YOUTH IN THE 1980s IN TURKEY:

CHILDREN OF CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

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Turkey is an arena of social struggles for young people who have often been repressed, marginalized, invalidated, isolated and stereotyped by the dominant discourses that shape the existence of youth. This could be related to the rapidly changing circumstances that anticipate the milieu of frequent crises Turkey has been associated with. This thesis is an attempt to contribute to an understanding of the social patterns that are reflections of the mediated crisis and their role in identity formation processes of youth in the 1980s. It focuses on the post-1980 generation in Turkey. The study analyzes constructions and representations of youth in Turkey, particularly between 1980 and 1990. Institutional ethnography was used in order to understand the emergence of the post-1980 generation, as well as to draw a picture of politics and culture in the 1980s, focusing on identity politics to comprehend the public discourse in which this generation was represented.

Keywords: generation, crisis, identity, representation, discourse

ÖZ

1980'LERDE TÜRKİYE'DE GENÇLİK:
KRİZ ÇOCUKLARI

Can, Işın

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji

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Türkiye gençler için, çoğunlukla gençliğin varlığını şekillendiren baskın söylemlerle klişelendirildiği, izole edildiği, geçersiz sayıldığı, marjinalize edildiği ve baskı altında tutulduğu bir toplumsal mücadeleler arenasıdır. Bu durum, çok sık gerçekleştiği için Türkiye ile özdeşleşen kriz ortamının hızla değişen koşulları ile ilgili olabilir. Bu tez, aracılık edilen krizin yansımaları olan toplumsal örüntüleri ve bu örüntülerin 1980'lerde gençliğin kimlik oluşturma süreçlerindeki rollerini anlamaya bir katkı sağlama girişimidir. Bu çalışma Türkiye'de 1980 sonrası kuşağa odaklanmaktadır ve özellikle 1980 ve 1990 arası Türkiye'de gençliğin kuruluşunu ve temsillerini analiz etmektedir. Hem 1980 sonrası kuşağının oluşumunu anlamak hem de bu kuşağın temsil edildiği kamusal söylemi kavrayabilmek için kimlik politikalarına odaklanarak 1980'lerin siyasetini ve kültürünü resmetmek amacıyla kurumsal etnografi kullanılmaktadır

Anahtar kelimeler: kuşak, kriz, kimlik, temsil, söylem.

...to my mother Hatice Taşkın

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although a society's survival is directly related to the capacity of the productive and transformational power of the younger generations and young people comprise the biggest proportion of Turkey's population, it cannot be said that there is significant attention paid to the issues related to the social conditions of youth in Turkey. For the most part, it is neglected that youth in Turkey have been suffering within the chaotic condition created by dominant institutions, such as families, schools, communities, state, religion, traditions, economy and the media, which together manufacture young people's overall being. Young people are merely marginalized socially and economically and the tendency of neglecting youth's potential allows the market to be overrepresented in the media by targeting youth as consumers.

Developed Western societies consider a young labor force in reserve as a great benefit; yet, contemporary society in Turkey is an arena of social struggles for young people who have often been repressed, marginalized, invalidated, isolated and stereotyped by the dominant discourses that shape the existence of youth. This could be related to the rapidly changing circumstances that anticipate the milieu of frequent crises Turkey has been associated with. The term became so popular and 'functional' that it has been used in almost every single discussion on society. There has been a considerable literature developed on the *'crisis'* noticeably. Major changes in society have been explained and analyzed with reference to the causes and results of the crisis. From the sixties on, Turkey experienced significant changes with regards to power relations since there have been interruptions to the ongoing

regime by two military coups and a military note. Above all, the coup in 1980 caused a tumult in society both politically and economically. It also gave rise to significant changes in the social and cultural spheres.

Furthermore, the mass media was involved in the public and private spheres not only as the main source of mediated information but also as a powerful social institution that carries prevailing discourses. As a peripheral component of the global mass culture from 1980s on, Turkey has been experiencing the tension between the global and the local more profoundly. Acknowledging that youth have more at stake in the crisis conditions introduced through globalization trends, I attempt to explicate the power relations in society by which young people have been confined.

The central aim of this thesis is to contribute to an understanding of the manufactured patterns that I consider as reflections of the mediated crisis and their role in identity formation processes of youth. I deal with the generation of people born between 1961 and 1981. Most frequently called as the post-1980 generation, it is a contemporary product of the perpetual crisis in the world and in Turkey. I aim to look at constructions and representations of youth in Turkey, particularly between 1980 and 1990. I define a generation as a socially constructed category which explains social changes from the perspective of collective memories and shared historical conditions. I examine the representations of youth in the media in the 1980s that give noteworthy clues to understand the conflicts between the contradictory discourses; and the effects of the events of that particular era on the processes of identity formation of youth. After drawing the theoretical framework and explaining the mode of operation, I elaborate on definitions and perspectives on youth through different perspectives. I briefly discuss the generational theory and its relation to crisis. Negative attributes on the post-1980 generation show similarities to stereotypes of Generation X in North America and its different versions in different countries. As post-1980 politics and culture are influenced by global changes, I also take account of Generation X coverage in the media and academic

works, emphasizing the relevant stereotypes. I discuss generations in Turkey before 1980 briefly to show the shifts in construction of youth in public discourse.

Before moving onto the emergence of the post-1980 generation, I strive to draw a picture of politics and culture in the 1980s and to explain identity politics in order to understand the ground on which this generation was represented. I am looking for the implicit meanings and dynamics through the power relations that shape young people's bodies, identities and cultures. I want to explore the opportunities of critical discourse analysis to understand why and how a generation has been different than the previous one and changes of public discourse on youth in time. Being aware of the fact that whatever is said or written eventually builds a new discourse, I read power relations by utilizing institutional ethnography, thus giving voice to members of a generation.

However, the main challenge for me has been writing the social from the standpoint of my experiences as a member of the generation in question. In other words, my inquiry derived from the issues I have met within the social relations in Turkey, which is the 'locale' of this work. Hence, I apply "institutional ethnography" to map out the political and cultural patterns that shaped a generation. Institutional ethnography allows me to discover the social from the actualities of people's experiences, as it draws out paradigms beyond the everyday, and provides subject positions to emerge within the discourse of sociology. Using institutional ethnography, I aim to find patterns of ruling relations and look at the institutional complexes by examining various discourses regarding youth predominantly in the 1980s.

I interviewed fourteen people with different backgrounds yet all from urban and middle-class families for the purposes of this thesis. The rise of the middle-class population accompanied with rapid urbanization in Turkey during the 1980s has provided a terrain for generational identities to come into sight similar to other

societies. I also interpreted two different texts by Küçük İskender, a striking literary figure, in order to show self-reflexivity that is associated with this generation. I used a number of different texts with regards to films, television, constitution and humor to trace how youth is represented. I also made the most of my interviews with an effort to create a dialogue through experience.

CHAPTER
II

METHOD AND FRAMEWORK

Dorothy Smith's (2005: 51-52) *Institutional Ethnography* provides opportunities to analyze hidden social relations in everyday life experiences of people within a framework of ruling relations. She introduces institutional ethnography as an alternative sociology for people, by which "maps" of ruling relations can be created and knowledge of institutions and ruling relations are formed. According to Smith's (2005: 225) definition: "Institutional ethnography explores the social relations organizing institutions as people participate in them and from their perspectives. " She regards people as "expert practitioners of their own lives" and she argues that the ethnographer needs to learn from them and analyze the coordination of their activities in order to map the "institutional aspects of ruling relations". These maps can provide knowledge for people of their lives in comparison with other's at different places and in different times.

As Terry Threadgold (2003) clarifies, Smith has an eclectic approach deriving from knowledge of Marx, ethnomethodology, Foucault, Bakhtin, critical discourse analysis and conversational analysis. She writes the social from the standpoint of "the embodied subject", as Threadgold (2003) describes, the mediator between "textual forms" and "the social". Yet, subjects do not formulate and reformulate the social only, but also themselves. Thus, textual processes shape and imprint the body with the elements of the content, so the body acts within the "textuality" of everyday life as an institution and gives flesh to the social. In Smith's (2005: 225) framework, the term "institution" is used to spot the multifaceted patterns of "ruling relations" that are formed as organized functions with distinctive discourses. Education, health care, legal system or any other organization as such fall in to the area of institutions. Institutions have their distinctive discourses to form a system that consists of categories and concepts of ruling relations. Thus, institutions are associated with

generalizations in their discourses, in which people are not seen as subjects and agents. Discourse, in this approach, is used in its Foucauldian sense, hence, it refers to:

> translocal relations coordinating the practices of definitive individuals talking, writing, reading, watching, and so forth, in particular local places at particular times. People *participate* in discourse and their participation, and their participation reproduces it. Discourse constrains what they can say or write, and what they say or write reproduces and modifies discourse. Though discourse is regulated in various ways, each moment of discourse in action both reproduces and remakes it (Smith 2005: 24).

Michel Foucault (1988b: 18) considers social institutions as being inherent to discourses that construct various kinds of institutional establishments, in which people are constructed and categorized in general and specific ways. According to Foucault, "Technologies of power" that are imposed by dominant authorities and "technologies of the self" internalized apparatus for the self-discipline of individual action fall into the area these discourse constructions.

As media plays a significant role in formation and circulation of contemporary discourses, I also take John Fiske's conceptualizations into account. Fiske (1996: 3) takes Foucault's concept of discourse further and defines it as an 'elusive' term that implies, a theoretical concept with a broad and spectrum and particular practices within that frame. He defines discourse as "the language in social use" that gives a new order to the practice of constituting and utilizing meanings. These meanings shift from being in a conceptualized form into specific circumstances related to history, social relations and politics. Thus, discourse for Fiske, "as the language in social use", has an inherent emphasis on power relations throughout history. Its usage depends on the social actors and their place within these power relations. Fiske suggests that discourse is totally attached to the conditions that brought it into being and to its circulation. He does not deal with how consistent and traditional the discourse is but how and by whom it is created. While Foucault divides societies as

monodiscursive and multidicursive according to the level of advance in the capitalist structure, for Fiske, on the contrary, there is a nondiscursive reality, but people can access the reality only through discourse which determines their sense of the real. Hence, discourse may not produce reality, but it does produce the instrumental sense of the real that a society or social formation uses on a daily basis.

> Discourse, then, is always a terrain of struggle, but the struggle is never conducted on a level field. The dominant discourses, those that occupy the mainstream, serve dominant social interests, for they are products of the history that has secured their domination. (Fiske, 1996: 5)

Fiske's definition of discourse as a terrain of struggle helps me to make an account of dominant and conflicting discourses in Turkey in the 1980s. It is significantly beneficial in understanding how these discourses emerged and altered under specific conditions and by whom they were produced and modified. Since I try to focus on the social conditions and cultural codes by which youth identities are shaped, I also benefit from explanatory components of critical discourse analysis the way it is used in Norman Fairclough's (1995: 132) description is the endeavor :

> to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power.

While discussing the shifts from the political to the cultural in the 1980s, the theory of mass society comes across as one of the most influential apparatus in social sciences. It was cited by Daniel Bell in his well recognized work *The End of Ideology*, as described in *State Master Encylopedia* (n.d):

> Mass society is a society in which the concerns of the majority – the lower social classes – play a prominent role, characterized by extension of voting rights, an improved standard of living for the lower classes and mass education.

The theory derives from different sources from Tocqueville to Mannheim and occupied the Frankfurt School with its take on the culture. The main assumption has been:

> the mass society develops a mass culture, in which cultural and political values and beliefs tend to be homogeneous and fluid. In the middle and at the bottom-in the atomized mass-people think and feel alike; but thoughts and feelings, not being firmly anchored anywhere, are susceptible to fads and fashions. At the top, poorly-organized elites, themselves mass-oriented, become political and managerial manipulators, responding to short-run pressures; they fail to maintain standards and thereby encourage the spread of populism in politics, mass tastes in culture-in short, and a "sovereignty of the unqualified. (Harold Wilensky, 1964:175)

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Institutional ethnography by mapping the ruling relations, namely, textually based social organizations in Smith's terms. Hence the concept of ruling relations focuses on the idiosyncratic "translocal forms of social organization and social relations mediated by texts of all kinds (print, film, television, computer and so on)…"(Smith, 2005:227).

CHAPTER

III

YOUTH AND GENERATIONS AS PROBLEMATIC CATEGORIES

Taking into consideration Turkey's unique social dynamics, I discuss the different perspectives on how and to what extent age and generations can be employed as explanatory factors in furthering the understanding of social processes. Although they provide a convenient way for measuring events or transitions, I consider them as subjective devices for building categories that are by and large meaningful in their particular context. Nonetheless, they provide a flexibility to revise the existing frames in order to search out for useful clues to comprehend the particular case in Turkey.

Youth and generation as social categories have been debatable, as there is neither a common age range for youth nor a specific time interval for a generation. Both definitions of youth and labels of generations create a risk of oversimplifying the social group in question. Yet, bearing in mind that these are socially constructed categories that cross cut class, gender and race allows utilizing youth and generation to understand social change.

Most of the theoretical perspectives concerning contemporary youth and generations are based on the examinations of the social dynamics in western societies that are affecting young people. Despite the fact that there are significant divergences between different societies, it is possible to utilize these perspectives to identify with the economic and cultural globalization processes that are resulting in the homogenization of life styles everywhere in the world.

3.1 Definitions of Youth

On definitions of youth Leyla Neyzi (2001: 413) states that:

> "Youth" tends to be defined demographically as a cohort between ages of 15 and 24. Rather than universal, however, as historical and ethnographic studies have shown, the concept of youth is a product of the experience of modernity.

The category of youth is problematic and it is not a standard conception in all societies. It is a very new phenomenon, which was created by the change in perception of how young people come of age by the rise of industrialization. Before the nineteenth century, even childhood was categorized as an altered phase of life and it was seen as miniature adulthood (Philippe Aries, 1979: 95-96).

Youth as a category reflects many of the values, aspirations and interests of society at large. As argued in *Youth and Sociology* (1972: 17), a society's organization, its division of labor, its major values, its norms of symbols, all intensely influence how youth is defined and portrayed. Youth is a category through which social roles; attributes and meanings are created and reproduced. After the sixties, the category of youth has been extended to a longer period of one's life-span including 10 year old children and people in their late twenties, 30 years old and even early thirties along the prolongation of their dependency to their parents. Theodore Roszak (1972: 3) sees this social extension process has led to a creation of youth with particular set of roles, beliefs, standards of behavior and feeling, and visions of the future. Despite the differences among various societies, there is one thing in common in the perception of youth: the period of youth is a transition from childhood to full adult status in society. Sergei Eisenstadt (1972: 17) describes this as follows:

> This is the stage at which the individual's personality acquires the basic psychological mechanism of self-regulation and self-control, when his/(her) self-identity becomes crystallized. It is also the stage at which the young are confronted with some models of the major roles they are supposed to emulate in adult life and with the major symbols and values of their culture and community.

For David Smith (1981: 239-251), the sociology of youth was dominated for a long time by structural-functionalism and a range of idealist studies. Accordingly, both youth culture and youth subcultures were introduced by structural-functionalism. He says that the term "counter-culture" was used by Neo-Marxists as a critique to the scholars that studied youth cultures. Neo-Marxists considered that youth had the potential to lead to a radical change in society in 1960s. Smith explains how the theoretical focus on youth had changed within the framework of British Sociology in 1970s. He defines it as the "New Wave Sociology". Accordingly, the focus on youth shifted to the social reaction theory, by which subcultures were conceptualized in line with problem solving approaches. He also mentions Marxists studies on youth and claims that they reintroduced class as a standpoint in understanding youth. He suggests that the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University had made a great contribution to the sociology of youth but their domination in the field both theoretically and empirically caused many problems to remain unresolved.

However, the perception of youth is different in Turkey. Neyzi (2001: 415) suggests that "youth" is identified with a person's marital status in Turkey. Thus, even when a teenager gets married he or she enters the world of adults. Neyzi emphasizes the importance of difference between age groups in Turkey and she observes that it is in the core of building individual identity. She indicates the nickname "delikanlı" (wild blooded) given to young people in Turkish society referring to their aptitude to challenge the status quo.

3.2 Perspectives on Youth

James E. Cote and Anton L. Allahar (1994:13-16) in their pioneering work *Generation on Hold* compare different perspectives on youth in two different categories: nature and nurture approaches. Nurture approaches are given emphasis here as they fall into the field of culture with an assumption that youth is culturally constructed. Cote and Allahar (1994:16-20) explain that functionalist approaches are based on a suggestion that young people in agrarian economies were central to the production whereas in industrial economies they have become marginal. Hence, they have shifted from being economic assets to being economic liabilities for their families. This is due to the ideologies that include the significance of shielding the young from the malevolence and difficulties of the adult world; and the institutions that include the education system and different government agencies that ensure the isolation of youth from the adult world. Accordingly, along with the rapid changes in socialization processes, young people become mature earlier regarding their sexuality and they develop their cognitive capacities through prolonged formal education and new technologies but they remain dependent to their parents for a significantly longer time. This is due to the limited chances for young people to make their living independently as a shift from manufacture base of the economy to service base occurred. By the side of this shift, service economy is divided into three segments: catering (e.g., the fast-food industry, transportation and sales); information(e.g., banking, telecommunications); and high-technology economy (e.g., computer programming, education) and young people are negatively affected by the expanded service economy as they remain in the lowest level of catering positions even after having completed their postsecondary education which became a standard requirement for career development. Functionalist view of society has been criticized for taking granted unavoidability in the social order and social change by overlooking human action that forms and changes society. Yet, human action is very important as it determines how power relations are structured in society.

In Cote and Allahar's (1994: 21-25) account of postmodern views, it is emphasized that importance is granted to the subjective. Postmodern approaches deal with the ways things are experienced rather than searching for an objective reality. Postmodernism is based on the assumption that there is a shift from modern era to the postmodern, in which conventional structures such as science, linear logic, and order that used to explain existence in modernism are abandoned. There is not an agreed-upon postmodern view of youth but issues related to youth are taken into account from varying perspectives. As explained in *Generation on Hold* (1994: 22-23), Richard Tinning and Lindsay Fitzclarence claim that a global postmodern youth culture is expanding as a result of the advanced modern information technologies that have become widespread in global capitalism and that are components of a new extending institution around the world with the help of the mass media. Accordingly, in the postmodern era, the media plays a key role as a mediator for fundamental social organizations like the family, education and workplace. Young people's recognitions and experiences regarding these organizations are formed by how they make use of the information technology such as television, telephone, radio, video and computer. Yet, these approaches do not look at the influences of the media negatively; instead, they suggest that these influences give power to the young to create their own biographies. Thus, young people are capable of deciding whether or not the images and commodities they consume will make a meaningful contribution to their life projects of self-making.

Gordon Tait (1994: 23) considers "youth" as a creation of state policies that are based on the principle that each individual must form an adult self. Namely, the state controls the way young people use up their time through diverse institutional programs that categorize young people in terms of success, normality, etc. At this point he follows Foucault's concept of 'technologies of the self', namely, internalized means for the self-discipline of action, practice and identity:

Technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality." (Foucault, 1988:18)

Tait (1994: 23) merges Foucault's concept with Bourdieu's work *Outline of Theory of Practice* and argues that state activities to regulate the way young people spend their time provide a 'habitus' for youth, which is a pattern of conduct related to 'a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions.' Another postmodernist view of youth analyzed by Cote and Allahar (1994: 24) focuses on the gender differences on the regulation of the young. Mica Nava argues that young men and women are not engaged in public spheres to the same degree, and young women spend more time at home that is the major place for them to be controlled. She suggests that studies of youth in which no distinctions are highlighted between males and females regarding the public sphere, neglect gender within the frame of power relations.

Cote and Allahar (1994: 25) demonstrate that from the political economy perspective, the importance is not given to the reaction of youth but instead to the causes of their reaction. Within this framework, the economic and political conditions that determine how youth react are produced by the unequal distribution of power, in which young people are often seen as a class without power. Through the political economy perspective, it is the state which dictates the recognition of existing power structures as normal, natural, good and benevolent to serve the interests of capital and those who control it. The educational system and institutions like the media are seen as the mechanisms of this indoctrination. Hence, young people instructed within the status quo are considered to agree with and maintain measures that work straight against their interests. As a result, they will get into a state of false consciousness. They are seen to consider that economy works for the common people; education is provided according to skills of people; working hard is good as there is a reward for that; the conventional life-style is the key to happiness;

14

if something wrong happens it is their fault. These internalized perceptions may be seen as an effective socialization through functionalist view whereas they indicate false consciousness and alienation through political economy perspective.

Moreover, there are additional pressures (that Erving Goffman (1994: 26) calls "cooling out" pressures) practiced by parents who were socialized in the same manner; the police, courts, schools, namely, institutions that work for the state. As young people are not independent economically, it is easier to control and manipulate them emotionally. It is obvious that mainstream youth culture is a consumer culture in which identities and tastes of youth are defined by the immense industries. The goods produced in the music, art and fashion industries are constantly changing and young people are required to consume and to follow the trends in order to be 'in'. These commodities have identity–presenting qualities according to political economy views, and the capitalist system is in harmony with enterprises which target profit maximization regardless of the social costs.

According to Cote and Allahar (1994: 20), subcultural views deal with the marginalization of youth from adult society through the complex relationship that exists between dominant and subordinate classes. A subculture is defined as a subdivision within the dominant culture that has its own norms, values and belief system. Accordingly, subcultures emerge when individuals in similar circumstances find themselves virtually isolated or neglected by mainstream society. In view of the subculture, young people in industrial societies develop collective reactions to the process of globalization which changes social patterns regarding the transition of young people to maturity. Thus they group together for mutual support. Young people try to form new identities to deal with hasty social change by forming spaces –geographies- for them. As they do not have full access to the power which defines their being in the adult world, they build up their own culture to fill the emptiness created by the partial and futile roles granted them by adults. Under industrial conditions, young people develop a "new symbolic world" for themselves in terms

of language, clothing, personal adornment and actual behavioral appearance of self because they recognize that they cannot rely on the conventional identity patterns that no longer grant flexibilities within the social milieu. Correspondingly, the more mainstream adult culture ignores the youth, the more they become involved in a subculture.

Dick Hebdige (1979: 90) sees subcultural style as a signifier of youth resistance that is created from a distance to the dominant culture. Accordingly, young people take bits and pieces of mainstream culture and shape them into their own modes. For him, subcultures have a great potential to break the rules and to provide spaces of representation for young people in mainstream society. Hence, subcultures represent 'noise' that can get in the way of the mainstream representations in the media. Therefore, their signifying power should not be overlooked as they can create a short-term jam in the system of representation with their potential of being spectacular. Hebdige takes class difference into account while analyzing the patterns of rejection created in different youth cultures. He claims that resistance in subcultures is shaped by various practices such as ritual, slang, music and clothing. For him, young people create new meanings through these practices and they disturb the semantic consistency of the dominant culture.

Subcultural views provide useful clues to understand the essential relationships between youth cultures and style, incorporation, hegemony, resistance and the problems some young people face within this context. Recent approaches in subcultural views deal with the ways youth produce their cultures through images and ideas received from the media. According to these relatively optimistic approaches, young people adopt them through an active and creative process in order to construct new cultural patterns to provide new openings for them within the mainstream culture. However, subculture views have been criticized due to their optimism as within this framework, style is either a symbolic form of resistance or a "magical solution" and therefore not a real one. And also, as quoted by Stahl (1999)

, in the creation of a "subcultural other" such as the media, the mainstream, or the popular, determines the role each plays in the subculture's own internal construction and its imaginary. Considering class as the main cause for occurrence of subcultural practices neglects and often rules out other factors such as age, gender and ethnicity.

Feminist views criticize other perspectives that focused on male youth cultural forms. In *Feminism and Youth Culture* Angela McRobbie (2000: 26) argues that the literature on youth culture is mainly male-biased. She claims that issues such as the nature of women's and girls' leisure; the role of hedonism, fantasy escapes and imaginary solutions in their lives and their access to these spheres and symbols are neglected. McRobbie examines subcultural views through Paul Willis's *Learning to Labor* and Dick Hebdige's *Subculture* and suggests that both demonstrate how young men grab elements from the mainstream culture and turn them into different social practices and styles. She thinks the phrases in subcultural literature are one-sided and mostly explained in masculine terms. Hence, issues about girls, sexuality and femininity in youth are marginalized in Women's Studies. McRobbie draws attention to the lack of sphere of family and domestic life in youth literature of the 1970s; she says: "Only what happened on the streets mattered." Her suggestion is that subcultural studies did not succeed in illustrating how hard it was for women to break out and access to the spheres and symbols that youth shared. McRobbie (2000:43) also claims that the issue of sexual division is not very well explored and explained. She finds the language used by young men too much humiliating in Willis's study and also thinks that Willis fails to show the private experiences of young men. McRobbie criticizes Hebdige for ignoring sexuality and sexism while paying attention to race and racism. She thinks that Hebdige creates another silence regarding gender issues in youth cultures despite the fact that his study pays attention on feminist works like Julia Kristeva's notion of radical signifying practices and that his method is broadly utilized in feminist media studies. Her claim is that the structure of Hebdige's usage of style leaves women out.

3.3 Generational Theory and Crisis

Howard Schuman and Jacqueline Scott (1989: 359-360) suggest that the attention paid to the generational concept derives from the assumption that it bears a potential to shed light to individual and collective political behavior. June Edmunds and Bryan S Turner (2005: 559) argue that the concept of generation has not attracted much attention until lately. They suggest that a number of demographic, cultural and intellectual advances brought back an interest in the issue, which was initiated with Karl Mannheim's archetypal article on generations. For Karl Mannheim,(1952: 378) the generation does not have the same characteristics of an actual community, which is a group of people that know each other fairly well and that need substantial immediacy in order to live as a mental and spiritual unit. It merely is a specific sort of "identity of location" that accommodates people of similar age in a given time and social course of action. Mannheim (1952: 381) suggests that unlike class location, which can be analyzed in terms of economic and social conditions, generation location depends on a set of experiences and ideas that was passed from previous generations. According to Mannheim (1952: 379), generation location is shared by individuals that were born in the same year and they happen to be in the same historical time of the social course of action.

However, Mannheim (1952: 387) says that people who were born or lived in the same time period do not necessarily share the similar location, yet, to be able to construct a similar location; they need to encounter same events and facts. Mannheim (1952: 399) considers generation as a social category like the class position of an individual. He thinks, like class position, to be a member of a certain generation is an objective fact, no matter if the individual in question knows his/her position or not. He emphasizes that not every generation location is able to be determinant with new aggregated forces in a specific state of affairs. Members of a generation can only create a change in society when they grasp the given capacity of

their location. On the other hand, Mannheim (1952: 393) introduces generation of actuality, which consists of people who do not only share a generation location but also a network to create a shared future for their generation. For Mannheim (1952: 394), there has to be a solid connection between members of a generation in terms of the ways they become subjects to the signs of a constant decline of the social and intellectual course to be called as an actual generation. According to Mannheim (1952: 395-397), even within the same actual generation different groups may be formed with different shared experiences and they create "generation units". Generation units appear to be alike in a way that they process the similar information to build up their consciousness in order to proceed in a shared future.

Sergei Eisenstadt (1988: 28) draws attention to how youth and age are defined and differentiated and he claims that to have such categories are beneficial both for society in general and for the individual in particular. He suggests that these categories provide a base to determine the roles of individuals within a given society. By knowing these roles, individuals become able to take steps towards their "self-identification". He suggests that the membership of an age stage is important for the formation of an individual's "self-perception" and expectations from other members of society. Eisenstadt (1988: 109) examines different types of societies and communities to see how age differences function in the social system. He considers age differentiation as a phenomenon that is universally accepted. He emphasizes that how youth express them in a given culture and society is determined by the conditions they are surrounded with.

Ortega y Gasset (1962:43-47) highlights the difference between contemporaries and coevals. He says that the contribution of coevals to the forming of the world is the same. For him, the concept of generation means being of the same age and having "some vital contact". Coevals make a generation by sharing the same time interval and the place. He believes that integration in being and living is a characteristic of a generation, which indicates to have a common future. He suggests that the method

of generations provides opportunities to analyze life thoroughly in a more realistic manner. **.** According to Ortega y Gasset (1962: 53), age is not a specific date, but a "zone of dates". Hence, members of a generation are people that were born within the same zone of dates. He claims that any given generation emerges like an abridged version of the entire history as it bears inside all the former generations. In a sense, a generation's current state is destined by the way previous generations lived. Gasset's (1962: 62) conceptualization of "the decisive generation" is reminiscent of Mannheim's "actual generation": a decisive generation is the one that "for the first time thinks the new thoughts with full clarity and in complete possession of their meaning; a generation which is neither still the precursor nor yet the follower."

Mannheim's (1952: 387-392) take on a generation's consciousness is analogous to what Ortega y Gasset says on the effect of previous generations. He uses the term "fresh contact" of a generation for a generation's encounter with the world. He suggests that the way that youth embody themselves is contingent on the favorable circumstances they can get in their extant social structure. Depending on their position and chances of improving their social and intellectual qualities, they may end up being conservative, progressive, radical etc. Like Ortega y Gasset, Mannheim emphasizes the perpetual interaction between the generations. He sees that interaction like a relationship between a teacher and a student, in which both of them learn something from each other. He suggests that the tension between older and younger generations can be more obvious in societies, where the change is more rapid whereas in societies with stagnant circumstances, younger people are inclined to settle in the values and attitudes of older generation to the extent that look older.

Edmunds and Turner (2005: 560-561) point out Mannheim's emphasis on the part that traumatic events in the history play in bringing into being a generational consciousness. For that reason, wars are very significant to shape a generation's political consciousness. Quoting Eisenstadt, Edmunds and Turner also stresses the

importance of youth movements. They appreciate the conceptualization of generations as age-cohorts to the extent that it provides a function to make it comprehensible, but do not think that this approach allows further sociological enquiries. Thus, Edmunds and Turner tend to focus on the role of social relations and processes in understanding generations, as not every age cohort constructs a generation with a characteristic cultural or political identity. They claim that 'generation' becomes a remarkable sociological category when it is analyzed in terms of the relationships between social structure, conditions that a generation is dependent on and available means for it in the history.

Edmunds and Turner (2005: 562) refer to Pierre Bourdieu's work on cultural change to figure out how shared experiences of a generation results in a shared consciousness that has the potential to create change in a society. Accordingly, Bourdieu considers generational struggle vital in cultural change and he suggests that society is composed of different, semi-autonomous fields that involve people that use a variety of means in a competition for status. The competition for these means is at the bottom of the generational change over time. Moving from Bourdieu's intergenerational struggle to their conceptualization of 'active' and 'passive' generations, Edmunds and Turner suggest that if generations make good use of the means to get into cultural, intellectual or political areas, they shift from being a passive generation ('generation in itself') into an active generation ('generation for itself') with the consciousness they gain. They think that change between generations can be explained with an assumption that active and passive generations appear in a sequence. That is, an active generation with a great contribution in the social and cultural change is succeeded by a passive generation that takes over what is left from the precursor.

Edmunds and Turner consider the 1960s generation as an example for an active generation that had a great social capital and benefits of being a postwar generation. Their claim is that 1960s generation utilized flourishing social conditions very well

and stood up for themselves. Though, such an active generation is followed by 'Generation X' in western societies and it is considered to be a passive generation that was blamed with apathy and had not much social capital and less social security. Edmunds and Turner (2005: 566) claim that advances in communications technology helped the 1960s generation to become a global phenomenon. They highlight the significance of the media to create a collective memory. For them, television was one of the major mediators for the 1960s generation to build up generational consciousness and identity and the distribution of 1960s cultural patterns worldwide. They also claim that global intellectual generations emerge in countries, where migration and multiculturalism have been experienced for a long time. Accordingly, 1980s generation was not able to become a global generation as the previous one, since there was not the same hopefulness that was created by new opportunities of technology and abundance of resources.

As Bryan S Turner (1998: 302) explains it elsewhere, the cultural definitions of generations are related to a 'traumatic event' that an age cohort that shares a 'common habitus and lifestyle' experience and these definitions are the results of the reactions of generations to social movements in the twentieth-century. Thus, a specific group of people at a certain time and location that gains access to particular resources by virtue of specific historical events consists a generation. Accordingly, a person can only admit to those resources with a specific generational identity that is provided with some exclusive practices that enable a generation to maintain the benefits against successive generations. Eisenstadt's (1966: 30) take on the conflict between generations is quite similar:

> The elder age grades usually exert some authority over the younger ones; they can direct, formally or informally, their activities and command their respect. This basic asymmetry of power and authority is characteristic of the interaction between different age grades and generations as a whole.

Turner (1998: 299-304) clarifies 'the notion of generation' in Bourdieu's sociology in which generation is considered as "a social construct" that is an outcome of the conflict over economic and cultural resources within a specific field. Accordingly,

conflicts of goals are formed in each field that includes specific 'laws of ageing'. Attitudes against youth derive from these competing goals particularly in groups that are fearful of youth's goals and attitudes that are different from their conventional ones. Thus, youth face resentments from older people, who feel that their status is in decline. As an example, Turner (1998: 302) claims that Bourdieu considered the crisis of May 1968 as "a conflict of academic generations over competing credentials. In view of that, older generations try to rule out younger ones by challenging them with cultural obstacles whereas the latter point the finger at the cultural lack of the former.

The largest part of the work on generational theory has been done in America; however, there is a tendency of taking this theory into account as a universal model, no matter what the specific patterns of a society in question are. For the case in Turkey, for instance, the 68ers generation was a constructed category taken up from the western notion of Baby-boomers. Indeed, this process of espousal undermines the incomparable social and historical conditions of Turkey.

> Generation is defined as an age cohort with a shared historical experience
> Neyzi (2001: 413).

In accordance with Neyzi's statement, I prefer to use the term generation as the shared memory of an age group, despite their dramatically different backgrounds and experiences, yet were born to the same society within the same time intervals. I try to understand why the concept of generations is widely upheld as a dominant social category and the dynamics that make people to refer to this imaginary common ground of social experiences with regards to the socialization process of young people. I am aware of the dangers of framing people within the borders of generations, as within the other categories and/or definitions; I am concerned with finding out the representations of a particular generation in Turkey throughout the 1980s.

3.4 Generation X

<div align="right">
I'm a loser baby, so why don't you kill me.

Beck, "Loser", 1993
</div>

The image attributed to youth by the elder generations has to do with sexuality and violence starting from the 1960s. Such an image makes people both anxious of and attracted to the young. Edmunds and Turner (2005: 568) suggest that the 1980s generation was not politically driven until the end of the decade. They paid more attention to health and lifestyle issues with the rise of environmentalism and values of self care.

Despite the fact that it does not exist in the Turkish alphabet, the letter 'X' implies a number of meanings in the Turkish language that have negative implications to a significant extent such as; unknown, lost, extra, previous, unidentifiable, dead. In North America, it has been used to define a generation. The term was coined in the 1950s and later popularized by Vancouverite novelist Douglas Coupland with his well-recognized novel *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture (*1991). Neil Howe and Bill Strauss (1993:12) in their renowned work *13th Gen: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail* suggest that it is the generation born between 1961 and 1981. Despite the fact that there are other claims on the interval of years to define Generation X, I use the suggestion of Howe and Strauss for the purposes of this work.

<div align="center">
You're a whole new generation
You're dancing through the day
You're grabbing for the magic on the run
You're a whole new generation
You're lovin' what you do
Put a Pepsi in the motion
That choice is up to you

Hey-hey
</div>

You're the Pepsi Generation
Guzzle down and
Taste the thrill of the day
And feel the Pepsi way
Taste the thrill of the day
And feel the Pepsi way
You're a whole new generation

Michael Jackson for Pepsi, 1988

Although it was a name given to a generation in North America, the characteristics attributed to that generation have also been considered explanatory for different societies when global changes that affected all societies are taken into account. Pelevin calls the members of same age cohort as Generation P in Russia. P stands for Pepsi; "Pizdets" ("whatever you like"); Pi and "pustota" (emptiness). (Dalton-Brown, 2006: 240) Generation X in Japan is called "Shinjinrui" (new breed), a term coined in 1985 which means "shinjin-rui" (new faces) and "shin-jinrui" (new human race). It was also called as "Shirake Sedai" (the reactionless generation) for their lack of interest in politics. In Germany, "Generation Golf" defines this cohort with a reference to VW Golf car, which is seen as an attribute to the members. (Hachtman 2008: 16-17) "Pasotas" (lackadaisical or, one without interest, vigor or determination) is a term used for Spanish Generation X (Erdem, 1999: 76).

Sherry B Ortner (1998: 416) says that there have been changes in the portrayal of Generation X, which has attracted the attention of demographers, marketing specialists and journalists, initially. In America, members of Generation X are also called Baby Busters, the successor of Baby Boomers. Ortner says that this name was given due to the boom/bust contrast in economics, as their major attributes are economic. She argues that Generation X stands as an ideal type in a "media saturated world". Despite the fact that its representation has shifted over time, it well has been present as a distinctive imagery from the 1980s on. In the eighties, the public attention paid to the youth became more noticeable as it had been the period

of widespread youth opposition. It was seen as a sign of the panic and alienation as results of high risk conditions derived from varying sources. The concept and practices of family life had changed. Mass education became dominant. Unemployment rates had risen. The role of the media in societies became crucial and the bombardment of consumption ideology through the media had been considered as a fact. Racism, sexism and human rights violations were seen and heard more with the help of mass media. (Edmunds and Turner, 2005: 568) The representations of the generation by their members were also seen as a result of " the disaffection of the middle class" and interpreted with regards to Deleuzian/Guattarian "deterritorilization" which refers to "the loss of content in the search for form, signified by the worship of that which is "contentless" and lacking in territory, such as money." Pelevin and Coupland refer to an historical amnesia as a result of the saturation by the media while describing their generation. This amnesia is supported by cultural relativism, which indicates itself in a style formed with pastiche and irony (Dalton-Brown, 2006: 239-246). Generation X is seen as "aimless" and "apathetic" widely, yet Mimi Marinucci (2005: 506) argues that these are false media stereotypes. She interprets Beck's lyrics above not coming from apathy but cynicism.

As mentioned above, most of the definitions of this generation fall into the area of economics. Members of this generation are very well educated; actually they are the most educated generation in the history of America. However, the employment conditions and the income they can get are not proportional to their high level of education. That is, they are overqualified and underemployed. Ortner states that the decline in incomes only affects "the middle" class, dramatically (Ortner, 1998: 417) As the service sector expanded globally, middle-class Generation X members have been subject to "low-pay, low-prestige, low-dignity, no future jobs in the service sector" which Coupland calls McJobs (Coupland, 1991: 5).

> My generation inherited not free love, but AIDS, not peace but nuclear anxiety, not cheap communal lifestyles but crushing costs of living, not free teach-ins but colleges priced for the aristocracy (Beaudoin 1998: 10).

Moreover, there is a number of social conditions that this generation faced, such as AIDS epidemic, ecological disaster, high divorce rates, high rates of working mothers and "latchkey children' (refers to children who return from school to an empty home because a parent or both parents are away at work) (Howe and Strauss,1993: 61) as a result. Ortner (1998: 418) claims that the portrayals of this generation shifts from classifications of "the pathologies of the world" to the classifications of "the pathologies of Gen X consciousness". They are seen as deeply depressed whiners with anger and frustration and their nickname "slackers" also shows that they want to hide themselves in "a television-generated world of soap operas, quiz shows, and MTV"(Ortner, 1998:419).

The Generation X representation both derives from the middle class and addresses it. Ortner (1998: 422) explains it with the rise of the managerial class within the capitalist process in the 20th century. Therefore, most of the theories of this process have been built upon the different aspects of the middle class. Theories of class shifted towards shaping a new narrative which provides a new map that Bourdieu calls "social space". It is "a field of both locations and trajectories, possibilities of movement, defined by economic and cultural capital." For Edmunds and Turner (2005: 568), social problems started to get into the sphere of politics only at the end of the 1980s with new voices after the downfall of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the Berlin Wall. They maintain that the 1980s experienced a process which they consider as an 'erosion of citizenship'. Favorable circumstances of 1960s decreased dramatically while instabilities accelerated. There was less assurance to reforms that would increase the standards of living in all aspects. Consequently, the escalation of neo-conservatism caused abatement both in social capital and shared efforts to improve living conditions whereas 'possessive individualism' increased fiercely (Ken, 2007: 268).

27

Although generations are distinguished in different manners, negative attributes of Generation X with regards to selfishness, apathy and cynicism are quite common in public discourse on the post-1980 generation in Turkey. Before tracing such similarities, I would like to give a brief account of how generations are perceived in the history of the Turkish Republic.

3.5 Generations in Turkey

Generations in Turkey have been defined and analyzed according to the political changes in society, mostly. I prefer to focus on Leyla Neyzi's (2001: 412) account on how youth is constructed in public discourse in three distinctive periods: 1923-1950, 1950-1980 and post-1980. Her work gives emphasis to discourses on youth rather than how young people represent themselves. Although there are not many generational studies in Turkey, Neyzi (2001: 415) points out that age cohorts have a great significance in determining identity and forming ascendency. People also refer to their generation quite often while defining themselves (Erdem, 1999: 78)**.**

3.5.1 1923-1950

The Turkish Republic was entrusted to youth by the time it was established as a nation state in 1923 (Ahıska, 1999: 11). Neyzi (2001: 416) calls the generation between 1923 and 1950 as "guardians of the regime". Young people were addressed both as the ideal types to carry its values and as representatives of the Republic. Atatürk addressed the Turkish youth in his speech on the Second Congress of the Republican People's Party in 1927:

> Turkish youth! Your first duty is to maintain and protect Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the primary basis of your existence and of your future… (Quoted in Neyzi, 2001: 417).

And he says that youth will find the strength to fulfill that sacred duty "in the noble blood that flows in their veins". As Neyzi (2001: 417) indicates, the oath that Turkish students have to recite every morning sums up the duties of youth and the relations based on age difference:

29

I am a Turk, upright, diligent. My law is to respect my elders, protect those younger than myself. To love my country and nation more than my own self. My ideal is to rise up and go forward. Let my being be sacrificed for the sake of Turkish existence! (Quoted in Neyzi 2001:417).

Hence, the Republican youth was considered as the "Children of Republic" or "Atatürk's children", who had to get good education and carry the nation to "the level of contemporary civilizations" (*Onuncu Yıl Nutku*). The nation was also identified with the dynamism and strength of the youth in the first decade of the Republic as can be traced in Selim Sırrı Tarcan's speech "young is strong, young is healthy, young is happy, young is independent, young is everything. Being young is a privilege and honor in of itself" (Ahıska, 1999: 13). The major student organization at the time (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği National Turkish Student Union) worked like soldiers for government policies to ensure that people would speak Turkish and use local products only. ("Citizen Speak Turkish" and "Let us use local products") (Neyzi, 2001: 418) 19 May was set "Youth and Sports Day" in 1938 to consolidate youth's position in society. In spite of the fact that "being revolutionary and progressive" were the main duties given to the Republican youth, young people got into trouble once they wanted to achieve these attributes later on (Ahıska, 1999: 14).

3.5.2 1950-1980

Neyzi (2001: 418) distinguishes the period between 1950 and 1980 with the ultimate political goal of the Turkish youth, namely, "Saving the Country", and emphasizes the shift in youth's identity from "from vanguard to rebel". From the 1950s on, Turkey experienced a tension between the Republican elite that was central to the power and the periphery. Following the transition from single-party to multi-party system in 1946, "Republican People's Party represented the "bureaucratic center" and whereas the Democratic Party the "democratic periphery" (Mardin, 1973: 186). As a consequence of rapid migration flows, "the periphery" ended up in the urban

areas. Thus, 'White Turks" perceived it as an invasion by "the barbarian within". Democrat Party was brought in power by a vast majority, yet it was prosecuted due to fraudulency and autocracy that led to call for a coup by the army and the students. The 1960 coup was followed by the most liberal constitution in the history of the Republic, which provided a great deal of tolerance for voicing different political views (Neyzi, 2001: 418). In 1961 Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers Party of Turkey) was established as the first legal leftist party in Turkey (Mardin, 2008: 255).

The winds of change affiliated with mass movements in Europe, Latin America and different parts of the world in 1968 affected the politicization process of youth in Turkey. Mostly university students took part in political organizations, which were polarized as "leftists" and "rightists" in the late 1960s. Leftist camp identified itself with the revolutionary identity of the 1968 and called themselves as '68 generation. Kemalist ideas were stressed by the leftist student organizations with regards to saving the country from enemies outside and within. Severe political polarization gave rise to extreme violence, which Mardin considers as a result of the dissonance of youth caused by cultural break-down and anomie. He sees the conflict between the generations as a component of this violence (Mardin, 2008: 260). In the 1970s, youth was perceived as "contentious and dangerous" due to the conflicts between right and left. In 1971, the Republican regime experienced another coup equipped with repressive measures. Consequently, public discourse on youth moved from "active dynamic citizens of future and guardians of the regime" to "bandits, terrorists and threats to the regime" .Leftist young activists, on the contrary, defined themselves as the supporters of Kemalist ideas and advocated the legitimacy of their actions by quoting Atatürk's orders in his Bursa speech "He (Turkish youth) protects his own creation (the regime) with his hands, with stones, with sticks, with arms, with whatever means available to him" Neyzi defines Deniz Gezmiş as "the student leader who was hanged by a military tribunal in 1972" and quotes his letter to his father to show that Gezmiş considered the youth movements as a continuance between generations. Gezmiş emphasizes that his father influenced him by

addressing Kemalist ideas and that his generation is fighting the second War of Independence (Neyzi, 2001: 419).

As Neyzi (2001: 420) explains, the members of the active generation on the left side of the political spectrum that experienced the 1971 coup call themselves "78 Generation". Leftist and rightist claimed the same ideal of "saving the country" either through socialism or nationalism. Political movements were dominated by men, who could be distinguished as leftist or rightists by the shape of their mustache or their clothing. Women were mostly seen as comrades by the leftist men and as sisters by the rightists. Another common aspect of both groups was the emphasis they made to their collective identity. They tend to explain their ideals not on an individual level by using "I" but on a collective level referring to "we or us". They also had a tendency to think of themselves as fighters that are willing to sacrifice their lives for their country. Both sides believed in the "sacred cause" and named their sacrifices as martyrs of revolution. Neyzi also points out that the leaders of student organizations, particularly leftists, came from middle-class families in the early years of political movements. Due to the change of demographic patterns and rise of the number of university students with rural backgrounds, the majority of political activists on both sides came from working-class families towards the late 1970s.

Before discussing the post-1980 generation that Neyzi associates with "Turning the Corner", a "rising value of Özal's regime" that means getting rich without due labor, I want to draw a picture of the political and cultural climate of the 1980s in Turkey. I also analyze the identity politics that emerged and accelerated between 1980 and 1990.

CHAPTER IV
POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE 1980s

4.1 Political Arena in the 1980s in Turkey

September 12th, 1980 was a critical turning point for the history of Turkey. The third military intervention and the second coup d'état in the history of Turkish Republic was executed followed by the crisis in economy and politics of the late 1970s. It also dissolved the relatively liberal regime that was commenced by the 1961 Constitution. The political polarization accompanied by the rise of violence and anarchy; economic turmoil and political instability in the late 1970s were the reasons articulated by the army for its involvement in the action. As the political system was paralyzed both by violence on the streets and lack of consensus in the parliament, society was led into a deadlock (Gunter, 1989: 64). The National Security Council (NSC) was established under the leadership of Kenan Evren and the intervention was justified by the failure of the political parties in sustaining the democratic order in the country.

The NSC dissolved the parliament, suspended the existing constitution, banished the political parties and detained their leaders by blaming them for the polarization of the political system (Ergüder, 1998: 564). All professional associations and trade unions were abolished; strikes were outlawed; workers on strike were ordered to withdraw. Mayors, local governors and official authorities that were assumed to have connections with political organizations were expelled. Martial law was declared all through the country.

General Kenan Evren became the head of the state and he gained the overall control of the political power along with the army and the NSC. In few days following the coup, he disclosed the agenda of the junta to de-politicize society by making fundamental changes in all areas of it except for the foreign policy and the economy. The priority in the new plan of the junta was given to political arrests in order to abolish all aspects of 'the Left' and the extreme Right. Systematic tortures and missing people were everyday occurrences as the junta's major task became 'combating terrorism' (Ahmad, 2003: 150).

The NSC assigned responsibility to a new government under the leadership of Bülent Ulusu, a retired Admiral. The cabinet that was announced on the 21st of September consisted of retired Generals, academics and bureaucrats including Turgut Özal, who was given the task to restructure the economy as a figure that was known to foreign financial circles with his World Bank experience. He was the architect of the economic package known as "January 24 package", which was launched on January 24, 1980.

> The package included a large devaluation (from TL 47.1 to TL 70 to the US$), export subsidies, an increase in interest rates, and substantial price increases for state enterprise products and the promise of abolition of most government subsidies. Perhaps more important than the specific measures was the clear enunciation of a new approach favoring exports, outward orientation and liberalization (Rodrik, 1990: 4).

In the following year, in October 1981, the NSC started preparations for a new constitution by designating a committee for consultation. The Prime Minister declared that the previous constitution was too liberal and he ensured that all necessary measures would be taken in order not to allow anarchy and terrorism to rise again. All political parties were overthrown and their assets were seized by a new law in that regard. In November 1981, the 'Higher Education Law' was passed and it turned the education system into a nationalist and conservative one. Almost 4

thousand teachers and 120 faculty members were removed from their jobs as they were 'too liberal' for the new education system (İlkiz: 2005). The new constitution was completed in 1982 and it was accepted by the majority of people in a referendum. The authorities of the president and the army were strengthened and centralized whereas freedom of the press and the unions was suppressed. A 'democracy without freedoms' was introduced by a constitution, which was imposed on people and was not allowed to be discussed publicly. The elections were held a year later in 1983 and the Motherland Party (MP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal won. Özal claimed that MP was a synthesis of the previously dissolved parties, as it grasped their essential features and principles. "It was conservative like the Justice Party, traditionalist like the Islamist, nationalist like the neo-fascists, and left-of-centre like the Republican People's Party because it believed in social justice." (Ahmad, 2003: 151). MP's ideological standpoint was obviously similar to the politics that were shaped by neo-liberalism such as Reaganism in the USA and Thatcherism in the UK. It was a neo-conservative ideology that endorsed a smaller state, freer markets and weaker trade unions (Ahmad, 2003: 154). Initially, the new wave of conservatism was embraced by the industrial capitalists that were willing to integrate to the global market. Nevertheless, neo-conservative strategies of the new right attracted the middle classes eventually.

> The discourse of the new right, namely nationalist-conservatism, was a mixture of neoliberal elements such as anti-statism, economic efficiency and individualism, and conservative tones of traditions, family, religion, law, and order, which were already a part of the traditional Turkish right's discourse. The peculiarity of new right is this specific way of articulation of these liberal and anti-liberal elements (Özkazanç, 1997: 31).

Özal assigned young men, who were called Özal's princes, with immense US experience and knowledge of 'Reagan revolution' to restructure the system in Turkey in a similar way. The princes advocated the 'silent majority' like their fellow conservatives in the US. Özal called that majority of society 'the central pillar' that was an inclusive group that consisted of farmers, civil servants, workers and

craftsmen. It was an ambiguous concept that blended in different social classes in a non-ideological manner (Özkazanc, 1998: 22).

Özal focused on restructuring the economy and asked the army to sustain a peaceful society for the next five years in order to achieve his goals. It meant no strikes or protests against the undertakings of the Motherland Party. Özal gave his word that Turkey would 'skip an era' under MP's government as it would be the one that 'got things done' (Ahmad, 2003: 155). There was a majority of engineers with Islamic background in the MP and they changed the direction of the politics in the country. They utilized the common reaction to political polarization and the violence of late 1970s society and claimed that they would bring consensus and tolerance instead. Nilüfer Göle (1993: 211) suggests that "the post-1983 Turkish political culture has been shaped largely by a form of social engineering with Muslim overtones, which has constituted the core ideology of the MP. "

Sabri Sayarı (1992: 29) argues that Özal's accomplishments to restructure the economic system occurred in three different steps with regards to the political change. Between 1980 and 1983, an authoritarian government that formed the guidelines in economy ruled. Followed by the elections in 1983, Turkey experienced a move from military regime to 'limited political liberalization' until 1987. After 1987 a relatively excessive passage to redemocratization occurred.

> The transition from authoritarian rule in the1980s was initially controlled from "above" and engineered by the military leadership; the restructuring of civil society was not mediated through political pacts between the key actors such as the leaders of the principal political parties and the top military command; and the transition has not yet culminated in a fully consolidated democratic regime despite significant progress toward legitimizing democratic institutions since 1987 (Sayarı, 1992: 29).

According to Göle, the MP had a pragmatic identity rather than an ideological one, thus, the party gave priority to policies instead of politics. After 1983 open market economy, exportation, privatization and competition became key initiatives of the

36

MP along with an aspiration to unify the market economy to Islamic principles. MP had a claim of being a 'conservative progressive' party with an objection to Western liberalism. Göle believes that what MP tried to accomplish was Muslim social engineering by using Islam as an alternative moral system to the Western modernity. She indicates that in 1980s the technocrats in Turkey changed the perception of the West by providing a different definition to political elites, yet, with the 'scientization of politics' they confined political debate and representative democracy (Göle, 1993: 213-218).

Özal's popularity declined dramatically in four years after 1983 elections. In 1987, previously banned politicians returned to the political scene by a referendum held on 6 September 1987. Özal decided to push for an early general election in order not to allow enough time for his political rivals. The election was held on 29 November 1987 and MP won more seats with a lower percentage of the votes provided by the altered election law. MP was not favored in the local elections held in March 1988 and the party could only get 22 per cent of the votes, less than half of the previous local elections by which the party scored 45 per cent. Özal's power was also shaken by corruption that was affiliated with his family and immediate circle. Criticisms of 'Özal dynasty' and his attempts to bring the presidential system damaged his reputation. Moreover, he had not shown any efforts to accelerate the democratic process and to change the junta regarding the trade unions, higher education, elections and political parties, the press, the penal code and broadcasting. Consequently, Özal made a move to run for president in 1989 and became the eighth president of Turkey and the second civilian president of the Republic. Yıldırım Akbulut took Özal's seat as the new prime minister and he was not able to show his presence and gain popularity since he acted and was regarded as a puppet of the president (Ahmad, 2003: 156).

The political inconsistency that arose in the late 1980s accelerated in the early beginning of 1990s by means of the sprouting Kurdish revolt in the South-East of

the country and the rise of Islamist articulation. An anti-terrorism law was passed by the government in spring 1990. The army and police were granted salient powers. Furthermore, the Gulf Crisis in 1990 altered Turkey's situation utterly and she acquired an exceptional magnitude with regards to her strategic place, which was shaken by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the removal of the Soviet threat. The ongoing internal crisis was replaced by a critical international one (Ahmad, 2003: 156-157).

As generations emerge with a traumatic experience in society, I trace bits and pieces of a collective memory of the post-1980 generation. Since I argue that the post-1980 generation is shaped by social institutions and defined in new public discourses, I strive to understand the process of constructing new discourses on youth by looking at the social changes traumatically and that were "consented" upon. There has been a "forced consent" to embrace the coup; the repressive measures, and the 1982 Constitution, subsequently. As I read through various historical accounts of the era, a common point comes forward regarding the majority of the population that accepted the Constitution without hesitation. In my opinion, the propaganda campaign of Kenan Evren on television loaded with threats of "returning to the dark days" should not be underestimated, as it triggered the fear of people, who eventually said "YES" to the new Constitution. Furthermore, that fear also seems to be reflected to the referendum process. The shared trauma was neither articulated nor confronted for a considerably long time, yet its shadow has tainted every aspect of social relations. The state of fear accompanied by a dream of not returning to the bloody past paved the grounds for silent majority that raised a generation in a twilight zone.

One of my interviewees, Reşit, was a polling clerk responsible for the referendum boxes. He explains his first-hand experience of the referendum and says that the papers for YES votes were white, whereas the ones for NO votes were blue. Reşit also points out that the envelopes were transparent white, which made the vote

papers visible even after they were put in the envelopes. He remembers the anxiety of people, who wanted to vote NO, as they were trying to hide the envelopes in their hands before sticking them into the boxes quickly. This anxiety indicates itself in the public discourse on a generation that was identified with "Twilight Age".

4.2 Cultural Climate in the 1980s

4.2.1 Consuming the Image and Expression: Private is New Public

> 1980s was the end of content; the end of history; the beginning of the individual…1980s meant liberalization; … subjectivity; it was OK to say "me"; it was equal to entrepreneurship; …1980s was the period of postmodern plunder. 1980s was full of opportunities….(and) …varieties. Nothing has been the same after 1980s… has been itself and has had to be anything…..Everything could be something else,…… could pretend to be something else. Everybody could be someone else (and) ….could pretend (Kıvanç, 2002: 69). (Translation mine)

Utopias of freedom and equality that marked 1960s and 1970s all over the world were announced dead by the widely consented "death of ideologies"; yet utopias of wealth and fame were promoted by the media instead. In 1980s, consumption patterns became the criteria for social status; the concept of "business" was glorified and "knowing one's business" was considered as the ultimate virtue. As Can Kozanoğlu (1995: 8) in *Cilalı İmaj Devri* (the Age of Polished Images) points out, "Images of love, welfare, leaders, victories, namely, images of everything were produced and made available for consumption." Official bans were replaced by actual ones to protect those images as they were shown; and to provide a legitimate ground for "rising values". Kozanoğlu calls the decade from 1980 to 1990 in Turkey as the Age of Polished Images. He suggests that new stars were born in this era and their common aspect was "rising on the shoulders of new social tendencies beyond their personal qualities."

Nurdan Gürbilek (1992:8-9) in her well-recognized book *Vitrinde Yaşamak* (Living on the Display) divides the same decade into two and claims that the repressive discourse of the state in the first half of the decade collided with a more modern and civil discourse that was full of emancipatory promises in the second, thus, the cultural climate of the 1980s was shaped by this conflict. At odds with the harshest repressive measures, people started to feel freer than ever as they could exist outside

of the restraining institutions and could consume at their pleasure. The political was replaced by the cultural; hence, culture gained great significance. Correspondingly, daily life itself became more cultural by allowing a proliferated freedom of expression at the personal level. The same tendency has been observed in Anglo-American culture. Ali Şimşek (2005: 76) in *Yeni Orta Sınıf* (the New Middle Class) reminds that serious newspapers such as The Times and The Guardian in America and Britain have started to deal with life-style issues in the 1980s. In Turkey, the media was occupied with writers of new middle class that have used a "confession" style journalism loaded with hedonist, apolitical, sarcastic issues on private life.

Gürbilek (1992: 18) claims that there was a boom in sexuality talk within the discourse of emancipation and individualism. She thinks that the main dynamic of this burst was related to people's urge to tell stories about their private life in a confession form that was independent of the discourse of institutional authorities on sexuality issues. Gürbilek (1992: 39) refers to Foucault on sexuality and explains how sexuality is surrounded by discourse and imprisoned in verbal expression. She follows Foucault with regards to fragmentation of power and emergence of power strategies. Gürbilek (1992: 40-42) exemplifies this point with a session of Ertürk Yöndem's TV program on homosexuality. She indicates that the title of the session was "Chronic Crisis", in which Yöndem utilizes a very well known conservative and judgmental discourse on homosexuality that is defined as a "case" and presented to expert's comment. An expected conventional and prohibitive discourse was replaced by seduction to expression as a new power strategy. Gürbilek relates it to Foucault's argument that is "anything expressed verbally accepts control".

I discussed what Gürbilek calls burst of expression with my interviewees to see if discourse on sexuality provided them with emancipatory patterns in their experiences:

As for private life talk in the 1980s, one of my interviewees Bilge, a 30 year old well-educated woman from an upper-middle class family, thinks that Bülent Ersoy's sex change operation caused a severe trauma for that generation that experienced that time even though she does not remember it. Her environment was not conservative. She says she had no problem dressing and undressing in a room full of people for her ballet lessons, neither was she afraid of being naked. Bilge attended the secondary school in Germany. While explaining her experiences there, she says that none of the girls around her -14-15 year olds- were virgins. Moreover, they would not hide their private life and some of them would find it very weird, if a girl did not have any sexual experience by the age of 15. Bilge did not think that they were wrong but she used to feel shy due to the fact that "sexuality was still something to hide in Turkey". "Our bodies are considered to belong to the public not us" she says. Bilge was confused as she neither could be like one her friends in Germany nor like the ones in Turkey.

In her high school years in Turkey, a boy at school asked Bilge if she was a virgin and she said "yes" and he abandoned her right at that spot. Bilge could not understand what his intention was. She thinks love is imprisoned in our culture and it is sealed like anything else that can be experienced freely. At another occasion, Bilge went on a school trip in Turkey with group of high school students, who were "busted" while having fun. She emphasizes this point: "They were just having fun, actually!" After that incident, their teacher asked the girls to get virginity tests. She says "if I were a parent and a teacher did the same thing to my child, I would sue the teacher." Bilge also remembers an article on a mainstream newspaper (most probably *Hürriyet*) towards the end of the 1980s. It was about a girl and a boy who were busted while making out at a school in Britain. A journalist commented on it saying that "Thank God, we do not have such things in our society!" She could not comprehend how he would say it so surely and why it would be a moral issue.

Reşit, a leftist revolutionary '78er in his late 40s, laughs at himself when he talks

about how he approached personal issues when he was younger. He states that as a revolutionist he felt guilty when he thought about his right to fall in love and spend time with a beloved one. Reşit says he learnt love from the movie "Love Story", first. His intimate relationships were always a big secret. He says that the traditional institutions like family and religion were feudal remnants for him, then. Reşit believed that sexual revolution was a component of socialist revolution and he did not consider it as a crucial matter.

Kamil, with his conservative lower middle-class family background from a smaller city, thinks that the nouveau riche in the 1980s caused a reaction and considers it as a cause for him to become a radical Islamist in high school. He believes that many young men from Anatolia who could not have any access to the nouveau riche life-style also became like him (radical Islamist) then. He claims "Now the generation in charge of the power is my generation". Kamil argues that young people internalized the image of the West in the media and they wanted to punish themselves for that. He thinks that they were not brave enough to admit "We can not suck the marrowbone! (The most delicious part of the food stands for the girls) "Therefore, we said Damn the West! instead, which sounded better".

The burst of expression in the 1980s was perceived in different ways by the 78ers who were born in the 1960s and by the rest of the generation who were born in the 1970s. Members of the 78er generation were raised without having a chance to express their ideas about their private issues, whereas young people who were born in the 1970s were able to experience the social changes brought about by the media while growing up. Hence, they could grasp the ideas of individualism at a different pace.

4.2.2 Nostalgia versus Arabesk: Multidiscursive Scene?

The culture in Turkey in 1980s is discussed in two different subjects. Firstly, there is a complaint about not having a "common culture", which could have been accumulated in line with the initiatives of the Republican discourse. Secondly, culture was expanded through an individualist discourse that allows all kinds of differences and singularities. Ahmet Çiğdem (2001:46-47) states that the de-politicization process that targeted the youth eminently should not be disregarded while discussing the replacement between real political demands and cultural expressions that fall apart from the politics. This shift is often seen as a negative outcome since both conservative-right and liberal-left circles focus their criticism on the normative aspects that were left behind in all terrains of culture. Although these criticisms differ in their content, an intense nostalgia that goes hand in hand with eliticism flares from all of them. It has become so phenomenal that a new idiom was coined in Turkish language: "doing nostalgia".

Nostalgia enmeshed the active generations that experienced severe traumas caused by the violent political scene in the previous decades and the aftermath of the coup. As they could not have an opportunity to make an objective and collective account of what and had happened and why, their discontent with the new era that was identified with political silence and degeneration in culture with the boost of arabesk flowing from the slums of big cities to the center of everyday life led them to create mythologies of "their good old times". The main content for these mythological stories has been the old city İstanbul affiliated with "high culture" (Kozanoğlu, 1995: 42). Despite the fact that the population in 1980s was widely differentiated, there has been a tendency to refer to a single generation, the post-80 generation, while discussing the confusing change in society. Tanıl Bora (2001:56) thinks it is a problem to look upon the time after 1980 as a monolithic entity, since this perspective indicates a failure in analyzing the historical process as a memory space.

Most of the accounts with regards to the common past of the political generation preceding the coup ended up as arbitrations of the power structure within the Left that faced a major defeat by the coup. There has not been an "effort of grief" in order to cope with the after-effects of physical and mental traumas caused by the punitive measures of military intervention. September 12 made the silent majority internalize the pressure with its promises to end terror and to provide consistency.

A "popular history" was produced and made available for consumption in 1980s. There was no real content and it lacked historical depth. This widely popular history formed with an ambiguous and unreasoned language, was initially promoted by the advertisement sector. This arbitrary language transformed the real history into a sum of quotations with the help of a-historical images. Gürbilek (1992: 19-20) indicates that this "synthetic language" had been reproduced in "arabesk" music which was also a mixture of different genres.

In her pioneering work, Meral Özbek considers arabesk within the framework of popular culture in relation with the process of modernity in Turkey and elaborates on the spatial and symbolic patterns in that regard:

> One way of thinking about arabesk is to see it as a metaphor for popular identity—for the responses of the urbanizing popular classes to the capitalist modernization process in Turkey. Official cultural politics, growing market forces, the development of a culture industry, and popular traditions and changing lifestyles at the margins of society have all prepared the ground and provided the materials for the gradual articulation of arabesk music and culture. But it was specifically the spontaneous popular response that simultaneously opposed and affirmed the modernizing practices that gave arabesk its hybrid form and its original, potent energy (Özbek, 1997: 212).

Özbek traces the changed meanings of arabesk both as a music genre and as a distinctive culture in conjunction with changing politics in the country and indicates the tension between the urban masses that migrated from rural areas and the intellectuals that reacted to it which eventually carried arabesk from its cultural

scene to the ideological arena. In spite of the fact that arabesk did not emerge as a direct political response to the poor conditions and their difficulties that migrant masses faced in urban areas, its symbolic discourse based on the vocabulary of love was perceived as a call for better standards and a better life in which love could have been actualized. Moreover, this vocabulary also provided means to cope with the lack of meaning caused by dislocation by creating an imaginary network for people with similar experiences. Although arabesk music created its first idol, Orhan Gencebay, in the second half 1960s during the rapid migration flow, it started to expand with the introduction of audiocassettes by the mid 1970s and was played in 'gecekondu' (slum) areas, minibuses, trucks, taxis, namely, everywhere except for the state-run television and radio. Özal noticed the political potential hidden in arabesk already in the late 1970s. He not only utilized it for political campaigns of the Motherland Party but also assigned a research group analyzed the arabesk culture as early as 1983. Soon enough, arabesk became the lifestyle choice of the nouveaux riches. This class internalized the pragmatic value system of Özal's regime, in other words, "turning the corner without due labor". In the late 1980s arabesk was absorbed by the culture industry and its popularity was passed through public events like political campaigns and football games. Sub-genres were produced soon after, such as "Islamist", "revolutionary" and "nationalist" arabesk. The reaction to the cultural patterns that came along with arabesk led to creating new terms such as 'maganda' and 'zonta' to define the members of the "low culture", namely the invaders of the good old city, and the response for them 'entel' as a derogatory term for the "intellectuals" that perceived themselves as the owners of the city with its "high culture". By and large, arabesk marked the 1980s with its changing appearance and proliferated through other facets of culture with its negative signifiers such as vulgarism, banality, sexism etc (Özbek, 1997: 222-226). Consequently, it has turned into an all around allegory which referred to a fast spreading disease in society and was used to explain different aspects of it such as arabesk democracy, arabesk economy, arabesk politicians (Öncü, 1999: 110).

As much as arabesk was unavoidable in the 1980s, my interviewees' accounts show that it was consumed to some extent but not very well embraced as a source for identity formation:

Kamil thinks arabesk was addressed to him. Although most of the singers were older than him –except for Küçük Emrah and Küçük Ceylan- he could relate to their lives with what he did not have and urged for. He remembers himself embracing arabesk singers as role models and acting older than he really was like a "Serious Brother" (Ağır Abi). Kamil had similar elements in his life such as: a drunken father, poverty, beating, which made him easier to identify himself with arabesk singers. He could not feel the same thing for foreign movie or music stars as there was a distance in reality and he did not have the same cultural elements in his life. He says there was a naming tendency and some places or people were named after those foreign movie stars but it was only a title for them with no corresponding reality. Kamil remembers an apartment building named after Sue Ellen (The protagonist who used to drink whisky all the time in popular TV series Dallas) but the tenants would not drink whisky.

Ebru's background is mixed in terms of ethnic origins and she is in her mid-thirties, now. Ebru's only arabesk tape was one of Ahmet Kaya, a leftist popular musician. Even that was given to her as a gift. It was the Yorgun Demokrat (Tired Democrat) album. She states that she used to like foreign and classical music. Therefore, Ebru had never missed Hikmet Şimşek's (The conductor of Presidential Symphony Orchestra at the time) show on Sundays.

Şennur is a from upper middle-class family from the capital city. Şennur did not watch Turkish films and did not listen to Turkish music. Her family did not listen to arabesk music. Once she heard her aunt listening to arabesk and Şennur was surprised. She felt it was a totally different mentality. Her aunt took Şennur and her sister to a Ferdi Tayfur film and Şennur says that the arabesk ambiance in those

films felt so strange to her. As she is coming from an upper middle class family of not politicized parents, she has never had financial anxieties. She says "We were in touch with Europe and not really affected by what had happened within the country."

Emre, with his a middle-class family background from İstanbul has been a leftist activist since he was in high school. He admits that he liked arabesk music and used to listen to Orhan Gencebay and Müslüm Gürses. He also says that he would gather his friends from the political organization and take them to Ahmet Kaya concerts. Emre does not agree with high-culture versus low culture debates and says " We were not like the entels to look down to people's taste. " Emre adds that one weekend he would take his friends to an arabesk show, another weekend to the opera.

Arabesk does not seem to be well embraced by the middle-class members of the generation initially. Only after it was merged with different music genres, the perception of arabesk changed and the reaction to it mellowed down.

4.3 Identity Politics

> On an ordinary day in 1986, a group of Turkish stage actors dressed in Nazi (SS) uniforms asked randomly the people walking in the streets of Istanbul to show their identity cards. Interestingly, they had employed a mixed language-semi German and semi Turkish - in approaching these people and asked for 'kimlik bitte!'. What was more interesting was that the majority of the people who were approached by these actors in SS uniforms showed their identity cards without questioning any part of the staged act. The whole event was meant to be humorous, yet it also revealed the unquestioned authority of any-body dressed in a uniform in a country with a strong state tradition (Kadıoğlu, 1996: 177).

"Kimlik" stands for identity in Turkish and it often refers to identity cards at the outset. When people are asked for their identity, they show their IDs right away. It is a reflex of the political era and not to be questioned most of the time. Ulus Baker (n.d.) considers identity as universalizing or generalizing and distinguishing biases and they only refer to a legal reality with our identity cards. Accordingly, when real life experiences such as homosexuality, nationalism, childhood, sex, religion or capitalism are drawn into the categories of identity politics, they shift meanings. I intend to elaborate on the rise of identity politics in the 1980s in order to discuss the opportunities for youth to form an identity within the paradoxical public sphere, where fragmentation of every single aspect of one's life experience falls into another category.

Along with the change in Turkey's political circumstances the effects of the globalization process became more visible in the cultural sphere. Ayşe Kadıoğlu (1996: 189-190) argues that the globalization process caused "homogenous, standardized cultures in an international order whose main political actors were the nation-states" to get fragmented. Strangely enough, the forces of globalization impelled the rise of local identities all over. The uncompromising restraint on each and every politically radical discourse in Turkey after the coup went along with the exaltation of identity politics. Through the impacts of globalization in Turkey since

1980s, Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu (2005:109) account for 'the changing meaning of modernity in Turkey' and they claim that the decade started the process of 'the emergence of alternative modernities' which embraced "new actors, new mentalities of development and new identity claims". They consider these new mentalities and claims as sources of alternatives to the traditional "state-centric model of modernity" not only with their 'cultural or discursive' but also with their 'institutional and material' structures.

As everywhere in the world, the rise of globalism and new global communication opportunities provided by the advances in technology endorsed new social movements to expand. Kadıoğlu (1996: 190) suggests that the global integration process of Turkey that started in the early 1980s was hastened with the introduction of new television channels and the opportunity to watch global television channels like CNN and BBC. As a result, the significance of the official Turkish Radio and Television that operated as an effective apparatus to assert 'the monolithic Turkish identity' was deprived.

Since new opportunities that enhance the network between different localities have been inherent to the globalization process, changes in all areas of societies began to affect each other. Thus, change cannot only be understood with reference to national dynamics but also to global/local factors. Moreover, culture cannot be regarded as subordinate to politics and economics within the context of this process since culture enables new actors, new meanings of modernity through formerly 'silenced identities' and new considerations of politics and their participants beyond the scope of the conventional strong-state to appear (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005: 111).

As Turkey's modernization and nationalism processes share some similar aspects with European countries, Sefa Şimşek (2004:119) elaborates on the social movements in Turkey applying new social movements' theory. Only after Turkey's attempt to integrate to the global process, namely, after 1980s a lot of ethnic,

cultural, linguistic and religious components that were inhibited any which way before, started to appear in the public sphere. Şimşek explains this with the new economic policies, the hasty population growth and the lack of employment opportunities that made people migrate to urban areas. As a result, more than half of the total population ended up living in urban areas creating a huge demographic change, which led to significant changes in "the moral, cultural and religious values of society".

From 1980s on, as the formerly national progressive structure of the Turkish economy had been transformed into a "free-market based economic rationality" which required minimal state; there has been a feasible ground for a new discourse shaped by neo-liberal individualism. Furthermore, the change in identity politics caused the fragmentation of political culture with the revival of Islam and Kurdish question. There has been a steady increase both in civil societal elements such as the protests of women activists, environmentalist, homosexuals, transsexuals, Islamic university students; and in the number of civil society organizations (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005: 43).

Before the 1980s, public sphere was determined by the Leftist or Rightist political identities in which young people fit without having to question alternative sources of identity politics. Therefore, I elaborate Islamism, feminism, the revival of Alevi and Kurdish identity in the 1980s, since they provided a multi-discursive scene from which opportunities to form identity patterns were provided.

4.3.1 Islamism

Islam was used by the military regime in 1980s as "the spiritual force" to unite society whereas the ideals of Kemalism served as "the intellectual force". Islam was introduced into the curriculum of the national education in appropriate doses under close control. The military regime assumed that it was worthwhile to avail religion to antagonize the oppositional powers such as extreme-nationalist, leftist, Kurdish separatists and religious fundamentalists provided that it was controlled by the state. Moreover, "politicizing religion" would be beneficial to turn away the public attention from other crucial issues such as the economic mess and human rights violations (Pak, 2004: 330).

According to Kadıoğlu (1996: 190), particular aspects of the internal politics in the 1980s enabled Turkey to be linked with "the international global medium": the post-1983 government empowered the political elites to introduce a more democratic environment; Islamic tones with regards to the Turkish identity became more evident in the altered discourse of state elites, which caused the renunciation of "Kemalism as a political manifesto". Kemalist ideals were again accentuated yet not to establish "a monolithic Turkish identity" but to hinder the dissemination of Marxism, fascism and religious fundamentalism instead. Kadıoğlu maintains that Islam was moved from the periphery to the center of Turkish politics in order to counteract communism. She also claims that as a result of the steady dismissal of the constraint by the center over the periphery various civil society activities could be actualized.

Ayşe Saktanber (2007: 419) argues that before the ascent of Islamic revivalism in the 1980s, "the meaning of being a Muslim" has never been debated so frequently. She finds it very difficult to discuss Islamic identity with regards to youth as a distinctive issue by putting aside Islamism, which has become "the other" recently.

Saktanber claims Islamism is directly related to the efforts of hindering fundamentalism neither to Islam nor being Muslim. While considering "urban and modern" youth in relation with their Muslim identity, she distinguishes young people, who were raised with "local and religious values" from the ones that were raised with "secular and Western values". Saktanber claims that these categories intersect a lot and suggests another classification with regards to whether Islam is taught celestial or not. Consequently, Saktanber (2007: 420) also indicates another category as Islamist or 'dindar' (religious) in relation to the religious patterns of young people's socialization either in the family or by religious institutions. Accordingly, despite the differences between these categories and between youth identifying themselves with them, certain similarities are present in the ways that youth perceive religion in contemporary Muslim societies. Saktanber argues that the Islamist young people in Turkey define themselves as members of a sociopolitical category. She refers to Karl Mannheim's collective "consciousness" that keeps the members of a generation together and allows them to challenge the conventional thoughts and bring about new discourses as a result of traumatic events that radicalize them. Saktanber also mentions Edmunds and Turner with their take on the active versus passive generations that I explained in the "Generations" section. In her account of Islamist youth, Saktanber (2007: 421) indicates that "at least some of them" formed a "new discourse of reflexive subjectivity" within the context of the changes in cultural and political spheres in Turkey. Thus, Islamist youth do not necessarily refer to their communal or collective identites; they rather define themselves in terms of individuality either liberal or religious.

Edmunds and Turner (2005: 573) relate the conflict between the traditional and modern patterns of culture to the rise of global consumerism and the opportunities to access various cultural products. They exemplify this phenomenon with young women in Turkey, who study the Qur'an as well as Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas and Susan Sontag. Hence, Edmunds and Turner argue that a global generational consciousness is most likely more possible than a global class

consciousness and therefore analyzing the changes at the cultural and social sphere through generational perspective may be more feasible.

My interviewees' accounts on their relationship to rising Islamism in the 1980s are as follows:

Kamil looks back at the Islamist circles then and says that the Islamist identity was very important with regards to "the magazineation" of ideologies. He states that there was a big bang among Islamists based on translated materials. Journals were good gathering places for Islamists as they could find "imported and translated" sources instead of classical ones. Kamil compares the activities of those Islamist groups to those by '68ers (Leftist activists) and says that no Islamist organization emerged from them despite the fact that they had similar characteristics with the people around Leftist journals such as *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment) and *Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi* (Independence Socialist Journal) in terms of their operation strategies. Kamil states that "the support of the state for Islamist" then was created by confusion. He thinks the state kept silent against those groups as there was no real political organization –except for Hizbullah- and no activity in the streets unlike Leftist organizations in 1970s. Thus, the police could not find a reason to bust the groups around those journals and they spread by networks mostly gathered at homes. Kamil describes that period for Islamists as followed: "As if there was a gate opened from the ocean towards Islamists and new knowledge was flowing constantly into them. "

Gaye, in her late thirties now, was studying French when she escaped home to marry a radical Islamist man. She moved to a more conservative neighborhood in Ankara, where she noticed a clear cultural difference. As she felt lonely and discriminated in her husbands Islamist circle, she decided to "cover herself". Gaye was welcomed by the very well educated women of that Islamist circle soon and started to join their home gatherings to discuss religious issues. She says that the women were separated

from men in those gatherings, where men would occupy another room "to save the world". Men would have a mentor, mostly a young and educated imam (prayer leader). Women also would choose a mentor for each session to determine what was going to be discussed. Women would make research on a subject related to Islam and discuss it eventually. Gaye was surprised how Islamist women would talk about having a simple life and let it go at basic needs, while they would have ultra-modern furniture and appliances at home and wear super expensive clothing. She felt that those people were in contradiction with what they advocated. Once, "kabir azabı" (according to Islam the agony a soul must serve in the grave until being located in heaven or hell) was picked as a discussion topic. It was the time Gaye's mother died. All other women argued that a woman with an uncovered head will be subject to a long agony in her grave and her hair will transform into snakes that will bite her. Gaye did not believe in that kind of agony after death. She asked the other women, if they thought her mother would suffer like they described. Their answer freaked Gaye out. She thought that they were superstitious and did not care for a person's grief. Gaye felt more distant from the group as she kept asking other questions and getting weird answers. She decided to get rid of her turban (headscarf) and open up after three years. Gaye explains how she was discriminated against and kept away from school when she was "covered" and also the process of alienation from her neighborhood and friends circle when she decided to "open up".

Kemal, in his early forties now, grew up in a nationalist neighborhood in Ankara. He participated in Ülkü Ocakları (Forges of Ideal-centers for nationalist young men) and was shaped by nationalist ideas. Kemal emphasizes that one would be either a leftist or rightist before the 1980s, he was confused with Motherland Party's principles later in the 1980s, since there was not such a party tradition. He used to think that leftists were all communists and communists were robots from Moscow in order to crash the moral system of nationalists and Muslims. Kemal says that most of the nationalists got introduced to Koran in prison. He argues that nationalists would know Islam but not Koran. According to him, people Ülkü Ocakları have

seen seccade (prayer rug) in the center after nationalist leaders were released from prison for the first time. He claims that people would not pray in Ülkü Ocakları before. Kemal thinks that tarikats (religious orders) influenced nationalists to pay attention to Islam and Tasavvuf (Islamic Mysticism). Kemal himself used to read works of Necip Fazıl (a poet, novelist, playwright and philosopher, who used to object secularism) a lot. He got interested in tarikats and joined Menzil group in Nakşibendi tarikat. Kemal compares radical Islamist groups to Nurcular (another tarikat) and claims that Nurcu groups were pro-state whereas radical Islamists were against the state, as they wanted to have an Islamist regime. He says that he could distinguish Nurcu men from other groups: " If a young man wears crinkled pants; has a mustache and says "abi (brother)" a lot, he is a Nurcu".

Evidently, Islamist circles provided a sense of belonging to young people who were left in limbo between the ongoing westernization process and the conventional values. Furthermore, the public discourse of Islam in the 1980s allowed Islamist people a departure from peripheral and marginalized perceptions of the religion. Islamists merged the traditional codes of language and culture with the modern political references.

4.3.2 Feminism

As a positive outcome of the emphasis on individual rights and individualism inherent to liberalism, feminist activism started to flourish in the mid-1980s (Arat, 1998: 119). None of the political organizations prior to the coup in 1980 concentrated on women's issues and rights, yet women could only act along within those organizations. (Deniz Kandiyoti as cited in Nadje 2002)

> Ironically, the restrictions imposed on general political life by the military regime helped to liberate women activists from the straightjackets of male-dominated political structures. Being disappointed by their experiences within the previously existing political parties and organizations increased women's inclination to seek new venues and frameworks for their activism. (Nadje, 2002: 24)

The new wave of feminism and the major change that was brought about influenced Turkish feminists in the 1980s. There was already a tradition introduced by the founders of the Republic that provided a relatively safe space for feminism to breakthrough during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the issues and embodiment of that new wave were unconventional. Firstly, feminists were not operating in small groups; they started to go on protests in bigger cities. Secondly, they gathered around more specific issues related to their bodies and identities such as domestic violence and abortion rights no matter what their political inclinations were (Arat, 1998: 119). Feminism achieved a well-built appearance in the Turkish public sphere with various activities and organizations. The first significant one was a conference on women's issues held in Istanbul in 1982. There wasn't any significant official pressure on women activists then, as they were not regarded as a threat to the status quo (Arat, 1994: 244).

> Professional and intellectual women organized a study group named *Kadın Çevresi* (Women's Circle) in 1984. Its major concerns were publishing materials, organizing symposia, and panel discussions about women's issues as well as providing care, health and consultancy services for women (Şimşek, 2004: 125).

In that very era of de-politicization, the forms and the content of the media changed dramatically. Weekly news magazines and popular monthlies with different target audiences were published, namely, men and women were considered as separate consumer groups. In order to stay away from political issues, which were subject to censorship and further liabilities, intellectuals and journalists started to pay more and more attention to "private" issues that had not been addressed in the public sphere before (Öztürkmen, 1998: 277- 278).

Kadınca (Womanly) was launched before the coup in 1978 as a conventional women's magazine but its content and vision was changed totally from 1979 on since the takeover of the production by Duygu Asena and her staff. It was the most popular and pioneering magazine for feminism throughout the 1980s followed by popular women's magazines such as *Kadın*, *Elele*, *Rapsodi*, *Marie Claire* and *Vizon*, which utilized not a radical but a pragmatic discourse (Kırca, 2001: 460)**.** Nonetheless, *Kadınca* and Duygu Asena were subject to some criticism by academic and activist feminist circles with regards to the magazine's consumerist content and modus operandi and the objectification of women in ads (Öztürkmen, 1998: 289). On the contrary, both *Kadınca* and Asena had contributed to the popularization of feminism. Asena's first book *Kadının Adı Yok* (The Woman Has No Name), which was launched in 1987 became a best seller for a considerably long period and was regarded as the first feminist manifesto in some feminist circles (Kırca, 2001: 463). Women's issues were not only discussed in the popular media but also in various journals such as *Somut* (Concrete), *Feminist*, *Sosyalist Feminist* and *Kaktüs* (Cactus), which were prepared by feminist scholars, professional women and activists (Kırca, 2001: 460). Moreover, feminists started to translate some masterpieces of feminism under the sponsorship of YAZKO (the publishing company of authors and translators) (Nadje, 2002: 25) and formed consciousness raising groups **(**Kırca, 2001: 460).

Furthermore, women engaged in a petition campaign in Ankara and İstanbul to put pressure on official authorities in order to get the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women that was signed in 1985 applied actually. In 1987, violence against women was protested with a major campaign and a festival (Arat, 1994: 245). As a component of the rising political Islam, Islamist women appeared in the public sphere with their criticisms of the dominant secular order, which had kept religion under its control. They also challenged and pushed the boundaries of the predominant ideas of democracy and national identity in Turkey in order to alter the aforementioned conceptions. Some of them integrated their efforts to the activities of existing religious party later whereas others persisted critical and chose to utilize their democratic rights outside of the party (Arat, 1998: 124-126)**.** Consequently, women's movement provided participation in politics both at grass roots level and in the political arena for women in Turkey. Women also established feminist institutions through which they gained more power against the state and patriarchal discourse. Their efforts supported to form a political democracy in Turkey (Arat, 1994: 247).

I examine my interviewees' take on feminism as follows:

Kamil heard about feminism while Duygu Asena was made fun of in political circles. He doesn't think that she and feminism were taken seriously then. He recalls sexist jokes about her and feminism which was considered as a humiliating and ludicrous activity. He thinks that Duygu Asena was symbolized by the media in order to empty the content of feminism which became a kind of pop art for that period.

Ayça defines herself as a socialist feminist and she emphasizes her awareness of the conflict between socialism and feminism in the 1980s. She explains that she would not comprehend why women's issues were considered as secondary in every belief system that dared to change the world or at least the status quo. She says that her

resources for consciousness-raising were *Kadınca*, *GırGır* and *Nokta* magazines. Ayça noticed later that *Kadınca* had a much more liberal direction compared to other resources (academic books on feminism) that improved her knowledge more evidently. She appreciates *Kadınca* for waking her up to everyday issues on being a woman such as: getting embarrassed while buying sanitary pads; perceiving virginity as a sacred state to be protected; trying to hide the incident and feeling guilty when getting sexually or verbally abused; not being able to express and maintain opinions from a women's point of view; feeling under pressure by a bombardment of moral values that trapped women and so on. Ayça remembers reading *The Woman Has No Name*, which made her aware of the difficulties to articulate the issues about a woman's sexuality in Turkey. She attended a literature gathering at a bookstore, where most of the audience were socialist men including a publisher that was known for his socialist literature selection. As *The Woman Has No Name* has become the bestseller at the time, it was one of the discussion subjects. Ayça could not believe how furious the socialist men were while referring to the book. Even the publisher said "I want to throw this piece of crap against the wall". Ayça left the meeting with disappointment and frustration and noticed that there was a long way to go before men could appreciate women's existence and voices in public and cultural spheres. Ayça admits that she suffered eating disorders for many years. She researched the effects of the media on body images of women and she could not believe how many women in the world in the last 20 years suffered and died as a result of similar depression related disorders. Ayça thinks that women are stuck in mental cookie cutters that are the stereotypes telling women how to look and how to be. She hates advertisement sectors as they produce sexist images and trends to put more pressure on women, who are degraded to mere objects.

Gaye says that she always approached feminism with hesitation. Both in religious and more liberal groups, she could not sense the solidarity between women. When she covered her head according to Islam, she was criticized by women initially. Similarly, when she decided to open up, it was women who reacted most intensely.

Gaye thinks it is a men's world and women try to defend values that were established by men. She has read a lot of books written by women, yet she thinks that there is not much space for women's ideas in the real world.

Bilge defines herself as a feminist and she admits that it was not very difficult for her to identify herself with feminism thanks to her feminist mother. She says that girls who are raised by strong and educated women in Turkey are lucky, since they become aware of the gender inequalities very soon. Bilge also says that a feminist woman is always a threat for men and other women, who do not have that kind of awareness. She believes that the problems in her private relations derive from her "I am not needy and I do not need your protection" attitude. Bilge read a lot of feminist articles and books but she could not relate to some body image issues that other girls suffered. She says she is aware of the bombardment by the media to have one size of women who act similarly.

Emre heard about feminism in 1982. He says it was the time for him to read leftist literature mostly. In books and magazines, Emre came across issues regarding women and their emancipation. When Emre was at the university, he was active in student movements and he encouraged women students to learn more about feminism. He says their (his and other leftist men in the same group) take on feminism was different than the other leftist groups, namely, they did not see feminism as a challenge to socialism but as a supplementary component. They even thought that feminism could be a way to overcome the crisis in socialism. Emre talks about his women friends, who established independent women's organizations in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir in the second half of the 1980s. He divides these groups into two and says that one group consisted of women, who were active in leftist organizations before the coup; another group consisted of younger women, who were active in student organizations in the 1980s. Emre states that young men from the same socialist organizations would not participate in women's discussions and protests, yet they would set an agenda with regards to women's issues such as

violence against women; sexual and verbal abuse; and so on. He admits that these issues were ignored before. Emre remembers some young socialist men objecting to feminism, as they perceived it as a petit bourgeoisie deviation. He used to discuss feminism in terms of new social movements and considered feminism as a strong perspective that should not be ignored and isolated from socialist discourse. Emre admits that he was never fond of independent feminists on the individual level and has always kept his distance from them. Emre joined the 438 protests (an article that used to be in the Civil Code about a discount on sexual abuse charges if the victim was a sex trade worker) and when he got taken into custody, policemen made fun of him: "Emre, what is up? Have you also become a feminist?". Emre says his awareness of feminism influenced his private relations in a good way. He admits that he did not like the liberal and popular version of feminism around popular women's magazine circles, since he considered that kind of feminism as an artificial and unreal movement of "Enlightened" women.

Kemal has a Turkish nationalist and radical Islamist background. He became aware of feminism with Duygu Asena's book. Kemal was in a group called *Bilinç* (Consciousness) and used to publish a journal with the same name. When Duygu Asena came to Ankara for a book launch, Kemal decided to go to the event and object her with his ideas deriving from Islam. He believed that feminism was a product of capitalism to degenerate women and to make them enemies of men. For him, feminism would make consumerist women as it was the case in the West and those women would get enslaved in the capitalist market as provoked buyers of all kinds of goods. Kemal articulated his ideas to Duygu Asena and said that as an Islamist man he did not believe in equality but justice. He remembers Asena's answer "Equality is not an obstacle for justice!". Kemal objected her by quoting verses from Koran with regards to women's place in society.

In the 1980s, feminism did not only challenge the prevailing official perception of equality between men and women but also the public discourse on women's issues.

Although feminists appeared as a heterogeneous group in the public sphere, they all started to question the given status to women by bringing about issues from the private sphere. Feminists began to speak up for women within the framework of sexuality, violence and discrimination. Feminists emerged a new discourse which allowed women to address and express their demands both in the public and private sphere. The rise of feminism in the 1980s transformed the identity patterns of young people in a radical manner by providing an emancipatory discourse.   .

4.3.3 The Revival of the Alevi Identity

As the state adopted Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a major policy to prevent the revival of political polarization, Sunni Islamic patterns were promoted in society. The Alevis, "a heterodox religious minority group, began to claim their identity politics in the 1980s in a distinctive way. The secularization process followed by the establishment of the Turkish Republic provided a relatively safe ground for Alevis to blend in the Turkish culture and identify themselves with the principles of Kemalism. However, they experienced a steady integration into society with a Sunni majority, which caused a growing tension. Therefore, they tended to live in more clustered neighborhoods in bigger cities. Alevis also adopted leftist ideologies until the end of 1970s, when the decline of Kemalism became quite obvious and all radical leftist organizations they were a part of were abolished. The compulsory religious courses that were introduced in primary and secondary schools promoted Sunni- Islamic patterns on one hand; however the failure of their religious leadership (dedelik) to integrate itself to the hastily changing circumstances of 1980s the Alevis call for new identity politics became more evident. They also moved from the periphery to the center with new organizations and started to articulate their identity in terms of ethnicity rather than religion. Subsequently, they established foundations and associations that carried their practices and culture into a more modern and urban environment (Bruinessen, 1996:7-10).

I enquired about the place of Alevi identity in the post-80 generation and came across to the accounts below:

Although Kamil did not have any Alevi neighbors, he remembers all derogatory terms given to them by Sünni Muslims. He thinks that he has Alevi roots but he is not sure about that.

Kemal used to think that all Alevis were leftists. He says Alevis would not live in nationalist neighborhoods before 1980s. Kemal remembers their Alevi neighbors who moved to their neighborhood in the 1980s and helped his family a lot. His mother loved them and said that they were prejudgmental against Alevis before. Thus, their opinion on Alevis changed. Kemal used to consider Alevis as degenerates before, because for him, they transformed Islam into ridiculous cultural codes.

Emre, on the contrary, had nothing against Alevis. He grew up in a Sünni Islamist neighborhood but he also had Alevi neighbors. His family favored Alevis, as they thought Alevis were more open minded than Sünnis. Emre did not like the idea of addressing a religious sect politically and organizing a movement based on that.

Ali, as an Alevi, is very upset about the humiliating stereotypes attributed to Alevis. He talks sarcastically: " I will tell you what we do and who we are! We blow out candles (It is an idiom that refers to "immoral sexual habits of Alevis"). We have all kinds of moral failures! We are ignorant Kızılbaş (Red headed is another humiliating term referring to Alevis) people. We steal! We cheat! We are dirty! We are degenerates". Ali says that these are all discriminating attributes and that is why he cannot introduce himself as an Alevi in a new environment. He talks about Alevi culture and says that Alevis are very respectful people; they are faithful and do not discriminate other people; they love people, animals and plants, namely, every single part of nature; they are modest people and they are always careful with what they say and do. Ali is content with the rise of Alevi identity in the 1980s and he thinks it was an important historical process with regards to the recognition of Alevi culture.

Melek is also an Alevi and she thinks it is still difficult to have Alevi identity in Turkey. She remembers her friends breaking friendship with her when they noticed

she was an Alevi. Melek's first boyfriend abandoned her for the same reason and his parents looked down to her as if she had a contagious disease. She also says that she was going to rent a place and the owner turned her down. Melek asked him why he did so, his answer was humiliating: "I do not want a Kızılbaş, who will have candle blowing sex parties in my apartment". Melek thinks that the revival of the Alevi identity in the 1980s is an urban legend. She still experiences hardship in her daily life.

In the 1980s, the Alevi identity was one of the most popular discussion topics in the Turkish media. The revival of the Alevi identity gave rise to new and alternative concepts regarding the Alevi culture. Since the Leftist organizations in which Alevis pursued their activism in the 1970s were banned, Alevis began to look for alternative channels from within their cultural heritage. The emphasis on the cultural patterns of Alevism became a great benefit for young people in order to identify themselves with a distinctive yet unifying source of reference.

4.3.4 "The Kurdish Issue"

For the sake of the monolithic Turkish identity and homogenous nation state granted by the Turkish Republic, Kurds have been denied as a separate ethnic group. The official policy with regards to Kurds was based on an ongoing effort to prove that they were of Turkish origin and they had adopted some different cultural and linguistic patterns as a consequence of unforeseen historical events. The Kurdish movement was blended with the leftist activism from 1960s on and empowered by consciousness raising activities on the issues of the inhabitants of Eastern and Southeastern regions. In the 1970s, political groups that advocated the interests of Kurds became more organized and mobilized, which led to the establishment of PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) towards the end of that decade (Bruinessen, 1996: 7). The repressive rules of the military regime between 1980 and 1983 had a converse affect on Kurds and induced the sympathy for PKK, which called up for guerilla war against the Turkish state and the army. The escalating strength of PKK caused the Kurdish issue to be considered in association with violence and terrorism. Only by the end of 1980s the issue was brought up in public by the efforts of some politicians including Özal, who also was from Kurdish origin. With the recognition of the Kurdish reality, Kurdish people could have legal grounds for their claims through publications such as *Özgür Gündem* (Free Agenda) and *Özgür Ülke* (Free Country) and through NGO's such as İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association), İnsan Hakları Kurumu (Human Rights Institution) and Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği Türkiye Şubesi (the Turkish Branch of Helsinki Citizen's Assembly) in early 1990s (Şimşek, 2004: 131).

Generational attributes mostly leave the ethnic aspect aside. I emphasized through Ortner's account before, most of the studies on generations are of middle-class accounts. I also limited my scope and interviews with urban, middle-class members of the post-1980 generation, bearing in mind that there is "a need for more in-depth ethnographic studies of young people of the post-1980 generation" as Neyzi puts it

(2001: 427). In respect of the Kurdish issue in identity formation, following parts from my interviews draws a general picture:

As for Kurds, Kamil recalls them as "dirty and poor migrant people", initially. Later, he met Islamist Kurds in religious circles but Kurds were not speaking up much. He states that with their majority in Islamist groups Kurds stopped them to deviate into a more nationalist version of Islam.

Sevgi is from an upper-middle class family in Diyarbakır and Kurdish in origin. She tells me that her family had to move from their hometown in the 1980 to the West, as they were not able to cope with the threats coming from both PKK and the Turkish army. PKK accused her father of being a spy for the Turkish army, while the Turkish army officers accused him of aiding and abetting terrorists. Thus, her father was tortured by both sides for many times before they moved to another city. Sevgi's older brother has an engineering degree, yet he was fired by his first employer due to his ethnic identity. Sevgi states that her awareness of ethnic identity is related to her experiences mostly. She emphasizes that she cannot comprehend debates on Kurdish reality, as they sound very superficial to her. "As long as you do not appear as a Kurd and do not articulate your ethnic identity, you are welcomed everywhere by everyone, which I find very hypocritical." she concludes.

Çiğdem's mother is Kurdish in origin. She says she felt her mother's ethnic identity as a different aspect in their life in the 1980s. Çiğdem states that only after arabesk became widespread, she noticed that her mother had her own taste in music. Her mother used to love İbrahim Tatlıses and was deeply affected by his music. As Çiğdem puts it "Although I used to listen to punk and rock music mostly, I felt as if İbrahim Tatlıses lived with us. As my mother used to listen to him constantly, his music was almost circulating in our veins" Çiğdem says that her mother was like an Eastern princess, who was modern like the women from the West. Her mother is well educated and also has work experience but she could not pursue a life as she

wanted. Çiğdem thinks that arabesk music was all about her mother and adds "The music was so painful and I think it was the first time our mother communicated with us like that."

Kurdish nationalist groups did not emerge in the 1980s; they were already active in the Leftist organizations prior to 1980. The emphasis on Kurdishness was not so strong in the 1970s, since the revolutionary ideas were more dominant than any demand derived from an ethnic identity. Public discourse on Turkish and Kurdish identities and nationalisms changed through time within an interactive agenda. It was only after 1980, the Kurdish issue gained a legitimate platform in the public sphere. Urbanized young people began to refer to their ethnic identity in an environment where fragments of identity politics became more visible and vocal.

4.3.5 Civil Society in Question

While the abovementioned new claims for identity and new social movements that employed a range of civil societal elements, Navaro-Yashin (1998: 5) questions the idea of "state" and "civil society" as oppositional terms in the scientific and public discourse to explain the changes in the 1980s and in the 1990s in Turkey. Unlike other scholars who portray this period "as one of progressive and favorable democratization, of a decentralization of statecraft, and, most importantly, of a development of "civil society" and a certain sort of pluralism and multiculturalism in Turkish society", she regards it as an era of "a changing enmeshed relationship" between the state and society that cannot be separated from each other so straightforwardly. Accordingly, there was a rigorous endeavor to "reproduce" and "enhance" the power of the state by triggering various locales within the synonymous society which cannot be interpreted as the rise of civil society. She disagrees with the claims of a number of post-Kemalist scholars who explained the ascent of Islamism in Turkey as " the awakening of civil society against the state". She points up the analysis of Göle on social formations at the time (Towards an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey), in which the public sphere was regarded as being "autonomous" from the state and its power representatives. According to Navaro-Yashin such a perspective on the public sphere may lead to draw an unrealistic picture of it, where all civic formations could coincide in a nonbelligerent manner. She, on the contrary, opposes Göle's account asserting that the 1980s:

> …was a period of tension-ridden struggles between diverse organs of the state (sometimes in disjuncture with one another), on the one hand, and members of social movements (also in collision), on the other. What has been left out of this account of the public sphere is the effects that martial law and war in the East had on the public culture all over the country after the military coup, as well as the prevailing repressive, controlling and intervening power of various organs of the state, in such diverse places as prisons, courtrooms, airport checkpoints, streets, universities, neighborhoods, or through media and other means in one's own home (Navaro-Yashin, 1998: 5).

70

With her rather distinctive ethnographic accounts both on Islamist and secularist circles, she indicates that the experience of "civil society" in Turkey in 1980s is not idiosyncratic but circumstantial which became a "symbolic ground" for state power to get legitimized and mount on (Navaro-Yashin, 1998: 21).

Emrah Göker (1998: 3-4) takes account of the Twilight Generation and argues that young people, who form different identities by using means available to them as commodities and their symbolic meanings, are seen as dangerous. Since they do not fit in the frame of socialization drawn by bourgeoisie, they are considered as "wrinkles to be ironed". He exemplifies this tendency as follows:

> Young people, who use drugs are exposed in public and bombarded with moral speeches; young people, who live in the streets are seen as potential criminals; homosexual young people are considered to have "defective genes" and they are seen as perverts, who transmit AIDS; young people with long hair are seen as "lost" and young people, who are active in politically are considered as "anarchist and traitors (Göker, 1998:4).

CHAPTER

V

THE POST-1980 GENERATION AND DISCOURSES

5.1. The Post-1980 Generation

Navaro-Yashin (2002: 222) argues that both secularist and Islamist identities in the current Turkish society are manufactured. Accordingly, these identities are not "original and essential" although they may be experienced per se. In this respect, they are not representations of any fundamental Turkish identity. I will argue that compared to previous generations, both representations and self-reflections of youth identities after 1980 were shaped through the market and the media. This framework was the dominant reference for all other institutions of society when defining this generation, including the generation itself, which did not oppose the stereotypes. As Navaro-Yashin puts it:

> Politics of culture between secularist and Islamist in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s developed in the context of a consumer market influenced by globalization. So central was consumerism to the social life of this period that political conflicts were organized, expressed and mediated through this medium (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 222).

Navaro-Yashin (2002: 224) states that in Özal's period the import rate was higher than the export rate, thus consumerism indicated a hasty rise. She claims that the consumer culture of the era was strictly related to the identity politics. In Navaro-Yashin's (2002: 247) account identities became commoditized soon and commodities became available in the market for every single identity. She considers the consumption of symbols that indicate an identity in relation to the force of representations and examines it with Baudrillard's conceptualization of the signifier that does not necessarily signify anything but itself.

In my opinion, the new middle class started consuming commodities manufactured by life-style economies and transformed them into identity patterns. Meanwhile, popular culture allowed youth to consume and transform subcultural elements that have been pulled to the industry rapidly. In Turkey, music, clothing and jargons related to subcultures, which were generated mostly by working or lower-middle class youth groups in western countries in a specific context as a reaction to mainstream culture were presented to middle-class youth as commodities in the shelves of popular culture sectors. Thus, they were consumed within a different context as choices of taste. The movement was missed; the fashion was consumed. There has been a hybrid form of these consumption patterns with regards to time, locations and meanings. For instance, I remember buying heavy-metal cassettes from a tiny little music shop that used to carry lots of arabesk music products before the spread of interest for heavy-metal music. As original cassettes were both expensive and very rare, the store-owner used to make copies of the original tapes he would receive. Most of the copies were dubbed onto arabesk tapes, so often an album would start with the intro of an arabesk song and continue with heavy-metal ballads. Similarly, as there were no specific venues identified with newly rising hard-rock and metal scenes, metal bands used to rent wedding banquet halls to perform their shows. It was very common to see traditional families with rolling eyes leaving the hall for metal heads.

Stüdyo İmge was the first rock magazine published in Turkey in 1986. In an interview in *İstanbul'da Rock Hayatı*, the founder of the magazine, Levent Erseven (1995: 59-60), argues that everything was experienced very fast in the 1980s in Turkey. He suggests that young men who were running in the streets with their guns (refers to the political youth prior to 1980) suddenly took other positions in the 1980s. Erseven claims that Özal's period caused liberalism to explode in Turkey. He associates the 1980s with a burst of expression which caused a subsequent obsession and dependence on the media. Erseven argues that Turkish people were not able to

comprehend the hasty change in the 1980s. As a result, they shut out in order to deal with the situation without getting insane.

In the same study (*İstanbul'da Rock Hayatı),* there is a strong emphasis on the 'pedagogical' approach of the Rock magazines published in Turkey in the 1980s. It is argued that these magazines aimed to teach the young audience what rock music was about and how it should be listened. Preferring pedagogical over didactic shows the tendency to consider the young audience as children to be educated. This fact becomes more obvious in the interview with *Laneth* magazine which was introduced as a fanzine initially. Süreyya İzgi (1995:67), one of the authors of *Laneth* heavy-metal magazine, claims that it is ridiculous to associate music with socialism. For him, music should not be taken too seriously. İzgi admits that the authors of *Laneth* like the philosophy of Rock and Roll but they find the intellectual approach of other music magazines which try to teach the philosophy of music too idiotic. İzgi claims that authors in other music magazines overestimate their positions. As İzgi puts it (1995: 67) "For instance, Talking Heads is an American band. If anybody in the US does it (writes a ten page comment on the band) it is OK! But you are (refers to Turkish authors) in Turkey and you should know your limits. Sit and listen, that is all you can do!" İzgi also points out the conflicting attitudes of young people who embraced subcultural symbols in Turkey. He refers to a criticism written for *Laneth* Magazine "You hang out all day long in your black outfit with your long and well groomed hair and when you return home you have the soup which was sent from your parents' village and prepared by your mother." (İzgi, 1995: 67).

As for clothing, flea markets were popular for finding old army jackets and boots and paradoxically, those military outfits were preferred by the members of rock and hard-rock scene and used while listening to rock ballads and socialist anthems that were symbols for anti-military attitude. Likewise, traditional heybe –a bag made of old carpets- had become very popular to complete a neo-hippie outfit with tie-dye. A similar tendency was experienced with regards to jargon of youth. As Ayşe

Saktanber (2002: 266) points out, stag-talk (geyik muhabbeti), which she considers as a correspondence to geek talk became very popular from the 1980s on, both in secular and Islamist youth circles. I relate it to the rise of sarcastic expressions marked with that particular era. Pastiche patterns in identity formation of youth did not differ much among Islamist and secular circles, as they were nurtured from the same source: the market.

Samet İnanır (2005: 37-51) claims that youth's cultural identities are mediated through the media and he considers the stereotypes on youth as problematic categories. İnanır indicates that most of the negative representations of youth in the media are formed by young people themselves who worked in the media and had a tendency to compare contemporary youth to the '70s youth. İnanır does not find it fair to label youth with negative attributes derived from other people's own experiences and practices which are usually merged with an intense nostalgia. İnanır sees defining political youth as a single category as problematic. He thinks this is related to a tendency to acquire an ideal type of youth, which can be bombarded with advertisements in order to boost consumerism. İnanır is also hesitant to accept representations of youth as apolitical consumers. He thinks this discourse is directly related to white and secular Turks. İnanır argues that both Islamist and Kurdish political youth in the 1980s are ignored by this discourse. İnanır also claims that criteria and identification are problematic, as they leave out the dynamics of depolitization process in the world and in Turkey. In İnanır's account applying generational theories to the Turkish society without assessing the differences is an anachronism. İnanır states that exaggerated claims in public discourse on identity politics that the ideals were embraced by youth in the same way everywhere causes reductionism. İnanır considers identity patterns as experiences that everyone can go through while they are young.

As described in Studies on *Youth Policies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries* (2008: 12-13), Lüküslü regards the definitions of youth in Turkey in two categories. First one is what she calls "youth myth", by which youth are considered as "active

and dynamic citizens of future". The second one is on new generations that do not fit in this ideal category and seen as "consumerist, insensitive, apolitical, good for nothing children of September 12". Both categories are problematic and do not reflect experiences of current youth. Negative attributes on youth are similar to stereotypes of youth created from the 1980s on in global discourse.

Neyzi (2001: 412) indicates that the post-1980s brought about new opportunities for youth through the media. She points out the shift of public discourse on youth and emphasizes that the modernist construction of youth was challenged. Neyzi shows the tendency to blame youth as apolitical consumers, yet she thinks that young people have become able to challenge negative attributes on them by using new opportunities of the media age.

5.2 Emergence of the post-1980 Generation

As the military coup and the policies of Özal marked Turkey in the 1980s, the decade was seen as a "dark" or "Twilight Age". Privatization and the rise of consumer society along with the advance of new communication technologies made the media as a major player in Turkish society (Neyzi , 2001: 422).

> The loss of legitimacy of the political system has resulted in widespread cynicism and political apathy, feeding the cycle of corruption, nepotism, and anarchic individualism (Neyzi, 2001: 423).

Neyzi (2001: 423) argues that in the post-1980 period "modernist construction of youth" changed. Young people's representation in the media accelerated and new constructions of youth were circulated through the media. Neyzi emphasizes that " turning the corner" is identified with the ethos of post-1980 period. She relates this expression to the promiscuous representations of the private sphere as well as the consumerist life-styles in the age of media and liberalization. Media representations of the youth known as " Özal generation" or "Özal's brats" as Mina Urgan prefers to define, were "selfish individualistic consumers that lack a sense of collective responsibility".

Demet Lüküslü (2009: 132-133) argues that there has been a homogenous perception of the post-1980 generation until present. She mentions the pejorative terms used in public discourse while defining the post-1980 youth and claims that a monolithic identity is chosen to accuse youth of being apolitical. Lüküslü (2009: 114) states that the Turkish youth in the 1960s and 1970s shows a characteristic of being a continuation of the youth myth based on the "saving the country" ideal. She objects to the homogenous perception of youth and argues that while analyzing the post-1980 generation, a new approach has to be employed to understand the " new youth". Accordingly, the new youth is not a monolithic entity but a heterogenous social category. Therefore, multiple definitions should be taken into account to

comprehend the post-1980 generation. Lüküslü mentions various new terms identified with the new youth; such as yuppie, tiki, metrosexual and materialist-achiever. Not surprisingly, all of these terms derive from the new policies in economics (Lüküslü, 2009: 122). Lüküslü's emphasis on the changing social structure is directly related to the neo-liberal policies of Özal's regime.

Kozanoğlu (1995: 14-23) twists four tendencies that created a synthesis of Özal's regime and claims that while trying to understand the appeal of the new era, four keywords should be kept in mind: English, computer, fear and dream. In Kozanoğlu's account, the psyche of that regime was built upon one motto:' Think big, earn big!''. He sees it as an extension of 24 January package and states that 12 September and the media helped "rising values" to settle down in a society where people feared to get back to "those days" of hindered dreams. Kozanoğlu indicates that the ultimate value of *yırtma* (making it) has spread in such a milieu, steadily. As much as "making it" or "turning the corner" would sound easy in terms of "equality of opportunities", one had to have some privileges to achieve a better life. Youth had to have access to a computer and speak English in order to "make it". Özal himself used to speak a hybrid language such as "payplaynlarda bir nevi foreyn körrınsi akışı da sağlanır" (A kind of foreign currency flow is provided in the pipelines). Dreams of "making it" were paved with English words sprinkled in sentences as they were pronounced in Turkish. The opportunity to "make it" through computers was perceived in a similar manner. Fears of "getting shot and getting killed" in the 1970s were replaced by "you cannot get rich and you cannot consume" threats in the 1980s. Youth internalized those rising values to be "in" and got occupied with "making it" as "rich people were favored" by the architects of the new moral system. Kezban Acar (2002:6) indicates that the number of schools providing education in foreign languages, particularly in English, increased hastily from the early 1980s on.

When I asked my interviewees to describe the immediate aftermath of the coup with regards to their ways of coping with the new moral values in society, I came across with very explanatory accounts:

Kamil , with his conservative lower-middle class background from the Black Sea Region argues that the youth before the coup was very political and that is why "the system" targeted "us" (youth) while restoring itself. He claims that "the system" was trying to hinder the political activities of youth while portraying "role models" for them in the media that would be worthwhile for the post-24 January period. Kamil states that he was scattered politically and relates this fact to the political arena where people advocated coup were distributing Koran to keep youth away from communism. For him, it was a social transformation into Puritanism. Kamil remembers the slogans of political organizations on the walls of their neighborhood homes but he would not know what they meant. According to him, an apolitical milieu was created after the coup, which alienated people from the political jargon. His anecdote about the time when he was in primary school emphasizes this point: Kamil's teacher asked the class to make a negative sentence and when it was his turn Kamil said "Propaganda is a bad thing!" without knowing the meaning of propaganda. He says, "It had to be a bad thing, as everyday young people with their shaved heads were exposed on TV; they were arrested for having made illegal propaganda".

Ebru has a mixed ethnic identity with Armenian, Kurdish and Berberi roots from the South, Mediterranean Region. Her uncle was a left-wing activist and Ebru met all of his friends, who died after the coup. She says their neighborhood was not a playground but a battle field. Ebru remembers the riots happening every single day just opposite to their house, where a teacher's political organization was located. She used to see people carrying coffins quite often. Ebru's father used to be member of DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions) yet after a while as she

says "He turned 180 degrees and became a pro-boss person". Ebru remembers watching Kenan Evren on television every single day and she felt as if the whole society consisted of retarded children subjected to Evren's rather manipulative speeches. In her opinion, parents then were very amateur in raising kids.

Bilge, as the only child of a middle class family, where both parents were well educated, defines her mother as a liberal and her father as a CHP leftist, a Kemalist. She heard their stories about the time before the coup. As her mother was pregnant with Bilge, she could see the bullets going through the streets. Her father was hassled, since he used to wear a "parka"-military jacket looking coat- in Bahçelievler, a neighborhood with a majority of Rightist militants. Her parents used to complain about line-ups for buying the basic foods for home. As Bilge was born in 1980 she doesn't remember the immediate aftermath of the coup. When she was in primary school, she could not understand why students had to wear that black outfit as if they attended a monastery. She adds "Perhaps we were mourning for freedom". It was also difficult for Bilge to comprehend the phrases in the national anthem such as "Hakka tapmak" (Worshipping the God and the Right at the same time). She felt like a little soldier when teachers ordered "Right! Left! Go ahead!". While singing the national anthem on Monday mornings and Friday evenings, Bilge could feel the effects of the coup, mostly.

Özgür's parents and immediate relatives were leftists in 1970s. His aunt's husband was imprisoned due to his political stance. Özgür's parents shifted to social democracy after the coup in order to get into harmony with the system. They got concerned with their careers and their kid's future, before the coup happened, so their transformation to the new system was smoother. Özgür claims that his parents experienced a vertical mobility in the class system from lower middle class to upper middle class in the 1980s. Özgür says he used to watch television a lot and he was the only one in his family who liked Özal. He says "I used to find him more sympathetic than the others (other politicians)". Özgür's parents criticized his pro-

Özal attitude, so Özgür started to shape his political stance by repeating the criticisms he would read in GırGır humor magazine. It was the time when Özgür started to write political poetry. In one of his poems, he criticized the Higher Education Council for its bad deeds of making the exam questions very difficult. Özgür gave up on his Özal sympathy when he got more involved with GırGır magazine and shifted to left-wing, as it was a family tradition being a leftist that loved Atatürk.

Gaye's mother used to vote for AP (Justice Party) and his father for CHP (Republican People's Party), they voted for ANAP (Motherland Party) in the 1980s. Two of her cousins were extreme leftists. Gaye remembers one of them grabbing her and saying that "We will make her a bomber!", which frustrated Gaye's mother. Gaye lived in Bahçelievler, a neighborhood with a majority of rightist people. He mother cautioned her "If people ask you whether you are rightist or leftist, just tell them you are for the "Bread Party" and run quickly".

Reşit was born in 1961 to a middle-class household in Ankara and lived in Emek neighborhood which was known for having a majority of Leftist population. He thinks the sole difference of his generation was "to reject everything before accepting any part of it". Reşit believes that the members of his generation proved themselves in exaggerating the universal skepticism to the levels of paranoia. He says "We were suspicious of having fun; of the space studies conducted then; of the female prime ministers; of computers; of sexual freedom; of various ideologies; the media - we called it the press first, later TV - and the most importantly, we were suspicious of each other. Later on, however, we "accepted" everything presented to us." Reşit remembers the coup very well. He tries to express his urge to resist then but he admits that he was frozen in front of the TV set which he felt penetrated and permeated by. Reşit says he was very quiet while listening to the news by which he felt extremely dishonored. He makes an account of the defeat of his generation in comparison to the preceding and succeeding generations. For Reşit, the previous

generation failed and got suppressed and the next generation was not aware of anything. He thinks his generation the '78ers were the real victims of the 1980 coup.

Despite the fact that the 78ers are a distinct group within the time interval chosen for this thesis, they were also affected by the hasty change in society. Members of the 78ers define themselves with clear references to their collective identity, yet they do employ a similar jargon while expressing their confusion brought about by the 1980 coup.

5.3 Official Discourse on Youth

The 1980 coup has brought severe measures to hinder youth participating in political activity. Youth branches of all parties were shut down for the next 17 years. Youth was perceived both as objects to be protected and agents that are in charge of maintaining the state and independence of the Republic in the 1982 Constitution as follows:

> A. Protection of the Youth:
>
> ARTICLE 58. The state shall take precautions to ensure the training and development of the youth into whose keeping our state, independence, and our Republic are entrusted, in the light of contemporary science, in line with the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation. The state shall take necessary precautions to protect youth from addiction to alcohol and drugs, crime as well as gambling, and similar vices, and ignorance.

Thus, with the article above the state clearly legitimizes its right to exercise power on young people, who were considered as objects of the regime. It allows state's intervention in the relations of youth, whenever and wherever necessary. Young people are not seen as equal citizens, who have rights, but as the sources of any potential harm and danger.

> B. Development of Sports
>
> ARTICLE 59. The state shall take precautions to develop the physical and mental health of Turkish citizens of all ages, and encourage the spread of sports among the masses. The state shall protect successful athletes.

The core belief in Article 59 is very similar to the perception of youth as healthy, dynamic, strong guardians of the regime by the time it was established. Bodies and minds, namely, the existence of young people is a matter of sacrifice for the regime and the country (Kurtaran, 2008:73-74).

Moreover, Council of Higher Education (YÖK) published the Student Disciplinary Statute in the early 1985, according to which involvement in political activities; distributing, publishing, possessing any political materials as flyers, booklets, posters etc; making political propaganda verbally or in writing at the schools was banned (Kurtaran, 2008:63).

A striking example of a direct dispute to that era is Küçük İskender's letter to Kenan Evren. It shows awareness of youth, who experienced that time in a sarcastic way:

> I am one of the few individuals of a generation that has been drawn into the vortex of an immoral act like thinking; I am a child of a period ,which you hoped to leave crippled; it was not an age of tulips but an age of profuse beating (İskender: 2007). (Translation mine)

İskender explains that he was just 17 years old –like the young people that were hanged- when "His Excellency" conducted the coup. He tells about his communist father, who ruined himself and his family due to witnessing his friends and other people tortured. İskender says that his father died in an extremely dishonored way in the dark rooms of a half-burnt, dirty building near Tünel, despite the fact that he was a painter with academic education. He continues his criticism by referring to his experience:

> I, thanks to You, completed my education in Kabataş Erkek Lisesi, a nest of science, accompanied with soldiers walking in its hallways, who would run the gauntlet on us with the billies when they get bored. While you were occupied with tortures, I run away from cadavers with nausea in the medical school I attended, where I used to see myself as a torturer. (İskender: 2007) (Translation mine)

İskender talks more about his painter father and emphasizes that he could not paint nudes, as being naked was related to poverty in his father's mind. Therefore, İskender swipes at Kenan Evren, who started painting nude after he was retired from the NSC. İskender cannot comprehend how Evren was inspired to do so and says:

most probably girls, whose genitals were flushed with pressure water or wild blooded revolutionary young men, whose genitals were given current, were the associations….(İskender:2007) (Translation mine)

Kenan Evren's famous statement on young people, who were hanged was "Should we feed them instead of hanging? "at the time. İskender defines himself as one of the young people; who was not hanged but fed instead. İskender recommends Kenan Evren "Crime and Punishment" by Dostoyevsky in order to make him aware of the pathological structure of one's self account. He says that it may not be very social but individualistic-making fun of the rise of individualism- and suggests that "individual" is a good starting point to understand society. After mentioning various points in frenzy, İskender indicates that he is aware of his short attention span and relates it to his generation that embraced schizophrenia both as a barricade and a place of refuge in order to live in peace with the pain caused by the era. İskender sarcastically refers to a popular American TV Series Dallas that was shown in the 1980s, while criticizing a recent plan on the country, according to which the country would be divided into states in order to locate "Dallas" in the middle. He emphasizes that the new generations do not read, thanks to Evren, they play cards to fill their static brains and look after their belated satisfactions before the nude paintings of 17 year old girls, instead.

5.4 Films on Youth

Father: Your friends try to make you someone like them.

Son: I wish I were like them. I am afraid of becoming someone like you.

Father: What am I?

Son: You are senile. You are an outdated "spider head" (stands for old bag).
 (Translation mine)

These lines, from the movie *Kahreden Gençlik* (Crushing Youth), were uttered just in the middle of the so called Twilight Decade and indicate a turn in Turkish youth cinema. There was a boom in youth films in the 1980s both in Hollywood and local cinema sectors. In the early 1980s, the themes of youth films were mostly narcotic and sexual hijinks, which were considered a reaction to neo-liberal puritan ethic of that period (Shary, 2002: 29).

Kahreden Genclik, however, introduces a novel subtext. For instance, the girl in his film comes from a new-rich household where father has a glass of whisky in his hands and the mother plays cards all throughout the movie. The parents offer her unlimited freedom, which equals to an "do whatever you want to do and live your life!" attitude. She lives her life to the edge by trying every single drug available, acting seductive for steady pleasure, partying almost everyday and night and joining motorcycle races to feel even more "high". Her boyfriend to be comes from a middle class (main pillar) household and he is aware of his responsibilities as a hard working student staying away from "dangerous" circles, "meaningless" partying, "careless sex" and drug abuse. At first, they only have one thing in common: an overwhelming degree of boredom. Eventually, they fly "high" to the abyss of consuming themselves.

Kahreden Gençlik (Crushing Youth) (1985) is only one example of Turkish cinema produced a number of youth films with similar themes in this period; most of which, was for the video cassette audience. I listed 10 Turkish films on youth made in the 1980s, five of which, including Crushing Youth, were directed by Orhan Elmas: *Kayıp Kızlar* (Missing Girls) (1984); *Suçlu Gençlik* (Guilty Youth) (1985); *Kızlar Sınıfı Yarışıyor* (Class of Girls is Competing) 1985; *Canım Oğlum* (My Dear Son) (1988); One film is in comedy genre (*Kızlar Sınıfı Yarışıyor*), which is very similar to *Hababam Sınıfı* (Class of Hababam) films that marked the 1970s. The remaining four films are on "degenerated youth", drug mobs and drug abuse; forced or careless sex; missing girls; sex slave drivers; conflicts between youth and their families; dangerous city and moral failure of society.

Other directors besides Elmas also paid attention to troubled youth.

Beyaz Ölüm (The White Death) (1983) for example, and *Kızımın Kanı* (My Daughter's Blood) (1987), directed by Halit Refiğ; both of which dealt with drug abuse and fragmented families and lives. Another example is *İllet* (Disease) (1983) directed by Oğuz Gözen that tells the story of a lone morphine abusing young guy. Alternatively, *Çalınan Hayat* (Stolen Life) (1985), directed by Sırrı Gültekin, and is about two suicidal youths. Finally, *Beyaz Bisiklet* (The White Bicycle) (1986), a remake of a French film*,* was directed by Nisan Akman, and tells story of a well educated man that keeps humiliating his innocent wife who ends up losing her mind as a result.

I elaborate several subtexts broached in *Kayıp Kızlar* (Missing Girls)*.* The movie follows a bunch of girls from different backgrounds who escaped from home with dreams of a better life; that is, independent, famous and rich. They all end up in the hands of sex slave drivers that also deal drugs. Only one girl is portrayed as having come from a rich family, though one marred by divorced and remarriage. Unable to

feel at home at her mother's place, as her step-father tries to abuse her sexually all the time, so she runs away. Meanwhile, she is ignored completely by her actual father. She moves in with a friend who is exploited by sex slave drivers, getting her deeper into trouble. Abandonment, leading to free living and therefore tragic ruin is clear. Another girl in *Kayıp Kızlar* escapes from her village to get rich and famous, like the artists she keeps a poster of on her wall. A third girl flees her immigrant working-class home in Germany to live her life as she likes. She winds up living with a pimp in Istanbul, who she also leaves for a bigger boss. They all end up in police station after a drug bust and get subjected to a speech by a police officer who articulates the public discourse on youth clearly and even repeats this line twice in the course of the film.

> It is a problem of society. A society should be in charge of its individuals and protect them. Otherwise, many other problems and victims will appear.

All girls are shown having the same fear before they go missing, namely, to get rotten at home. They are shown mostly at discos dancing while getting drunk and high to get used to their new life. Only the girl from a rich family does not get moved with those scenes. The other two want to have "everything". Youth is shown having fun with an intense hedonism in discos throughout the movie. The police officer explains the situation:

> The drug mafia and the sex trade mafia are in collaboration. Young girls, girls of an age of a child, are getting drawn to that 'net.

It is stressed that most of the young people try to get rich and famous and they are extremely foolish as they do not know anything about the dangers of the filthy big city. As they do not know better, they have to be kept in their homes no matter what happens and protected by the institutions of society. There is a jungle out there with all its seduction but the price to get into it is very heavy: loss of innocence and lives.

A similar moral template is employed in *Suçlu Gençlik*, which also focuses on neglected youth and their tragedies. The protagonist, the daughter of a successful lawyer, falls in love with a heroin addict from a rich and divorced family. Pulling her into his life style ruins both her life as well as those close to her.

He rapes and impregnates her younger sister, who eventually dies from a botched abortion. Other members of this circle meet similarly tragic ends. For instance, a loving couple planning to get married commits suicide; and another young guy ends up in prison for theft and gambling. The crucial scene however is when the protagonist kills her ex-boy friend, who she holds responsible for wrecking the lives of her sister and her friends. She enters his place right after he has his dosage of heroin. He licks the syringe and looks at her. Just before shooting him with her gun, she says;

> You ruined us all! You took advantage of our helplessness and crisis. You gave us colorful pills first and heroin later…You won't be able to ruin anyone else!

In the closing scene of the movie, the father of the protagonist defends her actions in the courtroom. All the other parents of the young people belonging to the same group are present. His speech is rather significant to show that youth needs to be protected by all institutions of society. He blames himself and other parents for not paying attention to their children and states that they should not be surprised when youth cannot build healthy relations in life and get pulled down into the terrible world of drugs; violence; homosexual relations; prostitution; theft and murder. With his rather conservative perspective the father of the accused points out bad deeds of parents such as: cheating on a spouse; homosexuality -which he emphasizes with a homophobic tone-; gambling; fictitious exports-that were very common in the 1980s identified with Özal dynasty's corruption-; spending more time for career and private life and so on. He concludes his "moral panic" speech as follows:

> Both poor and rich young people that cannot find their way through society need their parents' love first and foremost. Generations change. Young people do not have to understand us, but we have to understand them. We have to pay attention to their problems…..The youth is not guilty! Parents like us are guilty!

As Henry Giroux (1996: 10) claims, youth is considered as an allegory in terms of historical memory and it also indicates the responsibilities of adults for subsequent generations with regards to ethics and politics. Hence, youth as a category is both "enabling and disabling". It shows what needs to be done for the future and "how a society thinks about itself". Thus, youth is a sign of changing values in a society.

Most of the representations of youth in films are coupled with the moral panic in the 1980s both in Turkish and American movies that were also consumed by the Turkish audience. There is a hypocritical approach in indicating all "dangerous" patterns of youth culture in a ritualistic manner such as a young guy licking the syringe after having had his dosage of heroin. Other scenes are more sexually charged. For instance one scene has a young girl licking her boyfriend's bellybutton that is filled with cocaine. Elsewhere, young people talk about their "wings" after sharing drugs and describing their 'high' with seductive maybe sensual sentences. On the one hand young couples are having sex and fun escaping the adult world. On the other, they are digging deep holes or even graves for themselves by getting involved with prostitution, theft, murder, and mafia and so on. These films on youth represent young people both as extremely innocent, almost foolish; having been first thrown into the depths of boredom and crisis through neglect they become degenerates in a society that failed to protect them. Representing youth both as victims and criminals in public discourse however only helps to hide the causes of the social problems and the severity of the social conditions at large.

This is how Giroux (1996: 307) clarifies the perspective generated by youth cinema:

Lauded as a symbol of hope for the future while scorned as a threat to the existing social order, youth have become objects of ambivalence caught between contradictory discourses and spaces of transition. While pushed to the margins of political power within society, youth nonetheless become a central focus of adult fascination, desire, and authority. Increasingly denied opportunities for self-definition and political interaction, youth are transfigured by discourses and practices that subordinate and contain the language of individual freedom, social power, and critical agency. Symbols of a declining democracy youth are located within a range of signifiers that largely deny their representational status as active citizens. Associated with coming-of-age rebellion, youth become a metaphor for trivializing resistance.

My interviewees' perceptions of Turkish films on youth in the 1980s differ slightly. They all have a common realistic approach to what was shown to youth:

"Turkish films then were all about discos, where young girls were raped" Kamil says " and argues that young people were degenerated by them so that an official evil could be created to fight against. He thinks the evil characters in those movies are so stereotypical that those environments would appear desirable for a consumer group. Kamil does not think that youth would take lessons from preaching like that. He admits that he would love to consume those places but he could not have any material access to them. He remembers how he envied those young people in the films though. Kamil argues that those role models are not well-rooted yet a mental frame was formed by them. He claims that those characters in the movies are very far from "our" reality and one would wonder who they are in fact. Kamil says that the scene of those factious characters looked like heaven on earth for him where he had "zero" access to girls. He did not care for the consequences if he could get any kind of access to such an environment but he did not know how. In a boarding school in Samsun, Kamil was not aware of the fact that "Turkey was getting out of her box" and he thinks the images and stories in the media served the purpose of getting the country out of its box. He emphasizes that there is no politics and no class issues and no morality other than "girls backsliding" in those films. Kamil

states that those years were when Özal's riches were rising like mushrooms and they were the ones that gave drugs to those "innocent girls". Yet, they were "agas"-big brothers, bosses- and "bey"s –gents- around "us".

Ebru's mother used to love those 80s Turkish movies with heroin and disco. Ebru remembers them very well, and she used to watch them too but she did not like them. Ebru says that they were not her cup of tea but her mother's. Ebru used to make fun of those films and she never felt that she was influenced by them. She did not like Turkish films anyways as they seemed fake to her.

Şennur remembers youth films with disco and drug use for their nauseating stereotypes. She says: "Hippie style youth would go to a disco. They would always hang out as a group. Usually the hero comes from a poor family, he envies the rich people and gets deceived by them." She used to find those films detached from society. For her, they did not reflect the realities. Şennur could not stand extreme exaggeration, generalization, classification and labeling in youth films. She emphasizes that good people are extremely good and bad people are extremely bad, so society is shown in a polarized way. Şennur was upset with the fact that all rich families are publicized as degenerates in those films: The father gambles and cheats on the mother; the mother plays cards and drinks her head off. Parents mostly ignore their children. Rich children are always brats. They do not feel loved and end up in trouble using drugs and becoming a member of a deviant group of young people. Şennur emphasizes that virginity is a big issue in those films. She thinks it is still important now but in those movies losing one's virginity is equal to death.

Zeynep watched both arabesk and youth films in the 1980s. She makes fun of the stereotypes in those movies and says that they are all about poor families and youth that experience degeneration in the jungle of the big city. Zeynep did not know anyone in her environment resembling young people in those films. She says only

young people, who returned from Germany with their parents in the 1980s were similarly relaxed in terms of their body image and had identity crisis like those in youth films. Zeynep also remembers evil rich people as another stereotype and relates it to the emergence of main pillar as a class in the 1980s.

Emre considers these films as an extension of the rhetoric on youth in the 1970s. He says that young people were shown as masses deceived by terror and anarchy in the 1970s, whereas they were shown as sliding to the jungle of sex, drugs and discos in the 1980s. Emre thinks that it is a junta discourse on youth as public enemies.

5.5 Humor and Youth

> In the ten year period of repression, the only possibility of radical press materialized in comics magazines. In a work practice similar to the going-ons of a student canteen, the magazine *Gırgır* talked through its cartoon characters. Anarchist youth groups formed the narrow path of opposition through their magazines and fanzines, always with 'new' as a prefix to the name"(Köker and Doganay, 2007: 20).

Levent Cantek (1994: 79) argues that evaluations on comic magazines from the mid-1980s on face a limitation of nostalgia. He also talks about a tendency to blame the post-80 generation as being so "imbecile, apolitical and lost" that it cannot generate its humor. Cantek denotes that as much as *GırGır* was a confirmed opponent, it was not able to criticize the military government between 1980 and 1983 due to official bans. He notes the shift in *GırGır's* strategy by focusing on recognized individuals identified with the regime. In Cantek's account *Gırgır* could strengthen its dissenting attitude with Motherland Party and Özal. On the other hand, Cantek argues that *GırGır's* dissent has never been too radical.

Artun Avcı (2003:82) states that *GırGır's* policy targeted state supported bourgeoisie with its anti-imperialist content and had a leftist Kemalist, patriotic and populist line. Accordingly, *GırGır* represented the "little man" in the neighborhood identified as either a worker or a student. As neighborhood was perceived as a refuge from the turbulence of rapid rise of capitalism, people could identify with *GırGır's* characters. Avcı claims that *GırGır* comforted crowds left in limbo through modernization and urbanization processes. He explains the need for new humor strategies with the rise of neo-liberal sectors and new urban culture as a result. Since the neighborhood was replaced by the new global city, the new humor of the city addressed youth that embraced the new values of the era. Avcı understands how

post-1980 humor looks less critical yet he claims that the new global city brought about "new, alternative, destructive, radical and hopeless black humor".

Cantek indicates that this radical and disturbing brand of humor settled down with Limon from 1986 on. He argues that *Limon* was not pleased with politicians and the system, so its lingo became uneasy. Göker (1998: 20) explains how Cantek sees *Leman* –an extension of *Limon*- as a battle field against power. Cantek's argument is based on the idea that the crew of *Leman* represents a general dissident that should not be looked through a leftist perspective. For Cantek, *Leman* shows alternative standpoints by taking images, official views and mainstream ideas bombarded by mainstream media that supports the status quo. Cantek considers these attempts as "ideological guerilla attacks" in line with Fiske's approach, whereas Göker indicates *Leman* crew's different political tendencies such as: leftist Kemalism, neoliberalism, socialism and neutralism. Göker also claims that young people, who buy *Leman* cannot be homogenized, since they also have different standpoints, tastes and reasons to consume the magazine. Göker does not think that being anti-media is enough to pursue a guerilla war against the dominant system, since guerilla war should aim to satisfy all people not a chosen group.

Şimşek related new tendencies in humor to the rise of the new middle-class and states that "scanner eye" is the perspective of the new middle-class, who took snapshots, circumstances and conditions out of everything. He considers the terms "maganda" and "zonta" as a reaction of the new middle-class to traditional middle and lower classes and he argues that the new middle class stares at these other classes' habitus while forming its cultural capital. He also suggests that the "little man" of the previous decades used to look at the world with his criticism whereas with the introduction of new kind of humor "little man" has become someone to look at with a sharp discrimination. Şimşek claims that drawings of the new middle-class also became more "grotesque, sharp, complex and disturbing" (Şimşek, 2005: 85-86).

95

Kamil used to read *GırGır* and *Fırt* comic journals. His cousin used to buy *Fırt*, as there were half-naked pictures of women in that journal, such as "The Babe of the Back Page". His cousin used to cut that page off in order not to get busted by his conservative parents. Kamil thinks there has been a deep hypocrisy in our culture. He says "whatever has been considered degenerate formally has been dominant in the society. Namely, a "do not do as I do but do as I say" attitude.

Şennur read *GırGır* periodically. She used to borrow it from her neighbor on Sundays. She did not like political jokes on rich people and employers, as if all of them were bad. Şennur says that representation of people in comic journals were black and white: workers were poor and innocent whereas employers were filthy rich cruel people.

Özgür was also in the habit of reading *GırGır* and *Fırt* and he says *GırGır* shaped his political identity as a leftist. His leftist uncle had hard copies of comic journals and Özgür envied him for paying so much attention to collect popular culture products that represent the spirit of the era.

Zeynep was accustomed to read *GırGır* and all other comic journals as an extension of it. She says *GırGır* experienced mitosis, as everyone was so upset with the regime and dedicated their time and money to consume humor as a refuge.

5.6 Self Reflexive Literary Representation of Youth

Gürbilek (1992: 38-39-45-46) defines the 1980s in association with a "burst of expression" and argues that many areas of life such as "the individual", " the generation", "the private life", and "the sexuality" that were not addressed before became the subjects of this burst by being named. She thinks this process of naming was also a "seduction to discourse" in a Foucauldian sense, as it created a politics of words that transformed all experiences into objects of prosecution. Accordingly, power was not exercised by techniques of denying, objecting, restraining, prohibiting and excluding anymore but by constructing, regulating, seducing and multiplying. She exemplifies this new tendency to seduce the receiver –reader- with several newspaper and newsmagazine headlines that lacked verbs, such as: "A Finger Full of Honey for Civil Servants", "The Achy Justice", " Perfume Scent in Politics", "Public Support for Strikers". Hence, using nouns instead of verbs in the new news discourse eliminates the real content of the given information and transforms it into an image of quotations which only serves like a data that does not provide any opportunity of questioning the real event.

Naming is one of the strategies of the new middle class that was manufactured by neo-liberalism. An important aspect of this new middle class is that their members were both the producers and consumers of their culture. The display for this culture is the media, (Şimşek, 2005: 58-59) which showed all cultural patterns as disposable life-style. Ironically, the members of this new middle class were employed by the media sectors. In Turkey, media started to utilize a discourse that prioritized the "new middle class" by the burst of expressions" mostly about the private life in an ongoing confession form. Thus, the private became more public and vice versa (Gürbilek, 2002:49). News was told in a life-story format in news journals by blurring the borders between the private life and the work place (Gürbilek, 2002: 48).

97

According to Şimşek, the discourse of Nokta News Journal is a good example as providing opportunities for new generations to code the previous ones in a "cynical" and "ironic" jargon. The Journal created various files of issues within the framework of generations which led to a magazination around pessimistic and renegade Leftist generations with additional caricaturization of them in comic magazines (Şimşek, 2005: 67). Şimşek claims that the new middle class was able to spread some cultural elements from a bundle of strategies such as grotesque, cool, irony, parody and pastiche (Şimşek, 2005: 78).

I endeavor to indicate the crystallized synthesis of the strategies attributed to this generation, namely, irony, cynicism, naming everything in a sarcastic way, in a part of Küçük İskender's poem. İskender was born in İstanbul in 1964 and attended Medical School for 5 years, he also studied sociology for 4 years but he did not get a degree. His poems were published in the 1980s in well recognized journals and his first book *Gözlerim Sığmıyor Yüzüme* was published in 1988. He uses this nickname which has different connotations. "Küçük" means little in Turkish and it can also be used for "junior". Firstly, it may imply the fad of young arabesk singers that became famous in the 1980s such as: "Küçük Emrah" and "Küçük Ceylan". Moreover, it may refer to "Alexander the Great" as its opposition "Alexander the Little".

İskender was considered an anarchist and marginal poet in literary circles as he pushed the borders of poetic expression. His private life, which he freely talked about, was also a focus of criticisms. His work was also seen as a free ride between the styles of different poets and a pastiche of their poetry. He is a gay activist and he also took part in several popular films. His sharp jargon can be read as a challenge to generations that sums up the results of identity politics. He swipes everyone, who define themselves with regards to an ideology or meta-narrative:

You!
Structralists, spiritualists, taletellers

Situationists, fortunetellers,

Those with zero fingerprints, with italic poses,
Those that make tonic out of surplus value for their gins
Several venerable coups
Those that pretend to be pure revolutionaries in desires and passions!!!

Above, he also criticizes leftists that use the Marxist jargon while getting drunk with dreams of "saving the country". He defines people who were not charged or filed in political protests as "those with zero fingerprints" and people who obey authoritarianism as "(those) with italic poses.

….

Puffers, retarded children!!-that's Şehsuvar's
Constitution..
Mayists, Septemberists!!

While taking another swipe at atomistic identities, he addresses the coups in 1960 and 1980 and the constitution as a result of the latter. His criticisms include literary, religious and socialist groups:

You!!
Free guitarists, peace brats, machinists!!
Leeches of religion!! Existentialists: My next door neighbors!!
Poets of slogans and of ordinary!!
Those that have capital as social aspect,
Those that have capital of onion-bread-socialism only!!
Those that are Leftist until they are thirty
Are for Social-Justice between thirty and fifty
Become senile after fifty and get happy
While leaning on women from behind in the bus
You our extraordinary intellectuals!!

He shows the dichotomy between the republican "buy local goods only!" versus "import oriented free market" consumption patterns and relates it to the conflicting ideas of the East and the West:

Captain black-ers, bafra smokers,
Once babbler once big talkers, up-staters

those who utter, ah the east is my rose.

Those stick to their logic
Let'm eat you"obscene tape!!

Here, İskender also indicates the censorship in the political arena and blames intellectuals for internalizing it so easily.

My uncles, my aunts: you, homosexuals!!
Feminists, andocentrics, social democrats,
Theocrats, aristocrats, you snotty bourgeoisie!!
Opportunists, optimists!!
….
"Give me a consolation"-ists, "god given"- pretenders

From his standpoint as a gay activist and poet, he is taking pot shots on the rise of identity politics in the 1980s. He compares arabesk cultural patterns to the Turkish version of bourgeoisie.

Hey!! You!!
My friends, ones that I could not get used to: my hands, my feet!!
You!!
Idealists, egoists, utopists, narcissists!!
….

Me
Sehsuvar!!
Vapor that rises behind shallow boredoms
A tumor that grew up without experiencing its childhood
A deceived, unrecognized art knife;
A forgotten screwdriver, a useless nail,
With her gazes that lay mines on the borders
Sehsuvar that is You!! Those borders
Are your borders. Me
Sehsuvar
A public bus that rises behind shallow boredoms
Did you steal my bus passes?

You are sure
That we have met before, right?

(İskender, 1988: 43-45) (Translations mine)

100

Finally, İskender gives a clear description of how youth is constructed and pigeonholed in society with all pejorative attributes such as pathology, delinquency, menace, and boredom, lack of recognition, apathy, selfishness and neglect.

5.7 TV and Collective Memory of a Generation

In *Television Histories*, Steve Anderson (2001: 22) regards memory as "a site of discursive struggle" in line with Foucault, who sees memory as an important factor in struggle and argues that it is possible to control "people's dynamism, their experience and their knowledge of previous struggles" by controlling their memories. It is also clarified in *Television Histories* that in Foucault's account institutional apparatus are used to influence what is substantial to popular memory and how popular memory is transmitted. Accordingly, television and cinema are instruments to reorganize popular memory.

Iwona Irwin-Zarecka (2009: 55-55) defines generations as communities of memory bearing in mind that every individual's relation to key events is different. She doesn't see generations as age cohorts sharing similar social conditions but as groups of people from various age groups "who would all be strongly affected in their outlook by a particular time in history". Accordingly, generations are not merely communities of remembrance, since their shared memories have a formative aspect for them and also change the cultural site. In this respect, members of communities of memory do not necessarily have the same experience but a common sense of what it means and how it is relevant to their lives. Irwin-Zarecka understands collective memory as "a socially articulated and socially maintained reality of the past".

The post-1980 generation is the first generation that grew up with television in Turkey. Television was introduced in 1968 and it had created new social patterns in society. Halit Kıvanç, an anchorman himself, coined the term telesafirlik, which was an amalgam of television and visit. People used to visit their neighbors or relatives to watch television together. The National Broadcasting Institution (TRT) was a monopoly until after the late 1980s. It is not surprising that a generation's collective memory was shaped mostly by television. Along with the rise of nostalgia culture,

several texts that addressed the post-1980s generation have started to circulate, either in newspapers or on the internet. I focused on two very similar texts both with similar titles "Being a Child in the 1980s" and " '80s Generation" and one book *60'lar Hikaye 70'ler Terane 80'ler Şahane* (The '60s were a Story The '70s were The Same Old Story The '80s were wonderful) to track down the patterns of collective memory of a generation. Majority of what people count in their memory is either from television or from popular culture mediated by television.

References are made to: Kenan Evren's and Özal's television appearance; television commercials with Ajda Pekkan and Michael Jackson; cartoons like Smurf, He-Man, Clementine, Voltron, She-ra and Transformers; TV series such as: Dallas, Isaura the Slave, Roots, Gallactica, Shogun, Generations, Dynasty; anchormen like Cenk Koray and Korhan Abay; music celebrities such as Michael Jackson, Madonna, Jason Danovan, Sandra, Cindy Lauper, Sezen Aksu, Barış Manço, Laura Braunigan; bands like Duran Duran, Modern Talking, Wham, A-ha; televised events such as: the 1980 coup, Ceauşescu's trial and execution, Space Shuttle Challenger's launch, the Chernobyl disaster,etc.

Another collective memory is the role of television as the central medium in the household, where it was given the best place in the living room and treated as the most important guest that everyone should pay attention to. As there used to be only one TV set per family, sharing the experience to watch television was perceived as a communal activity, which had its ritualistic aspects. It is similarly explained in these nostalgia texts: Listening to tales from Adile Naşit appears as common experience, so, television was the new storyteller. Recording concerts from television was seen as a sacred experience not to be interrupted by parents, thus, television was the new friend. Approaching the TV set to adjust the volume was considered as a difficulty: television was the new challenge. Standing up while the national anthem is played on TV before the end of daily programming and reciting the anthem simultaneously were seen as duties: television equaled to discipline. The hypnotizing effect of

Özal's pen while he briefed governmental matters is shared: television was the new manipulator. Efforts to adjust the TV antenna are made fun of: television was a matter of know-how.

Most of the common phrases and expressions used in the era are related to television. Everyone remembers Özal's request from his wife "Semra please insert a cassette so that we cheer up." Advertisements for value added tax are also in shared memory with "Every time I buy something I get a receipt." Jingles of commercials are also regarded as codes known by heart. Jokes improved from TV show lines are recalled "I am opening your box, now!" (Cenk Koray in Sunday shows). Catch phrases of TV shows are mentioned "I have the power!" (He-man); "Let's go! Voltron Force " (Voltron); "May the Force be with you!" (Starwars), etc. By creating a common agenda, television spread common references such as: objects, people and events. Also, in *60lar Hikaye 70ler Terane 80ler Şahane* (The '60s were a Story The '70s were The Same Old Story The '80s were wonderful) almost half of the references out of 295 articles are television related. Between 1980 and 1990, over 200 foreign TV series were shown on Turkish television and overwhelmingly, more than 140 of them were American in origin. Obviously, not only imported goods but also imported cultural patterns entered lives of people with the introduction of free-market economy.

My interviewees relate their memories to television in terms of both education and entertainment. They were amazed how television opened a new window to the world but they also criticize the stereotypes shown on TV, as they feel their knowledge was based on these limited representations of the world and other cultures:

Ebru says that the first TV series that she can remember watching is "Roots". She used to watch everything until the closing time as her father used to work night shifts. Ebru wants to share her relation to TV as she finds it very funny. "You know there was national anthem before closing time on TV. I used to stand at attention. It

is interesting. Now, I laugh at it. Why was it worked up like this?". Ebru states it was very weird to witness the collapsing of Berlin wall on TV and she admits that she did not comprehend anything at the time. She says we did not know why it was so important for those people, as we had our invisible walls around us. Compared to our lives in Turkey, she says Germans only had one wall dividing their country into two and it felt very normal to her so she did not understand why they were so happy. Ebru remembers the news on Rock Hudson and Freddy Mercury when they passed away. She was so scared when she heard about AIDS as the cause of their deaths. Ebru states that the media frightened us too. Having heard that AIDS would pass to homosexuals and to people, who have free sex, she was scared. Ebru thinks that the panic on AIDS was the biggest obstacle for a sexual revolution to happen in Turkey. She considers that the panic validated the traditional moral codes. Ebru says we were still lucky to some extent as the films shown at that time were way better than the ones now. She remembers the stereotypes:' Vietnamese people were bad. They would kill soldiers that they caught with torture. We have never questioned why those soldiers were there though. We only knew that Vietnamese people were cruel. American natives were bad as they would take off the skins of the skulls. Poor cowboys! we thought. We did not know what the cowboys did. We never questioned it."

As Bilge spent 3 years in Athens, when she was a child, she remembers how different the local television programs in Turkey and Greece were. Trying to keep away from the didactic ones, like origami lessons on TV, she preferred cartoons and got addicted to Smurfs. Bilge also remembers the Generations, an American TV series on youth and their love stories, and talks about it with excitement. She did not have any taboos as a child, thus, foreign films were very familiar to her life-style; therefore she felt that the representation of youth in those series were more realistic than the ones in local shows. Bilge did not understand why her grandmother would turn off the TV whenever a kissing scene appeared. Bilge describes the news on TV as adventurous; therefore she wanted to be a news correspondent to experience that adventure. She remembers Mehmet Ali Birand as the anchorman with his

convincing and energetic style while discussing political issues. Bilge has never questioned the news as she thought there was no "game" in them so they had to be true.

Kamil thinks the introduction of color TV to our lives was a real revolution. He admits that we were the first real generation to grow up with TV. He makes a very interesting point by saying that his dreams before he started to watch color TV were black and white. It was only after color TV that Kamil was able to have colorful dreams.

In the early 1970s when the winds of '68 started to calm down, Reşit was introduced to TV and certain realities of the world through it. Most striking of all for him, perhaps, was his imagination bursting to the levels he could not even imagine provided by science fiction series. Reşit was not asking for the American cars he had seen in movies anymore, but for spacecrafts. He says that maybe the motto of "be realistic ask for the impossible" adopted by the previous generation lost its meaning among his generation and those words were transformed into simple wishes. Reşit states that the destiny of the nations was decided upon and named as the New International Economics Order (NIEO) and The New International Communication Order (NICO) in 1971 and 1972, respectively. Accordingly, the world had become a global village. He recalls his and his friends' efforts to change themselves and their country with the help of the news, information, messages and ideological fragments bombarded to them through NICO, but they felt their knowledge, background, culture, population, capital and communication resources were inadequate to do so. He claims that their ideologies - Marxism, fascism, capitalism, Islamism were a sum of translated social codes and they lacked the social experience of the societies from which these ideologies derived. Reşit gets embarrassed when he admits that his knowledge about other cultures was so limited then. He says " I thought that Africans were cannibals and pygmies; Mexicans were lazy and they slept a lot;

Native Americans were savage and Japanese were descendants of the Middle Ages."
Reşit followed the news on Anatolian News Agency when Iran and Iraq went to war and adds "It felt very weird to me not being able to change anything in the world and just being an audience. I felt lost and I thought I was similar to my '68ers brothers who considered themselves as the successors of Kuvay-ı Milliye (National Independence Forces) asking for a better place in the world." He thinks the media was getting between him and his ideals.

Şennur says that there was only TRT, when she was a child. She remembers foreign films were shown on Tuesday nights and Turkish films were shown on Saturday nights. She says that everybody used to watch them and she and her family used to visit their neighbors to watch films with. They used to watch Dallas, Streets of San Fransisco, the White Shadow, Roots and Galactica. Şennur indicates that there were always riots and deaths on TV before the coup. She remembers the curfew order. Her neighbors were yelling each other from the windows. Şennur watched TV to see what was happening and she says Kenan Evren was talking about things she could not comprehend at the time.

Çiğdem remembers watching foreign TV series on TV: Dallas, Flamingo Road, etc. If the youth were shown enthusiastic on TV series, she used to like them. If they were too informative, she would get alienated. She thinks the reason for that was having watched many cartoons and films, when she was in Saudi Arabia. They affected her a lot. Çiğdem was able to watch Greek channels in İzmir. She could compare a foreign channel to our local one and she could see the difference. She considers Greek channels as windows to the world outside of our country. Çiğdem remembers music programs on Greek channels particularly. She admits that they were so good and she was happy that she had an alternative to TRT. Çiğdem had a habit of recording stuff. Her father recorded so many films and music programs in the '70s. Çiğdem and her brother used to know them by heart. Çiğdem could see that TRT was too limited. She remembers that Eurovision was a big fad, especially Ajda

Pekkan with Petroleum song. Çiğdem says her memories of television are so fragmented. She remembers commercial jingles very well. Çiğdem was amazed when they got color TV.

Özgür recalls exactly when TV was brought to their home for the first time. He used to listen to the radio before they got the TV. Özgür says that they had black and white TV just before color TV was introduced. He remembers that a place was arranged for the TV in their living room and he sat on the floor and waited for it to be set. His parents did not let him to go near it as they thought Özgür would break it. He remembers the first thing that he watched on TV: Tarzan. Özgür says that there was news all the time on TV and some kind of entertainment and game shows that TRT would produce. He used to watch whatever was available. Özgür remembers watching Dallas and he admits that he cried when JR died. He also used to watch "Roots", "Little House on the Prairie" and all nostalgic stuff. Özgür says the early 80s were all about Michael Jackson. He still knows the wrong versions of his songs by heart.

CHAPTER
VI
CONCLUSION

In this study I have argued that youth in Turkey have been neglected as individuals and stereotyped by dominant discourses that frame their identities with references to changing political and economic conditions, despite the fact that young people comprise the majority in the population. Considering youth and generation as socially constructed categories that provide noteworthy clues to understand social changes, I have focused on conflicting discourses on youth that have shifted along with altered social circumstances in Turkey from 1980 onwards. In order to comprehend the manufactured paradigms manifested in crisis conditions that proceed with youth's identity formation, I have explored the definitions of and perspectives on youth initially. Bearing in mind that the concept of youth is a quite recent output of the rise of industrialization and modernity, I treated it as a category that is perceived differently in every society. I also approached various perspectives on youth in a comparable manner and benefitted from political economy and feminist views on youth mostly. As youth's public representations have been negatively built to personify apathy, cynicism and neglect from the 1980s on, I examined constructions of youth by various institutions to find out mediated patterns.

I chose the interval between 1961 and 1981, in which serious ruptures to the ongoing regime happened in Turkey. I observed that all identities in the contemporary Turkish society have been mediated through the market and the media; therefore, I approached youth's representations between 1980 and 1990 in Turkey within the framework of generational theory, as I came across similarly negative attributes to youth identities in other societies. I have elaborated on generational theory and its

relation to crisis to find out the effects of traumatic events on the emergence of generational identities. In line with Edmunds and Turner, I strived to analyze the generation in question with regards to its relation to the social structure and conditions in Turkey. As I also took account of the tension between global and local dynamics in the post-1980 era, I briefly reviewed labels of generations departing from Generation X and searched for its versions in different cultures. The contemporary image attributed to generations helped me to understand underlying political and economic factors in society.

Critical discourse analysis and institutional ethnography helped me to scrutinize dominant discourses on youth and their implications in social relations. While analyzing the shifts in perception of youth in Turkey, I noticed the burden loaded on youth's shoulders both as guardians of the regime and rebels against it before 1980s. As a defining moment of post-1980 generation in public discourse, the 1980 coup and repressive measures it has brought about have changed the ground for youth identities to rise. Moreover, changes in public and private spheres through Özal's regime affected the cultural climate dramatically. Young people were introduced to rising values of urbanism, consumerism, individualism, being open to the world, entrepreneurship, and ambition to earn in order to "make it" in a restructured society. Mass media has become one of the strongest institutions to shape youth identities from the 1980s onwards. On the other hand, representations of youth after 1990 have been very problematic and unrealistic in mediated and rapidly consumed images. Additionally, the rise of nostalgia talk by the previous active generations appeared as another challenge for youth to compete with their identities.

As an outcome of neo-liberal measures in politics and economy, the highly and widely promoted idea of individualism in the 1980s gave rise to consumption of images and expressions that influenced youth in different ways determined by their access to them. Along with the change in Turkey's political circumstances, and influences of

globalization, identity politics have loomed large in public sphere with regards to Islamism, feminism, Alevism and Kurdish nationalism. Thus, real life experiences that would only be an issue for individuals and social groups became fragmented categories that affected youth identity formation. Both official and public discourse on youth that manifested themselves in various texts such as: the constitution, newspapers, journals, films, comic magazines and television have been mostly negative. Young people have been regarded as selfish individuals, who only care about consuming whatever is available to them with no sense of collective responsibility. They are also seen as sources of potential harm and danger both to themselves and to the entire society.

However, ethnographic patterns that I have collected from memories of the members of the manufactured generation indicate that representations of youth between 1980 and 1990 did not reflect the actual ideas, voices and conditions of youth evidently. As Navaro-Yashin (2002: 222) points out, the politics of culture in the 1980s were cultivated in the consumer market that was shaped by the influences of globalization. Along with other things, youth identities were commoditized and consumed in such a milieu. That is why stereotypes on youth circulated by the media were problematic. The loss of legitimacy in political and cultural spheres was noticeably not addressed and instead blamed youth with apathy, cynicism and neglect. My interviewees' accounts show that representations of youth are directly related to how society considers itself, as Giroux (1996: 10) puts it. Young people with their marginal economic and political power are easy to blame and pigeonhole, yet, expecting resistance behind every symbol associated with youth is another strategy to underestimate influences of social change shaped by all institutions of a society.

Consequently, self-reflexive expressions of youth indicate shifts in youth identities within a broader context that crosscut other categories such as: class, gender, and

race. The generation's collective memory drawn from popular culture reflects new strategies of widely established new middle class from the 1980s on. Sarcasm manifests itself in youth jargon; pastiche is seen in dressing codes and being cool is associated with consumption patterns that shape life-styles. In line with Navaro-Yashin's account on identities, my perception of representations of the manufactured generation is that they are commonly mediated and embraced by all institutions of the Turkish society.

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