

REPRODUCTIVE PRACTICES: KURDISH WOMEN RESPONDING TO
PATRIARCHY

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Yakın Ertürk	(METU,SOC)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör	(METU,SOC)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu	(BILKENT,POL)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oğuz Işık	(METU,CRP)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç	(METU,SOC)	_____

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Name, Last name: Miki Him

Signature:

ABSTRACT

REPRODUCTIVE PRACTICES: KURDISH WOMEN RESPONDING TO PATRIARCHY

Him, Miki

Ph.D., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör

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This dissertation is a case study of reproductive practice among Kurdish rural-urban migrant women in Van, Turkey. Van is one of the eastern provinces where high fertility persists despite the rapid fertility decline in the country. In Van and some other provinces where Kurdish population concentrates, however, fertility levels not only continue to be high but also increased in the period between 1980 and 2000. In order to explore the social dynamics behind the divergent fertility trend, this dissertation conducted interviewing with women in a Kurdish migrant neighbourhood and examined their reproductive experiences from the feminist political economic perspective that pays particular attention to reproduction's embeddedness in patriarchal social relations which are contingent upon political economic contexts. This dissertation argues that Kurdish migrants in the studied neighbourhood experienced, and still experience, considerable socioeconomic insecurities resulted from the neoliberal economic policy since the 1980s and the destructive mass displacement in the 1990s. Migration to the city could offer women empowering opportunities. Yet, while the traditional rural form of patriarchal practices lingered until recently, a new form of patriarchy seeks to restore masculine confidence in the context of insecurities by tightly controlling the woman's

movement and considerably hinders her access to public spaces and hence reproductive healthcare. This dissertation proposes that enduring high fertility among the recent Kurdish migrants can be closely related to the form of patriarchy reconfigured in a way to work against the woman's autonomy which is essential for the exercise of reproductive rights.

Keywords: reproductive practices; patriarchy; Turkey; Kurds; migration

ÖZ

ÜREME PRATİKLERİ: ATAERKİLLİK İLE MÜCADELE EDEN KÜRT KADINI

Him, Miki

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör

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Bu tez Van'da yaşayan köyden kente göç etmiş Kürt göçmenler arasında üreme pratiklerini araştıran bir örnekölay çalışmasıdır. Van, ülkedeki üreme oranındaki hızlı düşüğe rağmen yüksek üreme oranının korunduğu doğu illerinden birisidir. Ancak, Kürt nüfusunun yoğun olduğu Van ve diğer bazı illerde doğurganlık oranının yüksek olarak devam etmesinin yanında 1980 ve 2000 yılları arasındaki dönemde ise artmıştır. Farklı üreme eğilimlerinin arkasındaki sosyal dinamikleri sorgulamak için bu tezde, bir Kürt göçmen mahallesinde kadınlarla mülakat yapılarak onların üreme deneyimleri, özellikle siyasal iktisat bağlamındaki ataerki sosyal ilişkilere gömülü olan üremeye vurgu yapan feminist siyasal iktisat açıdan incelendi. Bu tez, çalışmanın yapıldığı mahallede yaşayan Kürt göçmenlerin 1980'lerden sonraki neo-liberal iktisadi politikalar ve 1990'lardaki yıkıcı kitlesel yerinden olma sonucunda ortaya çıkan ciddi sosyoekonomik güvensizliklere maruz kaldıklarını ileri sürmektedir. Kente göç kadınlara güçlendirici fırsatlar sunabilirdi. Ancak, ataerki pratiklerin geleneksel kırsal biçimi son zamanlara kadar devam ederken, ataerkilliğin yeni bir biçimi güvensizlik ortamında kadınların hareket özgürlüklerini sıkı bir şekilde denetleyerek erkeksi özgüveni yeniden kurmaya çalışır ve kadınların kamu alanına ve dolayısıyla üreme sağlığı hizmetlerine erişimini önemli ölçüde engeller. Bu tez, yakın zamanda göç eden Kürtler arasında devam eden yüksek doğurganlığın,

üreme haklarını uygulamak için gerekli olan kadın özerkliđinin aleyhine olacak şekilde yeniden biçimlenen ataerkillik ile yakından ilişkili olduđunu ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: üreme pratikleri; ataerkillik; Türkiye; Kürt; göç

To My Parents

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HUIPS	Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
ICPD	International Conference of Population and Development
IRRRAG	International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group
IUD	Intrauterine Device
LAM	lactational amenorrhoea method
SIS	State Institute of Statistics
SPO	State Planning Organization
STD	sexually transmitted disease
TDHS	Turkey Demographic and Health Survey
TFR	total fertility rate
TMIDPS	Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Scope of the Dissertation

This dissertation addresses the regional inequality in levels of fertility in Turkey. It challenges cultural discourses that underplay political-economic contexts and reduce the high level of fertility in the eastern and southeastern regions to the residual of cultural values. The basic argument of the dissertation is that it is neither backwardness nor a culture but rather the political-economic conjuncture which forced millions of the people into a considerably vulnerable position over the last decades that maintained the fertility level in the regions divergent from the national trend.

A number of historical, anthropological and feminist studies of human reproduction have suggested that birth control is by no means the sudden accomplishment of modern mind and biomedical technology. People have tried to enhance or limit fertility since antiquity for a variety of personal or group interests. Women, too, have always desired to and have struggled for controlling their own body, sexuality and re/production within the limits of societal values, the desires of their intimate partners or other family members and the level of their own empowerment. If patriarchy means a social order that perpetuates systematic male domination over women, we all still live in patriarchal society as we used to do in the past though in different ways. Thus, women continue to experience a varying degree of constraints on exercising reproductive rights. However, patriarchy intersects with other hierarchical orders of class, race and ethnicity and historical conjunctures. Hence, it affects women who are differently positioned in the other systems of hierarchy in different ways. Therefore, it can be a harder or a longer process for some women to gain control over their reproduction.

By the 1990s, a growing number of underdeveloped countries were rapidly approaching the replacement level¹ of fertility and they were assumed to continue to experience further fertility decline (UN Population Division 2002: 3). Yet, fertility decline is not necessarily a linear irreversible process. John Bonggarts (2008) recently pointed out the “stalls” in the midst of fertility transition in a number of countries, which were hardly seen before. Among forty countries in fertility transition that Bonggarts examined, fourteen sub-Saharan countries, Guatemala, and Turkey did not experience significant fertility declines in the late 1990s. Further, while fertility level continues to vary from country to country, it can also differ - maybe even more radically - among social groups within a country. Turkey is one of those countries which experienced the rapid decline of fertility yet its pace is considerably uneven within the country.

Total fertility rate (TFR) in Turkey has continuously been dropping for nearly half century in an uneven way. According to the 1960 census, the national fertility rate was estimated to be 6.18, ranging from 3.07 in the metropolitan area to 8.00 in the rural south-eastern region (Shorter 1968: 13). The rural “East-Central” region ranked in the middle (7.69) among the rural subdivisions of nine regional divisions (Shorter 1968: 13).² Today, TFR of the East is 3.26 while that of all the other regions is below the replacement level or just above it (HUIPS 2009: 12). Moreover, a few provinces in the East maintain even higher rates of fertility compared to the other provinces within the region. State Institute of Statistics’ (SIS)³ provincial indicators (2002a) show that there are a number of eastern and south-eastern provinces where fertility rates increased during the period between 1980 and 2000 when the country experienced a rapid fertility decline.⁴ For example, in Van, TFR had dropped from

¹ This is the level of fertility at which a couple has only enough children to replace themselves. It is defined as 2.1 children per couple in demography.

² Shorter (1968) does not explain the provincial distribution of the regional units. “East-Central” probably corresponds to the region called “Central East Anatolia (*Ortadoğu Anadolu*)” in NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, or *İstatistikî Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması – İBBS*) which was officially introduced in 2003. “Central East Anatolia” includes the provinces of Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş, and Van (see Turan 2005 for details).

³ It is renamed as Turkish Statistical Institute, or TURKSTAT.

⁴ Fertility decline was particularly rapid in the 1970s and the 1980s in Turkey (HUIPS 2004: 49).

5.2 to 4.9 between 1980 and 1985 but rose to 6.0 by 2000.⁵ It appears that the rise of fertility in Van and some other provinces in the East in those years contributed to the “stall” in the process of fertility transition in Turkey, yet no satisfactory account for it has been offered yet.⁶

The exceptionally high levels of fertility in the East have not attracted the same attention as the socioeconomic inequality of the region which ranks at the bottom of regions in the country (Dincer *et al.* 2003). The widespread assumption of the parallel progress of fertility decline and socioeconomic development, or “modernisation”, held by many social scientists may account for this neglect. However, it has become known that fertility rate very often varies among social groups within a country depending on the accessibility of social and economic resources, aspirations and life strategies, even when contraceptives are available.⁷ During the last few years, a number of social scientists, most of whom are demographers, began examining the regional inequality of fertility levels in Turkey, yet most of these studies are macro-level quantitative analyses.

This dissertation therefore attempts to undertake a qualitative analysis of the reproductive practices among a social group with high fertility in Turkey which has been understudied so far. In this respect, it attempts to explore and understand the social dynamics behind the enduring high level of fertility among rural-urban migrants in Van, an East Anatolian city, in order to contribute to the existing gaps in knowledge. The concern of the research is not demographic but sociological and feminist. It attempts to explore a particular gendered socioeconomic arrangement in which women’s reproductive lives are embedded. I embark on this research with a belief that socioeconomic dynamism underlies demographic patterns.

⁵ SIS, or TURKSTAT, has not published the provincial data since 2000. Hence, this is the latest data available.

⁶ To my knowledge, Murat Yüceşahin and Murat Özgür (2008) are the only scholars who drew attention to the recent rise of fertility level in some provinces in the East so far. Their work will be referred in the following chapters.

⁷ For example, see a case of South Africa in Swartz (2002).

1.2. High Fertility among Kurdish Women in Turkey: A Traditional Pattern of Reproduction?

Regional inequality of fertility level in Turkey appears to correspond to the ethnic differentiation between those who speak Turkish, the official language, as mother tongue and those who speak Kurdish, the language which has not been recognised in the country until recently. Existing studies on fertility differences in the country are divided between the views which see the ethnic divide important and those which consider other factors such as educational level and settlement areas significant. However, ethnic differences in Turkey tend to overlap with regional, socioeconomic and educational inequalities (Sirkeci 2005; Koç *et al.* 2008). In other words, more Kurdish citizens tend to reside in underdeveloped eastern parts of the country, live in poor living conditions and be deprived of educational opportunities. Yet, there are significant socioeconomic differences among Kurds at the same time (Işık and Pınacıoğlu 2006). It is therefore not an easy task to identify a single determining factor of the demographic inequality.

Alternatively, this dissertation attempts to place enduring high fertility in eastern Turkey within a dialectical relationship of socioeconomic, ethnic and gender hierarchies which are deeply embedded in modern capitalist societies. World-systems theory informs us that the fluctuating development of capitalism, which has been continuously globalising and the process has accelerated in an unprecedented manner after the middle of the last century, simultaneously makes its impacts throughout the world yet unevenly (Wallerstein 1979). From this perspective, many Kurdish women in Turkey have maintained high fertility probably because they are integrated into capitalist system differently (or more disadvantageously than) from the other women in the country rather than being isolated or excluded from modern society as modernisation theorists might argue.

This dissertation explores a question; How has Kurdish women's persisting high fertility been shaped by social, economic and political conjunctures in which their reproductive life is embedded? It then proposes that Kurdish women's high fertility

is not a mere continuance of a traditional pattern of reproduction (either ‘natural fertility’ or a culture of high fertility) but a product of deepening socioeconomic and gender inequalities in the conjunctures of intensifying social, economic and political insecurities to which many of them are very vulnerable.

1.3. Theoretical Perspective

Theoretically, this dissertation owes feminist knowledge very much. Contrary to the conventional perception of human reproduction as a basically biological event, many prominent feminist scholars see that reproduction has been a central site of gender struggles. For instance, in her controversial and powerful discussion of reproduction as “genderically differentiated” historical process, Mary O’Brien (1981) tells us that men are destined to be alienated from reproduction because of their physiological functions. They have however struggled and largely succeeded in overcoming the alienation by appropriating women’s reproductive labour power and the children women laboured by discovering, institutionalising and magnifying paternity. The woman is thus deprived of control over reproductive process and her children, despite the fact that it is her body in which an almost whole process of reproduction occurs and it is her who labours them, not because of given biological male superiority but as a result of a historical triumph of patriarchy. The origin of patriarchy is difficult to be verified but only presumed. Yet the understanding of patriarchy as historical construction makes feminist projects meaningful.

From a feminist perspective, human reproduction that we know today cannot be understood sufficiently without recognising its patriarchal organisation because it is a social process that is embedded in and reproduces patriarchal gender hierarchy simultaneously. In this dissertation, patriarchy is defined not in a literal narrow sense of ‘the rule of fathers’ which refers to the pre-industrial feudal domestic unit but, as will be elaborated in the next chapters, in a broader structural sense of a gender order that promotes male privilege in all spheres of social life by being male dominated, male identified and male centred. In recent years, feminist scholars have established that patriarchy is by no means a fixed orderly monolithic structure. It is a deep-seated

structure yet constantly contested by discordant voices and sometimes forced to reconfigure. It is always a temporal product of constant struggles, negotiations and reconfiguration. It also inevitably intersects with other hierarchical social orders of class, race and ethnicity and always threatened by changing historical conjunctures which exert complex effects over multiple hierarchical social orders. Hence, reproduction cannot be fully understood by a static and isolated understanding of patriarchy. Instead, this dissertation applies a feminist and political-economic perspective that places patriarchy in wider dialectical relations with class and ethnic hierarchies and historical conjunctures. It attempts to show that such a theoretical perspective would reveal an important aspect of reproduction that is constructed through complex political struggles.

This dissertation takes a position that reproduction and patriarchy are organised politically and economically. Hence, an existing pattern of reproduction is likely to be a reflection of the desires of hegemonic gender, class and/or ethnic groups in a society. Women, as the oppressed gender, may or may not share the dominant ideology of reproduction in a society to which they belong. Recent historical and cross-cultural feminist studies of reproduction indicate that fertility control may not be only a matter of individual knowledge, availability and acceptance or rejection of birth control. The International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group (IRRRAG)'s studies about women's perceptions on reproduction (Petchesky and Judd 1998) demonstrate that socio-economically disadvantaged, uneducated women do recognise their 'right' to control own reproduction and often struggle to limit their births for the very reason of economic hardship in spite of a number of conjugal, familial and cultural obstacles. On the ground of the findings of those studies, this dissertation assumes that women, regardless of their educational levels, hardly remain passive about reproduction despite a range of social pressures. At the same time, it also acknowledges a possibility that a fertility trend may not be a reflection of women's desires due to the prevalence of patriarchal gender regimes.

1.4. Methodology

Feminist Methodology as a Project for Transformative Change

This dissertation is an interpretative study directed by feminist methodology. According to Caroline Ramazanoğlu and Janet Holland, feminist methodology “is one set of approaches to the problems of producing justifiable knowledge of gender relations” (2002: 10). It enables a researcher to question an existing order of things embedded in unequal gender relations and to work for a “transformative change” towards *human* relations between women and men (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16-7; Ertürk 2004). It is motivated by a particular uneasiness and dissatisfaction with conventional positivist scientific enterprise which has ignored gendered aspects of social world for its methodological proneness to conventionalism (Popper 1965: 52-3) and hence androcentrism. It is a methodology that is inspired by political and ethical commitment for women, grounded in women’s experience, informed by feminist theories and accountable to women (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16, 7). It is not an attempt for an end to systematic inquiry but to male domination (Harding 1986: 10). It is also not an attempt for producing women-centred knowledge in place of men-centred knowledge but feminist knowledge which is free of gender loyalties and subject-object hierarchy (Harding 1986: 138). This dissertation applies feminist methodology in its appropriateness to shed light on male domination over women hidden or euphemised in both conventional discussion and practice of reproduction by systematic inquiry.

Case Study as a Method to Generate a New Proposition

This dissertation is based on a case study. Case studies are generally applied by social researchers in order to illustrate the specific and/or sometimes exceptional cases of individuals or groups which do not fit the patterns accounted in previous studies (Reinharz 1992: 167-71). Although it is contrary to the logic of orthodox positivist studies which value generalisation, comparability and replication, even a single previously unknown or ignored case can be a powerful device of falsification (Popper 1963). A systematically studied, carefully selected case can invalidate a previously accepted generalisation and indicate new research directions. In particular,

when they are directed by feminist theoretical perspectives, case studies suit to challenge conventional androcentric research, in which women are systematically absent or represented in a way to reconfirm patriarchal social arrangements, by demonstrating a powerfully illustrative case of injustice based on gender regardless of its statistical significance. Feminist case studies which explore particular experiences, voices and contexts with specific sensitivity to gender inequality could reveal evidences that cannot be adequately revealed by gender-blind studies.

Further, case studies are useful in drawing attention to particular social settings and processes. Attention to particular settings and processes helps avoid abstract universalism and brings to light the temporality and social constructedness of a particular form of patriarchy which, as a sociological concept, has suffered from ahistoricism. Positivist quantitative studies pursue verifiable and generalisable accurate facts and they are very useful to know the general characteristics and behavioural trends of a particular population. It is however a starting point to understand a series of dynamic processes of negotiations and renegotiations in constructing and reconstructing social world by individuals behind statistical data (Angin and Shorter 1998: 556).

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967), the founders of grounded theory, argue for the usefulness of a constant comparable selection of cases with theoretical sensitivity in exploratory qualitative studies. In grounded theory, cases are not selected in order to verify a certain theory as positivist researchers do. Nor are they collected in order to know everything about the field as ethnographers do. They are selected and accumulated step by step according to theoretical relevance in a course of research in order to generate concepts, hypotheses and eventually a theory, all of which grounded on data. With the guidance of grounded theory, this dissertation investigates Kurdish migrant women's struggle for a control over their reproduction with theoretical sensitivity to the socioeconomic embeddedness of reproduction and an intimate relation between patriarchy and reproduction, which has not been able to be sufficiently discerned by abundant statistics and quantitative analyses of reproductive behaviour in Turkey.

Interviewing as a Method to Learn from Women

In principle, case studies can make use of data ranging from historical documents and literature to surveys, interviews and participatory observation. Documents and literature on women's experience of reproductive decision-making in contemporary East Anatolia are extremely scarce. Surveys have been already shown to be insufficient in understanding particular social contexts in which reproductive lives of individuals are embedded. Participatory observation is not appropriate because of the very private nature of the issue concerned. Interviewing is hence considered to be the best method to explore women's own accounts of their experience of social arrangements of reproduction and consequent decision-makings, which have been often ignored in the discussion of high fertility probably because of the prevalent assumption of high fertility as natural fertility. Semi-structured interviewing is equipped with a plan of questions about a given topic but consists of primarily open-ended questions and allows flexibility in the order of questions and probing if it encourages interviewee for expressing her/himself. It allows more interaction between the researcher and the interviewee and facilitates opportunities for clarification and discussion (Reinharz 1992: 18). It also fulfils one of the feminist interests; learning from women. It produces less standardised data yet the data are likely to be rich in variety and expression, which could be "a valuable reflection of reality" (Reinharz 1992:19).

In fact, it is debatable whether interview data are a reflection of reality. David Silverman accounts (2006: 118-32) that positivist studies assume that the data they collected by random sampling and standardised questions give us an access to 'facts' about the world. What he calls emotionalist studies assume that interviewees are experiencing subjects and give a great importance on their accounts as significant data which provide an authentic insight into people's experience. Constructionist studies assume that interviewers and interviewees are always actively engaged in constructing meaning and pay attention to the way in which meaning is constructed rather than what they say. This dissertation, combining emotionalist and constructionist approaches, assumes that women are active members of society and they partly, informally and often unintentionally but certainly contribute to construct

social reality which is extremely complex and multi-faceted. It thus relies heavily on the accounts of women interviewed not as ‘facts’ but as data that help understand women’s experiences, views and practices which construct part of social reality.

When a feminist researcher privileges women’s experiences, one rationale is to recover previously repressed voices and to expose existing injustices; the other is to produce more unifying knowledge of the general and the particular, the public and the personal, and the structural and the individual. In conventional positivist studies, women’s experience used to be ignored for the reason that it belongs to the latter (the particular, personal and individual), that is, non-generalisable. An emotionalist-constructionist treatment of women’s experience can be however more revealing than the exclusively generalised knowledge or the wholly subjective knowledge since it exposes the often contradictory but intimate connections between society and individuals in which the former exerts overwhelming effects over its agencies. Indeed, “sociological imagination” is the fundamental of scientific study of social realities (Mills 2000). Yet, such unitary knowledge does not derive from female cognition or female body as some feminists once claimed (e.g. Rose 1983, 1984, Hartsock 1983, 1984, and Flax 1983 cited in Harding 1986: 142-54). It needs to be learned. The challenge to the abstracting, objectifying masculine/bourgeois knowledge is not the feminisation but humanisation of knowledge with the full employment of human capacities of generalisation, interpretation, objectification, comparison, empathy, rationalisation and critical analysis.

Problems of Verification and Reliability

Qualitative research is prone to a criticism of anecdotalism, which appeals to “a few telling ‘examples’ of some apparent phenomenon, without any attempt to analyze less clear (or even contradictory) data” (Silverman 2006: 47). In order to avoid anecdotalism and enhance the validity of the research, this dissertation applied five principles Silverman proposes (Silverman 2000: 178-85) and one additional principle; the refutability principle; the constant comparative principle; comprehensive data treatment; deviant-case analysis; appropriate tabulations; and political-economic analysis. First of all, the refutable principle tells a researcher to

seek to refute their initial assumptions rather than to confirm apparently interesting evidence. For example, I first looked for information related to traditions or culture of high fertility such as pro-natal worldviews, religious prohibition to birth control and son preference in the process of interviewing at the same time with paying attention to the material basis of those practices.

Second, it is Glaser and Strauss (1967) who proposed the constant comparative method in their grounded theory. It tells a researcher to constantly compare the data fragments within a single case and seek another case for further comparative purpose to test out emerging hypotheses in the process of data collection. My practice of it will be described in Chapter Five.

Third, a principle of comprehensive data treatment tells a researcher to seek not correlations but generalization within a dataset. Generalization that qualitative research seeks needs to be derived from repeated systematic inspection. It needs to be consistent and applicable to every piece of relevant data that a researcher collected. What is achieved then is “an integrated, precise model that comprehensively describes a specific phenomena (*sic*)” (Mehan 1979 cited in Silverman 2000: 180).

Fourth, deviant-case analysis tells a qualitative researcher not to be satisfied until every piece of data can be accounted for. Instead of ignoring divergent cases as exceptional or hiding them to preserve the consistency and seamlessness of datasets, deviant cases need to be sought out and addressed actively. Social world is never consistent and seamless but rather always contradictory, conflicting and multi-faceted. Exposing and seeking accounts for those cases, rather than hiding them, enhance the validity of research.

Fifth, using tabulations helps a researcher to see beyond her/his first impressions on the data collected. Quantifying data in appropriate places enhance objectivity of a research. It also provides readers with a sense of access to data, more than a researcher’s words and in turn, for the researcher, minimizes doubts about the accuracy of her/his interpretation about the data. Numerous types of tabulations other

than those presented in the text were attempted in the process of data analysis for this dissertation.

Lastly, I believe that seeking to place specific qualitative datasets within larger social milieu and account them against it greatly helps a qualitative research go beyond the subjectivism of both parts; interviewees and the researcher. I researched political-economic context in which the women whom I studied live from existing quantitative and qualitative studies before and after interviewing and tried to examine their accounts against it.

On the other hand, in qualitative research, it is difficult and even not favoured to apply the quantitative approach's understanding of reliability as measurement consistency and stability (Neuman 2000: 170). Qualitative researchers acknowledge that different researchers or researchers who use different measures could get distinctive but all illuminating results because qualitative data collection is an interactive process after all (Neuman 2000: 170). Then, reliability of qualitative research is a matter of the way in which a researcher collects and analyses data rather than that of measurement and scale. It is a matter of accountability as well as analytic consistency.

In order to enhance reliability, firstly, I tried to be careful about the clarity and consistency of concepts and categories that I used throughout the dissertation. Secondly, I paid great attention to the contexts, nuances and tones of the talk each interviewee made. I inscribed the recorded interviews within a few days not to forget them. Lastly, tapes and transcripts are open to readers for further inspection in theory, yet in most cases, readers have to rely on the researcher's description and interpretation of data (Silverman 2000: 185). I regret that I could not attach the transcript of the interviews in order to allow readers for further examination but it would have swollen the text to hundreds more pages. Alternatively, I chose to present a sufficient amount of the excerpts from the interviews in every opportunity in the text.

As for any case study, the findings of the dissertation cannot be generalized neither for the entire population of East Anatolia, that of Van nor that of any unit. The purpose of the research is not to make generalisation even for the neighbourhood or the people I studied. Yet, as a case study, it would bring valid new evidences with respect to patriarchal organisation of human reproduction in relation to socioeconomic transformation.

Reason Why Van was Chosen as a Case

Interviewing was conducted with forty women living in one of the rural-urban migrant neighbourhoods in the city of Van. The research was conducted in Van because it is one of the provinces with the highest fertility level, is among the least developed provinces, consists of a large Kurdish-speaking population, and experienced the political unrest, displacement and significant demographic changes over the last decades.

During the period of displacement between the mid-1980s and the 1990s, Van received migrants from villages both within the province and of neighbouring provinces, such as Hakkari and Şırnak. Consequently, by 2000, the urban population of Van suddenly exceeded the rural population.⁸ Those migrants however seem to be particularly the people who had neither material resources to rebuild a new life nor social network to refuge in larger cities (Bilgil *et al.* 1998). While those who engage in farming⁹ significantly decreased from 1985 to 2000, the employment in industry¹⁰ is still very low and even lagging in the province. The unemployment rate¹¹ went up three times between 1980 and 2000.

Although it is difficult to assess whether women in the eastern part of the country are more oppressed by men than the other women in the country, the available data suggest that they are more disadvantaged than the latter in many respects such as

⁸ The rate of urbanization was 35% in 1985 and rose to 51% in 2000 (SIS 2002b: 44).

⁹ It was 78.9% in 1985 and 67.2% in 2000. It decreased significantly among men; 65.3% in 1985 and 46.7% in 2000 (SIS 2002b: 53).

¹⁰ It was 1.9% in 1985 and rose to 3% in 1990 but fell again to 2.5% (SIS 2002b: 53).

¹¹ It was 3.1% in 1980 and 10.8% in 2000 (SIS 2002b: 52).

literacy, formal education and employment opportunities. The effects of increasingly insecure socioeconomic environment on the lives of the women who are already considerably disadvantaged have not been studied systematically until today.

The neighbourhood was chosen because it is one of the oldest migrant neighbourhoods in Van and consists of both voluntary migrants who mostly moved to the city in the 1970s and the early 1980s and forced migrants who migrated in the late 1980s and the 1990s. It is also known to comprise the people with ethnic nationalist sentiments. It was considered to provide an illustrative case of the intersecting effects of reconfiguring patriarchy, ethnicity and socioeconomic insecurity on reproduction in a particular historical context.

1.5. The Plan of the Dissertation

First of all, in the next chapter, feminist and conventional accounts of human reproduction will be examined. Feminist political-economic accounts of human reproduction will be discussed at the end of the chapter as a perspective which captures both patriarchal organisation of human reproduction and the embeddedness of reproduction and patriarchy.

In Chapter Three, in order to understand the shifts of state policy and their effects on reproduction at a local level, the historical changes in population policy and family planning programme in Turkey will be overviewed. It will be shown that the national population policy is contingent on both international population politics and national political interests, which are often at odds.

In Chapter Four, the political-economic context of Van will be delineated in order to help examine a particular case of reproductive practices in the migrant neighbourhood against larger milieu.

In Chapter Five, the characteristics of the neighbourhood where the research was conducted and of the participants of interviewing will be described. Further, the processes of data collection and analysis and field experience will be discussed.

In Chapter Six, the research findings with regards to reconfiguring patriarchy will be examined as a background that possibly accounts the participants' choices of action related to reproduction.

In Chapter Seven, findings concerning changes and trends in reproductive practices among the participants will be analysed. In the end, the possible relationship between reconfiguring patriarchy and the enduring relative high fertility will be discussed.

In the conclusion, it will be argued that traditional patriarchy has declined in the migrant community and a new form of patriarchy is emerging, yet, in a considerably insecure urban environment. The new patriarch increasingly desires to father the limited number of children since child rearing is expensive and too much burden for his meagre income. The political and economic basis of his authority is indeed fragile for his marginal integration into formal economy and the national political system. He however attempts to regain a sense of control by enhancing the control over women. While traditional patriarchal exploitation lingers on, the reinforcement of patriarchal surveillance has a considerable subversive effect on women's entrance into the public sphere and attainment of more effective contraceptives. It seems that women's low level of education and rural origin do not prevent them from learning about and desiring modern methods of contraception. Yet, their multiple deprivations and intensified patriarchal surveillance make harder and longer the process in which they learn to cope and deal with patriarchy and control their own reproductive bodies.

CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS FEMINIST POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall first attempt to clarify two major concepts I use in this dissertation: patriarchy and reproduction. Both concepts have been used in a variety of meanings in social science. Particularly, patriarchy is controversial in its contemporary usage. The assumption that patriarchy is no longer adequate to explain women's subordination in contemporary societies is a hurried judgement. I shall argue on the contrary that patriarchy is a constantly negotiated temporal outcome yet continues to be an enduring oppressive system across cultures. Understanding patriarchy is still vital to explicate gendered aspects of reproduction and all the other spheres of social life today.

I shall then review two different social explanations of reproduction. One is second-wave feminist accounts which saw reproduction as a material base of women's subordination in one way or another yet could not go further to situate it in a specific historical conjuncture and remain abstract and universalistic. The other is conventional accounts by demographic studies and anthropological works which take into consideration a range of factors from socioeconomic to cultural yet lack a critical understanding of patriarchy which is a powerful underlying force that organises relations of human reproduction. Studies examined are by no means representative of the disciplines or schools of thought; they are inevitably selective for the purpose of analysis and the relevance to the subject of this dissertation.

In the last part of the chapter, I shall attempt to put forward a newly emerging approach, a feminist political-economic account of human reproduction, which

attempts to demystify reproduction (which has mystified women's subordination) as a theoretical orientation of this dissertation.

2.2. Patriarchal Organisation of Human Reproduction

One of the most significant contributions of feminist scholarship is perhaps a discovery of a system of gender inequality: patriarchy. However, it is conceptually not without confusion and controversy not only in popular usage but also among feminists. It has been used in a variety of different meanings and even some feminists increasingly doubt its explanatory power. Judith Lorber, for instance, chose to study 'gender' in place of 'patriarchy' in her challenge against male domination; "I have chosen not to use the term "patriarchy" as an explanatory concept because of its overuse and slippery conceptualization" (1994: 3). Gender is indeed a very important concept in understanding the social constructedness of hierarchised differences between women and men. Yet, in my view, gender is not the same thing with patriarchy and cannot replace it. Without understanding patriarchy as a social system of hierarchy, gender as we experience is inconceivable. In this section, I shall first attempt to clarify the reasons why patriarchy is still a useful sociological concept and then explicate the theoretical assumption of this dissertation that human reproduction is not only socially but also patriarchally organised.

2.2.1. Is Patriarchy Outdated?

Perhaps, patriarchy has been increasingly considered to be outdated mainly for two reasons. One is a quiet revival of non-feminist definition of patriarchy. The other is the failure of rigorous conceptualisation which has allowed the prevalence of abstract and ahistorical usage of the concept.

A Revival of Non-feminist Definition of Patriarchy: Is Patriarchy about Pre-modernity?

Etymologically, 'patriarchy' means the rule of fathers. It once referred to a rule by the male head of a social unit such as family or tribe over the members of the unit

(Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 93). It was therefore frequently used specifically to describe a hierarchical system among men within the domestic mode of production particular to feudal societies (Hartmann 1981: 14; Walby 1990: 19). Max Weber for instance defined patriarchy as the rule of men who were heads of households over household economies and extended family affairs (Barrett 1988: 10; Walby 1990: 19). Meanwhile, although Friedrich Engels (2000) obviously recognised that women's subordination was central to patriarchy and it endured in the capitalist bourgeois family, he and Karl Marx wrote in *Communist Manifest* that "[t]he bourgeoisie ... has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bond man to his 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than ... callous 'cash payment'" (2000: 247). According to the literal and conventional understanding of patriarchy, it is a pre-modern system of social relations, which lost to a system of contractual relations in seventeenth-century Europe (Pateman 1988: 19). Thus, it is often considered inadequate to explain contemporary social relations while some scholars argue that gender relations in the family continue to be characteristically feudal in contemporary capitalist societies (e.g. Hearn 1987).

Women's subordination however persisted even in advanced capitalist societies in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus so-called second wave feminism emerged in the 1960s in North America and Europe. They explored women's experience of subordination and attempted to account it by means of patriarchy as a social system of male domination distinctive from class system. A term 'patriarchy' thus became more used generically to mean a social system of male domination over women rather than feudal social relations. However, outside feminist scholarship, attempts to associate patriarchy with feudal societies have persisted, or revived, and the term is often distorted to refer to traditionalism while some feminist scholars became convinced about the association and prefer other terms such as mere 'gender inequality' or 'androcentrism' to refer to contemporary male domination (e.g. Harding 1986).

For example, in his writing on underdevelopment in Arab society, Hishami Sharabi uses the terms ‘patriarchy’ and ‘traditionalism’ or ‘pre-modernity’ interchangeably. Sharabi sees modernity and Arab patriarchy as contrasting social systems of reason, scientific knowledge, democracy, horizontal social relations and class versus myth, religious knowledge, sultanate, vertical social relations and family, clan, or sect (Sharabi 1988: 18). He then defines the persisting patriarchal (or traditional) culture in the system of capitalist dependency in Arab society as “neopatriarchy”. According to Sharabi, neopatriarchy is a kind of patriarchy which is modernised in a distorted manner as a result of colonisation, cultural imperialism, and dependent relations with Western imperialist countries. Neopatriarchal society is neither modern nor traditional since it lacks both features of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. In his dichotomous and linear historical view, it is schizophrenic. It has been developed within contemporary urban capitalist Arab society yet rooted in social relations of kinship, clan and religious and ethnic groups (which are, according to Sharabi, all pre-capitalist social formation). For Sharabi, the solution is the achievement of “true modernity”, by which he means autonomous capitalism of Western countries which he calls imperialist. He considers that women’s subordination in Arab society also derives from a conservative neopatriarchal ideology and women would be largely emancipated by true modernisation (Sharabi 1988: 32-3).

Sharabi’s observation that a distinctive form of patriarchy has developed in Arab society in the process of unequal political and economic encounter with the West and Islamic fundamentalists, Muslim reformists, and progressive secularists are all the agencies of modernised patriarchy is convincing. However, in addition to his historical view, Sharabi’s usage of the term is misleading and problematic. First of all, it is misleading to use a term, ‘patriarchy’, when he is actually talking about a particular process of modernisation in the late 1980s when feminist scholarship has already established the concept in the context of gender order.

Secondly, Sharabi probably applied the late nineteenth century sociological usage of patriarchy (He often refers to Tönnies, Weber, and Marx in his account of social change). Nonetheless, the interchangeable usage of the terms between pre-modernity

and patriarchy is problematic. He talks about women's subordination under the same concept of neopatriarchy and argues that the end of neopatriarchy (women's subordination in contemporary Arab society) is bound to true modernisation and a growth of nuclear family which he believes to be inherently egalitarian (1988: 31). Yet, if his assumption were correct, *The Feminine Mystique* was not written in USA in the 1960s and the second wave feminism did not emerge particularly in advanced capitalist societies.

Lastly, Sharabi's assumption of modern social relations, both between men and between men and women, as non-patriarchal thus gives rise to a misconception that patriarchy belongs to pre-modern or non-modern society and a denial of feminist claims about the persistence of a system of male domination regardless of modes of production across cultures and throughout history until today. He cites Arab feminist writers such as Nawal El-Saadawi and Fatima Mernissi but probably did not pay attention to their convictions for the persistence of male dominated familial and religious formations both in the West and non-Western societies.

Both Mernissi (1991) and El-Saadawi (1980) open the English editions of their books by expressing the opposition to the idea which particularises Arab women's subordination. Mernissi points out the continuation of religious life in contemporary Western societies and concludes after her faithful yet feminist reading of the Qur'an and the *hadith* (the collections of writings that document the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad) that Muslim women's subordination does not derive from their religion but its misogynist interpretation and imposition of practice.¹² El-Saadawi explicitly writes that "[t]he oppression of women ... are not characteristic of Arab or Middle Eastern societies, or countries of the 'Third World' alone. They constitute an integral part of the political, economic and cultural system ... - whether that system is backward and feudal in nature or a modern industrial society" (1980: i).

¹² However, a danger of Mernissi's and others' attempts to establish Islam's actual compatibility with the emancipation of women is a distraction away from Muslim women's lives embedded in dynamic temporal socioeconomic processes. They are as ahistorical approaches as those studies which attribute Muslim women's subordination to the principles of Islam (See Ertürk 1991; Kandiyoti 1999). They are theologically interesting yet sociologically problematic.

She tries to argue throughout the book, which vividly depicts apparently culturally particular or personal issues of female genital mutilation, incest, and rape, that what underlies these aggressions against women is not tradition, backwardness, or ignorance but patriarchy.

Losing Confidence in the Concept: Is Patriarchy a Failed Concept?

Over the last half century, feminist scholarship has become ever more sophisticated and certainly contributed to raising gender consciousness (and backlash) all over the world. Nonetheless, many non-feminist scholars continue to be resistant to recognise patriarchy as a sociological concept as important as capitalism and racism. Further, a failure for rigorous conceptualisation and increasing disagreements over the concept among feminists and its abandonment by some, like Lorber (1994), are also partly conducive to the recent decline of patriarchy as a sociological concept.

In the late 1960s, radical feminists as activists and scholars asserted one case after another that patriarchy persisted in pervasive and reinvigorated forms even today after material and symbolic powers of feudal patriarchs were undermined. Thus, Kate Millet stated that “groups who rule by birthright are fast disappearing, yet there remains one ancient and universal scheme for the domination of one birth group by another – scheme that prevails in the area of sex” (Millet 1971 cited by Barrett 1988: 11). Radical feminism went beyond liberal feminism’s demand for legal equality of individual choice and opportunity and drew our attention to the underlying system which enables male domination and women’s subordination regardless of individual motives. For radical feminism, patriarchy is about the categorical domination over one sex by another, which is the primary form of domination preceding all the other forms of domination.

Marxist feminism emerged from feminist criticisms against orthodox Marxism’s neglect of women and reproduction. They shed light on previously ignored women’s unpaid domestic labour and argued its capitalist exploitation (e.g. Dalla Costa 1972 cited in Ueno 1990). However, their approach that prioritised capitalism rather than patriarchy was soon criticised by many feminists since it not only makes an account

of women's subordination in non-capitalist society impossible but also obscures an issue of gender inequality. Some critics (who are sometimes called materialist feminists) instead attempted to pay primary attention on the domestic modes of production and reproduction not as a cooperator of capitalist domination but as the material basis of male domination. For example, Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard (1992) assert that women's unpaid domestic labour is primarily for men as father or husband. It is the fundamental material basis of women's subordination to men before its contribution to capitalist expansion. Meanwhile, Ann Ferguson (1997) argues motherhood torn apart by the sexual and affective triangle relationship between the father, the mother, and the child as the material basis of male domination over women.

Socialist feminism on the other hand defines patriarchy as a distinctive system yet intersecting with the other systems such as class and race. Early socialist feminists proposed what is called dual-systems theory and explored the dialectical and complex (sometimes collaborating and sometimes contradictory) relationship between patriarchy and capitalism (e.g. Eisenstein 1979, Sokoroff 1980, Hartmann 1981). For them as well as Marxist feminists, patriarchy is a system of domination in the sphere of reproduction parallel with class, or a system of domination in the sphere of production as Engels formulated in *The Origin of the Family*. Regardless of different focuses of attention, both Marxist and socialist feminists tended to see that patriarchy is essentially about the production of human beings in the familial sphere distinctive from the production of things while recognising its significant influence over other areas of social life.

Thus, when women's wage work has become increasingly common in advanced capitalist societies and gender inequality in work place became visible for the first time, it was felt necessarily to make a distinction between 'private patriarchy' and 'public patriarchy'. In the face of critics who understand patriarchy as a feudal form of social relations or see it as a familial affair and claim the end of patriarchy on the ground of the prevalence of capitalism and relatively egalitarian nuclear family, Sylvia Walby (1990) demonstrated that in advanced capitalist society private

patriarchy based on the traditional forms of family structure and the authority of father may be weakening but public patriarchy that manifests in the areas of paid work, state, and the media are growing.

However, the exclusion of women from work place and other public areas is a manifestation of patriarchy equally with sexual harassment and women's lower pay *vis-à-vis* men. According to Carole Pateman (1988), the intense privatisation of patriarchy in the age of modernisation in Europe was, for instance, realised by the fraternity of (potential) fathers and exclusion of women from public sphere. Perhaps, patriarchy as male domination over women has always been at work, either by exploiting or excluding, everywhere regardless of spatial distinction. Patriarchy is more pervasive and ubiquitous than we ever imagined. Partly for that reason, women's acquirement of paid work or refusal of domestic labour is not sufficient for ending their subordination as women.

Psychoanalytic feminists also saw patriarchy rooted in familial relations but, for them, at the level of the unconscious. Juliet Mitchell (1974) for instance argued by combining the theories of Sigmund Freud and Claude Levi-Strauss that the symbolic rule of the Father in human unconscious and the cultural rule of incest taboo in human civilization must be the basis of universal male domination over women. Nancy Chodorow (1978) paid more attention to social context (which is though assumed to be universal) and challenged Freud's androcentric interpretations of sexuality. Chodorow focused on boys' and girls' differentiated relationship with mothers rather than fathers. She claimed contrary to Freud's argument of penis envy that masculinity is more problematic than femininity because of the boy's primarily intimate yet later disconnected and conflictual relationship and difficult identification with his mother. In fact, it is masculinity, not femininity, which is defined negatively; not-mother or not-female. However, throughout this developmental process of male identity, it is women, as mothers, who are objectified.

Chodorow's attempt to problematise masculinity is innovative and an important step to overcome a popular perspective that tends to define patriarchy as women's

problem. Yet, psychoanalytic analyses, either Mitchell's grand universalism or Chodorow's insight for socialisation, are prone to deal male domination as a cognitive matter disengaged from temporal social contexts and explain it away by the irrepressible unconscious. They do not tell why it has to be the rule of Father, why the boy's relation with his mother has to be conflictual only because they have different genital organs or why the unconscious has to be formed in a way to devalue women.

Feminist researchers have contributed to a paradigmatic shift by questioning and shedding light on many aspects of gendered reality that we took for granted. Their studies have demonstrated that male domination is neither natural, accidental, nor personal but systematic. Systematic male domination, or patriarchy, has endured throughout history and is enduring in contemporary societies across cultures. It is ubiquitous in all spheres of social life, whether the productive, the reproductive, the material, or the symbolic, although individual scholars pay attention to different aspects of it. Yet, in the course of feminist struggles to assert male domination as a sturdier, more rigorous, more uniform, more enduring, and more pervasive system than anything else and hence as worthy an opponent as bourgeois domination in capitalist societies (Pateman 1988: 19), the concept of patriarchy was applied to account a variety of phenomena (Beechey 1979: 66; Pateman 1988: 20; Ramazanoglu 1990: 33, 39; Lorber 1994: 3; Murray 1995: 8). It became a convenient word for "whatever oppresses women" and often a descriptive term for women's subordination in a very broad and abstract way (Beechey 1979: 69; Hartmann 1981: 29).

Naming such extensive, diverse and complex phenomena by a single word 'patriarchy' of course raised suspicions because "[w]hen it is designated this broadly, ... it loses much of its relevance. Since most societies, over most of human history, can be described as patriarchal, the descriptor begins to seem pretty empty" (Folbre 1994: 59). As Veronica Beechey and other feminist scholars observed, some critics asserted that such unspecific term had no analytical value (Beechey 1979: 67-8; Pateman 1988: 20; Walby 1990: 2; Ramazanoglu 1990: 37-8). Some attacked a few

feminists' ambitious attempts to identify a single fundamental cause for patriarchy as reductionist and suggested that the concept should be abandoned. Patriarchy is thus increasingly considered to be not only an outdated but also failed concept while there is no alternative which illuminates systematic male domination still prevailing, though in variation, across societies.

I consider that the apparent lack of historical and geographical specificity actually reflects patriarchy's pervasiveness, durability and transformability. Yet, it is also true that rigorous conceptualisation is necessary rather than discarding the term (Beechey 1979: 66). Otherwise, a particular injustice that women have experienced in one way or another for being female despite so many other differences between them goes back to "the problem that has no name" (Pateman 1988: 20, Ramazanoglu 1990: 39, Friedan 1992). It risks lapsing into the natural, the accidental, or the invisible. Allan Johnson writes, "the most efficient way to keep patriarchy going is to promote the idea that it doesn't exist in the first place" (2005: 154). While Ramazanoglu doubts the explanatory power of the concept, she supports for retaining the term for its descriptive power which enables us to see mechanisms in which male domination over women is realised within different social institutions (1990: 40).

A Rise of Gender as Sociological Concept: Is Gender Alternative to Patriarchy?

The 1990s when patriarchy lost its popularity as an analytical concept was also the time when feminist movements met a backlash. It was the time when Marxism has already lost its assertiveness in political and academic arenas. Rapidly progressing globalization encompassed people in the world within more unifying capitalist forces but at the same time further differentiated people. Rising postmodernism attacked metanarratives and congratulated differences, fluidity, disconnectedness, locality, and temporality. Their claims captured the air of the time and discouraged claims for any systematic form of subordination which inevitably categorise people under big names. In this context, a concept of gender became widely circulated in place of patriarchy yet in a depoliticised manner of mere socially constructed complementary differences, rather than inequality, between men and women (Oakley and Mitchell 1997: 30 cited in Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 57; Ertürk 2004: 4, 9).

In fact, gender is a term adopted by feminists in order to underline the social constructedness of hierarchical differences between sexes and problematise the “naturalizing power” which a term of sex invokes (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995). It is about the social construction of differences between being feminine and being masculine. It is an important concept for it challenges the naturalness, inevitability and stability of what is defined as femininity and masculinity and the assumed superiority of the latter. Yet, gender is not exactly about a social system of male domination although it is a key element to it. Johnson points out that gender is so important to us not because heterosexuality is vital to human reproduction but because it serves to the interests of patriarchy; “If we were human beings first and women or men second, the patriarchal order wouldn’t make much sense, ...” as “[r]ace distinctions ... would barely exist ... without their link to white privilege” (2005: 83).

Feminists are aware that gender relations are not only different but always hierarchical in all known societies. Lorber chooses gender instead of patriarchy for her analytical concept but also recognises that “gender is not synonymous with patriarchy” (1994: 3). She states further that “inequality of the statuses of women and men was a historical development and that ... there are cross-cutting racial and class statuses within each gender status that belie the universal pattern of men’s domination and women’s subordination implied by the concept of patriarchy” (Lorber 1994: 3-4). I see nothing in her statement to contradict all the things that researchers of patriarchy have said in general so far. Nonetheless, she hesitates to call patriarchy the historically formed universally prevalent pattern of men’s domination and women’s subordination intersected with class and race because she limits her definition of patriarchy to “the ideological dominance of women by men” (Lorber 1994: 2).

The value of a concept of patriarchy is its grasp of the very existence of extensive and complex nevertheless systematic subordination of women to men which can endure regardless of individual beliefs and cannot be changed overnight. It is a social

system with coherence and contradiction that is historically constructed, materially based, and symbolically managed. Lorber is correct when she says that the term, gender, “badly needs precise definition and clearer conceptualization or it will go the way of patriarchy” (1994: 3). Or, it already did. It was done so mainly in three ways. One way is returning gender to the natural (Oakley and Mitchell 1997: 30 cited in Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 57; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995: 16) by saying that the universality of socially attributed differences between male and female proves that it is the way should be and inevitable, that is, natural or functional, if we like it or not. The second way is calling for a force of social evolution by saying that gender inequality belongs to a traditional family system called ‘patriarchy’ in pre-modern world or the Orient. It will be automatically solved as modernisation or westernisation proceeds (e.g. Sharabi 1988). The third way is reducing gender to an apolitical sense of culture by saying that gender relations are shaped culturally by particular worldviews and practices in different societies and must be respected.

The functionalist reduction of gender to a natural order and the cultural celebration of gender differences conveniently ignore the fact of hierarchy in gender relations. The social evolutionist othering of gender inequality is unable to explain glass ceiling, feminisation of poverty, and domestic violence which are experienced also by women who live in Western industrial societies. All the distortions are possible when we refuse to face our patriarchal legacy or a set of social forces which organising power enables men’s domination and women’s subordination in a variety of social contexts. Before discarding ‘patriarchy’, normalising ‘gender’, or coining another term, it should not be forgotten that inequalities between women and men continue to be, as Yakın Ertürk maintains, “embedded in the patriarchal legacy that manifests itself through particular relations of domination and subordination depending upon specific social formations” (2004: 9).

In her feminist project, Lorber aims to “challenge the validity, permanence, and necessity of gender” (1994: 5). However, this statement seems to me misleading because what feminism is challenging is not gender itself but an existing arrangement of gender in which women and men are not merely differentiated but

hierarchised. Hypothetically, gender relations are not necessarily unequal and patriarchal as she also pictures a case “[w]here women and men are different but not unequal, women’s birth-giving is not a source of subordination” (Lober 1994: 6). Ertürk (2004) reminds us that among the most important feminist projects are to challenge the inevitability of *patriarchal* relations between women and men which has never been contested throughout history unlike the relations of production and to work for a “transformative change” towards *human* relations between women and men. If what is problematic about gender is its *patriarchal* constructions, there is no reason to abandon the concept simply because some of the earlier studies ended up universalism and reductionism or a structural analysis is out of fashion. Without understanding patriarchy, a study of gender is fruitless while understanding gender is essential to a study of patriarchy.

In addition, the concept of patriarchy carries further significance in analyzing male domination in Muslim societies where women’s subordination tends to be particularised in terms of culture within an Orientalist paradigm. Valentine Moghadam is one of the scholars who argue against the recurrent inclination to attribute women’s low status in the Middle East to Islam. She presents very clear reasons why the deference to the commands of Islam cannot be the fundamental basis of women’s subordination in the region (2003: xi-xii). Firstly, it is not only Islamic theology which confines women in the roles of wives and mothers but also all the other major religions do this. Secondly, low female literacy, education and labour force participation are also observed in India where Hinduism is dominant. Likewise, early marriage and high fertility are also prevalent in sub-Sahara Africa and India. Thirdly, religious law is applied not only in some Muslim countries but also in Israel. Finally, it is hard to ignore the important fact that there is a great deal of diversity across and within Muslim countries with regards to women’s status as well as other aspects (e.g. Ertürk 1991). Moghadam proposes a “normalization” of the Middle East by paying deserving attention to structural determinants rather than religious particularities.

Understanding structural forces working in men's domination and women's subordination is indispensable in order to challenge recurrent naturalising, individualising, and othering attempts that obscure a range of injustice which women have been and are experiencing for being women.

2.2.2. Patriarchy as Social Process

Indeed, a structural analysis of men's domination and women's subordination is indispensable. Yet, in order to avoid a determinist approach, it requires more rigorous investigations in different historical and social contexts. It requires more attentions to patriarchy's inner workings and interconnectedness with other systems of inequality. A real problem of patriarchy as a theoretical concept has been probably an overemphasis of its endurance and effect in the course of feminist struggles to assert its significance over the organisation of social life and our seemingly private lives. It was necessary because male domination has been one of the least questioned status quos and hence appeared a natural order of things until feminists began courageously and publicly questioning male privilege (Rich 1986: 56). It is true that patriarchy is probably the most enduring social system and its structural effects are considerably deep-seated, pervasive and significant. However, the emphasis on its endurance, pervasiveness and effects has evoked "an overly monolithic conception of male domination" (Kandiyoti 1988: 274-5) or given "the impression of a simple, orderly structure" (Connell 1987: 108). Yet a reality might be closer to a series of incessant hard workings, negotiations and reconfigurations for making male domination a status quo. El Saadawi writes, "[t]he patriarchal system ... would never have been possible, or have been maintained to this day, without the whole range of cruel and ingenious devices" (1980: 40). Likewise, Robert Connell mentions with regards to patriarchy that "[behind] the façade is likely to be a mass of disorder and anomaly. Imposing order requires a mobilization of resources and expenditure of energy" (1987: 108).

In his study of gender and power, Connell presents a processual perspective of the structure of gender relations that gives room for multiplicity, contradictions, and

transformations while recognising its power to make patterns of men's domination and women's subordination among people from different walks of lives nonetheless. He explicates that there is no such a thing as ultimate determinant which explains away all manifestations of gender relations yet there is a unity which is always imperfect and under construction. It is not the unity of an inherent system in a functionalist sense. It "is not a logical unity but an empirical unification" (Connell 1987: 116). It is historical composition brought about tentatively in the laborious process of strategic interaction and group formation responding to particular circumstances, which gives rise to a gender order at the level of a whole society.

From this perspective, gender is neither an individual property nor socially formed individual character as commonly considered. Gender is not personal but collective. It is not determined but structured. It is not a thing but social practice. It deals with our biological differences rather than derives from them. It is an engagement. It is "the process of organising social life in a particular way", or in relation to the reproductive division of people (Connell 1987: 140). Hence, gender is, Connell suggests, better to be used as a verb. Gender relations are not only social relations but power relations continuously deployed in forms of domination, compliance, and resistance. "A high degree of systematicity is" thus "likely to reflect the dominance of a group whose interests are served by a particular gender order" which is heterosexual and patriarchal in most contemporary societies (Connell 1987: 117).

In addition to his insight into gender as process, Connell's other contribution to gender study is his observation of multiple masculinities which challenges a monolithic view of patriarchy and questions an oversimplified definition of patriarchy as men's domination over women. A number of researchers are aware of multiple dimensions of patriarchy, especially its generational element (e.g. Millet 1970: 25; Hartmann 1981: 14; Folbre 1994: 74; Murray 1995: 8). Some recognise the hierarchy, rivalry and solidarity among men based on or regardless of class and others as an essential part of gender inequalities. Heidi Hartmann for example sees patriarchy as the triad of the powerful men, the other men and women. She defines patriarchy as "a set of social relations between men, which have a material basis, and

which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women” (1981: 14). However, many feminist scholars prefer to play down a hierarchy among men when they conceptualise patriarchy for its assumed irrelevance to contemporary contract societies they study, its alleged contingency in relation to gender hierarchy, or a feminist desire for prioritizing women’s oppression. For Walby, Hartmann’s interpretation implies that the domination over women is merely contingent in patriarchy. Yet, as her work on “men’s organizational ability to expropriate women’s labour” shows, it is clear that it was not what she intended (Walby 1990: 20).¹³

According to Connell, patriarchy does not consist of only one unilateral power relations between men and women. It contains a gender-based hierarchy among men as well as the alliance and solidarity of men. Its intersection with race and class inevitably creates a hierarchy among men as socialist feminists argue but Connell stresses that patriarchy itself requires a *gender-based* hierarchy among men of hegemonic masculinity, conservative (complicit) masculinity and subordinate masculinities (Connell 1987: 110, 183-8). Hegemonic masculinity is not what the majority of men are or how powerful men are in a given society. In reality, most men do not fit the image of hegemonic masculinity and it is not intended to do so. But hegemonic masculinity sustains the power of powerful men and is supported by large numbers of other men. It is defined in relation to various subordinated masculinities (for example, homosexuals and young men) and women. It aims to achieve ascendancy over them and prevent alternatives from gaining recognition. Most men are complicit in hegemonic masculinity because they also benefit from the subordination of women. Not a few women also co-operate with hegemonic masculinity because a culturally celebrated femininity, or “emphasised femininity”, tends to be formed to meet its desire and encourages doing so.

¹³ Nancy Folbre also mentions about a historical development of organization which enabled men’s collective action and then their control of women, which outcompeted over alternative forms of organization (1994: 75).

Meanwhile, Johnson (2005) provides one of the most explicit and sophisticated analyses of patriarchy. He also analyses male domination in terms of both structure and practice and views patriarchy as “an ongoing process that’s continuously shaped and reshaped” (Johnson 2005: 43). He stresses that patriarchy is not about men or a particular group of men. It is not about a He, a Them, or an Us. It is a kind of society, or a gender order, in which men and women participate and by which their being and doing are structured at the same time. It “shapes both the world we live in and our seemingly private selves” (Johnson 2005: 22). It consists of numerous institutions and individuals who participate in a variety of ways. It is a complex system full of paradox and dynamism; a tangled knot with deep roots. At the core, it is a deep-seated system that “promotes male privilege by being *male dominated*, *male identified*, and *male centered*” and being obsessed with control to an oppressive degree, an inevitable consequence of which is the subordination of women (Johnson 2005: 5, the emphasis is in original).

An important implication of patriarchy as a social system beyond individuals is that it is more than how they think, feel, and behave and hence changing cultural definitions of masculinity and femininity or gender relations would barely undermine it (Johnson 2005: 37). Patriarchy can accommodate cosmetic reforms and cultural changes. Participating in and benefiting from patriarchy does not make men particularly cruel toward women (Johnson 2005: 26). Yet even the most understanding men certainly benefit from patriarchy if they want or not. In fact, most men and women take “paths of least resistance” and we are all involved if only by our silence (Johnson 2005: 41). On the other hand, an implication of the important role of individuals who participate in patriarchy (we cannot choose not to participate in it) is that “we have the power to affect through the choices we make about how to participate” and there is a room of variation and transformation depending on how we participate (Johnson 2005: 29).

Johnson’s attention to patriarchy’s inner workings is revealing partly because most of the things written about patriarchy so far have been part of its effects, that is, the oppression of women in various forms. His insight is enlightening partly because it is

based on his lifelong experience and critical observation as a White heterosexual educated middle-class man who has participated in patriarchy as a member of the dominant group. His experience tells that patriarchy is not only about women's subordination but there are more things going on among men. His critical 'participant observation' concludes that it is men's paradoxical fixation on control, fear, competition, and solidarity with other men that drives patriarchy (Johnson 2005: 53-63). Men compete and bond each other by using violence against each other as well as women. They have to be tough enough to be able to endure and use violence in order to be recognised as 'a real man' and join fraternity. At the same time, they are in a constant state of competition with other men for their obsession with control and hence fear of losing it by aggression of other men, which teaches them to be autonomous and disconnected rather than cooperative and connecting. Thus, controlling and subordinating women is not the primary purpose of patriarchy but an inevitable consequence and an essential part of it. On the one hand, men use women as badges of success to keep score on their manhood. They use them as objects to be competed for and possessed. On the other, they ally and reinforce solidarity with other men by being disengaged from and subordinate women. The subordination of women is also vital in order to contain men's resentment over being defeated or controlled by other men and prevent overpowering male solidarity.

However, an obsession with control, disconnectedness, autonomy, an inclination to competition and aggressiveness are not necessarily male nature. Both gendered capacities of connection, sharing and cooperation and disconnection, competition and control are in fact human capacities. In spite of the fact that human existence is fundamentally relational, the latter set of capacities are celebrated when they are associated with masculinity and encouraged as a moral standard in patriarchal society while women are discouraged and condemned for displaying those capacities (Johnson 2005: 56). Johnson speculates that men rather than women are more vulnerable to and systematically familiarised with the cycle of fear and control because men's connection to the creation of new life is invisible and more open to feel disconnected (Johnson 2005: 74). Hence, most known societies are patriarchal rather than matriarchal or others.

2.2.3. Reconfiguring Patriarchy

Both Connell and Johnson's analyses expose the problems of early feminist studies and some directions to which the study of gender inequality can go. One of the problems of many theories of patriarchy in early years was their neglect of historical and social contexts. Feminist investigations are in fact intended to expose the social and historical constructedness of unequal relationships between women and men and demystify their apparent inevitability. In their assertion of the existence and systematic perpetuation of gender inequality, early feminists paradoxically often asserted a universal determinant of patriarchy as exemplified by the physiology of Shulamith Firestone (2003) and the unconscious of Mitchell (1974). A conventional positivist search for the universal law beyond human control made them end up suggesting the inevitability of patriarchy they attempted to challenge. They asserted great universal principles and explained away all the complexities and historical specificities.¹⁴ Searching the origin or the fundamental principle would not help much understanding patriarchy as social process as well as limited to speculation.

In recent years, more feminist scholars pay attention to not merely the perpetuation of patriarchy but its reconfiguring capacity. They attempt to investigate a particular form of patriarchy which emerges out of certain historical and socio-cultural contexts. For example, Walby (1990) analyses a transformation of patriarchy from a private to public form in contemporary Britain. Mary Murray (1995) investigates the changes of patriarchal gender relations at the time of a transition from feudal and capitalist forms of property relations in England. Charlotte Hooper (2000) analyses a transformation of Anglo-American hegemonic masculinity and its intimate connection with struggles for power in the globalising financial sector in recent years. Moghadam (2003) proposes a world-system perspective that locates gender system along with class system under the constraints of a regional context and a global system of states and markets.

¹⁴ Mary Murray points out that prominent feminist theorists of patriarchy recognized the historical variety of the forms of patriarchy but their recognition remained assertion (1995: 33-4). Ramazanoglu also repeatedly states that new wave feminists after the 1960s were aware of differences among women yet had no means of dealing with it (1990).

Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) is also one of the scholars who have attempted to overcome the conceptual abstraction and ambiguity of patriarchy and investigated its socio-historically specific inner workings since early years. She proposes two ideal types of contemporary Asian patriarchy as a tool for comparative analysis. One is the sub-Saharan form of patriarchy which is based on polygyny, men's weak responsibility as breadwinner and the relative autonomy of mother-child unit. The other is what she calls "classic patriarchy" which is prevalent across the North Africa and Middle East to South and East Asia and based on the patrilocally resided patrilineal corporate extended household arrangement. Those cases of the reconfiguration of patriarchy imply that patriarchy has been challenged time and again in a variety of ways in different parts of the world.

Another problem of early theories of gender inequality was the too strong emphasis on the structural force of patriarchy as if it is a massive static monolith as other structuralist social theories were. While revealing and describing a whole variety of sufferings and injustices which women have experienced for being women throughout history, some feminist works sometimes gave an impression that patriarchy is a flawless system. Ironically, they thus delivered a pessimistic picture of a chance for the end of patriarchy. A structural perspective is vital for understanding gender inequality yet it must be remembered that any social system is perpetuated, undermined, or reconfigured by a great number of participating individuals who respond to a range of social circumstances and make choices.

Many recent feminist studies now attempt to reveal women's agency which can be complicit in or subversive against the patriarchal gender regime. Moghadam (2003) advocates an analysis which pays attention to women's active role as shapers and makers of social change in order to avoid structuralist rigidity. Gloria Raheja and Ann Gold (1994), for example, produced a work which recovered the subversive voices of North Indian women who live under strict patriarchal control from songs and poems they daily recite. Kandiyoti (1988) devised a concept of "patriarchal bargaining" which enables us to see women's agency in their complicity in patriarchy. Women's accommodation or collaboration with male domination can be

their bargaining strategy rather than false consciousness. For instance, “classic patriarchy” works in such a way to minimize women’s autonomy and maximize their dependency on male members of the household. Women therefore tend to try maximizing their benefits and male protection by manipulating the affections of their sons and husbands and stressing men’s role as the head of the family and breadwinner through practicing seclusion or withdrawing from paid work rather than asserting their autonomy.

Feminist studies have rightly focused their analyses on the oppression of women in their challenge against patriarchy.¹⁵ Despite their analytical insights, however, they were sometimes criticised for a descriptive and circular argument (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 96). Yet, it was probably an inevitable consequence because the oppression of women is an effect of patriarchy, not what patriarchy is. If “it is more about what goes on *among men*” (Johnson 2005: 53, the emphasis is in original), feminists were trying to explain a cause by an effect. The latter tells something about how the former is but cannot explain what it is. They thus often ended up a circular argument of patriarchy (men’s domination over women called patriarchy derives from patriarchy defined as men’s domination over women). The oppression of women can be explained by patriarchy yet patriarchy cannot be fully explained by the analysis of the oppression of women. Hence, this dissertation is an attempt to understand a particular case of women’s struggle in controlling their reproductive body under a particular complex of patriarchal gender regimes, not vice versa. Its attempt is not to explain patriarchy by women’s subordination in reproduction. Such an attempt is possible only when one assumes women’s reproduction is given.

¹⁵ Ironically, feminists’ exclusive focus on the oppression of women has helped men’s invisibility in gender inequality. Women’s subordination is often considered as women’s problem and gender is popularly thought to be equivalent to women. As Johnson points out, in patriarchal society, men’s invisibility masks male privilege, denies the existence of patriarchy as an oppressive system, and perpetuates it while women’s invisibility devalues them (2005: 155-8). A recent increase of studies on masculinities is therefore very encouraging and would help much understanding patriarchy and the oppression of women. (e.g. Hearn 1987; Brittan 1989; Seidler 1994; Cornwall and Lindisfare 1994; Hooper 2000; Connell 2005; Ouzgane 2006).

In this dissertation, I use the term 'patriarchy' in a sense of Johnson's definition: a gender order that promotes male privilege by being male dominated, male identified, and male centered. It however does not assume either male privilege as given or a homogeneous group of men or even the gender-based equality among men. Men are trained for patriarchal manhood and many men experience pain, confusion, and ambivalence, and resistance during the training (Johnson 2005: 53). Men's solidarity is firm only contextually in the face of the subordination of women. A historical cycle of competition and consequent hierarchy among them survives without destruction for the existence of women as a group subordinated to all men.

Despite our relational existence with others, the actual interdependence between women and men, and the unnecessary consequence of women's oppression, patriarchy is a gender order in which we have been participating for a long time. Our social lives and private selves are structured by it as well as by other systems of class, race and ethnicity. However, it is not a static monolith but rather dynamic social process. It has been transformed throughout history and across societies because it is not an isolated organisation but embedded in economy and culture and intersected with class, racial and ethnic systems. It has managed to reconfigure in response to varying socio-economic and cultural contexts. It also differently affects individuals according to their socio-economic, racial and ethnic positions and sexual orientations and blurs the relations of domination. On the other hand, individuals are not only structured by patriarchy but also participate in it, whether active, complicit, passive, or subversive manners. They can objectify it by supporting or criticising while being integral part of it. Even subversive participations of particular individuals or subversion in particular areas of social life, however, do not overturn it as the disappearance of patriarchal fathers from family life in advanced capitalist societies did not end patriarchy as the macro order of male privilege. Yet, a way in which individuals participate in it certainly has effects as a trigger of change, readjustment, or backlash as the rise of second-wave feminism was countered by new conservatism in later years. Such dynamism of patriarchy, its reconfiguring capacity, consequent effects on women's lives, and their particular responses have just began to be

investigated and are still scarce particularly in non-Western societies many of which have been undergoing radical social changes in the age of globalisation.

2.2.4. Conceptualising Reproduction: Reproduction as Social Organisation

Human reproduction is an essential part of human life. Engels wrote in the preface of the first edition of *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State* published in 1884 as follows;

According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of the immediate essentials of life. This, again, is of a twofold character. On the one side, the production of the means of existence, of articles of food and clothing, dwellings, and of the tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social organization under which the people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is determined by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labor on the one hand and of the family on the other (Engels 2000).

However, after Engels, reproduction *per se* has been a neglected area of investigation in social science. The neglect is stark when it is compared with the abundance of discussions made for production. Mostly, reproduction has been studied biologically in the medicine. When it is investigated in social science, it has been studied in terms of fertility rate in demography. In modern times, reproduction has been naturalised and medicalised. It has increasingly become taken away from a fabric of everyday life and alienated. Thus, we feel awkward and face difficulty with incorporating reproduction into social theory. We suffer from the relative poverty of theories and empirical knowledge about the social organisation and intimate relations of human reproduction while we have rich but dry data of fertility rates from all over the world.

In her introductory notes of the book which is one of the first anthropological attempts to understand human reproduction in relation to women's status, Lucile Newman wrote nearly thirty-five years ago that there had been meagre academic interests in social dimensions of human reproduction and we knew much less about experiences of pregnancy, breastfeeding, mothering and fathering than lactation in the cow and abstract kinship systems (1975: 7). Likewise, Ann Oakley felt the need

to propose a sociology of childbirth because of the overwhelming lack of recognition about the social dimension of reproduction even among a few studies on childbirth (Oakley 1980: 2). She criticised that when human reproduction was studied, it was in medicine and psychology. What they did was “try to return reproduction and the character of women to the domain of nature” (Oakley 1980: 70). When it was studied in sociology at all, it was done in the sociology of marriage and the family. What they did, within the functionalist framework of the time, was again to call upon biology and reduce reproductive processes to “the general cultural idealization of femininity and maternity” (Oakley 1980: 90).

Of course, it is not that the social dimension of reproduction was totally unknown. As exemplified by *the Sexual Life of Savages in North Western Melanesia* (1929), one of the representative works of the father of modern anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski, anthropologists have well recognised since the early years of the discipline that the process of reproduction like conception, pregnancy, birth, and childrearing are socially organised and perceived in culturally particular ways in different societies (Newman 1975: 9; Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 313). A number of ethnographies of pre-industrial societies demonstrated the cultural varieties of perception and practice with regards to reproduction. However, those findings have been ignored by either particularising as exotic practices or naturalising for their non-use of biomedical modern contraception.

In fact, what those historical and ethnographic findings imply is the social organisation of human reproduction throughout history. They, for instance, provide numerous evidences which question the assumption of ‘natural fertility’ before the introduction of modern contraception (MacCormack 1982, Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 326). They suggest that people’s reproductive behaviour has been probably almost always shaped by various social factors, ranging from deliberate attempts of birth control such as the stigmatization of infertility, the encouragement of low or high calorie foods for women in reproductive years, the intake of herbs which are believed to be abortive, infanticide, and sexual taboos to indirect causes intended for something other than birth control such as late or early age of marriage, economic

crisis, and war (Edholm *et al.* 1978: 112, Harris and Young 1981, McLaren 1990, Greenhalgh 1995a, Duben and Behar 2002). Nancy Folbre points out the existence of many structural constraints that would regulate fertility beyond individual calculation, and says;

There is nothing 'natural' about prohibitions on sexual practices that could aid contraception. There is nothing 'natural' about restrictions on women's rights to earn money or hold property independently of men. There is nothing 'natural' about property rights or laws that give parents economic and legal leverage over their adult children. Yet rules like these are common in most high fertility societies (1994: 77).

However, structural constraints and individual (non-)efforts that create a certain fertility pattern as a socially negotiated effect had been largely unnoticed for a long time and it often continues to be so especially for a high fertility pattern. The myth of natural fertility based on the idea that reproduction is originally a natural activity until the introduction of modern contraception still persists and high fertility tends to be simplified by an explanation of the non-use of contraception due to ignorance or the lack of access.

Yet, like some other social scientists, I began this research with a belief that there must be always ongoing social dynamism behind demographic patterns (Aries 1980 in Duben and Behar 2002: 2, 239). Émile Durkheim (1951), for example, examined suicide sociologically, which was widely regarded as an individual act and generally explained psychologically. He elucidated the way in which the consistent variation of suicide rates among European societies was socially constructed according to such factors as religion, marriage status, education and political upheaval. A fertility trend does not emerge out of contexts, too. It is embedded in socioeconomic and cultural contexts; "the very fact that reproduction involves at least two persons makes it automatically social and an arena wherein different interests intersect and possibly conflict" (Delaney 1991: 17).

In their study of childbearing in rural North India, Patricia Jeffery and her colleagues state that;

women's and men's supposed nature and the knowledge and meanings attached to biology are socially constructed and specify socially acceptable behaviour. Women's

capacity to bear children is deployed within specific contexts of gender and class relationships and is not a matter of natural drives. It is essential to the continuing restocking of each household's labour force. Its regulation entails the social organisation of pregnancy, childbirth and the post-partum period within marriage. Biological reproduction may seem natural but it must still be analysed sociologically (Jeffery *et al.*1989: 11).

In recent years, a number of historical and cross-cultural studies increasingly suggest that the number of children which a couple brings into the world is far beyond a private matter but often concerns a wide range of society from the extended family to states and international organisations on the one hand; such apparently private decision is made (if it is made deliberately at all) in the contexts of particular marriage, family, and economic and cultural systems on the other hand (McLaren 1990, Greenhalgh 1995a, Duben and Behar 2002). Fertility rate is a temporal numerical expression of complex historical and socioeconomic processes. It is neither an isolated matter of biology nor an individual act. It is in fact part of one aspect of a very fundamental but tremendously complex structure of society, that is, reproduction.

“Reproduction is a slippery concept” however (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 311). Despite the growing (re-)recognition for its significance as one of main social structures, there remains a confusion in the usage of a term ‘reproduction’ in social science. In Marxist studies, it means nothing but social reproduction of capitalist system. In many feminist analyses, it is frequently equated with domestic work whichever women do. It however eventually risks the reassertion of the same dualism (production and men / reproduction and women) that feminism has been challenging (Harris and Young 1981: 111). It is also often used interchangeably with patriarchy. It would risk the reassertion of the narrow definition of patriarchy as limited in familial relations. Perhaps, it is necessary to analyse reproduction and patriarchy as separate concepts and see beyond all the conventional dichotomies associated with reproduction and production.

Reproduction needs to be conceptualised in itself first before its relations with other phenomenon are considered. Here, Felicity Edholm, Olivia Harris and Kate Young's

conceptualisation of reproduction (Edholm *et al.* 1978; Harris and Young 1981) would be helpful to avoid confusions with the term and begin to analyse the social organisation of reproduction in itself. They identify three different meanings of the concept. The first is social reproduction in a sense of the reproduction of capitalist system in Marxist theory. The second is another social reproduction which Marxist feminists talked about. It is the reproduction of labourer as adequate bearers of specific social relationships (class-based in capitalist societies), as adequately socialised labourers, and as adequately nourished, clothed and ‘recreated’ labourers. The third is biological or human reproduction, which is the subject of this dissertation.

2.2.5. Reproduction Which Is Not Only Social but Also Patriarchal

Contrary to its conventional understanding as natural and unchanging, human reproduction has been subject to differing forms of social control throughout history (McLaren 1990). It can be partly because how we produce human-beings is closely related with their allocation in re/productive systems; “the particular biological tasks of women are frequently conflated with the overall process of social reproduction” (Edholm *et al.* 1978: 103). “The social relations of reproduction” is, Edholm and her colleagues define, “the conditions of possession of both the means of (re)production and of control over the product” (Edholm *et al.* 1978: 111). However, the focus on its influence over production needs to be cautiously examined for it can lead to a shift of interest from investigating human reproduction in itself to examining it in terms of its contributions to production while it remains a constant: natural, unvarying, and unproblematic ‘biological’ reproduction.

In *Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux (Maidens, Meal and Money)*, Claude Meillassoux (1975 cited in Edholm *et al.* 1978) argued the significance of relations of human reproduction for all modes of production though his analysis was based on certain pre-capitalist societies. He however asserted that for its key role in the allocation of labour power women’s reproductive capacity *needs* to be appropriated by means of social institutions and hence by men who control those institutions for the

continuation and expansion of a society. According to Meillassoux, it is production which is contingent upon reproduction and organised in various ways for the continuation and expansion of society. Edholm and her colleagues criticise that Meillassoux totally ignores women's equally important role as producers in pre-capitalist societies. Despite his argument for its social significance, he assumes reproduction as a universal unchanging constant which aims only perpetuation according to the evolutionary principle. Eventually, he explains women's subordination as social necessity by universalising reproduction and women's subordinate place in it. Despite his historical materialist approach to different modes of production and social injustice, Meillassoux's view of women's subordination was functionalist.

Edholm and her colleagues attack Meillassoux's static view of human reproduction. Their choice for abandoning a search "for the supposed necessity of the control of women's reproductive powers" is probably right because of its potential trap of another determinist conclusion (Edholm *et al.* 1978: 111). Indeed, as they argue, the dynamic social dimension of human reproduction, which is simultaneously structured by and structures other social organisations of economy, politics and culture, needs to be explored more in different social and historical contexts.

However, in doing so, to keep on questioning the fact of social control of women's reproductive capacity throughout history across cultures is necessary in order not to fall in a fundamentalist trap of social 'need' of women's subordination due to its universal prevalence. Although it is impossible to know whether the egalitarian gender relations of reproduction ever existed, when we challenge the prevalent subordination of women even in the production of human beings in which they are the ones who labour and nurture and picture such a society where individual women are able to control their generative power for their own good, we can see that human reproduction that we know is not patriarchy itself but patriarchally organised.

Social organisation of human reproduction has been patriarchal in most known societies while it is simultaneously capitalist, feudal or others. Yet, it does not

necessarily mean that it has to be that way. Rather, it has been patriarchal, despite the fact that women are, for their biologically bestowed generative and nurturing power, potentially capable of playing active roles in the processes of human reproduction, although a conventional argument tells the opposite: women are inevitably dependent on men for their biological functions of pregnancy and breastfeeding.

Human reproduction is mystifying as well as mystified. It has been so partly because it is one of the most unexplored areas of study in social science and even in feminist studies. Despite an almost identical relation between fertility and human reproduction, human fertility is rarely interpreted in the context of social organisation of reproduction but more often that of production; i.e. the level of economic development, the cost and profit of childrearing, the expectation for old age security, and so on. In feminist studies, reproduction is more seriously taken but often referred as a mystifying cause of other phenomena such as women's subordination and sexual division of labour. By its "magnetic power of attraction", "we are drawn back to universals" again and again (Edholm *et al.* 1978: 127). Human reproduction is therefore not only needed to be studied but also to be demystified. For that, as Edholm and her colleague put forward, it needs to be studied empirically. Lack of empirical knowledge reinforces the myth. Understanding reproduction needs to be grounded in economic, political, and gender relations - multiple power relations - at a particular historical conjuncture. Such an approach will reveal that it is a political battle ground between members of gender, class, and other social groups. A particular pattern of human fertility is constructed in multiple political contexts.

2.3. Explaining Human Reproduction

Before presenting the theoretical orientation of this dissertation, I shall discuss the earlier studies of human reproduction in feminist and conventional studies in social sciences in this section. It would provide a clearer idea about the reason why feminist political-economic approach would reveal the dynamics of patriarchally organised human reproduction than the other approaches.

2.3.1. Feminist Accounts of Reproduction

Radical Feminist Approach: Women's Body Matters

The second wave of feminist activism emerged first in the USA in the 1960s, slightly later in Europe, and then in many other parts of the world. Despite the achievement of the rights to vote and own property and access to education and profession after a half century of the struggles of early feminist movement, women continued to face economic dependency, cultural double standards and sexual violence because of their sex. A new radical feminism advocated not the more equality of opportunity but the overthrow of all forms of existing hierarchy and oppression. What women should aim is not the equal participation of patriarchal racist class society we have now but the construction of a totally new society free of oppression. They dismissed reforms. They demanded revolutionary transformation of society. Radical feminists nonetheless often argued that women's oppression is the oldest and most pervasive form of oppression: the root of all other forms of oppression which needs to be eradicated foremost and forever for a new society.

In *Gyn/ecology*, Mary Daly attempts to "exorcise" internalised "Godfather" who governs misogynist myths and practices hoping to discover a world behind patriarchy where women can "spin" and self-define in indefinite ways. She unmask and attacks misogynist languages and myths and various forms of violence done against women across cultures. Daly argues that customary violence needs to be enacted from time to time since scapegoats are always necessary in order to silence women who remember their human capacity and attempt to define themselves and enforce an age-old patriarchal order. Indian Suttee, African genital mutilation and Western gynaecology are all the re-enactment of gynocidal divine act; "the oppression of women knows no ethnic, national, or religious bounds" (Daly 1978: 111).

Like Daly, new feminists were convinced that patriarchy is a universal and far more deep-seated phenomenon than once thought. But, not all considered that patriarchy is just a big lie that would fall apart once we see through it as Daly did (1978: 20). Many suspected that there should be a certain firm material basis that has enabled

systematic male domination beyond ethnic, national, and religious boundaries. In particular, radical feminists often saw sexuality as the fundamental problematic and many believed in early days that sex differences can and should be overcome (Evans 1995: 64).

Firestone (2003) is one of those feminists and probably among the most well-known. She argues that inequality between women and men is so deep and pervasive that it cannot be solved by mere reforms or consciousness-raising but requires overthrowing the very organisation of nature and a fundamental biological condition. Like many other feminists at that time who were disappointed from radical yet male-centred New Left, Firestone retained historical materialism as an analytic method but felt that Engel's economic interpretation of male domination is reductionist. Women's oppression needs to be analysed in its own right because it is a level of historical reality that does not directly stem from economic relations but relations between sexes. From Firestone's materialist view of history based on sex rather than class, reproduction is the origin of historical dynamism. It divides us according to different reproductive functions between women and men and produces unequal power relations between them. It is women's reproductive functions (i.e. menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing) destined by biology that made them obliged to be dependent on and then dominated by men for physical survival.

Firestone however does not say that biology is our destiny. She refers to Simone de Beauvoir and maintains an existentialist view of nature; "the 'natural' is not necessarily a 'human' value" (Firestone 2003: 10). Human beings, unlike animals, do not passively submit to nature. We are part of nature yet at the same time capable of objectifying it. We can work on it and create society. We can transcend Nature. Firestone then attacks nature and women's reproduction. She rejects romanticising them. "Pregnancy is barbaric", she says (Firestone 2003: 180). And she goes on, "childbirth *hurts*. ... it isn't good for you" (Firestone 2003: 181). The biological family is the home of women and children's oppression. She argues that the key to sexual revolution is freeing women from the tyranny of reproduction by means of artificial reproduction and cybernetic communism. Children are born artificially by

reproductive technology and cared in a voluntary formed household in early years of their life. In society where no one giving birth and no one working, oppressive biological family as well as class system would disappear. It would then result in not only the elimination of male privilege but also that of the sexual distinction itself; “genital differences between human beings would no longer matter culturally” (Firestone 2003: 11).

Firestone is one of the first critics who examined reproduction seriously in light of patriarchy. Although the conclusion that she reached was not taken seriously, her insight of problematising reproduction as a key arena to uphold patriarchy continues to be a valuable one. Nonetheless, apart from utopianism, her argument seems to be problematic at two points in order to continue feminist discussion of reproduction. First of all, her dialectical materialism is only partial. Firestone criticises de Beauvoir’s existentialism based on the dualism between men and women for her designation of the latter’s otherness *a priori*. She argues that the philosophical categories of man and woman as his Other has also grown dialectically out of history (Firestone 2003: 8). On the other side, she believes that it is Nature that produced the fundamental inequality between men and women; that determined half the human race bear and rear the children; and that cost women physically, emotionally, and culturally in an utterly non-dialectical way (Firestone 2003: 184).

She also claims that we can transcend Nature. From dialectical materialist perspective, however, our relationship to nature is never one-sided. It is not simply either determined or controlling. We are part of nature and cannot transcend it. Yet, at the same time we have never been totally determined by it. We have worked through and on it. Blaming nature is ahistorical, non-dialectical and ignoring human agency. A dialectical materialist proposition of history based on sex could be that male domination over women is a temporal system grown out of struggles between women and men in the face of biological reality of reproduction which sets different reproductive functions between women and men yet by no means determines women’s submission to men unless we do.

Secondly, Firestone recognises that the potential of technologies to free women and other oppressed people would not be automatic. She mentions that the development of reproductive as well as other technologies in the hands of the current powers would result in “a nightmare” (Firestone 2003: 182). She is aware that technology does not exist independent of society. In patriarchal society, it is not developed and applied in a way within its order though unexpected consequences are always possible. Her faith in artificial reproduction regardless of the awareness is one problem. Yet, her lack of awareness that nature is not independent of society in relation to humans is another. Nature does not organise itself. Humans organise society through nature in an egalitarian, oppressive, or liberating way.

Indeed, we must ask how far sex is natural and primary. It has been accepted in sociology that sex is a biological division between women and men and gender is socially constructed differences in relation to that biological division. In other words, gender is “a social dichotomy determined by a natural dichotomy” (Delphy 2003: 60). Delphy however questions that whether sex really comes before gender chronologically and hence logically. She urges to overcome a feminist dilemma between our desire for ending male domination and our fear against losing what seem to be fundamental identities. She suggests to hypothesise that gender may precede sex. Firestone and others argue that biological sex or different reproductive functions between males and females necessarily give rise to division of labour and then extend to all the other spheres of social life. Some claim that sex more than other physical traits is cognitively salient and destined for classifications. However, sex differences were not just out there, waiting to be discovered their dichotomous values. According to sociological knowledge, values cannot be made independent of social structure. Biological sex is not only dichotomously but also hierarchically distinguished because we live in patriarchal society. The symbolic value of sex is “one of the final *conclusions* of a long progression: the point of arrival and not of departure” (Delphy 2003: 62, *italic is in original*).

Meanwhile, there are a number of critics from radical feminism who also see women’s reproduction as crucial yet in a positive way. They try to revalue and

celebrate female capacities and experiences of giving birth and mothering instead of loathing them as fetters which prevent women from being as independent and free as men. Some of them claim that supposedly female characteristics and values of caring and relatedness are superior to men's (Evans 1995: 76). Audre Lorde is one of feminist writers who believe in that motherhood should be in fact good for women and a new society without oppression. She is by no means essentialist, however. She considers that all women are mothers because they are already or potentially mothers or be mothered and share the experience as the universal basis of womanhood. However, her argument is more nuanced and careful enough not to celebrate the motherhood simply because it is done by females. She tries to historicise motherhood and argue that it is not inherent that motherhood oppresses women.

In *Of Woman Born* (1986), Lorde tells us that women's capacity to bear and nourish human life is a *potential* source of power, which had been however feared and controlled by men since ancient times. Motherhood is not inherently a fetter although we have little knowledge about the power which pre-patriarchal women, whose existence can be only speculated from mythologies and early anthropological studies, possibly had. However, motherhood we know is institutionalised motherhood which is established in a way to ensure that women's reproductive capacity and hence sexuality shall remain under male control. "If rape has been terrorism, motherhood has been penal servitude", says Lorde (1986: 14). It is not how motherhood has to be.

Lorde believes that the woman's body is the crucial strategic terrain for patriarchy. Since ancient times, men had feared and envied women as mothers who are bestowed a divinely power to give birth and nourish. Patriarchy derives not from nursing mothers' physical dependency on men but from men's struggles for controlling maternal power. By controlling the woman's sexuality and reproduction, the man assures the possession of his children, patrimony and the salvation of his soul after death. "It is" thus "not from God the Father that we derive the idea of paternal authority; it is out of the struggle for paternal control of the family that God the Father is created" (Lorde 1986: 67).

Under patriarchy, Rich observes, childbirth became alienated labour. Most women in history have become mothers without choice since motherhood was institutionalised. Mothers are expected to be endowed with “maternal “instinct” rather than intelligence, selflessness rather than self-realisation, and relation to others rather than the creation of self” (Rich 1986: 42). Therefore, it has never been questioned that mothers are impregnated passively and suffer passively throughout childbearing and childrearing rather than coming to know and take charge of their own bodies and human lives they brought forth. Motherhood is institutionalised to ensure that the woman passively suffers for ‘larger purposes’ which are not hers though she has often incorporated. Indeed, patriarchy celebrates motherhood, but only so long as the woman produces a ‘legitimate’ child who bears the name of a father who legally controls the mother.

According to Rich (1986: 13), the institution of motherhood is the fundamental basis of the other social systems. It has done violence not only to the experience of motherhood but to more diverse human relations and experiences. It imposes the distinction between private and public life, pardons men from actual fatherhood, distorts the mother-child relationship, prevents women from making decisions about own lives, alienates women from their own bodies, and domesticates and degrades female potentialities. Hence, only when the institution of motherhood is destroyed, women might be empowered from the creative experience of mothering and achieve not ‘sexual liberation’ but genuine sexual autonomy finally. For that, however, every part of social life must be unchained from patriarchal rule: unravelling the gender knot (Johnson 2005).

Marxist/Socialist Feminist Approach: (Re)production Matters

Socialist feminists also emerged out of the disappointment with earlier achievements and anger against male-centred New Left as radical feminists. The difference between radicals and socialists is not so clear-cut and they are not homogenous groups within themselves, too. Nonetheless, one important demarcation can be made by socialists’ disagreement with the radical feminist view of patriarchy which assumed its invariable applicability to all the women (Evans 1995: 108). Socialist

feminists instead attempted to historicise patriarchy by examining patriarchy in relation to capitalism. They however disagreed with Marxism's exclusive focus on class and neglect of other forms of social hierarchies. They condemned that Marx and Marxists have uncritically accepted the relations of reproduction as natural and complementary and hence undeserved to be the object of serious analysis (Hartmann 1981: 2; Barret 1988: 8). In industrial societies, reproduction is a range of activities conducted largely in domestic sphere and mostly by women. However, the gendered physical and ideological separation between workplace and home or the public and the private is a historical product and the devaluation of the latter, or reproduction, is not accidental but political. A circular argument of female, natural, particular, private, apolitical and insignificant is an archetypal patriarchal reasoning which was historically achieved finally in modern society.

Since Betty Friedan's endeavour to demystify "the happy housewife heroine" in the early 1960s (1992), feminists have attempted to reveal sexual politics behind an apparently simple matter of sexual division of labour. While radical feminists politicised a variety of issues from family, marriage and housework to childbirth, women's reproductive body and female sexuality which had been safely placed in the order of nature, the project of early socialist feminists, or often called Marxist feminists, centred on 'reproduction' as opposed to production and claimed the previously neglected importance of the former in capitalist society. They questioned a middle-class connotation of housework and argued that it is far from the sanctuary of non-labour protected against ruthless capitalist relations. On the contrary, housework is something more than service out of love: "the comfortable concentration camp" (Friedan 1992) which places women in a dependent position *vis-à-vis* men who engage with wage work (e.g. Oakley 1976).

Marxist feminists argued that housework is indeed labour. It is reproductive labour which is done not only for family members but also for capitalism by shouldering reproduction of adequately socialised and adequately nourished labour without pay (e.g. Dalla Costa 1972 cited in Ueno1990). This so-called 'domestic labour debates' soon came to focus on the contributions of unpaid housework which were largely

done by women to capitalism rather than overall unequal relationships between women and men as if they tried to appeal the significance of reproductive labour in its relation to production which Marxism, and men, counted. They “attempted to ‘fit women in’ to Marxism” instead of examining patriarchy in its own right (Evans 1995: 109). Their Marxist faith often made them claim that patriarchy is a product of capitalism, which is chronologically unsound and objected by many other feminists. Some feminists then argued conversely that for its very arrangements in which services are done unpaid exclusively by women as wives and daughters for men as husbands and fathers, reproductive labour does not only contribute the development of capitalism but rather primarily provided the material basis for the maintenance of women’s subordination to men (Delphy and Leonard 1992).

Hartmann called Marxist feminist attempts “unhappy marriage”, comparing with the marriage of husband and wife in English common law because they both claimed for one and that one was always the former (1981: 2). Hartmann proposed a more progressive union of Marxist methodology and feminist perspectives rather than divorce: the more properly materialist analysis of women’s oppression. She and other so-called dual-systems theorists argued that a patriarchal gender system in reproduction and a capitalist class system in production were in dialectical and mutually reinforcing relationships (Eisenstein 1979) and both simultaneously had an independent logic of its own and may contradict or coordinate each other (Sokoloff 1980). They stressed that, contrary to Engels’s prediction, patriarchy survived in capitalist societies not just as an archaic remnant but in reconfigured forms, which Hartmann called “a healthy and strong partnership” (1981: 19). According to her account of the dialectics of two systems, capitalism, the system of abstraction, produces the empty places of capitalists, managers, clerks and housewives yet it is indifferent to individuals who fill them. It is patriarchy as a particular which fills particular places with men rather than women or the other way around (Hartmann 1981: 10).

Dual-systems theory provided a revealing insight in understanding a capitalist/patriarchal social order we live in. However, when dual-systems theorists

use a term patriarchy interchangeably with reproduction and say that patriarchy is an independent system from capitalism although dialectically related, they restate the dichotomy between patriarchy/reproduction/domestic work/private and capitalism/production/wage work/public. Further, when they define 'reproduction' so broadly as if it means everything that women do, they re-naturalise women's exclusive commitment with 'reproduction', or unpaid devalued social activities in capitalist patriarchal society. Both social relations of re/production we live in today are capitalist and patriarchal at the same time. It is not the dual systems of reproduction/patriarchy and production/capitalism but the dual systems of patriarchy and capitalism in relations of re/production.

When socialist feminists debated on 'reproduction' in early years, they talked about the reproduction of labourer and hardly paid much attention to human reproduction proper. O'Brien is however one of a very few socialist feminist scholars who conducted theoretical examination of human reproduction. Like other feminists, O'Brien considers that class analysis is insufficient to comprehend male domination. She also challenges Engels's economic determinism; "In terms of social practice, there is no absolute need to leave property to one's 'own' offspring, no immediately evident reason why private property must be in male hands, no clear reason why property need be individually heritable at all" (O'Brien 1981: 148). However, O'Brien sees reproduction as an essential and material base of human history but not in a way Firestone does. She defines reproduction as a *social* process which begins with ovulation and ends with the child's independence from others in a sense of physical survival (O'Brien 1981: 16). She also adopts Marx's analysis of the productive labour process for its common characteristics with reproductive labour process she intends to examine. According to her observation as a former midwife and sociologist, both reproductive and productive forms of labour mediate the separation between nature and humans; both are mediations of contradictions; both emerge from necessity and contribute to the dialectical structure of human consciousness; and both produce values and create new needs and hence social labour (O'Brien 1981: 15-6). O'Brien, however, does not use Marx's dialectical materialism in order to support his analysis of capitalism eventually but to show that

his is also part of masculine tradition of political thought which denies the social and historical aspect of reproductive labour and offer a more well-founded radical analysis of patriarchy.

In *Politics of Reproduction*, O'Brien endeavours "a dialectical, historical and material analysis of reproductive process" (1981: 21). She argues that masculine philosophical attitude from Aristotle to Hegel and Marx that has simplified or naturalised birth is not accidental but "has a material base", which "lies in the ... genderically differentiated process of human reproduction itself" (O'Brien 1981: 21). The genderically hierarchical social relations of reproduction are inseparable from and dialectically related to reproductive process and that *experienced* process is inseparable from and dialectically related to human consciousness. In other words, it is not female reproductive physiology that predetermines the social relations of reproduction but the genderically different experience and consciousness of the biological process that dialectically and historically form the social relations of reproduction. Patriarchal relations of reproduction we have known are not biologically determined. They are a historical outcome and can change.

O'Brien argues that it is male reproductive consciousness, that is, the uncertainty of paternity which is the fundamental original driving force towards the historical construction of patriarchal social order. Due to their reproductive function, men inevitably experience the alienation of the seeds in copulation and uncertainty of paternity. Women also experience alienation at childbirth, yet their alienation is "*mediated in labour*", which is the fact totally disregarded by male thinkers (O'Brien 1981: 32, *Italic is in original*). "(M)aternal labour does confirm for women the conception of the child as *her* child. Fathers do not labour and do not have this certainty" (O'Brien 1981: 36-7, *Italic is in original*). This experiential fact differentiates male and female reproductive consciousness and, more importantly, their temporal consciousness between continuous female temporal consciousness and discontinuous male temporal consciousness. Men are deprived of a sense of unity with nature and continuity as a member of species. Their alienation is never mediated

for sure, whereas women confirm their integration with species through reproductive labour. As a matter of fact, “for men, physiology is fate” (O’Brien 1981: 62).

However, what makes particularly humans is their resistance to Nature. They resist alienation and try to mediate experienced contradictions through labour. In order to overcome their separation from genetic continuity, men “have always sought principles of continuity outside of natural continuity” (O’Brien 1981: 33). The discovery of physiological paternity is the first world historical event in reproductive process. It transformed male reproductive consciousness. It made men take an action. Men had to take an action because “paternity is a unity of thought ... and action” in opposition to maternity which is a unity of consciousness and involuntary labour (O’Brien 1981: 37). Men annulled the alienation of their seed by appropriating the child that he thinks *his*. In order to substantiate physiological paternity, they however appropriated women’s reproductive labour power by, in cooperation with other men, creating the institutions of reproductive social relations, notably heterosexual monogamous marriage, the public/private distinction, and the privatisation and segregation of women from other men. Men have even written numerous motherless myths and philosophy in which birth “is negated so that man may make himself, control the conditions of his self-made second nature and house his divided self in an uneasy separation of the public and private realms” (O’Brien 1981: 156-7). The rule of fathers is based on fraternity over the man’s right and obligation to the child and the woman’s reproductive labour power, which makes him legitimate father and endows him domestic authority in the private and political citizenship in the public. Thus, patriarchy is neither necessitated by biology nor brought about by “the certainty of property but the uncertainty of paternity” (O’Brien 1981: 148). It is a historical outcome of genderic struggles. It is “a triumphant over nature” (O’Brien 1981: 54).

O’Brien controversially and effectively argued that our society is not only economically but also genderically hierarchised and that gender hierarchy is not given but materially and historically constructed by a dialectical formation of reproductive experience and reproductive consciousness. She sees female

reproductive consciousness as materially and historically constructed yet still universal across women. She says that we have to celebrate childbirth and raise female reproductive consciousness, which is among a few occasions of the affirmation of sisterhood yet historically negated. She believes that the recent invention of contraceptive technology coincided with the emergence of feminist movements is another world historical event. By enabling women to choose parenthood, it would radically change reproductive consciousness and transform social relations of reproduction. What we saw a decade after her optimistic prediction was however backlash.

I consider that O'Brien and Rich's historical insight of patriarchy as a result of gender struggles over reproduction denies the inevitability of patriarchy and gives an important hope for feminist struggles. They also challenge Firestone's belief that women are biologically condemned. Exorcising patriarchal myths or denaturalising patriarchal order is a crucial step in order to envision alternatives. However, one cannot help ponder what women have been and are doing throughout the male struggles for paternity. Were they simply convinced or forcibly muted? Did they not realise what they have lost or did they resist but lost? In most feminist accounts of reproduction, women's historical struggles for controlling their reproduction were hardly discussed. It is difficult to know if it is because of the 'absence of women in history' or the real absence of women's resistance against paternity. But, O'Brien and Rich's feminist interests tend to be more in reproduction as the root of women's oppression than women's oppression in relations of reproduction. Thus, reproduction was hardly examined within social, economic and political contexts. Marxist and socialist feminists introduced a political economic perspective yet it was mostly limited to the relation of reproduction with production in capitalist societies. I believe, as Hartmann (1981) maintained, that a more progressive union of Marxist methodology and feminist perspectives, that is, the more properly materialist analysis of women's oppression is necessary.

2.3.2. Conventional Accounts of Reproduction

Before discussing about the theoretical framework that this dissertation applied, conventional (or non-feminists) accounts of reproduction in two disciplines, anthropology and demography, which have produced important studies regarding reproduction, will be examined in the following pages. It will be then suggested that their inclination towards cultural explanation for a particular mode of reproduction or fertility trend needs to be taken with caution. Critical examination of these studies will make clear why feminist political-economic approach can provide further valuable insights to the study of human reproduction.

2.3.2.1. Anthropological Accounts of Reproduction: Legacy of Traditional Culture

Searching for Sociocultural Construction of Reproduction

The ‘domestic’ – kinship, marriage and family – has been always a central interest of anthropologists. However, after Malinowski, few anthropologists seriously investigated human reproduction apart from scattered information about cultural varieties of the way people see and deal with reproduction. Because of their traditional interests in kinship and marriage, women have always been present in ethnographies, yet they were usually described according to male informants’ accounts about them (Moore 1989: 1-2). Therefore, issues like pregnancy, childbirth, lactation and abortion from which men are excluded in many cultures have been hardly documented. However, following the rise of feminist critiques within the discipline in the early 1970s, a number of anthropologists began to centre women’s lives in their ethnographies and a subject of human reproduction also emerged as one of new potential subjects.

Being Female (Raphael 1975a), a collection of articles by anthropologists who have studied different societies, was published in the mid-1970s. It was one of the first attempts in anthropology to explore the relationship between reproduction and women’s status. It was considered instinctively that reproduction must be important

to women who have been a muted group in ethnography and now discovered as a frontier to be studied because “most women spend most of their adult lives either pregnant or lactating or worried about being or not being either pregnant or lactating” (Raphael 1975b: 1). It however failed to meaningfully contextualise women’s status in relation to the reproductive process in which they engage. Human reproduction was examined by a comparative analysis with other mammals’ reproduction rather than in light of social systems. Reproduction was still firmly presumed as a matter of biology though ambiguously and it was examined separately from a theme of women’s power in the domestic sphere throughout the book.

In the same time, Jack Goody, a well-known social anthropologist, produced an ambitious piece of work, *Production and Reproduction* (1976). He attempted a comparative study of the development of domestic institutions in relation to long term changes in the mode of productive activity, specifically the change from hoe to plough agriculture. He discussed the differences between Eurasia where marriage within the social group, monogamy, concubine, step-parent, spinster and adopted child are prominent and Africa where marriage outside the group, polygyny and co-wives are common. He argued that such regional differences in domestic institutions are associated, ‘in the last resort’, with economy, or agricultural systems. The title of the book attracted an interest of many feminist anthropologists who endeavoured to figure out the relationship between reproduction and women’s subordination.¹⁶ However, Goody’s total omission of gender issues, despite the fact that many themes in the book are closely related to them, greatly disappointed or even irritated them (Whitehead 1978: 151). Rather than paying attention to a heated debate on production and reproduction in the feminist circle at that time, he chose a more conventional theoretical framework, Althusian economic determinism, in an orthodox way.

Ethnography of Fertility and Birth (MacCormack 1982) is another collection of ethnographic works on reproduction. Its theoretical framework was reproduction as

¹⁶ The 1978 issue of *Critique of Anthropology* featured reproduction and women’s subordination and includes an article by Edholm and her colleagues cited above.

social. Carol MacCormack, the editor, challenges the concept of ‘natural fertility’ by saying that “even most biological variables are modified by cultural practices and social circumstances” (1982: 1-2). Fertility varies even among societies where women do not use contraceptives. She says fertility is an interrelated set of biological, cultural and social variables. It is determined by a range of factors from the age at which women are allowed to marry or become sexually active, the acceptability of extra-marital sex and the age difference between the wife and the husband to women’s access to calories-rich diet, residential patterns and suckling patterns. Further, women may be motivated to give birth or refrain from doing so according to a variety of economic and cultural contexts.

Reproduction as Material or Ideological Construction: Examples of Labour Pains and Labour Power and The Seed and The Soil

Reproduction is a potentially interesting field of study in anthropology. It could reveal diverse ways in which humans negotiate and renegotiate with reproduction. It could show how much variety of cultural meanings humans have given to reproduction, how much variety of ways they have organised it, how much variety of ways they have created reproductive social relations, how much variety of ways they have invented social and cultural systems of reproduction and how much variety of ways power was exercised by different actors in the process of reproduction. However, to my knowledge, a very few anthropological studies on reproduction have been produced after a short period of enthusiasm. It could be because of individual researchers’ indecisiveness about reproduction’s ‘social-ness’ and fear of biological reductionism they might fall. Or it could be because of an obvious difficulty of practicing participant observation for personal acts of conception, pregnancy and childbearing which are segregated from public eyes in most cultures. Nonetheless, there are two contrasting yet equally exciting ethnographic studies of reproduction.

One is *Labour Pains and Labour Power* (1989) by the Jefferies and Andrew Lyon. The authors are sociologists yet the work is an ethnography which is based on a long-term field work in two North Indian villages and a careful analysis of views and voices of local women and men. Their work demonstrates how contemporary

ethnographic study of reproduction *per se* in non-Western society can be. The Jefferies are particularly experienced with field work in the region and previously wrote about women's life in purdah and health policy in India respectively. This collaborative work is about childbearing in rural North Indian women. The authors attempt a holistic approach and examined reproduction and production simultaneously in opposition to the artificial analytical distinction between the private and the public, which does not reflect the life of the women they studied. They argue that ignoring the day-to-day and intergenerational reproductive activities (that is, all the three types of reproduction mentioned above) is likely to result in omitting women from the picture altogether. The stereotypical identification of women as mothers needs to be challenged yet emphasising a lately discovered Third World women's role as producer exclusively does not reflect most women's lives in India either. The authors argue that writing about Indian women's life must cover across the board because they are childbearers and workers simultaneously in a large part of adult life and bridge reproduction and production by reproducing labour force.¹⁷

In rural North India, the woman is a "wealth bringer". She marries in with dowry, comes back with gifts at her every visit to the natal family and gifts are sent to in-laws from her family at her childbirths. She produces and nurtures future labourer for the husband's family (biological reproduction, or "intergenerational reproduction of labour force"). She does domestic work to nourish and invigorate men who work in the field (social reproduction, or "the daily reproduction of the labour force"). She does agricultural works which men do not do such as animal-work and crop harvesting and processing (production). Thus, the woman's marriage is, as it were, "labour migration" though it is not seen as such for her work is devalued customarily (Jeffery *et al.* 1989: 43). However, the man has vested interests (i.e. the continuation of his name and old-age security) in owning a woman to whom he has exclusive access and who bears *his* children (Jeffery *et al.* 1989: 24). All her works are done in

¹⁷ IRRRAG also found that many women from different countries they interviewed experienced reproduction not as biological events but as forms of social labour done for others, which are lifelong, socially-determined and highly gender-specific (Petchesky and Judd 1998: 9).

the context of strict social control over her sexuality, childbearing capacity, mobility and contacts with natal family as well as the deprivation of access to resources including the products she made. The authors say, “women are controlled and valued for their childbearing capacity, but their needs associated with that role are given little weight” by the husband, his family and the government (Jeffery *et al.* 1989: 221).

The authors found that the gendered reproductive and productive contexts above are shared by almost all the women in childbearing age, yet their lives are not only gendered but also classed. An important emphasis of *Labour Pains* is differences among women which feminist scholars have begun taking notice. Women’s work, childbearing career and life in general differ according to their class (defined in terms of land and livestock ownership) as much as they differ from men’s. Rather than maintaining that childbearing is the fundamental experience which women universally share or their oppression rooted in it, the authors try to demonstrate that women’s childbearing experiences can differ from one another depending on the baby’s sex and its birth order and household arrangement and class position because all of which affect the access to resource like foods, health service and help from others and the extent of control over her own labour power.

The new mother’s successful labour is not celebrated candidly, but negotiated between celebration and degradation and between the needs for rest for her future intergenerational labour and the needs to resume her daily reproductive and productive labour for the family members’ welfare. Her well-being varies between the poles according to a result of the negotiation in relation to different circumstances which they live in. The birth of son and also the first birth regardless of the baby’s sex are a matter of celebration and the new mother is valued for her success in displaying her capacity for bearing offspring. Yet, childbirth is polluting and shame so as a labouring woman and new mother is until her bleeding stops. A labouring woman quietly retires inside, after finishing all the chores she is responsible for, wears an oldest clothe and lies down on a rag. She takes care to be unnoticed from male members of the family. Only a midwife and one or two married women, usually

the mother-in-law, assist her during labour. Nobody but a midwife touches her and a new born baby who is also considered polluting.

The needs of a woman who has newly given birth for a good rest and care are well recognised by the people, yet they are hardly guaranteed. A new mother in the extended family is likely to have less autonomy in daily life yet tends to gain more and longer term of assistance after birth because of the availability of the mother-in-law and other female members of the family though it is not guaranteed for it depends on the relationship with them. The Muslim middle class woman for instance tends to obtain the least assistance and the shortest time of rest after birth. It is probably because the Muslims concern less about pollution in comparison to the Hindu. The middle class household usually owns animals and engages in labour-intensive agriculture. In the middle class household, both works depend on the unpaid labour of female family members in opposition to the wealthy household which employ wage labourer and the poor household which does not own animals and land. Therefore, her need for rest is more likely to be outweighed by the need to resume daily work than the women from other economic and religious groups.

The authors' painstaking fieldwork and careful analysis shed light on the voices of women reflecting on their experience of childbearing embedded in social and economic contexts. Women do not give birth in isolation from society however women and their labour are tried to be segregated, individualised, naturalised or even degraded to none. The social, political and economic embeddedness of childbearing inevitably differentiates women in their experience of it. The authors' emphasis is more on the embeddedness of childbearing and the differences among women. However, it is also the fact demonstrated in the study that, despite the socioeconomic and experiential differences, women's reproductive and productive labour is indiscriminately appropriated by the husband and his family. Men and the rural household are helplessly dependent on women's reproductive labour as well as productive labour. Yet, patriarchal society degrades and devalues it as if it is afraid that its dependency on women's bearing capacity comes to be known and it is

recognised as power. Women's economic dependency on men is enforced and stressed while men's dependency on women is kept secret.

Women's sexuality and bearing capacity as well as access to economic resources are strictly controlled in accordance with the honour/shame complex and given away from the natal family to the husband's family. Dowry, widow-burning and purdah may be popularly seen as root of Indian women's oppression. Yet, they are probably only one set of means to administer men's appropriation of women's reproductive capacity which was invented in a particular socioeconomic and cultural context. They are symptoms rather than the root. Saying this by no means underestimates or denies the differences among women. I believe that patriarchy is not all about the appropriation of women's reproductive capacity though it is a considerably important driving force of patriarchy. Women are subordinated *vis-à-vis* men in multiple ways as well as hierarchised by class, race and ethnicity.

Carol Delaney's study on the folk theory of procreation in rural Turkey, *The Seed and the Soil* (1991), is another important anthropological work of reproduction in recent years. Delaney also disapproves the binary categories of reproduction and production. It is however not because the distinction does not reflect the social life of villagers she studied but because it is, she argues, misleading and obscures what is in fact at stake. According to Delaney, what matters to gender relations is not a fact of reproduction but the "more over-arching symbolic structure of coming-into-being" (Delaney 1991: 266). In rural Turkey, the "monogenetic" theory of procreation, which is metaphorically informed by the theological doctrine of monotheism and agricultural life cycle, organises the overall systems of values and social relations. It is not just about reproduction or production but about the origin; "how life comes into being". Within this Islamically informed cosmological system, everything originates from one source and that one is symbolically masculine. In analogous with God the Creator, the man with the seed is endowed with godlike life-giving ability. It is his seed that provides the creative spark of life and the child's identity. The woman merely nurtures and sustains the seed. Like the soil, she is naturally open but socially closed by male ownership. She should not nurture any seed but one which belongs to

a man who owns her. She is then, like the field, sowed by a man who owns her, nurtures his seed, and bears his child. The child's identity is determined by the man who inseminated as the kind of plant is determined by the seed, not the soil. Thus, gender relations are symbolically hierarchical from the beginning; the man who is endowed with godlike potency and the woman who merely nurtures his seeds. Delaney argues that what makes Turkish gender relations hierarchical is neither the woman's reproductive physiology nor her confinement into the sphere of reproduction but a particular, though widespread, folk theory of sex roles in the process of procreation.

Delaney is probably right when she says that paternity is something more than the recognition of a physiological link between a man and a child, which has been only assumed until recently. Paternity has meant, in monotheist cultures, "the primary, creative and engendering role" (Delaney 1991: 11). Thus, the scientific discovery of the union of sperm and ovum was received as a confirmation of the father's physiological link with a child whereas the genetic contributions of ovum continued to be obscured; the "older images are suffused throughout the culture" (Delaney 1991: 13). Hence, "human procreation is not simply about the natural processes of sex and biology": it is "inextricably bound up with a specific religious/cosmological system" (Delaney 1991: 16).

Delaney's argument is mainly intended to be a criticism against socialist feminists who, she considers, take for granted "the commonsense meaning of biological reproduction" (Delaney 1991: 17). Yet, as shown above, many feminist scholars well recognise that reproduction is not a matter of mere biology but social practice which is gendered and value-laden. They further attempted to reveal the power and politics of reproduction behind the mask of nature whereas Delaney seems to have decided to underplay that aspect despite her remark of "an arena wherein different interests intersect" cited above for her priority of reconstructing the well-spun symbolic web of procreation. For instance, O'Brien tried to demonstrate that paternity is the result of men's struggles for continuity and integration into the species. She attempted to demystify patriarchal monogenetic theory. She says, "Man the procreator, by virtue

of his need to mediate his alienation from procreation, is essentially man the creator. What he has created are the institutional forms of the social relations of reproduction” (O’Brien 1981: 56). Rich on the other hand objected to the idea that motherhood is an inherent cause for women’s oppression but the motherhood institutionalised for patriarchal interests is a major historical cause for it. She also objected to an idealist account of patriarchy; it “is not from God the Father that we derive the idea of paternal authority; it is out of the struggle for paternal control of the family that God the Father is created (Rich 1986: 67).¹⁸

Indeed, Delaney is a devoted idealist. She claims that it is not reproduction “but only women’s culturally perceived role in the process” that is devalued (1991: 27, 266). Women’s inferior status derives not from their physiology or the work they do but from their gender symbolically constituted in relation to their perceived role in procreation. She accuses feminists of assuming women’s reproduction as the basis of their subordination (1991: 27). However, it is probably only a handful of feminists in early days like Firestone who considered women’s physiology in itself is the cause of the problem. When socialist feminists see the public/private and production/reproduction distinctions as problematic, they by no means assume that it is a natural order of things or universal. They are well aware that the distinctions and the devaluation of the latter spheres are historically particular to capitalist societies (e.g. Eisenstein 1979; Hartmann 1981; Pateman 1988).

A worldview exerts intense cognitive power and certainly affects social practices. Yet, it does not emerge out of context. Is it possible that a patriarchal worldview establish itself without patriarchal society? Is a theory of paternity an unbiased interpretation from the observation of reproductive process or just presented in Qur’an? As Delaney observes, Islam is more than a faith but regulates one’s bodily existence and everyday life (Delaney 1991: 25). However, which religious instructions are commonly observed, how each Qur’anic verse is interpreted and

¹⁸ Historical study of contraception Angus McLaren (1990) seems to support the thesis of paternity as male achievement. She shows that since ancient times male thinkers and religious men have proposed a variety of theories about the importance of male role in the process of reproduction.

which verse is emphasised or underplayed vary throughout time and across and within Islamic societies (Mernissi 1991). Women's subordination also greatly varies in extent and form across and within Islamic societies (Moghadam 2003). Body, work and idea are dialectically, rather than causally, related. They together constitute social relations and in turn are structured by them. Patriarchy is not simply a matter of worldview or ideology but a complex social system embedded in social, political, economic and cultural contexts.

When Delaney argues that women's inferiority "derives not from their work but ... from their perceived role in procreation" (1991: 266), she ignores the fact that work structures gender relations as well as it is structured by them. By excluding women altogether, segregating into particular types of work, paying less, inhibiting promotion and firing first *vis-à-vis* men, it creates a pattern of gender hierarchy for real in terms of material existence as well as of perceived value. Delaney seems to assume that socialist feminists consider that women are subordinate to men since they engage in subordinate chores, probably because of an early optimistic Marxist proposal of women's participation into paid work as a solution. However, most prominent recent socialist feminists focus on work because a capitalist and gendered organisation of work in our time gives rise to women's socioeconomic dependency on men, which the idea of male superiority, whether a folk theory of procreation or else, alone cannot make it happen.

Delaney's neglect of real-life conflicts and contradictions is in fact not a personal intellectual choice but a methodological problem. Delaney, as a student of symbolic anthropology, meticulously decodes and reconstructs the seed-and-soil symbolic system in which Anatolian villagers interact and reproduce social life. Her outstanding skill of fieldwork and ingenious interpretation made her ethnography a successful piece of work of symbolic anthropology. However, her seed-and-soil system appears oddly atemporal. She (re)constructs a too much neat seamless system of symbols so that it gives an impression that it is impossible for the people to behave beyond the web of meanings they have spun. In fact, it is a basic assumption, as well as a problem, of symbolic anthropology. According to Clifford Geertz, a

founder of the school, “a man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (1973: 5). However, is a symbolic system so neatly woven? Is it equally shared by members of a society? Is it achieved peacefully by a mysterious force of symbols which is irresistible to people? Delaney attributes the timeless and apolitical appearance of her work to the timing of the research, aftermath of the military coup which banned political activities in the country. Yet, it is a problem shared by symbolic approaches in general. Pierre Bourdieu made a critical comment that they tend to take up a viewpoint and places a people’s action into the framework “as if all the interactions within it were purely symbolic exchanges” and practices were “no more than the acting-out of roles” (1990: 52). Discounting ongoing conflicts, negotiations and contradictions is a weakness inherent in symbolic anthropology which pursues a coherent “thick description” of meanings (Geertz 1973; Ortner 1984; Spencer 1989).

If O’Brien and other feminists are right, the masculine monogenetic theory of procreation is not given, biological or cultural, but a historical construct resulted from gender struggles. It is a resource to authorise the achieved male superiority rather than an eternal irresistible force which governs the people’s conscious or unconscious. Bourdieu (1990) showed us how implicit meanings can be invoked and manipulated in the service of power. “Symbolic violence” disguises, euphemises and conceals the overt manifestation of relations of domination and sustains them in a more economic way than physical or economic violence. The folk theory of procreation is the dominant discourse which does violence to women symbolically and supports physical and economic violence at times. It is however hard to believe that women have never questioned it and been simply enacting the subordinate role prescribed by it even if they appear so.

According to James Scott (1990), it is plausible that the weak are likely to misrepresent themselves as if they approve the dominant not necessarily out of fear but for a strategy. The use of the dominant discourse by subordinates has been often construed as evidence that they internalise it. For example, Antonio Gramsci argued the totalising power of hegemony and believed that working class people were

prevented from radical action because their consciousness was defined by the hegemonic ideology (Scott 1990: 90). Until recently, many anthropologists have also conventionally written ethnographies as if people are “the unquestioning bearers” of the tradition and fully internalise the dominant ideology (Raheja and Gold 1994: xxvi). Even Bourdieu’s writings on *habitus* (1990) also give an impression that subordinates are made convinced that the state of their subordination is inevitable and that this is ‘how things are’ through everyday practices while dominants actively calculate their material and non-material interests in order to maintain the domination. Scott however criticises the assumption of a monolithic discourse by conventional studies. He asserts that subordinate groups certainly speak at times in terms of the dominant discourse, but this is because they tactically see it as a political resource rather than because they are ideologically incorporated (Scott 1990: 95). They do imagine the reversal of the dominant discourse even in the seemingly inevitable situation of their subordination (Scott 1990: 80). We need to “move beyond apparent consent” but look out alternative discourses; “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990: 16).

Scott sheds light on the subjectivity and power of the weak by revealing their subversive voices and petty resistances which have been disregarded or despised. However, Scott sometimes overstates the homogeneity among a group of subordinates and the existence of their coherent subversive subculture (1990: 134-5). His approach can lead to the same trap of conventional studies which assumed cultural coherence by exaggerating the existence and coherence of a subversive subculture. It is often inadequate to speak of subordinates as a substantive group (O’Hanlon 1988: 198, 203; Kaplan and Kelly 1994: 129).

In particular, due to their very subordination, women have been historically hindered to establish female solidarity and hardly had what can be called a female discourse (O’Brien 1981: 10).¹⁹ Assuming homogeneity, solidarity or the existence of a

¹⁹ In their vivid ethnography focusing on women’s subversive songs and narratives in North India, Raheja and Gold point out that women “do not find a unitary female voice opposed in all respects to a male discourse” (Raheja and Gold 1994: 25). Lila Abu-Lughod (1990)’s investigation on various forms of resistance of Bedouin women also shows the difficulty of identifying them as a unitary subordinate group. The Bedouin women she studied basically have four forms of resistance: the

coherent subversive discourse among women is misleading. Further, romanticising their petty resistance and celebrating their newly discovered power requires a caution because it can risk obscuring the fact of subordination. It is also apt to lead us to an epistemological trap. Rosalind O’Hanlon maintains that the enthusiasm for finding the subjectivity of subordinates could make their ‘voices’ heard yet might “render their figures in the image of our own” (O’Hanlon 1988: 213, 210). Here Michel Foucault’s statement is considerably meaningful; “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault 1990: 95).

Notwithstanding enormous challenges remaining, however, as a number of feminist ethnographers have revealed in recent years (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1990; Raheja and Gold 1994), it is an important and encouraging fact that Third World women, who at times emphasise their powerlessness and passivity, are probably far from passive bearers of tradition but “have actively responded to and resisted their situations” in a variety of disguised ways (Abu-Lughod 1990: 41). The dominant discourse is only, though powerful, a part of the situation. Only reconstructing it is, from a feminist viewpoint, too conservative. Ethnography of reproduction would be more revealing if gender struggles in reproduction and their embeddedness in socioeconomic, political and cultural contexts are described as Jeffery and her colleagues (1989) demonstrated.

2.3.2.2. Demographic Accounts of Reproduction: Legacy of Modernisation School

From Socioeconomic to Cultural Approach of Fertility Transition

sexually segregated women’s world itself (it helps to use secrets and silences to their advantage), the resistance to unwilling marriages (by crying, shouting, and fasting), the sexually irreverent discourse (it allows women to make fun of men and manhood in certain situations, whereas they are expected to respect men in the official discourse), and in oral lyric poetry (it expresses sentiments different to those in their ordinary conversations). These forms of resistance are against men, especially elder men in a community, and all women may more or less share feelings and understandings about these forms of resistance. However, Abu-Lughod takes notice of another form of resistance; that of young women against their elders of both sexes unlike the other forms deployed between genders. It leads that these women cannot be assumed as a fixed subordinate group.

In social science, demography is the discipline that has studied reproduction most closely and consistently. It has conducted abundant sophisticated researches on fertility across countries. Since the middle of the 1940s, three approaches to fertility transition have been developed in the discipline (Greenhalgh 1995b). The first approach was demographic transition theory which was heavily influenced by the Modernisation School of development studies like many theories in other disciplines in the period. As Susan Greenhalgh (1995b) demonstrates, it assumed fertility transition as a phased, homogenizing, Europeanising, irreversible, progressive and lengthy process just like Modernisation School predicted that modernisation process was going to be. Being well financed by neo-Malthusian population establishments, demography has examined reproductive behaviour in a goal-oriented manner - for the aim of fertility decline and population reduction in the Third World (Smyth 1996; Grimes 1998; Eager 2004).

Demographic transition theory dominated the discipline for a long time. However, it came to be questioned in the 1970s after the findings of the Princeton European Fertility Project were published. The project was launched in 1963 and designed to identify specific socioeconomic conditions under which fertility began to fall by analysing a provincial-level data base they constructed (Kertzer 1995: 31). Yet, it found the non-existence of significant relations between the timing of fertility decline and any indicators of socioeconomic development. Urbanization, literacy, infant and child mortality and industrialisation all failed to explain the onset of fertility decline (Kertzer 1995: 32). These findings led demographers to thorough reconsideration and a search for new perspectives. The members of the project then suggested that it could be 'culture', defined as language, ethnicity, region or anything non-economic, which accounts for the differences in fertility behaviour (Greenhalgh 1995b: 5). They stated that;

Cultural setting influenced the onset and spread of fertility decline independently of socioeconomic conditions. Proximate areas with similar socioeconomic conditions but dissimilar cultures entered the transition period at different times, whereas areas differing in the level of socioeconomic development but with similar cultures entered the transition at similar times (Knodel and van de Walle 1986: 412 cited in Kertzer 1995: 32).

Since then, cultural approaches have attracted many demographers who were looking for novel perspectives. A concept of culture added a new dimension to the study of fertility and created an interdisciplinary space in the subject. According to Greenhalgh (1995b: 6-8), the cultural theory of fertility transition was developed into three different approaches. One is the approach which focuses on ideational change, that is, attitudes towards birth control, through cultural communication. Another approach focuses on micro-level transformation in family organisation. For instance, the wealth flow theory predicts that fertility decline is related to the emergence of the child-centred nuclear family in which the psychological values of children could be high but their economic values are minimal or even negative. The other approach is the consumer choice theory which focuses on individual decision-making process with regards to the costs and benefits of having children. Lastly, there is a strand of different approaches called institutional approaches (e.g. McNicoll 1975, 1980, 1984, 1994; Cain 1981, 1986; Lesthaeghe 1980; Potter 1983 cited in Greenhalgh 1995b: 8). They attempt to explain the actual variances in a course of fertility transition across societies despite the apparent similar trend towards low fertility at a distance. They focus on the institutional changes specific to each society which would force individual adjustments and produce a particular pattern of fertility transition.

Women have been always the object of fertility studies yet their sociological existence was hardly at issue in demography. They however gradually became the subject of the studies along with the emergence of cultural approaches. For example, Alaka Malwade Basu (1992) studied the relationship between women's status and demographic behaviour in India. From her research of women in a slum in Delhi, she found that fertility rate seems to differ not according to socioeconomic status (all are low status), language (all are bilingual), religion (all are Hindu), region (all live in the city) but according to the status of women which in turn differ by the region of origin. Among the women from the Tamil Nadu (the southern region), child mortality as well as sex differentials in it tend to be lower, childbearing tends to be halted earlier and fertility rate is hence lower in comparison to those from the Uttar Pradesh (the northern region). Basu argues that the only significant difference between those women is their position in the family. Marriage practice and kinship

system are more favourable for women among the Tamil Nadus than the Uttar Pradeshes. Furthermore, the Tamil Nadu women tend to take more active economic roles in the family and have a greater exposure to outside the home. They are more willing to use modern medical care and contraceptives and have the greater ability to realise it. She concludes that “cultural background ... influences demographic behaviour in large measure through its intermediate influence on the position of women” (Basu 1992: 225).

Basu’s argument was however questioned by Anju Malhotra and her colleagues (1995). They pointed out some problems with the argument which links fertility to the cultural origin of women’s position in India. Firstly, it is too early to postulate the relationship because of the lack of macro-level quantitative analysis. Secondly, it needs to be examined by more specified variables with regards to kinship system and women’s position. Thirdly, kinship and patriarchy need to be examined in connection with structural factors such as socioeconomic development and social stratification. By using the 1981 census, they examined the relationship between fertility rates and the particular dimensions which were considered to be related to women’s status, socioeconomic development and social stratifications. The results suggested a considerable variation *within* regions; negative correlations with women’s literacy rate, participation in paid work, rice cultivation and late marriage; the stronger negative relationship with the rates of literacy and child mortality than economic indicators; the positive relationship with being Muslim; and the negative relationship with landlessness.

The conclusion which Basu arrived may need to be pushed further. It said that fertility behaviour corresponds to the degree of women’s autonomy and in turn to their regional backgrounds so that it is culturally (or regionally) determined. However, if the degree of women’s autonomy differs regionally, or culturally, then what should be investigated is which social, economic and political circumstances in the regions they came from could have positioned women in the family and society in particular ways rather than letting the particularities speak for themselves. Talking about cultural or regional differences without political and socioeconomic forces can

lead to the denial of historical dynamics of society and the essentialist view of culture. The risk is often shared by many demographic studies which claim to take cultural approaches as well as conventional interpretive anthropology as shown in Delaney's work discussed above.

Cultural Account of Fertility Difference in Turkey

In the context of Turkey, Çığdem Kâğıtçıbaşı (1982) once attempted to explain the variance in fertility within the country according to a 'cultural' approach which focused on family organisation (the second cultural approach according to Greenhalgh's categorisation). Her analysis revealed women's socioeconomic insecurity *vis-à-vis* men. Kâğıtçıbaşı saw the values of children (VOC) as a missing link which connects an apparent relationship between development and fertility decline observed in many parts of the world. She accounts that it is not socioeconomic development but a shift of VOC from economic to psychological along with socioeconomic development that contributes to a fertility decline. Those who lack formal education, well-paid employment and social security tend to attribute economic values to children for their old age security and hence tend to have many children and a stronger preference for boys. These inclinations are more intensified for women. It suggests their insecurity *vis-à-vis* men with similar socioeconomic statuses. Curiously, those who live in more developed regions tend to attribute less old age security reasons to boy preference than those who live in less developed regions but this is not the case for women. For women, it is not the general socioeconomic development but the increased level of her education that most contributes to the decrease of economic VOC, or her economic dependency on sons. Her examination reveals women's dependency on men, especially sons who are the only labour power which they can control (Kandiyoti 1988: 279) in the context of the conventional patriarchal state which entrusts individual welfare with the male-headed family instead of institutional welfare.

Kâğıtçıbaşı's approach is however not 'cultural' enough in the eyes of culturalists. Delaney is, for example, apparently disturbed by her depiction of Turkish women and men as *homo economicus*; "To me this approach suffers from an excessively

utilitarian view of humanity” (1991: 74). According to Delaney, Kâğıtçıbaşı’s and other approaches which try to link fertility with women’s education, paid work or old age security are all blind to the underlying cultural force; the importance of seed. Delaney tried to draw attention to the cultural root of ‘high fertility’ in the country at the time when she studied a central Anatolian village (1980-2). Yet, the seed-and-soil theory, which is supposed to be, according to Delaney, shared by all Anatolian Muslims regardless of their current engagement with agriculture, cannot explain the fertility variance within the country and the constant fertility decline which the country has actually experienced since the 1960s.

Today, the fertility variance in the country came to be explained by another cultural dimension; ethnicity. Regional fertility difference is increasingly polarised between the East and the rest of the country over the last decades and it appears to coincide with the geographical distribution of language groups. It directed some researchers to look at ethnicity as a potential variable.²⁰ Sutay Yavuz (2006, 2008) is one of the first demographers who argued the significance of ethnicity for fertility difference in the country. Yavuz examined third birth developments by language groups and paid particular attention to an aspect of ideational change (the first cultural approach according to Greenhalgh’s categorisation). He found that the probability of third birth has been declining among both Turkish and Kurdish women, but it began falling considerably later among Kurdish women and they were still 60% more likely to have a third birth than Turkish women in the period between 1994 and 1998 (Yavuz 2006: 448). Fertility rate of Kurdish women who are literate in Turkish has also declined more slowly than that of Turkish women but became closer to it in the latest period (Yavuz 2006: 451).

Yavuz concludes that the particularly delayed fertility decline of the non-Turkish speaking Kurdish women in comparison to the other women in the country can be attributed to their “uneven integration (or even isolation)” into “the general

²⁰ The availability of data is also an important factor of a recent increase of demographic studies which looks at ethnicity. The demographic data by language group were not available to the public before the 1993 TDHS.

socioeconomic and cultural modernization process” (2008: 332). Their lack of knowledge of the official language has prevented them from acquiring the “information and values about fertility regulation (new aspiration about childbearing, knowledge of modern fertility contraception, adaptation of Western cultural attitudes etc.)” (Yavuz 2008: 332). Thus, after displaying the partial contributions of economic (costs and benefits of childbearing), socioeconomic (macro economic fluctuations), and cultural (customs related to marriage) factors to the different fertility levels within the country, he argues that it is diffusion theory, which tells us that social interaction, via a common language for instance, would be a key catalysis of demographic change, that explains the cultural isolation and delayed fertility decline of Kurdish women.

Yavuz’s statistical analysis presented a new dimension in demographic studies in Turkey and provided another evidence for a case of linguistic capital that Jeroen Smits and Ayşe Gündüz-Hoşgör (2003) argue in their discussion of non-Turkish speaking women’s disadvantages. His study evidences that the knowledge of Turkish is linguistic capital in Turkey and its deprivation gives rise to further disadvantages, one of which is, as he suggests, the access to alternative mode of reproduction.

Nonetheless, it seems to me that explaining away Kurdish women’s delayed fertility decline by diffusion theory could miss some important social dynamics which the phenomenon might reveal and underplay patriarchal basis of linguistic deprivation. First of all, although socioeconomic backgrounds of linguistic deprivation is beyond the scope of Yavuz’s study, one’s lack of knowledge of Turkish indicates the already disadvantaged position in which non-Turkish speaking citizen is located as well as it is a considerable disadvantage in itself which brings about multiplier effects because it is the official language and spoken by most people, including linguistic minorities, in the country. According to the 1998 TDHS based data provided by Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2003: 840), the great majority of non-Turkish speakers are estimated to be comprised of those who speak Kurdish as mother tongue but women and those who live in the East in particular. Further, if one was born and brought up in Turkey and does not know Turkish, it is most likely that she never had formal

education and illiterate, too, probably because of poverty, the place of settlement, birth order or/and gender.

The concentration of non-Turkish speakers among Kurdish women in the East and their disintegration from the national demographic trend are not resulted from accidental causes. It is the political result of unequally distributed opportunities - a consequence of regional underdevelopment and a particular from of patriarchal gender inequalities, which were constructed in a process of specific historical conjunctures. The term 'diffusion' is deceiving. Technologies, commodities and values do not diffuse to every direction. They are distributed according to geographic, socioeconomic, gender and ethnic hierarchies. "Western cultural attitudes" were probably unfamiliar to eastern village women until recently since television has not yet a common household item in the region two decades ago while men could have more opportunities to travel outside the community for military service and trade. Effective contraceptive devices have not become available in eastern rural area as early as in the other regions probably because more eastern villages are remote from a town and remained without health services for a long time. Thus, rural women could hardly access effective contraceptives without the husband's assistance. The official language was not learned particularly by Kurdish women probably because there used to be more villages without school in the East while boys were often allowed to go to school in another village or they had a chance to learn Turkish during military service. Besides, familial and state investments on women's health and education are hardly the priorities not only in the eastern Anatolia but many parts of the country and the world.

I argue that in Turkey, the issue of language is not just an ethnic but also a gender problem. I do not intend to say that ethnicity is not an issue in the country because there is the evidence that among many ethnic minorities Kurdish citizens in particular are considerably disadvantaged in the country (Koç *et al.* 2008). However, diffusion theory risks obscuring gender as relations of domination and reducing gender inequality to a matter of tradition as Sharabi (1989) did. It cannot explain the reason why Kurdish women in particular do not know the official language and why

Kurdish men's knowledge of the official language has not affected their reproductive practice.

Secondly, Yavuz's data show that the rate of third birth among non-Turkish speaking Kurdish women increased between 1993 and 1998 whereas that of Turkish-speaking Kurdish women began to fall after 1993 (2008: 302, 326). As we shall see below, the 1990s is the period when the conflict-induced destruction and displacement was intensified in Kurdish villages of eastern and south eastern regions. Diffusion theory rarely takes into account historical contingencies and cannot explain such fluctuation in fertility.

Murat Yüceşahin and Murat Özgür lately published their analysis of fertility differences among provinces with a particular focus on the period between 1980 and 2000 when the regional inequality widened. They describe the fluctuations of national fertility rate, concentration of high fertility provinces to conflict-affected regions, and setbacks of health services from those regions between 1985 and 2000 (2008: 151-3). They however also chose to construe the trend by diffusion theory and support Yavuz's thesis. They conclude that "cultural isolation" due to the use of the local language and the "patriarchal-traditional norms" "unique to the Kurdish population" are the major obstacles to "the diffusion of modern reproductive behaviour in this community" and hence "ethnicity and cultural factors are definitive of high fertility in southeastern Turkey" (2008: 153, 135).

Thirdly, the cultural isolation thesis does not seem to be consistent with the 2003 data provided by *Turkey Demographic and Health Survey* (HUIPS 2004). The data show that almost all women in the eastern region where the great majority of Kurdish speakers live (Smits and Hoşgör 2003: 835; Sirkeci 2005: 156) know at least one modern method of contraception just like the other women in the country (HUIPS 2004: 61).²¹ There is, of course, a possibility that Kurdish women are informed of

²¹ The data of contraceptive knowledge divided by regions are not available in the previous Demographic and Health Surveys. Yet 95.9% of couples knew at least one modern method in 1998 (HUIPS: 1999: 46).

contraceptive methods yet do not use them because they do not want to limit or space births because of high value on the large family, a religious belief against birth control, cultural celebration of fecund women or the mere persistence of traditional reproductive patterns. In other words, as Yavuz suggests, no ideational change toward modern planned small-size family may have yet occurred among non-Turkish speaking Kurdish speaking women. However, if there is a culture or tradition of high fertility in pre-industrial agricultural society, that would be a product of the male-centred dominant discourse. Consulting feminist knowledge, it is hard to believe that a woman, whether pre-modern or rural, customarily gives births unlimitedly and successively despite her health and workload, existing children's well-being and the limited material and symbolic benefits that she can gain from having many children in comparison to a father.²²

A number of feminist writers have evidenced that reproductive control is not the invention of modernity and many women were and are still struggling for it before and after modernisation. In her historical study of fertility control in the West, Angus McLaren maintains that a history of contraception was not a linear progressive increase of contraceptive practices. Most existing studies on the history of contraception emphasises two contraceptive revolutions in the West: men's employment of *coitus interruptus* in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the introduction of the pill and legalised abortion in the 1960s. They suggest that what saved us from successive births and high mortalities of infants and labouring mothers was the emergence of "modern mentality" and the triumph of science over fertility (McLaren 1990: 2). However, McLaren establishes in her re-readings of historical studies that since ancient times there has always been a social and political concern to control, whether to reduce or increase, fertility and there have always been important groups of men and women in society who attempt to limit fertility for one reason or another. States and men in general have always had vested interests in women's reproductive power though their objectives and ways to control women and

²² Ismet Koç's (2000) examination of the TDHS-1993 shows that women's working status (agricultural, non-agricultural, out of labour force) has no effect on contraceptive usage though it does affect the choice of method and women who engage in non-agricultural work tend to choose modern methods. Today, rural women also desire and use contraception in Turkey.

fertility varied from society to society. It is thus more appropriate to say that a certain fertility trend at a time is a result of negotiations between conflicting gender and class interests rather than a reflection of mentality or scientific development. Breakthroughs and reactions have been repeated throughout the history of the regulation of reproduction.

The IRRRAG team conducted a cross-cultural research on socioeconomically disadvantaged non-Western women's reproductive strategies in the 1990s. The team explored whether women in various countries see decision-making about reproductive activities as their entitlements. They found that women consider so, even though they did not use the term rights, have knowledge of contraception, modern or/and traditional, and was struggling to gain a control over their body and life in general, often with not insignificant sacrifice: e.g. going through informal surgical abortion secretly, trying out herbs known to have abortive effects, being sterilised, taking hormonal pills secretly from husbands, avoiding husbands by sleeping with children, and divorcing (Petchesky and Judd 1998). Women do make decisions about their reproductive and less about sexual life. They however do it not as individuals but as daughters, wives, or mothers. They always decide to comply, negotiate, or fight back in relation to others like parents, husband, in-laws, children, neighbours and social conditions like income, work conditions, welfare benefits, the availability of childcare services, and so on. Those familial and social conditions are often out of their control although there is sometimes a room of negotiation.²³ This

²³ Rich, as an educated middle-class American poet, confesses that she “had leaned that (her) body was not under her control” when she conceived her third child against her will (1986: 28). “None of us, I think, had much sense of being in any real command of the experience. Ignorant of our bodies, we were essentially nineteenth-century women as far as childbirth (and much else) was concerned”, says Rich (1986: 176). It is however not an only personal accident but a political consequence of patriarchally institutionalised motherhood. She then reveals a painful fact, probably shared by not a few women in the world, from a letter of a woman seeking birth-control advice cited in Margaret Sanger's *Motherhood in Bondage* in the early twentieth century. The woman writes that she wants to use contraceptive so that she can “be natural and play the part” during the intercourse with her husband without fear of another pregnancy (Rich 1986: 41). What made her to try to get some modest control over the use of her body is unknown - the “needs of her existing children”, her “husband's demands”, the “dim, simmering voice of self” or all of them (Rich 1986: 41). Yet, it is clear to many women that she endeavoured it in the context of “impossible contradiction” of motherhood. Institutionalised heterosexual marriage not only enforces a woman to give birth to a child for a man who owns her but also teaches her to fear for losing love, home and desirability as a woman and fake orgasm (Rich 1986: 41).

means that resistance would cost a lot. Their findings suggest that birth control is probably more the problem of life circumstances and social systems which are patriarchal in most societies than that of unmet needs, false consciousness, life style or culture (See also Smyth 1996; Currie and Wisenberg 2003).

A theory of unachieved modernisation and traditional fecund women appears convincing at first sight probably because of the lingering effects of social evolutionism and modernisation thesis. Yavuz is well aware of the limitation of quantitative analysis and sociological details are beyond the scope of his analysis. Nonetheless, he referred to Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör's argument of linguistic capital and non-Turkish speakers in Turkey because his study evidences a case of linguistic deprivation behind the ethnic difference of fertility level. Diffusion theory based on modernisation theory is however insufficient to look into politics and contradictions behind the difference. In order to understand complex social dynamics, it requires alternative perspective.

Meanwhile, whereas the relationship between ethnicity and fertility level seems to be statistically significant, there are also a number of studies which suggest that it could be also educational level that has a strong impact on reproductive practices and fertility. Özlem Alpu and Hatice Fidan (2006) found from their examination of TDHS-1998 that women who did not have schooling and had up to primary school education are less likely to use contraception than those who studied up to the secondary level or more. Yüceşahin and Özgür's analysis of provincial data also demonstrated that the provinces with high TFRs tend to be high in the percentages of illiteracy among women as well as those of Kurdish population (2008: 150). İsmet Koç (2000) concluded from TDHS-1993 that the spouse's educational level, but women's in particular, is a significant determinant of both the practice of contraception in general and the choice of modern contraceptive methods while his statistical analysis shows that Kurdish-Kurdish couples and Kurdish-Turkish couples are less likely to use contraceptives than Turkish-Turkish couples. Likewise, his another study with Banu Ergöçmen and their colleagues (Ergöçmen *et al.* 2004) about the practice of withdrawal based on TDHS-1998 and several other nationally

representative surveys concluded that Kurdish-Kurdish couples are most likely to use the traditional method in comparison to Turkish-Turkish and Kurdish-Turkish couples but the husbands with low educational level are also very likely to practice the method even when their wives are educated.

Dilek Cindoğlu and Ibrahim Sirkeci (2001) used TDHS-1993 and examined the determining factors for the access to prenatal care. They conclude that ethnicity (speaking Kurdish) does not account for women's access of prenatal care when socioeconomic status was controlled. Instead, formal education more than the secondary level and urban residence increase the chance for utilizing prenatal care services regardless of ethnicity. In another study about determining factors of choosing withdrawal over modern methods (2008), they argue that their analysis of the 1998 TDHS data by means of multinomial regression model shows that the environment which is favourable for women's empowerment (urban residence, better socioeconomic status, better education) and experience (age, duration of marriage, the numbers of pregnancy and births) contribute to the usage of modern contraception over withdrawal. Kurdish women are 1.56 times more likely to rely on withdrawal than Turkish women probably because many of them reside in the environment unfavourable for women's empowerment (rural area, underdeveloped region and poverty in which educational and employment opportunities are minimal). Cindoğlu and Sirkeci argue that the overarching determinant of the woman's modern contraceptive usage over withdrawal is her empowerment.

Further, Oğuz Işık and Melih Pınarcıoğlu state, with caution, that “an over-emphasis on ethnicity might be misleading” because of geographical differences of the level of fertility even within particular ethnic groups (2006: 405). Their analysis of the district-level data of the 2000 population census by a geographically weighted regression model which takes into account the spatially contingent impacts of independent variables demonstrated that regional inequalities are much more complex than a simple divide between the East and the West; there are many grey areas and there are different dynamics within the areas with similar fertility levels. They found that adult literacy, female participation in non-agricultural labour force,

urbanisation and GDP (gross domestic product) had particularly pronounced impacts on the fertility level in the eastern and south-eastern regions where the rates of those variables are considerably low in general. They maintain that fertility decline is by no means a linear process and modernisation theory which embraces it “is destined to fail even at the outset” (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2006: 417).

2.3.2.3. Culture as an Analytic Concept

‘Culture’ is one of the most frequently used terms in social sciences and at the same time one of the most problematic concepts in its definition and usage. On the one hand, it contains very broad and complex phenomenon of everything non-biological or sometimes non-economic in particular. On the other hand, it is often seen as a coherent timeless set of values and practices happily shared by members of a society for generations. And, in contemporary sociology and anthropology, ethnicity has been defined in terms of this convenient yet problematic concept until recently (Eriksen 1993). It however increasingly came to be known that ethnic groups are very often actively created and politically mobilised rather than mere primordial static grouping (McKay 1982). Outside observers used to see ethnicity as primordial group not only because of their theoretical bias but because members of an ethnic group demarcate themselves from others or others define a certain ethnic group by invoking their own or the other’s distinctiveness in terms of ‘culture’ in a sense of inherent and quasi-genetically inherited characteristics just as anthropologists used to do (Spencer 1990; Abu-Lughod 1991: 144-6). Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) argues that by elaborating on the meaning of culture and overemphasising coherence (as Delaney did), anthropology has served to construct, produce and maintain ‘culture’ as a bounded entity distinctively different from one another. Such conceptualisation of culture freezes difference. It enforces separations and also a sense of hierarchies, which is very Orientalist. “Culture is the essential tool for making other” (Abu-Lughod 1991: 143).

Culture is being mould within power relations. It gives not only differences but hierarchies the air of natural or self-evident. Culturalised differences may reflect and

simultaneously deepens unequal political and economic relations while disguising them. In other words, as Eugene Hammel argues, “while it may seem to us that ethnicity is an important predictor variable, ethnicity may only proxy the political relations that define those economic relations within which demographic behaviour is embedded” (Hammel 1995: 254). In order to avoid traps of simplistic causal explanation, we must look into the complex ground of political economy behind culture: strategies, contradictions, flux, and conflicts embedded in complicatedly interconnected multiple contexts behind a mask of coherence and simplicity (Kertzer 1995: 50; Abu-Lughod 1991: 158). Such a strategy not only subverts othering practice but brings out our similarities beyond cultures in the struggle for humanity from different grounds (Abu-Lughod 1991: 149, 157).

In demography, a concept of culture has been more often used simplistically, instrumentally and ambiguously. Many demographers tend to define language, ethnicity, religion, region, gender and marriage and kinship systems, that is, anything “extra-economic” as ‘culture’ (Basu 1992: 1, 229; Greenhalgh 1995b: 5; Kertzer 1995: 43-4).²⁴ This broad usage of ‘culture’ has been criticised by some anthropologists who study demographic changes. David Kertzer, for example, complains that “culture is treated as a grab-bag of non-demographic, non-economic characteristics” by demographers (Kertzer 1995: 29). It is often used as a residual in apolitical and ahistorical ways when all other explanations fail (Greenhalgh and Li 1995: 603). For instance, gender is increasingly taken into consideration as a

²⁴ Yavuz’s use of a concept of culture is also confusing. Such values and practices as “the two-child norm” (2008: 333), “adaptation of Western cultural attitudes” (Yavuz 2008: 332), “a new aspiration about childbearing” (Yavuz 2008: 332), and the practice of biomedical birth control are cultural variables. Indeed, in anthropology, diffusion theory is about cultural diffusion and it was a dominant concept for the account of cultural change in early days. However, apart from fertility norms, he counts arranged marriage, bride price, endogamy and patrilocal postnuptial residence as cultural factors just as Basu did (Yavuz 2008: 330-1). He then uses a term ‘culture’ interchangeably with ‘traditions’ which are, according to him, equal to “gender inequality” (Yavuz 2008: 163). Thus, for him, gender inequality is a kind of culture in a sense of tradition. He continues to argue that family system is usually intertwined with gender system, and hence ‘culture’ can be used interchangeably with ‘institutions’ (Yavuz 2008: 156). It is very confusing but he calls what sociologists usually call institutions ‘culture’. What is not only confusing but problematic is that by equalizing gender inequality with tradition, he assumes that it shall be ended by modernisation and in turn fertility rate shall go down along with modernisation and ‘modern’ egalitarian gender relationship. Yet, it is very debatable that modernisation ends gender inequality and fertility decline necessarily signals egalitarian gender relationship and women’s increasing control over their body.

‘cultural’ or non-economic factor but often in a way of merely adding women into existing quantifiable measurements (e.g. rates of female education and labour force participation) and Modernisation School models (Riley 1999: 372).²⁵

Besides, a cultural account of patriarchy has also often particularised gender inequalities to a set of pre-modern or Third World customs and given an empirically wrong impression that they are bound to disappear along with modernisation. It often hides or underplays the deep-seated structural force of patriarchy and makes us believe that ideational change would suffice to achieve gender equality. Culture understood as apolitical phenomenon often contributes to the persistence of politics of hierarchising by depoliticising domination. Hence, culture requires a caution when it is used as an analytical concept.

I argue that ethnic differences need to be analysed historically and political-economically in a current conjuncture of Turkey since the conspicuous fertility and related behavioural differences between Turks and Kurds in the country is based on considerable socioeconomic inequalities in terms of spatial distribution, regional development, education, primary and reproductive healthcare and living conditions (Içduygu *et al.*; Sirkeci 2005; Koç *et al.* 2008) and there are considerable differences among Kurdish citizens according to gender, socioeconomic status and the place of residence. In fact, Yavuz’s study (2006; 2008) showed the fertility differences between the Kurds in the East and the other regions, between Turkish speaking and non-Turkish speaking Kurds and the Turks in the East and the rest of the country.²⁶

²⁵ Yavuz recognises those criticisms (2008: 152-4). He then seems to reject a static and essentialist view of culture but approves a view that sees culture as changing process in relation to institutional and political forces. However, in his analysis of fertility decline in Turkey, the changing is envisaged in a linear and goal-oriented manner as modernisation theory did. Thus, he calls the third birth “risk.” He names educated Turkish women whose fertility rate began to fall earliest “pioneers” on the one hand and non-Turkish speaking Kurdish women whose fertility rate has just begun declining lately “laggards” on the other.

²⁶ Hammel’s examination of fertility changes in the northwest Balkans between 1700 and 1900 suggests the need for a caution about a cultural account of fertility difference. At a glance, the data appear to show the tendency of high fertility in the areas where the proportions of Orthodox Christians and Germans are high. However, it is not as straightforward as it appears. Although the data tell that the higher the proportion of Orthodox is the higher the fertility is, in fact, the fertility of Roman Catholics is higher than that of Orthodox Christians in nine out of twelve such areas (Hammel 1995: 245). Meanwhile, the data show the relative low fertility in the areas where the proportion of Croatian

As mentioned above, the recent findings of statistical examinations of the relationship between TFR or reproductive practices and social, economic and cultural variables seem to suggest that ethnicity might be an intervening variable. What needs to be looked at further is political-economic milieu in which Kurdish women with high fertility have engaged in human reproduction.

2.3.3. Towards Feminist Political Economy of Human Reproduction

In the last section of this chapter, I shall argue that a study of human reproduction requires feminist and political economic perspectives which seek to understand patriarchal relations of reproduction under certain socioeconomic and political conjunctures in which women strive for controlling their body. I have already argued above that reproduction is not only socially but patriarchally organised and a central site of gendered struggles. A study of reproduction would be therefore incomplete or could be even distorted without feminist perspectives which problematise the patriarchal gender order. However, until the 1980s feminist studies have analysed not reproduction itself but either as a possible cause of patriarchy, a site where women's subordination is most intense, or a site of feminine experience possibly shared by all women. When such universalistic or essentialist approaches came to be attacked with the rise of postmodernism in the 1990s, human reproduction became an unpopular subject in feminism regardless of the fact that women's reproductive capacity continues to be controlled by patriarchal institutions (e.g. the family, health institutions, states and international population establishments) and the control is increasingly institutionalised. Feminist perspectives are indispensable to a study of reproduction. Yet, it requires a sociological approach, too, not because reproduction is the material basis of society but rather because women's reproduction is embedded

Catholics is high although practicing birth control is not accord with the usual precepts of Catholicism. Further, it is also unclear why being Croatian makes their fertility pattern different, because, Hammel points out, Hungarian Calvinists and Catholics and Croatian Catholics in Hungary share the pattern of fertility decline and control but a Croatian dialect is not mutually intelligible with Hungarian. After a close examination, he concludes that it is "not a simple matter to attribute the fertility differences to "cultural" differences by simple ethnic or linguistic labelling" because his analysis reveals that "a commonality of demographic trends across major cultural and linguistic differences but demographic differences within much more closely defined cultural commonality" (Hammel 1995: 244, 253). It is just the opposite to the findings of the Princeton European Fertility Project.

in social, economic, political and cultural contexts and hence it is differentiated according to an individual woman's class, race and ethnic positions within a society and the global system developing today. However, the feminist approach would be more fruitful if it applies not simply a sociological but political-economic analysis in understanding contemporary human reproduction for two reasons; one is the increasing political-economic nature of reproduction in modern times; the other is the growing interconnection of different problems that we are facing today under the rapidly globalising political-economic system for the last decades.

Macro Politics of Reproduction

First of all, as McLaren (1990) demonstrated, women's reproductive capacity has been by no means a concern restricted to individual women and men since antiquity. It has always been at the centre of the vested interests of a wide range of society from the husband to the ruling class. In the modern era, it became one of central concerns of states to encourage or discourage the reproduction of citizens or particular groups of people within a nation while a process of medicalisation contributed to increasing male domination in modern childbearing. By the latter half of the twentieth century, the reproduction of women, particularly that of women of colour and Third World women, has become a subject of security concern and controlled by the population establishment with such a scale unseen in history.

Today, high fertility tends to carry a negative moral connotation of irresponsibility, irrationality or traditionalism. Yet, the idea is historical and political. It is the product of a relatively recent development of global inequality and a rise of neo-Malthusianism. Early modern states tended to be pro-natal due to the idea that population growth was a crucial factor for the country's military and economic strength. In the nineteenth century, Malthus's thesis of 'overpopulation' as a cause of scarce natural resource, poverty and social disorder became popular among the ruling classes who were terrified by the French Revolution and disturbed by the rise of urban poor (Bandarage 1997: 27). In the early twentieth century, along with the uneven but significant improvements of living conditions, the world began to experience such a rapid population growth as unseen in human history. In the middle

of the 1960s, population growth became an international political 'problem' for the first time in history. It was 'problem' because the most of this increase was occurring in the Third World. It therefore appeared to the First World not a mere increase of world population but a growth of the resented poor, i.e., the potential source of Communist uprisings. In the post-colonial Cold War context, the population growth became a 'threat' to racial balance, migration, natural resources, and political instability particularly in the eyes of a hegemonic country, namely the United States (Grimes 1998, Eager 2004).

With generous financial assistance from the US government, the neo-Malthusian population establishment has succeeded in persuading the world about the threat of population 'explosion' and promoted anti-natal policies in underdeveloped countries including Turkey. The renewed Malthusianism provided a theoretical justification for state intervention in the people's reproductive behaviour (Grimes 1998). It argued that rapid population growth was an obstacle to development because it was outstripping their economic growth and therefore the state must necessarily direct the people to have fewer children. It was also assumed that the most effective intervention was to deliver local women modern contraceptive devices on a massive scale because what they lacked was considered to be effective contraceptive means rather than the rationale of family planning (Grimes 1998, Eager 2004). Thus, the population control policies in the latter half of the 1960s and the early 1970s echoed the early Modernisation School approach which assumed development as technical problem without any consideration of socio-cultural circumstances in which people live and prioritised the benefits of a country to the well-beings of individuals. The target-oriented approach which set the goal as the prevalence of contraceptive devices and the numerical reduction of fertility rate often resulted in such coercive practices against poor or/and minority women as the rejection of a removal of intrauterine device (IUD) by health workers, the tests of new contraceptives without consent, and forced, coerced or uninformed sterilisation and other methods (Smyth 1996). As a result, fertility decline was achieved despite continuing high infant mortality, poverty and low female literacy in some countries such as Bangladesh (Bandarage 1997: 43).

However, by the mid-1970s, the causal relationship between population growth and development came to be questioned. At the 1974 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) held in Bucharest, the reversal of the neo-Malthusian thesis was claimed by the participants from the South which constituted a majority of the membership of the United Nations by then; fertility increase was a consequence rather than a cause of underdevelopment and hence the developmental aid would be more welcomed than population control programmes (Eager 2004: 153). However, in the same year of the Bucharest, the US National Security Council conducted the research on the effect of world population growth on the US security over the next 25 years and the report known as NSSM 200 (National Security Study Memorandum 200) concluded that the US government could not wait for socioeconomic development and a subsequent decline of fertility rate in Third World countries since during those long years inequality grew in those countries and politically agitated young people would follow Communism (Eager 2004: 155). Subsequently, in the post-Cold War era, a threat of Communism became no longer an issue yet political-economic situation around the world has become increasingly volatile and insecure. Increasing poverty, worsening inequality and environment or conflict-induced displacements were all seen by policy makers as part of population problems. Thus, 'overpopulation' continued to be a main security concern of the US in the 1990s onwards (Bandarage 1997: 44).

Meanwhile, the feminist groups both from the South and the North who have worked on the promotion and protection of women's reproductive and general health, known as Women's Health Movement (WHM), had been increasingly growing since the 1970s and being empowered by globalising grassroots networks. They made well use of the opportunities of the UN Decade for Women between 1975 and 1985, the US Congress's financial and political withdrawal from family planning programmes after the arrival of conservative administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and then the election of the Democratic Party of Bill Clinton in 1992. During the decade of the US retreat from family planning programmes between 1981 and 1992, WHM worked hard on replacing the population control discourse with the

reproductive rights and health discourse, while reframing their own health paradigm by the human rights concept at the same time (Eager 2004: 158).

The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro (the Earth Summit) powerfully re-pronounced the concept of ‘overpopulation’, this time, in relation to much concerned ecological degradation. Threatened and motivated by the Summit’s call for population control in the name of a new popular concept of sustainable development, WHM reorganised themselves, re-focused the issue, made an ally with the Clinton administration, lobbied the US congress and the UN in order to influence the coming ICPD Cairo Conference in 1994 and integrated their views of reproductive rights and health and women’s empowerment into its official document (Dodgson 2000). Despite their efforts, the words ‘reproductive rights and health’ were left bracketed in the draft of the Cairo Programme of Action until the Conference. In the end, the Chapter VII on Reproductive Rights and Health was accepted after the compromise of an inclusion of a new paragraph which acknowledged the sovereign right of each country and the full respect for various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of the people; the ubiquitous paradox of state sovereignty and cultural rights on the one hand and individual human rights on the other in the UN documents (Eager 2004: 160). The milestone Chapter defines reproductive rights as follows;

Reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national laws, international human rights documents and other relevant UN consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic rights of all couples and individuals to decide freely and *responsibly* the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. They also include the right of all to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence (ICPD 1994: chp.VII: A, *Italic is mine*).

The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted at the Forth World Conference on Women reinforced the spirit of the Cairo Programme of Action and further made clear to the world that women’s reproductive and sexual health and freedom were specific aspects of human rights; women’s human rights. It reads;

The human rights of women include their rights to have control over and decide freely and *responsibly* on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationship

between women and men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared *responsibility* for sexual behaviour and its consequences (UN 1995: Para.96, *Italic is mine*).

The 1990s was a momentous decade for the achievement of women's human rights. Population establishments have also adopted human rights and feminist discourses and promoted a modern two-child norm under family planning programmes and the Safe Motherhood Initiative. As Asoka Bandarage (1997: 92-3) points out, however, they continue to be motivated by a fear of 'overpopulation' and have hardly concerned about women's well-being, empowerment and control over their body. In fact, they have rarely provided them genuine choice. As stated in the UN documents on reproductive rights above, it became an individual *responsibility* to limit and space births. The term 'responsibility' delivers a sense of obligation about birth control for the sake of a larger society rather than an individual woman. It can be interpreted to justify institutional interventions into birth control yet conveniently ignore women's rights to be informed, receive decent health services and be respected for their choice to have or not have children. It excludes "other aspects of reproductive and human rights such as the right of the poor to health and well-being, including the right to bear and sustain children" (Bandarage 1997: 93).

It must also not be forgotten that biomedical contraceptives are developed and promoted in the context of "a deepening partnership of drug company officials, technical and scientific experts and population control advocates" (Bandarage 1997: 80). They are predominantly men. Hence, new male contraceptive methods have been rarely developed and "relatively little" has been "done to promote contraceptive use among men" (Bandarage 1997: 81). Tubal ligation, rather than vasectomy, has been promoted, sometimes coercively, in many Third World countries despite the fact that the latter is surgically simpler and less risky. IUD and oral contraceptives, rather than barrier methods, have been promoted despite the risks of infection (in case of IUD) and side effects such as circulatory disorders, changes in body metabolism, risks of cancer and birth defects (in case of the pill) (Bandarage 1997: 82). One kind of injectables, Depo-Provera, is effective for men but not promoted

among men because of their concerns about loss of libido while it is applied to women of colour and in the Third World despite a number of health risks and side effects (Bandarage 1997: 83-4). Thus, “the patriarchal belief that birth control is solely a female responsibility continues to be affirmed” (Bandarage 1997: 81).

Micro Politics of Reproduction

Fertility is not only socially constructed but a focus of political struggles. As explicitly seen in the latter half of the last century, controlling fertility can be a tool of domination. However, a particular pattern of reproductive practices and resulting fertility rate are by no means shaped unilaterally by macro politics. Local reproductive practices can “be both constituted by and resistant to more global forms of power” (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991: 313). Even in the last half of the century when the political influence of population establishments has been overwhelming, they have been dialectically constructed through a wide range of socioeconomic relations in varying ways in different societies. They can be negotiated in relations between countries, between groups in a society and between members within a group, such as women and men, the youth and the elderly. In other words, they are effects of struggles and negotiations between individuals, groups and countries, of which relations are hierarchised economically, racially, ethnically and genderically yet dialectical and intersected in multiple ways at the same time. Therefore, a feminist political-economic analysis of reproduction needs to take into consideration not only gendered international politics but also gendered politics at local levels; “synthesising ... the local and the global by examining the multiple levels on which reproductive practices, policies, and politics so often depend” (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991).

Greenhalgh’s study of the negotiations between the local enforcers of one-child policy and village women in China is one of a very few but excellent examples of feminist political-economic study of reproduction. Greenhalgh (1994, Greenhalgh and Li 1995) demonstrates that the skewed sex ratio at birth in China is not a product of traditional patriarchal culture but a product of a series of negotiations between the local resistance and the national policy enforcement and the reworking of traditional

values. According to Greenhalgh, in the villages she studies, the incentives for having many children and forming extended family had already diminished before the 1979 introduction of the one-child policy because of socialism-induced poverty in previous decades. For parents, having more than one son meant the multiplying costs of building extra houses for their sons due to the prevalence of nuclear household arrangement. Further, increasing quarrels between brothers and daughters-in-law's desire for independence after reforms in the 1980s made many parents to appreciate daughters. Thus, having one son and one daughter became the ideal for many parents.

During the first years of the introduction of one-child policy, villagers resisted and negotiated hard to have at least one son and also a daughter. Sex ratio at birth in those years thus became distorted to 121, which suggests the disappearance of many girls, while that from the early 1960s to the late 1970s was 105 and close to the natural state. However, during the years between 1984 and 1987 when the financial and political supports from the party-government for local cadres were withdrawn, the cadres, who share the local values, began tolerating the removal of IUD for those who have no son. Further, the formal policy was also re-written to allow the second birth in case where the first child was female. Thus, the one-child policy which was at first gender-neutral became engendered. Sex ratio at birth went back to 109 during this period of accommodation. Yet, the government strengthened the enforcement of the policy again for fear of failing economic development which was believed to partly but importantly depend on fertility decline during the years between 1988 and 1993. Villagers were forced to passively neglect or adopt out baby daughters especially when they had no son yet. Thus, reproductive practices became engendered, too. Consequently, sex ratio at birth became skewed to 153 during those years. Greenhalgh observes that women's resistance to the policy had paradoxical effects for them. Their insistence for having at least one son and resistance to one-child policy made a traditional value of son preference re-emerge and even the official policy recognises it. Thus, culture is "historically situated construction" (Greenhalgh and Li 1995: 610).

Greenhalgh maintains that “power and politics are central to reproductive process” (1995b: 26). She emphasises that the analysis of fertility needs to be situated in the context of political economy at both macro and micro levels while taking agency into account simultaneously. It should go beyond a “demography of women”, integrate feminist perspectives and problematise reproduction as a product of classed, raced, ethnicised and gendered unequal relationships (Greenhalgh 1995b: 23). Her analysis of the Chinese villagers’ resistance to the state population policy shown above exemplifies an alternative approach of reproduction which draws on demographic data, anthropological sensitivity to culture and micropolitics, feminist knowledge of dynamics of reproduction and the insights of political economy which connect local systems and practices to national and global dynamics.

Sociological Imagination

Half century ago, Wright Mills (2000) urged sociologists to imagine sociologically rather than myopically looking at numerous small bits of precise data and waiting them to speak for themselves. By imagining sociologically, or conceptualising social structure on the ground of systematically collected information, we are able to make sense of the troubles and struggles of different individuals in the context of larger historical scene. Such an insight is even more necessary today when a variety of personal troubles and social problems have become interconnected under a force of escalating globalisation.²⁷

²⁷ Notwithstanding popular imagination, globalisation is by no means a novel phenomenon. While translocal contacts had always existed in many parts of the world for many centuries, more progressive global interactions have been expanding and intensifying since the infancy of capitalism (Wolf 1982; Abu-Lughod 1989). As Marx diagnosed (2000), capitalism is such a system which constantly renovates its means of production and expands itself for infinite accumulation of capital. It has progressively incorporated diverse local systems and eventually established a single world-system by the second half of nineteenth century. The early capitalist transformation is generally called modernisation and carried on, although in very diverse ways, principally through the creation of national economies which interlink to one another under the single capitalist world-economy. Immanuel Wallerstein (1979: 19) however reminds us that capitalism is a globally oriented system from the very beginning. Efforts for making national economy originated from the demand of less competitive local capitalists which was responded by the patriotic enthusiasm of statesmen of infant nations (e.g. England *vis-à-vis* the Netherlands in the second half of the seventeenth century, France *vis-à-vis* England in the eighteenth century). Later on, in face of massive destructions by the WWII, advanced capitalist countries were inclined to establish regulatory international systems which protect state sovereignty and national interest of each country (i.e. the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund etc.) and adopted protective Keynesian state policies. At the same time, a number of new nations emerged as a result of decolonisation in the post-World War

What is called globalisation today was initiated by economic restructuring in the early 1970s and immediately followed by the restructuring of the world order and political instabilities around the world. Globalisation has given rise to concomitant manifold transformations in every sphere of society, yet it is nonetheless better understood principally as a process of capitalism's restructuring struggle rather than an arrival of a different system (Cox 2000: 23). Zygmunt Bauman (2000) aptly named the transformation as that from "heavy modernity", which was inclined to substantiality, stability, growth in size and spatial expansion, to "light modernity", which pursues more adaptability, mobility, flexibility, and instantaneity. The terms suggest that the latter inverted the tendencies of the previous decades yet nevertheless it is still modernity. While the previous modernity was a policy-led capitalist order, the new modernity is a market-induced process (Mittelman 2000: 3). However, it does not mean that the latter is a natural, evolutionary, or inevitable process; it is still a political process which was imbued by the latest crisis of capital and has been directed by strategies and ideologies in favour of capital and often ensured by repressive police and military force to prevent protests and destabilisation by the disadvantaged (Cox 2000: 23). Globalisation is by no means a transformation of capital in isolation; yet a transformation in the relationship between capital and labour, which opens up new tensions and contradictions (Mittelman 2000: 2; Ertürk 2006: 80). Thus, whereas globalisation has been affecting everywhere and everyone and awakening a liberal self-image of more opportunities for more people, it has been in fact making a new polarisation of emancipation and insecurity for capital and labour respectively (Bauman 1998).

period. Political economic stability in those nations was crucial for the West in the context of the Cold War for the consideration that popular discontents could lead to red revolution. Hence, nation-building in the Third World was generally directed by way of development policies that promised national capitalist economic growth and eventual well-being for all the population. Nonetheless, modernisation was in effect a force of integration and differentiation within and among nations at the same time. While it integrated people in different parts of the world into the capitalist world-economy indirectly through nationalised polity, economy and culture, it differentiated them by class and centre/periphery relations in addition to pre-existed hierarchies such as gender and race.

Economic restructuring and consequent tensions have been coincided with political instabilities around the world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989 was a definitive sign of an overall restructuring of the world order as well as the beginning of destabilisation. It was the end of a balance of polarised Great Powers between the US and the Soviet Union which had been suppressing internal disagreements and discontents within nations. For many countries in the world, the great external enemy as a uniting force of a nation suddenly disappeared. A major incentive for core countries to deliver aid to periphery countries was considerably weakened since the fear of a rise of Communism disappeared. The latter themselves had been struggling with new fiscal structural adjustments. Such conjuncture gave rise to political and economic instabilities being combined with existing frictions within countries. It then resulted in ideological and territorial fragmentation and numerous internal conflicts in following years not only within the previous territory of the collapsed Soviet Union but also in many other parts of the world. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2006a: 108-9) reports that whilst a large number of refugees who had been displaced by Cold War conflicts were repatriated or resettled during the 1990s, new internal ethnic and civil conflicts simultaneously began generating millions of refugees in many regions of the world and there were still 27 protracted refugee situations and 7.9 million refugees in 1993. Many of those conflicts tended to turn chronic and the numbers of protracted refugee situations and refugees rose to 33 and 5.5 million respectively in 2004, which are more than the figures at the end of the Cold War. The number of refugees decreased in following years but “the number of people ‘of concern’ to UNHCR” increased from 19.5 million to 20.8 million between 2005 and the beginning of 2006 due to a large increase of those who were displaced by conflicts but did not or could not cross borders (UNHCR 2006b). The number of those who were affected by conflict-related internal displacement is estimated to be 24.5 million in 2006 (IDMC 2007: 6).

In fact, the apparent unilinear socioeconomic development in the previous decades was a historically particular temporary phenomenon. Today, we witness deteriorating poverty, widening inequalities, increasing insecurities and the reversal of many achievements realized in the first half of the twentieth century in many parts of the

world. Without taking political-economic developments over the last decades into serious consideration, the sluggish social and economic improvements are incomprehensible and simplistically attributed to ignorance, traditionalism or culture of members of disadvantaged groups. Economic competition is often deployed between not individuals but groups as opposed to the liberalist assumption and hence it can manifest as civilisational or cultural conflicts. Capitalist development itself is an abstract process but hardly destroyed existing inequalities between sexes and racial and ethnic groups. Rather, it has mostly been reworking them. Therefore, the sluggish social and economic improvements and disadvantages of a certain ethnic or racial group and women need to be analyzed in relations to political-economic conjunctures before being satisfied with ahistorical and apolitical social evolutionary or cultural explanation.

Bandarage (1997: 17) advocates a political-economic analysis of women's subordination. According to her, it views patriarchy as an organising principle of the entire globalising political-economic system rather than as an order applicable only to the family.²⁸ Unlike previous Marxist and socialist feminist approaches, it pays attention to women's restricted access to and control of the means of both production and reproduction in both spheres of public and private. It is also a dialectical analysis. It does not assume a simplistic causal relation between women's subordination and reproduction or specific variables such as education and employment.²⁹ It acknowledges the complexities of reality that women's lives are embedded in not only gender but also class, racial and ethnic relations while it takes seriously the

²⁸ See Marianne Marchand and Anne Sisson Runyan (2000) for an excellent analysis of reconfiguring forms of dominant masculinity in the process of economic restructuring.

²⁹ Nancy Riley is critical of demographers' use of a concept of gender in general for their treatment of it as individual characteristics rather than an organising principle of society as a whole (1999: 370). Measuring gender by such variables as women's education and labour force participation often misrepresents complexities of gender politics because women's labour force participation as well as fertility decline does not always reflect women's empowerment *vis-à-vis* men or a decline of patriarchy. Basu (2000) points out possible trade-offs behind the increases of women's education and employment. She draws attention to such cases as the lowering child mortality but increasing sex differentials in child mortality with the increase of mother's education in South Asia and the increasing elder sister's burden at home as a result of the mother's employment. See Günseli Berik (1991) and Hale Cihan Bolak (1991) for paradoxical consequences of women's labour force participation in rural and urban Turkey respectively.

structural force of patriarchy in overall society. It thus seeks to go beyond the notion of women as the homogenous group. It seeks to expose women's different and conflictual interests and the often paradoxical consequences of their struggles for the control over their body and life.

Economic and political restructuring and consequent instabilities and uncertainties appear to have worsened gender inequalities in many parts of the world. It has been pointed out that in case where the internal sociocultural boundary of a group is threatened by encounters and conflicts between two opposing groups, the existing power structure within the group can attempt to restore by reinforcing moral regulation and control over women (Ertürk 1996). Reproductive health problems of female refugees and migrants have been also reported in recent years (Bandarage 1997: 53). Yet, reproduction and fertility have been rarely examined in the context of political turmoil and insecurities and patriarchy reconfiguring in relation to them. Kurdish rural-urban migrants in Turkey are the people who have been disadvantaged in the process of economic liberalisation, increasing regional inequalities, political instabilities, and conflict-induced displacement over the last thirty years. Explaining their persisting high fertility without looking at social structural factors of political instabilities, migration, urbanisation, new poverty, ethnicity and patriarchy would risk overlooking ongoing micro social dynamics behind the scene as well as reproducing the myth of modernisation as linear progression. As an alternative to both social evolutionary and ahistorical cultural approaches, this dissertation attempts to go beyond the static view of reproduction and patriarchy and understand the reproductive struggles of Kurdish rural-urban migrant women in the East from a feminist political-economic perspective.

2.4. Conclusion

Conceptual framework of this dissertation is the political-economy of patriarchy and reproduction. A concept of patriarchy is one of the most significant theoretical contributions of feminist scholarship. However, today, patriarchy is sometimes seen as an outdated or failed sociological concept because of the quiet revival of non-

feminist literal definition of it as a feudal social system and the gradual loss of confidence in it among feminists themselves. The concept was often criticised for being too broad, abstract, reductionist and descriptive from both outside and inside the feminist circle. Feminists responded in various ways. Some abandoned the concept and shifted the focus of attention to gender. Some avoided the term and replaced it by male domination, androcentrism, or gender inequality. However, none of those terms capture the enduring phenomenon of systematic hierarchisation of individuals based on gender. A number of feminists continue to defend the concept since a range of injustice that women continue to experience systematically for being female despite an increasing faith for gender equality lapses into a state that has no name and then invisibility otherwise.

I consider that the concept of patriarchy needs to be defended and further developed. Patriarchy is not a failed concept but an immature one that requires further empirical studies and rigorous conceptualisation. Patriarchy did not disappear. It continues to be maintained in reconfigured forms across societies. The authority and privilege of father *vis-à-vis* mother, children and non-fathers continue to be upheld in modern capitalist society. All sorts of social relations continue to be not only gendered but embedded in the patriarchal legacy while being classed, raced and ethnicised. Patriarchy's apparent lack of specificity in fact reflects its pervasiveness, durability and transformability. They are its potency, too. They disguise and even naturalise the relations of domination that it creates. Patriarchy's reconfiguring capacity in dialectical relation to other systems of inequality, socioeconomic and cultural contexts and historical contingencies however requires further studies and refinement as an analytical concept.

The value of the concept of patriarchy is its grasp of the very existence of far-reaching and complex yet systematic and enduring subordination of women and men of subordinate masculinities to men that cannot be simply ended by one reform or another. None of male domination, androcentrism and gender inequality captures it. They are all important yet partial effects of patriarchy. Patriarchy is a social order that is historically constructed through genderic struggles. It is a gender order with

coherence and contradiction that is materially based and symbolically managed. In this dissertation, I use the term ‘patriarchy’ in a sense of a gender order that promotes male privilege by being male dominated, male identified and male centred.

The concept of reproduction is no clearer than patriarchy in sociology. Engels maintained that the production of human beings is one side of the twofold basis of society. However, reproduction has hardly been investigated further in contrast to the production of the means of existence until the second-wave feminists politicised the private, family and reproduction and claimed its intricate dialectic relations with the public and production. In sociology, the Marxist current in particular, reproduction usually meant social reproduction of capitalist system. Human reproduction was believed to be outside the domain of social life.

Anthropologists have recognised a number of cases that could evidence that human reproduction is not simply biologically determined human activity yet organised socio-culturally in a variety of ways. Those findings were however hardly paid attention until feminist activists and scholars problematised reproduction as a major site of patriarchal domination. The problematisation of reproduction was a considerable paradigm shift and opened up a new area of investigation. More feminist studies directed their attention to social reproduction of labourer which is disproportionately shouldered by women’s unpaid labour in capitalist society rather than human reproduction. Yet, a few but insightful studies of human reproduction were produced in the previous decades by prominent feminist scholars.

Firestone attempted a historical materialist analysis of reproduction in itself for the first time and pointed out its force of constructing gender inequality according to sexually different reproductive functions. Although she assumed reproduction as essentially biological, she argued that transcending Nature is one essential human capacity. In fact, attempts for working on reproduction are part of human struggle for transcending nature throughout history. However, it appears that the struggles have been led and dominated disproportionately by men. O’Brien argued that social relations of reproduction are not predetermined by biology but based on genderically

different experience of reproductive process; men's experience of unmediated alienation from the process of production of human beings and women's experience of mediated alienation at childbirth through labour. Fathers have struggled to mediate this alienation, uncertainty of paternity and separation from genetic continuity throughout history. They sought principles of continuity outside nature and crafted a range of institutions that systematically appropriate women's reproductive power and children and substantiate paternity. Therefore, as Rich argued, women's sexuality, reproductive capacity and motherhood are the crucial terrain for patriarchy. Far from being natural, they have been worked on hard to be institutionalised but patriarchally. Patriarchal organisation of reproduction is a historical consequence of genderic struggles. This is the theoretical premise on which this dissertation is grounded.

Feminists' (re-)discovery of reproduction as patriarchal organisation helped some social scientists set out studying reproduction. The ethnographic studies of Delaney and Jeffery and her colleagues are among the most prominent analyses of particular forms of gendered organisations of reproduction. Demographers have always studied fertility and looked at reproduction partially. The limitation of socioeconomic causal explanation of fertility decline, the growing interest in cultural, or non-economic, factors and the rise of gender consciousness in the discipline however made many demographers to take into account sociological factors, including women's socioeconomic status, which were considered to be related to reproductive behaviour. The new demographic studies of fertility have provided abundant valuable data with regards to reproduction. However, cultural approaches in demography tend to continue to be under the influence of the legacy of Modernisation School and see social change as linear and Westernising. This perspective risks overlooking complex and often contradictory social dynamisms of relations of reproduction behind an apparently consistent pattern of fertility. Further, its modernist bias often presumes that reproductive control is an invention of modern mind and technology and ignores the historical fact that it has been the central terrain of human concern and genderic struggles throughout history. Hence, it has difficulty in conceiving a possibility that poor, uneducated or/and Third World women may engage in the struggles for reproductive control despite the result.

The theoretical orientation of this dissertation is a feminist and political-economic perspective which seeks to understand patriarchal social relations of reproduction under certain socioeconomic and political conjunctures. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, patriarchy is not limited to the domestic sphere. Patriarchy is a gender order that organises all spheres of social life extending from the public to the private or from macro to meso and micro levels by means of a range of institutions. It is hence inevitably intersected with other social forces. Secondly, reproduction is one of the central terrains of domination at both macro and micro levels. It is the central concern of international and national politics historically and particularly after the 1960s in the context of growing global inequality while it is also a central area of local, familial and conjugal politics. Thirdly, under a force of escalating globalisation, personal, local and global lives are increasingly interconnected today. Economic restructuring and the end of the Cold War world order have brought about considerable economic and political instabilities in many parts of the world. Under such historical conjunctures, the conventional view of social change as a linear process is no longer useful. What is required for the study of human reproduction today is a feminist and political-economic perspective that pays particular attentions to the interconnection of larger contexts and personal troubles and the dialectical relations between the systems of inequality (especially patriarchy) and historical contingencies.

CHAPTER 3

POPULATION POLICY IN TURKEY

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall delineate how Turkey's population policy has changed in response to shifting national political situations and international population politics. It would help us to see that a local pattern of reproduction is by no means an independent or isolated event from larger politics and policies. The shifts in population policy have, directly or indirectly, affected the way in which women in the country control their reproduction. In particular, inconsistent implementations of family planning programme, persistent inequalities between regions and settlement areas in health services and an overall instrumental approach that objectifies women as a means to generate the modern fertility pattern (i.e. the planned births of two children with an appropriate age gap by means of modern contraception per woman) not only left many women in eastern and south-eastern regions unable to benefit from adequate health services but also labelled them as "the laggard" to be taken special measures today.

3.2. Shifts of Population Policies in Turkey

The Period of Pro-natalist Policy, 1858-1960

Before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, birth control was already a subject of state law. It appeared for the first time in the Imperial Penal Code, the first comprehensive criminal code of the Ottoman Empire, codified in 1858 in large conformity with the Napoleonic French Code of 1810. Under the law titled "Crimes and Offences against Persons and Punishment thereof", abortions performed by the pregnant woman, by another person with consent of the pregnant woman and by another person without consent of the pregnant woman were all criminalised with increasing penalties (Franz 1994: 47).

When the Republic was founded, it was facing massive human losses resulted from the successive wars (the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the War of Independence) and a high level of infant mortality (Levine *et al.* 1978: 53; Franz 1994: 48; Özberk 2003: 73). In this period, population growth was seen as a key for the economic development and military strength of the nation as it was in post-war Europe. The population growth for recovering the defence needs of the country and the shortage of agricultural manpower became one of the priorities in state policy. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Republic, repeated the need to ‘increase the population and raise a dynamic population’ in a number of speeches. His one-party parliament made a series of pro-natalist laws and measures to encourage population growth in addition to those which encouraged the immigration of Turkic people from abroad. Many of them were enacted by following Mussolini’s population policy in Italy; “maximum birth and minimum death” (Özberk 2003: 74).

The Turkish Civil Code of 1926 was adapted from the Swiss Civil Code but reduced the marriage age for men and women to 18 and 17 and further to 17 and 15 respectively in 1938 though the main purpose of the amendment was said to be the integration of the rural population into the new state by acknowledging their customs rather than the encouragement of fertility (Levine *et al.* 1978: 53-6; Franz 1994: 48-9). In 1929 and 1930, the Law on Local Administrations and that on Municipalities were passed and the obligations of the improvement of public health, the establishment of free maternity hospitals and the distribution of cheap or free medicines to the poor were imposed on local administrations. In 1930, the Law on Public Hygiene obliged the Ministry of Health to award mothers of six or more children with money or medals and prohibited the import and sale of contraceptives except for medical reasons. Several amnesty laws that allowed parents to register children who were born out of wedlock, or in unauthorised religious marriage (*imam nikâh*), were issued in 1933 onwards. In 1938 heads of large families were exempted from road construction drafting and given priority for land distribution and benefits in repayment concessions. In 1944, child support payments for civil servants were

introduced. In 1949, income tax reduction was decided to be weighed up according to the number of children.

The new Turkish Penal Code, which was adopted from the 1889 Italian Penal Code (IPC) and passed in 1926, was almost same as the rules of IPC on the matter of abortion. It however added an article which mitigates the punishment for abortion in case where it was performed in order to save the honour of the pregnant woman (Article 472) (Franz 1994: 49). The Code was modified in 1936 in accordance with the new Italian law of 1930 legislated under the Mussolini's fascist regime and "The Crime of Induced Abortion" was changed to "Crimes against the Integrity and Health of Race" (Esen 1975 cited in Levine *et al.* 1978: 55). The amended articles penalised any action which attempted to avoid conception, increased the penalties for induced abortion (Levine *et al.* 1978: 55) and for the first time criminalised acts which restrict "the procreative power", that is, sterilization and castration (Franz 1994: 49).

However, the effectiveness of those measures to encourage childbearing is highly questionable (Levine *et al.* 1978: 56). In particular, despite a further increase of penalties in 1953, abortion continued to be widely practiced, approximately one out of five pregnancies (Levine *et al.* 1978).³⁰ The population finally began increasing from 1945 onwards probably because of the decline of mortality rate and extension of longevity according to Frederic Shorter's estimation (1968). Shorter estimates that birth rate in effect declined in the period between 1935 and 1960 precisely because of the change of birth control practice in marriage regardless of the prohibition of abortion and other contraceptive methods (Shorter 1968: 16-8). Shorter's estimation seems to be supported by Alan Duben and Cem Behar's (2002) findings in the study of family formation in Istanbul in the late Ottoman and early Republican period. They found from their close examination of censuses and other documents that the late Ottoman and early Republican Istanbul household structure was quite simple, both male and female marriage ages were already quite late in the 1880s in

³⁰ Bans on abortion led to illegal, risky and often crude operations. According to a study conducted in 1959 in 137 villages, more than half of the deaths of mothers could be related to abortions (Levine *et al.* 1978: 58).

comparison to that of neighbouring countries and further increased in the following years and women were spacing births longer and longer and stopped childbearing earlier and earlier. They argue that contraception had been thinkable and possible well before the end of the nineteenth century in Istanbul and a range of folk methods had been already practiced (Duben and Behar 2002: 180-9).

For example, the barrier methods were widely known and different kinds of spermicide (e.g. salts of lemon, ammonium chloride, aloes, asphodel root, tannin and soap) seemed to be used as pessaries among late Ottoman and early Republican Istanbul women. The douche was also seemed to be frequently practiced for contraception. Regardless of the prohibition, abortion, whether induced abortion or self-abortion, seemed to be widely perceived and practiced as a birth control method. Withdrawal (*azil*) is the only mentioned and explicitly approved method in the *hadith* (the written collection of the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad) and was probably widely practiced. Duben and Cem conclude that the preference and attempt for a smaller household among Istanbul people in at least as early as the 1880s derives from the aspirations for European lifestyle of the period and they were the trend-setter of the rest of the country. They mention about the changes in urban economic structure in the period, such as the dramatic increase of the number of people who engage in bureaucracy and other kinds of wage work (Duben and Behar 2002: 36) but understated more than they, I consider, deserve.

The Year of Transition, 1958

It was the end of 1950s when objections against the pro-natalist state policy emerged for the first time. A committee set up by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in 1958 reported about a large-scale practice of illegal abortion and consequent health problems and deaths of mothers. It then recommended the legalisation of abortions under certain circumstances and contraceptives for the first time in official document in Turkey (Levine *et al.* 1978: 57-8).

In the same time, anxieties about the sudden rapid population growth after the WWII began to be voiced by doctors and concerned scholars. Some pointed out the possible

problems of rapidly growing urban population and argued for population control (Levine *et al.* 1978: 57). Some tried to draw attention to unceasing deaths of mothers as a result of unsafe abortions (Akin 2007: 88-9). The 1950s was also the period when the US and other Western countries' foreign policies began taking measures against 'population explosion' in the Third World and argued its destructing effects for national economic growth (Özberk 2003: 79). However, the voices were heard only after a group of leftist military officers called National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*) deposed the centre-right government under the Democrat Party (*Democrat Partisi*, or DP) by a *coup d'état* and a new government adapted state developmentalism.

The Launch of Antinatalist Policy, 1960-1967

The military government and the following centre-left civil government viewed the rapid population growth as an impediment to economic growth (Franz 1994: 52-3). In 1961, the High Planning Council and the Ministry of Health had the first discussion about population planning and decided to pursue antinatalist policy. Nusret Fişek, the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, supported the legalisation of abortion by arguing that the rapid population growth causes high unemployment, a drain of state budget, a rise of landless villagers, mass migration into cities and consequent poverty leads to a number of unsafe abortions and deaths of mothers (Akin 2007: 90). In 1963, the newly established State Planning Organization (SPO - *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, DPT) drafted the First Five-Year Development Plan. It also expressed the concerns about the negative effects of population growth over economic growth and proposed the abolition of laws against birth control, the launch of family planning programme and a public campaign on birth control.

In 1962, the bill which was drafted by SPO to provide the legal basis for public family planning programme was proposed but passed as the Population Planning Law (*Nüfus Planlama Yasası*)³¹ after three-year long heated discussions between

³¹ Law no. 557.

those who supported for the reasons of economic development and mother and child health (mostly the MPs from the Republican People's Party - *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, or CHP) and those who opposed for the reasons of morality, the possible harms of contraceptives to women's health and the need for labour force (largely the MPs from a new centre-right party, the Justice Party – *Adalet Partisi*, or AP) in the parliament (Levine *et al.* 1978: 59-65). The Law was renamed from 'family planning' to 'population planning' for the fear that the former implied an invasion of familial intimacy (Levine *et al.* 1978: 63; Akin 2007: 91). It articulated the legal right of every citizen to determine the number of children and birth-space; authorised the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to organise the public education about birth control and distribute or sell contraceptive devices with minimum prices; penalised the sale of contraceptives which were not authorised by the Ministry and abortions, sterilisation and castration without medical reasons; lifted the articles with regards to the encouragement of childbearing and the prohibition of contraceptive use and advertisement (Franz 1994: 55-6).

By the end of 1966, the Ministry of Health opened 142 family planning centres. A three-day course on birth control methods was given to health personnel in different towns across the country. In the same year, the manufacture of contraceptives was launched within the country. It was aimed to reach 5 percent of the women in reproductive age and IUD was promoted in particular. Public health services provided IUD for free but charged for other methods (Akin 2007: 93). It is said that IUD was supplied to 115,000 women by the Ministry by the year 1968 (Özbay and Shorter 1970: 1). In 1967, the General Directorate of Family Planning (*Aile Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü*) was set up. The Institute of Population Studies (*Nüfus Etüdüleri Enstitüsü*) was established in the Hacettepe University in the same year (Franz 1994: 56-7).

The Period of Antipathy, 1968-1979

The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968-72) set the goal of the five percent increase of female contraceptive users by the year 1972. It advised to target rural women in particular. The Third Plan (1973-8) attempted to integrate family planning

services with Mother and Child Health services and stressed the importance of socioeconomic development rather than population reduction in itself. However, the 1965 Population Planning Law and the measures drawn up in the Five-Year Plans are said to be not implemented satisfactory and the population continued to grow rapidly (Levine *et al.* 1978: 66, 68; Franz 1994: 57).

As a matter of fact, it seems that the use of contraception increased and fertility rate dropped rapidly after 1963 (Franz 1994: 57; Yüceşahin and Özgür 2008: 140). Ferhunde Özbay and Shorter (1970) examined the difference of contraceptive practice between before and after the legislation of the 1965 Population Planning Law. They found that the desire for birth control was unchanged from 1963 to 1968 but the knowledge and practice of birth control increased further in all the settlement areas and regions though they were rather limited in rural areas. Nonetheless, the most practiced and most increased usage was withdrawal. IUD was the method actively promoted by the Ministry but accepted by only a fraction of women for the official target. Further, the women who ever had abortion seem to have increased, perhaps in order to correct contraceptive failure rather than as a means of birth control. Özbay and Shorter conclude that the pro-natalist policy was introduced when the practice of birth control had been already rising and it probably reinforced the trend but did not initiate it.

There are a number of reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of public family planning programme. According to Levine and his colleagues (1978: 66-71, 240-2), first of all, the educational programme of family planning planned in rural areas was never institutionalised partly because of a rather pro-natalist position of the Ministry of Education. Levine and his colleagues observed a general hesitation among many policy makers with rural origin about aggressive family planning programme in the 1970s. Secondly, the number of family planning centres had increased across the country since the beginning of the programme but half of them were inoperative because of the absence of physicians who were authorised to insert IUDs particularly in small towns and villages. Thus, the number of IUDs which were distributed had decreased constantly since 1969. Thirdly, in the latter half of the 1970s, public

opinions of both right and left wings developed anti-imperialist sentiments and opposed family planning as imposition or plot by imperialist countries. Thus, while the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) and the Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selâmet Partisi*, MSP) were expressing strong pro-natalist views, the rest, including the ruling party, the AP, were avoiding the issue of family planning altogether. Lastly, the Third Five-Year Development Plan integrated in their own terms the rising voices from the South that argued the impediments of development is not population growth but unequal distribution of income and resource and poverty, which was pronounced in the 1974 ICPD in Bucharest (Özberk 2003: 79-80). The Plan thus prioritised socioeconomic development, which was hoped to bring about fertility decline eventually.

In 1978 when Bülent Ecevit took power and CHP formed a coalition government with independents, a problem of never-ceasing unsafe abortions was taken up again in the government (Franz 1994: 63-4). In 1979, a bill for legalising induced abortion by a medical doctor was presented to the National Assembly but failed because of the growing influence of right-wing parties, MHP and MSP. The debate over abortion continued afterwards for a while. Yet, the end of the 1970s was the years of administrative instability, political violence and growing economic crisis. The issue of liberalisation of abortion as well as the implementation of family planning programme was forgotten by policy makers who had to tackle with economic reforms.

Re-launching Anti-natalist Policy, 1980-1985

The army took over political power once again on September 12, 1980. General Kenan Evren took over the office of Head of State and the National Security Council consisted of high-ranking military officers set out suppressing terrorism and reconstructing national economy. Within their economic reform, the regulation of population growth became an issue again. Evren pronounced at a speech in Trabzon in April 1982, "Two children are enough!" (Franz 1994: 65). For the first time in Turkish history, the subject of family planning was included in the new constitution accepted by referendum in November 1982. In the Constitution, family planning was

circumspectly placed in the context of family under Article 41 titled “Protection of Family” and eliminated a possibility that it was related to sexual liberty (Franz 1994: 66).

In 1983, the new Population Planning Law (*Nüfus Planlama Yasası*)³² was legislated. It repealed the 1965 Population Planning Law. In the new Law, not only physicians but also trained nurses and midwives are authorized to implement contraceptive methods (Art. 3); sterilization for both male and female adult at his or her will is legalized (Art. 4); and abortion up to tenth week, or later in case of medical need, is legalized (Art. 5). Article 6 stipulates the consent of the pregnant woman herself for the termination of pregnancy or sterilization but also requires the permission of her guardian in case of the minor and that of her spouse in case where she is married.

After the general election held in 1983, the army returned state authority to the elected representatives. Turgut Özal and his centre-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, or ANAP) formed the government with 45% of the votes and set out democratization and neoliberal economic restructuring. Population or family planning was not a particular concern for the ANAP government. It only abolished the law that benefited families with many children in tax reduction.³³ The Fifth (1985-89) and Sixth Five-Year Development Plans (1990-94) continued the position that prioritises socioeconomic development and welfare rather than population control (Franz 1994: 69).

Enforcement of Family Planning Programme, 1986-1989

The 1985 census however shocked policy makers (Franz 1994: 72). Population growth rate which had been gradually declining since 1960 suddenly rose between 1980 and 1985 (See TURKSTAT 2005: 2). In spring 1986, the General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning (*Ana Çocuk Sağlığı ve Aile Planlama*

³² Law no. 2827.

³³ Law no. 3289 of 11.12.1985.

Genel Müdürlüğü, or AÇSAP)³⁴ launched a country-wide campaign for family planning, the largest in scale in the country's history, under the slogan "fewer but healthier children" and aimed at the reductions of infant mortality and induced abortion with a full support of President Kenan Evren and some business circles.

In 1987, the Basic Law of Health Services (*Sağlık Hizmetleri Temel Kanunu*)³⁵ was passed as a start of health reform. The reform was however hindered financially and politically from the beginning. The Özal government attempted the privatisation of health sector but failed because of financial difficulties and political resistance (Franz 1994: 76). Financial shortage, the imbalance of the distribution of fiscal expenditure and the increasing political unrest in eastern and south-eastern regions held back the reform. The number of health personnel increased and regional disparities were eased. Yet, a number of eastern and south-eastern provinces, including Van, suffered even the decrease of the number of physicians who were already insufficient in the 1980s (SIS 1990 cited in Franz 1994).

Meanwhile, international population establishments used to provide reserved aids to Turkey since the country was considered to be equipped with administrative and financial capacity to operate family planning programme (Franz 1994: 74). However, in 1987, a delegate of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) expressed the impatience with Turkish policy makers about their lack of full recognition of "the need for more forceful family planning strategies" "especially with regard to the less developed regions ... where educational and other social services lag behind" (Holzhausen 1987 cited in Franz 1994: 73). In 1988, the UNFPA prepared a financial plan of five million dollars fund for family planning projects in Turkey for the period between 1988 and 1992 although the US government had withheld foreign aids to the agencies and programmes that support

³⁴ AÇSAP was established as a result of the unification of the General Directorate of Family Planning and the Directorate of Mother-Child Health in 1982.

³⁵ Law no. 3359.

or promote abortion since the introduction of so-called Mexico City Policy by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 (Franz 1994.: 74).³⁶

In the same year, the media campaign for family planning was launched for the first time. It was broadcasted through the state-run radio and TV stations (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*, or TRT) and sponsored by the private family planning foundation of the Koç Holding, Turkey Family Health and planning Foundation (*Türkiye Aile Sağlığı ve Planlama Vakfı*).

Target Group Approach, 1991-Today

In the 1990s, the issue of women in development discourse was shifting from the concept of ‘Women in Development’ (WID) to that of ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD). The emphasis had changed from women’s participation in development to women’s empowerment. It was reflected in international population policy, too. In the 1994 ICPD, the concept of ‘reproductive rights’ was finally integrated in place of the idea (or fear) of ‘overpopulation’ as a result of feminist lobbying as mentioned in the previous chapter.

SPO also took up women’s issues in the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1985-1990) and the development programmes published in 1994 and 1995 (Özberk 2003: 81). The 1997 programme re-defined the services of AÇSAP within the framework of the concept of reproductive health rather than that of population or birth control. It declared the increase of the number of family planning clinics in hospitals in order to enhance the accessibility of the services and their quality and the promotion of postnatal care. In the same year, different concerned institutions came together and prepared the National Action Plan for Women’s Health and Family Planning (*Kadın*

³⁶ The Mexico City Policy was named after the venue of the 1984 ICPD where the final language of the recommendations was negotiated by the deputy chairman of the U.S. delegation, Alan Keyes, to withhold federal funds from international organizations that support abortion. The policy required United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to withhold funding from all NGOs that engage in any activities which promote abortion services in other countries. It was in effect until 1993 when Democrat President Bill Clinton revoked it (See US President Barack Obama’s Memorandum for the Secretary of State on 23 January 2009, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/MexicoCityPolicy-VoluntaryPopulationPlanning/).

Sağlığı ve Aile Planlaması Ulusal Faaliyet Planı) (Özberk 2003: 81). It stated the need to integrate the youth and men as target groups and include public education about sexually transmitted diseases in the services. It also drew attention to the relationship between women's socioeconomic status and the access to health services.

In reality, the country's fertility rate had already declined to below three in 1990 and was steadily approaching to the replacement level. Thus, family planning programme in the late 1990s shifted to a target group approach which focused on rural women, migrant women in urban squatters, women in eastern and south-eastern regions, men and the youth whom the programmes in previous periods could not reach or did not include (Franz 1994: 94). According to Franz, growing regional discrepancies in contraceptive usage and fertility rate were well acknowledged and women in the eastern and south-eastern regions were seen as a 'risk' group by policy makers.

It is reported that during a short period in the late 1990s even public polyclinics (*sağlık ocağı*) in small towns became equipped with a room for family planning counselling in Van for example (personal communication with Dr. Tuğrul Erbaydar). Koç's examination of TDHS-1993 reveals that modern contraceptive methods are more likely to be used in the East *vis-à-vis* traditional methods. Koç infers that it is a consequence of the intensive enforcement of state-led family planning programme in the region (2000: 340). Research papers concerning contraceptive usage which were published in the 2000s reflect the tendency. During the last decade, studies on the acceptance and usage of contraception and primary healthcare service by women in the East,³⁷ women in squatter areas,³⁸ and men³⁹ have suddenly flourished. Yet intensified political unrest particularly in rural area within the regions prevented a satisfactory implementation of the programme in the context of limited financial

³⁷ C.f. Ertem *et al.* (2001); Şahin and Şahin (2003); Ertem *et al.* (2004); Zeterolu *et al.* (2004); Ozcirpici (2005); Saka *et al.* (2005); Ergenekon-Ozelci *et al.* (2006); Eryilmaz (2006); Boyacıoğlu and Türkmen (2008).

³⁸ C.f. Erbaydar (2003); Ince *et al.* (2003); Karavus *et al.* (2004); Save *et al.* (2004); Ay *et al.* (2007); Dinç *et al.* (2007).

³⁹ C.f. Özvaris *et al.* (1998); Mistik (2003); Akin and Ozaydin (2005); Ortaylı *et al.* (2005); Pirinçici and Oguzöncül (2008); Albrechtsen *et al.* (2008).

resources (Setbacks in public services in the eastern region in the 1990s are further discussed in the following chapter).

Further, in 2001, Republican US President George W. Bush re-instituted the Mexico City Policy which was rescinded by President Clinton in 1993 and the US donors partially withheld funding from the family planning sector (Kulczycki 2004: 1031). It was coincided with economic crisis in Turkey and followed by the re-engagement of neoliberal economic policy of the conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, or AKP) which took power at the 2002 general election. They all seem to have had negative effects on the expansion and improvement of family planning services. It appears that under the new neoliberal health policy family planning programme has become less prioritized and the role of family planning counselling was centralised to AÇSAP centres which are usually found mostly in provincial centres. As a consequence, *sağlık ocağıs* in small towns and villages came to be equipped with less types and number of contraceptive devices (personal communication with Dr. Tuğrul Erbaydar; Karahan *et al.* 2007).

On the other hand, the Ministry of Health and AÇSAP continued to make efforts to integrate the reproductive rights concept into their primary health policy and launched the five-year Turkey Reproductive Health Programme (*Türkiye Üreme Sağlığı Programı*) in coordination with EU in 2003. In 2005, they published *National Strategic Action Plan for Sexual Health and Reproductive Health, 2005-2015* (General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning 2005a). The Action Plan identified five problems in sexual and reproductive health in Turkey: the high rate of maternal deaths; the large number of unwanted pregnancies; the increase of STD (sexually transmitted disease) and HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome); the low level of sexual and reproductive health among the youth; and the regional and residential (rural, urban and squatter areas) inequality in terms of sexual and reproductive health.

The preventive measures that the Plan proposes reflect a reproductive rights perspective. Those for unwanted pregnancies target the eastern region and rural and

squatter areas and aim at reducing the inequalities between regions and settlement areas in particular. They emphasise the individual rights to decide whether, how many and in how long interval she has children freely and responsibly; to obtain related information in order to do so; to access the best quality health services and benefit from them regardless of sex, race, marital status, age, ethnicity, income, region and settlement area; to decide whether and which family planning method she uses freely and knowingly; and to choose and apply an effective and safe method (General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning 2005a: 33). They also recommend health personnel to protect the privacy and personal information of the beneficiary of the services, approach her in a respectful and concerned manner, help her/him feel comfortable and ask her view concerning the services. The ways in which those measure are implemented and their consequences will be shown in future time.

Return to Pro-natalist Policy?

TURKSTAT's population projection tells that in Turkey the rate of infant mortality will further drop from 16‰ to 8.8‰, life expectancy will extend from 73.6 to 75.9 years old, total fertility rate will decline from 2.14 to below the replacement level (1.97) and then the rate of population increase will slow down even more from 11.5‰ to 7.4‰ between 2008 and 2025 (TURKSTAT http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11). It suggests that the country's population begins aging gradually during the first quarter of the century. Nonetheless, Turkey still continues to be a young country in comparison to EU countries, in which the population above the age 65 is predicted to consist nearly one third of the whole population (Gürlehel 2004: 36). While 66.9% of Turkey's population was in the working ages between 15 and 64 years old in 2008 (TURKSTAT 2009b), it will be 68.1% in 2025.⁴⁰ Turkey will soon be the only country which still has a substantial working-age population in Europe at least for the next 50 years while EU countries will face a serious shortage of labour force as well as a crisis of social security system (Gürlehel 2004: 35). Therefore, it is pointed out

⁴⁰ It was calculated from "Mid-year Population Projections by Age Groups and Sex", available online at http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11 (accessed on 27.10.2009).

that the next half century is the “golden opportunity” for the country because the number of the population in school ages is decreasing and the state can invest in order for increasing the quality of education, rather than just increasing the number of schools, for the urgent need of labour force in the region near future (Gürlelel 2004: 50).

However, the prediction is taken as a predicament at least by the Prime Minister. On the 8th of March 2008, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke at a meeting for International Women’s Day in Uşak. He talked to women;

The West is suffering at this moment. Do not fall into these traps. If things go like this, the majority of Turkey’s population will be over 60 years old in 2030. Dear my sisters, I don’t speak as Prime Minister but as your worried brother. You never fall into this trap. We must preserve our young population exactly as it is. What is essential to economy is human beings. If there are human beings, then there are successes. If not, there aren’t any of them. What do they want to do? They want to clean out the root of Turkish people. What they did is this. If you do not want your population decrease, then there should be three children for one family. You are to judge. It’s a different matter (NTMSNBC 10.03.2008).

Erdoğan’s message is not only based on wrong data or misunderstanding of the data but also collected a few different criticisms; one is neo-Malthusian and the other is anti-nationalist. A former President, Süleyman Demirel, commented that the consequence of more births without educational and employment opportunities would be the production of street children who snatch women’s purses; “A country with a small population which has overcome poverty rather than a population which is much in number but impoverished will be a stronger country” (Hurriyet 11.03.2008). An article titled “Family Planning for Kurds, Many Children for Turks” published in *Yuksekovahaber* (Diken 2008) strongly criticised the message as a nationalist propaganda *vis-à-vis* Kurdish population on the ground that the message was given in an Aegean city; “What would have happened if a Kurdish politician said the same thing?”

The Prime Minister nonetheless keeps on repeating the message at weddings to which he was invited and they are publicised through the media. At the conference concerning the senior citizens held in September 2009, he stressed again that there

should be three children for each family in order to preserve the current state and achieve an advantageous position “before it becomes too late” (NTMSNBC 10.10.2009).

Inconsistent Implementations and Constant Fertility Decline

The history of Turkey’s population policy is a curious process of inconsistent implementations of family planning programme and constant fertility decline since the post-WWII period (Figure 3.1). As Shorter (1968) and Duben and Behar (2002) demonstrated, the desire and attempts for limiting births were existent long before the legalisation of biomedical contraceptive devices (IUD and oral contraceptives) in 1965, which was motivated by the rapid rise of population in the context of the rise of neo-Malthusian discourse in international politics. The authorisation of birth control probably reinforced people’s attempts for forming smaller family. Yet it was largely realised by traditional methods of withdrawal, folk barrier methods and induced abortion. In 1978, more than 60% of contraceptive users applied traditional methods (See Table 3.1). On the other hand, in the same year only 3% of married women in reproductive age were using IUD which the Ministry of Health promoted and the number of abortions per 100 pregnancies was more than doubled despite the legalisation of contraception (Akin 2007: 95). Family planning programme never took an aggressive approach in Turkey. It was hardly implemented insistently and consistently because of the hesitation against aggressive family planning campaigns among the following centre-right government and policy-makers, the rise of anti-imperialist sentiments in public and the emergence of counter-discourse against neo-Malthusianism that prioritises socioeconomic development and more equal distribution of resources.




Figure 3.1. Fertility Decline in Turkey, 1923-2003.
(Source: Yüceşahin and Özgür 2008: 140; HUIPS 2009: 12).

Table 3.1. Distribution of currently married women by currently used contraceptive methods in percentage, 1963-2008.
(Source: Akin 2007: 95; Ergöçmen *et al.* 2004: 226; HUIPS 2009: 17).

Contraceptive method	1963	1978	1983	1988	1993	1998	2003	2008
Any method	22.0	38.0	51.0	63.4	62.6	63.9	71.0	73.1
Any modern method	5.3	13.4	22.6	31.0	34.5	37.7	42.5	46.0
Pill	1.0	6.1	7.5	6.2	4.9	4.4	4.7	5.3
IUD	0.0	3.0	7.4	14.0	18.8	19.8	20.2	16.9
Condom	4.3	3.1	4.1	7.2	6.6	8.2	10.8	14.3
Female sterilisation	0.0	0.4	1.1	1.7	2.9	4.2	5.7	8.3
Other modern methods	N/A	0.8	2.5	2.0	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.2
Any traditional method	22.4	24.6	28.4	32.3	28.1	26.1	28.5	27.1
Withdrawal	10.4	16.8	25.0	25.7	26.2	24.4	26.4	26.3
Other traditional methods	N/A	7.8	3.4	6.7	1.9	1.7	2.1	0.8

The sudden rise of population growth rate in the first half of the 1980s, though fertility rate was declining as ever, became the second impetus for the implementation of anti-natal measures (Figure 3.2). However, financial shortage, the introduction of neo-liberal policy, fiscal bias against social welfare and increasing political unrest in the eastern and south-eastern regions deepened regional inequalities in the availability of primary healthcare and fertility decline while rural-urban discrepancies were narrowing. The setbacks in the eastern and south-eastern regions are reflected in the stagnation of national fertility decline between 1985 and 2000 (Yüceşahin and Özgür 2008). Yet the national fertility began dropping further than the 1985 rate after 2000 when the conflict was subsided despite the AKP government's reengagement of neo-liberal policy and the gradual centralisation of family planning services to AÇSAP centres.




Figure 3.2. Population and Annual Rate of Growth by Census Year in Turkey, 1935-2000. (Source: TURKSTAT 2005: 2).

3.3. Modernist Bias in the Implementation of Population Policy and Its Consequence for Eastern Women

As in other places in the world, family planning programme was introduced in Turkey as part of anti-natal population policy and modernisation project rather than for the purpose of improving women's health and empowering them. The prevalence of unsafe abortions and the consequent deaths of pregnant women were asserted as important reasons why contraception and then abortion need to be legalised and administered under the Ministry of Health. The primary motivation however derived from the fear of 'population explosion' among the poor in particular. The overall purpose of family planning programme has been population reduction, at least until recently, and the realisation of modern fertility pattern by an instrumental use of women's bodies. Hence, family planning programme is exclusively directed towards women as seen in the fact that it is administered under AÇSAP. IUD - a provider-control, and cost-effective (for the public sector), method - has been the most, even only, actively promoted, known and used biomedical contraception since the mid-1980s when AÇSAP launched a large-scale campaign (Table 3.1).⁴¹ Female barrier methods,⁴² which could provide a more effective control and satisfaction for a woman (Bulut *et al.* 2001), have no side effects and protect from STD, have been hardly promoted and used in the country where among the most frequent reason for not using or giving up biomedical contraception is known to be the fear of or experience of side effects (Karavus *et al.* 2004; Save *et al.* 2004; Ay *et al.* 2007).⁴³

Today, the usage of modern, that is, biomedical contraceptives is still limited in Turkey in comparison to European countries (General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning 2005b: 6). It disturbs the country's policy makers and health personnel. The knowledge of both traditional and modern contraceptive methods is widely prevalent regardless of age, settlement area, region and

⁴¹ It is curious that Alpaslan Baksu and his colleagues' (2005) examination of medical records in 1997 and 2000 obtained from a hospital in Istanbul show that women of higher educational level are less likely to choose IUD but more likely to use pill or condom.

⁴² Female barrier methods include female condom, diaphragm, cervical cap and spermicide.

⁴³ Diaphragm users consisted 0.6% in 1998 and 2003 (HUIPS 1999: 48; 2004: 64).

educational level and TFR is approaching to the replacement level in Turkey (HUIPS 2004: 61). However, the usage of modern contraceptive methods is still relatively low and withdrawal continues to be the most frequently used method. A significant rise of contraceptive usage from 1978 to 1983 owed to the increase of withdrawal users and a quarter of contraceptive users are using the method until today (Table 3.1), which is considerably high in comparison to most European countries (General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning 2005b: 7; Kulczycki 2004: 1020). It is often assumed by family planning experts that people's 'unfounded' but traditionally derived prejudice against modern medicine is the major impediment to the prevalence of 'modern' family planning pattern.

For instance, a group of medical professors conducted a research in an area of low-income migrant neighbourhoods in Istanbul with regards to the attitudes towards oral contraceptives (Karavus *et al.* 2004), which is used by less than 5% of the users despite the free distribution at *sağlık ocağıs* (HUIPS 2004: 64). They found or consider that the main reason why the women and men who participated in their research rejected the use of the pill is their "exaggerated" perception of health risks (Karavus *et al.* 2004: 95). They report that the women complained or were concerned about such "perceived health risks" as weight gain, headaches, nervousness, dizziness and irregular menstruation. However, headaches and irregular menstruation are mentioned as possible side effects for combined pills in the family planning counselling booklet prepared by AÇSAP (General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning 2005b). Weight gain and moodiness are also usually mentioned in the instruction of some oral contraceptives (e.g. Microgynon®). Likewise, another two different groups of doctors studied the practice of contraception in the same area and also found that birth control was desired and tried out by the people they interviewed yet the side effects of biomedical methods were "overemphasised" or "exaggerated" and withdrawal was the most frequently used method among them (Save *et al.* 2004; Ay *et al.*: 2007). The customary suggestion of those family planning experts is more "education" about the existing biomedical contraceptives rather than the promotion of side-effect free barrier methods and a range of natural family planning methods or the development of more male methods

or more sophisticated female methods (e.g. Karavus *et al.* 2004; Save *et al.* 2004; Ozcirpici *et al.* 2005; Ay *et al.*: 2007).

Ebru Özberk (2003: 104-8) argues that Turkey's population policy has presumed a set of opposing female types and attempted to transform one type into the other. One type is "the modern woman" who is a modern contraceptive user, urban, the western, between 25 and 44 years old, and educated. She marries at a relatively old age, gives birth at hospital, spaces births, attends pre and antenatal care, knows how to avoid STD and takes her children to a clinic for vaccination. Hence, her children are unlikely to die from preventable diseases. The other type is "the traditional woman" who is non- or traditional contraceptive user, highly fertile, rural, the eastern or the south-eastern, old or very young and uneducated. She marries early, gives birth at home, does not attend pre and postnatal care, does not know about STD, does not take her children to a clinic for vaccination, and loses many children she gave birth. Thus, Yüceşahin and Özgür (2008: 141) state;

Modernisation processes in Turkey have to a large extent changed the old image of the woman with numerous children working in the agricultural sector ... Over time the image of the modern woman working in a non-agricultural sector who wants to limit her number of children has gained currency. This image has strengthened the operation of social interaction channels among women ...

Eastern and south-eastern women who do not speak the official language, they argue, could not adopt the new image of women because of linguistic and hence cultural barriers and keep on giving births many children.

This dichotomy moralises women's reproductive behaviour. It advocates that the latter traditional type of women needs to be corrected into the former type not for their empowerment or well-being but rather for the realisation of modern low fertility pattern. The latter type of women is targeted for behavioural correction of their ignorance, biases and cowardice while the former type of women are glorified and promoted as knowledgeable and rational for overcoming anxiety about health risks. Such hierarchical and discriminatory attitude of health experts towards women has been probably reflected in the relationship between health personnel and the

recipients of services seen as ‘traditional women’.⁴⁴ Whether or not the reproductive rights perspective documented in the latest Action Plans will be implemented is going to be shown in future.

3.4. Conclusion

Turkey’s population policy has been swinging between the developmentalist desires to keep up with international political conjunctures and population policies – the compliance state patriarchy with global patriarchy - and the nationalist desires to force back external influences and perpetuate the non-intervention into the private sphere entrusted to the rule of fathers - the observation of patriarchal contract. Regardless of the inconsistent implementations of state family planning programme, the level of fertility has however almost consistently declined since the post-WWII period, that is, before the legalisation of contraception. Nonetheless, the increasing population growth continued to disturb developmentalist administrators, and foreign population establishments. The national TFR was approaching to the replacement level in the 1990s yet the persistent high fertility in the East was targeted for the implementation of family planning programme in order to bring into line with the national fertility level. It was an opportunity to provide primary and reproductive health services to more women in the region yet hindered by a series of setbacks – the intensified conflicts, economic crisis, the re-engagement of neo-liberal economic policy, the partial withdrawal of US donors from the family planning sector after the US government’s reinstatement of Mexico City Policy. The political and economic instabilities in the already underdeveloped region thus reflected in reproduction in a form of the increase of fertility level or stagnation of fertility decline in a number of provinces in the region.

⁴⁴ Kırımlioğlu *et al.* (2005)’s study of the client-provider communication in family planning consultation in three hospitals and fourteen village *sağlık ocağıs* in Eskişehir found that the clients’ unmet expectations towards health personnel were “respect for the rights and personality of the client” and “listening to the anxieties of the client sympathetically.” They also found from the voice record during consultations that the client-provider relationship is asymmetrical and the service provider always dominates the conversation.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF VAN

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall describe a particular political-economic context of Van in which relations of reproduction of Kurdish migrants in the city are embedded. Van's particularity does neither begin nor end with the ethnic composition. Its social and economic trends significantly diverge from the national patterns not only in fertility level but almost all indicators. Considering the powerful integrating and differentiating force of capitalism, the divergence however indicates not exactly the isolation from national system but the marginalised integration. The preservation of tribal system and feudal relations, insufficient (or inefficient) and inconsistent investments, and the rise of ethnic nationalism and political instabilities all hindered the fair integration into national system. They are all local matters yet closely interlocked with national and global economy and politics. As we shall see in the following chapters, the local relations of reproduction are inevitably embedded in such insecure political-economic context.

4.2. General Description

The province of Van is located at the east end of Turkey, between the Iranian border and Lake Van, the largest lake in the country (Figure 4.1). It is surrounded by high volcanic mountains and the half of the terrain is covered with mountainous areas. The population amounts to 1.004.369 in 2008 and it is rather dispersed across the province (TURKSTAT <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul>). Partly

because of the geographical location⁴⁵ and partly because of the lack of particular products with market value, Van, as well as many other eastern and south-eastern provinces, has been among the least favoured location for public and private investments and remained underdeveloped in comparison to the other regions in the country (Sönmez 1998). In addition, the political and economic alliance between political parties and administrators and tribal leaders in the East, perhaps including Van, resulted in the maintenance of feudal relations and hindrance of new opportunities to the people (e.g. Ertürk 2007: 6). Regional socioeconomic inequalities in Turkey have already deepened considerably and replaced rural-urban inequalities in the period between 1960 and 1980 (Sönmez 1992). Even during the period of state-led industrialisation, public investment hardly reached the East. In 1968, Van was designated as the prioritised province for development but the period of inefficient yet protective state capitalism was ended after a short while simultaneously with the 1980 military coup and the introduction of neoliberal economy by Özal government. As a result, state subvention and public investment by the Public Economic Enterprises (*Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri*, or KIT) considerably decreased in following years.

⁴⁵ In the Ottoman Empire and also the early Republic of Turkey, the integration into capitalist system was attempted through the export of raw material to Europe and hence western cities with ports such as, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana were preferred by the state for infrastructural investment.




Figure 4.1. Map of Van and neighbouring provinces. The inlet shows the area taken and enlarged from the map of Turkey.
 (Source: <http://www.kgm.gov.tr/images/turkiye.jpg>, accessed on 24.11.2009).

Thus, as many other eastern provinces, Van's socioeconomic development remained sluggish and it is ranked at 75th out of 81 provinces according to the provincial development indicator today (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 55). For example, GDP amounts to one thirds of the national average and the provincial share of GDP is only 0.5% (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219). Social infrastructure like health and education has been gradually improving in recent years largely due to purposeful investments by the state which wishes to eliminate popular discontents and eradicate their support for Kurdish separationism. Nevertheless, Van people still continue to be significantly disadvantaged compared to other people in the country. For instance, infant mortality rate dropped from 92 to 61 per thousand between 1990 and 2000 but it was still high compared to the national average (43 per thousand) in 2000 (SPO 1997, Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219). The numbers of hospitals and *sağlık ocağı* have increased during the last decade but the situation is not as good as in other places in the country. The number of physicians per 10,000 persons is less than half of the national average (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219). However, the introduction of Green Card (*Yeşil Kart*) in 1992, which is a type of health insurance given to the low-income citizen who cannot afford the other types of health insurance, greatly increased the access to health services among the low-income population in Van as well as those in the other provinces (Van Governor 2009a; HUIPS 2006: 82).⁴⁶

In addition to underdevelopment and the introduction of neoliberal economic policies, the conflict between the Kurdistan Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* or PKK), a paramilitary ethnic nationalist organisation, and the security force since 1984 not only terrorised people but also destroyed the livelihood of a great number of people mostly in rural area and forced them to leave villages. As Steven Holtzman and Taies Nezam (2004: xi, 1-10) point out, the tragedy of conflict-induced displacement by no means ends simultaneously with a flight from combat zone. The state of displacement tends to prolong for years or decades. The state of "living in

⁴⁶ Nearly 30% of the population is the green card holder in Van (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219). According to Hacettepe University's migration and internally displaced population survey (HUIPS 2006: 82), more than 90% of security-related migrants did not have any health insurance before migration but nearly two thirds of them have health insurance now probably because of the introduction of Green Card.

limbo” creates their particular vulnerability and multiplier effect of displacement depending on socioeconomic conditions before displacement and those in host societies. Besides, the multiplier effect may not be limited to the individual life of the displaced but can make impact on larger society, such as ethnic and communal antagonism which could renew violent conflict.

In fact, the Kurdish question in Turkey is an old problem. It goes back as far as the late Ottoman period which launched into the transformation of the empire to a centralised modern nation-state. The details of early Kurdish revolts are beyond the scope of this dissertation and many issues such as the timing and nature of the emergence of Kurdish identity are still controversial among the scholars.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, it is safe to say that early Kurdish resistance was fundamentally an objection against the administrative and economic centralisation and the secularisation policies in the Republic. It was tribal and religious in nature and concerned only tribal leaders and religious upper classes (Içduygu et al. 1999: 993, Güneş-Ayata and Ayata 1998: 132). Hakan Özoğlu (2001) for example argues for the catalytic role of Kurdish notables in the emergence and subsequent development of Kurdish nationalism. In the eyes of Kurdish notables, centralisation was a threat to tribal autonomy maintained as a buffer zone between the two empires of the Ottoman and the Persian. Republicanism and secularisation were equally distrustful for them who were members of the Ottoman bureaucracy and also Sufi origin. Özoğlu also supports a social constructionist approach of Kurdish identity. He argues that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement emerged only after World War I in the interaction with the modernisation project of the late Ottoman state and mobilised by

⁴⁷ For instance, while some claim the non-existence of formal assimilation policies in the Republican Turkish state (e.g. Heper 2007), some discuss that the Turkification of the saved territory was central part of the nation-building project of both the late Ottoman and the early Republican states (e.g. Üngör 2008) and some scholars argue that Kurdish identity has developed in a dialectical manner in the process of Turkey’s nation building. Mesut Yeğen (1996) for instance maintains that Kurdish identity has been constructed through the dichotomous relations between “Kurdishness” to be eliminated and “Turkishness” to be achieved which the Turkish state discourse has consistently identified: tribal politics/national politics; the Caliphate/the Republicanism; Islam/secularism; smuggling/national economy. Thus, by attacking the practices on the left categories as obstacles for building a modern nation-state, the Turkish state discourse has attempted to eliminate Kurdish identity.

Kurdish notables who had long-standing disputes among themselves but was united against the rising Turkish state.

However, with the introduction of multiparty system, a right-wing populist party, Democratic Party (Democrat Partisi, or DP), came to power and an agricultural policy which favoured landowners was instituted in the 1950s onwards. Tribal leaders were thus integrated into mainstream politics before long, which contributed their further political and economic empowerment (McDowall 2004 cited in Çağlayan 2009: 91). Yet, the same policy created new economic divisions in rural area, particularly of the southeast where landownership tended to concentrate in a few hands (Güneş-Ayata and Ayata 1998: 132). This in part contributed to prepare the background of the rise of socialist movements, including the PKK, in the 1970s.

The PKK's political objective and strategy have changed over time. As Ayşe Güneş-Ayata and Sencer Ayata (1998: 133-5) summarise, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its Marxist-Leninist claims were de-emphasised and more Islamic themes came to be stressed in its propaganda so that they could undermine the popular basis of a rising Islamic party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, or RP) and gain the supports from the generally religious local population. Its military struggle heightened in this period and attacked not only military and police installations but also factories, power plants and schools in order to destabilize the region and undermine the legitimacy of the Turkish state. However, by the latter half of the 1990s, the PKK was forced to reconsider its strategy as its attempts for urban uprisings were repressed, military camps were bombarded by the Turkish army and its military victory for national liberation from the Turkish state became unfeasible. Although its paramilitary operations are not totally given up until today, the organisation reformulated its propaganda in a way to appeal to international public opinion which has become increasingly sensitive to ethnic issues. It now represents the Kurdish question more as a minority problem and a matter of human rights violations by the Turkish state than that of imperialist exploitation.

Meanwhile, by the end of the 1990s, the increasing political unrest enhanced persisting underdevelopment in the regions where Kurdish population concentrates.⁴⁸ It has given rise to discontent and growing ethnic consciousness among the mass of ordinary Kurdish-speaking population for the first time. Yüceşahin and Özgür (2008: 152-3) point out considerable setbacks of public services including primary healthcare and family planning services in the region. In the 1990s just when *sağlık ocağıs* were about to increase across the region and began being accessed by the people even more than the other regions (HUIPS 1989 cited in Yüceşahin and Özgür 2008: 153), PKK militants destroyed already limited public utilities on one hand; the state closed down a large number of schools and *sağlık ocağıs* as part of security measures on the other. There were thus considerable setbacks in family planning services, as well as other public utilities, in the region during the 1990s.

Some early analysts used to optimistically anticipate the integration of Kurdish rural-urban migrants into the national socioeconomic system. Ayşe Güneş-Ayata and Sencer Ayata (1998: 138-9), for example, predicted, assuming the pattern of the previous conventional rural-urban migrants, that rural-urban migration would help Kurdish population integrate into the national economy and culture on the presumed ground of their knowledge of Turkish, the absence of ethnic discrimination, the lower unemployment rate than their home town, the access to houses and communal solidarity in squatter areas, and the prevalence of intermarriage among Sunni Muslims regardless of ethnicity.

On the other hand, Ahmet İçduygu and his colleagues (1999) pointed out the systematic socioeconomic inequality between Kurdish and Turkish speakers in Turkey and argued for the prevalence of material and cultural insecurities among Kurdish-speaking population. Enduring underdevelopment in the East, increasing regional and ethnic inequalities, prolonging political unrest and armed conflict

⁴⁸ According to the latest study by İsmet Koç and his colleagues (2008), Kurdish speakers comprise 14% of the national population and the second largest language group after Turks (83%). Kurdish population increased more than threefold between 1965 and 2003 probably for high fertility and declining mortality rates. Despite a large scale of migration after the mid-1980s and hence their significant increase in western and southern regions, the majority of Kurdish speakers (69%) continue to live in destitute eastern provinces.

between PKK militants and the security force, consequent material destruction and psychological damages, tightening state control over the use of Kurdish language⁴⁹ and expression of ethnic identity, and an increasing nationalist hostility of non-Kurdish citizens against Kurds are all interrelated and created not merely the fact of ethnically patterned socioeconomic inequality but also “an environment of insecurity” which nurtured the increasing resentment against the Turkish state and politicized Kurdish identity among many of those who identify themselves as Kurds regardless of the experience of displacement.⁵⁰

Recent studies based on the TDHS-1993 and onwards, which include the nationally representative language-related data for the first time since 1965, seem to support İçduygu and his colleagues’ argument. They show that all the indicators of mortality rates⁵¹, maternal care⁵², educational attainment⁵³, living conditions⁵⁴, and intermarriage⁵⁵ suggest considerable deprivations among Kurdish-speaking

⁴⁹ The Kurdish language was not recognised and its usage was banned in public spheres after the 1980 military coup until 1991 in Turkey. At the beginning of the 1990s, Kurdish identity gradually became recognised in official statements by statesmen for the first time since Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Republic (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 113). The official treatment of the language was considerably liberalised in the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union membership over the last few years. In March 2006, broadcasting programmes in Kurdish was allowed in two private television channels (Gün TV and Söz TV) and one radio station (Medya FM) except for cartoons and educational programmes teaching Kurdish. On 1 January 2009, the state-run Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) started a Kurdish TV station, TRT6.

⁵⁰ Sirkeci (2005: 160) refers to van Bruinessen’s finding that even the immigrants with Kurdish origin in Western Europe discovered their Kurdishness during the years of the armed conflict in Turkey.

⁵¹ The infant mortality rate of Kurdish children is 110% and 60% higher than that of Turkish children and the national average respectively and the far more rapid decline of mortality rate is observed among Turkish children than among Kurdish children in the period between 1993 and 2003 (Koç *et al.* 2008: 454).

⁵² The proportion of Kurdish mothers who received antenatal care and gave birth in a medical institution with an assistance of a health professional is only 14% while that of Turkish mothers amounts to 65% (Koç *et al.* 2008: 454-5).

⁵³ According to Sirkeci (2005: 166-7), in 1993, 28% and 40% of Kurdish men in the West and the East respectively had no formal education and it amounts to 48% and 66% for female counterparts. The regional averages unspecific to language group are much lower; 8% and 23% for men and 20% and 48% for women.

⁵⁴ For example, among rural Kurds, only 25% had drinking water piped into the house in 1993 while that accounts for 42% in rural Turkey on average. In the same year, only 15.4% of rural Kurds had toilet facilities in the house. Even in urban centres, almost one third of Kurdish households either use shared or no toilets inside while the majority of the national population used their own flush toilets (Sirkeci 2005: 169).

⁵⁵ As opposed to Güneş-Ayata and Ayata’s prediction (1998), intermarriage between Turks and Kurds continues to be uncommon despite of urbanisation (Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits 2002; Koç *et al.* 2008). In 2003, a great majority of both Turkish women (98%) and Kurdish women (92%) were married to

population particularly in eastern and south-eastern regions and their social segregation (Koç *et al.* 2008; Sirkeci 2005; Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits 2002). Further, in the study of recent urban transformation in Mersin, which has also received a large number of Kurdish migrants from the eastern and southeastern villages, Mim Sertaç Tümtaş and Atilla Göktürk (2009) found that the migrant population is losing the relationship with home villages, becoming more impoverished and acknowledging disintegration from urban life; the city is increasingly polarizing economically and then ethnically.

Changes of political adherence over the last two decades indicate a rise of Kurdish nationalist consciousness in the city of Van after the mass migration induced directly or indirectly by the conflicts and the sudden increase of urban population.⁵⁶ In 1984, CHP lost local election to the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, or RP) and the RP served three terms consecutively for fifteen years. In the 1999 election, the first Kurdish nationalist party, the People's Democratic Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, or HADEP), won the local election with 45% of the votes. But, HADEP was banned in 2003 for the allegation of its connection with the PKK, which was designated as an outlawed organization. In the 2004 local election, the new ruling party, AKP, won the municipality. The members of the Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, or DEHAP), which continued Kurdish nationalist politics after the banned HADEP, joined the election in an alliance with the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi*, or SHP) and, in Van, still won 40% of the votes after AKP. Since November 2007 when the parliamentary approval for cross-border military operation against the PKK was given to the armed forces, a number of demonstrations have been organised by Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, or DTP), the successor of DEHAP, and joined by the mass of women and men in Van as well as many other provinces which received Kurdish migrants from the areas affected by the conflict. At the local election in March 2009, DTP won back the municipality from AKP.

men of the same language group (Koç *et al.* 2008: 455). Kurdish women who are married to Turkish men even decreased within a decade between 1993 and 2003.

⁵⁶ The population of Van city increased 45.2% from 1990 to 2000 (SIS 2002b: 61).

I consider that the popular support for a series of Kurdish nationalist parties in Van for a decade indicates not simply the effect of propaganda but the persisting deprivations of Kurdish migrants in the city. However, I further argue that while ethnic nationalism is expressed in a gender neutral way, migrant women in Van suffer the deprivations as a migrant, as an indigent, as a squatter, as a Kurdish-speaker, and as the uneducated in a different and severer way from their men because of their gender. The divergent fertility trend of Van is one indication of this. According to SIS (2002a), the fertility rates of Van and some other eastern and southeastern provinces including Van increased during the period between 1980 and 2000 when the country had experienced a rapid fertility decline yet the East went through serious political unrest and socioeconomic insecurity (Figure 4.2).

In the following sections, by consulting both the accounts of the people I talked in the field and other written sources, I shall try to delineate socioeconomic insecurities of Kurdish rural-urban migrants in Van at the conjuncture of mass migration and exclusionary economic neoliberalism as a political-economic context which cultivates a form of patriarchy that is 'obsessed' with the confinement of women within a group boundary.




Figure 4.2. TFRs of Turkey and some eastern and south-eastern provinces between 1980 and 2000.
(Source: SIS 2002a).

4.3. Conventional and Conflict-Induced Migrations

In fact, population movements from the east to the west and from rural to urban area have been prevalent since the 1950s in Turkey.⁵⁷ As one of the eastern cities, Van has been thus both the sender and receiver of internal migration.⁵⁸ While the rate of out-migration of the province has constantly increased since 1975 with a rather lower rate than the other provinces in the region (Sönmez 1998: 17), the city of Van has been receiving rural-urban migrants from within the province and from neighbouring

⁵⁷ Since the 1950s, Turkey has been experiencing gradual but dynamic rural-urban migration with its peak in the first half of the 1980s (Kocaman 2008: 18). The urban population thus exceeded the rural counterpart by the early 1990s (Kocaman 2008: 7).

⁵⁸ Due to its location adjacent to the Iranian border, Van is also known for the first city where international migrants including asylum seekers from the politically and economically troubled countries such as Iran and Afghanistan arrive.

provinces since the 1970s. Furthermore, Van is one of the cities which have received two different types of rural-urban migrants for a relatively short time of period; the conventional voluntary⁵⁹ economic migrant and the conflict-induced forced migrant.⁶⁰ The arrival of the latter group of migrants significantly changed the socioeconomic landscape of the city and its impact is only assumed but not properly evaluated as many cases of conflict-induced displacement in the world. This section will examine the multiple impacts of forced migration on people's life: material resource, social network, and human capital.

As regards to terminology, in this dissertation, 'conventional' or 'voluntary migration' refers to a type of rural-urban migration that is motivated by better socioeconomic opportunities and has been prevalent since the 1950s in the country. Unless it is mentioned otherwise, 'conflict-induced' or 'forced migration' refers to the mass population movement in the eastern and south-eastern regions during the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s which was directly or indirectly caused by the conflict between the PKK and the security force.

⁵⁹ The term may be misleading and needs to be used with caution (Parnwell 1993: 24; Boyle *et al.* 1998: 38). Even labour migration in which actors appear to move deliberately with a purpose of maximising economic opportunity can be a decision made in the choices between survival and starvation resulted from the external forces like environmental or structural changes. On the other hand, forced migrants still do make a series of decisions on their move, too. Migration is social phenomenon; neither purely a result of individual deliberation nor totally a consequence of external forces. Thus, the distinction between voluntary and forced is an indication of "relative levels of freedom, set in the context of personal characteristics and of the society in which the migrant lives" (Boyle *et al.* 1998: 38).

⁶⁰ There are multiple types of forced migration; conflict-induced migration, development-induced migration, disaster-induced migration, and human trafficking. While forced migrants who crossed border are defined as refugees or asylum seekers, those who remained within the border but have been forced to move are commonly called as internally displaced persons or IDPs. The former can have a legal status according to a legal definition issued in the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, though there are estimated to be a substantial number of under-reported cases, on the one hand; the latter form of migration has no legal definition on the other. According to *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* which first appeared in a 1998 report presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights, IDPs are defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (UNCHR 1998: Introduction, para 2).

Conventional Migration

First of all, a substantial number of voluntary migrants began to arrive at the provincial centre in the 1970s when Van was designated as a prioritised province for development and communicational infrastructure, such as motorway, railway, airport, and ferryboat, was facilitated. The designation also resulted in setting up a number of state institutions and enterprises. They created a range of employment opportunities.⁶¹ In the meantime, animal husbandry was gradually undermined as a result of overcrowding in village and increasing state control over pasture. Many people thus moved from neighbouring rural areas to the city with the hope of better socioeconomic opportunities.

Voluntary migrants very often live in proximity with their relatives, if they had any, and formed *gecekondu* (squatter area), which literally means ‘the put up over night’ and is found almost all cities in Turkey which received rural-urban migrants. They built *gecekondu* houses by themselves on unoccupied public land at the peripheries of the city and re-created a relative-community.⁶² Besides, all the members of a household usually did not migrate at once. Thus, the mutual support between family members in home village and the city tends to continue if the village was not emptied as a result of the conflict which broke out later on.⁶³

⁶¹ The period between the 1950s and the 1980s was the time when import-substitution industrialisation was pursued through state-led development planning and public enterprise in Turkey. State enterprises tended to be overstaffed and inefficient but, from the perspective of migrants, provided secure employment in addition to job opportunities in the informal sector. For example, in his study of a migrant community in Istanbul in the 1970s, Metin Heper described a parallel development of the neighbourhood and a few plants in addition to hundreds of car repair shops (Heper 1978: 43). Kemal Karpat, who studied the same area, found that 79% of the married men and 41% of the married women had permanent jobs in 1968 although the employment in private firms was more common than state enterprises (Karpat 1976: 102).

⁶² According to Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2005: 112), the emergence of *gecekondu* is a complicit solution to provide housing with the urban poor excluded from both formal housing market and public provision. Populism in the period allowed municipal governments not only for tolerating the illegal housing but also for compromising in supplying water, electricity, and public transportation and even distributing title deeds to occupiers in exchange of votes. *Gecekondu* has thus provided low-income migrants with inexpensive residence, familiar environment and support mechanism: the community (Erman 1997: 95-6; Buğra and Keyder 2003: 18-9; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2005: 114).

⁶³ In Turkey, not only do the majority of conventional migrants continue to have families and relatives in village but also they maintain the intense material and social relation with home village by frequent visits, retaining the share of family plot, assisting harvest in summer holiday, receiving foodstuff from home, sending home money, putting up relatives and co-villagers who come to a city for medical

Thus, voluntary migrants in Van are also what Ertürk (2005) conceptualises “land-based/free-floating labor force” which come and go between wage work in city and the land in village. According to Ertürk, conventional rural-urban migration in Turkey principally results from the strategy of diversifying household resource, rather than ‘uprooting’ or ‘venturing’, for taking measures in the context of uncertain market economy without an efficient formal social security system. The strategy is becoming even more imperative as economic restructuring progresses and economic insecurity increases in the process of globalisation. Land-based/free-floating allows a migrant for working in city even without social security without risking the life of his family and himself. At a time of crisis, his wife and children can still live on land or share the hearth with other family members in village. In case of failure in city, he can go back to home village. Such strategy has provided migrants not only with material ease but also a considerable sense of security and insurance (Erder 1998: 25, Buğra and Keyder 2003: 23).

Many voluntary migrants brought animals and looms with them for making subsistence in case where they could not find a source of income immediately. Those early unskilled migrants could either continue animal husbandry in an outskirts of the city or found regular employment as labourer in public institutions which were newly set up in the city. That is a privilege which cannot be expected by later migrants.

Forced Migration

Conflict-induced migration or displacement began in the mid-1980s when the armed conflict between the PKK and the security force was instigated in eastern and south-eastern regions. The PKK is a paramilitary organisation led by Abdullah Öcalan since the establishment, and it is said that even after his arrest in 1999 he is still recognised as the honorary leader within the organisation and among sympathisers. It was founded in the 1970s for the revolutionary purpose of creating an independent socialist Kurdish state in order to emancipate Kurdish peasantry and working class

treatment or other reasons (Karpat 1976: 167-71, Erman 1998: 546-7; 2001: 122; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2005: 114-5).

from the Turkish ruling class and the Kurdish feudalists and bourgeoisie who collaborate with the former (Kirişci and Winrow 1997: 110). However, since 1984, a year after the restoration of civilian rule after the 1980 military coup, the organisation escalated paramilitary attacks against military and police installations. They set up mobile training camps once in Syria and Northern Iraq and later in the mountains on the border between Turkey and Iraq. The Turkish government responded with a range of measures such as designating six eastern and south-eastern provinces (Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van) as the State of Emergency Region (*Olağanüstü Hal Bölgesi*, or *OHAL Bölgesi*), launching the Temporary and Voluntary Village Guard System (*Geçici ve Gönüllü Köy Koruculuk Sistemi*)⁶⁴, evacuating the settlements which were suspected to provide logistical support for the PKK, and issuing a number of additional articles for the Pasture Law (*Mera Kanunu*) to restrict grazing in pastures in order to cut possible supports for the PKK militants hiding in mountains.

As a result of armed conflict, evacuation, pressures to support the PKK or join the village guard system, and restricted economic activities due to the conflict, a great number of people in the villages were forced to migrate to neighbouring or metropolitan cities during the last two decades.⁶⁵ In 1997, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) set up the commission for investigating the displaced people due to the evacuation. Their report (TBMM 2000: 258) identifies three major causes of conflict-induced forced migration; first, leaving villages due to the difficulty of continuing animal husbandry and cultivation as a result of the Pasture Law and frequent conflicts or/and the pressures and attacks from either the PKK or the security force for accepting to be village guards or rejecting it; second, the evacuation of villages by the PKK for rejecting logistical supports and particularly

⁶⁴ For the purpose of providing a means of self-defence against the attacks by the PKK, the village guard system is launched in 1985 by modifying the status of village guard already designated in an article in the Village Law issued in 1924 and still continues in 22 provinces, including Van, today. They receive 365 Lira (about \$243) on average as monthly wage. Although the employment of new village guards was suspended in 2000, there were still 57.172 temporary village guards in 2006 and there were 12.279 voluntary village guards in 2003 (Kurban *et al.* 2006: 72-4).

⁶⁵ According to TMIDPS (HUIPS 2006: 62), a large part of the security related migration from the rural areas took place between 1991 and 1995 (61%). Nearly one third occurred between 1986 and 1990, 5% between 1996 and 2000, and 2% between 2001 and 2005.

becoming village guards; and third, the evacuation of villages by the security forces according to a legal order⁶⁶ mainly because of the collective rejection of the village guards system.

According to *Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey* (TMIDPS) by HUIPS, the population displaced for security reasons⁶⁷ from the eastern and south-eastern provinces between 1986 and 2005 accounts for 1.48 % of the national population and are estimated to be between 953.680 and 1.201.200 persons (HUIPS 2006: 61).⁶⁸ Those from rural area are 1.15 % of the national population, which hence occupies a great part of the security-related migrants. Ninety-eight percent of the population displaced for security reasons between 1986 and 2005 originates from fourteen provinces in the east: Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van (HUIPS 2006: 6, 72). Half of them currently live in the urban (40.4%) or rural areas (10.1%) within those fourteen provinces and the other half live in the provinces of Istanbul, Kocaeli, Bursa, Manisa, Izmir, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, Adana and Malatya (HUIPS 2006: 6).

⁶⁶ Nevertheless, according to TMIDPS (HUIPS 2006: 78), although half of the security related migrants received a notice regarding to migration, almost all of which were verbally done.

⁶⁷ In TMIDPS (HUIPS 2006: 23), security reasons (*güvenlik nedenleri*) includes the anxiety for safety of life and property, the order of evacuation, the pressure to join the terrorist organization or the village guard system, and the anxiety for subsistence, for instance, due to the Pasture Law. Those who referred as security-related migrants or the people who migrated for security reasons (*güvenlik nedeniyle göç edenleri*) in the Survey are treated as the conflict-induced forced migrants in this dissertation.

⁶⁸ Defining and counting displaced people, particularly internally displaced people, are always difficult for its political nature and fluidity (Holtzman and Nezam 2004: 7-8). The case of conflict-induced forced migration in eastern and south-eastern Turkey is no exception. The government figures show that 378.335 persons were evacuated from 3165 settlements (TBMM 2000: 257). However, the governmental report includes only the people who evacuated from villages either by the pressures of the PKK or the order of the security forces but excludes those who were forced to decide to migrate due to the dispute with the PKK, village guards, or the security forces or the economic hardship directly or indirectly caused by the conflict. Further, as Turgay Ünal and his colleagues (Ünal *et al.* 2006: 69) point out, military operation and consequent conflicts took place not only in rural areas but also in some small towns (e.g. Lice, Kulp, Cizre) and a provincial centre (Şırnak). Thus, the figures estimated by NGOs tend to be much higher than those of the government, ranging from 1 to 4 millions (Ünal *et al.* 2006: 70). The dispute over the number however seems to be ended with the results of the national representative survey, TMIDPS.

Van, for instance, received the migrants both from within the province and from the neighbouring provinces, particularly Hakkari, Şırnak, and Siirt. Consequently, in the 1990s, the annual population growth rate of the provincial centre went up to 6%, which is as twice high as that in Istanbul in the same period (SIS 2002b: 61). In 2000, the urban population exceeded the rural population in the province (SIS 2002b: 44).

Consequences of Forced Migration: Losses of Material Resource, Social Network, and Human Capital

Although there are many voluntary migrants who suffer from insecure employment and poverty in Turkey today, it is probably possible to say that conflict-induced migrants from the eastern and south-eastern regions tend to face additional difficulties that the former did not experience: the lack of preparation and the losses of material resource, social network and human capital. First of all, it can be said that conflict-induced migrants are the people who were not prepared to migrate both psychologically and materially. They were forced to leave everything and migrate out of sudden because of external threats to their lives or livelihoods. Particularly, those who came to Van were often the people who did not have enough material resource, social network, or/and human capital to migrate earlier or to venture a new life in larger cities at the time of migration. In other words, it can be said that in general they were the people who were not empowered enough to move out of village if they were not forcibly displaced.

TMIDPS (HUIPS 2006: 72) shows that the most frequent reason for the choice of a place of migration among security-related migrants is the existence of relatives or co-locals. However, according to the 1996 research on the rural-urban migrants who moved to Van within two years, 97% of the respondents had no relatives or acquaintances in larger cities, such as Istanbul, Adana, Izmir, Antalya and Mersin, which also received the substantial number of conflict-induced migrants (Bilgil *et al.*1998: 333). This indicates that forced migrants who came to Van were the people who had limited social network in urban area. They had no place to go but the city of Van where they had a few relatives or simply some familiarity because of proximity from home viillage.

Secondly, in addition to their vulnerability before displacement, the conflict-induced migrants became truly uprooted because of the displacement. They were forced to leave land behind and sell livestock when they migrated. The result of TMIDPS is compatible with the accounts of the people I talked to in the field. According to the survey (HUIPS 2006: 80), more than 80% of the security-related migrants from rural areas used to own house, garden, field, farming equipment and livestock before migration. Sixty-eight percent and 46% of those from urban areas also owned livestock and field respectively before migration. Almost all the migrants reported that they had to sell or abandon their properties.

Some villages were burned down. Some villages were evacuated and turned into ruins. Many of them thus lost the access to plots that they left behind either because of the total demolition of their villages or the absence of relatives remained there. In the same way, some of the earlier voluntary migrants also lost their home villages and consequently material benefits from them some time after their migration. Some villages managed to remain since some villagers chose to become village guards instead of migration. But, those who rejected to become a village guard and left the village have difficulty in returning or visiting the village out of fear for possible abuse from village guards (Ünalán *et al.* 2006: 74).

There are some migrants who returned to their villages by applying to Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP)⁶⁹ or becoming village guards.⁷⁰ TMIDPS (2006: 71) shows that nearly half of the return migrant are over the age 30 and 15% is over the age 50. It suggests that returned migrants tend to be older in age and apply the conventional strategy of household resource diversification and leave their grown-up children in city. However, many migrants from the affected areas by the

⁶⁹ RVRP was launched in 1994 as part of Southeast Anatolian Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi* or GAP) for the purpose of assisting the return and resettlement of the villagers who were displaced for a variety of reasons ranging from conflict to development project and natural disaster. It was initially conducted in twelve provinces in the region including Van and then two more provinces were added later (Ünalán *et al.* 2006: 71-2).

⁷⁰ According to TMIDPS (2006: 63), at least 91.000 of the security-related migrants from eastern and south-eastern provinces in the last twenty years are estimated to have returned to the places of their origins. It amounts to at least 10.9%.

conflict, both the forced and the voluntary, no longer have home village that they can turn to as conventional rural-urban migrants from the other regions have been doing (Erder 1998; Buğra and Keyder 2003: 23).

Thirdly, it is not only material resource but also traditional social capital, or social networks that the conflict-induced migrants lost in the process of displacement. Holtzman and Nezam argue that social networks, whether ascribed or voluntary, are an important potential resource for vulnerable populations like the displaced in contributing individual households' well-being, providing informal social safety nets, or allowing for collective action to bring the benefit for the members from public institutions (2004: 103). However, they point out that spatial fragmentation of pre-existing communities is among the most tangible impact that displacement can bring about (Holtzman and Nezam 2004: 108). Physical separation is a serious threat to social cohesion and network, even ascribed one such as kinship, which are by no means given but require day-to-day social interaction and maintenance as well as contextual relevance; “[f]or example, social networks in agricultural communities are in many ways tied to the mode of agricultural production. ... When displacement alienates communities from this environment, the relevance of such foundations erodes in significance” (Holtzman and Nezam 2004: 110).

In case of eastern and south-eastern Turkey, the mass displacement in the 1990s accelerated the disintegration of tribal system (*aşiret*) in particular (Özer 2003). In Van, as well as many other places in the eastern and south-eastern regions, *aşiret* has been a traditional mechanism of social security. *Aşiret* is principally a socio-political consanguineous group commonly seen among nomadic or semi-nomadic people in the Middle East.⁷¹ Lale Yalçın-Heckmann (2006) studied Kurdish tribal system in Hakkari in the early 1980s. She defines *aşiret* as a segmentary⁷² (alleged⁷³)

⁷¹ According to Rüstem Erkan and Alpay Ok (2004: 57), a term '*aşiret*' is used more often for explaining tribal groups among Turks and Kurds while '*kabile*' refers more often to those in Arab society. In contemporary Turkey, '*aşiret*' refers particularly to tribal groups among Kurdish population.

⁷² In a theory of segmentary tribal system, the members of *kabiles* belonging to a certain *aşiret* are expected to join a conflict between another *kabile* in the same *aşiret* and a *kabile* in another *aşiret*. Thus, the conflict can spread beyond the families concerned and up to all the members of the *aşirets*

patrilineal group which consists of multiple groups of kinsmen (*kabile*) each of which is again composed of several households (*mal*). In the south-eastern part of Turkey, *aşiret* is generally ruled under the authority of landlord (*ağa*). On the other hand, in the eastern region, the people have traditionally engaged in animal husbandry rather than farming for the geographical reason. Thus, livestock, not land, is the major source of subsistence and the most valued property (Yalçın-Heckmann 1993). Pasture is never privately owned but shared by the members of an *aşiret*. The legitimacy and authority of the head of *aşiret* are therefore principally based not on landownership but on lineage inherited from the founder of the tribe as well as personal characteristic required for leadership although the founder's name has been lost in most cases and an *aşiret* is generally named after the area where the members reside today (Yalçın-Heckmann 2006: 136). *Aşiret* membership and solidarity in the eastern region are based ideologically on the assumed common lineage, economically on the sharing of pasture, and socially on physical proximity and daily interaction.

As Yalçın-Heckmann observed in her fieldwork, *aşiret* membership is by no means given but requires reinforcement by continuous remaking of kinship, friendship, and neighbourly relations (1993: 182). Thus, for many urban dwellers in Van, *aşiret* is no longer functioning as an organisational principle of their daily life but as a loose sense of identity.

While *aşiret* no longer operates as a safety net, migrant neighbourhoods in Van tend to lack communal solidarity (Conseil Sante *et al.* 2007: 77-8, 96). One of the reasons can be the perceived heterogeneity of a neighbourhood in comparison to home village which is mostly consisted of relatives. In case of conflict-induced migration,

they belong and maintain the solidarity among the members of an *aşiret*. However, Yalçın-Heckmann (2006: 157-8) argues that it is not always the case for the *aşirets* in Hakkari. For instance, those who live far from the *aşiret* members who involved in a conflict do not necessarily participate in the conflict. Physical proximity is important for tribal solidarity.

⁷³ As Yalçın-Heckmann also acknowledges (2006: 135), the members of an *aşiret* are assumed to be descended from the same ancestor yet in reality it is hard to trace it.

the decision to migrate was often made collectively and hastily.^{74 75} However, despite a collective decision for migration as a community, the people often dispersed from one place to another rather than resettling in one place together. After a large-scale in-migration of displaced families from different villages, many migrant neighbourhoods tend to be divided by numerous small blocks each of which is generally occupied by a couple of households of relatives or co-locals. The people tend to hardly socialise beyond a small circle of relative-neighbours.

A consequence of such a physical structure of the neighbourhood is significant for women. The issue will be discussed in the next chapter in details. It may be sufficient to note here that the degeneration of old social network after displacement largely resulted from the physical separation away from a particular context of production and the members of a community. Migration diminished the very foundation of traditional social network based on relations of agricultural production. However, it is hard to know that general reluctance to form new social networks beyond a small circle of relatives in new environment stems from the perceived heterogeneity of the neighbourhood or the mistrust nurtured in the process of conflict and displacement.⁷⁶

Lastly, another negative impact made on forced migrants is the area of human capital and it seems to have more severely affected women than men. According to Holtzman and Nezam, “conflict-related casualties among civilians can have significant impacts on the human ... capital of displaced populations, even after long periods of displacement” although human capital is mobile in general and hence its

⁷⁴ TMIDPS shows that a great majority of the security related migration in the last twenty years was collectively done as family (55.1%) and community or a part of community (41.9%) (HUIPS 2006: 77). The decision to migrate or accept the village guard system of course varied from village to village. It was often made in a way to oppose rival tribal groups (Içduygu 1999: 997). The village which made a collective decision to provide village guards and support the state against the PKK became facilitated with public services such as school and policlinic and the people remained in village.

⁷⁵ According to TMIDPS (2006: 77-8), one fourth of the security related migration was realized within the period between two days and one week.

⁷⁶ One of Holtzman and Nezam's findings (2004: 110) is suggestive: in the places in Europe and Central Asia where displacement was experienced in recent years, it is observed that trust is a commodity that suffered considerably in the transitional years of the 1990s and in Bosnia, for example, it is found that internally displaced persons socialised less than the local populations.

impact on the displaced is very much affected by their condition before displacement (Holtzman and Nezam 2004: 81, 84).⁷⁷

It can hold true for migrants in Van. Rural population in the eastern and south-eastern regions have been already considerably disadvantaged *vis-à-vis* the others in the country prior to migration in terms of educational attainment. For example, although the data of literacy and educational attainment by settlement area is not available, in Van only 37% of the population and 17% of the women of the age 6 and over were literate in 1980 when two-thirds of the population still lived in rural area while they were 67% and 55% respectively in the country (SIS 2002b: 44, 47, TURKSTAT 2005: 17). Two decades later, literacy rate improved but to the level of the 1980 national average (68% for the population and 52% for the women) and it remains considerably disadvantaged compared to the other parts of the country today (SIS 2002b: 44, 47, TURKSTAT 2005: 17). According to TMIDPS, the majority of conflict-induced migrants had no formal education or did not complete the five-year primary education (HUIPS 2006: 76). Particularly, it seems that those who migrated to urban area were more deprived of educational opportunity than those who were displaced but remained in rural area. Those who had no formal education or did not complete the five-year primary education amounted to 82% for the former and 66% for the latter.

Furthermore, despite the significant improvement of literacy in general, it seems that the gender gap deteriorated in Van during the period of political unrest. In 1980, the rates of illiteracy of men and women who are the age 25 and more were 47% and 90% respectively in Van (SIS 2002b: 49). In 2000, they became 21% and 64%. The gap widened from about twice to three times. Today, 72% of the adult female population have not attended school at all or did not complete primary education in Van while approximately 80% of the male counterparts can read and write and 70% completed at least five-year primary education. The gender gap is considerable. Thus,

⁷⁷ For example, they found from the cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia where public services were extensive and literacy was already universal, that the people were hardly affected by displacement in terms of education and occupational skills (Holtzman and Nezam 2004: 84).

it can be argued that many children in the province, especially girls, probably could not benefit from basic educational opportunity during the last two decades not because of the lack of school as it used to be in many eastern villages but because of political unrest and displacement which forced the already disadvantaged people into unfamiliar and insecure environment.

Men are more advantaged than women in terms of language, too. According to available data, 42% of the population spoke Kurdish language as mother tongue in the eastern region and 65% in the south-eastern region in 1990 (Mutlu 1995 cited in Kirişci and Winrow 1997: 120). However, Kurdish-speaking men are typically able to communicate in Turkish, even if they missed school education, because of military service and their gender role in trading, shopping and dealing with other business outside Kurdish-speaking community while women have engaged in domestic and agricultural production and hardly gone out of their Kurdish-speaking villages. Thus, in 1998, 4% of the adult female population in the country did not know the official language as opposed to only 0.4% for their male counterpart (Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör 2003: 840). The majority of the non-Turkish speaking women were Kurdish speakers and 88% of them lived in the East (Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör 2003: 840). Distribution of linguistic capital is thus specifically gendered. It implicates a considerable disempowering impact on eastern and south-eastern Kurdish women who migrated to urban area.

4.4. Marginal Integration into Formal Economy

While mass displacement affected conflict-induced migrants considerably but also voluntary migrants partly in terms of the loss of home village and the formation of heterogeneous rather alienated neighbourhood, economic difficulties are more and more shared by both types of migrants after global economic restructuring and the shift of state economic policy towards neoliberalism. As mentioned above, since the mass migration in the 1990s, a set of traditional mechanism of safety net (land, livestock, tribal and communal networks) has been rapidly dissolving in the eastern and south-eastern regions without the generation of alternative system. Continuing

socioeconomic deprivations of the eastern and south-eastern migrants are not only due to regional underdevelopment and low educational attainment but also due to the sudden loss of traditional safety net and also 'liberalising' economy which deepens socioeconomic inequality. At the launch of the Özal government in 1983, the national economy abruptly shifted from protectionism to neoliberalism and responded to globalising capital which increasingly demanded cheaper, flexible, and disposable labour force through a series of economic policies of limited state intervention, deregulation, privatisation, and export-oriented industrialisation. Consequently, urban economy is polarised between the increasing flow of capital into domestic market and the lowering cost of manufacturing which now turns to external market. The former resulted in the growth of consumerism among the rising middle class and the latter transformed the form of employment in manufacturing into subcontracting and piecework. The contemporary form of employment thus no longer provides unskilled workers like rural-urban migrants with social security and an adequate amount of pay sufficient for social integration (Buğra and Keyder 2003: 24-5).

In fact, recent migrants, either forced or voluntary, can no longer expect a secure job and social mobility as earlier migrants could, especially if they are unskilled.⁷⁸ Restructuring of state institutions resulted in the reduction of secure jobs for unskilled workers. After the reduction of state enterprises, few private investments were made in the region with poor infrastructure and political unrest. Accordingly, the unemployment rate in Van rose from 6.5% to 10.8% in the 1990s and it was as high as 32% in the provincial centre in 2000 (SIS 2002b: 52, 124). In the urban area, the majority of men work in service sectors (78% in 2000) (SIS 2002b: 123). Unskilled male workers mostly engage in construction, service work (e.g. waiter, cook and cleaning staff) or other casual temporary works while those in rural area continue animal husbandry and farming or are hired as village guards (SIS 2002b:

⁷⁸ TMIDPS reports that a great majority of security-related migrants after 1986 is either unemployed (44.5%) or works without social security (49.7%) (HUIPS 2006: 76).

148-50).⁷⁹ The rate of employment in industry amounts to only little more than 2% (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219). The employment rate of women has decreased as urbanization proceeds since many women have withdrawn from agriculture but their labour force is not absorbed in the other sectors.⁸⁰ It was 61% in 1980 and dropped to 47% in 2000 (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 52). The great majority of working women (95% in 2000) still engage in agriculture today and most of them (91% in 2000) are unpaid family workers (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 54-5).

Thus, it is possible to say that Van reserves a vast pool of unskilled labour which contemporary volatile economy requires. Seasonal labour migration to larger cities is very common among young migrant men today. The supply of day labour considerably decreases in winter when construction work, the major sector which provides jobs with unskilled workers, is totally suspended for bitterly cold weather in Van. Those who rely on irregular work go and work in other cities such as Istanbul and Mersin seasonally. Insecure employment and the disappearance of old *gecekondu*⁸¹ do not allow them to settle in those cities but seasonally migrate in spite of the lack of livelihood in Van.

⁷⁹ The considerable part of the provincial GDP consists of animal husbandry and agriculture. More than 70% of the land in Van is pasture (Van Governor 2009b). However, as mentioned above, the conflicts between the PKK and the state security forces in the last decades mostly occurred in highlands and many villagers were forced to abandon animal husbandry.

⁸⁰ This is a general trend in Turkey since the mid-1980s. See Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008) for details.

⁸¹ Parallel to the global trend, Turkish national economy transformed from an integrating force to a fragmenting force which promotes economic differentiation as well as cultural diversification. Over the last two decades, not only has what is called “new middle class” grown remarkably in urban areas (e.g Ayata 2002) but also the urban poor have been differentiated within itself. In their study of the transformation of an Istanbul *gecekondu* area, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2005:155-78) account that the urbanisation of rural-urban migrants changed from a mild and integrating process to a tense and excluding process since the 1980s. Urban economy in the previous decades slowly but surely integrated rural-urban migrants through a range of grassroots buffer mechanisms such as *gecekondu* and *hemşehri* (co-villager) networks; but in the 1980s and onwards it pushed them directly into at the midst of market economy which is increasingly volatile and competitive. In Istanbul, *gecekondu* became no longer a community, which shelters underprivileged rural-urban migrants, by the 1990s. As a result of populism in local politics in the 1980s, many *gecekondu* dwellers benefited from housing amnesties and granted title deeds. At the same time, the vast land at urban peripheries where *gecekondus* located became part of the urban centre as the city has expanded and its value dramatically increased. Early migrants who became *gecekondu* house owners increasingly came to sell their plots to housing estates or build apartments to rent flats to new comers. As a result, *gecekondu* became consisted more of tenants. It then lost neighbourhood solidarity. *Gecekondus* thus became no longer the *gecekondu* which used to shelter and support new migrants. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu argue that old migrants who have established relatively secure life in the city but nevertheless face

Alternatively, border trade provides a wide range of people from unskilled rural-urban migrants to villagers with good source of income although it is often illegal. In fact, border trade is a long standing important source of gaining cash in Van, a border province which lacks fertile land and industries but benefits from cross-border tribal and kin networks. In past, consumer goods such as sugar, tobacco, and tea used to be smuggled from Iran in exchange of sheep. Today, diesel fuel, heroin, and people are mainly smuggled across the border. In recent years, smuggling economy at the village level expanded to the national and international operation as the profits elevate incomparably. A smuggler living in Van talked to Ahmet İçduygu and Süle Toktaş who conducted a difficult fieldwork in order to investigate the mechanism of irregular border crossings from the southern countries to Europe through Turkey;

In this region, smuggling is part of our economy. If it weren't for animal husbandry and smuggling, the people in this region would not have survived for centuries. Smuggling is a way of life here and not something negative. ... I live in Turkey but more than half of Khvoy, Iran, is my kin. This kind of a relationship is an advantage for all sorts of smuggling, including the smuggling of people. It works like an insurance system (2002: 36-7).

Smuggled diesel fuel is sold everywhere in the city of Van from petrol station to individual houses in the back streets. In fact, it is hard to find legally traded petrol in the city. It is usually carried in the tanks of a range of vehicles from a lorry to a sedan by anyone who has access to smuggling networks. Smuggling drugs can be assumed to be less prevalent than diesel fuel for its much higher risk and limited access to the network. Nevertheless, the arrests of smugglers or drivers of vehicles carrying drugs are frequently reported in Van.

In my view, it is noteworthy that smuggling has been a crucial part of the region's economy not only because of the geographical location, limits of even the only ecologically plausible form of production (animal husbandry) and lack of secure means to obtain cash; but also because of the advantage of cross-border social capital

increasing insecurity are seeking economic betterment by excluding new comers into further poverty and contributing to their exploitation; thus, "poverty in turn" (*nöbetleşe yoksulluk*) as the book is titled. And, those new comers are mostly consisted of conflict-induced migrants from eastern and south-eastern regions.

inherited from the pre-Republican years before the national borders were strictly controlled. In the context of marginal integration into formal economy, people capitalize on such resource.

For example, in her analysis of sheep smuggling in Hakkari, Yalçın-Heckmann (1993: 22) accounts that smuggling requires a good accumulation of economic, human and social capital. The trader, who often belongs to the prominent families of the tribe, must have animals to sell, cash to hire shepherds and pay bribes, a career of smuggling experience and a wide range of contacts with officials and local allies. İçduygu and Toktaş (2002) also found that the international smuggling of immigrants in the Middle East is operated by loose horizontal kin, friend or ethnic network of locals, not by organised criminal groups. The task of smuggling is divided in many parts. But the chain of smugglers, porters and others who deal with miscellaneous jobs is only loosely connected by means of cellular phone. Turkey is the last transit country for immigrants who attempt to reach European countries and it appears that the Turkish Kurd plays a crucial role for smuggling career (often inherited from the father), cross-border relations⁸² and linguistic ability to communicate both with Kurdish-speaking smugglers across Iran and Iraqi borders and in Europe as well as Turkish smugglers and officials in Turkey.

According to Yalçın-Heckmann (1993: 24-6), smuggling is everyday experience for everyone, either as the smuggler or the consumer, in the region due to the prevalence of smuggled goods and it affects the people's relationship with the state. She argues that the long standing everyday experience of illegality already prepared Kurdish villagers for adversarial relations with state officials. I additionally argue that persisting marginal integration into formal economy in spite of increasing integration into capitalist system is enhancing such relations of Kurdish rural-urban migrants with the state.

⁸² The Kurdish population is dispersed across five countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia) in the Middle East and 500.000 Kurds are estimated to live in Western European countries (Sirkeci 2005: 153).

4.5. Conclusion

Relations of reproduction are embedded in political-economic and sociocultural contexts. Political-economic milieu in which Kurdish migrants in Van have been for the last decades is increasing instability and a consequent environment of insecurity. Persisting underdevelopment and deprivation of new opportunities and a decade of conflicts, political instabilities and displacement considerably destabilised the life of one of the most disadvantaged groups of people in the country. Particularly, the conflict-induced displacement between the mid-1980s and the 1990s created a new disadvantaged group. The mass displacement made devastating impacts at both individual and communal levels. As a result of the unprepared forced migration to the urban yet underdeveloped new environment, individuals lost material resource, social network and human capital. Communities dispersed and tribal system lost everyday relevance for many migrants, which in turn meant for individuals the loss of traditional mechanism of a safety net and being exposed to uncertain market economy before acquiring the power to access efficient formal institutional protections and re-establishing lives. The period of the political instability and displacement was coincided with increasing neoliberalism in the economic policy. It considerably reduced the opportunity of formal employment for unskilled workers like Kurdish migrants from the eastern villages. It affected not only conflict-induced migrants but also many voluntary migrants who tend to have moved to the city earlier yet are likely to be equally unskilled. In fact, mass displacement, too, affected voluntary migrants indirectly. Many of them lost their connection to home villages because of the evacuation. They are also exposed to the political unrest related to ethnic-nationalist movement and socioeconomically marginalised at the same time. In following chapters, I shall attempt to demonstrate how political-economic insecurities in which they live give rise to a defensive form of patriarchy which is obsessed with the woman's movement and greatly restricts her autonomous space to control reproduction.

CHAPTER 5

FIELD EXPERIENCE: HOW REPRODUCTIVE EXPERIENCES WERE LEARNED FROM KURDISH MIGRANT WOMEN

5.1. Introduction

The regional and ethnic differences of fertility in Turkey began to be studied in recent years yet most studies are quantitative analyses of nationally representative statistics. They provide large pictures of trends and they are valuable data in themselves. Yet, they are insufficient to understand social dynamics behind the trends and produce further knowledge about patriarchal organisation of reproduction embedded in particular political-economic context. Hence, in this dissertation, case study was chosen as a research method for its appropriateness for studying a phenomenon that qualitative data and empirical substantiation and a new perspective are in need.

Fieldwork was conducted in one of rural-urban migrant neighbourhoods, called *Doluca mahallesi*,⁸³ in the city of Van. Data were collected by means of in-depth interviewing between April and May in 2007 and between February and June in 2008. The residents of Doluca neighbourhood were chosen as a population because of their relative homogeneity in terms of income (low), education (low), religion (the Shāfi‘ī School of Sunni Islam), ethnicity (the Kurd) and place of origin (the East and rural) on the one hand and its relative diversity in terms of the type and time of migration on the other. The homogeneity helped to control environmental and other unnecessary variations. The heterogeneity allowed for comparisons between voluntary and forced migrants who are considered to differ in the degree of social, economic and psychological deprivations as discussed in the previous chapter. It was considered to help seeing the differences and similarities within a group of Kurdish

⁸³ The name of the neighbourhood is a pseudonym.

rural-urban migrants. In the following pages, I shall delineate the research process from the researcher's entrance into the field and data collection to data analysis and the profile of the participants of interviewing.

5.2. Entering the Field

I was advised by some people to enter the field with the help of a local NGO which has worked in low-income neighbourhoods in Van for poverty reduction and women's empowerment. I had no information about local people's perception about the NGO or NGOs in general. Yet, in either case where they (or some of them) have antagonistic feelings against or cordial relationship with the organisation, I considered that it was very likely that they take me as part of it because of my social status (a middle-class looking foreign woman). They might approach me with a certain bias, either suspicion or some material expectation. I could not predict but anxious about their influence on research. Eventually, I decided to ask the *muhtar*, a legally and socially legitimate gatekeeper of a community in Turkey in general, for introducing me to the neighbourhood. Even if there are some people who are hostile to him, it seemed to be unlikely that they would identify me with him. My instinctive anxiety was probably right. The *muhtar* made a comment against a group of researchers who once came to the neighbourhood to conduct interviews with girls and their families with regards to schooling in the name of an international organisation. He did not tell me the details but his expectation, whatever it is, was not met by them. He said, "They deceived us. They just travel around with the money from the organisation."

On the 1st of April in 2007, the *muhtar* took me to the neighbourhood. He sent one of the children around to call someone. A tall teenage girl came out from a path between clustered clay houses holding up her hands with sticky dough. She was helping her mother baking bread in tandoor. He introduced me to Dila, a high school student. He explained my purpose of being there as I told him in the mixture of Kurdish and Turkish; a student wants to talk with women to learn about childbearing in the neighbourhood. He told her to take me to women who have children in the

neighbourhood. She accepted the request and took me to her father's sister's daughter-in-law right away.

5.3. Description of the Field

Doluca neighbourhood is one of the oldest and largest squatter areas in Van. It is also the most remote neighbourhood from the city centre. It makes up a vast neighbourhood, spreading under a hill at the south end of the city which leads to Çatak and further Siirt and Şırnak where many people in the neighbourhood came from. It is a Kurdish-speaking migrant neighbourhood which consists of both voluntary migrants who have moved to the city throughout the period from the 1970s to today and conflict-induced forced migrants who migrated during the period of the mass displacement between the late 1980s and the 1990s.

In the late 1970s, a few migrant families from rural areas began settling in the area for it suited to graze livestock. Earlier settlers typically say, "It was much more comfortable thirty years ago. There were only a few houses then." The father of one of the participants of interviewing was one of them. Not only did he bring his animals when he moved from Uludere with his family; but also he launched a livestock trade. He used to bring animals from Iraq and sell them in Van until he was killed by robbers in Iraq on his business trip. However, the population has rapidly increased particularly since the 1990s. It has grown to a huge neighbourhood with 2,500 households and a population over 20,000 today. The area is now crowded with numerous small clay houses and some concrete multi-story houses up to the foot of the hill. The neighbourhood is composed of many small blocks. Co-villagers tend to live in proximity and some blocks are named after their home village. One of the participants accounted as follows;

I married in 1995. In those days, there weren't houses this many. People came later and built houses. When my father-in-law bought here, there were (only) his house and, you know that there was a wedding the other day, that house. Later on, his relatives bought plots in the same place in order to be close to each other. I mean, his uncle and his sons came and bought a plot just next to his. Another bought one next to theirs. It grew that way. Just like a village. Our block of houses is from the same village. There are the *Y aşiret* in another place. One from *Y aşiret* came but didn't

buy a plot here. They bought one in the place of their people. To be close with them (a 26-year old voluntary migrant from Çatak).

A group of a few households who are patrilineal relatives often share a tandoor and a backyard where two- or three-metre high heaps of balls of cow dung (*tezek*) are dried for fuel. Making *tezek* is women's job. One woman from Çatak where there are forests and people used woods for fuel cynically said that she never imagined that she had to use droppings for baking bread in the city. Baking bread is also women's job. Women of each household bake flat tandoor bread about once in ten days. Those who share a tandoor bake bread in turn but they sometimes help each other when one is ill or does not have another adult female member in the household because at least two persons (one for rolling out dough and one for fixing it to and taking it out from tandoor) are necessary for baking bread. A tandoor is the only 'communal' place where women from different households, though they are always relatives, come together.

It was the late 1990s after the mass in-migration that public services began reaching the neighbourhood. Until then, women used to carry water from a spring which located about 4 kilometers away. Today, almost every house is equipped with tap water and has the supply of electricity. There are some houses which draw water from the canal running through the neighbourhood instead of municipal water supply. The meters for water and electricity are usually tricked not to count the consumption and corrected when the officials come to check them. Therefore, in the most households, the people use a portable electric cooking stove even if they have a gas cooker for which bottled propane gas needs to be purchased. The sewer system is not well facilitated in the neighbourhood so that lanes are always muddy. Garbage is not regularly collected, too. Thus, the sides of the streets are lined with trashes. Today, both public buses and private-run minibuses (*dolmuş*) collect people from every corner of the neighbourhood and take them to the city centre every ten or fifteen minutes.

The first primary school was built in the southern part of the neighbourhood, the area where interviewing was intensively conducted, in 1996.⁸⁴ Today, there are two primary schools and one high school which was newly built in 2008 in the area. In the spring of 2008, a *sağlık ocağı* finally opened in the neighbourhood. Until then, the people had to go to polyclinics or hospitals in the city centre by taking a bus. There is the state-run Maternity Hospital called *Doğum Evi* near the north end of the neighbourhood. Women and children in the neighbourhood visit *Doğum Evi* most frequently. In recent years, public investment increased within and around the neighbourhood as well as Van in general and other eastern provinces as the state increases investment on public service against the Kurdish separationist movement (Polis Haber 04.11.2008). A new state hospital was under construction in the neighbourhood in 2008. A picnic site was built at the entrance of the neighbourhood in the same year though it was always closed during the period of the fieldwork.

An important characteristic of the neighbourhood is that there is no coffee house (*kahvehane*) which is a major socializing location for men in villages and neighbourhoods in many parts of Turkey. Doluca men tend to socialise in *kahvehanes* in the city centre while waiting for job offers as daily labourer rather than socializing particularly with their neighbours. The head of neighbourhood (*muhtar*) lives in the neighbourhood but spend most of the time in his office at the city centre as the *muhtars* of other neighbourhoods and villages around the provincial centre in Van. There are small grocery shops almost every corner of the neighbourhood. Despite the crowded houses, the streets in the neighbourhood are always quiet and relatively empty except for some occasions of wedding and Kurdish nationalist celebrations and protests. There is one mosque. It is probably the only place where men in the neighbourhood gather once a week for Friday Prayer.

Doluca neighbourhood is known for the residents' political adherence to Kurdish nationalism and support for the PKK and a series of pro-Kurdish political parties,

⁸⁴ There was one primary school at the far north end of the neighbourhood, the side closer to the city centre, but it took half an hour walk from the part of the neighbourhood I studied and the people usually did not send girl children that far.

currently the DTP. Before the 2004 local election, children stoned a bus which carried the AKP mayor candidate when it was passing before the neighbourhood (Gündem 2004). In February 2008, two men were arrested for distributing a bulletin on behalf of the PKK (Forumlegal.net. 2008). On the 27th of November in 2008, the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the PKK was celebrated with fireworks in Doluca and two other neighbourhoods (Gündem 2008). The resentment against the ruling party particularly increased after the cross-border military operation against the PKK militants was launched at the Iraqi border in December 2007. The DTP organised a number of demonstrations against the raids in the city. It mobilised men, and women who hardly go out, into streets. The images of air raids and demonstrations arrived at every household through television and entertained the imagination of the state's unilateral violence against Kurdish rebels and mass demonstrations across cities in the country.

During the pilot study in spring 2007, young women and girls used to tell that they were happy with the life in the city. However, since the operation, they have been furious with the bombardment and expressed negative views on migration. Although she has never seen her parents' villages, one young woman angrily said, "We were very happy with village life. The state forced us to move out our village and we are in poverty and misery here. They always resort to violence. All violence, violence and violence!" She and her family often talked about the demonstrations against the operation in other towns reported by Roj TV, an international satellite Kurdish broadcasting, with excitement.

In recent years, the government launched a range of social assistance programmes. A great number of households in the neighbourhood seem to benefit particularly from conditional income supports, which were initiated as part of the World Bank's Social Risk Mitigation Project yet are now implemented by the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity. However, people generally consider that the aid comes from a foreign source rather than the state which they believe to be hostile to or uninterested in Kurdish citizens. One woman asked who was giving the assistance at the bank which she went to receive the money for school children from low-

income family. A clerk said, “Eat grapes. Don’t ask the vineyard.” Another woman was very thankful to ‘the UN’ for granting monetary assistance to mothers and giving her an experience of spending her own money for the first time in her life.

Of course, not everyone supports the PKK. There are some who try to keep distance from the pro-Kurdish politics. For instance, one participant never went to demonstrations despite her neighbours’ persuasion. Her home village was one of the villages which accepted the village guard system. Despite the fact that her mother died from childbirth because there was no doctor in the village at that time, she stresses the village’s natural beauty and well-facilitated infrastructure brought probably after the villagers’ acceptance for supporting the state. She said that she saw no point of pro-Kurdish slogans that her neighbours shout; “I’ve never seen anything like this in my father’s house.” Her husband is a wedding singer and was told to sing without pay at a DTP’s meeting. He refused. According to her, his jobs were considerably reduced since then.

5.4. Selecting Participants

The selection of participants for interviewing was conducted according to a combination of snowball and theoretical samplings. Case study does not aim and claim for generalisability and representativeness. Therefore, what was done is not exactly ‘sampling’. But rather it was selection of cases for theoretical, not statistical, purposes (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Hence, cases were not selected randomly but purposefully with the care of including married women in different ages, both Turkish speakers and non-Turkish-speakers and both voluntary and forced migrants in the process of shaping hypotheses during data collection (Eisenhardt 1999).

After entering the field, I conducted pilot interviews with eight women during April and May 2007. I later appreciated that the *muhtar* introduced me to the right person. Dila took me to six women in person; her father’s sister’s daughter-in-law, her maternal grandmother’s two daughters-in-law, her uncle’s two daughters-in-law, and her mother. Her mother, Berfin, was one of the few women who were known for

benevolence and trusted by her neighbours. She is one of the oldest residents in the neighbourhood, too. Her parents migrated from Uludere to Van in the late 1970s when she was about six years old. She grew up in the neighbourhood and married with a son of another early migrant family from Pervari. Not only did she patiently help me to get a general idea about social life in the neighbourhood with the translation of her oldest daughter during the first days of the research; but also she introduced me to her next-door neighbours by saying that I was her friend whom the *muhtar* introduced her. They in turn convinced the other women to help me by referring to Berfin and the *muhtar*. Many women seemed nervous at first and some repeatedly asked who brought me here and why I wanted to know about their life. Yet, they seemed to become relaxed after they heard the names of Berfin and the *muhtar*.

The *muhtar* introduced me to Dila, rather than her mother, probably because she was a high school student who has a privilege of more freedom of movement than many other girls and women who have no duty like schooling and wage work. However, even Dila could take me only to the houses of women who were her relatives. When we went to her grandmother's house to see her daughters-in-law and I discovered after a while that it was her grandmother's house, she said to me, "Of course. That's why I'm relaxed this much." I thus understood that she usually does not visit non-relatives in her daily life and cannot take me to women other than her relatives. Consequently, I have interviewed only the daughters-in-law of Dila's relatives and one neighbour, Ceren, who rented a house next to hers by the end of pilot study and most of them and all of their husbands were voluntary migrants. I asked Berfin and the other women whom I already interviewed if they knew anyone who migrated in more recent years because of the conflict and if they could introduce me. They said that they were sorry but they visited only relatives and knew no families which came to the neighbourhood because of the conflict. I also asked one of the participants to introduce me to her mother and sisters-in-law who live in the neighbourhood but a little far. She said that it would be difficult because she did not visit them very often and even if she did she could not stay there for a long time with her three small children.

When I was considering about asking the *muhtar* again to introduce me any forced migrant family and restarting another snowball sampling from them, I met a forced migrant woman by chance. In September 2007, Ceren and her husband moved out to their new house in another area of the neighbourhood and another family moved in the house next to Berfin's. They were forced migrants. After examining the pilot interviews I conducted so far, I returned to the field in February 2008 although I had continued visiting some of the women from time to time in order to keep in touch. To my surprise, none of the women but Berfin had talked to their new neighbour by the time. They said that she hardly went out. I asked Berfin to introduce me her new neighbour. She readily accepted and knocked her door right away. She introduced me to Yasemin and explained her about my research in Kurdish. I had no clue how Berfin explained about me and my research but Yasemin was listening to her with smile and occasional giggles and invited me into her house. She said, "I like Berfin very much. Everyone here is *X aşiret*. They support one another very much but do not help outsiders. Only Berfin helps me. She gave me coals the other day, too." Yasemin was a forced migrant who came from a village in Çatak with her family in 1995 when she was seven years old. She introduced me to her brothers' wives and mother-in-law who were also forced migrants. Her mother and brothers' wives live just across the street from her house. It is a block inhabited mostly by forced migrants from Çatak. Most of the forced migrant women I interviewed were Yasemin's relatives and one was her mother and sisters-in-law's neighbour, Sevda. Sevda dropped by Yasemin's brothers' wives when I was also there and accepted to have an interview in her house. She came from another neighbourhood when she married her husband seven years ago. She thus also did not know anyone whom she can introduce me; "I'm sure I'd have introduced you someone if I knew anyone. I go nowhere but only to Yasemin's (family). Even that is criticised sometimes."

Another key person was Songül. I met her when I visited Berfin's oldest daughter who in summer 2007 married a man living a hundred metres up the street from Berfin's house. Songül is the wife of the man's uncle who died two years ago from a traffic accident. She lives with her four children in a small clay house next to the

man's father (that is, her brother-in-law) and his family. She was the only woman I met who had continuous visitors. It could be partly because of her hospitality, benevolence, and friendliness, partly because of the trust from the neighbours for her piety and sincerity, and partly because of the absence of her husband. She called me her sister and energetically introduced me her husband's relatives, her brothers' wives, and even to non-relative neighbours. Some of the neighbours were reluctant to have interview yet she convinced them with patience. She responded to my specific requests as well. As the research progressed, theoretical sampling became more necessary in order to see cases which were likely to replicate or develop emerging hypotheses. For example, I wanted to see particular cases for comparative purpose such as more cases of forced migrants and cases where a woman does not have a son, a woman has continued giving births in order to have a son and a woman who has no child. Although neither her nor her husband's family was forced migrants, she introduced me to her forced migrant neighbours. She responded to my other requests, too.

In retrospect, snowball sampling was useful for two points. Firstly, being introduced by someone whom a woman already knows well seems to have contributed to the high rate of acceptance for participating in interviewing. There were only two rejections. One was the wife of brother-in-law of one of the participants. According to the participant, she does not know Turkish and never talks to strangers. She hides even from visiting nurses whenever they come for vaccination. She did not hide from me and even sat next to us during one interview but always behaved as if I did not exist. The other was the sister-in-law of another participant. She did not know Turkish, either. I met her several times when I was visiting the participant. She lived in a block which I never visited and hence I knew none of her relatives on her husband's side. She thus refused and explained that her husband and in-laws would ask her about my identity, purpose of the interview, its content and so on. She seemed to want to avoid every possible trouble with her family. If random sampling was applied, the rejection rate might have been much higher in this neighbourhood

where misgivings toward outsiders prevail,⁸⁵ social control over women is strict, and women thus tend to avoid strangers and unknown situations. Secondly, snowball sampling was useful for learning women's social network. As mentioned above, it soon became clear as the research progresses that women daily interact only with a very limited number of individuals; relatives on the husband's side who live in proximity.

5.5. Introducing Participants and Their Household Characteristics

Eventually, the interviews were conducted with 40 women between February and June 2008 (those who were interviewed during the pilot research were also re-interviewed during this period). The lists and profiles of the participants (Table 5.1) and their husbands (Table 5.2.) and the summary of household characteristics (Table 5.3) are presented below.

⁸⁵ It is partly because of a range of illegalities the people are involved from the occupation of land without title deeds to the illegal use of electricity. One participant kept hiding from me until she was persuaded by her neighbours about my identity because she thought that I came from the municipality and would find out something against her and her family.

Table 5.1. List of the participants and their profiles.

No.	Name*	Age	Language	Literacy	Education (years)	Work experience
1	Melike	23	Kurdish/Turkish	Little	0	kilim
2	Sevim	21	Kurdish/Turkish	No	2	N
3	Müjde	26	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	5	N
4	Gülcan	40	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	8	N
5	Leyla	23	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	N
6	Berfin	38	Kurdish	No	0	kilim
7	Ceren	21	Kurdish/Turkish	Little	3	sweatshop, lace knitting
8	Perihan	21	Kurdish/Little Turkish	No	0	kilim
9	Berivan	26	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	5	N
10	Özlem	28	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	4	N
11	Yasemin	19	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	0	kilim, lace knitting
12	Esra	18	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	8	kilim
13	Ceylan	28	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	2	N
14	Nesrin	43	Kurdish	No	0	N
15	Sevda	25	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	kilim
16	Beyza	28	Kurdish	No	0	N
17	İpek	37	Kurdish	No	0	kilim
18	Makbule	26	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	N
19	Hüsniye	38	Kurdish	No	0	N
20	Ayfer	26	Kurdish	No	0	kilim
21	Hasret	21	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	N
22	Songül	34	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	3	kilim
23	Elif	46	Kurdish	No	0	N
24	Saadet	30	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	5	lace knitting, sales of tableware
25	Gülbet	31	Kurdish/Little Turkish	No	0	N
26	Eylem	47	Kurdish	No	3	kilim
27	Havva	32	Kurdish	No	0	N
28	Selma	28	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	N
29	Nazife	40	Kurdish	No	0	N
30	Zekiye	30	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	5	N
31	Yıldız	49	Kurdish	No	0	kilim
32	Güllü	31	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	0	lace knitting
33	Fatmagül	38	Kurdish/Little Turkish	Little	5	N
34	Ayşe	51	Kurdish	No	0	kilim
35	Ayşegül	29	Kurdish/Turkish	Little	0	kilim
36	Yaren	35	Kurdish	No	0	N
37	Hanım	27	Kurdish/Little Turkish	No	0	kilim
38	Emel	30	Kurdish/Turkish	Little	0	N
39	Esmanur	31	Kurdish/Turkish	No	0	N
40	Sibel	36	Kurdish/Turkish	Yes	5	sales of cows' milk

* The names of the participants are pseudonyms.

Table 5.2. List of the husbands and their profiles.

No. *	Age	Literacy	Education (years)	Occupation	Seasonal labour migration
1	28	Yes	11	Cook in NY	N
2	36	Yes	0	Daily labourer	N
3	38	Yes	5	Daily labourer, Wedding singer	Mersin, Istanbul
4	46	Yes	3	Border trade	N
5	31	Yes	5	Lorry driver (border trade)	N
6	40	Yes	0	Lorry driver (border trade)	N
7	31	No	0	On welfare	N
8	35	Yes	5	Sweet shop	N
9	35	No	0	Daily labourer	Istanbul
10	34	Yes	0	Painter (<i>boyacı</i>)	Istanbul
11	28	Yes	0	Cook	N
12	36	Yes	0	Lorry driver (border trade, in prison)	N
13	38	Yes	0	Beekeeper	Adana
14	40	Yes	0	Lorry driver (border trade, in prison)	N
15	25	No	5	Border trade	N
16	28	Yes	5	Lorry driver (border trade, in prison)	N
17	37	Yes	5	Daily labourer	Istanbul
18	32	Yes	5	Cleaning staff	N
19	40s	No	0	Corner shop	N
20	20s	No	0	Daily labourer	N
21	27	Yes	11	Painter (<i>boyacı</i>)	Istanbul
22	34	Yes	5	Driver	N
23/33**	50	Yes	5	Civil servant	N
24	31	Yes	11	Lorry driver (border trade)	N
25	35	Yes	5	Welder	N
26	53	Yes	3	Unemployed	N
27	35	Yes	0	Peddler	N
28	35	Little	2	Daily labourer	N
29	50	Yes	5	Clerk	N
30	32	Yes	0	Maintenance man (<i>kapıcı</i>)	N
31	59	Yes	5	Daily labourer	N
32	30	Yes	2	Bus driver	N
34	63	Yes	0	Unemployed	N
35	35	Yes	5	Driver	N
36	35	Yes	5	Cleaning staff	N
37	22	Yes	5	Factory worker	N
38	32	Yes	5	Driver	N
39	38	Yes	0	Lorry driver (border trade, in prison)	N
40	39	Yes	0	Tea vender at a hospital (<i>çaycı</i>)	N

* It corresponds to the number of the wife.

** 23 and 33 are co-wives.

Table 5.3. Household characteristics.

No.*	Household arrangement	Household size	Health insurance	Type of house	Ownership
1	Extended	9	Yeşil Kart***	Concrete	Houseowner*****
2	Extended	6	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
3	Nuclear	6	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
4	Extended	22	None	Concrete	Houseowner
5	Extended	22	None	Concrete	Houseowner
6	Nuclear	8	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
7	Nuclear	5	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
8	Extended	6	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
9	Nuclear	6	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
10	Extended	21	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
11	Nuclear	3	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Rented
12	Extended	4	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
13	Nuclear	7	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
14	Nuclear	8	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
15	Nuclear	6	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
16	Nuclear	4	None	Clay	Houseowner
17	Extended	21	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
18	Extended	7	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
19	Extended	9	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
20	Nuclear	5	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
21	Extended	21	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
22	Nuclear	5	SGK****	Clay	Houseowner
23/33**	Extended	14	SGK	Concrete	Houseowner
24	Extended	6	None	Clay	Houseowner
25	Nuclear	7	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
26	Nuclear	11	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Rented
27	Nuclear	8	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
28	Nuclear	8	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
29	Nuclear	11	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
30	Nuclear	5	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
31	Nuclear	7	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
32	Nuclear	6	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
34	Extended	21	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
35	Nuclear	6	None	Clay	Rented
36	Nuclear	8	SGK	Clay	Houseowner
37	Nuclear	6	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
38	Extended	8	Yeşil Kart	Concrete	Houseowner
39	Nuclear	7	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner
40	Extended	10	Yeşil Kart	Clay	Houseowner

* It corresponds to the number of the participant.

** 23 and 33 are co-wives.

*** Yeşil Kart is a type of health insurance given to the low-income citizen who are not entitled to or cannot afford the other types of health insurance.

**** SGK is the public health insurance.

***** All houseowners do not own title deeds.

Age

Many women did not know their exact ages mainly because they were born in village and registered a few years after their births when their fathers had another business in town. Their birth dates were often modified in order to appear appropriate according to the ages of their brothers which were also modified to delay or make earlier their military service. Many did not know their husbands' ages, either, because they had "never asked" or the ages written on the ID were often not real ages. In those cases, the most plausible age was figured out by asking the approximate ages of siblings and the approximate years of starting school, the first menstruation, and other occasions. According to such calculations, the age of the participants ranges from 18 to 51. There were one teenager, 18 in twenties, 15 in thirties, 6 in forties and 1 in fifties. The mean age of the participants was 31. Most of the husbands were older than their wives. The largest age gap was eighteen years.

Language

The mother tongue of all participants and their husbands was Kurdish. Most of them speak Kurmanji (*Kurmançî*) dialect. Kurdish language has several dialects and, according to some women I talked to, those who speak different dialects cannot understand each other. They say that they often do not understand the dialects of some neighbours who came from other regions. This may also be partly contributing to the distance kept from each other among the neighbours. One participant talked about a neighbour who came from Mardin and married in the neighbourhood. Nobody but her husband can understand her and she suffer loneliness. Yet, most brides seem to become accustomed to the dialects spoken in their husbands' households as time passes.

More than half of the participants know Turkish very well (23 out of 40). Meanwhile, all husbands know Turkish. While many women who do not know Turkish claimed that there were no difficulties in their daily life because they could always find someone who knows Kurdish in downtown or have a company who knows Turkish, some expressed their frustration about their dependence on others and desire for learning Turkish. For example;

(If I knew Turkish) It would have been better. I would have had occupation, would have not gone to hospital with someone, and could have gone everywhere by myself. ... It would have been very nice. For example, if my baby gets sick now, I can't take her to hospital by myself. Until my husband is ready (Perihan).

Another participant, İpek also stated that she felt very sad whenever she went to hospital because she did not understand the people talking to the doctor about her and she could not speak to the doctor directly.

Education

More than half of the participants were illiterate. Almost two thirds had no schooling at all.⁸⁶ One sixth dropped out and one seventh completed the five-year primary school education. Only two women had eight-year education. One is Esra. She was born in the neighbourhood and the youngest among the participants. There was already a school in the neighbourhood when she reached the school age. The other is Gülcan. She had five-year education in village and another three years from home because there was no junior high school in her village. There was no one who went to high school.

Almost 90% of the husbands were literate. Yet, nearly half of them did not go to school at all or left the primary school before the fifth grade either (or both) because they did not like school or they had to work and help the family. There were three husbands who completed high school education.

Work

All the participants said that they were housewives. However, some make lace or knitted accessories for neighbours or local markets in exchange of money to contribute to family budget. Sibel sells the milk of the cows which she looks after to neighbours. Saadet for example recently began selling tableware to her neighbours in addition to laceworks which she knits;

I have never worked in a proper workplace. But, I always knit something. I've just begun (selling tableware) this year. I bring some dishes. I sell them to neighbours. When I can make profits, I contribute to my family. I can make pocket money for

⁸⁶ Many young women who did not have formal education but knew Turkish said that they learned Turkish from TV and friends.

my children and myself. I bring them from wholesaler. How much profits the shops in downtown add to the price, I put the same in the neighbourhood.

More than one thirds of the women have weaved *kilims* (flat-woven rug) in exchange of money some time in their life, particularly in the early years of migration, either forced or voluntary. Many have given it up because they became too old to do such meticulous hard work or, some said, because there were not many buyers in recent years. There used to be an atelier where young girls in the neighbourhood learned to weave *kilims* in the neighbourhood until recently. Those who used to go to the atelier learned Turkish, made friends, and earned pocket money yet they usually quitted when they got married. Now, only Esra and Eylem continue weaving *kilims* in order to look after their families instead of their husbands who are in prison and unemployed respectively. Ceren was the only participant who had the experience of wage work. She was sent to Istanbul when she was six years old in order to keep a company with her older brother's wife who could not endure a new lonely life in the big city. She left school at the third grade and began working at a sweatshop until she married and came to Van.

Meanwhile, most of the husbands worked in informal sector, that is, without social security. Thirteen out of thirty-nine husbands were wage workers (4 drivers - 1 for the public bus and 3 for private companies; 2 cooks; 2 cleaning staff; 1 tea vender hired at a state hospital; 1 factory worker; 1 maintenance man of an apartment; 1 clerk at a bus company; and 1 civil servant) (Figure 5.1). However, only three of them worked with social security. Nine husbands had irregular income by working as daily labourer, peddler, or beekeeper. The same number of husbands engaged in border trade (e.g. diesel oil, miscellaneous goods) but nearly half of them were then in prison for the charge of carrying heroin on the vehicles they were driving. Others were small merchants and craftsmen. There was one on welfare. There were two unemployed husbands. One of them retired from the village guard but did not begin to receive his pension yet. He and his family lived with his married sons. The other had lived on the wife's kilim weaving, the support from the married son, and family allowance.




Figure 5.1. Occupations of the husbands (Numbers in each category are shown in brackets).

In addition, labour migration is relatively common in the neighbourhood. Twelve husbands (31%) were working at the time of research or have ever worked in other cities such as Istanbul, Mersin, Siirt, Adana, and Antalya. In recent years, for single men who are planning to marry, labour migration seems to be a sort of ‘rite of passage’ in order to save money for bride price. Sevim, for instance, met her husband in Mersin when he was working there. Müjde’s husband was working mostly at construction sites as day labourer. He works in Van during summer and in other cities during winter because construction works become very scarce in winter in Van. Zeliha’s husband has been working as a cook in Istanbul for a long time since he left high school and just gone to New York to work in a restaurant. Her older brother-in-law has been working as a waiter in Ankara. Her younger brother-in-law also began working in Istanbul in order to prepare for his future marriage. There were no men left in their household.

Social Security

The majority of the participants were *Yeşil Kart* holders. There were 5 couples who had no health insurance. Four of them were Gülcan, Leyla, Beyza,⁸⁷ and Saadet. They could not benefit from *Yeşil Kart* because their husbands owned cars while they did not or could not afford paying for social security of the self-employed. Another was Ayşegül and her husband. They registered their marriage two years ago and their health insurances covered by their fathers' were canceled. They had not applied for *Yeşil Kart*.

Housing

More than half of the participants lived in a clay house. The rest lived in the newly built concrete houses most of which were still in a state of under construction for a future plan of adding more floors, which is typical in the *gecekondu*. Three lived in rented houses but all the others were 'house-owners' without title deeds.

Type of Migration

Migration history of the participants and their husbands are described in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively. Migration can be classified in many forms such as spatially, temporally, and by motivation. Spatially, all the participants and their husbands or their parents were rural-urban migrants. All the participants and their husbands or their parents came from the villages of the Van province or those of neighbouring provinces (See Figure 4.1). Nearly half of both the participants and their husbands' families came from villages in Çatak. Nearly one fourth of the participants' families migrated from villages in Şırnak. One fourth of the husbands' families were from Siirt.

⁸⁷ Beyza's case is complex. Her husband used to earn from illicit border trade but was caught for the allegation of carrying heroin in his van. There was another lorry which belonged to her husband but her older brother was using. She attempted to apply for *Yeşil Kart* with the help of her brother-in-law's wife (Esra) but was refused for the reason that the Mercedes lorry is registered in her husband's name. She had to look after her two children without income except for her another older brother's occasional help. She could not receive any sort of public social assistance because green card proves the right to benefit from it as well as health service. She could not afford medical care for her diabetes, either.

There were some participants who first migrated to other cities such as Adana and Mersin before they settled in Van. One participant (Ceylan) migrated to Adana due to the conflicts but returned to home village because of economic hardship. She however migrated again to Van because of the conflict in the village she married in. Two participants (Havva and Yaren) migrated to Van with their families. Yet, they married in the families in villages and migrated to Van again with their husbands.

From a temporal perspective, the majority of the participants and their husbands were primary migrants who experienced migration by themselves though some migrated at very young age. Fifty-five percent of the families of the participants and 32% of those of the husbands were relatively new migrants who left their home village after 1990. Thirty percent of the participants and 10% of the husbands were born in or migrated to city before school age. Thirty-two percent and 23%, respectively, migrated during the school age (7-15). Thirty-eight percent and 45%, respectively, migrated after school age.

By motivation, the participants and their husbands could be classified into two types of migrants: voluntary migrant and forced migrant. In this dissertation, the voluntary migrants were the participants and their husbands (or their parents) who migrated mainly for the purpose of socioeconomic betterment. The participants who migrated from their home villages to the Van city where their husbands live *for the first time* at the time of marriage were also categorised as voluntary migrants.

According to the accounts of the early voluntary migrants, conventional migration for socioeconomic betterment was realised very often when home village became too growded for grazing or young married men, who did not want or could not buy livestock, the major livelihood in the region, after separating the household, chose to or forced to work in the city. Many men were already familiar with the city since they used to visit it frequently before migration for trading and shopping or other purposes. Not only those from the villages within the province but also those who lived in villages of neighbouring provinces used to travel to Van for grazing and

trading. Many of them had one or more relatives in the city. They thus migrated to Van with relative familiarity and already had some information about the city.

On the other hand, the forced migrants were those who were forced to migrate due to sudden external pressures such as the displacement, the conflict and blood feud. Their accounts of displacement largely support the description presented in the previous chapter. Because of the sudden unprepared migration, villagers dispersed wherever they could go. Thus, forced migrants tend to have only a very few relatives in the same neighbourhood.

Besides, the people's categorization differed from sociological one. They usually called "göçmen (migrant)" only those who moved from a village to a city because of the conflict. Despite their accounts of economic hardship in village, many voluntary migrant participants and others first responded to my question about the reason for migration by stressing the voluntariness of their action; "We didn't migrate. We came for pleasure (*Biz göç etmedik. Biz keyif için geldik.*)" As the research progress, I understood that the remark probably suggested their negative perception about forced migrants and the claim for their better socioeconomic standing *vis-à-vis* their forced migrant neighbours.

Accordingly, 25 participants (62.5%) were voluntary migrants and six of them migrated to Van at the time of marriage. The remaining 15 participants (37.5%) were conflict-induced forced migrants. Meanwhile, 25 husbands were voluntary migrants and 14 could be categorized as forced migrants. There were three husbands whose families were forced to migrate for other than security reason. Güllü's husband's family was forced to migrate due to blood feud. Esmanur and Sibel's husbands were brothers and migrated to the neighbourhood after their father's death in their childhood which forced their widowed mother to leave her husband's village and came to her brothers-in-law in Van expecting some protection. In the majority of cases, participants and their husbands' migration types are same.

Table 5.4. Migration history of the participants.

No.	Name	Place of origin (district, province)	Type of migration	Year of migration *	Age of migration **	Places of migration before Van
1	Melike	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1981	0 ***	N
2	Sevim	District unknown, Şırnak	Voluntary	1980s	0	Mersin
3	Müjde	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1994	12	N
4	Gülcan	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary (marriage)	1993	25	N
5	Leyla	Çatak, Van	Forced	1987	0	N
6	Berfin	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1977	6	N
7	Ceren	Tatvan, Bitlis	Voluntary	1992	6	Istanbul
8	Perihan	Beytüşşebap, Şırnak	Forced	2000	14	N
9	Berivan	Uludere, Şırnak	Forced	1994	13	N
10	Özlem	Edremit, Van	Voluntary (marriage)	1994	14	N
11	Yasemin	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	7	N
12	Esra	Çatak, Van	Forced	1990	0	N
13	Ceylan	Çatak, Van	Forced	1988	8	Adana
14	Nesrin	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	30	N
15	Sevda	Çatak, Van	Forced	1983	0	Siirt
16	Beyza	Başkale, Van - Çatak, Van ⁸⁸	Forced	1997	17	N
17	İpek	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1980	9	N
18	Makbule	Başkale, Van	Voluntary	1984	14	N
19	Hüsniye	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary (marriage)	1985	15	N
20	Ayfer	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	13	N
21	Hasret	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1987	0	Iraq
22	Songül	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1989	15	N
23	Elif	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1984	22	N
24	Saadet	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1970s	0	Şırnak
25	Gülbet	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	16	N
26	Eylem	Beytüşşebap, Şırnak - Çatak, Van ⁸⁹	Forced	1988	27	N
27	Havva	Çatak, Van	Forced	1991	15	N
28	Selma	Muradiye, Van	Voluntary (marriage)	1996	16	N
29	Nazife	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	24	N
30	Zekiye	District unknown, Hakkari	Voluntary	1998	20	N
31	Yıldız	Çatak, Van	Forced	1984	25	Adana, Siirt
32	Güllü	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1963	0	N
33	Fatmagül	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	22	N
34	Ayşe	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	38	N
35	Ayşegül	Çatak, Van	Forced	1984	5	Adana, Siirt
36	Yaren	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1980	4	Mersin
37	Hanım	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1990	9	N

⁸⁸ Beyza's home village is in Başkale. Yet, she married in a village in Çatak and migrated to Van city from her husband's village.

⁸⁹ Likewise, Eylem's home village is in Beytüşşebap yet migrated from her husband's village in Çatak.

Table 5.4. (Continued)

No.	Name	Place of origin (district, province)	Type of migration	Year of migration *	Age of migration **	Places of migration before Van
38	Emel	Çatak, Van	Voluntary (marriage)	1996	16	N
39	Esmanur	Gevaş, Van	Voluntary	1977	0	N
40	Sibel	Van, Van	Voluntary (marriage)	1991	19	N

* It is the year when a participant or her parents first left home village.

** It is the age when a participant first left home village.

*** Age 0 means that the family of a participant migrated before her birth and she was born in the city after migration.

Table 5.5. Migration history of the husbands.

No. *	Place of origin (district, province)	Type of Migration	Year of Migration **	Age of migration ***	Places of migration before Van
1	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1980	1	N
2	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1975	3	N
3	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1987	17	N
4	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1977	15	N
5	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1977	0 ****	N
6	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1980	13	N
7	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1980s	About 10	N
8	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1975	2	N
9	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1987	15	N
10	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1980	6	N
11	Çatak, Van	Forced	1988	8	N
12	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	23	N
13	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	25	N
14	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	30s	N
15	Çatak, Van	Forced	1993	10	N
16	Pervari, Siirt	Forced	1997	17	N
17	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1980	9	N
18	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1970s	0	N
19	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1975	About 10	N
20	Çatak, Van	Forced	1995	About 10	N
21	Pervari, Siirt	Voluntary	1980	1	N
22	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	18	N
23/33 ⁹⁰	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1984	36	N

⁹⁰ 23 and 33 are co-wives.

Table 5.5. (Continued)

No. *	Place of origin (district, province)	Type of Migration	Year of Migration **	Age of migration ***	Places of migration before Van
24	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1973	0	N
25	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1989	16	N
26	Çatak, Van	Forced	1988	33	N
27	Çatak, Van	Forced	1993	20	N
28	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	19	N
29	Uludere, Şırnak	Voluntary	1992	34	N
30	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1995	19	N
31	Çatak, Van	Forced	1984	35	Adana, Siirt
32	Uludere, Şırnak	Forced	1970s	0	N
34	Çatak, Van	Forced	1981	50	N
35	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1995	23	N
36	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1996	21	N
37	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1989	3	N
38	Çatak, Van	Voluntary	1989	13	N
39	District unknown, Muş	Forced	1970s	About 10	N
40	District unknown, Muş	Forced	1970s	About 10	N

* It corresponds to the number of the wife.

** It is the year when the husband or his parents first left home village.

*** It is the age when the husband first left home village.

**** Age 0 means that the husband migrated before his birth and he was born after migration.

Some characteristics of migration groups need to be mentioned. First of all, the average ages of both forced migrant participants and voluntary migrant participants was 31 years old. Secondly, less than half of the forced migrant participants knew Turkish (47%) and less than two thirds of the voluntary migrant participants (64%) knew Turkish. Among the voluntary migrant participants, almost all those who migrated for marriage (5 out of 6) knew Turkish while a little more than half (11 out of 19) of the other voluntary migrants who migrated with their parents in childhood knew Turkish. Thirdly, the average year of formal education of the forced migrant participants was 1.2 years and that of voluntary migrant participants was 1.8 years. Those who migrated for marriage seem to be a little more advantaged than the others in education, too. The average year of education for them was 2.8 years while that of the other voluntary migrants was 1.5 years. It appears that the public service (schools and *sağlık ocağıs*) finally began reaching eastern villages in the 1980s onwards but

those who were in school age in the period and migrated to urban squatters which did not have schools missed the opportunity of education. Thus, almost all the participants who had formal education went to school when they were in villages (10 out of 13).

5.6. Establishing Rapport

In order to earn trust from women, I set two simple principles to myself: honesty and trusting women. First of all, I honestly told every woman whom I was introduced to or came to be acquainted in the field that I was a student and needed their help to write a book in order to get a degree and become a qualified researcher called sociologist. When people asked about me, my family, and other private matters, I replied sincerely and as many details as possible to all their questions as I expected them to my questions while I tactically emphasised my similarities with them (e.g. being mother and housewife).

Secondly, before being trusted by women, I tried to show my trust and respect for them. For example, I expressed my non-judgemental attitude towards them at every opportunity. In the first days of the research, a group of young women told me that I should teach women in the neighbourhood to have fewer children. I replied that I believed everyone knew how many children they want and wished anyone could have just as many children as they want. They seemed a little surprised but smiled satisfactorily. I now consider that that question was their defensive reaction to me, who, they considered, saw their high fertility critically as other middle-class urbanites.

Further, I deliberately relied on women who I already had interviews about recruiting other women. I was afraid that I might give an aggressive impression if I too actively try to recruit an interviewee and she might see me as an intruder and react defensively if I approachd her without a reference of someone whom she trusts. It might have slowed 'sampling' but, I believe, helped to minimise the anxiety of women. Because I relied on women's references, I paid great attention to be

respectful and responded to their every account which they provided me with sincerity and gratitude during interviews. I tried to prioritise that a woman feels comfortable and being listened and respected more than that all the questions that I prepared to ask were answered. I tried to avoid anything that might raise suspicions and negative impressions about me, which might have risked further research in the neighbourhood.

At the beginning of every interview, I promised each participant about the confidentiality of the information which they would provide. I told her that the book was going to be written in English and kept in the university library. I also assured her that I would be very careful about keeping their stories confidential and anonymous by not allowing anyone else to listen to their accounts recorded by a voice recorder and field notes and changing their names in the book. During the interviews with non-Turkish speakers, interpreters sometimes tried to skip those details but I requested them every time to translate them as I said and acquire their consents.

I tried to establish the non-mechanical, non-hierarchical and sympathetic relationship with the participants and I believe that it was generally successful. But, I made a mistake as a researcher, too. I shall first describe some episodes which indicate the participants' trust on me and then an incidence which strained my relation with some individuals in the neighbourhood.

To my surprise as well as relief, the people's attitudes toward me were polite and very welcoming in general. Most participants did not send me home without having meals and tea. When some could not prepare a meal because they were the only woman in the house and busy with interviewing, they gave me tandoor-baked bread to take home. Because of the nature of the migration which many people in the neighbourhood went through, I expected that they might approach me with more cautions or be displeased with being intruded by a stranger. Nevertheless, as the research progresses, women's comments on me and my research made me understood that some were rightly anxious about talking with me at first yet they

came to trust me later on. It became gradually clear that they had been observing how I dress, what I say, what others say about me and so on. For example, although I did not wear a long skirt and headscarf like them throughout the research, I tried to dress plainly and conservatively (long sleeved and loose tops, full-length trousers and socks). It was because they came to know me as a foreigner, student and researcher whom they do not expect to dress in a long skirt and cover hair. I thought that it was awkward to dress like them suddenly. I later discovered that they considered me dressing appropriately (conservatively enough) as one commented, “You always dress nicely. It’s not open.”⁹¹ For another example, I came to be acquainted with Özlem during the pilot interviewing but had an interview with her after a year for the first time. When I asked her permission for tape-recording, she said, “Of course. We trust you. You live in Van and always come here.” Berivan also had known me for a year by the time when I had a two-hour interview with her because I had visited her brother-in-law’s wife, Müjde, who lives her next door, very often since my first day in the neighbourhood. She told me an episode that a group of women ‘like me’ once came to the neighbourhood and asked questions women who were baking bread in tandoor. According to her, they did not talk much because they could not understand who they were and what purpose they asked questions. She agreed to have an interview for me because “I can know from your eyes that you are a good person.”

None of the participants told me that they needed to ask their husbands before they had interviews. Neither did I attempt to ask permission from husbands for the interviews with their wives because I was trying to establish direct and intimate relationship with women on their own initiatives. Some men nevertheless fulfilled their role of gatekeeper. And, it became clear to me that the husband’s opinion matters to a woman for every matter. Makbule, for instance, accepted me in her house right away out of her hospitality. She however seemed to become anxious after she eloquently talked about her contraceptive history. She murmured again and again

⁹¹ Similarity or lack of social distance between the interviewer and the interviewee is said to facilitate rapport and minimize interview bias (Bailey 1994: 184). My difference in clothing was often pointed out by women but Bailey refers to the importance of dressing in a way to legitimize the role as interviewer, too (Bailey 1994: 185).

after the interview as if she tried to convince herself that she did nothing to upset her husband, “You know, I can’t do anything beyond my husband’s words nevertheless. Everything is clear about me though. I told you everything. I’m a housewife. I have three children. That’s all. There is nothing to hide” I met the husbands of several participants when they happened to come home early in the afternoon. All of them kindly told me that I was always welcome in their houses. They thus showed me that they were the gatekeeper of the household. The participants later told me with a great relief and joy that their husbands told them to help me for my research. Berivan said proudly, “I have told my husband again and again that you are a good person. I know that. But he used to say how you’d know. Now, he saw you and agreed with me.” Mijde said after I first met her husband, “You heard him. He said you’re always welcome here. He told me to help you with his own mouth. He used to ask me what you asked and tell me not to tell everything. I just told him that you ask me about our old life in villages or something” (, which I actually asked her and her mother-in-law who was visiting her in one occasion). Ceren told me that her husband told her to help me as much as she could because I was away from home and must be on my own (*gariban*).

In general, men tended to pay attention to my non-Turkishness rather than the fact that I was a total stranger to the neighbourhood. They thus tended to see me as an opportunity to assert the oppression of Kurds in Turkey and welcomed me as a guest. For instance, Sevim’s brother-in-law (Perihan’s husband at the same time) did not go to the sweet shop which he runs and waited me on the first day when I made an appointment with her for an interview. He asked me a couple of questions. Then, he told me that I was always welcome in his house and I could come to have a chat with the women in his house whenever I liked. He then brought a TV in the room where we were sitting and turned on one of the Kurdish channels. It did not show clearly. He said, “They (the state) often send signals and disturb the reception of Kurdish broadcasting.” He said, “Turkish is not the mother tongue for you, too. You can understand us. My mother cannot go to the hospital by herself. She cannot tell her problems to the doctor.” It was a typical conversation with the men I met in the neighbourhood. They talked about the difficulty of living in the country where the

official language is not their mother tongue while reminding the fact that I am not a Turk, too. When I asked them which language, Kurdish or Turkish, is easy for them, they all said that it did not matter to them. Then, they started again telling how difficult for their mothers to go to the hospital and expressed their anger against the ban on Kurdish in recent history.

Despite all the care I paid to the relationship with the people, in the middle stage of the research, I was about to risk further interviewing in the neighbourhood. One day I was having an interview with Hüsniye in her sitting room with the help of her brother-in-law's daughter whom she had brought up since her parents' deaths from a traffic accident when she was still a newborn. Hüsniye's father-in-law, whom I had already met in Sevim's house (He is Sevim's husband's grandfather at the same time), came home in the midst of the interview. He asked for tea and sat with us. I told Hüsniye that I could come back later for further interview. She said in Turkish, "No, no. He's got old. He's finished." Her father-in-law also said, "I got old, I've finished." I decided to keep last questions about contraception for another day and continued. When I was asking Hüsniye about her miscarriages, he suddenly got upset and went out of the room; "Can such things be asked!?" I was talking in low voice but the translator was loud enough for him to hear my questions. Hüsniye said, "Go on. It's nothing. I suffered from him a lot. I don't care." I deeply regretted my carelessness and could no longer concentrate on interviewing. On the way back, I saw Müjde and told her about the incidence. She was one of the few women with whom I became very close and discussed many things. I wanted to ask her opinion. She calmly said, "We wouldn't have told you those stories if you're a man. We can share those things because we're women. Well, he also shouldn't have stayed there!" She taught me that it was inappropriate for me as a woman to talk issues concerning childbearing in front of men.

A few days later, I dropped by Sevim partly because I had a couple of additional questions I wanted to ask her and partly because I wondered if Hüsniye's father-in-law told his relatives how rude I was. As I was afraid, Sevim and her mother-in-law, who used to welcome me rather grandiosely, did not hide their hostility against me.

They suddenly said that Chinese people eat dogs and how disgusting they are. Hüsniye, who happened to be passing by, tried to defend me and told them that I was Japanese. They began quarrelling in Kurdish. I told them that I needed to go to someone else and left them without more ado because it was obviously not about my ethnicity. I was afraid that Hüsniye's father-in-law told his other relatives and neighbours about my rudeness yet it was not the case.

Field research is social interaction. A researcher is a living device to collect and record the data in the field. However, it is undeniable that s/he is a social being full of personality. S/he might train her/himself as an objective interviewer. Yet, it is unrealistic to expect the people s/he studies see her/him as the neutral individual. Some of my social attributes were advantageous to build rapport with the people in the neighbourhood but some kept them distanced. My student and foreign statuses and relatively young appearance invoked their sense of hospitality and protectiveness. My non-Turkish ethnicity made them identify me with themselves as ethnic minority in Turkey. My Islamic faith made many accept me at once. My residence in Van also helped the people trust me. My gender helped women to be at ease with me. My marriage status and being mother further helped us share the issues of childbearing, contraception, and sexuality with empathy. The fact that I am a total stranger made some women, whose daily interactions are limited to their in-laws, want to share their secrets with me. Some even thanked me for listening them.

However, my lack of knowledge of Kurdish disappointed the women who do not know Turkish while those who know Turkish were proud of displaying their bilingualism. They said again and again, "If you know Kurdish, I've told you so many stories about my life." My gender certainly contributed to distance men from me. My foreignness and the people's hospitality allowed me transgressing some gender codes; going out alone, visiting strangers, wearing trousers, not wearing headscarf (*yazma*), and talking to non-relative men. Yet, talking about family planning with men could upset the people. Having interview with a man in private as done with the women could be outrageous and such an attempt would have certainly spoiled the whole research. The event with Hüsniye's father-in-law, which is caused

by my heedlessness, made me finally decide to give up the interviews with men which I initially planned. The information that I collected directly from men are therefore unsystematic and considerably limited to the individuals whom I came across when I visited the women for interviews. Most of the information about men is therefore provided indirectly by the women I interviewed.

5.7. Interviewing Process

At the stage of pilot interviews, I had three aims; getting to know the people and their life in general, checking the appropriateness of the questions prepared in a semi-structured manner beforehand and examining the possibility of alternative hypotheses and the adequacy of my own proposition. A list of questions was constructed partly by referring to the questionnaire for married women used by TDHS-2003 (HUIPS 2004: 247-312) yet most were largely modified into open-ended questions. The questions consisted of the topics regarding demographic characteristics, migration, social relations, marriage, fertility and birth control.

While my proposition, grounded in feminist and political-economic readings, was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is related to socioeconomic insecurities and patriarchal organisation of reproduction, at this stage I flexibly retained two alternative hypotheses; one was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is the continuation of a traditional pattern of reproduction which has withstood because of cultural isolation from the national modernisation process; the other was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is related to women's active attempt for having more children as a strategy to guarantee their well-beings in the patriarchal household. The first hypothesis was proposed by Yavuz (2006; 2008) yet has not been examined empirically. The second hypotheses is inferred from some empirical cases that women tried to have children when they were the only source of social esteem and economic security or in order to guarantee the husband's support (Bandarage 1997: 169) and an anecdote that I heard from a friend of mine that in a village nearby Van city a newly married woman insisted to have many children like her neighbours although her husband considered that two children were enough. However, during

the preliminary field work, it became clear that those hypotheses were hardly supported in Doluca neighbourhood.

Interviewing was conducted intensively after the pilot interviews were examined and the list of questions was reorganised. The interviews were conducted mostly in the participants' own houses (sometimes in their own rooms if they lived in extended household and wanted privacy) but for some in their neighbours' houses according to circumstances. All the interviews were recoded by a voice recorder with the permission of participants. None of them seemed to be disturbed by the voice recorder. The interviews took from half an hour to three hours. Recording greatly helped me to concentrate on the conversation with a participant and contributed to create an atmosphere of chatting rather than interviewing. The questions were not read literally but asked in a conversational manner. Some terms were translated into colloquial words which commonly spoken in the neighbourhood.⁹² Unlike structured interviewing used in a survey research, probes, such as rephrasing questions, repeating answers and shortly and positively commenting on answers, were not refrained in order to indicate my interests or obtain more accurate answers depending on situations and participant's personality. The order of questions was frequently modified according to the flow of conversation. Thus, the answers acquired in the interviews are less standardised and comparable, yet, I believe, more illuminating than those possibly acquired by rigidly structured interviews. A printed form of questions (see Appendix A) was used to remind me of questions to be asked during interviewing but it was filled after each interview in order to know individual participant and check the questions which were missed and should be asked later. After every visit to the neighbourhood, field notes were also taken on the same day. All recorded interviews were inscribed as Word documents within a few days.

The issue of birth control was considered to be a very private matter and initially planned to be asked at the second visit. However, while women are ashamed of any

⁹² For instance, withdrawal is expressed as "the husband protects (*Koca korunuyor*)". Male condom is called "balloon (*balon*).". Pilot interviews helped me to learn colloquial Turkish spoken among women in the neighbourhood.

indication of menstruation, pregnancy, birth and birth control in front of men and sometimes from senior women, they seem to always share those issues with other women. Thus, they eloquently talked about their reproductive history. Further, the women who introduced me to the other women generally seemed to have explained them my interest as birth control. Thus, many participants were ready and eager to talk about their experience of childbearing and birth control. Some were even relieved when they learned that they would be asked those things rather than anything more complicated. Accordingly, it was much easier than I considered to discuss about birth control.

Repeated visits were initially planned for all participants. Yet, because the warm and close relationships enough to talk about private issues such as contraception were established with the participants more quickly than I expected, additional interviews were not necessary for every participant especially in the latter part of the research. Eventually, 15 participants were visited more than once either in order to clarify seeming contradictions in previous interviews or to ask further stories. Before I went to a second visit, I studied the field notes and written records of interviews belonging to specific participants whom I planned to visit in order to prevent repeating the same questions and continue smooth conversation from the point ended in previous interviews. Memorising participants' children and relatives' names and their life histories also helped to establish relationships 'like old friends' with some participants.

The interviews with non-Turkish speakers were conducted with the assistance of interpreters who were the choice of the participants (mostly their daughters). One problem of interviews with non-Turkish speakers was that because of the linguistic distance between the participant and me, conversations were prone to be exchanged between the interpreter and me. Therefore, I paid special care to talk while continuously looking at the participant and referring to her name in particular and tried to provide an impression that she was the leading actor in the dialogue and encourage her to talk spontaneously. But, I must confess that it was not always

successful. Non-Turkish speaking participants sometimes gave up accounting details and sighed; “I wish you knew Kurdish.”

Another problem with non-Turkish speakers was that interpreters often tried to speak for them. Because of their intimacy with the participants, they often claimed that they knew everything about them; “We always talk these things. We share everything.” It was true in many cases. Nevertheless, in order to avoid collecting an interpreter’s version of story as a participant’s, every time when an interpreter answered in place of a participant, I told her that I wanted to hear answers or stories from the participant’s own mouth, too, and requested to ask her again. Interpreters always understood me and bothered to ask the participants the questions which they already answered instead. In one occasion, an interpreter, the daughter of a participant, got upset when her mother answered differently from her versions again and again; “Oh! Why do you say different things?! I don’t do translations for you again.” Yet, this method was helpful in general. In most occasions, interpreters expressed surprise and curiosity to participants’ unexpected responses or new stories and they themselves asked further questions to encourage more detailed accounts.⁹³

5.8. Data Analysis Process

Data analysis was divided in two stages; during the field research and after the field research. During the field research, the filed notes and transcriptions of interviews collected so far were read and re-read. It was done so for three purposes: first to learn about each participant and her reproductive history; second to generate new

⁹³ For example, Elif’s daughter helped the interview with Nazife as the interpreter. She is Nazife’s close neighbour and her and her husband’s families are Nazife and her husband’s co-local. Nazife had a son for the first time after eight daughters. I asked Nazife if she would have accepted a co-wife (*kuma*) if she did not have a son at all. Our interpreter promptly said, “No.” Nazife seemed to have understood my question. I stared at her to prompt her answer. She murmured glancing at her interpreter, “You never know.” She was shocked; “No, no! A person I know can’t bring a *kuma*. Her husband is very good. He is a modern person (*Çağdaş insandır*).” Nazife smiled raising her eyebrows, implying ‘You never know.’ I asked Nazife if she would have told her husband not to bring *kuma*. She said, ‘I wouldn’t have said (*Demezdim*).’ Elif’s daughter quickly accepted the situation and shared her ideas; ‘You know, she doesn’t work. For example, where could my mother (who was obliged to accept her co-wife) look after her children if she had left her husband? She also would have stayed (despite of a co-wife) in order to be able to look after her children.’

questions about particular cases; and third to compare cases and seek recurrent stories, illuminating episodes and emergent themes.

When the data seemed to become saturated, that is, when new cases began replicating those already acquired, all the filed notes and transcriptions of interviews were more closely analyzed. Firstly, a table of personal reproductive history (marriage, childbearing and contraceptive use) was reconstructed for each participant.

Secondly, the participants' accounts were classified by means of editing functions on Word documents according to, first, the phases of reproductive career of marriage, childbearing and birth control and, second, emerging such themes as 'early or/and forced marriage', 'ideal number of children', 'desire for birth control', 'social control over women', 'son preference', 'a fear for the husband's remarriage', 'obstacles to contraception.'

Thirdly, deviant cases in relation to the emerging themes were searched and examined (e.g. cases of voluntary marriage, desiring for more than four children, undesiring for birth control, escaping social control, not expecting the husband's attempt for remarriage).

Fourthly, the cases under the themes were compared for language and migration types in order to find differences and similarities across the groups. Final analysis and findings are presented in the following chapters.

5.9. Limitation of the Research and Lessons Learned

Oakley (1999) argues that the conventional positivist instruction of interviewing is unattainable in reality and its masculine paradigm is unfit to a feminist interviewing with women. It tells us that the interviewer is an instrument of data collection on one hand and s/he should establish 'rapport' without being too friendly in order not to bias the information that the interviewee would provide on the other. S/he needs to make a reasonably warm relationship with the interviewee in order to let him/her

speak without revealing him/herself, being too much involved and forgetting that s/he is the object of study. In the conventional paradigm, the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is prescribed to be mechanical, hierarchical and exploitative in the disguise of pseudo rapport for the sake of objectivity. Oakley maintains that such a contradictory relationship is not only irreconcilable in reality but also unhelpful for acquiring detailed information about people and ethically unjustifiable particularly for a feminist researcher. From her rich interviewing experience, she is convinced that “the goal of finding about people through interviewing is best achieved when the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity” (1999: 51). I was convinced by her insight as the interviewing progressed.

I also experienced the benefit of the woman-to-woman interview, which a number of feminist researchers claimed against the conventional instruction of interviewing which defines the ideal interviewer as depersonalised figure (Oakley 1999; Finch 1999). Janet Finch writes about her surprise at women’s readiness with talking to her in her two different studies. She considers that it derives from the facts that women are more used than men to questioning from doctors, health visitors, social workers and so on; being interviewed by the woman in an informal way at their homes made them feel at ease and turn interviewing into an intimate conversation; and their structural position of being confined in the privatised home and doing more listening than being listened made them willing to take an opportunity to talk to the sympathetic listener (1999: 70).

The last two reasons that Finch mentions are probably applicable in Turkey, too. Most Kurdish migrant women I interviewed were also relaxed, eloquent and willing to talk about themselves once they accepted interviewing. Especially, young participants who were in the midst of struggling to get accustomed to patriarchal social control over the bride burst out narrating difficulties and injustices that they have experienced and probably questioned themselves again and again. They appeared to be very happy that someone asked about them and listened to them

intently and sympathetically. As the women who participated in Finch's study, some of them said after interviewing, "Thank you for listening to me."

I tried to establish a friendly and non-hierarchical relationship with the participants. I regard this dissertation as a feminist project which is produced by a collaboration with the participants in order to make the voices of a certain group of women heard and shed light on one aspect of social life (hence, I call them participant, not interviewee). However, such intention of mine does not eliminate the hierarchical and exploitative relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee because there is no room for the participants to make decision about how to present their accounts and what conclusion to be made and there remains the fact that this dissertation is written for my academic curiosity and diploma.

Other than the unresolved ethical problem, this dissertation has four major limitations. Some of them were already indicated above yet it may become clearer if they are restated. The first limitation is that the findings cannot be generalized even for the neighbourhood studied. However, this is a case study. A purpose of the research is to generate a new proposition which is tentative yet grounded on case data.

Second, men's accounts concerning reproduction could not be collected directly and systematically in this research. A local gender rule did not allow me as a woman to discuss such a private issue as family planning with men. The decision not to conduct interviews with men was made not to risk the research itself.

Third, my lack of knowledge of Kurdish language discouraged some non-Turkish speakers to tell their stories in detail. It may have resulted in excluding a certain group of women, for example those who are reluctant to talk with non-Kurdish speakers, systematically from analysis.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ As mentioned above, two women who rejected interviewing were both non-Turkish speakers.

Lastly, the issue of sexual and reproductive rights in conflict settings is an increasing concern among feminist scholars today.⁹⁵ It was hoped during the research that some information about the conflict and its effects on reproduction would be reached. However, most of the conflict-induced migrant participants witnessed the conflict in childhood. Older migrants I encountered in the neighbourhood also did not talk about the details. It is not the issue that people readily talk because of the nature of the event and the time passed. Besides, they probably did not see me as the appropriate listener because I did not know Kurdish (none of the older women I met did not know Turkish and elderly men were also not fluent in Turkish in general). For this matter, another research is necessary.

5.10. Conclusion

In this dissertation, case study was chosen as a strategy to learn reproductive experience of Kurdish migrant women from the women themselves in order to raise a new hypothesis grounded on empirical data. Data were collected by in-depth interviewing with forty women who were selected by the snowball technique and theoretical sampling. They were analysed manually by within- and cross-case analysis and iterative tabulation.

The participants of interviewing consist of 23 Turkish speakers and 17 non-Turkish speakers. There were 25 voluntary and 15 conflict-induced migrants. The participants generally have low educational achievements. More than half of them were literate yet nearly two thirds never went to school. The husbands also seem to have had limited educational opportunity yet they all knew Turkish and almost all of them were literate. All participants did not have paid work at the time of interviewing. The number of the husbands was 39 because two participants were co-wives. Twenty-five husbands were voluntary migrants and fourteen husbands were forced migrants. Most of the husbands were working in informal sector and had no social security. Most were *Yeşil Kart* holders.

⁹⁵ For instance, *Reproductive Health Matters* featured the question of sexual and reproductive rights in conflict and crisis setting in Issue 31 in 2008.

Before conducting in-depth interviewing with forty participants, pilot interviews were conducted for the three purposes; getting to know the people and their life in general in the neighbourhood; checking the appropriateness of the list of questions prepared beforehand; and examining the possibility of alternative hypotheses and the adequacy of my own proposition. While my proposition directed by a feminist and political-economic perspective was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is related to a historically particular patriarchal organization of reproduction embedded in socioeconomic insecurities, two alternative hypotheses were also retained at the stage of pilot study; one was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is the continuation of traditional pattern of reproduction which had withstood due to cultural isolation from modernization process; the other was that Kurdish migrant women's high fertility is related to women's active attempt for having more children as a strategy to guarantee their well-beings in patriarchal household. It however became clear at the early stage of the research that the knowledge, concern and attempt for birth control were widespread and the latter two hypotheses were hardly supported in Doluca neighbourhood. Therefore, the questions were concentrated more on the participants' experience of attempts for birth control and its contexts.

CHAPTER 6

RECONFIGURING PATRIARCHY IN DOLUCA NEIGHBOURHOOD

6.1. Introduction

Before examining the reproductive experiences of the participants, I shall discuss a particular patriarchal context in Doluca neighbourhood in which their reproductive practices are embedded. It shows us that the participants live under a system of social control that is beyond their control. It is the system that is male dominated, male identified and male centred and systematically restricts the woman's autonomy and her negotiating power in human reproduction in a way to uphold male privilege. The analysis of the participants' accounts in the light of a larger political-economic context of Van which was discussed in Chapter Four reveals that they have been in the middle of a tough period of reconfiguration from a traditional form of patriarchy based on the agricultural mode of production and *asiret* system to a new form of patriarchy which is full of contradictions yet (or hence) opens up a room for covert resistance.

6.2. Declining Traditional Patriarchy

Kandiyoti (1988) once named as "classic patriarchy" a particular form of male domination which is prevalent in the vast region where John Caldwell (1978 cited in Kandiyoti 1988) called "patriarchal belt" stretching from North Africa and Middle East to South and East Asia. It is based on an agricultural mode of production, patrilocal residence, patrilineal corporate extended household, and hence the material and symbolic authority of the senior man. It works in such a way to maximize the woman's dependency on male members of the household through a range of practices from early marriage to a deprivation of accesses to material resource. In Turkey, urbanisation has gradually undermined the agricultural mode of production,

patrilineal corporate extended household, and hence the material and symbolic authority of the senior man. Such transformation has simultaneously allowed gender relations to be renegotiated though its outcomes vary depending on socioeconomic contexts in which people are placed. In the following pages, a changing form of patriarchy observed in Doluca neighbourhood will be described.

Extended Household Arrangement as a Privileged Strategy of Voluntary Migrants

As delineated in Chapter Four, many migrants from the eastern and south-eastern regions, particularly those from the conflict-affected areas (regardless of the reason of migration), can no longer access their fields which they left behind in village and have totally and suddenly lost the agricultural basis of livelihood. For the majority of the participants, the only property was a house on a piece of land without title deed and they relied on meagre wage work or precarious border trade. The occupational summaries of the participants' husbands indicate the difficulty of re-establishing livelihood in the city particularly after the 1980s. While 6 out of 10 fathers of the husbands who migrated in the 1970s worked or retired from state institutions, none of their sons had a job with social security at the time of interviewing.⁹⁶

Therefore, maintaining extended household can be one of the most plausible strategies to maximise family budget. However, nuclear household arrangement (24 households, or 60%) exceeded the extended one among the participants. Young women in the neighbourhood often mentioned that it had not been possible for a couple to separate from the husband's father's household in past but it was no longer the case and suggested their expectations for forming nuclear families.⁹⁷ It may be assumed that an apparent preference for nuclear household is the result of

⁹⁶ I had a chance to talk to a few elderly men who retired from the State Hydraulic Works (*Devlet Su İşleri*, or DSI) as permanent staff. They said that they were mainly sent to digging works in the construction of, probably, sewer system. However, this kind of work is more and more transferred to informally employed daily labourers in these days.

⁹⁷ Saying this, Berfin's oldest daughter added that she bought her own washing machine and refrigerator as part of her trousseau for future separation from her in-laws. Yet, it seems difficult in near future because her husband has been unemployed since he completed his five-year education. He began working irregularly in Istanbul as a labourer before marriage but still depends on his father who works at State Hydraulic Works (*Devlet Su İşleri*, or DSI).

urbanisation and individualisation. Yet, it seems not to be the case among the participants.

The average year of migration of the husbands who lived in extended household was 8 years earlier (M=1980) than those in nuclear household (M=1988).⁹⁸ In other words, those who came to the city earlier are more likely to maintain extended household arrangement. In fact, the majority of extended households were formed by conventional voluntary migrants (Table 6.1). There were only three forced migrant families among fifteen extended households⁹⁹ but one of them migrated for the outcast of the widowed mother and the other two were conflict-induced migrants. One conflict-induced and one non-conflict induced forced migrant extended households consisted of a couple, their children and a widowed or separated mother of the husband. Brothers had already separated the hearth. All voluntary and one conflict-induced migrant extended households were multiple conjugal extended families. In other words, the extended household arrangement with multiple wage earners seems to be more predominant among voluntary migrant families.

Table 6.1. Migration types of the husbands and household arrangements.

	Number of extended household	Number of nuclear household	Total
Voluntary migrants	12 (48%)	13 (52%)	25 (100%)
Forced migrants	3 (21%)	11 (79%)	14 (100%)
All households	15 (38%)	24 (62%)	39* (100%)

* The number of the husbands was 39 because two participants were co-wives.

The extended household arrangement with multiple wage earners is probably the most effective available strategy for maximising meagre household budget as it is suggested in relative well-beings of those households. For instance, although the

⁹⁸ There were one husband in extended household and one in nuclear household whose families migrated in the 1970s but the specific year was not clear. Their migration years were all calculated as 1975.

⁹⁹ Elif and Fatmagül are co-wives and counted as one household. See Table 5.3.

majority of the husbands were labourers and their individual incomes probably did not differ greatly, all those families with multiple wage earners resided in concrete houses while the majority of nuclear families lived in clay houses (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2. Household arrangement types and building materials of the houses.

	Number of concrete houses	Number of clay houses	Total
Extended household	13 (87%)	2 (13%)	15
Nuclear household	4 (17%)	20 (83%)	24
All households	17 (44%)	22 (56%)	39*

* The number of the husbands was 39 because two participants were co-wives.

However, maintaining an extended household is not easy in the urban context in which there is neither land nor livestock to be shared by household members. It seems to be the privilege of the family of cooperative brothers each of who has relatively regular income and none of them is seen as a burden of the other. Voluntary migrant families are more likely to be able to maintain extended household probably because voluntary migrant men are more likely to have formal education and hence relatively stable jobs, though informal, than forced migrant men (Table 6.3). The average year of education which the voluntary migrant husbands completed was 4.3 while that of the forced migrant husbands was 1.4. The former group included three high school graduates while there were none in the latter group (Table 6.4). More than two thirds of the voluntary migrant husbands completed the compulsory education whereas the majority of the forced migrant husbands were not primary school graduates.

Table 6.3. Migration type and occupations of the husbands.

	Wage work with social security	Wage work without social security	Border trade	Irregular work	Craftsmen and others	Un-employed	Total
Voluntary migrants	3 (12%)	7 (28%)	4 (16%)	5 (20%)	6 (24%)	0 (0%)	25
Forced migrants	0 (0%)	3 (21%)	5 (36%)	4 (29%)	0 (0%)	2 (14%)	14
All husbands	3 (8%)	10 (26%)	9 (23%)	9 (23%)	6 (15%)	2 (5%)	39*

* The number of the husbands was 39 because two participants were co-wives.

Table 6.4. Migration type and educational levels of the husbands.

	No schooling	Primary school uncompleted	Primary school*	High school	Total
Voluntary migrants	6 (24%)	2 (8%)	14 (56%)	3 (12%)	25
Forced migrants	9 (64%)	2 (14%)	3 (22%)	0 (0%)	14
All husbands	15 (38%)	4 (10%)	17 (44%)	3 (8%)	39**

* It is the five-year primary school education.

** The number of the husbands was 39 because two participants were co-wives.

Economic Hardship and Household Dispersion

Most of those who formed nuclear families did not separate from the husband's father's household for seeking conjugal freedom but they were often forced to do so despite the fact that they could hardly afford building new houses (Case 1).

Müjde did not want to separate from her in-laws. Despite of his three sons' objection and lack of means to build separate houses, her father-in-law decided the separation because his first wife never accepted his second wife and quarrelled with him day and night. For a couple of years, they were forced to live 'separately' in each room under the same roof until Müjde's eldest brother-in-law moved out to the basement in a primary school where he worked as a janitor and then her husband built a small clay house next to his father's. Müjde and her husband's younger brother's wife, Berivan, consider that they could save up money and built a multi-story concrete house like her husband's relatives if they had lived together with her father and brothers-in-law;

Müjde: One of my husband's uncles is building an apartment. He works as a guard and his sons work in other places. They buy foods and other things with his earning and save up all his sons' earnings. If we didn't separate, we could build an apartment and didn't have to struggle with dirt everyday;

Berivan: If we were together now, we'd have built one house. I wish if we didn't separate. Now, a big house over there is my husband's uncle's. Everybody eats in their own flat. But they (the uncle and his sons) pool the money they earned. If they worked on their own, they couldn't build a house. When one works, he can barely look after his children (Case 1: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak; Berivan, age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere).

Forced migrant fathers and sons were less likely to have stable jobs and tended to be unable to afford looking after each other's family. Frictions between household members tend to overwhelm familial bond without economic bond. Thus, many forced migrant participants separated the hearth from the husband's father for poverty-related reasons (Cases 2, 3).

Sevda lives with her husband and their four small children in a single room in her father-in-law's house. Her father-in-law told her husband to separate from his hearth when her husband came back from military service and just begun border trade (of miscellaneous goods like toys and snacks) by a van which he and his friend bought with loan. Her father-in-law spared them one room in his house. They share the kitchen and the bathroom and frequently come and go each other but eat separately. Sevda was going to make tea for guests one day and opened a wardrobe in which one shelf was full of groceries and kitchen utensils. She laughed and said, "Look, my wardrobe became my kitchen. It's very difficult to live in one room. It is a bedroom, sitting room, kitchen and kids' room at the same time." Her father-in-law once told me apologetically that he had ten more children to look after including one newly-wed unemployed son; "there is no place for them, no place ..." (Case 2: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Ayfer married at very small age, probably about twelve. A year after her marriage, she migrated to Van with her husband and his family. Her parents-in-law constantly complained that she turned on light unnecessarily or spent too much coal. Their complaint intensified a couple of years later when her husband went to military service; "Why do you still spend things this much while your husband isn't here? We can't look after you." They gave one room to one married son and another to Ayfer. She lived on weaving *kilims* then and after her husband returned from military service because his earnings from occasional daily labour was never sufficient to support them. Eight years after the separation, they could finally build their own small house with the help of her brother who also lived in the same neighbourhood (Case 3: Ayfer, age 26, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Some participants separated the hearth due to constant quarrels between household members yet these cases also had material basis; a problem of sharing meagre economic resource (Cases 4, 5).

Yasemin's husband has been the only wage earner in the household for the last several years since his father was fired and became unemployed. He married to a woman of his choice, Yasemin, and still pays a debt for her bride price. Her in-laws did not treat her well. She was, probably, seen by her in-laws as a drain of money although she was weaving and selling kilims to contribute to the family budget. They separated after three-year constant quarrels but her husband still continues to provide his parents and siblings. When I visited her in-laws, they repeatedly remarked economic difficulties in city and added that Yasemin's husband who used to be the only major breadwinner was no longer with them (Case 4: Yasemin, age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Esmanur had severely suffered from the violence of one of her brothers-in-law for a long time. But it was his economic exploitation that encouraged her husband to make up his mind to separate from his older brother. Her husband and his brother had been running a *kahvehane* together. Her husband left the *kahvehane* and began working at a production site for concrete blocks. He nevertheless continued to give his earnings to his brother as before for a while. But one day he told him that he wanted to separate the hearth and spare some money for buying materials for building his own house. His brother was furious; "Oh, I work at the *kahve*. I provide the household. Now, you work separately for yourself!" A year later, he threw them out of the house after another quarrel for a trivial matter. Esmanur, her husband and their children began to live in a separate house which was still under construction (Case 5: Esmanur, age 36, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

There were cases where the working old father asked his son, who makes little economic contribution, to separate in order to get rid of extra dependents. For example, Güllü and Ayşegül's fathers-in-law had regular jobs at state institutions but they told their sons to look after their families by themselves (Cases 6, 7).

Güllü's husband has been working as a bus driver but hardly spent his salary for the family. His father had looked after Güllü and her children as well as his own other children. But he eventually told his only son to move out. Despite the fact that Güllü did not get along with her mother-in-law especially since she arranged the second wife for her husband, Güllü did not want to separate from them because she knew that her husband would not look after her. She is now obliged to live with her husband and his second wife and look after her children by herself with the money which she earns from sewing and making decorative linens for trousseau (Case 6: Güllü, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Ayşegül's father-in-law works for TEKEL (the state company of tobacco and alcohol) and had supported his son and Ayşegül for seven years since they married. After they had the first child, he told them to move out to another house although (or because) her husband did not have a regular job. They could not afford building a house. They have been living in a rented clay house for seven years since then (Case 7: Ayşegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

In the context of the limited supply of jobs for unskilled labour in recent years, one of the major forces to form nuclear household is, I argue, a considerable decline of economic benefits for maintaining extended household often on the part of the father who cannot see the benefit of living with unemployed sons and their families rather than the young couple who seek freedom.¹⁰⁰ In the eastern villages where people engage labour-intensive low-return animal husbandry and small-scale cultivation, sons and their wives and children are all valuable labour. However, in the city where all adult men have to struggle with seeking livelihood, married sons or brothers who cannot earn enough to support their own wives and children can be seen as mere burden. Besides, getting rid of the dependents could mean for the old patriarch giving up the control over his sons gradually. It could help increasing the bride's autonomy from in-laws but it seems that the multiple deprivations of material resource, education and freedom of movement prevented many participants from capitalising on the separation.

Increasing Autonomy of Men and Persisting Kinship Control over Women

Traditional patriarchy is losing its political base as well as its economic base. According to the accounts of the participants, in the village, the head of household played a crucial role as a political representative in the community, *kabile* or village. Decisions concerning the community, such as the usage of pasture, reconciliation of disputes and migration, were made by the heads of households in the community. However, in the migrant neighbourhood, daily activities and interactions to form the fabric of community are rare. As mentioned above, the *muhtar* mostly stays in his office in the city centre and works more as the mediator between the municipality and the neighbourhood in order to bring public services and other assistance to the residents rather than dealing with internal affairs in the neighbourhood. Decisions

¹⁰⁰ For old age security, probably the youngest son is kept in the father's house.

concerning the neighbourhood are rarely made collectively by the inhabitants but unilaterally through the *muhtar* by the municipal administration in general. There is even no *kahvehane* where men can gather and discuss issues concerning the neighbourhood.

In fact, a number of the participants did not initially understand the term “*aşiret*” (Turkish) or “*eşiret*” (Kurdish) but asked if I meant “*kabile*.” Today, for many people, *aşiret* seems to have lost its everyday relevance in urban area where there are few interests which they share as *aşiret* members, except for only a few powerful prominent families which dominate political and economic local network. It does not mean that *aşiret* has no importance to the people. But *aşiret* became a more abstract level of belonging without strict binding relations and a loose sense of solidarity which is mobilised rather flexibly.¹⁰¹

For Doluca migrants, the ‘community’ has shrunk to a small group of close relatives who live in proximity. Each household is principally the independent private domain under the rule of the head of household. A group of women which included some of the participants accounted as follows;

Woman A: It (*aşiret*) is not relatives but it has the same leader. You know, they say X *aşiret*. The leader of all of us is that. There is no (blood relations). It gets thin as it expands. Now our leader is the head of household. There is no longer an *ağa* (landlord) system. We didn’t have it anyway. There was no in our *aşiret* ever. But, it became X *aşiret* as *kabile*.

Woman B: For example, X is one group of people (*bir millet*). Those from Çatak are another. When anything happens, we come together. For example, when a fight takes place, we support each other.

Women around: No, no. That doesn’t happen.

Woman B: I say, for example.

¹⁰¹ For example, Ceren (age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan) was said to move out by her house owner only six months after she moved in. She considered that such an injustice could be done to her because she is not from her *aşiret*. Berivan (age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere) recounted one day a quarrel which her husband involved in downtown; “One man in the shop came out and separated the two. He sent off the other man and said to my husband that he saw he did nothing wrong. You know, *he was from us*, I mean, he was also X *aşiret*!”

Economic hardship forced the migrants to accept gradually that there are no rights and duties to share even among close relatives in different households except for customary visits. Once a household is separated, the father and brothers are not obliged to help each other (Case 8).

Since Müjde and Berivan's father-in-law and his sons separated the hearth, they have not materially supported each other even in one another's very difficult days despite their daily mutual visits. Müjde and Berivan's eldest brother-in-law has a regular job but hardly provided his younger brothers' impoverished families even during their absence during military service and seasonal labour migration. Müjde seemed to take it for granted. But Berivan recounted the days when her husband was away for military service;

Believe me, I don't want to remember those days at all. My husband wanted money sometimes. I used to sit and cry. I had no money to send my husband. We separated (the hearth). I was alone in the house. ... What can I do? I'm not working. I have three children. When I asked my eldest brother-in-law for money, he used to say that he had none. The other brother-in-law (Müjde's husband) also used to say that he hadn't any. They work and barely look after their children. Everyone is all alone (*Herkez tek başınadır*). Every one of us has got four or five children (Case 8: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak; Berivan, age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere).

However, for the matter of controlling/protecting women, the authority of the senior in a patrilineal group continues to be influential. An argument between two participants over the existence of *aşiret* may illustrate this. One day, I dropped by Müjde (age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak). Ceren (age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan), a neighbour, noticed me and joined us. Although she does not understand Turkish, Müjde's mother-in-law, who was visiting Müjde at that time, was intently watching "*Sıla*", a popular Turkish TV drama about a young woman, *Sıla*, who was brought up in Istanbul but forcibly married to a young *ağa* (the tribal leader – landlord – entrepreneur) in Mardin, a south-eastern province, in exchange of the *ağa*'s sister with whom her brother eloped. Müjde said that there was no such a thing around here, probably meaning a general context of drama coloured with oppressive tribal traditions. Ceren objected. She argued that people asked her where she was going whenever she went out and that proved the existence of *aşiret*. Müjde replied that there was no such a thing as *ağa*, however. Ceren insisted that there was in her village in Tatvan. I threw a question;

“What happens if a girl elopes in this neighbourhood? Does her father decide what should be done or is there anyone else with authority to decide?” Müjde explained that it is not her father but the senior among relatives such as the uncle who decides the girl’s future. The oldest uncle has the right to say what should be done and the father would follow his words, in their case, for instance. He has such right not as *ağa* but as the senior among the brothers because he does not have any economic rights and duties over anyone other than his wife and children. Nobody works for him. He is not obliged to support them. Each head of the household supports his family on his own (See Case 8).

Today, the authority of patriarch is principally based on the role as the head of household; the breadwinner and guardian of household members. His power is directed inward and limited to the private domain of household. However, notwithstanding the tendency for nuclear family and economic autonomy of each household, the hierarchy between brothers is by no means diminished. The eldest brother is not necessarily economically responsible for his brothers and their families if they do not live together. Yet, he can exercise his power over them on the matter concerning family honour which relies on women’s virtue. After losing the common economic base of land and livestock, family honour/women’s virtue is the only property that they still share. Individual man may have earned more autonomy as a result of tribal and familial dispersion. Each man has become the head of his own household. Yet, women and children continue to be subordinate not only to the father/husband but also to male kin. They continue to be the common property of the patrilineal group.

In the following sections, I shall discuss the participants’ multiple deprivations under reconfiguring patriarchy; traditional deprivations which continue from rural life, deprivations which are under negotiation and new deprivations which emerged in the context of the traumatic encounter with urban environment. I argue that the participants’ old and new disadvantages force them into a considerably weak position in the conjugal negotiation of reproductive decision-making and then possibly make

them vulnerable to repeated undesired pregnancies which will be argued in the next chapter.

6.3. Two Patriarchies and Twofold Deprivations

The participants are generally more underprivileged not only than the other women and men in the country but also than their husbands and other male members of the family. They are disadvantaged not only in terms of human capital but also positions they occupy within marriage, economic and moral systems as women. It is true that their husbands are also disadvantaged in comparison to many men and women in other parts of the country in many aspects. Low educational attainment and poverty may be shared by both women and men in the neighbourhood. However, the participants are certainly more underprivileged than their underprivileged husbands. The participants tend to lack fluency in Turkish, be illiterate, uneducated and unemployed more than their husbands and other male members of family. Further, for being women, they are deprived of freedom of movement. In fact, women's lack of education, fluency in Turkish and wage work is based on patriarchal gender regimes that organise, legitimise and enhance practices which assure women's disempowerment *vis-à-vis* men. Hence, some participants were more educated than their husbands by default but they were also subject to early involuntary marriage, economic dependence and restriction of movement. Some participants weaved *kilims* and earned money in difficult times when men could not work particularly after migration yet it did not help them being empowered in the household although women themselves do not take it for granted.¹⁰²

¹⁰² It is noteworthy that many of the participants who earned money by weaving kilims consider that they deserve more respect and better treatment and stress their economic contribution to the household. The contradiction of low status despite their economic contribution made them critical of men's authority. Yasemin (age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak), for example, have been weaving kilims since her childhood. She appears a bashful young woman. But, she was outspoken about constant mistreatments by her own and husband's families in spite of her labour and economic contribution for many years. She recounted that her brothers (her father remained in the village with his second wife) did not send her school and did not buy her trousseau and kept her bride price with them. She angrily said, "I made lots of kilims there (in my brothers' house). Nearly I was providing their livelihood. And then, I married. It became worse. ... I was really oppressed there (in her in-laws' house). I was like Cinderella in a story, really. I was oppressed everywhere. My own family was not good to me. How can they be good to a stranger?"

I argue that it is not just the lack of education and income which make the participants subordinate to their husbands in reproductive decision-making and fail to control their reproduction. But, it is manifold factors of traditional patriarchy (i.e. the marriage system based on patrilocality and patrilineal kinship solidarity, the familial/male right to control/protect women's sexuality, men's exclusive access to economic resource) and a reconfigured form of patriarchy in a particular structural position in the city (i.e. economic and psychological insecurities after migration, unfamiliar urban Turkish-speaking environment surrounded by strangers, women's withdrawal from production and confinement in the house) that force the participants into a particularly vulnerable position. I shall first delineate traditional deprivations in the following pages.

6.3.1. Traditional Patriarchal Deprivations

Traditional Deprivation of the Right to Decide When She Marries: Early Marriage

The prevalent marriage system in the neighbourhood is organised to ensure the bride's subordination. For instance, the age of the first marriage was notably early among the participants. While the mean age of the first marriage for the husbands was approximately 21, it was 16 for the participants, which is much younger than the national and regional averages.¹⁰³ Twenty-seven out of forty participants (67.5%) married at or before sixteen years old.¹⁰⁴ The age of the first marriage tends to be earlier for forced migrant participants (M=15.3) than voluntary migrant participants (M=16.5). Among the voluntary migrants, those who did not experience migration until marriage tended to marry at a little older age than the others (M=17.5).

¹⁰³ In 2008, the national average of the age of the first marriage for women was 22.9 and that in the Central Eastern region which Van belongs to is 22.7 (TURKSTAT 2009a).

¹⁰⁴ According to Turkish Civil Law before the 2002 reform, the legal age of marriage with the consent of the family was fifteen years old for women and seventeen years old for men. Today, it became equal for women and men and increased to seventeen years old (Article 124).

Yet, the people's perception of marriageable age is gradually but certainly changing.¹⁰⁵ Many participants thus stressed the earliness of their marriages in a critical tone during interviews (Case 9).

If only one marries when she becomes twenty. She can understand things better (at that age), can't she? People marry at seventeen. I wasn't even seventeen (Berivan was about fourteen years old when she got married). I mean, I looked like so. I married and had three children. I wasn't even twenty then. Can you believe that? I'd had periods for one and half years and then got married. I finished school, two years passed, became acquainted (with my husband), and came here. I mean, we're small but tall. I was tall and looked grown up. Everybody used to say that I was old enough (Case 9: Berivan, age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere).

Nevertheless, teenage marriage used to be very common and is still not rare in the neighbourhood while child marriage is said to be unheard lately. When a girl quits schooling after her father or brother's objection to her further exposure in the public sphere or her mother's request for babysitting or helping other domestic chores, matchmakers begin visiting her parents. She eventually gives in the pressures exerted by adults (matchmakers, parents, groom candidates' parents) and accepts one of marriage offers before long (Cases 10, 11).

Songül's daughter recounted her classmate's marriage in the previous year and explained;

If one doesn't continue education, then she marries. What else is going to be? When a girl leaves a school, then a marriage offer comes. After hearing someone made a marriage offer to her, people begin thinking that the girl should be old enough. After a while, she marries with one of them (Case 10: Songül's daughter, age 14).

¹⁰⁵ For instance, Berfin (age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere) and her husband (age 40, voluntary migrant from Pervari) protected their oldest daughter by hiding coming-in marriage offers from her. The daughter accounted;

When I was still thirteen, I was still going to school, matchmakers used to come. Thirteen years old, believe me! ... My dad didn't ask me. For I would be influenced. He never ever asked. Yes, there are cases where someone asks a thirteen-year-old girl in marriage and offers a good sum of bride price, and she is given away (Berfin's oldest daughter, age 21).

Hasret (age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari)'s father considered her marriage early when she decided to marry a man she saw at a wedding three years ago;

My father was against my marriage. He said, 'You're still small. How shall I give you up? But my mother did not object. She wanted for she is (my husband's) relative. My father objected very much. When I visit them, he still says, 'How I gave my daughter at this small age. I hate myself. I was thinking to give you when you become 21 or 22. But, it seems to be a fate.'

Esra was planning to go on to high school. But, her parents were sick and her sister who was one year older than her got married when she was in the eighth grade. She decided not to continue her education in order to help her sick mother. Soon after she left school, her mother's oldest brother came to ask her to marry his son who was eighteen years older than her. Esra and her parents were initially reluctant but eventually could not reject his request;

I was a student. That's why they didn't ask before. When I left school later on, they said I became a homemaker or so. Then they came to ask for me in marriage. They'd been intending but didn't ask because I was going to school. Having left school, they came to ask (Case 11: Esra, age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

A young daughter is easier to persuade to marry. Likewise, a young bride is certainly easier to control. Many women consider that it was partly their age that silenced them and allowed their in-laws to subordinate them (Case 12).

Ayşegül married when she was fifteen years old. Her father accepted a marriage offer for her despite her and her mother's objection because of her age. Ayşegül bitterly recounted the early days of her marriage;

They (my mother-in-law and sisters-in-law) didn't treat me well at all. Guardianship (*sahip çıkmak*) is not that. When one takes a bride of a small age, she must know that she's still a child. ... I didn't know what marriage was like. ... I regret very, very much. If only I didn't marry. *One comes to her senses at least at twenty or twenty-two. ... When she's a child, she is under the impression that this is this and that is that in the world. But it's not like that* (Case 12: Ayşegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Traditional Deprivation of the Right to Decide Whether She Marries: Forced Marriage

A woman's young age makes much easier and appear legitimate for her father to ignore her will and arrange her marriage on her behalf. However, the parental responsibility for children is sometimes abused by the patriarchal denial of individualities of women and children and distorted to the understanding of children as the father's property. Social expectation for the woman to repress her sexuality further makes difficult for her to refuse the marriage arranged for her although it is difficult for a man as well to object his father or older brother's decision on his marriage if he is very young. While women in the neighbourhood typically said that girls were not asked about her marriage in old days, it seems to me important to note that they at the same time recounted a number of stories in which mothers objected their daughters' marriages at very young ages or without their own consents. Forced

marriage (marriage against the bride or/and the groom's will) may be never justified in the eyes of women not only today but also in the past. In recent years, the idea of marrying a daughter with her consent as a virtuous conduct seems to be openly shared by many people. Yet, it remains to be the reality that she can be married off regardless of her will at any time once the father decides it.

Forced marriage tended to be more frequent among forced migrant participants. More than half of them were married off (53.3%) against their wills while nearly two thirds of the voluntary migrant participants (64%) married as they wished or with their consent. Among the voluntary migrants, none of the participants who did not experience migration until marriage married against their will while 53% of the others married as they wished or with their consent. Because forced marriage is more likely to happen in the cases of early marriage, it is expectable that it is also more prevalent among forced migrants than the other migrant group. The tendency for early and forced marriage among forced migrant participants could be due to their particular migration experience and insecurity rather than their relatively short period of residence in the city because the participants who had lived in the village until marriage tend to marry later and with their consent than the others.

Forced marriage seems to happen often for the sake of fraternity between the fathers of the groom and the bride or in place of the brother's bride's bride price, or *berdel*.¹⁰⁶ Once the father sees his own interest such as friendship and an exemption of bride price in a particular affinity, marriage can be carried out regardless of not only the couple's but also the other family members' objections (Cases 13, 14, 15).

Ceren's paternal grandfather promised her father-in-law, who is his distant relative and also very good friend, to marry his granddaughter to his weak-sighted son without bride price; 'I sacrifice my (grand)daughter to you.' Ceren added cynically, "It's as if I were a cow." He did not consult anyone including her and her parents. Ceren's mother tried to prevent this marriage by sending her away to a wedding party which was going on in their village on the day of engagement. She challenged her husband. Ceren's father was also against this marriage but could do nothing to

¹⁰⁶ *Berdêl* (Kurdish) or *berdel* (Turkish) is the exchange of sisters between two men. It is a form of marriage which is seen in the eastern and south-eastern Turkey and in many other regions in the world such as Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Australia (Balaban 1982: 43).

stop his father. He beat Ceren's mother and silenced her. Ceren accounted how she gave in;

I said! I did say (to my mother that I didn't want to marry)! My mother cried and went to my father. My father said, 'I can't do anything', and beat my mother. He said, 'What can I do? My father gives (Ceren) ...'. ... My grandfather came and told me, 'If you don't take it, I would neither talk to you for life nor forgive you, nor bless you (*ne hakkımı helal ederim*, which means not giving up a religiously legitimate claim on her and is a serious statement).' A very big fight was going to happen in our house. I said to myself, 'It was best to say 'yes'' (Case 13: Ceren, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan).

Her marriage was thus realised when she was fifteen years old.

Ayfer's father married her off before puberty. He was befriended with a man in another village. The man had a son who had speech defect. He asked her father to 'give' one of his daughters to marry his son in exchange of his own daughter plus bride price for one of his sons. No one but her father knew about the groom's disability until the very day of the wedding. Ayfer did not want this marriage but could not say anything because she was scared of possible troubles; "I was scared and said nothing. If I declined the engagement, people would have asked who did it? (And, people say) She did it. *I couldn't turn down out of fear.*" Yet, her mother spoke up to her husband in order to prevent this marriage but she was silenced in the end. She said to him, "Don't commit sin. Why do you do this to my daughter? She is still small. She doesn't love him yet." He beat her and told off, "I divorce you if you say a word." Ayfer's mother cried so much. She still recounts that day from time to time; "I never forget the word" (Case 14: Ayfer, age 26, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Ayşegül's father decided her marriage with one of his remote relatives despite her mother's objection. He swore and beat his wife and silenced her eventually.

My father had an old head. They (my husband's parents) came to ask me for marriage. He (my father) gave me because they were relatives. In short, he sacrificed me to them. ... It's an idea of the very ignorant. Indeed, I didn't want. It happened by force. ... I told my mother I didn't want it. ... They (my husband's parents) came at one raining night. They made us engaged. *I couldn't say anything.* As if they put me under a spell. My mouth was locked. I couldn't say anything. But after they went I regretted very much (Case 15: Ayşegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Some participants said that *berdel* became less common in Şırnak where bride price is steep and highly esteemed. Twelve participants (30%) married in this way. In all the *berdel* marriages but one, either the participant's father or her husband's father was from Çatak in Van. In general, it was practiced in place of bride price in order to reduce the burden of the grooms' father (Case 16).

Hanım's father and father-in-law had known each other since the days when they were in the village because her father's village was on the way to the city of Van

from her father-in-law's village and he used to put up her father-in-law and his co-villagers. Her father went to her father-in-law to ask his daughter in marriage to his son. Her father-in-law required bride price. Her father had difficulty in paying the money required. Then, his eldest son interfered and required his daughter, Hanım, for his younger brother instead of bride price, that is, *berdel*. Her father and uncles agreed. Hanım expressed her unwillingness for *berdel* because she had always heard from her neighbours that *berdel* is difficult for women. Yet, her father did not listen to her; "My dad gave me by force. I objected. He didn't listen to me; 'It's decided. Our custom (*töre*) is thus'" (Case 16: Hanım, age 27, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Berdel is a quintessential practice that the father ignores his children's individualities and treats them as his or the family's property. The participants were generally very critical of this practice. Songül (age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak) is Hanım's sister-in-law. She protested her elder brother who demanded Hanım in place of bride price for their younger brother who was still fourteen years old at that time. She argued, "Can four persons be identical? One couple marry as they wish. But, what about the other?"

There is however a case in which a woman successfully prevented her brother's and own *berdel* marriages (Case 17).

Zekiye rejected and prevented *berdel* by persuading her father to spend her bride price, which would be paid by her husband who was making a marriage offer, for the bride price for the woman of her brother's own choice. Otherwise, Zekiye's father was planning to refuse the marriage offer from her husband and marry her brother by marrying Zekiye to his future bride's brother in place of bride price. She did not want *berdel* because she considered that it carries a possibility that when one bride is mistreated by her in-laws, the other also becomes mistreated by her in-laws as payback. What is worse, if one couple divorces, so does the other (Case 17: Zekiye, age 30, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Hakkari).

I suggest that early marriage, forced marriage and fathers' fraternity are closely related to one another in the neighbourhood and probably in the eastern Turkey. In early marriage, the father can exploit his daughter's small age and immaturity by his authority as an adult, a man and the father. Zekiye (Case 17) was twenty-four years old when she got married. She was old enough to talk to and persuade her father for preventing her and her younger brother's *berdel* marriages. Hanım (Case 16) was eighteen years old when her marriage was arranged. She failed to persuade her father

but was courageous enough to express her unwillingness to her father. However, most participants who married against their wills, for *berdel* or not, were still in their early teens when their fathers arranged their marriages and could not speak up out of fear in front of the adults (See Cases 13, 14, 15). They characteristically expressed that they were still small and could not say a word against their fathers despite their unwillingness; “*Ben daha küçüktüm. Birşey diyemedim*” (I was still small. I couldn’t say anything).

Traditional Deprivation of the Right to Decide Whom She Marries: Arranged Marriage

Even if not forced overtly, many marriages of the participants tended to be arranged by the third person. Arranged marriage (the marriage arranged by the third party) was much more common than love marriage (the marriage initiated by either person of the couple) among the participants (62.5% and 37.5%, respectively). It tended to be more common among those who migrated in later years and hence conflict-induced migrants. The average years of migration are 1988 and 1980 for the husbands who did arranged marriage and those who did love marriage, respectively. The majority of the forced migrant husbands (71.4%) did arranged marriage while more than half of the voluntary migrant husbands (58%) married with a person of their own choice.

However, from the woman’s perspective, love marriage in its exact sense is rare among the participants. What is called ‘love marriage’ here is only from the husband’s perspective in most cases (13 out of 15 cases). In those cases, the husband saw or glanced at his future wife at a wedding or somewhere else and liked her. A marriage offer was still made to the bride’s father by his parents. The traditional format of the transfer of a woman from the father to the husband’s household continues to be maintained. Thus, the woman is still requested from her father by the groom’s parents and bride price is paid.

Besides, in the neighbourhood, marriage between relatives seems to be ideally favoured particularly by the parents but in reality it may not be very common. The

majority of the participants (80%) were married to non-relatives but nearly half of the marriages (19 out of 40) were tribal endogamy, in which bride price is paid less than tribally exogamous marriage.

About 58% of the participants married with consent whereas the majority of the husbands married with a person of their choice or with their agreement. Yet, many of the participants who were asked their wills and consented to their marriages had no idea if they wanted or not because, as they typically mentioned, they were still too young to know it. However, they ‘agreed’ “due to their respect for their fathers,” or the cultural expectation for children to obey the father and for girls and women to leave important decisions to men. Asking a daughter’s consent or informing her is thus a matter of formality in many cases. Some participants remarked that it is regarded as a shame that a girl expresses her likes or dislikes with regards to her marriage; “For example, one says that she doesn’t like this (man). They say, ‘Ah! She chooses the husband (*Koca seçiyor!*)!’” (Ceylan, age 28, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak); “You know, it’s a word that is better to die than to be said” (Songül, age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak). In general, the father and the daughter do not directly talk about her marriage. If the daughter is asked about her opinion about a particular marriage offer, she is usually asked by her mother. She then typically replies, “my father knows (*babam bilir*),” which means he can arrange her marriage as he wishes (Cases 18, 19).

When Müjde’s husband sent his marriage offer through his parents, she was thirteen years old. Müjde’s stepmother asked her if she wanted to marry him whom she had seen only twice on his visits to her family. She did not answer because she did not know what to say (“I didn’t know even what marriage was!”). Being under pressure by the groom’s family and her husband, her stepmother lost patience in the end and told (threatened?) her that she was going to call her father to talk to her if she did not answer right away. Because she was very ashamed to talk with her father about such a matter, she gave in and said, “My dad knows. Whatever he says is it” (Case 18: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

I didn’t want to marry at first. [Interviewee (I): Why?] I don’t know. [I: Is it because you didn’t like your husband?] I didn’t want to marry. My age was small. [I: How were you persuaded?] My father ... I said, ‘It will be whatever my father wants.’ [I: How did your father talk to you?] I don’t know. I didn’t talk to him at all (on this matter). He didn’t talk at all. It’s just gone by. [Gülcan, one of her brothers-in-law’s

wives (H): If there was anyone she wanted, her mother would have told him. In our society, 'Be whatever the father says' means 'Yes, I accept. You can give me away if you think it's appropriate'.] [I: Can they say openly that they don't want?] [H: They don't. They can't, to tell you the truth.] [I: Couldn't you say 'no' or couldn't you say 'yes'?] My father wanted. I wanted so. [Nebahat, one of her sisters-in-law (N): She wanted but couldn't say so. That's why she said, 'As you know'.] [H: That is, it meant 'I want.' Of course, she would have said she didn't want if he was someone she didn't want.] *I wouldn't have said* (in a low voice which only I could hear). [N: Of course. Today's girls! ... In her case, too. Her maternal aunt's son wanted her. She didn't want him.] [I: Why didn't you want him?] *My father* didn't want. [I: Did your father like you husband?] He liked him. Very much. [I: Did you like him?] I liked. I love my husband very much (Case 19: Leyla, age 23, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Leyla's responses in Case 19 illuminate, despite their briefness, the complexity of social pressure on a woman's obedience, social efforts to make 'the obedience' her will, and her irrepressible subjectivity. In fact, she was not very confident in her Turkish and the other women in the household often tried to help or answer my questions instead of her. Every time when they spoke in place of her, I turned to her to re-confirm answers after listening to them and she expressed her views regardless of her in-laws' attempt to impose their version of story of consented marriage.¹⁰⁷ Many participants articulated, more explicitly than Leyla, that they were not the decision makers of their own marriages and they by no means took it for granted despite their acceptances (Case 20).

Makbule was a diffident woman. She repeatedly remarked that she could not do anything beyond her husband's words. Her accounts showed that she has almost

¹⁰⁷ It is hard to know whether the discrepancy between Leyla and her female relatives on her husband's side derives from a tribal or a regional difference with regards to marriage practice or the latter's desire to present a story in favour of their family. Leyla's husband's family belongs to the Gui *aşiret* from Uludere which comprises a considerable part of the early voluntary migrants in the neighbourhood. The Guis are acknowledged for their practice of consented marriage although probably it is a trend after migration because it can be assumed from old Gui women's accounts that marriage without the bride's consent was not rare in the past among the Gui, too. Nonetheless, Songül's (age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak) account of her marriage suggests the difference between those from Çatak and the Gui today. Her older brother wanted to marry a girl from the Gui family in the neighbourhood. Her father went to the girl's oldest brother (her father lives in the village) to ask the permission of his son's marriage with her and proposed a berdel, Songül's marriage to his younger brother, instead of bride price. The girl's brother asked his brother and sister about their marriages. They agreed. Songül's mother urged her husband to ask Songül if she wanted or not but he found no need for that because he liked the groom very much. Songül said, "He (my father) said, 'I like that boy very much. If my daughter likes me, she would like him, too. I got it and I didn't speak up. But, you know, Guis! If girls don't want, they don't give them. Now, we are from a different *aşiret*. We don't speak up. They do.'"

always tried to be obedient to her father and husband. Nevertheless, she occasionally expressed her critical views concerning what has been going around her, for instance, marriage.

They (my parents and parents-in-law) became acquainted with each other through my father's friend. They (my parents-in-law) came, saw me, and liked me. (I: Did your father ask you about your marriage?) No, he didn't. My father didn't ask me, but he asked my younger sister if she wanted or not (when she received a marriage offer). They didn't ask me. (I: Was it not a custom to ask a girl in your time?) *It's not a matter of custom (adet). They didn't want to ask me.* I didn't say anything, too. If my father and my mother thought appropriate ... (I: Did you want to marry?) (She breathed deeply.) I WANTED. I saw the boy; the boy saw me, too, and liked me ... *even if we didn't want, we had to.* (She suddenly spoke hurriedly) I wanted. I wanted for Allah. I saw my husband, liked him, and wanted (Case 20: Makbule, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Başkale).

Traditional Deprivation of the Right for Monogamy: Polygyny as a Threat

Not only women but also young men can be subjected to early, forced and arranged marriages. However, men are exempted from the threat of polygamy thanks to the gender regime that ensures paternity. It has been customarily accepted by lay believers that Islam admits polygyny up to four wives although theologians often maintain that Koran does not prohibit polygyny up to four wives for the consideration of special cases yet actually recommends monogamy against the ancient practice of unlimited polygyny by placing the impossible condition of the equal interest and treatment among wives (Paçacı 2007). The Turkish state prohibited polygamy by criminalising it after the establishment of the Republic. Hence, even if a man 'marries' more than one woman by the religious ceremony (*imam nikâhu*), only one wife can obtain the legally recognised marriage and benefit from legal rights as the wife.

In the neighbourhood, polygyny is not rare although it is not very common.¹⁰⁸ Among the participants, five women (12.5%) had a co-wife. There was one participant who approved polygyny. Gülcan (age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari) married a man who had already married to a widow of his deceased brother but as an official wife. She defended that she saw polygyny as part of their tradition which her mother, her grandmother and 'everybody' did and

¹⁰⁸ According to Civerek and Koç (2007), those who married as *kuma* (the second wife) amounted to 2 women per thousands in 2003 in Turkey.

declared in front of the other women in the household that she loved her husband very much and never ever got jealous.

Women explained that in some cases, the first wife possesses a superior position over the second wife (*kuma* in Turkish; *ser hevi* in Kurdish) in the case where the latter is much younger than the former and she is taken in order to bear male children. In those cases, the second wife's children are taught to call the first wife Mother or 'big Mother' while they call their biological mother 'little Mother'. The first wife thus remains the mother of the house and enjoys the authority while the second wife is only a wife to the husband.

Nevertheless, as seen in the participants' accounts described below, the arrival of the second wife is the worst dream of most women after divorce. Examples of men's second marriages are told again and again and, I argue, are often shown as a lesson for women that they have to appreciate their position as the only wife and the failure to please the husband and in-laws can invite the second wife at any time. Women are very aware of the real possibility that conflict with their husbands or in-laws or having no sons can lead to the husband's second marriage at any time. Almost everyone has a story about someone who had to accept the second wife or is threatened by the possibility. For instance, most participants' spontaneous response was "the second wife will come (*kuma gelir*)" when they were asked 'if you had no sons ...' Even those who believe their husbands' devotion consider that their in-laws would marry their husbands again if they did not give birth to sons. They are also very aware of the fact that they cannot prevent it when it happens.

The participants, except for Gülcan, and some of the participants' mothers or mothers-in-law who had a co-wife expressed their disapproval and talked about the objections they made when their husbands brought another wife to the house. However, in all the cases which I was told, they could do nothing but accepted the second wife in the end. It seems that men in the neighbourhood tend to marry another woman without the knowledge of their wives and other family members probably

because they expect their objections. It is thus usually too late for a woman to object when she learns about her husband's marriage (Cases 21, 22).

Nesrin had not been getting along with her husband and he used to intimidate her at every quarrel that he would bring *kuma*. When she was pregnant with the fourth child, he really married to another woman whom he met in Mersin. Without the knowledge of Nesrin, his mother, brothers and other family members, he sold his minibus, paid bride price, and married the woman. He registered her as his official wife. Nesrin's brothers heard his second marriage and protested. However, they could do nothing but stopped visiting them as a sign of disapproval. Since then, Nesrin has been left alone with her husband and *kuma* both of who do not talk to her but quarrel. All the other family members and her neighbours blame Nesrin now. They criticise that she is fractious, could not get along with her husband, and constantly fights with her *kuma* who now runs the household instead of their husband who is in prison (Case 21: Nesrin, age 43, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Müjde's father-in-law married a woman from a neighbouring village without anyone's knowledge including his wife and sons when they were still in the village. He married the woman and married off his two daughters to her brothers in place of bride price. When his wife learned that he married another woman and was taking her home, she got furious but it was too late. She now says that she had never allowed this marriage if she knew beforehand. Yet, she was obliged to live with her husband and *kuma* for more than twenty years until her oldest son moved out and she decided to live with him and his family. In her case, too, women seem to have blamed her. Müjde explains;

Our mother-in-law was not a kind of person who did not take good care of our father-in-law. I mean, people explained us so. My mother-in-law didn't say that by herself. Some other people used to say so. They said that your mother-in-law didn't care for your father-in-law so that he got married (Case 22: Müjde's mother-in-law, age unknown, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

Meanwhile, among the participants who have no co-wife, nearly one third gave a positive answer when they were asked whether they would accept a co-wife *if they did not have sons*. They typically said that they had to (*mecbur*) (Cases 23, 24, 25).

I would have accepted it (a co-wife) for my husband. One is obliged to accept, isn't she? It (a male child) is very necessary. In general, everyone accepts. In such a case, they accept. The rich, the poor, everyone. A man marries anyone he likes. He marries regardless of his wife's willingness. ... Here most people do not want their daughters to go as *kuma*. No one wants. What can we do? It still happens (Case 23: Melike, age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

If there were no (sons), I would have had a *kuma* by now. If I objected, we'd have divorced. There is no separation here anyway. I don't know, the woman stays in the husband's house until she dies. There is a death but no separation. Even if one separates, the husband comes and shoots you. There is no separation. There is no divorce. [I: Can't you return to your father's house?] Because these (my husband and his family) do not accept (a separation) in any event, I can't stay with my father obviously. Either they come and shoot me or I can never marry again. Even if I go to my father, I can't marry (Case 24: Ceylan, age 28, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

(If all children were girls) A *kuma* would have come on me! ... If one gives birth to six or seven daughters, then they bring a *kuma*. Even if I don't accept, they still bring. That's the way in our society. ... (If I didn't have sons,) I don't want but I would have brought for my husband. If one loves her husband, she'll want a child (for him) (Case 25: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

On the other hand, 20% of the participants who had no co-wife gave the negative answer to the question but added that their husbands could marry another woman nevertheless once they or in-laws wanted.

Traditional Deprivation of the Right to Refuse Sexual Intercourse: Rape within Marriage?

Although the participants know that it is very difficult for a woman to prevent her husband's second marriage once he decided, some of them said that they would express her disapproval *by refusing her duty as the wife* if he marries again; "I wouldn't have accepted. I'd have looked after my daughters. He (my husband) would have looked after his wife" (Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak). Some participants actually attempted to refuse their husbands' sexual or/and reproductive claim over them when their husbands married or attempted to marry again despite their objection. It was the only, yet very meaningful, protest that they could possibly make. It is meaningful in a sense that by refusing her husband's access to her body, the woman tries to remind her husband of 'marriage contract' and protect her dignity. However, it is not easy in practice (Cases 26, 27).

Esmanur's husband once attempted to marry for the second time although it was not realised due to the rejection of the woman whom he intended to marry. Esmanur got devastated when she learned his attempt. She saw it as cheating. Rather than confronting him, Esmanur declared her husband that she would go to bring the

second wife by herself and they would continue to live together but just as the parents of their children;

I suffered a lot. I got worn out. But nothing destroyed me as much as cheating (*aldatma*). Because *I didn't deserve that, definitely*. ... I was pregnant with Kader then. ... He was going out with a widow, a divorced woman. He was going to bring her on me. ... But I told my husband my conditions. I said I would go and ask her for marriage. But, after we bring her, we would of course live in the same house until you find another house for yourself or for me, yet we would never have married life. We'd become like a brother and a sister. Of course, we wouldn't divorce. *But, never enter my room. Never request any work from me*. I only take care of my children as their mother. You care for kids as their father, too. If not, after you bring her, if you want to share me as well, I never accept it. Because I can't take that. ... All right, I'm an ignorant person, but if you love me, you wouldn't bring her. ... But if you don't love me, then you can bring her, you're free. Do whatever you like, I said. ... I said I never ever accept (the continuation of our married life) though. Why does someone who loves me go into someone else's bosom? How was he going to go into her room in front of my eyes? Of course, I was going to die everyday. I used to go mad as I considered that. ... He didn't accept (my conditions). 'You can't obstruct this; you're my wife'. He said so. But if he had brought her, I would never have accepted. I wouldn't have accepted (Case 26: Esmanur, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

Elif's husband married a widow (Fatmagül) when she had three daughters and three sons already. He married her secretly while he was preparing for his younger brother's wedding at the same time. When Elif learned about her husband's marriage, she threatened her husband by telling him that she would kill herself if he brought the second wife to the house but it had no effect. When she realised that she could do nothing but continued married life with her husband, *she decided to refuse to bear his children any more and used a contraceptive for the first time*. She had an intrauterine device placed at the hospital. But, she had to remove it eventually due to excessive bleeding and conceived four more times (Case 27: Elif, age 46, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere).

Sexual intercourse by force within marriage is a crime according to Turkish Penal Code (Article 102/2). However, it seems to be understood by men that the husband is entitled to a conjugal 'right', or sexual access to the wife, regardless of the wife's willingness. Esmanur's husband did not accept her demand for either not marrying another woman or ending their conjugal relationship (Case 26). Elif had one miscarriage and three more children from her husband against her will after her husband married his second wife (Case 27). Müjde's mother-in-law had to endure sharing a bedroom with her husband and his second wife for more than a decade (See Case 22). Nesrin continued getting pregnant against her will for three years after her husband's second marriage until, according to her brothers'-in-law's wives, her husband began keeping distance from her and neither approached nor provided her

and her children in apprehension of his second wife (See Case 21). Yasemin's mother had endured child marriage, domestic violence, the *kuma* and separation. She narrated her rejection of sexual relations with her husband after he stopped providing her;

Yasemin's mother said that she used to enjoy sexual relations with her husband. But after he brought the second wife to their house, she no longer wanted to have his children. She used to sleep at one corner of the room and the second-wife at the other corner of the same room. Whenever their husband slept with her at night ("He used to come by force even if I tried to take out his eyes)," the second-wife got up a number of times and turned on light or went to drink water. After daily quarrels with the second-wife, she left the house and moved to her older brother's house. Her husband also told her to go with her children. Her husband did no longer provide her and her children since then. But he continued to come to her and demanded sexual relations; "He still wanted children from me." She used to refuse and lock the door. She murmured, "Only if he provided me ..." (Case 28: Yasemin's mother, age 59, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

In fact, the rejection of sexual relations is a conduct which requires courage and determination for women. One participant accounted sexual relations with her husband as follows;

It is nice to have relationship with my husband IF both want. In early days, my husband didn't understand about periods. He used to get upset and accused me that I was making excuses. I explained him again and again (about periods) and he gradually understood. Now he asks if I took a bath.¹⁰⁹ For us, it's not acceptable that the wife refuses the husband's demand. The wife can't turn her back against her husband in bed unless he says to do so. It's an offence to him. My husband's brother once beat his wife when she was pregnant (after repeated miscarriages and wanted to avoid sexual intercourse) (Case 29: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Men might see the husband's unilateral conjugal right and polygyny as their God-given right. Yet, the view may not be shared by all women. Esmanur for instance sees her husband's attempt for the second marriage as "cheating (*aldatmak*)" (See Case 26). Elif's daughter called her father "mentally unbalanced (*dengesiz*)" for his second marriage (See Case 27). Polygyny may be losing social legitimacy (or never be to the eyes of women). Elif and Yasemin's mother decided to refuse the husband's 'unquestionable' right over their bodies, though failed, on the ground that they brought the second wife.

¹⁰⁹ Ablution of the whole body is required after the end of menstruation in Islam.

Nonetheless, polygyny still functions both as male privilege and as a disciplinary threat to women. Because divorce is the most unfavourable option, even worse than having a *kuma*, they have no choice but to live with the humiliation of sharing the husband and the wife's entitlements with another woman whether they like it or not. Women in the neighbourhood all know well that they have no choice but endure the humiliation once the husband decides to marry again. Divorce can be the last option for women because of their economic dependency and the traditional father right over children. If a woman chooses to divorce, her husband and his family is likely to force her to give up her children. However, women's choice for divorce or children seems to be changing in recent years. Some areas of gender relations which are being negotiated will be discussed in the next section.

6.3.2. Traditional Patriarchal Deprivations under Negotiation

As described above, a number of traditional patriarchal deprivations of women's human rights still persist today. However, it is observable that many areas of traditional gender inequalities are questioned by women and being negotiated as the socioeconomic basis of traditional patriarchy was undermined and the new patriarch is having a difficult time in fulfilling the role of breadwinner although the consequences may not be necessarily in favour of women entirely.

Traditional Deprivation of Mother's Right vs. Rising Consciousness of Motherhood

A few participants, especially a group of forced migrant women from Çatak, stated that there was no such a thing as divorce for them (See Case 24). Nevertheless, it seems that there have been always some women who leave their husbands if not many. Some of the participants recounted the stories of women who ended marriage by leaving children to their husbands and eloping with another man, which is the only way of divorce or separation for a woman who has no access to economic resource (Case 30).

Soon after the death of Berivan's father-in-law, his second wife suddenly disappeared leaving her four school-age children behind. One day, she told Berivan that she was going to visit her parents and asked her to cook something for her children who were still at school. Berivan prepared a meal for her mother-in-law's children and waited but she did not return. Her mother-in-law telephoned her deceased husband's older brother who lived next door and said to him, "Don't look for me. I'm going to my father. Look after *your* children." However, it was soon found out that she did not go to her father's house but married with a man from her home village and moved to another city (Case 30: Berivan's second mother-in-law, age 40s, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

There is a prevalent idea in the neighbourhood, and in many other parts of the country until recently, that children belong to the father and his partilineal family (e.g. Delaney 1991). Thus, the woman is not expected to demand her parental right over children if she is divorced or leave her husband. However, a number of the participants stressed that in these days women do not leave children but stay. When they talked about the women who left the husband and hence children behind, it was always narrated in a reproaching manner and they all added, "But, nobody leaves her children behind in these days." Berivan, for example, commented after the story of her second mother-in-law's elopement: "We couldn't get it. We couldn't imagine such a thing at all; leaving children behind. *And, nobody leaves her children in this time.* Everybody looks after *her* children." It is hard to know whether Berivan's mother-in-law really considered that children whom she gave birth to and nurtured belonged to the patrilineal household or she made a difficult choice to leave her children behind in order to marry another man who probably did not want to support another man's children. Nonetheless, it seems that leaving children behind when separating from the husband or his family after his death is becoming less and less common and even becoming a conduct to be unexpected or criticised if it is done (Case 31).

Songül has lost her husband from a traffic accident three years ago and she received compensation. Her father-in-law who lived in a village in Şırnak demanded the money. He told her that he would buy her a flat (but in his name) in Gaziantep where he already owned a few flats. Songül refused his offer. Her oldest brother-in-law, who lived next door, also supported her. Her father-in-law came over to Van and tried to get the money from her by force. He broke the windows and beat up his oldest son who sided with her. He was taken to the police station in the end. Songül said that she did not blame her father-in-law nevertheless. In past, widows generally left their children to in-laws and remarried. "He is an old man. It is normal that he

thought I would remarry and leave with the money.” She considers that it is other relatives around him who must be blamed because they provoked him by saying that she would leave her children to him and disappear with the money. “*The people in their age must know that I wouldn’t do such a thing*” (Case 31: Songül, age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

The women of the previous generations tended to choose moving from a deceased husband to another husband for survival even if it costs the separation from her children. Or, it might be truer to say that she faithfully but cunningly fulfilled the role of a ‘mere’ reproducer as traditional patriarchy dictates by leaving the parental responsibility to children’s patrilineal family after their father’s death rather than shouldering it; if there is no right, there is no responsibility (See Case 30).

On the other hand, women today seem to have adopted the idea of the ‘modern’ motherhood regardless of the unprecedented physical and moral burden that it demands the mother. I consider that there are several underlying reasons for that. Women increasingly take the burden of “institutionalised motherhood” (Rich 1986) probably because it replaces the role of agricultural labourer that they used to occupy in the unit of domestic production in the village. They sense its potential effect for enhancing their functional and moral values in the eyes of the husband and in-laws and their patriarchal protection. Further, it could be the investment on the mother-child bond and the daily support in case of the daughter and the future patriarchal protection in case of the son. The daughter helps the mother’s empowerment by assisting housework and babysitting her siblings from ten years old or even younger until her marriage. The daughter’s assistance in the house not only reduces her chores but also enables her to go out even if she has small children. The son is not only the future economic supporter and social protector for the mother but also the only man whom she is likely to be able to control. Mother (*Ana*) occupies a symbolically and emotionally important place in Anatolia. Nonetheless, the mother-child bond is, I argue, not a biologically inherent relationship but social relationship which requires investments and involves material and non-material interests.

Women are now more conscious of motherhood and choose to remain within the husband’s family even after his death in order to mother their children. They tend to

struggle for staying married even in case where they were severely mistreated by the husband and/or his family. The woman usually does not have income to support children independently. Her father or new husband would support her but if she leaves her children to their father's family. Her newly developed conscience of motherhood (one not only of affection and sacrifice but also of parental responsibility and right) does not allow her leaving children behind. She thus rather chooses to stay with her husband or his family even if it means living with violence or/and humiliation for the possible secure life in future (Cases 32, 33).

Esmanur and her husband fell in love with each other and married when she was fifteen years old. Esmanur's mother-in-law, brother-in-law and his wife, Sibel, however, wanted Sibel's younger sister as a bride, not Esmanur. They have been unkind to Esmanur from the very first day when she married into their house. Her brother-in-law frequently beat her. They were looking for an opportunity to separate Esmanur and her husband and tried it a couple of times. Esmanur's husband was the youngest among the brothers and could not say anything against his mother and brother. It was the third day since Esmanur gave birth to her second child. She was feeding her one-year-old son tandoor-baked flat bread and yogurt. Her mother-in-law got angry at her for she gave her son fresh bread while there was still some stale bread left. Esmanur talked back to her for the first time and called her husband, "I can't bear any more!" She exploded her anger. "What do you want? Do you want to divorce?," responded her husband. They began quarrelling. Her mother-in-law called her other three sons; "Esmanur is beating her husband! She demands him a crib for the baby or divorce". Three brothers pulled her hair and beat her up. Sibel's husband told Esmanur's husband, "Divorce her. I'll go and bring my wife's sister for you today". Three brothers decided to send Esmanur back to her father's house. A few days later, on the first festive day after the fast of Ramadan, her three brothers-in-law and husband came to visit her grandfather and parents and also to take her children. Her husband told her to get ready the older son. He said that he was going to his friend. He returned and told her to get ready the other child. She understood what he was going to do and refused. She held her new born baby tightly in her arms. Her husband, mother and younger brother all tried to grab the baby from her. Her mother tried to persuade her, "*Let him take it, my daughter. They don't want you. Why do you want their child?*" Esmanur's father was away for his job but, according to her, he would have given her children to her husband if he learned that he was divorcing her. Esmanur resisted, "Mom, *how do I give up a piece from my liver? Don't you know them? You came and saw them. Those who do not love me do not love my children, too*". She put her hand on the baby's neck and pretended to squeeze; "Wait, I'll kill him. You'll bring the body. I would know you put him in grave at least. He wouldn't suffer tortures like me then. ... I'll reach the other child and kill him, too. I'll kill myself after that and go to their side." After further quarrels and grapples, Esmanur begged her husband in the end; "All right, I accept all these tortures. I promise you, in the name of Allah, I'll accept even if they tell me to come and give my hands to use as toilets. So, do not separate me from my children!" She returned. A few years later, Esmanur's husband was imprisoned. Her brother-in-law battered Esmanur badly one day and broke her rib. Esmanur's father

tried to bring her back to his house and insisted that she should sue him. He even came to take her with a group of armed men. Esmanur refused. She stayed with her children again. She accepted neither to leave her house nor to go to the police stubbornly because suing her brother-in-law antagonises all members of his patrilineal extended family and they would never allow her to return them again, which means her separation from her children (Case 32: Esmanur, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

Güllü married to her husband after his insistent courting. Her husband began flirting with other women soon after they got married however. Her mother-in-law did not like her very much and found a candidate for the second bride from her relatives in Şırnak when Güllü was pregnant with the third child. She planned to marry the woman to Güllü's husband as the official wife and register Güllü's children as hers. Soon after she learned that, Güllü went to downtown with her children and went in a lawyer's office which she found by chance. She asked the lawyer for advice. She got a word from her that it was not legitimate to register her children as someone else's without her consent even if she is not officially married to her husband and such a conduct would be penalised by imprisonment up to ten years. The lawyer also told Güllü that she can register her children on her own without official marriage. Güllü went to see one of her uncles who worked as an architect in the downtown. She got a support from him, too. She was encouraged and called her father. Her younger brother came to fetch her and her children. Her father called her husband and told him to marry her officially in two days, or not to send her back again. Her husband accepted. Nonetheless, her father and uncle decided not to leave the matter to him. They talked to the people in the register's office in two days and Güllü and her husband's marriage certificate as well as their children's identification cards and Green Card were issued on the third day. Güllü thus succeeded registering her children as hers. Actually, she could have registered her children only on herself without marriage but chose to register her marriage and remain married with her husband because she knew that she had to leave her children in the case where she separated from her husband and returned to her father's house;

I was stuck between two, my children and my family. My family told me to come back. (They said,) 'We'll build a house for you. We'll buy a car in your name.' But I couldn't leave children. I didn't want to leave these three children. ... I'm not such a person. I wish I could leave children and go. I endured everything for children. When children are grown up, I'll go. I won't stay. I'm waiting for that they're grown up. *I'm not a kind of person who accepts this sort of thing but I have to* (Case 33: Güllü, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Esmanur expected my understanding for her decision to return her husband's family as a mother in her generation, which her mother could not understand;

"I came ... for my children. You are also a mother. May Allah not put anyone else in my place, but if you were in my place, you would have done the same thing. ... I came back. I came ..."

Her consciousness for motherhood empowered her to stand up to her in-laws who did not like the bond between her and her husband and tried to separate them and stayed

with them even if it meant further physical and psychological violence against her. Later on, she and her husband separated from his family (See Case 5). After her husband was sentenced the twelve-year imprisonment, her brother-in-law again abused her. He tried to sell her cows. He tried to fabricate her affair with another man and besmirch her reputation at every opportunity. He beat her up and broke her ribs. Her father attempted to persuade, sometimes threatened, her to return his home again and again. She did not accept it and stayed with her children in the house which she built with her husband. She seemed to have eventually achieved what she wanted. She saved her marriage with the man she loved and won the independence from her in-laws. Yet, it cost so much. She had to bring up her five children on her own by family allowance until the day when her oldest sons who were 14 and 13 years old begin working.

Meanwhile, Güllü's courage to visit a lawyer and ask her uncle and father for support derived from desperation. Notwithstanding her intelligence and power for action, she could not win legal marriage without the support from her natal family. She could not go beyond the choice between divorce and children that traditional patriarchy dictates. When she said, "I'm not such a person. I wish I could leave children and go," she distinguished herself from many other women in previous generations who are said to 'irresponsibly' abandon unhappy marriage and children behind. It morally empowered her but obliged her to choose unhappy marriage and bring up her children under the institution of patriarchal guardianship. She considered that she did not deserve any of the humiliations done to her. Nonetheless, she had no choice but wait for the day when her oldest son grows up and she begins an independent life from her husband with her son's economic support and guardianship. Thus, women's investment on motherhood based on the deprivation of access to wage work and other economic resources preserves the importance of the son to the woman in practice in spite of their objection to son preference and male superiority ideologically.

Traditional Deprivation of Women's Access to Production vs. Increasing Condemnation of Son Preference

All the participants denied their preference for sons and many of them strongly objected the idea. They recounted their grandparents, uncles, parents-in-law or unspecified others who discriminate girls from boys or want to have sons particularly and condemned or ridiculed them. Yet, more than half of the participants (22 out of 40) stated that either their husbands or in-laws have ever demanded male children from them. Many of the participants whose first child or children were girls said that they encountered other women's 'encouragements' or experienced an anxiety that their husbands or in-laws might be disappointed. They openly criticised their discriminatory remarks (Cases 34, 35).

When I gave birth to girls, people used to tell me, 'Why didn't you give birth to a boy?' They want boys. ... I had two daughters (first). My mother called me (and said), 'Don't be upset. You'll also have a son'. *As if I'm upset!* ... My husband didn't say anything but he wanted a son. I knew he wanted a son. My mother-in-law and they (my family) also wanted a boy (Case 34: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Saadet has four daughters and has no intention to have any more children for now.

'Oh, you don't have sons!' And so and so ... This problem is so much in our people. I mean, very common. My husband says to everyone, 'No, no. Daughters are better. Don't interfere with those matters.' ... Almost everyday, there is someone who mentions that. Just yesterday, my mother-in-law said and she was going to say today as well but she couldn't find an opportunity (She laughs). When I helped her a bit, (she says) 'May Allah allot you a son.' People remind me even though it doesn't come to my mind! (She laughs.) My father-in-law, for example, says, 'Why doesn't she bear? She should give birth to one son.' As if it's something in my hand! (She guffaws.) Younger generation is more understanding. They don't mention that. But, old people, 'How many kids does she have? Oh! She still has got those girls! No boys at all! Oh, may Allah give her a son.' (She laughs.) I used to get upset at the beginning. But now, when people say those things, I laugh and say that may Allah give if He wants. I get used to now. ... If my husband pressured me, then I would become very hurt. ... He doesn't care, so I'm not offended (Case 35: Saadet, age 30, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere).

A few participants argued that daughters were more valuable in these days and proudly accounted how much their husbands were keen on their daughters (Case 36).

Özlem has two sons. She says that she might try to have one more child to have a girl.

Both my husband and I don't think so (that sons are necessary). There is no difference between boys and girls. ... My husband always says that we didn't think of a boy even if we had only one girl. I mean, there're some people who

say, 'We don't have sons' and wish for male children. There're some people who say, 'We don't have sons and so want to get pregnant.' I get stunned (when I hear that). *We're not like them.* Whatever Allah gives is it. ... *Girls are more connected to mothers and fathers.* My father-in-law has got one sister. She has got four or five daughters and one son. He went to France. He didn't look after his mother. The only son. She was attached to him; (She used to consider) 'He's gonna look after me.' He didn't look after her. Now her daughters are taking care of her. ... A male child is good if his wife is good but bad if she isn't (Case 36: Özlem, age 28, Turkish speaker, marriage from Van).

The participants' accounts suggest that the obvious son preference over daughters is becoming a conduct to be condemned as 'backward.' There seems to be efforts for making discourse of daughter's value (See Case 36). However, their further accounts reveal that the political-economic context which necessitates sons (i.e. patrilineality, patrilocality and the exclusion of women from inheritance and independent access to economic resource¹¹⁰) continues to reinforce their dependency on men and threaten those who do not have sons. Eleven out of forty women (27.5%) remarked that sons were necessary (*şart*), although they added without fail that they loved daughters more than or as much as sons or tried to argue that it is for the sake of daughters (See Case 21), because daughters go away for marriage but sons stay. They will look after the family after the father's death, carry on the household and protect the property (Cases 37, 38).

It (male child) has to be. Customs (*törel*). You know, the girl marries and goes. She flies away. But, the boy is permanent. He looks after both mother and father. One (son) is necessary at least. Now, I wish two or three of my sons or at least one son comes to visit his father's house or sister's house after he marries. It's a very

¹¹⁰ For instance, Esra's (age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) account illustrates how the absence of sons can prevent a woman from claiming material rights on her own. She has been married to her husband for one and half years and has one daughter. Her husband is now in prison. She now lives with her mother-in-law and her baby daughter. Her brothers-in-law's wives live separately but side by side. Beyza (age 28, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) is one of them. Her husband is also in prison and she also lives alone with her two children in a house which is semi-detached to Esra's and belongs to her husband. One spring day, two co-wives of their oldest brother-in-law, who is also in prison now, were cleaning their house and began throwing their unnecessary furniture and a stove into Beyza's house. Beyza opposed, swore, and cried. Two co-wives shout her back and one of them beat her. Esra was not there at the time of fight but went to one of the co-wives who beat Beyza to reprove her conduct. She took her co-wife and went to Esra's uncles and complained about her. Esra was furious; "They told everyone, my uncles, 'Your daughter has no conscience. Your daughter said, 'This is my place''. It is my place anyway! ... Look, think why they said that. In our place here, ... they say she's a woman and has a daughter; her husband is away and she's a new bride; how dare she say 'it's my place'! It's hard for me, you know. ... Because of that I'm a woman and have a daughter.

nice thing that he visits and brings something for her. It's a very sweet thing in our society (Case 37: Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

It (male child) is necessary in our society. The more the better. I don't know (why). It comes from old times. I don't have the same idea. For me one is enough. ... One is a must but that's enough. In past, very long time ago, when fathers die, they (sons) used to claim to be heads of households and look after (families). They used to run households. That is why. If there are no (sons), they would certainly bring *kumas* (Case 38: Melike, age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Two most frequent responses to a remark 'if there were no sons ...' were "the property goes to others (uncles)" (Cases 39, 40, 41) and "the second wife will come." They were aware that the appropriation of property that was left to daughters is illegitimate according to both state law and Islamic doctrine but they also knew well from their experience and hearsays that they cannot prevent it in practice and the best thing they can do is to try to bear sons or accept the second wife.

Someone had six daughters. Their father died. People took their property. (I: People?) Relatives, neighbours ... They didn't give it to the daughters. Their relatives spent it among themselves. Look, that's why people want male children (Case 39: Berfin, age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere).

That's Allah's work. It's better if one has (a son). If not, it's Allah's work. There is no difference between boys and girls. My child is my child. Well, I wouldn't say 'necessary', I mean, it's better if there is (a son). For instance, I heard that my mother has one sister. Her husband was the only child. My aunt hadn't had children yet, neither a daughter nor a son. She died. And then, her husband. All the properties were left to others. So many people got into the disputes. If they had one child, one son, it would have been left to him. ... I love my daughter more than the other three sons. Both I and her father, really. It makes no difference to us. Child is child. ... But, may Allah prevent, if anything happens to my husband and I have no sons but only a daughter, her uncles won't leave her alone. *If she's married into strangers, her uncles won't leave her alone with the property left to her.* Her uncles will take it. ... *It's not a custom. It's a sort of fraud* (Case 40: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Even if there is a lot of money, it's not given to a daughter when she marries. It is like that here. If there is a son, the property is left to him. That's why people want (sons). Women have to bear (sons). If they don't bear sons, they (in-laws) bring a *kuma*. My brother's wife's uncle is so. He has five daughters. Two daughters got married. He now has grandchildren. He got married again to have sons. He brought a young girl. His brothers' wives used to tell his wife, 'Your property would be left to our sons when your husband dies'. ... *These people also know that (daughters are also entitled to inherit). They ignore that knowingly.* After all, boys are with you;

girls are in strangers' houses (Case 41: Yasemin, age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Many participants recounted about a woman who had no son and brought a *kuma* to have her bear sons.¹¹¹ They accounted that it is hard (harder than accepting a *kuma*) for any woman to leave her house to 'strangers' (brothers-in-law) because she has furnished and maintained it with so much troubles for decades. It is even difficult for her to know that it will go to others when there are her daughters and they will lose a house to turn to at a difficult time of their marriage (Case 42).

There is one woman here, for example. She brought a *kuma* for her husband in order not to leave the inheritance to brothers-in-law and their wives. (I: Is it hard for her that the inheritance goes to her in-laws?) It *is* hard for her. It is even hard when she has daughters. When there is a step brother, the door (of natal home) opens to girls. I mean, they can come to visit their brother's house freely. *Women consider about her daughters*; 'After I die and my husband dies, she has her brother around at least' (Case 42: Ayşegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

The participants' mixed responses to son preference and reluctant acceptance of the need for a son shed light on the persistence of women's economic dependence and its implication. Fundamental material inequality between women and men (e.g. the denial of the daughter's right to inherit, the woman's lack of access to wage work, her socioeconomic dependence on men - the husband, brothers and a son) forces women to 'want' sons and narrowly upholds the ideology of son preference even when it is demystified.

6.3.3. New Patriarchal Deprivations

In addition to the disadvantages which the participants inherited from older generations, there are some constraints on women which newly emerged in the context of insecurity. They are particularly related to spatial control. Constraints on women's freedom of movement in public spaces deprive them of independent access to the services available in the city. They not only prevent them from benefiting from

¹¹¹ They might have told about the same woman but it could not be confirmed.

new opportunities but also enhance already existing gender inequalities. In this section, I shall illustrate renewed social control over women's access to public sphere.

Migration and Deprivation of Women's Autonomous Network

Traditionally, in many parts of Turkey, the movement of the woman is confined within a particular social boundary (e.g. a village or a neighbourhood) (See Delaney 1991) and that beyond the boundary requires companions to guard her or rather her *namûs*. *Namûs* (Kurdish) or *namus* (Turkish) is a complex of honour closely associated with the virtue of women which male honour relies on (Sev'er and Yurdakul 2001: 973). It can mean the woman's physical and moral existence itself. Thus, a man may say that his wife, mother, sister or daughter is *his namûs*. Male honour is vulnerable to his female kin's virtues because of both its dependence on them and their fragility. The honour complex of female virtue and male honour can be easily damaged by other men's contact (sexually, physically, verbally or even imaginary) with a woman. Therefore, a woman is expected to restrain her movement not to expose herself to strange men on one hand; men are anxiously on the watch for her movement on the other.

However, within the social boundary, the woman is relatively free in movement. She takes advantage of sexual segregation and cultivates her own autonomous networks with other women who not only share joys and sorrows with her but also exchange information and accompany her when she wants to go out without her husband and in-laws (See Fallers and Fallers 1976; Sirman 1995; Erman 1997).¹¹² The skill to cultivate her own social network, especially non-kin network which is more

¹¹² Nûkhet Sirman (1995)'s study on women's bargaining power in an Aegean village in Turkey illustrates the married women's cultivation of their own social network of exchange in patrilocal settings by their own socializing skills. Through this network, a woman employs paid workers in the field and unpaid domestic workers (brides) and also gains help for housework, goods, and information from friends. The young bride who is removed from her natal village and placed among the husband's kin and non-kin network is very disadvantaged and soon attempts to cultivate her own new network especially with other new comers who are not part of her mother-in-law's network. This network not only helps her employ the labour power which she can control and reduce their burden and work hours but also it enables her to access information other than via her husband. Female companies not only support her psychologically by sharing joys and sorrows but also enable her to go out beyond the social boundary of the village without being escorted by her husband. Namely, it contributes to reduce her dependence on men.

egalitarian than kin network, plays a significant role in deciding her well-being within the patrilocal living arrangement in which she marries in as the “stranger bride” (Kandiyoti 1988).

It seems that Doluca women also used to have such space within social boundary in which they could freely (without undermining her reputation) move about before migration. While one participant who came from a village of Pervari (Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker) mentioned that in her home village girls were not sent to very far from a house for the fear of abduction, many women from villages of Çatak in Van recounted that they used to walk for miles to collect woods or fetch water as a group of women. In the village which is mostly consisted of relatives, the social boundary in which the woman can walk about by herself can be as broad as the village itself and pasture belonging to the village (Case 43).

People are free in village. For everyone is your relative. People visit one another. There is no such a thing in this neighbourhood. They are all strangers. We go to relatives. We don't go to strangers. For example, that's my husband's relative's house, uncle's house. I come and go there. I don't go to the others' houses. I don't know them. I can't go there, even if it's close. They (Men) know each other. They come and go each other. We women don't. We come and go only relatives' houses. (Case 43: Özlem, age 28, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Edremit).

By contrast, Doluca neighbourhood consists of ‘strangers,’ that is, numerous small groups of people from different villages, tribes and regions. The inhabitants do not see the neighbourhood as a conventional sense of community where the members are connected by kinship or fictive kinship, know each other well for generations and can trust each other. Relationships between neighbours beyond the relatively small number of close relatives are therefore distanced and considerably weak. Unlike conventional migrant women in the other parts of the country,¹¹³ Doluca women hardly spend time outside of a house unless they have an enclosed garden. They take a great care to walk around minimally even within the neighbourhood. They hardly

¹¹³ Tahire Erman (1997: 95-6) refers to the intimate social relations of reciprocity, hospitality, togetherness as one of characteristics of the *gecekondü* neighbourhoods which she studied. She argues that the *gecekondü* provides women with a sort of confined freedom. Women typically sit in front of a house and have a long chat with other women. They can freely travel around and spend time outside within their neighbourhood while their movement is restricted beyond the community.

socialise with anyone except their next door relatives in daily lives.¹¹⁴ They tend to socialise with only a few relative-neighbours with whom they share a tandoor.

In the context of patrilocal residence, the people whom the woman socialises daily are usually her husband's unmarried sisters and nieces and brothers' wives who live together or next doors. They are not her direct relatives but in-laws after all unless she is married to a relative, which was not very common among the participants. Therefore, the autonomy of her already limited relations with other women is partial. For example, the women whom she daily socialises, that is, her female in-laws, often side their men, not her. In a number of occasions during casual discussions with a group of women, a young girl interfered with her brother's wife when the latter made critical or casual negative comments on her husband. Gülcan's husband's youngest sister who is half the age of Gülcan 'corrected' her every time when she began talking about the husband's ruling over her: 'It's not because of the rule (*hüküm*) but of the neighbourhood'; "Nobody interferes with others in this house". One of Berfin's daughters sometimes warned Müjde, who is the wife of one of her father's relatives, not to talk too much when she spoke as if she ridiculed her husband or made negative remarks about him. Besides, in the patrilineal patrilocal tribal system, a woman's *aşiret* identity can become ambiguous in cross-*aşiret* marriage. While she is seen as no longer belonging to the father's *aşiret*, she may experience a sense of exclusion in daily life among her husband's relatives at the same time (Case 44).

Müjde cannot go to weddings of her father's relatives because she married in a different *aşiret*. Her brother's wife who is one of her husband's relatives is also in the same situation. Müjde's deceased father used not to allow her to go to a wedding of her own relatives; "What business do you have with X *aşiret*? You married in the *Kavştan*. You're a *Kavştan* now." On the other hand, Müjde occasionally experiences a sense of exclusion among her husband's relatives because of her different *aşiret* origin. Her brother-in-law's wife who lives next door is also from the X *aşiret*, the same *aşiret* with their husbands. Müjde is one of the few real 'strangers' among her neighbour-relatives.

¹¹⁴ Once I got lost in the neighbourhood. I asked a woman and a man who were talking in front of their house by referring the full name and name of *aşiret* of the woman I was going to visit. They had no idea who she was, despite of the fact that her husband's family was one of the oldest residents in the neighbourhood and lives in an unusually large new house in the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, they kindly showed me a couple of directions where the members of the *aşiret* I named live. In fact, her house was just around the corner.

Everyone asks me for help. ... When someone is going to marry, then she asks me to trim headscarves (for a bride's trousseau). But, nobody helps me when I'm in trouble. Last winter we had a little fire in the kitchen. I was cooking chicken and potatoes. Everything got blackened because of smoke. I washed everything including carpets in winter. But, no one came out for help. If I were a *X aşiret*, they would have helped me (Case 44: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Furthermore, the woman's attempts or opportunities for cultivating autonomous network with other women are carefully controlled. The husband thus often does not allow a woman to help even her relative-neighbours if they are not household members (or his sisters' or brothers' wives, whether they live together or not) (Case 45).

Not a few women who do not know Turkish came to ask Müjde to keep them company to a hospital for her fluent Turkish. However, her husband does not allow her to go and help them. She once kept a company with her husband's relative's bride who lives in the same block to the hospital. Her husband and in-laws who lived together then scolded at her, 'You'd left your own work and chores and gone! Never go again!' From her bitter experiences like this, Müjde learned not to go out without her husband's escort or the company of her brother-in-law's wife (Berivan) who lives next door (Case 45: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

In this context, increasing nuclear household arrangements and independence of individual households can enhance the woman's isolation. Most participants had a few next door relatives. Yet, those who did not or were not in good terms with them were totally dependent on the husband or considerably isolated. For example, Yasemin (age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) was one of the participants who were deprived of mutual supports with other women because she was not in good terms with her in-laws, moved out from their house and rented a house in the midst of non-relatives. She tries to cope with the situation by adjusting herself to an individualistic world-view. She often mentions, "Nobody has to like anybody. Nobody has to help anybody". Not having even a relative-neighbour female network could mean considerable vulnerability and bring about significant consequences, such as being unable to access contraceptives without the husband's company, for a migrant woman whose independent movement in the public sphere is considerably restricted.

Lost Community and Social Control over Women's Access to the Public Sphere

Doluca neighbourhood is very crowded. Non-relatives can live next door or across a lane in spite of the people's effort to live with relatives in cluster. Even within the neighbourhood, a step outside the door therefore may belong to a strange world where a woman become exposed to male strangers, that is, those who are sexually forbidden and hence potentials to injure her virtue according to the honour complex. In other words, for Doluca women, a social boundary considerably shrunk to one's house, courtyard or block at most.

Almost all of the participants unanimously said that they hardly go to anyone and anywhere.¹¹⁵ 'Going out freely' is categorically a male conduct. When a woman talks about that someone or she herself went somewhere by herself, she typically adds a remark, 'like men.' When those who do not know Turkish says that they do not go out very often, other women typically attributes the reason to their lack of Turkish; "She'll get lost in downtown!" However, their own accounts reveal that those who are fluent in Turkish also do not go out frequently. They also restrict themselves to the minimum travel for socially legitimate purposes and with a companion by all means (Case 46, 47).

Müjde completed primary school, is fluent in both Kurdish and Turkish, and has been in the city since she was twelve years old. Nonetheless;

I don't go anywhere, really. ... I go with my husband if I go to hospital, if something is needed for the house, or if I go to visit relatives. (Otherwise) I don't go anywhere else. ... We go only for that sort of business. That's also with my husband. If my husband is not here, (I go) with someone older from the family, my mother-in-law, brother-in-law or his wife. We go together. We go and buy some requisites in *Bayrams* (two Muslim festivals celebrated at the end of Ramadan and at the Feast of the Sacrifice). Sometimes, we go to a bazaar. A bazaar came near us this year. And then, if there is a relative's wedding, we go to the wedding all together. We go to a bazaar with neighbours, I mean, together with my brother-in-law's wife. *If I need something very urgently today and need to buy it but there is no one to come with me, then I don't go. We definitely come and go together.* ... It's not nice but it's like that. They do that. Especially, women. Men go everywhere. Some people go. Those whose husbands give permission go. Those whose husbands don't don't go. My husband never gives

¹¹⁵ A research of health seeking behaviour conducted in 2006 also points out that social relations between neighbours are very limited and women thus can hardly go out and receive health service in migrant communities particularly in Van and Adana (Conseil Sante *et al.* 2007: 77-8, 96).

permission in life (Case 46: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Gülcan is a self-assured woman. She studied up to the eighth grade from home because there was no class after the fifth grade in her village. She is married to the eldest son and head of the extended family of 25 members. She thus seemed to occupy the highest position among the brides in the household. Yet, she was also under the same rule of conduct as other women in the neighbourhood;

(I: Even if you can read and write and know Turkish, you still do not go out on your own.) Yes. Once I want, I go to even Istanbul and deal with a business. I'm sure about myself. But, you see, I won't be sent. There is the rule (*hüküm*). There is the rule over us (Case 47: Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

In fact, thanks to the proximity to the city centre, easy access to public transportation and the ubiquitousness of Kurdish-speakers, it is theoretically possible for any woman to go anywhere in the city. However, the woman's presence in public spaces, or outside the house, without a male companion is strictly scrutinised and constantly discouraged by neighbours' unfriendly gossips and criticisms (Case 48, 49, 50, 51).

Everyone knows one another. Van is not that big place. There is one downtown and one marketplace. They are the places everyone goes. 'Where're you coming from?' This is the first question. I prepare the answer to the question. I say, 'I come from a doctor'. The first thing they ask is not 'How're you?' They say, 'Where're you coming from?' ... *If I don't run into these questions, I would have gone everywhere.* (Gülcan's husband's youngest sister continued)

You know, in the neighbourhood, no women go out alone. They're certainly with a son, daughter or husband. If one goes out by herself, people gossip right away; 'So-and-so's wife was definitely alone and was wandering in the downtown' (Case 48: Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

(To go out) Alone is sort of shameful (*ayıp*). (People ask,) 'Where did she go on her own? Where does she go alone as a woman?' *That's why we're careful about ourselves.* I mean, people don't see those who go alone positively. For that, everyone can't go by herself. ... If a person is free, has a problem, goes by herself and solves it, it's better. *But, even if we want that, it can't be that way. There isn't such a thing (as a woman going out alone) in traditions.* ... Let's say I went out alone. If someone who knows my husband tells him, 'Where was your wife going by herself yesterday?' Then, *it's shameful as if it has become a stain on him.* I mean, as if it is shameful (Case 49: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Esra is also an educated young woman but brought into line as soon as she got married;

I used to go to and talk to neighbours when I was a girl. But, since I came here, I don't go out much. There is too much gossip in our community. *Because of*

gossip, we can't go outside much. When I go out, it happens that some people say, 'She's a new bride. What business does she have? Why does she go to a neighbour? Is she gossiping? She doesn't stay at home for her husband isn't at home'. I also don't think it's appropriate for me. And, in order not for rumour going around (Case 50: Esra, age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Sevda accounted how much small social space in which she is confined;

Now, if you go out, for example, and neighbours, (I mean) men, come and pass there, they'd say, it's like this in our custom; 'This woman has been outside since the morning. She doesn't go inside at all. She isn't good', and so on. They assume you're bad. There're lots of gossips. Now, there is an apartment just opposite. She (her younger sister who got married to her husband's younger brother six months ago) hasn't visited the house for these six months yet. They're not strangers. They're from the same village (with our husbands). They're relatives but not very much though. She's a new bride. If she goes out, people will speak behind her. I've become a bit old. I go up to Esra's house. (She laughs because it's just five metres away). But when I go there, people tell me, 'It's shame that you go over there'. [I: Who tell you that? Your mother-in-law?] No. You know, there're senior men here. They say. There're women. They tell (my mother-in-law), 'Your bride's been outside since the morning'. If I go outside for one minute, they'll say, 'She's been outside since the morning!' (Case 51: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

The neighbourhood and the city are full of strangers. Men hardly spent time in the neighbourhood but have a much wider range of social network within and outside the neighbourhood than women. Men, except for very old ones, do not stay at home during the day but go to the downtown to work, to wait for an offer of day labour at a *kahvehane*, or to just wander. If people passing through the downtown were total strangers, a woman could enjoy a particular freedom of the city where nobody knows each other. But, they are likely to be ones of co-villagers or neighbouring villagers of her father or husband's family who are unemployed and roaming in the downtown from the morning to the evening. Even if she does not know them, they are likely to know her through their *kabile* or village networks which are loosely but constantly renewed at occasions like weddings. Thus, any one of them can spot her wherever she goes. Sevda replied to my naïve question, "Nobody would recognise you in that crowd. Why do you mind people's eyes so much?", that; "In every neighbourhood there are the people from our village. Now, if one of them sees you, ..., he goes to my husband and tells him, 'Your wife is in the downtown again today. What business does she have? She's been wandering since the morning'."

As Müjde (Case 49) states, the participants and other women in the neighbourhood are therefore very careful not to invite rumours and accusations which would severely disgrace her, her husband's and his family's honour. Such self-confinement and virtuous manner are not culturally given but learned. It seems that many participants have made unintended or mischievous 'transgressions' especially in early days of marriage. And, they were usually discovered, punished and disciplined right away (Case 52).

Sevda's experience illustrates how women are brought into line;

I went to my father one day. There were his guests. My sister hadn't married yet then. We went shopping for the guests. We bought vegetables, meat, and so on. One of their (our opposite neighbour's) daughters married in that neighbourhood. She lives in that neighbourhood. She telephoned her mother and told her, 'Since the morning ***'s bride has been wandering here.' They came to my mother-in-law and told her that. As soon as I came home, my mother-in-law swore at me. ... 'You go to your father and wander about there. You go there to walk around. I sent you to your father. Why do you wander about?!' ... She still tells me. When we quarrelled, she says to me, 'You go and walk around. I can't send you to your father much' (Case 52: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

In early years of marriage career, the woman may make minor 'transgressions' for her naivety and courage deriving from inexperience. However, unfailing disciplinary gossips, accusations and rebukes teach her to stay in her place within a short period of time.

The woman can go out without fearing of gossips and censures only when she has the husband's permission and a legitimate company. As Müjde accounted (See Case 46), some women can get the husband's permission more easily and go out more often than others while some are permitted hardly or less often depending on the husband. In other words, whereas the husband's permission is an absolute constraint for some women, it is a safeguard for some against accusations. Those who use the husband's permission as a safeguard against neighbours' interference indicate his sole authority over her (Case 53). By doing that, they challenge the rule of traditional patriarchy which legitimises tribal and communal control over women yet simultaneously reinforce a new patriarchal discourse in which she is accountable only to but to her husband. Besides, they emphasize their unharmed virtuousness by

arguing that they are steadfast enough to remain sexually segregated even when they enter into the public sphere. Thus, they eventually uphold a patriarchal moral code of honour complex.

Ceren had an experience of wage work in Istanbul before her marriage. She knows reading and writing better than her husband who has weak sight and no formal education. She has no close female neighbour-relatives either on her or her husband's side whom she can ask for a company. She and her children are constantly sick. Hence, she relatively often goes out by herself in order to see a doctor.

I go (to hospital) alone (*tek başıma*), I mean, by myself (*kendikendime*).¹¹⁶ *My husband trusts me. I trust myself, too. I come and go by myself. In this neighbourhood, people say, 'Oh! How do women go out alone?' When a person is upright (namuslu) and honourable (şerefli) like free men and her forehead is clean (she has no shadow of blame), let whoever speak whatever they say. I said (to the people), really, 'Maybe my husband can't come with me that day. Maybe he's got a job. Does my husband always take my arm and come and go with me?' ... Why shame?! I go to the hospital, see a doctor, have blood tests, take an X-ray or whatever necessary, buy medicines if required, and come home. Where else do I go? I don't like outings at all anyway. ... My husband says, 'I can send you even to Ankara on your own.' ... When one marries, it is trust, respect, and love (that are required). Without these three, marriage doesn't work. Thanks to Allah, we've got three (Case 53: Ceren, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan).*

In fact, going out behind the husband not only leaves her vulnerable to accusations that besmirch the husband's or family honour but also is almost impossible. The woman usually has no access to cash unless she lives separately from in-laws and the husband is absent for labour migration or imprisonment. If she wants to go to the city centre, she has to ask her husband for money. The husband usually asks the reason why she wants money even for a penny.¹¹⁷ Thus, it is very difficult to go out without his knowledge (Case 54).

¹¹⁶ Ceren replaced the term "*tek başıma*" by another term "*kendikendime*." The former term has a negative connotation when it is used for women since it suggests the state of defenceless of her virtue. Meanwhile, the latter term suggests her autonomy and power.

¹¹⁷ For example, Gülcan (age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari) is frustrated about her husband's control over her expense and hence movement; "When I asks for one million (lira) (which is about 60 cents at that time), he (my husband) asks what I do with it. I told him the other day, 'I even polish your shoes and put them in front of you. One gives a shoe polisher five million (lira) as alms! I say one million! I need it. I have been polishing your shoes this much. Forget about shoes; I have nurtured your children.'

Sevda explained why she could not go out without her husband's knowledge, let alone his permission, even though she wanted and needed to go to the downtown very much at the time of interviewing;

You can't go by yourself. I need so many things now. I can't go. Even if I try to go, I have to ask him for money. ... He'll ask then, 'Where're you going?' You can't go to the downtown without money, you know. 'Why do you come and go this much? It's shameful. Don't go'. He says that sort of things. He doesn't leave me alone (Case 54: Sevda, age 25, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

And, Deprivation of Educational Opportunities

According to the accounts of the participants, girls used to have no chance of formal education if there was no school in the village while boys were often sent to a school in a neighbouring village. It varies from a village to a village but it seems that it was about thirty years ago that schools were gradually opened in more villages and people gradually began sending their daughters to school. All participants but one who ever had formal education went to school when they were still in village (Cases 55, 56, 57).

As a daughter of *muhtar*, Gülcan was the first girl who went to school in her village; I started school as the first girl (in our village). In village, people used not to send girls to school. My dad took me to school. He said (to the people), 'Other girls also should be registered. I sent my own daughter.' People didn't let girls study in those days. It was like that thirty years ago; girls stay at home, don't go schools; there is a teacher; there are so-and-so's children. They didn't send. They sent male children. But now, everyone, in our village, everyone now, sends their daughters to Adana and other places in order to let them study high school (Case 55: Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

Songül went to school in her home village up to the third grade. Her grandmother used to tell her father that it was shame to send girls to school. But, the army officer in charge of the area told her father that if you sent your daughter to school, then everyone would do the same. He was persuaded and registered her to a school (Case 56: Songül, age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Eylem studied until the third grade in her home village near Iraqi border which benefited from its logistical importance and state investment (though she forgot Turkish mostly afterwards). Her first five children did not go to or gave up school before the fifth grade from the hardship after migration. One of her daughters explained;

Their *aşiret* is not like us. They are little more developed compared to us. My mother's brother is angry at us; you didn't go to school, you don't work. In their families, everyone went to school (in village). There are some who got

occupations; one is an engineer, another is a school teacher (Case 57: Eylem, age 47, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

After migration, however, the fathers of many participants did not send their daughters to school because there was often no school in the areas where they migrated (migrant neighbourhoods are usually formed at the periphery of a city) or they were anxious about allowing daughters to come and go to school in unfamiliar environment although many of their parents sent their sons to school however far it was. Accordingly, the participants who migrated in their school age tend to have missed school education (Cases 58, 59, 60).¹¹⁸ It appears that they consider that their fathers could but did not send them school despite the availability of educational opportunity that the city provides and feel bitter about the fact.

They didn't send me (to school). I wanted. They didn't let me. ... *They didn't want to let me.* It (a school) was far in those days. Now, my youngest sister is studying at the last grade of high school. My older brothers went to primary school (Case 58: Leyla, age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

I had so much desire to study, to go to school. My father didn't register; 'You are big now, you can't go. It's shame'. But my younger sister went. Only I didn't go. ... I said to my father, 'You wronged me. You didn't let me study. (*Benim hakkımı yedin, ben okuyayım*)'. He said, 'You don't study, you don't'. ... *We'd just moved from our village. He said we're stranger in Van. We were suffering from its difficulties. The school was far. I was a girl. And, alone.* He said, there are dogs, there are, excuse me, jerks on the way. In those days, in our neighbourhood, I mean, my father's, not so many people used to go to school. That's why he didn't want. (When my siblings became school age) Houses increased, schools opened, and people's children increased. Children were together on the way. It didn't happen by my age (Case 59: Makbule, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Başkale).

I went to school for two years in village. You know, we migrated after that. ... We went to Adana and stayed there for three years. I migrated when I was eight. We went to Adana and couldn't study. We didn't know, we were ignorant, which school we could go (Case 60: Ceylan, age 28, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

After the mid-1990s when a primary school was opened at the south end of the neighbourhood, girls in the area gradually began being sent to school in Doluca

¹¹⁸ However, TMIDPS shows that more than half of the security related migrants in urban area says that migration had positive impact on children's education (HUIPS 2006: 85). They might refer to male children's education.

neighbourhood. Today, it is common to send both girls and boys to school.¹¹⁹ Particularly, mothers are so eager about their daughters' education ("not to be like me") that many girls tend to start school a couple of years earlier. Yet, many girls are still facing difficulties in continuing beyond the now eight-year compulsory education when they enter puberty and their movement in public spaces began being controlled (Cases 61, 62).

Müjde's daughter is in the seventh grade. Müjde registered her for a school when she was still five years old. She wants her to continue her education and have some occupation such as a nurse. Her husband however does not intend to send her to high school; "Do you want her to go to high school and wear jeans and walk around with boyfriends?" (Case 61: Müjde's daughter, age 12).

Yasemin is still livid because she was not allowed to go to school but wove *kilims* for her newly migrated family. She hopelessly referred to her seventh-grade niece who was once about to be withdrawn from school at the fifth grade but remained due to her teacher's persuasion of her parents;

They will give this girl to the husband, too. She is diligent. Now, girls work harder but people don't let them study. Boys are naughty but they let them go on studying. They tell us that girls should contribute to household, do chores; it'll be better. What would they do even if they study? They consider that even if they study, she'll marry and it'll benefit the husband.¹²⁰ I know them (her parents). They wouldn't send her (to high school) (Case 62: Yasemin's niece, age 12).

However, it is not only the father or the eldest brother who prevents the adolescent girl from continuing school. It is often the case that the mother also wants her daughter to stay at home and help housework. In general, the eldest daughter, or sometimes the second oldest daughter if the oldest daughter marries out early, is withdrawn from school in order to babysit her siblings and assist housework. Müjde's daughter is the eldest (See Case 61). Müjde referred to her daughter as her "right hand." Yasemin was the eldest daughter and wove *kilims* with her mother instead of going to school while her sister who was one year younger than her went to school.

¹¹⁹ In order to close the gender gap in education, the nationwide campaign for girls' primary school enrolment, called *Haydi Kızlar Okula!* (Let's go to school, girls!), was launched by the Ministry of Education with the support of UNICEF in 2003. The opening ceremony was held in Van. Primary school enrolment increased from 88% to 98% between 2000 and 2008 in the province of Van (Dincer *et al.* 2003: 219).

¹²⁰ It is mentioned in other studies as well that the idea of educating daughter as a drain of money is commonly held in rural Turkey (Urla-Zeytinoğlu 1989 cited in Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör 2003: 836).

Yasemin's niece, Dilek, is also the eldest and did not go on highschool eventually (See Case 62). Dilek's mother, Ceylan, had four more children (9, 8, 3 and one year old) and was pregnant at the time of interviewing. Dilek said, "Mom would go mad if I won't help her." Indeed, Ceylan had coped with the situation a great deal by Dilek's help in babysitting and housecleaning. Yasemin and other family members said that Dilek looked after Ceylan's three-year old daughter and she would take care of her one-year old son after Ceylan gives birth to another baby.

The participants inherited many disadvantages as women from the previous generations, but many things are actually changing under surface. For instance, the participants do not take those disadvantages for granted as tradition (*töre*). They consider that their fathers ignored their objections or did not ask them about their own marriages and education because it did not suit their interests rather than it was the way to be done. Many of them used an expression, "He did not want to" ask their opinions about marriage or let them study rather than "He did not" (See Cases 20, 58, 59). They deny that marriage without consent, the man's second marriage without his wife's consent, the uncles' seizure of their nieces' inheritance and the prohibition of girl's education are customs or traditions.

Paradoxically, strict social control over the woman's movement which is newly emerged in the insecure alien urban environment is said to be part of their tradition. Müjde says that there is not such a thing as that a woman goes out on her own in their traditions (See Case 49). It is true that that the woman goes out on her own beyond a social boundary is not traditionally legitimate. However, it is particular to the neighbourhood, and also maybe to the other migrant neighbourhoods in the eastern region, that the woman's outing without a companion beyond the doorstep and her socialisation with other non-related women are condemned. This increasing surveillance over women became required because of women's increased potential accessibility to the public sphere and the ambiguity of social boundary after migration. It effectively but narrowly hinders women from benefiting from public services and increasing her autonomy. Some participants' identification of the confinement of women as tradition may suggest the effectiveness of its operation.

The participants coped with the new constraint very often by investing the mother-child bond and exploiting the daughter's labour in particular. The daughter's loyal assistance empowers the mother. As the daughter grows up, the mother becomes not only relieved from certain chores but also able to go out more often by making her babysit her small children or taking her as a company. Paradoxically, the mother's empowerment is often realised at the cost of her daughter's educational opportunity.¹²¹ In other words, behind the façade of affectionate mother-daughter bond, patriarchy is being reproduced.

6.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, it is argued firstly that a traditional form of patriarchy is declining in the migrant neighbourhood along with the loss of its material basis. It is however not leading to the decline of patriarchy but its reconfiguration. While the authority of the *kabile* or *aşiret* leader is becoming insignificant for migrants, patriarchal authority is gradually being distributed to individual heads of smaller households. The new patriarch's political and economic base is considerably weak *vis-à-vis* the traditional patriarch. His patriarchal authority instead largely depends on his ability to control women whose virtues he is responsible for (e.g. the wife, daughters and sisters) within a patriarchal honour/shame complex.

Secondly, it is argued that the participants, and probably other women in the neighbourhood, now face new restrictions in addition to old deprivations. As mentioned above, the participants are already socio-economically and linguistically more disadvantaged than many other people in the country as women who live in the least developed region and speak a once banned non-official language. Deprivations of primary educational opportunity, early and forced marriage and polygyny, which

¹²¹ Drop-out at the secondary level of compulsory education is a serious problem in Turkey today (Gündüz-Hoşgör 2005). According to Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2006), the problem is particularly significant for girls and in the East. More than half of the girls aged 13 and 14 were not in school in 1998 while it was one third for boys in the same ages. Further, the factors which affect on drop-out differ between boys and girls. For boys, poverty seems to be the significant factor for drop-outs. Yet, for girls, mothers seem to have a significant influence over their withdrawal from school. The data Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör provide reveal that 61% of the daughters of non-Turkish speaking mothers were not in primary school.

many women in other parts of the country have overcome, continue to enhance their subordination as women. Despite everything, migration provided them physical proximity to public services, such as transportation, schools, clinics, the police and law offices, which can possibly help women empower themselves. However, it was observed that the participants' access to the public sphere continues to be restricted considerably. I shall argue that it is partly because of the heterogeneous composition of the neighbourhood which has considerably reduced the space in which the woman can freely move without a companion and the fragility of the reconfiguring patriarchy in the insecure environment which forces it to struggle for re-securing its territory and power by controlling the space and resources which she can access.

Thirdly, it was pointed out that many traditional patriarchal values and practices were questioned and challenged by the participants. The participants respond to the new constraints of increasing patriarchal surveillance and economic dependency by investing the mother-child bond expecting the son's future support and the daughter's daily assistance. Paradoxically, it seems to contribute to reproduction of patriarchy eventually.

In the next chapter, I shall discuss how both traditional disadvantages and the new constraint of patriarchal surveillance have restricted the participants from benefiting from contraceptives despite the radically increased accessibility to health services.

CHAPTER 7

CHANGING HUMAN REPRODUCTION IN DOLUCA NEIGHBOURHOOD

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall examine reproductive practices in the Doluca neighbourhood and explore what form of gender regime their reproduction is embedded in. The participants' accounts reveal that their attitudes towards and practices of reproduction are changing in response to the increasing integration, though in a considerably disadvantaged way, into market economy. At the same time, the collective experience of socioeconomic insecurity in urbanisation process in the age of neoliberalism has a great deal destabilised a traditional form of patriarchy and seems to have directed it towards the enhancement of social control over women who are always a signifier of men's potency in patriarchy. One important strategy for resecuring patriarchal authority is spatial control. The confinement of women in the private sphere effectively undermines women's autonomy and access to empowering resources. It was found that the strict spatial control over women limited hindered the participants from cultivating women's network and accessing public spaces independently. It made the attainment and effective usage of biomedical female contraceptive methods considerably difficult for them in spite of the availability of health services.

7.2. Childbearing Practices

Reproduction from Puberty to Menopause

In Doluca neighbourhood, it is prevalent that women are reproductively active as long as the period between puberty and menopause.¹²² As mentioned above, many of the participants married some time after they had the first menstruation while some of the older women in their forties and above married even before puberty. Physical appearance, rather than age, used to be often the primal criteria of appropriate timing of marriage a decade ago (See Case 1). Just like in other parts of Turkey,¹²³ a newly married bride is expected to become pregnant within the year of marriage as if she had to prove her reproductivity. Thus, the average age of the first birth among the participants was about 16.9 years old, or 0.9 year older than the average age of marriage. People, as well as young brides themselves, see pregnancy as a ‘natural’ event to come after marriage (Case 63).

Melike married at the age of 14. According to her, she looked more mature than her age yet did not conceive for four years. She used to be constantly asked by people if she got pregnant in those days.

There were people who asked me (if I was pregnant). I used to just pass it by. What could I say? I wanted (a baby) a bit. But now, I don’t want at all. I don’t know but having a child seemed to me natural (Case 63: Melike, age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Most women (35 out of 40) stated that the first pregnancy was one they desired or they felt happy about although in many cases they actually did not have a chance to think over childbearing due to their young age and its immediacy.

¹²² Duben and Behar’s study of reproduction in Istanbul from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century argues that Istanbul women in the period were a trendsetter of reproductive practices in Turkey. According to their analysis (1991: 167), a considerably low fertility in the period among Istanbul women largely resulted from a rising age of marriage (around the age 20 at the turn of the century and the age 23 towards the end of the 1930s) and the limit of birth at an earlier age (for the women who were born between 1851 and 1855, the mean age of the last birth was 34 and for those between 1911 and 1915, that was 28). Many participants consider that marriage in the early twenties is ideal. It is however still far from the reality for the majority of Doluca women.

¹²³ In Turkey, the median age of the first marriage and that of the first birth among women between the age 25 and 49 were 20 and 21.8, respectively, in 2003 (HUIPS 2004: 56, 92).

Childbearing not only begins early but also lasts as long as physiologically possible at least among the generation over the age of 40. It is not rare and socially acceptable, if not impressed, for a woman who has grandchildren to bear a child. For instance, Yasemin talked about the man who had grandchildren married second time in order to have a male child. She replied to my question whether having a child after becoming a grandparent is embarrassment, “It isn’t for men; actually, it’s not for women, either.” Yıldız (age 49, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) who has two married daughters claimed that she would still bear a child if Allah gives. Ayşe (age 51, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) gave birth to her last child when she was forty three years old. People told her not to bring forth more children since she already had a grandchild and it was shameful for a woman with grandchildren to keep giving birth. She decided to take injectables. She stopped having periods after four injections. She considers that she has been sick since then and regrets that she listened to the people; “I should have had four more children and didn’t suffer from illness”.¹²⁴

There is a prevalent and strong discomfort about not having regular menstruation among the women. They have a powerful bodily image that monthly periods cleanse a woman’s body and the lack of menstruation causes illness for it means the accumulation of impurities within the body.¹²⁵ It is also a prevalent view, especially among older generations, that childbirth revitalises the woman’s body. Older women typically give other women advice for bearing a child when they complain about some physical discomforts. Younger women are, however, often sceptical about the traditional pro-natal health advice (Cases 64, 65).

Müjde has been suffering from headache, abdominal pains and amenorrhoea for several years since she removed her IUD due to pelvic infection. Whenever she mentions about her illness, people tell her to give birth.

There is my mother’s step-mother. She’s quite old. She was sitting at a *sağlık ocağı*. She asked, ‘What’s that in there?’ I said, ‘It’s an injection. A doctor gave me’. (She said,) ‘Bear a child, then you’ll get well!’ ... And, my sister-in-law,

¹²⁴ Ayşe gave up further injections but has been infertile since then. If the injection which she used was Depo Provera, it is one of common side effects to stop having periods although it is not clear in her case whether amenorrhoea was due to the injection or menopause.

¹²⁵ The same view is reported by a study in Istanbul (At *et al.* 2007: 156).

“Give birth to one, and then you’ll get well!” Does my health depend on a baby?! I’m sick, right? How do I know if a baby I conceive becomes sick or disabled or if I die when I give birth or remain sick? (Case 64: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Özlem is also against the traditional pro-natal discourse;

They say the women who don’t bring forth a child get weak, grow old, and become sick. When bringing forth a child, the blood is renewed. But, they don’t know how many children one brings forth, she’ll get old that much. I guess so (Case 65: Özlem, age 28, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Edremit).

Desire for Limiting Births: “It’s not important to bring forth but to look after”

Younger generations about under the age of 40 generally wanted to limit births. There were four participants who replied that they wanted to have children as many as possible, or ‘as many as Allah gives (*Allah ne kadar verirse*).’ One of them was 35 years old and three were older than the age of 45. All other participants considered limiting the number of children at some point. The ideal number of children of the participants, except for those four women who answered ‘as many as Allah gives’, ranges from 1 to 7. As shown in Figure 7.1, the most frequent numbers are 2 (one son and one daughter) and 4 (two sons and two daughters). All of the four participants who wanted children ‘as many as Allah gives’ did not know Turkish but the other non-Turkish speakers¹²⁶ want or wanted 3.3 children on average, ranging from 1 to 7. Meanwhile, Turkish speaking participants want or wanted to have 3 children on average, ranging from 2 to 5. By migration type, forced migrant participants tended to desire little more children (3.4) than voluntary migrant participants (3).

¹²⁶ The category of ‘non-Turkish speakers’ includes those who do not know Turkish at all and those who know a little.




Figure 7.1. Ideal number of children among the participants.

Some participants expressed their desire for two daughters and two sons, but if they became better off (Case 66).

I want two (children). It can be four or five. Yeah, it can be, if I can look after. I'm in a rented house. It's very difficult. People give birth like that but they have a house. They may be poor but their houses belong to them. ... If we become better off, then it can be (more children). But, if we don't, then it can't be. If we go on living in the rented house, I won't have even the second (Case 66: Yasemin, age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

They prefer four children rather than two generally for their consideration of old age security and future mutual supports between siblings after their death. Nonetheless, most participants' concern is rather how to feed children better and spare their school expenses (Case 67).

Everybody says not to give birth, really. Everybody says that it's difficult to look after children in this time. It was better in village. People had sheep. People had gardens, orchards, everything. We didn't buy anything. For example, we used to have all sorts of fruits. We even dried fruits and preserved for winter. We had cows, sheep and goats. We had milk, yogurt, and cheese. Thanks to Allah, we weren't in need of others' help. Children don't need other things if they eat yogurt and cheese

anyway. Aren't they? There aren't such things here. Everything is by money. A litre of milk is 1 million (1 lira). ... You buy a litre (but) I have four children. I boil it up, and it's not enough for everyone to have a glass of milk. We were eight siblings. My mother used to give us milk. There were lots of chickens. There were so many eggs that we didn't want it. The most important things are eggs anyway, and milk, cheese and yogurt, aren't they? They say why people in village give birth that many. Believe me, their nourishment! There were herbs and that sort of things. May Allah preserve, it was better. ... Some have one child in city but can't look it after properly. Some in village had nine or eight children and very fine children, believe me! I sometimes say to myself only if we were in village; I could give my children milk, cheese, and yogurt regularly and nourish them properly (Case 67: Berivan, age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere).

More than one third of the participants, mostly retrospectively, consider that two children are ideal particularly for economic reason. They consider that it is the affordable number for them to bring up children in a way which they want (Cases 68, 69, 70).

It's not important to bring forth (children) but it's important to look after and bring up. It's sin if you bear a child and leave it there. One has needs. One needs clothes, shoes, and foods. Excuse me but by bringing forth (a child), it doesn't become a proper man. One should bring it up and then bring forth another. ... If what I want could be, one girl and one boy were enough. But, thank God, I have two daughters and two sons ... too many. Thank God, (but) enough. Enough, enough ... (Case 68: Makhbule, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Başkale).

Four is enough, because of rent and that life is very difficult. One can't buy anything. As children grow up, their problems also increase. They want more things. One can't look after them. Two were enough. But Allah has given. I still thank Him. (But,) Two were enough (Case 69: Byegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

If I give births constantly, living conditions have been already ... in general Kurdish people's living conditions are not good. I don't know but if I give birth, one's shoes are missing, one's clothes are missing, one's foods are missing. I don't want that. I, personally, if it depends on me, want two and look after well and raise them properly (Case 70: Esra, age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

It is noteworthy that women are producing a counter religious discourse against a traditional pro-natal one. While a few participants (6 out of 40) stated that they consider birth control is a sin, many conversely argued that it was a sin to have children whom one cannot look after appropriately (Cases 68, 71, 72, 75).

Havva went through twelve pregnancies for her sixteen-year marriage life. She has six living children and another baby was due within a couple of weeks at the time of interviewing. She was very unhappy about her fecundity;

One or two children were enough. I can't look after. He (her husband) wants, 'Bring forth ten', really. It's my sin eventually. It'll be written for me (as a sin because I can't take care of them). He doesn't feel compassion for me at all, 'Bring, bring'. Neighbours say, 'Get protected. It's pity for you' (Case 71: Havva, age 32, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

In our religion, it says to bring forth children as many as you can look after. If you read (the interpretation of) the Qur'an in Turkish, it says not to produce a child if you cannot take care of. It is sin after a child is born anyway. It's not sin if you do something before a child is born. They say, 'Allah has given, Allah has given'. O! Allah has given but one shouldn't produce if she can't look after (Case 72: Eylem's daughter, age 22, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Furthermore, a number of the participants said that they were advised by their mothers not to have as many children as they did (Case 73).¹²⁷

I want two. ... My mother always says, 'Do not do like us. Do not bring forth this many children. Bring a few children so that you can get children educated and look after well, dress well, feed well. We were in village. We didn't know anything.' My mother suffered a lot. She brought forth many children. (She gave thirteen births and brought up ten children). My mother said, 'You bring forth a few children so that you can look after them well. You can look after yourself, too.' When one bears many children, she can look after neither herself nor children. Both a child and she get worn out (Case 73: Hasret, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

The majority of the participants desired to limit childbearing at some point of their life. Many participants wanted to have as few as two children in order to be able to feed and dress their children properly and have them educated. Even meeting children's basic needs is incomparably expensive in the city ("Everything is by money (*Her şey para iladır*)"). In urban economy where they no longer own any means of production, education is the (expensive but) only investment parents can make for preparing their children for acquiring livelihood.

¹²⁷ The mean numbers of the participants' mothers' births and pregnancies, which were roughly estimated from the participants' accounts, were 7.6 and 10, respectively.

Desire for Spacing Births: "I want to raise children one by one"

A great majority of the participants expressed not only their desire for limiting but also spacing births. They want or wanted to space births. Some of them argued that spacing births is better for children's development and expressed their desire to raise children one by one; another birth only after the previous child starts school (Cases 74, 75, 76).

If I had reason that I've got now when I had the first child, I would have brought her up to seven years old and send school, and then I would have got pregnant and given birth to the second. If I could look after the second, too, they were enough for me (Case 74: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Even if I want, it's not now. I'll send this child to school. I'm always saying that I won't have a child until he goes to the second grade. ... You see the world. Expenses ... I'm looking at the future. I didn't study. My children should study and gain occupations. I don't want sins get in my neck. Our mothers and fathers didn't get us educated. If they had fewer children, we would have studied more and gained very good occupations (Case 75: Özlem, age 28, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Edremit).

After my daughter grows up and goes to school. That's much better. For example, she becomes 10 or 11 years old, goes to school, and I won't need to care her much. Then, I will think of one. So that I can take care of her more. I want to raise children one by one. I mean, there are some people whose babies are still small and who still breastfeed them but get pregnant! They can look after neither this nor that. How can I look after? I can't. Children are healthier that way (Case 76: Hasret, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

In reality, it is still not unusual that older women and men expect their daughters-in-law to bear children incessantly. In particular, the father-in-law sometimes encourages his daughters-in-law, *via* his wife, to continue giving births when she seems to cease to become pregnant. Yet, more and more people even in older generations now believe that childbirths are better to be spaced. Melike's mother-in-law, for instance, tells her to take a break for a few years after she gave three births successively; "You'll bring forth another after that." Saadet also gave the first three births consecutively. Her father-in-law used to tell his wife to take Saadet to the hospital for a contraceptive; "It's pity. She can't look after (children)" although now he says, "They (children) grew up. Tell her to bring forth one more." Thus, while it is

still taken for granted by older generations that reproduction lasts throughout one's reproductive years, spacing births has become widely supported now.

Unwanted Pregnancies: "My daughter is still small!"

In contrast to their aspirations, most of the participants have experienced successive pregnancies and gave birth to more children than they wanted except for a few participants who were newly married or difficult to conceive. The participants' successive pregnancies can be seen from Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1. Reproductive profile of the participants.

No.*	Age	Years of marriage	Number of children		Number of mis-carriage	Number of abortion	Number of still birth	Total number of pregnancy
			male	female				
1	23	9	1	2	1	0	0	4
2	21	6	0	1	0	0	0	1
3	26	13	3	1	0	0	0	4
4	40	15	3	2	1	0	0	7**
5	23	8	1	1	0	0	0	3**
6	38	25	4	3	0	0	3	10
7	21	6	2	1	0	0	0	3
8	21	3	1	1	0	0	0	2
9	26	12	2	2	3	0	0	7
10	28	14	2	0	1	0	1	4
11	19	3	1	0	1	0	0	2
12	18	2	0	1	0	0	0	1
13	28	14	3	2	3	0	2	11**
14	43	23	3	3	3	0	2	11
15	25	7	2	2	0	0	0	4
16	28	11	1	1	0	0	0	2
17	37	22	3	4	1	2	1	11
18	26	13	2	2	0	0	0	4
19	38	23	2	2	5	0	2	11
20	26	14	1	2	0	0	0	3
21	21	3	0	1	0	0	0	1
22	34	16	2	2	0	0	1	5
23	46	31	3	6	1	0	1	11
24	30	13	0	4	0	0	0	4
25	31	15	2	3	1	0	0	6
26	47	32	7	4	0	0	2	13
27	32	16	5	1	1	0	4	12**
28	28	12	4	2	0	0	0	6
29	40	21	1	8	0	0	1	10
30	30	6	1	2	1	0	0	5**

Table 7.1. (Continued)

No.*	Age	Years of marriage	Number of children		Number of mis-carriage	Number of abortion	Number of still birth	Total number of pregnancy
			male	female				
31	49	41	2	5	2	0	0	9
32	31	11	3	1	0	0	0	4
33	38	23	0	0	3	0	0	3
34	51	36	7	5	0	0	5	17
35	29	14	2	2	1	0	1	6
36	35	20	0	6	0	0	0	6
37	27	9	3	1	1	0	0	5
38	30	14	2	2	0	0	0	4
39	31	16	3	2	1	4	0	10
40	36	17	5	2	1	0	1	9

* It corresponds to the number of the participant.

** Pregnant at the time of interviewing.

In general, the participants regret the neglect and slow development that older babies possibly suffered. It is widely believed that breast milk becomes detrimental if a woman is pregnant.¹²⁸ Hence, the participants gave up nursing as soon as they noticed their new pregnancies. Despite the desire for spacing and a number of regrets, pregnancy within twelve months after the previous birth seems to be frequent. Nearly half of the total pregnancies of the participants occurred within a year after the previous birth (128 out of 251 pregnancies) (Case 77).

When this one (the first child) was three months old, the other was in my womb. This one was (born in) '97, that is '98, Murat is '99, and (the last one is) 2001. ... (When I became pregnant with the second child), I didn't know (that I was pregnant again). There is her (my brother-in-law's wife, Berivan) uncle's wife. I was taken to her. I couldn't eat anything in mornings. Excuse me but I felt nauseous and dizzy. ... She touched my abdomen by her hands. Then, she went out with her (Berivan). She said to her, 'Oh! I don't wanna tell her. She's gonna upset. Her child is still small and she's pregnant.' I heard that. But, I didn't want to believe it. She said to me, 'To the Maternity Hospital.' I went. They examined and said, 'Congratulations! My girl, you're pregnant.' 'What congratulations about? Ahhh! My daughter is still small!', I cried (Case 77: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

¹²⁸ The same belief is reported in a study of breastfeeding practices among rural-urban migrant women in Diyarbakır, too (Ergenekon-Ozelci *et al.* 2006).

Further, nearly half of the participants have already given birth to more children than they wanted to have. The number of children among the participants ranged from 0 to 12 and they had 4.5 children on average at the time of interviewing. Even when those who were older than the age 40 were excluded, the mean number of children was 3.8. The most frequent number of children was 4. Yet 40% of all participants and almost one thirds of those who were the age of 40 and younger had more than 4 children. Further, the majority of the participants who were 40 and younger (74.3%) had children more than two which was the most frequent ideal number of children.

Meanwhile, all participants and those of the age of 40 and younger had 6.3 and 5.4 pregnancies on average, respectively, so far. The number of pregnancy differed between migrant groups while there was little difference with regards to the number of children. Forced migrant participants had 4.7 children on average and voluntary migrant participants had 4.4 children on average at the time of interviewing. However, while the former had 6.9 pregnancies on average, the latter had 5.9 pregnancies on average.

The difference between the numbers of living children and pregnancies is probably related to the frequency of spontaneous and induced abortions and the number of children who died after birth. Force migrant participants had 0.9 miscarriages on average and voluntary migrant participants had 0.7 miscarriages on average. The former lost 1.4 children after birth and the latter lost 0.4 children after birth. There were two voluntary migrants in their thirties who had induced abortion. One had abortion twice and the other four times.

The gaps between the ideal and actual numbers of children and the desire for spacing and the successive childbearing in reality suggest the prevalence of unwanted pregnancies. Nearly 43% of all of the pregnancies that the participants had were unwanted (107 out of 251 pregnancies). As shown in Figure 7.2, 67% of the participants experienced either ill-timed pregnancy (61%) or never-desired pregnancy (45%) at least once. Many of them (47%) have become pregnant against their will more than once.

The total number of unwanted pregnancies (either ill-timed or never-desired) was three times more among Turkish speaking participants (M=3.1) than non-Turkish speaking participants (M=1.2). Meanwhile, it was only slightly more among voluntary migrants (M=2.8) than forced migrants (M=2.5). However, both non-Turkish speakers and forced migrants tended to have experienced ill-timed pregnancies less frequently but never-desired pregnancies more frequently than or as much as their counterparts (Table 7.2). Non-Turkish speakers had 0.6 ill-timed pregnancies and 1.6 never-desired pregnancies on average while Turkish speakers had 2.1 and 1 respectively. Forced migrants had 1.3 ill-timed pregnancies and 1.2 never-desired pregnancies while voluntary migrants had 1.5 and 1.2 respectively. In particular, voluntary migrants who moved to the city for marriage had a considerably low frequency of never-desired pregnancies in comparison to the others.




Figure 7.2. Frequency of unwanted pregnancies among the participants.

Table 7.2. Numbers of unwanted pregnancies of the participants by language and migrant groups.

	Number of ill-timed pregnancies	Number of never-desired pregnancies
Non-Turkish speakers	0.6	1.6
Turkish speakers	2.1	1.0
Forced migrants	1.3	1.2
Voluntary migrants	1.5	1.2
Those who migrated for marriage	2.5	0.5

It could be the result of that those who migrated for marriage did not experience migration and insecurity at school age and tended to have gone to school in village (3 out of 6), knew Turkish (5 out of 6) and were capable of learning to control reproduction more quickly than the women who had to migrate to the squatter neighbourhood in childhood although they also experienced unexpected pregnancies in early days of reproductive career. Meanwhile, the relative frequency of unwanted pregnancies among Turkish speakers and voluntary migrants in comparison to their counterparts may be the consequence of their stronger desire for spacing and limiting birth as well as the difficulty of its realisation. For instance, those who replied that they wanted children as much as gifted tended not to count unwanted pregnancies.

Low Frequency of Induced Abortion: “I was thinking to get it removed but ...”

Despite upsets and regrets, most of the unwanted pregnancies were carried on and resulted in births. Out of 107 unwanted pregnancies, only 6 pregnancies of two participants were aborted at private clinics. Most participants responded to a question related to abortion with fear and abhorrence: “May Allah protect!”; “It’s a murder for us!”

However, it does not mean that the participants never thought of terminating unwanted pregnancy when they faced it. A quarter of the participants admitted that they had thought of abortion at least once but desisted (Case 78).

In the first months I was thinking to get it removed. This one (the third child). I was having many difficulties. I was distressed. Two children were still small. Even the older one was small, too, because I gave birth to both one after another. I was thinking that I'd rest a bit while these (children) grew up. I was thinking to get it removed. After one or two months ... they no longer allow to get it removed. They get it removed outside (private clinics) but they don't in the hospital. No, I didn't try. ... This is also one life after all. I let it be this time but I'll never bring forth the fourth. I thought so. ... And, one fears from Allah a bit. It's something Allah gave after all. People don't give it by themselves. I remained without children for four years (See case 63). If it comes from my hands, I would have made. But, it was beyond my capacity, as long as Allah didn't want (Case 78: Melike, age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Those who had thought of abortion tended to have given up eventually, according to them, for a religious reason, or for the fear from Allah (*Allah korkusundan*). It must be the powerful psychological reason which they could not endeavour to terminate pregnancies which they did not desire; "We have no right to take life when a desired pregnancy is out of our control but only of Allah". However, it may be sometimes *de facto* reasoning in part. In fact, having an induced abortion without anyone else's knowledge is considerably difficult for any participant, and probably other women in the neighbourhood. It is almost impossible for her to go to a clinic and have curettage by herself without the knowledge of her husband because she usually does not have money which she can spend freely. It is also very difficult for her to go to a clinic without the knowledge of relatives and neighbours who watch each other's coming and going. They are most likely to try to stop or accuse them for such attempt. İpek's mother-in-law once persuaded her to give up abortion by saying that she could bring up a child with the money she would spend for abortion. Besides, the legal period of induced abortion tends to past due while she tries to negate the possibility of her unexpected pregnancy and thinks over a visit to a hospital to confirm it. If she wants to have abortion after the legal period, she needs to know a specific clinic which still operates abortion. Her lack of autonomy and patriarchal surveillance thwarts the chance of safe abortion.

Accordingly, popular methods are more accessible, though mostly unsuccessful and risking health. They are more advantageous for their attainability and for hiding the actor's initiative to terminate the pregnancy. Regardless of the participants' strong

guilty conscience about abortion, stories of attempts for ‘miscarriage’ by such ways as jumping, carrying heavy loads and taking herbs (e.g. henna, the root of a plant called *runas* in Kurdish) circulate as someone’s attempts (Cases 79, 80).

Women seem to have tried, and probably still try, inducing miscarriage in village where the access to health services are even more restricted, too, when they really no longer want to have a child. Ayşe recounted that she used to go to pasture on a horse with other women for grazing in summer. She used to wish for miscarriage on the way while bumping on the horse.

Meanwhile, Eylem tried to say that there was no such a thing as abortion in her generation and repeated, “It’s forbidden, it’s forbidden. It’s sin! There used to be no such a thing as curettage.” Yet, her oldest daughter related;

As far as I remember, many women used to swallow henna (secretly because) they were scared that mothers-in-law would learn that they aborted children. Indeed, they got poisoned in most of the times. (But) Nothing happened (to a child). But it (miscarriage) happened when it happened. But my mother never does. She is afraid of Allah. As far as I heard, not in our place but in other places, women jump from a rock or even a wall hoping that a child will be miscarried (Case 79: Ayşe, age 51, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak; Eylem’s daughter, age 22).

In the neighbourhood, there was no place either to ride a horse or to jump off from the wall without drawing people’s attention. Thus, Esmanur tried different kinds of abortive herbs and a plant which is claimed to sterilise a person. She says that she learned about them from old women. She also took several tablets of aspirin a day because “everyone says it causes miscarriage.” She added, “It’s written on a box that pregnant women should not take.” She tried “whatever people say to be abortive” for almost every pregnancy but none of the attempts were successful although they damaged her stomach badly (Case 80: age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

The circulation of stories like ones described above indicates women’s hidden but powerful desire to control their reproduction however difficult it is. Induced abortion seems to be a less pragmatic means to limit births for the participants.¹²⁹ Yet, mostly unsuccessful but age-old attempts for miscarriage have probably always existed

¹²⁹ By contrast, in Turkey in general, induced abortion is said to be often used as a birth control method by women. According to TDHS-2003, 40.3% of pregnant women had abortions in order to limit births (HUIPS 2004 cited in Kavlak *et al.* 2006: 9). However, it is probably a more common practice in the western regions (e.g. Kavlak *et al.* 2006) or for those who have a little more autonomy and economic means than Doluca women. A couple of doctors in Van told me that they had seen ‘many’ women who used abortion as a birth control method and had it repeatedly. However, it is not a very pragmatic method for the participants, and probably many other women in the neighbourhood, whose freedom of movement is considerably restricted.

among women in the region and they have probably always wished and struggled to control childbearing rather than passively bringing forth children as impregnated.

Knowledge of Contraception: “We don’t go anywhere but nurses used to come to us”
Frequent unwanted pregnancies among the participants take place not only regardless of their desire for spacing and limiting births but also their knowledge and practice of birth control. As consistent with the result of TDHS-2003 mentioned above, all of the participants knew about contraception. They were all informed about most of the traditional and modern contraceptive methods available in the country.¹³⁰ They all recognised tubal ligation (female sterilisation), oral contraceptives, IUD, injectables, male condom, lactational amenorrhoea method (LAM) and withdrawal (*coitus interruptus*). One participant heard of contraceptive patch and another knew suppository and cervical cap. None of the participants heard of vasectomy (male sterilisation), contraceptive implant, progestogen-only pill, emergency pills and natural family planning.

The participants tended to have learned about contraception after marriage and after migration. Only eight participants knew about birth control before marriage. Most of those who married in village and had never stayed in the city before marriage gained knowledge of contraception in later years of marriage after migration. Accordingly, there were two participants in their forties who learned about contraception after menopause or separation.

Most of the participants learned about contraceptive methods from visiting nurses and other women within the household. There were two participants who learned about contraceptives for the first time from their husbands. It seems that the role of visiting nurses was momentous for spreading contraceptive knowledge among women in the neighbourhood. From the participants’ accounts, it can be presumed that at the end of the 1990s nurses visited the neighbourhood intensively and

¹³⁰ This dissertation used the TDHS’s categorisation of traditional and modern contraceptive methods. In TDHS, traditional methods include periodical abstinence, withdrawal, LAM, a variety of folk methods and modern methods include tubal ligation, vasectomy, the pill, IUD, injectables, male condom, and diaphragm (See HUIPS 2004: 64).

informed women about contraception in a caring and concerned manner while vaccinating children. According to the participants, some of the nurses knew Kurdish language. They visited each household and explained about major modern contraceptive methods of female sterilisation, the pill, IUD, injectables and male condom. They often encouraged women to go to a clinic in order to get a device of their choice (Cases 81, 82).

Nurses used to come to see us. We don't go anywhere but they used to come to our houses. They don't come now again. Now women go to them. They vaccinated my children, and then came to me two or three times. They said to me, 'Come to the Maternity Hospital. They fit in a coil (IUD), give pills and whatever you want.' I learned thus and went there (Case 81: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

There was one nurse. She used to come to the neighbourhood. She was passing by and I went to her. I was probably dumping rubbish on the street. I asked her, 'Are you a nurse?' she said, 'Yes, I am a nurse.' I said, 'I'm shy to say this but can I ask you something?' 'Of course', she said. I said, 'I have one child. I don't want children any more. Now I have a child. I want one after she grows up.' She said, 'Of course, we can help you.' ... After that she used to come all the time. ... She was very nice. I liked her so much. She showed me (how to prevent pregnancy) (Case 82: Ceren, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan).

7.3. Struggles for Controlling Reproduction

Barred Access to Health Service: "She knows contraception but can't go!"

"In these days, everyone gets protected. Those who have children use contraceptives. Those who don't do not use. For they want children. But those who have small children like me resort to contraceptive methods", says Melike (age 23, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak). Her observation is probably not far from a current trend in the neighbourhood yet might reflect more women's desire for birth control than actual achievement.

There was not so many but the nonetheless significant number of the participants who have not been able to access contraception despite their knowledge of and desire for use. Nearly one third of the participants have never used contraceptives, whether

traditional or modern methods. More non-Turkish speaking participants (59%) than Turkish speaking participants (13%) and more forced migrant participants (53%) than voluntary migrant participants (20%) tended to be non-users (those who never used any contraceptive method) (Tables 7.3 and 7.4). There were no non-users among those who did not experience migration in childhood and moved to the city for marriage with men who lived in the neighbourhood.

Table 7.3. Usage of contraception among Turkish and non-Turkish speakers.

	Number of non- contraceptive users	Number and percentage of contraceptive users	Total
Turkish speakers	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	23
Non-Turkish speakers	10 (59%)	7 (41%)	17
All participants	13 (32%)	27 (68%)	40

Table 7.4. Usage of contraception among voluntary and forced migrants.

	Number of non- contraceptive users	Number and percentage of contraceptive users	Total
Voluntary migrants	5 (20%)	20 (80%)	25
Forced migrants	8 (53%)	7 (47%)	15
All participants	13 (32%)	27 (68%)	40

The lack of knowledge of the official language appears to be an important factor for non-use. Yet, it is by no means the single determining factor although it indicates multiple disadvantages which deprived a chance of learning the language which is an important means to access resources. In fact, the reasons for non-use are various. Some participants have not used contraceptives due to their own choices. Five participants were against birth control since they believed that it was a sin although one participant (Ayfer, age 26, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak)

among them stated that she would use some contraceptive method however if Allah gives children one after another. Two participants were trying to have a child since one (Fatmagül, age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere) had no children after repeated miscarriages and the other (Beyza, age 28, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) had two children but had difficulty in conception and wanted one more child.

The other six participants did not use contraceptives despite that they wanted to space or limit births. Sevim (age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Şırnak) was not using contraceptives because she believed that she would not be able to conceive more than three children due to the caesarean section which she had at her first childbirth. She probably misunderstood the doctor's advice that she was better not to try to have more than three children because of the caesarean section; "Because I had a caesarean, if I produce one more child now, the child will turn upside down and I can't have a child once again. That's why I'm saying that let it be if it will be. You can't have more than three children anyway if you have a caesarean."

Two participants once went to a *sağlık ocağı* in order to have an IUD fitted but returned without it. Gülbet (age 31, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere) was scared and left before medical examination. She had five children at the time of interviewing and was considering having tubal ligation. Güllü (age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak) only learned that she was already pregnant with the fourth child when she went to a *sağlık ocağı* for IUD and she has had no married life with her husband after that since he married to another woman (See case 33).

There were two participants who could not access health services at all regardless of their desire to limit births. They have not been able to go to clinic because they did not know Turkish, were illiterate, had no network of female relative-neighbours and hence hardly been out of the neighbourhood and their husbands were not supportive. This case was not many in number among the participants but great in significance

for it manifests the consequence of Kurdish-speaking migrant women's particular disempowerment by multiple patriarchal deprivations of official language, literacy, income, network and freedom of movement (Cases 83, 84).

Nesrin began going out of the neighbourhood only very recently a decade after her migration to the city. She had three miscarriages and two still births and had six living children. When she was pregnant with the fourth child, her husband married another woman (Case 21). She no longer wanted to have a child. Yet, she did not know Turkish, had never been outside the neighbourhood before, could not get along with not only with her husband but also with other women in the household and her natal family were in village, all of which left her without courage, money and companion to go to clinic to acquire contraceptives (Case 83: Nesrin, age 43, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Havva had one miscarriage and three still births. She was pregnant with her seventh child at the time of interviewing. She seemed reluctant to say 'unwanted' for her living children but stated that she wished to have one or two children since she could not afford looking after seven children. She learned about contraception when she once moved to Van with her parents before marriage. Soon after she married with her husband in a village in Çatak, she migrated to Van again due to the conflict. She lives only with her husband and children. She cannot get along with her parents-in-law and does not have a very close relation with any of her relatives on the husband's side. Her own relatives live in another neighbourhood in Van but cannot see them very often. Yasemin is her mother-in-law's brother's daughter and lives just fifty metres away. Yet, they hardly visit each other.¹³¹ According to Yasemin, She has no one and nobody comes to her. She gave birth to all of her children on her own at home and cut their umbilical cords by razor by herself. Havva told that she knew about contraceptives and wanted to use them after the third birth but could not go to clinic. Yasemin explained;

She knows contraception. She doesn't know how to go any place. No one has to go (with her). If she gets the pill, doesn't it finish in a month? Who buys for you? She knows (contraception)! But she can't go. Who takes her to? She can't go even to the Maternity Hospital.

The first *sağlık ocağı* in the neighbourhood was newly opened in front of Havva's house a few weeks before the interview. She murmured that she would go there and ask for a contraceptive after birth (Case 84: Havva, age 32, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Sometimes, the health personnel's patriarchal unawareness of women's reproductive rights (the rights to decide whether, when, and with whom she has or has not have a

¹³¹ I met Havva by chance. When Yasemin and I were going to visit Yasemin's mother-in-law (Eylem), we passed before the house of Havva who was beating wools taken out from duvets. Havva said something to Yasemin and they exchanged words. I then learned that they were relatives. I asked Yasemin to introduce me to her. She accepted and persuaded Havva, who was reluctant at first, to have an interview with me. I consider that there are more women like Havva whom an outsider like me is unlikely to be able to meet.

child) can bar women from accessing contraceptives. For example, there was one participant who was refused by a nurse to provide contraceptives without the husband's permission for the reason that she had no experience of conception and had a risk of infertility by using a contraceptive (Case 85).

Esra is an assertive young educated woman. She was informed of contraception before she married. According to her accounts, before she married, she used to be unusually sociable compared to other girls in the neighbourhood. She used to share her knowledge with her older female relatives and even distribute them condoms which a visiting nurse brought for her mother though none of them used them. Soon after she married, she consulted a nurse at a *sağlık ocağı* secretly from her husband and mother-in-law who lived together because they were expecting her immediate conception and objected her when she told them that she wanted to wait for a couple of years to have a child. She told her husband that she did not feel well and asked him to take her to a *sağlık ocağı* where the nurse she had become acquainted before worked. Her husband wanted to enter the nurse's room with her but she persuaded him that there was no need. She asked for a contraceptive but the nurse refused to provide her with any contraceptive;

She said, 'It's first time for you. You won't be able to bring forth a child. You'll be infertile. ... We'll do if you get permission from your husband. If your husband doesn't want, we can't take responsibility for that.' If I tell my husband, he would kill me! For that, I could do nothing (Case 85: Esra, age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Esra is a woman of the new generation. She is the youngest bride among her relative-neighbours who live in the same block but she is the most educated and one of the most assertive women. She is the bride of her father-in-law's choice (See Case 85). She is at the same time his niece and used to visit them very often since childhood. In other words, she is not a stranger bride. Her father-in-law returned to his village with his second wife. Esra lives with her first mother-in-law. She is a good-hearted woman and depends on Esra's husband. She seemed to have lost her authority over her sons and brides especially after her husband left her. Her brothers-in-law tend to be away or in prison. Hence, she used to go out relatively frequently for keeping a company with other women although she now refrains from going out of the house after her husband's arrest for fear of gossips. Thus, she managed to go to a *sağlık ocağı* and ask the nurse for contraception without the knowledge of her husband and mother-in-law in the very first days of her marriage. But, her attempt was failed by health personnel. Esra's case shows that even a relatively empowered woman who is

able to manage to act behind private patriarchy can be barred from accessing contraceptives by state patriarchy.

Anxiety about Biomedical Contraceptives: “They make bad parts good, good parts bad”

On the other hand, more than two thirds of the participants have used at least one contraceptive method, whether traditional or modern. Among them, fifteen participants used at least one traditional method of withdrawal, LAM, herbal medicine, or abstention. The most prevalent method among them was withdrawal as it was in Turkey in general (e.g. HUIPS 2004). Thirteen couples ever used this method. Five participants tried LAM as a contraceptive method.¹³² Two participants took herbs that were believed to work for sterilization. One couple practiced abstention for some time.¹³³

In the early days when nurses began visiting women in the neighbourhood, many people were sceptical about contraceptives as well as vaccinations which nurses tried to provide. They used to warn each other since they believed that they would cause illness or some other troubles. Many participants recounted that they were scared of IUD at the beginning since their neighbours used to keep telling them that the coil would stick to the womb or it goes to the heart or elsewhere (Case 86).

Songül: Do you know, Miki? This neighbourhood, all, came from villages. They don't know such a thing at all. If you use (contraception), they say, 'It's not good. Don't do. You'll become infertile' and so on. They scare people.

Saadet: Now nurses walk around and do tetanus vaccinations. One says, 'It's tetanus vaccination.' Ten people or twenty people say, 'It's infertility vaccination. They'll sterilise you.' Why do they sterilise?! Why does one do that to their own people ...? (Case 86: Songül, age 34, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak; Saadet, age 30, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere)

¹³² All of the participants know that breastfeeding has an effect of contraception. Yet, they also know from hearsays and own experience that it can fail very often. Thus, many participants seemed to have taken advantage of lactational amenorrhoea but only five participants tried to use LAM consciously as a contraceptive method and breastfed regularly and frequently.

¹³³ Özlem had a caesarean section at the seventh month of her pregnancy in order to avoid the risk of miscarriage. She and her husband followed the doctor's advice and refrained from sexual intercourse for half a year (the husband was away for four months) until she recovered and have an IUD inserted.

The people used to oppose vaccination, too. Nurses used to come, and still come, to vaccinate women in the age between 15 and 45 for the prevention of neonatal tetanus. It caused a suspicion among the people that the state was trying to sterilise Kurdish women (Case 87).¹³⁴

Ceylan: After the first child, I mean, as soon as we came to Van, nurses began coming and explained to us. She was a very good nurse. She was a very nice person like you. Really, she understood people's troubles. My husband didn't want me to have vaccination once because we didn't have a male child (yet). That nurse came here only for me. She asked me, 'Why don't you want?' I said, 'No problem (to have the vaccination for me), really.' (But,) My brother-in-law's wife took my arm and didn't let me for fear that my husband would beat me. People had told my husband that that vaccination was harmful.

Esra: In this neighbourhood, people used to say, 'You'll become infertile!' Did I become infertile after I used it?!

Ceylan: A nurse came here. One mother didn't let her daughters have jabs. Why? Because they won't be able to bring forth children after that vaccination.

Esra: Vaccination is used to protect ourselves from a disease. Our Kurds, women don't understand. There is a nurse I know. She came to our house when I was a girl. We used it. We understood of course. That's for contagious diseases. My uncle's wife, then, didn't allow (her daughters to have the vaccination), saying that my daughters will become infertile or something. I got it and used it. Thank God, I've got a child. My older sister also has a child. I rub it on their face, 'You said I was going to be unable to have a child!'

Ceylan: What did they say? They said you'd be infertile. The nurse went mad here; 'How do you think such a thing?!' ... She's a doctor, not an enemy. She also said, 'I'm not your enemy. I'm here for your health.' They no longer come. We go (Case 87: Ceylan, age 28, Turkish speaker, forced migrant Çatak; Esra, age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

The participants now laugh at those days and criticise the seniors who warned them against vaccinations and contraception for their ignorance. It shows that how the people's attitudes have changed over less than a decade. The change probably began with a few courage women who tried the vaccination or the contraceptive despite the warnings (Case 88).

Müjde used to be very scared of IUD but took great courage to use it after three unwanted pregnancies. She now encourages other women to use it.

There were neighbours who knew (about the IUD). (They said,) 'Don't do that. You'll be sick. You'll die and so on.' Later on, gradually (I saw) it's not like

¹³⁴ A research of health seeking behaviour conducted in 2006 also reports that nurses who visit houses to give vaccination against tetanus in Van, either rural or urban area, encountered people's refusal for the reason that they heard that it would sterilize women (Conseil Sante *et al.* 2007: 66, 73-4).

that. For example, they said to many people, 'It'll remain stuck with you.' We were scared to death. Later, we talked to one woman in this neighbourhood and she said, 'I'm with the coil.' We thought that nothing happens to anyone. I don't know but one said, 'It opens by itself. It goes to the heart, and so on.' They used to scare people. They didn't know anyway. Now I say (to others), 'It's not difficult at all. Go and get it' (Case 88: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Today, the women in the neighbourhood have become accustomed to vaccinations. They no longer believe everything said about contraceptives, too. However, they continue to hear, witness, and experience side effects and health problems which were caused or believed to be caused by contraceptives. Many participants expressed their concerns for side effects of common female modern methods (IUD, injectables, and the pill). Thus, among those who ever used traditional methods, there were four women who had used only traditional methods because of health concern (Cases 89, 90) or could not take courage to use biomedical methods for fear of side effects.

Gülcan does not use any modern method not for unreasonable fears but after good consideration. She has given birth to five children for five years and was pregnant with her sixth child. Before she became pregnant with the last child, she was searching for the best method which satisfies her because she did not want to use the pill and injectables for her future health and also the IUD for religious reason. Her husband rejects using condoms. They were practicing withdrawal until she became pregnant again.

I talked to my husband. He said, 'Get a coil fitted or use the pill.' I'm a very healthy person, thanks to Allah. I can't harm myself. ... Pills are bad. They make bad parts good and good parts bad. That's why I don't want to use. So, I'm telling my husband, 'You use.' He doesn't approach to it (a condom). I don't know what to do any more. Only if there was, for example, a pill which I need to use only that night. Yet, there is no such a thing. One has to use the pill continuously. Can you imagine? You take a pill everyday for 365 days! ... I never want to use the pill. The coil, too. In our religion, it is said that it is a sin. But I'm definitely against the pill. I can't harm myself. I'm a healthy person. I'll be good for a year or two years. There should be its side effect in the future. I'll certainly see its harms during the period of menopause ... I would use a coil if it is not a sin. I read Qur'an. I fear from Allah. ... Both the pill and injections dry up people. I want an operation (tubal ligation). But materially ... I even asked the price. They said 600 million lira (600 lira, which is about 100 US dollars). Really. I would choose that (if I can pay for it) (Case 89: Gülcan, age 40, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

Ayşegül married at fifteen years old. She did not know anything about contraception and conceived a baby girl after a year although she did not want a child at that time. She was stillborn. Her second pregnancy resulted in miscarriage. She had her first child at the third pregnancy and wanted to wait for another child until her daughter

begins school. She went to a *sağlık ocağı* and asked for advice. Yet, while she was considering which method to use and her husband was practicing withdrawal, she became pregnant;

After the first daughter came into the world, people said to tie (an IUD). I said, no. I'm sick already. I'm anaemic. Women tied (an IUD) and had bleeding a lot. I'm already sick. That's why I didn't get it fitted. I actually thought of a coil. But women were telling that sometimes it falls, sometimes one gets pregnant nevertheless. ... I'll tell you the truth. Our economic condition is not very good for buying the pill every month. My husband doesn't want (condoms). When I have health insurance, I'll have a small operation and tie it up. I don't want children any more, at all! (Case 90: Ayşegül, age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

The other two participants who have used only traditional method (withdrawal) could not take courage to use modern female methods for fear of side effects which they heard from other women (Cases 91, 92).

One gets scared, you know. It (IUD) has risks in most cases. For example, one woman in the neighbourhood did it. Despite that, she got pregnant. That can happen to some. And, this time, the child got stuck to the intestine or somewhere else.¹³⁵ I was frightened. ... And it can also happen. When one uses the pill and injection, they harm your health, don't they? One has to breastfeed. I was like that, too. Everyone is scared. Did you hear Müjde? She became like that (a piece of an IUD remained imbedded in her uterine wall). That's another problem (Case 91: Yasemin, age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

I went (to a *sağlık ocağı*) with my brother-in-law's wife and asked (for an IUD). They said that they can't because I had a problem with the bladder (She has been suffering from bladder infection for a long time). They said they would give an injection. There is a sister-in-law of my neighbour. She became ill because of that injection. She was bedfast for three months. I was frightened. I couldn't have an injection, either. They said they would give me a balloon (condom). I felt very ashamed from the balloon. ... I threw it away and couldn't get protected. I got pregnant. I heard of the pill but didn't use. That sister-in-law became ill because of the pill and injections. I was frightened. I'm very scared. You know, that sort of things happened to me a lot. I suffered so many things from doctors. I can't get well at all after that curettage (one she had after one of her miscarriages). All are because of that curettage. Because that woman (the doctor who operated me) tore me to pieces (Case 92: Ceylan, age 28, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Health concerns for the pill, injectables, and IUD were quite common among the participants. Those who were actually using any of those methods also tended to be anxious about future health problems they might cause. The four participants above

¹³⁵ She probably talked about ectopic pregnancy.

did not want to or could not use only specific modern methods for health reasons (e.g. the pill for stomach ache or breastfeeding, IUD for excess bleeding, injectables for amenorrhea). Yet, when it is combined with religious (e.g. IUD),¹³⁶ economic (e.g. tubal ligation, the pill), and personal (or patriarchal) (e.g. male condom) reasons, no alternative but withdrawal is left.

Table 7.5 below shows the participants' choice of contraceptive methods. The most frequently used modern methods among the participants were IUD, the pill, male condom and injectables. The choice of female contraceptive methods was diverse among the participants yet tended to be similar within a group of relative-neighbour women.¹³⁷ For instance, one group of the participants who were relative-neighbours talked about how bad side effects injectables caused by referring to their own or others' experiences while another group expressed their desire to use injectables probably because it was not tried out very much by women in the group and they have not heard about their side effects much. It suggests the on-going exchange of information yet only within a small group of women.

¹³⁶ There were three participants, including Gülcan, who did not want to use the IUD because they considered that it spoils ablution and is a sin to use.

¹³⁷ Ay *et al.* (2007) also observed the sharing of information and rumours about contraceptive methods within a network of women in a neighbourhood in Istanbul.

Table 7.5. Contraceptives used by the participants.

Contraceptive methods	Number of users*
Withdrawal	13
IUD	12
Pill	11
Male condom	10
Injectable	8
LAM	5
Abortive herbs	2
Tubal-ligation	2
Cervical cap	1

* Some participants used more than one method of contraception.

Access to Modern Female Methods and Migration Type

The majority of the contraceptive users used at least one modern method (23/27 users). Many participants used both traditional and modern methods while a number of contraceptive users have used only modern methods (12/27 users). When looked at by language groups, more Turkish speakers appeared to have used only modern methods or both methods than non-Turkish speakers (Table 7.6). However, the percentages of modern method users within language groups suggest that non-Turkish speakers were likely to use modern method(s) once they decided and managed to practice birth control. Among the participants who practiced contraception, all non-Turkish speakers used only modern method(s) or both methods while 80% of Turkish speakers used either only modern method(s) or both methods.

Table 7.6. Participants' choice of traditional and modern contraception by language groups.

	Number of participants who used only traditional method	Number of participants who used only modern method	Number of participants who used both modern and traditional methods	Total
Turkish speakers	4 (20%)	8 (40%)	8 (40%)	20
Non-Turkish speakers	0 (0%)	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	7
All contraceptive users	4 (15%)	12 (44%)	11 (41%)	27

A modern/traditional type of contraception used by the participants differed more distinctively by migration type, however (Table 7.7). More voluntary migrant participants used only modern method(s) or both methods than forced migrant participants; among the contraceptive users, 95% of the voluntary migrants chose only modern method(s) or both methods while 58% of the forced migrants used only modern method(s) or both methods. Accordingly, it might be hypothesised that in case of Kurdish speaking migrant women in Van migration type is more significant for a woman to decide whether she can access modern contraceptives than the knowledge of the official language.

Table 7.7. Participants' choice of traditional and modern contraception by migration groups.

	Number of participants who used only traditional method	Number of participants who used only modern method	Number of participants who used both modern and traditional methods	Total
Forced migrants	3 (42%)	2 (29%)	2 (29%)	7
Voluntary migrants	1 (5%)	10 (50%)	9 (45%)	20
All contraceptive users	4 (15%)	12 (44%)	11 (41%)	27

The choice of method also differed according to language and migration groups. The most frequently used modern method by Turkish speaking contraceptive users was male condom while many of them used a range of female methods, too (Table 7.8).

Table 7.8. Participant's choice of contraceptive methods by language groups.

	Number of Turkish speakers	Number of non-Turkish speakers
IUD	9	3
Pill	8	3
Male condom	10	0
Injectable	6	2
Tubal-ligation	1	1
Cervical cap	1	0
Withdrawal	11	2
LAM	4	1
Abortive herbs	1	1

By contrast, there were no non-Turkish speaking contraceptive users who used condom. It seems that they tended not to choose male methods (condom and withdrawal) in comparison to Turkish speakers (Table 7.9).

Table 7.9. Participant's choice of male and female contraceptive methods by language groups.

	Number of participants who used male contraceptive methods*	Number of participants who used female contraceptive methods
Turkish speakers	17	11
Non-Turkish speakers	2	7

* Some participants used both male and female methods.

Meanwhile, Table 7.10 shows that the most frequently used modern method by voluntary migrant contraceptive users is IUD while they seem to have used a range of female methods. By contrast, no forced migrant contraceptive users chose IUD.

Table 7.10. Participant’s choice of contraceptive methods by migration groups.

	Voluntary migrants	Forced migrants
IUD	12	0
Pill	10	1
Male condom	7	3
Injectable	7	1
Tubal-ligation	2	0
Cervical cap	1	0
Withdrawal	8	4
LAM	5	0
Abortive herbs	1	1

As shown in Table 7.11, more forced migrants relied on male methods than female methods.

Table 7.11. Participant’s choice of male and female contraceptive methods by migration groups.

	Number of participants who used male contraceptive methods*	Number of participants who used female contraceptive methods
Voluntary migrants	13	16
Forced migrants	6	2

* Some participants used both male and female methods.

In summary, although non-Turkish speaking participants were more likely to be non-contraceptive users than Turkish speakers, non-Turkish speaking contraceptive users could access female and modern methods once they decided and managed to practice birth control. On the other hand, there seemed to be difference between the voluntary migrant participants and the forced migrant participants in terms of the access to modern female methods. More voluntary migrant participants tended to have used modern methods, while they tried traditional methods as well, than forced migrant participants. When forced migrant participants used modern method, it tended to be male condom rather than female methods.

Indeed, because of the very small size of the sample, it is impossible to generalise the trends. Nevertheless, it might be hypothesised that for Kurdish speaking migrant women in Van, migration type is significant for a woman to be able to access modern and female contraceptives which requires their ability to access health services by one way or another. Hence, it also might be possible to suggest tentatively that voluntary migrant participants tend to be more empowered than forced migrant participants in accessing the public sphere and attaining modern and female contraceptive methods. In addition, voluntary migrant participants tended to have tried more kinds of contraception than the latter as shown below. This may imply their ability to access health services and biomedical contraceptives yet it might be the result of their unsuccessful usage of contraceptives which they have tried at the same time.

Trial and Error: "I've tried everything"

One important characteristic of contraceptive usage among the participants was that many of them used a range of methods. The participants who practiced birth control began it at a relatively early stage of reproductive life. Half of them began it after the birth of the first or second child. Furthermore, the majority used a modern method as the first contraceptive method (20 out of 27 contraceptive users). Yet, half of those who practiced contraception tried more than one method, up to five different methods. Figure 7.3 shows that the number of contraceptive methods used varies by the migration groups whereas it does not very much differ between the language

groups. Voluntary migrant contraceptive users used one method more than forced migrant users. In particular, those who moved to the city for marriage used three different contraceptive methods on average at the time of interviewing.




Figure 7.3. Number of contraceptive methods that the contraceptive users tried by language and migration groups.

The tendency that voluntary migrant users tried multiple methods of contraception may be another indicator of their capability to access health services. Yet, their frequent changes of contraceptive methods may also suggest the prevalence of dissatisfaction, discontinuity or/and an incorrect use of contraceptives, which may result in an unwanted pregnancy. Thus, there was a paradoxical trend of apparently higher fertility among the modern contraceptive users than the others. The mean age of the participants who ever used any of modern contraceptives was 30.7 years old and that of those who never used a modern contraceptive was 32.3. Yet, the former had approximately 6.6 pregnancies and 5 children on average while the latter had about 5.8 pregnancies and 4 children on average. The fewer number of children

among the non-users could be resulted from the fact that some of non-users had difficulty in conception. Nonetheless, the result is paradoxical. What can be inferred from it is a relative ineffectiveness of modern contraception among the participants.

Among 27 contraceptive users, either traditional or modern, there were 10 participants who had consistently used one method. They comprised of 4 male condom users, 3 IUD users, and 3 withdrawal users. Among them, 6 participants experienced no unwanted pregnancies since they began using the contraceptives. Four of them were using condoms and the rest were using IUD. They continued one specific method due to its successful contraception and their satisfaction for it. The average number of unwanted pregnancies among the one-method users is thus about 1.5. Besides, this group of the participants included Turkish speakers and non-Turkish speakers and both types of migrants. On the other hand, the majority of the participants who used more than one method of modern contraception tended to have experienced unwanted pregnancy repeatedly - 4.6 times on average.

Although I tried to seek some tendencies among the participants and formulate some hypotheses, the tendencies found in this research cannot be generalised to any larger population. The purpose of the dissertation is not to present any statistically reliable and valid trends but to understand the context. Now, I shall delineate the social contexts in which the participants did not or could not continue practicing contraception consistently despite their desire to do so. Frequent discontinuities of contraceptive practice can be related to the relatively high fertility and repeated unwanted pregnancies among the modern contraceptive users. However, the factors which made them try one method after another vary.

Pro-natal Husband: "He wanted a child and I got a coil removed"

A few participants could not use a contraceptive until later years of marriage because of their husbands' objection. Generally, the participants and their husbands seemed to be in agreement with regards to the number of children they wanted to have. However, there were as many husbands who wanted more children than the participants did as the husbands who agreed with the participants. When a husband

disagrees with a participant, it becomes very clear who has the control over reproduction. Makbule's case illustrates this.

Makbule learned about contraception soon after marriage from a nurse who was visiting women in the neighbourhood. She had a baby girl a year after her marriage. She wanted to wait to have the second child until her daughter completes potty training. Two months after the childbirth, she went to the Maternity Hospital with her sister-in-law who lived together and had an IUD inserted without her husband's knowledge. In the evening, her husband asked where she went during the day. He got very angry for that she had the IUD inserted. Four months later, he told her that he wanted a male child. She went to the hospital and removed the IUD. She soon became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. She then had two more children although one daughter and one son were enough for her. She began using an IUD again after the fourth child. Her husband still wanted more children. She was replying to him that it was not the right time; the youngest child will go to school and then. Yet, she did not know what to do when he begins school.

Thanks to Allah, (but) it's enough. Enough, enough. My husband does not endure these difficulties. ... But it's me who suffer from the ordeal most. Putting to bed, feeding, drying, cleaning, all the responsibilities are left with us. Our husbands do nothing! ... I do not want (to remove the IUD). Even if my husband gets angry, I don't want.

Makbule however repeated at the same time that she could not do anything that her husband did not want (Case 93: Makbule, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Başkale).

In fact, the case of discontinuity because of the husband's objection was not very frequent because most participants did not initiate birth control without the husband's open or silent approval.¹³⁸ In village, women attempted to induce miscarriage by jumping off from a high place and taking abortive herbs. They used to make use of folk knowledge shared among women when they did not want more children. It was possible without the husband and in-laws' knowledge. In the neighbourhood, however, any action without their knowledge is very difficult because of women's confinement in the house, physical proximity with relative-neighbours, and strict patriarchal surveillance. Despite her diffident appearance, Makbule once managed to have an IUD without her husband's knowledge. She was illiterate but knew Turkish. She was a voluntary migrant. She was not sent to school due to her father's anxiety

¹³⁸ However, Şahin and Şahin (2003) interviewed 518 patients who visited the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the University Hospital in Van between 2000 and 2001 and reported that the disapproval of husbands and family leaders was the most frequent reason for not using contraceptives. In the current research, this was not the very frequent case for non-use, except for the very early years of reproductive career, because spacing births was widely supported in the neighbourhood.

in a new environment but she was brought up in the town of Edremit (a district of Van province) probably without insecurities and restrictions to the degree that many forced migrant women have experienced. She had been living with her husband's parents' and brothers' families. That is, she had a number of female relatives who could accompany her if she wanted to go out. In other words, she was relatively empowered among the participants. However, her attainment of IUD was easily denied by her husband's demand for a son.

Restrictions on Freedom of Movement: "You can't prevent it without going out"

For the participants who were under patriarchal surveillance and whose freedom of movement was considerably restricted, visiting a clinic when they needed was not a straightforward matter. In order to go out of the neighbourhood to see a nurse or a doctor in clinic, a participant had to take permission from her husband and maybe mother-in-law, find some excuse for outing such as her child's vaccination in case where someone asked her on the way where she was going, and ask one female relative-neighbour for accompanying her if her husband could not or did not come with her, which was frequent for many husbands' reluctance to take part in contraception. While she was waiting for the appropriate time to go to clinic, she could become pregnant again. Some participants have experienced that they only learned that they were already pregnant when they finally went to a clinic one day (Case 94).

Ceren married at the age of fifteen and soon had the first child before she could even think if she wanted a child or not. After the birth of the first child, she tried the pill and a three-month injectable. She gave up the pill for severe stomach aches. She became ill after she had the injection, too. She nevertheless did not intend to give up the injection since she was determined not to have another child for a while at all costs because of economic hardship; "It's enough for me if I don't bear a child. We pay rents. It's not good to have another child." Yet, she could not go to a *sağlık ocağı* at the end of the third month when she was supposed to have another injection and became pregnant. By the time, she and her husband had moved out of his parents' house. It was not easy for her to find someone who could accompany her (Later she gradually began going out with her small children. See Case 53). After the second birth, Ceren asked one of visiting nurses to go to a *sağlık ocağı* together to have an IUD. However, she only discovered there that she was already pregnant. She thought of abortion but she couldn't. She went to a *sağlık ocağı* within the forty-day

period¹³⁹ after birth this time and had an IUD inserted. Two unwanted pregnancies despite her struggles became traumatic for Ceren. She has been using the IUD for three years and suffers from bloated abdomen. A doctor told her to get it removed once, use another method for a while and have another inserted later since it became imbedded in the uterine wall. She refused the doctor's advice for fear that she would become pregnant again before she gets another IUD inserted.

I'm scared. ... [I: Can't your husband use condoms?] He says, 'Open it. I'll get protected.' I don't trust him. Oh! I'm scared so much that whatever he says ... It happened twice to me. I can't take the third. ... In the name of Qur'an, I tried everything. I tried a three-month injection. I tried a coil. I tried the pill. I tried, what was the name? They bring in small packets. I used that, too (condoms). ... I wanted an operation (sterilisation). When I gave birth to this child (the third), they didn't do it. ... They said, 'Your age is small. You can't stand both (of childbirth and the surgery). We do it (for those) above the age 30 or at least the age 25.' Allah tells me, 'Let it be, my daughter. Give birth' (Case 94: Ceren, age 21, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Tatvan).

Moving out of the father-in-law's house and being distanced from female relative-neighbours considerably restricted some participants' movement out of the house which was already restricted. Ceren managed to communicate and establish a good relationship with a visiting nurse for her fluent Turkish and sociable personality (Case 94). However, when other constraints such as the lack of knowledge of Turkish are added, the restriction could totally hinder a woman from accessing health service. İpek's case exemplifies this. İpek knew only Kurdish and did not talk about the details. Yet, her life history regarding childbearing and contraceptive usage indicates the circumstances in which she could not access contraceptives for a specific period of time when she lived alone with her husband and children (Case 95).

İpek had one miscarriage, two abortions and eight childbirths for her twenty-two year marriage life so far. The first child died at three months old. She has seven children now. She has always wanted to space births since the birth of the first living child and did not want to have any more children when she had two daughters and one son. She used a contraceptive, the pill, for the first time after two ill-timed pregnancies, one of which resulted in miscarriage. It was around the time when Özlem married in as her younger brother-in-law's wife. Özlem is the second bride in the household after İpek and the only woman who knows Turkish and literate in the household. Despite the use of the pill, İpek became pregnant after a year or so and gave birth to the third child. In the same year, her husband began a new job and they moved out of his father's house. Although İpek no longer wanted more children, she did not use any contraceptive in those days. She had one abortion and gave birth to three more children during her separation from in-laws. She and her husband thought

¹³⁹ The first forty days after childbirth is the term during which a couple customarily avoid sexual intercourse.

of the termination of the other pregnancies, too, yet did not have enough money for that. In the year when she gave birth to the sixth child, her husband was fired and they returned to his father's house. İpek began using the pill again but became pregnant again within a year or so. During the same period, Özlem was also using the pill (Case 95: İpek, age 37, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Pervari).

Özlem once mentioned that she and İpek always went to see a doctor together whenever they became ill or they wanted to ask about or get contraceptives. This probably explains why İpek did not (or could not) use contraceptives during the years of separation from in-laws regardless of her unwillingness for further children. Her husband used to work in another town during weekdays in those days. All of her children were still small. Their company also would not have helped because she did not know Turkish. Thus, she could not go to clinic for contraceptives when she was away from Özlem.

The bad relationship with the household members also could totally hinder a participant from accessing the public sphere and hence modern contraception. Esmanur used to be bullied by her brother-in-law (see Case 32). The other household members, his mother and wife, always sided with him and were hostile to her. They strictly restricted her from going out of the house except for fetching water from the water canal in the early days of marriage when she lived with them (Case 96).

Esmanur has heard about birth control before marriage. She wanted to use a contraceptive after the birth of the first child yet she had no chance to go out and attain it.

I wanted to take a break but traditions ... They (my mother-in-law and brother-in-law) didn't give permission. I couldn't go out anywhere. You can't prevent (pregnancy) without going out. I knew there was (a way to prevent pregnancy). But I didn't know (the methods) and couldn't go. Can you imagine? I couldn't go even to a neighbour. I couldn't go even to a shop. Because there was no permission. (Because of) Gossips ... I couldn't do research about it. When I went to my father's house, too, I couldn't find an opportunity. We used to come and go right away.

Esmanur tried different mixtures of herbs which were said to be abortive when she discovered that she was pregnant again. None of them worked. She gave birth to two more children one after another without using any contraceptive by the time when she and her husband moved out of her brother-in-law's house (Case 96: Esmanur, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

Recurrent Side Effects: They cause all kinds of illness, being a woman is very difficult

There were only a few participants who settled for a specific female modern method without suffering any side effects (two IUD users who have consistently used only one method as mentioned above). All of the users of injectables abandoned the method after the first or the second injection because of a number of discomforts such as irregular bleeding, bloating, and backache. Nine out of twelve participants who used IUD gave it up mainly because of pelvic infection. Four out of eleven participants who ever used the pill stopped taking it because of excess bleeding and stomach ache. Because of a series of health problems after trying a couple of female methods, some participants eventually decided to practice withdrawal for good (Case 97).

Özlem settled for *coitus interruptus* after she tried IUD, the pill, and an injectable. After the birth of the first child at the seventh month by a caesarean section, Özlem and her husband went to the Maternity Hospital for contraception. As the doctor recommended, they chose to use IUD. In the third year, she began feeling pains in her abdomen. She had pelvic infection and had the IUD removed at the hospital. They practiced withdrawal yet she became pregnant after a year. After the birth of the second child, she tried the pill. She had constant bleeding and gave it up. She tried an injectable but her back, legs and arms ached constantly. She abandoned it, too. She does not want her husband to use condoms not only because he once refused it but also because she heard that a man would have hernia by using them. She asked a visiting nurse for advice. The nurse recommended withdrawal to her. She got pregnant again before long but ended up with miscarriage. Since then, she has prevented pregnancy for four years. She considers that she and her husband are successful in withdrawal for their will power. She says, "If one doesn't want a child, then s/he can get her/himself protected very well, either a man or a woman. For both of us do not want, we prevent it well." Nevertheless, she seemed to be aware of the chance of pregnancy. She added, "But there is no other choice." She is considering "getting tubes tied" at the same time with childbirth if she conceives another child (Case 97: Özlem, age 28, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Edremit).

In fact, fifteen participants, that is, 60% of those who needed contraception (that is, those who did not want a child, were not pregnant, were not in menopause, and were sexually active), were still seeking a better method because of previous failures or discomforts or dislikes of the method which they used. Five participants were considering at the time of interviewing that they would have tubal ligation at the same time with childbirth if they fail contraception again like Özlem (Case 97). Two

participants actually applied for tubal ligation at hospital but rejected for the reason of their young age. One participant, Sibel, actually found a solution for controlling her reproduction at long last by sterilisation after the failures of two traditional and three modern methods and seven unwanted pregnancies (Case 98).

Sibel and her husband planned not to have another child until their first child becomes two years old. They practiced withdrawal and Sibel breastfed her daughter regularly. But, she became pregnant before long. They continued the same method and had five children, including one who died soon after birth, in five years; "I used to give birth one after another. Excuse me, but three months passed (after each birth) and I used to get pregnant. I used to breastfeed. I still get pregnant. When I learned (that I was pregnant), I used to wean." Her mother and the others from her family told Sibel to have a coil fitted; "Don't look at old people. People in this time bear two or three children. It's pity for your youth." She used an IUD for three or four years. She felt considerable discomfort whenever she had sexual intercourse after she had the IUD yet she did not want to remove it. The doctor, however, decided to remove her IUD after several examinations. Sibel had an injectable but became very ill. She did not have another. Her husband used condom once but she did not let him use it again since it caused discomfort to her. After a while, she became pregnant.

The coil causes troubles. It causes cancer and (other) diseases. It makes some people fat and some thin. Some people have bleeding. I don't know but they cause all kinds of illness. Being a woman is very difficult. It's not like men.

Sibel tried almost all methods available and had health problem every time. After the birth of the fifth child, Sibel and her husband returned to LAM and withdrawal. All the same, they had two more children. Sibel decided to have a tubal ligation.

When I was thinking to get the tubes tied after the sixth child became one and half years old, I got pregnant. I went to the Maternity (to get the tubes tied). The doctor said, 'You're pregnant.' ... It was one and half months. He (her husband) said, 'Get it removed.' I didn't. I can't take that sin. I used to be very sick. I was constantly in the hospital. It didn't turn upside down at the eighth month. I took medicine. I made a reservation. I had a caesarean. I got the tubes tied. I no longer give birth. It's enough! (Case 98: Sibel, age 36, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Van).

Failures: "I couldn't get how it happened"

Many participants experienced pregnancy when they were practicing birth control. More than half of the participants who practiced contraception became pregnant at least once during the practice (15 out of 27). Withdrawal was the most frequent method which resulted in unexpected pregnancy (11 out of 13 withdrawal practitioners). The second most frequent method was the pill (5 out of 11 users) and the third was injectables (3 out of 8 users). The pill needs to be taken every day and it is prone to be forgotten to take regularly. Likewise, one needs to have an injection regularly every month or every three months. The appointment for the next shot can

be missed or forgotten. Esmanur's case illustrates repeated unwanted pregnancies despite the usage of contraceptive pills and injectables (Case 99).

Esmanur had eight unwanted pregnancies and four of them resulted in abortion. Three of her unwanted pregnancies happened while she was taking pills.

Right after the separation (from my in-laws), I said (to a doctor) at the Maternity Hospital that I wanted to get protected and I didn't want a child. S/he prescribed me one medicine. I don't know if s/he wrote wrong medicine or I bought a wrong one. It was pills. I got pregnant soon, after a year. ... S/he (the doctor) said to begin it at the first day of the period. I started it at the first day of my period. I was taking it everyday until 21 drajes are finished. S/he said to take a break. So, I used to take a break.

Esmanur had abortion for this pregnancy and the next. And, she began using the pill again.

S/he (the doctor) gave me the pill. ... After one and half years, again, I got pregnant. I can't do it anymore. I don't have the money for curettage. What can I do? I said to myself that I'll give bith to this one. But, I constantly used herbal medicine. Constantly. Right after the birth of the daughter, I went to see a doctor, at the Maternity Hospital. Only two months have passed (since the birth). (I said that) I don't want a baby any more, I'm not in a good situation, my husband is not working, ... I want to use the pill. S/he prescribed the pill for me. I went right away and bought it from the pharmacy. I used them. Unfortunately, it didn't protect me. Again, I got pregnant when my little baby was three months old. I used it every evening. Besides, I got pregnant before I had my period again. I was crying day and night. I was distressed. I was using herbal medicine. Who says whatever, I still use it. I didn't know what to do anymore.

None of the abortive herbs worked and Esmanur gave birth to the child. She was prescribed the pill again at the hospital. She bought it from the pharmacy but she could not trust it any longer and went to a *sağlık ocağı* where one nurse whom she knows worked.

I couldn't trust it (the pill). I went to hospital. There was a *sağlık ocağı* nearby the State Hospital. There was a nurse I'm acquainted with. I saw her. She said to me to use an injection every month. I took the prescription of that injection to, you know, there was my private doctor (the doctor who operated her abortions at his private clinic). I showed him. He said, 'My daughter, these are very dangerous. It causes headache. It causes backache.' ... I still used those injections. I used them for six months. I couldn't get what happened. I don't know if one day passed or not. I don't know if I didn't use an injection that month. I couldn't understand how it happened. Again I got pregnant (Case 99: Esmanur, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Gevaş).

There was one participant, Selma (age 28, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Muradiye), who was prescribed the pill at a *sağlık ocağı* but not instructed how to take it. She knew Turkish but was illiterate. She could not read the written instruction in the package. She was thus taking pills irregularly (probably only after sexual intercourses) and became pregnant. The case of the prescription of oral

contraceptives without instruction was not frequent among the participants. However, Selma's case may suggest unsystematic family planning service.

7.4. Changing Attitude towards Reproduction

The participants' desires and attempts for taking care of fewer children better and controlling reproduction for that challenge the view which relates their relatively high fertility to the ignorance of modern contraception or 'traditional' fatalistic attitudes towards reproduction. There were indeed some participants who wanted as many as four or more children if they were better off. In the context of volatile economy and the absence of reliable social security, siblings continue to be the best and only safety net that parents can provide for their children as well as for themselves. It is also true that children continue to occupy a central importance to the participants' life. Not only are they "the merriness of a house" but also provide them with a purpose of life as the mother and determine their well-being in the household as the bride/wife/reproducer. A number of participants mentioned that a life without one's children was meaningless and insecure (Case 100).

Fatmagül had three miscarriages and had no children. She married second time and became the second wife of the man with whom she fell in love sixteen years ago. She went through very difficult times with the first wife (Elif) and bitter quarrels with her husband over the furnishings and a flat that he promised to her before marriage. All those troubles no longer matter to her; "What do I do with furnishings if I don't have a child?" Now she wants only a child desperately. She had a surgery with the uterus and has seen different doctors both of modern and folk medicines. She constantly knits lacework and sweaters like many other women in her age. Yet other women sympathetically say what all they are for if she does not have a child. "I don't want many. One is enough. I want just one very much. For an end (*sonu için*). May Allah preserve, but if something happens to my husband, my child would take care of me", says Fatmagül. Indeed, after her husband's death, Fatmagül's status in the household would become ambiguous without a child from him. Indeed, at the first marriage she was sent back to her father's house after the husband's sudden death because she did not have 'his' child and became no one to them (Case 100: Fatmagül, age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere).

However, economic hardship after migration and a near disappearance of economic context that necessitates child labour have considerably reduced the advantage of having many children. The participants in their forties or above mentioned

unanimously that their husbands or fathers-in-law used to demand as many children as possible in order to have them work in the field and pasture. They gave the same reason to child marriage as well. A child bride is not able to fulfil a reproductive role at first but can carry woods and milk cows. In the city of Van, child labour is not unusual in small shops and streets yet children do not usually earn enough to contribute to a household budget significantly unlike in other cities such as Istanbul and Adana (Akşit *et al.* 2001). One participant mentioned in a disapproving manner that the mothers who send their children to streets did so not for money but for getting rid of them from a crowded small house. In fact, none of the children of the participants was working.

It must be noted however that women might have always desired to have a control over their reproductive bodies even in the powerful patriarchal pro-natal rural culture¹⁴⁰ which hardly had contact with the Turkish-speaking urban reproductive culture.¹⁴¹ Even in remote villages where the traditionally patriarchal agricultural structure which confines women categorically into a sole instrumental role as the labour-reproducer persists, women may not have simply let men control their reproductive bodies and ‘natural’ fertility prosper. Many participants’ accounts show that mothers often challenged their husbands who were marrying off their little daughters (See Cases 12, 13). Even those women who had no access to modern contraceptives for a long time until migration were attempting to control their reproduction, though by rather rough methods, when they had difficulty in dealing with both taking care of a number of small children and other works or they suffered from ill health.

¹⁴⁰ For example, Ayfer (age 26, forced migrant from Çatak) was forcibly married off at the very small age. She thus did not have a child for four years after marriage and had the second child seven years after the birth of the first child. Her father-in-law often jeered in front of others; “Even if a child comes out of my butt, a child won’t come out of my bride’s butt.” He also used to harass her when she was taking a rest while weaving a *kilim* by reminding her that she did not have a son; “You take a rest as if you have given birth to a son already.” Older women unanimously say that a fecund woman used to be praised by people and a barren woman sometimes suffered from humiliation. Now they cynically say however that fecundity does not help promoting her social status; “she is a woman after all.”

¹⁴¹ In her comparative study of contraceptive usage between settlement areas, Olson-Prather (1976) observes that metropolitan and rural women differed from each other less by their desires and attitudes towards reproduction and contraception than by the opportunity structure they live in.

Now, most participants not only want to have smaller family than the family in which they were brought up but also they are willing to practice contraception. Some participants consider that it is a sin not to be able to look after children properly and have them educated rather than to practice birth control and interfere with the command of Allah (See Cases 68, 71, 72, 75). Today, it seems that a religious discourse is being transformed into one that supports birth control along with the changes in socio-economic contexts in which they live.

The participants' changing attitude towards reproduction can be inferred from a comparison with rural women in the same region. Ayfer Türkmen (Boyaciolu and Türkmen 2008) conducted interviews with 32 married women regarding family planning, pregnancy, and childbirth in a village of Bahçesaray district, Van, in 2002. The rural women whom Türkmen interviewed seem to have knowledge of contraception yet 45% of them never practiced it although the majority of them had more children than they desired. As accounted above, 68% of the participants whom I interviewed in Doluca neighbourhood practiced contraception and 58% of them used modern methods. Whilst Türkmen says that the women she interviewed tend to attach material values to children and particularly value male children for manpower and the continuation of lineage, most participants of the current research expressed a mixture of psychological and material values of children such as a purpose of life, mutual assistance among siblings, and old age security. They also stressed psychological and material drains by having many children. The participants very often emphasised their love, desire, and values of female children earnestly on one hand; they admitted the "need" of male children in order to prevent their property from being handed down to their husbands' brothers and provide with their daughters the brothers whom they can rely on at a time of crisis in their marriage on the other. This indicates the endurance of political-economic basis of patriarchy which reproduces women's dependency on men in spite of their earnest objection against gender discrimination.

However, in comparison to the rural women in the country, much fewer women in Doluca neighbourhood might be practicing birth control persistently. For instance,

42.5% of the participants were practicing birth control at the time of interviewing while it was 68.9% for the rural women in the country in 2008 (HUIPS 2009: 15). Twenty-five percent of the former were using modern contraceptives as opposed to 40.3% for the latter. The participants desired 3 and had 4.5 children on average while the latter's ideal number of children and TFR were both 2.7 (HUIPS 2004: 104, 6). Whereas there was almost no disparity between the rates of wanted fertility (2.6) and total fertility (2.7) for the rural women in the country (HUIPS 2009: 106), the participants had approximately 2.7 unwanted pregnancies (both ill-timed and never-wanted pregnancies) on average by the time of interviewing.¹⁴²

Meanwhile, some studies in rural-urban migrant neighbourhoods in Istanbul (Save *et al.* 2004, Ay *et al.* 2007) and Manisa (Dinç *et al.* 2007) reveal a number of similarities between those rural-urban migrants in the western parts of the country and the participants in Doluca neighbourhood. In recent years, the high rate of practicing withdrawal and relatively lower rate of modern contraceptive usage despite their widespread knowledge in Turkey are a major concern of public health specialists. A number of studies have been conducted about attitudes towards family planning especially in urban squatter areas where the people with lower income, lower level of education, and rural origin and assumed to be resistant against contraception reside. Both migrant women of the western cities and Doluca neighbourhood have good knowledge of traditional and modern contraceptives, desire for spacing and limiting births, approve birth control, appear to have access to health service and contraceptives at low costs. Their health concerns tend to overweigh usage or they tend to quit a contraceptive because of side effects without finding alternative method other than withdrawal. Consequently, both women tend to have more unwanted pregnancies and higher fertility than the other socioeconomically and educationally more advantaged urban women. Nonetheless, the fertility of migrant women in the West seems to be considerably lower than that

¹⁴² According to TDHS-2003, the gap between the total wanted fertility rate and the TFR is the largest among the women in the Eastern region (HUIPS 2004:106). A study conducted in the Southeast Anatolian Project Region (Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak) from 2001 to 2002 reports that the numbers of pregnancy and children are as twice as the ideal number of children in the region (Ozceirpici *et al.* 2005).

in the East. For example, for the squatter women in Manisa, the desired number of children was 1.5, 62% were practicing birth control, and their TFR was 2.4 in 1999 (Dinç *et al.* 2007).

7.5. Patriarchy at All Levels

Every participant's account of her reproductive history reveals that there were a variety of multiple factors that prevented her from exercising control over her reproduction at different times in the course of life. Nevertheless, after a close reading of the participants' accounts, recurrent factors emerged as shown above and they can be categorised, for analytical convenience, into three different levels of patriarchy: familial, communal, and state levels.

Patriarchy at the Familial Level

First of all, it was the father, not a woman, who had the last word about her marriage in most cases. Many participants were customarily deprived of one of the fundamental reproductive rights - the right to choose with whom one has a child and form a family - often by means of a violence of coerced early marriage. As illustrated in the previous chapter, a number of participants were either forcibly married off for the sake of fraternity or married without knowing if they wanted to marry and have a family when they were still in early teens. Ceren consented to her marriage, which her grandfather arranged for his friendship, because she was scared that the serious fight was about to break out between her parents if she did not (See Case 13). She was only fifteen years old then. Müjde agreed to her marriage after days of direct and indirect pressures from her parents and future parents-in-law (See Case 16). Yet she even did not know that her wedding was also going to be carried out on the day of her brother's wedding and tried to join a group which was going to fetch her brother's bride. She was still thirteen years old then. Müjde mentioned once that although she loves her husband now, she feels that she missed something important; she wanted to *decide* whom she marries. Early, and patrilocal, marriage exposes women to childbearing early and defencelessly. Many participants thus became pregnant and gave birth to a child before they became aware of their own

reproductive capacity. The lack of awareness of their own reproductive, and other, capacities means considerable defencelessness and results in not only unexpected pregnancies but also the near total control of their labour, body, and existence by others;

One comes to her senses at least at twenty or twenty-two. ...When she's a child, she is under the impression that this is this and that is that in the world. But it's not like that (See Case 12).

Secondly, it is the husband who has the last word about birth control on the one hand; it is the wife who uses a contraceptive in many cases on the other. Many participants have been denied their right to decide if and when they have a child yet very often were obliged to shoulder the responsibility of birth control on their own. All of the participants used or did not use contraceptives with their husbands' approval or disapproval. They also often used or did not use certain contraceptive methods with their husbands' approval or disapproval. The practice of contraception is initiated by the participants rather than the husbands in most cases yet when the latter disagreed, they failed to use a contraceptive except for secret rough attempts for 'miscarriage.' However, when the husbands wanted to limit the number of children and the participants did not, birth control was nevertheless practiced always and successfully even if it was by a female method.

In general, even those who married in young ages and were unaware of their reproductive capacity began seeking a way to take control over their body after the first childbearing usually by attempting to obtain a contraceptive device from health service. However, it is not a straightforward matter for many participants to apply to health service for contraception. They had to find a way to go to clinic under patriarchal surveillance and between domestic responsibilities if they wanted to space or limit births. It was more difficult for some participants to go out to the public sphere, such as those who did not have female relatives who lived together or next door, than others. Some hesitated or were considering for a while if they used a female biomedical method because of side effects and troubles that they heard, and then became pregnant again. Some took courage to use one, yet only found out that they were already pregnant or, in case of IUD, had to wait until lesions in genital

tracts or pelvic infection were healed. They became pregnant again before they were treated and went back to a clinic. Others managed to have an IUD inserted, have an injectable, or get the pill prescribed. But, some missed an injection or forgot to take pills regularly. After a short while some gave up taking pills or another injection or had the IUD removed because of increased or irregular menstrual bleeding, stomach ache (in case of the pill), pelvic infection (in case of IUD), or other discomforts such as backache and bloating (in case of injectables). They often became pregnant before visiting a clinic again and using another method.

Indeed, “being a woman is very difficult” as Sibel said (See Case 98). However, in all cases where a participant was anxious about using hormonal contraceptives or scared of inserting an IUD, she had health problems and could not use the method which she preferred, and she had to or wanted to give up the method which she was using because of the health problem caused by it, her husband could use condoms. Yet, in reality, many husbands refused to use condoms even when they did not want more children. For example, there were at least five husbands who clearly rejected the participants’ requests for using condoms (Case 101).

When Müjde finally went to hospital for the IUD after three unexpected and unwanted pregnancies, she was said that she had lesions (probably in the genital tracts) and she should come back after she finished a packet of medicine that she was prescribed. So, Müjde handed her husband condoms which her second mother-in-law got from a clinic.

I said to my husband, ‘Look, my dear, I don’t want to bear a child. You also do not want. Our children are still small. You do nothing. Use these (condoms) at least. He said to me, ‘If you don’t take it away out of my sights, I’ll make you eat it.’ I threw it in a stove right away. He didn’t want. He said, ‘Are you joking with me?!’ He also doesn’t want a child though. It was hard for him. ... He said, ‘You do (use a contraceptive)!’

Müjde became pregnant before she finished the medicine. After the birth of the fourth child, she used an injectable and an IUD. She had the injection only once because of constant bleeding. She used the IUD for four years. But, she had pains in abdomen and was obliged to have it removed. Since then, she has not had her period for nearly four years and continues to suffer from backache and bloating of abdomen and sometimes swelling of hands and legs. She is angry with her husband because he did almost nothing for contraception despite that he also did not want to have more than two children because of economic hardship.

I removed the coil. I don’t get pregnant since then. I suffer from sickness this much! ... There is a thing, a balloon (condom). And then, sometimes men (do withdrawals), who love their wives very much. My husband! He says, ‘You use

a coil. You take pills.’ ... But if my husband wants, he can. If he wants, he can protect himself.

Some time after the interviews with her, Müjde began going to the hospital for her amenorrhoea. Actually, she was very anxious whether she was able to prevent pregnancy when she recovers. Yet she wanted to have regular periods, her womb to be cleansed every month, and be healthy more than everything else. Her husband ridiculed her, ‘What happened? Or do you want a baby, Müjde Hanım? You go and give birth to a baby! No, no. You stay like this. Don’t be treated. You don’t get pregnant then’ (Case 101: Müjde, age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

Many of the husbands wanted a limited number of children or considered that births should be spaced. However, they tended to avoid involving in contraception despite the facts that almost all affairs which require an entrance into public spaces and contacts with strangers are carried out by men and the most and only prevalent modern male contraceptive, male condom, has no side effects and causes almost no health problems except for possible allergic reactions to latex. For instance, Ayşe (age 51, non-Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) regreted her use of the injectable because of the discomforts that she believes it continues to give her for many years even after she gave it up. She accused her husband that he could go and do research about contraceptives instead of her who did not know Turkish and find a better method if he wanted. Berivan (age 26, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Uludere) was also acidulous against her husband;

They (men) don’t give birth. They don’t get pregnant. They don’t suffer that torture. They don’t look after children. My husband is just like a guest. Of course, they are working. But, does he suffer from the troubles of children? Does he clean them? Does he do cares? Of course, it is a woman who gets pregnant and lives with torments until giving birth. Once given birth, he goes to Istanbul. He even doesn’t know how I live on, how children are ... One has to think that. They (men) don’t know. I assure, even if my baby cries till morning, he doesn’t even touch a cradle. ‘It’s pity for you, you didn’t sleep till morning’, he doesn’t think that way. If only he has got my reason. So, I got to think.

When I was trying to understand why Berfin (age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere) has not been able to limit her births regardless of her knowledge of and efforts for contraception over a decade, her oldest daughter reminded me that asymmetrical sexual division of labour is integral part of reproduction;

In fact, we women have a thing, one problem. We deal with a problem of whether we want or do not want a child. I mean, we don't expect anything from the opposite side (men). For example, your husband also can protect himself, can't he? Why do women get protected? To me, men also need to become understanding a bit.

It seems that many husbands generally want to and do control reproduction after having a couple of children and facing economic hardship. But, they are so alienated from its practice that they often leave all actual bodily works of contraception to their wives and make them take all the responsibilities for it. For example, Güllü (age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak) said, "My husband want neither a child nor to get protected. He's a kind of a person who considers only about himself all the time." He told her to have the forth child aborted. Beygul's (age 29, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) husband also neither practiced withdrawal nor used condoms but told her to have abortion when she told him that she became pregnant; "I don't want a child. Go and get it removed." It is noteworthy that there were no husbands who were against contraception and abortion for religious reasons. All of the participants who were ever demanded abortion by their husbands refused it by saying that the sin would belong to them, not their husbands ("*gunah bende, ona değil*").

Here is Esmanur's eventful and painful history of reproduction (Case 102). Her story demonstrates a woman's lone struggle for birth control despite a number of deprivations of the resources for accessing public spaces as a woman and the husband's alienation from conception and contraception.

Esmanur had one miscarriage, 4 abortions and 5 childbirths for her sixteen-year marriage life. She tried the pill, IUD, injectables, withdrawal, and condoms. Nevertheless, she had 9 unwanted pregnancies. Every time, she took abortive herbs again and again. They did not work at all but damaged her stomach. When she found out her third unwanted pregnancy, she pleaded her husband for the money for abortion. She first went to a state hospital but they did not accept since her pregnancy had already entered the ninth week. She took her husband to the hospital and tried to persuade the doctor but it did not help. She thus went to a private clinic and had abortion. Doctors, her mother and others told her that she would no longer be able to have a child after curettage. She took it literally or she understood that way. Hence, she was shocked and distressed when she learned that she became pregnant again in the following month. Although she was determined to abort again, she could not tell her husband for a while; "Our living condition wasn't good. I

couldn't ask for money again and again." Eventually, she told him and first went to the state-run Maternity Hospital yet was refused a surgery for the reason that her uterus had not recovered from the previous abortion. She helplessly went to a private clinic again. Although she was taking the pills, she became pregnant and gave birth to two more children because she could not find money to have abortions. Her husband accused her badly, "Why didn't you get protected? Why did you do this? Go and get the coil fitted." After the birth of the last child, she was going to have a tubal ligation but refused by the doctor for the reason that she was still young. She had two more abortions in the same year. Her husband was very furious with her at her fourth abortion and sent her back to her father's house;

Go to your father's house! I don't want you. I struggle this hard. I work this hard. I cut expenses for myself. I cut expenses for my kids. I cut expenses for home. Do you give all to abortions?! Pity me a bit.

She considers his accusation is unfair yet has endured his fury and insults to save the marriage and keep children;

He didn't think (that I didn't have those children alone). He values money very much. It was very bad because there was no money. I sometimes acknowledge him to be right. He says, 'It's as if I collect money with a broom!' But he didn't pity me; this woman has had curettage for four times; she couldn't buy even medicine. He didn't think thus. I had to bear this. What can I do? ... But still, because I love him and for my children, I endure this.

After the fourth abortion, she had an IUD inserted. But she became very ill; her hands, legs and abdomen got swollen. When she went to a check-up, she was said to remove the IUD because she developed pelvic infection. She refused; "I only want that I do not get pregnant. I accept every sickness." She took medicine for the infection and got a little better. She endured for three years yet could not bear it further;

I stayed with the coil in that bad state. After three years, I did not have strength to stand any more. Very very excuse me, but when I entered relations with my husband, I used to cry. I didn't show him. I never showed him. In order for that he wouldn't go outside (to a brothel house). But he still used to go. ... I went and had the coil removed.

She again returned to monthly injectables; "Of course I knew that they were unhealthy. But I had to. Not to become pregnant. Whoever said whatever, I still used it." She gave up injectables after half a year and persuaded her husband to use condoms. She however could not trust them and began using the pill again until the day when her husband was jailed two years later (Case 102: Esmanur, age 31, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant Gevaş).

Esmanur's case is illustrative of three things here. First, she struggled to attain contraception by all means and tried all of the methods available. Nonetheless, it resulted in another pregnancy every time for different reasons. She shed tears and became distressed every time. She had abortions with enormous agonies. She endured side effects of the contraceptives which she used and consequent ill health, too. When she had been struggling with all these in order to space and limit births for a decade, her husband has been little involved in the matter. All he did were to give her money for abortions and to use condoms and withdrawal occasionally in later

years. Second, Esmanur's husband conveniently forgot his role in reproduction and accused her for the failures to prevent pregnancies. He even punished and humiliated her by sending her back to her father's house as if it were all her responsibility. Third, Esmanur accepted the accusation in order not to be divorced and separated from her children although she considered that it was not fair. While her right to decide if, when, and how to prevent pregnancy could be easily denied (See Case 96), the responsibilities for conceiving or not conceiving and its consequences were all solely put on her shoulders.

The importance of the role of husbands in birth control may become clearer by an examination of the cases of successful contraception. One thing common among the participants who successfully prevented pregnancy was the husband's desire for no more children and active involvement in birth control. Once the husband took part in contraception actively, it tended to be successfully practiced even when a participant herself did not think of limiting births. Related cases are as follows (Cases 103, 104, 105);

Leyla was born in the neighbourhood but had hardly been to the city centre. She has been to the downtown only once or twice during her eight-year marriage. She was illiterate and not very confident in speaking Turkish, either. She conceived her second child when the first child was ten months old. She did not expect that she could become pregnant that soon and hence did not take any contraceptive although she was not considering about the next child until the first child begins school. After the birth of the second child, she told her husband that she wanted to use the pill or injectables. He went to a *sağlık ocağı* and asked about contraception. He considered that the pill and injectables were harmful for his wife and their suckling baby and decided to use condoms. Leyla was about to give birth to the third child in the summer when their second child was going to begin the first grade. If her husband did not take part in contraception, it was probably very difficult for her to control her reproduction by herself (Case 103: Leyla, age 23, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak).

Hüsniye considered that birth control was sin. Yet, her husband persuaded her to take contraceptive pills because of her ill health resulted from repeated miscarriages. She had four miscarriages and lost two babies soon after birth by then. "I don't take any pill without my husband's permission!," said Hüsniye. He took her to a state hospital and asked a doctor for the pill. The doctor did not see her healthy enough to use it. So, they acquired it from a private clinic. But she had heavy bleeding after taking it and gave it up. She became pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl. She again conceived another child three years later but it died just before the term. When she had a caesarean section in order to remove the lifeless foetus, the doctor, who

spoke Kurdish, asked her and her husband if they no longer wanted a child. She had a tubal ligation then (Case 104: Hüsniye, age 38, non-Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Uludere).

Hanım wanted seven children. She therefore gave birth to her four children year after year although she knew about contraceptives even before she was married. After the birth of the fourth child, her husband told her that he did not want children any more and she should get an IUD fitted. She went to a *sağlık ocağı*. A nurse also recommended her IUD for the reason that injectables cause diseases and the pill can cause cancer.¹⁴³ She has been preventing pregnancy successfully since then for two years. When I said and tried to stir up, “But you want seven children”, Hanım laughed at me, “I’ll remove it when my husband wants. If he doesn’t want, how do I have a child?” (Case 105: Hanım, age 27, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak).

The cases above indicate that men can control reproduction despite their wives who labour children; women cannot control reproduction despite their husbands. A patriarchal organisation of reproduction prevails in the cases of successful birth control, too.

In their valuable examination of conjugal negotiations regarding birth control in an Istanbul neighbourhood, Zeynep Angin and Shorter (1998) question the thesis that relates the high usage of male method in Turkey with male domination in reproduction. They maintain that even in cases where the husband uses condoms, the wife’s persuasion is often influential. I agree that conjugal negotiation is an important aspect of reproduction and the perspective is valuable in order to look into the dynamism of reproduction. Nonetheless, I argue that although both the husband and the wife exercise power over birth control and reproduction, it should not be hurried to conclude that they influence mutually in a symmetrical manner. It must not be forgotten that it is much harder for the wife to have or not to have a child *despite the husband* even though it is her who gives birth while the reverse is not unusual as the current study shows. It may be the case that the Istanbul women manage birth control not despite the husband but because of the husband.

¹⁴³ A study conducted in Umraniye, Istanbul, a decade ago reports that health professionals tend to emphasise health risks and not recommend oral contraceptives as the first choice of contraception (Karavus *et al.* 2004).

Patriarchy at the Communal Level

One might ask why Doluca women cannot use contraceptives despite the husband when there are female methods which allow a woman to prevent pregnancy without depending on her husband. However, in the neighbourhood, the communal level patriarchy considerably restricts the sphere of women's autonomous movement without the interference of familial patriarchy. A study conducted by Emelie Olson-Prather thirty years ago may help understanding their difficulties in accessing contraceptives and controlling their reproduction.

By analysing the 1968 national survey in Turkey, Olson-Prather (1976) attempted to challenge a thesis of the higher usage of modern contraceptives among more egalitarian communicative 'modern' couples who are in agreement about contraceptive usage. According to her analysis, in case of Turkey, the concurrence of an idea about contraceptive usage was less relevant in metropolitan couples while it was significant in the contraceptive usage of couples in small towns and even more so for rural couples. In metropolitan areas, the couple's agreement about contraceptive use has positive influence on the actual usage as rural couples. Yet, half of metropolitan women still use contraceptives in spite of the husband's disapproval while it is the case for only 5% of rural women. On the other hand, Olson-Prather observed that the husband's desire for limiting births and tacit support for modern contraceptives is essential for rural women even to use female methods. Since those devices are not widely available in rural areas and women do not travel without a male companion customarily, either the husband needs to go to the city or he must accompany the wife to acquire a contraceptive to the city. However, because of the relative accessibility of contraceptives, metropolitan women can exploit the social segregation of the sexes which is persistent in all segments of the people in Turkey and benefit from the support of other women in order to attain a contraceptive without an interference of the husband; "in fact, both discussion and companionship between the spouses may actually limit the woman's freedom, since she is accustomed to exploiting the separateness of male and female spheres" (Olson-Prather 1976: 385).

Like the metropolitan cities, contraceptive means appears easily accessible in the city of Van. It takes only a fifteen-minute travel by bus at most from the Doluca neighbourhood to go to a number of public and private hospitals, clinics (including the AÇSAP centre), and pharmacies. The Maternity Hospital, which Doluca women often visit, is even closer to the neighbourhood. However, it seems hardly possible for the participants to continue to use even a female method while the husbands disapprove (See Case 93). As described above, it is considerably difficult for them to go out of the neighbourhood without their husbands' knowledge probably not because of intimate communication and companionship between spouses but because of the communal patriarchal surveillance.

The participants often made opposing remarks. They said that they were determined to practice birth control whatever their husbands would say on one hand; they mentioned that they could not do anything that their husbands do not want on the other. They believe that they should be able to decide if they use a contraceptive or not or the husband should be more cooperative because it is them who labour and nurture children and it appears that all the other better-off women seem to be doing so. However, they are well aware of the difficulty at the same time. The dilemma derives from their experience. They have learned the difficulties of defiance by the time through witnessing or experiencing the consequences of transgressions: gossips, swearing, beating, a tacit or open threat to divorce or bring the second wife.

The network of surveillance to control the woman's movement is so far-reaching thanks to extensive tribal relations that it seems almost impossible for her to go anywhere behind her husband and in-laws. She cannot go out of the neighbourhood and visits a clinic without suffering from people's interrogation and gossips. In order to avoid unpleasant accusations and protect her virtue and hence her husband's honour, she needs to make sure that she gets her husband's permission and arranges someone to accompany her. The communal surveillance not only effectively restricts the woman's movement by dishonouring her who goes out without a companion and informing her whereabouts to her husband and in-laws; at the same time it discourages the formation of the woman's autonomous network by limiting her daily

contacts within a tight-knit small group of relative-neighbours who are usually on the husband's side in the patrilocal residential arrangement.

Many participants were thus often obliged to postpone the hospital visit until she acquires her husband's permission for contraception, her in-laws' permission for going out, and her relative-neighbour's acceptance for accompanying her and also she finds another 'legitimate' reason to go out, such as her child's vaccination, as a precaution for elderly neighbours' interrogations. Some became pregnant meanwhile. Therefore, the husband's active support for her visit to a clinic or/and his use of a contraceptive even for a short time of the blank period is essential to avoid unwanted pregnancies.

Patriarchy at the State Level

Sometimes, the state level patriarchy prevented the participants' effective use of contraception. The participants' accounts suggest that nurses used to visit women in the neighbourhood frequently and inform them about contraception actively around the end of the 1990s. The participants and many other women seemed to have been benefited directly or indirectly from the nurses' compassionate family planning service. The relatively extensive knowledge of types of the contraception among the participants shows the effectiveness of the service. However, the nurses' visits suddenly ceased in the very beginning of the 2000s except for occasional short visits for tetanus vaccinations. It coincides with the time of the beginning of overall cutback of family planning service in the country as mentioned in Chapter Three. In his research of family planning services in *sağlık ocağıs* in the province of Van, Dr. Tuğrul Erbaydar, a lecturer in the Department of Public Health, Yüzüncü Yıl University, observed a gradual retreat of family planning service in *sağlık ocağıs* and a tendency towards a centralisation of the service at the AÇSAP Centre located in the city centre approximately after 2001 (personal communication; Karahan *et al.* 2007). He accounts that during a short period before 2001 it was not unusual that even *sağlık ocağıs* in small towns and villages were equipped with a separate private room for family planning counselling. Yet, after 2001 family planning retreated to the less

prioritised task in *sağlık ocağıs* and some types of contraceptive were not often found in many clinics.

The participants say that now they go and see a nurse in a clinic, if they can. Yet, there was no *sağlık ocağı* in the neighbourhood until the spring of 2008. It is not difficult to imagine the degree that Doluca women, who cannot go out as they wish, benefited from visiting nurses. The scheme for improving family planning service, however, was short-lived. Now it appears to become less standardised and depends more on goodwill of the health personnel. Thus, low-income Kurdish speaking migrant women like those from Doluca neighbourhood are often subjected to mistreatment, a nurse's poor knowledge laden with patriarchal bias, and health personnel's ethnic bias. Almost all participants who ever had childbirth in the hospital had the experience of verbal and physical abuses by some nurses and midwives while they fairly added that there were kind ones, too. Berfin's daughter who attended her mother's difficult latest birth and complained about some nurses' disrespect said bitterly, "They do that especially to Kurds. Because some don't know Turkish and don't understand what they say ..."

I personally witnessed a nurse's disrespect towards a patient when I went to a *sağlık ocağı* with Yasemin (age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) who was suffering abdominal pains for a couple of days.¹⁴⁴ The doctor prescribed an analgesic injection for her and we went to the nurse's room. A nurse asked Yasemin bluntly, "Which injection? (*Hangi iğne?*)" Yasemin could not tell the name of injection and got flustered. She tried to explain her problem hoping that the nurse

¹⁴⁴ Actually Yasemin was planning to go to the Maternity Hospital. She planned to go with her brothers-in-law's wives who live with her mother in another block. They however had already left for the hospital before she went to them. She was troubled: she could not go to the hospital by herself; her mother was looking after small children whom her brides left with her; she could not go to even a *sağlık ocağı*, which newly opened in the neighbourhood and was just a few metres away from her house, with her very active two-year old son, whom she hesitated to leave with her mother who was already busy with her other grandchildren. I told her not to postpone and suggested that I would watch over her son while she sees a doctor. We decided to go to the *sağlık ocağı* together. Yasemin said to the doctor that she missed her periods for two months. The doctor suspected irregular menstruation. He prescribed an analgesic injection yet told her to have some tests at a larger hospital if the pain persists. Many women tend to postpone going to see a doctor, either for illness or for contraception, because they always had various obstacles to go out even to a clinic.

would find out what injection she needed. I intervened and told the nurse that the doctor wrote a prescription; she would know better if she reads it. Yasemin handed her prescription to the nurse. The nurse looked at the prescription and said, “Why don’t you say so! (*Öyle desene!*)” Yasemin murmured, “I couldn’t know ...” She asked the nurse whether and how she lied on the bed. The nurse told her off, “Lie however you want! I’m gonna give a shot on the hip (*Nasıl yatarsan yat! Kalçaya vuracam*).”

For another example, when Müjde (age 26, Turkish speaker, voluntary migrant from Çatak) attempted to regain her reproductive power and health after her four-year long suffering from abdominal bloating, backache, and amenorrhea (see Case 64), the doctor was not supportive. After medical examinations, it was found out that a piece of the IUD was left imbedded in her uterine wall and it was causing pain and inflammation. She had a surgery to remove it yet her period did not come back. When she went back to the hospital for a check-up, the doctor told her, ‘How nice you wouldn’t get pregnant if you don’t have periods. What else do you want?’ Müjde demanded her that she wanted to have regular periods because she was still young; this shouldn’t be normal. But the doctor ridiculed her, ‘Do I make you a young girl again?!’

The disrespect of the nurse and the doctor to Yasemin and Müjde, I consider, derives from their socioeconomic status and also gender. They might not have made those disrespectful remarks if Yasemin and Müjde were men. If Müjde were a man, her reproductive health and rights would not be disregarded with ridicules by the doctor. Esra could obtain a contraceptive if her husband asked for it instead of her (see Case 85). Özlem’s husband accompanied her to the hospital once when she had an IUD inserted for fear that “they (health personnel) might cause a problem without the husband (*kocası olmayınca sorun çıkartabilirler diye*).” Thus, a woman’s dependency on her husband in reproductive control is systematically enforced by the state level patriarchy, too.

When it comes to contraception, as mentioned above, some nurses¹⁴⁵ seemed to be not well trained about both the medical knowledge with regards to contraceptives and women's reproductive rights. It allows arbitrary advices and patriarchal and ethnic biases to prevail in medical practice. As mentioned above, Esra (age 18, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) was refused to use a contraceptive without her husband's permission because of her non-experience of childbearing and the risk of infertility (see Case 85). In order to understand the prevalence of the practice, I talked with the nurse who gave Yasemin an injection. She had worked in another district in Van for eight months before she was appointed to the new *sağlık ocağı* in the neighbourhood. She answered my questions kindly and politely. She replied, "Yes, we don't give contraceptives to those who have not given birth. The pill can cause infertility. IUD cannot be inserted to anyone who experienced no birth." She added, "They have many children. They are ignorant. They don't know things. And, we have a language problem, too (*Çok çocuk yapıyorlar. İnsanlar cahiller, bilmiyorlar. Birde dil sorunu yaşıyoruz.*)" I heard similar phrases with a hint of discrimination from a couple of doctors who worked in Van.

An institutional choice of recommendation of contraceptives also reflects patriarchal bias at the state level. The nurse mentioned above stated that IUD, combined pills, and male condom were the methods that they usually recommended. Injectables were also given at *sağlık ocağıs*. Contraceptive implant and tubal ligation were available only at large hospitals. Female condom and diaphragm were available in pharmacies but not in *sağlık ocağıs* (According to Dr. Erbaydar, they were no longer stocked in pharmacies in Van in those days). She did not know about emergency pills.¹⁴⁶ The nurse's account corresponds to the contraceptives that the participants generally knew. Whilst all of the participants knew about IUD, the pill, injectables, tubal

¹⁴⁵ According to the participants' observation, especially those who were young and single tended to make remarks that disregard the reproductive rights of patients; "They don't know. They haven't given birth to a child yet (Bilmiyorlar. Daha hiç çocuk doğurmamış ya)."

¹⁴⁶ For example, a study of health personnel's perceptions about emergency contraception conducted in Izmir shows that only half of health personnel (midwives, nurses, and doctors) heard of emergency contraception (e.g. emergency pills and IUD) (Mandiracioglu 2003). The similar study in the University Hospital in Van also reports that more than one forth of health care providers has not heard of emergency contraception (Zateroğlu 2004).

ligation and male condom, none of them heard of not only emergency pills but also vasectomy, progestogen-only pill, and natural family planning. Dr. Erbaydar and his colleagues' research found that there were no *sağlık ocağıs* in Van which stocked progestogen-only pill for the reason that it is not assured by the Ministry of Health (Karahana *et al.* 2007). In fact, there were several participants who had given up using pills because of breastfeeding. Yasemin (age 19, Turkish speaker, forced migrant from Çatak) was one of them. When I told her once that there was a kind of the pill we could use while breastfeeding, she blankly replied, "They don't give that sort of things to people like us. Our problems are very difficult. *They don't help us.*" Considering the existence of some participants who hesitated to use a contraceptive because of breastfeeding and other health concerns, natural family planning and progestogen-only pills which a woman can use without harming a suckling baby's health might help those women whose husbands are unwilling to use condoms prevent unwanted pregnancies.

Unsuccessful usage of contraceptives is often attributed to women's ignorance; an "exaggeration" of the side effects, a lack of understanding of mechanism of a contraceptive method, and hence inconsistent usage especially when they are from low-income strata and rural origin (e.g. Ay *et al.* 2007). However, many side effects that a health specialist would call "exaggeration", such as heavy or irregular menstruation, could worry any lay woman, either educated or not. Besides, considering a local meaning of menstruation mentioned above, an anxiety of irregular or lack of menstruation must be grave for those women. Constant bleeding is disturbing for women who are devoted to perform prayers regularly five times a day for bleeding spoils ablution. Heavy menstruation is also distressing because many of those women often cannot afford sanitary napkins and use a piece of cloth instead. It causes a great trouble for a woman if she lives in a crowded household because the indication of menstruation is considered to be shameful and she has to clean up the traces of bleeding without letting anyone, especially men, notice. It seems to me that the problem of the participants is that they cannot go to see a doctor to clarify anxiety, solve health problem, or acquire alternative contraceptive whenever they have a trouble rather than that they worry 'too much' about side

effects because there was no clinic in the neighbourhood until recently and they have difficulty in going out of the neighbourhood as they wish.

It was also observable that many participants were advised about the choice of contraceptives by a nurse yet they were not advised about things which they need to be careful about when they use a particular method and sometimes not informed about its possible side effects. I consider that the frequent poor communication between a nurse and a migrant woman results not simply from the latter's lack of Turkish (no non-Turkish speakers do not go and see a doctor without a Turkish speaking company) or education but from the institutional failure that the standardised plain family planning instruction is not put into practice. Unstandardised family planning service allows arbitrary and biased instruction and communication with a patient. It can allow individual nurses' bias against a non-Turkish speaking or uneducated patient and their unwillingness to communicate with her sincerely.

7.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, it was attempted to demonstrate firstly that the participants desire to control reproduction regardless of the knowledge of Turkish and migration type; secondly that their attitudes and practices of reproduction have changed over a generation after migration towards the spacing and earlier limitation of births because of economic hardship and the increased accessibility to more effective contraceptives; thirdly that their persistent relative high fertility despite struggles for contraception was related to their disempowerment rather than their lack of familiarity with the idea and methods of birth control; fourthly that forced migrant participants who tended to be more disadvantaged in terms of income, language, education and social network were likely to have more difficulties in accessing health services than voluntary migrant participants; lastly patriarchal constraints against the participants' control of their own reproduction prevail at all the levels of family, community, and the state and hence even the participants who managed to

overcome familial and communal restrictions could face state-level institutional constraints against their attempt for controlling their reproduction as they wished.

It is probably possible to assume that the people in Doluca neighbourhood have gradually changed their attitudes towards reproduction since they moved to the city. As their subsistence relies more on wage work, the economic value of children is much delayed to old age security. As living costs increased greatly in urban life, their desire for children became less in number. Many participants considered that two children were the affordable number for them to bring up properly. Meanwhile, as a result of their migration and the target approach of family planning programme, contraceptive knowledge became widely shared by women in the neighbourhood over the last decade. Thus, all of the participants had a good knowledge of contraceptive methods.

The gradual yet increasing change of attitudes towards reproduction has probably encouraged Doluca women to attempt birth control more actively. The participants have been struggling to space and limit births in order to, they argued, spare more care and money for the children they already had or sometimes as a form of resistance against the husband's second marriage. However, the majority of the participants have experienced repeated successive pregnancies and unwanted pregnancies and births. Unlike women in many other parts of the country, those who could apply to induced abortion were very few among the participants. Accordingly, nearly half of the participants already had more children than they wanted at the time of interviewing. Their attempts for birth control seems to be much less effective than both the rural women in the rest of the country who are assumed to have more physical difficulties in accessing health services than women living in city and the rural-urban migrant women in other regions who share the hesitation and discontinuation in using biomedical contraceptives because of the concerns for side effects. Withdrawal was one of the most widely used method among the participants in Doluca neighbourhood as well as many other couples in the country though it was by no means the method which was regularly used by the participants.

It was also tried to demonstrate in this chapter that when the participants tried to control their reproduction more effectively by using modern methods of contraception, they had to overcome many obstacles of the multiple institutionalised deprivations of reproductive rights, the restrictions over movement, the anxiety over side effects, and the objection of the husband. Any of familial, communal, and state levels of patriarchal control over reproduction are probably experienced by many other women in the country in similar or different ways. However, because of their particular historical socioeconomic disadvantages, all the levels of patriarchy have constrained the participants from controlling their own reproductive bodies in a more intensive and intertwined manner.

At the outset, early marriage exposed many participants to pregnancies without knowledge and early childbearing. They were thus deprived of fundamental opportunity to decide whether they want to have children from the very beginning of their reproductive lives. After the first childbirth, they soon became conscious of their reproductive body and childbearing. Yet, narrowing women's autonomous space and increasing control over their movement considerably restricted the participants' access to the public sphere and hindered their successful practice of modern contraception especially when their husbands remain alienated from and indifferent to the reproductive process including contraception. The traditional form of patriarchy has just begun transforming but in a way to save its masculine territory by 'their' women's confinement within a small circle of patrilineal relatives.

Under the increasing patriarchal surveillance, forced migrants seemed to have more difficulties in accessing contraceptives than those who did not experience displacement. Forced migrant participants tended to be more vulnerable to patriarchal surveillance because they were likely to live in more insecure environment due to a particular form of their migration and lack women's network which is the indispensable resource for women to enter the public sphere. Patriarchal surveillance of course affected voluntary migrants, too, who were relatively more capable of managing to access the public sphere for their social capitals. It did not allow them to go out whenever they wanted, either. Thus, they also could not obtain

reproductive advice and a contraceptive exactly when they needed them. It leads to a pregnancy before the attainment of a contraceptive or a period of non-usage between discontinuation and the application to a new method. It is reflected in the high numbers of contraceptives that they tried and undesired pregnancies.

Some of the participants were also subjected to the unstandardised family planning service which allows health personnel's arbitrary or inadequate counseling, patriarchally biased advice, and ethnically and gender-based discriminatory attitudes, and hence poor communication with patients. Because of their multiple disadvantages, the participants were more vulnerable to arbitrary health services than many other women in the country. Thus, there exist numerous hard struggles for birth control behind the discontinuous and ineffective contraceptive usage and the high rate of unwanted pregnancy among the participants.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Responding to Patriarchy

Feminist readings of contraceptive history and cross-cultural practices have argued against the conventional understanding of birth control as a modern invention. According to feminist knowledge, women have always desired and struggled to control their own reproductive bodies in one way or another. Women's passivity in reproduction before modernity is a myth created as a result of gender struggles.

The current case study of Kurdish migrant women in Van delineated above supports this. It indicates that rural Kurdish women in the study site desired to control their reproduction even when they were in the village and required to reproduce future labour successively for the husband's household. Because of heavy workload, they wanted to limit further births after giving several births (especially of sons) and establishing their position in the husband's household. They used to make secret attempts of miscarriage by carrying heavy loads, bumping on a horse, jumping off from a high place and taking presumably abortive herbs.

Meanwhile, most participants of the current study desire to space and limit births for the reasons of economic hardship and better care and education for the children they already have. Many of them consider two children as the ideal number that they can look after as they wish yet some want to have more children if they become better off.

The participants' accounts also indicate that women are actively making an anti-natal discourse and creating a cultural environment which approves their attempt for birth control. They revised the pro-natal religious discourse into one that instructs

responsible parenthood (See Cases 71 and 72).¹⁴⁷ Many participants unanimously mentioned that “it’s my sin if I can’t look after my children.” It appears that the new discourse is gradually winning over the traditional pro-natal discourse in the neighbourhood. A number of participants referred to the modern discourse of progressiveness and responsible parenthood while contrasting themselves against women in their mothers’ generation or themselves in early years of marriage (e.g. Case 75). One participant accounted that there used to be people who told her that birth control was a sin. Yet she learned how to respond them; “I tell this to those who preach me; ‘I do protect myself (from pregnancy). You bring forth. Don’t tell me such a thing. I know myself. I’m grown up. I’ve got my reason. I know things, too.’”

The participants not only desire but also know about contraception regardless of their level of education, knowledge of the official language, and migration experience. Many of them tried especially modern contraceptive methods. It corresponds to Koç’s finding from the TDHS-1993 that women in the East are more likely to use modern contraceptive methods than women in the other regions regardless of their lowest absolute rate of contraceptive usage in the country (Koç 2000: 340). It is probably an effect of the intensified state-led family planning programme in the late 1990s which targeted the eastern women and also a reflection of women’s strong concern and search for a way to control reproduction effectively.

When the participants’ contraceptive usage was examined by language and migration groups, Turkish speakers than non-Turkish speakers and voluntary migrants than forced migrants were more likely to use contraceptives. However, once they decided and managed to practice contraception, both Turkish speakers and non-Turkish speakers seem to have been able to access modern and female contraceptive methods which were attainable only from a clinic or a pharmacy. Yet, forced migrants were more likely than voluntary migrants that they used no modern methods and relied on

¹⁴⁷ According to Riffat Hassan, a leading feminist theologian, the Qur’an includes both verses which encourage procreation and verses which demand individual well-being and responsible actions for it and hence can be interpreted as an approval of contraception (Hassan 2009). The *hadiths* (the collections of writings that document the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad) on withdrawal (*al-azl*) as a contraceptive method are well known and widely accepted by Islamic theologians (Moghissi 2005: 208; Al-Qaradawi 2006: 117-20).

withdrawal. Even when some of the forced migrants used modern methods, they are more likely to have used condom rather than female contraceptive methods than the other migrant group.

Voluntary migrant participants' higher chance of using modern female contraceptives in comparison to forced migrant participants can be interpreted as an indication of their relative empowerment in accessing health services, and maybe the public sphere in general. However, voluntary migrant participants' ability to access health services does not necessarily lead to successful birth control in a straightforward way. They tend to have tried more methods of contraception than forced migrants and it seems to suggest the frequency of failures and discontinuity. Accordingly, the participants who used more than one contraceptive method experienced three times more unwanted pregnancies on average than those who continue to use only one method.

Regardless of the desire for spacing and limiting births and attempts for birth control, many participants thus already had children more than they wanted. The majority of the participants experienced unwanted pregnancy at least once and many had it more than once. Some participants considered their unwanted pregnancies as their faults ("It was all my faults. It's because I didn't think it through"). Some attributed it to life circumstances. The participants' accounts of their reproductive histories indicate that they had to deal with different multiple circumstances that thwarted their autonomy and hindered them from successfully controlling their reproduction in different stages of life. Nonetheless, a number of hindering circumstances shared by many participants can be delineated as discussed in the previous chapter. Marriage in very young age, patriarchal surveillance, the lack of husband's support and the lack of women's network all require women considerable efforts to make up order to have autonomy and access contraceptives when they need them.

Most of the participants have eventually learned to deal with multiple patriarchal control and managed or would manage to access modern contraceptives as they learn the husband's and in-laws' temperament by attempting some transgressions and

facing consequences, earn their trust by carefully demonstrating modesty and devotion for the family, obtain the husband's active support for birth control by exploiting economic hardship and a modern discourse of responsible parenthood, reinforce alliance with the limited number of relative-neighbours or grown-up daughters, communicate with health personnel at the latter's home visits or their own hospital visits on the occasions such as childbirth and children's vaccination and go through the trial and error of a number of contraceptive methods. As Cindoğlu and Şirkeci (2001) stated, experience is an important factor of birth control.

Controlling reproduction is a learning process for everyone because women, in particular, are encouraged to remain ignorant about their own bodies and reproduction. Women however cannot remain really ignorant for good because of a series of real consequences of menstruation, sexual intercourse, pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding on their own bodies. Further, contradictorily, they are always said to be careful about the way in which they show or cover their bodies while they are expected to be ignorant about them. Therefore, learning to control one's own body and reproduction is not an automatic process and requires some efforts.

The learning process can be however relatively easy or difficult for different women depending on their positions in the hierarchical complex of social orders. This dissertation argued that for Kurdish migrant women I studied, it is a considerably long and hard process to learn to control their own reproduction in spite of the availability of contraceptives. It is not because of their ignorance or traditionalism but because of multiple patriarchal deprivations which have been maintained and reconfigured under changing political-economy. Women have always struggled for their well-beings but in response to reconfiguring patriarchy.

Cultural Isolation, Ignorance, or Minority Resistance?

Many researchers of fertility and birth control have attributed Kurdish women's fecundity and relatively low contraceptive usage to cultural isolation from modern family norms or suggested a relation with low educational attainment. The current case study conducted in Doluca neighbourhood however demonstrated that many of

the socioeconomically, educationally and linguistically disadvantaged women are eager and struggling to space and limit births for better life and parenthood.

The finding does not nonetheless falsify the cultural isolation thesis that was proposed by Yavuz (2006; 2008) and supported by Yüceşahin and Özgür (2008) simply because the case study is by no means generalisable to the Kurdish population at large and it was conducted a decade after the period that Yavuz examined. His thesis might be valid in different locations or in the previous decades. Nonetheless, the current case study powerfully questions and challenges the cultural account of high fertility among Kurdish population that does not take into serious consideration woman's desire for reproductive control, social embeddedness of reproduction and the structural forces of volatile political-economy and patriarchy.

Health experts often relate women's educational level and the overanxiety about health risks with the non- or inconsistent usage of contraceptives. The current study however showed that women's complaints about side effects were not necessarily unfounded. When the participants refrained from or gave up a certain contraceptive method, they often weighted disadvantages (i.e. religious prohibition, the elder's disapproval, conjugal conflict, physical pains and discomforts, excess or irregular bleeding, and amenorrhoea) against advantages (i.e. controlled reproduction, the reduction of economic burden, more investments on each child, and good parenthood) on the ground of their own experience or what they observed. At one time, they delayed a hospital visit hoping that they would not become pregnant so easily until they could find an appropriate time to go out. At another time, they stopped taking pills or injectables or removed IUDs because of irregular, excess or no menstruation. Having no menstruation disturbs them very much because it means the accumulation of impurities within the womb. Irregular or excess bleeding is also a serious problem for women who cannot buy sanitary pads all the time or whose husbands become very angry when sexual intercourse is rejected. A number of participants want tubal ligation but consider that it is not possible while they have young children to look after because it requires a good rest after operation. Abortion

costs so much to them: money, reputation, and guilt. It is hardly possible without the husband's assistance.

Their decisions for another birth while they do not want might seem 'irrational' to health professionals. Yet, they can be a well-thought and 'rationally' compromised decision at a point in time for women whose purpose of life is not solely the limitation of births. Sometimes, letting another pregnancy happen seems to be easier for them than resisting all the constraints and the fear and troubles of side effects. Struggling with small children is culturally approved act for women. Women can get some assistance from mother-in-law, sisters-in-law and older daughters for childcare and housework. But, struggling with birth control often involves patriarchally disapproved acts such as going out to public spaces and indicates women's autonomy, which threatens status quo. Women cannot readily get support and assistance for it. Thus, it is a relatively lonely struggle.

Kurdish women's high fertility is sometimes popularly presumed to be minority resistance against assimilation. Yet, such evidence was not found in the current research.¹⁴⁸ Suspicions and resistance against the state's promotion of vaccination and contraception in early years that were reported in some studies (e.g. Conseil Sante *et al.* 2007) and recounted by some participants seem to have already been subsided. Rather, they were replaced by a sort of frustration about the perceived reality that they do not benefit from public services as much as the other citizens in the country (the Turk or the better-off or those who live in the western regions).

In ethnic nationalist projects, women are often attributed the roles of the biological reproducer who gives birth to members of the society; the social reproducer who passes on a culture; the bearer of cultural symbols; the marker of a group boundary; and the participant of political and military struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989 cited in Çağlayan 2009: 23). In her study of the formation of Kurdish women's identity in the ethnic nationalist movement, Handan Çağlayan demonstrates that

¹⁴⁸ Yüceşahin and Özgür (2008: 151) also state that they could find no information that links fertility increase in eight eastern and south-eastern provinces in the late 1980s and Kurdish nationalism.

women's role in Kurdish movement in Turkey has radically transformed as the socioeconomic background and gender distribution of activists and the ideological objective change. In the late Ottoman period, the image of "the free, warrior, and leader Kurdish woman" derived from the portrayal in the seventeenth-century Orientalist literature played an important role in Kurdish movement. To Kurdish intellectuals, the image, which is "inconsistent with social reality" (Çağlayan 2009: 67), was the marker of the distinctiveness and modernity of Kurdish people. They described women as the symbols of modernity and authentic Kurdishness. They also assigned women the role of mother who gives birth to new members of society and passes on Kurdish culture and argued for their segregation from external influences, such as Turkish education, in order for the preservation of traditional (and inherently progressive) Kurdish culture.

By the 1980s, however, Kurdish movement transformed from the *aşiret* leaders' assertion of autonomy to a leftist movement mobilised by Kurdish youths in the process of the *aşiret* leaders' integration into the national political and economic system and the proletarianisation of villagers in the East. The cause of struggle changed from the political and cultural autonomy of the Kurds to the emancipation of socioeconomically and politically oppressed Kurdish people. In the 1990s and onwards, the increasing number of women began to participate in the movement first as "mourning mothers (*acılı anne*)" who lost their children in conflicts or during detainment and then as PKK militants and party members. In the same period, the PKK abandoned classic socialist themes and shifted its struggle from the building of an independent socialist Kurdish nation-state to the realisation of social, economic, political and cultural rights of Kurdish citizens in the country. In this context, the oppression of Kurdish women in family by Kurdish men who are oppressed in society came to be questioned, too. These changes, according to Çağlayan, opened up a room for heroic modern women who go out of the private sphere and fight for their own and Kurdish emancipation along with men. These "new women" are however the desexualised women attributed the image of "goddesses" who sacrifice their lives for society or of "comrades/sisters" whose virtues are never harmed because of their devotion to the struggle. Thus, after the 1980s, women's role in

Kurdish movement in Turkey radically changed from the biological and social reproducer and bearer of cultural symbols to the participant of political and military struggles. This may be the reason why any evidence and effect of nationalistic pro-natal ideology was not found in the current research.

Patriarchal Rivalry and Instrumental Use of Women

Alternatively, this dissertation proposes a feminist political-economic account of enduring high fertility of Kurdish migrant women in an eastern squatter neighbourhood. As argued in Chapter Two, the feminist political-economic account takes into consideration first of all patriarchy not as a chronologically and geographically limited traditional practice but as a social system that organises all spheres of social life according to the principle of male supremacy and secondly political-economic conjuncture in which patriarchy is embedded and hence enhanced, limited or transformed. From the feminist political-economic perspective, what underlies Doluca women's socioeconomic disadvantages and hindrances of re/productive autonomy is, I argue, altering patriarchal alliance and rivalry in accordance with political-economic conjunctures in the country.

It has been argued in Chapter Two that patriarchy operates, in point of fact, not only between men and women but also between men. Johnson (2005) stated that men compete and bond one another by roughing each other as well as winning, possessing, controlling and subordinating women. Men's paradoxical fixation on control and fear and competition and solidarity is the fundamental driving force of patriarchy.

As referred in Chapter Four, it is also pointed out by a few scholars in Turkey that a traditional form of patriarchy has been maintained in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey until very recently because of the alliance between tribal leaders and the state. Ertürk (2007: 6) accounts that after the introduction of the multiparty system in 1946 and DP's agricultural modernisation policies, the *ağa* class became integrated into the national political-economic system. Yet, the consequence was contradictory; the *ağa* system was preserved in a modernized form and the feudal relations in the regions were maintained. In Şanlıurfa, a south-eastern province,

politicians and administrators have avoided the interference with local, internal and private matters for the sake of *ağas'* political supports while *ağas* themselves have often participated in party politics and occupied governmental offices. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2006: 417) argue that the state continued the non-interference because it found the benefit in the maintenance of *aşiret* system against the rise of socialist-minded PKK and growing Kurdish nationalism in the regions. However, the exceptional maintenance of traditional political system arisen from the alliance between tribal patriarchs and state patriarchs allowed the maintenance of traditional patriarchal gender regime, too.

Yet, as discussed above, in recent years, the traditional political-economic system based on *aşiret* and agriculture has been considerably undermined in Van largely because of mass migration. Migration forced the head of household to transform himself from the patriarch who manages labour-intensive animal husbandry and large family under the *ağa's* patronage and *aşiret* or *kabile* solidarity to the breadwinner who supports his family with meagre wage labour on his own. It imposed enormous insecurity on men.

In order to overcome fear, men in patriarchal society seek more control, very often, of women (Johnson 2005). A number of feminist researchers pointed out the tendency of increasing moral regulation and control over women in the contexts of perceived dangers of patriarchal group boundaries (Ertürk 1996: 26). In her comparative study of feminism and nationalism, Kumari Jayawardena (1986) demonstrated that some Asian countries, including Turkey, which she examined responded to the pressures of imperial power and national crisis by paternalistically emancipating and controlling women and womanhood in a way to enhance their political autonomy and cultural identity against the previous regime and imperial powers. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes about territoriality and women in her essay on subaltern studies. Spivak calls for the attention of historian of the subaltern to the fact that in colonial India, kinship ties were the principal means of rebel mobilisation against the coloniser and they were often re/produced and enhanced through the operation of winning and barring women by patrilineal and patrilocal

marriage practice. The continuity of community was produced on the deprivation of women's identity and subjectivity: their discontinuity (1988: 31).

I argue that Doluca women, too, have been struggling with the deprivations created by the paradoxical patriarchal alliance and rivalry at the levels of the family, the community and the state. Firstly, the half-century alliance between the state and the *ağas* had sustained the traditional patriarchal political system and allowed the continuation of Kurdish rural women's deprivation of a range of new empowering means (or civil rights) from birth registration and formal education to official marriage, health service and paid work.

Secondly, economically and politically insecure Doluca men have been increasingly fixed on controlling women and patriarchal boundary, of which border can be as narrow as the household, the block or the neighbourhood depending on the contextually altering definition of the other (men) - the non-kin, those from a different *aşiret*, the Turk, or the state - who can potentially harm women's virtue which is in turn men's honour. When controlling the movement of women, men both ally and compete with other migrant men by informing women's transgressions each other for support or offence as well as demarking the territory against the other groups. Controlling and barring women from the other men was always an essential part of manhood in the village, too. However, it became more difficult and appeared to be always threatened in urban environment because of the proximity of strangers and the ambiguity of communal boundary. Male honour is inherently fragile partly because it is "less easily measured and counted than land or livestock" and suspicions on it can harm badly even the most powerful (Bourdieu 1990: 121) and partly because it entirely depends on women. In the current context of insecurity and ambiguity, honour is at constant potential risk to the eyes of Doluca men.

Thirdly, the state has changed its hidden policy of non-interference and began penetrating the eastern and south-eastern regions at the end of the 1990s when the conflict was subsided. Whereas it tries to provide once-practically-withdrawn civil rights and public services to eastern women and girls through a variety of new

programmes ranging from the campaign for girl's schooling to the cash transfers to mothers, it can be argued that the driving force behind is the rivalry against the local patriarchs and the West. On the one hand, the state is now reaching out Kurdish women in the East like Doluca women and claims patronisingly that it can 'protect' them better than their men (the father, the husband, *ağas* or Kurdish nationalist leaders). On the other hand, it has targeted them for the completion of the modernisation project since the foundation of the Republic which has aimed to elevate Turkey to "the civilisational or developmental level of the West." Making the eastern women 'modern' - for example, bringing down their fertility - will do this effectively because of their considerably poor scores in all developmental measurements. Therefore, the family planning programme has not been primarily designed to help women's empowerment and exercise of their reproductive rights but rather to distribute modern contraceptives to as many eastern women as possible and complete fertility transition evenly across the country.

Patriarchal Bargaining Revisited

Multiple patriarchal forces at familial, communal and state levels have been instrumentally using Kurdish women in the East like Doluca women for their rivalry and fraternal alliance. However, do women simply endure the oppression or take it for granted as a way of life or fate? As discussed in Chapter Two, Kandiyoti in her well-known article on "patriarchal bargaining" (1988) established that even under the most domineering form of patriarchy women by no means remain passively submissive yet often craft practices that would maximise their well-being within the system, though they may be minor, inconspicuous or haphazard and have setbacks. One typical shrewd tactic of bargaining under the form of patriarchy that enforces women's dependency is the deliberate reenforcement of dependency, or the right to be supported and protected. By stressing modesty and vulnerability, women appeal their righteousness to be supported and protected by men. Doluca women also carefully observe a modest dress code and spatial sex segregation because they have learned that it helps strengthen the husband and in-law's favour and prepare room for negotiation as well as there is no benefit but harm in breaking the moral regulation.

However, Doluca women also stepped forward further and are making discourses subversive to traditional patriarchy yet within patriarchy nonetheless. First, women are revising the traditional pro-natal Islamic discourse into liberal anti-natal one that emphasises individual responsibility for action in combination with a modernist ideology of responsible parenthood that the state has promoted. Second, the most frequently uttered phrase by them was “we (the husband and the self) can’t look after (*bakamıyoruz*).” It seems to be habitually used to fend off the elder’s advice on more children or criticism against birth control and to persuade the husband who is uninterested in family planning. Women thus recall not only the modernist ideology of responsible parenthood but also the modern patriarchal ideology of breadwinner. They thus remind their husbands of gender contract. Third, they remind them of gender contract also by a newly adopted ideology of modern motherhood as shown in Chapter Six. They are now not mere wombs which nurture fetuses for the husband but the mother who labours, nurtures and raises children. She is irreplaceable and unrivalled. She is righteous to be respected and supported by the father of children for her labour. By reminding the husband of this, they take measure against the threat of the second wife in place of the old strategy of fecundity for securing the position in the husband’s household. Their exploitation of modern yet patriarchal discourse is appealing to particularly younger and relatively educated men who aspire to differentiate themselves from the older generation and achieve more integration into the national system. Lastly, and paradoxically, many women respond to strict patriarchal surveillance and cope with the care for multiple small children by capitalising on the mother-daughter bond.

The resistance of the weak is hidden and euphemistic most of the times but can be really subversive and lay the groundwork for transformative change (Scott 1990). However, in case of gender relations, it has been always transformative to an extent that it changes a direction *within* patriarchy nonetheless. Doluca women, and probably many other Kurdish women in the East, would manage to have fewer children as the state’s paternalistic project penetrates into the region and their subversive yet conservative discourses win over traditional patriarchy covertly. However, it would probably not lead to women’s liberation but ‘modernisation’ as

experienced by many other women in the country and other countries which completed fertility transition.

This dissertation attempted to demonstrate another reproductive struggle of one of the most disadvantaged groups of women in the country. Reproduction is embedded in a wide range of social relations, which are patriarchal in most societies and contingent upon political-economic contexts. Volatile economy and increasingly insecure political situations are global phenomena and affect everyone in the world, but often affect badly the life of those who were already disadvantaged in particular by taking away the accustomed way of life and withdrawing new opportunities at the same time. Doluca women's reproductive struggle during the last thirty years is part of that story.

If women have been and still are struggling for the control of their own bodies and reproduction in different ways yet throughout history and across cultures, it is because the hegemonic gender, social class and global and national political powers have vested interest in human reproduction (Bandarage 1997: 171). The fact that reproductive rights continue to be some of the most contested rights issues globally evidences this. The ways in which patriarchy reconfigures within changing societies and the different relationships of different forms of patriarchy with reproduction remain to be studied. In order to understand the historically and culturally different modes of human reproduction despite women's universal desire and attempt for controlling their reproduction, what should be looked at may be reconfiguring patriarchy and masculinities more so than women's education, employment or perception of childbearing. Patriarchy matters!

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE GUIDELINE FOR THE INTERVIEWS

Tarih (Gün-Ay)				
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Görüşmede kullanılan dil(ler)			Türkçe 1 Kürtçe 2 Diğer 3	
Çevirmen kullanıldı mı?			Evet 1	
Kim?			Hayır 2	

Tanıtm Bilgileri					
Küme - Sokak					
Ad-Soyad Liste No.					
(Nüfus cüzdanında yazılan) Doğum Ay-Yıl					
				1	9
Bitirilmiş yaş					
Nüfus cüzdanı üzerindeki yaş gerçek yaş değil <input type="checkbox"/>					
Gerçek yaş					

Hanehalkı Bilgileri					
1	Evde yaşayan kişi sayısı				
2	Evde yaşayan kişiler				
		YAKINLIK CEVAPLAYICI	YAKINLIK REİSİ	YAŞ	GECE Evet ..1 Hayır ..2
					Nerede
		01			1 2
		02			1 2
		03			1 2
		04			1 2
		05			1 2
		06			1 2
		07			1 2
		08			1 2
		09			1 2
		10			1 2
3	15 ve yukarı yaşta kiler	ANA DİL		TÜRKÇE	
	Dil bilgisi			İyi biliyor 1	
				Az biliyor 2	
				Bilmiyor 3	
		01		1	2 3
		02		1	2 3

		03			1	2	3		
		04			1	2	3		
		05			1	2	3		
		06			1	2	3		
		07			1	2	3		
		08			1	2	3		
		09			1	2	3		
		10			1	2	3		
4	7 ve yukarı yaştakiler								
	Öğrenim durumu		OKUMA YAZMA Evet 1 Biraz 2 Hayır 3 Bilmiyor ... 4	OKUL Evet 1 Hayır 2 Bilmiyor...3	EN SON OKUL İlkokul 1 Ortaokul 2 Lise 3 Üniversite 4 Lisansüstü 5 Okuma kursu .. 6 Bilmiyor 7	S I N I F	D E V A M		
		01	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		02	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		03	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		04	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		05	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		06	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		07	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		08	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		09	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
		10	1 2 3 4	1 2 3	1 2 3 4 5 6 7				EH
5	7 ve yukarı yaştakiler								
	Çalışma durumu		ÇALIŞIYOR Evet 1 Hayır 2 Bilmiyor 3	ÖNCE Evet 1 Hayır 2 Bilmiyor 3	AİLE İŞİ Evet 1 Hayır 2 Bilmiyor 3				
		01	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		02	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		03	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		04	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		05	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		06	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		07	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		08	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		09	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
		10	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3				
6	7 ve yukarı yaştakiler								
	Geçmişte ve/veya şimdi yaptığı iş(ler)i	01							
		02							
		03							
		04							
		05							
		06							
		07							
		08							
		09							
		10							
	<i>Şu an çalışmayan</i> 01 Öğrenci 02 Ev kadını 03 Emekli 04 İrat sahibi (kira, kar payı vb) 05 Ev işleri yapıyor 06 Özürlü yardımı alıyor 07 Hasta 08 Askerde/askere gidecek 09 İş arıyor 10 Diğer (BELİRTİN) 11 Bilmiyor	01							
		02							
		03							
		04							
		05							
		06							
		07							
		08							
		09							
		10							
7	Sağlık sigortası	Yok 0 Neden?							

		SGK (SSK, Emekli sandığı, Bağ-kur) 1 Özel sağlık sigortası2 Yeşil kart 3 Diğer 4 (BELİRTİN)
8	Ev sahibi	Bilmiyor 5 Evde yaşayanlardan biri 1 Kim? (BELİRTİN) Evde yaşamayan diğer aile ferdi, akraba2 Kim? (BELİRTİN) Yabancı ev sahibi 3 Diğer 4 (BELİRTİN)
9	Bu ev kimin kazancı ile geçiniyor.	<i>II2'ye bakın. Fert no.yu işaretleyin.</i> 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

I. GÖÇ																		
I1	<p>Hangi il - ilçe de doğdunuz?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>Bu yer o zaman il merkezi mi, ilçe merkezi mi, bir bucak ya da köy müydü?</p>	<p>Halen yaşadığı yer 0 → I3</p> <p>İl merkezi 1</p> <p>İlçe merkezi 2</p> <p>Bucak/Köy 3</p>																
I2	Bu mahalleye gelene kadar nerelerde oturdunuz?																	
I3	<p>Hangi yılda/kaç yaşındayken Van merkezine geldiniz?</p> <p><i>Bu mahallede doğdu ve büyüdü ... 0000</i></p> <p>↓</p> <p>Anneniz ve babanız hangi yılda Van merkezine geldiler?</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <th colspan="4">BABA</th> <th colspan="4">ANNE</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td> <td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td> </tr> </table>	BABA				ANNE												<p><input type="checkbox"/> yaşındayken</p>
BABA				ANNE														
I4	<p><i>II'e bakın</i></p> <p><i>Van merkezde doğmadı</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Van merkezine gelmenizin temel nedeni neydi?</p> <p><i>Van merkezde doğdu</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Babanızın Van merkezine gelmesinin temel nedeni neydi?</p> <p>Hikâye - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>KİŞİSEL NEDENLER</p> <p>Evlilik 11</p> <p>Eğitim 12</p> <p>İş aramak 13</p> <p>İş değişikliği / tayin 14</p> <p>Memlekete geri dönüş 15</p> <p>EŞLE İLGİLİ NEDENLER</p> <p>Eşin yanına gitmek 21</p> <p>Eşin iş araması 22</p> <p>Eşin iş değişikliği / tayini 23</p> <p>Eşin ölmesi / boşanma 24</p> <p>AİLEVİ NEDENLER</p> <p>Ebeveynin yanına gitmek 31</p> <p>Ebeveynin iş araması 32</p> <p>Ebeveyninin iş değişikliği / tayini 33</p> <p>MERANIN DARALMASI 41</p> <p>GÜVENLİK NEDENLERİ 51</p> <p>BİLMİYOR 61</p>																

		DİĞER _____ 71 (BELİRTİN)																
I5	Köyünüzde halen yaşayan aileden veya akrabadan biri var mı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 → I8																
I6	O kimdir?	Ebeveyn..... 1 Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7 Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer _____ 10 (BELİRTİN)																
I7	O kişi ile en az yılda bir kere görüşüyorsunuz?	Evet 1 Hayır 2																
I8	Kocanız hangi il-ilçe de doğdu? _____ Bu yer o zaman il merkezi mi, ilçe merkezi mi, bir bucak ya da köy müydü?	Halen yaşadığı yer 0 → II0 İl merkezi 1 İlçe merkezi 2 Bucak/Köy 3																
I9	Kocanız bu mahalleye gelene kadar nerelerde yaşamış?																	
I10	Kocanız hangi yılda / kaç yaşındayken Van merkezine geldi? <i>Eşi bu mahallede doğdu ve büyüdü ... 00</i> ↓ Kocanızın annesi ve babası hangi yılda Van merkezine geldiler?	<table border="1" style="float: right;"><tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr></table> <input type="checkbox"/> yaşındayken																
	<table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tr><td colspan="4" style="text-align: center;">BABA</td><td colspan="4" style="text-align: center;">ANNE</td></tr><tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr></table>	BABA				ANNE												
BABA				ANNE														
I11	<i>I9'a bakın</i> Kocası Van merkezde doğmadı <input type="checkbox"/> Van merkezine gelmesinin temel nedeni neydi? Kocası Van merkezde doğdu <input type="checkbox"/> Babasının Van merkezine gelmesinin temel nedeni neydi? Hikâye - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	KİŞİSEL NEDENLER Evlilik 11 Eğitim 12 İş aramak 13 İş değişikliği / tayin 14 Memlekete geri dönüş 15 EŞLE İLGİLİ NEDENLER Eşin yanına gitmek 21 Eşin iş araması 22 Eşin iş değişikliği / tayini 23 Eşin ölmesi / boşanma 24 AİLEVİ NEDENLER Ebeveynin yanına gitmek 31 Ebeveynin iş araması 32 Ebeveyninin iş değişikliği / tayini 33 MERANIN DARALMASI 41 GÜVENLİK NEDENLERİ 51 BİLMİYOR 61 DİĞER _____ 71 (BELİRTİN)																
I12	Kocanızın köyünde halen yaşayan aileden veya akrabadan biri var mı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 → II																
I13	O kimdir?	Ebevey 1																

		Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7 Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
I14	O kişi ile en az yılda bir kere görüşüyorsunuz?	Evet 1 Hayır 2

II. AİLE ve AKRABA İLİŞKİSİ		
II1	Siz geniş / çekirdek ailesiniz. Bu doğru mu?	Geniş aile 1 → II3 Çekirdek aile 2
II2	Ne zamandan beri çekirdek ailesiniz? <i>Evlendiği zamandan beri ayrı ise 00 yazın.</i>	Evlendikten <input type="checkbox"/> yıl sonra. <input type="checkbox"/> çocuk vardı. Kimden, neden ocağınızı ayırdığınızı anlatabilir misiniz? HİKÂYE - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/> → II6
II3	Siz ...lerle beraber oturuyorsunuz. Peki, siz ve eşinize ait yatak odası var mı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2
II4	Peki, genellikle ...lerle beraber yemek yiyor musunuz?	Evet 1 Hayır 2
II5	Kazançlarınızı beraber mi harcıyorsunuz?	Evet 1 Hayır 2
II6	Akrabanız ile ilgili sorular sormak istiyorum. Aynı kümede oturan sizin akrabanız var mı? Ya da aynı binada fakat ayrı dairede oturan sizin akrabanız var mı?	Evet 1 Küme <input type="checkbox"/> Bina <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2 → II10
II7	Kim(ler)?	Ebevey 1 Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7 Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
II18	Bu akrabaların evine sık gidermisiniz? <i>Hayır ise: Neden sık gitmiyorsunuz?</i>	Evet 1 Hangiler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2 Neden? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
II9	Bu akrabalar ile sık beraber iş yapar mısınız? (ekmek yapmak, yün yıkamak vs.)	Evet 1 Kimlerle? . <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ne işler? _____

		Hayır 2
III 0	Aynı kümede oturan kocanızın akrabası var mı? Ya da aynı binada fakat ayrı dairede oturan kocanızın akrabası var mı?	Evet 1 Küme <input type="checkbox"/> Bina <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2 → III4
III 1	Kim(ler)?	Ebevey 1 Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7 Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
II 12	Bu akrabaların evine sık gidermisiniz? <i>Hayır ise:</i> Neden sık gitmiyorsunuz?	Evet 1 Kimler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2 Neden? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
III 3	Bu akrabalar ile sık sık beraber iş yapar mısınız? (ekmek yapmak, yün yıkamak vs.)	Evet 1 Kimler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ne işler? Hayır 2
III 4	Aynı mahallede oturan sizin akrabanız var mı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 → III8
III 5	Kim(ler)?	Ebevey 1 Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7 Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
II 16	Bu akrabaların evine sık sık gidermisiniz? <i>Hayır ise:</i> Neden sık gitmiyorsunuz?	Evet 1 Kimler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2 Neden? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
III 7	Bu akrabalarınız ile sık sık beraber iş yapar mısınız? (ekmek yapmak, yün yıkamak vb.)	Evet 1 Kimler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ne işler? Hayır 2
III 8	Aynı mahallede oturan kocanızın akrabası var mı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 → II22
III 9	Kim(ler)?	Ebevey 1 Abi(ler) 2 Küçük erkek kardeş(ler) 3 Amca(lar) 4 Hala(lar) 5 Dayı(lar) 6 Teyze(ler) 7

		Abla(lar) 8 Küçük kız kardeş(ler) 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
II2 0	Bu akrabaların evine sık gidermisiniz?	Evet 1 Hangiler? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 2
II2 1	Bu akrabalarınız ile sık beraber iş yapar mısınız? (ekmek yapmak, yün yıkamak vb.)	Evet 1 Kimler <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ne işler? Hayır 2
II 22	Aileniz ile ne sıklıkta görüşüyorsunuz? <i>Aynı mahallede ailesi oturmuyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Aileniz nerede oturuyor? (YERİN ADI)	Her gün 1 Her hafta 2 Her ay 3 Yılda 2-3 defa (bayramlarda) 4 Yılda bir 5 Daha az 6 En son ne zaman gördünüz? ... <input type="checkbox"/> ay/yıl önce Neden daha sık görüşemiyorsunuz? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/> Evlendikten sonra görmedim 7 Neden? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
II 23	<i>Türkçe bilmiyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Hiç Türkçe bilseydim diye düşündünüz mü? Hiç Türkçe öğrenmeye çalıştınız mı? <i>Türkçe biliyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Hiç iyiki Türkçe biliyorum diye düşündünüz mü?	Hikâye - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
II2 4	Siz son üç günde hangi dilde, ne türlü programlar izlediniz? (haber, dizi, müzik, kadın program vs.)	Haber Türkçe 1 Haber Kürtçe 2 Dizi/Film Türkçe 3 Dizi/Film Kürtçe 4 Müzik/Eğlence Türkçe 5 Müzik/Eğlence Kürtçe 6 Belgesel Türkçe 7 Belgesel Kürtçe 8 Kadın programı..... 9 Diğer 10 (BELİRTİN)
II 25	<i>Okuma yazma yok</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Hiç okuma yazma bilseydim diye düşündünüz mü? Neden okula gidemediniz? Hiç okuma yazma öğrenmeye çalıştınız mı? <i>Okuma yazma var</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Hiç iyiki okuma yazma biliyorum diye düşündünüz mü?	Hikâye - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>

III. EVLİLİK	
III1	Şimdi evliliğiniz hakkında sormak

	istiyorum. Kaç kez evlendiniz?		<input type="checkbox"/> kez
III2	Kocanız bir kez mi yoksa daha fazla mı evlendi? Kaç kez evlenmiş?		<input type="checkbox"/> kez
III3	Kocanızın başka eşi var mı? Kaç kişi var? <i>Başka eşi yoksa 0 yazın.</i>		<input type="checkbox"/>
III4	<i>Bir kez evlenmiş</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kocanızla hangi ayda ve yılda evlendiniz? <i>Birden fazla evlenmiş</i> <input type="checkbox"/> İlk kocanızla hangi ay ve yılda evlendiniz?		<input type="text"/> Ayı bilmiyor 00 Yılı bilmiyor 0000
		SÜTUN 1 İLK KOCASI	SÜTUN 2 ŞU ANDAKİ KOCASI
III5	(İlk) Kocanız ile evlendiğinizde siz kaç yaşındaydınız?	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
III6	(İlk) Kocanız ile evlendiğinizde adetiniz var mıydı?	Evet 1 Hayır 2	Evet 1 Hayır 2
III7	Evlendiğinizde (ilk) kocanız kaç yaşındaydı?	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
III8	(İlk) Kocanız ile resmi nikahınız var mı(ydı)?	Evet 1 Hayır 2	Evet 1 Hayır 2
III9	(İlk) Kocanız ile dini (imam) nikahınız var mı(ydı)?	Evet 1 Hayır 2	Evet 1 Hayır 2
		Resmi ve dini 1 Sadece resmi ... 2 → III13 Sadece dini 3 → III12 Nikah yok 4 → III12	Resmi ve dini 1 Sadece resmi → III13 Sadece dini 3 → III12 Nikah yok 4 → III12
III10	Bu nikahların hangisi önce kıyıldı?	Resmi nikah 1 Dini nikah 2 Beraber 3 → III13	Resmi nikah 1 Dini nikah 2
III11	İki nikah arasında ne kadar zaman geçti?	Kaç yıl? <input type="checkbox"/>	Kaç yıl? <input type="checkbox"/>
III12	Resmi nikah kıyılmamasının/beklemesinin nedenleri nedir?	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
III13	(İlk) Kocanız ile evliliğiniz kim tarafından kararlaştırılmıştı? Siz ve kocanız mı, aileniz mi, yoksa başka akrabanız mı? <i>Başkası tarafından kararlaştırılmış ise:</i> Sizin fikriniz soruldu <input type="checkbox"/> Sizinle ...'in evliliğin nasıl gerçekleştiğini biraz daha detaylı anlatırmısınız? HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	Kendilerinin isteği ile ve ailesinin muvafakatı ile ..1 Kocasının isteği ile ve ailesi ve kendisinin muvafakatı ile 2 Ailesi/Akrabası ama kendilerin muvafakatı ile 3 Ailesi/Akrabası ve sadece kocasının muvafakatı ile.4 Kocasının isteği ile ve ailesinin muvafakatı ile ama kendisinin muvafakatı yok..... 5 Ailesi/Akrabası ama kendilerinin muvafakatı yok..... 6 Kaçtı 7 Kaçırıldı 8	Kendilerinin isteği ile ve ailesinin muvafakatı ile. 1 Kocasının isteği ile ve ailesi ve kendisinin muvafakatı ile..... 2 Ailesi/Akrabası ama kendilerin muvafakatı ile 3 Ailesi/Akrabası ve sadece kocasının muvafakatı ile.....4 Kocasının isteği ile ve ailesinin muvafakatı ile ama kendisinin muvafakatı yok..... 5 Ailesi/Akrabası ama kendilerinin

			muvafakatı yok..... 6 Kaçtı 7 Kaçınıldı 8
III14	(İlk Evliliğiniz kararlaştırılırken yukarıda bahsedilen kişilerden başkasına danışıldı mı? Kim(ler)?	Evet 1 Kim(ler)? _____ Hayır 2	Evet 1 Kim(ler)? _____ Hayır 2
III15	(İlk Kocanız ile sizin aranızda akrabalık var mı(ydı)?	Evet 1 Hayır 2	Evet 1 Hayır 2
III16	(İlk Kocanız neyiniz oluyor(du)?	Amcasının oğlu 1 Halasının oğlu 2 Teyzesinin oğlu 3 Dayısının oğlu 4 Komşu 5 Babasının arkadaşının oğlu 6 Annesinin arkadaşının oğlu 7 Diğer 8 (BELİRTİN)	Amcasının oğlu 1 Halasının oğlu 2 Teyzesinin oğlu 3 Dayısının oğlu 4 Komşu 5 Babasının arkadaşının oğlu 6 Annesinin arkadaşının oğlu 7 Diğer 8 (BELİRTİN)
III17	Evlenirken başlık verildi mi? <i>Evet ise:</i> Kime verildi? Nasıl harcandı? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Hayır ise:</i> Neden verilmedi? - Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	Evet 1 Hayır 2	Evet 1 Hayır 2
III18	<i>III'e bakın:</i> Bir kez evlenmiş <input type="checkbox"/> → IV Birden fazla evlenmiş <input type="checkbox"/> İlk kocanız ile evliliğiniz hangi yılda sona erdi?	Bilmiyor ... 2009	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
III19	İlk kocanız ile evliliğiniz ne şekilde sona erdi? Eşinizini kaybettiniz mi yoksa boşandınız mı?	Eşi ölmüş 1 Boşanmış 2 Nedenini anlatabilir misiniz? HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	
III20	İlk kocanızdan olan çocuğunuz var mı?	Yok 0 → IV Var 1	
III21	İlk kocanızdan kaç kız ve erkek çocuğunuz oldu?	Kız <input type="checkbox"/> Erkek <input type="checkbox"/>	
III22	Çocuğunuz kocanızda mı yoksa sizinle mi yaşıyor?	Kocası 1 Kendisi 2	

IV. DOĞURGANLIK VE DOĞURGANLIK TERCİHLERİ		
IV1	Şimdi size bugüne kadarki gebelikleriniz hakkında sorular sormak istiyorum. Kaç kızınız var? Kaç oğulunuz var? <i>Toplam</i> <input type="checkbox"/>	Kız <input type="checkbox"/> Oğul <input type="checkbox"/>
IV2	Hiç ölü doğum yaptınız mı?	Evet 1 Kaç <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 0
IV3	Sizin doğurduğunuz ama doğumdan	Var 1

	sonra ölen kız ya da erkek çocuğunuz var mı?	Yok 0 Kaç <input type="checkbox"/>																																																							
IV4	Siz hiç düşük yaptınız mı? Toplam kaç kez düşük yaptınız? Ne _____ zaman?	Evet 1 Kaç <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 0																																																							
IV5	Hiç isteyerek düşük yaptınız mı ya da çocuk aldırдыңız mı? Toplam kaç kez isteyerek düşük yaptınız?	Evet 1 Kaç <input type="checkbox"/> Hayır 0 →IV9																																																							
IV6	Bu çocuk aldirmaya kim karar verdi?	Doktor 1 Kendisi 2 Kocasi 3 Kendisi ve kocasi birlikte 4 Diğer 5 (BELİRTİN)																																																							
IV7	Bu gebeliğin bitirilmesinin başlıca nedeni neydi?	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>																																																							
IV8	Bu gebeliğin bitirilmesi için hangi yöntemte başvurduunuz? Nerede ... yaptırdınız?	Kürtaj 1 Nerede? _____ Diğer 2 (BELİRTİN) Nerede? _____																																																							
<i>Toplam sonuçlanmış gebelik sayısı</i>																																																									
<i>İlk gebe kaldığı yaş</i>																																																									
<i>Evlendikten kaç yıl sonra</i>																																																									
	Anneniz kaç çocuk doğurdu? Kaç düşük yapmış? Kaç ölü doğum yapmış? Annenizin ölen çocuğu varmı? <i>Toplam sonuçlanmış gebelik sayısı</i>																																																								
IV9	<i>Çocuğun hanehalkı listesindeki sıra numarasını yazın. Hanehalkı listesine yazılmamış ise 00 yazın.</i> ..., hangi ay/yılda doğdu?	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>NO.</th> <th>AY-YIL</th> <th>YAŞ FARKI</th> <th>Düşük Ölü doğum</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>01</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>02</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>03</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>04</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>05</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>06</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>07</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>08</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>09</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>10</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr> </tbody> </table>		NO.	AY-YIL	YAŞ FARKI	Düşük Ölü doğum	01					02					03					04					05					06					07					08					09					10				
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IV10	<p>..., gebe kalmadan önce, gebe kalmak istiyor muydunuz, bu gebeliğin daha sonra olmasını mı tercih ederdiniz, yoksa bu gebeliği hiç istememiş miydiniz?</p> <p><i>Daha sonra veya hiç istemediği gebelik varsa:</i> Hiç kürtaj olmayı düşündünüz mü ya da denediniz mi? <i>EVET cevabı varsa:</i> Neden vazgeçtiniz? Anlattırmısınız? HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>		İSTİYORDU..... 1		KÜRTAJ			
			DAHA SONRA 2		Evet ... 1			
			İSTEMİYORDU 3		Hayır...2			
			BİLMİYORUM 4					
		01	1	2	3	4	1	2
		02	1	2	3	4	1	2
		03	1	2	3	4	1	2
		04	1	2	3	4	1	2
		05	1	2	3	4	1	2
		06	1	2	3	4	1	2
		07	1	2	3	4	1	2
08	1	2	3	4	1	2		
09	1	2	3	4	1	2		
10	1	2	3	4	1	2		
IV11	<p>'DAHA SONRA İSTEDİ' veya 'İSTEMİYORDU' cevap yok <input type="checkbox"/> → IV12 En az bir kere 'DAHA SONRA İSTEDİ' veya 'İSTEMİYORDU' cevap var <input type="checkbox"/> ↓ Gebelikten korunuyor muydunuz? Neden istemediğiniz halde gebe kaldınız?</p>	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>						
IV12	<p>...'ın doğumunu nerede yaptınız?</p> <p>Bu sizin tercihiniz miydi? Neden ...yi tercih ettiniz?</p> <p><i>Hayır ise:</i> Kimin tercihiydi? HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>		NEREDE	TERCİH	KİMİN			
			Ev _____ 1	Evet... 1				
			(KİMİN)	Hayır...2				
			Hastane _____ 2					
			(YERİN ADI)					
			Diğer _____ 3					
			(BELİRTİN)					
		01	1	2	3	1	2	
		02	1	2	3	1	2	
		03	1	2	3	1	2	
		04	1	2	3	1	2	
05	1	2	3	1	2			
06	1	2	3	1	2			
07	1	2	3	1	2			
08	1	2	3	1	2			
09	1	2	3	1	2			
10	1	2	3	1	2			
IV13	Eğer tam istediğiniz sayıda çocuk sahibi olmanız mümkün olsaydı hayatınız boyunca kaç çocuk sahibi olmak istersiniz/istediniz?	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> Allah ne kadar verirse 98						

		Bilmiyorum 99
IV14	Bu çocuklardan kaçının erkek, kaçının kız olmasını istersiniz?	Erkek <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Kız <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cinsiyet hiç önemli değil ... 97 → IV16 Bilmiyorum ... 98 → IV16
IV15	<i>Daha fazla erkek çocuk istiyor ya da sadece erkek çocuk istiyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Neden daha fazla / sadece erkek çocuk olmasını istiyorsunuz? <i>Daha fazla kız çocuk istiyor ya da sadece kız çocuk istiyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Neden daha fazla / sadece kız çocuk olmasını istiyorsunuz?	Neden?- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV16	Kocanız ile kaç çocuk sahibi olacağınız hakkında hiç konuştunuz mu (konuşuyor musunuz)?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 → IV21
IV17	Kocanız kaç çocuk sahibi olmak istiyor?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Allah ne kadar verirse 97 Bilmiyor 98 Bilmiyorum 99
IV18	Kocanız ... çocuk istiyor. Peki, bu çocuklardan kaçının erkek, kaçının kız olmasını istiyor?	Erkek <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Kız <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cinsiyet hiç önemli değil ... 97 → IV20 Bilmiyor 98 → IV20 Bilmiyorum 99 → IV20
IV19	<i>Daha fazla erkek çocuk istiyor ya da sadece erkek çocuk istiyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kocanız neden daha fazla / sadece erkek çocuk istiyor? <i>Daha fazla kız çocuk istiyor ya da sadece kız çocuk istiyor</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kocanız neden daha fazla / sadece kız çocuk istiyor?	Neden?- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV20	<i>Kaç çocuk sahibi olacağınız hakkında aynı fikirdeler</i> <input type="checkbox"/> → IV21 <i>farklı fikirdeler</i> <input type="checkbox"/> ↓ Peki, kimin istediği gibi oldu? Neden sizin istediğiniz gibi oldu / olmadı?	Cevaplayıcı 1 Kocasını 2 Hiç kimse 3 HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV21	<i>Doğurganlık çağı tamamlanmamış</i> <input type="checkbox"/> → IV23 <i>Doğurganlık çağı tamamlanmış veya istediğinden daha çok çocukları var</i> <input type="checkbox"/> ↓ Neden istediğinizden daha az/çok çocuğunuz oldu?	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV22	Neden daha az/çok çocuk olmasını istediniz?	HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>

IV23	Sizce her çift için mutlaka erkek çocuk olmalı mı? Erkek çocuk olması gereken / gerekmeven sebepler nedir?	Evet 1 Hayır 2 Neden?- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV24	<i>Erkek çocuk var</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Eğer şimdi sizin erkek çocuk olmasaydı erkek çocuk olana kadar gebe kalmaya çalışır mıydınız? <i>Erkek çocuk yok</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Siz erkek çocuk olana kadar gebe kalmaya çalışır mısınız?	Evet 1 Hayır 2
IV25	<i>Kocasının kuması var ve erkek çocuk yok</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Sizin erkek çocuğunuz yok diye kocanızın kuma getirmesini kabul ettiniz mi? <i>Kuması yok ve erkek çocuk var</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Eğer sizin erkek çocuğunuz olmasaydı eşinizin kuma getirmesini kabul eder miydiniz? <i>Kuması yok ve erkek çocuk yok</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Eğer sizin erkek çocuğunuz olmazsa eşinizin kuma getirmesini kabul eder misiniz? <i>Kocasının kuması var ve erkek çocuk var</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kocanızın kuma getirmesini siz kabul ettiniz mi? Neden? HİKÂYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	Evet 1 Hayır 2 Neden?- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>
IV26	Kocanızdan başka sizin kaç çocuk sahibi olacağınız ve / veya ne zaman çocuk sahibi olacağınız hakkında fikir söyleyen var mı(ydı)? <i>Evet ise:</i> Kim(ler)?	Evet 01 Kim? Doktor/Hemşire 02 Anne 03 Abla/Küçük kız kardeş 04 Yenge 05 Baba 06 Abi/Küçük erkek kardeş 07 Kayınvalide 08 Görümce 09 Kayınpeder 10 Kayın 11 Elti 12 Komşu/Arkadaş 13 Diğer 14 (BELİRTİN) Hayır 00 → V
IV27	Bu kişi(ler) ne söylüyor (söyledi)? Daha çok çocuk yapmanızı mı, beklemenizi mi, ya da artık çocuk yapmanızı mı?	Daha çok yapmanızı..... 1 Beklemenizi 2 Artık yapmanızı 3

		Diğer _____ 4 (BELİRTİN)
IV28	Bu kişi(ler) neden ...nı söylüyor?	Neden?- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>

V. GEBELİĞİ ÖNLEYİCİ YÖNTEMLER						
V 1	Şimdi sizinle aile planlaması konusunda konuşmak istiyorum. Gebe kalmamak için kullanabileceğiniz çeşitli usuller vardır. Siz hangi usulleri duydunuz? ..., hiç duydunuz mu? Siz ... hiç kullandınız mı?					
		KENDİ- LİĞİNDEN Evet	DUYDU Evet Hayır		KULLANDI Evet Hayır	
01	KADININ TÜPLERİNİN BAĞLANMASI	1	2	3	1	2
02	ERKEĞİN KANALLARININ BAĞLANMASI	1	2	3	1	2
03	HAP	1	2	3	1	2
04	SİRAL	1	2	3	1	2
05	İĞNE/ENJEKSİYON	1	2	3	1	2
06	DERİ ALTI İMPLANTLARI / NORPLANT	1	2	3	1	2
07	KONDOM (BALON)	1	2	3	1	2
08	KADIN KONDOMU	1	2	3	1	2
09	DIYAFRAM, KÖPÜK, JEL FİTİL	1	2	3	1	2
10	ACİL KORUNMA HAPI	1	2	3	1	2
11	SÜT / EMZİRME İLE KORUNMA USULÜ	1	2	3	1	2
12	TEHLİKESİZ GÜNLER	1	2	3	1	2
13	GERİ ÇEKME	1	2	3	1	2
14	Siz gebe kalmamak için erkek ya da kadınların başvurduğu başka bir usul duydunuz mu?	1	3		1	2
		(BELİRTİN)			1	2
		(BELİRTİN)			1	2
VI'ı bakın. Hiç bir yöntemi duymamış <input type="checkbox"/> → V4 En az bir yöntemi duymuş <input type="checkbox"/> ↓						
V 2	Gebelikten korunma hakkında kocanız ile hiç konuştunuz mu? HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	Evet 1 Hayır 2				
V 3	Bu usul(ler)i kimden duydunuz? HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/>	Doktor / Hemşire 11 Bilgi almak için siz mi hastane veya polikliniğe gittiniz yoksa bilgilendirmek için hemşire mi size geldi? Cevaplayıcı <input type="checkbox"/> Hemşire <input type="checkbox"/> Anne 21 Abla/Küçük kız kardeş 22 Yenge 23 Kayınvalide 31 Görümce 32 Elti 33 Kocası 41 Komşu/Arkadaş 51 Diğer 61 (BELİRTİN)				

<p><i>VI'e bakın.</i> <i>En az bir modern yöntem kullanmış</i> <input type="checkbox"/> → V8 <i>Hiç bir modern yöntem kullanmamış</i> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p>		
V	<p>4 Siz gebeliği önlemek ya da geciktirmek için hiç bir modern yönteme başvurmadığınızı söylediniz.</p> <p>Peki, bunun nedeni nedir?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>SAĞLIK/DOĞURGANLIK NEDENLERİ Doktor önermiyor 11→ V7 Gebe kalmaması zor/kısır 12→ V7 Kocası kısır 13→ V7 Menopoz 14→ V7 Yeni doğum yapmış15→ V7 Cinsel münasebeti yok 16→ V7</p> <p>KENDİ KARARI İLE Gebe kalmak istiyorum 21 Sağlık kaygısı 22→ V7 Bütün yöntemler mi, yoksa bazıları mı? Bütün yöntemler..... .1 Bazıları..... 2 Hangisi? _____</p> <p>Dini nedenler 23→ V7 Bütün yöntemler mi, yoksa bazıları mı? Bütün yöntemler 1 Bazı yöntemler 2 Hangisi? _____</p> <p>BİLGİ EKSİKLİĞİ Hiç bir yöntem bilmiyorum..... 31→ V7 Nasıl temin edeceğini bilmiyorum..... 32→ V7 Siz bilgi almak için bir şey yaptınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>KOŞULLARDAN DOLAYI Pahalı 41→ V7 Bulunmuyor/Ulaşma güçlüğü 42→ V7 Siz bu konuda bir çözüm bulmak için bir şey yaptınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>BAŞKASININ KARŞI ÇIKMASI Kocam istemiyor 51→ V7 Neden? _____ Siz kocanızı ikna etmeye çalıştınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Diğer kişi kullanmamasını söylüyor 52→ V7 Kim? _____ Siz bu kişinin sözünden çıkmaya çalıştınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>DIĞER _____ 61 → V7 (BELİRTİN)</p>
V	<p>5 Siz (daha) çocuk istediğiniz için gebeliği önleyici yöntem kullanmadığınızı söylediniz. Peki, hiç gebeliğinizi geciktirmek istediniz mi?</p>	<p>Evet 1 Hayır 2→V7</p>
V	<p>6 Peki, neden hiç gebeliği geciktirme yöntemine başvurmadınız?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>SAĞLIK/DOĞURGANLIK NEDENLERİ Doktor önermiyor 11 Gebe kalmaması zor/kısır 12 Yeni doğum yapmış13 Cinsel münasebeti yok 14</p>

		<p>KENDİ KARARI İLE Sağlık kaygısı 22 Bütün yöntemler mi, yoksa bazıları mı? Bütün yöntemler 1 Bazı yöntemler 2 Hangisi? _____ Dini nedenler..... 23 Bütün yöntemler mi, yoksa bazıları mı? Bütün yöntemler 1 Bazı yöntemler 2 Hangisi? _____</p> <p>BİLGİ EKSİKLİĞİ Hiç bir yöntem bilmiyor 31 Nasıl temin edeceğini bilmiyor 32 Siz bilgi almak için bir şey yaptınız mı Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>KOŞULLARDAN DOLAYI Pahalı 41 Bulunmuyor/Ulaşma güçlüğü 42 Siz bu konuda bir çözüm bulmak için bir şey yaptınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>BAŞKASININ KARŞI ÇIKMASI Kocam istemiyor 51 Neden? _____ Siz kocanızı ikna etmeye çalıştınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Diğer kişi kullanmamasını söylüyor 52 Kim? _____ Siz bu kişinin sözünden çıkmaya çalıştınız mı? Evet <input type="checkbox"/> → HİKÂYE Hayır <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>DiĞER _____ 61 (BELİRTİN)</p>																		
V 7	<p>V3 yada V5'e bakın NASIL TEMİN EDECEĞİNİ BİLMİYOR <input type="checkbox"/> HAYIR işaretleyin. Diğer sebepler ise: Peki, siz gebeliği önleyici bir yöntem temin edilebilecek bir yer biliyor musunuz? → V11</p>	<p>Evet 1 Neresi? _____ Hayır 2</p>																		
V 8	<p>Şimdi sizinle gebeliği önlemek için başvurduğunuz yöntem(ler) hakkında konuşmak istiyorum.</p> <p>Gebeliği önlenmek için kullandığınız yöntemleri kullandığımız sıra ile söyley misiniz?</p> <p>Bu yöntem(ler)i kullanmaya başladığınız zaman kaç çocuğunuz vardı?</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>USUL no.</th> <th>ÇOCUK SAYISI</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>01</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>02</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>03</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>04</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>05</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		USUL no.	ÇOCUK SAYISI	01			02			03			04			05		
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05																				
V 9	<p>Bu yöntem(ler)i kullanmaya kim karar verdi?</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>KİM Kendisi .. 1 Kocası ...2</th> <th>BİLİYOR Evet ... 1 Hayır ... 2</th> <th>NEDEN Kayıt</th> <th>YIL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		KİM Kendisi .. 1 Kocası ...2	BİLİYOR Evet ... 1 Hayır ... 2	NEDEN Kayıt	YIL													
	KİM Kendisi .. 1 Kocası ...2	BİLİYOR Evet ... 1 Hayır ... 2	NEDEN Kayıt	YIL																

	<p><i>KENDİSİ ise:</i> Kocanız sizin ... kullandığınızı biliyor mu(ydu)? ↓ HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Neden bu yöntem(ler)i kullanmayı tercih ettiniz?</p> <p>Kaç yıldır kullanıyor / kullandınız?</p>		Beraber...3		<input type="checkbox"/>			
		01	1 2 3	1 2				
		02	1 2 3	1 2				
		03	1 2 3	1 2				
		04	1 2 3	1 2				
		05	1 2 3	1 2				
<p>V 10</p> <p>Bu yöntem(ler)i kullanmaya devam ediyor musunuz yoksa bıraktınız mı?</p> <p><i>Bırakmış ise:</i> Neden bıraktınız? HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>		<p>DEVAM E / H 1 2</p>		<p>NEDEN Gebe kalmak istedim1 Gebe kaldı 2 Yan etki 3 Biri söyledi 4 → HİKÂYE Diğer ... (BELİRTİN)5</p>				
				01	1 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		
				02	1 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		
				03	1 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		
				04	1 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		
				05	1 2	<input type="checkbox"/>		
<p>V 11</p> <p>Size gebeliği önleyici yöntemleri kullanmamanızı söyleyen kişi(ler) oldu mu? Kim(ler)? Siz ne yaptınız?</p>	<p>Evet 1 Hayır 2 HİKAYE- Kayıt <input type="checkbox"/></p>							

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

Turkish and Kurdish words that are used frequently in the text are listed below. They are made plurals by adding ‘s’ in the text. Words that are used only occasionally are accompanied with translation.

AÇSAP (Ana Çocuk Sağlığı ve Aile Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü): General Directorate for Mother-Child Health and Family Planning

ağa: landlord or head of tribe

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi): Justice and Development Party

aşiret: tribe

berdel/berdêl: form of marriage in which sisters are exchanged between two men

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): Republican People’s Party

DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi): Democratic Society Party

gecekondu: squatter house or area

hadith: collection of writings that document the sayings and actions of the prophet Muhammad

kabile: group of kinsmen

kahvehane: tea house (the literal meaning is coffee house)

kilim: flat-woven rug

muhtar: the elected head of neighbourhood or village

PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan): Kurdistan Worker’s Party

sağlık ocağı: public polyclinic

Yeşil Kart: Green Card, or a type of health insurance given to the low-income citizen who are not entitled to or cannot afford the other types of health insurance

APPENDIX C

TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Tezin Kapsamı

Bu tez Van'da yaşayan köyden kente gelen Kürt göçmen kadınlarda üreme pratiklerini araştıran bir örnekölçü çalışmasıdır. Van, ülkede doğurganlık hızının 1960'lardan sonra düşmesine rağmen doğurganlık hızının yüksek kaldığı doğu illerinden birisidir. Kürt nüfusunun yoğun olduğu Van ve diğer bazı Doğu ve Güneydoğu illerinde doğurganlık hızı sadece yüksek kalmamış, aynı zamanda bölgede silahlı çatışmaların, toplu yerinden edilmenin görüldüğü ve kent nüfusunun hızla arttığı 1980 ve 2000 yılları arasında artış göstermiştir. Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü'nün bölge verilerine göre (2002a), Van'da toplam doğurganlık hızı 1980 ve 1985 yılları arasında 5.2'den 4.9'a düşmüş ve 2000 yılında ise 6.0'a yükselmiştir. Ancak, sadece Doğu ve Güneydoğu illerinde doğurganlık hızının yüksek seyretmesi değil son zamanlardaki değişkenliği de bu zamana kadar fazla dikkat çekmemiştir. Bunun nedeni, yüksek doğurganlığın doğal doğurganlık olarak algılanması veya doğurganlık hızının düşmesi ve sosyoekonomik gelişimin paralel ilerlediği algısı olabilir. Son birkaç yılda bazı sosyal bilimciler Türkiye'deki doğurganlık seviyesindeki bölgesel eşitsizliği incelemeye başladılar, ancak bu çalışmaların çoğu demografik ve makro seviyede niceliksel çalışmalardır. Bu çalışmalar, Türkler ve Kürtler arasındaki etnik ayrımı önemli gören görüş ile eğitim seviyesi ve yerleşim alanları gibi diğer faktörleri önemli gören görüş arasında bölünmüşlerdir. Ancak Türkiye'deki etnik farklılık sadece doğurganlıkla ilgili farkla değil bölgesel, sosyoekonomik ve eğitimle ilgili farklılıklarla da örtüşme eğilimindedir (Sirkeci 2005; Koç ve ark. 2008). Diğer bir ifadeyle, Kürtler arasında da önemli farklar olmakla birlikte, Kürt vatandaşların ülkenin gelişmemiş Doğu bölgelerinde ikamet etme, kötü yaşam koşullarında yaşama, eğitim olanaklarından mahrum olma ve daha çok sayıda çocuk sahibi olma ihtimalleri daha yüksektir (Işık ve Pınarcıoğlu 2006).

Bundan dolayı doğurganlıktaki farkı belirleyen tek bir faktörü ayırdetmek kolay bir iş değildir. Alternatif olarak bu tez yüksek doğurganlığın arkasındaki sosyal dinamikleri incelemeye çalışmıştır. Böylece bu tez, Van ilinde son zamanlarda görülen politik, sosyoekonomik ve demografik dinamizmin başlıca aktörleri/kurbanları olan göçmen Kürt kadınları arasındaki üreme pratiklerinin niteliksel bir analizini yapmıştır. Bu tez, Kürt kadınlarının yüksek olan doğurganlıklarını geleneksel doğal üreme paterninin devamı olarak gören sosyal evrimci görüşü sorgulamıştır. Her zaman cinsiyetleşmiş olan politik-ekonomik dinamizmin sıklıkla demografik paternin temelini teşkil ettiği görüşüyle hareket edilmiştir. Araştırmayı daha çok ilgilendiren konu böylece demografik değil, sosyolojik ve feministtir.

Teorik Bakış Açısı: İnsan Üremesinin Feminist Politik-Ekonomisi

Geleneksel üreme anlayışında, ataerkilliğin ve politik ekonominin özellikleri sıklıkla belirsizdir. Pek çok antropolojik çalışma, üremenin farklı toplumlarda değişik yollarla organize edildiği göstermiş ve üremeyi sadece biyolojik bir olay olarak alan modern anlayışı eleştirmiştir. Ancak, sanki bir topluluk, özellikle ev hayatı, kendi sınırları içerisinde dengeli bir durumdaymış gibi, üreme ile ilgili politikaların etkilerini son zamanlara kadar hafifsemişlerdir.

Örneğin, Carol Delaney'in Türkiye'nin kırsalında üremenin (procreation) halk (folk) teorisi üzerine yaptığı çalışma (1991), son yıllarda yapılan üreme ile ilgili önemli bir antropolojik çalışmadır. Delaney, üremenin "monogenetik" teorisinin Türkiye kırsalında değerler ve sosyal ilişkiler sistemlerini düzenlediğini açıklamaktadır. Bu kozmolojik sistem içerisinde, herşey tek bir kaynaktan orijin alır ve bu kaynak da sembolik olarak erildir. Yaratıcı Tanrı ile benzer şekilde erkek tanrısal bir hayat verici yeteneğe sahiptir. Hayatı yaratıcı kıvılcımı ve çocuğun kişiliğini belirleyen onun tohumudur. Kadın sadece bu tohumu besler ve idame ettirir. Toprağa benzer şekilde, doğal olarak açık, ancak sosyal olarak erkeğin sahipliğinde kapalıdır, çünkü o başka bir tohumu değil sadece ona sahip olan erkeğin tohumunu beslemelidir. Böylece, kadın bir tarla gibi sahibi olan erkek tarafından ekilir, onun tohumunu besler ve onun çocuğunu doğurur. Bundan dolayı, cinsiyet ilişkileri başlangıçtan beri

sembolik olarak hiyerarşiktir; tanrısal yeteneklerle donatılmış erkek ve erkek tarafından sahiplenilen ve onun tohumlarını besleyen kadın. Delaney, Türkiye’de cinsiyet ilişkilerini hiyerarşik yapan şeyin, ne kadının üreme fizyolojisi ne de üreme alanına hapsolünmesi olmadığını, üreme sürecinde cinsiyet rolleri ile ilgili özel bir halk teorisi olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Gerçekten de, Delaney’in ataerkillik anlayışı idealistiktir. Delaney, değersizleştirilen şeyin üreme değil, bu süreçte kadının kültürel olarak algılanan rolü" olduğunu iddia etmektedir (1991: 27, 266). Kadınların düşük olan statüleri, onların fizyolojileri veya yaptıkları işlerden değil, onların üremede algılanan rolleriyle ilişkili olarak sembolik bir şekilde oluşturulan cinsiyetlerinden kaynaklanır. Ancak, cinsiyet hiyerarşisinin sembolik olarak oluşturulması, sosyoekonomik hiyerarşi gerçeği olmadan çok zor kalıcı olur. Delaney feministleri, kadınların üremesini onların ikinci plana itilmelerinin temeli olarak algıladıkları için suçlamaktadır (1991: 27). Ancak, önceki yıllarda Shulamith Firestone (2003) gibi kadın fizyolojisinin problemin nedeni olduğunu düşünen muhtemelen bir elin parmakları kadar feminist vardı. Feministler kamu/özel ve üretim/üreme arasındaki farkları eleştirirken, bunların kesinlikle doğal düzenler veya evrensel olduklarını düşünmezler. Feministler özel ve üreme alanlarının ayrımı ve önemsizleştirilmesinin tarihsel olarak oluşturulduğunun farkındadırlar (örn. Eisenstein 1979; Hartmann 1981; Pateman 1988). Feministlerin yapmaya çalıştığı şey, doğa maskesinin arkasındaki güç ve üreme politikalarını ortaya çıkarmak iken, Delaney bu görüşü önemsememiş ve sembolik anlamların yorumuna odaklanmıştır.

Örneğin, Mary O’Brien (1981) ataerkilliğin, erkeklerin devamlılık ve türlere entegrasyonu için mücadelelerinin sonucu olduğunu göstermeye çalışmış ve ataerkil monogenetik teoriyi açıklamaya teşebbüs etmiştir. Adrienne Rich anneliğin kadınların baskılanmasının bir içsel nedeni olduğu fikrine karşı çıkmıştır ve ataerkil çıkarlar için kurumlaşmış anneliğin kadınların baskılanmasının tarihsel bir nedeni olduğunu savunmuştur. Adrienne Rich ayrıca ataerkilliğin idealist düşüncesine de karşıydı; ataerkil otorite fikrini Baba Tanrı’dan çıkarmadı; Baba Tanrı aileyi ataerkil kontrol altına alma çabasından ortaya çıktı (Rich 1986: 67).

Bu feministler eğer haklıysa, üremenin eril monogenetik teorisi sunulmuş, biyolojik veya kültürel değil, cinsiyet mücadelelerinin sonucunda tarihsel olarak oluşmuş bir yapıdır. Bu, başarılı erkek üstünlüğünü onaylamak için bir kaynak değil, daha ziyade insanların bilinç veya bilinçsizliğini belirleyen sonsuz karşıkoymamaz güçtür. Pierre Bourdieu (1990) bize, güç uğruna anlamların nasıl açıkça manipüle edildiğini göstermiştir. "Sembolik şiddet" egemenlik ilişkilerinin açıkça ifade edilmesini gizler, ve bunların fiziksel veya ekonomik şiddetten ziyade daha ekonomik bir yolla devam ettirir. Üremenin halk teorisi, kadınlara sembolik olarak şiddet uygulayan ve zaman zaman fiziksel ve ekonomik şiddeti destekleyen egemen söylemdir. Ancak, kadınların bunu hiç sorgulamadıklarına ve sadece tanımlanan ikincil rollerini oynadıklarına, öyle görünüyor olsa da, inanmak oldukça zordur.

Ancak, son yıllarda pek çok feminist etnoğrafyacıların ortaya çıkardığı gibi ortada büyük sorunlar olmasına rağmen (örn. Abu-Lughod 1990; Raheja ve Gold 1994), zaman zaman güçsüzlüklerini ve pasifliklerini vurgulayan üçüncü dünya kadınlarının muhtemelen geleneğin pasif taşıyıcıları olmayıp, "içinde buldukları durumlara değişik gizli yollarla yanıt vermiş ve direnmiş olmaları" önemli ve ümit verici bir gerçektir (Abu-Lughod 1990: 41). Egemen söylem bu durumun güçlü olmakla birlikte sadece bir parçasıdır. Feminist bakış açısıyla, egemen söylemi tekrar ortaya koymak aşırı muhafazakarlıktır. Üremede cinsiyet mücadeleleri ve bunun sosyoekonomik, politik ve kültürel duruma gömülü olması tanımlanırsa, üreme etnoğrafyası daha fazla açıklayıcı olur.

Bu arada, demografi üremeyi en yakından ve tutarlı bir şekilde inceleyen bir disiplindir. Klasik modernizasyon teorisine dayandırılan demografik değişimin sosyoekonomik anlayışının 1970'lerde sorgulanmasının ardından, demografi doğurganlık eğilimlerinde ekonomik olmayan veya kültürel faktörleri gözönüne almaya başladı. Ancak, kültürel bir özellik (örn. etnisite, din ve bölgesel farklılıklar) sosyoekonomik açıklamanın başarısız olduğu durumlarda sıklıkla rezidüel bir değişken olarak kullanılır. Demografik çalışmalar modernizasyon teorisine dayanan sosyal değişim tezini tekrarlamaya devam etmiştir. Demografik çalışmalar

ataerkilliğin belirlenmesinin ötesine geçmeye ve buna neden olan karmaşık sosyal dinamiklere bakmaya meyletmezler.

Sutay Yavuz (2006, 2008) Türkiye’de doğurganlık farklılıklarında etnisitenin önemini vurgulayan ilk demografyacılarıdır. Yavuz, dil gruplarına göre üçüncü doğum oranlarını incelemiştir. Yavuz, Türkçe bilmeyen Kürt kadınların ülkedeki diğer kadınlara göre doğurganlıklarının özellikle daha geç düşmesinin, onların “genel sosyoekonomik ve kültürel modernizasyon sürecine” “eşit olamayan şekilde (veya hatta onların izolasyonu)” entegrasyonuna bağlanabileceğini ileri sürmüştür (2008: 332). Resmi dili bilmemeleri onların “doğurganlığın düzenlenmesi ile ilgili bilgileri ve değerleri (çocuk doğurma ile ilgili yeni arzular, modern doğum kontrol yöntemleri bilgisi, Batılı kültürel değerlerin alınması vs.)” edinmelerini engellemiştir (2008: 332). Sosyal ilişkilerin, örneğin ortak bir dil vasıtasıyla, demografik değişikliğin önemli bir katalizörü olabileceğini bize söyleyen difüzyon teorisidir, ki bu da Kürt kadınların kültürel izolasyonu ve doğurganlıklarındaki düşüşün gecikmesini açıklar.

Yavuz’un istatistiksel analizi Türkiye’deki demografik çalışmalara yeni bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Ancak, bana öyle geliyor ki, Kürt kadınların doğurganlıklarının düşüşündeki gecikmeyi difüzyon teorisiyle açıklayıvermek, fenomenin dil yönünden yoksun olmanın ataerkil temelini ortaya çıkarabilecek ve bunu önemsizleştirebilecek önemli sosyal dinamiklerin gözden kaçmasına neden olabilir. Yavuz’un çalışması Türkiye’de doğurganlık farklılıklarını etnik olarak delillendirmeye çalışmış, ancak ben bu söylemin kültürel açıklamanın ötesine geçmesinin gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Birinci olarak, dil yönünden yoksun olmanın sosyoekonomik arkaplanı Yavuz’un çalışmasının kapsamı dışında olsa da, dil konusu Türkiye’de sadece etnik değil ayrıca cinsiyet problemidir. Etnisitenin ülkede bir sorun olmadığını söyleme niyetinde değilim, ancak difüzyon teorisinin cinsiyeti egemenlik ilişkileri olarak gizlemek ve onu bir modernizasyon meselesi haline indirgemek gibi riskleri vardır.

İkinci olarak, Yavuz'un verileri, Doğu ve Güneydoğu bölgelerindeki Kürt köylerinde çatışmaların ve göçlerin yoğunlaştığı 1993 ve 1998 yılları arasında Türkçe bilmeyen Kürt kadınlarında üçüncü doğum oranının arttığını göstermiştir. Difüzyon teorisi tarihsel şartları nadiren gözönüne alır ve doğurganlıktaki bu gibi dalgalanmaları açıklayamaz.

Üçüncü olarak, kültürel izolasyon tezi Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması'nın 2003 yılı verileriyle tutarlılık göstermemektedir (HUIPS 2004). Bu veriler, Kürtçe konuşanların büyük çoğunluğunun yaşadığı Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi'ndeki hemen hemen bütün kadınların, ülkedeki diğer kadınlar gibi en az bir modern doğum kontrol yöntemini bildiklerini gösteriyor (Smits ve Hoşgör 2003: 835; Sirkeci 2005: 156; HUIPS 2004: 61). Kürt kadınların doğum kontrol yöntemleri konusunda bilgilendirilmiş olmalarına rağmen, kalabalık ailenin daha değerli olması, doğum kontrolüne karşı olan dini inançlar, doğurgan kadının kültürel olarak övülmesi veya sadece geleneksel üreme paterninin devamı nedenleriyle bu kadınların doğumları sınırlandırmak istememiş olmaları ihtimali de elbette vardır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Yavuz'un da söylediği gibi, Türkçe bilmeyen Kürt kadınları arasında planlı modern küçük aileye doğru fikirsel bir değişim olmamış olabilir. Ancak, endüstri öncesi tarım toplumunda yüksek doğurganlık kültürü veya geleneği varsa, bu erkek-merkezli egemen söylemin bir ürünü olabilir. Feminist bilgiye göre, pre-modern veya kırsal olsun kadının, onun sağlık durumu ve işyükü, halihazırda olan çocuklarının refahı ve çok çocuk sahibi olmanın ona babaya göre daha az maddi ve sembolik faydalar sağlayacağı gerçeklerine rağmen, mutad bir şekilde arka arkaya sürekli doğum yaptığına inanmak çok zordur.

İnsan üremesi ile ilgili pekçok tarihsel, antropolojik ve feminist çalışma, doğum kontrolünün modern düşünce ve biyomedikal teknolojinin birdenbire oluşan bir başarısı olmadığını ileri sürmüşlerdir. İnsanlar çeşitli kişisel veya grup çıkarları için antik çağlardan beri doğurganlığı arttırmak veya azaltmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Kadınlar da, her zaman kendi bedenlerini, cinselliklerini ve üremelerini toplumsal değerler, eşlerinin ve diğer aile fertlerinin istekleri ve kendi güçleri ölçüsünde kontrol etmek istemişler ve bunun için mücadele etmişlerdir. Erkeklerin üreme ile

ilgili sorunları sadece kadının doğum yapabilmesi gerçeğinden kaynaklanırken, kadınların zorlukları ataerkillikle yakından ilgilidir. Böylece, feminist bakış açısıyla bakıldığında, bugün bildiğimiz insan üremesi onun ataerkiil organizasyonunun farkına varılmadan yeteri kadar anlaşılabilir.

Bu tezde ataerkillik, endüstri öncesi feodal domestik birime gönderme yapan 'babaların yönetimi'nin literal olarak dar anlamıyla değil, sosyal hayatın bütün alanlarında erkek ayrıcalığını teşvik eden toplumsal cinsiyet düzeninin daha geniş yapısal anlamıyla tarif edildi (Johnson 2005). Son yıllarda, feminist bilim insanları ataerkilliğin kesinlikle değişmeyen düzenli tekparçalı bir yapı olmadığını ortaya koydular. Ataerkillik derin bir yapıya sahiptir, ancak sürekli olarak muhalif görüşler tarafından karşı koyulmakta ve bazen de yeniden şekillenmeye zorlanmaktadır. Sürekli devam eden mücadele, müzakere ve yeniden şekillenmenin zamansal bir sonucudur. Ayrıca diğer sınıf, ırk ve etnisite gibi hiyerarşik düzenleriyle kaçınılmaz olarak kesişmektedir ve sıklıkla değişen tarihsel gelişimler tarafından tehdit edilir. Böylece, diğer hiyerarşik sistemlerde farklı şekilde konumlanan kadınları farklı şekillerde etkiler.

Feminist yaklaşımlar insan üreme araştırmaları için vazgeçilmezdir. Bunun yanında, bazı eski feministlerin farzettikleri gibi üreme toplumun materyal temelini oluşturduğu için değil, kadınların üremesi toplumsal ilişkilere gömülü olduğu için insan üreme araştırmalarında sosyolojik yaklaşım da gereklidir. Ancak, feminist yaklaşım, bugünkü insan üremesini anlamada sadece sosyolojik değil, ayrıca politik-ekonomik analizi de uygularsa daha verimli olabilir. Bunun üç nedeni vardır: birincisi üremenin güçlü bir organize edici gücü olarak ataerkilliğin politik-ekonomiye bağlı olması; ikincisi günümüz modern çağında üremenin artan politik-ekonomik özelliği; üçüncüsü son yıllarda hızla küreselleşen politik-ekonomik sistemde yüzyüze geldiğimiz farklı problemlerin gittikçe birbirlerine daha bağımlı olmalarıdır. Böylece, feminist politik-ekonomik yaklaşım, cinsiyetleşmiş karmaşık politik mücadelelerle yapılan insan üremesinin önemli bir yönünü ortaya çıkarabilir.

Metodoloji ve Metodlar

Bu tez, feminist metodoloji ile yapılan ve bir örnekolay çalışmasına dayanan yorumlayıcı bir araştırmadır. Feminist metodoloji, kadınlar için politik ve etik taahhütten ilham alır, kadınların tecrübelerine dayanır, feminist teorilerle bilgilendirilir ve kadınlara karşı sorumludur (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16, 7). Feminist metodolojinin kadının ikinci plana itilmişliğine olan duyarlılığı, araştırmacının eşit olmayan cinsiyet ilişkilerine gömülü olan düzenleri sorgulamasına ve kadın ve erkekler arasındaki insani ilişkilerde 'dönüştürücü değişim' için çalışmasına olanak sağlar (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16-7; Ertürk 2004). Sistemik araştırmayı sonlandırmaya değil erkek egemenliğini sonlandırmaya teşebbüstür (Harding 1986: 10). Ayrıca erkek-merkezli bilgi yerine kadın-merkezli bilgi üretmeye bir teşebbüs değil, cinsiyet bağlılığı ve özne-nesne hiyerarşisi olmayan feminist bilgi üretmeye bir teşebbüstür (Harding 1986: 10). Bu tez, geleneksel tartışma ve üreme pratiklerinde gizlenen veya üstü örtülü olan kadınlar üzerindeki erkek egemenliğine sistemik araştırmayla ışık tutmak için uygun olduğundan feminist metodolojiyi benimsemiştir.

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) açıklayıcı niteliksel araştırmalarda teorik duyarlılık ile sabit bir karşılaştırılabilir örnekolay seçiminin faydalı olduğunu savunmuşlardır. Temel alınan teoride, örnekolaylar pozitivist araştırmacıların yaptığı gibi belirli bir teoriyi doğrulamak için seçilmezler. Etnoğrafyacıların yaptığı gibi saha ile ilgili herşeyi bilmek için de toplanmazlar. Hepsi verilere temellendirilen kavram, hipotez ve sonunda teori oluşturmak için araştırma süresince teorik ilgiye göre örnekolaylar aşama aşama seçilip toplanırlar. Sistemik olarak araştırılan ve dikkatlice seçilen bir örnekolay daha önce kabul gören bir genellemeyi geçersiz kılabilir ve yeni araştırma açımları getirebilir. Temel teorinin rehberliğinde bu tez, üreme ve ataerkilliğin politik-ekonomik organizasyonuna teorik olarak duyarlı kalarak, Türkiye'deki üreme davranışlarının niceliksel analizleriyle yeteri kadar açıklanamayan göçmen Kürt kadınların üreme davranışlarını inceledi.

Veriler mülakatlar yapılarak toplandı. Temel olarak, örnekolay çalışmaları tarihsel belgeler ve eserlerden inceleme, mülakat ve katılımcıl gözlemlere kadar pekçok

veriyi kullanır. Ancak günümüz Doğu Anadolu bölgesinde kadınların üremede karar verme tecrübeleri üzerine oldukça sınırlı miktarda belge ve eser vardır. Anket çalışmalarının doğurganlık eğilimlerinin arkasındaki sosyal yapıyı aydınlatmada yetersiz oldukları görülmüştür. Katılımcı gözlemler araştırılan konunun mahremiyetinden dolayı uygun değildir. Yarı-biçimlendirilmiş mülakat ise, kadınların üremenin belirli sosyal düzenlemelerindeki ve takibinde karar verme süreçlerindeki tecrübelerini incelemede en iyi yöntem olarak düşünülür. Yarı-biçimlendirilmiş mülakatta, bir konu hakkında önceden hazırlanmış sorular vardır, ancak bu sorular temel olarak ucu açık sorulardır ve mülakat yapılan kişiyi kendini ifade etmesi için cesaretlendirdiğinde soruların sıralamasında ve araştırmada esneklik sağlar. Araştırmacı ve mülakat yapılan birey arasında daha fazla bir etkileşime, tartışmaya ve olayların açıklığa kavuşturulmasına imkan verir (Reinharz 1992: 18). Bu yöntem feminist tercihlerden biri olan "kadınlardan öğrenmeyi" de sağlamış olur. Daha az standardize olan bir veri sunar, ancak veriler çeşit ve ifade açısından daha zengindir. Feminist bir araştırmacının, kadınların tecrübelerine ayrıcalık tanımadaki bir mantık, daha önceden baskılanmış olan söylemleri ortaya çıkarmak ve varolan adaletsizlikleri açığa çıkarmak, diğer mantık da daha birleştirici olan genel ve özel, kamusal ve kişisel, yapısal ve bireysel bilgi üretmektir. Geleneksel pozitivist araştırmalarda, kadınların tecrübeleri özel, kişisel ve bireyselle ait olduğu, yani genelleme yapılamadığı için gözardı edilmektedir. Kadınların tecrübelerine duygusalıcı-kurmacı (emotionalist-constructionist) yaklaşım, sıklıkla toplum ve bireyler arasındaki çelişkili ancak sıkı olan bağları ortaya çıkardığı için genelleştirilmiş veya tamamen subjektif olan bilgiden daha faydalı olabilir. Aslında, "sosyolojik imgelem" sosyal gerçeklerin bilimsel araştırmalarının temelidir (Mills 2000). Böylece bu tezde, kadınların hikayeleri ilgili araştırmalardan elde edilen sosyolojik ve tarihsel bilgiler ışığında incelendi.

Politik Ekonomik Arka Plan

İnsan üretmesi günümüz dünyasında ulusal ve uluslararası politikaların ana konularındandır ve sıklıkla kadınların bedenleri kontrol edilerek düzenlenmektedir. Türkiye'nin nüfus politikaları, uluslararası politik eğilimlere uymak için kalkınmacı istekler – ulusal ataerkilliğin küresel ataerkilliğiyle uyumu- ile dış etkilere karşı

koyma ve babaların egemenliğine emanet edilen kişisel alana karışmama ulusal istekleri – ataerkillik anlaşmasının tanınması, arasında gidip gelmektedir. Resmi aile planlama programlarının tutarsız uygulamalarına rağmen, ulusal toplam doğurganlık hızı 1990’larda kendini yenileme seviyesine yaklaşıyordu. Ancak, doğurganlık hızı Doğu ve Güneydoğu bölgelerinde ise yüksek olmaya devam etti. Bundan sonra bu Doğu ve Güneydoğu bölgelerinde doğurganlık hızını ulusal doğurganlık seviyelerine getirmek için aile planlama programları uygulandı. Bu, primer ve üreme sağlık hizmetlerini bölgedeki daha çok sayıda kadınlara ulaştırmak için bir fırsat olabilirdi. Ancak, kısa süre sonra bazı olaylarla aksadı – bölgedeki çatışmalar, ekonomik krizler, neo-liberal ekonomik politikaların yeniden başlaması ve ABD’deki aile planlama sektörlerinden gelen kaynakların kısmen çekilmesi. Bu arada, Doğu Anadolu Bölgesinde’ki kadınlarla ülkedeki diğer kadınlar arasındaki farklılıklar eskiden beri var olan özellikte değil tarihsel olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Ulusal politik sistemde aşiret liderlerinin politikacılar ve bürokratlarla olan ilişkileri, 1950’den sonra aşiret sisteminin modernleşmesi (Çağlayan 2009: 91) ve PKK ile devlet güvenlik güçleri arasındaki yoğun çatışmalar ve 1980’lerin sonu ile 1990’larda Doğu bölgelerindeki köylerden toplu yeriden edilmelerin olması hep birlikte Doğulu ve Kürt insanların kapitalist sisteme ülkenin geri kalanından farklı olarak entegre olmalarına neden olmuştur. Bunun etkileri cinsiyetçi (gendered) ve de sınıfçı (classed) olmuştur ve özellikle kadınları olumsuz etkilemiştir (Ertürk 2007: 6).

Aşiret sisteminin modernizasyonu, feodal sosyal ilişkilerin ve geleneksel ataerkillik sisteminin yakın zamana kadar korunmasına neden olmuştur. Bölgedeki pek çok Kürt kadının bir seri temel vatandaşlık haklarından faydalanmasını engellemiştir. Devletin 1980’lerde Doğu’daki köylere ulaşmaya başladığı sırada ortaya çıkan çatışmalar kamu hizmetlerini baltalamış ve sosyal hayatı sınırlamıştır. Toplu yeriden edilme hem bireysel hem de toplumsal seviyede yıkıcı etkiler oluşturmuş ve ülkede yeni bir yoksun grup yaratmıştır. Gelişmemiş bir kente hazırlıksız olarak zorunlu göçün bir sonucu olarak, insanlar maddi kaynaklarını, sosyal ağlarını ve insan sermayesini kaybetmişlerdir. Topluluklar dağılmış ve aşiret sistemi her zamanki önemini yitirmiştir. Bu, bireyler için geleneksel güvenlik ağı mekanizmasının kaybı ve resmi korumaya kavuşma ve hayatlarını yeniden

oluşturamadan önce istikrarsız piyasa ekonomisine maruz kalmaları anlamına geliyordu. Bunun yanında, çatışmaların ve toplu yerinden edilmenin olduğu zaman süreci ekonomide artan neoliberalizme denk geliyordu. Bu durum, Doğu'daki köylerden göç eden Kürtler gibi vasıfsız işçilerin resmi işlerde çalışabilme imkanlarını oldukça azaltmıştı. Bu, sadece çatışmalar dolayısıyla göç edenleri değil, aynı zamanda biraz daha önce gönüllü olarak göç eden ve benzer şekilde vasıfsız olan göçmenleri de etkilemiştir. Aslında, toplu yerinden edilme de gönüllü göçmenleri dolaylı olarak etkilemiştir. Bunların pek çoğu, köylerin boşaltılmasıyla kendi köyleri ile olan bağlarını ve geleneksel güvenlik ağlarını kaybetmişlerdir. Böylece, bu gönüllü göçmenler çatışmalardan, sosyoekonomik güvensizlikten ve marjinalleşmekten zorunlu göç edenler kadar çok olmasa da etkilenmiştir. Uzayan ve şiddetlenen güvensiz ortam erkeklerin kontrolü kaybetmekten korkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum, kadınların hareketlerini kısıtlayarak erkek alanının sınırlarını korumakla meşgul olan ataerkilliğin yeni bir şeklinin ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır.

Veri Toplama

2007 Nisan ve Mayıs aylarında yapılan ön çalışmanın ardından, 2008 Şubat ve Haziran ayları arasında Kürt göçmenlerin yaşadığı mahallelerden biri olan Doluca mahallesinde yaşayan kırk kadın ile mülakatlar yapıldı. Mülakat yapılacak kadınların seçimi, kartopu ve teorik örneklem kombine edilerek yapıldı. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, örnekölay çalışmaları genelleştirme ve temsil amacı ve iddiasında değildir. Aslında yapılan tam anlamıyla "örneklem" değildir. Yapılan şey daha ziyade istatistiksel değil teorik amaçlarla örnekölayların seçimidir. Dolayısıyla örnekölaylar rastgele seçilmedi, farklı yaşlarda evli kadınları, hem Türkçe konuşan hem de konuşamayan kadınları, hem gönüllü hem de zorunlu göçmenleri içermesine dikkat edilerek veri toplama ve önermenin oluşturulması sürecinde amaçlı olarak seçildi.

Kırk katılımcının 23'ü Türkçe konuşabiliyordu. Katılımcıların yarısından fazlasının okuma yazması yoktu ve yaklaşık üçte ikisi hiç okula gitmemişti. Mülakat yapıldığı sırada katılımcıların hiçbirinin maaşlı bir işi yoktu. Katılımcıların eşlerinin hepsi Türkçe biliyordu ve bunların %90'ı okur yazardı. Ancak eşlerin yaklaşık yarısı hiç

okula gitmemiřti veya beřinci sınıftan nce ilkokuldan ayrılmıřlardı. Eřlerin oęu sosyal gvencesi olmayan gayri resmi iřlerde alıřıyorlardı. Katılımcıların ve eřlerinin oęu, bazıları gen yařta olsa da gc bizzat yařayan primer gmenlerdi. Van'ın atak ilesindeki kylerden veya Siirt ve řırnak gibi evre illerin kylerinden gelmiřlerdi.

Mlakatlar genellikle katılımcıların kendi evlerinde gerekleřtirildi. Sorular Trke soruldu. Trke bilmeyenlerle yapılan mlakatlar, katılımcının tercih ettięi bir tercmanın (genellikle kızı) yardımıyla yapıldı. Btn mlakatlar katılımcının da onayı ile ses kayıt cihazına kaydedildi. Mlakatlar yarım saatten  saate kadar srd. Katılımcıların 15'ine birden fazla sayıda ziyaret yapıldı.

Bulgular

Gvensiz yařam kořullarında, 20. yzyılın son on yıllarında g eden doęulu Krt kadınları, pek ok saęlık hizmetinin verildięi kent blgelerinde yařıyor olmalarına raęmen kendi remelerini kontrol etmede yoksun bir durumda bırakılmıřlar gibi grnyorlardı. Bu arařtırmada, mlakata katılan oęu kadının ekonomik zorluklar ve sahip oldukları ocuklara daha iyi bakabilme isteęi nedenlerinden dolayı doęumları sınırlandırmak ve aralarındaki sreyi amayı arzu ettikleri grlmřtr. Pek ok katılımcı istedikleri gibi bakabilecekleri ideal ocuk sayısının iki olduęunu dřnyordu. Hepsi de pek ok doęum kontrol yntemi hakkında bilgi sahibiydi. Pek oęu zellikle modern doęum kontrol yntemlerini denemiřlerdi. Bu muhtemelen, doęulu kadını hedef alan devletin yoęun olarak uyguladıęı aile planlama programının bir sonucudur ve de kadınların remeyi etkili bir řekilde kontrol etme arzusu ve arařının bir gstergesidir.

Katılımcıların doęum kontrol yntemleri kullanımları dil ve g gruplarına gre incelendięinde, doęum kontrol yntemlerinin kullanımı Trke bilenlerde bilmeyenlere gre, gnll g edenlerde zorunlu g edenlere gre daha fazlaydı. Ancak, bir kere karar verip uyguladıklarında hem Trke bilenler hem de bilmeyenler, sadece poliklinikler veya eczanelerden alınabilen modern doęum kontrol yntemlerine ulařabiliyorlardı. Zorunlu g edenler gnll g edenlere

göre geri çekme yöntemini daha çok uyguluyorlardı. Zorunlu göç eden bazı kadınlar modern yöntemler kullandığında bile, kadın doğum kontrol ürünlerinden ziyade erkek prezervatiflerini diğer göç grubuna göre daha fazla kullanıyorlardı.

Gönüllü göç eden katılımcılar, Türkçe bilmeleri ve kadın ağının bulunması yönleriyle zorunlu göç edelerden bir miktar daha fazla avantajlıydılar. Bundan dolayı, zorunlu göç edenlere göre bu gruptakilerin daha yüksek olan modern kadın doğum kontrol yöntemlerini kullanma oranları, bu kadınların sağlık hizmetlerine ve genel olarak toplumsal alana ulaşmada daha güçlü olduklarının bir göstergesi olarak yorumlanabilir. Ancak, gönüllü göç eden katılımcıların sağlık hizmetlerine ulaşabilmeleri doğrudan başarılı bir doğum kontrolüne neden olmuyor. Bu kadınlar pek çok doğum kontrol yöntemini denemişler ve bu da devamsız kullanım ve başarısızlığın sık olmasının bir nedeni olabilir. Buna ilişkin olarak, birden fazla sayıda farklı doğum kontrol yöntemi kullanan kadınlar, sadece bir çeşit yöntem kullananlara göre üç kata daha fazla sayıda istenmeyen gebelik geçirmişlerdir.

Doğumların sayısı ve sıklığını sınırlama arzusuna ve doğum kontrolü teşebbüslerine rağmen, pek çok katılımcı istediklerinden daha fazla sayıda çocuk sahibi olmuştu. Katılımcıların çoğu en az bir kez, pek çoğu da birden fazla kez istenmeyen gebelik yaşamıştı. Katılımcıların üreme hikayeleri, kadınların özerkliklerini kısıtlayan ve hayatın değişik evrelerinde üremelerini başarılı bir şekilde kontrol etmelerini engelleyen pek çok durumla mücadele etmek zorunda kaldıklarını göstermiştir. Pek çok katılımcı tarafından paylaşılan bu engelleyici durumlardan bazıları tarif edilebilir. Erken yaşta evlilik, mekansal segregasyon üzerinde ataerkil gözetleme, kocanın desteğinin olmaması, sınırlı kadın ağları ve sağlık personelinin ataerkil ve etnik önyargısı kadınların bir miktar özerklik sahibi olmaları ve ihtiyaçları olduğunda doğum kontrol yöntemlerine ulaşabilmeleri için oldukça fazla çabalamalarını gerektirmektedir.

Bunun yanında, katılımcılar arasında doğum kontrolü bilgisinin yaygın olması, 1990'ların sonlarında hemşirelerin evleri ziyaret ederek verdikleri ve kısa bir dönem devam eden üreme sağlık hizmetleri politikasının etkili olduğunun da bir

göstergesidir. Bu örnekolay çalışmasında da görüldüğü gibi, üreme haklarına işlerlik kazandırılması diğer insan haklarından ayrı olarak gerçekleştirilemez. Ancak devlet politikaları, primer sağlık hizmetleri ve kadınların üreme hakları nüfus politikasındaki değişikliklerle engellenmeden tutarlı ve sistematik bir şekilde sağlanırsa, doğulu Kürt kadınların üreme sağlıklarının biraz daha iyileştirilebileceği düşüncesine yol açmıştır.

Bulgular, katılımcıların doğurganlıklarının geleneksel üreme paterninin bir devamı olmadığını göstermektedir. Katılımcıların üreme hikayeleri, üreme süreçlerinin gömülü olduğu politik ekonomik bağlam ışığında incelendiğinde bu tez, katılımcıların doğum kontrol teşebbüslerini özellikle zorlaştıran faktörün, doğum kontrol sorumluluğunu ekonomik kaynaklara ulaşmasına, ayrıca hareket özgürlüğünü kısıtlanarak insan ve sosyal sermaye imkanlarını oluşturmasına izin verilmeyen kadına yükleyen yeniden şekillenen ataerkillik olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

Katılımcıların hikayeleri, onların eski yoksunluklarına ilaveten yeni kısıtlamalarla yüzyüze kaldıklarını ortaya çıkarmıştır. Katılımcılar ülkedeki diğer vatandaşlara göre zaten daha yoksundular. Ülkenin diğer bölgelerindeki kadınların üstesinden geldikleri eğitim imkanlarından yoksun olma, erken yaşta ve zorla evlendirilme ve çekeşlilik kadın olarak baskılanmalarını kolaylaştırmaya devam etmektedir. Özellikle, erken yaşta evlilik kadınların üreme açısından aktif oldukları dönemi uzatmakla kalmamakta, aile planlamasına katılma ve çocuk sahibi olma konusunda karar verecek kapasite ve güce ulaşmadan önce onları cinsel ilişkilere ve gebeliğe maruz bırakmaktadır.

Köyden kente göç geleneksel ataerkilliği sarsmıştır. Herşeye rağmen, göç kadınların toplu ulaşım, okul, poliklinik, polis ve hukuk büroları gibi kamu hizmetlerine fiziksel olarak daha yakın olmalarını sağlamıştır ve bu da onların muhtemelen daha fazla güçlenmelerine yardım edebilir. Ancak, sağlık hizmetlerini de içeren kamu alanlarına katılımcıların kendi başlarına ulaşabilmeleri, toplum tarafından organize edilerek ortaya çıkan ataerkil gözetleme ile etkili bir şekilde kontrol edilmiş ve önemli ölçüde kısıtlanmıştır. Araştırma yapılan mahallede, ataerkilliğin geleneksel bir şekli maddi

tabanının kaybolmasıyla birlikte gerilemekteydi. Ancak bu, ataerkilliğin gerilemesine değil yeniden şekillenmesine neden olmaktadır. Kabile veya aşiret liderlerinin otoriteleri önemini kaybederken, ataerkil otorite daha küçük hane reislerine dağıtılmıştı.

Bu yeni ataerkinin otoritesinin politik ve ekonomik temelleri pek sağlam değildi. Ataerkil toplumdaki erkekler bu endişe verici durumun üstesinden gelebilmek için kadınlar üzerinde daha fazla egemenlik kurmak istemektedirler (Johnson 2005). Böylece, yeniden şekillenen ataerkillik, kadınların ulaşabilecekleri alan ve kaynakları kontrol ederek kendi eril alan ve gücünü tekrar garantiye almak için çabalamaktadır. Alışılmadık kent ortamı, göç edilen mahalledeki heterojen yapı ve endişeleri olan yeni ataerki, kadınların kötü niyetli dedikodulardan korkmadan özgürce hareket edebildikleri alanı küçültmüş ve kadınların namus/hicap (honour/shame) kompleksindeki özerkliğini artırmada kaçınılmaz bir araç olan kendi ağlarını oluşturma imkanlarını ortadan kaldırmıştır.

Hala kısmen devam eden geleneksel ataerkillik ve yeniden şekillenen ataerkilliğe ilaveten katılımcılar devlet ataerkilliliği ile de yüz yüze kalmışlardı. Devlet, kadınları güçlendirmek için değil de, yerel ataerklere eril gücünü hissettirmek ve Batı'nın gelişmişlik seviyesini yakalamak için 1990'ların sonundan itibaren paternalist bir şekilde Doğu Anadolu'da doğum kontrolünü teşvik etmiştir.

Buna rağmen, katılımcıların çoğu sonunda değişik seviyelerde ataerkil kontrol ile mücadele etmeyi öğrenmişlerdi ve çok sayıda istenmeyen gebelik yaşasalar da modern doğum kontrol araçlarına ulaşmayı başarabilmişlerdi. Aslında, üremenin kontrolü herkez için bir öğrenme sürecidir, çünkü özellikle kadınlar sosyokültürel olarak kendi bedenleri ve üreme hakkında cahil kalmaları teşvik edilmektedir. Ancak öğrenme süreci, çeşitli hiyerarşik sosyal tabakalar kompleksindeki pozisyonuna bağlı olarak farklı kadınlar için kısmen kolay veya zor olabilir. Bu tez, Doğu Anadolu'daki Kürt göçmen kadınlar için, 1980'lerden beri devam eden politik-ekonomik durumların istikrarsızlığıyla da desteklenen pek çok ataerkil kısıtlamalardan dolayı, doğum kontrol araçlarına ulaşabilmelerine rağmen kadınların kendi üremelerini

kontrol etmelerini öğrenmelerinin oldukça uzun ve zor bir süreç olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Ancak, çalışma yapılan mahalledeki kadınların mücedeleleri sadece pek çok ataerkil engellemelerin üstesinden gelmekten ibaret değildi. Onlar bir basamak daha ileriye giderek, ataerkilliğin içersinde kalsa da, geleneksel ataerkilliği sarsacak bir söylem getirmişlerdi. Örneğin, pro-natal dini söylem, sorumlu bir ebeveyn olmayı önceleyen bir söyleme dönüştürüldü. Çoğu katılımcı ittifakla, "çocuklarıma bakamazsam benim günahımdır" diye ifadelerde bulundular. Öyle görünüyor ki yeni söylem, araştırma yapılan mahallede geleneksel pro-natal söylemin yerine giderek daha fazla yerleşmekte. Çok sayıda katılımcı, kendilerini annelerinin nesilleriyle veya kendilerinin daha önceki evlilik yıllarındaki durumlarıyla olan farkları dile getirirken, sorumlu ebeveynlik ve ilerleyicilik modern söylemlerine gönderme yaptı.

Sonuç

Gebelik önleyicilerin tarihi ve farklı kültürlerdeki uygulamalarının feminist yorumları, doğum kontrolünün geleneksel olarak modern bir icat olarak anlaşılmasına karşı çıkmıştır. Feminist anlayışa göre, kadınlar her zaman bir şekilde kendi bedenlerini kontrol etmek istemişler ve bunun için mücadele etmişlerdir. Modernleşmeden önce üremede kadınların pasif kalmaları, cinsiyet mücadeleleri sonucu ortaya çıkan bir efsanedir.

Burada yapılan araştırma da bunu desteklemektedir. Bu çalışma, kırsaldaki Kürt kadınının, eşinin hanesi için potansiyel işgücünü karşılamak üzere arka arkaya doğum yapmasının beklendiği köy hayatında yaşadıkları zamanlarda bile, üremelerini kontrol etmek istediklerini göstermektedir. İşyüklerinin çok ağır olması nedeniyle kadınlar çok sayıda doğum yaptıktan (özellikle erkek çocuk) ve eşlerinin hanelerinde kendi pozisyonlarını oluşturduktan sonra daha fazla doğum yapmak istememişlerdi. Ağır yükler kaldırarak, ata binerek, yüksek bir yerden atlayarak veya düşük yapıcı bazı bitkisel olarak gizlice düşük yapmak için denemelerde bulunmuşlardı. Bu araştırmaya katılan çoğu kadın, kendilerinin kamu alanlarına

ulaşmasını engelleyen pek çok faktöre rağmen, modern gebelik önleyicilerini kullanarak doğumlarının sayısını ve sıklığını sınırlandırmak için mücadele etmişti.

Doğurganlık ve doğum kontrolü ile ilgili araştırma yapan pek çok araştırmacı, Kürt kadınlarının yüksek olan doğurganlıkları ve kısmen düşük olan gebelik önleyicileri kullandırmalarını, modern aile normlarından kültürel olarak izole olmalarına bağlamışlar veya eğitim seviyelerinin düşük olmaları ile ilişkilendirmişlerdir. Bu tez çalışması, Yavuz (2006; 2008) tarafından ileri sürülen ve Yüceşahin ve Özgür (2008) tarafından da desteklenen kültürel izolasyon tezini inkar etmemektedir, çünkü buradaki örnek olay çalışması kesinlikle tüm Kürt nüfusu için genelleştirilemez ve Yavuz'un inceleme yaptığı dönemden on yıl sonra gerçekleştirilmiştir. Yavuz'un tezi farklı bölgelerde veya daha önceki yıllarda geçerli olabilir. Buna rağmen, buradaki tez çalışması, kadınların tarihsel mücadelelerini dikkate almayan Kürt nüfusundaki yüksek doğurganlığın kültürel söylemi ve tutarsız politik-ekonominin ve ataerkilliğin yapısal güçlerini etkili bir şekilde sorgulamaktadır.

Kürt kadınlarının yüksek olan doğurganlıkları bazen asimilasyona karşı azınlık direnci olarak algılanmaktadır. Ancak, bu araştırmada bunu destekleyen bir bulguya rastlanmadı. Bazı yayınlarda bildirilen (örn. Conseil Sante ve ark. 2007) ve bazı katılımcılar tarafından da anlatılan, daha önceki yıllarda devletin aşılama ve doğum kontrolünü teşvik etmesine karşı halkta oluşan direnç ve şüphelerin azalmış olduğu gözlemlendi. Hatta bu düşüncelerinin yerini, kamu hizmetlerinden ülkedeki diğer vatandaşlar (Türkler veya Batı bölgelerinde yaşayanlar) kadar faydalanamadıkları algılamalarının oluşturduğu hayal kırıklığı almıştır.

Etnik milliyetçi projelerde, kadına sıklıkla toplumun bireylerini doğuran biyolojik doğurucu, kültürü devam ettiren sosyal doğurucu, kültürel sembollerin taşıyıcısı, grup sınırlarının belirteci ve politik ve askeri mücadelelerin katılımcısı rolleri atfedilir (Çağlayan 2009: 23). Handan Çağlayan (2009) etnik milliyetçi harekette Kürt kadınının kimliğinin oluşması çalışmasında, sosyoekonomik altyapı, eylemcilerin cinsiyet dağılımı ve ideolojik hedefler değiştikçe Türkiye'deki Kürt hareketinde kadınların rolünün de radikal bir şekilde değiştiğini göstermiştir.

Çağlayan, 1980'lerden sonra Türkiye'deki Kürt hareketinde, kadınların rolünün biyolojik ve sosyal doğurucu ve kültürel sembollerin taşıyıcısı olmaktan, politik ve askeri mücadelelerin katılımcısı olma rolüne doğru değiştiğini söylemektedir. Bu yaklaşım, burada yapılan tezde neden milliyetçi pro-natal ideolojinin göçmen Kürt kadınların üreme pratiklerinde bir etkisinin gözlemlenmediğini açıklamaktadır.

Alternatif olarak bu tez, Doğu Anadolu gecekondulu mahallelerinde yaşayan göçmen Kürt kadınların devam eden yüksek doğurganlıklarına feminist politik-ekonomik bir yaklaşım önermektedir. Yukarıda da tartışıldığı gibi feminist politik-ekonomik yaklaşım, ataerkilliği birincisi, kronolojik ve coğrafi olarak sınırlı bir geleneksel pratik olarak değil, sosyal hayatın bütün alanlarını erkek üstünlüğü prensiplerine göre organize eden bir sosyal sistem olarak ve ikincisi, ataerkilliğin gömülü olduğu ve dolayısıyla güçlendirildiği, sınırlandırıldığı veya dönüştürüldüğü politik-ekonomik durum olarak ele almaktadır. Feminist bir politik-ekonomik yaklaşım açısından, Doluca kadınlarının sosyoekonomik yoksunluklarının ve üreme özgürlüklerindeki engellerin altında yatan nedenlerin, ülkedeki tarihsel politik-ekonomik durumlar doğrultusunda değişen ataerkil ittifaklar ve rekabetlerin olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Çok sayıda feminist araştırmacı, ataerkil grup sınırlarının algısal riskleri bağlamında kadınlar üzerindeki ahlaki düzenlemeler ve kontrolün artmakta olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir (Jayawardena 1986; Ertürk 1996: 26). Doluca kadınları da, sadece modernizasyonun gerisinde kalmayla değil, aile, toplum ve devlet seviyelerinde paradoksal ataerkillik ittifak ve rekabetinin sonucu olarak da ortaya çıkan yoksunluklarla mücadele etmektedirler.

İlk olarak, devlet ve ağalar arasındaki yarım yüzyıllık ittifak, geleneksel ataerkil politik sistemin devam etmesini sağlamış ve kırsal Kürt kadınların nüfusa kaydedilme, resmi eğitim alma, resmi evlilikler, sağlık hizmetleri ve ücretli çalışma gibi kadınların güçlenmesine neden olacak pek çok araçtan (veya sivil haklar) yoksun kalmalarına müsaade etmiştir.

İkinci olarak, Doluca erkekleri gibi ekonomik ve politik olarak güvensiz olan göçmen Kürt erkekleri, kadınlar üzerindeki kontrollerini ve ataerkil sınırları giderek daha fazla belirlemeye odaklanmışlardı. Bu ataerkil sınırlar, kadınların ahlakını ve dolayısıyla erkeklerin namusuna zarar verebilecek olan yabancıların (erkekler) duruma göre değişen tanımlarına bağlı olarak, oturulan hane, bina veya mahalleyle sınırlı olacak kadar dar olabilmekteydi. Kadınların hareketlerini kontrol ederken erkekler, birbirlerine kadınların hareketleri hakkında bilgi vererek diğer göç eden erkeklerle hem ittifak kuruyor hem de rekabet ediyorlardı. Kadınları kontrol etmek ve diğer erkeklerden korumak köy hayatında da her zaman erkekliğin önemli bir parçasıydı. Ancak, kent ortamında yabancıların daha yakın olmaları ve toplumsal sınırların tam olarak belirli olmaması nedeniyle bu durum daha zor bir hal aldı ve her zaman tehlikedeymiş gibi algılandı. Erkeklerin namusu, "tarla veya sürülere göre daha kolay ölçüldüğü ve sayıldığı" (Bourdieu 1990: 121) ve bu namus üzerindeki şüpheler en güçlülere bile çok zarar verebileceği için ve kısmen de bunun kadına bağlı olması nedeniyle içsel olarak kırılğan bir konudur. Bugünkü güvensizlik ve belirsizlik ortamında, Doluca erkeklerinin gözünde namus, potansiyel olarak sürekli tehlikededir.

Üçüncü olarak, devlet müdahale etmemeye dair gizli politikasını değiştirmiş ve çatışmaların azaldığı 1990'ların sonunda Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgelerine nüfuz etmeye başlamıştır. Devlet değişik yeni programlarla Doğulu kadın ve kızlara, bir zamanlar pratikte olmayan sivil hakları ve kamu hizmetlerini sağlamaya çalışırken, bunun arkasındaki itici gücün yerel ataerklere ve Batı'ya karşı olan rekabet olduğu ileri sürülebilir. Bir taraftan devlet Doluca kadınlarında olduğu gibi şimdi Doğu'daki kadınlara ulaşıyor ve gururla onları erkeklerinden (baba, koca, ağa veya Kürt milliyetçi liderler) daha iyi "koruyabileceğini" iddia ediyor. Diğer taraftan da devlet, Türkiye'yi Batı'nın sahip olduğu medeniyet ve gelişmişlik seviyesine ulaştırma amacıyla olan Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşundan itibaren devam eden modernizasyon projesinin tamamlanması için onları hedef almıştır. Doğulu kadını modern yapmak, örneğin doğurganlıklarını azaltmak, etkili bir şekilde bu hedefe götürecektir, çünkü Doğulu kadınların durumu bütün gelişmişlik ölçütlerinde oldukça zayıftır. Bundan dolayı, aile planlama programı, primer olarak kadınların

güçlenmesine ve onların üreme haklarının uygulanmasına yardımcı olmak için değil, gebelik önleyici araçların mümkün olduğu kadar çok kadına ulaştırmak ve doğurganlık değişimini tüm ülkede eşit olarak tamamlamak üzere dizayn edilmiştir.

Bu tez, ülkedeki en yoksun kadın gruplarından birinin üreme ile ilgili bir diğer mücadelesini ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Üreme, pek çok toplumda ataerkil olan ve politik-ekonomik durumla bağlantılı olan bir seri sosyal ilişkilere gömülüdür. İstikrarsız ekonomi ve giderek daha çok güvensiz olan politik durumlar küresel fenomenlerdir ve dünyada herkezi etkilemektedir, sıklıkla da alışılmış hayatı ve yeni olanakları ellerinden alarak özellikle zaten yoksun olan kişilerin hayatını fena etkilemektedir. Doluca kadınlarının son otuz yılda yaptıkları üreme ile ilgili mücadeleleri bu durumun bir parçasıdır.

Kadınlar eğer geçmişte olduğu gibi günümüzde de hala kendi bedenlerini ve üremelerini tarih boyunca ve farklı kültürlerde değişik yollarla kontrol edebilmek için mücadele ediyorlarsa, bunun nedeni hegemonik cinsiyet, sosyal sınıf ve küresel ve ulusal politik güçlerin insan üremesi üzerinde menfaat aramalarıdır (vested interest) (Bandarage 1997: 171). Üreme haklarının küresel olarak en tartışmalı insan hakları konularından biri olmaya devam etmesi gerçeği bunu göstermektedir. Değişen toplumlarda ataerkilliğin hangi yollarla yeniden şekillendiği ve ataerkilliğin farklı şekillerinin üreme ile farklı ilişkileri henüz çalışılmamıştır. Kadınların evrensel olan kendi üremelerini kontrol etme arzu ve teşebbüslerine rağmen insan üremesinin tarihsel ve kültürel olarak farklı şekillerini anlamak için bakılması gereken konu, kadınların eğitimi, istihdamı veya çocuk doğurma algılarından ziyade yeniden şekillenen ataerkillik ve erkekliklerdir (masculinities). Ataerkillik önemlidir!

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Him, Miki (Suzuki)
Date and Place of Birth: 31 August 1974, Kanagawa, Japan
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 432 225 15 15
email: mikisuzukihim@hotmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Edinburgh University Social Anthropology	1998
BS	Tokyo Womens Christian University Cultural Studies	1997
High School	Tokyo Junshin Girls High School, Tokyo	1993

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2006- Present	Yüzüncü Yıl University Sociology Department	Part-time Lecturer

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Turkish and Japanese

PUBLICATIONS

1. Suzuki, Miki (2000). "Law as a Subversive Site: Women's Struggle in Bangladesh" *Journal of Asian Women's Studies* 8:24-39.

HOBBIES

Badminton, Gourmet, Movies, Travel