultural category. Accordingly, it can be considered in the context of the form of culture and identity. For Smith, the power of nationalism should be attributed to the fact that membership in a nation provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture. According to him, an “ethnie” is “a named human community whose members share common myths of ancestry and memories, elements of common culture, and some measure of solidarity” and specific historical inheritances from traditions and shared memories help determine the character of modern nationalism. Some “ethnies” so strongly approximate nations that the historical continuity between their beliefs and praxis is more robust than those of more recently created nations (Smith, 2009: 23-33). It can be claimed that common culture and history are very crucial in the process of becoming an ethnic group and a nation.

According to Aydin (1999, 132-133), all “nation-state” formations assume, or rather base themselves on a ‘national culture,’ which, in reality, they themselves construct:

This “constructed culture” is assumed to coincide with the “national essence”, which is itself another construction. The framework and the components of “national identity” are formulated by national historiography, which states that its subject-matter (the nation whose history it deals with) is unique and “homogenous”, has a claim of antiquity and authenticity in its territory; that the notion has reached “national consciousness” at very early stages of its history and has realized a civilizing mission. The national historiography has also to discover an “ethnic entity” which, in its history, is identical with the nation and to demonstrate its continuity as a homogenous and unique entity since its inception. This process is designed as a “historical march” of the nation from its roots in a long-obliterated past to the present (and often to an everlasting future).

The question of the characteristics of national historiography is related to the problems or paradoxes of national history-writing, because it also means to consider the internal contradictions of the nation-states on the basis of the official “national identity” and other “ethnic identities”. It is obvious that national history contains paradoxes because historians neglect some thoughts or historical events in order to tell the story as a scenario, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The revelation of these distortions can be viewed as a misuse of history for the official history-writers and cause damage to the nationalist ideological framework. These distortions enable a critical observation of national historiography.

### **2.1. The Characteristics and the Paradoxes of National Historiography**

It is possible to mention national historiography from two main peculiarities: anachronism and exceptionalism. Indeed, each of them involves the other and it can be said that they are inseparable since they are the possible results of nation-state building.

Anachronism is one of the main characteristics of national history. For instance, there is no homogenous and harmonious social structure of a nation consisting of only one ethnic identity in the world. For this reason the Enlightenment philosophy was based on the theory of “social contract”. However, national historiography aims to discover an ethnic entity. The assertion about the continuity of an ethnic entity which has not been obliterated from past to present is fictional and ideological. This kind of “ethnic essence” was constituted by the contribution of history in accordance with the official ideology of the nation-states (Aydın, 1999: 58). In this sense, the important thing for the founders of nation-states is to produce the people as a social community. As Balibar states (2002: 93), “every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary”. Balibar further adds that “no modern nation possesses a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of a national independence struggle. Moreover, no modern nation ‘egalitarian’ it may be, corresponds to the extinction of class conflicts” (2002: 93). According to Hobsbawm

(1998: 12), the most usual ideological abuse of history is based on anachronism rather than lies. The omissions and decontextualizations can be traced in the nationalist version of history. Hobsbawm gives an example to demonstrate the relation between anachronism, history, and nationalism:

Greek nationalism refuses Macedonia even the right to its name on the grounds that all Macedonia is essentially Greek and part of a Greek nation-state, presumably ever since the father of Alexander the Great, King of Macedonia, became the ruler of the Greek lands on the Balkan Peninsula ... There was no Greek nation-state or any other single political entity for the Greeks in the fourth century B.C.; the Macedonian Empire was nothing like the Greek or any other modern nation-state, and in any case it is highly probable that the ancient Greeks regarded the Macedonian rulers, as they did their later Roman rulers, as barbarians and as not Greeks, though they were doubtless too polite or cautious to say so. Moreover is historically such an inextricable mixture of ethnicities.

In the nineteenth century, some disciplines were institutionalized and used accordingly with the needs of nation-state. By the end of World War I, nationalism turned to account the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, etymology, archaeology, literature, folklore, and Western historiography to legitimate the past of a nation. In the meantime, historiography was the newly developing pseudo-scientific narrative genre. It became an appropriate ground for nationalist ideological aims. In this respect, anthropology and archaeology gave support to the search for the past and ethnic identity. Three main races were categorized: black, white, and yellow. This categorization was seen as a scientific finding. Hence, the positivist science transformed social sciences into “pure sciences” and physical appearances were accepted as evidence for the distinctions of ethnic communities (Ersanlı, 2006: 43). In addition, in the quest for an “ethnic basis”, the founders of nation-states began to discover an antiquity and authenticity in their territory for establishing a connection with their “glorious past”. These findings gave rise to the claim of being an “autochthon” community in the territory since the pre-historic times. The non-European nation-states especially insisted that their ethnic basis had existed in the ancient community. As a result, according to nationalist historians of the states, this “sacred race” and its conveyors transformed the territory into the motherland. This

kind of endeavour resulted in anachronism because the main purpose of the search was to demonstrate evidence to European racist approaches that their non-European nation was not “secondaire” race. In this sense, the main purpose was to solve the “historical priority” problem and also to display the racial entity’s continuity as a homogenous and unique entity since its inception. In consequence, the desire for priority, which way demanded to prove an ancient civilized ethnic origin, resulted in the emergence of counter-theses and anachronistic interpretations of history (Aydın, 1998).

In order to understand the connection between anachronism and the quest for ethnic basis for nation-states, focusing on the process during which history became narrative can be helpful.

According to İlhan Tekeli (1998: 118), it is vital to take into consideration the conditions which shaped historiography in the nineteenth century as well as the misuse of history so as not to neglect both the emergence of the nation state and the nationalist historiography. However, Tekeli does not mean that the conditions were shaped by historians who abused history. He believes that instead of explaining historiography in terms of the subjectivity of historians, it is more significant to consider historiography within the social context. In this respect, the emergence of German historicism and idiographic<sup>9</sup> historiography became noteworthy in opposition to positivism and nomothetic<sup>10</sup> historiography. At this point, three epistemological stances had crucial roles in the emergence of national history in Europe. Firstly, the nationalist history creates a new subject possessing the “national identity” while labelling the contrary as the “others”. Secondly, it narrates the events chronologically, which changes the perception of “time”. Thirdly, the idiographic approach was adopted in history and geography. These three epistemological stances made it possible for the construction of national identity through historiography.

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<sup>9</sup> This kind of historical study focuses on individual cases or specific events. It is concerned with discrete or unique facts and events.

<sup>10</sup> It is opposed to idiographic, which involves the study or formulation of general or universal laws while taking the past into account.

The subject of nationalist history is not dynasty and heroes, but rather the people of the nation. The people are the glorified subject of nationalist history. Such history is about the peoples' victories; it neglects the failures. If the reasons for failures are revealed, it can be seen that they are tricks of the "others". The failures cannot be derived from the nation itself in the discourse. The definition of "ourselves" is made according to the depiction of "others". The "ourselves" are stereotyped. The "others" are pointed out not only outside, as the other nations, but the discourse of national history also depicts the "others" within the nation. This discourse refers to the enemy nations as the "others" outside the borders; on the other hand, the "minorities" or "unenlightened" people are the "others" within the nation. As a result, the subject and its depiction point out the aims of nationalist historiography. Balibar (2002: 94) states:

"the people is constituted out of various populations subject to common law. In every case, however, a model of their unity must 'anticipate' that constitution: the process of unification presupposes the constitution of a specific ideological form. It must at one and the same time be a mass phenomenon and a phenomenon of individuation, must effect an 'interpellation of individuals as subject' (Althusser) which is much more potent than the mere inculcation of political values or rather one that integrates this inculcation into a more elementary process of fixation of the affects of love and hate and the representation of the 'self'". In this sense, the historical production of the people can be made possible through the depiction and interpellation of the "self" and the ideologies of patriotism or nationalism.

The selection of the narration style in nationalist history has important functions. The narration fictionalizes the historical data in the cause and effect relationship chronologically. The genre of this narration style is similar to novels and epic poems which are in fact a misconception of real life. Nationalist historiographers depict the reality as if they were the sole authority. In this way, certain incidents are given priority as well as enabling the creation of the "others". In addition, nationalist historiography is deprived of theoretical framework; in order to fill the historical gaps and homogenous time it haphazardly tries to gather and pick up the bulk of



events. Historicism does not only make explanations by the juxtaposition of the selected events one by one, but it also tries to expose the genealogical community of the national society. Accordingly, it provides a legitimization of the past. Through the idiographic approach, the authenticity of the events and processes are presented and the nation's differences from other nations are emphasized. It can be said that the selective use of existing historical facts contributes to the re-creation of the past, and in this process some historical elements are remembered but some of them are ignored.

The other important feature of narrative history is the concept of "time". History is narrated in a specific time. The time of history progresses day-to-day in a linear fashion. The nation would be built within the evolutionary time period or historical evolution. The fact that the evolution theory has affected the trend of historicism should not be neglected when looking at nationalist historiography critically. Through this perception of time, the nation state was presented as the progressive stage. In other words it is perceived that this nation-state has an everlasting future. The fiction related to the inception of the nation-state primarily shaped the discourse of its history. By employing the "revival metaphor", it hinders an interrogation of the preceding era and events of the nation-state. Thus, the aim of this discourse and the questions on the period before stages of the nation-state become insignificant (Tekeli, 1998: 118).

The narration of history by the idiographic approach is constituted in the idiographic geography. Every historical narration is the story of the formation of the spatiality or the practice related to the spatial at the same time. Every change in the economic and social dimensions gives rise to a re-formation in the spatiality. If a nation is depicted on the basis of its idiographic distinctiveness from other nations, the depiction has to be spatial as well as historical. In this context, the territory is praised for the unique beauty that enables people to reinforce the discourse regarding national identity. In other words, it also helps to depict national characteristics with the glorification of the homeland (Tekeli, 1998: 118-120). According to Smith (2004: 25), especially in

civic nationalism the nation cannot be considered without a geographic territory, of which the boundaries are defined precisely. However, this territory cannot be an ordinary space; it has to be a historical homeland to which the generations were devoted from the past to the present. The homeland for which heroes fought and in which saints and sages lived has become the space of historical memory and its associations. The historical homeland was the high and spiritual terrain for the citizens of nation.

History textbooks are good examples of such history by alluring and stirring up people, they aim to create nationalist sentiments. In this sense, the connotations of the words become very crucial in this kind of historiography. It is vital to take into consideration the linguistic features of the texts to analyze this historiography. These texts have three features, which are the metafiction of the narrations, the means that are used for the explanations, and the kinds of metaphors that are used.

According to Hayden White, historians use four archetypes<sup>11</sup> in order to fictionalize their narratives: Michelet's romantic archetype, Ranke's comic archetype, Tocqueville's tragic archetype, and Buckhard's satiric archetype. The events are organized chronologically in the narratives in accordance with the narration's archetype. The romantic archetype is generally used in nationalist history. Which events will take place in the history is previously determined. National historians strive to affect people and evoke their sentiments. They do not aim only at impressing on peoples' mind but inspiring them to action. The subjects in romantic historiography are heroes, who surmount tremendous difficulties and win victories so that they do not submit to destiny. Therefore, romantic history gives people hope for the future. (Tekeli, 1998: 121).

The explanation of the coincidental connections is crucial in the romantic nationalist historiography. Accordingly, it does not prefer general explanations based on

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<sup>11</sup> "Archetype is the original pattern or model from which all things of the same kind are copied or on which they are based; a model or first form; prototype." (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/archetype>)

nomothetic laws. Rather, it prefers contingent and contextual explanations that are able to articulate the historicist interpretations. In addition, the nationalist history-writers utilize the organicist explanations in order to give importance to the national integrity (Tekeli, 1998: 122).

Territorial and national integrity are noteworthy in national historiography and in the exceptionalist thesis defined by Nancy Lindisfarne. According to Lindisfarne (2008: 202), exceptionalism is a kind of history-writing based on the distinctiveness of the nation. It aims at comparing the nation to others by emphasizing the uniqueness of the nation. Therefore, the citizens cannot comprehend their agency or role in national or international issues. For Lindisfarne, it is clear that the exceptionalist theses are the explicit features of the mainstream nationalist histories and that they can be observed in the historical textbooks. In short, the exceptionalist theses are the hegemonic dimension of the nationalist ideologies. "Nation" is perceived as an essence, so it creates an obstacle to the explanation of the complexity of social processes and the dialects of social life. The standardization of a people, such as "Turks" or "Turkish people", hinders the class, ethnic, sectarian, and regional differences in the nation-state. In this sense, it is a "part of class ideology." As Anderson (1983: 16) states, the nation is an imagined political community because there are inequalities and exploitative relationships in the society in which all people are represented as fellows (quoted in Lindisfarne, 2008: 203). Moreover, exceptionalism has another way of creating national essence. National borders are attributed as the natural and fixed borders. The historical process and national and international policies related to the borders are neglected, so the nation is isolated from the social process beyond the borders of the state through the exceptionalist discourse. However, this kind of isolation contradicts with the real changes of social life. It also brings about ignorance of the relation between cultural, economic, and political changes and the world system. In short, exceptionalism determines the rhetoric of national governments and the historical and political literature. Thus, this historiography hinders the class differences and dialectical process through the

exceptionalist discourse in which the perception of this hegemonic dimension is difficult.

If the Turkish exceptionalism is taken into consideration, the famous saying of Mustafa Kemal, “We are like ourselves and no one else” (*Biz bize benzeriz*), can be a good illustration because it refers to the overlapping of the Kemalist discourse and practice with the modern state. Kemalist republican rhetoric and practice conceals the economic interests of the privileged classes and their supporting institutions and state policies. These theses approve the existing class relations while the exceptionalist historiography strives to emphasize that the inception of this structure has been shaped by the foundation of the Republic. The Republican regime presents itself as an indication of the nation’s uniqueness and distinctiveness. Therefore, the comparative studies in history are obstructed. Although a nation’s history employs the use of a comparative method in which the other nations’ histories are dwelt upon, the comparisons are generally vulnerable or banal in practice. In addition, they are not detailed analyses; indeed, they bear assertions (Lindisfarne, 2008: 205-207). This can also be seen in the case of Turkish historiography.

In the following part, the role of history in establishing nationalist ideology and the nationalist historiography in Turkey in 1930s will closely be examined. To this end, for understanding the relation between nationalism and Turkish historiography is vital. Secondly, the role of anthropology and how it became an independent discipline in Turkey will be analyzed. Finally, the reflection of the relationship between the nation-state and minorities reflects in nationalist historiography will be exposed.

## 2.2. Turkish Historiography in the 1930s: The Myths of Unification

It is important to consider the fact that the political power of any country has a crucial role in defining its past because of the close relationship between historiography and political power. During the endeavours of centralization in Europe, history became a very important tool for governments. At this stage, during the so-called age of nationalism, some current of thoughts such as secularism, positivism,<sup>12</sup> romanticism,<sup>13</sup> and historicism<sup>14</sup> shaped historiography. These were influential factors on history-writing in many countries in which attempts of using history in order to create nationalistic feelings were seen. Modern historiographical development in general is closely connected to the nation-state formation. Romanticist, positivist, and historicist trends that developed mainly in France and Germany were the signs that underlined political power was with reference to specific styles of nationalism. For example, as a reaction to France's political and military supremacy during the nineteenth century, the German philosophers stressed *kultur/staat* nationalism (Ersanlı; 2002, 337). On the other hand, according to Suavi Aydın (1996: 114), Turkish historiography cannot be considered as a model that consists of the articulations of romanticism, positivism, and German historicism because it is the juxtaposition of the characteristics of modernization. The modernization of the Turkish nation-state, which occurred late, in comparison to the European states, becomes totalitarian, idealistic, and romantic in catching up to the ideal model. It also becomes positivist to the utmost degree in order to provide legitimization. The nation and the state become unhistorical essential existences in

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<sup>12</sup> The main argument of positivism is that we can reach knowledge only through the methods of natural sciences. Its ideology provided scientific objectivity for the created past, which also provides political legitimization.

<sup>13</sup> German Romanticism accepts the nation as an organism. It is anti-revolutionary, emphasizing historical continuity or the evolution of a nation in history. Romanticism emphasizes specific characters of nations and opposes universal values. It also accepts education or the didactic role of history as an important tool to create national consciousness.

<sup>14</sup> German Historicism idealized the nation and state at the expense of individuals. Historicism also encouraged archaeological and anthropological studies to document the individuality of the nations.

the modernization project and every ideological apparatus is used for legitimization. For instance, the Turkish History Thesis applied racist claims by trying to prove that the people in the Anatolian region were Turks in order to legitimize the nation-state.

Turkish historiography has its roots in the old established tradition of Ottoman historiography. Ottoman history was written for political legitimacy by recording military-political victories, and Turkish historiography inherited this Ottoman legacy. The most efficient way to achieve this aim is by ensuring that the writers of history are the makers of history at the same time; at least, they belong to the same small class. The political power had a direct relation with the history and these political affiliations determined the discourse and methodologies of historiography. Victories or failures were narrated in this discourse. There was no comparison between the Ottoman state and other countries or empires. The Ottoman Empire alone and its political life were the sole focuses of the historiography. In spite of the richness of the genres, the content did not change.

Similarly, in Turkish historiography the subject was simply Turkey's own history. In addition, the historiography was perceived as literary and used for pragmatist aims. Therefore, the responsibility of the historians, or *vakanüvis*, was to write about political leaders. Indeed, the 1908 Revolution brought a relative autonomy for cultural activities for the intellectuals within the Empire but this was ended by the Kemalist intervention in cultural activities. Turkish Republic's historiography was dominated by the pragmatist and instrumentalist approaches. On the other hand, Republican historians did not inherit the richness of genres such as *gazavatname*,<sup>15</sup> *şehname*,<sup>16</sup> *seyahatname*,<sup>17</sup> and *nasihatname*; what remained was only the political-military approach to past events. In other words, as Ersanlı (2002: 338) mentioned,

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<sup>15</sup> *Gazavatname*, or *Gaza*, was the genre of history in the 15th and 16th centuries, which was written about wars and military victories.

<sup>16</sup> *Şehname* was epic poetry or prose poetry written by the *vakanüvis*.

<sup>17</sup> *Seyahatname* was the notes of itinerants concerning the history of civilization and geography.

“The Republican enterprise was grounded on a kind of historical discontinuity loaded with political pragmatism. In other words, it divorced political recognition from historical method. During the first decades of the Republic, Turkish historiography was defensive and isolationist in its nationalistic sentiments. However, the spatial and temporal scope of the self in the then newly written textbooks was remarkably vast”

Turkism stated in the Tanzimat era as a cultural movement with the studies of the Turkish language and the role of Turks in world history. It gained political character as a result of development of nationalism among non-Turkish subjects. Focusing on the connection of pan-Turkism and the territory populated by Turks, the historians began to write Turkish history. Pro-Ottoman Turks published many newspapers and journals after 1908. There were three proposals for national identity in the early twentieth century: Ottomanism, Cultural Turkism, and Functional Turkism.

According to Ersanlı (2006: 76), “scientific nationalism” as a trend affecting Turkish nationalism was identified with positivism. Sociology and competition with other nations were the stimulating factors of the “scientific nationalism”. In this respects, the Ottoman intellectuals suggested different methodologies for historical research. According to Yusuf Akçura, neither Ottomanism nor Islamism could create a modern identity for the Turks in Turkey. Projecting ethnic and cultural homogeneity within the nation’s boundaries was the general objective of official policy and historiography. The new historiography should be based on positivism and contribute to Turkism. It had to focus on the historical documents and the critics of the documents should not be neglected. On the other hand, Fuat Köprülü emphasized the geographic, ethnic, and social aspects of the historical events.

Generally speaking, in the early twentieth century the French Revolution was an important source of inspiration for Turkish nationalism since it reinforced the hatred of the palace and the monarchy. Therefore, Turkish historiography turned into a superficial version of French and sometimes German historiography. French positivism and German historicism were adopted in Turkish historiography. It was believed that the findings of archaeological excavations had reflected the objectivity

of historical knowledge. These material findings in the soil were accepted as evidence of the Turks' historical and thus national identity (Ersanlı, 2002: 339).

As mentioned earlier, before the formalization of the Turkish History Thesis, national identity was discussed in some associations and periodicals. In other words, historical research on the basis of ethnic origin did not begin in the early Turkish Republic. The concern on the Turkish origin began with the secular implement in the field of education in the Second Constitutional era. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the state declared Turkish nationalism as the official ideology. In the 1930s, Kemalist nationalism took a new form.<sup>18</sup> Through pragmatist aims, the intellectuals, politician-historians, strived to study the Turkish History Thesis immediately.

### **2.2.1. The Turkish History Thesis**

Early in 1930s, the Kemalist regime sought to centralize the power in the hands of the Republican People's Party (RPP). In the meantime, "Turkish Hearts" (*Türk Ocakları*)<sup>19</sup> and then "The Peoples' Houses" (*Halkevleri*) were used for populist and nationalist propaganda. (Çağaptay, 2002: 69). Under strong political control, history was viewed as a tool for prop-agitating Turkish nationalism. The Kemalists tried to

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<sup>18</sup> Ahmet Yıldız (2007: 16) proposes three phases for understanding the delimitation of the Turkish national identity. In the first phase, during the National Independence War in 1919-1922, Turkish national identity was defined by religion and the nation was associated with Islam. For real politic discourse, ethnic pluralism was an appropriate hinge. The second phase (1924-1929) witnessed the radical separation from the religious definition and the abandonment of the pluralist discourse. Turkish national identity began to be defined by the republican characteristic. In accordance to this definition, to be a Turkish citizen, growing up in Turkish culture, speaking Turkish, and being loyal to the Republican ideal, was enough to be considered as a Turk. Lastly, in the third phase (1929-1938), Turkish national identity was defined on the basis of ethnicity. This ethnic/racist definition articulated the former definition. The common origin was emphasized.

<sup>19</sup> Turkish Hearts was the intellectual core of Turkish nationalism since 1912 and they abolished themselves on 10 April 1931. After joining the RPP, they were renamed "The Peoples' Houses" (Çağaptay, 2002: 80). The Turkish Hearts gave importance to the positivist and scientific explanations in their historical studies. The society had a scholarly journal named *Turkish Homeland* (*Türk Yurdu*). Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Halide Edip Adıvar, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ferit Tek, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu were the important members of the society and very important figures for Turkish historiography.



create a “national history” until 1932. The historians who created the Turkish History Thesis were employed by the state and members of the RPP. Some of them were members of the Parliament. The politician-historians perceived the search of the past as a scientific study. The Turkish Republic’s ethnic policy was shaped by the authoritarian, elitist, pragmatist, and radical program.

The Turkish History Thesis is a good example for understanding the relation between historiography and nationalism. It signified the break with the backward Ottoman past to realize the aim of establishing a modern secular state and society. All secular and modern reforms aimed at purifying society of the Ottoman-Islamic background. There was mythically a search for pre-Islamic and non-Arabic or Persian national symbols. Moreover, the word “Türk” itself became a symbol. This term had been used in a somewhat pejorative sense before the nineteenth century to define uncultured peasants, while the educated Turk was an “Osmanlı”, a citizen of the Ottoman Empire. However, with the resurrection of pre-Islamic Turkish history, first in the hands of foreign scholars, and then in the hands of the Turks and a Turkish nationalist, Ziya Gökalp, in particular, the words “Türk” and “Türkiye” finally came to carry honorable and proud connotations. Conversely, symbols like the Caliphate, the administrative authority of the Ottoman sultan inherited distantly from the Prophet, came under attack as representing links to a past to be shed, in this case the Islamic Ottoman Empire. In addition to the Turkish History Thesis, language reforms were important indicators of Kemalist Turkish nationalism in the 1930s. As Parla and Davidson (2004: 78) state there are various episodes in the Kemalists’ language reform policies. These episodes include the founding of the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language in early 1932. The Society promulgated the “Sun Language Theory” in 1935. Advocates of this new view sought to find this in the pages of history a Turkey, or a “Turan”, whose language was Turkish rather than the heavily Arabized and Persianized language of the educated Ottomans, and whose cultural origins were neither Arabic nor Persian. This was found by linking Turkey to the Sumerians, the Trojans, and the Hittites, but not to Byzantium, which was identified, of course, with the rival Greeks (Gordon, 1971: 90-92).

Beginning in 1930s, the Turkish national identity was defined by race. In other words, Turkish nationalism was predominantly shaped by a racist discourse. The Turkish History Thesis, claiming that Turks who had migrated from Central Asia and constituted the origins of all the powerful world civilizations, was the product of the high Kemalist period of the 1930s, when a state-party tightly controlled Turkish society and politics. The Turkish History Thesis suggests a nationalist interpretation of the past and tries to establish Turkish national identity as the cradle of civilization in the human past. To sum up, the Turkish History Thesis made a few key assertions. Firstly, the origin of the Turks went back to several thousand years B.C. Secondly, the Turks came from Central Asia during early historical times due to climatic factors. Thirdly, the excavations on Anatolian soil “showed” that the Turks were brachicephalic and Aryan, and therefore much closer to European peoples. Finally, Turkish was the Ur-language of all the civilized languages; in other words, European languages were derived from it. In this context, it is obvious that the nationalist, secularist, and positivist characteristics of Kemalism determined the content of the thesis. Ersanlı (2002: 340) points out the distortion of this history: “Cultural and ethnic mixing with Mongolian peoples was radically denied, and nomadic and sedentary Islamic features that had had an impact on the Ottoman state and had been inherited by the Republican state and society were ignored.”

The thesis was shaped from 1929 to 1937. The first and second History Congresses were convened to develop and finalize the cultural enterprise of the Kemalist Revolution, in 1932 and 1937 respectively. The first congress was planned as a seminar for teachers in order to introduce them to the new historical textbooks. The Turkic world had been contracted to a name given to a single republic, reinforcing its legitimacy as the last Turkish state. Although the thesis was celebrated and approved in the congresses, the other current of thought, represented by scholarly historians such as Fuat Köprülü and Zeki Velidi Togan, questioned the sources and the methods of politically oriented mainstream historians. They were very keen on the methodological soundness of identity construction. During the first and second

Turkish History Congresses, they strived to emancipate the historical narrative of Turkic origins from pre-historical ages. Although Fuat Köprülü could not denote in the congress, he believed in the importance of primary documents or resources from China about Turkish ethnic origin of Turkey. They questioned the methodologies ambiguously (Ersanlı, 2006: 144).

### **2.2.2. The Turkish History Thesis and the discipline of Anthropology**

There is an obvious parallelism between the progress of the institutionalization of science and Turkish modernism. Positivism gained importance from Westernization and the process of the formation of the nation-state. The endeavours for modernization did not only include technological innovations and economic changes, but also changes in cultural, social and political spheres. The Kemalist cadres did not neglect the political and cultural spheres in consolidating their power. In this sense, while legitimizing nation-state implementations and creating national identity, they gave importance to history, culture, and language. During this period, anthropology was the instrument in discovering the ethnic origin through which it became possible to indicate that members of the nation shared common myths of ancestry and memories, elements of common culture, and some measure of solidarity.

As noted before, different disciplines of social science, such as linguistics, anthropology, and archaeology, were used as reference to discover the pure race of nations. Written documents were not seen as enough for non-European countries in order to demonstrate their “glorious history”, because they were written within the prejudice of the earlier nationalized states. Archaeology was replaced by archaic historiography and its methodologies, and purpose was to find out the origin of culture, which had been the official witness of the civilization in the past. The quest for pure race brought about the uses of physical anthropology under the effect of social Darwinist approach. Therefore, the cultural material and its creators were sought. From the later 19th century, the science of physical anthropology began to have a large role in anthropological research. The practitioners of this approach

advocated counting, measuring, and experimenting as the basis of positivistic science which was more than mere observation and description. The quest for certainty in the understanding of the human species would be achieved by means of *number*. Anthropology would become the scientific discipline of measuring the parts of the human body, principally the skull, but also the features, the limbs, the genital organs, the stature, the diameter of the center of the buttocks, and so on (Maksudyan, 2005: 295).

Indeed, this endeavour began with the German project to discover ethnic origins through archaeological findings. According to these efforts, cultural continuity meant ethnic continuity. Consequently, anthropological racism was fortified by this pre-historical racism. The races were categorized as “wild”, “barbarian”, “civilized”, and “cultured”. The cultured race was believed to be the uppermost stage. High culture, good education, science, art, and economic infrastructure were the aims to be achieved by this race. (Aydın, 2002). Especially in the 1930s and 1940s, the state attempted to articulate racism in its official ideology and to impose some sanctions in Turkey. As a result, racism became an ideological element of the state’s politics and these politics included rhetoric aspiring to and encouraging genealogy. However, racism has never become the dominant element of official ideology (Arslan, 2008: 410).

There was a close connection between culture and civilization, which stimulated the quest for a civilized race. Turkey followed Germany example and chose anthropology and archaeology for historical studies instead of classical historiography. According to Ziya Gökalp, civilization was composed of positive science, techniques, and methods. In addition, a nation could reach the civilization stage but it had a unique culture that could not be changed. In this sense, according to Gökalp, the development of culture was the same as the process of becoming civilized (Aydın, 2002).

The anthropological studies were done by Australian and German scientists in the Ottoman period. When the University of Istanbul was founded in 1933, the Turkish Institute of Anthropology was first placed under the roof of the Faculty of Sciences, as a separate department of Anthropology. After the establishment of the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography at Ankara University in 1935, the Institute was then moved there, under the new name of the Turkish Institute for Anthropology and Ethnology. According to Kansu, who was a medical doctor working as an assistant in the Department of Internal Diseases at the University of Istanbul and one of the important writers of the *Turkish Review of Anthropology*,<sup>20</sup> anthropology was “the co-science” of the history and it deserved its position in Atatürk’s concern and auspices in the Turkish History Society and the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography. Besides this, anthropology had also played a main role in the Turkish History Thesis.

Nazan Maksudyan (2005: 293) points out the discriminatory tendencies of Turkish nationalism in defining national identity, or in other words, the non-civic, namely racist, side of Turkish nationalism. She emphasizes the significance of the interaction between the political elite and the scientific racist elite. She examines that the racist Turkish nationalism on the basis of the *Turkish Review of Anthropology* and the articles written by elite cadres, inspired by an ethnoracial ideology. It can be mentioned that the journal was published to demonstrate the myths about the Turkish race as truth, by using positivist methods of physical anthropology. Anthropology was considered to be a perfect tool to convey truths about the Turkish race that were no more than nationalist inventions in a scientific manner. For Maksudyan, the journal can also be seen as an official outlet of political power, because during the period from 1925 to 1950, the journal was published with the support of state authorities and it was impossible to undertake any sort of scientific activity without state approval.

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<sup>20</sup> *The Turkish Review of Anthropology* was a journal published between 1925 and 1939 by the Turkish Institute of Anthropology. The first issue of the journal appeared in October 1925. The journal was a publication of a state academy/university. Its research was supported by the government.

As Aydın (2002) states, all these endeavours were for the foundation of national science and national science laboratories. The Faculty of Language, History, and Geography received great support until World War II. The most comprehensive anthropometrical measurements were analyzed at this time. In 1937, a wide-ranging anthropological survey was carried out. Afet Inan stated that her study was the most important anthropological survey undertaken in Turkey. A total of 64,000 people from both sexes were measured by ten different working teams, the members of which were gathered from among civil and military doctors, medical servants, and teachers of physical education. It took six months to finish the study (quoted in Aydın, 2002). Maksudyan (2005: 293) notes three measurement methods used in that project: somatometry or anthropometry (the measurement and study of the human body and its parts), cephalometry (the measurement of the bones in the head of the living), and craniometry (the measurement of dry skulls after removal of their soft parts). The measuring techniques adopted were usually designed to determine unchanging racial characteristics of the Turkish people.

During the period extending from 1938 until World War II, the racist paradigm was reinforced and the purpose was not to prove the Turkishness of Anatolia. Rather, the purpose was to demonstrate “racial unity” based on national membership and corporatist solidarity of the people who inhabited the boundaries of Turkey. The inclination of racism also became obvious when the conference series of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), held between 1935 and 1945, are taken into consideration.

The annexation of Hatay, in 1939, can be considered as noteworthy example of the rising of a racist paradigm. After the annexation of Hatay, Agop Dilaçar, one of the important intellectuals of the Turkish Language Society, gave a speech titled “Alpine Race, Turkish Ethnie, and Hatay’s People” (*Alpin Irk, Türk Etnisi ve Hatay Halkı*), in the Iskenderun People’s House (*İskenderun Halkevi*) and declared that all people living in Hatay were racially Turks. He asserted that even though people in Hatay spoke a different language and were the members of different religious sect,

Alevism, the people had remained Turkish racially and genetically. Dilaçar argued against the Kemalist racism in his speech and rejected Ziya Gökalp's Turkism. Gökalp's idea that "every Turkified person is a Turk" was refutable for Dilaçar, and according to him it could only be corrected by stating that "any person with Turkish origin is a Turk". In this respect, he equated ethnic origin with culture. Therefore, the people of Hatay had to return to the Turkish culture because they were Turkish in origin. In an ethnic community, one of the qualifications, such as somatic, linguistic, or cultural, could be predominant, but if it was a somatic qualification it was based on racial essence. On the other hand, for Gökalp's Turkism, there was no ethnic origin in the community because the somatic element was neglected. Race is both a somatic and ethnic category since racial and cultural elements were mixed in community. What made Hatay "Turkish terrain" was the fact that the inhabitants dwelled on the territory in pre-historic times. In other words, it could be said that they were the proto-Turks of the region. Nevertheless, Hatay's Turks spoke Arabic as their "native" language; indeed, they were members of the Alpine race because their race did not have any relation to Semitic people (Aydın, 2003: 14-16).

Until the break out of World War II, many articles concerning eugenics and genetics were written. The anthropology of the 1930s, which spread out to the wider world, engendered a strong racist paradigm, but after World War II it declined. The reason why that anthropology declined was not only paradigmatic but also political. Şevket Aziz Kansu, one of the founders of the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography at Ankara University, was accused of being a communist. Instead of essentialist paradigms, universalist and anti-local approaches were chosen by intellectuals and university teachers who encouraged the field studies. It would bring about the discharging of these scientists. The defeat of Germany after World War II was also one of the important reasons for the decline of the racist paradigm (Maksudyan, 2007: 65).

In conclusion, it is clear that the history of anthropology in Turkey, especially in the 1930s, is the story of the racist/ethnic paradigm of this period. The close relation

between the state and universities gave rise to the formation of science. The shape of racist daydreams or mentalities overlapped with the endeavours of unifying the nation. The problem was not the inconsistencies or contradictions of theories. Rather, it was the attempts at legitimizing ethnicism with the support of pseudo-scientific studies.

### **2.3. Conclusion**

According to Smith (2004: 197), ethno-history is used for the re-invention of the common cultural and historical roots in order to become a nation. The history is also used selectively in order to forget some parts of history. The question of how the history of a locale or a region that is part of nation is narrated in national historiography can be significant for understanding the approaches of the state to its regions. This can enable us to grasp the distortions and interpretations of national history.

Cultural issues were handled by the Kemalist cadres in the Early Republican Period. The creation of the Turkish nation was meant to be the creation of a new modern individual. By the foundation of a nation-state, the social relations were changed alongside capitalist relations. In the formation of a nation-state with a multi-ethnic structure, the state aimed at national integrity. In this respect, national culture and national history were used for the construction of national identity but also for unifying people around the nation-state. Turkish nationalism in 1930s was considered to be meant for national integrity and consolidation of state power. In order to legitimize nation-state implementation and construct national identity, the disciplines of history, anthropology, archaeology were considered as tools for discovering the ethnic origin. By this re-invention, it would be possible to indicate that members of the nation shared common myths of ancestry and memories, elements of common culture, and some measure of solidarity. The efforts of Turkish Republic in the late of 1930s for the annexation of Hatay indicate the common Turkish origin of the Sanjak's Alawis. This pragmatic approach affected



historiography regarding the region. In the next chapter, the international factors which affected this historiography will be taken into consideration.

## CHAPTER 3

### HATAY IN THE TURKISH NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Hatay<sup>21</sup>, whose geo-political importance is commonly emphasized in the official Turkish history, is situated in the southernmost of Turkey. Until the end of World War I, the region was located as a country town (kaza) attached to the sanjak or sub-province of Aleppo. It became a marginal and quiet city during the last centuries of Ottoman Empire. The First World War accelerated the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Having lost the war, the Ottoman army began to withdraw its troops from the fronts. Shortly after signing the Moudros Armistice on 30 October 1918, the French army occupied Syria including Antioch as one of the three central towns of the region. The entrance of France into Alexandretta on 7 December 1918 marked the beginning of the twenty years of mandate rule of the French authority. In 1936, the Syria-France Friendship Treaty was signed, which was followed by the avowal of claims over the territory. As the problem of the region's future could not be solved, the issue was carried to the League of Nations in the precarious international environment. Accordingly, the Sanjak was given an autonomous status under the authority of Syrian government. It would be independent in its internal affairs, but dependent to Syria in its foreign affairs, finances, and customs. The Hatay parliament assembled on 2 September 1938 and decided for annexation of Hatay to Turkey. The process was completed on 23 June 1939 (Ada, 2005; Güçlü, 2001; Khoury, 1987; Özgen, 2005).

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<sup>21</sup> I preferred to use the terms "Hatay" and the "Sanjak of Alexandretta" or only "Sanjak" to refer the region interchangeably. However, it is important to bear in mind that the name of Hatay was given for attributing the Turkishness of the region by Mustafa Kemal in 1936.

Since the region became the contested territory after 1936, the political and diplomatic history of the Sanjak gained importance in the Turkish literature. Especially, in the nationalist historiography, the memories and the diplomatic victories of the ruling class had a great importance and other social groups in the society such as marabas (sharecroppers) were depicted as if they had sided with the Turkish leaders who struggled for liberation. Therefore, it is vital to take national, international, and local dynamics and their developments during this period into consideration, as well as the viewpoints of other social groups.

While studying the local history of any region, it is important to take the broader historical background of the region into consideration in order to grasp the overall picture in which the region's history is shaped. To consider the political, cultural, economic, social changes or transformations in the region can shed light on the historical process in a broader perspective. In this chapter, the focus will be on how the region's history is reflected in the Turkish nationalist historiography. Firstly, to examine the conditions in which the national historiography was shaped, the historical background of the "Hatay Issue" will be looked into generally. Then, the case of Hatay history as an example of local history will be examined extensively. To this end, in this chapter, firstly, the impact of the Wilsonian self-determination doctrine and the nationalist movements in the Middle East, specifically after the World War I, will be assessed in the historical and economic contexts. Secondly, how the history of the region was written by the nationalist history-writers in the annexation process and after the annexation of Hatay into Turkey will be elaborated. The answers to "Who were these history-writers?" and "What were the common characteristics in their texts?" will be sought in this chapter.

### **3.1. The Repercussions of the Wilsonian Principles in the Sanjak: Self-determination and Historiography**

In the nineteenth century, it can be claimed that two important changes caused the beginning of a new era that occurred in the world history: an expanding world

economy unlike any that had existed before and a political system characterized by nation-states. On the one hand, the modern period marks the emergence of an integrated world market, binding together nations in a global division of labour. On the other hand, a new form of political association –the nation state- appeared on the world stage for the first time. This political association also spread, and achieved primacy worldwide (Gelvin, 2005: 9). These twin systems affected economic, social and cultural, and political life everywhere in ways unprecedented in world history.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the question of how the Middle Eastern region would be controlled arose. Thus, the future of the political system in the Middle East became very ambiguous and proposals given by the Entente Powers were taken into consideration as an attempt to solve this ambiguity. These powers pretended to be supporting the inhabitants of the region under the “strenuous” conditions of the modern world, claiming that this would benefit the inhabitants of the region; however, the main purpose was to attain imperialist and colonialist interests over the region. Gelvin maintains that both the principle of self-determination and the mandate system helped to disguise all these aims and both of implementations contributed to re-produce the world system (2005: 184). Under these conditions, the question of what changed in the Middle East in general and in the Sanjak of Alexandretta or Hatay in particular is crucial.

To understand how the history of this region and its inhabitants was written, it is vital to bear in mind the nationalist movements that emerged in the region as well as the local and international dynamics that triggered these movements. This is why the role of the Wilsonian principles regarding the doctrine of “self-determination”, the secret treaties regarding the region signed by the Entente Powers and other alliances, the age of neo-colonialism and its relation with the mandate system, the process of construction of nation-states and also the history of nationalisms such as Turkish nationalism, Arab nationalism, Syrian nationalism and Egyptian nationalism in the territory became vital so as to figure out the relationship between the historiography of the region and the ideology of nationalism during this period.

With the complete change of the social and economic relations of the inhabitants of the Middle East during the nineteenth century, the effects on the region become even more tragic after The First World War. The new political order in the region gave rise to the creation of new states. At the beginning of the World War I, the Ottoman Empire had power in Anatolia, the Levant, Mesopotamia, Egypt, parts of the Arabian peninsula, and a small sliver of North Africa. However, this was only nominally not practically. By the early 1920s, the Asiatic Arab provinces of the empire had been divided. In addition, Egypt had evolved from being an Ottoman territory to a quasi-independent state, and much of the Arabian peninsula had been united under the control of the dynasty of ibn Saud (Gelvin, 2005: 172- 173). In other words, separations from the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of nation-states were important issues during this period.

While taking the war into consideration, it should be noted that the new states in the Middle East were created in two ways. In the Levant and Mesopotamia, the sites of present day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel were the states constructed by France and Britain through mandate system. Guided by their own interests and preconceptions, these great powers partitioned what had once been the Ottoman Empire and created states that before had never existed. Even though the inhabitants of these territories were given the opportunity to express their demands and needs, these were hardly taken into account when it came to deciding the political future of this region. In contrast, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt emerged as independent states due to the anti-imperialist struggle in Turkey, the *coup d'état* in Iran, the revolution in Egypt, and the conquest of Saudi Arabia. In each of these cases, the national myth recounting the deeds of a heroic leader or the founding fathers created a firmer foundation in the building of the new nations rather than like in the states created in the Levant and Mesopotamia (Gelvin, 2005: 175).

In addition to the emergence of new nation-states, the increasing nationalism in the region was another crucial issue, having an important impact on the everyday life of the people during that time. Nationalism was the ideological glue that bounded these

states together but in some cases challenged them. After the war, a variety of nationalist movements emerged in the territories previously controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Some of these movements were successful whereas others were not. To consider that the region of Middle East only encountered nationalism after the World War I is misleading because it is possible to claim that various other nationalist movements were seen before World War I. For instance, in the nineteenth century the Ottoman state tried to plant the notion of citizenship in the people of the regions it ruled. Therefore, many people in the empire started to view themselves as parts of expanded political communities of the Ottoman Empire, bounded together by shared experiences and distinguishing traits. This is what nationalism is all about. However, at the end of the World War One, Ottoman nationalism –*Osmanlılık*- was no longer an option. By the time the Ottoman Empire fell, a political framework that could have united the Arabs and the Turks, the two largest ethno-linguistic groups found within that region, no longer existed. Nor was there a commonly accepted political framework to unite the Arabs with one another. (Gelvin, 2005: 173) As a result, looking back at the Sancak of Alexandretta, it can be seen that various nationalisms spread throughout this region in the twentieth century, including ideologies of pan-Arabism, Kemalist nationalism, and Syrian nationalism, which encountered or clashed one another gradually after the Sanjak of Alexandretta was controlled by the French mandatory. Each of these nationalisms claimed the exclusive right to command the loyalty and obedience of the members. However, a struggle of power slowly turns into a struggle of identity. This was seen in this region. Therefore, a struggle of identities was gradually brought to the foreground.

### **3.1.1. The Role of Self-determination and The King-Crane Commission in the Sanjak**

Woodrow Wilson, a professor of Political Science as well as the President of the United States, enunciated the doctrine of self-determination, which was widely accepted as a sensible proposition for the solution of national and ethnic issues. Allowing people to decide their own future was the main idea according to this

principle . Jennings contradicted this by stating that people cannot decide until someone decides who these people are (quoted in Whelan, 1994: 99).

The question of how a variety of nationalisms emerged and spread in the region is related to the self-determination doctrine of the Wilsonian principles because it promoted the issues of “self”, “identity”, and “ethnicity”. Focusing on the doctrine of self-determination brought about the obsession regarding numbers which determined the majority of the population with the claim of a “distinct” territory. This was a solution to the chaos brought about by the results of the secret agreements made by the Entente Powers regarding the Middle East.

Starting from 1915, the Entente Powers began negotiating secret treaties that pledged mutual support for the territorial claims made by themselves or their would-be allies. As stated by Gelvin (2005: 177), “Entente Powers hoped to confirm those claims, attract their alliance outlying states such as Italy and Greece, and, as the war went on, keep the alliance intact by promising active combatants a pay-off at the close of hostilities” by these treaties.

Britain both initiated and signed the secret agreements, as well as made pledges to local or nationalist groupings to assure their support or at least quiescence. For example, the British offered to shelter Ibn Saud within a “veiled (secret) protectorate” provided that he would stay out of trouble. After the war, British diplomats signed contradictory treaties with different parties in order to be the dominant force in the Middle East. In 1915, the British were in touch with Sharif Husayn, an Arabian warlord based in Mecca. Husayn stated that he would discuss starting a revolt against the Ottoman Empire with his son, Amir Faysal. Husayn was to be paid with gold and guns and would be given the right to establish an ambiguously defined Arab “state or states” in the pre-dominantly territories of the Ottoman Empire by the British for his services. These negotiations led to the famous

Arab Revolt<sup>22</sup>, guided by the even more famous British Colonel T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). The revolt was guided by British military strategists because they thought it was useful to harass the Ottomans and compel them to over extend their forces. They also believed the revolt would shore up the right flank of a British army invading Ottoman territories from Egypt. The leaders of the revolt, believing the British, viewed it as a means to achieve Arab unity and independence from the Ottoman Empire.

In addition, Britain wanted the support of the United States as part of the Entente side. Thinking that Jews had a great deal of influence not only over the American president, Woodrow Wilson, but also within the Bolshevik movement, the British thought that they had the winning hand. It also wanted to keep Russia, which had just experienced a revolution, in the war. While these secret agreements and pledges set a number of diplomatic and political precedents, they were relatively ineffective in determining the post-war settlement for a number of reasons. First, the agreements were both ambiguous and mutually contradictory. The Palestinian Issue is a good example. According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a secret treaty done by the French with Britain, Syria was promised to France and at that time, Palestine was part of Syria. According the same agreement from the Russian point of view, this was simply the territory surrounding Jerusalem and Jerusalem was to be placed under international control. However, according to Sharif Husayn, Palestine was to be part of the Arab “state or states” with the exchange from the British government. It can be stated that all the secret treaties resulted in the conflict of who was to own or to govern these lands.

On the other side of the coin was the United States. The United States took up role of bringing peace and resolving the chaotic situation. When the United States entered

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<sup>22</sup> The Arab Revolt has a very broad place in both Turkish and Arab historiographies. To construct national identity, two sides use this event in order to arouse nationalist sentiments. In the Arab national historiography, The Arab Revolt is a part of their nations’ graceful past. On the other hand, the actors of the event are represented as betrayers in the Turkish historiography.



the war on the side of the Entente Powers, President Woodrow Wilson announced his intention to make his Fourteen Points the basis of a post-war peace. The American president Woodrow Wilson stated:

Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited of the balance of power; but every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims against rival states (quoted in Gelvin, 2005: 180-181).

On January 8th, 1918 President Wilson formulated the “Fourteen Points” which, at the end of the war, gave out immense moral influence upon the Allies during the peace negotiations. Point Twelve of the Fourteen points specifically dealt with the Ottoman Empire: “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are under Turkish rule should be assured and undoubted the security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of development.” (quoted in Güçlü, 2001: 53)

In the Fourteen Points, items of freedom of navigation on seas and free trade (as far as “possible”), were included with two other items that made European diplomats uncomfortable: the right of peoples to self-determination and an end to secret agreements. Indigenous nationalist leaders were particularly interested in Wilson’s call to end the secret agreements and wanted to be given the right of determining their own future. The British and French diplomats got more and more uncomfortable day by day of this but played along with Wilson the best they could while they came together in private. Nevertheless, when Wilson stated that his main aim was to bring peace in the area and nothing else, the representatives to the peace conference with the aim of ending the unrest in that area were attacked by Kurds, Arabs, Zionist, Armenians, and others, all demanding their right of self-determination (Gelvin, 2005: 180).

Getting together in Paris, the entente powers as peace negotiators attempted to solve the conflicting claims of their governments and to lay the foundations for the post-war era. The negotiators agreed to establish the League of Nations in an attempt to provide a place for resolving international disputes “peacefully”. Although this notion for the League of Nations is stated in Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, the United States did not join it as soon as it was created (Gelvin, 2005: 180). Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations done in Paris dealt with the region, establishing the so-called mandates system there:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequences of the last war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities of the performance of that trust should be embodied in the Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility....Certain communities for merely belonging to the Turkish Empire had reached a stage of development were their existence as independent states can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of assistance by a mandatory (power) until such time as they are able to stand alone, the wishes of the communities must be a principle consideration in the selection of the Mandatory (Güçlü, 2001: 342).

The American President Wilson himself did not precisely define what mandatory obligations would be involved. Nonetheless, in Article 22 the notion of self-determination was clearly stated in the clauses relating to the peoples of the Middle East. The League therefore obliged the mandatory powers to prepare these peoples for independence. Theoretically, the application of the mandate placed Syria under French tutelage in preparation for future independence. The mandate system, however, provided France with an opportunity to secure its strategic interests in the Levant while only talking about the widely publicized principle of self-determination. The mandate system was definitely not aimed to create new imperial possessions. Therefore, France acted like a colonial government supported by a

superior military power from the very beginning. (Güçlü, 2001: 54). The League of Nations had entrusted the territories of the Ottoman Empire to Britain and France so that the European states could prepare their changes for self-rule. Whatever the charter had said about “the sacred trust of civilization”, Britain and France accepted the mandates so that they could retain control over those areas in which they felt they were vitally interested in. This resulted in the mandatory powers dividing and combining territory into states to suit their own interests, without giving much thought to ensure that their mandates were both economically *and* politically viable. However, even though the right of self-determination seemed to be the resolution for peace in the Middle East; in fact, it would have been the precursor of the problem of “identity” among the communal groups which had not identified themselves by ethnicity.

As a result, what “self-determination” meant and what its consequences in the region can pave proper ways to understand the implicit feature of the doctrine. According to Whelan (1994: 99-100), the Wilsonian Principle of self-determination was founded from several ideas while trying to shape the modern world through a period of a few centuries. One was that the governing needed the consent of the governed to make its rule legitimate:

“One is that the legitimacy of rule is dependent upon the consent of the governed. Through the English, French and American Revolutions, the idea has achieved almost universal currency that the people are not subjects of the State, but are sovereign, and "can do their own state- making". Another is that of State sovereignty in international affairs, which arose as national kingdoms became consolidated in Europe and the feudal claims of Empire (and Papacy) were eroded. A third is the idea of ethnic nationalism, often exclusivist and irredentist, which threatened the great multinational empires of Europe in the nineteenth century, and aided their collapse in the twentieth”

Similarly, Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, remarked that self-determination simply stated the question of "self", and that claims must necessarily conflict resulting in a clash between the definitions of “self” in different regions:

“When the President talks about 'self-determination', what has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability.” The answer to the question of what “self” was seemed to be what expert commissions of ethnologists, geographers, and historians reported as the "facts" of "racial aspects, historic antecedents, and economic and commercial elements". Whelan agrees with Pomerance (1984: 19) that this definition did not even begin to answer the questions whether to adopt a territorial or an ethnographic criterion of the "self"; on the boundaries of areas and the identity of "races" or "communities"; and on the importance to be attributed to the factor of time and to historic claims (Whelan, 1994: 102).

David Makinson (1988: 69) points out the importance of the concepts of “people” and “minority” in a text of the doctrine. He mentioned about logical failures when he remarks that it would be "a confusion of thought to see the term 'people' as a simple opposite of 'minority', partitioning the domain of collectivities in two". In fact, the problem of identifying<sup>23</sup> peoples under the Wilsonian principle is not the complexity of differentiating between groups on the basis of language, culture, race, religion, and aspirations although necessary and will often be difficult and controversial; rather, it is a simple question of line-drawing. Depending on where the dividing line is drawn, an ethnic, religious or other community aspiring to nationhood can become either a "people", entitled to full self-government, or a minority, with only the minimal rights accorded to members of what was, in the Versailles scheme, a residual category (quoted in Whelan, 1984: 102-103). The uses of the concept of “people” did not refer to the members of a subordinate as left wing politics are linked with. Indeed, the concept of the “people” as a collective identity implies the identification of members of a nation rather than members of a class. Indeed, the ambiguity of the concept in the Wilsonian principles makes it possible to include the connotations of both ethnic and civic nationalism. With the rise of nationalism in the

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<sup>23</sup> The notion of a minority is relational. But whether or not a collectivity constitutes a "people" should be a qualitative question independent of the choice of any larger reference group (quoted in Whean, 1994: 102).

nineteenth and twentieth century, there were major changes in collective self-consciousness. For the sovereignty of the region, the hegemonic struggle between the rivalries who tried to prove that they were ancestors of the territory or the majority of the population caused the rise of nationalist movements. The numerical obsession came about among the contesting groups who wanted to demonstrate itself as the majority through “scientific data” with the Wilsonian principles.

It is significant to consider the history of Cilicia as a good example of the consequences of the Wilson’s principles as it paved the way for the usage of scientific methodologies. It is because the example of Cilicia can help to observe and compare with the historiography concerning Sanjak of Alexandretta despite differences. In the aftermath of World War I, France occupied Cilicia<sup>24</sup> and pledged for political autonomy of the majority of population.<sup>25</sup> In accordance with the Wilsonian principles, the lobbying activities of Turks and Armenians tried to persuade French occupiers that they formed the majority of the population. In this context, they began to use not only statistical data, but also physical anthropology, ethnography and linguistics to support these statistical data, which were used as a divider of the population along with ethnic and racial categories. Thus, this “numerical history” as a genre gained importance and was used as a strategy for determining the parameters of French imperialism. Sam Kaplan (2006: 19-45) analyzes this genre of historiography and the struggle between two sides. He emphasizes how the approaches and the methodologies changed in accordance with the change of the French policies concerning the region. The main aim for the Armenian and Turkish lobbies was to take control in the territory and all strategies, tactics and assertions regarding characteristics of the region were used to gain

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<sup>24</sup> France occupiers named Cilicia; ancient name of southern of Turkey that was included Ottoman provinces of Adana, Maraş and Antep. In this region, diverse ethnic communities were lived together.

<sup>25</sup> French occupied Cilicia after the Mudros Treaty on 30 October 1918. Because of the growing cost in money and blood, French had difficulties for establishing political order in the region. By the end of 1920, the French position in Cilicia become untenable and the difficulties derived from Turkish nationalists and conflicts in Syria has led to France for agreement. With the signing of the Ankara Agreement on 20 October 1921, the war between Turkey and France ceased. France ceded the region to Turkey two and a half years later (Güçlü, 2001).

victory. In this respect, it can be said that their approaches to the region's history, which was used to prove that they were the autochthonous community was pragmatist, essentialist and positivist. According to Kaplan, although the two lobbies used different semantic and pragmatic frameworks for strengthening their political thesis, both of them took into consideration their non-Western past by applying the French "universal" methodologies. While Armenian nationalists used physical anthropology and statistical data in order to legitimize their claims on the region, Turkish nationalists stressed on their linguistic and economic superiority (Kaplan, 2006: 24). It is worthy to note that Turkish side's assertions and the methods that they preferred for the campaign in Cilicia in 1920s changed with the signing of the Syria-France Friendship Treaty in June 1936 and the status of Sanjak of Alexandretta became a controversial issue between Turkey, Syria and France. By the late 1930s, as a way to achieve full power in this region, Turkey utilized different sciences compared to those had been used in 1920s in the attempt to prove that the majority in Sanjak were the Turks. As Armenian nationalists used the methods or disciplines for their claim on Cilicia, Turkish nationalists also used physical anthropology, geography, archaeology in order to re-write the history Sanjak. The approaches, campaigns, propagandas of Turkish nationalists for Cilicia and Sanjak require considering the political, diplomatic, social circumstances of the two regions in different times and the process of nation-state building in Turkey that affected the shaping of history-writing. On the other hand, when the future status of Sanjak occupied the political agenda of Turkey in 1930s, the main purpose of the Turkish nationalists was not only to demonstrate the majority of the Turks to the League of Nations, but also they attempted to gain popular consent through propaganda as well as bribery and coercion. Even though the numbers became a contested domain after the World War I, the French High Commissariat census results can be considered as the most reliable ones.

<b>Population of Alexandretta: Ethnic Distribution (Mid-1930s; numbers and percentages are approximate)</b>		
<i>Community</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>% of Total</i>
<i>Sunni Muslim Turcophones</i>	<b>85,000</b>	<b>38.3</b>
<i>Alawite and Ismaili Arabophones</i>	<b>62,000</b>	<b>27.9</b>
<i>Christian Armenians (all denominations)</i>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>11.3</b>
<i>Sunni Muslim Arabophones</i>	<b>22,000</b>	<b>10.0</b>
<i>Christian Arabophones( all denominations)</i>	<b>21,000</b>	<b>9.5</b>
<i>Sunni Muslim Kurds</i>	<b>5,000</b>	<b>2.2</b>
<i>Sunni Muslim Circassians</i>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>.7</b>
<i>Jewish Arabophones</i>	<b>500</b>	<b>.3</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>220,000</b>	

Source: Robert B. Satloff 1986. "Prelude to Conflict: Communal Independence in the Sanjak of Alexandretta 1920-1936", *Middle Eastern Studies*. No. 22.

According to this data, no majority of any ethnic or religious group in the Sanjak of Alexandretta was seen. For this reason, the Turkish side tried to get of support the other non-Turkish communities especially Arab- Alawites. The efforts to prove the Turkisness of the region and Alawites began with the irredentist claims of Turkey and for examining this aim it is crucial to consider the political and diplomatic history of the limitation of the Turco-Syrian borders encompassing the region.

Turkey accepted the status of Sanjak in the Lausanne Treaty, which left it outside of the national borders with a special administration. Turkey did not avow claims on this territory until signing of the Syria-France Friendship Treaty in June 1936. This treaty granted the release of Syria from the Mandate and the gradual establishment of an independent Syrian state after three years of transition period. French responsibilities regarding the status of the Sanjak were transferred to Syria. This immediately provoked Turkish reactions. The Turkish state, which until this time had not any irredentist tendency, began to affirm allegations regarding the future status of the Sanjak and mobilized operations at the diplomatic and international, national and local levels. Until the final annexation of the Sanjak by Turkey in 1939, the Turkish government and the press persistently manipulated the people and advocated racist theses proving the so-called 'Turkishness' of the region.

Turkey's objections to the Franco-Syrian treaty and its insistence on independence of the Sanjak initiated long negotiations between France and Turkey. The issue in the precarious international environment was carried to the League of Nations as well. The League of Nations sent a delegation of observers to Antioch to watch the events and prepare a report on the situation of the Sanjak. The delegation came to Antioch in October 1937. Accordingly, the Sanjak was given an autonomous status under the authority of Syrian government. It would be independent in its internal affair, but dependent to Syria in foreign affairs, finances, and customs. Turkey and France would be guarantors of the Sanjak's territorial integrity. France was feeling extremely threatened and its priority was about its security rather than the security of Syria which was anxious of Turkey is motivations to annex Hatay.

After the ratification of the draft constitution on 15 April 1938, a census began in preparation for the forthcoming elections. The constituencies were divided not along geographical but religious and ethnic lines as Turkish, Alawite, Arab, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Kurdish and other communities. The seats in the assembly were going to be allotted proportionately with the numbers registered for every community. Turkey increased its efforts in the region to secure as many people as possible to be registered as Turk. It employed various tactics to persuade people to register on its side. Through Turkish supporters, it disseminated a number of theses. For example, they persuaded Alawites by stating that they are the Eti Turks and they originally come from Hittites who were the first inhabitants of Anatolia, hence ethnically Turkish. They contacted Alawite villagers to convince them to register as Turk. They also talked to Alawite notables giving them Eti Turk ağa names and securing their loyalty. The notables did not refrain from coercing the peasants when they came across with resentment from them. The Turkish side was able to obtain a group of votes through this strategy (Özgen, 2005: 60-74).

On the other hand, If this table is compared with the number of registered for voting, it seems that only half of the population and less than forty percent of people from



other communities were registered. For Bandazian (1967: 127-128), the results of the registration were quite significant because it was clearly demonstrated that many people because of their dissatisfaction or disaffection or intimidation did not register. The following figures showing the population after the registration was completed at 1 August 1938 were released by the authorities:

<b>Turks</b>	<b>35,847</b>
<b>Alawite</b>	<b>11,319</b>
<b>Armenians</b>	<b>5,504</b>
<b>Greek Orthodox</b>	<b>2,098</b>
<b>Arabs</b>	<b>1,845</b>
<b>Miscellaneous</b>	<b>395</b>

Source: Walter C. Bandazian, 1967. "The Crisis of Alexandretta", unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, American University. p. 127.

In fact, the King Crane commission, making it an American Inquiry, had embodied the repercussion of the doctrine of self-determination in the Middle East. Before the mandate system was accepted, in the early 1919 the fate of the Ottoman Empire was discussed at the Paris Conference<sup>26</sup>. In the meantime, the King-Crane Commission<sup>27</sup> was established to ascertain the public opinion. The commission consisted of two Commissioners, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, and three advisers and a secretary-treasurer prepared reports after their journey to certain cities in the Near East (Bandazian, 1967: 19-20). In fact, the question of "self" or "identity" or "ethnicity" did not gain importance or gain mass support in the region as it is asserted in the nationalist historiography. Besides, the people were asked under

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<sup>26</sup> At the Paris Peace Conference, the negotiations which involved the Middle East were contingent upon a series of secret treaties, the Sykes Picot being of foremost importance, which was signed between France and Britain. According to this treaty, France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab state or a Confederation of Arab states and also Alexandretta shall be free port as regards the trade of the British Empire. However, because of the colonialism indulged in by Britain and France, these statements were not realised and after the war the negotiations began between Allied powers for the "peace" (Bandazian, 1967:11).

<sup>27</sup> At the Conference, the commission was proposed to be established for investigating the feeling of the indigenous populations. France and Britain began to hedge on the decision and refused to participate in the commission. However, Wilson decided that if France and Britain would not submit agents to participate in the work of the commission, then the United States would go it alone—as so it did; in April 15, 1919, Wilson instructed the Secretary of State to appoint H. D. King and Charles R. Crane as American representatives. The commission became known as the King-Crane Commission (Bandazian, 1967:19).

which nation-state or mandate they preferred to be administered. According to Captain William Yale, Technical advisor for the Northern Regions of Turkey in the commission, “in Alexandretta there was a fairly free expression of opinion, although the work of the French officials, particularly with the delegations from Antioch, appeared to have been thoroughly done, with memorized formulae about “Great France, the Mother of Civilization” and others. On the other hand, the commission received a telegram from representatives of Antioch, Harim, Alexandretta, Jisr and Eshouge by which they declared the oppression and intimidation of French Governors of their distinct through imprisonment, deportations and ill treatment. The polarization was mostly formed on either being supporters of the French mandate or not. For instance, a Greek Orthodox group was asked whether they supported a British or American mandate. The Turks, the largest single element in the Alexandretta, wanted union with Constantinople, and a “sane mandate” (Howard, 1963: 136).<sup>28</sup> In this respect, it can be said that instead of ethnic terms, the imagining of a national community can be seen more prominent in the region. In addition, according to Gelvin (1998: 34-35), while the Entente Powers had charged the commission with a simple fact-finding mission, its presence in Syria catalyzed a mobilization of the Syrian population that was unprecedented in scope. The nationalist elites prepared for the arrival of the commission and designed public meetings in order to present to an outside audience an image of a sophisticated nation eager for independence. However, the nationalist elites failed to integrate the majority of the population into their nationalist project. They never negotiated with the population about the ideology of the program; they never synthesized a political discourse that was compelling non-elites. They only tried to establish bond with their future compatriots in the other areas of the world. To sum up, the announcement of the formation of the King-Crane Commission and their visit of Syria started an unintended chain of events that culminated in the emergence of a popular nationalist

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<sup>28</sup> The commission suggested that the whole of Syria should be placed under one Mandatory Power “as natural way to secure real and efficient unity.” Even with the mosaic of various ethnic groups, “the people of Syria there, forced to get on together in some fashion.” However, the report of the commission was not made public and, in fact, the government of the United States did not print the official document until 1947 (Bandazian, 1967: 21-23).

movement dissociated from the direction of the Arab government and the nationalist elites. For Gelvin, Syria was converted as the myth of “Potemkin villages” goes through the hands of nationalist elites because the region was to be present to the members of the commission differently from the real conditions as the people there were taught what to say not taught to say what they really want (Watenpugh, 2006: 149-153).

Moreover, as Altuğ (2002: 65) claims, at the period of the arrival of the commission, instead of privileges of ethnic identities like “Arabness” or “Turkishness” over other identities, the local correspondences such as “Antiocheans” was mostly referred if the published memories taken into consideration (Altuğ, 2001: 66; Sökmen, 1978: 21). Therefore, privileging Turkish or Arab nationalism is to mis-present the motivations, experiences, and aspirations of the majority in this period. There was a reaction against the French imperialist occupation, which provided the cooperation of hostile groups or organizations. It can be claimed that the increasing politicization process and the idea of self-determination and French occupation had given rise to the “imagined nation” among Antiocheans prior to 1936 when the claim of Turkey concerning the region was not avowed yet. The nationalist ideology did not disseminate to the masses before 1936. In the next section, the agents of history-writers of the region will be focused on.

### **3.2. The History-writers: Kemalist Turkish Nationalists or Progressives**

“The national community is understood as the history of a self that comes to awareness, or of a people that begins to imagine its people-hood. History is written to describe the growing self-awareness of a collective subject. This imagination takes the form a gradually revealing of the collective subject to itself, a revelation shaped by those powers of communication, reason, and consciousness that define our understanding of an emergent self.”

Timothy Mitchell<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Timothy Mitchell. (2002) *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

“Writing history is as important as making history. It is an unchanging truth that if the writer does not remain true to the maker than history writing takes on a quality that will confuse humanity”

Mustafa Kemal

Keith D. Watenpaugh focused on the history-writers who were the new urban middle class in Aleppo from 1908 to 1946. He tried to examine the relation between “being modern” in the Middle East and the emergence of this new class consisting of civil servants, teachers, journalists, officers. According to him, history writing played a crucial role in the lives of the middle-class revealing the way of a particular manner of understanding the past fulfilling the emotional, ideological and practical needs of middle-class modernity (2006: 134-159). Similarly, the history-writing become very important among intellectual middle-class in the region. They tried to use the concepts of “Turkishness”, “Arabness”, “nationalism”, “nation” and “patriotism” in the newspapers and books. For scrutinizing the history of the region in the nationalist historiography, it is crucial to avoid taking into account merely the local history as a story of ethnic conflict or seclusion between Turkish and Arabist nationalists. Since, it prevents the understanding of the role of this class with the relationship of nationalist historiography, the context in which the Arab and Turkish nationalisms emanated and the process of politicisation of the radical groups.

The concept of a “nation as pedagogy”, suggested by Mitchell (2002: 183), refers to the endeavour to fix a version of past in the popular consciousness in didactic format but it does not mean that it is completed process. Understanding the struggle over the identities and how these struggles produce, reproduce and structure identities can be meaningful to consider that the identities are discursive and there is a dynamic process generated in the ongoing struggles between different groups and discourses. The representation of history is a vehicle to promote different ideologies because there is always a competition between different social groups to shape the perception of history. In other words, the past can be used as a tool for achieving political and social purposes and thus, the present knowledge of the past becomes a political resource because it helps to validate present behaviours. As a result, before unveiling

the hegemonic narratives of nationalist history, it is important to grasp the ways through which histories are socially constructed by different agents and the relationship between this construction and the ideological beliefs of these agents (Çetin, 2004: 347-349). In this section, firstly, the history-writers as agents and their memories, which play an important role in the creation, affirmation, and protection of cultural identity, will be introduced by taking notice of their class and ethnic backgrounds. Secondly, the texts of researchers who wrote books in order to prove Turkishness of the region and Alawis will be examined. Even though the history of Sancak in the Turkish national historiography is ostensibly represented as an “ended issue” during the period between the two world wars in which the border between Syria and Turkey was delimited, many publications and studies have already been published in order to legitimate the process of annexation and its implementations in fortifying hegemony in society. Bhabha (1994: 43) notes that hegemony requires iteration to be effective and to be productive of politicized population. In this sense, the reproduction of the nationalist discourse through the subsequent publications concerning the history of the region is important to reinforce the hegemony.

### **3.3. The Memories of “Hatay” Issue in the Nationalist History**

In general, many historians have assessed the Sanjak issue as the Franco-Turco-Syrian struggle of the late 1930s on a large-scale version of the domestic conflict. Moreover, as Sattloff (1986:147) claimed, for most of historians, Alexandretta is a code word for Arab-Turk animosity. On the other hand, if one avoids understanding this process from 1920 to 1939 as the ethnic domestic “inevitable” conflict, history can be viewed differently; i.e., it is not the story of the disintegration between ethnic groups merely, indeed; the fracture occurred along economic divisions within and between ethnic groups. According to Altuğ (2002) and Özgen (2005), instead of considering the history of the region as a conflict among ethnic groups, it is possible to divide the social groups such as notables, middle class and marabas (sharecroppers) or landless-peasants and to consider the historical process upon the continuity of the change of these groups. In so doing, through looking at the rivalry

and political fractions among notables or inter ethnic groups it is possible to abstain from viewing the region's history as the domestic conflict in line with Arab-Turk animosity. Although the nationalist historiography tends to adopt *a sui generis* approach towards "minorities" and to label the ethno-religious groups in accordance with the anti-Turk image, it is known that a priest of the Antioch Orthodox Christian became a member of the CUP (*The Committee of Union and Progress*) with some Christian notables of the city (Altuğ, 2002: 31-32). In this sense, to think that the members of the CUP in the Sanjak were made up of only pure Turks gives rise to consider the history of region in line with the rivalry among ethnic groups. In contrast, the politicisation process was portrayed as along the axis of ethnic lines in the nationalist historiography. Thus, it can be more significant to look the inception of division of notables in the region.

The trace of division among notables can be observable after the Ottoman efforts of modernization because the policy of centralization of the Ottoman government resulted in the sedentarization of nomadic Turkmen tribes in the Amik Plain. Before sedentarization, the region was used alternatively as a winter camp for long-range Turkmen nomads who controlled the area, and by Kurdish mixed farming mountain groups who planted in some of the plains for the summer harvests under sharecropping arrangements with the Turkmen. However, the land registration by the Ottoman government in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in the transformation of high-ranking families into capitalist farmers and the impoverishment of the lower ranking families of the tribal groups, who were evicted from their lands and their reduction to wage labour in the cotton fields or urban centres or sharecroppers. The registration of land titles in the names of clan heads of the Turkmen very quickly resulted in a landowner-peasant class division and a creation of rural Turkmen elite (Aswad, 1968). After the World War I, the price of wheat increased and these notables became warlords who dwelt in the countryside and were known as the Amik Begs. On the other hand, there was another notable group known as "urban notables" residing in Antioch. They had land in the countryside, but they also visited lands only for collecting harvest or controlling the production. Their clients were

merchants, artisans, religious minorities and *sufi* orders, but most significantly the Sunni *ulama*. Being modern and educated, in other words, possessing cultural capital was seemed as being urban notables. As Altuğ (2002) states, Turkmen Begs were not acknowledged completely as a cultured members of the notables' classes in Antioch. Their lack of urban culture and its requirements prevented them to be urban class. Ahmet Faik Türkmen<sup>30</sup> makes a distinction between notables: the first nobles were the urban notables and the second were the rural ones. According to Yerasimos (2000: 178), the distinction between Sunni Turk notables came out after the 1908 Revolution and the 1909 and 1915 Armenian massacres respectively. The political fraction among notables became apparent after the advance of the CUP and the 31 March Incident. The traditional urban elites increasingly turned against the CUP and eventually established the Party of Freedom and Accord (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*). The rural notables consisted of more moderate, middle class notables who gained power against the traditional elites by establishing a branch office of the CUP in Antioch (Özgen, 2005: 63). On the other hand, according to A. Faik Türkmen, although this division was derived from different ideological approaches, it was actually a result of rivalry and hostility among them (1939: 916). While this hostility was continuing, the French occupation affected the relations between these two groups apparently. The uneasiness or disturbance in the region began to transform gradually into ethnic and nationalist idioms. In other words, the new middle class who was disturbed by the existing system began to be politicised.

By the 1930s, it can be claimed that the new middle class had emerged. Its wealth and social power was not derived from land or affiliation with local administration but, rather from their cultural capital. Robert Satloff describes the emergence of new class in the following:

“During those years (mandate years), the Sanjak did have a history, a history marked by the evolutionary disintegration of the inter-ethnic

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<sup>30</sup> Ahmet Faik Türkmen was one of the important politic figures in 1930s. His book of “Mufassal Hatay” was published in 1937 and gave information about the geographic, historic, ethnographic, linguistic structure of the region. In four volumes, he sought to display the Turkishness of the region. His observation with the sociological analysis is taken place in the book. As at the below it can be seen, Türkmen is examined as one of the history-writers in this thesis.

coalition. But even then, the evolution did not fracture along ethnic lines, but along economic divisions within ethnic groups. Prosperity fostered the growth of new classes of financially secure artisans and modern-educated youth dissatisfied with the appointment of political power. At first, elite was able to thwart any serious effort at reform, such as attempt to found carpenters' cooperative in 1928. But by the early 1930s, a depressed economy catalysed the growth of popular disenchantment and exacerbated *intra*-communal divisions. Both the Turcophone and Arabophone communities fragmented into groups in defence and in oppositions to the *status quo*. Progressive Turks, opposed to the Ottoman style of local Turkish *aghas*, found patronage in Kemalist Turkey; progressive Arabs, opposed to accommodationist policies of local chieftians, looked to the Damascene nationalists for support. But the Sanjak's troubles still did not collapse into *inter*-communal violence. Insurgents within both major linguistic groups comprised only a small fraction of the Sanjak's total population"(1986: 147-148).

Even though Satloff claims that domestic peace was derived from economic prosperity from 1925 to 1936, it was an optimistic approach. He adds that the ethnic division of labour and consumption provided this peaceful coexistence. As Altuğ stated, "...in the mid-1930s, with the gradual ascendance in Turkish nationalism in the city, ethnic division of labour commenced to weaken throughout the penetration of different communities in diverse forms of craft." In this period, numerous newspapers and magazines were published in the Sanjak. The young clubs such as pro-Turkish Genç Spor Klübü (Young Sport Club), libraries, the new syndicates paved the way for politicization in the city. During this process, this new class of elites whose wealth based on liberal professions was unemployed.

In general, the new modern-educated youth and their aspirations regarding the rightful political and economical distribution brought about intra-communal divisions and inter-generational conflicts. Following the 1929's economic depression, the public sector contracted and the possibility of a feasible solution for unemployment become bleaker. Moreover, this new generation spent most of their time in the new coffee houses, libraries and clubs. Although nationalist ideologies in variant versions were the references that shaped their political stances, it can



certainly not be said that their founding principle of thinking was based on ethnic nationalism. The dichotomies of being modern or traditional, possessing urban culture or lacking of it, to be educated or uneducated transformed into the ethnic idioms gradually after 1936. Two important oppositions were palpable for the Turkish Kemalist nationalists. Most of the nationalist history writers were among these groups and they were nearly had similar social and ethnic backgrounds.

Before dealing with the texts, it is important to mention from the nationalist history writers. In the process of annexation, Kemalist nationalists had crucial roles and some of them, who were the members of the Hatay assembly and journalists of the pro-Turkish newspapers, became the writers of the history. In other words, the makers of the history as bureaucrats of the Hatay state were also the writers of the region's history. Their memoirs or autobiographies have helped to shape the Hatay's history in the nationalist history as a primary source but it does not mean that all historians assessed these materials uncritically.<sup>31</sup> The writers of such books are Tayfur Sökmen<sup>32</sup>, Abdurrahman Melek<sup>33</sup>, Ahmet Faik Türkmen<sup>34</sup>, Selim Çelenk<sup>35</sup>, Nuri Konuralp<sup>36</sup>, Hamdi Selçuk<sup>37</sup>, Kemal Sülker<sup>38</sup>, İbrahim Necdet Göker and Remzi

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<sup>31</sup> Güçlü (2001) and Yerasimos (2000) were the historians who examine the process without neglecting local dynamics or internal developments. They make inferences according to these memoirs. However, it is also open to question the reliability of the information obtained from these memoirs. In other words, to approach these materials critically can pave the way to examine the characteristics of nationalist historiography and to understand the process with light of social history for abstaining from political and diplomatic history of the region.

<sup>32</sup> Tayfur Sökmen was the president of the Hatay Republic which existed from September 7, 1938 to June 29, 1939. His book's title is "*Hatay'ın Kurtuluşu İçin Harcanan Çabalar*"

<sup>33</sup> Abdurrahman Melek was the prime minister of the Hatay Republic. He graduated from the Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University. Before the annexation, he was the header of the *Hatay Erginlik Cemiyeti* at the branch office in Istanbul. After the annexation, he was the member of the Turkish National Assembly as a Hatay deputy. His book's title is "*Hatay Nasıl Kurtuldu*"

<sup>34</sup> Ahmet Faik Türkmen was the Minister of Education of the Hatay Republic. Before annexation his book of "Mufassal Hatay" was published and the book has been used as the most cited primary resource.

<sup>35</sup> Selim Çelenk was the journalist at the Yenigün, pro-Turkish newspaper. When the Yenigün censored by the French Mandate in 1938, the newspaper was closed and he began to work at Atayolu Newspaper. After the annexation he became mayor at Antakya Manucipality in 1946. His book's title is "*Hatay'ın Kurtuluş Mücadelesi Anıları*"

<sup>36</sup> Nuri Aydın Konuralp was the member of the Hatay Assembly. He participated in the *çete* activities before the mandate regime. After the annexation, although he was nominated a candidate for Turkish Parliament, he was not elected. His book's title is "*Hatay Kurtuluş ve Kurtuluş Mücadelesi Tarihi*"

Siliöz<sup>39</sup>. However, writers were not solely these men as the pro-Turkish newspaper of Yenigün's journalists and columnists were involved in these groups. In general, Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Society), some of them revealed by the local publications, published some of these memoirs. Moreover, these history-writers were nearly had similar social backgrounds.

If one takes into consideration the region's history and the published materials, it can be seen that certain plots are selected. The choices of what to include and work up in these historical reconstructions need to be interrogated for the significance of what is absent as well as present in their narratives. The questions of whose voices and whose views are privileged in this version of historical telling and whose voices and whose views are casted to the margins are crucial while examining how the nationalist history is written and re-written. In their writings, the elitist and nationalist tone is noteworthy. It can be observable if how they viewed the lower classes and the rural population is questioned. According to Altuğ, their elitist discourses are manifested through the hierarchy created on the basis of class and the urban-rural difference (2006: 21). For instance, the depictions of peasants and minorities in the memoirs reveal the Turkish writer's view of points. In the following section, which plots were chosen and why they were chosen will be examined.

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<sup>37</sup> Hamdi Selçuk the member of the Hatay Assembly. As the other members, he also participated in the çete activities with Tayfur Sökmen. His book's title is "*Hatay'ın O Günleri*"

<sup>38</sup> Kemal Sülker was the journalist and columnist in the Yenigün newspaper. His memories was published in some journals. His book's title is "*Anılara Yolculuk.*"

<sup>39</sup> Remzi Siliöz was the teacher in Sanjak and also his some articles were published in the Yenigün. His book's title is "*Hatay İli Milli Mücadele Yılları*"

### 3.3.1. Irregular Bands in the Construction of National-identity

The irregular bands<sup>40</sup> take an important place in the national historiography and their activities were used as an ideological requirement. In other words, the aim is to present how the nation was liberated in spite of the traitorous endeavours of the external and internal enemies. As mentioned before, it is no doubt that the heroic plots were chosen as a way to help the construction the Turkish national identity. These irregular bands are portrayed as if they were regular bands who were gathered for the aim of a nationalist struggle. On the other hand, as Yetkin (2003: 13) indicates, irregular band has not a certain ideological framework or organizational form. This band is deprived of taking place in a revolutionist action and cannot even be assessed as dissidents politically. Instead, they can be considered as some peasants who refused to be subordinated. On the other hand, the çetes in Antioch were organized in order to fight against the French occupation. In this process, Tayfur Sökmen, the first and last president of Hatay Republic, was the leader of such local militia powers.

Tayfur Sökmen's book, "*Hatay'ın Kurtuluşu İçin Harcanan Çabalar*", is a kind of oral history or interview because, as stated at the preface of the book, his memories were collected by type-recorder by Arı İnan, the secretary of the Turkish History Society. Even though the information about events in the region in this process, the relationship between Turkish nationalists in the Sanjak and Kemalists in the Turkey and the power relations among notable families, which were the landowners or merchants, are attainable through his memories, some of which are selected to highlight the nationalist sentiments. Narration is the feature of the autobiographical texts, in this sense; while attempting to examine these texts, it is important to remember the social context because it is impossible to ignore the subjectivity of the narrator. However, which events were selected and how he narrated the process is important to understand how the Hatay history was formed in the national

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<sup>40</sup> The term of "irregular bands" is used for describing "armed troops" which did not have any ideological standpoint in the thesis.

historiography. Sökmen's state-centered approach can be perceived throughout his book entirety. Just as the other writers of the period, Sökmen also divides the history of Hatay in two stages as "armed struggle period" and "unarmed struggle period". The armed struggle period or as Abdurraman Melek called "the anarchy period" or the *çete* activities were depicted in the first stage of the struggle. As Altuğ (2002: 48) states, the activities of irregular bands were represented organized forms of a nationalist awaken in Sökmen's memoirs and like Sökmen, all other politicians and pro-Turkish journalists wrote their memoirs and mentioned about the activities of irregular bands which provided an instrument for the construction of national identity. The heroes or the leaders of these *çetes*<sup>41</sup> who struggled for "independence" of the region, which is Turkish are entirely depicted as nationalist figures. According to Tekeli (1998: 110-118), the "othering" is one of the inevitable aspects of the national historiography. The new subject of the history is not the dynasties and the heroes; instead, the masses. This subject is depicted through and against the depiction of "other": Turkish people and "Armenians", "Arabs", "Christians" and even the Turkish betrayers who has Turkish origin but took place in the Arab Revolt. The construction of the identity and thus, being "us" and "the other" require a social process that is dependent to the creation prejudice regarding the other or others. To sum up, the period from the occupation of the French powers to Ankara Agreement, so called "Anarchy Period", was the fertile ground for pointing out the "others".

The Armenians, who emigrated from Cilicia to the Sanjak, and then the Arabs were mainly represented as "other" or anti-Turk image in the national historiography. For instance, the narration of the attack of the immigrated Armenians to the Turkish villages for revenge was taken place nearly in all memoirs. Ahmet Faik Türkmen wrote this incident as: "When the Armenian, who saw Turks as enemy, came to Antioch, they did not hesitate to run wild. After creating troubles without reason, they went into the villages and pillaged." The incident was also told by Şerif, who

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<sup>41</sup> The *çetes*', which can be described as irregular, local, armed organizations against the French occupation, struggle are examined elaborately by Altuğ (2002: 36-38). Altuğ points out that the Turkish description of these irregular forces is highly charged with ethnic and nationalist connotations.

was the mayor of the Yayladağ, and his father was the head of the People House (Halkevi) in their town before the annexation:

“Fransızların buraya gelişinde Kesepliler, Ermeniler, arkadan gelmişler. Bizimkiler de bu Fransızlar geliyor diye kaçmışlar sağa sola. Kimisi namusumuza dokunur korkusu kimisine. Vururlar öldürürler gibi. Kaçmışlar etrafa. Kesepliler buradan Fransızlar çıkar çıkmaz burayı yakmışlar Ordu’yu, Ordu buranın eski adı. Burayı yakmışlar. Dönmüşler, gelmişler bizimkiler, bakmışlarki herkesin evi yanmış. Siz misiniz burayı yakan, bizimkiler de gitmişler Kesep’i yakmışlar. O zamanın olayları bunlar.”<sup>42</sup>

Şerif’s expression was in harmony with Ahmet Faik’s but the reaction to this attack of the Turks was absent because it was also important to emphasize the downtrodden Turkish peasants under the French rule. Hamdi Selçuk wrote the same event in the same manner (1972: 46). It is noteworthy that Şerif told this event proudly. The emphasis on ethnic identities, like Armenians and Turks, are the main traits of the nationalist history. Akyol (2006: 84) states that if the idea that “national ideas are based on the differences between separate groups” is considered, the Turkish identity is important for inhabitants to identify themselves. To express the ethnic identity and to stress the role that their ancestors played in the decision to join Turkey. Therefore, the separation itself from the minorities based on ethnic origins gives clues about how the history-writers and interviewees placed themselves in the society. The çete activities and the joining of these activities have a role in the construction of national identity.

The period of çetes was especially important to consider about the function of “Arab Revolt” and “betrayer Arab” image in the construction of Turkish national identity. The clashes of the Arab and Turkish historiographies were observable clearly while conveying the same events. For instance, the Arab revolt was presented as the starting point of “national awakening” in the Arab and Turk nationalist historiographies.

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<sup>42</sup> Şerif, interview by author, tape-recording, 5 October 2008, Yayladağ.

### 3.3.2. Arab Revolt, Ibrahim Hananu and Turkish Nationalist Historiography

Most of the memoirs of Kemalist-Turkish nationalists began with the narration of the Arab revolt and the act of Ibrahim Hananu<sup>43</sup>. A much recent Syrian nationalist historiography considers Ibrahim Hananu's rebellion as the first of broader serious of coordinated revolts against the French occupation of the emerging the Syrian nation-state. The works concerning the Hananu's revolt tried to present an early and centrally organized "Syrian" resistance to the French occupation. In the end, the later apotheosis of Hananu as a premier Syrian nationalist fulfils the political needs of a later period rather than the realities of the 1920's and has no basis in historical facts. Rather than being a "Syrian" rebellion, Hananu's revolt was tied into the larger trans-Eastern Mediterranean resistance against European imperialism and the broader struggle to rebuild the Ottoman Empire. The differences of the portrayal of Hananu in the national historiography are noteworthy to observe how some politic figures were used for the distortion of facts (Watenpaugh, 2006: 174). In other words, whereas Hananu symbolizes the leader of the nationalist movement in the Syrian historiography, he takes place as an anti-Turk in the Hatay history. Hamdi Selçuk's words about Hananu can be good example of anti-Turk image thus, to understand how nationalists selected to emphasis the fair rule of the Turks: "Ibrahim Hananu, whose origin was Arab and the leader of Arabs, did not accept cooperation with French. He participated in our second army crops. Afterwards he went to Aleppo. He was arrested by the French and sentenced to death." (Selçuk, 1972: 55) According to Tayfur Sökmen, who was çete leader in this period, Hananu felt ashamed because of the occupation of French powers in this region and then, he broke the affiliation with the Faisal's movement (Sökmen, 1978: 41). Hananu appeared as an Arab nationalist and emphasized his ethnic origin wrongly in the Turkish nationalists' memoirs, but

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<sup>43</sup> Ibrahim Hananu was born in Kafr Turharim near Harim in 1879. The young Ibrahim attended the local Qur'an school until his family sent him to the imperial high school in Aleppo. He continued his studies at administration and education at the Mülkiye in Istanbul. Upon graduation he briefly taught at the military academy. While still a student in the mid-1890s, he joined the CUP. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, he left Istanbul and served as a mayor of a sub-province of the province of Diyarbakır. At the time of British occupation, he was Harim's representative at the Syrian Congress of 1919 and served a secretary to the governor of Aleppo and after a while later he resigned both positions (Watenpaugh, 2006:175).

the more critical point in these texts was why Hananu was depicted such a manner. Mostly Hananu was mentioned with an incident in Antioch. When Hananu arrived to declare the establishment of the Arab government in Antioch, his reaction to the taking off of Turkish flag was narrated by Hamdi Selçuk as follows:

“When Arab nationalists got news about the withdrawing of the Turkish troops from Antioch, they moved in the city by the leading of Arab Ibrahim Hananu and Ibrahim Ethem. There was a crowd and people were carrying Arab flags in their hands. While they were walking they saw a flied Turkish flag on the balcony of a school. A hoca shouted that: “This rag was still flying here! Take off it!” Although Hananu was the enemy of Turks, he reprehended the hoca: “This is not rag. It is a flag under which the Islam world lived and the crescent on the flag symbolizes Islam.”(1972: 44-45)

According to Akyol (2008: 39), this event was taken place in the memoirs in order to emphasize on the fairness of Turkish rule. On the other hand, Hananu, can be considered as an Islamic modernist, which can also be an interference on this event. According to him, the Arab revolt was an alternative of Ottoman-Anatolian resistance. Therefore, his revolt can be interpreted as a sideshow in the resistance against the French occupation. There is no evidence –either in contemporary archival sources or in Aleppine newspapers or journals– that Hananu had any relationship with Faisal prior to the British occupation, or that he ever joined al-Fatat, the secret Arab nationalist organization; rather, his education and professional trajectory place him squarely in the empires middle managements of bureaucrats and officers- a consummate of a “New Man.” On the other hand, after the Ankara Agreement, France recognized a boundary between “Syria” and “Turkey” and then, France and Turkey agreed on a ceasefire. Even though Hananu continued to struggle for the expulsion of the French and the re-assertion of Muslim political dominance, he can be considered as a Syrian nationalist not pan-Arabist (Watenpaugh, 2006: 179-182). In 1919, Hananu organized a regional Committee of Defence, which coincided with the arrival of information about Sivas Congress but it does not mean that there was a link between this congress and his new organization. Instead, it can be claimed that the Hananu’s organization existed at the same time. Like the other post-war Ottoman committees, he planned military and administrative activities. He considered that this organization was connected to other committees, which emerged in areas

territorially adjacent. Therefore, he modelled this kind of organization like the form of organizations in Cilicia and the Upper-Euphrates simultaneously. Additionally, he established local municipal councils and installed military bureaucrats in positions of leadership in the areas conquered from the French. In this sense, his organization can be associated with Ottoman military-bureaucratic administration. Even though there is no evidence for the opposition of Hananu's organization to the Faisal government, he has been presented as a collaborationist of Faisal in the published materials. On the contrary, because of lacking the linkage with Sivas Congress, his actions were seen ambiguous. The Turkish and Arab nationalists as ideological aims in their historiography used this circumstance. For instance, as mentioned earlier, in addition to the presentation of fair Turkish rule, the memoirs of Turks regarding him were used for the creation of the "other". In the national history, the reasons of failure are explained by the tricks of the other and it is important to highlight on the "ourselves" which constructed the "other". For instance, Ahmet Faik Türkmen (1939: 930-31) put into writing an incident that pointed out a trick of Hananu and its result. Before English troops came to Antioch on December 3, 1919, a Turkish battalion under the command of Mustafa Kemal departed to support the corps in the city. Türkmen claims that when Turkish people in the Sanjak heard the coming of the Turkish military, they went to the bridge for the welcoming ceremony. Even though Hananu attempted to prevent this meeting, the *Turkish people* gathered. When the troop was seen, Hananu said to the commander of the troop "Sir, unfortunately, you are late. An Arab government has been declared and these people on the bridge have gathered to attack you. In order to prevent the violence, return please." The troop was withdrawn." As a result, for Turkmen, "Turkish people" were forced to be ruled as a slave under the mandate regime because of his trick. They had an opportunity for the salvation, but it was hindered by Hananu.

To sum up, the description and the role of Hananu was important to create the "other" as an ideological necessity in the national history as well as to demonstrate the fair rule of the Turkish administration from the inception of çete activities in this region. Watenpaugh (2006: 182, 184) indicates that while taking into account the



popular Syrian/Arab nationalism the historians tend to explain through ascribing a violent opposition to British and French colonialisms which were seen as a foremost role in the awakening of identity –nationalist, Syrian, Arab, Turkish or otherwise. However, this kind of approach gives rise to ignore the continuing place of complex transformations of class, forms of thought, and styles of politics in the late nineteenth century Ottoman society. Moreover, it causes to deny the very agency of their subjects, reducing them to one-dimensional, vaguely romantic who fought against Western imperialism and whose ideologies, worldviews appeared out of nothing (*ex nihilo*) in the interwar period. Therefore, the çete activities and the cooperation between Hananu and Turkish çetes against French imperialism can be conceived as the mutual aid among the rivalry groups for achieving the common aim. However, this approach confines the process as the struggle between nationalisms in this region.

### 3.3.3. Hatay Issue, “Renaissance of the Science” and The Sanjak’s Alawis

“Some canonists claimed that the people of Nusayra Mountain were devoted to the sun, the moon, stars, stones, and trees. They said that these people adopted the rebellion as a trait on their mountain. They could not get rid of some habits such as pillaging, murdering, stealing, and rebelling against modern world since the term of Phoenicians. Some of the canonists thought that their gods belonged to the term of pre-deluge...Nusairis and the people who interested in their past were resuming to ask who they are.”<sup>44</sup> (Et-Tavil, 2000: 304)

Ibrahim Hakkı Akyol (1943c: 247- 276) suggests that Turkish Republic Era in Turkey can be called as “Renaissance of the Science.” (quoted in Özkan, 2002:165) The relationship between politics and sciences or power and knowledge gives way to unveil the hegemonic power gained through the nationalist historiography and how sciences were used as tools in the national and international politic process especially in the early Turkish Republic. In addition to the memoirs of Turkish nationalists, the

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<sup>44</sup> “Kimi fakihler Nusayra dağı halkının güneşe, aya, yıldızlara, taşlara, ağaçlara taptığını söyledi! Dört bin yıldır yaşadığı dağda isyanı şiar edindiğini, Fenikelilerden beri yağmalama, öldürme, başkasının malını helal görme ve uygar dünyaya başkaldırma özelliklerini değiştirmedini söylediler. Kimileri de Fenikelilerin de öncesine, yani Tufan öncesine dayanan Tanrıları olduğunu düşündü...Nusayriler ve ne olduklarını merak edenler soru sormayı sürdürüyordu...”

“numerical” or “scientific” history was written after 1936. In other words, two kinds of historical knowledge were produced after this period: one of them is political-diplomatic history of the region as a plot and the second is a genre, which tries to prove the Turkishness of the region and Alawites through geography, anthropology, and ethnology. Yet, this process gives clues regarding how the territory was imagined as a nation. The geographical future of the Sanjak was taken place in Ahmet Faik Turkmen’s book of “*Mufassal Hatay*” (A Detailed History of Hatay). Nureddin Ardiç wrote the archaeological history of the region entitled “*Antakya-İskenderun Etrafındaki Türk Davasının Esasları*” and he claims that although Turkish dominance over the region was asserted, the proofs were not announced. His book was written for achieving this aim (Ardiç, 1937: 3-4). “Mufassal Hatay” was crucial to understand how a “space” is transformed into “place” with the contribution of the discipline of geography. In other words, in order prove the Turkishness of the region, the physical and demographical similarities between Anatolia and Sanjak was stressed. Besides, through the linkage between economic structure and geographical conditions, the reason of economic underdevelopment of the Sanjak was presented as being out of the motherland (Turkey). In so doing, the acquisition of the Sanjak territory was sought to be legitimized and stimulated through the discourse of geographic losses. By the foundation of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara University in 1935, many articles and book were released. From 1920 to 1938, the nationalist tone became more noticeable through the contribution of Turkish History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory in the Turkish historiography. It is palpable that this pragmatist approach gave rise to use history and to assert the ancestors of Alawites in the region also were Eti Turk like the other Sunni Turks. From Tayfur Sökmen (1978: 45) memoirs, the state’s pragmatist approach can be realized. He claimed how he had obtained this proof regarding the Turkishness of Alawis at below:

Moda caddesinde Aga Bey sokak 9 numarada ikamet eden Necip Asım Bey’le, Kilisli hemserisi dostum Avukat Resit Bey aracılığı ile yaptığım temasta durumu anlatınca; bana ilk sözü su oldu, "Anan, bacın, kızın var mı?" Bu soru karşısında hayretle Resit Bey’in yüzüne baktım. Bunu gören tarihçi Necip Asım Bey "Hayretle bakmakta haklısın, çünkü; benden istediğin tarihi bilgi ve vesika ile sana sordugum sual baska görülüyorsa da istediğin bilgi benim sualimin muhtevasıdır. Zira kız alıp

vermezsiniz, camilerine gitmez, caminize sokmazsınız; kestigi eti yemez, Alevi, Fellah diye tahkir edersiniz, sonra da kalkıp tarihi vesika istersiniz. Iptida (önce) siz simdiye kadar tatbik etmediginiz insanı muameleyi tatbik edin, sonra ben size tarihi vesika vereyim" dedi. Cevaben; "Beyanatınız tamamen bir hakikattır. Atatürk vatandaşlar arasında devam edegelen ve cereyan eden bu fena duruma son verecektir. Lütfen tarihi vesikayı verin" dedim.

The effort of proving the Turkishness of Alawis was a strategy of a campaign in order to gain consent of Alawi communities and in this period until the annexation of Sanjak to Turkey, Alawi community was praised through both the printed media and oral propaganda. Additionally, this elitist view of the Turkish nationalist history writers was observable apparently from the Ahmet Faik's book. After mentioning the distinction between notables as "Amik Beys" and "urban notables", he stated the advantages and disadvantages of these circumstances. According to him, firstly, these Sunni Turks notables due to this struggle of notables became more energetic and brave than the other minorities. Secondly, they were more intellectual and experienced than the others because they attained a political and social power as a monopoly in the public sphere. On the other hand, while Alawi sharecroppers, Orthodox Christian and Armenian merchants and artisans cooperated, Sunni Turk notables failed to unite because of internal conflicts (1939: 906). Additionally, according to him, the reasons of why some Alawi sharecroppers sided on Arabists were their ignorance and poverty. On the other hand, the approach of Remzi Siliöz to the Alawi peasants was more romantic and was in accordance with the peasantry discourse. The emphasis was on their Turkishness: "Turkey, which is developing and growing day after day and adapting technological developments, and a land next to Turkey, which is enslaved. It is the picture of being free and enslaved. I wandered through Antioch's villages. I talked with the peasants. Turkish women were working with their men who I saw. They were speaking Turkish beautifully and purely... The villages' women were very beautiful and strong in their traditional dress...They are not different from their fellowships in Turkey in the way of their dressing and life styles. Antiocheans are intelligent, clear-headed and brave like every Turk..."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>"Her gün büyük bir hamle ile ilerleyen, teknikleşen büyük Türkiye ile, yanı başında yaşama şartlarını kaybetmekte olan esir yurd. İşte hür ve esir yaşamının iki ayrı tablosu...Antakya köylerinde gezdim. Köylüleriyle konuştum. Türk kadını orada kaç göç saçmasına kapılmadan erkeğiyle yan yana çalışırken ve görüşürken gördüm. Onlar ne temiz, ne tatlı Türkçe ile konuşuyorlardı...Köy

(1937:44). In fact, to prove the Turkishness of Alawi peasants was not as important as to gain consent of them in this period. In fact, it was an attempt to fix a particular moment in history and perception of the past of the popular consent, and to contribute to the construction of the new generations' national identity. Thus, they tried to emphasize that all Alawi peasants were Turks like the Turkish peasants in Anatolia. The Sanjak's separation from Syria and its incorporation into Turkey does not solely mean the demarcation of borders between Syria and Turkey. That is to say, the process of delimitation of the borders geographically, cannot be considered without taking the process of the construction of national identity into account in the Hatay. It is a part of hegemonic struggle.

After the annexation, the strategic alliance with Alawis was terminated. Moreover, the government reversed its policy of courting the Alawis. In a letter to Tayfur Sökmen, Ankara wrote that since there were also "Arabs, Armenians, Orthodox, Kurds, Circassians in Hatay, who were Sunnis or belonged to various Christian denominations", the sympathy thus so far shown to Alawis should be terminated because it offended the others (Çağaptay, 2006: 121).

### **3.4. Conclusion Remarks**

This chapter tries to answer two main questions concerning the historiography of Hatay. First, the effect of international and local dynamics on historiography is analyzed. Second, how the memoirs of the history writers of the époque shaped this history is investigated by taken into consideration their social positions. These two questions are reconciled in the analysis, as the history writers' plots and documents were examined.

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*kadınları, etekleri ve omuzları kırmalı, çiçekli basma entarileri, saçlarında hiç eksik etmedikleri karanfil ve kadife çiçekleriyle ne kadar güzel, ne kadar dinç idiler...Onlar ülkeleri, dilleri, giyiniş ve yaşayışlarıyla öz yurddaşlarından hiç de geride kalmamışlardı. Antakyalıyı her Türk gibi zeki, anlayışlı ve mertözlü buldum."*

First of all, in locally, the current circumstances in the dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire are important to envision the hegemonic impact on historicism. As it has been mentioned, the mandate system and the principle of self determination in this period played an important role in the increase of the national movements in the late 1930's. Nationalism have a great impact on understanding the history of Hatay because by using the history, the national identity tried to be constructed. Therefore, this circumstance gives opportunity to consider the hegemonic dimension of national historiography which tends to employ sui generis approach towards minorities. In addition, the duality of the concepts "majority" and "minority" in the plot of national narratives opens the question of the identities of the writers of such plots. Considering the changes in the cultural political and social structures of the region in the annexation period, it would be difficult to regard the history writers, most of whom were the deputies in the Hatay assembly, solely as Turkish nationalists. Namely, the question "who are the history writers" is important when their class position is questioned. When their studies are examined, the absence of some plots and the plots that they prefer to emphasize on gives clue about the route of the formation of the history of region within the Turkish national historiography. For instance, when the writings are examined, the consideration of the WW I as a break point for the "national awakening" give a good example that how history was distorted according to ideological requirements. Therefore, there is a close relationship between the rise of nationalism in the late of 1930s in the Sanjak and the question of who the history-writers were.

Moreover, when international dynamics are considered, the report of King-Crane Commission is illuminative to understand that ethnic identity did not gain mass support as the nationalist history-writers claimed. As noted, this commission was sent to the Middle East region by the United States in 1919 in order to obtain information about the inclinations of the indigenous people of the region and the report evinces the contradictions of the narratives written by history writers. It can also be said that, the principle of self determination gave rise to consolidate the ideal of being majority or to be seen as the majority in the annexation process. This

understanding of numerical majority led historicist to write “numerical history” to prove the dominance of that ethnicity. Thus, the report indicates the pragmatic usage of the principle of self determination.

Second, in order to legitimize the annexation of Hatay to Turkey on the international level, the political and diplomatic history of the region is given importance in order to legitimize the annexation. Through the memories of the Turkish-Kemalist nationalists, the history of Hatay became the history of the struggle against French occupiers and the betrayal of anti-Turk groups regardless of social dynamics. Thus, the history of Hatay became the narration of national and local ruling class in which the ordinary people were silenced and the methods of social history were neglected. As it has been emphasized above, the memories of this class belong to those who have voice in the hegemonic struggle.

In conclusion, as to the two questions were being considered and the history writers narratives and plots are examined, it can be said that the history of Hatay in the Turkish History Thesis, which was written during the annexation process, is an anachronic, idiographic, and pragmatic historiography. In the next chapter, during and after the annexation process will be taken into account with the narration of the ordinary people who experienced the annexation process.

## CHAPTER 3

### **BEFORE AND AFTER THE ANNEXATION: NARRATIVES OF THE “ORDINARY PEOPLE”**

The effort of examining the history of Hatay requires the voices of inhabitants whose families had no option except remaining in the Sanjak. On the other hand, the history of Hatay in the nationalist historiography excluded these voices or heard them how it wanted to hear. The omitted subjects in the region’s history, the narration of Arab political figures in order to create the “other” and an attempt to establish a link between çetes and nationalist ideology in the region after the World War I demonstrate the distortions and the pragmatic aims of the nationalist historiography.

In this chapter, the paradoxes or characteristics of nationalist historiography will attempt to unveil by using the method of oral history. Yet, the main aim of this chapter is to give priority to the words of “ordinary people”. In this respect, four themes was determined to talk to the interviewees; land system, Arab-Turk nationalisms, the cult of Atatürk and migration. All of these themes will be taken into account in line with the construction of Turkish national identity. The land system and its changes during the mandate regime and after the annexation of the region is one of the important themes in order to understand how Alawi peasants became crucial for Turkish and Arab propagandists in late of 1930s. Moreover, the questions about Arab-Turk nationalists and their activities can pave the way to examine how people remember ethnic violence and how affected violence their memory after the integration to Turkey. Similarly, the cult of Atatürk and the relationship between anti-ağa discourse and the cult of him especially for Alawis in the Sanjak are significant in order to examine the annexation and the integration process. Lastly, in

this chapter, migration of Arab nationalists, Armenians and Alawis to Syria and how they remembered by the remaining people are taken into account in order to grasp what means of Turkish citizen for them.

#### 4.1. Landowners and peasants

In the late sixteenth century, the Ottoman *Timar* system began to dissolve and the state undertook measures in order to collect taxes more efficiently. *İltizam* was a form of tax farming through which, the government sold the right of collecting taxes farming for a year to those who paid in advance. Therefore, until the beginning of nineteenth century, the local notables (a'yan) had gained immense political and economic power. The upper classes learned the language of the ruler, adopted their religion and received political titles. Thus, the *mültezims*, the notables who were granted the right of collecting taxes, who mostly consisted of Sunni Muslims, could hold office and own land. According to Harik (1965: 411), this is a system in which “the dignitaries whether war lords, aristocratic chiefs or notables were invested with government authority by an overlord who enjoyed over them the prerogative of appointment and dismissal.” (Aswad, 1968: 6) The way of cutting back the power of local notables in the region was sedentarisation. During this period, the way of sedentarisation was denoted as “exile” for the members of the tribes. The aim of sedentarisation was both to increase the agricultural production and to re-assert the authority of the state to provide the security on the trade routes. However, the attempt of the sedentarisation in the Sanjak was not realised as an easy or painless experience. The marshland and later, malaria, were obstacles in the areas where the tribes were considered to settle. Arif<sup>46</sup> (41, M, Alawi) explaining the sedentarisation experience of the Turkmen tribes in the following:

- ... Mesela buranın çok eski bir belediye başkanı var Hasan Mürseloğlu, o da işte 1850'lerde Osmanlı'nın bu Türk şeylerinin Tahtalı Dağlarından buraya getirilip yerleştirilmesinin hikâyesini anlatır. Sonra bunlar, bunlar Araplara karşı... Mesela Amik Ovası... Bir Arap ovasıydı Amik Ovası. Fakat Osmanlı aldı, oraya el koydu, Türkmenlere dağıttı. Fakat onlar burada yerleşemediler, çoğu kırıldılar. Tahtalı

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<sup>46</sup> Arif, 28 March 2008, Iskenderun.



dağlarından geliyorlar. Ovaya gidiyorlar. Ova bunları kırdı. Sıtmaya yakalandılar, çoğu öldü. Kaçtılar. Osmanlı bunları bir daha aldı geldi. Zorla. Tahtalı dağları nerdedir bilir misiniz?

- Hayır.
- Tahtalı dağları Maraş'ın üst tarafı. Çok geniş yaylaların olduğu yerdir. Konar-göçer...Aldı bunları götürdü. Fransızlar sonra, çok sonra geldiler.

As Arif claims, the Ottoman state forced the Turkmen tribes to settle in the valley. To this end, it used incentive methods as well as coercive means. The granting of fertile lands to these nomadic herders was the frequently used method in attracting the tribes. Yet, it was not enough to prevent the brigandage on the trade and caravan routes between Syria and Southern Turkey. The Ottoman government continued to force the settlement of long-range nomadic herders in their winter camping grounds by using its authority strength. To this end, Ottomans founded the Reform Division (Fırka-i Islahiye) in 1825 and later in 1865. The armed forces attempted to settle 26 tribes in the new towns and villages created between Ceyhan River and Asi River. Reyhaniye, Islahiye and Hassa were the centres of these villages. The settled groups were granted land titles in 1859 and they acquired wealth through hereditary tax farms. Moreover, they were sometimes exempted from tax-paying in order to entice them for staying in the region. Therefore, the tribal chieftains owned large land areas with large private estates in the region and became landowners. During the Tanzimat period, the reclamation of the swampland in the Amik Valley was accelerated and the area became more fertile for cropping. The Turkmen tribes began to cultivate wheat in the Amik Plain. After the World War I the price of wheat increased and the tribal chieftains then became warlords (Altuğ, 2002: 30, Aswad, 1968: 38-39, Tekeli, 1990: 51-53).

There is a much of different information regarding the conditions of Alawi peasants (marabas) stressing that the Turkmen tribal chieftains, so-called rural notables, employed the poor Alawi peasants as sharecroppers and later they became wage-labourers after their sedentarization in the region. It can be claimed that newly emerged conditions affected the existing social stratification in the region (Kasaba, 2006: 208, Yerasimos, 2000: 177-8). As a matter of fact, there were also Christian

peasants working on the lands of the Sunni-Turkish notables as well as Turkish peasants who were concentrated in the Amik plain. The Armenian peasants in Jabal Mousa were the only group that they held their own land and resembled small peasantry in Anatolia in Antioch, Suveydiye<sup>47</sup> (Altuğ, 2006). In the same way, Özgen (2005: 54) points out the miscellaneous background of the different ethnic and religious affiliations of the marabas. In this sense, it is difficult to consider Alawis as a sect-class in the region. Mendenhall (1991: 95-96) questioned whether ‘Alawis in Alexandretta and Antioch can be considered as sect-class. He uses data regarding the economic roles in the market of Antioch and their occupations in 1934 and suggests that ‘Alawis historically formed a more diverse population than the notion of the sect-class would suggest. The sect-class notion has relevance to a particular group of Alawis, the minorities of detribalized landless sharecroppers under oppressive Sunni and Greek Orthodox landowners. Khoury (1987: 496) also states that the most significant and downtrodden peasants were the Arabic speaking Alawites and they were exploited by the Sunni landowning class. Rather, it can be claimed that in some parts of the region some ethnic and religious groups were concentrated. For instance, it can be said that most of Alawi sharecroppers were working in Kuseyr plateau and Orontes valley and their landowners were Turk Sunni urban notables while Turkish, Kurdish and Alawi peasants together worked for Turkmen Beys in the Amik Valley.

Moreover, the sedentarization resulted in a massive change in the socio-economic order and the stratification of society along with people’s affiliation or closeness to the landownership and agricultural production. The political and economic struggle between urban notables and rural notables continued during the mandate regime. The distinction between them appeared and embodied with the politicization process. The Turkmen ağas sided with the CUP (*the Party of Committee and Union*) while most of the traditional urban notable families favoured *the Party of Freedom and Accord* (Altuğ, 2004). However, as mentioned before, this struggle was not based on

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<sup>47</sup> Suveydiye is one of the kazas of Hatay and it is the region whose population mostly consists of Alawis. Suveyde, currently named Samandağı, surrounded by Musa Dağı (Jabel Musa).

ideological standpoint. Whether having an “urban culture” or not showed the distinction between these groups. Salih (55, M, Arab Sunni) mentioned from these two rivalling groups of notables as follows:

“Buranın özelliği Hatay’ın toprak sahipleri kentte oturur, aynı zamanda ticaretle uğraşır. ‘Şehir Eşrafı’ dedikleri bunlar işte. Ovadaki ağalar ise Mursallar, Bahadırlar işte, Reyhanlı tarafında kalanlar, bunlar aşiret halinde gelip, toprağı işgal edip,orada beraber yaşıyorlar. Köylülerle beraber yaşıyorlar. Orada aslında tarım çok geç başlıyor. Yani buğday tarımı var da, tarım çok geç başlıyor. Şimdi Altınözü, Samandağ, Harbiye ve Antakya çevresinde, özellikle geçmişte bahçe, bağ sistemi, meyvecilik, bu toprakların sahipleri genelde şehirde, merkezde. Yanlarında çalışanlar genelde marabalar.... Ovada ağa köyde yaşar, köylüsüyle beraber. Antakya’da bu ova, Amik Ovası’nın dışında, Altınözü, Yayladağı, Harbiye’deki toprak sahipleri ‘zadegan’ denen ailelerdir. Kimdir bunlar; Kuseyrilerdir, Bereketlerdir, Türkmenlerdir. Bunlar kentsoylu, şehirlidir. Burjuva anlamında değil ama.”<sup>48</sup>

To be “zadegan” was conceived as having an urban culture. As Altuğ (2006) explains:

“The new comers, the Turkmen ağas of the Amik plain could never become “urban” elites in the sense of the traditional notables even though they undertook conventional methods of elite membership such as marriage alliances. This was not solely due to their enduring relationship with their “land of origin” such as staying in the Amik plain in certain months of the year unlike the traditional elite families like the Berekets, Adalı or Kuseyr. The fact that the Turkmen Begs were not acknowledged completely as a full-fledged member of the notables’ class in Antioch rests on their lack of having a deep-rooted and having settled urban background that of an “urban culture and its requirements”.

In other words, they held the necessary economic capital but lacked the cultural capital. Access to land as owners or sharecroppers shaped the political and hegemonic relationship among social groups and their linkage to the officials. Until the end of the French Mandate in 1939, landownership is one of the important factors for understanding the hegemonic struggle for the local politics and the distribution of the local power. In this sense, the roles of the notables become more visible in the region’s history. On the other hand, anti-elite class such as peasants became visible during and after the annexation process, when Turkish nationalists with their elitist

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<sup>48</sup> Salih, interview by the author, tape-recording, 7 November 2008, Antioch.

view considered them as intended citizens. The narratives of the peasants or the narratives regarding them can provide a different point of view related to political, cultural, social and economic life because the rural life and peasants were portrayed as a nostalgic issue or a backward region with its people by some Turkish history writers. Although all of peasants were called only as “marabas” literally, there were different types of contracts between landowner and croppers in the region. Therefore, it is also crucial to concentrate on the variety forms of the access of land available to peasants which did not derive from direct ownership, such as sharecropping, labour-rent agreements, and the other forms of tenancy as well as landownership.

The land system and the different values of different types of land can shed light on understanding the conditions of the peasant. Accordingly, in this section, firstly, the land system in the region will be introduced. Namely, while considering the landownership and the political power or the influence of the urban and rural landowners, as well as the contracts or agreements between landowners and peasants or croppers, the development of private property, land system and marginalization will be taken into consideration. In other words, after the commercialization of the land with the spread of western capitalism into the Ottoman Empire, change in the land system will be examined. Therefore, the relationship between ağas (landowners) and the marabas (landless sharecroppers) will be highlighted to decipher the changing or unchanging aspects in the land system and complicated indebtedness relations. Oral history, as a method, was used for gaining detailed information about the land system and its changes during the mandate regime and after the annexation of the region into Turkey because accessing official sources is very difficult. Thus, the question of whether there was a transformation from sharecropping to labour-wage for the peasants who were working for ağas is crucial. Secondly, the relationship between sharecroppers, landowners, and mandate officials will be questioned for examining the changes in the land system in the region after the mandate system. Although this is arguable, the mandate regime was the first modern state experience for the region’s people. It affected the meaning of state or of belonging to a state for the people of the Sanjak and especially for the candidates for

citizenship. In other words, their relation with and perceptions of power will be scrutinized.

#### **4.1.1. Types of Sharecropping Agreements or Being Maraba**

There were three important fertile lands in the region. The Orontes valley, the Kuseyr plateau and the Amik plain and there were several types of sharecropping agreements. Before concentrating on the agreements, it would be beneficial to describe the agricultural production and products in these areas because it can throw light on the dependency of peasants on landowners. Ahmet Faik Türkmen was the foremost researcher who gives detailed information on the agricultural conditions of the region in 1938. Yet, the information in his book requires to be read with critical eye but it is still important because the book gives clues about the general picture of agrarian production. Türkmen states that there were big vegetable and fruit gardens in the Orontes Valley. Additionally, the production of silk cocoon<sup>49</sup> was provided from the valley's mulberry orchards and most of the peasants were "Turkish" Alawite marabas of the land. As mentioned earlier, most of the Alawi sharecroppers cultivated urban notables' lands. In Kuseyr, olive was the main source of revenue but liquorice plant and grapes were also important crops. The villages were closely tied to Antioch. The ağas of the land lived in the surrounding villages. The Amik Plain was the most fertile region of the rural area of the city. Especially, after the World War I, the price of the cereal was increased and the agricultural trade gained importance in the region. Namely, it can be possible to make a distinction between peasants as "peasant-gardener" (*al-fallah al-bustani*) in the Kuseyr and Orontes Valley and the "agricultural peasants" (*al-fallah az-zira'i*) in the Amik Plain.

According to Aydın (1990: 168) peasant family labour plays an instrumental role in the accumulation of capital in some cases. He argues that instead of concentrating on

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<sup>49</sup> After 1840s, French established some silk factories in the region. For the trade of the silk, improving the port of Alexandretta and linking it by rail to Aleppo gained importance. After World War I, the economic value of the region began to decline, in this respect.

solely the mode of production, it is essential to keep in mind the use of family labour and the ownership of the means of production as well as marketing and the credit systems. Similarly, Aras (1956: 24-25) suggests that rural workers were family labourers (male, female and child members who are able to work together) rather than individual labourers. This was very convenient for the landowners, who faced difficulties in finding labour force. At this point, the sharecropping arrangements became significant to grasp how landowner benefits from household labour force in the case of the Sanjak as the household production can be observable in Antioch and its surroundings (quoted in Aydın, 1990: 169). Türkmen (1937, 50-51) claims that there were maraba families working for landowners. Each family lives in small roofless house in a big vegetable or fruit garden, which was called “dam-bahçe”. Each garden was divided into four parts for indicating the property line and the place in which a maraba family lived in order to cultivate. Zarife’s (-, F, Alawi) family was one of the maraba families and this system in her own words was as follows:

- Annem bana birkaç aylık hamileydi. Babam öldükten sonra annem bahçeciliğe devam etti ömrü boyunca. Ağaların yanında muraba olarak çalıştık Küçük Dalyan’da. Her maraba bir bostanda ekin yetiştirirdi. Bir muraba bir bostan, bir muraba bir bostan. Meyve-sebze yetiştirirdik işte.
- **Ağa size para mı öderdi meyve sebze yetiştirdikten sonra?**
- Bu yarı toprak senin, bu toprak benim. Biz mahsülü çıkarırdık, 1 hafta sonra biz satardık yani. Daha sonra ağa gelirdi parayı bölüşürdük, al bu kadar para senin, bu kadar benim.<sup>50</sup>

Both the household production and the diverse sharecropping agreements were prevalent in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. According to Aswad, the more prevalence types of sharecropping agreements in the region were: Ortak or Sharik (sharecropping), murabe, ‘azab, icar, rahaniya. Sharecropping, the mode of agricultural tenancy by which the tiller is remunerated for his labour by a share of the yield, has been one of the most enigmatic features of agrarian studies (Tamari, 1990: 70). Whereas the owner provides the land and seeds, the workers provide the animal and seeds. After produce tax is taken, the worker gets 50% of crop. Muraba literally means “a quarter” in Arabic. This term has been used to refer Alawi peasant working

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<sup>50</sup> Zarife, March 2008, Antioch.

the land of usually a Sunni-Turk ağa (Altuğ, 2002: 84). The owner pays for all the expenses and the worker gets 25% after taxes. Azab is hired for a year at a wage whatever the landowner sees fit to pay. Azabs can be defined as agricultural labourers who were devoid of both land and capital. Icar means the contract of renting land. The landowner leases the land for cash for a year or more. The renter pays all the expenses and the gets the profits. On lands that rotate cotton and wheat, the usual term is two years. The rahaniya system occurred between lineage mates. When one needs money, he receives cash in payment of loaning his land to another who both pays the expenses and takes the profits. When the landowner gets enough money, he repays the loan and takes his land back. Under this system, his land can never be lost to the other lineage mate due to inheritance rules (Aswad, 1968: 152-53). In spite of variety of the agreements, all sharecroppers who were interviewed called themselves as maraba because of its common usage. For instance, even though Zarife states that her mother worked as “peasant gardener” (al- fallah al bustani) for the 25% of the land as muraba; indeed, her mother worked as “yarıcı”<sup>51</sup>. Similarly, Sultan and her husband worked as azabs in the Amik Valley:

- **Kocan askerden döndükten sonra nerede çalıştı?**
- Valla benim kocam ağaların yanında...çiftçiydi yani, maraba.
- **Hangi ağanın yanında?**
- Topboğazda, şimdi öldü o ağa. Orada buğday ekerler, pamuk ekerler. İnekler, camus(öküz) vardı. Çalışıyordu yani. Para yok sadece 5-6 teneke buğday getirirler eve.
- **O zaman ağa var zengin, siz çalışıyorsunuz marabalar...**
- Şimdi bak kızım evet fakirik ama ağalar da bakardı, evde ne var yok. Yoksa alırik mesela 3 kilo un. Böyle alır, saklarık ne ihtiyaç kızım. Ama geldi baktı, bizde varsa fazla onu da alır gider. Bir kere 10 kilo verdik. 10 kilo az, değil valla. Ama bakar. Biz mesela deriz kalmadı, yok. Sedirin altında saklamışız.
- **Sen gördün mü böyle yaptı ağa?**
- İyvalla gördüm.
- **Nasıl ağa, nasıl biri?**
- Valla büyük biri, zengin. Çocukları var. Böyle ata bindi mi hiç kimseye bakmaz böyle. Biz bakarız, ne yaptık. Kocam yanlarında çalışır, akşama kadar böyle. Allah vere kenarda otur.
- **Onların evinde de çalışıyordunuz yani?**
- İyy valla. Evini temizliyok, çalışıyok yanlarında. Yemek böyle yapıyok.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Yarıcı makes the same agreement with landowner like ortak or “sharik” and gets %50 of crop.

<sup>52</sup> Sultan, 5 April 2008, Antioch.

As she stated, they did not only cultivate the land or worked on other agricultural works but also she did in the household works as cooking. In other words, they personally serve the landowner who supplied them with board and lodging. Neither were they paid in cash as azabs nor were they responsible only for the production of the crop. The exemplary of wage labourer was told by Salih (55, M, Arab Sunni) whose grandfather had been a yarıcı (shariks) on the land of ağa in Altınözü. Although his grandfather had a small land, he earned his livelihood from hiring peasants to cultivate the land and collecting harvest of the ağa's land. According to him, his grandfather and the other shariks like him can be separated from the sharecroppers and it is possible to consider them "ara sınıf". As a supervisor of the land workers and yarıcı, his grandfather makes a contract with ağa:

- ...Ben mesela kendi dedemden bahsedeyim. Benim dedem böyle bir adam. Kendi toprağı var ama belli bir gücü, feraseti de bilmem neyi. Ama bunun yanında şehirdeki ağalara ait yüzlerce dönüm toprak çalıştırıyor.
- **Onları denetim altında tutan, onları kontrol eden mi?**
- Hayır,hayır. Şimdi denetim altında...
- **Başında duran da değil.**
- Hayır, hayır. Kendisi aynı zamanda yarıcıdır. Maraba dedikleri yarıcıdır. Yani işte bu oran zeytinde dörtte birdi eskiden. Şeyde yarı yarıyadır, tarlada tahıl da yarı yarıya bölüşülür tamam mı? Şimdi bu sistem genelde, bu adamlar büyük adamların topraklarına bakarlar, aracılırlar. Fakat küçük de olsa toprak sahibidir başka bir köyde. Ama kendisi de çalışır ağanın yanında yarıcı olarak. Yanında işçiyi, köylüyü çalıştırır. Ama mesela ben bile yetiştim. Mesela biz son zamanlarda, dediler ki biz artık terk etti bu adamlar. Biz bu çiftlikleri kiraya verelim. 56'lı yıllarda babam çiftliği kiraya aldı. Daha traktör de girmemişti. Bütün o toprağı nasıl işleyeceğiz? Ne yapıyorduk? İşçi de çalıştırıyorduk veya sulu arazide diyorduk ki aileye gel, sen bu 5 dönümlük araziye sebze ek, sen gel meyve ek diyorduk...Ama ağa bilmez, ağa bilir ki ne kadar ürün geldi, buna bakar. İlhaktan önce gelir bakardı ağa, mahsulun ne kadar çıktığına , genelde güvenirdi. Ama genelde bir bakmışlığı olurdu. O bilir ki hakikaten, ne kadar buğday çıktı, kendisine ne kadar düştü. Onu gelir buraya şehre teslim eder veya harman kalkacağı zaman gider, ölçerler. Ağanın hissesi bir tarafa ayrılır, şeyinki bir tarafta kalır. Ona bakan maraba, yani yarıcısı kendi işçisiyle kendi muhattaptır. Ona artık ne verecekse. Yani sistem bu.<sup>53</sup>

At the time of harvest, a yarıcı made a contract with ağa. He employed peasants and their families as wage labourers. In this sense, while the landowner obtains %50 of crop, a yarıcı became a provider of labour force for the landowner. Yet, it is arguable whether this kind of sharecroppers can be examined as an intermediate class. The landowner not only got the surplus through obtaining the necessary family labour

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<sup>53</sup> Salih, 7 November 2008, Antioch.



force, but also found the way of extending the fertile areas. After he was asked what the “maraba” was, Vahit (79, M, Alawi) explained this kind of agreement between landowner and cropper as:

- Bahçenin sahibi var bir de onun çalışanı var. Maraba çalışır ortakçı olarak veya ücretle mal sahibi ile beraber. Sonra da bazı aletler vardır. Mesela bir tarla. Bunu işleyecek kim? Alevi. Karşılığında ne alacak? Ya ücret alacak. Bazıları buna “imar ve ihya”. Yani güzelleştirme, daha iyi bir hale getirme. Buna imar deriz. Arapça biliyorsunuz değil mi? İşte bu imar ve ihya. İşte o zaman bu örf ve adete göre maraba veya murabi çalıştı mesela bu tarla(önündeki masayı gösterir) Düz tarlayı şuradan eker diyelim buradan eker. Bu 5 senede mahsül verir. İşte mahsül verme çağına gelince, o zaman ne oluyor, tarla zeytinlik haline geliyor. Buradaki örf ve adete göre zeytinlik yapılırken ya düz zeytinlik olur veya bir zeytin bir incir, bir zeytin bir incir. Böyle mesela düşün bu masa kadar geniş bir yer. Murabi bunu imar edecek, ihya edecek. Çorak olmaktan kurtaracak. Meyve verir ağaçlarla donatacak ve bunun karşılığını alacak. Meyve verince bunu 4’de birini, 3’de birini alır. Toprağın...
- **Toprağın?**
- Toprağın değil, mahsülün.
- **Yani benim duyduğum, çıkan mahsülün satışından sonra çıkan karın paylaşımı mı bu dediğiniz?**
- Yok bu ayrı, senin dediğin sebze için böyle. Sebze işinde. Benim bu dediğim zeytinliklerde olur. Çünkü zeytin ağacı 35-40-50 yıllıktır. Ama sebze öyle değil. Mesela kış mahsülleri var. Yazın yetişen mahsüller var. Fasulye, biber lahana. İşte bu mevsimlik ürünlerde. İşte benim şimdi arazim var. Ben çalışmıyorum, çalışan köyden gelen adamlar var. Çalışıyor oradaki yerleşmiş kurallara göre. Biz buna Türkçe’de ‘ortaklık’ diyoruz. Zirai ortaklık. Arapça’da ‘murabilik’ diyorlar. Bu murabilik kuralları, şimdi benim orada çalışan çiftçiler, murabiler. Ortaklık. Paranın sahibi ne koyar ortaklığa? Çalışan ne koyar? Mesela?
- **Siz tohumu falan mı veriyorsunuz?**
- İşte tohum var, emek var. Evvela mesela mahsüle göre murabiye %40-%50 veriyor. Şimdi mesela suyun temini toprak sahibine ait<sup>54</sup>

He gave detailed information of the land. The system of amelioration was used to transform badlands into the fertile lands in order to increase the profit. Moreover, it can be said that being “peasant-gardener” or “agricultural- peasant” or the genus of the crop cultivated by the peasants affected the dependency on the landowner. Hence, after collecting the crops, the peasants who cultivated vegetables and fruits could work either on the other lands or in other jobs in the city such as shoemaking, hardware dealing, bakery running etc. After considering about these types of sharecropping agreements, the question of what was changed or whether there was any transformation in the land system under the mandate regime is significant.

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<sup>54</sup> Vahit, 20 December 2008, Antioch.

Following the occupation of the French, the economic recession became apparent. According to Ada (2005: 88-90), it is enough to look at the data of exporting from the port of Alexandretta. If Beirut and Tripoli can be seen as belonging to Lebanon, Alexandretta was the most important port of Syria. It was vital especially for the commercial link between northern Syria, especially Aleppo, and the Mediterranean world. This recession in the region was a result of losing the importance of Aleppo as a hinterland gradually. The political instability in Syria from 1926 to the late of 1930s and the 1929 World Economic crisis gave impetus to this decline in economy. These changes affected the relationship between the French regime and the local notables. The two notable families as rivalling groups in Antioch, the traditional urban elite and the Turkmen Beys had different relations to the mandate regime. It is important to keep in mind that the relationship with the regime and authorities were not shaped by nationalist ideologies. Instead, the fear of losing economic and political power was more determining factor. For instance, the tax collection or acquiring position in administration became important issues for the notables in order to perpetuate their authority. The French Regime cooperated with the traditional urban elite and offered them positions in the bureaucracy of the Sanjak.

Nevertheless, should be underlined that the mandate regime attempted to change landownership as a strategy against Arab nationalism. Promoting small peasant proprietorship, conducting cadastral surveys, the new taxation system are the means of reforming the land structure. The Amik Plain was designed for cotton development project among other fertile lands in Syria. In 1930, a new code, which sought to reinforce the compulsory registration of all immovable property and standardize different forms of land-ownership was enacted. Yet, the high investment costs and inability of the High Commission to attract the capital investment were the obstacles for these endeavors favoring the small peasantry. Indeed, the strategies against Arab nationalism through destructing the material base of the urban elites were only a general strategy. As a result, it did not mean the total neglect of the landowner bureaucratic class (Altuğ, 2002: 69, 79-80, Özgen, 2005; 58). Accordingly, however, the Amik Beys, the second group notables of the Sanjak

which were later-settled, had no or lesser relations with French regime and its authorities; they continued to exert their economic and political power. To sum up, it can be asserted that these agricultural relations had been continuing during the mandate system and even though the mandate regime attempted to enact land reform; indeed, it did not go beyond the challenge for the pro-Arabist traditional landowner class.

#### **4.1.2. Perception of Ağa: Who is ağa?**

If the relationship between an ağa and a peasant is tried to examine, it can be viewed as an economic oppressed-oppressor relationship at the first glance but it is more complex than it is seen. In this section, the complexity of this relationship will be emphasized through taking into consideration the diverse dynamics. In order to understand this relationship, eight sharecroppers were interviewed and all of them were Alawis. It should be borne in mind that they made judgements about the behaviours of ağas according to their life conditions in the past, ethnic and religious identity.

Özgen describes the peasant's relation to the landowner as one of the patron-client relationship. The peasants were dependent on the notables in many respects including dealings with the local state authorities. Notables held both economic and political power. They were able to mobilize peasants in crisis and transformations such as during the autonomous Hatay Republic's first elections (plebiscite) in 1939. The patronage relationship was of asymmetric nature because the cashcroppers who produced for the local notables were at the same time the customers of small merchants in towns, where the latter was dependent on the landowner to collect the former's debts in times of harvest (2005: 58). In other words, the peasants were the customers of small merchants of the city and the merchants were dependent on the notables for the on-credit dealings which were made in the time of harvest (Altuğ, 2002: 83). This economic patronage among merchants, ağa and peasants was the determining factor for understanding their relationship but it was only one facet of it.

Besides, it can be asserted that there were different relationships between the ağa and the cropper in the three fertile lands- Amik Plain, Orontes Valley and Kuseyr Plateau. For instance, Alawi sharecroppers cultivated silk cocoons on the Orontes Valley using the traditional methods. The ağa visited his lands either in the summer or during the period of cocoon collection for inspection. To prevent the stealing of the harvest, ağa spent his time with the peasants. The personal contact with ağa changed the manner of the relationship between an ağa and a peasant. Mediha (84, F, Alawi), even though was not a sharecropper or worker, went with her friend, whose name was Ğedla and whose family was working for ağa, for collecting cocoons near the Orontes Valley. She saw an ağa for the first time then. Her words are illustrative for understanding the relationship:

- **Kim vardı o dönemde zengin?**
- Bizim burada zengin denilen kişi, kim iyi buğday mahsul almışsa ve diğer mahsulleri o zengin sayılırdı. Bilirsiniz siz Aydınlıları bunlar hepsi şıgtı (şeyh). 1-2 ağa vardı. Bunlardan biri de işte Aydınlılar. Yani biraz daha mahsul alan o zengindi.
- **Ağa nasıl davranırdı onlara?**
- Kurt beslerlerdi, ipek üretirlerdi. Bahçelerine bakarlardı. İneklerine bakarlardı, ineklerinden süt, yoğurt ve çökelek yaparlardı.
- **Kötü mü davranırlardı, iyi mi davranırlardı?**
- Valla işte zeytin koparacaklarsa bile ağalar yanlarında olurlardı. Bilirim, Hıristiyan ağalar vardı. Zeytin bahçesinde toplamaya başladıktan bitene kadar yanlarında kalırlardı.
- **Sen hiç çalıştın mı?**
- Ben hiç çalışmadım ama köylülerin hemen hemen hepsi onların elinin altında çalışırdı.
- **Peki, ağa hakkında konuşurlar mıydı?**
- Marabaları çok yorarlardı, bize öyle anlatırlardı.
- **Neler yaparlardı mesela?**
- Valla komşumuz beni bir defa yanında almıştı. Ailesinin yanına, ailesi bahçede dut ağaçları yoluyordu, ağa da sandalyesinde oturmuş onları bekliyor. Çocuklar işte bilirsiniz kozaları .... satarlardı. Ağa orada olduğu zaman çocuklar .... bile yaklaşamazdı. Ben oturmuştum. Ve ben söyledim eve gidecem. Komşumuza söyledim. Ağa sordu bu kim. Komşum da valla bunu işte benimle köyden getirdim dedi. Tek başıma gelmeyim diye onu yanımda çiftliğe getirdim dedim. Dedi bu komşumuzun kızı. O da yanıma çağır mısın dedi. Ağa da “sen geldiğinden beri hep oturdu, hiç yerinden kalkmadın” dedi. Al bu ipek böceği evinize götür dedi. Ben de anneme ağanın bu kozaları verdiğini söyledim. Annem inanmadı. Anneme dedim yok valla yok valla ben çalmadım, dedim koza Ağası verdi. Annem çok üzüldü, beni götüren Ğedla’ye gelince ona soracağını söyledi.
- **Ağadan bir şey çalmak ayıp mıymış?**

- Ağa ama kendisinden çok korkarlardı. Bazı çocukları böyle saklayıp yanlarında götürürlerdi.<sup>55</sup>

In the Orontes Valley the sharecroppers did not work for other landowners the other lands (Türkmen, 1937: 53). In other words, they did not move as those sharecroppers in Kuseyr and Amik. Accordingly, there was a greater degree of attachment between Alawi peasants of the Orontes and their respective ağas than between the Sunni Turkish peasants of Kuseyr and Amik (Altuğ: 2002, 84). On the other hand, even if the personal contact provided the narration of ağa in a positive tone, the fear-embedded respect can be conceived from her words. The words of Selim (81, M, Alawi) about Rifat Ağa are striking because on the one hand ağa was so cruel to his workers while on the other hand he protected his marabas against the bad behaviour of the butler who oversaw their working. Selim thinks that they were under the auspices of their ağas:

- **Çocukken sen ağaları görünce ata bindiklerini ne düşünürdün?**
- Ağa ya ne demek.
- **Ağa zalim miydi?**
- Bazen zalim bazen değildi.
- **Korkar mıydınız ağadan?**
- Korkardık. Ondan polisten korktuğumuzdan daha çok korkardık. Ağa padişah gibiydi, yanına askerler alıp köye inerdi. Fransızlar zamanında yanına birini çağırduğunda o kişi gelmezse ona asker gönderip getirtirdi. Elleri kelepçeli bir halde getirirlerdi hem de. Fransa ağaların elinin altındaydı, ağalar ne derse onu yaparlardı.
- ....
- Ağa gelmeden tabi toplanıp, kendi aramızda hangi işi nasıl yapacağımızı konuşurduk. Mesela bir yeri ekip mahsülünü toplayacağımız zaman onun yarısı ağanın yarısı bizimdi. Ağa olmasa bile yerine birini vekil olarak görevlendirip bizleri kontrol ederdi; ayrıca o kişi bize kötü davranırsa onu görevinden alırdı. Bunun dışında marabalardan da onun hakkında kötü bir şey duysa o marabayı kovardı. Ağa Fransız komutanın yanına gidip ben şu kadar asker istiyorum derse komutan askerleri ağanın emrine veriyordu.
- **Peki ağa onun hakkında kötü konuşanları nasıl tespit ediyordu?**
- Ya sevmediği kişiyi de kovuyordu.<sup>56</sup>

The personal contact shaped the view toward ağa. According to him, the ağa has an enormous power as a monarch or a sultan but he was also a protector at the same

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<sup>55</sup> Mediha, 12 September 2008, Antioch.

<sup>56</sup> Selim, 15 October 2008, Antioch.

time. Like Altuğ (2004: 158), Esra Demirci Akyol<sup>57</sup> asserted that the relationship between ağa and landowner was based on trust far more than economics because “*marabas* had an important role in the life of the *ağas* and beys in the sense that they were responsible for all the agricultural activities on the land as well as the security of the property.” (2008: 70) After the annexation, the lands of ağas passed to their children and as a result of the inheritance system, the land has been fragmented. The small peasants who cultivated the land as sharecroppers began to purchase the land gradually after 1950s. Sometimes a number of marabas bought the land together but as they stated the land was sold at an underrated price. According to them, the landowners’ children did not work on the land or earn a living from the agricultural production. As most of them had liberal professions, they could not make a profit from the land they owned. Ali<sup>58</sup> (89, M, Alawi), who was an Alawi religious leader in Iskenderun (Alexandretta), wrote a book about the past of Arab Alewis, titled “Tarihte Aleviler”. Both in his book and in the course of interview, he asserted, “Sunni landowners had tyrannized over Alawi peasants for centuries. Yet, they began to lead a dissolute life in which they squandered money as free-spenders.” According to him, the Alawis were liberated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and they were no longer second-class citizens or a minority. Atatürk and the six arrows of Kemalism gathered the Turkish nationalists and Alewis who were asserted that they were of the same origins with the Turks. He emphasized the importance of the opposition of Sunni Islam and thereby the co-operation of the ulema and the traditional landowners. As a result, he refers ağas as Arabist traditional notables:

- **Türkiye’ye ilhaktan sonra ağalar gitti.**
- İntikal etti.( Mallar intikal etti) Türklerden Hıristiyanlara
- **Nasıl intikal etti?**
- Türk ağaları son zamanlarda çoştular. Var bir sürü toprakları var, bahçeleri var. Şimdi bunları bırakıyor, gidiyor İstanbul’a sefahata
- **Türkiye’ye ilhaktan sonra mı?**

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<sup>57</sup> Esra Demirci Akyol conducted an oral study in 2007 and she tried to understand how the people from different ethnic and religious background experienced the term. She interviewed with nine people and the interviews are put in Appendix B in her thesis. She was able to talk with the people from Hassa, town of Hatay. In this sense, if her interviews are taken into consideration, it can be possible to see the larger picture.

<sup>58</sup> Ali, 7 January 2009, Iskenderun.

- Daha önce, daha önce bu başladı. Şimdi İstanbul'dan geliyor buraya ne varsa kendine yetiyor. Dünyanın zengini. Sattılar.
- **Siz biliyor musunuz böyle ağalar?**
- Mesela Suphi Bereketler vardı. Rıfat Ağa vardı. Bizim köyde 2 ağalar vardı. Ben biliyorum Beyazıt Bey, iyi biliyorum bütün mallarını sattı. Ondan sonra onu eniştesi vardı, ismini bilmiyorum. Ama ablası İhbas Hanım, kocası satmış, 1-2 tarla 1 bahçe kalmıştı kendisine. Alanlar, satın alanlar hep bizim millet. Bizimkiler daha önce köle gibi çalıştı. Onların topraklarında...sonra onlar ağa oldular çalıştıkları topraklarda
- **Ama onlar ağalar kadar zengin olmadılar**
- Nasıl aldılar? Ağaların 40 tane 50 tane toprağı var. Adam 1 tane aldı. Ağanın 10 tane bahçesi var. Bizimki 1 tane satın aldı. Zaten bizimkiler birleşmişler. 1 tane bahçe almışlar. Ben iyi bilirim. Mesela bir adam vardı, 4 tane çocuğı bahçede 4 çocuğı çalışıyor. Her bakanın bağı olan tarlaları var. 4 tane oğlu tane oğlu her birisi bahçenin 4'ünde birini aldı. Yani ben o kitabı Alevilerin ne hale geldiklerini tarif etmek için yazdım. Mesela birçok köy var. Aşağı yukarı köy derler. Mesela Bakras; Aşağı Bakras, Yukarı Bakras. Şimdi Türklerin, daha sonra Aleviler geliyor, onlar aşağıda. Çiftlikte çalışıyor onlar.

Generally, interviewees told about the period after the annexation of the region with a rivalry between two agents as winners (sharecroppers) and losers (ağas). They perceived that justice had been done and while ağas were getting poor, marabas became wealthier thanks to their hardworking character which was not peculiar for the peasants instead it was a group quality<sup>59</sup>. Although they became the owners of the lands in some part of the region, they produced only self-sufficient production as much as they need to earn a living. They have cultivated fruits and vegetables for only the local market. After the late 1950's, the transport system was improved. Additionally, modern agricultural techniques began to be used through the technological development. However, these techniques were very expensive for crofters in order to cultivate their small lands and even in some families; agriculture has become a secondary source of income. In a nutshell, this emphasis on the dissolution of ağas refers to the period which ended with the beginning of Turkish rule and Hatay Republic. According to interviewees, people under the authority of

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<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, the Alawi peasants are not the only ones that depict themselves as intelligence as it can be seen in the situation with an English consul who had a long connection with them in the nineteenth century considered them "at least equal in intelligence to the peasantry of any country in Europe." A French scholar who studied them in depth in the 1930s threw into a sharp relief of their "great power of adaptation." However, their most salient quality is their capacity for enduring hardships. These traits, in addition to the tractability of the Alawis of the plains, explain why the great proprietors of the past generally preferred them to the more difficult and less contented peasants of Bedouin origin. Similar to landowning families in Syria, landed families in the valley of Orontes employed Alawi cultivators as sharecroppers (Batatu, 1999: 11-12). Most of the Alawi interviewees emphasized these traits of the group proudly.

the ağa with oppression and poverty acquired legal rights such as education after the annexation. The equalization based on citizenship was conceived as the equalization of Sunni and Alawi people. The state gave them rights that they did not possess before. Then, they used these rights and climbed the upper class through the next generation, who were educated and had liberal professions such as being a doctor, lawyer, and engineer. According to Vahit (79, M, Alawi), who is lawyer and whose father was one of the deputies in Hatay Republic Parliament in 1938, the change of inter-communal and intra-communal dimension was changed as follows:

- Şimdi bana kalırsa şöyle. Zaten size söyledim, kasaptı, fırıncıydı, öyle basit basit yorucu mesleklerde hep bizimkiler çalışırdı. Onlar daha rahat mesleklerde. Daha rahat olunca bu sefer başka şeylere yöneliyorlar. Neye yöneliyorlar? Kültüre yöneliyorlar. Mesela okula giden birisini düşünün, bir de gitmeyeni düşünün. Giden ne yapar okula? Okula kendini verir..Hem sabah ders, öğleden sonra bütün gün. Şimdi ne oldu? Öğlenci sabahçı 5 ders sabaha, 5 ders öğleden sonraya sıkıştırıldı. Şimdi okuyan kişi bütün vaktini bu tedrisata verince başka mesleklerden uzaklaştı. Kendini toprağa veren ne yapıyor? Arazinin sahibi ve çocukları okula devam ederken, toprağı çalıştıran kendisi, ailesi ve çocukları kendilerini toprağa verdiler. Ne oldu? Biri kendini toprağa verdi, biri kendini zirai faaliyete. Tabi bizimkiler zirai faaliyette bir ilerleme kaydettiler, onlar kültürde. Mesela avukat, doktor, mühendis onlar, çoğunluğu elde ettiler. Bizimkiler de bu çalışma bölümünde elde ettiler.<sup>60</sup>

Vahit's father was a silk merchant and had good relationships with the notables of the city in 1930s. Even though he had not gone school, he strove to encourage his son to go college which was incredible for an Alawi child in this period. The expression of Alawis as a sect-class indicates how "cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity." (Assman, 1995: 125 quoted from Demirci, 2008: 81) The narration of unfairness towards Alawis helped to the creation of identity and awareness of community. Akyol (2008: 81-82) compares an Arab Sunni interviewee's declarations with the two Arab Alawi ones and asserts that even though all of them emphasized their group's hardworking character and how they were able to buy all the land from their first owners, Arab Alawi interviewees tended to tie these achievements or characteristics with their communities' trait. It can be interpreted that the class

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<sup>60</sup> Vahit, 20 December 2008, Antioch.



difference between Sunni ağa and Alawi maraba on the discursive dimension was articulated with moral and humanistic values such virtue and in the subsequent process, namely after the annexation it contributed to the representation, formation and the narration of group identity.

Furthermore, being a peasant working the land of an ağa helped to reinforce the local spatial loyalties. The local patronage relationship thereby limited the development of a national identity superseding these loyalties. For the nearby rural areas of Antioch, like Harbiye and Suveydiye, the ağa was the inevitable intermediary between the outside world, namely the city, and the local village or neighbourhood. Furthermore, religion in general and sect in particular were other noteworthy dynamics in the relation to ağa. As Altuğ points out, the ağa's being a co-religionist of the peasants strengthened the local attachments. For instance, İbrahim Tuhani, one of the notables in Harbiye, was Arab-Alawi ağa and the relationship between ağa and marabas can be considered as a kind of familial relationship. After 1938, the propagandas become widespread in the region and Ibrahim Tuhani and his brother were imprisoned because of supporting the French mandate regime. The peasants and his relatives walked to the jail from Harbiye to Antioch in order to protest. His niece Sıdika (80-81, F, Alawi) tells this event as follows:

- **Ne zaman hapisten çıktı?**
- Hani Antakya Türkiye'ye katılınca on beş gün hapiste kaldı. İşte millete haber saldıği vakit amcamın oğlu Muhammet bir kumru gönderdi, mektuplar Karaçay'a, Samandağ'a Yakto'ya civar köylerdeki muhtarlara köyün hepsini toplayacaksınız hepiniz geleceksiniz ve hapishaneyi yıkacaksınız diye. Bunlar çok büyük bir kalabalıkla toplandılar hapishaneyi yıkacaklar yüz binden fazla asker toplandı, dediler ki yapmayın etmeyin vallahi bırakacaklar onları, bizimkiler de hayır bizler alevilerin temsilcilerini (kefillerini) istiyoruz. Yaşlı bir kadın elinde asasıyla seslenir biz onları istiyoruz diye, ya vallahi teyzecim bırakacaklar diyorum size. Kimse engel olamıyordu onlara askerlerin silahlarında mermi de yok! Kalabalık hapishaneye varmak üzereydi. O sırada koca bir bölük daha Fransız askeri geldi insanlar kaçışmaya başladı ben küçüktüm onlarlayım nereye kaçacağımı bilemedim, düştüm yuvarlandım. Dediler vallahi bırakacaklar öylesine içeride tutuyorlar sadece korkutmak için. Üç gün sonra Türklerden adı Hasan olan biri geldi Allahım az önce söylemişim. Bu Adalı ailesinden adı Hasan.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Sıdika, interview by Fulya Doğruel, August 2008, Antioch.

In this context, it is difficult to consider the relationship between ağa and marabas as only oppressor-oppressed relations but religion was not the main factor which determines the form of relationship. On the other hand, it is more significant to claim that the submissiveness of the peasants towards the ağa had varying tones depending on the ownership profile and the economic conditions of the peasant. Therefore, their narratives underlined more the poverty and landlessness and disapproval of landowning ağa. Writing in 1934, I. H. Tokin stated that in 1930s in the eastern and south eastern provinces, the land and other means of production used by the peasants were the property of the tribal leaders, *bey*s and *agas*.. In the provinces of these regions, peasants not only cultivated the land of the bey but also lived on it and served as corvée labour (quoted in Aydın, 1990: 170). That is to say, despotism was valid for this kind of land system which was prevalent in the eastern and south eastern of Turkey in 1930s. This claim can be substantiated when we examine what the peasants from the rural areas of Sanjak told about the despot ağa. The unique dynasty of the villages or the lands was the ağa in their narration. For instance, Vehibe (-, M, Alawi), whose family was maraba in Kuseyr plateau, tells the despotism of the ağas. She speaks in Arabic and during the interview her son translated her words into Turkish:

“Kuseyriler (allah rahmet eylesin diyor). Zamanında 3 değişik yerde bu Kuseyriler idam sephası hazırlamışlar, 3 değişik yerde. Bu komşu köyde bir tanesi, Tosunpınar eski adıyla Tampınar, eski dağdan bir pınar geliyordu, evlerin hemen bitişiğinde ben nerede olduğunu hatırlıyorum. Şimdi lise yapılmış eskiden ortaokul olan ki onların eviydi. Onların konaklarıydı. Konağı terk ettikten sonra devlet ortaokula çevirdi. Orada da bir idam sephası varmış. Devlet onlardı diyor. İstediklerini asabiliyorlardı. Kendilerinin geldiği dönemde hani Cumhuriyet dönemine denk geldiği için onların yönetimi bitmiş gibiydi. Ama daha öncesinde birçok kişinin asıldığını duymuş. Kendilerinden önceki dönemlerde çok kişinin asıldığını söylüyor. Kendilerine karşı gelen, emirlerine karşı gelenler çok kötü dayak yiyebiliyorlardı. Kendilerinden önce olan olaylarım bunlar. Çok büyük bir çınar varmış, zaten o çınarı kullanıyorlarmış asmak için. Halepoğulları mesela bunlar da ağa takımındanmış. Vahit Halepoğlu veya onun ailesinden birilerini hatırlar. Bu işleri yapanlar zaten onlarmış. Kendilerine karşı gelenlere bu şekilde ceza veriyorlarmış. İstedikleri şekilde halka muamele yapabiliyorlar. Yargı diye bir şey yok, adamlar tek hakim tek güç”.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Vehibe, 22 September 2008, Antioch.

Additionally, the strategies providing to cope with power for peasants it can be mentioned. Erdoğan (2000) suggests a concept called “popular metis”, largely drawing upon de Certeau’s work. “*Popular metis*” can be defined as tactical, diversionary and heterologic practices performed by subaltern groups; i.e., ways of using, escaping without leaving, making do with or living in the other’s territory:

A prolific inventory of popular *metis* including forms of practical intelligence, tactical creativity, trickery, simulation, dissimulation, disguise, and vigilance, was employed to be able to trick, evade, escape, and cope with the apparently omnipotent state power in subaltern history as well as in the representations of encounters with the rulers in the folk tradition of laughter. It was intertwined with a grotesque imagery in the latter case. The subaltern subject thus dwelt in a liminal space vis-à-vis the state, being neither able to accept nor able to reject the law of the place. Such practices help undo the prevalent discursive binaryisms of obedience / rebellion, consent / dissent or ideological incorporation / subversive challenge, and thus have a deconstructive and de-territorialisation force (Erdoğan, 2000: 9).

It is such a practice of Russian proverb as John Berger mentioned; do not run away from anything in the mean time do not do anything (quoted in Erdoğan, 2000: 9). It is possible to mention that Alawi peasants performed a similar strategy after the annexation under the Turkish rule. Except the Turkish flag, flags were banned to unfurl by the state. However, as Vehibe told, they used a tactic :

“Eski zamanlarda düğün yapılacağı zamanlarda gelini evden çıkarma merasimi yapılmış. O merasimlerde gelin ata bindiriliyor. Yüzü görülmeyecek şekilde duvakla örtülüyor. Bir kişi buna “bayraktar” deniyor işte, dedemiş işte o, lakabı oradan alıyor. Dedem de Hızır Aleyhisselamin yeşil bayrağını sancak olarak tutuyor. O atın önünde gidiyor. Götürüyorlar işte. Gelin etme merasimi o şekildeymiş. Gelinlerin önündeki sancağı tutma meselesi yani. Türkiye buraya geldikten sonra Türk bayrağına “bandera<sup>63</sup>” adını vermişler. Bu tür düğünlerde eğer resmi bir kişi olmadığı zamanlarda makbule geçmiyormuş. Dolayısıyla onu kullanmıyorlar. Eğer zorunlu kalıyorlarsa Türk bayrağını kullanmak gibi bir şeyler varmış. Resmi görevli vesaire falan olursa devletin gözü üstünde olursa biraz işin gerçeği halkın korkusu oluyor ve Türk bayrağını kullanıyorlar. Yok kendi kendilerine, kendi içlerinde olduklarında dini simge olarak Hızır Aleyhisselamin bayrağı, sancağı var onu kullanıyorlar. Daha önceden de buranın simge olarak kullandığı yerel bayrak asıl Hızır Aleyhisselamin bayrağı. Buranın yerel bayrağı o. Yani Alevilerin simge olarak kullandığı bayrak o.

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<sup>63</sup> “Bandıra” is a term which is used as an idiom. It means a flag.

Simgesel olarak ne bileyim senin söylediğin şeylerle bağlantısı var. Bayrak seçimi olarak düşünürsen Alevi mi, Araplık mi, Sünnilik mi, Türklük mü. Aslında bayrak olarak bunun kullanılmasının bir anlamı olmalı. Dini simge olarak kullanılması Araplık kavramından ziyade Alevicilik kavramına kayıyor. Mezhepsel bir şeylik var, bakış açısı.”<sup>64</sup>

Similarly, after turning off the recording, Arif (41, M, Alawi) told about a reminiscence regarding İbrahim Hananu who was known as one of the famous Arab nationalists. At that time, it was very common to hang a small rug on the wall and generally they were the portraits of the leaders on the rug. In Arif’s family, in some houses there was a portrait of Hananu and when any stranger, especially a Turk guest come to the house, people covered the rug with the other rug. Therefore, as a tactic of everyday practice, these two illustrations show how the people cope with the power strategically. They pretended to obey the rules like ordinary Turkish citizens as expected to them by the state.

Another tactical practice, which was performed by the marabas, was to collect the remained cereal from the harvest which was called “afara etmek” literally. They entered into the land of ağa stealthily and got to the afara. In 1930s and even 1940s this tactic can be considered as the way of escaping from omnipotent landowner’s power but today it is seen as zakat. Abdullah (85, M, Alawi) told how he, his uncle, and his cousin stole afara from ağa’s lands as follows:

“Ben, amcam ve amcaoğlu hasat sonrası buğday artıklarını toplamak için tarlaya gittik orada beş altı çuval topladıktan sonra bir at bulduk ve ata yükledik o zamanlarda Antakya’dan geçemedik yasaktı biz de çevreden dolaştıralım dedik, tarlanın orada bekçiye yakalandık bu ne dedi bekçi buğday dedik. Yasak olduğunu bilmiyor musunuz? Oradan bekçinin karısı bize acıdı yazıktır bırak gitsinler dedi öyle bundan kurtulmuş olduk tam köye vardık orada da biri bize bu taşıdığımız nedir diye sordu buğday dedik adamın amacı bunun yasak olduğunu söyleyerek mala el koymaktı o an aklıma bir fikir geldi ona Tarlanın oradan birinin ismini söyledim dedim ki o kişi eğer kim buğdayı almak istese ona buğdayı ver sonra da gelip bana kimin aldığını söyle diye bunu dedikten sonra adam vazgeçti biraz alıp gitti.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Vehibe, 22 September 2008, Antioch.

<sup>65</sup> Abdullah, 21 July 2008, Antioch.

It was the way of surviving at the same time. The poor Alawi peasants could not consume wheat because of its high cost. In other words, they were used to acquire this cereal through finding the secondary ways without paying taxes. The cooperation between land keeper and peasants or being blind to the peasants' stealing shows their opposition to the power. It should be kept in mind that there is a difference between the power of ağa and the state. However, it can be said that the people resumed performing tactics against any power.

To sum up, the relationship between ağa and "marabas" cannot be considered in the context of economic dependency. Besides, many dynamics such as religion, personal contact, and the distance to the city had roles for the formation of this relationship. On the other hand, the trust of ağa to his marabas cannot be considered as decisive factor. Additionally, neither patronage nor paternalism was valid or adequate for understanding this relationship and as a result, the descriptions of ağa of the interviewees changed according to these complex factors.

Especially after 1937, the Alawi peasants became an instrument of the strategy of Turkish nationalists in order to show the majority of their community. Kemalists tried to communicate without the mediation of Alawi ağas in the Harbiye and Suveydiye (Samandağ). Furthermore, they attempted to contact with and persuade the Alawi ağas to register as Turks. In the next sections, such strategies used by the Kemalists towards the Alawi peasants will be considered in comparison to the Arab propagandas in the framework of popular nationalism.

#### **4.2. The Question of Popular Nationalism in Antioch: Zaki Al-Arsuzi "the Professor"**

The Sanjak of Alexandretta witnessed the territorialization process from 1920s to 1930s. As Yerasimos indicates, the region's history is a good example of how territorial integrity occurred in the Middle East and of the construction of nation-states in general (2000: 175). In other words, how the region was integrated into the

Turkish national borders through attributing ethnic connotations or how the Sanjak of Alexandretta became the Hatay Republic and then the province of Turkey through this territorialisation process can help to see the relationship between space and politics.

The annexation of the region is represented as the failure of Arab nationalists and the victory of Turkish nationalists in the Turkish nationalist history. The loss of the Sanjak or the liberation of Hatay was narrated by the two nationalist sides. On the other hand, the factors, which gave fertile ground for pervading nationalist sentiments among the masses in the mid-1930s, make possible to ask some questions regarding local dynamics and hegemonic struggle between two groups. The efforts for proving the Arabness or Turkishness of the region was not only required for the invention of the common past for the Sanjak's people scientifically but also to sustain the national sentiment for the imagined community as a part of the struggle. Yet, it does not mean to neglect the development on the international level such as the Italian menace in the Eastern Mediterranean or the acquisition of complete sovereignty over the Straits by Turkey in the interwar period, which had role in the separation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta from Syria or the integration of Sanjak to Turkey. However, in this section, the post 1936 period when the treaty of Friendship between French and Syria National Bloc<sup>66</sup> was signed will be taken into consideration from the point of view of ordinary people who witnessed the period. The propagandas of two camps and the uneasiness and discontent due to the system and unemployment articulated into nationalist idioms giving rise to the dispersion of nationalist ideologies are the central issues of the following part. The comparison of propagandas of these two groups accompanied with the biography of pan-Arabist leader, Zaki Al-Arsuzi allows delving into the period extending from 1936 to 1939. In the 1920s and early 1930s, ethnic and religious conflicts were not severe as in the late of 1930s. As Khoury (1987: 494-5) claims, the dramatic slowdown of the Sanjak economy owing to the world depression and the rapid spread of Turkish and Arab

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<sup>66</sup> The Syrians concluded the Franco-Syrian Treaty of September 9, 1936, by virtue of which Syria was promised the termination of the mandate and independence and Turkey had opportunity to discuss the future status of the Sanjak (Khadduri, 1945: 409).

nationalist ideologies in the late 1930s helped the explosion of ethnic conflict especially in Antioch.

Under the mandate regime, the education system expanded rapidly. In the decade after the World War I, the number of primary schools expanded by 265 percent and the number of students in those schools jumped 286 per cent. The High Commissariat built a new lycée in Antioch and offered scholarships for higher education to eligible students of all communities. Mandatory officials encouraged students to seek post-lycée education; nevertheless, they had to leave the insular confines of the Sanjak to do so. By 1936, 65 Turcophones were enrolled in Anatolia colleges; comparable numbers of Arabic speakers studied in Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo.

The Antioch lycée was founded in 1921, after the Ankara Agreement by which the Turkish inhabitants gained the right of enjoying every facility for their cultural development. One of the education languages became Turkish. The lycée was separated into two parts such as Turkish side and Arab side after 1925 (Galioglu, 2004: 1-2) The texts of Turkish students supplied by Turkey. Engin's (30, M, Sunni-Turk) grandfather was one of the Kemalist nationalists in this period and he tells how his grandfather supported by Turkish authorities as follows:

“Dedem Antakya Lisesi'ne gitmiş. Atatürk okutmuş zaten onu, hep Atatürk için manevi babam der çünkü öz babası dedem doğmadan savaşta şehit olmuş. Dedem bir gösteriye katılmış plebisitten önce o lisedeki hocalar ve yönetim de Fransız sempatanıymış anladığım kadarıyla dolayısıyla bi sınav sırasında bu gösteriye katılanların kağıtlarını alıp kopya muamelesi uygulamışlar o da Adana Valisine durumu bildiren bir mektup yazmış. Dönemin Valisi de onu ve arkadaşlarını Adana'da bir Lise'ye yerleştirmiş. Daha sonra arkadaşları İstanbul'a gitmek istemişler dedem de onların peşine takılmış. Daha sonra dedem Hukuk Fakültesine gitmiş İstanbul'da.”<sup>67</sup>

Especially after 1936, both Turkophone and Arabophone students from the lycée organized demonstrations due to the future status of Sanjak. As in Alexandretta, these groups came under the influence of Turkish and Arab nationalists. However, it

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<sup>67</sup> Engin, 14 September 2009, Ankara.

cannot solely be expressed along with inter-communal animosity in the early 1930s. Instead, during this period, these modernized elements sought to redefine relationships within the ethnic groups. In the mid 1930s, a struggle between *novateurs* and *conservateurs* degenerated into ethnic conflict. The new generation, children of the artisans, farmers and labourers, could not enterprise in the liberal professions and even administrative posts. There were simply too many lawyers, accountants and engineers in the private sector, and civil service could not give positions to them because of budget problems of the Sanjak. Therefore, the unemployment among educated youth was increased and they felt cheated by the system. They refused to return to the occupations of their fathers (Satloff, 1986: 165-171). Along with the world depression, the traditional elites' economic power worsened, they began to encounter difficulty in renegotiating mortgage financing. Moreover, they could not find buyer for their undervalued lands. Under these conditions, the traditional notables lost their most valuable assets and this paved the way to present them vulnerable to the attacks of the progressives. However, still the Sanjak's youthful insurgents did not pose a danger for them because these youth group were only small percentage of the population. It can be asserted that the Arab and Turkish nationalisms were only secondary issues in the region in this period. In this process, the public space expanded by the foundation of newspaper, magazines, youth clubs and syndicates. Therefore, it paved the way to expand the new social and cultural organizations for this insurgent generation and artisans in the city. Yenigün Newspaper and Youth Sport Club helped to the articulation of discomfort and frustration of the youth and artisans in nationalist terms.

The syndicates which replaced guilds were noteworthy exemplary to consider these spaces of socialization for nationalists. They represented the foundation of new loyalties exceeding traditional vertical ties. Yet, most of the syndicates were ethnically homogenous. For instance, carpenters founded the first syndicate in 1928 and all of the members were Sunni Turks whereas the syndicate of masons and bricklayers was formed by the Orthodox Christians. However, only one syndicate included people from different religious and sectarian backgrounds was that of the



barbers. The syndicates were not established by the aim of class interest of artisans. Rather, they represented the uneasiness with the system and the sympathy with the Kemalist Reforms. In this context, the syndicates became the signifier of some “new” like practices such as replacing Sunday holiday with Friday or wearing European hat instead of fez (Altuğ, 2006, Satloff, 1986: 172).

On the other hand, contending groups began to identify themselves with various ideological positions. According to Khoury, there were three political factions among the Turkish-speaking population:

The autonomists who were favourably disposed to cooperate with Damascus provided that the Sanjak retained a considerable measure of administrative autonomy; those who sought independent Sanjak with strong ties to Turkey; and Turkish irredentists who wanted the Sanjak completely integrated into Turkey (1987: 502).

The autonomists were the most influential group among these three factions, which consisted of the great Turkish landowning families of the region and Turkish-Muslim religious establishment. They were socially and religiously conservative and the Kemalist movement were seen as a threat by them because they were increasingly intimidated by the Turkish nationalists. The secular reforms and anti-ağa discourse of the Kemalists were the reasons for their opposition. The two Turkish nationalist groups, the Kemalists and irredentist Kemalists, separated because their different strategical approaches. Namely, their break point was not ideological so they were cited as Kemalists who was acknowledged as “those with hat” (şapkalılar) in many articles. For Satloff (1987: 172), it is possible to split out these progressive Turkish nationalists: Independent Kemalists and Irredentist Kemalists. The former, mostly artisans and Sanjak-educated students, believed that independence from Syria and linkage to the French authorities and mandate regime would be sufficient. On the other hand, irredentist Kemalists, primarily Anatolian- trained intellectuals, demanded Alexandretta’s annexation into Turkey. The Turkish nationalisms in the Sanjak became harmonized and integrated into one dominant version gradually. In

other words, whereas the political factionalism and ambiguity continued for each ethnic community, different interpretations of the Turkish nationalism in the region converged to the official Turkish nationalism. On the contrary, the same development was not realized for Arab nationalism in the Sanjak. As Altuğ (2006) claims, the Arab nationalism did not undergo a centralization process because of the “powerless” Syrian nationalist government and the inherent ethno-religious diversity within the community.

The Arabic-speaking population was split into two major nationalist groups: National Bloc (*Vatanis*) and pan-Arab League of National Action (*‘Usbat al-‘amal al-qavmi*). While the former sought the Sanjak’s complete unity with Syria and were connected to the nationalists in Aleppo and Damascus, the latter saw the Alexandretta Crisis as the first step for the creation of a larger Arab nation. On the other hand, there was another faction in the Arabic speaking population, pro-French Mandate Arabs (autonomists). The autonomists consisted generally of the Christian minorities in the towns, the Armenians and the Alawite communal leaders. Both Turkish irredentists and the National Bloc leaders were viewed as a threat by autonomists. They were anxious to lose their authority if the National Bloc’s Sunni Arab leaders seized the control of the region.

After a while, Turkish and Arab autonomists decided to converge and founded *Ittihad-ı Anasır* (*Union of Communities*). The members were from different ethno-religious communities and older generation notables. Selahattin Kutlu, the head of Peoples House in Antioch, wrote in pro-Turkish Yenigün Newspaper that the aim of this party was not to gather all communities for peace; instead, to create opportunities or positions in any circumstances for the future<sup>68</sup>.

The pan-Arabist organization the League of National Action (*‘Usbat al-‘amal al-qavmi*) was led by Zaki al-Arsuzi<sup>69</sup> in the Sanjak, a graduate of the Sorbonne, a

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<sup>68</sup> Yenigün, 14 January, 1938.

<sup>69</sup> Zaki Al- Arsuzi was born in 1900 or 1902 in Latakia. His mother, Maryam, was from prominent religious family, and his father, Najib, was a lawyer. The family moved to Antioch in 1904. His father was known as a member of an Arab clandestine society opposing the Ottoman rule. His father was

secondary school teacher and a son of a lawyer, middling landowner of Latakia. He belonged by faith, to the Alawi sect. He drew his inspiration from racialism and struggled against Turkish irredentists between 1936 and 1938. In this period, he considered the Alexandretta Crisis as a measure of success for conveying nationalism to a broad section of society (Batatu, 1999: 135). According to Watenpaugh, the ideological and political struggle for the uncertain status of Alexandretta, the French colonial intrigue, and Turkey's political and cultural intervention contributed to the formation of the ideology that al-Arsuzi brought with him from Antioch as a refugee to Damascus in 1938 (1996: 364). It can be said that al-Arsuzi's experience in Alexandretta was fundamental to the formation of his version of Arab nationalism.

After returning to Antioch from France, he was appointed as high school philosophy teacher. He considered this position as an opportunity to create an idea of nationalism among students. Like Fichte, he wanted to seek the antidote to past imperial and colonial interventions and machinations through education and

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arrested and after brief imprisonment and torture, Najib al-Arsuzi was sentenced to exile in the central Anatolian city of Konya. After the World War I, he studied in Beirut for one year to master French. He was introduced to philosophy at school. He had limited notoriety because of saying "Sons of Earth are more capable of directing their affairs than sons of heaven." In 1920, he was appointed as a teacher of mathematics at Antioch's secondary school (tajhiz). Later, he headed the school district of Arsuz (the town, south of the Alexandretta) from 1924 to 1926. The French mandate authority appointed him to the secretariat of a cultural bureau from 1926 to 1927. Later, he acquired licencié (bachelor) of philosophy and went to Paris. Even though he attended classes, he did not obtain a degree from Sorbonne. He studied Western philosophy and scientific rationality through the works of Bergson, Nietzsche, Fichte, Decartes, Kant and others. Apparently, Bergson and Fichte influenced his nationalist ideology. Fichte's *Reden an die deutsche Nation* is an analysis of European national traits on the basis of racially determined characteristics and a plan to create a nation among the German-speaking people of Northern Europe through mass education. This plan's effect can be observable in al-Arsuzi writings on education. Therefore, he had learned the basic vocabulary of nationalism when he returned Antioch from Paris. While returning, he had jotted down in his diary the following words in French:

"Faire une nation ou créer "fantômes" être prophète ou artiste, voilà le problème."

"To forge a nation or to create images, to be a prophet or an artist, that is the question."

He departed Paris with both a sense of the ideal nation and a belief in its inherent validity and necessity. When Al-Arsuzi returned to Antioch, he encountered strange political reality which was eventually culminated by the Alexandretta Crisis. Under the provisions of the Ankara Agreement, Turkey was allowed to initiate an intensive political propaganda through various cultural and consciousness-raising programs among the Turks of the Sanjak (Auyama, 2000: 1-4, Watenpaugh, 1996: 364-8).

nationalist curriculum. In his words: “The result of this curriculum was that mind of the student took on a new condition. There were no longer Muslims and Christians in the class, rather the group became Arab and well-versed in the awakening of their community from its slumber.” (quoted in Watenpaugh, 1996: 368) Later, French authorities expelled him to Aleppo after a little more than a year because of this highly nationalist curriculum. In Aleppo, he contacted with the members of the League of National Action (‘Usbat al-‘amal al-qawmi). The members of the organization consisted of the educated youth and they were more radical than the older nationalists were. After returning to Antioch in 1934, he presided over Arab reaction to the Alexandretta Crisis.

According to Khoury (1987: 401), if one looks at the *Bayān al-Mu’tamar al-Ta’sīsī li-‘Usbat al-‘Amal al-Qawmī* (The Manifesto of the Constituent Conference of the League of National Action) released on August 23, 1933, it can be seen that the program of Usbat was neither socialist nor Marxist-Leninist (Altuğ, 2002: 155). Indeed, it replaced class struggle with pan-Arabism. Although the resistance against feudalism took the place in the *Bayān*, the two main purposes of the League were Arab sovereignty and independence and the comprehensive unity of the Arabs. On the other hand, in Antioch, the local dynamics were very different from the principles and targets of the League. The Alawi community gained importance to demonstrate the majority of the population for Arab and Turk nationalists in the process when the future status of Sanjak was ambiguous after 1936. In the Sanjak, most of Alawis were marabas or sharecroppers and they were working the land of Sunni Turk landowners as extensively explained in previous parts. Even though the two camps, Kemalists and pan-Arabists, articulated this class struggle and structure their nationalist discourse or tried to blend class struggle with ethnic idioms, it can be said that their focuses and propagandas differentiated after 1936.

As mentioned before, after the signing of the Franco-Syrian agreement in 1936, Turkey began to assert claims about the future of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The separatist tendencies became more crystallized by this agreement in the region. Furthermore, two new regulations in the process of registration facilitated Turkish

side victory. Firstly, there is an ethnic gerrymandering regarding separation communities for the plebiscite. Namely, while the Turks were allowed to register according to their ethnicity, the non-Turks were required to register on a quasi-confessional basis. Individuals could be registered in one of six groups: Turkish community, Alawi community, Arab community, Armenian community, Greek Orthodox Community and other communities. This kind of separation was very strange because it seems as if the hybrid of the Ottoman millet system and French ethnic policy in the Middle East. The Arabic-speaking community was divided based on confession whereas the Turkish group maintained as single voting group. Idiosyncratic separations were made according to language, confession and ethnicity. Secondly, On 19 March 1938, the League of Nations made a new regulation: “The applicant shall be presumed to be a member of the community to which he declares himself to belong.” (Watenpaugh, 1996: 370) Indeed, this regulation gave the way for the intimidation of non-Turk people to register as Turks. The fate of the region would be decided according to the Wilsonian ideals of democracy and the self-determination, which became the fertile ground for the rivalling nationalist groups.

The coincidence of Turkish and Arab programs for “national awakening” in the Sanjak points towards a link between Kemalism and Arabism in the postwar period is noteworthy. Like Turks’ Yenigün Newspaper, al-Arsuzi and his colleagues began to publish a pro-Arab newspaper, *al-Uruba* (Arabism), on 30 October 1937<sup>70</sup>. According to him, schools, political and cultural clubs, and newspapers were important tools for creating Arab national identity. As mentioned before, he opposed

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<sup>70</sup> The history of printed media in the Sanjak in this period during the mandate regime was very dynamic since it was used as a propaganda tool. Especially after the Ankara Agreement French, Arabic, Turkish and also Armenian newspapers and journals began to be published. Mehmet Tekin categorizes them and gives information about these publications in his book of “Hatay Basın Tarihi” (The History of Hatay’s Printed Media) but he presupposes that these papers’ publishing policies were determined by nationalist aims. In this sense, according to him, the media was divided by two camps: Turkist and anti-Turkist(pro-mandate or Arabist). This book gives clues about the printed media in this period. Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to attain these publications. According to Tekin’s archive, 25 newspapers were released from 1918 to 1939 in the Sanjak. Especially some exiled people who was in the list of “150 persona non grata”, known as *Yüzellikler* in Turkish or literally *Hundredanfiftysers*, began to write in these papers. Tank Mümtaz, Celal Kadri, Hasan Sadık, Refik Halit Karay, Ali İlmi Fani were some of writers in case. Mehmet Tekin(1985). *Hatay Basın Tarihi*. Antakya: Kültür Basımevi.

to the French sectarian policy, which was implemented in the Middle East known as “divide and rule system.” In this context, he attempted to gather Christian, Sunni and Alawi people under the Arab identity.

Among obstacles that al-Arsuzi confronted in his attempts to arouse national consciousness through the newspaper were widespread illiteracy in the Arab community and the weakness of media alone in enforcing ideological uniformity. Even if people were able to read about or hear the ideas expressed in the paper, without the proper training in the vocabulary of nationalism, they would not understand their meaning. Because al-Arsuzi’s politics had made him persona non grata in the government schools a few years before, clubs and club based outreach programs remained the best means available to further the consciousness-raising process among the young and uneducated (Watenpaugh, 1996: 374).

In this sense, he decided to establish the Fine Arts Club (*nādī al-funūn al-jamīlah*) for arousing the national consciousness among the anti-Turk people. It was the place of meeting especially for students. They made lectures and discussions in the club. According to al-Arsuzi, through the club their ideas could reach to the countryside from the centre of the city. The store-owners who participated in club activities were seen as mediator who were carrying the message of Arabism to their customers, in other words, to the peasants. Thus, it would be possible that the region echoed with nationalist feeling and spirit. This club were closed by the French and later, the Arabism club (*nadi al-uruba*) was opened in 1937. In fact, the Fine Arts Club was known as a sectarian club of the Roman Catholics and the Greek Orthodox so al-Arsuzi founded the Arabism club to gather various religious and sectarian allegiances for discussing Arab nationality and resurrection (Aoyama, 2000: 5-6, Watenpaugh, 1996: 374).

According to al-Arsuzi, the Arabism Club succeed in a short while obliterating the different sides. Young men and women from this club became ubiquitous in the streets, distinguishing themselves from cloth-cap wearing Turkish young men

(şapkalılar) by sporting the *sidera/irakiye*, a boat-shaped military hat made popular by King Faysal, which symbolized independent Arabia. Additionally, wearing *fez* was the sign of being pro-French or supporter of status quo. Pan-Arabists greeted one another with “*tahya al-uruba!*” (Long Live Arabism!) and a modified fascist salute rather than with traditional and religious greetings.



The local sports were important for the prevailing of national sentiments among the people. Turkish nationalists founded Genç Spor Klubü (Young Sport Club) on 26 August 1926. In turn, the Arab nationalists established Young Scout Club as a part of the Arabism Club. Yet, it was prohibited by the French after a while. According to al-Arsuzi while Turks conceived the importance of the club as a nationalist tool, Arabs in the Sanjak denied this institution.



The photo was taken in Affan where Fevzi Çakmak elementary school was there now. The members of the club were wearing the scout clothes.<sup>71</sup>



The identity card belongs to Zeki el-Kasım who was the head of the propagandists in 1930s.<sup>72</sup>

Like Zeki al-Kasım, whose identity card is seen above, Mehmet's (79, M, Alawi) uncle participated in this scout club. In the late of 1930s, he was eight years old. What he recalls Arsuzi's speeches is as follows:

- *Bu Fransızlar gittiğinde 8-9 yaşındaymış. Kışlada şehit olanları hatırlıyor.*
- **Siz var mıydınız Fransızlar giderken?**
- Biz o zaman küçüktük yani. Amcam mesela daha büyüktü bu Arsuzi'nin kurduğu cemiyete üyeydi. İzciydi orada. Bana kartını göstermişti, 30 numaralı üyesi miydi neydi. Suriye'den gelecekti. Bu izciler Arsuzi'yi karşılayacaktı. Benim abim de geliyordu. Onları karşılayacaktık.
- **Neler yapıyordunuz?**
- Vilayete gelindi işte.

<sup>71</sup>It was obtained from Mihraç Ural's archive.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.



- ....
- Zeki Arsuzi vardı, allah rahmet eylesin, biz onunla olurduk. O gençliği çoştururdu, Alevileri falan. Eee o kaçtı işte, Şam'a gitti. Ben Şam'da gördüm kendisini tesadüfen sordum işte...Nerdensin diye sordu, söyledim, o canımm dedi...
  - **Gençleri çoştururdu dediniz ya, ne derdi? Ne anlatırdı?**
  - Arapları çoştururdu. Mesela Şam'dan heyet gelirdi Hatay'a yani Antakya'ya, biz onu karşılardık. Harbiye'ye kadar yayan yürürdük. Bütün Antakya'da 3 tane araba yoktu. Gelir işte 3-4 kelime söylerdi. Korkmayın falan işte bugünkü siyaset gibi, yani herkesin çıkarı falan. Ama bizimki biraz değişikti. Yani biz ırkımız yani müslümalığı...Şey vardı, kötü durumlar vardı. Antakya'daki Sünnilerin en güzeli bizi sevmiz. Biz de sevmizdik. Çünkü kavga olurdu. Hocalar bizi düşürürdü. Zenginler bu iki tarafı düşürürdü. Niye? Kendisi 3-4 tahsilli. Tarih yazdı bunları gördü. Mesela Abdülğani Türkmen bütün Sünnilere karşıydı. Bizim burada birkaç tane vardı. Para verildi işte, onu tuttu bunu tuttu. İstedikleri oyunları yaptılar. Vatandaş bilmezdi..<sup>73</sup>



Al-Arsuzi was in the middle of the photo

Like Mehmet, many interviewees were children in the late of 1930s. He also talks about the inculcation that Al-Arsuzi advise them not be afraid. Probably, al-Arsuzi was retelling the rumours of Turkish incursions about which he wrote on the *al-Uruba*. Moreover, the claims of Turkish side were avowed through the newspapers in Turkey that brought about anxiety among non-Turkish population. On December 4, 1936, the issue was conveyed to the League of Nations and Ismail Müştak

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<sup>73</sup> Mehmet, 11 February 2009, Antioch.

Mayakon wrote that “We like peace as well as weapon game”<sup>74</sup> for the browbeating. In this sense, Turkey attempted to demonstrate that if it was necessary, they would have not hesitated to go to war. The Arab nationalist side was aware of this lunge.

Al-Arsuzi wrote an issued letter to the League of Nations delegates, which was published in the paper regarding the disadvantageous positions of Arabs in the coming elections and the tricks of the Turkish side in the registration.<sup>75</sup> For instance, he pointed out that Turks, originally from the Sanjak, were sent by Turkey and as they did not appear on the electoral lists prepared by the Sanjak government; they could have themselves registered in two or three precincts (Watenpaugh, 1996: 387). In this sense, what they mostly remembered were meetings, demonstrations, street fights, and al-Arsuzi’s Alawi identity. Especially in 1938, the frequency of public demonstrations, and inter-ethnic strife increased, and people who stayed in the region after annexation remember the process with violence and fear. For most of them, the conflict was not between the Arabs and Turks, instead between the Sunnis and Alawis and al-Arsuzi was the leader of Alawis. In line with this, Mehmet’s emphasis on Abdülgani Türkmen’s attitude towards Sunnis was noteworthy in terms of the comparison between Kemalists and pan Arabists. The opposition of Sunni ulema and also traditional elites was distinctive and palpable for the propagandas of Kemalists.

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<sup>74</sup> Cumhuriyet, 4 December 1936, p1. “*Biz sulhu sevdiğimiz kadar silah oyunundan da hoşlanırsız*”



“Race is everything” is written on the placard.<sup>76</sup>

Especially for the Alawis residing in Antioch, al-Arsuzi was the natural leader against Turk-Sunnis. Abdo (79, M, Alawi), who was lived in Affan throughout his life, remembered him as the “French professor”. Affan and Dörtayak were known as the politicized parts of Antioch in which mostly Alawis were resided:

- **O dönemde Arsuzi vardı.**
- Evet ben gördüm. Tanırım kendisini.
- **Kimdi bu adam? Ne yapıyordu?**
- Liderdi bu adam. Fransızca profesörü. Buraya geldi bu adam. Kendisi zaten buralı, Antakyalı. Liseye atandı. Sonra Fransaya gitti, tedrisat gördü. Baktı ki Arap kısmı, Aleviler eziliyor. Kalktı dernek kurdu. Derneği kendisi kurdu. Ondan sonra kavga falan oldu, ondan sonra anlaşma oldu. Evet...
- **Arsuzi taraftarları o dönemde bi şapka mı takıyorlardı? Sidara mı?**
- Sidara, sidara.
- **O şapkayla dolanırlar mıydı sokaklarda?**
- Evet, evet. Hatta ben de aldım. Baktım gençler falan takıyorlar, ben de istedim. Anneme babama söyledim.
- **Ne yapıyordu bu adam?**
- Bilmem, hatırlamam. O zamanı görmedim ben.
- **Peki anlatırlar mıydı?**

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

- Suriye'ye iltihak etmek için çalıştı.
- **Aileniz ne diyordu?**
- Arap taraftarıydı.
- **Ne diyorlardı?**
- Fransızlar ayırım yapıyor diyorlardı. Arsuzi.. Her gün toplanıyorlardı. Taraftarı vardı, zenginler vardı.
- **Zenginler kimler?**
- Fransız taraftarı da vardı. Sadık Maruf. İbrahim Seyfettin. O gitti Lazkiye'ye Atatürk geldikten sonra.<sup>77</sup>

Although Abdo expresses that he did not remember the content of his speeches, it is possible to infer al-Arsuzi's opposition to the French imperialism and his version of nationalism including a tone of class-struggle. According to him, the French authorities supported the rich people and therefore al-Arsuzi organized a nationalist act against them.

According to Süleyman al-Isa, who was one of the disciples from Alexandretta, "For, al-Arsuzi, the toiling masses were the source, and nationalism would be built through liberating the toiling masses ... He perceived philosophy as embodied in the ingenuous and dispossessed (...). He related the nationalist and ideological cause to the toiling people, not to all the people. This is not some kind of class distinction, as it may seem, but it rests on the assumption that the exploiting classes are not an integral part of the nation as such but strangers to its fatherland. A nation is made up solely of the miserable and dispossessed masses." (quoted from Aoyama, 2000: 4) This toiling mass was particularly the Arab Alawi peasants according to al-Arsuzi. Therefore, the oppressed Alawi community shaped the propaganda and its class-based tone.

Indeed, although he did not neglect the local dynamics and importance of "toiling masses" or the most impoverished Arab Alawi peasants in the Sanjak, he had to struggle against Turkish irredentism and French imperialism because of the two main purposes of the League of National Action. In other words, the heightening Syrian opposition to the French Mandate and the news accusing the French of indulging of Turkish irredentism were the main factors that contributed the formation of Arab

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<sup>77</sup> Abdo, 15 January 2009, Antioch.

nationalism in the Sanjak. On the other hand, there was another obstacle regarding this “toiling masses.” As a matter of fact, the politics was essentially an urban phenomenon which was disseminated around the cities, mainly in Antioch and Alexandretta, rather than in the countryside. Therefore, the middle class nationalist youth, small artisans and merchants were involved in the struggle more than the non-elite people who lived in the rural areas. Yet, it does not mean that the non-urban population were isolated from political sphere completely. It is noteworthy that in the pan-Arabist group, the class difference within and between religious-sectarian communities was experienced and accentuated on the rural-urban axis. In other words, the urban Arabist Christian and Sunni youth degraded the Arab Alewis as a group. The urban Christian and Sunni population in Antioch overlapped being “Arab” with having urban culture and being political. Arab-Alawis in the rural were seen as uncultured and even ignorant by them in the Sanjak even though the leader of the League of National Action in the Sanjak, al-Arsuzi, and some important members of League, were Alawis (Altuğ, 2002: 155). Although for this study, neither an Arabist Christian nor a Christian whose relative was an Arabist youth could be interviewed, Seda Altuğ (2002: 158), for her thesis, interviewed Edvard Huri whose family was among the notables of Sanjak. Edvard Huri’s words about al-Arsuzi and Alawis make clear this interpretation:

“Some sensible Christians were not the followers of Arsuzi. But of course they wanted to status quo to continue because, they are happy with their lives. They traded with Lebanon and Syria. They are educated in the best schools of Lebanon. They consanguinity, marriage and cultural relations with that region. They believe that all these opportunities would be lost when Turkey shows her face. But the Alawis are ignorant. They are uneducated. Arsuzi is like a prophet for them. They are devoted to him from the heart, similar to their conservative devotion to their religious.”<sup>78</sup> (quoted in Altuğ, 2002: 158)

In the same way, even though Mikail’s (79, M, Christian) father was small artisan and he was also uneducated Christian; namely, had never gone to school, he expressed similar attitude as follows:

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<sup>78</sup> The interview was conducted on June 2001 in Antioch.

- **Peki mesela burada şeyler olmuş, yani ben öyle işittim de. Dininize göre nüfus sayımında oy vermeyin, Araplara oy verin veya Türklere. Böyle bir şey hatırlıyor musunuz?**
- Öyle bir şey yok. O sana bunları söyleyen yanlış söylemiş.
- **Mesela Zeki al-Arsuzi diye bir adam varmış?**
- Eee tabii bu adam, Alevi Zeki Arsuz. Eee onların adamları, belki yani, bize göre bilmiyoruz. Onlar aralarında kimse geçmez. Evet onun ismi vardı, Alevilerin hepsi ona taparlardı. Yani Alevilerin büyük adamı, ona giderlerdi. Konuşurlardı aralarında ne yapacaklar, ne edeceklerini. Din şeylerinde olsun millet şeylerinde olsun, her şeylerini ona sorarlardı. Yani işte bilmiyoruz, ne?<sup>79</sup>

As it can be seen, the Alawi identity of al-Arsuzi was also emphasized by the member of Christian community in a different manner. Both Mikhail and Edvard Huri claimed the devotion of the Alawi followers to al-Arsuzi. The word of “devotion” which was used to telling how Alawi community politicized in the city and their affiliation with the pan-Arabism refers the perception of the Alawis as an uneducated, traditional religious group in view of Arabist non-Alawi communities in this period. As a result, not only the political factionalism but also inter-communal hierarchy was an obstacle for uniting of Arabs under the single roof. Al-Arsuzi wrote articles under the headline of “Who are the Alawis?” or “The Alawis are Arabs” were not only written for persuading of Alawis in order to be registered as Arab, but also convincing the Christian and Sunni Arabs for the Arabness of Alawis (Watenpaugh, 1996: 372).

Moreover, when the interviewees were asked why al-Arsuzi could not persuade people to register as Arabs or did not succeed in, they responded that he was not as powerful as a “state” and could not lead the people. For instance, according to Zarife (-, F, Alawi), al-Arsuzi made speeches frequently but he was not persuasive:

- **Arsuzi?**
- Yahu Arsuzi gençleri toplardı, konuşma yapardı, bir şeyler anlatırdı Affanda. Biz de duyardık, öyle söylüyor, böyle söylüyor diye. Ama zaten çocuktuk. Ondan taraf olan çok yoktu, yani ne olacak?
- **Neden taraf olan olmadı?**
- Olmadı yahu. Onlar devlet değildi, bir şey değildi. Hükmedemediler millete. Yani haydi öyle olacak, haydi böyle olacak, olur mu? Yapamadı bir şey. Ama çok çok

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<sup>79</sup> Zarife, March 2008, Antioch.

konuşma yapardı, toplardı milleti. Destekçisi vardı ama biz hiç değiştirmedik.  
Atatürk.<sup>80</sup>

Similarly, Hüseyin expressed that al-Arsuzi cheated the people because he defamed Turkey and told that Turkey was not good for people:

- **Hüseyin Amca Arsuzi diye birini duydun mu?**
- Evet, Arsuzi vardı. Gördüm Arsuzi buradayken, geziyor Arapçılara konuşuyor, geziyor. Hatta eskiden fes giyiyorlar. Arsuzi tarafı sidara böyle, sidara giydiler...Ama Fransız olan fes...İyvalla Arsuzi açtı bir tane şeyden “Nadi”. Nasıl söylenir? (Türkçesini bulmaya çalışıyor). Yani millet açtı Arsuzi, yani halk. Seven gidiyor orada yazılıyor, sevmeyene yok. Arsuzi burada çevirdi biraz, yani neyi çevirdi? Kandırdı milleti, kandırdı...
- **Ne yaptı? Nasıl kandırdı? Ne dedi?**
- Bunlar Türkiye böyle, Türkiye iyi değil, Türkiye aç. Vuruyorlar asker Türkleri. Bes asker Türkleri girdiği zaman, görürsen allah yardımcı olsun. Giydiği elbiseyi görsen...
- **Arsuzi Türkiye için ne dedi mesela?**
- Türkiye’ye vermeyin diyor, size böyle yapacaklar, şöyle edecekler. Kandırdı, olmayan bizim malımız dedi. Biz bırakmadık Türkiye’yi. Oylarını onlara koydular Arsuzi...<sup>81</sup>

While considering about Arsuzi’s nationalist movement in the Sanjak or his version of nationalism, it is important to take into account his Antioch experiences and the encountering of Turkish and Arab nationalisms in the region. The national awakening program contributed each other and it can be asserted that they produced each other reciprocally. Al-Arsuzi planned a program through which their ideas would reach to the countryside from the centre of city. The clubs, newspaper, speeches were considered as tools for reaching people in the rural in his program. Yet, his theory did not overlap the local dynamics and the circumstances in the city. However, he encountered many obstacles in order to make propaganda such as the disparity between Turks and Arabs, confining the struggle with the opposition to Turkish irredentism and French imperialism, not being able to reach de-politicized people in the rural and the conflict with members of *National Bloc* and *Ittihad-ı Anasır*. Additionally, the politics was an issue performed around the important cities, Antioch and Alexandretta. This claim was substantiated with the interviewees’ expressions. Among the interviewees, the people in the rural reminded him either with the ethnic violence or not to hear his name. Therefore, when the term of

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<sup>80</sup> Mikail, 27 October 2008, Antioch.

<sup>81</sup> Hüseyin, July 2008, Antioch.

registration was talked about, they remembered the violence and al-Arsuzi is the important figure who was remembered with the bad days. Radical groups from both of the sides attacked to each other and many people died. As a result, Atatürk was seen as liberator who interrupted the violence and street fights for the remaining people. As Altuğ (2004) stated, the nationalist ideologies had to appeal to the “people” and they sought to disseminate their respective ideologies. Indeed, the “success” of nationalisms laid in their power in translating the existing discomfort and uneasiness in the Sanjak into the terminology of official nationalisms and making people imagine their liberation at the hands of the nation state. Kemalist propagandists used different strategies for gaining popular consent in the Sanjak. In general, persuasion was employed for the winning the consent of the elites of each community whereas they used coercion towards non-elites groups in the rural hinterland (Altuğ, 2002: 211). For instance, as early as November 1937, the Electoral Commission had ascertained that the fellahin (Arab, Alawi and Kurdish agricultural labourers) had been threatened and maltreated by the Turkish ağas of Amik Plain, trying to influence them to register as Turks. According to the report of the Electoral Commission, during the registration proceedings proper a number of these ağas were involved in several cases of menace and violence to their labourers (Sanjian, 1956: 154). Additionally, the coercion was not employed towards the non-politicized people in the rural, but also towards the Turks of the Sanjak origin who were unwilling to go to Sanjak in order to register and vote (Çağaptay, 2006: 120). On the other hand, Ankara launched a campaign to win the Alawis. They used a seductive anti-ağa discourse when recounting their encounter with the rural and non-politicized Alawite population living in the district especially at the time. What were blamed for the economic impoverishment and degradation of the Alawites of Antioch were the structure of landownership, the state of landlessness, ağa and the power of the Sunni urban notables. Moreover, the government favoured the Turkish Alewis to show to those in the Sanjak that life would be good for them under the Turkish rule. In this sense, the suffering of the Antiochean Alawites that perpetuated under the Ottoman and French rules and the better conditions they would have under the Turkish rule was the main plot of the propaganda. On May 29, 1937 the EİUM (Emniyet İşleri



Umum Müdüriyeti) admonished the governor of Adana to treat well “our Turkish brothers, the so called Alawis, who we know are united with us in race.” Furthermore, the Kemalist propagandists also criticized Syria for the Sunni origin of the National Bloc and for the disturbances and the uncertainty in the country. Instead of viewing the peasant only through the patronage of the ağa, the Turkish propagandists tried to disjoin the ağa from peasants. However, they also employed the influence of a submissive Alawi ağa over his peasants on the condition of his being a Hittite-Turkish Alawi ağa (Altuğ, 2002: 210, 155). For instance, on January 10, 1937, it informed the governor of Adana that, “It has been decided to elect a Nusairi (Alawi) to the parliament.” In so doing, the governor was asked to suggest the name of a person in Adana or Mersin, who has contributed to the Turkish national movement, whose connection of the Turkishness and Turkish national revolution undoubted, and who is influential among the Nusairis. Therefore, Turkey attempted to court Alawi notables for influence over the masses. They tried to seduce them with the gifts of pistols to the Alawi notables of Harbiye, Suveydiye, and Karamurt sub-districts of Antioch (Çağaptay, 2006: 120). The Kemalists in the Sanjak was organized more strictly than their Arab-counterparts through the support of Turkey.

For al-Arsuzi an attempt to create a cult of personality around himself like Atatürk was an ideological necessity. He gave importance to the contribution of newspaper to the construction of the Arab national identity. In this sense, as the photography of and the news about Atatürk on the pages of Yenigün, al-Arsuzi’s every movement within and outside the province was taken place on the al-Uruba (Watenpauh, 1996: 377). Indeed, the local Turkish newspapers and journals such as Yeni Mecmua, Yenigün, Atayolu published news, articles and also poems about Kemalism, reforms and the movements of Atatürk in Turkey. Moreover, they tried to convey and show the greatness of Atatürk through comparing with the other leaders by showing his deep love to the Sanjak and its people (Tekin, 1994: 10-11). In other words, they repeated the veneration to him through the newspapers. Similarly, al-Arsuzi<sup>82</sup> was

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<sup>82</sup> After the Sanjak issue was carried to the League of Nations, a delegation of observers came to Antioch. The delegations began to discuss the problems in Antioch and after the long diplomatic traffic between Ankara, Paris and Geneva, a statute and draft constitution was drawn up for the Sanjak

portrayed as the leader of the Arabs but obstacles did not allow the creation of a cult of the Professor and dissemination of this cult in the region.

### **4.3. Remembering and Talking about Him: the Cult of Atatürk in Hatay**

The central role of Mustafa Kemal in the Turkish national history is not coincidental or surprising because Kemalist ideology is based on his epic. His character and personality was tried to be overlapped with the nation and state especially in the single-party era. In this context, it was necessary for the re-interpretation of Turkish Independence War, the narration and recalling of awful conditions of people for winning popular consent and appealing people and in so doing, the re-writing the legend of “Great Liberator Atatürk” was required (Daldal, 1998: 46). It is possible to find many literary works that portrays miserable conditions of people during the Turkish Independence War and glorifies the liberator of the people. However, it should not be neglected that the historical, political, personal, cultural, ideological factors were influential in the creation of the cult of Atatürk. Therefore, the image of Atatürk consists of both exaggerated and correct information regarding to him in the perception of an ordinary person. According to image, Atatürk is a long-sighted, genius and infallible person. In the national history, after 1919, he almost created the new Turkey alone and made the country out of nothing miraculously (Ünder, 2002: 140). If one traces the discourse concerning the liberation of the Turkish people, the same story or destiny in different time can be seen for the people of Hatay but just realized belated. As narrated in the national history, he used the strategic manoeuvres in the process of annexation of Hatay to Turkey thanks to his supernatural power and his talent of foreseeing remote results. He was the hero who solved the “Hatay issue” without violence and conflict or war in the region. These assertions were both true and exaggerated which reduces the local dynamics. Additionally, Atatürk’s

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and elections planned ( Özgen, 2005: 69). Arsuzi was arrested on the Election Day because of advocating a retaliatory boycott against Arab traditionalists. When Arsuzi and his followers received the same level of political and material support from communal leaders that Turkish progressiveness had been receiving from Ankara, it was too late to reverse Kemalist gains. Arsuzi went on to become a founder of the Arab Ba’th Party (Satloff, 1986: 75).

acquisition of the province of Hatay from French shortly before his death is discursively positioned as a final vindication against the humiliation of the Europeans, as well as his parting gift to the Turkish people in accordance with the ethno-centric civilizational<sup>83</sup> discourse in the 1930s.

Shelia O'Rourke (2006) in her dissertation of "*Gender, Selfhood, and Media: Hatay in the Context of Turkish Modernity*" focuses on the relationship or linkage between the "cult of Atatürk" muscularity and Turkish military. According to her, Turkey's acquisition of the Republic of Hatay is very important and in so doing it can be possible to understand how Hatay remains a repository of meanings of particular concern for the Turkish military and what impact this has on the province's civilians, a substantial portion of whom are of Arab ethnicity. She tries to understand how Arab population perceived Turkish identity and associated these two identities in historical context. Her ethnographic field study can give clues about the role of cult of Atatürk in the construction of national identity in the region. She states that Arab men of what was then the Sanjak of Alexandretta had fought with Europeans in the Arab Revolt against Gazi Mustafa Kemal, and soon after, some fought with General Kemal's army's against Europeans in the Turkish War Independence. Those who survived returned to their villages, towns and cities, and for the remainder of their lives plied family and friends with the tales of exploits in one or the other, or both of the two wars (2006: 72-73). Retelling of these narratives by their descendents, contribute to the sense, that from the very inception of Turkey's modern national drama, the Arab's of Hatay have been situated as "in between". Inherent to this in betweenness is the unstructural capacity to modify or transform the social order as well as to reinforce the status quo through serving as an escape valve, scapegoat, and reflection of what modern, civil Turkish society is not. She gives an example of this perception provided from a descent, Vesile Hurmet. Vesile Hurmet defines herself as being *benusin* (in between) Arab and Turkish, which is an apt self-evaluation when

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<sup>83</sup> Ethnocentric-civilizational(ism) as a concept is used to point out the period in which the Turkish national identity was seen as masterful ethnicity or race against Western countries. In this sense, the annexation of Hatay takes place in the national history for the vindication against the humiliation of Europeans.

considering the Arab peoples of Hatay are characterized by intellectuals and academics, as “Turkicized Arab” (2006: 47). On the other hand, her interpretation can be assessed by only one explanatory factor while considering the process in which the national identity was attempted to construct.

In this section, the answers to the question of how Atatürk as a leader is/was perceived by interviewees from different ethnic and religious background and classes during and after annexation will be tried to be interpreted. In this context, the questions of who is Atatürk , how did he liberate them, when did they see Atatürk or his photography were asked in the first place. In so doing, it is possible to learn both the legends about Atatürk in the region and thus to understand how the propagandas of Kemalist nationalists<sup>84</sup> were perceived.

The answers of peasants, all of whom are Alawis, shows that they relate Atatürk’s effort of annexation with the anti-ağa discourse. It was usually stated that “Atatürk made all people equal”. This statement implies two different inequalities for these interviewees to be equal with Sunni people and to get rid of being maraba, to reach higher social class and all of the achievements that were succeeded through the annexation. Sadık (84, M, Alawi) told about an incident, which indicates how this anti-ağa discourse was shaped in the collective memory:

- **Türkiye askeri ilk geldiğinde burada mıydın? (resim gösteriyorum.)**
- Buradaki Türkler, Türk askeri gelince çok sevindiler ve buradaki Alevileri katledip burada barındırmayacaklarını sandılar. Bir tane kız geldi, çıplaklığı. zilt<sup>85</sup>. Türk askerinin yanına gitti ve soyundu. Türk askerine kendini sundu. Sandılar ki, biz Alevileri yok edecekler. Türkler Alevileri katledeceklerini sandılar. Ama yalan, Atatürk buradaki Alevileri Türklerden daha fazla tuttu.
- **Yani Atatürk sağladı bunu.**
- Evet. Atatürk Adana’da bir ev Alevilerin bir ev Türklerin demiş. Buradaki Türkler de Alevilere evlerinizi bize verin, geldikleri zaman zaten sizi sürecekler, katledecekler, “Oğlum bu evleri bize verin, siz de bu evler de onlar gelene kadar oturabilirsiniz” diyorlardı. Sonra haber verdiler. Kimi cemaatler var Atatürk’e telgraf gönderdiler. Atatürk haber gönderdi. Buradaki bütün ağaları Adana’ya akşam çağırılmış. Adana’da

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<sup>84</sup> As mentioned earlier, Kemalist nationalists were opponent to the structure of land system, ağa and the power of Sunni urban notables and the Sunni religious establishment. They were seen as drawbacks by Kemalist nationalists.

<sup>85</sup> Zilt means “naked as a jeybird” (anadan doğma).

onları topladı. Ağalara birer birer “Sizin yanınızda kaç kişi var? 15-20 mi? Ne kadar silahlılar bunlar? 2 tane mertini<sup>86</sup>, 3 tane çift ve şu kadar tabancaları var” diye söylüyorlardı. Bunların hepsini yazdırdı. Bütün bu köylerdeki adetlerini silahlarını yazdırdıktan sonra, ağalara 2-3 gün sonra geleceğim ve ben geldiğimde bütün bu köylüleri silahları ile birlikte aynı yerde toplayacaksınız. Biz Alevilerin hepsini katledeceğiz” demiş. Ve geldi. Ve Kışla’nın orada o toplanan köylülerin hepsini askerleri ile kuşattı. Sonra hepsini zapt etti Adana’dan gelen askerlerle(Türk askeri). Ağaları çağırırdı. Her ağaya adamların kim, ne kadar silahın var, ne kadar adamların var diye sordu. Adamları ile silahlarını gösterdi. Köylülerin silahlarını aldı. Askerler silahlara el koydular ve köylüleri gönderdiler. Ağaları göndermediler, tuttular. 30-35 ağa vardı. Bu ağaları gün ışımadan astılar. Gün ışıdıktan sonra halk çıktı, meydanlarda ağaların asılmış cesetlerini gördüler. Orada bulunan Türkler bu sefer Alevilerin yanına koşup yalvardılar bize bir şey yapmayın diye. Bu olan olay Adana merkezliydi. Bu şekilde barış geldi, anlaşmış oldular.<sup>87</sup>

There was no means of mass communication in the rural areas and illiterate public population had a dense oral communication network running through rumor, gossip and hearsay. The event told by Sadık is significant example of how they recognized these propagandas. Atatürk is generally understood as a symbol for the state ideology of Kemalism, especially in its key republican and secularist principles. Comprising between Syria, Turkey and the mandate rule, the Alawi peasants perceived the Turkish rule as the only salvation from the poor conditions that they were enduring as the propagandists presented. In this context, Mustafa Kemal was seen as liberator for the Alawi peasants.

In the early 1938, a commission was established which named “Faal Heyeti” (hey’et-i faale)<sup>88</sup> in Ankara and the commission was sent to the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Ada, 2005: 152-53, Melek, 1966: 39). Alawis in the region were very important for the census and showing the majority of the Turks. Besides, an attempt to prove the Turkishness of Alawis in Ankara was started before establishing the commission. It was decided that one of the important mission of the commission was to convince Alawis in order to register as Turks. The other was to provide dwelling in the city to those who were born in the Sanjak but living in Turkey. Alawis from Adana came to Antioch and rural areas to talk about their experiences under the Turkish rule. Moreover, a letter of instruction was prepared for the civil servants or propagandists.

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<sup>86</sup> Shotgun (Av tüfeği)

<sup>87</sup> Sadık, 25 September 2008, Antioch.

<sup>88</sup> The members of the commission were Abdurrahman Melek, Rasim Yurtman, Alibullah Mürsel, İnayet Mürsel, Veli Karabay, Dr. Vedii Bilgin (Melek, 1966: 39).

According to the letter, they must come with their families, and when they came to the city, firstly, they had to visit the commission, to become a member of the Hatay People Party and to get information about rules from party. Especially, it was declared that their primary responsibility was to make propaganda about circulating the “fact” that they were the Eti Turks and they originally come from Hittites who were the first inhabitants of Anatolia. Hamdi Selçuk, the president of the People House in 1937, states as follow:

“Yapılacak bir çok işler vardı. Kökü ta Etilere dayanan, Öz Türk oldukları halde mezhep ayrılığı yüzünden ayrı bir cemaat olarak gösterilmiş olmaları birçok Alevi hemşerilimizi rencide ediyordu. Türk listesine Türk olarak yazılmak istiyorlardı. Bu yolda düşünenlerin başında Antakya ve Samandağ’da büyük isim yapmış Cilli ailesi ve Suphi Bedir ve Gali ailesi, Şeyh Sait Tüleyli, Harbiye’den Fazıl Gabbuş ve ailesi ve birçok Alevi ileri gelenleri vardı. İskenderun ve havalisinde, evvelce Suriye Meclisine milletvekili seçilmiş olduğu halde meclisi terk ederek gelen Şeyh Davut Reyhani ve bu ailenin bütün fertleriyle İskenderun’da Abdülhamit Tümkaya ve oğulları Ahmet ve Selim Tümkaya ve münevver gençlerden Ali Şelhum, Süleyman Örs, Mavunacılar Derneği Başkanı Reis Sülayman ve yine Reis Mikail, Tüccarlardan Sabri Mavi ve daha birçok şahsiyetler bu davanın önderliğini yapıyorlardı...Sık sık köylere ve bucaklara gidiyor halka davanın önemini izah ediyorduk. Davaya inanmış olmanın heyecanını taşıyan Türkçe bilmeyenlere Arapça olarak tenvir edici müessir sözler ediyordu.” (Selçuk, 1972: 91-92)

The “illuminative” speeches of the propagandist were not only uttered by the Kemalist Alawi Antiocheans, but also by the Alawis from Adana. Cilician Alewis were praised because of their dedication for affiliation to the Turks in the Yenigün Newspaper on 8 April 1938. The headline of “Especially Cilician Alewis are the apple of our eye” laid emphasis on the cooperation of some Alewis who accepted their Turkishness. As Altuğ (2006: 23) states, in some cases, Atatürk was claimed to belong to the Alawi sect. Vehibe (-, F, Alawi) , When she was a child, witnessed a propagandist utterance as:

- *Bizim komşulara gelen Adanalı birisi ama Arap Alevisi Adana’da yaşıyor. Ve bu Atatürk’le falan daha Türkiye gelmeden evvel, bu adam “Ben Atatürk’le aynı safta ceme girdim, ceme katıldım. Birlikte biz namaz kıldık cemde ”tarzında bir açıklama yapıyormuş. Annem de bunu bizatihi duymuş. Yani Atatürk’ün kimlik olarak Alevi kimliği falan işte, bir şekilde sahip olduğunu düşünmüşler. İsmi de mesela şey yapıyorlar, Ali Rıza’dır. Ali Rıza da Oniki İmamlardan birinin ismidir.*
- Annesi Zübeyde Hanım.

- *Zübeyde ve Ali Rıza. Ali Rıza zaten Alevi ismi. Ve oradan değişik bir bağlantı kurmuşlar.*<sup>89</sup>

Markus Dressier argues what Mustafa Kemal symbolizes in the Turkish Alawis' religious narrative. The portraits of the two Alevi saints, Ali and Hacı Bektaş, accompanied by that of Kemal Atatürk, the founding father and first president of the Turkish Republic, whose picture is almost omnipresent in Turkey. Dressier states that some Alewis not only strongly upheld Kemalist republican and secularist principles, but also give them a religious meaning. These Alewis honored Atatürk as a saint and embed laicism and certain themes of republican history into their religious narrative (2003: 109). In comparison with the Turkish Alewis, Arab Alawis did not conceive him as a saint. But indeed, considered him a member of their sect as an Anatolian Alawi. It can be inferred from Vehibe's interpretation regarding his father's name, Ali Rıza, which is an Alevi name.

According to the plot of the Kemalist propaganda, the Antiochean Alewis had been suffering under the Ottoman and French rules and those Alewis from Adana (Cilicia) had been experiencing much better conditions under the Turkish rule. For the liberation from religious discrimination of Sunni ulema and ağas, Kemalist reform programme -which transformed the *iltizam* system or mandate regime into a republican secularist nation-state- was conceived as the way of salvation.

The salvation of the region was demonstrated as the liberation of women in the Sanjak as well. At this point, the linkage between Kemalist propaganda especially in relation to wearing religious based clothes such as the veil and turban the liberation of women as important. In 1938, Nuriye Siliöz, who was the teacher in the Sanjak, wrote an article regarding the region's women.<sup>90</sup> She expressed her observations about women in Antioch and in the countryside. The main purpose of the article was to emphasis on their Turkishness and similarity in terms of the origin. On the other hand, the differences were not neglected by her. The urban women were represented

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<sup>89</sup> Vehibe, 22 September 2008, Antioch.

<sup>90</sup> Yenigün, 16 April 1938, p 4.

as modern, bookish, open to innovation and having knowledge about etiquette and home economics whereas women in the rural were praised by their purity, hard working character and virtue. Moreover, Siliöz pointed out the difference between Amik's women and Turk Alawi women in the rural with an anthropological eye. For demonstrating the common origin, in spite of their different arrays and rituals, she associated Amik's women with the Avşar (Avshar) tribe's women in Central Anatolia while she tried to show the similarity regarding dressing between Yörük (Yuruk) women and "Turk" Alawi women. Siliöz also attempted to imply the Turkishness of Alawi women through the equality between sexes in the Centra Asia. Namely, she gave an example to show that rural women went to ceremonies with their husband. According to Siliöz, the class difference, which could be understood through the impoverishment of Alawi peasants, stemmed from the previous despotic and autocratic regimes. However, these differences could be eliminated through the struggle for national liberation in Hatay. In so doing, all people in the Sanjak became together and equal on the basis of civic ties. This liberation was at the hand of Atatürk. Kemalism and Turkishness was the way of cohesion for the women. After the annexation to Turkey, like Siliöz, Nakiye Elgün, who was member of the parliament, reminded to the women of Hatay their Turkishness (Arat, 1998: 88). In turn, the interviewees Mediha and Zarife, Alawi women in the rural, did not perceive the ban of garments as liberation for women. When Zarife was asked what changed in their lives after the annexation, she replied as follows:

- **Ne değişti Atatürk geldikten sonra?**
- Geldiği zaman ne değişecek, sadece iyi oldu. Yüzünüzü kapatmayın dedi, giyinmek isteyen böyle giyinsin dedi. Bazıları kendini kapatırdı, gizlerdi böyle çarşafı sanki kadın gibi, eteklerinin altında silah saklardı Atatürk'ün yanında. Allah Rahmet eylesin Atatürk. (susar)..<sup>91</sup>

Mediha, like Zarife, indicates the possibility of assassination against Atatürk, which was probably a rumour, disseminated among people in the rural. Although it is

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<sup>91</sup> Zarife, March 2008, Antioch.



possible to mention the idea of equality from Zarife's words; indeed, it was not between man and woman:

- **Türklerden de askere gidenler oluyordu ama?**
- Evet, Atatürk zamanı, herkesi eşit yaptı.
- **Atatürk geldiği zaman ayırım olmadı?**
- Yok yok yok, olmadı. O zamanlar çarşaf vardı, mesela çarşıya giderdik, annemin mesela hiç yüzü görünmezdi. Sırf Atatürk için, mesela hıyanet yapacak çarşafli erkekler vardı. Biz çıkardık o erkekler yüzünden. Çarşafın içinde kaçakçılık yapardı, hıyanetlik yapardı. Bak şimdi bunun içinde silah saklıyorlardı.
- **Alevilerin arasında Arapları tutan oldu mu? Yoksa hepsi Atatürk'ü mü istedi?**
- Yok yok yok hiç yoktu öyle şeyler. Hepimiz çok sevindik Atatürk gelince. Kızım Atatürk geldiği zaman kim varsa hepsini eşit yaptı. Dağılmış olanları topladı. Bitirdi yani düşmanlığı. Sona erdirdi. Özgürlük getirdi nasıl... Eskiden annem çarşaf giyinirken ben seçemezdim annemi, hepsi birbirine benzerdi.(gülüyor).<sup>92</sup>


The emphasis on making Sunnis and Alawis equal under the Turkish rule and the opposition to ulema were the focuses of the Kemalist propaganda in the region. Therefore, to put off garments was the tool in the process of annexation to the modern state and it is important to consider it in the context of the cult of Atatürk.

Furthermore, as has been noted, the relationship or linkage between the “cult of Atatürk” muscularity and Turkish military can be taken into account in the context of Hatay history in the national historiography. According to O'Rourke, the cult of Atatürk and its hegemonic masculinity is elemental for *Jandarma* (gendarme) in order to exert social relations of dominance over the population of Hatay. If one considers the mean of “cult of Atatürk” for Arab descent, it is important to grasp how depicted Turkish military and Arab men were in the historical narratives. In this sense, how the Arab çetes and the struggle of Turkish military against Arabic çetes depicted is important. The question is who is the hero and who is the betrayer. The Arab is depicted less than masculine whereas Turkish depicted more paternalistic. Categorizing Arab men as less than masculine, and as less than Turkish, and being paternalistic, physically abusive and systematic in their military domination fortifies the jandarma's collective identity. This endeavour of demonstrating Turkish military

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

as more masculine can be seen in the picture below on the left which was taken place in the Yenigün Newspaper on July 5, 1939:



*Geçen sene 5 Temmuz da Hatay Memetçisine böyle kavuştu.*



Contrary to this portrayal of masculine Turkish military, the interviewees who witnessed the Turkish troops entering into the region had a very different depiction. George (79, M, Christian) was going to his school when the troop was marching and he tells about the day as follows:

- O sene ikinci senesinde, sene 1938 yok eee 38. Çantamı koymuşum annem bana torba dikmiş, o torba böyle askılı aynı çantalar gibi. Arapça ve Fransızca kitaplarım içinde. Bir de mürakkep hokkası elimde ve aynı zamanda o zamanki kalem tahta ve ucu girşli olur. Uç içersinde giriyor, onunla yazı yazıyoruz. Şimdi onlar yok, tarih onlar. Evden çıktım, ev burada (eliyle gösterir). Anadolu lokantasının önüne geldim. Bir gürültü bir ses. Ne bu dedim. Türk askeri geldi dediler, ordu. Ben orada durdum. O lokantanın önünde bir pencere var önünde eskiden yıktılar onu, bir tahtası var böyle. O pencereye dayandım. Oturdum oraya. Türk askeri geçti, Türk askeri geçti buradan böyle, durduk. Beylan'dan taa buraya yayan gelmişler. Bir koku ter koku, off, (burnunu tutar) neyse. Onlar artık yorgunluklarından, terlemelerinden koktular, o kadar insan. Burdan böyle geçtiler, buradan böyle çıktılar, taa şeye Kurtuluş caddesinden Habib Neccar Camisinin oraya. Oraya yerleşim yaptılar. Hazırlık yapmışlar onlar. Bir sene Türk askeri ile Fransız askeri yaşadı burada beraber. Netice, şeye geçtik o günü, okula, müdür dediki, oğlum dedi, bugün okul kapandı, siz gidin evinize, biz size haber ederiz. Ve o gidiş. Bir daha okul mokul yok ve ben hiç okumadım ondan sonra. Bir sene sonra, Fransız askeri burayı teslim aldı, şeyy çıktı. Türk askerine teslim etti, bayrak indirip bindirdiler merasimle ve Fransız askeri çıktı gitti buradan (...)Başladılar burada askerler gidip geldiler eğitime. Taa şeye gidip eğitim yapıyorlardı, lise varya şimdi. Bu lisenin arka tarafı geniş sahaydı. Kurbatlık derdik biz oraya, yani bütün kurbatlar çingeneler orada yaşardı. Çadır aslında. Siyah kıldan yapılmış böyle çadırlar var. O çadırların altında yaşıyorlar orada. Şimdi asker yürürken şöyle derdi “ Belen

dağlarından indik aşağı/Karşıdan göründü Asi Irmağı/ Hatay'a dikildi Türkün bayrağı/  
Yeniden vatana bir vatan kattık/ Haykırırız yılmaz Türk'le yine patlayan topraklar/ Şahit  
o günler, kılıçtan damlayan kanlar” Halbuki ne kavga oldu, ne kan süzüldü, ne bir şey  
oldu. Bunu devamlı gidişlerde gelişlerde söylerlerdi. Biz de çocuktuk, öğrendik. Biz  
de beraber söyledik. Daha ne anlatayım sana?<sup>93</sup>



On 5 July 1938, Antioch

Despite the fact that Mediha had not seen the soldiers, her friends talked about them, after the ceremony:

- **Hiç Türkiye gelmesin diyenler olmuş muydu? Korkanlar olmuş muydu?**
- Evet çocuklarımız askere gidecek diye korkanlar olmuştu. Daha önce Suriye varken askerlik yoktu. Türk askeri buraya geldiğinde gördük, çok fakirlerdi. Yazık derdik onlara. Çok kötü giyinmişlerdi. Böyle çok kötü giyinmişlerdi, çok üzüldük.
- **Onları geçerken mi gördün?**
- Yok bazı çocuklar gördüler. Ben evden çıkamazdım o zamanlar, ben görmedim, onlar anlattılar. Kız çocukları o zamanlar evden çıkmazdı yani

Like Mediha, Salim<sup>94</sup> (-, M, Alawi) makes similar depiction about the Turkish soldiers. Their poorness, weakness and was stressed by the ordinary people and their claims are not consistent with the narration of Turkish testimonies mostly taking place in the national historiography. The emphasis on the braveness, powerfulness, and masculinity of the soldiers refers the fictional feature of the national history.

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<sup>93</sup> George, 14 January 2009, Antioch.

<sup>94</sup> Salim, 21 July 2008, Antioch.

#### 4.4. The Migrated and the Remaining People: Remembering or Forgetting

Following the French-Syria treaty of 1936, the issue regarding the future status of the Sanjak was carried to the League of Nations in September 1936. The entire discussion centred on the question as to whether the Sanjak would be a part of Syria after the French Mandate expired or become a separate political entity. In the meantime, Turkish government has not yet demanded the immediate incorporation of the Sanjak into Turkey but it supported the proposal that the Turks of the Sanjak had the right for self-determination. At the end, the League of Nations designed the Sanjak explicitly as an “independent entity” (entité distincte) separate from Syria and it granted the Turkish element at the same time extensive administrative and cultural autonomy in May 1937 (Pekesen, 2006: 62-3). The League of Nations appointed a commission to make preparation for the first elections to the Assembly of the Sanjak to be held on April 1938. In this period, the violence in the streets and neighbourhoods of Antioch reached to its peak. Street fights were increased in the city; spatial segregation became more explicit. Mehmet stated the street fights as:

- **Siz hiç öyle çatışmalar hatırlıyor musunuz?**
- Bazen öyle kavga falan olurdu. Şimdi bizim annemlerin evi cadde üzerinde, şimdiki Affan kahvesinin oralarda. Biz gençlere taş getirirdik, çünkü silah yok. Tabi karşı tarafta da öyle. Bu olunca bir bakarsın ya polis gelir ya Fransız askeri gelir, bazılarını alırlardı. Çok iyi hatırlarım.<sup>95</sup>
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He said that he did not prefer remembering this tragic period during the interview repeatedly. His uncle was an Arabist and for this reason, he did not want to be seen as an Arabist, he accentuated his loyalty to the Mustafa Kemal and Turkey. According to him, the reason of all these fights between “Sunnis” and “Alawis” was the French authorities which was a common external enemy. The fighters of both parties were mostly artisans, local toughs, shopkeepers and the unemployed. The violence grew as fierce as to force the League’s commission to withdraw (Watenpaugh, 2006: 377).

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<sup>95</sup> Mehmet, 11 February 2009, Antioch.

Despite the autonomists and traditional urban elites had more localist and authentic tones, the violence forced people either to choose one of the nationalist parties or to leave. In the meantime, Sunni Turk traditional notables sided with the Turkish part because of the possibility of losing their existing economic power. Turkey and its local representatives tried to obtain an absolute majority in the registrations, but in spite of all the intimidation and manipulation they resorted to, they could not attain the intended majority when the registration was resumed in May 1938<sup>96</sup>. A hundred-sixteen families of Arabs and anti-Kemalists had already immigrated from the Sanjak to Syria; others were waiting their turn. The forthcoming electoral proceedings would help them to make their decisions in favour of leaving. On May 28, it was announced in Turkey that the French had guaranteed a Turkish majority of 22 seats out of 40 in the future Sanjak Assembly (Altuğ, 2006). The Hatay Republic was inaugurated on September 2, 1938. The new regime filled all-important posts with Turks, especially emigrants who had returned to the province from Turkey. On the economic front, there was now free and increased trade between Turkey and Hatay. By February 1939, Hatay became part of Turkey (Khoury, 1987: 511-12).

After the incorporation into Turkey, the exodus of large numbers of people into Syria began. Just two months after the annexation, Syria had already received some 50,000 refugees. The largest number was Armenians –as many as 22,000- who had fled their homes even before the French troops pulled out, many for a second time in less than 20 years. Moreover, some 10,000 Alawis, 10,000 Sunni Arabs (including tribes), and 5,000 Christian Arabs left. Those who chose to remain were Sunnis and Alawi peasants who were attached to the land and who, unlike the merchant or artisanal communities, had few opportunities to settle in Syria (Khoury, 1987: 513).

Many interviewees remembered this big emigration as some emigrants were their relatives. It can be claimed that there were various reasons to emigrate. For instance, Sultan's (82, F, Alawi) brother was a salaried soldier in the *Troupes Spéciales du Levant*, which was established in the Middle East by the Mandate regime in order to

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<sup>96</sup> It was seen that the ratio of Turks increased only 7 percent after the registration.

provide safety and security (van Dam, 1996: 22). The troop in the Sanjak was composed of Alawi and Armenian inhabitants. Her brother went together with the French when the city was evacuated:

- Evet Fransızlar geldiler, gittiler yani, hiç öyle harb marb yok. Dediler ki Türkiye geçecek buraya. Öyle çekip gittiler, kardeşim barabar gitti. Biz burada kaldık...<sup>97</sup>

She stated that her brother was recruited because of their poverty and it was seen as a job opportunity. Many interviewees claimed that the Alawi peasants in the rural and poor people in the city were recruited owing to the same reason. On the other hand, the recruitment of Alawis was seen as a trick of French authorities by other communities. According to Fikret (89, M, Sunni Turk), who was the first mayor of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) after annexation, it was a tactic in order to seduce Alawis:

- Kızım şimdi Aleviler de bütün milletlerde olduğu gibi Alevilerden bize iltihak eden de oldu. Kimisi paralı Fransa'dan, zaten askerliği de hep paralıdır, para suretiyle tahrik suretiyle Alevileri kullandılar, Ermenileri kullandılar genellikle. Mücadele bu yönde oldu, evet. Hatay devleti kurulduktan sonra Ermeniler gerilemeye başladı ve Cumhuriyetin şeyleri Hatay kavuşunca, başta Ermeniler olmak üzere dışarıya doğru gittiler. Hatay'ın çeşitli yerlerinden kaçmaya gitmeye başladılar.<sup>98</sup>

He thinks that Armenians and Alawis were used as tool by the French in the Sanjak. While the immigration of the Armenians was talked, he used the term of “the thing of Republic” for who immigrated to Syria. What he implies was probably the opponents of the Turkish Republic and Turkish nationalists such as anti-Kemalists, 150'liks, Armenians, Arabists. Fikret's family was the member of a Turkish tribe from Karayılan, a town near Iskenderun. Their relationship with Mursaloğulları, and thus Tayfur Sökmen was very close. In this sense, he was a Kemalist nationalist and he can be interpreted as a mouthpiece of the Hatay government or the reflection of the state-centred approach. At the beginning, he stated that being looser was the main factor for Armenian's flight to the Syria after the annexation. However, when the

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<sup>97</sup> Sultan, 5 April 2008, Antioch.

<sup>98</sup> Fikret, 9-10 July 2008, Iskenderun.

factor of fear was asked to him, he accepted the importance of the fear but he explained it with state-centred viewpoint:

- **Sizce neden kaçıyorlardı? Korku...**
- Korku efendim, biliyorsunuz Birinci Cihan Harbi'nin sonunda, Doğu'da özellikle Ermenilerle Türklerin, Ermenileri Ermeni Devletlerinin tahrik etmesi sonucunda çatışmalara başlandı. O başladığı vakit, halk da galeyana geliyor tabi, senin benim derken, o onu yakıyor bu bunu yakıyor, o öbürünü öldürüyor derken... Bunları tarihte okuduk tabi. Hepimiz de duyduk tabi. Onda böyle bir korkaklık olduğu için, oradaki Ermeniler özellikle Türkiye'dekiler, astı, kesti, yaktı, sonra hepsini darmadağın etti. Buradaki Ermenilerin çoğu Adana, Antep Maraş'tan gelmedir. Bunların çoğu Halep'e göçtü. Şimdi, öyle olaylar oluyor ki, o onu vurunca bu bunu vurunca ve herkes gitmeye karar veriyor. Hükümet bir karar çıkarıyor. Diyor ki, bu tarihten itibaren Türkiye'yi terk edip gitmek isteyenler birer birer evlerini satıp paralarını alarak istedikleri gibi gidebilirler. Kimisi ehliyetli gitti, kimisi askerle gitti.
- **Bir zorlama söz konusu değildi?**
- Zorlama değil. Türkiye de bir zorlama yok. Türkiye vatandaşı dışındakilere gitmen lazım dedi. Mallarını satsınlar dedi.<sup>99</sup>

Fikret's expression is accordance with that of Abdullah Melek, who was the prime minister of the Hatay Republic. Even though there was no reason to leave or it was exaggerated, the Armenians migrated. Melek states that the harassment of one or two drunk men in Kırıkhan and Belen was exaggerated by the Armenians. An Armenian deputy of Hatay Assembly went to Cyprus and sent a letter in which he wrote that he resigned from being a member of the Parliament. The source of the rumours related to the maltreatment towards Armenians was presented as the propaganda of the "strangers" but Abdurraman Melek did not write who they were in his book (1966: 82). As mentioned earlier, the new regime filled all-important posts with Turks and Fikret obtained one of the posts as a mayor when he was eighteen years old:

- Ermeniler, Türkler, Fransızlar birbiriyle kardeş gibi yaşadı. Zerre kadar olay olmazdı. Şimdi yalnız Ermeniler değil, Fransızlardan da diğer milletlerden de gidenler oldu. Gidenler olunca başta kaymakam, emniyet müdürü, posta müdürü, belediye başkanı gibi amirler Ermeniydi, Türkler gelince bunların hepsi işi bırakıp gitmek istediler. Gidenler gitti yerleri boşaldı. Yerine adam getirecekler... Şimdi milletin işi durmaz. Yerine gelecek insanın da 3 lisan bilmesi lazım, Türkçe, Fransızca ve Arapça olduğu için...Bu işleri de herkes bilemez. Onu bilen bir memleket sever, hizmet sever bir Türk olacak...O zaman böyle adam hiç yok. Ben belediye başkanı olduğum için Benim babam da mücadelede hizmet ettiği için, beni getirdiler, belediye başkanı ettiler, fotoğrafları vardır. Ben 18 yaşındaydım o

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

zaman,18 yaşında daha sakalım çıkmamış. Böylece belediye başkanlığı hizmetim oldu. Tabi devirler değiştikten sonra ben askere gittim sonra seçim yaptılar, benim durumum böyle geldi geçti. Şimdi benim aslında benim burada kim olduğum ne olduğum gerek yok. Bu beni methetmekten, övmekten başka bir işe yaramaz.<sup>100</sup>

According to Fikret, the main factors of his appointment were that he was multilingual and a Turk who devoted to public service. This political implementation coincided with the maxim of Kemalist nationalism that “Turks are governed only by Turks” (Yıldız, 2002: 210). The Turkishness is depicted based on ethnicity not race. The ruling elite and secularist-intellectual class was expected to be Turk.

As a result, the evacuation of the French caused panic in the non-Turk communities and the large-scale emigration could no longer be prevented. There was only one Armenian interviewee, Gabriel<sup>101</sup> (-, M, Armenian-Christian), among the interviewees. He was also among those, who chose to stay in his hometown, Vakıflı, a small Armenian village. Gabriel stated that before the withdrawal of the French troops, General Collet, the delegate of High Commissioner, came to their village and claimed that there was no reason for being panic because, as Collet stated, the leader of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal would protect them. Although he expressed the trust on the General Collet’s words, the main reason of remaining was that there was no better option for them. As Khoury pointed out, the attachment to the land was the main factor for staying even though they were anxious at this time. Likewise, Altuğ indicates, the mass-forced emigration from the inception of the World War I until the annexation, the street fights, violence were the main factors, which contributed the formation of the remaining people’s attitudes and feelings. These events stimulated people to look for a way to sustain their living. In other words, mainly two events were important in the occurrence of the fear among non-Turkish people: immigration and ethnic violence. After the annexation to Turkey, the fear of those who had no option other than staying, was transformed into a submissive respect towards the dominant state (2002: 151-2).

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Gabriel, 2 January 2009, Samandağ.



Besides, it can be claimed that this submissive respect was accompanied by the “narration of regret”. There was a prevalent belief regarding the emigrants that they were all stayed in Syria became poorer who had had property in Antioch. Therefore, according to this narration, they were so regret until now. The dialog regarding to emigrants between Mehmet and his son, Selim illustrates this belief well:

- *O zamanlar Arsuzi'yi nasıl görüyordun? Bunlar arap milliyetçiliği için mücadele veriyordu. Sonra burada kaybettiler. Kaçmak zorunda kaldılar.*
- *Elbette. Şimdi oradan kaçanlar da...Çok Antakyalılar da Alevi olanlar onunla birlik oldular. Kimse kafasını çalıştırmıyordu, git dediler. Çünkü sonra dediler ki, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti geliyor, sizi öldürecek, Alevileri bilmem ne yapacak filan...Onlar korktu gitti..Şu ana kadar pişmanlar...kalanlar kazandı. Bu da ayrı mevzu.....*
- *Şimdi ben şunu merak ediyorum. Bu Zeki Arsuziler, Zerkalar, Kavvaslar, Cebbaralar, bunlar kaçmak zorunda kaldı...*
- *Onlar pişman oldular.*
- *Ama onlar Suriye'de de önemli yerlere geldiler. Bu adamların gidişlerini sadece korkuya bağlamamak lazım. Türkiye'de yaşamaktansa Arap olarak yaşamayı tercih etmiş olabilirler. Sanki Antakyalılar da onları böyle görmek istiyor gibi geliyor bana. Şimdi Türkiye Suriye'den ilerde, ama ben burada yaşayamam diyerek de gitmiş olabilirler. Çünkü bunların yaşam tarzı da bunu gerektiriyordu. Yani pişman olmamış da olabilirler. Onların gidişine üzünlenler olmadı mı?*
- *Ama oğlum isteyerek gidenler de pişman oldular. Mesela üzülenler aileler oldu. Bunların çocukları gitti Suriye'ye. Ben çok iyi hatırlıyorum. Türkiye'nin böyle davranacağını tahmin etmediler. Ben Türkçe bilmem, yazmayı bilmem. Bize devlet tarafından gece okulu verdiler. Sen çalışıyorsun, esnafsın, fakirsin, işte, sen bilmem nesin demeden, kitap verdiler, defter verdiler.<sup>102</sup>*

The remaining people who experienced to living under the Turkish administration were seen themselves lucky because the rumours that they would be massacred but the massacre did not realized. On the other hand, those who “chose” to leave the homeland regretted. It Emsal's (80, F, Alawi) father was a cutler in Antioch and he also migrated to Syria. According to her, he went there with others for finding a job there but when he regretted going because of the unemployment, and returned. Emsal sang a song, which was famous in Affan neighbourhood. The song was written, and sung by the dwellers:

Vatanım canım vatanım  
Antakyanın ortasında aklım ve ruhum.  
Tahsildar geldi  
Evrakları dağıttı

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<sup>102</sup> Mehmet and Selim, 15 October 2008, Antioch.

Nüfusumu fesh etti.

George Şihvar  
Malını sermayesini batırdı  
Dükkanı kapattı  
Nüfusunu kaybetti.

George Keleş  
Malını bedavaya sattı  
Evrakları dağıttı nüfusu düştü

İbrahim Seyfettin  
Parsellerini sattı  
Evrakları dağıttı nüfusu düştü<sup>103</sup>

Georger Şihvar, George Keleş and İbrahim Seyfettin were renowned peoples in Affan. This song also refers that being a Turkish citizen is more rational than losing the property from the point of view of lower class non-Turkish people. According to Mehmet, what was expected from them by the state was only to talk Turkish after annexation. In other words, it can be said that instead of losing the property and leaving the homeland, it is more acceptable to “speak” Turkish. Moreover, it can be used for legitimizing the present. According to Connerton (1999: 10), our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order and memory affects the structure of perception. In this respect, it can be said that “the narration regarding emigrants’ regret” serve to legitimate of the present conditions of the remaining people in Hatay.

On the other hand, learning Turkish or not was not the optional for the non-Turkish people. Turkish began to be taught to people in the People Houses and in “night schools” (gece okulları) but it can be claimed that coercion accompanied by seduction to learn Turkish. The question of whether there was an oppression in order to learn Turkish was generally replied as “No, not too much”. When the name of “Aşur Bey”, who was appointed as prosecutor after the annexation, was uttered, the oppression was expressed in the interview but this oppression was seen as a requirement for learning Turkish by the most of the interviewees.

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<sup>103</sup> Emsal, 18 April 2009, Antioch.

On May 20-22, 2003 a symposium was organized in Antioch, “Avrupa’nın Kurucu Ögesi Olarak Akdeniz”. In symposium, the last discussion was arranged as “oral history.” The lecturers were Kemal Şehoğlu, Semiramis Kuseyri, Muhsin Yeşillioğlu, Hasan Fehmi Akkaya and Duvillo Huri. They are members of the famous families in Antioch and their ages were between 83 and 72 in 2003. Hasan Fehmi Akkaya recalled “Aşur Bey” and how his brother was hit by a stick under the command of Aşur Bey:

“Bir de ben bir olaydan bahsetmek istiyorum. İlk vatana katılımımızın senesi buraya tayin edilen savcılardan biri emir veriyordu karakollara: “Arapça konuşanı yakalayın”. Yakalanıp, karakola götürülen çocuk falaka denilen sandalyeye oturtulur, güzel bir falaka çekerlerdi. Türkçe bilmeyen birçok kimse vardı o sıralarda. Bu çocuklar bir yere giderken birbirleriyle ister istemez Arapça konuşuyor, hemen yakalıyorlar. Bu olayı büyüklerimiz Ankara’ya bildirmek mecburiyetinde kaldılar. İkinci Cumhurbaşkanımız rahmetli İsmet Paşabir tamimle Antakya’nın tüm resmi dairelerine “Vatandaşlar, tümü, her türlü kanuni haklara haizdir. Hiç kimseye tazyik, dayak falan olmayacaktır” dedi. Bu şekilde falakadan kurtulduk. Bu falakayı yiyenlerden biri benim abim. Onun için anlatmak istedim. *Espri olsun diye anlattım.*”

Although he stated that he was telling this incident as a joke, speaking of Aşur Bey conveys the tones of respect and fear. Whereas Mehmet and Abdo remembered him with this oppression, Cemal, who was a lawyer, talked about his fair approach towards people of Hatay and the close relationship between Savcı Aşur Bey and the lawyer Cemal (83, M, Alawi), he narrated Aşur Bey differently:

- **Savcı Aşur Bey’i hatırlar mısınız? Hiç gördünüz mü?**
- Tabi tanırım, hem de konuşmuşum onunla. Bu Antalya’da öldü. Burda yine vaka oldu. Birisi gidip yataken diğerini öldürüyor. Aşur Bey elini koyuyor olaya. İfadeler almıyor. Onun asılmasını sağlıyor Kurtderesi Mahallesinde.
- **Nasıl birisiydi Aşur Bey?**
- Şöyle bir vakam var Aşur Beyle? Ben ... vekil işimi yapıyordum, bir kız vardı. Kızı ailesi Antakya’da hizmetçiliğe Kuseyri’lere vermiş. Kızı evine getirmeye çalışıyorlar, Kuseyri’ler vermiyor. Adamcağız bana geldi. Evlendireceğiz bunu burda kalamaz dedi. 20 senedir orda. Ben gittim Aşur Bey, dedim başsavcım bakınız bu kız yarın öbür gün kasap çocuklarıyla dalga geçer, başımıza bela olur. Firinciyla flört eder.. Babası anası bu kızı evlendirmek istiyor, vermiyorlar. Kim dedi bana. Filan dedim. Hemen telefon etti emniyete bulun kız ailesine teslim edin dedi. Onlar kuvvetli kişiler... Hele bizim soframızı hazırlasında öyle teslim ederiz demişler. Bi daha müracaat ettim Aşur Bey’e. Dedim bunların yemek hazırlaması mecburi bir şey değil dedim. Kalktık Aşur Beyle kızı aldık. Elimle getirdim buraya. Sonra

Kuseyriler beni gördü dediler ayıptır bu yaptığımız. Niye dedim? Bu kız 20 yıldır annesini babasını görmez. Ali Dik vardı, onu astı.<sup>104</sup>

As a result, considering the submissive respect towards dominants state requires to closer looking the relationship between state and society in the historical context. Oral historians underline mostly one structural element of the narratives: “silences”. What a narrator misconstrues, ignores, or avoids could have cultural meanings. There are many reasons of silences and if one takes into account the case of minorities, the relationship between the memories of wars, migrations, discriminative policies appeared in the past and silence can be linked each other. In this study, especially some of the interviewees, the relatives of emigrants who chose to remain or were obliged to stay became silent while talking about the violence. For instance, Ibrahim<sup>105</sup> (75, M, Alawi) and tried to switch the conversation or the point and he did not want to talk about Aşur Bey. Similarly, Mikail (79, M, Christian) became silent when the violence in late of 1930’s was reminded to him.

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<sup>104</sup> Cemal17 January 2008, Samandağ.

<sup>105</sup> Ibrahim, 21 November 2008, Antioch.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study has been an attempt to examine how the history of Hatay was written by the Turkish-Kemalist nationalist elites during and after the annexation, what the paradoxes of this nationalist historiography are and what the ordinary people experienced during this period. The contradiction between the memoirs of Turkish nationalists and the reminiscences of ordinary peoples shows how history was used for gaining the consent of the remaining people after the annexation and for constructing the national identity of the next generations.

The rising ideology in the world in the 1930s was nationalism so that is why the historiography in Turkey was shaped within the framework of the nationalist ideology. Hatay, in particular, was greatly affected by this convention. Another factor that affected the history of Hatay was international dynamics. As the region is a part of the Middle Eastern geography, the effects of the mandate regime and the doctrine of self-determination on the history of ethnic communities cannot be ignored. As a result, the historiography of Hatay like any nationalist historiography can be claimed to have anachronic, pragmatic, idiographic and essentialist qualities.

On the other hand, the narratives from oral history project provide closer looks at the annexation process. The narratives of people from different social, economic, religious, ethnical background do not only reveal these contradictions, but also they give an opportunity to consider about some cases in detail. For instance, the information regarding the change of land system under the Ottoman Empire, the mandate regime and Turkish rule can be examined extensively by the expressions of people. Furthermore, it is possible to examine the local dynamics, which are

neglected in the political-diplomatic history of the region. By doing so, it is possible to replace the historical agents such as “diplomats, leaders, and notables” with the “sharecroppers, shoemakers, blacksmiths” in the historical narrative or at least to give priority their narratives.

I interviewed with twenty-nine people whose ages were between eighty-nine and thirty. Most of them were children in 1930s and they remember the annexation process and incidents. In order to abstain from understanding the Hatay history as the history of contested territory between Turkey and Syria, it is crucial to take into consideration the change in social structure. In this respect, the sharecroppers, the landowners, the merchants, the artisans, and their impact on political life, the rivalry between traditional urban notables and rural Amik Beys, the newcomers who were middle class, educated, and unemployed youths are vital in order to consider the region’s history from a different perspective. Thus, in this study, the sharecroppers and the sharecropping contracts between landowners and “marabas” are taken place. To illustrate, the relationship between an ağa and a peasant is tried to be examined. It can be claimed that this relationship is more complex when it is viewed beyond an economic oppressed-oppressor relationship. It can be claimed that many dynamics such as religion, personal contact, and the distance to the city affected this relationship because these factors showed the role of the dependency to the ağa. As a result, it can be claimed that the submissiveness of the peasants towards the ağa had varying tones depending on the ownership profile and the economic conditions of the peasant. This relationship between ağa and sharecroppers is important because in the post-1936 period, when the treaty of Friendship between French and Syria National Bloc was signed , the League of Nations decided that a plebiscite for the region was a solution. Alawi peasants in the region were very important for the census as they had the potential of showing that the majority in the Sanjak was Turks. The nationalist agitation of the Turkish and Arab nationalist groups, was accompanied by class struggle.

Furthermore, another issue is related to the nationalist movements, ethnic violence and how the remaining people remember these incidents. The leader of Arabist action in the Sanjak, Zaki al-Arsuzi, was asked about to the interviewees in order to help them recall the post 1936 period. Thus, it could be possible to examine or interrogate the popular nationalism in this period. Besides, to look at these nationalist groups paved the way to understand the change in the social-class structure. Although the members of these two groups did not have economic power, they had cultural capital and they felt cheated by the system. The resentment of these groups in the early 1930s intermingled with ethnic idioms. When the period of registration was asked to the interviewees, they remembered the violence. Al-Arsuzi, the important figure, who was remembered and identified with the bad days marked by the violence. It was usually stated that “Atatürk made all people equal.” This statement implies two meanings with regards to be equal with Sunni people and to get rid of being maraba. Many interviewees compared al-Arsuzi with Atatürk. After talking about al-Arsuzi, they began to talk about Atatürk. He is seen as liberator who ceased the violence and street fights for the remaining people although I did not ask them. He used strategic manoeuvres in the process of annexation of Hatay to Turkey thanks to his supernatural powers and his talent of foreseeing remote results. He was the hero who solved the “Hatay issue” without violence and conflict or war in the region. This reaction reveals the duality of traditional Syria with modern Turkey, “weak” Syria- “powerful” Turkey in their perceptions. As a result, it can be claimed that the identity is and was perceived contextual for them. Because they did not perceive to register as Turks or Arabs as disclose of their ethnic identity, instead they thought that they had chosen a county, a nation, namely their homeland. Besides, it is crucial not to ignore which instruments the Kemalist nationalists used for persuading the notables and the non-elites in order to gain hegemony while considering peoples’ attitude during and after the annexation process. Especially Turkey sent Cilician Alewis for propaganda in order to disseminate the rumour that Atatürk was the member of Alawi sect. This rumour is still transmitted from generation to generation. As a result, according to the plot of the Kemalist propaganda, the Antiochean Alewis had been suffering under the Ottoman and French rules and those Alewis from

Adana (Cilicia) had been experiencing much better conditions under the Turkish rule. For the liberation from religious discrimination of Sunni ulema and ağas, Kemalist reform programme -which transformed the mandate regime into a republican secularist nation-state- was conceived as the way of salvation. On the other hand, the coercion was another tool in this hegemonic struggle. In general, persuasion was employed for the winning the consent of the elites of each community whereas they used coercion towards non-elites groups in the rural hinterland. Displaying loyalty and submissive respect towards the dominant state was the general way of behaving during the interview. The same attitude of the interviewees could be observable when talking about the immigrants who left the region during and after the annexation.

In the nationalist historiography, the immigration of Arabs, Armenians, and Christians was used in order to represent the fair Turkish rule. It is stated that even though they declared that there was no reason for panic, they insisted on leaving. Moreover, the immigrants had right to sell their properties and take their personal estate while leaving. Yet, for instance, George (79, M, Christian) told that how his master's personal estates were handled by the Turkish authorities. Such incidents do not take place in the history of Hatay which was written by the Turkish Kemalist elites. As Khoury states that after the incorporation into Turkey, the exodus of large numbers of people began to Syria. Just two months after the annexation, Syria had already received some 50,000 refugees. The largest number was Armenians –as many as 22,000- who had fled their homes even before the French troops pulled out, many for a second time in less than 20 years. Moreover, some 10,000 Alawis, 10,000 Sunni Arabs (including tribes), and 5,000 Christian Arabs left. Those who chose to remain were Sunnis and Alawi peasants who were attached to the land and who, unlike the merchant or artisanal communities, had few opportunities to settle in Syria (1987: 513). The interviewees remembered this large-scale immigration but how they remember is related to how they see Syria when they compare it to Turkey today as well as the incidents of the period as street fights and violence. These factors contributed to the formation of the remaining people's attitudes and feelings. These



events stimulated people to look for a way to sustain their living. In other words, two events were mainly important in the occurrence of the fear among non-Turks people. The fear of those who had no option other than staying was transformed into a submissive respect towards the dominant state. Besides, it can be claimed that this submissive respect was accompanied by the “narration of regret”. There was a prevalent belief regarding to the immigrants that those who stayed in Syria became poorer than those who had had property in Antioch. It can be claimed that these images regarding the past events serve to legitimate the present social order and the memory affects the structure of perception. In this respect, it can be said that “the narration regarding immigrants’ regret” serve to legitimate of present conditions of the remaining people in Hatay.

In this field study, it is attempted not only to understand how people remember the past differently from the written nationalist documents but also to consider about the process of the construction of the national identity of “minorities” in this region. Therefore, it is valuable to talk about the past in order to see how people reconstruct the past and to determine which factors in the past have role in such reconstruction today.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

Görüşülen kişinin adı ve soyadı: Mehmet-Selim

Cinsiyeti: Erkek

Doğum yeri ve tarihi: 1930 Antakya doğumlu

Mensup olduğu cemaat: Arap-Alevi

Medeni durumu: Evli

Görüşme tarihi: 11 Şubat 2009

- **Siz kaç yaşındasınız?**
- 49
- **49 mu?(gülüşmeler)**
- Bu Fransızlar gittiğinde 8-9 yaşındaymış. Kışlada şehit olanları hatırlıyor.
- **Siz var mıydınız Fransızlar giderken?**
- Biz o zaman küçüktük yani. Amcam mesela daha büyüktü bu Arsuzi'nin kurduğu cemiyete üyeydi. İzciydi orada. Bana kartını göstermişti, 30 numaralı üyesimiydi neydi. Suriye'den gelecekti. Bu izciler Arsuzi'yi karşılayacaktı. Benim abim de geliyordu. Onları karşılayacaktık.
- **Neler yapıyordunuz?**
- Vilayete gelindi işte.
- **İlhaktan önce değil mi?**
- 30 lu yıllar. 38-39 yılları işte. Hatırlamak istemeyiz ama
- **Çok mu kötüydü?**
- Kötüydü.
- **Neden kötüydü?**
- Burada din ayrımı vardı. Mesela bizim Aleviler Affandan buraya, Dörtayakta aleviler öbür tarafta Sünniler otururdu. Çok kötü günlerdi yani. Alevi evinden çıkmaz, Sünni çıkmaz. Ayrılmış her yer.
- **Siz hiç öyle çatışmalar hatırlıyor musunuz?**
- Bazen öyle kavga falan olurdu. Şimdi bizim annemlerin evi cadde üzerinde, şimdiki Affan kahvesinin oralarda. Biz gençlere taş getirirdik, çünkü silah yok. Tabi karşı tarafta da öyle. Bu olunca bir bakarsın ya polis gelir ya Fransız askeri gelir, bazılarını alırlardı. Çok iyi hatırlarım.
- **Mesela Fransızların özellikle ortalığı karıştırdığı falan söylenirdi?**
- O büyükleri, o şimdi şöyle. Sünnilere silah verirdi, Alevilere silah verildi. Birbirine çatışma yaptırırdu. Kendi rahatta kalırdı. Yani bu çok iyi yapıldı. Yani ne Alevi toplumunun ne de Sünni toplumunun bilinci yoktu o zamanlar. Benim rahmetli abimin dükkanı... çarşıdaydı. Şimdi mesela mal gelir, dükkânın önüne atılır. Bir yaramaz genç, Sünni ya da Alevi, bütün dükkâna

zarar verir ama hepsi Sünni Alevi toplar. Sünnilerden gitti, Alevilerden gitti. Yani çok kötü günlerdi

- **Yani Fransa müdahale etmiyordu?**
- Fransa olur mu, kıskırtıyordu. Sonra olay yerine geliyor, O bu alıyor ama aslında teşvik ediyor. Arada Fransızlara yardımcı olanlar da vardı. Yani Alevi olmasına rağmen Fransızlarla işbirliği yapanlar oldu. Bu günlerin anılması bile kötü.
- **Ama siz ilhaktan önceki dönemi de hatırlarsınız?**
- Mesela?
- **Mesela siz okula gitmeden önce Arapça biliyordunuz?**
- Ben okuldayken Fransızca ve Arapça okuyordum. Birinci sınıftaydım. Hatta ve hatta bu olaylar olduğu zaman bizi okuldan pencereden büyüklerimiz çıkarmıştı. Yani çocuktuk.
- **Sonra Türkçe mi öğrendiniz?**
- Elbette. Okuldan sonra, bu ilhaktan sonra Atatürk allah rahmet eylesin bizlere böyle bir hak tanıdı. Bu ayrımı kesinlikle kaldırdı. Aleviye hak tanıdı.
- **Nasıl bir hak tanıdı?**
- Şimdi eskiden olaylar olurdu ve büyüklerimiz bahsederdi. Bu büyüklerimiz müslüman olarak, Aleviler...İlhaktan sonra Aleviler Aleviliğini bildi, Sünni Sünniliğini bildi. Okul yapıldı. Mesela o zamanlar gece okulu açıldı Aleviler kesimine. Türkçe bilmeyiz ya, hiçbir şey bilmeyiz. Bize gece okulu açtı rahmetli Atatürk. Gece okulunda harfleri öğrenmek için, Türkçeyi öğrenmek için büyük küçük yok. Neticede, çok kalabalık olduk ama hayır ne zaman? Yemekten sonra, neden? İşinden gücünden olmayacaksınız. Yemekten sonra 1-2 saat Türk hocaları bize ders verirdi. Hiç olmazsa A'yı Z'yi öğrenmeye çalıştık.
- **Sonra siz türkçe konuşmaya mı başladınız?**
- Ee elbette. Yani o zaman özgürüz, hem Arapça hem Türkçe.
- **Ama o zaman arapça öğretmiyorlardı, yalnız Türkçe.**
- Biz hem Fransızca okuduk hem Arapça.
- **Ama ilhaktan sonra sadece Türkçe okudunuz, arapçayı öğrenememiş oldunuz, en azından okumayı.**
- Tabi tabi, şimdi eskiden bizde o zamanlar en azından Türkçe...
- **Yani o zaman Türkiye'ye daha kolay katılmak için herkese Türkçe öğretiler değil mi? Arapça konuşmayı yasakladılar ama?**
- Yaa şimdi yasak diye bir şey yok. Şimdi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kanunları Arapçayı yasaklamadı. Mesela bir savcı o. Savcı Aşur bey. Kendisi Şamlı. Evet o adam Arapça konuşan adamı alırdı, götürürdü. Şey de yaptı. Döverdi. Çok zalimdi ama çok kötü demek istemiyorum.
- **Herkesi mi döverdi?**
- Tabi tabi, akşam herkesin kapılarını dinlermiş. Arapça konuşuyorsa, tutar yakarlar, Ne kadar kendisi Arap olmasına rağmen, o kadar Alevilere işkence yaptı, konuşturmadı. İyi mi yaptı kötü mü yaptı bilemiyorum.
- *Ama şimdi senin yaşındakiler dahil olmak üzere kimse arapça yazmayı bilmiyor. Çocuklar torunlarda bilmeyecekler.*

- Bak şimdi sana söyleyim, o dönemde arapça okumak için okula gitmesi lazım. Yani kalburüstü ailelerin çocukları ancak okulla arapçayı öğrendi, yazardı. Mesela amcan hem Arapça hem Fransızca'yı öğrendi ama aynı zamanda izci oldu.
- **Siz okula gittiğinizde Türkçeyi bilen öğrenci sizden daha iyi bilince eğitimde sizden ileri değil mi?**
- Yok kızım, o zaman için önemli olan önce TC vatandaşı olmak. Konuşsan yeter. Önemli olan özgür olmak, o kadar. İlk başta önemli değil. Eğitim sonradan. Bizde öncelikle Alevi çocuklarına veya Arap çocuklarına diyelim, Araplar da vardı. Onları TC'ne katmak için ellerinden geleni yaptılar. İşte türküm, doğruyum çalışkanım demedik mi...Şimdi seçim yapıldı. Türkiye bizim sayemizde kazandı. Bu dava böyle kazandı. Eğer Arap daha fazla kalsaydı, bu ülke Türklere geçmezdi. Ama dışarıdan da bir sürü Türk getirilmiş. Adana'dan Maraş'tan ve bunlar camilere kondu. Yani paylaşılmak için, buranın çoğunluğunu Türk yapmak için ellerinden geleni yaptılar. Oylar veriyorlar ve buradaki Arapların Türk yazılmasına uğraştılar. Ama burada rahmetli Atatürk'ün yaptığı en güzel yaptığı şey, eşit kabul edildi. Tabi Osmanlıdan sonraki olmadı. Aleviler ikinci sınıf vatandaşlıktan birinciye geldi. Ve artı seçim yapıldı. Soruldu. Mesela sandıklar konuldu. Antakyanın her tarafında. Türk müsün Alevi misin filan. Aleviler de çoğunlukla Türküz dedi. Yani hepimiz Türküz dedik. Ben şimdi çok iyi hatırlarım, şöyle dedik, anadilimiz Arapça dedik ama biz Türküz, bunu belirttik yani.
- **Alevilerin Türk olduğuna dair bir kampanya var sanırım.**
- Şimdi kızım siz nerelisiniz?
- **Antakyalıyım, Affan...**
- Zeki Kavvas bu işi bilirdi rahmetli. Yani aslında bizim o Sünniler, bizim ilerlemizi istemediler, yani aslında bizim Türk yazılmamızı da istemediler. Biz Türk olmak için yarıştık. Hakikaten öyle oldu. Bu gerçek kızım. Biz gerçek Türküz dedik. Şimdi bakın Antakya'da birçok Sünni Türk olan Türkiye'yi istemediler. Biz Alevi olarak Türkiye'yi istedik. Biz Türküz dedik.
- **Siz dediniz de Türk olduğunuza inandınız mı?**
- Ne demek kızım, niçin inanmayacam? Asker olduk, kışlaya girdik. Sağcısı geldi, solcusu geldi, kabul etmedik. Anan yok baban yok dediler, öksüzün dediler ama bu ülke sahip çıktı, vatandaş olarak. Zeki Arsu'ya vardı, allah rahmet eylesin, biz onunla olurduk. O gençliği çoştururdu, Alevileri falan. Eee o kaçtı işte, şam'a gitti. Ben Şam'da gördüm kendisini tesadüfen sordum işte...Nerdensin diye sordu, söyledim, o canımm dedi...
- **Gençleri çoştururdu dediniz ya, ne derdi? Ne anlatırdı?**
- Arapları çoştururdu. Mesela Şamdan heyet gelirdi Hatay'a yani Antakya'ya, biz onu karşılardık. Harbiye'ye kadar yayan yürürdük. Bütün Antakya'da 3 tane araba yoktu. Gelir işte 3-4 kelime söylerdi. Korkmayın falan işte bugünkü siyaset gibi, yani herkesin çıkarı falan. Ama bizimki biraz değişikti. Yani biz ırkımız yani müslümalığı...Şey vardı, kötü durumlar vardı. Antakya'daki Sünnilerin en güzeli bizi sevmez. Biz de sevmezdik. Çünkü kavga olurdu. Hocalar bizi düşürürdü. Zenginler bu iki tarafı düşürürdü.

Niye? Kendisi 3-4 tahsilli. Tarih yazdı bunları gördü. Mesela Abdülğani Türkmen bütün Sünnilere karşıydı. Bizim burada birkaç tane vardı. Para verildi işte, onu tuttu bunu tuttu. İstedikleri oyunları yaptılar. Vatandaş bilmezdi...

- **Yani vatandaşın kapışması ne çıkar sağlandı?**
- Kavga ile iki taraf birbirine geçerdi. Kimse kimsenin tarafına geçemezdi. Bizim Alevi toplumu Harbiye'den Sümerlere kadar meyve sebze yiyecek bizde. Bir düşmanlık oldu, biz onlara göndermedik artık. Biz meyveyi ya yedik ya attık. Atılır mı? Onlarda sıkıştı. Sünnilerde yok ne meyve ne sebze. Yani bizimkiler çok çalışkan ve şeyler. Ama diyeceksin ne oldu? Devlet de bizi unutmadı bizim hareketlerimizi. Seçim yapıldığı zaman sen Türksün sen Alevisin, Alevilerin yüzde 99'u Türküz diye yazıldı. Ondan devlet bizi unutmadı.
- **Aşur Bey miydi? Sanırım zorluyormuş Arapça konuşmayın diye. Peki devlet dairesine gittiğinde ne yapıyorlardı? Türkçe bilmeden.**
- Yarı Arapça yarı Türkçe hallederlerdi.
- **Peki, ayırım yaparlar mıydı Türkçe bilmeyenlere?**
- Hayır, hayır, Bak kızım sana söyleyim. Aşur Bey buranın başsavcısı, yani o gün için reis'i cumhurdu o gün için işte. Yani bizim toplum Türkçe bilmez, Arapça konuşanı götürürdü. Zorla nezarete götürürdü. Bilmem ne işte. Zorlardı Türkçe konuşmasını...
- **Peki, sizin anneniz babanız gider miydi devlet dairesine?**
- Eee Aleviler de devlet dairesine girdi vazifeli. Aralarında Türkçe bilenleri, eski Arapça bilenler onlar yardımcı oldular. Bunlar mecburi olarak alındı çünkü evraklar Arapça bu yüzden ikisini bilen adamlarını tercih ettiler. Bir de tercümanlar vardı. Dışarıdan gelen Sünni arkadaş o defterleri bilemezdi. İşte Alevileri yani Arapça bilenleri almak zorunda kaldılar. Müdür Sünni oldu, müdür muavini Alevi alındı, kolaylık olsun. Mesela işi düşen de sen diyordun bilmiyorum diye, yanında da adam getirirsin Türkçe bilen.
- **Ama çevirileri Aleviler yapıyordu ama sonuçta yönetici Sünni mi oluyordu?**
- Evet, zaten kendi adamlarını getiriyorlardı. Bak kızım ben şimdi kendi gördüklerime, yaşadıklarına göre söyleyecem, şimdi biraz ağır konuşuyorum ama Alevilerin en kötüsü, bunu herkes cesaret yapıp söyleyemez, Sünnilerin en iyisine bedel. Şimdi neden diyeceksin? Şimdi bizim buradaki Sünniler Atatürk'e karşı oldular, şimdi neler neler yaptılar, neler söylediler Atatürk'e. Ama ne için? Ne için? Bize türkçe hakkını verdiği için. Atatürk severler mi?
- *Şimdi iki cemaat arasında çekişme var. Onlar 1. sınıf vatandaş konumunu kaybettiler. Cumhuriyet yönetimine girince burada en azından kanun nezdinde bütün vatandaşlar eşittir. Bunlar da Türkçe öğrendiler. Tabi bunlar da bu eşitliği kabul etmiyor. Atatürk bunları birbirine eşit kıldı. Tabi bir de Atatürk düşmanlığı var. Alevilerde de tam tersi. Devletin partisi Atatürkün partisiydi. Bunlar da onu tuttular. Tutmayanlar da vardı. Çıkar çatışmasıydı işte. Atatürk eşit yaptı, Sünniyi Alevi yaptı, Alevi'yi Sünni yaptı. Ben şahsen babamdan sonra Atatürk'ü severim. Neden diyeceksin? Ben gördüm o zamanları, o zulmü.*

- *O zamanlar Arsuzi'yi nasıl görüyordun? Bunlar arap milliyetçiliği için mücadeleye veriyordu. Sonra burada kaybettiler. Kaçmak zorunda kaldılar.*
- *Elbette. Şimdi oradan kaçanlar da...Çok Antakyalılar da Alevi olanlar onunla birlik oldular. Kimse kafasını çalıştırmıyordu, git dediler. Çünkü sonra dediler ki, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti geliyor, sizi öldürecek, Alevileri bilmem ne yapacak filan...Onlar korktu gitti..Şuana kadar pişmanlar...kalanlar kazandı. Bu da ayrı mevzu...Türkiye geldi, arapça bilmeyenleri, mesela ben, arapça okuyordum. Türkiye geldi gece okulu açtı Alevilere...gece okulu...öğretmen veriyor, masa veriyor, okul veriyor parasız, kitap defter de verdi. Mesela sen zanaatkârsın, seni alıkoymuyor, gece işin biter, yemeğini yersin, gidersin. Sinemaya gideceğine, kahveye gideceğine, şeye gece okuluna gidersin. Yani...*
- *Şimdi ben şunu merak ediyorum. Bu Zeki Arsuziler, Zerkalar, Kavvaslar, Cebbaralar, bunlar kaçmak zorunda kaldı...*
- *Onlar pişman oldular.*
- *Ama onlar Suriye'de de önemli yerlere geldiler. Bu adamların gidişlerini sadece korkuya bağlamamak lazım. Türkiye'de yaşamaktansa Arap olarak yaşamayı tercih etmiş olabilirler. Sanki Antakyalılar da onları böyle görmek istiyor gibi geliyor bana. Şimdi Türkiye Suriye'den ilerde, ama ben burada yaşayamam diyerek de gitmiş olabilirler. Çünkü bunların yaşam tarzı da bunu gerektiriyordu. Yani pişman olmamış da olabilirler. Onların gidişine üzünlenenler olmadı mı?*
- *Ama oğlum isteyerek gidenler de pişman oldular. Mesela üzülenler aileler oldu. Bunların çocukları gitti Suriye'ye. Ben çok iyi hatırlıyorum. Türkiye'nin böyle davranacağını tahmin etmediler. Ben Türkçe bilmem, yazmayı bilmem. Bize devlet tarafından gece okulu verdiler. Sen çalışıyorsun, esnafsın, fakirsin, işte, sen bilmem nesin demeden, kitap verdiler, defter verdiler.*
- **Sizi kazandı yani Türkiye cumhuriyeti?**
- *Elbette.*
- *Siz de gönüllü oldunuz?*
- *Evet. Bir de geri dönenler oldu.*
- **Bunlara baskı uygulandı mı?**
- *Yok yok hayır, yapılmadı. İnsanları kendi haline bıraktılar... Mesela en basiti, en basiti, buralarda malı mülkü bahçeleri evi olan gitti, şimdi orada sürünüyorlar. Birkaç sene sonra TC onlar için kanun çıkardı, gelin satabilir, gidebilir.*
- **Ermenilerin malları ne oldu?**
- *Onlar ayrı bir mevzu, ben o zamanı bilmiyorum ama bildiğim onların mallarına devlet tarafından el konuldu. Çok kişiler en güzel evlere en güzel bahçelere el koydu.*
- **Bu kişiler arasında Aleviler de var mı?**
- *Çok köylere Türkler yerleştirildi. Mesela Yayladağ tarafında, Samandağ tarafında. Vakıflıya giderken Ermeni köyüken Türk köyü yapılan köyler oldu. Şimdi vakıflı dışına gidersen orada Kapısuyu'na Yoğunluk'a, Musa dağına. 7 tane köy vardı işte, Ermeni köyü. Kalan 6 köye hep Sünniler*

yerleştirildi ve bu devlet tarafından getirildi içeriden. Bir ara Alevilere de engel konulmak istendi ama bu gizli yapıldı. Şimdi bana sorarsan o zamanki Türkiye devletinin başında olanlar kendine güvencesi yok gibi geliyor bana. Şimdi bir Sünni'yi getir Alevi'nin karşısına. Demek ki bu bir korku meselesi. Seni kendi vatandaşı olarak görmüyor, tehlike olarak gördüğü için bunu yapıyordu, nüfusu değiştirerek yapıyordu bunu işte. Mesela göçmen getirdi şimdi, onlara toprak verdi, ev verdi, para verdi bilmem ne işte...

- **Siz hiç halkevine dair şeyler hatırlıyor musunuz? Mesela o dönemde başka şehirden gelenler olmuş diye duydum ben Türk yazılmak için ve halkevine gelmişler. Siz halkevine gider miydiniz?**
- Ben küçüktüm o zamanlar, yani hatırlamam pek bir şey.
- **Mesela bu alevilerin Eti-Türkü olduklarına dair bir propaganda var?**
- *Şimdi etnik kimlik babalarının zamanında ayrılması güç. Etnik yapı ile din arasında ayırım yapamıyorlar. Yani din açısından Alevi, Sünni, Hıristiyan. Arap kökenli olmak başka değerlendiriyor. Yani insanlar farklı değerlendiriyor. Yani mesela bu babamın anlattığı süreçte dilinden kültüründen ayırıyorlar insanları. Bu Arap kimliğinden de kopuşu getiriyor. Sen Türksün diyorlar, onlar da tamam biz Türküz diyorlar. Bunu kabul etmiş görünüyor, Türklüğünü kabul etmiş görünüyor. O çok problem değil onlar için. Ama yani...Aslında Alevileri kendilerine katmak için yapıldı bu. TC vatandaşlığını kabul ediyor. Ama ben Aleviyim diyor. Diline de çok sahip çıkmıyor çünkü okuma yazma olmayınca Arapça da unutuluyor. Çocuklar da okulda Türkçe konuşuyor. Aman çocuk okulda zorluk çekmesin, Arapça konuştuğu anlaşılmasın diye doğrudan doğruya Türkçe konuşuyorlar.*
- Bizim şimdiki Alevilerin, 15-25 yaşındaki gençler buradaki Sünnilerden çok daha iyi Türkçe konuşuyorlar. İşte bu bir meziyet olarak görülüyor... Arapça öğretmeyelim Türkçe öğretelim... Aman Türkçesi güzel olsun.
- **Peki, batınlıkla bir alakası var mı bunun?**
- *O artık oto-asimilasyona, gönüllü asimilasyonla alakası var onun. Bu artık batınlık değil. Bu başka bir şey... Ben batın olmak istemiyorum ve TC vatandaşı olmak istiyorum. Kökenim köküm önemli değil. Bu süreç böyle işliyor. Ama burada daha çok ben Türküm ama ana dilim Arapça yani işte en aslında Arabım, Türk vatandaşım, Aleviyim. Yani Türk Alevisi olarak kabul etmiş. Sonrasında Türküm, doğruyum, çalışkanım.*



## APPENDIX B

İSİM	YAŞ	CEMAAT	TARİH	YER	MESLEK
Şerif	89	Türk-Sünni	5 Ekim 2008	Yayladağ	Emekli-Yayladağ eski belediye başkanı
Fikret	89	Türk-Sünni	9-10 Temmuz 2008	İskenderun	Emekli- İskederun'un ilk belediye başkanı
Ali	89	Alevi	7 Ocak 2009	İskenderun	Şeyh
Mahmut	86	Alevi	28 Mart 2008	İskenderun	Emekli- devlet memuru
Hüseyin	86	Alevi	Temmuz 2008	Antakya	Sebzeci
Abdullah	85	Alevi	21 Temmuz 2008	Antakya	Şeyh
Sadık	84	Alevi	25 Eylül 2008	Antakya	-
Mediha	84	Alevi	12 Eylül 2008	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Cemal	83	Alevi	17 Ocak 2009	Samandağ	Avukat
Sultan	82	Alevi	5 Nisan 2008	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Sıdıka	81	Alevi	Ağustos 2008	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Sevim	81	Alevi	Mart 2009	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Selim	81	Alevi	15 Ekim 2008	Antakya	Bahçeci-maraba
Emsal	80	Alevi	18 Nisan 2009	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Abdo	79	Alevi	15 Ocak 2009	Antakya	Muhasebeci
Mehmet	79	Alevi	11 Şubat 2009	Antakya	-
Vahit	79	Alevi	20 Aralık 2008	Antakya	Avukat
George	79	Hristiyan	14 Ocak 2009	Antakya	Ayakkabıcı
Mikail	79	Hristiyan	27 Ekim 2008	Antakya	-
Naim	77	Alevi	15 Ekim 2008	Samandağ	Demirci
İbrahim	75	Alevi	21 Kasım 2008	Antakya	-
Salih	55	Arap-Sünni	7 Kasım 2008	Antakya	-
Arif	41	Alevi	28 Mart 2009	İskenderun	-
Engin	30	Türk-Sünni	14 Eylül 2009	Ankara	Şirket yöneticisi
Vehibe	80 üstü ama emin değil	Alevi	22 Eylül 2008	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Salim	78 üstü ama emin değil	Alevi	21 Temmuz 2008	Antakya	Şeyh
İspir	80 üstü ama emin değil	Hristiyan	30 Mart 2008	Antakya	Terzi
Zarife	80 üstü ama emin değil	Alevi	Mart 2008	Antakya	Ev hanımı
Gariel	80 üstü	Ermeni	2 Ocak 2009	Samandağ	-