IMAGINING TURKEY IN A RE(DE)TERRITORIALIZED WORLD:
TURKEY, THE ORIENT AND THE OCCIDENT

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ABSTRACT

IMAGINING TURKEY IN A RE(DE)TERRITORIALIZED WORLD: TURKEY, THE ORIENT AND THE OCCIDENT

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This thesis analyzes the construction of geopolitical imaginations of Turkey in the post-September 11 era on the basis of critical geopolitics and in the frame of a center (the United States and the European Union)-margin (Turkey) relationship. The dissolving of the relatively stable concepts of the Cold War era by globalization and the demise of the Soviet Union -such as state integrity, sovereignty, inside/outside dichotomy and state identity- has created deterritorialization in the global space of territorial states. However, territorial states have continued to exist via reterritorialization on the basis of new enemies/others/boundaries borrowed from old concepts, narratives and dramas. Following the September 11 attacks, the attempts to construct self/other dichotomy based on the geopolitical imaginations of the globe and Turkey in the US and the EU political circles have changed geopolitical imaginations of Turkey. Their discourses over Turkey have encountered counter-discourse of Turkish policymakers presenting Turkey as a "bridge" between civilizations to increase the "strategic" value of Turkey. In this study, taking into consideration the geography as a product of a specific power/knowledge alignment rather than something naturally given to determine foreign policy, the geopolitical (geocultural) imaginations of Turkey are being examined and the power-knowledge relationship is exposed.

Keywords: Turkey, Orient, Occident, Geopolitical Imagination, Critical Geopolitics

ÖZ

YENİDEN ÜLKESELLEŞEN (BÜTÜNSELLEŞEN) BİR DÜNYADA TÜRKİYE'Yİ HAYAL ETMEK: TÜRKİYE, ŞARK VE GARP

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde oluşturulan jeopolitik (jeokültürel) tasavvurlarını eleştirel jeopolitik yaklaşımı temelinde ve merkez (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği) - çevre (Türkiye) ilişkisi çerçevesinde incelemiştir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde devlet bütünlüğü, bağımsızlık, içeri/dışarı ikilemi ve devlet kimliği gibi görece sabit ve dengeli kavramların küreselleşme ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin çökmesi ile çözülmeye başlaması ile territoryal devletlerden oluşan dünyada eski ülkeselleşmelerde parçalanmalara sebep olmuş ve küresel anlamda bütünleşmeler ortaya çıkarmıştır. Fakat territoryal devletler önceki dönemlerde üretilen kavram, anlatı ve sahneleri kullanarak yeni düşmanlar/diğerleri/sınırlar temelinde yeniden ülkeselleşmelerle devam etmektedirler. 11 Eylül saldırılarının akabinde, ABD ve AB'deki siyasi çevrelerin dünya ve Türkiye jeopolitik tasavvurları temelinde biz/diğerleri ikilemi oluşturma çabaları, Türkiye'nin jeopolitik tasavvurunu değiştirmiştir. Türkiye üzerine oluşturulan söylemleri Türk politika yapıcılarının Türkiye'nin "stratejik" değerini arttırmayı amaçlayarak ülkeyi medeniyetler arası bir "köprü" olarak sunduğu karşı söylemi ile karşılaşmıştır. Coğrafyanın dış politikayı belirleyen doğal olarak belirlenmiş bir faktör olmasından ziyade kendine özgü bir güç/bilgi yapısı olduğu göz önünde bulundurularak, bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin jeopolitik (jeokültürel) tasavvurları incelenecek ve bu tasavvurlardaki güç/bilgi ilişkisi ortaya çıkarılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Şark, Garp, Jeopolitik Tasavvur, Eleştirel Jeopolitik

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ABBREVIATIONS

AK Parti Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

EU   European Union

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OIC   Organisation of the Islamic Conference

UN   United Nations

US   United States

USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD   Weapon of Mass Destruction

1. INTRODUCTION

As Gearoid Ò Tuathail argues, geopolitics is not something naturally given but a form of power-knowledge relationship.[1] Geographical assumptions in the making of geopolitics are constructed for states, blocks, or regions in terms of strategic importance by political geographers, strategists, scholars, and politicians.[2] In analyzing representations of Turkey's geopolitics and in debates on Turkey's relations with Western powers, chiefly the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), and with surrounding regions, it has generally been emphasized that Turkey has a "strategic" location between the two distinct spaces formed by the West and the East, the developed and developing states, serving as an energy corridor between Europe and countries with rich energy resources and so on. This discourse treats these spatial divisions as natural and objective determining Turkey's geopolitical practices and creating opportunities and risks for Turkey. However, such discourses are more like a product of a specific power/knowledge alignment on the Turkish spatialism ranging from Turkey as a pivot country, a bridge, a barrier, a crossroad, an energy corridor, other, a model, an ally, a seam state, to Turkey as a torn country, a central, a Western or a Middle Eastern, or a Mediterranean state.

The geopolitical discourse of the Cold War and world order constituted under American hegemony began to lose its spatial order from the late 1960s as a result of

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[1] Gearoid Ò Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (London: Routledge, 1996), 1.

[2] John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.

the relative decline of both territorial states and the American hegemony. This is especially true in the area of finance and production and these processes made state integrity, sovereignty and national identity problematic.[3] These relatively stable concepts in the historical context of the Cold War have been more unstable and hybridized through globalization. The demise of Soviet Union, opening of ex-communist economies to global capitalism, and developments in global communication, media and transportation have challenged old identities and meanings of the world. These processes have created deterritorialization in world politics and postmodern vertigo. It has become difficult to explain this new world (dis)order by grand narratives. This postmodern vertigo has put sociospatial identities and meanings of the West, the EU-rope and the United States into a crisis. The feelings of insecurity and being threatened by globalization has also created reterritorialization of world order against this postmodern vertigo by reproducing identity through using belief, thoughts, customs, and narratives borrowed from old order and concepts.[4] Intellectuals of statecraft have attempted to reproduce old concepts against new threats to stabilize their meanings. Through these deterrritorialization and reterrritorialization processes, Turkey's geopolitical representation and meaning in the world (dis)order has also been redefined by the Western power centers and Turkey's political elites.

Ò Tuathail and Agnew define "intellectuals of statecraft" as "a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world

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[3] Ò Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 228-230.

[4] Ibid.

who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft."[5] These intellectuals of statecraft play crucial roles in the construction of geopolitical imaginations and practices of foreign policy by creating new dangers and threats. David Campbell has noted that dangers and threats are integral parts of the identity/foreign policy construction. For example, in the post-Cold War era, new perils to the US government and society have been constructed by the intellectuals of statecraft such as AIDS, ecological problems, economic power of Japan, fundamentalism, terrorism, international criminal networks and so on.[6] One of the perils has been 'Muslim fundamentalism' constructed by Orientalist scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington and Daniel Pipes. They have argued that one of the great threats the US has to confront has been anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism. In these arguments, Muslim countries as well as Muslim minorities in Western societies are a threat to the existence of the Western civilization.

The September 11 attacks have popularized this thesis about Muslims. The mainstream media in the US has especially debated the subject as to whether the West and Islam can coexist peacefully, the connection between Islam and terrorism, and whether Islam is compatible with modernity and democracy. In the case of Islam, culture is constructed by Orientalist scholars through political and territorial terms. History of the "Middle East" has become the history of Islam.[7] They argue that the essentialist characteristics of Islam are the problem. Huntington demonized

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[5] Gearoid Ò Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 192.

[6] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 196-197.

[7] Mahmood Mamdani, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political perspective on Culture and Terrorism," *American Anthropologist* 104:3 (2002): 766-775.

the entire Islamic civilization. This view then has been modified. Muslims has been classified into "bad" and "good" ones. In this view, not all Muslims are threatening, but the "terrorist ones" are related to radical interpretations of Islam based on Salafi (especially Wahabbi) tradition. Thus, the problem has been misinterpretation of the sacred scripts, and deviated people who hate what Bush said their (Americans) freedoms: freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom to vote, assemble and disagree with each other.[8] This has created the façade of war between good and evil. The so-called bad Muslims had to be defeated to introduce modernism to the "premodern" and "traditional" societies of the Middle East.[9] Turkey as an example of "moderate" Islam (so-called good Muslims) and an "Islamic" republic could to be a model to the "Muslim" states of the Greater Middle East.

A reterritorialization process has also emerged in Europe with the European Union project. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Union has enlarged to the east. Unlike its post-Westphalian order inside the Union, the EU has followed spatial practices of territorial states. It began to harden its external boundaries by creating "varying degrees of 'EU-Europeanness'".[10] Feelings of insecurity in a risk society of globalization and increasing xenophobia have brought backlash against cosmopolitan Europe and enlargement process. Nation-states and national identities have become popular in EU-identity, enlargement processes, and border control issues. Economic recessions, unemployment issues, increasing xenophobia and Islamophobia have

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[8] "Transcript of President Bush's address," *CNN,* September 20, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (11 October 2009).

[9] Mamdani, 767.

[10] James W. Scott and Henk van Houtum, "Reflections on EU territoriality and the 'bordering' of Europe," *Political Geography* (2009): 1.

caused feelings of loss of the control of external borders in the European societies and a feeling of threat by illegal immigrations and "foreigners". They have invoked national sentiments and a desire to create a homogeneous community on cultural–civilizational basis by defining who is in and who is out, who is European and who is non-European. These processes have created more defensive union.[11] These issues have become more visible in the post-September 11 era.

Turkey's accession negotiations have coincided with rising uncertainty and deep introspection in the EU.[12] The EU member states have split over the Iraqi war and they have failed to form a coherent policy. However, most of the problems are internal ones. After the 2004 enlargement, negative feelings against this process have risen. A legitimacy gap between the EU elites and the citizens had been emerged. The treaty to establish a constitution for the EU failed in France and Netherlands. The anxieties in Western European societies toward being threatened by cheap labor of the new members have increased with the 2004 enlargement. Problematic relations of some EU countries with their migrant communities have increased Islamophobia with terrorist attacks and Turkey's accession.

In the 1990s, Turkey was presented as a "secular" and "democratic" country with a liberal market economy to newly independent Turkic republics by the Western policymakers (especially the US) as well as by the Turkish policymakers. Following

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[11] Ibid., 2.

[12] Fabrizio Tassinari, "Variable Geometries: Institutions, Power, and Ideas in Turkey's European Integration Process," in *The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins*, ed. Noel Parker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2008), 217.

September 11 attacks, Turkey has been demonstrated as an example of a "moderate" Islamic country by some in the West (especially some in the US political circles) to Middle Eastern states and Muslim societies in general. With the decision to open negotiations of Turkey's accession in 2004, and beginning them in 2005, EU identity, its boundaries, and Turkey's Europeanness began to be discussed. Advocates of Turkey's membership to the EU have securitized Turkey's accession as an anti-thesis of the clash of civilizations, as a bridge between civilizations and as a peaceful message of the West/EU to Muslims.[13] The opponents have constructed Turkey as the other of the West/Europe.

In Turkey, "political Islamic" and "Kemalist" groups have also redefined their identities vis-à-vis the West/Europe. Modern Islamic identity in Turkey was constructed on the basis of an anti-Western discourse.[14] However, the so-called postmodern coup d'état of the Turkish military on 28 February 1997 divided "Islamic" groups into two. The "reformist" line founded the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AK Parti), which became a champion of Turkey's accession to the EU. The reformists became more confident in their relations with the West after modernization and economic developments in Turkey. Besides, experiences of Turks in Europe have demonstrated to the reformist Islamic line that it is possible to remain Muslim even if Turkey is part of the EU political order. Moreover, their political experiences demonstrated that even if the reformists

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[13] Craig Winneker, "Rehn seeks to keep Turkish train on rails," *European Voice*, October 05, 2006, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/rehn-seeks-to-keep-turkish-train-on-rails/55787.aspx> (20 December 2009).

[14] İhsan Dağı, "Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: The Rapprochement of Turkish Islamic Elite with the West," in *Clash or Cooperation of Civilization? Overlapping Integration and Identities*, ed. W. Zank (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 43.

come to power, the pressure of Kemalist regimes on them would increase. Their interest of curbing Kemalist pressure has coincided with the EU's demands to improve the civil/military imbalance in the country. They have legitimized their position for a harmony of Islam and democracy and bridging civilizations under the EU project.[15] Opposition to Turkey's accession on as being different and the other is challenged by the AK Parti government by its emphasizing Turkey's difference with the West/Europe, and legitimizing its membership on the difference.[16] They argue that if the EU is based on values and norms like democracy, freedom, and diversity, Turkey has right to be a member; otherwise the EU will lose its credibility, and will become a 'Christian club'. During this period, although the Bush administration supported the Turkey's membership to the EU, the government portrayed Turkey as a democratic Muslim country which could be a model to the Greater Middle East. Colin Powell labeled Turkey as an "Islamic republic" and this invoked sensitivities of secularism among the Kemalists, and some claimed that the US had a "moderate Islam" project aiming at the erosion of the secularist and Western character of Turkey.[17] In addition to this, erosion of sectarian policies through democratization process on the road of the EU, Kemalist elites have become more anti-Western.[18] The government and Kemalist elites have portrayed a different type of "Occident" in the post-September 11 era.

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[15] Ibid., 45-46.

[16] Tassinari, 218.

[17] Ruşen Çakır, "Bu gaf çok konuşulacak," (This goof is much debatable) *Vatan,* April 03, 2004, <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?Newsid=25395&Categoryid=4&wid=73> (15 January 2010).

[18] Necati Polat, "Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey's European Union Accession," *Government and Opposition* 41:4 (2006): 512–533.

In this paper, I will argue that critical geopolitics can be used to analyze both Western policymakers' discourses over representations of Turkey and counter-discourses of Turkish policy-makers. I will focus on co-constitutive characters of representations of Turkish identity from different positions of both Western policymakers and Turkey's political elites toward Turkey's geopolitical representations. I will analyze the geopolitical imaginations of Turkey when the new Greater Middle East was constituted by the Bush administration; the candidacy and prospective membership of Turkey into the EU have been highly debated among EU policymakers and Turkish policymakers' has constituted counter-discourses aiming to increase Turkey's "strategic" value. By discourses I do not only have in mind the speeches and the articulations of the policymakers, but also practices.[19]

I will try to analyze the imaginations on Turkey's geography via a center/margin relationship.[20] Intellectuals of statecrafts and policymakers of Western power centers (the US and the EU) have been redefining and reproducing their identity concepts of American, EU-ropean, westerner and the "external" world by creating new dramas borrowing from older concepts. These reterritorialization processes have given new meanings to Turkey's geography. However, these are not unchallenged processes of total domination of the center over the margin. Margins are places where fixing identity/difference is the most unstable. These constructing identities and differences

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[19] Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985), 107.

[20] Noel Parker, "A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins," in *The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins*, ed. Noel Parker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2008), 3-24.

are accepted, resisted and rejected by the margin. The margin also redefines its identity and difference vis-à-vis the center.

To discuss the new geographical imaginations on Turkey, first, the paper will introduce the theoretical background and analytical tools to analyze these geopolitical constructions. In the third chapter, the clash of civilization paradigm will be examined. The AK Parti government has constructed the Turkish experience of Islam and democracy as an anti-thesis of this paradigm. In the fourth chapter, the study will consider the factors that constitute new geopolitical imaginations in American identity/foreign policy and the EU identity/borders. It will analyze the ideology, the geopolitical assumptions and visuality that led to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East in the US and the EU-rope in the EU. The fifth chapter will continue to examine how the center/margin competitions of identity/difference have shaped the meaning of Turkey's geography.

2. MODERN GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS
AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics is in our daily life. Geopolitics provides us with the ability to visualize the world in a particular way through maps, atlases, and photographs. This shapes how we look at the world. Geopolitics is in our everyday life, from foreign policy practices to popular practices in movies, books, TVs, radio, and internet. In one way, geopolitics constitutes a simple model of the world by labeling and identifying places geographically such as United States, Turkey, Germany, Europe, Middle East, Balkans and it produces metaphors, narratives, and dramas of politics. In this way, a particular understanding of geopolitics is constructed to use in foreign policy making.[21] These descriptions are produced and reproduced. To engage in a distinct understanding of geopolitics, is to focus on how these particular understandings of geopolitics are generated and how this works in official discourses of foreign policy, movies, media, academia, in the everyday life of people.[22] The latter is what critical geopolitics does. Critical geopolitics is critical approach to modern geopolitical imaginations of world politics. Thus, before discussing what critical geopolitics is, we need to analyze the historical construction of modern geopolitical imaginations.

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[21] Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4-5.

[22] Ibid.

2.1. Modern Geopolitical Imaginations

The roots of modern geographical imaginations as practice go back to the Voyages of Discovery of the fifteenth century. Modern geopolitical discourse has gained its identity from Western imperialist project. It portrayed others as backward and permanently disadvantage. Europe's own past (pagan and barbarian) was discovered to differentiate new worlds from Europe.[23] Through the Voyages of Discovery, Western Europeans surveyed, mapped and catalogued the earth in terms of European significations and scales. The earth was defined through understanding of the Cartesian perspective. The subject was separated from the object. This geographical knowledge was considered as objective, and independent of thought.[24]

This kind of production of geographical knowledge has been continued by surveys. The western will to survey the globe has continued in the contemporary era through the institutionalization of various sites such as universities, strategic institutes, and strategic area centers. These surveys contributed to "sighting", "siting" and "citing" of the demarcated globe. Survey has been an important tool for the maintenance of empire by providing knowledge about places, territories, and population. Through sighting, the globe became recognized and rendered visible. The globe has been visualized within a particular view. By siting, the globe space such was delineated as "Middle East", "Eastern Europe", "Balkans", etc. By citing, narratives were produced through the literature of Orientalism, developmentalism, Sovietology and

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[23] John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 49.

[24] Gearoid Ó Tuathail, "Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statecraft and Strategy," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19 (1994): 260.

so on.[25] These institutions have attempted to create a comprehensive strategic survey of global political space and "the external reality" of global politics in the Foucauldian terminology of "a form of panopticism", and "an institutionalized strategic gaze".[26] "Middle East" has still being constituted on the basis of old narratives, concepts, and images of instabilities, chaos, terrorism, and threats as an Oriental other.[27]

2. 2. Emergence of Geopolitics

Geopolitics as a distinct subject has emerged in late 1890s. As Dodds argues, three factors contributed to this. First, the competition between imperial powers, especially Britain and France, in the emerging interconnected global economy, made economic nationalism and trade protectionism popular. Then, emergence of the US as a rising power strengthened these policies. Second in an era that British geographer Halford Mackinder described as post-Columbian the competition between rival powers to dominate new territories accelerated. Third, the establishment of geography as an academic discipline provided new research opportunities in this subject.[28]

Rudolf Kjellen, the Swedish professor of political science first to coin the term geopolitics in his article published in 1899, wrote about boundaries of Sweden. In his work, his aim was to reveal the role of physical geography in forming the state and

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[25] Ibid., 260-261.

[26] Ibid., 269.

[27] James D. Sidaway, "Geopolitics, geography, and 'terrorism' in the Middle East," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12:3 (1994): 357.

[28] Dodds, *Geopolitics*, 25-6.

international politics.[29] He treated states as a living organism. The term, then, has gained different meaning for various authors. It is a term which is a "historically ambiguous and unstable concept".[30] It has been reproduced in accordance with political objectives of the statecraft of powerful states. The term popularized by German Karl Houshafer had a distinct meaning from the usage of Kjellen. Geopolitics became popular in Nazi Germany as a tool in international affairs.[31] Then the usage of the term in Anglo-American political tradition became paradoxical. On the one side it was "taboo word" because of its connection with Nazi Germany foreign policy. On the other hand it was a "necessary evil" to be studied in world politics.[32]

Geopolitics became part of Cold War strategic discourse under the influence of certain intellectuals like Isaiah Bowman, Richard Hersthhorne and Hans Morgenthau.[33] Under the influence of these intellectuals of statecraft, the U.S. followed three strategies during the Cold War.[34] First one was to prevent fascism by demilitarization of Germany and Japan and reorientation of their economies. Second one was to contain the spread of Soviet influence by the military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Third was to restructure of global economy based on American ideas by creation of United Nations System, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), The International Monetary Fund

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[29] Ibid., 24-5.

[30] O'Tuathail, *Problematizing Geopolitics*, 259.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., 259-60.

[34] Agnew and Cortbridge, 23.

(IMF), The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/World Bank and the Bretton Woods Agreement. During this time, three Cold War geopolitical concepts played important roles in construction of the dominant discourse of the US vis-à-vis the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union, USSR). These were containment, domino effects and hegemonic stability.[35] First the Soviet Union had to be contained economically, politically and militarily. Second, relating to first concept, client regimes and allies had to be protected. In any failure of protecting one ally, the US might lose its credibility and it would create a domino effect to lose others. Third, the US had to lead the free world, and it was burden and responsibility to protect the common interest of this free world.[36] The Cold War geopolitical discourse had managed to constitute powerful and pervasive political ideology to represent the world drama as a struggle between "us" and "them". The Cold War was a discourse created by strategic elites of bureaucracy-military-industrial-academic complex, and it constituted hardheaded statesmanship and gamesmanship in international affairs.[37]

Developments in economic globalization, telemetric and communication, global media, the internet, and transnational activities of legal and illegal organizations have put the traditional geopolitical understanding of spatial demarcations of globe as states, block and their "settled" "fixed" identities into question and have created

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[35] Ibid., 73.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Gearoid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, "Introduction," in *Re-Thinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics,* eds. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 1.

'complex unsettled hybrid identities".[38] Cold War geopolitical discourse and its epistemological basis of ethnocentric practices began to be criticized by postmodern theories like feminism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism in the late 1980s.[39] During this period the critical geopolitics emerged as a critique of this problematic.

2.3 Critical Geopolitics

During the last years of Cold War, 'Western' writers began to address the nexus between ideas and spatial practices. Critical geopolitics has emerged out of the work of a number of scholars in the field of geography and International Relations (IR). They have problematized geopolitics as a social, cultural and political practices rather than an external reality of world politics.[40] Critical geopolitics was developed as interdisciplinary studies and inspired by the discipline of gender studies, IR (especially post-structuralist theories, world system theory, feminism), and political economy.[41]

The term critical geopolitics was coined in the late 1980s and developed by two geopolitical geographers Simon Dalby and Gearoid Ò Tuathail.[42] Various authors have defined this new concept. Muller argues that "critical geopolitics" is the

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[38] Gearoid Ó Tuathail, "Postmodern geopolitics? The modern geopolitical imagination and beyond," in *Re-Thinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics,* eds. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 16-17.

[39] Ó Tuathail and Dalby, *Introduction*, 2.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Klaus Dodds, "Political geography III: critical geopolitics after ten years," *Progress in Human Geography*, 25:3 (2001): 470.

[42] Ibid.

examination of "the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities- the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning".[43] Klaus Dodds has noted "critical geopolitics complemented new forms of political geography which questioned traditional understandings of the 'political' and the 'geographical'". It is new research agenda on globalization, identity politics and sovereignty.[44] Using Richard Bernstein's usage of term 'constellation' inspired by Theodore Adorno and Walter Benjamin over the debates of the modern/postmodern situation, Dalby and Ó Tuathail define critical geopolitics as a new constellation of geopolitical problematic. Constellation is a situation of juxtaposed clusters of changing elements that resists reduction to essentialism or mastery by a single principle. There is always awareness of instabilities in this constellation.[45] In a more general way, as Ó Tuathail has noted, critical geopolitics is "no more than a general gathering place for various critiques of the multiple geographical discourses and practices that characterize modernity".[46] Critical geopolitics criticizes scientific truth of traditional geographical knowledge. Geographical knowledge and representations are not innocent objective external realities, but are political and ideological. Unlike traditional theorists of geopolitics attempts to demonstrate the drama of the world politics and a grand picture from Mackinder to Kissinger, Bowman to Brezenski, and Gray to Huntington in a transcendent objectivist perspective, critical geopolitics students argue that all nature

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[43] Martin Müller, "Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice," *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 323.

[44] Dodds, *Political geography*, 471.

[45] Simon Dalby and Gearoid Ó Tuathail, "The Critical Geopolitics Constellation: Problematizing Fusions of Geographical Knowledge and Power," *Political Geography* 15 (1994): 451-452.

[46] Laura Jones and Daniel Sage, "New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction," with contributions of Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Jennifer Hyndman, Fraser MacDonald, Emily Gilbert and Virginie Mamadouh, *Geojournal* (21 January 2009).

of form of geopolitical reasoning is "situated, contextual and embodied".[47] Inspired by Derrida and Foucault, "critical geopolitics involves deconstructing the ways in which political elites have depicted and represented places in their exercise of power".[48] Critical geopolitics deconstructs this kind of "objective" knowledge, and exposes power-knowledge relationship in these constructions.

Geopolitics is a form of political discourse of power and space.[49] Discourses are not just text, images, speeches, or articulations of sovereign autonomous actors, but they are language, ideas and practices which articulate, constrain and position subjects. Social practices are integral part of discourses.[50] According to Bialasiewicz et al. "discourses refer to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible".[51] They are performative. They are both representations and practices which constitute ontological effects. By reiterative and citation practices discourse produce effects of which it names.[52] Discourses constitute and constrain both the objects and subjects they articulate. There is no autonomous subject out of the domain of discourse. Recitation and reiteration as constraints on security policies of statecraft and on the arguments they

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[47] Dalby and Ó Tuathail, *Introduction*, 5-6.

[48] Paul Reuber, "Conflict studies and critical geopolitics – theoretical concepts and recent research in political geography," *GeoJournal* 50 (2000): 38.

[49] Dodds, *Political geography*, 470-1.

[50] Laclau, and Mouffe, 107. Müller, 325-6. Geroid Ó Tuathail, "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning*: The Case of US. Policy towards Bosnia in 1992*," Political Geography 21:5 (2002): 605-606.

[51] Luiza Bialasiewicz, David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey, and Alison J. Williams, "Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy," *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 406.

[52] Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 2.

claim demonstrate the importance of discourses in constituting both geographical imaginations of policymakers and their foreign policies according to these imaginations. Unlike its perception of the geopolitical traditions of "wisemen" of statecraft, geopolitics is a much broader cultural phenomenon of spatial practices of statecraft including both material and representational ones.[53] Thus, critical geopolitics analyses these geopolitical imagi-nation of the state. Foundations of state and constructing national community within this demarcated space are geopolitical acts. These practices involve construction of national identity, drawing boundaries between inside and outside, attempts to create a homogeneous community, producing national history, and projection of a visual order of space such as national maps with administrative provinces. Critical geopolitics analyses these geopolitical imagi-nations of states and boundary-drawing practices of everyday life.[54]

Critical geopolitics has taken four directions; 1) questioning relations between geographical/political reasoning and geopolitical practices of world politics 2) questioning geopolitical traditions (studying ideas of geopolitics in historical and geographical context) 3) studying popular representations of geographical knowledge and world politics in media, books, internet etc. and 4) studying how globalization, informatics developments and economic transformations effect the discourse practices of state representation.[55] Geopolitics is, for critical political geographers, not a singular one to specific to practice of statecraft, but a plural one that diffuses

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[53] Dalby and Ó Tuathail, *Introduction*, 3.

[54] Ibid. See also John Agnew, "The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1 (1994): 53-80.

[55] Dodds, *Political Geography*, 470-1.

throughout society. Geopolitics is a decentered set of practices with elitist and popular forms. These forms of geopolitics could be distinguished loosely in three typologies: the practical geopolitics, the formal geopolitics, and popular geopolitics. The practical geopolitics is about the practices of statecraft such as president, prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and of bureaucracy and political institutions. The formal geopolitics is the production of geographical knowledge and practice of particular sites like strategic institutions, think tanks, and academies. The popular geopolitics is the geopolitical representations of media, cinema, novels, or cartoons.[56]

Table 1. The Forms of Geopolitics.[57]

Modern geopolitical imaginations are historically and geographically constructed discourses. As Ó Tuathail and Agnew have noted, there are four specific points about

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[56] Dalby and Ó Tuathail, *Introduction*, 4-5.

[57] Ibid.

geopolitical discourses and political elites.[58] Their first point is that describing a foreign policy situation through geopolitical terms constitutes a normalization of division and descriptions of places by narratives, subjects and understandings. Geopolitics is about discursive practices of hegemonic states and core powers spatializing international politics in particular ways involving places, people and dramas. Secondly, modern geopolitical discourses are used for practical reasoning relying on common sense narratives and distinctions and they reflect dominant spatial representations. The third point is that the geographical knowledge has a reductive nature which is filtered and suppressed to fit into formal geographical categories. Geopolitical discourse simplifies the complex reality of places into controllable narratives. In the fourth point, political elites in the great powers or in a hegemonic state have more influence on the constitution of dominant political discourse. However, this discourse in not an unchallenged one, but even challenges must be within the terms of dominant discourse.

These points are important to analyze the representations of Turkey's geopolitics critically. First, because of hegemonic states and political elites in great powers are more powerful in constituting dominant geopolitical discourses; I will begin my analysis with the US and the EU narratives of geopolitical order of the post-September 11 era. These geopolitical imaginations and practices of the US and the EU as a center/core power in the post-September 11 era have also changed their margins of geopolitical representations and practices. Center-margin interactions have influences on the creation of a self/other dichotomy. The ordering capacity of

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[58] Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 193–194.

the center weakens in its margins. Margins are spaces where (in)stabilities of the center's identity becomes more fluid. Margins are not passive in construction of a self/other dichotomy. Margins are both constructed and constitutive of the center. However, this does not mean that center's ordering capacity fades at margins, but it may not face a strong challenge, and it may either continue for a short time or make some modifications.[59]

With the end of Cold War, there has been novelty in understandings of security/threat in the United States. Annihilation of the well-established and less ambiguous threat of Soviets has created more uncertain and indefinite security issues in security reasoning of the political elites of the US.[60] Various authors have attempted to create a new cartography of world politics, and guidance for foreign policy of the US in post-Cold War era. In this period, the EU has also continued its reterritorialization process and search for identity/foreign policy. These new imaginations of the world by the core powers, and their world dramas have pressed new occasions on Turkey. However, this is not one-sided change, but rather are mutual interactions. Turkey's policy makers have also redefined their own identity/foreign policy according to new perceived circumstances. They accept those which have increased Turkey's geographical importance, and resist the circumstances which externalize Turkey.

In the next chapters, I will examine the construction of geopolitical imaginations of the Western power centers in the post September 11 era, and their imaginations of

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[59] Parker, 8-20.

[60] Campbell, 7.

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Turkey in their constituted world, and in their new imagined Islamic geography/Southern Mediterranean/Greater Middle East as a model/other/bridge role, and Turkey's counter discourses of these imaginations. These processes have reproduced both Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses. Geography is about power, and these power centers have competed on the meaning of Turkey's geography.

3. A WORLD OF CLASHING CIVILIZATIONS

In the post-Cold War era (especially following the September 11 attacks) both Western policy makers and Turkish governments have referred directly or indirectly to the clash of civilizations thesis of Huntington in their imaginations of Turkey's representations. Deadly terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, followed then by other attacks in Western capitals, London and Madrid, and attacks in Cairo, and Istanbul. Besides, Islamist discourses of terrorists to legitimate their causes, and cartoon crises have invoked the questions of whether Islam is compatible with democracy and whether Islam and West can coexist peacefully. Mainstream media especially in the US has framed these events in the context of Islam. It explained these problems by applying the clash of civilization thesis.[61] This was an antithetical assault to modernity by deviated people who have false belief distinct from universal Western civilization (progress, reason, and every other good thing).[62] The media have popularized the Huntington thesis. His book on the clash became a bestseller. Yet Huntington was not the first person who coined the term. Various people have used the term before Huntington. One of the important figures used the term before Huntington in the post-Cold War was Bernard Lewis. Lewis, in his article published in 1990, *the Roots of Muslim Rage*, used the term to define the increasing anger among Muslims to the West and their fundamentalist reaction to

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[61] Ervand Abrahamian, "The US media, Huntington and September 11," Third World Quarterly 24:3(2003): 529-544.

[62] Simon Dalby, "Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's new war," *Geopolitics* 8:3 (2003): 61.

Western modernity and secular values.[63] Huntington extended this clash to whole world by separating globe into several civilizations.

3.1. Samuel P. Huntington: An Intellectual of Statecraft

Intellectuals of statecraft have a crucial role in producing geopolitical imaginations and creating foreign policy practices. This crucial role includes "recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations."[64] As Agnew and Ó Tuathail have noted geopolitics is spatialization of international politics by intellectuals of statecraft in order to construct a world which is divided into certain places, people, and narratives.[65] During late 1980s and 1990s, various writers who had been involved in previous administrations began to write about new opportunities and threats to the world and specifically to the US.[66] They attempted to designate the world in a simplified way to fit certain imaginations.

Huntington was a prominent intellectual of statecraft. In the time he wrote his book, Huntington was director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He had been director of security planning for the National Security Council in the Carter Administration, founder and co-editor of Foreign Policy, and president of the American Political Science Association. Huntington's thesis of "Clash of

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[63] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266:3 (1990): 47-60.

[64] Bialasiewicz et al. 409.

[65] Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 192.

[66] Ibid.

Civilizations" is important because it reflects certain feelings and imaginations within the US foreign policy community to the new world (dis)order.[67]

3.2. The Clash of Civilizations Paradigm

Huntington argued that in the post-Cold War world global politics became multipolar and multicivilizational. The conflict has transformed in the history from conflicts among princes to nation-states, and then to among ideologies. Contemporary conflict is among civilizations.[68] In this era, the most important differences among people would not be ideological, political, or economic, but cultural/civilizational.[69] Peoples' identities have changed dramatically and world politics has been reconfigured along cultural lines.[70]

Huntington criticizes other post-Cold War paradigms of *One World: Euphoria and Harmony* (Western Universalism), *Two Worlds* (West vs. East, or North vs. South), *184 States- More or Less* (Realist View of State Behaviors), and *Sheer Chaos* (Disorder of World Politics). He rejects one civilization, or the division of world into two spheres like West vs. East, North vs. South. He argues that they are either wrong or inadequate to explain world politics. They miss crucial features of the new era. There is no one East, but multiple civilizations. The clash is also is not just about economic interest as North /South clashes, it is cultural. He suggests that the world in

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[67] Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 248.

[68] Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993): 22-23.

[69] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster Press, 1996), 21.

[70] Ibid., 19.

terms of seven or eight civilizations explain this new era by distinguishing important events from unimportant ones, and by seeing "order" and general trends in world politics.[71]

Huntington tries to simplify the world into a map of major civilizations. According to Huntington, maps are useful to find the way in a complex world by simplifying reality.[72] He is looking for order in post Cold War era. He argues that models are needed for five reasons. Firstly, we order and generalize about reality. Secondly we understand causal relationships among phenomena. Thirdly, we anticipate and predict future developments. Fourthly, we distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and lastly they show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals.[73] He suggests that a multicivilizational world order helps us understand new trends. Huntington spatializes civilizations (and also religions) with more clear borders.

The term civilization is used by Huntington as the broadest identifications for people. Civilizations are the biggest "we". They are the broadest cultural entities. Thus, according to Huntington, although there are differences in civilizations such as ethnic, religious, and regional differences, at the highest level, people define themselves in civilizational identities. A German may differentiate himself/herself from an Italian. But they also define themselves as Europeans. Europeans also define themselves as Westerns. However, they distinguish from Hindus, Chinese, and

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[71] Ibid., 34-36.

[72] Ibid., 29-30.

[73] Ibid.

Muslims. In the broadest identification, they belong to Western civilization.[74] Further, he remarks that major civilizations in history have been related to religion.

Huntington perceives culture as both a divisive and unifying force. People of different civilizations have killed each other even though they sometimes share the same ethnicity and language.[75] He argues that people who share the same culture began to come together as in spite of their different ideologies, and states united by ideologies, but not by civilizations come apart.[76] According to Huntington, each civilizations has different philosophical assumptions, underlying values, social relations, customs, and overall outlooks on life, and religion is a reinforcing factor in creating of these differences. He suggests that different political and economic developments and achievements of states of different civilizations are directly related to their cultures. This is the reason given for the lack of democracy in Muslim countries, this is why East Asian states developed their economies, but not democratic institutions, this is why Central European countries which share the same culture with Western Europe easily transformed democratic countries, but not other ex-communist states.[77]

Huntington argues that cultural differences are more important than physical characteristics of races. He remarks that race or ethnicity does not create distinction in values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, but cultural/civilizational

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[74] Ibid., 43.

[75] Ibid., 42.

[76] Ibid., 28.

[77] Ibid., 28-9.

differences do. People of the different races may be united by the same civilization, whereas people of the same race may be divided due to their civilizational/cultural differences.[78] Huntington accepts that civilizations have no definite boundaries which show where they begin and where they end. They change over time. They are dynamics. They rise, fall, merge, divide, and die. However, according to him, they can be long-lived, and are the most enduring of human associations. He suggests that they are cultural entities, not political ones. Political entities in civilization may be the same or may vary. In the contemporary world, most civilizations contain more than one state.[79] Here, Huntington contradicts his claim by defining states in civilizational identity term and by mapping clear borders of civilizational world. Each state has a civilizational identity. He divides the world into "us" and "them" in terms of civilizations. Through this, he attempts to spatialize the world into world civilizations and constitute cultural cohesion internally by answering who Western/American people are and to guide the geopolitical strategy of the West (the US) in post-Cold War era.

Huntington is also pessimistic about human nature. As in the classical realist argument of the bad/selfish nature of humans, he argues that "it is human to hate".[80] Huntington remarks that humans need enemies for their self-definition and motivation. He claims that enemies are important in the construction of identity and "the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the

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[78] Ibid., 40-42.

[79] Ibid., 43-44.

[80] Ibid., 130.

world's major civilizations".[81] In post-Cold war era, Huntington suggests that this enemy would be other civilizations. He argues that nation states continue to be the principal actor in world politics, but their attitudes have changed. In addition to pursuing of power and wealth, their behaviors have being shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences unlike during the Cold War. According to him, nation states are now grouping and forming blocks in terms of civilizations.[82] He suggests that at the micro level, local politics is the politics of ethnicity and at the macro level; global politics is civilizational.[83] Huntington puts states into civilizations (the West, Islam, Sino, Japan, Hindu, Orthodoxy, Latin and African civilizations) which distinguished mostly by religion. Sinic civilization (labeled as Confucian in the article) includes China and the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China, and Vietnam and Korea. Japan is a distinct civilization separated from China. Hinduism is the civilization of the Subcontinent with India as the core state. Islamic civilization includes many cultures and ethnicities including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Malay. Western civilization includes Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

Huntington remarks that historically, Western civilization is European civilization. In the modern era, Western civilization is Euro-American or North Atlantic civilization. According to Huntington, Greece is a non-Western country although ancient Greek civilization is assumed as the root of Western civilization.[84] Latin American

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[81] Ibid., 20.

[82] Ibid., 22.

[83] Ibid., 28.

[84] Ibid., 162.

civilization includes the remaining part of the American Continent except for Canada, the US and several small states. African civilization is a merging civilization in sub-Saharan Africa.[85] Huntington argues that most civilizations have core states which are the principal sources of the civilizations. They are the most powerful states of their civilizations and they lead kin countries. The US is the Western core state with a Franco-German core in Europe, and Britain as an additional center of power. Japan is the single core state of Japanese civilization. China is the core state of Sinic civilization, India is Hindu, and Russia is Orthodox. Islam, Latin America, and Africa lack core states.[86]

Huntington argues that civilizational clashes are generated by Western universalism, rise of Asian powers and Muslim fundamentalism. While at the macro or global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest (especially Sino-Islamic alliance), at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others.[87]

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[85] Ibid., 45-47.

[86] Ibid., 135.

[87] Ibid., 255.

Here is the map of post-Cold War map of world according to Huntington.

Map 1. The World of Civilizations: Post-1990[88]

3.2.1. The Western Universalism

Huntington reconstructs the West of North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand and divides Europe along the divide between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy and Islam.

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[88] Ibid., 26-27.

Map 2. The Division between Western Christianity and Orthodoxy/Islam in Europe[89]

Huntington distinguishes modernization and Westernization. He argues that in the early changes of non-Westerners, Westernization and modernization were interwoven. But now, modernization promotes de-westernization. He remarks that through modernizations, non-Western societies have become wealthier and more powerful politically and economically, and these developments make them more confident and more assertive in their culture.[90] According to him, the decline of the

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[89] Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations?*, 30.
[90] Ibid., 76.

Western civilization weakened the attractiveness of the Western model and also its power to dominate the world as it did in the early 20th century.[91]

Huntington criticizes the identification of Western civilization with modernity. He suggests that the emergence of the West was before modernity. According to him, it emerged in the eighth and ninth centuries and developed distinctively. He defines the core of Western civilization as the classical legacy (Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Christianity), Catholicism and Protestantism, European languages (unlike other civilizations with one language or one core language, it has multiple languages), separation of spiritual and temporal authority (separation of God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority and temporal authority), rule of law, social pluralism (strong civil society tradition), representative bodies, and individualism. He suggests that the Western civilization with these characteristics which are not available in other civilizations is unique.[92] Further, he remarks that globalization brings modernization but not Westernization. Globalization of communication, transportation and economy will not lead to a common civilization. Magna Mac does not mean Magna Carta.[93]

He argues that the Western civilization is in decline. According to him, there are three specific points of this decline. First, the decline of the West is still slow. Second, it is not a straight line process but an irregular one with pauses, reversals and reassertions. Third, the West has not the same power as it had in early twentieth

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[91] Ibid., 83-84.

[92] Huntington, *Remaking the World Order*, 69-72.

[93] Ibid., 58.

century. The power requires economic, military, institutional, demographic, political, technological, social, or other resources. He remarks that although the West is still powerful, and has most of these resources; its power began to decline relatively to those of other civilizations.[94] He argues that culture follows power.[95] With decline of its power, the West has no ability to impose its values on non-Westerners. Huntington criticizes the belief in the universality of Western culture. According to Huntington Americans think that non-Westerners want to adopt the Western values and institutions. They have desire to promote "Western values, institutions, and culture because they embody the highest, most enlightened, most liberal, most rational, most modern, and most civilized thinking of humankind". However, Huntington notes that it is "false, immoral and dangerous".[96] He warns that the Western universalism is dangerous for both the world and the West. It is dangerous, because it may lead to a clash of civilizations between the core states, and it is dangerous for West because it might cause its own defeat.[97]

3.2.2. The Economic Rise of Asian Powers

Huntington suggests that during the Cold War, the Soviet threat led to political cooperation between the US and Asian powers like the US-Japan mutual security treaty and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China in

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[94] Ibid., 83-84.

[95] Ibid., 310.

[96] Ibid., 310.

[97] Ibid., 311.

1979.[98] However, in an era without the Soviet threat, Huntington argues, the common interest between the US and the Asian powers was removed and other conflicting interests came to the fore. He warns that increased interaction in areas of communications, trade, and investment multiplied the issues and subjects where their interests clash. Moreover, the economic development of the East Asian countries gave them confidence vis-à-vis the West.[99] The fundamental cultural differences showed themselves in international politics. He argues that the Asian perception of the supremacy of the state over society and of society over the individual, the values of authority, hierarchy, the subordination of individual rights and interests, the importance of consensus, and the avoidance of confrontation have been incompatible with American beliefs of liberty, equality, democracy, and individualism, and the American propensity to distrust government, oppose authority, promote checks and balances, encourage competition, sanctify human rights.[100]

3.2.3. The Problem of Islam

Huntington argues that the problem is not Islamist fundamentalism, but Islam itself.[101] He claims that Islam is a source of instability in the world. There are conflicts where Islam meets non-Islam. The most dangerous and violent clashes are between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islam is incapable of coexistence. It has "bloody

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[98] Ibid., 224.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., 224-225.

[101] Ibid., 209.

borders".[102] Why is Islam problem? According to Huntington there are both historical and temporal causes. First, Islam is a religion of war. It has been "a religion of the sword" throughout history. Violence is on the foundation of Islam. Islam has a violent character and Muslims have an enthusiasm for war. Second, since the emergence of Islam in Arab Peninsula, it has spread to the world (Middle East, North Africa, Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia, and India) with expansionist ambitions of Islamic states. The expansionist legacy of Islam has remained. Thus, clashes arise where Muslims directly contact with non-Muslims. The third problem is "indigestibility" of Muslims. Islam is an absolutist faith, and there is no separation between religion and politics, and world is divided by sharp line of *Dar al-lslam* (House of Islam) and the *Dar al-harb* (House of War). People and minorities of other civilizations confront less difficulties living in each other societies, but Muslims have problems. Both Muslims living in a non-Muslim country or minorities living in a Muslim country face big issues. According to Huntington, these features explain historically violence in Islam.[103]

Huntington suggests that there are also temporal reasons why there are both intra and inter civilizational clashes of Islam. Islam is a source of instability in the world, because unlike other civilizations, there is no center/core state to represent and lead it. He argues that there are some potential states aspiring to be leaders of Islam, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and potentially Indonesia, but none of them have power to mediate the conflict both among Muslims and between Muslims and

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[102] Ibid., 258.

[103] Ibid., 263-264.

non-Muslims.[104] They have all constraint for this purpose. Iran is Shiite, different from Sunni Islam which makes up ninety per cent of Muslims. Its population is not Arab, but Persian and there is historical antagonism with Arabs. Pakistan is relatively poor, and has political instabilities both inside (ethnic and regional divisions) and outside (border dispute with India). Saudi Arabia has the holy lands of Islam with its oil resources, but it has relatively small population and geographical vulnerability. This makes it dependent to the West for its security. Another candidate is Turkey for the core state of Islam. However, because of the secular character of its institutions and Kemalist heritage, the leadership of Islam is rejected. It became a torn country.[105] However, for Huntington, Turkey is in a unique position for this role with its extensive historical connections with Muslims in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. If Turkey redefines itself, like South Africa did (abandonment of Apartheid regime), by abandoning secularism as alien to its being, it would change itself from a torn country to the core state of Islam and would lead Islamic civilization.[106]

Huntington was pessimistic about the development of democracy and secularism in the Muslim societies as well as among other civilizations. He continues Lewis's perception of Islam and secularism. According to Lewis, in Christianity, Christ told his follower "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's."(Matt.XXII:21). On the other hand, in Islam, Muhammad became both leader of the political community and the religious leader. Thus, in

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[104] Ibid., 264-265.

[105] Ibid., 177-179.

[106] Ibid.

Islam, political and religious affairs have been interwoven.[107] Huntington continues this Orientalist argument. God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority and temporal authority, have been separated in Christianity. The separation of religion and state is a unique character of Christianity. The other exception is Hinduism. In Islam, God is Caesar.[108] Both Lewis and Huntington are pessimistic about the development of democracy and modernity in Muslim societies. They claim that free elections in Islamic societies are problematic. Lewis argues that for Islamist opposition, democracy is a "one-way road" to come to the power. When Islamists are in power, they have no obligation to give rights and freedom to the opposition. This is the sovereignty of God, and so there can not be any rejection.[109] Modernity in Muslim states has also failed. Lewis warns that huge gaps with the West in wealth and power, lack of opportunities, poverty and repression has brought resentment and anger to the region. These sentiments were first directed to their own rulers and then, to their assumed external supporters. Feeling humiliation because of the desperate situation vis-à-vis the West and ancient hatred against it has been seen as clash of civilizations.[110] Bernard Lewis argues in "The Roots of Muslim Rage" that:

> It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations — that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival.[111]

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[107] Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 6.

[108] Huntington, *Remaking the World Order*, 70.

[109] Lewis, *Crisis of Islam*, 111.

[110] Ibid., 119.

[111] Lewis, *The Root of Muslim Rage*, 60.

Huntington argues that the demographic explosion in Muslim societies is another problem. Actually it is the most important problem for Huntington. The growing number of unemployed in the young population is a source of instability and of violence.[112] Population growth in Muslim countries (particularly young people between 15 and 24) provides recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration.[113]

Huntington warns about Sino-Islamic military alliances. In an era when the Western countries are diminishing their defense budget, they are still increasing their military powers. To protect their interests against other civilizations, the West has to maintain the economic and military power by strengthening international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and by increasing its military capabilities. To remain dominant in the international system, Huntington recommends that the Western countries should exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states.[114]

3.2.4. Civilizational Faultlines

In this emerging era, according to Huntington, the most dangerous conflicts would be ones in civilizational faultlines. These are wars/conflicts between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Huntington argues that faultline conflicts are intermittent and interminable. They are hard and rare to solve. They can not be solved by

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[112] Huntington, *Remaking the World Order*, 265.

[113] Ibid., 103.

[114] Huntington, *Clash of Civilization?,* 46-49.

comprehensive peace treaties but they may be stopped by a period of time with truces and cease fires. They stem from the geographical proximity, different religions and cultures, separate social structures, and historical memories of the two societies.[115]

Huntington claims that during war, multiple identities in society weaken and the most dominant one of the conflict comes to fore. War becomes an identity war of "us" and "them". In faultline conflict, religion is the most effective justification of war. Warring groups appeal to civilizational identity and for support from members of their civilizations.[116] He argues that this is mostly case in Islam. A conflict between an Islamic state and non-Muslim one has potential to transform into bigger one by rallying other members of clashing civilizations. These conflicts might create kin country syndrome. Each group rallies for support from other members of the civilization. Support might be any kind ranging from official or unofficial, overt or covert, material, human, diplomatic, financial, symbolic, or military. Kin countries or groups support their warring partners.[117] He gives the conflict of Yugoslavia as an example of such conflicts. He argues that Russia supported Serbs; Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Libya funded and armed the Bosnians because of cultural kinship, not because of reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest.[118]

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[115] Huntington, *Remaking World Order*, 291.

[116] Ibid., 267-268.

[117] Ibid., 272.

[118] Ibid., 28.

3.2.5. Internal Decay in the Western Societies

Huntington warns about the "moral decline, cultural suicide and political disunity" in the Western societies. He argues that there is an increase in antisocial behaviors (crime, drug use, and any kind of violence activities), family ties have weakened (including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single-parent families), membership in voluntary associations are in decline (in the US mostly), a cult of personal indulgence in the expense of work ethic has risen, and there are serious problems in educational systems.[119]

He claims that Western societies and culture are also in danger because of immigrants who reject assimilation and continue their own values. Muslims in European societies and Hispanics in the US are threats to integrity of the societies. Europeans face also the threat of weakening of its central component, Christianity, and Americans might be a cleft country, if it can not assimilate the Hispanic minority.[120]

Huntington also denounces multiculturalism, and considers it as end of the US which is part of Western civilization. He argues that defenders of multiculturalism try to split the US into various racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.[121] According to him, the US must protect the country's cultural heritage. Multiculturalists in the US create a country of many civilizations, that is, a country

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[119] Ibid., 304.

[120] Ibid., 198-207.

[121] Ibid., 305.

which does not belong to any civilization. Huntington argues that such a state can not survive. The multiculturalism means end of the US. Huntington claims that de-Westernization of the US means the end of Western civilization. The West would be just Europe and a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries. With a declining population the West can not survive. He suggests that the future of the West depends on the US. Americans have to reaffirm their commitment to Western civilization.[122]

3.2.6. Implications of the Multicivilizational World Order for the West and World Peace

Huntington gives recommendations to the Western policymakers for the emerging era. He claims that the Western civilization is unique, but not because of its universality. According to him, it is unique because of the distinctive character of its values and institutions (its Christianity, pluralism, liberty individualism, and rule of law). He recommends that the West should not shape other civilizations according to their image of non-Westerners, but sustain its civilization.[123] He criticizes that American leaders and policymakers fail to see the emerging reality of the new world order. Huntington also criticizes policies of the US involvement in Asia, and advocates transatlantic relations with Europe instead. He recommends that the Western countries must strengthen their organizations and the Atlantic community against non-Westerners. They have to renew their moral values, develop more political and economic integrations, and strengthen the NATO. They can only

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[122] Ibid., 307.

[123] Ibid., 311.

succeed if the US reaffirms its identity as a Western nation and as a leader of Western civilization.[124] The West should promote greater integration among themselves politically, economically and militarily and should exploit the differences between other civilizations.[125]

He argues that Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.[126] To sustain peace and security in a multicivilizational and multipolar world, three rules have to be followed. First, core states of each civilization must abstain from intervention in other civilizations. This is the abstention rule. Second is the joint mediation rule which means that core states of each civilizations work together to solve the disputes of fault line conflicts. Third, common values among civilizations should be promoted (Commonalities rule).[127]

Huntington has concluded his book with the statement of that "in the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war."[128] Faultline disputes can be solved by mediation of secondary or tertiary parties who have rallied their kin. They have both the capacities to negotiate on the behalf of their warring kin and have leverage over their kin to halt wars.[129]

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[124] Ibid., 308-309.

[125] Ibid., 311-312.

[126] Ibid., 310.

[127] Ibid., 316-320.

[128] Ibid., 321.

[129] Ibid., 292.

According to Huntington the United Nations Security council should be reformed according to new world order. The world is now multicivilizational and multipolar. He suggests that every civilization should be represented in the Security Council.[130] Japan and India should be permanent members. Africa, Latin America, and the Muslim world should have permanent seats. Selections might be made by the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of American States (the United States abstaining) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.[131]

In sum, Huntington argues that the post Cold War era is a drama of competition and collaborations of seven or eight civilizations. Their commonalities and differences shape their attitudes and their interests.[132]

3.2.7. The Geopolitical (Geocultural) Imagination of Turkey

Huntington puts countries which can not be classified within one civilization appropriately into different categories such as cleft states and torn countries. A cleft country is composed of at least two civilizations such as India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Philippines, and Indonesia, in which there are conflicting civilizational groups. A torn country has a single predominant civilization, but their

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[130] Ibid., 317.

[131] Ibid., 317.

[132] Ibid., 29.

political elites want to be part of another civilization (generally the West) and this category includes Mexico, Turkey and Russia.[133]

Huntington argues that torn countries are identifiable by two phenomena. First, their policymakers define the country as a bridge between two cultures, and observers describe them as "Janus-faced".[134] Next, they have identity problems. To redefine civilizational identity, according to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, the elite of state must support this shift. Second, the public must at least acquiesce in this redefinition. Third, the dominant elements of the host civilization have to support and accept this.[135] Huntington argues that the third requirement is not met in Turkish case. During the Cold War, Turkey's civilizational identity was not so much of a problem because of the Soviet threat. Without the Soviet threat, Turkey's identity began to be questioned. The EU is not supportive of Turkey's membership. He remarks that the real reason to oppose Turkey's membership is its religion. Since Turkey is Islamic, this means that Turkey does not belong to Europe.[136] Huntington argues that Turkey would continue to be a torn country. Turkish leaders define the country as a bridge between civilizations, but a bridge is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither.[137]

Huntington also notes a rising Islamist discourses in political life in Turkey in 1990s. In the post Cold war era, the secular heritage of Ataturk came under attack and

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[133] Ibid., 137-139.

[134] Ibid., 139.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid., 145-146.

[137] Ibid., 149.

Islamic resurgence is eroding Atatürk's legacy. Islamic sentiments have increased in this new era. The rulers adopt themselves to this situation. The supposedly secular Turkish government maintained an Office of Religious Affairs with a budget larger than those of some ministries, and financed the construction of mosques, required religious instruction in all public schools, and provided funding to Islamic schools. The character of politics has also changed. Muslim symbols and discourse began to be used in elections, and propagandas. This resurgence of Islam has changed Turkish foreign policy and it is becoming increasingly Islamicized.[138]

Huntington argues that with its history, population, middle level of economic development, national coherence, and military tradition, Turkey could be the core state of Islam.[139] It is in a unique position for this role with its extensive historical connections with Muslims in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. However, because of the secular character of its institutions and Kemalist heritage, the leadership of Islam is rejected. It became a torn country. He recommends that Turkey should give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a "beggar" pleading for membership in the West.[140]

In his paradigm, Huntington wants to continue Cold War logic in the absent of Soviet Union. He tries to reterritorialize the world in terms of civilizations. With the September 11 attacks, this paradigm has occupied mainstream American media on the nexus between Islam and terrorism, Islam and democracy, and Islam-West

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[138] Ibid., 147-149.

[139] Ibid., 179.

[140] Ibid., 177-179.

relations. Islam has been portrayed as a source of fundamentalism, terrorism and a threat to existence of the Western civilization by tendentious Orientalist scholars and journalists who lack knowledge of history, language or culture of Muslim societies and continue to reproduce old stereotypes about Islam which has been constructed since tenth century.[141] This paradigm is also important to the construction of world politics. The influence of paradigm over policymakers of the Western states to follow the recommendations of Huntington has been debatable, but to prevent the prophecy of clash of civilizations, the dialogue has been securitized.[142] Dialogue and alliance among civilizations (particularly West and Islam) has become popular in the post-September 11 era. Turkey has been presented by both some Western policymakers and the Turkish government as an antithesis of this paradigm.

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[141] Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Definitions," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the New Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York, Chichester and West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2003), 78.

[142] Helle Malmvig, "Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures," Mediterranean Politics 10:3 (2005): 355.

4. THE GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS OF THE US AND THE EU IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

4.1. The US Geopolitical Imaginations in the Post-September 11 Era

State identity is constituted through discourses. Policymakers perform foreign policy based on particular interpretations of threats against this identity. Foreign policy is a political practice which plays a principal role in constituting, producing, and maintaining American political identity (also in other sociospatial entities) in relation to difference/danger/other.[143] However, national states are in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, identity is not primary or stable/fixed. Constitution of, what Benedict Anderson termed, this "imagined community" has tensions in it, and it is always in a process of coming into being. This process, however, is never fully completed.[144] On the other hand, states continue to exist thanks to this indeterminate/unfinished identity, and lack of security. If danger/threat ceased to exist and security was provided, states would not secure their existence.[145] Thus, a threat/enemy/other is needed for continuation of identity. The post-Cold War and post-September 11 geopolitical discourses of the US have been attempts to replace the Soviet threat with something new and to constitute a more stable world order by using the similar terms of the Cold War. Therefore, to understand post-Cold War geopolitical discourse, it is necessary to examine the Cold War geopolitics.

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[143] Campbell, 8.

[144] Ibid., 11.

[145] Ibid., 11-12.

4.1.1. The Cold War Discourse of the US

The Cold War was product of a conflict over the meaning of modernity.[146] During the Cold War, territoriality was more stable and defined two ideological camps led by superpowers. On one side, there was liberal capitalist block (the US/NATO/ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and on the other side, it was communist block (the USSR/Warsaw Treaty Organization/Council on Mutual Economic Assistance).[147] The two blocks attempted to create their own jurisdiction and to spread their own way of modernity to a "third" world. There was a temporal difference between first/second worlds and third world. Both two saw their pasts in this "third" world and the third world had to follow the same path to reach the present. It was a competition of the US and the USSR to expand their sphere of influence and their political-economy model to a "third world". The geopolitical discourse of the Cold War had also cultural meaning.[148] The US represented capitalism and the Soviet Union represented communism and each idealized the other as foreign and threatening.

However, the geopolitical discourse of Cold War and world order began to lose its spatial order from the late 1960s. Both territorial states and American hegemony relatively declined especially in the area of finance and production. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the world order based on it collapsed. In

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[146] Agnew and Corbridge, 51.

[147] Gearoid O Tuathail and Timothy W. Luke, Present at the (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 84/3 (September, 1994): 383. See also Timothgy W. Luke, *Screens of Power: Ideology, Domination and Resistance in Informational Society* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 229-236.

[148] Agnew and Corbridge, 68.

the early 1990s, with the demise of Soviet Union, the Cold War ended. The East/West block competition to spread political, economic and cultural values came to an end. The geopolitics of modern Western conceptions and categories of territorial states have been dissolved with the condition of postmodernity.[149] Various discourses arose to compete to dominate the imagination of the world in particular perspectives and of the US identity/other in this era.

4.1.2. The Post Cold War Discourses

With the collapse of Soviet Union, the US did not only lose its powerful rivalry, but also its identity and role in global affairs.[150] The US as a sole remaining superpower attempted to reterritorialize world politics by remaining within the similar Western geopolitical structure of the Cold War as a leader of free world with the responsibility to bring freedom to the rest of the world, but without a single rival. This was the new world order. But there was no sustained effort of Bush government remapping in early 1990s.[151]

New discourses of danger have been required to contain the challenges to identity in the absence of the Soviet threat, within a more indeterminate and uncertain division of world into blocks, and inside/outside. New threats of AIDS, terrorism, environmental derogation, and Japan's economic assertiveness began to compete to

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[149] O'Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 226.

[150] O Tuathail and Luke, 382.

[151] Ibid., 383.

take place of the communist threat.[152] During this time intellectuals of statecraft attempted to make sense and to constitute grand geopolitical visions to new world (dis)order, and have sought to reconstitute the identity of the US. Fukuyama declared the triumph of Western liberal values and an end of the history.[153] Huntington argued the conflict would continue but this time within a civilizational base. New map of blocks would be on the basis of civilizations and their faultiness.[154] Thurows's argument has centered on economic clashes between Japan, the EC/EU and the US.[155] These are all attempts to construct a meaning of new world (dis)order and to create an identity and a path the U.S. should follow.

In Clinton era, US foreign policy was to integrate "tamed zones" of global prosperity, to enlarge liberal market democracies, to contain "wild zones" of threats and to be the world watcher of global environment.[156] The Clinton administration began to focus more on geoeconomical and environmental issues alongside political issues. During the Clinton administration, various writers who had been involved in previous administrations began to write about new opportunities and threats to the world and specifically to the US such as threat of international terrorism, failed states, rogue states, cultural/civilizational conflict, and the opportunity to expand democratic peace zone to ex-Soviet countries, Asia, the Middle East where freedom

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[152] Campbell, 196-197.

[153] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (NY: Free Press, 1992).

[154] See the third chapter.

[155] Lester Thurow, *Head to head: the coming economic battle among Japan, Europe and America* (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

[156] O'Tuathail and Luke, 394-395.

and free markets lack.[157] Especially works of neo-conservatives resonated with geographical imagination and foreign policy of the Bush Administration.

4.1.3. The Neo-Conservative Geopolitical Vision

 The US foreign policy during the Bush Administration included resonations of geographical imaginations of the world from neo-conservative intellectuals of statecraft, their perceived threats and foreign policy suggestions. These intellectuals of statecrafts, what Bialasiewicz et al. coined non-state scribes, have a crucial role in "recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations."[158] They are not spokesmen of the government. Their work is between academic and 'policy-oriented.[159] Neo-conservative intellectuals of statecraft who claim assertive foreign policy became dominant in Bush government.

Although most Americans believe in their exceptionalism with their liberal values and institutions, two mainstream approaches have emerged in American political tradition. The first approach is exemplarism. This is an isolationist tradition of preserving American values and to make the US perfect. An activist foreign policy might corrupt these values. Second perspective is vindicationism. Defenders of this

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[157] Bialasiewicz et al., 409.

[158] Ibid., 409.

[159] Ibid.

perspective argue that the US must spread its model to the world.[160] Since the Second World War, the second approach has overweighed the first.

Although its main themes go back to early Cold War debates, neo-conservatism emerged in the mid-1970s as both a reaction to détente in relations with the Soviets and to distrust in the US power because of the Vietnam failure. Since then, neoconservatism has become more coherent set of causal and normative beliefs which support the assertion of American military might and values.[161] Neoconservatives defend vindicationist foreign policy. There are three core dimensions of this policy. These are liberal optimism, benign nature of US power, and the efficacy of American power.[162] First, the neoconservative view is optimistic. It argues that US national identity is universal and exportable. Liberal political change could be sustained by assertive policies. Democracy is spontaneous and natural, but there are some artificial obstacles such as a minority group who abuses power and prevents democracy. Thus, with the termination of these obstacles, democracy emerges. Second, the nature of US power is a benign and redeeming force. The US does not resemble other great powers. It has an exceptional character because its power lacks abuse or domination. It cares about common and universal interest, not only private interest. Third, the American power must be used effectively to change the international system according to liberal political and economic rules set by the US.

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[160] Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," *International Security* 29:4 (2005): 113.

[161] Ibid., 143.

[162] Ibid., 143-155.

The views of neo-conservative organizations like the Project for New American Century (PNAC) and people such as Robert Kagan, and Tomas Barnett shaped the geopolitical imaginations of the Bush administration.[163] The most effective organization which had influence in shaping the foreign policy of Bush administration was the PNAC whose aim is to promote American global leadership.[164] It was founded in 1997. Some of important Project founders are Vice President Dick Cheney, and first Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld of the Bush administration, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense (then World Bank President) Paul Wolfowitz, former ambassador to Iraq (then US Ambassador to the UN) Zalmay Khalilzad along with neoconservatives Francis Fukuyama, Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol.[165] The members of the PNAC argue that "it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge and to meet threats before they become dire". The US can not "avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise".[166] They suggest that the US must increase defense spending to carry out its global responsibilities, cooperate more with democratic allies, challenge hostile regimes, and promote political and economic freedom abroad, and accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to the Americans' security,

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[163] Bialasiewicz et al., 410-411.

[164] "Statement of Principles," in Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm> (15 October 2009).

[165] Bialasiewicz et al., 410.

[166] "Statement of Principles".

their prosperity, and their principles.[167] These views have shaped the US foreign policy of the Bush government.

Besides these PNAC founders, Robert Kagan (one of the co-founders of the PNAC who chose to stay "outside" and currently one of the Project Directors) and Thomas P. M. Barnett (senior strategic researcher and professor at the U.S. Naval War College) continued to resonate these neo-con views of unilateral American intervention and preemptive actions before threats spread.[168] Kagan argues that the American and European perspectives have diverged especially in the post-Cold war era. The EU has become a greater supporter of law-based world order, transnational negotiation and cooperation whereas the US exercises its power unilaterally and pursues its policy on the possession and use of military tools. Kagan claims that the differences between the two allies as "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus".[169] It is the responsibility and burden of the US to sustain global peace and order.

Barnett, another influential person in constituting the foreign policy of Bush Administration, has defined a new threat to the existence of the US in the post-Cold War era as disconnectedness from global order. He argues that in the early 1990s, the US was concerned about "a united Europe", "a powerhouse Japan," and "a rising China". These arguments claim that only developed states or organizations could

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[167] Ibid.

[168] Bialasiewicz et al., 411-413.

[169] Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (2002).

threaten the US. He remarks that the September 11 attacks showed the opposite.[170] The new security paradigm of the US according to Barnett in this global age is to prevent disconnection of states from global norms, values and institutions that bind countries. For, "disconnectedness defines danger".[171] The real threat is coming from failed states which are disconnected from the world. This is why the Al-Qaeda was based in Sudan and Afghanistan.[172] He divides the world into two regions. First is the Functioning Core, or Core where globalization works with its all aspects of network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security and places of stable governments, rising standards of living, and more people die by suicide than murder. This Core includes North America, much of South America, the European Union, Putin's Russia, Japan and Asia's emerging economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa. The other parts of the world are called as the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap. This is opposite of the Core. Barnett suggests that the effects of globalization do not reach these parts of the world properly or are totally absent. These are places of politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder and sources of global terrorists. Barnett also defines some seam states which are situated along "bloody borders" of the Gap. Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia are some classical seam states. He remarks that terrorists access the Core through these seam states, and they have a crucial role to "shrink the Gap". The US requires cooperation with these

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[170] Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map, *Esquire* (March 2003).

[171] Ibid.

[172] Ibid.

states.[173] Barnett argues that there is a nexus between military operations of the US in the post-Cold War era and the Gap regions of the world like the Caribbean Rim, Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia. If a state rejects the globalization and is disconnected from it, it is more likely for the US troops to intervene that state. If this is not the case, the US is not expected to send troops to that state.

Barnett argues that the US began its strategy in the Middle East where there is a lack of personal freedom and there are resentments especially among young population. Why are these regions resisting change? According to Barnett it is fear:

> What stands in the path of this change? Fear. Fear of tradition unraveling. Fear of the mullah's disapproval. Fear of being labeled a "bad" or "traitorous" Muslim state. Fear of becoming a target of radical groups and terrorist networks. But most of all, fear of being attacked from all sides for being different—the fear of becoming Israel.[174]

Barnett continues the arguments of neo-conservatives. He suggests that not all states easily transform to democracy and market economy by forces of globalization. External power is required for change, and to bring freedom, security must be provided. He argues that this is the US's "most influential public-sector export" and it has a very good record in this area. The regions which are secure and wealthy are the ones where there are strong or growing ties between local militaries and the US military.[175] He outlines the US national security strategy. It, he argues, would be;1) increase the Core's immune system capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations; 2) work the seam states to firewall the Core from the Gap's

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[173] Ibid.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Ibid.

worst exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most important, 3) shrink the Gap."[176] These geopolitical imaginations and representations of the PNAC, Kagan, and Barnett were resonated in the Bush doctrine.

4.1.4. The Policies of the Bush Administration

The US was attacked in its own territories which were assumed as immune. Afterwards, the president's speeches and the news adopted the theme of war.[177] America soon was at war once its sovereignty was violated. However, this was a kind of one-side violation, because the attackers did not represent a state. They were part of the terrorist network, Al-Qaeda. On the other side, the attacks required violent and powerful response. The question of how to respond to these attacks prevailed rather than the questions of the causes of these events. Questioning the roots and causes was unpatriotic. The simple reality was they were external attacks to "an innocent, supposedly safe interior".[178]

State-centric imaginations of modern geopolitical reasoning of political elites both in the US and in other states constrain the interpretations of events. Thus, events were just seen as violations of sovereignty and required military action in the name of self-defense. Anger in the US political discourse framed the new war on terrorism. The attacks were on freedom. By building diplomatic links with various regimes, providing support from the NATO under the Article 5, and passing a resolution for

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[176] Ibid.

[177] Dalby, *Calling 911*, 61.

[178] Ibid., 64.

self-defense, the US began its war on terrorism.[179] The first target was Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban regime associated with Al Qaeda terrorist network. As a leader of free world, the US drew the line between the free world and terrorist/enemies. There was no neutrality in the war on terror. Bush said in his joint news conference with French President Jacques Chirac "You are either with us or against us". Allies had to give more than sympathy. They had to support the US with action.[180]

4.1.4.1. Internal Security Measurements

Security measures and control over society, especially marginal groups, political dissidents and recent immigrants from threatening places of "wild zones" which have potential to be terroristic have increased under the justification of homeland security.[181] ". In the US and other Western states, civil liberties have weakened. The Bush government passed the Patriot Act to tap phones and e-mails. Border regimes have also become stricter. Borders are important instruments to separate the space into states. States (also non-state organizations like the EU) control and regulate entry to / exit from "national" spaces through borders. They constitute borders between inside/outside, citizen/alien, and domestic/international. Border controls also demonstrate sovereignty of states.[182] The post-September 11 era has provided justification to strict border controls for the rich states and regional organizations to

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[179] Ibid.

[180] 'You are either with us or against us', *CNN*, November 6, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/> (20 October 2009).

[181] Dalby, *Calling 911*, 72.

[182] Dodds, *Geopolitics*, 55-56.

consolidate their national boundaries.[183] The events have been used for reterrirtorialization of state integrity, and to order and control "inside".

4.1.4.2. The Identity/Foreign Policy

These ideas and imaginations of neoconservatives had influence on shaping the National Security Document of 2002.[184] In the document, it was noted that the US kept promoting both development of democracy and economic openness to every corner of the world. It was argued that they were the best tools to sustain both domestic stability and international order. It was claimed that weak and failed states were not less dangerous than strong states. They could pose threats because they have weak institutions and corruption which made them vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders as in the case of Afghanistan. It was emphasized that the aim of the US was to build "a balance of power that favors freedom". It recommended that all freedom-loving nations had to fight against terrorism.[185] It emphasized the common values of freedom and justice. It was argued that these values are universal and nonnegotiable demands of human dignity such as the rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance and respect for private property. It was emphasized that the US had an obligation to spread these

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[183] Ibid., 71.

[184] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2002), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (15 October 2009).

[185] Ibid., 1.

values to make the world both safer and better.[186] There would be no concession to terrorists, and there is no difference between terrorists and their supporters.[187] The threat had to be destroyed before reaching American borders. The US would seek international support in its war on terror, but it would not hesitate to act alone if it could not find any. It was right of self defense to attack preemptively before these terrorists again harm American citizens.[188] To prevent the rise of terrorism, especially in the Muslim world, the US would support moderate and modern governments.[189] This was the fight for American values against fear of terrorism.[190] Rogue states (states which press on their own people, do not respect international law, seek for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), support terrorism, reject human rights and hate the US) and their terrorist clients had to be stopped before they were able to develop WMDs against the US and its allies.[191] The US could not let these enemies strike first.[192] In the document it was also recommended that the US should also promote economic growth and economic freedom. It was remarked that the opening of to commerce and investment are crucial to economic growth. It was suggested that a liberal economy was the best to begin to develop. To secure the country, the US had to spread free market and free trade.[193]

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[186] Ibid., 3.

[187] Ibid., 5.

[188] Ibid., 6.

[189] Ibid., 6.

[190] Ibid., 7.

[191] Ibid., 14.

[192] Ibid., 15.

[193] Ibid., 17-23.

The geopolitical imaginations and practices of the political elites of the US in the Bush era was a form of neoliberal geopolitics. This geopolitical vision combines neoliberal idealism's virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration to the violence of American military force. It has been "a new development in these patterns of state-managed liberalization."[194] The foreign policy under the Bush administration was to direct use of military and political power to promote democracy and market economy in the areas where terrorist networks emerged as a threat to the US. The Bush administration, like neo-cons, believed in two assumptions in exercising power for liberal change. First, bandwagon policy rather than balancing policy was the common policy. Second, military might came through increasing military budget and is strengthened by technological innovations.[195]

In his speech of State of The Union on January 29, 2002, President Bush said, the administration had two objectives. First, the government would shut terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice and second, the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be stopped threatening the US and the world.[196] If other governments hesitated to act against terror, the US would act. Bush articulated North Korea, Iran and Iraq as a threat to US and world peace. Although they were silent since September 11 attacks, the US knew their "true" nature. Bush reproduced the discourses of past administrations. He

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[194] Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke, "Neoliberal Geopolitics," *Antipode* 35:5 (2003): 886-887.

[195] Monten, 148.

[196] "Bush State of the Union address," *CNN*, January 29, 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript/> (15 October 2009).

defined Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an axis of evil (similarly Axis powers of the Second World War) and spoke of the intention to establish democracy Iraq similar to the establishment of democracy in Asia and Europe after World War II.[197] The War on Terror policy of the Bush administration was defined in geopolitical terms because the policy was applied to states perceived as harboring terrorist groups and seeking WMDs, nuclear and biological weapons.[198] The US and its allies began to pressure states of the "axis of evil" both diplomatically and economically, or operated military attacks to overthrow despot regimes, destroy terrorist networks and "liberate" the countries. The main objective of the war on terror was to terminate the Al-Qaeda networks and its leaders Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri who were responsible for the September 11 attacks. Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded.

Although it seems that imagined geography of the globe of neoliberals (a smooth, de-centered, borderless, level playing field) contradicted with uneven and asymmetrical images of a divided world under the US leadership and a unipolar world, the contradiction is not just as big as it seems. Double standards exist inside central neoliberal traditions from Locke, Mills, to the contemporary neoliberals such as Friedman. "One rule set for us and one rule set for you" is common theme in neoliberalism. Out of the Core, values cherished by the neoliberals such as liberal freedom, are absent. Even in Core regions there is a division. These values do not reach even inner cities, workfare administration offices or the prisons both within the

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[197] "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East," *The White House*, November 6, 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html> (15 October 2009).

[198] Dodds, *Geopolitics*, 71-72.

Core as well as prisons located out of the Core such as at Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib.[199]

The policy of integration/exclusion has been adopted by the US and it was followed by certain allies, especially in Europe. Those failing to adopt and follow the US values (liberal democracy and market capitalism) would be punished by excluding them from a world led by the US.[200]

4.1.4.3. The Imagined "Greater Middle East"

The Middle East region has been redefined in American imagination in the post-September 11 era. The enemy has been defined as terrorist networks and their harboring states. The Middle East has been constructed as sources of Islamist extremism because of repressive governments. This is a geography including various 'rogue' or 'failed' states that posed a danger to US interests and international peace.[201] The US has always had democratic promotion themes in its foreign policy discourse since World War I. The US administrations in the post-Cold War era (especially since the September 11 attacks) have taken the mission to promote democratization to the Muslim world.

Evaluating these events as exceptional and separate from the continued violent activities in various parts of Muslim world was followed by a moral rectitude to the

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[199] Roberts et al., 894.

[200] Bialasiewicz et al., 416.

[201] Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, "'The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy'," *Geopolitics* 15:1 (2010): 31.

American war and violence in Afghanistan and Iraq.[202] Geopolitical reasoning of separate spaces between us and them in terms of a state-centric approach gives justification of self defense against states harboring terrorists. Democracy promotion was also used by the government as justification of the invasion of Iraq because other arguments (weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism) of the invasion were discredited.[203] Democracy promotion was considered as a strategic necessity for war on terror. The belief that roots of Islamist extremism is caused by repressive regimes of Middle East put the democracy promotion into the policy agenda of the Bush government toward Middle East.[204]

Bush noted in the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment that democracy was spreading because the world's most powerful and influential nation has been built on democracy. He remarked that people aspire to democracy and freedom and they know they are secured in the US, and the US has a mission to promote liberty around the world as it did before in Europe, in Asia, and other parts of the world. This time, the US had a mission for the Middle East.[205] He argued that democracy had not been rooted in most parts of the Middle East. His arguments and speeches reflected the old images of the Muslim world, or the Middle East which have been constituted by Orientalists. Bush claimed that Islam was not incompatible with democracy. According to him, most of the Middle East was in a desperate situation because of the failure of economic and political ideologies. Thus, most parts of societies of the

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[202] Dalby, *Calling 911*, 70.

[203] Christopher Hobson, "A forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East: US democracy promotion and the 'war on terror'," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59:1 (2005): 40.

[204] Ibid., 40.

[205] "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East".

region are poor, and lack freedom (especially women). In contrast to progress in the other parts of world, he claimed that this region was "stagnant".[206] The US succeeded to establish democratic institutions in Japan and Germany after Second World War and it was time to do the same in the Middle East.[207]

The Bush administration often emphasized that the war on terror was not a clash of civilization, but the clash inside a civilization. The US had to struggle for the future of the Muslim world against extremism.[208] The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked that the US policy to favor stability in the Middle East at the expense of democracy was unsuccessful and the US had achieved neither.[209] Bush suggested that the success of freedom rested upon "the choices and the courage of free peoples, and upon their willingness to sacrifice." According to him, it is "worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for -- and the advance of freedom leads to peace."[210] The region needed reform to solve its problems. The government noted that Westernization did not mean modernization. Every nation could choose its own style of representative governments. However, there were some principles which are not negotiable for the government. These were limitation on the power of the state and the power of the military, impartial rule of law, healthy civic institutions, religious

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[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid.

[208] "*National Security Strategy*," 31.

[209] "Rice calls for Mid-East democracy," *BBC,* June 20, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4109902.stm> (16 October 2009).

[210] "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East".

liberty, privatization of economies and securing the rights of property, investment health and education, and improvement of the rights of women.[211]

Liberal economy was a crucial part in democracy promotion. The US has supported a certain type of democracy in Central and South America, Eastern Europe and other ex-Soviet states. This is what Gill, Rocamora and Wilson called "low intensity democracy". This is a model which limited political participation with periodic elections of elites without reaching underlying problems of society and causing more inequalities and power differentials. Practices and outcomes of Bush's democracy promotion seemed to be continuation of former policies.[212]

The US created a region-specific program for the Middle East to assist democratization by funding civil societies and education. The Middle East Partnership Initiative was launched in 2002. However, the budget of the initiative was only 29 million dollars for the whole region in 2003.[213] In 2004, the US made democratization of the Middle East an international issue at the G8 summit in June 2004. This time the initiative was named the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. The central policies in foreign policy towards the Middle East are solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of democracy in Iraq as a model to other regional states.[214] The democratic model in Iraq would spread to other parts of the region. With this initiative, the US attempted to justify its presence in the

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[211] Ibid.

[212] Hobson, 43.

[213] Ibid., 42.

[214] Ibid.

region. This time, the US had a mission to democratize the region. Since Iraq would be a model for wider Arab and Islamic world, Iraq war was necessary and just war.[215]

Orientalism, as Said noted, is 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident."'[216] The invention of the East and construction of the basic distinction between East and West continue. The 'other' was inferior and it was the white man's burden to develop it. Freedom theme in the American enlightenment is Eurocentric and Orientalist. Bush government pursued Aristotle's distinction between Greece's 'love of freedom' and Asia's despotism. There is no freedom in the East (in this case Greater Middle East) and people suffer under despotism of their rulers and can not have this freedom without external support. This situation could be changed only by the American pressure and force. It is the US responsibility and burden to bring Middle East from the past/undeveloped/backward to the present/future/freedom.[217]

The September 11 events were discussed narrowly and were considered as an American war in the Bush administration as well as in the American mainstream media. The attack was directed at the US, not at the US foreign policy towards Muslim world. The US was the victim. The events had little to do with "complex diasporic politics, political economies of resource control, power and violence at

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[215] Güney and Gökcan, 30.

[216] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1978; reprint, London: Penguin, 2003), 2.

[217] Anthony Burke, "Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War," *Social Identities* 11:4 (2005): 333.

distances from the metropole."[218] State-centric geographical reasoning of the attacks is problematic. In spite of promotion of anti-imperial themes of American foreign policy discourse and its exceptionalism, the US is an imperial state. In this perspective, the US has not engaged in a new kind of warfare, it continued the old one with the latest military technologies of laser-guided bombs and satellite communication. Bases abroad are an integral part of American military operations to maintain control of peripheries by supporting local political leaders favoring the US.[219]

The replacement of the Bush administration with the Obama administration in 2008 has not totally changed the geopolitical imagination of the Greater Middle East. The "democracy promotion" and the "war on terror" policies of the Bush administration have been resonated in the Obama administration. However, the tools of these policies have modified. The Obama administration has preferred more diplomacy and multilateralism rather than the unilateral militaristic policy of the Bush administration.[220]

4.2. The EU Geopolitical Imaginations in the Post-September 11 Era

Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Community (European Union since 1993) in 1958, the EU has transformed significantly. Today the EU has emerged as a significant actor in the international

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[218] Dalby, *Calling 911*, 76-77.

[219] Ibid., 79-83.

[220] Güney and Gökcan, 33-36.

arena. With the Single European Act signed in 1987, the EC/EU has strengthened its economic power domestically and also increased the attractiveness of the market to the third parties and their demand for privileged market access.[221] The single market has still power to create demand for membership or association with the EU. This also gives leverage for political influence and actually, it is the most important source of external influence of the EU. In addition to the economic power, with the Treaty on European Union in 1993, some attempts have been made to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and military capabilities of the EU.

It has been argued that a convergence can be seen in the foreign policies of the member states of the EU. However, there is more cohesion in policies of internal security issues such as migration, but there is little consensus on the issues "outside" of the Union. Seeberg analyzes the policies of Britain, Germany and France toward the Mashreq, the Maghreb and Turkey, and argues that these states follows more "self-interested" foreign policies rather than in unity.[222] In this vein, I will analyze the EU's common policies toward its margins through enlargement process, border regimes, and construction of strategic identity construction vis-à-vis its margins rather than wider CFSP on construction. My main focus will be on the post-September 11 era.

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[221] Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *Europe as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), 4-5.

[222] Peter Seeberg, "European Security and the 'Clash of Civilizations': Differences in the Policies of France, Germany and the UK towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East," in *Clash or Cooperation of Civilization? Overlapping Integration and Identities*, ed. W. Zank (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 147-166.

The emergence of the EU as an actor in world politics has also brought new spatial practices. The EU has tried to create its identity to act in cohesion vis-à-vis the "external" world. These attempts have produced "others" and "counter-images" in these spatial practices.

4.2.1. The Identity Issue of the EU

The question of European identity is crucial in the debate of the EU-Turkey discussion. Thus, it is necessary to question identity construction of the EU. Identities are very complex constructions. To analyze the complexity of identity, Hansen suggests four analytical steps to examine the constitution of identity.[223] Firstly, foreign policy discourse always articulates a self and a set of others and there are degrees of otherness in the process of identity construction ranging from the radical to the less-radical. Secondly, there is no single self-other dichotomy, but there are series of process of linking and differentiation. There is a dual process of linking and differentiation in identity construction. On the one side, it is a process to link a series of signs to construct the self and produce the relation of the sameness; on the other side, it is a process of differentiation to construct a series of signs, others which differ from the self. The third step is to analyze how identity is spatially, temporally, and ethically situated in foreign policy discourse. Political identities are spatial, temporal, and ethical constructions. These have equal theoretical and ontological status which none of them is the most fundamental and determinant. Spatial construction of identity is about the delineation of space and construction of

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[223] Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 14-82.

boundaries. For example, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Northern Africa, or the Middle East might be constructed as the EU's spatial others. Representations of identity are also spoken of in a particular temporal identity by using themes of progress, transformation, repetition, backwardness, or development. Defining regions, states and civilizations as developed/backward-underdeveloped, modern/traditional indicates that there is a time difference between states, regions or civilizations. Developed and modern states and regions are superior/civilized while those are underdeveloped and traditional are inferior/barbaric/primitive. The underdeveloped/backward/barbarian other is defined in two ways. The other can be defined as capable of transformation to decrease temporal differences between the self and the other, and the other either becomes like the self or is unable to change. There will be always time differences between the self and the other. Ethical identity involves the construction of responsibility to national politics/national interest or to international responsibility in order to legitimize policies. This identity is about discourse of ethics, morality, and responsibility.

The fourth suggestion is a discussion of how discourses can be seen as organized within a field of debate. In these step, themes in texts are examined. Although each text has a unique nature, they are bounded together around common themes, certain constructions of identity and sets of policies through certain basic discourses. Basic discourses are built on articulations of key representations of identity and show the main structural positions within a debate and relations between discourses with their convergence and confrontations. All texts are part of a larger textual web. They make references to the previous text and the previous ones are products of other readings

and interpretations. Thus, texts are situated within and against other texts. They are linked intertextually each other.[224] In addition to this intertexuality, I will analyze the practices. These analytical steps are useful to discuss identity/foreign policy of the EU. Debates of the EU policymakers with national governments about identity, geography, and culture of the EU-rope, have creates varying degrees of EU-ropeanness, others, and borders.

Increasing friction with the US in economic and political areas and economic crisis of 1971 by dramatic rise of oil prices forced the EC to act in cohesion. As Bo Strath has noted "the history of European identity is history of concept and discourse".[225] The European identity was introduced at the Copenhagen European Commission summit in December 1973 in the context of growing tension between the US and Western European countries of the EC over economic issues like the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement based on fixed currency of the dollar, the overstrained dollar by Vietnam War, the sharp increase in oil prices in 1973 and a recession of the economic development of the EC. It was used as instrument to consolidate the unity of the EC states in the international order.[226]

The document on The European Identity was published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973, in Copenhagen.

> The Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time
> has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to

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[224] Ibid., 49, and Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

[225] Bo Stråth, "A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept," *European Journal of Social Theory,* 5:4 (2002): 388.

[226] Ibid., 388-389.

achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe.[227]

The document emphasized that the unity among the nine was a necessity to "ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common". "The principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice - which is the ultimate goal of economic progress - and of respect for human rights" are fundamental elements of the European Identity. On the way toward construction of a united Europe, what has been created and established on the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome (a common market or institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation) are an essential part of the European Identity. And this project of a United Europe is open to other "European" nations who share the same ideals and objectives.[228]

Intensification of the European integration has also brought the search for roots of Europeanness in political and academic circles. They look for the sources of European identity in history, religion, science and culture. In many construction, the concept of the European identity has been as a "distinct civilization" with its culture and identity raised on Ancient Greece, Roman civilization, Christianity, the Enlightenment, science and reason, and democracy. When it encounters others, it is

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[227] "Declaration on European Identity," *Bulletin of the European Communities* 12 (December 1973): 118. <http://www.ena.lu/declaration-european-identity-copenhagen-14-december-1973-020002278.html> (20 November 2009).

[228] Ibid., 118-122.

superior to them.[229] These two themes have continued to be debated through EU evolution by enlargement, its border regimes, and interactions with its margins.

4.2.2. The Borders of the EU

Today the EU bordering process goes into two directions. On the one way is deepening integration and removing borders among member states. On the other hand, the union is hardening external borders. Through these process the union has created 'EU-Europeanness' in varying degrees.[230] The external policies of the EU have evolved in two directions. The first one is to extend to the East (Central and Eastern Europe) and the second one is to contain the South (Middle East region).[231] Today, the EU defines the Mediterranean Sea as its southern border and its eastern border is still on negotiation. Besides, the EU follows policy ranging from market protection to immigration and asylum to create relative fixed borders in terms of geography and culture.[232] The reconstruction of the EU's external border of the east has continued to change by the enlargement of the EU since German reunification in 1989. The EU has gained types of practices of state like common border regimes at external borders. The Schengen Implementation Treaty was signed by Germany, France, the Benelux states, Portugal and Spain to provide common border regime as

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[229] Strath, 388.

[230] Scott and Houtum, 1.

[231] Pınar Bilgin, "A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era," *Geopolitics* 9:2 (2004): 270.

[232] Ibid.

well as internal security and migration.[233] This treaty has extended to new members after their enlargement. The UK and Ireland have not participated in this agreement.

4.2.2.1. The European Identity/Foreign Policy and the Eastern Borders

During the eighteenth century, Western travelers to Eastern Europe invented an East opposed to the West. The East was to be the opposite of the West. It was backward, primitive, despot, Asian, and the Orient whereas the West represented progress, liberty, and civilization.[234] Eastern Europe was in Europe geographically but not civilizationally.

In Cold War, the East was represented by the Soviet Union with its allies and satellites. Europe was divided into two parts. In this period, both other and borders between the two blocks were clearer. The Western Europe was part of the North Atlantic alliances, and the Eastern Europe was part of the communist block. The Communist block was the one sealing its borders against "imperialist capitalism" from Western Europe.

The demise of the Soviet Union and transformation of the world order have affected the EU's identity and its geopolitics. The division of Europe (East-West confrontation) came to an end. After 1989, the EC/EU has increased its border

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[233] Brigitta Busch and Michał Krzyzanowski, "Inside/outside the European Union: Enlargement, migration policy and the search for Europe's identity," in *Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire,* eds*.* Warwick Armstrong and James Anderson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 110.

[234] Joshua Hagen, "Redrawing the imagined map of Europe: the rise and fall of the 'center'," *Political Geography* 22 (2003): 492.

control against unwanted immigration from the east. The meaning of the border between east and west in Europe has changed.[235] The reconstruction of the EU's external border of the east has continued to change by the enlargement of the EU. In the post-Cold war era, a new Europe has emerged with 27 member states. With the enlargement, post communist states have become part of the new Europe.

The EU has been a partly inclusive organization. Any state which considers itself European can apply for membership. The EU decides on the degree of Europeanness of the applicant. If the application is accepted, the applicant is considered as European de facto. After it meets criteria of the EU which has been developed since Rome Treaty and includes standards on liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law as well as functioning market economy and other economic criteria. However, this process creates its own inclusion and exclusion.[236]

The East–West division of Europe since the enlightenment has been resonated throughout history. With the end of the Cold War, this division is still continued to create new east/west dichotomies that have been redefined with the EU enlargement. Although this East and West division is a product of Western imaginations, it has been adopted, accepted, modified, or resisted by political and cultural leaders of the East.[237] The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia have been replaced by various new states. The former dominant geographical imagination of

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[235] Ibid., 108.

[236] Sami Moisio, "EU Eligibility, Central Europe, and the Invention of Applicant State Narrative," *Geopolitics* 7: 3 (2002): 97.

[237] Ibid., 493.

Europe divided into two blocks (liberal/communist) has lost its meaning. The idea of Central Europe has become more dominant in the post-September 11 era.

The collapse of the Soviet block has brought new states in the eastern part of the Europe. The idea of Central Europe was developed by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish dissidents as a challenge to the division of the continent where "Central Europe" was under Soviet hegemony and the West's apathy toward this situation. Czech, Hungarian, and Polish dissidents sought to define a central European identity and culture distinct from the East.[238] Policymakers in these countries have continued their attempt to construct a Central Europe in the early years of the post-Cold War. However, their attempt to form economic, political and security organizations among these countries did not become successful. Advocating a separate Central Europe has been weakened with the idea of return to Europe. The EU has been enlarged by accession of new states of Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern states of the old East have become part of the West through the project of "return to Europe". The EU considered its own enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe as reunification of the continent. It was an intermediate stage between deconstruction of the East and return to Europe. This idea of central space in the middle of Europe has helped to demarcate these countries from the East and make them member to the EU and part of Western society.[239]

Shifting of geopolitical imaginaries with the collapse of the Soviets has also changed regional constructions within Europe. The power of the division of Europe into two

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[238] Ibid., 499-500.

[239] Ibid., 508.

as West and East has remained although the Cold War ended. The East was now a source of crime, unwanted immigration, political instability, and violent nationalism.[240]

The other issue is the role of new members on European identity and rebordering of the EU both externally and internally.[241] European identity(ies) and national identities of member states are not mutually exclusive nor does one emerges at the expense of other(s), but they are in interaction to produce each other.[242] For example the moral languages of new members of Central and Eastern European countries on their identity and their repositioning to Russia help to reproduce eastern borders of the union. Dissidents of the Cold War period have become new political leaders of their countries. Their reimagination of their national identities and negative feelings toward Russia as well as EU criteria influence on eastern borders of the union. Evolution of the EU criteria and re-imaginations of these new states identities vis-à-vis Russia as well as other non-EU states will define the Eastern borders of the EU.[243]

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[240] Ibid., 493.

[241] Moisio, 91.

[242] Ibid., 92.

[243] Ibid., 109-113.

4.2.2.2. The European Identity / Foreign Policy and the Southern

(Mediterranean) Borders

The political, economic and social relations with the southern and eastern neighbors have been developed under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was founded with Barcelona Declaration at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27-28 November 1995. Its aim was to develop regional cooperation on areas of political, economic and social issues between the EU and its southern neighbors. It is composed of three chapters. The first is a political and security partnership aimed at establishment of a common area of peace & stability; the second is economic and financial partnership aimed to create an area of shared prosperity (free trade area); and the third is partnership in social, cultural and human affairs: developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.[244]

The third chapter is the most ambiguous. It could be criticized as remaining issues which do not belong to the first two areas, or involving sensitive issues like human rights.[245] The cultural chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership involves various regional programmes, such as Euromed Heritage (conservation and development of the cultural heritage of the Euro-Mediterranean region), Euromed Audiovisual (cooperative projects in the areas of cinema, television and radio), and

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[244] "Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference," *Bulletin of the European Union* 11 (1995). <http://www.ena.lu/barcelona-declaration-27-28-november-1995-020005386.html>. (20 November 2009).

[245] Isabel Schäfer, "The Cultural Dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Review of the First Decade of Intercultural Cooperation," *History and Anthropology* 18: 3 (September 2007): 334.

Euromed Dialogue, the cultural activities of the Delegations of the European Commission in the countries participating in the partnership as well as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which was founded in 2005 as a response to September 11 attacks.[246] The third chapter was considered as a "ladies program" or as counter-discourse of the Clash of Civilizations thesis by aiming at promotion of dialogues between cultures. After the September 11 attacks, this chapter has come to the fore with the dialogue between the West and Islam.[247]

The rise of political Islam and Islamist movements has caused fear among scholars and policy-makers in Western societies. They are perceived as a threat and challenge against Western values as well as the West itself.[248] With tension between Western societies and Muslim minorities after the September 11 attacks, increasing Islamophobia, the cartoon crisis with the depiction of the Prophet Mohammed by a Danish cartoonist and several publications in various newspapers, violent Muslim reactions against these, Western policymakers, media, commentators, and scholars began to argue the compatibility of European secular values and the Muslim world.[249] During this period, the securitization of the migration issue and tightening external borders has accelerated. Perceived threat of Islamist extremists with the Madrid train bombing and London subway bombing has caused poorly integrated minorities and migrants to become a security issue. They are perceived as source of

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[246] Ibid.

[247] Ibid., 334.

[248] Barrie Wharton, "Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam', Global Change," *Peace & Security* 20:1 (2008) : 41-42.

[249] Ibid., 43.

danger and cultural confrontation.[250] The clash of civilizations paradigm has become popular.

The EU has sought alternative ways to deal with the prophecy of the clashing civilizations. The dialogue of civilizations was perceived as an emergency to prevent the prophecy.[251] The dialogue has been securitized by articulation of ignorance and misperceptions as the root causes of conflict between cultures, invoking urgent dialogue to escape from the threatening future. The "real" knowledge about the "other" would be learned by the dialogue and the clash would be prevented.[252]

The normative aim of the Europe –Mediterranean partnership is to form a political, economic and social unity between the EU and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries by removing barriers and divisions. On the contrast, the project has appeared as the consolidation of borders and divisions between the EU and non-EU countries (except for Malta and Cyprus). The perspective of the EU towards the Mediterranean is as a soft-security issue. The aim is to prevent migrations which cause internal political, economic and social problems.[253] The Mediterranean region has been constructed as a counter-image of the EU. Losing the ideological other with the annihilation of the Soviet Union which helped integration and identity among

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[250] George Joffé, "Europe and Islam: Partnership or peripheral dependence?" in *Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire, eds.* Warwick Armstrong and James Anderson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 92.

[251] Malmvig, 355.

[252] Ibid., 355-357.

[253] Ibid., 91.

western European countries, the EU has needed new others.[254] Unlike its debated east borders (still on negotiation), the Mediterranean borders are more clear. With the rejection of the application of Morocco, the Union demonstrated where its borders end in the south. Ferrer-Gallardo demonstrates the contradiction between geopolitical (security-oriented-especially migration issue) and geoeconomical (free trade) orientations of the EU on reconfiguration of the Spanish-Moroccan border where two Spanish cities, Ceuta and Melilla, lies in North Africa.[255] With the accession of Spain in 1986, the meaning of the borders between Spain and Morocco has changed. Territorial borders of the two states became the post-national borders of the EU with its southern limits. These borders have securitized under the Schengen Treaty. On the other hand, the desire to create a free trade area with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has contradicted this political situation.

Developments in economic integration among members as well as political integration have brought the question of common culture and values of the Union. Some politicians began to refer to the Christian heritage as in the case of constitution debates. The EU has reterritorialized at the expense of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.[256] It creates striker borders along southern and eastern Mediterranean states. Thus, this Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could be seen as extension of EU's zone of cultural and geographical influence without accepting these partners as a member to the EU and construction of a union with more

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[254] Schäfer, 336.

[255] Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, "The Spanish-Moroccan border complex: Processes of geopolitical, functional and symbolic rebordering," *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 301-321.

[256] Schäfer, 336.

"homogeneous" political, geographical and cultural aspects where southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are not part of this, but the other of it.[257]

4.2.2.3. The EU as a Gated Community

According to Bretherton and Vogler, there are two distinct facets of the EU identity. Firstly, the EU is a value-based community, and non-member states come closer to the EU and access its privileges of the market (close association or membership) by adopting the declared EU values. Here non-members are seen more or less European. On the second facet, the EU is seen as a fortress. The EU follows policy ranging from market protection to immigration and asylum. There is relatively fixed geographical and cultural boundaries of the EU.[258] Actually, these two facets of the EU are partly true.

A new reterritorialization has emerged in Europe. The EU has some practices of state like common border regimes at external borders. The Schengen Implementation Treaty was signed by Germany, France, the Benelux states, Portugal and Spain to provide a common border regime as well as internal security and migration.[259] In the world, especially in the Western states, the threat was not perceived as a military attack from other states as in the case of the Cold War. Today, 'new' security issues such as drugs smuggling, terrorism, people trafficking, arms dealing and asylum seeking have more influence on the construction of these borders. The issue is how to

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[257] Ibid., 337.

[258] Bretherton and Vogler, 37-8.

[259] Busch and Krzyzanowski, 110.

manage border controls and govern the territory against these new threats. Now the external borders of the EU are not just at the geographical edges of the state, but are located inside of the EU like international airports or train stations. Against transnational and deterritorialized threats, border controls are at networked spaces.[260]

The Union has modernized its immigration policies. In contrast to its internal liberalization of cross-border labor mobility for EU citizens, the EU has been tightening the controls at its external borders against the entrance of illegal immigrants or any kind of "strangers" who could endanger the comfort zone, economic welfare, public security as well as the community's self-defined identity.[261] It has been making agreements with non-European countries neighboring the Union which are either the source or route of these immigrants. However, these borders are not totally closed. They are selectively open to various migrant workers who have a profession in the areas which have a growing scarcity of labor temporarily or permanently. It resembles more a gated community rather than a fortress Europe.[262]

There seems to be "commodification" of migrants in terms of their value as human resources or human capital. They are scanned to determine their value, worth and danger to the community when they are imported.[263] The global terrorist networks of

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[260] William Walters, "The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective," *Geopolitics* 9: 3 (2004): 659-664.

[261] Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers, "The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU," *Antipode* 39: 2 (2007): 291-309.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Ibid., 302.

Al Qaida have increased anxieties about "global terrorism" and labor, asylum and immigration policies of the EU (and also the US) have became more restrictive.[264] The September 11 attacks and Madrid and London bombings have securitized migration from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. The EU began to follow two interwoven policies. It has increased democracy promotion towards the region. Secondly, discourses of multiculturalism and citizenship became high politics. The integration of minorities (especially Muslim ones) and citizenship have become controversial. New rules and obligations have been made for citizenship.[265] The borderlines have been militarilized. They have become a zone where a lot of illegal immigrants have lost their lives while trying to find work or shelter in the EU. The old EU members even have feared being occupied by the cheap labor from new members.[266]

Externalization of the other has produced both out of common borders of the Union, as well as inside it. European citizens are categorized in terms of their degree of Europeanness. Those with most rights are citizens of states which were members before 2004. Citizens of other member states since 2004 are 'second-class citizens". Third is the group of people of the "third countries". These people are also categorized according to their market value: highly skilled and highly valued professionals have the same rights of EU citizens, but the largest proportions of migrant workers are unskilled and low paid. They have limited rights.[267] The

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[264] Ibid., 294-295.

[265] Seeberg, 150.

[266] Houtum and Pijpers, 298-299.

[267] Busch and Krzyzanowski, 111-112.

definition and delimitation of Europe has not entailed the construction of a horizontal (and thus equal) European community. Self-definition and limitation of (politically) imagined Europe, Busch and Krzyzanowski argue, is a dual process. In one way, the EU has tried to create its identity and borders by referring to "external", "outside", as not part of core Europe. The external borders of the EU is a complex system of concentric circles encompassing traditional member states, new member states, prospective candidate states and neighboring states for which membership is not an option. This imagined construction is reproducing with the enlargement process. In another way, it creates division inside its societies according to class, religion, and nation. Problems of criminality, drug abuse, human trafficking and terrorism have been connected to the presence of migrant communities.[268]

There is no one type of self/other relation of the EU with its peripheries. The EU's interactions with various states and regions are diversified on its peripheries. Rumelili demonstrates that the EU's interactions with Morocco, Turkey, and states of Central and Eastern Europe differ in terms of dimensions of difference, social distance, response of other, and these dimensions produce different kinds of self/other relationships between them.[269] The first issue is how the differences are constructed. Rumelili draws a heuristic distinction between inclusive identities constituted in relation to acquired differences such as liberal or democratic and exclusive identities such as European (in a geographical sense) or Islamic, constituted in relation to inherent differences. The second dimension is how the other

[268] Busch and Krzyzanowski, 116.

[269] Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation," *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 27–47.

responds to this self/other construction. The third dimension is the question of how the self is socially distanced with respect to the other. Their association or disassociation has influenced self/other relations.[270]

Since the 1990s, nation-states and nationally defined identities have become more assertive in Western European societies. Enlargements of the Union (especially Eastern Enlargement) have caused fear and the rise of national sentiments. Nationalist populism has accelerated by the fear of illegal immigrations and losing control over borders. Additionally, in the post-September 11 era, a possible Turkish accession has increased Islamophobia. The European elites have already identified a problem with the public because of communication gap with the public and the rejection of the constitution treaty in Netherlands and France demonstrated the democracy deficit (elitist project) of the enlargement process. The themes of national identity, sovereignty and European civilization have become mainstream political discourse.[271]

Civilizational geopolitics emerged in the eighteenth century Europe as a reaction to chaos of the wars of religion.[272] This discourse was based on the uniqueness of European civilization whose distinctiveness came from its past of ancient Greek and Rome. This discourse emerged in a time when the Christian Church changed its claim from universality to more narrowly Christianity. Secondly, Arab and Ottoman

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[270] Ibid., 36.

[271] Scott and Houtum, 1.

[272] Agnew and Corbridge, 51.

threats created loyalty to Respublica Christiana.[273] Right-wing parties and their supporters have especially tried to constitute such exclusive identity by using this kind of civilizational geopolitics. These processes have invoked oriental others of the EU such as Islam, Turks, Balkans, Russia. However, the Europe has not fixed borders throughout history. It has been changing cultural construct according to cultural, political and ideological considerations. Dominant discourses and power/knowledge relations has been the determinant to define the continent of Europe.[274]

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[273] Ibid., 52.

[274] Lila Leontidou, "The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 11 (2004): 594.

5. THE GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF TURKEY

Geopolitical imaginations and practices of the US and the EU have also changed the meaning of geopolitical imaginations of Turkey's geography. However, this is not a one-side transformation, but mutual interactions. Turkey- West (the US and the EU) relations has been main axis of Turkey's foreign policy. Thus, geopolitical practices of the US and the EU have effects on the meaning of Turkey's geopolitics and practices of Turkish policy makers. Hegemonic discourses of the US and the EU to construct self/other in the post-September 11 era and their dressing occasion to Turkey have been accepted, resisted, changed by the counter-images of Turkey's self and other (West). It is important to analyze the western-orientation of Turkish foreign policy to understand post-Cold War (and post-September 11 era) geopolitics of Turkey.

5.1. The Western Orientation in Turkish Foreign Policy

Since the establishment of the republic, political elites of Turkey wanted to create a "secular" and "Western" nation-state based on Kemalist ideology. They implemented top-down and rapid modernization/Westernization to create a modern and secular nation state. They had a desire to get rid of the Ottoman past perceived as backward and dogmatic, whereas the new Kemalist ideology was scientific and progressive. The aim was to catch the train of contemporary civilization, *muasır medeniyet*, and

both Ottoman past and Islam were seen as the root of backwardness, dogma, and an obstacle to progress. They wanted to create organic unity around homogeneous, secular, non-class based national unity; they oppressed any differences in the society such as Islamic identity, Kurdish identity, and other minorities.[275] Reforms were made to modernize the state and society and make it a part of the West.

Besides admiring Western values and technology, or feeling threatened by Soviets, non-material aspects of security were also important to understand the Western-oriented foreign policy of Turkey. Non-military and non-specific insecurities of the early Republican era where European/International Society was ambivalent towards Turkey's "difference" partly explain this western-oriented foreign policy of Turkey.[276] Although new Republic of Turkey was recognized de jure by European Powers with the Lausanne Treaty, this recognition was not perceived as total acceptance to the European/International Society. Memories of past and interpretations of threats were a cause for the perception of lack of full recognition by the Europe/International Society. This made Turkish policymakers felt insecure. To escape intervention from Western powers and to be part of the International Society whose standards were set by the European powers, Turkey implemented Westernization and modernization processes to benefit from privileges of the membership. The West was a source of both inspiration and insecurity.[277]

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[275] Fuat Keyman, "Turkey between Europe and Asia," in *Europe and Asia Beyond East and West*, ed. Gerard Delanty (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 207-208.

[276] Pınar Bilgin, "Securing Turkey through western-oriented foreign policy," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 117.

[277] Ibid., 119.

After the Second World War, both for security considerations (threat of Soviets) and cultural concerns (desire to be part of the West), Turkey with a predominantly Muslim population closely aligned with the "West".[278] Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations, and a member of NATO (1952), the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1961) and an associate member of the Western European Union (1992) and Ankara chose to begin cooperating closely with the European Economic Community in 1959. Turkey became an associate member following the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Hence, the relations between the European Union and Turkey were institutionalized by the Ankara Agreement of 1963. The Cold War process partly satisfied Turkey's identity issue as a Western ally and part of the "West". The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union terminated the East-West division where Turkey belonged to the West.[279]

In the post Cold-War era, identities constituted in the Cold War has become problematic. Reconfigurations of the "West" and "world (dis)order" by the US and the EU have influence on the representations of Turkey. A discursive construction took place of self and other encounters with the other's "counter-construction" of self and other.[280] In the West (chiefly the US and the EU)-Turkey relations, the construction of geopolitical imaginations of Turkey and its own identity by the US and the EU encounter Turkey's discourse on its own identity and on the West and the Europe. The US's promotion of Turkey as a model country to the Middle East and

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[278] Paul Kubicek, "Turkey's Inclusion in the Atlantic Community: Looking Back, Looking Forward," *Turkish Studies* 9:1 (2008): 27.

[279] Pınar Tank, "Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey's Identity", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 6:4 (2006): 463.

[280] Hansen, 38.

the EU's ambivalence toward Turkey in their search for identity and difference produced a counter-construction of Turkey on the self and the West/Europe.

In early 1990s, Turkey was shown as a model for newly-independent Turkic republics as a secular, Western, democratic state and free market economy against influences of Iran and Russia in this region. This was a struggle between "good" and "evil" which Turkey represented the modern and progressive whereas Iran represented backwardness and reactionaries and Russia had imperial desires.[281] With the end of the Cold War and annihilation of divisions of Europe, Central and Eastern states of the old East had become part of the West through the mission of "return to Europe". On the other hand, Turkey's accession is considered as a partner or a bridge between cultures.[282]

Turkish elites also presented Turkey as a bridge between continents. Rejection of Turkey's application for membership to European Community and the demise of Soviet Union, Turkey's identity and roles are redefined and reproduced.[283] In the absence of the (communist) 'East, the claim which Turkey has argued that it is a member of the 'West' and/or 'Europe has weakened. Turkish officials portrayed Turkey as a gate to Eurasia.[284] The bridge metaphor became popular in the post-Cold

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[281] Süha Bölükbaşı, "Jockeying for power in the Caspian basin: Turkey versus Iran and Russia" in *The Caspian: Politics, energy and security*, ed. Shirin Akiner (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 219.

[282] Asa Lundgren, "The case of Turkey: are some candidates more "European than others?" in Questioning the EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, ed. Helene Sjursen (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 123.

[283] Lerna K. Yanık, "The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: 'Bridging' Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War," *Geopolitics* 14 (2009): 536.

[284] Ibid., 538.

War era. This metaphor has been articulated in two ways: a bridge between continents and a bridge between civilizations. With the metaphor of Turkey bridging continents, Turkish political elites gave three roles to Turkey.[285] Firstly, Turkey was a model/mediator/facilitator between West/Europe and new Turkic republics and to some extent the Middle East as the best democratic, secular country with a liberal market economy in the region. Secondly, Turkey was under international public service by connecting these countries to the International Society and world economy and by preventing religious extremism to spread to these regions. Thirdly, Turkey brought Western values, democracy, liberal market economy and secularism to the region to help the emergence of the region "Eurasia". To sum up, Turkish leaders tried to show that Turkey still mattered and was an important ally for the West/Europe.

The leader figure is also important for Turkey's policy towards newly independent Turkic republics. Turgut Özal was a supporter of the US policy in this region and he believed that the Turkish national interest coincided with the US interest.[286] Turkey competed with Iran to get power of the region where there was a perceived power vacuum with the disintegration of the Soviets. Under this occasion, Turkey was promoted as a secular and (liberal) democratic model to the newly-independent states. Özal saw this region as an area to extend Turkish influence, and increase Turkey's importance for the West. Özal's policy was also a deviation from the traditional Turkish foreign policy constructed by Ataturk with his famous motto

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[285] Ibid.

[286] Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-93," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37:1 (January 2001): 76.

"peace at home, peace in the world" which has been generally interpreted by Turkish policymakers as a status quo power with disinterested with external world and issues. [287]

Turkish politicians wanted to highlight Turkey's similarities with the West/Europe rather than differences with bridging the continents in 1990s. Policymakers have not liked this bridge metaphor, but they tried to regain the value of the Turkey for the West again. They wanted to have a more active role in the Caspian Basin to increase Turkey's "strategic" location. They were reluctant to attach the Middle East.[288] The bridge metaphor has been used against the reluctant EU. After the September 11 attacks, the bridge between civilizations metaphor has been emphasized more.

5.2. The AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) and Turkey as a Bridge between Civilizations

In the second half of the 1990s, "Islamic" politics in Turkey were also in transition. Islamic critiques of the West emerged as an oppositional discourse to pro-Western Occidentalism of Kemalist elites of the 1930s and 1940s. Although they criticized the West as decedent, materialist, soulless, and immoral, the basic target was the Kemalist elites.[289] The closure of the Welfare Party and the decision of their leaders to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights was a turning point in the "Islamic" discourse in Turkey. Many Islamic elites have developed a pragmatic

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[287] Ibid., 77.

[288] Tank, 468.

[289] Cemil Aydın, "Between Occidentalism and the Global Left: Islamist Critiques of the West in Turkey," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26:3 (2006): 452.

attitude to the West, and especially to the EU as a support against Kemalist hegemony in Turkey.[290] The pressure of the military on Islamic politics and the February 28, 1997 process caused a division in the National Outlook Movement of the Islamic politics into two: "reformists" and "traditionalists". The "reformists" founded the AK Parti and began to follow more pro-Western policies and pro-European policies. They understood that even if they formed the government, and especially if they come to the power, the pressure on them would increase. Thus, in order to delegitimize military-bureaucracy-judiciary coalition of the Kemalists and to terminate restrictions on civil-cultural and religious rights, the "Islamic" groups contacted European and American civil right organizations and followed the desire to make Turkey a member of the EU.[291]

The AK Parti whose founders are mostly from the ex-National Outlook of the Welfare Party with Islamic affiliations, and the self-declared "Conservative Democrats" won the national election of 2002 and came to power. However, they had a legitimacy problem in the eyes of Kemalist bureaucracy and Western politicians. The post 9/11 era/conjecture gained legitimacy for the AK Parti government which brought doubt for "secret agenda" both domestically and internationally. They worked to make Turkey a member of the EU and advocated the harmony of civilizations against the clash theorists.[292] The AK Parti's 2002 national election victory has brought religious/civilizational discourse to the bridge metaphor.

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[290] Aydin, 458. Dağı, 46-49.

[291] Aydın, 458.

[292] Dağı, 45. Aydın, 460.

The AK Parti government was invited by Spain to the "Alliances of Civilization" initiative of the UN and joined the initiative; Turkey has seemed to be spokesman of Islam, a mediator between the West/Europe and Islam.[293] The government began to use this bridge metaphor for its own interest. As Yanık argues, this bridge metaphor is not simply a geographical imagination, but it is also about the perception of national identity and the role the state wanted to pursue in international politics.[294] The bridge metaphor has been used in three interwoven policies. Firstly, it is a response to the clash of West and Islam and legitimization of its position in Turkish politics against suspicions of "secret agenda". The government has advocated the harmony of civilizations against the divergence of civilizations. Secondly, it is a tool to escape from the pressure of militaristic unilateralism of the US toward the "Greater Middle East region" where the AK Parti has wanted to pursue more active policy. The government has wanted to solve problems of with Middle East and to involve the region as a mediator and facilitator. The bridge metaphor gives maneuver in foreign policy which is criticized by the West. It is a tool to maneuver in its foreign policy especially towards Syria, Iran and Hamas. Thirdly, it has been used as leverage in Turkey's EU vocation in a time of increasing opposition to Turkey's accession. They have promoted EU membership to be bridge a harmony of civilizations. Thus this focuses on inclusive dimensions civilizations rather than exclusions and dangerous others of civilizations as Huntington argues.[295] To materialize these foreign policy targets, the AK Parti government has followed active

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[293] Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," *Turkish Studies* 9:3 (2008): 15. Yanık, 539.

[294] Yanık, 533.

[295] Ibid., 538-543. Balcı and Nebi, 400-402.

foreign policy in its very neighboring regions. The ideological basis of these policies has been constructed by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu is known as the intellectual architect of the AK Parti's foreign policy, and has been influential in a number of major foreign policy developments. There is a consensus that it was Davutoğlu who has changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing to it a dynamic and multi-dimensional orientation.[296]

5.2.1. Ahmet Davutoğlu: An Intellectual of Statecraft

Ahmet Davutoğlu is the most influential person in the construction of Turkish foreign policy in the AK Parti government. He is both a politician and political scientist. He is now minister of foreign affairs in Erdoğan government. He was an advisor of Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül in the former AK Parti governments. His "strategic depth" policy is shaping Turkish foreign policy.

His post-Cold War geopolitical imaginations (and the post-September 11 era) have been influential on geopolitical practices of the AK Parti government. He constructs alternative paradigms of the post-Cold war. He criticizes Fukuyama's and Huntington's predictions for the post-Cold War era. He claims that the Bosnian crisis showed the fallacy of Fukuyama'a thesis by revealing the imbalances of Western civilization and also the deformities of the existing world order.[297] New world order

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[296] Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener, "National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12:1 (2010): 81.

[297] Ahmet Davutoglu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 2:4 (Dec 1997–Feb 1998): 1.

under the US leadership could not protect Bosnia, a member of the UN. Davutoğlu
also criticizes Huntington's ignorance of the hegemonic character of Western
civilization which puts pressure on and marginalizes the Lebensraum (living space)
of these civilizations.[298] He argues that Huntington blames non-Western civilizations
as the cause of the conflicts. According to him, Huntington ignores the fact that the
most destructive global wars of human history have been in Eurocentric Western
civilization to decide systemic leaderships of world politics rather than between
civilizations. Davutoğlu partly agrees with Huntington on role of civilizational
identity as a source of political and military confrontations. According to him, this
identity is one of the root causes of these conflicts. He suggests that the collapse of
Soviet Union has dissolved both "pseudo-identities" and "the pseudo-political fronts
of the bipolar international system". The vacuum has been filled with
historical/cultural identities. They have become effective on political mobilizations
and civilisational clashes.[299]

Davutoğlu accepts civilizations as separate entities as Huntington does. He also
pursues the identification of states with civilizational identity. He argues that conflict
between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a civilizational conflict. However, He claims that
these identities are not only causes of conflicts. He remarks that there are others such
as "intra-civilisational strategic competition among the western powers, the
geopolitical prioritization, the trade war to control international political economy,
etc". He outlines the causes of these instabilities as following:

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[298] Ibid., 2.

[299] Ibid., 2.

(i) the end of strategic stability; (ii) geopolitical and geo-economic vacuum of power in international relations and international political economy; (iii) the emergence of authentic identities after the dissolution of the pseudo-fronts of the bipolarity; and (iv) intra-civilizational and intra-systemic competition.[300]

Davutoğlu follows the traditional geopolitical reasoning that geography shapes foreign policy. He suggests that geopolitics has a dual effect on the emergence of crisis between states and the constitution of the international system. The geopolitical theories have shaped the hegemonic powers' strategic policies. He explains the Cold War competition according to this traditional geopolitical understanding. He argues that there was a geo-strategic balance between the "Trade-Dependent Maritime World" and the "Eurasian Continental Power" during the Cold War.[301] If one of the powers tried to threaten this balance by attempting to control geopolitical choke points, the crisis appeared like the Cuban missile crisis, the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, and the invasion of Afghanistan. He remarks that the end of the Cold War and failure of the US to create a new balance system have created geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic vacuums. According to him, we are in a transition period between bipolar strategic stability and a multipolar balance-of-power structure. This is a ceasefire period. The huge vacuum where the Heartland and Rimland intersect has created instability in this zone which includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the choke points of the Rimland (The Persian Gulf and Bab el-Mandeb/Red Sea).[302]

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[300] Ibid., 2-3.

[301] Ibid., 5.

[302] Ibid., 6.

He explains the instabilities in the Muslim world according to the power struggles based on the traditional geopolitical reasoning of great powers. The Cold War was a struggle between sea power and land power. He argues that the Muslim world has potential to develop both a continental and maritime strategy.[303] In the post-Cold War era, Davutoğlu remarks that most of these strategic points are dominated by Muslims. He argues that Islamic peril is a veiled reason for military operations towards these strategic points as well as strategic raw materials. In order to contain these geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic potentialities of the Muslim world, the Islamic threat is used in justifications of operations to control these potentialities. The intra-systemic hegemonic powers to control these areas are the main causes of military/political clashes and conflicts.[304]

Davutoğlu published his book, *Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position*, in 2001 before working for the government. In the book, he argues that the power of a state comes from constant parameters like history, geography, population and culture and potential parameters like economy, military capacity and technology.[305] However these are, Davutoğlu emphasizes, not enough to become a powerful state. He underscores that a strategic mentality, a strategic vision and political will are needed to articulate these power parameters. He criticizes Turkish policymakers. He argues that they lack these features in the construction of foreign policy and because

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[303] Ibid., 9.

[304] Ibid., 11.

[305] Ahmet Davutoglu, *Strategic Derinlik / Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu*, (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position) 21.th ed. (Istanbul: Küre Press, 2001), 17-33.

of this, Turkey can not benefit from advantages of its geopolitics, geo-culture and geographic place.[306]

Davutoğlu has noted that security understanding started to focus on not only external based and militaristic threats but also on political, economical, environmental and socio-cultural issues. Because of the change of security concept, the power has been redefined. To maintain security, military capability became inefficient and geocultural, geoeconomical power of states became important.[307] In this period, Turkey found itself in these security issues and being attracted by problems of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.

Davutoğlu argues that a strategic thinking is required to benefit from Turkey's historical and geographical depth. He suggests that Turkey has responsibilities toward its neighboring regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Middle East on the basis of its historical and organic ties with those regions. He remarks that political/historical heritage and its location between Afro-Eurasia landmass offer great risks and opportunities to Turkey. Turkey should develop a comprehensive and coherent articulation of its historical/cultural heritage and geopolitical location to be a central state.[308] He recommends that relations with other regions and states should be developed and foreign policy should be formed by evaluating geopolitical, geoeconomical and geocultural dimensions. In this way,

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[306] Ibid., 45-48.

[307] Ibid., 16-17.

[308] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı (Turkey should be the central state)," *Radikal 2*, February 26, 2004, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=107581> (16 January 2010). See also Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey* 10:1 (2008): 77-96.

Turkey would be prepared when the new emerging international order is fully formed.

Geopolitics studies in Turkey have been dominated by people who were related to the military. "Scientific" geographical truths have been constituted by the military's ''experts'' to shape Turkey's foreign policy as well as domestic issues. Military-civilian imbalance in the country have created a situation of "undisputed" ''scientific'' status of geopolitics of Turkey.[309] Politician then have invoked this geographical determinism to support their preferred foreign policies. For example, the ''central state'' metaphor was first offered in a text authored by the Office of the Commander of the Military Academy in 1963. This metaphor then has been used by various authors. Ahmet Davutoğlu also uses this metaphor for justification of multi dimensional and more proactive foreign policy.[310]

Davutoğlu argues Turkey has to be active its foreign policy and to center its power. In the post-September 11 era, he argues, Turkey has to redefine its position which has both an ideational and a geographical basis. Turkey has a unique geographical location "in the midst of Afro-Eurasia's vast landmass".[311] It is a central country with multiple regional identities. Such a country has to have active foreign policy, and it can not define itself in inward and defensive manners. He suggests that Turkey is also a central country with its cultural and historical heritage. Culturally it is

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[309] Pınar Bilgin, "'Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography': The uses of 'geopolitical truths' in Turkey," *Political Geography* 26 (2007): 740-756.

[310] Ibid., 748-749.

[311] Davutoğlu, *"Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision,"* 78.

composed of various elements such Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Iraqi Turcoman and Anatolian. Its "cultural" capital, Istanbul, is between two continents and it is Middle Eastern, Black Sea and a Mediterranean city. With its geographical and historical assets, Turkey can not continue to be a periphery state, or can not pursue a one-dimensional foreign policy (Western-oriented). It has to pursue more active policy to provide stability and security for its neighboring environment.[312]

Since the AK Parti came to power, Davutoğlu remarks, five principles shape Turkey's new foreign policy.[313] First, there is a balance between security and democracy in the country. One can not be sacrificed at the expense of the other. A country which does not have balance can not form an area of influence in its environment. Second, Turkey has pursued "zero problem policy" toward its neighbors. Turkey has tried to solve its problems with its neighbors in a peaceful manner, and develop its political, economic, and cultural ties with them. The third principle is to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond. Turkey is now more active in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The fourth, Turkey follows a multi-dimensional foreign policy. In addition to its relations to Western allies, Turkey has developed its relations with other global actors. This process is not at the expense of relations with the US or the EU, but it is complementary to those. The fifth principle is rhythmic diplomacy. Turkey has hosted various international meetings and organizations since 2003 such as the NATO Summit, and the OIC Summit. Turkey now has an observer status in the

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[312] Ibid.

[313] Ibid., 79-84.

African Union. It also leads various meetings and initiatives to solve the issues of Iraq. Turkey began to follow holistic foreign policy.

Davutoğlu actually rejects the bridge metaphor. He prefers the central country metaphor to describe new role of Turkey in world politics. A bridge, Davutoğlu argues, just connects two entities, and/or transports something from one side to other side. This metaphor is perceived negative both in the West and East (Islam). Non-Westerns perceived Turkey as a Western state trying to impose Western values on them, and in relations with the West, Turkey has been perceived as a negative Eastern state. According to him, Turkey is more than this. Turkey, without being bothered by its Eastern identity can discuss issues and problems and look for solutions; on the other hand, as a country with internalized Western notions it could discuss future of Europe with a European vision.[314] However, the bridge metaphor has been used by the prominent party leaders.

Ahmet Davutoğlu considers territories of that Ottoman Empire ruled as Turkey's ''natural sphere of influence'' and its ''strategic depth''. He adopts the state-as-organism metaphor.[315] He also continues West/East (Islam) dichotomy. According to Davutoğlu, there are two kinds of identification. These are self-cognition and identity. Self-cognition is pre-given one. It exists without construction of other. It is not constructed through institutional and formal ways or relation-related identity construction. On the other hand identity is based on social interactions. Civilizational self-cognition is pregiven also. It is about world view of the individual which forms a

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[314] Davutoğlu, "*Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı,*".

[315] Bilgin, *"Only Strong States,"* 749.

meaningful frame to his/her ontological/existential problematic.[316] He suggests although changes appear within the appearance of individuals and institutions in the social life though interactions and exchanges with people of other civilizations, this identity still exists. This is why non-Western civilizations have survived in spite of Western dominations. The construction of a western-oriented secular Turkish identity separated from its historical basis has not managed to eliminate the self-cognition of Turkish people coming from the Islamic civilization. This self-cognition can not be eliminated by political will.[317]

Davutoğlu argues that Western civilization has a strong and hard self-cognition. The strong character of it means that its self-cognition is well-defined, it has strong philosophical and metaphysical roots, and it is based on comprehensive and coherent world views. It is hard because, it is the exclusive other civilizational elements which influence its self-cognition. Western civilization is a monopolistic, hegemonic and power-oriented civilization.[318] On the other hand, he suggests that Islam has strong and flexible self-cognition. It is an inclusive civilization which harmonizes new elements inside.[319] He compares characteristics of Western and Islamic civilizations on their understandings of place, time, knowledge, human-nature relations, human-God relations, and human-human relations. He argues that there are essential differences between the two civilizations.[320]

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[316] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki (Self-cognition of Civilizations)," *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2:3 (1997): 9-10.

[317] Ibid., 10.

[318] Ibid., 13-14.

[319] Davutoğlu, "*The Clash of Interests,*" 2.

[320] Davutoğlu, "*Madeniyetlerin Ben-idraki,*" 19-45

Davutoğlu also suggests that there is a civilizational crisis in current world politics. According to him, the problem between civilizations has resulted because of hegemonic characteristics of Western civilization. He argues that Western civilization has tried to dominate living spaces (*Lebensraum*) of other civilizations. He considers civilizations like living organisms. However, he also claims that civilizations do not always clash, but also they co-operate and interact. To solve this problem, he recommends that the right to survival of non-Western civilizational identities should be recognized and an atmosphere of coexistence of different cultures and civilizations should be developed. For this aim, he suggests that a civilization dialogue and a free exchange of values should be stimulated.[321] According to him, the strategic exploitation of the civilization difference creates a real challenge for the international system.[322] Davutoğlu's geopolitical imaginations of the world and Turkey have shaped the geopolitical imaginations and practices of the AK Parti government.

5.2.2. Turkey as an Anti-Thesis of Clash of Civilizations

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the Bush government's war on terror policy, debates on Islamist fundamentalism and the clash of civilizations, especially between the West and Islam, have increased. These attacks were followed by terrorist attacks in various European cities like London and Madrid, and other problems like unemployment, and immigrations from especially Muslim regions to

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[321] Ibid., 14.

[322] Ibid.

European states which have increased Islamophobia and xenophobia in the US and some member states of the EU.[323] On the other hand, events like the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and cartoon crisis has raised the anti-Western sentiments in Muslim societies. These events are seen as a civilizational crisis and necessitated mutual understanding and dialogue between "Western" and "Islamic" civilizations. Even those who reject the thesis have tried to find alternative solutions against it. Various initiatives have been arranged to prevent the clash of civilizations and increase intercultural/intercivilizational dialogue such as the UN's "Year of Dialogue among civilizations", "German initiative for a dialogue with the Islamic world", "EU's Dialogue between Cultures in the third basket of Euro-Med Partnership", and additionally IR theorists inspired by Habermass work on how the dialogue should be.[324] The dialogue has been securitized.

The metaphor of bridging civilizations has become the dominant discourse in 2000, but it was also used in the 1990s against Samuel Huntington's thesis of "Clash of Civilizations" which argues the clash is inevitable and Turkey is torn country with confused identity between the West and Islam. The early usage of the metaphor bridging "civilizations" emphasizes the commonalities with the West, but in the early 2000s, the difference with the West, the Muslim character of Turkey, has also been emphasized.[325] Before the September 11 attacks, Turkish policymakers made only statements about Turkey as a bridge between civilizations to increase its strategic

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[323] Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, "Turkey on the Brink," *The Washington Quarterly* 29:3 (Summer 2006): 66.

[324] Malmvig, 350.

[325] Yanık, 540.

interest vis-à-vis West/Europe. In the post-September 11 era, Turkey also reflects this role in its practices. During the coalition government of DSP (Democratic Left Party)-MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)-ANAP (Motherland Party), Turkey held the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the EU Joint Forum in Istanbul, on February 12–13, 2002.[326] Since the AK Parti came to power, civilizational discourse in foreign policy became more dominant. The alliance of civilization policy of the AK Parti government was developed in accordance with the "non-confrontational and consensus-seeking" policy of Ahmet Davutoğlu.[327] The government has followed active foreign policy to solve problems between Muslim world and the West. The government has desire to develop mutual understanding and coexistence among civilizations. Going against Huntington and the arguments which articulate September 11 attacks are evidence of the clash has created reactions in the AK Parti government, which began to put Islam in the bridge metaphor.[328] Civilizational attitudes have been added to foreign policy by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, President Abdullah Gül and other prominent members of the AK Parti through discourses of peaceful and non-confrontational relationships and solutions to the problems between Islam and West.[329]

After the Madrid train bombing and Zapatero's election victory, the government in Spain followed a new path to combat terrorism. Zapatero proposed the "Alliance of

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[326] Ali Balcı, "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?," *Insight Turkey*, 11:3 (2009): 102.

[327] Ibid.

[328] Ibid, 540-541.

[329] Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," *Turkish Studies*, 9:3 (September 2008): 388.

Civilizations between the Western and the Arab and Muslim world" to the UN in 2004. In 2005, Turkey was invited to the initiative by Spain. The Spanish government has more interest in the security dimension of the initiative. On the other hand, Turkey has become more supportive of the initiative. The leaders of the government have searched for support in various organizations, panels, and meetings with other governments.[330] Their policy was separation from the Kemalist legacy which supports abstention from Middle East affairs and pursuit of secular and Western identity of the republic. This alliance of civilization policy is a declaration of Turkey as a Muslim country and part of Islamic civilizations. This policy suggests that there is misperception and ignorance towards each other in both Western and Muslim societies. The government has argued that Turkey could be a bridge between the two civilizations. The government has acted as the spokesperson of Islamic world.[331]

The alliance of civilizations discourse is a counter discourse to the clash of civilizations thesis and of the idea of ancient hatred between Islam and Christianity. Criticizing the clash of civilizations thesis based on the same epistemological basis by advocating dialogue/alliance of civilizations is just a construction of essentialist civilizations without interaction.[332] It is an assumption of existing civilizations with homogeneous spatial divisions. There are misunderstandings and stereotypes of each other, and through dialogue these problems can be solved.

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[330] Ibid., 401-402.

[331] Balcı and Nebi, 400. Yanık, 534.

[332] Aydın, 460.

5.2.3. Turkey as a Bridge between the US and "Rouge States"

The Middle East has been subject to direct external interference. Western powers, especially US, have wanted to "change" the region after the September 11 attacks. The US led coalition invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and they had desire to transform the region politically and economically. They have called for reform and the development of democracy, and liberal market economy in the region. The Bush government accused Syria and Iran of supporting terrorism in the region, especially in Iraq and it has alleged Iran about developing a nuclear weapons program. The US administration increased pressures on these states and followed an isolation policy against them.[333] The US and its allies constructed a region of Greater Middle East that lacked democracy and freedom and was a source of instability, global terrorism, rouge states, and threats to global peace in their political imagination. Neoconservatives with ideas similar to Orientalists about the Islamic Orient, wanted to change the direction of the region from anti-modern, backward, and a threat to modernity, progress, and development by the military might of the US.[334]

In their geopolitical imagination of this region, they also redefine Turkey's geopolitical representation. The US and western allies in Europe have emphasized the Muslim character of Turkey rather than its Western and secular character. Turkey has now been a model to Middle East as an "Islamic republic" and example of "moderate Islam" which other Muslim states should follow in democratization

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[333] Bülent Aras, "Turkish-Iranian-Syrian Relations: Limits of Regional Politics in the Middle East," *Power and Interest News Report* (2005). <http://www.pinr.com> (10 January 2006).

[334] Said, *Orientalism,* xxi.

processes. Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled Turkey as an Islamic republic on a German television.[335] The democratization process in Turkey and its increasing credibility in Arab worlds with Turkish parliament's disallowing of American troops to use its territory in the Iraqi war has created a new image of Turkey. Neo-conservatives who began to advocate democratization in the Middle East welcomed this new image of Turkey. Turkey was invited to the Group of 8 (G8) Summit of June 2004 which advocates a 'democracy dialogue' with the Broader Middle East and North Africa.[336] At the NATO Summit in Istanbul in the same year, President Bush reemphasized the Turkish model by standing in front of a mosque and a bridge in Istanbul and giving a speech to the media. This symbolic meaning emphasized both the Muslim character of the country and a bridge between West/Europe and East/Islam.[337] The US representation of Turkey was an Orientalist one based on modernization theory that assumes non-Westerners should follow the Western model of development to catch the standards of civilizations.[338] This was a Manichean world of struggle of progressive good and reactionary/evil powers within Muslim societies.

The AK Parti government has joined the US led democracy promotion initiatives. The leaders of the party have advocated democratization in Middle East. However, the government has been more supportive of the democracy development by

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[335] Meliha Altunışık, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 27:1&2 (2005).

[336] Tank, 470-471.

[337] Tank, 473. Yanık, 532.

[338] Etga Ugur, "Intellectual Roots of Turkish Islam and Approaches to the 'Turkish Model'," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24:2 (2004): 337.

supporting civil societies rather than by the militaristic means.[339] The AK Parti government constructed a new brand of bridge between civilizations for Turkey in the post-September 11 era. Tank has noted that "manipulating its history, geography and culture, the brand state constructs an identity, a unique image that may fill a particular niche in the geopolitical space". The government has constructed an alternative brand of Turkey as a progressive, democratic, Muslim state in contrast to the Western identity of the Turkish Republic which has been defended by the Kemalist elite.[340]

Turkey's geopolitical representation has been totally determined by the US geopolitical imaginations over Turkey and its surrounding regions. The government has also wanted to follow more assertive foreign policy towards the Middle East in accordance with geographical, historical and the cultural strategic depth of the country advocated by Davutoğlu. In the first years of government, 'example' and 'bridge' themes were used more in the foreign policy. Turkey presents itself as a role model for Middle Eastern reform and modernization. These identifications are not simple naming, but reflections of an actor's desired role in world politics and its justification of their practices. Turkey's new neighborhood policy under the AK Parti government has a vision of minimizing the problems in its neighboring regions. The leaders of the government argue that Turkey has duties and responsibilities on these regions of the Middle East, the Caucasia, and the Balkans.[341] Thus, they claim that

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[339] Altunışık.

[340] Tank, 464.

[341] Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, "National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12:1 (2010): 82.

Turkey should become directly involved in conflicts and other issues in these regions. To constitute more stable and cooperative security environment, Turkey has to contact all political actors in these regions to sustain dialogue between conflicting parties.

Political Islam and Kurdish nationalism have been perceived as threats to the republic since the foundation of it. In 1997, Kurdish separatism and reactionary Islam were included in the National Security Policy Document as the new national security threats. Turkey's domestic problems with Kurdish separatism and political Islam-bureaucracy friction have been reflected in the foreign policy.[342] They have deteriorated Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran. Turkey criticized these states as supporters of the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group. Iran was perceived as the other of the Kemalist secular ideology. It was claimed that Iran was trying to export its regime to Turkey. Turkey has had desire to have political and economic relations with these states during the AK Parti government. However, the US pressure on these countries and isolation policies created obstacles to develop relations. The government has used the bridge metaphor to create maneuvering space for its desired policies in the Middle East.

Turkey has developed its political and economic relations with these states during the AK Parti government. Turkey follows extensive and intensive diplomatic initiatives to solve these countries' issues with international society. Turkey has developed economic relations with Middle Eastern countries such as free-trade agreements with

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[342] Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakyapolat, "Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61:4 (2007): 472-474.

Syria and Egypt, and economic cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The Turkish ministry of foreign affairs invited Khaled Mashal, political leader of Hamas in exile, to Turkey. This was criticized by the US and Israel. Palestine issue is seen as a historical responsibility for Turkey. Abdullah Gül, when he was foreign minister, stated that Turkey could not stay out of this issue while it still had the land registration records of Palestine.[343] The AK Parti government has identified Turkey in different categories in Turkey's relations with external world. They used the terms such "regional leader", "regional protector", "regional sub-system collaborator", "global sub-system collaborator", "example" and "bridge" to define Turkey's role in the new world system.[344] With the AK Parti's increasing confidence in foreign policy and more active and influential roles in neighboring regions, "regional leader", "regional protector", "regional sub-system collaborator", "global sub-system collaborator" have been more pronounced.[345] By giving the regional leader role to Turkey, the leaders of the AK Parti have implied more active policy with "duties" and "special responsibilities" to surrounding regions. The geocultural dimension of Turkey coming from its Ottoman past requires more active, multilateral foreign policy.

Turkey held various mediation initiatives between Syria and Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the West/US and Iran and so on. Besides its role as a regional actor, the political leaders of the AK Parti now emphasize that Turkey is a global actor. Turkey

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[343] Ibid., 480.

[344] Aras and Görener, 81.

[345] Ibid.

is also involved issues beyond surrounding regions. Turkey has been selected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, and has an observer status in the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the American States (OAS).[346]

Although Turkey was promoted as a model by the US, and both sides continued to define strategic ally during this period, the relationship deteriorated because of Iraqi invasion.[347] The Turkish parliament did not allow American troops to use Turkish territory in their operation. US forces detained eleven soldiers of the Turkish military in Sulaimaniyah in 2003. In the post-Saddam era, Turkey feared an autonomy or independence in northern Iraq. Turkey's resentment has also risen because of the PKK presence in this era. Up to the agreement made between US and Turkey on sharing intelligence against the PKK in Iraq, both sides had mistrusted each other. Anti-Americanism grew in Turkey. Turkey has supported a plan to enhance diplomacy to solve the problem between Iran and Syria and Western states on nuclear issues of Iran and Syrian interference of Lebanese domestic issues while the Bush administration wanted Turkey to bandwagon its isolationist policies toward these "rogue" states. The content of these new representations of Turkey are modified in favor of the AK Parti government. Western policymakers began to appreciate Turkey's relations with these "problematic" actors in the region and Turkey's efforts to solve the problems. Turkish diplomats carried on and still do

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[346] Ibid.

[347] Tank. 473.

intensive shuttle diplomacy among the US, Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the EU.[348]

5.2.2.4. The Accession of Turkey to the EU as an Alliance of Civilization

In the post-September 11 era, the decision to open negotiations with Turkey in the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 if Turkey met the political criteria and, then the opening of accession negotiations in December 2004 after a hot debate have invoked the debate about the European identity and Turkey's Europeanness among Europeans.[349] Turkey's candidacy has created tensions. Turkey began to be presented in binary images as an ally/other, a dynamic economy/poor country, a Muslim state/a Western state. Some argues that the EU will be neighbors with the Middle East and the Caucasia where there are wars and conflicts and the EU will have unstable borders.[350] Others argue that Turkey will be helpful to spread European values to those regions and it could be a bridge.

There are two basic approaches to European identity[351] related to Turkey. The first one is the definition in the official documents of the EU. According to these documents, Europe is about norm and values defined by the Treaty on European Union and Copenhagen criteria. This construction is challenged by the second one.

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[348] Aras and Karakyapolat, 478.

[349] Ziya Öniş, "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 9:3 (2004): 6.

[350] Matthew Omolesky, "The Turkey Question: The EU and the Concept of Border," *The Brussels Journal*, January 01, 2007, <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1842> (16 November 2009).

[351] Erhan İçener, "Understanding Romania and Turkey's Integration with the European Union: Conditionality, Security Considerations and Identity," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 10:2 (2009): 228.

The second approach is essentialist which defines Europe as common cultural heritage which goes back Greek-Hellenistic-Roman times, Christianity, Reforms and Renaissance and articulates this in terms of geography. These are competing discourses about what being European means. Similar to the Western debate on the Balkans and Bosnian war,[352] two basic discourses emerged in Turkey's accession. These competing discourses produced two central representations of Turkey and its identity within the Western debate over Turkey: responsibility/security considerations and civilizational/sociospatial differences. First is the Enlightenment discourse which argues that Turkey is different from Western/European civilizations but has capacity to transform to democracy and liberal economy and the West has both moral responsibilities to help Turkey and should keep promises to Turkey. Turkey has geostrategic importance as an alternative energy corridor, the only democratic country in Islamic world, and as a model country which has to be kept close to West. In official documents Turkey is a European country and has a right to be part of the Union. Walter Hallstein, president of the EEC Commission stated upon the occasion of signing the Ankara Agreement in 1963:

> Turkey is part of Europe. That is really the ultimate meaning of what we are doing today. It confirms in incomparably topical form a truth which is more than the summary expression of a geographical concept or of a historical fact that holds good for several centuries. Turkey is part of Europe: and here we think first and foremost of the stupendous personality of Ataturk whose work meets us at every turn in this country, and of the radical way in which he recast every aspect of life in Turkey along European lines … Turkey is part of Europe: today this means that Turkey is establishing a constitutional relationship with the European Community. Like the Community itself, that relationship is imbued with the concept of evolution.[353]

In the Cold War security conditions, Turkey's Westernness/Europeanness was not questioned like it has been in the post-Cold War. Discourses of security

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[352] Hansen, 83-186.

[353] Kubicek, 30.

considerations and geopolitics caused changes in the EU identity. Turkey was granted as a candidate for three security-related considerations.[354] Firstly, the Balkan Crisis (Kosovo Crisis) had influence. After the crisis, Western Balkan countries were given status of candidacy. Putting Turkey outside would mean losing Turkey. Secondly, this would cause the termination of leverage of the EU as a normative power over Turkey. Thirdly, deterioration of relations with Turkey would also affect the EU project of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and made possible Turkey's objection to the ESDP and EU-NATO cooperation. Turkey also began its accession negotiation in a post-September 11 era when a dialogue between cultures/civilizations was securitized. In this conjuncture, rejecting Turkey would create an image of the EU as a Christian club, and this has potential to influence wider subjects of relations between the EU and Muslims (both inside and outside of EU), which would deteriorate the EU's relations with Islamic world when it is needed for dialogue among civilizations to prevent their clash. Turkey could be a bridge between West and Islam.

The other discourse is that Turkey does not have a Judeo/Christian heritage which is fundamental for Western civilization. Accession of Turkey to the EU will end the European project and will bring chaos and unstable borders/wars to Europe. Thus, Turkey should be kept out of the EU. It might be given privileged partnership or anchored to the EU but can not be a member. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and attacks on Western European cities, rightwing parties have increased their support. The additional effects of these events to threats and

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[354] İçener, 233.

insecurities caused by globalization have created powerful objections to Turkey's membership. Islamophobia feelings became more powerful in the EU. Images of Turks in Europe are interwoven with the entire Islamic "civilization", not just a specific nation. This image has been produced and reproduced since the fourteenth century of identification of Islam with the Ottoman Empire.[355] The Ottoman Empire was the most significant other to the construction of European identity. Muslim peril through Ottoman expansion towards Europe shaped European identity by constructing Ottomans as other/enemy/difference. The empire was perceived in Europe as not part of Europe by most of the European powers.[356] Today, this image is common among especially right-wing parties vis-à-vis Turkey. They argue that Turkey lacks cultural/civilizational/Christian commonalities with European civilization. They fear that Turkey's inclusion means the end of the European project and some fear that the EU will have borders with an unstable region with the accession of Turkey. Turkey is seen as a buffer rather than a bridge. The perception of Europe as a Christian club with precise boundaries means Turkey is outsider.[357]

In the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU, the open enedeness of the process, the capacity of the absorption of the EU, and the negative public opinion against Turkey are often emphasized.[358] The Austrian government, the German Christian

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[355] Edoardo Boria, "One Stereotype, Many Representations: Turkey in Italian Geopolitics," *Geopolitics* 11:3 (2006): 487.

[356] Nuri Yurdusev, "Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman) – European Relations," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in the World Politics,* eds. Tariq Ismail and Mustafa Aydın (New York: Ashgate, 2002), 84.

[357] "Turkey entry 'would destroy EU'," *BBC,* November 8, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm> (15 December 2009).

[358] Erhan, İçener, "Privileged partnership: An alternative final destination for Turkey's integration with the European Union?," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 8:4 (2007): 421.

Democratic Union (CDU) party and their leader Angela Merkel, the European People's Party, former French President, Vale´ry Giscard d'Estaing, and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy reject Turkey's membership and offered privileged partnership instead. Most of the argument for privileged partnership related to the dilemma of widening and deepening of the EU, the cost of last enlargement of 2004, the failure of referendums on the Constitution Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the public opposition to Turkey's membership, alternative final destination if the negotiations fail, and Turkey's ineligibility for membership.[359] A decision was taken in France and Austria to hold referenda on ratification of Turkey's Accession Treaty. Change of governments in the EU and the change of context in the international system give ambiguous signals to Turkey. The ambivalent attitudes of the EU policy makers towards Turkey raised the suspicions of Turkey that the EU tries to drawn its borders in terms of civilizational considerations.[360] Turkey is at the center of this issue with its question of geography and culture. Therefore, Turkey's candidacy has invoked very identity of Europe (EU-rope) and Orientalist discourse. The issue is over how to deal with Turkey's "difference". Will Turkey be capable of the change to absorb "European" values or will it be an eternal "other"?

In opposition to Turkey's accession on difference/other, the AK Parti government challenges this opposition by emphasizing Turkey's difference with West/Europe, and legitimizes its membership on the difference. The AK Parti government emphasizes more on differences between Turkey (part of Islamic civilization) and the West. Turkey is an example of harmony of Islam and democracy, and Turkey's

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[359] Ibid., 422-4.

[360] Bilgin, *"A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics,"* 270.

membership to the EU will be a proof of co-existence of civilizations without confrontations. If the EU is based on values and norms like democracy, freedom, and diversity, Turkey has right to be a member, otherwise the EU would lose its credibility. Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized this point in his interview with New Perspectives Quarterly.

> Since democracy and Islam hardly coexist anywhere in the world, Turkey will prove to be a great model. This will change the view of the Islamic world toward the EU in a positive manner and vice versa. At this point in history, Turkey has a special role as the bridge between Europe and Asia.
> Our accession to Europe will, in fact, prove Samuel Huntington's idea of a "clash of civilizations" wrong. On the contrary, it will show that a union of civilizations is possible. [361]

In his speech in Sarajevo, Erdoğan continued his argument. Erdoğan argues that the EU should be center of alliance of civilizations. The Union can manage this with Turkey's membership.[362] The government has also continued its intermediate role in the Caucasia, the Balkans, and the Middle East and uses it as leverage against opposition to Turkey's membership. Because of these intermediate roles which Turkey wants to have between conflicting parties like Russia and Georgia, Syria and Israel, and the improvement in Turkish-Armenian relationship has been positively resonated as an EU counterpart. In the enlargement document of 2009, the EU appreciated Turkey's effort.[363]

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[361] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, **"**European Union Should Be About Values, Not Borders," interview with Nathan Gardels, *New Perspectives Quarterly* 20:2 (2003).

[362] "Başbakan müjdeyi Bosna'dan verdi" (The PM gives the good news in Bosnia), *Bugün*, April 6, 2010.<http://www.bugun.com.tr/haber-detay/98304-mujdeyi-bosna-dan-verdi-haberi.aspx> (6 April 2010).

[363] The European Commission, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, *COM*, Brussels, October 14, 2009.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/strategy_paper_2009_en.pdf> (17 October 2009).

5.3. The Kemalist Occidentalist Discourse in the Post-September 11 Era

Kemalist Occidentalist discourse has portrayed a negative image of the West/Europe in this period. This discourse assumes that there is lack in the people of backward Arab/Islamic geography and they have desire to get rid of this past/present insufficiency to future progress. During the single party period of the republic (1923-1950), to escape from the "Arabicized Ottoman past", Kemalist elites defended Turkification and Westernization. This understanding corresponds with the project of the Orientalists' image of the Orient.[364] The Westernization of society and state is both a source of progress and threat. On the one side, there is fear of being late and inferior vis-à-vis the West. On the other side, there is danger of too much Westernization.[365] Deepening relations with the EU since the Helsinki Summit and the decision to begin accessions in December 2004 have caused decline in the sectarian identity politics which created clientelism of party politics and limited democracy in Turkey.[366] Three political groups (Kemalists, "radical Islamists", and Kurdish nationalists) who have felt threatened by this process have come together against Turkey's accession in spite of their different political visions.[367] Kemalist elites like the main oppositional party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Public's Party, CHP), the military and the bureaucracy have felt threatened both by the reform process and the emphasis of the Muslim character of Turkey by the US administration. The ambiguity of the word republic relates to its two interwoven

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[364] Meltem Ahıska, "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102:2/3 (2003): 365.

[365] Ibid., 366-7.

[366] Polat, 514.

[367] Ibid.

meanings: the Republic of Turkey and the republican administration (limited controlled democracy of Kemalist ideology) made it possible for Kemalists to present any to threat the republic ideology as a threat to territorial integrity of Turkey.[368] Colin Powell described Turkey as a "moderate Islamic state" like Malaysia in his interview. Various media groups began to be interested in comparisons between Malaysia and Turkey in 2007. Although the Bush administration supported Turkey's membership to the EU, Kemalists perceived this "moderate Islamic republic" label as a threat to the secular and Western character of Turkey that they have advocated since 1923.

Two characteristics of the Occident have been emphasized in Turkish political discourse. One is the West of prosperity, universal values, and contemporary civilization (future), and the other is the imperial West with evil intention and animosity toward Turks and for the division of territorial integrity of the state.[369] The second type of Occident/West/Europe began to be constructed by Kemalists in the post-September 11 era.

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[368] Ibid., 516.

[369] Aydın, 451.

6. CONCLUSION

Modern geopolitical imaginations are based on state-centric demarcation of the globe. States are considered as centralized powers with fixed borders and homogeneous societies. People are connected these entities through citizenship, and they are separated from the external world by being defined with one of these nation-states. These states are considered as sovereign entities which represent "nations" in the international system, and have exclusive power within their territories. The domestic area is separated from foreign affairs. An imagined community is constituted by boundary constructions. These constructions are strengthened by various practices like a national anthem, national history, national education, citizenship with identity cards, passports, national maps which demonstrate the external borders of states. These geopolitical "imagi-nations" have underpinned what Agnew termed "territorial trap".[370]

This kind of geopolitical imagination was sustained in the Cold War context. The alliance of politicians-military-bureaucracy-media of the great powers constituted relatively stable state identities with fixed borders. The demonized threat of the Soviet Union has constituted a threat "out there" outside the peaceful domestic space. The enemy was territorially well-defined. Spaces of friends (free world) and enemies were clearer. The world was divided into two blocks of capitalism and communism with a third world. However, this world of territorial states with blocks has been

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[370] Agnew, *"Territorial Trap."*

under attack since the 1970s when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Changes in the global mode and means of productions with globalizations and developments in technology of transportations and communication have created new world (dis)order. Mobilizations of people, ideas, and goods have accelerated. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the West led by the US lost its rival as well as meaning. These transformations have made the old concepts like, "national identity", "West", "sovereignty", and "nation-state" problematic. They have become more unstable and hybrid concepts. Deterritoralization has accelerated. On the other side, territorial states have survived by reterritorialization based on new threats.

Some American and Western European intellectuals of statecrafts, politicians, journalists and scholars try to protect and fix the meanings of identities of former geopolitical discourses of "Western", "American", and "European" civilization which are assumed unique and superior. They are constructing counter images of the self. These constructions are reflected in the spatial practices of the state. The reterritorializaton of the sociospatial entities have been inserted in two interwoven ways in the US and the EU. The first is redefinition of the identity by ordering "inside". Developments of transportation, communication, economic activities, the global media, and the internet have challenged old concepts of territorial states. Transnational liberalism began to dominate the global economic activities without a single hegemonic power to manage it. Industrial productions have flown from these "developed" states to poorer ones with cheap labor. Except for high skilled and some semi-skilled workers, unemployment has risen in Western countries. Moreover, increasing numbers of legal and illegal immigrations from poorer countries to the

richer ones, their pursuing of traditions, habits, and diets by attaching their home countries thanks to globalization have increased the feelings of threat by cheap labors and foreigners.[371] These feeling of losing jobs and cultural homogeneity have invoked the old concepts of territorial states. Right-wing politicians have manipulated these feelings, and demonstrate these "foreigners" as sources of problems. Border regimes have been hardened to protect homogeneity of the society and economic welfare. Border controls have tightened for people of the "third" world as well as goods. Various measurements have been applied to limit imports from these countries through quotes, tariffs, standards and so on. Some, like Huntington, denounce multiculturalism and try to define who Westerners, Americans, and Europeans are by keepings chaotic foreigners, enemies, and goods out of the safe domestic space.

Second, this reterritorialization has been constituted by creating counter images of the modern, developed, superior Western, American, and European self as chaotic, threatening, backward eastern other like "Middle East", "Greater Middle East", or "Broader Middle East and North Africa". The Middle East region has been constructed as a region of instability, "rogue" states with despotic leaders who seek WMDs, antithetical movements against universal values of the West and modernity. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the enemy has been redefined as terrorist networks and their harboring states by the Bush government. The Greater Middle East region has been constructed as a region with sources of Islamist extremism because of repressive governments. These others/enemies/threats must be

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[371] Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics,* 67-84.

contained, controlled and rearranged to prevent them from spreading to the safe haven of the self. The September 11 attacks were presented as the violation of the US sovereignty and as events separated from the violence in so-called Middle East region. Where there is a power struggle of an imperial power and its allies against fundamentalist opposition to this hegemony in this geography. The US was the victim, and the enemy had to be destroyed. The democratization and modernization of the region would destroy the fundamentalism and terrorism the region has produced. The strategic elites in the governments, business, and the Pentagon have disguised this strategic interest to control the region by preventing challenging powers as well as sovereign control over oil resources.[372] These power struggles continue on the disputed nuclear issue of Iran.

In this paper, I examined the debates over the geopolitical narratives over Turkey's geographical identity(ies) in post-September 11 era. Discourses and debates in Western political and intellectual circles to make sense of the world of post-modernity and attempts to redefine and reproduce identities which have dissolved with globalization and the demise of Soviet Union have invoked old narratives of the Orient and the Occident in a redefined way to adopt problems of the present. Orientalist discourses of Western/European construction of the self and the Middle Eastern and Turkish other have encountered Turkey's self image as a bridge between civilizations, between West/Europe and Islam, Islam and democracy. Turkish political elites have used this bridge metaphor to resist Western geopolitical imaginations and practices over Turkey's geography and the Middle East region. The

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[372] Dalby, *Calling 911*, 76.

US administration has taken the mission to promote democratization to the Muslim world. The Bush administration branded Turkey as a model for Arab and Muslim dominated states by emphasizing more its Muslim identity (an example of moderate Islam) rather than "secular" and "Western" identity.

The Bush administration expected the bandwagon of Turkey in the US policies in the region. However, the geopolitical imagination of the Middle East by the AK Parti government is different. They argue that Turkey has historical, cultural and geographical ties with the region. Thus, it can not avoid the problems of the region or problems between Turkey and its neighboring countries. The government defends that Turkey has to have zero-problems with its Middle Eastern neighbors to be a central state. Thus, the bridge metaphor has been used to avoid Western critics and gain a maneuvering space in its policies towards Iran, Syria, and Hamas. Turkey has also used this metaphor as leverage against its accession to the EU. Against the resistance to Turkey's membership on the difference of Turkey, the government challenges this argument on the same point. They argue that Turkey is different, but the EU is a political organization based on secular values. If the EU does not accept Turkey, it will demonstrate itself as Christian club. The AK Parti government has continued the dichotomy between East (Islam) and West, but they argue that this not unbridgeable. The harmony among Christians and Muslims is possible. On the other hand, Kemalist elites have created a threatening Occident which tries to erase the secular character of Turkey and change it in accordance with the moderate Islam project of the US.

The question of the West and the East is still debated in the geopolitical imaginations of Turkey. The foreign policy of AK Parti and its attachments to the issues of Middle East has invoked the debate of Western-orientation of the Turkish foreign policy. Because of Erdoğan's rejection to define Hamas as a terrorist organization, critics of Israeli policies and Turkish vote against a UN Security Council resolution aiming at some sanction over Iran, some (chiefly in the mainstream media in the US and Turkey) argue that the axis of the Turkish foreign policy has shifted form the West to the East. However, the government rejects this argument.

There are several specific points about the geopolitical imaginations of the post-September 11 era. First, although intellectuals of statecrafts, politicians and journalists have constructed a divided space in civilizational terms (or in any kind of us/them) of stable identities and fixed boundaries and argue about clashes/alliances, the debates of these constructions and the mutual constructions of identities demonstrate the interactions of people and identities over, under, and inside the boundaries/walls which have been created.[373] Second, the old concepts such as the West, the East, the European civilization, and Islam have been used to describe the new world dis(order), but these concepts do not have a fixed meaning. They are situated and contextual so are geopolitical imaginations of Turkey. They change according to new imaginative world order constituted on the basis of specific form of power/knowledge relationship. Third, these imaginative world dramas are not as powerful as the discourse of the Cold War. They are more unstable and indeterminate. Fourth, during the Cold War, the concepts and discourses produced in

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[373] Aydın, 460.

the core states and great powers have more powerful to dominate the world through

adaptation by both allies and enemies. Although the military-industry complex in the

US tried to shape the world in a particular view during the Bush administration, this

policy has failed. Agnew goes over the change in the very spatial ontology of world

politics in a more accurate and persuasive way:

> In its place we are seeing a world with an increasingly complex spatiality of power, as localities, global city-regions, regions, and trading blocs connect or network with one another to challenge the primary state-based territorial divisions. So, if the twentieth century was the American century, the twenty first is not likely to be. American hegemony has set in motion a world that can no longer be dominated by any single state or its cultural fruits.[374]

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[374] John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), viii.

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