

TRAVEL, CIVILIZATION AND THE EAST:
OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF "THE EAST"
IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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ABSTRACT

TRAVEL, CIVILIZATION AND THE EAST: OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF "THE EAST" IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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This thesis analyzes the Ottoman travellers' perception of "the East" in the late Ottoman Empire. In doing that, it links the Ottoman intellectual debates on the concept of civilization to their perceptions on the non-European lands and peoples. It mainly argues that the Ottoman intellectuals' attempt to create a synthesis between the material elements of Western civilization and their own morality resulted in a perception of the East different from the Western perceptions. While the Western perceptions envisage a monolithic, unchanging and static East, the Ottoman perceptions vary in accordance with the temporal and spatial setting as well as with the intellectual inclinations of the travellers. Hence, this thesis contributes to the literature by fulfilling the gap about the Ottoman perceptions of the concepts of civilization and the East, by questioning the limits of existing literature on the Ottoman perception of the East which defines it as Orientalist/colonialist, by attracting attention to the use of Ottoman travel literature in understanding the Ottoman identity and their perception of the world, and, finally, by underlining the importance of the Ottoman perceptions of civilization and the East in understanding the historical roots of the "identity question" in Turkey.

Keywords: Travel writing, civilization, Ottoman Empire, Orientalism, the East

ÖZ

SEYAHAT, MEDENİYET VE DOĞU: SON DÖNEM OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU'NDA OSMANLI SEYYAHLARININ “DOĞU” ALGISI

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Bu tezin amacı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son dönemlerinde Osmanlı seyyahlarının Doğu algısını analiz etmektir. Bu çerçevede bu tez Osmanlı entelektüellerinin medeniyet kavramı merkezinde yaptıkları tartışmalar ile Osmanlı seyyahlarının Avrupa dışı bölge ve halkları nasıl algıladıkları arasında bir ilişki kurmaktadır. Osmanlı entelektüelleri Batı medeniyetinin maddi elemanları ile kendi moralitelerini birleştiren bir sentez yaratmaya çalışmışlardır ve bu sentez onların Batılı algılardan daha farklı bir Doğu algısı geliştirmelerini sağlamıştır. Batı'nın Doğu algısı tek tip, değişmeyen ve statik bir Doğu öngörürken, Osmanlı seyyahlarının algıları zamansal ve mekansal bağlam ile seyyahların siyasi eğilimlerine göre farklılaşmıştır. Böylece bu tez Osmanlıların medeniyet ve Doğu algıları arasında bir bağ kurarak literatürdeki boşluğu gidermeyi amaçlayarak, Osmanlıların Doğu algısını Oryantalist/kolonyalist olarak nitelendiren mevcut literatürün sınırlarını sorgulayarak, Osmanlı kimliği ve Osmanlıların dünyayı algılamaları bakımından seyahatnamelerin önemine dikkat çekerek ve son olarak Osmanlıların medeniyet ve Doğu algılarının Türkiye'de bugün de mevcut olan “kimlik sorunsalı”nın tarihsel kökenlerinin anlaşılmasına yardımcı olduğunu vurgulayarak literatüre katkı sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Seyahat yazımı, medeniyet, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Oryantalizm, Doğu

To my beloved and my family

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INTRODUCTION

The academic fields explaining the behaviour of human collectivities (i.e., nations, states, and civilizations) such as the disciplines of History and International Relations have a significant shortcoming, namely the attachment of extreme significance to the concept of “state” instead of the concept of “people.” The discourse in these disciplines follows as, for example, “state X declared war on state Y,” or “state X signs a treaty with state Y.” In other words, instead of focusing on people, the students of history and international relations prefer to personify states. States emerge as mechanical entities, having their own reason, mentality, interests, in sum, having their own personality. Contrarily, the human factor has been neglected to a great extent; the fact that the states have been established and administered by people has been oftenly disregarded.

Indeed, relatively recent debates in the discipline of history have begun to bring the human factor to the forefront. Some historians tend to emphasize the human presence behind the state machinery in addition to the political relations between states.¹ However, in the discipline of International Relations, except for some limited attempts to challenge it (such as constructivist or historical sociological analyses) the state-centric discourse underestimating the human factor still prevails.² Although the name of the discipline, “*international*

¹ Especially, the Annales School, established in the 1930s onwards by a group of French historians, including Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel, Georges Duby, Jacques le Goff, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. This movement, known as *la nouvelle histoire* (the new history), aims, according to Peter Burke, for (1) substituting a problem-oriented analytical history for a traditional narrative of events, (2) substituting the history of the whole range of human activities for political history, and (3) cooperating with other disciplines to present a holistic account of history. Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution, 1929-89*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 1-2.

² For the constructivist analysis of the social construction of the concepts of state, anarchy, agent and structure, see, for example, Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), 335-370; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), 391-425; Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), 71-81. For a detailed account of historical sociology of international relations, see Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries*, (London and New

relations” refer to the relations between particular human collectivities, namely the nations, what has so far been examined in the literature has been the *inter-state*, instead of *inter-national* relations.

One significant attempt to insert human factor into the discipline of international relations is the incorporation of the concept of identity to understand state behaviour.³ Such an attempt evidently necessitates the inclusion of societal factors, as history, traditions, language, or religion of a particular social group turned out to be essential elements of an identity ascribed to a particular state. The argument that the state identity influences state behaviour provides the discipline of International Relations with the need of examining the human factor in addition to the state machinery.

In the formation of social identities, and by extension, state identity, perceptions matter. On the one hand, human beings develop certain perceptions regarding their external environment either through their own observations or through learning from others. On the other hand, these individual modes of thinking are shaped by the social framework, of which the individual is a part. Therefore, a mutually-constituting process is operational in the formation of perceptions. The individual perceptions contribute to the formation of a body of societal perceptions and this, in turn, shapes the individual perceptions. The identity of a particular social entity or a state, therefore, emerges out of this process.

Among many factors shaping perceptions, such as religion, traditions, language or the common experiences, literature has a significant place. The oral or written narration of the individual or social feelings contributes much to the establishment of perceptions. Here, the process of mutual-constitution is

York: Routledge, 1998) and Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.), *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

³ For some examples of identity studies in international relations, see Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1997); Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Albert J. Paolini, *Navigating Modernity: Post-Colonialism, Identity and International Relations*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1999).

operational as well. As a member of a particular society, the narrator or writer's perceptions have been shaped by social structures on the one hand, and through dissemination of his own narration, he/she contributes to the shaping of these structures on the other. By affecting the mindset of people, literature contributes to their understanding of the external world.

Despite this significance, the students of international relations have long ignored literature as a source to understand socio-political identities and perceptions. Only recently, with the utilization of the findings of post-colonial/subaltern studies, which has originally emerged under the discipline of literary criticism, they began to consider literature as an important tool to understand international relations better. This new interest in linking discourse analysis to the discipline of International Relations is still in its infancy; however, it contributes to the emergence of seminal works initiating fierce and thought-provoking debates in this field.⁴ What is more, the importance attached to the human factor through discourse analysis makes the students of international relations aware of the need for interdisciplinary studies for presenting a more compact account of the interaction between states and other socio-political entities. In other words, these students begin to underline that it is the connections between the discipline of International Relations and other fields

⁴ The field of postcolonial studies has gained significance since the late 1970s. According to some authors, the popularity of postcolonial studies has risen in the Western academy after the dissemination of Edward Said's influential critique of Western constructions of the Orient. This field is quite interdisciplinary, linking the disciplines of literature, anthropology, film studies, or political science. Among the major intellectual founding fathers of post-colonialism, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi and Edward Said attracted attention. The field has been further developed with the writings of a new generation of authors, such as Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Bill Ashcroft, and Partha Chatterjee. For a review of postcolonial literature see Diana Brydon (ed.), *Post-Colonialism: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies*, 5 Volumes, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). It is difficult to completely discern the differences between postcolonial and subaltern studies, since both of them are interested in the study of "inferior" groups; however, the scope of subaltern studies is wider, since it includes not only resistance to colonial discourse, but also all other kinds of classifications, which create superior-inferior distinction based on the criteria such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or religion. For a review of subaltern studies and its relationship with the postcolonial studies, see Vinayak Chaturvedi (ed.), *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial*, (London and New York: Verso, 2000) and David Ludden (ed.), *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the Globalization of South Asia*, (London: Anthem Books, 2002).

of social sciences and humanities that eradicate the shortcomings of the former as well as the latter.

One of the most successful applications of interdisciplinary analysis to the discipline of International Relations is the concept of “Orientalism.” This concept has emerged in the 1960s as a result of the decolonization movement and it was popularized in the 1970s with the publication of one of the most inspiring (and for some, provoking) pieces of social and literary studies, namely Edward Said’s masterpiece, *Orientalism*.⁵ The concept of Orientalism and the literature evolved around it gather scholars from different fields, including literary criticism, sociology, history, political science, and international relations. The utilization of this concept for understanding the interrelationship between the largest collectivities of human beings, namely civilizations, and for criticizing the perceptions of a particular civilization (the Western civilization) over the rest of the world, have created a fierce debate. The critiques of Said have challenged the generalizing and essentializing nature of the writings of a group of Western authors from the late eighteenth century onwards in a way to reach a grand conclusion, which is the ultimate and unsormountable distinction between the West and the rest. In other words, the strength of the Saidian understanding of Orientalism comes from the utilization of a corpus of literature to reach this grand conclusion, which, in turn, becomes its main weakness, as the critiques of Said have argued. Still, the approach that Said and those writing along the same line pursued contributes to the discipline of International Relations at least for two reasons. The first contribution is related to the argument of “civilization” as a “unit of analysis.” The acceptance of civilizations as units of analysis in international relations provides the discipline of International Relations with a historical and sociological depth, since the analysis of the concept of civilization requires an extensive temporal and socio-spatial framework. In other words, the examination of large collectivities experiencing a longer lifespan than the states, forces the student of international relations to

⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 3rd Ed., (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul Ltd, 2003). The literature on Orientalism is reviewed in the first part of this dissertation.

engage in an interdisciplinary study linking history and international relations. The second contribution of Saidian understanding of Orientalism was the emphasis placed on the literature; in other words, literary works are considered as a significant source to understand societal perceptions, and thereby inter-societal relations. The reliance on literature as a source to understand international relations also encourages incorporation of human factor into the discipline besides the mechanization of the state.

The idea behind writing this dissertation is exactly derived from these two contributions. The need for interdisciplinarity and the significance attached to the study of human perceptions for producing a better outlook of international relations stimulates the author of this dissertation to focus on a particular literature (the travel literature) in order to understand the perceptions of a particular group (the Ottoman travellers) over a particular geography (the “East”). The formulation of the subtitle of the dissertation as “The Ottoman Travellers’ Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire” reflects this combination.

Having mentioned the rationale of writing this dissertation, in order to delineate the boundaries of its subject matter, to set its main arguments and to argue for the reasons for its penning, the 5W 1H approach is borrowed from the discipline of journalism. As is known, this approach employs six questions (when, where, who, what, why, and how) for examining any event to comprehend all of its dimensions. Similarly, these questions are answered below to present the reader a compact picture of what this dissertation is about and why it has been written.

The “When” Question: The Temporal Boundaries of the Dissertation

The subtitle of this dissertation indicates that the temporal range of the dissertation comprises the period called “the late Ottoman Empire.” This rather vague expression needs to be clarified. In this dissertation, “the late Ottoman Empire” roughly includes the period between the promulgation of the Edict of *Tanzimat* (Reordering) in 1839 and the ultimate disintegration of the Empire in the early 1920s. The end point of this temporal scale is quite understandable

since the political framework has been totally transformed with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The reason for setting the Edict of *Tanzimat* as the starting point is the transformation of the Ottoman bureaucratic, social and intellectual structures after its promulgation to a considerable extent. The *Tanzimat* reforms could hardly be implemented properly; however, despite their shortcomings, they altered traditional structures and resulted in the emergence of a dual system in which the traditional and modern elements conflictually coexisted. This duality produces one of the most fertile periods of the Empire in terms of intellectual debates; hence, the Ottoman intellectuals' discussions regarding the concept of civilization and their perceptions of the "East" were intensified in the *Tanzimat* period and aftermath. That is why the dissertation examines the period after the promulgation of the Edict of *Tanzimat*.

The temporal framework set between early 1840s and early 1920s is also quite significant for the world history; as Selim Deringil notes laconically, in this period, "the world history seemed to accelerate."⁶ The beginning of the *Tanzimat* period roughly corresponds to the aftermath of a destructive series of intra-European wars (the Napoleonic Wars) and the long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire ended with a worldwide confrontation (the First World War). Between these two significant collisions, there emerged a precarious balance among the European powers, which had been transformed after the consolidation of new unified states in Europe, namely Germany and Italy. Besides this political dimension, regarding the economic and technological spheres, the period considered in this dissertation was revolutionary as well. One after another, new inventions appeared to facilitate daily life; European economies prospered and European capitals such as Paris and London were reconstructed as "world-capitals," namely as models for the developing nations.

This period is also significant for the maturation of the concept of civilization and a closely related debate, namely the "Orient/Occident debate."

⁶ Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), 3-29, 3.

There emerged a particular perception of the concept of civilization in this period in general, and of the Western civilization's supremacy over the rest of the world, in particular. All these debates resonated in the Ottoman intellectual circles and produced vivid discussions on the concepts of civilization and the "East," which are examined in this dissertation in detail.

In sum, the temporal delineation has both theoretical and practical reasons. First of all, the consolidation of the linkage between the concept of "civilization" and "Orient/Occident debate" in Europe lasted almost until the first half of the nineteenth century; its reception by the Ottomans has been realized later, from 1840s onwards. Hence, only after this period, it is possible to frequently encounter with Ottoman intellectuals' elaborations on such themes. What is more, especially since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there emerged an increasing Ottoman interest towards the "East," as a result of the Pan-Islamic policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909).⁷ Therefore, the number of travels to, and the travelogues written about the "East" increased in this period. In other words, the basic source of this dissertation, namely the Ottoman travelogues on the "East," only appeared as a distinct literary genre from the mid-nineteenth century onwards and this is the practical reason for the temporal limits of this dissertation.

The "Where" Question: The Spatial Boundaries of the Dissertation

The second question to be answered to draw the boundaries of the dissertation is where the "East" is. Until here in this dissertation, the word "East" is written in quotation marks; the reason for such usage is to question this very word. In other words, the concept of the "East" (which is sometimes used interchangeably with the concept of "Orient") is not merely a geographical concept; there are some values attached to it and the essence of Saidian

⁷ A Note on the Dates: In this dissertation, the dates attached to the names of the rulers (with a mark of "r."), show the period of their reign; whereas, the dates attached to the names of authors, diplomats, intellectuals, etc., show the year of their birth and death. Some of the names do not have an indication of dates of birth or death; the reason of this absence is that these dates cannot be clearly determined.

understanding of *Orientalism* is the presentation of these values to reveal the power/knowledge relationship carved in the perceptions of the geographical entity called the “East” as well as of its inhabitants.

Therefore, in this dissertation, the “East” means the territories defined by the Western corpus of literature as the East. In a narrower sense, this region comprises the contemporary Middle East. In a wider context, the non-European world (excluding the North and Latin America, Australia and Oceania), including the Africa, the Middle East, the Central Asia, and the South and East Asia constitute the East. In this dissertation, this wider context is preferred, meaning that the concept of the East denotes the non-European parts of the Old World.

However, such conceptualization does not necessarily mean a monolithic perception of these vast lands and their inhabitants. Therefore the East, in this dissertation, is displayed under three broad categories, being (1) the Muslim provinces of the Ottoman Empire in which non-Turkish population constituted the majority, namely the North Africa, the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula; (2) the Muslim (and partially Turkish) outback of the Ottoman Empire, namely Iran, Central Asia, East Turkistan, Afghanistan and some parts of India; (3) and finally the non-Muslim countries of Africa as well as the East and South Asia, such as Abyssinia, some parts of India, China and Japan. In other words, the criteria used for categorizing the East are religion and the degree of Ottoman control. The level of exertion of the Ottoman control was strongest in the first category because these regions were politically part of the Ottoman Empire. In the second category, the Ottoman Empire still had a limited impact beyond its borders because of the religious/spiritual source of authority of the Caliphate. Finally, the Ottoman Empire was an external actor, having diplomatic or non-diplomatic relationships with the non-Muslim countries establishing the third category.

In sum, when thinking about the concept of the East, this dual meaning should be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the Ottomans had a perception of the East as a distinct religious-cultural entity defined *vis-à-vis* the West and most of the Ottoman intellectuals thought that they were part of this

entity. On the other hand, the East was not monolithic; the Ottoman travellers' narration varied from region to region or from country to country. Depending on the internal and external circumstances, personal experiences and the Ottoman intellectuals/travellers' backgrounds, and the characteristics of the regions that they were dealing with, there might be multiple perceptions of the Eastern world.

The “Who” Question: The Actors of the Dissertation

This dissertation is about the writings of a particular group of Ottoman intellectuals who had travelled to the East. Whether these travellers are members of the Ottoman intellectual community is a matter of controversy and could be answered either affirmatively or negatively. Among the multiple definitions of the concept of “intellectual,”⁸ the author of this dissertation prefers a wider and simpler definition, which facilitates the linking of the Ottoman intellectuals and travellers by defining Ottoman travellers as Ottoman intellectuals at the same time. For the purposes of this thesis, the “intellectual” is defined as a member of a small group of men of letters, who, in various degrees, are aware of the main problems of his age and offer prospective solutions for these problems. Since the Ottoman travellers preferred to write their travel accounts in a way to reflect

⁸ Like all such abstract words, the word “intellectual” has no single definition. What makes the matter more complex is its social connotation and the discussions on who can be defined as an “intellectual.” The dictionary definitions of the word ranges from the simple definition of “a person of superior intellect” to a more complicated version, namely “a person, who places a high value on or pursues things of interest to the intellect or the more complex forms and fields of knowledge, as aesthetic or philosophical matters, esp. on an abstract and general level.” For these definitions, see *Random House Unabridged Dictionary*, (London: Random House, 2006). Similar to dictionaries, there is no consensus among the scholars for the definition of this concept. According to Raymond Aron, in its widest usage, the term “intellectual” can be defined as all non-manual workers, including the three categories of scribes, experts and men of letters. However, Aron himself brings about concentric circles to define the word hierarchically, which limits his wider definition. In other words, a second and narrower definition would only include experts and men of letters; while a final and narrowest definition would solely include men of letters. See Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, translated by Terence Kilmartin, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1962), 205-206. Among many scholars who dwell upon the concept of “intellectual,” André Malraux defines the term as “a man whose life is guided by devotion to an idea”; Peter Viereck as “a full-time servant of the Word, or of the word” connoting both the religious and non-religious dimensions; or Maurice Barrés as “pen pushers and leftist ideologues.” For further definitions, see Thomas Molnar, *The Decline of the Intellectual*, (New York: Arlington House, 1973), 7-8.

upon the problems that the East had encountered and to comment about possible solutions, they could be labelled as intellectuals.

The degree of independence of these travellers from the political authority is another controversial issue regarding the objectivity of their writings. Most of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Ottoman travellers to the non-European world were state agents (diplomats, bureaucrats, sanitary officials, soldiers, or spies); very few of them undertook travels for personal reasons. Some of the travelogues were initially written as reports to the authorities sending these officials; others were published to inform their readers about distant lands and peoples. Keeping these in mind, arguably, in the Ottoman Empire, the state-traveller relationship is an intimate one; however, there were some travellers, who did not refrain from writing critically about the Ottoman administration. Therefore, being an agent of state does not necessarily mean a relationship based on patronage. The outcome of these diverging patterns is the differences between the styles and contents of the Ottoman travelogues.

Of course, as literary pieces, one should not expect the travelogues to be composed of objective knowledge regarding the Eastern lands and peoples. The travellers' mindset influenced the themes to be written down as well as the style. The observations and experiences in these distant territories were generally penned down for a purpose, either for contributing to a particular discourse pursued by the political authority or for criticizing it. Hence, the travelogues should be read carefully in order to discern the intentions and aims of the traveller in writing this particular narration.

The “What” Question: Main Arguments of the Dissertation

Having set the temporal and spatial boundaries and having introduced the actors, in this section the main arguments and basic questions of the dissertation are examined. To start with, the departure point of this dissertation is a recent trend in the literature on the late Ottoman Empire, which aims to extend post-colonial studies to the Ottoman case in a way to argue for an “Ottoman Orientalism.” The scholars following this trend argue that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman ruling elite and intellectuals began to

perceive the Middle East, its adjacent territories and inhabitants by utilizing the Western discourses of the Orient. In other words, these scholars claim that the Ottomans perceived the Orient as the Westerners did.⁹

This dissertation, on the other hand, argues that the concept of “Ottoman Orientalism” has significant shortcomings in presenting the Ottoman perception of the East because this concept is based on the presumption that the Ottoman attempts for Westernization resulted in the emergence of Western modes of thinking with regard to the concepts of civilization and the Orient. In other words, according to the defenders of the “Ottoman Orientalism” argument, the Ottoman search for the adoption of Western civilization consolidated the perception of inevitability of Westernization. Presuming themselves as “civilized” in Western terms, the Ottomans began to reflect their Orient as an “uncivilized” region and tried to project their civilizational development over these backward territories in the form of a *civilizing mission*. However, this dissertation asserts that the argumentation of “Ottoman Orientalism” neither fits into the Saidian understanding of Orientalism, nor is immune from its basic shortcomings, namely generalization and monolithization of the East. In making this argument, this dissertation does not deny the existence of a quasi-Orientalist mode of thinking in the writings of some Ottoman intellectuals regarding the Ottoman Orient; however, it claims that these perceptions cannot be generalized in a way to argue that the Ottoman intellectual and bureaucratic elite were totally Orientalist.

Then, this dissertation has two main arguments. The first argument was that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman bureaucratic elite and intellectuals have developed a unique understanding of civilization different from European conceptions. Although they admired

⁹ For the argumentation of “Ottoman Orientalism,” see Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, “Orientalism ‘*alla turca*’: Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim ‘Outback,’” *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 2, Ottoman Travels and Travel Accounts from an Earlier Age of Globalization (July, 2000), 139-195; Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3 (June, 2002), 768-796; Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), 311-342.

European material achievements and accepted the inevitability of the transfer of these achievements into the Ottoman Empire, this did not necessarily mean that they aimed for total westernization. Rather, based on the writings of the major intellectuals of this period, this dissertation argues that the Ottomans applied the notion of selectivity in their conceptualization of civilization, meaning that they tried to reach a synthesis by combining the material achievements of Western civilization with the Eastern/Islamic/Ottoman morality. In other words, they aimed to be modernized without being westernized. This synthesis is one of the most significant impediments in front of the argumentation of “Ottoman Orientalism,” because, although the Ottomans were critical of Eastern backwardness *vis-à-vis* the West, this was not done to emphasize their superiority over the East, but to criticize their wrongdoings as members of the Eastern community.

If the Ottoman perception of the Orient was not Orientalist in essence, then what kind of a perception did the Ottoman intellectuals develop for this region and its inhabitants? In other words, can one argue for a particular Ottoman perception of the “East”? In answering these questions, the second main argument of this dissertation claims that unlike the Western Orientalist discourse, the Ottomans had not a monolithic perception of the East; rather their perceptions changed from one traveller to another, from one period to another, and from one region to another. It is this personal, temporal and spatial differentiation that contributes to a colourful description of the Eastern lands and peoples on the one hand, and impedes the establishment of a static and unchanging concept of the “East” based on the distinction between the East and West on the other.

The “How” Question: The Methodology of the Dissertation

In addition to the boundaries and themes of the dissertation, its methodology and the sources utilized for its penning should be mentioned in order to answer the question of how this dissertation is written. Two types of sources are used in the writing process. The first one is the secondary sources, which are utilized extensively in the discussions of Orientalism in general and

the “Ottoman Orientalism” in particular, as well as with regard to the European perceptions of the concept of civilization. The second and more significant source, on the other hand, is the primary sources, namely the writings of the Ottoman intellectuals on the concept of civilization and the Ottoman travelogues focusing on the non-European world. The Ottoman intellectuals’ writings have generally been transliterated; therefore, these transliterations are utilized and the original texts are referred only when necessary. On the other hand, although most of the Ottoman travelogues to the non-European world have either been transliterated or abridged, in order to provide the reader with the original style and wording, and to reflect the spirit of time that the travelogues had been written in better, the texts written in Ottoman Turkish are utilized, whenever they are available. In order to reach these original texts, the author of the dissertation consulted several libraries including Süleymaniye Library, Beyazıt Library, Millet Library, the National Library and the Halil İnalcık Collections in the Bilkent University Library.

After having been collected from these libraries, these texts have been submitted to a detailed reading process, in which the specificities of the period that they were written in and of the places that they were about have been considered. In other words, discourse analysis is the basic method utilized in this dissertation to set out the Ottoman understanding of the concepts of civilization and the “East.” The travelogues have been examined to find some common themes with regard to particular regions and their inhabitants in order to emphasize the similarities and differences that the Ottoman travellers had underlined. In sum, in this dissertation, the primary sources are contextualized with the knowledge acquired from the secondary sources to display how the Ottoman intellectuals had understood the concepts of civilization and the “East.”

The “Why” Question: The Justification of the Dissertation

The first reason for engaging in such a difficult project, which requires detailed elaborations upon a long period, a wide geography and highly debated concepts such as civilization and Orientalism, is to fill a significant gap in the literature on the Ottoman perceptions about the external world. Indeed, the

literature of the linkage between Orientalism and the Ottoman Empire has so far had two pillars: (1) the Western perception of the Ottoman Empire and (2) the Ottoman perception of the West. Here, an ironic point is that although there is a significant literature written by Turkish scholars on the Western travelogues depicting the Ottoman Empire,¹⁰ a similar effort regarding the Ottoman travelogues is not much visible. One significant exception to this neglect is a voluminous book written by Baki Asiltürk and entitled *Osmanlı Seyyahlarının Gözüyle Avrupa (Europe in the Eyes of Ottoman Travellers)*.¹¹ In this book, Asiltürk examines the Ottoman travelogues on Europe, most of which were written during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In doing that, he tries to put forward the Ottoman perception of Europe in its totality. Another significant secondary source on the Ottoman travelogues is İbrahim Şirin's *Osmanlı İmgeleminde Avrupa (Europe in the Ottoman Imagination)*.¹² This book is composed of an introductory chapter on the Ottoman imagination of Europe in the early modern period and this chapter is followed by two chapters on ambassadorial reports (*sefâretnâme*) and travelogues. This last chapter on the travelogues cites only a few nineteenth century travelogues on Europe and evaluates them with regard to the Ottoman perception of European civilization, daily life, administration, science and technology.

Although these two studies are among the most comprehensive studies that have ever been done so far on the Ottoman travelogues of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, they hardly surpass a simple travel literature review. In other words, what Asiltürk and Şirin do is to pick up some themes and to classify the excerpts from the Ottoman travelogues in accordance with these

¹⁰ For a couple of examples, see Feridun Dirimtekin, *Ecnebi Seyyahlara Nazaran XVI. Yüzyılda İstanbul*, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1964); Necati Güngör, *Seyyahların Kaleminden Şehr-i Şirin İstanbul*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996); İlhan Pınar, *Hacılar, Seyyahlar, Misyonerler ve İzmir: Yabancıların Gözüyle Osmanlı Döneminde İzmir, 1608-1918*, (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2001); Gülnur Üçel-Aybet, *Avrupalı Seyyahların Gözünden Osmanlı Dünyası ve İnsanları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003); Salih Özbaran, *Portekizli Seyyahlar: İran, Türkiye, Irak, Suriye ve Mısır Yollarında*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007).

¹¹ Baki Asiltürk, *Osmanlı Seyyahlarının Gözüyle Avrupa*, (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2000).

¹² İbrahim Şirin, *Osmanlı İmgeleminde Avrupa*, (Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi, 2006).

chosen themes. They do not contextualize nineteenth century travel literature within the concept of “civilization” and “Orient/Occident debate”. Therefore, the Ottoman self-perception *vis-à-vis* the European civilization is somehow provided in these books, while the Ottoman perception of the “East” is completely neglected. Although, in the introductory chapter of his book, Asiltürk enlisted a couple of the nineteenth century travelogues on the East; in the coming chapters he does not review them.

Ironically, a systematic study of the Ottoman travelogues on the “East” has been done not by the students of Ottoman history in Turkey, but by two foreign scholars, Christoph Herzog and Raul Motika. Although their article examines most of the travelogues utilized in this dissertation, it does not comprehensively question the Ottoman perception of the East as well; rather it focuses on the patterns of Ottoman travel to and travel writing about the Muslim outback of the Ottoman Empire.¹³

This dissertation, therefore, aims to fill this gap by utilizing the Ottoman travelogues as a source to reveal the Ottoman perception of the Eastern lands and peoples. Such an analysis is quite important because it also helps to question the Ottoman self-perception *vis-à-vis* the East. In other words, this dissertation tries to contribute to the Ottoman modernization literature and Ottoman intellectual history through combining the Ottoman discourse of “civilization” and the Ottoman perception of the “East.” Such an approach seems to be more productive, because it tries to refrain from two significant simplifications generally encountered in the literature on this issue. First of all, this dissertation questions the argument that the Ottoman intellectuals had been the mere imitators of the Western civilization. Contrarily, it argues that there had been a fierce and sophisticated debate among the Ottoman intellectuals regarding the notion of “civilization,” its material and moral elements. What is more, they were also aware of the Occident/Orient debate vividly discussed in Europe, since the Ottoman Empire had been one of the most significant actors of this debate as a “westernizing” Eastern state. Thus, to label the Ottoman modernization process

¹³ Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism ‘*alla turca*’.”

as a simple imitation procedure is an oversimplification. Secondly, this dissertation also questions the very existence of the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism,” in other words, the monolithization of the Ottoman perception of the “East” and the generalization of any kind of superior-inferior discursive relationship in the form of Orientalism.

The Challenges Encountered during the Preparation of this Dissertation

There are two significant challenges encountered during the argumentation and writing processes of this dissertation, which should be mentioned to inform the readers about the problems of writing on these issues. To start with, avoiding generalizations in this dissertation required an arduous effort since this method is strongly criticized. However, writing on a long period of time and a vast region make the resistance towards grand conclusions quite difficult. Still, instead of answering the questions posed in this dissertation as completely affirmatively or negatively, a rather balanced approach is followed by including most of the debates regarding the contentious issues. For example, with regard to the Ottoman perception of the concept of civilization, although, at the end, it is argued that the Ottomans had developed a version of this concept different from the European one, this does not necessarily mean that this version was adopted by the entire Ottoman intellectual community. Rather it means that it was the dominant discourse of civilization among other discourses. Similarly, although this dissertation clearly questions the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism,” it does not altogether reject the existence of quasi-Orientalist texts in the Ottoman literature. However, it is emphasized that such pieces could and should not be generalized as if they established the dominant discourse in the Ottoman Empire.

A second challenge stems from the question whether the Ottoman travelogues to the East suffice to argue for an Ottoman perception of the “East.” In other words, do the Ottoman travellers’ accounts represent the Ottoman perception of the “East”? Indeed, the author of this dissertation is aware that there are other sources written by the Ottoman intellectuals on this particular part of the world; however, most of them were written not as a result of their authors’

actual experiences in these regions. Rather, they were penned after reviewing the Western or Eastern literature on these lands and their inhabitants. On the other hand, the travelogues narrated the firsthand experiences; the actual presence of the traveller in the “East” is therefore more fruitful to produce a relatively objective outlook. Of course, the degree of objectivity in these pieces is a matter of controversy, since these travelogues are not academic studies. Indeed, they are subjective pieces reflecting the sentiments of the travellers. However, it is this subjectivity that produced an original perception of the regions travelled and the peoples encountered. Therefore, although the travelogues comprised a limited part of the Ottoman literature on the “East,” as being firsthand accounts, they tell about the Ottoman perception of the East more than any other source.

The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of thirteen chapters under four parts. The first part of the dissertation analyzes the concept of Orientalism, the travel literature as a source of Orientalist discourse, and the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism.” In other words, this part provides the theoretical background of the dissertation. There are two chapters in this introductory part. The first chapter deals with a brief analysis of the concept of Orientalism with reference to pre-Saidian and Saidian versions. This chapter provides the reader with the essential elements of the Orientalist discourse and establishes the linkage between travel writing and Orientalism. The second chapter focuses on the specific application of the Orientalist discourse to the Ottoman case in a way to argue that the Ottomans perceived the Orient as the West did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This argument is questioned in this chapter and its shortcomings are emphasized through questioning whether it fits to the Saidian Orientalism and whether the problems of Saidian Orientalism have also been reflected in this specific version of Orientalism.

Following this theoretical account, the second part of the dissertation introduces the sources, namely the Ottoman travel literature, to the reader. Within this framework, the third chapter mainly analyzes the Ottoman travel writing before the nineteenth century and tries to demonstrate the reasons for the

underdevelopment of this genre in the classical period. The fourth chapter, on the other hand, focuses on the renewed Ottoman interest towards travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards and underlines the intellectual, social and technological factors contributing to the development of Ottoman travel and travel writing. What is more, this chapter also serves as a brief historical background for the transformations that the Ottoman Empire had experienced in the nineteenth century. Finally, the fifth chapter introduces the Ottoman travelogues to the non-European world through enlisting them both chronologically and in terms of the reasons for travel.

After having discussed the theoretical background and the literature utilized in the dissertation, the third part analyzes the Ottoman perception of civilization. In the sixth and seventh chapters, the emergence and evolution of the concept of civilization in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire are presented in a parallel setting. Especially, in the seventh chapter, the emergence of the Ottoman version of this concept, *medeniyet*, and its different perceptions in different periods are examined. The eighth chapter focuses on the Ottoman travellers' perception of civilization and the similarities and differences between those who had never been to the East and those who had actually experienced it. This comparison also demonstrates that the idea of civilization had been perceived not exactly the same as the Western or Western-influenced perceptions.

Finally, the fourth part of the dissertation is devoted to the Ottoman travellers' perception of the non-European world and its inhabitants. This part is composed of five chapters, each of which is devoted to a distinct region, being the North Africa, the Ottoman Middle East (including the Fertile Crescent, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula), Iran, the Central Asia and the South and East Asia. In each of these chapters there are two sections. While the first section sets the historical background for the Ottoman relationship with that particular region, the second section deals with Ottoman perception of the regions and their inhabitants based on the account of the travelogues. The dissertation finally ends with an overall conclusion recapitulating its main arguments and answering its basic questions.

PART I

ORIENTALISM, TRAVEL AND “OTTOMAN ORIENTALISM”

As the cover of this dissertation indicates, the subtitle used for defining its subject matter is “The Ottoman Travellers’ Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire”. From this very title, three significant themes could be derived. First of all, the actors presented in this dissertation are the travellers; in other words, the practice of travel and travel writing is one of this dissertation’s significant components. Secondly, the expression of “perception of the East” directs the reader to the concept of Orientalism, which can be used as a framework to understand the East. Finally, the identity of the actors attracts attention; the travellers, whose travelogues are examined, were from the Ottoman Empire. It is *their* perception of the East that establishes the basic subject matter of the dissertation. In other words, there are three issues, which should be examined briefly before engaging in deeper analysis of the Ottoman traveller’s perception of the East: These are the concept of Orientalism, its interrelationship with the practice of travel and travel writing, and one of its claimed versions, namely the “Ottoman Orientalism.”

In this first part of the dissertation, therefore, these three issues are introduced to the reader in two chapters. In the first chapter, the concept of Orientalism is examined in order to set the background for the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism.” What is more, the intimate interrelationship between travel writing and Orientalism as mutually-feeding mechanisms is covered. After putting this general analysis of the concept, the second chapter particularly focuses on the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism.” Here, first of all, some different variants of Orientalism are examined in order to discuss the possibility of claiming a particular Ottoman version of the concept. Then the literature on the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism” is reviewed, and the limits of the applicability of post-colonial studies and Orientalism to the Ottoman case are examined.

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF ORIENTALISM

Published in the year 1978, Edward Said's masterpiece, *Orientalism*, has initiated a fervent debate within social and literary theory for its ambitious, if not provocative, style and content. This book not only transforms the understanding of "Orientalism" and "the Orientalist," but also presents a significant critique of the corpus of Western literature on the Orient. What is more, with this book, Said develops the previous studies on Orientalism (which is called in this dissertation as the non-Saidian Orientalism) by adding a significant literary criticism. Some authors accused Said's arguments of being biased, generalizing and essentialist,¹⁴ while others tend to generalize them more in a way to include any kind of relationship between a colonial/imperialist power and the colonized entity.¹⁵ Said's book and its critiques have established a literature of its own; therefore, the studies focusing on the relationship between the East and the West generally refer to this literature before extending it.

Since this dissertation is about the Ottoman perception of the East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and since this temporal framework converges with the period concentrated by the studies on Orientalism, the emergence and evolution of this concept should be analyzed in order to understand how the Oriental Studies themselves have been studied. Therefore, this chapter of the dissertation is devoted to an analysis of the concept of Orientalism and its relationship with travel writing. The first section deals with how the concept of Orientalism had been perceived before Said, and focuses on

¹⁴ For a summary of the criticisms directed against Orientalism, see Fred Halliday, "Orientalism and Its Critics," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993): 145-163; Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluvalia, *Edward Said*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 69-82; Robert J. C. Young, *Post-Colonialism: An Historical Introduction*, (Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 389-392

¹⁵ For an examination of the application of Orientalism to the regions other than Orient see the first section of the next chapter entitled "New Orientalisms."

the pre-Saidian critiques of Western literature on the Orient. The second section focuses on the Saidian understanding of Orientalism by examining his definition of three pursuits of this concept and analyzes the evolution of Oriental Studies and discourses. Finally, in the third section, the intimate relationship between travel writing and Orientalism is elaborated since travel writing is one of the major sources of the Orientalist discourse. Here, the evolution of the perception of travel and travel writing in the West is briefly covered as well.

1.1. The Perception of the Concept of Orientalism before Edward Said

Very few concepts in social sciences and humanities have experienced a more significant transformation than the concept of Orientalism. In the nineteenth century, this word had multiple meanings in the Western world. For an intellectual, it generally referred to the work of “a scholar versed in the languages and literatures of the East;” for an artist, it identified “a character, style or quality commonly associated with the Eastern nations;” for a British colonial administrator in India, it meant the policy of preserving local laws and customs for ruling this colony better.¹⁶ Except for the last meaning, which had disappeared due to the abandonment of that particular colonial policy, the references perceiving Orientalism as an academic field or an aesthetic movement continued. After the end of the Second World War, the concept acquired additional meanings, which transformed its reception by the academic community. Particularly, the decolonization movement of 1950s and 1960s and subsequent emergence of the critical and reactive stance of post-colonial and subaltern studies resulted in a swift and massive transformation of the concept of Orientalism. As A. L. Macfie writes:

[...]n a little more than twenty years [following the end of the Second World War], it [the concept of Orientalism] came to mean not only the work of the orientalist, and a character, style or quality associated with the Eastern nations, but also a corporate institution, designed for dealing with the Orient, a partial view of Islam, an instrument of Western imperialism, a style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between Orient and Occident, and even an ideology, justifying and accounting for the subjugation of blacks,

¹⁶ A. L. Macfie, *Orientalism*, (London and New York: Longman, 2002), 3

Palestinian Arabs, women and many other supposedly deprived groups and peoples.¹⁷

In this transformative development in the literature on the Orient, Said's *Orientalism* has a significant place. The perception of Orientalism not only as an academic endeavour, but also as a discourse based on the epistemological and ontological distinction between two separate geographical entities, namely between the Occident and Orient, owed much to his work, which has provided a significant inspiration for postcolonial studies as well.¹⁸ However, more important than that, Said's *Orientalism* considerably transformed the values once attached to several political, sociological and philosophical themes. As Macfie argues, with this book:

[w]hat had previously been seen as being good (orientalism, text-based scholarship, knowledge of classical languages, concepts of absolute truth, ethnocentricity, racial pride, service to the state, and national pride) was now seen as being bad, or at least suspect. And what had previously been seen as being bad (anti-colonialism, racial equality, uncertainty regarding the nature of truth, resistance to imperialism, mixed race and internationalism) was now seen as being good, worthy of promotion.¹⁹

Although these changing values revolutionized the understanding of Orientalism, indeed, this concept had been examined critically before Said, particularly by three scholars, namely Anouar Abdel-Malek, an Egyptian-Coptic sociologist, Abdullatif Tibawi, a Palestinian student of Arabic history, and Bryan S. Turner, a leading English sociologist and a student of Marxism. Together with Said's critique, Macfie calls their works as the "four assaults on Orientalism,"²⁰ because all these authors questioned the academic (or quasi-academic) works done under the framework of Oriental Studies, and emphasized the Western prejudicial attitude towards the Orient, which permeated into these texts.

¹⁷ Macfie, *Orientalism*, 4.

¹⁸ According to Gayatri Spivak, an eminent scholar of postcolonial/subaltern studies, it was this work of Said that "released" the colonial discourse studies, which "has [...] blossomed into a garden where marginal can speak and be spoken". See, Gayatri Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine*, (New York, Routledge, 1993), 56.

¹⁹ Macfie, *Orientalism*, 7-8.

²⁰ Macfie, *Orientalism*, 4, 73 ff.

Abdel-Malek's article entitled "Orientalism in Crisis" was published in 1963 and includes one of the earliest critical approaches to Orientalism. According to Abdel-Malek, the decolonization process and independence movements of former colonies resulted in a crisis within Oriental Studies, since the former "objects of study" turned out to be "sovereign subjects".²¹ In other words, the inhabitants of the colonies were no more passive actors waiting for the Westerners to come and study themselves in a way to tell them what they really were. By acquiring their sovereignty, they not only established their political independence, but also became independent from Western imagination. They began to define themselves by their own means. This transformation from "object" to "subject" leads Abdel-Malek to distinguish between "traditional orientalism," which was based on the objectification of the Orientals during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and "neo-orientalism," which emerged from the mid-1950s onwards both in Western Europe and in the Socialist bloc in order to reproduce Western perceptions of the Orient in a setting where Orient was no more a simple object of study.²²

Regarding traditional orientalism, Abdel-Malek appreciates Oriental Studies for their contribution to the understanding of the Oriental cultures; however, he argues that the prejudice infiltrated in these studies should not be disregarded. According to him, the nineteenth century Orientalists were composed of two groups: the first group was the scholars dealing with the Orient solely as an academic field of study, while the second group was formed by "an amalgam of university dons, businessmen, military men, colonial officials, missionaries, publicists and adventurers," whose "[...] only objective was to gather intelligence information in the area to be occupied, to penetrate the consciousness of the people in order to better assure its enslavement to the European powers."²³ With regard to the Occidental perception of the Orient,

²¹ Anouar Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," *Diogenes*, Vol. 11, No. 44 (Dec., 1963): 103-140, also incorporated in Brydon (ed.), *Post-Colonialism*, Vol. 3, 815-845, 815.

²² Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," 822-824.

²³ Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," 817-818.

Abdel-Malek argues that both these groups perceived the Orient and Orientals as an object of study and such a perception required non-participating, non-active, non-autonomous, and non-sovereign understanding of the region and local peoples.²⁴ What is more, this essentialist conception expresses itself through an ethnist, even a racist typology.²⁵ The absence of autonomy for Orientals and their objectification finally leads Abdel-Malek to perceive Orientalism as an instrument of imperialism designed to secure colonization and enslavement of the Third World.²⁶

Unlike Abdel-Malek's general criticism of Orientalism, Tibawi focuses on the Orientalist perception of Islam and Arab nationalism. His two articles on the English-speaking Orientalists mainly criticize their centuries-long prejudiced misinterpretation of Islam and the Islamic texts as well as their biased outlook towards Arab nationalism since the end of the Second World War.²⁷ In the first article published in 1964, Tibawi refers to the "unfortunate antecedents" of the Islamic and Arabic studies in the West. He argues that since the medieval period, the "Judeo-Christian hostility to Islam" has resulted in significant distortions in the writings about Quran and the Prophet Muhammad (571-632), since "Muhammad's role as the bearer of the divine message" has continuously been challenged.²⁸ Although Tibawi narrows his research to the English-speaking Orientalists, the temporal range of the texts he chooses is quite extensive ranging from the Crusades until the mid-1950s.

According to Tibawi, in the mid-1950s, the earlier prejudiced perception of Islam was extended in a way to include Arab nationalism. The Anglo-

²⁴ Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," 818.

²⁵ Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," 818.

²⁶ Macfie, *Orientalism*, 6-7.

²⁷ A[bdul] L[atif] Tibawi, "English Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism," the first part of the article was published in *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (Jan.-June, 1964): 25-45, (thenceforward, Tibawi, "English Speaking Orientalists", I) and the second part was published in the same journal, Vol. 8, No. 3-4 (July-Dec., 1964): 73-88 (thenceforward, Tibawi, "English Speaking Orientalists", II).

²⁸ Tibawi, "English Speaking Orientalists", I, 25.

American fear from a prospective communist expansion in the Middle East, the irritation emerged as a result of the Muslim world's rejection of the liberal-democratic model, the sympathy and support for Israel, the concern for the continuity of the flow of Arab oil, and, finally, the disappointment because of the decline of Western power in the Middle East resulted in such a biased perception of Arab nationalism.²⁹ In sum, Tibawi underlines the continuity of the Western perceptions from the Crusades to the mid-1950s in essence; his point of departure is the eternal and deep-seated hostility between the Islamic and the Christian world, which has transformed from the perception of Islam to the perception of Arab nationalism.³⁰

Different from Abdel-Malek's focus on the academy and Tibawi's focus on the texts on Islam and Arab nationalism, Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, which was published in the same year with Said's *Orientalism*, engages in a Marxist critique of Orientalist studies. According to Turner, the Orientalist literature takes underdevelopment of the Orient for granted because of the stereotypes that this literature has developed. The Orientalists argue that social development is caused by internal characteristics of a society, and the historical development of a society should follow either an evolutionary progressive or a gradually declining pattern. Turner claims that these arguments lead the Orientalists to establish a dichotomy between an ideal Western society, having an evolutionary progressive pattern of development, and a stagnant and even declining Orient.³¹ However, he asserts that the underlying reason for the economic and political underdevelopment of the Orient is not the inherent

²⁹ Tibawi, "English Speaking Orientalists," II, 80-88.

³⁰ Fifteen years after this first article, in 1979, after the publication of Said's *Orientalism* and Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, Tibawi published his second article on the English speaking Orientalists. In this article, he once more examined the problems raised in his first article in the recent colossal publications, such as the *Cambridge History of Islam* or the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, and concluded that the motives and methods employed to analyze Islamic themes had changed very little from the earlier ages to the recent period. See A[bdul] L[atif] Tibawi, "Second Critique of the English-Speaking Orientalists," *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1979): 3-54.

³¹ Bryan S. Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 81.

internal structure of the region, but its entrapment in a peripheral relationship with the global centres of capitalism. When capitalism has once established, in order to pursue this centre-periphery relationship, it has to conserve and even intensify the pre-capitalist modes of production on the periphery. This resulted in the total closure of the evolutionary path from traditional to modern society, and that is what has happened in the Orient.³²

Although Turner utilizes the Marxist understanding of centre-periphery relations to demonstrate the significance of external reasons for economic and political underdevelopment of the Orient, he also criticizes the infiltration of Orientalist ideas into the Marxist thinking. According to Burke and Prochaska, Turner evaluates “Marx’s assumptions that history proceeded in stages and that Europe was at the leading edge of progress, and his efforts to distinguish an Asiatic mode of production all derived from the penetration of Marx’s thought by orientalist categories and assumptions.”³³ Thus, what Turner tries is to replace the Orientalist roots in Hegelian Marxism with the introduction of an analysis of the pre-capitalist modes of production, the effects of colonialism and the post-colonial state on the one hand, and to revise the reasons for the political and economic underdevelopment of the Orient through these new analyses on the other.

What unites Abdel-Malek, Tibawi and Turner is their commitment to the necessity of questioning the literature produced in the West about the East. All of them argue that this literature has produced valuable knowledge on the region and its inhabitants. But this body of knowledge should be critically scrutinized, since it has been a prejudiced one distorting the reality of the Orient. In other words, they were sceptical about the literature on Orient and this scepticism distinguished them from the other studies on Orientalist literature. However, despite their valour for opening a significant discussion, the studies of Abdel-Malek, Tibawi and Turner are very much concealed under the shadow of Said’s

³² Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, 82-83.

³³ Edmund Burke and David Prochaska, “Rethinking the Historical Genealogy of Orientalism,” *History and Anthropology*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June, 2007): 135-151, 141.

Orientalism, which initiated a revolutionary and equally provocative debate regarding the Western perceptions of the Orient.

1.2. Edward Said's Orientalism

What makes Said's *Orientalism* so much popular in social science and humanities literature is his systematization and generalization of the vast Western literature on the Orient from the antiquity to the 1960s by blending them with Foucauldian notion of discourse, Gramscian notion of hegemony, and his personal characteristics including his belongingness to a subaltern culture (Palestinian/ Christian Arab) as well as his humanism.³⁴ His generalizing attitude, on the other hand, becomes the main target of his critics. The book has opened such a provocative discussion that a corpus of related writings, almost all of which adopt a critical approach towards the Saidian understanding of Orientalism, has emerged. As Robert J. C. Young rightly puts "[t]he production of a critique of *Orientalism* even today functions as the act or ceremony of initiation by which newcomers to the field assert their claim to take up the position of a speaking subject within the discourse of postcoloniality."³⁵

Said starts this controversial work by arguing that the Orient was a European invention since the antiquity. According to him, the Orient "[...] is not only adjacent to Europe [but] also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other."³⁶ In other words, Said underlines the Western distinction between "us" and "them" otherizing the Orient, which legitimizes the superior-inferior type of relationship between the Occident and Orient. Therefore, this relationship "[...] is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex

³⁴ Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 184-185, and Jacinta O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said*, (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 188.

³⁵ Young, *Post-Colonialism*, 384.

³⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 1-2.

hegemony.”³⁷ Said, moves from this inherent distinction based on power, domination and hegemony, to one of the basic elements of his argument of Orientalism, namely the inequality between the West and the East:

The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination. There is no way of putting this euphemistically. True, the relationship of strong to weak could be disguised or mitigated, [...b]ut the essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen – in the West, which is what concerns us here – to be one between a strong and a weak partner.³⁸

After setting this unequal relationship between the Orient and Occident, Said defines Orientalism as a “mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”³⁹ Therefore, although Orientalism seems to be an academic endeavour in the first instance, it is absolutely more than that:

[...] Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious “Western” imperialist plot to hold down the “Oriental” world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do).⁴⁰

³⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, 5.

³⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 40.

³⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 2.

⁴⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 12.

From this long excerpt, it can be inferred that Orientalism cannot be confined to the simple geographical distinction between the Occident and Orient; this distinction permeates into almost all spheres of Western discourse, from art to sciences, from literature to politics. Secondly, Orientalism cannot be perceived solely as a passive understanding, whose only aim is to understand and interpret the Orient; rather, it is a set of perceptions deliberately designed for producing and reproducing hegemonic relationship between the Occident and the Orient.

Although Said's main emphasis is on the discursive level of Orientalism, it is not the only level that he elaborates upon. He mentions about three different pursuits of Orientalism, which are closely interrelated with each other. To start with, Said defines Orientalism as an "academic discipline," which, for centuries, has assembled an archive of knowledge serving the development of a systematic approach to the Orient as a subject of learning, discovery and practice. Here, he focuses on the academic achievements since the late eighteenth century onwards, although he sometimes refers to the studies of earlier periods. Secondly, Said defines Orientalism as a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between" the Orient and Occident. Within this context he includes not only the academicians but also poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, or imperial administrators, who incorporated this basic distinction as the starting point for their works on the Orient and Oriental peoples. With this definition, Said extends the temporal range of his study by including the works of the authors from the Greek playwright Aeschylus (524-455 B.C.) to the Italian poet Dante Alighieri (1265-1335), from the English poet Geoffrey Chaucer (1343-1400) to the French linguist Jean François Champollion (1790-1832), from the British colonial administrator Lord Cromer (1841-1917) to the Hungarian anthropologist Raphael Patai (1910-1996). He concludes that the distinction between the Orient and Occident exceeds any temporal limitations. Finally, Said perceives Orientalism as a "corporate institution" for dealing with the Orient "dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring,

and having authority over the Orient.”⁴¹ This pursuit of Orientalism illustrates the use of discourse to execute authority and domination over the Orient. In other words, in this third pursuit, Said refers to the institutional establishment of Orientalism.

What is common with all these three pursuits of Orientalism is the ultimate ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and Occident. Indeed, this distinction is not peculiar to the period after the late eighteenth century; the historical record demonstrates that the first two pursuits of Orientalism, namely Orientalism as an academic discipline and a style of thought have already been consolidated until that period. Accordingly, the perception of the Orient as an academic field could be traced back to the medieval period, when the Western scientists, theologians and philosophers met with the Islamic science and culture during the long Arabian domination of the Iberian Peninsula. Indeed, the Western concern to learn about Islam was quite practical; it had been derived from the desire to know more about the adversaries of Christianity. However, not only Islamic theological, but also Arab/Islamic scientific and philosophical texts were translated into Latin and other European languages in the late medieval period.⁴² What is more, in 1312, the Church Council of Vienna decided to establish chairs in Arabic, Hebrew and Assyrian languages at the Universities of Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca. This was one of the first indications of the emergence of Oriental Studies in the West.⁴³ During the zenith of Ottoman power in Europe, namely between the fifteenth and

⁴¹ For these definitions of three pursuits of Orientalism, see Said, *Orientalism*, 2.

⁴² Among them, al-Farabi's *Kitâb-ı İhsâ al-Ulûm* (The Enumeration of Sciences) and Ibn Sina's *Al-Kânûn Fî't Tıbb* (The Canon of Medicine) translated by Gerard of Cremona (1114-1187) in Toledo, several works of Ibn Rusd were translated by Michael Scot (1175-1232), and excerpts from al-Ghazali's *Tahâfut al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of Philosophers) and Ibn Rusd's *Tahâfût al-Tahâfût* (The Incoherence of Incoherence) replying al-Ghazali's work were translated by Ramon Llull (1232-1316). For a detailed analysis of these translations see Marshall Clagett, "Some General Aspects of Physics in the Middle Ages," *Isis*, Vol. 39, No. 1/2 (May, 1948): 29-44; Harry A. Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes," *Speculum*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 1961): 373-392; Ramon Llull, *Selected Works of Ramon Llull (1232-1316)*, 2 Volumes, translated by Anthony Bonner, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

⁴³ Said, *Orientalism*, 49-50.

seventeenth centuries, the works on the history of the Turks and the Turkish Empire were quite popular; it was the fear from the Turk that had increased the popularity of such pieces.⁴⁴

Turks and Islam was not the only subject of study for the Westerners in this period. The Jesuit missions to the Far East starting from the late sixteenth century onwards introduced Chinese language and culture to Europe. David Martin Jones' study on the image of China in Europe demonstrates that these missionaries were quite impressed from the complexity of Chinese religion and culture, and became aware of the intellectual inferiority of Europe *vis-à-vis* China. Hence they tried to accommodate the contradictions between Christianity and Confucianism by attempting to create a "Christian-Confucian synthesis". These efforts of accommodation reached such a level that in the first half of the eighteenth century, Vatican had to renounce the Jesuit strategy of creating a synthesis by two Papal Bulls. Despite this renunciation, these missionary works served for the establishment of the field of Sinology in Europe.⁴⁵

The style of thought created by such academic studies was not monolithic. On the one hand, the European philosophers and scientists were aware of the virtues of Islamic science and philosophy; however, the Church was extremely sceptic regarding the utility of these texts for religious reasons. Quran was translated into Latin by Robert of Ketton (c. 1110 – c. 1160), however, it had been perceived as a work by Muhammad, not as a divine text.⁴⁶ What is more, the perception of Islam as an alternative system caused a significant reaction by the Church. For example, after the geographical explorations, the

⁴⁴ For example, Richard Crafton's *The Order of the great Turckes Courte, of hys menne of warre and of all hys conquestes with the summe of Mahumetes doctryne*, published in 1544 as a translation from Antoine Geuffroy, Peter Ashton's *Short Treatise upon the Turkes Chronicles* published in 1546 as a translation from Paolo Giovio, and Richard Knolles' *The General Historie of the Turkes* published in 1603 emerged as significant history books in England in this period. For a detailed account of English history literature on the Turks see Hamit Dereli, *Kraliçe Elizabeth Devrinde Türkler ve İngilizler*, (İstanbul: Anıl Matbaası, 1951), 23-29.

⁴⁵ David Martin Jones, *Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought*, (Gordonville VA.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 14-19.

⁴⁶ For an analysis of Robert of Ketton's translation, see Bruce Lawrence, *The Quran: A Biography*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007), particularly Chapter 7, 97-107.

natives of America did not attract such a fierce reaction from the Church because their primitive belief systems did not pose a significant threat to the very existence of this institution. However, Islam was perceived as the rival of Christianity not only as a religion, but also as a social system.

During the medieval and early modern period, the main criterion of the Western academic perception of the Orient was religion; however, starting from the eighteenth century onwards, science began to replace it. The reasons for this transformation are manifold. First of all, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, first the Reformation, and then the Enlightenment processes resulted in the gradual retreat of religion from science. In other words, the world was begun to be perceived more secularly. The geographical explorations revealed the unknown parts of the globe, while the developments in various fields such as anatomy, botany, zoology, astronomy, or physics, and the understanding of the mechanics of the universe besides the divine intervention to worldly affairs consolidated this transformation. Within this framework, the Orient was searched by the Western scholars as the bearer of an ancient revelation, which had once established the roots of Western knowledge. Therefore, these scholars had “[...] the desire to escape into some remote and fantastic ‘other’ and to find there a lofty yet illusory means of uplift, or the material for dreams of lost wisdom or golden ages.”⁴⁷ Secondly, the military balance between the Eastern and Western worlds began to be deteriorated by the defeats of the Easterners, particularly the Ottoman Empire, by the Western powers. In other words, Islam and Orient could no more pose systemic threats to Christianity and the Occident. This disappearance of the fear from the East contributed to a more objective understanding of the Orient.⁴⁸

During the eighteenth century, the academic aspect of Orientalism became more visible with the Western interest towards Oriental languages. In his

⁴⁷ J[ohn] J[ames] Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 19.

⁴⁸ Bryan S. Turner, “Outline of A Theory of Orientalism,” in Bryan S. Turner (ed.) *Orientalism: Early Sources*, Vol. 1, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.

famous study entitled *The Oriental Renaissance*, Raymond Schwab argues that around the turn of the eighteenth century, Oriental Studies consisted of nothing more than the study of Hebrew for theologians and the study of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish for the interpreters serving in the Levant.⁴⁹ However, this situation had changed tremendously after 1700 with the emergence of systematic studies on Oriental literatures such as Barthelemy d'Herbelot's (1625-1695) *Bibliothèque Orientale* (Oriental Library) published in 1697, or Antoine Galland's (1646-1715) translation of the *Kitâb 'alf layla wa-layla* (The Thousand and One Nights), which consolidated the exotization of the East.⁵⁰ These works influenced the field of Oriental Studies in the first half of the eighteenth century, while in the second half Sinology and Indology became two significant subfields of Oriental Studies. The European intellectuals' search for an ancient linkage between the Eastern and Western languages resulted in the mushrooming of linguistic studies.⁵¹

This linguistic interest also directed many Enlightenment thinkers, including John Locke (1632-1704), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), John Toland (1670-1722), François-Marie Arouet Voltaire (1694-1778), and David Hume

⁴⁹ Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Discovery of India and the East (1680-1880)*, translated by Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 21.

⁵⁰ Kabbani summarizes the impact of Galland's translation as such: "[The Thousand and One Nights] was greeted with great enthusiasm in an era that was fidgeting under the stern dominion of rationalism, desiring imaginative space and relief from sobriety. They came at a time of intellectual secularization, when Europeans wished to become acquainted with cultures that were not Christian. The East was an obvious repository of such cultures, and although Islam continued to be regarded with suspicion and distaste, its sublunary aspects [...] produced a passionate desire for additional narrative of this kind." Kabbani, *The European Myth of Orient*, 28-29. This translation was followed by other influential works regarding the Orient such as George Sale's (1697-1736) translation of Quran, Simon Ockley's (1678-1720) *History of Saracens*, or Baron de Montesquieu's (1689-1755) *Lettres Persanes* (Persian Letters). See Pallavi Pandit Laisram, *Viewing the Islamic Orient: British Travel Writers of the Nineteenth Century*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 9

⁵¹ For example, the German philosopher Gottfried William Leibniz (1646-1716) wrote that the Chinese people were the *prima gentis* (the first origins) and the Chinese language was the key to a universal language. Similarly, the European linguists such as Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805) and Sir William Jones (1746-1794) argued that Sanskrit language might be the origin to European languages since its roots went deeper than Latin and Greek. See Jones, *Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought*, 20.

(1711-1776) to appreciate the virtues of the East.⁵² The Enlightenment universalism, prevalent in the writings of these philosophers, contributed to the enthusiasm of perceiving the East as a source of inspiration for the universal rationalist scientific thinking; however, this universalism soon disappeared in the late eighteenth century, when “the elaborate and detailed examinations of Oriental languages, histories and cultures were carried out in a context in which the supremacy and importance of European civilization” became unquestioned.⁵³ Therefore, for most of the authors writing on Orientalism, the last decades of the eighteenth century was a turning point for all three Saidian pursuits of Orientalism.

There are some historical events taken place in this period, which are considered as having a transformative impact on the Western perception of the East. For example, for Abdel-Malek, the creation of Orientalist societies starting from the late eighteenth century onwards constitutes the first wave of the systematization of Oriental Studies.⁵⁴ For Said, on the other hand, the major turning point was Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition of 1798.⁵⁵ All such historical occurrences have implications on the transformation of the Western perception of the East; however, in order to understand the systemic dynamics that reveal this transformation, the combination of material and mental factors should be examined. In other words, it is this combination that transformed academic, discursive and imperialist aspects of Orientalism.

By material transformation, the consolidation of Western military and technological superiority over the East is meant. The evident military decline of the three Muslim Empires (namely, the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires),

⁵² For example, Jones writes that Voltaire argued “[...] what Europe had only just come to realize through Lockean psychology and Newtonian physics, the Chinese had known from the earliest historical times and had sustained that knowledge through the practical virtue of a Confucianized mandarinatate.” Jones, *Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought*, 21

⁵³ Ashcroft, *Edward Said*, 50-51.

⁵⁴ Abdel-Malek, “Orientalism in Crisis,” 816.

⁵⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 76.

which had been controlling the vast region stretching from the North Africa to the Southeast Asia, was compounded with an increasing European penetration to these regions; in other words, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Orient became a scene of rivalry among the European colonial powers. That is why the concepts like the “Eastern question” or the “Great Game” had dominated the European public opinion during the nineteenth century.⁵⁶

The technological superiority of Europe, which also fostered an economic advantage for the Europeans in expanding their capitalist interests towards the non-European world, was the second material aspect contributing to the Western sense of supremacy over the East. The development in military technology was significant for the military victories of the Europeans over the Eastern Empires, while the establishment of factories based on steam power and the development of transportation facilities including steamship and train resulted in a dramatic increase in the economic production and long-distance trade. All these factors facilitated further European economic penetration into the non-European world not only for commercial purposes, but also for the extraction of raw materials and natural resources required for cheaper production in Europe, which contributed to the rapid industrialization of the West at the expense of the colonies.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Although there were many definitions of the concept of “Eastern Question,” it can be briefly defined as the rivalry of the Great Powers for domination over the Ottoman territories from the late eighteenth century until the early twentieth century. There is a plethora of literature on the Eastern Question; however, two books provide the reader with a comprehensive account of the emergence and evolution of the Eastern Question: Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, (London: Macmillan / New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966) and A. L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, (London and New York: Longman, 1994). “The Great Game”, on the other hand, is a term used for the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. For a brief account of the Great Game see Robert Johnson, *Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947*, (London: Greenhill Books, 2006).

⁵⁷ For example, the East India Company’s revenues soared from 3 million pounds in 1765 to 22 million pounds in 1818. See Sugatha Bose and Ayseha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History Culture and Political Economy*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 71. What is more, from 1750 to 1938 the non-European world was almost completely de-industrialized either forcefully by the colonial powers or through internal economic dynamics. The statistics shows the impact of imperialism clearly. In the year 1750, the developed core produced the 27 % of the world manufacturing output, while China and India produced 32,8 and 24.5 % respectively. By the year 1830, the share of developed core rose to 39. 5 percent, while Chinese and Indian shares declined

The European self-declared civilizational supremacy, which established the mental transformation towards the end of the eighteenth century, was even more significant than the European military, technological and economic superiority. As a result of this transformation, the Enlightenment perception of universal rationality was replaced by a universalized version of European understanding of rationality. In other words, the European civilization was perceived as the only modern civilization, which the others had to emulate.⁵⁸

It is this material and mental transformation that contributed to the emergence of the third Saidian pursuit of Orientalism in the nineteenth century, namely, Orientalism as a corporate institution. The combination of military, technological, economic and civilizational superiority claims consolidated the inherent ontological distinction between the Orient and Occident to a degree unseen before.⁵⁹ In sum, during the nineteenth century, the three pursuits of Orientalism were combined and consolidated in a way to produce a particular structured perception of the Orient. The academic pursuit reached to a zenith with the linguistic works of one of the most eminent linguists of this period, namely Antoine Isaac Sylvestre de Sacy (1758-1838), and his students such as Jean François Champollion (1790-1832) in France, John Martin Augustine

to 29.8 and 17.6 % respectively. The most dramatic decline was experienced with the fierce implementation of imperialist expansion. In the year 1880, the share of developed core was doubled to 79.1 % and the total share of India and China was declined to 15,3 %. Finally in 1938, the developed core produced 92,8 percent of the world manufacturing output, sweeping almost all other producers in the world. See table 5.1 on the world manufacturing output (1750-1938) in Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950*, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2006), 68.

⁵⁸ J. J. Clarke, *Jung and the Eastern Thought: A Dialogue with the Orient*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 15. For a detailed account of this mental transformation regarding the concept of civilization see Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

⁵⁹ One of the first significant indications of this combination was the Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798, which was not only a military expedition aiming to dominate Egypt and Syria in order to challenge the British colonial rule in India, but also a scientific one since the French army was accompanied by a group of scientists, archaeologists, geographers, and cartographers "to study" the regions that they conquered. In other words, the expedition did not only mean the first European military encroachment to the very heart of the Orient since the Crusades, but also an enterprise, as Napoleon himself declared to his soldiers, having "incalculable consequences for civilization." In other words, this expedition united the academe and the discourse in order to dominate and restructure the Orient. See Julie Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 16.

Scholz (1794-1852) in Germany, and Carl Johann Tornberg (1807-1877) in Sweden. The anthropological studies soon followed the linguistic ones particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century under the shadow of social evolutionism and even social Darwinism.⁶⁰

Besides these academic works, the rapid and efficient institutionalization of Oriental Studies was quite remarkable as well. Starting from the late eighteenth century onwards, numerous Orientalist societies and organizations were established in European countries as well as in their colonies. The Asiatic Society of Calcutta, founded in 1784, was soon followed by *Société Asiatique* (Asiatic Society) in Paris (1822), the Royal Asiatic Society in London (1834), the American Oriental Society in Massachusetts (1842) and the *Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft* (German Oriental Society) in Leipzig (1845). All these institutions also published academic journals in which the findings of studies on Orient were exhibited. In the second half of the nineteenth century, another initiative was introduced for gathering the academicians studying the Orient, namely the Congress of Orientalists, which had first been convened in Paris in 1873; sixteen congresses were held from this first congress until the First World War.

Regarding the discursive level of Orientalism, it was literature that contributed the most to the consolidation of a discourse based on the distinction between the Orient and Occident because while the academic studies had a limited number of recipients, literary works could easily be reached by the masses. Painting and architecture also created an Orientalist aesthetic based on the exotization and thereby alienation of the East. Particularly, in the world exhibitions, in which the Oriental countries were represented through architecture, Oriental buildings were constructed to introduce not only the Eastern architecture but also the Eastern living-style to the Westerners.⁶¹ The

⁶⁰ For a brief analysis of the implications of social evolutionism and social Darwinism on the literature on Orient, see the Chapter 6 of this dissertation on the evolution of the concept of civilization in Europe.

⁶¹ For the Orientalist painting, exoticizing and eroticizing the East, see, for example, Lynne Thornton's two essential works, *Les Orientalistes: Peintres Voyageurs, 1828-1908*, (Paris: ACR Edition, 1983) and *La Femme dans la Peinture Orientaliste*, (Paris: ACR Edition, 1993). For a

paintings and architectural works enhanced the European feeling that the East was different from the West not only in terms of mentality, but also in terms of appearance. In sum, as Bryan Turner notes “[f]rom the eighteenth century, the Orient has existed within a literary and visual tradition which is both romantic and fantastic.”⁶²

In this period, while the Orientalist discourse emphasized the superiority of the Western civilization, at the same time, it defined the Orient by what the Occident has and what the Orient lacks. According to Turner, this resulted in the definition of Orient by “a series of lacunae”, which can be summarized as the absence of revolutionary change, the missing middle class, the erosion or denial of active citizenship, the failure of participatory democracy, the absence of autonomous cities, the lack of ascetic disciplines and the limitations of instrumental rationality as the critical culture of natural science, industrial capitalism and rational government.⁶³ All these absences resulted in a general public attitude towards the Orient especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, fed by the writings and speeches of these authors, politicians and colonial administrators, which was a “mixture of patronising chauvinism and racist contempt.”⁶⁴

In sum, although Saidian Orientalism focuses on a long period of time in order to understand the Western monolithic perception of the East, it is in the nineteenth century that the three Saidian pursuits of Orientalism became interrelated the most. The academic studies nourished the Western discourse on the Orient based on the civilizational superiority and dynamism of the West over

detailed analysis of these nineteenth century world fairs and Islamic architectural monuments constructed for these exhibitions see Zeynep Çelik, *Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World's Fairs*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1992).

⁶² Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Orientalism,” 1.

⁶³ Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Orientalism,” 4.

⁶⁴ Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment*, 17. For a comprehensive collection of such Orientalist speeches and writings see Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter (eds.), *Imperialism and Orientalism: A Documentary Sourcebook*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).

the inferiority and indolence of the East; this in turn contributed to the rationale and justification behind the European imperialist expansion and persuaded the European public opinion about the necessity of bringing the European civilization to the “uncivilized” parts of the world.

1.3. Travel Writing and Orientalism

In the establishment of the Orientalist discourse, the role of travel writing has been extremely significant. It has been the travellers, who introduced the unknown lands and their unknown inhabitants to their countrymen, and thus provided them with the opportunity to make a comparison between “the self” and “the other.” In other words, travel literature produced the “elemental questions of epistemology, the relation between subject and object, knower and the known.”⁶⁵ Making the self a subject via the category of “the knower” and making the other an object via the category of “the known” has been a fundamental aspect of the Orientalist discourse as well, which promote an active Occident aiming “to know” a fixed and passive Orient. Therefore, the mentality of travel writing overlapped with the mentality of Orientalism to a great extent. As Paul Smethurst writes:

European travel writing, a corpus spanning several centuries, has been hugely influential in producing and circulating knowledge about the rest of the world and fuelling aspirations for expansion and conquest. Travel and travel writing, and the imaginative geographies they conjured, were crucial to the discursive formation of empire, especially by their insinuation and cementation of crude binaries such as the West/the Rest, attached to which were the clearly pejorative formulations of civilised/savage, scientific/superstitious, and so on.⁶⁶

Since travel writing has targeted the curiosity of the reader by introducing what he wonders because he does not know, travel literature has proven to be remarkably popular in general. However, its popularity reached a zenith with the geographical explorations. The fascination to the concept of “new world,” which had been believed to have beautiful and bountiful lands with extreme riches,

⁶⁵ Quoted from Janis Stout by Casey Blanton, *Travel Writing: The Self and the World*, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), 3.

⁶⁶ Paul Smethurst, “Introduction,” in Paul Smethurst and Julia Kuehn (eds.), *Travel Writing Form and Empire: The Poetics and Politics of Mobility*, (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 1.

attracted the attention of the people to the travelogues about the newly explored lands. On the other hand, by the late Renaissance, travel became to be perceived as a significant opportunity, crucial to the development of one's intellectual powers. Hence a particular form of travel, the Grand Tour, which was performed by the younger sons of the European aristocrats towards Italy, became a significant component of their education.⁶⁷

These two different ways of travel produced two different types of travel writing. From the geographical explorations, there emerged the logbooks and journals of the sailors, having a linear factual structure, in which the events were reported chronologically following the itinerary of the trip. A similar style was also visible in the narration of the voyages of pilgrims and merchants, since the purpose of travel was not travel itself, but exploration, religious devotion, or economics. From the travels, such as the Grand Tour, on the other hand, there emerged travel writings including the emotions, thoughts and personal characteristics of the author, since the purpose of travel was to acquire self-development through learning about other geographies.⁶⁸ Especially during the Enlightenment period, “the Lockean perception of knowledge, rooted in experience and nowhere else,” resulted in an increase in the importance and desirability of travel.⁶⁹

“[T]he precarious Enlightenment balance between science and sentiment”⁷⁰ ended with the subjectivity of the romantic period towards the end of the eighteenth century, in which the sentiments about the lands that the traveller had seen surpassed their factual appearance. In other words, the reader read what the traveller had felt more than what he had seen. Hence, “[b]y the early nineteenth century, travel writing had clearly become a matter of self

⁶⁷ Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 11.

⁶⁸ Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 11.

⁶⁹ James Buzard, “The Grand Tour and After (1660-1840),” in Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37.

⁷⁰ Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 15.

discovery as well as a record of the discovery of others.”⁷¹ Together with the European travellers’ belief in the superiority of the European civilization *vis-à-vis* other native cultures, this self-discovery resulted in the establishment of an “imperial self”.⁷² As Roy Bridges writes, “[w]ith technological superiority came presumed intellectual superiority: Europeans could claim to be able to understand and interpret not only the terrain they entered but the inhabitants as well.”⁷³ Therefore, it is not surprising that the period between 1850 and 1930, which was the heyday of European imperialism, was also the period that the quality and quantity of travel and travel writing had reached to a zenith. The reasons for this development are manifold. First and foremost, travel became easier with the development of transportation facilities. The steamship and train became the two mediums of travel in the second half of the nineteenth century, providing not only speed but also comfort to the travellers.⁷⁴ Secondly, “democratization of travel,” in other words, transformation of travel from an aristocratic enterprise to a bourgeois practice, increased the number of travellers and thereby travel writing.⁷⁵ In this period, travel was continued to be perceived as an informative instrument; however it began to be understood as a source of enjoyment as well.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 15.

⁷² Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 16.

⁷³ Roy Bridges, “Exploration and Travel outside Europe,” in Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53.

⁷⁴ Barbara Korte, *English Travel Writing from Pilgrimages to Postcolonial Explorations*, translated by Catherine Matthias, (Hampshire: Macmillan / New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 85.

⁷⁵ Blanton, *Travel Writing*, p. 19. Paul Fussell also linked the rise of travel during the nineteenth century to the “bourgeois vogue of romantic primitivism.” See Paul Fussell, *Abroad: British Literary Travelling between the Wars*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 38.

⁷⁶ Derek Gregory mentions about the “conversion of sites into sights” in order to underline the popularization of travel; the historical sites, which had been travelled by scholars previously, was transformed in the late nineteenth century into sights, even places of touristic attention. See Derek Gregory, “Scripting Egypt: Orientalism and the Cultures of Travel,” in James S. Duncan (ed.), *Writes of Passage: Reading Travel Writing*, (London: Routledge, 1998), 117. What is more, according to Casey Blanton, especially for women, travel became an opportunity to escape

All these factors contributed to the increase in travel and travel writing in the second half of the nineteenth century; however, it was the nature of the lands travelled that determined the style and content of travel writing in this period. The destinations were either European colonies or interior parts of the continents, which had not been explored yet, but which had been partitioned by the colonial powers on paper. In other words, the travellers usually went to the regions, which were, at least nominally, under the control of the European states. There, they could experience the relationship between the colonial self and the colonized other. Their narration of these lands and the communities living there was therefore shaped by that particular colonial setting. Smethurst defines this phenomenon as “mobilization of knowledge” and argues that “[...]he uneven development of travel and exploration (and travel writing) provided the West with both literal and figurative mobility, and this gave imperialist discourse its vigour and means of dissemination.”⁷⁷ In other words, travel writing became a significant tool for the expansion of the discursive basis of European imperialism.

The outcome of the popularization of travel and travel writing within this colonial framework was the emphasis on the sentiments of the travellers more than the factual appearance of the locations of travel, which resulted in the construction of “imaginative geographies.”⁷⁸ Hence the Orient was constructed with little or no reference to those who really lived and what really existed there; rather, it was exoticized to a degree that it became a “flittering phantasmagoria,” half illusion, half reality.⁷⁹

the rigidity of Victorian society; therefore the number of female travel writers increased considerably. Blanton, *Travel Writing*, 20.

⁷⁷ Smethurst, “Introduction,” 1-2.

⁷⁸ This concept was derived from the title of the second section of Said’s *Orientalism*, “Imaginative Geography and its Representations: Orientalizing the Oriental.” For a detailed examination of this concept, see Derek Gregory, “Imaginative Geographies,” *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1995): 447-485.

⁷⁹ Gregory, “Scripting Egypt,” 145-146. He quoted the concept of “flittering phantasmagoria” from William Henry Bartlett’s travelogue entitled *The Nile Boat: Or Glimpses of the Land of Egypt*, (London: Arthur Hall, Virtue and Co., 1849).

In the nineteenth century, travel also became one of the major sources of knowledge accumulation. For example, the anthropological studies utilized the material produced by the travellers to a great extent. As Caroline Brettell writes:

[w]hile contemporary ethnologists tend to regard fieldwork and participant observation as their primary methods of data collection, a century ago anthropologists depended almost entirely on the accounts of missionaries and merchants, traders and travellers for their ethnographic material.⁸⁰

The impact of travel writing over anthropological studies also demonstrates the linkage between science, travel writing and Orientalism. As Barbara Korte argues, this linkage produced “a seminal instrument of control” or an imperialist ideology, which produced and reproduced an object-oriented description of the manners and customs of the inhabitants of the lands that had been travelled through.⁸¹ This resulted in the detachment of the writers from the “other;” to put it differently, “the text constructs an ‘other’ with whom the European traveller does not establish a genuine interpersonal relationship.”⁸²

All in all, there has always been an intimate relationship between Orientalism and travel writing, and this relationship was mutual. On the one hand, the travel literature provided the Orientalist with a particular knowledge of the Orient shaped not solely by the objectivity of what the traveller had actually seen, but also by the subjectivity of what he had felt. On the other hand, the traveller has been influenced from the Orientalist discourse and started his travel with a pre-defined mindset. In other words, travel writing and Orientalism feed each other. The outcome is the exacerbation of the Orient-Occident divide, which continuously fed the Orientalist discourse.

In sum, both the Saidian and non-Saidian versions of Orientalism argue for an unsormountable distinction between the West and the East emerged out of

⁸⁰ Caroline B. Blattell, “Introduction: Travel Literature, Ethnography and Ethnohistory”, *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring, 1986): 127-138, 127.

⁸¹ Korte, *English Travel Writing*, 89-90.

⁸² Korte, *English Travel Writing*, 92. For a detailed analysis of the construction of this imperial ideology, see Mary Loise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, (London: Routledge, 1992).

the perceived civilizational supremacy of former over the latter. The Western objectification of the East resulted in the creation of a fixed and static account of the political, economic and socio-cultural structures of the non-European world. Although both versions of Orientalism examined the Western perceptions of the East, recently, some scholars began to question the possibility of extending the presumptions of Orientalism to non-European actors in a way to reach a conclusion that the perception of a particular territory or group of people as “uncivilized” by another group of people, who called themselves as “civilized,” might be understood through employing the principles of Orientalism. The next chapter examines these *new Orientalisms* and questions their limits.

CHAPTER 2

OTTOMAN ORIENTALISM

The previous chapter on the evolution of the *Orientalist discourse* as well as the *discourse of Orientalism* aims to provide the reader with a general outlook of how the Western perception of the East has developed and how travel writing has contributed to this process. In this chapter, the possibility of arguing for *other Orientalisms* is discussed. In doing this discussion, the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism,” namely the systematic Ottoman perception of the Orient, is focused on. Indeed, this argument has not a well-established background. It has emerged in the 2000s, particularly as a result of a recent trend in post-colonial studies for widening the scope of Orientalism by using the framework that Orientalism offers to understand any kind of colonial-discursive relationship. Those arguing for a particular “Ottoman Orientalism” suggest that in the nineteenth century, together with the reforms for centralization, the Ottoman centre’s perception of its Arab periphery had been transformed, and this transformation can be understood within a colonial setting. In other words, the Ottomans adopted the discourses of Western imperialist states and their Orientalist agents in order to define and perceive their Arab provinces. This adopted discourse produced a particular Orientalist mode of thinking evident in the works of Ottoman travellers, intellectuals and bureaucrats as well as in the policies of late nineteenth century Ottoman governments.

This chapter focuses on the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism” and questions the applicability of Saidian Orientalism to the Ottoman case as advocated by the proponents of this argument. It focuses on some structural conceptual problems labelling the Ottoman perception of Arabs as Orientalist, and aims to demonstrate that Saidian Orientalism does not fully fit into the Ottoman case. The first section of this chapter deals with the attempts to extend the scope of Orientalism by introducing *new Orientalisms*, such as the Russian or the Japanese versions. The second and third sections review the “Ottoman

Orientalism” literature and discuss the limits of applicability of Saidian Orientalism to the Ottoman perception of the Orient.

2.1. New Orientalisms

From the 1990s onwards, post-colonial/subaltern studies have relatively been a well-established field of social science and, compared to the earlier periods, both the quality and the quantity of the works on “post-colonial condition have increased. Moreover, the definition of the “colonial power” and “colonized” was extended. Before, post-colonial studies mainly focused on British, French and German colonialism of the nineteenth century and American and Soviet encroachments to the Third World after the end of the Second World War to a lesser degree.⁸³ However, recently, new actors have been defined, whose policies somehow resembled to the “classical” or “modern” colonial powers. Therefore, there emerge *new Orientalisms* besides the British, French, German or American versions.

One of these new Orientalisms is the “Russian Orientalism.” The proponents of this argument claim that the colonial policies and discourses of the Russian Empire are so similar to the British and French ones that one can advocate for a specific “Russian Orientalism.” According to the scholars,

⁸³ Just to cite a few examples, one can refer to David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 1773-1835*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Nicholas Tromans (ed.), *The Lure of the East: British Orientalist Painting*, (London: Tate, 2008); Andrew Long, “The Hidden and the Visible in British Orientalism: The Case of Lawrence of Arabia,” *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2009): 21-37; Madeleine Dobie, *Foreign Bodies: Gender, Language, and Culture in French Orientalism*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Srilata Ravi, “Adventure in Malaya: Henri Fauconnier and French Orientalism,” *Asia-Europe Journal*, Vol.1, No. 3 (Aug., 2003): 419-432; Gerald Needham, “Orientalism in France,” *Art Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 4, *The Crisis in the Discipline* (Winter, 1982): 338-341; Jennifer Jenkins, “German Orientalism: Introduction,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2004): 97-100; Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ursula Wokoeck, *German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800 to 1945*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Mae M. Ngai, “American Orientalism,” *Reviews in American History*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 2000): 408-415; Meghana Nayak and Christopher Malone, “American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony,” *The International Studies Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June, 2009): 253-276.

through the attempts of modernization and westernization, especially in the nineteenth century, the Russians turned out to be a colonial power, whose discourse regarding its Southern and Eastern peoples were quite Orientalist in a Saidian sense. What is more, they argue that from the early nineteenth century onwards, the Russians were aware that the knowledge of the East was essential for their colonial expansion; therefore, there emerged a significant body of Oriental Studies in this country. The Russian travellers' perception of the Orient was almost the same with the Western perceptions, in other words, in discursive level an Orientalist depiction of the East was evident in the Russian travelogues. In sum, nineteenth century Russia might have gathered the three Saidian pursuits of Orientalism, namely Orientalism as an academic field, as a style of thought and as a corporate institution.⁸⁴

However, these scholars are also aware of the problems of extending Saidian Orientalism to Russia. First of all, Russia is a hybrid case, a “grand paradox”, as Sahni Kalpana writes, because of its westernizing but oriental characteristics. According to Kalpana, Russia adopted the Western model of progress without being colonized by Europe in order to distance itself from the “true barbarians” living in the southern and eastern borders of the Empire.⁸⁵ In other words, the “awkward triptych” placing Russia in the midst of the West and the East makes this country “not only the subject of Orientalist discourse but also the object of it.”⁸⁶ Therefore, Russian understanding of the Orient cannot be as similar to the Western understanding as it has been thought.

⁸⁴ For an argument of Russian Orientalism, see Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sahni Kalpana, *Crucifying the Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of the Caucasus and Central Asia*, (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997); Austin Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire : North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845-1917*, (Montréal, London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); Izabela Kalinowska, *Between East and West: Polish and Russian Nineteenth-Century Travel to the Orient*, (Rochester, N.Y. : University of Rochester Press, 2004); Elena Andreeva, *Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁸⁵ Calpana, *Crucifying the Orient*, xv.

⁸⁶ Nathaniel Knight, “Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Spring, 2000): 74-100, 77.

Another problem of “Russian Orientalism” is its incompatibility with the monolithic nature of the Orientalist discourse. Unlike Western Orientalism, which has the tendency to create a unified perception of the Orient, the Russians looked for distinguishing between different lands and peoples. According to Nathaniel Knight:

Orientalism sweeps away the need for distinctions and focuses on the production of a core knowledge consisting of factual statements universally applicable to the orient as a whole. For Russians, however, it was not quite so easy to dispense with the particular. As is often pointed out, in Russia, the oriental “other” was not necessarily an unknown creature set apart by thousands of miles and vast oceans. In Russia, the “other” was all around – in ethnic enclaves penetrating deep into the heartland of Russian settlement, in scattered settlements and in vast stretches of borderland in which ethnic groups met and interacted over the course of centuries. In such a setting, the knowledge that one “other differed from another was of fundamental significance.⁸⁷

In sum, the argument for Russian Orientalism has two significant shortcomings, being the ambivalent Russian identity situated between the East and the West, and the lack of unified perception of the East. These two shortcomings draw the limits of the Russian version of Orientalism.

In addition to Russia, another new actor in the post-colonial studies is Japan. The debate on “Japanese Orientalism” is quite different from the Russian case because it is not related to the Japanese perception of the Orient, but rather to the Japanese perception of their colonies in the Far East, such as Taiwan, Korea, Micronesia, and Manchuria. In other words, in the Japanese case, Orientalism is used not as a specific Western or Western-like perception of the Orient, but as a representation of certain colonies by a certain colonial power.⁸⁸ According to Daisuke Nishihara, similar to Russia, Japan was an Eastern but, at the same time, a colonial power in the nineteenth century; therefore the reception of Said’s *Orientalism* in Japan produced mixed results. On the one hand, the Japanese appreciate Said’s effort to reveal the Western hegemonic perception of

⁸⁷ Knight, “Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862,” 97.

⁸⁸ For an argument of Japanese Orientalism see Brian Moeran, *Language and Popular Culture in Japan*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989) and Jennifer Allen Robertson, *Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

the East, unifying and degrading the Eastern people as the “other” of the Western civilization; on the other hand, this reception does not give way to an anti-Western sentiment:

Rather, the manner in which Said's work was received emerged out of the feelings of guilt associated with the fact that Japan itself, just like Western nations, had been a colonizer. [...] Thus, the history of the Japanese Empire cannot but become a target for severe criticism under Orientalist theory. As a result, Said's conception of postcolonialism was smoothly adopted by the tradition of Japanese Marxism that had condemned pre-war militarism. So-called left wing scholars started to apply Said's theory in order the better to analyze Japan's pre-war discourse on other Asian countries.⁸⁹

In other words, some Japanese scholars tried to utilize Said's theoretical findings to explain the Japanese perception of their own colonies; the similarity between the Western and Japanese colonial ventures directed them to argue for a specific Japanese Orientalism.

The problem of extending Saidian Orientalism to the Japanese case is the possibility of generalizing the conclusions of Said regarding the Western perception of the East to any other colonial power's perception of their colonies.⁹⁰ This generalization contradicts with the fundamental elements of Orientalism. To start with, in Japan, in the nineteenth century, there was no academic studies and thereby no extensive knowledge accumulation about the

⁸⁹ Daisuke Nishihara, “Said, Orientalism, and Japan,” *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, No. 25, Special Issue: Edward Said and Critical Decolonization (2005): 241-253, 243.

⁹⁰ Such a generalization was also evident in other studies. For example, Wurlig Borchigud mentions about a Chinese “Orientalist,” Ma Hetian, who had written about Inner and Outer Mongolia in the mid-1920s. He wrote that similar to the Western Orientalists, “Ma had an authority to speak of his ‘inferior’ Inner Mongol objects as their civiliser as well as to represent his ‘helpless’ Outer Mongol ‘brothers’ as their national guardian.” See Wurlig Borchigud, “Between Chinese Nationalism and Soviet Colonisation: A Chinese Orientalist's Narration of Inner and Outer Mongolia (1926-1927),” *Inner Asia*, Vol. 4 (2002): 27-46, 27. Another advocate of Chinese Orientalism was Christian Tyler, who perceived Chinese policy towards East Turkistan as “Chinese Orientalism.” See Christian Tyler, *Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang*, (London: John Murray, 2003). Another attempt to enlarge the scope of Orientalism is the “Latin American Orientalism” which focuses on the perception of the Orientals brought to Latin America by the Spanish conquistadors. In his article entitled “Latin American Orientalism,” Hernan G. H. Taboada, writes that the Spanish brought their perception of the Moor to Latin America and made it diffused into the natives of the continent. From the late eighteenth century onwards this Spanish-origin perception gave way to an Anglo-French version of the perception of Orientals in Latin American countries. See Hernan G. H. Taboada, “Latin American Orientalism: From Margin to Margin,” in Sylvia Nagy-Zekmi, *Paradoxical Citizenship: Edward Said*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006).

colonized territories to produce and reproduce colonial presence. As Ronald Suleski writes, for instance, Chinese studies in Japan have developed into one of the most active and productive fields of academic inquiry in the world only after the end of the Second World War and particularly in the 1960s, long after the end of Japanese colonial project.⁹¹ Moreover, in discursive level, Saidian Orientalism was based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident; this was not only a distinction of superior-inferior; rather, it was the distinction between the superior West and inferior East. In other words, Orientalism is a concept designed for a particular geography (the Orient), particular actors (the Western statesmen, intellectuals, artists, men of letters, and Eastern countries and peoples), and although being less clear, a particular time period (from the late eighteenth century onwards). The attempts to see any kind of colonial discourse based on the civilizational supremacy of the colonial power and the inferiority of the colonized as Orientalism, means the abuse of Saidian definition of Orientalism as “a generic term” employed to “describe the Western approach to the Orient.”⁹²

Despite its hybrid nature, “Russian Orientalism” seems to be more similar to the Saidian sense of Orientalism, since it denotes a non-Western but extremely Westernized perception of the Orient by the Russian academia, intellectuals, or statesmen. What is more, this perception contributed to the production and reproduction of colonial rule in the Russian periphery. The argument for “Japanese Orientalism” is more difficult to sustain because the targeted area was not the Orient; but the colonies of an Eastern colonial power. Therefore, there is the problem of extreme generalization of a particular phenomenon. However, the most recent offspring of Orientalism, namely the argument of “Ottoman Orientalism,” is a very interesting case study regarding the applicability of Saidian sense of Orientalism to the perceptions of an Oriental actor about the Orient. The rest of this chapter, therefore, focuses on the recent

⁹¹ Ronald Suleski, “Modern Chinese Studies in Japan and the West: Coming Closer Together,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 75 (Sep., 1978), 655-659, 655.

⁹² Said, *Orientalism*, 73.

literature on Ottoman Orientalism and discusses the degree of applicability of Orientalism to the Ottoman case.

2.2. Orientalism *alla turca*? Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika

Setting the relationship between the Ottoman imperial centre and the peripheral provinces within a colonial framework has already been discussed in the literature on Ottoman history;⁹³ however incorporating the Saidian understanding of discourse into this analysis is a relatively novel approach. The first attempt to link Orientalism with the Ottoman Empire is the article written by Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika and published in 2000 in *Die Welt des Islams* with a stimulating title “Orientalism ‘*alla turca*’.”⁹⁴ Indeed, Herzog and Motika do not intend to apply post-colonial studies to the Ottoman case; they do not engage in a critique of Ottoman centre-periphery relations as a kind of colonial relationship. Rather, they try to examine the travelogues written by the Ottoman travellers on their travels to the Muslim “outback” of the Empire, and to reveal their self-perception *vis-à-vis* their perception of the regions that they had been to. Therefore their analysis is very much similar to the studies of literary criticism, rather than the studies of political science or history.⁹⁵

⁹³ For example, Efraim Karsh reinterpreted Said’s brief account of Ottoman *millet* system as an indication of “Ottoman colonialism;” see Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History*, (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 2007), 109. Heather Jane Sharkey labelled the Ottoman rule in Egypt as “Ottoman colonialism;” see Heather Jane Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 126. Ussama Makdisi goes one step further and defined the Ottoman rule in Lebanon in the nineteenth century as “Ottoman imperialism;” see Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform,” in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Beirut: Orient Institut der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 2002), 29-48.

⁹⁴ Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*: Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim ‘Outback’.”

⁹⁵ Besides Herzog and Motika, Ezgi Dikici’s article on the signs of Orientalism in the some stories of Turkish author Ömer Seyfeddin (1884-1920) is another literary linkage between Orientalism and the Ottoman Empire; however Dikici does not generalize Orientalist discourse to the whole Ottoman intellectual circles and she only focuses on a particular author. See Ezgi Dikici, “Orientalism and the Male Subject of Turkish Nationalism in the Stories of Ömer Seyfeddin,” *Middle Eastern Literatures*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Apr., 2008): 85-99.

In their article, Herzog and Motika focus not only on the perceptions, but also on the patterns of travel and travel writing in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Therefore, the article introduces some of the Ottoman travelogues about the Ottoman periphery to the readers and explains why and how they had been written. Moreover, it tries to reveal why the Ottomans interested in travel and travel writing in the nineteenth century more than any other period. In displaying the reasons for the increasing Ottoman interest to travel and travel writing, the article excerpts a nineteenth century travelogue's preface written by Ahmed Midhat (1844-1912), a prominent Turkish author of the nineteenth century, and mentions how Ahmed Midhat's perception of travel and travel writing differs from the Orientalist version. Indeed, according to Herzog and Motika, Ahmed Midhat was aware of the power/knowledge relationship that the European Orientalists established to understand and represent the Orient:

Ahmed Midhat Efendi clearly sees an intimate connection between European travel cum travel-accounts and the economic and political dominance of the European powers. However, in his view the connection of travel and power does not invalidate the accumulation of universally valid knowledge achieved in this way. Nor does he in this context unduly refer the lack of an Ottoman interest in travel to an "Orientalist" representational model of "Oriental" culture. This means that he does not essentialize a (defective) "Oriental" or "Muslim" otherness *vis-à-vis* Europe. Rather, the focus of his criticism aims at the bureaucratic and commercial middle and upper strata of the Ottoman imperial centre.⁹⁶

In other words, Ahmed Midhat's awareness of European essentializations and generalizations directed him to a critical stance, in which he intended to avoid such defective articulations in his writings. However, this does not necessarily mean that Ahmed Midhat's writings had no similarities with the Orientalist literature. Rather, Herzog and Motika argue that despite his effort to define a middle position between Western and Islamic civilizations, uniting the material elements of the former and the moral elements of the latter, Ahmed Midhat perceived the Ottoman Empire as a natural leader of the Islamic

⁹⁶ Herzog and Motika, "Orientalism *alla turca*," 150. The travelogue was written by Mehmed Emin on his voyage to Central Asia and published in the printing house of Ahmed Midhat, who also wrote its preface. See the preface of Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, (İstanbul: Kırk Anbar Matbaası, 1296 [1878]).

community bringing European innovations and “new laws of civilization” to the Islamic world. This means, according to the authors of the article, a *mission civilisatrice ottomane*.⁹⁷ That is to say, the Ottomans distinguished between civilized and uncivilized parts of the Empire and assumed a self-responsibility to civilize the underdeveloped regions. However, Herzog and Motika are aware that although the Ottomans had a civilizing mission mentality, this was different from the European mentality. Again, referring to a novel of Ahmed Midhat, *Rikalda Yahud Amerika'da Vahşet Alemi*⁹⁸ (*Rikalda or the World of Savagery in America*) Herzog and Motika argue for an anti-Orientalist stance in Ahmed Midhat's writings, particularly with regard to the Ottoman conceptualization of civilization:

It is interesting to note that Ahmed Midhat, in his fictitious travelogue *Rikalda*, criticised what the Europeans believed to be an inseparable link between Christianity and civilisation: For the Europeans, he claims, the difference between savagery and civilisation was Christianity alone. A savage people was regarded as civilised by Europe just by its acceptance of Christianity, whereas even the most civilised peoples of India and China were regarded by them as barbarians. For most modern Ottoman travellers, civilisation was not only Islam but a combination of modern [i.e. Western] civilisation and Islam.⁹⁹

In other words, according to Herzog and Motika, the Ottoman perception of civilization differs from the European one. The Ottomans argued that the European conceptualization of civilization was religious; whereas they perceived civilization as a combination of religious and secular elements.

Herzog and Motika's examination of the Ottoman travelogues is equally cautious. While they try to establish similarities between the Ottoman and Western traveller's perception of the Orient, they do not clearly link the Ottoman perception with a colonial relationship between the Ottoman imperial centre and the Muslim periphery. Rather, they focus on the different perceptions of different communities establishing the Muslim “outback” of the Empire living both within

⁹⁷ Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*,” 150-151.

⁹⁸ Ahmed Midhat, *Rikalda Yahud Amerika'da Vahşet Alemi*, (İstanbul: [Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası], 1307 [1890]).

⁹⁹ Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*,” 191.

and outside the state borders, such as the Tuaregs, the Central Asian nomadic Turkish tribes, the Indian Muslims, the Sudanese, Iraqi Arabs, or Iranian Shiites:

There existed no overall picture or discourse which defined the non-Ottoman Muslim. However, there seems to have been a common feeling of Ottoman superiority *vis-à-vis* the rest of the Islamic world, which included a hierarchy of relegations ranging from “our little brother” Afghanistan to “those savage” Tuaregs who were implied to be incorrigible desert bandits. Perhaps not surprisingly, Iran appears to be placed right at the bottom of this hierarchy.¹⁰⁰

Thus, Herzog and Motika emphasize that the Ottoman travellers developed a hierarchical representation of the Muslim communities extending from the category of “savage” to “brother.” Therefore, they attract the attention to the lack of monolithization in the Ottoman discourse of the Orient.

In sum, Herzog and Motika’s study of Ottoman travelogues do not label the Ottoman travellers of the nineteenth century as Orientalist in a Western sense. Rather, they underline the specificities of the Ottoman perception of their Muslim periphery by labelling it as “Orientalism *alla turca*.” According to their analysis, there are some significant differences between the Ottoman and Western perceptions of the Orient. First of all, the Ottoman and Western conceptualization of civilization are different. What the Ottomans sought was not to adopt the Western civilization as a whole; rather they tried to establish a synthesis of Western civilization with Islam in order to be able to project its achievements to the underdeveloped parts of the Islamic world, at least rhetorically. Secondly, unlike the Western inclination for essentializing and generalizing the Orient as a monolithic entity, the Ottomans focused on different characteristics of different Muslim communities. They established a “hierarchy of relegations” among these communities and declared the Ottoman superiority over the other Muslim peoples. This sense of superiority, according to Herzog and Motika, is the only factor that unites the Ottoman travellers. All in all, they conclude that even if one can label the Ottoman travelogues to the Muslim outback as Orientalist, he/she should be aware that this labelling is different from the discourse of Western Orientalism.

¹⁰⁰ Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*,” 195.

2.3. Ottoman Orientalism/Ottoman Colonialism: Ussama Makdisi and Selim Deringil

Although Herzog and Motika's study underlines the differences between the Western Orientalism and the quasi-Orientalist writings of the Ottomans, the articles of Ussama Makdisi and Selim Deringil almost equate the Ottoman perception of the Orient with the Western perception by examining them within the same framework of colonial discourse. The article of Makdisi was published in 2002 in *American Historical Review* with the simple but ambitious title of "Ottoman Orientalism."¹⁰¹ This was the first utilization of the concept of "Ottoman Orientalism," similar to the other versions such as "British Orientalism" or "French Orientalism," meaning that the Ottomans were not only the victims of European imperialism, rather they were similar to the European imperialist powers in terms of their perceptions on the Orient. Selim Deringil followed Makdisi by publishing his article in 2003 in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* with a long title: "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate."¹⁰² As the title indicates, what Deringil aims in this article was to apply the findings of post-colonial studies to the Ottoman case. These two articles have significant similarities regarding their evaluation of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and the policies of the imperial centre towards the Arab provinces of the Empire.

To start with, the aim of both authors is to extend post-colonial studies to the Ottoman Empire. Makdisi clearly stipulates that his aim was to employ the conclusions of Saidian understanding of Orientalism to the Ottoman case:

[t]his essay, therefore, extends Edward Said's analysis of Orientalism by looking at how Ottomans represented their own Arab periphery as an integral

¹⁰¹ Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism".

¹⁰² Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate". Indeed, Deringil writes a book published in 1998, which included the precedents of the arguments crystallized in this article. See Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998). However, in this dissertation, rather than his book, which does not clearly mention about Ottoman colonialism, his article is preferred to be analyzed.

part of their engagement with, explicit resistance to, but also implicit acceptance of, Western representations of the indolent Ottoman East.¹⁰³

Therefore, he argues that there is a particular version of Orientalism, which he calls the “Ottoman Orientalism.” He defines this version as such:

By Ottoman Orientalism, I mean a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theatre of backwardness.¹⁰⁴

In other words, what leads Makdisi to coin the concept of “Ottoman Orientalism” is his perception of the Ottoman modernization as a phenomenon producing an ultimate distinction between the superior West and inferior East, which is the essence of Saidian understanding of Orientalism.

Deringil, on the other hand, does not underline Saidian Orientalism; indeed, he does not even mention about “Ottoman Orientalism” at all. What he focuses on is the “Ottoman colonialism” instead of “Ottoman Orientalism:” “In this article I will argue that as the nineteenth century neared its end, the Ottomans adopted a colonial stance toward the peoples of the periphery of their empire.”¹⁰⁵ In other words, Deringil clearly labels the Ottoman Empire as a colonial power administering and perceiving its periphery in a colonial setting.

Despite this conceptual difference, both authors mainly concentrate on the centre-periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire in a way to establish a linkage between the Orientalist discourse and colonial intercourse. Unlike Herzog and Motika, who turn their attention to the Ottoman perception of the Muslim “outback,” namely to the Muslims living outside the borders of the Empire, Makdisi and Deringil examine the Ottoman perceptions and policies regarding the Ottoman provinces located in the Orient. Makdisi particularly gives priority to the province of Mount Lebanon, while Deringil provides the

¹⁰³ Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 768.

¹⁰⁴ Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 769.

¹⁰⁵ Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 313.

reader with analyses on wider regions, including the provinces of Hejaz, Yemen, and Tripolitania.

In sum, Makdisi and Deringil argue that during the nineteenth century (or in a particular period in the nineteenth century) the relationship between the imperial centre and Arab periphery of the Empire was a colonial relationship. As Makdisi argues:

[...]through efforts to study, discipline, and improve imperial subjects, Ottoman reform created a notion of the pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way European colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects. This process culminated in the articulation of a modern Ottoman Turkish nation that had to lead the empire's other putatively stagnant ethnic and national groups into an Ottoman modernity. Islam in this vein served to signify the empire's commonality with the Muslim majority of its subjects, but this commonality was implicitly and explicitly framed within a civilizational and temporal discourse that ultimately justified Ottoman Turkish rule over Muslim and non-Muslim subjects.¹⁰⁶

Quite similarly, Deringil advocates the existence of a distinct Ottoman colonialism towards the end of the nineteenth century:

It is the view of this writer that sometime in the nineteenth century the Ottoman elite adopted the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists and came to conceive of its periphery as a colonial setting. It is my contention that the Ottoman elite conflated the ideas of modernity and colonialism, and applied the latter as a means of survival against an increasingly hostile world.¹⁰⁷

From these two excerpts, some common points could be derived. First of all, according to Makdisi and Deringil, the colonial relationship between the Ottoman imperial centre and the Arab periphery was a direct result of the Ottoman modernization. Adopting some aspects of the Western civilization had been perceived by the ruling elite as the only way of survival. This would not only modernize the Ottoman Empire, but also demonstrate to the Europeans that the Empire could be a modern state while retaining its Islamic nature. In borrowing from the West, the Ottomans adopted not only technological achievements or some institutions, but also the colonial discourse and methods in order to employ them to sustain the territorial integrity of the Empire. In doing

¹⁰⁶ Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 769.

¹⁰⁷ Deringil, "'They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery'," 311-312.

that, they developed the category of “pre-modern” to distinguish themselves from the backward components of the Empire (as Makdisi argues), and conflated the ideas of modernity and colonialism as a means of survival in a hostile world (as Deringil argues). Whatever the reason, the Ottomans utilized colonial discourse and practices on their Arab periphery.

Secondly, Makdisi and Deringil underline the significance of Islam in this colonial setting. They argue that the role of Islam is one of the most significant differences of the Ottoman Orientalism/colonialism from the Western Orientalism /colonialism. Islam turned out to be the ultimate legitimation for the Ottoman rule over the Muslim constituents and it was utilized in the nineteenth century in a way to converge with the components of Western civilization. As Deringil writes:

One half of this borrowed colonialism was based on tried and true practices of Islamic Ottoman empire building; the Caliphate, the Sharia’, Hanefi Islamic jurisprudence, guilds, and Turkish/Islamic law (kanun/yasa). The other half, or ‘new’ half, was a creature of the nineteenth-century positivist, Enlightenment-inspired centralizing reforms.¹⁰⁸

To put it differently, according to Deringil, Ottoman colonialism was not solely derived from the adoption of Western discourses, practices and structures; rather Islam was also used as a means of colonialism through several institutions (such as the Caliphate) and legal frameworks (such as the Islamic jurisprudence).

Third, Makdisi and Deringil resemble the Ottoman perception of the Arab periphery to the perceptions of the European colonial powers such as Britain or France on their colonies, such as India or Algeria. In making this comparison, they utilize the concepts favoured by post-colonial studies; among them the most significant ones are the “civilizing mission” and “white man’s burden.” For example, Deringil writes:

Ottoman’s constant use of the “civilizing motif” was similar to the White Man’s Burden as applied by the British Raj in India, where all opposition to

¹⁰⁸ Deringil names Ottoman colonialism as “borrowed colonialism,” in order to emphasize that the Ottomans adopted colonial methods and discourses in order to ensure the survival of the Empire. Deringil, ““They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 316.

British rule was dubbed, as by nature, “fanatic” as in a “fanatic Moulvi” who “provoked the fanaticism of the natives.”¹⁰⁹

Similarly, according to Makdisi:

By casting the Ottoman Empire as the progenitor of the Enlightenment ideal (and therefore its natural inheritor), capable of its own renaissance, Ottoman reformers also articulated a notion of the “Ottoman man’s burden” toward its subject populations, who would have to be disciplined and reformed before the Ottoman Empire could firmly establish itself as a civilized power.¹¹⁰

In other words, by employing such European conceptualizations to describe the Ottoman discourse on the Arab provinces, Makdisi and Deringil try to demonstrate that the European and Ottoman “colonial” discourses were quite similar; hence they open the way for arguing a particular “Ottoman Orientalism” likewise the British or French Orientalism.

In sum, the debate of “Ottoman Orientalism” is quite stimulating in the sense that it focuses on a long-underestimated dimension of Ottoman studies, namely the Ottoman discourses on the East. The Ottoman perceptions of the West and Western civilization have already been covered by several works (most of which are cited in the third part of this dissertation on the Ottoman perception of civilization); however its perceptions of the East have not been discussed thoroughly. The applicability of post-colonial studies to the Ottoman Empire could inspire a better understanding not only of the concept of Orientalism, but also of the Ottoman intellectual history. However, besides these contributions, the debate of “Ottoman Orientalism” has significant shortcomings, most of which are also admitted by its proponents. These problems might result in questioning both the limits of the applicability of post-colonial studies to the Ottoman case and the very definition of the concept of “Ottoman Orientalism.”

To start with the conceptual problems, the concept of “Ottoman Orientalism” had significant differences from the Saidian understanding of this concept. The Ottoman perception of the Orient does not totally fit into Said’s three pursuits of Orientalism (namely, Orientalism as an academic field of study,

¹⁰⁹ Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 318.

¹¹⁰ Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 782.

as a style of thought and as a corporate institution used to dominate and authorize the Orient). First of all, according to Said, the knowledge of the Orient is extremely significant for the establishment of biased and prejudicial accounts of this particular region. That is why, Oriental studies had been consolidated both institutionally and academically in the nineteenth century in the Western world. However, in the Ottoman Empire such an academic study of the Orient had not existed as systematically as in the West. The Ottomans did not engage in linguistic studies such as Sinology or Indology. Their interest to the Arabic and Persian as Oriental languages did not arise from an academic attraction; rather Arabic and Persian had been taught in Ottoman *madrasah* curricula for centuries for theological or literary purposes.¹¹¹ Beyond that, the Ottomans did not also engage in archaeological or anthropological studies as intensely as the Western scientists did in various parts of the world, because they did not perceive the Orient as an “object of study” in a Western sense. However, there are always some exceptions to this general trend; one of such exceptions is Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910), the famous nineteenth century Ottoman archaeologist and artist, who has been referred in Makdisi’s and Deringil’s articles as a proof of the existence of Ottoman Oriental Studies.¹¹² As a disciple of the famous French Orientalist Ernest Renan (1823-1892), of course, Osman Hamdi Bey was influenced from the Orientalist literature and art; however, it would be more accurate to perceive him as an exception because his studies did not suffice to create a body of Oriental studies in the Ottoman Empire. All in all, one of the most significant components of Orientalism, namely the academic knowledge of the Orient treating the region as an “object of study,” is largely absent in the Ottoman Empire.

¹¹¹ For a brief account of Arabic and Persian teaching in classical Ottoman education, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 19-31 and İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Eğitim ve Bilgi Üretim Sisteminin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 21.

¹¹² Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 783-787; Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 331-333.

Secondly, Said particularly perceives Orientalism as a style of thought based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and Occident. This distinction was first religious; the reason of its insurmountable nature was the ultimate distinction between Christianity and other monotheistic or polytheistic religions. In the nineteenth century, the concept of civilization, which also included religion to some extent, became the main medium of differentiation. Applied to the Ottoman case, it can be argued that the Ottomans had also distinguished between the Orient and Occident based on religion and then on civilization. As Makdisi writes, “[j]ust as European Orientalism was based on an opposition between the Christian West and the Islamic Orient, the Ottomans believed that there were some essential differences that distinguished them from the West – especially a notion of Islam.”¹¹³ However, in this distinction the Ottomans were generally perceived themselves as a part of the Orient, not the Occident. True, in the nineteenth century, they tried to adopt some elements (particularly the material ones) of the Western civilization; however, this does not necessarily mean that they began to perceive themselves as Westerners, as the members of the Occidental community. Rather, they were sensitive to preserve their Oriental morality (religion and ethics) although sometimes they were critical of the current problems of the Orient. This criticism was not similar to Western Orientalism, which perceived the stagnancy of the Orient as a fixed phenomenon. The Ottomans were aware of the detriments of Western imperialism and argued for the modernization of the East (in particular the Islamic world) in order to cope with this threat. What they criticized, therefore, was the Eastern indolence, and what they tried was to evoke a revival based on the convergence of Western modernity and Islamic morality. This means that rather than producing and reproducing the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and Occident, they tried to reach a synthesis.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 769.

¹¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman perception of civilization and their Oriental identity see Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Makdisi and Deringil rightly argue that the Ottoman attempt for modernization resulted in the Ottoman perception of some communities of the Empire as backward within a civilizational framework, similar to the perceptions of Western Orientalism. However, this was the perception of the Ottoman ruling elite, who, at the same time, perceived themselves as modernized-yet-oriental. In other words, the Ottoman elite's perception of, for example, the Arabs of Iraqi provinces, was the perception of a relatively under-developed Oriental group by a more developed Oriental group. In other words, although it was similar to a Westerner's perception of an Easterner, it was not the same in essence. Indeed, Makdisi himself was aware of this paradox. He writes:

[Ottoman Orientalism] posited an empire in "decline" yet capable of an independent renaissance, westernized but not Western, leader of a reinvigorated Orient yet no longer of the "Orient" represented by the West, nor that embodied in its unreformed subjects. Ottoman Orientalism accommodated both strictly secularist and explicitly Islamist interpretations of modern Ottoman identity. It discredited Western representations of Ottoman indolence by contrasting Ottoman modernity with the unreformed and stagnant landscape of the empire. In effect, it de-Orientalized the empire by Orientalizing it.¹¹⁵

In other words, Makdisi admits the ambiguous positioning of the Ottoman ruling elite between the Western world and its Eastern periphery, and surpasses this paradox by arguing that the Ottomans demonstrated to the Europeans that there was an Ottoman modernity through distancing themselves from the underdeveloped parts of the Empire. In doing that, he presents another paradox, "the de-Orientalization of the Empire by Orientalizing it."

What is more, the utilization of the concepts like "Ottoman civilizing mission" or "Ottoman man's burden" is equally subject to debate. According to Robert Geraci, there are two kinds of civilizing mission, one internal and the other external. The external civilizing mission meant the Western colonial powers' discourse regarding the "uncivilized" inhabitants of the non-European world, while the internal one can be seen everywhere in the world in terms of provision of internal civilizational development of one states' citizens.

¹¹⁵ Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 772-773.

Considering the French case, Geraci explains the internal civilizing mission as such:

Arguably, one of the first civilizing missions was the spread of the French Revolution – that great crusade for progress – throughout Europe by Napoleonic France. Afterward, European states and elites undertook the extension of civilization downward on the social scale and outward from capitals to the rural world. As Eugen Weber has described it, the process of making “peasants into Frenchmen” – rooting out linguistic and intellectual parochialism and instilling what were considered proper manners, mores, and mentalities through nationalizing institutions such as schools – was essentially a civilizing mission.¹¹⁶

In line with this explanation, the “Ottoman civilizing mission,” if such a concept can be used, is more domestic than external, since the Arab provinces were an integral part of the Empire. In other words, just as the French state had tried to transform “peasants into Frenchmen,” the Ottoman state had also attempted to create an Ottoman citizenship including the nomadic tribes as well as the settled Arabic people of the Empire. The Ottoman perception of the inhabitants of Arabia as Muslims more than Arabs almost until the last decades of the Ottoman Empire enhances the argument for internal civilizing mission instead of the colonial-external version.

To recapitulate, considering the three pursuits of Saidian Orientalism, the argument for “Ottoman Orientalism” does not fit into the first pursuit, namely Orientalism as an academic discipline, and only partially fits into the second pursuit, namely Orientalism as a style of thought. Indeed, what Makdisi and Deringil focus on is the third pursuit of Orientalism, being the corporate institutional characteristics of this particular body of discourse, which has been used to dominate and authorize the Orient. Both authors either directly or indirectly mention that the Ottomans had engaged in colonial discourses and practices somewhere in the nineteenth century. However, the perception of Ottoman Empire as a colonial power is equally problematic.

In the beginnings of his article, Deringil makes a quotation from Edhem Eldem and a reference to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s (1870-1924) famous pamphlet

¹¹⁶ Robert P. Geraci, “The Concept of Civilization,” in John Merriman and Jay Winter (ed.), *Europe 1789 to 1914*, Vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of the Age of Industry and Empire*, 5 Volumes, (New York: Thomson Gale, 2006), 461.

Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism in order to base his arguments on Ottoman colonialism. The quotation that he makes from Eldem argues that the Ottoman Empire imitated the Western colonial powers in the nineteenth century through consolidating a homogenous core region based on Eastern Thrace and Anatolia and establishing an Arabian periphery.¹¹⁷ Then Deringil argues that his definition of colonialism closely follows the Leninist position, which he finds one of the best and most succinct definitions of imperialism.¹¹⁸ However, when this pamphlet of Lenin is exposed to closer analysis, there is hardly any proposition that could be applied to the Ottoman case in a way to explain Ottoman colonialism. What is more, in line with the propositions that Lenin made, it can be argued that the Ottoman Empire was the victim of the Western imperialism, not an active actor of it. In other words, the Leninist perception of colonialism could not easily be adopted to define an “Ottoman colonialism.”¹¹⁹

Creating single definitions for the concepts of colonialism and imperialism is quite difficult because there are multiple definitions for each of them. For the purposes of this dissertation, colonialism can be briefly defined as “the settlement of territory in one region or country by people from outside that area, with control over the new territory generally remaining in the hands of the country from which the colonizers have come.”¹²⁰ Imperialism, on the other

¹¹⁷ Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 312.

¹¹⁸ Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 312, footnote no. 1.

¹¹⁹ For an English translation of this pamphlet, which had first been published in Petrograd in 1917, see Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, [unknown translator] (Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1934). Anthony Brewer makes a brief summary of Lenin’s pamphlet and argues that he focused on the following themes in order to reveal the emergence of imperialism: (1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this ‘finance capital’ of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which share the world among themselves; and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 117.

¹²⁰ Alastair Pennycook, *English and the Discourses of Colonialism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 34.

hand, can be described as “the larger organization of colonies into one economic, military or political system controlled by the imperial power.”¹²¹ Said’s own definition of imperialism is also important to set the relationship between imperialism and colonialism:

As I shall be using the term, “imperialism” means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; “colonialism”, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory.¹²²

Keeping these definitions in mind, the labelling of Ottoman rule over the Arab provinces as colonialism has some significant problems. True, there had been Ottoman settlements in the Balkans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and these settlements had significant similarities with settler colonies of other nations; however, in the Middle East, such settlements were quite insignificant. What is more, in the Middle Eastern provinces until the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a significant autonomy; the local elites were in charge to a great extent besides a governor appointed by the centre. Even in the eighteenth century, the governors in some provinces were appointed from the local notable families such as Al-Azm family in Syria and Jalili family in Mosul.¹²³ According to Thomas Philipp, the loyalty of these families to the centre “was not just a cause of paying lip service;” the reason for their obedience was that “[...]the Ottoman political system was the frame of reference for their own worldview and gave, in the last analysis, legitimacy to their own acts.”¹²⁴ Hence the classical definition of colonialism, like the Leninist definition, can not

¹²¹ Pennycook, *English and the Discourses of Colonialism*, 34.

¹²² Said, *Orientalism*, 8.

¹²³ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47. Other notable families such as the Bakri family in Cairo, Khalidi and Alami family in Jerusalem, Jabiri family in Aleppo, and Gaylani family in Baghdad had significant political authority in these respective cities. See Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 11. For a brief account of Ottoman rule in the Middle East, see the Chapter 10 of this dissertation.

¹²⁴ Thomas Philipp, “Bilād al-Šām in the Modern Period: Integration into the Ottoman Empire and New Relations with Europe,” *Arabica: Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies/Revue d'études arabes et islamiques*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2004): 401-418, 405.

easily be applied to the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces of the Empire at least until the mid-nineteenth century.

Then what had happened in the mid-nineteenth century that transformed the Ottoman-Arab relations so dramatically and directed Makdisi and Deringil to argue for an “Ottoman colonialism”? The answer they give to this question was the Ottoman centralization. Makdisi and Deringil prefer to read nineteenth century Ottoman centralization in a way to justify their argument of Ottoman colonialism. Accordingly, they argue that the Ottoman centralization, which had been perceived as a policy of ensuring the preservation of the Ottoman territorial integrity and provision of the survival of state, was realized in a way to curb the local autonomy of Arab periphery *vis-à-vis* the centre. This policy resulted in a “reformist imperial gaze,” which was based on the backwardness of Arab provinces of the Empire at the discursive level.¹²⁵

Indeed, this argument has validity to some extent. The Ottoman ruling elite might have perceived centralization as a means for diminishing the local autonomy of local rulers and chieftains. However, as Hasan Kayalı argues, they did not do this as a colonialist venture. The local elites were represented in the provincial assemblies, which contributed to the governance of the provinces and therefore retained most of their power.¹²⁶ What is more, in the late nineteenth century, the Arabs were not only represented in the local municipal councils and institutions but also in the Ottoman Parliament, which had first been convened in 1877 and then in 1908. Accordingly, in the two subsequent sessions of the Parliament between 1877 and 1878, there were 32 Arab deputies out of 232, elected through provincial councils from the provinces of Aleppo, Syria,

¹²⁵ Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 770; Deringil, ““They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 338.

¹²⁶ Hasan Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlıcılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık (1908-1918)*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 20. For a detailed account of the transformation of the Ottoman rule in the Middle East, also see the Chapter 10 of this dissertation on the Ottoman perception of the Middle East.

Baghdad, Basra and Tripolitania.¹²⁷ According to Kayalı, these deputies perceived themselves as the representatives of the Empire; but rather than dealing with the general issues discussed in the Parliament, they preferred to focus on the local problems of their respective provinces.¹²⁸

The representation of the Arab community in the Ottoman Parliament was a phenomenon unseen in the European colonial states. Such a representation was never the case in the British or French Parliaments; there could be no Algerian parliamentarian in the French Parliament, or the presence of an Indian parliamentarian in the British Parliament was impossible in the nineteenth century.¹²⁹ In other words, the Arab representation in the provincial assemblies in local level and in the Ottoman Parliament in central level demonstrate that the centre-periphery relations were quite different from European colonial experience.

Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the policies for Ottoman centralization had been applied smoothly in the periphery. There had been significant reactions, even rebellions, to the Ottoman central rule and the Ottomans sometimes attempted to suppress these rebellions by force. Makdisi's emphasis on the problematic status of the province of Mount Lebanon and

¹²⁷ Mount Lebanon was also invited to send deputies to the Assembly; however, in order to underline their extensive autonomy obtained in 1860s, the provincial assembly rejected this invitation. See, Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar*, 28.

¹²⁸ Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar*, 31. After its dissolution in 1878, the Parliament was reconvened in 1908; in this Parliament the number of Arab deputies was 60 out of 260. Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar*, 94. According to Faroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, in 1914, the number of Arab deputies reached a zenith, 84 out of 259; comprising almost one third of the Ottoman Parliament. See Faroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler: 1908-1918," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. 4-5 (1975-1976): 245-284, 246.

¹²⁹ Even, the Jewish citizens of United Kingdom could not be a member of the Parliament; that is why the parents of Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), a Jewish-origin British politician and prime minister, baptised him when he was thirteen years old. See Bernard Glassman, *Benjamin Disraeli: The Fabricated Jew in Myth and Memory*, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2002), 38. Meanwhile, in the late Ottoman Parliaments there were several Jewish deputies representing different parts of the Empire. Emmanuel Carosso from Salonika, Vitali Faraci and Viktor Çorbacıoğlu from İstanbul, Nesim Masliyah from İzmir and Sasun Hasgayl from Baghdad were among such deputies. See Ahmad and Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler: 1908-1918," see the list of deputies, 265-284.

Deringil's emphasis on Yemen's upsurge against central rule can be understood within this framework. However, whether to label the Ottoman suppression of these rebellions in order to provide the integration of the periphery as a colonial policy is a matter of discussion.

Another problem in the analysis of Makdisi and Deringil is their frequent comparison of the Ottoman Empire with the major colonial powers of the nineteenth century, namely Britain and France. This comparison usually disregards the structural differences between the imperial establishment of the Western colonial powers and the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, Britain and France had a modern, centralized, and a novel form of empire, which was composed of a centre (or a core), being more or less a nation state, and a periphery (or colonies/dependencies). These states had their own colonial administrations, bureaucracies, establishments to rule their colonies. However, in the Ottoman Empire, there was no such "nationalized" centre. Makdisi's equation of Ottomanization with nationalization does not necessarily mean the creation of a nationalized centre as in British or French cases because Ottomanization, particularly in the sense of *Tanzimat* reforms, based on the legal equality of all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, unlike the inequality between the British/French citizens in the metropolis and their colonial subjects, in the Ottoman Empire, at least legally, starting from *Tanzimat* period, all the Ottoman subjects had the same rights and obligations. What is more, the main target of this legal equality was the non-Muslim constituents of the Empire, not the Arabs, who had assumed legal equality for centuries, since they were Muslims and subject to the Islamic law. In other words, even before the *Tanzimat* reforms, Arabs were not treated separately in legal sense. What *Tanzimat* brought, therefore, was the Ottoman citizenry. Makdisi also admits this reality by writing that:

[b]eginning with the *Tanzimat*, Ottoman reformers identified with these subjects as potential fellow citizens with whom they should be united in a newly defined common modern Ottoman patriotism. They also saw them as fellow victims of European intrigue and imperialism.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 770.

The perception of legal equality continued until the end of the Empire despite some grave problems in its last decades in practical terms. In other words, there had been some significant practices disturbing the legal equality of Ottoman citizens. Makdisi and Deringil particularly refer to the Turkification policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP); however these policies could only be partially realized after the Balkan Wars, when the Ottoman military failures created a significant panic and anxiety about the future of the Empire. According to Benjamin Fortna, although the dominant trend in the late Ottoman historiography was to emphasize the supremacy of secular/Turkist thinking in the last decades of the Empire, this is a mistake; as he quoted from Şerif Mardin, this means the “underestimation of the sacred,” in other words, the Islamic credentials of the imperial structure.¹³¹ Similarly Ernest Dawn argues that even in the last decades of the Empire, most of the Ottoman intellectuals “[...] remained conservative and merely reaffirmed with renewed vigour the traditional belief that Islam was the best of all possible ways of life.”¹³² According to Feroz Ahmad, the leaders of the CUP had adhered to the ideology of Ottomanism and understood it as the only way to safeguard the Ottoman state. For them granting all the Ottomans, regardless of their ethnic origins or religion, the same rights and demanding the fulfilment of the same duties under the vague umbrella of Ottomanism would provide the survival of the state. It was only after the Balkan Wars, in other words, in the last years of the Empire that, the ruling elite’s ideology was transformed from an Ottomanist to a Turkist one.¹³³ To sum up, the emphasis on the CUP’s policies of Turkification seen in the articles of the authors arguing for “Ottoman Orientalism” resulted in their overestimation of Turkish nationalism. This overestimation contributes to their perception of the Ottoman ruling elite’s relations with the Arabs as Turkish-Arab relations as well

¹³¹ Benjamin C. Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Aug. 2000): 369-393, 370.

¹³² C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 129.

¹³³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 22-23, 154.

as their perception of Turkish self-perception of civilizational superiority over the Arabs. However, except for a brief period after the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, Turkish nationalism had not been the dominant ideology of the Ottoman ruling elite, and even after that period until the disintegration of the Empire, there were always strong contestants of Turkish nationalism as Ottomanism or Islamism.

Another problem in the writings of Deringil and Makdisi is their perception of the Arab community of the Empire as an entirely passive entity. In other words, while focusing on the Ottoman perception of modernism and civilization, they neglected the Arab perception of these two concepts. In his study on Arabism, Dawn focuses on the Arab modernists and their intimate relationship with the Ottoman counterparts as well as with the Arab and Ottoman conservative Islamists. He writes:

All [Arab modernists, Ottoman modernists, Arab and Ottoman conservative Islamists] were unwilling to admit that the East was inferior to Europe; instead, all maintained that Islam and the culture of the East were intrinsically superior to Christianity and Western civilization. The conservatives simply denied inferiority and reaffirmed superiority. The modernists, both Ottomanist and Arabist, admitted inferiority in their day but explained it away by making their backwardness the result of deviation from true Islam, which was inherently the perfect system.¹³⁴

In other words, the majority of the Ottoman modernists also perceived themselves as backward; therefore, while perceiving the backwardness of the Arab territories they emphasized not their own civilizational superiority, but the civilizational superiority of the West. The Arab modernists, on the other hand, also labelled the underdeveloped parts of the Arab provinces as backward; in other words, there was not much difference between the Ottoman and Arab modernist perceptions.

The argument of the passivity of Arabs consolidated Deringil's argument of "Ottoman colonialism." In his article, he defines "Ottoman colonialism" as "[...] the new attitude of increased distance from the population [...] whereby the fact that the population in question is Muslim is not of the first

¹³⁴ Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 140.

degree of importance.”¹³⁵ Contrarily, according to Kemal Karpat, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the relationship between Arabs and the Turks were closer more than any other period in their common history. Karpat argues that this was a period when the Turkish language had been influenced from Arabic the most and the communication between Arab and Turkish intellectuals had been quite developed. What is more, the common anti-imperialist discourse consolidated this communication to a great extent.¹³⁶ Unlike Makdisi and Deringil, Karpat also argues that after 1911, the CUP had entered into a process of reconciliation with the Arab community in order to foster a “Muslim opposition” against the Western imperialist expansion; hence they began to abandon their former secular and positivist policies disturbing the Arab community.¹³⁷ This also demonstrates that even in the CUP period, pro-Islamic discourses were also visible besides Turkist ones and they were equally significant.

In sum, treating the Ottoman centre-periphery relations as a colonial relationship is equally problematic compared to the first two pursuits of Saidian Orientalism. First of all, the territories exemplified in the articles of Makdisi and Deringil were not Ottoman colonies, but Ottoman provinces; their administration was not similar to, for example, the British administration of India or the French administration of Algeria. Secondly, from the *Tanzimat* period onwards, the Arabs were legally equal citizens of the Empire and they were represented both in local and central level. Of course, the process of centralization resulted in several problems in centre-periphery relations; however labelling the Ottoman handling with these problems as the Ottoman colonialist venture in the Arab periphery of the Empire might be misleading.

Up to now, the literature on Ottoman Orientalism has been criticized in line with the perspective of Saidian Orientalism; however, two additional

¹³⁵ Deringil, “‘They Live in A State of Nomadism and Savagery’,” 338.

¹³⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Ortadoğu’da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk*, translated by Recep Boztemur, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2001), 149-151.

¹³⁷ Karpat, *Ortadoğu’da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk*, 153.

criticisms can be directed to this literature, which are also the main criticisms directed towards Said himself. The first one is Said's generalizations and selective literature review. Reaching grand conclusions in a way to exclude other representations through selective literature review is a significant shortcoming of Saidian Orientalism, which is also evident in the literature of "Ottoman Orientalism." Makdisi and Deringil pick up several documents and writings of some bureaucrats or intellectuals to reach the conclusion that the Ottoman discourse and practice towards the Arab periphery could be understood in a colonial setting. However, the perceptions of these bureaucrats and intellectuals reflect only one set of perceptions. For example, Makdisi recalls the writings of a pro-Western Ottoman intellectual, Hüseyin Cahid (Yalçın, 1875-1957), on the Arabs and Arabic science in order to demonstrate the ethnic and even racial "segregation" of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. However, he did not mention, for example, Abdül Bey, one of the deputies representing Ioannina in the Ottoman Parliament, who said in one of his speeches that the Ottomans are civilized because they had been descended from the Arab nation.¹³⁸ In other words, the Ottoman perception of the Arabs could not be generalized as a colonial/Orientalist perception; although there were such representations, the existence of other perceptions should not be neglected.

The argument that the civilizational tune of the Ottoman discourse on the Arab provinces makes this discourse colonialist/Orientalist is equally generalizing and therefore subject to criticism. True, the Ottomans sometimes evaluated the Arab periphery in terms of civilization and argued that at least some parts of these territories were uncivilized. Here, lack of civilization occasionally meant lack of settlement, since the Ottoman version of the word "civilization" generally referred to the concept of "settlement" more than the European version denoting a level of development; in other places, the word was utilized in the European sense. However, this does not necessarily mean that this discourse was peculiar to the Arab provinces. Rather the Ottomans utilized a

¹³⁸ "Madem ki Arab milletinden neş'et etmiş bir milletiz, elbette medeniyiz." This speech was delivered in the Ottoman Parliament on January 24, 1878. Cited by Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar*, 40.

similar discourse for some of their European territories as well. For example Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895), one of the Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals of the second half of the nineteenth century, defined some parts of Herzegovina as being in the “state of savagery and nomadism” (*hâl-i vahşet ve bedâvet*).¹³⁹ Similarly, Cenap Şehabettin (1870-1934) perceived Bulgarian and Romanian villages as miserable settlements with indolent inhabitants.¹⁴⁰ Such a perception was not only peculiar to the Ottoman Empire at that time; almost all the nationalist movements in the Balkans produced an image of the “other” in civilizational terms. For example, according to Borianna Panayotova, Bulgarian nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century perceived themselves as “civilized” not only *vis-à-vis* the “barbarian” Ottomans, but also *vis-à-vis* the “barbarian” Serbs.¹⁴¹ In other words, the enmity among the Balkan states resulted in the development of civilization-barbarism discourse, which could not necessarily be labelled as Orientalist.

Therefore, not all the perceptions of the self as “civilized” and the other as “uncivilized” are Orientalist. What is more, the negative perception of the relatively weaker parts of the territories within a state in a civilizational sense might not always be Orientalist as well. For example, Glenn Hooper argues that some of the English travellers visiting Ireland perceived some parts of this island less civilized compared to British territories. He cited from the travelogue of Reverend James Hall (1755-1826) on Ireland, where Hall mentioned that after seeing the “miserably poor” cabins of Irish countryside, he sought “whether there were any manufacture in the country, and on other pretences.”¹⁴² Similarly,

¹³⁹ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, 4 Volumes, transliterated and edited by Cavid Baysun, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), Vol. 3, 34.

¹⁴⁰ Cenap Şehabettin, *Avrupa Mektupları*, (İstanbul: [Matbaa-i Amire], 1335 [1917]), transliterated by Sabri Özcan Sav, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1996), 1-2, 14-16.

¹⁴¹ Borianna Panayotova, “Soi et l’Autre dans la perspective de l’antagonisme ‘barbarie-civilisation’: le cas de la Bulgarie et de ses voisins balkaniques,” *Canadian Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d’histoire*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Aug. 2003): 199-229, 227-228.

¹⁴² James Hall, *Tour through Ireland; Particularly the Interior and Least Known Parts*, 2 Volumes, (London: Moore, 1813), Vol. 1, 56-57, cited in Glenn Hooper, *Travel Writing and*

Hall criticized the superstitious beliefs of the Irish priests, when he met a young girl carrying a pin-cushion hung round her neck given by the local priest for her recovery from illness.¹⁴³ This was quite similar to the Ottoman travellers' criticism of the role of superstitions in the Orient, which will be examined in Part IV of this dissertation. In sum, it is difficult to label the Ottoman perception of Arab provinces as Orientalist, just as it is difficult to label the British perception of Ireland as Orientalist.

The second shortcoming of Saidian Orientalism and by extension the argument for "Ottoman Orientalism" is the monolithic perception of Orient. Both Makdisi and Deringil generalize the Arab provinces of the Empire as Orient and neglected the Ottoman perception of other parts of the Eastern world, such as Iran, Central Asia, India, China, Japan, or sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, they only focus on the internal Arab communities of the Empire and neglected the non-Ottoman Muslims as well as other Eastern peoples to a great extent. Looking solely the Ottoman perception of its Arab community and generalizing it as "Ottoman Orientalism," therefore, is quite problematic.

All these criticisms should not be read as the total denial of any possibility of linking post-colonial studies in general and Saidian Orientalism in particular to the Ottoman case. Of course, there were many Ottoman intellectuals and texts, whose discourse were extremely similar to the discourses of the Western Orientalist literature. Influenced from Western civilization and being aware of the Western Orientalist texts, some of the Ottoman intellectuals sometimes emulated these discourses. What is attempted in this dissertation is not to ignore or exclude such works but to place them in a historical setting together with other kinds of representations of the Orient. Different Ottoman intellectuals might have different perceptions of the Orient and the Orientals, and it was these differences that created the intellectual richness of the Empire. In other words, what this dissertation disagrees is not the existence of the

Ireland, 1760-1860: Culture, History, Politics, (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 87.

¹⁴³ Hall, *Tour through Ireland*, p. 203, cited in Hooper, *Travel Writing and Ireland*, p. 87.

Orientalist discourse in the Ottoman Empire, but the generalization of the writings of some selected individuals or some selected documents to establish a particular “Ottoman Orientalism” as the dominant discourse in the nineteenth century within the framework of a colonial setting.

PART II

PATTERNS OF TRAVEL AND TRAVEL WRITING IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The previous part of this dissertation sets the theoretical interrelationship between travel writing and Orientalist discourse. Before engaging in a deeper analysis of the Ottoman intellectuals' and travellers' perceptions of civilization and their reflections on Eastern peoples and cultures, this part is devoted to an examination of patterns of travel and travel writing in the Ottoman world. In doing that, it is argued that these patterns had considerably transformed from classical to modern age, and the reasons for this transformation are quite interrelated with the Ottoman encounter with the concept of civilization as well as with the renewed interest of the Ottoman intellectuals about the developments taking place in the distant parts of the Empire and in the regions outside the Ottoman borders by the mid-nineteenth century onwards.

This part of the dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, Ottoman classical travel writing is analysed. In doing that, the reasons for the underdevelopment of Ottoman travel writing and the earlier forms of travel literature are examined. The second chapter proceeds by underlining the intellectual, technological and socio-cultural factors contributing to the emergence of modern travel literature in the Ottoman literary circles and compares and contrasts the classical travel narration with the modern one. Finally, the third chapter examines the modern Ottoman travelogues on the non-European world in order to introduce the primary sources of this dissertation. Not only the patterns of travel writing, but also patterns of Ottoman travel to the non-European world are covered in this chapter. All in all, as the first part of the dissertation provides the reader with a theoretical background, this second part establishes the historical, intellectual and cultural setting, in which the travelogues examined in this dissertation had been penned.

CHAPTER 3

OTTOMAN TRAVEL WRITING BEFORE THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

Considering the Ottoman literature before the mid-nineteenth century, it can be argued that travel writing had not emerged as a distinct genre. In this period, the Ottoman verse is composed of a plethora of poems on love (both mundane and divine), heroism and amusements, while the Ottoman prose includes a surfeit of writings on Islamic theology, astrology, politics, history, and philosophy. However, travel writing is one of the extremely limited fields of the classical Ottoman literature, and except for a couple of works, travelogues from this period hardly appears in libraries compared to the other genres.

3.1. The Reasons for the Underdevelopment of Travel Writing in the Ottoman Classical Literature

While most of those studying the Ottoman literature touch upon the rarity of travel writing during the Ottoman classical age, they fail to present a detailed analysis regarding the reasons for this underdevelopment.¹⁴⁴ However, elaborating upon the factors that deterred the Ottomans to write their travel experiences would provide the opportunity to understand the rationale not only behind the existence of only a few travel narrations, but also its revival as a new genre in the second half of the nineteenth century.

¹⁴⁴ For example Nicolas Vatin argues that before Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatnâme*, pieces of travel narration hardly exist and even the "logic of writing these pieces has nothing to do with what we understand from travel narration." See Nicolas Vatin, "Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?," translated from French by Işık Ergüder, *Cogito*, No. 19, Osmanlı Özel Sayısı (1999): 161-178, 161. According to Orhan Şaik Gökyay, on the other hand, except for *Mirâti'l Memâlik* written by Seydî Ali Reis, no travelogue was written by the Ottoman travellers in the Ottoman classical age. See Orhan Şaik Gökyay, "Türkçe'de Gezi Kitapları," *Türk Dili*, Vol. 27, No. 258 (Mar., 1973), 457-467, 459. Baki Asiltürk emphasizes that between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman travel literature experienced a very futile period. See, Baki Asiltürk, "Edebiyatın Kaynağı Olarak Seyahatnameler," *Turkish Studies: International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, Vol. 4, No.1 (Winter 2009), 911-995, 924.

Considering the Ottoman socio-political and cultural environment, several factors for the underdevelopment of travel writing in the classical age of the Ottoman Empire can be discerned. Accordingly, one of such factors might be that the Ottomans usually travelled only for official purposes, and the act of travel for the sake of travel was almost non-existent in the Ottoman classical age. In other words, it can be argued that it is not the rarity of travelling within and outside of the borders of the Ottoman Empire that resulted in the scarcity of travel narratives. As Nicolas Vatin argues, travelling in various forms – wars, merchandise activity, pilgrimage, diplomatic missions, and even espionage – was a frequent activity.¹⁴⁵ Each year, thousands of troops marched the plains of Balkans, the deserts of North Africa, or the mountains of Iran; thousands of people visited the sacred cities of Islam, namely Medina and Mecca, for pilgrimage. Dervishes and spies silently or clandestinely wandered within and outside the Ottoman realm. Merchants filled the ancient trade routes on camels and horses, carrying precious spices, silk and other commercial goods of the East to the West. Envoys handled diplomatic negotiations for resettling peace, for boundary demarcations, or simply for heralding the enthronement of the Ottoman Sultans to the foreign rulers. In sum, some Ottomans had a quite mobile life. Then, the answer of the question of what prevented the Ottoman travellers from writing their memoirs mainly resides in the lack of “travel consciousness,” or travel as a leisure activity. In other words, the problem was not the lack of travels or travellers, but the lack of “travel writing” as a genre, since the Ottoman traveller perceived himself as a soldier, official, pilgrim, or merchant, instead of a traveller.

A second reason for the underdevelopment of travel writing in the Ottoman classical literature might be the relative immobility of the Ottoman men of letters. Being a small group of talented as well as highly educated people, they were generally resident in the prominent cities of the Empire, such as Bursa, Edirne, İstanbul, Baghdad, or Damascus, during their lives. In other words, except for a few of them, who had also have other capacities in military,

¹⁴⁵ Vatin, “Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?,” 161.

bureaucratic or judiciary circles, the Ottoman poets, historians, or philosophers, rarely travelled, and even more rarely wrote their experiences when they did so. The eminent figures of the Ottoman verse, such as, Bakî (1526-1600), Şeyhülislam Yahya (1553-1644), Nailî (?-1666), or Nedim (1681-1730), were born and died in the same city; the esteemed historians such as Neşrî (?-1520), Peçevî (1572-1650), or Naîmâ (1655-1716) were born in different cities of the Empire; however, they came to İstanbul when they were quite young, and after attaining a bureaucratic post, they rarely travelled except for going to their cities of appointment. Hence, even if they had travelled, they had not written their travel experiences, since they perceived their journey as a part of their mission.

Another major disincentive might be related to the very perception of the nature of writing activity as perceived by the Ottoman men of letters. Accordingly, writing was apprehended as a noble and venerable activity; therefore it was commonly accepted that only the issues or subjects worth of mentioning should be written down. İskender Pala notes the Ottoman men of letters had a tripartite categorization of the oral expression. Accordingly, they perceived *kâl/söz* (meaning simply “the word”) as a neutral concept, while they utilized *kelâm* (meaning “a rhetorical word”) in order to define the act of beautifying the expression, and *laf* (meaning “an empty word”) to connote the sayings for the sake of saying something. For them, only *kelâm* is worth of recording through writing.¹⁴⁶ Love, being either mundane or divine, bravery of the masters (commanders, viziers, governors, and most importantly the Sultan himself), history, and philosophy were praised as the issues or fields deserving utmost literary talent, since they constituted the core of essential human existence for the Ottoman men of letters. On the other hand, travel, as a personal experience, which might not interest the majority of people, did not appeal an equivalent attraction compared to the “important” themes, unless it was presented to the people to lead them to draw a “lesson” (*ibret*). Hence, the secondary importance attached to travel might discourage the travellers to write

¹⁴⁶ İskender Pala, *Ah Mine'l Aşk*, (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2004), 4.

their experiences. That is why travel narration did not emerge as a distinguishable literary genre, but as a part of other literary genres.

The Ottoman perception of travel, particularly the personal travel, as an arduous, if not dangerous, affair might be another discouraging factor. Even, in the mightiest days of the Ottoman Empire, neither distant land routes, nor sea lanes had been safe and comfortable enough to make the travel more enjoyable. Brigandage and piracy could not be eliminated totally; despite relative development of caravanserais and inns along the trade routes, travel still meant a considerable and exhausting effort. Only a few routes were accessible for long-distance wheeled traffic, which forced the travellers to ride camels, horses or other kinds of pack-animals.¹⁴⁷ All these factors contributed to the negative perception of personal travel and distracted the Ottoman elites from frequent or voluntary travelling. Therefore, if travelling was inevitable, Ottomans generally preferred to travel in large and safer groups, in which personal security had been more or less guaranteed. Armies, protected trade caravans, or the “imperial pilgrimage groups” (*surre alayları*), accompanied by the troops assigned by the Sultan, were favoured compared to personal travel. Despite such measures for easing travel, the Ottoman travellers generally complained about their travels; even some of them entitled the pieces that they had written on their experiences in a way to emphasize the difficulties that they had encountered during their journeys.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands,” in *The Later Ottoman Empire, (1603-1839)*, in Suraiya N. Farouqi (ed.), Volume 3 of *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 18-43, 42.

¹⁴⁸ *Der Beyan-ı Meşakkat-ı Sefer ü Zaruret-i Mülazemet* (The Description of the Difficulties of Journey and Distress of Travel) written by Cemalî to describe the difficulties as a soldier participated in the Albanian campaign of Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481) in 1478, *Hasbihal-i Asakir-i Pür-melal der Taraf-ı Kal'a-yi Kamanıçe* (The Conversation of the Depressed Soldiers from the Castle of Kamanıçe) written by a poet named Hasan to describe the Ottoman defeat at Hotin and the misery he experienced in retreating from Poland in 1673, or *Mihnet-i Keşan* (The Tribulation of Keşan) written by Keçecizade İzzet Molla (1785-1829) to describe the hardship and misfortune he encountered during his exile and travel to Keşan in Eastern Thrace in 1823 were some of such pieces contributing to the negative perception of travel. See Menderes Coşkun, “Seyahatnâme ve Sefâretnâmeler,” in Talat Sait Halman [et.al.] (eds.), *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınlığı, 2007), Vol. 2, 327-344, 333-335.

Besides these general causes, there are several practical factors that contributed to the underdevelopment of travel literature. One of them is quite related to the nature of the interrelationship between the ruling elite and the Ottoman men of letters. The grants by the patrons (*câize*), such as the governors, viziers or the Sultan himself, were a considerable source of revenue for the Ottoman men of letters; that is why some subgenres of *kasîde* (poems praising the bravery and heroism of the Sultan or his viziers) were extraordinarily developed in the Ottoman classical poetry. Not only the poets but also the prose-writers, the historians, theologians, or geographers, preferred to dedicate their writings to the Sultan or some viziers, who supported them financially.¹⁴⁹ The financial dependence of the men of letters to the ruling elite might lead them to write about the themes that would favour the patron, while deterring them to write about their personal experiences, such as travelling, which was considered to be unattractive for whom the pieces had been dedicated to.

Another practical reason that discouraged the Ottoman travellers to write about their experiences might be the costs of book production. In the Ottoman classical age, compilation of manuscripts as a book was a costly endeavour, since there were many steps requiring significant payments for the transformation of manuscripts into books. Accordingly, the manuscripts had to be copied by eminent calligraphers and bound and gilded by respected artists. They were sometimes illustrated by able miniaturists, and this process increased the cost further. Finally, the low level of literacy among the Ottoman population had shrunk the market for books, which was another major disincentive for the writers.¹⁵⁰ In sum, the book was a valuable item; the subjects to be written should be chosen properly in order not to waste all these investment to produce an attractive book for the buyers.

¹⁴⁹ For a detailed analysis of the interrelationship between the ruling elite and the men of letters in the classical age see, Halil İncalcık, "The Poet and the Patron: A Sociological Treatise upon the Patrimonial State and the Arts," *Journal of Turkish Literature*, Vol. 2 (2005): 9-70.

¹⁵⁰ For a brief analysis on the costs of book production and the patterns of reading in the Ottoman Empire see Fahri Sakal, "Osmanlı Ailesinde Kitap," in Güler Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), Vol. 11, 732-738, 736.

Considering all these factors the Ottoman men of letters preferred to write about more general themes, such as poems on love and heroism in verse and history, theology and philosophy in prose, which might have attracted the attention of the small group of book-purchasers, rather than writing about their travels, which was perceived as an extremely personal affair.

3.2. Genres Including Travel Narration in the Ottoman Classical Age

Despite the underdevelopment of travel literature as a distinguishable genre in the Ottoman classical age, still, there are numerous pieces including descriptions of the travels performed by the Ottomans. They can not be labelled as travelogues in essence, but they include significant information, which provide the reader with a panorama of places and peoples of the period. In order to understand the emergence of such travel narrations, one should focus on the reasons for the Ottoman travel in the classical age as well as the motives that directed the people to include their travel experiences in the pieces written for other purposes. Among these reasons, war, pilgrimage, trade, or geographical studies are quite significant. What is more, there are even some anomalous examples, which can be considered as extremely closer to the genre of travelogue in a modern sense. The rest of this chapter is, therefore, devoted to the sources of travel narration and exemplified some pieces that are perceived as milestones of Ottoman travel writing in the classical age.

3.2.1. War as a Source of Travel Writing:

Arguably, the Ottomans had naturalized war as a way of life. In their poems, songs and anthems, they sometimes expressed how they admired the peculiar vehemence and grandeur of war; sometimes how they disliked the destructiveness of its longevity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the bulk of the travel narrations before the mid-nineteenth century is composed of the pieces written by soldier-poets or poets accompanied their masters during military campaigns. In other words, wars turned out to be an important opportunity for the Ottomans to travel abroad, and the verse and prose describing the road of campaigns, the soldiers' life, the cities and regions passed along or conquered, or

the peoples encountered became the precedents of travel writing in the Ottoman literature.

Of course, such descriptions do not form the essence of these pieces; the author had other intentions such as recording the proceeding of the campaign, heralding the victories of the Ottoman armies, praising the heroism of the commanders, describing the routes that the army followed, or expressing the difficulties encountered during the war. For Vatin, all these intentions serve for two purposes, one general and one practical. The general purpose was the reproduction of the authority of the master (either being the Sultan or viziers commanding the Ottoman armies).¹⁵¹ The soldier-poets participated in war within the entourage of their patrons; hence they were both paid and esteemed for writing about the courage of the master and his successful administration of the campaign. Their narration contributed to the image of his grandeur; hence his legitimate authority was consolidated in the eyes of the public. The practical purpose, on the other hand, was the writer's intention to give information on the conduct of the Ottoman campaign to those who would intend to participate in similar military activities in the future. In other words, these pieces "[...] serve as a guide for travellers as well as for those who join in royal expeditions."¹⁵² To sum up, these earlier pieces had both a legitimizing and informing impact on the Ottoman society.

The narrations on campaigns were written in various forms, which can be classified under five categories, namely *gazavâtname*, *rûznâme*, *fethnâme* (or sometimes *zafernâme*), *menâzilnâme*, and finally *esâretnâme*. *Gazavâtname* (literary means "the document/register of [religious] wars"), as an Ottoman classical literary genre, emerged in the earlier establishment of the Empire as a result of the conquests after a special kind of warfare, known as *ghaza* in the

¹⁵¹ Vatin, "Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?," 163.

¹⁵² Quoted from Hüseyin Gazi Yurtaydın in Nicolas Vatin, "Itinéraires d'agents de la Porte en Italie (1483-1495): Réflexions sur l'organisation des missions ottomanes et sur la transcription des noms de lieux italiens," *Turcica*, No. 19 (1987): 29-50; cited in Vatin "Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?," 164.

Ottoman/Islamic terminology.¹⁵³ They were generally written by those, who were commissioned by the Sultan or by the commanders of the Ottoman armies to watch and record their campaigns; therefore, the author/poet wrote extensively on the heroism and particularly on the service of his master to the spread of Islam in the lands of the “infidel.”¹⁵⁴ These pieces are also interesting for describing the lands that the campaigns had been directed to, as well as for reflecting the Ottoman perception of different communities living in those regions.¹⁵⁵ As a literary genre, *gazavatnâme* had declined considerably with the relative secularization of warfare starting from the mid-sixteenth century onwards.

Rûznâme (literary means “daily records”) is written as a diary kept during military campaigns and most of them included daily records of the march of the army, transportation of ammunition and weaponry, and the speeches of the Sultan or viziers commanding the army before, during and after the campaign. These pieces, generally written in verse, included descriptions of the regions that

¹⁵³ The word *ghaza* stems from the word *ghazva* connoting the wars to which the Prophet himself participated. In its narrowest sense, it meant “fighting with the enemy.” In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, this notion meant spread of Islam and enlargement of the territories controlled by Muslims. After 1260 Çobanogulları Beylik was assigned to fight with the Byzantines and among the labels used for Çobanogulları was *nusret-ul guzzat* (meaning “the victor of ghaza”). The label *ghazi* (meaning “the one fighting for the God”) was also used for denoting the Bey of Sinop and Aydın, who were contemporaries of Osman Bey, the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Cemal Kafadar, “Gaza,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 37 Volumes (continues to be published), (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi Genel Müdürlüğü, 1988 onwards), Vol. 13, 427-429, 427.

¹⁵⁴ For an analysis of *Gazavât-nâme* in Ottoman literature, see Agah Sırrı Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey Gazavât-nâmesi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1956).

¹⁵⁵ For example, *Gazavât-ı Hayrettin Paşa* (The [Religious] Wars of Hayrettin Paşa), written by Seyyid Muradî, a naval officer who had been assigned by Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa (1478-1546) to write about his warfare against the “infidels” in accordance with the orders coming from Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566), is one of the most known examples of this genre. It describes the Mediterranean port cities as well as the Christian communities, such as the Venetians, Spanish, and Maltese. See, Seyyid Muradî, *Seyyid Muradî'nin Kaleminden Kaptan Paşa'nın Seyir Defteri: Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, transliterated and edited by Ahmet Şimşirgil, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2003).

the army marched along; hence they contributed to the travel narration in the Ottoman classical age.¹⁵⁶

Fethnâme (literary means “document/register of conquest”) is also a kind of narration of the campaigns undertaken by Sultans or viziers, however, different from *rûznâme* or *gazavât-nâme*, it was generally written in the form of a letter sent by the Sultan to the foreign monarchs or to the prominent people of the Ottoman Empire, such as high-rank bureaucrats or governors, heralding the conquest of a particular city or region (in case of an Ottoman victory, the genre is called as *zafernâme*, meaning “the document/register of victory”).¹⁵⁷

More practical in essence and less colourful in style, *menâzilnâme* (literary means “the document/register of military camping posts”) was particularly written to determine the distances between two camping posts (*menzil*) of the Ottoman armies, and to describe these posts in a quite simple way. One of the most popular *menâzilnâmes* was the one written by Matrakçı Nasuh (?-1564) and entitled *Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn*¹⁵⁸ (*The Description of the Camping Posts of the Campaign on Two Iraqs*), which also included the miniatures drawn by the author himself, depicting the camping

¹⁵⁶ For example, the *Rûznâme* written by Haydar Çelebi, who participated in the campaigns of Selim I (r. 1512-1520) against the Safavids and Mamluks between 1514 and 1516, informed the reader not only about the Ottoman troops, their administration and the heroism of the Sultan, but also about the territories and peoples under the rule of these dynasties. See, Haydar Çelebi, *Haydar Çelebi Rûznâmesi*, transliterated and edited by Yavuz Senemoğlu, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, [unknown year of publication]). From the late seventeenth century onwards, when the Sultans gave up leading the military campaigns, the genre of *rûznâme* was transformed into a palace diary, which narrated the daily routines of the Ottoman imperial palace. For example, see V. Sema Arıkan, *III. Selim'in Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Rûznâme*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1993). One of the last examples of this genre is *Manzume-i Sivastopol (A Piece of Verse on Sivastopol)*, written by Rızaî describing the day-by-day developments of Crimean War in detail. For an analysis of *Manzume-i Sivastopol*, see Necat Birinci, *Edebiyat Üzerine İncelemeler*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), 31-42.

¹⁵⁷ According to Franz Babinger, *Fethnâme-i Sultan Mehmed (The Fethnâme of Sultan Mehmed)* written by Kıvamî in the late fifteenth century was one of the earliest examples of this genre and described the conquests of Mehmed II period. See Kıvamî, *Fetihname-i Sultan Mehmed*, transliterated and edited by Franz Babinger, (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1955). For other examples, see Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey Gazavât-nâmesi*, 50-52.

¹⁵⁸ Nasuh üs-Silahî (Matrakçı), *Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i 'Irakeyn-i Sultan Süleyman Han*, transliterated and edited by Hüseyin Gazi Yurtaydın, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1976).

posts that the Ottoman army had stopped during Süleyman's campaign to Baghdad in 1534.¹⁵⁹

At least for some of the Ottoman soldiers, wars had not ended successfully since they were captured by the enemy forces; however, some of these captives had produced one of the most interesting forms of travel writing in the Ottoman classical age, namely the *esâretnâme* (literary means the "document/register of captivity").¹⁶⁰

All in all, campaigns produced the earliest and primitive forms of travel literature in the Ottoman classical age. Although they can not easily be classified under the genre of travelogue, still they incorporate narrations regarding the Ottoman perception of outlying regions and the peoples that had been encountered. Hence they reflect the Ottoman understanding of the world and supply the reader with significant clues on the practice of travel before mid-nineteenth century.

3.2.2. Pilgrimage as a Source of Travel Writing:

Besides military campaigns, pilgrimage provided a fertile ground for the Ottomans to write their memoirs; hence emerged the genre of *menâsik-i hacc*.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ For the analysis of the miniatures see Nurhan Atasoy, "Matrakçı Nasuh and Evliya Çelebi: Perspectives on Ottoman Gardens (1534-1682)," in Michael Conan (ed.), *Middle East Garden Traditions: Unity and Diversity*, (Dumbarton Oaks: Harvard University Press, 2008), 197-220, 197-198.

¹⁶⁰ According to Menderes Coşkun, the earliest *esaretnâmes* was written in letter form by two soldiers named Hüseyin and Abdî Çelebi, who were captured by the pirates in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century; he cited *Vakiât-ı Sultan Cem (The Sultan Cem Affair)*, which was presumed to be written by Haydar Çelebi who accompanied Prince Cem in his exile in Rhodes and Europe between 1481 and 1495 after being defeated by his brother Bayezid II (r. 1481-1502) on his quest to the throne, as another example. See Coşkun, "Seyahatnâme ve Sefâretnameler," 331-332. According to Vatin, *Vakiât-ı Sultan Cem* was one of the writings closest to a travelogue in modern sense, since it described the European cities such as Lyon, social characteristics such as the dresses of women, institutions such as Papacy or techniques such as whale hunting in a linear fashion, meaning following a temporal sequence between different events. See Vatin, "Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?," 165.

¹⁶¹ The word *menâsik* is the plural form of *nüsk*, meaning certain religious requirements that a pilgrim should perform during the pilgrimage; hence *menâsik-i hacc* emerged as a practical guide instead of a travelogue, aiming to inform the prospective pilgrims on the performance of pilgrimage. For a detailed account of pilgrimage practice in the Ottoman Empire and its socio-political implications, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans (1517-1683)*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).

These pieces would later be transformed into one of the most literate and adorned narrations on travel with religious motives. However, except for a couple of examples, such pieces could not be frequently encountered. Indeed, this underdevelopment is difficult to understand, since thousands of Ottomans performed this ritual annually. The reasons for the scarcity of pilgrimage narratives despite the huge numbers of pilgrims are suggested by Menderes Coşkun as (1) the pilgrims' perception of pilgrimage as a duty, not as an adventurous endeavour, (2) the ordinariness of pilgrimage because of the huge numbers of pilgrims, and (3) the monotony of the route and unsurprising travel within a large caravan protected by imperial troops.¹⁶² In other words, pilgrimage was perceived as a religious requirement and presumed to be known by the entire Islamic community in detail; therefore, according to pilgrims, there was no need (and even it might be perceived as nonsense) to mention about the practice of pilgrimage journeys.¹⁶³

Although initially designed as practical guides, the pilgrimage narratives provide the reader not only with the perception of religious motives behind the pilgrimage as a form of travel, but also with the descriptions of Ottoman Anatolia, Middle East and Arabia, including the cities like Konya, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Medina and Mecca. Hence, pilgrimage narratives turned out to be a significant source of travel writing in the Ottoman classical age.

¹⁶² Menderes Coşkun, "Osmanlı Türkçesiyle Kaleme Alınmış Edebî Nitelikli Hac Seyahatnâmeleri," in Hasan Celal Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), *Türkler*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999) Vol. 11, 806-814, 806.

¹⁶³ The oldest piece on the travel for pilgrimage was written by Ahmed Fakîh in the beginning of the fifteenth century, entitled *Kitâb-ı Evsâf-ı Mesâcid üş-Şerîfe* (*The Book on the Characteristics of the Sacred Mosques*) in which he described the three holy sites of Islam, namely Jerusalem, Medina and Mecca. For the full text of this travelogue see Ahmed Fakih, *Kitâb-ı Evsâf-ı Mesâcid üş-Şerîfe*, transliterated and edited by Hasibe Mazıoğlu, (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1974). The ninth volume of the ten-volume travelogue of Evliya Çelebi (1611-1683) was also devoted for describing his pilgrimage. It can be argued, on the other hand, that the most popular pilgrimage travelogue was Nâbî's (1642-1712) *Tuhfetü'l Haremeyn* (*The Gift of Mecca and Medina*) written in 1712. For the full text of this pilgrimage travelogue see, Nâbî, *Hicaz Seyahatnâmesi: Tuhfetü'l Haremeyn*, transliterated and edited by Seyfettin Ünlü, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1996). Menderes Coşkun labelled this travelogue as the "most literate" pilgrimage travelogue ever written in the Ottoman literature. Coşkun, "Osmanlı Türkçesiyle Kaleme Alınmış Edebî Nitelikli Hac Seyahatnâmeleri," 812.

3.2.3. Trade as a Source of Travel Writing:

Besides military and religious motives, commercial activity contributed to the travel literature before the mid-nineteenth century; however, this contribution was extraordinarily limited, since the merchants did not generally write about the trade routes, the cities and regions that they visited for economic purposes. Nevertheless, it is quite ironic that one of the oldest travelogues of the Ottoman classical literature was written by a merchant, Ali Ekber Hataî. It was entitled *Kanunnâme-i Hutâ ve Hotan ve Çin ve Maçin*, more commonly known as *Hutâinâme*.¹⁶⁴ Ali Ekber Hataî wrote this travelogue in Persian in 1515, after his travel to China between 1508 and 1510, leading a trade caravan. It was first presented to Selim I (r. 1512-1520) and then to Süleyman (r. 1520-1566), and was later translated into Turkish in the period of Murad III (r. 1574-1595).¹⁶⁵ Another example was *Acâibnâme-i Hindûstan (The Records of Wonders of India)*, written by merchant/traveller, Ahmed bin İbrahim el-Tokadî, in the late sixteenth century, whose manuscript included the descriptions of Central Asia, India and Arabian Peninsula, since he went India via Kabul and returned İstanbul following the sea trade route from India to Egypt via Basra, Yemen and Hejaz.¹⁶⁶ Besides these two pieces, travel narrations emerged out of travels performed for economic purposes have not reached today.

3.2.4. The Manuscripts on Geography as a Source of Travel Writing:

The pieces on geography written in the Ottoman classical age also include the personal experiences of their authors; therefore, at least some parts of

¹⁶⁴ The word *kânunnâme* can be translated as “code,” however it does not exactly match the meaning in this context. *Hutâ* was diverted from the labelling of China by the Han Chinese during the Ming Dynasty; *Hotan* was another name given to China by the northern and western tribes during the Liao period. The expression “*Çin ve Maçin*” is visible in the Turkish texts from Kaşgarlı Mahmud’s Turkish lexicon, *Divân-ı Lugat-ı Türk*, and described the Chinese territory as well. For a detailed analysis of all these concepts see Alimcan İneyet, “Divanü Lûgat-it-Türk’te Geçen “Çin” ve “Maçin” Adı Üzerine,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 2007): 1174-1184.

¹⁶⁵ Gökyay, “Türkçe’de Gezi Kitapları,” 459.

¹⁶⁶ Gökyay, “Türkçe’de Gezi Kitapları,” 459.

these pieces could be perceived as travel narration. For example, the *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye* (*The Book of Navigation*), written by Pîrî Reis (1465-1554) in 1521 (later extended in 1526), followed the tradition of *portolan*¹⁶⁷ texts and charts, and aimed to describe the entire Mediterranean ports, winds, and streams for the Ottoman sailors. Divided into chapters, each describing a different coastal area of the Mediterranean, the manuscript included maps of these coasts as well. Although the manuscript is not in the form of a travelogue in essence, Pîrî Reis' description of the cities and peoples during his voyages makes the work closer to the genre of travelogue.¹⁶⁸

Kitâb al-muhît fi 'ilm al aflāk va'l-abhur (*The Book of Settings on the Science of Skies and Seas*) written by Seydî Ali Reis (1498-1562) was another example. Accordingly, after his assignment in 1553 of bringing the Ottoman naval squadron from Basra to Suez, Seydî Ali Reis left Basra; however, off the coasts of Oman, the Ottoman fleet was forced by the Portuguese to retreat towards India after a naval battle. Seydî Ali Reis came to Gujarat and decided to return to İstanbul by land. During his stay in Hyderabad in 1554, he wrote this manuscript for the sailors sailing in the Indian Ocean. Besides citing the previous manuscripts on the winds, port cities, islands, or streams of the Indian Ocean, Seydî Ali Reis included his own observations. Excerpts from the manuscript were later translated into English, German and Italian.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ *Portolan* or *portolano* is an Italian technical navigation term meaning a manual of navigating along coastal regions of a particular sea or ocean.

¹⁶⁸ Svat Soucek, "Piri Reis," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2005), Vol. 8, 308-309, 308. The original manuscript of *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye* is currently present in the Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya Section, numbered 2612. It was later published as an edition of Fevzi Kurdoğlu and Haydar Alpagut, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1935). For an analysis of the book as a cartographic work see, Dimitris Loupis, "Piri Reis' Book on Navigation (*Kitab-ı Bahriyye*) as a Geography Handbook," in George Toliás and Dimitris Loupis (eds.), *Eastern Mediterranean Cartographies*, (Athens: Institute for Neohellenic Research, National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2004), 35-49.

¹⁶⁹ Şerafettin Turan, "Seydî Ali Reis," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945-1986), Vol. 10, 528-531, 531. For a review of this manuscript see Sayyid Maqbul Ahmed, *A History of Arab-Islamic Geography (9th-16th Century)*, (Amman: Al-Bayt University Press, 1995), 248-251.

Menâzirü'l Avâlim (*The Panorama of Worlds*) written by Aşık Mehmed bin Ömer (1557-1598) in 1596 and *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ* (*The Book of Cosmorama*) written by Kâtip Çelebi (1608-1656) in 1648 (rewritten in 1654) included the personal experiences of their authors as well. Aşık Mehmed spent twenty years of his life travelling almost all parts of the Ottoman Empire. Although his book seems to be a geography book, indeed it deserves to be labelled as a travelogue.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, in writing *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ*, Kâtip Çelebi benefitted much from his travels undertaken to participate in several military campaigns in the mid-seventeenth century.¹⁷¹

The inability to discern between the manuscripts on geography and the travelogues is quite understandable in the Ottoman classical age in which the literary genres were extremely intermingled. Still, as long as the geography manuscripts include the travel experiences of their authors, they deserve to be examined in detail in order to figure out the Ottoman perception of the world in this period.

3.2.5. Diplomatic Missions as a Source of Travel Writing:

If the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed primitive travel narrations either in verse such as the poems on campaigns or pilgrimage, or in prose such as the books on travels of merchants or geography, in the eighteenth century travels were begun to be narrated in the form of ambassadorial reports, or *sefâretnâme*. Compared to the previous pieces, they were more detailed in terms of describing the travels of the Ottoman envoys to the distant parts of Europe, Asia, as well as Africa. What is more, they were closer to the genre of travelogue in modern sense, since they followed a linear temporal narrative regarding the journey and a detailed description of the cities visited and the peoples encountered.

¹⁷⁰ For the full text of this book see, Aşık Mehmed, *Menâzirü'l Avâlim*, transliterated and edited by Mahmud Ak, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007).

¹⁷¹ Gökyay, "Türkçe'de Gezi Kitapları," 459. Also see, Orhan Şaik Gökyay (ed.), *Katip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1957).

From the very onset of the Ottoman Empire, *ad hoc* diplomatic missions were commissioned for several reasons. Informing the foreign rulers about the enthronement of the Ottoman sultans (such as Zıřtovili Ali Ađa sent to Poland for informing the King of Poland about the enthronement of Osman III (r. 1754-1757) in 1754), representing the Ottoman Empire in the enthronement of foreign monarchs (such as Ali avuş sent to Germany for the enthronement of Maximilian (r. 1564-1576) in 1564), engaging in diplomatic negotiations (such as Mehmed Ađa sent to Russia for boundary demarcation negotiations in 1722), delivering the approved versions of bilateral treaties (such as Mehmed Bey sent to Austria for delivering the approved version of bilateral treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Austria in 1573), delivering the letters of Ottoman Sultans to the foreign monarchs (such as Halil avuş sent to Venice for delivering the *Fethnâme* of Süleyman I to the Doge of Venice written to celebrate the conquest of Belgrade in 1521), and establishing or continuing friendly relations with foreign states (such as Mehmed Bey sent to Iran for delivering the gifts of the Sultan to continue Ottoman-Iranian peace in 1697) are among the motives for sending diplomatic missions.¹⁷²

Although, it can be inferred from the archival documents that from 1417 onwards Ottoman diplomatic missions frequently visited foreign capitals, except for some primitive documents dated back to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the earliest ambassadorial report found in the archives was written by Kara Mehmed Pařa (? – 1684) in 1665, who was sent to Vienna in order to re-establish peaceful relations between Austria and the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Vasvar.¹⁷³ Following this earliest travelogue, Unat’s study enlisted forty-one ambassadorial reports written between 1665 and 1838 by the heads or

¹⁷² Faik Reřit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefâretnameleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 17-19. The examples mentioned are chosen from the table included by Unat at the end of his study showing the *ad hoc* diplomatic missions until 1835, 221-236. For another analysis of Ottoman ambassadorial reports see, Hadiye Tuncer and Hüner Tuncer, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefâretnameler*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997).

¹⁷³ According to Faik Reřit Unat, this *sefâretnâme* was penned by Evliya elebi, who had been in the entourage of Kara Mehmed Pařa, and this explains the reason why Evliya elebi included the full text of this document in the seventh volume of his own travelogue. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefâretnameleri*, 47-49.

the clerks of the diplomatic missions sent various parts of the world, including Austria, Bukhara, England, France, India, Iran, Italy, Morocco, Poland, Prussia, Russia and Spain.¹⁷⁴

Sefâretnâme constituted a transitory genre between the classical forms of travel narration generally written in verse and the modern forms of travelogues generally written in prose. The decline of Ottoman military power and increasing reliance to diplomacy instead of long and exhausting wars contributed to the development of *sefâretnâme* literature. The European capitals, such as Berlin, London, Madrid, Moscow, Vienna, and especially Paris were introduced to the Ottoman public opinion with a mixed admiration of European advancement in science and technology *vis-à-vis* its moral decadence. Hence these ambassadorial reports resulted in the emergence of an idea of “Europe” in the Ottoman minds and altered the Ottoman perception of civilization to a considerable degree.

3.2.6. Travel Itself as a Source of Travel Writing:

Although Ottoman travellers did not generally travel for the sake of travel, there are two pieces extremely closer to the genre of travelogue understood in modern sense, namely *Mir’âtü’l Memâlik* (*The Mirror of Countries*) written by Seydî Ali Reis and *Seyâhatnâme* (*The Book of Travel*) written by Evliya Çelebi (1611-1684), since it was the travel itself that

¹⁷⁴ Among them, *Fransa Sefâretnamesi* (*The Ambassadorial Report on France*) written by Yirmi Sekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi in 1721, *Viyana Sefâretnamesi* (*The Ambassadorial Report on Vienna*) written by Ahmet Resmî Efendi in 1758, *Sefâretname-i Abdülkerim Paşa* (*The Ambassadorial Report of Abdülkerim Paşa*) written in 1776, *Nemçe Sefâretnamesi* (*The Ambassadorial Report on Austria*) written by Ebubekir Ratip Efendi in 1792, and *Avrupa Risalesi* (*The Treatise of Europe*) written by Mustafa Sami Efendi in 1838 attracted the attention of Turkish and foreign scholars and they have been published separately. See Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi, *Paris'te Bir Osmanlı Sefiri: Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi'nin Fransa Seyahâtname'si*, transliterated and edited by Şevket Rado, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006); for a detailed analysis and English translation of *Sefâretname-i Abdülkerim Paşa* see Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Ebubekir Ratip Efendi, *Ebubekir Ratip Efendi'nin Nemçe Sefâretnamesi*, transliterated and edited by Abdullah Uçman, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1999); Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmî Efendi, 1700-1783*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Avrupa Risalesi*, (İstanbul: Takvim-i Vekayi Matbaası, 1256 [1840]), transliterated and edited by Fatih Andı, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1996).

constituted the core theme of these pieces, not the other themes, such as war, pilgrimage, or trade.

Indeed, even these two travellers had not travelled for the sake of travel itself. Seydî Ali Reis aimed to reach İstanbul after being defeated by the Portuguese off the Indian coast, while Evliya Çelebi generally travelled as part of an official mission, either within the entourage of a vizier or as an envoy. Seydî Ali Reis wrote his memoirs to save his life after being defeated by the Portuguese;¹⁷⁵ while Evliya Çelebi, as narrated by himself, became a traveller after demanding “travel” (*seyâhat*) instead of “intercession” (*şefâat*) from the Prophet Muhammad in his dream as a result of his tongue’s lapse. In other words, they were accidental travellers in their own expressions. However, although they had not travelled for the sake of travel, they utilized their travels as a source of travel writing and give precedence to the travel itself, rather than the reason for their travels. Hence, main theme of their writing was not a diplomatic negotiation, a merchandise activity, pilgrimage ritual, or writing a book on geography, but solely their travel. It is this quality of their work that makes their work closer to the genre of travelogue as the term understood today.

In *Mir’âtü’l Memâlik*, Seydî Ali Reis described the lands he had visited during his travels, such as Kokand, Bedakhshan, Khwarizm, and Horasan, the rulers and peoples that he had encountered during his voyage, as well as the adventurous events that he experienced.¹⁷⁶ The literary style of this travelogue was so significant and novel for the age of its inscription that Orhan Şaik Gökyay labelled it as the “only travelogue known from the Ottoman classical

¹⁷⁵ As it has been mentioned above, Seydî Ali Reis had to retreat to India after loosing a naval battle with the Portuguese fleet in the Indian Ocean. He left the remaining ships he had commanded to the Sultan of Gujarat and turned back to İstanbul via following a land route passing through Central Asia and Iran. He had already witnessed the fate of Pîrî Reis, who had been executed in 1554 after his failure against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, in order to make himself forgiven by the Sultan, with the encouragement of his friends, he decided to write his travel from India to the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁷⁶ Turan, “Seydî Ali Reis,” 531. The manuscript was first published by Necip Âsım, (İstanbul: İkdâm, 1313 [1885/86]). For the transcription of the manuscript see Seydi Ali Reis, *Mirat-ül Memalik*, transliterated and edited by Necdet Akyıldız, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, [unknown year of publication]).

age;”¹⁷⁷ while, according to Nicolas Vatin, this piece is “the most suitable one to the definition of the genre of travelogue.”¹⁷⁸

The first travelogue that comes to one’s mind, when this genre is somehow mentioned in Turkish literature, is Evliya Çelebi’s *Seyâhatnâme*. This travelogue was an oddity, if not an anomaly; in the Ottoman travel literature since it had no significant predecessor as well as successor. In other words, neither in the previous, nor in the subsequent ages until the mid-nineteenth century, a travelogue like *Seyâhatnâme* existed.¹⁷⁹ Indeed, *Seyâhatnâme* was not a single book, but a ten-volume colossal piece, including the account of forty years of Evliya Çelebi’s travels in various parts of the Ottoman Empire and its periphery.¹⁸⁰ He did not generally travel alone except for a few excursions to the environs of İstanbul, but rather within a large group such as a diplomatic mission or a pilgrimage caravan; however, different from previous travellers what he prioritized, unlike other travel narrations of the Ottoman classical age, was the travel itself. All other issues, such as detailed descriptions of diplomatic negotiations, the character of the people that he travelled with, the letters sent or treaties concluded had been mentioned as details not as the foci of the travelogue.

¹⁷⁷ Gökyay, “Türkçe’de Gezi Kitapları,” 459-460.

¹⁷⁸ Vatin, “Bir Osmanlı Türkü Yaptığı Seyahati Niçin Anlatırdı?,” 166.

¹⁷⁹ According to Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar what makes Evliya Çelebi so distinguished was his talent to describe what he had seen as successful as a painter; in other words, his “picturesque pleasure” as well as his simple style free from literary ornaments of the classical literature produced the best known travelogue of the Turkish literature. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Edebiyat Üzerine Makaleler*, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1969), 169. Robert Dankoff, on the other hand, focused on the multi-layered personality of Evliya Çelebi to claim for his originality. Accordingly, he defined Evliya Çelebi as “a man of İstanbul,” “a man of the world,” “servitor of the Sultan,” “gentleman and dervish,” “raconteur” and “reporter and entertainer.” All these different identities attached to him resulted in the most colourful travelogue of the classical Ottoman age. For a detailed analysis of all these different identities, see Robert Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006). For a brief account of Evliya Çelebi’s life and travels see Mücteba İlgürel, “Evliya Çelebi,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 11, 529-533.

¹⁸⁰ The routes of travel stretched from the Balkan provinces of the Empire to Caucasus, from Crimea to Crete, from Egypt and Sudan to Aleppo, Damascus and Jerusalem, from Medina and Mecca to Vienna. Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahâtname*, transliterated and edited by various authors, 9 Volumes, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996).

In sum, *Seyâhatnâme* is an extremely complex piece for studying; some authors find it unreliable due to Evliya Çelebi's frequent exaggerations, while others perceived it as a useful text to understand the Ottoman perception of the world. However, almost all of them agree that it is an anomalous piece both in terms of its volume and content. As İbrahim Hakkı Akyol mentioned, Evliya Çelebi was "the last and, perhaps, the most interesting representative" of the Ottoman geography: "[... W]ith Evliya Çelebi, in the widest sense, the lineage of great Eastern geographers had come to an end."¹⁸¹

All in all, although travel writing had not emerged as a distinct genre before the mid-nineteenth century in the Ottoman literature, travel was narrated in various forms, generally as a part of other literary genres. The reasons for the underdevelopment of travel writing are very much related to the nature of travels, travellers and the writing activity. The practical reasons ranging from the interrelationship between the patrons and men of letters to the costs of book production also discouraged the travellers to write their experiences.

Despite this underdevelopment, travel narration was not altogether absent in the Ottoman literature. The accounts of soldier-poets regarding the Ottoman wars with its neighbours, of pilgrims wandering around the "holy lands" of Islam, of merchants regarding the routes of their merchandise activity, of the missions sent for diplomatic communication, of some men of letters or sailors producing geography texts included significant travel narrations. Indeed, it is these narrations carefully picked up from these pieces that contributed our knowledge of Ottoman perception of the world in the Ottoman classical period. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, with the intellectual, technological and socio-cultural transformation of the Ottoman Empire, new forms of travel and travel writing had emerged. Travel writing became a more discernable genre compared to the classical age. The factors that contributed to this transformation and the emergence of a new travel-literature is examined in the next chapter.

¹⁸¹ İbrahim Hakkı Akyol, "Tanzimat Devrinde Bizde Coğrafya ve Jeoloji," in *Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıl Münasebetile*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 511-571, 521-522.

CHAPTER 4

OTTOMAN TRAVEL WRITING FROM THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY ONWARDS

Ottoman travel writing had entered into an unproductive period after Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatnâme*. The reasons for this lack of productivity in this genre are many. To start with, continuous Ottoman defeats in long and exhausting wars undermined the *raison d'être* of several sub-genres of the Ottoman classical poetry regarding military campaigns such as *gazavâtname*, *fethnâme*, *zafernâme*, or *menâzilnâme*, which include substantial travel narration. Secondly, the shift of the centre of world trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic diminished the significance of classical trade routes passing through the Ottoman realm. Ottoman merchants could not compete with their European counterparts; hence long-distance trade, which had been another source of travel writing, became not as attractive and lucrative as before. Third, except for two notable exceptions, Nâbî's *Tuhfetü'l Harameyn* and Mehmed Edib's *Menâsikü'l Hacc*, pilgrimage travelogues turned out to be simple replications of the previous pieces; hence they lost their allure in the Ottoman literary circles. Fourth, domestic insecurity as a result of *Celâli* rebellions in the seventeenth century and the revolts of local notables (*a'yân*) in the eighteenth century, as well as external insecurity due to prolonged wars discouraged people from travelling within and outside the borders of the Empire. All in all, except for the genre of *sefâretname*, which reached its zenith in the eighteenth century, travelogues hardly existed in the Ottoman literature.

In the nineteenth century, this trend was reversed. Quantitatively and qualitatively the genre of travelogue experienced a significant development. What is more, travelogues extremely closer to the European samples of this genre were produced. The reasons for this reversal should be elaborated more closely. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to an analysis of intellectual,

technological and socio-cultural factors, which resulted in the increasing interest of the Ottomans about travelling as well as travel writing in this period.

4.1. Intellectual Factors Contributing to the Rise of Travel and Travel Writing in the Nineteenth Century

Ottoman military decline and subsequent internal problems from the late seventeenth century onwards resulted in the emergence of a mentality transformation, although this transformation was initially very slow and limited to certain fields, particularly the military issues.¹⁸² However, the infiltration of new ideas into the Ottoman Empire even from these small cracks had revolutionary consequences for the Ottoman modernization movement, which would reflect themselves clearly in the nineteenth century.

4.1.1. Perception of External World as a Subject to be Studied Scientifically:

Towards the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman intellectuals systematically began to perceive the external world as a subject to be studied “scientifically” in order to prevent and even reverse the decline of the Empire. This perception contributed to the re-emergence of travel literature, this time in a more modern sense. This generalization needs to be elaborated further; it does not necessarily mean that the Ottoman intellectuals of the classical age were totally incognizant of the external developments. It does not also mean that before the nineteenth century they had never engaged in a “scientific” analysis of the world.¹⁸³ Contrarily, the decline of Ottoman military power together with internal disturbances starting from the late seventeenth century onwards forced the Ottoman intellectuals to examine the reasons for this decline. One of the

¹⁸² For a detailed analysis of earlier modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London: Hurst&Company, 1964), 23-49.

¹⁸³ Indeed according to Ramazan Korkmaz, the Ottoman intellectuals had followed the developments in the West in the sixteenth century “[...] closely and timely, not with a systematic consistency but with a selective attention.” See Ramazan Korkmaz, “Yenileşmenin Tarihi, Sosyo-Kültürel ve Estetik Temelleri,” Talat Sait Halman [et.al.] (eds.), *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınlığı, 2007), Vol. 3, 17-42, 19.

most significant results of this consideration is the renewed emphasis on the concept of “science” (*ilm*). Indeed, the Ottoman classical literature on science distinguished between the “theological sciences” (*naklî ilimler*) and “positive sciences” (*aklî ilimler*), and prioritize the former over the latter. However, starting from the late seventeenth century onwards, the neglect of positive sciences came to be regarded as one of the most significant reasons for the military failures in the hands of Western adversaries of the Empire. This concern resulted in the Ottoman intellectual’s interest in the Western sources; some of them were directly translated from their original languages, while some others were indirectly referred to in the Ottoman manuscripts on science in this period.¹⁸⁴

Two men of letters, one from the seventeenth (Kâtip Çelebi) and the other from the eighteenth century (İbrahim Müteferrika, 1674-1745) contributed much to the transformation of the Ottoman perception of positive sciences. Their works resulted in a renewed interest in science, particularly in the scientific development of Europe. Their perception of geography as one of the most useful sciences for understanding the external reasons of the decline of the Ottoman Empire opened a way for the transmission of Western geographical knowledge into the Ottoman Empire, which also triggered the Ottoman interest in travel and travel writing.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ For the earlier encounters of the Ottoman intellectuals with Western sources on science before the nineteenth century, see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Introduction of Western Science to the Ottoman World: A Case Study of Modern Astronomy (1660-1860),” in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.), *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World*, (İstanbul: IRCICA Publications, 1992), 67-120. Translations from Western resources became a practice not only in İstanbul but also in various parts of the Empire. For example, Osman bin Abdülmennan el-Mühtedi translated four books from European scientific literature in Belgrade upon the recommendation of Hafız Ahmed Paşa, the governor of Belgrade in the late eighteenth century. See, George N. Vlahakis [et.al.], *Imperialism and Science: Social Impact and Interaction*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 86.

¹⁸⁵ Indeed, the significance of Katip Çelebi comes from his deep knowledge not only on Islamic works but also on the findings of Western studies on geography. He translated some European geography books and atlases into Turkish and used them extensively in his manuscripts. What is more, he considered several premises of the new European geography as more accurate and thus utilized them in his own works. For example, *Cihannüma* is one of the first Ottoman works on geography, in which the world was divided into continents whereas the former manuscripts on Islamic geography were based on the classical division of the world on seven climes. See Gökyay, *Katip Çelebi: Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler*, 129-133. The works of İbrahim

These earlier works, which increased the credibility of Western scientific sources in the eyes of the Ottoman intellectuals, were followed by other pieces clearly accepting the scientific and technological supremacy of Europe towards the end of the eighteenth and in the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Establishment of modern military education,¹⁸⁶ appointment of a group of Western technicians as teachers in the new imperial schools, and sending Ottoman students to European capitals to get higher education demonstrated that the Ottoman intellectuals began to believe in the adoption of the European science and technology as the remedy to reverse the continuous decline of the Empire.¹⁸⁷

Parallel to these developments, the Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats were faced with the works of European enlightenment starting from the first decades of the nineteenth century. Particularly, the diplomats and students sent to

Müteferrika, on the other hand, reflected the significant increase in the emphasis on science and scientific understanding of the world in the eighteenth century, since he claimed that the decadence of the Empire could be reversed by relying on scientific methods. That's why his famous manuscript written in 1732 was entitled as *Usul ül-Hikem Fî Nizam ül-Ümem* (translated by Niyazi Berkes as *Rational Bases for the Politics of Nations*). In this pamphlet, İbrahim Müteferrika argued that one of the reasons for the deterioration of internal and external conditions of the Empire was the neglect of scientific methods and the knowledge of the enemy; hence to reverse this situation the ruler should give precedence to several sciences, most important of all, geography. İbrahim Müteferrika, *Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usuller*, transliterated and edited by Ömer Okutan, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000), 63. For a review of this piece see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 36-45.

¹⁸⁶ Among these military schools, the *Mühendishâne-i Berr-i Hümayûn* (Royal Military Engineering Academy) had already been established in 1773 and two decades later, in 1793, Selim III opened the *Mühendishâne-i Bahr-i Hümayûn* (Royal Naval Engineering Academy). The *Mekteb-i Ulûm-i Harbiye* (Military Sciences College) and *Mekteb-i Harbiye* (Military Academy) followed the suit in 1834 and 1846, respectively. For a brief account of these schools, see Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 45-50.

¹⁸⁷ Accordingly, the first four Ottoman students were sent to Paris in 1830 for military education. This was followed by eleven students in 1840 for medicine and science education, thirty two students between 1847 and 1856 for positive and social sciences education, sixty one students between 1856 and 1864, which resulted in the establishment of an Ottoman School (*Mekteb-i Osmani*) in Paris, and ninety three students between 1864 and 1876, this time for technical education. See Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, "Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı," in Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (ed.) *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 335-397, 374. For a detailed account of these students, see Adnan Şişman, *Tanzimat Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri (1839-1876)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2004).

European capitals were influenced from the positivist philosophy.¹⁸⁸ The reception of European positivist literature by the Ottoman intellectuals brought the knowledge of external world to the forefront more, and encouraged the Ottomans to focus on travelling to observe the West through their own eyes. In other words, reading from Western sources would not suffice to learn about the reasons for the supremacy of the West; travel would provide the Ottoman intellectuals with the opportunity to be aware of these reasons by their own observations.

A parallel development contributing to the perception of external world as a field to be studied scientifically was the increasing significance attached to geography in the first half of the nineteenth century. The achievements of Europe in the field of geography were followed by the Ottomans with great curiosity. For example, it was in the 1830s that the Prussian soldier/technicians serving in the Ottoman army were ordered to prepare the European-style maps of the Empire. This was soon followed by the Ottoman military geographers, and the first map, produced by the Ottomans, was presented to the Sultan in 1859.¹⁸⁹ In other words, the Ottoman ruling elite considered European-style maps as more accurate compared to the classical maps of the Ottoman Empire, and they perceived map-making as a key element for the proper defence of the Ottoman territories.

What is more, at the same time, geography was begun to be taught at the Ottoman modern schools. Starting from 1840s onwards, many European

¹⁸⁸ For a detailed review of the earlier encounters of the nineteenth century intellectuals with positivism see Murtaza Korlaelçi, "Bazı Tanzimatçılarımızın Pozitivistlerle İlişkileri," in *Tanzimatın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Ankara, 31 Ekim-3 Kasım 1989, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994), 25-43. The works of these philosophers were so quickly spread in the new Ottoman schools that one of the foreign visitors of *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şâhâne* (Imperial School of Medicine), Charles McFarlane, had been surprised when he saw that the students had been reading not only positivist but also the popular materialist literature of the time, such as *Jacques le Fataliste et Son Maître* written by Denise Diderot (1713-1784), *Système de la Nature* written by Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), or *Le Compere Mathieu* written by Henri Joseph du Laurens (1719-1793). Charles McFarlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny*, (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850), Vol. 2, 163, 167, quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 116-117.

¹⁸⁹ Akyol, "Tanzimat Devrinde Bizde Coğrafya ve Jeoloji," 542-543.

geography books were translated into Turkish and taught not only in military academies, but also in secondary schools (*rüşdiye*) and high schools (*idâdî*).¹⁹⁰ The significance attached to geography in the nineteenth century was so clear that among the 242 scientific books published in the Ottoman Empire between 1840 and 1876, after mathematics and medicine, geography was the third field that the Ottomans published the most.¹⁹¹

To sum up so far, one of the most significant reasons for the importance attached to travel and travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was the Ottoman perception of the external world as a subject to be studied scientifically. In other words, the external world, generally unknown to the Ottoman intellectual, became a matter of curiosity. Of course, the military failures of the Ottoman Empire *vis-à-vis* the West contributed to this mentality transformation. The sense of Ottoman supremacy in the earlier centuries of the Empire led the Ottoman intellectuals to de-prioritize the study of the external world; however, the perception of European supremacy starting from the late eighteenth century onwards resulted in a renewed interest about the achievements of Europe. This triggered Ottoman travel, particularly to the West, and transformed the Ottoman perception of travel to a considerable degree.

4.1.2 Perception of Travel as a Useful Endeavour, Even as a Component of Civilization:

The significance attached to European science and technology as the basic factor behind the European military supremacy resulted in the Ottoman modernization. The higher echelons of the Ottoman bureaucracy, which had assumed political power in the *Tanzimat* period, had been learning about

¹⁹⁰ For an analysis of geography education in the Ottoman Empire, see Ramazan Özey, "Osmanlı Devleti Döneminde Coğrafya ve Öğretimi," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 8, 326-333. Among the geography books taught at Ottoman schools, Hüseyin Rıfka's *El Medhal Fi'l Coğrafya (Introduction to Geography)* published in 1830, Osman Saib's *Muhtasar Coğrafya (Abridged Geography)* published in 1841 and Ahmed Hamdi's *Usûl-i Coğrafya (The Method of Geography)* can be cited. For a detailed analysis of translations of geography books, see Akyol, "Tanzimat Devrinde Bizde Coğrafya ve Jeoloji," 557-559.

¹⁹¹ İhsanoğlu, "Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı," 376.

European civilization, culture and current developments directly from eminent European sources.¹⁹² However, some of them, who had been to European capitals as diplomats, students, or simply as travellers, were not satisfied with indirect accumulation of knowledge through books, and relied on their own observations in Europe.¹⁹³ Therefore, travel within and outside the borders of the Empire by the Ottoman ruling elite became a widespread endeavour.¹⁹⁴

The perception of external world as a subject of study and the appreciation of the advancement of European science and technology not only increased the number of travels to Europe, but also transformed the perception of travel. Travelling, which had been perceived as a troublesome and difficult endeavour, was now considered as a useful way of understanding the world.

¹⁹² For an analysis of the translation activities and the reading habits of Ottoman elite see Remzi Demir, *Philosophia Ottomanica: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Türk Felsefesi*, (İstanbul: Lotus Yayınevi, 2007), Vol. 3, 28-31 and Johann Strauss, "Who Read What in the Ottoman Empire (19th-20th Centuries)?," *Middle Eastern Literatures*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 2003): 39-76.

¹⁹³ The eminent bureaucrats of the *Tanzimat* era such as Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Sadık Rıfat Paşa, Ali Paşa, Fuad Paşa, etc., were among the intellectuals who had been to Europe mainly for diplomatic purposes. They were followed by students such as İbrahim Şinasi in 1850s, escapee Young Ottoman intellectuals starting from mid-1860s onwards such as Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, Agah Efendi and Reşad Bey, and finally travellers seeking for self-education or utilizing their purpose of being in Europe to travel the whole continent from 1880s onwards. Ahmed İhsan, who travelled to learn latest printing technology in Europe, was an example for the first category, while Ahmed Midhat was an example for the second category, travelling to attend the Congress of Orientalists in Stockholm and using this opportunity to travel all around Europe.

¹⁹⁴ Not only the bureaucrats or diplomats, but even the Sultans themselves began to travel. It was Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), who first travelled within the Ottoman Empire not for political or military purposes, or simply for hunting, but for examining various parts of his realm. He travelled around the Danubian provinces as well as İzmir and Rhodes. Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861) followed the suit by engaging in two domestic travels, the first one in 1844 to Bursa, Çanakkale, Gallipoli and Lesbos and the second one in 1846 to Rumelian cities including Edirne, Varna, Rusçuk and Silistre. Nihat Karaer cited from Hayreddin Bey's *Vesâik-i Tarihiye ve Siyâsiye* (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1326 [1908-1909]) that indeed Abdülmecid was the first Sultan who also intended to travel to Europe after being invited by Prince Napoleon, the nephew of French Emperor Napoleon III (r. 1852-1870), who had been to İstanbul to participate the Crimean War. See Nihat Karaer, *Paris, Londra, Viyana: Abdülaziz'in Avrupa Seyahati*, (İstanbul: Phoenix Yayınları, 2007), 33-34. This desire to visit Europe would later be realized by his successor, namely Sultan Abdülaziz's (r. 1861-1876) in 1867, turning him to the first Ottoman Sultan travelling to European capitals including Paris, London and Vienna for peaceful purposes, namely for attending the opening ceremony of the *Exposition Universelle*. For a detailed analysis of Abdülaziz's travel to Europe and Egypt see, Nihat Karaer, *Paris, Londra, Viyana: Abdülaziz'in Avrupa Seyahati*; Cemal Kutay, *Sultan Abdülaziz'in Avrupa Seyahati*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1991); Ali Kemali Aksüt, *Sultan Aziz'in Mısır ve Avrupa Seyahati*, (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1944).

What is more, travel for the sake of travel began to become a popular practice in Europe towards mid-nineteenth century, and this development was imitated by the Ottomans as in other fields. As Bedri Rahmi Eyübođlu noted, “[t]he desire to travel is not a home product. As many of our desires, it comes from the West.”¹⁹⁵

Ahmed İhsan (Tokgöz, 1868-1942) was one of the most ardent supporters of travel as a practice serving self-development. In the preface of his fictional travelogue entitled *Asya-yı Şarkî’ye Seyahat (Travel to the East Asia)*, he wrote that in Europe travel had been perceived as a scientific and educative enterprise. He defined travel as the “first medium for the real expansion and enlightenment of the ideas emerged out of scientific studies” (*[t]etebbû-u ulûm ile küşayış bulan fikrin cidden tevsî ve tenvîr etmesi için birinci vâsıta*) and argued that in Europe travel had long been perceived as such. He further mentioned that geographical studies might be beneficial for understanding the world; however, they were quite abstract and “could not exceed beyond the limits of theory” (*dâire-yi nazariyâtta kurtulamaz*).¹⁹⁶ Therefore, personal travels were necessary to increase knowledge and for self-development.

Having appreciated the European inclination towards travelling as a way of accumulation of knowledge, the Ottoman travellers were quick to adopt European methods of travel as well. They began to utilize European travel agencies to conduct their travels not only to Europe, but also to the other parts of the world.¹⁹⁷ What is more, they carefully followed the European travel guides, particularly those published by the Baedeker Company, in order to be informed

¹⁹⁵ Bedri Rahmi Eyübođlu, *Canım Anadolu*, (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1953), 3.

¹⁹⁶ Ahmed İhsan, *Asya-yı Şarkîye Seyahat*, (İstanbul: Alem Matbaası, 1307 [1890]), 1.

¹⁹⁷ For example, Azmzade Sadık el-Müeyyed, who was assigned as a diplomatic envoy to the Emperor of Abyssinia, Menelik II, in 1904, first went from İstanbul to Marseilles via a passenger ship of French travel company, *Messagerie Maritimes*, instead of travelling with an Ottoman ship sailing to Egypt. See Azmzade Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*, (İstanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1322 [1906]), 4. The comfort of European travel agencies were preferred by the Ottoman elites in this period; even Babanzade İsmail Hakkı openly criticized the Ottoman failure to set up their own travel agencies, which turned out to be a lucrative enterprise. See Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, (İstanbul: Tanîn Matbaası, 1329 [1911]), 6.

about the cities they had visited.¹⁹⁸ For example, Ahmed İhsan always referred to his *Baedeker Guide of Paris*, while he was wandering in that city in 1891 and cited some information from that particular guidebook in his own travelogue.¹⁹⁹

Ottoman intellectuals were not only interested in travel, but they also began to criticize the neglect of their predecessors, who generally refrained from engaging in what now became a praiseworthy enterprise. Indeed, the perception of travel as a matter of civilization, as a novel practice for one's self-refinement, resulted in a critical outlook to the former stagnancy of the Ottoman intellectuals. One of such criticisms was reflected in the preface written by Ahmed Midhat to the travelogue of Seyyah Mehmed Emin. He wrote:

We, the Ottomans, attach rather little significance to travel compared to other nations. Each ship which goes to sea from the countries of Europe and each traveller who thus sets out on a journey tours every part of the world. While they make a trip around the world and include the features of their journeys in brilliant travelogues, we rarely travel properly even in our own country.²⁰⁰

In the same text, Ahmed Midhat indirectly criticized the wealthy Ottoman elite's neglect of travel as well; he wrote that the lack of Ottoman travel could not be explained by the financial insufficiencies. The Ottomans had spent huge sums of money to build mansions and kiosks, which could easily burn to the ground by a flick, while they refrained from spending even a very small portion

¹⁹⁸ After buying a bankrupt publishing house in 1832, whose list included several primitive travel guidebooks on Germany, the publisher Karl Baedeker (1801-1859) decided to publish more detailed travel guidebooks on various countries of Europe. After his death his three sons enlarged the publishing house and began to publish guidebooks on various parts of the world, including Syria, Palestine and Russia. For a brief account of Baedeker guidebooks, see Kevin J. Hayes, "Baedeker Guides," in Jennifer Speake (ed.), *Literature of Travel and Exploration: An Encyclopedia*, (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2003), Vol. 1, 58-60.

¹⁹⁹ Ahmed İhsan, *Avrupa'da Ne Gördüm*, transliterated and edited by Alain Servantie and Fahriye Gündoğdu, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007). The book was published probably in his own printing house in 1892. For the details of publication see the preface written by Servantie and Gündoğdu, ix-lxv.

²⁰⁰ "Biz yani Osmanlılar milel-i sâireye nispetle seyahate pek az ehemmiyet vermişiz. Avrupa bilâdından kalkan bir gemi veyahud yola çıkan bir seyyâh dünyanın her tarafını dolaşarak bir devr-i âlem seyâhati icra ve suret-i seyâhatlerini mükemmel seyâhatnâmelere derc eylemiş oldukları halde bizim kendi memleketimiz dâhilinde bile layıkıyla deveran edenlerimiz pek az görülmüştür." Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 2. The excerpt translated was taken from p. 2; its translation was quoted from Herzog and Motika, "Orientalism *alla turca*," 142.

of such expenditures for travel. Hence the problem was not lack of enough financial resources but the Ottoman intolerance to the difficulties of travel. “However”, he wrote, “travel does not mean trouble, but enormous pleasure and huge enjoyment that has no equivalent in this world.”²⁰¹

Similar to Ahmed Midhat, Mehmed Mihri, who wrote a travelogue on Sudan, criticized the Ottomans for not travelling, while he appraised the efforts of the European travellers for revealing the unknown regions of the world. He wrote regretfully (and for self-appraisal) that among the Easterners, nobody had travelled to distant regions of the world such as Sudan and nobody wrote their observations and feelings open-mindedly.²⁰²

Another significant aspect regarding the transformation of the perception of travel in this century was that the Ottoman intellectuals began to establish a linkage between travel and civilization. Mentioning about the necessity of travel, Ahmed Midhat argued that travel should be an indispensable effort for the Ottomans because of the peculiar characteristic of the Ottoman Empire situated between the European and Islamic civilizations. He wrote:

Europe is progressive with so many inventions and modernized with new laws of civilization and has really amazed the human mind, while the vast Islamic world in fact needs our guidance in matters of progress and innovation. As we are between both, it is our greatest and sacred duty to take a closer look to the state of civilization in Europe and the Islamic countries and compare them . While this duty includes our taking travelling seriously, we have not seen this as our responsibility. So let us attach to travel the importance it deserves.²⁰³

²⁰¹ “Halbuki seyâhat bir zahmet değil cihanda hiçbir şeyde bulunmayacak kadar azîm bir zevk ve nihâyetsiz bir lezzettir.” Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 4. The translation was quoted from Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*,” 144.

²⁰² Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahât-nâmesi*, (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1326 [1910]), 5.

²⁰³ “Zira etrâfında bunca muhterât ile müterakkî ve kavanin-i cedide-i medeniyetle müteceddid olup her hâl-ü şânları hakîkaten hayret-fermâ-yı ukul ve ebnâ-yı beşer olan Avrupa’nın ve diğer taraftan dahi terakkî ve terakkî ve teceddüdlere emrinde gerçekten bizim delaletimize myhtaç bulunan azîm bir kıt’a-yı İslamiyenin arasında bulunduğumuz hasebiyle gerek Avrupa’nın ve gerek memâlik-i İslamiyenin ahval-i medeniyesini yakından görüp birbirine tatbik eylemek bizim en büyük ve hatta mukaddes bir vazifemiz olduğu ve şu vazife-i seyâhat hususuna ehemmiyet vermeliğimizi icap eylediği halde biz o vazife ile kendimizi muvazıf bilmemişiz ki hatta seyâhate dahi layık olduğu ehemmiyeti verebilelim.” Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 2. The translation was quoted from Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism *alla turca*,” 142.

Besides travel, travel writing was considered as a *civilized* practice as well. For example, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, who wrote his memoirs during his diplomatic visit to Afghanistan in 1877, underlined the importance of travel writing by perceiving the genre of travelogue as a “[...] laudable work that serves civilizing purposes to the benefit of the whole mankind.”²⁰⁴

Another significant transformation of travel writing experienced in the late Ottoman Empire was the perception of travelogues not only as useful pieces for self-development, but also as pieces for amusement. The publishers became aware of their popularity and began to publish more travelogues to meet this demand. Even some newspapers began to distribute illustrated travelogues as a gift for their readers. For example in 1898, following the second visit of the German Emperor, Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918), to İstanbul, the *Sabah* newspaper distributed a travelogue entitled *Hâtırâ-ı Seyahât* (*The Travel Memoirs*) written by an anonymous correspondent accompanying the Emperor. In the subtitle of this travelogue, it was especially mentioned that it was a gift to the readers of the newspaper.²⁰⁵ Another example was the publishing of *Musavver Hindistan Seyahatnamesi* (*Illustrated Travelogue of India*), written by Selanikli Mehmed Tevfik as a compilation of several European travelogues. In the preface of his work, the administration of the *Sabah* newspaper claimed that it was “the illustrated travelogues that the readers read with a great joy and desire”.²⁰⁶ It was also added that “[...]these travelogues both inform the readers about the

²⁰⁴ “[...] cem’iyyet-i beşeriyenin menâfi’i ve fevâid-i temeddüniyelerine hizmet eder bir eser-i cemil [...]” See Şirvanlı Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, *Seyahâtname: Hindistan, Svât ve Afganistan*, (İstanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1300 [1883]), 292.

²⁰⁵ *Hatıra-yı Seyahat: Almanya İmparatoru Haşmetlu Wilhelm ve İmparatoriçe Augusta Viktorya Hazeratı’nın Dersaadeti Def’a-i Saniye Olarak Ziyaretleriyle Suriye Seyahatlerine Bir Hatıra-i Naçiz Olmak Üzere (Sabah) Gazetesi Tarafından Kar’iin-i Osmaniyyeye Hediye Edilmiştir*, İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1316 [1889].

²⁰⁶ “[...] erbab-ı mütâlaanın en ziyade lezzetle, rağbetle okudukları şey resimli seyahâtâmelerdir.” Selanikli Mehmed Tevfik, *Musavver Hindistan Seyahâtnamesi*, (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1318 [1900]), 3.

customs, morality and other characteristics of some distant countries and make them benefit from these informations, and at the same time amuse them.”²⁰⁷

The perception of travel as a useful endeavour, even as a condition of civilization, resulted in a renewed interest on the travel literature. On the one hand, the European travelogues, both real and fictional, were translated into Turkish; on the other hand, imitating the Western literature, fictitious travel novels were written.²⁰⁸ However, relying solely on books about distant regions as well as their inhabitants was insufficient for some of the Ottoman intellectuals. Increasing curiosity about the world thanks to the translation of European books on geography and science, as well as the newspapers informing the readers on external developments, contributed to the Ottoman desire to travel. This preference of travel to reading travel books was clearly reflected in several pieces written in the late nineteenth century.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ “*Bu seyahâtnâmeler erbâb-ı mütâlaaya hem bir takım memâlik-i bâide ahalisi âdât ve ahlâkı ve ahvâl-i sairesi hakkında malûmat verir, müstefid eyler, hem de onları eğlendirir.*” Selanikli Mehmed Tefik, *Musavver Hindistan Seyahâtnâmesi*, 3.

²⁰⁸ For some examples of translations from European travelogues see, George August Schweinfurth’s *Im Herzen von Afrika (The Heart of Africa)*, (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1874), was translated by Ahmed Bey and Mustafa Said Bey as *Şivnfort’un Afrika Seyahâtnâmesi*, (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: Basiret Matbaası, 1291 [1874-1875]); Januarius Aloysius MacGahan’s *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1874) was translated by Kolağası Ahmed Bey as *Hive Seyahâtnâmesi ve Tarih-i Musavver*, (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: Basiret Matbaası, 1292, [1875]); Eugene Schuyler’s *Turkestan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja* (New York: Scibner-Armstrong, 1876) was translated again by Kolağası Ahmed Bey as *Musavver Türkistan Tarihi ve Seyahâtnâmesi* (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: Basiret Matbaası, 1294, [1877]). Ahmed İhsan was one of the major translators of fictional European travelogues into the Ottoman. He translated Jules Verne’s *Les Tribulations d’un Chinois en Chine (Tribulations of a Chinese in China)*, (Paris: Hetzel, 1879) as *Çin’den Seyahat* (İstanbul: *Alem Matbaası*, 1308 [1891]); *Deux Ans de Vacances* (Two Year’s Vacation), (Paris: Hetzel, 1888) as *Mektep Tatili* (İstanbul: Matbaatü'l-Alem, 1308 [1891]; and *César Cascabel*, (Paris, Hetzel, 1890) as *Araba ile Devr-i Alem Yahud Sezar Kaskabel* (İstanbul: Matbaatü'l-Alem, 1309 [1892]). For the Ottoman fictional travel literature see, for example, Ahmed İhsan, *Asya-i Şarkıye Seyahat*, (İstanbul: *Alem Matbaası*, 1307 [1890]); Ahmed Midhat, *Acâib-i Âlem*, (İstanbul: Tercüman-ı Hakikat Matbaası, 1299 [1882]), later transliterated and edited by Nurullah Şenol and published with the same title (İstanbul: Bordo-Siyah Yayınları, 2004).

²⁰⁹ For example, the protagonist of the fictitious travel novel written by Ahmed Midhat in 1882 and entitled *Acâib-i Âlem (The Wonders of the World)*, Subhi Bey, who decided to travel to the polar regions, was asked by his future travel-mate, Hicabi Bey, whether sitting in his library and reading books on external world was not preferable to bear the difficulties of travelling. He answered that it was impossible to get the same pleasure by reading a travelogue compared to travelling. Ahmed Midhat, *Acâib-i Âlem*, 42. The footnote was given from the edition of Şenol.

According to the Ottoman intellectuals, another disadvantage of relying solely on reading travelogues instead of actual travelling was the unreliability of some European travelogues. For example, Mehmed Mihri particularly emphasized that his travelogue should not be compared with the other travelogues previously translated by the Ottoman authors, because the translations were not useful for the Ottoman readers since they were written in accordance with the “patriotic efforts of the author felt towards his own country” (*kendi memleketi hakkındaki amel-i vatanperverânesi*).²¹⁰ In other words, national peculiarities resulted in different evaluations of the same reality, and the Ottomans should not be misled by reading the travelogues serving the interests of other nations.

Although Ottoman intellectuals/travellers advised learning about the world through travel instead of reading travelogues, they were also aware that it was impossible for all the Ottoman citizens to travel abroad. Therefore, travelogues, written by the Ottoman travellers properly, would avail the readers to benefit as much as possible from others’ experiences. As Ahmed Midhat wrote:

In any case, it is beyond the measure of possibility to make all individuals of a nation travellers; it is even beyond imagination [...] While this is so, it could be judged only as absurd to encourage all our compatriots to travel around the world [...] If we ourselves do not find the opportunity to travel throughout the world and see the wonders and curiosities, can we not at least partake in the pleasures by reading the works of those who managed to travel?²¹¹

He answered this question affirmatively and argued that the reason of mass production of travelogues in Europe was the people’s interest in learning

²¹⁰ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 4. Perception of travel writing as a patriotic effort because of the informative nature of the travelogues is also visible in the travelogue of Halid Ziyaeddin, who wrote that he decided to pen his memoirs because he perceived this effort as “a complementary of patriotic duties.” (*vazîfe-i vatanperverî mütemmemâtından*). Halid Ziyaeddin, *Musavver Mısır Hatıratı*, (İstanbul: Agob Matosyan Matbaası, 1326 [1910]), 4.

²¹¹ “Zaten bir milletin kaffe-i efradını seyyah etmek hadd-i imkanın değil tasavvurun bile haricindedir. [...] Hal bu derecede iken bütün hemşehrilerimizi devr-i alem seyahatlerine teşvik eylemek gülünç olmaktan başka bir hokum tevliid etmez. [...] Biz kendimiz dünyayı seyahat ederek acaib ve garaibini görmeye imkan bulamıyor ve muvaffak olamıyor isek buna muvaffak olanların asarını okuyarak onların aldıkları lezaize iştirak edemez miyiz?” Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 9-10. The excerpt was quoted from Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism alla turca,” 147.

from others' experiences. In other words, giving information about the distant lands and their inhabitants was one of the most important motives, which encouraged not only the European but also the Ottoman travellers to write travelogues from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Almost all the travelogues written in this period included a justification paragraph mentioning that the reason for writing the travel memoirs was mainly to inform the Ottoman readers about the external world. For example, Abdülkadir Câmî, who wrote a travelogue on Tripoli and Fezzan, wrote the rationale behind writing his memoirs as such:

I will be happy, if I am able to produce an idea of Tripoli for my compatriots and to attract the attention of our enterprising, sound, self-confident youth to these regions, this deserted and isolated province, which has been left far away from the support of the motherland requiring more active, smart and devoted administration compared to other provinces of the Ottoman Empire.²¹²

Likewise, Mehmed Fazlı wrote in the introduction of his travelogue on Afghanistan that except for some mythical narratives, there was no single book about the past and contemporary situation of this country since almost no Ottoman citizen had ever been there and even if they had been, they had not written what they had seen there. Therefore, he decided to write this travelogue to inform the Ottomans about the political and military situation of Afghanistan in order to increase the Ottoman sense of love and friendship to this country.²¹³ Mehmed Hurşid similarly argued that he composed his travelogue on the Ottoman-Iranian border in a way to describe the characteristics of the local tribes, which had either not been recorded in their totality so far, or remained unknown because of different and inconsistent narratives regarding them.²¹⁴ All in all, the educative purpose in writing the travelogues was quite extensive in this period.

²¹² Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: [Unknown Publisher], 1326 [1909]), 7.

²¹³ Mehmet Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmet İhsan, 1325 [1909-1910]), 1.

²¹⁴ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudûd*, (İstanbul: Takvîmhane-i Amire, 1277 [1860-1861]), 2. Later transliterated and edited by Alaattin Eser and published with the same title (İstanbul: Simurg Yayınevi, 1997), p. 2.

Another significant aspect of travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards is the traveller/author's emphasis on the reliability of their own travelogues. The experiences of Ottoman travellers in distant parts of the world were so unfamiliar to the Ottoman public opinion that the authors were concerned about suspicion and even disbelief of the readers on what they had written. This concern forced them to underline the reality of their experiences, however odd and weird they might seem. Hence, they repeatedly wrote that they noted down only what they had seen, nothing more. For example, Mehmed Fazlı wrote in the introductory chapter of his travelogue that he "[...] wrote as [he] had seen and felt without adding anything."²¹⁵ Similarly, Rüşdi Paşa, who wrote his memoirs on Yemen, mentioned that his "[...] expressions stands to [his] observations and investigations" (*ifadâtım müşahedâtıma ve tetkikâtıma müstenâddir.*)²¹⁶

Visualizing the travelogues was another significant novelty particularly in the early twentieth century, which contributed to the reliability of the travelogue. Indeed visualization was also a common practice in the Ottoman classical age to make the travel narration more attractive. In the classical pieces, miniatures had been utilized to colour the writings of the author. In the nineteenth century; however, more realistic illustrations were begun to be utilized. The travellers to Europe tried to obtain the illustrations of the monuments, gardens, or some peculiar personalities in order to visualize their travel experiences. Hence there emerged several travelogues, which included the word *musavver* (illustrated) in their titles. Starting from the 1890s onwards, after the Ottoman encounter with photography, Ottoman travelogues began to include photographs, which were treated as the proof of the credibility of the author since photographs were perceived as more reliable compared to illustrations.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Mehmet Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 2.

²¹⁶ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, (İstanbul: Kütübhane-i İslam ve Askeri - İbrahim Hilmi, 1327 [1910-1911]), 3.

²¹⁷ For a detailed account of the history of photography in the Ottoman Empire, see Engin Özendes, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Fotoğraf*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

Besides the authors' emphasis on their own observations and incorporation of visual materials, a third factor increasing the reliability of the travelogues was citing the sources utilized by the traveller/author in composing his travelogue. The European travelogues, Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahâtnâme*, Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* and some other history books were among the most referred texts in the travelogues. For example, before commencing on narrating his travels, unlike other travelogues, Mehmed Mihri enlisted the Islamic and Western sources that he utilized in writing his travelogue.²¹⁸

All in all, the negative connotation attached to travel in the Ottoman classical age was gradually replaced by a more positive connotation. Travel was still perceived as an arduous endeavour; however, the traveller should bear the burdens of travel because the benefits acquired from travel would far exceed the difficulties encountered. Travel was considered not only as a way of accumulating knowledge about the external world which would contribute to the *civilization* of the Ottoman society, but also as a *civilized* practice in itself. In other words, the Ottomans argued that the traveller is a *civilized* man, or in reverse, a *civilized* man would enjoy travelling. One of the most significant reasons for the renewed interest in travel and travel writing in the Ottoman literary circles from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was, therefore, the linkage established between travel and civilization.

4.2. Technological Factors Contributing to the Rise of Travel and Travel Writing in the Nineteenth Century

The perception of external world as a subject to be studied and the growing interest in understanding the reasons for European supremacy were the intellectual motives behind the increasing popularity of travel towards the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the development of transportation and

²¹⁸ Among the Western sources, there were history books written by Bonaparte or Herodotus as well as other travelogues, the most renowned of which was the one written by Schweinfurt. Among the Islamic sources he cited several history books, such as Naum Şakir's *Sudan Tarihi*, *Tarih-i Abdüllatif Bağdadi*, *Tarih-i Bediüzzaman Hamedani*, *Tuhfet-ün Nazirin*, *Selaset-üt Tevarih*, *Tarih-i Arab Kabl-el Islam*, *Tarih-i Ibn-ül Fedâ*, *Tac-üt Tevarih* and *Tarih-i Ibn Khaldun*. See Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtnâmesi*, 3.

communication technology eased travelling from and to the Ottoman Empire and facilitated gathering information regarding the developments in the external world. All these factors increased the quality and quantity of travel as well as travel writing in the late Ottoman Empire.

To start with the development of communication technologies, the establishment of the Ministry of Post in 1840 and rapid linkage of Ottoman postal services with the European ones contributed to the Ottoman awareness about the external world. The Ottoman officials and students sent to the European capitals began to communicate with their families as well as with the Porte through sending letters, which turned out to be one of the most significant sources including travel narrations in the nineteenth century.²¹⁹

Establishment of telegraph lines was another significant factor facilitating Ottoman awareness of the developments in external world.²²⁰ Telegraph was far more revolutionary compared to postal services, since it connected the Ottoman Empire with the external world more quickly. Telegraph was frequently used by the Ottoman journalists, who were assigned by their newspapers to travel to the distant parts of the Empire and to report about the recent developments. Even, the travelogue of Ahmed Şerif was composed of the telegraphs that he sent to the *Tanîn* newspaper from where he had visited.²²¹

²¹⁹ The letters of Namık Kemal from Paris and London, Abdülhak Hamid from London and Bombay, Süleyman Nazif from Iraq etc., were among such sources. See, Fevziye Abdullah Tansel (ed.), *Namık Kemal'in Hususi Mektupları*, 8 Volumes, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1967-1986); İnci Enginün (ed.), *Abdülhak Hamid'in Mektupları*, 2 Volumes, (İstanbul, Dergah Yayınları, 1995).

²²⁰ After a decade from the utilization of the telegraph in the West, Ottomans were cognizant of this device and the Crimean War provided the opportunity to establish several telegraph lines connecting İstanbul to Europe. In 1847, telegraph was first introduced to Abdülmecid by one of the colleagues of Samuel Morse and the appreciation of Abdülmecid about the device was so strong that Samuel Morse had once said “Abdülmecid is the first great European man understanding the value of my invention.” During the Crimean War, in the year of 1855, Varna-Balaklava and Varna-Kilyos sea lines as well as İstanbul-Edirne and Edirne-Şumnu land lines were constructed. The same year Ottoman Telegraph Agency (*Osmanlı Telgraf İdaresi*) was established. By early 1860s, many Ottoman cities were connected via telegraph lines. For a detailed account of the history of telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, see Nesimi Yazıcı, “Osmanlı Haberleşme Kurumu,” in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 139-209.

²²¹ Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'da, Sûriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, transliterated and edited by Mehmet Çetin Börekçi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999).

Regarding the development of transportation facilities in the Ottoman Empire, two vehicles, the train and the steamboat, became extremely significant for the increasing number of travels in the late Ottoman Empire. Massive railway constructions had already tied many European cities in 1850s and 1860s.²²² With the construction of İstanbul-Edirne railway line, the Ottoman capital was tied to European capitals by train in 1888. *Orient Express*, a special train from Paris to İstanbul began to operate regularly one year later in 1889. In other words, towards the end of the nineteenth century, it took only a couple of days for an Ottoman traveller to reach Paris. Parallel to the development of railway transportation, maritime travels increased as well thanks to the establishment of travel agencies, such as British *Cook Company* and French *Messagerie Maritimes*.²²³

The ease of travelling was so extensively felt by the Ottoman travellers that even Babanzade İsmail Hakkı referred to the former usage of the word *travel* as a difficult practice, and argued that this word lost its meaning:

Travel!... I think this word has actually been abused; because although this word has been perceived as one of the fundamental principles of humanity, currently, with the provision of gradual developments it almost totally lost its meaning. It only preserved its real and original meaning for the countries [whose inhabitants were] in the stage of nomadism and in the earlier phases of humanity.²²⁴

All in all, the development of communication and transportation technologies facilitated travels of the Ottomans and contributed to the

²²² In 1850, European railways hardly exceeded 18000 kilometres, while only two decades later this number was more than 58.000 kilometres. For a detailed analysis of railway construction in Europe see, Robert Millward, *Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and Transport, 1830-1990*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 59-75.

²²³ For the impact of these agencies on Ottoman tourism see Susan Nance, "A Facilitated Access Model and Ottoman Empire Tourism," *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 2007): 1056-1077.

²²⁴ "Seyahat!.. Bence bu kelime artık suistimal ediliyor. Zira bu kelime mebâdî-i beşeriyette vaz' olunmuş olduğu halde bilâhare tedricen terakkiyat vâki' ola ola medlûlünü heman tamamen denilecek derecede kaybetmiş ve yalnız hâl-i bedâyet ve bedâvette bulunan memleketler için medlûl-ü hakiki ve vaz'-ı ibtidaisini muhafaza eylemiştir." Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 58-59.

transformation of the Ottoman perception of travel from an arduous and troublesome activity to a more pleasuring one. This was another reason for the development of travel writing from the late nineteenth century onwards.

4.3. Socio-Cultural Factors Contributing to the Rise of Travel and Travel Writing in the Nineteenth Century

Not only intellectual and technological, but also socio-cultural factors contributed to the renewal of the Ottoman interest in travel and particularly travel writing. Among these factors, two of them are of considerable significance, and therefore require closer examination. The first one is the transformation of the Ottoman literature and the emergence of a new literary style in the nineteenth century, which contributed to the appearance of travelogues as a more distinct genre. The second one is the development of Ottoman printing and press, which had not only fostered the Ottoman awareness about the external world, but also resulted in the utilization of a simpler and purer language, enlarging the target group of the literary works, including the travelogues.

4.3.1. Transformation of the Ottoman Literature:

One of the most significant factors contributing to the development of travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was the changing mentality of the Ottoman men of letters. In the classical age, Ottoman literature was mainly confined to a limited group of writers and a limited group of readers. The very concept of *divân edebiyâtı* (court literature) means that the classical literature was developed around the palace circles and could not generally reach to wide masses. However, according to Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, from the late eighteenth century onwards, the monopolization of literary writing by a small group of people began to decline; writing activity was no more done for a particular category of people but for a wider recipient group.²²⁵

²²⁵ What is more, the gap between the court poet (*divân şairi*) and the ordinary people began to get closer. There emerged court poets, who preserved the classical genres of the Ottoman poetry but at the same time gave up writing in an extremely adorned style such as Nedim (1680-1730); while some of the folk poets (*halk şairi*) began to compile his literary works in a *divân* (the compilations made by court poets) such as Bayburtlu Zihni (1795-1859). Ziyaeddin Fahri

A parallel development was the purification of language to make new works accessible to masses. As it is mentioned before, the classical Ottoman authors preferred adorned literary expressions (*kelâm*) over more simple and neutral ones (*kâl/söz*). In the nineteenth century, however, a movement for simplification and purification of language was started by the prominent Ottoman men of letters. Among them, Namık Kemal was one of the most significant proponents of simplification of language. He mentioned about the precedence given to *söz* instead of *kelâm* by writing that the Ottoman language had so far been ignored since it was thought that the “the ordinary people had not the capacity to understand the literary language” (*lisân-ı edebîyi anlamaya avâm muktedir değildir*). In other words, in the Ottoman literature, the meaning was being sacrificed for art (*edebiyâtımızda mânâ san'at uğruna fedâ olunageldiğinden*) and in order to reach the masses, a simpler and purer language was a necessity.²²⁶

The relative closure of the gap between the men of letters and the common people, and the attempts to establish a purer and simpler language were consolidated during the implementation of *Tanzimat* reforms, which had extremely significant implications for the transformation of Ottoman literature. To start with, the emergence of a strong bureaucracy besides the imperial dynasty, sharing the authority of the Sultan, altered the classical interrelation between the poet and the patron. In the Ottoman classical age, the poet was extremely dependent on his patron, either being a governor, a vizier, or the Sultan himself, since the patron was not only his protector but also his financier. This interrelationship declined with the emergence of alternative sources of authority, or alternative patrons. In the 1840s and 1850s, this alternative source of authority was the bureaucracy itself. The men of letters of the period were either high-level bureaucrats or middle officials serving under the entourage of the ruling elite of *Tanzimat*. That is why, for example, İbrahim Şinasi (1826-

Findıkoğlu, “Tanzimatta İçtimai Hayat,” *Tanzimat I*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 619-659, 637

²²⁶ İsmail Parlatır, “XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Türkçesi,” Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 9, 471-481, 472.

1871), could dare to write about the virtues of rational understanding of the world instead of a religious one; without the protection of Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1800-1858), it would be an extremely dangerous enterprise to shatter the classical foundations of the Ottoman mentality.²²⁷ In the 1860s and 1870s, the bureaucracy produced its own rivals, namely the Young Ottomans, who bitterly criticized the very foundations of *Tanzimat*. They had to flee to Europe under the auspices of a new patron, an Egyptian prince, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa (1829-1875). Having found alternative sources of income, the Ottoman authors began to write for the cause they were defending besides praising their financiers. The breakdown of former patron-client relationship resulted in the politicization of the Ottoman authors, and the politicization resulted in writing for the masses to get public support.

Secondly, with the transformation of Ottoman subjects into Ottoman citizens through *Tanzimat* reforms, the significance of “individual” was recognized better. Orhan Koloğlu argues that before these reforms, Ottoman ruling elite had refrained from engaging in closer relations with their subjects; he summarized the spirit of the classical age with the popular phrase: “Becoming closer with the people is a sign of bankruptcy” (*Nâs ile istinâs, âlamet-i iflâs*).²²⁸ Such an understanding was gradually abandoned starting from early nineteenth century onwards. Fındıkoğlu displayed one of the earliest indications of the altered interrelationship between the ruler and the ruled by citing a line from one of the poems of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807), who wrote: “Serving the people is the purest joy for me” (*Eylemek mahz-ı safâdır bana nâsa hizmet*).²²⁹ In other words, the “individual” acquired an identity; hence the themes regarding his daily life became important. That is why the Ottoman prose was enriched after *Tanzimat* with Western genres like novel, story, or article, which generally

²²⁷ For the pioneering impact of Şinasi on secularization see Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 197-198.

²²⁸ Orhan Koloğlu, “Osmanlı’da Kamuoyunun Oluşumu,” Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 7, 327-336, 328.

²²⁹ Fındıkoğlu, “Tanzimatta İçtimai Hayat,” 638.

processed individual experiences as a theme.²³⁰ Translations from Western literature, particularly translation of novels, contributed to the development of Ottoman perception that there was another lifestyle in Europe.²³¹

All in all, writing for the masses instead of a limited group of people became one of the major characteristics of the new Ottoman literature. The combination of the growing interest in personal themes about the daily lives of the individuals including travel, and the desire to write for a wider group of readers, contributed to the rise of travel literature. The educational purpose attached to the literature and the self-imposed responsibility of the Ottoman intellectuals about enlightening the ordinary people were also important in the proliferation of the genre of travel writing, which was perceived as both educational and interesting for the ordinary people. In other words, writing travel memoirs not for a limited group of people but for the benefit of a wider group of recipients became a significant concern for the Ottoman travellers.

In sum, the transformation of the Ottoman literature was another significant factor for the revitalization of travel writing in the Ottoman literature in a modern sense. The convergence of the increasing curiosity of the Ottoman public opinion about the external world and the self-assumed responsibility of the intellectuals to feed these knowledge-hungry souls contributed to the popularity of travel narration as a travelogue or in various other genres.

4.3.2 Development of Ottoman Printing and Press:

The development of Ottoman printing and press was an equally important factor for the increase in travel writing in the Ottoman Empire. The newspapers

²³⁰ Parlatur, "XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Türkçesi," 473.

²³¹ What is more, Ottoman authors began to model these novels to write their own; in other words, personal experiences turned out to be the theme of this new literature. Starting from the first novel in Turkish, *Taaşuk-u Talat ve Fitnat* (*The Love Affair of Talat and Fitnat*), written by Şemseddin Sami in 1872, personal experiences, including travel became the topic of many pieces. Yusuf Kamil Paşa translated Fenelon's *Telemaque* in 1859; Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* was translated as *Hikaye-i Mağdurin* in the same year. Theodore Kasap translated Alexandre Dumas' *Les Comte de Monte Cristo* and Alain-René Lesage's *Le Diable Boiteux* in 1872. For similar translations, see Korkmaz, "Yenileşmenin Tarihi, Sosyo-Kültürel ve Estetik Temelleri," 25-29.

and periodicals, which were published starting from 1830s onwards, not only raised the interest of the public opinion regarding the external developments, but also encouraged travel narration to a great extent, either by publishing travel letters or sending correspondents for following external developments.²³²

Indeed, the Ottomans met with newspapers even before *Tanzimat* era. The first newspaper in the Ottoman realm was published in 1828 in Egypt under the administration of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa (1789-1848). Entitled *Vakayi'-i Misriyye*, this newspaper had a limited total daily circulation of only six hundred prints; however, it forced the Ottoman ruling elite to create a counter official newspaper in 1831, entitled *Takvîm-i Vakayi'*. According to Koloğlu, the establishment of these two newspapers and particularly their polemical stance during the rebellion of Kavalalı and Ottoman-Egyptian wars between 1831 and 1833 contributed to the emergence of Ottoman public opinion.²³³

The first article published in *Takvîm-i Vakayi'* entitled *Mukaddime* (Preface) was extremely important to demonstrate the transformation of Ottoman mentality regarding the awareness of the public about internal and external developments. Accordingly, the article criticized the former evaluation of the internal and external developments through the official historians of the Empire (*vak'aniivîs*) of being extremely literary and generally useless because of their style not intended for informing the people. Therefore, one of the major reasons for publishing *Takvîm-i Vakayi'* was to catch up with the latest developments and to inform the people about these developments rapidly.²³⁴

In other words, the Ottomans began to be aware of the internal and external developments, albeit officially, and this resulted in an increasing interest

²³² Cenap Şehabettin's *Hac Yolunda* and Babanzade İsmail Hakkı's *Irak Mektupları* were initially published as letters in Ottoman newspapers; Ahmed Şerif, on the other hand, was sent as a correspondent to Albania, Syria and Tripoli to write about the political as well as military developments in these provinces.

²³³ Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Toplumunda Kamuoyunun Evrimi," 329.

²³⁴ "Mukaddime-i Takvîm-i Vakayi'," *Takvîm-i Vakayi'*, No. 1, 1 November 1831, cited in Ali Budak, *Batılılaşma Sürecinde Çok Yönlü Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Münif Paşa*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), 102.

regarding daily political issues. Ali Suavi (1839-1878), one of the most notable nineteenth century journalists of the Ottoman Empire, emphasized the Ottoman eagerness to learn about external world as such. He wrote that the Ottomans tried to be cognizant of the secrets of political, economic and foreign affairs and for that reason they began to spend money to buy newspapers.²³⁵ Similarly, Namık Kemal wrote that while initially a journalist had been content to publish three hundred copies of newspaper a day, the popular demand to newspapers was so high in the early 1870s that the same journalist did not satisfy with three thousand copies a day.²³⁶ He further praised the development of Ottoman press by mentioning that in six years the newspapers saved the Ottoman literature from Arabic and Persian influence enduring for six centuries by purifying the Ottoman language and by catching up with the contemporary ideas prevailing in the Western world.²³⁷

All in all, the development of Ottoman printing and press contributed to the renewal of Ottoman interest to travel writing. On the one hand, quantitatively, the development of Ottoman printing increased the number of books published and made books cheaper and easier to purchase. This encouraged the travellers to write their experiences, since they were confident that their books would be sold. On the other hand, qualitatively, the development of Ottoman press increased information flow and further triggered Ottoman curiosity about the wonders and oddities regarding the external world. Indirectly, the establishment of Ottoman public opinion through newspapers increased the

²³⁵ Ali Suavi, "Gazete," *Muhbir*, No. 28, 3 March 1867, cited in Parlatur, "XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Türkçesi," 473.

²³⁶ Namık Kemal, "Gazete Muharrirliği ve İbret," *İbret*, No. 97, 20 January 1873, cited in Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, compiled, transliterated and edited by Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu and İsmail Kara, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2005), 402. After the introduction of *Tanzimat* reforms, the establishment of semi-official *Ceride-i Havadis* newspaper in 1840 and then İbrahim Şinasi's first private Ottoman newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* in 1860, and particularly his *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* published in 1862 increased the Ottoman awareness of external world and particularly contributed to the emergence of alternative non-official evaluations of the events. The mushrooming of both metropolitan and provincial newspapers from 1860s onwards spread this consciousness to the periphery of the Ottoman capital.

²³⁷ Namık Kemal, "Matbuat-ı Osmaniye," *Hadika*, No. 8, 19 November 1872, cited in Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, 533.

readers' demand of being aware of the course of Ottoman as well as foreign developments. All these factors contributed to the consolidation of travel writing as a genre in the late Ottoman Empire.

To sum up, most of the reasons for underdevelopment of travel writing in the Ottoman literature disappeared in the nineteenth century particularly with the Ottoman modernization. Travel, which had been perceived in the Ottoman classical age as a dangerous and personal endeavour worthless for mentioning in detail, turned out to be a matter of civilization in the nineteenth century. The prevalence given to scientific understanding of the external world as a result of the Ottoman decline contributed to the curiosity about the distant lands and thus resulted in a renewed interest in travel writing. The popularization of the Ottoman literature and the breakdown of traditional patron-client relationship between the political elite and the men of letters also established the basis for revitalization of travel literature.

Not only intellectual and socio-cultural, but also technological factors resulted in the establishment of travel writing as a more distinguishable genre. Facilitation of travel through establishment of railways and travel agencies, and development of communication technologies contributed to the popularization of travel and travel writing. What is more, the development of Ottoman press decreased the costs of book production and increased the number of publications as well as the number of readers. The Ottoman newspapers, on the other hand, not only fed the Ottoman curiosity regarding the external issues but also reinforced the purification of language, which indirectly contributed to the popularity of travel literature. In all, a new age of travel was opened and the Ottoman travellers once more wandered on the distant parts of the world. The Ottomans travelling to the East were among these travellers and the reasons for their travels as well as their travelogues need closer attention in order to display how the transformation of the political, economic and social structure of the Empire was reflected in Ottoman patterns of travel and travel writing.

CHAPTER 5

OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS IN THE ‘EAST’ IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1850-1920)

Despite intellectual, technological and socio-cultural factors contributing to the practice of travel and travel writing, considering the travels of Ottomans to the non-European world, it can be argued that travel for the sake of travel hardly experienced in the modern age as well. These travels still had a purpose other than travelling, being military, economic, or diplomatic. What distinguishes the Ottoman travelogues from classical travel narration was, therefore, not the changing purpose of travel but the changing style of travel writing. While the description of the purpose of travel surpassed its description in the classical travel narration, the description of travel prevailed over its purpose in the late Ottoman literature. In other words, the late Ottoman travelogues especially focused on the conduct of travel; the purpose of travel turned out to be a detail within the text.

In this chapter these travelogues are classified both chronologically and according to the purpose of travel. In the first section, travelogues written between 1860 and 1876 are covered; in other words, the renewed interest in the non-European world during the Azizian era is examined. The second section, on the other hand, focused on the Hamidian travelogues written between 1876 and 1908. It is underlined in this section that both the quantity and the quality of travel writing regarding the non-European world increased tremendously thanks to the Pan-Islamic rhetoric of Abdülhamid II. Finally, the third section deals with the post-Hamidian travelogues, which were extremely significant for their critical tune, compared to their predecessors in terms of the Ottoman neglect of the East as well the negative effects of the infiltration of European influence in the region.

5.1. Earlier Travelogues to the Non-European World (1860-1876)

The first travel to the non-European world in the nineteenth century ending with the penning of a travelogue is the one performed by Mehmed Hurşid (?-1882) from Basra to Ağrı along the Ottoman-Iranian border. Mehmed Hurşid was one of the scribes (*kâtib*) of the Commission for Border Demarcation, which had been established in 1848 to solve the border disputes between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. His travelogue, written during his four-year mission along the border and thus entitled *Seyahâtname-i Hudûd (The Travelogue of Borders)*, was published in 1860.²³⁸ In the introduction of the travelogue, Mehmed Hurşid narrated how the Commission passed along and visited the cities of the border provinces, namely Basra, Baghdad, Shehr-i Zôr, Mosul, Van and Bayezid, and described the nomadic and settled inhabitants as well as the agricultural and industrial production in these provinces. The travelogue is composed of six chapters; each one is devoted for a particular province. Within this framework, not only the geography of the region and its inhabitants' economic activities are analysed, but also the characteristics of "the nomadic Arab and Kurdish tribes and clans" (*urbân ve ekrâd aşâyir ve kabâ'ili*) are examined.²³⁹

Following this first travelogue, in the 1860s, three travelogues had been penned by the Ottoman travellers about the remotest regions that had ever been reached by the Ottomans so far, namely about Brazil and South Africa. The purpose of these travels to the non-European world was both practical and even accidental. The first of these travels was performed by Ebubekir Efendi, a member of Baghdadi *ulama*, to South Africa in 1862, who was sent by Abdülaziz in order to end the hostilities among the Javanese Muslim community living in Capetown and to teach them the "true path of Islam." He was accompanied by a young disciple, Ömer Lütfî Efendi, who recorded not only their voyage to, but also their experiences in South Africa. As a result, the

²³⁸ For the establishment of this commission and its activities, see Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1997): 205-234, 213.

²³⁹ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, (İstanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1277 [1860]).

travelogue entitled *Ümit Burnu Seyahâtname* (*The Travelogue of Cape of Good Hope*) was penned, which informed the reader about the characteristics of the Javanese Muslims, as well as the Ottoman perception of Africa in the mid-nineteenth century.²⁴⁰

The other two travelogues on Brazil and the coastal Africa were the products of the same military mission, performed after Abdülaziz had ordered two Ottoman corvettes, named *Bursa* and *Izmir*, to join the Ottoman fleet in the Persian Gulf. Since the Suez Canal had not opened yet, they had to sail around the African continent. Indeed, what Abdülaziz intended was to demonstrate the strength of the Ottoman navy, on which he invested huge amounts of money. The corvettes left İstanbul on 12 September 1865 and after a long journey they entered the Atlantic Ocean, where they were caught in a storm dragging them along the ocean. Finally, they were able to arrive at Rio de Janeiro and stayed there for two months for the repairing of the corvettes. Afterwards, they ended their journey in Basra passing a long route including the port cities of Capetown, Port Louis, Bombay, Muscat, and Bushehr. This adventurous voyage was penned by two Ottoman officials serving on these corvettes, one engineer and one *imam*.

²⁴⁰ Towards the mid-nineteenth century, a group of Javanese Muslims from Capetown went Mecca for pilgrimage and they understood that their religious beliefs did not totally comply with the rest of the Muslim world. When they returned Capetown, they began to tell other Muslims that their understanding of Islam was quite different from the “real” Islam they had practiced during the pilgrimage. However, this resulted in a significant contention between those conservative Muslims, who did not want to abandon their traditions and those reformers who aimed to teach Muslims the “real” religion. The contention soon transformed into a bloody conflict among the Javanese Muslim community. The elites of the Javanese Muslims, who wanted to end these hostilities dividing the community, applied to the British governor of Capetown to demand a religious scholar from the Ottoman Sultan, which was also the Caliph of all Muslims, to solve their problems, and to teach them the authentic version of Islam. The governor informed the British government about the situation and the British government applied to the Ottoman government via the Ottoman Ambassador to London, Kostaki Müsürüs Paşa (1814-1891). The then Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz complied with this demand and ordered the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Âli Paşa, to send an able religious scholar to the region, who was able to end hostilities among the Muslim community (*ihtilâfın ref ve izâlesine muktedir*). Âli Paşa informed Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, who had been transferred to the ranks of bureaucracy from the echelons of ulama and thus familiar with those members of this community bearing the aforementioned qualities. He advised Ebubekir Efendi, a religious scholar from Baghdad, who had been in İstanbul at that time in order to settle a local religious dispute in the province of Shehr-i Zôr. Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtname*, (İstanbul: Basiret Matbaası, 1292 [1868]), transliterated and transliterated by Hüseyin Yorulmaz, *Yüzyıl Önce Güney Afrika: Ümitburnu Seyahâtname*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2006), 3.

The travelogue of the former, Mühendis Faik, entitled *Seyahâtnâme-i Bahr-i Muhît* (*The Travelogue of Atlantic Ocean*) was published in 1868.²⁴¹ The other travelogue, written in Arabic by the *imam* of *Bursa* corvette, Bağdadlı Abdurrahman Efendi, was entitled *Seyahâtnâme-i Brezilya*²⁴² (*The Travelogue of Brazil*); it was first translated into Turkish by Antepli Mehmed Şerif and published three years later in 1871. *Seyahâtnâme-i Bahr-i Muhît* was composed of two parallel narratives. The first one is about the cities, peoples and customs that the author had personally observed or learned from external resources, the second one is about the events that he encountered during his voyage. Thus, the first narrative is quite informative; it even resembles to a geography book. On the other hand, the second narrative is very vivid, demonstrating the amazement of an Ottoman traveller in extremely distant parts of the world. *Seyahâtnâme-i Brezilya* was more autobiographical than informative. Accordingly, Bağdadlı Abdurrahman Efendi wrote about his decision to stay in Brazil in order to teach Islamic principles in the Muslim community living in the region, and he introduced the reader the Muslims in these distant lands.

These earlier travelogues could hardly exceed traditional forms of travel writing. Despite the authors' eagerness to write about their personal experiences, the informative style permeated over the whole text. However, still, these earlier attempts to portray non-European cultures and communities reflected the growing Ottoman interest towards the external world, and thus significant to understand the perception of the Ottoman encounter with the people that they had not encountered before.

5.2. Hamidian Travelogues to the Non-European World (1876-1908)

Utilization of *ad hoc* diplomatic missions continued even after the establishment of permanent embassies; since except Teheran, Ottoman

²⁴¹ Mühendis Faik, *Seyahâtnâme-i Bahr-i Muhît*, İstanbul: Mekteb-i Bahriye-i Şahane Matbaası, 1285 [1868].

²⁴² Bağdadlı Abdurrahman Efendi, *Seyahâtnâme-i Brezilya*, translated into Ottoman Turkish by Antepli Mehmet Şerif, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1288 [1871]).

administration did not open a permanent embassy in Asian and African states.²⁴³ Therefore, inter-state relations with the East were generally conducted by temporary envoys. This was particularly the case in the Hamidian era, in which Pan-Islamist diplomatic initiatives required such missions to a great extent.²⁴⁴ This resulted in a strong affiliation between the traveller and political authority, since the former was assigned by the latter; in other words, it should not be overlooked that the narrations of the travellers reflect this strong interrelationship.

During this period, two diplomatic missions ended up with travelogues. The first mission was conducted right after the eruption of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, which prompted the Ottomans to mobilize the Muslims of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan through using the spiritual influence of the Caliphate. The new Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II, who had found himself in the midst of a war threatening the very integrity of the Empire just one year after his enthronement, immediately began to seek for collaboration with Central Asian Muslims, particularly the state of Afghanistan, for a joint endeavour against the Russians.²⁴⁵ As a result of the intensification of Ottoman-Russian War, and particularly through the encouragement of British Ambassador to the Porte, Sir Henry Layard (1817-1894), Abdülhamid II decided to send an envoy to the ruler of Afghanistan, Shir Ali Khan (1825-1879), headed by a member of *ulama*, Kazasker Ahmed Hulusi Efendi, in order to inform Shir Ali Khan “[...] of the Caliph’s requests, that is, Russia was the enemy of Islam and wanted to

²⁴³ Indeed except for Abyssinia, Iran, China, Siam, and Japan, there was no totally independent state in Asia and Africa at that time; this was one of the most significant reasons for the lack of establishment of permanent embassies in the region.

²⁴⁴ For a detailed account of Pan-Islamism in the Hamidian era see Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); Cemil Aydın, *Politics of Anti-Westernism: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

²⁴⁵ Dwight E. Lee, “A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep. 1941): 335-356, 336. Azmi Özcan writes “[s]uch attempts were the first and one of the most dramatic Pan-Islamic steps taken by the Ottomans in modern times.” Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 78.

destroy the Muslim lands, therefore the Amir should not show favour of Russia.”²⁴⁶ It was planned that the Ottoman mission would reach Afghanistan via India and the journey started on July 12, 1877 from İstanbul. After reaching India, Ahmed Hulusi Efendi headed for Afghanistan, and on the way, he sent one of the members of his envoy, Şirvanî Ahmed Hamdi Efendi (?-1889)²⁴⁷, to the city of Saidu, where the *Akhund* of Swat (1784-1877), “[...] an ascetic, who was thought to have great influence among the Muslims of Afghanistan and the northwest frontier of India,”²⁴⁸ resided, in order to prompt him to convince Shir Ali Khan on obeying the orders of the Caliph. In other words, while Ahmed Hulusi Efendi would try to ignite the belligerent nature of the Afghans against the Russians, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi would aim for convincing the religious authority to influence the secular one. Both missions failed because of the anti-British policies of the Afghans and the only outcome of this enterprise was the travelogue entitled *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahatnamesi (The Travelogue of India and Swat and Afghanistan)* by Ahmed Hamdi Efendi.²⁴⁹ This travelogue was one of the most significant texts on Ottoman perception of India and Afghanistan since the travelogue of Seydî Ali Reis written in the sixteenth century.

The second diplomatic mission assigned by Abdülhamid II and ended with a travelogue was Azmzade Sadık el-Müeyyed’s (1858-1911) mission to

²⁴⁶ Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 81.

²⁴⁷ Born in Şirvan, a region in Eastern Caucasia, as the son of a religious scholar, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi came to İstanbul where he studied at various *medreses*. After his education, he reached the grades of *müderriis* (professor) and he worked in the bureau of Grand Mufti as well as in some educational institutions such as the Assembly of Education (*Meclis-i Maarif*) and the Board of Inspectors (*Encümen-i Teftiş*). He authored several books on religious as well as non religious fields, such as geography, logic and literature. See Herzog and Motika, “Orientalism ‘*alla turca*’,” 154.

²⁴⁸ Lee, “A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877,” 344.

²⁴⁹ Şirvanlı Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahâtname*s*i*, (İstanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1300 [1883]). For a descriptive account of this travelogue, see Wasti, Syed Tanvir, “Two Muslim Travelogues: to and from İstanbul”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1991): 457-476.

Abyssinia in 1904.²⁵⁰ Accordingly, the mission was sent in response to the envoy of Menelik II (r. 1889-1913), the Emperor of Abyssinia, sent to the Porte in 1896 in order to secure several rights of the Abyssinians living in Jerusalem.²⁵¹ In order not to disappoint the Abyssinian envoy, Abdülhamid II preferred neither to reject nor to accept this demand, while he reciprocated the Abyssinian diplomatic initiative by sending the envoy headed by Sadık El-Müeyyed to Menelik.²⁵² The mission hardly passed beyond a courtesy visit; however, the travelogue, *Habeş Seyahâtnâmesi* (*The Travelogue of Abyssinia*) written by Sadık el-Müeyyed during his journey provided the reader with a colourful account of Abyssinia and with a sample of Ottoman perception of Africa at the turn of the twentieth century.²⁵³

Besides these inter-state diplomatic missions, another travelogue was written after an *ad hoc* semi-diplomatic travel by Sadık el-Müeyyed on the

²⁵⁰ Azmzade Sadık El-Müeyyed (later Paşa) was born in Damascus as a member of a notable Anatolian-origin Syrian family. After graduated from Ottoman Military Academy in 1880, he was appointed as aide-de-camp (*yâver-i hazret-i şehriyâri*) of Abdülhamid II. Before being assigned as an envoy to Abyssinia, he was sent to Libya two times in order to send the gifts of Abdülhamid II to the Sanussi Sheikh Muhammed el-Mehdi in 1887 and 1895. He was sent to Germany within an envoy celebrating the enthronement of Wilhelm II as the King of Germany in 1888 and accompanied Grand Duchy of Russia, Sergei Alexandrovich during his visit to Jerusalem in the same year. In 1900, this time he was assigned to coordinate the establishment of Hejaz telegraph line. After his diplomatic mission to Abyssinia in 1904, he was appointed as Commissioner-General to Bulgaria and continued this duty until 1908. Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahrâ-yı Kebîri'nde Seyahat*, (İstanbul: Alem Matbaası, 1314 [1896-1897]), transliterated and edited by İdris Bostan, (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008). For a detailed biography of Azmzade Sadık el-Müeyyed, see the preface written by İdris Bostan to his travelogue, xi-xxv.

²⁵¹ The Abyssinian community of Jerusalem demanded the control of *Deyr-üs Saltana* monastery over which they and the Egyptian Copts had contested. In the letter that Menelik sent to Abdülhamid II, he mentioned that he demanded similar rights for the Abyssinians living in Jerusalem that he granted to the Muslims living in Abyssinia. Azmzade Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtnâmesi*, see the preface written by Mustafa Baydemir, 13.

²⁵² Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1996), 163-164.

²⁵³ Sadık el-Müeyyed followed a long route to reach Abyssinia. He first went to Marseilles and then to Port Said. Passing the Suez Canal, he reached at Djibouti on a French warship. From Djibouti, he headed for Dire Dewa and Harar by train and afterwards he had to go to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Abyssinia, on mules since there was neither railway nor a regular road. During this journey, he was accompanied by two Ottoman officers, major (*binbaşı*) Talip Bey and sergeant (*çavuş*) Yasin Efendi and some thirty local soldiers, servants and muleteers, who were provided by local authorities.

Saharan Desert. The mission was sent to Benghazi and al-Jaghbug (in contemporary Libya) in order to deliver the gifts of Abdülhamid II to the Sheikh of Sanusiyya movement, Muhammed al-Mehdi al-Sanussi (1845-1902), in 1887. The travelogue written after this mission was entitled *Afrika Sahrâ-yı Kebîri'nde Seyahat (Travel in the African Great Sahara)*. This was not a diplomatic mission in essence; Sadık el-Müeyyed was sent to deliver the gifts from the Sultan to the Sheikh of Sanussiyya in order to ensure that the Sheikh would continue his efforts to control the bedouins and to encourage them to struggle against French colonial aggression.²⁵⁴ The travelogue is quite valuable especially for its depiction of the desert life and the Ottoman perceptions of the Bedouins.

Besides diplomatic or semi-diplomatic initiatives, another official duty assigned to the Ottoman soldiers or bureaucrats in the nineteenth century was accompanying foreign monarchs or delegations visiting the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, starting from the Crimean War onwards, the rulers of European countries visited İstanbul and other parts of the Empire, most notably Jerusalem, for religious purposes and they were guided not only by Ottoman officials, but also by journalists during their visits. Two of such visits were of considerable significance since the Ottomans accompanying the foreign delegations wrote their memoirs in the form of a travelogue. The first one was the *Seyahâtname-i Arz-ı Filistin (The Travelogue of the Land of Palestine)*, written by an Ottoman soldier, Colonel Mehmet Refet Bey, who accompanied Crown Prince Victor Emmanuel of Italy (1869-1947) in 1886 during his visit to Palestine and Jerusalem. The travelogue was composed of sixteen chapters, which described the sixteen itineraries that the Crown Prince and the Italian delegation had followed. Although the travelogue consists of 196 pages, only 61 pages of it were written in the form of a travelogue. The remaining parts were designed as an encyclopaedia describing the sites, rulers, philosophers, prophets or historical monuments of Palestine.²⁵⁵ The second travelogue was not written by an

²⁵⁴ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahrâ-yı Kebîri'nde Seyahat*, (İstanbul: Alem Matbaası, 1314 [1896-1897]).

²⁵⁵ Mehmet Refet Paşa, *Seyahâtname-i Arz-ı Filistin*, (Suriye: Suriye Vilayet Matbaası, 1305 [1887]).

Ottoman official, but an unknown correspondent of *Sabah* newspaper, who followed the travel of German Emperor, Wilhelm II (r. 1888-1918), towards Syrian and Palestinian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in 1899. Accordingly, the German delegation first went to Beirut by sea, and then they visited Jaffa, Haifa, Sidon, Tripoli and Jerusalem, and the travelogue recounted all these destinations in detail.²⁵⁶

Economic motives resulted in travels in Hamidian era as well. The bankruptcy of the Ottoman economy in 1875, and subsequent establishment of the Ottoman Debt Administration (*Duyûn-u Umûmiye*) in 1881, resulted in the accumulation of several tax revenues under a single authority in order to pay the debts of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵⁷ The Debt Administration employed Ottoman officials to write reports on the resources on which the taxes could be imposed. Among these employees, Âli Bey's (1844-1899) mission towards Eastern Anatolia as well as the Iraqi provinces of the Empire ended with a travelogue entitled *Seyahât Jurnalî* (*The Travel Diary*). Âli Bey was first sent to Eastern Anatolia in 1884 as an inspector to control the operations of the Debt Administration; he was then instructed to go to the Iraqi provinces of the Empire. After his inspections in these provinces, he returned to İstanbul through a long journey via India in 1888. His travelogue was conspicuous not only for the Kurdish tribal life in the late nineteenth century, but also for providing a vivid Ottoman portrayal of India.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ *Hatıra-yı Seyahat: Almanya İmparatoru Haşmetli Wilhelm ve İmparatoriçe Augusta Viktorya Hazeratı'nın Dersaadeti Def'a-i Saniye Olarak Ziyaretleriyle Suriye Seyahatlerine Bir Hatıra-i Naçiz Olmak Üzere (Sabah) Gazetesi Tarafından Kar'iin-i Osmaniyyeye Hediye Edilmiştir*, (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1316 [1889]).

²⁵⁷ Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression' of 1873-1896," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1984): 107-118, 114. For a detailed account of *Duyun-u Umumiye*, see Faruk Yılmaz, *Devlet Borçlanması ve Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Dış Borçlar: Duyun-u Umumiye*, (İstanbul: Birleşik Yayıncılık, 1996).

²⁵⁸ Indeed, Âli Bey was one of the most significant play writers of *Tanzimat* era, known for his plays such as *Ayyar Hamza*, *Kokona Yatıyor* and *Geveze Berber*. He was also among the publishers of the famous humour magazine, *Diyojen*. Âli Bey was later appointed as the Governor of Trabzon in 1896 and the Director of the Ottoman Debt Administration. That's why he was also known as Direktör (Director) Âli Bey. Âli Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalî: İstanbul'dan Bağdad'a ve Hindistan'a, min sene 1300 ilâ sene 1304*, (İstanbul: Rauf Bey Kütüphanesi, 1314 [1898]).

The military missions were another source of travel writing in the Hamidian era. Two travelogues had emerged from the military missions sent to one of the most problematic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, namely Yemen. One of such missions was the military mission of Rüşdi Paşa who served in Yemen for two years between 1896 and 1898. He both stayed in Hudaydah for administering the transfer of troops from İstanbul to Yemen and in the inner parts of the province to suppress local rebellions.²⁵⁹ Accordingly, in order to prevent corruption and bribery which had resulted in the rebellion of Yemen and in order to realize necessary reforms a Committee of Reform (*Heyet-i Islahiye*) had been established. He was appointed with the rank of lieutenant colonel in order to control the transfer of the troops and he left İstanbul on June 7, 1896. His travelogue, entitled *Yemen Hatırası (The Memoirs of Yemen)* described the peoples and regions of nineteenth century Yemen and narrated the miserable conditions that the Ottoman soldiers experienced there. Another travelogue was written by a military doctor, İbrahim Abdüsselam (?-1927), entitled *Yemen Seyahât-nâmesi ve Coğrafya-yı Nebâtiyesi (The Travelogue of Yemen and Its Botanical Geography)*, who was sent to Yemen in 1894 for a visit of inspection. In this travelogue, while informing the reader on the flora of the Yemeni lands, he referred to the lifestyle of Yemeni people as well.²⁶⁰

Another military mission in this period was undertaken by Abdülkadir Câmî (Baykut, 1877-1958), an officer and a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which was a clandestine anti-Hamidian organization at that time. His critical stance towards Hamidian administration encouraged him to accept a difficult mission that might have required voluntary self-exile. The mission was the establishment of the Ottoman authority over the small but strategic town of Ghat on the Ottoman-Algerian border, which was carried out in response to the request of the inhabitants of this town fearing the French colonial intentions for the Province of Tripolitania. As a result, Abdülhamid sent

²⁵⁹ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 4

²⁶⁰ İbrahim Abdüsselam, *Yemen Seyahât-nâmesi ve Coğrafya-yı Nebatiyesi*, (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: Hilal Matbaası, 1324 [1908]).

Abdülkadir Câmî there as a district governor. His travel account from Tripoli to Ghat was published in 1909 as a travelogue entitled *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru* (*From Tripoli to the Great Sahara*).²⁶¹ In this travelogue, he not only criticized the Hamidian regime, but also portrayed the desert life and the nomadic tribes.

Sanitary inspection was another motive for travel in the Hamidian era and three sanitary missions to struggle with epidemics in several provinces of the Empire ended up with travelogues. The first one of such kind was written by Mehmed Şakir Bey (1851-1897) as a result of both personal and official reasons. Indeed, Mehmed Şakir Bey had already been serving as a sanitary officer in the Ottoman army and travelled to Hejaz, India, Baghdad, Basra, Comoro Islands and Yemen to investigate the sanitary conditions of the pilgrims travelling to Mecca. In 1890, he decided to perform pilgrimage; however, he was assigned an additional duty by Abdülhamid II, who wanted him to write about the sanitary conditions of Hejaz and possible reforms for preventing the epidemics, particularly cholera, in the region. His report delivered to the Sultan was more than a simple report; indeed, it might be perceived as a travelogue on Hejaz.²⁶²

The second travelogue written after a travel for sanitary purposes was written by Cenap Şehabettin (1870-1934), who was sent in 1896 to Hedjaz as a military doctor in an attempt to contain an outbreak of the cholera disease. He

²⁶¹ Abdülkadir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'den Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru* [*From Tripoli to the Great Sahara*], (Dersaadet [İstanbul]: [Unknown Publisher], 1326 [1909]). Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 163. Abdülkâdir Câmî (Baykut) was graduated from the Military Academy. After the re-proclamation of Ottoman Constitution in 1908, he resigned from the army and became the deputy of Fezzan in the Ottoman Parliament. After the First World War, he participated in the national liberation movement and became the first Minister of Interior of the nationalist forces in Ankara. After his retirement from active politics until his death he wrote articles in many newspapers. For the establishment of the Ghat district and the role of Abdülkâdir Câmî in this process, see Ahmet Kavas, "Büyük Sahra'da Gat Kazasının Kurulması ve Osmanlı-Tevarik Münasebetleri," *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 3 (1999), 171-195, 172.

²⁶² This report was not published as a separate book; the only manuscript is in the collection of İstanbul University Library. Its title is *Hicaz'ın Ahval-i Umumiye-i Şihhiye ve Islahat-i Esasiye-i Hazırasına Dair Bazı Müşahadat ve Mülâhazat-ı Bendegânemi Havi Bir Layiha-yı Tıbbiye* (A Medical Pamphlet Consisting of Some of His Servant's Observations and Remarks about the General Sanitary Conditions and Current Principal Reforms of Hejaz). It is transliterated and edited by Gülden Sarıyıldız and Ayşe Kavak with the title *Halife II. Abdülhamid II'in Hac Siyaseti: Dr. M. Şakir Bey'in Hicaz Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Timaş, 2009).

recorded his travel to Jeddah via Egypt in seventeen letters first published between 1896 and 1898 in *Servet-i Fünûn (The Riches of Sciences)* journal and later compiled as a travelogue in 1922 entitled *Hac Yolunda (On the Way to Pilgrimage)*.²⁶³ İsmail Habib Sevük, an eminent scholar of Turkish literature, defines this travelogue, which described Egypt, its cities and inhabitants in detail, as the ‘first literary travelogue’ of the Turkish literature because of its artistic style and pompous use of language, compared to the previous travelogues written in a plainer fashion.²⁶⁴

A similar travelogue, entitled *Seyahat Hatıraları (Travel Memoirs)* was written by Şerafettin Mağmumi (1869-1927), who was appointed as a sanitary inspector in 1899 to the Province of Syria to struggle with the outbreak of cholera epidemic sweeping the region in the late 1890s and early 1900s.²⁶⁵ His travelogue depicted not only the Western and Southern Anatolian cities that he passed along to reach his final destination but also the prominent cities of the province of Syria, such as Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. Being one of the ardent supporters and members of the CUP, the travelogue is quite critical regarding the underdevelopment of the province of Syria and since it was published after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, this critical tune was very much preserved.

Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey’s (1885-1964) memoirs, published in Germany in 1968, did not originally form a travelogue; however having served the Ottoman

²⁶³ Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kanaat, 1341 [1922-1923]). After graduating from Military High School and Military Academy of Medicine, Cenap Şehabettin was sent to Paris for further education and after his return he was assigned for health inspection missions in Mersin, Rhodes and Jeddah. However, besides his military background, he was renowned as one of the most famous poets of the late Ottoman era. See Celal Tarakçı, “Cenab Şehabettin,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 7, 346-349.

²⁶⁴ İsmail Habib Sevük, *Tanzimattan Beri Edebiyat Tarihi*, 2 Volumes, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1942), Vol. 1, 380.

²⁶⁵ Similar to Cenap Şehabettin, Şerafettin Mağmumi was also a graduate of the Military Academy of Medicine; however, different from him, he became one of the founding members of the Society (later Committee) of Union and Progress. His interest in politics resulted in his fleeing to Paris in 1896 and after the split of the Committee between Ahmed Rıza and Mehmed Murad, he became one of the ardent supporters of the latter. This resulted in his exclusion from the Committee, which assumed power after the re-proclamation of Ottoman constitution. He spent his remaining life in Cairo and died there. Şerafettin Mağmumi, *Seyahât Hatıraları*, (Mısır’ı Kahire: Matbaatü’l Fütuh, 1327 [1909]).

Empire in various missions, Ekrem Bey was quite eager to write down his travel experiences. Therefore, he produced one of the most colourful descriptions of the late-Hamidian Ottoman Middle East.²⁶⁶ Accordingly, in 1904, at the age of 19, as a young secretary in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, Ekrem Bey was invited by the second chamberlain of Abdülhamid II, İzzet Holo Paşa (1852-1924), to participate in the opening ceremony of the Hejaz Railway as the representative of the Foreign Ministry. His descriptions of the provinces of Syria and Hejaz as well as the nomadic tribes of the region in his memoirs are quite interesting. One year later after his return from this mission, Ekrem Bey was sent with Ottoman warships to Persian Gulf in order to “[...] demonstrate the presence of Turkish navy in the remotest parts of the Arabian Peninsula.”²⁶⁷ This time, he wrote about the cities and peoples living in the coastal regions of the Arabian Peninsula and emphasized their allegiance to the Porte. In sum, the memoirs of Ekrem Bey are important for touching upon various parts of Ottoman Empire ranging from the Arabian deserts to Persian Gulf, from Cairo to the ancient sites of Levant.

During the Hamidian period, the Ottomans did not only travel for official purposes; there were some exceptional Ottomans who had engaged in travels to distant parts of the world for personal reasons. One of them was Mehmed Emin (1854-1925), who had decided to travel to India in 1876 both for sanitary reasons to remedy his depressive mood and in order to find his father, who, he heard, had been residing there. His travelogue, entitled *İstanbul'dan Asya'ya Vusta'ya Seyahât (Travel from İstanbul to Central Asia)* did not mention about India, his final destination, but rather provides the reader with the Ottoman perception of Central Asia as well as the precursors of Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkist sentiments in its most primitive forms.

²⁶⁶ The *Avlonyalı* [Vlore] dynasty was one of the oldest families of Albania, which the Ottoman Empire had collaborated to pursue its sovereignty over this country. Ekrem Bey was a member of that family serving for the Ottoman Empire. His memoirs provide the reader with interesting details not only about the Albanian independence movement but also about various parts of the Ottoman Empire since he travelled a lot. Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, translated by Atilla Dirim, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006). Originally published as *Ekrem Bey Vlora: Lebenserinnerungen (1885-1912)*, (München: Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 1968).

²⁶⁷ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 143.

Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü (1865-1922?) was probably the man, who had travelled to the widest area that had ever been seen by a single Ottoman traveller during his travels between 1901 and 1907 to parts of Iran, Central Asia, Europe, North Africa, South Asia and China. Born as a descendent of an *ulama* family in the town of Eğirdir in south-western Anatolia, he was appointed as a postal official in various parts of the empire after his education in his home town. He wrote that the reason for his travel was his escape from the city of Deir ez-Zor in contemporary Syria, where he was exiled in 1901 as a result of being defamed by his rivals.²⁶⁸ However, he did not clearly explain how and why he undertook such a long and expensive journey. This ambiguity has led some scholars to argue that he was a clandestine agent supported by Abdülhamid for carrying out his Pan-Islamist policies.²⁶⁹ Indeed, Süleyman Şükrü's pro-Hamidian stance and his staunch critique of Abdülhamid's opponents strengthen this claim. His travelogue entitled *Seyahat-i Kübra (The Great Travel)* was published in 1907 after he had reached at St. Petersburg.²⁷⁰ This travelogue is one of the most interesting accounts of the perceptions of an Ottoman citizen regarding the European as well as the non-European world.

Halil Halid's (1869-1931) *Cezayir Hatıratından (From the Memories of Algeria)* was another interesting personal travelogue, which emerged as a result of his travel to Algeria not on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, but because he was sent as a delegate of Cambridge University to the Fourteenth Congress of Orientalists organized in Algiers in 1905.²⁷¹ Similar to Abdülkadir Câmî, his

²⁶⁸ Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, pp. 130-31.

²⁶⁹ According to Hee Soo Lee and Arzu Ocaklı, Süleyman Şükrü was sent by Abdülhamid under the auspices of the Grand Vizier Tahsin Paşa in order to launch Pan-Islamist propaganda in the region. See Hee Soo Lee and İbrahim İlhan, *Osmanlı-Japon Münasebetleri ve Japonya'da İslamiyet*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 367; Arzu Ocaklı, "XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ve XX. Yüzyılın Başında Çin Müslümanları ve Osmanlı İlişkileri," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 588-93, 593

²⁷⁰ Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, (Petersburg: [The Printing House of Abdürreşid İbrahim], 1907).

²⁷¹ Halil Halid was born in 1869 to a notable family living in Ankara; after his primary education in this city, he was sent by his family to İstanbul for further education. As a reaction to the confiscation of his hereditary lands by Abdülhamid II, he fled to Britain in 1894 and later appointed as Lecturer of Turkish in the University of Cambridge in 1902. After 1908, he returned

stance was quite anti-Hamidian because the Hamidian administration had confiscated the properties of his family, which resulted in his escape to Great Britain and his admission to Cambridge University as an instructor of Turkish. However, unlike Abdülkadir Câmî, he published his memoirs as a travelogue within the Hamidian period in 1906, in the *İdjtihad* publishing house run by Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932, also an ardent opponent of the Hamidian regime) in Cairo under the patronage of the Khedivate. Halil Halid's travelogue is also important for the description of French colonial administration in Algeria as well as his critique of the Orientalist discourse presented at the Congress of Orientalists.

Another ardent opponent of Abdülhamid who travelled for his own personal reasons in this period was Mehmed Fazlı, whose journey to Afghanistan was not previously planned but came about quite haphazardly. In Cairo, in January 1906, where he was residing as an exile due to his opposition to the Hamidian regime, he and some of his friends were invited by Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), the Afghan reformer acting at that time as the chief of bureau of translation for the Afghan royal court, who had expressed his need for talented people to serve for the modernization of Afghanistan.²⁷² Mehmed Fazlı's journey to Afghanistan via a long route over Russia and Central Asia provided the reader with a significant critique of the Ottoman neglect towards the Central Asia as well as with interesting insights regarding the modernization of Afghanistan.

All in all, the Hamidian era was one of the most fertile periods considering the genre of travel writing. The Ottoman officers and officials, who had travelled both within and outside the Empire for official as well as personal reasons, preferred to record their memoirs in the form of travelogue. Some of

to İstanbul and participated to the Ottoman Parliament as the Deputy of Ankara. In 1913, he was sent to Bombay as consul general and then returned to his academic life in İstanbul in the Faculty of Literature and then the Faculty of Theology in İstanbul. Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, (Mısır: Matbaa-i İctihad, 1906), transliterated and edited by Cemil Çiftçi, (İstanbul: Hece Yayınları, 2007). For his biography, see the preface written by Cemil Çiftçi to his travelogue, 7-14.

²⁷² Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, see the preface written by Kenan Karabulut to his travelogue, 4-10.

these travellers acted as diplomatic agents or agents for the implementation of Pan-Islamist policies; some others were also sent officially; however, they were not sincerely loyal to the Sultan and they would later be seen in the circles of the opposition movements. Finally, there were some personal travellers, who preferred to write and publish their memoirs for informing the readers. In sum, the travelogues of the Hamidian era are extremely useful for understanding the Ottoman travellers' perception of the East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

5.3. Post-Hamidian Travelogues to the Non-European World (1908-1920)

In terms of the reasons for travel, post-Hamidian travels did not differ much from the previous period; the Ottomans went to distant parts of the Empire as well as the world for official as well as non-official purposes. What distinguishes the post-Hamidian travelogues from the Hamidian ones was their critical tune. Although some Hamidian travelogues also included critical evaluations, particularly regarding the underdeveloped parts of the Empire, the degree of criticism was within the limits prescribed by the censure of the period; otherwise it would be impossible for them to be published. Post-Hamidian travelogues, either on the periphery of the Empire or on the Asian and African countries, included significant criticisms regarding the Hamidian suppression. According to these travelogues, the underdevelopment of remoter provinces of the Empire was the outcome of the negligence of previous administrations. What is more, the Ottoman travellers to the East frequently associated what they had seen in the non-European world with the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire, and thus blamed the Ottoman administration.

To start with the outcomes of individual experiences, three travelogues, written by authors having no official duty but engaging in voluntary travels, attract attention. The first of these travelogues, entitled *Âlem-i İslam ve Japonya'da İntişâr-ı İslâmiyet* (*The Muslim World and the Spread of Islam in Japan*) was written by Abdürreşid İbrahim after his travel to the Far East between September 1908 and October 1909, and it was one of the most voluminous travelogues of the Ottoman literature consisted of two large

volumes.²⁷³ Although Abdürreşid İbrahim was not an Ottoman citizen during his travel to the Far East, he can still be considered as an Ottoman traveller because he acted as if he was an Ottoman traveller during his travels to the Far East. Indeed, Abdürreşid İbrahim declared that the reason for his travels in these distant lands was personal; he claimed to just be obeying the religious prescriptions advising Muslims to travel and undertook this long and exhausting voyage.²⁷⁴ However, his intimate connection with Sultan Abdülhamid II makes some scholars to maintain that Abdürreşid İbrahim was a special agent supported by the sultan both for missionary purposes and for the provision of the continuation of local Muslim communities' allegiance to the Caliph.²⁷⁵ Whether an agent of Abdülhamid or not, his travelogue is perhaps the most detailed account of the Far East ever written by an Ottoman about these lands.

The second travelogue, emerged out of personal reasons, was entitled *Sudan Seyahât-nâmesi* (The Travelogue of Sudan) and written by Mehmed Mihri (1849-1915?), who penned down his voyage with the Crown Prince of Egypt, Yusuf Kemal to the interior parts of Egypt and Sudan for a hunting expedition in

²⁷³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam ve Japonya'da İntişâr-ı İslâmiyet*, 2 Volumes, (İstanbul: Ahmed Saki Bey Matbaası, 1328 [1910]). Abdürreşid İbrahim was born to a Bukharan Uzbek family in the small town of Tara in the Tobolsk Province of Siberia. After having basic religious education in his home town, he went to Medina where he stayed five years and attended prominent religious schools of the city. During his return voyage to Russia, he came to İstanbul where he attracted the attention of Münif Paşa (1830-1910), the then Minister of Education of the Ottoman government, whose mansion had been renowned to be a guesthouse for the theologians, philosophers and artists both from the East and the West. His encounter with Münif Paşa resulted in his presentation to the Ottoman bureaucratic and intellectual circles as well as Sultan Abdülhamid II. Although he returned to his hometown, he continued to visit İstanbul and these frequent visits ended with the granting of Ottoman citizenship to him in 1912. This was also the date when he published his travelogue. For the brief biography of Abdürreşid İbrahim, see the preface written by Ertuğrul Özalp who transliterated and edited this travelogue, 2 Volumes, (İstanbul, İşaret Yayınları 2003), Vol. 1, 21-32.

²⁷⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 7.

²⁷⁵ For example, see Lee and İlhan, *Osmanlı-Japon Münasebetleri*, 367; Ocaklı, "XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ve XX. Yüzyılın Başında Çin Müslümanları ve Osmanlı İlişkileri," 593. Selim Deringil, on the other hand, argues the contrary and writes that "the popular conception of Abdürreşid as Abdülhamid's envoy and missionary is misplaced." See Selim Deringil, "Ottoman-Japanese Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Selçuk Esenbel and Inaba Chiharu (eds.), *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), 42-47, 44.

the spring of 1909.²⁷⁶ In writing this travelogue, he stated his aim as informing the Ottomans about the general conditions, climate and history and natural economic sources of Sudan.²⁷⁷ Moreover, during the hunting trip, he encountered many African tribes, whom he portrayed in detail. His writings on the ethnic taxonomy of these tribes were quite important in understanding the Ottoman perception of the concept of race.

Finally, the third travelogue written after travels undertaken for personal reasons and entitled *Âfâk-ı Irak (The Horizons of Iraq)* was written by Cenap Şehabettin during his voyage in the Iraqi provinces of the Empire. Indeed, he did not clearly define the purpose of his voyage he made in 1916, but it was presumably a personal matter. This travelogue was particularly important for its extensive elaboration on the distinction between urban and non-urban space as well as between nomadism and civilization.²⁷⁸

Ali Suad's *Seyahatlerim (My Travels)* is another travelogue about the Iraqi provinces of the Empire. There is almost no information regarding the life of Ali Suad or his purpose of travel; however, still, it can be inferred from his travelogue that he went to the region as a member of a commission given the duty of "investigating some important issues regarding the [local] government and the tribes" (*hükümete ve aşaire ait bazı mesâil-i mühimmenin tahkîki*).²⁷⁹ His travelogue was quite similar to the aforementioned travelogue of Cenap Şehabettin due to his emphasis on nomadism vs. civilization distinction. However, his utopian projects for the revitalization of these desolated provinces

²⁷⁶ Born in Kirkuk to a local religious scholar of Turcoman origin, Mehmed Mihri joined the entourage of Mustafa Fazıl Paşa in the mid-1860s. After several years in the Chamber of Translation, he was assigned as the Ottoman consul in Khoy in 1878. From the beginning of the 1880s, until the First World War he was in the service of the Khedivian family. He was a poly-linguist commanding not only Arabic and Persian, but also French and English. See Herzog and Motika, "Orientalism *alla turca*," 152.

²⁷⁷ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 1.

²⁷⁸ Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak: Kızıldeniz'den Bağdat'a Hatıralar*, transliterated and edited by Bülent Yorulmaz, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2002).

²⁷⁹ Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, (Dersaadet: Kanaat Matbaası, 1332 [1914]), 36.

were more significant since they demonstrated what the Ottoman travellers prescribed to reverse the decline of the Empire in the periphery.

Another bureaucrat writing his memoirs in the post-Hamidian period was Halid Ziyaeddin. He was sent to Cairo for a purpose, which he did not mention clearly in his travelogue entitled *Musavver Mısır Hatırası* (*Illustrated Memories of Egypt*); however, he wrote that he decided to write down his memoirs in order to present the reader an account of Egyptian modernization and what the Ottomans could learn from the Egyptian experiences. What is more, he added the photographs taken during his travel and visualized the early twentieth century Egypt in the eyes of the readers.²⁸⁰

Journalists were another group of Ottoman intellectuals, who visited the Middle Eastern provinces of the Empire and sent their observations regularly as letters or telegraphs to their newspapers in the post-Hamidian era. Especially *Tanîn* newspaper published such correspondence in this period. One of these journalists was Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, who was elected as the Deputy of Baghdad to the Ottoman Parliament and soon performed a travel in 1908 towards the province that he represented. His letters sent to *Tanîn* were compiled by the author himself three years later; therefore his travelogue, entitled *Irak Mektupları* (*Letters of Iraq*) on his travel memoirs from Beirut to Kuwait, had emerged.²⁸¹ In these letters, İsmail Hakkı repeated most of the discussions frequently encountered in the travelogues written about the Ottoman Middle East at that period, such as the underdevelopment of the Ottoman territories, the emergence of Arab nationalism, the rebellious nomadic tribes, the failures of Ottoman armies in the region, and the English hegemony over the Persian Gulf.

Another journalist was Ahmed Şerif, who engaged in several travels between 1910 and 1912 in various parts of the Ottoman Empire in order to inform the readers about the reflections of the re-proclamation of the Ottoman constitution and parliamentary system. After visiting Albania, and watching the

²⁸⁰ Halid Ziyaeddin, *Musavver Mısır Hatırası*, (İstanbul: Agob Matosyan Matbaası, 1326 [1910]).

²⁸¹ İsmail Hakkı Babanzade, *Irak Mektupları*, (İstanbul: *Tanîn* Matbaası, 1329 [1911]).

unrest in this region because of the maladministration of the Ottoman government, he went to Syria and Lebanon in order to examine the conditions of Syria, Hawran and Jabal Druze and to follow the military expedition against the Druze rebellions in the region.²⁸² However, he not only reported about these military incursions, but also wrote his travel memoirs about the regions he visited. From Lebanon, after the eruption of the Ottoman-Italian War in Tripolitania, Ahmed Şerif went to the Ottoman headquarters in Aziziye, near Darnah, Tripolitania, in order to follow the Turco-Italian war. Hence his correspondence with the newspaper provided the reader with the perception of these vast regions by a journalist sympathetic to the CUP.

Diplomatic and non-diplomatic, even clandestine, missions to the Asian states were also visible in the post-Hamidian period, particularly on the eve of and during the First World War. The reason for these missions was to obtain the support of Central Asian Turks to the Ottoman struggle against the Allied States. However, all these missions failed, either as a result of the reluctance of Central Asian Turks to cooperate with the Ottomans, or the Russian, and particularly the Chinese pressure on the missions for preventing the accomplishment of their aims. The diplomatic mission of Ubeydullah Efendi (1858-1937), who was appointed as the Ottoman Ambassador to Afghanistan in 1915, was one of them.²⁸³ He gathered his memoirs written during this mission in two volumes when he returned, and later decided to deliver these manuscripts shortly before

²⁸² Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'da, Sûriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, 101.

²⁸³ Mehmed Ubeydullah (Hatipoğlu) was born to a notable ulama family of İzmir; after his education, his political ideas resulted in his fleeing to Paris. After his return in late 1890s, he was assigned to participate into the Universal Exposition of 1893 in Chicago. He wandered on the American continent visiting not only the United States, but also Mexico and Cuba. This journey lasted for five years. From 1901 to 1906, he was in exile in Taif; he could only feel comfortable after the re-proclamation of the Ottoman constitution in 1908. After that he became the Deputy of Aydın in the Parliament. During the First World War, he was sent to Afghanistan; however, his mission failed. After the War, he was arrested by the British and sent to Malta for trial. In the Republican era, he published many articles on various newspapers and once more became a Deputy in the Ottoman Parliament. He died in İstanbul in 1937. For a detailed information about his life and travels see Ömer Hakan Özalp (ed.), *Mehmed Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Malta, Afganistan ve İran Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2002) and Ahmet Turan Alkan, *Sıradışı Bir Jöntürk: Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Amerika Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997).

his death to a famous journalist, Hikmet Feridun Es (1910-1992), who published some excerpts and summaries from these notes in some journals and newspapers during 1930s and 40s. These memoirs included quite satirical and extremely interesting accounts regarding the Ottoman perception of Iranians and Central Asian Turks as well as their counter-perception.²⁸⁴

The First World War also produced three more travelogues written by Pan-Turkist young Ottoman officers, who were extremely eager to save their country through a strong alliance among the Turks. In other words, Pan-Turkist ideals led them to cooperate with the CUP and particularly with the Special Organization (*Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa*). One of such missions was performed by Habibzade Ahmed Kemal (İlkul, 1889-1966), who went Kasghar in 1913 in order to educate Turkish youngsters in Turkistan living under oppressive Chinese rule.²⁸⁵ In some cities of Turkistan, such as Kasghar, Artux, Kucha and Urumchi, he attempted to introduce modern education to the Turkish youngsters; however, he encountered the opposition of the local Muslim elites, who opposed the youngsters being inculcated with ideas such as liberty, equality, or

²⁸⁴ Ubeydullah Efendi started his mission on April 8, 1915; the ambassadorial mission was composed of himself as the ambassador, the former governor of Basra, Süleyman Şefik Paşa, as the military attaché, several secretaries from the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his personal aide and an imam. However, when they reached Mosul, the envoy was warned that the way ahead was not safe due to rebellions of local tribes; therefore the members of the envoy did not want to go further. This did not stop Ubeydullah Efendi and he continued his mission on his own. On September 7, he reached at Hamadan, in which they were welcomed with a great respect; everyone closed their shops and the Jewish community of Hamadan, who were both Ottoman citizens and dominating the trade of the city, expressed their content for the arrival of the mission to their city. In Hamadan, he heard the similar warnings; but he was insisted on continuing the mission; so he left Hamadan and went Sultanabad, where he was welcomed as an “emperor.” Then he left for Isfahan, Yezd and Kerman. In the environs of Kerman, he was captured by the British; however one of the local Turkish tribal leaders attacked the British garrison and saved Ubeydullah Efendi. Özalp (ed.), *Mehmed Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Malta, Afganistan ve İran Hatıraları*, 206-222.

²⁸⁵ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal was born in Rhodes in 1889 to a merchant family; he took his education from *Medrese-i Süleymaniye* established by Ahmed Midhat Efendi when he had been in exile on this island and he also took private lessons from Ottoman intellectuals exiled to the island, such as Vicdani Bey and Tevfik Bey. After his education he served as teacher in various Aegean islands; in 1911, he had to flee from Meis after the Dodecanese were invaded by the Italians. Then, he came to İstanbul, participated to the CUP and he became one of the closest aides of Talat Paşa. In 1913, a notable local elite from Kasghar, Ebulhasan Hacı arrived İstanbul on his way to pilgrimage and after listening the ignorance of the youngsters of Turkistan, Talat Bey decided to send Ahmed Kemal to Kasghar as a teacher. See the preface written by Yusuf Gedikli to *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları, Şangay Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1997), 1-13.

abandonment of religious dogmatism, which would shatter the local elites' authority in the region. As a result of the tacit collaboration between these elites and the Chinese, Ahmed Kemal was imprisoned by the Chinese authorities, who later brought him to Shanghai and took him into custody. He was released in 1919 due to the intervention of the Consul of the Netherlands and was able to return to İstanbul a year later. His adventurous memoirs were compiled in two travelogues, the first one, entitled *Çin Türkistan Hatıraları (Memories of China-Turkistan)*, was published in 1925 and the second one, entitled *Şangay Hatıraları (Memories of Shanghai)*, was published in 1939.²⁸⁶ In these travelogues, he not only criticized the Muslims of Turkistan for their ignorance and bigotry but also narrated the Far Eastern cities he visited and peoples he encountered along his exile route from Kasghar to Shanghai.

The second Pan-Turkist mission was undertaken by Adil Hikmet and his four companions during World War I. In 1914, on the eve of World War I, Adil Hikmet and four other Ottoman officers were ordered by the CUP administration to organize the Central Asian Turks and, if possible, to ignite a Turkish rebellion against Russia. During their mission, they were captured by the Russians in 1915, tried and sentenced to death; however, with the intervention of the German Embassy in Beijing, they were imprisoned in Kapal, China. In 1916, they were able to escape and returned Turkistan. Then they took the leadership of the local Kirghiz rebels and launched one of the most significant rebellions against the Russians during World War I. After this rebellion had been suppressed by the Russians, Adil Hikmet and his fellow officers fled to Khotan by passing through the Taklamakan Desert. Finally, in June 1918 they reached Shanghai, where Adil Hikmet stayed for three years. His memoirs were published in the *Cumhuriyet*

²⁸⁶ See Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin Türkistan Hatıraları*, (İzmir: Marifet Matbaası, 1341 [1925]); *Şangay Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Kader Basımevi, 1939). The first one of these two travelogues was transliterated by N. Ahmet Özalp, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1996). This travelogue was combined with the second one under a single volume as well. See, Ahmed Kemal İlkul, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları, Şangay Hatıraları*, transliterated and edited by Yusuf Gedikli, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1997).

newspaper in 1928 and later compiled as a book.²⁸⁷ These memoirs were particularly important for understanding the Ottoman perception of the central Asian Turks as well as the Chinese and the presence of European colonial powers in China.

All in all, post-Hamidian travelogues were significant for their fervent political tune; the CUP's political agenda leaked into most of these texts and the Hamidian regime was presented as the major source of underdevelopment of the peripheral regions of the Ottoman Empire. The travels to the Middle East in this period reflected the miserable conditions of the cities and peoples. Like many of the travelogues of the preceding periods; they focused on the distinction between nomadism and civilization as well. On the other hand, the travelogues to the Central Asia and particularly Turkistan reflected the Pan-Turkist exuberance and included quite positive accounts of the Turks living in the region.

One of the most significant but one of the most underestimated sources to understand the Ottoman perception of the East in the late nineteenth century were the travelogues written by the Ottoman travellers to the non-European world. Despite the difference of styles and contents, these travelogues have some common characteristics. To start with the patterns of travel, it can be argued that they did not change much from the classical to the modern era; official duties, including military, diplomatic or economic missions, established the basic motives to travel; however, particularly by the 1870s and onwards, personal travels became more frequent.

Secondly, regarding the content, it can be argued that the major difference between classical and modern travel-narration was the latter's prevalence given to the travel memoirs rather than the purpose of travel. This prevalence also resulted in the politicization of travelogues from the very beginning. For example, the Ottoman discontent regarding nomadism (as for Mehmed Hurşid), their centuries-long rivalry with neighbouring states,

²⁸⁷ Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk [Five Turks in Asia]*, compiled, transliterated and edited by Yusuf Gedikli, (İstanbul, Ötüken Neşriyat, 1998). For the brief biography of Adil Hikmet, see the appendix written by Gedikli, 551-554.

particularly with Iran (as for Mehmed Fazlı) and Russia (as for Habibzade Ahmed Kemal), the opposition to Hamidian regime (as for Abdülkadir Câmî), or the dislike of Young Turks by some pro-Hamidian travellers (as for Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü) permeated the lines of the travelogues. Hence these travelogues were not only written for enjoying the readers but also for presenting the political thoughts of the author directly or indirectly.

Finally, regarding the style, it can be argued that most of the travelogues were extremely informative. The educative purpose attached to the travelogues was so dominant that even parts of some travelogues were totally derived from Islamic as well as Western history or geography books. This sometimes dried the style; however still, there were several travelogues written by the most famous men of letters of the age such as Cenap Şehabettin, Direktör Âli Bey or Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, which could be labelled as the most brilliant pieces of Ottoman travel writing. In other words, travel literature contributes to the Ottoman knowledge regarding the external world and did so by attracting the attention of the reader through colourful descriptions of the regions visited and the peoples encountered. These pieces are also important for their presentation of the Ottoman perception of the concept of civilization both in the European sense of this word and in the traditional Islamic sense displaying this concept as the opposite of the concept of nomadism; the notion of civilization and its reception by the Ottoman intellectuals/travellers is the theme of the next part of this dissertation.

PART III

THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION: EUROPEAN AND OTTOMAN VERSIONS

Any study on the Ottoman perception of the East can not be fulfilled without an analysis of the idea of civilization in the Ottoman Empire, since this perception is very much shaped by this concept. The word *civilization*, which had emerged in Europe in the mid-eighteenth century as an ideal to elevate the humanity to a higher stage of being, soon reached the Ottoman Empire first as a *technique* to prevent the decadence of the Empire and to provide her a place among the *civilized* nations, and then as an *ideal* for social as well as individual development. However, the Ottoman intellectuals did not simply emulate the European understanding of this concept. When they were adopting it, they transformed its meaning through incorporating a selective approach by distinguishing between the material and moral elements of civilization, and through blending the European conceptualizations with the Ottoman/Islamic notions and perceptions. On the one hand, since the Ottomans learned about the material and moral aspects of the European civilization directly from the European sources, their perception of civilization had significant parallels with the evolution of the understanding of this concept in Europe. On the other hand, some of the notions of civilization had already been present in the Ottoman/Islamic culture; hence these notions were revitalized and harmonized with the European ones. In sum, the outcome is a unique perception of civilization, which has both similarities with and differences from the meaning of this concept in Europe.

The analysis of the emergence and evolution of the concept of civilization in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is therefore essential to understand the Ottoman perception of the East. As mentioned previously, the central argument of this dissertation is that the Ottomans did not perceive the East as the Westerners did,

and one of the most significant justifications of this argument is the originality of the Ottoman conception of civilization. The reason of writing this part of the dissertation is, therefore, to demonstrate the roots of this originality by referring to three sets of differences, being (1) the differences between the European and Ottoman conceptions of civilization; (2) the different perceptions in the Ottoman intellectual circles in different periods; and (3) the differences between the perceptions of the Ottoman intellectuals, most of whom had never been to the East, and the Ottoman travellers who had actually experienced it.

This part is composed of three chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the emergence and evolution of the idea of civilization in Europe, since the discussions on this idea forms one of the most significant sources of the Ottoman perception of civilization. In doing that, the transformation of this concept from a universal phenomenon to a European one is covered in order to demonstrate the Ottoman reaction to this transformation. The second chapter deals with the Ottoman intellectuals' perception of this concept and its evolution during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The parallel narrative of these two chapters is useful to understand how the Ottoman perceptions had been influenced from the transformation of the concept in Europe. Finally, the third chapter particularly focuses on the Ottoman travellers' perception of civilization and how it resembles and differs from the perception of other Ottoman intellectuals, who had never been to the East. Engaging in such a differentiation demonstrates that these two groups of intellectuals focused on different aspects of the notion of civilization in order to compare and contrast the East and the West.

CHAPTER 6

EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION IN EUROPE

The concept of civilization has not a single meaning prevalent at all times and in all places. Like many other concepts, it has emerged and evolved within a peculiar temporal and spatial framework; in other words, its meaning varied in different periods and in different regions. For example, the ancient Greek perception of the Persians had something quite interrelated with the modern conception of the word *civilization* based on the distinction between the *civilized* and *uncivilized*, since the Greeks distinguished between themselves as the defenders of freedom and by extension as civilized, and the Persians as the defenders of despotism/tyranny, in other words as uncivilized.²⁸⁸ The concept of *umran*, which had extensively analyzed in the writings of the fourteenth century Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), had significant similarities with the concept of civilization in the nineteenth century.²⁸⁹ The Chinese, from the third century B.C. to the tenth century A.D. had the concept of *li*, meaning courtesy, propriety, or politeness, and distinguished between their *li*-based culture and “little people,” who could not accomplish such a level of refinement. This perception reminded the aforementioned distinction between the *civilized* and *uncivilized* as well.²⁹⁰ All these examples show that it was not

²⁸⁸ Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3.

²⁸⁹ In his article on Ibn Khaldun, Mohammed Talbi translated the concept of *al-umran* as “the civilized society” (*la société civilisée*). See Mohammed Talbi, “Ibn Haldūn et le sens de l’Histoire,” *Studia Islamica*, No. 26 (1967): 73-148, 79; For a detailed account of *umran* see the introduction written by Franz Rosenthal to Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah: Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*, translated and introduced by Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

²⁹⁰ Charles Halcombe, *The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C. – A.D. 907*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 42-44.

the idea of civilization, but its word form, emerged in a particular period (i.e., mid-eighteenth century) and in a particular place (i.e., Europe, more particularly France).

The Ottomans encountered with the word *civilization* in the early nineteenth century, and the Ottoman version of this word, *medeniyet*, was coined after this encounter. What is more, the evolution of the concept of *medeniyet* had significant parallels with the evolution of the concept of civilization. The reason for focusing initially on the emergence and evolution of the European understanding of civilization is, therefore, important to reveal how the Ottomans had perceived all these transformations, and how the concept of *medeniyet* had been conceived accordingly. In doing that, a chronological sequence is followed. First of all, the precursors of the concept of civilization are examined in line with the particular historical experiences of Europe before the mid-eighteenth century. Then the emergence and consolidation of the concept from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century is analysed through referring the socio-political conditions in Europe that resulted in this neologism. Finally, the transformation of the concept of civilization from a universal phenomenon, first to a more particularistic, and then to a more racist one throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is covered in order to draw attention to its flexibility.

6.1. The Precursors of the Idea of Civilization before Mid-Eighteenth Century (1500-1750)

In order to understand the emergence of the concept of civilization in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, the evolution of its precursors, such as the words *civiliser* (to civilize) and *civilité* (civility), should be examined. Although the root of all these three words (*civiliser*, *civilité*, and *civilization*) descended from the Latin word *civis* (citizen) or *civitas* (city), they acquired their meanings closer to the contemporary understanding only from the sixteenth century onwards.²⁹¹ The socio-political developments of the early

²⁹¹ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 24-25.

modern Europe are therefore quite important in understanding the emergence of the precursors of the idea of civilization.

According to Thomas Patterson, it was the geographical explorations that added a new connotation to the words *civiliser* and *civilité*, with which they were utilized as a distinguishing medium between the native communities and the European explorers. This distinction would soon evolve into the oppositional duality between the *civilized* and the *uncivilized*.²⁹² Similarly, Bruce Mazlish claims that the encounter with *primitives* evoked the query of how the *civilized* man did arise; this query would evolve into the presentation of civilization as “the last stage of mankind from an original barbarism and savagery” in coming years.²⁹³

The European encounter with the native communities of America and Africa, combined with Europe’s increasing maritime trade with Asia, resulted in the flow of abundant information about the non-European world. This flow carved the discussion regarding the differences between the Europeans and the non-Europeans, and resulted in the categorization of non-European people in terms of religion, more particularly, in terms of their capacity to adopt Christianity. In other words, a European medium (i.e., Christianity) was utilized to demonstrate the distinctiveness of a particular group of people from *others*.²⁹⁴

While religion and civility were closely interrelated, more secular categorizations, based on the notion of progress of the humanity, were also quite popular in the early modern period. In 1568, the French historian Loys le Roy (1510 - 1577) claimed that the ancient inhabitants of Europe had been as rude

²⁹² Thomas Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997), 30.

²⁹³ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 8.

²⁹⁴ For example, José de Acosta (1539-1600), a Jesuit missionary served in Peru, wrote in late 1570s in his book entitled *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias* (The Natural and Moral History of the Indies) that the non-European peoples could be divided into three, being (1) the subjects of non-Christian monarchies like China and Japan who could be converted to Christianity through peaceful teaching, (2) the illiterate barbarians like the Incas and Aztecs who could be converted only through a strong Christian ruler, and (3) the savages like the peoples of the Amazon basin who could only be converted by force. See Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, p. 31.

and uncivilized as the contemporary communities encountered in America and Africa, and he utilized the verb *civiliser* to describe the process denoting the change from a primitive, natural condition to a more advanced one.²⁹⁵ This was one of the earliest indications of the notion of *progress*, and the progressive understanding of history, which would later be an essential part of the debates of civilization.

In the seventeenth century the precursory words of civilization, namely *civiliser* and *civilité*, had developed in three distinct but interrelated paths (1) as an individual attribution, (2) as a source of progress through reason, and (3) as a legal process. To start with, the relative decline of aristocracy and the parallel rise of bourgeoisie, according to Norbert Elias, resulted in the replacement of the French words of *courtoisie* (courtesy) and *policé* (politeness) with the word *civilité* in the seventeenth century, and this replacement facilitated the transformation of this word into the word *civilization* a century later.²⁹⁶ Accordingly, the word *civilité* was defined in the *Dictionnaire Universal* (Universal Dictionary) of Antoine Furetière (1619-1688) as polite and courteous behaviour attributed to individuals, and this usage was utilized extensively thenceforward.²⁹⁷

The second meaning of civilization, associated with progress through reason, began to emerge towards the mid-seventeenth century. In the writings of proto-Enlightenment philosophers such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650), reason was appraised as a uniquely human attribute differentiating people from animals and nature; it was argued that in case of the systematic application of reason, irrational customs and superstitions could be eliminated, nature could be controlled and social institutions could be improved. According to Patterson, all these processes, achieved through the application of

²⁹⁵ Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 32

²⁹⁶ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, translated by Edmund Jephcott, (London: Blackwell, 2000), 10.

²⁹⁷ Lucien Febvre, *Uygurluk, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, translated by Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1995), 22

reason, would turn out to be the fundamental aspects of the idea of civilization in the eighteenth century.²⁹⁸ The prevalence of reason over divinity also resulted in the secularization of the understanding of the world, and particularly, Europe. The continent was generally referred as the *Respublica Christiana*, which gradually lost its significance from the seventeenth century onwards. From then on, Europe was begun to be defined as a continent composed of people sharing some commonalities besides religion. Hence, this line of thinking contributed to the Europeans' differentiation of their continent from the non-European world, which would in turn be one of the most important elements of modern understanding of civilization.²⁹⁹

Third, particularly after the Treaty of Westphalia, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the verb *civiliser* acquired a technical meaning in law; namely "to subject to the law of civil or social propriety" and "to make lawful or proper in a civil community."³⁰⁰ This legal usage was so popular in the eighteenth century that the famous French *Encyclopédie* included only a juristic meaning for the verb *civiliser*, namely "to change a criminal legal action into a civil one."³⁰¹

All in all, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the precursors of the idea of civilization were evolved in a way to prepare the ground for the coinage of the concept of civilization. The geographical explorations, which introduced the non-European/inferior other to the Europeans, the relative decline of aristocracy *vis-à-vis* bourgeoisie, which enlarged the scope of the concept of *civilité* from the narrow courtly circles to a wider group of individuals, the focus on reason, radically altering the static perception of history and creating a

²⁹⁸ Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 35.

²⁹⁹ For this line of argumentation see Anthony Pagden, "Europe: Conceptualizing A Continent," in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From the Antiquity to the European Union*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33-54, 52-53.

³⁰⁰ A. Nuri Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, (London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 58.

³⁰¹ A[lfred] L[ouis] Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), 17.

dynamic version of social development based on the idea of progress, and finally the acquisition of European military superiority over the non-European world in the mid-eighteenth century contributed to the formulation of the word *civilization*.

6.2. The Emergence and Consolidation of the Word *Civilization* (1750-1800)

Although the precursors of the idea of civilization can be traced back to the early modern period, the actual coinage of the word was an outcome of the Enlightenment, namely the eighteenth century intellectual developments in Europe.³⁰² The first usage of the word *civilization* was a matter of discussion. According to Lucien Febvre, the word had not been used before Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger's (1722-1759) *L'Antiquité Devoilée par ses Usages* (The Antiquity Revealed by Its Uses), published in 1766.³⁰³ According to Emile Benveniste, on the other hand, the first usage of the word appeared a decade ago in Marquis de Mirabeau's (1749-1791) *L'Ami des Hommes* (The Friend of the Men), printed in 1756.³⁰⁴ In Mirabeau's usage in this text, the word appeared three times. It was first related to religion; Mirabeau writes that "religion [...] is the mainspring of civilization."³⁰⁵ In the other two usages, Mirabeau related the concept of civilization with barbarity and established the famous formula of *civilization vs. barbarity*. Accordingly, the second usage follows as "[f]rom there one can see how the natural circle leading to barbarism to decadence, by way of civilization and wealth, might be begun against by a clever and attentive minister [...]" and

³⁰² For a detailed analysis on the theorizing regarding the concept of civilization and a good review of twentieth century literature on this concept see Johann P. Arnason, "Civilizational Patters and Civilizing Processes," *International Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2001): 387-405.

³⁰³ Febvre, *Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, 13

³⁰⁴ Emile Benveniste, *Problemes de Linguistique Générale*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 337-338.

³⁰⁵ Indeed, Mazlish finds that usage quite surprising since the Enlightenment period had a tendency to secularization. See, Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 5-6.

the third usage as “[...] in financial affairs we can see this ghost of spectre of barbarism and oppression weighing down on civilization and liberty.”³⁰⁶

In sum, the concept of civilization first appeared in word form in the second half of the eighteenth century. Then the question is what socio-political circumstances resulted in the appearance of this concept in that particular period? According to Elias, one should refer to the emergence of a new understanding of society in the Enlightenment period in order to understand the coinage of the word *civilization*. He argues that the transfer of the perception of civilized behaviour from the court society to the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century necessitated the reformulation of courtesy and politeness not only as an individual character, but also as an attribution to society. Hence emerged, in his words, the *natural* life of middle classes as opposed to the *unnatural* life of court society; this naturalization of life and its spread from the small echelons of nobility to the wider middle classes increased the interest of people towards a *refined* – or rather a *civilized* – lifestyle.³⁰⁷ In other words, the aim of the Enlightenment philosophers was to derive a general characteristic for the society, namely *civilization*, from the individualistic conception of the *homme civilisé* (the civilized man).³⁰⁸

The second significant factor in the coinage of the concept of civilization in the eighteenth century was the primordial crystallization of the social sciences. According to Mazlish, the disciplines of social sciences began to appear out of “sciences of man,” and the emerging awareness that the society could be continuously transformed by human reason created a fertile ground for the emergence of the word *civilization*.³⁰⁹ He further argues that, particularly as a result of the works of the *Encyclopédistes*, the key words such as *public*, *public opinion*, *public sphere*, *social*, and *sociability* became omnipresent; these words:

³⁰⁶ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 6

³⁰⁷ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 17.

³⁰⁸ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 35.

³⁰⁹ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 11.

[...] are all part of an effort to describe, understand, and project new forms of social bonding. They arise in the face of an awareness that the old ties and structures are crumbling when confronted by impending revolutionary change, both political and economical.³¹⁰

The perception of society as a collectivity that could be improved through human reason would later be associated with the progressive understanding of social development; civilization would, therefore, appear as an ideal to realize the positive transformation of the society to a better state of being.

In sum, in this period, the self-perception of the Europeans based on religion began to be replaced by a more secular understanding of civilization based on the ideas of Enlightenment. According to Pim den Boer:

Christianity continued to play a role in the self image of Europeans during the eighteenth century but it was no longer the dominant force that it had been in previous centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century Europe and Christendom were no longer synonyms. European feelings of superiority were based on a conglomeration of ideas proceeding from the Enlightenment which, in turn, came to be associated with the notion of civilization.³¹¹

Besides the internal developments in Europe and secularization of spatical conceptualization of the continent another significant reason for the emergence of the concept of civilization in the mid-eighteenth century is the consolidation of the European superiority over the non-European world in this period. Until the mid-eighteenth century, Europe was only controlling the Americas to some extent and some Oceanic islands in the Pacific region; the core parts of the Old World were still dominated by non-European powers, such as the Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese Empires. However, from the early eighteenth century onwards, all these three non-European powers began to decline *vis-à-vis* Europe, which increased European penetration in the regions that they had been controlling. In other words, the search for the idea of European superiority contributed to the emergence of the concept of civilization which had been assumed as a motive to understand this idea.

³¹⁰ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 12.

³¹¹ Den Boer, "Europe to 1914: The Making of An Idea," 38.

Eighteenth century did not only witness the emergence of the concept of civilization, but also a renewed understanding of its opponents. As mentioned above, the words like *savage* and *barbarian* had already been referred as antonyms of the concept of *civilized*; however, in the eighteenth century their meanings were more established and consolidated in relation to the concept of civilization. The hierarchy once established in the sixteenth century on religious grounds was replaced by a similar hierarchy this time based on the civilizational patterns. Accordingly, the bottom of this hierarchy was constituted by the *savage*, which had been defined in the eighteenth century under two categories, being the *ignoble savage*, who was violent to any kind of human being either civilized or uncivilized, and the *noble savage*, whose innocence was appreciated by the Romantics to criticize the negative aspects of European civilization. The savage, in both forms, was perceived as a childish human being; he was closer to nature, and he could be educated to *mimic* the European manners, either peacefully (for the noble savage) or through force (for the ignoble savage).³¹²

Between the savage and the civilized man, the category of barbarian resided. The barbarian was more developed compared to the savage; however, he was perceived as irredeemable and dangerous unlike the savages. Thus the barbarians can not be educated and continue to present a threat for the civilized. Indeed, although the savage constituted the bottom of this hierarchy, it was a more favoured category, since the barbarian was feared to have a system alternative to that of the civilized. In other words, the *civilized* was associated within a system, in which elements of Christianity and sovereignty based on rule of law merged; the *barbarian* had a system as well, which was composed of a mono/polytheistic but an established belief system together with sovereignty based on despotism. The existence of an inferior, but still an alternative system made the promulgators of the universality of civilization in the eighteenth century more reactive to the barbarian than to the savage.³¹³

³¹² Mark Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations*, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 20-21.

³¹³ Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations*, 22.

After its coinage, the concept of civilization was consolidated until the end of the eighteenth century.³¹⁴ According to Patterson, the word was extensively used by French *physiocrats*³¹⁵ and Scottish philosophers.³¹⁶ He wrote that the word became so popular that even in 1792 the newborn daughter of a French deputy was named *Civilisation*.³¹⁷ What is more, the expression *la civilisation européenne* (The European civilization) was first used in 1766 by the French physiocrat Abbé Baudeau (1730-1792), who recommended “[...] not only converting the American Indians to Christianity but also to European civilization in order to make real Frenchmen of them;” such a usage clearly distinguished between Christianity and civilization since Christianization did not suffice to civilize an uncivilized man.³¹⁸

In the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, the concept of civilization had not meant the same everywhere in Europe. Particularly, there are

³¹⁴ Following Mirabeau and Boulanger, Abbé Raynal (1711-1796) used the word in his *L'Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes* (*The Philosophical and Political History of the Establishments and Commerce of Europeans in Two Indias*) published in 1770; this was followed by Denis Diderot's (1713-1784) *Réfutation d'Helvétius* (*The Refutation of Helvetius*) in 1774, and Henri Linguet's (1736-1794) *Théorie des Lois Civiles ou Principes Fondamentaux de la Société* (*The Civil Law Theory and the Fundamental Principles of the Society*) in 1776. Febvre, *Uygurluk, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, 16; Benveniste, *Problemes de Linguistique Générale*, 341

³¹⁵ The *physiocracy* was perceived as one of the earliest economic theories. Emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century (hence, a contemporary of the word “civilization”), this theory argues that the wealth of nations was derived solely from the value of land agriculture or land development. For a detailed account of *physiocracy* see Phillippe Steiner, “Physiocracy and French Pre-Classical Political Economy,” in Jeff E. Biddle [et. al.] (eds.), *A Companion to the History of Economic Thought*, (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).

³¹⁶ The word *civilization* was soon imported by the English authors. According to Benveniste, the first English usage of the word was realized by the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) in his book entitled *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* published in 1767; this was followed by another Scottish philosopher and historian John Millar's (1735-1801) *Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society* published in Amsterdam in 1771. See Benveniste, *Problemes de Linguistique Générale*, 342-343. Febvre added that it was the English lawyer and author James Boswell (1740-1795), who wrote in 1772 in his memoirs that he could not convince the famous British lexicographer Samuel Johnson of using the word *civilization* as an antonym of *barbarity*, meaning that the British intellectuals were aware of the significance of the concept. Febvre, *Uygurluk, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, 18.

³¹⁷ Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 42.

³¹⁸ Den Boer, “Europe to 1914: The Making of An Idea,” 45.

two different, if not opposing, perceptions of civilization. One of them was promulgated by the Anglo-French authors; whereas the other was stemmed from the German tradition. According to Elias, the Anglo-French conception of civilization “[...] sums up in a single term their pride in the significance of their own nations for the progress of the West and of humankind.”³¹⁹ The German conception, on the other hand, preferred to utilize *Kultur* instead of *Zivilisation* in order to denote what the Anglo-French conception meant. Accordingly, *Zivilisation* was of secondary importance for the Germans, “[...] comprising only the outer appearance of human beings, the surface of human existence.”³²⁰

According to Elias, therefore, there are significant differences between the concepts of civilisation and *Kultur*. The first difference is that while the Anglo-French conception refers to the political, economic, religious, technical, moral or social facts, the German conception clearly divides between the intellectual, artistic and religious attributes on the one hand, and political, economic and social attributes on the other. Secondly, the Anglo-French conception describes a progressive process, something in constant motion forward; it ignores national differences between peoples and emphasizes the commonalities of all human beings. The German conception, on the other hand, places special stress on national differences and the particular identities of social groups. In other words, the universalizing tendency of the Anglo-French understanding of *civilization* clearly contradicts with the more particularistic German conception of *Kultur*.³²¹

The division between civilization and *Kultur* soon evolved into a significant debate in the last years of the eighteenth century, which would later form the basis of the criticisms towards the utilization of the concept of civilization as a veil over European imperialism. The main source of this debate

³¹⁹ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 6.

³²⁰ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 6.

³²¹ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 6-7. As Julie Reeves summarized, “[f]rom the German perspective *Zivilisation* was artificial, foreign and of no benefit to the intelligentsia [...] whereas *Kultur* was something altogether more natural and pure; something that spoke for the German people and their achievements.” Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 21.

was the German romanticism and the main protagonist was the famous German historian and philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), who bitterly criticized the Enlightenment view of civilization, which legitimated, in his eyes, the subordination and exploitation of non-European peoples with claims about the superiority of European civilization.³²² Herder's distinction between civilization and culture and his prioritization of the latter over the former was significant for the non-European states. This distinction would later be adopted by the modernizing states of Asia, such as Turkey and Japan; the promulgators of modernization in these states such as Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), who extensively utilized the distinction to argue for the possibility of adopting civilization without abandoning national characteristics.³²³

In sum, the second half of the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence not only of the concept of civilization but also of the essential debates regarding its perception. While, on the one hand, the English soon adopted the French version of the concept and contributed to the consolidation of an Anglo-French understanding of civilization, the Germans resisted against this perception by utilizing the concept of *Kultur* in lieu of civilization in order to emphasize the national particularities rather than the universalizing nature of the new-born concept.

6.3. The Evolution of the Concept of Civilization from the Napoleonic Wars until the First World War (1800-1914)

If enlightenment was one of the major factors that led to the coinage of the word *civilization*, it was the Industrial Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte's (1769-1821) military expedition to Egypt in 1798 that resulted in the quick spread and consolidation of this new concept. Accordingly, the Industrial

³²² Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 72.

³²³ See Alastair Bonnett, "Makers of the West: National identity and Occidentalism in the Work of Fukuzawa Yukichi and Ziya Gokalp," *Scottish Geographical Journal*, Vol. 118, No. 3 (2002): 165-182.

Revolution, which contributed to the wealth and prosperity of Europe compared to the other parts of the world, strengthened the already established idea of European superiority, and the concept of civilization “[...] seemed most appropriate for distinguishing the achievers from under-achievers.”³²⁴ What is more, it was after the Industrial Revolution that the imperialist expansion of European powers extended to a considerable degree. Meanwhile, Napoleon, who was accompanied by hundreds of historians, archaeologists, geographers, and cartographers, was aware that his Egyptian expedition was more than a military one. It was reported that he had told his troops as they set off for Egypt, “[s]oldiers, you are undertaking a conquest with incalculable consequences for civilization.”³²⁵

Hence the idea of civilization turned out to be a popular term at the turn of the nineteenth century. “By the early 1800s,” wrote Patterson, “civilization was being viewed as both a *process* and an *achieved condition* characterized by social order, refined manners and behaviour, and the accumulation of knowledge.”³²⁶ Thus the two meanings of the concept, namely civilization as a quality and civilization as a condition or process were consolidated in this period more.³²⁷ Furthermore, there emerged a third meaning towards the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century. According to Febvre, in 1819, in the book entitled *Le Vieillard et le Jeune Homme (The Old Man and the Young)* written by a counter-revolutionary author Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847), for the first time, the word *civilization* was utilized in its plural form.³²⁸

³²⁴ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 16.

³²⁵ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 16.

³²⁶ Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 42.

³²⁷ According to Yurdusev, the first usage, namely civilization as a quality, “[...] refers to the state of being civilized, to the possession of good manners and self-control.” Through this meaning, it qualified both the individual and society. The second usage, on the other hand, indicated civilization as a condition and process, which reflects “[...] a particular condition of men and societies, and also a process the result of which is that particular condition, called civilization.” See Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History*, 63

³²⁸ Febvre, *Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, 37.

Combined with the German Romantics' critique of universality of the Enlightenment and thereby civilization, this effort would evolve into the third meaning of this concept, namely civilization as a collectivity. Accordingly, the proponents of the plural form of civilization argue that there were "[...] separate, distinct societies of human beings, which have their own identifiable characteristics worthy of being called 'civilized.'"³²⁹ However, initially, the idea of multiple civilizations was associated with the historical collectivities; in other words, in history, there were civilizations coexisted or succeeded each other. Herder's conception of history as "structural cycles of civilizations" contributed to the plural understanding of civilization.³³⁰ Such a perception ironically fed the European idea that there was civilizational singularity in the nineteenth century; there was "one civilization" – the European one – at that particular period. The European emphasis on Chinese or Indian civilizations was only a reference to a historical phenomenon; the nineteenth century Chinese and Indian cultures had not been depicted as civilizations.³³¹

1820s did not only witness the plural usage of the concept of civilization, but also the first serious studies on this concept. In other words, until 1820s, the word *civilization* was utilized simply as a word to denote a process, a condition, or a quality. This was changed by the works of a French historian and statesman François Guizot (1787-1874), who perceived the concept of civilization as a field of study.³³² Although Guizot referred to a universal civilization encompassing all aspects of social life in his works, indeed, what he examined was the "European civilization" in general, and the "French civilization" in particular. According to

³²⁹ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History*, 63.

³³⁰ Maike Oergel, *Culture and Identity: Historicity in German Literature and Thought, 1770–1815*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 26.

³³¹ Despite the emergence of plural conception of the word *civilization* in the first half of the nineteenth century, according to Roger Wescott, before 1918, only two historians, the French philosopher and historian Joseph Arthur de Gobineau and the Russian naturalist and historian Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky, enumerated different civilizations. See Roger Wescott, "The Enumeration of Civilizations," *History and Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1970): 59-85, 59.

³³² Ceri Crossley, *French Historians and Romanticism: Thierry, Guizot, the Saint-Simonians, Quinet, Michelet*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 72.

Febvre, he delivered lectures in Sorbonne on the history of civilization in Europe in 1823 and the history of civilization in France in 1829.³³³ In these lectures, he had established the basics of European understanding of civilization as the supremacy of European civilization and the inevitability of progress in civilizational history.³³⁴

Guizot further argued that in modern European civilization all the principles of social organization existed together, and unlike other civilizations, different social powers were in a continuous struggle among themselves without anyone having sufficient force to master the others and take sole possession of the society. It was this diversity that made the European civilization so peculiar and so superior compared to the other civilizations.³³⁵

As previously mentioned, although the concept of civilization had always been a hierarchical one, defined in opposition to the concept of uncivilization/barbarity, in its earlier life, it had been an inclusive concept. In other words, “[...] there was one civilization to which all people, in theory, belonged;” therefore, “[a]ll people had the potential to become ‘civilized.’”³³⁶ However, by the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a paradigm shift occurred, which ended up with the consolidation of two significant theoretical openings, namely Social Evolutionism and Social Darwinism, which resulted in the incorporation of the concept of *race* to the idea of civilization. Both theories were fed from two sources, being the biological revolution thanks to the introduction of evolution

³³³ Febvre, *Uygarlık, Kapitalizm ve Kapitalistler*, 47.

³³⁴ According to Crossley, Guizot defines civilisation as intrinsically progressive in nature. She quoted from Guizot the following excerpt which clearly determined the singularity of European civilization: “The idea of progress, of development, appears to me to be the fundamental idea contained in the word, civilisation’ [...] The historian of civilisation studies the progressive actualisation of principles. Since civilisation designates a process and not a state and since Europe alone displays real progress we should perhaps conclude that, in this sense, only Europe is truly civilised.” See Crossley, *French Historians and Romanticism*, 86.

³³⁵ Marcello Verga, “European Civilization and the ‘Emulation of the Nations’: Histories of Europe from the Enlightenment to Guizot,” *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec. 2008): 353-360, 359.

³³⁶ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 23.

theory, and the spread of nationalist ideas over Europe, which emphasized national characteristics, instead of a universal civilized body.

Indeed, the idea of evolution was a product of positivism and the critique of the theory of fixity of species. Although the theory of evolution was very much associated with Charles Darwin (1809-1882), indeed, its basics could be found in the writings of the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), whose studies would later influence Darwin and other evolutionists to a considerable degree. It was Lamarck, who had written almost half a century before Darwin that all species were transformed from the simplest and the most imperfect state to a perfect complexity.³³⁷ What makes him more significant for social evolution theory was his combination of biological and environmental factors in understanding evolution unlike Darwin, whose theory was explicitly biological.³³⁸

Social evolutionism experienced its “golden age” in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly with the application of Lamarckian ideas to the social field.³³⁹ Its rise owes much to the studies of the British philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), particularly to his perception of the ideal society, or the “social state.”³⁴⁰ Accordingly, the “social state” was established by a society “[...] based upon amity, individual altruism, an elaborate specialization of functions, criteria which recognize only achieved qualities (as opposed to ascribed ones), and primarily, a voluntary cooperation among highly disciplined individuals.”³⁴¹ In other words, this was an ideal future society and the movement towards its achievement was called by Spencer as “social progress” or

³³⁷ Ralph F. Shaner, “Lamarck and the Evolution Theory,” *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Mar., 1927): 251-255, 252.

³³⁸ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 24.

³³⁹ Stephen K. Sanderson, *Social Evolutionism: A Critical History*, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 2.

³⁴⁰ For a detailed account of Herbert Spencer’s contribution to social evolutionism see Sanderson, *Social Evolutionism*, 10-12.

³⁴¹ Robert G. Perin, “Herbert Spencer's Four Theories of Social Evolution,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (May, 1976): 1339-1359, 1343.

“social evolution.”³⁴² However, different societies and races were advancing to this ideal state at different speeds, and the reason of this difference depended both on the biological inheritance (in other words, the race) and environmental factors.³⁴³

Social Darwinism was clearer in terms of the relevance of race in different degrees of development of different communities. Darwin’s biological concepts, such as struggle for existence, adaptation, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest, were incorporated into the social theory, though they were often distorted in this transfer.³⁴⁴ Accordingly, Social Darwinists argue that:

[...the] human society had always been a battleground for competing individuals and races in which the fittest survived and the unfit were cruelly eliminated; and, for the sake of human progress, this struggle for existence must be allowed to continue unchecked by governmental intervention or social reform.³⁴⁵

The incorporation of race to the concept of civilization found its clearest representations in the writings of the French philosopher Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), who brought social Darwinism one step further through classifying the peoples hierarchically based on the concept of race.³⁴⁶ According to Gobineau, it was the race that determined the degree of civilization of different communities; he once wrote in his significant work *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (Essays on the Inequality of Human Races)* that “the racial

³⁴² Perin, “Herbert Spencer's Four Theories of Social Evolution,” 1343.

³⁴³ Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 45.

³⁴⁴ Kenneth E. Bock, “Darwin and Social Theory,” *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr., 1955): 123-134, 124.

³⁴⁵ Howard L. Kaye, *The Social Meaning of Modern Biology: From Social Darwinism to Sociobiology*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 12.

³⁴⁶ Indeed, Social Darwinism was not a popular intellectual movement among French social evolutionist; they rather tried to combine Darwinian and Lamarckian evolutionism. Even they preferred to use the concept *transformisme* instead of *Darwinisme* to emphasize that the ideas associated with Darwin had already been covered by Lamarck. See Linda L. Clark, “Social Darwinism in France,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, No. 1, On Demand Supplement (Mar., 1981): D1025-D1044, D1029.

question over-shadows all other problems of history.”³⁴⁷ He argued that the civilizations were based on the accomplishments of a pure race, and through its degeneration by a mixing of blood, the civilization established by that pure race declined.³⁴⁸ What is more, Gobineau classified between the races under three categories being “[...] the brutal, sensual, and cowardly black race; the weak, materialistic, and mediocre yellow race; and the intelligent, energetic, and courageous white race.”³⁴⁹ In all, Gobineau’s classification was complementing the former division between the savage, barbarian and the civilized in a racist way.

According to Reeves, first the evolutionist and then the racist theories:

[...] changed the meaning of civilization from an inclusive concept to one based on a fundamental separation of peoples based on their blood. Whereas in the eighteenth century the idea of civilization had been thought to be the destiny of the whole of humanity, by the late nineteenth century a different set of assumptions had come to prevail. These assumptions rested on the ideas about the divisible nature of humanity.³⁵⁰

By the turn of the twentieth century, then, the language of race became the prominent discourse in the study of civilization, and the synthesis between three concepts, being the white skinned, superior and civilized, was complete. Hence the years between 1900 and 1914 were the years in which there emerged significant distinction between different degrees of civilization both vertically (i.e., upper classes are more civilized than the lower classes) and horizontally (i.e., colonial powers are more civilized than the colonies).³⁵¹

The perception of European civilization as superior to other civilizations produced the idea of *mission civilisatrice*, or the civilizing mission. Indeed, the various versions of the idea of civilizing mission, “[...] of extending Empire for

³⁴⁷ Quoted by Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 59.

³⁴⁸ Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 59.

³⁴⁹ Paul A. Fortier, “Gobineau and German Racism,” *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn, 1967), 341-350, 342.

³⁵⁰ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 25.

³⁵¹ Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, 26-27.

the higher purpose of educating and rescuing the barbarian,” were used by all the actors, which participated in imperial expansion throughout history.³⁵² However, it was by the mid-nineteenth century that the civilizing mission had demonstrated itself clearly in imperialist discourses. The information about non-European world was processed to feed the perception of European superiority, and with the British and French colonial expansion, the idea of civilizing mission became widespread.

All in all, the evolution of the concept of civilization can be followed in three phases. The first phase comprised the period from the coinage of the word until the early nineteenth century, in which civilization was perceived as a higher stage of being attainable by any society having the capacity to employ reason. The second phase from the beginning until the mid-nineteenth century witnessed the consolidation of the idea of European civilization. This transformation from the universality of civilization based on reason to the universality of civilization based on a particular geography was the result of the sense of European supremacy over non-Europe. Finally, the third phase, stretching from the mid-nineteenth century until the First World War, was dominated by the association of civilization with race, which not only enhanced the idea of European supremacy on the one hand, but also monopolized the concept of civilization to a particular race and resulted in the reaction of non-European cultures against this monopolization. All these different perceptions of civilization influenced the Ottoman perceptions of this concept and resulted in a parallel evolution in the Ottoman intellectual circles, which establishes the subject matter of the next chapter.

³⁵² Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96.

CHAPTER 7

EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Starting from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the interest of the Ottoman intellectuals in European achievements gradually increased. The desire to prevent the decline of the Empire led them to seek the reasons of their backwardness. This search resulted in the Ottoman awareness of the new social concepts of Europe. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Ottomans began to utilize the concept of civilization only a few decades after its consolidation in Europe. This chapter, thus, intends to examine the emergence and the evolution of the concept of civilization in the Ottoman Empire in order to show the divergence of perceptions in different periods and the originality of the Ottoman understanding of this concept. Such a survey is also useful to set the background of the answer to the question of why the Ottoman intellectuals could not perceive the East as the Westerners did in the nineteenth century.

This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section deals with the coinage of the word *medeniyet* to meet the word “civilization” in the third decade of the nineteenth century, and focuses on a group of Ottoman diplomats, who utilized this concept in their diplomatic despatches. The second section is devoted to the consolidation of the idea of civilization among the Ottoman intellectuals, and the emergence of basic discussions around it between 1860s and 1890s. In the third section, the crystallization of three political movements, namely Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, and their different perceptions of civilization from 1890s onwards to the end of First World War, are covered.

7.1. The Coinage of the Word *Medeniyet* and the First Generation of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Intellectuals (1834-1856)

In the previous part of the dissertation, it is argued that by the turn of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman curiosity about the developments in Europe

increased tremendously, and Ottoman youngsters were sent to Europe either for education or as the part of several diplomatic missions. These students and diplomats did not only experience what they had been taught there; they also became acquainted with the concepts that had already been established in the Western literary circles, such as liberty (*hürriyet*), fatherland (*vatan*), progress (*terakkî*), and most importantly, civilization (*medeniyet*).³⁵³ Besides these conceptual elements of Europe, the visual elements they had seen in various European cities amazed them as well; especially Paris and London turned out to be an ideal. The well-planned construction of the city, the refinement of its people, new colossal buildings such as museums, theatres, observatories, laboratories, and botanical gardens, attracted their attention and resulted in the perception of Paris as a model to be achieved in the Ottoman imperial capital.³⁵⁴

All these experiences ended up with the Ottoman perception of civilization as a catchword to acquire what the Europeans had achieved, and thereby to increase the well-being of the Ottoman society. As Cemil Aydın mentions, “[...] it was only during the 1830s that Ottoman Muslim elites began to conceptualize a holistic image of Europe as a model for reform and as the potential future of the Ottoman polity.”³⁵⁵ Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the word *civilization* was first utilized by three young Ottoman diplomats, born in the first decade of the nineteenth century and sent to European capitals around 1830s. These three members of 1800 generation, Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1800-1858), Mehmet Sadık Rıfat Paşa (1807-1857) and Mustafa Sami Efendi (1800?-1855) did not only introduce the word *civilization* to the Ottoman literary circles,

³⁵³ According to Ali Budak, most of these diplomats began their career in the Chamber of Translation, which acted as a platform for transferring Western knowledge to the Ottoman Empire. For a list of members of the Chamber of Translation who had been appointed as diplomats to the European capitals see Ali Budak, *Batılılaşma ve Türk Edebiyatı: Lale Devri'nden Tanzimat'a Yenileşme*, (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2008), 390-393.

³⁵⁴ Niyazi Berkes argue that the Ottomans did not admire the consumer products of the Western civilization in the nineteenth century; rather what they admired was the Western living-style and principles on the one hand, and technological achievements and colossal buildings on the other. Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, (İstanbul: Yön Yayınları, 1965), 31-32.

³⁵⁵ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 15.

but also added an additional meaning to it, different from its usual conceptions in Europe.

The first usage of the word *civilization* in a Turkish text was dated 1834. The user was the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, who wrote the word in some of his despatches without translation, but with a similar pronunciation, as *sivilizasyon*.³⁵⁶ The context that he utilized this word was quite important in order to understand the meaning given to it. Accordingly, Mustafa Reşid Paşa employed the word civilization within a socio-political context, through referring to two significant political developments, which were vital to the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, namely the Egyptian question and the French occupation of Algeria in 1830.³⁵⁷ In the first despatch, Mustafa Reşid Paşa wrote that the Europeans, particularly the French, had been favouring Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa for his modernizing reforms; however, these reforms were cosmetic in essence. In order to display that the Ottomans were not reluctant about modernization, Mustafa Reşid Paşa wrote that the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, paid significant attention to the “technique of civilization, in other words, the issues of decency of people and enforcement of laws”

³⁵⁶ Mustafa Reşid Efendi was later appointed as the Ottoman Foreign Minister and the Grand Vizier in various Ottoman governments; he was also known as the architect of the Edict of Tanzimat. This claim of first usage belongs to Tuncer Baykara, who probably makes the only study regarding the importation of the concept of civilization to the Ottoman Empire. See Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı ve Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıla Dair Araştırmalar*, (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1999), 12. However, Baykara also mentions that the word *civilization* had already been translated by French linguists into Turkish in the French-Turkish dictionaries published in the second decade of the nineteenth century. In 1828, two dictionaries, the *Vocabulaire Français-Turc* published in St. Petersburg by Georges Rhasis and *Dictionnaire Français-Arabe* published in Paris by Ellious Boctor, translated the word civilization as *ünsiyet* (sociable familiarity), *tehzib-i ahlâk* (moral improvement), *te'nis* (to make sociably familiar), *te'dib* (to discipline) and *ta'lim* (to educate). In 1831, two dictionaries added the expression, *edeb ve erkan* (politeness and propriety). Baykara, *Osmanlılarda Medeniyet Kavramı*, 20. These earlier translations demonstrate that the socio-political connotation of the word, denoting a higher stage of being for a particular community, had not much consolidated in a way to be included in the dictionaries. Rather, the former European words to meet the concept of civilization, namely refinement, politeness, propriety, etc, were utilized to define the word in Turkish and Arabic languages.

³⁵⁷ One of the primary aims of Mustafa Reşid Efendi's mission to Paris in 1834 was to avert the negative Egyptian propaganda against the Ottoman Empire and to prevent further French intentions in North Africa. Cavid Baysun, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa'nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasi Yazıları,” *Tarih Vesikaları*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 1941): 283-296, 284-285.

(*sivilizasyon usûlüne, yani terbiye-i nâs ve icrâ-yi nizamât husûslarına*).³⁵⁸ In another despatch, he wrote that Mehmed Ali Paşa was able to get the support of the French public opinion through arguing that he had been applying the “technique of civilization” properly, and that the Ottoman Empire refused to do the same.³⁵⁹ To prevent such negative propaganda, Mustafa Reşid Paşa advised the government to publish articles about some developments in the Ottoman Empire, which had been perceived in Paris as “the appurtenance of the technique of civilization” (*sivilizasyon usûlüniün müteferriâtından*).³⁶⁰

If the concept of civilization was first imported by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, its first translation into Turkish was realized in a small treatise written by another Ottoman diplomat, Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa, in 1837, when he was serving as the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna.³⁶¹ In this treatise, Sadık Rıfat Paşa utilized the expression of “contemporary European civilization, in other words, the technique of sociable familiarity and civilization” (*Avrupa’nın şimdiki sivilizasyonu, yani usûl-ü me’nûsiyet ve medeniyeti*); this was the first usage of the word *medeniyet* to meet the word *civilization*, which would quickly replace the word *sivilizasyon*.³⁶² Both the French and the Turkish versions of the word were derived from the same root, namely “city” (*civitas* in Latin and *medina* in Arabic). In other words, *medeniyet* excellently met the word *civilization*.

³⁵⁸ The despatches sent by Mustafa Reşid Efendi from Paris to the Porte were published by Cavid Baysun as a series of articles in the journal of *Tarih Vesikaları*. For this particular despatch dated November 9, 1834, see, Cavid Baysun, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa’nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasi Yazıları,” 287.

³⁵⁹ For this despatch see Cavid Baysun, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa’nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasi Yazıları,” *Tarih Vesikaları*, Vol. 2 No. 9 (Oct., 1942): 208-219, 211.

³⁶⁰ For this despatch see Cavid Baysun, “Mustafa Reşid Paşa’nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasi Yazıları,” *Tarih Vesikaları*, Vol. 1, No. 6 (Apr., 1942): 430-442, 432.

³⁶¹ Whether this treatise was written as a despatch or as a separate work was not clear; it was first published in 1858 by *Takvimhane-i Amire* after the death of Mehmet Sadık Rıfat Paşa. This edition was entitled as *Avrupa’nın Ahvaline Dair Bir Risale (A Treatise on the Conditions of Europe)*. In his collection of works entitled *Müntehâbat-ı Asar*, which was also compiled in 1873 after his death, the treatise was once more published.

³⁶² Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Avrupa’nın Ahvaline Dair Bir Risale*, (İstanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1275 [1858]), 9.

In the subsequent lines of the treatise, Sadık Rıfat Paşa argued that Europe became civilized through several processes, namely the increase in population (*taksîr-i efrâd-ı millet*), provision of prosperity of the country and the state (*imâr-ı memâlik ve devlet*), and of security and comfort (*istihsâl-i asâyiş ve rahat*) of the people.³⁶³ In other words, he implied that such European achievements were only realized through the technique of civilization, and the Ottoman Empire should follow this technique in order to attain them properly. This analysis of European achievements leads Berkes to label Sadık Rıfat Paşa as the “first statesman able to see not only the mere externals of European civilization, but also its fundamental distinctiveness from non-European civilizations.”³⁶⁴ Similarly for Tanpınar:

He [Sadık Rıfat Paşa] is not a traveller or a witness, who brings his simple-hearted admiration wherever he goes and who closes his eyes to the essence. Contrarily, he is a statesman with vigilant ideas, who seeks for the secret, even the system, that gives [... social] life its direction and conscience and that makes the meaning and character of its vitality.³⁶⁵

Besides Mustafa Reşid Paşa and Sadık Rıfat Paşa, a third influential author/diplomat of the same period was Mustafa Sami Efendi, who had served in the Ottoman Embassy to Paris between 1838 and 1839. His voyage to Paris and his experiences in this city would later be published in 1840 by himself as a book entitled *Avrupa Risâlesi* (*A Treatise on Europe*).³⁶⁶ This piece was very significant not for its descriptions of Paris and other European cities, which had already been done by his predecessors, but for the first utilization of the word *medeniyet* in a published book, since Mustafa Reşid’s despatches were not published until 1940s, while Sadık Rıfat’s small treatise could only be published

³⁶³ Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Avrupa'nın Ahvaline Dair Bir Risale*, 9.

³⁶⁴ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 131.

³⁶⁵ Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 119.

³⁶⁶ Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Avrupa Risâlesi*, (İstanbul: Takvim-i Vekayi Matbaası, 1256 [1840]), later transliterated and edited by Fatih Andı with a detailed introduction to the life and Works of Mustafa Sami Efendi. See Fatih Andı, *Bir Osmanlı Bürokratının Avrupa İzlenimleri: Mustafa Sami Efendi ve Avrupa Risalesi*, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1996. The footnotes below will be given from the edition of Andı.

in 1858. What is more, the simpler style of Mustafa Sami Efendi demonstrates that his book was written for a wider group of readers; therefore, his work presumably served the consolidation of the concept of civilization in the Ottoman literary circles more than his predecessors.³⁶⁷ Indeed, Mustafa Sami clearly stated that his aim in writing this piece was to mention about the achievements of the Europeans as a result of their “technique of civilization” (*usûl-i medeniyet*), and to serve the people (*avâm-ı millet*) through attempting to demonstrate the underlying reasons of European achievements.³⁶⁸ What is more, according to Berkes, Mustafa Sami’s book was the earliest attempt to explain the causes of things to be admired in the European civilization. The role of science, religious freedom and the continuity maintained between the new acquisitions and the achievements of the past were the three significant features attracted his admiration.³⁶⁹ Similarly according to Aydın, different from the earlier selective approach to Europe, Mustafa Sami “[...] offers a holistic assessment of the excellence of Europe and its superiority, connecting all the positive characteristics of European institutions and practices in a civilizational unity [...]”³⁷⁰

Considering the writings of these three diplomats, what is striking is that they perceived civilization as a technique or as a practice, rather than a condition, a stage, or a phase. In other words, civilization itself had not been perceived as an ideal condition to be reached; rather it was evaluated as a tool to reach an ideal condition.³⁷¹ This usage was not encountered in European texts, which

³⁶⁷ Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 124.

³⁶⁸ Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Avrupa Risalesi*, 3-4.

³⁶⁹ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 129.

³⁷⁰ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 17. For another review of *Avrupa Risalesi*, see Budak, *Batılılaşma ve Türk Edebiyatı*, 427-431.

³⁷¹ According to Berkes, in these years, the European civilization was not strongly characterized by expansionism and imperialism; rather, the Enlightenment universality and scientificity had been living its heyday. Therefore the achievements of Europe were idealized by the Ottoman diplomats and intellectuals; this resulted in the perception of civilization as a technique to achieve what the Europeans had achieved. Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, 33.

glorify civilization as an ideal stage of being from the very beginning of the utilization of this concept. Therefore, the Ottoman usage was both a contribution to the understanding of civilization and an indication that the Ottomans did not solely adopt the concept as it had been conceived in Europe. The Ottoman selectivity, which would be one of the main characteristics of the next generation of Ottoman intellectuals, showed its earlier manifestations in these earlier texts. However still, it should also be mentioned that there had been no detailed analysis on this concept yet; rather, the word could only be glimpsed in these texts. This means that although their authors were aware of this word and its significance for the development of Europe, they did not centralize it as an ideal. This centralization would wait for the next generation of Ottoman intellectuals.

7.2. Dualism as the Great Debate in the *Tanzimat* Period and the Second Generation of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Intellectuals (1856-1890)

In the first section of this chapter, it was argued that the European ideas began to leak into the Ottoman intellectual circles from the early nineteenth century onwards through the increasing interaction of the Ottoman students and diplomats with Europe. By the mid-1850s, however, the Ottoman elite had already begun to adopt, either forcefully (i.e., the dress reforms of Mahmud II) or voluntarily (i.e., as a result of increasing connection with the West or with the Westerners in İstanbul), some aspects of European life-style. Therefore, European practices began to coexist with traditional Ottoman life-style and the Ottoman elites were eager to merge these two.³⁷²

This coexistence produced the question of the degree of adoption from the European civilization; in other words, how much should be taken from the

³⁷² Particularly, the presence of European journalists, soldiers, and diplomats in the capital because of the Crimean War (1853-1856) resulted in a colourful social life in İstanbul and introduced the Western life-style to the Ottoman elite. The Ottoman bureaucrats, even the Sultan himself, attended the balls organized by the diplomatic missions. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa wrote that from 1854 onwards, Ottoman Grand Viziers began to attend such balls in the European Embassies. On February 1, 1856, Abdülmeçid attended to the ball organized by the British ambassador to the Porte, Stratford Canning (1786-1880). This was the first attendance of and Ottoman sultan to such an organization. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, Vol. 1, 61.

European civilization and how much should be preserved became the most significant debate of the Ottoman intellectuals regarding the concept of civilization during *Tanzimat* period, and afterwards. Accordingly, there emerged three perceptions; two of them established the margins and the third emerged as a middle way.³⁷³ The margins were composed of those, who argue for total adoption of the European civilization regardless the distinction between its material (scientific, technological, institutional, or administrative) and moral (lifestyle, daily habits, or culture) elements, and those who argue for its total rejection. Indeed, both of these views perceived civilization as an indivisible totality, which should either be adopted or rejected as a whole. Therefore, they either sacralised or de-sacralised the concept of civilization.

Those, arguing for the adoption of European civilization as a whole, treated civilization as the only way to provide the survival of the Empire. For example, one of the former ministers of education, Saffet Paşa (1814-1883), wrote in one of his letters from Paris in 1879 that “[...] unless Turkey [...] accepts the civilization of Europe in its entirety – in short, proves herself to be a reformed and civilized state – she will never free herself from the European intervention and tutelage [...]”³⁷⁴ Hence, the only way to prevent the losing of Ottoman prestige and independence *vis-à-vis* Europe was to become a European state, which could only be achieved through total adoption of the European civilization. On the other hand, those arguments totally rejecting the European civilization rested on the equation of European civilization with Christianity and even with blasphemy. The rejectionists accused the total adoptionists of being neglectful in terms of religion, if not of being infidels.³⁷⁵ In other words, for the

³⁷³ Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, 50.

³⁷⁴ Quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 185.

³⁷⁵ Even the importation of the practice of quarantine, the Ottoman bureaucrat and historian Ahmet Cevdet Paşa wrote, made this group reactive to Mustafa Reşid Paşa due to his “inclination towards the new methods” (*usul-ü cedideye inhimâkı*). See Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, Vol. 1, 8. He further noted that the discussions regarding the translation and application of French laws in the Ottoman Empire frustrated the *ulama* so much so that they “[...] declared those, who diverged to such *alla franca* ideas, as infidels” (*ulema güruhu ise o makule alafranga eskâra sapanları tekfir ederlerdi*). See Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, Vol. 1, 63.

rejectionists, even the adoption of the smallest elements of European civilization might be enough to diverge from the true path of Islam, and therefore to label the adoptionists as infidels.

Both these margins were at the extremes and those who argued for partial adoption of European civilization composed the bulk of the intellectual community. The majority of the Ottoman intellectuals were aware that the reason behind European development was civilization, and benefitting from European achievements was inevitable to reverse the decline of the Empire. The discussion was not, therefore, erupted on whether elements of European civilization should be adopted or not, but rather on which elements of European civilization should be adopted and how they should be incorporated to the Ottoman/Islamic/Eastern system/culture/civilization. This discussion on the Ottoman selectivity is one of the main reasons of the unique perception of civilization developed by the Ottoman intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century.

7.2.1. “The Three Great Authors of Modernity”:³⁷⁶ İbrahim Şinasi, Münif Paşa, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa:

If there is a scale demonstrating the ideas of the Ottoman intellectuals regarding how much should be imported from European civilization and how much should be preserved, İbrahim Şinasi should be placed somewhere closer to the margin arguing for the total adoption of the European civilization. Indeed, it was Şinasi, “the first modern writer and enlightener,”³⁷⁷ who popularized the concept of civilization. He was one of the best representatives of the dualism central to the Ottoman social system during and after *Tanzimat* period. His writings efficiently demonstrated the opposition between various categories, between the old and new, the *alla turca* and *alla franca*, the Ottoman Empire and Europe, and the East and the West. According to Tanpınar this reality of dualism

³⁷⁶ This expression belongs to Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 153.

³⁷⁷ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 197.

was “the most significant fatality”³⁷⁸ of *Tanzimat* period and it produced the first ideology of this period, namely “civilizationism” (*medeniyetçilik*):

The first ideology of *Tanzimat* period is civilizationism [...] Reşid Paşa, Âli Paşa, Cevdet Paşa, Münif Paşa, Sultan Abdülaziz, all try to define it in their writings and edicts. [...] And, finally, Şinasi transforms this concept, which had slowly been leaking in our lives, into a religion for his and future generations by labelling Mustafa Reşid Paşa as the “prophet of civilization.”³⁷⁹

Thus, Şinasi’s perception of civilization was so central to his writings that he even sacralised it to attract the attention of his readers to this phenomenon. Being an ardent admirer of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, his first accounts on civilization could be found in his earlier poems dedicated to Mustafa Reşid Paşa. In one of these poems, Şinasi was courageous enough to label him as the “prophet of civilization” (*medeniyet resûlü*).³⁸⁰ In another one, he identified him as *fahr-i cihân-ı medeniyet* (another expression meaning the “prophet of civilization”).³⁸¹ In other words, he perceived Mustafa Reşid Paşa as the man, who brought civilization to the Ottoman realm, and sacralised this concept by utilizing a religious terminology.

Another significant characteristic of Şinasi’s perception of civilization was his clear association of civilization with Europe; such clarity was hardly visible in the writings of his predecessors. According to Şinasi, civilization could only be transferred from Europe, since this continent was the source of civilization. In one of his poems, he characterized the Edict of *Tanzimat* as a European beauty (*Avrupalı büt*), which gave splendour and dignity (*revnâk-ü şân*) to the Ottoman realm, and made it a land even envied by the Europeans

³⁷⁸ Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 132.

³⁷⁹ Italics added. Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 147.

³⁸⁰ İbrahim Şinasi, *Müntehâbât-ı Eş’ar*, (İstanbul: Tasvir-i Efkâr Matbaası, 1279 [1862]), transliterated and edited by Kemal Bek, (İstanbul: Bordo-Siyah Yayınları, 2004), 56. This footnote and other footnotes below are given from the edition of Bek. The poem including this expression was written in 1857.

³⁸¹ The expression *fahr-i cihân* was utilized for the Prophet Mohammed himself. Şinasi, *Müntehâbât-ı Eş’ar*, 58. The poem including this expression was written in 1858.

themselves.³⁸² In other words, he argued that only through incorporation of European-type regulations, the Ottoman Empire could prosper and reverse its decline.

Şinasi's symbolic utilization of the concept of civilization would later be popularized and deepened in his articles, which appeared in the newspapers published by himself such as *Tercümân-ı Ahvâl* (starting from 1860 onwards) and *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* (starting from 1862 onwards). In these articles, he used the expression of *hâl-i medeniyet* (the condition of civilization) instead of *usûl-i medeniyet* (the technique of civilization) preferred by his predecessors; this transformation was important, since it means that Şinasi began to touch upon the essence of this concept, not its practical side. In other words, civilization was no more the technique, but the aim, the ideal to be achieved.

Şinasi also dwelled upon two other significant debates regarding the concept of civilization. The first one was the distinction between the *civilized* and *uncivilized*, which had already been discussed in the Islamic world through a Khaldunian perspective. The second debate was whether it was possible for the non-Europeans to be civilized. Şinasi clearly distinguished between “the civilized and non-civilized nations” (*mîlel-i mütemeddine ve mîlel-i gayr-i mütemeddine*), and put forward the basic characteristics of the civilized nations as being more prosperous, more peaceful, being interested in politics more and having a peculiar public opinion influencing, if not contributing to, policy-making. This distinction, however, was not an unsurpassable one, since Şinasi's perception of civilization was based on reason.³⁸³ While most of the European intellectuals of the time perceived reason as a European phenomenon unfamiliar in the non-European world, Şinasi argued that civilization based on reason could not be monopolized by the Europeans, and any community centralizing reason in

³⁸² Şinasi, *Müntehâbât-ı Eş'ar*, 48. The poem including this expression was written in 1849.

³⁸³ In one of his articles published in *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* in 1863, entitled “On the Beggars” (Seele Hakkındadır), Şinasi mentioned that the civilization of the European states was based on reason (*medeniyetinin temeli hikmet üzerine kurulu olan memleketler*). See Abdullah Kaygı, *Türk Düşüncesinde Çağdaşlaşma*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), 57.

their attitudes and behaviours could be labelled as civilized.³⁸⁴ What is more, Şinasi did not want to abandon all the Eastern characteristics of the Empire. Rather what he tried was to evoke the rationalism that had once been a characteristic of the Islamic philosophy. His famous aphorism, cited almost in all reviews of his writings, “to marry the mature reason of Asia with the virgin ideas of Europe” (*Asya'nın akl-ı pirânesiyle Avrupa'nın bîkr-i fikrini izdivâc ettirmek*), clearly demonstrates his effort to reach a synthesis instead of total adoption of the European civilization.³⁸⁵

If Şinasi was closer to the pro-European margin of the aforementioned scale on the degree of adoption from the European civilization, Münif Paşa (1828-1910) should be placed somewhere in the middle; since his writings demonstrate that he was almost in between the total adoptionists and total rejectionists. Hence, he was one of the excellent examples of the dualism between the old and new, Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and the West and East.³⁸⁶

The significance of Münif Paşa particularly resides in his most conspicuous contribution to the Ottoman literature, namely the journal of

³⁸⁴ This demonstrates that Şinasi was very much influenced from the earlier universality of the concept of civilization prevalent in Europe until the popularity of the idea of European superiority. According to Aydın, most of the early *Tanzimat* intellectuals, such as Şinasi, believed that “[...] civilization was the common heritage of humanity, not an exclusively European ideal;” however, it was still perceived as originated from Europe. See Aydın, *Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 20.

³⁸⁵ İbrahim Şinasi, “İstanbul Sokaklarının Tenvir ve Tathiri” (The Enlightening and Cleaning of the Streets of İstanbul), *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, No. 192, 28 Zilkade 1280 [29 April 1864], quoted in İbrahim Şinasi, *Makaleler*, compiled, transliterated and edited by Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, (Ankara: Dün Bugün Yayınları, 1960), 105.

³⁸⁶ On the one hand, Münif Paşa closely followed the philosophical developments in the West; he translated major Western philosophical texts written by Fénelon (1651-1715), Fontenelle (1657-1757), and Voltaire (1694-1778) and compiled them as *Muhâverât-ı Hikemiye* (*The Philosophical Dialogues*). See Münif Paşa, *Muhâverât-ı Hikemiye*, (Dersaadet: Ceridehane Matbaası, 1276 [1859]). On the other hand, he translated al-Harîrî's (1054-1122) *Makâmât* (*The Assemblies*), which was one of the most significant social critiques of medieval Arab society. This translation was not published as a book. For a brief account of this translation, see Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 375-383. On the one hand, he translated Victor Hugo's masterpiece *Les Misérables* in Turkish as *Mağdurîn Hikayesi* (*The Story of Misérables*); on the other hand, he wrote one of the last examples of a classical Ottoman poetic genre (*destan*), depicting each Ottoman Sultan, namely the *Dâstân-ı Âl-i Osman*.

Mecmuâ-i Fünûn (The Collection of Sciences), which introduced Western science and culture to the Ottoman public opinion.³⁸⁷ This journal did not only contribute to the Ottoman intellectual development, but also to the understanding of civilization particularly through the articles of Münif Paşa on this issue. Within this context, his first article published in this journal and entitled “Mukâyese-i İlm-ü Cehl” (The Comparison between Knowledge and Ignorance) was extremely important, since it highlights major ideas of Münif Paşa on the concept of civilization and the debates that had already been initiated by Şinasi.

To start with, similar to Şinasi, Münif Paşa perceived civilization as an ideal state of being to be reached and the ultimate phase of the humanity; he considered civilization as “a reflection of the progress in science and industry” (*ulûm ve sanayîde terakkînin bir tezâhürü*).³⁸⁸ His emphasis on science and industry as the two pillars of civilization reflects that he focused on the material aspects of civilization instead of the moral ones. He then compared the nomadic and civilized societies by associating the former with ignorance and the latter with science and industry. He argued that the nomadic tribes of Africa and America could only sustain their basic needs and they had nothing else, while the civilized nations had prosperous countries and wealthy people. Hence civilization was displayed as the source of prosperity and wealth. What Münif Paşa added to the distinction between civilized and uncivilized nations was the idea of domination of the former over the latter.³⁸⁹ Therefore, according to Münif

³⁸⁷ The journal was begun to be published in 1862 and it was the first Turkish periodical ever published in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed there are two other journals or journal-like publications before *Mecmuâ-i Fünûn*. The first one is the *Vekâyî-i Tıbbiye* (first published in 1850), which was bilingual (published in Turkish and French) and more like a newspaper than a journal. The other one is *Mecmuâ-i Havadis*, published by Vartan Paşa in 1852 in Turkish written in Armenian script. Kayahan Özgül, *XIX. Asrın Benzersiz Bir Politeknîği: Münif Paşa*, (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2005), 49-50. Tanpınar mentions that *Mecmuâ-i Fünûn* was a school and it played the role of the great *Encyclopaedia* in France in the eighteenth century. For a brief but very significant account of Münif Paşa and *Mecmuâ-i Fünûn* see, Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 170-173.

³⁸⁸ Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 549. For a brief account of Münif Paşa’s perception of the concept of progress see, İsmail Doğan, *Tanzimatın İki Ucu: Münif Paşa ve Ali Suavi, Sosyo-Pedagojik Bir Karşılaştırma*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1991), 115-116.

³⁸⁹ Münif, “Mukâyese-i İlm-ü Cehl,” *Mecmuâ-i Fünûn*, No. 1, Muharrem 1279 [June 1862], 21, quoted by Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 550.

Paşa civilization was something inevitable; it could and should not be avoided. That is why, he clearly condemned those, who preferred nomadism to civilization, and labelled this preference as a “vicious idea” (*fıkr-i fâsîd*).³⁹⁰ In all, he established the oppositional categories between civilized and uncivilized based on the medium of science and industry; the ones associated with this medium were perceived as civilized, while the ones lacking it were labelled as uncivilized. This oppositional categorization was quite similar to the civilized/uncivilized distinction made in Europe, particularly in the writings of Guizot on civilization and of Social Evolutionists on the supremacy of the civilized peoples over the uncivilized ones.

Although Münif Paşa gave examples from European countries in order to depict the concept of civilization, he perceived this concept not as a European phenomenon, but as a universal achievement. Indeed, such a perception was quite widespread in the Ottoman intellectuals of the time, since they reacted to the Western texts monopolizing civilization as a European product. They were eager to demonstrate that civilization could not be confined within a single geographical entity (Europe) or a single religion (Christianity); its principles could and should be applied by whole humanity.³⁹¹ What is more, Münif Paşa perceived civilization as a quality envisaged by Islam, in other words, for him, a true Muslim was a civilized man.³⁹² That is why, he defended civilization against the critique of Islamists by writing that “[s]ome misconducts and misdemeanours witnessed among the civilized men is not an outcome of civilization, but presumably emerged out of its non-excellence.”³⁹³

All in all, like Şinasi, Münif Paşa perceived civilization as an ideal for the well-being of the Ottoman citizens and for the endurance of the Empire, and he

³⁹⁰ Münif, “Mukayese-i İlm-ü Cehl,” 22, quoted by Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 552.

³⁹¹ Therefore, it was not surprising that neither in the articles of Münif Paşa, nor in the other articles published in *Mecmua-i Fünûn*, the expressions like “Western civilization,” “European civilization,” or “Islamic civilization” were utilized. Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 271.

³⁹² Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 551.

³⁹³ Münif, “Mukayese-i İlm-ü Cehl,” 26, quoted by Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 555.

focused on the universality and universal applicability of this concept similar to its earlier usages in Europe.³⁹⁴ He also added the argument of the supremacy of civilized nations over the uncivilized ones to the debates regarding civilization. This argument would later be developed more, particularly by those who argued for the inevitability of civilization.

Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895) was one of the most conservative intellectuals of the *Tanzimat* period and this was because of his education and career.³⁹⁵ He was very suspicious about the European civilization and this makes him very distant to the pro-European margin of the scale displaying the degree of adoption from the West. To start with, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa perceived the concept of civilization quite in line with Ibn Khaldun.³⁹⁶ Hence, his understanding of civilization as an advanced condition compared to savagery (*vahşiyet*) and nomadism (*bedeviyet*), and his perception of its inevitability were derived from Ibn Khaldun. In other words, unlike Şinasi and Münif Paşa, whose sources were mainly Western, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa relied more on Eastern sources to establish

³⁹⁴ Özgül, *Münif Paşa*, 162.

³⁹⁵ Considering the intellectual life in the mid-nineteenth century, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895) was probably one of the most interesting figures. His traditional *madrassa* education, his earlier career in the ranks of the *ulama*, and his latter transfer to bureaucracy produced one of the most colourful intellectuals of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. For this peculiar education of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa see Richard L. Chambers, “The Education of a Nineteenth Century Ottoman *Âlim*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct. 1973): 440-464. His colossal *History (Tarih-i Cevdet)* and its latter companions *Tezâkir* and *Maruzat* provide the reader with a vivid account of the problems of Ottoman modernization as well as the evolution of the Ottoman intellectual debates. The Ottoman civil code called *Mecelle-i Ahkam-ı Adliye (The Book of Civil Provisions)* was prepared under his guidance and was practically in enforcement until late 1920s in Turkey. His writings on logic (such as *Miyar-ı Sedad*), linguistics (such as *Kavaid-i Osmaniye*), and theological history (such as *Kıyas-ı Enbiya ve Tevârih-i Hulefa*) were as important as his other works. All these works gives significant insights regarding his more conservative understanding of civilization, which both resembled to and distinguished from the perceptions of his contemporaries, namely Şinasi and Münif Paşa.

³⁹⁶ Indeed, he was one of the translators of Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah* in Turkish. This translation was started by Pîrîzade Sâib Molla in the beginning of the eighteenth century and could only be completed by Cevdet Paşa in 1860. Ercüment Kuran, *Türkiye’nin Batılılaşması ve Milli Meseleler*, edited by Mümtaz’er Türköne, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), 142-143.

his own understanding of civilization.³⁹⁷ What is more, according to Ümit Meriç, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa was not content with the argument of a single civilization; he rather perceived the Islamic civilization as one of the greatest civilizations of world history, which was backward at his times, but had the potential to be an alternative to the Western civilization.³⁹⁸

By giving examples from his inspections in the Province of Bosna, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa justified the domination of the civilized over the non-civilized similar to Münif Paşa. Accordingly, he argued that in some parts of the province, where the condition of savagery and nomadism (*hâl-i vahşet ve bedâvet*) prevailed, some kind of military/colonial administration (*koloni militer usulü*) should be established. He wrote:

Although the inhabitants of the regions, where *colonie militaire* practice would be applied, were quite savage, since their former conditions and customs were similar to this practice, its application would be possible with a dominating style which would not brutalize them.³⁹⁹

In other words, the practice of establishing military/colonial administration by a civilized authority over uncivilized communities was perfectly acceptable in order to provide the loyalty of these people to that particular authority.⁴⁰⁰

Besides these perceptions, it can be argued that Ahmet Cevdet Paşa was perhaps the first official historian of the Ottoman Empire explaining the decline of the Ottoman Empire with its backwardness compared to the development of

³⁹⁷ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 6 Volumes, (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Amire, 1271 [1855]) Vol. 1, 17. Also see Harun Anay, "Ahmet Cevdet Paşa'nın Modernizme Bakışı," in *Ahmet Cevdet Paşa Sempozyumu*, 9-11 June 1995, (Ankara, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995), 67-77, 70; Zeki İzgöer, *Ahmet Cevdet Paşa*, (İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 1999), 58.

³⁹⁸ Ümit Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1979), 31.

³⁹⁹ Italics added. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezahir*, Vol. 3, 34-35.

⁴⁰⁰ Such a perception is also visible in his reports written during his inspection in the provinces of Empire in south-eastern Anatolia, where he associated nomadism with un-civility. However, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa appraised some of the nomadic tribes, which demonstrated allegiance to the Empire, while he criticized the "savagery" of other nomadic tribes resisting against the Ottoman rule. Disloyalty and disturbance of order, therefore, emerged as a criterion for un-civility in his writings. For the details of these inspections, see Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezahir*, Vol. 3, 107-240.

Western world. Hence he tacitly accepted the supremacy of West; but this supremacy was only confined to the material fields, namely science, technology and administrative mechanisms. In his *History (Tarih-i Cevdet)* he wrote that the European developments in administrative (*umûr-u mülkiye*), financial (*umûr-u mâliye*) and military (*umûr-u askeriye*) fields produced the current welfare of the continent and the adoption of European regulations in these fields could contribute to the revitalization of the Ottoman Empire, provided that these regulations were in conformity with the Islamic law and the customs of the Empire.⁴⁰¹ In other words, in principle, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa was not against importation of some elements of the European civilization; however, they have to be in conformity with the basic principles of the Ottoman-Islamic tradition. This means that he was against imitation (*taklîd*) and superficial application of European practices rather than its essence.⁴⁰² He was also against the rapid implementation of European practices in the Ottoman Empire; he argued that a more gradual adoption of such practices would ease social tensions. The reason for this cautiousness was his firm belief in the peculiarity of the Ottoman/Islamic culture and the contradiction between the European and Islamic civilizations: “We have some peculiar characteristics; therefore, what is beneficial for other states will be detrimental for us. What is an urgent treatment for them is a fatal poison for us. This is the most important issue is to discern and comprehend.”⁴⁰³

In sum, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa made a clear distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization. After stating that one of the most significant reasons of Ottoman decline was the lack of technological development, he wrote that the European science and technology should immediately be transferred to the Ottoman Empire. However, he argued that the implementation of moral elements of European civilization such as the legal system or values would disturb the Ottoman society. Because the moral elements

⁴⁰¹ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Vol. 3, 51-52, quoted by Kuran, *Türkiye'nin Batılılaşması ve Milli Meseleler*, 144.

⁴⁰² Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezahir*, Vol. 4, 220.

⁴⁰³ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezahir*, Vol. 4, 221.

of civilization were the product of peculiar characteristics of a particular society; therefore, they were applicable only for that society. In sum, for him, the adoption of material elements of European civilization was a requisite for the revival of the Empire, and it would not disturb the peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman society; whereas, the adoption of moral elements would create significant problems.⁴⁰⁴

All in all, the word *medeniyet* had soon been consolidated, and only three decades after its coinage, it became the central theme of the Ottoman intellectual debates regarding the modernization of the Empire. Particularly, the writings of 1820 generation, namely Şinasi, Münif Paşa and Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, were quite influential in the popularization of the concept and for the establishment of the basic trends, which would later evolve into political movements towards the end of the Empire. The dualism between the old and new, the European and Islamic civilizations, and the East and West became quite clear because of the notion of selectivity applied to the elements of European civilization. This contributed to a blend of the material elements of the European civilization associated with reason, which was not a European but a universal phenomenon, and the moral elements of the Ottoman/Islamic civilization, which should be preserved in order to prevent imitation, a mortal malice for the Ottoman society. In sum, the dyadic presentation of these two different entities and the attempts for their harmonization was the most significant originality of the Ottoman perception of civilization in this period.

7.2.2 Deepening the Civilization Debate: Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, Ahmed Midhat Efendi, and Şemseddin Sami (1870-1890)

The major debates regarding civilization, such as singularity/plurality of this concept, its inevitability and the degree of adoption of European civilization were consolidated more with the writings of a younger generation of intellectuals, who were born around 1840s, and whose legacies continued until

⁴⁰⁴ Christoph Neumann, *Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet'in Siyasi Anlamı*, translated by Meltem Arun, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), 145- 146.

the end of the nineteenth century and beyond. Therefore this sub-section deals with the deepening of these debates and their evolution into the ideological division which would dominate the last two decades of the Empire.

Before examining the intellectuals of 1840 generation in detail, one significant point should be emphasized in order to underline the peculiarity of the period in consideration. Accordingly, the period between 1876 and 1878 was a significant turning point for these intellectuals both for their own mental transformation and for their perception of civilization. Until 1876, the focus of their writings was to criticize the bureaucratic autocracy of the ruling elite and to pursue parliamentary regime to prevent the disintegration of the Empire. Therefore, in this period, the concept of civilization was quite interrelated with the concepts of liberty, parliamentary regime, or anti-authoritarianism.⁴⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the significance attached to the material aspects of civilization instead of moral ones continued and even deepened. Moreover, until 1876, the Young Ottomans' perception of Europe was extremely positive not only because what they defended had indeed been sprouted in Europe, but also because they found a secure place to disseminate their thoughts in some European states when they had to flee to Europe in the mid-1860s.

This situation took a sharp curve with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78; European states did not support the Ottoman Empire against the Russians unlike the Crimean War, and the European public opinion began to turn against the Ottoman Empire. Having read the European publications condemning Ottoman maltreatment towards some subjects of the Empire (especially the Bulgarians),⁴⁰⁶ Ottoman intellectuals began to defend their state against these

⁴⁰⁵ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 215.

⁴⁰⁶ No politician could be more successful than William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898) and no pamphlet could be more influential than his *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, published in 1876, in turning the European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. Criticizing the support of Benjamin Disraeli's (1804-1881) government to the Ottoman Empire, he accused the Turks of being "the anti-human specimen of the humanity," after the Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian rebellion. See Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 40. For a detailed analysis of Gladstone and British perception of Islam during 1870s and 1880s, see Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 140-145.

accusations. The defence of Islam⁴⁰⁷ as a religion compatible with contemporary civilization in general, and with science in particular, therefore, turned out to be a major theme in the writings of the prominent figures of the second half of the nineteenth century including Namık Kemal (1840-1888), Ali Suavi (1838-1878), Ahmed Midhat (1844-1912), and Şemseddin Sami (1850-1904).⁴⁰⁸

The articles of Namık Kemal, published in his newspapers, particularly in *İbret*, were quite important regarding his argumentation of the concept of civilization, and these articles included one of the most developed analyses on the positioning of the Ottoman Empire *vis-à-vis* the European civilization. To start with, Namık Kemal argued that the word *civilization* was one of the concepts created after the Ottoman interaction with Europe.⁴⁰⁹ However, in defining civilization, he not only referred to the European perceptions, but also to the Khaldunian notion of *umran* by writing that civilization meant the social/settled life of human beings and thus “a natural requisite of human life” (*hayat-ı beşer için levâzım-ı tabiiyeden*).⁴¹⁰ Therefore, Namık Kemal argued for the inevitability of civilization, and criticized those who had been trying to stand against it:

The excellence of civilization and the degree of skills of Europe began to be recognized here. The impossibility of standing against the victorious influence of this total power by this country individually was understood in a short period of time.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ According to Kemal Karpat, the period between 1875 and 1880 was so significant that it was in this period that Islamism turned out to be a modern ideology. See Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 119.

⁴⁰⁸ What is more, by the 1880s the image of the West was altered dramatically due to advancement of European imperialism; the European scramble to Africa as well as the British occupation of Egypt and French occupation of Tunisia alarmed the Ottoman intellectuals. While they still believed in the virtues of European civilization in this period; they were more cautious when they were mentioning about Europe as a polity. See Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 39.

⁴⁰⁹ Namık Kemal, “Medeniyet,” *İbret*, No. 94, 16 Zilkade 1289 [15 January 1873], in Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, 358.

⁴¹⁰ Namık Kemal, “Medeniyet,” 358.

⁴¹¹ “Avrupa'nın kemâlât-ı medeniye ve derecât-ı marifeti buralarda bilinmeye başladı. Öyle bir kuvve-i külliye'nin galebe-i nüfuzuna münferiden şu mülkün karşı durabilmesinde olan

Again, similar to Münif Paşa, Namık Kemal argued that civilization was a source of domination; civilized nations would inevitably dominate the non-civilized once. What is novel in Namık Kemal's writings was his association of civilization with liberty and his argumentation that uncivilized communities could not preserve their liberty against the civilized ones.⁴¹²

Namık Kemal also defended civilization against those who were criticizing it as the source of "social and moral evils" (*fuşşiyat*). He wrote that "social and moral evils emerge not out of its [civilization's] essential deficiencies but imperfectness of its application." (*fuşşiyat [medeniyetin] avâriz-ı zâtiyesinden değil, nekâis-i icraatındadır.*)⁴¹³ He further argued that even if one accepted the European civilization as the source of evildoing, this should not prevent the Ottomans to benefit from its material achievements; since the Ottomans need not to imitate European civilization as a whole:

Now, if we desire to favour civilization we will derive such beneficial realities from wherever we find. We are not compelled to imitate the dance and wedding practices of Europeans just as we are not compelled to derive the habit of eating snails from the Chinese.⁴¹⁴

In other words, similar to his predecessors, Namık Kemal did not favour total adoption of the European civilization; rather he preferred selectivity. He prioritized the adoption of the material aspects of the civilization such as steam engine, gas lamps, medicine, and science as well as some legal regulations and

imkansızlık pek az zaman içinde anlaşıldı." Namık Kemal, "İttihad-ı İslam," *İbret*, No. 11, 21 Rebiyülahir 1289 [28 Haziran 1872], in Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, 84.

⁴¹² For a brief account of Namık Kemal's understanding of liberty see Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 383-385.

⁴¹³ Namık Kemal, "Medeniyet," 360.

⁴¹⁴ "Şimdi biz tervic-i medeniyeti arzu edersek bu kabılden olan hakâyık-ı nâfiayı nerede bulursak iktibas ederiz. Temeddün için Çinlilerden süllük kebabı ekl etmeyi almaya muhtaç olmadığımız gibi Avrupalıların dansına, usul-ü münakehatına takli etmeye de hiç mecbur değiliz." Namık Kemal, "Medeniyet," 361.

institutions such as factories and companies which would be beneficial for the development and progress of the society.⁴¹⁵ He once wrote:

For a nation in order to join into the race of civilization, which has advanced rapidly, it is necessary to learn how the technique and equipments that other nations possessed has emerged, [...] to adopt harmless ones, and to make them harmonious with the national structure by changing some parts of them after adoption.⁴¹⁶

Namık Kemal not only defended adoption of European achievements against the conservative *ulama*; but also defended his religion, which had been accused of being an obstacle to scientific development, against the Europeans. One of his acclaimed texts entitled *Renan Müdafaanâmesi (Defence against Renan)* reflected such a reactive stance. In this short book, he criticized Ernest Renan (1823-1892), who perceived Islam as an impediment before scientific development and claimed that the relative development of Islamic philosophy and science was a product of either irreligious rulers of the Islamic states or the Greek/Sassanid philosophers.⁴¹⁷ Namık Kemal responds that Islam, as a religion, had always encouraged its followers to acquire knowledge wherever it was; it would be extremely inaccurate to label Muslim caliphs as irreligious rulers; and borrowings from other cultures did not demonstrate the deficiency of borrowing culture but its richness.⁴¹⁸ His diversion from a more pro-European stance to a more Ottomanist/Islamist one became clearer after his disappointment due to negative European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire.

⁴¹⁵ Namık Kemal, "İbret," *İbret*, No. 3, 11 Rebiyülahir 1289 [18 June 1872], in Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, 46-48. According to Berkes whenever Namık Kemal used the term civilization, he referred only to industry, technology, economy, the press and education. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 216.

⁴¹⁶ Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1326 [1909]), transliterated and edited by Mücahit Demirel, (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2005), 25-26.

⁴¹⁷ Renan's book entitled *L'Islam et la Science (Islam and Science)* (Paris: M. Levy, 1883), written after his conference delivered with the same title in the University of Sorbonne in 1883 with one of the most prominent Islamic scholars of that period, Jamaladdin al-Afghani (1839-1897) created a significant resentment in the Ottoman Empire, which was concretized by *Renan Müdafaanamesi*.

⁴¹⁸ Namık Kemal, *Renan Müdafaanâmesi*, (İstanbul: Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1326 [1908]), transliterated and edited by Abdurrahman Küçük, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), 97-109.

Besides Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi emerged as one of the most eccentric intellectuals of the late *Tanzimat* era with his complex personality.⁴¹⁹ Unlike Namık Kemal, who generally refrained from a polemical stance and rather preferred to write smoothly to prevent any misunderstandings, Ali Suavi was quite sharp in his newspaper articles. Being against imitation like most of his contemporaries, he wrote that the Ottomans lost their peculiar characteristics, customs and traditions after they began to imitate the Europe; he perceived imitation as an illness (*maraz*).⁴²⁰ He even mentioned that what Ottomans perceived as civilization was nothing but debauchery: “The bitch called debauchery entered İstanbul under the dress of civilization.”⁴²¹ In other words, he bitterly criticized the Ottomans of being super-westernized at the expense of losing their own characteristics. Indeed, this criticism was not a new one; however, it had not been stated as sharp as in these expressions before.

The Islamist tune in the writings of Ali Suavi soon experienced an unfamiliar transformation into a Turkist one. Therefore, one of his significant contributions to the discussion of civilization was his incorporation of the concept of race to the idea of civilization. Accordingly, in one of his articles, he wrote that “[i]n Europe there is the issue of race. In other words, there is the belief that one should consider the race of a community in order to evaluate its talents and skills.”⁴²² After that he focused not on the Ottoman but on the

⁴¹⁹ He can not be labelled under a category easily; although he had no *madrassa* education, he adopted the *ulama* dress and gave speeches in the mosques. Then he joined the Young Ottomans and defended liberty against the authoritarian regime of *Tanzimat* bureaucracy. This struggle ended up with his flight to Europe where he married an English woman, Marie Steward Lugh and republished the newspaper *Muhbir* in London and the newspaper *Ulûm* in 1869. His life had a dramatic end; he was killed while he was trying to re-enthroned Murad V in 1878. Doğan, *Tanzimatın İki Ucu*, 214-222.

⁴²⁰ Ali Suavi, “Taklid,” *Le Mukhbir*, 18 January 1868, quoted in Doğan, *Tanzimatın İki Ucu*, 292.

⁴²¹ “[...] *sefahat dedikleri kahpe, İstanbul’a medeniyet kisvesiyle girmiştir.*” Ali Suavi, “Kemal’in Zevali, Süs Neticesi Hacet Miktarını Tecavüzün Neticesi,” *Muvakkaten Ulûm*, 1287 [1870], quoted in Doğan, *Tanzimatın İki Ucu*, 293.

⁴²² Ali Suavi, “Türk,” *Ulûm*, No. 1, 22 Rebiyülahir 1286 [1 August 1869]. For a detailed analysis of the article see Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 226-228. Indeed, it is quite interesting that Mahmud Celaledin’s (1826-1875, a Polish-émigré named Konstanty Borzecky, converted to Islam and became a general in the Ottoman army later on) *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (The Ancient and Modern Turks) was published in the same year in a French

Turkish history, and argued that this history could not be brushed away just as the story of a chain of invasions. Rather, according to him, Turks were the representatives of an old glorious civilization. He particularly referred to Jean Sylvain Bailly's (1736-1793) *Lettres sur l' Atlantide de Platon (Letters on Plato's Atlantis)* published in 1779, who argued that the cradle of civilization was Central Asia.⁴²³ Moreover, Suavi insisted that it was the Turkish people that introduced animal-herding, establishing dams over rivers, mining, history and rhetoric to the world.⁴²⁴

All these interesting, if not weird, explanations demonstrate that, with Ali Suavi, the ideas of race and the Central Asia as the cradle of civilization somehow entered into the Ottoman literary circles. Of course, these ideas were quite naïve, they did not emerge out of a detailed historical analysis; however still, they should be evaluated as quite original and thought-provoking. In an age where the Lamarckian Social Evolutionism and Social Darwinism was rising in Europe, such explanations by an Ottoman intellectual, who had lived for some time in the centres of these debates, namely Paris and London, was not totally bizarre. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that Ali Suavi had covered all the literature on racism; however, at least he was aware of the concept of race and tried to implement it in his analysis of history and civilization. He was one of the earliest authors writing on the Turkish race and their achievements; that is

publishing house in İstanbul. In this book, Mustafa Celaleddin attacked the idea of racial inferiority of the Turks and tried to prove that the Turkish and European peoples had descended from the same origin. He also set parallels between European languages and Turkish language. His studies produced different implications; on the one hand, there were those criticizing his book as filled with speculative expressions, while others perceived him as one of the earliest representatives of Turkish nationalist discourse even influencing the thoughts of Atatürk. For an account of Mustafa Celaleddin and his book see İlker Aytürk, "Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov., 2004): 1-25, 8-10.

⁴²³ He wrote: "Mister Bailly, who had achieved the qualification of a knowledgeable scholar among the English scholars, mentioned in his writings about Plato that it was the Turkish people, who had brought science, industry, civilization and illumination to the world." (*İngiliz uleması beyninde allame vasfını kazanmış Mister Bailly, Eflatun üzerine talikatında der ki: Dünyaya ulum ve sanayi ve medeniyet ve tezehhüb veren kavim Türklerdir.*) Quoted by Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 227.

⁴²⁴ Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 227.

why Tanpınar argues that he influenced the pre-1908 philological and historical studies on the Turkish people by a group of intellectuals.⁴²⁵

If Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi processed the concept of civilization in their newspaper articles, Ahmed Midhat did this in his literary works, particularly in his novels.⁴²⁶ Similar to the intellectuals of his age, he admired European achievements and argued for their adoption in the Ottoman Empire, while he was against “being Frankish” (*alafrangalaşmak*), in other words, the simple and superficial imitation of the Westerners.⁴²⁷

Ahmed Midhat Efendi was not much interested in daily politics unlike Ali Suavi and Namık Kemal. This disinterest distanced him from the two major political movements of his earlier and latter life; in other words, he could not get along with both the Young Ottomans in 1870s and Young Turks from 1890s onwards.⁴²⁸ According to Tanpınar, Ahmed Midhat opposed the methods of Young Ottomans in bringing revolutionary change to the fragile Empire; therefore, he preferred to provide the grounds of Ottoman modernization through

⁴²⁵ These intellectuals included Ahmet Vefik Paşa (1823-1891), Necib Asım Bey (1861-1935), and Bursalı Mehmed Tahir Bey (1861-1925). Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 227.

⁴²⁶ Born as the son of a poor shopkeeper, Ahmed Midhat, lived a difficult childhood. After completing his education, he was appointed as secretary to the Governorship of Danube province, which was established under extraordinary conditions by one of the most significant statesmen of the Tanzimat era, namely Midhat Paşa (1822-1884). There, he attracted the attention of Midhat Paşa, who would later give his name ‘Midhat’ to his young secretary. During his service in the Danube province, Ahmed Midhat began to learn French and followed European literature. Later, when Midhat Paşa was appointed as the Governor of Baghdad Province, he brought Ahmed Midhat Efendi among his staff. There, Ahmed Midhat was able to learn Eastern literature as well. In sum, his career provided him to evaluate these two literatures, which contributed much to his perception of the East and West’ For a short biography of Ahmed Midhat, see Orhan Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi*, (Ankara: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), 3-7.

⁴²⁷ Carter Vaughn Findley, “An Ottoman Occidental in Europe: Ahmed Midhat Meets Madame Gülnar, 1889,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Feb., 1998): 15-49, 23. According to Aydın, Ahmed Midhat was the person, “[...] who brilliantly formulated the Muslim modernist attempt to separate the universality of modernity from the Western experience,” and who “[...] not only confirmed the liberal modernism of the earlier generation and harmonized Islamic identity with the pro-modernist attitudes but also responded to the dominant European discourse on the inferiority of Muslims. See Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 41.

⁴²⁸ Findley, “An Ottoman Occidental in Europe,” 19.

educating the people. This was the starting point for his attempts to write and publish continuously for almost half a century.⁴²⁹

Ahmed Midhat's dislike of revolutionary change and his preference of a more cautious modernization resulted in his distinction between the material and moral aspects of civilization, which he preferred to label as the distinction between "technique" and "idea." Orhan Okay argues that this distinction was quite popular in the Hamidian era. On the one hand, the Ottoman intellectuals were aware that the Ottoman Empire fell extremely backwards compared to Europe in technical sense; therefore the material elements of civilization had to be adopted immediately and without questioning. On the other hand, the Western ideas, such as liberty, republicanism, representative democracy, laicism, were perceived as the "poisons" of the Western civilization, which should be avoided to prevent the total disintegration of the Empire.⁴³⁰ Ahmed Midhat was not as solid as other pre-Hamidian intellectuals on regime question; however, he argued that the discussion on regime question and liberty should wait for the achievement of material development in the Ottoman Empire.⁴³¹

Ahmed Midhat argued that it was impossible to deny the scientific development of Europe as he declared himself as "the student or disciple of Europeans in the way of progress."⁴³² However, like Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, he criticized the Ottomans for adopting the moral elements of civilization more easily and more rapidly than its material elements. The main theme of his novels is, therefore, the adoption of the wrong side of the European civilization; there are generally two protagonists, one representing the super-westernized, ignorant, and morally corrupted Ottomans and the other representing the Ottomans who preserved their religious and cultural values while educated themselves through

⁴²⁹ Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 403.

⁴³⁰ Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi*, 10.

⁴³¹ Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi*, 10.

⁴³² "Biz kendimizi bu şehrah-ı terakkîde Avrupalıların peyrevi ve âdetâ şakirdi addeyle[riz]." Ahmed Midhat, *Ben Neyim: Hikmet-i Maddiyeye Müdafaa*, (İstanbul: Kırkambar Matbaası, 1308 [1892]), cited in Okay, *Batı Medeniyeti Karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi*, 13.

learning about European material achievements. The oppositional representation of these characters, the self-defeat of the former and the achievements of the latter at the end of the book establishes a typical Ahmed Midhat novel.⁴³³

Another significant novelty of Ahmed Midhat was his Social Darwinist stance. According to Atila Doğan, he was the first significant representative of this movement in the Ottoman Empire.⁴³⁴ Some of the articles in the journal *Dağarcık* published by himself demonstrate that he was very much influenced by Lamarckian social evolutionism. For example, in one of his articles, he associated human progress with the concept of rivalry and argued that the recent progress of humanity was an outcome of the sense of rivalry which forced the human beings to seek always the better.⁴³⁵ In another article, social Darwinist concepts were more visible; he mentioned that in the history of humanity the idea to destroy (*fikr-i tahrip*) always preceded the idea to construct (*fikr-i tâmir*), and he argued that the humanity had always reached a better condition after each destruction.⁴³⁶

Şemseddin Sami (1850-1904), a major author and linguist of Albanian origin, was very significant for the perception of the concept of civilization; since his four articles published in *Hafta* journal between 1881 and 1884 summed up all the major discussions of the nineteenth century regarding this

⁴³³ The most significant comparison of such kind was presented in *Felatun Bey ile Rakım Efendi* in which Felatun Bey represented the super-westernized Ottomans and the Rakım Efendi represented morally conservative but materially progressive Ottomans. In the initial parts of the book Felatun Bey was a rich, morally corrupted man engaging in inconvenient relationships with women, while Rakım Efendi was relatively poor, but still a man of dignity. At the end of the book, Felatun Bey was bankrupted and fell into a miserable condition, while Rakım Efendi achieved almost what he wanted. In sum, Ahmed Midhat tried to demonstrate that the former group was destined to decay while the latter group would succeed despite whatever difficulty they would experience on the way. Other novels of Ahmed Midhat on the same theme included *Ahmet Metin ve Şirzad*, *Paris'te Bir Türk*, and *Jön Türk*.

⁴³⁴ Atila Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), 152.

⁴³⁵ Ahmed Midhat Efendi, "İnsan," *Dağarcık*, No. 2, 1288, 40-49, cited in Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, 158.

⁴³⁶ Ahmed Midhat Efendi, "Fikr-i Tahrip ve Fikr-i Tamir," *Dağarcık*, No. 9, 1289, 260-263, cited in Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, 162-163.

concept.⁴³⁷ To start with, he was one of the first authors, who systematically argued that the concept of civilization was a product of the intellectual developments of the eighteenth century, emerged as a result of the works of Voltaire, Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists such as Dalambert and Diderot. He also mentioned that the way to the works of these figures were opened by “the scientific innovations and philosophical ideas and perceptions” (*keşfiyât-ı fenniye ve efkâr-ı mütalaat-ı hikemiye*) of Descartes, Newton, Herschel, Kant, and Bacon.⁴³⁸ This account of the historical roots of civilization was quite original and demonstrated the awareness of the author on the Enlightenment literature. He further argued for the inevitability of civilization as his predecessors; what is novel in his approach was the indestructibility of civilization. He mentioned that the spread of civilization reached such a level that, nothing could prevent its further development and nothing can destroy it. He wrote that the civilization can not be destroyed even with the destruction of entire Europe, let alone Paris and London.⁴³⁹

Moreover, Şemseddin Sami clearly distinguished between the Islamic and the European civilization. He argued that the Islamic civilization had contributed to the scientific and intellectual development of humanity in the past; however, today, current civilization had spread to the world from Europe. In other words, he associated the Islamic civilization with the past and the European civilization with the present. He underlined that the material elements, particularly steamships, railway and telegraph, were the guardians of civilization and under their protection, nothing could harm the progress of civilization.⁴⁴⁰

Şemseddin Sami also criticized the bigotry of some Ottomans regarding the European civilization. He wrote that since the idea of civilization seemed to

⁴³⁷ For the full texts of these four articles see Zeynep Süslü and İsmail Kara, “Şemseddin Sami’nin ‘Medeniyet’e Dair Dört Makalesi,” *Kutadgubilig*, No. 4 (Oct. 2003): 259-281, 274.

⁴³⁸ Süslü and Kara, “Şemseddin Sami’nin ‘Medeniyet’e Dair Dört Makalesi,” 274.

⁴³⁹ Süslü and Kara, “Şemseddin Sami’nin ‘Medeniyet’e Dair Dört Makalesi,” 276.

⁴⁴⁰ Süslü and Kara, “Şemseddin Sami’nin ‘Medeniyet’e Dair Dört Makalesi,” 275.

be monopolized by the Christian community, ignorant people thought that it was a product of Christianity and that the Muslims should resist it. He contested this view by arguing that indeed it was not Islam preventing the progress of the Islamic community; rather the problem was the reaction in the name of Islam against the incorporation of civilization to the Islamic community.⁴⁴¹

From this point, Şemseddin Sami advanced to a critique of some of his predecessors, particularly the conservatives such as Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, who had argued that the Islamic civilization had once enlightened the world and the emergence of European civilization owed much to the works of the Muslim scientists and philosophers. He partially accepted these arguments; however, he found some of them as extremely exaggerated. Although, these arguments served easing the reaction of the ignorant masses against civilization, they produced some kind of an ungrounded pride that deterred them from adopting European achievements, since they underlined that civilization had once been achieved by the Muslims and thus could not be monopolized by the Christian Europeans. Şemseddin Sami argued that the Ottomans should give as much significance to the works of European scientists and philosophers as the works of the former Muslim scientists and philosophers. However, he added that:

[...] we can neither use telegraph nor carry out steamship and railway locomotive by the chemistry of Cahiz and philosophy of Ibn Rüşd, just as we can not cure malaria with the medicine of Ibn Sina. Therefore we should leave the study of Islamic scholars' works to the scholars of history and antiquities, and we should take science and technology from the current civilization of Europe if we want to be civilized.⁴⁴²

All in all, Şemseddin Sami argued that current civilization had spread to the world from Europe. Therefore, he advised the Ottomans not to resist the importations from European civilization by arguing that these importations were peculiar to Christianity. Also, the Ottomans should not remain satisfied with

⁴⁴¹ Süslü and Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'Medeniyet'e Dair Dört Makalesi," 272.

⁴⁴² "[...] İbn Sînâ'nun tıbbıyla sıtmayı kesmeğe muktedir olmayacağımız gibi Câhız'ın kimyası ve İbn Rüşd'ün hikmetiyle de ne demiryolu lokomotifleriyle vapuru yürütebiliriz, ne telgraf kullanabiliriz. Bunun için biz, ulema-yı İslâmın âsârıyla uğraşmağı tarih ve âsâr-ı atfka ulemasına bırakarak, temeddün etmek ister isek ulûm ve fûnûnu Avrupa medeniyet-i hâzırasından almamız." Süslü and Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'Medeniyet'e Dair Dört Makalesi," 279.

glorifying the Islamic civilization of the Middle Ages; instead, they should work hard for adopting the current civilization in order to reverse the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

The 1840 generation, who experienced both the bureaucratic suppression of the Azizian and the authoritarian rule of Hamidian periods, not only deepened the discussions on the concept of civilization through elaborating them more systematically, but also widened the scope of the concept through incorporating some discussions in Europe, such as Social Evolutionism and its emphasis on race. The destructiveness of 1877-78 War and the Hamidian censure decreased the degree of pro-Europeanness and the critical tune of the Ottoman intellectuals; but they also voluntarily defended their own Islamic/Ottoman characteristics against European criticisms. Moreover, the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization, the perception of the necessity of the adoption of the material elements as well as the solid emphasis on the preservation of the moral elements continued to a great extent in this period. Another important point is that this generation's perception of civilization had a significant difference from the prevalent Western perception of the concept at that time. As Aydın clearly states the Ottomans searched “search for a global modernity that would be in harmony with the multiple traditions of different religions and cultures, at a time when European discourse of Orient and race were trying to limit the achievements and future of modernity only to the Western race and Christian culture.”⁴⁴³

To sum up, *Tanzimat* intellectuals brought the argumentation of civilization one step further. Unlike most of the European intellectuals, who argued for the impossibility of progress in non-European societies, they courageously defended that the East could and should progress, because lack of progress meant extinction for them. In other words, they had the firm belief that the Eastern societies were not static; they had the potential to change.⁴⁴⁴ This

⁴⁴³ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in the West*, 42-43.

⁴⁴⁴ Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, 37. However, Berkes also criticized the *Tanzimat* intellectuals of not passing beyond the contemporary European civilization, and of not understanding the underlying historical and social dynamics that resulted in its advance. He

critical tune developed against European critiques of the non-European world, would consolidate in the post-Hamidian period evaluated in the next section.

7.3. Westernism, Islamism and Turkism, and the Third Generation of Ottoman Intellectuals (1890-1920):

The dualism descended from *Tanzimat* period never ceased to exist in the Ottoman Empire until its final disintegration; indeed, it was this dualism that provided the intellectual richness and colourful debates of the post-Hamidian era. Although crystallization of three political movements, namely Westernism, Islamism and Turkism, seemed to be realized after the restoration of the parliament, indeed, they were the culmination of a century long discussion, which was considerably transformed during the Hamidian period.⁴⁴⁵ That is why, this section does not examine the period from 1908, but from 1890s onwards. As Berkes states, it was in the heyday of Hamidian period, the depths of intellectual circles “[...] were boiling with the signs of a coming revolt. Between the

argued that they mentioned reason, science and hard-work (*say*) as the factors producing the existing civilization; however, all the other underlying reasons were neglected. Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, 61.

⁴⁴⁵ Indeed, one of the earliest attempts to present different currents of thought as political movements was Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey's (1876-1935) famous article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (The Three Ways of Politics) published in *Türk* newspaper in Cairo in 1904. In this article, he mentioned three currents of thought, being Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. He argued that Ottomanism aimed to establish an “Ottoman nation” based on the idea of fatherland (*vatan*) in which the components of the Empire would have equal rights and obligations. However, he mentioned that this was an extremely difficult task for several reasons: (1) protection of the borders of the Ottoman fatherland would not suffice for the survival of the state; (2) the Turkish component would lose its authority *vis-à-vis* the Arabs because of the changing demographic conditions; (3) Russia and the European public opinion would resist such a project for political and religious reasons. Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey defined Islamism as a project uniting all the Muslims of the world under Ottoman leadership. He perceived the realization of this aim more possible; however, still, he argued that its realization might take a very long period, which could not be bothered. Finally, he determined Turkism as the third current of thought and argued for a gradual union of the Turks, starting from the Ottoman Empire and later enlarged to Caucasia and Central Asia. Although it was understood from his writings that he favoured the last option, he did not clearly mention that; rather he concluded his article with a question to be answered by the intellectuals through choosing among the Islamist and Turkist solutions. See Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, transliterated and edited by Enver Ziya Karal, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976).

conflicting pressures of conservatism and the Western penetration, the lines of thinking on cultural matters began to clarify and differentiate.”⁴⁴⁶

What distinguished this period from the earlier periods was that the idea of civilization was no more analyzed in individual works; rather it turned a major theme of relatively more systematic political movements. In other words, all of these political movements had a peculiar understanding of civilization; their adherents placed the concept in the midst of their discussion on the perception of the West *vis-à-vis* the East, as well as on the reasons of the Ottoman decline and possible solutions to prevent and reverse it. Secondly, all these movements adopted a tougher stance under Hamidian pressure. Most of the adherents suffered considerably from the censure, exiles, or arrests. Hence anti-Hamidianism was a common point for all of them. The Westernists perceived Hamidian regime as the most significant obstacle in front of modernization and Westernization.⁴⁴⁷ Islamists were not content with the monopolization of Islamism by the Sultan; they argued that the establishment of the omnipotence of state under Hamidian regime imperilled religion.⁴⁴⁸ Turkists were reacting to the Hamidian Pan-Islamism, since they emphasized nation instead of religion. For instance Ömer Seyfeddin (1884-1920) wrote that Abdülhamid felt the greatest enmity to the Turks and the Turkish nationalism.⁴⁴⁹ The sudden mushrooming of political organizations and publications after 1908, therefore, owed much to this reaction beneath the surface. After setting these common points, the rest of this section is devoted to a comparative analysis of these three movements in terms of their perception of civilization, the West, and the reasons of Ottoman decline and the remedies to reverse it. Such a survey is particularly useful to understand how the concept of civilization was transformed in the post-Hamidian era.

⁴⁴⁶ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 289.

⁴⁴⁷ Mustafa Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları: İctihad, Sebilü'r Reşad ve Türk Yurdu'nda Toplumsal Tezler*, (İstanbul: Lotus Yayınları, 2007), 479.

⁴⁴⁸ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 290.

⁴⁴⁹ Ömer Seyfeddin, “Yeni Lisan ve Hüseyin Cahit,” *Genç Kalemler*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 13 Mayıs 1327 [26 May 1911], for the full text of the article see Ömer Seyfettin, *Makaleler I*, compiled, transliterated and edited by Hülya Argunşah, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001), 130-135.

7.3.1. The Perception of Civilization

To start with the Westernist discourse, it can be argued that the adherents of this movement firmly believed in the singularity of civilization.⁴⁵⁰ In other words, according to them, there was one single civilization, and it was the Western one. Abdullah Cevdet, an ardent defender of westernization, wrote in one of his articles as such: “We have to understand one thing – there are not two civilizations, there is only one to which to turn to, and that is Western civilization, which we must take into our hands, whether it be rosy or thorny.”⁴⁵¹

However, the Westernists did not altogether reject the existence of other civilizations, particularly the “Islamic civilization.” Rather, similar to the European intellectual mood of the time, which perceived the coexistence of multiple civilizations as a historical not contemporary phenomenon, they argued that this civilization had once existed; however, currently, it could not respond the needs of the Ottoman society. They criticized the Islamist argument that the Western civilization was established through the borrowings from the Islamic civilization, and found it nonsense. For example, Hüseyin Cahid (compared the “Arab civilization” (he meant the Islamic civilization) and the Western civilization and argued for the ultimate superiority of the latter:

Articles about the teachings of Arab science have taught me only one thing: I finally learned that we have been liberated from Arab civilization forever! If our gratitude to Arab civilization is due to those Arab sciences, we can declare our good riddance of it without hesitation [... L]et us leave those Arab books and embrace passionately the modern books which can fill our brains with the sciences and techniques of our time.⁴⁵²

Moreover, some of the staunch Westernists, such as Abdullah Cevdet, were against the distinction between the material and moral elements of

⁴⁵⁰ For a detailed analysis of Westernism, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Aug., 1997): 133-158.

⁴⁵¹ Abdullah Cevdet, “Şime-i Muhabbet,” *İçtihad*, No. 89, 16 Kanun-i Sani 1329 [29 Ocak 1914], quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 358.

⁴⁵² Hüseyin Cahid, “Arab’dan İstifade Edeceğimiz Ulum,” *Tarık*, No. 4630, (1898), quoted from Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 298.

civilization, which had ultimately ended with the prioritization of the former over the latter. According to them, civilization was a whole; it should be adopted not partially, but totally. Hence, in order to modernize the society, the adoption of material achievements did not suffice; a more radical moral and mental transformation was necessary.⁴⁵³ This radical version of Westernism was quite different from the earlier currents of thought as well as other post-Hamidian political movements, which were based on this distinction.

These three points, the singularity of civilization, the rejection of the “Islamic civilization” as an alternative, and the holistic perception of civilization were severely criticized by the Islamists. To start with, the Islamists rejected the singularity of European civilization; despite they acknowledged the superiority of the West *vis-à-vis* the Islamic world, they argued that this was only a material superiority. The West was morally corrupted; its material achievements did not suffice to perceive it as the single civilization of the contemporary world.

Thus, the Islamists accepted not only the existence of “Islamic civilization,” but also perceived it as the alternative to the Western civilization. Unlike the Westernists, they believed in the glory of the Islamic civilization which had been the source of the Western achievements.⁴⁵⁴ They utilized the concept of the “true civilization” (*sahîh medeniyet*) to denote the Islamic civilization; and thus emphasized that there was no other way for the Muslims

⁴⁵³ Of course, it is not possible to say that there is uniformity in the thoughts of the Westernists regarding this distinction. For example, a more moderate Westernist, Celal Nuri (İleri, 1882-1936) clearly distinguished between the “industrial civilization” (*snaâ medeniyet*) and “real civilization” (*hakiki medeniyet*). He argued that the main mistake of the Ottoman intellectuals and administrators was to adopt both of them; what should be done was to adopt the former and to preserve the real civilization of the Ottomans. See Celal Nuri, *İttihad-ı İslam: İslamin Mazisi, Hali, İstikbali*, (İstanbul: Yeni Osmanlı Matbaası, 1331 [1913]), 26-33, also quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 122-123. For a detailed analysis of the Celal Nuri's concept of civilization see, Tufan Buzpınar, “Celal Nuri's Concepts of Westernization and Religion,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar., 2007): 247-258.

⁴⁵⁴ According to Berkes, in 1886, in the *Tarîk* journal, a series of articles, entitled “The Islamic Civilization,” appeared, which aim to “[...] show the achievements of the Arabs [...] in science, technology (*fen*), literature and historiography; and, second, to prove that all of these were taken over by the Europeans.” This was followed by the Akyiğitzade Musa's book entitled *Avrupa Medeniyetine Bir Nazar* (*A Glance to the European Civilization*), published in 1897, whose opening sentence follows as: “The bases of contemporary civilization are nothing but the actions and traditions of Muhammad.” See Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 263.

but to turn to Islam in order to survive and to prosper.⁴⁵⁵ According to Musa Kazım Efendi (1858-1920), the real aim of “true civilization” was to provide the people with happiness and prosperity, and Western civilization failed to do so. Therefore, he argued only the true religion (*hak din*) could produce the true civilization. Similarly, İskilipli Mehmed Atıf (1875-1926) argued that Western civilization could not be labelled as the true civilization unless it incorporated the “sacred principles and essences of Islam and the path of the prophets.” Therefore, Muslims did not necessarily need to adopt Western civilization; contrarily, it was the Westerners that need to adopt Islamic civilization to prevent and reverse their moral decadence.⁴⁵⁶

Again, unlike the Westernists, the Islamists were quite firm in the issue of the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization. They were in favour of the adoption of material elements of civilization. For example, Mehmed Akif (Ersoy, 1873-1936) once wrote in one of his poems that:

Take the science and technology of the West, take it.
Give, also, your efforts on this way its utmost speed.
Because it is impossible to live without these.
Because only the science and technology has no nationality.⁴⁵⁷

Despite their admiration to scientific and technological achievements, the Islamists were strictly rejecting moral dimensions of the Western civilization. For example, Selahaddin Asım clearly wrote:

European behaviour is utterly contrary not only to Islam, but also to the principles of any social life [...] What painful wounds, the European civil laws have opened on social life in terms of morals and ethics is obvious [...] It is true that we have [...] to benefit from European civilization, industry, and

⁴⁵⁵ Musa Kazım, *Külliyat-ı Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım: Dini-İçtimai Makaleler*, (İstanbul: Evkaf-ı İslamiye Matbaası, 1336 [1920]), quoted by İsmail Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler/Kişiler*, 3 Volumes, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1997), Vol. 1, 130-131.

⁴⁵⁶ İskilipli Mehmed Atıf, *Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kader, 1340 [1924]), quoted by Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 339.

⁴⁵⁷ “Alınız ilmini Garbın, alınız san’atını / Veriniz hem de mesâînize son sür’atini / Çünkü kabil değil artık yaşamak bunlarsız / Çünkü milliyeti yok san’atın, ilmin; yalnız.” Mehmed Akif, *Süleymaniye Kürsüsünde*, in Mehmed Akif Ersoy, *Safahat*, edited by Ertuğrul Düzdağ, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1991), 176.

knowledge; and yet it is absolutely imperative for us [...] not to allow their customs, morals and conduct to enter into our countries.⁴⁵⁸

Similarly, according to Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi (1865-1914), a conciliatory approach was necessary, which could both embrace the material achievements of the West and the moral principles of Islam; therefore, there was no other way from “the adoption of the way of eclecticism” (*iktitaḫ mesleğini ihtiyardan daha eslem tarîk yoktur*).⁴⁵⁹

According to the Islamists, the ultimate distinction between the Islamic and Western civilizations resulted in the impossibility of the import of moral elements of the latter to the former. For example, Said Halim Paşa (1863-1921) argued that the reason for this impossibility was that the entire social order of Islam is based on the fundamental principle of the absolute sovereignty of the *shariah*.⁴⁶⁰ In other words, the moral elements of Western civilization and Islam were not compatible with each other, and any attempt for reconciliation might have fatal consequences for the Islamic world.

What is significant with the Turkist perception of civilization was the distinction between the concepts of civilization (*medeniyet*) and culture (*hars*), clearly put forward by Ziya Gökalp. Indeed, this distinction was not altogether original; as mentioned before, it had its precursors from 1860s onwards regarding the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization. It was not also peculiar to the Turkists as well, more moderate Westernists, such as Celal Nuri, made a similar distinction between the industrial civilization denoting the material elements and the real civilization denoting the moral elements. However, what is novel with the differentiation between civilization

⁴⁵⁸ Quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 354.

⁴⁵⁹ Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi, *Hangi Meslek-i Felsefîyi Kabul Etmeliyiz*, (İstanbul: Hikmet Matbaası, 1329 [1913]), quoted by Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, pp. 23-24. For a detailed review of Ahmed Hilmi’s life, thoughts and works see Amin Bein, “A ‘Young Turk’ Islamic Intellectual: Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and the Diverse Intellectual Legacies of the Late Ottoman Empire,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Nov., 2007): 607-625.

⁴⁶⁰ Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Paşa: Ottoman Statesmen, Islamist Thinker (1865-1921)*, (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2003), 130.

and culture by Ziya Gökalp was the incorporation of a sociological tune through incorporating nationalist elements to this discussion.

According to Gökalp, there were significant differences between the concepts of culture and civilization, which should be comprehended properly in order to understand the reasons for the Ottoman Empire's decline and to search for the prospective solutions. To start with, according to Gökalp, culture is national, while civilization is international:

Culture is composed of the integrated system of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and technological spheres of life of a certain nation. Civilization, on the other hand, is the sum of total of social institutions shared in common by several nations that have attained the same level of development.⁴⁶¹

Unlike the Islamists, who clearly distinguished the technical/scientific dimensions of civilization from the moral ones, Ziya Gökalp treated the eight spheres of life mentioned in the quotation above as an integrated system. This was similar to the Westernist perception of the singularity of civilization; however, indeed, Gökalp inserted the criteria of nationality into this analysis, and argued that when this integrated system was handled at national level, it denoted culture, and when it was handled at international level, it denoted civilization.

Secondly, according to Gökalp, while civilization was created by men's conscious actions, and was, therefore, a rational product, the elements that constituted culture were not artificially created; they grew naturally and spontaneously. In other words, they did not emerge as an outcome of a rational process.⁴⁶² Therefore, while civilization could be transferred from nation to nation, culture could never be transmitted.⁴⁶³ He wrote:

[C]ulture is composed mainly of emotional elements, while civilization is composed of ideas; this is another difference between the two. Emotions are

⁴⁶¹ Ziya Gökalp, "Hars ve Medeniyet," translated by Niyazi Berkes in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959), 104.

⁴⁶² Gökalp, "Hars ve Medeniyet," 104.

⁴⁶³ Gökalp, "Hars ve Medeniyet," 106.

not conscious and rational products of men. A nation cannot imitate the religious, moral or aesthetic feelings of another nation.⁴⁶⁴

In other words, in the analysis of Gökalp, it was the culture that held the members of a nation together; the civilization was the upper and looser structure, a rational product of men based on ideas, not emotions. It was this distinction that resulted in the emergence of Turkism as a synthesis of moral elements of Turkish culture, incorporating not only the national, but also the religious characteristics, and the material elements of Western civilization.

7.3.2 The Perception of the West:

Keeping the Westernists' admiration of European civilization in mind, it is not surprising that the Westernists perceived the West as "the best of all possible worlds,"⁴⁶⁵ a cradle of civilization. For them, the West was characterized not only by material achievement, but also by moral advancement. As Berkes notes, for the Westernists underlined individual freedom against suppression of the individual by the state or religion, reason against the domination of custom and superstition, and the application of the scientific mind against ignorance.⁴⁶⁶ In other words, the European civilization provides its adherents the most prosperous, the most liberal and the most humane life. The Westernists associated the West with continuous progress, as a realm of inventions, development and thus the source of a happier and an advanced life. Hence the West was idealized as the only source of enlightenment; without adopting the elements producing this magnificence, survival of the Empire would be impossible.⁴⁶⁷

The Westernist admiration of the European civilization and its presentation as the only solution was considerably shattered by the Tripolitanian

⁴⁶⁴ Gökalp, "Hars ve Medeniyet," 108.

⁴⁶⁵ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 352.

⁴⁶⁶ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 352.

⁴⁶⁷ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960), 79.

War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The severe Ottoman defeats and the support of Western powers towards the adversaries of the Empire created a significant disillusionment. It not only strengthened the Islamist and Turkist movements, but also split the Westernist movement into two camps, the radical Westernists, who, such as Abdullah Cevdet, still blamed the Ottomans for their defeats and continued their pro-Western stance, and the moderate Westernists, who, such as Celal Nuri, clearly declared their disappointment in the West. In his article entitled *Şime-i Husumet* (The Nature of Animosity), Celal Nuri wrote:

I am incapable of explaining our plight further. The whole world is our enemy [...] The whole world of infidels! Friendship for the West is the vilest of all crimes I can imagine. A nation incapable of hating the West is doomed to extinction.⁴⁶⁸

Unlike the Westernists, for the Islamists, the West was clearly associated with Christianity. Thus, while admitting the material achievements of the West, the Islamists tend to focus more on moral decadence and corruption of the European civilization. In one of his articles published in *Sebilü'r Reşâd*, an Islamist journal published during and after the second constitutional period, Ahmed Fuad wrote that Europe was totally corrupted by the illness of materialism and the Europeans tried to remedy this corruption by returning to some principles that had already been envisaged by Islam such as the prohibition of alcohol, proper taxation as a counterpart of alms (*zekât*), or proper laws for divorce (he criticized Catholic prohibition of divorce).⁴⁶⁹ For the Islamists, the Western materialism resulted in the abandonment of the sense of justice, hence emerged the Western imperialism.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁸ Celal Nuri, "Şime-i Husumet," *İçtihad*, 15 Kanûn-ı Sâni 1329, [28 January 1914] No. 88, quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 357. For a brief account of Celal Nuri's earlier and latter perceptions of civilization and the West see Kaygı, *Türk Düşüncesinde Çağdaşlaşma*, 114-139.

⁴⁶⁹ Ahmed Fuad, "Garpta Şarklılaşmak Cereyanı," *Sebilü'r Reşad*, Vol. 33, No. 575, 1339 [1923], for the full text of the article, see İlyas Çelebi, "Son Dönem Osmanlı Aydınlarının Batılılaşma Serüveni," in Ferhat Koca (ed.), *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Siyaset ve Değer Tartışmaları*, (İstanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 2000), 17-122, 41-45.

⁴⁷⁰ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Cereyanı: İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatı Boyunca Gelişmesi ve Bugüne Bıraktığı Meseleler*, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962), 68-71.

The Islamist suspicion of the West was exacerbated with the continuous Ottoman defeats between 1911 and 1918 by the Western states; the word *civilization* was associated with the justification of Western aggression and imperialism against the Islamic world. Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi once wrote that the contemporary Western imperialism could not even be compared with the cruellest periods of the humanity, because while these earlier cruelties were the product of the bestial ambitions of human beings, the “civilized cruelty” (*medenî vahşet*) was totally devoid of any humane feeling. It was a scientific and mathematical cruelty since it was designed consciously and carefully (*fennî, ilmi, hatta güzelce hesap edildiği için riyazî bir vahşettir*).⁴⁷¹ This negative perception of the West resulted in the association of the concept of civilization with Western imperialism. Hence emerged the famous formulation of Mehmed Akif, which was popularly referred to the National Anthem of the Turkish Republic: “How can this fiery faith ever be killed by that single-fanged monster you call civilization?”

The Turkists followed a middle way in their perception of the West. Especially before the Balkan Wars, they were neither pro-West as the Westernists, nor anti-West as the Islamists. They accepted the arguments of both pro-Westernism and anti-Westernism partially.⁴⁷² They were Westernist to the extent that they accepted the role of reason, which resulted in the emergence of the concept of society and civic morality different both from medieval Christendom and Islamic notion of *ummah*. However, they were also aware that although European civilization seemed to be universal in essence, indeed its basis was not reason or universality, but the existence of distinct national identities.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹ Şeyh Mihridin Arusî (a pseudonym for Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi), *Yirminci Asırda Âlem-i İslam ve Avrupa: Müslümanlara Rehber-i Siyaset*, (İstanbul: Hikmet Matbaa-i İslamiyesi, 1327 [1911]), quoted by Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 87.

⁴⁷² Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 355.

⁴⁷³ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 355.

The effects of Balkan Wars on the Turkists were quite dramatic. On the one hand, it resulted in a rapprochement between the Pan-Turkists and the Turkists. With the loss of Ottoman territories in the Balkans, the Turkists turned their attention more to their brothers living in the Central Asia.⁴⁷⁴ Pan-Turkism even penetrated into the bureaucratic circles on the eve of the First World War and ended with the ambitious campaigns of Enver Paşa (1880-1922) during the War. The second outcome of the Balkan Wars was the consolidation of anti-Western stance within the Turkist movement. The West was perceived as the main adversary of the Turks and Turkish nationalism. Ömer Seyfeddin wrote in one of his articles that the external enemies of the Turks were quite clear: “All the Europeans.” He argued that unlike smaller neighbours of the Ottoman Empire, which tried to enlarge their territories, what the European states wanted was not territory but to steal the national wealth of the Turks, to enslave them and to kill the nationalist sentiments by imposing their own national education.⁴⁷⁵ In sum, similar to the Islamists, the Turkists developed a negative perception of the West, especially after the Ottoman defeats *vis-à-vis* the former components of the Ottoman Empire, which were corrupted by the Westerners.

7.3.3. The Problem of Ottoman Decline and the Possible Solutions

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, all the political movements had one superior aim, to prevent and reverse the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This aim was much stronger in the political movements of the post-Hamidian period, since the internal and external perils threatening the Empire grew considerably. Therefore, stating the causes of the Ottoman decline and the search for solutions became the major theme of the publications of this period.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁴ Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 358.

⁴⁷⁵ Ömer Seyfeddin, *Vatan! Yalnız Vatan...*, (Selanik: Rumeli Matbaası, 1327 [1911]), for the full text of this pamphlet, see Ömer Seyfeddin, *Makaleler I*, 141-159.

⁴⁷⁶ In the first issue of *İçtihad*, Abdullah Cevdet wrote that the journal would try to answer two questions: (1) What are the reasons of the decline of the Islamic world? (2) What is the most efficient solution to prevent the Islamic world from total collapse and to give it a new life? Abdullah Cevdet, “Tahkikat-ı İlmiye,” *İçtihad*, 1 September 1904, No. 1, quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet’in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 67.

Indeed, all three post-Hamidian political movements argued that the decline was not peculiar to the Ottoman Empire; rather the entire East was in an inferior condition *vis-à-vis* the West. For the Westernists, the reason for this decline was not the European aggression, but the inherent deficiencies of the East contributing to the incontestable superiority of the West. In other words, the reasons of decline should be sought in the internal system of not only the Empire, but also the Islamic/Eastern world. The Westernists argue that the Muslims not only neglected contemporary developments, but also consciously resisted them. Abdullah Cevdet gave the example of Morocco in one of his articles and stated that in this country there was no single publishing house, no single newspaper in Arabic, no single library. “In sum,” he wrote, “there is nothing from the effects, the consequences and the knowledge of civilization, which has also loftily been ordered by Islam.”⁴⁷⁷ He also underlined that the existing civilization had no mercy to the uncivilized and “the laws of evolution” were cruel and merciless. According to him:

[t]he contemporary civilization is an overflowing flood, which opens its course in the European continent. It destroys any obstacle in front of it. The Muslims could protect their social life only through adapting and conforming to this current.⁴⁷⁸

In other words, there is one single solution to the Muslim world’s and by extension the Ottoman Empire’s decline, namely, Westernization. Even imitating the West (*taklîd*) did not suffice; the elements of Western civilization, particularly the moral system and values should be adopted as they were (*isticnâs*).⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁷ “Hasılı İslamiyetin ulvi bir şekilde emrettiği medeniyetin tesirlerinden, neticelerinden ve irfanından hiçbir şey yoktur.” Abdullah Cevdet, “Fas Hükümet-i İslamiyesinin İnkırazı,” *İçtihad*, April 1905, No. 5, the full text of the article is included in the edition of Mustafa Gündüz, *İçtihadın İçtihadı: Abdullah Cevdet’ten Seçme Yazılar*, (İstanbul: Lotus Yayınları, 2008), 61-65.

⁴⁷⁸ “Bugünün medeniyeti coşkun bir sel gibidir ki, mecrasını Avrupa kıtasında açmıştır. Önüne gelen her türlü engeli, şiddetli bir şekilde alt üst etmekte ve yıkmaktadır. Müslüman toplumlar bu coşkun medeniyet seline karşı direnmekten geri durmalıdırlar. Milli hayatlarını ancak bu cereyana tabi olmakla ve ona katılmakla temin edebilirler.” Abdullah Cevdet, “Fas Hükümet-i İslamiyesinin İnkırazı,” in Gündüz, *İçtihadın İçtihadı*, 61.

⁴⁷⁹ Abdullah Cevdet, “Şime-i Muhabbet”, Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet’in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 82.

Quite the contrary, the Islamists perceived Westernization as the major reason for the material decline and moral decadence of the Ottoman Empire. This did not necessarily mean total rejection of the Western civilization. For the Islamists, the Muslims should be aware of the reasons for the Western material development and should adopt some of these material elements in order to be equipped to struggle with Western expansionism.⁴⁸⁰ That is why, in the first issue of the ninth volume of *Sebilü'r Reşâd*, the aims of the journal were determined as:

[1] to understand the reasons for the progress of the Westerners, [2] to determine what should be adopted from the European civilization, [3] to search what should be done to advance in terms of ideas, arts, and trade within the framework of Islamic morality, [4] to make the Muslims awaken through informing them about the education and progress of Europe.⁴⁸¹

For the Islamists, there were internal and external reasons for decline; some internal reasons were similar to those argued by the Westernists, such as ignorance, laziness, and superficial imitation of the West. The external reasons, on the other hand, included the Western aggression both militarily and in terms of cultural penetration through missionary activities, as well as the internal division of the Islamic community. The Islamists were against nationalism and racism, which divided the Islamic community in terms of national or racial identities. Such divisions disturbed Muslim fraternity and weakened Islamic community *vis-à-vis* the Christian West. In order to resist external pressure, therefore, the only solution was to defend the “Islamic unity” (*ittihâd-ı İslam*).⁴⁸²

⁴⁸⁰ Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi clearly mentioned the material superiority vs. moral decadence of the Western civilization as such: “We are the most sincere admirers and appreciators of the material civilization of Europe. The industrial maturity reached by European nations today has a magnificence which results in the admiration of every thinker. However, the level of the vileness of the moral civilization is lowest unseen in history.” Şeyh Mihridin Arusî, *Yirminci Asırda Âlem-i İslam ve Avrupa*, 88.

⁴⁸¹ “Sebilü'r Reşad Dokuzuncu Cildine Başlıyor,” *Sebilü'r Reşad*, 23 Ramazan 1330 [5 September 1912], No. 209, quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 220.

⁴⁸² Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet'in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 227. Indeed, the idea of Islamic Unity was not a post-1908 phenomenon; it had its intellectual roots in the *Basiret* newspaper in late 1860s, and particularly in the writings of Namık Kemal in his *İbret* newspaper. For an analysis of this idea see Karpat, *The Politization of Islam*, 119-123.

To reverse the decline of the Islamic world, the Muslims should adopt Western scientific developments and material achievements; however they should also preserve their religious traditions and identities, purified from superstitious beliefs. This does not necessarily mean that post-Hamidian Islamists were *salaḫī* in essence; they were rejecting not the material modernity, but the cultural/ religious penetration of the Christian/Western civilization into the Islamic civilization. They argued that the Islamic civilization was morally superior to the Western one; thus what should be done was to return to true teachings of Islam. As Ahmed Naim stated “the principles that Europe seems to present as new inventions and as samples for all societies of the world, such as liberty, justice, equality and solidarity, are among the fundamental principles of Islam.”⁴⁸³

For the Turkists, the reason for Ottoman decline *vis-à-vis* Europe should be searched within the internal structure of the Ottoman society as the Westernists argue. According to Ziya Gökalp, “[a] nation may be destroyed by an external power, but it [the external power] does not cause its decline.”⁴⁸⁴ Therefore, the major reason for the Ottoman decline was the fanaticism displayed for not adopting the Western civilization’s achievements. Ziya Gökalp once asked: “The West [...] did not show fanaticism in imitating and borrowing the achievements of the Muslims of the time [...] Why, then, did we show fanaticism when their civilization has excelled ours?”⁴⁸⁵

The neglect of Turkish identity was another source of decline for the Turkists. They argue that Turkish identity was suppressed by the Ottomans, and the Turks were forced to abandon their national character.⁴⁸⁶ After loosing their warlike nature, the Turks abandoned their pure morality and former traditions.

⁴⁸³ Ahmed Naim, “İslamiyet’in Esasları, Mazisi ve Hali,” *Sebilü’r Reşad*, 30 Kanun-ı Sani 1329, [12 Şubat 1914], quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet’in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 251.

⁴⁸⁴ Quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 351.

⁴⁸⁵ Quoted by Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 351.

⁴⁸⁶ Doktor Fuad Sabit, “Anadolu Duygularından,” *Türk Yurdu*, 9 Teşrin-i Sani 1329 [22 November 1913], quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet’in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 383-384.

This resulted in the exploitation of their service by other nations. Ahmet Agayef (1869-1939) argued that “by forgetting themselves [i.e., their national identity] Turks are the only nation that worked for other nations for centuries.”⁴⁸⁷

Then what should be done for the Turkists was to wake up, to get rid of all the former ties that resulted in the suppression of their national identity on the one hand, and in the backwardness of the Turkish society *vis-à-vis* the West on the other. Ömer Seyfeddin mentioned what to do as such:

Wake up, in order to win, you have to know your enemies; you should know that although the battles are waged by armies, they can not win the victory in this century. The victory belongs to order and progress... The Turanic family, the Turks, occupying this Ottoman realm, this continent ranging from Schkoder to Baghdad, can only preserve their sovereignty through a strong and serious progress. The progress, on the other hand, can only be achieved through the spread of science, knowledge and literature among all of us [...] Our century is a century of progress, struggle and rivalry.⁴⁸⁸

Besides material progress, Ziya Gökalp argued for the creation of a new identity for the Turks, which should be established by avoiding the *ümme* “culture” prescribed by the Islamists as well as the European “culture” prescribed by the Westernists. Instead, this new identity should merge the Turkish culture preserving national as well as religious characteristics of the Turkish nation with the European “civilization”:

As the civilization of the West is taking place of the East everywhere, quite naturally the Ottoman civilization, which was part of the Eastern civilization, would fall and leave its place to Turkish culture with the religion of Islam on the one hand, and to Western civilization, on the other. Now, the mission of the Turkists is nothing but to uncover the Turkish culture, which has remained in the people, on the one hand, and to graft Western civilization in its entirety and with all its living forms on to the national culture, on the other.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁷ Ahmet Agayef, “Türk Medeniyet Tarihi, Mukaddime,” *Türk Yurdu*, 16 Mayıs 1329 [23 May 1913], quoted by Gündüz, *II. Meşrutiyet’in Klasik Paradigmaları*, 386.

⁴⁸⁸ “Uyanınız, galebe için düşmanlarımızı tanımak lazımdır ve biliniz ki, bu asırda muhârebeyi ordular yaparsa da muzafferiyeti asla kazanamaz. Muzafferiyet intizâm ve terakkîndir... İşkodra’dan Bağdat’a kadar bu kat’ayı, bu Osmanlı memleketini işgal eden Turanî ailesi, Türkler ancak kuvvetli ve ciddi bir terakkî ile hâkimiyetlerinin mevcûdiyelerini muhâfaza edebilirler. Terakkî ise ilmin, fennin, edebiyatın hepimizin arasında intişârına vâbestedir [...] Asrımız terakkî asrı, mücâdele ve rekâbet asrıdır.” Ömer Seyfeddin, “Yeni Lisan,” *Genç Kalemler*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 29 Mart 1327 [11 Nisan 1911], for the full text of this article see Ömer Seyfeddin, *Makaleler I*, 102-113.

⁴⁸⁹ Ziya Gökalp, “Hars ve Medeniyet”, quoted by Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, 289.

To sum up, from 1890s onwards, three currents of thought, Westernism, Islamism and Turkism, began to crystallize as political movements, and organize around journals to disseminate their ideas on civilization, the West, the reasons for the Ottoman decline and possible solutions to reverse it. For the Westernists, the Western superiority was both material and mental, the ideas of liberty, rationality, equality, and modernity, were perceived as equally important as the scientific and technological advance of the Western civilization. For the Islamists, the West was superior only in terms of its material achievements; however, it experienced moral decadence and corruption. Therefore, in terms of morality, the Islamic civilization was superior to the Western one. For the Turkists, Western superiority was clearly material and partially moral. Despite technological development, another reason for the Western superiority was each nation's awareness of national identity within the framework of culture.

Secondly, except for some radical Westernists, the intellectuals of post-Hamidian era continued the former distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization, and even deepened it. Celal Nuri's distinction between industrial civilization and real civilization was mirrored by Islamist effort to revive the Islamic morality despite their clear admiration to Western technological advance. This distinction reached its zenith with its systematization through Ziya Gökalp's differentiation of culture from civilization; while the former was very much related to the moral aspects peculiar to a particular nation, the latter mainly emphasized the material elements, which were the products of the mankind.

Third, regarding the reasons for the Ottoman decline, all of these movements agreed that the process of Westernization was wrongly implemented in the Ottoman Empire. According to the Westernists, the Ottomans had only superficially westernized; they tried to solely adopt the material achievements. However, what should be done was to adopt Western civilization as a whole. The Islamists distinguished between technological modernization and superficial westernization, and argued that what had so far been done was adopting the Western living style, values, morality without giving precedence to material development. The outcome of this choice was the developmental inferiority

together with a moral corruption due to deviation from the Islamic morality. For the Turkists, the Ottomans failed to adopt the material achievements of the West and to recognize the real dynamic behind Western superiority, the idea of nation.

Finally, regarding the solutions of the problem of Ottoman decline, all these political movements agreed that immediate and profound adoption of the material elements of civilization was an inevitable requisite of providing the survival of the Empire. However, they differed in terms of moral motivations behind this adoption. While the Westernists argued for the unconditional adherence to the Western civilization by adopting both material and moral elements of civilization, the Islamists aimed to reach a synthesis between the Western material modernity and Islamic morality inside the Ottoman Empire, and to achieve an Islamic unity outside its borders. The Turkists, on the other hand, developed another synthesis based on three different levels: (1) they aimed for the revival of Turkish national culture; (2) they tried to preserve Islamic credentials as a significant part of this national culture; (3) at civilizational level, they aimed for modernization through adopting the material elements of Western civilization.

CHAPTER 8

OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF CIVILIZATION

After examining the Ottoman intellectuals' perception of civilization, the Ottoman travellers' perception of this concept should be analyzed as well; because there are significant similarities and differences between the perceptions of those who had not been to the non-European world and those who had actually experienced it. These similarities and particularly the differences demonstrated that the Ottoman travellers' perception of "the East" is closely interrelated with their perception of civilization. Therefore, in this chapter, different meanings assigned by the Ottoman travellers to the concept of civilization and different mediums attributed for labelling a community as civilized or uncivilized are elaborated.

8.1. Civilization as Citification

One of the most significant differences between the usages of the concept of civilization by the Ottoman intellectuals and by the Ottoman travellers to the East was the extreme significance attached to the concept of city by the latter. The identification of civilization as citification was a peculiar characteristic of the Ottoman travellers, which was not as widely visible as in the writings of the Ottoman intellectuals, who had not travelled to the East. The reasons for attaching so much importance to city as a medium of civilization are many. First of all, etymologically, it was quite natural that the Ottoman travellers had perceived citification as the essence of civilization, since both the word *civilization* and its counterpart in Turkish language, *medeniyet*, had been derived from the root *city*. Indeed, neither the European usages, nor the Ottoman intellectuals' usage of this concept emphasized the role of citification in establishing civilizations in such an essential way. In Europe, when the concept had first been coined, there was no distinction between nomadic tribes and settled communities; except for very small and negligible groups of people,

nomadism was no more a European phenomenon. Hence the concept of civilization had emerged as a quality or a condition denoting a higher stage of being. On the other hand, the Ottoman intellectuals, who had learned this concept from Europe, had incorporated it into their lexicon first as a technique to attain the welfare and prosperity of Europe, and then as an ideal to achieve in order to provide the Ottoman society with security and welfare. In other words, they attached less significance to citification as a medium of civilization and put their emphasis on the material achievements of Europe. However, the Ottoman travellers to the East frequently encountered with desolated lands such as the jungles of inner Africa and India, the deserts of Arabia and North Africa, or the steppes of Central Asia, and nomadic peoples, which provided the travellers with the opportunity to compare and contrast the urban and rural lands as well as their inhabitants. Such comparisons are frequently encountered in their travelogues. Hence they preferred to conceive the concept of *medeniyet* through its etymological background, namely “citification.”

The second reason for giving so much significance to city as a medium of civilization was that the Ottoman travellers were somehow familiar to the Khaldunian dyadic conceptualization of nomadism (*bedeviyet*) and civilization (*hadariyet/umran*). Indeed, it is difficult to say that all of them had read Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*; however, the Ottoman intelligentsia had a familiarity with the concepts like nomadic (*bedevî*), city-dweller (*beledî*), savage (*vahşî*), or nomadic life-style (*hâl-i bedavet*).⁴⁹⁰ In more recent travelogues such as Abdülkadir Câmî’s travelogue on North Africa (published in 1908) and Mehmed Mihri’s travelogue on Sudan (published in 1909), there were clear references to Ibn Khaldun. In sum, their awareness of this former conceptualization of citification/settlement as a higher condition compared to nomadism contributed to their attachment of the concept of civilization with citification.

⁴⁹⁰ The word *bedevî* has two different usages. The Western form of the word, *bedouin*, is used to denote desert-dwelling Arab nomadic pastoralists found throughout most of the desert belt extending from the Atlantic coast of the Sahara via the Western Desert, Sinai, and Negev to the Arabian Desert. On the other hand, the Ottomans used the word to denote all the nomadic groups, just as the word *bedeviyet* means nomadism as a general phenomenon. Therefore; in this dissertation, *bedevî* is used to meet the word nomadic in general, not a particular group of nomadic people.

The third reason was the Ottoman cautiousness towards the nomadic tribes from the very beginning of the Empire. Since the Ottoman economic as well as military establishment was based on land, land registry was an extremely important official duty. After a conquest, the conquered lands were immediately registered, some of these lands were allocated to the Sultan and the high-ranking bureaucrats, some of them were given to religious foundations for revenue and the remaining parts were distributed to Timariots in order to provide the Empire with troops.⁴⁹¹ In other words, agricultural production was essential in the countryside to sustain the economic and military establishment of the Empire. However, nomadic tribes disturbed this system. On the one hand, they did not recognize the existing land regime and fed their animals wherein they migrated to; this resulted in the exhaustion of pastures. Secondly, they could not easily be recruited as soldiers, since recruitment was done in accordance with land registry. Third, they did not recognize the borders of the state as well, and resulted in some diplomatic problems between the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours. Finally, they sometimes revolted against the state, when the state tried to exert its authority over them. In other words, nomadism was associated with anarchy, while settlement was associated with peace and order. Since the aim of civilization was to bring peace, order and prosperity to the Empire's subjects, this concept was very much associated with citification and emerged as an antonym of nomadism.

In sum, all these factors contributed to the Ottoman travellers' perception of city as a medium of civilization. When this medium was established, it was quite natural that two oppositional accounts had emerged in the travelogues to the East. The first one was about the land, distinguishing between the urban and non-urban space, and the second one was about the inhabitants, distinguishing between the nomadic and settled peoples.

⁴⁹¹ For a detailed account of *Timar* system in the Ottoman Empire see Niceora Baldiceanu, *Le Timar dans l'État Ottoman: Début XIVe Début XVIIe Siècle*, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980) and Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Kuruluş Devrinin Toprak Meseleleri*, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937).

8.1.1. Urban vs. Non-Urban Space

Based on their association of civilization with citification, the Ottoman travellers to the East made a clear distinction between urban and non-urban space. One of the most significant criteria for this distinction was the sense of safety. The Ottoman travellers perceived urban space as a safe area, where they felt themselves much more secure and comfortable since they likened the urban areas to where they had used to live. On the other hand, non-urban space was totally unsafe since it was unknown to the traveller. Such an understanding is quite visible, for example, in the travelogue of Ahmed Hamdi Efendi on India, Swat and Afghanistan. While he admired almost all cities, ancient and modern, of India he defined rural areas as “half-savage regions inhabited by people naked until their waists.”⁴⁹² For example, while he praised Ahmedabad as the most well-planned city of Asia with its secure and comfortable environment,⁴⁹³ the route he had passed to reach that city was defined as “the realm of savagery” (*vahşet-âbâd*).⁴⁹⁴ In other words, the city was reflected as an island of civilization in the midst of a savage space; although the author admired the natural beauties of the jungle, he felt himself comfortable only when he reached a city. In sum, the insurmountable border between city and jungle also demonstrated the dichotomy between the civilized and non-civilized space.

For those Ottoman travellers, who had travelled in North Africa and in the Middle East, the desert was the unsafe non-urban space. Most of the travellers wrote quite negatively about the desert, although they generally admired its natural beauties. The discomfort they experienced during their travel resulted in their negative perception of the desert *vis-à-vis* the cities established just next to them. For example, Mehmed Mihri visited Port Said when he was returning from Sudan and was amazed how such a modern and comfortable city

⁴⁹² Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, *Seyahâtnâme: Hindistan, Svât ve Afganistan*, 24.

⁴⁹³ Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, *Seyahâtnâme: Hindistan, Svât ve Afganistan*, 141.

⁴⁹⁴ Ahmet Hamdi Efendi, *Seyahâtnâme: Hindistan, Svât ve Afganistan*, 28.

could be established next to the desert. He particularly mentioned that the city was established in European style as “the achievement of Western assistance,” (*garblıların eser-i himmeti*) as “a sample of contemporary grandeur of the civilization of Europe” (*Avrupa'nın muasır azime-i medeniyesinden bir numune*) just next to the “piece of the realm of savagery” (*kıt'a-yı vahşet-âbâd*).⁴⁹⁵

The linkage of the sense of security with urbanization was extremely clear in the two travelogues of Cenap Şehabettin as well. In his travelogue on Egypt and Red Sea ports, he associated security with citification as such:

Think about a man who lost his way in a dark night: The situation is not frightening as long as that man is in a city or in its environs. And put that man in one of the African jungles, in the vast plains nobody has ever stepped on. The situation quickly changes; he feels threatened from all sides.⁴⁹⁶

Similarly, in his second travelogue on the Red Sea and Iraq, Cenap Şehabettin compared Port Sudan and the desert surrounding the city and his expressions clearly demonstrated the Ottoman travellers' distinction between urban and non-urban space. Accordingly, he wrote:

In order not to seduce anyone, I should immediately inform that Port Sudan is not a paradise [:] it is even far from being a paradise. However, no doubt that it is a place of breath on the side of Africa [...] Compare it with the rural lands of Sudan just one or two kilometres far from the new city; oh my God, what a mess, what a misery, what a misfortune to be obliged to live here. Look at Port Sudan, trembling and shining, sunny and breezy under the blueness of the burning skies, look at this filthy trash!⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁵ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 342. In writing about the geography of Yemen, Rüşdi Paşa made a similar distinction between the coastal areas of this province where major cities were established and the mountainous areas called *tehame*. The Ottoman troops were able control the coastal regions; hence this area was perceived as a safe area; whereas the nomadic tribes inhabiting the mountains of the province disturbed order and created an unsafe space, which was threatening the Ottoman presence there. For an analysis of Yemeni geography in terms of security see Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Haurası*, 191-195.

⁴⁹⁶ “Bir adam tasavvur ediniz ki karanlık bir gecede yolunu kaybetmiş olsun: Bu adam bir şehrin içinde, yahud civarında bulunduğça hadisenin hiç bir dehşeti yoktur; bir de bu adamı Afrika ormanlarından birine, pay-i beşerin henüz temas etmediği o namütenahi kıt'alardan birine koyunuz; hadise derhal tebeddül-ü kıyafet eder, güya her tarafından bir sehem-i semim-i tehlike görünüür.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 21.

⁴⁹⁷ “Hiç kimseyi iğfal etmemiş olmak için hemen haber vereyim ki Porsudan cennet değil, hattâ cennet olmaktan pek uzaktır. Fakat hiç şüphe yok ki Afrika cihet-i kenarında bir teneffüsghâhtır. Ne hacet, yeni şehrin bir iki kilometre ötesindeki Sudan karyesiyle mukayese ediniz; aman yâ Râbbi, bu ne levs, ne sefâlet, burada yaşamaya mecbur olmak ne büyük bedbahtlık... Semânın kebûdî-yi âteş-nâki altında pür-şems ü nesim titreyen ve parlayan Porsudan nerede, nerede bu murdar süprüntülük!...” Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak*, 46.

Different from his writings about the linkage between citification and security, Cenap Şehabettin added a civilizational dimension to urban vs. non-urban space distinction. He compared the tidiness, cleanness, and orderliness of the city with the irregularity and uncleanness of the rural areas. His depiction of Port Sudan demonstrated how citification was equated with civilization:

When we entered Port Sudan, this new harbour of Khartoum and Omdurman, I could not believe in my eyes for I found this continent – which I have not seen for seven years – so transformed [...] Instead of old Port Sudan, which had speckled the desert with its vile barracks, now there established an orderly city with its buildings made up of stone and brick, its wide streets, its docks, parks, boulevards. Oh my God, the magic of the touch of the wand of progress creates wonders on the fruitless surface of the sands!⁴⁹⁸

Despite these examples of the clear distinction between urban and non-urban space and the association of civilization with citification, there were some Ottoman travellers, who did not have such a negative perception of non-urban space. Most of them were familiar to the life in non-urban space; they had been to deserts, jungles or steppes before their travels that established the theme of their travelogues. They even declared their satisfaction of being in such desolated lands. For example, Ali Suad romanticized his experience in Iraqi deserts:

While I was watching the horses that were taken from the stables around for a walk, I could not prevent myself from thinking the subduing meanings of old Arabian knights [and] the tales of desert on horses, girls, weapons and wines within an unlimited love, which have not still made themselves forgotten.⁴⁹⁹

Indeed, it can be inferred from Ali Suad's writings that he had stayed in the Najd region in the midst of the Arabian Peninsula for a couple of years, which made him accustomed to desert conditions. The positive and even poetic

⁴⁹⁸ “Porsudan’a, Hartum ve Omdurman’ın bu yeni limanına girdiğimiz zaman – yedi seneden beri görmediğim – bu kıtayı o kadar değişmiş buldum ki gözlerime inanamıyordum... Hakîr barakalarıyla çölü benekleyen eski Porsudan yerine şimdi kârgîr binaları, geniş sokakları, rıhtımları, parkları, bulvarları ile bir belde-i muntazama kâim olmuş. Yâ Râbbi asâ-yı terakkinin sihr-i temâsi kumların sath-ı akîminde bile harikalar vücuda getiriyor.” For Cenap Şehabettin, “the magic of the touch of the wand of progress” (*asâ-yı terakkinin sihr-i temâsi*) represented the achievements of British administration of Sudan; hence, he indirectly reflected his admiration to the European civilization, which was able to create a Western-type city from almost nothing. Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak*, 42.

⁴⁹⁹ “Yakındaki ahurlardan çıkarılıp gezdirilen müteaddid atları seyrederken eski Arab şövalyelerini, çöl menakıbını, bir aşk-ı nâmahdud içinde atlar, kızlar, silahlar, şaraplarla sahraların kendilerini hâlâ unutturmayan kahramanlarını düşünmekten kendimi alamazdım.” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 36-37.

descriptions of the countryside in the travelogue of Sadık el-Müeyyed on Abyssinia also reflects that the author had used to live in difficult conditions before he travelled to this country. Indeed, despite his aristocratic background, as a soldier, Sadık el-Müeyyed had experienced desert life in the Arabian Peninsula, when he had been given the duty to administer the establishment of the telegraph line linking Mecca and Medina with Damascus, as well as in North Africa, when he had been assigned to deliver the gifts of Sultan Abdülhamid to the Sheikh of the Sanusiyya order. Therefore, he felt quite comfortable during his voyage from Djibouti to Addis Ababa; he could even write that the forests and mountains surrounding the city of Dire Dawa resembled to the mountains of Switzerland, if it were not for Abyssinians around.⁵⁰⁰

Ali Suad's and Sadık el-Müeyyed's positive perception of the non-urban space might be understandable because of their former experiences; however, Mehmed Emin's admiration of the deserts of Central Asia was quite interesting since, from his travelogues, it can be inferred that this was his first travel to such a difficult terrain. Although he described the environs of Khive as a large desert in which without local guidance no traveller would find his way, he exclaimed his happiness to be in the desert.⁵⁰¹ He stated that he was not content with the crowd of the cities and towns, and he preferred such desolated regions.⁵⁰² The reason for his preference of desolation could be found in his reason of travel; indeed as previously mentioned he was advised by his doctor to engage in a travel in order to heal his depressive mood. This psychological motivation might have resulted in his favour of desert, since these vast plains might have a meditative effect on him.

All in all, one of the most significant distinguishing features of the Ottoman travellers to the East from the other Ottoman intellectuals in terms of the conceptualization of civilization was their clear association of civilization

⁵⁰⁰ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*si, 129-130.

⁵⁰¹ Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-ya Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 33.

⁵⁰² Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-ya Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 33.

with citification by differentiating between urban and non-urban space. What is more they linked this distinction with the perception of safety; accordingly, they perceived urban space as a safe and civilized place, while the non-urban regions were generally displayed as an unsafe and uncivilized spatial entity. Even those who approached non-urban space more positively did not refrain themselves to make such a distinction; but it is this distinction that made them feel in non-urban space as comfortable as in the urban space.

8.1.2. Nomadic People vs. Settled People:

It is quite natural that the distinction made between the urban and non-urban space by the Ottoman travellers was compounded with another distinction between the nomadic people, in other words, the inhabitants of the non-urban space, and the settled people, the inhabitants of the urban space. In doing that, the sense of security and the idea of civilization based on citification became the criteria to distinguish between these two groups of people. Accordingly, in general, the fear felt by the Ottoman travellers about the non-urban space was both fed by and also resulted in the negative perception of the nomadic people, while the attachment of civilization with citification contributed to the labelling of the nomadic people as uncivilized and the settled people as civilized. However, there were several exceptions to this general trend; that is to say, there were some travellers, who emphasized the virtues of nomadic life, and thus developed a positive perception of nomadism and nomadic people.

8.1.2.1. Negative Perception of the Nomadic Tribes:

The most negative attributes to the nomadic people by the Ottoman travellers were very much related with their personality. Many of the adjectives used to characterize them emphasized their disturbance of the settled order. Particularly, the nomadic sense of liberty was criticized the most. According to Mehmed Hurşid, one of the most significant reasons for the boundary problems between the Ottoman Empire and Iran was the nomadic tribes, which were living on both sides of the border, and breaching it continuously and harming the others' territory. Therefore, as a state official, he bitterly criticized the nomadic

sense of liberty as disloyalty or disturbance of order. Writing about one of these tribes, Mehmed Hurşid emphasized that the nomadic people were inclined towards “vagabond and freedom” (*bîserlik ve serbestiyyet*), which was a “bestial attitude” (*tavr-ı hayvânî*).⁵⁰³ He defined the social order of these tribes as a “disordered natural republic” (*cumhûriyyet-i tabî’iyye-i gayr-i muntazama*).⁵⁰⁴ The nomadic tribes preferred living autonomously as a kind of republic (*bir nev’i cumhûriyyet sûretinde serbest bulunmak*) and wandering in mountains to the honour of civilization (*şeref-i medeniyet*), thus exhausting their lives with savagery (*ömürlerini vahşet ile ifnâ edegelmişlerdir*).⁵⁰⁵

Cenap Şehabettin similarly criticized the nomadic perception of freedom through resembling it to the sense that the animals felt:

O deaf and oblivious bedouin, you still insist on thinking liberty as idleness. You should know that the horses of the Haymana plains are captive of their wildness; you will only be free in the day that you will feed yourself with the grain you will grind; it had been field and plough that freed our first ancestors from the captivity of nature [...] No, do not deceive yourself, this land is not yours, it belongs to the honest farmer waiting somewhere in the future with agrarian desire [*amâl-i zirâiye*] in his heart and with pickaxe and oar in his hand! If you do not give this soil the right to life [*hakk-ı hayat*] and the right to be planted [*hakk-ı nebât*] today, it will only give the right to decay under itself tomorrow.⁵⁰⁶

In other words, Cenap Şehabettin associated freedom with settlement; therefore, the nomadic people were not free although they declared themselves so. They could only attain freedom when they were settled and when they began to earn their own livelihood through agriculture. Such a presentation of nomadic life was a clear example of Ottoman association of civilization with settlement.

⁵⁰³ Mehmet Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, the quotations were made from the edition of Alaaddin Eser, 16.

⁵⁰⁴ Mehmet Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 16.

⁵⁰⁵ Mehmet Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 203.

⁵⁰⁶ “Ey sağır ve bî-haber bedevî, sen hâlâ hürriyeti başıboşluk zannetmekte devam ediyorsun. Bil ki Haymana ovasındaki beygirler kendi vahşetlerinin esiridir; sen ancak kendi öğüttüğün buğday ile karnını doyurduğun gün hür olacaksın, esaret-i tabîyeden ilk ecdâdımızı tarla ve saban azad etti. [...] Hayır, aldanma, burası senin değil, elinde kazması ve küreği, gönlünde amâl-i zirâiyesiyle mâverâ-i ferdâda bekleyen namuslu çiftçinindir. Eğer sen bugün bu toprağın hakk-ı hayatını ve hakk-ı nebâtını vermezsen yarın o toprak sana ancak altında çürümek hakkını tanyacak.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak*, 81.

Other personal negative characteristics attached to the nomadic people included their sense of arrogance, which made them extremely belligerent and directed them towards banditry. For the Ottoman travellers, the nomadic life was very much associated with unlawfulness. For example, in categorizing different classes (*sunûf*) of a nomadic tribe, Mehmed Hurşid used the degree of arrogance and inclination to robbery and plunder as a medium.⁵⁰⁷ It can be inferred from his writings that the more settled the nomadic people, the less autonomy they had and the more they were favoured, since they did not openly resist the control of the central government. Hence, the *fellahs* were more favourable for the Ottomans compared to the nomadic people.

However, *fellahs* could not be perceived as civilized settled people, because although they engaged in agriculture, they could not free themselves from the domination of the nomadic people. Hence, according to Mehmed Hurşid, in terms of negative personal characteristics there was little difference between the nomadic people and *fellahs*. In describing another tribe he clearly underlined that the nomadic people and *fellahs* shared similar qualities:

This aforementioned tribe had two components; some of them are *fellah*, in other words people of cultivation and preservation, and the others are the descendents of property, in other words, the aristocrats, who had the responsibility to lead over different groups of people. The former component deals with agriculture, and the latter is impaired with the disease of arrogance and pride, while both components are deceitful, robber, liar and trickster.⁵⁰⁸

The distinction between settled and nomadic people was also clearly represented in the travelogue of Abdülkadir Câmî. He particularly favoured the settlements resisting against the assaults of nomadic people, who were disloyal to the central government. For example, regarding the town of Sukana, established in the interior parts of the Saharan desert, Abdülkadir Câmî wrote quite positively, although the town was not much different from other

⁵⁰⁷ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 42-43.

⁵⁰⁸ “Aşîret-i mezbûre iki kısım üzere olup bir kısmı Fellâh ya'nî ashâb-ı zer' ve hurâset ve kısm-ı diğeri evlad-ı hamûle ya'nî asilzade olarak fırka fırka tâ'ifeler üzerine mütekallid emr-i riâyâsetdir ki kısım-ı evvel rençberlik ile meşgul ve kısım-ı sâni illet-i kibr ve nahvet ile ma'lûl olup iki kısmı da hilekâr ve halli halince hırsız ve yalancı ve mekkâr âdemlerdir.” Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 25.

settlements in the region. The reason for this favour was the resistance of the town against the rebellion of a nomadic chieftain and their support to the Ottoman troops sent there to suppress that rebellion. Therefore, he described Sukana as a “proud town which perceived the obedience to this emerging power [*sâhib-i zuhûr*] as disgrace.” Moreover, the inhabitants of the town were defined as intelligent, hardworking, and talented in trade. All these characteristics proved that they “[...] attained ancestral wealth and happiness since the ancient times and accustomed to civilization.”⁵⁰⁹ In other words, Abdülkadir Câmî was so impressed from the support of this town to the continuation of Ottoman rule and order in the region that he even labelled the inhabitants of the town as civilized. Here, the nomadic people were associated with rebellion and incivility and the settled people with loyalty and civility.⁵¹⁰

Besides his emphasis on the civility of the towns, Abdülkadir Câmî also distinguished between the members of the same tribe and appreciated the settled members of the tribe compared to the nomadic ones. Regarding the *Şati* tribe, he wrote that that most members of this tribe were “civilized so much to be labelled as half-civic” (*nîm-beledi itibar olunacak kadar medeni*); they were praised as being “wealthy and civic” (*mütemevvil ve beledi*). Contrarily he described the nomadic members of the tribe as “savage and austere” (*vahşî ve haşîn*), continuously dealing with banditry and plunder.

The reference to the concept of civilization in distinguishing between the nomadic and settled people reached its zenith in the travelogue of Abdülkadir Câmî in his analysis on the Tuareg tribes. Accordingly, he stated that the Tuaregs were the offspring of a “nomadic, savage, pillager” (*göçebe, vahşî, yağmakâr*) tribe, which attacked “civilized communities” (*akvâm-ı medeniye*) living in

⁵⁰⁹ “[...] *min’el kadîm nesebî bir refah ve saadete nail ve medeniyete mütehali olduklarına [...]*” Abdülkadir Câmî, *Trablusgarp’ten Sahra-yı Kebîr’e Doğru*, 82-83.

⁵¹⁰ Similarly, regarding the inhabitants of Fezzan, Abdülkadir Câmî wrote that, compared to the bedouin tribes surrounding the city, they were “...quite hardworking, courageous, self-sacrificing and particularly honest” (*Fizanlılar gayet çalışkan, cesur, kanaatkar ve hususen namuskar ademlerdir*). In entire Maghreb, they were renowned for their probity. Abdülkadir Câmî admired their patience and pursuance in making agriculture on this “ingrate soil” (*nankör arz*) as well. Abdülkadir Câmî, *Trablusgarp’ten Sahra-yı Kebîr’e Doğru*, 116.

coastal regions during the Phoenician and Roman eras. He quoted from Ibn Khaldun that they refrained to come close to civilized regions and preferred to live individually; they were wild but courageous never submitting to an external authority. He added that these narrations of Ibn Khaldun were still valid; in other words, according to him these communities never progressed.⁵¹¹ Indeed, the last page of his travelogue focuses on their unchanging nature. He quoted from the Sicilian historian Diodorus who wrote about the ancient Libyans as such:

They live like animals, they sleep in the wild, they eat quite savagely, and being homeless and unclad, they clothed themselves with goat skin. Having no aim other than approaching their enemies rapidly in pursuing [their enemies] and in retreating, they go fighting with three spears in their hands and a skin bag full of stones. In general, in treating the foreigners they obey neither their words nor any kind of law.⁵¹²

After making this quotation, Abdülkadir Câmî concluded his travelogue with this sentence: “Here are the thirty-century old ancestors and their contemporary successors who completely resemble each other!”⁵¹³ Indeed, this exclamation demonstrated another negative characteristic of the nomadic people, namely their resistance to change and progress.

The belligerency of the nomadic tribes, which was the source of their inclination towards banditry and plunder, was one of the most despised characteristics attributed to these people. Almost all of the travelogues, which included passages on the nomadic life, bitterly criticized the belligerent nature of the nomads as a matter of insecurity. For example, Ali Suad did not refrain from labelling them as criminals. Regarding the deserts of Najd region, he wrote:

I passed sixth time this unpleasant and disordered as well as wild and naked sea of sand, this terrible desert, which is the scene of many murders and plunders

⁵¹¹ Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 180.

⁵¹² “*Hayvân gibi yaşarlar, açıkta yatarlar, pek vahşîyane şeylerle tagaddi ederler ve meskensiz, elbisesiz, yalnız keçi derisiyle setrederler. Gerek takibde olsun gerekse ric'atde düşmanlarını sür'at-i seyr ile tefevvuk etmekten başka bir gâye takip etmeyerek ellerinde üç aded harbe ve taş parçaları doldurulmuş deri bir torba olduğu halde muhârebeye giderler. Umûmiyetle ecnebilere karşı olan muâmelelerinde ne ahde ve ne de bir kânuna riâyet ederler.*” Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 220.

⁵¹³ “*İşte tamamiyle yekdiğerine benzeyen otuz asır evvelki ecdâdla bugünkü ahfâd!*” Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 220.

[...] Until this day, on this road, how many victims have been robbed, how much money and property have been absorbed by the throats of the bedouins as long as the snake's crawl.⁵¹⁴

All in all, nomadism was a condition disliked by some of the Ottoman travellers to the East. Generally, the reason for this dislike was not much related to the inferiority of the nomadic people *vis-à-vis* the settled ones. Rather, the reason was the bedouin unrest, their inclination to banditry and their continuous disturbance of settled order. The fact that most of these travellers were state officials, thus representing the attitude of the state towards nomadism, explains the reason for such a negative perception of nomadism.

8.1.2.2. *Positive Perception of the Nomadic Tribes:*

Despite these negative qualifications, the Ottoman travellers appraised some aspects of nomadic life and some characteristics of nomadic people. Generally, in the travelogues, the positive characteristics were mainly personal and depended on the degree of loyalty of the nomadic tribes to the central government. In other words, the more they were obedient to the central government, the more they were perceived positively. However, there are other nomadic characteristics appreciated by the Ottoman travellers. One of them was their talent to adapt to the extremely difficult natural conditions. For example, Mehmed Hurşid labelled some tribes as hardworking since they had continuously been striving for being vigilant about and cognizant of the developments around themselves since they were living in volatile border regions.⁵¹⁵ Similarly, Mehmed Emin admired the Turcoman tribes' capacity of quick adaptation to their environment. He argued that these tribes did not hesitate to adopt the customs, language and even dresses and external looking of the inhabitants of the regions that they had temporarily settled.⁵¹⁶ The adaptation to

⁵¹⁴ “Bu vahşî ve çıplak olduğu kadar çirkin ve arızalı kum denizini, bu birçok katl-ü nehb fecaiinin sahnesi olan fena çölü bugün altıncı defa olarak geçiyordum [...] Bu yolda o güne kadar kaç kurban soyulmuş; ne kadar emvâl-i nukûd, bedevîlerin yılan kursağı kadar uzun boğazlarına geçmiş idi.” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 7.

⁵¹⁵ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahât-nâme-i Hudûd*, 26.

⁵¹⁶ Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 37

natural environment was so significant for the Ottoman travellers that they even tolerated some of the unusual practices of the nomadic tribes. For example, Abdülkadir Câmî did not condemn some customs of Tuaregs, such as drinking camel blood and eating fat from camel hunch; rather, he stated that they had to do so because they had to be obedient to the rules of the infertile environment that they are living in.⁵¹⁷

Another positive characteristic attributed to the nomadic people was their hospitality and generous treatment towards their guests. Some of the Ottoman travellers were hosted by nomadic tribes; hence they experienced and appreciated the intimacy of these people. While writing about the *Tayy* tribe of Şehr-i Zôr Province, Mehmed Hurşid wrote that the members of this tribe were very generous, polite and courteous. He mentioned that it was not surprising that, one of the most esteemed religious saints of the Islamic world, Hatem-i Tai (?-686), who had been renowned for his generosity, had been a member of this tribe. All these characteristics led Mehmed Hurşid to describe the *Tayy* tribe as “akin to civilized people” (*hâl ve mişvârları medenîlere karîbdir*).⁵¹⁸ Mehmed Emin also emphasized the hospitality of the Turcomans and argued that hospitality was a characteristic of all desert-dweller (*bâdiye-nişîn*) tribes: “Whatever religion, sect, nation or tribe he belongs to, when a voyager entered into a Turcoman *kibitka*, then his life and property will be under the protection and patronage of the people of *kibitka*.”⁵¹⁹ According to him, it was the solitude of the deserts and the lack of government for the protection of people that required such sense of hospitality.⁵²⁰

Some of the travellers considered nomadic life a natural and healthy one, in which the problems that the city-dwellers had experienced were absent. For

⁵¹⁷ Abdülkadir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 194.

⁵¹⁸ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudûd*, 171.

⁵¹⁹ “Hangî din ve mezhep ve millet ve kabileden olur ise olsun bir yolcu Türkmen kibitkasından içeriye girdi mi artık onun canı da malı da kibitka ahalisinin hıfz-ü himayesi altındadır.” Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 40.

⁵²⁰ Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 40.

example, Mehmed Hurşid expressed his desire to have such a natural life; however, he added that he should have at least the basic benefits and avails of civilization, such as cleanliness (*nezâfet*), social cooperation (*nev'i benî âdemin yek diğere i'ânesi*), security (*emniyet*) and education (*tahsîl*).⁵²¹ In other words, what Mehmed Hurşid aimed was to combine the purity of pastoral life with some of the basic elements of civilization.

In some travelogues, more romantic accounts of the desert and nomadic people are visible. Some of the Ottoman travellers depicted the nomadic people quite similar to some of the European romantics, who drew a parallel between the nomadic life and the chivalric traditions of pre-modern Europe. Such depictions were frequently encountered in the writings of Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey. Regarding the two Arab Sheiks, the Druze Sheikh al-Atrash and the sheikh of *Anaze* tribe, Abdülaziz Sheihan, whom he had met in a dinner in the desert, he wrote as such:

These were quite magnificent people; they were long, slim, solemn but gentle. Both of them embodied aristocracy with an old tradition, [they were members of] a centuries-old race, which was accustomed to the mission of giving orders and leading others. They did not have a title of nobility; they did not have an imperial edict which granted and protected their posts; however, they were “different” from all other invitees on the table. Perhaps, I will be accused of being inculcated, bedouin romanticism, and prejudice. But the certain thing is that whenever such people came, regardless of how modestly they had dressed, people respectfully opened a corridor by stepping aside to give way to them.⁵²²

Ekrem Bey romanticized his encounter with the *Anaze* tribe and the daughter of the *Anaze* Sheikh so much that his writings make the reader felt that they were quoted from an Orientalist piece. He described in length the beauty of the “desert princess” and her horse by depicting them as the “embodiment of an equestrian Renaissance painting.”⁵²³

The nomadic tribes' preference to seize the day and not to care about the future was another characteristic that some of the Ottoman travellers admired.

⁵²¹ Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudûd*, 205-206.

⁵²² Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 118.

⁵²³ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 131.

Indeed, the Ottoman traveller, who was aware of the the Empire' decline and its ultimate destination, was extremely anxious about the future; therefore, they envied the nomadic tribes for their disinterest in the future. For example, while mentioning a local tribe in the Sahara desert, Abdülkadir Câmî stated that they were “free of anxiety about their future” (*endişe-i ferdadan azade*); hence, despite their poverty, they lived happily and in joy.⁵²⁴

All in all, the Ottoman travellers were not altogether negative about the nomadic people; they also appreciated some of the characteristics of the nomads, particularly their hospitality, their efforts to adapt to the difficult natural conditions, the natural life that they had been living in, and their indifference regarding the future.

8.2. Other Mediums of Civilization

Although the Ottoman travellers' perception of civilization was mainly based on citification, there were other mediums of civilization that they had used to distinguish between the civilized and uncivilized. Some of these mediums were related to the material achievements of the European civilization such as steamship, railway, train, telegraph, or factory, while some non-material elements, such as religion and the situation of women in social life, were also referred to evaluate the degree of civilization.

To start with the material elements, it can be argued that the Ottoman travellers were quite impressed from European technological achievements, especially in the field of communication and transportation. They depicted any vehicle easing and speeding up their travel as an element of civilization. The reason for their emphasis on these material elements was the stark contrast between the geography they had wandered and the vehicle they had encountered.

Train and steamship were the most cited material elements of civilization in the writings of the Ottoman travellers. For instance, Âli Bey appraised the steamship as a “product of civilization” (*âsâr-ı medeniyet*). Voyaging on a primitive small boat made up of wood and inflated leather over the Tigris River,

⁵²⁴ Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 134.

and continuously complaining about his uncomfortable travel, Âli Bey encountered with a small British boat near Tikrit patrolling in the region, and declared his satisfaction for seeing this product of civilization in such a desolated place.⁵²⁵ Steamship appeared once more in his travelogue as a medium of civilization. During his voyage from Basra to India, in Muscat, Âli Bey was invited for a dinner in a British military steamship, *Turquoise*, whose crew patrolled the shores for protecting Indian merchants from the attacks of the nomadic tribes. He appreciated the enlightenment of the vessel, the delicious dinner he had and the play performed by the crew:

The organization and enlightenment of the hall, the refinement and taste of the foods [and] the harmony of the music made us forget that we are on the Sea of Oman in front of the rocks of Muscat. Actually, it is a great joy to encounter with such products of civilization in such places. Particularly, it is not imaginable to have a *supé*, while watching a play, listening to a concert and tasting rare foods and drinks in an uncivilized country like Muscat; most probably, there has been no such occasion before.⁵²⁶

This quotation demonstrates that what made this occasion so significant was the contrast between the wild and hostile environment and the place where the dinner had been held. In other words, the steamship became the scene of “civilized” practices such as a joyful play and a perfect dinner.

Train was the counterpart of the steamship on land. It facilitated travel to a great extent; especially in desert, it provided comfort and velocity to the travellers. Therefore, the Ottoman travellers perceived train as a medium of civilization. For example, Mehmed Mihri, who performed the first phase of his travel from Cairo to Sudan on train, resembled it to a wild animal in a civilized

⁵²⁵ Direktör Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 52.

⁵²⁶ Italics added. “*Salonun tertibatı ve tenviratı et’imminin nezaket ve nefasetiyle mûsikînin halâveti Bahr-i Umman’da Maskat kıyılarının önünde bulunduğumuzu bize unutturdu. Böyle yerlede bu misillü âsâr-ı medenîyyete tesadüf etmek doğrusu hoşta gidiyor. Hususiyle Maskat gibi gayr-ı medenî bir memlekette tiyatro ve konser görerek en nadir ve nazik makulat ve meşrubat ile (supe) etmek hatır ve hayale gelir şeylerden olmadığı misillü emsâli de sebk etmemiş olsa gerektir.*” Direktör Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 104. Ali Suad was another traveller who perceived the steamship as a civilized vehicle. In his voyage on a British vessel, he artistically wrote that “[t]he vessel sails like an extraordinarily big as well as mythical goose with its civilized majesty within the immortal secrets of the night.” (*Vapur gecenin layemut serairi içinde azamet-i medenîyyesi ile fevka’l tabii ve büyük olduğu kadar esatirî bir kaz gibi yüzerek gidiyordu.*) Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 78

form (*bir nazire-i makyuse-i medeniye*). Similarly in comparing the Italian rule in Abyssinia and the Ottoman rule in Yemen, Rüşdi Bey perceived railway construction in Abyssinia as a “product of civilization” (*âsâr-ı medeniyet*) and criticized the Ottoman Empire for not establishing railway in Yemen to facilitate the transport not only of the troops when necessary, but also of the goods and services from the port cities to the interior parts and *vice-versa*.⁵²⁷

Ahmed Kemal mentioned some of the European technological achievements in his travelogue. He labelled them as the products of humanity and criticized the religious bigotry of the Muslim elite of Turkistan towards these material elements of civilization. To give an example, in the town of Bay, Ahmed Kemal met the former *mufti* of Gochar, telling him some people rumoured that whoever adopted the new educational system introduced by Ahmed Kemal quitted praying to the God. Ahmed Kemal tried to persuade the *mufti* that these rumours were false. In doing this persuasion, he referred to the material elements of European civilization:

The new schools are the houses of knowledge, religion, good manners and talent opened for educating youngsters who would be able to find the way for the salvation of the country from bloody claws [...] As you see, today the Christians fly on our heads like birds with airplanes and zeppelins; they blew like a thunder with wireless telegrams and other electrical devices. We do not even know to walk on the ground. Although we are human beings like them, why are we so deprived of humanity... The Europeans had tired apart the layers of weather through wired and wireless telegrams and transformed the world into a unified body. The man in the East understands the ideas and works of the man in the West in a moment. We could not understand the words of the men next to us. Franks [the Europeans] disturb the veins of soil in order to search metals and to add inexhaustible treasures to the world of richness; yes they turn the soil upside down. We do not still know how to benefit from the surface of the soil [...] With such ignorance, with such inertia, would the religion and nation survive?⁵²⁸

⁵²⁷ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 70.

⁵²⁸ “*Cedit mektepleri [...] vatanın kanlı pençelerden esbâb-ı halâs yolunu arayıp bulmaya akli yeter gençler hazırlamak için açılmış birer darü’l irfan ve birer daru’d-din-i edeb ve hünerdir. Görüyorsunuz, ji bugün nasara başımızın üzerinde kuş gibi – ayeroplan ve siplenler – ile uçuyor, şimşek gibi – telsiz telgraf ve sair alât-ı elektiriyye ile – çakıyor. Biz hâlâ yerde doğru yürümesini bilmiyoruz. Biz de bunlar gibi insan olduğumuz halde niçin bu insanlıktan mahrumuz... Avrupalılar telli ve telsiz telgraflar ile hava tabakalarını yardular ve cihanı bir uzv-u gayri münfek hale getirdiler. Şarktaki adam garptaki adamın amel ve efkârını, ân-ı vâhitte anlıyor. Biz hâlâ yanımızdaki adamların sözlerini anlamaktan aciz bulunuyoruz. Yine Frenkler, maden aramak ve cihan-ı servete lâ-yüfnâ hazineler ilave etmek için, yerin damarlarını bozdular, evet yerin altını üstüne getirdiler. Biz hâlâ yerin üstünden bile istifade etmek yollarını bilmiyoruz.*

These lines were written in 1916 and one can infer that the train and steamship were replaced by more modern revolutionary transportation vehicles, such as airplane and zeppelin. What is more, telegraph was referred as another significant technological achievement, which compressed distance.

Besides technological vehicles, there were some other material elements of civilization which were related with the daily life of the people that the Ottoman travellers encountered. For example, Abdülkadir Câmî perceived the civilizing effect of the date trees for the Saharan nomadic tribes. He once wrote that these trees were the “jewels of the desert” and they had a “[...] significant civilizational mission in the social life of Fezzan.”⁵²⁹ He utilized the word *civilizational* in both senses. On the one hand, date trees resulted in the settlement of nomadic tribes since the raising of dates required a settled life; on the other hand, the settled life civilized several nomadic manners of the tribes.

Eating and drinking habits were also encountered as a medium of civilization. For example, during his voyage to Abyssinia, Sadık el-Müeyyed hired a local cook, who ate meat and fat uncooked. He wrote that although the cook had acquainted with “the products of progress and civilization” (*asar-ı terakki ve medeniyet*) such as soft-boiled egg, grilled cutlet, pasta and other dishes of Western cuisine when he had accompanied several Western travellers in their expeditions to the interior parts of Africa, he did not abandon his habit to eat raw meat.⁵³⁰ In another occasion, he wrote that the Abyssinians generally drink *teci* (a local drink of Abyssinia) with horns not with bottles and glasses. However, after bottles, jugs, glasses and chalices “filled with European civilization” began to enter the country, the Abyssinian elite began to drink with

[...] *Bu cehaletle, bu ataletle din ve millet payidar olur mu?*” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 114.

⁵²⁹ “[...] *Fizan’ın hayat-ı içtimaiyyesinde mühim bir vazife-i medeniye ifa eder.*” Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*, p. 176.

⁵³⁰ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*, p. 176.

jugs and chalices.⁵³¹ In other words, the dishes of the Western cuisine, bottles, jugs, glasses and chalices were labelled as symbols of civilization.

Besides these material elements of civilization, two particular moral elements were emphasized in order to depict a group of people civilized. One of them is religion, especially Islam. For some Ottoman travellers, Islam had a civilizing effect. For example, Mehmed Mihri argued that it was Islam, which civilized the inhabitants of Sudan. Describing the Sudanese people, he argued that the Sudanese abandoned their pre-Islamic customs and traditions due to the introduction of Islam by the Arabs in the region: “Although they preserve some of their ancient customs and practices, they save themselves from the ridiculous practices of still-infidel Central and South African black people, due to Islam.”⁵³²

Different from Mehmed Mihri, for Sadık el-Müeyyed and Ebubekir Efendi, it was not Islam *per se*, but the concept of religion that raised the uncivilized people to the level of civilization. When Sadık el-Müeyyed met *Itu* tribe in East Africa, he argued that these people were half-savages because they did not accept any religion. Therefore, most of them were naked except for a small piece of cloth around their waist and they marry seven or eight women.⁵³³ He did not clearly mention about Islamizing them; rather he referred to the concept of religion as a civilizing medium. Similarly, in one of his letters sent from South Africa to the journal of *Mecmua-i Fünûn*, Ebubekir Efendi wrote about the *Fettar* tribe. He mentioned that this tribe was extremely ignorant and simple-hearted (*gayet cahil ve safdil*) and therefore the Europeans sent missionaries to convert them to Christianity. He then wrote as such: “The local government [the British colonial government of South Africa] gave the permission to invite this tribe to the religion of Islam since the same Europeans

⁵³¹ “*Habeşler umumen teciyi şişe ve bardak yerine boynuz ile içerlerdi. Avrupa medeniyetiyle dolu şişeler, dolu sürahiler, bardaklar, kadehler girmeye başladığından kibarlar sürahi ve kadehlerle içmeye başladılar.*” Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*sı, p. 350.

⁵³² “*Her ne kadar a’dât ve ahlâk-ı kadîmelerinden bazılarını hıfz etmişler ise de henüz müşrik olan Afrika-yı Vustâ ve Cenubî zencilerinin gülünç adetlerinden, İslamiyet sayesinde, kendilerini kurtarmışlardır.*” Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*sı, 158.

⁵³³ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*sı, 435-436.

were introducing the technique of civilization [in the region].”⁵³⁴ In other words, Ebubekir Efendi appreciated the Europeans that what was important for them was not the religion but bringing civilization there, either by Christianity or by Islam.

Sadık el-Müeyyed also discussed the civilizing role of a particular religious establishment in North Africa, namely the Sanusiyya movement. Accordingly, the sheiks of this movement were teaching not only the true principles of Islam to the local people, but also the proper methods of agriculture and herding. What is more, they preserved internal security of the region. According to Sadık el-Müeyyed, they were the “guides and teachers” (*mürşid ve mürebbî*) of the local people and they deserved to be labelled as the “desert civilizers” (*çöl medeniyetçileri*).⁵³⁵

Woman was another medium of civilization. For instance, Mehmed Emin compared civilized and nomadic lifestyles in terms of their attitude towards women. He argued that although complimenting the beauty of women was perceived as a respectful manner for the women in the “civilized countries”, in the “nomadic world” such a practice was only the right of the husband and anyone else who behaved so meant to assault the honour of the woman.⁵³⁶

Regarding the veiling practices, Mehmed Emin wrote that in the Islamic countries except Iran, although the women were veiled in accordance with the Islamic principles, they were not prohibited from living together with the men in social life. He found this practice as totally “right and appropriate for the progress of civilization” (*savâb ve terakkiyat-ı medeniyeye muvafık*). He argued that if the masculine and feminine realms were entirely separated, then

⁵³⁴ Ebubekir Efendi, “İkinci Mektub,” *Mecmua-i Fünûn*, Vol. 1, No. 10, Şevval 1279 [1863], quoted from the edition of Ömer Lütfî’s travelogue by Hüseyin Yorulmaz, *Yüzyıl Önce Güney Afrika: Ümitburnu Seyahâtname*, 86.

⁵³⁵ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebiri’nde Seyahat*, 71-72.

⁵³⁶ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 64.

particularly the boys were raised within women, which would disturb their character.⁵³⁷ He wrote:

The son of a mother who is the daughter of lion will be a lion. The child learned the first samples of heroism from his mother. Therefore, in Asia, in the age of ten or eleven, a child could be an able horseman and a strong valiant, while in our lands a teenager of eighteen or twenty years old could not go out at night without his nanny. Why? Because he was raised in *harem*.⁵³⁸

Mehmed Emin also complained that in the Ottoman Empire, some Ottoman citizens had recently maltreated some Ottoman woman and he criticized this behaviour and perceived that such an occurrence could not happen in a civilized society (*cemiyet-i medeniye*). He argued that the reason of this scandal was the separation of men and women in the social sphere. According to him, there can be no civilized society behaving their women as such; even the prostitutes did not deserve such behaviour; “because” he wrote “there [in civilized countries], men and women are together members of the civilized society.”⁵³⁹ He further argued that in terms of the liberty of women, civilized world resembled the nomadic world, since women were relatively free in both lifestyles, while in Iran and in the Ottoman Empire, women was very much isolated from social life.⁵⁴⁰

All in all, in distinguishing between the civilized from the uncivilized, neither the city nor the material elements of Western civilization were perceived as the sole mediums of civilization. Rather, a wide range of technical as well as non-technical factors, including vehicles such as steamship and train, the eating and drinking habits, religion and even women, turned out to be labels for categorizing a society as civilized or uncivilized.

⁵³⁷ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 64.

⁵³⁸ “Aslan kızı olan bir validenin çocuğu dahi aslan oğlu olur. Şecaâtin, bahadırlığın ilk numunesini çocuk validesinde görür. İşte bu sebebe mebnûdir ki Asya'da on-on bir yaşında bir çocuk a'lâ süvari, gürbüz kahraman kopup bizde ise on sekiz-yirmi yaşında bir delikanlı dadısı yanında olmayınca gece dışarı çıkamaz. Niçin? Çünkü haremde büyümüşdür.” Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 66-67.

⁵³⁹ “Çünkü oralarda kadın ve erkek hep bir cemiyet-i medenîyyenin a'zâsıdır.” Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 65.

⁵⁴⁰ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 66.

8.3. Civilization As a Learnable Talent

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Ottoman intellectuals tried to create a synthesis of Western science/technology and Eastern morality and when they referred to the concept of civilization, they generally meant this synthesis. The Ottoman travellers followed a similar understanding. The inhabitants of the regions that they had visited were non-Europeans; therefore most of them had the notion of Eastern morality. To attain civilization, therefore, what they “should” do was to abandon nomadism and to adopt the Western science and technology. In sum, for the Ottoman travellers, civilization was a learnable, an attainable talent. In an age when the dominant criterion for the concept of civilization was the race, the Ottoman travellers argued that everyone could be civilized since civilization was a characteristic of the mankind.

If civilization was a learnable talent, the reason for the uncivilized nature of the non-Europeans was their ignorance and their reliance on superstitions through unsound interpretation of Islam as well as Western achievements. For instance, Mehmed Hurşid bitterly criticized the nomadic ignorance and their resistance to education. In his travelogue, he narrated that he had once encountered with an interesting conversation between the sheikh of *Benî Lam* tribe and the governor of Baghdad. Accordingly, the sheikh visited the governor with his nephew at the age of twelve and during their conversation the governor asked the child whether he knew reading and writing. His uncle answered negatively “because he is the son of a sheikh.” The governor asked what did that mean and the sheikh answered: “In our great families, reading and writing is a shame; these practices are not for us.”⁵⁴¹ Witnessing this conversation Mehmed Hurşid wrote that these people “demonstrated their bestiality while presenting their politeness.”⁵⁴²

⁵⁴¹ “[...] bizim büyük familyalarımıza okumakla yazmak ayıbdır, bize düşmez [...]” Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 65.

⁵⁴² “[...] kibarlıklarını arz ederken hayvanlıklarını meydâna urmuş idi.” Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahâtname-i Hudud*, 65.

Most of the Ottoman travellers were not as rigid as Mehmed Hurşid in their criticism towards ignorance. For example, in writing about the Swat people, Ahmed Hamdi wrote that they were extremely intelligent but unfortunately uneducated. While describing a local Swat ruler, he noted that this person would have been an adroit man, if he had been educated.⁵⁴³ In other words, the problem was not the racial inferiority of these people, but the lack of education. Therefore, education turned out to be a significant medium transforming civilization into a learnable talent. For example, in his travelogue Abdülkadir Câmî mentioned certain tribes, living in the western parts of the Libyan Desert, who were more talented for civilization (*medeniyete istidâdları çoktur*) because of their continuous voyages from Tripoli to Ghat and their compulsory relationship with other people.⁵⁴⁴ He wrote that if these tribes were granted an appropriate education under a proper administration they would be enlightened more rapidly than the other nomadic tribes living in the region.⁵⁴⁵

Similarly, according to Ahmed Kemal, the reason for the “backwardness” of the Central Asia was the lack of proper education. He wrote that indeed the youngsters living in Kasghar had an extraordinary intelligence (*zekâvet-i fevkalade*). He appreciated the talent of the young students despite the old methods of education:

[...] I could not deny that these poor Turkish boys having lively eyes and a wide scope of reasoning did never refrain to demonstrate their existence, although they have been buried under the musty roofs and venomous methods of these *medreses* and choked by the irresolvable tumultuous problems.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴³ Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, *Seyahâtnâme: Hindistan, Svat ve Afganistan*, 218.

⁵⁴⁴ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 55.

⁵⁴⁵ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 55.

⁵⁴⁶ “Fakat hiç inkar edemem, cevval gözlere, vüs’at-ı muhakemeye sahip bulunan bu zavallı Türk gençleri bu medreselerin köhne sakfları altına ve fikirleri zehirleyici usulleri arasına gömüldükleri ve bu içinden çıkılmaz dağdağalı meseile boğuldukları halde, yine her zaman mevcudiyetlerini göstermekten hali değildirler.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 29.

In sum, he claimed that if they had been taught in schools employing the new methodology (*yeni usûl mektepler*), they would have been intellectually developed.

All in all, for the Ottoman travellers, civilization could be provided through education, either traditional or modern. For some of the travellers the knowledge of Islam would have a civilizing effect since this religion intentionally ordered for learning both about science and technology as well as theological teachings. Others focused more on education through new methods, implying a Western kind of education, which would also enhance the moral development of the students. Therefore, similar to the Ottoman intellectuals, they attached special significance to education as a tool for bringing civilization to the uncivilized.

8.4. Civilization As a Collectivity: The Travellers' Interest towards Former Civilizations

As mentioned before, one of the meanings of the word *civilization* denotes a collectivity, the distinct societies of human beings with their own identifiable characteristics. This meaning resulted in the utilization of this word in its plural form, and such utilization is evident not only in the writings of the Western authors, but also of the Ottoman intellectuals. Some of the travelogues written by Ottoman travellers to the East also included the plural form of civilization; in other words, especially in informing the reader about the history of the regions that they had been travelling, the Ottoman travellers labelled the former historical collectivities dominating the region as civilizations.

Indeed, the rudiments of archaeology as a distinct discipline reached the Islamic world very lately, only after the mid-nineteenth century. The European excavations in the Middle East and the recovery of ancient artefacts led to a greater awareness of an indigenous heritage in the regions. From then on, first in Cairo under the auspices of British and French archaeologists, and then in İstanbul through the efforts of Osman Hamdi Bey, the first Ottoman

archaeologist, archaeological studies were introduced in the Islamic world.⁵⁴⁷ However, most of the Ottoman travellers read about the ancient civilizations from Western sources even before the systematization of archaeological studies in the Ottoman Empire. They were not indifferent to the achievements of former inhabitants of the Ottoman realm; rather they were extremely eager to see the traces of civilization and to compare the existing conditions of the regions with the former conditions.

For the Ottoman travellers to the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt was perceived as the centre of the most significant ancient sites and attracted their attention. They were aware of the grandeur of Egyptian civilization and thus desirous to see the Egyptian sites and monuments. For example, almost one third of the travelogue of Mehmed Mihri was devoted to the ancient Egyptian history and the description of the Egyptian sites that he had visited during his journey. He admired the pyramids and their mathematical construction; moreover, he was particularly amazed when he saw the mummified bodies of the pharaohs.⁵⁴⁸ He was so impressed by the ancient monuments that he criticized the Western tourists to the region, who had carved their names on the statues he encountered in Upper Nile. He was so annoyed that he wrote the heads of these people, who had harmed these precious historical monuments, should be smashed by the pickaxes.⁵⁴⁹

Cenap Şehabettin similarly criticized the indifference of the local inhabitants of Egypt to the historical monuments. He wrote:

⁵⁴⁷ According to Stephen Vernoit, with the growth of nationalist sentiments, antiquities policies were introduced and museums founded in Egypt and İstanbul. He wrote that in Egypt, “[...] an antiquities policy evolved under Auguste Mariette from 1858, primarily for the protection of pharaonic remains, but in 1881 the Committee for the Conservation of Monuments of Arab Art was founded and three years later the Museum of Arab Art opened in the mosque of al-Hakim in Cairo. In the Ottoman Empire an antiquities regulation that placed all archaeological excavations under the control of the Ministry of Education was put into effect in 1884 by Osman Hamdi, the director of the Archaeological Museum in İstanbul. Osman Hamdi also organized his own excavations, discovering in 1887 the Sidon sarcophagi.” See Stephen Vernoit, “The Rise of Islamic Archaeology,” *Muqarnas*, Vol. 14 (1997): 1-10, 2.

⁵⁴⁸ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 109-110.

⁵⁴⁹ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 131.

If their souls had acquired the necessary refinement through a lengthy art education; they would have not seen the ornamented ruins among tombs with such indifferent eyes [...] They understand nothing from these fragile architectural ambitions, from these leaves and flowers made up of stone, from these refine and emaciated lines and ornaments.⁵⁵⁰

For Cenap Şehabettin, the Egyptian civilization was one of the greatest civilizations of mankind and he claimed that the Egyptian civilization influenced the course of history:

The first presumptions of beliefs establishing the required beginning of the history of progress emerged out of here... First superstitions and the first affliction of suspicion and hesitation of ideas were felt here; the thoughts regarding the existence of the soul, the beauties of the soul and the immortality of the soul were born out of here. The Egyptian, which began to develop after the first tribes spreading from a migrating community coming from Asia driven towards the centre of Africa and particularly towards Sudan, established the first phase of apprehension and superstition. The first cradle of superstitions was Egypt; but it was not confined to that; it became the cradle of industry, the cradle of science, the cradle of philosophy, and finally in the nineteenth century, it became the cradle of wealth and prosperity.⁵⁵¹

Similarly, Halid Ziyaeddin depicted the pyramids and the Egyptian relics exhibited in the Museum of Cairo as “extremely surprising” (*hayretbahş-i ukûl*) and perceived the Egyptian civilization as “the producer and complementary of the current civilization” (*umran-ı hâzıranın müsebbeb ve mütemmâmâtı*).⁵⁵²

Besides Egypt, Mesopotamian sites attracted the attention of the Ottoman travellers as well. For example, Ali Suad mentioned about an ancient site in

⁵⁵⁰ “Eğer bunların ruhları uzun bir terbiye-i san’atla rikkat-ı lazımiye kazanmış olsa idi belki merakid arasındaki enkaz-ı menkuşeyi o nazar-ı istiğna ile göremezler [...] onlar bu kabil inkisar-ı hevasat-ı mamuriyeden, bu sengin evrak ve ezhardan, bu nahif ve nazenin halut ve nükuştan hiç bir şey anlamazlar.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 170.

⁵⁵¹ “Tarih-i terakkinin mukaddeme-i zaruriyesini teşkil eden ilk zünûn-u itikadat buradan çıkmış... İlk ebatıl ile fikrin ilk ıztırabat-ı şekk ve tereddi burada tercüme edilmiş... Vücut-u ruh, letafet-i ruh, beka-yı ruh fikirleri burada doğmuş idi; Asya’dan geçen bir fırka-yı muhacere tarafından aşair-i müteşettete-i iptidaiye Afrika’nın merkezine ve bahusus Sudan cihetlerine doğru sürüldükten sonra neşv-ü nemaya başlayan medeniyet- mısriye ilk devr-i evham ve harafatı tesis etti, işl mehd-i ebatıl-ı kıta-yı Mısriye oldu; fakat bununla kalmadı; sırasıyla mehd-i sanayi; mehd-i fûnun, mehd-i felsefe ve nihayet on dokuzuncu asr-ı miladide mehd-i servet oldu.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 229.

⁵⁵² Halid Ziyaeddin, *Musavver Mısır Hatıratı*, 3. Abdülkâdir Câmî also mentioned about the traces of former civilizations of North Africa. He particularly referred to the Phoenician, Carthaginian and Roman settlements in North Africa as “civilized” settlements and argued that they were continuously attacked by several nomadic tribes which were the forebears of the Tuaregs. Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp’ten Sahra-yı Kebîr’e Doğru*, 179.

Bahrain. He decided to visit the site, where a British archaeological team was excavating. He tried to meet the head of the team; however, he was absent there. Ali Suad expressed his regret for not being able to inform the reader about this site as he wanted.⁵⁵³ It is quite interesting that he perceived this visit not as a matter of courtesy but as an opportunity to inform his readers.

Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey was one of the most curious travellers regarding the ancient sites in Syria Province. He visited Petra and Palmyra during his travel in the region and he had to bear a long and tiring journey to reach the sites. Particularly, regarding Palmyra he emphasized the striking contrast between the former civilization and the current desolation: “The traces of the grand and magnificent culture of the past in the desert and, next to it, the miserable Arab village of *Tadmur*, as the symbol of the decadence in our time.”⁵⁵⁴

Not only the ancient sites, but also the Islamic past of the region was glorified in some travelogues. For example, in writing about Basra, Cenap Şehabettin labelled the city as “the first noble city established by the hand of Islam” (*dest-i İslamın ilk tesîs ettiği belde-i necîbe*) and “the earliest keepsake of Islamic civilization” (*İslamın evvelîn yâdigâr-ı medeniyeti*).⁵⁵⁵ However, he also emphasized that this glorious Islamic past had waned and the current situation of the city was far from its former grandeur.⁵⁵⁶

All in all, similar to the European perception of several historical collectivities as civilizations, the Ottoman travellers considered the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Islamic sites as the mirrors reflecting the ancient great civilizations established in these regions. They admired the ancient monuments; however, their archaeological interest hardly passed beyond this admiration.

⁵⁵³ Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 16.

⁵⁵⁴ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 132.

⁵⁵⁵ Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak*, 61.

⁵⁵⁶ Cenap Şehabettin, *Âfâk-ı Irak*, 61.

To conclude, the Ottoman travellers' perception of civilization had both similarities and differences in comparison to the perception of the Ottoman intellectuals. To start with the similarities, the Ottoman travellers accepted the technological and scientific superiority of the West and tried to introduce the material elements of civilization to the non-European world. They also emphasized the preservation of moral elements of the Islamic/Ottoman culture while adopting these material elements. Their focus on education as a source of civilization reflected this synthesis as well.

However, different both from the European understanding of civilization as well as from the Ottoman intellectuals' perception of this concept, the Ottoman travellers put their real emphasis on the issue of the distinction between nomadism and settlement when they were mentioning about the concept of civilization. In many of the regions that they had visited ranging from the Saharan Desert, to the jungles of Africa, from the Central Asian steppes to the mountainous regions of Yemen, nomadism was the major life-style and the Ottomans perceived it negatively for centuries. Therefore, for the Ottoman travellers education and learning about the Western science and technology were of secondary importance only after the provision of settlement. In other words, without the transformation from a nomadic to a *civilized* life-style, such processes would not mean much. The Ottoman travellers' solid distinction between the urban and non-urban space, the positive qualifications attached to the former and the negative ones attached to the latter demonstrated their desire to *civilize* these regions through first promoting the settled life and then to increase the level of knowledge of the people through proper education.

However, still, there was no unified perception on this matter; there were some Ottoman travellers who complained for the indolence of the settled people *vis-à-vis* the vigilance of the nomads, or who criticized the hypocrisy of some city-dwellers *vis-à-vis* the hospitality and honesty of some nomadic tribes. Therefore, although the focus on the concept of civilization was mainly based on the distinction between nomadism and settled life, this was not the only criterion for labelling a group of people civilized.

PART IV

OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF THE "EAST"

The previous two chapters on the Ottoman intellectuals' perception of the concept of civilization in general and the Ottoman travellers' perception in particular demonstrate that the Ottoman understanding of civilization was different from the European one since it aims for a synthesis instead of total adoption. This difference was one of the most significant impediments in front of labelling the Ottoman perception of the "East" as an Orientalist perception. Another significant difference between the European and Ottoman outlooks towards the region called "the Orient" is that while the former accounts generally established a superior-inferior distinction and thereby a monolithic civilizational understanding of "superior West" and "inferior East;" the Ottomans, particularly the travellers, mentioned differently about different parts of this broad category of "Orient." In other words, although most of them accepted this distinction, they placed themselves in the Eastern world and resisted the civilizational inferiority argument by attempting to modernize themselves without westernizing. This distinction was, therefore, not an insurmountable one.

Considering all these issues, the final part of this dissertation focuses on the Ottoman travellers' perception of the "East" and questions whether a monolithic perception of a particular "East" is present in their writings. In doing that, five geographical regions, the North Africa, the Middle Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Iran, the Central Asia and the South and East Asia, are determined, and separate chapters are devoted for each of them. Each chapter has two sections. The first section deals with a brief account of either the Ottoman rule over or the Ottoman relations with that particular region. The second section focuses on the Ottoman travellers' perception of that region through emphasizing the similarities and differences regarding their narration of these distant regions. In doing that, it both presents the common themes that the travellers touched upon and underlines the issues specific to that particular region.

CHAPTER 9

THE OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF AFRICA

9.1 Ottoman Empire in the African Continent

9.1.1 The Ottoman Rule in North Africa (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)

Ottoman Empire's southward expansion in the early sixteenth century and the conquest of Egypt after the defeat of Mamluks in the Battle of Ridaniyah in 1517 resulted in the Ottoman penetration to the continent of Africa. Egypt was transformed into an *eyalet*⁵⁵⁷ of the Ottoman Empire in the same year and became a stronghold in the north-eastern corner of the continent. After this initial establishment, from the 1520s onwards, the need to control Eastern Mediterranean for containing the two significant rivals of the Empire in the region, namely the Habsburg Empire and Venice, forced the Ottomans to occupy some strategic posts in Northern Africa. The first target of the Ottomans was Algiers, which became an *eyalet* under the governorship of a privateer, Khair-ed-din Barbarossa (1478-1546), after his voluntary acceptance of the Ottoman sovereignty and his appointment as the High Admiral of the Ottoman fleet (*kaptan-ı derya*) in late 1533. Unlike this peaceful expansion, the littoral parts of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were captured from the Order of St. Jean in 1551, while the city of Tunis was occupied in 1574 from the local al-Hafsid dynasty, which had been collaborating with the Habsburg Empire, four decades after the failed Ottoman initiative to occupy the city in 1534. Therefore, by the end of the

⁵⁵⁷ *Eyalet* is the largest administrative division in the Ottoman Empire until the 1864 Provincial Code. It is composed of multiple *sanjaks*. The governors of *eyalets* were generally having the rank of *beylerbey* and were equal to the rank of vizier in the Ottoman protocol. For a detailed description of the concept of *eyalet*, see Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*, 3rd Edition, 3 Volumes, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları), Vol. 1, 577-578.

sixteenth century, there were four Ottoman *eyalets* on the North Africa, being Egypt, Algiers, Tripolitania, and Tunisia.⁵⁵⁸

By the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans concerned not only about the control of the Eastern Mediterranean, but also about the increasing Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese naval incursions in the southern parts of the Red Sea and in the eastern shores of Africa alarmed the Empire; since it threatened the newly established *Eyalet* of Egypt as well as the sacred cities of Islam in Hejaz. Therefore, the Ottomans first supported some local Muslim leaders against the Portuguese and their major ally in the region, namely the Abyssinians.⁵⁵⁹ Then, they took more concrete measures and managed a significant campaign towards the strategic ports of north-eastern Africa, namely Massawa and Suakin, which were captured between 1555 and 1564. These newly occupied territories were reorganized as the *Eyalet* of Abyssinia.⁵⁶⁰

Considering the geographic, economic and social differences of these vast territories, the Ottomans established different modes of governance. First of all, these provinces were administered through the system called *saliyane*. Unlike most of the provinces in Anatolia and Rumelia, their territories were not divided into smaller territorial units allocated to soldiers for cultivation to produce wealth for raising an army (*dirlik*). Rather, a predetermined amount of annual tax was imposed on the provinces. Initially, the governors appointed by the centre and then the local governors had the responsibility to collect and send

⁵⁵⁸ For the Ottoman conquests in Africa, see Ahmet Kavas, *Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: TASAM Yayınları, 2006), 34-50 and Muhammad Al-Fasi, "Algeria, Tunisia and Libya: The Ottomans and Their Heirs," in Bethwell A. Ogot, *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 120-133.

⁵⁵⁹ The Portuguese-Abyssinian alliance, established in the period of Abyssinian Emperor Lebna Dengel (1508-1540), contributed to the Portuguese presence in the region. In order to repulse this threat, the Ottomans first supported Ahmed bin İbrahim Gran (c. 1507-1543), a Somalian tribal leader who attacked Abyssinia in 1520s and occupied several territories. In response, Lebna Dengel demanded Portuguese help. Ahmed Gran was defeated by the Portuguese and Abyssinian rule was restored in the occupied territories. For a brief account of these events see J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in Ethiopia*, (London: Frank Cass, 2008), 85-86.

⁵⁶⁰ Kavas, *Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri*, 46.

this tax to the central treasury.⁵⁶¹ Despite this common system of taxation there were significant differences in terms of governance and the degree of the interrelationship between *eyalets* and the centre. To start with, the ties of the *Eyalet* of Egypt with the centre was the most strong, because it was the richest administrative unit of the Empire in the sixteenth century, contributing to central treasury more than any other *eyalet*.⁵⁶² These strong ties continued until the beginning of the eighteenth century, after which the rivalry between the Ottoman administration, the Mamluks, who had remained in Egypt after the conquest, and the local Arab elite loosened the Ottoman presence.⁵⁶³ Unlike Egypt, the *Eyalet* of Abyssinia was the least centralized administrative unit because of its geographical distance and lack of institutional continuity. The rapid changes of governors and the absence of control over the local nomadic tribes contributed to its loose structure. In the seventeenth century the Ottoman influence gradually retreated from interior regions to the littoral and in the next century the administration of this *eyalet* was left to the local elites.⁵⁶⁴

Between these two extremes, there were the three remaining *eyalets* of the Empire in North Africa, which were labelled as *Garb Ocakları*. In these

⁵⁶¹ For a detailed account of *saliyane*, see Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimler Sözlüğü*, Vol. 3, 111-112.

⁵⁶² Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdağlıs*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 6. This significance forced the Ottomans to establish a more centralized administration not seen in any other province of the Empire in the region; particularly the Code of Egypt (*Kanunname-i Mısriyye*) promulgated by the Ottoman Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa (1493-1536) in 1525 contributed to this centralization. See P[eter] M[alcolm] Holt, "Pattern of Egyptian Political History from 1517 to 1798," in P[eter] M[alcolm] Holt, (ed.) *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 79-90, 81.

⁵⁶³ This rivalry ended in 1786, when Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa (1715-1790) was sent to Egypt to restore internal stability. He ended the Mamluk interference to the administration of province and restored the strength of centrally-appointed governors; however his efforts were not effective because of the French invasion of Egypt three years later. For a brief analysis of this period of turmoil, see Holt, "Pattern of Egyptian Political History from 1517 to 1798," 82-90. For a detailed analysis of Egyptian politics, economics and society during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdağlıs*; Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁵⁶⁴ Kavas, *Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri*, 47.

administrative units, there was a system called *ocak*, established by the janissary corps and the military troops brought from Western Anatolia for the maintenance of security and order in the region, and this military establishment turned out to be the ruling elite of these provinces. Since the governor sent by the centre had a very short tenure (three years) and the difficult duty of collecting taxes, internal affairs of these provinces were handled by the councils including the representatives of this military establishment and some local elites. Therefore, political power lied in the hands of these military elite. A second political group contesting the power of *ocak* was the naval troops (*levend*), the renegades from the Mediterranean countries who not only protected cities from naval incursions, but also contributed to the budget of the provinces as privateers.⁵⁶⁵

This political balance based on a governor sent by the centre and a governing council formed by the military and local elites tilted towards the latter with the gradual military decline of the Ottoman Empire and the sending of corrupt governors. In Algeria, the janissary commanders (*ağā*) were able get total control of the *ocak* in 1659 and until 1671 they established a military oligarchy, which was also approved by the Porte. In 1671, they were defeated by the naval troops, whose leaders, entitled *dey* assumed the governance. From then on, until the French invasion of Algeria, the province was ruled by the Deys, who were extremely autonomous from the centre, even having the competence to declare war and peace towards the neighbouring states, or to conclude political or economic agreements with the European states.⁵⁶⁶ In Tunisia, in 1591, the Deys revolted against the governor and forced the Porte to accept their authority over the *eyalet*, after with they virtually ruled for forty years. During this period, the Deys tried to collect taxes through an intermediary mechanism headed by a

⁵⁶⁵ For the system of *ocak* and its administration see Tal Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and Its Ideology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), 323-344.

⁵⁶⁶ For a brief account of these power struggles and administration of Algeria in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 159-164.

local bureaucrat called *Bey*, who was appointed by them and approved by the Porte. In 1631, the *Bey* of Tunisia, Murad Corso, defeated the Deys in this quest for power and convinced the Porte to accept his dynastic rule in Tunisia in the name of the Sultan. In 1705, this dynasty was replaced by a Turkic dynasty established by Huseyn bin Ali el-Türki (1669-1740), which ruled Tunisia until the French invasion in 1881.⁵⁶⁷ In Tripolitania, the administration of the governors appointed by the centre lasted until 1711, when a dynasty called *Karamanlı*, which had emerged out of the marriage of janissaries with local women, was able to end this system and forced the Porte to accept its rule. This dynasty ruled Tripolitania until 1835, when the Ottoman Empire re-established central administration.⁵⁶⁸

Besides these power contests and administrative transformations, the Ottoman Empire also contacted the Muslim states of Central Africa, especially the state of Bornu, the strongest state in Central Africa at that time.⁵⁶⁹ In this period, other smaller Muslim states also contacted the Ottoman Empire and declared their allegiance to the Caliph; in return, the Ottoman Sultan sent them

⁵⁶⁷ The first half of the eighteenth century was very much dominated by inter-dynastic struggle for power and disturbed Tunisian economy, while the second half was more stable due to the rule of Hammuda Pasha (1777-1814), who both imitated the limited modernization of the Ottoman centre and secured the borders of the province against external incursions, particularly by the Algerians. See Asma Moalla, *The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: Army and Government of a North African Ottoman Eyalet at the End of the Eighteenth Century*, (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 141-142.

⁵⁶⁸ For the establishment of *Karamanlı* dynasty see K. S. McLachlan, "Tripoli and Tripolitania: Conflict and Cohesion during the Period of the Barbary Corsairs (1551-1850)," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World (1978), 285-294.

⁵⁶⁹ Particularly, the correspondence between the Sultan of Bornu, Mai İdris Alloma (r. 1570-1602), and Murad III (r. 1574-1595) was quite significant. Accordingly, Mai İdris Alloma sent an envoy to Murad III (r. 1574-1595) in order to establish good relationships, to prevent Ottoman incursions into his realm, and finally to equip his army with Ottoman weaponry to dominate his rivals. Murad III advised Mai İdris Alloma not to attack other Muslim states in the region; however Ottoman weapons were sold to Bornu through private traders and some Ottomans served in the army of Bornu as military experts during the sultanate of Alloma. For Ottoman-Bornu relations, see Zekeriyâ Kitapçı, "Osmanlıların Orta Afrika Politikası: Askeri, Ticari ve Siyasi İlişkiler," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 411-420, 414-415 and Numan Hazar, "Türklerin Afrika ile İlişkilerinin Kısa Tarihçesi," in Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), *Türkler*, Vol. 13, 118-131, 122-124.

gifts and sometimes seals indicating that he accepted their loyalty.⁵⁷⁰ Although the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and these political entities hardly passed beyond the legitimization of the authority of their Muslim rulers through the Caliph's approval, still, these contacts reflect that there was an Ottoman awareness about these distant territories.

9.1.2. Challenges to the Ottoman Rule in Africa during the Nineteenth Century and the Ottoman Responses

The year 1798 was a turning point for the Ottoman Empire because European colonialism directly and militarily penetrated into the Middle Eastern territories of the Empire by the French invasion of Egypt. Although this invasion did not last long, its effects were profound. First of all, it resulted in the Ottoman perception that the central Ottoman territories were no longer secure from European attacks; the invasion of one of the richest provinces of the Empire meant that the attacks would no more be waged at the borderlands but at the very heart of the Empire. Secondly, it transformed the socio-political structure of Egypt. From the post-invasion turmoil a mighty governor, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa, emerged who would later challenge the Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt and would be able to establish his dynastic rule over this province.

Before the Ottoman Empire's recovery from this initial shock, the *Eyalet* of Algeria was invaded by the French in 1830. Initially this invasion was limited to the major cities in the Algerian littoral; however, local resistance movements forced the French to enlarge the scope of their colonial expansion from 1840s onwards. Ottoman Empire could not react to the invasion except for some diplomatic initiatives, because the central army of the Empire had already been dismissed with the abolition of Janissary corps in 1826 and the establishment of

⁵⁷⁰ Among them were the states of Vaday, Kanem, and Darfur (established in contemporary Eastern Sudan and Chad), the states of Agadez, Ayir and Kavar (established in contemporary Niger), the sultanates of Kano and Sokoto (established in contemporary Nigeria), the sultanate of Harar (established in contemporary Somalia), the sultanates of Funj and Senar (established in contemporary Sudan), and finally the sultanate of Zengibar (established in contemporary Tanzania and Mozambique). See Ahmed Kavas, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Afrika Kitasında Hakimiyeti ve Nüfuzu," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 421-430.

new army was not effective enough to cope with this problem. What is more, existing troops were sent to repulse Kavalalı's rebellion against the central administration. Therefore, the Empire had to acquiesce and later recognize the French invasion of Algeria in 1847.⁵⁷¹

However, several lessons were drawn from this invasion. First of all, the Ottomans perceived that a movement for centralization of the remaining North African provinces was a must, because it was evident that the French did not satisfy solely with the control of Algeria. Therefore, in 1835, Ottoman troops were sent to the *Eyalet* of Tripolitania to end the *Karamanlı* dynasty and to re-establish Ottoman central administration, which was consolidated particularly with the enactment of the Provincial Code in 1864. These measures proved to be effective; despite French and later English colonial ventures in North Africa, Tripolitania remained in the hands of the Ottomans until 1912. However, a similar initiative for Tunisia failed. Accordingly, in order to prevent the fall of Tunisia to French colonial rule the Tunisians demanded the Ottomans to establish a more central administration as in the case of Tripolitania. The Ottomans responded these demands positively and officially declared Tunisia as a part of the Ottoman Empire in 1871; however, this did not prevent the province from falling under French rule a decade later.⁵⁷²

While the Ottoman Empire was on the eve of losing its North African territories, the virtually independent governor of Egypt, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa, enlarged the territories of his *eyalet* by conquering Sudan in 1821. Thenceforward, the Province of Sudan was established, which was nominally governed by the Ottoman Empire and practically by Egypt. The territories of the province were once more enlarged in 1870 by Khedive İsmail Paşa (1830-1895) towards the Great Lakes in the south and Darfur in Western Sudan, in which a

⁵⁷¹ For the reasons and implementation of the French invasion of Algeria, see John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: the Origins and Development of a Nation*, 2nd Edition, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), particularly Chapter 3, 45-79.

⁵⁷² Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 187.

relatively modern administrative system was established.⁵⁷³ After this expansion another province was established, entitled the Province of Equator (*Hatt-ı Üstüva Vilayeti*). The governors of this province were generally foreigners appointed in consultation with the Great Powers, which were increasing their presence in the region.⁵⁷⁴ After British occupation of Egypt, a condominium was established on Sudan and Equator in 1899; however, the Egyptian control remained nominal.⁵⁷⁵

The intensification of the “scramble for Africa” after the Treaty of Berlin in 1881, which also resulted in the French invasion of Tunisia in the same year and the British invasion of Egypt a year later, forced the Ottoman Empire to take more concrete measures. One policy was to delineate the Ottoman territories in North Africa clearly. In order to prevent further French advance in the Saharan Desert, some smaller administrative units were established in the south-western borders of the Province of Tripolitania upon the request of the local people.⁵⁷⁶ A second policy was the use of diplomacy in order to prevent further colonial expansion. Ottoman diplomats tried to voice their protests in international platforms to protect the legal rights of the Empire.⁵⁷⁷ Finally, the Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamism was tried to be utilized in order to provide the allegiance

⁵⁷³ Gabriel Warburg, “Islam in the Sudan under the Funj and the Ottomans,” in David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon (eds.), *Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2006), 206-225, 210.

⁵⁷⁴ The first governor was the English Orientalist Samuel Baker (1821-1893), and after him. Charles Gordon (later Gordon Paşa, 1833-1885) assumed the governance. In 1878 when Gordon Paşa became the governor of Sudan, a German renegade, Mehmed Emin Paşa (Edward Schnitzer, 1840-1892) became the governor of this province. See Hazar, “Türklerin Afrika ile İlişkilerinin Kısa Tarihçesi,”127-128.

⁵⁷⁵ For a brief analysis of the Province of Equator see, İdris Bostan, “Orta Afrika’da Nüfuz Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1893-1895), *Belleten*, Vol. 54, (Aug., 1990): 665-697.

⁵⁷⁶ Indeed, the small towns in this region demanded the formal acceptance of Ottoman sovereignty; therefore district administrators were sent by the Porte and three districts (*kaza*) were established being Reşade and Tibesti (in contemporary Chad) in 1880 and 1884, and the district of Kavar (in contemporary Nigeria) in 1911. See Hazar, “Türklerin Afrika ile İlişkilerinin Kısa Tarihçesi,”124.

⁵⁷⁷ For an analysis of Ottoman diplomatic initiatives regarding Algerian and Tunisian incidents, see Abdurrahman Çaycı, *Büyük Sahra’da Türk-Fransız Rekabeti, 1858-1911*, (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970); Abdurrahman Çaycı, *La Question Tunisienne et La Politique Ottomane, 1881-1913* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1963).

and loyalty of local tribes to the Ottoman Empire and to the Sultan/Caliph. Abdülhamid contacted several religious orders, the most significant of which was the Sanusiyya order established in the Province of Tripolitania, for preserving the Ottoman control over the local tribes.

Besides Western colonial penetration, the second significant aspect of the nineteenth century was the modernization of the region either under colonial rule, or under the rules of the Ottoman or Egyptian governors. For example, Kavalalı and his successors urbanized and modernized Egypt to a significant degree.⁵⁷⁸ In Algeria and Tunisia, French colonial administration conducted the policy of eliminating traditional economic and political structures as well as ensuring the absolute and complete subjugation of the population.⁵⁷⁹ Finally, in the Province of Tripolitania, the Ottoman Empire's centralization was compounded with modernization. Sanitary conditions as well as education were tried to be developed. Particularly during the Hamidian era, tens of primary schools and a few secondary schools were opened in the province.⁵⁸⁰

All in all, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman presence in North Africa was very much shattered by the British and French penetrations, as well as by the quasi-independent administration of Egypt. The limited attempts of centralization could only serve for the maintenance of Ottoman control in Tripolitania, while other Ottoman territories were gradually lost. This age of turmoil was very much reflected in the Ottoman

⁵⁷⁸ For a detailed analysis of Egyptian modernization, see Gabriel Baer, "Social Change in Egypt: 1800-1914," in P. M. Holt, (ed.) *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 136-161; Ehud R. Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁵⁷⁹ This was done in Algeria through the *Code de l'Indigénat* (The Native Code), which perceived the colonized people as subjects, not as citizens and clearly separated between the local population and the new French settlers. Benjamin Stora, *Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History*, translated by Jane Marie Todd, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5-6.

⁵⁸⁰ For a detailed analysis of these schools, see the two articles written by Nesimi Yazıcı, "Osmanlı Son Döneminde Libya'da Türk Dilinin Öğretimi Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler," *Belleten*, Vol 59, (Apr. 1995): 121-132 and "Layihalar Işığında II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Libya Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler," in *Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri*, 27-29 May 1992, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1994), 47-84.

travelogues to the region; which is examined thoroughly in the coming section of this chapter.

9.2. Ottoman Travellers' Perception of Africa in the Nineteenth Century

Although the continent of Africa was quite remote to the Ottoman centre, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, it was one of the most visited regions by the travellers. Particularly, the pan-Islamist and anti-imperialist policies of Abdülhamid II found a significant playground in this part of the world, where the rivalry of imperialist powers intensified after 1880s. Therefore, in the late Ottoman Empire, travellers made their way to Africa as agents for developing good relations with the local Muslim elites in order to check imperialist expansion, as soldier/bureaucrats for preventing European, especially French, imperialist desires in the Sahara, or as diplomats for maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring African states. Whatever the reason for their presence in Africa, these travellers wrote and published their travel accounts as books or in newspapers and these publications contribute to the understanding of the Ottoman perception of Africa in this volatile period.

9.2.1. The Representation of the Allegiance and Loyalty of the African Muslims to the Caliph and the Ottoman Empire

Since the North African territories of the Ottoman Empire were under Western penetration during the nineteenth century, despite cultural differences between the Ottoman imperial core and North African periphery, the Ottoman travellers perceived these regions as parts of the Empire and emphasized this sense of belongingness in their travelogues. In other words, although the geography (for example, the desert) or the peoples (for example, the bedouins) were quite alien to the travellers, while demonstrating their feelings (excitement, astonishment, comfort or discomfort) emerged out of the difference between the observer and the observed, they were aware that these territories were part of their fatherland. For example, with regard to the Saharan Desert, Sadık el-Müeyyed wrote that the awareness that he was travelling in the Ottoman realm made him forget all the difficulties of travel by giving “an extraordinary

strength” to his body and “an unidentifiable sense of comfort and security” to his heart.⁵⁸¹ Similarly, Ahmed Şerif declared his feeling of peace when he passed the Ottoman-Tunisian border and entered Tripolitania, which he defined as the “holy soil of the fatherland;” he wrote that he felt as if he were at home.⁵⁸²

The perception of the remaining territories of North Africa as part of the fatherland was strengthened with the sense of pride emerged as a result of the African Muslims’ ultimate allegiance to the Caliph (in other words, the Ottoman Sultan). The travellers’ narrative of demonstration of this allegiance is not peculiar to the Hamidian era, when the discourse of Pan-Islamism reached its zenith. The travelogues written before and after this period also include similar narrations. For example, as early as 1860s, Ömer Lütfî wrote that when the Muslim community of Capetown had heard of the arrival of the Ottoman religious mission, they gathered to welcome the mission and expressed their gratitude to the Caliph for sending religious scholars. This welcoming demonstration satisfied Ömer Lütfî and his tutor, Ebubekir Efendi and made them feel in a friendly and familiar environment.⁵⁸³ What is more, during their stay, an Ottoman vessel visited Capetown and the Muslim community declared their “joy and cheerfulness” (*izhar-ı şadî ve ferah*) to Ömer Lütfî that they were extremely content to see a vessel of the Ottoman Empire in their city.⁵⁸⁴

The Ottoman travellers’ experience of Muslim allegiance to the Caliph took a visual form in the Friday prayers, when the *imams* prayed for the continuation of the reign of the Caliph/Sultan in their speeches. These prayers were the occasions where the travellers observed the sense of belonging to the same community to the highest degree. For example, Mühendis Faik attended a Friday prayer in Port Louis, Mauritius, during which the *imam* prayed for Sultan

⁵⁸¹ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebîr’inde Seyahat*, 45.

⁵⁸² Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk’da, Sâriye’de, Trablusgarb’de Tanîn*, 242.

⁵⁸³ Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtname*, 55, 57.

⁵⁸⁴ Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtname*, 87.

Abdülaziz as the Caliph of the entire Muslim community. After hearing this pray, Mühendis Faik wrote that they

[...] voiced their allegiance [to the Sultan] and adorned their tongues with the devotions 'long live the Sultan' in order to thank for hearing the name of our eminent benefactor even in such places as a result of his imperial grace.⁵⁸⁵

Similarly, Sadık el-Müeyyed attended a mass prayer in Harar, Abyssinia, in which almost two thousand Muslim people had prayed for the Caliph. He once more accentuated the significance of Caliphate in these distant lands:

Almost in all Muslim realms such a natural situation [praying for the Caliph] exists. But after passing all these seas and deserts, it is impossible for a loyal subject not to be happy after seeing that the highness of that holy name has always been chanted with respect and glorification.⁵⁸⁶

As it can be seen from this excerpt, the emphasis on the Muslim allegiance to the Caliph intensified in the writings of Hamidian travelogues. In another occasion, Sadık el-Müeyyed wrote that during his voyage to the Sanussi lodge in al-Jaghub, whenever the local Muslims heard that a representative of the Sultan had arrived, they came, declared their allegiance to the Caliph, and kissed his hands.⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, during his embassy to Addis Ababa, he continuously wrote about the mood of the Muslims in the cities that he visited. For example, he narrated the arousal of the Muslims in Djibouti and their expressions of content for the visit of the envoy of the Caliph vividly: "The Muslim community wanted not to see the envoy sent [by the Caliph] once, but to contemplate them with pleasure as much as possible."⁵⁸⁸ Such narrations

⁵⁸⁵ "Bizler dahi sâye-i şâhânede böyle mahallerde bile nâm-ı âli-i velinimetî kûş eylememize teşekküren padişahım çok yaşa dua'ı[na] icabet intimâsıyla tezyin-i lisân musarefet eyledik." Mühendis Faik, *Seyahât-nâme-i Bahr-i Muhît*, 47.

⁵⁸⁶ "Memâlik-i İslamiye'nin hemen her tarafında bu hâl tabii olup fakat bunca bahr-u küfrâyı kat ve tayy ettikten sonra o nâm-ı kutsînin ulviyetini daima ta'zîm ve tebcîl ile zîkr olunduğunu gören tebâ-yı sâdikadan birinin mesrûr olmaması kabil değildir." Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahât-nâmesi*, 159.

⁵⁸⁷ "Kafîle halkı hazret-i hilâfet-penâhîden olduğumu anlayınca kemâl-i ta'zîmle ellerime sarıldılar. Yolda ne kadar urbana ve urban meşâyihine rast geldimse cümlesi ta'zîmde kusur etmiyorlar idi." Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebîri'nde Seyahat*, 14.

⁵⁸⁸ "Ahâli-i İslâmiye taraf-ı eşref-i hazret-i hilâfet-penâhîden îzam buyurulan heyeti yalnız bir kere görmek değil mümkün olduğu kadar temâşâ etmek istiyorlar idi." Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş*

demonstrate the travellers' emphasis on the spiritual authority of the Caliphate over the entire Muslim realm.

This allegiance and loyalty of the local people was re-emphasized in the post-Hamidian era; however, this time, it was presented as a loyalty not to a religious figure, namely the Caliph, but to the Ottoman fatherland itself. Particularly, in Ahmed Şerif's travelogue, it was expressed in the form of the Ottoman anti-imperialist quest against the Italian aggression. Regarding the Arabs of Sfax (in contemporary Tunisia), Ahmed Şerif wrote that they expressed an extraordinary excitement against the Italian attack to the Province of Tripolitania and they shared his sorrow.⁵⁸⁹ Similarly, in writing about the province, he mentioned that its real wealth was not its fertile soil or sub-soil mineral resources but its people: "In order to find a people exerting such loyalty and allegiance to the government, being peaceful in their lives, one should go to Anatolia."⁵⁹⁰ Even, he wrote that the inhabitants of the region were more loyal to the state than the inhabitants of Anatolia considering the difficulties that they experienced because of Ottoman governments' negligence of the province.⁵⁹¹ This comparison with the Anatolian people demonstrated how he appreciated the efforts of the local communities in defending the fatherland against colonial expansionism.

In sum, narrating the allegiance of the local Muslims first to the Caliph and then to the Ottoman fatherland served for creating a sense of common identity, meaning that the Ottomans (including the North African people) had similar concerns and feelings with regard to the contemporary problems they had

Seyahâtname, 45. Another interesting experience was the extreme respect of the local Muslim rulers to the seal (*tuğra*) of the Caliph. Accordingly, Sadık el-Müeyyed brought some watches as gifts to these local Muslim rulers. They opened the watches, saw the seal of the Caliph carved in it and asked what that particular sign meant. When Sadık el-Müeyyed told them that it was the seal of the Caliph, they kissed and bring the watch to their forehead meaning they paid a great respect. Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*, 342.

⁵⁸⁹ Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'ta, Suriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, 241.

⁵⁹⁰ "Bu halk kadar hükümete sâdık ve bağlı, hayatında sâkin, adamlar bulmak için, Anadolu'ya gitmek gerekir." Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'ta, Suriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, 259.

⁵⁹¹ Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'ta, Suriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, 80.

encountered. This common identity was perceived as a way to prevent the ultimate disintegration of the Empire.

9.2.2. Comparing and Contrasting North Africa with Europe and Ottoman Empire

Comparing North African cities, landscapes, and peoples with the Ottoman Empire or Europe was a common practice for the Ottoman travellers. In making this comparison, the Ottoman travellers tried to display that the African cities and peoples may not be as much different from the European ones as had been thought. Moreover, comparison with Anatolia and other parts of the Empire might mean that these regions were not much different from the other parts of the Ottoman Empire as well. What is more, through such comparisons, it was also aimed to make these distant regions more familiar to the readers of these travelogues and to visualize them in their eyes.

To start with, some North African cities, modernized under the Ottoman governors or colonial administrations, were resembled to some European cities, particularly to Paris and London, the two significant models for the Ottoman travellers. For example, with regard to Alexandria, Ömer Lütfî wrote as such: “This city was quite ordered and adorned, and its streets were enlightened with gas lamps from one extreme to the other. It was a counterpart of London.”⁵⁹² Süleyman Şükrü similarly resembled al-Mansoura (in contemporary Egypt) to Paris: “The parts of al-Mansoura, which has no difference from European cities, along the Nile resembles to the banks of Seine of Paris.”⁵⁹³

⁵⁹² “Şehr-i mezkur gayet muntazam ve müzeyyen olub sokakları bütün bir baştan öbür başa gazlar ize münevver idi [...] Londra’dan bir nazire idi.” Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahât-nâmesi*, 109.

⁵⁹³ “Avrupa şehirlerinden asla farkı olmayan Mansure’nin Nil kenarına düşen kısmı Paris’in ‘Sen’ sahilini andırır.” Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 325. Besides Alexandria and Mansure, the Egyptian cities of Helwan and Port Said were perceived as having no difference from European cities in the travelogue of Mehmed Mihri. Regarding the city of Helwan, he mentioned that there was a hot mineral water resource, which resulted in the establishment of a European-style bath in the city. Besides, there were big hotels, coffee houses, a big observatory and gardens in which both Arabic and Western music was performed. In sum, he writes that “Helwan is a European-style, small and beautiful city, whose entire roads and streets were enlightened with electricity.” (*Hasılı Helvan bütün yol ve caddeleri elektrik ziyasıyla*

Halil Halid described the cities of Philippeville (contemporary Skikda in Algeria) and Algiers as French cities. With regard to Philippeville, he wrote: “There is nothing reminding East in the general composition of the city; it is an ordinary French city having apartments, taverns and so forth.”⁵⁹⁴ In Algiers, he experienced the degree of the visibility of French colonial presence:

When I arrived at the city of Algiers, I thought that I was in France. Because I found everything had become French. There is nothing that reminds one that he is in Africa unless there are porters wearing fez or turban, or other servants.⁵⁹⁵

All these expressions show that unlike other resemblances mentioned above, Halil Halid’s depiction of these cities includes a significant criticism of French colonial administration disturbing the original character of these cities and transforming them into mere replicas. What reminds the traveller of their real nature was the presence of Eastern-costumed “porters and servants,” in other words, the colonized people serving the colonial masters. This visualization of this colonial relationship in the form of French-type cities and Eastern-looking colonized people was the new characteristic of North Africa. Another criticism towards the extreme modernization of North African cities was directed by Cenap Şehabettin. Regarding Ramla, which was established in the suburbs of Cairo, he was critical of extreme intervention to nature and extreme reliance on scientific environmental arrangements. He wrote:

There, there is entirely science and ornaments; there remains none from nature and reality. There, they cut, broke and reaped the trees to give them the same shape... They mixed the colours as they wanted... They gave a geometrical shape to the branches... The curved and bended nature; they forcibly intervened in it...⁵⁹⁶

tenvir olunmuş, Avrupavari güzel ve küçük bir şehirdir) Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*sî, 71. For the depiction of Port Said, see 342.

⁵⁹⁴ “Şehrin şekl-i umumisinde şarkı andırır bir durum yok; apartmanları, meyhaneleri ve saireyi havi adı bir Frenk beldesinden ibarettir.” Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 6.

⁵⁹⁵ “Cezayir şehrine vasıl olduğum zaman kendimi Fransa’da zannettim. Çünkü her şeyi Fransızlaşmış buldum. Fesli, sarıklı hamallar veya sair hizmetkarlar da olmasa insana Afrika’da bulunduğunu andıran bir hal görülmez.” Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 73.

⁵⁹⁶ “Orada bütün bir fen, bütün bir ziynet vardı; hiç tabiat ve hakikat kalmamıştı. Orada ağaçları bir hizaya getirmek için kesmişler, kırmışlar, biçmişler... Renkleri istedikleri gibi meczetmişler...”

In other words, the Ottoman travellers were content with the modernization of the North African cities; however they reacted to the extreme modes of modernization, which resulted in the loosening of identities of the urban space. To put differently, they wanted to see modern cities having preserved their own characteristics.

Comparing African cities with İstanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire was another way of decreasing the unfamiliarity of the Ottomans to these distant parts of the world. For example, Mehmed Mihri resembled Khartoum to İstanbul by the way of comparing the Nile River with the Bosphorus, both of which divides the city into two parts.⁵⁹⁷ Similarly, Abdülkadir Câmî resembled the marketplace of the city of Tripoli to the bazaars of İstanbul and argued that it demonstrated a “disordered panorama” (*gayrimütecânis bir manzara*) with “a tumult peculiar to our East” (*Şarkımıza mahsûs bir kargaşalık*).⁵⁹⁸

Besides the comparison of cities and countryside, there were some other characteristics that directed the Ottoman travellers to resemble Africa to Europe. Military qualities and the situation of women were two such media of comparison. In comparing Abyssinian soldiers with the European ones, with regard to their courage, stability, strength and speed, Sadık el-Müeyyed found the former superior to the latter.⁵⁹⁹ He also compared European and Abyssinian women from the higher echelons of these societies and found the latter almost equal to the former. In describing a local chieftain’s wife, he wrote: “She has such a style, such courteous sentences and parables that make a person admired. The politest ladies of Europe could speak only as much as herself.”⁶⁰⁰

Dallara bir şekl-i hendesî vermişler... Tabiatı eğmişler, bükmüşler, bir vaziyet-i cebriyeye koymuşlar...” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 95.

⁵⁹⁷ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*sı, 136-137.

⁵⁹⁸ Abdülkadir Câmî, *Trablusgarp’tan Sahra-yı Kebîr’e Doğru*, 11.

⁵⁹⁹ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*sı, 372-373.

⁶⁰⁰ “Öyle bir seyak ve tarz-ı ifadeleri, öyle nazik cümle ve darb-ı meselleri vardır ki insanı hayran ediyor. Avrupa’nın en terbiyeli madamları o kadar söyleyebilir.” Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*sı, 390

In sum, one of the main concerns of the Ottoman travellers was to demonstrate that the North African territories were not much different from the European or other Ottoman territories. This was done not only for displaying that at least some parts of this region resembled to Europe unlike their alienation by the Europeans, but also to consolidate the Ottoman sense of familiarity to these regions by arguing that Africa shared some significant similarities with the Ottoman Empire irrespective of its physical or social differences.

9.2.3. “Urban Duality” in North African Cities: A Discussion of Modernity, Colonialism and Civilization

Another significant characteristics of the travelogues on the non-European world in general and North Africa in particular, is the “urban duality,”⁶⁰¹ in other words, the coexistence of modern European-style quarters with the old Arab/Islamic quarters in the urban space. This division of the urban space underlined the civilized/non-civilized, modern/non-modern, new/old dichotomies. For example, for the city of Tripoli, Abdülkadir Câmî underlined the contrast between the modern buildings established at the coastal areas of the city and the old buildings in the old city centre. While he utilized positive adjectives to describe the former, he pejoratively wrote about the old city:

The streets of new city outside of the walls are quite wide and the buildings are in good order. However the tumult and lack of homogeneity peculiar to the East demonstrate itself here as well. One can encounter *zerbe* established by the branches of date trees peculiar to the black people within a vacant plot next to an adorned building [...]⁶⁰²

⁶⁰¹ Indeed, the concept of “urban duality” is a recent coinage and is used to denote the social and economic, class-based differences in the urban space. In other words, it means the division of the city along quarters or regions resided by different groups having different socio-economic backgrounds. For the definition and a brief analysis of the concept of “urban duality,” see Chris Hamnett, “Social Segregation and Social Polarization,” in Ronan Paddison (ed.), *Handbook of Urban Studies*, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 162-176; for its application, for example, in Latin America, see Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, “Epilogue: Latin America’s Urban Duality Revisited,” in Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings (eds.), *Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America*, (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007), 138-141. In this dissertation, however, “urban duality” is used as a concept to denote the establishment of quarters in the urban space based on ethnic or religious divisions as well as the divisions created by colonial relationships between the colonizer and the colonized.

⁶⁰² “*Hâric-i surdaki belde-i cedîdenin caddeleri oldukça geniş ve ebniyesi muntazamdır. Ancak Şarka mahsûs kargaşalık ve adem-i tecânüs burada da hikmeti icra eder. Müzeyyen bir binanın*

Similarly, Cenap Şehabettin wrote that this coexistence disturbed the very identity of Alexandria:

Examined in whatever perspective, there is no particular characteristic of this city: One can encounter a mosque, a church, a synagogue, a Coptic monastery, or the temples of four or five communities. A large building on a new avenue is followed by an old house with bowed windows in a wide street. One street is narrow, dirty and dark; the street next to it is wide, clean, and adorned with gas lamps. There, an Egyptian sells vegetables, next to him a European deals with tailing; beyond, an Indian sells rarely-found relics, an Englishman has opened a pub, next to him there is the cabin of an Arab scribe [...]⁶⁰³

He further described the division between modern and non-modern quarters of Cairo with reference to the Mahmudiye Canal, which completely separated these two distinct urban spaces: “This bank, adorned and prosperous; the opposite bank, the real origin of the realm of Egypt, ruinous and inferior...”⁶⁰⁴

Cenap Şehabettin also argues that this dichotomy resulted in an ambivalent situation; for example, he defined Alexandria as a city ambivalently situated between the East and the West:

This place is neither West nor East, neither totally Europe, nor totally Africa... This place is a mixed and intermediate thing [between these two]. Its disharmony is ridiculous; however these colours and shapes are worth of looking at. The eyes never get tired from this looking, because the panorama continuously changes. Wandering around one thinks that he is playing a game [...]; because in every step he finds another situation, another life, another world.⁶⁰⁵

yanı başında boş bir arsada zencîlere mahsûs hurma dallarından ma'mul zerbelere [...] tesadüf olunur.” Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 12.

⁶⁰³ “Ne nazarla teftîş edilirse edilsin, bu şehrin bir tabiat-ı husûsiyesi yoktur: Aynı sokakta bir câmî-i şerîfe, bir kiliseye, bir sinagoga, bir Kıptî mâbedine... Dört beş milletin ibâdethânesine tesadüf olunabilir; bir büyük caddede pencereleri meşrebiyeli bir eski hâneyi bir bulvar binası takip edebilir; bir sokak dar, murdar, karanlık... yanındaki sokak geniş, temiz, havagazı fenerleriyle mücehhez. Şurada bir Mısırî sebzevat satıyor, yanında bir Avrupalı terzilik ediyor, ötede bir Hintli âsâr-ı nâdire satıyor, beride bir İngiliz bir birahâne açmış, onun yanında bir Arap barakası[...].” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 74.

⁶⁰⁴ “Bu sâhil bir zîb-ü servet, karşıki sâhil, küt'a-yi Mısıriyyenin mübde-i hakikîsi, harâb ve hakîr” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 82.

⁶⁰⁵ “Burası ne garb, ne şark, ne bütün bütün Avrupa, ne bütün bütün Afrika... Burası muhtelit, mutavassıt bir şey [...] Nisbetsizliği gülünç, fakat elvân ve eşkâli şayân-ı temâşâ; nazar bu temâşâlardan hiç yorulmuyor, çünkü dâima manzara başkalaşmakta. Buralarda dolaşırken insan kendisini [...] oynuyor zannediyor, zira her hatvede bir başka hal, bir başka hayât, bir başka cihân buluyor.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 75.

In sum, the presentation of European-style and Arab/Islamic quarters through the juxtaposition of new and old, brilliant and dull, wide and narrow, enlightened and dark, ordered and tumultuous, or clean and dirty serves for a more general comparison, namely the one between civilized and uncivilized. In other words, the European quarters were defined as samples of civilization while in the non-European quarters this quality was said to not exist at all.

The acceptance of such an account of Africa forced the Ottoman travellers to think about the reasons of this division and the underdevelopment of the Muslim space *vis-à-vis* the European colonial one. From the travelogues, three reasons could be discerned, related to (1) the characteristics of local people, (2) the Ottoman neglect of the region, and (3) the negative implications of colonial administration.

To start with, Ottoman travellers argued that one of the reasons for this perceived backwardness was some characteristics of the local people. This argument paved the way for the reproduction of several accounts very close to the Orientalist discourse. To begin with, idleness was one such characteristic. From the perspective of the Ottoman travellers, local people did not demand much from life; they were content with their simple lives. Therefore, they did not work hard enough to reach the avails of civilization. For example, Cenap Şehabettin wrote about the local inhabitants of Egypt as such:

[H]ere life and death are perceived as a kind of sleep and awakening reiterating daily; all the events of life are perceived as a deceptive dream... It is not for the sons of Egypt to live behind the strong and fortified Great Wall of China [...] Their nature wants to run in front of the winds of desire until getting tired and then to listen to the looseness and idleness of life in a neat and temporary tent.⁶⁰⁶

To put it differently, unlike the Europeans who were continuously striving for living under better conditions, the Egyptians preferred to obey the call of their desire instead of working hard for their future. What is more, in their

⁶⁰⁶ “Burada hayât ve memât her gün tekrar eden bir nev’i nevm-i yakaza gibi itibâr olunmuş; bütûn şuûn-u hayâtiyeye bir rûya-yı mağfel gibi bakılıyor [...M]etîn ve müstahkem bir sedd-i Çinî içinde yaşamak evlâd-ı Mısriye’nin kârı değil; onların mizâcî båd-ı hevesât önünde yoruluncaya kadar koşmak, sonra hafif ve zarif bir hayme-i muvakkate içinde kessân-ı hayâtı dinlemek istiyor.” Cenap Şehabettin, *Hac Yolunda*, 116-117.

lives, nothing was permanent; rather they preferred to live in temporary and loose frameworks. Besides the lack of diligence, the travellers accused the local people of being ignorant of how to benefit from the soil as well. According to Sadık el-Müeyyed, although the soil of Benghazi (in the Province of Tripolitania) was extremely fertile, the laziness of the local people and their lack of agricultural knowledge resulted in their underuse of the potential of their lands:

The agricultural productivity is one to one hundred and ten, one to one hundred and twenty in rainy season, despite the overabundance of laziness and lack of talent of the local inhabitants, who are perhaps, as mentioned before, the most awkward of all peoples of the world in terms of agriculture, and despite the lack and insufficiency of the agricultural tools and implements that they use.⁶⁰⁷

The indifference to life, laziness and ignorance were the intrinsic reasons attributed to the backwardness of local communities; however, according to the Ottoman travellers, the real reasons for underdevelopment were to be sought elsewhere. One of the explanations was the long Ottoman neglect of the region. Ottoman travellers, either indirectly or directly, accused the Ottoman central administration of not dealing with these regions properly. As early as the 1860s, Ebubekir Efendi criticized the Ottoman government for not being interested in the remote regions of Africa, although transportation had been quite developed in recent times. He pointed at the fact that Islam was spread in many parts of this continent and added that the desire of the African Muslim communities to establish contact with the Ottomans and their allegiance to the Caliph was very strong. Therefore, he argued, the establishment of friendly contact would be beneficial for both sides.⁶⁰⁸

The travelogues of the post-Hamidian Era also condemned the Ottoman neglect of their own territories in North Africa. The reason for this critique was not that these regions had really been neglected by the Hamidian administration;

⁶⁰⁷ “Ziraat kabiliyeti ise – evvelce de beyân olunduğu üzere – emr-i ziraatte akvâm-ı cihânın belki en beceriksizi olan sekene-i mahalliyenin fart-ı atâlet ve fikdân-ı mahâreti, kullandıkları âlât ve edevât-ı zer’iyyenin noksan ve adem-i kifâyeti ile beraber yine rahmetlerin bereketli olduğu zamanlarda bire yüz on, yüz yirmi vermek derecesindedir.” Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebîri’nde Seyahat*, 29-30.

⁶⁰⁸ Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtâmâmesi*, the edition of Hüseyin Yorulmaz, 90-91.

it was the anti-Hamidian stance of the travellers that directed them to criticize the former repressive regime. In other words, the argument for the neglect of Africa was not put forward to underline African backwardness; rather it was used as an opportunity to attack the Hamidian regime. For example, Abdülkadir Câmî argued that Tripolitania had gained notoriety in the eyes of the Ottomans because of the Hamidian regime's transformation of the province to an exile post for those convicted for their political views. He lamented that "Tripoli had a meaning for those living in İstanbul as horrible as the frightful and gloomy prison cells in the ground floors of inquisition dungeons and old castles of middle age princedoms."⁶⁰⁹ He also drew attention to the Ottoman failure to benefit from the riches of the region. For example, a particular herb called *halfe* had once been one of the most significant export items of the province. However, the central government's disregard for the proper cultivation of this source of wealth shattered the provincial economy to a great extent.⁶¹⁰ Unlike Abdülkadir Câmî, Halil Halid's criticism did not only focus on the Hamidian policies but also referred to a general neglect. He argued that instead of wasting human and financial resources for military conquests in Europe, the Ottomans should have allocated them for North Africa, which was populated by Muslims.⁶¹¹

Ahmed Şerif tried to help his readers visualize the Ottoman neglect of Africa by comparing the two sides of the Ottoman-Tunisian border. On the Tunisian side, one was to find paved roads, telegraph and telephone lines, and other traces of civilized life frequently. The fields were properly cultivated, even

⁶⁰⁹ "İstanbulularımız için birçok zamanlardan beri, kurûn-u vustâ prensliklerinin eski şatolarında, engizisyon mahbeslerinin zemin katlarındaki muhavvif ve muzellem zindan hücreleri kadar korkunç bir mânâ ifâde eden Trablus [...]", Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 4.

⁶¹⁰ "[...] hükümetin bu menbâ-i servetin muhâfazası husûsunda göstermiş olduğu lakaydî [...], Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 31. What is more, according to Abdülkâdir Câmî, the government could not even prevent the destructiveness of goat herds towards the olive trees which had been implanted by the Romans. In other words, he accused the government of even not preserving the heritage inherited from the Roman period. Abdülkâdir Câmî, *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebîr'e Doğru*, 32.

⁶¹¹ "Keşke eski Türkler o yorulmak bilmeyen kuvve-i cihâdiyelerini Avrupa içlerine ilerlemeye hasretmeyip de anâsır-ı İslam ile memlû Afrika-yı şimâlinin bu cihetlerine tahsis eyleselerdi." Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 71.

the soil was more fertile. On the other hand, the Ottoman side of the border could not display any such indications of civilization. The reason for this destitution was the previous Ottoman governments' disinterest in these parts of the Empire.⁶¹²

If the Ottoman Empire was one of the actors to be blamed for the backwardness of the North African territories in Ottoman travelogues, a more sinister actor was the imperialist Great Powers, particularly France. Unlike the civilizing effect of the British colonial administration, French colonial policy was regarded as the main reason for the backwardness of the region, particularly in the places that had once belonged to the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹³ The travellers especially underlined the very existence of the duality between the colonizer and the colonized. For instance, Süleyman Şükrü focused on the visual representations of the colonial administration through statues. In describing a French statue in Tunisia, he compared the representation of a French boy dressed in European style with a Tunisian boy dressed in traditional costume. He argued that the Tunisian boy was in an “insulting condition” both in terms of his appearance and because the French boy was depicted as teaching the French language to him. In other words, the French *mission civilisatrice* was clearly

⁶¹² Ahmed Şerif, *Arnavudluk'ta, Suriye'de, Trablusgarb'de Tanîn*, 257.

⁶¹³ Indeed, the initial travelogues to Africa, particularly the ones written on South Africa did not strongly criticize colonialism, particularly the British version; since their authors found British colonial administration useful for bringing civilization in this region. For example, in one of his letters Ebubekir Efendi wrote that the Muslims living in Capetown were loyal to the British, and they hated the Dutch because of their religious intolerance during their colonial rule before the British. What is more, the Muslims felt themselves as favoured by the British compared to the other nomadic or settled local communities of the region; this was another factor that resulted in Muslim loyalty to the British. Ebubekir Efendi even defended British colonial administration in Mozambique as a source of civilization. He appreciated the British for establishing many towns and cities and for having the local people raised cotton, sugar cane and other products; he perceived that the British tried to guide the local inhabitants of the region to civilization. However, despite these efforts the local people were so ignorant that they were not eager to learn civilization. See Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtname'si*, the edition of Hüseyin Yorulmaz, 85, 96. Similarly Mühendis Faik perceived British investments to Capetown as a contribution to the civilization of this region. He wrote that after the establishment of British control, the British spent a lot of money to develop the region and currently, the Capetown “is improved and developed as the European countries” (*Avrupa memleketleri gibi mâmur ve abâdan*). Ömer Lütfî, *Ümitburnu Seyahâtname'si*, the edition of Hüseyin Yorulmaz, 96.

carved in stone in order to demonstrate to the Muslims that the French were in Tunisia for nothing but to “civilize” them.⁶¹⁴

Halil Halid and Süleyman Şükrü bitterly criticized French colonial policies, particularly the religious intolerance of the French towards the Muslims despite their self-acclaimed laicism.⁶¹⁵ Both of them disapproved the French prohibition of reciting of the Caliph/Sultan’s name during the speeches of Friday prayers and the implementation of this prohibition by employing French soldiers in the mosques during the prayers.⁶¹⁶ What is more, for Halil Halid, the imposition of the French lifestyle in Algeria resulted in the moral decadence of the Islamic community; he wrote that the “freedom brought by French civilization undermined Islamic morality.”⁶¹⁷

In addition to religious intolerance and imposition of a “morally decadent” lifestyle, the segregation between the French settlers and the local Muslim community was strongly criticized. Süleyman Şükrü witnessed that the French were not treating the local inhabitants as equals; they did not even perceive them as human beings: “The nations that have fallen under their rule are [perceived as] nothing, regardless of the ethnic group or religious sect they belong [...] They do not perceive the ones other than their own race as human beings and they do not respect them at all.”⁶¹⁸

Ottoman travellers also criticized the French policy of appointing Frenchmen only to critical governmental posts. Both Süleyman Şükrü and Halil Halid criticized this policy of segregation by arguing that the Muslim community

⁶¹⁴ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 206-207.

⁶¹⁵ “[...]N]asaranın en mutaassıbı Katolik Fransızlar sözde terk ve tahkîr ettikleri dinlerinin mâhud taassubunu bir türlü bırakmadıklarından [...]”Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 207.

⁶¹⁶ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 279; Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 36-48.

⁶¹⁷ “[...] Fransız medeniyetinin getirdiği serbestî ahlâk-ı İslâmiyeyi kökünden sarsınca [...]”,Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 24.

⁶¹⁸ “*Taht-ı hükümetlerine düşen akvâm hangi cins ve mezhebe tâbî olur ise olsun, indlerinde hiçtir [...] Kendi ırklarından gayrısını insandan add ve zerre kadar itibâr etmiyorlar.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 262.

was not inferior compared to the Frenchmen; some of them were even considered superior to the officials of French origin. In criticizing the appointment of a French director to the *madrasah* of Algiers, Halil Halid wrote:

[...] The Frenchmen usurp all kinds of occupations from our hands and they even go further to perceive us as naturally impotent with regard to our capacity for governance [...] There was no quality of these Frenchmen superior to the Muslims. On the contrary, we know some intelligent people from the Muslim community who are not inferior to the Frenchmen in terms of knowledge and performance; they are even superior to them in terms of moral strength and required humanitarian characteristics. However, they are not perceived as eligible to have a proper job in their own country.⁶¹⁹

Likewise, according to Süleyman Şükrü, the Frenchmen had occupied all the critical governmental posts, all the companies, all the fertile lands of Algeria and deprived the local people of any kind of opportunity. Indeed, there were some local inhabitants of Algeria who could speak French even better than the Frenchmen; however, they were only employed as translators or Arabic language clerks with extremely low wages.⁶²⁰ What is more, this discrimination was not only imposed on the Muslims but also against the local Christians.⁶²¹

All in all, the critique of colonial administration, in general, and of unequal treatment of the colonized people by the colonizers, in particular, is one of the most significant themes in the Ottoman travelogues written about North Africa. The backwardness of the North African communities was not solely considered as an outcome of their internal problems, but also of the colonial administration. Notwithstanding the appreciation for the material development of the region as a result of colonial rule, the Ottoman travellers generally criticized the *mission civilisatrice* for being extremely destructive for the local people.

⁶¹⁹ “[...] *Frenkler her işimizi elimizden alıyorlar ve bizi idâre-i umûra salâhiyetten tab'en aciz telakîi etmeye kadar varıyorlar* [...] *Bu Frenklerin Müslümanlara pek de bâis-i tefevvuk bir sıfatları görülemez. Kezalik müslümandan bir hayli ashâb-ı zekâ biliriz ki malûmat ve mesaî cihetiyle o Frenklerden hiç de aşağı olmadıkları ve belki metânet-i ahlâk ve lâzûme-yi havass-ı insaniyetkârınca onlara müteveffik buldukları halde kendi memleketlerinde bir baltaya sap olmaya layık görülmemişlerdir.*” Halil Halid, *Cezayir Hatıratından*, 49-50.

⁶²⁰ “*İslamlar Fransızcayı Fransızlardan daha ala tekellüm ve kitabet edebiliyorlar.*” Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 279.

⁶²¹ Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 262.

9.2.4. The Taxonomy of Local People and Their Characteristics

In addition to themes such as the representation of the local Muslims' allegiance to the Caliph, the segregation of urban space, and the reasons for backwardness of the African people, the Ottoman travellers also paid attention to the taxonomy of the local people based on several criteria. This effort seems to be paradoxical since some of the Ottoman travellers criticized the European stereotyping and monolithic perception of the African people as well as colonial discrimination between the white colonial settlers and other races of the continent. However, still, there were significant differences between the European and Ottoman taxonomies.

First of all, the Ottoman travellers did not perceive the African people simply as black people. In the Ottoman writings about the ethnic taxonomy of the African peoples, the ethnic blending of the local people differentiating them from each other was one of the most referenced issues. In making such references, the Ottoman travellers established several racial hierarchies. For example, Sadık el-Müeyyed classified the local inhabitants of Abyssinia under several categories. Although there is no clear indication, it could be inferred that he established a loose hierarchy among these local people in which "Arabian-looking" Abyssinians were at the top. They were followed by the "Sudanese-looking" Abyssinians, the Galla people, and the Hamitic tribes, respectively. In other words, the Semitic ethnic groups were perceived as superior compared to the Hamitic ones.⁶²²

Mehmed Mihri's categorization of the peoples of Egypt was different. First of all, he distinguished between the Arabs and *fellahs*. This distinction seemed to be based on their life styles and occupations first and foremost. The Arabs were living in larger cities and dealing mainly with trade and industrial production, while *fellahs* were living in small villages and towns and growing local crops. However, later in his writings, other criteria, such as language, religion, and even, to a lesser extent, purity of blood, were added.⁶²³ On the other

⁶²² Sadık El-Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahâtname*, 330-31.

⁶²³ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 37.

hand, Mehmed Mihri thought that although *fellahs* were different from Arabs in terms of ethnicity, they became Arabized through the change of language and religion. In other words, for him, the real criterion for taxonomy was not simply blood; religion and language were even more important than that.

Regarding the Copts of Egypt, Mehmed Mihri mentioned how they preserved their own language and used it in their churches and schools. He wrote that there was no difference between the *fellahs* and the Copts in terms of appearance and customs, and the Copts resembled the figures on wall paintings and statues of ancient Egypt. These people were mainly dealing with art, printing and currency exchange.⁶²⁴ As it can be inferred from these explanations, occupation once again turned out to be a criterion for classification. Mehmed Mihri's perception of the *Berberî* tribe of Aswan also reflected the focus on ethnic blending as well as occupations. The *Berberî* tribe was described as the offspring of a mixture of the Arabian invaders of Egypt, the Sudanese and the remainders of the Ottoman army left behind after the Egyptian campaign of 1517. He wrote that this community was very much trusted by the Egyptians; hence, they were utilized in the aristocratic circles as cooks, cellar-keepers and servants.⁶²⁵

Unlike the description of Egyptian or *Berberî* communities, Mehmed Mihri's taxonomy of the inhabitants of Sudan was very much influenced by the European anthropological classifications of the nineteenth century. He explicitly noted that he informed the readers through the accounts of the European anthropologists (*ulema-yı tabiiyyûn*). Accordingly, he classified the Sudanese tribes in terms of their physiognomy, and, more importantly, in terms of their inclination to civilization. For example, the black people of Sudan were the most inferior community in his eyes since they were ignorant of science and civilization.⁶²⁶ What is more, he argued that these indigenous black people were

⁶²⁴ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 39.

⁶²⁵ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 119.

⁶²⁶ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname*, 240.

very ugly and their physical appearances could only become more comely when they mixed with *Berberî* or Arab tribes.⁶²⁷ In other words, physiognomic inferiority was compounded with ignorance. However, the author did not relate these two in a casual way; the former could be eliminated through ethnic blending and the latter through education.⁶²⁸

Physiognomy was a significant criterion for the classification of local people in the writings of Abdülkadir Câmî as well. In describing inter-tribal clashes in the Saharan Desert, he portrayed the local tribes with regard to their physiognomic characteristics:

When the white but dark-skinned, hawk-nosed, black eyed Arab bedouin encounters a long and slim, bright looking and black Tibu, whose long face, however, demonstrated that he belonged to the white race in Hamedeh, a lightening flashes in the eyes of both and only the rifles of the military headquarters in the vicinity prevents them to jump down each other's throats.⁶²⁹

Moreover, just as other travellers, Câmî Bey focused on ethnic blending when describing the inhabitants of Fezzan:

The inhabitants of Fezzan are most inclined to the black race. Although this The inhabitants of Fezzan are the closest to the black race. Although this resemblance seemed to be the natural result of the periods of governance of the black people from the Kanem and Borno tribes, which had occupied Fezzan one after another, it is certain that the marriage [of the inhabitants of Fezzan] with the black people brought from Sudan has a significant impact on this resemblance. Therefore, today all the inhabitants of Fezzan are so mixed that one can encounter all shades and scales of colours from all white to dark black.⁶³⁰

⁶²⁷ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname'si*, 318.

⁶²⁸ Mehmed Mihri described the Arabs quite positively; they were more "preferable and superior" (*müreccah ve efdal*) compared to other African tribes in terms of "civilized practices and issues and other kinds of progress" (*umur ve esbab-ı medeniye ve terakkiyat-ı saire*) as well as in terms of their nature, intelligence and cleverness." Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahâtname'si*, 256.

⁶²⁹ "Beyaz ve fakat esmer, ekserisi minkari-ül haşem, siyah gözlü bir Arab bedevi'siyle, uzun boylu, ince, siyah renkli ve fakat hutut-u vechesi ırk-ı ebyazdan olduğunu gösteren parlak nazarlı mağrur bir Tibu Hamide'de yekdiğerine tesadiuf ettikleri zaman her iki tarafın da gözlerinden bir şule-i berkiye çakar ve ancak civardaki asker karakolumun tüfenkleri tarafeynin yekdiğerinin boğazlarına sarılmasına mani olur." *Trablusgarp'ten Sahra-yı Kebir'e Doğru*, 130.

⁶³⁰ "Fizanlılarda en ziyade ırk-ı esvede temayül vardır. Bu temayül yekdiğerini müteakip Fizanı işgal etmiş olan Kanem ve Bornu akvam-ı zencisinin icra-yı hükümet ettikleri zamanların netice-i tabiisi gibi görünürse de Sudan'dan getirilen zencilerle izdivacın da bu hususta icra-yı tesir ettiği muhakkaktır. Bu suretle bugün umum Fizan seknesi o derece karışık bir unsur teşkil

The Ottoman travellers' emphasis on physiognomy, ethnic blending and hierarchical taxonomy of African tribes reveal that the Ottomans were not immune from the discussion of race as can be observed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century European colonial literature. Indeed, in this period, the European literature on the Orient was influenced from Social Evolutionism and Social Darwinism, which linked the concept of civilization to the concept of race. Particularly in the writings of French philosopher Arthur de Gobineau and British anthropologist Herbert Spencer, the word civilization was transformed from an inclusive concept embracing all of the humanity to one based on a fundamental separation of peoples based on their blood.⁶³¹ Therefore, most of the Orientalist literary production on Africa is replete with expressions underlining the racial inequality and taxonomy of African tribes as well as linking the lack of civilization in this part of the world to the intrinsic characteristics of the African people.⁶³² Not only European intellectuals and authors, but also the Ottoman travellers were likely influenced from the Social Evolutionist and Social Darwinist discourse through the translations of the seminal works of these theories into Turkish.⁶³³ Therefore, the Ottoman travellers' critique of some of the characteristics of local people for their backwardness and their taxonomy of these people along physiognomic lines resemble the Orientalist anthropological discourses developed in Europe. However, even in the presentation of African people along racial lines, there are significant differences between the Ottoman

ederler ki bunlarda tam beyaz renkten koyu siyaha kadar bütüin tabakat ve derecat-ı elvana tesadüf olunur.” Abdülkâdir Câmî, Trablusgarp’ten Sahra-yı Kebir’e Doğru, 116.

⁶³¹ Arthur de Gobineau’s *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* and Herbert Spencer’s *Principles of Biology* were the two seminal works emphasizing the inequality among races, the superiority of the white race and the “survival of the fittest.” See, Reeves, *Culture and International Relations* 25.

⁶³² For such pieces of the European literature, see, for instance, Henry Ridder Haggard’s *King Solomon’s Mines*, Joseph Conrad’s *The Heart of Darkness*, Rudyard Kipling’s *The White Man’s Burden*, or Charles Baudlaire’s *A une Malabaraise*. For a review of the English colonial literature, see E. Boehmer (ed.), *Empire Writing: An Anthology of Colonial Literature, 1870-1918*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); for an analysis of French Orientalist fiction, see J. Yee, *Exotic Subversions in the Nineteenth Century French Fiction*, (London: Legenda, 2008).

⁶³³ For instance, Ludwig Büchner’s *Natur und Geist*, Edmond Demolins’ *A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?*, and Gustave Le Bon’s *Les Lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples* were translated into Turkish from the late 1880s onwards. For the influence of these translations on the Ottoman intellectuals, see Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*.

and European accounts. To start with, for the Ottoman travellers, the reasons for the backwardness of the African people are not solely confined to their intrinsic characteristics; the Ottoman neglect of the region and European colonialism are cited as more significant reasons. In other words, the emphasis is on external reasons, instead of intrinsic ones, unlike the European Orientalist literature. Secondly, in terms of racial taxonomy, what the Ottoman travellers did is not to establish their own accounts, but to reflect upon what had been written by the European anthropologists. In other words, the Ottoman travellers' hierarchical representation of the local people does not emerge out of their own scientific expeditions or research unlike the Europeans. Even their prioritization of the Arabic-looking people over the others showed that their criterion for civilization is also religious, not simply racial.

To conclude, the examination of Ottoman travellers' perception of Africa and African people is important because this analysis reveals the Ottoman understanding of the concepts of civilization, colonialism and race. In a volatile period when most of the African territories of the empire were lost as a result of European colonial expansion and the remaining territories were under similar threat, Islam and Ottomanness were the two pillars that the Ottoman travellers extensively emphasized in their travelogues. The travellers' efforts for underlining the allegiance of local Muslims to the Caliph/Sultan or to the fatherland demonstrate that they considered some parts of Africa within the political/religious realm in which they also belonged. Therefore, these travellers did not consider the African lands as territories for colonization or exploitation as most of the Europeans had perceived. Instead, they represented the remaining African territories of the empire as indispensable parts of the Ottoman fatherland, and considered other regions of the African continent, where the Muslims resided, under the religious authority of the Caliph.

Notwithstanding these efforts for establishing a sense of shared identity, the Ottoman travellers also differentiated themselves from the African people by sometimes treating them as objects of study. The taxonomy of African tribes based on several criteria, including ethnicity, physiognomy, religion, and

occupation, and establishment of several hierarchies among themselves reflected the limits of the Ottoman travellers' attempts for emphasizing the commonality between the Ottomans and the African people.

The perception of colonialism was another paradoxical theme in the Ottoman travelogues on Africa. On the one hand, the Ottoman travellers' appreciated the colonial administrations' investment on infrastructure, establishment of modern urban centres or betterment of sanitation and education facilities. On the other hand, they bitterly criticized the colonial mentality based on the superiority of Western/Christian/white colonizers over the colonized. Being aware of the colonial discourse aiming to rationalize and justify European colonial penetration by focusing on the lack of "civilization" in Africa, the Ottoman travellers attempted to develop an alternative discourse by emphasizing the essentiality of modernization and adoption of material elements of European civilization for being strong enough to contain the threat of European colonialism.

The need to adopt some elements of European civilization to prevent European infiltration into the Ottoman realm was a paradox that the Ottoman travellers reflected in their travelogues. They could not deny the necessity of modernization; benefitting from the avails of civilization required the transfer of European material development into the "underdeveloped" regions of the world, such as Africa. However, at the same time, they were aware that it was the European colonial expansion concealed in the form of the civilizing mission that resulted in the backwardness of Africa more than anything else. This dual perception of "civilization," a better stage of human development on the one hand and a catchy word cloaking European colonial intentions over the rest of the world on the other, permeated into the Ottoman travelogues on Africa and thereby produced a paradoxical-yet-colourful account of this continent.

CHAPTER 10

THE OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

10.1. Ottoman Empire in the Middle East⁶³⁴

10.1.1. The Ottoman Rule in the Middle East until the Nineteenth Century:

The Ottoman control of the Middle East started in the early sixteenth century, with the Ottoman victory over the Mamluks in the Battles of Marj dabik (1516) and Ridaniyah (1517). After the incorporation of Mamluk territories to the Ottoman Empire,⁶³⁵ the former administrative divisions of the Mamluk Empire were very much preserved in the form of *eyalet* system. On these territories, initially four *eyalets* were formed, being the *Eyalet* of Aleppo, *Eyalet* of Damascus, *Eyalet* of Hejaz and *Eyalet* of Yemen.⁶³⁶ Although a more centralized administration was established in the Syrian territories of the Empire, the Arabian Peninsula was linked to the centre more loosely. Because of its special status for the presence of the two sacred Muslim cities, Mecca and

⁶³⁴ For the purposes of this dissertation, the Middle East includes three principle regions, being the Fertile Crescent, contemporary Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. Although Egypt is also perceived as an indispensable part of the Middle East, it is not included in this chapter in order to provide thematic integrity, since Egypt had been visited by Ottoman travellers not passing through the Middle East, but passing through North Africa. In other words, the travellers included the account of Egypt in their travelogues on North Africa; therefore, it is thought more appropriate to include Egypt into the previous chapter.

⁶³⁵ Besides Egypt, these territories included the Fertile Crescent (or *Bilâd al-Sham*, including contemporary Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan), Hejaz and Yemen.

⁶³⁶ Until the late seventeenth century, several administrative modifications were made in the composition of these *eyalets* for the special conditions of some regions. Particularly, it became extremely difficult to rule vast territories of the *Eyalet* of Damascus for the presence of too many ethnic communities living under regions difficult to reach and control; hence three new *eyalets* were established on its territories being Tripoli (1570) over the northern coastal strip of the Fertile Crescent, Raqqa (1586) over the south-eastern Anatolia, and finally Sidon (1660) over the southern coastal strip of the Fertile Crescent. See Philip Khoury Hitti, *History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine*, 2 Volumes, (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2002), Vol. 2, 664.

Medina, and because it was conquered peacefully through the recognition of the Ottoman sovereignty by the Amir of Mecca, Hejaz was initially remained under the administration of the Amir, who was given the status of vizier in the Ottoman protocol.⁶³⁷ In Yemen, although Ottoman direct rule was established from 1517 onwards, the Ottomans could never control the entire country because of the resistance of Zaydi Imams, the hereditary rulers of this region. They were initially successful in suppressing the Zaydi resistance; however, later on, the Zaydis took control of the interior parts of the country and the Ottomans were just stuck the coastal strip until the nineteenth century.⁶³⁸ Unlike the rapid and decisive conquest of Mamluk territories, Ottoman conquest of Iraq from the local rulers allegiant to the Safavid Empire and the establishment of Ottoman *eyalet* system in this region took almost four decades. The conquest of Mosul in 1516 was followed by the conquest of Baghdad and the peaceful transfer of Basra in 1534.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁷ Even, as a result of the Ottoman respect to Hejaz, Ottoman flag was not hung over the bastions of these two cities. Zekeriya Kurşun, "Osmanlı Devleti İdaresinde Hicaz (1517-1919)," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 316-325, 316. In the late sixteenth century, the *Eyalet* of Jeddah was established to control the Amirs, who sometimes abused the autonomy granted by the Empire. Therefore an administrative triptych was established in Hejaz by the Amir of Mecca as the local authority, who had legitimized his existence through his lineage descending from the Prophet, the *Beylerbey* of Jeddah, who represented the Sultan in the region, and the *Sheikh-ul Harem* of Mecca, who was particularly responsible for the administration of the holy places. Kurşun, "Osmanlı Devleti İdaresinde Hicaz (1517-1919)," 317.

⁶³⁸ For the establishment and collapse of the Ottoman rule in Yemen in the sixteenth century, see J. Richard Blackburn, "The Collapse of Ottoman Authority in Yemen, 968/1560-976/1568," *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 19, No. 1-4 (1979): 119-176.

⁶³⁹ Until the late sixteenth century, Mosul was first attached to the *Eyalet* of Diyarbakır, then to the *Eyalet* of Baghdad; however, because of its strategic significance as a crossroad between the Persian Gulf and Anatolia as well as between Syria and Iran, and as a granary of the Ottoman armies engaging in campaigns towards the Safavids, the *Eyalet* status was given in 1587. Ahmet Gündüz, "Musul: Osmanlılar Dönemi" *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 31, 363-367, 363. For the conquest of Mosul, also see Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 116-117. The *Eyalet* of Baghdad was established in 1535 just after its conquest; it was given the fifth place in the Ottoman protocol of *eyalets* after Rumelia, Anatolia, Egypt and Buda. See Yılmaz Öztuna, *Devletler ve Hanedanlar*, 6 Volumes, (Ankara: T. C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2005), Vol. 2, 1092. For the conquest of Baghdad, also see, Fattah and Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, 117-120. Since the former ruler of Basra, Rashid ibn Mughamis, recognized the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire after the conquest of Basra, he was first remained in power; the establishment of direct rule in Basra was only realized in 1545. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Basra: Osmanlılar Dönemi" *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 5, 112-114, 112. For the conquest of Basra, also see, Fattah and Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, 120-124. Finally the *Eyalet* of Shehrzör (including the contemporary

After the conquest of Iraq and establishment of a foothold in the Persian Gulf, in order to retain the Ottoman presence in the Gulf and to compete with the increasing Portuguese incursions into the region, the Ottomans decided to occupy the eastern littoral of the Arabian Peninsula. Between 1552 and 1555, they conquered this region entitled al-Hasa and established the *Eyalet* of al-Hasa in 1579. From then on, they tried to control the small sheikhdoms of Bahrain and Qatar. These sheikhdoms sometimes recognized the Ottoman sovereignty and sometimes resisted it via the Portuguese support during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁶⁴⁰

All in all, until the late sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire consolidated its rule in the Middle East and established its administrative divisions there. However, there were different modes of governance over these vast territories from the late sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Aleppo and Damascus as well as the four *eyalets* of Iraq were generally ruled by the governors sent by the Porte until the early eighteenth century. In general, the Syrian *Eyalets* were living peacefully during these years; however, the Iraqi *Eyalets* were under Safavid pressure as well as the attacks of the nomadic tribes to the cities. These disturbances resulted in the relative backwardness of Iraqi *Eyalets vis-à-vis* the Syrian ones.⁶⁴¹ Unlike these centrally governed regions, the control of the mountainous regions of Lebanon (*Cebel-i Lübnan*), which was primarily inhabited by the Druzes and a Christian Arab community called the Maronites, was given to the local Druze dynasties.⁶⁴² The Druzes established

Kirkuk and its environs) was established as a frontier post against Iran in 1549. See André Raymond, "Ottoman Legacy in Arab Political Boundaries," in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 115-128, 122.

⁶⁴⁰ For the establishment of the *Eyalet* of al-Hasa, see Jon E. Mandaville, "The Ottoman Province of al-Hasā in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 90, No. 3 (July - Sep., 1970): 486-513.

⁶⁴¹ Fattah and Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, pp. 126-127.

⁶⁴² These dynasties were the Ma'n dynasty, which ruled the region between 1516 and 1697, and Shihab dynasty between 1697 and 1841. Philip Houry Hitti, *Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present*, (London: Macmillan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 371, 387.

almost an independent rule; they sometimes remained allegiant to the Empire by sending their taxes properly, and other times resisted against the Ottoman administration.

The presence of the third holy site of Islam, namely Jerusalem, and the strategic significance as a crossroad between Syria and Egypt as well as a centre for the protection of pilgrimage routes, made Palestine a significant region for the Ottoman Empire. During the sixteenth century, Palestine was totally part of the *Eyalet* of Damascus and divided into five *sanjaks*, some of which were governed by local rulers and others by centrally appointed governors.⁶⁴³

During the seventeenth century, the Ottoman administration in Hejaz faced the problem of the struggle for power between the Amirs of Mecca and the Ottoman *beylerbeys* of Jeddah. Whenever incapable *beylerbeys* were sent by the Porte, the Amirs began to increase their authority *vis-à-vis* the central administration. This was generally acquiesced by the Porte if the Amirs were able to control the nomadic tribes, which might pose a problem to the settlements in this region.⁶⁴⁴ In Yemen and al-Hasa, Ottoman administrators had to collaborate with the local tribes and sheikhdoms to maintain the Ottoman presence in the region at least nominally.⁶⁴⁵ Unlike the seventeenth century, in which Ottoman central administration was still significant despite some challenges, the eighteenth century was an age of decentralization. Almost all the Middle Eastern provinces were either ruled by local notables, whose members were recognized as governors, or by some governors appointed by the Porte, but

⁶⁴³ These *sanjaks* were Gazza, Jerusalem, Nablus, Lajjun and Safed. Among them, Nablus and Lajjun were ruled by local rulers (Mansur ibn Furaiqh and Turabai tribe respectively) to reward their allegiance to the Empire during the Ottoman campaign over the Mamluks; others were ruled by the governors sent directly by the Porte. See Moshe Sharon, "Palestine under the Mameluks and the Ottoman Empire (1291-1918)," in Michael Avi-Yonah (ed.), *A History of Israel and the Holy Land*, (New York and London: Continuum, 2003), 272-322, 286-294.

⁶⁴⁴ Mustafa Sabri Küçükbaşçı, "Mekke: Osmanlı Dönemi," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 28, 563-572, 563.

⁶⁴⁵ In Yemen, there was not much disturbance during the seventeenth century; the status quo was preserved. However, in al-Hasa, the Ottomans had to encounter both the Portuguese threat and, more important than that, the rebellion of the Beni Khalid tribe; therefore, the Ottoman rule in the Eastern Arabia was very much challenged in this period. See Mandaville, "The Ottoman Province of al-Hasā in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 501.

acted almost independently. The Ottoman military as well as economic decline was the reason for this delegation of local authority.⁶⁴⁶

In sum, unlike Anatolia or Rumelia, the Ottomans were not strongly present in the Middle East; they preferred the establishment of the system of indirect taxation (*saliyane*) from the beginning and to govern the region via intermediary local notables. As Philip Hitti writes, “Turks came and went as officials, but there was no Turkish colonization of the land.”⁶⁴⁷

Meanwhile, during the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Middle East faced three significant external threats, contributed to the loosening of Ottoman presence in the region. The first one was from the East, namely from Qajar Persia. Accordingly, the ambitious Qajar ruler, Nader Shah attacked Ottoman Iraq two times (in 1733 and 1746) in the first half of the eighteenth century. Although, the cities of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra resisted these attacks, the environs of these centres were very much ruined.⁶⁴⁸ The second threat was from the South; namely from the Wahhabi movement of Arabia. After the alliance of anti-Ottoman al-Saud family of Najd with this movement in 1744, the Ottoman

⁶⁴⁶ Damascus was ruled by al-Azm family from 1724 until 1807 with some intervals; the members of same family were also appointed as governors of Sidon and Tripoli as well. See Philip Khoury Hitti, *History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present*, (London: Macmillan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 731. Two years later, the administration of Mosul was delivered to Jalili family, who would rule the region until 1834. Fattah and Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, 132-134. In Baghdad, the administration of the descendants of the freed Georgian/Caucasian slaves of the two *Beylerbeys*, Hasan and his son Ahmet Paşa, who ruled Baghdad between 1702 and 1747, lasted until 1831. This period was called as the Mamluk rule in Baghdad, reminding the freed Caucasian slaves ruling Egypt from the thirteenth until the sixteenth centuries. Fattah and Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, 128-129. In Lebanon, the Shihab dynasty continued their autonomy until 1841; however, during the eighteenth century, two significant rivals contested their rule. These were the two governors of Acre, Zahir al-Umar al-Zardani (c. 1690-1775) and Jazzar Ahmed Paşa (1720-1804), who had extended their rule over almost the entire Palestine. These governors came to their posts by force and then recognized by the Porte. See Gudrun Kramer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*, translated by Graham Harman and Gudrun Kramer, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 61. For a detailed account of Palestine under these two governors also see Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eigtheenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration*, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973).

⁶⁴⁷ Hitti, *History of Syria*, 671. For the mediation of the local notables see, Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, 11-12.

⁶⁴⁸ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, “Bağdat: Osmanlı Dönemi” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 4, 433-437, 435.

presence in Hejaz was very much threatened. The Wahhabi rebellion, which reached its zenith in the first decade of the nineteenth century could only be suppressed in 1818 and devastated the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as well as other cities of Hejaz like Taif and Jeddah.⁶⁴⁹ The final threat came from the West in 1798, when Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt and expanded northward into Palestine. There, he was stopped by the Governor of Acre, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, and forced to retreat in 1801. Although this invasion was quite short and proved futile, it demonstrated the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire's Middle Eastern territories against the Western colonial expansion.⁶⁵⁰

Under the Ottoman rule, Middle East preserved much of its prosperity thanks to the Ottoman system of capitulations, despite the changing trade routes from Eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic as a result of geographical explorations.⁶⁵¹ Through these concessions, European merchants had not only traded goods, some of them established industrial facilities in the Levant, from the the eighteenth century onwards, contributing to local economies.⁶⁵² Although the interior parts of Lebanon and Palestine were very much isolated from international trade until the nineteenth century, in the littoral regions significant commercial centres such as Beirut and Acre emerged. In Iraq, after a short period of reconstruction in the mid-sixteenth century, Iranian attacks and tribal pillages resulted in a gradual economic decline in the seventeenth century.⁶⁵³ Until the attacks of the Wahhabis, the Hejaz region retained its prosperity, thanks to the Ottoman subsidies in the form of gifts from the Sultan and the finance of the pilgrimage process.⁶⁵⁴ What is more, between 1516 and 1800, urbanization was

⁶⁴⁹ Kurşun, "Osmanlı Devleti İdaresinde Hicaz (1517-1919)," 319-320.

⁶⁵⁰ For the details of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, see Paul Strathern, *Napoleon in Egypt*, (New York: Bantam Books, 2008).

⁶⁵¹ Hitti, *History of Syria*, 671

⁶⁵² Hitti, *History of Syria*, 673.

⁶⁵³ Jane Hathaway, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*, (London: Pearson, 2008), 229.

⁶⁵⁴ Kurşun, "Osmanlı Devleti İdaresinde Hicaz (1517-1919)," 318.

the case in Arab *eyalets* of the Ottoman Empire, urban population increased significantly, both through immigration from the countryside and other provinces and through the transfer of military personnel and government officials.⁶⁵⁵ In sum, although the Ottoman Empire established a relatively loose administration, it contributed to the development of the region as much as its financial resources were available. However, the Ottoman economic decline, maladministration of the Ottoman provincial bureaucrats, and the internal and external disturbances resulted in the limited development of the Ottoman Middle East.

10.1.2. The Ottoman Rule in the Middle East in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century:

The nineteenth century of the Ottoman Middle East can be summarized by three words: centralization, reform, and foreign intervention. Introduction of a new order, namely *Tanzimat*, transformation of existing political and socio-economic structures albeit in a limited way, and the penetration of European Great Powers into the region had crucial implications for the Middle East.

To start with the centralization, it can be argued that great territorial losses in the eighteenth century, especially in the Rumelian lands of the Empire, forced the Ottoman Sultans to increase state control over the provinces; most of which were governed by local notables. This transformation was essential to link the periphery to the centre efficiently. Therefore, from 1830s onwards, under the rule of Mahmud II, centralization was imposed on the Arab provinces of the Empire. The first step of centralization was to replace the governors appointed from the local notable families with the ones sent by the Porte. In Baghdad, the Mamluk rule was ended in 1831 with the replacement of the last Mamluk governor Davud Pasha with a governor directly sent by the Porte.⁶⁵⁶ In Mosul, the Jalili period ended in 1834 with the appointment of governors from the

⁶⁵⁵ Hathaway, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*, 230.

⁶⁵⁶ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Bağdat: Osmanlı Dönemi" 436.

centre.⁶⁵⁷ With the establishment of the Province of Basra in 1888, the process of centralization of Iraq was completed; from then on, Ottoman Iraq was composed of three provinces until their unification under the state of Iraq after the First World War.

Establishment of central rule in Syria had already started with the replacement of the last governor from al-Azm family, Abdullah al-Azm Pasha with Genç Yusuf Paşa in 1807. However, the real centralization would have to wait the end of the Egyptian occupation between 1831 and 1841. Hence effective Ottoman control could only be established after 1841 and this process was not as smooth as in the case of Ottoman Iraq particularly because of the special condition of Lebanon. The power vacuum in Lebanon after 1841 with the end of Shihab rule was filled by the Maronites.⁶⁵⁸ This created a significant contention between the Druzes and Maronites, which resulted in a civil strife.⁶⁵⁹ After initial Druze rebellions against the Ottomans and clashes with the Maronites in 1845 and 1852, the most significant civil strife was fiercely erupted in 1860. This time, the Muslims of Damascus also participated to the strife by attacking the Christians. Upon the request of the Great Powers, particularly of France, which supported the Maronites, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Fuad Paşa, resolved the conflict after a brief military operation. In 1861, Mount Lebanon was established as an autonomous *mutasarrıflık*⁶⁶⁰ governed by a Christian governor appointed

⁶⁵⁷ This was followed by the provision of complete subordination of the quasi-independent Kurdish Sanjaks. In 1834, the governance of Revanduz was taken from the Soran tribe; Imadiye was relieved from the governance of Behdinan tribe in 1839, and Suleymaniye from the Baban tribe in 1850. After the establishment of relative centralization, in 1851, the status of Mosul was degraded to *sanjak* and became a part of Baghdad Province; it only reacquired the status of province in 1878. Ahmet Gündüz, "Musul: Osmanlı Dönemi" 366.

⁶⁵⁸ Accordingly, Bashir Shihab II, who had been ruling Lebanon since 1788, supported the Egyptian invasion; therefore when İbrahim Paşa (1789-1848), the son of Kavalalı, was retreating from Syria and Palestine, he decided to leave Lebanon in 1841. This created a political vacuum in the region, since some of the Druze families followed him. Tufan Buzpınar, "Lübnan: Osmanlı Dönemi," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 27, 248-254, 250.

⁶⁵⁹ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, (Berkeley: University of Columbia Press, 1993), 28

⁶⁶⁰ An administrative unit smaller than province and larger than a district. The provinces were composed of several *mutasarrıflık*.

by the Porte and an administrative council (*meclis-i idâre*), established along sectarian lines. With these regulations, the position of the Maronites was strengthened *vis-à-vis* the Druzes, and there began a relatively peaceful period in the region.⁶⁶¹

In this period of centralization, the territories of Palestine was divided into two and given under the authorities of two distinct provinces. Accordingly, Acre, Nablus and Jerusalem was attached to the Province of Sidon (after 1888, the Province of Beirut), while the East of the Jordan River was attached to the Province of Damascus. In 1872, Jerusalem was turned out to be an autonomous *mutasarrıflık* (comprising contemporary city of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa and Gaza) just as Mount Lebanon, for its special status as being a sacred city for three monotheistic religions.⁶⁶²

Although, Ottoman efforts for centralization were relatively successful in the Syrian and Iraqi provinces, in the Arabian Peninsula, the establishment of Ottoman central control had significant difficulties. The problem of dual governance in Hejaz continued during the nineteenth century; however, the balance was tilted towards the Amirs of Mecca because of the lack of a long-standing Ottoman presence in the region.⁶⁶³ In Yemen, the Ottomans tried to establish central administration several times during this period; however, they always encountered with the resistance of the Zaydi Imams. This resulted in

⁶⁶¹ Kais Firro, "The Ottoman Reforms and Jabal al-Duruz, 1860-1914," in Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs, *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honour of Butrus Abu-Manneh*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 149-164, 150-151; Akarlı, *The Long Peace*, 31-32.

⁶⁶² Kramer, *A History of Palestine*, 41.

⁶⁶³ Between 1858 and 1887, there were only four Amirs against seventeen Ottoman governors. This situation could only change after 1887 with the appointment of Mustafa Safvet Paşa, who remained in power until 1913. See William L. Oschenwald, "Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July, 1975): 300-307, 301.

futile campaigns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contributing to the depletion of material and human resources of the Empire.⁶⁶⁴

The second concept depicting the nineteenth century Ottoman Middle East was reform, which emerged out of the *Tanzimat* process. Accordingly, not only the Ottoman provinces in the region was tried to be brought under central administration, but also new forms of governance were introduced. According to Gudrun Kramer, during the nineteenth century, the state intervened more strongly in the fields of economics, law and infrastructure; what is more, the fields, which had not previously dealt by the state such as sanitation and education, were brought under state control.⁶⁶⁵ One of the most significant achievements was the establishment of assemblies, which resulted in popular participation into provincial governance. Accordingly, in 1840s, administrative assemblies (*meclis-i idâri*) were established; they were composed mainly of local notables appointed by the governor. This indicated that the power of notables had not ended completely; rather, it survived under some degree of governmental control.⁶⁶⁶ These assemblies were followed by municipal assemblies (*meclis-i beledî*) in 1860s, which incorporated propertied classes of urban population to the governance of cities. Finally, in 1870s, in provincial level, general assemblies (*meclis-i umûmi*) were established. According to Kramer, all these new structures contributed to the participation of the people in the decision-making processes:

Mediated through the elites, local populations gained their first access to political and administrative decision-making, from city planning and land assignments to the allocation of tax farms so important socially and economically.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁴ For a detailed account of the Ottoman campaigns in Yemen in this period see, Caesar E. Farah, *The Sultan's Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002)

⁶⁶⁵ Kramer, *A History of Palestine*, 75.

⁶⁶⁶ Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, 51.

⁶⁶⁷ Kramer, *A History of Palestine*, 74.

Besides the establishment of assemblies, several laws contributed to the reorganization of the Middle East. Two of them were of considerable significance. The first one is the Land Law of 1858, which, according to Haim Gerber, “[...] was destined to become one of the main pivots on which most of the agrarian issues in the Middle East turned in the subsequent century.”⁶⁶⁸ By this law, state ownership over the imperial possessions, which had long been out of governmental control because of decentralized provincial administration, was reasserted. This would later establish the base to distribute lands to landless peasants and to curb the power of local land-owning notables.⁶⁶⁹ The second law was the Provincial Law of 1864, which transformed *eyalet* to province, *sanjak* to *mutasarrıflık*, and added new structures, such as *kaza* (district) and *nahiye* (sub-district).⁶⁷⁰ In sum, this law not only eradicated the ambiguous administrative relationship between the centre and the periphery but also established a provincial government based on Ottoman citizenry.

Although these laws could not always be implemented properly, there were significant developments in the Ottoman Middle East, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, in Baghdad, under the governorship of Midhat Paşa (1822-1884) between 1869 and 1872, the peasants were given lands, the bedouin attacks to cities were prevented and some of them were settled, steamship companies were established to increase regional trade, newspapers were published, education and sanitation were given significance.⁶⁷¹ With the provision of relative security and stability, in this period Beirut, Jaffa and Jerusalem emerged as prosperous cities as a result of Ottoman infrastructure

⁶⁶⁸ Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1987), 67.

⁶⁶⁹ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 Volumes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. 2, 114.

⁶⁷⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2, 89. For the application of Land Law in the Ottoman Middle East, see Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, 73-90.

⁶⁷¹ Mustafa Cezar (ed.), *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, 6 Volumes, (İstanbul: İskit Yayınevi, 1972), Vol. 6, 3160-3163; for the implementation of Provincial Law and Land Law in Ottoman Iraq, see Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 15-18.

building and the expansion of international trade.⁶⁷² In Mosul, regional trade was developed; there emerged a primitive industry of leather tanning as well as cotton and woollen textiles.⁶⁷³ In Hejaz, new governmental buildings and waterways were established; the infrastructure of the province was developed considerably, particularly as a result of the Ottoman subsidies.⁶⁷⁴ Besides land reform, economic development and infrastructure building, sanitation and education were improved. Particularly, the quarantine services were introduced in the Middle East to cope with the most significant epidemic of the nineteenth century, namely cholera. What is more, new schools were established with a modern curriculum in order to decrease illiteracy. For example, in Palestine, at the outbreak of the World War I, there were 95 primary and 3 secondary schools with 8250 students.⁶⁷⁵ All in all, in the nineteenth century, the region was tried to be modernized albeit in a limited way because of the decline of Ottoman financial capabilities.

The last concept for depicting the nineteenth century Ottoman Middle East was foreign intervention. During the nineteenth century, the Middle Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire were mainly under the penetration of four

⁶⁷² For the implementation of *Tanzimat* reforms in Palestine, see Donna Robinson Divine, *Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine: The Arab Struggle for Survival and Power*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1994); Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the *Tanzimat*: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation*, (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 1986), 30-45; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of Tanzimat on Politics and Society*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); for the economic and social development of Jerusalem and Jaffa, see Ruth Kark, "The Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1840-1917," in Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period*, 45-58. For the implementation of *Tanzimat* reforms in Lebanon and development of Beirut see Akarlı, *The Long Peace*, 6-81.

⁶⁷³ For the development of Mosul's economy in the nineteenth century, see Sarah D. Shields, "Regional Trade and 19th-Century Mosul: Revising the Role of Europe in the Middle East Economy," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1991): 19-37.

⁶⁷⁴ For example, the budget of the province in 1884-1885 was approximately 25,5 million kurush, 24 million of which was paid as subsidy from the Ottoman Treasury. See, Oschenwald, "Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886," 301.

⁶⁷⁵ Kramer, *A History of Palestine*, 76.

states, being Iran, France, Britain and Germany.⁶⁷⁶ Among them Iran was the only Muslim actor, which tried to exert influence over the Shi'i population of Iraq. This created significant tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Iran and these tensions are examined in the next chapter of this dissertation.

The French and the British had already been present in the Middle East first as merchants and diplomats, and then as missionaries through capitulations from the late sixteenth century onwards. In the nineteenth century, however, there were some direct penetrations into the region. Especially France was an active participant into the internal disturbances of Lebanon, generally on the side of the Maronites. During the 1860 crisis, the French not only intervened diplomatically, but also militarily by sending a navy to the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁷⁷ From 1861 onwards, French presence in Lebanon increased considerably and French consuls serving in the region intervened in sectarian clashes until the end of the Ottoman rule and afterwards.⁶⁷⁸ On the other hand, the British generally favoured the Druzes, as Don Peretz writes the 1840 clashes between the Maronites and Druzes “[...] were related to the competition between France and Great Britain for influence in the Levant.”⁶⁷⁹

In addition to Levant, in the Persian Gulf, the Ottomans encountered the British penetration. From 1820 onwards, the British began to increase their naval presence in the region. After defeating the *Qasimi* tribal confederation, which had dominated the lands establishing contemporary United Arab Emirates, they began to sail freely in the Gulf and headed north for the control of other Sheikdoms, such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The signature of Maritime

⁶⁷⁶ A fifth actor might be the United States for the Protestant missionary activities in Anatolia as well as in the Middle East; however compared to other three states its presence in the region was quite limited.

⁶⁷⁷ For a detailed account of French interventions in Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century, see Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861*, (London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 2000).

⁶⁷⁸ For a detailed account of French interventions in Lebanon after 1861, see John P. Spagnolo, *France & Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1977).

⁶⁷⁹ Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 91.

Truce Agreement between Britain and *Qasimi* Sheikhs in 1853 created some kind of a British protection; this system of “Trucial States” was extended to Bahrain in 1861.⁶⁸⁰ What is more, the British acquired the monopoly of administering steamships in Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. They also tried to control the entrance of the Red Sea by occupying Aden in 1839.⁶⁸¹

The Ottoman response to the British and French presence in the Middle East had different strategies. The first strategy was the extension of the rights of the communities targeted by the external powers. In order to prevent direct French interventions in the Levant, bureaucratic reforms enhancing the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and incorporating non-Muslim components of the region into decision-making processes were tried to be implemented. Demonstrating the Ottoman presence in the regions where European Powers became actively penetrated was another strategy. In Ottoman provinces of Iraq, particularly under the governorship of Midhat Paşa, political and economic presence of the British was tried to be balanced through enhancing the Ottoman sovereignty in al-Hasa region with the reestablishment of the Province of al-Hasa, consolidating the Ottoman claims over Kuwait against the pro-British Kuwaiti ruling elite, namely al-Sabah family, and establishing a rival steamship company breaking the British Lynch Company’s monopoly.⁶⁸² A third strategy particularly implied in the Hamidian era was Pan-Islamism, which intended to arouse Muslim solidarity. Subsidizing the tribal chieftains as well as the sheiks and *ulama* proved futile in general. Finally, and most importantly, from the late

⁶⁸⁰ Within this system, the Gulf sheikhdoms accepted British protection against any kind of foreign aggression at the expense that their foreign policy would be conducted by Great Britain; what is more, in 1892 they agreed not to sell or lease their territories to any other state but Great Britain. These agreements established a significant British control of the Persian Gulf from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. See Uzi Rabi, “British Possessions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Arabia: The Last Abandoned in the Middle East,” in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (ed.), *Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner*, (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 264-282, 265-266.

⁶⁸¹ Rabi, “British Possessions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Arabia,” 267.

⁶⁸² For a detailed account of the Ottoman reaction against British presence in the Persian Gulf, Midhat Paşa’s and his successors’ policies in the region see Frederick Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

1880s onwards, the strategy of balancing imperialist powers threatening the Ottoman Middle East with another imperialist power, namely Germany, was tried to be implemented. The Berlin-Baghdad railway project, which could never be completed, was an example of Ottoman-German cooperation in the Middle East.⁶⁸³

All in all, in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire interested in the Arab provinces of the Middle East more than any other period; despite the shortcomings of the Ottoman administration in the region, the failure of most of the reforms initiated after *Tanzimat* period, the economic destructiveness of the capitulatory regime, and the insufficient level of development for most of the region, all the Ottoman initiatives served the maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty over the Middle East until the end of the First World War. In other words, the Ottoman targets of centralization and modernization might not be realized fully; however, the real motive behind these targets, namely the preservation of territorial integrity of the Middle East could largely be ensured.

10.2. The Ottoman Travellers' Perception of the Middle East

10.2.1. The Middle Eastern Cities:

The Ottoman travellers' perception of the Middle Eastern cities was not much different from their perceptions of the cities of other parts of the world. Generally the criteria for their appreciation of a city were the degree of its orderliness and the existence of "the traces of civilization" (*âsâr-ı medeniyet*). What is more, they did not forget to mention urban duality, the dichotomical composition of quarters within the city based on these criteria.

Arguably, the Ottoman travellers did not depict Iraqi cities as positively as the Syrian ones, since they perceived the former more underdeveloped. For example, with regard to Mosul, Âli Bey mentioned about the disorderliness of the city; he particularly criticized that the shops were extremely small, while the

⁶⁸³ For a detailed account of German interventions see İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 1998).

coffeehouses were the largest buildings in the market. According to him, this indicated that the city's inhabitants preferred to waste their time by idly sitting in the coffeehouses, instead of dealing with and enlarging their businesses.⁶⁸⁴ Similarly, the infrastructural inferiority of Basra was bitterly criticized in the travelogue of Cenap Şehabettin, who wrote that the streets of this city were not paved with stone, therefore, in case of a heavy rain entire city turned out a huge swamp: "There is no stone, when there is no stone, there is no pavement; urban hygiene is almost impossible without pavement [...] Therefore, streets are dirty and tangle as bowels filling the abdomen of Basra."⁶⁸⁵ These criticisms demonstrate that the Ottoman travellers accused the local inhabitants' indifference and laziness as an important reason for underdevelopment.

Instead of Mosul and Basra, it was Baghdad that attracted the attention of the travellers the most. They could not hide their excitement to see this city, which had once been the centre of Islamic civilization. For them, Baghdad was a city visualized in their dreams for a long time. For example, Cenap Şehabettin wrote that he could not sleep the night before they arrived in Baghdad and dreamed the city as the "Eden on earth": "Baghdad! This beautiful name promises my imagination so much, it elevated me on extensive visions and poetic hopes."⁶⁸⁶ However, when the Ottoman travellers saw the city, they were generally disappointed and began to criticize some of its aspects. For example, İsmail Hakkı underlined the inhabitants' lack of being timely as the basic reason for the decadence of this city, which had once been the centre of religious as well as positive sciences. For him, the reason of absence of arts, sciences and commerce in the city was that its inhabitants could not understand the value of time and they passed their time idly without working for ameliorating their life standards.⁶⁸⁷ Despite this critical tune, the travellers also preferred to emphasize

⁶⁸⁴ Âli Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 58.

⁶⁸⁵ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 68.

⁶⁸⁶ "Bağdat! Bu güzel isim hayâlîme neler vaad ediyor, beni ne vâsî tasavvurlara ve ne şâîrâne ümitlere yükseltiyordu." Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 88.

⁶⁸⁷ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 115-116.

the potential of this city besides its shortcomings. For Cenap Şehabettin, “[...] degradation never brought silence, dwellings full of joy and happiness emerged along Tigris out of the ruins of shattered silky and golden palaces.”⁶⁸⁸ Therefore, what made a city alive was not its buildings but its inhabitants; “[...] a city will not vanish if its inhabitants continue to manifest their existence.”⁶⁸⁹ Similarly, İsmail Hakkı stated that the population density of Baghdad was increasing day by day because people came to this city to live in a civilized way. He wrote that “as long as the idea of civilization spreads in this country, the population density of Baghdad will continue to increase.”⁶⁹⁰ In other words, for the travellers, current problems of the city were not eternal and insurmountable, as long as human potential had been preserved, they could be overcome.

The account of three prominent cities of Syria and Lebanon, namely Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut, was more positive compared to the Iraqi cities because of their more advanced level of development. For example, Âli Bey admired the city of Aleppo; he described its ordered stone houses, paved streets, prosperous market, whose inhabitants were famous for wealthy and honest merchants.⁶⁹¹ Damascus and Beirut, on the other hand, were generally presented in a comparative way. İsmail Hakkı emphasized the traces of civilization in both cities such as electricity, trams, newly established modern avenues and quarters. However, unlike Beirut, which was eager to absorb all elements of modernity immediately, Damascus was a conservative city. He wrote that the material and moral elements of “the East” and “Arabness” was reflected in this city more than Beirut.⁶⁹² Similarly, Ahmet Şerif argued that unlike Beirut, Damascus resisted the passage of time and preserved its unique characteristics. He wrote that

⁶⁸⁸ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 91.

⁶⁸⁹ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 91.

⁶⁹⁰ “*Fikr-i temeddün bu memlekette taammüm ettikçe Bağdat’ın kesefât-ı nüfusu artacaktır.*” Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 122.

⁶⁹¹ Âli Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 18.

⁶⁹² “*Şam tamamen bir Şark ve Arap şehridir.*” Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 32.

“Damascus was insisting on progressing through preserving its oldness to the degree that Beirut was rushing for acquiring another existence.”⁶⁹³ Although he criticized this Damascene conservatism for slowing down progress,⁶⁹⁴ he liked it, since he detested the hypocritical nature of Beirut, a city, which was alienating itself from the Ottomanness while being westernized.⁶⁹⁵

The inhabitants of both cities were appreciated for some of their qualities and criticized for others. For example, İsmail Hakkı praised the inhabitants of Beirut for their diligence and cleverness; he argued that they had a natural inclination for every kind of trade as well as money-changing business.⁶⁹⁶ Ahmet Şerif did the same for the Damascenes, who were naturally inclined to trade; he wrote that they would occupy a significant post in the world of trade if they could be equipped with the means of contemporary material developments.⁶⁹⁷ However, unlike the deep ignorance of the lower echelons of the Damascene society and lack of intellectual production by the upper echelons,⁶⁹⁸ according to İsmail Hakkı, the brilliant intelligence of the inhabitants of Beirut directed them towards literature and language education as well as politics. He wrote that neither in Anatolia, nor in Rumelia there was a city having the ability to compete with Beirut in terms of “general knowledge” (*malûmat-ı umûmiye*).⁶⁹⁹ Ahmet Şerif was also aware of this intellectual capacity; however, he criticized it for being anti-Ottoman: “You understand that in Beirut there is a significant idea of progress, a movement, whose importance and power cannot be denied, and an

⁶⁹³ “*Beyrut başka bir varlık kazanmaya ne kadar aceleci ise, Şam, eskiliğini koruyarak ilerlemekte o kadar ısrarcıdır.*” Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 110.

⁶⁹⁴ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 110.

⁶⁹⁵ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 153.

⁶⁹⁶ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 17.

⁶⁹⁷ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 110.

⁶⁹⁸ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 153.

⁶⁹⁹ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 19.

intellectual current, with the condition that there is no trace of Ottomanness in all of these.”⁷⁰⁰ In other words, this intellectual current fed itself not from Ottomanness, but from external resources (such as missionary schools), which alienated the inhabitants of Beirut from the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, he wrote that he preferred the ignorance of Anatolia to the intellectual awakening of Beirut since the latter had nothing to do with Ottomanness while the former had nothing but Ottomanness.⁷⁰¹ Similarly, and almost with the same discourse with Cenap Şehabettin’s account of Alexandria, Ekrem Bey wrote that he did not admire Beirut, because the city was in an ambivalent position; it was neither an Eastern, nor a Western city:

Beirut did not impress me much. A little remained from its old Arab-Syrian characteristics; it did not deal out from the modern culture and civilization – it was a soulless Mediterranean port city populated by the higher echelons of the Christian community. The people thought that they had a *non plus ultra* Parisian refinement. In reality, with the contemporary words, they were chatty, arrogant and superficial snobs.⁷⁰²

Therefore, the Ottoman travellers sought for the traces of civilization in the cities they visited in the Ottoman Middle East; however, they wanted to see these traces of civilization in a setting where the peculiar characteristics of the cities preserved.

Besides these basic metropolitan cities of the Ottoman Middle East, sometimes, the Ottoman travellers were surprised when they saw extremely developed small towns, which surpassed the metropolitan cities in terms of orderliness. The town of Zahle, in Mount Lebanon, was one of such surprises. Accordingly, İsmail Hakkı described excellent hotels and casinos of this town

⁷⁰⁰ “Anlarsınız ki, Beyrut’ta önemli bir ilerleme fikri, önemi ve kuvveti inkar edilemez bir hareket, fikir cereyanı var. Fakat bütün bunlarda Osmanlılıktan bir nişane bulunmamak şartıyla.” Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk’da, Suriye’de, Trablusgarp’ta Tanîn*, 153.

⁷⁰¹ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk’da, Suriye’de, Trablusgarp’ta Tanîn*, 160-161.

⁷⁰² Italics added. “*Beyrut beni fazla etkilemedi. Eski Arap-Suriye özelliklerinden geriye fazla bir şey kalmamış, modern kültür ve uygarlıktan da henüz nasibini almamıştı – üst sınıf Hıristiyn topluluğunun yaşadığı ruhsuz bir Akdeniz liman şehriydi. İnsanlar, ‘non plus ultra’ bir Paris inceliğine sahip oldukları zannı içindydiler. Gerçekte bugün kullanacağımız ifadelerle, geveze, kendini beğenmiş ve yüzeysel züppelerdi.*” Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 113.

attracting British and American travellers; he wrote that the level of its urban development could not be seen in most of the cities of the Empire. He was amazed when he learned that two newspapers were published in this small town, which had subscribers even from the United States.⁷⁰³ The level of development in the villages of Mount Lebanon also surprized the travellers. Ahmed Şerif wrote that since this part of the province could be able to escape from the oppression of the previous administration (namely, the Hamidian administration) because of its special status, the inhabitants of the region were able to develop their environment. He wrote that these villages were in a position envying even the most prosperous cities of our Anatolia.⁷⁰⁴ Similarly, İsmail Hakkı admired the diligence of the inhabitants of the Mount Lebanon and their establishment of fertile fields. He wrote: “The samples of civilization, created by the hands of human beings through an ordered patience and effort, also attract the admiration and astonishment of the visitors.”⁷⁰⁵

However, the Ottoman travellers were aware that these developments emerged out of not only local peoples’ efforts but also external interventions. What they criticized was, therefore, not the achievements of these regions, but their achievement through external help instead of the efforts of the Ottoman administration. Therefore, their perception of the Druzes was very much negative. For example, Ahmet Şerif wrote that the Druzes were quite intelligent and curious; however they were deceitful as well. He argued that during his stay in Mount Lebanon, they were watching him with “a sarcastic and contemptuous smile” (*alaylı ve küçümseyici bir tebessüm*).⁷⁰⁶ What is more, he wrote that they were ambitious to hide their morality and traditions, particularly their religious

⁷⁰³ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 25. Similarly, Ahmet Şerif wrote that Zahle was quite ordered compared to Anatolia; its inhabitants were quite civilized and progressed so that their eyes were shining from their intelligence. Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 109.

⁷⁰⁴ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 109.

⁷⁰⁵ “*Dest-i beşerin bir sabr-u gayret-i muntazama ile vücûda getirmiş olduğu âsâr-ı umrân dahi ayrıca zâirin takdîr ve hayretini celbediyor.*” Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 23.

⁷⁰⁶ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 104.

principles; he found the upper echelons of the Druze community upright but ignorant.⁷⁰⁷ He defined them as people who were accustomed to rule.⁷⁰⁸

Besides the cities of *Bilâd al-Sham* and Iraq, the cities of Arabian Peninsula, such as Jeddah, Aden, Bahrain, or Kuwait were also narrated in the travelogues on the Ottoman Middle East; their perception was mostly negative because of their backwardness. Particularly, Jeddah and Aden were the most pejoratively narrated cities. Ekrem Bey perceived Jeddah as terribly dirty, desolated and silent; while Cenap Şehabettin argued that the city lost its former fame as the “Paris of the Red Sea” to the newly established ports along the Western shores of the Red Sea, namely, Massawa, Suakin and Port Sudan.⁷⁰⁹ This was presented as an indication of the Western superiority over the East since the latter cities were established by the Western colonial powers. Similarly, the Ottoman travellers criticized Aden for being totally deprived of any natural beauties. Cenap Şehabettin defined the city as a “huge piece of coal tumbling over the sea”, “a black soil, namely, a soil of negro”⁷¹⁰ The only duty of the city was to serve the British as a gatekeeper for the protection of British presence in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.⁷¹¹ Rüşdi Paşa mentioned about the backwardness of another Yemeni port, Hudaydah, which attracted attention with the lack of a port for the transfer of goods and people. The only governmental buildings in the city were the governor’s office and an uncompleted hospital.⁷¹²

Among the cities of the Arabian Peninsula, Kuwait and Bahrain were the only ones deserved relatively positive narration because of the British investment in these cities. After seeing the small and miserable port cities of the region, Ekrem Bey described Kuwait as a rich and big city “[...] if such strong

⁷⁰⁷ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 124.

⁷⁰⁸ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 216.

⁷⁰⁹ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 43.

⁷¹⁰ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 49.

⁷¹¹ Cenap Şehabettin, *Afak-ı Irak*, 91.

⁷¹² Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 66.

adjectives could be used for the conditions of Arabs,” and appreciated its vivid commercial life.⁷¹³ Similarly, Bahrain attracted Ali Suad’s admiration both for its natural beauties and infrastructural development. He wrote that the progress of Bahrain attracted his attention; the docks which he had seen one year earlier were advanced into the sea and he was also informed that large stores for commercial goods would be built in a year.⁷¹⁴ Regarding the merchants of the city, he wrote that when he was invited to a merchant’s store, he encountered with two Egyptian journals, *al-Muktataf* and *al-Menar*, and this made him conclude that “Arabs try to read regularly such journals published in their own language. Even, for those having some social rank, such attention included most of the political journals.”⁷¹⁵

All in all, there was no monolithic perception of the Middle Eastern cities in civilizational terms. The Ottoman travellers sometimes praised the cities without the traces of civilization or sometimes disliked the ones with them. In other words, there were some accounts criticizing the establishment of Westernized cities for they were losing their Ottoman character; on the other hand, there were other accounts admiring the achievements of Western influence over the urban space.

10.2.2. The Critique of the Ottoman Rule in the Middle East and the Perception of the Precursors of Arab Nationalism

One of the most significant aspects of the travelogues regarding the Middle East was a fierce critique of the Ottoman administration in the region, since most of these travelogues were either written or published in the post-Hamidian period. To start with, the post-Hamidian travellers accused the Hamidian administration of neglecting the Middle Eastern provinces and for not

⁷¹³ “[...E]ğer Arapların şartları için bu kadar yüksek sıfatlar kullanmak caiz ise [...]” Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 151.

⁷¹⁴ Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 19.

⁷¹⁵ “Araplar kendi lisanlarında çıkan böyle mecmuâları muntazaman okumaya gayret ederler. Hele biraz mevki-i içtimaîsi olanlarda bu dikkat cerâid-i siyasiyenin ekserisini ihâtâ eder.” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 21.

investing properly in this region. For example, Rüşdi Paşa argued that one of the most significant reasons for the rebellions in Yemen was the lack of proper Ottoman investment in the region. He wrote that the financial resources invested in the province were extremely limited; even the amount of twenty-five years of Ottoman investment in the region was only one fifth of the one year salary of the existing officials serving in the province.⁷¹⁶ Based on his previous experiences in Massawa controlled by the Italian colonial administration, Rüşdi Paşa argued that the Italians could only establish their rule strongly in Massawa after properly investing in this city.⁷¹⁷ Similarly, Ahmed Şerif argued that the reason behind continuous rebellions of the Druzes against the Ottoman Empire was the lack of Ottoman investment in the Mount Lebanon.⁷¹⁸ İsmail Hakkı wrote along the same line for the countryside of Iraq; he even wrote that after the collapse of the Abbasid rule, Iraq had not seen any material improvement except for the brief but efficient governorship of Midhat Paşa.⁷¹⁹

The Ottoman travellers criticized the Hamidian administration not only for the insufficient level of material investment; they also emphasized that more important than the lack of material improvement, the Ottomans failed to invest in the Middle Eastern provinces morally. In other words, they could not establish an understanding of Ottomanness in the region. For example, with regard to Syria and Lebanon, Ahmed Şerif implied that one of the main reasons of the emerging Arab discontent in the Ottomans was the Ottoman failure of creating a common identity. He wrote:

The history of the last centuries recorded no event of civilization regarding Ottomanness in this region [...] The Ottoman historiography always remained alien to this region and the Ottoman government preserved its position as a visitor sojourner.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁶ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 67.

⁷¹⁷ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 70.

⁷¹⁸ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 230.

⁷¹⁹ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 204.

⁷²⁰ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 128.

Ahmed Şerif added that the Ottoman Empire only conquered this region without conquering the hearts and the spirits of its inhabitants. Accordingly, although Syria was a beautiful land full of clever people inclined to civilization, the Ottoman Empire failed to create a sense of common citizenry.⁷²¹ Similarly, with regard to Mount Lebanon, he wrote that what the Ottomans solely did was to send troops to suppress the continuous rebellions of the Druzes. Although his initial perception of the Druzes was very much suspicious, after perceiving the Ottoman neglect, he found the anger and the enmity of the Druzes towards the central administration relatively understandable.⁷²² Accordingly, he wrote:

When the days are passing, it is seen that we have not a genuine knowledge of the Druzes; they are not monstrous, blood-shedding people, on the contrary, they have qualities as in other Ottomans. Although some ideas against us are settled in their minds for several reasons, indeed, they are not but human beings. Now, the real talent was to clear the ideas and emotions settled against the Ottomans and the government and to find the required method to transform them into a useful societal component, into citizens.⁷²³

Another criticism was directed to the Ottoman intellectuals by Ali Suad, who accused them of not having proper knowledge of the Ottoman Middle East. He wrote that these so-called intellectuals were working on solutions in İstanbul for the weaknesses of the state, on a green table with a strong self-confidence, but without experiencing the problems of different regions of the Empire.⁷²⁴ This confidence stemmed from the feeling that every issue can be fully understood after reading and learning from the books. Ali Suad underlined the insufficiency

⁷²¹ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 128.

⁷²² Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 230.

⁷²³ “Günlerimiz geçtikçe görüliyordu ki, Dürzîler hakkında hiç gerçek bilgilere sahip değiliz, onlar, canavar, kan dökücü adamlar değil, aksine, bütün diğer Osmanlılar gibi, bunlara da meziyetler var. Kendilerinde bir çok etkenlerin tesiriyle bazı fikirler yerleşmiş ise de, gerçekte bize karşı bir insandan başka bir şey değiller. Şimdi asıl hüner onlarda Osmanlılara ve hükümete karşı yerleşen fikirleri ve duyguları gidererek, kendilerini faydalı bir toplumsal organ, birer vatandaş haline getirmekte ve bunun için takibi gereken usûlü arayıp bulmakta.” Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 232-233.

⁷²⁴ Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 22.

of such knowledge by attributing İstanbul an “arrogant and conceited morbid atmosphere,” disturbing the discreet handling of the problems.⁷²⁵

Another reason for the discontent of the local population was the maladministration of the Ottoman officials. Especially, the Hamidian regime was accused of sending incapable officials to the region, which served for nothing but alienating the local inhabitants from the Ottoman Empire. While İsmail Hakkı directed this accusation for Iraq, Ahmed Şerif did the same for Mount Lebanon and Syria, and Rüşdi Paşa for Yemen.⁷²⁶ In this respect, one of the most detailed critiques was made by Ali Suad regarding the incapacity of Ottoman local officials in Iraq. He first questioned the concept of administration (*idare*):

What is the meaning of the word “administration”? If it is the preservation of the existing order, then there is no need to governors, investigations, inspections for that; because a court, a committee of *cabî*, and an excellent police force would suffice. But if it means the advancement of trade and agriculture through social and economic thinking and ascension of the general conduct through affecting the morality by [providing] progress and order in these blessed regions, our officials never do this. In order to think in such a way, we need people armour-plated their strong character with high knowledge and scientific principles.⁷²⁷

After putting this basic criticism, he argued that it was very easy to accuse local people of their backwardness; however, indeed what they did was to imitate the officials governing them:

There, it is easy to see that a generous and prosperous man is chaste and thief at the same time. The integration of these two opposites by men who are

⁷²⁵ “[...] *hodpesend ve mağrur heva-yı mâriz* [...] ” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 22. Ahmet Şerif made a similar criticism targeting himself; he pitied about his ignorance about the conditions of the regions he visited prior to his voyage. Accordingly, he wrote that although he could tell about America or French political system in detail, he knew nothing about Mount Lebanon before his travel. Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 173-174.

⁷²⁶ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 205-206; Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 231; Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 189.

⁷²⁷ “*İdâre kelimesinin medlûlü acaba nedir? Eğer hâl-i hazırı idâme ise bunun için valilere, teftişlere, tahkiklere hiç lüzum yok, çünkü bir mahkeme ile, bir câbi heyeti ve bir de gayet mükemmel bir kuvve-i zâbita kâfi... Yok eğer içtimâî, iktisadî düşüncelerle ziraat ve ticareti ilerletmek, ve bu tarikle bu mübârek yerlerin intizam ve terakkî yoluna eslâkî esasıyla hatta maneviyata da tesir ederek ahlâk-ı umûmiyenin i'lâsı ise memurlarımız bunu katiyen yapmıyor. Bunu düşünmek için malumât-ı âliye ve esasât-ı fenniyyeyi kendi şime-i mefînesine yerleştirmiş, insandan zırlılarımız olmalı.*” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 44-45. *Câbi* is a kind of tax collector who collects the rent of the estates of religious foundations and alms regularly paid for the state.

sometimes a brave and sensitive knight and sometimes suspicious and even a coward bribe-taker is because of their habit of walking under the shadow of the chief officials there. If the official is crooked, then the shadow will crook as well, if he is straight, its shadow will straighten. If the official embraces his political duty, everyone will walk in a straight way. If he cannot, then everything will reverse. What a sorrowful existence!⁷²⁸

Being aware of these problems, which were contributing to the anti-Ottoman sentiments in the region, the Ottoman travellers, particularly Ahmed Şerif and İsmail Hakkı directed attention to the “issue of Turkishness-Arabness” (*Türklük-Araplık meselesi*) in detail in their travelogues. Ahmed Şerif argued that Arabness was extremely dominant in Syria:

In this country, the inhabitants cannot be separated and classified in accordance with their religion; these people are not Muslim, Christian or Jewish in appearance. They are only Arabs. For their emotions, Arabness has the priority. Actually, in this region Arabness tied people spiritually and emotionally to each other with a strong tie and sincerity so much that this human community stands like an example of unity while the discussions and conflicts of nationality and religion, the disputes among the components are going on.⁷²⁹

In other words, he emphasized Arabness as a distinct characteristic separating a group of Muslim people from the rest. Contrarily, İsmail Hakkı rejected the discussions on Turkishness-Arabness by cursing those who initiated such treacherous debates against the integrity of the Empire. He argued that this issue was promulgated by some neurotic, seditious and exaggerating Syrians:

I completely understand that this threatening sword, which is wanted to be established as a kind of blackmail against the current Ottoman government by some people, is so rusty that it cannot even cut a piece of cigarette paper. I see that those, who produce such infusions of sedition and discord in order to appease their daily anger and ambitions or to benefit from it, are nothing but lunatics who shout in the midst of a desert and find no single audience. Whomever I talked cursed those who spread such fake words.⁷³⁰

⁷²⁸ “Âlicenap ve müreffeh bir adamın orada afif ve aynı zamanda hırsız olduğunu görmek kolaydır. Bazen merd ve hassas bir şövalye, bazen şüpheli ve belki denî bir mürteşî olan bu adamların bu iki zıtları cem’ etmeleri, oradaki rüesâ-yı memuriyenin gölgesinde yürümeye alışmış olmalarındandır. Memur çarpıksa gölgesi de çarpılır; doğru ise gölgesi de doğrulur! Memur vazîfe-i siyasîyesini ihâtâ ettiyse herkes doğru gider. Etmedi ise her şey tersine döner. Ne hâzîn bir mevcudiyet!...” Ali Suad, *Seyahatlerim*, 52.

⁷²⁹ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 127-128.

⁷³⁰ “Tamamen anladım ki, bazı kimseler tarafından hükümet-i hâzıra-i Osmaniyyeye karşı bir nev’i şantaj olmak üzere istimâl edilmek istenilen bu seyfi-i tehdîd bir sigara kağıdını kesemeyecek derecede paslıdır. Bu kâbil fine ve tefrika nasihatlerini – bir iki günlük hırs veya hiddetlerini teskîn veya menfaatlerini temin maksadıyla – verenlerin çöl ortasında bağırın, etrafında bir tek

What is more, İsmail Hakkı replied two significant criticisms directed against the centralization policies, namely the efforts for the prevention of the teaching of the Arabic language and the prohibition of the appointment of officials from the Arabs. With regard to the former criticism, he wrote that the government showed significant attention to the teaching of Arabic and made it compulsory in the entire Ottoman schools; what is more, during the new constitutional period, the teaching of Arabic became more widespread.⁷³¹ Meanwhile he answered the claims that the Arabs were not being appointed as officials as such:

In the civil service, nationality is not a criterion. The criteria are merit, authority and knowledge of the official language. Except for the inhabitants of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, we are contently observing that the most intellectual and educated people from the other Arab provinces had the knowledge of Turkish language.⁷³²

Despite this issue of Turkishness-Arabness, some of the travellers were praising the continuation of the local Muslims' allegiance to the Ottoman government and the Caliph/Sultan. For example, Ekrem Bey, who was sent with Ottoman warships to the Persian Gulf in 1905 in order to "demonstrate the presence of Turkish navy in the remotest parts of the Arabian Peninsula," mentioned that although the local inhabitants of the Red Sea ports had so far seen more impressive warships of different nations, the effect of the presence of Turkish navy was extraordinary.⁷³³ He narrated the sailing of hundreds of Arabs

müstemi' bulunmayan mecnûnlardan ibâret olduğunu görüyorum. Kimi gördüysem bu gibi erâcîfi neşr edenlere lanethûn oluyor idi." Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 47-49.

⁷³¹ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 49. Similarly, Ahmed Şerif emphasized the Turkish respect to the "noble Arab community" because of Islam; he found this sincere respect to this "honourable, clean and eminent community" extremely appropriate. He argued that the Ottomans should learn Arabic not only for religious or literary purposes but for understanding millions of Ottoman citizens who could not speak Turkish and having a significant place in the Ottoman trade. In other words, he did not mention about teaching them Turkish; but rather encouraged the Ottomans to learn Arabic. Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 143-144, 181.

⁷³² "*Memuriyette cinsiyet ve kavmiyet aranmaz, memuriyette liyâkat ve iktidar ve lisân-ı resmîye vukûf aranır. Nefs-i Beyrut ahâlisi ile Cebel ahâlisi müstesna olmak üzere diğer vilâyet-i Arabîyede az çok münevver-ül efkâr ve tahsîl görmüş kimselerin lisân-ı Türkî'ye vâkıf olduklarını mâalmemnûniye görüyoruz.*" Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 54.

⁷³³ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 143.

to the Ottoman warships when they approached to the port cities and their exclamation of “May the God always make the Sultan triumphant.”⁷³⁴ He exclaimed: “What an allegiance to the Caliph, what a power existed behind this simple wish of these ignorant people.”⁷³⁵ He stated that it was this simple but strong allegiance that resulted in the centuries-long grandeur of the Empire.⁷³⁶

All in all, according to the Ottoman travellers, the emergence of Arab discontent against the Ottoman central administration owed much to the internal deficiencies of the Empire in investing in these regions both materially and morally. The corruption of the Ottoman officials serving in the region contributed to the alienation of local people as well. This maladministration consolidated the sense of Arabness; however, still, according to some of the Ottoman travellers, since such problems were evident in other parts of the Empire, the Arab complaints did not have a solid ground. Finally, despite all these problems, some travellers tried to demonstrate that the local people (probably, the lower echelons of the society, not the intellectuals) still felt a strong allegiance to the Ottoman governments and the Caliph. In sum, what the travellers aimed was to consolidate the sense of common identity, namely Ottomanness, in order to prevent further alienation of the Arabs and subsequent disintegration of the Empire.

10.2.3. Ottoman Traveller’s Perception of Foreign Intervention into the Middle East

The Ottoman travellers mentioned about the impact of European powers’ interventions into the Middle East politically, economically and culturally. However, the degree of criticism is lower compared to the critical tune in the travelogues on North Africa because despite there was a significant European penetration in the region, it did not take the form of total colonial invasion as in

⁷³⁴ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 143.

⁷³⁵ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 143.

⁷³⁶ Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912)*, 143-144.

the case of Algeria or Tunisia. In terms of political intervention, the Ottoman travellers criticized the British presence in the Persian Gulf and the armament of the Gulf Sheikdoms as well as Yemen. Babanzade perceived Kuwait as the Iraq's "only depot of illegal weapons" (*yegâne eslihâ-yı memnuâ deposu*) and accused its ruler, Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah (1837-1915), for his hypocrisy. On the one hand, the Sheikh was preserving its allegiance to the Ottoman Empire nominally; however, on the other hand, he was establishing good relations with the British at the expense of the Ottomans.⁷³⁷ Similarly Rüşdi Paşa accused the colonial powers, which had been controlling the western shores of the Red Sea, of exporting weapons and ammunition to the *Zaydi Imams*.⁷³⁸ Therefore, to suppress the Yemeni rebellion, the Ottoman government should prevent the import of modern armaments to Yemen not militarily but diplomatically, through negotiating with the Great Powers.⁷³⁹

The Ottoman travellers criticized the economic penetration of the colonial powers into the Middle East as well. For example, İsmail Hakkı stated that in Damascus, there were some local products, which still preserved the admiration of the world such as curtains, cloths, wooden crafts or desserts. However, he wrote, "against the unbearable and great material and moral incursions of the Western civilization, it is evident that they will deplete and disappear one day."⁷⁴⁰ In other words, he claimed that without modernization, local economies could hardly resist European capitalist mentality based on the production of cheap and rapidly consumable products.

Finally, Ahmet Şerif criticized the cultural penetration of the colonial powers, especially of the French, through missionary activities. He argued that

⁷³⁷ Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 233-235.

⁷³⁸ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 56-57.

⁷³⁹ Rüşdi Paşa, *Yemen Hatırası*, 190-192.

⁷⁴⁰ "Birçok mahsûlat ve masnûat-ı Şâmîye daha vardır ki buhar, elektrik gibi kuvve-i cedîde-i tabiattan istifâde etmedikleri halde yine bütün cihânda mergubiyet ve itibarlarını muhafaza edebilmişler." Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 37. "Ancak medeniyet-i garbiyenin maddî, ve manevî istilâ-yı müdhiş ve mukavemetsûzu karşısında bunların da bir gün munkarız ve ma'dum olacağı muhakkak görünüyor." Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, *Irak Mektupları*, 37.

these cultural interventions disturbed the Ottoman identity of the youngsters of Beirut and fostered anti-Ottomanism. He mentioned that this was quite natural because of the “most evident law of the universe,” namely “the strong’s right to chew and swallow the weak” (*kuvvetlinin zayıfı çiğnemek ve yutmak hakkı*).⁷⁴¹ He complained that the elite of Beirut began to send their children to missionary schools where they were obliged to attend Sunday masses and if they resisted, they would be expelled from the school. After mentioning this, he wrote: “Poor freedom of conscience! You have been violated by the ones who were taunting you to us everyday.”⁷⁴² He criticized the missionaries as such:

Talk with the missionaries and the teachers of the school. They speak sweetly. They speak nothing but humanity, civilizing the underdeveloped places and adorning them with the light of knowledge. Politics, is it possible? They never think about that. But, there is a big difference between words and actions. In essence, they are enemies of our Ottomanness, our Islam. They are always working against these.⁷⁴³

In sum, he concluded that under this “foreign education” Beirut was distancing itself from the Ottomans, while Anatolia was getting closer with its “national education.”⁷⁴⁴

Arguably, in these travelogues it is this cultural dimension that attracted the attention of the reader the most. In other words, for the travellers, the material encroachments of the Western powers might be prevented in one way or another; however, the alienation of local inhabitants of the region through cultural penetration of the West could not be cured easily. Indeed, their criticism of this cultural penetration reflected their anti-colonial stance; their emphasis on

⁷⁴¹ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 154.

⁷⁴² “Zavallı vicdan hürriyeti! Başkaları tarafından her gün başımıza kakıldığı halde, yinde onlar tarafından nasıl tecâvüzlere uğruyorsun, bedbaht kutsal hak...” Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 155.

⁷⁴³ “Misyonerlerle ve okulun öğretmenleriyle görüşünüz. Ağzlarından bal akar. İnsâniyetten, geri kalmış yerleri medenîleştirmekten ve irfân nûru ile süslemekten başka şeylerden bahsetmezler. Siyaset, o hiç mümkün mü? Bunu düşünmezler bile. Fakat sözler ile hareketlerde ne kadar zıddiyet vardır. Bunlar esasta bizim Osmanlılığımıza, İslamlığımıza düşmandırlar. Hep onun aleyhine çalışıyorlar.” Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 155.

⁷⁴⁴ Ahmet Şerif, *Arnavutluk'da, Suriye'de, Trablusgarp'ta Tanîn*, 160-161.

the significance they attached to the Arabic people in general and the Arab language in particular aimed to demonstrate that they did not perceive the Arabs as inferior, or second-class citizens.

To conclude, the Ottoman travellers' perception of the Arab provinces of the Empire in the Middle East has some similarities and differences with their perceptions of North Africa, which was also a part of the Ottoman Empire. To start with, for both territories, the concept of urban duality prevails; the Middle Eastern cities including a significant Western community, such as Beirut, were evaluated in a way to employ urban duality, in other words, the different composition of Muslim and non-Muslim quarters of the city. Similar to the Ottoman travellers' accounts of the North African cities, the Middle Eastern cities were criticized for losing their peculiar characteristics at the expense of modernization. Moreover, the nomadic people of the Middle East were evaluated negatively as in the case of the nomadic people of North Africa and the Hamidian administration was criticized for its neglect of the region as in the case of North Africa. Although the degree of the critique directed towards European colonialism was lower in the Ottoman accounts of the Middle Eastern provinces compared to North Africa because of the lack of direct colonial expansion in the Middle East, still material and moral infiltration of the European colonial powers was critically evaluated by the Ottoman travellers.

Besides these similarities, the issue of Arab nationalism attracted the attention of the Ottoman travellers visiting the Arab provinces of the Middle East unlike the ones visiting the North Africa. Indeed the latter group of travellers criticized the Arabs of North Africa for losing their identities under colonial administration, while the former group criticized the Arabs for bringing their identity to the forefront. In other words, for the Arabs living under colonial rule, Arabness was perceived as the only way of survival, while for the Arabs living under the Ottoman rule, bringing the Arabic identity to the forefront was even cursed because of its facilitation of the disintegration of the Empire.

CHAPTER 11

THE OTTOMAN TRAVELLERS' PERCEPTION OF IRAN

11.1. Ottoman-Iranian Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

The long and exhausting wars between the two great Muslim Empires of the Middle East, namely the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, had come to an end with the Treaty of Zohab (or *Kasr-ı Şirin*) signed in 1639. This treaty established the boundary between these two empires, which survived with little change until modern times. However, the vague delimitation of the boundary did not necessarily mean the end of inter-imperial rivalry; rather, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ottoman-Iranian relations experienced significant problems, which brought these two Islamic empires into a series of wars or lesser clashes for regional domination.

The first problem continuously disturbing Ottoman-Iranian relations was the tribal question. The borderland was inhabited by several nomadic tribes, which had not recognized the established boundaries; depending on the conditions of pastures, they frequently passed the border to feed their herds. What is more, these tribes changed their allegiance from one empire to another quite often. As Rudi Matthee writes, the loyalty of the tribes might be bought but it could never be taken for granted.⁷⁴⁵ This shifting loyalty provided the borderlanders with a significant autonomy from both empires, which they utilized to a great extent. In sum, both the Ottoman Empire and Iran suffered from unamenable tribal formations preventing them from establishing effective control over their borders.

Continuous border breaches by the nomadic tribes produced the second major problem of Ottoman-Iranian relations, namely the border delimitation

⁷⁴⁵ Rudi Matthee, "The Safavid-Ottoman Frontier: Iraq-i Arab as Seen by the Safavids," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (Summer, 2003): 157-174, 165.

problem. The disputed territories on the borderlands resulted in a series of wars between two empires particularly during the first half of the eighteenth century, at the end of which several treaties were signed to affirm the original provisions of the Treaty of Zohab.⁷⁴⁶ Particularly, the campaigns of Nader Shah (r. 1736-1747) against the Ottoman Empire resulted in several significant Ottoman defeats; however when the Treaty of Kurdan was signed in 1746 at the end of these long campaigns, the boundary established in 1639 did not change.⁷⁴⁷

After Nader Shah's death, the relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire entered into a period of relative tranquillity until 1776 because of the Ottoman wars in the West and the inter-dynastic rivalry in Iran, which Shaw labels as "the longest continuous period of peace in [the Ottoman-Iranian] history."⁷⁴⁸ In this period, although the Ottoman Empire was encouraged by some other Islamic states, such as the Hyderabad Nizamate of India and Durrani Empire of Afghanistan, to wage a war against Iran, the Ottoman Sultans preferred to remain committed to the existing treaties with their Eastern neighbour, and even advised these Islamic states to develop friendly relations with Iran.⁷⁴⁹ In sum, the first half of the eighteenth century was a period of war

⁷⁴⁶ Between 1723 and 1746, there were four Ottoman-Iranian wars fought between 1723-1727, 1730-1732, 1735-1736, and 1742-1746.

⁷⁴⁷ For a detailed analysis of Nader Khan's campaigns against the Ottoman Empire see Stanford Shaw, "Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nader Shah to the Islamic Republic*, 7 Volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Vol. 7, 297-313, 298-309.

⁷⁴⁸ After Nader Shah's death Iran experienced a series of civil wars and impermanent governments under the short rules of Afsharid and Zand dynasties. This period could only come to an end with the establishment of Qajar rule in Iran in 1779. See Shaw, "Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", 311.

⁷⁴⁹ During his reign, besides his campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, Nader Shah also attacked Afghanistan and India; therefore the Sunni Muslim dynasties ruling in these regions suffered much from Iranian aggressiveness. Immediately after Nader Shah's death, the *Nizam* of Hyderabad, Qamer-ud-din Chin Kilidj Khan (r. 1720-1748), wrote a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud I (r. 1730-1748) in 1748 and encouraged him to initiate a religious/military campaign against the Shi'i Iran. Similarly, in 1762, the founder of Durrani dynasty as well as modern Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Durrani (r. 1747-1773) wrote a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757-1774) and demanded him to attack Iran as well. Both Sultans responded that they would follow the previous treaties with Iran. For these letters and the responses of the Ottoman

between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, and the lack of detailed border delimitation contributed much to the continuity of these wars, however, the second half of the century was a period of relative peace not because the border issue had been resolved, but because of other internal and external threats that these two empires had to face.

Besides the tribal and border problems, the third significant problem between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, which had descended from the early sixteenth century onwards, was the sectarian dispute between the Sunni and Shi'i communities of these states. Accordingly, since the onset of the Safavid threat, the Ottomans perceived Shi'i Islam quite negatively. The Shi'i propaganda over the nomadic Turcoman tribes of southern and eastern Anatolia in the first decades of the sixteenth century resulted in a significant uprising in 1511, which could hardly be suppressed. Particularly, the Ottomans had perceived this religious problem as one of the pretexts to engage in a war against a heretic sect for almost all the subsequent Ottoman-Safavid wars until the late seventeenth century.⁷⁵⁰ The perception of the Shi'i sect as a heresy continued until the eighteenth century; for example, in *Revan Fetihnâmesi (The Letter of Conquest of Yerevan)* written by Kemani Mustafa Ağa after the conquest of Revan in 1723, the Ottoman army was labelled as "the warriors fought in the name of Islam" (*guzzât-ı İslam*) while the Iranian troops were labelled as "the enemy of the religion" (*düşman-ı din*).⁷⁵¹

The end of the Safavid dynasty and the enthronement of Nader Khan as the Shah of Iran in 1736 transformed the Sunni-Shi'i cleavage to a considerable degree. Because of his previous achievements such as the provision of internal

Sultans see Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, "Nadir Şah Afşar'ın Ölümünden Sonra Osmanlı Devleti'ni İran'ı İstilaya Kışkırtmak İçin Yapılan İki Deneme," *Bellekten*, No. 46 (1948), 403-487.

⁷⁵⁰ For a brief analysis of Ottoman-Safavid relations see Feridun Emecen, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin 'Şark Meselesi'nin Ortaya Çıkışı: İlk Münasebetler ve İç Yansımaları," in *Tarihten Günümüze Türk-İran İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, 16-17 December 2002, Konya, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2003), 33-48.

⁷⁵¹ Münir Aktepe, *1720-1724 Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri ve Silahşör Kemani Mustafa Ağa'nın Revan Fetihnâmesi*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970), 41.

stability and external security, Nader Shah had a significant legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people. Being aware of his legitimacy and strength, before his enthronement, he convened the representatives of the *ulama*, the governors and other prominent bureaucrats of the state, and told them that he would accept to be enthroned as the Shah of Iran only if the Iranians accepted to pay respect to the four caliphs after the prophet, to abandon the militant Safavid version of the Shi'i faith, and to adopt the Jafari sect, which was closer to the Sunni understanding of Islam. Although the *ulama* initially resisted these demands, they reluctantly seemed to accept them in order not to challenge the authority of Nader Shah.⁷⁵² After that, in the same year, Nader Shah sent an envoy to the Porte and demanded the Ottoman Empire to accept the Jafari sect as the fifth sect of Islam following the prophetic tradition (*ehl-i sünnnet*).⁷⁵³ After consulting the Ottoman *ulama*, the government rejected this offer, and one of the Ottoman bureaucrats, the former *defterdar* (the official who heads the provincial treasury) of Yerevan and Baghdad, Mehmed Ragıb Efendi (1698-1763) was commissioned to write a pamphlet focusing on the abandonment of hostilities between Sunni and Shi'i sects, to establish friendly relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, and, if possible, to contribute to the unity of Islamic world through eliminating sectarian differences.⁷⁵⁴ Unfortunately, his pamphlet *Tahkik ve Teyfik (Investigation and Adaptation)* could not contribute to achieve these targets, since the rejection of Nader Shah's proposal resulted in another Ottoman-Iranian war between 1742 and 1746. During the war, Nader Shah occupied one of the holy cities of the Shi'i sect, Najaf, and convened another assembly bringing together the Shi'i *ulama* from various countries in 1743. The result of this assembly was the same with the one held in 1736. Nader Shah once more declared the Jafari sect as the official sect of Iran and demanded the

⁷⁵² Mehmet Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1999), 69.

⁷⁵³ The other four sects following the prophetic tradition were *Hanafî*, *Şafî*, *Maliki* and *Hanbali* sects.

⁷⁵⁴ For the full text of this pamphlet see Ahmet Zeki İzgöer, *Tahkik ve Teyfik: Osmanlı-İran Diplomatik Münasebetlerinde Mezhep Tartışmaları*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2003).

Ottoman *ulama* to accept it as the fifth sect of Sunni version of Islam. The second rejection of these proposals by the Ottoman government intensified the war, which ended with a treaty reaffirming the borders reached at 1639, and excluding a provision with regard to the approval of the Jafari sect as the fifth sect of Islam.⁷⁵⁵

In sum, during the eighteenth century, both the Ottoman Empire and Iran wanted to end the Sunni-Shi'i cleavage; however the attempts were made in such a way that no outcome had emerged out of years of debate. Indeed, Nader Shah tried to end hostilities through legitimizing the Shi'i faith by making the Ottoman Empire accept the Jafari sect as the fifth sect of Islam following the prophetic tradition. Ottomans, on the other hand, were reluctant and even reactive to do so for religious as well as political considerations. Instead, they wanted a solution resolving the differences between the Sunni and Shi'i sects and to create a unity rather than legitimizing the existing division through accepting a fifth sect. Since this unity would be established under the leadership of the sole legitimate religious authority, namely the Caliph, Iranians did not accept it. After Nader Shah's death, the sectarian issue was not brought to the forefront until the late nineteenth century, when the Hamidian Pan-Islamism once more initiated the discussion of ending the division between the Sunni and Shi'i Islam.

The three problems between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, namely the shifting allegiances of the tribes, the lack of delimitation of the Ottoman-Iranian border and the sectarian cleavages continued during the nineteenth century as well. However, except for a brief war between 1820 and 1823, the relations were more tranquil if not peaceful. One significant reason for this transformation was the common external threats menacing both empires and their internal processes of modernization. During the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire and Iran became the target of the Great Power rivalry, particularly between Russia and Britain. While Russia pursued the policy of reaching warm waters through the

⁷⁵⁵ Elton L. Daniel, *The History of Iran*, (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2000), 95. For a detailed analysis of Nader Shah's policies of Jafari sect see Ernest Tucker, "Nader Shah and Jafari Maddhab Reconsidered," *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1-4 (1994): 163-179.

Ottoman and/or Iranian soil and thereby cutting the British colonial route to India, Britain tried to prevent the realization of this policy. While the Ottoman Empire had to wage exhausting wars against Russia in the years 1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1853-1856, and 1876-1877, Iran had to fight with both Russia and Britain. The Russo-Iranian Wars of 1806-1813 and 1826-1828 resulted in the loss of significant Iranian territories in the Caucasus to Russia; this was followed by the Russian capture of some Iranian-controlled territories in Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. Iran also fought with Britain on the disputed territories in the Afghani-Iranian border between November 1856 and April 1857. All these wars with imperial powers depleted the financial resources of both empires and contributed to their decline.

On the other hand, these military defeats inflicted the idea of modernization in both Empires. The Ottoman modernization began to intensify by the turn of the nineteenth century under the rules of Selim III and Mahmud II, while Iran followed the suit during the tenure of Naser-ud-din Shah (r. 1848-1896). The reasons and the paths of modernization for both empires were quite similar. Both of them accepted their military, technological and institutional deficiencies *vis-à-vis* Europe and thus perceived Europe both as a model of change and a significant threat to their very existence. This resulted in selective modernization; both empires tried to modernize without adopting the moral elements of European civilization. What is more, both of them started their modernization in the military field and then widen its scope to the institutional and educational structure of the respective empires. The establishment of modern institutional forms for better governance and modern schools for better education were the common paths they followed.⁷⁵⁶

However, the degree of modernization in the Ottoman Empire and Iran were not the same. According to Nikkie Keddie, the modernization of the

⁷⁵⁶ For a detailed account and literature of Ottoman modernization see Part III of this dissertation. For a brief introduction to Iranian modernization see Monica Rigger, "The Discourse on Modernization and the Problem of Cultural Integrity in the Nineteenth Century Iran," in Rudi Mathee and Beth Baron (eds.), *Iran and Beyond: Essays in Middle Eastern History in Honor of Nikkie R. Keddie*, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2000), 56-69.

Ottoman Empire was earlier and more successful than Iran because of three factors:⁷⁵⁷ First of all, compared to the Ottoman Empire, nomadism was more prevalent in Iran. During the nineteenth century, as a result of Ottoman settlement policies, the number of nomads considerably declined in the Ottoman Empire; while in Iran the nomadic peoples constituted almost one third of the total Iranian population during most of the century.⁷⁵⁸ This lower degree of urbanization resulted in the slower dissemination of modernization into the society. Secondly, centralization and institutionalization was stronger in the Ottoman Empire compared to Iran; despite the internal problems of the Empire, there was dynastic continuity unlike its Eastern neighbour. More permanent state tradition resulted in a more continuous and courageous modernization in the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the Ottoman Empire's relations with the West were more developed. Ottoman Empire had been open to European trade long before Iran; indeed the Iranian trade with the West was done through the Ottoman Empire. This facilitated the Ottoman encounter with Western modernization earlier than Iran. Taha Akyol adds a fourth factor contributing to earlier, faster and stronger modernization of the Ottoman Empire; he argues that the Hanafi jurisprudence, which the Ottoman legal system was based on, was more flexible compared to the rigidity of the Shi'i jurisprudence of Iran. In other words, in general, the Ottoman *ulama* were less reactive to modernization compared to the Shi'i *ulama*. Therefore, Ottoman legal transformation could be realized more easily compared to Iran.⁷⁵⁹

Although both the Ottoman Empire and Iran had to wage their attention and resources to encounter foreign encroachments in the external sphere and modernization in the internal sphere during the nineteenth century, the three

⁷⁵⁷ Nikkie R. Keddie, "Socio-economic Change in the Middle East since 1800," in Abraham L. Udovitch, *The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and Social History*, (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1981), 765.

⁷⁵⁸ Nikkie R. Keddie and Mehrdad Amanad, "Iran under the Late Qajars, 1848-1922," in Avery [et.al.] (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 7, 174-212, 174.

⁷⁵⁹ Taha Akyol, *Osmanlı'da ve İran'da Mezhep ve Devlet*, (İstanbul: Doğan Yayıncılık, 1999), 195.

traditional problems (border disputes, borderlander tribes and Sunni-Shi'i cleavage) between these two empires did not come to an end. Starting with the tribes, the shifting allegiances of the nomadic tribes living in the border regions continued to be a major problem. Both states pursued the policy of hosting the tribes which had created several troubles in the neighbouring states.⁷⁶⁰ Similarly, the problem of delimitation of the border continued until the early twentieth century. The Ottoman-Iranian War of 1820-1823 ended with the Treaty of Erzurum, which once more confirmed the borders reached at 1639. However, the disputes over the control of Muhammarah and Shatt-al-Arab continued until the end of 1840s, when, through the mediation of the British and the Russians, a border delimitation commission was established in 1848. The commission's studies continued for four years; however it failed to resolve the problem.⁷⁶¹ The only outcome of this commission for the purposes of this dissertation was a detailed travelogue on the borderland between two empires, written by one of the members of the Ottoman delegation, Mehmed Hurşid, and entitled *Seyahâtnâme-i Hudûd (The Travelogue of the Borders)*.

In addition to the border delimitation and tribal questions, the Sunni-Shi'i cleavage continued during the nineteenth century as well.⁷⁶² The Treaty of Erzurum attempted to resolve several questions regarding this issue such as the

⁷⁶⁰ For example, after the Ottoman Empire appointed Halid Paşa the leader of Baban tribe of Iraq, as the governor of Suleymaniye in 1806 after the former governor İbrahim Paşa, the nephew of İbrahim Paşa from the same tribe, Abdurrahman Paşa, revolted against the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century and after being defeated by the Governor of Baghdad, he fled to Iran. Although the Ottoman government demanded from its Iranian counterpart to return Abdurrahman Paşa, the then Iranian Shah, Feth Ali (r. 1797-1834), refused to do so. See Mehmet Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, 79-80.

⁷⁶¹ For a detailed study on the border delimitation commission, see Kashani-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran;" Richard Schofield, "Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth Century Efforts to Delimit and Map the Perso-Ottoman Boundary," in Roxane Farmanfarmaian (ed.), *War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 149-173.

⁷⁶² For a detailed account of Ottoman apprehension of Shi'ism and Shi'i politics within the Ottoman Empire ,see Gökhan Çetinsaya, *The Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); Meir Litvak, *Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Faruk Yashçımen, "Sunnism Versus Shi'ism? Rise of the Shi'i Politics and of The Ottoman Apprehension in Late Nineteenth Century Iraq," Unpublished MA Thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2008).

free passage of Iranian pilgrims to Mecca, Medina and the holy Shi'i shrine cities in Ottoman Iraq, free trade of Iranian merchants in the Ottoman Empire and the opening of mutual diplomatic representations in Teheran and İstanbul.⁷⁶³ However, particularly after the 1847 Treaty, which had confirmed these provisions, Iran intensified Shi'i propaganda in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the region called *Atabât-ı Âliye* comprising the holy shrines of the Shi'i faith, such as Kazimeyn, Karbala, Najaf and Samarra. In this period, Ottoman government took some measures to prevent further Shi'i infiltration into the region such as the authorization of the Ottoman courts to handle with the legal cases between Iranian pilgrims coming to these holy shrines and the Ottomans, and the prohibition of land purchas by Iranians in these regions.⁷⁶⁴

In 1870, Iran was shattered by a significant famine and subsequent plague claiming the lives of one tenth of the Iranian population. Naser-ud-din Shah himself was among the survivors of the disease. After his recovery, he decided to pay a visit to the holy shrines in Iraqi provinces of the Ottoman Empire and demanded Ottoman permission. The Ottomans were initially reluctant; however they perceived this visit as an opportunity for better relations with their Eastern neighbour. Therefore, they gave permission to the Shah.⁷⁶⁵ This travel increased the hopes for normalization of relations with Iran, even some Ottoman newspapers began to mention about a prospective alliance and even the unity of these two Islamic states.⁷⁶⁶ However, particularly during Hamidian period, these hopes soon waned because of two significant problems, being the intensification of Shi'i propaganda activities in Iraq after Shah's visit and the Iranian discontent about Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamism.

⁷⁶³ Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, 81.

⁷⁶⁴ Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, 85.

⁷⁶⁵ According to Hasan Fasai, who had recorded this travel along with other developments in Iran, "[t]he first shah to travel peacefully from Persia to Iraq to perform the pilgrimage to the shrines of Emams and without the intention of conquering that region, was Naser-ud-din Shah." Hasan Fasai's *Farsname-i Naseri* was translated and edited by Heribert Busse as *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1972), 368.

⁷⁶⁶ Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, 89.

Gökhan Çetinsaya summarizes the reasons for the revival of the Shi'i problem in the late nineteenth century.⁷⁶⁷ To start with, he focuses on the highly politicized nature of the Iraqi Shi'i community due to a specific Shi'i school of jurisprudence called *Usûlî*, which had been widely adopted in the Iraqi provinces in the eighteenth century and which argued for an active political role for the Shi'i *ulama*. Secondly, he mentions about the British intervention into this problem by controlling a major source of revenue for the Shi'i shrines in Iraq called the "Oudh Bequest."⁷⁶⁸ This external infringement irritated the Ottomans more regarding the Shi'i propaganda activities. Third, after Naser-ud-din Shah's visit, the Shi'i *mollas* called *akhund* intensified their missionary zeal to convert Sunni inhabitants of Iraq into Shi'i. All these factors forced the Ottoman governments to take more effective steps to prevent the dissemination of Shi'ism in Iraq. They tried to prevent the publishing of pamphlets criticizing the Sunni faith, repaired the Shi'i holy shrines and adorned them with precious gifts, increased dialogue with the prominent Shi'i *ulama*, and opened new schools in the region to enhance the allegiance of the youth to the state and the Caliph himself.⁷⁶⁹

As the Ottomans were concerned about Iranian infiltration into the Iraqi provinces of the Empire, Iranians were discontent about the Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamism. Indeed, from the Safavid period onwards, Iran had always been sceptical about the projects on the Islamic unity; indeed, Iranian fear from being assimilated within the Islamic community encouraged the adoption of the Shi'i

⁷⁶⁷ Çetinsaya, *The Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, 99-101.

⁷⁶⁸ The Oudh Bequest had been established by the King of Oudh in India, and provided significant sums of money for the holy Shi'i shrines in Iraq. After the British annexation of this Kingdom, the British had assumed the responsibility of distribution of the bequest; hence they directly involved in the Shi'i problem of the Ottoman Empire. According to Meir Litvak, between 1850 and 1903, the Oudh Bequest channelled over six million rupees from India through British mediation, to the Shi'i shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. See Meir Litvak, "A Failed Manipulation: The British, the Oudh Bequest and the Shi'i Ulama of Najaf and Karbala," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (May 2000): 69-89.

⁷⁶⁹ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "The Caliph and Muftahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 2005): 561-574, 564; Saray, *Türk-İran İlişkileri*, 99-100.

sect in this country. In other words, they perceived their Shi'i faith as a means to preserve their identity. Therefore, the Hamidian call for Islamic unity was encountered quite negatively in Iran. Particularly, Abdülhamid's use of Jamaladdin Afghani to provide Iran's participation into a prospective Islamic unity resulted in significant reactions in Iran. Afghani was sent by Abdülhamid to Teheran to meet the Shah and the prominent Shi'i *ulama*, and delivered the Sultan's message of eliminating sectarian differences through a religious assembly consisting of Sunni and Shi'i *ulama*. However, the Iranian refusal directed Afghani to end this conciliatory approach and to call for the dethronement of the Shah.⁷⁷⁰ This angered the Iranians more and the Shah demanded Abdülhamid to imprison Afghani or send him to exile. Abdülhamid temporarily send him to London and allowed him to continue his activities there; however, after the British government demanded Afghani to stop his anti-Shah stance, he hosted Afghani once more in İstanbul. Finally, the assassination of the Shah by one of Afghani's followers in 1896 disturbed mutual relations more.

In sum, during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman-Iranian relations were far from being peaceful; this contributed much to the mutual negative perceptions developed by the Ottomans and Iranians regarding themselves. Such negative appreciation of the Iranians by the Ottomans was quite evident in the travelogues of the Ottoman travellers.

11.2. Ottoman Travellers' Perception of Iran in the Nineteenth Century

Unlike North Africa and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, Iran had not been a major destination of travel for the Ottoman travellers in the nineteenth century despite its geographical proximity. Except for diplomats⁷⁷¹ and merchants, who had served or made trade in Iran, Ottoman

⁷⁷⁰ His speeches in Iran accusing the Shah of "selling Iran to the infidels" resulted in his exile from the country in 1891. For the activities of Afghani in Iran see Nikkie R. Keddie, "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran," *Past & Present*, No. 34 (Jul., 1966): 70-80, 75.

⁷⁷¹ For a brief account of Ottoman diplomatic representations in Iran in the nineteenth century see Nejat Göyünç, "XIX. Yüzyılda Tahran'daki Temsilcilerimiz ve Türk-İran Münasebetlerine

travellers passed along this country to reach other destinations.⁷⁷² Their perception of Iran had been influenced from two main factors, being different levels of development of these two empires and their sectarian differences. It has already been mentioned that the Ottoman Empire and Iran had experienced different levels of modernization during the nineteenth century; Iranian modernization was relatively later, less effective and less continuous. When the Ottoman travellers saw Iran, they usually engaged in comparisons between these two empires in a way to emphasize the higher level of modernization of their own Empire. For example, in his memoirs, Abdülhak Hamid (1862-1937) referred to a conversation between Mirza Malkom Khan (1833-1908), the Iranian Ambassador to London, and Arifî Paşa (1830-1897), one of the Ottoman ministers (and later Grand Vizier).⁷⁷³ Accordingly, Malkom Khan stated that after seeing İstanbul, he had found no difference between the Ottoman capital and Teheran. Arifî Paşa later told Abdülhak Hamid that it was not quite surprising that Malkom Khan could not discern the “extreme difference” (*fark-ı azîm*) between these two capitals because he is both Iranian and of Armenian descent.⁷⁷⁴ In other words, his pride emerged out of his identity prevented him to appreciate the grandeur of İstanbul *vis-à-vis* Teheran. Similarly, Münif Paşa, who served as the Ottoman Ambassador to Teheran two times,⁷⁷⁵ wrote in one of his despatches that he had been discontent about the situation of his country and complained about the dullness in terms of progress; however, when he saw

Etkileri,” *Atatürk Konferansları*, 6 Volumes, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1975), Vol. 5, 271-280.

⁷⁷² Süleyman Şükrü passed Iran and reached Russia, Mehmed Fazlı passed along Iranian-Afghan border to reach Afghanistan, and Mehmed Hurşid travelled along the Ottoman-Iranian frontier for border delimitation.

⁷⁷³ Abdülhak Hamid had been to Iran during his father Hayrullah Efendi’s (1818-1866) embassy to Teheran between 1865 and 1866. Therefore, his memoirs included his observations in Teheran and became an interesting source for Ottoman perception of Iran.

⁷⁷⁴ Enginün (ed.), *Abdülhak Hâmid’in Hatıraları*, 70.

⁷⁷⁵ Münif Paşa served as the Ottoman Ambassador to Teheran between 1873-1877 and 1895-1897.

Iran, he thanked God for the level of progress of the Ottoman Empire because Iran's conditions "[...] were beyond imagination both in terms of bad governance and in terms of misery and ravage".⁷⁷⁶ In another despatch he wrote that the Iranian authorities had established an army division based on the Ottoman model; however they could not preserve the order of these troops unlike the Ottomans.⁷⁷⁷

Lack of proper governance and the rule of law in Iran was another matter of criticism in diplomatic despatches. In one of such correspondence with the Grand Vizier, Münif Paşa exaggeratingly noted that no law and rule existed in Iran.⁷⁷⁸ Similarly Mehmed Rebiî Paşa, who was sent within a diplomatic envoy bringing the medals and gifts of Sultan Abdülhamid to Muzaffer-üd-din Shah (r. 1896-1907), wrote in his report submitted to the Sultan that the "Iranian realm is totally devoid of any kind of reordering and reform."⁷⁷⁹ In sum, these diplomats underlined different levels of modernization between two states, and argued that despite the shortcomings of its modernization, the Ottoman Empire was in a better condition compared to Iran in terms of legal and institutional structure. The ultimate emphasis of *Tanzimat* intellectuals on the establishment of a new legal basis for the Empire was quite visible in such comparisons. What is more, they mentioned about Iranian failure in imitating some of the Ottoman practices, particularly the failure of ensuring the continuity of these modernizing moves.

Another indication of the Iranian inferiority *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman Empire in terms of modernization was the lack of city planning and squalidity of Iranian buildings. In one of his despatches, Münif Paşa wrote that from his childhood, he

⁷⁷⁶ "[...] *gerek su-i idârece ve gerek fakr-u harâbiyetçe tasavvur olunacak derecenin mâ-fevkindedir.*" This despatch was published in the newspaper *Uhuvvet-i Fikriye* on June 26, 1330 (July 9, 1914). For the transcription of this letter see Özgül, *Münif Paşa*, 288.

⁷⁷⁷ This despatch is dated 6 Cemaziyyülahir 1292 (10 July 1875); see Ali Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 34.

⁷⁷⁸ "*İran'da hiç bir şey için kanun ve kaide olmayıb [...]*" This despatch is dated 16 Receb 1290 (9 September 1873); for its transcription see Özgül, *Münif Paşa*, 292.

⁷⁷⁹ "*Memâlik-i İraniyye her türlü tanzimât ve tensikâttan külliyyen mahrum*" For the transcription of this report dated 28 Nisan 1314 (10 May 1898) see Nejat Göyünç, "Muzafferüddin Şah ve II. Abdülhamid Devrinde Türk-İran Dostluk Tezahürleri," in *İran Şehinşahlığı'nın 2500. Kuruluş Yıldönümüne Armağan*, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 159-162, 161.

dreamed of Iran as a place like paradise, however he had been disappointed when he saw miserable conditions of this country.⁷⁸⁰ These conditions were not only peculiar to the houses of ordinary people, but also even to the mansions of the Shah. When Münif Paşa was heading towards Teheran for his diplomatic service, on the way, he had been hosted in the mansion of the Shah in one of the smaller cities of Iran; this mansion was labelled by himself as the “villager’s house.”⁷⁸¹

Besides diplomatic despatches, the Ottoman travellers perceived Iranian cities and buildings quite negatively. For example, according to Süleyman Şükrü, Iranian cities were in an extreme disorder and misery, there was no architectural monument attracting the attention of the travellers.⁷⁸² What is more, he criticized the Iranians for being unaware of city-planning. For example, with regard to Zanjan, he wrote that the inhabitants of the city had established a tannery at the banks of the river passing through the city and disturbed its entire panorama.⁷⁸³

Mehmed Fazlı’s description of Meshed was not much different from Süleyman Şükrü’s accounts. Accordingly, Mehmed Fazlı was welcomed by a local notable to be stayed in his house; he described the way to his house as such:

The narrow and terrible streets that we passed while we were going to this house and the walls standing each other as if they would fall down, in sum, all the things that we saw were so dismal that they created gloominess and sorrow, grief and lapsing regarding our ideas about the civilization of the holy Meshed.⁷⁸⁴

In other words, Mehmed Fazlı had been thinking that Meshed was a city representing a particular (Islamic) civilization; however the appearance of the

⁷⁸⁰ This despatch is dated 11 Rebiulevvel 1290 (9 May 1873), for its transcription see Özgül, *Münif Paşa*, 283.

⁷⁸¹ Ali Budak, *Münif Paşa*, 413.

⁷⁸² “[...] *nazara çarpacak mebanii ve menazili, beğenilecek hiç bir semti yoktur.*” Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 135, 139.

⁷⁸³ Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 140.

⁷⁸⁴ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 33.

city disappointed him about the degree of civility of this city, which had been perceived as equally sacred by the Sunni and Shi'i communities.

Not only the cities in the countryside, but even Teheran, the capital city of Iran, received significant criticisms from the Ottoman diplomats or travellers. Münif Paşa wrote in his despatch to Yusuf Kamil Paşa that the buildings of Teheran was constructed simply from soil, therefore a heavy rain could destroy entire city, “even a fire-fighting squad could bring the most strong walls down to the earth.”⁷⁸⁵ For Süleyman Şükrü, except some inhabitants of Teheran, there was nothing worth of mentioning: “What makes Teheran active and demonstrates its glory is the presence of imperial dynasty, the elites and the rich people; there is no ostentatious and comfortable place worth of loving, seeing and enjoying.”⁷⁸⁶ Despite these negative characteristics and although having no resemblance to any European city, according to Süleyman Şükrü, Teheran had a “peculiar charm” (*kendine mahsûs bir letâfet*) particularly for those who were accustomed to the living style of the East (*Şark mâişetine alışkın olan zevât*). It was “the largest city in the Iranian realm and the most beautiful one among the cities in Central Asia.”⁷⁸⁷ These depictions of the city demonstrates that Süleyman Şükrü clearly distinguished between Europe and Iran, and unlike most of the Ottoman travellers, who had particularly attempted to find similarities between Oriental and European cities, he cited no such resemblance. What is more, Teheran could only be appreciated by the Easterners or those accustomed to the Eastern life-style; this was another clear-cut distinction between European and Iranian civilizations.

The countryside of Iran was under more miserable conditions. Mehmed Fazlı, who had passed along the eastern border zone between Iran and

⁷⁸⁵ “[...] *bir tulumbacı bölüğü dahi en metîn surunu zîr-ü zeber edebilir.*” Özgül, *Münif Paşa*, 284.

⁷⁸⁶ “*Tahran’ı şetâretlendirip şerefli gösteren hânedân-ı Şâhî ile küberâ ve ağniyânın vücudları olub, şehirde sevilecek, görülecek, eğlenilecek mutantan ve müferrah yer yoktur.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 142.

⁷⁸⁷ “[...] *Acemistan’da vakî bilâdın ekberi ve Asya-yi Vustâ’da bulunan medâinin ecmelidir.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 147.

Afghanistan, underlined the messy inns that he and his friends had stayed. In his travelogue, he compared Russia and Iran while passing the Russo-Iranian border. Despite the negative description of Russia because of its aggressive foreign policy towards the Central Asia, the Russian border garrison was appreciated as a modern and defensible post; while the Iranian border garrison was defined as a terrible ruin with a customs officer wearing rugged and shabby clothes. He and his fellow companions were forced to spend the night there, which he defined as such: “During this small journey, until here, we have not passed such a miserable night in such a miserable place.”⁷⁸⁸ In sum, Mehmed Fazlı emphasized the stark contrast between Russia and Iran in terms of the degree of modernization.

If one of the reasons for Ottoman travellers’ negative perception of Iran was the underdevelopment of this country compared to the Ottoman Empire, a more significant reason was the Sunni-Shi’i cleavage. This religious divide influenced the Ottoman perception of Iran to a significant extent and almost all the travelogues included an indirect criticism of Shi’ism. The intensification of Shi’i propaganda in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman attempts for including Iran to a prospective Islamic alliance fostered the mutual distrust between two communities; this resulted in Ottoman travellers’ comparison between Sunni and Shi’i versions of Islam and their emphasis on the shortcomings of the latter.

Interestingly, one of such shortcomings was perceived as the lack of hygiene. Since the travellers did not directly criticize Shi’i Islam, they did so by criticizing some of its provisions. The use of water for ablution was one of them. Accordingly, the Sunni version of Islam is more inclined to use flowing water for ablution, while the Shi’i version generally advises to use ditch water, in other words, they practice ablution from pools. However, the dirtiness of such pools was a significant matter of criticism for the Ottoman travellers. For example, Süleyman Şükrü went to a bath in Teheran after a long and exhausting voyage; however, after seeing the messy pool in which people were cleaning he did not enter into the pool and ordered fresh water for his own bathing. He argued that

⁷⁸⁸ “Bütün şu küçük seyahâtimizde buraya kadar, böyle sefil bir yer, böyle sefil bir gece geçirmemiştik.” Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahâtnâmesi*, 30.

such a practice of cleaning within a pool was a Shi'i tradition and he pitied the Iranians and demanded the God not to give such a miserable life even to his enemies.⁷⁸⁹ Similarly, in the Kazimeyn mosque in Iraq, Mehmed Hurşid saw a similar pool for ablution. He wrote:

They have a pool called *Havz-ı Kür*. They wash the meats and other ingredients of their food in the pool, they practice ablution, and they filled their ewers which they use in toilets from the pool. They do many other things which are obscene to be mentioned here. Since the water of the aforementioned pool is stagnant, there emerge a very disgusting smell difficult to define, and the respect and obedience of the Iranians towards good manners is evident with this [practice].⁷⁹⁰

In sum, the lack of hygiene was tied to the Shi'i tradition in Iran; this also means that the Ottoman travellers perceived themselves and their Sunni sect as superior to the Iranians and the Shi'i sect by degrading the latter through criticizing their disinclination to cleanliness.

A second shortcoming of Shi'i tradition was the bigotry (*taassup*) of its adherents. Accordingly, the travellers perceived Shi'ism as an impediment in front of modernization. Although this was not directly mentioned in the travelogues, from some of the descriptions of Iranians and their habits, such a perception could be derived. For example, while criticizing the indolence of Iranians to the recent technological developments, Süleyman Şükrü wrote as such:

I have no doubt that the Iranians, who could not abandon the rules of previous ages, [...] are totally devoid of wealth and happiness. To stay indifferent to all the progress of the developments of current times does never befit to a clever nation like Iranians.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁹ “*Bu diyar sekenesinin şu suretle geçirdikleri zillet hayatı Allah düşmanıma da nasip etmesin.*” Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 139.

⁷⁹⁰ “*Havz-ı Kür ta'bîr olunur bir havuzları olup ta'anda pişecek luhûmât ve sâireyi derûnuna daldırıp çıkarırlar ve derûnunda abdest alırlar ve ayak yolunda istimâl eyledikleri ibrikleri sokup doldururlar. Daha nice zikri müstehcen işler işlerler. Havz-ı mezbûrun suyu râkid olduğundan tariften hâriç bir mertebede pis çirkin râyiha peydâ etmekle A'câm'ın terbiye olan hürrmet ve riayetleri bununla ızâ'a olduğu bî-iştibâhtır.*” Mehmed Hurşid, *Seyahât-nâme-i Hudud*, 57-58.

⁷⁹¹ “*Kurûn-u evvelân kavâidini terk edemeyen İranilerin şu hallerini görünce, [...] refah ve saâdetten bilküllüye mahrûm olduklarına şüphem kalmadı. Asr-ı hâziranın her türlü terakkiyâtına karşı bîgâne durmak İraniler gibi zekî bir kavme asla yakışmıyor.*” Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 136.

Similarly, in criticizing the Iranian government, Süleyman Şükrü argued that the government reversed their “step to progress” (*hatve-i terakkî*) to the past and wrote that “the reason for the long sleep of this government as *Ashâb-ı Kehf* was the bigotry of its subjects.”⁷⁹² He compared the characteristics of Iranians with other nations as well: “The selfishness of Iranians is more than the English, their bigotry is more than the Spanish, their roguery is more than the Greeks, [and] their opium-addiction is more than the Chinese.”⁷⁹³ In sum, although Süleyman Şükrü bitterly criticized several practices of Iranians, indeed he perceived this nation as a clever one. The problem was, therefore, was not their lack of capacity to overcome these deficiencies, but the religious bigotry that prevented them to abandon the traditions impeding their modernization.

Mehmed Fazlı’s description of his experiences in Meshed in the Shi’i holy shrines also demonstrated the Ottoman criticism of Iranian maltreatment in these places, sacred not only for the Shi’i community but also for the Sunnis. In one occasion, he and his fellow companions were forced to give money to the keepers of the Imam Reza Mosque in order to be able to visit these monuments. Mehmed Fazlı found this practice quite odd, since they visited these places only for religious purposes. The exploitation of the religious sentiments of people was bitterly criticized in his travelogue.⁷⁹⁴

Mehmed Fazlı also underlined that the bigotry of Iranians did not only target the Sunnis but also non-Muslim communities. Accordingly, in the marketplace of Meshed, there was a chain beyond which non-Muslims were not allowed to pass. Mehmed Fazlı and his companions passed beyond the chain; however, due to their modern dresses, local people thought that they were

⁷⁹² “*Şu hükümetin ashâb-ı Kehf gibi nevm-i medîde dalmasındaki hikmet tebâsının taassubudur.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 144. *Âshab-ı Kehf* was a group composed of seven persons and their dog, who had escaped from the persecution of the Romans because of their monotheistic belief. They hide into a cave where they had slept for centuries. Süleyman Şükrü referred to that Quranic tale in his description of the Iranian government.

⁷⁹³ “*İranlıların hodbünlikleri İngilizlere, taassubları İspanyollara, belâperdazlıkları Yunanlılara, tiryak-keşlikleri Çinlilere [...] rahmet okutuyor.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 144

⁷⁹⁴ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 34-35.

Christians, and they attempted to attack them. The company could only survive the incident after they had convinced the attackers that they were Muslims. Mehmed Fazlı wrote in his travelogue that, the Iranian notable hosting them in Meshed warned them as such: “You should not go outside! The people are savage.”⁷⁹⁵ In other words, by citing the Iranian notable, indeed, Mehmed Fazlı aimed to demonstrate what the Iranian bigotry might mean.

All in all, the Ottoman travellers’ perception of Iran was extremely negative, almost more than any other region in the non-European world. Indeed, the reason for this pejorative outlook was not that Iran was extremely backward as they had depicted; however, the political problems with that particular state contributed to the emergence of a negative public opinion about Iran, from which the travellers were also influenced. What is more, the inherent Sunni reaction to Shi’ism consolidated the negative perception of Iran. In sum, the inferior status attached to the Iran and Iranians was not a result of Orientalist conceptions, but a result of political and cultural divergences.

⁷⁹⁵ “*Burada sokağa çıkılmaz! Ahali vahşidir.*” Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 38.

CHAPTER 12

THE OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF THE CENTRAL ASIA

12.1. Ottoman Relations with the Central Asia

Ottoman relations with the Central Asian states and peoples can be traced back to the sixteenth century, when the Safavid threat forced the Sunni Uzbeks to seek an alliance with the archrival of the Safavids, the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹⁶ Accordingly, the Uzbek Khans of Bukhara sent emissaries to the Porte in 1566 and 1588, and offered a mutual attack from the western and north-eastern frontiers of Persia.⁷⁹⁷ The first offer was not welcomed because of the Ottoman-Iranian peace emerged after the Treaty of Amasya (1555). However, the second offer, including the partition of Persia between the Ottoman Empire and the Khanate of Bukhara, came when the Ottoman-Safavid Wars of 1578-1590 was at its climax.⁷⁹⁸ Therefore, the Ottomans considered this offer; however, before its materialization, the war had ended, and the Ottomans declined further Uzbek demands of partition, which continued until the end of the sixteenth century.

⁷⁹⁶ Safavid Shah Ismail defeated the Uzbeks in 1510 and occupied Khorasan and Khwarizm. However; the Uzbeks were able to extend their authority over Transoxus region and reoccupied Khwarizm. From then on, there emerged an Uzbek-Safavid rivalry over Khorasan. Under the ambitious ruler of Bukhara, Abdullah Khan, the Uzbeks later captured Merv, Andhud, Shibirgan, Balkh, Samarkand and Tashkent between 1567 and 1579. This intensified Uzbek-Safavid conflict, which also coincided with the 1578-1590 Ottoman-Safavid Wars. Therefore, this war was the period, when the Ottoman-Uzbek relations reached a zenith. Abdullah Gündoğdu, "Türkistan'da Osmanlı-İran Rekabeti," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 581-587, 581-584. For a brief account of the Uzbek state and its relations with its Central Asian neighbours, also see Peter L. Roudik, *The History of Central Asian Republics*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 52-57 and René Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*, translated by Naomi Walford, Eighth Edition, (Chapel Hill, NC: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 481-486.

⁷⁹⁷ Mehmet Saray, *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler (1775-1875)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994), 6-7.

⁷⁹⁸ During the 1578-1590 wars, several Uzbek emissaries came to the Porte; these delegations were responded in 1586, when the Porte sent Piyale Paşa to Abdullah Khan in order for negotiating a prospective military alliance. Gündoğdu, "Türkistan'da Osmanlı-İran Rekabeti," 583.

Another significant development that directed the Ottoman attention to the Central Asia in the second half of the sixteenth century was the Russian southward expansion towards Caucasia. The Russian occupation of Kazan in 1552 and, more importantly, the conquest of the territories of the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556 concerned the Ottomans about the security of trade and pilgrimage routes from the Central Asia to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman initiatives to establish a naval base in Caspian Sea, known as *Bahr-i Kulzum Kapudanlığı* and the project of establishing a canal connecting the Don and Volga rivers (therefore, linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea) in the late sixteenth century reflected this concern, although both projects could not be materialized.⁷⁹⁹

The internal disturbances and the external threats diverted the attention of the Ottoman Empire from the Central Asia in the seventeenth century. However, still, the Central Asian states, such as the Amirate of Bukhara or the Khanate of Khive,⁸⁰⁰ or tribal political entities such as the ones established by Kalmyk or Kyrgyz people demanded Ottoman mediation to solve their internal problems. The Ottomans generally responded positively to these demands of mediation. For example, in 1647, the son of the Amir of Bukhara rebelled against his father and both sides demanded Ottoman mediation. The then Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim (r. 1640-1648) resolved the issue through advising the former to stop his rebellion against his father and the latter to forgive his son.⁸⁰¹ Similarly, in 1690, the Khan

⁷⁹⁹ Gündoğdu, "Türkistan'da Osmanlı-İran Rekabeti," 582.

⁸⁰⁰ From the sixteenth century onwards, the Central Asia was very much dominated by three states, being the Uzbek Khanate, the Amirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khive. The Amirate of Bukhara was established in 1500 and controlled western parts of Central Asia, while the Khanate of Khive established in 1512 mainly controlled the eastern parts. These khanates lived their golden age in the mid-seventeenth century, after which internal disturbances and external threats, such as the Russians and the Persians, weakened them. The third significant state of Central Asia, namely the Khanate of Kokand was established in 1710 after the weakening of the Amirate of Bukhara on the Fergana Valley. For the political, economic and socio-cultural structures of these Central Asian states, see Roudik, *The History of Central Asian Republics*, 57-62; Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 177-194.

⁸⁰¹ Mehmet Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan: Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2003), 196.

of Kalmuks, Ayuka (1669-1724), sent an envoy to the Porte declaring that he had recognized the Ottoman sovereignty. The reason for this recognition was that the acceptance of his allegiance by the Caliph would serve as a source of legitimization of Ayuka's political authority and increased his prestige among his rivals. The then Ottoman Sultan, Suleiman II (r. 1687-1691), accepted the allegiance of Ayuka Khan and advised him to get along well with the neighbouring countries.⁸⁰²

The activities of two external powers, namely Qajar Persia and Russia, which had been threatening both the Ottoman Empire and the Central Asian states, resulted in the intensification of the correspondence between these two in the second half of the eighteenth century. Ottoman-Qajar wars were relatively shorter and resolved quickly before 1750s, when Nader Shah directed its attention to the East, namely to the Central Asia and Afghanistan. Therefore, when Muhammed Bahadır Khan (r. 1742-1747) of Khive and Ahmed Shah Durrani (r. 1747-1773) of Afghanistan demanded the support of the Ottoman Empire in their quest against Nader Shah, the Ottoman Sultans, which wanted to maintain peaceful relations with Iran, advised them to abandon their aggressive stance against Nader Shah and to develop good relations with him.⁸⁰³

When the Russian threat against the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the second half of the eighteenth century with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, this time, the Ottoman Empire contacted the Central Asian states and demanded their support in the Ottoman quest against Russia. Within this context, Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-1789) sent Alemdar Mehmed Seyyid Ağa to the Amirate of Bukhara in order to arouse the Central Asian Muslims against Russia. In his letter to the Amir of Bukhara, Abdülhamid I demanded him to send sheikhs, dervishes and members of *ulama* to the Central Asian Muslims in order to get their support to the Ottoman Empire. The responding letter of the Amir indicated that he accepted the

⁸⁰² Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 197.

⁸⁰³ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 200-201.

Ottoman demands; however, no significant result had emerged out of this correspondence.⁸⁰⁴ Meanwhile, another Ottoman delegation, headed by Ferah Ali Paşa, was sent to Caucasia in 1780 in order to obtain the allegiance of the Circassian tribes in the region. This delegation contributed to the Islamization of the Circassians and their support of the Ottomans during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1787-1792.⁸⁰⁵

Another significant issue in the second half of the eighteenth century, which would later result in the intensification of Ottoman interest in the Central Asia, was the Chinese invasion of East Turkistan between 1755 and 1764 and the establishment of Chinese administration over the region.⁸⁰⁶ In order to provide total subservience of the Muslims of East Turkistan, China had established a strict administration, which triggered Muslim resistance movements in the first decades of the nineteenth century.⁸⁰⁷ What is more, Chinese Muslims found a significant ally in this period, the Khanate of Kokand, which was one of the strongest states of Central Asia in the early nineteenth century. The Khans of Kokand had been persuaded by the *Khojas*, the former rulers of East Turkistan deposed by the Chinese, about reclaiming the region in order to preserve their lucrative trade relations. In 1826, the Khan of Kokand sent Jahangir Khoja with the troops of Kokand to capture East Turkistan.

⁸⁰⁴ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 203-209.

⁸⁰⁵ Mustafa Budak, "Kafkasya ve Osmanlı Devleti (XVI-XX. Yüzyıllar)," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1, 594-612, 598.

⁸⁰⁶ After the Mongol rule in the Central Asia under Genghis Khan, his descendents and Timurids, in the sixteenth century, the rule of *Khojas*, the so-called descendents of Prophet Muhammed and masters of Naqshbandi order, in East Turkistan had been established. The rule of *Khojas* brought peace and stability to the region for most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; however, the rivalry among *Khojas* and the Kalmuk incursions to the region weakened their rule and this facilitated the Chinese invasion of East Turkistan. For a brief account of *Khojas* and their influence in East Turkistan, see James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 83-88.

⁸⁰⁷ Particularly, the rebellion of Ziyaeddin Akhund Khoja between 1816 and 1826 aroused the Muslims of East Turkistan to resist against the Chinese rule. See Baymirza Hamit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi*, translated by Abdülkadir Sadak, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), 138-139. In this period of invasion, the Chinese named East Turkistan as Xinjiang (The New Frontier) and from then on a contentious debate has been started about naming the region. See Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 97.

Initially, Jahangir was able to force the Chinese to retreat; however, after his victory, he cooled his relations with the Khan of Kokand, which resulted in the retreat of Kokand troops from East Turkistan and subsequent Chinese invasion in 1827.⁸⁰⁸ In 1830, The Khan of Kokand attacked China once more and captured East Turkistan for a while. From this period until 1864, the region had experienced the fierce rivalry of the Chinese, the Khanate of Kokand and the *Khojas*. Finally, in 1864, the Khan of Kokand and Buzurg Khoja, the son of Jahangir, had come to terms about the ruling of East Turkistan. A Kokand army headed by Yakub Bey was able to capture the region from the Chinese and install Buzurg Khoja as the ruler of East Turkistan. However, Yakub Bey was the *de facto* ruler of the country, and declared the independence of East Turkistan in 1867.⁸⁰⁹

While the Chinese were the most significant threat for the East Turkistan, for the rest of Central Asia, it was the Russians. Starting from the late 1840s, the three Khanates of Central Asia, namely, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, began to inform the Porte about the Russian threat and demanded the Ottoman support. However, the Empire had already been busy for consolidating internal reform processes and balancing the interests of the European powers. Therefore, these demands could not be replied positively.⁸¹⁰ Having been disappointed by the polite refusal of the Ottoman Empire, the Khanates turned their attention to Great Britain and sent envoys to the British governor of India. Indeed, Great Britain had already been concerned about the Russian desire to establish control over Central Asia; however, the British foreign policy focused on the establishment of Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and British India and the protection

⁸⁰⁸ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 111-112. For a detailed account of Jahangir Khoja's attacks on China and his relations with the Khans of Kokand, see L. J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, c. 1760-1860*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005), 95-123.

⁸⁰⁹ Hamit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi*, 140-145 and Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 116-123.

⁸¹⁰ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 214-215.

of British commercial interests in the region. Therefore, the British could not also respond the demands of the Khanates positively.⁸¹¹

The long-planned Russian military campaign towards Central Asia had started in 1864, when desperate calls from the Khanates reached the Porte. Already weakened by internal disturbances and rivalries among themselves, the Khanates fell one after another. In 1873, the Khive and Bukhara had been defeated and accepted Russian sovereignty; they would endure their existence until 1920 as semi-autonomous political entities. Three years later, Kokand was occupied by the Russians, and unlike the other two Khanates, it was directly transformed into the Russian province of Fergana. In sum, in the ten years between 1864 and 1873, Western Turkistan fell under Russian domination.⁸¹²

Russian advance was not limited to the Central Asia; Caucasia was under the Russian threat as well. Since some parts of this region were controlled by the Ottoman Empire, the Russian threat in Caucasia was more intimidating for the Ottomans, compared to the Central Asia. From the early eighteenth century onwards Russia from the north and Persia from the south pressed towards Caucasia. However, the decisive assaults began in the late eighteenth century, particularly after the Ottoman defeat in the Ottoman Russian War of 1778-1774. Russians began to move southwards and occupy some parts of Caucasia; as a reaction to Russian invasion, the religious orders, which had consolidated themselves during the eighteenth century, began to arouse Muslims against the Russians. Particularly, the resistance of Sheikh Mansur from 1785 onwards

⁸¹¹ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 216-217.

⁸¹² For the occupation of Central Asian Khanates and establishment of Russian direct or indirect rule in the region, see Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, 195-208; Francis Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross, *The Heart of Asia: A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times*, (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 163-168. For a detailed account of Russian rule in Bukhara and Khiva, see Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924*, (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004). For a detailed account of the establishment of Russian administration in Central Asia, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "From the Russian Capture of Tashkent to Full Sovietization, 1865-1966," in Edward Allworth, *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), 131 ff.

contributed to a wider resistance movement approximately half a century later.⁸¹³ Subsequent Ottoman-Russian Wars between 1788 and 1792, 1806 and 1812, and 1827 and 1828, resulted in further losses of the Ottoman territories in the region; meanwhile, the Russians continuously defeated the Persians and occupied most of the Eastern and Southern Caucasia between 1813 and 1828. In sum, from 1830s onwards, Russian control of Caucasia was very much consolidated. However, this control was not free from problems; particularly the resistance movement of Sheikh Shamil (1797-1871) prevented the Russians from administering the region properly.⁸¹⁴

The Ottoman governments followed the resistance of Sheikh Shamil closely. Especially during the Crimean War, the Ottomans contacted him and offered a mutual offensive against the Russians. Although these plans could not be materialized, Sheikh Shamil was granted with the title of “Grand Commander of Dagestan” by the then Ottoman Sultan, Abdülmecid, in 1854.⁸¹⁵

The Russian invasion of Caucasia resulted in a massive influx of Caucasian people into the Ottoman Empire. Especially during and after the Ottoman-Russian War between 1877 and 1878, thousands of Caucasians migrated to the Empire and the settlement of these migrants became a significant financial and social problem for the Ottoman governments. This war indicated the total collapse of the Ottoman rule in Caucasia; however, Ottoman contacts with local Muslim leaders continued until the end of the First World War.

East Turkistan faced a similar fate a little later. The independent East Turkistan state under Yakub Bey was able to maintain its existence against Chinese pressure until 1877, thanks to the British and Ottoman diplomatic and

⁸¹³ For the resistance movement of Sheikh Mansur, see Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 66-67.

⁸¹⁴ For a brief account of Sheikh Shamil’s resistance movement, see King, *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*, 77-91; for the implications of religious orders in Caucasian resistance movements, see Michael Kemper, “Khālidiyya Networks in Daghestan and the Question of Jihād,” *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2002): 41-71 and Moshe Gammer, “The Beginnings of the Naqshbandiyya in Dāghestān and the Russian Conquest of the Caucasus,” *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Nov., 1994): 204-217.

⁸¹⁵ Budak, “Kafkasya ve Osmanlı Devleti (XVI-XX. Yüzyıllar),” 604.

military support as well as internal problems of China.⁸¹⁶ Accordingly, Yakub Bey sent two missions, one to the Ottoman Empire and the other to the British governor of India. The mission to the Porte arrived in 1872 demanding the Sultan/Caliph's recognition of Yakub Bey's authority over East Turkistan and military support against Russian and Chinese pressures. Unlike the Ottoman response to the demands of other Khanates, Abdülaziz, who had already concerned about Russian advance in the West Turkistan, decided to respond positively to the demands of Yakub Bey. On the one hand, he accepted Yakub Bey's allegiance to himself as the Caliph and recognized him as Amir of East Turkistan; on the other hand, he sent arms and ammunition together with military personnel.⁸¹⁷ The Ottoman delegation reached Kasghar almost at the same time with the British delegation, which aimed to increase British commercial relations with East Turkistan. Yakub Bey signed a commercial treaty with the British in 1874 and a Central Asian Trading Company was established in the same year.⁸¹⁸ Another significant diplomatic success of Yakub Bey was to ensure Russian neutrality in the conflict between East Turkistan and China; this neutrality was because of the Russian focus on Western Turkistan and their concern about the relations between Yakub Bey and the British. However, all these efforts, Ottoman military and British commercial support as well as Russian neutrality, could not prevent the demise of this short-lived state of East Turkistan. In 1876, the Chinese full-scale attack began and Yakub Bey died. One year later, Chinese forces occupied Kasghar and ended the independence of East Turkistan.

In sum, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most of the Central Asian region was controlled by either the Russians or the Chinese. The only relatively independent state remained in the region was Afghanistan. Indeed, from the 1830s onwards, Afghanistan was perceived by the British as a vitally important state, since it would act as a buffer between Russia and British India.

⁸¹⁶ For a brief account of Ottoman and British support to Yakub Khan, Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 123.

⁸¹⁷ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 161.

⁸¹⁸ Saray, *The Russian, British, Chinese and Ottoman Rivalry in Turkestan*, 152.

From 1836 onwards, they contacted with the Afghan ruler Dost Muhammed Khan (r. 1826-1839 and 1842-1863); however, they found his main contestant, Shah Shuja (r. 1803-1809), a more reliable partner. The British intervention in Afghanistan to install Shah Shuja as the Afghan ruler resulted in the First Anglo-Afghan War between 1839 and 1842. This was a futile conflict, since the British retreated after a change of government in London demanding immediate end of British attack and since Dost Muhammed Khan preserved its position after the war.⁸¹⁹ This conflictual relationship soon turned out to be a friendship between 1869 and 1872 under the administration of Shir Ali Khan, because the British were concerning about the Russian southward expansion. However, when Russia occupied Bukhara and Khive and approached the Afghan border, the British governor of India failed to respond Shir Ali Khan's demand of support against the Russians. This alienated Shir Ali Khan from the British. In order to re-establish friendly relations, in 1876, the British demanded the Ottoman Empire to send an envoy to Shir Ali Khan and to persuade him to change his anti-British attitude. Indeed, Abdülhamid II also found sending an envoy to Afghanistan beneficial in order to get Afghans' support to the Ottoman Empire in a prospective Ottoman-Russian War. However, the Ottoman mission to Kabul headed by Ahmed Hulusi Efendi failed to convince Shir Ali Khan, whose deep distrust to the British even prevented the Afghan support to the Ottoman Empire.⁸²⁰

In 1878, Shir Ali Khan had to welcome an uninvited diplomatic envoy from Russia. Feared from a Russian-Afghan alliance, the British governor of India sent a delegation to Kabul; however, Shir Ali Khan refused this delegation. This refusal triggered the Second Anglo-Afghan War, as a result of which Shir Ali Khan was deposed and his nephew Abdurrahman Khan (r. 1880-1901) was

⁸¹⁹ Meredith L. Runion, *The History of Afghanistan*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 76-79.

⁸²⁰ Mehmet Saray, *Afganistan ve Türkler*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987), 56-61.

installed as the King of Afghanistan in 1880.⁸²¹ From then on, the British sought for negotiating with the Russians about Central Asia and after years of diplomatic initiatives, in 1907, an Anglo-Russian Treaty was signed, with which the Russians declared that Afghanistan would no longer be a Russian sphere of influence and the British declared that they would not occupy any part of Afghanistan.⁸²²

Meanwhile, Afghanistan was modernized under the rule of Abdurrahman Khan and his son Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919). The local rebellions were suppressed, a central administration was tried to be established, the tribal resistance was removed to a great extent, a central army was established and economy and regional trade as well as sanitation and education was tried to be improved.⁸²³ In this modernization process, Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), a Pashtun-Afghan intellectual and nationalist had a significant place. Accordingly, he invited experts in various fields from the Islamic world, and particularly contacted with the Ottoman soldiers, especially with the ones escaping from Hamidian pressure, to train Afghan army.⁸²⁴ In the post-Hamidian era, particularly during the First World War, the Ottoman governments tried to establish stronger contacts with the Afghans for their quest against the Russians. In 1915, when the Ottoman Sultan declared *jihad* , an Ottoman-German delegation was sent to Kabul in order to invite the Afghans to this holy war. Habibullah Khan welcomed the envoy and declared that he could act against the British in case a joint Ottoman-German army would be sent to Afghanistan.⁸²⁵

⁸²¹ Runion, *The History of Afghanistan*, 80-81.

⁸²² For a detailed account of 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, see Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Third Edition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 433; Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969) 117.

⁸²³ For a detailed account of Afghan modernization under Abdurrahman and Habibullah Khan, see Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 129-201.

⁸²⁴ For the role of Mahmud Tarzi in the Afghan modernization see Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 438-440. Mehmed Fazlı, the author of one of the travelogues mentioned in this dissertation, was among such military experts invited by Mahmud Tarzi.

⁸²⁵ Mehmet Saray, *Afganistan ve Türkler*, 88-89.

Since this project could not be materialized, Afghan support to the Ottoman quest for *jihad* could not be ensured.

Afghanistan was not the only target of the Ottoman governments during the First World War; they tried to ignite a general Turkish rebellion in Central Asia as well. Some agents of the Special Organization (*Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa*) were sent to the Central Asia to organize the local Turkish communities and to inflict a rebellion against Russia. They had participated and sometimes led the resistance movements, the most significant of which was the Great 1916 Rebellion.⁸²⁶ This rebellion reflected the Central Asian reaction to the Russian colonization as well as the increasing pressure over the nomadic people of the region under the war conditions. As Hélène Carrère d'Encausse mentions, “the excessive exploitation of the local population through taxes and forced labour” contributed to the Central Asian discontent of Russian administration.⁸²⁷ The rebellion continued until the end of the Tsarist regime and could only be suppressed totally in the 1920s after the establishment of the Soviet rule in Central Asia.

If external penetration either by Western colonial powers or China was one of the most significant characteristics of the late nineteenth century Central Asia, another significant aspect was the consolidation of the idea of modernization. Particularly, towards the late nineteenth century, an intellectual movement called *Jadidism* influenced not only the Russian and Central Asian Muslims, but also the Ottoman intellectuals thanks to the intimate connection between them and the major promulgators of this movement. Indeed, *Jadidism* emerged as an educational modernization movement in the 1880s, particularly with the writings of a Muslim intellectual living in Bakhchisaray, Crimea, İsmail Gaspiralı (1851-1914). He tried to disseminate his ideas with regard to the modernization of education in his newspaper, *Tercüman*, published between

⁸²⁶ Adil Hikmet Bey and his fellow companions were among these agents. His travelogue narrated the rebellion in detail.

⁸²⁷ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, “The Fall of the Tsarist Empire,” in Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, 208-209.

1883 and 1918. Accordingly, Gaspıralı argued that the major reason for the backwardness of the Muslim community and the colonial rule over the territories populated by the Muslims was ignorance emerged out of the lack of proper education. Therefore, instead of the traditional education, which had neglected positive sciences, modern pedagogical structures of the Western world should be adapted by the Muslim community.⁸²⁸ This initially educational movement soon turned out to be political debate between the old and new structures; the *Jadidists* began to enlarge the scope of their ideas of modernization to the other fields of social life. In 1910s, the debate between *Jadidists* and *Kadimists* (those arguing for the preservation of the traditional educational system) was intensified. The former accused the latter for bigotry, while the latter accused the former with blasphemy.⁸²⁹ Meanwhile the *Jadidist* movement spread towards the Central Asia with the opening of modern schools in the region from 1901 onwards.⁸³⁰ Some students were sent to the Ottoman Empire in the post-Hamidian era; they adopted the nationalist ideology of CUP and when they returned to the Central Asia, inspired from the Young Turks, they labelled themselves as the Young Bukharans (*Yaş Buharalılar*).⁸³¹

All in all, the Ottoman relations with the Central Asia continued until, and even intensified in, the last years of the Empire. The common ethnic identity, which had been emphasized in the post-Hamidian period contributed to these relations. However, still, the Central Asian connection remained limited and except for several diplomatic and clandestine missions, the Ottomans were not interested in the affairs of this region as much as they wanted. These missions were particularly important for attracting the Ottoman attention to the

⁸²⁸ Ingeborg Baldauf, *Jadidism in Central Asia within Reformism and Modernism in the Muslim World*, *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 2001): 72-88, 73.

⁸²⁹ Ahat Andican, *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi*, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2005), 25.

⁸³⁰ For a detailed account of the spread of Jadidism in Central Asia, see Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1998)

⁸³¹ Andican, *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi*, 29.

Central Asian Turks. The Central Asia connection was very much abandoned with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the consolidation of Soviet rule in the region during the 1920s.

12.2. Ottoman Traveller's Perception of the Central Asia in the Nineteenth Century

12.2.1. Turkish Identity and the Central Asia

One of the most significant differences between the Ottoman perception of the Central Asia and other parts of the non-European world was the sense of Turkishness strongly felt in this particular region. The Ottoman travellers visiting Arab provinces of the Empire felt themselves comfortable in these remote regions because they were part of the Ottoman Empire. They felt comfortable in South and East Asia because they were in the territories having a similar Eastern identity despite significant differences. However, in the Central Asia, they felt themselves more comfortable because they were in the Turkish lands, in other words, their ancestral fatherland. Of course, most of the travellers visiting the region were Turkists and they came to Central Asia on the eve of or during the First World War, when the nationalist conceptions were at their zenith. However, still, there was an earlier example, in other words, the travelogue of Mehmed Emin Efendi, published in 1880s, in which such national sentiments were evident as well. This demonstrates that Central Asia had been important for the travellers not only for the Muslim identity of its inhabitants, but also for their Turkish identity.

For the Ottoman travellers, it was enough to feel positively for a city or a region having some kind of a relationship with Turkishness, although these territories might not necessarily be within the Central Asian "fatherland." For example regarding Odessa, Habibzade Ahmed Kemal wrote much positively compared to other Russian cities, because he perceived this city as a former Turkish land (*eski Türk vatani*).⁸³² Similarly, although the Russian countryside

⁸³² Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 17

was narrated quite pejoratively, the Turkish villages in Russian territories, which appeared frequently when the travellers were approaching Central Asia, were extremely praised. For example, while Habibzade described the Russian villages as “owl nest” (*baykuş yuvası*),⁸³³ he wrote that when his train approached Russian Turkistan, even the climate became milder since they were approaching to the “heaven-like soil of Turkistan” (*cennet-misal Türkistan toprağı*).⁸³⁴

The excitement emerged out of approaching the “Turkish fatherland” was sometimes declared in the case of “Muslim” villages. In other words, some travellers emphasized the Islamic nature of the region more with regard to its Turkish identity. For example, Mehmed Fazlı wrote about Caucasia as such:

The panorama of small Circassian villages scattered in the edges of this cruel and bigoted country thorough modesty and a pretty poetic scene with nice small mosques and minarets revived joy and comfort in our angry souls; it caressed our Islamic feelings.⁸³⁵

Since even its adjacent territories aroused the travellers, it was not surprising that the Central Asia itself excited them the most. They sacralized this region as their ancestral fatherland and declared their sentiments quite vividly. For example, regarding East Turkistan, Adil Hikmet Bey wrote as such:

Here is Turkistan, which I had dreamed for years, and here are the Turks of this holy region... Finally, I was in it. These places would be a sphere of action for us. We would do everything around here and with these people. This place is the home of our ancestors. I found the faces of the people whom I saw very nice. Indeed, none of them were grumpy. Every face was smiling.⁸³⁶

⁸³³ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 19.

⁸³⁴ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 20.

⁸³⁵ “[...G]üzel mescitler ve minareciklerle bir tevazû ve şî’r-i latîf içinde, bu müstebît ve mutaassıp memleketin kenarlarında, şurasında burasındaki küçük Çerkes köylerinin manzarası bizim rûh-u mahrûrumuzda bir ferâh-u neşât ihyâ etti; hissiyât-ı İslâmiyemizi okşadı.” Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 20.

⁸³⁶ “İşte benim senelerden beri hayalimde yaşattığım Türkistan ve işte o mübarek kıtanın Türkleri... Artık onun içinde bulunuyordum. Buraları bize bir faaliyet sahnesi olacaktı. Bütün işlerimizi bunlarla ve bu civarda görecektik. Buraları cedlerimizin yurdu idi. Gördüğüm halkın çehrelerini çok sevimli buluyordum. Esasen onların hiçbirisi abus değildi. Her simada bir beşâset görüliyordu.” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, p. 106.

Similarly, Mehmed Fazlı narrated his voyage from Krasnavodsk to Merv in a way to underline the moral significance of this region:

While the train was passing through these holy lands, which are our homelands, the black tent-shaped Turcoman barracks on plain fields triggered our deep national feelings. We also felt sorrow for the sufferings of these blessed and noble lands in the hands of a cruel government like Russia...⁸³⁷

From these excerpts, it can be inferred that the travellers utilized strong adjectives, such as “holy” (*mübarek*) to denote the sacredness of this region for themselves. In other words, besides the holy sites of Islam, these regions were also given a sacred status not because of their Islamic nature, but because of their Turkishness. What is more, most of the travellers tended to disregard the negativities in the Turkish cities; they did not mention the dirtiness and disorderliness unlike their narration of much of the non-European world. Rather, they tried to bring the positive qualities of these cities to the forefront. For example, regarding the town of Yenihisar in East Turkistan, Adil Hikmet Bey wrote that he felt himself as if he was in an Anatolian town; unlike his pejorative account and backwardness of Russian or British dominated parts of Central Asia, he wrote that everyone seemed prosperous and happy.⁸³⁸ Similarly, Mehmed Fazlı resembled the market place of Merv to its counterparts in Anatolia and emphasized this resemblance, although he briefly touched upon the depravity of modern buildings in this city.⁸³⁹ Although he described Herat as an old city with small buildings and narrow streets, he did not complain about this as he did, for example, for Meshed. He rather underlined the hospitality of the Afghan officials.⁸⁴⁰ Similarly, unlike his fierce criticism of the inns and caravanserais of

⁸³⁷ “*Tren anayurdumuz olan bu mukaddes yerleri geçerken, siyah çadır şeklinde vasî ovalarda Türkmen kulübeleri hissiyat-ı âmika-yı milliyemizi tehzîz ederek bu mübârek ve azîm yerlerin Rusya gibi bir hükümet-i müstebide muzdarîp ve mukahhûr kalmasına elemeler çekiyorduk.*” Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 24.

⁸³⁸ Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 106.

⁸³⁹ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 25.

⁸⁴⁰ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 44-46.

Iran, although physical conditions did not change much in Afghanistan, he labelled the Afghan caravanserais (as comfortable facilities for the travellers).⁸⁴¹

All in all, Central Asia was perceived quite differently by the Ottoman travellers compared to their accounts regarding the other parts of the non-European world and the main reason for this difference was the nationalist sentiments felt towards this particular region. They sacralised the region as their ancestral homeland and thus neglected the negativities they had encountered. Such tolerance was not the case in their writings about the rest of the non-European world.

12.2.2. The Perception of the Central Asian People and Civilization

Likewise the territories and cities, the peoples of Central Asia were also narrated quite positively. To give an idea about this degree of positivity, it can be said that the travellers even found some fundamental aspects of Central Asian societies as superior to the Ottoman ones. For example, Mehmed Emin defined that in Turkistan the people were living a “pure and clean life” (*hayat-ı saf, hayat-ı pak*), thus he indirectly criticized the life in the Ottoman Empire as an impure and corrupted one.⁸⁴² He particularly admired the simple lives of the Turcomans and criticized the Ottomans for being extravagant. His criticisms towards the role of the women in society and the practice of *harem* in the Ottoman Empire, which are mentioned in Chapter Eight, also reflected his inclination towards the original Turkish lifestyle.

Mehmed Emin also argued that the Central Asia had once hosted a significant civilization. Although he did not clearly mention about a “Turkish civilization,” what he intended to say was exactly this. For example, when he reached the old city of Urgench, he dreamed of its glorious past and wrote that once upon a time, this city was the centre of civilization; it had been so developed in terms of industry and trade that the entire world had imported their

⁸⁴¹ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahati*, 47.

⁸⁴² Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul'dan Asya-yı Vusta'ya Seyahat*, 24.

products. All the neighbouring states demanded the help of this state in order to provide their security.⁸⁴³ However, he argued that all this prosperity and wealth, all this progress and civilization was destroyed under the feet of the horses of Kalmyks. Still, he particularly described the Ottomans as the inheritor of this civilization:

The Turks, being the first ferment of formation of our Ottoman nationality came from such a progressed, civilized and happy place under the guidance of Alp-Kaya. It is because of their exodus from such a source of civilization that after all they demonstrated a sample of a new civilization to the world by establishing a world-conquering state with the union of different nations.⁸⁴⁴

Mehmed Emin did not only praise the former civilization of Central Asia, but also tried to rationalize the unfamiliar practices of the Turcomans. In other words, he found their practices extremely logical, although most of the other travellers or authors found them quite weird. For example, he argued that the reason of the early age of marriage among the Turcomans was the prevention of adultery and the appreciation of having many children in this society.⁸⁴⁵ Similarly, he mentioned that some Turcomans named their child as “Father-Soul” (*Baba-Can*) or “Grandfather-Soul” (*Dede-Can*). He wrote that although this custom seemed to be ridiculous for the Ottomans, indeed it had a great wisdom underlining the continuity of the generation.⁸⁴⁶ Even, he touched upon the Turcomans’ extreme respect to their graves and wrote that one should not condemn this practice because these graves were the only indication that a person had lived on that particular territory and therefore being respected by the Turcomans.⁸⁴⁷

⁸⁴³ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 136.

⁸⁴⁴ “İşte millet-i Osmanîyemizin ilk mâye-i teşekkülî olan Türkler böyle müterakkî ve mütemeddîn ve mesut bir yerden Alp-Kaya delâletiyle çıktılar. Böyle menbâ-yı medeniyetten çıktıkları için değil midir ki muahharen bunca milel-i muhtelifenin tevhidîyle cihangîrâne bir devlet yaparak cihâna da bir medeniyet-i cedîde numunesi gösterdiler.” Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 137.

⁸⁴⁵ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 68.

⁸⁴⁶ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 69.

⁸⁴⁷ Seyyah Mehmed Emin, *İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vusta’ya Seyahat*, 71-72.

The positive perception was not only confined to the Turcomans. Regarding the Kyrgyz people, Adil Hikmet Bey wrote quite positively as well. After passing weeks under the British threat, as well as coping with some Afghani brigands, they were able to reach the Pamir Plains, where they met with the Kyrgyz people. Adil Hikmet Bey wrote that they “[...] understood what a happiness to stand in front of a noble Turk after such tiredness.”⁸⁴⁸ The perception of the Turks as a “noble race” (*ırk-ı necib*) was also evident in some other travelogues. For example Habibzade utilized this concept with regard to the people of East Turkistan.⁸⁴⁹

The Afghans were another community, depicted quite positively by the travellers. Adil Hikmet Bey encountered with them in Peshawar, and compared to his pejorative perception of the Indian Muslims, who collaborated with the British for the maintenance of their colonial rule, he praised their anti-British stance. He wrote that the Afghan inhabitants of the city were brave and honest, and they never engaged in spying for the British. What is more, not only the urban settlers, but also the nomadic Afghan tribes had a pure morality.⁸⁵⁰ Similarly, although Mehmed Fazlı made a distinction between the urban and rural (he mentioned them as mountaineers/*dağlı*) Afghans particularly with regard to their dress and occupation, in terms of their diligence and intelligence, there was no difference between these two.⁸⁵¹ These writings demonstrated that the discourse on urban-nomadic distinction evident in most of the travelogues regarding the non-European world was very much diminished in the travelogues on Central Asia.

⁸⁴⁸ “*Bu kadar yorgunluktan sonar necip bir Türk’ün karşısında bulunmanın ne saadet olduğunu anlamıştk.*” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 93.

⁸⁴⁹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 84.

⁸⁵⁰ Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 60.

⁸⁵¹ Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 72.

In writing about the Afghan people, similar to the travelogues on Africa or Asia, the concept of race became a significant component. For example, Mehmed Fazlı defined the Afghan race as such:

Afghan race from the Arian people and from the white race are almost completely long, brunette-skinned, handsome, charming, intelligent and brave. They are tough people intolerant to anger and violence [...] Their allegiance to religion is very excellent; they are extremely respectful to the peoples of piety and ascetics and sheiks.⁸⁵²

Despite these extremely positive accounts of the Central Asian people, they were criticized for some other characteristics. Generally, these criticisms were not directed to the ordinary people but to the local rulers. For example, Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü criticized the ruling elite of Bukhara for their ignorance of “the contemporary sciences and the science of politics” (*ulûm-u asriye ve fînûn-u siyâsiye*) as well as their incompetence to oratory (*hüsn-ü selîka*).⁸⁵³ He even wrote that the Russians, “who could not see an idea of progress in this government with closed-eyes” (*Bu gözü kapalı hükümette fikr-i terakki göremeyen Ruslar*) built an ornamented governmental building for the Amir of Bukhara in order to show a sample of the maturity that the art of architecture had reached for the last centuries.⁸⁵⁴

The critique of local rulers instead of ordinary people reached a zenith in the writings of Habibzade. For example, he felt himself quite ashamed in Kasghar, when he was heard that Musa Bayef, one of the local elites of the city, married with eighty women until his thirtieth birthday. He found such a practice and its legitimization with the improper exegesis of religious teachings as an extreme shame towards the “noble Turkish women.”⁸⁵⁵ What is more, he particularly found these local elite and the bigot *ulama* supported by them as the

⁸⁵² “Arya kavminden ve ırk-ı ebyâzdan Afgan halkı hemen umûmiyetle uzun boylu, esmer benizli, parlak gözlü, mütenâsib-ül âzâ, zekî, cesur bir kavim olup hiddet ve şiddete [...] tahammül etmez sert insanlardır. [...] Salâbet-i dinîyeleri pek mükemmel olup mollalara, ehl-i zühd ve takvâya ve meşâyihе fevkalâde hürmet ederler.” Mehmed Fazlı, *Resimli Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 70-71.

⁸⁵³ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, p. 202.

⁸⁵⁴ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, p. 202.

⁸⁵⁵ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 25.

real culprits of the ignorance and backwardness of the ordinary people. For example, unlike Mehmed Emin, he criticized the superstitious beliefs of the people regarding the shrines. He perceived the local *ulama* responsible for these superstitions:

Unless the devotion to shrines poisoning the social life, civilized life and national customs of Kashgar and other similar superstitions are not abandoned [...] the endurance and future of the country will be suffocated under suspicious clouds and within dark storms. Today, while Christian priests are warning their people and guiding them towards a civilized life by entering even the most desolate parts and forgotten fields of their homeland, our religious scholars and mullahs with big turbans do nothing but collecting money by cheating people and filled up themselves by wandering around.⁸⁵⁶

Similarly, with regard to the local elite of Kasghar, he wrote as such:

The *bays* of Kasghar have no sense of nation and civilization. Their hearts are blackened and roasted by enmity, the sense of jealousy, dissension and discord. Their aim is to preserve themselves at the expense of suffocation of all Turkish sons within the storms of poorness and misery and all peoples in that country being victims of the personal interests of these inhumane people.⁸⁵⁷

All these criticisms directed Habibzade and other travellers to argue that the problem behind the deviations and backwardness of this region was not the intellectual inferiority of the Central Asian people, but the lack of proper education. Influenced from the *Jadidist* movement, they argue for the establishment of new schools based on a new methodology. For example, Habibzade argued that the youngsters living in Kasghar had an extraordinary intelligence (*zekâvet-i fevkalâde*). If they had been taught in schools employing the new methodology (*yeni usûl mektepler*), they could have been easily developed intellectually:

⁸⁵⁶ “İşte Kaşgar’ın hayât-ı içtimaîye ve hayât-ı medeniye ve anânat-ı millîyesini zehirlemekte olan mezarlara hulûs ve daha bunun gibi hurûfat kalkmadıkça [...] memleketin hayât ve istikbâli şüpheli bulutlar altında, karanlık boranlar içinde boğulur kalır. Bugün nasrâniyet papazları, vatanlarının en tenha köşelerine, mensî sahrâlarına kadar girip milletlerini ikâz ve medenî hayâta sevk etmekteyken, bizim din adamlarımız ve büyük sarıklı mollalarımız, kapı kapı dolaşıp kursak doyurmaktan, halkı aldatıp cebe para toplamaktan baş kaldıramıyorlar.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 96-97.

⁸⁵⁷ “Kaşgar baylarında millet ve medeniyet duygusu, hemen yok demektir. Bunların kalpleri nefsâniyet, hiss-i haset, nifak ve şikak ile kararmış ve kavrulmuştur. Bunların emeli bütün Türk oğulları, fakr-u zarûret tufanları içinde boğulsun ve bütün bir memleket halkı, bu insafsızların şahsî faydalarına kurbân olsun.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 44.

If these youngsters of Gochar with such a nature had been taught in European gymnasiums, in the universities of the capital [i.e., İstanbul], the inventors of wireless telegraph, submarine, airplane, zeppelin could not have exerted more talent than the youngsters of Gochar. [...] Unfortunately these youngsters are convicted to shine and burn out with a sudden flash such as the light of a thunder [...] Because there are probably many people accusing them of blasphemy since they are interested in cinema or photography machines instead of appreciating them for their talent and arts.⁸⁵⁸

Similar to Habibzade, Adil Hikmet Bey also continuously mentioned about the role of education for national consciousness. In one of his conversations with an Afghani tribal leader, the tribal leader told Adil Hikmet Bey that they were waiting for the Caliph to save them from foreign intervention. Adil Hikmet Bey's response was conspicuous: "We said: The Caliphate was a delusion. It might be a power thirteen centuries ago. Today it is nothing. You should try to create a caliph's power within the personality of your children through educating them."⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵⁸ "Eğer bu yaradılıştaki Goçar gençleri, Avrupa jimnazyalarında, payitaht darülfünûnlarında okumuş olsalar, telsiz telgraf, tahte'l bahr, ayaroplan, siplin muhterleri, bu Goçarlı gençlerden daha fazla istîdat gösteremezlerdi [...] Maateessüf bu gençler [...] şimşek ziyâsı gibi ani bir iltimâ ile parlayıp sönmeye mahkûm... Çünkü bunların hüner ve sanatlarını takdir şöyle dursun, belki bunları, sinema ve fotoğraf makineleriyle uğraştığı için küfürle ithâm edenler de çoktur." Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 143. Having made such criticisms, Ahmed Kemal was able to open a school employing the modern education methods in the city of Artush by April 1330 [1914]. The school was named as "Teacher's College of Union" (*Darümuallimin-i İttihâd*) and established together with an organization called the "Islamic Society" (*Cemiyet-i İslâmiye*). However, just after the opening of these schools some prominent people in Kashgar began to criticize Ahmed Kemal and his school. They argued that the new methodology employed by Ahmed Kemal was contrary to Islam. Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 34. Particularly the teaching of geography and history and the illustrations in the books taught in schools were proclaimed by a local religious leader called Selim Ahund as forbidden by religion. Even some students began to complain that they were excluded from their communities. This alarmed Ahmed Kemal who delivered a speech to the public and defended his methods. The complaints seemed to decline afterwards; however, after a spectacle organized by Ahmed Kemal in the form of a play criticizing the old traditional education, some parents forced their children to abandon the school. The problem was finally resolved with the intervention of the Chinese local government in Kashgar and a document of concession was given to Ahmed Kemal's school proclaiming it as a legitimate establishment. For the full text of this concessions translated from Chinese to Turkish see Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 42. After getting this concession new schools were opened with interesting names such as "The Light of Education, The Source of Knowledge, The School of Progress, The School of Patriotism" (*Nûr-i Maârif, Menbâü'l İrfân, Terakkî Mektebi, Hamiyet Mektebi*). Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 43.

⁸⁵⁹ "Hilâfet, dedik, bir vehimdir. Bin üç yüz sene evvel belki de bir kuvvetti. Bugün için bir hiçten başka bir şey değildir. Çocuklarınızı tahsil ettirerek onların istikbalde hepsinin nefislerinde bir halîfe kudreti yaratmaya çalışmanız icap ederdi." Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, p. 77.

All in all, the idea of civilization as a learnable and an attainable talent was evident in the travelogues on Central Asia. The inhabitants of the region were praised for their sagacity, intelligence and hard-working; what was lacking was a proper education. However, this education did not necessarily mean westernization; rather it was limited to the the adoption of Western science and technology. The deviation from the “real” Islamic morality was another significant critique in terms of the achievement of modernity; thus together with Western morality, these deviations were perceived quite negatively as well. The prescription of the travellers was simple. Already, there were the basic elements for a better life in the region, namely the potential of the people and the Turkish (and Islamic) morality. If proper education was added to this equation, the result would be modernization without sacrificing the Turkish characteristics.

CHAPTER 13

OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF THE SOUTH AND EAST ASIA

13.1. Ottoman Relations with the South and East Asia

The Ottoman Empire's relations with the states and the Muslim communities of the South and East Asia had been intensified in two periods, namely the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire tried to cope with the Portuguese naval incursions in the Indian Ocean, and the second half of the nineteenth century, when Pan-Islamism was utilized by some Ottoman Sultans as a tool for alarming the European colonial powers about the Ottoman potential, hence directing them not to press on the Empire strongly. In the following subsections on the Ottoman relations with India and the Southeast Asia these two periods of intense relations are examined. The Ottoman interest towards East Asia, namely towards China and Japan, was quite late compared to the South and Southeast Asia, because of geographical distance, the Japanese self-isolation and the lack of Ottoman awareness about the Chinese Muslims. Therefore, almost no significant contact had been established between the Ottoman Empire and China/Japan before the second half of the nineteenth century. The subsections on the Ottoman relations with China and Japan therefore focus on the reasons and implications of the establishment of contact in this volatile era.

13.1.1. Ottoman Relations with India

The Ottoman diplomatic relations with India had started in the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, the two greatest Sunni Muslim states of that time, were at the zenith of their political and military power. These relations were sometimes friendly and other times indifferent, if not hostile. Such fluctuations depended mainly on the clash or overlap of the mutual interests of these two Empires as well as their identities. According to Naimur Rahman Farooqi the factors resulting in friendly relations were the common racial and cultural background, the Safavid threat, which from time to time afflicted two

Empires, and lack of any border clashes since Iran was a buffer state between them. Contrarily, the factors resulting in hostile relations were the question of the Uzbek state, sometimes supported by the Ottoman Empire while some territories of which were claimed by the Mughals, the issue of the Caliphate since some Mughal Emperors did not recognize the Ottoman claims, and finally the Timurid identity of the Mughal Empire, which reminded the Ottoman defeat by Tamerlane (r. 1370-1405) in 1402.⁸⁶⁰ The diplomatic relations between these two Empires reached a zenith in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and then gradually cooled until the late eighteenth century, namely until the establishment of British control in India.

Although the Ottoman relations with the Mughal Empire came to an end, contacts with some local Muslim states of India continued.⁸⁶¹ However, in this period, considering the tight balance in their relations with Western colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, the Ottoman Sultans did not engage in an active relationship with these political entities. The correspondence between the Sultan of Mysore, Tipu (r. 1782-1799) and the Ottoman Sultans, Abdülhamid I and Selim III was a significant example of Ottoman caution towards the Muslim states of India.⁸⁶² According to Kemal Karpat, this correspondence

⁸⁶⁰ Naimur Rahman Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748*, (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, 2009), 222-234.

⁸⁶¹ For example, the Mughal governors of Deccan tried to obtain help from the Ottomans during the eighteenth century. Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 10.

⁸⁶² Accordingly, in order to cope with the British ambitions over his sultanate and for a proper recognition by the Caliph as the Sultan of Mysore, in his first letter dated 1786, Tipu demanded from Abdülhamid I the establishment of better relations between two states, the control of the port of Basra in exchange for the port of Mangalor and the permission to construct a waterway from Euphrates to the city of Najaf, which was sacred for the Shia. According to Hikmet Bayur, these demands demonstrated that Tipu wanted to control Ottoman Iraq. While on the one hand, Abdülhamid's reply procrastinate these demands through assigning the governor of Basra to deal with these issues, on the other hand, it included an advice to Tipu for not attacking on the British. Together with his announcement that the Ottomans were preparing for a war with the Russians, this advice was planned to serve for not annoying the British on the eve of an Ottoman-Russian War and for getting the support of Tipu Sultan for this war, probably in financial terms. After this correspondence, the second letter was sent by Selim III to Tipu Sultan after hearing the rumours that Napoleon Bonaparte aimed to contact with him in order to establish an alliance against the British. Upon the request of the British, Selim III wrote in his letter, dated September 22, 1798, that Tipu Sultan should not cooperate with the French and should not act hostilely towards the British. Tipu Sultan replied this letter by offering the Sultan to deal with his own

demonstrated the earliest indications of the genesis of the idea of “Pan-Islamism” and the Caliph’s role for prompting the Muslim community:

Apparently, the British were the first to see the caliphate as the potential center that could not only mobilize and unite Muslims – and induce them to fight for England but also soothe some Indian Muslims, who perceived London to be the enemy of Islam. The Ottoman ruler appeared at this stage rather unaware of the potential of the caliphate – or unwilling to use it – for political purposes; the English, however, seemed to have a clear and concise opinion about the caliphate’s potential influence over other Muslims.⁸⁶³

In other words, the Tipu case was a significant starting point for the discussions on the issue of Pan-Islamism, which became intensified during the reigns of Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid II in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Indeed, until the 1870s, the Ottomans did not actively engage in the affairs of the Indian Muslims because of their policy of maintaining good relations with Britain.⁸⁶⁴ In order to continue the British backing towards the Ottoman Empire against Russian ambitions, the Ottomans had to support the British colonial rule over India. For example, they did not react to the great Indian Mutiny of 1857, where the Muslims and Hindus fought together against the British; they even allowed the British troops passing through the Ottoman territories to suppress this rebellion.⁸⁶⁵ However the Mutiny served for a closer relationship between the Indian Muslims and the Ottomans. According to Azmi Özcan:

adversaries, since he would do the same in India. In other words, he rejected the advices of Selim III and continued his struggle against the British until he was killed in the siege of the capital city of Mysore, Srirangapatnam, in 1799. For a detailed analysis of this correspondence and its implications see Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, “Maysor Sultanı Tipu ile Osmanlı Padişahlarından I. Abdülhamid ve III. Selim Arasındaki Mektuplaşma,” *Bellekten*, Vol. 12, No. 48 (1948): 617-654 and Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 49-52.

⁸⁶³ Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 51.

⁸⁶⁴ However, as early as 1849, the Ottoman consulates in Bombay and Calcutta were opened in order to protect Ottoman commercial interests and the rights of the Ottoman citizens living in the region. Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 14.

⁸⁶⁵ Despite this allowance, such a need never existed; therefore, British troops did not show up in the Ottoman Empire. Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 16; Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 32.

Since there was no Muslim sovereign left in India, the Ottoman Sultan Caliph appeared to be the natural focus for the emotional and spiritual attachment of the rank and file Indian Muslims. Thus followed the inclusion of the Ottoman Sultan's name in the Friday sermons.⁸⁶⁶

In other words, the Indian Muslims turned their faces to the Ottoman Empire, which was ruled by the only legitimate Islamic authority, namely the Sultan/Caliph.⁸⁶⁷ The friendly relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain initially prevented the Ottoman Sultans to reply the Indian Muslims' approach positively. However, the rapid deterioration of these relations after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 and, particularly, the British invasion of Egypt in 1881, resulted in an active policy pursued by Abdülhamid II, called as Pan-Islamism. Indeed, it was Abdülhamid II, who clearly became aware that he could use his power as Caliph in order to arouse the feelings of Indian Muslims, which might pose a threat to the British colonial rule; in other words, this provided the Sultan with a practical political power to preserve the precarious diplomatic balance among the European powers.

The indications of Pan-Islamist policy was even visible as early as 1877, when Abdülhamid II sought a Muslim alliance against the Russians, which might induce the Amir of Afghanistan, Shir Ali Khan, to attack the Russians from the south.⁸⁶⁸ The diplomatic mission sent to Afghanistan failed to realize this alliance because of the anti-British and pro-Russian policies of the Amir.⁸⁶⁹ However, still, the Indian Muslims declared their support to the Ottomans and financially contributed to the Ottoman army.⁸⁷⁰ After the war, Abdülhamid II pursued a policy of continuously disturbing the British by making them aware of

⁸⁶⁶ Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 19.

⁸⁶⁷ Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The Political Aspirations of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Sep., 2006): 709-722, 709.

⁸⁶⁸ For a brief account on the emergence of Pan-Islamism, see Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jan., 1942): 278-287.

⁸⁶⁹ Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, pp. 78-88. This mission produced one of the most significant Ottoman travelogues about India and Afghanistan, written by one of the members of the envoy, Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, and entitled *Hindistan ve Svât ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*.

⁸⁷⁰ Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 68-70.

his spiritual power over the Indian Muslims. According to Azmi Özcan this policy was composed of several strategies: (1) to contact with the *ulama* of the Indian Muslims, to host them in the Porte and to make them work for the Ottoman interests; (2) to engage in propaganda activities in India through printing new newspapers or supporting the existing ones; (3) to use Ottoman diplomatic missions, particularly the consulates for creating a public opinion supportive of the Ottoman interests; (4) to maintain close ties between the Ottomans and the Indian Muslims through regular (i.e., contacting with Indian Muslims during Hajj) or occasional opportunities (i.e., demanding Indian Muslim's financial contribution to the construction of Hedjaz railway).⁸⁷¹

Indian Muslim's intimate relations with the Ottoman Empire continued in the post-Hamidian era as well. The Indian Muslim's enthusiasm regarding the Young Turk Revolution, based on the notions of liberty, equality and fraternity, resulted in the continuation of their supports to the Empire, when the Empire was desperately in need of it, as in the case of the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and finally the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence.⁸⁷² The financial or moral support of the Indian Muslims during the Ottoman-Italian and Balkan Wars were transformed into a more active support with the declaration of *jihād* by Sultan Mehmed Reşad (r. 1909-1918), when the Ottoman Empire entered into the First World War. Even some of the Indian Muslims sought for an anti-British armed insurrection in north-western India in 1915 in order to help the Ottomans.⁸⁷³

All in all, having contained the largest Muslim community, the Indian sub-continent was a significant region for the Ottoman Empire. The initial fluctuating relationship with the Mughal Empire until the nineteenth century was followed by a more systematic policy of Pan-Islamism from the late nineteenth century onwards.

⁸⁷¹ Azmi Özcan, "Sultan Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlılar ve Hindistan Müslümanları," Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), *Türkler*, Vol. 13, 138-143.

⁸⁷² Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 129.

⁸⁷³ Wasti, "The Political Aspirations of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus," 710.

13.1.2. Ottoman Relations with the Southeast Asia

Similar to the Ottoman contacts with India, the Ottoman interest towards the Southeast Asia had started in the second half of the sixteenth century as a response to the increasing Portuguese naval activity in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese pressure on some local Muslim states, particularly on the Sultanate of Aceh, forced the Sultan of this state, Alaaddin Riayet Shah el-Kahhar (r. 1537-1571), to send several embassies to the Ottoman Empire, which demanded for Ottoman military support. The first of these missions reached the Porte in 1562 and were able to get cannons, rifles and military experts. With this support Sultan Alaaddin was able to repel the Portuguese threat and to extend his borders at the expense of other small Muslim states, especially the Sultanate of Johor.⁸⁷⁴ A second diplomatic mission, sent in 1566 for further military support, was failed because the military personnel and equipment sent to Aceh were used to suppress a rebellion in Yemen, storming the region between 1567 and 1571.⁸⁷⁵

These earlier contacts with the Southeast Asia ended until the mid-nineteenth century, since the Ottomans directed their attention to the wars with the European powers. The contact was re-established in 1851, with an Acehnese diplomatic mission to Sultan Abdülmecid, which demanded the establishment of Ottoman administration in Aceh against the increasing Dutch presence.⁸⁷⁶ The

⁸⁷⁴ Leonard Y. Andaya, "Interactions with the Outside World and Adaptation in Southeast Asian Society, 1500-1800," in Nicholas Tarling (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, 4 Volumes, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994), Vol. 1, 345-401, 383; for a detailed analysis of Ottoman-Achenese relations in the early modern period, also see Anthony Reid, *An Indonesian Frontier: Achenese and Other Histories of Sumatra*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 69-93.

⁸⁷⁵ İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, "Güneydoğu Asya İslam Ülkelerinde Türk İzleri," in Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), *Türkler*, Vol. 9, 618-631, 621.

⁸⁷⁶ Indeed, Aceh remained independent until the late nineteenth century; although the British claimed sovereignty over the Sultanate of Aceh, this was only a nominal declaration. In 1824, with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, Britain delivered her possessions on Sumatra to the Dutch; therefore, Aceh was begun to be claimed by the Dutch although the Dutch initially remained respectful to the independence of the Sultanate. However, from mid-nineteenth century onwards, the Dutch began to follow a more active colonial policy in the region; it was this transformation of Dutch colonial policy that contributed to increasing contacts between Aceh and the Ottoman Empire. For a detailed account of the Dutch colonial policy and the Sultanate of Aceh see M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 185-188;

Ottoman government initially responded these demands negatively and adjourned them by assigning the governor of Yemen to deal with the issue. Meanwhile, the Dutch increased pressure over Aceh and finally declared war on the Sultanate in 1873. Although they were able to occupy the coastal regions, the Acehnese resisted strongly in the interior parts of the Sultanate and once more applied to the Ottoman Empire for help. A mission headed by Seyyid Habib Abdurrahman ez-Zahir (1833-1896), the foreign minister of the Sultanate of Aceh, arrived in the Porte in 1873 and aroused Ottoman public support to the Acehnese resistance.⁸⁷⁷ However, the Ottoman administration did not respond actively in order not to disturb the Ottoman relations with the European states and only offered mediation.⁸⁷⁸ Despite the Ottoman failure to intervene into the Acehnese case, according to Cemil Aydın, this crisis had significant implications for the Ottoman public opinion's awareness of the Muslims living outside the Ottoman Empire; he wrote that "the Aceh debates increased Ottoman curiosity about Muslims in different parts of the world and create a trans-state Muslim identity."⁸⁷⁹

Although the Ottoman administration remained indifferent to such direct demands from the Muslim states of Southeast Asia, there emerged a growing

for the Acehnese diplomatic mission to the Porte in 1851, see Göksoy, "Güneydoğu Asya İslam Ülkelerinde Türk İzleri," 622-623.

⁸⁷⁷ Jan Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window, 1876-1926: Four Essays on Dutch, Dutch-Indian and Ottoman History*, (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul, 1992), 58.

⁸⁷⁸ The Acehnese resistance continued for the next thirty years and two other demands of help were made in 1893 and 1898, which were as futile as before. Göksoy, "Güneydoğu Asya İslam Ülkelerinde Türk İzleri," 623. For an account of the Acehnese question also see, Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 52-56.

⁸⁷⁹ Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 33. Besides the Sultanate of Aceh, the Amir of the island-state of Riau in the north-eastern and the Jambi Sultanate in the eastern part of Sumatra sent letters to the Ottoman Porte and similarly demanded for the establishment of Ottoman authority on their states to prevent the British and Dutch colonial desires in the late 1850s. Both demands were not responded positively. Göksoy, "Güneydoğu Asya İslam Ülkelerinde Türk İzleri," p. 624; for the correspondence between Taha Safiyyuddin of Jambi Sultanate and the Ottoman Porte see Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, *Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830-1907*, translated by Beverley Jackson, (Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 2004), 119-120.

interest towards this region particularly from 1860s onwards. Trade relations and pilgrimage traffic between the Ottoman Empire and the Southeast Asia grew day by day and these increasing contacts resulted in the establishment of an Ottoman consulate in Singapore in 1864.⁸⁸⁰ The Ottoman consuls, according to the Dutch observers of that time, served to give the local Muslims the impression that they were not alone in their legal quest against the colonial powers.⁸⁸¹ Through distributing religious publications published in İstanbul in the name of the Sultan/Caliph, establishing friendly relations with the Hadramauti Arab community of the region (which was the wealthiest community) by providing them with Ottoman passports and thus entailing them with an equal status with the Europeans, and agitating the local people against the discriminatory rules applied by the colonial administration, the Ottoman consuls acted as agents of Pan-Islamist discourse in the region.⁸⁸² What is more, as in the case of the Indian Muslims, the Ottoman administration also used pilgrimage and several initiatives, such as the demand of help from the Muslims of the region for the construction of the Hedjaz railway, for the maintenance of relations with the Muslim community of the Southeast Asia.⁸⁸³

The Ottoman interest towards this region continued in the post-Hamidian era as well. Particularly, the declaration of *jihad* by the Caliph/Sultan during the

⁸⁸⁰ Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 53. However, the first Ottoman consul died just one year after his appointment and the Dutch and the British colonial administrations were able to prevent the appointment of new Muslim consuls, fearing from an arousal in the Muslim public opinion in the region. However, from 1883 onwards, the Dutch government was unable to refuse the appointment of Ottoman consuls to Batavia (contemporary Jakarta) for reciprocity's sake. Göksoy, "Güneydoğu Asya İslam Ülkelerinde Türk İzleri," 624.

⁸⁸¹ Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 85-86.

⁸⁸² Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 86-87. For the Dutch discriminatory policy towards the Hadramauti community see Huub de Jonge, "Dutch Colonial Policy Pertaining to Hadhrami Immigrants," in Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (eds.), *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars, and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 94-111. For the Pan-Islamic publications in the region see Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942*, (Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 1999), 29-30.

⁸⁸³ Lik Arifin Mansurnoor, "Osmanlı Dünyasında İslam Reformu: Osmanlılar ile Malay Dünyası Arasındaki Sosyo-Dini Bağlar," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 2, 222-229, 222; Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 81-83.

First World War aroused the Muslim people of the region. Just after this declaration, an anonymous pamphlet in Arabic entitled “A Public Declaration to the Community of Muslim People,” which had been published by Muslim Welfare Society (*Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İslâmiye*, founded under the aegis of the CUP) was distributed in the region, which explained the concept of *jihad* in detail. This alarmed the Dutch government and the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, Van der Does, who demanded from the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Said Halim Paşa, to forbid further circulation of this pamphlet.⁸⁸⁴

In sum, the Ottoman relations with the Southeast Asia followed a similar pattern with its relations with India. The initial relations established in the sixteenth century against the Portuguese threat, were reiterated in the nineteenth century, this time against the British and Dutch colonial expansions. As in the case of India, the Ottomans did not respond actively to the demands of the Muslims of Southeast Asia. Rather, they pursued a precarious policy of contacting with the local Muslims loosely enough not to attract a significant reaction from the colonial powers, but, at the same time, strongly enough to make the colonial powers aware of the Ottoman capacity to arouse Muslim public opinion against their colonial intentions.

13.1.3. Ottoman Relations with Japan

Although some members of the Ottoman intellectual community were aware of Japan and the Japanese people prior to the nineteenth century, it was only after the 1860s that the two states contacted with each other.⁸⁸⁵ Similar to

⁸⁸⁴ Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 135-137. The implications of this pamphlet could not be determined clearly; however, it might stimulate some resistance movements in the region to support the *jihad* against the Western powers. For example, in 1915, in Singapore, a mutiny was erupted, organized by an Indian Muslim, Kassim Ali Mansoor and suppressed by the British. See Özey, *Islamic Identity and Development*, 27. One year later, this time in southern Sumatra, a rebellion, which was explicitly considered by its leaders to be part of the *jihad* of the Ottoman sultan against the Entente Powers, started and could only be suppressed by the Dutch in two months. Schmidt, *Through the Legation Window*, 53. For a detailed account of the southeast Indian Muslims during the World War I, see Kees van Dijk, *The Netherlands Indies and the Great War 1914-1918*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 287-316.

⁸⁸⁵ According to Selçuk Esenbel, Katip Çelebi's *Cihannüma* published in the second half of the seventeenth century had a few pages on Japan; while a Japanese geography book published in the eighteenth century mentioned about Ottoman Empire as a mighty state extended over three

the other parts of Asia, the first desire to establish a contact came not from the Ottoman Empire; but from Japan. Particularly, after the Meiji restoration, this self-isolated country became curious of and wanted to learn about the outside world.⁸⁸⁶ In this period, the major Japanese consideration was to be able to get rid of the unequal treaty system, which maintained an inferior status for Japan *vis-à-vis* the European states from 1858 onwards. Therefore, there emerged a search for the application of this system in other parts of the world. This search led the Japanese to contact with the Ottomans, which were another victim of the unequal treaties within the framework of the capitulations.⁸⁸⁷

The first Japanese delegation came to the Ottoman Empire in 1871 for reviewing the Ottoman legal relations with the Europeans. Indeed, this delegation was a part of a greater mission headed by Prince Iwakura Tomomi (1835-1883), which had been sent to Europe in 1871 to revise the unequal treaty system. Iwakura sent one of his secretaries, Fukuchi Genichiro (1841-1906), to İstanbul in order to study the Ottoman capitulatory system. The report of this first visit was not found sufficient for the Japanese government; therefore further delegations were sent in the 1880s and afterwards. One of the most significant of these delegations was the Yoshida Masaharu's mission sent directly by the Japanese Foreign Minister to İstanbul. Abdülhamid II welcomed the mission and

continents. Selçuk Esenbel, "Türk-Japon İlişkilerinin Tarihi," in Güzel [et. al.] (eds.), *Türkler*, Vol. 13, 149-161, 149. According to Orhan Koloğlu from 1841 onwards, the official newspaper of the Ottoman Empire, *Takvim-i Vekâyi* published several articles about Japan, and in 1863 other newspapers such as *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* and *Cerîde-i Havâdis* published some series regarding Japanese history, politics, and socio-economic structure. Indeed, these newspapers generally translated from the European sources; however, still their introduction of Japan to their readers was a significant development for the development of Ottoman-Japanese relations. Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı'da İlk Yapon Haberleri," *Tarih ve Toplum*, No. 218 (Feb., 2002): 83-85.

⁸⁸⁶ Indeed, in a narrow sense, the Meiji Restoration means a coup d'état carried out in Kyoto on January 3, 1868, that put control of the Imperial Court into the hands of men from some of the great feudal princedoms of Japan and terminated the hereditary feudal regime through reasserting the Emperor's direct responsibility for governing the country. In a wider sense, it means a series of reforms introducing political, economic and social modernization of the country from 1868 onwards. For a detailed account of Meiji Restoration see William G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1972) and Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," in Marius B. Jansen (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, 6 Volumes, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Vol. 5, 308-366.

⁸⁸⁷ Esenbel, "Türk-Japon İlişkilerinin Tarihi," 149.

encouraged the efforts for the establishment of diplomatic relations between two states. The mission undertook a detailed study of the Ottoman capitulatory regime as well as the Ottoman political, economic and social structure and submitted a report to the Japanese delegation in St. Petersburg. Upon receiving this report, the head of the delegation contacted the Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg, Şakir Paşa (served between 1878 and 1889), and submitted a survey regarding the Ottoman capitulatory system. This survey was replied by Şakir Paşa in detail.⁸⁸⁸

After these initial diplomatic contacts, the Ottoman capital began to host high-rank Japanese politicians and members of the Japanese royal family. One of such visits was paid by the brother of Emperor Meiji (r. 1867-1912), Prince Komatsu (1846-1903), who came to İstanbul in 1887 after a tour in Europe.⁸⁸⁹ Abdülhamid responded to this gesture visit by sending a frigate, *Ertuğrul*, carrying the students of the Naval Academy under the command of Admiral Osman Paşa as well as the Order of Merit (*İmtiyaz Nişanı*) for the Emperor Meiji sent as a response to the Order of Great Chrysanthemum given by Prince Komatsu. According to Kaori Komatsu, the mission was not a simple visit of courtesy; rather it included Pan-Islamic elements. Accordingly, the order sent from the Prime Ministry to the Naval Ministry about the mission mentioned that the students and the frigate were sent “to wave the Ottoman flag over foreign shores” (*râyet-i zafer-âyet-i Osmânî'nin sevâhil-i ecnebiyede temevviic eylemesi*) and to stop at port cities where the Muslims had been living.⁸⁹⁰ In other words,

⁸⁸⁸ For the Yoshida mission and a summary of the survey of the Japanese delegation in St. Petersburg, see Umut Arık, *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations: A Special Partnership*, (Tokyo: Gyosei Tsushin Co., 1991), 19-21; also see, Selçuk Esenbel, “Japanese Perspectives of the Ottoman World,” in Selçuk Esenbel and Inaba Chiharu (eds.), *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), 7-41, 12-13. For the English translation of Yoshida Masaharu’s reports, see Nakaoka San-eki, “The Yoshida Masaharu Mission to Persia and the Ottoman Empire during the Period 1880-1881,” in *Collected Papers of Oriental Studies in Celebration of Seventy Years of Age of His Imperial Highness Prince Mikasa*, (Shogakukan: Japan Society for Near Eastern Studies 1985), 203-235.

⁸⁸⁹ Hee Soo Lee and İbrahim İlhan, *Osmanlı-Japon Münasebetleri ve Japonya’da İslamiyet*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 26.

⁸⁹⁰ Kaori Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası: Bir Dostluğun Doğuşu*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 1992), 37-38.

the route of *Ertuğrul* was carefully chosen for demonstrating the potential power of the Caliph over the Muslims of South and Southeast Asia.

Ertuğrul started its voyage in March 1889 and reached Japan in June 1890. On the way, in accordance with the order given by the Prime Ministry, it had stopped in various ports such as Bombay, Colombo, Calcutta, and Singapore, and Osman Paşa sent telegrams to the Porte indicating that thousands of Muslims came to visit the ship and declared their allegiance to the Caliph. According to Komatsu, the Muslim interest in the mission alarmed the colonial powers of the region, particularly the British and the Dutch.⁸⁹¹ In Tokyo, the mission was accepted by the Emperor. The speech of Osman Paşa in the presence of the Emperor indicated that Abdülhamid II carefully followed the progress of the Japanese and desired the continuation of this progress which might bring about the establishment of good relations between these two countries.⁸⁹²

The mission of *Ertuğrul* ended with a tragedy. The frigate sunk in a storm on its return to İstanbul and most of its crew lost their lives. However, the sinking of *Ertuğrul* contributed the Ottoman-Japanese relations more. The survivors were sent back by two Japanese ships in 1891. One year later, Yamada Torajiro (1866-1957) brought the relief sent by the Japanese people for the families of those who lost their lives in the accident. Torajiro remained in İstanbul as a merchant and for the next twenty years he acted “as the unofficial ambassador of Japan to the Porte.”⁸⁹³

These positive relations were complicated with the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. Indeed this alliance was anti-Russian, which might be beneficial for the Ottoman Empire as well; however, the Ottoman-British relations were not as good as before. Particularly, after the British invasion of Egypt in 1881, the Ottomans had deep suspicions regarding the British. Therefore, the ideas for the

⁸⁹¹ Komatsu, *Ertuğrul Faciası: Bir Dostluğun Doğuşu*, 40-43.

⁸⁹² Arık, *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, 33.

⁸⁹³ Esenbel, “Türk-Japon İlişkilerinin Tarihi,” 153-154.

development of Ottoman-Japanese diplomatic relations and a possible signature of a treaty of friendship between these two states came to a halt.

Although the Ottoman ruling elite as well as the Ottoman intellectuals were aware of and appreciated the Japanese modernization, it was only after the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war and the subsequent Japanese victory that they began to perceive this state as a model. In Cemil Aydın's words, this war "[...] was interpreted throughout the world as the first victory of an Asian nation belonging to the yellow race over a major white and Christian Western Empire."⁸⁹⁴ The victory of the Japanese "[...] propelled all anticolonial nationalists to be more assertive and confident, strengthened the constitutional movements, and invalidated several key legitimacy discourses of the Eurocentric world order."⁸⁹⁵ As such, of course, the Ottomans, who had suffered a lot from the Russians, perceived that the Western imperialist expansion was not altogether unstoppable. Therefore, according to them, the Japanese victory and its background should be examined. Within this framework, during the war, a Turkish soldier, Colonel Pertev Bey (Demirhan, 1871-1964), was sent to Japan as an observer. He reached to the Japanese-Russian front in October 1904, followed the battles and returned to İstanbul two years later. His report laid great emphasis on moral factors, such as the order, discipline and the excellent relationship between soldiers and officers, as the key to Japanese military success.⁸⁹⁶

The victory of Japan impressed the Ottoman military establishment to a great extent; as Handan Nezir Akmeşe argues, "[...] it strengthened their convictions about the role of the army as an agent for change in the society and

⁸⁹⁴ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 71.

⁸⁹⁵ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 72.

⁸⁹⁶ Handan Nezir Akmeşe, "The Japanese Nation in Arms: A Role for Militarist Nationalism in the Ottoman Army," in Renée Worringer (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 63-89, 67. This report would later be published as a monograph entitled *Rus-Japon Harbinden Alınan Maddi ve Manevi Dersler ve Japonların Esbab-ı Muzafferiyeti (Material and Moral Lessons Drawn from the Russo-Japanese War and the Causes of the Japanese Victory)*, (İstanbul: Kanaat Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi, 1913).

what a ‘nation in arms’ could indeed achieve in the face of Western encroachment.”⁸⁹⁷ However, the army’s appreciation of the Japanese victory increased the suspicions of Abdülhamid II. On the one hand, he recognized the use of Japanese victory for diverting the Russians from being a potential threat for the Ottomans at least for some time; on the other hand, he was concerned about the perception of this victory by the “dissidents” (particularly the Young Turks situated in the army) as a victory for a constitutional state over an autocracy.⁸⁹⁸

The Japanese victory was not only a matter of discussion during the Hamidian era; the Young Turks continued to try to understand the reasons for the Japanese success. Accordingly, in 1911, a conference on the modernization of Japan was organized by the CUP, among the audience of which there were high-ranking and influential figures such as the Ottoman Prince Abdülmecid Efendi (1868-1944) and the then Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rif’at Paşa.⁸⁹⁹

For the Young Turk administration as for the other Asian observers, the Japanese model of modernization was valuable for three reasons: (1) This model presented a shortcut to the Western level of civilization since the Japanese were able to modernize quite rapidly; (2) it showed that non-Western cultures and religions did not necessarily act as impediments in front of modernization; (3) it provided a significant optimism for the Ottoman as well as Asian observers to rejuvenate radical reformism.⁹⁰⁰ That is why, they were very much interested in understanding the Japanese way of modernization.

All in all, the Ottoman relations with Japan started as a result of Japanese efforts to end the unequal treaties system starting from the 1870s onwards and

⁸⁹⁷ Akmeşe, “The Japanese Nation in Arms,” 66. What is more, as early as 1905, two staff officers, Major Osman Senai and Captain Ali Fuad, published a five-volume study entitled *The Russo-Japanese Campaign of 1904-1905 (1904-1905 Rus-Japon Seferi)*, which appeared to have been widely read by cadets at the War College and by officers. Akmeşe, “The Japanese Nation in Arms,” 68-69.

⁸⁹⁸ Akmeşe, “The Japanese Nation in Arms,” 68.

⁸⁹⁹ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 79-80.

⁹⁰⁰ Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 81-82.

continued through the visits of Japanese delegations until 1890, when Abdülhamid II decided to respond these visits by sending *Ertuğrul* to Japan. However, the Ottoman interest towards Japan passed beyond such courtesy visits after the Japanese victory over the Russians in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. The defeat of a Western power by an Eastern one was very much appreciated by the Ottomans seeking to do the same for years; therefore, the Japanese way of development without giving up the national culture and traditions became a significant model discussed by the ruling elite as well as by the intellectuals of the Hamidian and post-Hamidian periods.

13.1.4. Ottoman Relations with China

Unlike India, Southeast Asia and Japan, Ottoman Empire's relations with China was almost non-existent until the last decade of the nineteenth century. In the first instance, the reasons for this disinterest can be argued as the intense Ottoman relations with the West instead of the East and the geographical distance. However, this does not explain why the Ottoman Empire established relations with other parts of Asia and even with a remoter country like Japan. Therefore other factors should be examined to understand the Ottoman disinterest towards China. One factor was that the Ottomans were very lately informed about the existence of a Muslim community in China. They were aware of the Mughal Empire of India and the small Muslim political entities in Southeast Asia; however, their proper acknowledgement of the Chinese Muslim community had only started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Secondly, unlike Japan, there was no corresponding interest from the Chinese side to the Ottoman Empire; in other words, there was mutual disinterest. What is more, while Japan might offer a model for the Ottoman Empire due to its successful development patterns, China could not have such a modelling effect. All these factors contributed to the Ottoman disinterest towards China.

It can be argued that the Ottoman Empire's consideration of China had started in the 1870s with the issue of East Turkistan. Yakub Khan's contact with the Porte, which is analysed in the previous chapter, increased the awareness of the Ottomans towards the Chinese Muslims, which was intensified during the

reign of Abdülhamid II. This awareness was reciprocal; in the meantime, the Chinese became also aware of the Ottomans, since the Russian advance in Central Asia disturbed China to a great extent and made her seek for an alliance with the Western states against Russia. Within this framework, one of the Chinese delegations headed by Sie Fou-Tcheng was sent to Paris and London in 1890 and there, he met with the Ottoman ambassadors Esad Paşa and Rüstem Paşa. Particularly, his meeting with Rüstem Paşa was significant, because Rüstem Paşa proposed the signature of a treaty of friendship between these two states since they had a common threat, namely Russia.⁹⁰¹ Such a treaty was not signed; however, the first diplomatic contacts were thus established.

Besides this earlier contact, Abdülhamid II closely followed the Boxer rebellion against the imperialist powers. Upon the request of the Germans, he sent some religious scholars and one of his aides, Enver Paşa, to China in 1900 in order to meet with the Chinese Muslims and to convince them not to join the rebellion. However Enver Paşa returned after a short visit to Shanghai, because the rebellion had already been suppressed short before his arrival in China in 1901. Still, however, the mission served for the increasing Ottoman awareness regarding the potential of the Chinese Muslims. The *ulama* accompanied Enver Paşa distributed several religious pamphlets prepared in Chinese in order to increase the loyalty of the Chinese Muslims to the Caliph.⁹⁰²

In the first decade of the twentieth century, three more visits were paid by the Ottomans to China. The first one was performed by Muhammed Ali, a member of the *ulama*, sent by Abdülhamid II in 1902, who had contacted with the Muslim religious authority (*müfti*) of Beijing, Abdurrahman (the Chinese name was Wang Hao-Chan). His main mission was to make the Chinese Muslims allegiant to the Caliph.⁹⁰³ He was followed by Karçınzade Süleyman

⁹⁰¹ Ocaklı, "XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ve XX. Yüzyılın Başında Çin Müslümanları ve Osmanlı İlişkileri," 589.

⁹⁰² Barış Adıbelli, *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: IQ Yayıncılık, 2007), 107-113.

⁹⁰³ Hee Soo Lee, "II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya'daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti," in Eren (ed.), *Osmanlı*, Vol. 2, 363-371, 366.

Şükrü and Abdürreşid İbrahim in 1904 and 1906 respectively. Whether these two were independent travellers or agents of Pan-Islamism sent by Abdülhamid II was a matter of discussion. According to Arzu Ocaklı and Hee Soo Lee, Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü was sent by Abdülhamid under the auspices of the Grand Vizier Tahsin Paşa in order to make Pan-Islamist propaganda in the region.⁹⁰⁴ Hee Soo Lee also perceives Abdürreşid İbrahim as an agent of Abdülhamid as well; while Selim Deringil argued the contrary and wrote that “the popular conception of Abdürreşid as Abdülhamid’s envoy and missionary is misplaced.”⁹⁰⁵ In their travelogues, Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü and Abdürreşid İbrahim never declared themselves as agents of Abdülhamid II.

Meanwhile in 1906, Müfti Abdurrahman came to the Porte on his way to pilgrimage. He was followed by other Chinese pilgrims, which strengthened the ties between the Empire and the Chinese Muslims. Abdurrahman demanded from Abdülhamid to send Islamic scholars to China in order to teach the true principles of Islam to the Chinese Muslims. Abdülhamid responded positively and sent Hafız Ali Rıza Efendi and Hafız Hasan Efendi to Beijing. They educated Chinese Muslim students in one of the mosques of Beijing called Niou Kiai. What is more, in 1908, as a result of Ali Rıza Efendi’s initiatives, Beijing Hamidiye College (*Dar’ul Ulûm-i Hamidiye*) was established by the Muslim elites of the city as a gratitude for sending *ulama* to China.⁹⁰⁶

All in all, the Ottoman relations with China was extensively limited and except for the diplomatic contact established between the Chinese delegation and the Ottoman Embassies in Paris and London, there was no significant diplomatic contact. Rather, the Ottoman interest to China was mainly focused on the Chinese Muslims and their potential within the framework of the policy of Pan-

⁹⁰⁴ Lee, “II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya’daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti,” 367; Ocaklı, “XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ve XX. Yüzyılın Başında Çin Müslümanları ve Osmanlı İlişkileri,” 593.

⁹⁰⁵ Lee, “II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya’daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti,” 370-371; Selim Deringil, “Ottoman-Japanese Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Esenbel and Chiharu (eds.), *The Rising Sun and the Turkish Crescent*, 42-47, 44.

⁹⁰⁶ Lee, “II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya’daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti,” 366; Ocaklı, “XIX. Yüzyıl Sonu ve XX. Yüzyılın Başında Çin Müslümanları ve Osmanlı İlişkileri,” 592.

Islamism. Particularly, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, several religious scholars were sent to China for the maintenance of the allegiance of the Chinese Muslims to the Caliph. Beyond that, except for some Ottoman travellers, China remained out of the focus of the Ottomans.

13.2. Ottoman Travellers' Perception of South and East Asia in the Nineteenth Century

13.2.1. Ottoman Travellers' Perception of the Local People

13.2.1.1. The Perception of the Japanese

Among the peoples of South and East Asia, the Japanese were the most appreciated and admired community in the Ottoman travelogues; their cultural resemblance to the Muslims, their modernization without giving up their national qualities and their competition with the Europeans in terms of political and military power attracted the attention of the travellers.

The appreciation of the Japanese people even extended to their physiognomic qualities. Karçinzade defined the Japanese, whom he had encountered on the board of the vessel on which he had been travelling to Shanghai, as such: “They are short, their bodies are solid, their bones are big, their arms are strong, their feet are swift, their steps are agile, their hearts are vivid, their eyes are small but quite open.”⁹⁰⁷ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, on the other hand, resembled them to the Turkish race. This similarity made him feel comfortably and in a familiar environment during his stay in a Japanese hospital in Shanghai for the treatment of his illness. He wrote that the Japanese “[...] did not perceive [him] as a foreigner [...] They informed each other that one of their brothers in the West had come to their hospital.”⁹⁰⁸

⁹⁰⁷ “*Kâmetleri kısa, gövdeleri sağlam, kemikleri iri, kolları kavî, ayakları çevik, hatveleri serî, kalpleri hayy, gözleri küçük ve fakat gayet açık [...]*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 544.

⁹⁰⁸ “[.B]eni yabancı görmüyorlardı [...] Garbdaki kardeşlerinden bir ferdin hastahanelerine geldiğini birbirlerine haber veriyorlardı.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 223.

Besides their physiognomy, the Japanese modernization and the travellers' awareness of its successes resulted in a very positive perception of the Japanese, particularly some of their characteristics. First and foremost, the diligence of the Japanese was emphasized; accordingly, the Japanese were "thinking a lot and speaking a little," (*çok düşünür az söyler*)⁹⁰⁹ and "speaking a little and working a lot." (*az laf, çok iş*)⁹¹⁰ They were acting rapidly and working continuously; they were solely dealing with their own duties without laughing and talking in vain, because they were always seeking for the interest of their own nation.⁹¹¹ They were even working harder than the Europeans because while the Europeans closed all their shops and factories during holidays, the Japanese kept them open and worked even harder during their festivals to meet increasing demands of the Japanese people.⁹¹² They did not have a nightlife; this was another "indication of good morality" (*hiisn-ü ahlâk emâresi*), which showed that the Japanese were not idle people.⁹¹³ What is more, according to Abdürreşid İbrahim, they were extremely productive; the Japanese industry frequently produced new inventions. He particularly mentioned about the "patent practice" ("*patent*" *usûlü*), which encouraged the Japanese scientists, since the inventors could obtain all the rights and concessions of what they had invented.⁹¹⁴ Another useful method was commercial advertisements (*ilânât-ı ticâriye*) which fostered Japanese trade; even, in this respect, he found the Japanese far more superior to the Europeans.⁹¹⁵

⁹⁰⁹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 16.

⁹¹⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 281.

⁹¹¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 189; Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 17-20.

⁹¹² Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 198.

⁹¹³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 209.

⁹¹⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 318.

⁹¹⁵ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 196-197.

Besides their diligence, the Japanese were appreciated for their cleanliness, orderliness and plain lives. For example, on his way to Yokohama, Abdürreşid İbrahim visited a Japanese village and admired its clean and ordered streets and houses; he was also quite surprised when he saw a telephone cabin in the midst of the village together with a modern post and telegraph office.⁹¹⁶ Not only villages or houses, but also other institutions such as museums or prisons were very much appreciated.⁹¹⁷ Besides cleanliness and orderliness, he argued that all the Japanese were polite, hospitable and good-mannered.⁹¹⁸ Similarly, Habibzade wrote that it was difficult to establish friendship with the Japanese; however, once it was established, they were extremely generous and sincere towards their friends.⁹¹⁹

Another Japanese characteristics worth of mentioning was the importance given to education. Accordingly, even in the smallest villages there were proper schools; in the cities, except for governmental buildings, only the schools were constructed colossally, which was an indication of the value given to education.⁹²⁰ What is more, the Japanese were extremely inclined to reading; Habibzade was surprised when he saw libraries even in the houses of Japanese villagers.⁹²¹ Similarly, Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned that the Japanese were reading newspapers properly; the newspapers were distributed even to the smallest villages of this country⁹²²

The Japanese were also admired for their family lives and for their respectfulness to the national culture. For example, Habibzade emphasized the

⁹¹⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 185.

⁹¹⁷ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 234, 270.

⁹¹⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 214.

⁹¹⁹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 16-17.

⁹²⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 189.

⁹²¹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 16.

⁹²² Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 185.

education of the Japanese children by their mothers in accordance with Japanese traditions, the respect of the Japanese women to their husbands, and the helpfulness of the Japanese men to their wives.⁹²³ Similarly, Abdürreşid İbrahim found the Japanese women not as informal as the Western women; he appreciated the mutual respect between Japanese man and woman. He also argued that even the high-rank bureaucrats and the members of the ruling dynasty preferred the Japanese living style instead of the Western one. For example, The Minister of Imperial Palace accepted Abdürreşid İbrahim first in a room decorated in European style and after a few minutes he told him that the formality was over and now they could pass to his personal room decorated in Japanese style. He further said that they were both Easterners and therefore they should communicate in Eastern style⁹²⁴. Similarly, he watched a Japanese theatre, only for it reflected the Japanese sensitiveness towards preserving their own national culture, although he did not understand the language of the play.⁹²⁵

These positive qualities directed particularly Abdürreşid İbrahim to conclude that indeed the Japanese had already been practising the Islamic principles, such as cleanliness, honesty, or the mutual respect between man and woman.⁹²⁶ He wrote that “thenceforward, there is no doubt that Islam will spread in Japan because the Japanese nation were naturally inclined to Islam.”⁹²⁷ He also devoted a chapter on the characteristics of the Japanese similar to Muslims in order to show that “if [the Ottoman] *ulama* are able to show the way to the Japanese, there is no doubt that the Japanese have the perfect competence to Islam.”⁹²⁸

⁹²³ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 17-20.

⁹²⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 279-280.

⁹²⁵ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 224.

⁹²⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 265.

⁹²⁷ “[F]î mâ-bâd, İslâmiyetin Japonya’da intişâr edeceđi şüphesizdir. Zira Japon milleti tab’en İslâma yakın bir millettir.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 273.

⁹²⁸ “Eđer bizim ulemâmız Japonlara yol gösterebilirlerse, hiç şüphe yoktur ki, Japonlarda İslâmiyet için istidâd-ı tâm vardır.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 311.

Abdürreşid İbrahim also admired the international respect and power that the Japanese attained in a short period of time. In one of his conversations with the former Japanese Foreign Minister, Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922), he declared his sentiments about the Japanese as such:

First of all, the Japanese suddenly arose like the sun and in their first attempt they proved to the world that the eastern nations had the capacity to become civilized. This is against the European diplomats' vicious ideas and vile interests regarding the East; therefore there is no doubt that they will change the political ideas that they have been pursuing so far.⁹²⁹

Similarly, he wrote that the emergence of the Japanese as a mighty power in the East was miraculous: "The emergence of a small nation, having no name and trace in the world, by making all the nations existing in the earth trembling, is an unforgettable wonder."⁹³⁰

Besides such declarations of admiration, Abdürreşid İbrahim argued that the Japanese should act as a guide to all Eastern nations:

Today, I convinced myself through my own observations about the Japanese advance. It is the natural competence I observed in the Japanese that gives me a great confidence... The Japanese nation will act as a guide for all Eastern nations, the natural channel of the East is to rise.⁹³¹

....
I see the Japanese as a new-born sun; I demand from the God that the entire Eastern world shall benefit from the lights of this sun. The Japanese are newly-flowered fruit tree, all Eastern and particularly our Muslims are waiting to eat from its fruits... If the elites of this nation cannot preserve this fruit, they will become responsible to the entire Eastern world, because the life of Japanese is the life of entire Eastern world.⁹³²

⁹²⁹ "Evvelâ Japonlar birden bire güneş gibi tulû ettiler ve birinci hareketlerinde şark milletlerinin bir istidâd-ı temeddüne malik olduğunu âleme ispât ettiler. Bu ise Avrupa diplomatlarının Şark hakkında besledikleri efkâr-ı fasîde ve menâfi-i kasîdlerine mugâyir olduğu gibi, şimdiye kadar tâkip etmekte oldukları siyâsetlerini dahî tebdîl edeceklerinde şüphe yoktur." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 202.

⁹³⁰ "Dünyada hiç nâm ve nişânı olmayan ufacık bir kavmin bütün kürre-yi arzda mevcûd akvâm-ı beşeriyeyi titretircesine meydana çıkması hiç bir zaman hatırdan çıkmayacak hârikadır." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 500-501.

⁹³¹ "Ben bugün Japonların takaddümlerine bilmüşâhade kesb-i kanâat ettim. Japonlarda gördüğüm istidâd-ı fîrî bana gayet büyük itminân vermiştir... Japon milleti bütün akvâm-ı Şarkiyeye rehber olacaklardır. Şarkın mecrâ-yı tabîisi yükselmektir." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 215.

⁹³² "Ben Japonlara yeni tulû etmiş bir güneş nazarıyla bakıyorum. Bütün Şark âleminin bu güneşin nûrundan müstefîd olmalarını Cenâb-ı Hâktan temennî ediyorum. Japonlar yeni çiçek açmış bir meyve ağacıdır, bütün Şark ve husûsen bizim Müslümanlar bunun meyvesinden yemeye muntazırdır... Eğer millet ricâli bu meyveyi muhâfaza edemezse bütün maşrik âlemine karşı

Despite this extreme adoration towards Japan and the Japanese culture, there were three significant characteristics of the Japanese that were not appreciated by the Ottoman travellers. One of them was the lack of the practice of “proper veiling” (*setr-i avret*) and therefore the lack of the sense of “shame” (*hicâb*) in the Japanese culture. Particularly, the bathing of the men and women together resulted in such a criticism towards the Japanese culture.⁹³³ The second point of criticism was related to the Japanese tradition of cremation of the corpses. Accordingly, Abdürreşid İbrahim participated to a cremation ceremony and explained it in detail. Although he disliked this practice, he perceived it as a matter of belief.⁹³⁴ Finally, the Japanese were criticized for their suppression over the neighbouring nations such as the Koreans or the Chinese. Although this criticism was not as severe as the criticism of Western imperialism, still the insulting treatment of the Japanese towards the Chinese and their intention to pursue their authority over them was not liked much.⁹³⁵

13.2.1.2. *The Perception of the Koreans*

Among the Ottoman travellers, only Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned about the Koreans. His perception of this community was quite negative; he expressed his criticisms towards the Koreans through comparing them with the Japanese. To start with, cleanliness was one criterion of comparison. Regarding the Koreans of Pusan, Abdürreşid İbrahim wrote that they had been living under miserable conditions, in dirty and messy houses.⁹³⁶ Similarly, on his way to Seoul, he passed the night in a Korean town and the official in the train station advised him to stay in one of the Japanese houses instead of the Korean ones

mesûl kalırlar, zira Japonların hayâtı umum şark âleminin hayatıdır.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 339.

⁹³³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 209, 214.

⁹³⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 274-277.

⁹³⁵ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 489.

⁹³⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 461.

because of the cleanliness of the former; after visiting both kinds of houses he had to admit that the official was right.⁹³⁷

Another difference between the Japanese and the Koreans was the diligence of the former *vis-à-vis* the laziness of the latter. He wrote that, “[a]lthough the fields are wide and fertile in Korea, there was no trace of life, since the nation is a dead one; it [the trace of life] only exists where the Japanese are residing.”⁹³⁸ What is more, there was nothing to trade in Korea since the Koreans had nothing to sell or buy because their lives were even simpler than the Japanese. There was no wealthy person as well, since the Koreans only thought about how to feed themselves and nothing else.⁹³⁹

Comparison with the Japanese was not only done for presenting the inferiority of the Koreans *vis-à-vis* the Japanese; with regard to the sense of “shame” (*hicâb*) the Koreans were perceived as superior to the Japanese. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, this was a quality to be appreciated; in Korean houses there was a particular section in their houses for women (*harem*) and they never let foreign males to see the women.⁹⁴⁰

13.2.1.3. *The Perception of the Chinese*

The perception of the Chinese by the Ottoman travellers was quite mixed; it was not as positive as the Japanese and not as negative as the Koreans. They praised the virtues of the Chinese and criticized the negative characteristics of this people. To start with the positive qualities, the Chinese awareness of their national culture and pride, unlike the Koreans, was appreciated. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, in Manchuria, although both the Chinese and the Koreans

⁹³⁷ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 463.

⁹³⁸ “Kore’de arazi bi’nnisbe vasî ve münbît ise de millet ölmüş bir millet olduğundan hayat eseri hiç gözükmüyordu, yalnız Japonların bulunduğu yerlerde var.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 464.

⁹³⁹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 473.

⁹⁴⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 461. Later, he discussed this sense of “shame” and veiling practices of Korean women in detail, 467-468.

were living under the Japanese domination, the Chinese did not totally surrender as the Koreans. They remained more prosperous compared to the Koreans; the reason for their prosperity and their resistance to the Japanese domination was their respect to Chinese traditions and national customs, since this provided “another trace of life” (*başka bir hayat eseri*) for this people.⁹⁴¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim admired the respect of the Chinese to their national costumes and their long hairs.⁹⁴² He even compared this attitude of the Chinese with the Ottomans who were ashamed of their fez and changed it with a hat when they travelled to Europe.⁹⁴³ Secondly, the Chinese were perceived as extremely honest; in this respect, he concluded that “the Chinese civilization was the most strong and solid civilization.”⁹⁴⁴

The Chinese of Shanghai attracted the attention of Adil Hikmet Bey, who perhaps produced one of the most positive accounts of the Chinese in his travelogue besides the most negative ones. According to him, the Chinese of Shanghai were the most vigilant and patriotic Chinese of the entire country.⁹⁴⁵ He praised their respect to the Chinese culture and the importance given to the use of national products instead of European imports. The merchants were honest and they hated the tricksters. He concluded that “if all the Chinese people loved their country as the Chinese of Shanghai and if they became as hard-working as them, then there would be no doubt that the yellow peril, from which

⁹⁴¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 487-489.

⁹⁴² “[...B]ir Çinli ne kadar zengin olursa olsun kendi millî elbisesinden başka bir elbiseye rağbet etmez, belki millî elbisesiyle iftîhâr eder. Çok metîn bir millettir. Hele o hayvan kuyruğu kadar saçını heman takdîs edercesine muhâfaza eder.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 154.

⁹⁴³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 554.

⁹⁴⁴ “Çin medeniyeti en metîn ve sağlam bir medeniyettir.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 493.

⁹⁴⁵ “Şanghay Çinlileri, bütün Çin arazisinde yaşayan insanların en îzânlısı ve en vatanperveridir.” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 412.

the Europe has feared, is to be materialized.”⁹⁴⁶ What is more, in Shanghai, he met with some Chinese intellectuals and admired their anti-European nature:

A real Chinese intellectual hates the Europeans. A viper is seen as deserving more respect than a European. He hates the Chinese snobs altogether. For a real intellectual, a Chinese who is inclined to Europeanness is a great threat, and any Chinese, who has contaminated his personality with the European principles, is worth of an army of missionaries. That is why he is hated.⁹⁴⁷

Besides these positive qualities, the Chinese were criticized for their dirtiness and cowardliness towards the colonial powers.⁹⁴⁸ The most significant criticism to the Chinese came from Habibzade Ahmet Kemal and Adil Hikmet Bey, who had been imposed to unfair and even harsh treatment by the Chinese officials, including imprisonment and exile. Similar to Abdürreşid İbrahim, Habibzade emphasized the dirtiness of the Chinese, their houses and their quarters.⁹⁴⁹ However, it was the Chinese sense of law and that he criticized the most. Accordingly, he was imprisoned for several times in Kasghar by the Chinese authorities; therefore he concluded that “[i]n Kasghar governmental affairs are quite disordered. Order and regularity are forgotten [...] Government in Chinese country means the shelter of bandits emerged within cities.”⁹⁵⁰ With regard to the treatment in the Chinese prisons, he mentioned about torture and argued that “In this era of progress of the society of mankind, the cruel laws of China applied these provisions [he meant the provisions for torturing the

⁹⁴⁶ “Bütün Çin ahâlisi Şanghay Çinlileri gibi vatanlarını sevmeyi bilseler ve onlar kadar çalışkan olsalar, Avrupa'nın korktuğu sarı tehlikenin meydan alacağına şüphe edilmezdi.” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 412.

⁹⁴⁷ “Hakikî bir Çinli münevver Avrupalılardan nefret eder. Bir engerek, bir Avrupalıdan daha ziyâde hümete şâyân görülür. Hele Çinli züppelerden tamamıyla nefret eder. Avrupalılığa temessül etmiş olan bir Çinli, hakikî münevverin fikrinde müthiş bir tehlikedir ve her benliğini Avrupa akîdelerine bulaştırmış olan Çinli, bir misyoner ordusuna bedeldir. Bunun için ondan nefret edilir.” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 425.

⁹⁴⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 158-159, 493

⁹⁴⁹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 118, 132-133.

⁹⁵⁰ “Kaşgar'da hükümet işleri çok bozuktur. Nizâm, intizâm mefkûat [...] Çin memleketlerinde hükümet, şehir içinde türeyen eşkiyâların ocağı demektir. Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 79.

prisoners] on the sons of Adam.”⁹⁵¹ What is more, he argued that the Chinese were not aware of international law:

Since the Chinese governors have not yet been familiar to the rules and provisions of international law, they did not perceive such occurrences as important, they ignore even the most serious and significant problems humiliating the honor of the government and the dignity of the country with tolerance.⁹⁵²

All in all, Habibzade suffered so much from the Chinese maltreatment that when the Chinese officials decided to send him to Shanghai after two years of imprisonment, he summarized his negative perception of the Chinese as such:

I am ready to prefer even the road to hell instead of the Road to Shanghai in order to save myself from the arms of stubborn Chinese people, the unlawful officials and the long haired thieves unaware of the provisions of international law and the rules of civilization and in order to reach the homeland.⁹⁵³

Similarly, Adil Hikmet Bey criticized the Chinese officials as much as he could; he mentioned about their insidious nature, from which he suffered the most. His hatred towards the Chinese was so significant that except for the Chinese officials, who had declared themselves as of Turkish origin, and the Chinese of Shanghai, he perceived all the Chinese as venomous people.⁹⁵⁴ What is more, he mentioned about the Chinese sense of arrogance; accordingly the Chinese perceived themselves as superior to all other nations. In their eyes, all

⁹⁵¹ “*İşte cemiyet-i beşeriyenin bu devr-i tekâmülünde Çin’in zâlim kânunları, bu maddeleri Âdemoğullarında tatbik ediyor.*” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 139.

⁹⁵² “*Fakat Çin valileri henüz daha hukûk-i düvel kâide ve ahkâmına vâkıf adamlar olmadıklarından, bu gibi vukuatlara ehemmiyet vermezler, nâmus-u hükümet ve haysiyet-i memleketi tahkîr eden en büyük ve ciddi meseleleri bile nazar-ı müsâmahe ile geçirirler.*” These lines were written after an incident in which some friends of Habibzade were captured by the Russian Cossacks operating within the Chinese territory. He applied to the local governors and mentioned that Russia acted contrary to international law and the Chinese had the right to reclaim these captured Turks. However, the Chinese governor attempted to ignore the incident in order not to disturb the fragile relations between China and Russia. Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 51.

⁹⁵³ “[...A]nûd Çinlilerin, bu kâidesiz memurların, hukûk-u düvel ahkâmından, medeniyet kânunlarından bîhaber, hırsız uzun saçlıların kolundan kurtulup vatana kavuşmak için Şanhay yolunu değil, belki de, cehennem yolunu tercih etmeye hazırım.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 166.

⁹⁵⁴ Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 236, 241.

other nations of the world were savage and the Confucian ethics were the most civilized and proper law.⁹⁵⁵

The Ottoman travelogues mentioning about China did not only describe the Chinese, but also the Chinese Muslims. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, the Chinese Muslims were extremely superior to the non-Muslim Chinese with regard to their cleanliness.⁹⁵⁶ What is more, they were appreciated for their establishment of schools for the education of youngsters. Habibzade praised them for establishing a school in Beijing entitled “the Islamic School” (*Medrese-i İslâmiye*).⁹⁵⁷

The Chinese Muslims could not easily be separated from the non-Muslims because they cut their mustaches and beards and kept their hairs long.⁹⁵⁸ This physiognomic similarity resulted in the criticism of Abdürreşid İbrahim because he perceived the long hairs and nails of the Chinese and cutting of their beards and mustaches as inappropriate in terms of Islamic principles.⁹⁵⁹ What is more, according to Abdürreşid İbrahim the Muslim Chinese houses, shops and mosques could only be differentiated from the non-Muslim ones by the Arabic scripts and Islamic signs carved on these buildings.⁹⁶⁰

Another criticism directed towards Chinese Muslims was their ignorance and bigotry. Abdürreşid İbrahim found the Chinese *imams* extremely ignorant, even deprived of the knowledge of simple Arabic; what is more, they blended Confucian traditions with Islam, which was deteriorating the real Islamic principles.⁹⁶¹ What is more, the elites of the Chinese Muslims were quite

⁹⁵⁵ “*Dünyada mevcûd kavimlerin hepsi onlarca vahşidir ve bütün dünyada en medeni ve doğru kânunlar Konfüçyus ahkâmından ibarettir ve herkes de bu kânunlarla idâre olunur.*” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 369.

⁹⁵⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 138.

⁹⁵⁷ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghai Hatıraları*, 26.

⁹⁵⁸ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 563.

⁹⁵⁹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 512.

⁹⁶⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 138.

⁹⁶¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 141.

ignorant as well; when Abdürreşid İbrahim began to talk about the concepts like nation, progress or education, they did not listen to their words and even began to sleep.⁹⁶² After emphasizing the Muslim ignorance he offered the Ottomans to enlighten these people:

In northern China, especially in northeastern parts and in Manchuria ignorance is widespread, even to the degree that they are not aware of their ignorance, to awaken them and to send people to awake them are the duties of Muslims of enlightened ideas. Particularly the Muslims living under the Islamic Caliphate and especially the post of *seikhulislam* should help and save them from the darkness of ignorance; otherwise their future was extremely desperate.⁹⁶³

Habibzade also focused on the bigotry of Chinese Muslims; however, he appreciated this bigotry because the missionaries could not succeed to convert Chinese Muslims for their fanatical loyalty to their religion. He wrote that the Chinese Muslims called the missionaries as “the thieves of religion” (*din hırsızları*) and the missionaries called the Chinese Muslims as “Chinese barbarians” (*Çin barbarları*).⁹⁶⁴

13.2.1.4. *The Perception of the Indians and the Indo-Chinese*

What is significant, in the first instance, with regard to the Ottoman perception of the Indians and the Indo-Chinese was their effort to categorize different ethnic communities living in these regions. Such an effort was not much visible in the accounts of China or Japan because of the relative demographic homogeneity of these countries, except for the cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai or Hong Kong. In making these categorizations, certain criteria

⁹⁶² “Muallimden, tâlimden bir şey söylersem âdeti uyumaya başlar.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 143.

⁹⁶³ “Çin-i şimâlîde, husûsen şimâl-i şarkîde ve Mançurya’da cehâlet çok taammüm etmiş, hatta o derecede ki kendi cehâletlerinden kendilerinin haberleri yok, buraları ikâz etmek ve ikâz edecek adamları yollamak münevverü’l efkâr olan Müslümanların vazîfeleridir. Husûsen hilâfet-i İslâmîyede bulunan Müslümanlar ve bâhusus meşihât-ı İslâmîye bunların imdâdına yetişmeli, bu zulmet-i cehâletten bunları kurtarmalı ve illâ âkıbetleri çok vahîmdir.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 155.

⁹⁶⁴ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghai Hatıraları*, p. 27. Similarly Adil Hikmet Bey mentioned that the Chinese Muslims’ bigotry resulted in the failure of the missionaries. Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 313.

such as religion, dress, profession or ethnic background were used. For example, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi categorized the Indian population with regard to their religion and mentioned about the Muslim, *Mecusî* (he meant Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist communities), and Parsi communities.⁹⁶⁵ On the other hand, while he mentioned about the cosmopolitan composition of Bombay, he focused on different ethnic communities besides religious ones:

In the interior parts [of the city], there were peculiar quarters for Hind and Arab and Acem and Parsi and European and Chinese and etc. In its streets, Hindus with big turbans, naked bodies and red and yellow and blue lines on their faces, Arabs wearing Babylonian clothes, Parsis with long cones on their heads who very much look like Persians, Portuguese ladies wearing black costumes, savage-looking Chinese and Burmese speaking with a loud voice, Malays, Kûçî and Gujarati people with thin turbans and Afghans and Sind people with large turbans are encountered.⁹⁶⁶

Three points attracts attention in this long excerpt. First of all, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi defined these ethnic communities mainly by referring to their costumes, particularly their turbans. For example, what distinguished Parsis from Sind people is not their physical appearance but their head-covers. Secondly, the Portuguese were noted as the only European community; his disregard of the British or other European communities living in the city demonstrated that he perceived the Portuguese among the native population of the subcontinent. Finally, in depicting Indo-Chinese and Chinese communities, he focused on their language and physical appearance instead of their costumes. Such a

⁹⁶⁵ A Parsi or Parsee, is a member of a Zoroastrian community based primarily in the Indian subcontinent, who had claimed themselves to be descended from the Zoroastrians migrated from Persia to Indian subcontinent around the eighth century A. C. Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, p. 14. Similarly, Ali Bey classified the peoples of India in accordance with their religions under the categories of Islam, Parsi, Brahmans (*Bunyan*), Hindu and the Portuguese. See Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 107-111.

⁹⁶⁶ “*Derûnunda Hind ve Arab ve Acem ve Pârsî ve Avrupalı ve Çinli ve sâireye mahsûs mahaller olup, sokaklarında başları büyük kavuklu ve bedenleri çıplak ve yüzlerine kırmızı ve sarı ve mavi hatlar çekilmiş Hindulara ve Babilî elbiselerle mülebbes Arablara ve müşâhabetçe Acemlere pek karîb olan uzun külahlarıyla ser-efrâz Parsîlere yâni atesperestlere ve siyah elbiseler giyinip çıkmış Portekizli güzellere ve tantana ile tekellüm eden vahşî simâlî Çinlilere ve Birmanlılara, Malaylara ve ince sarıklı Kûçî ve Guceratîlere ve büyük amâmeli Afganîlere ve Sindlilere tesâdüf olunur.*” Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 15-16.

differentiation even reached to the level of labelling Indo-Chinese communities as savage-looking.

Similar to Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, Abdürreşid İbrahim was another traveller utilizing ethnic background for classification. Regarding the Sumatran people, he devoted a small chapter entitled “Ethnographic Aspect” (*Etnoğraf Ciheti*) in which he determined the Javanese and the Malays as mixed groups emerged out of the mixture of the Chinese and the Indians. Accordingly, the Javanese resembled the Chinese, while the Malays resembled the Indians.⁹⁶⁷

Rather than utilizing dress or ethnic background as a criteria, Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü mainly focused on the division of labour for categorizing them. For example regarding Ceylon, he mentioned that the Muslims were mainly dealing with trade, the Singhalese were working as artisans or officials, and the Tamil people were dealing with agriculture.⁹⁶⁸ Similarly with regard to the inhabitants of Bombay, he mentioned about the Muslim community, which was the most developed one in terms of industry and trade, the Zoroastrians dealing with the same sectors, and the Hindus dealing mainly with agriculture.⁹⁶⁹

Besides the categorization of local people, another significant point in the travelogues on India and Indo-China was the conditions of the Indian Muslims, which were perceived quite similar to the Chinese Muslims. On the one hand, the Indian Muslims' piousness and their loyalty to the Caliph were appraised; on the other hand, their acceptance of the British colonial administration was criticized. There was no single perception of the Indian Muslims; for example, Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü wrote that the Muslim community of Calcutta was quite pious and modest; they preserved and were proud of their spiritual ties with the Caliph.

⁹⁶⁷ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 19.

⁹⁶⁸ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 471.

⁹⁶⁹ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 361. Similarly, he utilized profession as a criterion for categorizing the peoples of Hong Kong. Accordingly the Muslim community were generally dealing with trade, bakery, butchery, grocery and they earned quite well. Europeans and the Japanese were dealing with trade, medical profession, artisanship, money changing, and hotel and bar management. The Jewish community was dealing with brokerage and finally the local inhabitants were working as farmers, workers, boatmen, and porters. Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 540.

However, the Muslim ruler (*nuvvab*) of Baroda, who had been deposed by the British and replaced by a Hindu raj, was depicted as a coward man, whose cowardliness, also visible in the Muslim community of that region, contributed to the British supremacy.⁹⁷⁰ Similarly, his perception of the Muslim community of Ahmedabad was quite negative. He wrote that these Muslims “[...] are oppressed by ignorance, poverty and laziness; their bloods are frozen, their hearts are dead, their minds are drowsy; therefore they cannot benefit from their inherited intelligence.”⁹⁷¹

Ignorance and lack of education was another point of criticism directed towards the Indian Muslims. Regarding Hyderabad, Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned about the miserable conditions of the mosques, religious schools, or lack of libraries. He argued that in this great Islamic state, such problems should not exist.⁹⁷² He bitterly criticized the students of the Muslim schools, who were “at the most primitive stage of the humanity.” (*insâniyetin pek ibtidâî derecesinde*).⁹⁷³ He also argued that the only education given in this school was on Arabic and religious sciences; there was no courses on the new sciences (*fünûn-u cedîde*).⁹⁷⁴ Similarly, in Porbandar, Karçinzade attended to the opening ceremony of a Muslim school entitled “The School of the Council of Benevolence” (*Medrese-i Encümen-i Ahyâr*), and made a speech on the importance of education. He mentioned that the curriculum of the school was rich in terms of language education, but extremely poor in terms of science education. To the languages taught in the school, Turkish must be added in order not to ignore the religious and commercial significance of the Ottoman Empire; what is more, besides history, geography and philosophy, positive sciences

⁹⁷⁰ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 447, 375.

⁹⁷¹ “*Cehâlet, atâlet, meskenet üzerlerine çöküp kanları donmuş, kalpleri ölmüş, âsapları uyuşmuş olduğundan zekâvet-i fitriyelerinden müstefid olamıyorlar.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 377.

⁹⁷² Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 89-90.

⁹⁷³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 91.

⁹⁷⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 91.

including, algebra, geometry, cosmography, geology and mineralogy should be added to the curriculum. Another department on trade and industry should be added to this school as well.⁹⁷⁵ These propositions demonstrated the significance attached to modern education by the Ottomans.

Finally, the Indian culture and Hindu religious practices attracted the attention of the travellers. Ahmed Hamdi Efendi mentioned about Indian culture generally quite objectively, without judging or comparing it with Islamic standards. Many Indian traditions, such as the cremation of the corpses or the sanctity of cows, were solely described by Ahmed Hamdi Efendi without a negative connotation. For example, he described how Indians had prepared the corps for burning and how the process of cremation had been executed in detail.⁹⁷⁶ However, he did not condemn it as an indication of barbarity. Similar to the Indian funeral traditions, he did not adjudge the Parsi tradition of placing the corpses on a high tower and leaving them to the birds to eat; rather he confined himself to narrate a conversation that he had made with a Parsi on the funeral customs of this community.⁹⁷⁷

Ahmed Hamdi Efendi approached another oft-cited practice, namely sanctity of cows, as a religious practice. He enlisted many rites regarding cows, even as marginal as the utilization of cow urine as a cleaning liquid or application of cow excreta by some Hindu sects on their foreheads for good fortune; however he just perceived them as religious rituals.⁹⁷⁸ On the other hand, Karçinzade was not as tolerant as Ahmed Hamdi Efendi regarding cow-worshipping. He criticized the dirtiness of cow-worshippers, since they utilized the urine and excrement of the cows for smarten up themselves. He wrote that

⁹⁷⁵ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 393.

⁹⁷⁶ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 10-11.

⁹⁷⁷ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 18.

⁹⁷⁸ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahâtname*, 72.

through this practice, the streets of Bombay resembled to “a river full of mess” (*müzhârefatlı bir dere*) and “a disgusting sewer” (*mekruh bir lağım*).⁹⁷⁹

As a Muslim scholar, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi did not question the validity of reincarnation as well. Writing on Hamirpur, he mentioned about Buddhists and their religious beliefs and he briefly described reincarnation without judging it with Islamic precepts.⁹⁸⁰ Unlike Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, Karçinzade derided with the religious practices of the Hindus; he sarcastically mentioned about their distorted beliefs.⁹⁸¹ For example he labelled a Hindu ritual as a “ridiculous disorder” (*gülünç bir keşmekeş*).⁹⁸²

There were a few traditions which Ahmed Hamdi Efendi did not remain neutral and criticized. For example, he mentioned his disgust over the leaving of the remnants of corpses after cremation to the Ganges River. Thus he describes the appearance of these remnants on the river as an “unsightly panorama” (*bir çirkin manzara*).⁹⁸³ Even commenting on this practice, Ahmet Hamdi Efendi did not abase it in religious terms, but rather condemns it as an unhygienic and hideous habit. Another tradition he fiercely criticized was the abandonment of those with mortal diseases to the banks of Ganges to make them drowned to the river during the high tide. He named this practice as a “disgusting custom” (*âdet-i kerîhe*) likewise the *satee*, the practice of a widow immolating herself on her husband’s funeral pyre, which had been severely prohibited by the British short before his arrival to the subcontinent.⁹⁸⁴

Ali Bey also found the cremation of corpses as a disgusting practice, which he could not afford to watch; such a negative perception was evident in

⁹⁷⁹ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 360.

⁹⁸⁰ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 122.

⁹⁸¹ For example, he criticized the worshipping to a statute having a human body with a donkey’s head. Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, p. 363.

⁹⁸² Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, p. 375.

⁹⁸³ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 66.

⁹⁸⁴ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan ve Svat ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 130.

the travelogue of Abdürreşid İbrahim, who found this practice as a savage tradition.⁹⁸⁵ Similarly, both of them condemned the tradition of *satee* and appreciated its prohibition by the British.⁹⁸⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim concluded that “[a]lthough such beliefs were present in almost all nations, I think that they are not as extreme as Hindus.”⁹⁸⁷

All in all, the travellers’ perception of the Indians was quite mixed. On the one hand, ignorance and bigotry were the main criticisms directed towards the Muslim community; however, these criticisms were also extended towards the Hindus and Parsis. Particularly the cremation of the corpses and the tradition of *satee* attracted the attention of the travellers the most, because these were extremely weird traditions conflicting with the basic Islamic principles. Therefore, the inhabitants of India and South East Asia were generally perceived negatively.

13.2.2. Cities of South and East Asia and the Issue of Urban Duality

Similar to the other travelogues on the non-European world, the travelogues on the South and East Asia included the detailed descriptions of cities and their characteristics. What make these travellers content about a city was its orderliness, cleanness and its level of attainment of the civilizational qualities. For example, Abdürreşid İbrahim compared Bombay and Calcutta; while he liked the former for having felt himself as in one of the European cities, he complained about the latter, particularly for its dirtiness.⁹⁸⁸ Similarly, regarding Bombay, Âli Bey wrote that the city was almost reconstructed by the British; he admired the orderliness of the new city; particularly large

⁹⁸⁵ Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, pp. 107-111; “İhrak-ı meyyitin mecusiyyette esas-ı dine alakası olmayıp, belki diyanet namına kabul olunmuş bir vahşettir.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 125.

⁹⁸⁶ Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 110; Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 126.

⁹⁸⁷ “Her ne kadar bu gibi itikatlar her millette dahi var ise de, Hind mecusilerinde olduğu kadar fahiş olamaz.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 32.

⁹⁸⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 31, 37.

governmental buildings. He even wrote that the railway station was much more superior to the ones that he had seen in Europe in terms of its largeness and architectural design.⁹⁸⁹

Among the cities of South and East Asia, it was Shanghai that impressed the travellers the most. For example, Habibzade admired the city's illuminated ports, European style buildings, automobiles, motorcycles, electrical trams and all other technological infrastructure. He perceived the city as a European capital instead of an Asian one, and felt himself as if he was in "one of the excellent cities of Europe" (*Avrupa'nun en müttekâmil şehirlerinden biri*).⁹⁹⁰ Similarly, Abdürreşid İbrahim wrote that this city was the most prosperous city of China and resembled to the European cities and wrote that "[t]here is no doubt that this region is a Chinese realm. However, the city is an international city in which administrative authority resides with the British administrators. In appearance it is almost a British city."⁹⁹¹ Adil Hikmet Bey was also impressed about the international nature of the city. He wrote that every European nation designed its own quarter as to remind their own country.⁹⁹²

Although Beijing was an old city deprived of the traces of civilization and modernity, Abdürreşid İbrahim admired the glorious past of the city; he labelled Beijing as "[...] one of the oldest cities of the world and one of the oldest examples of civilization. Beijing, which is the capital city of the Great Chinese state is a great city known by the world."⁹⁹³ He argued that the city had

⁹⁸⁹ Ali Bey, *Seyahat Jurnalı*, 112.

⁹⁹⁰ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, pp. 233-234; Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 7.

⁹⁹¹ "Hiç şüphe yoktur burası bir Çin ülkesidir. Fakat belde ise Entre-nationale bir belde olup hâkimiyet-i idâriye tamamen Administrer İngilizler tasarrufundadır. Zâhire bakılacak olursa adeta bir İngiliz beldesidir." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 584.

⁹⁹² "Her devlet kendi muntkasını diğeriyle rekâbet ederek imâr etmişti. Şurası Taymis kenarından bir köşe, burası Fransa'dan bir bucak, ötesi Almanya'dan bir parça idi." Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 411.

⁹⁹³ "Dünyanın en eski beldelerinden olup medeniyetin de en eski numûnelerindedir. Çin devlet-i mefhûmesinin payitahtı olan Pekin beldesi mâruf-u cihân olan bir belde-i muazzamadır." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 521.

been constructed so marvellously that it was very difficult to realize such a big project even in the period he was living in:

Those who had constructed and improved this castle five hundred years ago are the Easterners whom have been called by Europeans as barbaric and savage. It is worth of saying that today it is impossible to establish such a thing even millions are spent for it.⁹⁹⁴

The Sultanate of Johor also impressed Abdürreşid İbrahim for its self-modernization. He argued that the Sultan İbrahim Ebubekir, whom he argued had only served for his Sultanate, had established railways, post offices, ports, in sum an ordered and clean country unlike other regions of the South and East Asia. Even in terms of cleanliness, he found the Sultanate better than the Japanese. There were other cities he admired for their development; however, they owe their limited modernization to the colonial rule. What is significant for the Sultanate of Johor was its self-modernization by an able and modern-looking Sultan. In sum, according to Abdürreşid İbrahim, Johor was “a totally civilized country” (*tamamiyle medeni bir memleket*).⁹⁹⁵

Another significant aspect of the travelogues on South and East Asia was the analogies set between Indian and Western cities in accordance with several criteria such as economic positioning, geographical location, or quality of artisanship. For example, in resembling Ajmer to Frankfurt, Ahmed Hamdi Efendi focused on the existence of a wealthy banker community, which he depicted as the “Rothschilds of this country” continuously competing with each other.⁹⁹⁶ In resembling Benares to Napoli, he mentioned that two cities had a similar topographic establishment, climate as well as panorama.⁹⁹⁷ Finally, in resembling Bombay to Paris or London, he used the quality of carriage-making as a standard for comparison. He wrote that he had encountered with carriages on

⁹⁹⁴ “Bu kaleyi bundan beş yüz sene mukaddem binâ ve imâr edenler Avrupa’nın vahşî ve barbar dedikleri Şarklılardır. Bugün milyonlar sarf olunsa bile bu gibi bir şey meydana getirmek inkân hâricinde denilirse sezâdır.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 529.

⁹⁹⁵ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 17.

⁹⁹⁶ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan Ve Svat Ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 37.

⁹⁹⁷ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan Ve Svat Ve Afganistan Seyahât-nâmesi*, 57.

the streets of Bombay manufactured by Indians, which were almost identical with the ones manufactured in Paris or London.⁹⁹⁸ Similarly, when he visited Bina, he had the opportunity to compare diamond-cutting. While he admitted that the quality of diamond-cutting and faceting was inferior to that of the Dutch, still the Indians had acquired the ability to cut the diamonds to a degree that they were preferred in Europe.⁹⁹⁹ Besides such similarities with Europe, resembling the cities and landscapes of the region to Anatolia was another way of comparing these two different geographies. For example, when entering to the port of Bombay, Karçınzade resembled the greenness of the city to the forests of Anatolia; he even argued that Bombay and İzmir were created by the God as similar ports.¹⁰⁰⁰

Similar to the travelogues on North Africa, urban duality, in other words the spatial distinction between the quarters resided by the Europeans and the local people was a significant matter in the travelogues on South and East Asia. Cleanliness and orderliness, the existence of proper transportation and illumination were the criteria for separating between these two different spaces. The cities, particularly the cosmopolitan/metropolitan cities, such as Calcutta, Bombay, Beijing, Shanghai and Singapore were perceived in terms of urban duality. For example, regarding Calcutta, Abdürreşid İbrahim argued that while the European quarters of the city were not different from any other European city, the Muslim and Parsi quarters were quite disordered and dirty.¹⁰⁰¹ A similar criticism was made for Beijing. He argued that except for the quarters where the European diplomats resided; “the dirtiest street of İstanbul is cleaner than the cleanest street of Beijing.”¹⁰⁰² Regarding Shanghai, Habibzade went one step

⁹⁹⁸ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan Ve Svat Ve Afganistan Seyahâtnâmesi*, 16.

⁹⁹⁹ Şirvanizade Ahmed Hamdi, *Hindistan Ve Svat Ve Afganistan Seyahâtnâmesi*, 121.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 355.

¹⁰⁰¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 38.

¹⁰⁰² “*Bizim İstanbul’un en pis caddesi, Pekin’in en nazif caddesinden daha naziftir.*” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 533.

further and separated between “the civilized and uncivilized” (*medenî ve gayrimedenî*) quarters of the city in which the Europeans and the Chinese were living respectively.¹⁰⁰³

Unlike the travelogues on North Africa, urban duality was not solely constructed on the distinction between the European and non-European quarters; sometimes the urban space was divided between Muslim and Chinese or Muslim and Hindu quarters; with regard to this type of distinction, the Muslim space was always superior from the non-Muslim one. For example, Habibzade wrote about the Chinese and Muslim quarters of the city of Aksu. He wrote that although the Chinese quarter was newly built and therefore had physical superiority over the old Muslim quarter, he was quite bored in the former because of its narrow streets as well as its cold-blooded and static inhabitants. He preferred to live in the old, musty Muslim quarters since he was with his co-religionists in this part of the city. Similarly, in the account of Habibzade, the city of Urumchi was divided into three parts being the upper part inhabited by the Europeans, the lower part inhabited by the Turks and the middle part inhabited by the Chinese. He wrote that the Chinese quarter was the dirtiest part of the entire city because the Chinese were lifeless and miserable people deprived of any kind of social life.¹⁰⁰⁴

13.2.3. Critique of Western Colonial Policy

Similar to the Ottoman travelogues on North Africa, the travelogues on the South and East Asia included a significant critique of the Western colonial policy. While in the former travelogues, the target was the French colonialism, the latter travelogues mainly focused on the British colonialism.

To start with, the Ottoman travellers argued that the colonial powers exploited the resources of the South and East Asia and usurped the wealth of the local people. For example, Karçınzade argued that the British policy in India was

¹⁰⁰³ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 7.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Çin-Türkistan Hatıraları*, 156.

based on the imposition of unbearable taxes on the inhabitants of India; when they could not afford to pay these taxes, the British began to sell whatever they found and to “lift the wealth of India to London” (*Hind servetini Londra’ya aşırmaq*).¹⁰⁰⁵ Indeed, he admitted that the British had made some investments to India from these taxes in the form of construction of modern buildings and infrastructure; however, these constructions were made solely for the sake of the Europeans and their comforts. Regarding Bombay, he wrote that the British had only modernized the littoral parts, where they had been residing, and left other parts of the city unimproved.¹⁰⁰⁶ Similarly, regarding Calcutta, he wrote while all the ornamented buildings were constructed by Indians, they were not respected by the British and continued to live under miserable conditions.¹⁰⁰⁷ According to him, this was an intentional British strategy to show the difference between the British civilization and the Indian backwardness. Another way of demonstrating this duality was the construction of statutes representing the grandeur of Britain *vis-à-vis* the Indians; similar to the description of a statute in French colonies in North Africa, he depicted the statute of Queen Elizabeth in Calcutta in detail as the visual representation of Western superiority.¹⁰⁰⁸

A second point of criticism towards British colonialism was the segregation between the Europeans and the Indians. Karçinzade mentioned that an Indian, however noble, virtuous and wealthy he was, had not the right to enter into the lodges of the Europeans or to travel in the same compartment with them.¹⁰⁰⁹ Similar to his writings about the French colonial rule in North Africa, he mentioned that the Indians were never appointed to high-ranking posts; at most, they could be appointed as an official-in-chief. No higher career could be

¹⁰⁰⁵ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 357.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 359.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 442-443.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 447-448.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 364.

obtained by the local inhabitants of the country.¹⁰¹⁰ Similarly Habibzade wrote that it was impossible for a Chinese to enter to a park where the Europeans were wandering, to buy something from the shops where the Europeans bought something, or to go to a theatre or cinema where the Europeans were going.¹⁰¹¹ In other words, not only in India but also in China, same segregation prevailed.

The segregation was not only present in social life; it was legalized through law and establishment of dual courts separating the Europeans and the local inhabitants. Karçinzade mentioned that “[t]he Europeans had two kinds of laws in India and in other colonies. The provisions of one of them are for their own nations and the other on the ones under their authority.”¹⁰¹² Similarly, Habibzade mentioned about the dual courts in Shanghai, one devoted for the European trials based on European laws, and the other one dealing with the trials of the Chinese whose trial and persecution had been full of “different kinds of atrocities” (*envâ-yı mezâlim*)¹⁰¹³

A third point of criticism towards the British colonial policy was that the British had allowed, if not encouraged, the ignorance of the local people. Karçinzade argued that one of the main tenets of the British colonial policy was the preservation of the weird superstitions of the Indians:

The essence of the policy of preserving the British interests is to strive seriously for the continuation and permanence of all the ignorant traditions resulting in the eternal blindness of the Indians through hiding them under the curtain of liberty.¹⁰¹⁴

¹⁰¹⁰ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 371.

¹⁰¹¹ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 8.

¹⁰¹² “Avrupalıların Hindistan ile sâir müstemlekelerinde iki türlü kânunu vardır. Bunlardan birinin ahkâmı kendi milletlerine, diğeri sırf anâsır-ı mahkûmeye mahsûstur.” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 513.

¹⁰¹³ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 7.

¹⁰¹⁴ “Hindlilerin ilelebed kör kalmasına bâdî ne kadar âsâr-ı cehâlet var ise hürriyet perdesi altında gizleyerek devam ve bekâsına cidden çabalamak İngilizlerin tâkip ettikleri cerr-i menâfî planının esâsıdır.” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 364.

Similarly, Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned about the misapplication of the understanding of liberty in India, while he was mentioning about the freedom of publication. He wrote that in this country, the authors were free to write everything about religion, about the communities of India, about the backwardness of people; they could even insult prophets freely. The one thing they were forbidden was to criticize Britain and British colonial administration.¹⁰¹⁵

A fourth point of criticism was the intimate relations between the colonial administration and the missionary activities. Almost all the travellers to the South and East Asia were complaining about the works of the missionary groups. Abdürreşid İbrahim was the most fierce critique of them; he labelled the missionaries as “incorrigible parasites” (*haşerât-ı lâ-iflahûn*) and mentioned about their publications made to deceive ordinary people in detail.¹⁰¹⁶ He argued that “[t]he missionaries were not religion-spreaders and the servants of Christianity, they just sow the seeds of sedition.”¹⁰¹⁷ What is more, he criticized that the missionaries were benefitting from the miserable conditions or the weaknesses of the local population. For example, regarding the missionary activities in Korea, he wrote that the Korean addiction to alcohol facilitated missionary work, since the Koreans were converted to Christianity even with a glass of drink.¹⁰¹⁸

Similar to Abdürreşid İbrahim, Karçinzade complained about the disastrous nature of the missionary activities and the missionaries’ exploitation

¹⁰¹⁵ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 131-132.

¹⁰¹⁶ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, p. 305. Indeed it was quite ironic that Abdürreşid İbrahim was labelled by some authors as a missionary of Islam. However; he himself rejected the label of missionary attached to him. In one of his speeches in the presence of a Japanese audience he said: “What I shall first say to you is that I did not come here for religious education or spreading religion; in Islamic religion missions are performed not through proposing but through illuminating the morality.” (*Benim her şeyden önce size arz edeceğim şudur ki: Ben buraya din tâlimi ve neşri için gelmedim, zaten diyânet-i İslâmiyede misyonerlik tekellûfât ile değil, tezhîb-i ahlâk ile dir.*) Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 328.

¹⁰¹⁷ “Zaten misyonerler esâsen din nâşirleri, nasrâniyet hâdimleri değildir.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 553

¹⁰¹⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 473.

of the miserable conditions of the local inhabitants emerged out of famines or other natural disasters. He mentioned that through providing them simply with daily sustenance, the missionaries were able to convert many people into Christianity.¹⁰¹⁹ Habibzade underlined that the missionaries did not only benefit from the poverty of local people but also approached them as if they were one of them. Exemplifying the missionary activities in China, he argued that the missionaries were dressed like the Chinese and adopted Chinese living style in order to facilitate their contact with the local population and they organized their working programme in accordance with Chinese traditions.¹⁰²⁰ Similarly, Adil Hikmet Bey criticized the missionary activities by emphasizing that the missionaries did not refrain to kill, intimidate or make even the brothers enemies to each other.¹⁰²¹

According to these travellers the most important reason for the success of missionary activities in these regions was the local people's abandonment of their national culture and morality. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, Korea was the country where the missionaries had performed their jobs extremely comfortably because of the incapacity and indifference of the Koreans for the preservation of their national culture and identity.¹⁰²² Similarly, in one of his speeches delivered in Japan, he warned the Japanese for not abandoning their national culture, morality and identity, for not surrendering to Frankish customs and for bewareing the missionaries.¹⁰²³

Another interesting point in these travelogues was the perception of the travellers towards Japanese imperialism and Japanese missionary activities. Unlike their account of Western colonial policy, in general, they appreciated and

¹⁰¹⁹ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 512-513.

¹⁰²⁰ Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 10.

¹⁰²¹ "Misyonerler halkı tanassur için dâima mücâdelededirler. Bu maksatla hatta iki kardeş arasında bile münâferet uyandırırılar. Katl, tehdit, her şey bunlarca mübahdır." Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 381.

¹⁰²² Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 469.

¹⁰²³ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 383-384.

tried to legitimize Japanese imperialism and missionary activities over the region. Interestingly, they were content with an Eastern rival to Western imperialism; they believed that the Japanese imperialism was more preferable than the Western imperialism for the Chinese or the Koreans. For example, Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned that the Koreans welcomed Japanese invasion since the Japanese constructed a new infrastructure for them.¹⁰²⁴ What is more, he appreciated the Japanese colonial policy; because unlike the Western colonial policy which focused on ruining and exploiting the colonies, the Japanese colonial policy was based on reconstruction. He mentioned that whatever he found as a trace of civilization in Korean cities was constructed by the Japanese.¹⁰²⁵ Similarly, with regard to the Japanese-controlled regions of China, Habibzade wrote that “the Japanese found jobs for the Chinese, they educate them and they attempted any kind of propagandistic sacrifice through endorsing them with Confucian tradition in order to awaken a hatred and enmity against the Europeans in Asia.”¹⁰²⁶ In other words, the Japanese colonial policy was more constructive than destructive. Adil Hikmet Bey did not only excuse Japanese intentions towards China and Korea, he even encouraged the Japanese to expand towards the wide Asian soil. He advised them to continue their occupation from Korea to the inner parts of Asia including Mongolia and to establish industrial complexes in these newly acquired territories in order to be able to maintain their power.¹⁰²⁷

However, still, such appreciation had some limits. Habibzade criticized the Japanese treatment of the Chinese as such:

¹⁰²⁴ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 466.

¹⁰²⁵ “Zaten Japonların siyasetleri umumiyetle müstemlekatı daha ziyade inar ediyorlar.” Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 472.

¹⁰²⁶ “[...] Japonlar Çinlilere iş bulmakta, onları okutmakta ve Konfuzu ananelerini onlara telkin ederek Asya’daki Avrupalılara bir gayz ve kin uyandırmak için her türlü puropaganda fedakarlıkları yapmaktadırlar.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 12.

¹⁰²⁷ “[Yapılacak şey] geniş Asya toprağına nakletmek. Kore’den itibaren garba doğru istilaya devam ederk Moğolistan’ı da zaptetmek ve bütün snai müesseselerinizi bu mntıkada tesis etmek.” Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya’da Beş Türk*, 442

The Chinese make worked in these [Japanese] factories for a bowl of hot water and a piece of dry bread. In Asia injustice prevails instead of justice. Just as the Europeans who claimed for civilization in Europe and in international markets, the Japanese, which became a civilized nation of Asia, unfortunately closed the pages of the rule of law and the book of civilization in order to sustain all of their ambitious interests from the Chinese of the same race and deemed all kinds of injustice for this oppressed nation proper.¹⁰²⁸

All in all, the travellers attracted attention to the missionary activities and criticized them bitterly. They found cultural penetration of the West into the East even more dangerous than the military or economic one. Therefore, struggling with the missionary activities had to be sustained through the preservation of national or religious characteristics of the local inhabitants of the South and East Asia.

13.2.4. Ottoman Presence in the South and the East Asia

One of the most interesting parts of the travelogues on the South and East Asia was the travellers' critique of the lack of adequate Ottoman representation in regions. For example, Abdürreşid İbrahim mentioned about the absence of an Ottoman consulate in Singapore; he argued that there had once been a successful Ottoman consul, Ataullah Efendi, who had well-served for the interests of the Muslims in the region. After praising the level of development of the Sultanate of Johor, he stipulated that one of the reasons of the prosperity of this Muslim state and the Muslim community of the region was the efforts of this particular consul. He criticized that after his death no single consul had been sent to Singapore by the Ottoman Empire, although the presence of a consul was essential for maintaining the links between the Muslims of the region and the

¹⁰²⁸ “Çinliler bir kap sıcak su ile kuru bir lokma ekmek mukabilinde bu fabrikalarda çalıştırılır. Asya’da hak yerine haksızlık kaimdir. Avrupa’da ve beynelmilel pazarlarda medeniyet davası yapan Avrupalılar gibi Asya’nın mazhar-ı medeniyet olmuş bir kavmi bulunan Japonlar da maalesef kendi ırkdaşları Çinlilerin sırtından her türlü haris menfaatlerini temin için medeniyet kitabının ve hak düsturunun sahifelerini kapatmışlar ve enva-yı haksızlığı bu mazlum millet hakkında reva görmüşlerdir.” Habibzade Ahmed Kemal, *Şanghay Hatıraları*, 20-21.

Caliphate.¹⁰²⁹ In other words, according to Abdürreşid İbrahim, the Ottoman consuls should act as the agents of the unity of Muslims.

The maladministration of the existing Ottoman diplomats, particularly, those serving in India, was another matter of criticism. Accordingly, it was argued that these diplomats were incapable of maintaining good relations with the Muslim community. For example, in Bombay, during a Friday prayer, Abdürreşid İbrahim noticed the *imam* had not mentioned the name of the Caliph in his speech contrary to the Islamic tradition. When he asked the reason, the *imam* said that although he respected the Caliph, he refused to mention his name because his representative in Bombay (meaning the Ottoman consul) never attended the mosque and the Friday prayers. What is more, he accused the consul of wearing Frankish cloths and being disinterested for the affairs of the Muslims.¹⁰³⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim wrote that the Ottoman administration should be careful about sending diplomats, who would have the capacity to get along with the Muslim community of the region.

Karçınzade was even more critical against the Ottoman consul in Bombay, because in Ahmedabad, the local Muslims complained about the consul and accused him of being bribed by the British for acting on behalf of British interests instead of protecting the Muslim interests.¹⁰³¹ What is more, in Hyderabad, the Muslims claimed that they had been cheated by one of the former Ottoman consuls, named Hüseyin Hasib Bey, who had embezzled the money collected from the local Muslims during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878.¹⁰³² Karçınzade, himself, met with the then Ottoman Consul to Bombay, Emin Bey and labelled him as “a creep” (*dalkavuk*). According to him, Emin

¹⁰²⁹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 18-19. For the diplomatic representation of Ataullah Efendi, see Anthony Reid, “Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Feb., 1967): 267-283.

¹⁰³⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 40.

¹⁰³¹ Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 377.

¹⁰³² Karçınzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 451-455.

Bey never dealt with the problems of the local Muslims as well as the Ottoman citizens living in India.¹⁰³³

In sum, those who mentioned about the Ottoman diplomats in the region complained about their incapacity or dishonesty. They perceived the region as having a significant potential since millions of Muslims were living there. Both Karçinzade and Abdürreşid İbrahim had pan-Islamic ideas or arguing for projects aiming the unity of the East; the establishment of proper contacts between the Caliphate and the Muslim community of the region. Therefore, they demanded the Ottoman government to send abler diplomats to make the Empire benefit from this potential.

13.2.5. The Unity of the East

One of the most significant aspects of the travelogues on the South and East Asia, particularly of the ones written by Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, Abdürreşid İbrahim and Adil Hikmet Bey, was the idea of the “unity of the East” (*ittihâd-ı Şark*). Indeed, what these travellers argued was that the Western imperialist expansion could only be prevented through the establishment of an Eastern unity, not only uniting the Muslims, but also all the Eastern nations. In other words, only the unity of the East could confront the unity of the West.

To start with, these travellers argued that it was the “Eastern” indifference to the Western imperialist expansion that resulted in the backwardness of the East and its dominance by the Western Powers. For example, Karçinzade wrote:

Isn't it the deep sleep that the entire Easterners were in that indulges a couple of Western nations as such? When we got asleep, they woke up. They began to attack and spread everywhere in the absence of vigilant administrators. In order to survive from the evil of these plunderers, let's wake up.¹⁰³⁴

¹⁰³³ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 476.

¹⁰³⁴ “*Bir avuç akvâm-ı garbiyeyi böyle şımartan bilcümle şarklıların daldığı havâb-ı medîd değil mi? Biz yatınca bunlar kalktılar. Bu yağmakârların şerrinden kurtulmak için artık uyanalım.*” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 557.

This warning and the call for waking up was addressed not to the Muslims, but to the Easterners. This was a significant discursive transformation and showed that these travellers defined themselves as the members of the Eastern community.

Karçinzade further argued about the glorious past of the Easterners compared to the Westerners, and once more did not limit the anti-Western bloc with the Muslim community: “When Eastern nations were enlightened with the lights of science and were presented as an example to the world, the Western nations were swimming in stupidity and ignorance and they were totally unenlightened.”¹⁰³⁵ In other words, the Easterners once had superiority over the West and this should once more be rejuvenated.

Secondly, these travellers attracted the attention of the readers to the disunity of the Eastern communities and perceived this as an outcome of the Western colonial policies. For example, Karçinzade mentioned that the British colonial policy in India was based on the exacerbation of the enmity between the Muslims and the Hindus in order to be able to maintain their colonial administration.¹⁰³⁶ Similarly, he wrote about the internal division of the Muslim community of Singapore as a result of jealousy, which was fostered by the British colonial administration for the continuity of British authority over the region.¹⁰³⁷ Abdürreşid İbrahim also mentioned about the internal division of the Muslim community as well as the enmity among the Eastern nations. He particularly witnessed that the Muslim community of India was divided between Shia and Sunni versions of Islam, and argued that this division should be ended in order to struggle with Western imperialism and in order to be able to progress as the Westerners.¹⁰³⁸ He also attracted attention to the enmity between the

¹⁰³⁵ “Ümem-i şarkiye envâr-ı feyzâ feyz ile münevver ve muhterîn-i ilm iken garbiyyûn gabâvet ve cehâlette püyân ve ale'l ekser nâdân idiler.” Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 557.

¹⁰³⁶ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 389.

¹⁰³⁷ Karçinzade Süleyman Şükrü, *Seyahat-i Kübra*, 532.

¹⁰³⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 161-162.

Hindus and Muslims and proposed the end of hostilities between these two communities although he was aware that this was a difficult task to achieve.¹⁰³⁹

The idea of “the unity of the East” was clearly declared by Abdürreşid İbrahim in various occasions. For example, in one of his meetings with a high-ranking Japanese bureaucrat, Abdürreşid İbrahim argued that the Europeans could not bear the rise of a rival power in the East, and did their best to prevent Japanese progress and modernization. The only way to prevent this was to work together with the Chinese; considering the difficulty of this cooperation, he advised the Japanese bureaucrat to contact with Chinese Muslims, who might be more eager for such cooperation.¹⁰⁴⁰ In another occasion, he openly mentioned that the only way to cope with the European threat was “to serve for the unity of the East.” (*Şarkın ittihâdına hizmet etmek*)¹⁰⁴¹ Similarly, in Beijing, in a newspaper published by the Muslims, he published an article entitled “The East is for the Easterners” (*Şark Şarklılar İçindir*). In this article, he warned the Chinese Muslims about Western imperialistic intentions and repeated his thesis of establishment of the unity of the East.¹⁰⁴²

Indeed, Abdürreşid İbrahim was aware that the unity of the East was extremely difficult, because of the inherent enmities among the Eastern nations; however, there were some examples demonstrating that such a unity might be possible. He argued that there was a harmonious relationship between the Muslim and Hindu communities of Dekkan which might be considered as an example for the rest of India:

There is no enmity between Hindus and Muslims in this region, Dekkan Hindus are quite respectful to the Muslims, they called Muslims as *sahib*, they show their respect to the Muslims with a particular stance when they are passing. The Muslims on the other hand do not behave as if they are the dominant nation, they get along well. Dekkan Muslims and Dekkan Hindus are

¹⁰³⁹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 162-164

¹⁰⁴⁰ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 290.

¹⁰⁴¹ Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 351.

¹⁰⁴² “*Şarkın hayâtı Şarkın ittihadıyla temîn olunur, başka türlü olamaz.*” For the summary of the article see Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 1, 542-545.

therefore worth of congratulating, they treat themselves within the framework of humanity.¹⁰⁴³

Adil Hikmet Bey's account of the "unity of the East" was as clear as Abdürreşid İbrahim. He even went one step further and defined himself as an Asian; in other words, besides his Turkish and Muslim identity, he added a third dimension, namely Asian-ness. He mentioned that similar to the Japanese, he was an Asian, Anatolia was at the Western edge of Asia and the Turks had migrated to Anatolia from Central Asia.¹⁰⁴⁴ Similar to Karçinzade and Abdürreşid İbrahim, he argued that the unity of the East was the only way of survival from European imperialism; however, different from them, he demanded from the Japanese to lead this movement:

Yes, we, the Turks, who had struggled to protect Asia from the threat of the West for centuries and the Japanese, who [established] the most strong and the only independent state of the Far East, had forgotten each other. The Turks had shed their pure bloods continuously in order to protect Asia from their migration to the west of Asia until this time. Millions of sons of Asia had been buried because of the attacks of Europe and the Turkish population decreased for that reason. There are two independent states in Asia. You are a rearguard in the East and we are a forerunner in the West. You should understand that the forerunner is now very tired. You should assume this responsibility [of the unity of the East] as the noble sons of Asia.¹⁰⁴⁵

¹⁰⁴³ "Burada Hindûlar ile Müslümanlar beyninde bir münâferet yoktur, Dekkan Hindulari oldukça Müslümanlara ihtirâm ederler, Müslümanlara sâhib tâbirini kullanırlar, Müslüman geçerken bir Hindu mutlaka vaziyet-i mahsûsa ile Müslümana ezhâr-ı tevkîr eder. Müslümanlar da bilmukâbele millet-i hâkime falan muamelesinde bulunmazlar, oldukça men'us ve hoş geçinirler. Dekkan Müslümanları ve Dekkan Hindûları bu cihetle hakikaten şâyân-ı tebrîktir, yekdiğerine insâniyet dâiresinde muamele ederler." Abdürreşid İbrahim, *Âlem-i İslam*, Vol. 2, 100.

¹⁰⁴⁴ "Ben de Asyalı idim. Anadolu dahi Asya'nın garp köşesinde idi ve memleketimizin Türkleri Asya'nın orta muntikalarından hicret etmişlerdi." Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 425.

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Asya'yı garp tehlikesine karşı asırlardan beri korumaya uğraşan biz Türklerle, Aksâ-yı Şark'ın en kuvvetli ve yegâne müstakil bir devleti olan Japonlar biri birilerini evet, unutmışlardı. Türkler Asya garbına hicretlerinden itibaren bu zamana kadar Asya'yı muhâfaza etmek için mütemâdiyen saf kanlarını akıttılar. Milyonlarca Asya evlâdı Avrupa'nın savleti karşısında toprağa gömüldü ve Türkiye nüfusu bu yüzden çok azaldı. Asya'da istiklâline sahip iki devlet vardır. Siz Şark'ta bir dümdar, biz garpta bir pişdar vaziyetindeyiz. Takdir emelisiniz ki, artık pişdar çok yorulmuştur. Bu vazifeyi Asya'nın necip evlatları olan sizler deruhte ediniz." Adil Hikmet Bey, *Asya'da Beş Türk*, 441.

In sum, Adil Hikmet Bey clearly mentioned the Asian identity of the Turks and offered the Japanese to lead the unity of the East, since it was the Japanese that were capable of bringing this movement to success the most.

All in all, the Japanese victory over the Russians had tremendous implications over the Ottoman perception of the concept of the “East.” Even the Islamist thinkers began to think about a “unity of the East” which would also include a “unity of the Muslims.” This unity was perceived as the only solution for the prevention of further Western encroachments to the East and further decadence of the East *vis-à-vis* the West. The idea of the “unity of the East;” however, was a short lived one; during the World War I, with the employment of the idea of *jihad*, the Islamist tune once more prevailed over the other components of being Eastern and finally with the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the East was turned back for the sake of adoption of a European identity.

CONCLUSION

The Ottoman travellers' perception of the Eastern territories and peoples and the linkage between the Ottoman understanding of the concept of civilization and the concept of the "East" are important themes to understand the Ottoman self-perception. Indeed, this is the absent dimension of the studies on the Ottoman identity. Despite relatively extensive studies on the Ottoman self-identification *vis-à-vis* the West; its self-identification *vis-à-vis* the East has not been analysed in detail. This thesis tries to overcome this gap in the literature by setting the interrelationship between the idea of civilization and the idea of the East.

The concept of civilization was brought to the Ottoman literature during 1830s by a group of young diplomats, who had become acquainted with the concept during their service in European capitals. In these years, the concept of civilization had already been consolidated in Europe; however, it had not yet lost its universal and universalizing meaning. In other words, civilization was perceived as a phenomenon not peculiar to a particular group of people, but an attainable characteristic for all the human beings. Based on the Enlightenment notion of reason, the idea of civilization offered a refined, wealthier and happier life to its adherents.

Indeed, it was this universal nature of the concept of civilization that had attracted the attention of the Ottomans. The diplomats admired the order, the well-being and the magnificence of the European capitals that they had served and found out that the way to attain a similar level of development in the Ottoman Empire could be reached via the utilization of the "technique of civilization." In other words, the initial Ottoman perception of civilization differed from Europe in the sense that the civilization was not the end but the means to reach an end. This reflected that the classical Ottoman pragmatism, focusing on the means rather than the ends, somehow continued in this period. However, still, it can be argued that the Ottoman intellectuals of the time were aware of the significance of the concept and what it meant to the Europeans.

They no more focused on armament techniques, buildings, education, or factories individually, but perceived all these within the framework of a general structure, namely the civilization.

From 1820s to 1850s, the degree of the universality of the idea of civilization declined considerably in Europe; rather, civilization was begun to be perceived as a European phenomenon. This does not necessarily mean that it lost all its universality; indeed, what had changed is that the European intellectuals began to emphasize that the current level of civilization was the outcome of several developments experienced in Europe. Therefore, they argued, non-European societies could be civilized only if they followed the prescriptions provided by the Europeans. Guizot's studies on European as well as French civilization were quite popular among the French intellectuals of the time, from whom the Ottoman intellectuals were influenced to a considerable degree.

This transformation of the concept of civilization from a universal to a European one had dramatic implications for the Ottoman intellectuals and thereby the Ottoman perception of this concept. For them, it was easier to adopt a universal phenomenon since it did not had a cultural/religious base; however, the centuries-long equation of Europe with Christianity created significant tensions among the Ottoman intellectuals. In other words, there was the problem that any imports from "European" civilization might not fit with the Islamic identity of the Ottoman society.

The Ottoman intellectuals of the *Tanzimat* era tried to surpass this dilemma in two ways. First of all, they argued that although contemporary civilization had reached its utmost development in the European continent, this did not necessarily mean that the civilization was a European phenomenon. In other words, adopting the European civilizational achievements was indeed adopting what was best for all the mankind, including the Ottomans. The intellectuals like Şinasi and Münif Paşa clearly followed such an understanding.

The second way to overcome the dilemma, on the other hand, was to distinguish between the material and moral elements of civilization. The material elements of civilization such as scientific and technological inventions were not peculiar to the Europeans although they had been invented by them; rather they

could be perceived as the universal inheritance of the mankind. In other words, there was no problem in adopting them; they would serve nothing but to increase the well-being of the Ottoman citizens and to provide the survival of the state *vis-à-vis* its adversaries. Since these inventions were excelled in Europe, there was no reason to seek for an alternative; even their immediate adoption was extremely necessary.

The moral elements of civilization, on the other hand, should be treated carefully. Some of these moral elements, such as social justice, hard-working for the fatherland, or modern education had already been ordered by Islam; therefore, these were the Islamic principles that every Muslim had to obey. Some other moral elements peculiar only to the Europeans due to their cultural and religious background might conflict with the cultural and religious structure of the Ottoman Empire. In case of such a conflict, the Ottomans should preserve their own peculiarities and never tend to adopt such moral elements of European civilization, because what might be useful for the Europeans might have fatal implications for the Ottoman society. In sum, the distinction between material and moral elements of civilization, the unconditional and immediate adoption of the former and the rejection of the latter turned out to be the basic Ottoman understanding of civilization from *Tanzimat* period until the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

From 1850s until the end of the First World War, particularly with the development of social evolutionist and Darwinist theories on the one hand, and the consolidation of European imperialism on the other, the idea of civilization was very much understood within the framework of the concept of race. In other words, the idea of the universality of the concept of civilization turned out to be the idea of the universality of the concept of “European” civilization. This means that the European intellectuals argued that there was only one civilization, and it was the European one. The other forms of similar collectivities were perceived as a historical phenomenon; in other words, there had once been an Egyptian, Indian, or Chinese civilizations; however, they had ceased to exist. What is more, the idea of inequality of races, this idea of supremacy of the white

Caucasian race over the yellow and black races was extensively utilized to justify European imperialism as well as the civilizing mission.

The Ottoman response to these developments was mixed. On the one hand, some social evolutionist and even social Darwinist theories were adopted, at least partially, by some of the Ottoman intellectuals. Particularly, from 1870s onwards, the European literature on these theories were began to be translated and published in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Mithat's utilization of social evolutionist concepts, his particular emphasis on the inevitability of progress and the survival of stronger societies *vis-à-vis* the weaker ones, and Abdullah Cevdet's translations of the most famous European intellectual on racism, namely Gustave Le Bon, reflected this tendency. Indeed, for the Ottoman intellectuals, in terms of race there was no problem, the Ottomans belonged to the white Caucasian race; however, particularly the Islamists were rejecting the idea of race based on the Islamic notion of the ultimate equality of people. What is more, they sought for an example, which demonstrated that the race did not matter in terms of civilizational achievements. The example came in 1905, when Japan, a modernizing non-European state, won a significant victory against Russia, a European state. This created a significant excitement in the Ottoman Empire, since they found the example that they had been looking for; for the first time in recent history a non-European state defeated a European one.

The rising racist theories in Europe combined with the Ottoman disappointment with the West particularly from 1876 onwards consolidated the Ottoman distinction of the material and moral elements of civilization. Except for a group of radical Westernists, the Ottomans separated between the scientific and technological achievements of the West and the Western hypocrisy, cruelty and imperial policy. The *Tanzimat's* notion of modernization in order to be accepted as a European state transformed into an understanding of modernization to be able to resist the European aggression. Particularly, from 1908 onwards, the Ottoman political movements sought for a synthesis combining the European-style material development and Eastern (i.e., Islamic or Turkic) morality.

Indeed, it was this synthesis that established the originality of the Ottoman perception of civilization. In other words, in distinguishing the material

and moral elements of civilization, what the Ottomans sought was to create the merger of the modern developments experienced in the West with the existing moral structures of the East. All the Ottoman intellectuals were unified that the first part of this formula, namely adoption of Western material modernity, was essential. However, they differed from the second part of the formula. Except for the radical ones, the Westernists, aimed to continue what the Ottomanists had once tried to achieve during 1860s and 70s, namely to create a Western-style state. They did not deny the Islamic character of the state; however, what they sought was a religion as a matter of personal conscience, which did not resist modernization. Islamists tried to preserve the Islamic identity of the Empire and even extend it beyond the Ottoman Empire by providing an Islamic unity, which had not been achieved since the time of the Prophet. The Turkists, on the other hand, tried to link the material modernity of civilization with the Turco-Islamic cultural traditions. In sum, none of them wanted a totally westernized society; what they sought was a modern society capable of providing the welfare and security of its components.

All in all, the ambivalence that the Ottoman intellectuals felt during the nineteenth century between the East and the West led them to seek for a synthesis between these two. They were aware that they could not survive without adopting the requirements of their age; they were also aware that they could not survive without preserving their Eastern characteristics. Therefore, the only solution was the most difficult option, namely to conciliate the East and the West. In an age emphasizing the inherent distinction of these two entities and impossibility of their consolidation, their task was extremely burdensome; however, at least, they tried to achieve this. The ideal once put forward by Şinasi as the “marriage of the mature reason of Asia with the virgin ideas of Europe” became the ideal of the nineteenth century Ottoman intellectuals, which produced *the* Ottoman understanding of civilization.

This transfer of the idea of civilization to the Ottoman intellectual circles in a way to establish a synthesis has significant implications on the Ottoman perception of the “East.” Before the consolidation of the idea of civilization and its interrelationship with the “West,” the Ottomans had a notion of the East

(*şark*) hardly passing beyond a geographical reference point. In other words, the territories and inhabitants of the East were not perceived as forming a totality *vis-à-vis* the West; rather they were named and examined individually. For example, the geography books of the classical period mentioned about India (*Hind*) or China (*Çin-ü Maçin*), instead of a peculiar “East.” This began to change with the import of Orient-Occident debate, which had consolidated in Europe after the widespread usage of the concept of civilization from the early nineteenth century onwards. With this import, the Ottomans began to accept that the East is an entity different from the West. Accordingly, they followed the Western discourse to some extent, since they argued that the West was developed *vis-à-vis* the East. While the former was associated with technological and military superiority, orderliness, cleanliness, and development, the East was given an inferior status in technological and military terms; its disorderliness, uncleanness and underdevelopment had been emphasized to a great extent. In other words, the concept of the East acquired additional meanings besides its geographical understanding.

However, this does not necessarily mean that the Ottomans perceived the East as the West did. There are significant differences between the Ottoman and the Western perceptions of this concept. To start with, Western perception was based on a strict dichotomy between the East and the West based on the notion of civilization; in other words, this distinction was the distinction between the civilized and uncivilized. The Ottomans could not be such strict on this matter, because they perceived themselves as members of the Eastern community. In the travelogues, one can encounter with the expressions such as “We, the Easterners” or “our East” frequently. The adoption of the East-West distinction based on civilization would mean the acceptance of the status of “uncivilized” given by the Western discourse to the East. Therefore, the Ottomans developed some alternative discourses; the acceptance of civilization as a universal concept and the separation of its material and moral elements were the most significant of such discourses. Meanwhile, some of them, particularly the Islamists, began to define the East as another civilization; here the association of Eastern civilization with Islam was quite extensive. Since the acceptance of the Western superiority

would mean the inferiority of Islam, the production of an Islamic alternative to the Western civilization was a necessity for the Ottoman intellectuals.

The notion of Islamic civilization (*medeniyet-i İslâmiye*) and its linkage with the notion of the East continued until the disintegration of the Empire; however, there emerged another understanding in the first decades of the twentieth century with regard to the concept of the East, namely the perception of the East not as an Islamic entity, but as a civilizational entity in the Western sense. Two developments contributed to this perception. The first one is the relative secular thinking of the Turkists, which became a major current of thought in the post-Hamidian era. The Turkists were thinking about the idea of civilization and the Orient/Occident debate in more secular terms by distinguishing between the concepts of civilization and culture. The second development was the Japanese victory over the Russians, which was appreciated by the Ottomans as the failure of the argument of invincibility of the West and the indolence of the East. This victory was so impressive for the Ottomans that they began to redefine the East to include the South and East Asian states, such as India, China and Japan. India had already been a part of the Islamic understanding of Eastern civilization because of the Muslim community in this country; however, the perception of the East in its totality *vis-à-vis* the West was a new development. Even some of the Islamist Ottoman travellers, who had actually witnessed the Japanese modernization, began to argue for a “unity of the East” (*ittihâd-ı Şark*) including the classical understanding of the “unity of Muslims” (*ittihâd-ı İslam*). In other words, they defined some common internal and external problems faced by the Muslim and non-Muslim components of the East and offered the unity of the East as a remedy to overcome these problems.

If the Eastern element of the Ottoman identity was one factor that differentiated the Ottoman perception of the East from the Western one, the Ottoman rejection of the Western argumentation of the inherent superiority of the West *vis-à-vis* the East was another factor. Indeed, as mentioned before, the Ottomans perceived the superiority of the West in material terms; however, even in this regard, they argue that this superiority was not an insurmountable one. In other words, they claimed that when the existing problems of the East in general,

and the Ottoman Empire in particular, had been solved, then, the non-European world had the potential to re-assume its once glorious condition. This means that they rejected the argument that the Western world was civilized and the non-Western world was uncivilized; what they argued was that the problems of the Ottoman Empire and the East might have resulted in their current inferiority; however, this inferiority was not an eternal one and could be surpassed when certain measures would be taken.

One of these measures was education. Almost in all travelogues, education was perceived as the most significant remedy for the problems of the Empire and the East. Indeed, the acceptance of Western material superiority forced the Ottomans to review their educational system in a way to incorporate the scientific and technological achievements of the West. Thus, the education of people to keep up with the current developments was an essential element for the revival of the East. However, education did not only include the teaching of positive sciences; for example, according to the Islamists, proper teaching of Islamic theology, from which the non-Islamic principles impeding the scientific development had been cleaned off, was a necessity. According to the Turkists, the national and cultural elements should be taught as well, particularly in the Central Asia whose Turkish inhabitants were under the Russian and Chinese cultural oppression. In sum, the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization continued in the field of education as well; besides the teaching of material aspects of civilization, the Islamic/Turkish/Eastern morality should be preserved with their proper teaching.

If education would provide internal and intellectual development of the East and by extension the Ottoman Empire, the unity, either provided through the unity of the Muslims or through the unity of the East would protect the Eastern world from further external penetration. The Ottoman intellectuals in general and the Ottoman travellers in particular were critical regarding the European imperialism; they perceived the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern world as the victim of European encroachments. Therefore, the struggle with the imperialist expansion could not be successful by individual resistance; a collective action is required. What is more, the Ottomans did not think a military

confrontation; rather they targeted self-development and common action against the Western world after having acquired more or less the same level of development.

A third significant difference between the European and the Ottoman perceptions of the East was the usage of terminology. Accordingly, in the Ottoman case, the East had never been a field of academic study; in other words, there was no systematized Oriental Studies in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans generally learned about European terminology through translations from European sources. The Ottoman travellers, for example, read the European travelogues or their translations and used them as sources in their own writings. However, they did not reciprocate the European Oriental Studies in linguistics or anthropology. Therefore, their perceptions of several concepts remained extremely superficial. One conspicuous example is the concept of race. In several travelogues, the Ottoman travellers tried to categorize the inhabitants of the regions that they had been travelled in racial terms; they sometimes established several hierarchies depicting some races as superior to others. However, this does not necessarily mean that they internalized the concept of race as a medium for distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized communities. Religion is a more significant medium for most of them in establishing superior-inferior dichotomies. For example, with regard to the African tribes, the Muslim or Christian tribes were depicted as more civilized compared to the others. All in all, race had never acquired a status in the Ottoman perception of the East as strong as the Western perception.

If race was not the major criterion, then what were the major denominators of civilization for the Ottoman travellers? Accordingly, the most significant criterion in separating between the civilized and uncivilized was the settlement. Following the Khaldunian tradition, which was oftenly referred by the travellers, they argued that the settled communities were more civilized compared to the unsettled ones regardless of their race. With regard to this criteria the nomadic people of Anatolia and the nomadic people of Arabia, for example, had not much difference; both were perceived as uncivilized compared to the city-dwellers.

Secondly, the type of settlement was a matter of civilization as well. The travellers praised clean and orderly cities and perceived the inhabitants of such cities more civilized compared to unclean and disordered ones. The dyadic account of the quarters inhabited by the Europeans and the quarters inhabited by the local people (namely the urban duality) in the cities of the non-European world showed that city planning was another major criterion of civilization. However, again, the cleanliness and orderliness was not only perceived as a characteristic of Western civilization; rather it was argued that they were the major principles of the Islamic life-style as well. In making this emphasis, the Ottoman travellers tended to show that the backwardness of the non-European urban space can not be explained by the nature of Islam, as some Western intellectuals argued, but rather by the deviations from the true Islamic principles.

Finally, the fourth and perhaps the most significant difference between the European and Ottoman travellers' perceptions of the East was that while the former tended to establish a monolithic perception of the East based, in Saidian terms, on the epistemological and ontological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, the latter had developed a more diversified understanding on the East based on the ideological inclination of the traveller and the specificities of the regions that they travelled.

To start with the ideological inclination of the travellers, it can be argued that the Westernist, Islamist or Turkist inclinations have significant implications on the style and content of the travelogues. For example, the Westernists tended to criticize the Western colonial and imperialist expansion towards the non-European world less compared to the Islamists or Turkists. They felt themselves alienated in the regions they travelled in the East, except for some rather developed (and westernized) cities such as Alexandria, Cairo, Beirut, Calcutta, or Shanghai. They tried to avoid depicting themselves as Easterners; they focused on their differences more than similarities with the inhabitants of the regions they travelled. Therefore, they did not have the effort of establishing a common identity, either in Islamic or in Eastern form. In sum, their depictions were very much resembled to the Orientalist Western travelogues.

The Islamist travellers, on the other hand, bitterly criticized the Western imperialist penetration in the non-European world; they tended to set the European-non-European relations within Christianity vs. Islam dichotomy. They, therefore, focused on the exploitation of the Islamic world by the Christian West, the unjust and cruel treatment of the Westerners in the name of civilization and the destructiveness of the missionary activities. In the Muslim lands, they felt themselves extremely comfortable. Although they were critical of the underdevelopment of the Islamic world, what they criticized was not Islam as a religion, but the deviations from its true path. What is more, they seemed to be proud of labelling themselves as Easterners; this was quite understandable considering their critical tune regarding the Westerners.

When it comes to the Turkist travellers, similar to the Islamists, they were critical of the Western penetration to the non-European world. Besides political and military interventions, they also reacted to the missionary activities disturbing the national identity of the Turkish youth. However, different from the Islamists, they perceived some Muslim communities, particularly the Arabs, as different from themselves. For example, they accused the Arabs of being indifferent to the Western penetration, and argued that the Arabs began to be influenced from the anti-Ottoman propaganda of the Western powers. Therefore, they attracted attention to the precursors of the Arab nationalism, which had been perceived as a Western intrigue. They felt themselves as alien in the Arabic lands, while in Central Asia, they were quite comfortable as if in their homelands. In sum, the nationalist mind-set resulted in their less critical tune regarding the underdevelopment of these regions.

Besides these ideological inclinations of the Ottoman travellers, the region that had been travelled also differentiated the content and the style of the travelogues. Regarding the travelogues on the Middle East and North Africa, which was composed of the Ottoman provinces, most of the travellers perceived these distant and unfamiliar territories as their own country; because despite the distance of these regions from the imperial centre, they were still Ottoman lands. While some of the travellers wrote about the inhabitants of these lands as equals of themselves since they were all Ottoman citizens, others perceived the

inhabitants of these regions as inferior to themselves, since they were representing the urban-settled intellectual elite of the Empire while the inhabitants of the region were generally presented as nomadic or half-settled ignorant people. However, such a perception was not exactly an Orientalist one. Rather it is a discourse based on different levels of material and intellectual developments between a developed region where the travellers came from and a relatively less developed region where they were going to. In other words, it was not a distinction based on race to a great extent; for example the Ottoman travellers' discourse on Turkish villages was not much different from the Arabic villages; the problem here was not the problem of racial inferiority, but the problem of lack of settlement and education. Such a discourse could be comparable, for example, regarding the Parisian intellectuals' perception of French countryside.

The perception of Iran was quite different from the perception of other parts of the Muslim world because Iran, as an independent Muslim State adopted a different version of Islam, namely the Shi'ism, was perceived by the Ottomans as a rival political entity. This perception was not a new one; however, with the intensification of border disputes, the mutual attacks from the tribes populating the border region and most important of all the Shia propaganda activities in Ottoman Iraq resulted in a problematic relationship with Iran in the late nineteenth century; therefore the perception of this country was extremely negative compared to other parts of the Muslim world.

Regarding the Muslims of Central Asia as well as India and China, the Ottoman travellers had a sense of superiority for religious reasons. They perceived themselves as the representatives of a country, which was ruled by the supreme religious authority of the Muslim world, namely the Caliph. This made them think themselves as the true Muslims, therefore, they criticized some traditions of these people as deviations from the true path of Islam. However, still, it can be argued that compared to adherents of other religions prevalent in the region such as Hinduism and Buddhism, the Ottoman travellers approached to the Muslims more sympathetically for the sense of religious brotherhood. In Central Asia, this sense of religious brotherhood was compounded with a sense

of ethnic brotherhood, since the Turkic communities living in the region were perceived by the Turkist travellers as the underdeveloped brothers of the Ottomans. This ethnic similarity resulted in a more tolerant perception of the flaws of these people.

Finally, the Far East was perceived by the Ottoman travellers in a complex way. On the one hand, there was not much commonness between the Ottomans and these people, neither in ethnic nor in religious terms; however, they shared similar internal and external problems. The critique of the ignorance in the Ottoman lands and in China, for example, was not much different from each other. More important than that all these people encountered a similar external threat, namely the Western penetration. This common threat perception made the Ottoman travellers and the inhabitants of the Far East closer and there emerged a common identity based on the notion of Easternness. In other words, besides ethnic and religious elements of identity, Easternness became an element for establishing a common identity.

To conclude, the Ottoman perception of the East and the Ottoman identification of themselves *vis-à-vis* the inhabitants of the East had three levels. In the first level, the Ottoman travellers sought for religious similarities. Muslim inhabitants of the East were perceived as closer to the Ottomans. This religious brotherhood did not prevent the Ottoman travellers to criticize the backwardness of the Muslim territories and peoples; however, they also found themselves responsible for this problem. The critique of Ottoman ignorance of the Muslim lands which were part of the Ottoman Empire and the critique of Ottoman neglect to establish stronger ties with the Muslim communities living outside of the borders of the Empire demonstrated this responsibility. This also means that the Ottomans wanted to elevate the conditions of the Muslims of the East; however, this perception had significant differences from the mentality of *civilizing mission*. First, the Ottoman travellers sometimes perceived themselves as representing a higher level of development; however, what they intended to do was not to use this level of development to establish their rule over the East. They were aware the impossibility of this project. What they sought instead was to awaken the Muslims about the backwardness of the Islamic world, to make

them question the reasons of this backwardness and to take common action to overcome this problem and to struggle with the Western penetration. Since the Ottoman Empire was still the strongest independent power in the Islamic world having the religious authority of the Caliphate, the Ottoman leadership in this process was perceived as natural. This leadership did not have strong imperialist or colonialist intentions; in other words, in awakening the Indian Muslims, for example, the Ottomans did not think to replace the British colonial rule with their own. Rather, what they sought was to revive the once glorious Islamic civilization by making it compatible with the recent scientific and technological developments.

The second level comprised the ethnic similarity. Particularly, the post-Hamidian travelogues began to mention about the Turkish solidarity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkic communities of Central Asia. Here, the sense of brotherhood was higher since it was fed by two elements of identity, namely ethnicity and religion. The Ottomans perceived the peoples of Central Asia as their “little brothers;” here, the adjective “little” demonstrated the Ottoman attempt to act as an experienced and stronger actor. The Ottomans are more experienced, because they learned much from their interaction with the Europeans; they are militarily and politically stronger as well. Therefore, they can help their “brothers” to raise their level of development and make them contribute to the general quest against the Western penetration.

Finally, the third level is the loosest level based on the notion of Easternness, since the Ottoman travellers perceived common threats as a denominator bringing different communities of the East having no similarities but this denominator. Unlike the first two levels, in this third level, the Ottomans did not perceive themselves as the leader of the Eastern communities, because there was a much stronger candidate for this leadership, which was also supported by the Ottomans, namely the Japan. The success of Japanese modernization without giving up their own national peculiarities and their military victory over a Western power amazed the Ottomans. The travellers who had visited Japan or Japanese-controlled territories in East Asia directly observed their strength and accepted their superiority even over the Ottoman Empire.

Therefore, they did not hesitate to offer the leadership of their project of the “unity of the East” to the Japanese. This also demonstrated that this third level was not a civilizational one; in other words, the Ottomans did not clearly develop a notion of Eastern civilization *vis-à-vis* the Western one. What they did was quite practical, to emphasize their Eastern identity to create a common action against the Western military as well as cultural penetration.

All in all, it can be argued that the Ottoman perception of the East is not exactly the same with the Western perception. The political, economic, social and cultural structures of the Ottoman Empire, which were quite different from the European ones, resulted in the production of a different discourse on the Eastern lands and their inhabitants. The Ottoman search for a synthesis in terms of the concept of civilization resulted in the blurring of the epistemological and ontological difference between the East and the West, which is one of the basic tenets of Saidian Orientalism. What is more, the different ideological inclinations of the Ottoman travellers and different mode of relationships between the Ottoman Empire and different parts of the East did not result in reaching a monolithic perception regarding the East based on the notion of civilization. All these differences underlined that the Ottoman perception of the East was more complex, reflecting the intellectual as well as spiritual colours of its particular culture.

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TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Osmanlı Devleti'nin on dokuzuncu yüzyılda geçirdiği değişim ve dönüşüm, yalnızca siyasi, ekonomik veya askeri sahada kalmamış, sosyo-kültürel sahada, bilhassa da zihniyet sahasında son derece önemli değişim ve dönüşümlere tanık olunmuştur. Osmanlı Devleti'nin bekası sorunsalı bu yüzyılda devletin içinde bulunduğu krizden nasıl kurtulacağı/kurtarılacağı meselesini dönemin zihniyet tarihinin en önemli meselelerinden biri haline getirmiştir. Bu çerçevede “Batı”nın bir entite olarak on sekizinci yüzyılın sonundan itibaren “Doğu”ya “üstünlüğü” algısı Osmanlı entelektüelleri tarafından hem bir ölçüde kabul edilmiş hem de yoğun bir biçimde eleştirilmiştir. Batı'nın içinde bulunduğu refah ve gelişmişlik seviyesine Osmanlı toplumunun da ulaşması ve bunun yollarının araştırılması Osmanlı entelektüellerinin temel arayışlarından biri haline gelmiştir. Böylelikle “medeniyet” veya “Batı medeniyeti” kavramlarıyla tanışan bu entelektüel camia yalnızca kendisini ve içinde yaşadığı toplumu bu kavramları uyarlayarak anlamaya çalışmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda Batı'nın Doğu olarak adlandırdığı coğrafya ve toplumları anlamakta da kullanmıştır.

Osmanlı Devleti'nin bu maddi ve zihinsel dönüşümü gerek yerli gerekse yabancı literatürde yoğun bir biçimde tartışılmıştır ve halen tartışılmaktadır. Özellikle Osmanlı entelektüellerinin Batı'ya bakışları, Batılılaşma çabaları ve Batı'dan aldıkları/almaya çalıştıkları zihniyet parametrelerini kendi toplumları ile diğer Doğu toplumlarını anlamak için kullanmaları literatürde geniş yer bulmaktadır. Özellikle 2000'li yılların başından itibaren bazı tarihçiler Osmanlı entelektüellerinin Osmanlı coğrafyasının veya toplumunun belirli kesimlerini, özellikle de Batı'nın Doğu olarak tanımladığı kesimlerini, Batı'dan aldıkları parametrelerle algıladıklarını ve bu algının Edward Said'in Oryantalizm olarak tanımladığı kavramla örtüştüğünü iddia etmektedirler. Diğer bir deyişle bu tarihçilere göre bir “Osmanlı Oryantalizmi”nden bahsetmek mümkündür.

Osmanlı Oryantalizmi yaklaşımı özellikle post-kolonyal çalışmalar olarak adlandırılan alanın bir uzantısı olarak da algılanabilir. Post-kolonyal çalışmalar 1970'lerden itibaren kolonyalizm sonrası toplumların yapısal ve post-yapısal analizleri için geliştirilmiş bazı modellemelerden müteşekkil bir literatür teşkil eder. Osmanlı Oryantalizmi kavramını kullanan tarihçilerin bazıları da Osmanlı Devleti'ni kolonyalist/emperyalist bir devlet olarak addederler ve bu devletin "kolonileştirdiği" topraklar üzerinde (örneğin bugün Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika olarak adlandırılan bölgeler) yaşayan toplumları anlamak için tıpkı Batılı kolonyalist/emperyalist devletlerin aynı bölgeler için geliştirdiği söylemi taklit ettiklerini ifade ederler. Bu yaklaşım Osmanlı tarihinin bu az incelenen alanında, yani zihniyet tarihi konusunda, yeni ve eleştirel bir yaklaşım olarak literatüre katkı sağlamakla beraber ciddi sorunlar içermektedir. Özellikle kavramsal açıdan, Batı'da belirli siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel yapılar ve bu yapıların dönüşümleri neticesinde ortaya çıkan kavramların bu yapılardan oldukça farklı bir yapılar ve süreçler içeren Osmanlı Devleti ve entelektüelleri için kullanılmasının doğruluğu ve geçerliliği tartışılabilir. İşte bu tez de bu tartışmayı yapmak ve Osmanlıların Batı'nın Doğu olarak adlandırdığı coğrafya ve toplumları nasıl algıladığını göstermeye çalışmak üzere kaleme alınmıştır.

Tezin genel yapısını, temasını, temel sorularını ve metodolojisini tanımlamak üzere gazetecilik disiplininin sıklıkla kullandığı 5N 1K (ne, ne zaman, nerede, neden, nasıl ve kim) sorularını kullanmak yerinde olacaktır. Öncelikle "ne zaman" sorusuna yanıt olarak tezin zamansal sınırları çizilecek olursa, bu tez kabaca 1840'lı yıllardan imparatorluğun dağıldığı 1920'li yıllara uzanan bir dönemi kapsamaktadır. Osmanlı sisteminin dönüşümünün gözle görülür bir hal aldığı Tanzimat süreci ile başlayan bu dönem imparatorluğun bir ulus-devlete evrilmesiyle sona ermektedir. Bu dönem aynı zamanda tezin de temel kavramlarından "medeniyet" ve "Doğu-Batı" tanımlamalarının Avrupa'da yerleştiği bir dönem olduğu için önemlidir. Diğer bir deyişle Batı'da yerleşen bu kavramların Osmanlı entelektüellerince ithal edildiği Tanzimat dönemi ve sonrası bu tezin zamansal sınırlarını oluşturmaktadır.

"Nerede" sorusunun yanıtı tezin mekansal sınırlarını çizmekte yararlı olacaktır. Buna göre bu tez Batı'nın Doğu olarak tanımladığı geniş coğrafyayı

konu edinmektedir. Dar bir çerçevede bu coğrafya kabaca bugün Ortadoğu olarak adlandırılan bölgeye tekabül etse de bu tezde çok daha geniş bir çerçeve kullanılacak ve Doğu, Amerikalılar ve Okyanusya dışında kalan Avrupa-dışı alan olarak tanımlanacaktır. Diğer bir deyişle bu alan Afrika, (Rusya dışında kalan) Asya ve Ortadoğu'yu içeren bir bölgeyi kapsamaktadır.

Tezin zamansal ve mekansal sınırlarını çizdikten sonra, “kim” sorusuna cevaben tezin aktörlerini belirlemek gerekirse, bu tezin aktörleri uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe yaygın bir biçimde atıfta bulunulan devletler değil, gerçek şahıslardır, diğer bir deyişle Osmanlı seyyahlarıdır. Osmanlı seyyahlarının ve eserlerinin bu tezin temel kaynaklarını oluşturması bu grubun Doğu olarak tanımlanan bölgeyi bizatihi müşahade etmelerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu zümre, İstanbul'da veya imparatorluğun diğer merkezlerinde yaşayan ve Doğu'yu hiç görmediği halde Batılı kaynaklardan hareketle bir Doğu portresi oluşturmaya çalışan entelektüellerden farklı bir zümredir, yazdıkları da Doğu algısının daha gerçekçi bir biçimde oluşturulması açısından önemlidir. Elbette bu, seyyahların yalnızca gözlemlerine dayalı nesnel bir algı geliştirdikleri şeklinde yorumlanmamalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, seyyahların kişilikleri, siyasi görüşleri, meslekleri, seyahat ettikleri dönem ve bölge, görüşlerini şekillendiren en önemli etmenlerdir. Yani seyahatnameler öznel metinlerdir ve zaten bu öznelik onları bu tez için önemli ve değerli kılmaktadır.

“Ne” sorusuna verilecek cevap tezin temel sorularını ve iddialarını belirlemek için önemlidir. Buna göre bu tez temelde Osmanlı entelektüellerinin/seyyahlarının Doğu'yu Batı'nın Doğu'yu algıladığı biçimde algılamadıklarını iddia etmektedir. Bunun en temel nedeni de Osmanlıların, her ne kadar Batılılaşmaya çalışsalar da, özünde Doğulu bir toplum olmaları ve Batılı olmadıklarının bilincinde olmalarıdır. Bu anlamda eğer Said'in Oryantalizmin Batı ve Doğu arasında ontolojik ve epistemolojik bir ayrım gerektirdiği ve bu ayrımı “Batı'nın Doğu'dan üstünlüğü” şeklinde yorumladığı iddiası kabul edilecekse Osmanlıların genel olarak böyle düşünmediklerini söylemek mümkündür. Elbette Osmanlılar Batı ve Doğu arasında bir ayrım olduğunu kabul etmektedirler; hatta Doğu'nun maddi olarak Batı'dan geri kaldığını da içselleştirmişlerdir. Ancak bu Batı'nın Doğu'dan manevi anlamda

üstün olduğu şeklinde yorumlanmamalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, Osmanlı entelektüelleri Batı medeniyetinin maddi ve manevi elemanları arasında bir ayırım yapmışlar, maddi elemanların Osmanlı sistemine derhal entegre edilmesini savunmuşlar, ancak manevi elemanların Osmanlı/İslam moralitesi ile çeliştiği durumlarda reddedilmesi gerektiğini belirtmişlerdir. Bu aslında Osmanlı entelektüellerinin devletin bekasının ancak Batı tehdidi karşısında Batı ile maddi olarak aynı seviyeye gelinmesiyle ancak bu yapılırken toplumun İslami/Doğulu özünün korunmasıyla mümkün olabileceğini ifade etmelerinin bir göstergesidir. Yani Osmanlı entelektüelleri Batı medeniyetinin maddi elemanları ile kendi moralitelerinin bir sentezini aramaktadırlar ve ancak bu sentezin devletin bekasını ve toplumun refahını sağlayabileceğine inanmaktadırlar. İşte Osmanlı entelektüellerinin bu özgün medeniyet algıları onların Batı'nın Doğu olarak algıladığı bölgeyi Batılı parametrelerden farklı algılamalarına yol açmıştır.

Osmanlı entelektüellerinin Doğu algısının Batı'nın Doğu algısından bir diğer farkı da, Batılı algılamaların aksine Osmanlıların Doğu ile ilgili olarak tek tip (monolitik) bir algı geliştirmemiş olmalarıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, farklı Osmanlı entelektüelleri farklı dönemlerde farklı bölgeler için farklı algılar geliştirmişlerdir. Örneğin, Osmanlı seyyahlarının Kuzey Afrika'daki göçebe kabileleri algılamaları ile Orta Asya'daki göçebe Türk kabilelerini algılamaları arasında bile büyük farklılıklar vardır; her iki grubun da göçebe olduğu gerçeği farklı algılamalar geliştirilmesinin önünde bir engel değildir. Aynı şekilde Araplar, İranlılar, Türkler, Çinliler, Hintliler ve Japonlar gibi farklı toplumlar da farklı biçimlerde algılanmıştır. Kısacası Said'in Batı Oryantalizmi ile ilgili olarak geliştirdiği Oryantalizmin tek-tipleştirici niteliğinin Osmanlı seyyahlarının anlatıları için uygulanması mümkün görünmemektedir. Bu da Osmanlıların Doğu algısının Batılı algılardan farklı oluşunun bir diğer nedenidir.

Tezin zamansal ve mekansal sınırlarını, aktörlerini ve temel argümanlarını tanımladıktan sonra tezin metodolojisinden bahsetmek gerekir. Bu, aynı zamanda "nasıl" sorusunun yanıtlanması anlamına gelir. Bu tez iki tür kaynak üzerine bina edilmiştir. Bunlardan birincisi tezin kavramsal ve kuramsal çerçevesini oluşturmak ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Doğu olarak adlandırılan bölgelerle ilişkilerini tarihsel bir çerçeveye oturtmak için kullanılan ikincil

kaynaklardır. İkincisi ise Osmanlı entelektüellerinin medeniyet algıları ile Osmanlı seyyahlarının Doğu algılarını tespit etmek ve karşılaştırmak üzere kullanılan birincil kaynaklar, yani Osmanlı entelektüellerinin on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren yazdıkları eserlerden örnekler ve “Doğu”ya giden Osmanlı seyyahlarının kaleme almış oldukları seyahatnamelerdir. Bu kaynaklar İstanbul’da Süleymaniye, Beyazıt ve Millet Kütüphaneleri ile Ankara’da Milli Kütüphane ve Bilkent Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi Halil İnalcık Koleksiyonu’ndan temin edilmiştir. Bu eserler yazıldıkları dönem ve yazarlarının kişiliklerinin de analize dahil edildiği detaylı bir okumadan geçirilmiş, bir anlamda yapı-bozumuna tabi tutularak bazı ortak temalar oluşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle bu tez birincil kaynakların ikincil kaynaklar aracılığıyla tarihsel bir çerçeveye oturtulması sayesinde ortaya çıkmıştır.

Son olarak “neden” sorusunu yanıtlayarak tezin gerekçelerini ortaya koymak gerekir. Buna göre bu tezin yazılmasındaki temel amaç literatürdeki önemli bir eksikliğin giderilmesine katkıda bulunmaktır. Osmanlı entelektüellerinin Batı algısına yönelik ciddi bir literatür mevcut olmakla beraber, Doğu algısına yönelik literatür maalesef son derece sınırlıdır. Hele seyahatnamelerin Osmanlıların Doğu algısının anlaşılmasında bir kaynak olarak kullanılmasının bugüne kadar örneği mevcut değildir. İşte bu nedenle bu tez literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Elbette bu tezin yazımında ciddi sorunlarla da karşılaşmıştır. Bunlardan birincisi tezin de temel eleştiri noktalarından biri olan genellemelerden kaçınılması hususudur. Bu tezde her ne kadar genellemelerden kaçınılmaya çalışılmışsa da gerek zamansal gerek mekansal sınırların genişliği ister istemez genellemelere başvurulması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Yine de bu sorun genel görüşlerin yanı sıra alternatif görüşlerin de sunulmaya çalışılması ile dengelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Tezin yazım sürecinde bir diğer sorun da kısıtlı bir literatür olan seyahatname literatürünün Osmanlıların Doğu algısının anlaşılmasına ne kadar katkısı olacağı sorunudur. Elbette Osmanlıların Doğu algısının yalnızca bu seyahatnameler tarafından belirlendiğini söylemek güçtür; ancak bu seyahatnameler bizzat Doğu’yu müşahede etme fırsatı bulan bir

zümrenin eserleri olduğundan Doğu algısının anlaşılmasında diğer birçok kaynaktan daha yararlı addedilebilir.

Bu tez dört ana bölüm altında toplam on üç bölümden müteşekkildir. Birinci ana bölüm tezin kuramsal çerçevesi olan Oryantalizm kavramı, seyahat yazımı ile Oryantalizm arasındaki ilişki ile “Osmanlı Oryantalizmi” tartışmalarını analiz etmektedir. İkinci ana bölüm ise Osmanlı seyahat literatürüne odaklanmakta ve klasik ve modern dönemlerde Osmanlı seyahat yazımını mukayeseli bir analize tabi tutmaktadır. Bu bölümde ayrıca “Doğu”ya yönelik Osmanlı seyahatnameleri de okuyucuya tanıtılmaktadır. Üçüncü ana bölüm “medeniyet” kavramının Batı’da nasıl ortaya çıktığını ve nasıl evrildiğini, Osmanlı entelektüellerinin bu kavramı nasıl ithal ettiklerini ve farklı dönemlerde nasıl algıladıklarını, ve son olarak Osmanlı entelektüelleri ile Osmanlı seyyahlarının bu kavramı algılayışlarının nasıl farklılaştığını incelemektedir. Son bölümde ise Osmanlı seyyahlarının farklı bölgeler için nasıl farklı algılar geliştirdikleri tartışılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Osmanlı seyyahlarının Afrika, Ortadoğu, İran, Orta Asya ve Güney ve Doğu Asya bölgeleri hakkında geliştirdikleri algılar ayrı bölümler halinde incelenmektedir. Tez genel bir sonuç bölümüyle sona ermektedir.

Osmanlı seyyahlarının Batı’nın Doğu olarak tanımladığı bölgeler ve bu bölgelerde yaşayan insanları algılamaları ile Osmanlıların medeniyet kavramını algılamaları arasındaki ilişki Osmanlıların kendi kendilerini nasıl algıladıklarını anlamak açısından önemlidir. Aslında bu Osmanlı kimli çalışmalarının eksik bir yanındır. Osmanlıların kendilerini Batı’ya göre konumlandırışları üzerine ciddi bir literatür teşkil etmişken kendilerini Doğu’ya göre konumlandırışları genel olarak ihmal edilmiştir ve bu tez nihayetinde bu eksikliği doldurmaya çalışmaktadır.

Medeniyet kavramının Osmanlılar tarafından ithali başlı başına bir inceleme konusudur. Buna göre bu kavram Osmanlı literatürüne, Avrupa başkentlerindeki görevleri sırasında bu kavramla tanışan bir grup genç diplomat tarafından 1830’lu yıllarda ithal edilmiştir. Bu yıllarda medeniyet kavramı Avrupa’da yeni yeni yerleşmiştir ve henüz evrensel ve bütün insanlığı kapsayıcı niteliğini kaybetmemiştir. Diğer bir deyişle medeniyet kavramı yalnızca bir grup insanın (Avrupalıların) tekelinde bulunan bir kavram olarak değil tüm insanların

edinebileceği bir nitelik olarak algılanmaktadır. Aydınlanma döneminin akıl kavramına verdiği öneme binaen medeniyet fikri bu fikri kabul edenlere daha müreffeh ve mutlu bir yaşam vaat etmektedir.

Aslında Osmanlı entelektüellerinin dikkatini medeniyet kavramına çeken şey tam da bu kavramın bu evrensel niteliğidir. Osmanlı diplomatları görev yaptıkları Avrupa başkentlerinin düzen ve intizamına hayrandırlar ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin de benzer bir kalkınmışlık seviyesini yakalayabilmesi için “medeniyet usulü”nü kullanması gerektiğini dile getirmektedirler. Diğer bir deyişle Osmanlıların ilk medeniyet algıları Avrupa'daki algılardan farklıdır; zira Osmanlılara göre medeniyet ideal bir koşul değil bu ideal koşula ulaşmak için bir araçtır. Bu durum klasik Osmanlı pragmatizminin de bir tezahürüdür. Ancak yine de Osmanlı diplomatlarının bu kavramın önemini ve Avrupalılar için ne anlama geldiğini idrak ettiklerini söylemek mümkündür. Bu diplomatlar artık askeri teknoloji, binalar, fabrikalar gibi maddi unsurları medeniyet adını verdikleri genel yapı içerisinde değerlendirmeyi tercih etmektedirler.

1820'ler ile 1850'ler arasında medeniyet kavramının evrenselliği Avrupa'da ciddi bir düşüşe geçmiştir; bu kavram artık Avrupa'ya has bir kavram olarak algılanmaktadır. Aslında bu durum medeniyet kavramına atfedilen evrenselliğin tamamen ortadan kalktığı şeklinde yorumlanmamalıdır; bunun yerine Avrupa entelektüelleri bu kavramı Avrupa'da meydana gelen bir dizi sürecin sonucu olarak görme eğilimindedirler. Avrupalı olmayan toplumların ancak Avrupa'da geliştirilen bazı süreçleri takip ederek medenileşebileceklerini iddia etmektedirler. Örneğin François Guizot'nun bu dönemde “Avrupa ve Fransa medeniyeti” temalı dersleri Fransız entelektüelleri arasında olduğu kadar Osmanlı entelektüelleri tarafından da takip edilmiştir.

Medeniyet kavramının evrensel bir kavramdan Avrupa'ya has bir kavrama dönüşmesinin Osmanlı entelektüellerinin bu kavramı algılayışları üzerinde önemli etkileri olmuştur. Osmanlı entelektüellerine göre kültürel/dini bir boyutu olmadığı için evrensel bir kavramı ithal etmek çok daha kolaydır; ancak Avrupa'nın yüzyıllar boyunca Hıristiyanlıkla özdeşleştirilmesi bu kavramın ithali konusunda Osmanlı entelektüelleri arasında ciddi sorunlar

yaratmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, bazı entelektüellere göre Avrupa medeniyetinden yapılacak bir ithalat Osmanlı toplumunun İslami kimliği ile çelişebilir.

Tanzimat dönemi Osmanlı entelektüelleri bu ikilemi iki şekilde aşmaya çalışmışlardır. İlk olarak her ne kadar halihazırdaki medeniyet Avrupa kıtasında şekillenmiş olsa da bu, bu kavramın Avrupa'ya has bir kavram olmasını gerektirmez. Diğer bir deyişle Avrupa'daki medeniyetin bir takım elemanlarını ithal etmek aslında Osmanlılar da dahil tüm insanlığın yararına olan elemanları ithal etmek anlamına gelmektedir. Şinasi ve Münif Paşa gibi entelektüeller bu anlayışı savunmaktadırlar.

Bu ikilemi aşmanın ikinci yolu da Batı medeniyetinin maddi ve manevi elemanları arasında bir ayrıma gitmektir. Medeniyetin bilim ve teknoloji gibi maddi elemanları Avrupalılara has değildir, insanlığın genel bir ürünüdür ve bu çerçevede Osmanlı sistemi içine entegre edilmesinde bir mahzur yoktur. Bilakis, bu maddi elemanların entegrasyonu Osmanlı toplumunun refahı ve devletin bekası için elzemdir. Bu elemanların Avrupa'da mükemmelleştirilmiş olması başka bir alternatif arayışını da gereksiz kılmaktadır; bunun yerine bu elemanlar hızla ithal edilmelidir.

Osmanlı entelektüellerine göre medeniyetin manevi elemanlarına ise daha eleştirel yaklaşılmalıdır. Bu manevi elemanların bir kısmı, örneğin sosyal adalet, vatan için çalışma veya modern eğitim gibi hususlar zaten İslam tarafından da emredilmektedir; dolayısıyla bunlar zaten her Müslümanın uymakla mükellef olduğu hususlardır. Diğer manevi elemanlar ise Avrupa'nın kültürel ve dini arka planından beslendiği, yani Avrupa'ya has olduğu için bunların ithali Osmanlı toplumunun kültürel ve dini yapısı ile çelişebilir. Böyle bir çelişkide Osmanlıların kendi karakterlerini korumaları ve Avrupa medeniyetinin bu tür manevi unsurlarını kabul etmemeleri gerekir, çünkü Avrupa için faydalı olabilecek bir manevi eleman Osmanlıların toplumsal yapısında son derece olumsuz sonuçlar doğurabilir. Özetle, medeniyetin maddi ve manevi elemanları arasındaki ayrım, maddi elemanların derhal ve toplu olarak, kayıtsız şartsız kabulü ve manevi elemanların Osmanlı sistemi ile çelişenlerinin reddi Tanzimat döneminden imparatorluğun dağılına kadar Osmanlıların temel medeniyet algısını oluşturmuştur.

1850'lerden Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar, özellikle bir taraftan Sosyal Evrimci ve Darwinci teorilerin gelişimi diğer taraftan da Avrupa emperyalizminin güçlenerek yerleşmesi medeniyet kavramının öncekinden de dar çerçevede, ırk temelli bir anlayışla algılanması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Diğer bir deyişle, medeniyet kavramının evrenselliği bizzat Avrupa medeniyetinin evrenselleştirilmesine dönüşmüştür. Bu Avrupa entelektüellerinin büyük bir kısmının tek bir medeniyet olduğu, onun da Avrupa medeniyeti olduğu savını pekiştirmiştir. Diğer benzer yapılar ise tarihsel olgular olarak değerlendirilmiştir; belki bir zamanlar var olan bir Mısır, Hint veya Çin medeniyetinden bahsetmek mümkündür ancak bunlar günümüzde mevcudiyetlerini sürdürmemektedirler. Tüm bu görüşlerin yanı sıra ırkların eşitsizliği ve beyaz Kafkas ırkının sarı ve siyah ırklara olan üstünlüğü gibi fikirler bu dönemde Avrupa emperyalizmini ve medenileştirme misyonu kavramını meşrulaştırmak için yoğun bir biçimde kullanılmıştır.

Osmanlı entelektüellerinin bu gelişmelere yönelik tepkileri muhtelifdir. Bir taraftan bazı entelektüeller en azından kısmen Sosyal Evrimci ve Darwinci kuramların bazı bölümlerini kabul etmişlerdir. Ahmet Mithat Efendi'nin gelişmenin kaçınılmazlığı ve güçlü toplumların zayıf toplumların aleyhine varlığını sürdürdüğü iddiaları ve Abdullah Cevdet'in Avrupa'nın ırkçılık üzerine en fazla kalem oynatan entelektüellerinden biri olan Gustave le Bon'dan yaptığı çeviriler bu eğilimi yansıtmak bakımından ilginçtir. Aslında Osmanlı entelektüellerine göre ırk bir sorun teşkil etmemektedir, zira kendileri de beyaz Kafkas ırkına mensupturlar. Ancak özellikle İslamcılar ırk kavramını İslam'ın getirdiği insanların eşitliği prensibine aykırı olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Dahası Osmanlı entelektüelleri ırkın medeniyetin kazanımları hususunda etkili olmadığını gösteren örnekler aramışlar ve bu örneği 1905 yılında Batılılaşmadan modernleşen Japonya'nın Batılı bir devlet olarak algılanan Rusya'yı yenmesinde bulmuşlardır. Japonya'nın bu zaferi Osmanlı Devleti'nde büyük bir heyecan yaratmıştır; zira uzun süredir varlığını kanıtlamaya çalıştıkları tezin, yani Batılılaşmadan modernleşmenin mümkün olduğu tezinin bir örneğini Japonya özelinde bulmuşlardır.

Avrupa'da yükselen ırkçı kuramların 1876'dan itibaren Osmanlıların Batı'ya yönelik hayal kırıklıklarıyla birleşmesinin ardından Osmanlı entelektüellerinin Batı medeniyetinin maddi ve manevi unsurları arasında yaptıkları ayırım daha da pekişmiştir. Çok küçük bir aşırı Batıcı grup istisna tutulursa, Osmanlılar Batının bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişimi ile ikiyüzlülüğü, baskıcılığı ve emperyalist politikaları arasında kesin bir ayrıma gitmişlerdir. Osmanlı Devleti'ni Avrupa devletlerinden biri haline getirmeyi amaçlayan Tanzimat'ın modernleşme algısı Osmanlı Devleti'nin Avrupa'nın saldırganlığına direnmesini sağlayacak bir modernleşme algısına dönüşmüştür. Özellikle 1908'den sonra Osmanlı siyasi akımları Osmanlı Devleti'ni Avrupa tarzı maddi gelişme ile Doğulu moralitenin sentezine ulaştıracak bir formül arayışını sürdürmüşlerdir.

Aslında Osmanlıların medeniyet algısının orijinalliğini sağlayan da bu sentezdir; diğer bir deyişle Batı medeniyetinin maddi ve manevi elemanlarını birbirinden ayırarak Osmanlılar Batı'da tecrübe edilen modern teknoloji ile Doğu'nun mevcut moral yapılarını birleştirmeyi ummuşlardır. Hemen hemen tüm Osmanlı entelektüelleri bu formülün birinci kısmında yani Batı'nın maddi modernitesinin ithalinde birleşmişler, ancak formülün ikinci kısmında farklı görüşler geliştirmişlerdir. Radikal olanlarının dışında Batıcılar 1860lar ve 1870lerde Osmanlıcılığın başarmaya çalıştıkları siyaseti yani Batılı tarzda bir devlet yaratmayı amaçlamışlardır. Devletin İslami karakterini reddetmemekle beraber insanın bireysel vicdanı ile alakalı ve modernleşmeyi reddetmeyen bir din telakkisi geliştirmişlerdir. İslamcılar ise devletin İslami kimliğini korumayı ve bir İslam birliği kurarak bu kimliği Osmanlı Devleti'nin ötesine taşımayı amaçlamışlardır. Türkçüler ise medeniyetin maddi modernitesi ile Türk-İslam kültürel geleneği arasında bir bağlantı kurmaya çalışmışlardır. Kısacası, bu siyasi akımların hiçbiri tamamen Batılılaşmış bir devlet tasavvuru içinde değillerdir, düşündükleri tek şey tebaasının refah ve güvenliğini sağlayacak modern bir devlet sistemi teşkil edebilmektir.

Özetle Osmanlı entelektüellerinin on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Doğu ve Batı arasında arada kalmışlıkları bu ikisi arasında bir sentez oluşturma isteğini körüklemiştir. Böylelikle tek çözümün en zor seçenek olan Batılı ve Doğulu

elemenların biraradalığını sağlamak olduğunu kabul etmişlerdir. Bu ikisi arasında aşılabilir bir farklılık olduğunun savunulduğu bir çağda bu sentezi sağlamak neredeyse imkansızdır; ancak Osmanlı entelektüelleri en azından bunu denemişlerdir. Bir keresinde Şinasi tarafından “Asya’nın akl-ı piranesi ile Avrupa’nın bıkır-i fikrini izdivaç ettirmek” olarak özetlenen bu ideal on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Osmanlı entelektüellerinin en temel ideallerinden biri olmuştur ve Osmanlı’ya has bir medeniyet algısının oluşumunu tetiklemiştir.

Osmanlı entelektüel çevrelerinde medeniyet fikrinin bir sentez yaratacak şekilde Osmanlı sistemine transfer edilmesi Osmanlıların Doğu algısını da şekillendirmiştir. Medeniyet fikrinin ve bu fikrin Batı ile olan ilişkisinin yerleşmesinden önce Osmanlılarda Doğu kavramı coğrafi bir terim olmanın ötesine geçmemiştir; diğer bir deyişle Doğu bölgeleri ve halkları Batı’ya nazaran bir bütünlük içinde değil bireysel olarak algılanmıştır. Örneğin Osmanlı klasik devrinin coğrafya kitaplarında *Hind* veya *Çin-ü Maçin* gibi ifadelerle rastlanırken *Şark* ifadesi pek görülmez. Bu durum on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Avrupa’da iyiden iyiye yerleşen Doğu-Batı tartışmasının Osmanlı Devleti’ne ithal edilmesiyle değişmiştir. Bundan sonra Osmanlılar da Doğu’nun Batı’dan farklı bir entite olduğunu kabul etmeye başlamışlardır. Bu anlamda Batılı söylemleri bir ölçüde taklit etmişlerdir. Batı askeri ve teknolojik üstünlük, düzenlilik, temizlik ve kalkınma gibi kavramlarla özdeşleştirilirken, Doğu askeri ve teknolojik yetersizlik, düzensizlik, kirlilik ve geri kalmışlık gibi kavramlarla tanımlanmıştır; böylelikle Doğu kavramına coğrafi anlamının ötesinde değer yargıları atfedilmiştir.

Ancak bu durum Osmanlıların Doğuyu Batı’nın Doğu’yu algıladıkları gibi algıladığı anlamına gelmez. Osmanlıların Doğu algısı ile Batı’nın Doğu algısı arasında önemli farklılıklar vardır. Bunlardan birincisi Batı’nın Doğu algısının “medenî” ve “medenî olmayan” ayırımına göre “medenî Batı” ve “medenî olmayan Doğu” şeklinde bir ayırma gittiği yerde Osmanlıların böyle bir ayırımı kabul etmemeleridir. Bunun da nedeni Osmanlıların kendilerini bir Doğu toplumu olarak addetmeleridir. Osmanlı seyahatnamelerinde sıklıkla “Biz Şarklılar” veya “Şarkımız” gibi ifadelerle rastlanır. Medeniyet temelli bir Doğu-Batı ayırımının kabulü Batı’nın Doğu’yu gayrimedenî addetmesinin de kabulü

anlamına geleceğinden, Osmanlılar alternatif söylemler geliştirme zorunluluğunu hissetmişlerdir. Bu alternatif söylemlerden biri medeniyet kavramını evrensel bir kavram olarak düşünmek ve medeniyetin maddi ve manevi elemanlarını birbirinden ayırmaktır. Diğer taraftan bazı entelektüeller, özellikle de İslamcılar ayrı bir İslam temelli Doğu medeniyetinden bahsetmeye başlamışlardır. Batı medeniyetinin üstünlüğünün kayıtsız şartsız kabulü İslamın Batı'ya karşı daha alt bir statüde oluşunun kabulü anlamına geleceğinden, Batı medeniyetine İslami bir alternatif geliştirmek Osmanlı entelektüelinin bir çabası haline gelmiştir.

İslam medeniyeti kavramı ve bunun Doğu ile özdeşleştirilmesi İmparatorluğun dağılmasına kadar sürmüştür; ancak yirminci yüzyılın ilk yirmi yılında Doğu'nun yalnızca İslami bir entite olmadığını bilakis Batılı anlamda bir medeniyet olduğunu ileri süren bir anlayış ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu anlayışın ortaya çıkmasında iki gelişme etkili olmuştur. Bunlardan birincisi Türkçülerin görelî olarak din dışı bir bakış açısı geliştirmeleridir ki bu durum Abdülhamid sonrası dönemde kendisini iyiden iyiye göstermiştir. Türkçüler medeniyet ve kültür kavramlarını birbirinden ayırarak Doğu-Batı tartışmasını daha seküler bir çerçeve içerisine taşımışlardır. İkinci gelişme ise 1904-1905 Rus-Japon Savaşı'nda Japonya'nın zafer kazanmasıdır. Bu zafer Osmanlı entelektüelleri için ziyadesiyle önemlidir; zira Batı'nın yenilmezliği ve Doğu'nun durağanlığı tartışmalarına bir son vermiştir. Osmanlılar bu zaferin ardından Doğu'yu Çin, Hindistan ve Japonya gibi Güney ve Doğu Asya devletlerini de içine alacak şekilde yeniden tanımlamışlardır. Hindistan bu ülkede yaşayan Müslüman toplumu nedeniyle zaten İslami temelli Doğu medeniyeti algısının bir parçası olagelmıştır, ancak Doğu'nun Batı'ya karşı bir medeniyet olarak tanımlanması yeni bir gelişmedir. Öyle ki bazı İslamcı seyyahlar bile Japon modernleşmesine tanık olduktan sonra klasik "İslam birliği" anlayışı yerine bir "Doğu birliği"nden bahsetmeye başlamışlardır. Diğer bir deyişle hem Müslümanların hem de Müslüman olmayan Doğuluların karşılaşmış oldukları ortak tehdidin, yani Batı yayılmacılığının tek çaresinin bir Doğu birliği yaratmak olduğu düşüncesi önem kazanmıştır.

Eğer Osmanlı kimliğinin Doğulu boyutu Osmanlıların Doğu algısını Batı'nın Doğu algısından farklılaştıran bir etmense, Osmanlıların Batı'da yaygın

bir biçimde kabul gören Batı'nın Doğu'dan üstünlüğünü iddiasını reddi bir diğer etmendirdir. Aslında daha önce de ifade edildiği üzere Osmanlılar Batı'nın Doğu üzerinde maddi üstünlüğü olduğunu kabul etmişlerdir; ancak bu iddialarından bile bu üstünlük aşılabilir bir üstünlük değildir. Diğer bir deyişle, genelde Doğu'nun özelde de Osmanlı Devleti'nin mevcut problemleri çözüldüğü takdirde, Avrupa dışı dünyanın bir zamanlar içinde bulunduğu görkemli duruma dönme potansiyelleri her zaman mevcuttur. Bu aynı zamanda Batı'nın medeni ve Batı dışı dünyanın gayrimedeni olduğu iddiasının da reddi anlamına gelir. Osmanlı Devleti ve Doğu'nun sorunlarının halihazırda mevcut olan geri kalmışlıklarından kaynakladığı kabul edilse de, bu geri kalmışlık durumu sonsuza kadar sürecek değildir ve bazı tedbirler alındığı takdirde sona erecektir.

Bu tedbirlerden birincisi eğitimidir. Hemen hemen tüm Osmanlı seyahatnamelerinde eğitim İmparatorluğun ve Doğu'nun sorunlarının en etkili çözümü olarak kabul edilmiştir. Aslında Batı'nın maddi üstünlüğünün kabulü Osmanlıları Batı'da geliştirilen bilimsel ve teknolojik yenilikleri de içerecek yeni bir eğitim sisteminin tasarlanmasına zorlamıştır; böylelikle güncel gelişmelerin takip edilebileceği bir eğitim sisteminin kurulması Doğu'nun dirilişinin hayati bir unsuru sayılmıştır. Ancak eğitim yalnızca pozitif bilimlerin öğretimi anlamına gelmemelidir. Örneğin, İslamcılara göre bilimsel gelişmeyi engelleyen İslam dışı hurafelerin İslam dininden temizlendiği bir dini eğitim bir gereklilik olarak kabul edilmiştir. Türkçülere göre ise ulusal ve kültürel elemanlar da öğretilmelidir; özellikle Rus ve Çin kültürel emperyalizmi altında yaşayan Orta Asya Türkleri için bu son derece önemlidir. Kısacası medeniyetin maddi ve manevi elemanlarının ayrılması düşüncesi eğitim alanında da devam etmektedir; medeniyetin maddi elemanlarının öğretilmesinin yanı sıra İslami/Türk/Doğu moralitesinin öğretilmesi de müfredatta korunmalıdır.

Eğer eğitim Doğu'nun ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin dâhili ve entelektüel kalkınmasını sağlayacaksa, İslam Birliği veya Doğu Birliği şeklinde sağlanacak bir birlik de Doğu dünyasını dış baskılara karşı koruyacaktır. Genel olarak Osmanlı entelektüelleri ve özel olarak Osmanlı seyyahları Avrupa emperyalizmini şiddetle eleştirmektedirler; Osmanlı Devleti'ni ve Doğu dünyasının Batı'nın genişlemesi tehdidi altında görmekteyiz. Bu nedenle

emperyalist genişleme ile mücadele bireysel direnişle sağlanamaz, toplu bir hareket planı geliştirilmesi elzemdir. Dahası Osmanlılar Batı'yla bir askeri çatışma yerine, Batı dünyasının kalkınmışlık seviyesine kendi imkânlarıyla ulaşmayı hedeflemişlerdir.

Avrupa'nın ve Osmanlıların Doğu algılarının arasındaki üçüncü bir fark da terminolojinin kullanımudur. Osmanlılarda Doğu hiçbir zaman akademik bir çalışma alanı olmamıştır; diğer bir deyişle Osmanlı Devleti'nde sistemli bir Doğu Çalışmalarından bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Osmanlılar Avrupa terminolojisini de genellikle Avrupa kaynaklarından öğrenmişlerdir. Örneğin, Osmanlı seyyahları Avrupalı seyyahların yazdıkları seyahatnameleri veya onların çevirilerini okumuşlar ve kendi seyahatnamelerinde kaynak olarak kullanmışlardır. Ancak Avrupa'da mevcut olan Doğu Çalışmaları disiplinine karşılık gelecek dilbilimsel veya antropolojik çalışmalarda bulunmamışlardır. Böylelikle bazı kavramları kullanışları oldukça yüzeysel kalmıştır. Bunun çarpıcı bir örneği ırk kavramıdır. Bazı seyahatnamelerde Osmanlı seyyahları ziyaret ettikleri bölgelerde yaşayan hakları ırk temelli bir sınıflandırmaya tabi tutmaya çalışmışlar ve bir ırkı diğerinden üstün gösteren bazı hiyerarşiler tesis etmişlerdir. Ancak bu toplumları medeni ve medeni olmayan şeklinde ayırmak için ırk kavramını bir araç olarak kullanmayı içselleştirdikleri anlamına gelmez. Seyyahlar bu gibi ast-üst ikilikleri geliştirmede din kavramını daha sıklıkla kullanmışlardır. Örneğin Afrika kabileleri için Müslüman veya Hıristiyan kabilelerin diğer dinlere mensup kabilelere göre daha medeni olduklarını savunmuşlardır. Diğer bir deyişle ırk kavramı Osmanlıların Doğu algısında hiçbir zaman Batı'da olduğu kadar belirleyici olamamıştır.

Eğer ırk kavramı medeniyetin temel belirleyicisi değilse Osmanlı seyyahlarına göre bir toplumun medeni olup olmamasının temel belirleyicisi nedir? Osmanlı seyyahlarına göre medeni ve medeni olmayı ayırmayı sağlayan temel kıstas yerleşimdir. Seyyahlar tarafından sıklıkla atıfta bulunulan Ibn Haldun geleneğini takip edenler yerleşik toplulukların göçebe topluluklara göre daha medeni olduğunu ileri sürmektedirler. Bu çerçevede Anadolu'da yaşayan göçebe topluluklarla Arabistan'da yaşayan göçebe topluluklar arasında büyük bir fark yoktur; her ikisi de şehirliye göre gayrimedeni addedilir.

İkinci olarak yerleşimin şekli de bir medeniyet ölçütüdür. Seyyahlar temiz ve düzenli şehirleri takdir etmişler ve bu şehirlerde yaşayanları kirli ve düzensiz şehirlerde yaşayanlara nazaran daha medeni adanmışlardır. Doğu şehirlerinde müşahede ettikleri Avrupalıların yaşadığı mahallelerle yerel halkın yaşadığı mahalleler arasındaki ayırım (yani şehir alanının ikiliği) şehir planlamacılığının da önemli bir medeniyet kıstası olduğunu göstermektedir. Ancak burada da Osmanlı seyyahları temizlik ve düzenliliğin yalnızca Batı medeniyetinin bir niteliğiymiş gibi gösterilmesini eleştirmektedirler; onlara göre bu nitelikler aslında İslami hayat tarzının emrettiği niteliklerdir. Bu vurguyu yaparken seyyahlar Batılı entelektüellerce ileri sürülen Avrupa-dışındaki şehrsel alanın geri kalmışlığının İslam'ın doğasıyla alakalı olduğu iddiasını reddetmektedirler; onlara göre bunun nedeni İslam'ın gerçek prensiplerinden ayrılmaktır.

Son olarak Batı'nın Doğu algısı ile Osmanlıların Doğu algısı arasındaki dördüncü ve belki de en önemli fark Batı'nın Said'in de dediği gibi Doğu ve Batı arasında epistemolojik ve ontolojik bir ayımla temellenen monolitik bir Doğu algısı geliştirirken Osmanlı seyyahlarının böyle tek tip bir Doğu algısı geliştirmemiş olmasıdır. Osmanlı seyyahlarının Doğu algısı zamana, mekana ve seyyahların karakterlerine ve kişisel arka planlarına göre önemli değişiklikler arz etmektedir.

Seyyahların ideolojik eğilimleri ile başlanacak olunursa, Batıcı, İslamcı ve Türkçü eğilimlerin seyahatnamelerin içerik ve üslubu üzerinde önemli etkileri olduğu söylenebilir. Örneğin Batıcı bir seyyah Batı'nın Batı-dışı dünya üzerindeki kolonyalist ve emperyalist genişlemesini İslamcı veya Türkçü seyyahlara göre daha az eleştirmektedir. Batıcı seyyahlar, İskenderiye, Kahire, Beyrut, Kalküta veya Şanghay gibi gelişmiş (ve Batılılaşmış) şehirler dışında, ziyaret ettikleri bölgelerde kendilerini yabancı hissetmişlerdir. Kendilerini Doğulu olarak tanımlamaktan kaçınan bu seyyahlar kendileri ve ziyaret ettikleri bölgelerde yaşayan halklar arasındaki benzerliklerden ziyade farklılıklara dikkat çekmişlerdir. Bu nedenle ister İslami ister Doğulu bir çerçevede ortak bir kimlik geliştirme çabaları yoktur. Kısacası bu seyyahların tanımlamaları Oryantalist Batı seyahatnameleri ile büyük paralellikler arz eder.

İslamcı seyyahlar ise Batı'nın Batı-dışı Dünya üzerindeki emperyalist tahakkümünü şiddetle eleştiri ve Avrupa'nın Avrupalı olmayanla ilişkisini bir tür Hıristiyan-Müslüman ikilemi içine yerleştirmeyi tercih eder. Diğer bir deyişle bu seyyahlar Müslüman Doğu'nun Hıristiyan Batı tarafından sömürülmesi, Batılıların medeniyet namına vahşi ve gaddar bir tutum içine girmeleri ve misyoner faaliyetlerin yıkıcılığı gibi temalar üzerinde dururlar. Bu seyyahlar Müslümanların yaşadığı topraklarda kendilerini rahat hissederler. Her ne kadar İslam dünyasının geri kalmışlığını eleştirirler de bunun bir din olarak İslam'dan değil, bu dinin gerçek prensiplerinden sapılmasından kaynaklandığını iddia ederler. Dahası kendilerini Doğulu olarak addetmekten gurur duyarlar; bu da Batılılar için geliştirdikleri eleştirel dil düşünüldüğünde son derece anlaşılırdır.

Türkçü seyyahlara gelince, İslamcı seyyahlar gibi onlar da Batı'nın Batı dışı dünyaya yönelik baskılarından şikayetçidirler. Siyasi ve askeri müdahalelerin yanı sıra misyoner faaliyetlerin Türk gençliğinin ulusal kimliğine zarar verdiğini düşünmektedirler. Ancak İslamcı seyyahlardan farklı olarak bazı Müslüman toplulukların, özellikle de Arapların, kendilerinden farklı olduğunu düşünürler. Örneğin, Arapları Batılı müdahalelere tepkisi kalmakla ve Batılı güçlerin Osmanlı karşıtı propagandalarından etkilenmekle suçlarlar. Bu nedenle Arap milliyetçiliğinin belirtilerine dikkat çekerler ve bunun Batılıların bir tür oyunu olduğunu ifade ederler. Kendilerini Arap topraklarında yabancı hissederken Orta Asya'da kendilerini evlerindeymiş gibi rahat hissettiklerini yazarlar. Kısacası milliyetçi zihniyet yapıları Orta Asya'nın geri kalmışlığı için daha az eleştirel bir dil geliştirmelerine yol açmıştır.

Osmanlı seyyahlarının bu gibi ideolojik eğilimlerinin yanı sıra ziyaret ettikleri bölge de seyahatnamelerin içerik ve üslubu üzerinde belirleyicidir. Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'ya yönelik seyahatnamelerde bu bölgeler Osmanlı vilayetlerinden müteşekkil olduğu için ne kadar uzak ve yabancı olursa olsun ülkenin bir parçası olarak addedilirler; zira emperyal merkezden uzak olmalarına rağmen bu bölgeler halen Osmanlı toprağıdır. Bazı seyyahlar Osmanlı vatandaşlığı kavramını vurgulayarak bölgede yaşayan halklarla kendilerini eşit görürler, diğerleri ise bölge halklarını daha alt bir seviyede algırlar, zira kendilerini İmparatorluğun şehirli entelektüel eliti olarak algırlarken bu bölgede

yaşayan topluluklar onlar için göçebe veya yarı-yerleşik cahil bir zümredir. Ancak bu yaklaşım da Oryantalist bir yaklaşım olarak değerlendirilemez. Bu yaklaşım daha ziyade seyyahların geldiği daha gelişmiş bir bölge ile ziyaret ettikleri daha az gelişmiş bir bölge arasındaki gelişmişlik farkı üzerine bina edilmiş bir söylemdir. Diğer bir deyişle, bu ırk temelli bir ayırım değildir; örneğin Osmanlı seyyahların Türk köyleri için geliştirdiği söylem genellikle Arap köylerinden farklı değildir. Burada mesele ırksal eşitsizlik değil yerleşim ve eğitimin eksikliğidir. Böyle bir söylem örneğin Parisli bir entelektüelin Fransız taşrası hakkındaki görüşleri ile karşılaştırılabilir.

Osmanlı seyyahlarının İran algısı ise diğer Müslüman dünyanın algısından büyük ölçüde farklıdır, zira İran Şiilik gibi İslamın başka bir versiyonunu kabul eden bağımsız bir Müslüman devleti olarak Osmanlılar tarafından rakip bir siyasi güç olarak algılanagelmışlerdir. Bu yaklaşım yeni bir yaklaşım değildir; ancak on dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarında sınır çatışmalarının yoğunlaşması, sınır bölgelerinde yaşayan göçebe kabilelerin her iki ülkeye de saldırmaları ve Osmanlı Irak'ında Şii propaganda faaliyetlerinin güçlenmesi Osmanlı Devleti ve İran arasındaki ilişkilerin bozulmasına yol açmıştır. Bu dönemde İran'dan geçerek Orta Asya'ya giden seyyahların İran hakkındaki olumsuz algılarının temelinde de bu rekabet duygusu yatmaktadır. Orta Asya, Hint ve Çin Müslümanlarına gelince Osmanlı seyyahları bu Müslüman toplulukları için dini nedenlerden dolayı bir üstünlük vurgusu geliştirmiştir. Bu seyyahlar kendilerini Müslüman dünyasının en üst dini yetkilisi olan Halife'nin içinde bulunduğu toplumun bir parçası olarak görmektedirler; bu da onların kendilerini gerçek Müslümanlar olarak addetmelerine ve diğer Müslüman toplulukların bazı geleneklerini İslam'dan sapma olarak görmelerine yol açmıştır. Yine de bölgede yaşayan Hindu ve Budist topluluklar için geliştirilen algılara nazaran bölge Müslümanlarının daha olumlu algılandığını söylemek mümkündür; bunun da en temel nedeni dini kardeşlik duygusudur. Orta Asya'da bu dini kardeşlik duygusu etnik kardeşlik duygusu ile pekiştirilmiştir. BU bölgede yaşayan Türk toplulukları özellikle Türkçü seyyahlar tarafından Osmanlıların daha az gelişmiş kardeşleri olarak addedilmiştir. Bu etnik benzerlik bu toplulukların az gelişmişliğinin daha az eleştirilmesine yol açmıştır.

Son olarak Osmanlı seyyahları Uzak dođu için oldukça karmařık bir söylem geliřtirmişlerdir. Uzak Dođu ile Osmanlılar arasında ne dinsel ne ırksal bir benzerlik vardır; ancak Osmanlılar ve Uzak Dođu toplumları benzer iç ve dış sorunlardan muzdariptirler. Örneđin Osmanlı topraklarında veya Çin’de yaşayan bazı toplulukların cehaleti aynı kelimelerle eleştirilmektedir. Dahası Uzak Dođu ve Osmanlı toplumları benzer bir dış tehditle, yani Batı’nın emperyalist genişlemesiyle karşı karşıyadırlar. Bu ortak tehdit algısı Osmanlı seyyahları ile Dođu Asya toplumlarını yakınlılařtırmış ve Osmanlı seyyahlarının Dođululuk temelli ortak bir kimlik geliřtirmesini kolaylařtırmıştır. Diđer bir deyişle, kimliđin etnik ve dini boyutlarının yanı sıra Dođululuk ortak bir kimliđin tesis edilmesinde bir faktör olmuştur.

Sonuç olarak Osmanlıların Dođu algısının ve kendilerini Dođu’ya göre tanımlamalarının üç boyutu vardır. Birinci boyutta Osmanlı seyyahları dini benzerlik arayışındadır. Dođu’nun Müslüman toplulukları Osmanlılara daha yakın olarak algılanmışlardır. Bu dini kardeşlik duygusu Osmanlı seyyahlarının Müslüman yerleşimlerin ve halkların geri kalmışlığını eleştirmesini engellemiştir; ancak seyyahlar bu geri kalmışlıkta kendi sorumluluklarının da olduğunu kabul etmişlerdir. Osmanlıların bir kısmı Osmanlı Devleti’nin de parçası olan Müslüman dünyayı yeterince tanımayıřları ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin sınırları dışında yaşayan Müslüman topluluklarla yeterince ilgilenmeyişleri bu sorumluluđun bir göstergesidir. Bu aynı zamanda Osmanlıların Dođu’nun Müslümanlarının kalkınmışlık seviyesini geliřtirme yönünde çaba harcanması gerektiđini vurguladıkları anlamına da gelir; ancak bu medenileřtirme misyonu kavramından farklıdır. Bunun birinci nedeni Osmanlı seyyahlarının medenileřtirme misyonu kavramını kullanarak Dođu üzerinde hakimiyet kurma yönünde bir çabalarının olmamasıdır. Bu seyyahlar böyle bir projenin hayata geçirilmesinin imkansız olduğunu farkındadırlar. Seyyahların yapmak istediđi Müslümanları İslam dünyasının geri kalmışlığı hakkında uyarmak, bu geri kalmışlığın nedenlerinin sorgulanmasını sađlamak ve ortak tedbirler alma yönünde çaba harcamaktır. Osmanlı Devleti Hilafetin merkezi ve halen İslam dünyasının en güçlü bađımsız devleti olduğu için böyle bir arayışta Osmanlı Devleti’nin liderliđi dođal addedilmiştir. Bu liderliđin emperyalist ve kolonyalist

bir liderlik olduğunu iddia etmek zordur, örneğin Hint Müslümanlarının uyanışını sağlayarak Osmanlılar bu bölgede İngiliz kolonyal yönetimini ortadan kaldırıp kendi kolonyal yönetimlerini kurma arayışında değildiler. Osmanlılar daha ziyade bir zamanlar görkemli bir medeniyet olan İslam medeniyetini yeniden canlandırmak ve onu günün koşulları ve bilimsel/teknolojik gelişmeler ile uyumlu hale getirmeyi amaçlamaktadırlar.

İkinci boyut etnik benzerlik boyutudur. Özellikle Abdülhamit sonrası seyahatnameler Osmanlı Devleti ile Orta Asya’da yaşayan Türk toplulukları arasında bir işbirliği geliştirilmesi gerektiğini savunmaya başlamışlardır. Bu noktada kardeşlik hissiyatı daha yoğundur; zira bu hissiyat hem etnik hem de dini kimlikten beslenmektedir. Osmanlılar Orta Asya halklarını “küçük kardeşleri” olarak nitelendirirler, burada “küçük” sıfatı Osmanlıların daha güçlü ve deneyimli bir aktör olduğunu göstermek için kullanılmıştır. Osmanlılar daha deneyimlidir zira Batı ile etkileşimlerinden çok şey öğrenmişlerdir; askeri ve siyasi anlamda da daha güçlülerdir. Bu nedenle “kardeşlerinin” kalkınması ve Batı ile daha iyi mücadele edebilmeleri için onlara yardım edebileceklerdir.

Son olarak, üçüncü boyut en gevşek boyut olan Doğululuk kavramını içermektedir; zira Osmanlı seyyahlarına göre Doğulu toplumları bir araya getirebilecek tek ortak nokta ortak tehdit algısıdır. İlk iki boyutun aksine bu boyutta Osmanlılar kendilerini Doğu toplumlarının doğal bir lideri olarak addetmemektedir; zira Doğu’da müstakbel bir Doğu birliğinin çok daha güçlü bir lider adayı vardır. Bu aday aslında Osmanlı seyyahlarınca da üstünlüğü kabul edilmiş olan Japonya’dır. Japonya’nın batılılaşmadan modernleşmesi ve bu süreçte ulusal değerlerini koruması, Batılı bir gücü yenecek kadar da kuvvetlenmesi Osmanlıların hayretini celbetmiştir. Japonya’yı ziyaret eden veya Uzak Doğu’da Japonlarla karşılaşan Osmanlı seyyahları Japonya’yı Osmanlı Devleti’nde göre daha üstün addetmekten kendilerini alamamışlardır. Bu nedenle Doğu Birliği projesinin liderliğini Japonya’nın alması konusunda bir tereddütleri yoktur.

Sonuç olarak Osmanlıların Doğu algısının Batı’nın Doğu algısından önemli ölçüde farklı olduğu söylenebilir. Osmanlı Devleti’nin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel yapısının Batı’dan farklı olması Osmanlı seyyahlarının Doğu

bölgeleri ve bu bölgelerde yaşayan halklar için Batı'dakinden farklı söylemler geliştirmelerine yol açmıştır. Osmanlıların medeniyet kavramına ilişkin bir sentez geliştirme çabası Said'in Oryantalizm eleştirisinin temelinde yer alan Doğu ve Batı arasındaki ontolojik ve epistemolojik ayrımın bulanıklaşmasına yol açmıştır. Dahası Osmanlı seyyahlarının farklı ideolojik eğilimleri ve ziyaret ettikleri bölgeler arasındaki farklılıklar Doğu ile ilgili medeniyet kavramı temelinde tek tip bir Doğu algısının oluşturulmasını engellemiştir. Tüm bu farklılıklar Osmanlıların Doğu algısının son derece karmaşık ve çok boyutlu olduğunu gösterir ki bu Osmanlı kültürünün kendine özgü entelektüel renklerinin bir tezahürüdür.